[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS
APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2000
_______________________________________________________________________
HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED
PROGRAMS
SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama, Chairman
JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois NANCY PELOSI, California
FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia NITA M. LOWEY, New York
RON PACKARD, California JESSE L. JACKSON, Jr., Illinois
JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan
MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
JACK KINGSTON, Georgia
JERRY LEWIS, California
NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Young, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mr. Obey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Charles Flickner, John Shank, and Christopher J. Walker, Staff
Assistants,
Lori Maes, Administrative Aide
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PART 2
Page
Secretary of the Treasury........................................ 1
Security Assistance.............................................. 69
Military Training Report......................................... 233
Secretary of State............................................... 281
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-458 WASHINGTON : 1999
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida, Chairman
RALPH REGULA, Ohio DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
JERRY LEWIS, California JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
JOE SKEEN, New Mexico JULIAN C. DIXON, California
FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia STENY H. HOYER, Maryland
TOM DeLAY, Texas ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
JIM KOLBE, Arizona MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
RON PACKARD, California NANCY PELOSI, California
SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
JAMES T. WALSH, New York NITA M. LOWEY, New York
CHARLES H. TAYLOR, North Carolina JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
HENRY BONILLA, Texas JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan ED PASTOR, Arizona
DAN MILLER, Florida CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
JAY DICKEY, Arkansas DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
JACK KINGSTON, Georgia CHET EDWARDS, Texas
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr.,
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi Alabama
MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York JAMES E. CLYBURN, South Carolina
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr., MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York
Washington LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM, SAM FARR, California
California JESSE L. JACKSON, Jr., Illinois
TODD TIAHRT, Kansas CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan
ZACH WAMP, Tennessee ALLEN BOYD, Florida
TOM LATHAM, Iowa
ANNE M. NORTHUP, Kentucky
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
KAY GRANGER, Texas
JOHN E. PETERSON, Pennsylvania
James W. Dyer, Clerk and Staff Director
(ii)
FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS
APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2000
----------
Wednesday, March 17, 1999.
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET REQUEST FOR MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS AND
DEBT RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM
WITNESSES
HON. ROBERT RUBIN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WILLIAM E. SCHUERCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, DEBT AND ENVIRONMENT POLICY
Chairman Callahan's Opening Statement
Mr. Callahan. Even though some of the committee people
obviously are tied up in other meetings, we are going to
proceed in order that we can get you out of here in a timely
fashion and so Mrs. Kilpatrick and I can adequately celebrate
St. Patrick's Day.
We thank you for coming. I am happy to have a guest with me
from my hometown, Joe Galinowsky, who is president of the local
CBS affiliate in Mobile. He left. He met the Secretary and
left.
Good morning, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate your annual
visits to explain the requests of the President and the
executive branch with respect to your budget.
Secretary Rubin and I spoke briefly yesterday by phone, and
I informed him right off the bat that he could expect a 90
percent reduction in his appropriation this year as to what he
got last year. He gasped for a second or two, and then I
reminded him that last year he got an additional $18 billion
for the International Monetary Fund and therefore we were going
to start at $20 billion and come down.
Mr. Secretary, you are going to be well pleased with this,
I hope, and I know otherwise that you would get up from this
table right now and walk away.
Secretary Rubin. That is what I was going to suggest.
Mr. Callahan. We listened with great interest to the
President's remarks yesterday, especially about forgiveness of
debt. There are some on this panel who agree with the President
that debt forgiveness is a way to enable foreign governments to
provide more services for their citizens, but I disagree with
that. I think we ask for no accountability of the money they
have borrowed. Some of the monies that were borrowed by some of
the leaders of some of the countries have either disappeared or
were put into projects that were of such low quality that they
only lasted a few years; for example, some roads. Now we say
that we want to forgive all of their debt, and all this does in
my opinion is enable these countries to do more of the same.
We wipe their books clean, and as a result of that clean
slate they go to the banking community and say, Well, we don't
owe any money, let us borrow some more. I think that is not a
wise move. If our mission is to see that these foreign
governments, especially in the developing countries, have an
ability to do more for their people, then we ought to consider
direct assistance to programs that will benefit their people
rather than enable the leadership of those countries to
position themselves to borrow more money.
I have seen instances where in some countries entrepreneurs
have brought fundable projects to countries such as a toll
bridge or something like that which would require no capital
outlay for the countries; and the leaders of the country in a
sense turn them down and say, Why should we float a bond issue,
even though it would be repaid by the tolls, when indeed we can
just go to one of the banks and borrow the money and sit around
for a few years and then they will forgive all of the debt? I
disagree with that, and I know you and the President disagree
with me; and I know Ms. Pelosi disagrees with me.
Also in the supplemental bill that we are trying to get on
the floor as early as next week, although there is a good
possibility we may have some problems getting a sufficient
number of votes, we don't want to bring it up unless we have
the votes. Because of some problems not necessarily in our area
of jurisdiction, but in the defense jurisdiction where there
are no offsets, it is causing some problems. We want to make
certain when we go to the floor with a responsible bill that we
have a sufficient number of votes to pass it.
But we need you to, if you will, address the callable
capital issue. You and I have discussed this, and I don't know
whether I am right or wrong. If you wanted to bet on it,
naturally I would take you because your background and
knowledge of the financial community is so superior to most
everyone in Congress, and certainly to me.
I look at things a lot simpler than many people do. If I
were president of one of these banks that was having this
callable capital appropriation rescinded, it wouldn't bother me
in the least. I explained this to the full committee last week.
Some of us get in the position where our kids need houses and
their financial situation is not sufficient to secure the loan
they are trying to procure, and they come to their parents and
say, Would you endorse a loan, and we do this in many cases. So
we endorse a loan, but the bank doesn't say, Mr. Callahan,
since you are endorsing this loan for your child, we want you
to put this money in an account and not use it. They simply use
my assets, and certainly the assets of the United States are
still pledged. The authorization is still there. It is callable
capital in the event that it is necessary, and it doesn't give
me heartburn like it might give you heartburn. I see absolutely
nothing wrong with it. I don't think it is fiscally wrong. In
fact, I think it is fiscally right to do this because this
money has been sitting there for a long period of time. We are
not rescinding all of the callable appropriated capital, and we
are not rescinding any of the authorized capital.
So I would like for you to especially address these two
issues sometime during your statement. And as I said, once
again we welcome you to the committee.
Mrs. Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi's Opening Statement
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Happy St. Patrick's
Day. I like your tie except it has elephants on it. Anyway,
Happy St. Patrick's Day.
I want to join you in welcoming our distinguished Secretary
to our hearing this morning on the fiscal year 2000 request for
$1.523 billion, of which $1.395 billion is for the multilateral
financial institutions.
I first want to compliment the Secretary on his
perseverance in continuing to guide some of this
administration's policies and the country with sound economic
policies which have enabled this country to enjoy continued and
steady economic growth. Our economic progress and the creation
of budget surpluses are due in no small measure to his steady
guidance and the respect with which he is held, and his
involvement in this administration is something that all
Americans are grateful for.
Today the subcommittee will explore the fiscal year 2000
budget request for the multilateral development banks, as I
mentioned, of $1.395 billion for ongoing contributions and
arrears payments. This continues a downward trend in the
request levels for resources for the U.S. contributions for
these institutions.
Since 1994, the U.S. has reduced its annual commitment to
these institutions by 37 percent, going from an annual
aggregate budget of $1.9 billion to $1.2 billion. This has been
accomplished without decreasing our voting shares or our
overall influence within these institutions. And I know, Mr.
Secretary, that you negotiated some of that standing for us.
Thank you. I do intend to explore several bank-related issues
today, including the need for several new authorizations;
current lending policies to countries in economic difficulty;
cases of alleged corruption; and the use of resources
appropriated for callable capital as an offset to the recently
reported supplemental for Central America which our
distinguished Chairman went into in some detail. I have very
serious concerns about using the callable capital as an offset
and look forward to the Secretary's response.
As I have mentioned in the past, Mr. Secretary, I am always
interested in the IFIs, international financial institutions,
in regard to the environment, as well as being interested in
the AIDS issue. I am still clamoring for AIDS to be on the G-7
or -8 agenda because I believe that the spread of AIDS in the
developing world is a serious economic issue as well as a
humanitarian issue, and I think it should rise to that level of
discussion. I am interested in how the World Bank is addressing
this crisis as well.
Then we are talking about debt relief. The request also
includes $120 million for debt relief for several initiatives,
including the Bilateral Paris Club Initiative, contributions to
the HIPC, and funds to support the debt for rain forest
legislation.
While I am supportive of these initiatives, I continue to
believe that we need to develop and implement a more
comprehensive policy on debt relief for poor countries which
addresses the continued crushing debt burdens these countries
continue to struggle with. I intend to pursue these areas in my
questions today.
The Chairman talked about his opposition to debt relief,
and said I was in disagreement with him. I don't think that we
are that far apart. I do not support debt relief to supply
funds for governments to siphon off for whatever purpose. I
think if we are going to have debt relief, and I do believe
that it is an important initiative, then we have to have
certain provisos what we expect that debt relief to engender.
I also believe that following a natural disaster as we had
in Central America, that we should be very supportive of the
economic development that will happen there, in addition to our
humanitarian assistance which is very important, but much of
which is at the emergency stage. As we go beyond the emergency
stage, we have to be talking about helping these countries
thrive economically. And I think a means to that end is to have
full debt forgiveness, instead of having some debt forgiveness
and prolonging the agony, they will have to borrow again to
keep up with their payments. I think if we have debt
forgiveness it will be a giant step in the direction of the
economic recoveries that promote market opportunities that will
help these countries have almost a boom following the natural
disaster that they have suffered.
So in the spirit of hoping that we can find common ground,
because your objections to debt relief I share, but I think we
come down at a place where the debt relief is necessary, and if
our lack in confidence in how the funds would be used is to
have provisos, so be it. Let us do that.
We are here to hear the Secretary, and the Secretary is
well aware of the difference between the Chairman and me as we
approach the debt relief issue. I am interested in hearing the
view of the administration but I probably want more debt relief
than the administration does, Mr. Callahan.
With that I welcome you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you for
your great leadership.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you. Mr. Rubin, we will accept your
statement for the record and the floor is yours, sir.
Secretary Rubin's Opening Statement
Secretary Rubin. Mr. Chairman, Ms. Pelosi, let me first
start by saying that the subcommittee played a very important
role last year in the IMF appropriation and I do believe that
that appropriation was critical with respect to dealing with
the international financial stability of this past period. I
think that without what this committee had done, the world
might be in a lot worse shape.
As Ms. Pelosi said, for fiscal year 2000 we are requesting
$1.523 billion, which is an increase of less than 1 percent,
not when you start with the IMF $18 billion, but when you start
the other way. That request is for financing for the
international financial institutions, debt programs and
technical assistance.
Just one comment with respect to the financial crisis.
There has been a lot of discussion about whether the IMF and
the World Bank and others have handled this crisis in a
sensible fashion. My view is that they have faced complex,
unprecedented issues, and on balance they have made sound
decisions. There also has been a high level of willingness to
be flexible and make adjustments where necessary, and I think
they have done a good job in the face of an unprecedented,
complex situation. I think the world is a lot better off than
it otherwise would have been.
Two instances of countries in which the governments took
ownership of reform and where we see real progress--and this
never works unless a country takes ownership of reform--are
Korea and Thailand. I remember the last week of 1997. Korea
then had reserves of roughly $3 to $4 billion and they now have
reserves of $51 billion. Interest rates in Korea were as high
as 35 percent at some point after the crisis began. Interest
rates are now between 5 and 6 percent. Thailand has had similar
progress. Both of these countries have lots of challenges
ahead, but where countries have taken ownership and the IMF has
put in place strong programs, there has been real progress.
In terms of U.S. economic interests, as we have said so
many times during the course of the discussion about the
financial crisis, our economic interest is very much affected
by what has happened in the rest of the world. And while we
have continued to have a good economy and are likely to
continue to have a good economy, certainly many sectors have
been affected by the crisis and it has created an additional
risk in the overall economy.
Let me briefly speak regarding financial institutions and
why they are an appropriate way to center our efforts with
respect to both financial crisis and promoting long-term growth
in developing countries. Firstly, they internationalize the
burden. In 1998, $1.4 billion in American appropriations gave
us enormous influence with respect to $57 billion in total
multilateral development bank lending.
Second, our fiscal year 2000 request for the international
financial institutions is about 5.5 percent below last year's
appropriations. Both of those years' appropriation requests
have included payment of arrears, as you know. More broadly, we
have negotiated under Bill Schuerch's leadership, enormous
decreases in our ongoing scheduled requirements, which were
something like $700 million per annum higher in the mid-
nineties. I believe that is down about 35 to 40 percent.
Third, because these institutions are multilateral, they
can induce or require conditionality that you could not do on a
bilateral basis.
And fourth, each institution has a specialty unto itself.
We have worked very forcefully in these institutions to promote
reform both with respect to how they operate and the content of
the programs, including environmental, human rights and other
issues.
In terms of long-term growth, if you take a look over the
last 20 to 30 years, these institutions have been central.
There is really a very impressive record of growth in many
countries, even after allowing for the recent crisis. Infant
mortality rates fell by nearly 50 percent in the early 1970s to
the mid 1990s, and life expectancy has increased by an average
of 4 months a year on average since 1970. Adult literacy has
risen from 46 to 70 percent. And as that has happened, these
countries have become markets for our goods. I can remember 15
or 20 years ago when a developing country was thought of
basically as a recipient of aid. In 1997 they absorbed
something in the neighborhood of 40 percent of our exports.
As an example of international financial institution roles,
IDA is the world's largest lender of concessional resources for
projects in health, primary education, nutrition, safe drinking
water, proper sanitation; and in IDA for every dollar that we
put up, roughly speaking $8.5 is lent, and again we have
tremendous influence in how that money is used.
I think that does bring us to the question of the debt
burden. Let me say, Mr. Chairman and Ms. Pelosi, I actually
agree with both of you. I think it is a very complex issue,
because I think it is a balancing of competing considerations.
Yesterday, as you know, the President announced a new major
initiative, and let me try to express our philosophy with
respect to debt reduction. I think you will see a reflection of
both concerns.
Firstly, we believe debt reduction is unlikely to have any
lasting impact unless it is accompanied by meaningful economic
reform so that the resources freed up are used for good
purposes rather than simply consumed in some current fashion
and having no lasting impact. So we require that debt relief
goes only to countries that are engaged in effective reform
programs.
Secondly, our approach is designed to bring debt levels
down to what a country can reasonably be expected to afford.
And here there is a tension, and I think the Chairman brought
it out particularly well. Let me tell you the balance that we
have tried to find.
On the one hand, as Ms. Pelosi said, many countries are
simply overwhelmed by unsustainable debt and the call on the
country's resources makes it virtually impossible for these
countries to grow. And we think that is a nonviable position
for a country committed to reform to be in.
On the other hand, as the Chairman pointed out, if the
private sector does not believe that a country has a culture of
credit in which borrowers are committed to repay obligations,
then these countries will not get private sector capital, and
private sector capital is an absolute requisite for growth over
the long term.
Secondly, as the Chairman also pointed out, if borrowers
feel that they are not going to have to pay back debt, then
they will borrow carelessly and use money carelessly. So what
we try to do is find a sensible--and that is what the
President's program announced yesterday carries forward--a
sensible balance between these competing considerations.
Obviously reasonable people can disagree where that balance
lies, but I think the proposed framework is probably about
right.
In line with that analysis, we request $120 million this
year for debt relief programs broken out as follows: $50
million for the HIPC initiative. That is the heavily indebted
poor countries' initiative which has been launched by the World
Bank and IMF in 1996, and which is intended to reduce debts to
sustainable levels for those poor countries prepared to pursue
economic and social policy reform. And $20 million for the
Paris Club, which you know is a multilateral process for
bilateral debt reduction, and $50 million to finance debt
relief for tropical rain forest countries which is called for
under the Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998, which in my
view at least is a good piece of legislation.
We have also made great progress, under the leadership of
this subcommittee, in paying our MDB arrears, which I think is
very important in terms of maintaining our influence in the
institutions. If our requests for arrears in this budget are
fully funded, then arrears will be brought down to $141.9
million, which is tremendous progress compared to where they
were at their height. I believe they were at $900 million, not
counting the money held back because of our problem with IDA
11. So that is a lot of progress. This subcommittee obviously
played an absolutely indispensable role in that progress.
On the question of rescission, Mr. Chairman, I guess all I
can tell you is a reflection of my own experience, plus my
having spoken to some of the financial officials involved whom
I know and respect. They say that when the underwriters and the
regulators come to examine the multilateral development banks--
and I am particularly focusing on the World Bank now--the first
thing they ask is what is the United States' appropriated
callable capital, because of the concern--skittishness might be
a better word--because of the skittishness about American
commitment to international economic activity. There is a
skittishness amongst the underwriters and other agencies with
respect to our commitment, which they fear is reflected in the
length of time that it took us to get the IMF quota increase
legislation passed, the fact that we are massively in arrears
to the United Nations. So what they look at is the appropriated
callable capital, not the total callable capital.
So it is my concern that if there is a rescission, that
could adversely affect the perceived creditworthiness--whether
it should or shouldn't--the perceived creditworthiness of these
institutions; and therefore, their borrowing cost; and that in
turn would mean less money for the countries to which they are
lending. And that is coming at a time when we are enormously
involved with these institutions in trying to deal with this
financial crisis, which I think unfortunately still has a good
way to go before it works its way through the world economy.
In addition, it is a very negative message to send to the
rest of the world in terms of our commitment. It is a little
bit hard to tell how other countries would react, but it is
possible that a rescission will cause other countries to pull
back too. I do not know. But it is a risk, it seems to me, that
we should not be taking at this time.
Let me briefly mention one other item, even though it is
not in the jurisdiction of this subcommittee anymore, and that
is the coummunity adjustment and investment program of NAD Bank
the ``CAP''. As you know it has been moved to another
subcommittee, but we remain fully committed and we will be
working hard to get appropriate funding.
Let me conclude, if I may, by just saying that we continue
to strongly support the international financial institutions. I
think that they serve the American people and our economic
interests extraordinarily well. This committee has been
extremely constructive and central to providing that support
that they need and we look forward, Mr. Chairman and Ms.
Pelosi, to working with you this year as you review and
hopefully fund our budget requests. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
budget request
Mr. Callahan. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I know that the
primary purpose yesterday was to speak to your budget request.
We can't really give you any concrete answers because we don't
know how much money is going to be allocated but I do
compliment you on keeping your requested increase to the
minimal level, and we certainly will consider your request when
we finally get our allocations.
Indications are that we are going to be suffering from an
allocation point of view. The Budget Committee, which is
meeting now and which will be presented to the full House and
to the Senate maybe as early as next week, indicates that there
is going to be a very huge shortage of money for the
Appropriations Committee. And if that is the case, I don't
imagine they are going to be allocating me or this committee a
huge increase while reducing some other committees with
domestic needs. So we will just have to address that and we
certainly will stay in contact with you. We are also happy to
have Under Secretary Schuerch here today.
Mrs. Lowey. Bill.
Secretary Rubin. Bill Schuerch.
Mr. Callahan. He has a good educational background. He may
be a spy, but he is a good one for you and for us.
With respect to the callable capital, I still can't see why
we ought to be concerned about what the regulators say. The
facts are that the United States Congress and the United States
of America have committed callable capital to these banks,
period. No other country puts their money in a safety deposit
box or a drawer on the side and says, This money is here if you
ever need it. No other country does that, and there is no real
reason for us to do it. The full faith and credit of the United
States of America is in the agreement, where we agreed and
authorized through this Congress callable monies. I don't care
what the regulators' concerns are. I don't care about the
skittishness of the American commitment. That sort of
aggravates me. Since we are the number one donor in the world,
I don't know why we ought to be concerned about their
skittishness and the perceived creditworthiness. You put
yourself, you put me in their position, I would say the same
thing.
But the reality is that it is not a reduction of the
commitment. It is not a rescission of the commitment. The
assets of the United States fully can back up this amount of
money if indeed it were ever called.
And lastly, we are taking $650 million, that is 18 percent,
maybe 20 percent of the callable capital. If they indeed were
to call in capital, they just wouldn't call in our capital,
they would have to call in universal capital. We are talking
about a huge amount of money, and also there is callable
capital cash left there to begin with.
So I think they are overreacting. If I were president of
that bank, I wouldn't care. The full faith and credit of the
United States is there in the authorization, and the fact that
we won't put it in a side drawer or piggybank just in case they
need it, I think that is ludicrous.
I don't think that even stands up to good argument on their
part. The money is not needed. It hasn't been needed for, what,
20 years, 19 years; and why all of a sudden they would be
concerned if we took it out of the piggybank and put it into
something else, I don't know. But in any event, I can
understand them saying that. But if they want to say, Well, all
countries will have to do the same thing, that would be
something else. But they are only saying to the United States,
We don't trust you, we don't trust the Congress, and we feel if
you take this cash back, even though the commitment is still
there, we don't trust you. Well, that is too bad if they don't
trust us.
Secretary Rubin. The problem is not regulators. The problem
is basically the underwriters, and you may be 100 percent
right. It may be that there should not be a perceptual
difference. But when you look at what is happening with the
U.N. and IMF, you can see how people might be a little nervous.
Mr. Callahan. Was the IMF callable capital?
Secretary Rubin. No, but we had entered into a commitment
to----
Mr. Callahan. I understand that. We have authorization--
there is a big difference there because the Congress has
authorized this callable capital.
Secretary Rubin. There is that on the one hand. But once
you rescind, you have to go back to Congress again. I think the
basic problem here, Mr. Chairman, is whatever underwriters and
worldwide creditors think. At least based on the survey that I
have done, and I have talked to several people about this, it
is their view that rescission would affect--and this is a
question of people who provide capital in the markets--that a
rescission could be perceived as a significant event with
respect to the rates, at which money is lent to these
institutions.
That does not strike me as being totally irrational. In
terms of other countries, for the most part they don't have
this appropriation issue. Once they make a commitment, that is
the same as both our authorization and appropriation of
callable capital. In other words, they don't have the interim
problem of having to go back to a Parliament. So basically they
are in the same place we are with respect to our appropriated
callable capital.
Mr. Callahan. It is a difference of opinion, but it is
aggravating to me that they would say they don't trust the
appropriators. What they are saying is that we are not going to
require any other country--some of them are in real dire
financial straits, and they are not considering that some
detriment to the bank.
Secretary Rubin. The people whose capital depend on the
institutions aren't the developing countries. They are the
major industrial countries. It is not the World Bank and the
others that are the ones whose views matter. It is the
underwriters, the creditors and to some extent the rating
agencies. This is not a criticism of or a comment on the banks.
It is a comment on those who fund the banks, the rating
agencies who rate them, and the underwriters who raise the
money.
Mr. Callahan. I think if I were a bank, I would rather have
it in a lockbox or side drawer someplace, but it wouldn't
affect my judgment as to whether or not the bank was solvent or
whether or not it was actuarially sound. I disagree with them.
We will discuss that as we go further into the day.
Mrs. Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, how are
we proceeding?
Mr. Callahan. We are going to keep to the 5 minutes so we
make sure that everybody here--if you think you are going to be
longer than 5 minutes--I wasn't longer than 5 minutes.
Ms. Pelosi. I will take the same 5 minutes you did.
Mr. Callahan. Fine.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to follow
up on your line of questioning and have the Secretary continue
on a track that he was on before.
Mr. Secretary, you said the skittishness that you referred
to calls the commitment into serious question. Can you comment
further on how additional borrowing costs could hurt the banks
in terms of restricting new lending and funding debt relief
initiatives?
Secretary Rubin. The World Bank has a triple A rating. That
is a very rare rating in today's international financial
markets. If there were qualms about the triple A rating, the
bank could still be viewed as a very good credit risk, but not
triple A. That would substantially increase the cost of money
to the bank.
If a lower rating increased the cost of money, the Bank's
resources would have to be used to pay the higher cost of
capital, and that means less money would be available to use
for developing countries that they try to assist.
Ms. Pelosi. I have a couple of odds-and-ends questions.
Secretary Rubin. Mr. Schuerch points out that a lower
rating would particularly affect IDA, because IDA is funded in
some measure by transfers from the IBRD.
Ms. Pelosi. I just have serious concerns about using this
callable capital as an offset because I think it could----
Secretary Rubin. I would say this.
One of the concerns that I had about the proposed
rescission, and I know that it is a concern that others have
had that focus on this issue, is that once the callable capital
is seen as available and perhaps a source of budget authority
that does not carry a lot of consequence, that there are others
in Congress who might decide they would like to use it too. And
I think that there is little doubt that if this spread and
really took the whole $12 billion of appropriated callable
capital that is available for whatever purposes, I think you
really do run a substantial risk of having a substantial
adverse impact on the perceived creditworthiness of these banks
and would substantially increase the cost that they would have
to pay to borrow money.
Ms. Pelosi. I appreciate your response. I think that
anytime that that resource is put in doubt, it diminishes
confidence, and confidence is a large part of what we are
progressing with.
Secretary Rubin. It is a particularly bad time to have that
happen, given that we are still very much coping with the
question of confidence with respect to global financial
markets.
Ms. Pelosi. And particularly the Asian financial crisis to
go to the Asian bank. A couple of odds-and-ends questions, and
then we will have another round.
Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the advisory committee
to be established by Treasury to give advice to the IMF on IMF
policy as mandated by the bill enacted last year? When will the
members be announced and when will the first meeting take
place?
Secretary Rubin. There are two committees that we were
required to set up. Are you referring to the one that advises
me.
Ms. Pelosi. Why don't we talk about both of them.
Secretary Rubin. For one of them, the Advisory Commission,
the members are appointed by Congress. For the other, the
Advisory Committee, the members are appointed by the
administration. We have selected the members of the Committee.
Have we named them yet? It is not public yet. I guess we are
doing vetting. We have made our choices and we conferred with
labor and environmental groups and all of the relevant
constituencies that were involved, and we have a good group of
people that the constituencies that are supposed to be
represented will be pleased with.
In the case of the Commission the other advisory group
where the members are appointed by Congress, I don't----
Ms. Pelosi. Some are.
Secretary Rubin. Bill points out that the Democrats have
appointed their members, and the Republicans are in the process
of doing that.
Ms. Pelosi. Hopefully that will move along and we can use
our moral suasion that we have work to do and need the
commission report.
I mentioned in my opening remarks about the global AIDS
issue. In recent years the pandemic has been sort of on the G-7
agenda. Can you tell us what has resulted from these
discussions and if AIDS will be on the agenda again this year?
Secretary Rubin. I----
Ms. Pelosi. I am asking very abbreviated forms of my
questions in the interest of time, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rubin. I think if you look at Africa, AIDS has
become as significant as any other impediment to economic
growth. There are countries that have 20 percent rates now of
HIV-positive, and that is a horrible human tragedy. It is also
a horrendous economic development problem.
The World Bank is very focused on dealing with AIDS. And
particularly as I understand it, they are focused on education
and preventive measures. There is one country that I can
recollect that has put in place a significant education program
and they have reduced the HIV infection rate from 30 to 10
percent in a 5-year period.
Ms. Pelosi. I will submit these questions for the record
because they are very specific about this issue, but as a
supporter as I am of the World Bank, I was concerned that the
GAO report was critical of the World Bank for not cooperating
with the U.N. AIDS program, and I hope that you will convey the
high priority that this issue has here to the World Bank.
Again, I say that with the highest regard for the World
Bank, but it is just an issue of collaboration.
Secretary Rubin. They are very focused on AIDS. If they are
not cooperating with the U.N. program in some fashion, we can
follow up on that.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Packard.
Mr. Packard. Thank you, and thank you for appearing.
I share the same views on debt forgiveness that the
Chairman has spoken to. I have concerns. Your heavily indebted
poor countries, how does a country get on that list?
Secretary Rubin. By having a lot of problems. The
definition under existing programs would be a country having a
ratio of debt-to-exports in excess of 200 percent, and they
also have to have a poverty rate such that they would qualify
for IDA which means an average per capita income of $950 a year
or less. So they have to be poor and heavily indebted.
Mr. Packard. How many countries are listed in that group?
Secretary Rubin. My recollection is that there were 41
which by----
Mr. Schuerch. Forty-one by the poverty criteria.
Secretary Rubin. Forty-one by poverty and 23 by
unsustainable burdens of debt, not counting the additions that
would occur as a result of the program the President announced
yesterday. Is that correct, Bill?
Mr. Schuerch. Yes.
Mr. Packard. Any of the larger countries that we do a lot
of lending to on that list, Brazil, Russia, Ukraine?
Secretary Rubin. No, none of those. In fact, you will find
that a lot of the countries are sub-Saharan African countries.
Mr. Packard. One of my concerns is that with a very loose
requirement and monitoring of debt relief, there is so much
corruption in many of these small countries it could be an
incentive to further corruption rather than a disincentive, and
that is a great concern.
Secretary Rubin. I think your point is exceedingly well
taken. One of the factors that gets looked at with respect to
reform is corruption. In the program that the President
announced yesterday, although he didn't say this, one of the
factors that is involved in getting the deepest debt reduction
would be effective programs to a deal with corruption. So your
point is well taken.
Mr. Packard. A totally separate question. In my part of the
country, NAD Bank is very important down near the Mexican
border and San Diego area. I am not sure that we have lost
jurisdiction as a committee. I don't know where that stands as
of yesterday, but be that as it may, the United States and
Mexico have put close to a half billion dollars into that
program, and it is hopefully to be used to leverage and finance
up to $3 billion of environmental projects.
To date, very few projects have been funded by the NAD Bank
even though the money has been there and of course the mission
has been there. And, frankly, the environmental problems at the
border are worse today than when we started NAD Bank, and are
still further deteriorating. If we were to evaluate the program
from that point of view, it would have been a failure. I have
been supportive of NAD Bank and I will continue to do so, but I
really believe that it needs to be used for its mission.
Can you address what is being done and what can be done to
make sure that money is funded for projects which are going to
solve the environmental problems?.
Secretary Rubin. My impression is that on the environmental
side it was a little bit slow in getting up, and these are
complicated projects and it takes time to get them going. But I
think they are moving at a better rate now.
Why don't you respond, Bill?
Mr. Schuerch. I went down to the NAD Bank's annual meeting
and we had a public hearing. The management has been focusing
and will continue to focus next year on pushing implementation
of the projects that are in the pipeline. There has been quite
a bit of success. It is a difficult job, but I will have to say
that the tone of the comments in the public hearing was
remarkably different from what we have heard in prior years.
Most of the speakers came forward and were quite complimentary
of the focus on implementation now, although they were
dissatisfied a year ago and 2 years ago.
So I think we have at least the start of the turnaround in
that problem and we are certainly focused on it.
Mr. Packard. Certainly this Congress will become more
complimentary as we see results, and I hope you are right.
Secretary Rubin. On the community development side, we have
made real progress in moving money out the door. That is now in
the jurisdiction, I think, of the Treasury, Postal
Subcommittee. Treasury has nothing to do with the jurisdiction
issue but that is my understanding.
Mr. Callahan. We are going to go down the line, but Mr.
Obey has to leave by 11:20 so if we don't reach him, we are
going to have to jump over the line. Mrs. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. I will be happy to defer to----
Mr. Obey. I just want to see what is up first.
Mrs. Lowey. We only have 5 minutes, and I will move
quickly. I want to join my colleagues in welcoming you, Mr.
Secretary, and we are very proud of your outstanding record.
And Mr. Bill Schuerch, as Deputy Assistant Secretary, we are
delighted to see you.
Secretary Rubin. We just refer to him as our leader.
Mrs. Lowey. He has been our leader for many years, and we
are delighted to see him here.
There has been a good deal of discussion this morning on
callable capital, so I think I will get on to some other
issues, but I know that it does warrant further discussion and
exchange of ideas. I just do want to say, as a key advocate for
paying our United Nations arrears, there may be some questions
about the United States paying its debts. In all of my
discussions with many advocates, it is absolutely a shame--and
this committee is not responsible for that--but I think it is
shameful that we have not paid our United Nations dues. To
think that by the end of the year we will lose our vote in the
General Assembly under Article 19. If we don't pay our arrears,
it may put in question the faith and credit of the United
States and our commitments.
But to move on to another issue, I just wanted to talk a
little bit about GEF the Global Environmental Facility because
the house bill also included a rescission of $25 million for
GEF, and the Senate bill included a $60 million rescission for
GEF.
Can you let us know the impact these cuts would have on the
critical conservation work that GEF is engaged in? In fact, I
believe the United States is already $35.8 million in arrears
to GEF before this rescission?
Secretary Rubin. That is right, Mrs. Lowey. For FY 2000 we
are requesting $35.8 million of the $107.5 million which we
currently are in arrears to the GEF. I think GEF performs a
unique function in dealing with environmental problems and
cross-border effects, which no one country has the full
incentive to deal with and yet the globe certainly does.
It is our judgment that there shouldn't be any rescission
with respect to GEF. I guess I would have to say while that
would certainly be our preference, some rescission may be
absorbable. But at 60 million you get to a level that could
have a significant impact on a very important program. And as
you know, we are very much opposed to that level of rescission.
Mrs. Lowey. Following up on the impact the rescissions will
have on GEF, I want you to discuss further the work that GEF
does to help American businesses trying to compete in the
global marketplace. How does GEF combat the competitive
disadvantage that American businesses face as a result of weak
environmental laws in other countries?
Secretary Rubin. I think it actually serves an even broader
purpose, and that is when you have problems in tropical rain
forests and you have other environmental problems around the
world, the effects fall on us as well as on the countries in
which the problems take place; and yet these countries have
neither the resources nor the incentive to fully fund solutions
to the problems that they have, because these problems, while
originating in these countries, have effects that go much
beyond those countries. And that is what GEF deals with.
GEF also, by promoting environmental investment, is a very
important source of purchasing power with respect to
environmental equipment and we are the world's leader in the
provision of that kind of equipment.
Bill, would you like to add anything?
Mr. Schuerch. Yes. GEF spends a considerable amount of
resources also on helping Third World countries develop plans
and work through participatory processes with civil society
organizations so you build a base in support of environmental
activities, and this goes towards moving legislation as well as
getting them to have the same types of values and interests
vis-a-vis environmental activities as the United States does.
But it is a longer-term process, it is not an immediate
process.
Mrs. Lowey. I thank you. Another area that we have
discussed in the past is health and education. Last year a
number of us raised concerns about a drop-off in World Bank
lending for help in education. And I am happy to see that since
then, the World Bank has increased its commitment and has lent
over $5 billion for health and education in 1998. And I just
wanted to commend you and the World Bank president, Jim
Wolfensohn, for your commitment to this issue.
Could you perhaps discuss with us briefly the work that you
are continuing to do and you are planning to do with the World
Bank to ensure that education and health care continue to
receive the high priority that they deserve?
Secretary Rubin. We recently met with Jim Wolfensohn and
his principal deputy, I have forgotten exactly when. Some of
the priorities of the World Bank which we discussed were
education, health care, the other social programs that underlie
a market-based economy, and I think it would be fair to say
that they have over time reoriented their focus, and that is
why there were the improvements in 1998. They have reoriented
their focus away from large construction projects toward what
we think are more fundamental requisites for a successful
modern economy.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you. Mr. Knollenberg.
Mr. Knollenberg. Mr. Secretary, good morning. I have a
couple of follow-up questions on the GEF issue which was raised
by my colleague, Mrs. Lowey.
Since its establishment, the U.S. has contributed well over
$200 million to GEF, and last year's omnibus appropriation bill
increased by funding $192.5 million.
Secretary Rubin. Which was arrears.
Mr. Knollenberg. With regard to GEF, I have some serious
concerns about this organization in that it may be used by
those outside of our government who wish to implement policies
that have not yet become U.S. official policy. Of course. I am
referring to GEF's possible designation as a primary funding
mechanism for the global climate control issue, and its newest
incarnation which is the Kyoto Protocol, which, as you know,
has not been ratified by the Senate. I am concerned that almost
half of the GEF funding is channeled through nongovernment
organizations that are strong advocates of the Kyoto Protocol.
I am concerned that this flawed treaty fails to reduce
greenhouse gases, very honestly, but just relocates them. As
you have heard many times, it will have a devastating impact on
the American economy.
Can you assure this committee that GEF will not be used to
fund any activities under the Kyoto Protocol?
Secretary Rubin. Two comments if I may, and then let me see
if Bill would like to add anything.
The $192.5 million that you referred to last year was all
for repayment of the arrears. If part of that amount is
rescinded, then our arrears will increase by that amount.
On the question of Kyoto and climate control, GEF, as I
understand it, has been involved with climate control but none
of its activity has been affected by the Kyoto Protocol. At
least that is my understanding.
Mr. Schuerch. The Climate Convention was passed in the
Senate in 1992. So in terms of U.S. policy, activities under
the Climate Convention are appropriate things for GEF to be
doing, and they are funding those.
Kyoto has not passed, and in fact as we understand Kyoto,
there are no additional types of new activities that GEF would
be required to do under the Kyoto treaty. We had the head of
GEF, an American, Mohammad T. El-Ashry, up to brief staff, and
he made precisely the assurance that you have asked us to make,
which is that they will not be funding new activities under the
Kyoto treaty. They have no intention of doing so.
Mr. Knollenberg. With respect to the announcement yesterday
by the President, new initiatives, the concern about this debt
relief for the heavily-indebted poor countries, one of the
steps that I see that is outlined here in this report indicates
that under the innovative approaches, one such step would
channel resources into environmental protection.
And again I raise the question because it is mentioned
here. It is mentioned that there will be debt for nature swaps
in particular, and I would like to have you comment further on
these activities that are anticipated will be included in any
activities in conjunction with the Kyoto Protocol, and anything
at all that would have to do with implementation of the
protocol relative to the debt for nature swaps. I am not real
clear what that means. Maybe it is not understood just yet what
the focus of that means, but if you would comment, please.
Secretary Rubin. I can give you this response, and then we
can ask Bill to expand on it. Having spent a lot of time
working on developing this initiative, we can state that nobody
in the course of that discussion ever mentioned the notion of
using the debt for nature swaps as a way of implementing the
not-yet-ratified Kyoto convention, but there are debt for
nature swaps right now that operate in Latin America, if I
remember correctly, and I think it is a very successful
program. The idea is to relieve debt payments on the condition
that the resource is used for various purposes, and one of them
is various kinds of environmental purposes.
Mr. Schuerch. It is not just swaps in that program. The
prior debt reduction activity, the major one produced by the
last administration in Latin America, not from swaps but from
buybacks and other activities, a set of local panels which then
apply local currency that is generated from the debt reduction
to conservation activities. They are types of activities like
generating jobs in communities around national forests or
tropical forests so people are less likely to cut down forests
and things of that sort. None are oriented toward Kyoto treaty
activities to my knowledge.
Mr. Knollenberg. You understand my concern that once the
money gets out of the hands of any kind of U.S. control, and it
does, there may be little that you or anybody can do to curtail
expenditures on behalf of a policy to advocate implementation.
That is my real concern.
I understand that the intent is not there, but do we really
have total scrutiny and oversight over what those monies are
spent for? When they leave our hands and our control, how do we
know that they are not being spent?
Secretary Rubin. You always have that problem with any of
the national financial institutions and even debt relief
initiatives; but I think one thing that should give you some
comfort is that these countries are involved on an ongoing
basis with World Bank, the IMF, regional multilateral
development banks, and if funds are improperly used, then that
affects what they get going forward. And in most cases they
have programs that are given out in tranches, so you have the
subsequent tranches as your enforcement mechanism.
Mr. Knollenberg. My time has expired, and I appreciate the
response. Thank you.
Mr. Callahan. We are going to continue to go down the line
with Mr. Jackson next, but I want to tell you, Mr. Obey, this
timetable you put on us is helping things. Maybe at each
meeting you can come in and tell me where you have to be in 30
minutes.
Mr. Jackson for 5 minutes.
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr.
Secretary, for your testimony this morning. My questions center
in the first round around multilateral development banks.
The African Development Bank has had management problems in
the past, but I know under new leadership they have worked hard
to make institutional reforms, reforms which have improved the
overall health and the bottom line of the bank. I am happy to
see that the President and you have responded to these reforms
by including $5.1 million for fiscal year 2000, the first of 8
fiscal year installments.
Can you speak about some of the reforms at the bank,
discuss the current health of the bank and talk about the dire
need for these funds?
Secretary Rubin. Let me ask Mr. Schuerch to do that. But
let me start out with, first, noting the role the United States
has played in turning the bank around. First we said we would
discontinue funding the African Development Fund until its
management got straightened out a little bit. We played a very
active role. I met with the new president of the African
Development Bank, and the U.S. played a very active role in the
reform program for the bank and the fund.
I must say, having sat and talked with him and his staff
when I was in Africa, I certainly came away with the feeling
that they had a good sense of their mission and how they were
going to try to implement their mission. So we have recommended
substantial funding, and last year we got a good appropriation
for the African Development Fund.
Mr. Schuerch. It is about 4 years ago now we went through
the process. Funding was cut off for the bank. A new president
was brought in. Activities were undertaken to strengthen their
credit judgments so that countries that were able to repay
received bank hard loans and not soft loans. And countries that
were not able to pay received soft and not hard loans, which
was part of the problem that was going on. So their risk
judgments were improved substantially and put in line with
those of the World Bank.
I would also say that a significant number, I think the
number is in the range of 70, of the upper leadership of the
bank were removed in the process under the new presidency and
have been replaced. The quality of the staff is considerably
improved.
In this latest round of negotiations, we have structured
the capital increase for the bank in such a way that the
contributing countries have a stronger presence and voting
power, and there is a voting structure such that major
decisions within the institution cannot go forward without at
least two of the developing nation chairs in favor of them. I
think that is a big improvement from where we were.
Also in the IDA 12 negotiations and the negotiations on the
African Fund, we have pushed the two organizations together to
develop a memorandum of understanding and a closer working
relationship, and some staff programs where they work back and
forth between the institutions, so we are hoping that this will
also make a big difference.
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Schuerch.
Mr. Secretary, the African Development Fund helps the
poorest of poor countries. The fund has made some sound policy
commitments under its Aid for Replenishment. Can you speak
about some of the recent commitments that the U.S. has made
with the AFDF and the results of these commitments?
Secretary Rubin. The fund has made to specific African
countries?
Mr. Jackson. Yes.
Secretary Rubin. Bill, do you know?
Mr. Schuerch. I don't think that I can go country by
country and how much the lending program has been.
Mr. Jackson. Maybe some of them.
Mr. Schuerch. In the process of the new program, I want to
explain the change that is in your budget, if I can take this
opportunity.
In the past replenishment, we had some one-time events.
Italy was clearing up arrears. So there was a large payment.
There was also a cleaning up of the portfolio from past
projects that people felt were no longer appropriate. That
released a significant amount of resources. So while the budget
has a significant increase for the fund, it is in the context
of a lending program that continues on the course of the most
recent lending program for the same poorest countries in the
region.
Mr. Jackson. Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Rubin. I would also add if I may, Mr. Jackson,
another thing that has been done, and I think very
constructively, the donor countries have a larger role in the
management of the bank, or rather in the control of the funds
of the bank, which should help keep these institutions on the
performance track that they are on.
Mr. Jackson. Mr. Secretary, regarding the World Bank for
just a moment, I am wondering does the U.S. use and insist its
voice and vote to ensure that internationally recognized
workers' rights are upheld, and are there any recent situations
where the World Bank has disregarded the U.S.'s voice and vote
and lent money to a country with questionable labor practices?
Secretary Rubin. We have been very active in promoting core
labor standards and in the 12th replenishment for IDA, which is
the now pending replenishment, core labor standards have become
one of the central factors in loan programs.
In addition, we have had the World Bank and the ILO, again
in the 12th IDA replenishment, develop working relationships so
they can better promote core labor standards. And I think it
would be fair to say that the United States really has been by
far and away the most forceful advocate with respect to core
labor standards in the World Bank community.
Mr. Jackson. Are you aware of any instances where the World
Bank has ignored the voice and vote of the United States with
respect to core labor standards?
Secretary Rubin. I don't know of any, but there might be
some. We can get back to you on that, Mr. Jackson.
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Secretary Rubin. As you may well know, we have been very
strong advocates with respect to core labor standards. There
are many countries that don't share our views.
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Ms. Kilpatrick.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
I first want to say thank you for your staff, who spoke
with me regarding the very complicated structure of debt and
multilateral development banks and the like. I just want to say
to Mr. Schuerch that I need at least two more of those sessions
so I can speak more intelligently on it. Thank you for coming.
And I am serious, I would like to follow up.
There have been some discussion about U.S. arrears to the
U.N. and what might happen at the end of the year as a result
of our failure to pay. How likely is that? Would you comment.
Secretary Rubin. Well, the U.N. arrearage is something that
the State Department deals with and not Treasury. I would
repeat what Mrs. Lowey said. I think it is in our interest, our
national security and our economic interests, and our general
place in the world, that we pay our U.N. arrearages. To the
best of my knowledge, we are the only major economy that is in
arrears to the U.N., and that to me is a nonsensical position
for us to be in just in terms of our own self-interest.
Ms. Kilpatrick. It is. As we discussed today, with both the
multilateral arrangements that we have and the foreign impact
that we make, it seems to me that we cannot even behold, unless
we pay those.
Secretary Rubin. Another problem that we have, and I have
actually seen this in some of the activities that I have been
involved in, how you handle yourself in each piece of the
international----
Ms. Kilpatrick. It all fits. It is part of a major puzzle
and any piece missing----
Secretary Rubin. You are absolutely right. It affects how
you are perceived with respect to the others.
Ms. Kilpatrick. On the issue of the gold that the IMF wants
to sell, will we lose authority as we sell this gold? How are
other countries impacted, the U.S. in particular, as we sell
the gold?
Secretary Rubin. Congress, as you know, has to approve that
sale by the IMF.
Ms. Kilpatrick. What about autonomy? Will they be more
autonomous or less after selling this gold?
Secretary Rubin. That is an interesting question. I don't
think that it will affect their autonomy. What it will do is
take a certain amount of the gold--it is an asset with no
income--and convert it into cash which is converted into some
kind of a security, I presume triple A short-term debt
security, which has an interest yield which can be used to help
fund the HIPC initiative.
Ms. Kilpatrick. That is how IMF gets its money; it is
backed by gold, is it not?
Secretary Rubin. The gold is part of, if you will, the
credit backing of the IMF which secures, for example, their
obligations to the United States. But the value of the asset
will not be diminished; it will be changed on the balance sheet
from gold to an interest-bearing security of some sort.
Ms. Kilpatrick. That is given to whomever we send it?
Secretary Rubin. The interest-bearing security will sit on
the balance sheet, and the interest that it pays will then be
used to help fund the debt relief initiatives of the IMF, but
there will be no change in the creditworthiness of the IMF
because the asset is simply being changed from gold to what I
presume will be a triple A interest-bearing security of some
sort.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Should we be worried about whether the U.S.
and other countries will have more or less control or will it
stay the same?
Secretary Rubin. It is a good question. The reallocation of
the assets on the balance sheet should not affect our ability
to influence the IMF.
Ms. Kilpatrick. The discussion about the $18 billion that
finally was added to the IMF last year----
Secretary Rubin. There, I think, had we not provided the
$18 billion, we would have had an enormously diminished role in
terms of our ability to influence the IMF.
Ms. Kilpatrick. You mentioned earlier concessional debt.
How is a country eligible for that? What criteria is used?
Secretary Rubin. The suggestion the President is making
with the concessional debt--you mean bilateral concessional
debt?
Ms. Kilpatrick. Yes.
Secretary Rubin. Eligibility is predominantly based on
poverty. The President suggested or has recommended in this new
debt initiative that countries around the world do what the
United States has been doing, which is to provide our aid
predominantly in the form of grants, not concessional debt, so
you don't build up the debt levels for countries who already
have a difficult debt service problems.
Mr. Schuerch. This is one area where the United States
distinguishes itself from some of the other countries in the
debt programs. In 1985 there was a decision in the Congress to
no longer make large amounts of AID loans or economic support
fund loans such as had been provided in past years. So the U.S.
stopped being a participant in increasing the amount of debt
for the most part although there are still agriculture loans
and some other programs.
So the U.S. has a very high grant element in its program.
There is a loan program at AID now, and it is the housing
program, but it is not one that goes to the poorest countries.
It goes to a class of countries somewhat higher up.
Ms. Kilpatrick. As we move to grants instead of loans, are
other countries following suit?
Secretary Rubin. We actually, as Bill says, have moved to
grants instead of loans, which is sound, so you don't have the
debt burden. There are many other countries which give most of
their aid in the form of loans, not grants, and in some
countries those loans tend to be tied to trade requirements
which we think is yet another less desirable way of providing
assistance.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you.
Secretary Rubin. We would like to see the whole
international system be predominantly grants.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Sabo.
Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome the
Secretary. It is good to see you again.
Secretary Rubin. It is very good to see you.
Mr. Sabo. Let me just express that I share your concern
over what we are doing with callable capital. Clearly, in my
judgment, it has to do some negative things for the
international banks, and at the same time it doesn't do what we
pretend that it is doing. We are proceeding under the
assumption that we can't fund emergency bills, which I think we
should be able to fund; but then we are saying that we are
paying for them, but we really aren't, because we are not
offsetting the actual outlays, which are what our budget limits
are.
Mr. Chairman, if I might use your example, I think it is as
if I signed a guarantee on a $100,000 mortgage for one of my
kids and then decided that I wanted to buy a $30,000 car, and I
would send a letter to the bank, saying ``Sorry, I am cutting
the guarantee to 70,'' and think that somehow that gave me
$30,000 to spend, when in reality all I would have done is
upset the guarantee, make the bank very uneasy over the loan to
my kid, and not have $30,000 to go out and buy the car.
Mr. Callahan. He has let facts stand in the way of his
judgment.
Mr. Sabo. I think that is what we are pretending we are
doing here. We don't offset any outlays, but potentially create
problems with guarantees. That to me is sort of the worst of
all worlds. This whole world is new to me. This is the first
time that I am on this subcommittee.
What is a relative amount of bad debt for international
organizations? I have no sense what----
Secretary Rubin. It is an interesting question. There are a
lot of ways of approaching it. For example, my recollection is
our publicly-held debt to GDP ratio is about 44 percent now. It
was about 50 percent when the President was elected.
We can give you something in writing on this. It is a
complicated question. Usually people measure the debt levels
relative to export earnings.
Mr. Sabo. I am thinking of the relative loans outstanding,
say, from the World Bank. What is a ratio of loans that might
be to countries where we are considering debt relief?
