[Senate Treaty Document 105-28]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]



105th Congress                                              Treaty Doc.
                                 SENATE
1st Session                                                   105-28
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     



 
                 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  FROM

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY, OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AND SIGNED 
BY THE UNITED STATES AT NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1996. TREATY INCLUDES 
        TWO ANNEXES, A PROTOCOL, AND TWO ANNEXES TO THE PROTOCOL




September 23, 1997.--Treaty was read the first time, together with the 
accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
              ordered to be printed for use of the Senate

                              ----------                              

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
                             WASHINGTON : 1997


                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                               The White House, September 22, 1997.
To the Senate of the United States:
    I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the 
Senate to ratification, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 
Treaty (the ``Treaty'' or ``CTBT''), opened for signature and 
signed by the United States at New York on September 24, 1996. 
The Treaty includes two Annexes, a Protocol, and two Annexes to 
the Protocol, all of which form integral parts of the Treaty. I 
transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of 
the Department of State on the Treaty, including an Article-by-
Article analysis of the Treaty.
    Also included in the Department of State's report is a 
document relevant to but not part of the Treaty: the Text on 
the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, adopted by 
the Signatory States to the Treaty on November 19, 1996. The 
Text provides the basis for the work of the Preparatory 
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization in preparing detailed procedures for implementing 
the Treaty and making arrangements for the first session of the 
Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty. In particular, 
by the terms of the Treaty, the Preparatory Commission will be 
responsible for ensuring that the verification regime 
established by the Treaty will be effectively in operation at 
such time as the Treaty enters into force. My Administration 
has completed and will submit separately to the Senate an 
analysis of the verifiability of the Treaty, consistent with 
section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended. 
Such legislation as may be necessary to implement the Treaty 
also will be submitted separately to the Senate for appropriate 
action.
    The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
is a signal event in the history of arms control. The subject 
of the Treaty is one that has been under consideration by the 
international community for nearly 40 years, and 
thesignificance of the conclusion of negotiations and the signature to 
date of more than 140 states cannot be overestimated. The Treaty 
creates an absolute prohibition against the conduct of nuclear weapon 
test explosions or any other nuclear explosion anywhere. Specifically, 
each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test 
explosion or any other nuclear explosion; to prohibit and prevent any 
nuclear explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and 
to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in 
the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other 
nuclear explosion.
    The Treaty establishes a far reaching verification regime, 
based on the provision of seismic, hydroaucoustic, 
radionuclide, and infrasound data by a global network (the 
``International Monitoring System'') consisting of the 
facilities listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol. Data provided by 
the International Monitoring System will be stored, analyzed, 
and disseminated, in accordance with Treaty-mandated 
operational manuals, by an International Data Center that will 
be part of the Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The verification regime 
includes rules for the conduct of on-site inspections, 
provisions for consultation and clarification, and voluntary 
confidence-building measures designed to contribute to the 
timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising from 
possible misinterpretation of monitoring data related to 
chemical explosions that a State Party intends to or has 
carried out. Equally important to the U.S. ability to verify 
the Treaty, the text specifically provides for the right of 
States Parties to use information obtained by national 
technical means in a manner consistent with generally 
recognized principles of international law for purposes of 
verification generally, and in particular, as the basis for an 
on-site inspection request. The verificationregime provides 
each State Party the right to protect sensitive installations, 
activities, or locations not related to the Treaty. Determinations of 
compliance with the Treaty rest with each individual State Party to the 
Treaty.
    Negotiations for a nuclear test-ban treaty date back to the 
Eisenhower Administration. During the period 1978-1980, 
negotiations among the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
the USSR (the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)) made progress, but 
ended without agreement. Thereafter, as the nonnuclear weapon 
states called for test-ban negotiations, the United States 
urged the Conference on Disarmament (the ``CD'') to devote its 
attention to the difficult aspects of monitoring compliance 
with such a ban and developing elements of an international 
monitoring regime. After the United States, joined by other key 
states, declared its support for comprehensive test-ban 
negotiations with a view toward prompt conclusion of a treaty, 
negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban were initiated in the 
CD, in January 1994. Increased impetus for the conclusion of a 
comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty by the end of 1996 
resulted from the adoption, by the Parties to the NPT in 
conjunction with the indefinite and unconditional extension of 
that Treaty, of ``Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament'' that listed the conclusion of a 
CTBT as the highest measure of its program of action.
    On August 11, 1995, when I announced U.S. support for a 
``zero yield'' CTBT, I stated that:

          . . . As part of our national security strategy, the 
        United States must and will retain strategic nuclear 
        forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign 
        leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from 
        acting against our vital interests and to convince it 
        thatseeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In 
this regard, I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear 
stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States. ``I 
am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our nuclear 
weapons labs that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear 
deterrent under a CTBT through a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship 
program without nuclear testing. I directed the implementation of such 
a program almost 2 years ago, and it is being developed with the 
support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. This program will now be tied to a new certification 
procedure. In order for this program to succeed, both the 
Administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan 
support for the stockpile stewardship program over the next decade and 
beyond. I am committed to working with the Congress to ensure this 
support.
          While I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship 
        program will be successful, as President I cannot 
        dismiss the possibility, however unlikely, that the 
        program will fall short of its objectives. Therefore, 
        in addition to the new annual certification procedure 
        for our nuclear weapons stockpile, I am also 
        establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define 
        the conditions under which the United States can enter 
        into a CTBT . . .

    The safeguards that were established are as follows:

          The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship 
        program to ensure a high level of confidence in the 
        safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active 
        stockpile, including the conduct of a broad range of 
        effective and continuing experimental programs.
          The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory 
        facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory 
        nuclear technology that will attract, retain, and 
        ensure the continued application of our human 
        scientific resources to those programs on which 
        continued progress in nuclear technology depends.
          The maintenance of the basic capability to resume 
        nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should 
        the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this 
        Treaty.
          The continuation of a comprehensive research and 
        development program to improve our treaty monitoring 
        capabilities and operations.
          The continuing development of a broad range of 
        intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities and 
        operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive 
        information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear 
        weapons development programs, and related nuclear 
        programs.
          The understanding that if the President of the United 
        States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the 
        Secretary of Energy (DOE)--advised by the Nuclear 
        Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons 
        laboratories,and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic 
Command--that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability 
of a nuclear weapon type that the two Secretaries consider to be 
critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the 
President, in consultation with the Congress, would be prepared to 
withdraw from the CTBT under the standard ``supreme national 
interests'' clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be 
required.

    With regard to the last safeguard:

          The U.S. regards continued high confidence in the 
        safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile 
        as a matter affecting the supreme interests of the 
        country and will regard any events calling that 
        confidence into question as ``extraordinary events 
        related to the subject matter of the treaty.'' It will 
        exercise its rights under the ``supreme national 
        interests'' clause if it judges that the safety or 
        realibility of its nuclear weapons stockpile cannot be 
        assured with the necessary high degree of confidence 
        without nuclear testing.
          To implement that commitment, the Secretaries of 
        Defense ad Energy--advised by the Nuclear Weapons 
        Council or ``NWC'' (comprising representatives of DOD, 
        JCS, and DOE), the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons 
        laboratories and the commander of the U.S. Strategic 
        Command--will report to the President annually, whether 
        they can certify that the Nation's nuclear weapons 
        stockpile and all critical elements thereof are, to a 
        high degree of confidence, safe andreliable, and, if 
they cannot do so, whether, in their opinion and that of the NWC, 
testing is necessary to assure, with a high degree of confidence, the 
adequacy of corrective measures to assure the safety and reliability of 
the stockpile, or elements thereof. The Secretaries will state the 
reasons for their conclusions, and the views of the NWC, reporting any 
minority views.
          After receiving the Secretaries' certification and 
        accompanying report, including NWC and minority views, 
        the President will provide them to the appropriate 
        committees of the Congress, together with a report on 
        the actions he has taken in light of them.
          If the President is advised, by the above procedure, 
        that a high level of confidence in the safety or 
        reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to the 
        Nation's nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified 
        without nuclear testing, or that nuclear testing is 
        necessary to assure the adequacy of corrective 
        measures, the President will be prepared to exercise 
        our ``supreme national interests'' rights under the 
        Treaty, in order to conduct such testing.
          The procedure for such annual certification by the 
        Secretaries, and for advice to them by the NWC, U.S. 
        Strategic Command, and the DOE nuclear weapons 
        laboratories will be embodied in domestic law.

