[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.R. 4178 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4178

   To strengthen the strategic force posture of the United States by 
  ensuring the safety, security, reliability, and credibility of the 
                       nuclear weapons stockpile.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 8, 2012

Mr. Turner of Ohio (for himself, Mr. Brooks, Mr. Lamborn, Mr. Franks of 
   Arizona, Mr. Forbes, Mr. Fleming, Mr. Rehberg, and Mr. Miller of 
   Florida) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
   Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on 
  Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
   To strengthen the strategic force posture of the United States by 
  ensuring the safety, security, reliability, and credibility of the 
                       nuclear weapons stockpile.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Maintaining the 
President's Commitment to Our Nuclear Deterrent and National Security 
Act of 2012''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Commitments for nuclear weapons stockpile modernization.
Sec. 4. Limitation and report in the event of insufficient funding for 
                            modernization of nuclear weapons stockpile.
Sec. 5. Progress of modernization.
Sec. 6. Limitation on strategic delivery system reductions.
Sec. 7. Prevention of asymmetry of nuclear weapon stockpile reductions.
Sec. 8. Consideration of expansion of nuclear forces of other 
                            countries.
Sec. 9. Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility 
                            and Uranium Processing Facility.
Sec. 10. Nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles of the 
                            United States.
Sec. 11. Nonstrategic nuclear weapon reductions and extended deterrence 
                            policy.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) The term ``congressional defense committees'' has the 
        meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, 
        United States Code.
            (2) The term ``New START Treaty'' means the Treaty between 
        the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
        Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
        Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into force 
        on February 5, 2011.

SEC. 3. COMMITMENTS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MODERNIZATION.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) In 2008, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned 
        that ``to be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain 
        a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our 
        stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or 
        pursuing a modernization program.''.
            (2) Secretary Gates also warned in September 2009 that 
        modernization is a prerequisite to nuclear force reductions, 
        stating that modernizing the nuclear capability of the United 
        States is an ``enabler of arms control and our ability to 
        reduce the size of our nuclear stockpile. When we have more 
        confidence in the long-term viability of our weapons systems, 
        then our ability to reduce the number of weapons we must keep 
        in the stockpile is enhanced.''.
            (3) President Obama's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated 
        that--
                    (A) ``In order to sustain a safe, secure, and 
                effective U.S. nuclear stockpile as long as nuclear 
                weapons exist, the United States must possess a modern 
                physical infrastructure--comprised of the national 
                security laboratories and a complex of supporting 
                facilities.''; and
                    (B) ``[I]mplementation of the Stockpile Stewardship 
                Program and the nuclear infrastructure investments 
                recommended in the NPR will allow the United States to 
                shift away from retaining large numbers of non-deployed 
                warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical 
                surprise, allowing major reductions in the nuclear 
                stockpile. These investments are essential to 
                facilitating reductions while sustaining deterrence 
                under New START and beyond.''.
            (4) Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2549) 
        required the President to submit a report to Congress on the 
        plan for the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons 
        complex, and delivery platforms at the time a follow-on treaty 
        to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was submitted by the 
        President to the Senate. The President submitted such report in 
        May 2010 and submitted updates in November 2010 and February 
        2011.
            (5) Such section 1251 also contained a sense of Congress 
        that ``the enhanced safety, security, and reliability of the 
        nuclear weapons stockpile, modernization of the nuclear weapons 
        complex, and maintenance of nuclear delivery systems are key to 
        enabling further reductions in the nuclear forces of the United 
        States.''.
            (6) Forty-one Senators wrote to President Obama on December 
        15, 2009, stating, ``we don't believe further reductions can be 
        in the national security interest of the U.S. in the absence of 
        a significant program to modernize our nuclear deterrent.''.
            (7) Former Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy 
        James Schlesinger stated, while testifying before the Committee 
        on Foreign Relations of the Senate in April 2010, ``I believe 
        that it is immensely important for the Senate to ensure, what 
        the Administration has stated as its intent, i.e., that there 
        be a robust plan with a continuation of its support over the 
        full 10 years, before it proceeds to ratify this START follow-
        on treaty.''.
            (8) Former Secretary of State James Baker stated in 
        testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate in May 2010 that ``because our security is based upon 
        the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons, it is 
        important that our Government budget enough money to guarantee 
        that those weapons can carry out their mission.''.
            (9) Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger also stated 
        in May 2010 while testifying before the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations of the Senate that ``as part of a number of 
        recommendations, my colleagues, Bill Perry, George Shultz, Sam 
        Nunn, and I have called for significant investments in a 
        repaired and modernized nuclear weapons infrastructure and 
        added resources for the three national laboratories.''.
            (10) Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, while 
        testifying before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate 
        in June 2010, stated, ``I see this treaty as a vehicle to 
        finally be able to get what we need in the way of modernization 
        that we have been unable to get otherwise. . . . We are 
        essentially the only nuclear power in the world that is not 
        carrying out these kinds of modernization programs.''.
            (11) Secretary Gates further stated that ``I've been up 
        here for the last four springs trying to get money for this and 
        this is the first time I think I've got a fair shot of actually 
        getting money for our nuclear arsenal.''.
            (12) The Directors of the national nuclear weapons 
        laboratories wrote to the chairman and ranking member of the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate in December 2010 
        that ``We are very pleased by the update to the Section 1251 
        Report, as it would enable the laboratories to execute our 
        requirements for ensuring a safe, secure, reliable and 
        effective stockpile under the Stockpile Stewardship and 
        Management Plan. In particular, we are pleased because it 
        clearly responds to many of the concerns that we and others 
        have voiced in the past about potential future-year funding 
        shortfalls, and it substantially reduces risks to the overall 
        program. In summary, we believe that the proposed budgets 
        provide adequate support to sustain the safety, security, 
        reliability and effectiveness of America's nuclear deterrent 
        within the limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads 
        established by the New START Treaty with adequate confidence 
        and acceptable risk.''.
            (13) President Obama pledged, in a December 2010 letter to 
        several Senators, ``I recognize that nuclear modernization 
        requires investment for the long-term. . . . That is my 
        commitment to the Congress--that my Administration will pursue 
        these programs and capabilities for as long as I am 
        President.''.
            (14) Secretary Gates added in May 2011 that, ``this 
        modernization program was very carefully worked out between 
        ourselves and the Department of Energy; and, frankly, where we 
        came out on that played a fairly significant role in the 
        willingness of the Senate to ratify the New START agreement.''.
            (15) The Administrator for Nuclear Security, Thomas 
        D'Agostino, testified before Congress in November 2011 that, 
        ``it is critical to accept the linkage between modernizing our 
        current stockpile in order to achieve the policy objective of 
        decreasing the number of weapons we have in our stockpile, 
        while still ensuring that the deterrent is safe, secure, and 
        effective.''.