Secretary Rubin. The ratio of loans--I am----
Mr. Schuerch. Let me try and answer that question.
If you look at the countries that are debt relief
candidates, HIPC eligible or potentially eligible countries,
most of them are IDA countries. In some cases we have countries
that did borrow at one time from the hard loan windows and
slipped back. But overwhelmingly, the countries have borrowed
highly concessional lending from the soft loan windows.
Mr. Sabo. Let me try to rephrase it.
Secretary Rubin. I don't think that we have answered your
question.
Mr. Sabo. In loans outstanding by the World Bank?
Secretary Rubin. What percentage would be relieved under
HIPC?
Mr. Sabo. What is the scope? What percentage?
Secretary Rubin. I don't know the answer to that. You are
saying what percentage of World Bank loans would be relieved
under HIPC?
Mr. Sabo. Yes; which are potentially troublesome and in
need of relief.
Secretary Rubin. It is a relatively small percentage, but
what that percentage is, I don't know. We can get back to you
on that. But it is a relatively small percentage of total
loans.
Mr. Sabo. What about unilateral loans which we may have
outstanding in this country?
Secretary Rubin. Our recommendation is that 100% of the ODA
loans would be forgiven.
Mr. Sabo. What are ODA?
Secretary Rubin. Those are the loans which we were talking
about before, concessional loans that are part of aid. We have
already forgiven a lot of those loans. To the extent that ODA
loans still exist, our suggestion is that they be fully
forgiven for countries that are involved in effective reform
programs.
Mr. Sabo. So we have very little unilateral debt?
Secretary Rubin. We also have nonconcessional debt. Do you
know what the number is?
Mr. Schuerch. I believe the number is just under $2 billion
for the HIPC 40 countries.
Secretary Rubin. I think it is $1.9 billion for the 41
countries that meet the poverty test, and there are only 23
countries--we can get you those numbers.
Mr. Callahan. I think it would be good to submit this to
the committee for the record.
[The information follows:]
Amount of HIPC Debt Relief
Question. How much IFI debt and USG debt is potentially going to be
treated under the HIPC program?
Answer. Attached is a table showing total outstanding debt of all
41 heavily indebted poor countries. Under the current HIPC initiative
prevailing at the time of this hearing, we estimate that $1 billion in
debt owed to the USG by 23 countries would be forgiven and about $16
billion would be forgiven by all the IFIs. These figures are additional
to the amounts already forgiven by the Paris Club under Naples Terms
(67%) before HIPC forgiveness.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sabo. I thank you.
Secretary Rubin. But again it would be a relatively small
percentage of the total bilateral debt we have outstanding.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Obey.
Mr. Obey. Mr. Secretary, let me say I want to thank you for
your service to this country. I really do believe that you are
the best Secretary of the Treasury that I have dealt with in
the 30 years that I have been in the Congress.
Secretary Rubin. Thank you.
Mr. Obey. I am a little concerned about the fellow sitting
next to you. I think he has somehow wound up on the wrong side
of the table. Are you sure you are not supposed to be back up
here, Bill?
Secretary Rubin. I think he feels that he has descended
since he left working with you, Mr. Obey.
Mr. Obey. Lucky to escape, probably. I would like to talk
about your debt forgiveness proposal for a moment. I know that
this is different because we are talking about official debt
here versus commercial debt that I am going to refer to, but
there is a linkage.
Back a number of years ago after the Iron Curtain fell, we
had a very large question as to whether or not Eastern European
countries that were trying to move away from the Soviet sphere
would be able to survive or not. And to facilitate that
survival, this committee on a bipartisan basis made clear to
the administration that we would be highly reluctant to fund
the European Development Bank unless there was a significant
amount of commercial debt relief for Poland. I don't remember
how much debt relief that was.
Bill may remember. Do you, Bill?
Mr. Schuerch. I am not sure that I remember the gross
quantity. A $5 billion number I think represents the 50 percent
reduction that occurred on the private side, so the $10 billion
I think is the total commercial side of that transaction.
Mr. Obey. I would simply ask this: What chance would Poland
have had to really develop its economy and get ahead of the
curve if the West had not engaged in that debt reduction?
Mr. Schuerch. I think the main point in the case of
Poland--and I would say the HIPC program is in some case
modeled after the Poland experience--is that reform was
required of the country as they got debt relief in a tranched
process. So final and full debt relief for the percentages that
were envisioned occurred at the end of the process, but there
was some relief as it went along. But what was important was
the commitment was made at the start.
The other thing in the case of Poland was clearly political
leadership and commitment to the economic reform process were
critical. The time frame was critical for holding, I think,
Polish political commitment to the reform process during the
period as well.
I don't know that I can judge, you know, what part of that
was the most critical element. Clearly there are other things
in Poland, but the developed world made a very substantial
effort for Poland.
Mr. Obey. Mr. Balcerowicz, their Finance Minister, told me
last year that had it not been for that action by the West, he
did not think that their movement toward economic reform would
have succeeded. I think he is right.
Let me just ask two other questions. We have seen stories
in the newspaper about the way in which employees of the World
Bank and the IMF use the visa system for domestic workers from
other countries so they can obtain people to work in their
homes. Both institutions, I understand it, have specific
guidelines on wage rates, insurance, and payment of taxes, but
there is also little or no monitoring. There have been very
many allegations of abuses.
Mr. Secretary, what is your assessment of the problem in
these institutions? Do you agree that a program ought to be
initiated which informs domestic workers of their rights and
which requires bank and fund employees to document contracts,
Federal tax forms and truthful wages paid?
Secretary Rubin. Mr. Obey, that is a set of problems that
we saw for the first time in the press. We have been very much
focused on it and we have said to these institutions they need
to put in place programs which prevent this from happening in
the future. Whether those are the specific components that the
program should have, I don't know. But after listening to you,
those sound like programs that would make sense.
But whether that should be the content or not, I don't have
a view. Bill?
Mr. Schuerch. The State Department is working on this
issue. It is the G-5 visa program that is in question here and
there is a task force at the Justice Department on worker
exploitation. So the institutions have been fully cooperative
and have reacted strongly as well, and we are working toward
strengthening their programs to make sure that this doesn't
happen again.
Mr. Obey. I just think that there is a time factor
associated with this problem, and I would urge you to be very
aggressive. I don't think the State Department, left to its own
devices, will be aggressive enough.
Secretary Rubin. I recall, talking with one of the senior
people at the World Bank, who said this is much more of a
problem for them than anyone else because it affects how they
are perceived. He is onto the notion that this can adversely
affect them.
Mr. Obey. I don't want to get into the argument of callable
capital. I agree with much of what Mr. Sabo just said. But let
me ask you--you have been quite clear in your statements that
this could have a deleterious effect on the confidence that
investors have in those banks. I would like to ask you two
questions. First of all, to the best of your knowledge, has the
Congress ever engaged in any such action in the past?
Secondly, I understand what the concerns are on the part of
investors. But can you bring that home to us and tell us what
negative impacts it can have on our own economy if something
like this is read in the wrong way by people who care about
such things in the world economy?
Secretary Rubin. I will take the questions in the order you
asked them. The only Congressional Action that I know of that
is in the same area but it is not analogous to this was in
1994, but in that instance capital, if I recollect correctly,
had not yet been obligated. So that instance is not comparable
to the rescission that has been proposed here.
On the second question, as we have dealt with the world
financial crisis and as we have dealt more generally with the
question of promoting growth in developing countries which is
very much in our economic interest, all of our work centers
around the multilateral development banks and the IMF. I think
it would be enormously against the interest of the United
States to see these banks have their cost of money meaningfully
increased, which then would reduce the resources which could be
expended for the purposes they expend them.
Secondly, I do think at this very sensitive time in the
global financial markets, anything that looks like America
pulling back, anything that looks like an American withdrawal
from full leadership engagement in the problems of the global
financial markets can adversely affect confidence.
And in trying to work our way through this period, and
there is a tremendous amount of work that needs to be done,
anything that adversely affects confidence is against our
economic interests. And anything that we do that looks like a
withdrawal can have a meaningful effect on confidence.
Mr. Obey. If that erosion of confidence occurs, what
negative impacts does that have for us and our ability to
export our products and preserve economic health in this
country?
Secretary Rubin. In 1997 just before the crisis, about 43
percent of our exports were going to developing countries.
Since then, as you know, coming from an agricultural State,
exports in certain sectors have been very much adversely
affected; and the Chairman, I think, had a lumber company
affected by this, too, by the contractions in the economies in
Asia and contractions elsewhere in the world in developing
economies.
So far the economy overall has withstood this remarkably
well, but I do think that not only do we have the existing
problem of sectorial effects, but this crisis has created a
risk for our overall economy. I think as a consequence some
industries, of course, have been affected by large increases in
imports which come from the fact that other parts of the world
are now experiencing either negative growth or less strong
positive growth and so are importing less.
Taken altogether, any erosion of confidence creates an
additional risk for our economic well-being, growth for the
jobs, financial living and the rest, and even if our economy is
healthy, it certainly adversely affects some sectors.
Mr. Obey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Wolf.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Mr. Secretary. I apologize, I was in
another hearing.
I wanted to ask you just one question. There was a New York
Times article of February 11 that said, ``In a blistering
evaluation of its own operations in Indonesia, the World Bank
concludes that its officials turned a blind eye to corruption,
growing repression, and a collapsing financial system in the
final years of President Soeharto's 33-year rule,'' and then it
goes on.
What lessons did we learn, particularly with regard to
China? We never hear any expression of concern from the
administration or from the World Bank with regard to China. We
have had reports--China is one of the largest borrowers from
the World Bank--of slave labor camps actually getting loans
because they are part of companies. Do you feel that the
administration should say something? What did you learn from
the Indonesia one?
Secretary Rubin. That is a good question. Indonesia is one
of the more interesting cases in this whole financial crisis. I
think it was clear going into the Indonesia situation, Mr.
Wolf, whether or not this program would be successful was going
to be a function of what happened politically in Indonesia. And
it was widely recognized that there was a real risk, given the
various aspects of the Soeharto regime, that the politics might
not work to put in place a really effective regime.
I think as you come out of the Indonesian situation, it
reinforces the realization that corruption is a major
impediment to economic development. One of the leading figures
in the international arena with respect to this question of
developing countries was quoted the other day that, quote,
``Corruption is probably the single largest impediment now to
economic development in developing countries in many parts of
the world,'' and I think that is right.
One consequence of that experience is there is heightened
focus, and I think rightly so, in the World Bank on corruption
as a factor with respect to lending. And the President, when he
announced our new debt relief initiative yesterday, has
embedded in there corruption as one of the criteria that would
be considered with respect to debt relief.
That is Indonesia. It sort of reinforces the kinds of
concerns that people have had all along about corruption and
its effect on government.
In China, I believe they will no longer be eligible for IDA
loans after July of 1999, which is a few months from now. In
terms of expressions by the administration, it is true that we
have felt that a positive engagement is the policy that best
serves the multitude of concerns we have with regard to China.
It is also true that there have been many very vigorous
comments by the President about national security and human
rights and other matters with respect to China.
Mr. Wolf. Conditions since the President returned have
actually gotten worse both for the Buddhists in Tibet, the
slave labor camps and for the other people. There have been
some good words out of the administration, but I think it is
more than just words; it is also deeds. Anyway, I just think it
would be healthy. And some in the administration may feel a
little funny after they leave, looking back on this chapter,
that they were silent.
I think when China falls, and I think it will in our time,
as they go into records to see what was done and the forced
abortion and the persecution, I think many people in
government--and I may very well be wrong--are going to be
feeling very guilty and very unclean for their lack of speaking
out.
I just think that sometimes you speak out and it helps and
sometimes it doesn't, but at least you speak out. And today we
are not really having any effective speaking out on the part of
the administration that is credible in China with the
dissidents or credible with regard to the dissidents in Tibet,
if you want to call them that. Thank you very much.
Secretary Rubin. We have used our voice and vote against
credits extended in the multilateral development banks except
for basic human needs, but it is a complex subject. I would
agree with that.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Porter.
Mr. Porter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your
recognizing me. I have been across the hallway with my own
hearing and, Mr. Secretary, I apologize for being late.
Let me read you a statement and then you comment on it, if
you will:
President James Wolfensohn pledged at the 1997 Earth Summit
II to calculate greenhouse gas emissions associated with World
Bank projects. However, to date less than 10 percent of all
World Bank projects are being calculated for impact on the
climate. Since the 1992 Earth Summit, the World Bank has spent
25 times more in climate changing fossil fuels than on
renewables. Fossil fuel projects the World Bank has financed
will, over the next 20 to 50 years, add carbon dioxide
emissions to the Earth's atmosphere equivalent to 1.3 times the
total amount emitted by all of the world's countries in 1995.
While the U.N. continues to push the Kyoto Protocol to control
greenhouse gas emissions, the World Bank appears to be doing
nothing. In addition to financing dirty projects, the World
Bank is helping open up some of the world's richest untapped
oil and gas fields in regions ruled by dictators, while
ignoring renewable energy opportunities that others are seeking
out.
What do you think about that statement?
Secretary Rubin. Let me give you my response, and ask Mr.
Schuerch if he would also comment.
The World Bank is predominantly focused on poverty
reduction, but there has been an enormous increase in
environmental focus there as well. We have recently established
an office under Bill Schuerch with respect to environmental
review, and we now have 3 people in Treasury who specialize on
environmental review of multilateral development banks and IMF
programs.
Mr. Knollenberg made the point that Kyoto has not been
approved, but even without approval of Kyoto, that is a 300
percent interest in environemntalists. We had zero. We are very
focused on global climate change. In terms of the World Bank
and its focus on global climate change, let me ask Mr. Schuerch
to comment.
Mr. Schuerch. Let me say in being focused on poverty
reduction, the World Bank has a substantial conflict, if you
will, in recognizing where you strike the balance between
environmental issues and poverty reduction. This institution
was created, focused on poverty reduction particularly in the
poorest countries. But, when you come to energy projects, you
get into a whole range of questions. The bank does lending in
energy projects, but it does it in a way that is aimed at
influencing the activities so they become lesser emitters of
greenhouse gases.
Now, it is a marginal benefit, if you will, if you put up a
plant that emits gases less than otherwise would have happened,
but it is a gain. But all of the emissions out of that plant
are scored negatively as greenhouse gas emissions created by a
World Bank loan.
There is a balance here. The bank is dedicated to energy
efficiency, and we have a set of policies that we are pushing
related to new technologies and improved tracking. But the
gross measure of greenhouse gas emissions, I think will
continue to show a net increase in greenhouse gas emissions
overall, albeit the Bank would argue significantly less than
otherwise would be occurring.
Mr. Porter. Do you think that the United States has a
responsibility through its representative to push the
environmental side of their responsibilities as well as the
poverty fighting side?
Secretary Rubin. A, I do; and, B, I think we do. And as I
said a moment ago, to more effectively do that, we have now
created an office in the part of Treasury that deals with
development banks, so we can more effectively evaluate that
effort. But in answer to your question, yes.
Mr. Porter. Bill, it is good to see you. Bill was a very
valued member of the staff for this subcommittee, and it is
good to see you in this position.
Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, you are proposing to pay
down $168.4 million of our arrearage to the multilateral
development banks, and the arrearage is about $1.39 billion.
Are those the right figures?
Secretary Rubin. No. The arrearage right now is $310
million--it was $900 million and it is now $310. If we pay this
down with the amount requested for arranges in the FY 2000
Budget, which is $168.38, it will leave us with a balance of
$141.90 in arrearages.
Mr. Porter. This includes U.N. money?
Secretary Rubin. I am excluding U.N. money.
Mr. Porter. What if you include U.N. money?
Secretary Rubin. That is State Department. I don't know the
answer to that, Mr. Porter. But with respect to multilateral
development banks----
Mr. Porter. We would be able to make about 50 percent of
the way to getting this thing paid up?
Secretary Rubin. A little over 50 percent.
Mr. Porter. That is the best we can do?
Secretary Rubin. We would be happy to take more. We
obviously would like to get the whole thing wrapped up. The
subcommittee has done a very good job. We had a 3-year program.
I think we were $900 million in arrears at our high point, not
counting the IDA 11 problem.
Mr. Porter. What are the arrearages that the United States
run, say, to the rest of the world and how does that affect our
credibility in these institutions?
Secretary Rubin. I think when our arrearages were
substantially higher, we were rightly concerned about the
possibility that our influence would be substantially
diminished.
I think the program that this subcommittee has worked with
us on has really preserved this influence, and I think if we
get the appropriation that we have requested this year leaving
a balance of $141 million, we will have done what you have
suggested, which is preserve our ability to affect the overall
direction of these institutions.
Mr. Callahan. We are going to have to start the second
round.
Mr. Porter. How does it feel to be Secretary of Treasury
with the strongest expanding economy in American history?
Secretary Rubin. Well, it has pluses and minus, but on
balance it is plus.
Mr. Callahan. It probably feels the same way that it feels
to be a Member of Congress who caused this economic expansion.
Secretary Rubin. That was an unfortunate title for that
article.
Mr. Callahan. I am going to ask that you promptly get the
responses back to questions because some of them will involve
the supplemental, so get them back as quickly as you can.
We had a lot of discussion this morning about the African
Development Bank and the HIPC fund. Isn't part of the HIPC
money proposed to assist the African Development Bank?
Secretary Rubin. Yes.
Mr. Callahan. Why didn't you ask for all of it in HIPC?
Secretary Rubin. There are two different things. One is the
replenishment--there is a small amount of money for the African
Development Bank and a larger amount for the African
Development Fund.
There is a separate question, which is resources for debt
relief in the African Development group, if you will, and that
money goes into a trust fund at the World Bank which will then
provide the money to the African Development Fund. But the
ultimate benefit--althouth I see your point--of HIPC Trust Fund
support for the African Development group will accrue to the
countries.
Mr. Callahan. What countries? That is the next question.
What countries will be eligible for loans?
Secretary Rubin. Uganda would be an example. You mean for
debt relief? Uganda, Mozambique? You are talking about the HIPC
money?
Mr. Callahan. No, the African Development Bank money. If we
give you the $5.1 million--which African countries could
benefit from it?
Secretary Rubin. Do you have that list? I think there are 3
different pieces of money. One is the $5.1 million for the Bank
which would be used for ``hard money'' loans. So that would
have to be used for countries with relatively good credit.
Those would not be HIPC-eligible countries.
Mr. Callahan. Other than Morocco, Egypt and Botswana, who
would benefit? South Africa is not interested.
Secretary Rubin. Bill has a list of the hard dollar
borrowers. Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia. You are talking about
the $5.1 million. Seychelles and Gabon.
But none of those are countries which would be involved in
the HIPC debt relief program. So those are two unrelated
subjects.
Mr. Callahan. On the selling of gold, there were some who
argued last year that we should have done that in order to make
certain that the necessary monies were there for the
International Monetary Fund to provide assistance to the Far
East. The administration argued against that. Now you are
coming back and saying we ought to sell the gold.
Secretary Rubin. I think----
Mr. Callahan. Or swap it for interest-bearing bonds.
Secretary Rubin. There were some who felt that the gold
should be sold and those resources should be used to provide
loans to countries that were troubled. That would have
diminished the asset base of the IMF and its creditworthiness.
Mr. Callahan. The asset base of the IMF is not diminished
by advancing money to a country that is supposed to pay it
back. That becomes an asset.
Secretary Rubin. Well, yes, it does. And as you know, the
IMF has a very good record in the payment of its loans. But
loans are a lower-quality asset than gold. A loan to Thailand
in trouble is a lower-quality asset.
Mr. Callahan. What do these experts in the world market say
about the IMF selling this solid asset of gold in exchange for
some bonds? Do they say it is an even swap?
Secretary Rubin. I think if you sell gold and are going to
buy Treasury bills that are backed by the full faith and credit
of the United States Government----
Mr. Callahan. The full faith and credit of the United
States Government, you just said that it was not that good in
the foreign market.
Secretary Rubin. No, in terms of backing our debt,
particularly since we continued to pay our debts through the
1995 debt limit crisis, I think we have preserved the integrity
of the United States Government with respect to Treasury bills
and those kinds of obligations. I think in relation to our
support for international institutions there is somewhat more
concern, perhaps. My view is if you took gold and swapped it
with Treasury bills, there is no market risk because they are
short term. I don't think that would affect the perceived
creditworthiness of the IMF.
Mr. Callahan. Is the gold there at the cost of the gold or
does it fluctuate? Does the asset value fluctuate with the cost
of the gold?
Mr. Schuerch. $42.20.
Mr. Callahan. So the gold is carried at $42 an ounce, and
it is selling for $285-300 an ounce now. At one time it was
$800 an ounce.
Secretary Rubin. It has come down some.
Mr. Callahan. It would appear to me that an investment
banker probably would suggest to his client that someday he
sell an asset that went from $32 and put it in Treasury bonds.
Shouldn't that have been done long ago?
Secretary Rubin. My view, just as a personal view, I think
they would be wise to take a certain amount of their gold and
put it into interest-bearing securities.
Now, the negative of that approach and the reason some
people opposed it, as I say, is that gold has a certain
symbolic value or intangible value with respect to how
creditors perceive the IMF, and you might be sacrificing some
of that intangible value.
My guess is that you could do it up to a point. Beyond a
point you might affect perceptions; I don't know.
Mr. Callahan. You mentioned earlier that you were concerned
about the trend of us going into the callable capital account
and that this would be an indication that there is an
availability of money that we could use to rescind in some
future time?
Secretary Rubin. Correct.
Mr. Callahan. What if the International Monetary Fund comes
back, and they are not going to come back for additional
capital, why wouldn't the Congress say, Sell some of your gold
at a profit from $32 an ounce to $285 an ounce and make up your
capital needs from that asset?
Secretary Rubin. In my view, Mr. Chairman, and a few years
from now somebody else will be warning about that, but when we
look at the IMF----
Mr. Callahan. Do you mean that I might not be here?
Secretary Rubin. No, you will be here forever, and somewhat
longer. But when we look at the IMF and make judgments about
whether their obligations to us are good, we know where gold is
traded. We value it at market.
This is not unlike a lot of institutions that carry things
at cost, but when creditors look at assets they mark up the
balance sheets for the difference between cost and market. And
I think the problem with what you suggested is that though some
may suggest it, it would in fact be diminishing the actual
creditworthiness of the institution.
Mr. Callahan. We have talked about debt forgiveness and I
talked earlier about my concerns: Why are we going to pay off
their debts so they can just borrow more money. Japan, I
understand, puts contingencies on debt forgiveness to
countries, puts constraints on the country against borrowing,
and I just wonder why we don't. Nancy touched on it. If we are
going to forgive debts and enable countries to borrow new
money, why don't we put some constraints on what they can
borrow the money for?
Secretary Rubin. Well, what we do with our debt relief, I
think is along the lines that you are talking about. I am not
sure, Mr. Chairman, if I fully understand your point correctly
but I think I agree with it. What we don't want to do is
provide debt relief for a country that is not committed to
reform, because then we have the problem of the debt relief--
the resources--being wasted.
Mr. Callahan. That is my point.
Secretary Rubin. We agree with that.
Mr. Callahan. If we are just going to position the
countries to go and borrow more money to spend in such a manner
that the debt originally was, the money they spent for the most
part was wasted or put in some foreign bank by some corrupt
official or either used for a project that, because of
kickbacks and payoffs, you had low-quality material going to
bridges and roads that can't be used today. So we are going to
forgive the sins of the past and wipe your slate clean and we
are going to permit you to borrow more money because you don't
owe money? What is the protection against that?
Secretary Rubin. The concern that you have expressed is one
that we very much share. Number one, debt relief under our
existing programs and under the President's proposal would only
go to countries that are committed to strong reform programs.
Your correct question is, once they say that they are
committed, how do we know that they are going to do what they
say?
The way that the HIPC program works is the country makes a
commitment and, at least as currently structured, it has to
have a 6-year track record of reform before a closing and
reduction in the stock of debt. Our view is that they should
get interim relief during that period, but if they don't
continue to perform, that interim relief stops and their stock
of debt is not reduced.
Secondly, I don't think that there should be total debt
reduction because I think it is very dangerous to have
borrowers feel they can borrow and not have to pay back
anything. So I think we keep a certain discipline by saying we
should have very substantial debt reduction in the case of
these highly indebted countries, but not total debt reduction.
So I think those are the two ways that we try to address this
problem.
Mr. Callahan. I am going to ask one more question and then
submit the rest of them and move to the second round.
There was a lot of discussion this morning about the
callable capital, and I know that Mr. Obey is concerned about
it. The President is also concerned about the $900-plus million
for aid to Central America, as many of us are. And we want to
facilitate the President. Are you going to recommend to the
President that he veto this bill if we leave the callable
capital in?
Secretary Rubin. He has sent a letter saying that if the
bill has four offsets cited in the letter, he would veto the
bill. That is his letter. I believe if the callable capital is
in the offset, he should veto the bill.
Mr. Callahan. If we do not do that, then we are not going
to be able to get the money for the disaster aid in a
reasonable amount of time?
Secretary Rubin. I think the question then will be, Mr.
Callahan--my own view is that I think the disaster aid should
be done as emergency legislation--but if we are going to have
to offset it, I think the question is how does this get offset?
And that is something that the administration and the Congress
have to work on. But if you ask me would I recommend a veto if
the callable capital is in the offsets, yes.
Mr. Callahan. The emergency appropriation request also
comes with an urgency that they need the money right away to
begin the reconstruction and to help the people who are in such
dire need. If indeed the President is going to veto this thing
next week----
Secretary Rubin. I didn't say that he would veto it. We
think that the supplemental should be done on an emergency
basis.
Mr. Callahan. What you are doing is saying that you are
more concerned about what actuaries in these foreign countries
that keep the tabs on the assets and liabilities of these
foreign banks, that indeed we are more concerned with what they
are going to say or think, rather than whether or not we are
going to get assistance to these people who need the assistance
so badly in Central America?
Secretary Rubin. It is our view, Mr. Chairman, that we can
in the final analysis work with Congress, whether in the
conference context or some other context--although we don't
believe that the emergency assistance should have to be
offset--to come up with appropriate offsets.
Mr. Callahan. I would agree that the budget resolution
indicated there was no need for a budget offset, but in order
to pass any bill through the Congress, you have to have a
majority of the votes, and the leadership on our side has
instructed us to find offsets. We have come up with this
offset. Indeed if the administration feels is not the right
offset, well then where out of Treasury do you want me to take
this money or where out of the State Department do you want me
to take this money?
Secretary Rubin. I am not sure, Mr. Chairman. Let me defer
that question for the moment, because I am not sure that our
view quite relates to the framing that you just presented. We
will work with the Congress, we being the administration, to
find offsets.
Mr. Callahan. There is a problem here. We do not have
sufficient support within our conference, as far as I know, to
pass the bill. Maybe we could do it if all Democrats voted yes,
but with the callable capital in there--we don't have a
sufficient number of votes of a majority of our conference,
because they want offsets also for the military portion to come
from some area other than the military.
So we have problems with these offsets, and we are faced
with this reality, and we can argue about it for 5 or 6 months,
but in the meantime we are not going to have the money to
provide assistance to these people in Central America?
Secretary Rubin. Since we feel very strongly about the
assistance, I guess it would be our hope that it could be
worked through far more expeditiously without having to use
offsets, at least offsets that we think create the kinds of
problems that these offsets create.
Mr. Callahan. I don't think you are going to see a
supplemental bill come through this Congress or survive
conference that is not going to have offsets.
Secretary Rubin. I agree with that based on everything that
I have heard. The question is, given that we are going to have
to have offsets, what are the offsets that create the least
damage?
Mr. Callahan. We figured this offset created the least
damage.
Secretary Rubin. We may have some other ideas.
Mr. Callahan. Ms. Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a
number of questions and I am going to try to boil them down.
The offsets, I think that the Appropriations Committee is
making policy by requiring these offsets because it is saying
that the issue of an emergency is moot. The idea that an
emergency does not need to be offset is in the budget
agreement. If this does not qualify as an emergency with
thousands of people killed, millions homeless, economies wiped
out, people impoverished with no prospects, then there is no
emergency. This is the worst natural disaster in our hemisphere
in anyone's memory.
So I think that a step is being taken here that should
render moot any further discussion of not offsetting anything.
It amazes me that the defense spending in the bill is not
offset. That is an emergency, and our service people performed
beautifully down there. We are so proud of them and their
contribution should not be offset, nor should the contributions
of any of the other U.S. agencies or the alleviation.
Secretary Rubin. I totally agree with you. My discussion
with the Chairman had to do with whether we have to have
offsets. It is our view that we shouldn't have offsets. What
the Chairman said, is that there is no indication that it can
be done without offsets.
Ms. Pelosi. I understand that. I was addressing my
Chairman's comments.
Secondly, on the question of debt relief, we are all
talking about corruption and what leaders are stowing money in
foreign banks. I think we have to take ourself to a place
called alleviation of poverty and grow from there as to what
the best policy would be--to alleviate poverty by some
assistance, by stimulating the economy to take advantage of
market opportunities, by having economic reforms. But every
time we come from above, we end up with debt relief related to
structural reforms that exacerbate the poverty in these
countries, and the people at the low end pay the price, whether
it is IMF reform, debt forgiveness, all along the way.
So I hope that we will have provisos about how the money is
spent, but that we do it in furtherance of the goal of
alleviating poverty. If you want to talk about Chile or any
other success stories, we always end up with people at the low
end of the economic scale paying a big part of that price.
Secretary Rubin. We agree with your focus on poverty
remediation.
Ms. Pelosi. On environment, I am proud of the Pelosi
amendment and I am pleased that you have 3 people at the
Treasury Department, and I am glad that Bill Schuerch is
overseeing the multilateral development banks, et cetera.
I have a question about the IFC. The Fiscal year 1998
Foreign Ops bill extended the coverage of the Pelosi amendment
to the IFC. Is the IFC complying, and if not why not, and what
is the Treasury doing?
Mr. Schuerch. The brief answer is that we do not yet have
IFC in full compliance. IFC has many of its projects within the
120 days, but they do not have a policy that says 120 days.
They have a lesser policy of 60 days. We usually have our best
opportunity to achieve process through leverage, quite
honestly, in negotiations on capital increases, and the IFC has
been in a situation where we have not had that opportunity.
We have been using our voice and vote repeatedly in the IFC
in every instance. I don't think that we have missed a one when
the project has not met the 120-day rule. There also is an
issue, of course, related to projects that are not the most
environmentally sensitive, and timing on those as well.
We continue to work on the IFC and also at the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency. But as yet the effort is not fully
successful. I would have to be honest and tell you no other
government is supporting the United States in this effort.
Ms. Pelosi. That is what is known as leadership. Just
because other countries are not concerned about the environment
and economic investments and support for those projects doesn't
mean that the U.S. should not be taking the lead. Indeed, we
should be using our own leverage to protect the environment,
because we are not doing any favors to these countries by
helping them degrade their environments when there is a price
for us all to pay. And I know that you are committed to that. I
am just saying that falls on deaf ears to me. We have to exert
more leadership.
I just want to make a comment on the GEF because I think it
is a very important initiative, and with or without Kyoto--and
I wish I was here when Mr. Knollenberg was here when he was
tying it to Kyoto. The GEF's organized purpose is to mitigate
specific environmental problems in specific countries. GEF
cleans water, purifies air, and creates cleaner resources for
energy. Whether or not the Kyoto meeting ever took place,
whether or not that treaty is ever ratified, GEF has a purpose
that must be funded, and I appreciate your commitment to that.
Can you tell me, Mr. Secretary, about the World Bank's
Inspection Panel? Many environmental and human rights NGOs are
concerned that the changes being recommended by a working group
would seriously undermine the panel's effectiveness and
credibility. Senator Leahy, Congressman Barney Frank, and I
just sent a letter to President Wolfensohn expressing concerns
about some of these changes. What is the Treasury's view on the
panel and the proposed changes?
Secretary Rubin. Let me ask Mr. Schuerch to answer.
Mr. Schuerch. We are very much aware of the working group's
proposal. We worked very hard in the IDA 12 negotiations and
there is a clear statement of support for the inspection panel
that has passed the board of the Bank and is up for a vote by
each of the Governors now. So we will have a clear statement.
Nevertheless, we still have the activities of the working
group. It is a controversial set of proposals, and the
inspection panel itself has spoken out strongly against the
proposals. We have worked internally. Our USED is working very
hard on the subject matter. We have an agreement that is now
out in public for review and comment which had not been the
original arrangement.
And once those comments are back in, the board will have
further meetings. So we are actively pursuing making the
working group's product--or at least the action that later
passes the board vis-a-vis the inspection panel--one that will
at least leave it at its current position, if not strengthen it
further.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want
to submit a question about the size of the military budgets,
which concern should be taken into account when multilateral
development banks make lending decisions, and another question
regarding the debt relief for tropical rain forests.
I want to thank our witnesses for their leadership and
testimony today and acknowledge that Mike Marek was here
earlier. He is also an alumnus, and we are so proud of him, as
we are of Secretary Schuerch and of you, Mr. Secretary. Thank
you.
Mr. Callahan. We are going to recognize Mr. Jackson and Mr.
Porter for 5 minutes and then we are going to adjourn this
meeting and go to the St. Patrick's Day luncheon.
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to ask all of
my questions, submit the remaining balance for the record and
then leave the Secretary the time to respond.
Can the Secretary justify asking Nelson Mandela's
government to pay off debts contracted by the apartheid era
government, funds that were used to oppress the majority
population for decades?
Would the Secretary comment on the logic and morality of
forcing the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire,
to pay off the debts accumulated by Mobutu Sese Seko, our guy
during the Cold War, given that the 1982 report, commissioned
by the IMF itself, found that its loans were going directly to
the dictator's private accounts?
Number 3, is there no way for the U.S. to apply the same
logic to its recommendation on multilateral debt that it does
on bilateral debt; that is, press for full cancellation of all
debt for the most impoverished countries, at least for the
concessional portion, as in its own bilateral proposal?
Secretary Rubin. What is the third one?
Mr. Jackson. I am going in reverse order on the document I
provided to you.
Number 4 from the bottom: Is the secretary aware that
Mozambique, which received the largest reduction under the HIPC
so far, will see its annual debt payments dip from $111 million
to $100 million and that the Parliament and some of the Cabinet
were sent into an uproar upon learning that to get even that
amount of debt relief, they would have to quintuple user fees
at health clinics? By the way, they have a per capita income of
about $500 per year.
I am also interested in whether the Secretary is aware that
Claire Short, the Minister of Development in the United
Kingdom, recently disclosed that because of the fluctuations in
the price of coffee, that Uganda, which was the first
beneficiary of HIPC, is now back where it started with an
unusual and unofficially unsustainable debt? Does this speak
well for HIPC programs?
Lastly, what will the source of the apparent grants to HIPC
countries be? Apparently between the decision point and the
completion point--and really to follow up on a question and
concern, I guess, raised by our Chairman--since our country has
had some role in the Cold War in choosing in the global chess
game leaders to control and run various countries, particularly
in Africa, and Nigeria, the apartheid government, since we had
some role in making sure that these countries got these loans
during the Cold War, should we take a leadership role in
eliminating them without conditions?
Secretary Rubin. Let me try to give you a general answer
because I think debt relief gets into some very complicated
issues. I have been in South Africa and I met with the leaders,
and no one ever raised with me the question of debt relief with
respect to the apartheid-era debt.
I would guess, and I don't know, I would guess that it
might well be something that they would be very hesitant to do
because--and I said this in my opening remarks--it is a much
more complex subject once you get into it than it is at first
blush.
If a country is thought not to have a credit culture, a
culture in which people are basically committed to paying back
debts, I don't think that they are going to find that they can
get access to private sector capital from the international
financial markets.
Mr. Jackson. Mr. Secretary, certainly history plays a role
in this. For example, the 1982 report on our guy in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, he
was our friend, he was our guy, our country's friend. It says
that the money was lent through the International Monetary Fund
and through other international lending organizations to the
country of Zaire to take care of basic human needs,
infrastructure, roads and projects. But our guy--the money
never ended up with the people. It ended up in his private
accounts. Certainly we should not strap the people of Zaire
with the debt burden associated with him.
Secretary Rubin. That is why the President suggested that
in countries that have effective reform programs and have very
high debt levels and very high poverty levels, there should be
100 percent ODA concessional debt and 90 percent other
bilateral debt.
On the other hand, I don't think it would be--this is my
view, and you can argue this both ways, I suppose--I don't
think that it would be in their self-interest to get full 100
percent debt relief if the other comment that I made is
correct.
Mr. Jackson. Mr. Secretary, aren't we using precisely--
using your own logic, aren't we using the debt accumulated by
Mobutu Sese Seko that ended up in private accounts under the
IMF's own internal analysis of where the money actually went,
aren't we using that to advance a structural adjustment reform
for the people of Zaire who are not responsible for the
dictator's accumulation of that wealth?
Secretary Rubin. Well, I am not quite sure I would frame
the question that way. We are in favor of very substantial debt
relief in this situation. On the other hand, we are not in
favor of taking debt relief beyond the point at which it would
cripple the countries. It doesn't matter what our perceptions
are. But it would cripple the country's ability to get capital
in the international financial markets.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Porter?
Mr. Porter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the
United States has successfully done some debt for nature swaps
and----
Secretary Rubin. In Latin America, principally, I think.
Mr. Porter. The legislation was renewed and signed by the
President. The original legislation was mine, and Congressman
Portman was the lead on renewing and refining it. Fifty million
dollars is requested by the Administration for debt for nature
swaps for fiscal year 2000.
Aren't there opportunities with a lot of the countries that
we are now talking about giving debt relief to, to make that
debt relief a positive for their countries and preserve some of
the nature that otherwise might be lost?
Secretary Rubin. Well, the debt relief will be a positive
in any event because one of two things is going to happen.
Either these countries will pay their debts, and then they
won't have those resources to use, or they won't pay the debts
in which case they run the risk of becoming pariahs in the
international capital markets and of not being able to get
private sector capital.
I think the question that it raises--and you are referring
to a particular piece of legislation and it is a very important
piece of legislation--if a country has additional resources
because of debt relief, how should those resources be
allocated?
Your legislation requires debt for nature swaps, but there
are also other social and education needs that these countries
have, and it is a question of where you think that this money
can be best used.
Mr. Porter. Under the legislation we certainly have some
leverage to encourage environmental uses and preservation of
natural areas and that should be factored into our judgment.
Secretary Rubin. Under your legislation, it has to be used
for that purpose, doesn't it?
Mr. Porter. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Rubin, Irish lore has it if you want to
have a successful, fruitful year, that on St. Patrick's Day you
must spend time with some honest and noble people, and I have
two more stops to make.
Secretary Rubin. Then you may satisfy that aspiration, Mr.
Chairman. We apologize for wasting so much of your time with
respect to that objective.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you for your testimony.
[Questions and answers for the record follow:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, March 11, 1999.
FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET REQUEST FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE
WITNESSES
JOHN D. HOLUM, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
JAMES BODNER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Chairman Callahan's Opening Statement
Mr. Callahan. Thank you all for coming. Today we are having
this hearing on the international security assistance portion
of the President's budget for foreign operations. The funding
requested for the international security accounts including the
Economic Support Fund, IMET, the foreign military financing
program, voluntary peacekeeping operations and the
nonproliferation account exceeds $6.2 billion, an increase of
$120 million over the fiscal year level 1999.
Much of this funding is committed, as history always
reflects, to the Middle East. These numbers do not include the
fiscal year 2000 impacts of the Wye River supplemental, which
would add $500 million for economic support, and FMF for
Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza, and with these
funds the total increase of $620 million, or over 10 percent.
Of course, this budget request is used to support policy,
and therefore we will be focusing today on the status of the
administration's security and foreign policy throughout the
world.
We have a number of disturbing trends, at least to me.
First we continue to make North Korea one of the largest
recipients of our assistance in East Asia. That country is
developing missiles that threaten not only our allies, but
potentially, we understand, possibly the mainland of the United
States.
Second, we continue to provide substantial assistance for
both Russia, and the administration is asking for a huge
increase in assistance for that country, yet we continue to
read press reports that Russia is supplying arms and nuclear
and missile technology assistance to Iran and other enemies of
our friends in the Middle East.
Third, we have very disturbing reports about spying by
China at one of our most sensitive nuclear facilities in New
Mexico, and further reports that the administration did not act
promptly to either inform Congress about these activities or to
impose additional security measures.
At the same time, the administration is asking for an
additional $20 million to implement the comprehensive nuclear
test ban treaty, a treaty that has yet to be ratified by the
Senate.
Fourth, we continue to engage in air strikes against
targets in Iraq due to the failure of international efforts to
monitor the Iraq Defense Act activities. It is ironic that we
bomb Iraq for its failure to ban weapons of mass destruction,
but we provide assistance to North Korea when they are accused
of doing the same thing.
Fifth, even in Africa we see renewed warfare in Ethiopia
and Eritrea, the collapse of the U.N. peacekeeping operations
in Angola, and continuing civil war in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
Sixth, we see little progress in Haiti, which has not had a
government now for almost 2 years.
Finally, we have a prospect of another long-term commitment
to U.S. troops and resources in the Balkans, this time for
Kosovo. At the same time, the Dayton Peace Accord in Bosnia is
threatened due to the removal of the President of the Bosnian
Serb entity, and for the first time a U.S. soldier was forced
to kill a civilian to defend himself from harm.
We have a military that is increasingly stretched thin in
its ability to respond to all of these initiatives and still
retain its readiness and a core group of veteran professionals.
The U.S. military may face the worst personnel crisis since the
end of the Vietnam War. The proliferation of missions in far-
flung regions of the world is undermining our ability to
recruit and retain the most important instruments of the U.S.
international security, the men and women of our Armed Forces.
Our resources are not endless, and the ability of our troops to
respond to every possible contingency in the world is not
without limits.
Our witnesses today are John Holum, the Acting Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
Affairs, and James Bodner, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, and we welcome you all here today. Both of
your statements will be included in their entirety in the
record; therefore, I encourage to you summarize your statements
in order to allow Members time to ask questions.
Mr. Callahan. Ms. Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi's Opening Statement
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is a
very important hearing today. The subcommittee will hear
testimony on the fiscal year 2000 request for the security
assistance related programs in the Foreign Operations bill. I
want to join you in welcoming our witnesses, Secretary John
Holum, the Acting Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs, and Mr. James Bodner, the
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
I intend to discuss a range of topics today, including the
status of our military sales programs, progress on demining,
the implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, our
policy towards North Korea, the status of relations between
Greece and Turkey, and IMET for Pakistan as well as other
issues. The Chairman laid out a litany of concerns in his
opening remarks, and clearly there are so many issues it is
hard to see how we can cover them all in one hearing, but I
will try to cover my issues in the allotted time.
Mr. Chairman, last year as a result of growing concern
about the rapidly expanding foreign military training programs
conducted throughout the world by our Defense Department, a
provision was included in the Foreign Operations bill that
required a report on the scope of U.S.-sponsored military
training throughout the world.
The report, which was only recently submitted, indicates
that $1 billion has been spent on foreign military training in
the past 2 years on over 51,000 different activities. Clearly
the scope and range of U.S. foreign military training has
ballooned significantly well beyond the $50 million IMET
program funded in the Foreign Operations Bill.
The law requires that a foreign policy justification be
submitted for such training and, specifically, that information
on the JCET program, the Joint Combined Exercise and Training
program, be included in the report. The foreign policy
justification submitted with the report consists of one four-
sentence paragraph, and all the information on the JCET program
was submitted in classified form.
The report shows that there are numerous instances where
decisions are made to deploy U.S. forces in training capacity
into foreign countries without any congressional consultation
or involvement.
The Foreign Operations subcommittee is supposed to have
jurisdiction over foreign military training. The DOD budget is
supposed to fund training which primarily benefits our military
forces. Primarily. The scope and extent of foreign military
training funded by the DOD shown in this report demonstrates
that this distinction has been purposely evaded in order to
avoid congressional oversight.
Congress is not adequately informed of the vast majority of
these training activities and deployments, many of which have
foreign policy implications. Unfortunately, the DOD has chosen
to submit a report that is narrowly crafted and is unresponsive
to our concerns.
The apparent recent decision by the administration to
deploy U.S. special forces to train an 800-man counternarcotics
battalion in the Colombian Army is a recent blaring example of
this evasion. Because of numerous instances of human rights
violations and the Colombian police's mistrust of the Colombian
Army--making a distinction here, Mr. Chairman, between the
police and the army--U.S. policy and the debate in Congress has
centered around what resources should be provided to the
Colombian National Police for counternarcotics programs.
The administration has decided to initiate this special
forces army training within the last 2 months. Congress was
never informed of this decision, despite the obvious interest
and its controversial nature. I am forced to conclude that the
lack of consultation was purposeful, or, even worse, that only
selected individuals in Congress were informed despite the
direct role of this subcommittee.
Another recent example is the case of Indonesia where only
after press stories occurred was Congress made aware of
extensive training programs with the Indonesian Army and even
training of the Indonesian intelligence force. This is on the
heels of action taken by the DOD in the early 1990s to allow
Indonesia to purchase IMET training with their own funds to get
around a congressionally placed ban on IMET. The requirement
for the training report was a modest attempt to gather
information about all DOD training activities, and it is my
hope that a separate hearing will be scheduled so that we can
ask in-depth questions about all issues raised by it.
My intention today would be to explore with our witnesses
why this report was so narrowly crafted and how this kind of
behind-the-scenes decisionmaking can be justified in instances
that are so controversial and of such obvious interest to this
subcommittee.
The House may be spending the rest of the day debating the
deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo at the insistence of our
Speaker. He has scheduled this resolution in order to respond
to concerns within his caucus about the commitment of U.S.
troops. The situation in Colombia is only different from Kosovo
in scale. It is no different in terms of the controversy it
generates and the potential danger it poses. In fact, it may be
more dangerous sending U.S. troops to Colombia because of the
absence of a peace agreement. The recent killing of three
Americans in Colombia should demonstrate in stark terms the
perils of that country.
Finally I want to note my continued concern about our IMET
program in Pakistan. I have consulted extensively with the
State Department on this and agreed not to oppose a 1-year IMET
program for Pakistan. Decisions about the future inclusion of
this authority for next year will depend on Pakistani
performance on various nonproliferation concerns. I intend to
pursue these issues today to take advantage of the presence of
high-level officials from both State and DOD. I look forward to
the opportunity to discuss further the training issue in a
military training hearing. I look forward to the testimony of
our witnesses today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Secretary Holum, we have received your 22-
page Statement and had the chance to at least begin to scan it,
and certainly will take it seriously and read it in its
entirety at some time during this process, but we would ask now
that you summarize your presentation.
Mr. Holum's Opening Statement
Mr. Holum. I will be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman.
Members of the committee it is a pleasure to be with you
this morning along with Principal Deputy Under Secretary Jim
Bodner to testify in support of the administration's fiscal
year 2000 security budget request.
I know you have many issues that you want to discuss in the
next few hours, and you have given us a good many.
Mr. Callahan. We are not going to get too much into the
budget request. This is a policy hearing. You wouldn't like to
be in that meeting anyway.
Mr. Holum. A year ago Secretary Albright, Under Secretary
Slocombe and I appealed to you, Mr. Chairman, for a bipartisan
consensus to provide the resources necessary to help protect
American security and vital geopolitical interests. Through
your leadership, Mr. Chairman, and this committee's support, we
have worked together successfully over the past year to advance
American interests and sustain American leadership.
During that time we have made important progress. We have
helped achieve progress toward a peaceful, free and undivided
Europe. We are facilitating the integration into NATO of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as they prepare to join
the alliance. Security cooperation in Asia is on the rise. We
have also undertaken to strengthen key alliances, major
bilateral relationships and regional organizations.
Our efforts are paying dividends both here at home and
abroad, but we cannot afford to become complacent or ignore the
challenges beyond our borders, many of which you and Ms. Pelosi
have cited. Regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, persistent attempts to undermine or overthrow
legally constituted governments, terrorist attacks on American
citizens, instability in Russia, the ongoing crisis in Iraq,
and others should serve to remind us that the world continues
to be a very dangerous place.
If Americans are to be secure in such a world, we must be
willing to dedicate the resources necessary to protect and
enhance American national interests abroad. And so this morning
I am here once again to ask for your support.
This year we will celebrate the 10-year anniversary of the
fall of the Berlin Wall. Tomorrow Secretary Albright will
receive the instruments of accession to NATO from the foreign
ministers of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic,
effectively completing that process for them. It is amazing
when you go consider that only 10 years ago those nations, our
new allies, were on the other side of the Iron Curtain.
Our fiscal year 2000 security assistance request will build
upon the successes of the last several years in furthering the
efforts of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as they
deepen their military integration within NATO. And through the
Partnership for Peace and International Military Education and
Training program, IMET, it will assist our friends in Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union who may want to join in the
future.
Our request also provides support for the OSCE's extensive
responsibilities in Kosovo under the verification mission, its
ongoing activities to implement peace in Bosnia consistent with
the terms of the Dayton Agreement, and the eventual withdrawal
of SFOR troops, and its democracy activities through Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union.
In the Middle East our request continues our efforts to
bring about the comprehensive and lasting peace between Israel
and its Arab neighbors. Accordingly I ask the committee to
support our request for military and economic assistance for
Israel and Egypt. These levels reflect Israel's desire to
gradually reduce its amount of economic assistance while
maintaining a strong security relationship with the U.S.
We also seek your support for increased military and
economic assistance levels for Jordan, including the
President's emergency supplemental request to demonstrate our
responsiveness to Jordan's economic and military assistance
needs in the wake of the transition under King Abdullah.
Finally, I ask for your support in increased economic
funding for the Palestinian people.
In Asia, our budget request supports U.S. interests in
fortifying our core alliances, maintaining our forward
deployment of troops, and continuing implementation along with
our partners in the Agreed Framework. This request also
supports efforts by ASEAN and other regional leaders to
encourage democracy and the respect for human rights in
Cambodia and throughout the region.
Closer to home, Latin America continues to make great
strides. Today, except for one lonely exception, every
government in the hemisphere is freely elected. Peru and
Ecuador have resolved their border dispute, and Central America
remains free of conflict. However, the region still faces many
challenges, especially in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch and
earthquakes in Colombia. Our budget request supports continuing
market-based economic reforms; strengthening democracy, the
rule of law, and respect for human rights; building regional
cooperation on defense and security matters; and working with
the region's militaries to develop sound military strategies
and doctrines. I also ask for your support for an emergency
supplemental appropriation to help those countries hardest hit
by recent natural disasters.
