[Senate Hearing 105-480]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 105-480
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
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HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
48-165 CC WASHINGTON : 1998
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC
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ISBN 0-16-057011-5
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
SLADE GORTON, Washington DALE BUMPERS, Arkansas
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
CONRAD BURNS, Montana TOM HARKIN, Iowa
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire HARRY REID, Nevada
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado PATTY MURRAY, Washington
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
LAUCH FAIRCLOTH, North Carolina BARBARA BOXER, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
Steven J. Cortese, Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Deputy Staff Director
James H. English, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi HARRY REID, Nevada
SLADE GORTON, Washington ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah PATTY MURRAY, Washington
CONRAD BURNS, Montana HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
TED STEVENS, Alaska (ex officio)
Staff
Alex W. Flint
W. David Gwaltney
Lashawnda Leftwich
C O N T E N T S
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Page
Statement of Federico Pena, Secretary of Energy, Department of
Energy......................................................... 1
Opening statement of Senator Pete V. Domenici.................... 1
Statement of Senator Harry Reid.................................. 2
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Statement of Senator Byron L. Dorgan............................. 5
Stockpile safety and reliability................................. 6
Annual stockpile certification................................... 6
Treaty safeguards................................................ 7
Annual stockpile certification................................... 9
Prepared statement of Federico Pena.............................. 12
Annual certification............................................. 15
Funding for Stockpile Stewardship Program........................ 15
Importance of Stockpile Stewardship Program...................... 16
CTBT Treaty obligations and prohibition.......................... 17
New or modified weapon design needs.............................. 18
Proliferation of nuclear weapons................................. 18
Enabling legislation for the CTBT................................ 19
Responsibilities of DOE.......................................... 19
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Statement of Franklin C. Miller, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy, Department of
Defense........................................................ 21
Stockpile reductions............................................. 22
START I and future force levels.................................. 22
Key CTBT principles.............................................. 23
Tritium supply................................................... 23
Verification of treaty violations................................ 24
Prepared statement of Franklin C. Miller......................... 24
Statement of Harold P. Smith, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Atomic Energy (Nuclear and Chemical and Biological
Defense Programs), Department of Defense....................... 26
Verification of treaty violations................................ 28
Prepared statement of Harold P. Smith, Jr........................ 29
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Statement of Dr. Victor H. Reis, Assistant Secretary of Energy
for Defense Programs, Department of Energy..................... 35
Background on program............................................ 48
Stockpile stewardship--Concept and risk.......................... 49
Experimental and diagnostic tools................................ 50
Weapon remanufacture............................................. 51
Challenges and risks............................................. 52
Prepared statement of Victor H. Reis............................. 53
Funding for stockpile stewardship................................ 57
Annual certification............................................. 57
CTBT safeguards.................................................. 58
Supreme national interest clause................................. 59
CTBT safeguard C--Capability to resume underground testing....... 60
Detection capability............................................. 60
National ignition facility....................................... 60
Los Alamos Neutron Center........................................ 62
Confidence in the stockpile...................................... 62
Signatory countries to the CTBT.................................. 64
Dual revalidation................................................ 64
CTBT safeguard B--Nuclear laboratories........................... 66
Annual certification............................................. 66
Future funding for stockpile stewardship versus testing.......... 67
Onsite inspection mechanism of CTBT.............................. 68
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:41 p.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Pete V. Domenici (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Domenici, Cochran, Reid, and Dorgan.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
STATEMENT OF HON. FEDERICO PENA, SECRETARY OF ENERGY
OPENING STATEMENT OF PETE V. DOMENICI
Senator Domenici. Could we have order, please?
We are going to try in the next 2 hours or slightly less to
have two panels of witnesses on our subject matter, the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The first will be Hon. Federico
Pena, Secretary of Energy.
Then the panel following you, Mr. Secretary, will be Dr.
Victor Reis, Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense
Programs; and Frank Miller, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy, to be accompanied by
Dr. Harold Smith, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Atomic Energy.
I thank you all for coming and whoever is here in the
audience, we appreciate your presence.
I thank the two Senators who are here on the Democratic
side. My ranking member has exhibited as strong an interest in
all of this as I have and I am most pleased that he can be here
at this hearing. Frankly, as many Senators as can get a head
start on this issue, the better off the proposal is and the
better off we are as an Appropriations Committee.
This is the first hearing scheduled by the Energy and Water
Development Subcommittee of Appropriations to explore how the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, if ratified, will impact the
appropriation process for the Nation's defense and energy
budgets.
I am expecting that we will determine major impacts both on
DOE's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program and on their
verification programs on appropriations.
The President on September 22, transmitted the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Senate for our study and
evaluation prior to consideration of providing consent to
ratification of the treaty. While all treaty actions require
careful evaluation, this particular treaty presents a most
unique set of potential benefits and risks which will require
unusual care in our deliberations and studies.
In the short time we have spent thus far in learning about
it and attending other hearings on it, that last statement may
even be an understatement.
The CTBT is directly relevant to the power of our nuclear
stockpile as the ultimate deterrent force for preserving our
country's freedom and global stability.
On a personal note, nuclear stockpile issues are the
subject of intense interest and focus for me. I have worked at
them, around them, and with this stockpile issue for almost 25
years, now.
In our hearing today, we are going to hear from the
Secretary of Energy, Federico Pena, as our first panel, and I
have already told you who will follow on the second one.
Now, I yield to the ranking member and to Senator Dorgan
for any remarks they may wish to make.
STATEMENT OF HARRY REID
Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman, this hearing is extremely
important and I am glad that you have moved forward quickly to
establish the guidelines and direction for this, I think one of
the most important watershed events to come from the end of the
cold war, that is, how do we make sure that our nuclear arsenal
is safe and reliable.
Every president since President Eisenhower has maintained a
nuclear arsenal to deter aggression, initially of the Soviet
Union and later China, and it has worked.
Mr. Chairman, I have a statement that I would ask be made
part of the record in its entirety. I am very anxious to get to
the witnesses and my statement I think covers what needs to be
covered.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I would ask your permission to have this made part of the
record.
Senator Domenici. It will be made part of the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Harry Reid
INTRODUCTION
The serious consideration being given all around the world to
implementation of a treaty banning any and all nuclear explosions is a
watershed event accompanying the end of the Cold War. For more than 50
years, the major nuclear powers founded their relationships on the very
real possibility of a nuclear confrontation that might become
uncontrollable. To prevent this catastrophe, each side established
nuclear arsenals adequate to deter the other side from nuclear
aggression. The moves and counter moves essential to maintaining this
balance of deterrence required continuous modernization and replacement
of stockpiled weapons on both sides. The testing of these new weapons
for their respective stockpiles was, and is today, the only tried and
true means of guaranteeing that the newly configured stockpile would be
safe and effective, and would be perceived by the other side as
effective, in maintaining the nuclear balance between the opposing
superpowers.
Compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will deny
confidence, formerly attained through testing, for the production and
stockpiling of new nuclear weapon designs. This loss of confidence is
believed adequate to inhibit new weapons development by both sides,
effectively ending continuous stockpile improvements through
modernization and replacement. Although a prohibition of any and all
nuclear explosions cannot guarantee a prohibition of new weapons
development (it only prohibits the testing of newly developed weapons),
it will inhibit such development, and thereby will promote
stabilization of existing nuclear arsenals.
Implementation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty could promote
confidence between former adversaries that cooperation without
confrontation is possible. Such confidence could lead to further
reductions in nuclear arsenals. The international example of refraining
from nuclear testing, along with reductions in strategic stockpiles,
could reduce incentives for nonnuclear states to develop their own
nuclear explosives capabilities.
The likely cessation of unconstrained growth of nuclear weapons
stockpiles and reduction of proliferation incentives among nonnuclear
nations are benefits that are enabled by a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. A cost of these benefits is an unmeasurable reduction of
confidence in the safety and reliability of our enduring stockpile.
This cost arises because our past practices of testing for reliability,
and of replacement of aging, unsafe weapons with new, tested designs
will no longer be possible. It is essential that adequate confidence in
stockpile safety and reliability be maintained through means other than
testing because these weapons will continue to be the foundation of our
strategic national security.
Advice and consent of the United States Senate regarding the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will generate a broad debate of its
benefits and costs. As a part of that debate, it is important to
recognize what the treaty provides, and what it does not provide.
The CTBT prohibits any and all nuclear explosions for any purpose,
and thereby reduces confidence in stockpile safety and reliability
unless some other means is found to maintain that confidence.
The CTBT does not prevent new nuclear weapons development; it only
inhibits that activity. One of our earliest designs was used without
testing, so that it is evident that weapons development can proceed
without testing. However, the President of the United States has stated
that the National Weapons Laboratories are prohibited from undertaking
new weapons design activities. Moreover, United States weapons are
highly sophisticated systems that perform at the very boundary of
feasibility. It would be foolhardy in the extreme for the United States
to attempt to incorporate a new design in its delivery systems without
confirmatory testing. However, it needs to be recognized that other
nations might risk the development of a weapon without testing. In this
same spirit, the CTBT does not guarantee against modernization of
existing stockpiles; it only makes such practice highly unlikely
because new designs can not be tested for performance and safety.
Again, the United States stockpile consists of highly sophisticated
designs tailored to fit the existing delivery systems. Modernization of
that stockpile without nuclear testing is not feasible.
The CTBT provides no guarantee of a total cessation of nuclear
testing because compliance verification is very uncertain for all very
low yield tests (less than about 100 tons) and for higher yield
``decoupled'' explosions. At the same time, it is possible for a
signatory nation to execute a very high yield ``unattended'' explosion
in a clandestine operation that could not be attributed to its
originator. Whereas United States policy demands that it adhere to the
letter and the spirit of international agreements that it is a party
to, other signatory nations might not conduct their affairs with the
same level of fidelity. It is important to recognize that it is
technically possible to conduct a nuclear explosion that might not be
detected or attributed with confidence.
The CTBT does not prevent nuclear proliferation; it only inhibits
proliferation by possibly reducing proliferation incentives and by
inhibiting or preventing development testing.
The Senate debate of the CTBT risks and benefits will address each
of these issues. The following brief remarks will highlight what I
believe to be the core elements of a few of these issues.
maintaining safety and reliability of the u.s. nuclear stockpile
The nuclear weapons stockpile has been the foundation of U.S.
national security for more than 50 years. It will likely remain so for
the indefinite future. Although the Cold War has ended, there are still
enormous stores of nuclear weapons in Russia, a country whose political
and economic future remains uncertain. At the same time, China is a
significant nuclear power with national interests that will not always
be compatible with our own. For these and other reasons, the President
has said, `` * * * I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable
nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United
States.''
The advent of a ban on nuclear testing was accompanied by the
development of a plan to retain confidence in our nuclear stockpile for
the indefinite future without nuclear testing. This plan relies on
significant advances in scientific understanding and computer
simulation of weapons performance to predict with confidence the state
and character of our stockpile without testing. Its success depends
critically on dramatic increases in computational performance and on
dramatic increases in the resolution with which nonnuclear experiments
can be measured.
The core issues of this so-called Stockpile Stewardship Program are
the investments in computers and codes for advances in numerical
simulation, and the investments in new experimental facilities to
develop the data upon which the simulations will rely.
This year, the fiscal year 1998 appropriation for the Stockpile
Stewardship Program was about 4.2 billion dollars, exceeding the
Administration's request by about 200 million dollars. Subsequently,
the Department of Energy, working with the Department of Defense and
the National Weapons Laboratories, concluded that the stewardship
program will require about 4.5 billion dollars per year for ten years,
or 500 million dollars more per year than requested for fiscal year
1998.
The explanation for the differences between the original
Administration request, the appropriation, and the subsequent
determination of required funding is that the developers and executors
of the stewardship plan are still learning about program requirements
and their costs. This is a reasonable and believable explanation.
Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that we have learned all we need to
know to predict with confidence the exact content, schedule, and cost
of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. In fact, it is more likely than
not that we still have much to learn.
One of the ``safeguards upon which the CTBT is conditioned mandates
the stockpile stewardship program to ensure confidence in the safety
and reliability of our nuclear stockpile.'' It is important that the
Administration and the Congress recognize that the stewardship program
is breaking new ground, ``going where none have gone before'', and we
must be prepared and committed to providing the necessary resources for
its success.
The Senate deliberations on the CTBT will doubtless explore the
level of uncertainty in the stockpile stewardship plan, and will
attempt to determine the levels of commitment to program success on the
part of both the Congress and the Administration.
TEST READINESS
Another of the CTBT safeguards mandates the maintenance of the
basic capability to resume nuclear testing should the United States
withdraw from the treaty. Such withdrawal might be necessary if a
nation ignores or violates the treaty, and, in so doing, disrupts the
strategic balance in ways that might only be corrected through
additions or replacements to our own stockpile.
Another safeguard acknowledges that the President, in consultation
with Congress, is prepared to withdraw from the treaty in deference to
our supreme national interest in maintaining a safe and reliable
stockpile. This option could be activated if the Stockpile Stewardship
Program concluded that it was unable to certify high confidence in the
safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type that is determined to be
critical to maintaining our nuclear deterrent. This safeguard is
rendered impotent if we do not faithfully ensure our readiness to
resume testing if and when necessary.
I believe that a critical issue arises in test readiness. Should
the United States identify a safety or reliability problem with a
stockpile weapon type that prevents high confidence in the stockpile
deterrent value, it could withdraw from the treaty under the ``supreme
national interests'' clause. Withdrawal under these terms would permit
the recovery of stockpile confidence by nuclear testing. Upon
withdrawal, it might be concluded by another nation that the United
States stockpile is ineffective. Therefore, during the period of time
between treaty withdrawal and stockpile remedy through testing, an
opponent might conclude that the United States is vulnerable to nuclear
extortion or to nuclear attack. It is unacceptable to extend that
window of real or perceived vulnerability by inadequately defining or
funding a test readiness program.
During the Senate consideration of the CTBT, I am going to
stimulate the development of a plan for test readiness that will ensure
the absolute minimum delay between a decision to resume testing, and
the actual resumption of testing.
COMPLIANCE VERIFICATION
It is self evident that verification of compliance with the CTBT is
of paramount interest to all the signatory nations. Accordingly, a very
comprehensive treaty verification effort has been mounted as a part of
the treaty development. The International Monitoring System (IMS)
addresses all the known local and remote signatures that would indicate
that a nuclear explosion has occurred. A prototype data repository,
called the International Data Center (IDC) has been developed to
accumulate and integrate the data from the worldwide measurement sites
of the IMS.
Whereas the IMS and IDC will provide formidable capability to
detect a nuclear explosion, the system is not infallible. Very low
yield explosions can be conducted anywhere without assured detection,
and some geographic locations are better than others for clandestine
testing in violation of the treaty. At the same time, there are evasive
measures that permit much higher yield explosions without assured
detection by elements of the IMS. Finally, it is possible for a nation
to conduct a clandestine operation leading to an unattended nuclear
detonation that could not be attributed to the source nation. In this
case, all would know that a treaty violation occurred, but none would
know which nation was responsible.
Whereas it is reasonable to assume that the strategic balance might
not suffer from a single undetected test by one of the nuclear
superpowers, such a test by an emerging nuclear capable state could
provide that nation with confidence adequate to upset a local or
regional balance of power.
The inability to verify with confidence that signatory nations are
complying with the terms of the treaty is a serious deficiency. Such
compliance uncertainty might be considered a fatal flaw. This
deficiency would certainly make the treaty unacceptable if undetectable
violations could lead to a disruption of nuclear deterrence. Both of
these concerns must be explored during the coming debates.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A Comprehensive Test Ban treaty would indeed be a watershed event
deriving from the termination of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the CTBT
does not provide all the things its proponents claim for it. It does
assuredly prohibit all nuclear explosions for any purpose, but it does
not appear to be conclusively verifiable under all conditions and for
all prohibited activities.
A CTBT will necessarily reduce our confidence in the safety and
reliability of our nuclear deterrent, but the developing Stockpile
Stewardship Program shows promise of maintaining adequately high
confidence for the indefinite future.
Nevertheless, the program is still developing, so its costs and
risks are not known presently, and it is likely that their
understanding will continue to evolve over the life of the program.
This means that a dedicated Federal commitment will be necessary over
the long haul if the program is to succeed.
Maintaining readiness to resume testing is a central and compelling
ingredient of implementing a CTBT. This readiness provides a hedge
against stewardship failure and against a treaty breakout by another
nation. The period between a decision to resume testing and actual test
execution could be a period of real or perceived vulnerability, and is
consequently a period of extreme danger. That window of real or
perceived vulnerability needs to be made as small as possible.
Implementation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would be a
remarkable achievement that offers significant promise of strategic
nuclear stability. It could be a critical milestone along the path of
nuclear disarmament. But there are significant uncertainties in its
consequences, in our ability to manage and respond to those
consequences, and in the fidelity of assured compliance with the terms
of the treaty. These uncertainties and their associated issues will be
the subject of intense debate by the Senate as we move toward a policy
decision that will define an appropriate balance between the treaty's
costs, its risks, and its promised benefits.
STATEMENT OF BYRON L. DORGAN
Senator Domenici. Senator Dorgan.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, I think this hearing is an
excellent hearing. I appreciate your leadership and look
forward to hearing our witnesses. I would simply say that I
support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I would hope that we
could see rather swift Senate ratification of that.
I do have a Commerce Committee hearing at the same time, so
I will have to be in and out. Thank you so much.
Statement of Federico Pena
Senator Domenici. Thank you, Senator.
Would you please proceed, Mr. Secretary. You know our time
constraints and we know that you have a lot of things to do.
Your remarks will be handled however you like. You have a
written statement and it will be made a part of the record as
if read. You may either give it or parcel it out, whichever you
prefer.
Secretary Pena. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
also salute you and congratulate you for having the foresight
to have such an early hearing on such a very important matter.
I also want to thank the members of the subcommittee who are
here this afternoon.
Mr. Chairman, I do have a fuller set of remarks which I
would like to formally submit for the record.
Senator Domenici. They will be made part of the record.
Secretary Pena. Let me, if I may, present some abbreviated
remarks. I will try to follow the general guideline you gave in
opening the hearing. But I believe there are some significant
points that I do want to make and I would be very happy to try
to answer whatever questions you may have.
STOCKPILE SAFETY AND RELIABILITY
Mr. Chairman, since becoming the Secretary of Energy, I
have made the safety and reliability of our Nation's nuclear
stockpile a top priority. In my confirmation hearing, I stated
that I could not imagine any responsibility more serious than
certifying to the President on an annual basis that our nuclear
stockpile was safe and reliable.
Since my confirmation in March, I have visited each of the
Department's three weapons laboratories and have personally
engaged each of the weapons laboratory directors in discussions
about the strength and adequacy of stockpile stewardship. I
have also met with experts both within and outside of the
Department and I am pleased to report: One, that there is
strong consensus that stockpile stewardship is the right
program to address the challenges of maintaining our nuclear
deterrent without underground nuclear testing; two, that the
program is properly sized and funded for the out-years; and,
three, that with the President's six safeguards, we can enter
into the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT] with confidence
that the safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent can be
maintained.
ANNUAL STOCKPILE CERTIFICATION
These recent months of analysis and interagency review have
allowed us to complete the technical assessments that form the
basis for our second annual certification that the stockpile
remains safe and reliable and that there is no need to return
to underground nuclear testing at this time.
Secretary Cohen and I will soon make this certification to
the President. As part of this process, I have personally
spoken to each of the weapons laboratory directors and to the
commander in chief of the Strategic Command to insure that they
are confident in their assessment--and they are--of the safety
and reliability of the stockpile.
The quest to end underground nuclear testing and to
legislate a CTBT began decades ago with Presidents Eisenhower
and Kennedy. With the end of the cold war, we finally have an
opportunity to achieve this bipartisan goal.
The transmittal of the treaty by President Clinton to the
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification last month
represents the culmination of many years of effort on the part
of the U.S. Government agencies, the national laboratories, and
the Congress.
There continues to be overwhelming public support for such
a treaty, and for good reason. This treaty provides a
significant benefit to our national security. It will
contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the
process of further nuclear disarmament.
Even with these contributions, we recognize that the global
community continues to face difficult security challenges. To
meet the challenges, a credible nuclear deterrent, the
foundation of our U.S. national security, must be maintained.
As the President has stated, the United States must and
will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any
future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic
nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests.
In this regard, the President said, ``I consider the
maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a
supreme national interest of the United States.''
Mr. Chairman, it has been more than 5 years since our last
underground test and, as the Secretary of Defense and I will
soon certify to the President, the stockpile is both safe and
reliable today. Our job now is to continue to maintain the
safety and reliability of the deterrent under a CTBT. Why do we
think we can meet this challenge and what are we doing to
manage the risks?
TREATY SAFEGUARDS
In August 1995, when the President first announced that the
United States would pursue a zero-yield CTBT, he declared that
U.S. adherence would be predicated upon six safeguards. I am
here because the Department of Energy plays a vital role in
each of those six safeguards.
Let me briefly highlight those for you.
Safeguard A requires the conduct of a Science-Based
Stockpile Stewardship Program. President Clinton directed the
Department of Energy to develop stockpile stewardship more than
4 years ago, and he has repeatedly asked for the sustained
bipartisan support of Congress for this program. We have made
enormous strides in this program over the last several years.
I have visited our laboratories to see first hand the
progress of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. I am pleased to
report that it is working. We are successfully addressing
several stockpile warhead issues by using a combination of
analysis, new experimental data, archived test and
manufacturing data, and, most importantly, the collective
judgment of our weapon design laboratories. These successes,
using the experimental and testing tools available today,
provide confidence that the even more powerful computing and
testing tools being developed now will allow us to solve future
stockpile problems without nuclear testing.
Safeguard B requires the maintenance of modern nuclear
laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and
exploratory nuclear technology. A number of activities being
conducted as part of the Stockpile Stewardship Program are
designed to help us carry out our responsibilities under this
safeguard.
For example, in May, I participated in the groundbreaking
ceremony for the national ignition facility at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. The NIF is designed to produce,
for the first time in a laboratory setting, conditions of
temperature and density of matter close to those that occur in
the detonation of nuclear weapons. The ability to study the
behavior of matter and energy under these conditions is key to
understanding the basic physics of nuclear weapons and
predicting their performance without underground nuclear
testing.
Another central component of our program is the accelerated
strategic computing initiative, called ASCI. It provides the
leading-edge, high-end simulation capabilities needed to meet
weapon assessment and certification requirements without
nuclear testing. I believe that with the sustained, bipartisan
support of the administration and this Congress, the new
experimental facilities and programs will expand and enhance
the scientific and engineering base for stockpile stewardship.
In addition, they will assure that we can continue to attract
and retain the high quality personnel needed to make the sound
scientific and technical judgments on the safety and
reliability of the stockpile in the absence of underground
nuclear testing.
Safeguard C requires the maintenance of a basic capability
to resume underground testing. We are meeting this requirement
through a number of important activities at the Nevada test
site, including the conduct of subcritical experiments. I have
visited the Nevada test site. I want to thank Senator Reid for
his hospitality in helping me through that visit in August
because it has been over a decade since a Secretary of Energy
last visited the Nevada test site.