    As negotiations on a text drew to a close it became 
apparent that one member of the CD, India, would not join in a 
consensus decision to forward the text to the United Nations 
for its adoption. After consultations among countries 
supporting the text. Australia requested the President of the 
U.N. GeneralAssembly to convene a resumed session of the 50th 
General Assembly to consider and take action on the text. The General 
Assembly was so convened, and by a vote of 158 to 3 the Treaty was 
adopted. On September 24, 1996, the Treaty was opened for signature and 
I had the privilege, on behalf of the United States, of being the first 
to sign the Treaty.
    The Treaty assigns responsibility for overseeing its 
implementation to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (the ``Organization''), to be established in 
Vienna. The Organization, of which each State Party will be a 
member, will have three organs: the Conference of the State 
Parties, a 51-member Executive Council, and the Technical 
Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat will supervise the 
operation of and provide technical support for the 
International Monitoring System, operate the International Data 
Center, and prepare for and support the conduct of on-site 
inspections. The Treaty also requires each State Party to 
establish a National Authority that will serve as the focal 
point within the State Party for liaison with the Organization 
and with other States Parties.
    The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the deposit 
of instruments of ratification by all of the 44 states listed 
in Annex 2 to the Treaty, but in no case earlier than 2 years 
after its being opened for signature. If, 3 years from the 
opening of the Treaty for signature, the Treaty has not entered 
into force, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his 
capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, will convene a conference 
of the states that have deposited their instruments of 
ratification if a majority of those states so requests. At this 
conference the participants will consider what measures 
consistent with international law might be undertaken to 
accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the 
early entry into force of the Treaty. Their decision on such 
measures must be taken by consensus.
    Reservations to the Treaty Articles and the Annexes to the 
Treaty are not permitted. Reservations may be taken to the 
Protocol and its Annexes so long as they are not incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the Treaty. Amendment of the 
Treaty requires the positive vote of a majority of the States 
Parties to the Treaty, voting in a duly convened Amendment 
Conference at which no State Party casts a negative vote. Such 
amendments would enter into force 30 days after ratification by 
all States Parties that cast a positive vote at the Amendment 
Conference.
    The Treaty is of unlimited duration, but contains a 
``supreme interests'' clause entitling any State Party that 
determines that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by 
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the 
Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty upon 6-month's notice.
    Unless a majority of the Parties decides otherwise, a 
Review Conference will be held 10 years following the Treaty's 
entry into force and may be held at 10-year intervals 
thereafter if the Conference of the States Parties so decides 
by a majority vote (or more frequently if the Conference of the 
States Parties so decides by a two-thirds vote).
    The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is of singular 
significance to the continuing efforts to stem nuclear 
proliferation and strengthen regional and global stability. Its 
conclusion marks the achievement of the highest priority item 
on the international arms control and nonproliferation agenda. 
Its effective implementation will provide a foundation on which 
further efforts to control and limit nuclear weapons can be 
soundly based. By responding to the call for a CTBT by the end 
of 1996, the Signatory States, and most importantly the nuclear 
weapon states, have demonstrated the bona fides of their 
commitment to meaningful arms control measures.
    The monitoring challenges presented by the wide scope of 
the CTBT exceed those imposed by any previous nuclear test-
related treaty. Our current capability to monitor nuclear 
explosions will undergo significant improvement over the next 
several years to meet these challenges. Even with these 
enhancements, though, several conceivable CTBT evasion 
scenarios have been identified. Nonetheless, our National 
Intelligence Means (NIM), together with the Treaty's 
verification regime and our diplomatic efforts, provide the 
United States with the means to make the CTBT effectively 
verifiable. By this, I mean that the United States:

          will have a wide range of resources (NIM, the 
        totality of information available in public and private 
        channels, and the mechanisms established by the Treaty) 
        for addressing compliance concerns and imposing 
        sanctions in cases of noncompliance; and
          will thereby have the means to: (a) assess whether 
        the Treaty is deterring the conduct of nuclear 
        explosions (in terms of yields and number of tests) 
        that could damage U.S. security interests and 
        constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and 
        (b) take prompt and effective counteraction.