In Haiti, the challenge of shaping a Democratic culture and
market economy has been especially difficult. For millions of
impoverished Haitians, democracy has not yet delivered on the
hope of prosperity. Our request maintains strong levels of
support for Haiti to support programs that will help strengthen
the economy, eradicate unemployment, hunger and rural poverty,
and promote a professional police force and coast guard.
In Africa, many nations face ongoing challenges, among them
Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Angola, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Even
so, old conflicts are being settled, countries are looking to
modernize, centralized economies are giving way to open
markets, and civil society is beginning to flourish. Our
assistance will encourage such continued democratic and
economic reform and, where needed, support regional and
multilateral conflict resolution activities. And through the
African Crisis Response Initiative, it will also enhance the
ability of select African nations to increase their share of
the burden in responding to humanitarian peacekeeping crises on
the continent.
The area with greatest potential for serious conflict in
renewed genocide in Africa remains the Great Lakes region of
central Africa, where fighting could result in the permanent
destablization of Rwanda, Burundi, or the Democratic Republic
of Congo. Our programs in this region are designed to
strengthen mechanisms for justice and reconciliation in order
to break the cycles of impunity, extreme violence, and
instability that have plagued the area's recent history.
And in fiscal year 2000, we will continue to champion a
cause that I know is of great concern to many on this committee
and in the Congress, humanitarian demining. Through the
President's Demining 2010 Initiative, we are committed to
ensuring that civilians in every country on every continent are
secure from the threat of land mines by the end of the next
decade.
Mr. Chairman, to protect the security and prosperity of our
citizens, we are engaged in every region on every continent.
Many of our programs and concerns are directed, as I have
discussed, at particular countries or parts of the world, but
there are threats that are more encompassing and can best be
considered in global terms.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional
weapons now pose the principal direct threats to the security
of the United States and our allies. Arms control and
nonproliferation efforts remain a key part of our foreign
policy strategy to keep America safe. The objectives of our
nonproliferation programs are to reduce the risks of war by
limiting and reducing distabilizing forces, inhibiting the
spread of weapons of mass destruction delivery systems, and
building confidence through measures that enhance transparency
and verification of compliance with national commitments. We
must and will face these threats head on and request your
assistance in providing us the resources we need.
Working bilaterally through export control programs, the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, and under the
multiagency efforts of the new Expanded Threat Reduction
Initiative, as well as multilaterally through IAEA, KEDO and
the CTBT Preparatory Commission, we seek to stem the
unrestrained flow of sensitive materials, technology, and
weapons expertise that risks the well-being not only of the
American people, but of our friends and allies both now and in
the future.
I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, along with Ms.
Pelosi and Representative Obey, for allowing us to move forward
with the CTBT Preparatory Commission. This funding will allow
the United States to maintain a leadership role in developing
the Prepcom's work plan to further our nonproliferation and
national security objectives. I look forward to working closely
with you on this program.
Let me conclude by saying that this funding that we are
requesting directly increases the security of Americans and
advances our direct interest in a stable, peaceful and
prosperous international system. We undertake these programs to
achieve specific objectives, each of which can be measured in
terms of its success, and each of which makes America and the
world safer. U.S. security depends on the strengthening of our
alliances, resolving regional conflicts, limiting the
proliferation of destabilizing weapons and assisting democratic
forces in emerging or threatened democracies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Members for the
opportunity to address you on the security assistance budget,
and we would be pleased, after Deputy Under Secretary Bodner's
presentation, to answer your questions.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Bodner.
Mr. Bodner's Opening Statement
Mr. Bodner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Members of the
committee, I appreciate this chance to talk to you this morning
about U.S. security assistance programs and how they benefit
American national security interests. Mr. Chairman and
Representative Pelosi, your leadership and the support of the
rest of the committee provide us with the tools that we need to
protect and promote American national interests by shaping the
world environment, not simply reacting to it.
Enhancing the capabilities of our friends and our allies to
address conflicts, humanitarian crises, and natural disasters
makes it less likely that American forces will be called upon
to respond to regional problems, and it also limits their
involvement when they are called upon.
Security assistance programs help to ensure that when we do
employ our forces, foreign militaries can work with them more
efficiently and effectively rather than being hobbled by
mismatched equipment, communications and doctrine.
Our engagement activities promote the principles of
democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. And
indeed, one of our most cost-effective security assistance
programs, and some would say the most cost-effective security
assistance program, is the International Military Education and
Training program. IMET provides foreign military and civilian
defense officials professional education opportunities at
senior service staff colleges, as well as technical training in
areas such as maintenance and aircraft engine repair. By doing
so, the IMET program fosters military-to-military relationships
and promotes military professionalism in foreign militaries.
These benefits are key to our gaining cooperation of others to
conduct combined operations as well as to improving their
ability to defend themselves and operate with each other. IMET
training also ensures that small unit and field commanders know
how to conduct operations in ways that are both effective and
respectful of human rights.
These traditional military education and training programs
account for about 70 percent of the IMET program. The remaining
30 percent is conducted under the Expanded IMET program, which
focuses on issues such as responsible management of defense
resources, civilian control of the military, and improving the
military justice systems so they accord with international
standards of human rights.
This year the administration is requesting $52 million for
IMET for fiscal year 2000, which is a $2 million increase over
fiscal year 1999. This increase would be devoted primarily to
our programs in central Europe, both to support the three new
members of NATO and to support the Partnership for Peace
program. We also propose to restart our IMET program with
Nigeria.
The political and military benefits of the IMET program are
the main reason why this year we are also requesting that IMET
funding be extended to Pakistan--we appreciate the comments
that you made Ms. Pelosi. In addition, we recommend extending
full IMET to Guatemala and Indonesia.
In each of these cases we do believe that IMET contacts
will promote democratic values and be effective tools for
achieving our national security and our foreign policy
objectives, including greater adherence to international
standards of human rights. Allowing the administration to offer
these traditional IMET courses will help to reform these
militaries by exposing a new generation military officers and a
broader spectrum of students--to our standards of military
professionalism.
Let me briefly address the military training report that
Ms. Pelosi discussed. It was directed by Congress last year
that DOD and State Department together produce a report. We
submitted that report on Friday. We briefed members of your
staff about it. The report documents extensively the more than
52,000 education and training activities that were undertaken
in fiscal year 1998 and that we project to undertake in fiscal
year 1999.
During the briefing, members of your staff asked a number
of questions, and we are in the process of addressing them. In
particular, I want to assure the subcommittee that we are
reviewing the classified annex on JCETs and CINC activities and
will declassify as much information as possible and produce
those as quickly as possible.
Ms. Pelosi. I appreciate that.
Mr. Bodner. As you know, a vast majority of our security
assistance funding, of course, is in the FMF program, the
Foreign Military Finance program. This supports our security
goals by enabling key friends and allies to improve their
defense capabilities by financing the acquisition of U.S.
military articles, services and training. And I just would like
to emphasize that there has never been doubt that the FMF
program also promotes U.S. national security interests by
strengthening coalitions with friends and allies, cementing
cooperative relationships with foreign militaries, as well as
enhancing the interoperability of U.S. forces with those
foreign militaries.
This year we are requesting $3.43 billion for Foreign
Military Finance, which is an increase over the 1999
appropriation of $80 million. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman,
the overwhelming bulk of the request for FMF is to support
regional peace efforts in the Middle East. When you take into
account the increases proposed for Israel and Jordan, FMF for
countries outside the Middle East will decrease by $10 million
compared to the fiscal year 1999 level. Of the portion that
will not be devoted to the Middle East, the largest recipients
will be the three new members of NATO to facilitate their
integration into the alliance.
In addition, the request that we are proposing will allow
us to continue our support for the Partnership for Peace
program, help sustain a small professional defense and maritime
force in the Caribbean, and bolster African countries'
capabilities to conduct limited peace and humanitarian
missions.
Finally, I would note that FMF money is used to purchase
U.S. military equipment and services, and that means that
American workers as well as the defense industrial base benefit
from our security assistance program.
These various programs I have just outlined are truly
critical to our national security agenda, and they are critical
tools in promoting our national interests around the world.
Security assistance directly works to benefit U.S. taxpayers,
and there is a genuine linkage between the activities that we
conduct under the program and the interests of average
Americans. We genuinely believe that the dollars spent to
enhance the defense capabilities of our friends and allies to
improve their interoperability with U.S. forces and with each
other yield benefits to the American people far in excess of
the cost, and I urge you to support the request we are making.
I appreciate the chance to talk to you this morning.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Callahan. I have a feeling Ms. Pelosi is going to ask
some questions before we leave, but we have a vote on now. I am
going to, with your indulgence, yield my 5 minutes to Mr.
Knollenberg, who has a conflict, as I am sure every member on
the subcommittee does. And let me encourage all of you that if
you do have pressing conflicts and there is something of
extreme importance, we sometimes jump around to facilitate your
schedules.
Joe, you can start now. I would like for to you wait until
I get back from voting before you get into KEDO. Is that the
subject?
Mr. Knollenberg. That is the subject.
Mr. Callahan. Well, why don't we go vote and come back. I
will yield to Mr. Knollenberg my 5 minutes.
Ms. Pelosi. And I will follow the lead of my Chairman, too,
and yield to my colleagues.
Mr. Callahan. Why don't we just go vote.
[Recess.]
Mr. Callahan. I think we are going to have a series of
votes; nevertheless we will have to work ourselves around the
votes.
Mr. Knollenberg.
Mr. Knollenberg. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And welcome, Mr. Holum and Mr. Bodner.
north korea
Let me get into this quickly, and I do appreciate the
Chairman giving me this recognition early on. I have four
hearings this morning, but this is one I am very much
interested in.
As you know, recent media reports claim that Kumchang-ni in
North Korea is related to the construction of an underground
graphite-moderated reactor for the production of plutonium.
North Korea is denying that such an underground complex exists.
U.S. officials, I understand, have demanded access to the site,
and they have been denied. They have, in fact, been asked to
pony up $300 million as some kind of carrot in return for
access to the sites.
Now, along with this particular site there are many other
facilities that could be utilized for the production of nuclear
weapons, including reprocessing facilities to separate
plutonium for U235 fissile cores and highly secured storage
facilities. The administration is apparently making no effort
to gain access to these other facilities, and that concerns me.
The administration has clearly focused all of its efforts
in the ongoing negotiations with the North Koreans in New York
on attempts to gain access to the Kumchang-ni underground
facility. That is important. I understand that. But there are
several other sites that we are looking at here, and myself,
along with Majority Leader Armey, Chairman Ben Gilman, and
others, sent a letter to Mr. Perry, who is in a mode right now
to make some efforts over there. And the whole focus of that
letter was to make sure that we know, for example, that North
Korea is complying with the Agreed Framework. I know they are
asking for money, and they have no business asking for money.
We know they are not living up to the agreement.
What can you tell me about our efforts specifically to gain
access to those other sites.
Mr. Holum. Mr. Knollenberg, there is a limitation on what I
can say in open session about intelligence assessments. I can
tell you that as to the Kumchang-ni site, we are nearing the
end of another round of negotiations. The North Koreans
understand that a successful resolution of that issue will
require access to the site sufficient to confirm that no
activity in violation of the Agreed Framework is or will be
conducted there.
What that says about additional concerns that have or may
arise is that it sets a precedent for our approach to these
issues in the sense that although we haven't yet concluded that
Kumchang-ni is a violation of the Agreed Framework only to the
extent to which it has progressed, nonetheless we need to have
assurances that the commitments under the Agreed Framework are
being fulfilled and that this is a test of their willingness to
comply.
We will address other issues as they arise. It is very
important, I might add, that you have made your views known to
former Secretary Perry. He is engaged in a comprehensive
review, as you know, of our overall policy with North Korea. He
is now in the region consulting with allies including Japan and
South Korea, and we are looking forward to the results of his
review. This entire----
Mr. Knollenberg. That would be the end of March or
thereabouts?
Mr. Holum. We haven't put a deadline on his deliberations
for the reason we want him to have as complete as possible
access to the information he needs and take whatever time is
necessary, recognizing that this is an urgent matter. One of
the things that he has done in the process of this is consult,
as you know, with interested Members of the Congress, including
a very helpful session that I sat in on at our offsite with
congressional staff. And we have been very receptive--he has
been very receptive to hearing your views, so I am glad you
conveyed them.
Mr. Bodner. Let me add two points to that. First, the
existing facility at Yongbyon, the reprocessing facility and
reactor with the spent fuel, it is very important that we make
sure that that remains closed and not operational. That is very
important and why we think at the present time we should
continue the Agreed Framework, if possible, to keep that
facility, which we know exists and once was operating, closed.
Second, at Kumchang-ni, as Mr. Holum said, we do need
access to that site and are engaged in discussions with the
North Koreans to gain that access.
Third, were there to be other sites, our discussion with
North Koreans on Kumchang-ni is the precedent, because
obviously if we had serious concerns, we would also need access
to them.
Mr. Knollenberg. I appreciate that response. I recognize
the sensitivity, too, of breaching an area that we cannot speak
openly about. But let me go on to a question that has to do
with the ICBM technology. And, of course, you are very
familiar, I know, with the development that North Korea has
reached in terms of the multistage rocketry.
The Washington Times and other publications recently
reported that China is sharing this space technology with North
Korea. More specifically, they believe that China provided the
third stage and satellite technology to North Korea, which gave
the Taepo Dong its intercontinental range. In light of the
recent security breaches at our national weapons labs--and this
gets into a sensitive area, this is very disturbing, and I
think that it should be raised with the Chinese--to my
knowledge, the administration has not raised that issue with
the Chinese. In my view, the most serious issue related to
North Korea is not failure to abide by some agreement, it is
rather the very real threat posed to American security by rogue
nuclear states, and the facts are very ominous.
North Korea, number one, is very likely engaging in nuclear
weapons production at several sites throughout the country; and
then, number two, the recent launch verifies suspicion about
North Korea's ICBM capability. This threat is magnified by the
Chinese involvement in the export of missile technology to the
rogue regime, thus aiding North Korea in the construction of a
delivery system that is capable of reaching American shores.
What I would like to ask you is what can you tell me about
China providing satellite and third-stage boost technology to
the North Korean ICBM or Taepo Dong ICBM that is designed to
reach the United States? What can you give me? What can you
tell me about the accuracy of that statement?
Mr. Holum. Well, again, we have the same limitation on
discussing intelligence matters. I can tell you that missile
issues, both missile issues relating to Chinese assistance
through technology to other countries and the issue of North
Korea, are routinely on our agenda in discussions with the
Chinese officials at all levels, including the highest levels.
Mr. Knollenberg. Can you tell me if Secretary Albright made
that a part of her discussion recently with the officials?
Mr. Holum. I can't, but I can check on it for you.
Certainly the missile issues and North Korea issues.
[The information follows:]
We have no evidence to confirm press reports that China is
providing North Korea's missile or space programs with U.S.-origin
technology.
Nor are we aware of any evidence that China is engaged in
assistance to North Korea's space program that would be inconsistent
with the MTCR Guidelines.
Therefore, the Secretary did not raise these reports with Chinese
officials.
However, as part of our continuing nonproliferation dialogue with
China, the Secretary underscored our concerns about the threat to
international peace and stability posed by missile proliferation during
her visit to Beijing in March. She also discussed with Foreign Minister
Tang a broad range of missile nonproliferation issues, including
China's implementation of the export control and nonproliferation steps
necessary for it to join the MTCR.
Mr. Knollenberg. Those issues were raised during the recent
meeting; is that correct?
Mr. Holum. Yes.
Mr. Bodner. I don't believe the Intelligence Community has
come to a conclusion on the question that you raised, but I
believe we would be happy to share whatever information we
have.
Mr. Holum. More broadly in the case of China's assistance
on missile capabilities, as you know we have twice sanctioned
China for missile exports. The most recent sanctioning in 1993
gave rise to their commitment to not export MTCR-class missiles
to any country. That commitment actually goes beyond the
requirements of the MTCR and, to our knowledge, they are
abiding by that commitment. We have seen no indication that
they are transferring MTCR-class missiles to other countries.
At the same time we have very serious concerns about their
interpretation, particularly as to technology, missile
technology, of their obligation and of the MTCR commitment.
That is one of the reasons why one of our leading objectives is
to achieve their formal adherence to the Missile Technology
Control Regime, including the technical annex that would
include exports of those technologies, but it is a matter that
is not resolved, and we are not satisfied at the moment.
Mr. Knollenberg. There is a heightened awareness, is there
not, among the administration officials about the situation
with respect to this issue, this particular focus?
Mr. Holum. No question at all, and we will doubtless get
into this. One of the key reasons why the United States is
including money, and Deputy Under Secretary Bodner can
certainly address this, why we have included funds for the 5-
year defense program, 5-year defense plan for deployment--
possible deployment of the national missile defense is the
growth in North Korea's missile capabilities and particularly
the third stage. It has elevated the----
KEDO
Mr. Knollenberg. If I could go to a final question, and I
appreciate your willingness to give me this time up front. I
want to go to KEDO, the agreement itself, the framework and
part of the Agreed Framework that was established to gather
contributions from interested countries to finance the
construction of two light water reactors in North Korea. Japan
and South Korea, as you know, have primary responsibility for
financing this project. These countries decided it would be
better and would be sold in their own home countries if they
were to characterize this as a loan instead of a contribution
in order to make, as I say, make it more acceptable back home.
At the same time, we are assured that there was little
likelihood that North Korea would come through with payment.
This reality has raised the question of whether KEDO, in
the absence of North Korean payments, will be expected to
guarantee the Japanese loans. And if KEDO would, in turn, look
to the U.S. for additional funding to cover these costs. So the
question, I think, is fairly obvious: Given the fact that the
Japanese contribution to KEDO's project is in the form of a
loan, what is KEDO's liability to repay Japan in the very
likely event that North Korea will be unable to pay? And will
the U.S. be asked to step in and shore up that negative?
Mr. Holum. Let me begin with the last part first. The
United States does not bear financial liability for any KEDO
debts incurred with respect to the light water reactor
construction. That is the opening proposition. Japan and the
ROK are committed politically most recently to the KEDO light
water reactor cost-sharing resolution of October 21, 1998, to
contribute respectively $1 billion toward--and that is in the
case of Japan, and 70 percent of the total cost, that is Korea,
the light water reactor project, which is based on an estimated
total cost of $4.6 billion. The ROK and Japanese decisions to
style their financing as loans to KEDO does not alter their
commitment to fulfill those funding obligations.
Mr. Knollenberg. Their commitment has not been met of late,
though, that they would be on target?
Mr. Holum. They are moving in that direction. One of the
things that was a disturbance of the progress was the Taepo
Dong launch, which caused the Japanese to suspend consideration
of their participation. But we believe that all the parties
understand fully the essential nature of the financing and that
neither KEDO nor the United States will be financially
obligated to the light water reactor.
Mr. Bodner. Mr. Knollenberg, it is fair to say that Tokyo
and Seoul have been informed consistently in the last few years
of the U.S. views on this.
Mr. Knollenberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Just following up on KEDO, I appreciate the
patience the White House and the State Department has had in
trying to educate me in foreign policy. I have tried with every
ounce of resource I have to try to understand this KEDO
situation from a layman's point of view without ever walking
away from it with a feeling of despair over what I perceive as
almost the stupidity of this agreement from the word go.
This is one project that has happened under my watch
because the funding first started 4\1/2\ years ago, 5 years
ago, but now it has grown to the point where it is almost
getting ridiculous. I mean, the administration's request for
$50 million for North Korea? You know, we started off at $13
million and Mr. Carlucci told this committee then that if we
didn't give them $13 million, the world was going to come to an
end, and we were going to have a nuclear holocaust, and he was
going to blame it on me.
Well, that would have been all right, too. He could have
blamed it on me, but we gave them the $13 million so we
wouldn't have this nuclear holocaust because we were told at
the time that this would stop the advancement of nuclear
capabilities in North Korea. That part was logical.
Why we were ever involved at this stage, I don't know.
Negotiating the project with Japan and South Korea, that is
good, but why we are the only country putting up any money to
facilitate this peace process between the two countries and not
making any progress, and North Korea not paying any attention
to the agreement just is beyond explanation to me.
Maybe it is over my head, and maybe you professional
diplomats and professional foreign affairs experts, maybe you
can adjust your own logical thinking to justify this, but this
is never going to stop. We are going to have the first brick
laid on building a power plant.
The power plant never should have been built in North Korea
anyway, it should have been built in South Korea right on the
line, and they should have put power lines over there so if
North Korea ever started violating things, they could cut the
power off. But that is above my pay grade, too.
But we are getting to the point where we don't have $55
million to put into North Korea to continue this project, and
in addition to that, the administration is borrowing money such
as they are doing with the $19 million that Joe Knollenberg
mentioned. My assessment of that is that Japan is saying, look,
we want this project to go forward so we can be protected
against nuclear attack by North Korea, and we are pledging to
put up 3 of the 10 billion over whatever they are putting up.
Nothing is done. Japan has not spent a penny, and you are
saying this thing is falling apart. The Congress is balking. So
Japan says, I will loan you $19 million. They didn't give you
$19 million. They are advancing you 19 million, and probably
you are going to be back here next year saying, now we have an
additional debt, which the debt in itself I have never been
pleased with.
I don't know who gave you all the authority to go into
debt, and I recognize that you had pledges from other nations
who are not coming through. But you keep borrowing more and
more money, you keep coming to Congress telling us that there
is zero progress, but there are still problems. The South
Koreans and the Japanese are not really spending any money,
although I know they are doing some ground-breaking over there.
We cannot keep this up. You are not going to get this $55
million this year unless you come up with some suggestion as to
how we reshuffle the money that is going to be made available
to us, which is going to be an even greater problem. You sit
over there and think of all these grandiose ideas that maybe
sound good when you are meeting with leaders of these
countries, and then you start contending that is an obligation
of the United States of America.
For example, Egypt. You are talking about giving them some
type of interest-bearing account, which is going to cost your
agency millions of dollars if it is scored like CBO is telling
us it is going to be scored. That sounds good when you are
sitting down with Mubarak. Oh, Mr. President, we love you. We
love Egypt. We support that. We will ask the Congress to put
your pipeline money in interest-bearing accounts.
You don't ever think about money. You know and I know that
the budget resolution that is going to be considered in a few
weeks by the House and the Senate, and probably adopted, is
going to reduce the resources available to this committee to
provide you with money. Yet you keep coming forward with all of
these programs, and then you keep coming forward with these
requests of $55 million. What is that; what kind of increase is
that percentagewise? $20 million, that is nearly a 40 percent
increase in appropriations for KEDO, which you tell us is not
quite working.
But you have got Mr. Perry over there now, and I have great
respect for him, great admiration and great confidence, but the
answer to everything is not more money, and we are going to
have to look carefully at this request.
I don't want to run the foreign policy of this country. The
people elected President Clinton to do that. He appointed
Madeleine Albright, and I have great respect for Madeleine
Albright, and I think she is doing a wonderful job, and I don't
want to get involved in it. But we are getting down to the
point where I don't have the money. I have got to pick and
choose.
So you want to go back to my district, as Mr. Carlucci told
me he was going to do 5 years ago, and tell the people of my
district that I am going to be the one responsible for nuclear
disaster that is pending if I don't give him $13 million. And
so be it. That is all right. But the reality of the thing is
you have got to make some cuts somewhere if you are going to
ask for increases in projects such as KEDO and projects such as
the Egyptian pipeline money.
You all have got to come to reality over there and
recognize that without a doubt--and here I am, someone who had
never voted for a foreign aid bill before I became Chairman of
this committee and wrote the bill right, here I am having to go
and argue with my conservative friends on the Republican and
the Democratic side about, look, don't cut me. Cut education,
cut HUD, cut all of these other things. Cut Medicare, cut
Social Security and give me a billion dollars more.
So I am here fighting for you now. But even if I got the
billion dollars back, it is going to be insufficient. And you
all have got to tell me how you want to cut it down. You cannot
come over here and ask me for $2 billion because someone wanted
the Wye agreement to succeed. Give me 2 more billion dollars,
give me another interest-bearing account; the interest-bearing
account for Israel is wrong. So you are going to say we are
going to make two wrongs to try to make a right? That is wrong,
too.
You have got to realize we are not going to have the money
this year, and if you want this additional $20- increase for
KEDO, and if you want all of these new plans, you are going to
have to tell me where you want to cut. You cannot just say,
give me a billion dollars. We are not going to have $18
billion. So we are going to have to do the cutting. So there I
am directing foreign policy, which I don't want to do.
You are the professionals. You are going to have to give me
a list of your priorities. But the requests are unreasonable
under the circumstances of reality, and that reality is we are
not going to have the money to do these things.
So KEDO, I don't understand. Occasionally they call me
upstairs and put me in a room lined with lead and tell me if I
tell anybody about this, they are going to kill me, or somebody
will die. I don't even want to go up there and hear all of
that. So don't tell me about that.
I talk about money. I am going to be told that I have to
cut last year's appropriation, not including the $18 billion
for the International Monetary Fund. But I am going to have to
cut this year and cut drastically. So it is not whether or not
Sonny Callahan or this committee thinks you should have more,
it is the reality. It is the real world. And you guys are going
to have to come forth with an explanation or a request
prioritizing your needs.
You can override me on KEDO, because I am not as talented
in foreign policy as you all are. And you can override me on
Egypt if you want to, but you have got to tell me whether you
want me to take it out of USAID's hide or whether you want me
to take it out of Israel's hide, or whose hide do you want me
to take it out of. We are not going to have the money to
fulfill these requests. And this increase of 40 percent for
KEDO borders on the fringe of absolute stupidity, in my
opinion. So I am concerned about it. You guys say it is
absolutely necessary. And I have got to go vote before you can
respond.
Mr. Bodner. Mr. Chairman, you raised a number of topics. I
don't know if you have to leave right at this moment. Maybe I
could respond on KEDO, and John could respond on the broader
questions on the budget, because the KEDO question is genuinely
a security question.
Mr. Callahan. Let me go vote. You can answer that when I
get back. You can stay if you want.
Ms. Pelosi. I can't be asking questions without the
Republicans in the room.
Mr. Callahan. I will let you be Chairman. Raise your right
hand.
Ms. Pelosi [presiding]. I want you gentleman to know that
there is no hourglass here today. There is no mace, pointy
objects, nothing.
Well, this is highly unusual because usually we have at
least one Republican chairing the committee, and I will
probably have to run in a little bit, but in deference to your
time, I wanted to come down to start my questions.
The Chairman and I are in disagreement over KEDO, the
framework agreement, although I think his questions are very
legitimate and really deserve to be answered.
As far as North Korea, just for a moment, I would say that
one of the justifications for the administration's China policy
is that China is going to help us with North Korea. I don't
think they have used their good offices to that effect, and as
Mr. Knollenberg raised the issue of the possible cooperation of
the Chinese, I don't want to go any more into that because I am
a member of the Intelligence Committee. But, I think it is
something that has to be looked into and again, it would be a
serious undermining of one of the major justifications for the
current China policy. I think that whether or not that is true,
the mythology of Chinese cooperation on North Korea is just
that, a mythology. We have not had the cooperation that we
should on this really very, very dangerous place in the world
where we have our troops on the border.
I was in P'yongyang a year and a half ago with the
Intelligence Committee, and I have very serious concerns. That
is why I come down on the side of the administration on KEDO,
because I don't think that we have a lot of options. That is
one. Yes, the North Koreans have not cooperated fully to the
spirit of the law, but I continue to support that framework
because I saw what a desperate situation it is there, and any
opportunities that we can have there I think we should take
advantage of. I was surprised the North Koreans even let us in.
colombia
I want to go to some of the issues that I raised in my
opening statement. Based on that statement, I think it is clear
that I don't believe that Congress was either consulted or
informed on the decision to aid Colombia in the formation of
the counternarcotics battalion within their army. It is also
clear that a commitment to form and train an 800-man battalion
implies a long-term commitment for U.S. troops in Colombia and
brings about the need for significant resources to equip such a
force. It is also a significant departure from the policy
Congress has debated and endorsed; that is, helping the
Colombian police with a well-directed counternarcotics
assistance program.
Can either of you tell me why Congress was neither
consulted nor informed of this decision?
Mr. Bodner. First of all, this is a matter that is still in
process, Ms. Pelosi. The Colombian Government made public
statements last fall that they had desired to form a
counternarcotics battalion, about a thousand people. We have
engaged in discussions with them since then as their ideas have
evolved, and they have evolved, they have changed.
These discussions have been held primarily between our
Embassy and the Colombians, and SOUTHCOM has been engaged in
that as well. The current status, as I understand it, is that
the Colombians have stood up a single company which is fully
vetted. So far no U.S. training has been provided; however,
they have been working with the Embassy and with SOUTHCOM to
define what the requirements of the unit would be and,
therefore, how it is that we might be supportive of them
through some training.
My understanding is that the Embassy forwarded some
specifics on that to SOUTHCOM just this Friday. They have not
yet come to Washington yet. When they do come up, we will
review this and will be happy to continue consultations with
Congress. There have been briefings held on the Hill regarding
the status of this concept for a counternarcotics battalion
that the Colombians want to form, and we will be happy to
provide more information as it develops.
You raised a couple of other elements about it in terms of
authorities. If we were to provide training--and I think it is
likely that we will, although we are still defining that--we
would do so under the congressional authorities that have been
granted under sections 1004 and 1033 of Title X, and I would
note that 1033 is specifically about Colombia and Peru--
specific authorization granted to DOD by the Congress to
provide counternarcotics support to Colombia and Peru.
So I think that we feel that we, in fact, are complying
with the will of the Congress and fully with the law and all
the strictures that are included in 1004 and 1033. Again, we
would be happy to brief your staff again. I think we already
have briefed your staff with regard to this concept as it has
developed, and we would be happy to keep you fully informed.
Ms. Pelosi. Obviously, I would like the record to show that
the briefing took place only after we insisted upon having a
briefing.
Can either of you tell us why none of the training or
assistance planned for this was directed to respond to the
paramilitary forces running rampant in Colombia? In January,
over 140 people were killed by paramilitary forces in 15
locations over a weekend. No significant arrests have taken
place.
Mr. Bodner. Again, I believe that this battalion, as the
Colombians have conceived it, would be engaged in
counternarcotics work. I do know that the Colombian Government
is very concerned about these paramilitary groups. I met with
the Colombian defense minister recently, and he expressed grave
concern about it and described some actions that they are
taking. As you know, there is a new Colombian Government.
Ms. Pelosi. I have met the President. I am encouraged by
him.
Mr. Bodner. And a reform-oriented government. We have to
face the question: Are we going to support that government or
stand by and have it work on its own? We could do either, but I
think that we would more effectively meet our objectives if, in
fact, we work with them.
Our objectives are both trying to stem narcotics flow and
trying to instill greater respect for human rights. And I think
that, in fact, is the entire idea behind the formation of a new
counternarcotics battalion.
Ms. Pelosi. I hope that you are going to support the new
Colombian President in his efforts to make peace with the
insurgents as well, because some of these actions look like
they could be counter to that.
Specifically, how much will the training of this battalion
cost, how long will it take, and from what accounts will these
funds be derived?
Mr. Bodner. We are under the authorities of section 1004.
Mr. Kingston [presiding]. If the gentleman will suspend, I
am going to go vote, and I will be right back in time for you
to go vote. So if we could do that.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You were telling me what the training battalion would cost,
how long it will take, and what accounts it would be coming
from.
Mr. Bodner. If training proceeds, what we would envision is
that it probably would proceed in three phases, each of which
would last approximately 90 days, in which individuals and
company-level training would be conducted. The third phase
would be battalion-level multiechelon exercises that would also
involve the Colombian National Police. Just as other Colombian
Armed Forces units provide support to the police and work
together with them, this unit, which is focused on
counternarcotics as the Colombians envision it, would work
closely with the Colombian National Police.
As to the amount for equipment, again, none of these things
are finalized, but if training were to proceed, we would
anticipate that under section 1004 approximately $2 million in
nonlethal equipment would be provided during fiscal year 1999.
Similarly, under 1033, which again is a congressional
authorization specifically for Colombia for counternarcotics
support, about 2 million in nonlethal equipment would be
provided.
Ms. Pelosi. As I mentioned earlier, I had the opportunity
to hear the new President when he was here, and, yes, it was
right before the election. He is attempting to foster
negotiation with the guerrillas, and my question is how does
the formation of this battalion promote the prospects for
peace?
Mr. Bodner. As you say, President Pastrana is very
committed to a peace process.
Ms. Pelosi. I understand that. I am concerned about the
battalion's commitment to the peace process and how this
battalion is in furtherance of his goals, specifically that
numerous challenges to achieving the settlement would take a
long time and would require economic incentives for the
guerrillas and for poor people who live in guerrilla-controlled
territory. So I just wonder how this battalion is in
furtherance of that.
Mr. Bodner. President Pastrana and his government have
proposed this battalion. Their proposal. Their concept. They
are still refining it. I have to assume that they believe it is
part of their reform effort.
Ms. Pelosi. This is a request from President Pastrana?
Mr. Bodner. In terms of a training request that is now
being moved through the system--and as I understand it, it is
going to SOUTHCOM on Friday and will be coming to Washington
soon--the training request for the counternarcotics battalion
is a concept that the Colombians have pursued as part of their
overall reform efforts.
Ms. Pelosi. I better go vote. Excuse me.
kedo
Mr. Kingston. I know you have already spoken about KEDO. Do
you think we should have a briefing on KEDO by itself? I mean,
a $20 million increase is big. Should DOD or State, give us a
separate briefing or----
Mr. Bodner. It is part of the U.S. security interests. We
would be happy to come up and give a briefing to you.
Mr. Holum. I know that Secretary Perry plans to come back
to the Capitol Hill again before he completes his
deliberations. That would not be to a specific committee. It
would be to talk to Members who have been particularly
interested in the overall North Korea problem. But I think
overall, our overall policy, which we are in the process of
reviewing through Secretary Perry's leadership, as well as the
specific funding request, as Deputy Under Secretary Bodner
says, deserves careful scrutiny.
One thing I would point out is one of the big concerns is
over the amount of money that the United States has put in. Our
obligation is at the early part of this. That is for the heavy
fuel oil until the first reactor is completed. And that
obligation runs around $50 million a year.
We have made extremely persistent efforts to gain support
from other countries for the heavy fuel oil fund. We haven't
been as successful as we would like to be. But at the same
time, the debt of KEDO on heavy fuel oil is not going up, it is
going down. One of the virtues of low oil prices is that KEDO
has been able to retire some of that debt, and we expect that
by the year 2000, the end of fiscal 2000, if prices stay low,
it could extinguish the debt.
Mr. Kingston. Getting beyond KEDO itself and on the subject
of nuclear proliferation, George Tenet has said that they are
on the verge of developing some ballistic missiles, that maybe
we should have a classified briefing just on proliferation, and
that might be approved.
peru-ecuador peace agreement
Let me ask you, you requested $20 million for economic
support funds for the Peru-Ecuador peace agreement. Do you know
how you are going to spend that? Is that defined yet? I mean,
is that just kind of to pay everybody a little money to settle
things?
Mr. Holum. No, the basic program is designed to reinforce
the October 1998 peace agreement, which we, as a guarantor of
the Rio protocol, helped to broker. Peru and Ecuador have
developed a 10-year program to strengthen and integrate
communities, particularly on either side of the common border
where the fighting broke out. This program includes telephone
service, oil pipelines, road construction, energy projects--a
variety of programs that do two things. One is improve the
lives of the people living there, and secondly, demonstrate
that they have a stake in integration across the border.
So it would support microentrepreneurs and a number of
steps that we think would help solidify the peace as agreed on
paper in the 1998 peace agreement.
Mr. Kingston. Twenty million dollars for roads, telephones,
communications, training?
Mr. Holum. Telephone service, oil pipelines road
construction, energy projects, projects of that kind.
Mr. Kingston. Is that split equally between the sides? How
do you decide?
Mr. Holum. I will have to get that information for you. I
believe it is, but I am not absolutely certain.
[The information follows:]
peru-ecuador peace agreement
In October 1998, Ecuador and Peru signed a comprehensive
peace agreement that put an end to an often bloody, century-
and-a-half old conflict over demarcation of their border. The
United States, as one of the Guarantors of the 1942 Rio
Protocol, which established the framework for delimiting the
border, invested considerable time, effort, and resources in
helping the parties to achieve this peace. To make it
acceptable to both sides, regardless of the final demarcation
of the border, the peace settlement was built on a series of
agreements, including a treaty of commerce and navigation and a
binational peace fund for border integration, designed to
compensate difficult political concessions with investments to
stimulate growth and improve living conditions in an area
impoverished by years of conflict.
The United States plans to provide $10 million each to Peru
and Ecuador in FY 2000 to help launch, under the border
integration agreement, a ten-year program Peru and Ecuador
developed to strengthen and integrate communities on either
side of the border through improved telephone service, oil
pipelines, road construction, energy projects, and other
efforts to improve the lives of their citizens.
The Economic Support Funds (ESF) will aid successful
implementation of the peace settlement by helping to fund the
border integration program by, among other things, supporting
micro-entrepreneurs, strengthening local governments, improving
health care, and helping to create permanently demilitarized
``peace parks'' along the border to enhance natural resource
management. Specific projects for which U.S. funding is
proposed will be reviewed and approved by USAID and the State
Department. Other governments and international organizations,
including the Inter-American Development Bank, the Andean
Development Bank, and the World Bank, are also supporting this
border integration program with donations of their own.
Mr. Kingston. Is that expected to be an annual expenditure,
or is that a lump sum for $20 million?
Mr. Holum. We haven't planned specifically beyond fiscal
year 2000. I suspect we will conclude that we have a stake in
continuing to foster this effort.
Mr. Kingston. I would like to see that, because I hate to
just keep propping up--$20 million is a big deal, and there
really should be, particularly on a peace-type agreement, an
end at some point. An escape route.
Mr. Holum. I think in principle that makes a great deal of
sense, but I think the transition period from conflict to a
peace, durable peace, is very much in our interest, and we
ought not go backwards into a conflict situation.
Another thing we need to do in this context is giving
support to other governments and international organizations,
including the Inter-American Development Bank and the Andean
Bank, the World Bank. This is not purely a United States
endeavor and shouldn't be. It is a collective effort to try to
solidify the settlement.
Mr. Bodner. You have raised an important point. Let me
point out a couple of ancillary benefits from the end of the
Peru-Ecuador conflict. We had been providing helicopter support
to the observer group. We are no longer doing that.
Also, as a benefit of the conflict having been brought to a
close, Ecuadorans are focused on securing their border with
Colombia, which has benefit in terms of counternarcotics. So it
is important also to view it in the overall picture.
Mr. Holum. I can give you the numerical breakdown between
Ecuador and Peru. It is slightly imbalanced in Ecuador's favor:
$11.75 million, Ecuador; and $8.25 million for Peru, total.
environmental diplomacy
Mr. Kingston. Yeah, I would kind of like to see the
breakdown, why they get about 12, 11.5, whatever.
On the environmental diplomacy you are requesting $15
million for the account. Is that a new account? And how is it
earmarked? What is that money going to go to?
Mr. Holum. Let me flip to the appropriate page here.
It is an additional account, and it is basically designed
to advance the international environmental health agenda.
Mr. Kingston. Is that--are you talking about Kyoto?
International environmental health agenda? Is that part of the
Protocol?
Mr. Holum. This is not specifically designed to support the
Protocol, but it is designed for cases where we want to be able
to respond quickly with programmatic answers to a problem that
can help a----
Mr. Kingston. Was something like this a component of the
Protocol?
Mr. Holum. No, I don't believe so.
Mr. Kingston. So it is not a back door?
Mr. Holum. No, no.
Mr. Kingston. All right. Shouldn't that go through
Commerce-State-Justice?
Mr. Holum. Well, it is programmatic, though. It is
basically to respond quickly to emerging environmental crises
and advance negotiating positions at the same time.
Mr. Kingston. Was it a crisis? I mean, it sounds to me like
a legitimate concern, but not a crisis. And if it is not a
crisis, it should go through the State Department regular
budget.
Mr. Holum. It is designed for a crisis.
Mr. Kingston. So it is in anticipation of a crisis. It
would appear to me that as a regular diplomatic function it
should come through Commerce, State and Justice. I don't know,
I mean, I am just asking, but it would appear that--what is the
reason it doesn't?
Mr. Holum. Because it is a programmatic response would be
my answer, and I could probably provide a better answer for the
record, but we are talking about funding projects here rather
than funding administrative costs.
Mr. Kingston. Mr. Chairman? Thank you very much sir. Would
you like your gavel back?
kedo
Mr. Callahan [presiding]. I think you have done a great
job. You can have it for the rest of the day.
I guess while we are waiting for the rest of them, you go
ahead and explain. We will give you your opportunity to address
my concerns about KEDO.
Mr. Bodner. Thank you, sir. We did discuss this briefly in
response to other questions, but you made a very important
point, which is that this is an international effort. This is
not something that the United States alone should be funding.
We fully agree with that.
My understanding is that through fiscal year 1998,
contributions to KEDO have totaled about $250 million, of which
the U.S. supplied roughly half, and that others have made
contributions. You referred to the Japanese. And I understand--
--
Mr. Callahan. Is that pledged contributions or actual
contributions?
Mr. Holum. It is actual.
Mr. Callahan. If they are putting up all of that money, why
did you all have to borrow against it?
Mr. Bodner. In your absence, Mr. Holum observed your
concern about the borrowing. I know last year in this hearing
that was a concern. Last year the debt was something like $47,
$48 million, and at the present time it is something like $22
million. So while there is a debt still, it has gone down.
Mr. Callahan. Does 55 include paying off that debt?
Mr. Holum. Conceivably, but the 55 is roughly the cost for
the heavy fuel oil for the calendar year.
Mr. Callahan. So you are going to pay off debt and borrow
more money?
Mr. Holum. So our anticipation is that by the end of fiscal
year 2000--this depends on oil prices. We have benefited from
the----
Mr. Callahan. How long do you expect that the United States
is going to, as a contingency, to provide fuel oil for North
Korea?
Mr. Holum. The agreement provides that KEDO and we will
provide heavy fuel oil until the first light water reactor
comes on line.
Mr. Callahan. I understand, but my question was how long
and not--I know what the KEDO agreement says, which I disagree
with. How long is the United States going to have to continue
to provide heavy fuel oil to North Korea?
Mr. Holum. My judgment would be that this will continue
until that happens, and the target date is----
Mr. Callahan. Let me speak real slowly. How long, how many
years--or maybe you are in a position now, maybe we ought to be
talking about weeks--how long are we going to have to continue
this? How long do you think we are going to have to continue?
Mr. Holum. The heavy fuel oil specifically? Well, at least
through 2003. But, again----
Mr. Callahan. What was the original agreement?
Mr. Holum. I emphasize----
Mr. Callahan. Do we have a commitment--if they never build
these plants, do you think that the United States has a
commitment to provide heavy fuel oil for the next 50 years
under the agreement?
Mr. Holum. If the plants are not constructed, then the
Agreed Framework would be in a lot more trouble than the heavy
fuel oil, and I don't think that we would be doing it. With
everything else falling apart around it, which I don't think
will happen, we wouldn't be out there reflexively delivering
heavy fuel oil. It has to be in support of an active, alive,
working agreement. At this stage the agreement--for all the
threats, and there are a lot of them, it is continuously
hazardous--is doing what it was supposed to do.
Mr. Callahan. Were you in on the original negotiations of
KEDO?
Mr. Holum. I wasn't specifically involved in negotiations;
I was involved in the policy process.
Mr. Bodner. Sir, if I could address the security question
that Mr. Holum just made. The Agreed Framework currently
continues to serve our interests. We want it to remain vital.
Right now there is a processing plant, a reactor, and spent
fuel at Yongbyon, and we want to make sure that those do not
start back up. Had we not had an Agreed Framework, and KEDO is
an integral part of the framework, in addition to having the
spent fuel that is sitting there now, they would have refueled
that 5-megawatt reactor. It would have discharged fuel in 1995,
providing spent fuel for another set of weapons. It would have
been refueled and discharged again in 1998, providing more
plutonium for another set of weapons. The 50-megawatt reactor
would have been completed and discharged fuel in 1998 for a
significant number of nuclear weapons.
So, in the absence of the Agreed Framework, North Korea
right now would have a small, but militarily meaningful nuclear
weapons arsenal. Particularly in light of the missile
developments that have taken place, that would have been
something more than worrisome.
And so I think that it is not at all unfair to say that the
Agreed Framework has served our interests, and if it can remain
viable--and there is an ``if'' to that statement--then it will
continue to serve our interests. And I think that our position
is that we don't want to give an excuse to the North Koreans to
declare the Agreed Framework dead because they could turn
Yongbyon back on quickly and take the spent fuel that is
sitting there and turn that into weapons very quickly.
Mr. Callahan. If they have the money for that technology,
why can't they buy their own fuel oil?
Mr. Holum. They can.
Mr. Callahan. This is foreign aid.
Mr. Holum. They can, but the agreement provides that it
will be done this way. The rationale for it is that they shut
down the plants that were producing electric power, and the
heavy fuel oil obligation is to replace the power that they
lost by virtue of giving up those reactors.
Mr. Callahan. I don't fault the plan. I fault the United
States being the only country that is having to fork over real
dollars in order that the plant can go forward. I agree with
the philosophy and the intent behind the negotiations which we
were facilitating South Korea and Japan. That is fine. And in
that process we went to other countries, and they agreed to put
money in. Now you are telling me they put some of the money in.
I think for the first few years they didn't put money in. And I
think you have also been blessed by low crude oil prices. Now
what is going to happen within the next 6 months when you are
looking at probably a 30, 40 percent increase in oil?
Mr. Holum. It is going--the cost of heavy fuel oil can go
up, there is no question about that; but again, our money is up
front.
Mr. Callahan. I mean, does this $55 million include the
projected increase in the cost of oil?
Mr. Holum. It is predicated on expectations of what the
price of oil would be.
Mr. Callahan. What do you think it will be? I might buy
some stock. I don't know. You all haven't been able to look too
much to the future?
Mr. Holum. I would still sell short, I think.
Mr. Callahan. Let me go vote, again.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Let me yield to my Chair. I will follow
you. I defer.
Ms. Pelosi. If your schedule will allow, because I am here
for the duration, such as that may be.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Don't you have another meeting?
military training report
Ms. Pelosi. On the issue of the responsiveness of the
military training report to congressional concerns and the
requirements of the law, why does the report not contain a
country-by-country justification for training activity? And why
is all JCET information classified?
As you know, some of my concerns about the JCET activity
have been publicly reported in the press, particularly in the
case of Indonesia. Can you comment on any future plans for JCET
training, and what is the foreign policy justification for it?
We thought we were going to see, some of us did anyway, a
country-by-country justification for it, not just an
enumeration with four sentences.
Mr. Bodner. Let me answer the latter part. This was a
massive effort that we were asked to do in an extremely short
period of time, and so we did the best we could to be
responsive, which was to gather as much information and yet get
it to you before your hearing cycle started.
Ms. Pelosi. If I just may, one would have thought you would
have had such a thing ongoing, that you were just adding to as
you went along. What you are telling me is that it was hither
and yon, and you had to pull it together?
Mr. Bodner. We do keep track of these things. They are kept
track of in different manners, and we had to bring it together
in a single document, and just the mechanics of having it put
together in a single database that was compatible was a
significant effort.
Ms. Pelosi. While you are getting the report, one of the
questions is when will it be available on CD-ROM?
Mr. Bodner. Shortly. This was not a modest effort or
narrowly defined effort. This was very expansive in terms of
how we looked at this. We looked at everything that was
traditionally identified as training, as well as other things
that Congress was interested in, such as the JCET program,
which we would not normally put into that security assistance
bucket. So this was a massive effort, and we provided it as
quickly as we could in as comprehensive a form as we could.
The reason the JCET is classified is because we didn't have
time to go through it and declassify and still get it to you
before the hearings started. We are declassifying it as quickly
as we can. We have a different report coming up with similar
information, and that goes through a different process, and it
does come up declassified, and I believe that is provided on an
annual basis and will continue to be provided on an annual
basis.
Ms. Pelosi. But you don't have this information on a
country-by-country basis? Nobody can, say, report on this is
what we are doing in this country in these different
categories?
Mr. Bodner. On the justification quiestion, I will turn to
Mr. Holum for that.
Mr. Holum. What we responded to was what we understood to
be the request to provide the foreign policy justification for
the programs. Each instance of training under IMET and other
programs that we fund should be justified at the program level,
at the training level, in light of those foreign policy
considerations. So that is what we thought we were asked for.
Ms. Pelosi. So you don't have--then you decided that----
Mr. Holum. This does include--but there is, for example,
depending on the size of the program and the importance and
sensitivity of the country, in every case involving our
programs, the mission program plan of the embassy includes the
determination at that level of what will be done in that
country that year. And that becomes a part, justified in light
of the foreign policy objectives that we cited in the report.
And so it is integrated at the embassy level and very often
also at the State Department level, the regional level, into a
program plan for that particular country.
Ms. Pelosi. But that is what the report would be, a
justification of the foreign policy along with the spelling out
of what form the training took place. I find it disappointing
to have a listing. I mean, we are all familiar with the tactic
of loading people with information, and I appreciate that this
is--and I am not putting this in that category--but I am saying
that I was very disappointed that we got a listing rather than
a justification with an enumeration of what was happening to
see what the match was between the two.
Mr. Holum. Well, what might make sense, and we would be
happy to cooperate with you on this, is to focus on particular
countries of concern and look at the mission program plan.
indonesia
Ms. Pelosi. Let's talk about Indonesia. Much of the JCET
activity has been publicly reported in the press, particularly
in the case of Indonesia. Can you comment on future plans for
JCET planning? I would like to know the foreign policy
justifications. What role does it serve? Is it still going on
there? How does the extent that the U.S. has a role in
intelligence forces and the army square with the killings of
civilians during disturbances? And to what extent should
Congress be involved in decisions to deploy troops in a
training capacity for JCET activities?
I wanted to put it all out there so you could answer it not
question by question, but in a more comprehensive way. Some of
our unhappiness about this whole military training is related
to quotes--I don't know whether they are true or not, and we
would hope that your report would dispel them--from the
military that they really did not have any intention of
honoring the intent of Congress on the training; that they
would go around Congress' intent on the training.
Mr. Bodner. Let me address this if I could, because that is
a very important point. I want to assure you that we very
sincerely tried to be as responsive as possible on pulling this
together, and this was a massive job in a very short period of
time.
With regard to the question that you just posed about
whether there is some attempt somehow to evade the Congress, I
would like to say that out of all the activities listed here, I
believe that something like 90 or 95 percent of them, in fact,
fall under the traditional security assistance which passes
through this subcommittee--as opposed to other things, such as
1004 activities. But we do have that authority granted by the
Congress for the 1004 activities and similar activities.