While I was there, I spoke to the scientists who are
responsible for the successful completion of our two
subcritical experiments. These experiments, a key element of
stockpile stewardship, will help us improve our basic knowledge
of the properties of plutonium.
In addition, consistent with this safeguard, we are
maintaining the capability at the test site to resume nuclear
testing if directed by the President.
The President's inclusion of safeguards D and E recognizes
the importance of continuing research and development in
monitoring and verification to the success of the treaty. The
Department of Energy CTBT research program is further
developing the necessary core monitoring technologies to
increase confidence in verifiability. The research program
addresses all of the CTBT international monitoring system
technology areas as well as technologies for on-site inspection
and confidence building measures.
Safeguard F, the supreme national interest clause,
specifies that if the President is informed by the Secretaries
of Energy and Defense, advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council,
the directors of the weapons laboratories, and the commander of
the Strategic Command, that a high level of confidence in the
safety or reliability of a weapon type critical to the nuclear
deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in
consultation with the Congress, would be prepared to withdraw
from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in order to conduct
whatever nuclear testing might be required.
To determine the overall safety and reliability of the
stockpile, the President directed the establishment of a
rigorous annual certification process. As I noted, we expect to
complete the second of these annual certifications very soon.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Secretary, I am going to take a
telephone call. You can proceed.
Senator Reid, would you chair while I am gone. I will be
back shortly. It won't take me but 2 minutes.
Secretary Pena. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ANNUAL STOCKPILE CERTIFICATION
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I was going
to refer to a chart that I have here before us. But given the
nature of the time for this hearing, perhaps I will not go
through it in detail.
The purpose for presenting this chart to you--and I believe
you have copies before you--is to give you a sense of the
thoroughness and the reaffirmation of the process that we use
in order to allow both the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Energy to certify to the President that, in fact,
our weapons are safe and reliable.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TTREATY.000
Let me just give you a quick summary to give you a sense of
how we are able to make this certification with confidence.
We start at the top, with the Nuclear Weapons Council,
which initiates the process. If you look at the chart, you will
see that on the left-hand side we have DOD making all of its
military inputs. The services task the project officers group
and they give their input in terms of concerns they may have.
On the Department of Energy side, we have our laboratory
directors who also input their advice.
The importance of the working group is that they make an
assessment for each class of weapon and develop a report for
each class of weapon. I have been shown these reports. They
then go through DOE, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, and STRATCOM for review. From there
they go to the Standing and Safety Committee of the Nuclear
Weapons Council, then to the Nuclear Weapons Council, and then
to me and to the Secretary of Defense upon which we decide
whether we want to make the certification to the President.
The point that I want to make here is that, while we do
this collaboratively between the Department of Defense and the
Department of Energy, we also have independent reviews. For
example, the commander in chief of the Strategic Command,
General Habiger, has his own advisory group, former laboratory
directors, and others who advise him in reviewing the strategic
advisory group report.
Similarly, on the right side of the chart, in terms of DOE,
I also get independent letters from each of the laboratory
directors giving me their best judgment about the safety and
reliability of the stockpile. Based on these independent
reviews, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy
then jointly send a letter to the President indicating our
confidence in the reliability and safety of the stockpile.
I wanted to review that for you to give you a sense of the
thoroughness and the way in which we proceed. It is simply not
a ratification of what others have suggested.
CLOSING REMARKS
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me state that the
President has made the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty one of his
highest national security priorities, and the President is
committed to working with the Congress on stockpile
stewardship. The administration's continuing support for
stockpile stewardship underscores that our nuclear forces will
continue to serve as a deterrent against aggression and
coercion, a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of
our security commitments to our allies, and a discouragement to
those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring
their own nuclear weapons.
When the President made the United States the first
signatory of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the U.N.
General Assembly last year, he demonstrated that the United
States is committed to being a leader in this area. He signed
the treaty with the very same pen that President Kennedy used
because he thought it was important to show that we were
passing the torch.
We are passing that very same torch with a new generation
of engineers who will be working with our current engineers and
scientists who will prepare themselves for the future. It is
because we believe that this treaty is fundamentally in the
national security interest of the United States that we also
ask for your support.
Millions of Americans, perhaps more than ever before, long
for the peace of mind that comes with knowing that our world is
safe from either accidental or intentional nuclear disaster. By
constraining nuclear and nonnuclear weapons States from
developing more advanced weapon types, the treaty serves our
nonproliferation and disarmament goals and moves us all closer
to achieving this peace of mind.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for allowing me to make
my opening statement. I am very pleased now to respond to any
questions from you or Senator Reid.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary Federico Pena
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. It is
a pleasure to appear before you this afternoon to discuss the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and how the Department of Energy's
Stockpile Stewardship program allows us to maintain the safety and
reliability of our nation's nuclear stockpile.
Since becoming the Secretary of Energy, I have made the safety and
reliability of our nation's nuclear stockpile a top priority. In my
confirmation hearing, I stated that I cannot imagine any responsibility
more serious than certifying to the President on an annual basis
whether or not our nuclear stockpile is both safe and reliable.
Since my confirmation in March, I have visited each of the
Department's three weapons laboratories, and have personally engaged
each of the weapons laboratory directors in discussions about the
strength and adequacy of Stockpile Stewardship. I have also met with
other experts both within and outside of the Department, and I am
pleased to report that there is a strong consensus that Stockpile
Stewardship is the right program to address the challenges of
maintaining our nuclear deterrent without underground nuclear testing;
that the program is properly sized and funded for the outyears; and
that, with the President's six safeguards, we can enter into the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty with confidence that the safety and
reliability of our nuclear deterrent can be maintained.
These recent months of analysis and interagency review have also
allowed us to complete the technical assessments that form the basis
for our second annual certification that the stockpile remains safe and
reliable. I expect that Secretary Cohen and I will soon certify to the
President that the stockpile is safe and reliable and that there is no
need to resume underground nuclear testing at this time. As part of
this certification process, I have spoken to each of the weapons
laboratory directors, and to the Commander-in-Chief of Strategic
Command to ensure that they are confident in their assessment--and they
are--of the safety and reliability of the stockpile.
The quest to end all nuclear weapons test explosions began decades
ago with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. With the end of the Cold
War, we finally have the opportunity to achieve this bipartisan goal.
The transmittal of the Treaty by President Clinton to the Senate
for its advice and consent to ratification last month represents the
culmination of many years of effort on the part of United States
government agencies, the National Laboratories, and the Congress. There
continues to be overwhelming public support for such a treaty, and for
good reason. This treaty provides a significant benefit to the national
security of the United States. It will contribute to the prevention of
nuclear proliferation and the process of further nuclear disarmament.
We recognize that the global community continues to face difficult
security challenges. To meet the challenges, a credible nuclear
deterrent--the foundation of U.S. national security--must be
maintained. As the President has stated, ``the United States must and
will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future
hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from
acting against our vital interests * * * in this regard * * * I
consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be
a supreme national interest of the United States.''
It has been more than five years since our last underground test
and, as Secretary Cohen and I will soon certify to the President, the
stockpile is both safe and reliable today. Our job now is to continue
to maintain the safety and reliability of the deterrent under a CTBT.
Why do we think we can meet this challenge, and what are we doing to
manage the risks?
In August of 1995, when President Clinton first announced that the
United States would pursue a zero-yield CTBT, he declared that U.S.
adherence to a CTBT would be predicated upon six safeguards:
(A) The conduct of a Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship program--
for which there must be sustained bipartisan support from Congress--to
ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of our
nuclear weapons stockpile;
(B) The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and
programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology;
(C) The maintenance of a basic capability to resume nuclear test
activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be
bound to adhere to the Treaty;
(D) A continued comprehensive research and development program for
treaty verification and monitoring operations;
(E) The continued development of a broad range of intelligence
gathering and analytical capabilities; and
(F) The understanding that if the President is informed by the
Secretaries of Defense and Energy as advised by the Nuclear Weapons
Council, the Directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories, and
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command that a high level of confidence in
the safety and reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two
secretaries consider critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer
be certified, the President, in consultation with the Congress, would
be prepared to withdraw from CTBT under the supreme national interest
clause.
I am here today because the Department of Energy plays a vital role
in each of these six safeguards. And I am here because I consider the
stewardship of our nation's nuclear stockpile to be my highest
responsibility. I have emphasized the significance of this
responsibility with each of the directors of our nuclear weapons
laboratories and I will continue to stress the Department's
responsibility to uphold the six safeguards that the President
outlined. I would now like to briefly highlight our role in each of
these six safeguards.
SAFEGUARD A
Safeguard A requires the conduct of a Science-Based Stockpile
Stewardship program. President Clinton directed the Department of
Energy to develop this program more than four years ago. We have made
enormous strides in this program over the last several years. The
program has been designed to combine laboratory experimentation with
advanced computations in lieu of underground nuclear testing to ensure
high confidence in the safety and reliability of the stockpile.
I have visited our three nuclear weapons laboratories to see
firsthand the progress of the Stockpile Stewardship program. I am
pleased to report that Stockpile Stewardship is working. We are
successfully addressing several stockpile warhead issues by using a
combination of analysis, new experimental data, archived test and
manufacturing data, and most importantly, the collective judgment of
our weapon design laboratories. These successes, using the experimental
and testing tools available today, provides confidence that those even
more powerful computing and testing tools being developed now will
allow us to solve future stockpile problems without nuclear testing.
Our stewardship program is also designed so that the day-to-day
needs of the stockpile are met in a cost efficient and environmentally
responsible manner. The production plants at Savannah River, Pantex,
Kansas City, and Oak Ridge are producing critical limited life
components, like tritium reservoirs, and making the necessary repairs
to support the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile.
SAFEGUARD B
Safeguard B requires the maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory
facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear
technology. A number of activities being conducted as part of the
Stockpile Stewardship program are designed to help us carry out our
responsibilities under this safeguard. In May, I participated in the
groundbreaking ceremony for the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. NIF is designed to produce, for the
first time in a laboratory setting, conditions of temperature and
density of matter close to those that occur in the detonation of
nuclear weapons. The ability to study the behavior of matter and energy
under these conditions is key to understanding the basic physics of
nuclear weapons and predicting their performance without underground
nuclear testing.
Another central component of our program is the Accelerated
Strategic Computing Initiative. ASCI provides the leading-edge, high-
end simulation capabilities needed to meet weapon assessment and
certification requirements without nuclear testing. The national
laboratories are focused on providing the application codes and related
science needed to address weapon safety, reliability, and performance.
They are also developing improved tools and methodologies to utilize
this unprecedented volume of data.
Even at this early stage in their development, advanced ASCI codes
are providing unprecedented capabilities to our weapons program. For
example, we have reduced the time it takes to complete one simulation
from 74 days to 7 hours. We are not only doing the same things faster,
we are performing calculations and simulations that we once only
imagined possible.
I believe that with the sustained, bipartisan support of the
Administration and the Congress, the new experimental facilities and
programs will expand and enhance the scientific and engineering base
for Stockpile Stewardship, and assure that we can continue to attract
and retain the high quality personnel needed to make the sound
scientific and technical judgments on the safety and reliability of the
stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear testing.
SAFEGUARD C
Safeguard C requires the maintenance of a basic capability to
resume underground testing. We are meeting this requirement through a
number of important activities at the Nevada Test Site, including the
conduct of subcritical experiments. I visited the Nevada Test Site in
August and spoke to the scientists responsible for the successful
completion of our subcritical experiments. These experiments--a key
element of Stockpile Stewardship--will help us improve our basic
knowledge of the properties of plutonium. In addition, consistent with
this safeguard, we are maintaining the capability at the Test Site to
resume nuclear testing, if directed by the President.
My visit in August is the first that a Secretary of Energy has made
to the Test Site in more than a decade. I was impressed by the
dedication and the talent of the scientists and engineers who are
responsible for conducting the subcritical experiments.
SAFEGUARDS D AND E
The President's inclusion of Safeguards D and E recognizes the
importance of continuing research and development in monitoring and
verification to the success of the Treaty. The Department of Energy's
CTBT research program is further developing the necessary core
monitoring technologies to increase confidence in verifiability. The
research program addresses all of the CTBT International Monitoring
System (IMS) technology areas--seismic, infrasound, radionuclide, and
hydroacoustic--as well as technologies for on-site inspection and
confidence building measures. For example, to provide for CTBT
radionuclide regional monitoring, we have developed an automated ultra-
sensitive near real-time radionuclide detection and analysis system.
These technologies meet IMS specifications, and are available
commercially.
In addition, Department of Energy research programs are helping to
improve U.S. National Technical Means related to CTBT monitoring. For
example, the Department is also conducting research and development for
satellite-based detection systems.
SAFEGUARD F
Safeguard F specifies that if the President is informed by the
Secretaries of Energy and Defense, advised by the Nuclear Weapons
Council, the directors of the weapons laboratories, and the Commander-
in-Chief of Strategic Command that a high-level of confidence in the
safety or reliability of a weapon type critical to the nuclear
deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation
with the Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under
the Supreme National Interest Clause in order to conduct whatever
nuclear testing might be required.
To determine the overall safety and reliability of the stockpile,
the President directed the establishment of a rigorous, annual
certification process. As I noted, we expect to complete the second of
these annual certifications soon. I would like to take a moment to
explain how this process works. As you can see, it is a comprehensive
and thorough procedure.
The certification process requires that the weapons design
laboratories and the Department of Defense review all weapons types--
both active and inactive. From this review, the laboratory directors,
the Nuclear Weapons Council, and the Commander-in-Chief of Strategic
Command each independently advise the Secretaries of Energy and Defense
on the results. Based upon these results, we determine whether or not
to certify to the President that there is no need to return to
underground nuclear testing.
The rigor and thoroughness of this procedure ensures that, from the
level of the technicians working with the weapons on a day-to-day
basis, to the designers who know the inner workings of the weapons, to
Secretary Cohen and myself, every level of authority is appropriately
informed of and accountable for the safety and reliability of the
weapons stockpile.
And let me stress that if I am advised by the nuclear weapons
laboratory directors that there is a problem with the stockpile that is
critical to our nuclear deterrent and that we are unable to correct
without returning to underground nuclear testing, I will not hesitate
to advise the President of such.
CONCLUSION
President Clinton has made the CTBT one of his highest national
security priorities and is committed to working with the Congress on
the Stockpile Stewardship program. At the same time, the
Administration's continuing support for Stockpile Stewardship
underscores that our nuclear forces will continue to serve as a
deterrent against aggression and coercion, a hedge against an uncertain
future, a guarantee of our security commitment to allies, and a
discouragement to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise
acquiring their own nuclear weapons.
When President Clinton made the United States the first signatory
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the United Nations General
Assembly last year, he demonstrated that the United States is committed
to being the leader in this arena. He signed the Treaty with the very
same pen that President Kennedy used to bring the Limited Test Ban
Treaty to life. A symbolic gesture, but a meaningful one. The gesture
symbolized the passing of a torch from one generation to the next.
At our weapons laboratories right now, the torch is being passed. A
generation of scientists and engineers who created the awesome power
behind the mushroom cloud are passing the torch to a generation of
scientists and engineers, who may never know its shadow. To this new
generation of scientists and engineers, the CTBT, and the stewardship
program that underpins it, is our commitment to the national security
that they work so very hard every day to protect.
It is because we believe that this Treaty is fundamentally in the
national security interest of the United States that we ask your
support. Millions of Americans, perhaps more than ever before, long for
the peace of mind that comes with knowing that our world is safe from
either accidental or intentional nuclear disaster. By constraining not
only nuclear weapons development by non-nuclear weapons states, but
also the development of more advanced weapon types by nuclear weapon
states, the Treaty serves our nonproliferation and disarmament goals,
and moves us closer to achieving this peace of mind.
Annual certification
Senator Domenici. Senator Reid, do you have any questions?
Senator Reid. Yes, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, with the certification process there is no
congressional involvement other than appropriating the
necessary money. Is that true?
Secretary Pena. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Reid. How much time is there from beginning to end
of the certification process?
Secretary Pena. The first certification--and I must speak
from what I have been informed since it was conducted by my
predecessor, then Acting Secretary Curtis--took at least 1
year. It was the first time that the annual certification had
occurred. In fact, it took a little over 1 year.
Since that time, we have made very significant progress in
doing the second certification. And, in fact, as respects the
process of the second certification, the Nuclear Weapons
Council has already acted on the information provided to it. It
has now been transmitted to both myself and the Secretary of
Defense and we hope very soon to make the final judgment about
the second annual certification.
FUNDING FOR STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM
Senator Reid. It is my understanding that the
administration believes the stockpile can be maintained without
testing as we have known it for about $4.5 billion a year for
the next 10 years. So that is $4.5 billion times 10.
Is that something that you agree with?
Secretary Pena. I do, Senator. If I could just amplify that
a bit, as you know, when the Stockpile Stewardship Program was
first designed, it was contemplated that about $4 billion per
year would be needed.
We have observed in the last several years of the program
that additional needs were presented to the team responsible
for the Stockpile Stewardship Program and also that some
additional issues had been funded in previous years--for
example, emergency preparedness--which were not directly
related to stockpile stewardship.
For those and other reasons, we have now agreed that for
fiscal year 1999 we will formally submit to the Congress an
amount of $4.5 billion for stockpile stewardship. It will then
serve as the baseline for the out-years. And we will formally
submit that early next year as part of our formal budget
presentation to the Congress.
Senator Reid. As I think you have indicated and I want to
make sure this is right, the $4.5 billion does cover all the
known requirements for maintaining a safe and reliable
stockpile, is that right?
Secretary Pena. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Reid. Also, your certifying is dependent on
information you get from our laboratories and other such
information, is that not true?
Secretary Pena. From a number of sources, that's correct:
Our laboratories, the Nuclear Weapons Council, the STRATCOM,
and then whatever questions and information I gather when I
visit the labs, when I visit the test site, and other forms of
information.
Senator Reid. There is no fat in this $4.5 billion, then?
This is what the administration is determined is the amount of
money needed to certify safety and reliability for the
stockpile?
Secretary Pena. That's correct, Senator. This is a very
precise budget. We have spent many, many hours, not only with
our laboratory directors but with obviously the DOE team, with
the Department of Defense, with OMB and others to arrive at the
$4.5 billion amount.
Senator Reid. The last question I would ask orally is this,
and I would ask permission to submit some other questions in
writing. We, as appropriators, need to get $4.5 billion for you
to certify safety and reliability of this arsenal. This is not
a number that you have given us that has fat in it so that we
can come back with $4.1 billion and you will be able to do your
job. So, it is $4.5 billion to do your job, then, and nothing
less. Is that true?
Secretary Pena. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Reid. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
IMPORTANCE OF STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Senator.
Mr. Secretary and other members of the administration who
are here as proponents of the treaty, I assume you know all of
this. But I just wanted to make sure that I told you this.
If you want to hear at least one serious, lengthy
discussion against the treaty, you all ought to get the
testimony of Dr. Jim Schlesinger who testified before the
Committee on Governmental Affairs, which has jurisdiction over
much of this on the authorizing side.
Incidentally, an interesting observation was made by Dr.
Schlesinger for some of you who are more technical than I and
perhaps more technical than the Secretary. He said, ``Don't
misunderstand me. Even if we were permitted to do nuclear
testing, if you asked me for my recommendation, I would also
say you ought to also have stockpile stewardship anyway.''
So it is interesting, his observation of what this program
will do.
My second observation, Mr. Secretary--and these are among
the early hearings, so I think we ought to put some of these
issues out--is clearly Dr. Schlesinger's arguments and the
arguments that many will make on the same side do not concern
themselves with the next 4 years or even the next 10 years.
They are talking about 15, 20, and 25 years out.
I am not so sure that I want to say it is that far out.
But, nonetheless, the point of it is, the concern is that we
are locked into the treaty in perpetuity short of our pulling
ourselves out. I guess from the standpoint of some experts, the
fact that you could maintain a valid stockpile without testing
at some time is an issue that will find itself in these
discussions on this treaty without any question.
I want to just ask about two issues.
CTBT TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND PROHIBITION
I understand that the treaty obligations only prohibit the
conducting of nuclear explosions. I do not believe that the
CTBT is a nuclear disarmament treaty.
I believe you said that. But would you agree with that?
Secretary Pena. Senator, if I understand the nature of the
question, you are correct. What is prohibited is nuclear
explosions either for military purposes or peaceful purposes.
However, there are other forms of energy releases which are
permitted under the CTBT and there is a history in the
negotiations which allow certain things. For example, the
national ignition facility [NIF] is accepted as being
consistent with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Senator Domenici. I am going to get to another question in
1 minute. But I was making an observation that the treaty only
prohibits the conduct of nuclear explosions. I believe that it
is not a nuclear disarmament treaty. Is that correct?
Secretary Pena. That is correct, Senator. I misunderstood
your question.
Senator Domenici. I think the President, I note in sending
this treaty up, was very clear. There are a lot of ways this
treaty has been expressed, even by the President in various
speeches, which we have noted. But when he sent it up, he said
that the language does not imply that the treaty prohibits the
development of new types of nuclear weapons or the improvement
of existing weapons. It does recognize that the treaty will
have the effect of constraining in some way such activities.
NEW OR MODIFIED WEAPON DESIGN NEEDS
Now I want to ask you this question. Does the treaty take
away the rights of any country, including ours, to build or
design new nuclear weapons or to modify existing nuclear
weapons?
Secretary Pena. No, sir.
Senator Domenici. Would the treaty, if it were ratified,
have any relevance to the recent decision to modify the B-61
bomb to have an earth penetrating capability?
Secretary Pena. We believe it does not, Senator.
Senator Domenici. The effectiveness of this treaty in
constraining the development of nuclear weapons by rogue States
is a discussion piece. Many are talking about what is the
impact on the potential of rogue States having nuclear bombs.
Now from what I understand, the United States did not need
a test for one of the designs used in World War II, and the
earliest U.S. weapons were designed with computer tools far
less sophisticated than any modern personal computer of today.
Now I am not a historian, but I am told that is the case.
Perhaps Dr. Smith can confirm that when he takes the witness
stand.
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In the Governmental Affairs hearing on Monday, both
Secretary Schlesinger and Dr. Barker questioned whether the
CTBT would limit actions of rogue States, like Iraq, Iran,
Libya, or North Korea, to develop their own weapons or to use
testing that suited their purposes.
Now what assurances do we have that the existence of this
new treaty will constrain development of nuclear capabilities
by a rogue nation and, thus, effectively curb proliferation of
nuclear weapons?
Secretary Pena. Senator, that is a very good question. By
the way, let me say that I have had two conversations with Dr.
Schlesinger about these matters. So we have, I think, had a
very constructive discussion about it.
We strongly believe that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
in the way that it has verifiability provisions, in the way
that it puts forth a rather extensive monitoring system
throughout the globe, in the way in which it allows information
to be presented to the Executive Council by which a country
which allegedly has conducted a test inconsistent with the
treaty, effectively allows us to deter nations from conducting
the types of tests that are necessary to develop sophisticated
nuclear weapons.
