[107 Senate Committee Prints]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:83871.wais]
S. Prt. 107-84
EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
=======================================================================
VOLUME 3
__________
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
1953
MADE PUBLIC JANUARY 2003
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
107th Congress, Second Session
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel
Richard A. Hertling, Minority Staff Director
Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk
------
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois TED STEVENS, Alaska
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
Elise J. Bean, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Kim Corthell, Minority Staff Director
Mary D. Robertson, Chief Clerk
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
83rd Congress, First Session
JOSEPH R. McCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan ALTON A. LENNON, North Carolina
Francis D. Flanagan, Chief Counsel
Walter L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk
------
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
JOSEPH R. McCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas \1\
EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington \1\
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri \1\
Roy M. Cohn, Chief Counsel
Francis P. Carr, Executive Director
Ruth Young Watt, Chief Clerk
assistant counsels
Robert F. Kennedy Donald A. Surine
Thomas W. La Venia Jerome S. Adlerman
Donald F. O'Donnell C. George Anastos
Daniel G. Buckley
investigators
Robert J. McElroy
Herbert S. Hawkins James N. Juliana
G. David Schine, Chief Consultant
Karl H. W. Baarslag, Director of Research
Carmine S. Bellino, Consulting Accountant
La Vern J. Duffy, Staff Assistant
----------
\1\ The Democratic members were absent from the subcommittee from
July 10, 1953 to January 25, 1954.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Volume 3
Security--United Nations, September 14........................... 1807
Testimony of Julius Reiss; and Florence Englander.
Security--United Nations, September 15........................... 1833
Testimony of Paul Crouch; Dimitri Varley; Abraham Unger; and
Alice Ehrenfeld.
Security--United Nations, September 16........................... 1877
Testimony of Frank Cerny; and Helen Matousek.
Security--United Nations, September 17........................... 1889
Testimony of Abraham Unger; Vachel Lofek; and David M.
Freedman.
Communist Infiltration in the Army, September 21................. 1899
Testimony of Igor Bogolepov; Vladimir Petrov; Gen. Richard C.
Partridge; and Samuel McKee.
Communist Infiltration in the Army, September 23................. 1913
Testimony of Louis Budenz; Harriett Moore Gelfan; and Corliss
Lamont.
Korean War Atrocities, October 6................................. 1923
Testimony of Edward J. Lyons, Jr.; Lt. Col. Lee H. Kostora;
Maj. James Kelleher; Lt. Col. J. W. Whitehorne, III; Gen.
Fenn; and John Adams.
Korean War Atrocities, October 31................................ 1943
Korean War Atrocities, November 30............................... 1965
Testimony of 1st Lt. Henry J. McNichols, Jr.; Sgt. Barry F.
Rhoden; Capt. Linton J. Buttrey; Sgt. Carey H. Weinel; Col.
James M. Hanley; Pfc. John E. Martin; Capt. Alexander G.
Makarounis.
Korean War Atrocities, December 1................................ 2043
Testimony of Lt. Col. John W. Gorn; Lt. Col. James T. Rogers;
Cpl. Lloyd D. Kreider; Sgt. Robert L. Sharps; William L.
Milano; Sgt. Wendell Treffery; Sgt. George J. Matta; Cpl.
Willie L. Daniels; Sgt. John L. Watters, Jr.; Sgt. Orville
R. Mullins; and Donald R. Brown.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 8........... 2119
Statements of Paul Siegel; Jerome Corwin; Allen J.
Lovenstein; Edward J. Fister; William P. Goldberg; and
Jerome Rothstein.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 9........... 2201
Statements of Alan Sterling Gross; Dr. Fred B. Daniels;
Bernard Lipel; James Evers; Sol Bremmer; Murray Miller;
Sherwood Leeds; Paul M. Leeds.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 12.......... 2275
Statements of Louis Volp; William Patrick Lonnie; Henry F.
Burkhard; Marcel Ullmann; and Herbert F. Hecker.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 12.......... 2303
Testimony of Marcel Ullmann; Morris Keiser; Seymour
Rabinowitz; Rudolph C. Riehs; and Carl Greenblum.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 13.......... 2329
Testimony of Joseph Levitsky; William Ludwig Ullman; Bernard
Martin; Louis Kaplan; Harry Donohue; Jack Frolow; Bernard
Lewis; and Craig Crenshaw.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 14.......... 2389
Testimony of Harold Ducore; Aaron H. Coleman; Samuel
Pomerentz; and Haym G. Yamins.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 14.......... 2457
Testimony of Harold Ducore; Jack Okun; and Maj. Gen. Kirke B.
Lawton.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 15.......... 2487
Testimony of Vivian Glassman Pataki; Eleanor Glassman Hutner;
Samuel I. Greenman; Ira J. Katchen; Max Elitcher; Eugene E.
Hutner; Col. John V. Mills; Maj. James J. Gallagher; Marcel
Ullmann; Benjamin Zuckerman; and Benjamin Bookbinder.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 16.......... 2563
Testimony of Maj. Gen. Kirke Lawton; Maj. Gen George I. Back;
Maj. Jenista; Col. Ferry; John Pernice; Karl Gerhard; Carl
Greenblum; Markus Epstein; and Leo M. Miller.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 17.......... 2625
Testimony of Alfred C. Walker; Joseph Levitsky; and Louis
Antell.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 22.......... 2649
Testimony of Fred Joseph Kitty; Jack Okun; Aaron Coleman; and
Barry S. Bernstein.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, October 22.......... 2697
Testimony of Benjamin Wolman, Harvey Sachs, Leonard E. Mins,
and Sylvia Berke.
SECURITY--UNITED NATIONS
[Editor's note.--With the Senate Internal Security
Subcommittee already conducting an investigation of American
Communist infiltration of the United Nations, the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations confined its inquiry to ``an
employee of the United Nations not attached to that part of the
United Nations scrutinized by the Internal Security
Subcommittee.'' Julius Reiss (1907-1979) was an American
employed by the Polish Delegation to the United Nations. He had
also been an instructor for the U.S. Army during the Second
World War. In both this executive session and in a public
session on September 17, 1953, Reiss declined to answer
questions relating to Communist party membership and
activities. Florence Englander (1907-1981), who also testified
on September 14, did not testify in public.]
----------
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
New York, NY.
The subcommittee met at 10:40 a.m., in room 128 of the
United States Court House, Foley Square, Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy, presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Roy M.
Cohn, chief counsel; G. David Schine, chief consultant; Baline
Sloan, member, Legal Department, U.N.
The Chairman. Mr. Remes, will you stand and be sworn.
Mr. Reiss. My name is Reiss.
The Chairman. In this matter now in hearing before the
committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, nothing but
the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Reiss. I do.
TESTIMONY OF JULIUS REISS (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, ROYAL W.
FRANCE)
Mr. Cohn. Can we get the name of counsel for the record.
Mr. France. Royal W. France, 104 East 40th Street.
Mr. Reiss. Excuse me, sir. I didn't quite get the name you
used when you asked me.
The Chairman. You give us your name, will you?
Mr. Reiss. Julius Reiss.
Mr. Cohn. What is your address, sir?
Mr. Reiss. 741 Westminister Road, Brooklyn, New York.
Mr. Cohn. Where are you employed?
Mr. Reiss. At the Polish Delegation to the United Nations.
Mr. Cohn. What is that address?
Mr. Reiss. 151 East 62 Street.
The Chairman. I wonder if you would try and speak louder,
please.
Mr. Reiss. 161 East 62 Street. New York City.
Mr. Cohn. And what is the telephone up there?
Well, that is all right. Let me ask you this, sir. For how
long a period of time have you been employed at the Polish
Delegation to the United Nations?
Mr. Reiss. Approximately three years.
Mr. Cohn. Approximately three years?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. In other words, you went there in 1950, is that
right?
Mr. Reiss. At the end of 1950 sometime.
Mr. Cohn. End of ?
Mr. Reiss. Sometime.
Mr. Cohn. Will you just tell us generally what you do
there?
Mr. Reiss. I am a documentation clerk.
Mr. Cohn. What does that mean?
Mr. Reiss. I handle United Nations documents, file them. I
make abstracts, digests of them. I handle press end periodicals
and books and do research in the press, periodicals and books.
Mr. Cohn. Did you generally work along those lines?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Is your salary paid by the Polish Delegation?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. What is your salary?
Mr. Reiss. It is about $3900 a year. I think about $325 a
month.
Mr. Cohn. Is that net of taxes or----
Mr. Reiss. That is before taxes.
Mr. Cohn. What do you do, pay your own income tax?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Is that reimbursed to you in any way by----
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. In other words, you are paid a straight salary?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. You are. Are you paid in United States currency?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. What did you do immediately prior to going with
the Polish Delegation?
Mr. Reiss. Directly prior to that?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. I was out of work.
Mr. Cohn. For how long a period of time? Just
approximately?
Mr. Reiss. May I ask my counsel a question?
Mr. Cohn. Sure, you can ask your counsel anything you want.
Mr. Reiss. I think it may have been about two months or so.
Two or more, I am not sure.
Mr. Cohn. Directly prior to that, what did you do?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds of the Fifth
Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. On the grounds the answer may tend to incriminate
you, on the Fifth Amendment?
Mr. Reiss. On the grounds the answer may tend to
incriminate me, on the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. For how long a period of time will you claim a
privilege as to your employment? In other words, we are back to
two months prior to the time you went with the Polish
Delegation.
You can consult with counsel if you want. I don't want to
go back month after month.
Mr. Reiss. I think back to about 1935.
Mr. Cohn. Back to 1935?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever worked for the United States
government?
Mr. Reiss. I was in the army.
Mr. Cohn. As a soldier?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. During what years?
Mr. Reiss. 1942 to 1945.
Mr. Cohn. Did you serve in this country and overseas?
Mr. Reiss. Just in this country.
Mr. Cohn. Just in this country. Where were you stationed?
Mr. Reiss. I was stationed in Aberdeen, Maryland.
Mr. Cohn. Aberdeen, Maryland?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Aberdeen Proving Ground?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir. It had nothing to do with it.
Mr. Cohn. What was the particular assignment in the army
that you had?
Mr. Reiss. I was--I taught pedagogy.
Mr. Cohn. You taught pedagogy in the army?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What the hell is that?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir. Would you expand on that just for a
little bit?
Mr. Reiss. Yes. You have a lot of men who went through
cadre school and who you had to teach how to repair machine
guns and ammunition clerical work and so forth. They had to
teach. Well, I taught these men the technique of teaching.
Nothing to do with the material.
Mr. Cohn. I understand.
Mr. Reiss. Just the pure technique.
Mr. Cohn. All right, now, are you today a member of the
Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you--in 1950, were you secretary of the
National Youth Commission of the Communist party of the United
States?
Mr. Reiss. May I consult with my counsel?
I refuse to answer on the grounds previously stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever been known by the name of Julius
Remes?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever been assistant editor of the
Political Affairs Monthly, theoretical publication of the
Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer, on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr Cohn. Have you been a paid functionary of the Communist
party of the United States?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you served on the enlarged National
Committee of the Communist party of the United States?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Do you contribute any of the salary that you
receive now to the Communist party?
You can consult with counsel any time you want.
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You do not?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Do you contribute any money to the Communist
party of the United States?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You do not. Did you ever?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Did you last year?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever taught at the Jefferson School?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Now, were you in 1937 and 1938 an organizer for
the Communist party in Michigan and Louisiana?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Is it a fact that when you went to--is it not a
fact that when you joined the Polish Delegation to the United
Nations, became associated with it, you were instructed by the
Communist party not to continue in open association with the
party but to go in the underground?
Do you want to read that back, if the witness has
difficulty understanding the question?
[Question read.]
Mr. Cohn. Again, I say--I see you hesitate--you can consult
with counsel any time you want.
Mr. Schine. Proceed.
Mr. Reiss. I am just thinking.
Mr. Cohn. What?
Mr. Reiss. Thinking.
Mr. Cohn. Are you prepared to answer?
Mr. Reiss. I am just thinking for a minute.
Mr. Cohn. You want to think for a minute?
Mr. Reiss. Just for a minute.
Mr. Cohn. Oh, sure. Take all the time you want.
Mr. Reiss. Could I smoke?
Mr. Cohn. Oh, certainly.
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. That is not true. Do you know a man by the name
of Andy Remes?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. He is your brother, is he not?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Can you tell us whether or not he is in the
Communist party underground?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Can you state where he is today?
The Chairman. May I interrupt, Mr. Counsel? I do not
believe he can refuse to answer as to personal relationship,
whether he is his brother or not.
Mr. Cohn. All right.
Mr. Reiss. I can't refuse?
The Chairman. Uh-huh.
Mr. Cohn. Do you have any brothers?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the same grounds.
The Chairman. Mr. Counsel, I think that the chair will
order the witness to answer. There can be nothing incriminating
about the fact he has or has not brothers.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever worked for----
The Chairman. He was ordered to answer the question.
Mr. Cohn. I am sorry. You were directed to answer the
question as to whether or not you have any brothers.
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. You do have brothers. How many?
Mr. Reiss. Living?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. Two.
Mr. Cohn. And what are their first names?
Yes, sir?
Mr. Reiss. I was asked the question before and I refused to
answer.
The Chairman. I understand the witness refuses to answer as
to the names of his brothers.
Mr. Reiss. Sir----
The Chairman. I think in view of the fact----
Mr. Reiss. No, sir, I am just thinking.
Mr. Cohn. He is just hesitating.
The Chairman. Oh.
Mr. Cohn. Senator McCarthy, this is Mr. Sloan.
The Chairman. I am glad to know you, Mr. Sloan.
Mr. Sloan. How do you do, sir. I am just here as an
observer.
The Chairman. I understand. You are not responsible for
anything we do here.
Mr. Reiss. Well, I have one brother whom I haven't seen for
many years.
Mr. Cohn. What is his first name?
Mr. Reiss. Many years. Solomon Reiss.
Mr. Cohn. What about the other brother? What is his name?
And Solomon, what is his last name?
Mr. Reiss. Reiss.
Mr. Cohn. Reiss, yes. And what is your other brother's
first name, Mr. Reiss? Sir?
Mr. Reiss. I have a--yes.
Mr. Cohn. What is his first name?
Mr. Reiss. Andrew Remes.
Mr. Cohn. Andrew Remes?
Mr. Reiss. His legal name.
Mr. Cohn. His legal name?
Mr. Reiss. His legal name as far as I know.
Mr. Cohn. Where is your brother?
Mr. Reiss. May I just--Mr.----
Mr. Cohn. Sure.
Mr. Reiss. On purely--well, I hesitated speaking--may I say
this and then can I stop, and then I will repeat the same thing
word for word to----
Mr. Cohn. You want to say something off the record?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Go ahead.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Chairman. Have the record show the witness, on his own
request, was allowed to give the committee some information off
the record. He desires not to have it on the record. It will
not be on the record in this case; but this will be the only
case in which we will go off the record.
Mr. Reiss. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cohn. Where is your brother, Andrew Remes, now?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. When did you see him last?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Is it not a fact he is a member of the Communist
underground and out of circulation at the moment?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds stated.
Mr. Cohn. Now, you draw any pay from the Communist party at
this time?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Do you have any identification entitling you to
admission to the United Nations zone and grounds and building?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir. I have an identification card.
Mr. Cohn. Could we examine that, please?
Mr. Reiss. I do not have it with me.
Mr. Cohn. You haven't got it with you?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Do your duties ever take you over to the United
Nations building?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, of course.
Mr. Cohn. About how frequently?
Mr. Reiss. There is no regularity involved. I may go down
three times in one week. I think in the last three months I
have been down there--I really don't know--maybe once or twice.
Mr. Cohn. It hasn't been in session a good deal of the
time.
Mr. Reiss. But I don't go down there just during sessions.
Mr. Cohn. When you go down there, do you confer with
various people?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You do. Now, do you know any member--do you know
any persons employed by the secretariat of the United Nations?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know any American citizens employed by the
secretariat?
Mr. Reiss. I know some people there.
Mr. Cohn. Could you name the ones you know?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know any Americans employed by the United
Nations secretariat who are members of the Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. May I just ask a couple of questions?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you believe that the Communist party is
dedicated to the overthrow of this government by force and
violence?
Mr. Reiss. I do not.
The Chairman. You do?
Mr. Reiss. I do not.
The Chairman. You do not. Let me ask you the question again
in a slightly different form. Do you believe it is dedicated--
strike that.
Do you believe the Communist party is dedicated to the
overthrow of this government by force and violence if a
Communist government cannot be imposed on this nation by
peaceful means?
Mr. Reiss. Will you repeat that, please?
Mr. Cohn. Would you read it?
[Question read.]
Mr. Reiss. Seems to me that the answer to that was embraced
in the question that I just answered.
The Chairman. I am going to ask you to answer this
question. It is in slightly different form.
Mr. Reiss. Uh-huh!
Mr. France. Do you understand the question?
Mr. Reiss. It is a question of some difficulty for me to
grasp. I am not quite sure.
Mr. France. I wonder if the----
Mr. Cohn. I don't agree with that. You have taught at the
Workers School, haven't you?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. You have taught courses in Marxism and Leninism.
You can answer the question.
The Chairman. It is a very simple question. You can take
all the time you want, but it is a question I am going to order
you to answer.
Mr. France. Would you like the question repeated?
Mr. Reiss. No.
The Chairman. If you want the question read again, you may
have it read to you.
Mr. Reiss. Would you read the question to me?
[Question read.]
Mr. Cohn. Is that so difficult?
The Chairman. I will be back in a minute. Let the witness
think it over, and I will be back.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sir.
[Whereupon, the chairman withdrew from the hearing room.]
Mr. Cohn. Do you want to answer?
Mr. Reiss. I will, yes.
Mr. Cohn. You are still meditating?
Mr. Reiss. Yes. Not as easy as it sounds. Do you mean----
[Whereupon, the chairman returned to the hearing room.]
Mr. Cohn. He is still thinking. Still thinking of the
answer to that question. Huh.
Mr. Reiss. You see, I am trying to envision the possible
circumstances involved in this question.
Mr. Cohn. Let me ask you this preliminary question.
The Chairman. I think he should answer now.
Mr. Cohn. I want to know how much they paid you at the
Workers School to teach Marxism and Leninism.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated. I have been trying to envision the possible
circumstances under which that question would arise and----
The Chairman. We will give you until 2:30 this afternoon
and you think it over and----
Mr. Reiss. I can answer.
Mr. Cohn. We have other witnesses and can't sit here all
day for you to think it out.
Mr. Reiss. I think my attorney won't be here, and I would
like to answer the question now.
Mr. Cohn. We will have to have you back this afternoon
anyway.
The Chairman. Okay. If he wants to answer now----
Mr. Reiss. If I have to be back this afternoon, I will wait
until this afternoon.
Mr. Cohn. Let me ask you this question. Who obtained your
job for you at the Polish Delegation to the United Nations?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Was that obtained for you through the
intercession of the American Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Was it obtained by you--for you through the
intercession of any functionary of the American Communist
party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer.
The Chairman. Was there anything illegal in connection with
your obtaining that job, as far as you know?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
The Chairman. Was--to your knowledge, did you do anything
in connection with your obtaining that job that was either
directly or indirectly in violation of the laws of the United
States?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
The Chairman. You are then ordered to answer the question
propounded by counsel. If there was nothing illegal in
connection with your getting the job, if you are guilty of no
illegal activities in connection with your getting the job, you
are not entitled to the privilege under the Fifth Amendment, so
you answer the question.
You can discuss the matter with counsel at any time you
care to, Mr.----
Mr. Cohn. Sir?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer.
Mr. Cohn. Now.
The Chairman. Have the record show--I believe it is clear,
and if I am incorrect in this, counsel, you correct me. I
believe the record now shows the witness has stated that he is
aware of nothing illegal in connection with his obtaining the
job, that he feels he does not know of any law of the United
States which he violated either directly or indirectly in
obtaining the job. Have the record show that after that
appeared I turned and ordered the witness to answer; that the
witness consulted with counsel and has again refused to answer
the question.
We will let you go until 2:30 this afternoon. We had hoped
to finish up with your testimony this morning, but it has taken
so much time to get answers to very, very simple questions from
you that we will have to let you go now and take some of the
other witnesses whom we promised to handle this morning.
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. 2:30 this afternoon, and in case we are late
in that, we have other matters which we have to take care of,
you will be instructed to wait until we get to you.
Mr. Cohn. I would like to have you answer one last
question. I don't know whether I asked it before or not. Did
you work for Abraham Unger in 1950?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Did you--were you engaged in any activities
connected with the defense of the indicted Communist leaders?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer.
Mr. Cohn. Were you paid money for those activities by the
Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer.
Mr. Cohn. Okay.
Mr. France. It appears that all these refusals are based on
the same reason as before.
Mr. Cohn. The answers--the ground the answers might tend to
incriminate him.
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
The Chairman. Yes. I think, just off the record----
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. Reiss. I should like to state that all my refusals have
been on the basis of my privilege under the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution.
[Witness excused.]
TESTIMONY OF FLORENCE ENGLANDER
The Chairman. Will you raise your right hand.
This matter now in hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?
Miss Englander. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Could we have your full name?
Miss Englander. Florence Englander.
Mr. Cohn. Where are you employed?
Miss Englander. At the United Nations.
Mr. Cohn. In what capacity?
Miss Englander. My title is social affairs officer.
Mr. Cohn. Social affairs officer. And for how long a period
of time have you been employed at the United Nations?
Miss Englander. Exactly seven years.
Mr. Cohn. Seven years?
Miss Englander. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. What is your salary?
Miss Englander. I think it is $6200. I am not exactly sure.
Mr. Cohn. Is that net of taxes?
Miss Englander. That is my gross salary.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever been a member of the Communist
party?
Miss Englander. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. During what years?
Miss Englander. I think 1935 to 1940.
Mr. Cohn. 1935 to 1940?
Miss Englander. Yes. The----
Mr. Cohn. Did you have any associations with the Communist
party after 1940?
Miss Englander. None at all.
Mr. Cohn. None whatsoever?
Miss Englander. None whatsoever.
Mr. Cohn. Have you had any association with any Communists
since 1940?
Miss Englander. On one occasion.
Mr. Cohn. What was the name of that Communist?
Miss Englander. Louise Schatz.
Mr COHN. Will you spell that?
Miss Englander. S-c-h-a-t-z.
Mr. Cohn. When was that?
Miss Englander. In 1940. Well, she mentioned to me in
1947----
Mr. Cohn. What was the nature of your association with her?
Miss Englander. Well, I didn't know at the time, you see,
we shared an apartment together, and one day she just felt
inclined to tell me this.
Mr. Cohn. With that one exception, have there been any
other Communists with whom you have been associated?
The Chairman. May I interrupt off the record?
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. Cohn. Will you be back at 3:30?
Miss Englander. Here?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
[Witness excused.]
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m. a recess was taken until 2:30
p.m.]
afternoon session
[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m. this day, the hearing was resumed
pursuant to the taking of the recess.]
TESTIMONY OF JULIUS REISS (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, ROYAL W.
FRANCE) (RESUMED)
Mr. Reiss. Mr. Senator, I would like to make a statement.
The Chairman. Will you please try to speak louder?
Mr. Reiss. I would like to make a statement on one of the
questions I answered this morning.
The Chairman. You may.
Mr. Reiss. I would like that answer, that I did not know
anything illegal about my appointment--I wish to make it clear
that I know of nothing illegal about an American citizen
obtaining a position with any delegation to the United Nations
and in so stating, I did not state that discussions of any
associations which may have led to my being recommended to the
Polish Delegation might not tend to incriminate me, and that
was the basis for my refusing to answer, as to who recommended
me.
The Chairman. I don't understand. I frankly don't
understand what you said at all.
Mr. Reiss. I can just repeat it.
The Chairman. Read it a little louder.
Mr. Cohn. Let's see if I can explain it off the record.
The Chairman. Let's take it on the record. Everything
should be on the record.
Mr. Cohn. All right.
Is this what you are trying to say, that you did state
there was nothing illegal about your obtaining employment, the
manner in which you obtained it, or about your continuing the
employment, you said in your knowledge, you had no knowledge
about anything illegal; but you went on and claimed a Fifth
Amendment privilege on whether or not your job was obtained for
you by a top functionary of the American Communist party. You
are now saying your claiming of the privilege as to which
individual got the job for you and what discussion preceded
getting the job was not meant in any way to indicate there was
anything illegal about your obtaining the job. You decline to
answer who got the job for you because of the possibility of
Communist associations tending to incriminate you; is that
substantially accurate?
You may confer with counsel.
Mr. France. May I make a statement?
The position that the witness takes is, as I understand it,
that in stating that he knew nothing illegal about his being
appointed as an employee of the Polish Delegation, he did not
state that there might not have been recommendations made which
would involve associations which might tend to incriminate him
and, therefore, when the question came about the
recommendations, he felt that that was a different question.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this question: Do you know of
anything illegal on your part in connection with your getting
this job--any illegal activities on your part, not on the part
of someone else?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the ground of the Fifth
Amendment.
The Chairman. Do you feel that if you told the truth, that
answer might tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Reiss. I think that in the light of the----
The Chairman. Will you try to speak louder? I can't----
Mr. Reiss. Yes, in the light of the situation and the
connotations thereof, I would have to refuse to answer on the
ground that it might tend to incriminate me.
The Chairman. The question is, are you refusing because you
think a truthful answer might tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Reiss. No. I would like to repeat the answer that in
the light of the present general political situation I feel
that any answer that I might give might tend to incriminate or
degrade me.
The Chairman. You will not be allowed the privilege under
those circumstances. If you say any answer, that means you
commit perjury. You know that. The question is: Do you think
that a truthful answer to the question would tend to
incriminate you?
Mr. Reiss. I say that in the answer--that I included in the
answer the idea of the truth of the answer.
The Chairman. I can't hear.
Mr. Reiss. I say that I included the idea of the truthful
answer.
The Chairman. I am asking the question: Do you feel that a
truthful answer would tend to incriminate you? The answer is
yes or no.
Mr. Reiss. I think that as I said before, that the answer
might tend to incriminate me under present circumstances.
The Chairman. A truthful answer.
Mr. Reiss. That a truthful answer might tend to incriminate
me under the present circumstances.
The Chairman. Then you are entitled to the privilege.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Reiss, may I ask you this?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You are employed by the----
The Chairman. Can I ask one question?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
The Chairman. What was your baptismal name?
Mr. Reiss. Julius Reiss.
The Chairman. Julius Reiss?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I believe you refused to answer this
question, I am not sure. Did you later change your name to Joel
Remes?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer.
The Chairman. Has Julius Reiss always been your legal name?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Pardon me.
Mr. Cohn. Joel Remes was and is your Communist party name,
is it not?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Now, sir, you work for the Polish Delegation.
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. The Polish government is of course under
Communist domination today; is that correct? That is a
historical fact, is it not?
Mr. Reiss. I would like to ask a question: what you mean by
Communist?
Mr. Cohn. What do you think?
Mr. Reiss. As far as I know, there is a legally elected
government.
Mr. Cohn. I see.
Mr. Reiss. In which members of the Communist party
represent, and I think also other parties. I can't remember the
names exactly, but there are other parties.
Mr. Cohn. I see.
The Chairman. I just recall one of the reasons we gave this
morning for the recess was to let him consider his answer to
the question which had been propounded this morning. Have you
arrived at an answer to that yet?
Mr. Reiss. Could you repeat that?
Mr. France. Wants to know whether you are ready to answer.
The Chairman. The question was--I will re-ask the question.
Do you believe that the Communist party advocates the overthrow
of this government by force and violence if a Communist form of
government cannot be imposed upon this nation by peaceful
means?
Mr. Reiss. I said I do not feel that that question can be
answered yes or no. To discuss it would lead me into a long
discussion of Communist theory, which might involve questions
as to the basis of my knowledge or beliefs, and that might tend
to incriminate me. I also feel that that question that you ask
is outside the scope of the congressional committee, and in my
refusal to answer that question and other refusals, I invoke
the protection of the First and Fifth Amendments.
The Chairman. In other words, you refuse to answer on the
grounds that a truthful answer might tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You are entitled to the privilege.
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Now, let me ask you this, Mr. Reiss: In your opinion, who
was responsible--who was the aggressor in the Korean War?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. I see. If you were called upon--If you had been
called upon during the Korean War to fight in opposition to the
Communist forces, would you have done so?
You can consult with counsel.
Mr. Reiss. I am an American citizen. I did serve before and
I think if called upon, I will naturally serve.
Mr. Cohn. Including bearing arms against the Communists?
Mr. Reiss. That would have been my--necessary under the
Constitution of the United States.
The Chairman. If you could try to speak up.
Mr. Reiss. I am sorry, sir.
The Chairman. I can't hear you.
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir. As I did previously in the other war,
I would have done it here.
The Chairman. In other words--if I may, counsel--do I
understand then that if today or tomorrow we get into a war
with Communist Russia and you were called upon to bear arms
against Communist Russia and fight for the United States, your
testimony is that you would do that?
Mr. Reiss. I am sorry, sir. Could you repeat that question
once more?
Mr. Cohn. Would you read the question?
[Question read.]
The Chairman. Note for the record that the witness consults
with counsel.
Mr. Reiss. Senator, it seems to me that involves a great
many hypothetical questions.
The Chairman. Uh-huh!
Mr. Reiss. But I think it is clear that since I am an
American citizen subject to the laws of the United States, if I
were called into the army of the United States and to serve in
it, I would have to do so.
The Chairman. Would you be willing to do so if we were
fighting Communist Russia?
Mr. Reiss. On the question, I am not sure I know what you
mean by the word ``willing.''
The Chairman. Would you refuse to do so?
Mr. Reiss. I have already stated if I were called upon to
enter the United States Army, I would do so.
The Chairman. Even if we were fighting Communist Russia?
Mr. Reiss. I believe that that, again I believe that
involves so many hypothetical questions as to a possible war
between the United States and Russia, a war which I certainly
do not hope will take place and which I personally feel
peaceful desires both of the United--American people and the
Russian people will prevent from coming into existence because
It would be certainly a disaster for the entire world. But I
think it is clear that if in the event of such a war as in the
case of a war against Germany, when I was drafted into the
army, I entered into the army and performed my duties. If I
were drafted into the army, I would perform my duties there.
Mr. Cohn. Do you believe in our form of government or do
you believe in communism?
Mr. Reiss. Seems to me that--is that one or two questions?
Mr. Cohn. Let's break it down. Do you believe in communism?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the basis of the Fifth
Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. Do you believe in our form of government? Do you
believe in a capitalistic democracy?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the basis of the First and
Fifth Amendments.
Mr. Cohn. I see. Have you--when were you last in
consultation with any functionaries of the Communist party of
the United States?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated--on the ground of the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. Were you in consultation within the last six
weeks with any functionaries of the Communist party of the
United States concerning the forthcoming meetings of the United
Nations General Assembly?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Very specifically, within the last two weeks were
you in consultation with any functionaries of the Communist
party of the United States concerning the General Assembly of
the United Nations which was to commence this month?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Specifically, were you in consultation with any
functionaries of the American Communist party concerning the
formulation of policy concerning an issue which was to arise in
the General Assembly of the United Nations?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. I will ask the same question specifying were you
in consultation with functionaries of the American Communist
party concerning formulation of policy on the handling of the
Korean peace issue at the meeting of the General Assembly?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Now, have you ever been in Poland, by the way?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever been abroad?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You have not. Now, let me ask you this question:
Do you know----
Mr. Reiss. May I interrupt?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, sure.
Mr. Reiss. When you say abroad, do you mean Canada, for
example?
Mr. Cohn. Any place outside the Continental United States.
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir. I was. I was in about 1925 or 1926. I
went to Canada.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever had any connection with the United
States Treasury Department in any way?
Mr. Reiss. United States Treasury Department? So far as I
know, no.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know William Z. Foster, national chairman
of the Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you held any position in the United States
government in any agency other than your army service at any
time?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Whether or not you ever worked for any agency of
the United States government? I don't understand that, you
refuse to answer that.
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. What agency?
Mr. Reiss. I was on relief for WPA.
Mr. Cohn. You were on relief, drawing relief funds?
Mr. Reiss. Of WPA.
Mr. Cohn. Were you an employee?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. And what--during what years?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. When you were with the WPA, were you a member of
the Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. Do I understand the witness refuses to tell
what years he worked for the WPA?
Mr. Cohn. Apparently.
The Chairman. Are you refusing to tell us what years you
worked for the WPA?
Mr. Reiss. That was the answer.
The Chairman. You will be ordered to answer that question.
I will be glad to hear, if your counsel thinks you are entitled
to the privilege.
Mr. France. I understand the position the witness has
stated, that he feels that to answer about his employment from
the years--what was it? From 1936 on--might tend to incriminate
him.
Mr. Reiss. 1934.
Mr. France. And that any employment that he had during that
period might lead to questions about other matters or
associations which might tend to incriminate him even though
the mere fact of being on relief with WPA itself would not tend
to do. That is what I understand to be his position.
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
The Chairman. I may say that while the Fifth Amendment, Mr.
Counsel, is very broad and very liberally interpreted, it is
the position of the chair that he is not entitled to refuse to
tell us what dates he worked for the government.
If we start questioning him about any activities which
might be considered illegal, he could refuse to answer, but as
far as the dates and the agency, I believe he would not be
entitled to the Fifth Amendment privilege. It is all a matter
of record. I am going to order him to answer the question.
I may say for counsel's benefit it will lead to other
questions as to what other agencies of the government he worked
for.
Mr. Reiss. Well, sir, I can't remember the exact dates. It
was sometime--sometime in 1935 and 1936, and as far as I can
recollect, it was sometime in 1939 and 1940.
The Chairman. In other words, from 1935 or 1936 until 1939
or 1940.
Mr. Reiss. No, no. It was during 1935 and 1936 and during
1939 and 1940.
The Chairman. In other words, two periods of time?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you work for any other government agency?
Mr. Reiss. Outside of the army, let's see. No, sir. Except
the army, of course.
The Chairman. You were drafted into the army. You spent how
many years in the army?
Mr. Reiss. From May 1942 to June--to September of 1945.
The Chairman. And you were teaching the technique of
teaching at that time?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did you ever attempt to indoctrinate your
students with the philosophy of communism?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir. That was a purely technical subject,
and I taught nothing except the subject itself.
The Chairman. Did you ever solicit any of your students to
join the Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
The Chairman. We are not discussing your testimony.
Mr. Reiss. This isn't that funny.
Mr. Cohn. No. It certainly isn't.
I had asked you originally about William Z. Foster. You
claimed the privilege.
The Chairman Can I ask one more question?
Mr. Cohn. Sure.
The Chairman. At the time you were teaching the technique
of teaching in the army, did you attend Communist party
meetings?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds of the
Fifth Amendment.
The Chairman. Did you during that period of time attend any
Communist party meetings which were attended by your students
also?
Mr. Reiss. I think that since I have already invoked the
privilege on the question of whether or not I attended any
other--any Communist meetings, I would have to invoke it here,
too.
The Chairman. In other words, you feel if you told us the
truth as to whether you attended Communist party meetings which
were attended by your students while you were teaching in the
army, that truthful answer might tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Reiss. I think I would like to repeat just what I said
a moment ago, that since I have already invoked the Fifth
Amendment in regard to the question of whether or not I
attended any Communist meetings during that period, I would
have to invoke it also on this same question.
The Chairman. May I say you can only invoke it if you think
a truthful answer would tend to incriminate you. This is an
entirely different question. The other question is whether or
not you attended Communist meetings. You refused to answer
that. The question is now, did you attend Communist meetings in
that period of time which were also attended by your students?
If you did not attend such meetings, of course, the answer
could not incriminate you.
If you did attend, such meetings, then it is possible that
your answer might tend to incriminate you. So when you say you
are invoking the privilege because you refused to answer a
previous question, that is not sufficient ground. The only
ground upon which you can invoke it is if you feel a truthful
answer might tend to incriminate you. If you feel that a
truthful answer might tend to incriminate you, you can refuse
to answer.
So the pending question is: Do you feel that a truthful
answer to that question might tend to incriminate you?
May I say for counsel's benefit that the chair takes the
position that you are not entitled to the privilege if you feel
that perjury might incriminate you; that you are only entitled
to the privilege if you honestly feel that a truthful answer
might tend to incriminate you. That is why I asked the
question, so we can determine whether or not he is entitled to
the privilege.
Mr. Reiss. On that basis, I would say that I have no
knowledge of any student of mine having attended a Communist
meeting.
The Chairman. Did you ever attempt to--strike ``to.''
Did you ever discuss the Communist philosophy--strike that
again, I am sorry, Mr. Reporter.
Did you ever try to in effect sell the Communist philosophy
or sell communism or indoctrinate the young men who were your
students outside of the classroom? You already said you did not
try to indoctrinate them in the classroom. The question is, did
you try to do it outside the classroom?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds of the Fifth
Amendment.
Mr. Chairman. You are entitled to it.
Mr. Cohn. Now, you are--I asked you about Mr. Foster. Now,
did you at any time serve as aide to William Z. Foster in the
Communist party.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Did you accompany him constantly during any
period of time?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know Eugene Dennis?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know Simon Gerson?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer on the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever been arrested or convicted of a
crime?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Were you in the year 1936 in the state of
Michigan?
Mr. Reiss. 1936?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Were you there in 1937?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Were you a Communist party organizer in the year
1937?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Were you a Communist party organizer in Louisiana
during part of the year 1937?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Were you arrested on May 26, 1937 in New Orleans,
Louisiana, for Communist activities?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Were you at that time, secretary of the Communist
party in Louisiana?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer.
Mr. Cohn. At 130 Chartres Street?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Did you give your New York address as the
headquarters of the Communist party of the United States on
12th Street?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Were you convicted of a violation of Section 1436
of the Michigan Penal Code in 1937? Sir?
Mr. Reiss. Just trying to rack my brain.
Mr. Cohn. Or Act 1--rather Section 902 of Act 107, both?
Mr. Reiss. What was that? I don't know what those----
Mr. Cohn. Section 107--the charge was no visible means of
support and vagrancy and specifically--well, let's say that is
the charge.
Mr. Reiss. Where was this?
Mr Cohn. New Orleans, Louisiana.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. I will show you a document, which I will deem
marked Exhibit 1, and ask you to examine that and then tell us.
Mr. Reiss. I have read it.
Mr. Cohn. Does that refresh your recollection? I will ask
you the question again: Is your answer the same?
Mr. Reiss. The answer is the same.
Mr. Cohn. I will now show you a picture which I will deem
marked Exhibit 2 and ask you whether or not that is your
picture.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated. On the same grounds. Pretty.
The Chairman. Is 35 East 12th Street, New York City, the
headquarters of the Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr Cohn. Interpreting this question broadly, Mr. Reiss,
have you ever engaged in any espionage activities against the
United States?
Mr. Reiss. What do you mean, ``broadly''?
Mr. Cohn. I will just ask the question: Have you ever
engaged in any espionage activities against the United States
in connection with the Polish Delegation to the United Nations
or to the Polish Government?
Mr. Reiss. Never.
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me?
Mr. Reiss. Never.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever engaged in sabotage?
Mr. Reiss. What do you mean by sabotage?
Mr. Cohn. You know what sabotage is.
The Chairman. May I?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
The Chairman. Mr. Cohn, you asked whether or not he engaged
in espionage or--was it for the Polish Government? I would like
to reframe that and say: Have you ever engaged in any espionage
activities in this country?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
The Chairman. Are you aware of any espionage activities on
the part of anyone in this country?
Mr. Reiss. Shall I answer that now or wait for the senator?
Mr. Cohn. No. You can answer.
Mr. Reiss. I will say I am aware of the--from the press--
that people----
Mr. Cohn. No, no. Have you any personal knowledge?
Mr. Reiss. Personal knowledge of espionage activities?
Mr. Cohn. That is right.
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Have you any personal knowledge of activities
seeking to bring about the establishment or a Communist
government in the United States?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you in cooperation with any member or anyone
connected with the Polish Delegation engaged in any activities?
Mr. Reiss. To establish a Communist----
Mr. Cohn. That is right, toward establishing the Communist
government in the United States?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You say you have not?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Would you read that last question and answer,
please, Mr. Reporter?
[Record read.]
Mr. Cohn. Have you----
The Chairman. What did the witness have to say about it?
About what activities, espionage activities--
Mr. Cohn. He says he has no knowledge of that.
The Chairman. In other words, do I understand you are not
aware of any espionage activities on the part of anyone?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
The Chairman. Have you ever discussed, Mr. Reiss, either
past or potential espionage activities on the part of any
members of the Communist party with other members of the
Communist party, that is? If you don't understand----
Mr. Reiss. Yes, I don't quite understand that.
The Chairman. Let me rephrase it. Have you ever discussed
with any members of the Communist party or heard discussed at
any Communist party meetings any espionage activities on the
part of any individuals?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In public testimony on September 17, Julius Reiss answered:
``As I have stated, I have never been at any meeting where I have heard
espionage advocated.'' Senator McCarthy then read Reiss' refusal to
answer the question in his executive session testimony, and said: ``The
grounds previously stated were that a truthful answer might tend to
incriminate you. You tell us today that you did not here discussed any
espionage activities. Therefore when you appeared in executive session
and told us that a truthful answer might tend to incriminate you, you
were not properly invoking the fifth amendment, which of course makes
you in contempt of the committee. This is a very important
constitutional right which you nor any other Communist can play around
with, and you don't play around with it with this committee.
I will ask the committee to cite you for contempt or perjury
because you were not telling the truth when you told us that a truthful
answer would tend to incriminate you. Today you said you were not
present when such activities were discussed.
I may say there will be some delay in getting the citation. Can't
take it up until the Senate meets. But I am getting very sick of you
men engaged in the Communist conspiracy who come before this committee
and abuse the privilege granted under the fifth amendment. It is a very
important privilege. You are not going to use it to cover up your
conspiracy, if I can help it. You will be entitled to use the privilege
wherever you have the right.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever transmitted any information from
the American Communist party to any official of the Polish
Delegation of the United Nations?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever transmitted any information from
any member of the Polish Delegation to the United Nations to
the American Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. Who is your immediate superior up at the Polish--
--
Mr. Reiss. My superior? The permanent representative of the
delegation.
Mr. Cohn. Who is that?
Mr. Reiss. Mr. Henryk Birecki.
Mr. Cohn. Is he a member of the Communist party?
Mr. Reiss. I have no knowledge.
Mr. Cohn. You have no knowledge?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever discussed communism?
The Chairman. May I just off the record----
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. Cohn. Were you born here or a naturalized citizen?
Mr. Reiss. I was born here.
Mr. Cohn. What is your date of birth?
Mr. Reiss. October 24, 1907.
Mr. Cohn. Where were you born?
Mr. Reiss. New York City.
Mr. Cohn. Are you married, by the way?
Mr. Reiss. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Is your wife a member of the party?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
Mr. Cohn. What is your wife's maiden name?
Mr. Reiss. Gertrude Weixel.
Mr. Cohn. Gertrude what?
Mr. Reiss. W-e-i-x-e-l.
Mr. Cohn. By the way, what was your rank when you were
discharged from the army?
Mr. Reiss. Technical sergeant.
The Chairman. Were you under--pardon me, counsel.
Mr. Cohn. Go right ahead.
The Chairman. Were you under orders from the Communist
party at the time you were teaching in the army?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. I am going to show you a number of copies of
the Daily Worker. The first one is dated April 12, 1947, page
5, and there is an ad here which reads:
Tonight. Tonight 8:15 p.m. Joel Remes, Secretary National
Youth Committee, Communist Party, Assistant Editor Political
Affairs, speaks on Marxism and Liberalism. Admission 25 cents.
201 Second Avenue. Henry Forbes
--is that the section? ``Henry Forbes section.'' I believe
the other word is.
I am going to show this to you and see if--and then ask
whether this Joel Remes described in that ad is you.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds of the
Fifth Amendment.
The Chairman. I wonder if you would hand it back? I have
some other questions I want to ask you.
I call your attention to the Daily Worker of May 3, 1946,
page 13, an article entitled ``New Pamphlet on Socialism,
Weapons for Same,''and the subhead, ``Socialism: What's In It
For You?'' by A. B. Magill, New Century Publisher, 10 cents.''
The next subhead, ``Reviewed by Joel Remes.''
I want to hand that to you and ask you if that Joel Remes
is you.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. I have several other questions to ask you
about articles in the Daily Worker, and I perhaps could
dispense with asking them; you would repeat your answer. But to
make the record complete, I will go through the motion of
asking. I also----
Mr. Reiss. Do you want to ask them all and then give them
back to me?
The Chairman. I think that is a good suggestion. One dated
November 5, 1946, page 11:
Communist Party on Theory and Practice, reviewed by Joel
Remes.
Another one is dated--another issue of the Daily Worker
dated June 25, 1941, page 5.
I believe I will have to ask you about each one
individually because the matter is different.
May I ask whether the Joel Remes referred to in the
November 5, 1946 articles, ``Communist Party on Theory and
Practice reviewed by Joel Remes'' is that Joel Remes is you?
I assume you refuse to answer that?
Mr Reiss. Yes. I wanted to look at it. I refuse to answer.
Just let me take a look at the others.
The Chairman. The next one has no significance. The one
after that.
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. I may say, Mr. Counsel, just off the record--
--
[Discussion off the record]
The Chairman. Have the record show the witness indicates
that he merely refuses, unless he states some other ground, the
ground is the Fifth Amendment.
I have page five of the Daily Worker dated June 25, 1941,
an article entitled, ``Workers School offers course in world
politics.'' This is in the nature of a news story, and it
states that Joel Remes will conduct the class which will be one
of twenty classes offered during that summer.
Number one: Did you conduct such a class and are you the
Joel Remes referred to therein?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. I have the Daily Worker dated June 14, 1941,
page--I believe it is page eight--an article entitled
``Registration opened for special Marxist summer courses to
begin July 7.'' Is this Joel Remes referred to in here?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
The Chairman. This story also refers to Joel Remes of the
Workers School faculty.
Question: Is this Joel Remes referred to herein you, and,
No. two, did you conduct such classes?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. I wonder if you will stay here a second and
save the trouble of passing it back and forth.
I also have the Daily Worker dated Tuesday, September 30,
page three, an article entitled, ``Keep on your toes at Workers
School,'' subhead, ``Special course for outstanding teachers
and additions to curriculum,'' and Joel Remes is referred to
again in this. Is that Joel Remes you?
Mr. Reiss. I refuse to answer under the grounds previously
stated.
The Chairman. One final question on this Daily Worker of
September 24, 1941, page three. ``Workers School course to
study Socialist State.''
I don't see----
Will you strike the last one, Mr. Reporter. I think that is
all.
Mr. Counsel, have you any further questions?
Mr. Cohn. No, Mr. Chairman.
I was saying to the senator we will definitely want Mr.
Reiss back probably sometime in the course of tomorrow. There
is no use making him sit around all day, so the best thing for
him to do. We are hearing other witnesses concerning his case,
and there will come a point where we will have to call him back
to get additional information.
Mr. France. I wonder, Senator, if I might ask this favor. I
am engaged with out of town people tomorrow morning. I wonder
if this could be tomorrow afternoon?
Mr. Cohn. We will certainly try to accommodate you.
The Chairman. I think we will give you the definite promise
he will not be called tomorrow morning.
Mr Cohn. You know at all times where you can get him. We
will wait until we need him and then we will get in touch with
you. We will skip tomorrow morning in deference to your
request.
The Chairman. You understand, Mr. Reiss, instead of having
you sit around in the outer room waiting until you are called,
we will leave it that when we need you, we will call your
counsel.
Mr. France. Thank you.
The Chairman. And let him know where you are at all times
so he can get you in a half hour's notice.
Mr. Reiss. In terms of time, it will be in the daytime?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. Between what hours?
The Chairman. Never be before ten; never be after at the
very latest 4:30. In other words, you need not worry about it
before ten o'clock and need not be worried after 4:30. In fact,
I would say four o'clock. Let's make it four o'clock. After
four o'clock we won't be calling you.
Mr. France. Excuse me. For your information, my telephone
number is MU 6-0450.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Reiss, I forgot to ask you this. Confirmatory
of something. How many other American citizens work in the
Polish Delegation?
Mr. Reiss. How many others?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. I really can't answer that, I am sorry.
Mr. Cohn. Will you name the ones? Would you name the ones
that you know of?
Mr. Reiss. You mean the ones I actually know on the
permanent staff there?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. I don't know their names. Right now I think
there is a chauffeur named Sal.
Mr. Cohn. How do you spell it?
Mr. Reiss. S-a-l. That is a chauffeur.
Mr. Cohn. Who else?
Mr. Reiss. Employed there now?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. There is a cleaning woman who comes in there and
I don't know who she is employed by.
Mr. Cohn. Let's forget about the cleaning woman for the
moment.
Mr. Reiss. Employed in the office of the permanent
delegation?
Mr. Cohn. I don't know about permanent or temporary or
anything like that; but any other American citizen working for
the Polish Delegation.
Mr. Reiss. The only one I know of is this fellow Sal.
Mr. Cohn. You know of no others?
Mr. Reiss. No.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know of any Americans employed by any
other foreign delegations?
Mr. Reiss. By my other office?
Mr. Cohn. Specifically, do you know of any American
employed by the Czechoslovakian Delegation?
Mr. Reiss. No, sir, I don't know whether they employ them
or not.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know of any other American employed by
another foreign delegation to the United Nations?
Mr. Reiss. Any other American employed by foreign
delegations?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Reiss. Frankly, I don't know. I might have bumped into
somebody, any of the other delegations, and it is possible I
might know, but at the moment it doesn't strike me.
Mr. Cohn. Okay. Thank you.
The Chairman. One final question. Did you ever make
arrangements for or accompany any Polish delegate to the
Communist headquarters where he spoke to a group?
You are not clear on that?
Mr. Reiss. Yes, I understand the question.
No, sir.
The Chairman. I have nothing further.
Mr. Cohn. Okay.
Mr. France. Good night.
[Witness excused.]
TESTIMONY OF FLORENCE ENGLANDER (RESUMED)
The Chairman. Just one or two questions.
Miss Englander. Yes.
The Chairman. I understand from our chief of staff that you
are willing to give the FBI any information you have about
the----
Miss Englander. Yes.
The Chairman. [continuing]. Communist activities?
Miss Englander. Yes.