Ms. Pelosi. That still doesn't give us the justification
for why.
Mr. Holum. As I understand it, the JCET program in
Indonesia was canceled in May of 1998, and it hasn't been
resumed there. So for 1999, our military training with the
Indonesian military is limited to small programs of
humanitarian, engineering and medical activities. There is also
a mobile team providing training in human rights awareness and
civil-military relations. The question of restoring--of
proposing--and that is under E-IMET--the question of restoring
full IMET to Indonesia is still under discussion. It hasn't
been resolved.
Ms. Pelosi. Mr. Secretary, who is responsible for
determining that a given military activity in a given country
fits into our foreign policy toward that country?
Mr. Holum. Going back to what I was saying earlier, I think
the primary responsibility is for the mission in the country,
for the ambassador in the country to make a determination that
that activity is consistent with our foreign policy goals in
the country, whether it will become a part of the mission
program plan or, if it is a JCET or CINC's sort of program, it
will be coordinated at a minimum with the embassy, which is the
repository of our policy toward that country.
Ms. Pelosi. So the CINC and the ambassador.
Mr. Bodner. The country teams are actively engaged in
helping to identify the relevant activities, including JCET
activities, and they are the ones who provide, for example, the
human rights report that comes back to the Department before
activities are carried out, and that is appropriate.
Mr. Holum. That is a red light. In terms of the green
light, in terms of the decision to proceed, it is part of a
mission program plan that would be developed at the embassy
level.
Mr. Callahan. Ms. Kilpatrick.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
And I think following up on my Ranking Member's question,
as a new member of the subcommittee, I am kind of concerned in
looking at a $6 billion budget that is before me, a little over
6 billion. Through my calculations, I see less than $120,000
for the largest continent, most populous in the world. That
kind of bothers me a bit.
And I guess my first question--and that, I think, is what
my Ranking Member was asking--is what determines who gets the
money, what kind of things? I think you started talking about
the ambassador and so forth. Is there a formula, or is it all
politics?
africa
Mr. Holum. No, it is certainly politics in the sense of our
relationships with the various countries and the identification
of needs through the embassy. The process of building the
budget is regretfully largely a process of what the Chairman
was referring to before of setting priorities, identifying
urgent needs, identifying cases where funds can be productively
used for specific purposes, including a number of initiatives
in Africa, a crisis response initiative and a number of others.
But the overall process is one in which all of the regional
and functional considerations make their case, and ultimately
the Department of State arrives at a position, and then we go
to the ultimate arbiter for the administration, the Office of
Management and Budget, who correlates everything.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I want the record to reflect that I am not
trying to take any funds from anyone or any part of the world
that is receiving them.
Mr. Bodner. Could I comment on your question, because we at
DOD have a very strong interest in working with African
countries in a variety of ways.
Our FMF proposal for this year proposes $10 million for FMF
for the African Crisis Response Initiative and for East African
regional activities. And the idea there is to work with
countries to help build up their capabilities so that they can
become more self-sufficient as well as able to work with us
effectively. For the IMET program we are proposing $8.5 million
for training and education for military and civilian personnel
from African militaries and defense ministries in the United
States.
Secretary Cohen and I were just in South Africa, and we
have an extremely extensive program of cooperation with the
South African Defense Ministry and military. We have conducted
a great deal of collaborative work with them on equal
opportunity, for example, especially with Major General Jackie
Sedibe who is in charge of EEO there. It is an extremely
important issue for their armed forces, because they integrated
seven different armed groups into their military at the time of
changing governments, and now they are in the process of
downsizing, and you can imagine the difficulties that are
involved in that as they choose who to discharge and reforming
promotion policies.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I appreciate the work that you are doing.
Can you prepare for me something addressing the African
continent and what you are doing and what you plan to do with
some projections?
Mr. Bodner. Absolutely.
Ms. Kilpatrick. The Chairman in his opening remarks
mentioned Angola and the new Republic of Congo and Eritrea. I
was in Eritrea in 1997, when they were at peace for that period
of time they have now started fighting again. I am concerned as
to how we could help. And again, I don't want to take funds. I
know strategically in terms of the Middle East, where I have
also visited, as well as the conflict in Kosovo and the former
Russian republics, there are strategic military weapons of mass
destruction, and those kinds of things, which we have to
protect ourselves from.
I am kind of surprised, Mr. Chairman, that our budget is so
small with what is happening in the world and the role that the
U.S. plays. I know the small foreign operations budget is a
matter of caps, politics, what is available and all of that. As
we move to this new century, security in the world, something
that we all work to achieve so we all live in a safe and secure
environment. This is a global economy now. In a few clicks of
the computer we can be anywhere. We must ensure the security of
our troops, as well as their families, and our children.
So you have an awesome responsibility. I do recognize that.
I would like to work closely with you to see how I can help to
further financing as well as peace.
Mr. Bodner. I would again say that DOD certainly has a
strong interest. We have had to have military forces engage in
Africa repeatedly in the last couple of years to deal with
problems, and what we want to do is to have a long-range
strategy to prevent problems and to buildup capabilities and
professionalism so that problems don't arise, rather than
trying to step in and stanch problems after they arise. And
this is, again, an ongoing effort.
We are hosting a meeting among the South African Defense
Ministry leadership meeting in the United States a week after
next, and it is a sign that we are absolutely committed to
working with colleagues in Africa. We are proposing the restart
of our IMET program in Nigeria, $425,000 this year. We very
much would appreciate your support for that.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I will look forward to working with you.
I noticed on the list that staff gave me, when you
discussed sub-Saharan countries, there were several northern
countries in that list. I believe there are 40 of them. I don't
know how many, but I did notice Nigeria, which I would consider
not sub-Saharan; that is, not to be included in the sub-Saharan
list that was given me. How do you determine what is sub-
Saharan? Obviously it is not below the Sahara Desert. Is there
some other definition?
Mr. Holum. I don't know which list you are referring to.
Mr. Bodner. I have a list right here, and these were the
numbers that I was referring to.
Mr. Holum. Nigeria is on here.
Ms. Kilpatrick. So Morocco, Egypt--those would not be sub-
Saharan countries.
Mr. Bodner. That is correct.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Anything more southern than those, like
Nigeria, which is west and southern, that is a sub-Saharan
country. So it is Tunisia, Morocco, Namibia; 90 percent of the
continent would be. When we say sub-Saharan, I think most
people think below the Sahara Desert, but it is not that. It is
also some northern countries as well.
Mr. Holum. I can add on the development side, one of the
problems with considering the budget in segments is that we are
doing the security assistance portion, and the total in the 150
budget accounts for Africa is a billion dollars, including
assistance.
What we are focusing on here is funding that is
specifically related to security concerns, and there are a
number of extremely important initiatives. The one that I think
has been most visible and is proving successful and requires
continued investment is the Africa Crisis Response Initiative,
which is basically a program to do a big part of what Jim
Bodner said, to avoid the requirement for troop deployments by
generating an indigenous trained capability for crisis response
in African countries. And it is already paying dividends. It is
not a large investment of funds, but it involves dedicating not
full-time, not a standing force, but dedicating trained
personnel, equipping them with communications capabilities and
so forth, to respond to crises in the region.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Is it within your jurisdictional
responsibility, to put the various pools of money together and
show me total dollars in the programs? I would like to work
with you.
Mr. Holum. Absolutely.
Mr. Bodner. Absolutely.
Mr. Callahan. Let me respond to your concerns about sub-
Saharan and the distribution of the money. I think this
committee does it exactly right by giving as much latitude to
the administration as we possibly can.
For example, we give $600 million to the administration
each year for child survival to take care of children. If they
want to spend it all in sub-Saharan Africa, they can. And they
do--that is not in here, but they do spend a great percentage
of it there, but we don't say, spend it here, spend it there.
As you well know, we will be allocated maybe $12 billion if
we are fortunate, maybe $10 billion. So if it were left up to
me, I would write the State Department a check for $12 billion
and say, run foreign policy, but it is not left up to me, and
we have to do some things that we do because we have to
appropriate the money for Israel. That is a political reality.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I understand. It is a very important part
of the world.
Mr. Callahan. We have to appropriate the money to Egypt,
because that is sort of a political reality. So it leaves us
with very little money left when you compare the entire budget.
But we try to give the administration as much flexibility as we
can.
But now comes the problem that I was talking about with
KEDO. They are here and telling us they want another 40 percent
increase, $20 million increase, increasing it from about $30
million to $55 million, or $25 million, to buy some oil for
North Korea, who is developing a nuclear capacity probably, at
least a missile capacity, to attack the United States of
America. And they are telling us to earmark money for that.
Then they tell us to earmark Israel. Then they come and say
earmark Egypt. And then they come and say, also, earmark the
interest, create an interest-bearing account, because you are
not spending the Egyptian money fast enough. They tell us all
of these things which probably comes to $20 billion if you look
at it, which we don't have. And then they go out and complain
about this committee and this Congress not giving them what
they asked for, and if there is a disaster and we don't give
them the $55 million for North Korea and they attack Japan,
they are going to blame it on us and say, well, if Congress had
given us the $55 million, we could have precluded this.
So it is a difficult committee that you are serving on.
When we try to do the responsible thing by giving the
administration the flexibility to utilize what limited
resources we have, it puts us in a bad position. But we do try
to give them as much flexibility as we can.
With respect to the military training in Africa, I agree
that we should, because the reason we are training military
forces in Africa is to hopefully preclude the necessity of
sending our own people there someday. So it is important. But I
don't know what the solution is. We give them as much
flexibility as we can. We don't say, spend this money here,
except for a few countries. In fact this committee doesn't
hardly earmark any money except what we are politically
required to do because of the political situation with respect
to earmarks to Israel and to Egypt and to, admittedly, Ireland.
But then I am Irish.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I support that, sir. I support you and the
leadership. I married that name. That is right. I do support
you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your leadership on this, and I
know there is not enough money to go around, and we must be
spending it wisely and making it work.
My concern and interest in Africa and around the world is
that we do make countries stable so that economics can grow, so
they can take care of themselves, and grow their own food, and
take care of their children. It ripples on. I appreciate your
commitment.
Mr. Holum. Mr. Chairman, at the risk of getting us back
into KEDO, may I correct a statement I made earlier?
My written statement has it correct that of the $55
million, some portion of that is for debt reduction. Those are
three things: Reduction of the debt, the next year's purchase
of heavy fuel oil, and our share of the administrative costs.
So I didn't want to leave it confused on the record.
Mr. Callahan. Are you finished Ms. Pelosi?
Ms. Pelosi. No.
bosnia
Mr. Callahan. Let me just get a brief question answered.
Let's talk briefly about Bosnia and the removal of the
President, you know, which reeks of at least philosophical
understandings of what democracy is all about, that the high
representative in Bosnia just ordered the removal of the
President, who was freely elected, from office.
Now, I mean, what are we going to do about that? Is that
your understanding of what we thought Bosnia would do with
respect to moving towards democracy or--what are we going to do
about that, nothing?
Mr. Bodner. Perhaps I could offer a brief response, and Mr.
Holum might add to it.
My understanding is that the High Representative acted
under the authority that is contained in the Dayton agreements
and that the Peace Implementation Council has affirmed several
times over the last couple of years. He did so because the
behavior of President Poplasen was inconsistent with the Dayton
agreements, threatened the Dayton agreements, and indeed in the
letter that Poplason wrote to the High Rep, implicitly
threatened NATO forces.
Mr. Callahan. What did he do?
Mr. Bodner. In the opinion of the High Rep, President
Poplasen is attempting to remove the Prime Minister, who is
also put in office through democratic means, and doing so in a
manner that was inconsistent with the Constitution and,
underlying that, inconsistent with the Dayton agreement. And as
I say, President Poplasen expressed implicitly in this
communication with the High Rep a threat to NATO forces. And I
think you can appreciate the fact that we don't countenance
that very well.
Mr. Callahan. Well, let me ask you the same question. You
answer it this time and listen very closely: How long are our
troops going to be in Bosnia do you think? We have already
passed that 1-year projection that we were told, the Congress
was told. How long are we going to be in Bosnia?
Mr. Bodner. I think we have learned the lesson to focus on
the end state and not an end date.
Mr. Callahan. The question is, once again: How long are we
going to be in Bosnia? Months? Years? Just all I need is one
line. How long do you think we are going to be in Bosnia?
Mr. Bodner. The President has identified several
benchmarks, and I think it will take a period that will extend
at least another year there. I would say that we have drawn
down our forces significantly. At one time they were in excess
of 20,000. Last year----
Mr. Callahan. I appreciate all of that. Listen, next week
is Saint Patrick's Day, and I have been watching all of these
television specials where these so talented Irish people are
doing this beautiful dance. And you are such an excellent
example of dancing, maybe you could teach me to do that.
I understand you are not going to answer that because you
don't know, and none of us do.
You mentioned--your request there mentioned that we fund
the Hurricane Mitch situation. We are going to begin doing that
at 1 o'clock today in full committee. I don't know what we are
going to do about--I don't think you ever answered, but we
don't have a whole lot of time, just briefly, what about the
pipeline interest-bearing account for Egypt? What is your
justification for that? Is it fairness because Israel gets
theirs in advance or what?
Mr. Holum. That is certainly part of it. As the Wye
supplemental proceeds----
israel and egypt funding parity
Mr. Callahan. There is no Wye supplemental.
Mr. Holum. Well, as the Wye settlement proceeds, what we
have tried to do is through the Department of State and the
Department of Defense work on reviewing ways to accommodate
Egypt in light of the proposed reductions in economic support
funds and the increase in foreign military financing for other
countries in the region, Israel for example. And what this will
do is help maintain some funding parity between our partners in
the region.
We set the account at $470 million, because $470 million is
the amount already required to be deposited and is deposited
should termination of the Egyptian foreign military sales
program take place, and that has to be on hand to compensate
for the sales.
As you probably know, the estimated yearly cost of this
would be $24 million. But that is the basic rationale for it.
Mr. Callahan. This latest announcement that Secretary Cohen
is announcing today or yesterday about the military purchases
for Egypt, does that pretty well deplete, or is that--does that
come out of FMF financing?
Mr. Bodner. That is continuation of the existing programs.
Mr. Callahan. This is the new press release that came out
yesterday or today.
Mr. Bodner. As I say, yes, he was in Egypt. They talked
about their ongoing programs.
Mr. Callahan. I mean, won't that deplete the obligation of
that, deplete most of the pipeline monies for Egypt?
Mr. Bodner. Well, those are planned programs already
programmed in there, so it is a continuation of existing
programs, and the budget submission takes into account those
activities.
Mr. Callahan. You all think we ought to give Israel that
money on October 1st of each year. Is that good foreign policy?
Does that help you out?
Mr. Holum. Yes.
Mr. Callahan. I am not making light of what you are doing,
it is just these things seem sometimes strange to me. We are
not going to--or at least I am not going to agree to the
Egyptian pipeline money. I told President Mubarak this as well
as the Ambassador. And you all you talk about parity, equal
treatment of countries in the region. You must keep in mind
that we forgave a huge debt to Egypt during the Desert Storm
crisis and that there was no parity suggested then, and that
the very fact that we forgave that huge debt, I think it was $7
billion, I think that if you are looking at fairness, then you
ought to include everything, not just one aspect of it.
And the fairness of the advanced payment to Israel opposed
to an interest-bearing account for fairness I think is more
than evenly offset by the forgiveness of debt that we gave to
Egypt during the Persian Gulf crisis. So that is not a good--
and I have expressed that to Mr. Mubarak, and I don't think we
are going to consider it anyway. Anyway, we don't need to talk
about that anymore.
So now we will go back to Ms. Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I was listening with interest to your
comments, as well as your comment to our colleague Ms.
Kilpatrick, and isn't she a wonderful addition to our
committee? Very attentive.
Mr. Callahan. I didn't know she was Irish.
Ms. Pelosi. She wants the statements of the witnesses in
advance so that she will have them read before, so I want the
administration to know that our new Members share in our
concern about getting statements early. No reflection on the
gentlemen who are here right now.
Actually, you and I agree about the latitude that should be
given to the administration with the dollars that are allocated
for them. We agree because we agree they should have the
latitude, except where we have areas of disagreement. You
disagree on Korea, Haiti, Bosnia, possibly Egypt, et cetera,
and I disagree on other areas.
Mr. Callahan. I voice my disagreement, but I have given
them, for example, every penny they have asked for. And I have
given you almost every penny you have asked for.
imet
Ms. Pelosi. And every penny I have ever gotten. But the
point is that we do have some--I, for one, as a matter of
conscience and constituency, will not give latitude to an
administration--and I am not saying that this administration,
but in the ongoing--that has used IMET funding to bolster
armies which have violated the rights of people in those
countries, whether it is Indonesia, Guatemala, and there are
others.
I was interested that President Clinton in his statement in
Guatemala said, ``For the United States, it is important that I
state clearly that support for military forces and intelligence
units which engaged in violence and widespread oppression was
wrong and the United States must not repeat that mistake.'' And
I completely associate myself with that remark and will be ever
vigilant when the military decides to circumvent the intent of
Congress to do training when they know that there is a
prohibition directly on that kind of military training; witness
Indonesia, repression in East Timor, attacks on noncombatants
there. So that is one point I want to make.
landmines
Another area which I don't really need an answer to, in
fact there is not time for, is in the area of land mines. Mr.
Holum--and by the way, Mr. Holum, your position as Acting Under
Secretary, and I hope Under Secretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security Affairs, is a very, very important
one, per se, but its importance is not lost on many of us in
the Congress, and we are pinning our hopes on you because
disarmament arms control issues are at the end of the day the
most important issues. Everything else we can accommodate or
put off or fight longer for, but proliferation of weapons and
our own buildups and those of our allies in my view puts our
best brains to our most destructive means, and I think our
resources should go someplace else.
Of course we have to have a strong national defense, but I
was disappointed in your characterization--I mean, I thought it
was overly optimistic, shall we say, of your comment--I have in
my notes, ``The primary objective of the President's Demining
2010 initiative is to accelerate international demining
operations and to stimulate substantially and increase
resources internationally, both from other governments and the
private sector.''
I think that those words would mean a lot more if the U.S.
were part of the Canadian initiative, the Canadian Convention
on Demining.
school of the americas
I want to move on, though, to a couple of questions about
the School of the Americas, which I have shared with many of my
colleagues in the Congress. In the aftermath of discovery of
manuals used at schools, which are familiar to us, the DOD
committed to improve the oversight of the curriculum by issuing
a directive on training programs meeting human rights
standards. Has that directive been issued? Could you provide us
a copy of it? What steps have been taken to assure that all
curriculum developers and instructors are aware of the
directive? Is there any oversight beyond that exercised by the
board of advisors on the School of the Americas' curriculum?
Mr. Bodner. Yes indeed, beyond that the Secretary of
Defense is required to certify each year as to the content of
the program there. He recently submitted yet another annual
certification, and in it I believe he stated not only do the
courses and curricula at the School of the Americas meet the
standards that we apply at our own military education programs,
but they exceed them when it comes to questions of human rights
curriculum and international and humanitarian curriculum.
Ms. Pelosi. In that kind of certification, then, you must
have--do you have some documentation or assessment of the
performance of the School of the Americas' graduates in 1997
and 1998? Are any of these graduates implicated in human rights
abuses? What are they, if they have? And how many students--
describe how many students are enrolled in human rights
training, the training course, in 1999, and describe the
planning to offer it in 1999 as well.
Mr. Bodner. With regard to how many students were enrolled
in a particular course.
Ms. Pelosi. Train the trainer.
Mr. Bodner. We could probably provide it. I have been told
it is in the report here.
Ms. Pelosi. I know. I say, it is in my files. You go find
it.
Mr. Bodner. We will identify the data for you. Let me
also----
Ms. Pelosi. I am sure you will be able to provide that for
us directly.
[The information follows:]
In fiscal year 1998, the U.S. Army School of the Americas
did not have any students who took the Human Rights Train the
Trainer Qualification course. This same course has been made
available to Latin American countries for fiscal year 1999, and
there are currently no students scheduled for enrollment at
this time.
Mr. Bodner. Let me also add, as Secretary Holum has said,
in the Western Hemisphere we now have a democratic hemisphere.
We have governments of legitimately elected, credible
leadership; democratically elected, committed to reform in most
cases. And it is those leaders, reform-minded people, who come
to us and ask us to engage their militaries.
Ms. Pelosi. I was really asking a more direct question
about whether any of the graduates of the School of the
Americas have been implicated in human rights violations in
1997 and 1998, those graduates? Do you know?
Mr. Bodner. I don't have the information right here to give
you on that.
Ms. Pelosi. So the certification is based on the
curriculum, but not the performance of the graduates; is that
correct?
black hawk helicopters
Mr. Bodner. Certification attests to what the training
program and the education program is at the school.
Ms. Pelosi. So you don't have any results about the
improvement? We have had some pretty unsavory characters
graduate from the School of the Americas, and I am assuming
from the certification there has been some improvement in that.
We have been more discriminating in terms of who has been
allowed to go there, and the record of recent graduates is an
improved one. Would that certification--am I inferring
incorrectly from the certification?
Mr. Bodner. The certification, the content of which is
dictated by law, addresses what the training activities and the
education activities are.
Ms. Pelosi. But you have no record of the performance of
the graduates?
Mr. Bodner. We don't individually track every person who
goes through one of our training programs.
Ms. Pelosi. But you don't know of any notorious violation
of human rights?
Mr. Bodner. I am not aware of any notorious violators as
you have described.
Mr. Holum. We do vet.
Mr. Bodner. Certainly, before people come to the school, of
course, we do vet. And many of these individuals----
Ms. Pelosi. The Chairman is appropriately admonishing me
about the time. But I want to get into--and then I will submit
the rest of my questions for the record, and unfortunately some
of my colleagues share some of these concerns, and they are not
here to ask them. The Import-Export Bank recently funded the
sale of armored personnel carriers to Turkey. One-time, 10-
year-old authorities were recently used to fund the sale of 50
Black Hawk helicopters to Turkey. Some American companies are
attempting to get the Eximbank approval to use the same 10-year
authority to fund the sale of 50 attack helicopters to Turkey
as part of a larger sale.
What is your position on the use of this authority? Do you
think U.S. companies will be allowed to make this sale to
Turkey given your promises that such a sale would be contingent
on meeting certain human rights conditions?
Mr. Holum. You are talking about the attack helicopters?
Ms. Pelosi. Yes.
Mr. Holum. Well, the issue hasn't explicitly arisen now. As
you know, Prime Minister Yilmaz discussed this issue with
President Clinton, discussed this issue with him in December of
1997, and he made commitments to concrete human rights reforms.
And when we consulted with the Congress prior to issuing the
marketing license for the attack helicopters, we made clear
that if a U.S. company wins the competition, our sale will be
based on all the elements of the arms export control policy,
which includes an evaluation of Turkey's progress on human
rights.
There have been some positive steps, including the
submission of legislation that we have called for increasing
the accountability of civil servants and easing restrictions on
free speech. Their attack helicopter competition is still going
on. We don't know if a U.S. company will be chosen, but if a
U.S. company is chosen, the decision on arms sales will be
based on our arms export control policy, including our
expectations on the human rights side.
Mr. Bodner. May I just add that regardless of the
financing, the sale has to go through the licensing process as
Mr. Holum has described.
ex-im funding authority
Ms. Pelosi. But my question was do you--you answered part
of my question. The other part of my question, what is your
position on the use of this authority, this 10-year-old
authority, to use Exim? See, I don't think that the American
people think that we have established the Eximbank to
facilitate arms sales, so some of us have a very particular
view about that, and that increases for the--Eximbank money is
very scarce around here, as you know, and the opportunity costs
are only one consideration. If we are spending it here, then we
are not able to provide financing and et cetera for other
exports from the U.S. And so many of us would oppose Exim going
down this path. Now they are using this old authority in these
cases, and I am asking you what your position is on the Exim
using this old authority for the attack helicopters.
Mr. Holum. I will have to give you a response for the
record because I have been intensely involved in that subject,
but it has been several years since I focused aggressively on
it. I will get back to you.
[The information follows:]
export-import bank financing
The Administration will not use this authority to finance
the sale of attack helicopters to Turkey. This authority was
established in 1990 to provide financing for the export of
utility helicopters to Turkey and Greece. This facility allows
for deliveries up until June 2001, or until the Ex-Im credits
are used up.
A contract for the sale of 150 Sikorsky Black Hawk Utility
helicopters was signed in 1922. Under this contract, 53
helicopters have been delivered. Effortrs are now underway to
use this authority to execute the sale of 50 Black Hawk
helicopters to Turkey. Since these 50 helicopters are within
the scope of the original authorization, this authority can be
used for the sale of these additional utility helicopters.
Financing for attack helicopters is not within the terms of
this facility. Turkey's attack helicopter competition of still
going on, and we do not yet know if a U.S. company will be
chosen. Two U.S. companies, Bell/Textron and Boeing, are in the
running. If a U.S. company wins the competition, our sale
approval would be based on our arms export control policy,
which will include an evaluation of Turkey's progress on
improving human rights in its country.
Mr. Holum. As a general proposition there are two
questions. One is should Eximbank authority be used for
exporting military equipment. I personally think that once we
make a determination that a military export is in our national
security interest, and that should be the basis for making the
judgment, not out of the relationship, but out of the
seriousness of the security interest, then we should advocate
it. Whether Export-Import Bank financing should be available
depends on a lot of factors including the one you cited of
opportunity costs.
Ms. Pelosi. Or us becoming the arms salesmen of the world
and then saying to other countries that you shouldn't do this,
and we are financing it. And the free market system--all of
these people who advocate the free market system, it is, see,
they can't do anything without Uncle Sam holding their hand.
Mr. Holum. Part of the--some of the helicopter transactions
here are not military helicopters. They are unarmed.
Ms. Pelosi. Would you call the attack helicopter a
nonmilitary?
Mr. Holum. No, that is a misnomer.
Mr. Callahan. Let me answer that my understanding of part
of that was that authorization was given to Eximbank by this
Congress at the insistence of Senator Dodd 10 years ago, and
this is fulfilling the commitment that his committee under the
direction of Mr. Obey--that Exim is operating under the
authority granted then.
Ms. Pelosi. Very old. You are right, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. And also there is some question as to whether
or not some of the personnel carriers are really for military
activities. I think they have some other agencies within the
Turkish Government that had requested the personnel carriers,
but they are not defense-type people. They are more policemen.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
kedo
Mr. Callahan. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate you for
coming. I am sorry to have made light of some of the concerns I
have, but I think you know where I am coming from. We are going
to be as generous as we can under the circumstances. We have to
explain these questions when they come to the floor. And even
though I disagree, for example, with KEDO, when it comes to the
floor, I have to wind up defending it, and, therefore, I have
got to have some answers to these things that no doubt will
surface on the floor of the House and during the process. So it
is important that you all explain to us. I don't know if we are
going to be able to come up with all the money for anything,
but KEDO specifically, we will do the best we can. And we thank
you very much for being here.
[Questions and answers for the record follow:]
Submitted to the Department of State
Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman Callahan
Question. Mr. Holum, the Administration's budget request for FY
2000 includes $5,000,000 from the FMF account which, according to the
State Department's congressional presentation document, is to ``bolster
the capabilities of East African states (Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda)
. . .'' through its ``Front Line States'' initiative.
Please provide a breakdown of how much funding will be made
available to each nation in fiscal year 2000.
Answer. $5 million has been requested for FY 2000, but has not yet
been allocated to any of the three `Front Lines States' (FLS)--
Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda. Allocations among the three
participating nations cannot yet be made, since our request is pending
before Congress and we have suspended FLS assistance to Eritera,
Ethiopia, and Uganda. Allocations to Ethiopia and Eritrea may later be
made if a peace settlement is reached.
Question. Given that Eritrea and Ethiopia have spent much of the
past year engaged in military conflict with one another, how does the
Administration justify providing military aid to either nation in
fiscal year 2000?
Answer. The Administration will not approve additional military
assistance to either nation as long as fighting continues, except for
limited professional military education conducted in the United States.
Our request for military cooperation funds for FY2000 presumes that a
peaceful resolution to the conflict will be found, which will permit us
to renew the effective military-to-military relationships that existed
with both countries prior to the outbreak of the border conflict.
Question. What steps has the Administration taken to ensure that
U.S. military hardware is not used to further the tensions between
these two nations?
Answer. The Administration has not and will not approve licenses
for sale or transfer of military equipment to either country that would
further their pursuit of the conflict, nor will the Administration
approve the allocation of any assistance funds for military use. This
policy will remain in effect until hostilities have definitively ended.
Question. What estimates are available to the Administration about
the financial costs to Eritrea and Ethiopia from this war?
Answer. Both governments have kept arms purchases secret, and have
purchased a variety of military equipment and materiel from a range of
suppliers. Unclassified reports note that costly, sophisticated
equipment, including high-performance aircraft and artillery, have been
acquired by both countries.
Question. For Fiscal Year 1999, the Administration has notified
Congress through its section 653(a) process that it intends to provide
$5,000,000 in FMF to these ``Front Line States''. What will these funds
be used for? How much funding will be provided to each country?
Answer. If hostilities cease, Front Line States funds will support
procurement of non-lethal military supplies and equipment for Eritrea,
Ethiopia, and Uganda, such as boots, radios, and individual clothing
and equipment. No funds have yet been allocated, since our request is
still pending before Congress. Some funds may also be used for storage
of two C-130 aircraft acquired by Ethiopia prior to the outbreak of
hostilities and not yet delivered to it, as well as storage of spare
parts procured for the C-130s.
Question. Does the Administration have any information that U.S.
equipment, made available in the past through the FMF program or the
African Crisis Response Initiative, was used during the hostilities
during the past year?
Answer. All equipment provided to Uganda is non-lethal. However, we
have no information that any equipment provided to Uganda under the
``Front Line States'' (FLS) initiative or the African Crisis Response
Initiative (ACRI) has been used in the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
Neither Eritrea nor Ethiopia has received equipment under ACRI.
Equipment purchased under FLS is limited to non-lethal items such as
radios, individual clothing and equipment, and repair parts. Repair
parts accompanying the two C-130 aircraft that were delivered to
Ethiopia prior to the beginning of the border conflict with Eritrea may
have been used in support of the Ethiopian Army. However, we have no
information that any other FLS or FMF equipment provided to either
Eritrea or Ethiopia has been used in the conflict.
Question. Mr. Holum, the Administration's budget request for FY
2000 includes funding for IMET programs for a number of governments--
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Congo, Zimbabwe, and Angola--that
have been involved in regional conflict during the past year.
What is the justification for IMET training for governments which
are engaged in conflict?
Answer. The United States continues to play an active role to help
prevent and resolve African conflicts. Good governance and sustained
economic development cannot thrive in an environment plagued by
recurring armed conflict. This premise remains true as we face the
current conflicts.
In the past, we have been quick to sever all military-to-military
engagement with countries at the outset of a conflict. This frequently
has had the undesired effect of reducing our influence with governments
with which we are trying to negotiate for the cessation of hostilities.
Often this knee-jerk termination of IMET and other military contact
hinders our ability to promote peace at a time we need it the most.
Once severed, these ties and the mutual confidence we have built
through IMET and other programs are very difficult to reestablish.
Because of our strong opposition to conflict situations, we cannot
continue with ``business as usual'' with these countries, and yet, we
do not want to cease all military contacts. Now, we are more likely to
reduce our military contacts with countries involved with conflicts,
while not completely severing the relationship. For example, on a case-
by-case basis, we might reduce our military engagement in a given
country by canceling scheduled exercises and/or denying export licenses
for some items, while retaining an IMET program for courses conducted
in the United States.
Examples of actions we have taken this year because of regional
conflicts include the canceling of scheduled exercises in Rwanda,
Ethiopia, and Eritrea, the postponement of Africa Crisis Response
Initiative (ACRI0 training in Ethiopia and Uganda, and the denial of
several export license requests for military items to Uganda, Eritrea
and Ethiopia, while allowing IMET training to continue in the United
States for these countries.
Retaining IET in this manner allows us to maintain our ability to
positively influence human rights, ethical conduct, civil control of
the armed forces, and professional military values in these countries.
These are important democratic attributes that we cannot support by
cutting training in precisely these same areas.
For these reasons, and in anticipation of success in our bilateral
and international mediation efforts in the ongoing African disputes, we
have requested IMET funding for some of these countries in crisis in FY
2000.
Question. Will these IMET funds be used to train or educate
military officers directly involved these conflicts?
Answer. Although, in future years, it is possible that some of the
officers involved in these conflicts may participate in IMET training,
each student will be screened as required under current Congressional
mandate to ensure they are not participating in gross human rights
violations. These screening procedures for IMET students are already in
place and operating in our embassies abroad.
Question. Mr. Holum, the Administration's budget request for FY
2000 includes $26,500,000 from the Economic Support Fund for an Asia
regional financial crisis program. However, congressional presentation
documents provided to the Committee give very little detail about how
these funds will be spent.
Please provide the Committee with additional justification for this
program, including which countries will be recipients and what types of
programs will be implemented.
Which U.S. government agency will administer this program?
Answer. The Accelerated Economic Recovery in Asia (AERA) Initiative
is designed to help the Asian reigon recover from its protracted
economic crisis by addressing key weaknesses in the economic,
governance, and social systems of three crucial countries; Thailand,
Indonesia, and the Philippines. The crisis has increased Asian
receptiveness to reforms the U.S. has long encouraged. As these reforms
are implemented, the overall business climate will be improved to the
benefit of all commercial activities, including those of U.S. firms.
The initiative will achieve its objective by restarting bank and
business activity, improving transparency and accountability in banks,
businesses and governments, and improving the targeting, coverage and
availability of social programs for vulnerable populations.
Based on country-specific analyses, AERA will support the following
types of activities in FY 2000 that represent immediate needs and
complement existing bilateral and multilateral donor programs.
Provide assistance and training to improve bankers' skills in risk
assessment and management and credit analysis;
Provide assistance and training to local corporations on debt
restructuring, problem loan workouts, and debtor/creditor agreements in
targeted sectors;
Train Small-Medium Enterprise (SME) executives to analyze and
improve profitability;
Provide technical assistance and training to improve bank and
corporate accounting and to encourage the adoption of internationally
accepted accounting standards;
Support reform and implementation of key commercial laws that
govern bankruptcy and foreclosure;
Work with stock markets to improve the enforcement of disclosure
requirements for publicly listed companies;
Improve the analyses and coordination of anti-corruption efforts by
accountability organizations;
Expose key government agencies to best practices in public sector
governance from other countries through training, seminars, and
technical assistance programs;
Strengthen epidemic and nutritional, surveillance systems through
technical assistance;
Improve targeting of social safety net programs, such as
unemployment insurance, pension programs, and targeted health and
education subsidies.
The United States Agency for International Development will
administer this program.
russian arms transfers to iran and the middle east
Question. Recent press reports indicate Russia is continuing to
supply technical assistance to Iran to develop long-range missiles, and
to develop its nuclear capability. According to recent public testimony
by CIA Director George Tenet, ``expertise and material from Russia has
continued to assist the Iranian missile effort in areas ranging from
training and testing to components.''
The Administration is requesting that funding for Russia increase
from $172 million in 1999 to $295 million in 2000. Much of this funding
is for the new Expanded Threat Reduction Assistance Initiative.
What are the details of the threat reduction initiative?
Answer. The Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative seeks to intensify
the partnership among Russia, the NIS, G-8 and others to address the
security implications of the economic crisis that affected Russia and
the other New Independent States over the past year, including
increased risks of weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Over the
next five years, we will seek $4.5 billion in funding from Congress to
expand, increase and accelerate U.S. programs for Russia and the other
NIS to help address high priority security, arms control and
nonproliferation requirements. This reflects an increase in FY2000-2004
of $1.7 billion to an estimated $2.8 billion in previously planned
programs. Additionally, the U.S. will strongly encourage the G-8, other
nations and international financing institutions, to join in this
effort.
The primary objective of this Initiative is to further reduce
international security threats by expanding, increasing and
accelerating U.S. and international assistance activities in Russia and
the other NIS to address high priority security and proliferation
areas. The Initiative seeks to build on the security cooperation and
partnerships established over the past seven years and engage for the
long-term with Russian scientists and WMD technical experts, scientific
institutions, universities, WMD-related industries and ministries.
Existing programs, such as the successful Cooperative Threat Reduction
and other security programs sponsored by the Departments of Defense,
Energy, State and other U.S. agencies will continue. This initiative
would expand and accelerate these existing programs, create new
programs where they are needed, and promote complementary assistance
efforts by other nations.
We envision increased cooperation under the intensified partnership
would fall in the following four priority areas:
1. Nuclear Security Programs: increased assistance for strategic
nuclear delivery vehicle dismantlement, warhead dismantlement,
transport and storage security; fissile material and spent fuel
storage; material protection, control and accounting; securing highly
enriched uranium (HEU) and cooperation in plutonium disposition;
reactor core conversion; and transformation of the nuclear cities;
2. Non-nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs: increased
assistance for Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) implementation;
physical security enhancements and related biological weapons (BW)
infrastructure elimination; and export control system enhancements;
3. Science and Technology Nonproliferation Programs: increased
assistance to engage weapons scientists and institutes and redirect WMD
expertise to civilian research and commercial joint ventures under the
multilateral International Science and Technology Center (ISTC); the
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program; the Civilian
Research and Development Foundation (CRDF) and other science and
technology programs; and
4. Military Relocation, Stabilization and Other Security
Cooperation: ammunition disposal and force relocation assistance to
help deal with the cost of military realignment outside of Russia and
assistance to facilitate military downsizing and reforms to address
destabilizing conditions resulting from severe economic crisis. Such
assistance, for example, could contribute to the disposition of
munitions in Transniestria and facilitate the withdrawal of Russian
troops; funding from international sources could contribute to severe
housing shortages that constrain troop downsizing and military reform.
Question. Why would we provide money to Russia that is designed to
reduce their military threat, while on the other hand Russia is
assisting Iran to develop weapons of mass destruction?
Answer. We are increasing our assistance to Russia because it
serves U.S. national interests. Our assistance to Russia reduces and
prevents the threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and
helps ensure a democratic and market transition in Russia and the other
NIS. The Administration's proposed Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative
will substantially increase U.S. national security by reducing the
threat posed by residual Soviet weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in
Russia and the proliferation of WMD materials, technology and expertise
to Iran and other rogue states.
Russian weapons of mass destruction pose both a direct and profound
nonproliferation threat as well as a latent military threat. The
economic crisis that affected Russia and the other NIS over the past
year has greatly increased the threat of proliferation. The
Administration has taken a leadership role in launching an
international effort to head off the increased danger of proliferation.
The specific programs included in this effort will, for example, make
clear and direct contribution to U.S. national security by safely
eliminating and securely storing thousands of Russian nuclear warheads
and the fissile material derived from dismantled warheads, eliminating
stores of dangerous chemical weapons, redirecting WMD expertise to
civilian research and commercial joint ventures, and facilitating
Russian military downsizing and reform by helping relocate forces and
equipment from Moldova and Georgia to Russia.
Question. What steps has the Administration taken, and what steps
will it take in the future, to persuade Russia to halt its arms
transfers to Iran and other nations of the Middle East?
Answer. We are concerned about the possibility of sales to
countries of concern (Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria and Libya) and
have expressed these concerns to Russia on numerous occasions.
Russia appears to be abiding by the UN Sanctions on sales to Iraq.
Under an agreement reached in 1995, Russia committed not to undertake
any new arms contracts with Iran, but would service existing contracts.
We believe Moscow is living up to that commitment.
Russian entities have recently sold anti-tank guided missiles to
Syria. We have imposed sanctions against those entities and have warned
Russia that any future sales could result in sanctions against the
government.
Question. The 1999 appropriations act contains a provision that
reduces our aid to the Government of Russia by 50% if the President
determines that Russia is supply assistance to Iran's nuclear program.
What is the status of this determination at the present time?
Answer. The relevant section of the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Acts for the Fiscal Year 1999 provides that, of the
funds appropriated under the heading ``Assistance for the New
Independent States of the Former Soviet Union'', 50% of the amount
allocated for assistance for the Government of Russia shall be withheld
from obligation until the President determines and certifies in writing
that the Government of Russia has terminated cooperation relating to
the implementation of arrangements to provide Iran with expertise,
technology or equipment necessary to develop a nuclear reactor, related
nuclear research facilities or programs, or ballistic missile
capability. The President may waive the restrictions if he determines
that the assistance is vital to the national security interest of the
United States and that Russia is taking meaningful steps to limit major
supply contracts and to curtail the transfer of technology and
technological expertise related to developing a nuclear reactor,
related nuclear research facilities or programs, or ballistic missile
capability.
Accordingly, as soon as appropriated funds were available for
expenditure for this fiscal year, the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to
the New Independent States directed all agencies implementing
assistance programs in Russia to withhold 50% of the relevant FY99
funds allocated for assistance to the Government of Russia until
further notice.
Based on our current evaluation of Russian cooperation with Iran,
particularly with regard to development of a nuclear reactor, we do not
anticipate that it will be possible for the President to make the
necessary certification or waiver under the FY99 provision. We are
therefore consulting with the relevant agencies and with congressional
staff regarding the 50% reduction in assistance to the Government of
Russia. We are examining possible reprogramming of FY99 funds for
assistance to non-governmental entities or for other countries in the
NIS. Some portions of these funds are also being reprogrammed for
assistance to front-line states affected by the Kosovo conflict. We
will keep you and your staff informed as we give further consideration
to these important non-proliferation and assistance issues.
assistance for the west bank and gaza
Question. At the time of the Oslo Agreement, the President made a
commitment to provide a total of $500 million in assistance for the
West Bank and Gaza over a five-year period, including $75 million
annually through the Economic Support Fund and $25 million in OPIC
funding. The OPIC activities never materialized, primarily due to the
fact it is very difficult for private companies to operate under the
auspices of the Palestinian Authority.
We have met our five-year commitment through the Economic Support
Fund by the appropriation of $75 million for fiscal year 1999. Now the
President has requested an additional $400 million over three years for
the West Bank and Gaza as part of the Wye River supplemental.
However, you are also requesting $100 million as part of the
regular fiscal year 2000 budget for the West Bank and Gaza. Why do we
have to fulfill a commitment that was never made? Can't we save that
money, or do these five-year commitments continue indefinitely?
Answer. The Administration's budget proposal for FY 2000 includes
an additional $25 million in economic support funds (ESF) for the West
Bank and Gaza--bringing the total request to $100 million.
None of these funds will go to the PLO, nor will we provide any
financial assistance directly to the Palestinian Authority.
We intend to use these funds to expand our assistance to the
private sector, specifically to broaden our support for private trade
organizations and help Palestinian enterprises meet international
product standards.
We will also use the funds to expand our assistance in the water
sector, which includes water management activities, water usage,
wastewater treatment, and the reuse of water for agricultural purposes.
The additional assistance will be particularly welcome given the
significant declines in the Palestinian economy since the signing of
the Declaration of Principles with Israel in 1993--per capita income
for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza has fallen by one-third
since that time. The ESF increase will contribute to reversing this
economic decline while building a constituency for peace.
The additional funding requested for the Palestinians as part of
the Wye Supplemental covers other critical needs.
U.S. leadership is essential to mobilizing broader support for the
Palestinians from the international community. Our pledge to work with
Congress to secure $400 million in supplemental assistance helped
mobilize substantial commitments from the Europeans ($480 million),
Japan ($200 million) and Norway ($180 million) and others.
Some of the Wye supplemental funding would be used for projects
directly related to Wye implementation; other activities would include
community development, rule-of-law, preparation of Bethlehem for its
celebrations in the year 2000, maternal-child health care, and a
scholarship fund for graduate level education.
voluntary peacekeeping operations
Question. The President's request for voluntary peacekeeping
activities totals $130 million, a 70% increase over the fiscal year
1999 level of $76.5 million.
The two biggest components of the increase are:
1. A $33 million increase for the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe to monitor a cease fire in Kosovo that doesn't
exist; and
2. An $11 million increase for activities in Bosnia.
What are the reasons for the size of these increases? Why are we
spending more money in Bosnia for these activities, when our bilateral
program is being reduced.
Answer:
Funding for Kosovo
We have requested an increase of $33 million (a total of $43
million in FY00) to pay for the U.S. contributions to the OSCE Kosovo
Mission, the largest field mission undertaken by the OSCE to date.
Prior to commencement of NATO operations, the OSCE Kosovo Mission's
1380 international staff were evacuated to FYR Macedonia, and then
drawn down to core staffing levels.
The majority of the approximately 300 remaining core staff have
been redeployed to assist UNHCR in addressing the humanitarian crisis
on the ground in FYR Macedonia and in Albania. The balance are
preparing for a rapid reintroduction of the OSCE Mission into Kosovo--
once conditions allow--to undertake civilian implementation tasks.
We have requested $43 million in FY00 PKO funds to pay for our
share of the costs of the on-going OSCE Kosovo Mission's activities,
and for present estimates of an eventual OSCE-led civilian
implementation effort in Kosovo.
Funding for Bosnia and Other OSCE Missions and Activities
Our OSCE-related costs in Bosnia are, in fact, expected to decline
next year. We have requested this increase to pay for increased
expenses in Croatia, Albania, FYR Macedonia and other OSCE missions.
Croatia
The OSCE assumption of UNTAES policing responsibilities in Croatia,
and expected Presidential elections in 2000, will require additional
OSCE resources.
The presence of OSCE police monitors in eastern Slavonia is
integral to maintaining the peace and creating an environment fostering
refugee return.
OSCE is expect to play a critical role in assuring that acceptable
election standards are observed--a key to firmly establishing a stable,
enduring peace in Croatia.
Albania and FYR Macedonia
Spillover effects from the crisis in Kosovo have had a significant
impact in the region and on the OSCE's responsibilities in these
countries.
In the past year, the OSCE has moved proactively to address this
situation. In order to monitor the situation on the border with Kosovo,
the OSCE increased the mandated international staff of the Albania
Presence twice in the past year, and opened five branch offices in
Northern Albania.
Other OSCE Missions
The OSCE presently has 18 field missions operating throughout
Eurasia, including three new OSCE field offices in Central Asia. Based
on the President's Berlin initiative, we have actively encouraged the
OSCE to enhance its outreach to Central Asia and the Caucasus--areas
where democratization and respect for human rights are weakly rooted.
We strongly support OSCE's work to foster enhanced compliance with
democratic standards and human rights through the establishment of in-
country field missions and the efforts of the OSCE's Office of
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).
ODIHR's programs focus on improving compliance with key OSCE
commitments--including respect for fundamental human rights,
democratization, and establishment of transparent free-market
economies.
Question. If a peace agreement is signed for Kosovo, will the
Administration be requesting additional funds for implementation of the
agreement? If so, how much will be requested, and what would the funds
be used for?
Answer. Ongoing NATO operations in Kosovo and Serbia have changed
our estimate of what will be needed to address humanitarian needs,
implement a peace agreement, contribute to reconstruction, and pursue a
program of economic and democratic development. We will probably need
to request supplemental appropriations to meet these objectives. We are
currently working with DOD and OMB to determine how much is needed and
expect to present our request to you shortly.
north korea
Question. The United States continues to claim that the 1994 Agreed
Framework between the United States and North Korea is the basis for
our policy with that country. The Agreed Framework was designed to deal
with one nuclear reactor in that country. However, it does not directly
deal with the development by North Korea of intercontinental ballistic
missiles that may have nuclear warheads.
It appears the primary goal of the North Koreans is the development
of an ICBM that can threaten the mainland of the United States.
According to recent public testimony by CIA Director George Tenet, they
will soon ``be able to deliver large payloads'' to the continental
United States.
This is not just a case of nuclear threats to our allies in Asia;
North Korean nuclear and missile development activities are a direct
threat to the national security of the United States and its citizens.
In light of that reality, why do we continue to act as if the
implementation of the Agreed Framework is the only game in town with
the North Koreans? Does it make sense to continue to provide foreign
assistance to a country that is working to develop missiles that can
strike the West Coast of the United States?
Answer. The Agreed Framework was concluded in the context of a
nuclear nonproliferation crisis in 1994, and was designed to deal with
the nuclear reactors and related facilities which the North was then
building or operating at Yongbyon and nearby Taechon, which had the
potential to produce significant amounts of nuclear weapons-usable
material.
The Agreed Framework requires the DPRK to freeze and eventually
dismantle these facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) monitors the freeze full-time and reports that it remains in
place.
The IAEA has also placed virtually all of the approximately 8000
spent fuel rods, or over 98 percent of the DPRK's estimated total,
under seal. These rods, canned by a U.S. team in cooperation with the
DPRK, are to be removed upon completion of the first of two
proliferation-resistant, light-water reactors to be supplied by the
North Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).
In effect, the nuclear freeze on the facilities at Yongbyon and
Taechon prevents the DPRK from using these facilities to produce
plutonium for nuclear weapons. This is very much in the U.S. security
interest.
The Framework has also served as a basis for our broader
relationship with North Korea. That relationship links U.S. movement
toward political and economic normalization to parallel DPRK steps on
issues of great concern to the U.S., with ballistic missile development
among the most prominent.
We have told Pyongyang that any further long-range missile tests
would have very serious consequences for our relations with North
Korea. Failure to make significant progress on missile issues will
prevent us from moving forward with our relations with the DPRK. This
point has been made clear to Pyongyang repeatedly, including during the
just-completed Fourth Round of Missile Talks held in Pyongyang March
29-30.
The prospect of improved relations provides an incentive for the
DPRK to moderate its missile activities over time. Meanwhile, we
continue, along with our ROK and Japanese allies, to press the DPRK to
cease all development, testing, deployment and export of long-range
missiles and related missile technology.
The purpose of the Agreed Framework is not to provide foreign
assistance to North Korea. The heavy fuel oil (HFO) which KEDO
provides, pending the completion of the first light-water reactor, is
an interim replacement for the energy that North Korea agreed to forego
by freezing its nuclear reactor facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon.
While the U.S. has taken a leading role in funding KEDO's HFO
program, other countries have also contributed amounts which, taken
together, approach the magnitude of the U.S. contribution. The ROK and
Japan have agreed to provide the lion's share of funding for the LWR
project, funding which will quickly surpass the U.S. contribution to
KEDO.
Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to provide humanitarian food aid to
North Korea in response to appeals by the World Food Program and out of
concern over the dire humanitarian situation there.