I believe that the experts who will talk to you in a
classified setting will perhaps share that there may be some
very basic types of weapons that may not need the kind of
testing that we are concerned about. But for very sophisticated
weapons, we believe no country can develop those unless they
have the ability to do underground testing.
Because this treaty, if ratified and in effect by the
nations of the world, would prohibit those kinds of tests, we
believe that effectively it prevents and deters and certainly
discourages other countries from even beginning to consider the
kind of testing necessary for the development of very
sophisticated nuclear weapons. In that sense, it is a very
effective deterrent to the proliferation of nuclear weapons
throughout the world.
Senator Domenici. I believe, Senator Reid, you asked
whether or not there was anything that the Congress had to do
other than to ratify this treaty as it pertains to this treaty.
Senator Reid. And appropriate the money.
Senator Domenici. And appropriate the money, yes. I might
say, obviously, the Senator is correct and the response that
you gave is correct.
ENABLING LEGISLATION FOR THE CTBT
But it does seem that in order to make sure that this
treaty is supported, we may have to get enabling legislation
passed that creates some assurances with reference to how we
are going to conduct ourselves with reference to supporting
what this treaty needs. I assume you are looking at some
possible enabling legislation and you will be open to
discussing that with various committees?
Secretary Pena. That's correct, Mr. Chairman. There are a
number of enabling pieces of legislation which would be, I
think, appropriate for final passage.
But if I might, I believe the question that Senator Reid
asked me was particularly about this process. He asked, as I
walked through this chart, if the Congress was particularly
involved in this process [indicating], and I answered no as
respect to this process.
But, obviously, the Congress is involved in many other
ways.
Senator Domenici. I was out of the room and returned in the
middle of that discussion. I apologize for my
misinterpretation. But I think essentially we understand each
other.
Before I move on to some other witnesses, I want to make a
couple of comments to you.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOE
Mr. Secretary, when you were assigned, designated by the
President to be the Secretary of Energy, we had some rather
lengthy meetings. I believe my best advice was that the success
of the Department of Energy for any prolonged period of time
here in the Congress would probably rely almost exclusively on
how you conducted yourself with reference to that part of the
Department of Energy that has to do with maintaining the
nuclear arsenal.
I believe I suggested to you that the most questionable
aspects about the Department of Energy among many Senators was
whether or not it would appropriately handle, year by year, the
requirements of maintaining this nuclear arsenal.
I was very pleased that you listened attentively and that
on a couple of occasions thereafter you concurred. I want to
compliment you.
This is not to say that you don't have many other powerful
functions in the Department. I think when you have one of the
powerful hands with reference to nuclear bombs and nuclear
weapons maintenance, I assume you end up thinking it is a very
important part of your mission.
I do want to compliment you on how much time you have
designated to it and how diligently you have gone about
learning the job and, equally as important thus far, the kind
of people you are surrounding yourself with. I think we talked
about that, too.
We cannot have people with three or four missions in life
talking about maintaining the stockpile. They have to be
preoccupied with and worried about it and it has to be very
predominant in their thinking.
While we have not been able to approve all of your
designees, I think we are going to. We have six of them waiting
up here.
Secretary Pena. Last night, Senator, five were approved.
Senator Domenici. And I think the sixth is going to be
approved now.
So thank you very much. You don't have to stay around for
the rest of the hearing. I know that you have much to do.
We are going to proceed with the next panel.
Secretary Pena. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Reid.
Senator Domenici. Thank you.
Senator Reid. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN C. MILLER, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY
Senator Domenici. Our next panel is made up of Vic Reis,
Dr. Smith, and Mr. Miller. Whether it is the Defense Department
supporting the DOE nuclear programs or the DOE supporting
Defense, in any event, you are all friends today.
Dr. Reis. Yes; we are all friends today--and it is really
more than just today, sir.
Senator Domenici. We will begin the second panel now. We
will have questions about two issues that are going to require
some closed sessions which we will do afterwards. We will just
ask you to go with us to the closed session room. It won't take
us very long.
We are going to start now with Mr. Miller. Dr. Smith, you
should go second. Dr. Reis, if you don't mind, you will go
third.
First, I want Mr. Miller to review the current U.S. nuclear
weapons requirements. Then I want you to explain how those
might change, what our stockpile will be if Russia ratifies
START II, whether the tritium reserve requirements might change
and the status of dealerting proposals, and consideration of
changes in the makeup of the TRIAD.
I think you are aware of that. Then, when I get to Dr.
Smith, I will tell you what I am hopeful you will present to
us.
Mr. Miller.
STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN C. MILLER
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator Domenici, Senator Reid.
I am honored to have this opportunity to appear before you
to discuss the confidence in the safety and reliability of our
stockpile without nuclear explosive tests.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will begin with a
brief historical perspective.
Since the end of the Second World War, U.S. nuclear weapons
have deterred major aggression threatening the United States
and our allies. It was that deterrent against the backdrop of
the cold war which broke the historic and periodic pattern of
total conventional war. It is a remarkable fact that, for
almost one-half century, the United States and its allies faced
the U.S.S.R. and its coerced auxiliaries armed to the greatest
extent which huge sacrifice would afford and yet did not fight
a large-scale war.
We successfully persevered long enough to allow Soviet
communism to collapse of its own internal weaknesses.
Some had argued that the danger of nuclear weapons was so
great that the risk of possessing them outweighed the benefits.
But I don't think we agree. Nuclear deterrence helped buy us
time, time for democracy and diplomacy to contain communism,
time for the internal forces of upheaval and decay to rend the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and bring about the end of the
cold war. I don't think anybody doubts that our nuclear
deterrent played an important role in all of this.
But the cold war is now over and the U.S. nuclear posture
reflects this. I think history will make clear that that
posture and our policy anticipated this historic development.
Nuclear deterrence requirements and the plans designed to
implement them are the result of an intense, collaborative
process between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
joint staff, and the U.S. Strategic Command.
Working from broad national guidance, my staff, the joint
staff, and the Strategic Command staff develop the targeting
requirements which underpin U.S. nuclear deterrence policy. The
type of delivery vehicles and the type of warheads carried by
those delivery vehicles are derived directly from those
targeting requirements.
The Navy and the Air Force then assume primary
responsibility for the health and safety of the delivery
systems, while my colleagues, Dr. Smith and Dr. Reis, assume
primary responsibility for the health and safety of the nuclear
stockpile itself.
STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS
As you point out, Senator Domenici, we are engaged in an
arms control process. Over the past 10 years, but particularly
since the end of the cold war, we have significantly reduced
our nuclear weapons arsenal. We have done so on the basis of an
analysis, a careful analysis, of the changes in the world and
the consequent changes that our deterrence posture requires.
We have determined that many categories of weapons are no
longer needed and we eliminated those categories.
All of this does not mean that nuclear weapons have no role
in our future deterrent posture, in our future national
security posture. In 1994, the administration's nuclear posture
review reaffirmed the role of nuclear deterrence in our
national security policy. But while we continue to explore the
new possibilities for increased stability and future arms
reduction treaties, we also plan to deploy a TRIAD of strategic
nuclear delivery systems and a very limited arsenal of
nonstrategic nuclear forces, insuring a survivable and
effective deterrent force.
START I and future force levels
Our current policy, in fact, the law of the land as
mandated by the Congress, is that we maintain our forces at
START I levels until START II is ratified by the Russian Duma
and enters into force. At that point, we will proceed down to
3,500 to 3,000 nuclear warheads. But we will maintain a TRIAD.
We are examining, as the committee, knows, the START III
requirements. We have worked a basic framework with the Russian
government at Helsinki this spring, and that would further
reduce strategic nuclear warheads to an active arsenal of
between 2,000 and 2,500 weapons. Obviously and clearly, the
requirements that we have for tritium will shrink, depending on
the entry into force of START II and the successful negotiation
and entry into force of START III.
But our current policy, again, as mandated by law, is to
maintain START I levels until the Duma ratifies START II. Our
policy is that we will not begin active negotiations of START
III until the Duma ratifies START II.
The CTBT is an important element of our approach to
national security in the post-cold war world. The United States
took a leading role in the creation of the treaty. President
Clinton was the first head of State to sign it and we look
forward in the near future to receiving the Senate's advice and
consent to the treaty.
KEY CTBT PRINCIPLES
The treaty is in the national security interests of the
United States and it will constrain nuclear and nonnuclear
weapons States from developing more advanced weapons
capabilities. Nevertheless, under the CTBT, certain key
principles will remain unchanged. Because nuclear weapons will
continue to play a role in our national security strategy, the
deterrent must remain credible.
The warheads and the systems that carry them must be safe,
reliable, and effective, and the quality, reliability, and
effectiveness of our forces, including command, control, and
communications links and the people who operate them, are among
our top priorities in the Department of Defense.
The safeguards which Secretary Pena alluded to and
discussed, in fact, are structured to maintain our nuclear
stockpile and insure our continued security under the CTBT.
In the interest of brevity, Mr. Chairman, I will not go
through all of the safeguards because Secretary Pena spoke to
them. Of course, safeguard A does mandate the establishment of
a science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program which is
absolutely essential to the safety and reliability of the
stockpile under the CTBT.
Under the Stockpile Management Program, under the
Stewardship Program, we may, in fact, in the future have to
modify nuclear weapons and their delivery systems as, in the
future, parts reach the end of their design life. These
modifications are not prohibited by the CTBT. In fact, only
nuclear weapon test explosions are prohibited.
While there is no current need to produce nuclear warhead
designs, administration policy requires that the Department of
Energy maintain that capability to respond to potential future
requirements.
DOE must maintain the capability to refabricate and certify
weapons types in the enduring stockpile.
TRITIUM SUPPLY
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned tritium. We in the Department
of Defense are particularly interested in assuring the
continuity of the tritium supply and we await with great
anticipation a decision from the Department of Energy in the
near future on its preferred approach to insuring the tritium
production supply.
I will not discuss safeguard F as that has already been
discussed by Secretary Pena.
VERIFICATION OF TREATY VIOLATIONS
Another CTBT matter of extreme importance is the
verifiability of the treaty. We recognize that there are
enormous monitoring challenges presented by the treaty. It is
wider in its scope than those imposed by any previous nuclear
test related treaty. But we believe that our existing and
future programs will provide us the capability to do so.
There are, of course, conceivable CTBT evasion scenarios.
But the administration believes the treaty is effectively
verifiable because of the wide range of resources that we have.
We have the means to assess whether the treaty is deterring the
conduct of nuclear explosions and we believe that, in terms of
numbers and yields of tests, that we would know if any nation
were carrying out actions which could undermine U.S. security
interests.
PREPARED STATEMENT
The administration's judgment that the CTBT is effectively
verifiable also reflects the belief that U.S. nuclear
deterrence would not be undermined by the numbers and yields of
possible nuclear tests that the United States might fail to
detect under the treaty.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Franklin C. Miller
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to have
this opportunity to appear before you today as this committee considers
the important question of how the United States will ensure continued
confidence in the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile
without nuclear explosive tests.
With the Chairman's permission, I will begin by providing a brief
historical perspective. Since the end of World War II, U.S. nuclear
weapons have deterred major aggression threatening the U.S. and its
allies. It was the U.S. nuclear deterrent which, against the backdrop
of the Cold War, broke the historic and periodic pattern of total
conventional war. It is a remarkable fact that for almost half a
century, the U.S. and its allies faced the U.S.S.R. and its coerced
auxiliaries, armed to the greatest extent huge sacrifice would afford,
and yet did not fight a large-scale war. We successfully persevered
long enough to allow Soviet Communism to collapse of its own internal
weakness.
Some argued that the danger of a nuclear war was so great that the
risk of possessing these weapons far outweighed their benefits. I do
not agree. Nuclear deterrence helped buy us time, time for democracy
and diplomacy to contain Communism; time for internal forces of
upheaval and decay to rend the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and
bring about the end of the Cold War. Can anyone really doubt that our
nuclear forces played an important role in this? But the Cold War is
over now and the U.S. nuclear posture reflects this. Indeed, history
will make clear that U.S. nuclear policy and posture anticipated this
historic development.
Nuclear deterrence requirements--and the plans designed to
implement them--are the result of an intense collaborative process
between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and
the U.S. Strategic Command. Working from broad national guidance, my
staff, the Joint Staff, and the STRATCOM staff develop the targeting
requirements which underpin U.S. nuclear deterrence policy. The type of
delivery vehicles and the type of warheads carried by those delivery
vehicles are derived directly from those targeting requirements. The
Navy and the Air Force then assume primary responsibility for the
health and safety of the delivery systems, while my colleagues, Dr.
Smith and Dr. Reis assume primary responsibility for the health and
safety of the nuclear stockpile itself.
Over the past 10 years, but particularly since the last year of the
Cold War, we have significantly reduced our nuclear weapons arsenal. We
have done so based on careful examination of the changes in the world,
and the consequent changes in our deterrence requirements. We
determined that many categories of nuclear weapons were non-essential
to our national security and have taken them out of the arsenal and
eliminated them. We halted nuclear weapons systems development
programs. But all of this does not mean that nuclear weapons have no
role in our current or future security posture. In September 1994, the
Administration's Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the importance of
nuclear deterrence. The NPR recognized that the strategic environment
has been important role in this? But the Cold War is over now and the
U.S. nuclear posture reflects this. Indeed, history will make clear
that U.S. nuclear policy and posture anticipated this historic
development.
Nuclear deterrence requirements--and the plans designed to
implement them--are the result of an intense collaborative process
between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and
the U.S. Strategic Command. Working from broad national guidance, my
staff, the Joint Staff, and the STRATCOM staff develop the targeting
requirements which underpin U.S. nuclear deterrence policy. The type of
delivery vehicles and the type of warheads carried by those delivery
vehicles are derived directly from those targeting requirements. The
Navy and the Air Force then assume primary responsibility for the
health and safety of the delivery systems, while my colleagues, Dr.
Smith and Dr. Reis assume primary responsibility for the health and
safety of the nuclear stockpile itself.
Over the past 10 years, but particularly since the last year of the
Cold War, we have significantly reduced our nuclear weapons arsenal. We
have done so based on careful examination of the changes in the world,
and the consequent changes in our deterrence requirements. We
determined that many categories of nuclear weapons were non-essential
to our national security and have taken them out of the arsenal and
eliminated them. We halted nuclear weapons systems development
programs. But all of this does not mean that nuclear weapons have no
role in our current or future security posture. In September 1994, the
Administration's Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the importance of
nuclear deterrence. The NPR recognized that the strategic environment
has been transformed. Conventional forces have assumed a larger share
of our security posture. Nonetheless, nuclear weapons continue to play
a critical role in deterring aggression against the U.S., our forces
and our allies. While we continue to explore new possibilities for
increased stability and future arms reduction treaties, we also plan to
continue to deploy a triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems, and a
very limited arsenal of non-strategic nuclear forces, ensuring a
survivable and effective deterrent force.
The positive changes in the international environment are far from
irreversible. And there are a range of new potential threats. One
cannot survey the list of rogue states with potential WMD programs and
conclude otherwise. The knowledge that the U.S. has a powerful and
ready nuclear capability is, I believe, a significant deterrent to
proliferators to even contemplate the use of WMD.
The CTBT is an important element of the Administration's approach
to nuclear security in the post-Cold War world. The United States took
a leading role in the creation of this treaty. President Clinton was
the first head of state to sign it and we look forward in the near
future to receiving the Senate's advice and consent to the Treaty. The
Treaty is in the national security interests of the United States. It
will constrain nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states from developing
more advanced nuclear weapons capabilities.
Nevertheless, under a CTBT, certain key principles will remain
unchanged. Because nuclear weapons will continue to play a role in our
national security strategy for the foreseeable future, the Nation's
nuclear deterrent must remain credible. Weapons systems and their
warheads must be safe, reliable and effective. The quality,
reliability, and effectiveness of our forces, including the command,
control, and communications system, and the people who operate them are
among our top priorities in the Department of Defense.
Under our national security strategy requiring a nuclear deterrent,
the Administration's CTBT safeguards are structured to maintain our
nuclear stockpile and ensure our continued security under a CTBT.
Safeguard A mandated the establishment of a Science-Based Stockpile
Stewardship program to insure a high level of confidence in the safety
and reliability of the stockpile. To this end, the Department of Energy
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) is a comprehensive
program designed to meet that requirement. The Department of Defense
has worked closely with DOE in developing this plan. DOE Assistant
Secretary Reis will discuss the program in more detail.
Under the SSMP, we must maintain the capability to certify weapon
types in the enduring stockpile. This means we may have to modify
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in the future as parts reach
the end of their design life, wear out, and are no longer in
production. These modifications are not prohibited by the CTBT, only
nuclear weapon test explosions are prohibited. We will require that the
stockpile continue to remain safe, secure and reliable into the future.
While there is no current need to produce new nuclear warhead
designs, Administration policy requires that DOE maintain the
capability to respond to potential future requirements. DOE must
demonstrate the capability to refabricate and certify weapons types in
the enduring stockpile. It must also maintain the capability to design,
fabricate and certify new nuclear warheads.
A critical element of stewardship is tritium. If ``new'' tritium is
not available sometime near the middle of the next decade, the U.S.
could be forced to make unilateral reductions in deployed forces, or to
otherwise modify our deterrent posture for lack of technical and
material support. We anticipate and eagerly await a decision from DOE
in the very near future on its preferred approach to producing tritium
that will meet our future stockpile requirements.
Under Safeguard F, associated with the CTBT, President Clinton
directed the Secretaries of Defense and Energy to certify to the
President whether the Nation's nuclear stockpile remains safe and
reliable without the need for nuclear explosive tests. The
certification is based on an assessment by the Nation's chief nuclear
managers, operators, and scientists (i.e., the joint Nuclear Weapons
Council, the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Command, and the
Directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories). If our experts advised
us they could no longer certify the safety and reliability of a weapon
type critical to our national deterrent without testing, the
Secretaries would inform the President, who would be prepared, in
consultation with Congress, to withdraw from the Treaty under the
supreme national interest clause and conduct appropriate nuclear tests
required to fix the problem. We consider this possibility to be remote
given a properly supported and executed stockpile stewardship and
management program.
Another CTBT matter of extreme importance is the verifiability of
the Treaty. We believe the Treaty is verifiable but recognize that the
monitoring challenges presented by its wide scope exceed those imposed
by any previous nuclear test-related treaty. One of the President's
conditions for the Treaty is to continue a comprehensive research and
development program to improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and
operations. Therefore, our current capability to monitor nuclear
explosions will undergo significant improvement over the next several
years to meet the monitoring challenges.
There are, of course, conceivable CTBT evasion scenarios. However,
the Administration believes the Treaty is effectively verifiable
because the U.S. has a wide range of resources (e.g., National
Intelligence Means, the totality of information available in public and
private channels, and the mechanisms established by the Treaty) for
addressing compliance concerns and imposing sanctions in cases of
noncompliance. Thus, we will have the means to assess whether the
Treaty is deterring the conduct of a series of nuclear explosions that,
in terms of the numbers and yields of tests, could undermine U.S.
security interests. These verification means would enable us to take
prompt and effective counteraction.
For the authoritative estimate of U.S. monitoring capabilities with
respect to the CTBT, I refer you to the recently completed National
Intelligence Estimate, ``Monitoring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Over The Next 10 Years.''
Thus, the Administration's judgment that the CTBT is effectively
verifiable also reflects the belief that U.S. nuclear deterrence would
not be undermined by the numbers and yields of possible nuclear tests
that the United States might fail to detect under the Treaty.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy
to take your questions now or for the record.
STATEMENT OF HAROLD P. SMITH, JR., ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ATOMIC ENERGY
(NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
DEFENSE PROGRAMS)
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
Now, I would like Dr. Smith to explain how the DOD develops
specific criteria. How do we decide which warheads with which
capabilities are necessary?
I want him to explain what the President meant when he said
we will maintain our nuclear deterrent. Does that mean we can
do without some designs if problems come up? If so, which ones
do we need and which ones do we not need? Or do we have a
management structure that can make that kind of decision?
Dr. Smith.
Dr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran,
Senator Reid. For the record, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
note that the Junior in my name goes with Smith, not with the
Junior Assistant to the Secretary. With a name like ``Smith,
one needs all of the identification that one can obtain.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit my written
testimony for the record and address the questions that you
just directed to me.
Senator Domenici. It will be accepted.
Dr. Smith. Thank you, sir.
When Dr. Reis and I took office in 1993, we did not know it
but we strongly suspected that the United States had just
conducted its last nuclear test. Starting with that point, Dr.
Reis and I have jointly and collegially, built the program that
currently is before you now.
We started with concepts: That is, we knew that there were
problems associated with not testing, and we knew that there
were solutions, whether they be fast computers or particularly
new facilities. We had to develop a plan to apply those
solutions to the various problems. And, of course, we are now
to the point where we have actually developed a program--that
is, resources are being placed against those plans to solve the
problems that come up.
You might say in the beginning, in 1993, Dr. Reis and I had
to guess what this program would cost. Later on, we had to
estimate what it would cost. And now I think we are to the
point where we can calculate what it will cost.
All of this is captured in the vehicle called the Green
Book, which is, in fact, a clear, detailed program plan
developing by DOE under the auspices of the Nuclear Weapons
Council. I think we did remarkably well. The initial guesses
were about $4 billion per year. The current budget, which
Secretary Pena mentioned, is about $4.5 billion a year. To have
been within 12 percent in this brave new world of no nuclear
testing I think is quite a remarkable accomplishment. I give my
colleague, Dr. Reis, the greater part of the credit for
developing that program.
Now our job is to program scarce and competing resources
against the very demanding requirements of a world with nuclear
arsenals but no nuclear tests. The funds for the DOE and DOD
nuclear weapons activities are derived from a large, common
defense account, fondly known as 050.
In 1988, fortunately, Congress created the Nuclear Weapons
Council and authorized that it develop nuclear weapons
stockpile options, evaluate the costs of those options, and
coordinate budget matters between the two Departments.
I think the Congress is to be congratulated. The NWC, the
Nuclear Weapons Council, is ideally constituted to apply these
resources to the tasks in a prioritized manner.
It is my pleasure to chair the standing committee that
supports the Nuclear Weapons Council. It has been meeting
monthly for many, many months. We recently decided that it was
essential that we reexamine from stem to stern the nuclear
requirements, eventually leading to the DOE program.
Mr. Miller, my colleague, only last month reviewed
carefully the policy by which we set these requirements. In the
ensuing months, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will convert that
policy once again to requirements, and General Habiger, as
Commander of STRATCOM, will convert those to actual war plans,
eventually leading, of course, to the DOE program that Dr. Reis
could discuss in detail.
We must insure that adequate funds are provided to both
Departments to have a safe, reliable, and effective nuclear
deterrent. Further, these costs must be balanced against a wide
assortment of national defense priorities. The Nuclear Weapons
Council will work through the established, deliberative
procedures to insure that the nuclear programs compete
effectively against other important and high priority programs
for funding adequate to meet the broad requirements of national
security.
Senator Reid, the chairman had asked if I could address the
manner by which we come to the requirements. I have given you
the procedures and in closed session, I will be happy to go
into more detail.