SEC. 4. LIMITATION AND REPORT IN THE EVENT OF INSUFFICIENT FUNDING FOR 
              MODERNIZATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) consistent with Condition 9 of the Resolution of Advice 
        and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty of the 
        Senate, agreed to on December 22, 2011, the United States is 
        committed to ensuring the safety, security, reliability, and 
        credibility of its nuclear forces; and
            (2) the United States is committed to--
                    (A) proceeding with a robust stockpile stewardship 
                program and maintaining and modernizing nuclear weapons 
                production capabilities and capacities of the United 
                States to ensure the safety, security, reliability, and 
                credibility of the nuclear arsenal of the United States 
                at the New START Treaty levels and meeting requirements 
                for hedging against possible international developments 
                or technical problems;
                    (B) reinvigorating and sustaining the nuclear 
                security laboratories of the United States and 
                preserving the core nuclear weapons competencies 
                therein; and
                    (C) providing the resources needed to achieve these 
                objectives, at a minimum at the levels set forth in the 
                President's 10-year plan provided to Congress in 
                November 2010 pursuant to section 1251 of the National 
                Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public 
                Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2549).
    (b) Insufficient Funding Report and Limitation.--
            (1) In general.--Paragraph (2) of section 1045(a) of the 
        National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (50 
        U.S.C. 2523b) is amended to read as follows:
            ``(2) Insufficient funding.--
                    ``(A) Report.--During each year in which the New 
                START Treaty is in force, if the President determines 
                that an appropriations Act is enacted that fails to 
                meet the resource levels set forth in the November 2010 
                update to the plan referred to in section 1251 of the 
                National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 
                (Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2549) or if at any time 
                determines that more resources are required to carry 
                out such plan than were estimated, the President shall 
                submit to the appropriate congressional committees, 
                within 60 days of making such a determination, a report 
                detailing--
                            ``(i) a plan to remedy the resource 
                        shortfall;
                            ``(ii) if more resources are required to 
                        carry out the plan than were estimated--
                                    ``(I) the proposed level of funding 
                                required; and
                                    ``(II) an identification of the 
                                stockpile work, campaign, facility, 
                                site, asset, program, operation, 
                                activity, construction, or project for 
                                which additional funds are required;
                            ``(iii) any effects caused by the shortfall 
                        on the safety, security, reliability, or 
                        credibility of the nuclear forces of the United 
                        States; and
                            ``(iv) whether and why, in light of the 
                        shortfall, remaining a party to the New START 
                        Treaty is in the national interest of the 
                        United States.
                    ``(B) Limitation.--If the President submits a 
                report under subparagraph (A), none of the funds made 
                available for fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year 
                thereafter for the Department of Defense or the 
                National Nuclear Security Administration may be used to 
                reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads until--
                            ``(i) after the date on which such report 
                        is submitted, the President certifies in 
                        writing to the appropriate congressional 
                        committees that the resource shortfall 
                        identified in such report has been addressed; 
                        and
                            ``(ii) a period of 120 days has elapsed 
                        following the date on which such certification 
                        is made.
                    ``(C) Exception.--The limitation in subparagraph 
                (B) shall not apply to--
                            ``(i) reductions made to ensure the safety, 
                        security, reliability, and credibility of the 
                        nuclear weapons stockpile and strategic 
                        delivery systems, including activities related 
                        to surveillance, assessment, certification, 
                        testing, and maintenance of nuclear warheads 
                        and strategic delivery systems; or
                            ``(ii) nuclear warheads that are retired or 
                        awaiting dismantlement on the date of the 
                        report under subparagraph (A).
                    ``(D) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
                            ``(i) The term `appropriate congressional 
                        committees' means--
                                    ``(I) the congressional defense 
                                committees; and
                                    ``(II) the Committee on Foreign 
                                Relations of the Senate and the 
                                Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
                                House of Representatives.
                            ``(ii) The term `New START Treaty' means 
                        the Treaty between the United States of America 
                        and the Russian Federation on Measures for the 
                        Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
                        Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and 
                        entered into force on February 5, 2011.''.
            (2) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) 
        shall take effect on October 1, 2012.