The Chairman. I think, Frank, what you ought to do is
inform Mr. Hoover and tell him if they want to have a young
lady drop in on this young lady, she will give any information
she can, and you can arrange if possible at her convenience----
What hours do you work?
Miss Englander. 9:30 to 6:00, five days a week.
The Chairman. Have you any further questions?
Mr. Cohn. No. I think what we can do, Mr. Chairman, in view
of the fact the witness desires to be cooperative, we can work
with her on this and go over everything and we won't have to
bother.
The Chairman. Your name will not be given to the press,
incidentally, unless you give it to them. No one will know you
are here unless you tell the press.
The young man here from the United Nations, Mr. Sloan----
Miss Englander. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And he has been told he has the freedom to
discuss it with you as your superior but not any member of the
public. I merely mention to clear you on it, your name will not
be given out publicly unless you give it out.
Let me ask this. I assume, having worked some five years in
the Communist party having attended meetings and that sort of
thing, you will be able to give the FBI a sizeable number of
names?
Miss Englander. Yes, I will, whatever I recall.
The Chairman. I don't think we should go into that now, if
she is willing to give that to the FBI. That should be
sufficient.
You are not excused yet from the subpoena. I don't think we
will want you further, but consider yourself under the subpoena
in case we need you for some further information.
Miss Englander. Goodbye.
The Chairman. Good luck to you.
Miss Englander. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
SECURITY--UNITED NATIONS
[Editor's note.--Paul Crouch (1903-1955) had been court-
martialed by the U.S. Army in 1925 for attempting to form a
Communist League among soldiers in Hawaii. In his defense he
testified: ``I am in the habit of writing letters to my friends
and imaginary persons, sometimes to kings and other foreign
persons, in which I place myself in an imaginary position. I do
that to develop my imaginary powers. That is why this letter
was written. Part of it is true and part of it is not.''
Convicted, he served two years at Alcatraz. On his release, he
became active in the Communist party and remained a member
until 1942, after which he served as an expert witness in
numerous judicial and congressional proceedings against alleged
Communists. Crouch's memorandum on ``Communist Infiltration of
the American Armed Forces'' was one of the factors leading to
the subcommittee's investigation at Fort Monmouth.
In 1954, the newspaper columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop
branded Crouch as a ``powerful imaginer,'' who fabricated many
of his allegations. They asserted that ``the Government has a
duty to investigate the reliability of the informers it
hires.'' After the Justice Department launched an
investigation, Crouch was dropped as a paid consultant in
deportation cases for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. Crouch then wrote to J. Edgar Hoover, demanding that
the FBI investigate the attorney general and his staff for the
``frame-up conspiracy'' against him. He also filed a libel suit
against the Alsops, claiming that his reputation ``as an expert
witness, writer, lecturer, and researcher into communism and
Communist infiltration in the Untied States had suffered.'' The
case never went to trial. Crouch testified in public session on
September 17, 1953.
Abraham Unger (1899-1975), a founder of the National
Lawyers Guild, had appeared as counsel for Communist party
leaders accused of violating the Smith Act, and Jacob Reiss had
worked as a researcher for that case. In his testimony,
Although Unger did not invoke the Fifth Amendment, he adopted a
strategy that the chairman compared to filibustering. During
Unger's appearance at a public session on September 18, Senator
McCarthy ordered him removed from the hearing room. On August
16, 1954, the Senate cited Unger for contempt for his failure
to answer questions on the grounds that the the subcommittee
had ``no authority to inquire into the political beliefs and
opinions of any other person.'' On July 27, 1955, Judge Edward
Weinfeld dismissed the charges against Unger. The U.S. Court of
Appeals unanimously upheld the dismissal, finding that the
subcommittee lacked legislative authority to investigate
subversive activities by individuals outside the government.
Speaking to reporters after this executive session, Senator
McCarthy said that a $12,000-a-year American ``high official''
of the UN secretariat had admitted friendship with Communists
and had contributed to organizations listed by the attorney
general as Communist fronts. Despite the chairman's demands
that the UN dismiss this ``high official,'' Dimitry Varley
(1906-1984) remained in his position as an economist at the UN;
nor were any charges of perjury brought against him. Alice
Ehrenfeld [Weil] (1925-1996) later became the first woman
assistant secretary general at the United Nations, and director
of the UN's General Legal Division. Neither Varley nor
Ehrenfeld testified in public.]
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
New York, N.Y.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 10:30 a.m., in room 128, of the
United States Court House, Foley Square, New York, Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy, presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Roy M.
Cohn, chief counsel; and G. David Schine, chief consultant.
TESTIMONY OF PAUL CROUCH
The Chairman. Will you stand and raise your right hand,
please?
In the matter now in hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Crouch. I do.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Crouch, were you at one time a member of the
Communist party.
Mr. Crouch. I was.
Mr. Cohn. During what years?
Mr. Crouch. From 1925 until early 1942.
Mr. Cohn. Were you a top functionary of the party?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, I was a top functionary throughout that
period, and a full-time organizer for fifteen years.
Mr. Cohn. What were some of the positions you held in the
Communist party?
Mr. Crouch. I was a representative of the Young Communist
League and the Communist party of the United States to the
meetings of the executive committee of the Communist
International, Young Communist International, Moscow; I was a
student and lecturer at the Frunze Military Academy and an
honorary officer of the Red Army; I was the head of the
Communist party's National Department for Infiltration of the
Armed Forces in the United States, national editorial director
of the Young Communist League, member of the editorial staff of
the Daily Worker, district organizer for the Communist party in
Virginia, New York and South Carolina, Tennessee and Utah;
member of the district bureau of the Communist party in the
Alabama district and the California district, Alameda County
organizer, 1941.
I was editor of the New South, Communist organ for the
southern States, 1937 to '39, and had been a member of the
editorial board of its predecessor paper, the Southern Worker,
since 1934.
I was a member of the Negro Trade Union Agricultural Anti-
Imperialist, Anti-Militarist Commissions of the Central
Committee of the Communist party of the United States, and
participated in the work of the Central Committee from 1927
until 1941. Those are some of the major positions.
Mr. Cohn. I don't know how you could have had time for
more. Now, Mr. Crouch, since the time you have left the party,
particularly in recent years, you have, under subpoena and at
the request of the United States government, testified at
various trials held in this courthouse and elsewhere throughout
the country for the government, and have given them what
information you have as a result of your membership and
activity in the party; is that right?
Mr. Crouch. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Cohn. I recall, of course, you were a witness in the
trial in which Mr. [William] Remington was convicted in this
building.
Now, Mr. Crouch, when you were in the Communist party, did
you know a man named Joel Remes?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, I knew him from about 1934 until 1940 or
'41.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Remes, when you knew him, was he a member of
the Communist party?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, he was.
Mr. Cohn. Was he more than a member of the party?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, he was an official of the party throughout
the period I knew him, including such positions as
organizational secretary of the Communist party for the
Louisiana district, headquarters at New Orleans, and was----
Mr. Cohn. About when was that?
Mr. Crouch. That was, as nearly as I can recall, from about
late 1936 until 1948, approximately, and he was at that time in
charge of the Communist book store called the People's Book
Store at 130 Chartres Street in New Orleans, and in that
capacity he handled the distribution of the New South, of which
I was editor, and I had correspondence with him from time to
time regarding the distribution of the New South and regarding
supplying editorial material in it.
Mr. Cohn. Now I am going to show you a picture, Mr. Crouch,
and ask you if you can identify that as Mr. Remes.
Mr. Crouch. Yes, this is the Joel Remes I knew in the
Communist party.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Crouch, at that time, around 1937, in those
years, did you have any connection with the Communist party
counterpart of the Daily Worker down South?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, I was the editor of it.
Mr. Cohn. What was that called?
Mr. Crouch. It was first called the Southern Worker, and
then the New South, changing its name to the New South in 1937.
Mr. Cohn. Now, were you in charge of subscriptions to that
Communist publication?
Mr. Crouch. I was.
Mr. Cohn. And you kept a little cardboard box containing
the cards with names of subscribers throughout the years; is
that right?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, a box that I brought in and was introduced
as evidence in the trial of William Remington.
Mr. Cohn. That is the box in which you produced the card
showing William Remington was a subscriber to this Communist
publication, received at the official post office box of the
Communist party; right?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. And in that same box, did you find a card
indicating that you had shipped twenty-five copies of this
Communist publication to the People's Book Store, at 110
Chartres Street, New Orleans, Louisiana?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. The original is in a box which is in
the custody of the government, and I have a photostat prepared
at the time of the Remington trial, and one of the photostats
shows the bundle order going to the People's Book Store at 130
Chartres Street, of twenty-five copies per month.
Mr. Cohn. Was Remes the man you were dealing with there?
Mr. Crouch. He was.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know any relatives of Remes in the
Communist party?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, his brother, Andy Remes, was one of my
closest friends in the Communist party over many years. I had
long, detailed discussions on many matters--and incidentally,
his brother, Andy Remes, played a very important role both in
my decision to leave the party and increasing my fear of the
consequences of leaving, as a result of his connections with
the whitewash of what was unquestionably a G.P.U. murder of
Laura Law, of Aberdeen, Washington, about January 4, 1940.
Mr. Cohn. Was Laura Law any relation to Joel Remes and
Andrew Remes?
Mr. Crouch. No, she was--she and her husband had been
members of the Communist party under Andy Remes' jurisdiction
as secretary for the Northwest district. She broke with the
Communist party in the fall of 1939 and informed the party that
she was going to the government and tell what she knew about
the party. Shortly thereafter her body was found with her head
crushed in, and her chest and back covered with brutal stab
wounds--unquestionably a G.P.U. murder to silence her, to
prevent her from telling her extensive knowledge of the party
apparatus throughout the northwest.
Andy Remes played a leading part in the whitewash of this
case, and as he described it to me, by taking the offensive and
charging that industrialists had Laura Law murdered because of
her husband's union activities.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Chairman, will you receive this photostatic
copy of this card in evidence and have it deemed marked as
Exhibit 1?
The Chairman. Yes, it is received.
Mr Cohn. And the picture of Remes which was identified by
Mr. Crouch we will have deemed marked as Exhibit 2.
And this criminal record, a certified copy of which we
received, we will have deemed marked Exhibit 3. We received a
certified copy from the police department at New Orleans,
Louisiana.
The Chairman. Mr. Crouch, there is something we have often
wondered about, and maybe you can enlighten us. In the trial of
this Scientist X, as I recall, you had considerable information
and evidence on him. Why weren't you called by the Justice
Department in that case, if you know?
Mr. Crouch. I was called as an expert witness in rebuttal,
but was not permitted to describe my knowledge of him as a
member of the party, or to describe the closed meetings of the
Communist party I had attended. And my wife [Sylvia Crouch],
who was under subpoena in the trial, was not called at all, and
I was advised informally to the effect that it was impossible
for us to give our testimony without bringing in the name of an
internationally famous scientist who was also a member of the
Communist party, who had been present at the meetings with
Scientist X.
The Chairman. Who in the Justice Department told you you
could not be used to testify about your knowledge of Scientist
X, his Communist activities?
Mr. Crouch. Mr. Cunningham, of the Justice Department, and
Mr. Hitz, assistant United States attorney, advised me that I
would not be questioned because our testimony would bring in
his name.
The Chairman. Bring in the name of Robert Oppenheimer?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer.
The Chairman. Both you and your wife, I understand, then,
were available; the Justice Department knew you had attended
Communist party meetings with Scientist X, and one of the
issues was whether or not he was a Communist?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And the jury found him not to be a Communist,
ultimately?
Mr. Crouch. They found him not guilty due to lack of
sufficient identifying witnesses who had been in closed
meetings with him, that is, witnesses who could testify to that
effect.
The Chairman. Just for the record, was he being tried for
perjury?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And one of the counts was that he committed
perjury when he said he was not a Communist?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And because of lack of evidence, he was
acquitted?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And both you and your wife, when members of
the Communist party, had attended these closed Communist party
meetings with him, and you were informed by two Justice
Department lawyers that you would not be used because if you
were used and you were examined as to who else was there, you
would have had to identify Robert J. Oppenheimer; is that it?
Mr. Crouch. To that effect, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did they say who had given them those
instructions?
Mr. Crouch. No, sir, they did not, they did not indicate it
in any way.
The Chairman. When was this trial held?
Mr. Crouch. Last year.
The Chairman. What was the date of that trial, Roy?
Mr. Cohn. I don't know the exact date.
The Chairman. And Scientist X, who has been identified, as
Scientist X, what is his name again?
Mr. Crouch. Dr. Joseph Weinberg.
The Chairman. Is there any doubt in your mind that
Oppenheimer was a member of the Communist party?
Mr. Crouch. No, sir, none whatever. I met him in a closed
meeting of the Communist party in a house which was
subsequently found to have been his residence at the time,
although I did not know it then, and following that I met him
at quite a number of Communist party affairs in Alameda County.
The Chairman. I noticed with some interest Oppenheimer's
articles in regard to the H-bomb, for example; he vigorously
opposed our proceeding with any experimentation in the
development of the H-bomb. When he lost out in that, he now has
taken the position that we should not have an air force capable
of delivering that bomb. Maybe I am simplifying it a bit, but
in fact that is his argument. His argument has been that we
should build a screen of defense around this nation.
From your knowledge of the working of the Communist party,
do you know whether or not that was the policy of the Communist
party at that time?
Mr. Crouch. His position, in substance, his efforts have
corresponded with the efforts of the Communist press throughout
this period. The Communist press has sought to prevent the
development of the H-bomb. They have sought to obtain a U.S.
pledge not to use the atomic bomb, first in time of war, and
their policy has coincided with the public statements of Dr. J.
Robert Oppenheimer and the authoritative press accounts of J.
Robert Oppenheimer's position as appeared recently in Fortune
magazine, Life, and others.
The Chairman. Just to refresh my recollection and to get
the record straight on this, is it correct that after you
notified the FBI that you had attended a closed Communist
meeting with Oppenheimer that they drove you around the city of
Los Angeles to find the house in which you had attended that
meeting?
Mr. Crouch. Not Los Angeles--in Berkeley, California.
The Chairman. In Berkeley?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. FBI Agent Brush, and another FBI
agent----
The Chairman. Brush?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. B-r-u-s-h?
Mr. Crouch. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you know his first name?
Mr. Crouch. I don't recall.
The Chairman. Do you know the other agent's name?
Mr. Crouch. Modehouse, or a similar name.
The Chairman. In any event, they drove you around Berkeley
to see if you could find the house in which you had attended
the meeting with Oppenheimer; is that correct?
Mr. Crouch. That's right.
The Chairman. And you drew a diagram for them of the inside
of the house?
Mr. Crouch. Exterior and interior, before the house was
located.
The Chairman. So that before the house was located you gave
them a drawing of the interior of the house in which you
attended the meeting, and you described the exterior of the
house; you didn't know the address, so they drove you around
until you found the house?
Mr. Crouch. That's correct. All I knew was the house was in
the hills around Berkeley, overlooking the bay. That's all I
knew. I gave these drawings to the FBI and to the California
Un-American Activities Committee.
The Chairman. Now, when someone from the FBI later went
into this house, did they find that your drawing of the
interior was an accurate drawing of the house?
Mr. Crouch. I don't know whether the FBI went into the
interior or not, but they told me they had obtained information
regarding the interior, and that the interior corresponded to
my drawings and description.
The Chairman. Was it discovered then also that at the time
the meeting was held in this house, the meeting which you
attended, that he was living in that house?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. In other words, that was his home?
Mr. Crouch. That was the first information I obtained that
that was the home of J. Robert Oppenheimer, was from the FBI,
from Agent Brush.
The Chairman. How many Communist meetings would you say you
attended with Oppenheimer?
Mr. Crouch. I attended one closed meeting restricted only
to party members, where I gave an official report. I attended a
number, at least six, social affairs arranged by the Communist
party, where he was present, one being at the home of Kenneth
May, one being an affair arranged to raise funds for the
Spanish Communists.
Incidentally, I talked with Dr. Oppenheimer last year in
the presence of Justice Department officials and Dr.
Oppenheimer recalled one of these occasions, the one to raise
funds for Spain, and placed the date of it as the night before
Pearl Harbor, in the presence of Mr. Cunningham and Mr. Hitz.
As for the other affairs, he said, in substance, he attended so
many Communist-arranged affairs, he couldn't recall how many;
he might well have been at the one at Kenneth May's home. He
could not recall the closed meeting at his own home or my
report there. He did recall one meeting at which Mr. William
Schneiderman was present in 1941.
The Chairman. Now, there are two Oppenheimers, both rather
famous, and I think we should have the record clear that you
are speaking about the Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer.
Mr. Crouch. Yes, I knew both. I knew his brother, Frank as
a Communist, also, and identified Frank as a Communist in
testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities
in May of 1949.
The Chairman. Did your wife attend the closed meetings with
Oppenheimer?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, she did.
The Chairman. Do you know of anyone besides you and your
wife who can testify as to Oppenheimer's membership in the
Communist party?
Mr. Crouch. Not offhand.
The Chairman. I might say it is important beyond words, and
dangerous, of course--I am sure you will agree with me--if our
top atomic scientist is a member of the Communist conspiracy.
It would be extremely important if we could get additional
witnesses who were present physically and knew he was a member
of the party.
Mr. Crouch. I might say, Senator, that in my work with the
California Un-American Activities Committee I learned that
military intelligence has a vast amount of evidence regarding
his membership in the Communist party and his Communist
activities, and that the California Un-American Activities
Committee has a great deal of information which, of course,
would be at the disposal of this committee.
The Chairman. Do you know why the Justice Department and
the California committee have apparently shied off at the
exposure of Oppenheimer?
Mr. Crouch. The California committee has tried to go into
this. They brought out a great deal of information, including
testimony by both myself and my wife, Sylvia, in their
published report for the year--reported in 1951, covering the
year 1950. They gave a great deal of information in this report
on the background of both J. Robert Oppenheimer and his wife,
who--one of whose husbands was killed in Spain while fighting
with the Communist forces there, and during the California
hearing the state committee out there in California issued a
public invitation to Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer to appear before
the committee, as an invitation to both Dr. Oppenheimer and his
wife, Katherine, to appear before the committee, and both Dr.
Oppenheimer and his wife ignored the invitation. The California
committee had no power of subpoena and has been unable to
follow up on the matter.
The Chairman. Do I understand you to say that his wife's
former husband was killed in Spain fighting on the Communist
side?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, I might say further, so there should be no
confusion, that his wife, Katherine, was born Katherine
Puening, in Germany; came to the United States and is a citizen
by virtue of her father's naturalization while she was a minor.
She was first married to a man named Ranseyer. According to
many people in intelligence, her second husband was the one
killed in Spain, named Joseph Dallet, who had been a Young
Communist League organizer in Ohio. Her third husband, after
this husband was killed in Spain in 1936 or early 1937, her
third husband was Richard Stewart-Harrison, of Great Britain,
from whom she was divorced in January 1940, and married Dr. J.
Robert Oppenheimer in November of 1940.
The Chairman. I missed your last few words. Did you say
that this husband was a Communist?
Mr. Crouch. Yes.
The Chairman. The third husband?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, the one killed in Spain. I don't know
whether the other two previous husbands were Communists, or
not, but the one killed in Spain was a Communist and a very
close friend of Steve Nelson.
Incidentally, according to many public statements, Mrs.
Oppenheimer introduced her friend, Steve Nelson, to J. Robert
Oppenheimer, who was a frequent guest at the Oppenheimer home
during the 1940 to 1942 period when Dr. Oppenheimer was in
charge of work on the atomic bomb.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this: Is there any doubt in
your mind but what Oppenheimer was under Communist party
discipline at the time you were attending these Communist
meetings with him?
Mr. Crouch. No, sir, none whatever.
The Chairman. And if he were under Communist party
discipline, he, of course, would be bound to turn over any
atomic secrets to them that he had available?
Mr. Crouch. That the party directed.
The Chairman. And naturally they would be interested in any
atomic information he had?
Mr. Crouch. Yes, sir. Just as a matter of fact, the
Communist party might have chosen to direct him to turn over
the information; they might have chosen to direct him to
appoint other Communists to key positions who would in turn
turn over the information. It is a matter of record that Dr.
Oppenheimer has appointed many Communists to key positions in
the atomic energy program. For example, Lloyd Lehman, who had
been associated with Dr. Oppenheimer, in the Communist party
around 1940, was given a job at Dr. Oppenheimer's
recommendation in the radiation laboratory in California around
1942. Later, Lloyd Lehman left the laboratory and became the
open Communist party organizer for Alameda County in
California.
Another man who has admitted former membership in the
Communist party, Dr. Hawkins, was brought from California to
Los Alamos, although he was not a physicist, made historian for
the project, and given access to virtually all classified and
confidential matters there.
There are many other Communists who were employed by Dr.
Oppenheimer and also, according to the California committee's
information, Dr. Oppenheimer was active in urging atomic
scientists to join a Communist espionage apparatus called the
FAECT--Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and
Technicians--headed by Marcel Scherer, who had been trained in
the espionage schools in Moscow and who had been in charge of
infiltration of scientists since 1928, to my personal
knowledge.
The Chairman. This FAECT was headed by a man who went to
the Moscow School of Espionage and Sabotage?
Mr. Crouch. Yes.
The. Chairman. That is the Lenin school?
Mr. Crouch. Yes.
The Chairman. Where is he now, do you know?
Mr. Crouch. He is in New York City at the present time.
The Chairman. Is he connected with atomic work now, do you
know?
Mr. Crouch. I don't know.
The Chairman. What is his name?
Mr. Crouch. Marcel Scherer.
The Chairman. Oh, yes.
Mr. Crouch. I personally participated in discussions that
set up this apparatus for scientific espionage in 1928 and was
present at discussions between Scherer and William Z. Foster,
and Scherer and Communist international representatives from
Moscow, when this project was approved.
The Chairman. That will be all, then, for today.
[Witness excused.]
TESTIMONY OF DIMITRY VARLEY (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, HERMAN
A. GRAY)
The Chairman. Will you stand up and raise your right hand,
please?
In this matter now on hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Varley. I do.
The Chairman. Mr. Varley, you have the right to consult
with your counsel at any time you care to, advise with him
whenever you think it is necessary. If you care to, I will be
glad to give you a private room in which to have a conference,
if anything comes up of sufficient importance that you think
you require that. Counsel is not allowed to take part in the
proceedings other than that.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Varley, what is your position?
Mr Varley. I am employed by the United Nations as an
economist.
Mr. Cohn. Talk a little louder, and tell us specifically
what your position is.
Mr. Varley. I am a senior economic affairs officer in the
Department of Economic Affairs in the United Nations.
Mr. Cohn. What is your salary?
Mr. Varley. Gross salary is $12,000.
Mr. Cohn. $12,000 a year?
Mr. Varley. I think $12,000 and a few odd dollars.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, $12,000 and some odd dollars.
Mr. Varley. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. How long have you been with the United Nations?
Mr. Varley. Since the fall of 1946.
Mr. Cohn. Where were you before that?
Mr. Varley. I was with UNRRA.
Mr. Cohn. You were with UNRRA before that?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Who was director general of UNRRA when you were
appointed?
Mr. Varley. Mr. Lehman.
Mr. Cohn. Was Mr. Weintraub in UNRRA when you came there?
Mr. Varley. He was.
Mr. Cohn. Did you work with him in UNRRA?
Mr. Varley. I was working with him in the same bureau.
Mr. Cohn. And Mr. Lehman was the director general?
Mr. Varley. Right.
Mr. Cohn. Or director-whatever you call it?
Mr. Varley. I think it is director general.
Mr. Cohn. Director general.
Now, where were you before you went with UNRRA?
Mr. Varley. I was in the army.
Mr. Cohn. For how long a period of time were you in the
army?
Mr. Varley. For approximately one year and six months.
Mr. Cohn. What were your duties in the army?
Mr. Varley. I started with the air force, and then I was
attached to the Office of Strategic Services.
Mr. Cohn. OSS? What did you do with OSS?
Mr. Varley. I was attached to the research branch, which I
believe was called Russian Economic Analysis. I am not sure
about the exact title of the branch.
Mr. Cohn. What rank did you hold in the army, by the way?
What was your rank in the army?
Mr. Varley. I was a sergeant in the army.
Mr. Cohn. A sergeant. Now, have you ever contributed any
money to any Communist front organization?
Mr. Varley. Will you explain your question? May I ask my
lawyer?
Mr. Cohn. Surely. You can ask anything you want.
[Whereupon, Mr. Varley consulted with his counsel.]
Mr. Varley. Could you tell me what you mean by ``Communist
front organization''?
Mr. Cohn. Surely. For one example, I will give you an
organization listed by the attorney general as subversive.
Mr. Varley. I never saw or consulted the list. I know some
of them.
Mr. Cohn. Let me ask you this: Did you and your wife ever
contribute to the American Committee for the Protection of
Foreign Born?
Mr. Varley. I did.
Mr. Cohn. When? In 1950?
Mr. Varley. Yes, I think last time I did was in 1950.
Mr. Cohn. How about the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade?
Mr. Varley. I might have. I am not sure.
Mr. Cohn. Isn't it a fact that you did in 1947 contribute
to the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade?
Mr. Varley. Well, I don't clearly remember whether I did.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever hear of the Veterans of the Abraham
Lincoln Brigade?
Mr. Varley. I did.
Mr. Cohn. Do you think you gave them any money?
Mr. Varley. I might have, but----
Mr. Cohn. Now, is 1950 the last time when you contributed
to the American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign
born?
Mr. Varley. I think so. That is, to my best recollection,
yes. Might have been 1950--I mean, it might have been, let us
say, first month of 1951.
Mr. Cohn. Well, around '50, '51?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. You are clear you did not contribute in '52?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Were you ever a member of the State, County, and
Municipal Workers Union, Local 28?
Mr. Varley. I was.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know that was under Communist domination?
Mr. Varley. No.
Mr. Cohn. When did you find that out?
Mr. Varley. Pardon me? Will you repeat the question?
Mr. Cohn. Read the question, please.
[Whereupon, the last question was read by the reporter.]
Mr. Varley. To my best knowledge, it never was under
Communist domination.
Mr. Cohn. You have never heard that?
Mr. Varley. I heard subsequently, after I left the union,
that it was referred as left wing CIO union.
The Chairman. Who got you your job originally? Mr.
Weintraub?
Mr. Varley. Where?
The Chairman. In the UN.
Mr. Varley. The UN? Yes, he recommended me to the United
Nations.
The Chairman. Did you know that Weintraub was a Communist?
Mr. Varley. No.
The Chairman. When did you first hear that he was?
Mr. Varley. I never heard that he was a Communist.
Mr. Cohn. You never heard that he was?
Mr. Varley. Well, I have seen the reference in the papers,
accusations, but that is--even there I am not sure he was--he
said that he was a Communist.
Mr. Cohn. Did you read Whittaker Chambers' testimony?
Mr. Varley. No.
The Chairman. Did you and he ever talk over the affairs of
the Communist party?
Mr. Varley. Excuse me, may I just come back to that
question?
Mr. Cohn. Surely.
Mr. Varley. Did I read Whittaker Chambers' testimony?
Mr. Cohn. Yes.
Mr. Varley. Well, I have seen some bits of it, I mean here
and there in the papers, but I haven't seen his testimony about
Mr. Wetntraub.
The Chairman. Did you and Mr. Weintraub ever discuss the
work or the objectives of the Communist party?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You never did?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You never had any reason to believe he was a
Communist?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Now, have you ever been a registered member of
the American Labor party?
Mr. Varley. I was.
Mr. Cohn. Up through what year?
Well, the election records show you were a registered
member of the American Labor party in 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940,
'41, '43, '44, '49, '50, '51; is that right?
Mr. Varley. I couldn't have possibly registered in 1951,
because I think I wasn't in the country in 1951, at that time.
Mr. Cohn. At what time?
Mr. Varley. Well, last time I could have registered would
be at the time of primary registrations or elections. It would
be '49 or '50.
Mr. Cohn. Well, the last time you did register, say in
1950, did you register American Labor party?
Mr. Varley. Yes, I did, last time.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know the American Labor party had been
named as a Communist front by the House committee?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Didn't you know it was----
Mr. Varley. You mean that was named as a Communist
organization?
Mr. Cohn. Did you know that that was under Communist
domination and had been officially listed as a Communist front
by the House committee?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You did not. Hadn't you heard that it was under
Communist control?
Mr. Varley. May I consult----
Mr. Cohn. Surely.
[Whereupon, Mr. Varley consulted with his counsel.]
Mr. Varley. I have seen reference to that fact in the
newspapers, particularly during the election campaign.
The Chairman. Did you think it was Communist-controlled?
Mr. Varley. No, sir. My whole contact with American Labor
party amounted to my registering with American Labor party.
The Chairman. The question is: Did you think it was
Communist-controlled?
Mr. Varley. I really don't know.
The Chairman. Did you have any reason to believe that you
were registering in a front for the Communist party?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You did not think it was Communist-
controlled?
Mr. Varley. Senator, if I would have thought it was
Communist-controlled, I wouldn't have registered.
The Chairman. The question is: Did you think it was
Communist-controlled? It is a very simple question.
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You did not?
Mr. Varley. No.
The Chairman. You appeared before the grand jury, didn't
you?
Mr. Varley. I did appear before the grand jury.
The Chairman. Several times?
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And you know there is a recommendation to the
UN that your services be dispensed with; is that correct?
Mr. Varley. I don't know of this.
The Chairman. Didn't you hear that there was a
recommendation that you be fired? You were told that, weren't
you?
Mr. Varley. The grand jury recommended that I would be
fired? No, sir.
The Chairman. It was in the presentment of the grand jury,
was it not, that you should be removed from the UN?
Mr. Varley. No, sir, I never heard that.
The Chairman. You never heard that?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You never knew anything about it?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. No one ever told you that?
Mr. Varley. The grand jury recommended that I would be
fired? No, sir.
The Chairman. Did you know they made a recommendation
concerning you?
Mr. Varley. The grand jury?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Never heard it?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. No one ever told you that?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Did you read the presentment?
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Didn't you see any reference to yourself in the
presentment?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You didn't?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You understand, the grand jury presentment did
not mention names. Didn't you see a very clear description of
yourself in there? I mean, can you tell us honestly that you
read that presentment and didn't see any portion which you
thought referred to you?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Oh, really?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. What was the occasion of your reading the
presentment? Were you looking for references to yourself?
Mr. Varley. Well, I read the presentment when it appeared
in the newspapers.
The Chairman. Were you looking for references to yourself?
Mr. Varley. I can't answer that question in that way, sir,
because I just read whatever was in there, and now the counsel
asks me a question whether I found any----
The Chairman. When you read the presentment--you say you
read it--my question is very simple: Were you looking for
references to yourself, you having appeared before that grand
jury?
Mr. Varley. Could I put it this way--that I did not expect
to find reference to myself, and therefore I didn't look for
reference to myself.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Varley, as a matter of fact, to put it
frankly here, you are not very careful about telling the truth,
are you?
Mr. Varley. I think I do tell the truth.
Mr. Cohn. Well, now, you were before a grand jury, and I
asked you, before the grand jury, whether or not you had ever
been arrested or convicted, and you denied it at first and then
admitted it later; isn't that a fact?
Mr. Varley. I don't know what--[consulting with counsel].
Would you mind repeating the question?
Mr. Cohn. Read the question, please.
[Whereupon, the last question was read by the reporter.]
Mr. Varley. I never admitted that I was arrested.
Mr. Cohn. You never admitted that you were arrested?
Mr. Varley. No.
Mr. Cohn. You still don't think you were arrested?
Mr. Varley. That's right.
Mr. Cohn. I see. You got some good legal opinions about
that; is that right?
The Chairman. Is it your testimony that you had never been
arrested?
Mr. Varley. That's right, sir.
Mr. Cohn. What do you think, the records of the New York
Police Department are forged?
Mr. Varley. Well, I asked my lawyer to consult the records
and also tried to recollect the matter, and all my recollection
was that I was summoned before the court of magistrates.
Mr. Cohn. Isn't it a fact that--I regret the necessity of
going into this again--but isn't it a fact that you were found
by members of the New York City Police Department in the men's
room and 50-something Street and Lexington Avenue on December,
29, 1941, arrested on a morals charge, and that you pleaded
guilty and paid the fines, or you were given an alternative of
a fine or a jail sentence and you paid the fines, not only for
yourself but for the other man who was taken in along with you,
a man named Leonardo Boronek? Isn't that a fact?
Mr. Varley. Would you give me the question?
[Whereupon, the last question was read by the reporter.]
Mr. Cohn. Before you get to that, would you please add
this, Mr. Stenographer: the names of the policemen were
Valentine Piccirilli and William Vogel. Now, would you answer
that question?
Mr. Varley. This is not a fact.
Mr. Cohn. Tell me where it isn't a fact.
Mr. Varley. I was never arrested, and I was never convicted
on a morals charge.
Mr. Cohn. Tell us what happened.
The Chairman. Were you picked up by the policemen?
Mr. Varley. I was.
The Chairman. You were picked up by the policemen?
Mr. Varley. The policemen did talk to me, but I was not
arrested.
The Chairman. Did they take you along with them?
Mr. Varley. The policemen told me that----
The Chairman. Did they take you along with them?
Mr. Varley. No, they didn't. The policemen told me, as I
recollect it, that after we had very brief discussion, ``Let
the magistrate's court figure that out,'' words to that effect.
The Chairman. Did they take you down to the magistrate?
Mr. Varley. We went to the magistrate's court, all
together.
The Chairman. The policemen picked you up, they took you
down to the magistrate; is that right?
Mr. Varley. He didn't pick me up. He said that ``Well, let
all of us go to the magistrate court.''
The Chairman. All right. When I say ``picked you up,'' what
do you understand that I mean?
You said he didn't pick you up. What do you think it means
to get picked up?
Mr. Varley. What the counsel says, to be arrested.
The Chairman. And the policeman came in and took you to the
magistrate; is that right?
Mr. Varley. He said, ``Let's go to the magistrate.'' He
didn't say, ``You are arrested.'' I didn't resist----
The Chairman. Did he take you down in a police car? Did
they take you down in a police car?
Mr. Varley. I think it was an ordinary automobile.
The Chairman. They took you down in their car, did they?
Mr. Varley. We went in their car.
The Chairman. All right. They took you to the magistrate?
Mr. Varley. We went down to the magistrate's court.
The Chairman. They took you in their car to the magistrate,
is that correct?
Mr. Varley. May I say how I remember what happened?
The Chairman. No, you answer my questions. I may say that
if the policeman's testimony is correct, you have perjured
yourself about three times now. You can keep on if you want to,
or you can tell us the truth.
I will repeat the question: Did they take you in their car
to the magistrate? Either yes or no?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
The Chairman. They did, all right. Did they file charges
against you?
Mr. Varley. Yes, there was a summons by a policeman.
The Chairman. All right. And were you found guilty?
Mr Varley. I pleaded guilty.
The Chairman. You pleaded guilty?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
The Chairman. You paid a fine?
Mr. Varley. I paid a fine.
The Chairman. And did you pay the other man's fine, too?
Mr. Varley. I did.
The Chairman. You say you were never arrested?
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Cohn, I want this transmitted to the U.S.
attorney, a clear case of perjury.
Have you ever been arrested at any other time?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Did the policemen ever pick you up at any
other occasion?
Mr. Varley. In the same sense as in that case, in
connection with automobile incidents, yes.
The Chairman. How many times?
Mr. Varley. Several times.
The Chairman. On the same type of charge?
Mr. Varley. Well, the charge dealt with some violation of
traffic, but I do not recall what exactly was the nature of the
charge. It was some kind of an offense, similar charge.
The Chairman. How many times did policemen pick you up on
any other charges? How many times?
Mr. Varley. You mean bring me to the magistrate's court
directly?
The Chairman. Do you understand what I mean? You can keep
on perjuring yourself, if you want to.
Mr. Varley. I am trying to do my best and not to try to
evade the question, but in the first case you said, did the
policeman pick me up and bring me to the magistrate's court.
Well, I had summons given to me before by the policemen.
The Chairman. All right. How many times?
Mr. Varley. Well, I recall at least one case in the state
of Connecticut, when there was minor traffic accident and we
went to a police station.
The Chairman. And what were you charged with?
Mr. Varley. I know I paid a fine of about, around $15, I
think.
The Chairman. What were you charged with?
Mr. Varley. I don't remember the charge, sir.
The Chairman. You don't remember?
Mr. Varley. No. It was some kind of offense in the state of
Connecticut.
The Chairman. Were you charged with drunkenness?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You were not?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Are you sure of that?
Mr. Varley. I am positive.
The Chairman. Have you ever been charged with drunkenness?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Have you ever been found guilty on a morals
charge?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. No?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Have you ever pleaded guilty on a morals
charge?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You never have?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You never have been either convicted or
pleaded guilty to any charge involving morals?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Your answer is no?
Mr. Varley. That's right.
The Chairman. You are sure of that?
Mr. Varley. I am sure of that, sir.
Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cohn, we want the magistrate's record and
the policeman in here who arrested him before he was found
guilty. This is a clear case of perjury.
Mr. Cohn. What do you think you were picked up for by the
policemen at the time you were taken down to court in the
policemen's car? Didn't they tell you?
Mr. Varley. It was a charge of loitering.
Mr. Cohn. With another man; is that right?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. No? Was there another man there? You paid another
man's fine, didn't you?
Mr. Varley. I paid the other man's fine.
Mr. Cohn. Yes, you paid your own fine and you paid his
fine, too, didn't you?
Mr. Varley. When he pleaded guilty and he said he had no
money to pay, I felt sorry for the guy, and paid his fine.
Mr. Cohn. How long had you known this other man?
Mr. Varley. How long what?
Mr. Cohn. How long had you known the other man? You know,
you make it very difficult, Mr. Varley. This isn't the kind of
thing----
Mr. Varley. I didn't know the man.
Mr. Cohn. You met him in the men's room, then, didn't you?
Mr. Varley. I didn't meet him. He was in the men's room.
The Chairman. So it was a man whom you never knew, whom you
never met, and you paid his fine; is that correct?
Mr. Varley. That's right.
The Chairman. You will return at 2:30 this afternoon. You
are excused until 2:30.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., a luncheon recess was taken
until 2:30 p.m.]
afternoon session
TESTIMONY OF ABRAHAM UNGER (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, BERNARD
JAFFE)
The Chairman. Will you stand and raise your right hand,
please?
In this matter now on hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Unger. I do.
Mr. Jaffe. May I ask the senator something?
Mr. Unger. I was served with this subpoena yesterday. I
haven't had a chance to talk to him until about noon or so
today, and I was wondering whether or not we could possibly
adjourn this hearing so that I could have an opportunity to
look into the matter.
The Chairman. Well, how much time would you want?
Mr. Jaffe. Well, I would like a week, if possible.
Also, whom am I speaking to? I know you; you are Mr. Cohn.
Who is this gentleman?
Mr. Cohn. I am Mr. Cohn, counsel for the committee. This is
Senator McCarthy.
This is Frank Carr, executive director of the committee.
This gentleman here is from the legal division of the United
Nations.
Mr. Unger. I see. I make that same request. I think it is a
reasonable request which should be granted, if at all possible.
But in addition, I think you ought to indicate to me what the
purpose of the examination is so that I might have some idea
why it is that you are calling me as a witness. What is the
object of this inquiry by this senatorial committee? Those are
the two things we address to you.
The Chairman. I think your second request is certainly
reasonable, that you be notified why you are called. Obviously,
you are entitled to that. I believe until you know why you are
called and what information the committee wants from you, it
will be impossible for you to know from you whether you need a
day, or a week, or how much adjournment you need. You are
called in connection with an investigation of Communist
influence in the UN and in connection with alleged Communists
working there, one of whom, Mr. Remes, or Mr. Reiss. I think
his name now is Mr. Reiss--according to our information, worked
either for you or in your office, and I think the information
we want to get from you principally is with regard to this
fellow Remes. Now, I would suggest----
Mr. Unger. You are off on the wrong track, I want to tell
you that right now.
The Chairman. May I say this, that after Roy starts
questioning you, if you feel that you need a week's time to
discuss the matter with your lawyer, that is something that can
certainly be considered. I am inclined to think that the
questions will be of such a very simple nature that you won't
need any additional time on them.
Let me say this: I will let counsel proceed, and if after
he asks certain questions you think that you need additional
time, I am sure we can work that out.
Mr. Jaffe. Let me say this, Senator: I am a lawyer; I don't
know anything about the questions you are going to ask or
anything else. As far as I am concerned, whatever the problem
is, I would need time, because I don't know what the entire
situation is. Now, it may be that Mr. Unger wants to go ahead
without that. I mean, as far as I am concerned, you tell me
this; the names that you refer to don't mean anything to me.
Whether they mean anything to Mr. Unger, I don't know.
Mr. Cohn. You are not the witness.
Mr. Jaffe. I understand that. What I would like to do is to
have an opportunity to consult with him before I can advise him
about anything.
The Chairman. I think that is a reasonable request. You can
use the private office to discuss the matter, and then we will
take----
Mr. Cohn. There is only one name, Joel Remes, also known as
Julius Reiss.
Mr. Unger. I certainly would defer to counsel in the
suggestion that you make to confer together, and as we are told
here, it can be done privately.
But I will say this, so that there will be no question
about it. We are being given representation here that is the
purpose of the inquiry in so far as this witness is concerned.
On that representation, I see no reason why we can't ascertain
what it is that they are inquiring about as indicated here, and
then if any situation arises which requires conferring, we will
confer.
The Chairman. I think that is a good suggestion. If
something arises which makes you feel it is necessary to have a
conference, or a postponement, we can work it out. I am sure.
We will have no trouble about that.
Mr. Cohn. Could we have your full name, please?
Mr. Unger. I gave it to the stenographer--Abraham Unger.
Mr. Cohn. And you gave your address?
Mr. Unger. I did.
Mr. Cohn. Fine. What is your profession, Mr. Unger?
Mr. Unger. Lawyer.
Mr. Cohn. You practice in New York?
Mr. Unger. I do.
Mr. Cohn. You are admitted to the bar in New York?
Mr. Unger. I am admitted to the bar in New York.
Mr. Cohn. And to the federal court?
Mr. Unger. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Have you practiced before any government
agencies?
Mr. Unger. Do I practice? Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Which one?
Mr. Unger. Immigration. I don't recall that I practiced
before any other at this time--workmen's compensation,
perhaps--one being federal, one being state.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Unger, we have had testimony here that a man
by the name of Joel Remes, also known as Julius Reiss, has
worked under your supervision; is that true?
Mr. Unger. It is not.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know Joel Remes?
Mr. Unger. If it is the person referred to in the press, in
the newspaper yesterday, I assume it is the same person who is
identified as Mr. Reiss----
Mr. Cohn. That's right.
Mr. Unger. I know who he is, yes.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever met him?
Mr. Unger. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Under what circumstances?
Mr. Unger. He has come to our office, consulted with us. He
has also done some research work in or about or out of the
office of a perfectly innocent nature, such as of a kind that I
would consider not even important enough to remember, the sort
of thing that anyone--that you might do, that you might come to
the office and ask to look at a file--rather at a record on
appeal, or a case, and I would show it to you, and I wouldn't
even remember whether you had been there or not.
Mr. Cohn. I don't quite understand that. Was he in your
employ?
Mr. Unger. He was not. I have answered that question
already.
Mr. Cohn. I don't quite understand the situation as you
give it to me.
Mr. Unger. I said to you he came to my office to consult
with us on occasion.
Mr. Cohn. About what?
Mr. Unger. As a client.
Mr. Cohn. As a client?
Mr. Unger. I have no recollection what matter it was.
Again, it was of no significance, absolutely of no
significance.
Mr. Cohn. You say he came to your office to consult with
you on an attorney-client basis concerning a legal matter; is
that right?
Mr. Unger. That's right.
Mr. Cohn. Concerning how many legal matters did he consult
with you?
Mr. Unger. I have no recollection.
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me?
Mr. Unger. I have no recollection.
Mr. Cohn. Did he ever work for you?
Mr. Unger. He did not.
Mr. Cohn. He did not work for you in any respect?
Mr. Unger. I answered that.
Mr. Cohn. I know you answered it, but how does that square
with the fact he told us that he has reported income received
from your law firm for the year of 1950?
Mr. Unger. I say he did not work for me. I have never--I
never recall employing him. If he worked for our office he
certainly wasn't working there with my knowledge.
Mr. Cohn. Well, would you have knowledge of someone working
in your office? Do you know which people are employed by your
office?
Mr. Unger. No. The fact might be--well, what might be the
case is that in some matter that he was working on, not under
my supervision, he may have been on the payroll in the office
for the purpose of a case, possibly, I wouldn't know.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know that?
Mr. Unger. No, I wouldn't know.
Mr. Cohn. Will you check that for us?
Mr. Unger. I probably can.
Mr. Cohn. All right.
Mr. Unger. Probably can.
Mr. Cohn. That is as to the year 1950, particularly. As far
as your testimony, as far as you know, he retained your office,
he consulted your office as a client, in a legal matter, the
nature of which you didn't recall at all?
Mr. Unger. That's right. It is of no significance. And
beyond that, he has been to the office, I am sure that goes
back a number of years, in the course of doing some research
work of a nature that didn't concern me.
Mr. Cohn. What do you mean by research work?
Mr. Unger. He might have looked at a file in the office--
that is to say, a case on appeal, a record.
Mr. Cohn. Did he----
Mr. Unger. I don't know. What specific one? I haven't the
faintest idea.
Mr. Cohn. That is pure conjecture on your part, as to
whether he did or not?
Mr. Unger. As to whether he did, it is not conjecture; it
isn't actually knowledge in the sense that I actually saw him
sit down and do it, but I know that he was a person who was
doing research work.
Mr. Cohn. You have no idea as to the nature of the work?
Mr. Unger. No, it was of no importance to me. It was
insignificant.
Mr. Cohn. Did it have anything to do with the preparation
of the defense of any persons indicted under the Smith Act?
Mr. Unger. It may have.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know whether or not it did, Mr. Unger?
Mr. Unger. I don't.
Mr. Cohn. You have no knowledge?
Mr. Unger. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you do any such work?
Mr Unger. Did I do any such----
Mr Cohn. Did you do any such work concerning the
preparation of the defense of persons indicted under the Smith
Act?
Mr. Unger. I think that is irrelevant to the subject of
inquiry. That has to do with the question of attorney-client
relationships, which obviously are not something which you
should inquire into.
Mr. Cohn. In other words, your testimony is whether or not
you did any work of that nature is a confidential communication
from a client to you; is that right?
Mr. Unger. That's right.
Mr. Cohn. Is that your testimony?
Mr. Unger. Yes, of course. It is self-evident, Mr. Cohn.
Mr. Cohn. Well, let us not argue. Just try to answer the
questions.
Mr. Unger. I have.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know him by the name of Remes or Reiss?
Mr. Unger. Actually, I don't think I ever heard the name
Remes, only Reiss.
Mr. Cohn. Then it was the name Reiss?
Mr. Unger. Reiss.
Mr. Cohn. All right. Now, is Mr. Reiss, to your knowledge,
a member of the Communist party?
Mr. Unger. On that subject, I would say to you I object to
the question on the grounds of principle. I think, for one, on
the basis of what you have already represented here, that is
not a relative question to the inquiry; and secondly, I object
on the ground it is not within the purview of a congressional
committee, this one, to inquire into the political beliefs and
opinions of persons. And thirdly, that it is proper on my part
to identify any person--to describe, rather, the political
opinions or beliefs of any person. That is a matter between
himself and yourself, if he decides to state it.
The Chairman. If the refusal is on that ground, you will be
ordered to answer.
Mr. Unger. I didn't hear you.
The Chairman. If, I say, if the refusal is on that ground,
you will be ordered to answer.
Mr. Unger. I see.
Mr. Cohn. You are free, of course, to consult any time you
want with counsel.
Mr. Unger. I understand. I want you to understand, I said
to you I believe as a matter of principle you have no right to
make such inquiry.
Mr. Cohn. I heard what you said, sir.
Mr. Unger. You have indicated very plainly that the purpose
of your inquiry to me--you have represented to me was to find
out whether or not this man was working for me. I have stated
to you what I do know about him.
The Chairman. And what you know about him?
Mr. Unger. What?
The Chairman. And what you know about him.
Mr. Unger. You haven't asked me what I know about him. You
asked me what I know about his political beliefs, and opinions.
That is an entirely different subject.
The Chairman. Counselor didn't ask you about his political
beliefs and opinions?
Mr. Unger. Yes, he did.
The Chairman. He asked you whether he was a Communist.
Mr. Unger. That is a political belief or opinion.
The Chairman. That is whether or not he belongs to a
conspiracy that is dedicated to overthrow this government. You
will be ordered to answer the question.
Mr. Unger. Senator, I want to say to you again that your
statement as to what the Communist party is is simply a
volunteered personal comment which you make, and while there is
no one to stop you from doing so, you can hardly consider that
it is acceptable as either evidence or as a basis for a
question within the purview of the examination. You have
indicated what you were concerned with here is this man's
connection with me or my office.
Mr. Cohn. And with the Communist party.
The Chairman. You are here to give up any information which
you have about this man. Counsel asked you a very simple
question, whether or not he is a Communist. You will be ordered
to answer the question.
Mr. Unger. I have stated to you----
The Chairman. I have heard what you stated.
Mr. Unger [continuing]. That I think you are not giving it
sufficient consideration, Senator. I understand what your
purpose is. I know that you are going after Communists, and
that is a fairly well-known activity on your part, and it is
not my purpose here to debate that question with you. You have
the power to do so at present, and you seem to be exercising it
for your own purposes. But the point that I make to you is that
as a legal question you have no right to inquire into the
political beliefs and opinions of people, as in this instance
as to ask anyone concerning the political beliefs and opinions
of another, just as you wouldn't have the right to ask me
concerning your own political beliefs and opinions or your own
religious beliefs and opinions, and I have tried to state that
to you as fully and as fairly as I can.
The Chairman. I understand your position, but you will be
ordered to answer the question.
Mr. Unger. All right, I shall confer.
The Chairman. What did you say?
Mr. Unger. I said I shall confer with counsel.
Mr. Jaffe. You have called Mr. Friedman as a witness----
Mr. Cohn. He is Mr. Unger's partner, is that right?
Mr. Jaffe. Yes, and I am here with him as well, under the
same difficult conditions.