    My judgment that the CTBT is effectively verifiable also 
reflects the belief that U.S. nuclear deterrence would not be 
undermined by possible nuclear testing that the United States 
might fail to detect under the Treaty, bearing in mind that the 
United States will derive substantial confidence from other 
factors--the CTBT's ``supreme national interests'' clause, the 
annual certification procedure for the U.S. nuclear stockpile, 
and the U.S. Safeguards program.
    I believe that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is 
in the best interests of the United States. Its provisions will 
significantly further our nuclear nonproliferation and arms 
control objectives and strengthen international security. 
Therefore, I urge the Senate to give early and favorable 
consideration to the Treaty and its advice and consent to 
ratification as soon as possible.

                                                William J. Clinton.
                          LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                       Department of State,
                                    Washington, September 20, 1997.
    The President: I have the honor to submit to you the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the Treaty, or CTBT), 
opened for signature at New York on September 24, 1996, and 
signed by the United States of America and 145 other countries 
to date.
    The Treaty includes as integral parts, two Annexes and a 
Protocol (on verification) with two Annexes. Accompanying this 
Report for the information of the Senate, is an Article-by-
Article analysis of the Treaty.


                              introduction


    The Treaty represents the culmination of nearly four 
decades of efforts, beginning during the Eisenhower 
Administration, to ban completely all nuclear weapon test 
explosions, and any other nuclear explosions, wherever they 
might be carried out. Since 1963, the carrying out of a nuclear 
weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, in the 
atmosphere, in outer space or underwater has been prohibited by 
the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in 
Outer Space and Under Water (the Partial or Limited Test-Ban 
Treaty, or LTBT), done at Moscow August 5, 1963. More than 120 
states are party to the LTBT, but importantly two of the 
formally acknowledged nuclear weapon states, China and France, 
are not. During the 1977-1980 time frame, trilateral 
negotiations on a comprehensive test ban were carried out by 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. 
These negotiations reached an impasse over a number of issues, 
including seismic monitoring. They continued following the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in early December 1979 and were 
adjourned in November 1980.
    In the decade that followed, efforts to explore the 
verification needs for a comprehensive test ban were undertaken 
by the Group of Scientific Experts, a group of the Conference 
on Disarmament (the CD), while strong calls were made for 
negotiations on a test ban by many non-nuclear weapon states. 
In making their case for negotiation of a test ban, these non-
nuclear weapon states repeatedly referred to the preambular 
expressions of support for continued negotiations on a test ban 
contained in the LTBT and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow July 1, 1968.
    Since December 11, 1990, the United States and the Russian 
Federation (as successor to the Soviet Union) have been legally 
precluded from conducting nuclear explosions with yields 
greater than 150 kilotons in the one environment to which the 
1963 LTBT was not applicable, beneath the surface of the earth, 
by the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon 
Tests (TTBT) and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions 
for Peaceful Purposes (PNET), signed on July 3, 1974 and May 
28, 1976 respectively. Following signature of these Treaties 
and pending their entry into force, the United States and the 
Soviet Union in 1976 each publicly stated its intention to 
observe the 150 kiloton limit, provided that the other did 
likewise. Following agreement on new verification Protocols, 
the two Treaties were ratified and entered into force on 
December 11, 1990.
    The CTBT will prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions 
and any other nuclear explosion, however small, and it does so 
in each and every environment, without exception.
    The text of the Treaty was negotiated in Geneva, between 
January 1994 and August 1996, in the CD. Nearly all of the 
member states of the CD, initially numbering 38, but 
subsequently expanded to 61 in June 1996, participated actively 
in the negotiations. On behalf of the United States, 
representatives of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the 
Department of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the Intelligence Community, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, and the Department of Energy all played important 
roles in the development of the Treaty through participation in 
the negotiations in Geneva and the development of policy in 
Washington. Throughout the negotiating process, the United 
States consulted and worked closely with its Western Allies in 
the CD, as well as with Israel and withthe non-Western nuclear 
weapon state members of the CD, Russia and China.