I can say in this session that for each arm of the TRIAD,
there are two separate warheads, so that we can face systemic
failure of one type of warhead on each leg of the TRIAD and yet
still maintain that TRIAD. I will go into greater detail, if
you would like, in the closed session.
If I may, I would like to also discuss----
Senator Cochran [presiding]. I am serving as the chairman
in the absence of Senator Domenici, our chairman.
Dr. Smith. You can always tell a Democrat. Thank you,
Senator.
Mr. Cochran, would you like me to discuss----
Senator Cochran. I would like for you to answer the
questions that Senator Domenici outlined that he would like to
have answered.
Senator Reid. We are going to have a closed session, Thad,
a little bit later. He said that some of them he cannot answer
here.
Senator Cochran. Yes, I heard that.
VERIFICATION OF TREATY VIOLATIONS
Dr. Smith. I would like then briefly to go to the
verification of the CTBT, another important question before
this committee.
First of all, there is nothing theoretical about our
capability to verify nuclear explosions. We, the United States,
have applied many resources for many years to just this
problem. It is not perfect. There are some low yields which we
would not detect. I will leave to my colleague, Dr. Reis, if
you so desire, to discuss what the impact would be of not
detecting such low-yield devices.
But we do have a high level of confidence that we will
detect rather modest nuclear explosions and, more than that,
anyone who should choose to have a nuclear explosion, to
conduct a nuclear test, would have to live in a world in which
the CTB and the signatories of the CTB would be well aware that
such a test had been conducted.
In short, there is a form of deterrence here.
There are four different approaches to verifying nuclear
explosions. First, there is our own intelligence capability.
Second, the treaty itself allows for onsite inspections, which
is a new arm of how we verify whether or not a nuclear
explosion has taken place. Third, there are bilateral
agreements, including Russia, France, United Kingdom, and we
think next month we will have a similar agreement with the
Kazakhs. Finally, there are open sources, and these are not to
be taken lightly. Universities, laboratories, oil exploration
all have the kinds of instrumentation which can detect in one
form or another nuclear explosions.
The technologies involved here are legion. We have netted
seismic arrays. We have seismic stations. We have an array of
detectors. We have low frequency sound detection. We have
hydroacoustics. And, although not part of the treaty, our own
intelligence community provides sensors that include optical,
gamma ray, x ray, neutron, electromagnetic pulse. These are
part of our national technical means. They are not part of the
CTB. But they are all overlapping and they are all
complementary.
So the challenge is can we maintain an arsenal without
testing and can we verify compliance if there should be a test.
In my opinion, we should accept that challenge. The odds are
favorable and the benefits are legion.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I await your further
questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Harold P. Smith, Jr.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to have
this opportunity to appear before you today. As the principal advisor
to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the nuclear weapons
stockpile my remarks today will focus on the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Program (SSMP), the role of the Nuclear Weapons Council for
which I am the Executive Secretary and how the Departments of Defense
and Energy may continue to ensure high confidence in our Nation's
nuclear weapons stockpile within the constraints imposed by a
Comprehensive Test Ban.
Nuclear weapons will continue to be an essential element of
national security strategy, and the maintenance of a safe and reliable
nuclear stockpile remains a supreme national interest of the United
States. The Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Program was created to provide the tools, infrastructure, and personnel
necessary to ensure a high level of confidence in the stockpile.
In the past, nuclear testing was the sine qua non for confidence in
the Nation's stockpile. The challenge facing the Departments of Defense
and Energy is to maintain a high level of confidence indefinitely, in a
cost effective manner, without nuclear testing. The SSMP was developed
with the support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet this challenge. It is no coincidence that
these three organizations (DOE, DOD, and JCS) also provide the
principal representatives to the joint organization responsible for the
task of developing nuclear weapons stockpile options and the costs of
such options the congressionally established Nuclear Weapons Council
(NWC).
More than any other deliberative group, the NWC is the most
authoritative body concerned with the overall management of the nuclear
stockpile. As an interdepartmental organization, the NWC is supported
by a wide range of disciplines: security and safety experts, policy
makers, managers, maintainers, and operators. Membership of the NWC
consists of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)
who chairs the Council, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and a representative of the Department of Energy as designated by the
Secretary of Energy. Today, the DOE member is Deputy Secretary Moler.
The council is supported by the flag and general officer Standing and
Safety Committee, which I chair.
The activities of the NWC reflect the monumental scope of the SSMP
and the efforts put forth by both Departments to implement an effective
and efficient program. As you know, the enabling legislation for the
Nuclear Weapons Council charges the Council with responsibility for
developing costs for various stockpile options and states that the
Council will be responsible for:
(1) Preparing the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.
(2) Developing nuclear weapons stockpile options costs.
(3) Coordinating programming and budget matters pertaining to
nuclear weapons programs between the Department of Defense and the
Department of Energy.
(4) Identifying various options for cost-effective schedules for
nuclear weapons production.
(5) Considering safety, security, and control issues for existing
weapons and for proposed new weapon program starts.
(6) Ensuring that adequate consideration is given to design,
performance, and cost tradeoffs for all proposed new nuclear weapon
programs.
(7) Providing broad guidance regarding priorities for research on
nuclear weapons.
(8) Coordinating and approving activities conducted by the
Department of Energy for the study, development, production, and
retirement of nuclear warheads, including concept definition studies,
feasibility studies, engineering development, hardware component
fabrication, warhead production, and warhead retirement.
(9) Preparing comments on annual proposals for budget levels for
research on nuclear weapons and transmitting those comments to the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy before the preparation
of the annual budget requests by the Secretaries of those Departments.
The Council's primary focus is to provide the guidance necessary
for both Departments to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
weapons stockpile while at the same time ensure the efficient and
effective operation of the supporting infrastructure. I would like to
provide one example of how the process can work to the benefit of all.
The President established the current Annual Certification process
in August 1995 to ascertain on a yearly basis whether the stockpile
remains safe and reliable under a comprehensive test ban. Since then,
the Departments of Defense and Energy, the Commander of Strategic
Command, the Directors of the National Laboratories, the Services, and
Joint Staff have worked diligently to implement a timely and meaningful
process. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically
required that the process be both credible and enduring.
Over the course of the last two years, those most involved in
implementing the new Annual Certification process have developed a well
thought out approach. In 1996, the NWC completed its first report to
the President on stockpile certification. The second annual report has
been approved by the Secretary of Defense, and will be signed by both
Secretaries for transmission to the President soon. As a result of the
close cooperation, I am confident that the current process meets the
requirements stated by both the Chairman and the President and that
they will be able to certify again this year, as last, that there is no
need to return to underground nuclear testing.
The NWC and the NWC Standing and Safety Committee have striven
diligently as both Departments and the Services adjusted their
strategies, requirements, and capabilities to fit a post Cold War
world. Some of the highlights include:
--September 1991: Production of several planned new weapons halted by
Presidential initiative.
--September 1992: Last underground test.
--July 1993: Test moratorium extended.
--October 1993: Interagency Task Force Report, ``Plan for Stockpile
Stewardship Under a Test Ban''.
--November 1993: Stockpile Stewardship established.
--May 1995: First Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program Plan.
--February 1996 fiscal year 1996 SSMP Released First ``Green Book''
and Initial matching of costs to tasks.
--October 1997: Fiscal year 1997 SSMP Draft Second Green Book.
Allow me to now present two brief success stories from the past
year which illustrate the kind of effectiveness that exemplifies the
NWC process.
The first involves the retirement of the B53 bomb. Mr. Chairman, I
told you of this program when I testified before your Subcommittee
earlier this year so I will only briefly touch upon it here. Because it
was designed almost 40 years ago, the B53 did not meet modern nuclear
safety standards. The system that replaced it, the B61-11, is a modern
system that meets current standards for safety, security, and use
control. Due in large part to active participation from the
organizations represented by the NWC, the replacement program was
implemented in a remarkably short time only 16 months from initial
verbal authorization to delivery of the first retrofit kits. The drive
to replace the B53 made a significant contribution to the safety and
effectiveness of the enduring stockpile and is an outstanding example
of enlightened stockpile management.
I particularly want to emphasize that the B61-11 is a non-nuclear
modification of the previously fielded B61-7. The two weapons contain
the same physics package, so there are no requirements for nuclear
testing.
Secondly, the NWC coordinated the initiative for resuming
subcritical experiments at the Nevada Test Site earlier this year.
These experiments are necessary to study the performance of nuclear
materials in an aging stockpile. They do not involve a nuclear yield or
a nuclear explosion. Hence, they are not prohibited by a Comprehensive
Test Ban. The NWC reviewed the technical merit of these experiments and
recommended they proceed. The data derived from these experiments are
essential if we are to maintain our nuclear deterrent into the future
without the benefit of nuclear testing. Experiments such as these are
crucial to retaining a cadre of weapons scientists at the national
laboratories and an important aspect of a dynamic program of stockpile
stewardship.
Initiatives such as these illustrate the fact that the nuclear
weapons program has evolved significantly since the end of the Cold
War. The relationship between the Department of Defense and the
Department of Energy, which I have described as one of customer and
supplier, continues to evolve in response to these monumental changes.
The good news is that despite the changes, the Council remains a
dynamic, authoritative and deliberative body.
Mr. Chairman, in your letter of invitation, you asked us to address
nuclear weapons requirements and how these requirements are set. Let me
say briefly that requirements stem from our national policy. The broad
outlines of that policy have been in place for years, but in 1994,
President Clinton's Nuclear Posture Review recognized that while the
strategic environment had been transformed, nuclear weapons would
continue to play a critical role in deterring aggression against the
U.S., its overseas forces, and our allies and friends.
Having reaffirmed our policy of a continued nuclear deterrent, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff develop the
strategy needed to support that policy. The military Commanders in
Chief, including General Habiger, Commander of Strategic Command,
develop the employment plans to support that strategy. Nuclear weapons
numbers and types evolve from those plans. The President then completes
the process by approving these weapon numbers and types in the annual
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.
General Habiger and I have spoken on many occasions about the
adequacy of our current stockpile and I will leave it to him to comment
in more detail. While we must maintain the capability to certify weapon
types in the enduring stockpile, for my part, I see no current need to
produce new-design nuclear weapons. Of course we will have to modify
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in the future as parts reach
the end of their design life, wear out, and are no longer in
production. These modifications do not involve the nuclear warhead and
are not affected by the proposed CTBT.
I would now like to address the other issue which has been raised
by this committee, that is, our ability to verify test ban treaty
compliance by others.
I would like to state at the outset that a technical monitoring
system will always operate down to some limit greater than zero-yield.
The U.S. has sought a practical, proven, cost-effective approach which
will provide an acceptable level of confidence, a deterrent to
violations and an interlocking web of constraints that promotes
effective verification.
The challenges of monitoring a global ban on nuclear testing exceed
those imposed by any previous nuclear-test related treaty. The United
States has a long history in the practical application of monitoring
technologies. To meet the new challenges, the United States will use a
wide assortment of resources that include our national intelligence
means, all the information available to the intelligence community,
from both technical and non-technical sources and from public and
private channels.
Since the detection of the Soviet Union's first nuclear test in
1949, the United States has maintained and has continued to develop a
robust monitoring network of sensors and analytical techniques. Today,
the United States maintains seismic and hydroacoustic sensors for the
detection of explosions underground and in the ocean, air sampling
sensors for detection of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and
detection of effluents from underground nuclear testing, and sensors
onboard satellites for explosions in the atmosphere and space.
The verification regime called for in the Treaty includes an
International Monitoring System (IMS), composed of global networks of
seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide sensors, a global
communications network infrastructure to collect the data from these
systems and an International Data Center (IDC) to receive and process
these data and provide both data and analysis results to all Parties of
the Treaty.
The quality of these international networks are expected to meet
U.S. national standards. This system is designed to provide high
quality detection of signals from an underground, underwater or
atmospheric nuclear explosion to a level well below one kiloton when no
evasive action is taken. For example, the seismic and hydroacoustic
networks are expected to detect non-evasive tests of less than one
kiloton in the northern hemisphere.
Although each of the international sensor networks has been
designed to be operated independently, the combined capability of the
IMS is enhanced by the complementarity of the several international
sensor networks. When one sensor network detects a signal, other
networks look for corroborating patterns. The international system and
the U.S. national systems are also complementary. For example, the
established U.S. national systems tend to be focused on monitoring
areas which have in the past been of greatest concern to the United
States, while the international systems provide a more balanced global
coverage.
The result is a layered, synergistic approach to U.S. monitoring
where treaty and national mechanisms combine to improve our overall
capability for monitoring nuclear testing worldwide.
The International Monitoring System is being implemented by a
Preparatory Commission which began work earlier this year in Vienna,
Austria. The U.S. is working with the Commission to establish a
rigorous environment in which this equipment would operate. A number of
sites which were originally established as part of the United States
monitoring system will be incorporated into the new international
system. The most complete international system is the seismic network,
with 34 of the 50 primary detection stations already in place and
transmitting data to the prototype International Data Center.
The Department of Defense has in place an agreement with the
Russian Federation to cooperate with the development and installation
of IMS seismic array facilities in that country and agreements with
several other countries are pending. Current plans call for the IMS
networks to be operational within about three years.
At the center of the international verification regime is the
technically advanced International Data Center (IDC). This center must
detect and locate tens of thousands of events on an annual basis with
an unprecedented level of sensitivity and accuracy. The United States
has taken a leading role in the development of the International Data
Center and the prototype is currently operating in Arlington, Virginia.
The United States will work with the Preparatory Commission to
transition this facility to Vienna, Austria over the next three years.
The same data processing technology is also being incorporated into the
U.S. systems to handle and analyze data from our national systems.
Both the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy have
development programs to provide the required technical support to the
monitoring and compliance systems which will be used by the United
States. Both Departments will respond positively to the treaty
Safeguard requiring a continuation of the comprehensive research and
development program to improve out treaty monitoring capabilities and
operations. In this regard, I would like to acknowledge the unique
contribution that the Department of Energy's national laboratories have
made to U.S. verification capabilities, especially in the fields of
seismic sensors and on-site inspection technologies.
There are, however, evasion measures a potential violator could
employ to evade detection of a nuclear explosion or to obscure his
identity as the party responsible for the explosion. Because of this,
the U.S. will have difficulty monitoring very low-yield tests in all
environments with high confidence. Such evasive measures have been and
will continue to be carefully studied. It should be noted that the CTBT
establishes some mechanisms to provide information about ambiguous
events that we would not have otherwise. Moreover, if a significant gap
or weaknesses in the overall compliance regime is identified in the
future, further improvements in sensor capabilities would be programmed
and implemented.
In closing, our current capability to monitor nuclear explosions
will undergo significant improvements over the next several years to
meet the challenges of a global nuclear test ban. The United States
will have at its disposal a wide range of resources, including those of
our national systems, and those from the treaty monitoring mechanisms,
for addressing compliance concerns. The United States will therefore
have the means to assess whether U.S. national security interests are
being damaged by potential compliance concerns.
It is therefore our judgment that a global nuclear test ban is
effectively verifiable with the means provided by our intelligence
capabilities, together with the Treaty's verification regime, and our
diplomatic efforts.
In conclusion, the loss of testing changes the way the national
laboratories, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense
will establish confidence. We are in the process of transitioning from
an empirical system based on nuclear tests to a science based program
that will enhance our understanding of nuclear weapons processes, and
our ability to model them. In the United States, we have been preparing
for this transition for over five years. We are the vanguard of the
world's effort to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation while we
ensure our Nation's security.
The Department of Energy has a comprehensive program designed to
ensure that our weapons remain safe and reliable in the absence of
nuclear testing. The Department of Defense endorses this program. For
its part, the Department of Defense will be actively involved in
defining SSMP program elements and priorities. We look forward to
working closely with the Department of Energy to effectively manage
program responsibilities in the years to come.
We also strongly support the principle that if the SSMP does not
meet its objectives and the DOD and DOE cannot certify the reliability
of a critical element of our deterrent without nuclear testing, the
United States would give the most serious consideration to exercising
its right under the Test Ban Treaty to withdraw from the treaty under
the ``supreme national interest'' clause (Safeguard F) for the purpose
of conducting such necessary tests. The President regards that
possibility as remote, given a properly supported and executed
stewardship program. But to be successful, we need the support of not
only the Administration, but also bipartisan support from the Congress.
In short, today and for the future, assuming the SSMP program is
adequately funded and successfully executed, my confidence in the
safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent force will remain
strong. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management program is designed to
provide the tools to maintain this confidence well into the future.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
STATEMENT OF DR. VICTOR H. REIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
ENERGY FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Senator Domenici [presiding]. Thank you.
Dr. Reis, before you start, I want to pay tribute to you. I
think, while there have been many collaborators, obviously
without your vision we would not be where we are on the
science-based stockpile stewardship. And while it still has a
way to go before it is implemented, obviously, and a way to go
before we know how effective it is or will have been, I very
much think what you have done is something very significant for
the Nation and I want to congratulate you on that.
Senator Reid. Senator Domenici, that was very nice of you
to do that. I think that is very like you. Not only is it
important what he has done for our country, but for the world.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
Dr. Reis, would you proceed.
Dr. Reis. Thank you, Senator Domenici, and thank you as
well, Senator Reid, for your kind comments. Again, thank you
also for the opportunity to testify before you today on the
Stockpile Stewardship Program. This is a program that is
fundamental to our national security under a comprehensive test
ban. I would like to begin with a brief history of stockpile
stewardship, tell you what it is, give you its current status,
and then, of course, when we are in closed session, we will
answer any of your questions.
In addition to my written testimony, I would like to
provide the subcommittee with a recently published overview on
the program and, if you wish, submit it for the record. I think
you have copies of that.
Senator Domenici. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
Stockpile Stewardship Program
OVERVIEW AND PROGRESS
PREFACE
In the early 1990's, as part of its continuing world leadership
role in the arms control arena, the U.S. halted production of new
nuclear warheads and conducted its last nuclear explosive test. Thus
ended an era in which the U.S. modernized its nuclear weapons stockpile
by continually replacing aging systems with new systems and in which
nuclear testing served as the ultimate arbiter of the safety,
reliability, and performance of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.
With the decision to cease production of new nuclear warheads and
end nuclear testing, the nation now faces the challenge of maintaining
its existing nuclear weapons stockpile with other tools and different
kinds of tests. To meet this challenge, the Department of Energy has
developed a Stockpile Stewardship Program. The strategy and key
components of this new approach are described in the May 1995 DOE
report ``The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program: Maintaining
Confidence in the Safety and Reliability of the Enduring U.S. Nuclear
Weapon Stockpile.'' This overview and progress report updates the 1995
report and describes the program accomplishments to date.
Since the genesis of the Stockpile Stewardship Program in 1992,
significant progress has been made. A Record of Decision on the
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement was issued in December
1996, establishing the architecture for the future U.S. weapons
complex. An implementation plan for the Stockpile Stewardship Program
(the Green Book) has been developed and is already in its second annual
revision. The Presidentially mandated first Annual Certification of the
stockpile was completed in February 1997, and many new capabilities and
facilities for the Stockpile Stewardship Program are well under way.
The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility is under
construction, and the groundbreaking ceremony for the National Ignition
Facility has taken place. Industry has begun delivering the advanced
computers required for the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative,
and record-breaking teraops (one trillion operations per second)
operation has already been demonstrated. The first and second
subcritical experiments, ``Rebound'' and ``Holog,'' were successfully
completed at the Nevada Test Site on July 2 and September 18, 1997,
respectively. A life extension process for the enduring stockpile is
being developed, and the dismantlement of U.S. nuclear warheads retired
from the stockpile is continuing. The assets of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program were applied to a modification of the B61 bomb, and
we are on track to restore the nation's capability to produce tritium.
As experience is gained in assessing the safety and reliability of
the enduring U.S. nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing, key
program strategies of the Stockpile Stewardship Program have evolved
and become better focused. In this report, an overview of the current
program is presented along with the highlights of the Department of
Energy's accomplishments and progress to date.
Maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile in this new era will
continue to challenge our best capabilities. The Stockpile Stewardship
Program must be implemented promptly and fully. In particular, new
facilities and capabilities must be developed and validated while
personnel with nuclear-test experience are still available. In
addition, we will continue to rely on peer review between the three
weapons laboratories as a key element of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program. Despite the wide-ranging challenges and risks, we are
confident that this program provides the framework and capabilities for
success.
Victor H. Reis,
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, U.S. Department of
Energy.
PREPARED STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON
SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST
As part of our national security strategy, the United States must
and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future
hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces. In
this regard, I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear
stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States.
I am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our
nuclear weapons labs that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our
nuclear deterrent under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty through a
science-based stockpile stewardship program without nuclear testing.
President Clinton,
August 11, 1995.
ADDRESSING STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM CHALLENGES
Over the past five years, the Department of Energy's Stockpile
Stewardship Program has evolved from a vision for the future to an
implemented plan of action. While the program's fundamental objective
is unchanged from previous years--that is, to maintain high confidence
in the safety, reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile--the conditions under which this objective must be
accomplished have changed greatly since the early 1990's. The
Department of Energy (DOE) is meeting and will continue to meet an
unprecedented challenge--namely, to maintain high confidence in the
safety, reliability, and performance of the nation's nuclear weapon
stockpile by using nonnuclear experiments and computer simulations in
lieu of underground nuclear testing.
--No nuclear testing.--The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
which was signed by the President in September 1996 and
submitted to the Senate for ratification on September 23, 1997,
prohibits nuclear testing unless the involved State Party
invokes the ``supreme national interest'' clause and withdraws
from the treaty. Currently, there is high confidence in the
safety, reliability, and performance of the nuclear warheads in
the enduring stockpile. This confidence is based on
understanding gained from 50 years experience and more than
1,000 nuclear tests, including the results of approximately 150
nuclear tests of modern weapon types during the last 20 years.
The President has expressed his confidence in the ability of
the Department of Energy to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent
without nuclear testing. In response, the DOE's nuclear weapons
stewards have directed their combined energies to developing
new nonnuclear experimental facilities (National Ignition
Facility [NIF], Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
Facility [DARHT]), a world-class computational capability to
enable simulation of complex nuclear explosions, and the
conduct of subcritical experiments at the Nevada Test Site.
--Tritium production.--The United States has not produced tritium for
nuclear warheads since 1988 and will require a new tritium
production source possibly as early as 2005. A dual-track
approach using a commercial light water reactor and accelerator
production of tritium is being vigorously pursued.
--An aging stockpile.--Nuclear warheads are not static objects.
Materials change over time (e.g., radioactive decay,
embrittlement, corrosion). Some of these changes do not
adversely affect warhead safety, reliability, or performance;
but others may, and some are yet unknown. With the average age
of the stockpile now being 14 years--older than ever before--it
is expected that new problems will arise. In addition, a number
of warheads are approaching the end of their originally
anticipated deployment period. To meet this challenge, each of
the stockpiled warheads is undergoing a thorough assessment to
determine vulnerabilities and to establish refurbishment
schedules that will ensure stockpile life extension.