Mr. Cohn. Talk to him as well.
All right, it is the same facts, and everything else.
The Chairman. Incidentally, your client will be ordered not
to leave the building. He is under subpoena.
[Whereupon, the witness was temporarily excused.]
TESTIMONY OF ALICE EHRENFELD
The Chairman. Will you please stand and raise your right
hand?
In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I do.
Mr. Cohn. Miss Ehrenfeld, what is your occupation?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I am an attorney.
Mr. Cohn. You are an attorney. When were you admitted to
practice?
Miss Ehrenfeld. November '47.
Mr. Cohn. You graduated from Yale Law School?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. What do you do now? Where were you employed?
Miss Ehrenfeld. The United Nations.
Mr. Cohn. In what capacity?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I am in the social affairs department,
social affairs office.
Mr. Cohn. Social affairs office up at the United Nations.
When did you go to work for the United Nations?
Miss Ehrenfeld. In July 1951.
Mr. Cohn. Miss Ehrenfeld, have you ever been a Communist?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. You have not?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know a man by the name of Sol Newman?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. You don't. Have you ever been in New Haven,
Connecticut?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. You went to Yale, didn't you?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Were you up there around '44?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes, it was my first year.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know a man by the name of Sol Newman
there?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know a man by the name of Sid Silverman?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know a man by the name of Sid Taylor?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever know any member of the Communist
party?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No, not to my knowledge, no one I knew as a
member of the Communist party.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever been a member of the National
Lawyers Guild?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Are you a member now?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. What is the period of your membership?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I think the last time I paid dues was '48.
Mr. Cohn. 1948 was the last time you paid dues?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. When was the last time you had any connection
with the National Lawyers Guild?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I think it was some time in '48. I went to
a meeting in Washington.
Mr. Cohn. You haven't attended any meetings since then?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you regard the National Lawyers Guild as
under Communist domination?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Didn't you?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever consider that question?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No, I didn't consider it to be under
Communist domination.
Mr. Cohn. Don't you know that the entire roster of officers
in the National Lawyers Guild resigned from it some time ago--
Justice Jackson, Justice Pecora, and a number of others--and
called it an organization completely under the domination of
the Communist party? You were familiar with that, weren't you?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I knew it had been under attack for that.
Mr. Cohn. Didn't that give you some pause as to whether or
not you ought to belong to it?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I thought it was a reasonable professional
association at the time I belonged to it.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know of any policy it ever adopted which
was contrary to that followed by the Communist party?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No. To be absolutely honest, I didn't keep
very close track on it. I just went to a couple of meetings.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know anybody by the name of Abraham
Ehrenfeld?
Miss Ehrenfeld. That is my father.
Mr. Cohn. Is he teaching in a high school in New York?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No, he is an assistant superintendent.
Mr. Cohn. Assistant superintendent of schools?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Has he ever been a Communist?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Cohn. Is he a registered member of the American Labor
party, do you know?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I don't think so. He is a registered
Democrat.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know whether your father was ever a
sponsor or connected with the Carver School?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I don't know.
Mr. Cohn. You don't know that. Do you have a brother named
Robert Louis Ehrenfeld?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know whether or not he has been a
registered member of the American Labor party?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I think he once registered in ALP.
Mr. Cohn. When was the last time he registered in ALP, do
you know?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I don't know.
Mr. Cohn. Has he ever been active in the American
Association of Scientific Workers, which is listed as a
Communist front?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I don't know.
Mr. Cohn. Was one of your references for application at the
United Nations Thomas Emerson?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Is that Professor Emerson of Yale Law School?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know Professor Emerson was a member of the
Communist party?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I don't think so.
Mr. Cohn. You don't think to this day he was?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Would you regard him as a Communist?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know Professor Emerson rather well?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Yes, he was my reference.
Mr. Cohn. I see. Had you ever discussed communism and
related subjects with him?
Miss Ehrenfeld. We had political discussions.
Mr. Cohn. As a result of those political discussions, did
you not gain the impression that Mr. Emerson was a Communist?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. You did not?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you regard him as anti-Communist?
Miss Ehrenfeld. In some ways, yes.
Mr. Cohn. In what ways?
Miss Ehrenfeld. Well, I do remember his--I remember he took
issue on the Korean----
Mr. Cohn. That was quite a bit after you knew him as your
professor?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I really don't know too much about it, but
I do remember some things about left--Progressive party, or
something, on Korea. I really don't remember.
Mr. Cohn. Why did you drop out of the National Lawyers
Guild?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I just--I had never been very active, and I
went to a meeting in Washington and there didn't seem to be
anything very much, and I just didn't go any more, I just
didn't pay my dues any more.
Mr. Cohn. It had nothing to do with the question of
Communist control?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Would it bother you if the organization were
under Communist domination?
Miss Ehrenfeld. If I thought it was Communist dominated, I
probably wouldn't belong to it.
Mr. Cohn. Is there any doubt about that in your mind?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I didn't think it was Communist dominated.
Mr. Cohn. You said you wouldn't belong to it. Is there any
doubt that if it were under Communist domination you wouldn't
belong to it?
Miss Ehrenfeld. If there was no doubt in my mind that it
was under Communist domination, I would not belong to it.
Mr. Cohn. What evidence did you secure to indicate that it
was not under Communist domination, in view of the resignation
of the top officers?
Miss Ehrenfeld. I didn't go looking. I am not sure even
what time the top officers resigned.
Mr. Cohn. I see. And you are quite sure you don't know Mr.
Newman, or Mr. Silverman, who is also known as Mr. Taylor up in
New Haven; is that right?
Miss Ehrenfeld. The names don't mean anything to me now.
Mr. Cohn. One of those persons said that you had been a
member of a professional group of the Communist party up there,
they would not be telling the truth; is that so?
Miss Ehrenfeld. They would not be telling the truth.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever attend a Communist meeting?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. In New Haven?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever attend a meeting that you now think
might have been a Communist meeting?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. You have any doubt about that?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. None whatsoever?
Miss Ehrenfeld. No.
Mr. Cohn. All right, that will be all for this afternoon.
We will let you know when we want you back.
The Chairman. We may not want you back. Incidentally, your
name will not be given to the press by the committee, so that
the only way that anyone will learn that you were here is if
you decide to tell them yourself. We just want you to know that
there will be no publicity as to the fact that you were here,
unless you decide to give it out yourself.
Miss Ehrenfeld. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I doubt very much we will want you back, I
wish you would consider yourself still under subpoena, and in
case there is any further information we want we will let you
know. Thank you very much.
[Witness excused.]
TESTIMONY OF ABRAHAM UNGER (ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL, BERNARD
JAFFE) (RESUMED)
Mr. Unger. During the recess I conferred with my partner,
and he has reminded me that we were the attorneys of record in
the original Smith Act trial, and that in the course of that
time a number of people were employed for various tasks, among
which was the job of research, and among whom was Mr. Reiss,
who was on a payroll which was handled by him, by my partner,
whose name is David M. Friedman, and I think that is the
complete story. How long a period of time he worked there,
whether it was months or weeks, I have no recollection.
Mr. Cohn. So the specific matter on which Mr. Reiss was
working was research in connection with the defense of the
Communist leaders, your firm having been attorneys of record
for them?
Mr. Unger. That is the employment to which you refer.
Mr. Cohn. All right, sir, fine. That clears that up. Now,
can we get back to the question as to whether or not you knew--
--
Mr. Unger. I restate my objection, and also add the further
fact that I do not know.
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me?
Mr. Unger. I do not know.
Mr. Cohn. You don't know?
Mr. Unger. I don't.
Mr. Cohn. You have no knowledge as to whether he is or is
not a Communist?
Mr. Unger. Precisely.
Mr. Cohn. Or whether he was or was not in the year 1950?
Mr. Unger. That's right.
Mr. Cohn. You have no knowledge of that?
Mr. Unger. Precisely.
Mr. Cohn. Were you yourself at that time the head of the
professional group of the Communist party in this area?
Mr. Unger. I object to the question, and here we are back
again to the original issue raised by the senator's
representation and the representation made by the counsel for
the committee. It has been represented to us that this was an
inquiry into the employment or association of Mr. Remes or
Reiss, myself and my partner. There is no relevancy in the
question now propounded in so far as the nature of the
examination being conducted here, and it is not within the
province of this committee to make such inquiry as to the
political beliefs and opinions of myself. I object, for the
reason that this is an intrusion upon the personal political
rights and freedoms of an individual, and entirely outside the
scope and powers of a congressional committee, having no
relevancy to the subject of an investigation, not being
pertinent or material to the investigation, and intended solely
for ulterior purposes which are improper and unlawful, and I
therefore object to answering that question.
I further would indicate that that is a violation of the
representation already made by the chairman of the committee
and by counsel for the committee.
Mr. Cohn. That is just not accurate.
Mr. Unger. I insist that it is.
The Chairman. You have your position. Let us see. Number
one, Mr. Cohn, you certainly are strictly within the
jurisdiction of the committee when you inquire with regard to
this UN employee, Mr. Reiss, when you inquire as to his
Communist connections, whether he belongs to a conspiracy
against this country. I think that you are within your right
when you inquire as to whether or not he was the employer who
worked in defense of men accused of teaching and advocating the
overthrow of the government by force and violence. I believe to
go into the background of Reiss and to get the full picture of
him you must get the background of anyone associated with him.
Mr. Cohn. Of course, this witness says he doesn't know
whether or not Reiss is a Communist. As you know, Mr. Chairman,
we have some evidence to the contrary, and it appears that Mr.
Reiss was a member of the party.
The Chairman. In other words, you have got information that
shows this witness either knows or should know that Reiss was a
Communist; is that right?
Mr. Cohn. That's right.
The Chairman. And one way to evaluate his testimony is to
find out whether or not he is in a position to know whether or
not he was a member of the Communist party. In addition to
that, he works for government agencies--this witness himself
does.
Mr. Unger. Who does?
The Chairman. Practices before government agencies. I think
there is no question about that. Don't you think so?
Mr. Cohn. There is not.
The Chairman. The witness will be ordered to answer the
question.
Mr. Jaffe. May I say this, Senator----
The Chairman. No. I may say that you may advise with your
client fully, but the rules of the committee, that have been
adopted by the several members of the committee, are that a
lawyer can advise with his client as freely as he cares to at
any time, but the lawyer is not allowed to take part in the
proceedings. Therefore, you can advise with your client as much
as you care to. If there are any questions in mind that you
care to ask Mr. Cohn and myself, we will be glad to try and
answer them for you
Mr. Jaffe. That is what I mean. Can I ask you a question?
The Chairman. Oh, certainly.
Mr. Jaffe. See, when we first started, and I suggested that
an adjournment would be desirable, you indicated that the scope
of the inquiry would be about this man Riess.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Jaffe. And, well, as far as I am concerned, as a
lawyer, if somebody wants to answer a few questions about a
particular individual, he can go ahead.
But are you now indicating that this man's whole
activities, just like Reiss' whole activities, were open for
your inquiry, now this man's whole life, and his opinions, and
his activities, become open for inquiry?
The Chairman. I am not concerned with his opinions at all.
One of the questions is whether or not Reiss was a high
functionary of the Communist party. This witness says he
doesn't know. It is very pertinent to find out whether he is in
a position to know or not. He has been asked a very simple
question, whether or not he himself is high in the party. If
so, he would know whether Reiss is a member. He will be ordered
to answer that, unless he wants to take advantage of the Fifth
Amendment, of course.
Mr. Jaffe. Well, I wonder whether I might act upon your
earlier suggestion, then, and request an adjournment of this so
that I can discuss this with him fully, because this opens up
an entirely new area of inquiry, if I am to participate in it.
The Chairman. I think that is a reasonable request.
Mr. Unger. I should like to state for the record that the
witness has been misled by representations made by the senator
and a member of the bar in this inquiry, that after carefully
thinking over the problem, no reasonably minded person can come
to the conclusion that the questions presently propounded, or
the line of inquiry that seems to be indicated has any
relevancy to, has any bearing upon what was represented to be
the subject of the inquiry.
I have thought very carefully in the few minutes concerning
that matter, and I say, therefore, that the inquiry is not now
within the purview set down by the--within the purview of the
subject matter of the investigation or represented by the
senator and the counsel.
The Chairman. Do you want an adjournment? I won't hear any
statement, if you want an adjournment. I am not going to spend
any more time with you. Are you asking for an adjournment?
Mr. Unger. I concur with the request of counsel for an
adjournment.
The Chairman. All right. You will be given a recess until
tomorrow morning at 10:30. I may say, for your benefit, under
the rules of the committee, this committee has absolute
jurisdiction if we wanted to go into any subversive activities
on your part, in view of the fact that you are admitted to
practice before a United States agency. That is not the
principal purpose of this hearing. What we are interested in
are the subversive activities of Mr. Reiss. We will give you
adjournment until 10:30 tomorrow morning.
Mr. Unger. I will be in court at 10:30 tomorrow morning. I
have a court engagement set before this.
Mr. Cohn. What is the engagement?
Mr. Unger. The case of People vs Vitale and two others.
Mr. Cohn. Where is that? What court?
Mr. Unger. In felony court, youth term.
Mr. Cohn. Here in Manhattan?
Mr. Unger. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. How long do you imagine that is going to take?
Mr. Unger. Maybe twelve, one o'clock.
Mr. Jaffe. May I request your indulgence, Senator, for my
own purposes? As I say, I was called into this on very, very
short notice. My own schedule today is disrupted and it is very
crowded tomorrow. As a result, I wonder whether or not you
could indulge me in some additional time beyond that, so that I
can really have an opportunity to talk to him and know whether
or not I can go ahead or should represent him.
The Chairman. Well, here is our only problem. I certainly
would like to give you all the time that you think you need to
examine this legal question. We have the entire staff up here;
we have other work set for next week and the week after. Our
schedule calls for disposing of this this week. I don't think
we should disrupt your client's legal work that he is planning
on doing tomorrow morning. If he is going to be in court until
one o'clock, he shouldn't be asked to come here and testify. I
frankly don't think it is unreasonable if we gave him instead
of 'til 10:30 in the morning, in view of this court work, that
we give him until some time tomorrow afternoon.
We can do this: We can try and suit your convenience as to
the time we set for tomorrow afternoon. In other words, if it
will be easier for you to come in at 2:30, or 3:30, or 1:30, we
will try and accommodate you as to that.
Mr. Unger. You said at the outset that you will put it off
until next week.
Mr. Cohn. No, Mr. Unger, please.
Mr. Unger. Was I mistaken?
The Chairman. No, you asked for a week's adjournment and I
said if the matter came up and we needed additional time, we
would try and work it out.
Mr. Jaffe. This is an inquiry into Mr. Unger himself. Now,
I don't know what is involved personally, again. I am a lawyer.
I would like to inquire into it. I have heard Mr. Unger object
to this statement. I would like to discuss that with him, and
frankly, Senator, I realize that you are taking Mr. Unger's
convenience into consideration, but I want you to take into
consideration my own convenience.
Mr. Unger. I want to say, Senator--to aid you in forming a
judgment--I want to say to you, you have been told everything
there is to know concerning the relation of Mr. Unger or Mr.
Friedman with Mr. Remes, or Mr. Reiss.
Mr. Cohn. You say that now, Mr. Unger.
Mr. Unger. What?
Mr. Cohn. I say, you say that now. A few minutes ago you
were equally sure that Mr. Reiss had never been paid any money
by your firm, or he had not been employed by your firm.
Mr. Unger. That means nothing inconsistent. When I say
``equally sure,'' I meant just what I said, and as far as I was
concerned, he was not employed by us, and as a matter of fact
you might have asked about ten or fifteen other persons who
were employed in the same manner, and my answer would
undoubtedly have been the same, because in the course of my
practice as an attorney with my partner, I normally would know
the people that we employed. We employed a stenographer, we may
have employed a clerk, and that would be the end of it. This
happened to be a special and a very peculiar kind of
relationship that lasted for a short period of time, and as you
yourself are aware of, it was in connection with one case. That
is an obvious explanation for my having made the statement. I
didn't make the statement out of bravado, or out of a simple
desire to answer your question, but out of a conviction that
that was the fact. I find out that I am in error about it. I
correct that statement. You now have everything, practically
everything--I say practically, because I don't again want to be
held to whether or not I saw him one day on the street. You now
have everything that there is to know which might have any
relevancy to an inquiry by a Congressional committee concerning
the relation of Mr. Friedman or with Mr. Remes or Mr. Reiss,
period.
Mr. Cohn. You see, the senator has to pass judgment on the
question of relevancy. You don't know what we have and what we
want to do.
Mr. Unger. I said to you now, when I say, `` relevancy,''
all that I mean by that is that it excludes such a question as
whether or not I had a drink with him one day. But insofar as
it has anything to do with any business relations of any kind,
you have got the whole story, because that is all there is to
it. There is nothing more to it than that.
Mr. Cohn. The question we have now--I mean we have to ask
the questions we have to ask--the matter of adjournment.
The Chairman. Number one, it is important to know what, if
any, dealings he had with this man as a member of the Communist
party.
Mr. Unger. You have been told what they were.
The Chairman. Please don't interrupt. It is important to
know what dealings he had with this man Reiss, who has been
identified as a top functionary of the Communist party, in
order to pass upon the veracity of this witness, his
credibility, and to know what position he was in, to know
whether or not Reiss was a Communist. It is certainly relevant
to know whether this man was a top member of the party. I think
if counsel makes a point, however, that it is a very important
matter to him. He was subpoenaed yesterday.
Mr. Cohn. Of course, the witness is a member of the bar
himself.
The Chairman. He is a member of the bar and he has been
dealing with this particular type of work, so it is not new to
him at all, in defending these cases.
We will give you your choice, whether you want to come in
at 9:30 Thursday morning--that is a bit early--or if you want
to come in sometime Wednesday afternoon, and tell us what time
you prefer. I might say, we are trying to accommodate you as to
the time on Wednesday afternoon.
Mr. Jaffe. Couldn't you make it at least Thursday
afternoon, Senator, after your public sessions are over?
The Chairman. We cannot, because the public sessions will
last most likely Thursday and Friday.
Mr. Jaffe. At any time that they are over in the
afternoon--you see, it would be so much better for me, frankly.
One of my partners is away right now.
Mr. Unger. Why don't you put it over 'til next weekend?
Mr. Cohn. We can't do it.
Mr. Jaffe. If you put it over 'til Thursday or Friday, any
time.
Mr. Cohn. We can't do it, Mr. Unger. We have to get this
over with. We have a lot of other witnesses.
Mr. Unger. Why don't you take your other witnesses, if your
object is, as you state, or represented to me--or as you state
it in the newspapers--then I don't know why you persist in
saying that you have to have it tomorrow, when you are now told
that there is no more that you can get that has any bearing at
all on this matter in the remotest way?
The Chairman. The information that has a bearing is whether
or not you are a top member of the party.
Mr. Unger. I didn't hear you.
The Chairman. The information that has a very direct
bearing is whether or not you yourself were a top member of the
party.
Mr. Unger. I thought you were making an inquiry into Mr.
Remes, or Reiss.
The Chairman. We are not going to argue with you.
Mr. Unger. The whole point is in reference to the
adjournment.
Mr. Jaffe. If you can't put it over 'til next week,
couldn't you make it the afternoon of Thursday or Friday? Any
time you say; you can give me a call, or give Mr. Unger a call
when you are finished.
Mr. Unger. That's an idea. Give me a call, and give me a
couple of hours notice. Do you want to do it that way, on a
couple of hours notice?
The Chairman. We will make it Thursday afternoon at two
o'clock.
Mr. Jaffe. All right. Now, would the same thing apply to
Mr. Friedman?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Jaffe. Because the same information would be given by
Mr. Friedman.
Mr. Cohn. They are probably in the same boat.
Mr. Jaffe. And you propose to ask Mr. Friedman about his--
--
The Chairman. Yes. Just so there will be no question about
the scope of the examination, we will question both Mr.
Friedman and Mr. Unger on the activities of Mr. Reiss or Mr.
Remes, the capacity in which he worked in the office, the type
of work he was doing, whether he was known to them as a
Communist, anything else about him that would reflect upon that
question, and we will ask both Mr. Unger and Mr. Friedman about
their own activities, if any, within the party. That will be
necessary so that we can determine whether or not they are in a
position to know whether he was a Communist or not, and I may
say, just for the benefit of counsel, we have a rule of the
committee, passed unanimously by the committee, to the effect
that the chair can institute preliminary investigations, call
witnesses on any matter having to do with the business of the
federal government, so that even if Mr. Reiss' United Nations
matter were not up here, my interpretation of the authority of
the committee would be that we could call Mr. Unger anyway, in
view of his having been admitted to practice before a federal
agency. I bring that up because Mr. Unger was questioning the
jurisdiction of the committee.
I think we should subpoena, Roy, the records having to do
with the payments made to Mr. Reiss.
Mr. Cohn. Bring down just whatever you have reflecting
whatever payments were made to Reiss at any time by your firm
or by yourself.
Mr. Unger. I can see no reason offhand for not having them,
but I shall have to discuss that with my partner.
The Chairman. So the record will be clear, the witness is
ordered to produce the records showing payments made to Mr.
Reiss, or showing the type of work that Mr. Reiss did while in
the employ of the witness Unger, or his partner, Mr. Friedman,
or the firm. That will be two o'clock on Thursday. [Witness
excused.]
TESTIMONY OF DIMITRI VARLEY (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, HERMAN
A GRAY) (RESUMED)
The Chairman. The witness is reminded that he is still
under oath.
Mr. Carr. Mr. Varley, do you know a man named Johannes
Steel?
Mr. Varley. I don't believe so. I think I met him at one of
the UN cocktail parties.
Mr. Carr. Would you recall what year you met him?
Mr. Varley. Well, that would be anywhere from '46 on, I
guess.
Mr. Carr. You have no recollection as to the year?
Mr. Varley. No--I mean from '46 on.
Mr. Carr. After you were at the UN?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
Mr. Carr. Do you know who Mr. Steel is?
Mr. Varley. Yes. He is a journalist.
Mr. Carr. And a commentator. Did you ever subscribe to a
newsletter that he put out?
Mr. Varley. I did.
Mr. Carr. Did you subscribe at the time you met him, or had
you subscribed previous to that?
Mr. Varley. I don't remember the date. I subscribed on the
basis of the ad I received.
Mr. Carr. An ad that you had received?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
Mr. Carr. Do you think this was prior to the time you went
to the UN?
Mr. Varley. I don't remember clearly. I can check up, but
I----
Mr. Carr. You say you met him at a cocktail party, you
think, at the UN?
Mr. Varley. If I did meet him at all, I think I met him at
one of those receptions.
Mr. Carr. At the UN itself?
Mr. Varley. Not necessarily; at one of the receptions given
by a delegation.
The Chairman. Which delegation?
Mr. Varley. I wouldn't be able to recall. I have very vague
recollections, because I heard the name, I knew he was a
journalist, and I think it was some kind of a thing that so and
so, and you shake hands.
The Chairman. Is it a usual practice for the delegations to
invite well known Communists to their parties, their cocktail
parties?
Mr. Varley. I don't know what their practice is.
The Chairman. At the time you met him, did you have any
idea that he was a Communist?
Mr. Varley. I don't know whether he is a Communist or not.
The Chairman. Do you know now?
Mr. Varley. I don't know anything about him besides except
subscribing to his letters.
The Chairman. How did you pay for the subscription, do you
recall?
Mr. Varley. Mostly by my check.
The Chairman. By a check to him?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you have correspondence with him?
Mr. Varley. No, sir, except sending subscription to whoever
it was.
The Chairman. Did you ever write to him?
Mr. Varley. No, sir, not to my recollection.
The Chairman. Did you think that the material which he sent
you followed the Communist line?
Mr. Varley. I wouldn't clearly remember. I remember much
material he would write on foreign news, and my general
impression--may I continue, or do I make it too long?
The Chairman. You may continue.
Mr. Varley. I felt that it was rather lengthy and uneven
material, but there were some bits of stories that were not in
the daily newspapers it was worth reading.
The Chairman. How much did you pay for the paper, the
newsletter?
Mr. Varley. I think it was four or five dollars.
The Chairman. A year?
Mr. Varley. Yes. The reason why I think that, because I
thought it was expensive, because it was, I think, a monthly
mimeographed letter.
The Chairman. How many years did you subscribe to it?
Mr. Varley. I would think about two years.
Mr. Carr. You renewed the subscription to it?
Mr. Varley. I think so, but I think it folded up, because I
have recollection that it stopped.
The Chairman. It was a strictly Communist sheet, wasn't it,
put out by top Communists?
Mr. Varley. I don't know that he is a Communist, and I
didn't think it was.
The Chairman. Did you have any reason to think he was a
Communist?
Mr. Varley. No.
The Chairman. Did his material follow the Communist line?
You could tell by reading that he was a Communist, couldn't
you?
Mr. Varley. Really, Senator, I am trying to think hard, and
the last thing I remember about Steel was his radio comments
during the war. I don't recall them being Communist material.
The Chairman. You say you don't recall that the newsletter
you got from him appeared to be Communist?
Mr. Varley. I didn't have that impression, Senator.
Mr. Carr. Now tell me, Mr. Varley, did you ever subscribe
to any other newsletter?
Mr. Varley. I can't think offhand. May I ask my lawyer?
Mr. Carr. Certainly.
[Whereupon, the witness consulted with his counsel.]
Mr. Varley. I have no clear recollection.
Mr. Carr. The only newsletter you recall ever subscribing
to was the one put out by Johannes Steel?
Mr. Varley. Yes. Since you asked me that question, I recall
that.
Mr. Carr. It is possible there may have been some others,
but that is the only one you recall at this point?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
The Chairman. How about the Daily Worker?
Mr. Varley. I didn't subscribe to Daily Worker.
The Chairman. Did you buy it, or get it?
Mr. Varley. Many years ago I read it, but whether I read it
in the library or bought it on the stand, I don't remember.
The Chairman. How many years ago?
Mr. Varley. I would say it would be at least fifteen years
or so--up to the point when it was easier to get Russian papers
and I was looking for the material on Russian economic news.
The Chairman. Did you ever go to any Communist party
meetings?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Sir?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Did you know anyone who was a member of the
Communist party?
Mr. Varley. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Carr. Did you ever know a man named Harley Freeman?
Mr. Varley. Harley Freeman? Yes, I know him.
Mr. Carr. Did you know that he was a member of the
Communist party?
Mr. Varley. I don't know.
Mr. Carr. Do you know his wife, Vera?
Mr. Varley. I know her, yes.
Mr. Carr. Do you know that she is a member of the Communist
party?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did you know at that time that you knew them?
Mr. Varley. I didn't know, and I don't know.
The Chairman. How well do you know them?
Mr. Varley. I know them socially for several years.
The Chairman. You visited their home, did you?
Mr. Varley. I did.
The Chairman. And they visited yours?
Mr. Varley. They did.
The Chairman. You still have that association?
Mr. Varley. I see them infrequently socially, yes.
The Chairman. How many times have you been at their home in
the last six months?
Mr. Varley. I think I was once--that is, to my best
recollection--last six months.
The Chairman. How many times would you say they have been
to your home in the last six months?
Mr. Varley. They haven't been at my home during the last
six months.
The Chairman. Have you met them any place outside of their
home in the last six months?
Mr. Varley. No, sir, not that I can recall.
The Chairman. Did you ever discuss communism with them?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You say you never had any reason to know they
were Communists?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. You never suspected it?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did you know that Freeman had been associated
with the TASS?
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did you know that he had been employed by the
Daily Worker?
Mr. Varley. I might have heard it, that he was employed but
I am not sure that I----
Mr. Carr. You never discussed that with him?
Mr. Varley. No, sir. He is employed by TASS, that I know.
The Chairman. You knew he was employed by TASS?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
The Chairman. And you heard that he worked at the Daily
Worker?
Mr. Varley. I am not sure.
The Chairman. You say you had no reason to think that he
might have been a Communist?
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You still say that?
Mr. Varley. I still say that.
The Chairman. That is, a man works for TASS and the Daily
Worker, and you have no reason to think that he might have been
a Communist?
Mr. Varley. I am not sure that I know he worked for Daily
Worker. You mentioned it, and I am----
The Chairman. I might say that you are not even trying to
be truthful with us, when you tell us that this friend of
yours, that you know, whom you visit, who visits your home, you
know he works for the Communist paper from Moscow, and you
heard he worked for the Daily Worker, and then you sit there
and perjure yourself and say, ``I had no reason to know he was
a Communist.'' You know better than that. If you don't then you
shouldn't be holding a $12,000 a year job at the UN. You can go
right ahead and do all of the lying you care to. We will give
you all the chance in the world. I have warned you three or
four times either to tell us the truth or refuse to answer.
Mr. Varley. Senator, I didn't refuse to answer. I am trying
to be as cooperative as I can, and when you ask me whether he
worked, what I know, I did say and I did tell you that I didn't
discuss communism with him, and I have no reason to know that
if he worked for TASS, he must be Communist.
Mr. Carr. Do you know Amy Oppenheimer?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. From Tuckahoe, New York?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. You don't know her?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Are you sure of that, now?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. You have no recollection of having been in
contact with Amy Oppenheimer?
Mr. Varley. Could you tell me who she is? Maybe I can----
Mr. Carr. Amy Oppenheimer was a prominent member of the
tri-county section of the Communist party--tri-county meaning
covering the Tuckahoe area.
Mr. Varley. No, sir, I don't know her.
Mr. Carr. You never had any contact with her that you
recall?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Have you ever contributed to the Veterans of the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade financially?
Mr. Varley. That is the question the counsel asked me this
morning, and I might have, but I have no clear recollection.
Mr. Carr. Did you ever contribute to the American Committee
for the Protection of the Foreign Born?
Mr. Varley. I did.
Mr. Carr. You did. When was that, do you recall?
Mr. Varley. This morning, I said '49, '50. I don't recall
the date, but maybe we could----
Mr. Carr. That is all right.
The Chairman. Incidentally, I am not sure if counsel has
identified himself.
Mr. Gray. Yes, I did this morning: Herman A. Gray, G-r-a-y,
551 Fifth Avenue, New York.
The Chairman. All right.
Do you recognize the American Labor party as Communist
controlled?
Mr. Varley. I have no knowledge to believe so, sir.
The Chairman. Did you think it is not Communist controlled?
Mr. Varley. I don't know enough whether it is or not.
The Chairman. When you join a party and register as a
member, don't you first find out whether it is run by the
Communists or not, or are you interested in that?
Mr. Varley. I registered with the party many years ago and
I kept up that registration. At the time when I registered I
remember seeing some material on the aims of the American Labor
party, and it didn't appear to me to be in any way contrary to
it.
The Chairman. You registered again in 1950, didn't you?
Mr. Varley. Yes, I repeated registration, but I didn't
examine their aims--reexamine their aims, and I assumed they
were more or less what they were to start with.
The Chairman. You didn't read the publicity in the paper
about their being Communist controlled?
Mr. Varley. I think I mentioned this morning that I have
seen something, I believe, during election campaign, but I
didn't see any--I mean, nothing to convince me that it was the
case.
The Chairman. Did you ever hear of a publication called In
Fact?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
The Chairman. Did you sell that?
Mr. Varley. No, I did not.
The Chairman. Didn't you ever sell that?
Mr. Varley. Sell In Fact?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Varley. I subscribed to it once.
The Chairman. Did you ever sell it?
Mr. Varley. Not to my knowledge, not to my recollection.
The Chairman. You don't recall ever having sold it?
Mr. Varley. Excuse me, would you repeat that?
The Chairman. You don't recall ever having sold it?
Mr. Varley. I don't recall that. May I just come back to
one question that counsel asked before? In Fact was also a sort
of a kind of a newsletter, if I recall; it was way back, but I
think it was kind of a page or two pages.
The Chairman. A Communist publication, was it not?
Mr. Varley. Not to my knowledge.
The Chairman. Outside of the newsletter by Steel, who has
been named as a Communist, In Fact, which has been described as
a Communist publication, you don't recall having subscribed to
any other newsletters or papers?
Mr. Varley. Well, I subscribed, I recall, to the
information bulletin published by the Soviet embassy, when it
existed, but I didn't consider it--I considered it governmental
publication.
The Chairman. You subscribed to the Soviet embassy
bulletin? How many years did you get that? How many years did
you subscribe to that?
Mr. Varley. I think I started receiving it about 1945,
roughly.
The Chairman. How many years did you, subscribe to it?
Mr. Varley. And I got it until it was--they discontinued
it, or it was stopped.
The Chairman. Did you get bulletins from any of the other
embassies?
Mr. Varley. I do not recall, except that occasionally I
would get newsletters in my office from some countries--maybe
Australian or Brazilian. I wouldn't recall.
Mr. Carr. Do you know a man named Vladimir Kazakvich?
Mr. Varley. I did know him years ago.
Mr. Carr. When?
Mr. Varley. I went to college with him.
Mr. Carr. What college was that?
Mr. Varley. Columbia.
Mr. Carr. Columbia University?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
Mr. Carr, Were you a fellow student or----
Mr. Varley. We were fellow students.
Mr. Carr. You were fellow students?
Mr. Varley. Yes, at Columbia University.
Mr. Carr. He has been accused of being a Soviet agent?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. When did your acquaintanceship with him end or
does it continue today?
Mr. Varley. I knew him for some time after the college and
saw him occasionally, and stopped seeing him, I would say,
roughly around or before the war.
Mr. Carr. You haven't seen him since before the war, before
1941?
Mr. Varley. I have no recollection. Then I heard that he
left for Russia. That is about all I knew about him.
The Chairman. In other words, you saw him up until he left
for Russia?
Mr. Varley. I didn't see him--I might say that I have seen
him in the college days frequently and quite often after that,
because we both were members of a student organization.
The Chairman. What student organization?
Mr. Varley. It was National Russian Students Christian
Association.
The Chairman. National Russian----
Mr. Varley. Students Christian Association.
The Chairman. Are you of Russian descent, incidentally?
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir--excuse me, am I of Russian descent?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Were you born in this country?
Mr. Varley. No, I was born in Russia.
The Chairman. When did you come from Russia?
Mr. Varley. I came here in 1923.
Mr. Carr. Were you a member of a Soviet espionage ring in
conjunction with Mr. Kazahevich?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did he ever speak to you concerning what he was
doing?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did he ever approach you----
Mr. Varley. May I just----
Mr. Carr. Go ahead.
Mr. Varley. When you say was I a member of a ring, that I
don't even know of such a ring, so he never spoke to me about
it.
Mr. Carr. Did he ever speak to you about what he was doing?
When I say ``what he was doing,'' I mean what he was doing in
connection with this Soviet espionage ring.
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did he ever approach you to join with him in this
ring?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did he ever ask any favors of any kind of you?
Mr. Varley. That is more difficult question, because during
the student days he might have borrowed something from me and I
borrowed from him.
Mr. Carr. Following that period, in the period up to when
you last saw him sometime before the war, roughly 1941, did he
ever ask you to furnish him with any information?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did he ever ask your opinion concerning any
information--when I say ``any information,'' I mean on any
subject other than the weather, a ball game, or something like
that.
Mr. Varley. You mean in terms of the espionage?
Mr. Carr. Right.
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Do you know where he is today?
Mr. Varley. No, sir. I heard that he left for Russia.
Mr. Carr. You haven't heard from him since he left?
Mr. Varley. I haven't heard from him. Actually I haven't
seen him for years before he left for Russia.
Mr. Carr. When you were a member of the State, County and
Municipal Workers Union, did you not sell copies of In Fact to
other members of your local?
Mr. Varley. I cannot recall anything of that sort, sir. I
remember, as I told you, that I subscribed myself.
Mr. Carr. You don't remember seeing the man at your local,
Local 28, I believe it was, who distributed the In Fact
magazine letter?
Mr. Varley. I have no recollection.
Mr. Carr. You have no recollection of that whatsoever?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Do you know a man named Kenneth Durant? \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Kenneth Durant served as the chief American representative of
TASS--Telegrafnoye Agentstvo Sovietskovo Soyuza or Telegraph Agency of
the Soviet Union--from 1919 until 1944.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Varley. I do.
Mr. Carr. Who is he?
Mr. Varley. He is the husband of a woman who is dead now,
who was a teacher of my wife, who was a famous American poet.
Her name was Genevieve Taggard. That is how I met him.
Mr. Carr. When is the last time you saw Kenneth Durant?
Mr. Varley. I stopped at his place this summer about--when
was it--July or August.
Mr. Carr. This year?
Mr. Varley. This year--and that was, I believe, first time
I saw him in about last three years or approximately that.
Mr. Carr. You mean since 1949?
Mr. Varley. Roughly, yes.
Mr. Carr. Did you ever know Durant as a member of the
Communist party?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did he ever approach you to join the Communist
party?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Did you know that during the period that you were
in contact with him, which now includes up through 1953, that
he has been a liaison between the Soviet Union and the
Communist party of this country?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. You had never heard of that?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. Had you ever heard of him being accused of being
such a liaison?
Mr. Varley. I have seen something in the newspapers or a
magazine article, but I don't remember where it was--very
recently, but very vaguely.
Mr. Carr. Well----
Mr. Varley. May I just [consulting with counsel]. I really
don't remember.
Mr. Carr. But it was prior to July or August of this year
when you visited him again?
Mr. Varley. I can't really remember clearly.
Mr. Carr. You don't remember clearly concerning that?
Mr. Varley. No.
Mr. Carr. Where does Durant live? Where did Durant live at
the time you visited him in 1953?
Mr. Varley. In Vermont.
Mr. Carr. In Vermont? What place is that?
Mr. Varley. He lives on a farm. It is either East Jamaica
or Jamaica.
Mr. Carr. Now, just so this will be straight, at the time
you visited him in 1953, was that a social visit?
Mr. Varley. Purely social visit.
Mr. Carr. Did you stay there any length of time?
Mr. Varley. We came very late, I would say about seven
o'clock. They were going to some concert. They didn't expect
us--we were driving by--so they invited us to go to a concert.
We went with them to a concert, and we left early following
morning.
Mr. Carr. Did you stay overnight?
Mr. Varley. We stayed overnight.
Mr. Carr. At his residence?
Mr. Varley. At his residence.
Mr. Carr. Well, prior to this visit, had you heard that he
was a member of the Communist party?
[Whereupon, Mr. Varley consulted with his counsel.]
Mr. Varley. No, I did not.
Mr. Cohn. On this fellow Durant, we questioned you about
him before the grand jury a year ago, didn't we, and told you
he was a Communist?
Mr. Varley. You asked me whether I know he was a Communist.
That is my recollection.
Mr. Cohn. I see.
Mr. Varley. To my recollection, I said I didn't know.
Mr. Cohn. Don't you know Whittaker Chambers testified that
Durant was a liaison between Soviet underground and the
Communist party?
Mr. Varley. No.
Mr. Cohn. We told you that before the grand jury.
Mr. Varley. That Whittaker Chambers testified?
Mr. Cohn. Oh, yes.
Mr. Varley. May I look at the grand jury minutes?
Mr. Cohn. No, you can't look at them, and I can't look at
them. Do you remember being questioned about Kenneth Durant
before the grand jury?
Mr. Varley. That I remember. Yes, I do.
Mr. Cohn. What did we tell you about Durant?
Mr. Varley. You asked me whether I knew that he was a
foreign agent, I believe, and I said not to my knowledge.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever asked him whether or not he was?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. You haven't. Didn't it interest you?
Mr. Varley. It is difficult to answer yes or no on that
question. I had no reason to believe that he was, and therefore
I didn't believe I should ask him that kind of a question.
Mr. Cohn. You didn't think you should ask him that kind of
a question?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. And after you were questioned about him before
the grand jury and all that, you continued to see him?
Mr. Varley. I saw him, yes, sir.
Mr. Carr. Just one or two questions, Mr. Varley. Do you
know Caroline Flechener?
Mr. Varley. Yes, I do.
Mr. Carr. Was she instrumental in getting you your position
with UNNRA?
Mr. Varley. No, Mr. Weintraub recommended me in UNNRA.
Mr. Carr. In what connection do you know Caroline
Flechener?
Mr. Varley. She was working in UNNRA, and that is how----
Mr. Carr. A fellow worker with you?
Mr. Varley. Yes, and that is how I met her, I believe.
Mr. Carr. Did you know whether or not she was a member of
the Communist party?
Mr. Varley. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Carr. Did you ever attend any social gatherings with
her?
Mr. Varley. I doubt it very much. I mean, I have no
recollection about seeing her at any social events--again,
unless it was those big parties----
Mr. Carr. In connection with your work?
Mr. Varley. Yes, where I am sure she was there, because it
would be, say, a party given by a government.
Mr. Carr. When is the last time you saw her?
Mr. Varley. To the best of my recollection, during UNNRA,
when Governor Lehman was there.
Mr. Carr. She is not in the UN now, is she?
Mr. Varley. Not to my knowledge.
The Chairman. You went up and stayed overnight at Durant's?
Mr. Varley. I did.
The Chairman. After you had been notified that he had been
identified under oath as a liaison in the Communist underground
of the Communist party of this country; is that correct?
Mr. Varley. I stayed at his house overnight, sir, but--
could you repeat the question?
The Chairman. I will repeat it for you. The question is:
Did you go up and stay overnight at the house of Kenneth Durant
after you had been notified that Durant had been named under
oath as a liaison between the Soviet underground and the
Communist party in this country?
Mr. Varley. My recollection was that in the grand jury
proceedings I was asked whether he was a foreign agent, and I
said not to my knowledge.
The Chairman. Did they tell you at that time that he had
been identified under oath as a foreign agent?
Mr. Varley. I have no recollection of that, sir.
The Chairman. You don't remember that?
Mr. Varley. The counsel just said that even name of Mr.
Chambers was brought up in that connection. I just don't
recollect that.
The Chairman. After you had been asked about his being an
underground agent, you went up and spent the night with him; is
that right?
Mr. Varley. I spent a night at his place.
The Chairman. Answer my question.
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. The answer is yes?
Mr. Varley. Yes.
The Chairman. How well do you know this man?
Mr. Varley. I knew him socially, because he was the husband
of a woman who was my wife's teacher, an American poet who is
dead now.
The Chairman. How many years have you known him?
Mr. Varley. I can't remember clearly when I met him for the
first time.
The Chairman. About how many years ago?
Mr. Varley. It must have been before the First World War.
The Chairman. Now----
Mr. Varley. I am sorry, not before the First World War
before the Second World War.
The Chairman. When you went up to see him, was that shortly
after your appearance before the grand jury?
Mr. Varley. I appeared before grand jury--you mean when I
visited him in the summer?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Varley. Well, I appeared last before grand jury in
1952.
The Chairman. Did you contact him after you appeared before
the grand jury?
Mr. Varley. Before or after I appeared before the grand
jury?
The Chairman. After you appeared before the grand jury?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Didn't you get in touch with him immediately
after that?
Mr. Varley. No, sir.
The Chairman. Are you sure?
Mr. Varley. I am positive.
The Chairman. When is the first time you saw him after you
appeared before the grand jury?
Mr. Varley. After I appeared before the grand jury?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Varley. This summer.
The Chairman. That is the only time you have seen him?
Mr. Varley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did you tell him that you were asked about
him before the grand jury?
Mr. Varley. I don't believe so. I think I mentioned that I
was before the grand jury, but I did not think I mentioned
that.
The Chairman. You didn't tell him he was named as a
Communist agent, or a foreign agent?
Mr. Varley. I don't recall it, sir.
The Chairman. You will be excused for the time being, and
your counsel will be notified when we want you back. You are
informed that you are still under subpoena.
Mr. Varley. Do I do anything with the subpoena? Just hold
it?
The Chairman. Just keep it.
[Whereupon, the hearings were adjourned until Wednesday,
September 16, 1953, at 11:00 a.m. at the same place.]
SECURITY--UNITED NATIONS
[Editor's note.--Neither Frank Cerny (1888-1970) nor Helen
Matousek (1909-1989), a social affairs officer at the United
Nations, testified in public session.]
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
New York, NY.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 11:00 a.m., in room 128, of the
United States Court House, Foley Square, New York, Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy, presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Roy M.
Cohn, chief counsel; G. David Schine, chief consultant; Donald
O'Donnell, assistant counsel; Harold Rainville, administrative
assistant to Senator Everett M. Dirksen.
TESTIMONY OF DR. FRANK CERNY
The Chairman. Will you stand up and raise your right hand,
please?
In the matter now in hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Dr. Cerny. I do.
Mr. O'Donnell. Will you tell us your full name, Doctor?
Dr. Cerny. Frank Cerny.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you know a girl by the name of Helen
Matousek?
Dr. Cerny. Personally, no. I only know that she was in
Paris before the war and at the beginning, during the war.
Mr. O'Donnell. Were you in Paris, Doctor, and what was your
particular job at that time?
Dr. Cerny. I was counsel of delegation of Czechoslovakia
Mr. O'Donnell. In what years, Doctor?
Dr. Cerny. From '36 till '40--June, '40.
Mr. O'Donnell. And you left in '41?
Dr. Cerny. I left because the Germans advanced to Paris.
Mr. O'Donnell. Tell us what you know about Helen Matousek.
Dr. Cerny. Being official of the embassy, I was in
communication with the Czechoslovak National Committee, which
was created in Paris. This national committee had several
divisions, and one of these divisions was information division.
This information division was formed before the national
committee was created. It was established, I think, already in
the summer of '39, but the national committee was recognized by
the French government in November '39, and so this information
bureau afterwards became part of Czechoslovak National
Committee.
In this information division, about forty or forty-five
employees, and, among them was Matouskova--that is, the Czech--
in English is Matousek; in Czech Matouskova.
Mr. O'Donnell. Is that Helen or Helena?
Dr. Cerny. Helena.
Mr. O'Donnell. All right. Tell us what you know about her
Communist activity.
Dr. Cerny. I didn't know her personally, but through my
official business I was in contact with special commissioner of
Surete Nationale, Vidal, and he told me--now, I don't know
when--but he told me that Matouskova and another employee of
the Information Division, Czinnereva, were arrested for
Communist activities.
Mr. O'Donnell. When were they arrested for Communist
activities by the French police?
Dr. Cerny. It might have been in spring, '40. I don't
remember. It might have been in spring, '40.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know the disposition?
Do you know what happened to them after they were arrested?
Dr. Cerny. No, I don't know. I thought they were arrested
also in this Kulture House, but they were not. But as I know,
they have been at other times arrested Communists in France,
who have been sent before the advancing Germans to North
Africa, and Matouskova was probably also there.
Mr. O'Donnell. What was this House of Kulture, Doctor?
Dr. Cerny. I couldn't tell, because I was never there and I
was very busy in Paris. I know only that the Communists
gathered there, that they had meetings there.
Mr. O'Donnell. Were any Czech Communists involved in the
House of Kulture Communist activities? Were there any Czech
nationals involved in the House of Kulture?
Dr. Cerny. Sure. Vladimir Clementis was also there.
Mr. O'Donnell. He was a Czech national?
Dr. Cerny. He was also a refugee and an emigrant in Paris,
and he met with other Communists in this Kulture House.
Mr. O'Donnell. Was there any other Czech nationals? How
about Mr. Hofmeister?
Dr. Cerny. Hofmeister was arrested there, and one who
accidentally was there and was Communist was Mr. Sturm, who is
now in New York.
Mr. O'Donnell. Now, you do not know that she was arrested
in the House of Kulture with these Communists?
Dr. Cerny. I don't think so, because I have not it in my
notes.
Mr. O'Donnell. All right. Do you have any notes with you,
Doctor?
Dr. Cerny. Yes, I have.
Mr. O'Donnell. What do those notes say about her arrest as
a Communist by the Paris police in 1940, with this other girl?
What do your notes say?
Dr. Cerny. The Misses Matouskova and Czinnerova, sir,
arrested for Communists, and I am sure I got it--I knew it from
Mr. Vidal.
Mr. O'Donnell. And Vidal was what?
Dr. Cerny. Was special commissioner of the Surete
Nationale--that means of the minister of the interior in Paris.
Mr. O'Donnell. When did you make those notes?
Dr. Cerny. It is an excerpt of my notes in four or five
books. I ought to look in my notes when I did it.
Mr. O'Donnell. These are excerpts of notes from your diary?
Dr. Cerny. From my diary, yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. Well, which you kept from day to day?
Dr. Cerny. Yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. So these notes, based on your diary, would
have been made right after the arrest in May of 1940?
Dr. Cerny. Or three days, yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. So that you are basing your statement now on
a record that you kept in May of 1940; is that correct?
Dr. Cerny. In spring.
Mr. O'Donnell. In the spring of 1940?
Dr. Cerny. That's right.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know of any other names that she has
ever used?
Dr. Cerny. No.
Mr. O'Donnell. What was her married name?
Dr. Cerny. Matousek.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know of any Communist activity on the
part of her husband?
Dr. Cerny. No, he wasn't a Communist.
Mr. O'Donnell. As far as you know?
Dr. Cerny. He was not Communist. He was a painter and he
left France also for London, for England.
Mr. O'Donnell. On the basis of what you know concerning
her, Doctor, do you think that she is working against the
interests of the United States and the allied countries?
Dr. Cerny. Having these Communistic ideas, yes, sure.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you think she is a proper employee for
the United Nations, as far as the free world is concerned? Do
you think she is a proper employee, as far as the free world is
concerned?
Dr. Cerny. My personal opinion, no.
Mr. O'Donnell. Your own opinion?
Dr. Cerny. In my own opinion, no.
Mr. O'Donnell. You don't think she should be employed by
the United Nation?
Dr. Cerny. No.
The Chairman. I want to thank you very much, Doctor.
[Witness excused.]
TESTIMONY OF HELEN MATOUSEK
The Chairman. Will you stand and raise your right hand,
please?
In the matter now in hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mrs. Matousek. So help me God.
The Chairman. Will you state your full name, please?
Mrs. Matousek. Helen Matousek, also known as Helen
Matouskova, which is the Slav form of my name, born Helen
Sommerova.
The Chairman. Is that Miss or Mrs.?
Mrs. Matousek. I am divorced, sir.
The Chairman. Mrs. Matousek, counsel here have a couple of
questions they want to ask you. We have several witnesses in
who have testified in regard to your activities. Under our law
you are entitled to refuse to answer any question if you think
the answer in any way might incriminate you. It is very
important to you that you either tell the truth or refuse to
answer. Otherwise, if you give us a false answer, you are
guilty of perjury each time you give an untruthful answer. I
would like to impress that on you all I possibly can, in view
of the fact you haven't got a lawyer.