SEC. 5. PROGRESS OF MODERNIZATION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) In 2008, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned 
        that ``to be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain 
        a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our 
        stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or 
        pursuing a modernization program.''.
            (2) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated that ``the 
        President has directed a review of post-New START arms control 
        objectives, to consider future reductions in nuclear weapons. 
        Several factors will influence the magnitude and pace of future 
        reductions in U.S. nuclear forces below New START levels'', 
        including--
                    (A) ``First, any future nuclear reductions must 
                continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional 
                adversaries, strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and 
                China, and assurance of our allies and partners. This 
                will require an updated assessment of deterrence 
                requirements; further improvements in U.S., allied, and 
                partner non-nuclear capabilities; focused reductions in 
                strategic and non-strategic weapons; and close 
                consultations with allies and partners. The United 
                States will continue to ensure that, in the 
                calculations of any potential opponent, the perceived 
                gains of attacking the United States or its allies and 
                partners would be far outweighed by the unacceptable 
                costs of the response.'';
                    (B) ``Second, implementation of the Stockpile 
                Stewardship Program and the nuclear infrastructure 
                investments recommended in the NPR will allow the 
                United States to shift away from retaining large 
                numbers of non-deployed warheads as a hedge against 
                technical or geopolitical surprise, allowing major 
                reductions in the nuclear stockpile. These investments 
                are essential to facilitating reductions while 
                sustaining deterrence under New START and beyond.''; 
                and
                    (C) ``Third, Russia's nuclear force will remain a 
                significant factor in determining how much and how fast 
                we are prepared to reduce U.S. forces. Because of our 
                improved relations, the need for strict numerical 
                parity between the two countries is no longer as 
                compelling as it was during the Cold War. But large 
                disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise 
                concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies and 
                partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a 
                stable, long-term strategic relationship, especially as 
                nuclear forces are significantly reduced. Therefore, we 
                will place importance on Russia joining us as we move 
                to lower levels.''.
            (3) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review also stated that the 
        Administration would ``conduct follow-on analysis to set goals 
        for future nuclear reductions below the levels expected in New 
        START, while strengthening deterrence of potential regional 
        adversaries, strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China, 
        and assurance of our allies and partners.''.
            (4) The Secretary of Defense has warned in testimony before 
        the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives 
        regarding the sequestration mechanism under section 251A of the 
        Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 that 
        ``if this sequester goes into effect and it doubles the number 
        of cuts, then it'll truly devastate our national defense, 
        because it will then require that we have to go at our force 
        structure. We will have to hollow it out . . . [i]t will badly 
        damage our capabilities for the future. . . . And if you have a 
        smaller force, you're not going to be able to be out there 
        responding in as many areas as we do now.''.
            (5) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review also stated that ``by 
        modernizing our aging nuclear facilities and investing in human 
        capital, we can substantially reduce the number of nuclear 
        weapons we retain as a hedge.''.
            (6) The President requested the promised $7,600,000,000 for 
        weapons activities of the National Nuclear Security 
        Administration in fiscal year 2012 but signed an appropriations 
        Act for fiscal year 2012 that provided only $7,233,997,000, a 
        substantial reduction to only the second year of the ten-year 
        plan under section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2549).
            (7) The President requested only $7,577,341,000 for weapons 
        activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration in 
        fiscal year 2013 while the President's section 1251 plan 
        promised $7,900,000,000.
            (8) The President's section 1251 plan further promised to 
        request $8,400,000,000 in fiscal year 2014, $8,700,000,000 in 
        fiscal year 2015, $8,900,000,000 in fiscal year 2016, at least 
        $8,900,000,000 in fiscal year 2017, at least $9,200,000,000 in 
        fiscal year 2018, at least $9,400,000,000 in fiscal year 2019, 
        at least $9,400,000,000 in fiscal year 2020, and at least 
        $9,500,000,000 in fiscal year 2021.
            (9) While the administration has not yet shared with 
        Congress the terms of reference of the so-called Nuclear 
        Posture Review Implementation Study, or the Department of 
        Defense's instructions for that review, the only publicly 
        available statements by the administration, including language 
        from the Nuclear Posture Review, suggest the review was 
        specifically instructed by the President and his senior 
        political appointees to only consider reductions to the nuclear 
        forces of the United States.
            (10) When asked at a hearing if the New START Treaty 
        allowed the United States ``to maintain a nuclear arsenal that 
        is more than is needed to guarantee an adequate deterrent,'' 
        then Commander of the United States Strategic Command, General 
        Kevin P. Chilton said, ``I do not agree that it is more than is 
        needed. I think the arsenal that we have is exactly what is 
        needed today to provide the deterrent.''.
    (b) Nuclear Employment Strategy.--Section 491 of title 10, United 
States Code, is amended--
            (1) by striking ``On the date'' and inserting ``(a) 
        Report.--On the date'';
            (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
        subsection (b):
    ``(b) Limitation.--With respect to a new nuclear employment 
strategy described in a report submitted to Congress under subsection 
(a), none of the funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or any 
fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense may be used to 
implement such strategy until a period of one year has elapsed 
following the date on which such report is submitted to Congress.''; 
and
            (3) in the heading, by striking ``reports on''.
    (c) Limitation.--During each of fiscal years 2012 through 2021, 
none of the funds made available for each such fiscal year for the 
Department of Defense may be used to carry out the results of the 
decisions made pursuant to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 
Implementation Study until the date on which the President certifies to 
the congressional defense committees that--
            (1) the President has included the resources necessary to 
        carry out the February 2011 update to the report required under 
        section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2549) in the 
        budget of the President submitted to Congress under section 
        1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for such fiscal year;
            (2) the resources described in paragraph (1) have been 
        provided to the President in an appropriations Act; and
            (3) the sequestration mechanism under section 251A of the 
        Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 has 
        been repealed or the sequestration mechanism under such section 
        for the security category has otherwise been terminated.