--An aging cadre of stockpile stewards.--Many of the scientists and
engineers with actual weapons design, production, and test
experience have already retired, and most of those remaining
are within ten years of retirement. A new generation of weapons
scientists and engineers must be trained and their competence
validated before the current generation leaves the workforce.
Knowledge preservation programs are underway that include
video-recording the experiences of senior designers as well as
the mentoring of new stockpile stewards. The senior designers
are also reviewing archived nuclear weapon test data and
showing the future stewards how to interpret and extract useful
information previously not needed when nuclear tests were
conducted.
--A smaller less diverse stockpile.--The nation's stockpile now has
fewer warheads and fewer warhead types than at any time since
the 1960's. Thus, the U.S. nuclear deterrent is more
susceptible to common process and common component failures. A
new annual certification process and an enhanced surveillance
process have been initiated to ensure that potential problems
are found before the safety and reliability of the stockpile is
degraded.
--No requirements for new-design nuclear warhead production.--Without
new production programs, warheads will remain in the stockpile
well beyond their anticipated lifetimes and beyond the
Department of Energy's base of experience. Without requirements
for new warheads, existing warheads will be refurbished and
modified to extend their lifetimes. To address this challenge,
the capability is being maintained to design and fabricate
replacement warhead parts, as well as to design replacement
warheads for existing stockpiled weapons.
--A reconfigured production complex.--The production complex of the
Cold War years is being downsized and consolidated. The future
capability-based complex, with its reduced capacity, will not
be configured for high-rate production programs. Thus, improved
manufacturing processes, including the integration of system
design, component design, and process development, will be
needed to achieve timely production at a reduced cost. To
address this challenge, a Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement was developed that specifies significant reductions
in the size of the DOE nuclear weapons complex and the
development of an agile, capability-based manufacturing
enterprise that will use advanced design and production
techniques to respond to both normal and contingency
requirements.
The focus of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is the U.S.
nuclear stockpile. All elements of the program are directed at ensuring
the safety, reliability, and performance of this stockpile. As stated
in the above responses to each program challenge and as described in
more detail throughout this document, we will develop the fundamental
understanding needed to ensure the ability to anticipate and fix
problems and to deal with future unknowns before they affect stockpile
safety or reliability.
At the heart of the Stockpile Stewardship Program is the issue of
confidence. Confidence in the weapons is achieved through the effective
management of the system that maintains the weapons and the expert
judgment of the people who assess them. The ultimate measure of success
for the Stockpile Stewardship Program is to certify that the stockpile
remains safe and reliable without a recommendation to the President
that nuclear testing is required.
The first annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile has
been completed, and both the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOE have
concluded that the stockpile is safe and reliable and that there is no
need to conduct a nuclear test. The second annual certification process
is currently underway and is on schedule.
STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM INTEGRATION
A distinguishing feature of the Stockpile Stewardship Program is
its integration. As depicted below, the Stockpile Stewardship Program
(SSP) has three major elements: Surveillance, Manufacturing and
Operations; Scientific and Experimental Integration; and, Strategic
Computing and Simulation.
Stockpile Surveillance, Manufacturing and Operations focuses on
activities that extend the life of the current stockpile, including
surveillance, maintenance, refurbishment, assessment, and annual
certification of the warheads. The Scientific and Experimental
Integration effort involves developing advanced theoretical,
computational, and experimental methods that will enable the continuing
assessment and certification of warheads in the enduring stockpile
without nuclear testing. The Strategic Computing and Simulation effort
supports both Surveillance, Manufacturing and Operations and Scientific
and Experimental Integration and includes computation, experimentation,
and modeling as well as archiving and analysis of past nuclear test
data.
All of the Stockpile Stewardship Program elements are seamless and
continual, with no clear ending of one phase before the beginning of
another. Assessment and certification pervade all activities, from
surveillance through manufacturing. Likewise, computational modeling
and prediction are integral to every activity, from the assessments of
aging-related changes, to the design and certification of replacement
components, to projections of stockpile life extension.
Not only are the laboratories and plants working closely together,
particularly for surveillance and manufacturing, but the activities
under each program are tightly interconnected. High-performance
networks linking the advanced computers, coupled with other tools, are
essential elements of this effective integration. In addition, the
Department of Energy's laboratories and plants work closely with the
Department of Defense to make sure that the enduring U.S. nuclear
stockpile meets national security requirements.
STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM STRATEGIES
The goals of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) will be
achieved through an integrated surveillance, assessment, certification,
design, and manufacturing process. These activities have remained
constant; however, the integrating strategies have evolved as the
program has matured. For example, the Stockpile Life Extension Process
(SLEP) has been developed as a formal integrated activity through which
the Department of Energy, laboratories, plants, and military services
evaluate, plan, and schedule the specific refurbishment actions to be
conducted on each weapon system. The accelerated and greatly expanded
use of strategic computing and simulation tools is the fundamental
innovation of this evolution. Today, the program is characterized by
three integrated strategies or phases of stockpile stewardship.
--Surveillance: predicting and detecting problems.--Defects and
aging-related changes must be identified before they can
degrade warhead safety, reliability, or performance. To the
extent possible, we must predict--relying on experiments
coupled with computer modeling and simulation--the occurrence
and impact of changes, both those that have been dealt with
previously in stockpile warheads and changes that have not been
encountered.
--Assessment and Certification: analyzing and evaluating effects of
changes on warhead safety and performance.--The effects of
identified and predicted age- and environment-related changes
in stockpile warheads must be assessed, utilizing in large
measure advanced numerical simulations and models to determine
whether the changes adversely affect safety, reliability, or
performance. Determinations as to whether the degradation is
severe enough to require the replacement or rebuilding of
warhead components or even entire weapons must be made.
Evaluation and certification of new materials, new fabrication
techniques, and new manufacturing processes are essential to
make sure they are functionally equivalent to the originals.
--Design and Manufacturing: refurbishing stockpile warheads and
certifying new parts, materials, and processes.--Periodically
replacements must be made for limited-lifetime components
(e.g., tritium reservoirs, neutron generators), and other
warhead parts must be rebuilt or manufactured to replace those
that have experienced or are predicted to experience
detrimental aging-related changes. The new components must be
certified so that defects that degrade warhead safety,
performance, or reliability are not introduced into the
stockpile. Advanced simulation and modeling and extensive use
of archived data are critical to maintaining confidence in the
rebuilt or remanufactured parts.
Predicting and Detecting Problems: Surveillance
Stockpile surveillance has been a major component of the U.S.
nuclear weapons program ever since the first weapons were put into the
stockpile. Approximately 14,000 weapons have been examined and
subjected to a variety of nonnuclear laboratory experiments and flight
tests since 1958. In cases where these nonnuclear tests could not
provide conclusive answers, nuclear tests of stockpile warheads or
warhead components were conducted.
Problems requiring corrective action have arisen in nuclear and
nonnuclear warhead components. All of the warhead types in the enduring
U.S. stockpile have had repairs or retrofits, and several have required
repairs to the nuclear package.
Without the replacement of older warheads with new warheads, the
stockpile will age beyond the experience base. The Department of Energy
has never before had large numbers of 30-, 40-, or 50-year-old warheads
in the stockpile. (The average age of a stockpile warhead has always
been less than 13 years.) As a result, new types of aging-related
changes and problems in these older warheads are expected to be
encountered.
To succeed in this new reality, new surveillance methods and
predictive capabilities are needed so that the full range of problems
that may arise in the enduring stockpile can be detected. There is also
a need to predict and identify aging-related changes and to understand
the significance of these changes and their effect on warhead safety
and performance. Some changes have little or no effect, whereas others
can make a major difference.
Defects occur throughout the lifetime of a warhead. Typically in
complex manufactured systems, initial defects associated with design or
fabrication form a large fraction of all defects found. With a high
sampling rate during the early years, these defects can be detected and
corrected. During middle age, the defect rate typically declines to a
lower but nonzero level. As a system ages and components deteriorate,
the defect rate climbs. The U.S. nuclear stockpile has followed the
pattern of these first two stages. We have limited experience with the
third stage and must develop the capability to predict when it will be
reached.
The goal of enhanced surveillance is to predict or detect the
precursors and onset of aging-related defects before they jeopardize
warhead safety, reliability, or performance. Predictive modeling and
simulation are central to this activity. With sufficient lead time, the
necessary redesigns, refurbishments, and recertifications can be made
efficiently and cost effectively within the capabilities and capacity
of the downsized production complex.
An enhanced surveillance process has been established to develop
the technologies and methods as well as the fundamental understanding
of materials properties and weapons science to significantly improve
detection and predictive capabilities. The major activities to be
pursued are:
--Testing and researching the aging-related behavior of existing
stockpile materials, components, and systems, including those
from retired warheads.
--Developing improved computational models of materials aging and
materials performance.
--Developing and conducting high-fidelity (i.e., enhanced data
acquisition) nonnuclear flight tests to examine the behavior of
nearly all actual warhead components in realistic environments.
(Historically, most flight tests, for example, did not include
realistic simulation of the nuclear package.)
--Developing techniques for advanced analysis of existing
surveillance data, including complex numerical models and
simulations as well as improved access to and analysis of
archived data.
As these enhanced surveillance technologies and methods are
prototyped and validated, they will be integrated into the core
stockpile surveillance process. Improved predictions of component
lifetimes, made possible through enhanced surveillance, are key to the
strategy for extending indefinitely the life of stockpile warheads.
Analyzing and Evaluating: Assessment and Certification
Data and test results must be analyzed, assessed, and evaluated
before conclusions can be drawn as to the safety, reliability, or
performance of stockpile warheads. The Assessment and Certification
Processes are designed to:
--Develop an ability to predict and understand the lifetime and
aging-related changes that occur in every warhead component.
--Identify and understand significant changes, variables, and
processes in terms of warhead safety, reliability, and
performance.
--Validate new experimental and computational tools.
--Validate new manufacturing processes and materials to ensure that
rebuilt components and warheads are equivalent to the
originals.
--Develop and demonstrate the judgment of the next generation of
weapons scientists and engineers.
The science and engineering of nuclear explosives are extremely
complex. There are many parameters and unknowns that greatly influence
the performance of nuclear warheads. Some of these have, in the past,
been identified only in nuclear test failures. Even when nuclear
testing was permitted, the weapons scientists and engineers were never
able to test nuclear warheads to a statistical certainty. In addition,
various testing constraints (e.g., the Threshold Test Ban Treaty)
required extrapolations to evaluate full-warhead performance and safety
characteristics. The key to accurate extrapolations, then as now, is
the expert judgment of the weapons scientists.
Now more than ever before, confidence in the accuracy of the
judgment of the weapons scientists and engineers and confidence in the
safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile are closely
linked. In the past, a weapon steward's judgment was developed and
validated through nuclear testing and new warhead development. The
Stockpile Stewardship Program is developing other means for honing and
demonstrating the expert judgment of the next generation of stockpile
stewards.
This is being accomplished through the integrated management of
computational simulation, applied scientific research, and nonnuclear
experiments. In particular, experiments are being designed that test
and expand the boundaries of our understanding. There are many areas of
warhead operation that cannot be adequately addressed with existing
tools and the current knowledge base of the weapons scientists and
engineers. To close these gaps, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is
making significant investments in enhanced computational capabilities
and advanced facilities for above ground experiments.
Of particular concern is the assessment challenge posed by the
unrecognized problem--the ``unknown unknown.'' The Department of Energy
must have rigorous computational and experimental processes that not
only confirm and extend what is known and expected but also to discover
gaps in our current understanding. This ability to fill in the gaps is
especially important in those areas where previously nuclear testing
would have been used to bound the margins of our concerns. Therefore,
an aggressive verification and validation process for both the tools
and the results is needed.
The Stockpile Stewardship Program provides for demonstration-based
assessment and certification of warhead safety and reliability. In the
absence of nuclear testing, different experiments and tools must be
relied on to obtain data relevant to nuclear warhead performance. A
suite of enhanced capabilities that are needed to fill in the knowledge
gaps and provide data relevant to various stockpile concerns has been
identified (see chart below). Advanced experimental facilities will
provide high-resolution data on the stages of the nuclear explosion--
primary implosion, boost, primary-to-secondary coupling, weapon
effects, etc. Wherever possible, the goal is to obtain data
experimentally by more than one method.
CAPABILITIES NEEDED TO ENSURE HIGH CONFIDENCE IN WARHEAD SAFETY AND RELIABILITY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Computer Subcritical Pulsed
Weapon physics simulation DARHT experiments NIF power LANSCE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improved physical modes.................... X X X X X X
Early implosion............................ X X X ......... ......... X
Preboost................................... X X X X X X
Boost...................................... X ......... ........... X ......... .........
Primary-secondary coupling................. X ......... ........... X X .........
Secondary implosion........................ X ......... ........... X X .........
Weapon performance......................... X ......... ........... ......... ......... .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the Stockpile Stewardship Program, computational modeling and
numerical simulation provide the critical integration of theory,
existing data, new experimental results, and predictions into results
that can be verified and validated. Advanced computational capabilities
(application codes, computing platforms, and various tools and
techniques) are being developed under the Accelerated Strategic
Computing Initiative and incorporated into ongoing stockpile
computational activities. The weapons scientists and engineers will be
focused on numerical simulations and experiments. The goal is to
combine past nuclear test data, computational modeling, and new data
from current and advanced experimental facilities to fill in knowledge
gaps and extend the fundamental understanding in all vital areas.
To assess the aging-related changes that occur in the nuclear and
nonnuclear warhead components, complex three-dimensional computational
simulations that are beyond current computational capabilities are
needed. Through the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative, the
enhanced capabilities are being developed. For example, increases of
more than ten-thousandfold in computational speed, network capacity,
and data storage are planned to provide simulations of weapon safety,
reliability, and performance. These efforts are closely linked to
experiments to validate new and evolving computer models and to provide
improved physics.
These new capabilities will be used in addition to the experimental
and computational capabilities developed during the nuclear testing
era. However, because these older tools were designed to complement
nuclear testing, they are not, in and of themselves, sufficient in the
absence of nuclear testing. As new facilities and capabilities come on
line and are validated, their data will be incorporated into our
assessments. This transition period should take several more years.
Peer review is a key component of stockpile stewardship. Because
assessment and certification of stockpile safety, reliability, and
performance rely heavily on expert judgment, it is essential that the
assessment process be vetted and validated. Peer review, both formal
and informal, takes place among the three weapons laboratories. In
addition, periodic independent reviews by outside experts help provide
confidence in the credibility of the laboratories' assessments and in
the process by which the assessments are made.
Refurbishing and Recertifying: Design and Manufacturing
Nuclear warheads are not static objects. They contain radioactive
materials that decay and organic materials that decompose with time.
Some materials, like tritium, decay predictably and must be replaced
every few years throughout the warhead's lifetime. In addition,
radioactive decay produces changes in the radioactive materials
themselves and in adjacent materials. For example, plastics and other
organic materials change with age and exposure to heat and radiation.
Many of the metals used in nuclear warheads are chemically reactive and
are damaged by long-term storage and exposure to radiation. As a
result, all warhead parts must be considered limited-lifetime
components, and all warheads in the enduring stockpile will require
periodic refurbishment and remanufacturing.
With an improved understanding of the effects of aging on warhead
safety, reliability, and performance, developed through the enhanced
surveillance and assessment efforts, the Department of Energy will be
able to take a proactive approach to refurbishment. The goal is to
replace or fix components systematically, before aging-related changes
jeopardize warhead safety or performance.
The Stockpile Life Extension Process (shown graphically on the next
page) provides the framework for research and development activities
and production planning. To retain confidence in warhead safety,
security, and performance, the SLEP risk management strategy addresses
three categories of potential refurbishment actions: musts--correct
known degradations; shoulds--prevent foreseeable degradations; coulds--
enhance safety or security. A number of specific life extension options
are being defined for each warhead type, allowing the laboratories,
plants, and the Department of Defense to anticipate and plan for future
maintenance and refurbishment requirements. The schedule guides
stockpile-related research and development--at the laboratories to
design and certify replacement components and validate new materials
and at the plants to develop and certify new manufacturing processes.
A new approach to manufacturing is being implemented to fit the
capacity of the downsized and consolidated production complex and make
full use of its capabilities. Through the Advanced Design and
Production Technology (ADAPT) initiative, the laboratories and plants
are working together to:
--Integrate product and process design through the concurrent design
and development of replacement components and the processes
used to manufacture them.
--Develop and qualify new manufacturing processes that produce high
production yields, are more efficient, and meet modern
environmental, safety, and health requirements.
--Develop and characterize improved materials that are functionally
equivalent to the originals.
--Develop agile manufacturing technologies that allow the production
complex to gear up rapidly to produce different weapon
components.
--Identify, certify, and maximize the use of commercial parts and
processes.
The Department of Energy will continue to meet the day-to-day
production requirements for limited-lifetime component exchanges and
other replacement components while also continuing to implement the
Advanced Design and Production Technology initiative. For example,
tritium-containing components must be replaced every few years, and
various other parts are needed to reassemble warheads that are removed
from the stockpile for routine surveillance and inspection.
Simulation and Modeling: Strategic Computing and Simulation
Strategic Computing and Simulation is focused on achieving
capabilities needed to support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to
implement the Stockpile Stewardship Plan. Currently, there are five
major thrusts:
--Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI)
--Stockpile Computing
--Distanced Computing and Distributed Computing for Weapon Simulation
(DisCom2)
--Numeric Environment for Weapon Simulations (NEWS)
--Validation and Verification (V&V)
ASCI provides the leading-edge, high-end simulation capabilities
needed to meet weapon assessment and certification requirements without
nuclear testing. To accomplish this, ASCI integrates the resources of
the national laboratories, computer manufacturers, and academia.
The national laboratories are focused to provide the application
codes and related science needed to address weapon safety, reliability,
and performance without nuclear testing. They are also developing
improved tools and methodologies to utilize this unprecedented volume
of data. This involves research and development in the areas of
security, extremely high bandwidth transmission, extremely high data
rate speeds, and high-fidelity, high-density visualization of dynamic
data flows. Even at this early stage in their development, advanced
ASCI simulation codes are providing unprecedented capabilities to the
weapons program. We are not only doing the same things faster, but
performing calculations and simulations that were impossible to
contemplate before.
The computer manufacturers are developing the technology and
systems needed to operate at 1, 3, 10, 30, and 100 trillion operations
per second. This technology is being developed at about twice the rate
of commercial advances. ASCI has been highly successful in meeting its
milestones and providing highly effective new tools to support
stockpile stewardship.
This unprecedented computational power is also being made available
to the university community through the Academic Strategic Alliances
Initiative. Five universities have received initial research awards to
investigate projects in such areas as turbulence and shock physics,
astrophysical thermonuclear flashes, and numerical simulation of
accidental explosions. This research will have stockpile stewardship,
basic science, and civilian applications.
Stockpile Computing provides weapons designers and analysts with
computer center operations, model development, and code maintenance
services necessary to support the current Stockpile Stewardship Program
(SSP) activities. In particular, Stockpile Computing supports the
surveillance, maintenance, refurbishment, assessment, and certification
of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile by incremental upgrades to
models and computing systems, and infusion of ASCI-proven technologies
into routine SSP operations.
Stockpile Stewardship utilizes a diverse and distributed complex of
facilities to maintain the safety, reliability, and performance of the
nation's nuclear weapons. DisCom2 develops and provides the technology
needed to deploy an integrated environment that permits the weapons
laboratories and production plants to access computing (from desktop to
teraops) across thousands of miles. For example, DisCom2 provides for
rapid, secure, and verified transmission of engineering design and
change information between laboratory scientists and production plant
engineers, enabling teams to work on a common problem in real time,
simultaneously, with effective visualization and the ability to make
adjustments at a distance.
There is a critical need to upgrade the information architecture at
the laboratories to make effective use of ASCI teraops computers. NEWS
will provide a local computational environment for large numbers of
designers and analysts to use high-end simulation capabilities to
simultaneously address time-urgent stockpile issues. NEWS upgrades to
data archive, network, off-line processor, and visualization
capabilities link ASCI computational resources to designers' and
analysts' desktops to allow efficient and productive access to limited
teraops computer resources.
In addition to replacing and enhancing previous test-based
capabilities, there is also a need to demonstrate that the new tools
are providing the correct results. V&V provides the tools,
methodologies, and data to ensure that the high-end simulation
capabilities accurately model physical phenomena. The Department of
Energy will be able to demonstrate in many cases that the complex
simulations for national security reasons are reliable, that is, have
been verified and validated. Reliability is established by external use
of comparable codes, applications, and other methods by the oil
industry, the academic astrophysics community, and others.
Confidence in the System: Integrated Program Management
The Stockpile Stewardship Program is an integrated set of
activities performed by an integrated complex of laboratories and
plants. The technical challenges involved, combined with the downsizing
of the production complex and the consolidation of activities at the
laboratories, create the need for seamless, effective, and efficient
program management. Indeed, program management lies at the heart of the
new paradigm for stockpile stewardship.
The laboratories and plants are collaborating with each other and
with U.S. industry to develop tritium production technologies as well
as enhanced surveillance, advanced manufacturing, and computational
simulation and modeling capabilities. Once the capabilities are
developed and validated, integration and collaboration will continue as
surveillance results are evaluated, replacement parts and manufacturing
processes are designed concurrently, and refurbished warheads and
components are certified.
An essential element of maintaining confidence in the stockpile--
and in the system that maintains the stockpile--is the informed and
vigorous interactions that take place among the laboratories, the
Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense and its advisory
groups. These include:
--Peer review.--In scientific research, peer interaction and review
are essential for maintaining excellence and providing
confidence in the quality of the work. In the absence of
nuclear testing, the need for peer review in stockpile
stewardship is greater than ever before. Vital peer
interactions take place through integrated and collaborative
activities among the laboratories and through formal reviews of
independent activities.
--Dual revalidation.--This formal review process was developed in
consultation with the Department of Defense. Teams from the
three weapons laboratories, Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia--
New Mexico and California--independently evaluate the safety
and reliability of each warhead. The teams independently review
existing calculations and experiments pertaining to the
warhead, evaluate relevant stockpile surveillance results and
predictive analyses, and perform separate experimental and
calculational activities to investigate issues of concern and
improve the baseline of understanding. Dual revalidation will
be applied to all stockpile warheads, beginning with the W76.
The W76 Dual Revalidation is expected to be 2 to 3 years in
duration. Upon completion, the DOE and DOD will select the next
weapon system for dual revalidation.
--Stockpile Life Extension Process (SLEP).--The Stockpile Life
Extension Process addresses the need to extend the lifetime of
existing warheads. It is designed to balance the concern that
aging-related changes will degrade warhead safety or
reliability against the concern that stockpile modifications
may introduce new uncertainties. Life extension options have
been defined for each warhead type in the stockpile. These
refurbishments also provide the opportunity, when the warheads
are disassembled, to make modifications to improve safety,
reliability, or longevity. All stockpile life extension
activities are closely coordinated with the Department of
Defense before they are initiated.