Again I say it for your own good, either tell the truth, or
refuse to answer, and we have a great deal of testimony in
regard to alleged Communist activities on your part and counsel
will ask you about that.
Have you anything to add to the advice I have given the
witness?
Mr. Cohn. No, sir.
Where are you employed, Mrs. Matousek, at the present time?
Mrs. Matousek. I am working at the United Nations.
Mr. Cohn. In what capacity?
Mrs. Matousek. The Department of Social Affairs. I am the
social affairs officer.
Mr. Cohn. How long have you been with the United Nations?
Mrs. Matousek. Since February 1949.
Mr. Cohn. Now, when did you come to the United States?
Mrs. Matousek. September 27, 1941.
Mr. Cohn. Have you petitioned for naturalization?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes, I have.
Mr. Cohn. What is the status of your application?
Mrs. Matousek. I have my first papers. I have applied for
citizenship. I had my hearing in, I believe, December '48, and
have not heard any direct result since. I have a number of
times written the Immigration and Naturalization Department to
inquire what the status was. I did not receive a reply. I have
inquired and knew at the occasion of my signing the waiver of
privileges and immunities and I was told that there are
thousands of cases on hand, I have to be patient.
Mr. Cohn. Were you in 1940 arrested in Paris, France, for
Communist activities?
Mrs. Matousek. I was arrested in May 1940, in Paris, for
reasons unknown to me.
Mr. Cohn. What do you mean by ``for reasons unknown to
you''?
Mrs. Matousek. Because there was no trial, there was no
hearing, there was no questioning.
Mr. Cohn. What was the charge?
Mrs. Matousek. There was no charge preferred, that I know
of.
Mr. Cohn. You mean it is your testimony you have no idea
they arrested you, they just came along----
Mrs. Matousek. Yes, I do have an idea.
Mr. Cohn. Well, tell us.
Mrs. Matousek. While I was in Prague, I was secretary of a
committee for political refugees from Germany. That was from
1936 till spring, 1939. Some of these political refugees
obviously were Communists, just as obviously some of them were
not Communists. They were political refugees from Germany. They
were cleared by Czechoslovak police and they were passed on to
the committee for care. I have, therefore, known a great many
refugees, and inasmuch that I was detained in Paris, I was put
in a detention camp for German nationals, the only explanation
I have--and I admit that is my analysis--is that I might have
been mistaken for a German national. That must also have been
the understanding of my then government, which has issued,
therefore, to me an affidavit confirming my Czech nationality.
When I have shown this paper to the camp commander, he released
me immediately.
Mr. Cohn. Isn't it a fact that when you were arrested it
was made very clear to you that you were being arrested with
Communists on a charge of Communist activity?
Mrs. Matousek. No, sir, no such a thing was said to me
ever.
Mr. Cohn. Were you arrested with some Communists?
Mrs. Matousek. I was arrested with a number of people whom
I didn't know. There was one person I did know; there was a
Miss Margaret Zinner, whom I till then didn't know. I have not
known her very well. She was working as a secretary at
Czechoslovak National Council in Paris, where I have been
working. She wasn't any particular friend of mine till then. I
became friendly with her while we were detained together the
two months.
Mr. Cohn. I don't think you understood my question. The
question is: Were any other persons arrested with you
Communists?
Mrs. Matousek. I didn't know the other persons. The only
person I knew was Miss Zinner.
Mr. Cohn. Was she a Communist?
Mrs. Matousek. I don't believe so, but I do not know. I do
not believe so.
Mr. Cohn. You say you don't know; you didn't know any of
the other persons?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
Mr. Cohn. Where did they come from?
Mrs. Matousek. They were mostly German refugees, as far as
I have heard from them, but I didn't know them.
Mr. Cohn. You don't know if any of the other people
arrested with you were Communists?
Mrs. Matousek. No, I don't.
Mr. Cohn. Did you find out whether or not any of them were
charged with being Communists?
Mrs. Matousek. I have no idea.
Mr. Cohn. Therefore, during the period of your arrest, you
never heard it said that any of the people arrested with you
were arrested for Communist activity; is that what you want to
tell us?
Mrs. Matousek. That's right. I know that there were a great
many people who were simply German refugees, who at that time
lived in France or in Belgium. If you want me to tell it to you
chronologically, when I was in Paris, when I was arrested, the
night of the 19th of May, and taken to the Paris Prefecture of
Police, the only person I knew was Miss Margaret Zinner. Both
of us were perfectly convinced that this was some kind of a
mistake, and the other persons who were around I didn't know. I
do not know who they were, and there wasn't too much discussion
going on. When I was taken from the Police Prefecture----
Mr. Cohn. Go right ahead.
Mrs. Matousek [continuing]. To the Velodrome Devere, again
that was the detention center for German nationals. I didn't
know any of them until then except Miss Zinner. It didn't
appear to me that these people were political refugees. Some
may have been. I know there were some discussions going on.
There were some people who were violently anti-Nazi and some of
them who were violently anti-Russian. Remember, that was at the
time of the Soviet-Russian Pact. So they were thrown together
on the basis of their German nationality, and they were of all
colors, I believe.
The Chairman. When did you first go to France?
Mrs. Matousek. You mean to say in France or on visits?
The Chairman. On visits, or anything.
Mrs. Matousek. Oh, I believe I went to France first on a
tourist trip; I think it must have been in '35 or '36.
The Chairman. Then when did you go to France to live there?
Mrs. Matousek. That was in April or May 1939, after I have
escaped from Czechoslovakia.
The Chairman. Did you know a Dr. Prochek?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes, I did. I didn't know him in Paris. I
knew Dr. Charles Prochek; I met him in UNRRA in Washington in
the spring of 1945. I believe he comes from Minneapolis.
The Chairman. Were you with UNRRA then?
Mrs. Matousek. I was with UNRRA then.
The Chairman. Is that when you first met him, in 1945?
Mrs. Matousek. That was the first time when I met him in
person. However, I was in correspondence with his wife, who was
one of the persons who provided an affidavit for me when I
needed one for the visa. I didn't know about it; I was told
about it by the Czech Consulate when I arrived here, so I wrote
to her thanking her for this kindness, and then we had some,
oh, spotty correspondence here and there. But I didn't know Dr.
Prochek in person until I met him at this College Park in
Maryland with UNRRA in the spring of 1945.
The Chairman. Where did you meet Mrs. Prochek?
Mrs. Matousek. I never met her in person.
The Chairman. How could she give a letter, then,
recommending you, if she had never met you personally, do you
know?
Mrs. Matousek. Well, I assume that she was willing to give
it because I had very good recommendations from the Benes
government, and she was a very ardent Czech.
The Chairman. Were you living in France in 1937?
Mrs. Matousek. No, I was not living in France in 1937. I
may have been there on a short vacation trip. Let me think.
Yes, I believe I spent three weeks in summer of '37 on the west
coast of France in Pontiac.
The Chairman. Now, we have testimony here--and of course
the mere fact that we have testimony does not mean that the
committee considers it true or untrue, we just take all the
testimony in regard to any witness--we have testimony that in
1937 you were an organizer for the Communist party, that you
worked in France. What do you have to say about that? Is that
true or not?
Mrs. Matousek. It is not true. I am very glad that you said
that the mere testimony is not the truth. It isn't true,
unequivocally.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this: Have you ever done any
organizing for the Communist party?
Mrs. Matousek. I have not.
The Chairman. And have you ever joined yourself?
Mrs. Matousek. I have not.
The Chairman. And you are not a member now?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
The Chairman. Did you ever get paid any money by any
representative of Soviet Russia or the Communist party?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
The Chairman. Was your former husband a Communist, if you
know?
Mrs. Matousek. He was not a member of the Communist party
while we were married. I would say he was a sympathizer. He
wasn't a member of the party. I don't believe that he was
anything else but one of these neurotic persons who talk a
great deal and don't do anything.
The Chairman. How about yourself, were you a sympathizer
with the Communist party?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
Mr. O'Donnell. When you left Prague as an escapee, who
advised you to leave Prague, do you recall?
Mrs. Matousek. Well, in the first place, my own reason--you
see, the fact that I was helping anti-Hitler refugees obviously
could not make me popular with the German authorities, who by
that time occupied Czechoslovakia.
Moreover, I am Jewish, so there was no reason for me to
want to stay on.
Inasmuch as I have been helping other people to get out of
the country, I have done exactly the same thing. I have--since
Munich, my main part of the work for the German refugees, I
would say, was obtaining for them from the Czech government, in
an official capacity, interim passports and by dealing with
various consulates--I would say primarily the British
Consulate, French Consulate, the Norwegian Consulate--visas for
these people to leave the country.
Mr. O'Donnell. May I interrupt for a moment?
Mrs. Matousek. Sure.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you know a chap over there by the name
of Mr. Nejedly?
Mrs. Matousek. No, I don't remember to have known him.
Mr, O'Donnell. Did he at any time advise you to leave
Prague?
Mrs. Matousek. Most definitely not. I didn't know him.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know who the present foreign minister
of education is in Prague?
Mrs. Matousek. Oh, you mean Mr. Nejedly?
Mr. O'Donnell. That is correct.
Mrs. Matousek. Oh, sorry, yes, that Mr. Nejedly. I have met
Mr. Nejedly, I would say, oh, two or three times perhaps in my
life, but he certainly did not advise me to leave Prague.
Mr. O'Donnell. He did not advise you to leave Prague?
Mrs. Matousek. That's right.
Mr. O'Donnell. We have evidence from a witness who says
that you told the witness that he advised you to leave Prague.
Mrs. Matousek. That may be the other way around, sir. Mr.
Nejedly, at that time I believe was professor at the University
of Prague, knew that I was helping people to leave the country,
it was he who called me up and asked me if I could help him get
out of the country.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you help him get out?
Mrs. Matousek. No, I did not. I said, ``I am very sorry,
but my mandate is to help the people who are taken care of by
the committee, and I cannot do anything for any other people.''
Mr. O'Donnell. What is his first name?
Mrs. Matousek. Sdenek.
Mr. Cohn. What does he do now?
Mrs. Matousek. I believe that he is part of the Communist
government in--he is the present foreign minister of education
in Prague--minister of education, probably, rather than foreign
minister.
Mr. O'Donnell. He is the minister of education?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes, I believe so. So that it was the other
way around, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you ever tell anyone that he suggested
that you should leave Prague at that time?
Mrs. Matousek. I very much doubt it, because it isn't so.
It was the other way around. I may have said to someone that he
asked me to help him get out of the country.
Mr. O'Donnell. Were you very friendly with him?
Mrs. Matousek. No, I met him about two or three times in my
life.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you know he was a Communist?
Mrs. Matousek. Oh, yes, I did.
Mr. O'Donnell. Have you had any contact with him?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
Mr. O'Donnell. While you were with UNRRA, wasn't there a
group in UNRRA who were locating deserters from the Russian
army and having them returned to Russia?
Mrs. Matousek. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you ever contact a Russian deserter and
through indirection have him turned over to the OGPU?
Mrs. Matousek. Me?
Mr. O'Donnell. You?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know of anyone who did?
Mrs. Matousek. No, I don't.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know if that was a common practice at
UNRRA in Germany, to invite these deserters from the Russian
army in under pretexts and then have them turned over to the
OGPU, or to an OGPU agent?
Mrs. Matousek. I have never heard of that practice.
Mr. O'Donnell. You never heard of it?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
Mr. O'Donnell. You never participated in any activity such
as that?
Mrs. Matousek. Certainly not.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you ever visit Moscow?
Mrs. Matousek. I have never been to Moscow or to Soviet
Russia.
Mr. O'Donnell. Had your former husband ever visited Moscow,
to your knowledge?
Mrs. Matousek. Not to my knowledge, not as long as I was
married to him. I don't know whether he went there afterwards.
Mr. O'Donnell. How long were you interned after your arrest
for Communist activity in Paris?
Mrs. Matousek. I would like to state first that to my
knowledge I was not arrested by Communist activities, but for
reasons unknown to me, and I was detained for approximately two
months.
Mr. O'Donnell. Two months. Were you interned by the----
Mrs. Matousek. By the Vichy police of France, yes.
The Chairman. Was this before or after France was overrun?
Mr. O'Donnell. This was before.
Mrs. Matousek. I was arrested before, about two weeks
before the fall of France, and detained for about six weeks
after.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you know Adolph Hofmeister?
Mrs. Matousek. I knew Adolph Hofmeister, who was a lawyer,
painter and writer. I knew him slightly socially in Prague. I
met him, oh, just occasionally in Paris, where he was with the
House of Kulture, and then I met him very slightly again,
without any premeditation or making any appointment with him,
just occasionally and by accident a very few times here in New
York in, oh, I would say in '41, '42. The last time I met him
was when he arrived here in New York. By that time he became
Czechoslovak ambassador to Paris.
Mr. O'Donnell. What year was that?
Mrs. Matousek. That was in 1949, I believe. It might have
been 1950. I am not quite sure. And I met him in the hall of
the United Nations, and he recognized me and invited me for
lunch, which I did have with him. It was an absolutely non-
political lunch, but 1 was eager to hear what he had to say,
and afterward I told him--when he met me the next day he looked
straight through me, and never recognized me.
Mr. O'Donnell. Was he a member of the House of Kulture
group in Paris?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes, he was.
Mr. O'Donnell. What was the House of Kulture in Paris?
Mrs. Matousek. I cannot tell you too much about it, sir,
because I was not a member myself and didn't have any real
contact with them. It was a group of painters and artists, but
there were some people who didn't have anything to do with
arts, I believe, who rented together a house and lived there,
probably for reasons of economy. But what other activities they
have adopted, I do not quite know, because, as I said, I didn't
have any contact with them.
Mr. O'Donnell. Wasn't it generally known among your group
that the House of Kulture was a Communist group?
Mrs. Matousek. It was.
Mr. O'Donnell. And Adolph Hofmeister did belong to that
group?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes, he did.
Mr. O'Donnell. As a matter of fact, he was arrested as a
member of that group, wasn't he?
Mrs. Matousek. I believe so. There was a whole group of
people who were arrested at the very beginning of the war. I
believe all of the members of the House of Kulture were
arrested.
Mr. O'Donnell. Was Vladimir Clementis a member of the House
of Kulture?
Mrs. Matousek. I know whom you are speaking of. I would not
know, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. You would not know?
Mrs. Matousek. No.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you know Vladimir Clementis. Did you
know him?
Mrs. Matousek. I met him. He came several times to see my
then chief, Mr. Hubert Ripka, who was then President Benes'
representative of the National Council in Paris, and Mr.
Clementis came a couple of times with him. That is how I met
him. But then shortly afterwards I believe Mr. Clementis was
arrested, too, and that was in the fall of '39, and I didn't
have any contact with him since.
Mr. O'Donnell. Was he arrested as a member of the House of
Kulture group, too?
Mrs. Matousek. I wouldn't know, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. But you know he was arrested?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. By the French police?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know if he was arrested for
Communistic activity?
Mrs. Matousek. Oh, I would assume so, but I do not know.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did you know a Joseph Pelz?
Mrs. Matousek. I have known an Antonin Pelz.
Mr. O'Donnell. Who was Antonin Pelz?
Mrs. Matousek. Antonin Pelz was a cartoonist.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is the same chap.
Mrs. Matousek. Yes. His first name is Antonin. Was a
cartoonist whom I have met. I haven't known him too well, but I
believe he was a member of the House of Kulture, too.
Mr. O'Donnell. Then was he arrested in that group, the
House of Kulture?
Mrs. Matousek. I don't quite remember, but I believe so.
Mr. O'Donnell. Was the House of Kulture in existence when
you first arrived in Paris?
Mrs. Matousek. This I do not know, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. How many times did you visit the House of
Kulture yourself?
Mrs. Matousek. About twice, perhaps.
Mr. O'Donnell. What was the reason for your visits to the
House of Kulture?
Mrs. Matousek. Having dinner there.
Mr. O'Donnell. Having dinner there?
Mrs. Matousek. Yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. With whom?
Mrs. Matousek. Well, with my husband.
Mr. O'Donnell. Your husband. And would anybody else be
present?
Mrs. Matousek. Oh, well, they must have invited us, or we
must have invited ourselves, but I do not recall who would have
been present, because it was no other but social occasion.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did your husband ever belong to the House of
Kulture?
Mrs. Matousek. No, he did not, as far as I know.
Mr. O'Donnell. To what extent did your husband attempt to
become affiliated with the House of Kulture?
Mrs. Matousek. I believe he felt that they were in a way a
competition. My husband founded in Paris a group--they called
themselves, oh, Czechoslovak Artists in Paris, or some such a
thing, and he was president of this group and arranged for an
exhibition in Paris. He, I had an idea, rather felt that the
House of Kulture was a kind of competition.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did he make any positive effort to join the
House of Kulture, as far as you know?
Mrs. Matousek. He may have, but I am not aware of it. I
really don't recall.
Mr. O'Donnell. Were you ever approached to join the
Communist party by anybody?
Mrs. Matousek. No, I have not; not that I recall. Not in so
many words, I am sure.
The Chairman. That will be all. Incidentally, the committee
does not give the press the names of any witnesses who appear,
so that unless you tell the newspapers that you have been here,
no one will know you were here. I don't think we will want you
back for anything at all, but I wish that you would consider
yourself still under subpoena in case there is any additional
information the staff might want.
Mrs. Matousek. Certainly. I am at your disposition,
Senator.
[Witness excused.]
[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned to Thursday,
September 17, 1953, at 10:00 a.m.]
SECURITY--UNITED NATIONS
[Editor's note.--Abraham Unger's executive session
testimony was published in 1953. Vachlav Lofek did not testify
in public session. David M. Freedman testified publicly on
September 18, 1953.]
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
New York, N.Y.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 2:25 p.m., in room 128, of the
United States Court House, Foley Square, New York, Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy, presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Roy M.
Cohn, chief counsel; Robert Jones, administrative assistant to
Senator Potter; Harold Rainville, administrative assistant to
Senator Dirksen; and Blaine Sloan, legal department, United
Nations.
TESTIMONY OF ABRAHAM UNGER (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, BERNARD
JAFFE)
[Although taken in executive session, this testimony was
published in 1953 in U.S. Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, Security--United Nations (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1953), pages 40-55.]
TESTIMONY OF VACHLAV LOFEK
Mr. Cohn. Are you a citizen of the United States?
Mr. Lofek. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. Naturalized?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. In what year?
Mr. Lofek. 1937, in January.
Mr. Cohn. What is your employment at the present time?
Mr. Lofek. Employment, I work for?
Mr. Cohn. Where do you work?
Mr. Lofek. In the Czech Delegation.
Mr. Cohn. You work for the Czech Delegation?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, for the Czech Delegation.
Mr. Cohn. To the United Nations?
Mr. Lofek. To the United Nations.
Mr. Cohn. Is that right?
Mr. Lofek. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Are you a Communist?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir, I never been.
Mr. Cohn. Are you a Communist at the present time?
Mr. Lofek. No.
Mr. Cohn. You work for the Communist government?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, I do.
Mr. Cohn. Do they make a practice of employing people who
are not Communists?
Mr. Lofek. I don't know, but they never asked me to join,
or anything.
Mr. Cohn. Are you sympathetic to the Communist regime in
Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Are you opposed to it?
Mr. Lofek. Well, just nothing. I don't say nothing.
Mr. Cohn. I don't want to know if you say nothing. Are you
in favor of or opposed to the Communist regime in
Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. I don't like it the way they do. It now is there
anymore.
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me?
Mr. Lofek. I don't like the way they do.
Mr. Cohn. You mean in Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. You are opposed then?
Mr. Lofek. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. To the Communist government in Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. Do they know you are opposed to them up there?
Mr. Lofek. I don't know. They never ask. No, I never tell
it.
Mr. Cohn. What kind of work do you do?
Mr. Lofek. I am mostly like a messenger. I have to go all
around. They need something, I have to go get it.
Mr. Cohn. Do you ever carry papers back and forth?
Mr. Lofek. Papers, like the United Nations papers. I go to
the headquarters and pick them up and bring them to the office
and when they assort them they tell me to mail them, you know,
I send them back, you know, what they want to Czechoslovakia.
Mr. Cohn. What is your salary?
Mr. Lofek. $200 a month.
Mr. Cohn. $200 a month. Do you have any other income?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir. Well, I keep just a little bit from
what I saved before I work for them from the bank with
interest.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever carried any papers to the Communist
party headquarters?
Mr. Lofek. To the Communist party--no, I don't. You mean to
the Soviet or----
Mr. Cohn. No. I mean Communist party headquarters of the
United States.
Mr. Lofek. I don't know even where it is.
Mr. Cohn. Have you ever carried any papers to the Communist
party headquarters?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Any office of the Communist party?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir. I never know where these office----
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever deliver any to any American
Communist?
Mr. Lofek. No, no.
Mr. Cohn. Who obtained your job for you at the Czech
Delegation?
Mr. Lofek. Who--people?
Mr. Cohn. Yes, who got you the job there?
Mr. Lofek. I got it myself.
Mr. Cohn. How did you go about it?
Mr. Lofek. I got it 1943, you know, they advertised, but
they used to be Czech information office.
Mr. Cohn. After the Communists took over----
Mr. Lofek. Well, they kept me. You know they discharged
lots of people after they closed the consulate, the Czech
consulate two years ago, they discharged most of people, and
they only kept me.
Mr. Cohn. Were you the only one they kept?
Mr. Lofek. That is all.
Mr. Cohn. You are the only one they kept?
Mr. Lofek. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. You say they never asked you whether or not you
are a Communist?
Mr. Lofek. No. Never did, never noticed.
Mr. Cohn. When I first asked you if you were in favor of
the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia you were not sure
whether you were in favor or opposed?
Mr. Lofek. No, but I have never been, still never. Never
did anything for them, only this what I am working for now.
Mr. Cohn. Your testimony is that you have never talked with
anybody up there about----
Mr. Lofek. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn [continuing]. Whether or not you favor the regime
in Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Never discussed it?
Mr. Lofek. No.
Mr. Cohn. What do you object to in the regime in
Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. Well, the way they treat the people, like----
Mr. Cohn. What way do they treat the people?
Mr. Lofek. They took the property away from them, you know,
that is what I think because they did it for my sister, my
brother-in-law, you know.
Mr. Cohn. The Communists?
Mr. Lofek. Yes. Now, after two years ago.
The Chairman. Are your sister and brother-in-law living in
Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, but they died now. My sister died two years
ago and my brother-in-law died last fall.
The Chairman. Natural deaths?
Mr. Lofek. What is that?
The Chairman. They were not killed by the Communists? They
died natural deaths?
Mr. Lofek. Yes. My sister had a stroke.
The Chairman. Do you know whether they were members of the
Communist party in Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. No, never as far as I know. My brother was
against them. Always against them. And my sister, she never
know anything about politics because she was old.
The Chairman. Who recommended you for the job at the United
Nations?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir, no one, they kept me since I start to
work for the information bureau, you know, the Czech
information in 1943.
The Chairman. You started working for the Czech information
in 1943?
Mr. Lofek. That is right, in January.
The Chairman. That was under the free government in
Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, yes.
The Chairman. And then when the Communists took over they
kept you on as an employee.
Mr. Lofek. They kept me. First they said have to discharge
me, they have no work for me, but after the--I don't know--
couple of weeks later they said if I want to stay they keep me
because they need somebody to go around and understand a little
English because none of the others, none of them can speak
English, you know.
The Chairman. You are a messenger, you take papers from one
place to another, don't you?
Mr. Lofek. Not from one place to another. I mean I have to
go down to the headquarters, bring them to the office. They,
couple of the guys assort them, and they tell me which the
untied papers I have to wrap up and send to Czechoslovakia, you
know.
The Chairman. I see.
Mr. Lofek. But I don't carry any other papers any other
place.
The Chairman. In other words, when they tell you to do it,
you wrap up certain mail or papers?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, they give me----
The Chairman. And send them to Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. That is right, they give me, you know, what they
want to send and if they have letters like that they send over
to the states here for this, like United Nation delegations, so
I do that, too, you know. I stamp them, and I sent them out.
The Chairman. How is the stuff sent to Czechoslovakia? By
diplomatic pouch?
Mr. Lofek. No. This papers I send them not through the
diplomatic pouch. I send them through the parcel post. Printed
matter, through the post office; and sometimes if they want
something in a hurry, then I send it through Sabena Air Line,
you know. But that is only maybe once, sometimes only once in
two weeks, sometimes once a week.
The Chairman. Are you the only American citizen working for
the Czech delegation?
Mr. Lofek. There is one lady there, but she minding the
switchboard.
The Chairman. What is her name?
Mr. Lofek. Mrs. Joseph.
The Chairman. Mrs. Joseph?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, Mrs. Joseph.
Mr. Cohn. What is her first name?
Mr. Lofek. Eva. I forgot already, because I don't pay much
attention.
Mr. Cohn. Where does she live?
Mr. Lofek. I don't know where she lives.
Mr. Cohn. Does she live in Manhattan, do you know?
Mr. Lofek. Oh, yes, I guess she lives in Manhattan, but I
don't know.
Mr. Cohn. She is married, isn't she?
Mr. Lofek. That is correct.
Mr. Cohn. What is her husband's first name?
Mr. Lofek. Her husband is Mr. Joseph but he used to, as far
as I understand, he used to work for the UNRRA in Prague.
Mr. Cohn. What is his first name, do you remember?
Mr. Lofek. I don't know. I couldn't tell you.
Mr. Cohn. Didn't you ever meet him over at the office?
Mr. Lofek. I met him, but I never speak to him, but because
he came to see his wife.
The Chairman. Haven't you ever gone to their house for
dinner?
Mr. Lofek. No.
The Chairman. You don't know them well at all?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir.
The Chairman. Are you married?
Mr. Lofek. I was, but I am divorced already twenty years,
so far about twenty years.
The Chairman. Where is your former wife? In Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Lofek. In New York, but I don't know where she lives.
The Chairman. When did you come to this country?
Mr. Lofek. Where?
The Chairman. Yes, when did you come to this country.
Mr. Lofek. In the 13th of March.
The Chairman. When were you naturalized?
Mr. Lofek. In 1937.
The Chairman. Then you worked for UNRRA for a while?
Mr. Lofek. No, not me.
The Chairman. You didn't?
Mr. Lofek. No, not me.
The Chairman. Did you ever work for any other United States
government agency?
Mr. Lofek. No. Only once I worked for the post office, but
in the, you know, for the Christmastime two months, like that,
you know, when they were busy. I got a job in the Morgan Annex
two months only.
The Chairman. Have you ever attended Communist meetings?
Mr. Lofek. No, sir. No, sir, never. I never cared for those
things. I never did.
The Chairman. Never joined the Communist party?
Mr. Lofek. No, no, sir.
The Chairman. Anyone ever ask you to join the party?
Mr. Lofek. No.
The Chairman. It seems rather unusual that the Communist
delegation would hire an American who was against communism.
Mr. Lofek. They don't know about that. They don't know. You
see, if I tell them then I am finished with the job, you know.
And the job sufficient for me, like I am an old guy you know,
and it is not hard, you know, so that is why I am trying to
keep it as long as I could.
The Chairman. How old are you?
Mr. Lofek. Sixty-one, I am going to be next month.
The Chairman. I have no further questions, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Cohn. I have no more.
The Chairman. I may say that the Czech delegation will not
be notified you were called. The newspapers will not be
notified unless you tell them. If you want to tell anyone you
were here, that is up to you.
Mr. Lofek. Only the boss knows about it because I told him
I have to come down here.
The Chairman. I merely want you to know if anyone knows you
were here is because you tell them.
Mr. Lofek Yes.
The Chairman. Okay.
Mr. Lofek. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Who knows about it, you say?
Mr. Lofek. Only my boss, you know, because--I tell him I
come. Mr. Nosek.
Mr. Cohn. What is his name?
Mr. Lofek. Nosek
Mr. Cohn. How do you spell it?
Mr. Lofek. I had to tell him.
Mr. Cohn. How do you spell his name?
Mr. Lofek. N-o-s-e-k.
Mr. Cohn. Is he a Communist?
Mr. Lofek. Yes, I guess he is because he is the boss from
the delegation, you know, so----
The Chairman. Your testimony is that as far as you are
concerned you are not interested in communism?
Mr. Lofek. I never been and I am not.
The Chairman. Your job is merely a messenger?
Mr. Lofek. And like a little shipping clerk, I got to pack
those things and they need something, I have to do everything
for them, especially they come to the delegation.
The Chairman. You never have occasion to read the mail that
comes in or goes out?
Mr. Lofek. Oh, no, because I don't get that. I get the
mail, you know, the mailman gives it to me but I have to take
it right up there, you know.
The Chairman. Did they ever send you as a messenger to
deliver any material to Communist headquarters in New York.
Mr. Lofek. No, sir, no, sir, they never did.
The Chairman. So that you will know, the address is 35 East
12th Street.
Mr. Lofek. No, I never been there.
The Chairman. You never delivered any there?
Mr. Lofek. I don't know where it is, never heard about
that.
The Chairman. That is all. I don't think we will want you
back but consider yourself under subpoena in case we want to
call you.
Mr. Lofek. Yes, if you want to, then I am willing, see, but
the only thing is I got to tell the boss because, you know he
wants to know.
The Chairman. I don't think we will want you.
Mr. Lofek. He wants to know that I go.
The Chairman. This is off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Chairman. That is all. If you are discharged, let us
know. Understand, there is nothing we can do about it if you
are, but let the committee know if you are fired, will you?
Mr. Lofek. Thank you.
The Chairman. Your testimony will not be given to the Czech
delegation.
Mr. Lofek. Thank you. Good day.
[Witness excused.]
TESTIMONY OF DAVID M. FREEDMAN (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL,
BERNARD JAFFE)
The Chairman. In this matter now in hearing before the
committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Freedman. I do.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Freedman, you are a member of the New York
Bar?
Mr. Freedman. I am.
Mr. Cohn. Are you admitted to practice before any agency of
the federal government?
Mr. Freedman. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Which one?
Mr. Freedman. Immigration service.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know a man named Julius Reiss?
Mr. Freedman. I would like to say about that, when we were
here on Tuesday I was informed by my counsel that he had been
told that the purpose for which we were asked to come here----
Mr. Cohn. No, no. I don't think you got the question. Do
you know a man named Julius Reiss?
Mr. Freedman. I heard you.
Mr. Cohn. We were held up so much by Mr. Unger, we would
like to move along.
Mr. Freedman. I heard your question, but I would like to
make a preface to what I want to answer.
The Chairman. There will be no prefaces. Do you know Julius
Reiss?
Mr. Cohn. It is a simple question.
Mr. Freedman. It is not as simple as that.
The Chairman. We will make it simple. Answer the question.
Mr. Freedman. I am answering it, Senator. I am saying when
I was here Tuesday I was told----
The Chairman. Do you know Julius Reiss? I don't care what
happened Tuesday. Do you know him or don't you know him?
Mr. Freedman. I will decline to answer the question.
Mr. Cohn. On what ground?
Mr. Freedman. On the ground in view of the statements made
by the senator to the press which I have seen reported, it
would appear that the attempt to ask me that question is an
attempt to try to besmirch me. I will not allow myself to be
used in that way, and I will therefore decline to answer on the
ground the answer may tend to incriminate me.
The Chairman. You are refusing on the ground it will
incriminate you?
Mr. Cohn. He is entitled to that.
The Chairman. Is that the ground?
Mr. Freedman. I am urging that as a ground because of the
fact when you were--made a representation to my attorney on
Tuesday the only purpose for which we were coming here was to
ask questions with relation to this man, you used that as a
means for utilizing this forum with my partner, Mr. Unger, who
was here before, to try and investigate and interrogate him
with matters that had no concern with Reiss or anybody else,
and I refuse to be entrapped in the same way.
The Chairman. I have never met you before, know nothing
about you, never seen you before.
Mr. Freedman. That is mutual, Senator.
The Chairman. When I say I know nothing about you, I know
something about your background. You are now being asked the
question whether or not you knew Mr. Reiss.
Mr. Freedman. I have answered.
The Chairman. Are you refusing on the ground a truthful
answer might tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Freedman. I am answering on the ground that an answer
to that question may tend to incriminate me.
The Chairman. You are entitled to the privilege.
Mr. Cohn. Now, did Mr. Reiss work for you in connection
with the defense of the twelve Communist members of the
Communist party who were indicted under the Smith Act here in
1948?
Mr. Freedman. For the same reason I refused to answer the
previous question I will refuse to answer this one.
Mr. Cohn. Now, were you in the year 1950 a member of the
Professional Group of the Communist party?
Mr. Freedman. I believe that question is impertinent, and
it has no place in this proceeding. It is no function of this
committee to inquire about such things, if such a thing
existed, and I certainly resent being asked the question. I
think it violates my rights under the Constitution, under the
First Amendment and under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments and it
certainly is----
The Chairman. What is the Ninth Amendment that is violated
by--and the Tenth?
This is off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
Mr. Freedman. I will therefore not answer the question.
Mr. Cohn. Would you examine this for a moment, please, Mr.
Freedman?
The Chairman. What is the right under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments you think are violated by that question?
Mr. Freedman. The right is all powers not given to the
federal government are reserved in the people in this country,
and one of the powers not delegated to the federal government
was the power to inquire into the political affiliations and
beliefs and aspirations of the people.
The Chairman. You are refusing to answer under your rights
in the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments; is that right?
Mr. Freedman. I am right now.
The Chairman. You will be ordered to answer, then.
Mr. Freedman. I will refuse to answer under the ground any
answer may tend to incriminate me.
The Chairman. You are refusing--I don't guess there is any
further use questioning him. He has used the Fifth Amendment.
He is entitled to do it.
Mr. Cohn. I want to ask you one or two very short
questions.
The Chairman. Okay.
Mr. Cohn. Can you identify that record here which we
directed to be produced? Sir?
Mr. Freedman. I decline to identify it under the ground
this is simply a repetition of the question you previously
asked me in another form which I have declined to answer on the
ground it may tend to incriminate me.
The Chairman. On the ground it may tend to incriminate you?
Mr. Freedman. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. For the record we will indicate that is the
exhibit produced by Mr. Unger in response to the request to the
committee.
I don't know if I asked you this or not. Are you a member
of the Communist party today?
Mr. Freedman. You did not ask me that.
Mr. Cohn. Consider it asked now.
Mr. Freedman. My answer to that is the same as my answer to
the previous question. I decline to answer the question because
you have no right to ask me. I think it is impertinent to do
so, and on the further ground I will not answer on the ground
it will tend to incriminate me.
The Chairman. Do you think it is a crime to be a member of
the Communist party?
Mr. Freedman. I will not answer that question either,
Senator, for the same reasons.
The Chairman. On the ground that the answer might tend to
incriminate you. Is that the ground?
Mr. Freedman. That is the ground.
The Chairman. You are entitled to refuse.
You will be ordered to be here at 10:30 in the morning.
10:30 in room 110. I think I will make it ten o'clock in the
morning in room 110.
Ten o'clock. Incidentally, ten o'clock does not mean
someone will phone you and bring you over.
Mr. Freedman. I am sorry if you were inconvenienced any
this afternoon.
The Chairman. I am telling you about tomorrow, not today.
Mr. Freedman. All right.
The Chairman. Be here about ten. I think I will make it
10:15 in the morning.
Mr. Jaffe. Aren't the hearings going to be held next week,
or some other time? It will be impossible for me to make it. It
really is. I mean, I don't like to request anything like this,
but I had no notion that, you know, my coming here with these
attorneys would involve this much time.
The Chairman. Mr. Jaffe, it is your own clients that make
it difficult, not Mr. Freedman, he has taken very little time,
but your own client took up almost over two hours of the
committee's time, and when we have a witness who goes out of
the way to make trouble for the committee to accomplish its
purpose to get the information it wants and needs to perform
our function, I just don't like to call the entire staff back
here if it costs a lot of money to come back here. We have the
staff of Senator Dirksen and Senator Potter. Have their
investigators.
Mr. Jaffe. I thought you were sitting here next week, in
any event, Senator.
The Chairman. Not that I know of now.
Mr. Jaffe. If you were, I would really appreciate putting
this over.
The Chairman. As far as I know, we are not going to. We
need your man in the morning for the hearing.
Mr. Jaffe. Okay.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY
[Editor's note.--Igor Bogolepov and Vladimir Petrov (1916-
1999) both testified at a public hearing on September 28, 1953.
Additional testimony given in executive session on September 21
by Gen. Richard C. Partridge and Samuel McKee was published by
the subcommittee in Committee on Government Operations,
Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
Communist Infiltration of the Army (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1954), pages 85-105.]
----------
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 10:30 a.m., in room 155, Senate
Office Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.
Present also: Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel; and David Surine,
assistant counsel.
Present also from the Department of Army: Hon. Robert T.
Stevens, secretary of the army; Gen. Richard C. Partridge, G-2;
Brig. Gen. C. C. Fenn; and Joseph W. Bishop, acting department
counselor.
TESTIMONY OF IGOR BOGOLEPOV
The Chairman. Would you raise your right hand, please?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to
give in the matter now in hearing will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Bogolepov. I do.
Mr. Cohn. Could we get your full name for the record?
Mr. Bogolepov. My first name is Igor. My last name is
Bogolepov.
The Chairman. May I admonish everyone in the room that no
information is to be given out of Mr. Bogolepov's testimony
today. I may say, Secretary Stevens, that he objected very
strenuously to giving this testimony. Mr. Bogolepov is working
for the government himself. He didn't want to testify. He came
here because the committee wanted him to come.
Is that right?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Bogolepov, could you give us a little
background? Where were you born?
Mr. Bogolepov. Born in Siberia in 1904.
Mr. Cohn. Did there ever come a time when you went into the
Soviet Foreign Service?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, I was employed there from 1923 to 1942.
I was first an officer awhile in the legal department; then I
went to the Red Army; then came back to the foreign office in
the League of Nations desk; then I participated in the Civil
War in Spain as interpreter between the Soviet generals and the
Republican general staff. I was arrested in Spain by the secret
police and shipped back to the Soviet Union for trial. Then I
was released in 1938 and restored in the Foreign Service Office
in the Soviet Union.
I have participated in many international talks which took
place between the Soviet Union and Western nations, including
the Soviet-Nazi Pact and President Roosevelt's emissary, Harry
Hopkins, in the summer of 1941.
During the war I was in the Baltic countries and on the
Leningrad Front and come over to the German lines. I deserted
from the Soviet army being in rank of colonel of general staff.
I tried for sometime to convince the Germans to take less
stupid political line towards the Russian people and Russian
soldiers. Because of my stubbornness and perhaps too hot a
defense of the Russian national interests as opposed to
Communists and Nazis they put me in Gestapo jail for a while to
cool me down.
After release I went to a German farm in Bavaria and was
there until the American army came in 1945.
Under American occupation I was obliged first to hide
myself, for a couple of years, due to the western policies of
extradition to the Soviet police of all Russian people,
especially like me who were on the Soviet wanted persons list.
In 1947 I came out and explained to the U.S. Army
intelligence officers in Germany who I was actually and my
political standpoint and I started my work in the United States
Army.
First I worked as instructor in the European Command
Intelligence School in Oberammergau and next year I was
transferred to the General Staff School in Regensburg, Germany,
as an instructor on the matters of the Soviet policies, party
organization and similar matters. In 1952 I was brought by the
army to this country to testify before the Senate Internal
Security Committee against Owen Lattimore.
After my testimony I was dismissed from the army,
unfortunately, and I am living now in this country waiting for
my bill to be decided.
The Chairman. A bill introduced by Senator Karl Mundt
granting Mr. Bogolepov full citizenship.
Mr. Bogolepov. I had forgotten to mention that at the end
of the thirties I was able to join the Communist party of the
Soviet Union. I did it, as many other Russian anti-Communists
do, in order to get in a higher position and to influence in
that way the overthrow of the Communist regime in my country.
That is all.
Mr. Cohn. Were you dismissed from service with the army
after you testified before the McCarran committee?
Mr. Bogolepov. I think in connection with this. If you need
more information about it, when I came here the assistant chief
of G-2, General Bolling was much eager to get me for his
service. He introduced me in the Pentagon to another general
and they discussed my further employment as a lecturer in
various U.S. military colleges. Two days after the talks were
stopped and I got my discharge papers from the army.
The Chairman. What are you working at now?
Mr. Bogolepov. I am not very much happy with work, for
evidently my reputation of a radical Russian anti-Communist is
speaking against me. Neither State Department or Pentagon
wanted to have anything with me. I am working merely on an
informal basis. I have here some former students of mine. I
examine for them various aspects of psychological warfare; also
I am writing for newspapers from time to time, etc., etc.
The Chairman. In the statement I made in the record
originally, I understood you objected to testifying because you
are now working for the army. I gather you don't; that you lost
your job.
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, may I ask if you could check
that.
Secretary Stevens. You bet your life.
The Chairman. We would not like Mr. Bogolepov's name used
publicly.
Mr. Bogolepov, the secretary of the army will check into
your discharge after you testified before the McCarran
committee. It seems on the face to be completely unreasonable
that you worked for the army until you were subpoenaed before a
United States Senate committee and then were promptly fired.
The secretary will check into that.
Mr. Bogolepov, you were working in the Foreign Office,
Moscow, and a book entitled A History of Russia, War Department
Educational Manual EM 248 was being written. Is that correct?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is correct.
The Chairman. This book was written by a man in London?
Mr. Bogolepov. Right.
The Chairman. From the information we have, Mr. Secretary,
this has been used as an indoctrination course in the army.
Also I may say one of the sources for the document which we
discussed the other day. They used this as source material.
Mr. Bogelepov, while you were in the Russian Foreign Office
did you see any correspondence either with the man who was
writing this book in London or with the Russian embassy in
London giving instructions as to how propaganda was handled?
Mr. Bogolepov. I have to explain first that starting with
the middle of the thirties, big operation was set for by the
Soviet government in order to infiltrate into the Western
administrations the idea favorable to the Soviet government.
In that connection they used Soviet embassies, the
Komintera channels and emissaries sent from Moscow to various
foreign countries. Contacts were established with prominent
Western lawyers, scholars and especially with the people known
here under the name of Russian experts.
The idea was that in order to get Western politicians to be
confused and influenced--presidents, ministers of foreign
affairs, etc., one has to confuse and to influence their
advisors. The Russian experts in the west--I saw myself in the
secret files of the Soviet foreign office this directive of the
Foreign Commissar Molotov--must be ``won on our side.'' Molotov
said to the Soviet ambassador in London, Maisky, in 1939, that
he has to redouble his efforts in the matter of mobilization of
the people who work on Russian matters in England to get them
``work for us.'' They were supposed merely to supply false
suggestions on Soviet policies to the Western governments and
public opinion rather than to serve as a source of information.
Especially insistent was Moletov to influence members of the
British government in 1939 in the sense which will help the
aims of the Soviet foreign policies.
In one of the letters Ambassador Maisky sent back to Moscow
to the foreign office, it was mentioned that a noted British
scholar, Sir Bernard Pares, make appearances in the Soviet
embassy and ask the Soviet embassy's help in writing chapter of
his history on Russia dealing with Soviet matters. I remember
that report of Maisky was mentioned that the man asked embassy
to give information about Soviet history because he felt
himself incompetent and needed some assistance.
The Chairman. Mr. Bogolepov, just to have the record
straight, this book was originally written in 1926, apparently
revised in 1928 and a final revision in 1937. Now, was it
during the 1937 revision that this London Communist got
instructions from the Soviet embassy?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, that was in the end of the thirties. I
do not remember the exact date--1936 or 1937.
The Chairman. He did not do the original writing but the
final revision?
Mr. Bogolepov. Right, if one will judge by correspondence I
saw.
The Chairman. I may say, Mr. Secretary, that we have
checked and find that this was in use by the army up through
1952.
Secretary Stevens. What is that?
The Chairman. History of Russia.
It was released by the armed forces as a War Department
educational book. I might say also that it was source material
for the document entitled ``Psychological and Cultural Traits
of Soviet Siberia.'' I think I should emphasize for the record
that none of it had its origin under the present regime. It was
all brought in, long before Secretary Stevens took over and
long before President Eisenhower took over as president. I
assume it may still be in use because of the time lag in
getting rid of it. That is why I think our committee might be
of some benefit by giving you a picture of the unusual material
that has been used.
Mr. Bogolepov. Inasmuch as Mr. Secretary is present here, I
think it would be of interest to know that some of my students,
high officers of the intelligence division, were protesting
against use of this book in the Regensburg school and other
U.S. Army installations in Germany. I don't know whether they
succeeded or not but I do know that when I protested myself
against this and other literature and I got in serious trouble
and here I have with me copy of the order from the intelligence
school, Oberammergau, to tell you what kind of mess I got in
because of my protestation.
The Chairman. In other words, when you objected to the use
of Communist propaganda to indoctrinate our troops you were
removed from your job?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right. One of the reasons, they said
I was a chronic complainer, signed by J. E. Raymond, Colonel,
U. S. Infantry. In a way I certainly was. I was complaining
about communism for thirty years.
The Chairman. They didn't like you being a chronic
complainer about Communist literature.
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.
The Chairman. I can understand why you objected so
strenuously to coming here to testify.
When you came to the United States you then worked for army
intelligence for a while?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is correct. I still was employed by the
army one month after arrival to this country.
The Chairman. And you were furnishing the army all the
material you could about Soviet Russia and their potential war
plans, strength, etc.
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.
The Chairman. When you were discharged after you testified
before the McCarran committee were you given any reason for the
discharge?
Mr. Bogolepov. No. I just got my papers. That is all. When
I asked Colonel Brown, the adjutant to General Bolling, what is
the result of General Bolling's intention to employ me with
army in the United States, I got answer by telephone this issue
wasn't raised anymore.
The Chairman. How long after you testified before the
McCarran committee were you discharged?
Mr. Bogolepov. Immediately after I was released from the
subpoena of the United States Senate.
The Chairman. Getting back to this book, do I understand
your testimony to be that parts of the book, I think you
referred to the last chapter specifically, were written under
the direction of the Russian Foreign Office and instructions
having been submitted through the Russian embassy in London? Is
that correct?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is correct. Through the Soviet embassy
in London.
The Chairman. Have you had an opportunity to read this book
yourself?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, certainly I had.
The Chairman. Would you consider this Communist propaganda?
Mr. Bogolepov. I consider it worse than Communist
propaganda. I was in the army myself, and no worse thing
happens to an officer when intelligence gives him
misinformation and gives false description and evaluation about
enemy. Then the battle would be certainly lost. This book you
have in your hand, together with a lot of other information on
the USSR used by the army in Europe, is evidently calculated
misinformation. That is my sincere belief and impression.
The Chairman. So you consider this much more serious than
propaganda. You consider it important from the standpoint of
giving our officers information about the enemy which is
completely false, which would mislead them and which would
result in losing battles and wars if they relied on this type
of information.
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right, sir.
The Chairman. I may say, from a different source we will
have sworn testimony that the author of this book was a member
of the Communist party under Communist discipline.
Obviously, you know for a fact that he was taking
instructions but you are not in a position to know whether he
is a Communist or not. That information will be supplied by
another witness.
Mr. Surine. Could you furnish the details about the Bernard
Pares situation? You were in the process of testifying about
observing correspondence in the Soviet Foreign Office in Moscow
concerning Bernard Pares' contact with the embassy in London.
Could you finish that?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is more or less all. I don't remember
the details.
Mr. Surine. One of the other books which is used in the
bibliography of this report, ``Psychological and Cultural
Traits of Soviet Siberia'' is a book called U.S.S.R., a Concise
Handbook edited by Ernest J. Simmons. I hand you this book and
you will see----
Mr. Bogolepov. I know this book pretty well in six years
with the United States Army.
Mr. Surine. In the time you were in the army you worked on
the book itself, observed the book being used by the army.
Could you furnish the information you know about the various
source material you know in this book?
Mr. Bogolepov. I remember this book by heart. I testified
before the Senate McCarran committee that one of the authors of
the book, a professor at Columbia, John Hazard, spent time in
Moscow in so-called Moscow Institute of Soviet Law, which head
was in those days no other person than Vishinsky himself, and
Professor Hazard got a very good education in the Soviet law
and in time of his being there was graduated from this Soviet
Institute of Law with high praise and it is my opinion after
reading his article and this book that this praise was not
given in vain, he really deserved it. Professor Hazard in his
many writings, in this book as well as in other publications,
is carrying out the idea that the Soviet legal institutions are
more or less like American institutions. It does not help much
when he writes that Americans have a different way, still his
method of comparing Soviet institutions with the American
government administration and judiciary implies the false idea
that the things under communism aren't that bad.
The Chairman. I think the record should show that this is
work edited by Ernest Joseph Simmons, paragraphs were written
by different individuals, one by Corliss Lamont, who has been
identified as a long-time apologist for communism; one by
Harriet Moore, a rather notorious Communist who invoked the
Fifth Amendment in regard to espionage and communism; another
chapter written by Fredrick Schuman, who has been identified
not as a Communist but as a sympathizer.
Mr. Bogolepov, just to have the record clear, this book
which we are now talking about, U.S.S.R., a Concise Handbook by
Ernest J. Simmons, was used to indoctrinate our military while
you were working for the military?
Mr. Bogolepov. Right.
The Chairman. And I understand you objected to the use of
this book at that time?
Mr. Bogolepov. I did.
By the way, Senator, I met Simmons in Moscow. He visited
Soviet Union many times. If my recollections are correct, I
talked to him in Moscow in the Office of the Press Division of
Foreign Office and I was one of those who were obliged to give
him some indoctrination on how to carry out pro-Soviet
propaganda in this country. He was a very friendly, very polite
person. When I came to the West and disclosed that actually I
was an anti-Communist, he didn't want to have contact with me
anymore.
The Chairman. Were you convinced that Simmons was loyal to
the Communist cause?
Mr. Bogolepov. Well, Senator, my English is not very broad.
I don't know perhaps the actual significance of the word loyal.
If a man comes to the Communist Foreign Office and gets advice
on how to carry out pro-Soviet propaganda in this country, to
me that means he is loyal, but I may be wrong. It was my
impression at least.
Mr. Surine. You have finished your comments on the U.S.S.R.
handbook?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right.
Mr. Surine. You have had an opportunity to analyze the
report which is at issue in this hearing, haven't you?