SEC. 6. LIMITATION ON STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEM REDUCTIONS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 said, with respect 
        to modernizing the triad, ``for planned reductions under New 
        START, the United States should retain a smaller Triad of 
        SLBMs, ICBMs, and heavy bombers. Retaining all three Triad legs 
        will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, 
        while hedging against potential technical problems or 
        vulnerabilities.''.
            (2) The Senate stated in Declaration 13 of the Resolution 
        of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty 
        that ``In accordance with paragraph 1 of Article V of the New 
        START Treaty, which states that, `Subject to the provisions of 
        this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic 
        offensive arms may be carried out,' it is the sense of the 
        Senate that United States deterrence and flexibility is assured 
        by a robust triad of strategic delivery vehicles. To this end, 
        the United States is committed to accomplishing the 
        modernization and replacement of its strategic nuclear delivery 
        vehicles, and to ensuring the continued flexibility of United 
        States conventional and nuclear delivery systems.''.
            (3) The Senate required the President, prior to the entry 
        into force of the New START Treaty, to certify to the Senate 
        that the President intended to modernize or replace the triad 
        of strategic nuclear delivery systems.
            (4) The President made this certification in a message to 
        the Senate on February 2, 2011, in which the President stated, 
        ``I intend to (a) modernize or replace the triad of strategic 
        nuclear delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air-launched 
        cruise missile, an ICBM, and a nuclear-powered ballistic 
        missile submarine (SSBN) and SLBM; and (b) maintain the United 
        States rocket motor industrial base.''.
    (b) Limitation.--
            (1) In general.--Part I of subtitle A of title 10, United 
        States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
        chapter:

                     ``CHAPTER 24--NUCLEAR POSTURE

``Sec.
``491. Strategic delivery system reductions.
``Sec. 491. Strategic delivery system reductions
    ``(a) Annual Certification.--Beginning fiscal year 2013, the 
President shall annually certify in writing to the congressional 
defense committees whether plans to modernize or replace strategic 
delivery systems are fully resourced and being executed at a level 
equal to or more than the levels set forth in the November 2010 update 
to the plan referred to in section 1251 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 
2549), including plans regarding--
            ``(1) a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise missile;
            ``(2) an intercontinental ballistic missile;
            ``(3) a submarine-launched ballistic missile;
            ``(4) a ballistic missile submarine; and
            ``(5) maintaining--
                    ``(A) the nuclear command and control system; and
                    ``(B) the rocket motor industrial base of the 
                United States.
    ``(b) Limitation.--If the President certifies under subsection (a) 
that plans to modernize or replace strategic delivery systems are not 
fully resourced or being executed, none of the funds made available for 
fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of 
Defense may be used to reduce, convert, or eliminate strategic delivery 
systems, whether deployed or nondeployed, pursuant to the New START 
Treaty or otherwise until a period of 120 days has elapsed following 
the date on which such certification is made.
    ``(c) Exception.--The limitation in subsection (b) shall not apply 
to--
            ``(1) reductions made to ensure the safety, security, 
        reliability, and credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile 
        and strategic delivery systems, including activities related to 
        surveillance, assessment, certification, testing, and 
        maintenance of nuclear warheads and delivery systems; or
            ``(2) strategic delivery systems that are retired or 
        awaiting dismantlement on the date of the certification under 
        subsection (a).
    ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
            ``(1) The term `New START Treaty' means the Treaty between 
        the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
        Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
        Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into force 
        on February 5, 2011.
            ``(2) The term `strategic delivery system' means a delivery 
        platform for nuclear weapons.''.
            (2) Clerical amendments.--
                    (A) Table of chapters.--The table of chapters at 
                the beginning of subtitle A of title 10, United States 
                Code, and at the beginning of part I of such subtitle, 
                are each amended by inserting after the item relating 
                to chapter 23 the following new item:

``24. Nuclear posture.......................................     491''.
                    (B) Chapter 23.--Chapter 23 of title 10, United 
                States Code, is amended as follows:
                            (i) Section 490a is transferred to chapter 
                        24, inserted after section 491, and 
                        redesignated as section 492.
                            (ii) Section 491, as amended by section 
                        5(b), is transferred to chapter 24, inserted 
                        after section 492, and redesignated as section 
                        493.
                            (iii) The table of sections at the 
                        beginning of such chapter is amended by 
                        striking the items relating to sections 490a 
                        and 491.
                    (C) Chapter 24.--The table of sections at the 
                beginning of chapter 24 of title 10, United States 
                Code, as added by paragraph (1), is amended by 
                inserting after the item relating to section 491 the 
                following:

``492. Biennial assessment and report on the delivery platforms for 
                            nuclear weapons and the nuclear command and 
                            control system.
``493. Nuclear employment strategy of the United States: modification 
                            of strategy.''.
            (3) Conforming amendment.--Section 1041(b) of the National 
        Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-
        81; 125 Stat. 1574) is amended by striking ``section 490a of 
        title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a),'' and 
        inserting ``section 492 of title 10, United States Code,''.