--Annual certification.--The Secretary of Energy and Secretary of
Defense formally certify to the President that nuclear testing
is not required to assure that the U.S. nuclear stockpile is
safe and reliable. This certification is based on rigorous
technical analyses that lead to formal concurrence by the
Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of the three nuclear
weapons laboratories, and the Commander in Chief of the U.S.
Strategic Command.
Other important interactions take place between the Department of
Defense and the Department of Energy on issues related to stockpile
safety and security. In addition, the Nuclear Weapons Council carries
out executive decisions on stockpile actions. The Nuclear Weapons
Council, which is supported by a highly specialized staff of military
officers, members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the
Department of Energy's Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, also
reviews and coordinates the Department of Energy's stockpile plans.
STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS
More than five years have passed since the last U.S. nuclear test
and more than six years since the last new warhead entered the U.S.
stockpile. The decision to end nuclear testing and the absence of
requirements for production of new warhead designs significantly
changed the way in which the U.S. maintains the safety and reliability
of its nuclear weapons stockpile. As the accomplishments highlighted
below illustrate, much progress has been made in the development and
successful implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP).
Program Architecture: The PEIS
Beginning in May 1995, the Department of Energy held a series of
open-to-the-public meetings as part of the process for preparing the
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for the Stockpile
Stewardship Program. Meetings were held at each laboratory and plant
site and in Washington, D.C. The comments, questions, and discussions
arising from these meetings provided extremely useful input for
refining the program.
The Record of Decision for the PEIS was signed by the Secretary of
Energy on December 19, 1996. This document formally defines the
architecture of the weapons complex for the Stockpile Stewardship
Program. It covers the future capabilities required of the three
weapons laboratories, the four plants, and the Nevada Test Site. It
calls for construction of several advanced experimental facilities at
the laboratories, for downsizing production capabilities in place, and
for reestablishing some manufacturing capabilities at the laboratories.
The weapons complex outlined in the PEIS is consistent with the
reduced U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile under current and projected
START options. It also supports the U.S. nuclear weapons policy of
``lead plus hedge,'' as set forth in the Nuclear Posture Review
(conducted by the Department of Defense and approved by the President
in September 1994). With this complex, the U.S. will be able to
maintain a reduced nuclear arsenal while sustaining the capabilities
needed to reverse course (in terms of stockpile size, nuclear testing,
and new-design warhead production), should future circumstances
dictate.
Implementation Plan: The Green Book
The laboratories and plants have worked with the Department of
Energy to develop a detailed implementation strategy for the Stockpile
Stewardship Program. This strategy is presented in The Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan, often referred to as the Green Book.
Specific roles and responsibilities have been defined and unique
facilities and capabilities identified. As the program has evolved, the
strategy has been revised and modified. With an up-to-date and detailed
implementation plan, jointly prepared and agreed to by the plants and
laboratories, we will be able to execute the Stockpile Stewardship
Program efficiently and cost effectively without gaps in necessary
capabilities.
Administration and Congressional Support: The Budget
As the President has stated, ``In order for this program to
succeed, both the Administration and the Congress must provide
sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile stewardship program over
the next decade and beyond. I am committed to working with the Congress
to ensure this support.'' The President's 1999 budget request will
include a five-year plan that meets this commitment. With such
budgetary support, the Department of Energy is maintaining confidence
in the stockpile while proceeding with the design and construction of
vital new experimental facilities and with the acquisition of the next-
generation supercomputers required for the Stockpile Stewardship
Program.
Confidence in the Stockpile: The Annual Certification
A primary responsibility of the Department of Energy is to certify
the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.
Stockpile safety and reliability issues are continually assessed by the
Department of Energy and the Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia
laboratories. As part of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, a formal
annual certification process has been established. This process
incorporates technical evaluations from DOE and DOD, the Directors of
the laboratories, and advice from the Commander in Chief of the
Strategic Command, the laboratories' Directors, and the Nuclear Weapons
Council. The certification that the stockpile is safe and reliable
relies on the expert judgment of these senior officials. The first
Annual Certification was completed on February 7, 1997. In their letter
to the President, the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy
stated that they judge the stockpile to be safe and reliable and that
there is no need to conduct an underground nuclear test. The second
annual certification process is under way and on schedule.
NEW CAPABILITIES
Major strides in the development and application of new
capabilities to improve stockpile stewardship have been made. Data and
information from these new capabilities will be integrated with data
from experiments in existing facilities and from past experiments and
nuclear tests. Restoration of tritium production is essential and the
development of all the new experimental facilities and capabilities are
needed to provide confidence in the safety, reliability, and
performance of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, now and in the future.
Decisions: DARHT, NIF, Subcritical Experiments, and Tritium Production
Important decisions were reached regarding two vital new
experimental facilities, subcritical experiments, and tritium
production.
--DARHT.--The Environmental Impact Statement for the Dual-Axis
Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility was completed,
and construction is under way at Los Alamos. When completed,
DARHT will be the nation's most advanced facility for
hydrodynamic experiments. These experiments are essential for
validating the implosion performance of primaries.
--NIF.--Lawrence Livermore was selected as the site for the National
Ignition Facility (NIF). Engineering design work is under way,
and ground was broken for construction on May 29, 1997. This
immense laser facility will provide a means for experimentally
studying primary boosting. It will also provide important data
for assessing secondary performance and weapon effects and for
improving and validating new physics models and computer codes.
The Department of Energy is also investigating the feasibility of
follow-on facilities that may provide additional capabilities to verify
and validate the improved simulation models discussed above. To assist
in the evaluation of primaries, the Advanced Hydrotest Facility (AHF)
is being studied to provide improved understanding of the effects of
aging and weaponization features. AHF would expand multipulse,
multiaxis radiographic capabilities well beyond those planned for
DARHT. To assist in the evaluation of secondaries, a proposed follow-on
pulsed-power facility is being studied to extend the range of
capabilities for large-scale radiation flow measurements in complex
geometries. This builds upon the recent and significant advances in
pulsed power resulting from modification of an existing accelerator
facility at Sandia National Laboratories. Research on the technology
for these facilities is in progress.
--Subcritical Experiments.--In April 1997, the Secretary of Energy
announced a schedule for subcritical experiments, an essential
component of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The first and
second subcritical experiments, ``Rebound'' and ``Holog,'' were
successfully completed at the Nevada Test Site on July 2 and
September 18, 1997, respectively. These experiments are
providing valuable scientific information about the behavior of
nuclear materials during the implosion phase of warhead
operation. This information is needed to accurately predict the
performance of stockpile warheads as they age.
--Tritium.--The Department of Energy is pursuing a dual-track
production strategy for the most promising tritium supply
alternatives: (1) to initiate the purchase of an existing
commercial reactor (operating or partially complete) or
irradiation services with an option to purchase the reactor for
conversion to a defense facility and (2) to design, build, and
test critical components of an accelerator system for tritium
production. By late 1998, the Department of Energy plans to
select one of the tracks to serve as the primary source of
tritium. The other alternative, if feasible, would be developed
as a backup tritium source.
Substantial progress has been made for both alternatives since
the announcement of the dual-track strategy.
For the Commercial Light Water Reactor Project track: (1)
completed and certified the design of Tritium Producing
Burnable Absorber Rods, fabricated thirty-two rods, and placed
them in the Watts Bar commercial reactor for an 18-month
irradiation cycle, (2) the Conceptual Design Report for the
Tritium Extraction Facility was completed, independently
validated, and issued, and (3) prepared and issued a Request
for Proposals from nuclear utilities to sell the Department of
Energy a reactor or irradiation services for tritium
production. Proposals have been received and are being
considered.
For the Accelerator Production of Tritium Project track: (1) the
Conceptual Design Report was completed, independently
validated, and issued; (2) high-power density irradiation of
target/blanket materials was completed; (3) superconducting
radio-frequency linear accelerator technology was adopted; and,
(4) implementation of a modular approach that allows production
flexibility should future tritium requirements change was
initiated.
Strategic Computing and Simulation Advances: Entering the Teraops Era
Industry has begun delivering the advanced new computers required
for ASCI. ASCI's goal is to develop the complex three-dimensional
models of weapons operation needed to make the integrated simulations
that will provide a digital proxy for nuclear testing as well as
provide capabilities needed to address aging and other emerging issues.
Intel Corp. and Sandia National Laboratories are working in partnership
on the ASCI Red machine, in which thousands of Pentium processors are
linked together using a technique known as massively parallel
processing. In December 1996, the machine demonstrated record-breaking
teraop operation, performing one trillion operations in a second, which
made headlines around the world. The system will eventually be made up
of more than 9,000 processors and will be able to operate at 1.4
teraops.
IBM and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory are developing the
ASCI Blue Pacific machine. Los Alamos National Laboratory and SGI/Cray
are developing the ASCI Blue Mountain machine. Both systems are
intended to achieve benchmark performance at or above 3 trillion
operations per second. At this early stage in their development,
advanced ASCI weapons simulation codes are providing unprecedented
capabilities to the weapons scientists and engineers. For example,
coupled three-dimensional thermal-chemical-hydrodynamic calculations of
weapon safety (for example, a weapon in a fire) are now possible. As a
practical matter, some standard weapons-related calculations have been
performed one hundred times faster than before. Through this
initiative, the time it took to run one simulation was reduced from 74
days to 7 hours.
In July 1997, Secretary Pena announced research awards to five
major U.S. universities--Stanford University, California Institute of
Technology, the University of Chicago, the University of Utah at Salt
Lake, and the University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign. These
universities will collaborate with the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore,
and Sandia National Laboratories on challenging projects that will
drive the advancement of large-scale computational modeling.
meeting the day-to-day needs of the stockpile
The Department of Energy has continued to maintain the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile. Problems in the stockpile have arisen since the
cessation of nuclear testing. Some of these problems are similar to
those for which, in the past, nuclear tests were conducted to
investigate or resolve. However, using the stockpile stewardship
approach, we are drawing on test-related expertise and on emerging new
capabilities to evaluate and resolve these problems.
Dual Revalidation: The W76
The W76 dual revalidation is prototyping this formal process for
certifying a warhead's conformance with its military characteristics,
and obtaining a thorough baseline condition of the weapon. Two separate
teams of experts from the weapons laboratories are independently
assessing the warhead and combining new computational and experimental
investigations with stockpile surveillance results, predictive
analyses, and data from past nuclear and nonnuclear tests.
Stockpile Life Extension Process: The W87
The W87 life extension process incorporates changes to enhance the
structural integrity of the warhead. Engineering development is
proceeding and includes above ground experiments high-fidelity flight
testing. The effect of the proposed design changes on the warhead's
performance is being assessed using the latest computational models,
supported by the existing nuclear and nonnuclear test database and
laboratory experiments. Experience gained in the W87 refurbishment will
guide future life extension activities for other stockpile warheads.
New Process Qualification: Gas Reservoirs at Kansas City
Production of tritium gas reservoirs was moved from the Rocky Flats
Plant to the Kansas City Plant. Kansas City is now responsible for
manufacturing gas reservoirs for all warheads in the enduring
stockpile. Development and qualification of the production processes
are under way. This past year, the gas reservoir production programs
for two warhead systems--the W76 and the W80--were qualified.
Qualification of this critical production capability demonstrates
that the risks inherent in consolidating and downsizing the production
complex can be successfully managed and mitigated.
New Production Capability: Neutron Generators at Sandia
The production responsibility for neutron generators has been
successfully transferred from the Pinellas Plant to Sandia-New Mexico.
The new production facility was dedicated in July 1996, and
approximately 364 units will be recertified in 1997. This new facility
will support both production requirements and research and development
for new extended-life neutron generators. In support of Sandia
production efforts, Los Alamos has developed the capability for tritium
loading the targets needed for the neutron tubes.
New Production Capability: Nonnuclear
Under the Nonnuclear Reconfiguration Initiative, a number of
production responsibilities have been transferred from the Mound,
Pinellas, and Rocky Flats plants to Los Alamos National Laboratory in
addition to the Neutron Tube Target Loading assignment. The production
responsibility for detonators has been successfully transferred and the
capability is being installed. Los Alamos also has responsibility for
producing beryllium components and nonnuclear pit parts.
Limited Pit Production Capability at Los Alamos
The responsibility for pit surveillance and pit manufacture has
been transferred from the Rocky Flats Plant to Los Alamos. A pit
surveillance capability has been established and pit evaluation was
initiated this year. Limited pit manufacturing will now be done at Los
Alamos. The first demonstration W88 replacement pit is scheduled to be
produced in 1998.
Weapon Dismantlement
Dismantlement of the Cold War arsenal is being carried out as the
Department of Energy continues to develop the enhanced capabilities and
facilities needed to support the enduring U.S. stockpile. As a result
of the START I treaty and separate Presidential decisions, thousands of
weapons have been removed from the U.S. stockpile and are slated for
dismantlement. More than 1,000 weapons were dismantled in 1996, and
nearly 500 weapons will be dismantled in 1997.
Successful Application of the SSP Model: The B61 Mod 11
Replacement of the B53 with the B61 Mod 11 has improved the
inherent safety of the U.S. stockpile. The B53 gravity bomb was the
oldest weapon in the stockpile and was produced before modern safety
features were developed. By modifying a small fraction of the existing
B61 Mod 7 bombs, the Department of Defense can retire the B53 from the
stockpile while still meeting its mission requirements.
Conversion of B61 Mod 7's to Mod 11's requires replacement of the
radar nose and center case with a one-piece hardened steel nose and
replacement of the parachute in the bomb's tail assembly with steel
ballast parts and a drag flare to change the flight characteristics of
the weapon. The Department of Energy authorized these changes in
December 1995. The tail case subassembly retrofit was assigned to
Kansas City and the nose case replacement to the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant.
A very tight schedule called for delivery of the first conversion kit
one year later, in December 1996.
Teams from Los Alamos, Sandia-New Mexico, and the production plants
addressed and defined appropriate qualification tests and analyses for
certifying the acceptability of the modified bomb and its new delivery
conditions. A number of successful flight tests confirmed that the
modified warhead will perform as expected and can be deployed as a
replacement for the B53.
Because of the tight schedule and an already heavy workload in its
machining facilities, Kansas City procured a number of parts for the
tail case subassembly from commercial vendors. Assembly of the modified
tail case was done at Kansas City. The first conversion kit was
delivered ahead of schedule, in November 1996.
The accelerated schedule presented challenges to the Oak Ridge Y-12
Plant as well, particularly because a number of critical operations had
to be restarted from an extended stand-down. Numerous issues related to
the replacement nose case had to be resolved during production. The
first conversion kit of the replacement nose case was shipped in mid-
December 1996, two weeks ahead of schedule.
The conversion of B61 Mod 7's to Mod 11's successfully demonstrated
many aspects of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Integration of
design and production engineering was a key factor in meeting the tight
schedule. Teamwork between the laboratories and the plants and between
the plants and commercial vendors allowed the Department of Energy to
deliver the modified warhead in under a year (as opposed to two to
three years for a retrofit under the old paradigm). In years past, the
Department of Energy would likely have conducted at least one nuclear
test to validate the modified bomb. However, because nuclear-test- and
design-experienced people and all necessary computer analysis and other
required data were available at both the plants and the laboratories,
the B61 Mod 11 could be certified and put into the stockpile without a
nuclear test.
With the successful completion of the B61 Mod 11, the Department of
Energy has gained experience and confidence in the Stockpile
Stewardship Program. This project confirmed the value of the new
approach to manufacturing. In particular, it confirmed the feasibility
of stockpile modernization via retrofitting and life extension of
existing warheads. It also showcased the Department of Energy's ability
to respond rapidly across the entire weapons complex to an important
stockpile issue.
CONCLUSION
Under the Stockpile Stewardship Program, the Department of Energy's
goal is unchanged from previous years--namely, to provide high
confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance of the U.S.
nuclear warhead stockpile. Absent nuclear testing, the tools have
changed significantly--stockpile confidence will now rely on nonnuclear
demonstration-based assessments of warhead safety, reliability, and
performance. New experimental and computational capabilities are being
developed. With these tools, the Department of Energy must be able to
mitigate the loss of critical expertise that will result from the
retirement of nuclear-test- and design-experienced weapons scientists
and engineers. In the coming years, we will validate these new tools,
integrate the information they provide with the suite of weapons-
related data and models, and train the next generation of stockpile
stewards.
As previously described, taking full advantage of the capabilities
of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, the aged B53 bomb was replaced
with a modified B61 equipped with modern safety features, and several
other weapons system problems that would have previously required a
nuclear test were resolved. These major achievements and the related
progress being made to develop nonnuclear experimental facilities and
enhanced computational capabilities provide ample evidence that the
Stockpile Stewardship Program will be successful and will enable the
Department of Energy to continue to maintain high confidence in the
safety, reliability, and performance of the enduring U.S. nuclear
deterrent.
BACKGROUND ON PROGRAM
Dr. Reis. The Stockpile Stewardship Program began in July
1993 when President Clinton announced that he would continue
the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing and seek a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT] for nuclear weapons, a
goal that has been sought since President Eisenhower. In August
1995, President Clinton announced his intention to seek a zero
yield CTBT and he included as part of his announcement six
safeguards that would accompany the treaty.
The first of these was that we would conduct a science-
based Stockpile Stewardship Program. The Senate START II
ratification text in January 1996 also commits the United
States to a robust Stockpile Stewardship Program.
President Clinton signed the CTBT in September 1996 and on
September 22 of this year he submitted it to the Senate for
approval. As part of that submission, the administration
committed to fund stockpile stewardship at about $4.5 billion
in fiscal year 1999 and to use the fiscal year 1999 as a
baseline for future funding. This does not include funding for
construction of a new tritium production source. Thus,
stockpile stewardship, which is essential to maintain our
nuclear deterrent, also underpins the Nation's nuclear arms
control policy.
As President Clinton stated in August 1995,
I am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors
of our nuclear weapons laboratories that we can meet the
challenge of maintaining our nuclear deterrent under a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty through a science-based Stockpile
Stewardship Program without nuclear testing.
Thus, Mr. Chairman, within the U.S. national security
framework, the specific task of stockpile stewardship is to
maintain high confidence in the safety, reliability, and
performance of our nuclear stockpile indefinitely and without
nuclear testing. Part of this task is to maintain the
capability to return to testing and production of new weapons
if so directed by the President and the Congress.
STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP--CONCEPT AND RISKS
So what is the program, what are the risks involved, and
how do we plan to mitigate those risks?
The stockpile stewardship concept is simple. Each year,
representative samples of each weapon type are returned from
the active forces to the plants and labs, disassembled,
examined, tested and analyzed for defects--much as you would go
for an annual physical or take your car to a local automobile
mechanic. If any defects are found, their effect on
performance, safety, and reliability is assessed and if that
effect is deemed significant, the defective part is
remanufactured and replaced. It's like the battery or spark
plugs in your car. Some parts we know will require replacement
and these are replaced at regular intervals. That's it. Sounds
simple enough.
Unfortunately, while a modern nuclear weapon has about as
many parts as a modern automobile, it is much more complicated.
Many of the parts of a nuclear weapon are made from very
special materials--plutonium, highly enriched uranium,
tritium--which radioactively decay and change both their
properties and the properties of other materials within the
weapon.
Nuclear weapons are designed and manufactured to
extraordinarily rigid standards, both to enable huge amounts of
explosive energy to be packaged in relatively small containers
and to maintain phenomenal safety standards. A nuclear weapon
less than the size of a small desk can have the explosive power
to completely destroy a modern city. And yet, it must be able
to survive the worst kind of accident you can think of with
less than a one in a million chance of exploding. This level of
performance and safety must be maintained throughout the
weapon's lifetime, even as it ages and changes.
While we can expect the aging will cause the defect rate to
rise, just as it does with both humans and cars, we cannot go
out and buy a new warhead model. There is no new warhead
production and some of the old factories are out of business.
Moreover, the weapons designers who have had the experience
with nuclear explosive testing are also aging. In about 10
years, most of them will have been retired. This means that
about the same time the weapons reach the end of their design
life, we will no longer have anyone on the job with direct test
experience.
Despite these challenges, people from the weapons
laboratories, the production plants, and the Federal
establishment involved in stockpile stewardship have testified
and will so testify that we can do the stockpile stewardship
job. We believe we can maintain the safety and reliability of
the nuclear weapons in the stockpile indefinitely without
underground testing and keep the risks to manageable levels.
How do we expect to do this? First of all, we start from a
solid position. The current stockpile has been well tested, is
in very good shape, and is well understood. We have an
extensive database on each of these weapons and we have a cadre
of experienced designers, engineers, scientists and technicians
that can, with confidence, certify the safety and reliability
of the current stockpile.
Now since we cannot do a complete test of a nuclear
explosion, we conceptually divide the explosion into each of
its parts and test and analyze each of these separately, much
as you would test the ignition system, the cooling system, and
the brakes of your car. Then we put the whole thing together
into a computer calculation, a simulation to see if the
resulting performance is within specification. Each part of the
simulation must predict the results of each of the separate
tests and where they exist must be consistent with data from
previous underground nuclear tests. Let me give you some very
simplified examples of how this works.
Some of the processes are relatively straight forward to
simulate. The first part of the nuclear explosion sequence is
to send the right electrical signal to the right place at the
right time. We can test this exactly by flight testing actual
weapons with inert mockups of nuclear components. We can do a
good job of testing the first part of the nuclear explosion,
the implosion of the plutonium pit. But we do not use actual
plutonium. It would go off if we did. Then we can measure a
number of important features by taking x-ray pictures during
critical parts of the experiment. We can then compare these
pictures with calculations and previous actual underground
nuclear test results.
EXPERIMENTAL AND DIAGNOSTIC TOOLS
But current radiographic systems will not be sufficient to
measure the effects of potential defects in aged pits, so we
are building a new x-ray machine, the dual-axis radiographic
hydrodynamic test [DARHT], which will look at the shape and
size of an imploding pit model from two different directions
and with much better resolution.
Beyond obtaining x-ray pictures of imploding pit models,
however, we will no longer experimentally simulate a nuclear
explosion, but instead, will use experimental facilities to
obtain conditions that occur during such an explosion and then
use the results of these experiments to check computer
calculations. For example, we are investigating the way old
plutonium behaves when subjected to high pressures of an
implosion to subcritical tests at the Nevada test site, and we
expect to be able to generate conditions of temperature and
pressure of nuclear explosions with lasers at the national
ignition facility. These and other experimental facilities that
are online, under construction, or in the planning stage, will
give us a set of tools sufficient to investigate and help
understand anticipated problems in the stockpile.
As I mentioned previously, the experimental information is
tied to the assessment process through computation or, more
precisely, numerical simulation. But we know that the level of
computation needed to effectively simulate effects of aging or
a remanufactured part is much, much greater than that which is
currently available. So we have begun a computational
development program, the accelerated strategic computing
initiative in parallel with the experimental program. There is
no point in doing elegant experiments if you cannot interpret
the results in terms of nuclear weapon safety and reliability,
and there is no point in doing simulations if the computer
codes cannot be grounded in reality. You need both as well as
returning to the archives to match the new techniques with the
data from the underground nuclear tests.
