

reference or record source or that contains indications of falsified education or employment experience. Records or testimony of employment, education, or military service where the individual was involved in serious offenses or incidents that would reflect adversely on the honesty, reliability, trustworthiness, or stability of the individual.

3. Foreign travel, education, visits, correspondence, relatives, or contact with persons from or living in a foreign country or foreign intelligence service.

4. Mental, nervous, emotional, psychological, psychiatric, or character disorders/behavior or treatment reported or alleged from any source.

5. Excessive indebtedness, bad checks, financial difficulties or irresponsibility, unexplained affluence, bankruptcy, or evidence of living beyond the individual's means.

6. Any other significant information relating to the criteria included in paragraphs (a) through (q) of §154.7 or Appendix H of this part.

[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61026, Nov. 19, 1993]

APPENDIX E TO PART 154—PERSONNEL SECURITY DETERMINATION AUTHORITIES

A. *Officials authorized to grant, deny or revoke personnel security clearances (Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential):*

1. Secretary of Defense and/or designee
2. Secretary of the Army and/or designee
3. Secretary of the Navy and/or designee
4. Secretary of the Air Force and/or designee
5. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or designee
6. Directors of the Defense Agencies and/or designee
7. Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands and/or designee

B. *Officials authorized to grant Limited Access Authorizations:*

1. Secretaries of the Military Departments and/or designee
2. Director, Washington Headquarters Service for OSD and/or designee
3. Chairman, JCS and/or designee
4. Directors of the Defense Agencies and/or designee
5. Commanders, Unified and Specified Commands and/or designee

C. *Officials authorized to grant access to SCI:*
 Director, NSA—for NSA
 Director, DIA—for OSD, OJCS, and Defense Agencies

Senior Officers of the Intelligence Community of the Army, Navy, and Air Force—for their respective Military Departments, or their single designee.

D. Officials authorized to certify personnel under their jurisdiction for access to Restricted Data (to include Critical Nuclear

Weapon Design Information): see enclosure to DoD Directive 5210.2.

E. Officials authorized to approve personnel for assignment to Presidential Support activities: The Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense or designee.

F. *Officials authorized to grant access to SIOP-ESI:*

1. Director of Strategic Target Planning
2. Director, Joint Staff, OJCS
3. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
4. Chief of Naval Operations
5. Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
6. Commandant of the Marine Corps
7. Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands
8. The authority to grant access delegated above may be further delegated in writing by the above officials to the appropriate subordinates.

G. *Officials authorized to designate sensitive positions:*

1. Heads of DoD Components or their designees for critical-sensitive positions.
2. Organizational commanders for non-critical-sensitive positions.

H. *Nonappropriated Fund Positions of Trust:*

Officials authorized to designate non-appropriated fund positions of trust: Heads of DoD Components and/or their designees.

APPENDIX F TO PART 154—GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCTING PRENOMINATION PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

A. *Purpose.* The purpose of the personal interview is to assist in determining the acceptability of an individual for nomination and further processing for a position requiring an SBI.

B. *Scope.* Questions asked during the course of a personal interview must have a relevance to a security determination. Care must be taken not to inject improper matters into the personal interview. For example, religious beliefs and affiliations, beliefs and opinions regarding racial matters, political beliefs and affiliations of a nonsubversive nature, opinions regarding the constitutionality of legislative policies, and affiliations with labor unions and fraternal organizations are not proper subjects for inquiry. Department of Defense representatives conducting personal interviews should always be prepared to explain the relevance of their inquiries. Adverse inferences shall not be drawn from the refusal of a person to answer questions the relevance of which has not been established.

C. *The interviewer.* Except as prescribed in paragraph B. above, persons conducting personal interviews normally will have broad

latitude in performing this essential and important function and, therefore, a high premium must necessarily be placed upon the exercise of good judgment and common sense. To insure that personal interviews are conducted in a manner that does not violate lawful civil and private rights or discourage lawful political activity in any of its forms, or intimidate free expression, it is necessary that interviewers have a keen and well-developed awareness of and respect for the rights of interviewees. Interviewers shall never offer an opinion as to the relevance or significance of information provided by the interviewee to eligibility for access to SCI. If explanation in this regard is required, the interviewer will indicate that the sole function of the interview is to obtain information and that the determination of relevance or significance to the individual's eligibility will be made by other designated officials.

D. Interview procedures. 1. The Head of the DoD Component concerned shall establish uniform procedures for conducting the interview that are designed to elicit information relevant to making a determination of whether the interviewee, on the basis of the interview and other locally available information (DD 398, Personnel Security Investigation Questionnaire, personnel records, security file, etc.), is considered acceptable for nomination and further processing.

2. Such procedures shall be structured to insure the interviewee his full rights under the Constitution of the United States, the Privacy Act of 1974 and other applicable statutes and regulations.

E. Protection of interview results. All information developed during the course of the interview shall be maintained in personnel security channels and made available only to those authorities who have a need-to-know in connection with the processing of an individual's nomination for duties requiring access to SCI or those who need access to information either to conduct the required SBI or to adjudicate the matter of the interviewee's eligibility for access to SCI, or as otherwise authorized by Executive order or statute.

F. Acceptability determination. 1. The determination of the interviewee's acceptability for nomination for duties requiring access to sensitive information shall be made by the commander, or designee, of the DoD organization that is considering nominating the interviewee for such duties.

2. Criteria guidelines contained in DCID 1/14 upon which the acceptability for nomination determination is to be based shall be provided to commanders of DoD organizations who may nominate individuals for access to SCI and shall be consistent with those established by the Senior Officer of the Intelligence Community of the Component concerned with respect to acceptability for nomination to duties requiring access to SCI.

APPENDIX G TO PART 154 [RESERVED]

APPENDIX H TO PART 154—ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

1. *Introduction.* The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all U.S. Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees, and other individuals who require access to classified information. They apply to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information, to include sensitive compartmented information and special access programs, and are to be used by government departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations. Government departments and agencies may also choose to apply these guidelines to analogous situations regarding persons being considered for access to other types of protected information.

Decisions regarding eligibility for access to classified information take into account factors that could cause a conflict of interest and place a person in the position of having to choose between his or her commitments to the United States, including the commitment to protect classified information, and any other compelling loyalty. Accesses decisions also take into account a person's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. No coercive policing could replace the self-discipline and integrity of the person entrusted with the nation's secrets as the most effective means of protecting them. When a person's life history shows evidence of unreliability or untrustworthiness, questions arise whether the person can be relied on and trusted to exercise the responsibility necessary for working in a secure environment where protecting classified information is paramount.

2. *The adjudicative process.*

(a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is an acceptable security risk. Eligibility for access to classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudication process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following factors:

(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;