SEC. 7. PREVENTION OF ASYMMETRY OF NUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned in 2008 
        that, ``There is no way to ignore efforts by rogue states such 
        as North Korea and Iran to develop and deploy nuclear weapons 
        or Russian or Chinese strategic modernization programs. To be 
        sure, we do not consider Russia or China as adversaries, but we 
        cannot ignore these developments and the implications they have 
        for our national security.''.
            (2) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated that, ``large 
        disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on 
        both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be 
        conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term strategic 
        relationship, especially as nuclear forces are significantly 
        reduced.''.
            (3) The Senate stated in the Resolution of Advice and 
        Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty that, ``It is 
        the sense of the Senate that, in conducting the reductions 
        mandated by the New START Treaty, the President should regulate 
        reductions in United States strategic offensive arms so that 
        the number of accountable strategic offensive arms under the 
        New START Treaty possessed by the Russian Federation in no case 
        exceeds the comparable number of accountable strategic 
        offensive arms possessed by the United States to such an extent 
        that a strategic imbalance endangers the national security 
        interests of the United States.''.
            (4) At a hearing before the Committee on Armed Services of 
        the House of Representatives in 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon 
        Panetta said, with respect to unilateral nuclear reductions by 
        the United States, ``I don't think we ought to do that 
        unilaterally--we ought to do that on the basis of negotiations 
        with the Russians and others to make sure we are all walking 
        the same path.''.
    (b) Certification.--Section 1045 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (50 U.S.C. 2523b) is amended by 
adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(d) Prevention of Asymmetry in Reductions.--
            ``(1) Certification.--During any year in which the 
        President recommends to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in 
        the active and inactive stockpiles of the United States by a 
        number that is greater than one percent of the number of 
        nuclear weapons in such stockpiles, the President shall certify 
        in writing to the congressional defense committees whether such 
        reductions will cause the number of nuclear weapons in such 
        stockpiles to be fewer than the number of nuclear weapons in 
        the active and inactive stockpiles of the Russian Federation.
            ``(2) Limitation.--If the President certifies under 
        paragraph (1) that the recommended number of nuclear weapons in 
        the active and inactive stockpiles of the United States is 
        fewer than the number of nuclear weapons in the active and 
        inactive stockpiles of the Russian Federation, none of the 
        funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year 
        thereafter for the Department of Defense or the National 
        Nuclear Security Administration may be used to carry out any 
        reduction to such stockpiles of the United States until--
                    ``(A) after the date on which such certification is 
                made, the President transmits to the congressional 
                defense committees a report by the Commander of the 
                United States Strategic Command, without change, 
                detailing whether the recommended reduction would 
                create a strategic imbalance between the total nuclear 
                forces of the United States and the total nuclear 
                forces of the Russian Federation; and
                    ``(B) a period of 180 days has elapsed following 
                the date on which such report is transmitted.
            ``(3) Exception.--The limitation in paragraph (2) shall not 
        apply to--
                    ``(A) reductions made to ensure the safety, 
                security, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear 
                weapons stockpile and strategic delivery systems, 
                including activities related to surveillance, 
                assessment, certification, testing, and maintenance of 
                nuclear warheads and strategic delivery systems; or
                    ``(B) nuclear warheads that are retired or awaiting 
                dismantlement on the date of the certification under 
                paragraph (1).''.

SEC. 8. CONSIDERATION OF EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR FORCES OF OTHER 
              COUNTRIES.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of 
        the New START Treaty of the Senate said, ``It is the sense of 
        the Senate that if, during the time the New START Treaty 
        remains in force, the President determines that there has been 
        an expansion of the strategic arsenal of any country not party 
        to the New START Treaty so as to jeopardize the supreme 
        interests of the United States, then the President should 
        consult on an urgent basis with the Senate to determine whether 
        adherence to the New START Treaty remains in the national 
        interest of the United States.''.
            (2) In 2011, experts testified before the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the House of Representatives that--
                    (A) ``Russia is modernizing every leg of its 
                nuclear triad with new, more advanced systems'', 
                including new ballistic missile submarines, new heavy 
                intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying up to 15 
                warheads each, new shorter range ballistic missiles, 
                and new low-yield warheads; and
                    (B) ``China is steadily increasing the numbers and 
                capabilities of the ballistic missiles it deploys and 
                is upgrading older ICBMs to newer, more advanced 
                systems. China also appears to be actively working to 
                develop a submarine-based nuclear deterrent force, 
                something it has never had. . . . A recent unclassified 
                Department of Defense report says that this network of 
                tunnels could be in excess of 5,000 kilometers and is 
                used to transport nuclear weapons and forces.''.
    (b) Report and Certification.--
            (1) In general.--Chapter 24 of title 10, United States 
        Code, as added by section 6(b)(1), is amended by adding at the 
        end the following new section:
``Sec. 494. Consideration of expansion of nuclear forces of other 
              countries
    ``(a) Report and Certification.--During any year in which the 
President recommends any reductions in the nuclear forces of the United 
States, none of the funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or any 
fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the National 
Nuclear Security Administration may be used for such recommended 
reduction until the date on which--
            ``(1) the President transmits to the congressional defense 
        committees a report detailing, for each country with nuclear 
        weapons--
                    ``(A) the number of each type of nuclear weapons 
                possessed by such country;
                    ``(B) the modernization plans for such weapons of 
                such country;
                    ``(C) the production capacity of nuclear warheads 
                and strategic delivery systems (as defined in section 
                491(c) of this title) of such country; and
                    ``(D) the nuclear doctrine of such country; and
            ``(2) the Commander of the United States Strategic Command 
        certifies to the congressional defense committees whether such 
        recommended reductions in the nuclear forces of the United 
        States will--
                    ``(A) impair the ability of the United States to 
                address--
                            ``(i) unplanned strategic or geopolitical 
                        events; or
                            ``(ii) technical challenge; or
                    ``(B) degrade the deterrence or assurance provided 
                by the United States to friends and allies of the 
                United States.
    ``(b) Form.--The reports required by subsection (a)(1) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''.
            (2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 24 of 
        title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the 
        item relating to section 493 the following:

``494. Consideration of expansion of nuclear forces of other 
                            countries.''.

