[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2725 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
113th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 2725
To address noncompliance by the Russian Federation of its obligations
under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
July 31, 2014
Mr. Rubio (for himself, Mr. Risch, Mr. Hatch, and Mr. Wicker)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To address noncompliance by the Russian Federation of its obligations
under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Consequences for Russia's Arms
Control Violations Act of 2014''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) A public report in The New York Times on January 29,
2014, revealed that the Russian Federation is no longer in
compliance with the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination
of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed
at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1,
1988 (commonly referred to as the ``Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty'' or ``INF Treaty'').
(2) On April 29, 2014, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Anita E. Friedt
stated in testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives that, ``[w]e have concerns about
Russian compliance with the INF Treaty. We have raised them
with Russia and are pressing for clear answers in an effort to
resolve our concerns because of the importance of the INF
Treaty to Euro-Atlantic security. We've briefed our NATO allies
on our concerns and will continue to coordinate with them on
this and other matters that affect our common security. We have
been keeping Congress informed on this matter through briefings
with relevant congressional committees and will continue to do
so. We will continue to work with Russia to resolve our
concerns, and to encourage mutual steps to help foster a more
stable, resilient, transparent security relationship. We're not
going to drop the issue until our concerns have been
addressed.''.
(3) On March 5, 2014, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy Elaine Bunn said to the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, ``[W]e are concerned
about Russian activity that appears to be inconsistent with the
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. We've raised the
issue with Russia. They provided an answer that was not
satisfactory to us, and we will, we told them that the issue is
not closed, and we will continue to raise this.''.
(4) On April 2, 2014, the Commander, U.S. European Command,
and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Breedlove, stated,
``A weapon capability that violates the INF, that is introduced
into the greater European land mass is absolutely a tool that
will have to be dealt with . . . I would not judge how the
alliance will choose to react, but I would say they will have
to consider what to do about it. . . . It can't go
unanswered.''.
(5) The Russian Federation succeeded to the INF Treaty
obligations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in a
declaration issued at Biskek, Kyrgyzstan, in October 1992.
(6) The flight test or deployment of any INF-banned weapon
delivery vehicle by the Russian Federation constitutes a
militarily significant violation of the INF Treaty.
(7) The INF Treaty has unlimited duration, but, under the
terms of the Treaty, inspections and continuous monitoring of
Russian missile production under the Treaty ceased on June 1,
2001, thus the Treaty no longer offers any verification to
detect any militarily significant violations.
(8) A major problem exists with respect to the application
of the INF Treaty to any new ballistic or cruise missile that
is flight tested or otherwise flown once at a range not
prohibited by the Treaty (that is a range less than 500
kilometers or more than 5,500 kilometers) but will be flown at
a range that is banned by the Treaty (at a range that is
between 500 and 5,500 kilometers) as a weapon delivery vehicle.
(9) President Barack Obama has not made use of any INF
Treaty-provided means to address Russian Federation
noncompliance with the Treaty, to include convening a meeting
of the Treaty's Special Verification Commission under Article
XIII of the Treaty.
(10) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate noted
in its 1988 report on the INF Treaty, ``In the event Soviet
actions appear to contradict their obligations under the
treaty, Congress should be kept fully informed. Any
questionable activity should be fully discussed in the Special
Verification Commission. If the Soviet Union has not, after a
sufficient period of time, satisfied United States concerns or
ceased the activity in question, and if the Soviet activity is
deemed to be militarily significant, the President should
propose implementation of an appropriate and proportionate
response.''.
(11) The Administration has not made any serious or
credible effort, over several years, to respond to violations
by the Russian Federation of its obligations under the INF
Treaty.
(12) The INF Treaty is no longer effectively verifiable.
(13) The Russian Federation's actions, as detailed in the
January 29, 2014, report of The New York Times, have defeated
the object and purpose of the INF Treaty.
(14) Continued noncompliance by the Russian Federation with
its obligations under the INF Treaty and continued United
States adherence to the INF Treaty, in light of failure to
respond in a timely manner to Russian Federation noncompliance,
places the supreme interests of the United States and its
allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in
jeopardy.
(15) The Russian Federation has violated its obligations
under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and
has rendered null the effect and assurances of the NATO-Russia
Founding Act of 1997.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Russian Federation, through its flight testing of
both a ballistic missile intended for intermediate-range
targets as well its flight testing of a ground-launched cruise
missile prohibited by the INF Treaty, has acted contrary to the
object and purpose of a central purpose of the Treaty and is
therefore in material breach of its obligations under the
Treaty; and
(2) the President, after consultation with United States
allies directly affected by such Russian Federation ballistic
missiles or cruise missiles, should take such actions as the
President determines to be necessary to deny the Russian
Federation any militarily significant advantage resulting from
its noncompliance with the INF Treaty.
SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON FUNDS FOR PROGRAMS, PROJECTS, OR ACTIVITIES OF
THE U.S.-RUSSIA BILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION.
No funds made available to the Department of State may be used to
carry out programs, projects, or activities of the U.S.-Russia
Bilateral Presidential Commission until the President certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that the Russian Federation as of
the date of the certification has not flight tested a ballistic missile
at strategic range in a configuration (booster stages, post-boost
vehicle, or reentry vehicles) that is unlike a configuration that is
used for remaining tests of the system at ranges that are prohibited
under the INF Treaty.
SEC. 5. PROGRAM TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOP GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE
AND GROUND-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITIES.
(a) Program Required.--The President shall establish and carry out
a program to research and develop ground-launched cruise missile and
ground-launched ballistic missile capabilities, including by
modification of exiting United States military capabilities, with a
range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.
(b) Study and Report.--
(1) Study.--The President shall conduct a study for
potential sites of the cruise missile and ballistic missile
capabilities specified in subsection (a). In conducting the
study, the President shall consider selecting sites on United
States overseas military installations and sites offered by
United States allies.
(2) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the
results of the study.
(c) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirement to establish
and carry out the program under subsection (a) if, on or before October
1, 2014, the President certifies to the appropriate congressional
committees that--
(1) the Russian Federation is in compliance with all of its
obligations under the INF Treaty; and
(2) the Russian Federation has verifiably and completely
eliminated any military system that it has developed, flight
tested, and deployed in violation of the INF Treaty.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the President $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2015 to
carry out the program under subsection (a).
SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE RESPONSES TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S
VIOLATION OF INF TREATY.
The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Aegis Ashore sites
in Romania and Poland are deployed, consistent with the timelines
established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review of 2010, with an
operational capability to defend against short-, medium-, and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles launched by
the Russian Federation.
SEC. 7. SANCTIONS.
(a) In General.--If, on or before the date that is 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this section, the President does not
certify to the appropriate congressional committees that the Russian
Federation is not developing or deploying any military system that
violates or circumvents the INF Treaty, the President shall impose the
sanctions described in subsection (b).
(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions referred to in subsection
(a) are the following:
(1) The President shall suspend any cooperation with the
Russian Federation related to any aspect of the United States
program for national, theater, or regional missile defense,
including any provision of any data generated by the United
States in any test of any missile defense technology.
(2) The President shall deny any license pursuant to
section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077
b.) for the export of any nuclear material, equipment, or
technology to the Russian Federation.
(3) The President shall terminate the United States of the
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Russian Federation for
Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,
entered into force January 12, 2011, in accordance with the
provisions of Article 20(1) of that Agreement.
(4) The President shall not award any United States
Government contract to a private or public entity incorporated
in the Russian Federation.
(c) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirement to impose
sanctions under this section beginning on or after the date on which
the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees
that the Russian Federation has provided to the United States the
following:
(1) A list of all intermediate-range and shorter-range
missiles, as such terms are defined in the INF Treaty, as well
as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment
that are not intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles
listed under Article III of the Treaty as existing types and
which have been designed, developed, flight tested or deployed
by the Russian Federation since June 1, 2001.
(2) A list of all deployment bases for any intermediate-
range and shorter-range missiles, as such terms are defined in
the INF Treaty, including in particular, any base for any road-
mobile, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that are
not bases at which such missiles were located on June 1, 2001.
(3) A list of all flight tests carried out by the Russian
Federation for any new type of ground-launched ballistic or
cruise missile which has been flight tested at one or more
times below a range of 500 kilometers or above 5,500
kilometers.
(4) A list of all production facilities used for the design
and development of any ballistic or cruise missile that is
prohibited under the INF Treaty.
(5) A description of the reasons that the Government of the
Russian Federation has provided for undertaking the design,
development, and deployment of any ballistic or cruise missile
that is prohibited under the INF Treaty.
SEC. 8. RESTRICTION ON AGREEMENTS ON FURTHER REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR
FORCES.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
not engage in further negotiations with the Russian Federation to
reduce nuclear forces until the Russian Federation is in full
compliance with all existing bilateral nuclear agreements with the
United States, including the INF Treaty.
(b) Restriction.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
President shall not enter into any agreement with the Government of the
Russian Federation with respect to the reduction of nuclear forces
except with the advice and consent of the Senate pursuant to article
II, section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution.
SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee
on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee
on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations,
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) INF treaty or treaty.--The term ``INF Treaty'' or
``Treaty'' means the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered
into force June 1, 1988.
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