It is the longstanding policy of the U.S. around the world to
provide food aid strictly on a humanitarian basis. The amount of such
food assistance is based on need, as assessed by the World Food Program
and other international organizations, and our own information. All
food assistance provided by the U.S. to North Korea is monitored by WFP
and NGO monitors to ensure that it continues to reach those for whom it
is intended.
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (ctbt)
Question. We've recently read very disturbing press reports about
spying by China at U.S. nuclear laboratories in New Mexico. These
reports also state China may have used this information to develop
small nuclear warheads, very similar to those used by our submarine
missiles.
At the same time, we are being asked to appropriate an additional
$20 million to prepare for implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, or CTBT. The treaty has not been ratified by the Senate.
In order for the treaty to come into force, 44 countries must
ratify it. China and North Korea are two of those countries.
Do we have an indication from China and North Korea when, or if,
they will ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?
Answer. We have encourage all states, including China and North
Korea, to ratify the CTBT promptly. China signed the treaty on the same
day that the U.S. did. It is participating actively in the work of the
CTBT's Preparatory Commission in building the international
verification regime.
While China has not committed to a specific date for ratification,
Chinese officials have indicated that they believe it would be
advantageous to ratify by September. This is the earliest date at which
a conference of ratifying states can be convened to consider ways to
expedite entry onto force. President Jiang Zemin, in a March 26 speech
to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, noted that early entry into
force of the CTBT had become a more pressing task, and said the Chinese
government would soon officially submit the treaty to the National
People's Congress for ratification. At the same time, it is clear that
China is closely watching both the U.S. ratification process and India
for signs that it will adhere to CTBT as it has indicated it would.
North Korea is a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD),
which negotiated the CTBT. While the DPRK neither sought to block
consensus on the text in the CD nor voted against the UN General
Assembly resolution adopting the Treaty, it has not yet signed. The
issued has been raised with North Korea on a number of occasions to
stress to the DPRK the importance of CTBT signature and ratification.
Question. If they do ratify the treaty, how can we ensure that they
will abide by its terms? Based on press reports it appears North Korea
has not complied with the Agreed Framework. They are refusing us access
to a site that may have been used to develop nuclear material; the CTBT
calls for inspections when a violation may have occurred as well. What
will happen under that treaty if the North Koreans refuse to grant
inspection access to their nuclear sites?
Answer. Regarding compliance with Agreed Framework, the IAEA
conducts continuous, full-time inspections of the Yongbyon and Teachon
nuclear facilities and has determined that the DPRK is complying with
the nuclear freeze provisions of the Agreed Framework.
When the U.S. developed suspicions about certain underground
construction at Kumchang-ni, although we had no basis to conclude that
the DPRK was in violation of the Agreed Framework, we followed up
aggressively to demand that Pyongyang take steps to remove our
concerns. After several months of intense negotiations, our negotiating
team concluded with the DPRK on March 16 an agreement for U.S. access
to the Kumchang-ni site. We are confident that this agreement, if fully
implemented, will provide a basis to remove completely our concerns
about the site. The initial site visit will occur in mid-May, with a
second visit in May 2000 and subsequent visits upon U.S. request, as
long as our concerns about the site remain.
North Korea has not signed the CTBT, but the following provisions
regarding on-site inspections (OSIs) would apply to any state party:
Under the Treaty, an OSI can be requested to clarify whether a
nuclear explosive has been carried out in violation of the Treaty, and
to gather facts that might assist in identifying a possible violator.
The request will cover a defined geographic area, and under the Treaty
each state party commits itself to permit the CTBT Organization to
conduct on-site inspections on its territory or at places under its
jurisdiction or control.
An inspected state party is also obliged, among other things, to
provide access within the inspection area, refrain from impeding the
inspection team's ability to more within the inspection area, and make
every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with the Treaty.
At the same time, it has the right to take measures to protect national
security interests and prevent disclosure of confidential information
not related to the purpose of the inspection.
If a state party fails to comply with its OSI obligations, the
Treaty provides for various measures to ensure compliance, including
recommending sanctions and bringing the matter to the attention of the
United Nations. unanimous consent
agriculture
Question. This Subcommittee has emphasized the importance of
international agriculture assistance in overall development strategy.
The Economic Support Fund has played a role, especially in Egypt, in
funding this important aspect of our assistance program. How much of
your FY 2000 program will be for agriculture and how does that number
compare with FY 1999?
Answer. The Administration's request for Economic Support Funds
(ESF) is $2.389 billion, $44 million less than the FY 1999 level. Of
this amount, $83.2 million is for agricultural programs, a drop of
$62.3 million from the current FY 1999 estimate of $145.5 million. The
FY 2000 ESF planning level for agricultural programs in Egypt is just
over $43 million. This compares to Egypt's FY 1999 agricultural level
of $106 million. This significant drop is due partly to the decreasing
ESF being provided to Egypt. The FY 2000 request of $715 million in ESF
for Egypt is $60 million less than the FY 1999 level of $775 million
and $100 million less than Egypt's FY 1998 level of $815 million. The
drop is also due in part to a decision to shift the program focus in
Egypt to broader economic reform issues outside the realm of
agriculture. Other agricultural ESF programs in Jordan, Lebanon, Haiti,
and Guatemala remain constant for FY 1999 and FY 2000.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Mr. Knollenberg
azerbaijan
Question. On Monday, March 1, the government in Azerbaijan
announced that a Russian warplane had violated its airspace for two
minutes. The government considered the event to be an act of
aggression. As such, Azerbaijan announced that it would welcome NATO
bases and troops to guard against what it considers to be a ``Russian
threat.'' How does the U.S. government respond to Azerbaijan's request
for NATO bases and/or troops to enhance Azeri security? Do you think
that would be a viable option for the western alliance? How would it
affect U.S. relations with Russia, Armenia and Iran?
Answer. We are aware of various statements made by Azerbaijani
officials on this subject. However, the United States has received no
formal request from the Government of Azerbaijan to establish a
military base there. The USG has no plans to open military bases in
Azerbaijan. Our policy has been to discourage the introduction of new
foreign military forces and equipment into the region because these
could be viewed as destabilizing and threatening and could complicate
the peaceful resolution of such disputes as the conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh.
We do, however, maintain a security dialogue with Azerbaijan, as
well as with the other Caucasus states, Armenia and Georgia. We are
also continuing to develop military cooperation with Azerbaijan within
the limitations set out in Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act,
which restricts direct assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan, and
related legislation.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Mr. Forbes
Question. For several years now, the Administration has made it a
policy to forgo nuclear weapons testing and procurement and to sharply
cut the budget for procurement of conventional weapon systems. In light
of the recent discovery of a Chinese spy at a major nuclear weapons
laboratory and bellicose statements from Beijing threatening Taiwan and
the U.S., what actions have you taken to curtail security assistance or
defense sales to China? What actions might you suggest that we take to
aid Taiwan? How does the recent espionage case affect the way that you
approach arms control issues? Might the Administration make it a policy
to sharply increase defense sales in the Pacific region to offset
China? Are the Administration's arms control and security assistance
goals compatible?
Answer. There has been no change in the Administration's policy
regarding the export of defense articles and services to China. We do
not provide security assistance to China. After the Tiananmen Square
incident, the Department prohibited the export of defense articles and
services to the PRC. The prohibition on the export of defense articles
was later legislated in the Tiananmen Sanctions Act of 1990.
Regarding aid to Taiwan, the Administration has a strong interest
in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. For this
reason, we have approved defensive arms sales to Taiwan consistent with
the Taiwan Relations Act. We will continue to monitor the military
balance in the Taiwan Strait closely and meet our obligation to provide
Taiwan the arms it needs for an adequate defense.
The Administration takes seriously the questions regarding Chinese
espionage raised by the recent case. However, I am not in a position to
comment further on this specific case due to the on-going
investigation. We have no illusions about China. At the same time,
gaining China's cooperation on our security agenda is critical to
enhancing security in the region as well as promoting and effectively
implementing global arms control regimes. Over the last few years I
have established a regular dialogue with my Chinese counterparts on
nonproliferation, arms control and international security issues, which
is an important means of pressing China to adhere to international
nonproliferation standards.
Countries' interest in advanced defense systems obviously is
influenced by China's own behavior as well as that of the DPRK, which
China has some ability to influence.
The Administration will not respond by increasing arms sales to the
Asia-Pacific region. The basis of our defense cooperation with nations
in the Asia-Pacific region is not linked to the health of U.S.-China
relations. Rather, our defense sales and other security assistance in
the region is governed by our overwhelming desire to maintain peace and
stability, creating a suitable environment for economic recovery. Given
the fact that the United States has five treaty allies in the Asia
Pacific region, we naturally maintain close military ties throughout
the region.
Our arms control and security assistance goals are not
incompatible. Whenever we consider the potential transfer of a major
defense article into this region--or any other region--we seek to
ensure that the potential transfer will not lead to an arms race or
violate any arms control regimes. We analyze all potential transfers on
a case-by-case basis following the guidelines and criteria laid out in
PDD-34, the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Ms. Pelosi
russia/iran
Question. Fifty percent of the funds provided for assistance
through the Russian Government has been withheld pending an assessment
of Russian cooperation with Iran. Progress has been slow so far. What
can we expect from the upcoming meetings with Vice-President Gore and
high level Russians later this month?
Answer. Over the past several weeks, U.S. and Russian experts have
developed action plans aimed at curtailing cooperation by Russian
entities with Iran's missile and nuclear programs.
U.S. Special Ambassador Gallucci and Russian Space Agency head
Koptev agreed to a work plan that addresses some of our most pressing
concerns about missile proliferation, including development on a
priority basis of internal compliance offices at several entities of
concern.
We have offered technical assistance to help these entities set up
necessary export control regimes. The Russian government has made a
commitment to take effective measures to prohibit Iranian missile
specialists from operating in Russia and to facilitate the early
adoption of the Russian export control law.
This work plan could represent a path forward if the Russian
government acts effectively and quickly. We will continue to raise
missile and nuclear cooperation in our discussions with the Russian
side until all of our concerns are resolved.
Question. The Administration has stated clearly that they intend to
limit the Russians' ability to launch commercial satellites this year
if cooperation with Iran continues. How would you assess the
effectiveness of this tool for leverage versus the tool of 50% cut off
of U.S. assistance through the government?
Answer. There is no evidence that broad, general restrictions on
U.S. assistance to the Government of Russia have created effective
leverage on Russian policies. Rather, such restrictions cut off
assistance that is in U.S. national security interests.
The Administration supports creating incentives for Russian
entities to meet international nonproliferation standards and
imposition of specific, targeted and limited sanctions against those
entities for violating such standards. The Administration has informed
the Russian Government since January 1997 that we will be unable to
raise the current quota for launches of satellites to high earth orbit
until Russia halts cooperation with Iran's ballistic missile program.
The launch quota limitation would deprive the Russian space
industry of a sustainable stream of revenue, presently worth $70
million per launch. We believe the launch quota limitation gives
individuals and entities in the Russian aerospace sector a strong
incentive to halt these technology transfers.
Question. Large increases have been sought in the FY 2000 budget
for the Expanded Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Much of the
additional $242 requested is for Russia. Explain how these expanded
programs benefit U.S. security, and will this expansion help lessen
Russian Cooperation with Iran.
Answer. The Administration's proposed Expanded Threat Reduction
Initiative (ETRI) focuses on increasing U.S. national security, not
providing assistance to Russia. Current economic crisis in Russia and
other NIS prompted the development of ETRI as the best mechanism to
reduce the threat posed by residual Soviet weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) in Russia and the proliferation of WMD materials, technology and
expertise.
The FY00 request for the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative
(ETRI) overall in the NIS account is $241 million. Of this, $122
million is for ETRI activities in Russia, an increase of $97 million
over FY99 funding for these programs ($25 million). The increased
funding will allow us to maintain the substantial progress we have made
of the past seven years and to expand into some new areas where we have
assessed proliferation threats, such as security of biological
facilities and materials. Priority nonproliferation programs will
promote economic transition and infrastructure reforms while reducing
the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, weapons
delivery systems, materials, technology and scientific and technical
expertise. They include:
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and
U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF) programs to
provide thousands of former Soviet weapons scientists with civilian
research and development opportunities, business training and exchanges
in the U.S.;
U.S. Biotechnology Science Collaboration programs by the
Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and Health and Human Services (HHS)
to redirect former Soviet biological weapons expertise and facilities
to civilian commercial, agricultural and public health activities;
Equipment and training to strengthen Russian export control and
border security capabilities to stop weapons proliferation across
Russia's borders; and
Initial project development for ammunition disposal and force
relocation assistance to facilitate Russian troop withdrawal from
Moldova and Georgia.
Such cooperative U.S.-Russian projects provide an alternative for
Russian enterprises to cooperation with proliferant states, such as
Iran. Moreover, we have made it clear to Russian enterprises and
institutes engaged in these cooperative U.S.-Russian activities that
Russian entities that are found to be engaging in proliferation
activities will not participate in the benefits of U.S. assistance.
Increased investment in programs to redirect the expertise of
former WMD scientists helps keep those individuals out of the employ of
such states. There is no guarantee, even with expanded assistance, that
proliferation of weapons expertise will not occur. Nor is there are
expectation that U.S. assistance alone could support every former
Soviet weapons scientist. However, every weapons scientist who is
employed by such threat reduction programs is one less who may be
tempted by rogue states such as Iran to help them develop weapons of
mass destruction or delivery systems.
Question. Explain your plan to fund the removal of Russian military
bases from Moldova and Georgia with these funds. What does our money
pay for?
Answer. In addition to political obstacles, there are several
logistical problems that must be addressed in order to facilitate the
eventual removal of Russian forces from Moldova.
There are huge quantities of ammunition that must be moved or
destroyed. Much is old and unstable and there is a real threat of the
remaining ammunition being diverted to areas of conflict. There is
international interest in addressing this issue. The U.S. is prepared
to contribute to the cost of disposing of these munitions.
The FY2000 funding request includes $43 million for Military
Relocation assistance proposed as $3 million for Russia, $30 million
for Moldova and $10 million for Georgia. Funds would support project
development costs, including initial efforts by technical experts to
assess and identify bottlenecks to equipment removal, and the transport
and expedited removal or elimination of such equipment. U.S. funds may
be used to pay the costs of shipping this equipment by rail back to
Russia, or if the parties agree, to destroying some or all of it in
place.
Costs for complete disposal of Russian ammunition stocks in Moldova
and equipment removal in Georgia using U.S. environmental standards
would exceed the funding levels requested. The proposed level of
funding would give imeptus to international efforts aimed at
accelerating existing disposal efforts and support investigation into
alternative methods.
The Russian military faces chronic housing shortages in Russia and
bringing these forces out of Moldova will only exacerbate this problem.
While the U.S. is constrained from constructing housing for the Russian
military, we believe this is an area where some of our international
partners could play a useful role.
The Russian military will face similar problems in Georgia and we
and the international community should be prepared to provide similar
assistance at the appropriate time.
russia/iran--science centers
Question. Explain why the Science Centers program is anticipated to
increase from $21 million this year to $95 million in 2000.
Answer. The proliferation risk posed by the extensive former Soviet
weapons establishment is heightened by severe economic distress in
Russia and elsewhere among the NIS. THe original FY 2000 budget request
of $40 million was already a substantial increase over prior years, but
was formulated before the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia. The
anticipated increase in funding for the Science Centers will redress
serious gaps in our program coverage while allowing the U.S. to take
advantage of opportunities that have been cultivated.
Beginning with initial funding levels of $35 million for Russia and
Ukraine only, subsequent funding for the Science Centers program has
declined to levels of $14-18 million in FYs 1996, 1997 and 1998. These
budget had to cover greatly expanded program activity for Russia and
Ukraine, as well as in Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In addition, Congressional limitations on
overall funding to the Government of Russia resulted in a FY 1998
budget for Russia of only $4.2 million. Since the program began
operations in 1994, it has provided unprecedented access to and insight
about the extensive former Soviet weapons complex, in the context of a
fully cooperative and transparent effort among all participating
countries. We now have a much better understanding of the extent of the
overall proliferation threat, as we work with former Soviet facilities
and technologies that were unknown to us just a few years ago. In light
of current economic uncertainties in the NIS, it is imperative that we
fully engage the weapon science expertise that these countries have
inherited from the former Soviet Union.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Mr. Kingston
kedo
Question. First of all, I have to at least comment on the $20
million increase requested for KEDO. I'd like to associate myself
strongly with the comments of the chairman on this issue and repeat the
irony of North Korea's status as one of our leading foreign aid
recipients in Asia. I would just add that, in light of this massive
increase and our strong concerns about KEDO to begin with, I think it
may be time for this subcommittee to receive a separate, formal
briefing from DoD, IAEA, State, and whoever else is appropriate on
North Korea, its compliance with the terms of the Agreed Framework and
what exactly is going on underneath those North Korean mountains. I'll
put that suggestion before the chair and leave it open for any reaction
either of you may have.
Answer. The Administration has regularly briefed the staff of this
and other relevant Committees of the Congress. We would be happy to
arrange for a briefing for members of North Korea and the Agreed
Framework at a time of your convenience.
Regarding compliance with the Agreed Framework, the IAEA conducts
continuous, full-time inspections of the Yongbyon and Taechon nuclear
facilities and has determined that the DPRK is complying with the
nuclear freeze provisions of the Agreed Framework.
When the U.S. developed suspicions about certain underground
construction at Kumchang-ni, although we had no basis to conclude that
the DPRK was in violation of the Agreed Framework, we followed up
aggressively to demand that Pyongyang take steps to remove our
concerns.
After several months of intense negotiations, our negotiating team
concluded with the DPRK on March 16 an agreement for U.S. access to the
Kumchang-ni site. We are confident that this agreement, if fully
implemented, will provide a basis to remove completely our concerns
about the site.
The initial site visit will occur in mid-May, with a second visit
in May 2000 and subsequent visits upon U.S. request, as long as our
concerns about the site remain.
The Administration has briefed Committee staff on these
developments and will of course be prepared to brief you, in a setting
appropriate to the sensitivity of the information, on the outcome of
our visits to the Kumchang-ni site.
peru-ecuador peace agreement
Question. How will the requested $20 million in Economic Support
Funds for the Peru-Ecuador peace agreement be spent? Is that defined
yet? Is is simply intended as a trophy for resolving their border
dispute?
Answer. In October 1998, Ecuador and Peru signed a comprehensive
peace agreement that put an end to an often bloody, century-and-a-half
old conflict over demarcation of their border. The United States, as
one of the Guarantors of the 1942 Rio Protocol, which established the
framework for delimiting the border, invested considerable time,
effort, and resources in helping the parties to achieve this peace. To
make it acceptable to both sides, regardless of the final demarcation
of the border, the peace settlement was built on a series of
agreements, including a treaty of commerce and navigation and a
binational peace fund for border integration, designed to compensate
difficult political concessions with investments to stimulate growth
and improve living conditions in an area impoverished by years of
conflict.
The United States plans to provide $10 million each to Peru and
Ecuador in FY 2000 to help launch, under the border integration
agreement, a ten-year program Peru and Ecuador developed to strengthen
and integrate communities on either side of the border through improved
telephone service, oil pipelines, road construction, energy projects,
and other efforts to improve the lives of their citizens.
The Economic Support Funds (ESF) will aid successful implementation
of the peace settlement by helping to fund the border integration
program by, among other things, supporting micro-entrepreneurs,
strengthening local governments, improving health care, and helping to
create permanently demilitarized ``peace parks'' along the border to
enhance natural resource management. Specific projects for which U.S.
funding is proposed will be reviewed and approved by USAID and the
State Department. Other governments and international organizations,
including the Inter-American Development Bank, the Andean Development
Bank, and the World Bank, are also supporting this border integration
program with donations of their own.
environmental diplomacy
Question. I don't yet see exactly why you are requesting a new $15
million Environmental Diplomacy account. Is this a new account or is it
an earmark under ESF?
Answer. We are not requesting a new account. Rather, we are
proposing to use $15 million in ESF funds to carry out targeted
activities in response to three critical policy needs.
To encourage acceptance of the U.S. position in international
environmental negotiations, outside the normal negotiating venues such
as New York and Geneva, we will engage in activities that improve
international understanding of our positions and develop capacity
through regional workshops and training efforts. For example, program
funds will be used for workshops and related programs designed to
illustrate effective control strategies with regard to DDT and other
persistent organic pollutant chemicals in use in developing countries,
and to promote compliance, especially by developing countries, with
international environmental agreements.
To deal with transboundary environmental challenges that cannot be
addressed through either global or national efforts, we will promote
regional cooperation. For example, program funds will be used to assist
Russia in reducing air and water pollution in the Arctic. Environmental
diplomacy funds will also be used to sponsor regional conferences and
workshops with Southeast Asian governments (such as the Philippines,
Indonesia, Fiji) on the sustainable management and conservation of
coral reefs, including destructive fishing practices.
To address emerging environmental priorities we will use program
funds to determine the scope of the problem and to foster political
commitment and to develop international partnerships with the goal of
identifying courses of action.
Question. I understand your stated goal to encourage more
meaningful/substantive commitments from developing nations (such
commitments are missing in the Kyoto agreement) regarding reducing
various forms of pollution, but why do you propose pursuing this
outside of the regular State Department diplomatic process and budget
in CJS? Why are you requesting a new, separate account for diplomatic
purposes?
Answer. We are not requesting a new separate account in foreign
assistance for diplomatic purposes. We are proposing to use a small
portion of ESF ($15 million) to advance the broad range of
environmental challenges we face. Our proposal complements the ongoing
long-term developmental assistance agenda carried out by other U.S.
government agencies and institutions.
The Department would not normally request funds for this program
through the C-J-S appropriation, which typically funds Departmental
operating expenses such as USG salaries and expenses, official travel,
other support costs (e.g., computers and furniture), as well as
assessed contributions to international organizations.
Since environmental diplomacy resources will be used for programs,
projects, and activities in support of USG international environmental
objectives, it is more appropriate to request these funds from within
the foreign operations appropriation.
With regard to your reference on the Kyoto Protocol, we intend to
use a portion of these funds to advance existing commitments under the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change ratified by the United States
in 1992, such as reporting by developed and developing countries on
actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
no sweat shop initiative
Question. Along the same lines, why are you creating a new program
to provide grants to labor unions and business groups, for example, a
private sector labeling campaign? Human Rights observance in the
workplace and elsewhere is a fundamental diplomatic pursuit of State.
We should be pushing for these goals diplomatically, but why would we
create a new $5 million program to essentially contract responsibility
out to labor unions and other groups? It seems more appropriate to
support Kathy Lee Gifford's private sector labeling campaign
diplomatically than with a new multi-million dollar account.
Answer. The SUG has supported the Apparel Industry Partnership's
(AIP) private sector ``No Sweat'' initiative to eliminate unsafe,
unhealthy, or abusive labor conditions, particularly in foreign
factories that produce apparel goods for the American market. The AIP
approach is only the first step. We believe the new ``No Sweat''
initiative will enhance the work being done by the AP, and will
encourage more responsible corporate citizenship by U.S. companies
abroad. For this reason, the administration is proposing a broader-
based program that will go beyond what the AIP has been able to
accomplish.
Thus, the Administration's proposed $5 million ``No Sweat''
initiative is aimed at fostering the burgeoning effort to develop codes
of responsible conduct for all industries that produce for the U.S.
market. The proposed initiative would provide grants to labor unions,
business groups, and other NGO's that support and encourage monitoring/
labeling, ``Model Business Principles'' type programs in various
industries, both domestically and internationally, and worker's rights.
The ``No Sweat'' moniker is taken from the AIP's new Fair Labor
Association (FLA) program, which will award ``No Sweat'' labels to
companies in compliance with the AIP code of conduct. The FLA and other
similar groups will be candidates for support from this initiative.
The ``No Sweat'' initiative is one of the key components of the
Administration's international labor diplomacy agenda. It is very
important for the USG to be seen as taking the lead internationally in
promoting good working conditions, worker rights and core labor
standards worldwide. The ``No Sweat'' initiative allows the USG to
promote these core labor and human rights values by encouraging labor
unions, corporations and NGO's to form partnerships to achieve these
shared goals.
nonproliferation and disarmament fund
Question. What is the distinction between the goals/purpose of the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund versus the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program? Are there efforts closely coordinated
or simultaneously administered despite their separate funding streams?
Have or should our departments give thought to consolidating the NDF
and the CTR administratively if they aren't already? It could save some
administration duplication and cut some cost.
Answer. The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) is a small,
but highly flexible, program that supports primarily specific USG
diplomatic initiatives to prevent countries of concern from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction by permitting a rapid response to
unanticipated or unusually difficult, high-priority requirements or
opportunities worldwide. Its projects are often executed directly by
the Department of State or an American Embassy--thereby keeping policy
direction and execution closely linked.
The NDF currently has projects underway that affect over 70
countries. Both the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs and the Assistant Secretary for
Nonproliferation are personally involved in the approval of every NDF
project.
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is, by contrast, a
large DOD program that primarily assists the countries of the FSU in
the dismantlement of the extensive nuclear, chemical, and biological
arsenal left behind by the former Communist regime.
In those few cases where NDF and CTR have worked together,
cooperation has been close. For example, when the USG had an
opportunity to acquire and remove HEU from Georgia, State led the
negotiations and used the NDF to procure the sensitive materials, DOE
packaged the materials, and DOD/CTR provided security and transport.
NDF and CTR are sharply focused tools that permit the Departments
of State and Defense respectively to meet their national security
obligations. There is little overlap between the two programs and the
operating environments are very different. We believe consolidation of
these diverse functions would decrease the effectiveness, and
complicate administration, of both programs.
Submitted to the Department of Defense
Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman Callahan
foreign military training
Question. Do you have an estimate of the funding that is provided
through the foreign operations subcommittee for these activities,
through the IMET program and others?
Answer. Of the roughly $809 million in training (52,000-plus
activities) documented in the Military Training Report, 97% fell under
security assistance mechanisms funded through the foreign operations
subcommittee while the remaining 3% fell under DoD authorities. The
vast majority of the 97% was provided through the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) system, with financing from various sources including host
nation funds, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants, FMF loans, and
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) funds. IMET grants
accounted for about 6% of the $809M.
egypt arms deal
Question. We've just heard this morning that Defense Secretary
Cohen and the Egyptian government have reached an agreement on a new
arms package. Press reports have indicated that the total amount of the
deal would be $3.2 billion. Can you give us any details on this arms
sale?
Answer. The Clinton Administration agreed to Egypt's request for 24
additional F-16s and 200 additional M1A1 tanks and to provide pricing
and availability (P&A) data for Patriot PAC-3 missiles. The total
estimated price of the request is $3.035 billion. We have initiated
congressional notification for the 24 F-16s. The additional tanks and
Patriot missiles will require formal letters of request from Egypt.
Following the letters of request, a formal congressional notification
will take place.
Question. Would part or the entire sale be financed through the
Foreign Military Financing Program, or would this be a commercial
transaction?
Answer. The entire sale will be financed through the Foreign
Military Financing Program.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Mr. Forbes
security assistance policy
Question. Do you believe that Central Asia should be a priority for
security assistance, and what steps would you take to facilitate the
integration of the Central Asian states into an arrangement that would
be beneficial to NATO and the U.S.?
Answer. U.S. objectives in the New Independent States (NIS),
including Central Asia, include: (1) reducing the dangers associated
with weapons of mass destruction technologies, and preventing WMD
proliferation; (2) strengthening the sovereignty, independence, and
western orientation of the NIS; (3) encouraging the evolution of each
country's armed forces as a pillar of a democratic, free-market state;
and (4) promoting regional cooperation and participation in European
security systems.
Department of Defense engagement in Central Asia is heavily
dependent on security assistance programs to further our interests in
the areas of counterproliferation, defense reform, and regional
cooperation. Through these, and other defense and military contacts,
the DoD aims to develop close and lasting bilateral cooperation with
the defense establishments of Central Asia. We are, however, cognizant
that future defense cooperation could be jeopardized by a lack of
progress in the areas of democratization and respect for human rights.
Additionally, the Department promotes close cooperation between
Central Asia and NATO. The principal vehicle for this cooperation is
the Partnership for Peace (PFP). All Central Asian states but
Tajikistan are PFP partners, and Tajikistan has indicated that it will
join the program this year. A key source of Department support for PFP
participation is Warsaw Initiative funding, which includes a Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) component. Warsaw Initiative funds have been
critical to the development of the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion
(CENTRASBAT), which was formed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Uzbekistan and is focused on (1) fostering regional cooperation, (2)
developing NATO interoperability, and (3) developing peacekeeping
capabilities that meet international standards.
Question. Do you foresee a change is these activities (security
assistance) as more countries join NATO and the Chinese threat grows?
Answer. If and when NATO agrees to an additional enlargement, the
Defense Department will review the ramifications on our overall
security assistance policy. For now, the Defense Department has
recommended to the State Department that grant foreign military
assistance continue to the three newest NATO members (Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic) for several more years. We believe the aid
should continue at the modest levels of the past four years, during
which time the Warsaw Initiative provided an average of roughly $10-12M
per year per country. The military assistance would focus on increasing
the degree of NATO interoperability in areas such as C3, air defense,
logistics, and English language training.
The security assistance program in East Asia has been a critical
element of our regional engagement strategy, enabling us to build trust
and interoperability, improve the ability of our friends and allies in
the region to defend themselves, and enhance our ability to conduct
joint operations with regional partners. In so doing, the program has
played an important role in deterring agreesion and promoting regional
stability. We will continue to rely on security assistance as a means
of shaping events to promote and protect American interests and of
building a capacity in the region to respond decisively should there be
a threat to those interests.
Question. What countries constitute your major areas of activity at
the present?
Answer. The vast majority of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is
used to help the parties engaged in the Middle East peace process to
meet their legitimate security needs. This assistance supports the
long-standing U.S. policy goal of seeking a just, lasting and
comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. By helping
Israel maintain its qualitative edge, by facilitating the modernization
and readiness of Jordan's armed forces, and by fortifying Egypt's armed
and naval forces, FMF assistance enhances the overall stability and
security of these countries and advances U.S. regional stability
objectives. These regional objectives include checking the spread of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems; garnering
support for enforcing U.S. sanctions on Iraq, Iran, and Libya; and
facilitating U.S. access to the region in times of crisis.
FMF grants and loans also provide critical support to assist
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in taking the necessary steps
towards full integration with NATO, including meeting their Target
Force Goals. Funds provided under the PFP program help recipient
nations acquire the skills and equipment necessary to continue the
transition of their military institutions toward Western-oriented
doctrines, structures and operations, including democratic control of
the military.
Additionally, FY2000 FMF grant programs will:
Sustain Caribbean defense and maritime forces, allowing these
island nations to maintain small professional forces essential to
regional peace and security and to supporting U.S. objectives in the
region;
Support, in conjunction with Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) funds,
efforts by the African Crisis Response Initiative to improve and expand
the capabilities of African militaries to respond to limited peace and
humanitarian crises on the continent; and
Assist selected countries in improving their peacekeeping
capabilities with emphasis on communication systems and peacekeeping
education and training programs.
Question. Could you outline the Administration's policy on security
assistance from the perspective of DoD?
Answer. The security assistance program enables us to stay engaged
in the world and shape events to protect and promote American
interests. Enhancing the capabilities of our friends and allies to
address conflicts, humanitarian crises, and natural disasters makes it
less likely that American forces will be called upon to respond to
regional problems; it also limits their involvement when they are.
Additionally, the security assistance program ensures that when U.S.
forces are employed, foreign militaries can work with them more
efficiently and effectively rather than be hobbled by mismatched
equipment, communications, and doctrine.
Our continued engagement promotes the principles of democracy,
respect for human rights, and the rule of law. One of our most cost-
effective security assistance programs supporting this objective is
International Military Education and Training. IMET provides us with
access to the future leadership of foreign militaries and provides
foreign military and civilian defense personnel educational
opportunities at senior service staff colleges and technical training
in such areas as maintenance and aircraft engine repair. The IMET
program fosters military-to-military relations and promotes military
professionalism. These benefits are key to our gaining the cooperation
of others to provide access and to conduct joint operations, as well as
to improving the ability of our friends and allies to defend
themselves.
The vast majority of security assistance funding is in the Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) program. FMF supports U.S. regional security
goals by enabling key friends and allies to improve their defense
capabilities through financing acquisition of U.S. military articles,
services, and training. FMF promotes U.S. national security interests
by strengthening coalitions with friends and allies, cementing
cooperative bilateral foreign military relationships, and enhancing
interoperability with U.S. forces. Because FMF monies are used to
purchase U.S. military equipment, American workers and our industrial
base directly benefit from our security assistance program as well.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Mr. Kingston
kedo
Question. I would just add that, in light of this massive increase
and our strong concerns about KEDO to begin with, I think it may be
time for this subcommittee to receive a separate, formal briefing from
DoD, IAEA, State, and whoever else is appropriate on North Korea, its
compliance with the terms of the Agreed Framework and what exactly is
going on underneath those North Korean mountains. I'll put that
suggestion before the Chair and leave it open for any reaction of you
may have.
Answer. The Department of Defense believes that consultations and
briefings with the Appropriations Subcommittee on U.S. policies toward
North Korea, including the Agree Framework, contribute significantly to
achieving our security objectives on the Korean Peninsula. We would be
pleased to join other Administration agencies in meeting with the
Subcommittee on this important security challenge.
african crisis response initiative
Question. Will you tell us a little more about the status of the
ACRI? Has it participated in or conducted any actual peacekeeping or
interceding operations or is it still being formed and trained?
Answer. The program's long-term objective is to create an
interoperable African capacity of up to 12,000 military personnel
available for continental peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance
contingencies. To date, six African states have been the beneficiaries
of trained battalions: Ghana. Benin, Uganda, Mali, Malawi, and Senegal.
The program is scheduled to train a new battalion in Cote d'Ivoire
later this year. By all accounts, the training has been well received
and highly successful.
Under a mandate established by the Economic Community of western
African States (ECOWAS), Mali and Ghana have provided ACRI-trained
units as part of the ECOMOG peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone. Benin
provided ACRI-trained troops as part of an ECOWAS-approved force in
Guinea--Bissau. In both of the operations, the ACRI-trained soldiers
reportedly appear to have performed well.
Question. We have been providing funding for this initiative (ACRI)
for at least two years now. What assessments have you made thus far on
its impact versus its potential?
Answer. ACRI is a training initiative, not a standing military
force. Operational deployment of ACRI-trained troops is a sovereign
decision in response to a request from the United Nations, the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), or a sub-regional organization
such as ECOWAS. The recent open and transparent decisions of Mali and
Ghana to participate in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and of
Benin to participate in Guinea-Bissau clearly indicate the value of the
ACRI as a regional peace and security tool. The professionalism
displayed by these units proves that ACRI training is having a positive
impact.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Ms. Pelosi
imet for pakistan
Question. What is the Administration's position on whether IMET
training in Pakistan should continue in 2000?
Answer. The Department of Defense is keenly aware of the
sensitivities of this program with Congress. The Administration
continues to believe that IMET is an extremely cost-effective means of
building U.S. influence with the military forces of recipient countries
and of strengthening democratic civilian control of the military. This
is particularly important in Pakistan, where the armed forces are the
strongest national institution. In Pakistan's case, we have tailored
the program to restrict attendance to schools offering Professional
Military Education (PME) or Expanded IMET subjects. The U.S. Embassy in
Islamabad will screen all candidates to exclude any on whom we have
credible evidence of gross human rights abuses, drug trafficking,
corruption, participation in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, or
other activities not consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals. We look
forward to continuing this program in FY 2000.
military training report/jcet
Question. Why is all the JCET information classified?
Answer. The Special Operations Commands provided the JCET
information in classified form to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. In our effort to deliver the report to Congress in a
reasonably timely fashion, we did not have sufficient time to complete
a declassification review.
Subsequently, during the 23 March hearing on the Military Training
Report, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter B. Slocombe
provided the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
the JCET information in an unclassified form for all of the FY 98 and
first quarter FY99. Copies of the unclassified JCET information were
subsequently delivered to all other original recipients of the Training
Report.
Question. Much of the JCET activity has been publicly reported in
the press, particularly in the case of Indonesia. Can you comment on
future plans for JCET training?
Answer. All Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) activities for
Indonesia were suspended on May 8, 1998, and have not resumed. The
overall JCET program continues elsewhere and regional CINCs continue
planning for future JCETs as part of their normal training schedule.
Resumption of JCET activities in Indonesia will require approval of the
Secretary of Defense.
The FY99 Defense Authorization Act requires that the Secretary of
Defense provide prior approval for all activities conducted under the
authority of 10 U.S.C. 2011. The Secretary's decision to approve
proposed JCET events is predicated on the Embassy verifying that the
State Department does not possess credible information that members of
the units with whom DOD plans to train have committed gross human
rights violations. The Secretary's review and approval process also
looks closely at a host nation's internal stability as well as key
regional policy concerns.
Question. What is the foreign policy justification for it?
Answer. The Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program,
conducted under 10 U.S.C. 2011 authority, contributes significantly to
the Administration's foreign policy objectives. However, the primary
purpose of the JCET program is to train U.S. Special Operations Forces
(SOF) personnel thereby increasing overall U.S. military readiness.
U.S. regional CINCs rely on SOF to provide unconventional military
options for a wide variety of missions in theater. For example, Special
Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) at H.M. Camp Smith, Oahu, Hawaii
serves as the SOF component command for U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).
SOCPAC engagement focuses on organizing and training indigenous forces
in support of USPACOM's strategic objectives. U.S. SOF involved in
these activities enhance their foreign language and instruction skills,
expand their knowledge of foreign environments and cultures, and hone
their combat and combat support capabilities. Moreover, they improve
their capabilities to participate in humanitarian activities,
peacekeeping, non-combatant evacuations, and coalition operations.
U.S. military forces participating in JCET activities shape the
international security environment in ways that promote peace,
stability and human rights. Moreover, JCET events demonstrate American
military capabilities, underscore our continued commitment to regional
stability and to deterring potential aggressors, build trust and force
interoperability, and facilitate our access to a host nation's key
military personnel and support facilities. U.S. SOF gain valuable
training and overseas experience, which has proven critical to
maintaining and enhancing their special skills and readiness. In the
process, the interaction with foreign military counterparts afforded by
the JCET program provides an opportunity for U.S. forces to impart a
sense of military professionalism reflective of our nation's democratic
principles and traditions.
JCET activities clearly promote our foreign policy objectives as
they fulfill their primary purpose of increasing U.S. military
readiness. They improve a host nation's military skills and
professionalism, while promoting bilateral mil-to-mil dialogue.
Moreover, they are a principal means for DOD to develop and sustain
intelligent, experienced, and resourceful military personnel who have
the skills to interact successfully with foreign military organizations
and governments, U.S. country teams and non-government organizations.
Question. What role did it serve in Indonesia, is it still going on
there, and how does the extensive US role with the intelligence forces
and the Army square with the killing of civilians during the
disturbances?
Answer. JCETs have not been conducted in Indonesia since May 8,
1998.
Prior to this date, the primary purpose of Special Operations
Command Pacific (SOCPAC) Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)
activities in Indonesia was to train U.S. Special Operations Forces
(SOF) and maintain their highest possible level of readiness. U.S. SOF
involved in JCET events in Indonesia, under 10 U.S.C. 2011 authority,
enhanced their foreign language and instruction skills, expanded their
knowledge of Indonesian culture, and improved U.S. access to the
Indonesian military. They also had an opportunity to impart a sense of
military professionalism reflective of our nation's democratic
principles and traditions and enhance our bilateral mil-to-mil dialogue
with Indonesia.
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) relies on SOCPAC to provide
unconventional military options for a wide variety of in-theater
missions. In turn, USPACOM relies on JCETs to sharpen critical SOF
Mission Essential Task List skills, both at the unit and Joint levels.
JCET-trained U.S. SOF display the flexibility to adapt throughout
CINCPAC's vast area of responsibility and have the tactical precision
required for operations with far-reaching political consequences. The
JCET program in Indonesia contributed directly to USPACOM's strategic
goals of shaping the regional security environment and building a
capacity to respond effectively should there be a threat to American
interests in the region.
DoD policy, which was enacted into law in the FY99 Defense
Appropriations Act, prohibits U.S. troops from training foreign
security units whose members have committed gross violations of human
rights, ``unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.''
Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events provide a principal
means for U.S. military forces to impart to host nation security forces
a sense of military professionalism reflective of our nation's
democratic principles and traditions. During JCET activities, U.S.
forces emphasize the role the military must play in protecting and
promoting respect for human rights, both in conventional and
unconventional situations.
Question. To what extent should Congress be involved in decisions
to deploy US troops in a training capacity for JCET activities?
Answer. Congress has recently provided extensive guidance on Joint
Combined Exchange Training (JCET) activities. As amended, 10 U.S.C.
2011 Section 2011 requires that all training activities carried out
under its authority receive prior approval from the Secretary of
Defense. Section 8130 of the FY99 Defense Appropriations Act prohibits
DoD from using funds appropriated to train foreign security forces if
the State Department provides credible information that a member(s) of
the unit(s) DoD plans to train have committed gross human rights
violations, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.
Should the Secretary of Defense exercise the waiver authority granted
him by Section 8130, he must submit a detailed report within 15 days on
the purpose and duration of the training to be provided. Each of these
provisions ensures that the JCET program has appropriate senior
civilian oversight and is conducted in a manner consistent with U.S.
national security and foreign policy interests.
human rights vetting
Question. Are there different standards for vetting and why?
Answer. There is only one standard for vetting.
``Vetting'' is the process by which the available data on a host
nation's security forces, and members of such forces, is reviewed for
information on human rights violations. DoD does not conduct the
vetting process. ``Vetting'' is done by the relevant U.S. embassy and
starts when the host government identifies a security force or
individual(s) to receive U.S. training or equipment or to train with
U.S. forces. The overall process is the same from embassy to embassy,
although different ambassadors may establish particular internal
procedures or assign vetting responsibilities differently within their
respective country teams. Once an embassy has reviewed all available
human rights information, it provides the results to appropriate DoD
components.
As noted above, the evaluation of human rights information--through
the ``vetting'' process--is the same under all currently applicable
statutes. However, methods for addressing human rights problems that
may be identified during the vetting process differ slightly under sec.
568 of the FY99 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and sec. 8130 of
the FY99 Defense Appropriations Act. These two processes are described
in detail in Question 2.
Question. Describe both the DoD process and the Leahy provision
process.
Answer. As noted in Question 1, the human rights review or
``vetting'' process is the same for security assistance provided under
foreign operations authorities and for DoD-funded training. ``Vetting''
by the relevant U.S. embassy starts when the host government identifies
a security force or individual(s) to receive U.S. training or
equipment, or to train with U.S. forces. After reviewing all available
human rights information, the U.S. embassy provides the results to
appropriate DoD components.
If the Embassy determines that units or individuals selected for
U.S. training have committed gross human rights violations, one of two
processes will ensue.
Under sec. 568 of the FY99 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act,
the State Department will not dispense security assistance unless the
Secretary of State determines and reports to Congress that the host
government is taking effective measures to bring the perpetrators to
justice. If training funds are withheld pursuant to sec. 568, the
Secretary of State will inform the host government of the basis for the
decision and, ``to the maximum extent practicable,'' will assist the
host government in taking effective measures to bring those responsible
to justice. Until these actions are completed, security assistance may
not proceed.
Section 8130 of the FY99 Defense Appropriations Act enacted into
law existing policy that prohibits use of DoD funds to train foreign
security units whose members have committed gross violations of human
rights. If DoD receives credible information from the State Department
that foreign security forces or members of the unit(s) DoD was planning
to train have committed gross violations of human rights, the training
will not proceed unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.
``Corrective steps'' may include adjusting host nation participation,
either by training with security unit(s) not implicated in gross human
rights violations or by removing the identified human rights
violator(s) from the unit(s) to be trained. Once such corrective steps
have been taken, DoD may proceed with the training.
The Department will apply the ``corrective steps'' standard
carefully. DoD procedures require the U.S. ambassador to concur that
the corrective measures taken by host nation security forces are
adequate. In addition, all training conducted in the wake of such
corrective measures must be reported to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. These safeguards will ensure rigorous implementation of the
``corrective steps'' standard.
DoD policy, reflective of the standard set forth in sec. 8130 of
the FY99 Defense Appropriations Act, is appropriate for DoD-funded
training because the primary beneficiaries of combined training
activities often are U.S. military personnel and readiness. Moreover,
many of these training events strengthen important U.S. programs such
as humanitarian demining and counterdrug support. In all its engagement
activities, the U.S. military sets a high professional standard for
counterpart militaries, emphasizing respect for human rights and the
proper role of the military in a democracy.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
resources/dod
Question. How do you think the extent of foreign military training
has affected readiness?
Answer. The regional CINCs consistently place training among their
highest priorities to execute their regional engagement strategies.
They often rely on foreign military training to ensure the highest
possible level of military readiness.
Regional CINCs rely on Special Operations Forces (SOF) to provide
unconventional military options for a wide variety of in-theater
missions. In turn, the CINCs use foreign military training--whether
Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), humanitarian demining training
and counterdrug training--to sharpen critical SOF Mission Essential
Task List skills, both at the unit and Joint levels. U.S. forces
involved in these programs enhance their foreign language and
instruction skills, expand their knowledge of foreign environments and
cultures, hone their combat and combat support skills, and improve U.S.
access to key foreign military personnel and support facilities.
Foreign military training programs contribute directly to a CINC's
strategic goals of shaping the regional security environment and
building a capacity to respond effectively should there be a threat to
American interests in this area of responsibility.
Question. What is the rational for DoD funding of this vast foreign
training?
Answer. The DoD budget funded only a small portion of the total
training costs borne by the United States that are included in the
Military Training Report. Of the over 52,000 activities listed in the
Report, less than three percent fell under DoD authorities, including
activities executed under drawdown authorities which are funded by DoD.
The remaining 97 percent fell under security assistance mechanisms
(e.g., IMET, FMS). Of the $809 million in total training, IMET grants
accounted for about six percent and DoD authorities for about seven
percent, or $57 million. The balance, and by far the vast majority, was
provided through the Foreign Military Sales system, with financing from
various sources including host nation funds, Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) grants, FMF loans, and International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL) funds.
DoD-funded training provides the United States a high return on its
investment. In FY 1998, about $12.4 million funded Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET) activities conducted by Special Operations
Forces (SOF) under 10 U.S.C. 2011 authorities. The JCET program
produces superbly trained and highly qualified SOF who can implement
critical aspects of the CINCs' theater engagement strategies and
promote U.S. national security interests. The DoD-funded counterdrug
program develops host nation forces' capabilities to engage actively in
the counterdrug campaign. The humanitarian demining program develops
host nation capabilities to manage national demining centers, to locate
and destroy landmines, and to develop public information programs that
promote mine awareness.
school of the americas
Question. In the aftermath of the discovery of manuals used at the
School of the Americas, the DoD committed to improve the oversight of
the curriculum by issuing a directive on training programs meeting
human rights standards. Has that directive been issued? Provide a copy
of the directive for the record.
Answer. DoD took immediate corrective action when we discovered in
1991 that six instructional manuals the School of the Americas was
using contained 24 inappropriate statements. All of the manuals were
destroyed, with the exception of one set, which was set to the DoD
General Counsel's Office.
The School's Commandant has made promoting human rights awareness a
critical foundation of the School's mission. The School's formal
mission statement reads: ``Provide doctrinally sound, relevant military
education and training to the nations of Latin America, promote
democratic values and respect for human rights and foster cooperation
among multinational military forces.'' Eight hours of human rights
training is mandatory for each student attending the School.
Numerous internal and external reviews and inspections of the
School of the Americas have consistently noted a measurable improvement
in the School's awareness of and instruction in human rights. Several
organizations have provided oversight of the School's training
materials including the United States Army Infantry Center, the General
Accounting Office, the DoD Inspector General, the Department of the
Army Inspector General, the United States Army Training and Doctrine
Command, and U.S. Southern Command.
In light of the measures taken, no formal DoD directive on training
programs meeting human rights standards was required or issued, but DoD
did issue a policy memorandum requiring that all intelligence and
counterintelligence instruction of foreign nationals be consistent with
that given to U.S. military service members. This policy has been fully
implemented at the School.
Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense annually certifies that
instruction and training provided by the School of the Americas is
fully consistent with the training and doctrine imparted by DoD
institutions whose primary purpose is to train U.S. military personnel.
This pertains, in particular, to the observance of human rights.
Question. What steps have been taken to ensure that all curriculum
developers and instructors are aware of the directive and are complying
with it?
Answer. The School of the Americas is actively committed to
continued improvement in its human rights instruction. The School's
Commandant has made promoting human rights awareness a critical
foundation of the School's mission. The School's formal mission
statement reads: ``Provide doctrinally sound, relevant military
education and training to the nations of Latin America, promote
democratic values and respect for human rights and foster cooperation
among multinational military forces.''
All courses taught at the School must include a human rights
awareness component. Each course description that appears in the
School's catalog highlights human rights issues. Every instructor
receives a mandatory sixteen-hour block of human rights instruction as
part of the Instructor Training Course mandated by the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command. The latest annual training guidance,
issued by the School's Commandant in June 1998, explicitly states one
of the School's six goals is to ``Continue development of our Human
Rights Training Program and be recognized as the premier Human Rights
training institution in DoD.''
Question. Which IMET courses beyond expanded IMET contain a human
rights and/or civil military relations component?
Answer. Per se, there is no such thing as an IMET course. IMET is a
source of funding used to support the costs of training international
students in a wide variety of DoD-sponsored courses. With few
exceptions, almost all courses available to U.S. military students and
over 100 courses under expanded IMET (E-IMET) are available through
IMET funding. These courses of instruction fall into three broad
categories:
1. Professional Military Education includes command an staff
colleges, postgraduate education and other instruction directed toward
senior officers and mangers. Almost all of these courses include
education in human rights and or civil-military relations.
2. English language training is designed to ensure students achieve
prescribed levels of English proficiency needed to complete their
follow-up courses successfully. Topics of human rights and civil-
military relations are used throughout the English language curricula.
3. Traditional military training encompasses technical or general
skills, but does not include specific training in human rights or
civil-military relations. (Note: this category of training composes
only about 25% of IMET-funded programs.) These students are exposed to
U.S. values in human rights and civil-military relations through the
Informational Program.
The Informational Program (IP), a key component of the
international student's experience in the United States, encompasses a
variety of activities designed to enhance awareness and functional
understanding of human rights and the American democratic way of life.
This program is available to all international students and can be
financed through IMET, FMF, or country national funds.
The IP is designed to ensure that international students return to
their homelands with an understanding of the responsibilities
governments, militaries and citizens have to protect, preserve, and
respect the rights of every individual. IP activities can be powerful
tools for presenting U.S. institutional values to international
students. DSCA continues to work with the security assistance training
community to update and focus IP activities.