SEC. 9. CHEMISTRY AND METALLURGY RESEARCH REPLACEMENT NUCLEAR FACILITY 
              AND URANIUM PROCESSING FACILITY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Administrator for Nuclear Security Thomas D'Agostino 
        testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
        of Representatives in February 2008 that ``Infrastructure 
        improvements are a major part of the complex transformation 
        plan that we have, and we've made important progress, but we 
        have a lot more to do. Some major facilities that we have date 
        back to World War II and cannot readily meet today's safety and 
        security requirements. Let me give you just two quick examples, 
        if I could. A sufficient capability to work with plutonium is 
        an essential part of a national security enterprise and is 
        required for as long as we retain a nuclear deterrent, and most 
        likely even longer. Currently, we have a very small production 
        capacity at Los Alamos, about 10 pits per year, at our TA-55 
        area. Our building at Los Alamos, the Chemistry and Metallurgy 
        Research Facility, is well over 50 years old and is 
        insufficient to support the national security requirements for 
        the stockpile and for future national security mission areas. 
        So, whether we continue on our existing path or move towards a 
        replacement modern warhead-type stockpile, we still need the 
        capacity to produce about 50 to 80 pits per year, which is less 
        than one-tenth of our Cold War level, as well as the ability to 
        carry out pit surveillance, which is an essential part of 
        maintaining our stockpile.''.
            (2) Then Commander of the United States Strategic Command 
        General Kevin P. Chilton also testified in February 2008 that 
        ``When you have a responsive complex that has the capacity to 
        flex to production as you may need it or adjust your deployed 
        force posture in the future, should you need it--in other 
        words, if we go to a lower number, you need to be certain that 
        you can come back up, should the strategic environment change, 
        and you can't necessarily without that flexible or responsive 
        infrastructure behind it, and that's probably one of my great 
        concerns. And then how you posture both the portion of your 
        stockpile that you hold in reserve and your confidence in the 
        weapons that you have deployed is very much a function of 
        modernizing, in my view, the weapons systems that we have 
        available today, which are, as the secretary described, of Cold 
        War legacy design, and the associated issues with them.''.
            (3) The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture 
        of the United States reported in May 2009, with respect to the 
        timing of the replacement of the nuclear weapons infrastructure 
        of the United States, that ``This raises an obvious question 
        about whether these two replacement programs might proceed in 
        sequence rather than concurrently. There are strong arguments 
        for moving forward concurrently. Existing facilities are 
        genuinely decrepit and are maintained in a safe and secure 
        manner only at high cost. Moreover, the improved production 
        capabilities they promise are integral to the program of 
        refurbishment and modernization described in the preceding 
        chapter. If funding can be found for both, this would best 
        serve the national interest in maintaining a safe, secure, and 
        reliable stockpile of weapons in the most effective and 
        efficient manner.''.
            (4) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states--
                    (A) ``The National Nuclear Security Administration 
                (NNSA), in close coordination with DoD, will provide a 
                new stockpile stewardship and management plan to 
                Congress within 90 days, consistent with the increases 
                in infrastructure investment requested in the 
                President's FY 2011 budget. As critical infrastructure 
                is restored and modernized, it will allow the United 
                States to begin to shift away from retaining large 
                numbers of non-deployed warheads as a technical hedge, 
                allowing additional reductions in the U.S. stockpile of 
                non-deployed nuclear weapons over time.'';
                    (B) ``In order to sustain a safe, secure, and 
                effective U.S. nuclear stockpile as long as nuclear 
                weapons exist, the United States must possess a modern 
                physical infrastructure--comprised of the national 
                security laboratories and a complex of supporting 
                facilities.'';
                    (C) ``Funding the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
                Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory 
                to replace the existing 50-year old Chemistry and 
                Metallurgy Research facility in 2021.'';
                    (D) ``Developing a new Uranium Processing Facility 
                at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee to come on 
                line for production operations in 2021.'';
                    (E) ``Without an ability to produce uranium 
                components, any plan to sustain the stockpile, as well 
                as support for our Navy nuclear propulsion, will come 
                to a halt. This would have a significant impact, not 
                just on the weapons program, but in dealing with 
                nuclear dangers of many kinds.''; and
                    (F) ``The non-deployed stockpile currently includes 
                more warheads than required for the above purposes, due 
                to the limited capacity of the National Nuclear 
                Security Administration (NNSA) complex to conduct LEPs 
                for deployed weapons in a timely manner. Progress in 
                restoring NNSA's production infrastructure will allow 
                these excess warheads to be retired along with other 
                stockpile reductions planned over the next decade.''.
            (5) In the memorandum of agreement between the Department 
        of Defense and the Department of Energy concerning the 
        modernization of the nuclear weapon stockpile of the United 
        States dated May 3, 2010, then Secretary of Defense Robert 
        Gates and Secretary of Energy Steven Chu agreed that ``DOE 
        Agrees to . . . increase pit production capacity . . . plan and 
        program to ramp up to a minimum of 50-80 PPY in 2022.''.
            (6) The plan required under section 1251 of the National 
        Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-
        84; 123 Stat. 2549) submitted by the President states that the 
        Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement building and the 
        Uranium Processing Facility will complete construction by 2021 
        and will achieve full operational functionality by 2024.
            (7) The Senate required that, prior to the entry into force 
        of the New START Treaty, the President certifies to the Senate 
        that the President intends to--
                    (A) accelerate to the extent possible the design 
                and engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy 
                Research Replacement building and the Uranium 
                Processing Facility; and
                    (B) request full funding, including on a multiyear 
                basis as appropriate, for the Chemistry and Metallurgy 
                Research Replacement building and the Uranium 
                Processing Facility upon completion of the design and 
                engineering phase for such facilities.
            (8) The President did request full funding for such 
        facilities on February 2, 2011, when the President stated, ``I 
        intend to (a) accelerate, to the extent possible, the design 
        and engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
        Replacement (CMRR) building and the Uranium Processing Facility 
        (UPF); and (b) request full funding, including on a multi-year 
        basis as appropriate, for the CMRR building and the UPF upon 
        completion of the design and engineering phase for such 
        facilities.''.
    (b) Limitation.--Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (50 U.S.C. 2523b) is further amended by adding 
at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(e) CMRR and UPF.--
            ``(1) Annual certification.--Beginning fiscal year 2013, 
        the President shall annually certify in writing to the 
        congressional defense committees whether--
                    ``(A) the construction of both the Chemistry and 
                Metallurgy Research Replacement building and the 
                Uranium Processing Facility will be completed by not 
                later than 2021; and
                    ``(B) both facilities will be fully operational by 
                not later than 2024.
            ``(2) Limitation.--If the President certifies under 
        paragraph (1) that the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
        Replacement building and the Uranium Processing Facility will 
        be completed by later than 2021 or be fully operational by 
        later than 2024, none of the funds made available for fiscal 
        year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the National 
        Nuclear Security Administration may be used to reduce the 
        nondeployed nuclear warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile 
        of the United States until a period of 120 days has elapsed 
        following the date of such certification.
            ``(3) Exception.--The limitation in paragraph (2) shall not 
        apply to--
                    ``(A) reductions made to ensure the safety, 
                security, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear 
                weapons stockpile and delivery systems, including 
                activities related to surveillance, assessment, 
                certification, testing, and maintenance of nuclear 
                warheads and strategic delivery systems; or
                    ``(B) nuclear warheads that are retired or awaiting 
                dismantlement on the date of the certification under 
                paragraph (1).
            ``(4) Termination.--The requirement in paragraph (1) shall 
        terminate on the date on which the President certifies in 
        writing to the congressional defense committees that the 
        Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement building and the 
        Uranium Processing Facility are both fully operational.''.