I might point out for the record that Mr. Bogolepov did not
have an opportunity to look at this report until just a couple
of days ago.
Would you care to analyze that report on the basis of your
study?
Mr. Bogolepov. Right, but may I just make an observation
concerning this business with pro-Communist books in the army.
I wish to emphasize once more that I met a great deal of army
officers, intelligence officers, who were also as much upset as
I was. Some protested. For example, the former chief of
Regensburg Military School, Colonel Martin, was one who was
protesting against, to my knowledge, against the use of all
these books I mentioned here, especially with the special
service of the U.S. Army of occupation in Germany.
I wish to make it completely clear when I am talking about
such sad matters in American army, that it does not mean I
accuse army as a whole. I have only to praise the intellectual
and moral level of the American officers and soldiers as very
high. They resented much all this Communist propaganda stuff in
the army installations.
The Chairman. Your testimony is that a sizeable number of
the officers felt as strongly about this Communist type of
literature as you do?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right. They protested.
The Chairman. But you feel the army as a whole has a high
moral standard, anti-Communist, and that their protestations
were of no avail under the past administration?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is exactly what I mean, sir.
Mr. Surine. Proceed on this report.
Mr. Bogolepov. Well, how much time do I have? To talk about
this report and say everything which is really must be said,
requires too much of time.
The Chairman. As much time as you need.
Mr. Bogolepov. I will try to do it in twenty or twenty-five
minutes if such would be your wish.
There are two different methods of pro-Communist propaganda
in the Western world. One is direct and overt when people
simply praise all elements of the Communist regime in the
Soviet Union. That was possible before the war and up to 1948.
Now the Communist sympathizers were obliged to change tactics.
They can't praise the Soviet regime openly. They have to use a
subversive tactic since in general they come over to subversive
activities. The document on Siberia reflects both of these
methods of pro-Communist influence. First of all, I will give
you some examples of open praise of the Communist regime and
ideology.
In many instances the works of Stalin and Lenin and other
pro-Communist propagandists are used with just slightly
changing of the exact wording. For example, on page one of the
Siberian document at the very beginning it is stated: ``Harsh
Soviet government has liquidated or expelled potentially
rebellious elements.''
In this book in Russia, Stalin's Problems of Leninism, page
510, we may read:
Class of land-lords was liquidated during civil war. Other
exploiters shared the fate of the land-lords. All exploiters
became liquidated.
In other words, there is no more Communist opposition in
Russia, which is purely Communist propaganda, which is not
correct. The aim of this document is to make the army believe
that there is no cracks in the Kremlin walls; that there is
only one way to fight against communism; to carry out a total
war against all peoples behind the Iron Curtain.
On pages four and five, there is a long story about how
life is wonderful under the Communist regime.
The toiler was elevated to the highest level of
respectability The laborer is hero now in the Soviet Union. . .
. The farmers status has also risen sharply. . . . Women are
virtually on a par with men in all walks of life. Women have
the right to be employed . . . '' etc.
Exactly the same statement might be found again in the book
of Stalin's on page 518, when Stalin speaks that:
The working class of the Soviet Union who has liquidated
private property and capitalistic exploitations is now the
leading class of Soviet Society. . . . Our Soviet peasantry
also changed completely, became a new peasantry. It is a
peasantry liberated from the bondage. . . . And our working
intelligentsia is also a new intelligentsia, second to none in
the world.
In other words, the analyst of Siberia repeats word for
word the statements of Stalin.
Mr. Surine. In connection with the theme of people being
solidly behind the Communist regime, did you have or hear any
personal conversation by Molotov himself along that line?
Mr. Bogolepov. Along which line?
Mr. Surine. That is must be prevented at all costs--that
the Western world know of the real conditions behind the Iron
Curtain?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, that was the prime objective the
activities of the foreign office.
Mr. Surine. Would you repeat the conversation?
Mr. Bogolepov. Well, there wasn't one conversation. That
was the main line of instructions which Molotov always gave to
us, employees of the Soviet Foreign Office and to the members
of the Soviet embassies abroad, that we would have to do our
best in order to implant in the Western world the idea the
Soviet people would back the Soviet system; that there were no
enemies inside the Soviet Union; that in case of war against
the capitalist world, the whole country would have to fight,
the whole people will raise as one man against the capitalist
enemy. I couldn't refer to any particular talking. That was the
main theme all talks they have in Moscow and in the Soviet
Embassies and agencies abroad.
On page ten, for example, you might find extremely
revolving statement to the effect that in Communist countries
where there is no freedoms, still one freedom is maintained,
that is freedom of self-improvement within occupation.
This statement, again, is taken from this book of Stalin's
when it is said:
Under Soviet regime people works for themselves, not for
the enrichment of exploiters. . . . Our working man feels
himself as a free man. And if he works well, he is a hero of
labor, he is covered with glory.
That is from page five hundred, Problems of Leninism of
Stalin's, which evidently served as a basis for statements in
this document.
On page thirty-seven, it is stated:
Soviet elections generate great interest and enthusiasm.
The average Soviet citizen, whatever his nationality, is apt to
feel that he has full and equal citizenship in the U.S.S.R. and
shares much of the patriotic pride which is so marked in the
Great Russian segment.
Here I have another book which is considered as a Communist
``Bible,'' the Short Course of the Communist Party, which you
might find on the desk of every member of the Communist party
in the Soviet Union as well as abroad. On page 336 you may find
the statement:
The elections were carried out in the atmosphere of great
enthusiasm. Those were more than elections. Those were feated
as a great holiday, as a triumph of the Soviet people. Ninety
millions confirmed the triumph of socialism in the U.S.S.R.
with their votes.
Almost exact wording of Siberian document!
The Chairman. Who is the author of that book?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is the official history made by the
Central Committee of the Communist party in the Soviet Union.
That is the highest authority in the Soviet Union.
The Chairman. And Stalin personally is the author of some
of the chapters?
Mr. Bogolepov. That is right. That is, as I said, the
Communist Bible in a way.
On page forty-nine of the U.S. Army intelligence report we
read:
National leaders are vitally respected and admired. Stalin
and Molotov are regarded as great men.
I didn't give you any reference to Soviet propaganda
because this statement you might find on every page of this and
other Communist books.
On pages forty-seven and forty-eight, just a very last
observation, we may find one of the new clever, indirect
methods of the fellow travelers and Russian experts in this
country in their work of distorting the truth about Soviet
realities and confusing the American mind. It is an effort to
identify Russian people with present regime, the same method
you might find in all Communist publications. American self-
styled experts say there was never any freedom in Russia and
there is no freedom today, so you haven't to worry about
Russia, and the one way to deal with the mess is the Atomic
bomb. While using this method of putting all Russian
Communists, as well as non-Communists, on the same level, the
author or authors of the Siberian document go as far as to
repeat word for word basic untruths of the Red propaganda.
For example, on page nine we may read: ``Russia, long known
as prison of peoples.'' I open the story of the Communist party
on page six and I read: ``Czarist Russia, known as prison of
peoples.''
So it is a complete quotation from the Soviet book of
historical lies and this is just one example of how authors of
this document simply rewrote most appealing statements of
Communist leaders for influencing American officers, without
criticism or reservation made whatever.
On page forty-seven it is said:
Extreme caution is required in accepting hearsay data. The
opinion of 2,000,000 White Russian refugees and small numbers
of deserters and escapees cannot be taken as representative of
the 200,000,000 who remain in the USSR. Foreign travelers also
tend to distort what they see in terms of their own background,
and are readily misled by the typically human tendency of the
Russian to display deference to his correspondent's viewpoint,
particularly if the acquaintance is casual. The ardent foreign
Communist visiting the U.S.S.R. will attract his own kind, and
receives few negative impressions from those he talks to.
Similarly, Russians wishing to vent grievances will seek out
the American or British official, and casual acquaintances will
seem to agree with his opinions. Moreover, the outsider is
likely to impute his own reactions to the Soviet people,
forgetting that a situation intolerable to an American may be
acceptable as familiar routine to a Soviet citizen.
The idea is very familiar to me. When people of my type
came to Western world with the idea of explaining how dangerous
communism is exactly in the Western world, to make it obvious
that as long as communism exists in Western world, the dangers
of the Soviet Union will grow on, we immediately ran into
opposition of so-called Russian experts who have position
inside administration, publishing houses, newspapers, etc. Take
the books you have before you; take almost any other western
left-wingers writing on Russia and Soviet affairs. You'll have
almost always a hint as to non-reliability of Russian anti-
Communist refugees. Top British expert, Isaac Deutscher,
American fellow travelers, Fredrick Schuman, Harvard people,
they all are much insistent: Don't believe Russian
eyewitnesses. They are emotional and embittered. They don't
tell the truth. They are warmongers, Fascists, Communist,
everything. Believe only us Western experts on Russian affairs.
Mr. Surine. Mr. Bogelepov, isn't the effect of it that
officers reading the Siberian document should disregard
everything Russian defectors may say, and believe this document
allegedly putting out the real facts?
Mr. Bogolepov. In a way, yes. Intelligence officers who
more than often meet refugees from behind the Iron Curtain are
evidently the main target of the effort to deprive them of the
use of information provided by anti-Communist sources.
Mr. Surine. You have reviewed the entire document,
especially the last four or five pages?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes.
Mr. Surine. Have you found in the document any statements
retracting the previous seventy pages or any facts in it?
[Off-record discussion.]
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, I paid special attention to this moment
and as I told you in the beginning of my testimony, we have
before us a new method of fellow-travellers and false experts
on Russian affairs. They can't praise openly our common enemy.
They have to put it, as we Russian say, a spoon of tar into
the barrel of honey, I would say, to use a protective cover. If
somebody will say it is a pro-Communist report, they will quote
some sentences that sound objective: Say Soviet worker is
unhappy; there is no freedom in the Soviet Union; that there
certainly should be discontent, etc., etc. But isn't all that
in itself very confusing? It is to contradict all of what was
said before. It looks as a way of getting alibi for the authors
of this document. They say bad things do exist in the Soviet
Union but what matters is the whole impression American
intelligence officers may have after reading the document.
Coming to the end of my testimony about this document, for
I promised to be short, I would say that the picture of the
Soviet Union, of the Communist administration, of relations
between the Russian people and their Red oppressors, and
psychology of the Soviet soldier is strongly biased. For
example, there is a true statement that the average Russian is
not an American hater, has a very high respect towards
Americans, and as a Russian who lived most of his life in the
Soviet Union, I am happy to testify here that we really don't
hate any foreign nation, whereas we have especially high esteem
of the American people, and after my living in this country I
can understand why. I found that--I hope you won't get angry--
there are much similarity between Russians and Americans, in
human character. I found Americans very frank, very friendly to
other men and nations, exactly as an average Russian is.
All is not bad in the paper under our examination, indeed.
There is a very important statement in this document to the
effect that it would be a mistake to over-emphasize the problem
of national minority in the Soviet Union, and it is rightly
suggested that in case of war American army should not place
much emphasis on national minorities to try to use them against
the Russian majority. Nothing good would come out of this. I
agree on that point with the authors of the Siberian paper.
Besides these very few positive moments, I would say, after
reading this document, the impression of an American would be
full of confusion. He would know about the Soviet Union even
less than he did before because his brains would be completely
put out of balance, due to contradictions in documents.
The second impression a reader of the document should get,
in my opinion, that the life in the Soviet Union is not so bad;
that the Russians are accustomed to this life, take life as it
is and, therefore, in case of war, as I guess I mentioned
already, there is no opportunity for American intelligence or
psychological warfare to live a wedge between regime and
Russian people and profit by dividing of enemy camp. This is a
most dangerous thought. It may cost much to all of us.
The Chairman. I have an appointment at a quarter of 12:00.
I would like to have you back here this afternoon.
[Off-record discussion.]
Mr. Bogolepov. May I make one observation. In my opinion,
it seems to me that even if this document has been declassified
it would not be wise to disclose in public hearings the full
text of this document. If the Soviet intelligence would be
informed about the contents of this type of intelligence
documents in American army, it would be very valuable
information for our enemy.
The Chairman. In other words, you feel that if the Soviet
Union knew how badly misinformed our officers are, it would be
a benefit to them?
Mr. Bogolepov. Yes.
The Chairman. I have weighed that carefully. I think some
damage can be done by that, however, I think the benefit gained
by exposing the complete clear-cut propaganda of the old
administration would put the new administration on its toes.
We will adjourn until two o'clock this afternoon.
afternoon session
The subcommittee reconvened at 2:00 p.m., room 155, Senate
Office Building, with the following additional people present:
Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan; Karl Baarslag,
Research Director.
Present from the Department of Army: Col. Odis McCormick,
chief, Troop Information and Educational Division; Col. John L.
Chamberlain, asst. chief.
TESTIMONY OF VLADIMIR PETROV
The Chairman. Will you stand and raise your right hand?
In the matter now in hearing before this committee, do you
solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give shall
be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?
Mr. Petrov. I do.
Mr. Cohn. Give us your full name, please?
Mr. Petrov. Vladimir Petrov. P-e-t-r-o-v.
Mr. Cohn. And what is your occupation at the present time?
Mr. Petrov. Teaching at Yale University.
Mr. Cohn. Can you tell us a little bit about your
background?
Mr. Petrov. I am not a professor in the first place,
instructor. I was born in Russia in 1915. I lived there until
1944. I got my college education in Moscow and Leningrad. From
1935 until 1941 I served a prison sentence in Northern Siberia.
I was released shortly before the war began to turn back to
Europe and Russia, a few months before the area was occupied by
Germany. When the Germans began to retreat from Stalingrad, I
moved westward, first to Austria, Vienna and in 1945 I was in
Italy already. I stayed there for two years before I got a
chance to come over to this country. I have been on the faculty
of Yale University since 1947.
Mr. Cohn. I believe it is correct that since that you are
the author of at least one book?
Mr. Petrov. Two books.
Mr. Cohn. And magazine articles that appeared in national
magazines in this country, based on your experience and
knowledge of the Soviet Union. Is that correct?
Mr. Petrov. That is correct.
Mr. Cohn. Have you examined, Mr. Petrov, this army
indoctrination report?
Mr. Petrov. I certainly did.
Mr. Cohn. Could you give the committee and Secretary
Stevens the benefit of your observation and analysis of this
report based on your great experience concerning the Soviet
Union and the very matters dealt within this report.
Mr. Petrov. I'd be glad to. First, I will give you a
summary of what I think of it.
This is a paper of a scientific character that has little
to do with Siberia in the first place and that, in my opinion,
is a pro-Communist apology. It contains distorted information
about the Soviet Union that tends to mislead and misinform the
reader. If you read it, your inescapable conclusion would be
that the Russians are very content with the Communist
dictatorship; that Communists are admired by the population of
the Soviet Union; that even millions of slave laborers in
Siberian concentration camps are relatively happy. The paper is
trying to prove that there is no bounds to Soviet patriotism
and the Soviet soldier is so devoted to the Communist regime
that the United States will find it next to impossible to win.
So far as the paper is used for information of American
officers, it undoubtedly would spread a defeatist attitude and
a tendency to appease communism and encourage him to surrender
on the battlefield in case of diversities. I can prove every
statement from the text of that manuscript. If American
officers believed what the papers tells them, they can't help
but feel a sense of guilt fighting the happy Russian who
maintains cordial relations with their Communist government and
no matter what leads to war, the American officer is so
indoctrinated he feels they are the target of the United
States.
Needless to say that in order to prove his point, the
author or authors knowingly or unknowingly, impose half-truths
and outright lies. Since he used as bibliography largely so-
called fellow-travelers, there is no wonder it promotes
Communist propaganda lines on most points concerning the Soviet
Russia. It may be that only the army need clean up army
information and education from bias and misleading material,
the use of which, in my opinion, is harmful to the best
interests of this country.
I want to add that least of all I think that the author of
this book is a Soviet agent or an undercover Communist because
I had some experience in the past in this country with this
kind of people and the attitude that I discovered in this paper
is not a rare thing in this country I discovered. As a matter
of fact, the author, quoting himself on page fifty says:
Most Americans are fortunate enough never to have knowingly
had personal contact with a professed communist. In the USSR
the Communist is a patriot, a civic booster, and frequently a
war hero, doing his best to build up his country. In the United
States the communist is at best a fool, and at worst a traitor,
whose primary aim is to destroy his country. Communists in the
USSR enjoy public admiration, while those in the United States
are justly condemned as actual or potential felons.
This sentence, in my opinion, characterizes the whole
approach of the author to the problem. He believes that
communism is probably not good for the United States, but it is
perfectly all right for the peoples of the Soviet Union or
whatever other country it has under its control.
I can also point out that the author in another
unscientific way tries to disqualify the sources that may
disagree with him. On page forty-seven he says:
Extreme caution is required in accepting hearsay data. The
opinion of 2,000,000 White Russian refugees and small numbers
of deserters and escapees cannot be taken as representative of
the 200,000,000 who remain in the USSR.
While I, myself, admit that I am one of these refugees, I
think that this doesn't make me less trustful source of
information.
Everyone, of course, has his opinion and is entitled to his
opinion. One may think that communism is a good thing. Another
may think that communism is a wrong thing. I believe that is a
wrong thing but it doesn't diminish any knowledge of the Soviet
Union so far as facts go. When we discuss that or this event is
good or bad, it is matter of opinion but when we come to the
facts, I believe that after spending thirty years in Russia,
reading more books about Russian than any of the so-called
experts, that were listed in the bibliography in this
manuscript, I can at least claim to be a reliable source of
information.
Do you want me to go into any details of my findings
because I have marked out a number of quotations here.
The Chairman. I think perhaps not at this time. I just read
over your analysis of some of the comments you made on this. I
may say that I disagree with the author when he says disregard
anyone who was there, we should only listen to the Corliss
Lamonts and those others. I'd much rather listen to a man like
yourself who knows the people in Siberia, knows the people of
Siberia. I may say I want to thank you very much for coming
down here today and making this study. What I'd like very much
to do if it does not impose on your time, I would like to have
you continue your analysis of not only this particular document
under consideration but several of the other books used to
indoctrinate our military.
Mr. Petrov. It is a rather ungrateful task, very dull
reading and it makes me mad.
The Chairman. I would like to have you come back Monday, if
you could, for open session.
[Off-record discussion.]
COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY
[Editor's note.--Louis Budenz (1891-1972) and Harriet Moore
Gelfan testified at the public hearing on September 28, 1953.
The executive session testimony of Corliss Lamont (1902-1995)
was published in 1953.]
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
New York, N.Y.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 2:30 p.m., in room 128, United
States Court House, Foley Square, New York, N.Y., Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy, presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director.
The Chairman. Show the witness is reminded he has been
sworn previously.
TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ
Mr. Carr. Professor, you have been sworn.
First we would like to have you, extremely briefly, give
your present occupation.
Mr. Budenz. I am assistant professor of economics at
Fordham University and also on the faculty at Seton Hall
University.
Mr. Carr. You were formerly editor of the Daily Worker?
Mr. Budenz. That is correct.
Mr. Carr. Would you briefly recite your positions in the
Communist party very briefly?
The Chairman. May I suggest, Mr. Carr, that this is already
in the record?
Mr. Carr. We can skip that.
The Chairman. The fact Mr. Budenz was a very important
functionary and all his activities have been put in the record
so I don't think it is necessary to go through it again.
Mr. Carr. Fine.
Mr. Budenz, I am going to show you a book entitled A
History of Russia written by Bernard Pares.
Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carr. Are you familiar with Bernard Pares?
Mr. Budenz. I am. I don't know him personally, but I know
of him by official communications in the Communist leadership.
Mr. Carr. Do you know him as a member of the international
Communist movement?
Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir, and as a member of the British
Communist party.
Mr. Carr. In what year was this, sir?
Mr. Budenz. This was during the 1940's, over a period of
time, as a matter of fact. I should say roughly, so far as my
memory can serve now, from 1942 to 1945.
The Chairman. I am going to ask you, Mr. Carr, for the
record, has it been established this book is being used for
indoctrination purposes in the army?
Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. We had the man the other day that
testified that as late as 1952 this book was being used.
Professor Budenz, did you have an opportunity to look at
these pages of the book [indicating]?
Mr. Budenz. Rather hastily.
Mr. Carr. Would you care to express your opinion as to
these pages in the last chapter of the book or would you rather
have some time to study them?
Mr. Budenz. No. I think I can express an opinion.
This discussion here on the Soviet Constitution or the
Stalinist Constitution is a Communist interpretation of that
constitution. It is taking at its face value everything the
Constitution says whereas there is plenty of evidence now and
there was plenty of evidence then that this constitution is a
very decided hoax.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this, Professor. This book,
according to the evidence, has been used to indoctrinate the
American military, to teach them what communism is, what it
stands for. Do you think this is an honest description of the
workings of communism, what it stands for, what it is?
Mr. Budenz. It is not. The Constitution of 1936 was written
specifically to deceive the Western world and specifically the
United States. It incorporates provisions such as freedom of
assembly, the right to hold demonstrations, and many other
provisions which do not exist in Soviet Russia. We have ample
evidence of that. I know of that from information through the
Communist international apparatus, but I think that is public
information today. It is impossible to hold a demonstration in
Soviet Russia even for higher wages. And the Constitution
provides many such guarantees on paper which do not exist in
reality and was written in 1936, significantly when Soviet
Russia was seeking to bring about the people's front
arrangement or the means of deceiving the United States.
The Chairman. Here is one of the things that puzzles me and
disturbs me greatly, Professor. We have had many of these books
that we find are being used to indoctrinate our troops, one
being the book by Ernest J. Simmons. He has been identified by
Bogolepov, who was in the Soviet Foreign Office in Moscow. He
identified Simmons as the man he knew in the Soviet Foreign
Office and had instructions to write this book.
As I read it, and I am not nearly as such an authority on
this subject as a man like you, but just as I read it, I am of
the impression it is complete Communist propaganda. You have
this one by Pares. I believe the testimony is that the last
chapter was written under instructions from the Soviet Foreign
Office, those instructions being transmitted through the
Russian embassy in London.
Is that right?
Mr. Carr. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Would you have any idea at this point you may
want to give this more study, I don't know--as to whether this
material is being or rather has been put out to our military as
a result of merely stupidity or do you think that that is being
put out for more sinister reasons?
Mr. Budenz. May I see the book a moment, Senator?
The Chairman. Yes. The book which I hand you now,
Professor, is not only used as an indoctrination source for
other material, it also is being used in its entirety.
I would suggest you turn over and look at the authors that
were used. You will find an unusual group.
Mr. Budenz. The authors in this book indicate it is
Communist propaganda.
Corliss Lamont, to my knowledge, is a Communist.
Harriet L. Moore, to my personal knowledge and I have met
her in national committee meetings of the Communist party, is a
Communist.
Vladimir Kazekavich, though I have not met him, he was a
lecturer also and according to official communications, he was
a Communist.
Frederick L. Schuman has repeatedly and emphatically been
called to my attention by the Communist leaders as a Communist.
He is a member of so many Communist fronts that that should
suffice but I have this official information.
John N. Hazard, though I have never heard him mentioned
specifically as a Communist, has been noted as a close friend
of the Communist party. He helped, I think, Henry Wallace write
Soviet-Asia Mission, and you will observe that he also is an
editor of Vishinsky's Law of the Soviet Union.
The Chairman. I believe Hazard has been identified by Mr.
Bogolopov, who was in the Russian Foreign Office, as a
Communist for some years, was he not?
Mr. Carr. Yes.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Budenz. So it wouldn't surprise me, though I had never
heard it specifically mentioned that way.
Sergei Kournakoff is known to me personally--he is dead now
but was known to me personally not only as a Communist but as a
Communist espionage agent. He was a courier from the secret
underground apparatus of the Communist party of the United
States to the Soviet Consulate. He also wrote in the Daily
Worker under the name of The Veteran Commander and was
connected with the Communist Russian paper here--Russian
Communist paper here in New York.
Andrew J. Steiger, he is a Communist, wrote in the Daily
Worker and is also the ghostwriter for Henry A. Wallace's
Soviet-Asia Mission.
Dr. Henry N. Sigerist though I have never met him, was
officially called to my attention on a great number of
occasions and most emphatically because of his outstanding
position as a Communist.
John Somerville may be known to me personally, but at any
rate I know from official communications that he is a
Communist. About 1943 or 1944, he wrote an article on
dialectical materialism either for an encyclopedia or an
anthology on philosophy, and we had a discussion of that in the
cultural commission of the Daily Worker; and while that
discussion is of course no longer too clear in my mind, I do
know that on that occasion V. J. Jerome, who was in charge of
cultural work for the Communist party, declared Mr. Somerville
to be a Communist, and that was the information on which I
proceeded to act while I was managing editor of the Daily
Worker.
I noted here, Senator, also in the bibliography which I
have glanced at very hastily that most of the sources are pro-
Communist sources, some of them open Communist or at least
identified Communist.
For instance, we have here Dr. B. J. Stern who is notorious
as having written under the name of Bennett Stevens for the
Communists; and we have others of that character.
There are one or two references in here that are not
Communists and maybe you would say are even critical of the
Communists, but the overwhelming majority of those cited here
in the bibliography, and I would say without wanting to be too
accurate, almost 90 percent are pro-Communist sources,
including Communists.
The Chairman. Professor, we have another--first, let me ask
you a question, referring to the book that you had before you
written by this man, Simmons, which apparently is a compilation
of the works of a sizeable number of Communist authors, can you
conceive of that being of any benefit whatsoever, being used to
indoctrinate our troops?
Mr. Budenz. Most decidedly, not, and I am astounded to find
that the intelligence service, which is particularly sharp on
this matter, has accepted this book or any part of it.
The Chairman. I may say, in connection with the
intelligence service, we had General Partridge before us the
other day--he is head of G-2 now--and he said he has never read
any of the works of Marx, Lenin, Engels; he couldn't--didn't
know the difference between Marxism and Marxism-Leninism; he
didn't know what happened in the Communist movement from 1945--
that is when, as you know, they had the tremendous turnabout;
he didn't recognize who Harriet Moore was or any of the
Communist authors. And that is the man who is head of our G-2
at this time, so I am not too much impressed with G-2 as an
authority on communism.
We have here also, Professor Budenz, a document entitled
``Psychological and Cultural Traits of Soviet Siberia.'' This
was sent out to various commands--not a great number of the
original documents were sent out, but the command of course had
the right to reproduce it, if they cared to, and the obvious
purpose was to give the various commanders an accurate picture
of communism in action in Siberia.
I wonder if you have had a chance to look this over or not.
Mr. Budenz. I haven't seen this full document, Senator. I
have seen portions of it, and those portions were certainly not
realistic to start with and were not descriptions that should
be conveyed of Soviet Siberia.
The Chairman. I wonder if you would care to take the list
of people who were used as authors or sources for this document
and give us a rundown on it. I am particularly interested today
in Corliss Lamont, who will be here to testify.
Mr. Budenz. Corliss Lamont is known to me as a member of
the Communist party. I say that aware that he has denied this.
But on several occasions I met him as a member of the Communist
party. In official communications among the Communist leaders,
he was held up as being among the first rank of the Communist
concealed leadership. And, of course, the positions of
responsibility to which he was assigned as head of the Friends
of Soviet Russia, which later became the National Council of
Soviet-American Friendship indicates his position. I happen to
know, however, definitely face to face that he is a Communist.
The Chairman. Have you ever personally met him at a
Communist gathering?
Mr. Budenz. No, I have not met him personally, because the
understanding was that he was not to be at Communist gatherings
nor at the headquarters of the Communist party.
But I have met him in connection with the formation of the
People's World, where he represented the party. That is, he
didn't say so, but it was said to me by Frank Palmer and by a
Miss or Mrs. Field, I think it was Alice Field, in his
presence.
Secondly, in 1937 Herb Goldfrank, he is the husband of
Helen K. Colodny, the writer of children's stories and the
Soviet espionage agent, called to my attention the fact that
Corliss Lamont was on the telephone.
He stated that Lamont wanted to know about James Burnham,
then a professor in New York University, and I went to the
phone and talked to Lamont and told Lamont that Burnham was a
Trotskyite in his sympathies, and Lamont said as a Communist he
was pleased to hear that, or at least to get the information
because he had been taken in by Burnham temporarily.
At that same time, in that conversation, he sent word to
Clarence Hathaway, who was in charge of the penetration of a
number of organizations for the Communist party and also in
charge of the control of certain Communist fronts, that he,
Corliss Lamont was sending to Comrade Hathaway, and that was
the phrase he used, a report for the party on his activity
within the organization known as the Friends of the Soviet
Union.
The Chairman. Did he tell you this over the phone,
Professor, or where did you get the information that he was
sending his report?
Mr. Budenz. He told me that over the phone in this same
conversation about James Burnham.
The Chairman. May I ask you this: There is always the
possibility that I could call you and say, ``Professor Budenz,
this is John Jones speaking.'' Unless you recognized my voice,
you wouldn't know whether it was John Jones or Pete Smith or
Joe McCarthy. Do you think if you listened to Lamont testify,
you would be able to state definitely whether or not you would
recognize his voice as the man who admitted he was a member of
the Communist party?
Mr. Budenz. Yes, I think I would.
The Chairman. With that in mind, I would like very much if
you could--I know we have imposed on you and taken a tremendous
amount of your time, but we would like it very much if you
would stay in the room and listen to Lamont testify.
Mr. Budenz. Very well.
The Chairman. If you could do that.
[Mr. Budenz shakes head in affirmation.]
The Chairman. Pardon me, Frank, you have more questions.
Mr. Carr. Concerning this book you had before you, there
are other people listed in the bibliography. Would you
recognize any of the others there?
Mr. Budenz. Simmons.
Mr. Carr. Simmons you have spoken of?
Mr. Budenz. Pares, I have spoken of.
Mr. Carr. Yes.
Mr. Budenz. Professor Harper, though I don't know him as a
Communist, he was always considered by the Communists to be
very close to them in his attitude.
There is only one name that I see whom I could say to be a
critic of Soviet Russia and that is David J. Dolan, Forced
Labor in the Soviet Union. There is no doubt his work is
valuable.
The Chairman. Let me ask you----
Mr. Budenz. In criticizing slave labor in Soviet Union.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this. As I go through this
document, and I understand you haven't read it over, you may
not be in a position to testify in detail, but as I read it, I
find about 95 percent of it praises either directly or
indirectly the Communist system to the skies, and I find about
5 percent which is highly critical of communism. We have had
witnesses who have identified entire passages as coming
directly from Stalin's book, others that come from--I forgot
the name of the document--one that Bogolepov referred to as the
Communist Bible.
Mr. Carr. History of the CPSU.
The Chairman. History of the CPSU.
Mr. Budenz. That is Stalin's own work. That is what you
might call, if you dared use that language, the Bible of the
Communists.
The Chairman. I think that is the way it was referred to.
I think I understand the modus operandi here myself but for
the record, would you care to discuss the purpose of putting
in, into that document, material highly critical of communism,
3 or 4 or 5 percent of the entire work.
Mr. Budenz. Well, if there weren't something critical in
here, it would be seen to be too clearly a Communist document.
For example, we have some very startling statements: The
toiler was elevated to the highest respectability. That is
utterly false, false in view of the fifteen million slave
laborers in the labor passport system wherein the laborer could
not leave the job without the consent of the bureaucrat; false
measure of respectability is wrong; and it is false in addition
in Stalin's own words, if we had time to quote them from the
Problems of Leninism, where he shows the dictatorship of the
proletariat is actually the dictatorship by the Communist
party, by the vanguard. Just one statement like that
immediately throws the whole picture out of focus.
The Chairman. I wonder if I could ask you to do this,
Professor. I would like to send you the testimony of Bogolepov
and the Yale Professor who was in--what is his name?
Mr. Carr. Petrov.
The Chairman. Petrov, who had been imprisoned in Siberia
for some time and was an important member of the Communist
party in Russia, who has testified this is pure Communist
propaganda. I would like you to go over their testimony and the
passages which they pick up and get at some future time--oh, we
are having a hearing Monday, but I don't think perhaps we could
get around to your testimony then. I am taking Tuesday off. And
be in a position to give us a--oh, your idea of just the extent
to which this is Communist propaganda.
This is off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
[Witness excused.]
Mr. Carr. Mr. Chairman, to further identify one of the
authors mentioned, I would like to just note for the record
that the New York Times, of Wednesday, January 18, 1950, page
seventeen, carries an article in which Vladimir Kazekavich is
identified by Elizabeth Bentley as a Russian agent.
The Chairman. Kazekavich is one of the men being used to
indoctrinate or was used----
Mr. Carr. That is right.
The Chairman [continuing]. To indoctrinate the troops.
Mr. Carr. He is one of the contributors to the book called
USSR, a Concise History.
The Chairman. Which is----
Mr. Carr. Which is being used by the army.
The Chairman. Have we found out whether that is being used
as of this moment? We know it was up to 1952.
Mr. Carr. No. We were to get that.
The Chairman. From Stevens.
Mr. Carr. From Stevens.
The Chairman. We are to get that from Stevens. Good.
TESTIMONY OF HARRIET L. MOORE (HARRIET MOORE GELFAN)
The Chairman. Miss Moore, raise your right hand. In the
matter in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear
to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Miss Moore. Yes.
The Chairman. The answer is I do?
Miss Moore. I do.
The Chairman. Your name is Harriet Lucy Moore, is that
correct?
Miss Moore. That is my maiden name, yes.
The Chairman. What is your name today?
Miss Moore. Harriet Moore Gelfan.
Mr. Carr. What is your present address for the record,
please.
The Chairman. May I first inform the witness the principal
reason why you are here is because we found your works are
being used to indoctrinate our military on communism and upon
the Soviet Union. We have been investigating the use of the
works of Communist authors, the works of espionage agents to
indoctrinate our military, and that is the principal reason why
you are here today, to ask you some questions in that respect.
And Mr. Carr will proceed with the questions.
Mr. Carr. What is your present occupation, please?
Miss Moore. I have--housewife.
Mr. Carr. Housewife. Are you the Harriet Moore who assisted
in the preparation of the book entitled USSR, a Concise
Handbook, which was edited by Joseph J. Simmons, excuse me,
Ernest J. Simmons? \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ernest Joseph Simmons, ed., USSR, A Concise Handbook (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miss Moore. Yes. Well, I wrote one section of it.
Mr. Carr. Did you write the section entitled ``Number II,
Physical Features''?
Miss Moore. Yes.
Mr. Carr. Did you contribute in any other way towards the
production of this book?
Miss Moore. Not that I recall.
The Chairman. Do you know Ernest J. Simmons?
Miss Moore. I am in a peculiar position. I was called to
this committee at five o'clock yesterday. I have had no
knowledge of what it was about. I have not had an opportunity
to consult with counsel, and I don't quite understand the
implications of my being called here.
The Chairman. May I say this, that the subpoena has been
issued for some time, we issued it some time ago, and it wasn't
your fault that it wasn't served until last night.
If you feel for your protection you need to confer with
counsel, I think, Mr. Carr, that the witness is entitled to
have time to confer with counsel.
Mr. Carr. All right, sir.
The Chairman. Do you want to have an adjournment so you can
confer with counsel?
Miss Moore. How long an adjournment would I get?
The Chairman. How long do you want?
Miss Moore. As a matter of fact, I would need several days.
The Chairman. I think that is reasonable.
Miss Moore. I called and asked for such a delay, but
couldn't get one.
The Chairman. I think that is a reasonable request. You
have been identified, you see, under oath as an espionage agent
of Communist Russia. You have been identified as a Communist.
You have been identified as an important functionary in the
Amerasia publication, which has been named, I believe, by
intelligence agents as a tool for Soviet espionage.
In view of the seriousness of those charges, I think you
should have whatever time you think you need to consult with
counsel and decide whether or not you want to give us the
information which we want or decide whether you feel giving
such information to us would incriminate you.
Today is Tuesday. How would it be if we give you until next
Monday?
Miss Moore. Well, that's better than nothing.
The Chairman. If you think that isn't enough, we will try
to give you more time. I think that gives enough. That gives a
full week.
Miss Moore. Okay.
The Chairman. One thing that occurs to me is this. We had
some questions to ask you today principally about your alleged
Communist connections, about whether or not you were under the
discipline of the Communist party when you wrote these things,
and we were going into that.
We had hoped it would be unnecessary to call you to
Washington. If we don't hear you today, we will have to ask you
to come to Washington. That is both a hardship upon you and a
hardship on the committee, because we have to pay your way back
down there and back.
Miss Moore. If that is the only question you want to ask
me, I can answer that by declining to answer it, as you know I
do.
The Chairman. Why don't we do this. If it meets with your
approval, we will let Mr. Carr go ahead and ask you questions
and if the situation arises in which you think you want
additional time, then we will give you until Monday.
Miss Moore. It has already arisen.
The Chairman. I see. In other words, you do want additional
time?
Miss Moore. Yes.
The Chairman. We are giving you until Monday.
Miss Moore. All right. I will have to go to Washington?
The Chairman. Yes. Uh-huh! This may seem a hardship to you,
but, you see, and I have never met you before, know nothing
about you personally; all of the evidence about you is that you
were a very, very important functionary of the Communist party,
a party which is dedicated to the destruction of this nation by
force and violence; evidence that you were an espionage
agent.Therefore we are duty bound to try and get that
information from you. And we find your works are being used to
teach our military.
And I may say we do not enjoy this, either, but we will
have to ask you to come down Monday.
Miss Moore. There will no more hearings in New York?
The Chairman. No. I will be leaving--I will be here two
days, but I am tied up completely with the interviewing of
witnesses.
Miss Moore. It is very difficult for me. I have five small
children, and it is not easy for me to go to Washington.
Mr. Carr. It would be a one-day hearing.
The Chairman. It will be; might not get to her Monday. I
wouldn't like to call her down, if we have Budenz. Bogolopov,
and the Yale professor. I have got to take off Monday afternoon
before 3:30. Doubt if we can get to her Monday.
Mr. Carr. Then we would have to have a hearing here?
The Chairman. We will try and arrange so you can be heard
up here.
How old are you children?
Miss Moore. The oldest is 8\1/2\.
The Chairman. We will hold it up. We won't require you to
come to Washington Monday. I wish you would consider yourself
under subpoena, in other words not released from the subpoena.
We will try and hear you in New York. I perhaps won't be here
myself, but have one of the other senators hear your testimony.
Let me ask you this question, and you can either answer or
refuse to answer, using the Fifth Amendment, or ask for an
adjournment on this also.
Would you care to tell us whether or not as of today you
are a member of the Communist party?
I say, if you want to hold that answer up until you have a
chance to consult with counsel, you may do so.
Miss Moore. I would like to hold that up, too, please.
The Chairman. You may. You may. You will be excused, but
you are still under subpoena.
Miss Moore. Yes, sir.
[Witness excused.]
The Chairman. Mr. Lamont.
Mr. Wittenberg. How do you do, Senator? Mr. Lamont is
coming in. I am his attorney.
The Chairman. I see.
Mr. Wittenberg. Where do you want him?
The Chairman. Raise you right hand, Mr. Lamont.
TESTIMONY OF CORLISS LAMONT (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, PHILIP
WITTENBERG AND IRVING LIKE)
[Although taken in executive session, this testimony was
published in 1953 in U.S. Senate Committee on Government
Operations, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, Communist Infiltration in the Army (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1953), page 1-19.]
[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
KOREAN WAR ATROCITIES
[Editor's note.--A task force of the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, chaired by Senator Charles E. Potter,
investigated war atrocities committed by Communist forces
against American troops in Korea. Public hearings on the issue
were held on December 2, 3 and 4, 1953. None of the witnesses
who appeared at the executive session on October 6, Edward J.
Lyons, Jr., Lt. Col. Lee H. Kostora, Maj. James Kelleher, and
Lt. Col. J. W. Whithorne, III, testified again during these
public hearings.]
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 10:00 a.m., room 357, Senate
Office Building, Senator Charles E. Potter, acting chairman,
presiding.
Present: Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan.
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Roy M.
Cohn, chief counsel; Robert Jones, assistant to Senator Potter;
Harold Rainville, administrative assistant to Senator Dirksen;
Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk.
Also in attendance: Mr. John Adams, representing the
secretary of the army, Mr. Stevens; Brig. Gen. C. C. Fenn,
director, legislative and liaison division, Department of the
Army; Lt. Col. J. W. Whitehorne, III, G-2; Lt. Col. Lee H.
Kostora, G-1; Mr. Edward J. Lyons, Jr., Judge Advocate
General's Office; Maj. James Kelleher, Department of Defense,
Psychological Warfare; Mr. Charles A. Haskins, staff department
counselor.
Senator Potter. Gentlemen, first I want to thank you for
coming up here on such short notice to give us the benefit of
what information you can give us. As you probably know, the
chairman has designated me as a task force of one to try to
find out what has happened to the several thousand American
soldiers that the Communists haven't returned and we have
apparently no knowledge what has happened. We have seen in the
papers that many of them have been massacred behind the North
Korean lines. We would like to have that information.
Now, also, I think it would be well for me to say we have
no intention of competing with the military or competing with
United Nations forces in this field, but I do know that a
mother that has a son or a wife who has a husband that is
unaccounted for here desires to get full and accurate
information as to his whereabouts or what has happened to the
person that they are interested in. We solicit your cooperation
and we assure you that we will endeavor to carry out our duties
without any embarrassment to the military or anyone else. We
are not after anyone. We are on the same mission that I am sure
you gentlemen are.
Now, Frank, I assume you have discussed this with the
gentlemen here, so would you go right ahead.
Mr. Carr. I think first, sir, I will have Mr. Lyons give us
a little bit of background of the situation.
In the sense that this is going to be a roundtable
discussion, if at any point some of you other gentlemen find
something you want to put in that might help the senator----
Senator Potter. If you do that, take cognizance of the fact
that our fair young lady is keeping minutes of the meeting.
Mr. Cohn. I think if each person who speaks will identify
himself first.
TESTIMONY OF EDWARD J. LYONS, JR., WAR CRIMES
DIVISION, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Mr. Lyons. In the summer of 1950, to be exact, July of
1950, General MacArthur, at that time Far East commander,
ordered his judge advocate to take steps to investigate
atrocities, war crimes, being committed against our soldiers,
South Koreans and civilians. Within a week or ten days, General
MacArthur was appointed United Nations commander in charge of
all forces in Korea and thereafter he appointed his commanding
judge advocate responsible for the collection of war crimes
material, the investigation, interrogation of witnesses, the
collection of evidence in the preparation for trial. In his
capacity as United Nations commanding judge advocate, Colonel
George Hickman prepared what we shall call a ``direction'' to
all judge advocates in the field as to the manner in which they
would conduct interrogations and submit the evidence to him.
A step further, in October of 1950, the United Nations
commander, General MacArthur, ordered the judge advocate of the
United States Eighth Army to establish a war-crimes division in
his command which would gather all of this evidence and which
would interrogate the witnesses for all needs and coordinate
the work of various staff judge advocates in the army and
different commands. That division functioned as such until
August of 1952 when the then United Nations commander, General
Clark, ordered the duties of that division transferred to the
Korean Communications Zone, so as of 1 September 1952, the War
Crimes Division has been operating under the commanding general
of the Korean Communications Zone.
Senator Potter. In order to fully identify that command,
who is the commander?
Mr. Lyons. I am afraid----
Senator Potter. Is that a theater command?
Mr. Lyons. That would be a theater command. I don't know
the name of----
Mr. Adams. The Korean Communications Zone is not a theater
command as it is now known under General Clark. The Korean
Communications Zone was a line of communications to the Eighth
Army in Korea as distinguished from the theater command.
Mr. Lyons. It is headed by a Lt. Col. R. Todd, a judge
advocate lt. colonel.
During the time that the War Crimes Division has been in
operation it has investigated roughly eighteen hundred cases,
with the exception of roughly seventy duplicate files. All of
these case files are in Korea.
Senator Potter. Now, the case files for the entire eighteen
hundred cases are in Korea?
Mr. Lyons. The entire eighteen hundred cases are in Korea.
The case files range from cases that the judge advocate
believes are provable cases, and there are only a small
percentage of those cases which we have nothing more than an
unsupported confession or individual eyewitness testimony. Many
of the roughly eighteen hundred case files are based solely on
confessions of North Korean or Chinese Communists who were
prisoners of war at Koji Island. That was the United States
prisoner-of-war center.
Now, in our office we have at the present time what we call
case status reports of roughly sixteen hundred of these files.
Senator Potter. What do you mean by case status reports?
Mr. Lyons. A case status report is what we call a thumb
nail sketch of the file. It would contain, where possible, the
names of victims; where known, their nationality; whether
military or civilian. It will contain the names of suspects and
their nationality if they are known. It will state where the
incident occurred and then will give a brief description of
what the incident was or is.
It will give where we have the names of survivors and that
is pretty much all.
Senator Potter. Have the survivors been notified at all
that you have this information?
Mr. Lyons. The survivors have been interrogated in Korea.
Senator Potter. You are talking about survivors on the
spot?
Mr. Lyons. Yes, sir.
Now the statements, interrogations or affidavits of the
survivors will be found in the case files that are in Korea,
and in those case files in Korea you will find photographs; you
will find a report of the investigating officer; you will find
medical case histories, identification of bodies and any other
information that in the opinion of the investigating officer
would go to make up a case.
Senator Potter. What are your plans now? What are you
planning to do with this information?
Mr. Lyons. I would say that--let me answer your question by
going back a few months if I may, Senator. The Little Switch
Operation, that was a term of wounded POWs, which took place in
April of this year and was completed in the middle of the
summer. The returnees, both United Nations and our boys, were
interrogated in Korea. The results of those interrogations have
been incorporated, here applicable, in these eighteen hundred
case files. There is continual interrogation of all of the
returnees. As a result of this ``Little Switch'' operation
roughly 140 new cases have been opened. We have not as yet
received any of those case status reports.
Now we come to ``Operation Big Switch.'' There will roughly
be thirty-five hundred interrogations there. I don't know at
the moment what percentage of the thirty-five hundred
interrogations will obtain war crimes information but whatever
there is, whatever number we do extract will have to be
returned to the War Crimes Division in Korea for study and
incorporation in the pending cases or the possibility of an
opening of a great many new cases.
Senator Potter. In other words, your eighteen hundred cases
were discovered prior to the exchange of prisoners?
Mr. Lyons. No, I must say roughly fifteen hundred or
sixteen hundred, in round figures, prior to the exchange of
prisoners. There were roughly 141 new cases as of the 31st of
August as a result of ``Little Switch.''
Senator Potter. What type of a process did you find? Were
they on a mass basis or----
Mr. Lyons. They vary, Senator. You had the mass basis
particularly as regards the South Korean civilians. You did not
have, so far, too many of the mass cases involved in United
Nations. You do, of course, have the three or four cases that
have grown out of the march from Seoul to the border.
Now, we do expect and we have reason to believe that there
will be many more cases opened as a result of ``Little Switch''
and ``Big Switch'' having to do with the march from Seoul. We
have other cases--we have found other cases--we have the murder
of roughly twelve hundred United States soldiers by North
Koreans and there we have only the testimony of one North
Korean who was a participant and eyewitness but the War Crimes
Division in Korea thought that his statement would be accepted.
Senator Potter. I understand that this North Korean
testified or they have a statement from him that twelve hundred
were killed at one time?
Mr. Lyons. In one operation.
We have a large number of cases where the atrocity is two,
three, four, five, six, ten, twelve United Nations prisoners
who were wounded and their bodies were discovered with their
hands tied behind their backs with evidence that they were
beaten, their eyes gouged out, used for bayonet practice and
the like. We have one case where a wounded American, the enemy
Communist threw gasoline on his clothing and ignited him and he
managed to crawl back to the American lines and later died in
the hospital.
Senator Potter. You have his statement, I assume, before he
died?
Mr. Lyons. Yes.
Senator Potter. I wonder if from the G-1 section we could
find out what a man's family would be notified when a soldier
is missing in action and then his statement given to the War
Crimes Commission that he has been a victim of Communist
atrocity. I assume that G-1 notified the parents.
TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. LEE H. KOSTORA, G-1, OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
Col. Kostora. We notify, that is, the adjutant general
notifies the family or the next of kin of any change of status
of anyone missing in action or any casualty. If we have the
information on any casualty we report it to the parents. I
don't know of any cases where we reported atrocity cases, that
is, we have told the parents that an atrocity was committed.
Senator Potter. Now, in the cases that Mr. Lyons mentioned
where a majority of them haven't been definitely proven, do you
notify the family that the missing in action son has been
killed?
Col. Kostora. That is right. We have in our records where
we have definitely known that a person was missing in action
and died in a missing status, we have notified the family.
Mr. Adams. I think the Senator's question was: Do you
advise the family that he was murdered?
Col. Kostora. No, sir.
Senator Potter. It is changed from missing in action to
killed in action?
Col. Kostora. It depends on the circumstances. It would
depend on the report we would get from the Far East command.
All of the information that we get concerning a man we do
report to the family of the man.
Senator Potter. I don't know whether you have the
information Mr. Lyons is referring to or not. I assume you
don't.
Col. Kostora. I assume not. We probably have cases where
they died in American hospitals. I am sure the adjutant general
received information through casualty channels. What type of
information he received I couldn't say.
Senator Potter. If they have information from a North
Korean prisoner that he witnessed the massacre of a soldier or
several soldiers, then you wouldn't necessarily have that
information?
Col. Kostora. No, sir. Not necessarily.
Mr. Adams. I would like to say the army never revealed the
names of soldiers who were murdered at Malmedy Massacre
although they have them. They have not made the family aware of
the fact that they were murdered instead of killed in action.
That has been eight or nine years. I expect they will adhere to
that situation. They have photographs, in General Clark's
possession, of numerous soldiers with their hands tied behind
their backs readily identifiable, throats cut and things of
that sort. Obviously, if they are published the face will be
blacked out. That would be a terrible thing for a mother to
see. I don't think the fact that an individual was murdered
instead of killed in action would be revealed. Is that right?
Col. Kostora. That is right.
Senator Potter. I am not an expert on psychological
warfare, but I am just wondering if that might be a pretty good
psychology although it may be hard on the mother, but I am just
thinking out loud.