                         background information

    When the United States made the decision in mid-1993 
actively to pursue conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban 
treaty it did so in an environment, both international and 
domestic, significantly different from that in which 
negotiations of a test ban had taken place from 1977 to 1980. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the appreciation of the 
magnitude of the security threat posed by the possible 
proliferation of states having nuclear weapon capabilities 
fostered a new look at the impact a comprehensive test-ban 
could have on constraining such threats. Additional factors 
included the redress of the major imbalance in conventional 
forces in Europe brought about by the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty), done at Paris December 
19, 1990, which greatly reduced the levels of tanks, armored 
combat vehicles, artillery, attack aircraft, and helicopters, 
and the major reduction in the strategic forces of the United 
States and the former Soviet Union resulting from the START 
negotiations. Finally, it was determined that the United States 
had no current military requirement for new-design nuclear 
warhead production. Accordingly, the constraints of a test ban 
could be accepted. In contrast to earlier comprehensive test 
ban negotiations, all the negotiating parties were willing to 
accept relatively intrusive verification measures, including 
extensive in-country sensors and on-site inspections.
    In addition, legislation was signed into law by President 
Bush in 1992 that directed the United States to stop all 
testing by September 30, 1996, provided no other state tested 
after that date, and to engage in negotiations to achieve a 
comprehensive test-ban by that date. In the meantime, the 
legislation (sponsored by Senators Hatfield, Exon, and 
Mitchell) precluded the expenditure of funds for more than 15 
nuclear weapon tests (including three for the United Kingdom) 
and permitted the expenditure of appropriated funds for such 
tests only if they were found by the Executive Branch to be 
necessary for the sole purpose of maintaining the reliability 
and safety of the existing nuclear weapon stockpile.
    As regards the international climate that contributed to 
the U.S. decision actively to support negotiation and 
conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban, the then forthcoming 
1995 Review and Extension Conferenceof the NPT focused new 
light on the importance of a comprehensive test-ban to the member 
states of the NPT and to the continued viability of the 
nonproliferation regime. The United States was deeply committed to the 
indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, and it became clear 
that a comprehensive test-ban could make a major contribution to 
achievement of the NPT's permanent extension. The decision to support a 
concerted effort to conclude a comprehensive test-ban was thus based on 
the careful assessment that any possible risks were outweighed by the 
benefits to United States nonproliferation and other security 
objectives in constraining the spread and improvement of nuclear weapon 
capabilities. However, the U.S. decision to pursue actively a 
comprehensive test-ban was conditioned on having the capability to 
ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of the 
U.S. stockpile and to achieve an effective verification regime for the 
Treaty. At the same time, the United States sought to ensure protection 
of U.S. interests with respect to the scope, membership, and 
termination provisions of the Treaty.
    The negotiations in the CD continued throughout 1994, 1995, 
and most of 1996. The CD was working to meet a target date for 
signature of the Treaty in the fall of 1996 set by the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution unanimously adopted 
in December 1995. The objective was for the CD to forward the 
agreed-upon text to a resumed 50th session of the UNGA, which 
could then request the Secretary-General to open the Treaty for 
signature. As the 1996 CD session drew close to an end it 
became clear that one state, India, would block consensus 
action by the CD to forward the text to the UNGA. The member 
states of the CD that supported the text thereupon began to 
consider other means by which the text that had resulted from 
the deliberations within the CD's AD Hoc Committee on a Nuclear 
Test-Ban might be forwarded to the UN. Australia took the lead 
in its individual capacity, not as a member of the CD, and 
formally requested that the UNGA President convene a resumed 
session of the 50th General Assembly for the purpose of 
considering and acting upon the text of a comprehensive test-
ban treaty. At its resumed session the General Assembly adopted 
the text of the Treaty by a vote of 158 to 3 with 5 
abstentions. Thereafter the Secretary-General opened the Treaty 
for signature on September 24, 1996. At the same time, the 
Signatory States held a series of consultations regarding the 
Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization that had 
been developed at the CD. At a meeting of SignatoryStates of 
the CTBT on November 19, 1996, the Signatory States, at that time 
numbering 130, adopted by acclamation the Text, thereby establishing 
the Preparatory Commission for the Organization. This document provides 
the basis for the work of the Preparatory Commission, which is the 
entity responsible for preparing detailed procedures for implementing 
the Treaty and for laying the foundation for the operation of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (the Organization) 
that is established by the Treaty and will come into being once the 
Treaty enters into force. The Text, which is relevant to but not part 
of the Treaty, is enclosed for the information of the Senate. On 
November 20, 1996, the Preparatory Commission convened its first 
meeting (which was reconvened and concluded in March 1997), and began 
the process of developing Rules of Procedure, Financial Regulations, 
and other necessary measures for the future operation of the 
Organization in implementing the Treaty.