SEC. 10. NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE 
              UNITED STATES.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that reducing 
the number of nuclear warheads contained on each intercontinental 
ballistic missile of the United States does not promote strategic 
stability if at the same time other nuclear weapons states, including 
the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, are rapidly 
increasing the warhead-loading of their land-based missile forces.
    (b) Limitation.--
            (1) In general.--Chapter 24 of title 10, United States 
        Code, as added by section 6(b)(1), is amended by adding at the 
        end the following new section:
``Sec. 495. Nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles of 
              the United States
    ``(a) In General.--During any year in which the President proposes 
to reduce the number of nuclear warheads contained on an 
intercontinental ballistic missile of the United States, none of the 
funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter 
for the Department of Defense or the National Nuclear Security 
Administration may be used for such proposed reduction if the reduction 
results in such missile having only a single nuclear warhead unless the 
President certifies in writing to the congressional defense committees 
that the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China are both 
also carrying out a similar reduction.
    ``(b) Exception.--The limitation in subsection (a) shall not apply 
to reductions made to ensure the safety, security, reliability, and 
credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile and delivery systems, 
including activities related to surveillance, assessment, 
certification, testing, and maintenance of nuclear warheads and 
strategic delivery systems.''.
            (2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 24 of 
        title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the 
        item relating to section 494 the following:

``495. Nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles of the 
                            United States.''.