Mr. Adams. We have Major Kelleher here from the
Psychological Warfare Branch of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense who could describe the program if you'd like to hear
about it.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. JAMES KELLEHER, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Maj. Kelleher. That is presently under active
consideration, sir, and on the verge of approval a program
which will really include three different phases. First is the
exposure for the benefit of not only the American public but
the world in general the nature of these atrocities and that
really covers two phases there-domestic and foreign, do the
same thing on a global basis. It has a third phase which I
might say concerns Ambassador Lodge at the United Nations,
which will include the charge of biological warfare. This plan
will probably be kicked off within the next day or so. In fact,
Ambassador Lodge is going to show some film, motion picture
sound interviews with the same air force fliers who were
characterized in the so-called germ warfare charges. Over a
period of the last two years the Communists have produced at
least four or five propaganda films which have been distributed
through different areas of the world and various languages
which are built around their confessions--six people, four air
force fliers and two marine fliers. Also involved is a so-
called International Scientific Commission made up mostly of
Europeans and Asiatics. The British representative is a man
named Neeaam. They went to Korea under the auspices of the
Communists and made a so-called impartial investigation of germ
warfare. The biggest and most powerful propaganda on the
Communist side in the hearing of this commission were the
confessions of the two air force fliers, Lt. Enich and Lt.
Quinn. Oddly enough, we weren't so sure we would get these
individuals back from the Communists on the ``Big Switch.'' We
feel that we got them back because the Communists had put them
on film and gave it global distribution and quite evidently
couldn't hold them, they repatriated them. However, these
people on repatriation have all recounted, stated that
confessions were obtained under various degrees of mental
duress. We got for Ambassador Lodge sound motion picture
interviews with the same individuals and these are now in his
hands. If you will recall, he entered a resolution at the
United Nations last spring asking for an impartial
investigation of this PW thing, and he defied Communists at the
United Nations stating if you will bring the so-called
confessors out of North Korea and give them thirty days rest,
without exception they will recount on their confessions. They
have now recounted and he wants to put it on record. He has
invited members of various delegations and a pretty good press
quorum in New York to view these films. The latest word is that
it will be this afternoon or this evening, in what has to be a
kick-off on this program.
We also feel, if I may bring up this point, that your
committee in making these investigations can be of tremendous
help in the global program that we are trying to get underway
to bring this whole mess to the attention of the world.
To get back to your mention about notifying the mother that
her son was a victim of atrocity, from a psychological
standpoint it will undoubtedly have a powerful effect. It has
to be measured simply against the pain and emotional impact on
the mother and American people. Does that about suffice, sir?
Senator Potter. Yes. I would like to solicit your advice as
to how best we can utilize the information we have.
Maj. Kelleher. All right, sir.
Senator Potter. Since the truce and the switches of
prisoners has there been any interrogation of American PWs
after they returned to the states. Do we have information on
that?
TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. J. W. WHITEHORNE, III, COLLECTION AND
DISSEMINATION DIVISION, OACS, G-2
Col. Whitehorne. War crimes and atrocities information is
not in itself intelligence. However, during the interrogation
process applied to all returned personnel we do conduct, in
accordance with established EEI, Essential Elements of
Information, questioning for war crimes and atrocities
information as a collateral activity. That information in turn
is received after processing in the Department of the Army
where it is made available to the interested parties, in
particular the adjutant general casualty branch and the JAG
office.
G-2 does not evaluate or process this information. We
merely pass it on to the interested and competent agencies.
Does that answer you question, sir?
Senator Potter. Yes. The reason I asked the question, I
have had several inquiries from people, mothers, whose sons
haven't returned and they claim they have heard from certain
PWs, American PWs, that they saw them in prison camps. They
have no information from the military or they had no
information from the son while in prison camp. I saw some
correspondence where the mother contacted the army and gave the
army the names of some returned PWs who were supposed to have
information concerning her son. I am just wondering if the army
has had the time or facilities to track those individual cases
down by contacting PWs after their return to the states.
Col. Whitehorne. Each returnee is interrogated. They have a
list of questions--who they saw, where they saw them, physical
condition, where he thinks they are now.
Off the record, I can explain the process to you.
Where we receive an indication through the interrogations
that a particular man is alive, that information is passed to
the adjutant general along with the identity of the man who
gave it. In fact, we pass the raw information to them so they
have as much of the story as we do. They cross-check the other
persons who might have seen him. If John Jones is carried as
missing in action on the adjutant general's roster, then three
prisoners come back all of whom said they saw John Jones, that
gives the adjutant general a basis for three checks to see
whether he should be changed from missing in action status to
captured. Comparison of dates involved tell whether or not he
should have been returned on possibly this last exchange.
Senator Potter. How many should have been returned that
haven't been?
Col. Whitehorne. I believe Colonel Kostora----
Col. Kostora. So far we have turned over--the UN Command
has turned over to the Communists a list of 944 American names.
Senator Potter. 944?
Col. Kostora. Yes, sir.
Mr. Adams. That includes army, navy, air force and marines.
Col. Kostora. That includes all of the services.
Senator Potter. How many UN troops have been returned?
Col. Kostora. I think there were about three thousand,
roughly.
Senator Potter. About three thousand have been returned?
Col. Kostora. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Do we have any information at all that some
of our PWs have been sent to labor camps?
Col. Whitehorne. Yes, sir, installations which could be
called labor PW camps where they saw lumber, some mining, but
mostly lumbering.
Senator Potter. Do we have any information that we still
have American troops in labor camps?
Col. Whitehorne. None at present.
Senator Potter. I am thinking now in comparison to World
War II. I think they are still returning German PWs who served
seven or eight years in Russian Labor Camps. I wonder if they
have any Americans as a result of the Korean War. Do we have
any knowledge or information to that effect?
Col. Whitehorne. We have no information that any particular
individuals are held in camps of that nature at this time. We
have a dragnet out now for information and action trying to
ascertain that fact, as to who they are, where they are, why
they are there.
Mr. Cohn. You think there are people there and are looking
for further identification?
Col. Whitehorne. Typical. G-2 pessimism, there probably
are.
Senator Potter. For my own information, I am curious about
the twenty-three Americans who are still over there and
apparently Communist propaganda got the best of them--or maybe
they went into the service as pro-Communists. Is there any
check being made as to the background of the men still there?
Col. Whitehorne. That information is available.
Mr. Cohn. What was the answer on that? Did any of those
people have Communist backgrounds?
Col. Whitehorne. Some of them had leftist leanings.
Mr. Cohn. Would we be able to get some documentation?
Col. Whitehorne. There are some present FBI files of
activity prior to entry in service.
Mr. Cohn. From whom in your shop could we get that? You are
probably going into that pretty thoroughly?
Col. Whitehorne. No, we have not. Our information is fairly
scattered. The adjutant general may have some information in
their 201 files; then on check of the name for security
purposes, you may find that the F.B.I. had some report of
activity on the individual. Now, our security division would be
the people to contact regarding each person.
Senator Potter. Now, that is security division of G-2?
Col. Whitehorne. Yes.
Senator Potter. Could they supply us with a little summary
on each one of those on whom there is any derogatory
information?
Col. Whitehorne. They probably could. I am sure they could.
Mr. Cohn. I think it would be helpful--a summary on the
twenty-three on whom there is any information of leftist
activity before they went in.
Col. Kostora. Actually we have twenty-three names of people
as reported by the Communists at this moment. We don't know
whether the twenty-three men are the twenty-three named, and I
don't suppose there has been any attempt to find out whether or
not they are because I don't believe our people will ask the
identity of any men because of the feeling that we don't want
to reveal the identity of anti-Communist people that we have in
our possession.
Mr. Cohn. They have given us twenty-three names. If we
could have the information on the twenty-three imparted, what
information you have concerning them would be very helpful.
Maj. Kelleher. The twenty-three names were released by
Wilford Burchett, a Communist Korean correspondent for a
Parisian Communist newspaper. The Communists didn't do it--a
pretty neat trick to use a kind of third person.
They don't have to stand behind their lies regardless.
Certainly the UN commander or military never would have given a
list of the twenty-three names to the American press, knowing
the impact on American mothers and not knowing for sure that
they were the same ones. The Communists are only too glad to
help you out.
Mr. Cohn. Of course, you can't tell but I would think they
would try to be accurate. If someone named turned up on our
side they would look pretty sick.
Senator Potter. How many soldiers would you classify in the
so-called progressive group? The ones who played ball with the
commies previous to the war?
Col. Whitehorne. Before answering that I'd like to issue a
caution. The files are not complete as yet. When a man is
interrogated his file is received in the U.S., received in G-2,
Sixth Army, who turns over the file to the service of the
individual, in case of airman, marine, sailor. In case of army
personnel the files move from the Sixth Army to his home army,
what we call gaining command. The gaining command is charged
with the responsibility of reading the file for their own
information. They have the case in their hands summarizing it,
distributing summaries to other armies and back overseas to the
armed forces Far East and then forwarding the summaries, ten
copies of the summaries and original to G-2.
G-2 in turn makes the original and a copy of the summary
available to all interested parties. Unless those files are all
received in G-2, cross indexed and filed centrally, it will be
impossible to say ``yes'' or ``no.''
Senator Potter. How long before that process will be
completed?
Col. Whitehorne. We hope to have it done in about nine
months. Each individual returning has information on upwards of
two hundred others which means a cross indexing to two hundred
other files.
Senator Potter. Would you be in any position to make a
rough estimate to the number indoctrinated with Communist
philosophy here?
Col. Whitehorne. The Communists attempted to indoctrinate
them all. We feel that it has possibly taken on the basis of
``Little Switch'' about 2\1/2\ percent, ``Big Switch'' about 5
percent. However, as a complete group, the figure now--possibly
the overall impression is somewhere around 2\1/2\ percent.
Senator Potter. The major mentioned the air force personnel
who signed confessions concerning germ warfare. Now, I would
assume that the army and the Psychological Warfare Branch has
spent considerable time interviewing the returned PWs who
signed confessions, not only in germ warfare but went on the
radio--We did have some personnel that did that? Has that been
done?
Col. Whitehorne. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Another question that I would like to ask,
who do you think we should talk to? Who do you think we should
contact to get as much information as possible to conduct this
hearing?
Col. Whitehorne. On the, war crimes and atrocities or
overall?
Senator Potter. First, on war crimes, atrocities, then on
the overall--the prisoners of war and we'd like to get
information concerning the Communist methods. I think we should
blow that up. How the Communist used the prisoners of war in
violation of all international agreements as to indoctrination
and the methods used. I think that should be blown up as much
as possible.
Col. Whitehorne. On war, crimes and atrocities, War Crimes
and Atrocities Division, Office of the Judge Advocate; on
indoctrination, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare.
Senator Potter. Mr. Adams, I don't know whether anyone here
would be in a position to say whether the proper defense places
would loan us personnel to work on this case----
Mr. Adams. I am quite sure we can. I am quite sure the
department will lend the committee any assistance which you
required to make preparations for a hearing. I am sure the
secretary of the army would want to and I am sure the secretary
of defense would. The Psychological Warfare Office, under
General Erskine, Office of Secretary of Defense would be
available to assist you. I am sure then both the judge advocate
general, G-1 and G-2 of the army would give you all the
assistance possible.
I would like to make a slight reservation on the request of
Mr. Cohn that the cases on the twenty-three names be made
available to the committee, together with any background of
possible Communist affiliation before they entered the service,
in addition to the problems faced, these individuals would fall
within the terms of the president's directive on--I'd like to
reserve that long enough for us to examine whether or not this
situation would.
Mr. Cohn. That would still come under the Truman black-out
order?
Mr. Adams. I am quite sure it would.
Maj. Kelleher. May I say we were faced with the same thing
in supplying material to Ambassador Lodge at the UN. We have
run across it in one case. Finally--I'd like to mention this to
Mr. Adams--it was down to whether we were dealing with a
personnel loyalty file. We managed to skirt it in this case by
simply dealing with the open testimony given after coming back
from Korea.
Senator Potter. Of course, the names have been made public.
I know of the name of a men mentioned. I assume he is from
Detroit, and I mean Detroit newspapers played it up.
That is something that could be worked out with the staff?
Mr. Adams. That is correct.
Senator Potter. I wonder, Major, if you know whether the UN
have--do they have a committee or commission working on this
problem too?
Maj. Kelleher. With regard, sir, to the exposure of the PW
mess or refuting charges, yes, sir they do. It is, I might say,
a pet project of Ambassador Lodge and a follow through from his
resolution of last spring demanding an impartial investigation
of this thing.
Senator Potter. Would it be your advice to contact
Ambassador Lodge so that our efforts are coordinated?
Major Kelleher. Yes, sir. I believe so. It could be done
very handily right here in Washington. In this particular case
he has a back-stopping group which works out of the formerly
Psychological Strategy Board, now the Operations Coordinating
Board of the National Security Council. This is Mr. C. D.
Jackson's group, sir.
Mr. Adams. I might suggest, Mr. Chairman, you might wish
personally to get on the phone and talk to Ambassador Lodge
about it. It might also be well worth your while to speak to
General Robert Cutler, administrative assistant to the
president on this psychological strategy matter. Both of them
might be able to give you assistance, help the committee.
Senator Potter. That is good advice.
Do you think it desirable at this point to follow through
and talk with some of the returning PWs who you have
information concerning, eyewitnesses of atrocities committed?
Mr. Lyons. Yes, but the report on recent returnees--our men
go back to 1950 and 1951. The recent ones the files are in
Korea. No, some of them would be in the files in Korea, but I
think that a batch of affidavits would be found in the
Pentagon. A great number are still in ``Big Switch,'' which
have not as yet been processed. In the pipeline, sir.
Mr. Adams. There were two points in this Lyons made
yesterday in the meeting I attended you ought to know. One is
that the interrogations of these people developed the fact that
most of the men who had been incarcerated for a long period of
time, during the course of lengthy interrogation dropped two
hundred names of individuals they have known in prison camps.
Those people must be dropped into slots. We have no IBM
machines to do it. It is a hand job. That brings the second
problem. The army doesn't feel these people can be
interrogated, cross-checked and put in the proper place within
eight or nine months. The second point was made by the people
here, I have forgotten which one, but that can be elaborated
on. Some of these returning prisoners on interrogation proved
to be surprisingly inaccurate in the things they may say. I
have forgotten which one.
Col. Whitehorne. Yes. We have found instances where four or
five men had been together for a long period of time. They were
restricted in movement and one saw what everybody else saw.
Yet, we got reports from the four gentlemen and the fifth would
go off on a tangent, and well, we checked it in a couple of
instances--went to the adjutant general's file and found that
he left school in the fourth grade. He put misinterpretations
on things probably as a result of a fairly poor background, not
a trained observer, in fact, a poor observer. We also found
that the stories did not adequately describe the behavior of
individuals. It would take stories of four or five to describe
one--before we got the correct idea. At the present moment all
stories are considered unreliable and will be considered
unreliable until the facility is achieved whereby they can be
cross-checked.
We had one instance, and I would like to put this up as a
warning in dealing with these people, where one gentleman came
back and spoke to another here in Washington and made a
statement to the effect that four men should be decorated for
acts behind the enemy lines while prisoners. We proceeded to
try to build up stories so they could be decorated and found
just the opposite was true.
One of the men whom we know, in the hands of the enemy--in
an army group at the moment--is repeatedly reported as most
helpful to his fellow prisoners. Yet at the same time he has
indulged in all sorts of treasonable acts which amount to trial
of the individual.
Senator Potter. Just a good natured fellow helping both
sides.
Maj. Kelleher. There is a point on that. It goes back to
the basic philosophy of good treatment. In the Communist
indoctrination process good treatment is inducive to
indoctrination. It is not at all unreasonable when you have
studied it. There is a lot of ostensibly good treatment for a
very specific purpose. Good treatment of patients who adhere to
their teachings.
For instance, a fairly smart boy working on an ignorant
farm hand says come over to the indoctrination lecture and just
play along with your captives. They gave those boys a library
loaded with Communist trash and terrific anti-American
propaganda and it is not unreasonable to find the situation
Colonel Whitehorne is talking about.
Senator Potter. Do you have any suspicion that they have
sent some of the men who have been indoctrinated back and they
kept them from being identified too much as progressives so
they come back here and do their work?
Maj. Kelleher. Yes, sir, and I am thinking of your
committee too because I wouldn't say probably but possibly you
put out word that you welcome people to come and testify before
your committee, you might get to it, and they may get up and
give you a harangue with which I am sure Mr. Cohn is familiar.
Mr. Cohn. I gather they don't stock their information
libraries with pro-American books.
Maj. Kelleher. They take care of pro-Communist stuff. Don't
worry about that.
Senator Potter. Major, I assume you also received
information from the air force and navy as well as the army?
Maj. Kelleher. Well, sir, there is nobody involved in this
PW stuff except the air force and marines--this biological
warfare proposition. Obviously, the navy in this case was not
involved.
Senator Potter. When I spoke of navy, I meant it to include
the marines. I would assume that it would be probably desirable
to contact the appropriate officer of the air force and the
marine corps as well.
Maj. Kelleher. Is this with reference to prospective
witnesses?
Senator Potter. Yes. Would you have information?
Maj. Kelleher. We would either have it or could get it,
yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Mr. Adams, I am wondering if somebody could
be designated soon to work as liaison between the committee and
the Department of Defense on this matter.
Mr. Adams. Yes. Secretary Stevens asked me to work as
liaison with the committee on matters such as this; initially
me.
Mr. Cohn. We are going to be keeping you pretty busy on
other things. We would like to get one fellow who could just
keep his fingers on the whole situation all the time.
Senator Potter. I think this afternoon I will call General
Erskine or secretary of defense to see if one person can be
designated to work close liaison with the committee.
General Fenn, do you have anything you'd like to add.
Gen. Fenn. No, sir. I'd like to have Colonel Whitehorne
tell something about the screening process they are going
through, the details.
Col. Whitehorne. When the reports that I mentioned reached
Washington we have a reading panel set up who go through the
reports. Twenty-two different officers are perusing these
reports at the reading panel. They read the summary and the
report and designate whether or not they want the report
circulated to their particular agency. We have set a priority
on these things purely arbitrarily giving the adjutant
general's casualty branch first go. The reason we do that, it
is a life and death matter concerned with the welfare of the
individual and his family.
By using the reading panel system we show everybody what we
have and where we get it. Also, it gives them a chance to come
back and ask for individuals to be re-interrogated here in the
Continental United States by the army commander.
Senator Potter. These reports that are sent to you are from
the theater?
Maj. Whitehorne. The report that came back from overseas
with the individual.
Senator Potter. You say you have a reading panel?
Col. Whitehorne. G-2. My office--what we call our documents
library.
Senator Potter. After reading the reports do they make
recommendations or what happens?
Col. Whitehorne. We are acting there in the capacity of
disseminator of information. We make the information available
to the judge advocate who then takes it and processes it,
brings it forth in trial.
Mr. Lyons. We plan to excerpt from these interrogations any
war crimes information and forward it to our War Crimes
Division in Korea for incorporation in the case files as soon
as possible.
Senator Potter. Then the complete files are still in Korea?
Mr. Lyons. I am leading up to that Senator, if I may.
In the early part of September at the start of this so-
called Department of Army Psychological Warfare plan, we
communicated with the Korean Communications Zone and asked them
to forward to us, on a loan basis, a certain type of case.
Number one, what we would call a referral case. A case we
felt would be recommended for trial. Number two, a case which
had reached the point of proof; that additional evidence would
simply be accumulated. In other words ``Big Switch'' or
``Little Switch'' would add nothing to the merits of the case,
and Number three, those cases which they had which were of
prima facie nature where they had no perpetrator. They didn't
know the perpetrator. To date we have received seventy-eight of
those case files. Some of them are pretty good. Roughly forty
of them involved Americans solely or Americans and South
Koreans as the victims.
Now, we personally would like to offer for your
consideration as a suggestion the idea that you might want to
use some of those better case files and we would offer to you
the JAG officer whose interrogation it was in the field in 1950
and 1951, who saw the victims, talked with survivors,
interrogated eyewitnesses, were present when pictures were
taken, wrote up reports of cases which he submitted to the War
Crimes Division.
Now, we have six or seven officers available at the moment.
Senator Potter. Gentlemen, I think one of the main purposes
of this committee will be to get the greatest psychological
value we can from the hearings and it would seem to me from the
questioning this morning that it would be desirable to work
with yourself, the JAG office and also the others, particularly
Psychological Warfare Division, to get three or four or more
cases where we have eyewitness accounts where the soldiers are
back here. Bring him in for the purpose of a hearing. I think
it will be much better to have a former G.I. himself tell his
eyewitness story than it would be for an officer to relate his
story.
We could get--select four or five of these stories and work
with your people, then contact the eyewitness observer to have
public hearings. Now, can you see anything wrong with that?
Maj. Kelleher. It sounds fine to me.
Mr. Jones. Major, may I ask if the Psychological Warfare
Division has consulted any way General MacArthur or any other
field leaders over there?
Maj. Kelleher. No, sir. We haven't.
Mr. Adam. I think it would be well, Mr. Chairman, to
explain how the Psychological Warfare program was developed.
It generated in the army. It was first conceived by General
Ridgeway and proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
secretary of defense agreed to their proposal and it was
submitted to the National Security Council, which is composed
of the president, the vice president, secretary of state,
director of mutual security, secretary of defense and director,
Office of Defense Mobilization. The National Security Council
made the decision so it is as close to being a national policy
as you can get if the decision is finally made to publication.
It is not something that was ill-considered in the Pentagon. It
started as the public information program and has global
ramifications. The truth--the pure bare facts are such potent
anti-Communist propaganda that it has global ramifications
rather than just domestic.
Mr. Jones. You say the Psychological Warfare Board has been
working as a back-stop to Ambassador Lodge, have you in the
course of your work consulted with General MacArthur?
Maj. Kelleher. Not at my level, sir. If such consultations
have taken place, it would certainly be at a higher level.
Mr. Jones. Have there been such consultations?
Mr. Adams. We don't know. We have no way of knowing.
Mr. Cohn. Could you find out?
Maj. Kelleher. I could raise the question. Ours is purely
an intelligence collection and evaluation job to get ammunition
for Ambassador Lodge.
Mr. Jones. Wouldn't his advice be beneficial, helpful?
Senator Potter. What about General Van Fleet? Has he been
consulted since his return? I assume many of the reports came
while he was in command.
Maj. Kelleher. I am at a little disadvantage, sir. I am at
a little lower level.
Senator Potter. Sometimes word of such consultations gets
around. The fact that you don't know doesn't mean they didn't
take place?
Maj. Kelleher. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. The consultations with General Van Fleet, if we
could check on that too.
Maj. Kelleher. I doubt very much if I could get the answer.
Mr. Adams. I think what you could do would be to ask
General MacArthur and General Van Fleet. You might write them a
letter and get the answer for the record.
Gen. Fenn. I think, Senator Potter, we should go into a
little more detail of the cases that we have reports on north
of the parallel and we are now not able to do anything about.
You put on the record a large number of cases. Tell us
about the investigation.
Mr. Lyons. There were roughly about four hundred, in round
figures, incidents which have occurred in North Korea and you
are never going to be able to get back in the area where the
atrocity took place to check as regarding eyewitness accounts
of people in the neighborhood, local people, and to find the
bodies. A certain number of those case we have the confession
of the North Korean Communist but practically all of those
confessions were at a later date repudiated by the Communists.
Senator Potter. Has this information been submitted to the
United Nations?
Maj. Kelleher. Various portions of it, sir, are in
preparation.
First, our intelligence got together documents and prepared
them on a classified basis. Then they are put back through
intelligence channels for evaluation study and agreement with
conclusion. Then they request declassification and it becomes
an open public document for Ambassador Lodge's use. We use the
psychological vulnerability, which simply means those holes we
can get at.
Senator Potter. Is there any thinking that war criminals
will be prosecuted if we ever have the opportunity?
Mr. Adams. I think that point should be in the record, Mr.
Chairman. The point you should remember is that when the Korean
Truce was signed we did include among the prisoners in United
Nations control a number of individuals accused by one person
or a group of persons. War criminals were all returned just as
the Communist returned to us some people they accused of war
crimes.
Senator Potter. In other words, we returned a prisoner who
we had a case against of war crimes?
Mr. Adams. On whom we may have had cases.
Senator Potter. And in return they sent back people they
were charging with such stuff as germ warfare.
Gen. Fenn. I think we returned two hundred, 199.
Mr. Cohn. How many did we get back?
Mr. Lyons. We received a total of thirty-five hundred.
Mr. Cohn. I was thinking of the 199----
Mr. Lyons. That was the total exchange, ``Big Switch''----
Gen. Fenn. Mr. Cohn was referring to how many we got back
from the Communists charged with war crimes.
Mr. Cohn. Did we give back more than we got?
Mr. Lyons. There was no attempt to tabulate. I just don't
know.
Maj. Kelleher. We were perfectly willing to give one
hundred Commies for one American.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Lyons, you stated earlier that over in Korea
you have approximately eighteen hundred provable cases. Is that
correct?
Mr. Lyons. I can't tell you the exact number of provable
cases. There are roughly eighteen hundred case files. The
majority of them are based on the confession of a Korean or
Chinese Communist, which has since been repudiated--hearsay,
unsupported eyewitness testimony.
Mr. Jones. In other words, eighteen hundred files.
Mr. Lyons. Eighteen hundred files.
Mr. Jones. Have UN officials seen these files?
Mr. Lyons. No. The files are over in Korea.
Mr. Carr. You have sixteen hundred of these summaries of
files here?
Mr. Lyons. Yes.
Mr. Carr. Of this sixteen hundred, you must have been
making classification and study of that number. Do you have an
estimate or analysis of these? Narrow it down from sixteen
hundred to some number you think would be a good number of
cases. In other words, we would like to come over and look at
the sixteen hundred cases and not have to go through sixteen
hundred cases. Can you point out forty or fifty?
Mr. Lyons. Yes, from the case status report.
Senator Potter. Are some of these cases possible treason?
Mr. Lyons. I am quite sure not.
Mr. Cohn. I am thinking in terms of the Provoo case.
Col. Whitehorne. I am not a lawyer. I wouldn't know a
treason case if it fell on me except I do know actions inimical
to the best interests of the United States. It is up to the
judge advocate to decide whether a case exists.
Mr. Cohn. About how many cases would you say?
Col. Whitehorne. I wouldn't hazard a guess.
Senator Potter. Any referred to your office?
Mr. Lyons. No, sir, Senator, my understanding of that
procedure is that an army level determination will be made as
to whether a case can be prosecuted and recommendation will be
made at that field level.
Maj. Kelleher. Secretary Wilson made an announcement to the
press to the effect that cases will be considered on an
individual basis and each case will be given sympathetical
consideration.
At what point does a man's physical and mental ability to
withstand his treatment--at what point is he resolved of
responsibility from the standpoint of temporary derangement.
Colonel Enich, the air force confessor reached the point where
he realized later he was thinking like a ten year old child to
the point where he agreed to write and sign the confession.
Mr. Jones. Are both Allen Wington and Wilford Burchett,
wartime correspondents in Korea, are they British subjects?
Maj. Kelleher. They seem to figure in. We have one man who
said Burchett came to him shortly before he was repatriated and
said, ``You are the only American left in North Korea.'' He
signed the confession and was on his way down to Panmunjom.
That was a lieutenant. I don't remember this man's name. I
think he is covered in the U.S. News and World Report. That is
where you have got to decide the amount of psychological
pressure a man can stand.
Mr. Carr. Major, it seems apparent that your department,
psychological warfare, you seem receptive to the committee's
going into this matter. You say it will work out very well from
your standpoint. Now, what kind of concrete suggestion do you
have as to our approach to this thing.
Maj. Kelleher. I think I can answer that fairly clearly. We
would like to help. There are many sides to it. This mind
murder or complete inversion of mentality, if we could do
that--display the methods used in handling all propaganda, the
false conceptions, the distorted stories.
What we should do on a long-range goal is destroy the
credibility of Communist propaganda. Colonel Green would be a
good witness.
Senator Potter. Who was the air force colonel who signed
the confession?
Maj. Kelleher. Evans. I believe Colonel Evans would make a
good witness. Captain Sachden, who was repatriated, exchanged
in the ``Little Switch'' operation, I believe would make a good
witness.
Senator Potter. We have, you say, nine hundred and some
that are still missing?
Mr. Lyons. Nine hundred forty.
Senator Potter. They are not accounted for. Now, I assume
that possibly some of those could be victims of murder by the
Communists? Have the nine hundred and some been checked against
the atrocity file that Mr. Lyons mentioned?
Mr. Lyons. I don't know, sir. The adjutant general would
make that check. The adjutant general is making a check based
on the result of interrogation of returnees. The adjutant
general has put out a plan on gathering information on
casualties and the plan has gone to the field and has placed
the responsibility on local commanders to question all
returnees regardless of whether the returnee is a prisoner of
war. Every man who comes back from Korea who belonged to a unit
is subject to further interrogation for casualty information.
From time to time, as we get word from these returnees that
they saw a certain person in a prisoner of war camp, the
adjutant general sends material out to the field and advice to
contact members of that man's unit or other prisoners who might
have been in the camp for as much information as they possibly
can. The adjutant general is required to make determination
under the Missing Persons Act to finally close out these cases
and he is attempting to get everything he possibly can. Senator
Potter, you mentioned earlier something about mothers who write
in and they had never received any letters or had never
received any information, that is a continuing process and it
won't stop. It is very active.
Senator Potter. I have been swamped by letters from mothers
who have sons who haven't been accounted for as yet, and from
many of them I have a certain amount of evidence that they were
prisoners of war and I know the anxiety they have and we would
like to work with you so we can give them as much information
as possible.
Maj. Kelleher. Undoubtedly, it would hurry things up if we
could talk with them when they get off the ship at San
Francisco. However, under the law everyone coming back from the
Pacific, the first thing they get is a pat on the back and
thirty days leave. It is hard to interrupt that.
Senator Potter. Gentlemen, I have nothing further this
morning. I would appreciate it if somebody could be designated
as liaison with the committee. I think I had better take care
of that myself and call either the secretary of defense or
General Erskine so we would have somebody that would work with
our committee full time and not going off on cross purposes.
Mr. Adams. I am sure General Erskine for the psychological
strategy phase would designate Major Kelleher. As far as the
atrocity matter the secretary of defense would turn it over to
the army, Secretary Stevens and he would turn it over to me and
I would designate Mr. Haskins sitting next to me. I think that
would probably save you the call, unless you want to call
General Erskine.
Senator Potter. I am going to be away on other committee
assignments until the first part of December. That will allow
time for the staff to work liaison with Mr. Lyons' office and
also the Psychological Warfare Division and make other contacts
that might be necessary.
I would think it advisable to get some of your best files,
I think possibly I'd line up about ten cases, Frank. Try to
contact some of the returned PWs, returned soldiers, who were
eyewitnesses to these atrocities. Interview them in light of
the statements that they have given in prior interviews and set
that up for a hearing about the 10th of December. Is that
agreeable with you gentlemen? Can you see any cross purposes to
that? In the meantime I think the committee should go out and
contact Ambassador Lodge. We will also contact previous field
commanders, I think General MacArthur and General Van Fleet.
See if they have any suggestions. As a matter of fact, I think
General Van Fleet should be contacted. I would like to have him
work quite closely with this committee.
Maj. Kelleher. For your information, Ambassador Lodge has
the PW item coming up on his agenda today--anytime after about
the 21st of October--I am thinking only in terms of keeping the
campaign alive. This might just fit in.
Senator Potter. I expect to be on the West Coast the latter
part of the month and if you have any witnesses out there that
you could turn over I would be happy to see them while out
there.
In the meantime, Frank, if you have two or three you'd like
me to see while there it would save time.
Mr. Cohn. There definitely would be some on the West Coast.
Senator Potter. Well, gentlemen, if there is no other
suggestion, I want to thank you again for taking time to meet
with us and I will appreciate your continued cooperation as we
go along. Feel free at any time if you have suggestions as to
how to better operate this committee, we are working for the
same purpose and we will be very happy to receive them.
[Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 11:45 a.m.]
KOREAN WAR ATROCITIES
----------
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953, at 10:00 a.m. in room 357, Senate
Office Building, Francis P. Carr, executive director,
presiding.
Present: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Donald F.
O'Donnell, assistant counsel; Thomas W. La Venia, assistant
counsel; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk; Raymond Anderson,
administrative assistant to Senator Potter; and Robert L.
Jones, executive assistant to Senator Potter.
Present also: Edward J. Lyons, Jr., Judge Advocate
General's Office; Col. Wade M. Fleischer, Office of Secretary
of Defense for Public Relations and Legislative Liaison; Maj.
James Kelleher, Department of Defense, Psychological Warfare.
Mr. Carr. Gentlemen, to get started this morning, I think
we will just have a roundtable discussion as we did the last
time. Let me review briefly the situation as I see it, and as
it stands as of this moment.
It is our purpose this morning to salvage what we can out
of what appears to be an unfortunate situation. It was our
understanding at our last meeting at which some of us were in
attendance here on October 6th, that the hearings projected by
Senator Potter for this fall on the Korean War atrocities were
to be held in full cooperation and conjunction with the army
and Defense Department's projected program in this matter. It
was our understanding and it was quite clear to me, and to all
in attendance, that Senator Potter was extremely anxious that
the committee's work coincide with that of the whole program.
It was my understanding also that the Department of
Psychological Warfare and the Department of Defense were, I
would say, anxious, or at least enthused about having the
committee come in and take part in the program since it was
felt that the committee would be another means of bringing this
situation forcefully to the public's attention.
It seems to have developed to the point where we have hit
sort of an impasse which we will have to overcome this morning.
Mr. Anderson. Do you think it would be well at this point
for the purposes of the record to incorporate excerpts from our
executive session?
Mr. Carr. I think that would be a good point. The reporter
will make a part of the record excerpts of the original
conference of October 6, 1953.
[The excerpts referred to are as follows:] Excerpts from
Stenographic Transcript of Hearings Re Korean Atrocities, October 6,
1953, before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S.
Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican of Michigan, presiding.
Maj. Kelleher (Psychological Warfare). There is presently under
active consideration, sir, and on the verge of approval, a program
which will really include three different phases. First is the exposure
for the benefit not only of the American public, but the world in
general, as to the nature of these atrocities, and that really covers
two phases there--domestic and foreign, do the same thing on a global
basis. It has a third phase which I might say Ambassador Lodge at the
United Nations, which will include the charge of biological warfare.
This plan will probably be kicked off within the next day or so. In
fact, Ambassador Lodge is going to show some films, motion picture
sound interviews with the same Air Force flyers who were characterized
in the so-called germ warfare charges. . . . also involved is the so-
called International Scientific Commission, made up mostly of Europeans
and Asiatics. The British representative is a man named Needham. They
went to Korea under the auspices of the Communists and made a so-called
impartial investigation of germ warfare. . . .
If you will recall he (Ambassador Lodge) entered a resolution at
the United Nations last spring asking for an impartial investigation of
the PW thing, and he defied the Communists at the United Nations
stating that if you will bring the so-called confessors out of North
Korea and give them thirty days rest, without exception they will
recant on their confessions.
We also feel, if I may bring up this point, that your committee in
making these investigations can be of tremendous help in the global
program that we are trying to get under way to bring this whole mess to
the attention of the world. [P. 887]
Senator Potter. Mr. Adams, I don't know whether anyone here would
be in a position to say whether the proper defense places would loan us
personnel to work on this case----
Mr. Adams (Counsellor for the army). I am quite sure we can. I am
quite sure the department will lend the committee any assistance which
you require to make preparations for the hearings. I am sure the
secretary of the army would want to and I am sure the secretary of
defense would.
The Psychological Warfare Office under General Erskine, Office of
Secretary of Defense, would be available to assist you. I am sure that
both the judge advocate general, G-1 and G-2 of the army would give you
all the assistance possible. [P. 898]
Senator Potter. Major Kelleher, I wonder if you know whether the UN
has a committee or commission working on this problem too? [P. 899]
Maj. Kelleher. With regard, sir, to the exposure of the PW mess or
refuting charges, yes, sir, they do. It is, I might say, a pet project
of Ambassador Lodge's and a follow-through from his resolution of last
spring demanding an impartial investigation of this thing.
Senator Potter. Would it be your advice to contact Ambassador Lodge
so that our efforts are coordinated?
Maj. Kelleher. Yes, sir, I believe so. It could be done very
handily right here in Washington. In this particular case, he has a
back stopping group which works out of the former Psychological
Strategy Board, now the Operations Coordination Board of the National
Security Council. This is Mr. C.S. Jackson's group, sir.
Mr. Adams. I might suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you talk personally
to Ambassador Lodge about it. It might also be well to speak to General
Robert Cutler, administrative assistant to the president on this
psychological strategy matter. Both of them might be able to give you
assistance, help the committee.
Senator Potter. That is good advice. [P. 899]
Senator Potter. Mr. Adams, I am wondering if somebody could be
designated soon to work as liaison between the committee and the
Department of Defense on this matter.
Mr. Adams. Yes. Secretary Stevens asked me to work as liaison with
the committee on matters such as this; initially me. [P. 903]
Mr. Lyons. (Judge Advocate General's Office). . . In the early part
of September at the start of this so-called Department of Army
Psychological Warfare Plan, we communicated with the Korean
Communications Zone and asked them to forward us, on a loan basis, a
certain type of case. . . To date we have received roughly seventy-
eight of these case files. . . Now we personally would like to offer
for your consideration as a suggestion the idea that you might want to
use some of those better case files and we would offer to you the
officer whose interrogation it was in the field in 1950 and 1951, who
saw the victim, talked with survivors, interrogated eye witnesses, were
present when the pictures were taken, wrote up reports of cases which
he submitted to the War Crimes Division. [P. 906]
Senator Potter. Gentlemen, I think one of the main purposes of this
committee will be to get the greatest psychological value we can from
the hearings and it would seem to me from the questioning this morning
that it would be desirable to work with yourself (Mr. Lyons), the JAG
office, and also others, particularly the Psychological Warfare
Division, to get three or four names where we have eye witness accounts
where the soldiers are back here. Bring him in for the purpose of a
hearing. I think it would be much better to have a former GI himself
tell his eye witness story than it would be for an officer to relate
his story . . . [P. 906]
Mr. Adams. I think it would be well, Mr. Chairman, to explain how
the psychological warfare program was developed.
It generated in the army. It was first conceived by General
Ridgeway and proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The secretary of
defense agreed to their proposal and it was submitted to the National
Security Council, which is composed of the president, the vice
president, secretary of state, director of mutual security, secretary
of defense, and the director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. The
National Security Council made the decision so it was as close to
national policy as you can get if the decision is finally made to
publication. It was not something that was ill considered at the
Pentagon. It started as the public information program and has had
global ramifications. The truth, the pure facts are such potent anti-
communist propaganda that it has global ramifications rather than just
domestic. [P. 907]
Mr. Carr. (Executive director, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations) Major (Kelleher), it seems apparent that your
department, psychological warfare, you seem receptive to the
committee's going into this matter. You say it will work out very well
from your standpoint. Now, what kind of concrete suggestion do you have
as to our approach to this thing? [P. 913]
Maj. Kelleher. I think I can answer that fairly clearly. We would
like to help. There are many sides to it. This mind murder or complete
inversion of mentality, if we could do that, display the methods used
in all propaganda, the false conceptions, the distorted stories. . . .
The Acting Chairman. . . . I would appreciate it if somebody could
be designated as liaison with the committee. I think I had better take
care of that matter myself and call either the secretary of defense or
General Erskine so that we would have somebody working at full time and
not going off on cross purposes. [P. 916]
Mr. Adams. I am sure General Erskine for the psychological strategy
phase would designate Major Kelleher. As far as the atrocity matter is
concerned, I believe the secretary of defense would turn it over to the
army, Secretary Stevens, who in turn would give it to me, and I would
designate Mr. Haskins sitting next to me. I think that would probably
save you the call unless you want to talk with General Erskine. [P.
916]
Senator Potter. I am going to be away on other committee
assignments until the first part of December. That will allow time for
the staff to work liaison with Mr. Lyon's office and also the
Psychological Warfare Division and make other contacts that may be
necessary. [P. 916]
. . . Is that agreeable to you, gentlemen? Can you see any cross
purposes to that? In the meantime, I think the committee should go out
and contact Senator Lodge . . .
Maj. Kelleher. For your information, Ambassador has the PW item
coming up on his agenda today--any time after about the 21st of
October--I am thinking only in keeping the campaign alive. This might
just fit in.
[End of Excerpts]
Mr. Carr. It was pointed out at that time by Major Kelleher
that there was under consideration a program which would
include various phases. One phase was that Ambassador Lodge
might possibly kick off the program at the UN by showing of a
film and motion pictures of interviews of the American flyers
involved in the alleged germ warfare charges.
There was also, I believe, at that time a question as to
whether or not the Department of Defense could loan personnel
to the committee to work on this matter. Mr. Adams felt sure
that it could be worked out, and that proper liaison could be
established through Mr. Charles Haskins of his office.
Mr. Anderson. Do you recall the acting chairman pointed
out, and I might quote here, ``I would appreciate it if
somebody could be designated as liaison with the committee. I
think I had better take care of that matter myself and call
either the secretary of defense or General Erskine, so that we
would have somebody working at full time and not going off at
cross purposes.''
Mr. Adams followed and said, ``I am sure General Erskine
for the psychological strategy phase, would designate Major
Kelleher as far as the atrocity matter is concerned. I believe
the secretary of defense would turn it over to army Secretary
Stevens, who in turn would give it to me, and I would designate
Mr. Haskins, sitting next to me. I think that would probably
save you the call unless you want to talk to General Erskine.''
Mr. Carr. I think it should also be noted that I myself
stated that it was apparent that the psychological warfare was
receptive to the committee going into this matter, and asked
what kind of concrete suggestion could be offered so that we
could approach this thing in a proper manner. All of this is
being put in the record just to make it as clear as possible
that the position of everybody associated with the subcommittee
has been that we at least thought we were operating in full
cooperation with the Department of Defense on this matter. It
appears that somewhere along the line the business has become
pretty much snafued. We are in the position, as I understand
the picture, where we have a man who is over at the Department
of Defense trying to establish liaison in this matter, and yet
at the same time the information which he has been seeking is
made available to the press before it is known to him.
The point we are interested in getting straight here is
whether or not this was an oversight or some sort of design, or
what the purpose of this thing was, because it becomes apparent
that much of the information given to the press was the type of
information that we had been seeking.
It seems to me that our best position this morning should
be that we do everything we can to salvage something from the
situation. It also seems to me that a more proper way of
handling the situation would have at least been to notify
Senator Potter by at least forwarding this material to him at
the time the release was to be made.
I might say for Senator McCarthy that he feels that
something has been fouled up here, that he is anxious to get it
straightened out, and he is very anxious to see that Senator
Potter, as acting chairman, does have the full cooperation of
the Defense Department in this matter.
Mr. Anderson. May I interject something at this point? I
have discussed the situation with Ambassador Lodge of the UN,
and also Ambassador Wadsworth. It is quite clear that they
likewise were not notified of any release such as the
Department of Defense made available to the press on Wednesday.
Mr. Carr. Gentlemen, that seems to be the position we are
in. It is Senator McCarthy's intention, I know, because I have
been in contact with him, and I understand it is the intention
of Senator Potter's office, to continue to try to cooperate in
this matter to the point where we can conduct these projected
hearings as had been intended. The problem that presents itself
is what material do we use now. Most of it has been made
public. These are the points we would like to get under
discussion at this time.
Mr. Anderson. In the hearing of October 6, Mr. Lyons stated
as follows:
To date we have received roughly seventy-eight of these
case files. We personally would like to offer for your
consideration as a suggestion the idea that you might want to
use some of those better cases files, and we would offer to you
the officer whose interrogation it was in the field in 1950 and
1951, who saw the victims, talked to the survivors and
interrogated eye witnesses, and were present when the pictures
were taken and wrote up reports of cases which he submitted to
the War Crimes Commission.
It is my understanding that those cases were included in
the release given fully to the press.
Mr. Carr. On that matter, it is my understanding that Mr.
Lyons has fulfilled his statement made on October 6 in that he
has scanned the cases that were available and tried to be
helpful to the committee by, I would say, boiling it down to
several cases which he thought would be most helpful. He
notified you, Mr. O'Donnell, that the rest could be made
available.
Mr. O'Donnell. May I interject at this point, Mr. Lyons
made available at my first meeting with him at the Pentagon
approximately fifteen case files which probably were the best
case files in his unit from an evidentiary standpoint. There
were cases which probably would have been tried if the War
Tribunal Plan had gone into effect. At that time he also
informed me that we could have anything in his unit. So there
was complete cooperation with Mr. Lyons as far as I know.
Mr. Carr. However, as Ray points out, of the fifteen cases
all except one of those fifteen have been incorporated in this
report.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is correct.
Mr. Anderson. That is the point I wanted to establish.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is correct.
Mr. Carr. Now, of the original number of seventy-eight, or
seventy-four perhaps--
Mr. Lyons. Roughly around seventy.
Mr. Carr. It appears that all of these cases have been made
public at this time. What we have to come up with, I think, at
this time is some additional cases which have not been made
public which are, it seems to me, equally infamous. I think we
have to have some more positive assurance from the Defense
Department that the Defense Department is fully cooperating
with Senator Potter in this matter. We do not wish to appear
this morning to be in the role of complaining, other than the
fact that we cannot afford to let Senator Potter go into this
matter, and then have it exposed before he has had his full
chance to do it, especially when it seems to me that Senator
Potter was perhaps the most cooperative committee member that I
have ever seen on the Hill. His whole attitude was one of full
cooperation with the department in this matter. He made it
quite clear that he wanted his program to be coordinated into
the overall picture. He did not want to upset any applecarts
that were already under way. But by his coordination into the
general picture, I am sure he did not intend that he be
coordinated right out of the thing. It is like a fellow I knew
at law school who once said that the dean said he should do a
little relaxing, so he proceeded to relax himself right out of
law school.
That is the problem we are faced with this morning and we
want to come to some solution to this thing. We feel we must,
and we are definitely going to see that Senator Potter's
program in this matter is fully protected as well as it can be
at this stage. We would like to have any suggestions that you
might have on this matter.
Don, from your contact with Mr. Lyons and the others at the
Department of Defense, is there a possibility of there being
other cases?
Mr. Lyons. Could I interrupt before Mr. O'Donnell answers
that question?
Mr. O'Donnell. Yes.
Mr. Lyons. I will probably address my remarks more to Mr.
O'Donnell, because we sat down at that first conference. If you
will remember at that hearing when we spoke to the senator of
the officer who investigated, he said he would prefer to have
GI survivors as his witnesses. That, of course, immediately
lessened the available number of cases that we could give you,
because there were only a small percentage. I think as I said
that morning at the hearing, of the roughly seventy cases we
had then, only about forty involved Americans as the victims,
and of that forty, a smaller percentage were cases in which
there was an available U.S. survivor. So that in itself was the
reason why only roughly fifteen cases were offered to Mr.
O'Donnell at that time.
Mr. Carr. I might say, Mr. Lyons, we are satisfied with
that phase of the thing. The problem presented to us, now, of
course, is since those cases were so few in number, the
exposure of those cases, I might say personally, prematurely,
does place us in the position where the possibility of other
cases is very limited or almost the point of impossibility.
Mr. Lyons. I wonder if it can be said that making public
the information that has been made public in these cases has
destroyed the value for the committee. You have no eyewitness
testimony in these thumbnail sketches that have been given out.
Do you think that one of these good cases, the tunnel massacre,
has been spoiled because one paragraph has been given out? We
could bring in ten or fifteen or twenty witnesses who actually
saw the killing.
Mr. Jones. May I add this information which is a statement
made by the senator in the executive session. It reads:
Gentlemen, I think one of the main purposes of this
committee will be to get the greatest psychological value we
can from the hearings. It would seem to me from the questioning
here this morning that it would be more desirable to work with
yourself, Mr. Lyons, the JAG office and also others,
particularly the Psychological Warfare Division, to get the
names of eye witnesses where the soldiers are back here now.
Bring him in for the purpose of the hearing. I think it would
be much better to have a former GI himself tell his story than
it would be for an officer to relate the story.
That is the end of the quote.
Subsequent conversation with the senator on this particular
point cleared it up to this extent, that the senator would
prefer that a GI--and when he is thinking of a GI, he is
thinking of a non-commissioned officer and soldier, rather than
have the officer in the Pentagon relate the story.
Mr. O'Donnell. I think that was clearly understood. May I
interject at this point that according to the information I
received at the Pentagon the other day, and this is from Major
Robert Cook in the Office of Public Information, photostatic
copies of complete raw files on forty-two cases which came out
of your office with certain phases deleted, such as names of
survivors and the face, etc. blacked out, were made available
in toto to the press. He further informed me that he had
photostatic copies of two hundred of your thumbnail summaries
which would be presumably the better cases of your sixteen
hundred, and if any member of the press desired the raw file
case based on that summary, it would also be made available to
him. He further advised that this particular release, and the
availability of the files, was to be a continuing one, so that
any member of the press could come in at a later date and
review a file, which leaves us in the apparent position of only
having the possibility of live survivors to testify. But all
the other information is readily available to the press,
according to that office.
Maj. Kelleher. May I make a suggestion, sir? First I would
like to say that with regard to our original meeting with
Senator Potter, please believe me there was no intention of bad
faith or anything in the way of the manner in which the thing
developed. Senator Potter did make one statement at the October
6 meeting that sticks in my mind which may have been overlooked
where he said he was specifically interested in about 950
people whom we knew or had felt were still in the hands of the
Communists and still alive. That particular aspect of this has
not been gone into at all. It might be a very relevant point
and could be gone into. It seems to me that there should be
among the returned GI's in the United States now plenty of
people who were those individuals who gave us information when
repatriated as to the existence and the fact these individuals
were alive and know they had not been repatriated. That was one
point I thought Senator Potter was specifically interested in.
I think it was pretty early in the meeting that he brought up
this point.
Mr. Jones. I recall. I think it was 944 missing.
Mr. Carr. That is right.
Maj. Kelleher. When these people came through the
repatriation center, one of the first questions they were asked
was to name specifically anybody they knew of who was up there.
Then by a matter of comparison and elimination we came up with
a list of about 944 of the people we felt that the Commies
still held, and were alive, and we made a formal demand on the
Commies at Panmunjom to produce the people. They came back with
a list that said forty-eight people were repatriated, and the
others never existed. We still think they do and have evidence
to that effect. That thing stands right at about that point
now.
Mr. Carr. However, I think it was quite clear that Senator
Potter wanted roughly atrocity cases.