                 the treaty: its structure and content

    The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty consists of a 
Preamble, 17 Articles, and two Annexes, as well as the Protocol 
to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the Verification 
Protocol) having three Parts and two Annexes. The basic 
obligations of the States Parties are set forth in Article I. 
Specifically, each State Party undertakes: (a) not to carry out 
any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear 
explosion; (b) to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear 
explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and 
(c) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way 
participating in the carrying out of any such nuclear explosion 
by anyone else. The prohibitions and undertakings thus apply to 
geographic areas (i.e., any place under the jurisdiction or 
control of a State Party), as well as to the activities of a 
State Party (e.g., the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test 
explosion or any other nuclear explosion) wherever such 
activity might take place.

                         organizational bodies

    The Treaty establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 
Treaty Organization (the Organization, or CTBTO) located in 
Vienna, Austria, as the body that is charged with achieving the 
object and purpose of the Treaty and overseeing implementation 
of the provisions of the Treaty and the international 
verification system described in the Protocol to the CTBT. Each 
State Party to the Treaty is a member of the Organization, 
which itself has threeorgans: the Conference of the States 
Parties, the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat.
    The Conference of the States Parties (the Conference) is 
the body responsible for overseeing implementation of the 
Treaty, the activities of the Executive Council and the 
Technical Secretariat, and the States Parties' compliance with 
the Treaty's provisions. It is charged with considering and 
reviewing scientific and technological developments that could 
affect the operation of the Treaty, and with taking the 
necessary measures to ensure compliance with the Treaty and to 
redress and remedy any situation that contravenes the 
provisions of the Treaty.
    The Executive Council is composed of 51 member states, 
elected by the Conference of the States Parties. Annex 1 to the 
Treaty assigns each potential State Party to one of six 
geographical regions. Each region will present to the 
Conference designations of States Parties for seats on the 
Executive Council. Designations will be based, inter alia, on a 
State Party's nuclear capabilities relevant to the Treaty as 
well as the number of monitoring facilities and financial 
contributions to the Organization. The United States expects to 
serve continuously on the Executive Council. The Executive 
Council is the executive body of the Organization, responsible 
for the supervision of the Technical Secretariat. The Executive 
Council serves as the liaison with the National Authority of 
each State Party, and carries out the preparatory and follow-up 
work for sessions of the Conference. The Executive Council has 
important functions with respect to verification and 
compliance: it is directed to facilitate cooperation among the 
States Parties through the exchange of information; to 
facilitate consultations among States Parties; to receive, 
consider, and act on requests for on-site inspections; and to 
take action on the reports of such inspections. It may make 
recommendations to the Conference based on the results of on-
site inspections, or, if a case is urgent, take a matter 
directly to the United Nations.
    The Technical Secretariat is responsible, inter alia and 
most importantly, for supervising the operation of the 
International Monitoring System (the IMS), operating the 
International Data Center (the IDC), and the conduct of on-site 
inspections. It is headed by a Director-General, appointed by 
the Conference, who will serve a four-year term and not more 
than two terms. Data from the monitoring stations in the IMS is 
provided by States directly or through their own national data 
centers, tothe IDC, where it is processed, analyzed and stored, 
and made available to all States Parties. The IDC products that will be 
made available to all States Parties at no cost include: standard 
screened event bulletins, executive summaries of data acquired, and 
integrated lists of all signals detected by the IMS.