International Military Student Officers (IMSOs) must arrange
activities and events for international students that clearly support
at least one of the following areas of concentration. (1)
internationally recognized human rights, as outlined in the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights; (2) the democratic ideals of an elected
government and effective civil-military relations; (3) the roles and
interrelationships of a culturally, ethnically, economically, and
socially diverse population in a democratic society; and (4) the role
of the U.S. free enterprise system in a democratic society.
IMSOs arrange events that involve contact with a diversity of
groups that contribute to a vibrant civil society. These include
various groups such as civil rights, environmental preservation,
citizen tax review, anti-war and other organizations. Visits to and
briefings by these and other non-governmental organizations emphasize
how accountability in a democracy serves to preserve the human rights
and other freedoms of each citizen. IMSOs are required to complete
assessment reports for all IP events and to ensure that all students
complete evaluation forms. These forms are maintained on file.
Question. Provide an assessment of the performance of School of
Americas graduates during 1997 and 1998.
Answer. The U.S. Army School of the Americas graduated 946 foreign
and U.S. military students in 1997 and 778 students in 1998. These
graduates represented the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, the United
States, and Venezuela. Course offerings in 1997 and 1998 included the
following Expanded IMET courses: command and general staff officer
course, civil-military operations, and resource management. Other
course offerings included peace operations, counterdrug operations,
medical assistance, countermine operations, cadet leadership
development engineer, cadet leadership development logistics, battle
staff operations, joint operations, and NCO development.
The U.S. does not ``track'' foreign personnel after completing
their U.S. training. Formal tracking of graduates would be logistically
complex and costly--and perhaps impossible. The U.S., in all our
training activities could graduate over 30,000 foreign students in any
given year. Moreover, it is doubtful we could obtain the information
necessary for career-long tracking from foreign citizens who have no
continuing formal association with the U.S. government. Even if it were
feasible to collect this type of information, we do not believe it
would be worth the huge administrative burden, which would fall most
heavily on already stretched embassy staffs.
We do have some information about certain ``alumni'' who have
established and maintained informal relationships with U.S. personnel.
Graduates who have done well, often rising to very high positions in
their governments, frequently credit U.S. training as a key element in
their career development. Examples from Latin America include the
Minister of Defense of Venezuela; the Minister of National Defense of
Ecuador; and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Honduras.
There are sometimes reports of foreign officers charged with gross
violations of human rights or other misconduct who have attended U.S.
training at some point in their careers. We correctly condemn these
individuals, but their misconduct must not cast doubt on all recipients
who have received or may receive similar U.S. training.
Question. Were any graduates implicated in human rights abuses
during that time (1997 and 1998)? Provide the details of the violations
or alleged violations for the record.
Answer. The Department of Defense is not aware of any 1997 and 1998
graduate from the U.S. Army School of the Americas who has been
implicated in human rights abuses.
Question. Describe how many students were enrolled in the Human
Rights Train the Trainer course in 1998, and plans to offer it in 1999.
Answer. In fiscal year 1998, the U.S. Army School of the Americas
did not have any students who took the Human Rights Train the Trainer
Qualification course. This same course has been made available to Latin
American countries for fiscal year 1999, but there are currently no
students scheduled for enrollment at this time.
Question. What kind of ongoing, external oversight of the SOA
curriculum is exercised beyond that done by the Board of Visitors?
Provide for the record any recent relevant report by the Board of
Visitors, and reports from any other external oversight body.
Answer. Department of Defense and Department of the Army Inspectors
General have recently conducted detailed inspections of the School. The
DoD Inspector General conducted two inspections in 1997, while the Army
Inspector General conducted a follow-up inspection in 1998. Results of
these inspections point to a consistent improvement in human rights
training and instructional oversight. Additionally, the United States
Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) Human Rights Office has made numerous
visits to the School of the Americas to evaluate whether its human
rights training meets required standards, as well as to suggest
improvements and enhancements to the training. Also, representatives
for the Human Rights Office attend the School's quarterly Human Rights
Committee meetings to offer insight on curriculum content and focus. A
curriculum review team for USSOUTHCOM will again visit the School in
mid-April for a top-to-bottom review of the curriculum. A copy of the
DoD Inspector General's Report and inspection reports for the
USSOUTHCOM Human Rights Office are attached for the record; the interim
Army Inspector General's report will soon be available for final
release.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Mrs. Lowey
israel
Question. The U.S. has a vital national security interest in
keeping Israel stable and secure, and our military assistance to Israel
helps achieve that goal. In fact, the benefits of our military
assistance to Israel stretch far beyond the borders of that country.
Could you discuss how critical this aid is to the stability of the
entire region?
Answer. Providing Foreign Military Financing (FMF), not only to
Israel but also to Egypt and Jordan who have concluded peace treaties
with Israel, serves to build security, deter aggression, enhance
stability and set a strong example of the fruits of peace. Our military
assistance and R&D aid contributes directly to the development of
advanced defensive systems such as the ARROW ATBM and various counter-
terrorism systems, which contribute to regional stability in the face
of possible Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) aggression and terrorist
acts.
jordan
Question. How has our military assistance helped Jordan in this
capacity and how will the increase in military assistance requested in
the Administration's supplemental and regular FY 2000 proposals further
our goal of ensuring a stable and secure Jordan?
Answer. Our military assistance to Jordan since the 1994 peace
treaty with Israel has consisted of two major components--Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) and DoD drawdown. FMF from 1996 through 1999
was dedicated principally to the procurement of an F-16 squadron (16
aircraft), representing a major step in modernization of the Jordanian
Armed Forces and Jordan's largest procurement in nearly two decades.
Beginning with the supplemental request for Jordan in FY99 (which
includes $50M in FMF), we are working with Jordan to sustain and
selectively modernize its aging inventory of U.S.-origin military
equipment. Jordan has recently developed a five-year procurement plan
that has been carefully coordinated with the Department of Defense to
maximize both the utility of U.S. aid and the readiness of the
Jordanian military. The Jordanian plan is largely focused on upgrades
in anti-armor, ground mobility, and air defense. Although Jordan's
overall defense needs exceed what we expect to provide, we are
confident that our projected aid, if appropriated, will address the
most critical needs and will give Jordan a more capable deterrent
against aggression from Syria or Iraq.
DoD also has been directed to conduct three drawdowns of equipment
for Jordan ($100M in FY 96, $25M in FY 98, and $25M in FY 99). Although
drawdowns were initially a useful tool, the decline in DoD stocks has
severely restricted our ability to conduct further drawdowns without
impacting readiness. Additionally, drawdown equipment is typically old
and in poor condition; the burdens of maintaining it often outweigh the
benefits of having it. In short, DoD prefers not to conduct another
drawdown for Jordan after FY 99 and considers FMF as the most efficient
means of assistance.
egypt
Question. Can you please update us on the proposal to create an
interest bearing account and provide some rationale for it?
Answer. The Department of State, in conjunction with DSCA, drafted
language for Title III of the FY00 Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, which has been
included in the President's FY00 Budget submission to Congress. This
language authorizes the disbursement of up to $470 million of the total
Foreign Military Financing funds made available to Egypt under this Act
within 30 days of enactment of the Act or by October 31, whichever is
later. The $470 million represents the amount of funds required to be
on deposit to pay DOD contractors in the event of program termination.
Termination liability was chosen as the benchmark because these funds
are required to be on deposit should termination occur; but they are
not needed for disbursement unless termination does occur.
The IBA would be established, in the same manner as it is for
Israel, with the Federal Reserve Bank investing in non-marketable
foreign securities. Use of non-marketable foreign securities has no
impact on the U.S. Treasury balance. Interest will be paid to the
Government of Egypt interest-bearing account based on the amount of
principal placed in the account. Current estimates indicate that
interest earned would be $24 million per annum based on a principal of
$470 million.
The IBA will provide more program flexibility since the interest
earned will be treated, subject to certain limitations, as Egyptian
national funds. Currently, law and policy restrict the use of Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) for specific purposes. Interest funds, while
tightly controlled by the USG when earned with an FMF investment, will
allow under limited circumstances for the funding of defense items with
non-U.S. content; defense items for which DOD has no U.S. procurement
source; the lease of defense articles; and defense items that would
normally require an Arms Export Control Act (AECA) Section 42c
determination. Because the interest funds are earned with an FMF
investment and the use of FMF is restricted to specific purposes, the
interest earned should only be used for the above specified defense
purposes.
The Administration strongly supports this proposal. Creation of an
interest bearing account will accommodate our important strategic
partner in light of the proposed decreases in Economic Support Funds
and the increase in FMF for other countries in the region (mainly
Israel). This proposal will help maintain some funding parity among our
partners in the region.
Question. I know that the state of Egypt's economy is out of your
area of expertise, but I think it would be helpful for use to have an
analysis of Egypt's economic needs vs. its military needs.
Answer. Egypt's macroeconomic indicators have shown marked
improvement since the early 1990s. Last year, Egypt enjoyed a GDP
growth in excess of 5%, compared with 0.5% in 1992. Fiscal and monetary
discipline reduced annual inflation to 4% from 20% in 1991 and built up
Egypt's foreign exchange reserves to $20 billion--about 10 months of
goods and services import coverage. In addition, Cairo trimmed its
budget deficit from nearly 20% of GDP in 1991 to less than 1%
currently, but fiscal pressures will make this rate difficult to
maintain. Despite these generally positive signals, Cairo has been slow
to make the market-based reforms necessary to sustain future growth.
More far-reaching and consistent economic policy reforms would appear
to be necessary to attract foreign investment at levels that are
sufficient to provide jobs for Egypt's rapidly growing labor force.
As with many developing countries, Egypt's military plays a role
not only in defense of Egypt's border but also in providing internal
stability that allows for steady progress of economic and social
development. This stabilizing influence has been further enhanced as
personnel in the Egyptian Armed Forces have gained increased exposure
to U.S. culture and democratic ideals through training and interaction
with U.S. military and civilians resulting from Egypt's replacement of
its Soviet-era equipment with modern Western, primarily U.S.,
equipment.
Considering the total picture, our analysis is that diversion of
Egypt's military aid to economic aid would have little direct impact on
accelerating Egypt's economic development, which will depend on Cairo
undertaking additional market-based reforms. Such diversion, however,
would undermine its essential military modernization and thereby the
internal and regional stability upon which economic development is so
dependent.
Question. Perhaps you can let us know what increased military
threat Egypt is facing that justifies this request.
Answer. Egypt continues to face a security threat from Libya to its
west and Sudan to its south. However, the Administration's support for
creating an Egyptian interest bearing account does not hinge solely on
our concern about an increased military threat. Rather, an interest
bearing account would be a modest symbol of U.S. commitment to Egypt's
military modernization and recognition of the important role Egypt
plays in our military strategy in the Middle East and as a strong and
consistent advocate of peace and stability in the region.
military training report/jcet
Question. Can you justify your decision to classify the JCET
section?
Answer. The Special Operations Commands provided the JCET
information in classified form to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. In our effort to deliver the report to Congress in a
reasonably timely fashion, we did not have sufficient time to complete
a declassification review.
Subsequently, during the 23 March hearing on the Military Training
Report, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter B. Slocombe
provided the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
the JCET information in an unclassified form for all of the FY98 and
first quarter FY99. Copies of the unclassified JCET information were
subsequently delivered to all other original recipients of the Training
Report.
latin america
Question. Can you update us on the status of our policy with regard
to arms sales to Latin America?
Answer. Our policy for Latin America is consistent with U.S. policy
toward the rest of the world. In making case-by-case decisions on arms
transfers, our policy takes into account our overall goals of
restraint, strengthening democracy and civilian control of the
military, avoiding arms races and maintaining regional stability, as
well as the economic impact of any transfer and encouraging a focus on
economic and social development.
Some Latin American countries are addressing the need to modernize
their militaries, including institutions, strategies, force structures,
and replacement of obsolescing equipment. We have encouraged
democracies to professionalize their armed forces and engage in long-
term defense planning. Many currently have obsolete equipment that is
difficult and expensive to maintain, and must be replaced in the near
future. These modernization efforts enable militaries to meet the
requirements of changing missions within limited budgets and reinforce
the democratization process. The trend in security relations between
Latin American countries is toward greater cooperation, not
competition, and our ability to work with them on security matters has
facilitated this trend.
A significant goal of our policy is to ensure that defense
modernization occurs within reasonable economic constraints and with
restraint. As countries continue to review their budgets, missions, and
requirements, we are willing to work with them to meet legitimate
defense requirements, as we do for friends and allies worldwide.
We have seen no significant increase in requests from the Latin
American countries since we normalized our policy toward them, even
prior to the economic downturn. This region of the world has
historically spent less than other regions on its defensive needs, and
we expect this will continue to be the case, even with an improved
economy. The major sales of advanced weaponry currently pending in the
region are the possible sale of fighter aircraft to Chile and Brazil.
The Government of Chile is considering U.S. F-16 and F/A-18 fighter
aircraft, the Swedish Grippen, and the French Mirage. Brazil, while not
as far along in the process of replacing its antiquated fighter
aircraft, has requested technical data on the F-16 and F/A-18.
Argentina's modernization program has been very modest and has
consisted primarily of U.S.-origin Excess Defense Articles and used A-
4s purchased from the United States.
Tuesday, March 23, 1999.
MILITARY TRAINING REPORT
WITNESSES
WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
ERIC D. NEWSOM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY
AFFAIRS
Chairman Callahan's Opening Statement
Mr. Callahan. Thank you. This afternoon we are holding a
hearing on foreign military training. The focus of the hearing
will be the four-volume report issued to the committee on March
the 5th, by the administration, pursuant to Section 581 of our
1999 Foreign Operations Act. The report also included a
classified annex.
The report includes training that was conducted by the
Department of Defense during fiscal year 1998 and training
proposed for fiscal year 1999. It specifies 51,000 unclassified
training activities and 555 classified activities. The total
dollar value of this training approaches $1 billion, but most
of the training described in the report is provided as part of
foreign military sales or FMS purchased by foreign Governments.
These Governments use their own funds, in many cases, to
purchase goods and services from American companies. The U.S.
Government acts as their agent for these military sales and
associated training activities. Less than $50 million consists
of funds appropriated for the IMET program. The remaining 3
percent of the $1 billion consists of training appropriated
through the Defense Subcommittee. The military training under
the jurisdiction of our subcommittee is authorized in the
Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act.
Similarly, it is my understanding that military training
performed by DOD, using funds appropriated by the Defense
Subcommittee, is authorized, in part, by Title X of the United
States Code. Specifically, training by special operation
forces, the so-called JCETs program, is authorized by Section
2011 of Title X.
As recently as October 17, 1998, the authority for such
training was modified by the Congress through the Armed
Services Committee. This law also requires an annual report on
training by special forces. I am interested in ensuring proper
oversight over the foreign military training funded through
this subcommittee, and that is why I agreed to include Mrs.
Pelosi's amendment on training in the 1999 Appropriation Bill.
However, military training funded through the Defense
Subcommittee and authorized by the Armed Services Committee, is
the responsibility of those committees. Our subcommittee is the
proper venue for reviewing the programs and activities under
our jurisdiction, but I believe we have plenty to do without
trying to manage programs over which we have no funding
control.
Today, we are pleased to have Walt Slocombe, under
secretary of Defense for Policy, and Eric Newsom, assistant
secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, and we
welcome both of you. I urge you to summarize your statements so
members may have the opportunity to ask questions.
We will now see if Mrs. Pelosi has an opening statement.
Ms. Pelosi's Opening Statement
Ms. Pelosi. I do, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. I want
to begin by thanking you, Mr. Callahan, for agreeing to hold
this hearing on military training. We have invited our
colleagues from the Defense Subcommittee to the hearing, and I
do not know if they are coming. I talked to Chairman Lewis
earlier. He might be here, and I do not know about Mr. Murtha.
But I know Mr. Lewis has Intelligence Committee business right
now, as do I.
It is my hope that we can focus our discussion today on the
process by which Congress, and particularly this subcommittee,
is informed of decisions involving military training, which
have clear foreign policy implications.
I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses, Mr.
Chairman, Secretary Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, and Secretary Newsom, the Assistant Secretary of State
for Political-Military Affairs. Welcome, gentlemen.
The issue of military training was discussed at some length
recently at our security assistance hearing. Because our
witnesses today are different witnesses, I want to make some of
the points I made then and take the discussion into further
detail.
There is no doubt that the Defense Department has the
authority to conduct foreign military training with their own
funds. The theoretical justification for these authorities is
that the training activity benefits U.S. military readiness.
Mr. Slocombe's prepared statement also recognizes that,
``Engaging foreign military establishments through a variety of
training programs strongly supports U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests.''
The reality is that the growth in the breadth and scope of
these activities has made military training a foreign policy
tool. Congress does have input and has acted in the past in the
instance of, for example, the School of the Americas, to
prohibit or restrict foreign military training. It is the other
forms of training into which Congress has little or no input
about which I am concerned.
The report, recently submitted, indicates that $800 million
has been spent by DOD during the period covered by the report
on 52,000--you referenced this, Mr. Chairman--different
training activities. Of that amount, only $100 million spent
for the IMET program has come under the direct review of this
subcommittee. Although DOD has indicated that the vast majority
of the remaining $700 million is funded through FMS or
commercial means and that the majority of training deployments
do not affect OP TEMPO, it is impossible to distinguish from
the information contained in the report.
The real issue for us today is whether Congress is
adequately informed of DOD's decisions to deploy U.S. forces in
training situations with clear foreign policy impacts. The
reports submitted to Congress about those training activities
are all structured as after-the-fact reporting of training
deployments that have already taken place. In addition, the
requirements imposed by the Defense Authorization Bill, as far
as I know--correct me if this is not correct--only require
internal DOD and State approval in JCET deployments.
I intend, today, to discuss with you the appropriate role
Congress should play in deciding on the scope and purpose of
these deployments in cases where there are clear foreign policy
implications. With all due respect to our colleagues on the
Armed Services Committee, and I am glad to see our colleague,
Mr. Lewis, from the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I
believe Congress should be given enough information about these
deployments before they take place so the rationale and
judgments about their foreign policy implications can be made.
There are obvious and clear benefits that our Special
Forces derive from these deployments. Their job is to be ready
to respond to the full spectrum of crises that face them in an
uncertain future. However, when those training activities
overlap with foreign policy, Congress, and this subcommittee
specifically, has a right to be fully informed and consulted. I
intend to pursue these issues in my questions and to use
specific country examples to illustrate the dilemma which I
have outlined. I look forward and, again, welcome our
distinguished witnesses today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you. Chairman Lewis is a member of our
subcommittee, but he is also chairman of the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee. As a result, Jerry, since most of
the areas that we are talking about today include more of your
monies than ours here on Foreign Operations, we welcome you to
give an opening statement before we hear from the Secretaries.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have an
opening statement. I just might mention, however, that it has
been a while since I have really focused upon these issues in-
depth. But something like 90 percent of the actual expenditures
for such training is associated with foreign military sales,
and that is a very, very significant item. Within the remaining
10 percent, a significant piece of the remainder falls in my
bill.
But as we move forward to questions, I will be pleased to
be able to participate.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you.
Ms. Pelosi. Mr. Chairman, if I may?
Mr. Callahan. Yes?
Ms. Pelosi. Was there some constraint on time for our
witnesses?
Mr. Callahan. I understand they have 9 meetings they have
to go to----
Mr. Newsom. Not me, but----
Ms. Pelosi. I just wanted our colleagues to know that.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Slocombe.
Mr. Slocombe's Opening Statement
Mr. Slocombe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Pelosi, Mr.
Lewis.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here, and I apologize
that because of the situation in Kosovo, which is coming to a
head, there is a 4 o'clock White House meeting. I have got to
get back to the building to be in a secure teleconference. Bob
Keltz, who is the deputy director of the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency, will be here and is fully informed as to
all of these issues.
I have a couple of, so-to-speak, administrative points.
First of all, we were asked to reproduce the Military Training
Report in a CD-ROM version. And while I doubt if it will get an
award for the best record of the year, it is available here
today.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you.
Mr. Slocombe. Second, there was a question about
classification. The ``S.O.F.'' community tends to classify all
of its activities, and we asked them to review the material for
the S.O.F.-run programs which have already happened. That
information has all been declassified, so that the fiscal year
1998 and the first quarter of fiscal year 1999 material has
been declassified, and that is available here today.
I just want to make one point about the scale of activities
here. As I think you said, Mr. Chairman, the total cost of
training in the reports, if you add up all of the activities,
is just over $800 million. Because of combining fiscal year
1998 and the first quarter of fiscal year 1999, which is
already completed, and three-quarters of fiscal year 1999,
which is still prospective, that total number, in spite of
being in, I think, nine significant figures in the
calculations, is very much an approximation because the
programs are still ongoing.
So if you take those numbers, the great majority of it, as
you said, Mr. Lewis, well over 90 percent, comes through either
IMET or the Foreign Military Sales program or States'
International Narcotics program, all of which is through the
money appropriated in the 150 account.
It is also, I think, significant that the great majority--
since we submitted the statement, we actually were able to run
the numbers more accurately: I said 75 percent in the statement
to be safe, but it turns out to be 87 percent--is accounted for
by NATO countries, by our Gulf Cooperation Council partners in
the Gulf, by our Middle East peace process partners--Egypt,
Israel and Jordan--and by traditional allies like Japan, the
Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and
Thailand. And that accounts for 87 percent of the total dollars
attributed in the report.
In the statement I go through the rationale for these
activities and answer some specific questions. I want to make
one additional point, which actually came to our attention in
the course of doing the S.O.F. declassification, which is that,
by administrative error, the Africa Crisis Response Initiative
activities were inadvertently omitted. We have the data in
electronic form, and we are formatting it. We will have it for
the subcommittee by the end of the week.
Just to summarize, our foreign military training programs
serve our national policy. They are closely coordinated with
the State Department and with the relevant U.S. embassies. We
comply with all requirements and statutes, and we do our best
to follow less formal guidance on congressional intent, as
contained in legislative history and other sources.
If an activity occurs, that is contrary to law or contrary
to policy, we do our best to identify the problem and fix it as
rapidly as possible. We are not attempting to evade any laws
with respect to the training of foreign military forces. On the
contrary, we deal with these issues in our reports to the
Congress, with respect to the congressional oversight function,
both through the two appropriations subcommittees and through
the authorizing committees.
We are happy to provide additional information, as
requested, to increase confidence in the transparency of our
activities. And consistent with normal security practices, we
will provide that in unclassified form wherever possible.
I just want to repeat the point that the underlying
training in the engagement programs, which are reported in
these four thick volumes, are very important to our military,
our foreign policy and our national security interests. The
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Empire in
Central and Eastern Europe, democratic reforms in Central and
South America, as well as in Southern Africa, have provided
opportunities for which we waited for decades. In these and
other regions, we want the military establishments to be forces
for stability at home and potential coalition partners with us
abroad.
The activities described in the report represent a major
investment toward those objectives. It is an investment that
the subcommittee is familiar with because the great bulk of it
comes through activities within the jurisdiction of this
subcommittee, and it is an investment, particularly with
respect to IMET and FMF, for which we recognize and appreciate
this subcommittee's support. It is an investment we think pays
off well now and in the future, and I look forward to the
opportunity to answer specific questions.
My full statement, I assume, will be included in the
record.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Callahan. Your statement will be submitted and accepted
for the record.
Mr. Newsom.
Mr. Newsom. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Pelosi, Mr.
Lewis, Mr. Jackson. It is a pleasure to be here before this
subcommittee. I will make a few brief remarks----
Mr. Callahan. Mrs. Kilpatrick.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Kilpatrick.
Mr. Newsom. Oh, sorry. Mrs. Kilpatrick.
Mr. Newsom's Opening Statement
I would like to submit my full statement for the record.
I am pleased to join Under Secretary Slocombe today to
discuss this joint report to Congress on foreign military
training.
The Department of State provides the overall policy
direction for a wide variety of Government activities, such as
military training, which directly and indirectly support our
foreign policy goals. We take this responsibility very
seriously as we work with our colleagues in the Department of
Defense on the conduct of foreign military training.
We welcome the opportunity to discuss any questions or
concerns you may have regarding military training and share
your interest in maintaining a close relationship between us in
guiding these programs.
We view the thousands of training activities listed in this
report as important tools of U.S. foreign policy. The
activities funded through the foreign operations appropriation
are explicitly intended to advance the foreign policy
objectives of the United States. Fundamentally, this includes
encouraging democracy, improving human rights and promoting
regional stability.
These activities are a useful venue for strengthening
bilateral ties, promoting greater understanding of American
values and doctrine and demonstrating the United States is a
worthy and valuable ally. It is through strong military-to-
military interaction in peacetime that coalition members and
allies are made in wartime.
On the other hand, the activities conducted by the
Department of Defense, with its own appropriations, are largely
intended to provide U.S. military units with training they need
to fulfill their wartime and peacetime tasks. But even as they
meet these needs, these DOD programs also contribute to our
bilateral and regional policy objectives. Thus, regardless of
the funding source, both State and Defense are fully cognizant
of the degree to which these activities make important long-
lasting contributions to U.S. national objectives.
Let me just briefly outline to you how the State Department
participates in the policy review process to ensure that there
is policy oversight over all of the activities, including those
of the Defense Department.
Both the Department of Defense and the Department of State
has a process at a variety of levels to review military
training conducted for international personnel. This process
ensures that training activities are in support and consistent
with overall U.S. policy.
The theater commanders in chief, or the CINCs, and their
staff start the approval process by formulating annual plans
for their areas of responsibility. The CINCs and their staffs
are in frequent contact with the U.S. embassy to clarify issues
that impact foreign policy and training activities. The CINCs
also benefit from having political advisers from the State
Department, experienced senior foreign service officers, on
their staffs.
The CINCs present their annual training and exercise plans
to the respective U.S. embassies, where it is reviewed by the
ambassador and the country team. If there are questionable
cases, our embassies refer the issue to the Department of State
and DOD for further guidance.
As training events draw closer and details are finalized,
the unified command, again, clears the activity with the
embassy to ensure that there are no new circumstances which
could make the activity inconsistent with our bilateral and
regional policy objectives.
While this procedure has generally been satisfactory, we
are continuing to try to improve it, especially in countries
where military training is sensitive. And greater scrutiny has
resulted in cases where training exercises have been canceled
or revised.
However, we are finding it is not always easy to determine
which units or individuals were involved in abuses, especially
in countries with weak judiciaries and poor record
accountability. Our embassies are redoubling their efforts to
record abuses to ensure that inappropriate personnel are not
involved in our training programs and that training for
qualified units is not delayed.
The great majority of training activities overseas do not
raise human rights-related concerns and do not require vetting
beyond that provided by the embassy country team. We are keenly
aware, however, that troubled human rights records of security
forces in some countries require especially close scrutiny,
both locally by the embassy and back at the department level
here in Washington. For example, allegations of human rights
abuses in Indonesia resulted in cancellation of the JCET
program there in May of 1998. Currently, U.S. military training
with Indonesia military is limited to a small program of
humanitarian, engineering and medical activities. In addition,
a mobile team will provide training and human rights awareness
in civil military relations.
In the case of Colombia, all individuals or units selected
to receive training are carefully vetted by the embassy for
criminal, human rights or narcotics violations. Through a 1997
End-Use Monitoring agreement with the Government of Colombia,
we review indigenous sources of information; that is, criminal
records, and then double-check them against U.S. Government
records before training is approved.
In Turkey, the different elements of the U.S. mission in
Ankara coordinate to ensure that no U.S. Government security
assistance, which in this case is primarily IMET and counter-
narcotics assistance, goes to security forces involved in human
rights violations. We have seen something of an improvement in
human rights performance of the armed forces in recent years,
and we think that is, at least in some part, due to mandatory
human rights training for both officers and noncommissioned
officers of the Turkish armed forces.
However, human rights problems continue in parts of the
Turkish police, in particular, which led us last year to
restrict Ex-Im funding of a U.S. sale of armored vehicles to
the Turkish police.
In closing, I want to reiterate that foreign policy and
military training are mutually reinforcing. Foreign training
activities are investments that we believe reap significant
dividends in the long run. We are constantly trying to improve
our review process at multiple levels, both in the field and in
Washington, to ensure that we are getting the most from our
training activities.
Overall, the benefits derived from training activities have
generated good will, promoted regional stability and improved
interoperability with non-U.S. military forces, and we will
work to continue to ensure that this type of training
contributes to our diplomatic goals and is consistent with our
overall foreign policy objectives, including advancement of
human rights.
I thank the members of the committee for the opportunity to
address you on this report and will be glad to try to answer
any of your questions.
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foreign military training
Mr. Callahan. Thank you both for testifying. I may be
unique in Congress, but I agree with you that the monies you
use for foreign military training is a tool of the State
Department to promote our activities worldwide, and I think
that's the way it should be. I know that some, probably Nancy,
would totally disagree with that, or at least partially
disagree with that.
The coalition training, from a military aspect, I think is
absolutely necessary. If we are going to depend upon these
countries to be our allies, we must have some type of coalition
training in order to fight side by side with them should that
necessity ever occur.
I agree with it, but there are some who question whether or
not, as a result of some of this training, there were human
rights abuses. I imagine in the past there's pretty significant
evidence that is true. But I can't find it anywhere today. And
we cannot go back and correct sins of the past. We can only
insist that this type of abuse or the training that creates
this type of abuse be on the backs of the United States
taxpayers.
So I agree with Nancy's concerns about abuses, and I do not
disagree that history probably proves her correct. But I do not
see any evidence, including visits by my staff at my insistence
to some of these facilities, some of the IMET training
facilities, some of the School of Americas Activities to make
absolutely certain that there are no classes taught that teach
people how to torture people, and we have found no evidence in
the last couple of years of any real existence or abuse of the
of human rights that we share Nancy's concern.
sandia nuclear lab
I guess one question, Secretary Slocombe, the Chinese
situation. Recent reports that members of the Chinese military
and defense ministry continue to engage in exchange activities
and contacts with the military. We have seen press reports that
members of the Chinese military were engaged in some 80
activities in the United States in 1999, including a visit to
the Sandia Nuclear Laboratory in New Mexico. In addition,
members of the Chinese military may be observing airborne and
infantry training exercises.
Number one, are these reports true? And in light of the
serious allegations about spying by China at our nuclear and
military facilities, do you believe this is in the best
interest of our national security? And, finally, have members
of our armed forces, objected to these visits?
Mr. Slocombe. Mr. Chairman, we believe that the military-
to-military contact program with China serves our interests.
Needless to say, none of it involves training, in any sense of
the term, for any of the activities which were of the subject
of the reports.
The Chinese army is a major factor in China, and that's
simply a fact that we have to live with. How that society
develops in the coming years will be determined, at least in
part, by the attitudes of the Chinese military. It is an
extraordinarily insular institution. We are struck by the
number of senior visiting Chinese officers who, except maybe
for a trip to Moscow or to Pyongyang or Hanoi in the old days,
have never been outside China. And we believe, very strongly,
that contact with the outside world and particularly with the
United States military, is in our interest.
First of all, I think they understand how good we are when
they see us. Sometimes they actually tell us that in so many
words; that they realize not just the sort of nice things about
the American military, but also its extraordinary effectiveness
and, in a sense, how far behind they are relative to us. That
is not a bad message to get across.
They also realize something about how the military operates
in a democratic, constitutionally-run society, where the rule
of law applies. I want to come to a couple of specifics. But
all of that said, we apply very careful security standards to
any visits. And we also apply something that goes beyond the
security standards--we also apply a reciprocity standard. We
want to make sure that when our military people go to China, I
do not think the Chinese show us anything that they do not
intend us to see and, quite frankly, we do not show the Chinese
anything that we do not intend them to see, but we also want to
make sure there is a reasonable balance. And we have had some
important progress.
For example, when Secretary Cohen was there about a year
ago, we went to the Air Defense Command Center for the Bejing
military region, which is the first time a foreigner, at least
an American, has ever been allowed to visit, and it included an
entourage of American military officials.
Let me just briefly respond on the two points. One, the so-
called visit to the Sandia Nuclear laboratory. Foreigners are
regularly invited to visit Sandia a part of their tours. It
happens to be at Sandia, but it is a chemical weapons
verification center, where we are trying to work with countries
that are participants in the Chemical Weapons Convention on
means of verifying the treaty. It has nothing to do with
nuclear activity directly.
On the airborne and infantry training exercises, it is
certainly the case that periodically Chinese visitors, like
visitors from lots of other countries, are taken to see our
training activities. We are very careful to make sure that, in
terms of anything we show as part of those activities, it meets
security standards. We are aware of the possibility of
activities that are not within the purposes of the visit, and
if we believe a danger of unauthorized activities exists we
modify the visit or do not do it.
My basic message is this is a program which it is very much
in our interest to continue, but we do it very conscious of
some of the potential security problems that are involved.
Mr. Callahan. Mrs. Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As the Secretary said,
this is not the subject of today's meeting, but I did want to
make the point that Congressman Visclosky, the Ranking Member
on Energy and Water, and I sent a letter to Mr. Richardson in
November asking, when he was newly appointed Secretary, to send
us a list of all Chinese who have visited the national lab
since January of 1993. We have not heard back, and we keep
calling to see when we are going to get a response to that
letter, because it is an issue of major concern to us about
this accessibility.
I had particular concerns because I know that the
administration had looked the other way on visits of diplomats
to Silicon Valley beyond the range that they are allowed to go
in the San Francisco Bay area, and Mr. Visclosky had some
concerns about the openness of our labs.
But to get to the point of today's hearing. I am so glad
you asked that question on your time. Mr. Chairman, you and I
are not that far apart. I was listening to what you said. As I
said in my statement, there is no doubt that the Defense
Department has the authority to conduct foreign military
training with their own funds. I am concerned that I think the
real issue for us today, as I said, is, is Congress adequately
informed of DOD's decisions to deploy U.S. forces in training
situations with clear policy impacts. You said you think they
should be doing this, and we agree that they have the authority
to do it, and there are opportunities in our national interests
to do so.
Mr. Callahan. But, in addition, we can only fund what is
authorized.
human rights
Ms. Pelosi. I understand that. But in addition to that, you
said we do not use taxpayers' money associated with these
violations of human rights, and that really is the point;
Guatemala, Indonesia, Colombia, other places, where we have
serious questions about how the decisions were made on the
rest, but we have to protect how the taxpayers' dollar is used.
The taxpayers do not think that our money is being used to
train the Kopassus to teach sniper shooting, and kidnapping and
all of the rest of it in Indonesia. Kopassus was a major
embarrassment for the United States. It is likely that they
were responsible for the recent round of kidnappings last year,
and the exercises were suspended because of these revelations,
I believe. I do not remember Congress being informed that they
were suspended but, nonetheless, they were suspended, but
springing from the behavior of people that we were training.
imet
So this is not about saying, no, there is no case for
military training. I, myself, have cooperated with the
Administration on introducing IMET for one year in Pakistan
because we want to give it a chance to see if we can develop
these relationships with the Pakistani army, which has an
important role in Pakistani society.
But we hear over and over again that we have to establish
these relationships, and they pay off for the U.S. You know, we
certainly have a long list of names starting with D'Aubuisson
from El Salvador, who went to the School of the Americas. Can
you tell us the names of any of the people whom we have
benefitted by this training who then emerged as leaders in
their country and accrue to our benefit for having trained
them?
I mean, we know the bad list. Do you know the names of any
on the good list?
Mr. Slocombe. I am not sure I can remember the names. But I
know it is my experience that as you travel around,
particularly, in--I have just been handed the list. [Laughter.]
Mr. Slocombe. Not names, but titles.
Ms. Pelosi. Names? Do you have names?
Mr. Slocombe. Well, the first is the king of Jordan.
Ms. Pelosi. Well, I hope you are taking my question
seriously.
Mr. Slocombe. I am taking it seriously. What I am struck by
is the value we get out of having foreign military officers who
have spent a significant period of time, preferably in the
United States, in an IMET funded course or something like that
or in an FMF-funded course or a course funded by domestic or
national funds.
They know the United States, they know something about how
the United States operates as a society and how the United
States military operates. Just to give you an example of some
of the most senior, the king and prime minister of Jordan are
both IMET graduates, the chief of the Czech air force, the
minister of defense of Venezuela, the chief of the armed forces
of Latvia, the Secretary of State--that's roughly my
equivalent--for Defense for Romania, the deputy commander of
the Botswana defense force, the minister of national defense in
Ecuador, the director of the Strategic Defense Institute in the
Slovak Republic, the commander in chief of the Honduran armed
forces, the commander of the Djiboutian armed forces, commander
in chief of the Bahrainian defense force, the deputy secretary
of Defense of Kenya. And this is a list of very senior people.
I believe there are undoubtedly exceptions.
Ms. Pelosi. Well, and that is what we are trying to get at
today. I mean, with all due respect to that list, it is not
exactly what I would call a strategic one. But nonetheless, it
is a list----
Mr. Slocombe. Why is it not strategic?
colombia
Ms. Pelosi. You did not address any of the countries where
we have the concerns; Guatemala, Indonesia, Colombia, countries
like that. If I may go into a country, the subcommittee spent
considerable time discussing the deployment of U.S. special
forces to Colombia to train a counternarcotics battalion of the
Colombian army at our recent security assistance hearing. We
spent time on this.
This is an instance where decisions have been made by the
Administration which have overwhelming foreign policy
implications in which Congress has no role. In addition to this
program, the report before us shows a significant amount spent
for both IMET and other security assistance training which we
expect in conjunction with our counternarcotics program.
However, the report also indicates that in 1998 nine
different JCET deployments occurred training 450 Colombian
personnel at a cost of $1.2 million. In 1999, 25 different JCET
deployments are planned costing over $3 million, benefitting
well over 1,000 different personnel for all branches of the
Colombia military, as well as the police.
What benefits do U.S. troops gain from this level of
engagement in one country? Further to that, because I know your
time is short, in our prior hearing, the DOD witness indicated
the decision to train this battalion had not been finalized,
and this somehow justified the lack of Congressional
consultation.
Since the first deployment of our trainers is expected as
soon as April, can you indicate the status of our policy and
indicate when, if at all, Congress will be consulted?
Can you explain how the deployment of 20 U.S. special
forces for 90 days to one location in Colombia to provide basic
training to Colombian army recruits will benefit the readiness
of the U.S. armed forces? There are no resources budgeted to
equip this counternarcotics battalion, to my knowledge, from
our budget. Clearly, the Colombians expect this unit to have
modern equipment and to have air mobile capability. Where are
the resources going to come from?
Explain the different standards used to vet Colombian
personnel receiving training from U.S. sources. My concern
about Colombia, as you know, there has much been written about
it, and we all know we do not believe everything we read in the
paper, but as you know, beginning in 1994, Congress required
the Clinton administration to verify that U.S. military
assistance would go only to troops that primarily carried out
anti-drug operations.
In March 1996, the Administration reacted to evidence that
President Samper had taken money from the Cali traffickers by
cutting off almost all American aid to Colombia except what was
designated to fight drugs, a step known as decertification.
Yet, according to many officials, the Pentagon quietly
distinguished itself by finding creative ways around the
restrictions. ``We refuse to disengage,'' said a Pentagon
official. So this is why I hope you understand why these
concerns arise; Kopassus in Indonesia, the record that the
President apologized for in Guatemala and this situation in
Colombia, to name three.
Mr. Slocombe. That is a lot of questions. Let me----
Ms. Pelosi. I know, but I had to get them all in because
you have to go. [Laughter.]
Mr. Slocombe. Let me try to start. First of all, if there
was ever a case where there has been discussion with the
Congress about a specific program, it is true of the Colombia
drug battalion. That program was the primary topic, or among
the topics of discussions at at least five briefings for staffs
of a whole range of committees, including the staff of this
committee, where the Department of State is in the lead.
The training of the Colombian counterdrug battalion is a
matter distinct from the JCET issue. The reason that we do
JCETs in the Department of Defense is that one of the critical
capabilities of the Special Operations Forces is to be able to
go and work with the militaries of a whole range of countries
around the world. And the primary purpose, and the standard by
which we decide when to do JCETs, is what are the requirements
that the SOCOM establishes and the regional special operations
commands establishes for training our people with these
responsibilities.
They get opportunity to practice their language skills.
They get an opportunity to do what they would be doing in a
combat or, for that matter, a peacekeeping or peace support
situation.
The benefits to the American personnel I think are
straightforward and those are they. In Colombia, the fact is
that we have a very major drug problem, and we are trying to
work with the Colombian military and law enforcement people to
deal with that problem. We are trying to do it in a way which
keeps us clearly distinct from the counterinsurgency effort, a
distinction which is occasionally difficult to draw because the
counterinsurgency effort is heavily involved with the drug
lords. I do not mean to equate them, but there are some funny
alliances in that part of the world.
Congress, just last year, enacted special legislation
authorizing special programs with Colombia and also with Peru.
We have authority under the general authority we have for
counterdrug programs for these activities. I think that the
work we do in Colombia is an example of the situation where
there are real problems, and no one disputes that--even the
Colombians, for that matter, do not dispute--where that country
needs to improve its adherence to standards of conduct in their
counterinsurgency operations. But it is also a country where we
have a strong interest in a vigorous counterdrug program.
Needless to say, I do not agree with the characterizations
of our intent or our practice in the newspaper article you
read. What we have done has been entirely above board and
consistent with the authority that we have and, more to the
point, consistent not only with the requirement to maintain the
readiness of the special operations troops that are involved,
but also consistent with the very high priority that this
country, and this administration, and this Congress put on the
counterdrug effort.
abuses of kopassus
Ms. Pelosi. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just one follow-up. Do
you think, Secretary Slocombe, that the U.S. training of the
Kopassus was consistent, to use your word, with the intent of
Congress and our foreign policy goals in Indonesia? Is that
something you would be proud of and point to as a positive
example of our foreign military training?
Mr. Slocombe. I make no apologies for the abuses of
Kopassus or any of the other cases you cite. I think there is a
certain amount of hindsight in this, and I am satisfied that
while there were good reasons to stop the program, and we will
not do it in the future, judged by the information that the
people had at the time they were making the decision, there
were good reasons to work with Kopassus. Among other things, it
was the entry point for being able to work with the Indonesian
military in other areas which are not controversial, and there
are no serious allegations of abuses.
But the Kopassus record is appalling, and there is no
excuse for it.
Mr. Callahan. Chairman Lewis.
foreign military training
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we
appreciate very much your being with us. I must say that I have
paid more attention to this issue since I have had the
privilege of being Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee. Also
this issue was highlighted largely because of a vote we had on
the floor two years ago in which there was a very close call
between funding the School for the Americas. And I had a
personal conversation with Sanford Bishop, a member of
Congress, who represents the territory that involves the School
for Americas. Mr. Bishop is an articulate and passionate
supporter of the work that is being done at our school.
I want to mention that, through the work of my subcommittee
so far this year, we have asked a variety and mix of people,
including Secretary Cohen, Secretary of the Air Force, the Navy
and the Army, the commandant of the Marine Corps, General
Krulak, all of those CINCs, as well as their aides, their views
of the importance of foreign military training, both the kind
that is in my bill and that which is a part of IMET. Without
any exception, they gave a very strong endorsement of the
value, both in terms of the relationships between our military
and foreign military leaders, but also in terms of the value to
our country that this training, on an ongoing basis, has had.
Just today, just a few moments ago, Assistant Secretary
Buchanan said, ``As we contemplate Kosovo, it is really very
important to recognize that any involvement we might find
ourselves in will be with NATO forces, foreign military leaders
who have relations with our leaders that are very important,''
and it was suggested it would be much more difficult and much
less valuable if we had to develop those relationships as we go
to war rather than long before. That is a very poignant, timely
point made just today in our committee.
The CINC in charge of the territories to our south, General
Wilhelm, said, ``For the life of me, I cannot imagine why
people would even question the value to us, militarily and
otherwise, of the School for Americas.'' He said, ``There are
at least ten ambassadors in Latin countries * * *'' I may be
mistaken here, but I am remembering what he said. ``* * * who
have gone through that training. There are hundreds of military
chiefs who have gone through that training,'' and he went on.
And very poignantly he said, ``The unabomber went to Harvard,
and there are many a graduate who might be described as being
on a different path.'' Hitler went to the School of the Arts in
Vienna. Probably there are other graduates of that School of
Arts who had a different pathway.
I can understand these questions that take us back to the
eighties and Doba San and Noriega. But, my goodness, the only
remaining country in all of Latin America that is not a
democracy, or at least trying to strengthen democratic
processes is Cuba. I do not know whether Castro went to School
of Americas or not? Maybe I should leave you with that
question.
Mr. Slocombe. I believe that he did not go to the School of
Americas.
Ms. Pelosi. Mr. Chairman, may I just speak to that point?
Mr. Callahan. Certainly.
Ms. Pelosi. I just want the record to show that we are not
talking about the importance of interoperability among the 19
NATO countries that are involved in air strikes over Kosovo. We
are talking about something quite different from that.
Mr. Lewis. But these are military leaders who will have to
work together, and in many cases----
Ms. Pelosi. No, absolutely. And that is a given. What we
are talking about are the abuses, and Kopassus is one recent
example, not going far back in history. I think we have more in
common on this than your comments indicated. But, again, we all
understand how important interoperability, being able to work
togther is. What we are concerned about is that our funds are
being used in a way that attacks dissidents; troops that fired
on people in East Timor who are connected to the U.S. training
is not what the American people want, and we have a
responsibility to ask these questions in our oversight.
Mr. Lewis. Frankly, I do think that is part of our
responsibility in oversight and otherwise. But let me ask
either of you to respond to this question that really is an
extension of what Ms. Pelosi just said. We have seen a very
significant transition in Latin America, in terms of the growth
of the potential for freedom and democracy. I would have to
assume that the new military leadership in many of those
countries are people who participated in these kinds of joint
military training exercises, including the School of Americas,
but also IMET and, indeed, the program that is financed within
my own committee as well, which is a joint program.
Mr. Slocombe. I think that is true, and I think also, Mr.
Chairman, that the point you make about especially in Latin
America, but it is also true in Eastern Europe, it is true in
many countries in Africa, it is, to some degree in certain
countries, true in Asia. That what we have seen with the end of
the Cold War and with other changes in the world, is countries
that are trying to establish a democratic system, a system of
the rule of law, open markets and so on, they are going to have
militaries. Countries have military establishments, with a few
exceptions.
And it is very much in our interest that those militaries,
similar to the rule for doctors, that they, first of all, do
not do any harm. That is, that they do recognize the role of
the military in a democratic society and accept that and,
second, that they be good at something. That they be able to
work in their system to fulfill a function which serves their
interests, and often that will serve our interests because of
interoperability and so on.
And I like to make the point that it is not just when we
train them explicitly in human rights or civil-military
relations or the rule of law and that sort of thing. It is also
when we train them in how to run a professional military and
not a political party or a family business or an instrument for
corruption or oppression. We are also serving that purpose, and
that is one of the key things that I think we get out of this
military training program.
Unfortunately, if I am going to have any time to get to my
meeting, I am going to have to excuse myself.
Mr. Callahan. We applaud Ms. Pelosi and her concern about
human rights, and we do not want to be accused, nor do we want
to participate in any way whatsoever in training people who go
back to their respective countries and violate human rights.
Nancy, my daughter graduated from Auburn last Friday.
Ms. Pelosi. Congratulations, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Cum laude for the last quarter. [Laughter.]
If you look at the graduation program and you see the 900
students who graduated this winter semester at Auburn, you will
never hear about those who make huge contributions to society
that go out as most of the graduates of these schools do and
that this training benefit do.
What about the training, for example, at the School of
Americas where we train them to treat humans correctly and they
go back and make a contribution and they do treat people in a
humane manner? You never hear about them.
The only thing you hear about are those who go wrong, and
certainly, with the 900 students at Auburn, you are not going
to hear from 890 of them as far as any degree of notoriety is
concerned, but some of them are going to go wrong and you are
going to read about them.
I think it is important that we recognize that the School
of Americas has made dramatic changes. Jesuits taught me, and
they come to my office every year and are going to condemn me
to hell if I support the School of Americas, I tell them if you
all can give me one class or one textbook that proves what they
are arguing--that we are teaching these people to go back and
torture people, which we are not--if they can show me one
textbook, if they can show me one class where this is being
taught, then we will abolish the School of Americas, but they
cannot do that because it is not being done.
We have sent our staff people down there. They have
investigated. They have reviewed every textbook there. There is
no such thing. There may have been at one time, but not now.
Ms. Pelosi. Because of congressional oversight.
Mr. Callahan. That is a compliment to you and those who
have brought these problems to our attention, but the fact
remains, that we have corrected it. We cannot deny the
educational opportunities of military preparedness to these
countries who are struggling to create democracies, especially
in this hemisphere. The other 87 percent, the NATO portion that
you mentioned, none of this is ever questioned. It is just one-
tenth of 1 percent of the monies that are being spent in these
endeavors.
If, indeed, they can show us where we are contributing in
any way, shape, or form towards any type of encouragement of
human abuses, then I will join with you and we will eliminate--
--
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, whatever time I might have
remaining, I might mention that I----
[Laughter.]
I was going to mention that Secretary Cohen, as I remember,
had been one of the other CINCs or Secretaries, but they did
name specific people who are in ambassadorial kinds of
relationships, and dozens of military leaders, et cetera.
I might mention to you, Mr. Secretary, as you leave, that I
just received a note that said that Minister Primakov has
turned his plane around.
Ms. Pelosi. Oh, turned around?
Mr. Lewis. Turned around. He is not coming here, and we
have withdrawn our ambassadors, as I understand it.
Mr. Slocombe. Yes. When Holbrook left, the U.S. Embassy and
most of the NATO embassies, which were down to skeletal staffs
in any event, closed down.
Could I just, before I leave, make one point? Pursuant to
the statutes which were enacted last year, we have set up
elaborate procedures within the Department of Defense to
ensure, as Mr. Newsom mentioned in his testimony, that we are
in touch with the embassies in the countries where an activity
is going to take place.
Before anybody can sign off on any DOD-funded foreign
military training activity, there has to be a certification by
a non-DOD member of the relevant embassy that there is no
adverse human rights information about the unit or individual
to be trained.
If there is, there is an elaborate procedure to do
something about it, but the point is that we now have a system,
again, pursuant to----
Ms. Pelosi. Congressional.
Mr. Slocombe [continuing]. Congressional interest, but not
with respect to any policy that we did not think was the right
policy.
We would always respond if we had information about adverse
human rights reports about people who have been trained. We
will make sure that if that information exists, it is brought
to the attention of the decision-makers, and normally, what
happens is you just change the program.