SEC. 11. NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON REDUCTIONS AND EXTENDED DETERRENCE 
              POLICY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The NATO Strategic Concept of 2010 endorsed the 
        continued role of nuclear weapons in the security of the NATO 
        alliance, stating--
                    (A) ``The supreme guarantee of the security of the 
                Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of 
                the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; 
                the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United 
                Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of 
                their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and 
                security of the Allies.'';
                    (B) ``We will ensure that NATO has the full range 
                of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against 
                any threat to the safety and security of our 
                populations. Therefore, we will . . . maintain an 
                appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces''; 
                and
                    (C) ``[NATO will] ensure the broadest possible 
                participation of Allies in collective defence planning 
                on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear 
                forces, and in command, control and consultation 
                arrangements.''.
            (2) However, the 2010 Strategic Concept also walked away 
        from the decades-long policy encapsulated by the 1999 Strategic 
        Concept that said, ``The presence of United States conventional 
        and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of 
        Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North 
        America.''.
            (3) Former Secretary of Defense William Perry said in March 
        2011 testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of 
        the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives 
        that ``the reason we have nuclear weapons in Europe in the 
        first place, is not because the rest of our weapons are not 
        capable of deterrence, but because, during the Cold War at 
        least, our allies in Europe felt more assured when we had 
        nuclear weapons in Europe. That is why they were deployed there 
        in the first place. Today the issue is a little different. The 
        issue is the Russians in the meantime have built a large number 
        of nuclear weapons, and we keep our nuclear weapons there as 
        somewhat of a political leverage for dealing with an ultimate 
        treaty in which we may get Russia and the United States to 
        eliminate tactical nuclear weapons. My own view is it would be 
        desirable if both the United States and Russia would eliminate 
        tactical nuclear weapons, but I see it as very difficult to 
        arrive at that conclusion if we were to simply eliminate all of 
        our tactical nuclear weapons unilaterally.''.
            (4) During testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic 
        Forces of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives in July 2011--
                    (A) former Department of Defense official Frank 
                Miller stated, ``as long as U.S. allies believe that 
                those weapons need to be there, we need to make sure 
                that we provide that security.''; and
                    (B) former Department of Defense official Mort 
                Halperin stated, ``I do not think we should be willing 
                to trade our withdrawal of our nuclear weapons from 
                Europe for some reduction, even a substantial 
                reduction, in Russian tactical nuclear weapons because 
                if it is . . . that the credibility of the American 
                nuclear deterrent for our NATO allies depends on the 
                presence of nuclear weapons in Europe, that will not 
                change if the Russians cut their tactical nuclear 
                arsenal by two thirds, or even eliminate it because 
                they will still have their strategic weapons, which, 
                while they can't have intermediate range missiles, they 
                can find a way to target them on the NATO countries.''.
            (5) Section 1237(b) of the National Defense Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81) expressed the 
        sense of Congress that--
                    (A) the commitment of the United States to extended 
                deterrence in Europe and the nuclear alliance of NATO 
                is an important component of ensuring and linking the 
                national security of the United States and its European 
                allies;
                    (B) the nuclear forces of the United States are a 
                key component of the NATO nuclear alliance; and
                    (C) the presence of the nuclear weapons of the 
                United States in Europe--combined with NATO's unique 
                nuclear sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear 
                members participate in nuclear planning and possess 
                specially configured aircraft capable of delivering 
                nuclear weapons--provides reassurance to NATO allies 
                who feel exposed to regional threats.
    (b) Limitation.--Chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, as 
added by section 6(b)(1), is amended by adding at the end the following 
new section:
``Sec. 496. Limitation on reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of 
              nuclear forces based in Europe
    ``(a) Policy on Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons.--It is the policy of 
the United States--
            ``(1) to pursue negotiations with the Russian Federation 
        aimed at the reduction of Russian deployed and nondeployed, 
        nonstrategic nuclear forces;
            ``(2) that nonstrategic nuclear weapons should be 
        considered when weighing the balance of the nuclear forces of 
        the United States and the Russian Federation;
            ``(3) that any geographical relocation or storage of 
        nonstrategic nuclear weapons by the Russian Federation does not 
        constitute a reduction or elimination of such weapons;
            ``(4) the vast advantage of the Russian Federation in 
        nonstrategic nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to the United 
        States and its allies and a growing asymmetry in Western 
        Europe; and
            ``(5) the forward-deployed nuclear forces of the United 
        States are an important contributor to the assurance of the 
        allies of the United States and constitute a check on 
        proliferation and a tool in dealing with neighboring states 
        hostile to NATO.
    ``(b) Policy on Extended Deterrence Commitment to Europe.--It is 
the policy of the United States that--
            ``(1) it maintain its commitment to extended deterrence, 
        specifically the nuclear alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty 
        Organization, as an important component of ensuring and linking 
        the national security interests of the United States and the 
        security of its European allies;
            ``(2) forward-deployed nuclear forces of the United States 
        shall remain based in Europe in support of the nuclear policy 
        and posture of NATO;
            ``(3) the presence of nuclear weapons of the United States 
        in Europe--combined with NATO's unique nuclear sharing 
        arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in 
        nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft 
        capable of delivering nuclear weapons--contributes to the 
        cohesion of NATO and provides reassurance to allies and 
        partners who feel exposed to regional threats; and
            ``(4) only the President and Congress can articulate when 
        and how the United States will employ the nuclear forces of the 
        United States and no multilateral organization, not even NATO, 
        can articulate a declaratory policy concerning the use of 
        nuclear weapons that binds the United States.
    ``(c) Limitation on Reduction, Consolidation, or Withdrawal of 
Nuclear Forces Based in Europe.--In light of the policy expressed in 
subsections (a) and (b), none of the funds made available for fiscal 
year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense 
may be used to effect or implement the reduction, consolidation, or 
withdrawal of nuclear forces of the United States that are based in 
Europe unless--
            ``(1) the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of such 
        nuclear forces is requested by the government of the host 
        nation in the manner provided in the agreement between the 
        United States and the host nation regarding the forces;
            ``(2) the President certifies that--
                    ``(A) NATO member states have considered the 
                reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal in the High 
                Level Group;
                    ``(B) NATO has decided to support such reduction, 
                consolidation, or withdrawal;
                    ``(C) the remaining nuclear forces of the United 
                States that are based in Europe after such reduction, 
                consolidation, or withdrawal would provide a 
                commensurate or better level of assurance and 
                credibility as before such reduction, consolidation, or 
                withdrawal; and
                    ``(D) there has been reciprocal action by the 
                Russian Federation, not including the Russian 
                Federation relocating nuclear forces from one location 
                to another; or
            ``(3) the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of such 
        nuclear forces is specifically authorized by an Act of 
        Congress.
    ``(d) Notification.--Upon any decision to reduce, consolidate, or 
withdraw the nuclear forces of the United States that are based in 
Europe, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a notification containing--
            ``(1) the certification required by paragraph (2) of 
        subsection (c) if such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal 
        is based upon such paragraph;
            ``(2) justification for such reduction, consolidation, or 
        withdrawal; and
            ``(3) an assessment of how NATO member states, in light of 
        such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal, assess the 
        credibility of the deterrence capability of the United States 
        in support of its commitments undertaken pursuant to article 5 
        of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington, District of 
        Columbia, on April 4, 1949, and entered into force on August 
        24, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964).
    ``(e) Notice and Wait Requirement.--The President may not commence 
a reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of the nuclear forces of the 
United States that are based in Europe for which the certification 
required by subsection (c)(2) is made until the expiration of a 180-day 
period beginning on the date on which the President submits the 
notification under subsection (d) containing the certification.
    ``(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, the 
term `appropriate congressional committees' means--
            ``(1) the Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives and the Senate; and
            ``(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate.''.
    (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
after the item relating to section 495 the following:

``496. Limitation on reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear 
                            forces based in Europe.''.
                                 <all>