                    national implementation measures

    In addition to the implementing organs established by the 
Treaty itself, the Treaty requires each State Party to 
establish a National Authority to serve as a focal point for 
liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties. 
States Parties are also expressly required to take the steps 
necessary to prohibit natural and legal persons on their 
territory and natural and legal persons in any other place 
under their jurisdiction or control, from undertaking any 
activity that the State Party itself is prohibited from 
undertaking. In addition, they are required to prohibit their 
nationals from undertaking such activities anywhere. These 
prohibitions complement the basic obligation of each State 
Party under Article I to ``prohibit and prevent'' nuclear 
explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

                       verification of compliance

    The verification regime established by the Treaty has four 
separate but interdependent components: an international 
monitoring system, consultation and clarification procedures, 
on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures. The 
Protocol to the Treaty contains the specific objectives, 
authorities, functions, and requirements for the international 
monitoring system, on-site inspections, and confidence-building 
measures. The Treaty also provides for the States Parties to 
take measures necessary to ensure compliance and to redress a 
situation that contravenes the Treaty, including the 
possibility of the imposition of sanctions. In conjunction with 
States Parties' obligations to provide data and accept on-site 
inspections, provision is made for the protection of sensitive 
facilities and confidential information and data provided by 
States Parties. The Treaty also specifically recognizes States 
Parties' rights to use information obtained by national 
technical means in a manner consistent with generally 
recognized principles of international law, including the 
respect for the sovereignty of states, for purposes of 
verification generally, and in particular, as the basis for an 
on-site inspection request.
    Each State Party is required to maintain and operate, in 
accordance with agreements or arrangements between it and the 
Organization, those facilities for seismological, radionuclide, 
hydro- acoustical, and infrasound monitoring comprising the 
IMS, as well as laboratories and related communication 
facilities, listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol, located on its 
territory or for which it is otherwise responsible. The 
Organization is also authorized to enter into similar 
agreements or arrangements with states not party to the Treaty 
as necessary.
    For the purpose of clarifying whether a nuclear explosion 
has been carried out in violation of the Treaty, each State 
Party has the right to request an on-site inspection. Within 
specific time frames an inspection request must be processed 
and referred to the Executive Council, which must take action 
within 96 hours from the time the request is first received. 
Approval of the request requires at least 30 affirmative votes 
of the 51 members of the Executive Council. If the request is 
approved, the inspection team must arrive at the point of entry 
no more than six days following the Executive Council's receipt 
of the request. Following the inspection, an inspection report 
is provided to all States Parties, and the Executive Council 
reviews the report and must address any concerns expressed by a 
State Party as to whether any non-compliance with the Treaty 
has occurred and whether the right to request an on-site 
inspection has been abused. If the Executive Council determines 
that further actions may be necessary, it may make 
recommendations to the Conference on measures to redress the 
situation.
    Recognizing that signals from non-nuclear explosions might 
create ambiguities, the Treaty calls upon each State Party, on 
a voluntary basis, to participate in a number of confidence-
building measures, including the provision of information 
relating to any chemical explosions using over 300 metric tons 
of TNT-equivalent blasting material that it intends to carry 
out.