Mr. Callahan. Let me, before you leave, Mr. Secretary, let
us see if anybody has any questions they need to direct to you.
Yes. Ms. Kilpatrick.
Oversight
Ms. Kilpatrick. Just I am happy to hear you say, Mr.
Secretary, that you have instituted some oversight provisions
in the DOD budget that would address some of our concerns on
this issue. I think that is very good, and I appreciate that
very much. As you leave, I wanted to make sure that I heard
that correctly. I think that is what I heard.
Mr. Slocombe. That is right. As I say, we have a process.
Things are approved at different levels of the system, but
whoever has to sign off on it--sometimes it is the Secretary,
sometimes it is the CINC, sometimes it is other people--there
has to be a certification in writing by a non-military, non-DOD
official of the relevant U.S. embassy that there is no adverse
human rights individual with respect to the individual.
Ms. Kilpatrick. That is a step in the right direction. I
appreciate it.
Ours is statutory. Yours is administrative, it sounds like,
and we appreciate that.
Mr. Slocombe. This is pursuant to the statute.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Yes. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jackson. Mr. Chairman, just very quickly, I would like
to submit all of my questions for the record, but I do want to
say just before the Secretary leaves that our current and
ranking member, Ms. Pelosi, worked very hard to include Section
581 language in the committee report.
Military Training Activity
Mr. Jackson. I looked at the language very, very carefully,
and the language says this report shall include for each such
military training activity the foreign policy justification and
purpose for such training activity, and the general summary or
the executive summary that is provided for each such military
activity or training activity is very thin, if nonexistent.
It attempts in the executive summary to cover a general
analysis of how these various programs benefit and support
foreign policy, but the committee language is specific. It says
for each such training activity, and there is no report, at
least to the best of my knowledge, that supports each training
activity, and I think the language is very, very specific.
I also want to indicate the other conversation that was
extremely helpful, and, Mr. Chairman, I say this very
respectfully. There may be no such international book on human
rights violations that we train militaries around the world
with.
I think the problem may actually occur in emphasis of
training. What do I mean by emphasis of training? Our Congress
and our Nation is somewhat poised to deal with the Kosovo
situation.
Our troops, our men and women, may end up in some other
part of the world as peace-keepers. That is the emphasis. The
emphasis of our military is not patrolling the streets of
Chicago. They are possibly going to Kosovo and other hot spots
around the world.
At the School of the Americas where we train men and women
to go back to their countries, the emphasis oftentimes of the
militaries are not to supply troops to NATO or to supply troops
in other hot spots around the world. They end up being police
forces within their own countries, and that is where many of
the abuses I believe Ms. Pelosi was talking about are
highlighted and worthy of further discussion.
I am going to submit, Mr. Chairman, all of my questions for
the record, and I would certainly appreciate a response from
both the State Department and Department of Defense.
Mr. Callahan. We will excuse you, Mr. Secretary.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here on
this very difficult day.
Mr. Slocombe. Thank you.
Ms. Pelosi. And I look forward to continuing our
conversations on this. Again, with the recognition that our
military training is valid, we are just worried about the
abuses.
If Auburn were a medical school and you have got the wrong
doctor, you would not be too happy at that.
Mr. Callahan. She got the wrong doctor.
Mr. Slocombe. Equally, we are committed to make sure we do
not train people who have abused human rights in the past, and
we certainly do not train them in anything that by any stretch
of the imagination would teach them to do wrong.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Slocombe. Thank you.
Mr. Callahan. All right.
Ms. Pelosi. May we ask our distinguished chairman, when did
the plane turn around?
Mr. Lewis. I just got the note just before I came in here.
So it has been within the last hour.
Mr. Newsom. I was told just before I left the Department.
Ms. Pelosi. When we were at the briefing at the White
House, they said that there was the chance that that would
happen. That is very bad news.
Mr. Newsom. Mr. Chairman, would you like for me to respond
to Mr. Jackson?
Mr. Callahan. Oh, yes, very certainly so.
Mr. Newsom. On the question of laying out the foreign
policy rationale or justification for the training activities,
I was told by others who appeared before other committees that
this question had been raised, and so I looked into with the
people who offered the report as to exactly why that is
structured the way it is.
Perhaps there was something of a misunderstanding. Our
reading of the language made us believe that you were looking
for the overall justification and objectives established for
the individual programs. There are over 51,000 individual
activities. It did not seem reasonable that you would expect
there to be a justification for each one of the 51,000
activities.
So that is the----
Ms. Pelosi. Too bad we did not have some kind of
conversation.
Mr. Newsom. Yes. I asked were there any exchanges, to be
sure everyone understood, and I was told there was not. So I
regret that.
I was told at least you, Ms. Pelosi, were interested in the
justifications for the training activities, at least in some
selected problem countries. If my understanding is correct and
it would help the situation, I would undertake, if your staff
would identify countries of concern, that we would seek to do
that for you.
Ms. Pelosi. But my concern is overall, but it is Mr.
Jackson's time.
Mr. Jackson. It is still my time.
Then help answer this question for me. Is it true that the
Pentagon sidestepped the subcommittee's ban on funding to
Indonesia with the JCET programs?
Mr. Newsom. That the Pentagon side-stepped the ban, yes.
Mr. Jackson. On IMF funding to Indonesia with the JCET
programs.
Mr. Newsom. Well, I suppose that depends on where you sit.
There was no legal prohibition on JCET activities in
Indonesia. JCET activities are considered to be principally a
training activity that benefits the United States forces.
There was a ban on IMET activities up to 1996, I believe,
in Indonesia, so no IMET activities took place.
These are no co-equal types of activities. IMET activities
are aimed at establishing contacts with militaries who try to
cultivate American military values in these militaries. The
training is generally almost always done in the United States.
Only exceptionally is it done abroad, but the JCETs have a
completely different purpose. So, from where I sit, the answer
to your question or your statement there, Mr. Jackson, would be
no.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Jackson, would you yield?
Mr. Jackson. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. Lewis. I am going to try to clarify this in my own
head. I think at one place or another, there was a restriction
on the IMET funding which is funded through this subcommittee.
That same language, however, did not apply within the Defense
Subcommittee or the Authorization Committee, and so it did not
affect the JCET program, which come under our jurisdiction. I
frankly did not realize this myself until a couple of weeks
ago.
So apparently, JCET went forward, but the IMET programs
were not funded. Is that right?
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, gentlemen.
Ms. Pelosi, did you want some additional time?
imet
Ms. Pelosi. I just would say that I think it was clear what
the intent of Congress was on that subject, and I think you
were duly embarrassed by the training of the Kopassus that took
place in light of the Kopassus record, and that is all we are
trying to say here. You know what the intent of Congress was.
You had to know what the potential abuses were there--not the
potential, but actual. So you go take an end run with JCET and
then say you do not think that is circumventing the intent of
Congress in terms of training the military there.
Just further on Mr. Jackson's point, when you lump the IMET
training into large categories and it contains lots of acronyms
and the rest for which you have no key, you are giving us data
that is not really informative. So we may have to have some
more conversations about what is in this report.
Sometimes it is a technique, a tactic, to just dump
information which is not easily as discernible as it should be,
without the justification that specifically is requested. Let
us put the best intentions on what you were doing and say that
perhaps as this unfolds, we can get the real information there.
Mr. Lewis. Maybe in past administrations. Certainly not in
this one.
Ms. Pelosi. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Lewis. I am kidding.
Ms. Pelosi [continuing]. You know that this subject was not
something that only I had a personal interest in, and we talked
about it in the committee only. This is an issue that is
debated on the floor of the House every time our bill comes to
the floor. Is that not right, Mr. Chairman? Indonesia, and IMET
to Indonesia, has been a very high-profile issue in this
Congress, and I think the military knew full well what the
intent of Congress was in the strong vote that went in
prohibiting IMET to Indonesia, but that is what hopefully we
will be able to accomplish with this.
Mr. Callahan. And then that is also why we developed an
enhanced----
Ms. Pelosi. That is right, expanded on that, exactly.
Mr. Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to yield back
my time. I know my time has long since expired.
Mr. Callahan. We are going to let Ms. Kilpatrick get her 2
cents in here first.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am enjoying the conversation. I would yield to my
distinguished colleague. [Laughter.]
Mr. Jackson. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.
I just wanted to make a brief observation of an article
that appeared in The Washington Post entitled ``Free of
Oversight: U.S. Military Trains Foreign Troops,'' and there was
a quote from Wayne Downey, Commander of U.S. Special Forces
Operations Command from 1993 to 1996, where he said, ``There is
definitely a political card at play with the JCETs. They are a
direct instrument of U.S. foreign policy. They must be the most
direct and most involved tangible physical part of U.S. foreign
policy in certain countries.''
So I would certainly want to associate myself with
everything that Ms. Pelosi said with respect to our sensitivity
and Congress' intent with respect to not being considered a
side-swipe.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would be happy to yield the gentlelady back her time.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you.
I yield my time to the Chair.
Mr. Callahan. Ms. Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
It looks like we have a series of votes coming up. So maybe
this being the day that it is, we should try to squeeze in as
much before the vote as possible.
I want to ask some questions about Guatemala.
Welcome, sir.
guatemala imet
An analysis of the five-volume report indicates that
Guatemalan fiscal year 1999 can expect funding for 25 IMET
students in 14 different courses, the deployment of two mobile
training teams to Guatemala, a separately funded course for
students at the National Center for Hemispheric Defense
studies, two students attending the U.S. Military Academy at
West Point, and the deployment of U.S. forces in conjunction
with JCET exercises in the country.
This is all taking place in the context of this
subcommittee limiting Guatemala to expanded IMET only. With
respect to IMET 1999 plans, they are sending seven students to
the School of the Americas for three different courses,
including two students for command and general staff course.
Can you explain how these School of the Americas courses fit
the definition of expanded IMET?
I will have some follow-up questions to that as well.
Mr. Keltz. I think, first of all, the issue is how do you
address professional military education, and does it fall
within the definition of ``expanded IMET'' in terms of the
exposure to U.S. democratic principles and processes?
Part of the training at those schools includes orientation
and travel, specifically under an information program to expose
them to democratic principles. So I am not clear where the
concern arises with those particular curricula.
Ms. Pelosi. I think you do know because you answered the
question in a manner in which you did.
What you are saying is that you are giving this expanded
view of expanded IMET of something beyond the specifics which
are allowed under expanded IMET to say, in general, if you are
talking about a professional military, then that should be
included under the expanded IMET?
Are you saying that what the School of the Americas teaches
is expanded IMET, that their curriculum is expanded IMET?
Mr. Keltz. Not the entire curriculum, no.
You said School of the Americas. I do not have that same
listing.
What I do have is the American language course, civil
military operations, command and general staff, as the IMET, a
professional development course, democratic sustainment,
officer basic courses and so on. I will be happy to try and
further review that for you.
Ms. Pelosi. I would appreciate that.
How does the U.S. Army mobile training team deployment to
Guatemala plan for fiscal year 1999 with IMET funds fit the
definition of ``expanded IMET''?
Mr. Keltz. Well, again, you have me at a disadvantage, Ms.
Pelosi. I do not have the specifics of that MTT, but I will be
happy to get that for you.
Ms. Pelosi. We got this from you.
The fiscal year 1999 JCET deployments for the counter-
narcotics purposes are for counter-narcotic purposes according
to this report. This is for Guatemala still.
Can you explain what units of the Guatemalan army are
involved and the training they are receiving for those counter-
narcotic goals?
Mr. Keltz. I have no information on that JCET.
Ms. Pelosi. Okay. Well, we will need to get those for the
record as to Guatemala.
Mr. Keltz. I will be happy to provide those for you.
Mr. Callahan. We would like the responses to these
questions, too, before we write our appropriation bill.
Mr. Keltz. We will get those to you in several days, Mr.
Chairman. We would be happy to.
Ms. Pelosi. May I continue, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Callahan. Yes.
Ms. Pelosi. This is just a point of information. The report
indicates that over 150 individuals from many different
countries attend West Point, the Naval Academy, the Air Force
Academy, under service-sponsored academy exchanges. Does DOD
pay for that many scholarships to our service academies?
I am sure you will be happy to give a justification.
Mr. Keltz. We waive tuition to those countries that provide
reciprocal training for our military personnel. So, in the
main, yes, we do.
Ms. Pelosi. You waive the----
Mr. Keltz. That is correct, but only when there is
reciprocity.
Ms. Pelosi. Only when there is reciprocity. So, in your
view, there is no opportunity cost for other people in our
country who would want to attend those institutions.
Mr. Keltz. That is the intent, yes.
Ms. Pelosi. Okay. Let me just see. I did not realize I was
going to have this much time for questions, Mr. Chairman, but I
am always happy to do that.
Mr. Callahan. She complains if I cut her off, and she
complains when I give her too much time.
Ms. Pelosi. Did you take my questions? [Laughter.]
I think that there are many of our colleagues who have
questions about IMET. That is why expanded IMET was developed,
and we do not want to see that used as an umbrella under which
to put regular IMET.
Again, I will come back to the point that we do not have to
have a problem here. I think you invite the problem when you
keep the information from Congress, and then you get publicly
embarrassed by something like the Kopassus situation.
Congress has tried to make information available. Members
have tried to make information available to the administration
that bad things are being done with our money, our training,
our anointing these people in these countries as somebody who
has some association with the United States and that they are
proceeding in a manner that we would not be proud of.
So I hope that we can work together. I am hoping very much
that we can work together because otherwise we are going to
have this argument all the time, and I do not really think that
it is necessary.
jcet report
The JCET report indicates that the armed forces of a
country in North Africa will travel to Turkey to receive JCET
training from U.S. forces. Can you explain why this is
happening? Who pays for the transportation cost for the foreign
troops? Is this a common practice? Are Turkish troops
participating in this training? Are you aware of that? It is in
your report.
Mr. Keltz. There are a total of some 51,000 individual
events. I have not focused on that one particularly. I will be
happy to take the question for the record.
Ms. Pelosi. Well, it seems like every question I ask is one
that seems to be very unusual, but to me they just leap out
because they were the most notorious in talking about
Indonesia, Guatemala, Colombia, and some of these others,
especially as relates to a country like Turkey.
Let me just ask you about readiness. The state of readiness
of our armed forces is not what we would all like it to be,
according to many in Congress and the Pentagon.
Intelligence and defense-related committees have heard that
we are stretched thin from Pentagon witnesses. We have arrived
at this stage because of inadequate budgets and the deployment
of too many U.S. troops to too many foreign countries for too
long, according to some congressional experts.
It is stated that training does not affect OP TEMPO or
morale. Can you quantify for me the number of troops deployed,
the time frame for these deployments, and how the foreign
training affects our own training regime? How many U.S. troops
in total have been deployed for training of foreign troops in
the past 2 years, and from how many different units, for the
record?
Mr. Keltz. Would you like me to----
Ms. Pelosi. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, what we are going
to do is establish a dialogue on the subject so that when we
ask for a report, it comes back in a way that is serviceable.
Our chairman of the Defense Committee argues strongly. I do
not think you already get a status quo in terms of the
violations that have taken place, but I do not disagree that
there is a role that is here.
I think that because of public pressure, Congressional
pressure, they did change the curriculum at the School of the
Americas. Should there be such a school? Maybe so. Should this
school revamp itself? Maybe so because it has a bad reputation
from the past, but what we want to do is work together on it.
We should not even have to worry about this. It makes all the
sense in the world to have these lines of communication, but
let us not fool ourselves. Let us not do to it sustain regimes
just because we want to have some communications and liaisons
with the military. That may not be in our country's best
interest.
So, on one hand, I see what the goal is. On the other hand,
there are qualifications that should disqualify that from
happening with certain countries. The message is Congress is
alert to this. We know what is going on out there, one way or
another, and the JCET to Kopassus might be something that you
think was consistent with the intent of Congress, that is not
what people thought happened on the floor of Congress here over
and over again when we have voted against the IMET for
Indonesia.
Because this is such a miserable day that our young people
are going to be put in harm's way probably--I guess that is the
indication from the plane turning around--I know that everyone
is preoccupied with that, and justifiably so.
So I will submit my other questions.
Mr. Lewis. Would the gentlelady yield for an interruption?
Ms. Pelosi. I would be pleased to yield.
Mr. Lewis. Since I have not focused on this lately, it has
been surprising to me that as I reiterate that 90 percent of
this kind of training actions are going through for military
sales. So the remainder of 10 percent really is kind of a
combination of IMET and JCET. Probably, if there is $100
million left of that, 20 of it is in my bill and the rest is in
foreign operations.
If we really want to get a handle on this, we should tap
people like Sanford Bishop who has the school in his district.
Also, it seems to me that we ought to have a task force of
people who are interested within the Congress to try to figure
out where this dialogue really should go, rather than just
presuming if we close the school down and then re-create it
somewhere else, or close it down, period, it might be better.
In other words, if there is real value from this kind of
exposure by osmosis, if nothing else, for potential foreign
military leaders, I do not think one can discard it lightly. I
know it is not your intent to do so, but they can report back
every year, administration after administration, and the debate
would go on. These issues, I do not think are partisan issues.
So if we just absolutely commit ourselves to doing something,
it might have a positive effect.
Ms. Pelosi. Well, I think with your attitude, that is very
possible.
But, Mr. Chairman, you are obviously protecting your turf,
and justifiably so, with JCET being under the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee. Recognizing that the Congress
voted in heated debate against IMET for Indonesia and it was a
clear message about what Congress was doing, would that be
something that you think is appropriate for the Pentagon to run
them in the JCET program in our committee with no notification
to Congress? They got caught because Kopassus was so
outrageous, and then they withdrew the engagement with them,
but is that something that you would be supportive of, that you
would think that without any informing of you or Congress
that----
Mr. Lewis. Without a blanket saying yes, I think it is
great that they did that by passage, because they got a program
forward that was my turf, I would instead say that there was a
clear debate. There was a discussion. There was clear interest
on the part of Congress. Whether it is IMET that was mentioned
or IMET plus other programs that ought to be considered, there
should be discussion, without any question, but I do not think
as a result of that debate in any way, shape or form, our
committee would really change its position on JCET.
Ms. Pelosi. But you might say that they do not want you
going off and doing Kopassus and training people----
Mr. Lewis. When the Secretary was here, he somewhat gave a
commentary regarding Kopassus and what happened there. It was a
little different from what I have heard since then, and I must
say I would have to know more about what he has to say before I
make a final judgment, but in the meantime----
Ms. Pelosi. Secretary Slocombe.
Mr. Lewis. When he was here, I thought at least he was
saying, ``Hey, wait a minute. If all that you are suggesting is
accurate, then maybe I would want to reconsider, but I see some
positive things.'' I thought I heard that. I may be wrong. I
will have to review the record.
In the meantime, the real point is that there is a question
here that can be benefited by effective congressional
oversight, and our two committees ought to join together and
see what we can do.
Mr. Callahan. Let me bring out another factor here, too,
and that is I do not think the State Department nor the Defense
Department has willfully violated the intent of Congress
because I think the authorizing committees has given them the
authority to do that.
We are appropriators. The authorizing committees--we have
JCET and we have IMET and we have enhanced IMET, and we fund
those programs. If there indeed is a problem with the
permissiveness as outlined by the authorizers, then they are
the ones who should correct that, not this committee.
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, I want my report language to have
the weight of law, no matter what.
Mr. Callahan. And it does, but I shy away from that.
Let me once again congratulate the gentlelady from
California. You are the voice of the people who have great
concern about human rights violations, and I applaud you for
forcing the administration to comment on their report, the
problems that you perceive to exist in some areas of the world.
And if we are contributing to those problems by giving them
monies, well, then we will stop giving them monies, but I
appreciate also you all coming today.
So, with that, unless you want to come back, we will just
adjourn for the day.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Questions and answers for the record follow:]
Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman Callahan
authorities for foreign military training
Question. Secretary Slocombe, could you summarize the provisions of
existing law that authorize the Department of Defense and the
Department of State to engage in foreign military training? Were any of
these authorities modified during the past sessions of Congress? If so,
in what way?
Answer. The provisions of existing law that authorize the
Departments of Defense and State to engage in foreign military training
include: Chapter 5, section 541, Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (IMET
program, including activities conducted by the Defense Intelligence
Agency and National Imagery and Mapping Agency funded by IMET), section
21 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (training purchased under the
Foreign Military Sales system), sections 506 and 552(c)(2) of the FAA
(training provided under drawdown authorities--specific drawdown
legislation could also authorize provision of training), section 1004,
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 1991, and
section 1033, NDAA for fiscal year 1998 (counter-drug training), 10
U.S.C. Sec. 401 (humanitarian demining training), 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1595
and various NDAA provisions (George C. Marshall Center for Studies and
related security studies centers for the African, Western Hemisphere,
and Asia-Pacific regions), 10 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 4344, 6957, 9344
(Service Academy Foreign Student Program), section 30A AECA (authority
to conduct unit exchanges by the military services), 10 U.S.C.
Sec. 9381 (Aviation Leadership Program), 10 U.S.C. Sec. 168 (National
Guard State Partnership Program), 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2011 (Joint Combined
Exchange Training, which is a training program primarily for U.S., not
foreign, personnel).
10 U.S.C. Sec. 2011 was amended during the fiscal year 1999
legislative cycle to include a requirement that the Secretary of
Defense approve all proposed Joint Combined Exchange Training
activities.
Safeguards on Use of Funds in Both Bills
Question: Funds appropriated through the Foreign Operations
subcommittee are subject to the so-called Leahy amendment, which
prohibits funds for the security forces of a country if those security
forces have been engaged in violations of human rights. Are there
similar restrictions that apply to the funds appropriated through the
Defense subcommittees? If so, can I assume that there is no danger that
the Department of Defense would attempt to get around this provision in
the Foreign Operations bill by using funds appropriated through the
Defense subcommittee?
Answer. We have not and will not attempt to ``get around'' any
statute or clear congressional directive through any means. We have
attempted to make our activities as transparent as possible and will
continue to work with the subcommittee to satisfy its concerns. There
are two so-called ``Leahy Amendments,'' one typically included in the
annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and the other included in
the FY99 Defense Appropriations Act. The requirements of each amendment
are applied to activities governed under the respective appropriations
acts. The amendments are not identical. The difference attempts to
recognize that foreign military training conducted with DoD funds,
under specific authorities, is of special benefit to U.S. personnel and
U.S. interests. Foreign military training conducted under State
Department authorities and programs (and funded by the Foreign
Operations Acts) may not always have the same direct benefit to U.S.
forces. The differences between the two Leahy amendments and their
application are directly related to the difference between training
that is purely foreign assistance and training that may include
benefits to the U.S. Regardless of differences between the two ``Leahy
Amendments,'' all foreign military training activities are conducted
pursuant to specific authorization by law.
Allocation of Resources and Appropriated Funds
Question. Secretary Slocombe, in your testimony you indicate that
the value of the training identified in the report ``exceeds $800
million''. Earlier, we were told that the value of the training was
approximately $1 billion. In addition, you indicate that it is
difficult to determine how much this total is appropriated, but that
the vast majority of the funds are associated with the Foreign Military
Sales program, or FMS, and thus include a great deal of funds committed
by the host country.
Can you be more precise about the funding levels? How much of these
funds are associated with appropriations through the Foreign Operations
Subcommittee, and how much are appropriated through the Defense
Subcommittee?
Answer. Of the approximately $808 million in training included in
the Foreign Military Training Report (52,000+ discrete activities),
only about three percent in value was conducted under DoD authorities.
The remaining 97 percent in value fell under security assistance
mechanisms (e.g., IMET, FMS), and therefore under the cognizance of the
Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. The vast majority
falls under the Foreign Military Sales system, with financing from
various sources including: host nation funds; Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) grants; FMF loans; International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL) funds; or drawdown authorities. Unfortunately, while
we can identify the funding source for any individual entry, the data
configuration does not allow us to do so for the aggregate totals. We
are examining ways to track and report such information for the future.
Decisions on Training
Question: One of the concerns members have had about the foreign
military training is the impression that no one is coordinating the
decisions on where and how training will occur around the world. Can
you provide us with an explanation of how decisions to engage in
training are made for a particular country, and how the Department of
State provides input into these decisions? Perhaps using the special
forces training program as an example makes the most sense, given the
level of concern about these activities.
Answer. The special forces training program included in the Foreign
Military Training Report was the Joint Combined Exchange Training
(JCET) program. The primary purpose of this program is to train U.S.
Special Operations Forces (SOF), not foreign military personnel.
Nonetheless, the decision process for these activities does provide an
example of State Department involvement in development of annual
training plans.
As a preliminary matter, U.S. SOF units determine their Mission
Essential tasks--the individual steps necessary to accomplish the range
of missions they could be assigned. Theater SOF commands and CINC SOCOM
hold an annual JCET conference which finalizes proposed JCET training
plans, including countries, dates and types of training proposed. Tasks
that require, or would benefit from, training in a foreign country are
discussed with the regional CINCs for possible inclusion with their
respective theater engagement plans. At this point, there is enough
information about the proposed training activity for appropriate U.S.
embassies to be informally alerted to SOF requests for JCET activities
in their countries. In practice, relevant embassy country teams are
working with the CINCs' staffs virtually from the beginning of the
planning process.
Proposed JCET training plans are then formally transmitted to
appropriate U.S. embassies and Main State for human rights review and
coordination. Embassies then advise the theater CINCs, SOCOM, and OSD,
as appropriate, of any derogatory information they may have regarding
the human rights records of foreign forces with which training is
proposed.
If an embassy determines that units or individuals selected for
U.S. training have committed gross violations of human rights one of
two processes will ensue. Note: DoD policy is that a non-military
member of the country team must make the determination.
Under section 568 of the FY99 Foreign Operations Appropriations
Act, the Department of State will not dispense security assistance
unless the Secretary of States determines and reports to Congress that
the host government is taking effective measures to bring the
perpetrators to justice. If training funds are withheld pursuant to
section 568, the Secretary of State will inform the host government of
the basis for the decision, and ``to the maximum extent practicable,''
will assist the host government in taking effective measures to bring
those responsible to justice. Until these actions are completed,
security assistance may not be dispensed.
Section 8130 of the FY99 Defense Appropriations Act codified
existing DoD policy that prohibited use of DoD funds to train foreign
security units whose members have committed gross violations of human
rights. If DoD receives credible information from the State Department
that foreign security forces or members of the unit(s) DoD plans to
train have committed gross violations of human rights, the training
will not proceed unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.
``Corrective steps'' may include adjusting host-nation participation,
either by training with forces not implicated in gross violations of
human rights or by removing the human rights violator from the unit(s)
proposed to be trained. Once such corrective steps have been taken, DoD
will proceed with the proposed training.
The Department will apply the ``corrective steps'' standard
carefully. DoD procedures require the U.S. ambassador to concur that
the corrective measures taken by host-nation security forces are
adequate. In addition, all training conducted in the wake of such
corrective measures must be reported to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. These safeguards will ensure rigorous implementation of the
``corrective steps'' standard.
DoD policy, as reflected in section 8130, is appropriate for DoD-
funded training because the primary beneficiaries of combined training
activities are often U.S. personnel, and overall readiness of U.S.
forces. Moreover, many of these training events strengthen important
U.S. programs such as humanitarian demining and counterdrug support.
Other Reporting Requirements
Question. The transmittal letter accompanying the military training
report that was submitted to us on March 5 indicated that the
Administration is required to submit other reports on certain aspects
of foreign military training?
What are these other reports? Are they provided pursuant to law?
Who receives them?
Answer. In general, the Department has responded to a number of
requests for briefings on training activities, and has included
information on training as part of regular budget briefings to
congressional staff. This is especially true with respect to
counternarcotics oversight briefings. The most significant statutory
reporting requirement related to the subcommittee's concerns is the
annual report on Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) provided under
10 U.S.C. Sec. 2011(e).
Questions for the Record Submitted by Mr. Forbes
Question. Under Secretary Slocombe, with the breakup of the Soviet
Union and gradual democratization of much of the third world, military
training missions have become increasingly busy. Do you see any
problems associated with the increased deployments of military
personnel on such missions overseas? Are these problems of local
resentment of U.S. Troops as we see with the peacekeeping mission in
Bosnia? Do such feelings pose a physical threat to our troops? Do you,
or Mr. Newsom, fee that this poses a diplomatic problem that may hurt
the purpose of such missions?
Answer. In general, US training activities are not as visible or
politically symbolic as large exercises as peackeeping missions.
Therefore, if training were to be conducted as an ``anti-American''
area, it is not obvious that potential opponents would even know the
activity was taking place. But this is the exception: anecdotal
evidence from the commands suggests that we end up turning down many
more requests for training than we accept in the many new democracies.
The situation in each country, perhaps even in each training
activity, is different, I should say from the outset that in the event
local sentiment turns hostile toward Americans during the pendancy of a
training activity, the activity may be relocated or cancelled entirely
at the request of the US side to protect our personnel. It should be
self-evident that we do not send US personnel into an unstable
situation merely to conduct a training activity alone. The regional
CINCs are charged with protection of our forces in all their
deployments aboard. CINC security personnel work with State Department
Regional Security Officers and others to ensure that if US personnel
deploy to a tense area, the importance of their mission--be it training
or something else--is consistent with the level of risk.
Question. Mr. Slocombe, what asset in the US military do you
consider best serves the needs of military training? Does this require
additional support from Congress?
Answer. The best asset we can call on to achieve any of our
missions is the men and women of the US armed forces. Both the
Administration and the Congress have announced their intent to improve
military pay and benefits during the fiscal year 2000 appropriations
cycle. This is the most meaningful way in which either you in the
Congress or we in the Executive Branch can show our service members
that we appreciate what an asset they truly are.
Question. Mr. Slocombe, what is the most frequently requested type
of military training assistance? Is it different from the asset you
just described? Do we possess enough people capable of delivering this
type of training? Do we have enough surplus arms to give to foreign
militaries to conduct this training?
Answer. The most frequently requested type of training relates to
maintenance and operational training support associated with foreign
equipment purchases under the FMS system.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Ms. Pelosi
Benin Training
Question. To illustrate the difficulty we have had in getting the
kind if information we were looking for from this report I would call
your attention to an item in Volume III. With respect to the country of
Benin the report indicates that an MTT will take place sometime in 1999
costing $1,037,048 for Miscellaneous Operations where one member of
Benin's Army will be trained. I assume there is a more descriptive
explanation for this planned activity.
Answer. Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) never train just one
individual; typically, they train 20-30 students at one time. Because
this MTT is a projected future activity, the exact number of students
to be trained is unknown. The number 1 was simply used as a placeholder
in the report database until the final number is known. The report
represents a statistical ``snapshot'' of training activities underway
or planned as of December 1998. DoD components were directed to report
national plans for 1999 training activities even if some of planning
elements were incomplete at that time. The scope of the report and the
time available to complete it necessitated certain formatting decisions
that resulted in the anomaly described in this question.
Colombia
Question. The subcommittee spent considerable time discussing the
deployment of US special forces to Columbia to train a Counter
narcotics battalion of the Colombian Army in our recent Security
Assistance hearing. This is an instance where decisions have been made
by the Administration which have overwhelming foreign policy
implications and in which Congress has had no role.
In addition to this program the report before us shows significant
amounts spent for both IMET and Other security assistance training,
which we expect in conjunction with our counter narcotics program.
However, the report also indicated that in 1998 nine different JCET
deployments occurred training 450 Colombian personnel at a cost of $1.2
million. In 1999 25 different JCET deployments are planned costing over
$3 million benefiting well over 1,000 different personnel from all
branches of the Colombian military as well as the police. What benefits
do US troops gain from this level of engagement with one country?
In our prior hearing the DOD witness indicated that the decision to
train this battalion had not been finalized, and that this somehow
justified the lack of Congressional consultation. Since the first
deployment of our trainers is expected as soon as April, can you
indicate the status of our policy and indicate when, if all, Congress
will be consulted.
Answer. DoD conducted only one Joint Combined Exchange Training
mission in Colombia during 1998 and nine counterdrug (CD) missions.
Whether deploying to conduct JCETs or CD missions, SOF personnel
enhance their language abilities, cultural awareness, and operational
skills. However, JCETs and DoD counterdrug missions differ in who is
intended to receive the benefit of training. In CD missions, Colombian
counterdrug forces, rather than our deployed SOF, are the intended
beneficiary of the training. CD missions are designed to improve
Colombian counterdrug unit's ability to detect, monitor, and interdict
drug trafficking and support the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy.
The level of effort given to Colombia directly relates to the level of
drug threat presented by known drug trafficking. Because the drug
threat to the United States posed by activities in Colombia continues
to increase (due in large part to interdiction successes elsewhere in
theater), the level of effort in Colombia will continue to increase.
The Colombian CD battalion concept emerged from discussions between
USSOUTHCOM and the Colombian Ministry of Defense and between Presidents
Clinton and Pastrana in October 1998. Throughout the evolution of the
CD battalion concept, DoD communicated with congressional staff having
oversight of DoD counterdrug authorities. In March 1999, when the CD
battalion concept took on consistent form and substance, we formally
briefed the Congress. Then as now, DoD supports the training and non-
lethal equipping of a human rights vetted, Colombian light infantry
battalion dedicated to counterdrug operations focused in the heart of
the Source Zone. We undertake these activities pursuant to specific
legal authorization.
Question. Can you explain how the deployment of 20 US Special
forces for 90 days to one location in Colombia to provide basic
training to Colombian Army recruits will benefit the readiness of the
US armed forces?
Answer. Special Forces soldiers benefit each time they deploy into
a potential theater of operations through enhancement of their
language, cultural awareness, and operational skills. With each
deployment SOF members increases their understanding of the area of
operations and expand the host-nation's ability to act in concert with
the United States.
Question. There are no resources budgeted to equip this counter
narcotics battalion to my knowledge from our budget. Clearly the
Colombians expect this unit to have modern equipment and to have an air
mobile capability. Where are those resources going to come from?
Answer. DoD will use service Operations and Maintenance funds under
the control of US SOUTHCOM to conduct training of the unit pursuant to
section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 1991.
DoD will provide $3.5 million in modern, non-lethal equipment to the CD
battalion pursuant to section 1033 of the NDAA for 1998. DoD has
encouraged the Colombian military to identify long-term sources of
national funds to meet its mobility needs since DoD has neither the
authority or the resources to acquire helicopters for Colombia. In our
discussions with the Colombian Ministry of Defense, we have recommended
that the battalion's mobility requirements be met with current
Colombian Air Force, Army, and National Police rotary wing assets.
Question. Explain the different standards used to vet Colombians
personnel receiving training from US government sources?
Answer. The term ``vetting'' refers to the process where U.S.
Embassies and the Department of State review the available data on host
nation security forces, and members of such forces, for information on
gross violations of human rights. The DoD does not conduct or
participate in the vetting process. The details of the vetting process
are accomplished at the relevant U.S. Embassy. The vetting process
starts at the relevant U.S. Embassy when the host nation identifies the
security force, or the individual, that is going to be trained, receive
equipment, or train with U.S. forces. The organization and management
of the vetting process may vary by embassy, because each ambassador can
establish his/her embassy internal procedures and may assign
responsibilities for vetting within the country team differently. The
resulting human rights review information is provided by the embassies
to the Department of State and to the appropriate DoD agency for
action. Essentially, there is no difference between the vetting process
for assistance provided under foreign operations authorities and the
vetting process for training activities conducted under defense
authorities.
Under DoD-funded training activities, if the embassy notifies the
regional CINC that the Department of State has credible information of
gross human rights violations by a host nation security force, or a
member of such a force, with which the DoD was planning to train, then
before the training activity may proceed all necessary corrective steps
must be taken. This process was codified in section 8130 of the FY99
Defense Appropriations Act. Under DoD policy, in cases when we receive
credible information from the Department of State that a member of such
a unit has committed a gross violation of human rights, the application
of ``corrective steps'' can include adjustments to the host nation
participants, which could be made either by training with a host nation
security unit not implicated in human rights violations, or by removing
the identified violator/s from the units to be trained. Once these
corrective steps have been taken, DoD can proceed with the training.
Service Sponsored Academy Scholarships
Question. [Handelman] The report indicates that over 150
individuals from many different countries attend West Point, the Naval
Academy or the Air Force Academy under ``Service sponsored, Academy
exchanges''. Does DOD pay for that many scholarships to our Service
Academies and what is the justification?
Do these scholarships displace otherwise worthy candidates from
this country?
Answer. The service academy foreign student program is conducted
pursuant to sections 4344, 6957, 9344 of title 10. Another more limited
exchange program is conducted by the U.S. Air Force Academy. Up to
forty foreign students may attend each academy at any one time, subject
to the same admissions standards prescribed for U.S. citizens.
Admission of the foreign students is not required: the academies
measure the quality of the foreign applicant pool against the quality
of the U.S. pool and issue acceptances accordingly. Thus, it is not
necessarily the case that the foreign students' presence displaces a
``worthy'' American applicant, although they could displace a lesser
qualified U.S. applicant. Decisions on admission qualifications are
left entirely to the academies.
The foreign students participate in the full, four-year program of
study. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to waive full tuition for
up to five foreign students per academy at any one time; in addition,
up to 35% of tuition can be waived for the balance of the foreign
cadre. The current limits were enacted for fiscal year 1998; the
Secretary was previously authorized to waive all costs for up to all
forty foreign students permitted to attend each academy at any one
time. In response to the fiscal year 1998 restrictions, the Department
revised the criteria governing cost waivers to better reflect current
U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.
The foreign student program affords U.S. cadets and midshipmen
exposure to highly qualified potential foreign military leaders, while
facilitating military-to-military relationships. The program is
strongly supported by the academy superintendents and OSD from both
educational and foreign policy perspectives. The flexibility to support
foreign student attendance through the waiver authority has proven to
be a key factor in generating interest in the program and the
Department is seeking to restore some of the pre-1998 flexibility.
Indonesia
Question. Recent news articles have highlighted JCET deployments to
Indonesia as a primary example of a significant foreign policy decision
being made by the Administration without Congress being informed. Mr.
Slocombe in your statement you deny ignoring the letter or spirit of
the law, or that you evaded Congressional oversight. I would like you
to respond to the case of Indonesia specifically. As you know Congress
through this subcommmittee acted to prohibit IMET training to Indonesia
starting in the late 1980's. The DOD in the early 1990's offered
Indonesia the opportunity to buy IMET training without informing
Congress. Indonesia has continued to be eligible for expanded IMET only
since the early 1990. Despite these restrictions the DOD through the
JCET deployments started an aggressive training program with the
Indonesian Army and its intelligence forces. Congress has consistently
expressed its concerns about the behavior of those forces, particularly
in East Timor. We could debate the usefulness of this training in
making the Indonesian Army more professional, but first I would ask, do
you think that DOD was responsive to Congress in keeping them informed
as you moved forward with the JCET and other training programs?
Answer. The Department of Defense has been responsive to requests
from Congress for information on training activities in Indonesia. For
example, Representative Lane Evans requested information on this
subject on two occasions and the Deputy Secretary of Defense responded
in detail on February 13th and July 15th of 1998. Also, during the
spring and summer of 1998 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) provided a series of briefings
to Congressional staff members on training in Indonesia and the basis
for the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) activities. During a
formal hearing before the International Operations and Human Rights
Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee on July 24,
1998, the DoD witness, ASD/ISA, addressed the fact that DoD training
activities in Indonesia (including all JCETs) were ``on hold.'' It is
also important to note that JCET activities are not within the IMET
umbrella, so restrictions imposed by Congress on IMET did not affect
DoD plans for the JCET program.
Question. Given the recent events in Indonesia and the
involvement of the Army and intelligence forces in putting down
riots and possibly interfering with the emerging political
parties, how do you assess the affect of our training?
Answer. The Department firmly supports the principle that
we should not train foreign security units whose members have
been credibly implicated in gross violations of human rights,
unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken. This
policy was codified in Section 8130 of the FY99 Defense
Appropriations Act. The Department abhors the killing of
civilians in Indonesia during the disturbances. During JCET
activities we instruct counterparts on human rights and
appropriate behavior of military forces in both conventional
and unconventional situations. Nevertheless, in Indonesia and
elsewhere, host nation forces engaged in riot control or other
stressful sometimes do not adhere to every principle, or retain
the discipline, they may have been taught during activities
with U.S. forces.
Overall, we feel that these training activities have
certainly not hurt, and have likely helped the situation in
Indonesia. In many cases, although clearly not all, the
security forces have acted professionally and with restraint as
they struggle to maintain order. Further, the Army leadership
has been clear and public with its support of free and fair
elections and has instructed all its members to not get
involved in the elections and to stay removed from politics.
It would be incorrect to claim that positive statements by
military officials are the direct result of their participation
in JCET or other U.S. training activities. However, neither is
it correct to suggest that violence against civilians by some
members of foreign militaries results from, or is even
facilitated by, exposure to U.S. training activities under JCET
or other programs.
Question. Was Congress informed of your apparent decision
in May of 1998 to cease JCET activity in Indonesia, and if so,
how were they informed?
Answer. During the spring and summer of 1998 the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
provided a series of briefings to Congressional staff members
on DoD training in Indonesia, to include the basis for Joint
Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program activities in
Indonesia. The moratorium on training activities in Indonesia
was covered in those briefings. The cessation of JCET
activities in May 8, 1998, was also noted in the information
the Deputy Secretary of Defense provided in his response on
July 15, 1998 to Representative Lane Evans who had requested
data on DoD training activities in Indonesia. During a formal
hearing before the International Operations and Human Rights
Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee on
July 24, 1998, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs addressed the fact that DoD
training activities in Indonesia (including all JCETs) were
``on hold.''
All DoD bilateral activities with Indonesia have been
conducted in accordance with the law. The DoD has never
attempted to circumvent the will of the Congress regarding our
training activities in Indonesia. Although Congress prohibited
IMET funding for Indonesia from fiscal year 1993 to Fiscal Year
1996, other forms of bilateral military interaction, including
foreign military sales of training and exercises, were not
proscribed. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2011 authorizes U.S. Special
Operations Forces to conduct training with friendly forces
abroad, including Indonesia. The Department has reported to
Congress on section 2011 activities, in Indonesia and
worldwide, as required.
DoD officials have consistently indicated that we remained
engaged with the Indonesia military, until 8 May 1998, through
a variety of exchanges, exercises, visits, and training
activities. We have not attempted to hide that fact. To the
contrary, we have sought to articulate why the pursuit of such
an interaction is an important component of our East Asian
security strategy.
JCET Training in Other Countries
Question. The JCET report indicates that the Armed forces
of a country in Northern Africa will travel to Turkey to
receive JCET training from U.S. forces. Can you explain why
this is happening? Who pays for the transportation costs for
the foreign troops? Is this a common practice? Are Turkish
troops participating in this training?
Answer. The JCET portion of the Military Training report
contains an error that could create the impression the Tunisian
forces are training with Turkish forces (page CL-II-40). There
were two exercises that should have reflected Turkey as the
country vice Tunisia. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SEAL
Team-4) trained, in Turkey, with Turkish SEALs during the
period October 4-28, 1997. U.S. Special Operations Forces (3/10
SFG) trained, in Turkey, with Turkish Commandos during the
period August 6-21, 1998. We regret any confusion by the error.
Readiness
Question. The state of readiness of our Armed Forces is deplorable
according to many in Congress and at the Pentagon. Intelligence and
Defense related committees have heard that we are ``stretched thin''
from Pentagon witnesses. We have arrived at this state because of
inadequate budgets and the deployment of too many US troops to too many
foreign countries for too long, according to some ``Congressional
experts''. You have stated that training does not affect OP TEMPO or
morale. Can you quantify for me the number of troops deployed, the time
frame of those deployments and how that foreign training affects a
unit's own training regime?
How many US troops in total have been deployed for training of
foreign troops in the past two years from how many different units?
Answer. We are not able to quantify numbers of US troops deployed
on training missions or the time-frames for those deployments in a
timely fashion. Such information is not recorded in a central
location--or even in a finite number of primary locations around the
world--and would need to be developed virtually by hand.
The reason that we know foreign training does not affect OPTEMPO or
morale is that foreign training, in nearly all respects, is part of the
regular job description for those service members who perform this
function. When OPTEMPO and morale among our forces becomes strained it
is the result of unplanned contingency deployments away from their
current stations for extended periods. A US service member who is
deployed to perform foreign training might well be stationed abroad,
and might well be displeased by that fact. However, the service
member's overseas posting is almost never for the express purpose of
training foreign military personnel. In other words, his morale might
be strained whether or not foreign training was part of his job.
Moreover, his actual training deployment would rarely be on anything
other than a scheduled basis. Indeed CINC's regional engagement plans
are developed for an entire upcoming year: in virtually no case can a
US service member be deployed ``by surprise'' for the singular purpose
of foreign military training.
Another reason that training of foreign military personnel does not
drain readiness is because it is the regional CINCs, the commanders
literally ``on the front lines,'' who consistently place training at
the top of their regional engagement strategies. A CINC who feels that
training is impinging on the resources necessary for his primary
mission is always free to either cancel scheduled training events, or
to direct his staff to developed a scaled-down foreign training program
for the future. I can assure the subcommittee that if a regional CINC
is presented with a choice between devoting resources to foreign
training or providing pilots sufficient flight hours to maintain combat
proficiency, the flight hours will always win.
Guatemala
Question. (DSCA-LPP) An analysis of the five volume report
indicates that Guatemala in FY 1999 can expect funding for 25 IMET
students in 14 different courses, the deployment of two Mole (Mobile?)
Training teams to Guatemala, a separately funded course for 4 students
at the National Center for Hemispheric Defense studies, two students
attending the US Military Academy at West Point and the deployment of
US forces in conjunction with JCET exercises in country. This all is
taking place in the context of this subcommittee limiting Guatemala to
expanded IMET only in 1999.
With respect to IMET in 1999, plans include sending 7 students to
the School of the Americas for 3 different courses including 2 students
to the Command and General staff course. Can you explain how these
Schools of the Americas courses fit the definition of expanded IMET?
How does US Army Mobile Training Team deployment to Guatemala
planned for FY 1999 with IMET funds fit the definition of expanded
IMET?
The FY 1999 JCET deployments are for counternarcotics purposes
according to the report. Can you explain what units of the Guatemalan
Army are involved and how the training they are receiving fulfills
counter narcotics goals?
Answers. Before responding to the specific questions included in
this section, two important points must be made. First, the Department
has explained that the Foreign Military Training Report constituted a
``snapshot'' of DoD and State Department training plans as of December
1998. The numbers included in the report for FY99 activities were
notional at best. Second, U.S. support for Guatemalan participation in
NDU or U.S. Military Academy programs is provided pursuant to law and
funded with appropriate DoD resources. Foreign participation in the
Department of Defense's regional centers for security studies (Western
Hemisphere Center, Marshal Center for European studies, Africa and
Asia-Pacific centers), and in our undergraduate military education
programs through the U.S. service academies are among the most valuable
means we have to immerse foreign officers and future leaders in our
professional military culture.
(1) There are no Military Training Team deployments to Guatemala
scheduled for FY99, Military Training Teams carry out general IMET
education functions. There are three Military Education Team
deployments scheduled for Guatemala in FY99, dealing with civil
military relations, defense resource management and disaster relief,
respectively. The Military Education Team concept was developed
specifically to carry out E-IMET programs.
(2) The US Army School of the Americas (USARSA) curriculum includes
E-IMET-certified courses. Thus, the attendance of Guatemalan personnel
at USARSA during FY99 is not contrary to the FY99 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act restriction of IMET to Guatemala (provided that they
attend only E-IMET courses, which will be the case). The year-long
USARSA Command and General Staff Course has been approved as an E-IMET
course of study since it includes over 200 hours of human rights-
related activities. Thus, the participation of Guatemalan officers in
this course is not contrary to the FY99 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act restriction on IMET to Guatemala.
(3) The JCET references to counter-narcotics activities may have
been for planning purposes, or may indeed have been an error on the
part of US SOCOM. It is now DoD policy not to conduct JCET activities
for counter-narcotics purposes. Experience has shown that few counter-
narcotics tasks directly related to the Mission Essential Tasks of U.S.
SOF personnel. JCET training is for the primary purpose of improving
SOF personnel readiness to execute mission essential tasks.
Allocation of Resources and Appropriated Funds
Question. The report contains a large category of training entitled
Other Security-Assistance Managed Training which contains training
activity from a number of different sources. What are the different
sources of funding and why are they lumped in one large category.
Answer. The structure of the security assistance portion of the
report was driven primarily by the parameters of the existing security
assistance record-keeping system maintained by the Defense Institute
for Security Assistance Management (DISAM) located at Wright-Patterson
Air Force Base. DISAM collects data on the security activities overseen
jointly by the various Defense and State policy components, and
executed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
Specifically, we are able to break out the IMET-funded portion of
security assistance-related training because it is recorded separately.
Training that is funded through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system
cannot be broken down into separate categories because the DISAM
database does not identify the source of funding for such training (or,
for that matter, any of the other defense articles or services that may
be purchased under the FMS system). As you know, purchases under FMS
may be funded through U.S. grant assistance (Foreign Military Financing
[FMF]), loans underwritten by the U.S., or through foreign countries'
own resources. As I noted in my prepared statement, we have already
recognized the usefulness of being able to distinguish foreign-financed
FMS purchases, at a minimum, and are exploring modifications to the
database that would make this possible.
Responsiveness of Training Report
Question. How can you back up your claim that 97% of training in
this report is from FMS or commercial sources.
Answer. We have said that 97% of the activities described in the
report are conducted under security assistance authorities. We know
this because the security assistance data base generated 97% of the
total number of activities included in the report, and we believe that
the report successfully described the total spectrum of foreign
training conducted by the Departments of State and Defense.
Question. Explain the basis for your claim that the vast majority
of U.S. training and engagement activities require no additional
separation of U.S. military personnel from their families, put no
service members at risk of life or limb, and do not effect the OP
TEMPO.
Answer. (1) The vast majority of U.S. training and engagement
activities require no additional separation of U.S. military personnel
from their families because the vast majority of training is a
``normal'' duty of the service members who perform these functions. In
other words, it may well be the case that a U.S. service member is
forward deployed in Europe or Japan, and that this service member is on
an unaccompanied tour (e.g., the service member's family remained in
the United States rather than moving overseas). The service member in
this case is already separated from his or her family, and training of
foreign forces may be one of his or her duties. But the training is not
the cause of the separation. Similarly, service members may be assigned
temporary overseas duty for purposes of training foreign forces. While
this activity would likely entail separation from family, the service
member is equally likely to be assigned temporary overseas duty for any
number of purposes associated with his or her mission that have no
relation at all to foreign training. The important point is that the
vast majority of training of foreign forces is a programmed, routine
event: it is not conducted as a ``contingency operation,'' which jars
the rhythms of both families and regular military operations.