As I said before, we do not want to sound as though we are
sitting back here crying that we have been injured in the
thing. We want to salvage what we can from what we consider was
a mistake or perhaps a misunderstanding on somebody's part--
definitely a mistake--and it seems to me a definite slighting
of the senator's interest in this thing. The way the senator
wanted to cooperate, we feel that if they were going to make a
release, the very least they could have done was to have sent
the release out in the form of a notice to the senator that
this thing was being done. We do not want to continually harp
on that. We feel that the damage has been done.
I agree with Mr. Lyons that there is probably something we
can salvage from the thing, and that is what we have to do now.
I have to rely on Bob and Ray on this part, but I think the
senator was primarily interested in atrocity cases.
Mr. Anderson. That is correct.
Mr. Carr. It is true he did show some interest in these 944
cases. He also expressed a passing interest in the twenty-two,
but he indicated that he was not going into it. That is my
understanding. His prime interest was in the atrocities. Can we
work out some arrangement whereby he can still go into this
atrocity picture? What is the possibility on that, Don?
Mr. O'Donnell. The possibilities on that, as I see it,
depend on the number of cases that are released to the press
over and above those that are included in the report. Of
course, they do not have the individual survivors. Also, I
understand there may be some difficulty in using some of these
individual survivors in open hearings. So our field is
definitely limited.
Maj. Kelleher. I don't understand.
Mr. O'Donnell. There is a possibility that some of these
survivors gave the statement to the army on a confidential
basis, and did not want their names divulged at any time.
Maj. Kelleher. I am not aware of that.
Mr. O'Donnell. I picked up that information at the
Pentagon.
Maj. Kelleher. I see how it could be possible, but I knew
of no specific case.
Mr. O'Donnell. That was told to me by Major Cook.
Mr. Lyons. That may well be on cases involving
collaboration, but I find it difficult to understand that a
statement that would back up one of our atrocity cases, for
example, supposing we got hold of somebody who survived the
march, I don't think his statement would be confidential.
Mr. O'Donnell. If that is the picture, we could use the
individual.
Mr. Lyons. You remember what I said that morning, that when
we had determined the cases you wanted, then we were going to
go after the Big Switch returnees to see if it was possible to
turn it in later.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is right.
Mr. Lyons. We did submit eighty-three or eighty-four names.
Mr. O'Donnell. Eighty-three.
Mr. Lyons. Yes, from that batch of cases as a possible
start. I don't know to what extent you feel we can still use
those names in the original cases. I honestly believe we can.
Mr. O'Donnell. We can, but we are faced with this factor.
We don't know to what use the press will make these individual
cases available to the public between now and the time of the
contemplated hearings, which was indicated by Senator Potter as
December 10 of this year. So we are faced with an unknown
quantity as to what we are going to combat. We could
conceivably work up possible cases within the week before the
scheduled hearings, and have all of our material available to
the public by individuals of the press who have access to these
cases.
Maj. Kelleher. If they are not already out, certainly we
can reserve ten cases, or something like that, can we not?
Mr. Lyons. Mr. O'Donnell is correct when he says that
everything we have received from the field has been made
available to that channel. Either the photostats have been
delivered, or the cases have been examined, and they know that
the cases are in our possession and are available for their
use. That is why I brought up here roughly fifteen or twenty
cases that are not in that summary. They are cases where
Americans were the victims and there are American survivors.
Some of them I think are very good cases. I say to you either
the photostat of that case is in the Office of the Chief of
Information, or he knows that the case is in our office.
Maj. Kelleher. Mr. Lyons, I am not quite clear, but even if
the cases are in the Office of the Chief of Information, have
they also been made available to the press at this point?
Mr. Lyons. Not all of them.
Maj. Kelleher. I don't see why we could not get a stop on
some selected cases, and hold it up.
Col. Fleischer. Mr. Carr, the reason I have not been
getting into this, I have been getting filled in on it like you
have, on behalf of Secretary Seaton. Listening to this
conversation about these files, I will certainly go back and
talk it over with Mr. Seaton, as Mr. Kelleher has suggested to
see if cases in which you people have an interest can not be--I
hesitate to use the word ``withheld''--but shall we say just
withdrawn or not made available. I must confess my surprise at
the moment to the fact that these things were made available on
such a grand scale. I don't know the reasoning behind that.
That is something I am not familiar with, nor is Mr. Seaton. I
will be glad to go back and talk it over with him, and see what
we can do in that respect. I fully understand your position.
Mr. Carr. Our position, I think, is plain. I want to
emphasize at the risk of repeating myself, it might be perhaps
a little different from many investigations conducted by
committees on the Hill, this one Senator Potter was confident
was being conducted with full cooperation with the department,
and he was trying to coordinate his efforts into that of the
overall program. He did not express any desire, and did not
have any desire, to upset anything in the overall picture. He
realized it was a big picture. He realized, as Major Kelleher
said in the record the last time, Ambassador Lodge might kick
the thing off with some of these pictures at the UN. He
realized somewhere in the statement that somebody said it was
possible the president might even kick the thing off. The thing
was a program. He expected to be coordinated into the program
voluntarily. He was giving up a sort of prerogative of his as a
senator to go in there and demand things. He wanted to be part
of the program. He wanted to be helpful to the program. It was
his understanding that he was being helpful to the program by
holding some open hearings on the thing. We just get down to
this position that somewhere along the line, the thing has
gotten snafued and what appears to have been his contribution
to the program, exposing publicly some of these worst
atrocities, seems to have been usurped and already exposed.
Now we want to salvage what we can from that situation by
complete cooperation. If we can work out, Bob and Ray, some
arrangement whereby the Department of Defense would--I don't
like to say withhold, because it puts you in the position of
withholding information--would not make available to the
general public certain cases that we could possibly use from
the remainder, we might salvage something from that. I think
the department has, whether intentionally or unintentionally--
we do not want to get into that phase of it--has very
definitely slighted the Senator, which in my opinion is a very
unfortunate thing to happen. I think we should have some sort
of a statement from the department recognizing the fact that
Senator Potter has been in this thing, and is in this thing.
Bob, can you elaborate on that a little?
Mr. Jones. I have one question. May I inquire as to who is
the official liaison between this committee and the Pentagon
here this morning?
Mr. Carr. Col. Fleischer is the liaison with the Department
of Defense.
Col. Fleischer. I will say now it has gotten up on the
defense level. In other words, when Mr. Anderson talked to
Secretary Seaton, and Mr. Seaton asked me to discuss the
background and look into what had gone on before, and meet with
you people, I would say the assistant secretary of defense for
legislative and public affairs is now the liaison in this case.
Mr. Jones. Does that mean that from here on in you will be
the active liaison between the committee and the Pentagon in
the conduct of these investigations?
Col. Fleischer. It will probably boil down to being Col.
Britton in my office.
Mr. Jones. Does that action supersede Mr. Adams and Mr.
Haskins?
Col. Fleischer. I would not say it is a question of
superseding the Department of Army, because they have the
action responsibility, the files, the personnel, the know-how
and so forth. But when you get into a position as we are in
now, where a committee of Congress feels that a defense-wide
operation--I say that because it was not only the Department of
Army as such, but also General Erskine's office, Office of
Public Information and the Office of Secretary of Defense--we
now get into a position, as I see it, whereby this thing has
actually gotten up on the secretary of defense level.
Mr. Jones. In other words, in the future if Mr. O'Donnell,
or the subcommittee staff, or Senator Potter's office, wishes
at any time to gain access to any Department of the Pentagon,
it would go through your office as liaison to this committee?
Col. Fleischer. That is right.
Mr. Anderson. May I also make this attempt to clear this
up, Colonel? Secretary Seaton has control of the release of all
information from all branches of the service with respect to
the release to the press.
Col. Fleischer. I am sorry to say that I am a little hazy
on that problem, because up to the time that Mr. Seaton came
into the office, I was only concerned with legislative liaison.
I would be glad to go back and check that for you. I am not
quite clear in my own mind. As you probably know, the three
departments have their public information services, as well as
the Secretary of Defense. However, the release on this came out
of the Office of Secretary of Defense, Mr. Seaton's public
information division as distinguished from legislative liaison.
Mr. Jones. Yet that went out over the signature of the
secretary of the army.
Col. Fleischer. That is right.
Mr. Carr. That seemed to be one of the problems in this
general snafu. Without getting into why, how or where, perhaps
the liaison was not fully known. I don't see why it should not
have been, but perhaps it was not fully known. Perhaps
something could have been fouled up along the line that
obviously was not made known to the liaison that was dealing
with the situation. So we won't run into the trouble again, if
it is now on the defense level, the possibility of such a
release should, it seems to me, be taken into consideration by
your office with some sort of arrangements with the other
agencies.
Col. Fleischer. I might go a little bit further. In reading
over this transcript yesterday and talking once or twice with
Mr. Anderson and also the people in the Department of the Army
and also with Secretary Seaton, I came up, I guess, you might
say, unilaterally with the same suggestion that we discussed
here this morning, that we attempt to salvage as much as we can
for your committee.
I think, too, that some of these cases ought to be
developed as rapidly as possible so that you can get the
maximum benefit from them. I do not think in the month's time
you have left you have too long for both the army and our
people to help you develop these things, because you do have a
problem with the survivors and locating them.
Mr. O'Donnell. The actual number of cases that were made
available to the press as of Wednesday, the 28th, when I was
over there, there were thirty-four files that were available to
them as of that day. That is the photostats of the complete raw
files. Eight more were in the process. That made a total of
forty-two, which were as of that day available. Of course, some
of those forty-two involve atrocities not from the American POW
soldier standpoint, but from a civilian standpoint, cases in
which we would not be primarily interested. So there are cases
over and above that number, as Mr. Lyons pointed out, and some
of them are here. But whether or not it can be worked out so
that a stop can be put on those cases being released to the
press, I don't know.
Col. Fleischer. I don't know either, offhand. I just made a
note when you first mentioned that problem here, and I will
talk to Mr. Seaton as soon as I go back about the problem with
a view to him talking to the people in public information of
the army and also the other departments. I can see your point.
Certainly if you get ready, say, the day before your hearing,
and two or three of the magazines and the other press media
pick up either accidentally or on purpose the exact cases you
are about to have a hearing on the next day, that is going to
be a very difficult situation for everybody concerned.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is right. There is another thing here,
if I may, that is supplemental, but it is something we have
been completely lacking in from the knowledge standpoint of the
subcommittee staff. What is the specific program of the
department, particularly the Psychological Warfare Unit,
specifically in the future. We didn't know, for example, as of
Wednesday, and this is not in the nature of criticism, but lack
of information on our part, that General Dean was going to
appear on the TV show. We contemplated the possibility of using
Dean ourselves. We did not know that a movie was in the
preparation of release. We did not know, of course, that this
interim report was being published. We did not know to the
extent of it being made available to the press. This is only
part of it.
We didn't know that U.S. Steel was going to put on the TV
hour show.
Maj. Kelleher. We didn't either.
Mr. O'Donnell. You didn't? Well, that was on the other
night. We had no breakdown as to the positive program that was
under way by the army.
Col. Fleischer. If we learn in advance that certain of
these people are going to appear on a program, would you like
to know that?
Mr. Carr. Yes, if Don could keep a real cooperative liaison
with you, as I said before, this is the sort of thing in which
we are trying to work together with you, and if Don could be in
the position of knowing that, it would be helpful. I think also
if he is in the position of giving you any information he has,
it should be fully worked out. We don't want the situation to
arise again whereby we are caught off base. It seems to me also
that the UN was caught off base.
Mr. Anderson. It is my understanding that the UN was
completely caught off base, Colonel.
Mr. Jones. Who authorized it to happen so fast?
Col. Fleischer. I have not been able to determine that as
of yesterday.
Mr. Jones. How many cases have not been made public, Mr.
Lyons?
Mr. Lyons. I can't give you that answer. As far as being
made public, as far as I am concerned, concerning that,
everything that has come in has been made available to the
chief of information. At least they have knowledge of it. I
can't tell you.
Mr. Jones. In your original testimony here, you had
mentioned that sixteen hundred cases in the War Crimes
Commission in Korea were continually and daily being
supplemented, is that correct?
Mr. Lyons. That is right.
Mr. Jones. Have any of those cases been completed to your
knowledge since you were here last?
Mr. Lyons. An additional thirty or thirty-five. I think the
round figure now is around 110, of which possibly between sixty
and seventy involve GIs. Of that group, those in which there
are survivors that would be made available to the committee are
here, the ones Mr. O'Donnell saw, and one here that the file
was not available to me last night.
Mr. Jones. Will it be possible to have any of those files
in Korea brought over here?
Mr. Lyons. We have everything here from Korea that is of
any value at the moment.
Mr. Anderson. In other words, the cases are as complete as
you expect them to be developed at this moment, Mr. Lyons?
Mr. Lyons. At the moment. When they get this information
back on Big Switch, and when they can correlate it to what they
have over there, there will be a large number of cases,
particularly cases of mistreatment in the POW camps. But those
cases are months and months away. This report does not touch
that material at all, because it is not available. It is coming
in from the field very slowly.
Mr. Jones. That is the point I was trying to establish. I
think that might be a source of new material that this
committee could use, but you say that would be months and
months.
Mr. Lyons. For the Big Switch, yes, months and months. For
the committee I used seventeen hundred open files, and a batch
of closed files that were in the process of being re-examined.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Lyons, what exactly are these ten or twelve
files you have here?
Mr. Lyons. These are cases of GI victims, GI survivors whom
we think can be made available as witnesses, and the cases are
not referred to in this report.
Mr. O'Donnell. For example, these would be some of the
cases that we would like to have stopped that are available to
the Office of Public Information and through them to the press.
Mr. Jones. These have been made available to the Office of
Public Information?
Mr. Lyons. Some of them have. The chief of information
knows that everyone is in the office. Some of them he has
photostated copies. That does not mean that they have been
released.
Mr. Jones. But they would be released if the press
requested that information.
Mr. Lyons. Yes. I couldn't say to you that somebody is not
over there this morning right now.
Mr. Anderson. Mr. Lyons, in your opinion are these
outstanding cases?
Mr. Lyons. I think some of them are very good cases. Some
of them are not. I have gone over them very, very roughly. Some
of them are good cases.
Mr. Anderson. Comparable with the others that have been
pointed out to Mr. O'Donnell and made available?
Mr. Lyons. I think they are comparable to three or four of
those good cases that Mr. O'Donnell saw. The big march case and
the tunnel case, they are not comparable to those two big
cases.
Mr. O'Donnell. There is a possibility that we could still
use those seventy-five or seventy-six cases.
Mr. Lyons. I still think you can use seventy-five or
seventy-six. There are some good cases here.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Lyons, how long have you had these files
here in your possession?
Mr. Lyons. Early in October they started coming in. Wait a
minute. I have to go back on that. They started coming in the
latter part of September.
Mr. Jones. You will recall the day following our executive
hearing on the 6th of October I called you on the phone and
asked you for eight or ten of the more outstanding cases, as
Mr. Anderson just asked. You gave me those cases or a synopsis
of those cases over the telephone.
Mr. Lyons. Yes.
Mr. Jones. Included in those cases were the tunnel
massacre, the death march, and a few of the others, which you
considered to be the more outstanding cases.
Mr. Lyons. That is right.
Mr. Jones. Those were the cases that were in turn released
to the press. These were in your possession at the time.
Mr. Lyons. That is right.
Mr. Jones. You said the more outstanding ones were the ones
you gave me which were in turn released to the press which
would more or less reduce these to a secondary level in
importance.
Mr. Lyons. Yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. Mr. Lyons did not release it to the press.
Mr. Jones. No, he did not release it.
Mr. Lyons. You wanted to make a quick speech for the
senator that day, and I had a report on the desk and gave it to
you.
Mr. Jones. I was simply trying to establish the importance
of these documents as compared to the others.
Mr. O'Donnell. If I may, I would still like to go back to
the complete program in the Pentagon as affecting the war
atrocities because I think it is most important that we be
aware of that program from a knowledge standpoint, and be
alerted as soon as any aspect of the program comes to light,
whether it emanates from the Pentagon or outside source. I
think that is one of the difficulties in this unfortunate
situation. If we had known that this report was in preparation
for at least a month, and apparently it was, it would have
given us a different aspect. I would not have been over on any
of these fifteen cases that Mr. Lyons made available.
Mr. Jones. That is water under the bridge. Our job here is
to salvage something.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is right, but if we know the complete
program, it will help us immeasurably, because we don't know
what will develop to offset contemplated plans we might have on
a salvage basis.
Maj. Kelleher. The foreign exploitation will be a
continuing thing which falls outside of the domestic public
information situation. That will be right down the line on this
material that has been released. In other words, the material
that is over in the chief of information's office that is
available to the American press is by the same right available
to the U.S. Information Agency, which carries out the overseas
exploitation. So as far as the basic material is concerned, it
is exactly the same thing. This is one of those cases, call it
propaganda of truth, if you want to, but the story that is told
the American people is just as powerful a story to tell on the
local basis.
Mr. Jones. Did Dr. Charles Mayo work with you?
Maj. Kelleher. No. He gets his Washington support from a
division of state, which is just called backstopping. They
backstop the U.S. delegation from the Department of State here.
Mr. Anderson. That is C. D. Jackson's organization?
Maj. Kelleher. No, sir. C. D. Jackson is the president's
assistant on psychological warfare matters, but his activities
are with the Operations Coordinating Board of the NSC. Then the
OCB in turn assists the deputy secretary of state, deputy
secretary of defense, the director of foreign operations, Mr.
Stassen, and Mr. C. D. Jackson sits there as the White House
representative.
Mr. Jones. What then is General Cutler's position?
Maj. Kelleher. He is the president's assistant for the
National Security Council and the OCB in turn is an arm of that
organization.
Mr. Carr. To sum up a little bit here, I think by working
through Colonel Fleischer's office we can avoid this sort of
snafuing of the information by one agency without the other one
knowing it. I think we can avoid that by working through
Colonel Fleischer's office.
Mr. Anderson. Is that your opinion, Colonel?
Col. Fleischer. Yes. I might say that in saying what I did
a few minutes ago, where I am actually bringing in a new aspect
to our office, on our level with our contact with public
information of the Department of Defense, with General
Erskine's office, with the army and air force and navy, if the
occasion arises, I think we have a better hold on the big
picture than any one of the individual departments. This thing
is a good example of when we get into a program of this scope,
you almost have to have somebody topside who has quick access
to all these different arms that are working on one of these
programs, and also be able to pick up a piece here and there
and fit it all together. Oftentimes in this instance the case
was to do it in a big hurry. When it is operating for one
department, the army was the action agency on this and will
continue to be. As I said before, they have all the files and
most of the personnel and so forth. It is a little difficult
for them sometimes to know about something that is going on on
the defense level or General Erskine's office or the State
Department. In the secretary of defense level we have more
ready access to that sort of information.
Mr. Jones. Colonel, do you know who gave authority to Life
magazine to go in there a week ago?
Col. Fleischer. No, I do not. On that I only heard about it
yesterday afternoon. I heard that they were going to have
access to some of the pictures which come out in their issue
this week.
Mr. Jones. Who would ordinarily give authority to a
publication to come in and see files of this nature?
Col. Fleischer. Normally the chief of public information
who has the material in his possession. On the other hand, you
sometimes have a department, for example, ordnance, that has
material on a new weapon or something like that, and they might
in turn alert the press to what they have and make it available
to them through the chief of public information. So you can't
say on every occasion it would be the chief of public
information who would make something like that available.
Normally he would make it available.
Mr. Jones. Did not the authority who gave that
authorization realize that these were the very files that were
going to be used by the Senate committee in pursuance of this
investigation?
Col. Fleischer. That is a point. That is the reason I
brought up about the secretary of defense level getting into
the liaison in this, because it is quite conceivable that the
people who released that information were completely unaware of
the committee's interest in the same information, if you see
what I mean. It would be like saying that somebody gave
something to the Senate Armed Services Committee on a subject
that you were working on up here.
Mr. Carr. By handling it on a liaison basis through your
office, Colonel, we can check this sort of thing.
Col. Fleischer. I hope we can.
Mr. Carr. I know you can't guarantee that it won't happen
because things do happen.
Col. Fleischer. That is right.
Mr. Carr. That is our best available way of handling the
situation.
Col. Fleischer. I think so, Mr. Carr. In trying to salvage
this thing for you people, we have quite a job to do. The thing
that I am primarily interested in is seeing that nothing else
happens to this thing. While I am taking on the responsibility
in this area, I would rather do that than have this thing jump
the track again.
Mr. Carr. Now, as to what can be salvaged from this thing--
--
Col. Fleischer. Could I interrupt you a moment to explain
one thing?
Mr. Carr. Yes.
Col. Fleischer. In working through my office and Col.
Britton, your gentlemen of the staff here, I want you to
understand that you can still through Col. Britton and his
assistants deal completely with the army. As you are quite
aware, they have all this information.
Mr. Carr. Yes.
Col. Fleischer. Working through us and now that we are in
the public information business, too, if we have an inkling of
some other aspect of this thing that is coming up, since we are
constantly attuned to your problem here, we can stop the thing.
I have done it before. In the last four years I have been in
this business we have had many occasions where I have made it a
particular point to see that a committee or in a couple of
instances every member of Congress was informed of something
well in advance of its happening in the Defense Department.
That is a part of congressional relations.
Mr. Carr. Now, as to what can be salvaged from this thing,
how are we going to work that out?
Col. Fleischer. The only suggestion I have to make on the
thing is that we try to pick out some of these cases that you
people can develop. When I go back I will talk to Mr. Seaton. I
know he in turn will talk to the secretary of the army and the
information people about withdrawing from circulation those
cases which you people feel you have an interest in.
Mr. Carr. What possibility is there of doing something with
the cases, particularly the seventy-five or seventy-six?
Mr. O'Donnell. I think there is a strong possibility
depending on what publicity is given to those cases between the
time of now and when we have our hearings. If the two major
cases, seventy-five and seventy-six, are thoroughly related,
their value will be lessened considerably, but there is a
strong possibility of using those two cases, and probably three
or four in addition to the others that have been available.
Mr. Carr. Is all the information released?
Mr. O'Donnell. All the summary concerning those cases has
been made available to the press by having photostats of the
raw files, with certain phases, such as names of survivors,
deleted.
Col. Fleischer. If I may interrupt, again, I can picture,
however, that as a result of the interest focused on this
particular document, probably now following up the exploitation
of these cases, because I am pretty sure they are not going to
let these lie around. So you do have the risk of those being
exploited faster than you could ever keep up with them.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is right.
Col. Fleischer. Don't you agree, Mr. Lyons?
Mr. Lyons. Yes, I do.
Col. Fleischer. Once you give the press something to start
working on, that is what happens. We get several of the out of
town papers in the office, and I think it was yesterday's New
York Journal American which carried a feature article by one of
the CIC officers, a detective of the New York police force, and
they immediately grabbed him and ran a feature story on some of
the cases which he had investigated.
Mr. Lyons. That is something you can't control, the
investigators back in civilian life.
Col. Fleischer. But they probably got the lead from that
report.
Mr. O'Donnell. Or anybody who wanted to could go to the
press, and for a couple of hundred dollars give them the story.
Mr. Anderson. Colonel, do you have any knowledge that
further releases are contemplated on this same problem?
Col. Fleischer. I have no personal knowledge of it.
Maj. Kelleher. I think in that respect it is pretty safe
that the secretary of the army's release on that subject will
be the only one that is an official Department of Defense
release. The exploitation follows, of course. If they follow
past practices, there is one release on it which is in the form
of an announcement.
Col. Fleischer. I will make a note of that.
Mr. Lyons. I would like to offer for your consideration,
Mr. O'Donnell, that we gave some consideration to cases not
where there was a survivor, but where there was a witness. Take
this particular case [indicating].
Mr. O'Donnell. I see no objection to that as long as U.S.
soldiers are the victims.
Mr. Lyons. We had ruled those out because it was a witness
and not a survivor.
Mr. O'Donnell. We want primarily American troops to
testify.
Mr. Lyons. There are a couple of others of the same nature.
We have another case I think we could use where a medic found
the bodies. He was not a witness at all, but his testimony
would be worthwhile.
Mr. O'Donnell. I think we definitely should consider those
cases in the light of what has happened.
Mr. Carr. Bob or Ray, to make the best of this situation I
think we should consider the possibility of a release by the
Department of Defense of some sort of a story or some sort of
information to the effect that Senator Potter's probe into this
matter is still going on, that Senator Potter is being
furnished with information which has not been made available,
and that his probe will disclose additional information. What
thoughts do you have along that line?
Mr. Anderson. I think that is important. You will recall at
the executive session on the 6th, the senator said, ``I think
one of the main purposes of this committee will be to get the
greatest psychological value we can from the hearings.''
It is my opinion on behalf of the senator that if the
Department of Defense, in a news release, points up what you
have suggested here, it will fit into the program fully here to
emphasize the hearings that will take place early in December.
Col. Fleischer. We better have a little discussion on
Monday with you people to see what approach we are going to
use. The reason I say that is because I think that is an
excellent suggestion, but I think we have to make sure it is
carefully worded for this reason. We do not want to start
pressing about trying to beat you to the punch on some of these
cases.
Mr. Anderson. It was not my feeling that a release to that
effect ought to be made immediately.
Col. Fleischer. No.
Mr. Carr. No, that is right. From reading many of the news
stories on this thing, there is a definite impression left with
me that Senator Potter is entirely left out of the picture.
Mr. Anderson. That is right.
Mr. Carr. I think that should be corrected.
Mr. Jones. I think it ought to be clearly established,
Colonel, in this release that all future pronouncements on this
subject will be made by the senator and the Senate committee.
Mr. Carr. I would say the senator.
Mr. O'Donnell. Isn't it true it has reached a stage where
press inquiries are being received?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, they are constantly coming in.
Col. Fleischer. Did you see the last paragraph of the Star
story? I just happened to notice it this morning. I wonder if
that was supposition on the part of the press.
Mr. Jones. That was yesterday's Star?
Col. Fleischer. Yes. That provides a little lead to develop
whatever time you consider appropriate.
Mr. Jones. That was the only paper in which it was carried.
Col. Fleischer. Yes, I noticed that.
Mr. Carr. Just repeating myself again, but it gets right
back to the point that Senator Potter is not trying to grab the
thing. He wants to be a part of the thing and coordinate with
the department. I might say on behalf of Senator Potter--I
don't know whether he would say it himself--we don't intend to
see him coordinated right out of the picture.
Mr. Anderson. The senator made very clear at the close of
the hearing on October 6 that he was working very closely with
the Department of Defense.
Mr. Carr. Yes.
Col. Fleischer. I noticed that in the transcript.
Mr. Anderson. That does not appear to be evident.
Mr. Carr. I think in connection with this proposed release
some time in the immediate future, not today or tomorrow, the
release should be worked out primarily, Ray, through you or
with you, so that the senator can be closely advised as to what
is in this thing.
Mr. Anderson. That is right.
Mr. Carr. I think the terms of the thing can be worked out.
There won't be any real problem on that. That I think will
salvage some of the problem here.
The other points, as to the actual cases and what we can
salvage from the already released cases, Don will work out with
your office, Colonel, and with Mr. Lyons.
Mr. Anderson. I think that would have to be done quickly.
Mr. Carr. That is right. I think you should take under
advisement this problem of further release of additional cases,
and consider the advisability of whether or not the extent of
the release should be cut off at any certain point, realizing,
of course, that you can't withdraw ones you have released, but
consideration should be given to that. Unless you have any
further points on this thing, Ray, to bring up----
Mr. Anderson. It is my understanding that Don will
immediately get together with Mr. Lyons to segregate these
cases that can be used. Is that your understanding?
Mr. Carr. Yes.
Col. Fleischer. I think that would be the first step to
really get your hand on what you want to start working with;
the rest can be dovetailed into just exactly what you want.
Mr. Lyons. You will be changing the department flow. We are
under instructions to do all of our coordinating through Mr.
Haskins.
Col. Fleischer. When you get to the department, I will have
to work that one out.
Mr. O'Donnell. I would say probably the first step would be
to find out exactly how many files have actually been made
available, and whether or not those that have not been made
available can be withheld. Then let Mr. Lyons and I take it
from there as to what cases are available and which are the
more immediate of those cases.
Maj. Kelleher. When you get that set of files selected for
this committee determined, I would like to have that, Mr.
Lyons.
Mr. Lyons. Yes.
Mr. Anderson. When do you think, Colonel, that we could get
together on this release? In other words, I assume you are
returning to talk to Secretary Seaton about this whole problem.
Col. Fleischer. Yes.
Mr. Anderson. What is your suggestion with respect to
issuing the release and working that out between us?
Col. Fleischer. We can do that some time the early part of
next week. Whatever time you think is best. We could start in
on it, and have it all ready for release at any appropriate
time, but I would suggest we get together with you in the early
part of next week.
Mr. Anderson. You are likewise going to take steps, as I
understand it, Colonel, to avoid any further releases from the
various departments.
Col. Fleischer. I have that double checked and marked all
over it on this paper.
Mr. Jones. I assume your contacts in that direction will
involve finding out who the authority was who released this?
Col. Fleischer. I would prefer not to go that far.
Mr. Jones. At least that person should be informed by
memorandum, or something.
Col. Fleischer. I think so.
Mr. Carr. Do you have anything further, Bob?
Mr. Jones. No.
Mr. Carr. Concerning this release, I am particularly
anxious that it be handled through you, Ray, because I want the
senator to be fully posted on it.
Mr. Anderson. That is right.
Mr. Carr. Concerning the cases, Don, you will immediately
be in contact with Mr. Lyons on this problem.
Mr. O'Donnell. That is right.
Mr. Carr. I think we can salvage something from this thing.
I think we can come up with something that will be very good. I
think the whole situation, as it has developed, has been
unfortunate. I know Senator McCarthy feels that it is
unfortunate. I think that Senator Potter feels it is
unfortunate. As I said before, we do not want to be in the
position of complaining, yet on the other hand we want to be
sure that you understand our position on the matter. We do feel
that something has been really snafued on this coordination of
his activities with the program. We now have that behind us,
and we are now trying to reestablish the cooperation that we
wanted to establish in the first place.
Mr. Jones. Just one other thing, Colonel. I wonder if we
may have from the secretary a letter to the senator designating
yourself as liaison to this committee. I ask this in view of
the fact that a liaison was named at the last meeting of this
group, and you yourself said you were named today. For the
record, and for the senator's information, if we may have a
letter from the secretary, it would help establish
responsibility and authority.
Col. Fleischer. Yes.
Mr. Anderson. Is it your opinion, Mr. Lyons, that
worthwhile cases can be developed for the hearings?
Mr. Lyons. I am of the opinion that we can develop
worthwhile information for the committee for this public
hearing on the 10th of December? I am going a little bit
further. I honestly believe when we finish by working with Mr.
O'Donnell, you can say that no harm has been done. I think we
can put that over.
Mr. Anderson. Is it also my understanding, Colonel, that
such cases will not be made available to the press prior to the
hearing?
Col. Fleischer. When I go back, Mr. Anderson, I will tell
Secretary Seaton the results of this meeting, and my belief
that we should withdraw from circulation those cases in which
you are interested and prevent new cases from being made
available until we have had a chance to discuss it with you
people. I hesitate to go so far as to say that these will not
be released, because I am a little bit apprehensive that the
press may have gotten hold of a couple of these already through
circumstances which we just discussed. I will assure you of
doing everything I can with Secretary Seaton and the people
over there to see that your interests are protected.
Mr. Anderson. I think that is all.
Mr. Carr. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
[Thereupon at 11:30 a.m., the executive session was
concluded.]
KOREAN WAR ATROCITIES
[Editor's note.--1st Lt. Henry J. McNichols, Jr.; Pfc John
E. Martin; and Sgt. Carey Weinel testified in public on
December 2; Sgt. Barry F. Rhoden on December 3; Capt. Linton J.
Buttrey, on December 3 and 4; and Col. James M. Hanley and
Capt. Alexander G. Makarounis on December 4, 1953.]
----------
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1953
U.S. Senate,
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to notice, in
room 357 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Charles E.
Potter, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan.
Present also: Robert Jones, research assistant to Senator
Potter; Francis P. Carr, staff director; Donald F. O'Donnell,
assistant counsel; Robert J. McElroy, investigator; Ruth Young
Watt, chief clerk.
Senator Potter. Gentlemen, before we proceed I would like
to say again I am most appreciative of the cooperation of the
army and those of you who are now civilians and working with us
on this investigation.
You are not being investigated. I want to make that clear.
We are calling upon you to aid us in an investigation of the
enemy which we have been fighting. You can feel free to make as
complete a statement as you care to. This is a closed hearing.
Nothing you say here this morning will be known to the press.
We plan on holding two days of executive session. This is
not for publication as yet but we are planning to hold open
hearings beginning Wednesday morning. The open hearings will be
much similar to the hearings we plan on starting today.
I am sure you have been advised by the military personnel
here that you can speak freely. I think the only requirement
that they have made is that you not mention a person's name who
has suffered atrocities. You can tell about the incident and
you can tell his rank or whatever that may be. But don't
mention his name. The same thing is true with any aid you might
have received from Asiatics; don't disclose their name. But
outside of that, that is the only security restriction that you
have.
If, during the course of the testimony, something of a
security nature should come up, we can easily take care of it
here in executive session without your violating any security
code.
We will call Lieutenant McNichols.
STATEMENT OF 1ST LT. HENRY J. McNICHOLS, JR.
Senator Potter. Lieutenant, we do not want to put a man in
the military under oath, so we don't have to worry about that.
Your word is sufficient.
First, if you would identify yourself for the record,
Lieutenant, and give your full name and your present
assignment?
Lt. McNichols. Henry J. McNichols, Jr., First Lieutenant,
0-228401, Infantry School Attachment, Fort Benning, Georgia.
Senator Potter. Where is your home, Lieutenant?
Lt. McNichols. As a professional soldier, actually I was
born in St. Louis.
Senator Potter. You are regular army?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Lieutenant, what unit were you assigned to
in Korea?
Lt. McNichols. Company E, 5th Cavalry Regiment, sir.
Senator Potter. When did your unit first go?
Lt. McNichols. My unit arrived in Korea, Pohangdun, 19 July
1950, and I went in first as a weapons platoon leader of Easy
Company E and became the company executive officer, and I was
captured--do you want me to go through this?--I was captured on
the 10th of September 1950 in the vicinity of actually a little
north of Hill 203 in the vicinity of Taeju.
Senator Potter. Can you point out the approximate vicinity
on the map right behind you?
Lt. McNichols. Yes. It was approximately here, near Taeju.
Senator Potter. That was during the major flurries of the
North Koreans, wasn't it?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, the UN defenses there.
Senator Potter. Right up to the Pusan perimeter area?
Lt. McNichols. My unit was in the town of Waxwon and along
the Naktong River we pulled back from there about the 5th of
September, succeeding pulling back about a mile the first time,
the second time possibly a mile or two miles; but actually
about three miles south of the town of Wagwon, it is.
Senator Potter. At that time you were commanding Easy
Company?
Lt. McNichols. No, sir, I was executive officer.
Senator Potter. Company E executive officer?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
The night of 10 September I was separated from my unit, and
we pulled off a hill and I went back up on the hill to try to
get a wounded man off; I think I walked into an ambush. They
had a habit there, if you ever did have occasion where there
was a wounded man behind, they would jab him with a bayonet to
make him scream and before we got him off, I walked into an
ambush.
I was separated from my unit, and the Americans had pulled
on back then I was in between, and in fact actually the way I
came off this hill I ended up to the rear of their lines. The
next morning I became a member of the North Korean Army then,
and they had me from the 11th actually, caught me the morning
of the 11th and they had me until the night of the 20th.
Senator Potter. Were you captured by military personnel or
by civilians?
Lt. McNichols. By military personnel, North Koreans. I
don't know what units or anything that I was mixed up with.
They kept me ten days.
Senator Potter. Did they keep you in that vicinity?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, approximately about a five-mile square
area there.
Senator Potter. Were there other PW's with you?
Lt. McNichols. No, sir, I never ran into another PW.
However, they did show me a lot of AGO cards and not dogtags or
anything, but AGO cards and class A passes and what have you
that did belong to other soldiers.
Whether they got them off bodies or not, I don't know. They
did have these psychological warfare sheets and they used to
have a picture of the officer, usually up in one corner there
saying ``stay out of the capitalistic war,'' and then signed by
the man, and his name and rank and unit down there. They showed
me quite a few of those, also.
Senator Potter. You say they had a picture of an officer,
an American officer?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, Lieutenant Granberry, who never
showed up on the list.
Senator Potter. And that was one of those confessions?
Lt. McNichols. So-called, yes, sir.
Senator Potter. That it was an imperialistic war and that
was the nature of it?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, and stay away from MacArthur, the
warmonger. They did make me broadcast one day, and they gave me
one of those, and we wrote it to place my name and I was
supposed to read my name where the other man was and they had a
loud speaker set up. Actually it was in a South Korean sector
where it was, a little to the right of where the First Cavalry
Division was when I was there. And I read this thing.
Senator Potter. Was that in the same area?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, it was all back in the same area.
Senator Potter. What pressure did they use on you to get
you to broadcast?
Lt. McNichols. Well, first of all I had them believing I
couldn't read, and then they found out--I guess they figured
all officers were supposed to read or something--and finally
the colonel came up and said you will broadcast. We fooled
around and when they finally did take me, they had me with one
unit and they handed me over to this propaganda outfit, and we
went up into a farmhouse, actually a regular North Korean hut,
or South Korean in that case, and they had a generator and a
regular sound system and they gave me the thing and told me to
read the thing.
Persuasion, they stuck a pistol at my head; but that first
five days I got a lot of that.
Senator Potter. They put a pistol to your head which
implied if you did not do it, you were not long for this world,
is that true?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Do you know whether that type of broadcast,
was that heard by Allied troops?
Lt. McNichols. To the best of my knowledge; no, sir. I have
talked to a lot of officers that have come back from there, and
no one heard it, and well, I sound like Seoul City Sue, if you
ever heard one of her broadcasts; a dead, low monotone, and I
did the same thing. In fact, he was afraid I was talking too
fast and by the time I got finished my own brother wouldn't
know who was broadcasting. At the beginning I was supposed to
say ``I am Lieutenant McNichols.'' I said ``I am a lieutenant''
and I went on from there. So I didn't identify myself over it.
Senator Potter. How long a document was it?
Lt. McNichols. Sir, it wasn't but a piece of 8\1/2\ by 11,
regular typewriting paper, Korean type, that is what it was. I
wouldn't say it was over 250 words.
Senator Potter. Did that ask for other soldiers to
surrender?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, to stop the capitalistic Wall
Street fight and that kind of stuff.
Senator Potter. Do you know whether that was recorded or
not?
Lt. McNichols. No, sir, it couldn't have been. The
loudspeaker set-up they had, we use them at the Infantry School
and I am sure you have seen one. It is a generator system and
then the sound box, actually it was stamped USIS, and they must
have got it around Seoul. They had two loudspeakers and that
was back here by the farmhouse and I couldn't even hear the
thing going on. I could hear it away out in the distance.
They had a couple of girls there in this propaganda outfit
and they used to sing songs and then the various propaganda
about coming over and join our side and I didn't understand
Korean, but I imagine that is what they were putting up there.
Senator Potter. How long were you in this area?
Lt. McNichols. Well, actually, sir, they only had me ten
days altogether, and in that ten days I stayed right around in
this more or less immediate area. Actually there was an enemy
regimental or division CP, and I was questioned by four or five
people there and then turned over to this propaganda outfit and
when I was turned over to the propaganda outfit we actually
bore southeast.
Actually we were going to the right of Wagwon, and we got
that one broadcast in and they wanted to do it again, but the
Americans were pushing them too hard and they never got a
chance to set it up again.
Senator Potter. What else happened to you during that
period?
Lt. McNichols. Well, as far as the treatment went, there
was never--they scared me quite a few times there with the
various cases of the pistol flashing and so on, but I ate the
same thing that the Koreans got around there and we had a
bucket of rice.
About that time the rains had started and their underwater
bridge across the Naktong River then was about out of business
and they weren't getting any supplies either, and they were
hurt just about as bad as I was.
To the last night I actually had good treatment.
Senator Potter. Did they beat you at all?
Lt. McNichols. No, sir. The first day they had me they
walked me into the rear, that night, and put a load of rice on
my back the next morning and I walked that up to the front line
troops, which I think is a violation of the rules of warfare.
Senator Potter. They used you as a supply carrier for their
troops?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. What happened in the last day?
Lt. McNichols. Well, the last day the Americans had started
to break out from Pusan and the rest of them had come in at
Inchon, and we had been in actually a ravine right outside of
this Korean area there and we stayed there until approximately
5:30 or six o'clock when it got dark, at which time they wanted
to cook and started a fire.
Usually when I left I had about seven or eight prisoner
chasers on me, and one at either side and one at the foot and
one outside the door, and my case of trying to get away, it was
a little too late then. I was pretty well covered.
Senator Potter. Were you confined then in a house of some
kind?
Lt. McNichols. Actually put in a house, sir, and put in
there usually at dark, and brought out again in the morning
when we would go and hide some place from the air force and the
artillery spotter planes.
At any rate he woke me up, and I went to sleep, and he woke
me up about eight o'clock at night and I heard, or later found
out it was a jeep that hit a land mine and I heard a lot of
Americans yelling. But I didn't have any idea what it was, and
this lieutenant came and got me and the rest of the unit
there--there were about nineteen in all--and took us up to the
top of the hill and he told me to sit down and be quiet, at
which time he tied my hands behind my back and further tied my
hands then to a tree, and then went up actually to the lip of
this hill. There were actually two hills, and the shorter and
then the main peak of this hill; I was in a gully right in
between. The First Cavalry stopped at the first peak. They
started up with a good yell, and there wasn't much artillery
fire, and all of the Koreans ran out with the exception of this
lieutenant. He came over and shot me then.
Senator Potter. While you were tied?
Lt. McNichols. I was tied to the tree, yes, sir.
Senator Potter. In other words, your hands were tied behind
your back, and then that was that you were also tied to a tree?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Were you alone at that time?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, I was the only prisoner that they
had, the only American prisoner that I saw in the whole time
that they had me.
Senator Potter. It was a North Korean officer?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, a first lieutenant.
Senator Potter. Was he right up beside you when he shot
you?
Lt. McNichols. About four feet from me, I guess.
Senator Potter. Did he pull out his pistol?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. How many shots did he fire?
Lt. McNichols. Well, I only remember one. However, I ended
up with four bullet holes; four in and four out. I imagine the
first one, I got shot through the mouth and I remember my mouth
and my nose running, and I imagine the first one I got through
the mouth.
Senator Potter. Did he assume that you were dead?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, I think I did a pretty good job of
playing dead then, and all I remember was seeing the sparks,
and my mouth and my nose running. That was all I remember until
I woke up about, I guess I came to about, four o'clock in the
morning and I started yelling then. The soldier didn't come out
and get me because of the same fact of this using of wounded
for ambush purposes, but at daybreak they did come out and get
me.
Senator Potter. When did the shooting take place; what time
of the day?
Lt. McNichols. Approximately ten o'clock at night, sir, and
it would have been the 20th of July, 1950.
Senator Potter. And you were recovered by our troops then
on the following morning?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, about 7:15, 21 July.
Senator Potter. Where else were you hit besides in the
mouth?
Lt. McNichols. Two of them went in the neck, and one in the
shoulder, and I was shot through the leg the day they captured
me. I didn't get my medical treatment from them because I don't
think they had any. However, they all looked at it, and they
got some water out of a stream there and rinsed it off for me.
But no other form of medical aid.
Senator Potter. What type of pistol do the Communists
carry?
Lt. McNichols. It is not tovarisch, it is the only piece of
equipment that they had that didn't have a hammer and sickle on
it, that I saw, even enemy equipment.
Senator Potter. Most of their military equipment?
Lt. McNichols. Everything I ran into with the one exception
which was an officer's pistol, and I did run into one guy with
a Mauser, and he put that at my head and he said he liked my
shoes and I was without shoes for the rest of the time.
Senator Potter. When you were captured, they took your
shoes?
Lt. McNichols. After a day, yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did they take any other articles of
clothing?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir. When they frisked me they got
everything out of my pockets, and I got shot through the
pocket, and I had a Rosary and my wallet; I had an AGO card,
and identification card and a scapula medal and that is all.
They took all of that, and just peeled it right out.
Right after that some guy grabbed me and took my dog tags
off, and one time there I got into a Korean house and I found a
pencil and a piece of paper. I started to write my name and
address and stuff it in my pocket and they caught me at that
and took it off my pockets.
Senator Potter. Did you have any jewelry on you; a ring or
anything?
Lt McNichols. No, sir.
Senator Potter. Or watch?
Lt. McNichols. No, they were disappointed about that. I had
a busted fountain pen and they were put out that I didn't have
a wristwatch or a cigarette lighter.
Mr. O'Donnell. Did they take your clothing away?
Lt. McNichols. No, sir, they didn't. In my case, they got
my shoes and they gave me first some of these, they looked like
Keds, and I guess they were about four sizes too small, and
then I ended up, I went to a good house in one, or Korean
house, and I found they look like rubbers and they hook about
here and back here, and they are very hard to walk in and very
hard to keep on. But I did use those the rest of the time.
I had the army wool cushion socks which came in very good
and for a time I walked in my stocking feet.
Senator Potter. What time of the year?
Lt. McNichols. It was September of 1950, and it was just
before the cold weather.
Mr. O'Donnell. It was prior to the cold weather?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. Could you describe exactly in detail,
Lieutenant, the manner in which you were tied to the tree?
Lt. McNichols. Well, they got me out of the house and we
went up to the top of this hill and they told me to come with
them. So we got up there and this Korean first lieutenant
couldn't speak any English, nor could I speak any Korean.
However, with the colloquial Japanese between the two of us he
informed me to stay where I was and keep quiet.
However, he had rice linen, that white clothing which a lot
of them and quite a few of the soldiers they use it actually to
keep themselves warm and they could always throw it off and
look like a civilian. He took strips of that, then, and made it
into one long strip, and then tied my hands behind me and made
me sit down, and then tied me to the tree and told me to stay
there and he would be right back, and to be quiet while he was
gone.
He went then actually up on this lip of the hill, and when
the Americans started up the hill, all of the soldiers ran out
and took off north, and none of them came anywhere near me.
However, this guy did go by.
Mr. O'Donnell. You are speaking of the North Koreans?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. Actually you were tied; your hands were tied
behind your back and then you were later tied to the tree?
Lt. McNichols. Actually, it happened all at once, and first
he tied my hands behind me and made me sit down and then
whether he put the bindings to my hands to tree or not, I don't
know.
Mr. O'Donnell. What would be the reason as far as you know,
or do you know, the reason for the shooting?
Lt. McNichols. The only thing I can think of is just the
Oriental point of view. We shoot them and he doesn't come back
and fight us again. And in my case there I would have
undoubtedly fallen into American hands at that time. This is
hearsay evidence, but we had a company in my battalion who at
one time I had been a platoon leader over there, but not at the
time, that they shot the whole company of them, twenty-eight or
twenty-nine. They captured them, and when we organized a
counter-attack, immediately when we started into the thing,
they lined them up in a ditch and shot them. The only thing we
can figure is that they will kill us so we cannot come back and
fight.
Mr. O'Donnell. How long did it take you to recover from
your wounds?
Lt. McNichols. Six months, sir. I went back to duty the 9th
of March 1951.
Mr. O'Donnell. How long were you actually hospitalized?
Lt. McNichols. Actually, sir, I was in the hospital until 9
March 1951, until I was released from Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
Mr. O'Donnell. What condition are you in today, Lieutenant?
Do you have any reaction from those wounds?
Senator Potter. First, have you gone before the board as
yet?
Lt. McNichols. I am trying to make the regular army, but I
was disqualified because of wounds, but I do have a profile
change, and I am getting hard of hearing in this ear, rather,
and I have got what is known as a horno? I don't sweat on this
side of my head and I do sweat on this side of my body, and
this lid doesn't go all of the way up and this pupil is
smaller. Actually I went from astigmatism to farsightedness.
Senator Potter. Where did the bullet enter your head?
Lt. McNichols. One of them came in here, in this dimple and
came out over here, and two of them went in right here, and one
came out down here and one back here; and the other one was
through the shoulder there.
Senator Potter. What is your regular army profile now?
Lt. McNichols. I have got two two's, one on my shoulder and
two on my hearing.
Senator Potter. All of the rest are one's?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. For the benefit of the civilian, what is a
two and what is a one?
Lt. McNichols. A one is a warm body ready for duty; and a
one is actually, according to the army standard now, and the
army standard would actually vary depending upon whether it is
an all-out situation or a peacetime again, such as we have now.
Two is in the case of my right shoulder, a weakness in it,
and not a full ability to pull a full weight with it. When you
get up to three's and four's, then it is these guys who are
crippled, and in fact I had a friend who has a wooden leg and
they gave him a four on his leg.
Mr. O'Donnell. Actually you are useful to the army--your
usefulness hasn't been impaired apart from your physical
suffering?
Lt. McNichols. No, I don't think so. I can still carry a
rifle and squeeze the trigger.
Senator Potter. Lieutenant, you have seen the enemy at
first hand and you witnessed their attempts of indoctrination.
I can ask you the question for your opinion, and you do not
have to answer it unless you want to: Do you think that the
Communists in the United States are different than the
Communists that you were fighting in Korea?
Lt. McNichols. Do I have an opinion, Colonel? Actually, we
don't have any opinions. Let me make a statement. We have a
board of officers and we ask not to write these things. When I
came back to the States in 1950 I was one of the first returned
prisoners and we had an occasion in St. Louis, there of two or
three women put an ad in the paper to get our sons home from
Korea, and what have you.
I got very browned off and wrote to the paper and told them
to cancel my subscriptions. However, I found out later that
that was going on all over the states and they are organized.
Senator Potter. I had some visit my office.
Lt. McNichols. They probably know a lot more about you than
your wife does.
Senator Potter. I am afraid they do.
I think in order that the record may be complete, what
happened after you were tied to the tree. You say that you were
rescued in the next morning and just how did that happen? Can
you go into more detail how that came about?