       entry into force, duration, and withdrawal from the treaty

    Annex 2 to the Treaty names the 44 states that are members 
of the Conference on Disarmament and that are also listed in 
Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's April 1996 
edition of ``Nuclear Power Reactors in the World'' or listed in 
Table I of the IAEA's December 1995 edition of ``Nuclear 
Research Reactors in the World.'' Pursuant to paragraph 1 of 
Article XIV of theTreaty, these 44 states are those whose 
ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force. Once those 
states have ratified, the Treaty will enter into force 180 days 
following the deposit of the last instrument of ratification by the 44, 
or two years after September 24, 1996 (the date on which the Treaty was 
opened for signature), whichever is later.
    By virtue of this Article XIV provision, each of the 44 
named states could effectively block the entry into force of 
the Treaty. The Treaty therefore provides that three years 
after the opening of the Treaty for signature, if it has not 
yet entered into force, a majority of the states that have 
deposited their instruments of ratification can request the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations (the designated 
Depositary for the Treaty) to convene a conference to consider 
what measures, consistent with international law, might be 
undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to 
facilitate the Treaty's entry into force. This conference would 
not, however, have the authority to waive the requirement for 
ratification by the 44 designated states.
    The Treaty is of unlimited duration. The Treaty contains a 
``supreme interests'' clause, in accordance with which a State 
Party may withdraw from the Treaty upon six month's notice to 
all the other States Parties, the Executive Council, the 
Depositary, and the United Nations Security Council, if it 
determines that extraordinary events related to the subject 
matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. A 
State Party exercising this right is required to provide, along 
with its notice of withdrawal, a statement of the extraordinary 
event or events that it regards as having jeopardized its 
supreme interests.

                      reservations and amendments

    Reservations may not be taken to the Articles of the Treaty 
or the Annexes to the Treaty. Reservations may be taken to the 
Protocol and the Annexes thereto so long as they are not 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty.
    The procedures for amendment of the Treaty, the Protocol or 
the Annexes to the Protocol provide that any State party may 
propose an amendment, which, if considered and adopted at an 
Amendment Conference by a majority of States Parties and 
without a negative vote by any State Party, shall enter into 
force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of an 
instrument ofratification or acceptance by all those States 
Parties that voted for the amendment at the Amendment Conference.
    In addition, the Treaty provides that, for the purpose of 
ensuring the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, the 
Parties may make changes of an administrative or technical 
nature to Part I (dealing with the International Monitoring 
System and the International Data Center) and Part III 
(Confidence-Building Measures) of the Protocol, as well as the 
Annexes to the Protocol, in accordance with a separate 
procedure and without going through the formal amendment 
process.

                                 costs

    The expenses of the Organization are to be borne by the 
States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of 
assessments, adjusted to take into account differences in 
membership between the United Nations and the Organization. It 
is anticipated that the United States share will be 
approximately 25 percent. The Treaty provides that each State 
Party establishing or upgrading International Monitoring 
Facilities (IMS) may reduce its annual assessed contribution by 
up to 50 percent pursuant to agreement with the Organization 
and, if applicable, the state(s) on whose territory the 
facility is based. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission 
are to be divided in the same manner as the expenses of the 
Organization, and provision is made for giving credit to States 
Parties for their contribution to the Preparatory Commission as 
offsets against their assessed contributions for the regular 
budget of the Organization.

                        national implementation

    As noted above, the Treaty requires that each State Party 
establish a National Authority that will function as its 
liaison with the Organization and other States Parties. Each 
State Party is required to inform the Organization of its 
National Authority upon entry into force of the treaty for it.
    In order for the United States to ensure full compliance 
with its obligations under the Treaty, implementing legislation 
will be required. Such legislation will be submitted separately 
to the Congress. In addition, any environmental documentation 
that may be deemed appropriate will be forwarded separately to 
the Senate for its information.

                               conclusion

    I believe that this Treaty, by banning all nuclear weapon 
test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, as described 
above, and by establishing a comprehensive verification system 
to monitor compliance and assist States Parties in making 
compliance decisions, will significantly strengthen the 
national security of the United States and its Allies and will 
contribute to global and regional security as well. I therefore 
recommend that the Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its 
advice and consent to ratification at the earliest possible 
time.
    Respectfully submitted,
                                                Madeleine Albright.
    Enclosures: As stated.