It is this troika of computer simulation, experiments, and
previous nuclear test data that provides us a complete tool box
for the assessment process. Building this assessment tool box
in time to train the new cadre of scientists and engineers is
critical to the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
WEAPON REMANUFACTURE
This leaves remanufacture. We know now we will have to
remanufacture and replace some parts and are already doing so.
We know that eventually we will have to replace just about
every part in just about every weapon. That is the whole idea
of stockpile life extension. But to create these new parts, we
cannot rely on the cold war production complex that has
produced some tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. We are
establishing a production complex that is much more flexible
and much more environmentally sensitive than the production
complex it replaces.
We must use every applicable modern manufacturing
technique, the best that U.S. industry can offer. We must
understand the details of the manufacturing processes with
sufficient precision so as not to introduce new defects into a
remanufactured system. The key here is model based
manufacturing, similar to that which created the Boeing 777 and
being applied today by much of U.S. industry. Thus, around one-
half of the stewardship program is devoted to producing current
replacement parts and to planning and modernizing our
production complex to match the new job. We envision a complex
that is approximately one-fifth the size of the cold war
complex but one that can return to higher levels of production
if the need ever arises.
While we do not expect to need additional supplies of
enriched uranium and plutonium, there is one nuclear material
which we know we have to produce--tritium, a radioactive
isotope of hydrogen that is required for every modern nuclear
weapon.
Tritium decays fairly rapidly. Approximately 5 percent is
transformed to helium every year. The last tritium that was
produced in the United States was in 1988. With the end of the
cold war and with the reduction of numbers of nuclear weapons,
we have had large amounts of excess tritium. This excess has
been used to make up for the decayed tritium in the current
stockpile. But eventually this will run out. Based upon our
current estimates, we must produce tritium by the year 2005 to
support a START I nuclear stockpile. After a number of years of
analysis and changing requirements, we are down to two
approaches for making tritium--using an existing commercial
light water reactor or using a newly developed accelerator. The
DOE will select a primary source for tritium production as soon
as possible in fiscal year 1998.
So, in a nutshell, that is stockpile stewardship--
maintaining the stockpile without testing, surveillance,
assessment, remanufacture, tritium, labs, plants--a program
that must develop a new generation of technical experts before
the current generation expires.
CHALLENGES AND RISKS
Why do we think we can manage this challenge and what can
we do to manage the risks?
First, let me reiterate that we start from a solid base.
The current stockpile is well tested and well understood. The
designers and engineers who built them are available and active
and, indeed, they are the ones who are creating the Stockpile
Stewardship Program. They are the ones who are working on the
stockpile now and are helping to train their successors.
Second, we have laid out a plan for the Stockpile
Stewardship Program--weapon by weapon, part by part--that
projects the tasks that are required to maintain the stockpile
over the next 10 years and beyond. We have concurrence on this
program from the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs and
the administration has committed to fund this program and all
its parts.
Third, as one of the conditions for ratification, Safeguard
F, the President requires us to annually certify to him
directly the safety, reliability, and the performance of each
weapon type. This is done by the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Energy on the advice of the Nuclear Weapons
Council, the directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories, and
the commander in chief of the Strategic Command. As you recall,
Secretary Pena went through that with you in some detail.
Fourth, we have a backup, safeguard C requires us to
maintain the Nevada test site in a state of readiness, and the
subcritical and other experiments conducted there help keep the
people sharp and ready.
Fifth, safeguard B states that the ratification is
conditioned on maintaining the vitality of the nuclear weapons
laboratories--Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia
National Laboratories. Mr. Chairman, those labs are among the
best in the world and, in my opinion, they are the best in the
world. And they are better now than they were 4 years ago
because of the enthusiasm and vigor with which they are
attacking the Stockpile Stewardship Program. History tells us
that great labs need great missions and stewardship is just
such a mission. Our DOE labs will get even better because they
will attract the kind of people who are drawn to solve tough
problems of national importance.
Sixth, we are doing stewardship now and doing it
successfully. It has been 5 years since the last underground
nuclear test. We are just completing our second annual
certification. We have modified the B-61 bomb and have seen it
enter the stockpile to replace the aged B-53 bomb. We have
initiated a number of new experimental tools and our
computation program has developed the world's fastest super
computer by a factor of three. We have solved some problems by
using stewardship tools that in the past would have likely
required nuclear testing. We have literally done hundreds of
experiments that increase our understanding of nuclear weapons.
We have safely dismantled over 9,000 nuclear weapons since the
end of the cold war and have produced numerous parts on time
while continuing to downsize the complex. This is a system that
works and not just at the labs but also at the plants--Oak
Ridge Y-12, Pantex, Kansas City, Savannah River, and the Nevada
test site.
So let me finish by getting to the essential question: Do I
have the confidence that the Stockpile Stewardship Program will
work and can we maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile without
testing 10, 20, or 30 years from now?
My answer now is an almost unqualified yes.
The source of my optimism lies not in the immortality of
the current stockpile of weapons, though, in truth, they are
truly technological marvels, but in my faith in the integrity,
courage, and competence of the people in our weapons labs and
production complex. They are the men and women that designed
and produced the weapons that ended World War II and kept the
cold war cold. They have put together a program that is
comprehensive, coherent, and robust. They believe and I believe
that they can do the job by first and foremost maintaining and
supporting the institutions to do that job. I have confidence
in them, their integrity, their competence, and their
overriding dedication to their mission. If we give them the
tools that they need and stick with it, we can manage the
risks.
PREPARED STATEMENT
In the end, this is not an issue of technology, but an
issue of courage and will and persistence. If we have the
courage and will and persistence, we will not fail.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would be glad to answer
any of your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Victor H. Reis
Thank you, Mr Chairman for the opportunity to testify before you
today on the Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program is fundamental
to our national security under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I'd
like to begin with a brief history of stockpile stewardship, state what
it is, give you its current status, and then answer your questions. In
addition to my written testimony, I would like to provide the
subcommittee with a recently published overview on the program, and if
you wish, submit it for the record.
The Stockpile Stewardship program began in July 1993 when President
Clinton announced he would continue the moratorium on nuclear weapons
testing and seek a comprehensive test ban treaty for nuclear weapons, a
goal that has been sought since President Eisenhower. In August of 1995
President Clinton announced his intention to seek a ``zero yield''
CTBT. He included as part of his announcement, six safeguards that
would accompany the treaty. The first of these was that we will conduct
a ``science based stockpile stewardship program.'' The Senate Start II
ratification text in January 1996 also commits the U.S. to a ``robust
Stockpile Stewardship Program.''
President Clinton signed the CTBT in September of 1996, and on
September 22 of this year he submitted it to the Senate for approval.
As part of the submission, the Administration committed to fund
stockpile stewardship at about $4.5 billion in fiscal year 1999 and to
use fiscal year 1999 as a baseline for future funding. This does not
include funding for construction of a new tritium production source.
Thus, stockpile stewardship--which is essential to maintain our nuclear
deterrent--also underpins the nation's nuclear arms control policy.
As President Clinton stated in August of 1995: ``I am assured by
the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our nuclear weapons labs
that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear deterrent
under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty through a science based stockpile
stewardship program without nuclear testing.''
Thus, Mr. Chairman, within the U.S. national security framework,
the specific task of stockpile stewardship is to maintain high
confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance of the nuclear
stockpile, indefinitely, without nuclear testing. And part of this task
is to maintain the capability to return to testing and production of
new weapons, if so directed by the President and the Congress.
So, what is the program, what are the risks involved, and how do we
plan to mitigate those risks?
The stockpile stewardship concept is simple. Each year
representative samples of each type of weapon are returned from the
active forces to the plants and labs, disassembled, examined, tested
and analyzed for defects, much as you would go for an annual physical
or take your car into your local automobile mechanic. If any defects
are found, their effect on performance, safety, and reliability is
assessed, and if that effect is deemed significant, the defective part
is remanufactured and replaced. Like the battery or spark plugs in your
car, some parts we know will require replacement, and these are
replaced at regular intervals. That's it. It sounds simple enough.
Unfortunately, while a modern nuclear weapon has about as many
parts as a modern automobile, it is much more complicated. Many of the
parts of a nuclear weapon are made from very special materials--
plutonium, enriched uranium, tritium--which radioactively decay, and
change both their properties and the properties of other materials
within the weapon.
Nuclear weapons are designed and manufactured to extraordinarily
rigid standards, both to enable huge amounts of explosive energy to be
packaged in relatively small containers, and to maintain phenomenal
safety standards. A nuclear weapon, less than the size of a small desk,
will have the explosive power to completely destroy a modern city, and
yet it must be able to survive the worst kind of accident you can think
of with less than a one in a million chance of exploding. This level of
performance and safety must be maintained throughout the weapon's
lifetime, even as it ages and changes.
While we can expect that aging will cause the defect rate to rise--
just like it does in both humans and cars--we can't go out and buy a
new warhead model--there is no new warhead production, and some of the
old factories are out of business. Moreover, the weapons designers who
have had experience with nuclear explosive testing are also aging, in
about ten years most of them will have retired. This means that about
the same time all of the weapons reach the end of their design life, we
will no longer have anyone on the job with direct test experience!
Despite these challenges, people from the weapons laboratories, the
production plants, and the federal establishment involved in stockpile
stewardship have testified, and will so testify, that we can do the
stockpile stewardship job. We believe we can maintain the safety and
reliability of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile indefinitely
without underground testing and keep the risks to manageable levels.
How do we expect to do this?
First of all, we start from a solid position. The current stockpile
has been well tested, is in very good shape and is well understood. We
have an extensive data base on each of these weapons, and we have a
cadre of experienced designers, engineers, scientists, and technicians
that can, with confidence, certify the safety and reliability of the
current stockpile.
Now, since we cannot do a complete test of a nuclear explosion, we
conceptually divide the explosion into each of its parts and test and
analyze each of these separately, much as you would test the ignition
system, the cooling system, and the brakes on your car. We then put the
whole thing together into a computer calculation--a simulation--to see
if the resulting performance is within its specification. Each part of
the simulation must predict the results of each of the separate tests,
and where they exist, be consistent with data from previous underground
nuclear tests. Let me give you some very simplified examples of how
this works.
Some of processes are relatively straight forward to simulate. The
first part of the nuclear explosion sequence is to send the right
electrical signal to the right place at the right time. We can test
this exactly by flight testing actual weapons with inert mockups of the
nuclear components.
We can do a good job of testing the first part of the nuclear
explosion, the implosion of the plutonium pit, but we do not use actual
plutonium--it would go off if we did--and we can measure a number of
important features by taking x-ray pictures during critical parts of
the experiment. We can then compare these pictures with calculations
and with previous actual underground nuclear test results. But current
radiographic systems will not be sufficient to measure the effects of
potential defects in an aged pit, so we are building a new x-ray
machine--the DARHT--which will look at the shape and size of an
imploding pit model from two different directions and with much better
resolution.
Beyond obtaining x-ray pictures of imploding pit models, however,
we will no longer experimentally simulate a nuclear explosion, but
instead use experimental facilities to obtain conditions that occur
during such an explosion and then use the results of these experiments
to check computer calculations. For example, we are investigating the
way old plutonium behaves when subjected to the high pressures of an
implosion, through subcritical tests at the Nevada Test Site, and we
expect to be able to generate the conditions of temperature and
pressure of nuclear explosions with lasers at the National Ignition
Facility. These, and other experimental facilities that are on line,
under construction, or in the planning stage, will give us a set of
tools sufficient to investigate and help understand anticipated
problems in the stockpile.
As I mentioned previously the experimental information is tied into
the assessment process through computation, or more precisely,
numerical simulation. But we know that the level of computation needed
to effectively simulate effects of aging or a remanufactured part is
much, much greater than that currently available, so we have begun a
computation development program--the Accelerated Strategic Computing
Initiative--in parallel with the experimental program. There is no
point in doing elegant experiments if you can't interpret the results
in terms of nuclear weapons safety and reliability, and there is no
point in doing simulations if the computer codes cannot be grounded in
reality. You need both, as well as returning to the archives to match
the new techniques with the data from underground nuclear tests. It is
this troika of computer simulation, experiments, and previous nuclear
test data that provides the complete tool box for the assessment
process. Building this assessment ``tool box'' in time to train the new
cadre of scientists and engineers is critical to the stockpile
stewardship program.
This leaves remanufacture--we know now we will have to
remanufacture and replace some parts, and are already doing so. We know
that eventually we will have to replace just about every part in every
weapon--that's the idea of stockpile life extension. But to create
these new parts we cannot rely on the cold war production complex that
produced some tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. We are establishing
a production complex that is much smaller, more flexible, and much more
environmentally sensitive than the production complex it replaces.
We must use every applicable modern manufacturing technique; the
best that U.S. industry can offer. We must understand the details of
the manufacturing processes with sufficient precision, so as not to
introduce new defects into a remanufactured system. The key here is
model--based manufacturing--similar to that which created the Boeing
777 and is being applied today by much of U.S. industry. Thus, around
half of the stewardship program is devoted to producing current
replacement parts, and to planning and modernizing our production
complex to match the new job. We envision a complex of approximately
one-fifth the size of the cold war complex, but one that can return to
higher levels of production if the need ever arises.
While we do not expect to need additional supplies of enriched
uranium and plutonium, there is one nuclear material which we know we
will have to produce: tritium--a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that
is required for every modern nuclear weapon.
Tritium decays fairly rapidly; approximately 5 percent is
transformed to helium every year. The last tritium that was produced in
the U.S. was in 1988, but with the end of the cold war and the
reduction of numbers of nuclear weapons, we have had large amounts of
excess tritium. This excess has been used to make up for the decayed
tritium in the current stockpile, but eventually this will run out.
Based upon current estimates we must produce tritium by 2005 to support
a START I nuclear stockpile. After a number of years of analysis and
changing requirements we are down to two approaches for making
tritium--using an existing commercial light water reactor or using a
newly developed accelerator. The DOE will select a primary source for
tritium production as soon as possible in fiscal year 1998.
So in a nut shell, that's stockpile stewardship--maintaining the
stockpile without testing--surveillance, assessment, remanufacture--
tritium, labs, and plants,--a program that must develop a new
generation of technical experts before the current generation retires.
Why do we think we can meet this challenge, and what are we doing
to manage the risks?
First, let me reiterate that we start from a solid base. The
current stockpile is well tested and well understood. The designers and
engineers who built them are available and are active. Indeed they are
the ones who are creating the stockpile stewardship program. They are
the ones who are working on the stockpile now, and are helping to train
their successors.
Second, we have laid out a plan for the stockpile stewardship
program--weapon by weapon, part by part, that projects the tasks that
are required to maintain the stockpile over the next ten years, and
beyond. We have concurrence on this program from the Department of
Defense, and the Joint Chiefs, and the administration has committed to
fund this program and all its parts.
Third, as one of the conditions for ratification, Safeguard F, the
President requires us to annually certify, to him directly, the safety,
reliability and performance of each weapon type. This is done by the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy on the advice of the
Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of the nuclear weapons
laboratories and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command.
(If a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a
nuclear weapon type which the two Secretaries consider critical to our
nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in
consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT
under the standard ``supreme national interest'' clause in order to
conduct whatever testing might be required.)
Fourth, we have a back up. Safeguard C, requires us to maintain the
Nevada Test Site in a state of readiness, and the subcritical and other
experiments conducted there help keep the people sharp and ready.
Fifth, Safeguard B states that ratification is conditioned on
maintaining the vitality of the nuclear weapons laboratories--Los
Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories. Mr.
Chairman, those labs are among the best in the world--in my opinion
they are the best in the world--and they are better now than they were
four years ago because of the enthusiasm and vigor with which they are
attacking the stockpile stewardship effort. History tells us that great
labs need great missions, and stewardship is just such a mission. Our
DOE labs will get even better because they will attract the kind of
people who are drawn to solve tough problems of national importance.
Sixth, we are doing stewardship now, and doing it successfully. It
has been five years since the last underground nuclear test. We are
just completing our second annual certification. We have modified the
B61 bomb and seen it enter the stockpile to replace the aged B53 bomb.
We have initiated a number of new experimental tools, and our
computation program has developed the world's fastest supercomputer--by
a factor of three. And we have solved some problems by using
stewardship tools that in the past would have likely required nuclear
testing. We have literally done hundreds of experiments that increase
our understanding of nuclear weapons. We have safely dismantled over
nine thousand nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War, have
produced numerous parts, on time, while continuing to downsize the
complex. This is a system that works, and not just at the labs but also
at the plants: Oak Ridge Y-12, Pantex, Kansas City, Savannah River, and
the Nevada Test Site.
So let me finish by getting to the essential question: Do I have
confidence that stockpile stewardship will work, can we maintain the
nuclear weapon stockpile, without testing, ten, twenty, thirty years
from now?
My answer now is an (almost) unqualified yes.
The source of my optimism lies not in the immortality of the
current stockpile of weapons--though in truth they are truly
technological marvels--but in my faith in the integrity, courage and
competence of the people in our weapons labs and production complex.
They are the men and women that designed and produced the weapons that
ended World War II and kept the Cold War cold. They have put together a
program that is comprehensive, coherent, and robust. They believe, and
I believe, they can do the job, by first and foremost maintaining and
supporting the institutions to do the job. I have confidence in them--
their integrity, their competence, and their overriding dedication to
their mission. If we give them the tools that they need, and stick with
it, we can manage the risk. In the end this is not an issue of
technology but an issue of courage and will and persistence, and if we
have the courage and will and persistence, we will not fail.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would be glad to answer any of your
questions.
Senator Domenici. I think if you would add to your last
three words or tell me that it includes them, there must be a
sense of urgency lest we get lackadaisical.
Dr. Reis. I would certainly include that. Yes.
Senator Domenici. When we wrap up this session, we are
going right across the hall for the closed session. It should
not take very long. We will just lead the witnesses over there.
We will go with whomever is cleared.
Senator Reid, I am yielding to you as I did last time for
your personal questions.
FUNDING FOR STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP
Senator Reid. You are very kind, Mr. Chairman.
You heard the questions that I asked Secretary Pena about
the $4.5 billion, that being a bottom and not a balloon figure,
and he indicated that that was the bare minimum that was needed
to maintain the safety and reliability of our stockpile.
Would the three of you agree that that figure is
appropriate?
Senator Domenici. Mr. Miller, why don't you answer first as
we started today with you.
Mr. Miller. Senator, I am on the policy side and will defer
to Dr. Reis and Dr. Smith in this case.
Senator Domenici. All right.
Dr. Smith.
Dr. Smith. The numbers have been carefully scrubbed. There
is no question about that. As to predicting what budgets are
required many years into the future, of course, I would not do
that. That is why I am so pleased with the way the Nuclear
Weapons Council is constructed, so that we can, indeed, year-
by-year go into ever greater detail to make sure that the
program is meeting what will be, one would think, changing
requirements.
So I would agree with Secretary Pena that there is no fat
in the budget we are currently in the process of submitting to
the Congress. But I cannot agree regarding the years beyond
that without further study, which, of course, is going to take
time.
I can assure you, Senator Reid, that we are going to
conduct the thorough studies that I just mentioned.
ANNUAL CERTIFICATION
Senator Reid. The annual certification is not a political
judgment, in your estimation, it is a scientific judgment? Is
that true?
Dr. Smith. That is certainly true.
Secretary Pena did a fine job in going through this chart,
and the expertise from the warfighter to the scientist, from
the bureaucrat to the official is, I think, quite properly and
thoroughly brought to bear.
Senator Reid. Secretary Reis, would you agree with that?
Dr. Reis. Yes; I would. And I would like to say, first,
that I agree with Secretary Pena without qualification. I would
like for that to get on the record, please.
Mr. Miller. Senator Reid, if I might from a policy
standpoint----
Senator Reid. Please.
Mr. Miller [continuing]. That is the only way we would
accept the certification process. It has to be technical. It
has to be based only on the science and what is observed in the
stockpile.
Dr. Reis. Senator Reid, I would like to get back to the
certification. We really have done an extraordinarily thorough
job at this stage of the game. I think we discussed that, as
you will recall, with Senator Cochran's committee as well.
I believe it was Senator Cochran or one of the people on
your committee--perhaps it was Senator Levin--asked is there
anybody else that we could think of, both myself and Dr.
Barker, who could participate in that who is not participating,
and neither of us could think of anybody. I think it has been
an extraordinarily thorough process.
Again, I would like to compliment Dr. Smith, because it is
under the auspices of the Nuclear Weapons Council that that
process is done.
Senator Reid. I have a number of other questions, Mr.
Chairman, that I would ask all the panel to respond to. I also
have some questions for closed session. The problem is that I
have a couple of conflicts and might not be there to be able to
do that.
Senator Domenici. Just give me your closed session
questions.
Senator Reid. That would be great.
Thank you very much.
Senator Domenici. Thank you.
Senator Cochran.
CTBT SAFEGUARDS
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Miller, you mentioned the safeguards that are
associated with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I know
Secretary of Energy Pena also discussed those.
In connection with safeguard F, which I understand the
President has said he could use if he had been advised by the
Secretaries of Energy and Defense that they were no longer
confident that the nuclear weapons we had were safe and
reliable, can you imagine a scenario where the secretaries
would make that kind of advice available to the President?
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
I do not believe it will happen. I do not believe it will
happen because of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. But if the
Stockpile Stewardship Program were to determine that there was
a significant flaw in a weapon which played a key role in the
deterrent, and that flaw could not be corrected in any other
way than through a process that needed to be certified by
testing, then I believe the Secretaries of Defense and Energy
would come forward and I believe the President--or a
President--would do exactly what the President has said
safeguard F is all about.
Senator Cochran. It just strikes me that it is absolutely
unthinkable that we would get ourselves into a position where
we would announce to the world, in effect, that there were some
serious flaw in our nuclear deterrent. The fact of that
announcement would create such an invitation to potential
enemies that it would just be unthinkable.
Mr. Miller. If I could respond, Senator, I think the fact
is that we have in this country always depended on a real
deterrent and not an existential deterrent. It was not just the
existence of the weapon but it was the fact that there was a
weapon that had a credible means of delivery and a credible
plan that backed it up, and a credible policy and a credible
will that the weapons would have to be used, if necessary, that
formed the entire basis of the deterrent.
If we knew ourselves that there was some terrible flaw in
the system, we would owe it to the American people to fix that
flaw as long as nuclear weapons were part of our security
posture. I believe that we would do that.
I would say to you that, even in the circumstances that you
postulate--and, again, I do not believe they are likely, but
even in those circumstances--a potential enemy would not know
whether that flaw would disable one of our weapons, or 12, or
100, or 500. So, if I were a potential aggressor, that would
not be a sign to me that the United States was in a position of
weakness. But for our own internal responsibilities, we clearly
would have to come forward to the President, and the President
to the Congress and to take the steps necessary as commander in
chief to insure the deterrent.
Senator Cochran. If you had the choice of proceeding with a
Stockpile Stewardship Program and testing, would you elect to
do both?
Senator Reid. Senator, would you repeat your question,
please?
Senator Cochran. If you had the choice to engage in a
Stockpile Stewardship Program and to test, would you do both?