Lt. McNichols. Well, the soldier who came out and cut me
off got killed about three or four days up the road,
unfortunately. However, I have run into quite a few who heard
me out there yelling all night. As soon as I came to, I could
hear some sound out there and of course I didn't know who it
was and the only Korean word I knew was ``Oiy'' which means
either, hey you, or something like that. So I yelled ``oiy''
and ``help'' the rest of the time and I was having quite a time
as far as my mouth was concerned. I got about six teeth that
were running loose in my face and I was spitting those out and
so on, but I sat there and yelled.
Senator Potter. You were still tied to the tree?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, and they heard me. However, they
waited until about daybreak when they came out and got me and
they brought a litter and actually the man with the Carbine
bayonet which is a pretty sharp piece of merchandise, usually
you will find them a lot sharper than the M-1 bayonet, he spent
almost three or four minutes cutting all of that stuff off to
get me off the tree. He did quite a tying job on me.
Senator Potter. Were you rescued by your own unit?
Lt. McNichols. No, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry.
Senator Potter. Then you were evacuated immediately to
Pusan?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir, I went to the regular evacuation
channels, and they ran me down to the bottom of the hill and
back again.
Senator Potter. And you arrived back in the States when?
Lt. McNichols. I got back in the States the 18th of October
1950. I stayed in the Tokyo Army Hospital for twenty-three days
and whether the fact I had head wounds and they wanted to let
them dry out before they shipped me or not, I don't know, sir.
Senator Potter. Are you now on active duty?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. The question I asked you about whether you
felt your opinion of American Communists--I am sure that the
military has no objection to you expressing an opinion on that
if you care to do so. I will tell you frankly the reason I am
asking this question. You will find many people today in our
own country who have an idea that the Communist party of the
United States is a political party, and that is something
entirely different from communism elsewhere. One of the
purposes of the hearing is to let the people know the type of
enemy that we are fighting.
While it is true that the killing has stopped in Korea, the
war hasn't stopped as you well know, and the war is still in a
cold stage at the present time, but the war between communism
and free people is still in effect.
I think no greater service can be rendered than by people
like yourself, Lieutenant, and others, who have seen the enemy
firsthand. This is not newspaper accounts or some fuzzy-
thinking professor, but you have seen the Communists firsthand,
and if you have strong convictions towards it I am sure
military personnel would have no objections to you expressing
it.
Lt. McNichols. I have never had any dealings, that is
trouble, and you don't know whether you would have dealings
with a Communist, and you don't know whether your best friend
is one. I am a Catholic, also, and in my case where I went to
school communism was recognized way back in 1937, probably long
before that, and so we were always instructed in that affair.
Actually in our case, in the case of a Catholic, his religion
in itself, has been fighting communism as long as it has been
going on over there.
Senator Potter. That is true.
Lt. McNichols. However, if we get an opinion, if they can
run them out of business we have got a tendency to be too soft.
Senator Potter. Is it your opinion that the Communists of
the United States receive their orders from the same source as
the Communists of Korea or China or wherever it may be?
Lt. McNichols. I don't think that there is any doubt of it.
Senator Potter. Colonel, do you have any questions that you
would like to ask?
Col. Hanley. Due to the short time that you were held by
the enemy, I don't presume they tried to put out any propaganda
efforts?
Lt. McNichols. I did get a quizzing by a political officer,
some rather fantastic questions at times. They wanted to know
if my father was a worker or capitalist, and they were
particularly interested in the amount of time I had in the
service. And they called Harry Truman a rascal and MacArthur a
war monger, and they had a set up.
The thing they tried to get out of me was my home address.
I told them my mother and father were dead and I had no family,
and let it go at that and they never pressed it, the fact that
they didn't get my home address out of me in that respect. But
they were decidedly looking for the home address, there was no
doubt of that. Seoul City Sue did declare me dead on her
program, but the only thing, when I got promoted to 1st
lieutenant and I left the orders in the CP and they might have
found that order and some of my mail that was up there in a
bag.
Senator Potter. Did Seoul City Sue--is that the Korean
equivalent of Tokyo Rose?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. In the broadcast when she said you were
dead, did she know you were alive?
Lt. McNichols. Actually, it happened about, they picked a
broadcast up in Japan, some of the people over there, some of
the wives heard it; I didn't hear it and I think it happened
during the time I was a prisoner and she called me Nichols
instead of McNichols, but she had the right serial number and
the Second Battalion and she had quite a bit of information.
Therefore I think the way she got it, she must have found some
mail or they found this promotion order. That is the only thing
I can figure.
Senator Potter. Are there any further questions?
Mr. O'Donnell. Lieutenant, after you were shot and regained
consciousness, and started to yell, it was quite some time and
it was nearly daylight until you were actually rescued by our
forces, and now the reason for them not coming to rescue you
sooner, I think you mentioned, was because they were afraid of
an ambush?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. Was it a common practice to use a captured
PW as bait to get our boys to come into an ambush?
Lt. McNichols. I don't know whether in the other outfits, I
can only speak for my own experience, we did have occasions
where they worked over the wounded. In the cases we did come
over a hill and a man was wounded when we came down the side of
a hill and they would get him or any of these stragglers, and
in one case of pushing him with a bayonet and making this guy
scream. Now, the one I went up after, I talked to some other, a
sergeant in my company, and they went up the next morning to
try to find me and they did find a boy's body and he had been
both stabbed and shot.
Mr. O'Donnell. You would have to assume that they forced
him to yell?
Lt. McNichols. He was yelling, there was no doubt of that.
Senator Potter. And then they killed him?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, they probably did.
Senator Potter. He was found dead?
Lt. McNichols. It was very dark, and there was a moonless
night, and I don't imagine I was more than five yards from him
when I did walk into this ambush, and actually there were just
four of us coming together in the dark; three North Koreans and
myself, and that was it.
Senator Potter. I would like to also go back to questioning
by the political interrogator when he asked you if your father
was a working man or a capitalist.
Did they ask you whether you owned an automobile?
Lt. McNichols. They wanted to know who owned the jeep in
the company, and the argument was that a company commander had
to buy his own jeeps in there and they were curious about that.
One other thing might be for your interest: While I was a
prisoner, I had occasion to meet one who wanted to come over to
Westinghouse and study how to be a sound engineer.
Senator Potter. One of the North Koreans?
Lt. McNichols. He was from Seoul some place or other, and
my number one prison chaser has been a bartender in an
officers' club in Seoul, and a houseboy for a lieutenant
colonel up there. The first time that I was quizzed by this
colonel, this guy was interpreter, and I got talking to him in
strictly the Brooklyn colloquialisms and I said ``you have been
a bartender in some officers' club,'' and a couple of days
later he admitted he had been.
Quite a few of the North Korean soldiers still had drivers'
licenses from the 219 Battalion in Seoul.
Senator Potter. Do you have any notion as to whether they
were Communists by indoctrination or whether they had been
forced to fight with the North Koreans?
Lt. McNichols. I had quite a few that used to come up, and
say ``Capitalistic Dog'' and so on, and one kid--he was
strictly a kid, I think he was about seventeen years old--
wanted to come over to Westinghouse, and I think he was going
where the rice was at the time. What his bargain was and so on,
they used him for an interpreter and I remember we got a big
harangue from some colonel and he sounded about as bored as I
was when he interpreted the thing about the warmongers and what
have you.
But the great majority of them there were decidedly
Communistic, and there was no doubt of that, and decidedly
indoctrinated.
I ran into another one who got thrown out of Seoul in 1946
and was going to the University of Seoul, and he got thrown out
of school and I think out of South Korea for his Communistic
leanings. They used him for an interpreter when I was in this
regimental or division CP.
Senator Potter. Was he an officer?
Lt. McNichols. Sir, I don't know, he never wore a shoulder
board and I imagine he was, though.
Mr. O'Donnell. The only suggestion I have, when we go into
public hearings, it is for the benefit of civilians and will
you spell out the terms?
Mr. Carr. Lieutenant, this lieutenant that actually fired
the shots that hit you when you were tied to the tree, was that
as far as you could determine, an individual action? Everybody
else, you say, was getting out of there.
Lt. McNichols. It looked decidedly like an individual
action because this colonel that was with this propaganda
group, I hadn't seen him for better than two days and this
lieutenant was in charge of the bunch, and it seemed to be an
individual action that he did himself.
Senator Potter. Was this lieutenant in charge of this
group?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. So that actually he was the commander of
the group that did it?
Lt. McNichols. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. It wasn't just an individual soldier?
Lt. McNichols. It was the commander, himself.
Senator Potter. Do you know his name?
Lt. McNichols. No, sir, he didn't speak any English, and I
spoke very little Japanese, and about the only way we could do
it was through Japanese and he didn't have much to do with me,
and I could sit there and look him right in the eye and he
would turn away. The one I was telling you about, the sound
engineer, he and I got to be great buddies, and he actually
helped me out. I don't know where he used to do it, I was the
only one who was smoking cigarettes and he would go out there
and get them for me. The lieutenant was very uncommunicative
and decidedly a Prussian type of officer and strictly divorced
from the men.
Senator Potter. You mean to tell me in the Communist army
they had a caste system there?
Lt. McNichols You bet you they do.
Senator Potter. I have no further questions.
Lieutenant, the tentative plan will be for us to hold
public hearings beginning Wednesday morning, and if you could
be available--I do not know the schedule yet as to whether you
will go on Wednesday or Thursday or Friday--but we will
certainly appreciate it if you could stay around. You have a
story that should get out.
Lt. McNichols. Thank you very much.
Senator Potter. We will call Corporal Wilton.
STATEMENT OF SGT. BARRY F. RHODEN
Senator Potter. Will you have a chair, Corporal. Will you
identify yourself for the record, Corporal, and give your full
name and your present unit.
Sgt. Rhoden. You are mistaken, Senator. My rank is
sergeant, and my name is Barry F. Rhoden; Sergeant Barry F.
Rhoden, RA 1432093. I am assigned to the 35th, in Jacksonville,
Florida.
Senator Potter. What is your home address?
Sgt. Rhoden. McClenny, Florida.
Senator Potter. You are not kicking about your assignment?
Sgt. Rhoden. No, sir.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, would you tell the committee what
unit you were assigned to when you first went to Korea?
Sgt. Rhoden. I was in training with the Second Infantry
Division in Fort Lewis, Washington, when the Korean War
started. We were alerted for Korea, and on the 22nd of July we
left the States for Korea. We landed on about the 1st of August
in 1950. About the 30th of August of 1950 we were up on the
line, the Neptung River; and the exact position I do not know,
sir.
Senator Potter. Can you identify the approximate location
on the map behind you?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes. Right around here near Taeju
[indicating]. It was to the left of Taeju.
Senator Potter. That was also on the Pusan perimeter area?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. That was the western boundary of the Pusan
area?
Sgt. Rhoden. The whole time I was there I did not know
north, south, or what; but it was in the area near Taeju. The
exact dates, sir, I am not sure. In the affidavit I said on the
31st of August, sir, but I remember now when we were joking
with each other about payday. That was the next company day. So
it was on the 30th of August, sir, when the North Koreans hit
us there and my unit was surrounded.
On the morning of the 31st of August we were taken
prisoner. We had no ammunition. I, along with sixty other
fellows, was trying to move back to our lines. We were opened
fire on by some of the North Koreans.
Senator Potter. What was your duty with the company?
Sgt. Rhoden. I was the assistant squad leader, sir, in the
57 Millimeter Recoilless Rifle Squad. We were trying to get
back to our lines, sir, and we were kind of off to the side of
our company--on an outpost. When they overran the main
positions we were firing and they missed us. We were throwing
grenades in to a bunch of them, and they did not even notice
us. I do not know what was wrong, whether they were doped or
what.
After we were out of ammunition, we were trying to get back
to our lines. We were moving along the edge of the lake or a
little trail and we could hear the firing. We knew our lines
were there some place, and we were trying to get to them.
About a platoon of them opened fire on us from up on the
mountain. We began to run. We had no ammunition. We knew it was
the North Koreans and that they were after us. There was a bend
in the trail--it went around the edge of the mountain--and out
across the rice paddy I could see a bunch of fellows moving.
They looked to me like GI's. I looked through binoculars and I
could see they had on their GI uniform, the fatigue, the GI
boots, and the steel helmets. We actually thought they were
GI's, sir. We had been chased a while and we were going to let
them chase us right on into a trap, and it worked the other
way. When they opened fire on us, the North Koreans opened fire
on us. They came off the hill on us. The lake was at our back,
sir, and we were helpless there.
Senator Potter. How many of you were there in the group?
Sgt. Rhoden. There were seven to start with, sir, and three
of the fellows were killed while we were being taken prisoners.
We had just a few rounds each, sir, and our bayonets. We did
the best we could, sir, but three of them were killed. The
other four of us they put to carrying ammunition for them
during the day. The lieutenant mentioned taking the dog tags.
They took our dog tags. The officer who was in charge of the
group that we were with, he had a nice roll of chains and he
was making a collection of them.
Senator Potter. That was the Korean officer, the North
Korean officer?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir. Thereafter we were taken prisoner
and there was this one officer--they wanted to shoot us several
times and he would stop it. I take it he was the political
officer. He had a little briefcase with a lot of papers, of
propaganda, and pictures and so forth, and he would let us read
those.
Senator Potter. Were those the individual North Korean
soldiers?
Sgt. Rhoden. The North Korean GI's He would let them beat
us but he would not let them shoot us. As long as you would
look him right in the eye, it was all right; but if you turned
your back, he would hit you. They hit us with their rifle
butts. Maybe they would kick us or spit on us or beat us with a
stick or something.
They took all of the stuff we had on us--our billfolds, our
watches, and our papers--and it was like a kid at a Christmas
tree. He enjoyed getting all of it. We were put to carrying
ammunition for them.
Senator Potter. That was the same day?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir. They had loaded us down with the
ammunition, sir, and some of us were loaded pretty heavy. When
we would fall we got a flogging, sir. They had taken our boots
and our jackets. The North Koreans, none of them could speak
English, sir, and I could not speak their lingo. So the
questioning they did was by drawings on paper and signs. They
would draw a picture of a plane and they wanted to know how
many planes we had. So we put down ten planes--you had to put
something. I did not know, sir, and I tried to let them know I
did not know; and I would get a beating. So I got so I would
mark and he would draw a plane. He would want me to mark how
many and I would fill the page up. If I put maybe ten or twelve
down, I got a beating. So I filled the page up and just kept
going until he stopped me, and then he was satisfied. The same
way with the tanks and the artillery.
Senator Potter. This was all done by drawings?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, and by signs. He would draw his rank and
I would draw my two stripes down.
Senator Potter. Do you know what rank he had?
Sgt. Rhoden. No, sir, I do not. It was all confusing to me.
Senator Potter. But he was an officer?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir. He had the runners coming to him,
and when he gave an order the fellows jumped around. One time
when he was questioning me, sir, he got a little rough with me,
and this other fellow----
Senator Potter. What do you mean, he got rough?
Sgt. Rhoden. He put the pistol to my head, right up here
[indicating], and motioned I had better come across or else.
This other fellow came up and run him away and then he sat down
there with me, the old buddy-buddy. He pointed to me and then
to himself, and he would go like that [indicating] and I would
play dumb. He would go through the motion again, and again I
would play dumb. So the next time he went through the motion,
he took my hand and shook hands with me. I motioned I knew what
he meant.
The other fellow said, ``He is trying to get friendly. Ask
him for something to eat.'' We were all very hungry; our
rations were running low before we were taken prisoner. So we
asked him for something to eat. He went into a rage. He beat us
around a little.
Then the fellows told me, ``Ask him for some water.'' So I
asked him for water and they did give us a little water. But
all of the questioning was by drawings, sir, and signs.
After the questioning there, sir, where he tried to get
buddy-buddy with me----
Senator Potter. Was this the first day?
Sgt. Rhoden. This was all in the first day that I was taken
prisoner, sir. From there we went on. They had a unit
surrounded and they set up a road block. There was one vehicle,
an army truck, trying to get in to the outfit and they knocked
the truck out, killing the driver. Then there was one trying to
get out from the unit that was trapped and they knocked the
vehicle out. There were two GI's there and one of them got
away; he was wounded but he made it back down.
We could see the unit out in the valley. An American
infantry company started up to see if they could knock out the
road block. They left a few there to try and hold them back
while the main body of the ambush pulled back. They had us with
them and it was getting along late in the afternoon. Just about
dark, about two or three miles from where they had the unit
surrounded, they stopped us. A new officer had taken over, the
one that had been questioning us, and he had stayed behind I
guess. I did not see him anymore.
This new officer went through questioning me again by
drawings and signs. The rest of them were sitting up on the
hill. We were on the little trail right by a rice paddy. They
asked the other fellows questions. I was the squad leader at
the time, and the fellows would look at me before they would
try to give any answer. So they were really questioning me.
They thought I knew all the answers.
After questioning me he gave me a little piece of paper
about so long and so wide which was mimeographed. It had Korean
writing on it and also English. The statement was, ``You are
about to die the most horrible kind of death.''
Senator Potter. That was the statement that was given to
you?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir. He gave me the statement and told me
to read it to the fellows.
Senator Potter. What did it say, again?
Sgt. Rhoden. ``You are about to die the most horrible kind
of death.'' That was all there was to it, sir. I guess they
wanted to maybe make us run, sir, or something, and have a
sport with it. When I read this statement, the other fellows--
we had been expecting it. We had read of what had happened to
some of the prisoners.
After I read the statement I crumpled it up in my hand. I
wanted it there when they found us. They took the statement
away from me; they would not let me keep it. I do remember some
of the fellows saying, ``Well, they are finally going to shoot
us,'' or something like that, sir.
So he motioned me to go where the other fellows were
standing. They were just about the length away from us as we
are here, sir, and as I turned around to go--I did almost an
about face. He had the burp gun over his shoulder--they carried
it with a strap--and as I turned around, sir, I was shot in the
back with the burp gun. The bullet knocked me down, sir. As the
lieutenant said, I did a good job of playing dead, sir. It did
not knock me out. I lay there. The way I fell, I could see the
fellows out in front of me being shot.
Senator Potter. He shot you in the back and then he shot
the others?
Sgt. Rhoden. They shot me in the back, sir, and I laid
there praying and pretending I was dead, sir. They shot the
other fellows and then stopped over me and bayoneted the other
fellows a time or two. Then they left. After a while they left.
After they had gone, sir, I began to move around when I thought
it was safe. I was paralyzed from my waist down. I pulled
myself around, and I noticed the other fellows were still
alive, too. They were moving around. I went over and made them
as comfortable as I could.
There was a little embankment there and I pulled them down
over it. A couple of them helped them get down. I stayed there,
sir. I do not remember just exactly--I know there were four of
us when we were shot. There is one fellow that I am in doubt as
to just what happened there. I understood later that he made it
back to the States.
I do remember two fellows there. I bandaged them up the
best I could. I blacked out, sir. When I came back to what I
was doing, I was still there and it was dark. I felt the two
fellows and they were stiff. I do not know how long I had been
out there. The other fellows were definitely dead. I do not
remember the third one. I am kind of foggy. I do not know if I
could find them, and I do not think that I could find the other
fellow.
Senator Potter. You remember that two of them were dead?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes. I know I found two. The third one I am in
doubt, sir. I do understand this other fellow made it back. I
do not know if he is still in the army or out, sir. I crawled
off to a little stream and drank some water. When I drank the
water, sir, I blacked out. I do not remember anything else
until----
Senator Potter. This was at night?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir. They captured us in the morning and
they shot us that night. I guess it was the same night, sir.
When I drank the water I blacked out and I do not remember
anything else until I was wandering around calling one of the
fellows that had been shot with me. And then a patrol of North
Koreans--I saw them just about the same time they saw me--took
a shot at me, sir. The bullet missed me. It was at awful close
range, though.
They came up where I was at and made me get up and walk up
the side of the hill. They had me standing there and they were
kind of a half circle around me. One put his rifle up and made
like he was going to shoot me. Then they would all laugh and he
would take his rifle down and the next one would go through the
same motion.
At the time, sir, I was in such pain that I began to want
to get it over with. I felt I would be better off. I sat down,
and it made them mad, sir. I was actually trying to provoke
them into getting me out of my misery, sir. They were in a
stew. Then I saw this little plane circling around. I do not
know if he knew what was going on, but our planes started
strafing them.
When the planes started strafing them, one of the North
Koreans--the one in charge; I guess he was an officer, sir--was
hit. I picked up the little pot he had, the one he mixed his
rice in, and started off down the hill. At the bottom of the
hill there were two of them who came from behind a rock with
burp guns on them. They wanted to know in sign language where I
was going. I motioned to the ones on the hill and motioned they
were sending me to the stream to get water to take up to them.
I got that story like I did the pot.
When I got to the stream, it had pretty steep banks. I hid
in a small pea patch. I pulled the vines over me. I had my
little pot full of water. They came looking for me but they did
not find me. The rest of the time, sir, I would hide out during
the day and move at night. Sometimes I do not know what I did.
Sometimes I would be running around in the day time. Then I
would hide out.
Later I found out it was the 7th of September. I was just
fixing to hide out for the day. I was almost ready to give up
when I heard the vehicles, the motors, and I looked. I could
see the big white star. I knew it was our boys, sir, but they
got by before I could get there at the time. I would raise up
and just stumble until I would fall. I would give myself a pep
talk and I would go again. I knew I was so near our lines.
I made it out to the road. There was a jeep coming and a
tank, and then a truck loaded with GI's. I guess they were
replacements, sir. I guess as the lieutenant said, sir, with
the wounded they usually had an ambush waiting. So they were
kind of leary there. I began to think they were going to shoot
me. But they got down and the sergeant got out of the jeep. I
was doubled up and I did not have any shoes or any shirt, The
sergeant asked me, ``What is the matter? Do you have a cramp?''
I told him, ``Yes, I have got a cramp.'' I asked him if he
would take me to the aid station.
I do not know what unit it was, sir. I was so glad to get
back.
Senator Potter. How long were you behind the enemy lines?
Sgt. Rhoden. I was taken prisoner and shot on the 31st of
August of 1950. Later I found out it was the 7th of September
when I made it back to our lines.
The affidavit I have there, sir, I believe it says I was
captured and shot on the 1st of September. On my medical record
they say I made it back to my lines, or I was wounded, on the
7th of September. That is the date I made it back to our lines.
Senator Potter. Whereabouts were you shot in the back?
Sgt. Rhoden. The bullet went in just below my belt in the
back and fractured my spine and nicked my spine. The reason I
was paralyzed, the bullet went through my bladder and out
through the front, sir.
Senator Potter. That is certainly quite a story. What time
did you get back to the States?
Sgt. Rhoden. I believe, sir, it was the 27th day of
September of 1950. I was awfully glad to get back, though.
Senator Potter. I can well imagine. Actually, you are the
only one of the seven who came back, outside of this one man
that you are not sure of?
Sgt. Rhoden. I was under the impression he was, sir. I saw
a picture in a magazine of my old top kick, the first sergeant,
sir, and I wrote him a letter. He was in a hospital, sir, and I
wrote him a letter. He wrote back and told me that this other
follow had made it. I began to check around, and I think that
he did make it, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. I think we can let the record show that
there was another survivor. The other survivor's story up to
the point of the shooting completely corroborates Sergeant
Rhoden's story.
Sgt. Rhoden. His name, sir, when I made my affidavit I saw
from the War Crimes Section a little statement there that he
had made it. His name was Updegraaf, George Updegraaf. He was
from Kansas City, I believe, or Oklahoma City.
Mr. O'Donnell. We should have that in the record, that it
is completely corroborated.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, did they try to indoctrinate you
at all?
Sgt. Rhoden. He gave us a lot of the literature to read.
They have a picture up in the corner of an officer, always an
officer. They have a long list of stuff there, about how nice
it was, to come on over. They wished we would come on over and
join with them; why fight the people? It was the same old Wall
Street story and the capitalists. There were remarks about our
president, sir, and it was all phony. You could see it was
phony, sir, every bit of it. You could see right through it.
Also, when we read the stuff we would laugh and joke about it.
None of them could speak English, so we did not have to worry
about what we said too much.
Senator Potter. They did not have an interpreter with their
group?
Sgt. Rhoden. There was no one. I heard one word I could
understand while I was a prisoner, sir. When our planes were
strafing them and the marine corps were there, he called it
whispering death. He said ``whispering death'' as plain as I
can say it, sir. They cut their engines in to throw the
rockets. They wanted to know about the planes, and they kept
questioning us about them. They did not like them too well.
As I said, we marked down ten planes and we got a beating.
If we filled up a couple of pages, then they were satisfied.
Senator Potter. I want to make sure that I have this
clearly in mind. As I understand, after you were captured the
second time by this group and our planes strafed the group,
their leader was killed?
Sgt. Rhoden. There were several of them killed, sir, out of
the bunch. I say ``several,'' sir, but there were three or
four. Actually I will tell you, sir, I saw this little plane up
there circling. I guess it was an artillery or an observation
plane. As I said, I was trying to provoke them into shooting
me. My tummy felt like I had hot lead in it, sir, and I
actually spit at them when they were trying to make me stand
up. Then all of a sudden the plane was there. When the plane
started strafing them--I do not know why I picked the pot up
off the officer's pack, but I grabbed the pot. I do not know,
sir. When I saw the plane strafing them I was ready to give up,
but when the plane hit and I saw I had a chance, it gave me the
pop to try it again.
Senator Potter. Then you ran down towards a creek and you
met two other North Koreans and they thought you were going
after water for them, is that right?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, sir, I was stumbling down the hill and
the planes were still strafing up behind me on the hill where I
had just left. These two North Koreans came from behind the
rock and they wanted to know where I was going. They saw I was
wounded, and when they made me walk up the hill I started
bleeding an awful lot. My pants were all bloody and they wanted
to know ``bang-bang?'' I motioned ``bang-bang'' and they had to
look to see where I had been shot. It pleased them, sir.
Then they wanted to know where I was going and I motioned
that the ones on the hill were sending me to get the water. I
got the story like I did the pot. I had a good line, sir. The
planes strafing up there, they fell for the story. They stood
there and watched me. The stream was about one hundred yards
away and I kept looking back, and they were watching me. When I
got to the stream it had deep banks, but the water was only
about a foot deep. So I went up and hid in the pea patch.
When it got night, I started moving back to our lines.
As for the treatment we had, sir, this one officer would
let them beat us up but he would not let them shoot us. When we
asked for something to eat we got a beating. But he did send
off to get some water for us. He sent off the little pot for
the four of us, and when they brought it back there was about
an inch of water to the pot. I split the water with the other
fellows. He did not know what to think about that. The water
was for me and he did not care about the other fellows at the
time he was trying to get stuff out of me.
Senator Potter. During that seven-day period, you had no
food?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir, I managed. The North Koreans had
been through the area, sir. Actually, the most of what they ate
was what they could get out of gardens. I found one little
cucumber about so big and I ate the cucumber, but it made me
sick and I wished I had not eaten it. I had one little
cucumber.
Senator Potter. When they would beat you, would they beat
you around the head or where?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, mostly, as I said, sir, if you could
look him in the eye--I do not know why it was--but you would
stare him down and he would not do it. Usually we were carrying
equipment or something, and if we fell then they beat us on the
backs with their rifle butts. Maybe he would come up behind you
or if you walked by him going along, as you passed he would
reach out and hit you with his rifle butt. They always hit us
from behind, usually up and down in the back. I got hit once
right behind my neck. That was about the only time I was hit
around the head. I did have the pistol--they keep punching you
with a pistol when they wanted information and they thought you
were not telling them. They keep poking you with a pistol. It
was a pretty gun and made on the order of our 45. It had the
big red star in the handle. There was a little hole in there.
There was a red star and USSR, sir.
Senator Potter. A Russian pistol?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir. I saw the USSR.
Senator Potter. The leader was the one--he allowed the
beating but at that time he did not want any of the men to
shoot you. But was it the leader that shot you?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, sir, let me straighten this out now. The
first one--which I take it was the political officer, as he had
the briefcase with the stuff--he is the one that would not let
them shoot us. But he was separated from us when this one
infantry company was coming in there, sir, and they moved up
and got in their skirmish line and started forward. There was
about a battalion of them that had us.
There were a few hundred of them. They left just enough to
hold the company off, and they began to actually run. We tried
to make a break there, sir, even while the planes were strafing
them we would try and we could even plan and, talking just like
I am, what we were going to do. When the planes started
strafing them, they would always circle us, and point their
guns at us, and when they started running I began to fall back
and tell the other fellows to fall back, and we were going to
jump them when we got back on the end. But they caught on to us
and wouldn't let us.
But the political officer, what I take is the political
officer, he stayed behind and we were separated from him while
we were running there, sir. Then when they stopped us there----
Senator Potter. When you were shot, was it the leader of
the group that did the shooting?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir, he was the leader of the group. I
guess he was, the rank, sir, I don't know what it was. The
piece of paper I had crumpled up in my hand, his aide was there
to get it away from me. There were runners coming to him and
leaving him.
Senator Potter. You assume he was an officer?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir, when he gave the orders, you could
see them jump around.
Senator Potter. It was an officer that shot you?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir, he had the burp gun and shot me.
They got right up to my face to question me and they were
trying to get into my face, and I did an about-face and I was
shot by this same follow.
Senator Potter. How far were the other men away from you at
the time?
Sgt. Rhoden. Approximately as far from me to you, sir.
Senator Potter. About twenty-five or thirty feet or
something like that?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And he shot you and then he shot you first
and then he shot the others?
Sgt. Rhoden. He shot me, and the bullet knocked me down,
sir, and of course there was no pain at the time and when I
fell I was kind of like this and I could see the way the
fellows were, and I see them as they were being shot.
Senator Potter. And they were shot and then some were
bayoneted, is that true?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And afterwards you helped take care of a
couple of them so that you know that some of them were bayonet
wounds?
Sgt. Rhoden. I talked to them for a while, sir. They lived
for quite a while and I don't know just how long. They were
talking, though, trying to pep each other up.
Senator Potter. But they died that night?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir, they did.
Mr. O'Donnell. I would like to go back to when you were
seven and the seven were overrun for lack of ammunition and you
held out as long as you could, and three of you were killed.
How were the circumstances of those three deaths?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, sir, they were closing in on us, and as
I said they were coming up behind us, and from out in the rice
paddy and the lake behind us, and they were just about fifty
feet up there, just swarming off like ants. This one fellow,
the squad leader, a bullet creased him along the side of his
head and he fell and before he fell, sir, he said ``I am hit,''
and he was right by me. I know he was playing dead because he
stayed there for just a few minutes and a few seconds, and
fired his rifle the last couple of times there, and he fell,
sir, and I saw him look a couple of times. I was looking around
to see how many of us there were. Then the squad leader fell
and he was playing dead, sir, and the other two fellows, I
don't know how badly they were hit.
After they got us there, sir, they went over and they
bayoneted the fellows, and the other two fellows and shot them
in the head and I don't know if the other two were playing dead
or not. But I do know----
Senator Potter. Whether they were dead or not, they shot
them?
Sgt. Rhoden. They were the three of them were down, sir, on
the ground and they went up to these two and shot them and
bayoneted them several times, sir, and the squad leader, here
he was my very good friend and I know he was playing dead and I
was pulling for him, and maybe he could make it, sir, but they
walked up to him and this officer, he was the one that was in
command of the troops, sir.
Senator Potter. He wasn't the political officer?
Sgt. Rhoden. Not the political officer and he stuck a rifle
right down to his head and shot him. I know he was playing dead
because after he shot him, you could see him moving, you know,
and you could tell he was dying. I know he was playing dead,
sir, when he was shot and the rifle was put right to his temple
and he was shot.
Mr. O'Donnell. Were any of the four who were captured,
wounded?
Sgt. Rhoden. Maybe one or two creased, sir, and one nicked
me across my stomach, and he was fixing to bayonet me and I had
one round left and I had a pistol, a 45 automatic and one round
left, and I was saving it for myself, sir. I was going to shoot
myself before I would be taken prisoner, and I just didn't have
what it takes to pull the trigger and the excuse I made to
myself was as long as I have got a breath I have got a chance.
I looked and he was coming down, and we were right by a
little embankment and he was fixing to bayonet me and the
bayonet got me along the side here and I shot him, sir, with
the last round.
I was wounded just a little place along my ribs where the
bayonet hit me and the other fellows had been creased with a
bullet, the best I can remember, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. The prime reason they didn't kill the four
who were not seriously wounded was because they needed them to
pack ammunition and water, and so forth?
Sgt. Rhoden. I take it, sir, they did load us down, and
they gave us a tremendous load to carry. And it was an awful
load and they kept prodding us, too. It was heavy, actually it
was pretty rough going. It was just about all that you could
prod along with and it was enough that you would fall with it.
None of us were seriously wounded, no, sir. When we fell we
would get flogged.
Senator Potter. What type of ammunition were you carrying?
Sgt. Rhoden. Ammunition for about a 50-calibre that they
had, and I had a bag of ammunition for that, a big sackful, and
some of the follows, one of them had a big mortar plate for
their big mortar, and some ammunition for the mortar and a lot
of the personal gear of the fellows, and they would throw their
personal gear on it, and we were all loaded on ammunition with
the exception of the one who had the base plate for the mortar.
Mr. O'Donnell. How far would you estimate you actually
carried the ammunition?
Sgt. Rhoden. I would say approximately, sir, about eight or
ten miles, and all day we were going around this.
Mr. O'Donnell. During this period of time were you given
any food at all?
Sgt. Rhoden. No, sir, I asked for food once, and that is
when I got the beating.
Senator Potter. Do you have any questions?
Did the North Korean soldiers eat any food while you were
carrying this?
Sgt. Rhoden. Oh, yes, they had the rice there, and they had
a powder looking stuff that they eat, and it was like a meal
and they would mix it with water and eat it, and also they
would tell us we could eat and maybe we would find a potato
patch and they would tell us we can chop-chop, you know, and
motioned to help ourselves. Then we would dig the potatoes and
they would take them away from us and so we quit digging. As
long as we would dig the potatoes, they would take them away
from us.
I saw one eat a part of a pumpkin and they had to eat, and
they carried it in a nasty bag, this powder-like stuff, a meal,
and they would mix it with water and eat it just like that.
They didn't cook it, sir, a cold meal.
Senator Potter. But they had food?
Sgt. Rhoden. Definitely.
Senator Potter. But they did not give any food to you?
Sgt. Rhoden. No, sir.
Senator Potter. Or to the other men?
Sgt. Rhoden. No, sir, and I didn't see any get any food.
Senator Potter. How long were you hospitalized, Sergeant?
Sgt. Rhoden. I was released from the hospital--I made the
trip back to the hospital, sir, to our aid station, on the 7th
of September, and I was released from the hospital in January
of 1951.
Senator Potter. Are you on active duty now?
Sgt. Rhoden. I am, sir.
Senator Potter. Do you have any permanent injury as a
result?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, sir, sometimes yes, I have a little
trouble. It is with my legs, sir, I do.
Senator Potter. You are not on limited duty, you are on
active duty?
Sgt. Rhoden. I am on active duty, sir, but I have the
profile, a three on my profile which is a 3-D, and it limits me
to my assignments as to the places I can be assigned to.
Senator Potter. You are limited to service in the army, but
on active duty?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, do you mind if I ask you the same
questions I asked the lieutenant? You have an experience first-
hand, and do you have any comments that you would like to make
concerning the Communist movement here in our country?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, sir, I was fighting in Korea, sir, and I
hated them, and after I arrived back here, of course, we didn't
hear too much about communism.
Actually, sir, I didn't actually know what it was until the
Korean War started and I began to see what I could find out
about it. I finally made Korea and I hated them and after I
went into the hospital I was on a public appearance tour, and I
received some letters from them, around, and it is all the way
I take it, sir, for the same purpose. They are trying to
overthrow our government, and it is all for the same purpose.
If I hate them in Korea I see no reason why I shouldn't hate
them here. You asked me my personal opinion, sir, and that is
the way I feel about it.
Senator Potter. Sergeant, did the political officer, you
mentioned he asked you about the number of planes and the
number of tanks and so forth, did he ask you any political
questions about your home life or anything of that kind?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, he wanted to know where I was from, and
the way he would draw a map of Korea and he put Japan and the
States, and then he wanted to know where I was from, where I
come from, from the States to Korea or from Japan to Korea, or
what.
I was confused by doing this. I didn't know, and then he
would get rough and so I motioned the States and he wanted to
know maybe in the States and he wanted to know what point.
As for my address, sir, I had a lot of stuff in my wallet
and I didn't have time to get rid of anything, and they had all
of the stuff I had, as to the information as to the addresses
and so forth. They wanted to know where in the States I was
from and so forth.
Now, I got some pretty nasty letters, from the time I was
on the tour, sir, a couple that made some pretty----
Senator Potter. Do you have those letters with you?
Sgt. Rhoden. No, sir, I don't have them with me, and I
turned them over to our intelligence officer, sir, at district
headquarters.
Senator Potter. Could you give us the essence of what they
said in the letter?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, sir, it was along the same line we had
over there, maybe it was put together a little better. Actually
I didn't read it too thoroughly, or try to memorize any of it.
You could tell from where it was from, one point in the state
and one from another, and none of them were signed. They called
President Truman at the time, sir, a puke from Missouri, and
about MacArthur, remarks along the same line. I turned the
letter over to----
Senator Potter. The letters were postmarked from the United
States?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir, the one calling Truman a puke from
Missouri was from Daytona Beach, I believe. I turned the letter
over.
Senator Potter. Do you know where the other one was
postmarked from?
Sgt. Rhoden. From St. Petersburg, Florida, and maybe one
was Coral Gables.
Senator Potter. Colonel Whitehorn, do you suppose we could
get those letters from G-2?
Col. Whitehorn. I wouldn't know. I can check on that.
Senator Potter. Were you intimidated in any other way after
you got back from the Communists?
Sgt. Rhoden. No, sir, just the letters. I was encouraged in
the letters to write my congressman, and so forth, and try to
get the useless killing stopped in Korea and if you have got
the letter you will get an idea, all of them are along the same
line.
Actually, sir, at the time when I got the first letters, I
didn't turn them in, and I might still have some of them. What
I did get, if I have them I don't know, sir, but I have to
check through that, but this one or two that I turned in, sir,
they are all along the same lines, sir, and I turned in two
that I know of.
Mr. Jones. Let me get this information for the record.
The basis of your conversation with the political officer
in Korea was reestablished again in the form of a letter to you
mailed in the United States, is that correct?
Sgt. Rhoden. Well, sir, the letters were on the same line
as the pamphlets he gave us, yes, sir. It was on the same line.
Senator Potter. Capitalistic war and so on?
Sgt. Rhoden. Yes, sir, the same stuff and you read one
letter and the next one in the same way, and they don't vary
such.
Senator Potter. But the correspondence corresponds with the
type of indoctrination they tried to give you in Korea?
Sgt. Rhoden. Oh, yes, sir.
Mr. Jones. And we would assume that your name was sent
through the regular Communist channels to the Communist party
in this country?
Sgt. Rhoden. I wouldn't know that, sir.
Mr. Jones. That would very likely be the way they would
act.
Senator Potter. You had made some talks?
Sgt. Rhoden. They had me on this public appearance tour, as
soon as I could get around, and going before the various clubs,
and the Lions Club and the American Legion and so forth, and
giving those talks about my experience, sir, and how our
equipment compared to theirs, and so forth.
Senator Potter. Colonel Wolfe, do you have anything that
you want to add?
Thank you kindly, Sergeant.
I would like to call Captain Buttrey.
Captain, will you take a chair? You hadn't arrived when we
first opened our hearings, but I want to take this opportunity
to thank you ahead of time for being with us.
The purpose of this hearing, of course, is to aid us in the
investigations and to let the American people better know the
type of enemy that we have been fighting. We have nothing, and
we are not investigating anybody here, we are just trying as a
matter of securing information, to buttress our efforts in the
United Nations, and to secure public information.
Would you identify yourself for the record, Captain?
STATEMENT OF CAPT. LINTON J. BUTTREY
Capt. Buttrey. My name is Linton J. Buttrey, sir, 0407113,
and I am stationed at Replacement Training Center, Camp
Pickett.
Senator Potter. I have had some memories of Camp Pickett,
and I do not know that they are the most pleasant, but I was
stationed there at one time. I thought Camp Pickett was closed.
Capt. Buttrey. No, sir, it was very active Friday when I
left, sir. I think most of the people there are hopeful that it
will be closed.
Senator Potter. I was there in 1942, in Advance Training
Area before I went overseas.
What is your home address, Captain?
Capt. Buttrey. Nashville, Tennessee, sir.
Senator Potter. When did you first go to Korea, and what
unit were you with?
Capt. Buttrey. I was with the 19th Infantry, 24th Infantry
Division.
Senator Potter. What was your assignment?
Capt. Buttrey. I was assistant battalion surgeon, with the
first battalion. I am a medical service officer.
Senator Potter. Now, would you give us your account of how
you were captured, and what took place?
Capt. Buttrey. Well, sir, it was on a Sunday, 16th of July,
Sunday morning, and I use the vernacular, the old army talk,
when all hell broke loose in those rice paddies over there.
Senator Potter. This is 1950?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir, that was the 16th of July, 1950.
We were told to evacuate, and it was probably about 6:30 or
seven o'clock in the morning. We didn't evacuate right then. We
fought in and out of this little valley there on the Koon River
but in the afternoon we had to organize and protect the unit
itself, and all of our equipment.
But that night we had to abandon and leave it and move out.
I suppose we got out over the hill, the ridge, about midnight,
I am not sure, and no one paid too much attention to time under
those circumstances; but it must have been around midnight.
Senator Potter. And were you overrun?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir, we were. Of course, my job was as
a doctor there and we had two doctors in there. I don't
remember, but we had many patients and we were getting them out
all along the afternoon if we could run a roadblock--they had
set up a roadblock.
At night they would infiltrate and surround us, and as you
know the American forces were not large in numbers then, and so
they infiltrated and surrounded us and set up a roadblock the
night before, and they attacked in the morning, which occurred
about 6:30 or seven o'clock.
Senator Potter. Would they fire on an ambulance?
Capt. Buttrey. Well, yes, sir, they would fire on any
vehicle at that time. What actually happened, where the
ambulances were concerned, and I didn't witness this but the
ambulances were shot up, any of them that would come out and go
back, in case they didn't try to get back in, they were shot
up.
Senator Potter. Of course, our ambulances are very vividly
marked with the Red Cross.
Capt. Buttrey. They make good targets, and it was a
beautiful day.
Senator Potter. Captain, would you tell in your own words
after you left it, I assume it was your battalion aid station
about midnight?
Capt. Buttrey. Well, sir, we moved the battalion aid
station back to the regimental aid station, and that was prior
to our being completely blocked, but I suppose the regimental
commander and his officers expected to get out, which we
didn't. He was wounded there, too, the regimental commander
was.
But in the afternoon, probably three or four o'clock, when
we set up our convoy hoping to run this roadblock and put the
troops out on either side of the flanks to defend us after we
got out, their forces were stronger so I was told, and what
would have been our rear and we couldn't make it and so we had
to abandon the convoy and in doing that we had many patients. I
don't know just how many patients, sir, we did have. We had
some trucks loaded with them, and the signal told me there was
no doctor there then and he was attending other patients. But
in my immediate area we didn't have enough transportation to
get them out.
I couldn't think of leaving them, so the signal told me I
could unload their trucks, and they had two, I believe, in
there. Once we started to do that, but then that wasn't
feasible, all of the men weren't mobilized yet. So I asked for
enough people to help us take the patients over the hill and
they did. They let me have them and, of course, they had their
arms and it was dark by this time, you know, so they helped
carry the patients by litter over the hill.
In getting over there, there was no vegetation in South
Korea, that is trees, and there was a small cemetery there, and
they are just mounds--I believe they tell us they bury their
dead sitting upright, but anyway they are huge mounds. The only
vegetation there at all of any site, that is trees, there are
probably half a dozen of greens and they were tall and not much
foliage on them. But my idea there was we had this great number
of patients and we would have to move them and the sun would be
hot the next day.
So I asked them to put them down there, and then another
thing I requested of the troops themselves. They were still
fighting out there, and the officers who were present agreed
that every time we could that four men would take one patient,
and I don't know how many patients got out that night. But many
of them did and many of them died on their litters and we could
find them later, or they were found, so we were told later.
That was on the night, Sunday night of the 16th of July,
1950. All night long the chaplain, he had remained with me,
too, and about daybreak----
Senator Potter. In other words, you and the chaplain stayed
with the wounded?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir. There will be a little humor in
this. You know how we Americans are. It is bad enough, but I
like to think of the humorous side of it, too. I mentioned in
my report a corporal that got out and he did get out and I made
the remark that many of these people, patients now, dragged
themselves out. Well, he exemplified what I mean. He was from
Texas, and if there are any Texans in here you should be proud
of this. But the humorous article, I had asked each patient
during the night when they were calling for me and I would
adjust their bandages, and so forth, and give them any
medication, I would ask them--I didn't think we would get out--
and I would ask them: Do you think you can walk? And I intended
to get everyone out I could.
And Taylor, his name is, I would like to know where he is;
he is out somewhere. He was a skinny youngster and about
eighteen or nineteen years old, and when I got to the litter I
asked him, I said: ``Corporal, can you walk?'' And I had known
him in Japan and I had been on a trip with the navy and taken
thirty troops on a tour with them early in the spring. So he
said: ``Yes, sir, I think I can.''
I looked and he only had one boot and so in the old army
way I said, ``Where in the hell is your other boot?'' And he
said, ``I don't know, sir, I don't need it.''
I said ``We are ten or twelve miles away from any
medication, and you need it,'' and I said ``I will get one off
another patient.'' He said ``No, sir, I can go back for it''
and I said ``Oh, you damn Texans, I don't care how you get out
if it is on your head. If you can walk, get going,'' and so he
did. He was willing to just get out any way and so he did. I
will advance this a little bit, and so I find myself in Japan
and they were very nice to me in the hospital and bring me the
roster every day of those who had been admitted. So one day I
looked about a week or two days later, and here was Corporal
Taylor, and I didn't think he would get out, but by virtue of
his not accepting the boot, sir, I am pretty sure that that is
the only thing that made him get out. He was too weak
otherwise, and he couldn't have carried that extra boot.
But the pity of it now is this: I went to the ward and they
wheeled me to the ward to see him and he was in very bad shape
and he had been shot in one leg and he was almost paralyzed in
that, however he did get back. The one that was paralyzed, and
had no feeling, not necessarily paralyzed, but had no feeling
in it, he had dragged that leg until there was no skin on it to
speak of, from the knee to the end of his toes.
That is the circumstances under which he evacuated himself,
and he didn't have the feeling to know that he was doing that
apparently to himself.
Senator Potter. It was about a twelve-mile trip?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir, ten or twelve miles; yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Then did the North Koreans overrun your
position?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir. It was on Monday morning and I
don't know but it was seven or eight o'clock and the chaplain,
he saw them coming first, and I was administering to the
patients, and he just signaled to us that he saw them coming. I
don't know how many there were, but there were enough. And when
you get over there you have a lot of hills and you can see them
coming across these little ridges in great numbers. But
naturally they didn't get into us, all of them, at least I
don't think they did. But we were overrun and they were quite
gleeful and excited about it.
A thing that drew their attention quite a bit was our GI
ration cans, or C ration cans, the few we had had been thrown
out, and they picked them up and talked about them. I don't
speak Korean and they weren't speaking English, but they were
very happy about it and they were shooting some of them, and
they shot the rest of them.
Senator Potter. You mean they would shoot the patients?
Capt. Buttrey. The patients on the litters, and some of
them tried to flee, and those who, I expect they, like anything
else, they mustered a lot of courage, and some of them tried to
run and tried to got away, and they were shot in the back or
just shot.
Senator Potter. Did they shoot any right on the litters?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir, right on the litters.
Senator Potter. Did they shoot you, Captain?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir, I was wounded there, too, and they
shot me.
Senator Potter. Were you wearing an arm band?
Capt. Buttrey. On the arm, yes, sir, a medical brassard.
Senator Potter. And I assume the chaplain was similarly
identified?
Capt. Buttrey. He had on his, yes, sir, the chaplain's
brassard.
Senator Potter. Was he shot, too?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir, he was killed.
Senator Potter. About how many wounded were there at this
point, at that time?
Capt. Buttrey. About how many were there?
Senator Potter. Yes, sir, how many Americans.
Capt. Buttrey. Shot on the litters? It is only a guess,
sir, but I don't know, fifteen or twenty, and I don't know. You
see we had probably sixty or seventy to begin with, but many of
them, you see, were taken out, and many of them were able to
walk out. They weren't all originally on litters and we didn't
have that many litters, and so many of them had gotten out.
Senator Potter. Out of that group that were shot on their
litters, or at this collecting point, how many are alive today?
Capt. Buttrey. I don't know, sir.
Senator Potter. Where were you shot, Captain?
Capt. Buttrey. In the left thigh.
I suppose the one who shot me couldn't have been over five
or six feet away.
Senator Potter. So there was no doubt that they knew that
you were a doctor?
Capt. Buttrey. Oh, no, sir, I am not sure about that. There
were no matured individuals with them, all of them impressed me
as being just youngsters in teenage, and some of them may have
been twenty-one years old, and I doubt that.
Senator Potter. Was there a leader in the group?
Capt. Buttrey. You couldn't discern that, and you could not
identify any leader as such. It was sort of like a riot, you
know, just a bunch of youngsters.
Senator Potter. Were any of them bayoneted?
Capt. Buttrey. No, sir.
Senator Potter. They were all shot?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. When were you recovered, Captain?
Capt. Buttrey. I got out the next day, I think it was.
Senator Potter. How did you get out?
Capt. Buttrey. I had to walk out, sir. It was a miracle,
almost, sir. Lucky my leg wasn't broken, and the artery wasn't
cut and the muscle wasn't torn. I bled very little and, of
course, I became infected and I was in the hospital several
weeks.
Senator Potter. Did they assume you were dead?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes, sir, I hope that is what they did,
because I had to feign death there, and they shot at us after
they got away. They would shoot back in the area and they would
shoot from the hills and in fact all day long they would just
shoot over into the area from both sides.
If they had had mature leadership, sir, I don't believe
that they would have done that. I think they would have
probably killed us all, but I think they would have just done
it differently.
Senator Potter. It was more like a riot of hysterical kids?
Capt. Buttrey. Yes. Back somewhere, I am pretty sure they
had a mature leader, bu