Mr. Miller. I will take the easy route and defer to my
colleagues, because what we have to do here, what we have to do
on the policy side is defer to the judgment of our technical
experts as to the best way to maintain that stockpile. So I
cannot tell you from the policy side and as a nontechnical
person what the best way to maintain the stockpile is.
But Dr. Smith and Dr. Reis are more qualified to do so.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Smith, would you like to respond to
that?
Dr. Smith. With all deference, Senator, I do what the
President tells me to do and I don't do what the President
tells me not to do. He has said do not test. I do not intend to
test.
Senator Cochran. Would withdrawal from the CTBT in your
judgment be an announcement to the world that the United States
has a significant problem in its nuclear stockpile?
Mr. Miller. Sure.
Senator Cochran. I am going to Dr. Smith now.
Dr. Smith. I'm afraid that would be the logical conclusion.
Yes, sir.
SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST CLAUSE
Senator Cochran. Dr. Smith, President Clinton has referred
to the supreme national interest clause as an important feature
of the CTBT. Does it make you more willing to accept the risks
inherent in becoming a party to the treaty before the Stockpile
Stewardship Program has proven to be a sufficient alternative
to testing?
Dr. Smith. Yes, sir.
As a scientist, I am very pleased that in extremis, which I
think is very unlikely, I feel better having that escape
clause, safeguard F.
CTBT SAFEGUARD C--CAPABILITY TO RESUME UNDERGROUND TESTING
Senator Cochran. Presidential safeguard C has also been
mentioned. It says that the U.S. entry into the treaty is
conditioned on the maintenance of the basic capability to
resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the treaty should
the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this treaty.
Would it be difficult to maintain an ability to test without
testing?
Dr. Smith. I will answer briefly and then, if I may, I
should defer to Dr. Reis.
I think the answer is we will be ready to test and there is
good, solid evidence. We have had two truly splendid scientific
experiments in the Nevada site which I think keeps the people,
the equipment, and the goals up to the needs implied by further
testing.
So I think yes, we are in a continual state of being able
to test. Again, though, I should defer to Dr. Reis there.
DETECTION CAPABILITY
Senator Cochran. Let me ask you another question before Dr.
Reis is given another opportunity to respond.
I understand from some technical experts that the United
States has no technical means to detect tests conducted at a
level of 10 kilotons or less, certainly not at the level of 1
or 2 kilotons.
Would nations like Russia and China be able to conduct
testing at those levels without our being able to detect them?
Dr. Smith. If I may, Senator, I would rather defer that
answer to the closed session.
Senator Cochran. Secretary Reis, what is your reaction to
that question that I had about safeguard C? Would it be
difficult to maintain an ability to test without testing?
Dr. Reis. Senator, that is an integral part of our
Stockpile Stewardship Program. The whole purpose of stewardship
and the backups is also to maintain the ability to test and the
ability to do production, if so desired. The examples that Dr.
Smith gave I think are just right. The subcritical experiments
really, I think, put everybody--pardon the expression--really
to the test; you know, could they develop that type of
experiment, could it be done at a particular period of time?
We also have a sufficient inventory of already drilled
holes in case we have to do that. We have an inventory to get
started of a number of the types of equipment we need to do
that. Much of the diagnostics that we are developing now are
being used on things like other type of laboratory
experiments--pulsed power experiments and so forth.
So I feel that that is not something like oh, by the way. I
think that is an integral part of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program.
NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, my last question is about
the national ignition facility, which we discussed in our
hearings in the Governmental Affairs Committee. It is one of
the key elements of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. There
was a predecessor program or one similar to it called NOVA,
which took several years to build, and it was not until that
was completely built and the switch turned on, in effect, that
you found NOVA was not working. It took an additional 2 years
to get it to work right.
With that experience in mind, how do you know when the
Stockpile Stewardship Program will work or not?
Dr. Reis. First of all, of course, NOVA is working now and
is an integral part of our Stockpile Stewardship Program from
the laser perspective. We are also using the Omega laser, which
builds another part, again, from the laser perspective, in
terms of that. Yes; the national ignition facility is a
critical part and, while we have every expectation and
confidence that it will be built on schedule, as you point out,
things do happen and I certainly cannot guarantee that.
But there are other parts of the program that we build up
in time. We are doing it now. We will continue to do it. So the
problems that show up now we will solve now. As the stockpile
ages, we will expect more problems to show up, but we expect to
have more capability in time.
What we are talking about now is, if you will, a race
against mother nature, and we think we have laid out as best we
can what the problems are that we expect to have. We understand
a lot about these weapons. We don't expect to understand
everything about them. But, again, we have laid out a program
that we believe now is sufficient to answer all those
questions.
Ultimately, we also have to have built in the safeguards
for the stewardship program. That is a part of the program
itself.
Senator Reid. Senator Cochran, would you yield for just a
moment?
Senator Cochran. Certainly.
Senator Reid. Dr. Reis, in answer to his question, at least
as I understand it, he said do you believe the Stockpile
Stewardship Program will work, but I did not hear your answer.
Dr. Reis. The answer to that is yes, I do.
Senator Reid. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Domenici. Senator Cochran, are you finished?
Senator Cochran. Yes; I am.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much for attending today.
You are on the subcommittee and we thank you for the
participation that you are committing to us today. I understand
you have a broader based jurisdiction than we do. We are
looking at the budget implications and it is obvious that this
is not as simple a proposition as some would make it.
Is that not correct from what you know so far?
Senator Cochran. Well, I am not a witness, but I would be
glad to testify if you wish. [Laughter.]
Senator Domenici. No; you don't have to do that.
[Laughter.]
On page 7 of the document you asked that we might put into
the record--and we have made the whole document attached. Why
don't we attach that whole document rather than have it
printed. We can just attach it to the record.
[The information follows:]
CAPABILITIES NEEDED TO ENSURE HIGH CONFIDENCE IN WARHEAD SAFETY AND RELIABILITY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Computer Subcritical Pulsed
Weapons physics simulation DARHT experiments NIF power LANSCE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improved physical modes.................... X X X X X X
Early implosion............................ X X X ......... ......... X
Preboost................................... X X X X X X
Boost...................................... X ......... ........... X ......... .........
Primary-secondary coupling................. X ......... ........... X X .........
Secondary implosion........................ X ......... ........... X X .........
Weapon performance......................... X ......... ........... ......... ......... .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Domenici. On page 7, I note that you have listed
computer simulation, DARHT, subcritical experiments, NIF,
pulsed power, and LANSCE.
Dr. Reis. Yes, sir.
Senator Domenici. Now in response to Senator Cochran's
question regarding NIF, it is the biggest of the projects in
terms of a structure and expenditure, is it not--of the
program?
Dr. Reis. That's correct.
Senator Domenici. Pulsed power, if it proves out, could do
some of the things that NIF does. Is that not correct?
Dr. Reis. It is complementary. I think the pulsed power
could do some of the things that NIF does. It can do other
things that NIF cannot do. NIF can do some things that pulsed
power cannot do.
LOS ALAMOS NEUTRON SCIENCE CENTER
Senator Domenici. How does LANSCE fit into this?
Dr. Reis. LANSCE is the Los Alamos Neutron Scattering
Center, and that is where we use neutrons to really understand
the details of using neutron scattering to really get in and
look at the details of both the nuclear and nonnuclear parts,
the explosion itself.
One of the keys, Senator, is this ability to do
surveillance properly. What you would like to be able to do and
what we are pushing for, as far as what we call enhanced
surveillance, is you would rather not wait until there is a
defect and then fix the stockpile. What you really want to do
is determine ahead of time: Are there indications that, for
example, the high explosive is beginning to change its
properties so that we would have to change it out before there
is any problem?
To do that, we have to really understand in much greater
detail than we do now the material properties. That is where a
device, a system like the LANSCE, is particularly effective.
Senator Domenici. Dr. Reis, while I have you here, let me
just go back to something for 1 minute. It does somewhat
involve this but not totally.
Dr. Reis. I think we made a copy of that.
Senator Domenici. Fine.
CONFIDENCE IN THE STOCKPILE
In listening to Secretary Schlesinger in the Governmental
Affairs hearing, which Senator Cochran chairs, Dr. Schlesinger
expressed some grave reservations about the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty being in our Nation's interest. He argued that
continuation of the underground testing program is the only
assurance that we can have of the integrity of the stockpile.
He also noted that several previous defense chiefs, as well as
laboratory directors, several previous ones of both types, have
consistently noted the importance of underground testing.
In that same hearing, Dr. Barker, who is a Livermore
expert, expressed concern that it will be many years before we
will know if the Stockpile Stewardship Program can succeed and
in that regard succeed in maintaining the level of confidence
we require in our stockpile.
He questioned if national security is well served by
entering into a CTBT before we know how the stewardship program
will work.
How do you address their concerns that a nation needs an
underground testing program to maintain the integrity? If you
would like, I will add just a second point to this.
How would you address Dr. Barker that stockpile stewardship
cannot be demonstrated to succeed for many years and during
that time we will have low capabilities, will have lost our
capabilities, under the treaty?
Dr. Reis. Well, I would have to respectfully disagree with
both Dr. Barker and at some trepidation with Dr. Schlesinger.
But I would suggest that the reason I feel much more
comfortable about it than perhaps they do is I have been
working at it for 5 years while previous chiefs have said some
time ago that they were concerned about it.
This is a different program. We are now not trying to
develop new weapons. We are trying to maintain a stockpile of
very well tested and very well understood weapons.
Second, while it may be some years before the full program
is in place--I think the program is in place now and it is
working now. It has been 5 years since the last weapon was
tested. And, as Secretary Pena just said, we have just gone
through an extraordinarily detailed second annual
certification. While he has not yet signed off, as you said, he
expects to be able to sign off on that, as well as Secretary
Cohen to sign off fairly soon.
The last reason is one that I think I alluded to in my
testimony. I think our laboratories and our plants are now very
different places than they were 4 or 5 years ago. Through the
Stockpile Stewardship Program we have really been
reinvigorated--and I should say with help from you, Senator
Domenici, and Senator Reid, and the Congress as well, who have
been very supportive in terms of that program.
We have gone through some risks and it has taken quite a
bit of courage and resources to do this. So I think if you ask
the current laboratory directors, and I'm sure you will, and if
you ask the current senior military, and you have some examples
here from the civilian leadership as well, you will find that
they feel that yes, while there clearly is risk, that risk is
well worthwhile in terms of our broad national security
interests and that we will be able to maintain those nuclear
weapons and the system that supports those nuclear weapons
indefinitely. And we have a high probability of being able to
do that without testing.
SIGNATORY COUNTRIES TO THE CTBT
Senator Domenici. By the way, which countries are
signatories to the treaty now?
Mr. Miller. We can get you the full list. There are 41
countries now.
Dr. Reis. That have ratified at this stage of the game?
Mr. Miller. No; they are signatories.
I believe 145 have signed. I will get you the full list for
your record.
[The information follows:]
As of 31 October 1997, 148 countries have signed the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and seven have ratified it. The seven
are: Czech Republic, Fiji, Japan, Federated States of Micronesia,
Mongolia, Qatar, and Uzbekistan. Of the 44 countries named in the
Treaty, whose ratification is required for entry into force, all but
three--India, Pakistan, and North Korea--have signed the treaty.
Senator Domenici. And from those that are commonly known as
having nuclear capacity, nuclear weapon capacity, are they all
on board?
Mr. Miller. India and Pakistan are not.
If I could say something about that, I think that if we got
to a point where the treaty entered into force even without
India and Pakistan--and that would require an extraordinary
conference in 3 years time and it would require coming back to
the Senate for ratification of a provision that changes the
basic treaty, that says the treaty does not enter into force
until all the nuclear States and threshold States have
ratified--it creates an international norm which even a State
like India would break at some significant risk.
And so, if the treaty is in effect, I think it constrains
the weapons programs of even those acknowledged States that are
not party to the treaty. There is value there.
Senator Domenici. That's understandable.
Thank you.
Let me talk about another issue with the two scientists for
1 minute.
DUAL REVALIDATION
In matters such as this, it is very likely that there would
be differences of opinion among experts on the health of the
stockpile and the weapons that are principally of long-time
stockpile nature, and that may require some change in
manufacturing or some change in the stockpile weapon. How will
differences of opinion be resolved without the ultimate
authority of a nuclear test to settle an issue?
Dr. Smith. I'll take the first stab and will then turn to
Victor.
First of all, the process that had been up on the previous
chart brings together all the expertise that we have and the
debates that have taken place now with 2 years experience in
certification are very intense.
I think, in fact, I am positive that every possible expert
opinion is heard. It is not a case of taking a vote. It is a
case of working through the details. We have found so far that
when we work through those details, in fact, we are satisfied
that the weapons are safe, secure, and reliable.
But that is not enough. We have also instituted between the
two departments what we call dual revalidation, which
purposefully and deliberately sets up independent review teams
between the two weapons design laboratories--Los Alamos and
Livermore. If Los Alamos designed the weapon then Livermore has
to create its own independent team to go over the designs, the
tests, to recommend new tests, to do new calculations on old
data, to do everything they can to form their own independent
review.
So this is peer review such as the world has never seen.
I find it hard to believe that between those two processes
every opinion that is technically based, that is a true expert
opinion, will not be presented. It will be heard, will be
discussed, and a consensus I am rather certain will be formed.
Dr. Reis. Let me add two things to that.
First, as you notice, the process has not just a central
chain but two chains along the side. So what we have tried to
do is insure ourselves--and that reports are sent separately to
the Secretary of Defense and to the Secretary of Energy. So we
have been very sensitive to insure ourselves the independence
of those two groups.
They all work with the same data in terms of their
judgments, in terms of their questions. Not only does it work
through the process through the Nuclear Weapons Council, but
they are also required to give their own separate judgments to
the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense.
So we have been very sensitive to minority opinion.
Let me also add one more thing to this dual revalidation
process. Senator Cochran, I think that gets back to the point
you were making: How do we know this thing is working?
In addition, one of my main concerns is how do I train the
new people. How do we get the new people to understand what
went on in the heads and the understanding of the people who
actually had the experience in testing and had to do the
designing. That is where this dual revalidation comes in.
So not only, if you will, does it insure us literally from
going back to the basic information and the basic blueprints
and so forth that both these labs are working on with each
other, but this is the opportunity for the new people to come
along and work with the mentors, work with the people who have
actually done the designing over that time. Why did you make
this decision? Why did you make that decision? Let's look at
the new tools and see if we can predict some of the same
results we got from the old data, basically.
This is really the essence of what we are trying to do,
bring the new people on so that when the time comes that the
old people are gone, you will have had their judgment and
expertise. So, again, as you point out, I think correctly, the
issue is not now but 10, 15, or 20 years from now. That is when
the essence of the idea of the perpetuity of the treaty really
comes into force.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, if I might just give you an
example of how the policy--technical interface works in this
area, this dual revalidation is relatively new. Within the past
5 years it came about in part because of the prompting from us
in policy.
Previously, Los Alamos looked at its designs and Livermore
looked at its designs, but you didn't look at the other guy's
designs. Now we broke that wall down because we were concerned
about two things: One, getting a new pair of trained,
sophisticated scientific eyes on the other person's designs so
that potentially new flaws or flaws could be examined; and,
second, given the shrinking pool of expertise, we wanted to
take advantage, full advantage, of those capabilities that we
have, these national resources, these people who have done the
testing.
So there was a bit of a push from policy and the technical
walls came down, so that people from Los Alamos and Livermore
could now get involved in each other's work.
This is an example of the kind of crosscutting work that
occurs between all of us.
CTBT SAFEGUARD B--NUCLEAR LABORATORIES
Dr. Reis. Let me pick up if I could on that as well. That
is what safeguard B is all about. That is why the specific
safeguard B is there, which says you will maintain three
nuclear laboratories and you will insure yourself. It
specifically talks about the people and the vitality of those
laboratories. That is, if you will, the response to the concern
that we had from a technical perspective and the concern that
policy has. That is put right back into the policy.
As you recall, Senator, there were a number of discussions
2 or 3 years ago where people looking at this asked why do I
need all of these laboratories and couldn't I do it with one.
The answer is you cannot do it with one because what you really
need is that scientific competition to be continually
questioning each other with the people from Sandia, Livermore
and Los Alamos all working it out. That is just the nature of
the scientific method.
They cannot help themselves in competing from a scientific
perspective. They are always questioning, always probing each
other. It is basically built into their bones. That is just an
integral part of the whole stewardship program.
ANNUAL CERTIFICATION
Senator Domenici. I note in the previous chart that over on
the right hand side you have the three lab directors. I would
assume, Dr. Reis and Dr. Smith, that from a technical
standpoint, probably their conclusions and their observations
would be as important, if not more important, than almost
anybody else on that chart.
Is that correct?
Dr. Reis. I would suggest that the institutions that they
represent, because the laboratory directors are not necessarily
weapons designers, it is their job because they are the ones
who have to put their names on it to insure themselves that
their institution's integrity is intact. That integrity is just
all important to them.
That is why, frankly, I think it is so important to get, if
you will, their signature specifically on this and not just as
part of a bureaucratic process; that they have to stand up
every year and say look, representing my institution, those
weapons are safe and reliable--or not. Ultimately, you are
dependent upon the integrity and the competence, if you will,
of those people.
Senator Domenici. What I meant was not the individual
person signing it, but if you put up a chart over there with
those three people, representing 7,000 to 8,000 of the greatest
scientists in the world in each of three laboratories, I assume
they go through an exercise whereby their director concludes
from the input of that laboratory what he is going to say about
certification.
Dr. Reis. Yes.
Senator Domenici. That is a very powerful part, I would
assume, of this.
Dr. Reis. That is an extraordinarily powerful part.
Senator Domenici. Would you agree with that, Dr. Smith?
Dr. Smith. It is a simple answer that I would like to give.
I would not agree that the laboratory directors or, more
appropriately, the institutions they represent are the first
among equals. They are equals, though. They are certainly not
inferiors.
But we do want the opinions of STRATCOM, we do want the
opinions of the Nuclear Weapons Council with all the components
that it represents. But the laboratory directors and their
institutions are of equal and important input.
Senator Domenici. I have just two quick questions.
Do you have some more questions, Senator?
Senator Cochran. I just thought of one, if you would let me
ask it now.
Senator Domenici. Go ahead.
FUTURE FUNDING FOR STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP VERSUS TESTING
Senator Cochran. If you could compare, for example, a
nuclear testing program in terms of cost with the stewardship
program over the next 20 years, how much money would we save if
we did low yield testing instead of the stewardship program?
Dr. Reis. I don't think you could, but you just did low
yield testing, you would certainly save money. But if I did not
do the stewardship program, I would not be able to maintain the
safety, reliability, and performance of the stockpile. I think
both Dr. Schlesinger and Dr. Barker so testified. They said
fundamental to their discussion is you would still do the
stewardship program.
So if once you are doing the stewardship program----
Senator Cochran. Would it have to be as expensive as the
one we are undertaking?
Dr. Reis. I have looked at that because, indeed, we had to
worry about that. I think we have the right, essentially the
right program the way it is now. If we have to go back and test
or something like that, that is essentially built into the
program already.
So I don't think it is a cost issue, Senator. If people
looked at the program as, for example, what if we just
manufacture and test--I mean, there are other potential
solutions to the idea of basically maintaining the stockpile.
You know, different countries might do it basically based on
their systems.
Based on our system, based on how we are doing it, I think
we are doing it the right way. I don't think there are any cost
savings to be made. I think we have indicated that we don't
think there is any fat, basically any fat in the program. It is
hard to project 5, 10, 15, 20 years into the future. But I
don't believe one could come up with a program that will do
this job for any less money than that.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Senator Domenici. We have 13 minutes left on a vote and I
think we need a little time to move you over to the next room
to do our closed hearing.
I have a number of other questions that I am going to
submit. If you have any, Senator Cochran, you can submit them.
Senator Reid also had some.
ONSITE INSPECTION MECHANISM OF CTBT
But I want to just ask you one question about the onsite
inspection mechanism provided for in this treaty.
As this treaty unfolds, people are going to go through all
parts of it. You all have alluded to a few things that have not
been talked about much in public. But there are two ways,
obviously, to try to detect the explosion.
One is we were successful in maintaining in this treaty
that we could have our own system of detection. Whatever we
have by way of satellites or whatever we have, we can keep, and
so can other countries. Then there is a system of international
ones. Obviously, the question then comes is not an onsite
inspection almost always necessary to establish the situs.
I assume, for the most part, you want to actually locate
the situs of the explosion if it occurred.
I note in the treaty that 30 of the 51 nation executive
councils must agree before an onsite inspection can occur.
Now, I think this is going to be a bone of contention
around here and that there are going to be a lot of questions
about this aspect. Why such a large number and do you really
believe it is going to be easy to get 30 out of that Executive
Committee of 51 nations to agree to permit onsite inspections?
Let's start with you, Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. I don't think we know the answer to that,
Senator. But on the face of it, given that the vast majority of
the members are not nuclear weapons states, I don't see that
there is a built in reason why it would be difficult to get 30.
They are not protecting anything if they are not testing, and
if one of the states is testing, then it is a minority of one.
There will undoubtedly be controversy. This is a mechanism
that is going to have to be worked out, just like any other
treaty mechanism is going to have to be worked out. But on the
face of it, I do not believe that that is going to be a
problem. I could be proven wrong, but I don't believe so.
Senator Domenici. Do you have a comment on that, Dr. Smith?
Dr. Smith. If the evidence is close to incontrovertible and
the abilities we will have will strongly suggest that an
explosion of some magnitude takes place, then it would be very
hard, I would think, to resist the chance of a nation that
feels it has been unjustly treated to insist on an inspection.
And, as Mr. Miller has pointed out, there will be plenty of
nations in the 50 that would welcome the chance.
But as to the difficulty, I rather imagine it will be hard.
But you, far more than Mr. Miller and I, are well aware of how
ones tries to get 31 votes out of 50.
Senator Domenici. Yes; I try to get 51 out of 100.
Senator Cochran. We have to get 60.
Senator Domenici. Yes; sometimes 60. It can be very
difficult.
I do have an observation. I was told, and by people that I
am sure do know, that the reason for 30 is because that was
part of the bargaining to maintain in the treaty the national
technical means aspect of this treaty. And the swap-out was OK,
if you insist on keeping your own national means, then we are
going to go more than a simple majority or more than a big
minority allowing the onsite inspections.
Frankly, I don't know why we needed the tradeoff. If we
need to go to a country, at least we know from our standpoint
we are not going out there to look for something to learn, to
take away from them. We are trying to find out whether or not
this happened.
So I am not so sure about the statement that we have
equipment and technology to discern whether or not an explosion
has occurred. I would remind all of you of the situation in
Russia in Novaya Zemlya. We are still arguing about whether
there was an explosion there or not. We are not absolutely
certain there wasn't.
Dr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, we are not arguing about where
that event took place.
Senator Domenici. That's right. But all they would have to
say to this council of 51 is we don't think it happened and
here is our evidence. Why do we want to let this team come in
and inspect?
That is the reason I raised the point. It would take a long
time to agree on that.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Our open meeting stands in recess. We will resume in close
session across the hall in about 10 minutes.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., Wednesday, October 29, the
hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
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