(2) I said in my prepared statement that training ``puts no U.S.
service members at increased risk to life or limb'' because training
activities are no more dangerous when conducted with foreign militaries
than when conducted among U.S. personnel only. A particular activity
might well be extremely dangerous, as is the case for many of the day-
to-day tasks undertaken by our service members. Yet, teaching the
activity to a foreigner in an appropriately controlled environment will
not put the U.S. service member at any greater risk than teaching the
activity to other U.S. personnel. Most importantly, we only send our
military personnel in harm's way when national interests are important
enough to warrant such a risk. The many benefits of foreign training
that accrue to the United States typically are not of such weight as to
justify an increased risk to U.S. military personnel.
(3) As I noted in responding to question 19, above, the reason that
we know foreign training does not affect OPTEMPO or morale is that
foreign training, in nearly all respects, is part of the regular job
description for those service members who perform this function. When
OPTEMPO and morale among our forces becomes strained it is the result
of unplanned contingency deployments away from their regular stations
for extended periods. When military commanders and others complain that
U.S. forces are being stretched too thin, it is not in any respect the
result of foreign military training.
Question. (Curry) Can you submit a key to the numerous acronyms
used in this report.
Answer. This is very difficult to answer without an indication of
which acronyms are in question. The most-used acronyms (e.g., IMET,
FMS, JCET, CD) are identified in the narrative materials preceding each
section. We will be happy to provide a timely explanation of any
specific acronyms still not clear, if you will identify them to us.
Thursday, April 15, 1999.
SECRETARY OF STATE
WITNESS
HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE
Chairman Callahan's Opening Statement
Mr. Callahan. Good morning, Madam Secretary, and welcome
home. We are going to try to end this meeting early enough for
you file your income taxes today.
This hearing was originally scheduled to discuss the fiscal
year 2000 budget request, but events in the Balkans have
directed us into a higher priority at this time. And the
Speaker has asked the committee to take this opportunity to
bring up the crisis in the Balkans with you. Because of the
interest in the NATO air campaign against Serbia and its effect
on the people of Kosovo, the Chairman and ranking Democratic
Member of the full committee, as well as the Chairman of the
defense subcommittee, are present. They will receive priority
recognition after the Secretary has completed her testimony.
With everyone's cooperation, we can cover both the budget
request and the Balkans and still leave time if we will respect
the 5-minute rule for all Members to have input.
The Speaker has set out two goals for the House this year.
One is to pass the budget resolution by April 15, which was
passed yesterday. And second, he would like to move the House
appropriation bills to conference before July 4. I would like
to move the foreign operation bills to the floor before the end
of May. And I don't expect Chairman McConnell to lag very much
behind us.
Secretary Albright, your concerns about the new
congressional budgets are well known. While I don't know what
our 302 allocation is going to be, whatever it is, I intend to
live with the number we receive from the full committee. I want
to work with you on a bill that fits within our allocation. If
you cannot accept a dollar less than the request, as was the
case last year, then the committee must carry out its mission
nonetheless. We will write a bill that passes the House; and, I
repeat, I welcome your help in trying to draft that bill within
the 302 allocations.
Madam Secretary, before we turn to other critical issues I
would like to bring to your attention that we already have a
Central American supplemental that is ready for conference.
Those hurricane victims are our neighbors in this hemisphere;
and simply because the news networks have chosen to focus on
the flood of refugees fleeing Kosovo, the pressing needs of the
Hondurans and Nicaraguans have not diminished. We need your
help, and we need the help of the President to get that Central
American supplemental enacted quickly. That means sitting down
and working out the offset problem the administration objects
to. Any day we expect another supplemental request for Kosovo
and its neighbors. Most of that is to restore our national
defense posture, but I expect the White House will send up a
request for hundreds of millions of dollars from this
subcommittee for humanitarian assistance.
Unlike the Gulf War in 1990, no other countries are
contributing to the American costs. Between 80 and 90 percent
of the combat aircraft will be American. As I told the
President on Tuesday, this war is Europe's war and it is
Europe's neighborhood; and Europe should provide ground troops
if they are needed. As the crisis drags on, Americans will
focus on any discrepancy between European and United States
costs. Our public and private response to refugee needs will
continue to be generous, but I wouldn't count on American
financing to reconstruct what our bombs and missiles have
destroyed.
The committee requires an up-to-date accounting for both
military and humanitarian contributions to the alliance effort.
And we want you to provide us that information on a monthly
basis.
Any emergency supplemental for Kosovo will pay for this
fiscal year's costs. We still have to deal with Kosovo
appropriations for next year. We can't pretend that the crisis
and its costs will magically disappear before September 30. We
will welcome your assessment on the impact of this war on the
fiscal Year 2000 budget. That assessment could be based on two
outcomes: the alliance swiftly meeting the five goals NATO
agreed to earlier this week, and the Kosovars are able to
return home with international protection before the end of the
year; or Milosevic continues in defiance of NATO and continues
to kill and expel the Kosovars and a million or more Kosovars
are refugees. At the same time, we are trying to limit the
effect of these refugees on Serbia's neighbors. In any case,
our regular bill will be forced to reflect the radically
changed international situation. If Bosnia is any guide, we
will still be paying for Serbian's rampage into the next
century.
On two other Kosovo matters, we must do everything we can
to protect democratic Montenegro which has already welcomed
many thousands of refugees from Milosevic. We must do all we
can to protect our POWs and humanitarian workers who are in
Serbian prisons.
Finally, Madam Secretary, two proposed initiatives for next
month will receive close scrutiny as we mark up our foreign
operation bill next month. First, there is a proposal to
increase aid to Russia. Does this look less compelling right
now in light of new questions regarding espionage at our
national weapons labs?
Second, should we appropriate the Wye River request before
we know whether a new government in Israel will fully implement
the Wye agreement? The President, Secretary Cohen, and General
Shelton have spent a lot of time with Members of Congress in
serious two-way discussions about the crisis in Kosovo, but
this is our first opportunity to engage the Secretary of State
since the air strikes started.
I will now recognize Ms. Pelosi for an opening statement.
Ms. Pelosi's Opening Statement
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased
to join you in welcoming the distinguished Secretary of State
to our final hearing on the fiscal year 2000 budget request for
foreign operations. While we will undoubtedly spend most of our
time discussing Kosovo, I do want to raise several other budget
and policy issues first, though I want to compliment the
Secretary for her courageous leadership and for the strong
position she has taken at this critical time. I especially want
to commend her for her leadership in working with the NATO
alliance and keeping the alliance unified and focused on
Kosovo.
There will, of course, be many questions about the
decisions that have been made; and, as you know, there are 535
different ideas in the Congress about how to resolve this
crisis. But there are no easy answers; and the implications of
not acting boldly to stop Milosevic now, I believe, are
staggering. Congress will undoubtedly debate and vote on U.S.
involvement in Kosovo in some form in the near future. Some
will say with the benefit of hindsight that we should have
anticipated Milosevic's move on the Kosovars after the
discussion at Rambouillet. The use of ground troops, as
mentioned, will be debated. Some will call for accelerated
bombing of Serbia. But again I want to express my strong
support for the Secretary and, indeed, President Clinton for
their leadership in this crisis.
As the horrors of the refugee crisis become more and more
evident, including the use of rape as a weapon of war, Congress
must act to demonstrate the resolve of the U.S. to finish what
we and NATO are involved in there. It will not be easy. It will
not be inexpensive, Mr. Chairman; but we must stay united and
focused.
While everything else is occurring in the shadow of the
events in Kosovo, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, there are
many other issues that we want to deal with. I particularly
would like to acknowledge and applaud the administration's
decision to pursue a resolution condemning China's human rights
abuses at the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. As you know,
Mr. Chairman, the House unanimously passed a resolution 421 to
0 and the Senate 99 to 0 urging the administration to pursue
this resolution this year and to take all the measures
necessary to win at Geneva. I am pleased that the
administration responded, and I will be interested to hear the
Secretary's progress report on the administration's efforts to
lobby other countries to support this resolution.
I also want to commend the administration for the honesty
in its Human Rights Country Report on China this year. Many of
us feared there would be a whitewash of the China record. I
commend the State Department for its country report. I think it
follows that we should then pursue the resolution at the U.N.
on the strength of the information in the country report.
I want to also take a moment to express my concern about
the safety and well-being of a prominent Chinese reformer, Bao
Tong, a former senior party official currently under house
arrest in Beijing, having spent all the time since the
Tiananmen Square massacre, nearly 10 years, in prison. He is
now under house arrest.
In late March, Bao Tong sent a letter to China's President
and other leaders calling for the reversal of the official
verdict on the Tiananmen Square events. As Premier Zhu Rongji
is being wined and dined here in the United States, four
officials of the Chinese Public Security Bureau have visited
Bao Tong at home to inform him that his letter endangered state
security. He endangered state security by asking for the
reversal of the Tiananmen Square verdict. ``Endangering state
security'' is a charge used against many critics of China's
government and to deliver other threatening messages.
The intimidation of dissidents in China continues.
Following the President's visit last June, some Chinese,
including Xu Wenli, started to form a democratic party in
China. Xu Wenli is now serving a 13-year sentence for trying to
form a political party there.
I hope that the Secretary will use her good offices to
communicate to the Chinese government directly that such
attempts to muzzle its critics are not going unnoticed and
should be stopped. There are, of course, a number of other
issues relating to China which I would be interested in
discussing with the Secretary. But as you have said, Mr.
Chairman, we don't have all the time. So, I just wanted to put
those concerns on the record.
On the budget levels, the cuts contained in the budget
resolution of the majority, if realized, will devastate foreign
aid programs and irreparably damage our national security. Cuts
in the international affairs function of 15 to 25 percent
implied in the budget resolution would force the U.S. to close
embassies, cut back on assistance to all regions of the world,
including the Middle East, and require the U.S. to take a back
seat to other countries in the international banks, the U.N.,
and other international organizations. I intend to give the
Secretary the opportunity to comment on these budget cuts in
her testimony.
It is also important that we not lose sight of the
reconstruction needs in Latin America, which our distinguished
Chairman has mentioned as a result of the recent natural
disasters. Congress has once again gotten itself hung up on the
question of offsets and this has delayed this much-needed
assistance. The need to appropriate billions to pay for Kosovo
will force us once again to address the offset question. I hope
we can act expeditiously to get the assistance flowing. Clearly
the Central American supplemental should be funded as an
emergency without offsets.
Other concerns I intend to raise are military training,
infectious diseases--our Chairman has been a leader on child
survival--U.N. arrears, and our relationship with Russia, if
time allows. I look forward to the Secretary's testimony and
once again commend her for her courageous leadership. We are
all very proud of you, Madam Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you, Ms. Pelosi. Madam Secretary, we
have received your 32-page statement. We invite you, if you
want to take the time, to share it with the world. But if you
choose to abbreviate, that is your prerogative. Your statement
will be made a part of the record.
Secretary Albright's Opening Statement
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Ms. Pelosi and members of the committee. I am very pleased to
be here, although if I had my choice of dates to come and ask
you for money, April 15 would not be it.
As you said, you have my written statement, which I do urge
you all to review. It covers a lot of the important subjects
and parts of the world that I am not going to be able to
discuss today. But I think that it is important that people
understand the complexity and the range of issues that we deal
with. I will try to be briefer than 32 pages, but there are
some issues that I need to get on the table.
Events of the past year, especially in the Balkans, the
Gulf, Asia and Africa, illustrate the range of perils that
exist as we approach the new century. I come before the
subcommittee in search of the tools and resources that we need
to respond to those perils and to seize the opportunities for
ensuring our security and promoting our prosperity and
upholding our values. And I must say that this subcommittee has
generally supported adequate funding for international
programs, and for that I thank you and salute you.
This year, however, the proposed congressional budget
resolution would require a reduction of 15 percent in the
amount requested by the President for international affairs.
This is tantamount to surrendering American leadership around
the world. Anyone who says that we should do more to counter
terror or fight drugs to halt proliferation or promote American
exports or prevent the abuse of human rights should agree that
it is not possible to accomplish any of these goals without
resources. This is not a partisan issue. This is a call for a
strong U.S. foreign policy that comes from leaders of both
parties. And I hope very much that we can work together as we
have in the past, not only on our overall fiscal Year 2000
request for international affairs but also, as you have
mentioned, on our supplemental request for Jordan and to aid
the recovery of hurricane victims in Central America and the
Caribbean. We need to find a way of doing that without raiding
our priority programs.
In addition, the President will submit shortly an emergency
supplemental request to cover the costs related to the crisis
in Kosovo. The request will include funds for life-saving
humanitarian relief, assistance to embattled frontline states,
and other urgent requirements. If ever there were an emergency,
Mr. Chairman, this is one. We are not in this alone, for we
have friends in Europe and elsewhere who are providing a large
quantity of help, and we can get more specific on that in the
questions.
We do have to do our part. Thus, I will be urging the
subcommittee's support for prompt actions on the portions of
the request that will fall within your jurisdiction. I also ask
your support for our policy on Kosovo. We are confronting an
outrage we cannot accept, and only we and our allies have the
muscle to oppose.
President Milosevic has unleashed a rampage of ethnic
cleansing and genocide directed at the expulsion or total
submission of the Kosovo Albanian community. We have all seen
the images of families uprooted and put on trains, children
crying for parents they can't find, refugees recounting how
their loved ones were led away, and ominous photos from the sky
of freshly upturned earth. Behind these images is a reality
grimmer than any seen in Europe for more than half a century.
And make no mistake, this campaign of terror was not a result
of NATO action; it is a Milosevic production.
The region-wide killing, raping, shelling, burning, and
deporting were as meticulously planned as they are being
ruthlessly carried out. That is why force became NATO's only
option after the diplomatic solution we offered and reoffered
at Rambouillet was rejected over and over again by Belgrade.
Today our values and principles and our perseverance and
our strength are being tested, and we must be united at home as
we are with our allies overseas. And we must do all we can to
ease the suffering of the refugees and other victims. We must
and will persist in gathering evidence and documenting the
truth to help the war crimes tribunal hold perpetrators
accountable. And while continuing to strive to minimize
civilian casualties, we must strike and strike again until an
outcome that meets the demands of the international community
is achieved.
These demands are as simple as they are just. There must be
a verifiable stop to Serb military action against the people of
Kosovo. Belgrade's military police and paramilitary forces must
leave to enable refugees to return safely. An international
military presence must be permitted. And the people of Kosovo
must be given the democratic self-government they have long
deserved. In addition, as President Clinton has made clear, we
insist that the three American soldiers now in the custody of
Belgrade be released immediately and without conditions.
The current crisis highlights the need to integrate the
Balkans more fully into the Euro-Atlantic community of
democracies. We have made a start in this direction, but one
outcome of the current fighting must be a comprehensive
multiyear multinational approach. We do not want this conflict
to serve as a prelude to others. In the weeks ahead we will be
consulting with you and working with regional leaders, our
allies, and international financial institutions to develop a
strategy for bringing Europe's southeast corner into the
continent's main stream.
As we look ahead, we know that the prospects for long-term
peace in Europe also depend on the success of democracy in the
Baltics, Ukraine, Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia. For
this reason, I strongly urge your backing for the SEED and
Freedom Support Act programs. These democracy-building
initiatives are good investments. Already a number of countries
have graduated and no longer need our aid, but the region is
vast and the dangers posed by corruption, criminals, and
communist backsliders are great. We need your help in funding
these initiatives fully and flexibly so that the forces of
freedom may be bolstered and their enemies held at bay.
Our efforts to promote lasting stability across Europe are
mirrored in our own hemisphere through the Summit of the
Americas process. Here our challenge is to translate the
promise of reform into the reality of prosperity that is
broadly shared and to strengthen fragile democratic
institutions. One major test is in Colombia where we are
committed to helping President Pastrana reestablish the rule of
law and secure a future of peace for his people.
Similarly in Asia we are working with allies and partners
to improve security and cooperation, restore economic momentum
and build democracy. In this region there is no greater threat
to peace and stability than the situation on the Korean
Peninsula. With our Korean and Japanese allies and China, we
are seeking ways to reduce tensions. To this end, we have
vigorously pressed our concerns about North Korea's long-range
missile program. We have reached an agreement that will allow
U.S. inspection of suspicious underground construction at
Kumchang-ni, and we continue to insist that North Korea meet
its obligations under the Agreed Framework. That framework
succeeded in freezing North Korea's plutonium production and
separation functions at Yong Dong and bringing those facilities
under rigorous IAEA monitoring. Pursuant to the framework,
those facilities will eventually be dismantled and the nuclear
fuel shipped out of North Korea as long as North Korea is
abiding by its terms. Our support for the framework is vital,
and I urge Members to provide that support by approving the
President's request for $55 million for the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization.
Meanwhile, former Secretary of Defense William Perry is
conducting a comprehensive review of the U.S. approach to North
Korea. He is seeking extensive input from Congress and working
closely with our allies, and he will complete his
recommendations later this spring.
Also in East Asia, we have continued our strategic dialogue
with China. Since that dialogue began, China has taken positive
steps on proliferation, moved ahead on economic reform, and
played a responsible role during the Asia financial crisis. We
need to recognize this progress even as we press for more.
During Premier Zhu Rongji's visit to Washington last week,
President Clinton raised matters where the U.S. and China
disagree. These include our decision this year to pursue
vigorously a China-specific resolution at the Human Rights
Commission. This reflected our condemnation of widespread human
rights violations, including the arrests of Chinese who sought
peacefully to establish an opposition political party. And
Congresswoman Pelosi, I can assure you that the Chinese can
testify to you that I never miss an opportunity to raise the
subject.
Before and during Premier Zhu's visit, significant progress
was made towards an agreement that would allow China's
accession to the World Trade Organization on commercially
viable terms. Because such an agreement would clearly benefit
U.S. interests, we will resume negotiations later this month in
an effort to resolve the remaining issues.
As I have said before, in our relations with China,
engagement is not endorsement. We continue to have sharp
differences with Beijing, but we also believe that the way to
narrow those differences and to take advantage of the many
areas where U.S. and Chinese interests coincide is through
debate and dialogue.
In the Middle East, we continue to work with regional
leaders on behalf of peace. We are in regular contact with
Israeli and Palestinian officials, encouraging them to carry
out the Wye River Memorandum. We have expressed our support and
friendship to Jordan's new King Abdullah. We consult frequently
with the leaders of Egypt as we pursue our diplomatic efforts.
I hope we can count on the subcommittee's backing for those
programs that help our partners and support the peace process.
In the Gulf we have responded to flagrant Iraqi violations
with forceful measures to reduce the aggressive potential of
the Baghdad regime. We continue to defend pilots patrolling the
no-fly zones and to work with the Security Council to develop a
basis for resuming inspection and monitoring of Iraq's
remaining WMD capabilities.
Our policy is to counter the threats Saddam Hussein poses
to Iraq's neighbors, our allies, and our interests and to
support the Iraqi people's desire to reintegrate themselves
internationally and free themselves from a leader they do not
want, do not deserve and never chose.
Mr. Chairman, the new century will demand from us also a
fresh approach to the dangers and opportunities of Africa. With
regional leaders, we are searching today for ways to end bloody
conflicts from the Sudan and Horn of Africa to the Congo and
Sierra Leone. However, these immediate crises must not cause us
to neglect long-term goals; therefore, I urge your backing for
our efforts to assist the fragile transition to democracy in
Nigeria, to help extend the rule of law throughout the
continent, and to advance the essential human goal of
sustainable development.
Mr. Chairman, many of the measures we take to protect
American security and prosperity are directed at particular
countries or parts of the world. But others can best be
considered in global terms. These include our international
economic leadership, the war against terror, drugs and crime,
and initiatives to promote democracy and human rights. These
also include our strategy for safeguarding American security by
preventing weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that
deliver them from falling into the wrong hands.
The economic crisis in Russia and elsewhere in the new
independent states adds urgency to the need for effective
action. Thousands of scientists with WMD expertise are facing
increased temptations to sell their know-how to the highest
bidder. This year we are requesting $250 million for State
Department programs under the President's Expanded Threat
Reduction Initiative. These programs seek to enhance our
security by engaging weapons scientists to prevent
proliferation, halt smuggling, and tighten export controls.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, 50 years ago,
only a short distance from where we are now, President Harry
Truman delivered his first and only inaugural address. In what
came to be known as the ``Four Points Speech,'' he challenged
Democrats and Republicans alike to lend a hand to those
struggling for freedom and human rights; to continue programs
for world economic recovery; to strengthen international
organizations; and to draw on our country's expertise to help
people help themselves in the fight against ignorance, illness,
and despair.
I think that as we look at what is happening now, I believe
that we are summoned to meet similar responsibilities in a far
different time and to honor the principles that will endure for
all time. To achieve that mission, I pledge my own best efforts
and respectfully ask for your help and counsel.
We have a lot to do together, and I am very pleased to be
here today. Thank you, and I will now answer your questions.
[The statement of Secretary Albright follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Callahan. Thank you, Madam Secretary. At this time we
will recognize the Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Young of
Florida.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And Madam
Secretary, I would like to compliment you on your source of
energy. We see you showing up in all parts of the world, always
looking fresh and bright and energetic; and I am wondering
where that source of energy comes from. I think we would all
like to know that.
Secretary Albright. Makeup is a wonderful thing.
Mr. Young's Opening Statement
Mr. Young. And I want to compliment Chairman Callahan in
advance because he is going to have a major responsibility this
year to get as much out of the foreign operations account as he
can to do the things that you think and that he thinks needs to
be done. And also Chairman Jerry Lewis, who will have the
largest part of the supplemental as we deal with the national
defense aspect of the Kosovo involvement.
But also on this subcommittee--if you look closely you will
see that there are four subcommittee chairmen as Members of
this subcommittee, which gives it a very high priority and very
senior members. And I think that is good because they are going
to have a difficult time this year. And I wanted to focus on
the issue of Kosovo if I could and how that relates to the rest
of our responsibilities in the world.
And most of my comments will be related to national defense
and the Defense Department, but these days it appears that your
department and the Defense Department are pretty much merged on
a lot of the issues. So I don't feel out of order talking to
you about them.
But as we bring resources, military resources, into the
Balkan area, we are stretching really thin, Madam Secretary;
and I have been bringing this message to the administration and
to my colleagues in the Congress for the 4 years that I served
as Chairman of the defense subcommittee. But we are stretched
very thin. And today as we increase our involvement in the
Balkan region, we are taking resources from other areas of
responsibility.
For a number of years, we have talked about being able to
deal with two MRCs, major regional conflicts, simultaneously. I
don't think we can do that. Just recently, I have seen
resources taken from the Korean theater, the aircraft carrier
which has disturbed our allies in the region, the U-2 planes
that have been taken out of the region. F-15s that have been
dedicated to the defense of Korea and/or Japan have been
rededicated now to the Balkan area. EA6-Bs that were very
important in Northern Watch in Iraq have been dedicated now to
the Balkans.
And I am concerned that we are stretching so thin that if
something really serious like a major regional conflict
developed, we would be in trouble. And I worry about North
Korea because, as you know, you and I have met with the
leadership on many occasions and on some of those occasions we
have talked about North Korea, the development of the No Dong
missiles, the Taepo Dong missiles, the many underground
facilities that the North Koreans have. South Koreans are a
little edgy about this; our U.S. troops in the region are edgy
about this.
So the point that I am getting at--I am going to enlist
your help in convincing the administration--is that when they
send this supplemental down that we are prepared to consider as
an emergency without offsets that it be adequate, not only to
replace the bullets and the missiles and the spare parts, the
equipment that we are wearing out in the Balkans, but to
recognize that there is a serious stretching very thin of our
overall capability and hopefully support us in our effort to
try to get the military back to where it should be as far as
training hours, as far as spare parts, steaming hours for
ships, and things of this nature, things that we all know
about.
But the meeting we were supposed to have yesterday was
canceled for some reason. But we need to start the process
quickly on the dollar numbers. The number that I am reading in
the newspapers, in my opinion, will be totally inadequate to
carry the Balkan--even the Balkan issue from now to the end of
the fiscal year, because none of us know how much of an
involvement will be between now and the end of the fiscal year.
So what I am urging is an open mind and a realization that we
have to do more than just replace the bullets and the missiles,
because we are wearing out troops. We are wearing out
equipment. And I know you understand that. And I know you will
be supportive, at least I hope that you will be. And I thank
you for listening to me.
kosovo
Secretary Albright. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that I
think what has been quite remarkable in this administration,
especially as we look at Kosovo, has been the integration of
the efforts of the military with the diplomatic efforts, and
the very close work that I carry on with Secretary Cohen and
Chairman Shelton and the amount of time we all spend together
analyzing the various angles of the problem and supporting of
each other.
I have the highest respect for the American military.
Without it this country would not be what it is, and I believe
that the military needs to have what it must have in order to
be the strongest, best military in the world. I am grateful
every day to what our military is doing, not only in Kosovo,
but everywhere in the world. When I travel, I make a point of
visiting the troops.
I have also spent a lot of time in trying to work on a
policy where force and diplomacy work together. I think that
one without the other is not effective. Kosovo is a very good
example where we have tried for 10 years to solve the problem
diplomatically and ultimately needed the threat of force and
the use of force to support diplomacy. Now diplomacy is acting
in support of force. So with that I went to the NATO
ministerial meeting on Monday. It was in order to show the
political support for the NATO alliance.
I do believe that this is a package. Secretary Cohen and I
are talking about mutual support for each other as we look at
the emergency supplemental. It is a true emergency and needs to
be dealt with in that way.
The State Department part of it will consist of requests
for humanitarian assistance and assistance to the frontline
states and the Kosovars and security needs in terms of police
training, and war crimes and our operating budget. But I am
more involved in having discussions, not making decisions,
about OPTEMPOs and making sure that our military has what they
need to do the job. I agree completely that we need to support
them, and I am counting on you and Secretary Cohen to support
the other parts of the supplemental.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Obey.
Mr. Obey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, good to
have you with us. I don't intend to ask a question, I would
just like to ramble a little bit and lay out a couple of my
observations and concerns.
kosovo situation
As you know, I did not support the original resolution
endorsing the placement of U.S. peacekeepers pursuant to
Rambouillet. I did that for a couple of reasons. First of all,
as you know, I had a couple of concerns about the agreement
that was reached there. More importantly, I did not believe it
was any business of the Congress to decide where peacekeepers
should be placed because I feel that the placement of
peacekeepers falls within the President's commander in chief
prerogatives. And I also felt that the Congress' vote was
coming too early because we did not yet know what the final
conclusion was going to be to that conference, and I don't
believe in giving any administration a blank check.
Having said that, as I made quite clear, I fully support
what NATO is doing at the moment. I think we had no historical
choice. I said in the speech on the floor when we were debating
the issue that if we had a vote on the floor to deal militarily
with the situation, I would vote yes.
But I am concerned about some of the second-guessing that
is going on. And I would like to walk through some of that. We
now have, for instance, a lot of people in the Congress
insisting that we move in with ground troops. I would point out
that the vote in the Senate, which was only an authorization
for an air war, was a fairly narrow vote. And I doubt at the
time that if the Senate had voted on ground troops that they
would have voted yes. I think the Congress needs to be a little
skeptical about its own advice these days.
Secondly, sometimes when you are operating with an
alliance, you don't have the luxury of doing everything you
would do if you were operating alone. President Bush found that
out the hard way when he was criticized for supposedly stopping
one or two days early in Iraq and not going into Baghdad and
cleaning out Saddam then. In my view, President Bush had no
choice but to do what he did because the alliance that we had
had never agreed to move on to Baghdad. And so to keep the
alliance together, he chose an imperfect solution. I think he
had no choice at the time. And I think the administration has
had the same situation with respect to the cries for ground
action in Kosovo at this moment.
I think it has been amazing how far you have brought the
NATO alliance. But if General Clark had asked for ground troops
in the beginning, I don't believe he would have even gotten
NATO's permission to proceed with an air war. And I think it is
important to understand what this history has been.
On June 25 of '91, Croatia and Slovenia declared their
independence. In June 26 of '91, Serb forces moved into Croatia
in areas with large Serb populations. In October of '91,
Albania occupied Kosovo. On December 15 of '91, Germany warned
that they might recognize Croatia and Slovenia before
Christmas. At that time President Bush cautioned them; in my
view, correctly so. The next day, Germany did recognize
Croatia. I went to Germany the following April. My son was a
student at the University in Germany, and I gave a speech
there. I noted what the Germans had done in recognizing
Croatia, and I indicated that I felt that having done that,
they had incurred certain responsibilities. And one of the
responsibilities was to face the fact that Milosevic's
continued reaction to the destruction of Yugoslavia and the
western recognition of some of those countries would inevitably
lead to the need for them to use military action. That speech
was not well received, to say the least. They thought I was
nuts. But the fact is that today what I said, has largely been
borne out.
But now we are hearing a lot of second guessing. I want to
stipulate publicly that when I was in briefings with the
administration, with the military, with the CIA, with you, with
the Secretary of Defense, and with the President, we were told
up front by the President, nose to nose, that the Congress
needed to understand that this air war might not go very well,
especially at first. And we were told specifically that it
might very well not succeed in preventing Milosevic's driving
out the Kosovars, but that it would at least degrade his
military capability and begin to create the conditions that we
would hope would eventually lead him back to the bargaining
table. So I don't feel that what has happened so far is any
surprise, given what we were told about ahead of time by the
President.
But I believe certain things need to happen. I do believe
that the President needs to go on television and explain to the
country why he is asking for the supplemental. I think when he
does that, he needs to make quite clear what Mr. Milosevic was
planning in Operation Horse Shoe. My constituents don't know
that he was planning to wipe out a village a day because he
felt if he didn't do any more than that, the West would not
react. And when my constituents are told that, they immediately
understand that the carnage that is occurring in Kosovo is not
because of NATO; it is because of Milosevic and his thuggery,
and I think the President needs to go on television and explain
that.
I think the President also needs to continue to insist that
these funds not be offset. If we had run World War II by having
the accountants govern rather than the military strategists and
the political leadership, we wouldn't be worrying about having
to take on Mr. Milosevic in Kosovo today because Nazi flags
would still be flying in Belgrade and in Kosovo. We fought the
war first, and we did the accounting afterwards.
It seems to me that this is clearly an emergency and so is
Central America. After all, we are being asked to take about
20,000 refugees from Kosovo. We have 1,000,000 refugees coming
out of Latin America if this is not handled right. That is a
far greater direct impact on our own society than the war in
Kosovo will be.
The other thing I want to say is that when people are
urging that the Russians be involved--and I think they need to
be involved--I think it is going to be immeasurably more
difficult to get them involved when they see, for instance,
that the Congress has taken $300 million off the table in the
bill that the House passed a month ago, taken $300 million off
the table to finance an agreement we are trying to get started
with the Russians on converting weapons-grade plutonium. It
just seems to me that that, indeed, is a strange way to build
confidence with the Russians that they can deal with us on
issues.
So I would hope that the White House would be firm in its
insistence that accountants not rule the game. And I also would
make one other observation. I think it is to the credit of the
American people and to our press that they are concerned about
casualties on the other side. I think that says something good
about human beings in our public and in the press. But at the
same time, I think the press has to be careful in its coverage
of the mistakes that are made by NATO to not wind up creating
the impression that somehow because mistakes are made by pilots
that therefore we should be pulling our punches in what we are
doing in Kosovo. I just have to say that if NATO pilots were
consistently as accurate as the press is, that on occasion NATO
bombs would be falling on Iowa.
So I would simply urge people to recognize it is a hell of
a lot easier to second guess when you are sitting behind a
committee table or behind a TV camera than it is when you are
in the cockpit or when you are in NATO headquarters or when you
are trying to deal with this situation from the front lines. To
me, this is the time when we have got to come together, and we
need to do it fast. And while no one is going to agree fully
with what any administration does on any of these subjects, I
think that you are doing the very best you can under difficult
circumstances, and we need to stand with you.
nato
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Obey. I
appreciate very much your going through the history of this and
the attempts that we have made.
I am very proud of what this administration is doing
because I think we are standing up for American values, the
necessity of dealing when there is a barbaric attempt to
cleanse ethnically a whole group of people and when we see the
plight of the refugees. I appreciate very much your making that
clear. The President is giving a speech today on the West Coast
in San Francisco, and I think he is going to express again the
sense of determination that we and NATO have to carry this out.
I have said this before that I would much prefer to be
questioned by the press or questioned by all of you about what
we are doing than to be sitting here and have all of you say
why aren't you doing this? Why are you standing by while this
great horror is being carried out?
Mr. Obey. I do want to add one thing because I don't want
to leave any confusion. I do not object to the administration's
preparing for the eventuality of having to use ground troops.
In fact, I favor that. I recognize how difficult that is, given
the concerns of some of our other NATO allies. But I think
without busting up the alliance, we need to do as much as we
possibly can to prepare the infrastructure for the use--for the
possible use of ground troops if Milosevic does not respond to
the air campaign, because I am highly concerned that when this
is all over and we finally do get into Kosovo, we are going to
find large numbers of people no longer with us. And I don't
think we will feel very comfortable if we haven't done
everything possible to avoid that catastrophe.
opposition to ground troops
Mr. Callahan. Echoing some of the discussion on ground
troops, Mrs. Albright--I have expressed this to you and to the
President--I don't care what the polls say, I am opposed to
American ground troops in Kosovo under any circumstances,
whether they be peacekeeping or other types of ground troops.
We are participating and cooperating with the alliance. Our
proportional financial contribution, including our Navy and Air
Force, are far more of a contribution than any other country is
making. But I am not elected to make military decisions. The
President and his military people make those decisions. I am
elected by the people of my district in Alabama to represent
them in the Congress of the United States.
I did not poll the people of Alabama. My personal view is
that American ground troops in Kosovo are wrong and unnecessary
and that anything we can do to preclude the use of American
forces on the ground in any part of this endeavor. I am going
to be opposed to the introduction of our troops in the region.
Mr. Lewis. Chairman Lewis?
funding concerns
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, let me express my appreciation to
you, to Ms. Pelosi, and to the rest of my colleagues for
allowing me to be present, in part, wearing the hat that
relates to my other work in the appropriations process. Madam
Secretary, you may not be aware that our Ranking Member, Mr.
Obey, and I spent over a decade together on this subcommittee
in the past; and I must say I applaud his statement today.
Rambling, he suggested, but very cogent in terms of the
problems and priorities that are a part of our current crisis.
In that earlier decade, he and I didn't always agree. We
argued a bit about Central America and El Salvador, et cetera,
but at the end of the game we have had a different kind of
success in Latin America than we are experiencing currently in
the Balkans. And so, today, Madam Secretary, I come back as a
Member of this subcommittee for no light reason in this very
challenging time. I want to join my colleagues in welcoming you
here today and express my appreciation to your very committed,
not just energetic, but capable efforts in connection with our
challenges, particularly in Europe.
It is a privilege to serve on this subcommittee. But the
challenges of wearing that hat as the chairman of the defense
subcommittee are entirely another thing. As a consequence, in
our current activities in Kosovo the whole difficulty of
solving the immediate problem and finding our way out weighs
very, very heavily upon this member.
I know that today's session will largely focus upon
questions about Kosovo, for it is a necessity in this
subcommittee. But as we do that, I must tell you that I am
looking at this situation from another perspective. It is
extremely important that America not lose its broader focus. We
have been involved in a number of missions that were planned;
some were not planned. Several were unforeseen, clearly several
unbudgeted. And I would ask the committee just to focus for a
moment on some of that.
There have been missions that to many have been
questionable from a national security perspective and missions
whose demands in terms of people, equipment, and money have
been both substantial and debilitating to our overall military
preparedness. The military deployment to Bosnia has already
cost us over $9 billion, a figure that will grow to perhaps
maybe even more than $11 billion by the end of fiscal year
2000.
Operations against and around Iraq have cost about $7
billion, as we can measure it this moment. I am concerned that
as we are addressing Kosovo we are moving forces away from the
region around Iraq, and that in itself creates a number of
questions that are extremely problematical. Haiti and Rwanda
and other contingencies have cost us over a billion dollars.
Easily one can total in this variety of missions some $20
billion, largely unbudgeted, which puts great pressure on our
military processes.
We have, as you know, for some time been steadily reducing
the gross dollar amount allocated to our defense systems; and
yet you have clearly understood that there is a direct linkage
between our ability to carry forward our responsibilities as
the leader in the free world and our need for military strength
as we are now engaged in combat with Serbia. Madam Secretary,
as I said earlier, I am sure we will dwell on that problem
largely today. That is more than understandable under these
circumstances. But I raise these other points to remind you and
others that Kosovo is not only a national security problem. We
obviously can confirm today that it expands well beyond just
the Balkans. Iraq, North Korea, China, India, Pakistan, Iran,
and, of course, I certainly hope no one on this subcommittee is
forgetting Russia.
All of these are potential flash points, all posing serious
problems that engage our Nation's core national security
interests. I must ask how and whether we can rely upon our
military strength for possible contingencies in these areas at
the same time we have, in all likelihood, committed ourselves
to long and costly commitments in the Balkans, even if the
fighting were to end today.
When I ponder these questions based on where we are today,
Madam Secretary, I confess that I am not optimistic. The issue
is simple. Are we willing to commit resources needed to protect
our vital interests in many of these hard target areas first,
as we discuss Kosovo?
I would ask you to help me with two fundamentals. The first
is I believe the American people continue to need a clear and
understandable statement by the President as to what our
humanitarian, as well as strategic interests, are in Kosovo and
a plan connected with that objective as well as our end game.
How do we get out of this at the other end? That is largely a
defense question, Madam Secretary; but we are in this because
of our defense responsibilities.
But the second question involves one that very much falls
in the lap of this subcommittee specifically. As we get to
whatever endgame there is, on all of our minds is the plight of
these refugees who, in excess of a million, are in the minds of
the American public as well. I ask you, if we are successful as
a part of our plan in returning these refugees to their home
communities, who is going to pay the costs of rebuilding
Kosovo? The term NATO is very interesting and very important,
but the burden usually falls very significantly upon the United
States.
So who is going to bear these costs of the reconstruction
of Kosovo? Clearly, that is a foreign operations or a foreign
affairs question. Clearly, it is not a national defense
question. So, Madam Secretary, as I appreciate the opportunity
to ponder with you these very grave difficulties, clearly the
problem is not going to end with just the war itself. It goes
well beyond and involves your leadership specifically. I
appreciate your being with us.
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me say that, as I said to Chairman Young, I believe very
strongly that our military needs to have the assets to carry
out its responsibilities, and that we cannot let down our guard
in any other part of the world while we deal with the Kosovo
issue. And I can assure you that we also spend a great deal of
time thinking and talking about Korea, Iraq, and the other
flash points. It is very much on our mind that we cannot focus
on one thing to the avoidance of dealing with the issues there.
But let me just say--and you might expect that I am not
here to discuss the Defense budget--but I would like to say the
following: that the partnership between the Defense Department
and the State Department is what is essential in carrying out
our national security policy. We would also prefer to solve our
problems diplomatically. One can try as much charm as possible,
but ultimately it takes money. If you look at our budget as you
are quoting those figures, do you know that our entire budget
for the State Department is $21 billion? What I am coming here
to ask for is $14 billion for all the work that we do in
foreign operations, which has to do with a number of other
issues that are in my long written testimony and some that I
mentioned here that involve fighting the war on drugs or
dealing with terrorism or dealing with human rights problems or
assistance programs to countries that we are trying to make
sure do not tip over into chaos and confusion and create
instability for us.
It is a paltry amount, frankly, in comparison. It is 1
percent of Federal spending. And I think that most Americans
are surprised, because as foreign policy is described and our
foreign aid programs are described, you would think it was a
quarter of the budget, and it is not. I believe that the best
way to protect our military and work with it is for us to have
an effective diplomacy and to work hand in glove together on
it.
I would hope--and I am planning to speak out loudly on
behalf of the Defense budget because I believe in it--that we
also need those who speak on behalf of the Defense budget to
speak for the foreign policy part of the budget, the diplomacy
of the State Department. We can't have a hollow diplomacy. We
cannot have buildings that are not secure, and we can't have
buildings that are secure where nobody has anything to do in
them because we don't have any money.
As Mr. Obey said, you know, we can't do this by having
accountants worry about how we take care of our policy. We need
to have a robust policy. I have been saying that what is
happening on the offsets now is that we are not only robbing
Peter to pay Paul; we are robbing Paul.
We are robbing Peter to pay Paul. There is no money there.
You cannot keep moving money around.
kosovo
Now, on the issues that you asked about, the President and
I and his other advisors have said that our interests in Kosovo
are very broad and deep in terms of America's interests. First
of all, Americans, as we have seen, and the American public
supports what we are doing, are appalled at the kinds of
humanitarian tragedies. America cannot stand by while people
are slaughtered and raped and ethnically cleansed and watch as
that is taking place and creating a great sense of instability.
I happen to believe that the Balkan peninsula is very
important to European stability and security. European
stability and security is important to the United States.
Making sure that ultimately that peninsula is integrated into a
Europe where there is democracy and prosperity is important to
the United States.
Finally, we have done a lot of talking about NATO. NATO is
the prime military alliance of our time. This is the first war
that it has really fought. The unity of NATO is remarkable, and
America's leadership in it is something essential to the
national interest. Those are the broad interests that we have,
and I believe that, as the President is going to say a little
later today, we must prevail. It is essential that we prevail
for our national interests.
Now, the end game is that, as we have made clear, the air
campaign is going to continue. Milosevic has the choice of
saying that there will be an agreement, and that the Kosavars
will be able to go home and will be able to have a self
government and will be able to function within the Balkan
peninsula. And as the President is going to say, we are
prepared to inflict such damage to Milosevic's military that he
either accepts the outcome that we seek, or the balance of
power in Kosovo will shift against him at a time when his
actions, far from destroying his opposition, are galvanizing
its strength and determination. Ultimately he can choose to cut
his mounting losses or lose his ability to maintain his grip on
Kosovo. It may not come out with those words, but I think that
the point here is that we are determined to prevail.
Also let me say, and I can provide you with more detailed
information because I know that Chairman Callahan is
interested, that the Europeans are carrying their fair share.
They are carrying it by the contributions and the numbers of
planes and the sorties. I will let Secretary Cohen talk more
about that at some point. They are also sharing in terms of the
amount of money they have put aside for economic and
humanitarian assistance to Kosovo as well as to the neighboring
front line states. They have agreed to take the leadership role
in coordinating the international reconstruction assistance and
in managing that. Obviously we are going to have to take a role
in that. But I think that more than I have ever seen the
Europeans understand their prime responsibility for that. Our
role in reconstruction is to leverage the money that we have
with additional funds from them and to lead. Believe me I spend
a great deal of time on the phone with my fellow foreign
ministers. The American role in keeping unity and determination
is essential, and I think that it is a role that we should be
proud to have.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I appreciate the
Chairman's patience with my concern here. I am almost
desperately reminded of a former Secretary of Defense by the
name of McNamara in the Vietnam age and the word
``gradualism''. Madam Secretary, the refugees are at the other
end of that. That will be the committee's responsibility. But
between now and then there is almost an incredible job to make
sure that the American public understands that they are in that
for the long haul if we are going to go down that road.
Gradualism had a different effect at a different time in our
recent history. It could be disastrous for America's leadership
unless a very solid foundation that involves the permanency of
American public support has been well established by the
President. Otherwise will be known as Clinton's war. At the
other end, though, there is probably what used to be the
Marshall Plan, potentially the Albright Plan, that involves all
of the Balkans as a piece of the other end of this. Thank you.
Secretary Albright. Thank you.
funding concerns
Mr. Callahan. Madam Secretary, I want to recognize the
chairman of the full committee. But let me just make an
observation about some of the discussion that just took place.
The responsibility of this committee is to fund the foreign
operations of your State Department. That is our primary
function. But seemingly here lately we are beginning to be more
involved in the discussion of military activities. It appears
if we continue the type of activity we are engaged in today
before long we are going to have the Secretary of Defense sit
next to you in order to have a hearing on foreign policy. That
somewhat disturbs me. I don't know why, that just disturbs me.
Our role on this committee is to give you an adequate
amount of money to have an effective foreign policy. You
mentioned that we are only talking about $21 billion. I would
remind you, and we discussed it earlier, that today is April
15. Americans in my district and in every Congressional
district in our country are filing their taxes tonight. If you
divide it by 435, each Congressional district will contribute
about a billion dollars to the United States Treasury. So when
we are talking in terms of only $21 billion or talking in terms
of only a billion dollars, we are talking about all of the
income taxes that are paid in any single Congressional
district. So sometimes I think we lose sight of how much money
we are talking about when we talk about billions of dollars.
I would think today especially, when the people in my
district in Alabama recognize that when they send me a billion
dollars, I am going to spend it all in one day? I am going to
spend it all in just a matter of seconds here trying to help
people? It is not a question of whether or not they support our
efforts with respect to the humanitarian aspects of this
problem, but a question of real money coming into the Treasury
for our appropriations.
So I am concerned about the apparent closeness of the
Defense Department and the State Department. There are some in
Alabama who ask me is it Mrs. Albright or is it the Defense
Department, does she utilize the Defense Department to effect
her diplomacy. That is a question that comes up. It may not be
true, it may not be accurate. It may be unfair. But these
questions come up and they ask if we going into a diplomatic
room to negotiate changes that will make life better for all
the world, and at the same time saying that if you don't do
what we want, we are going to bomb you? That is a very serious
perception that is beginning to take place. I doubt seriously
that is the fact, but nevertheless it is a perception that we
must be concerned with.
diplomacy
Secretary Albright. May I comment, Mr. Chairman. First of
all, the point that I was making is that our budget is 1
percent of all federal spending. You were kind enough to invite
me to Mobile. I had a wonderful time addressing a very large
audience. At that stage the Asian financial crisis was hot and
heavy. Your constituents asked me about the effects of the
Asian financial crisis on your port. We talked about the
importance of solving it because some of your industries were
hurting as a result of the Asian financial crisis. I believe
that the American public really does understand that there is
no border now between domestic and foreign policy issues, and
that there is nothing foreign about foreign policy. We are
today focusing on the use of force in an area where we tried
diplomacy for 10 years. It didn't work because, as ``The
Washington Post'' has said, the Serb offensive was meticulously
planned. When you are dealing with someone who has decided to
eliminate a population or reengineer an entire province, there
is a certain stage at which diplomacy will not work.
Diplomacy does work without force, however, as we have
dealt with the trade crisis, in Thailand, Indonesia, South
Korea. We are looking at what we are doing in Central America
to develop a region of partnership with our hemisphere that is
stronger than ever before. We are trying to encourage democracy
and trade in Africa. This, diplomacy is an essential part of
how the United States works.
As I have said, there are times that diplomacy needs the
backing of force and force needs the backing of diplomacy. But
for the most part, diplomacy works on its own. The purpose of
foreign policy is to influence other countries to understand
U.S. national interests, and we do that with a minimal amount
of money and normally without the use of force.
I think that your constituents and everybody's constituents
here understand that there is no border between domestic and
foreign policy. What they don't understand is that it is only 1
percent of our budget that goes for that kind of active
diplomacy.
importance of foreign aid
Mr. Callahan. I might comment because of your visit to
Mobile you have certainly educated the people of my district
about the importance, not only economic importance, but the
overall importance of a well-financed foreign policy. That is
not a question anymore because of the fact that you did explain
it to them. I think that you recognize that you are well
revered in my district. I am happy that you are not eligible to
run for the presidency, because you do have a great deal of
admiration and popularity in my district.
But regardless of your popularity or mine, we have a
responsibility. That responsibility is--my role in government
is appropriating money. That is my role. I think that I do have
the responsibility and the right to question any agency of
government and to try to help them understand that while the
people do want and do understand the importance of an effective
foreign policy, at the same time they are filing their taxes
today and they wonder where all of that money is going to or
will more money be needed in the future.
Secretary Albright. I have no better partner than you, Mr.
Chairman, in doing that work.
budget resolution
Mr. Young. Madam Secretary, yesterday the House passed the
conference report on the budget resolution. I know some that
support that resolution and some that don't and some that are
sort of mixed on it. Because that happened we can now proceed
with the assignment of the 302(b) allocations, and I am going
to have to excuse myself because that process I am beginning
that morning. But as I go to do that, and I know all of the
members of the subcommittee are anxious to see what the 302(b)
allocations are going to be, it is not going to be easy because
as we look at the 1997 budget caps, I think everybody--all of
the subcommittees are looking for the opportunity to meet more
responsibilities than those budget capss provide for. However,
as I go to do that, I just wanted to leave one other thought
along the lines of my first comments to you.
For the last 14 years we have been reducing our investment
in our national defense. Desert Storm, we had 18 Army
divisions, today we have 10. The number of fighter wings in the
Air Force are down substantially since Desert Storm. We have
been, as Mr. Lewis pointed out, to so many deployments. I hope
that you will pass on to the President, and I hope that you
will agree, I have passed it on to him and I am not sure if he
agrees or not, but Madam Secretary, you can't fight wars out of
a petty cash fund. If you are going to fight wars, if you are
going to commit troops, you have got to be prepared to pay for
them. Congress has not been involved in any of the decisions to
fight these wars, but we always get the bill at the end. So
understand that as we deal with that supplemental, it has got
to be realistic. We have got to get real and make up for a lot
of lost time in our national defense at the same time we pay to
replace the bullets and the missiles and the spare parts and
things like that.
I appreciate you being here, and I apologize for having to
leave but the 302(b) bill allocations are essential if we are
going to keep on schedule for our appropriations bills. Thank
you.
Secretary Albright. Let me just say that our feelings about
the budget resolution are not mixed.
Mr. Young. I understand that.
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am very
sorry our distinguished chairman is leaving. We have been
blessed on the Appropriations Committee with always having a
very distinguished chairman and I know that Mr. Young will look
out for the interests of our subcommittee in the 302(b)
allocations.
Like the defense budget where the spending has been
reduced, so too with the foreign operations budget. We are 25
percent lower than we were probably 10 years ago. Obviously,
foreign aid is a good investment. If we do more diplomatically,
we would have to do less militarily, and I think that is what
the American people would like to see us do.
I appreciated your expression about the budget in your
remarks and your response to our distinguished chairman, Mr.
Young. I am concerned about, for example, initiatives that we
want to take in Africa in development and in child survival,
again our chairman is the leader there. Loan forgiveness is not
one of his areas of interest, but it is one of mine. I regret
that we missed an opportunity to stop genocide in Rwanda.
Specifically, I want to comment on the issue of AIDS, which
is one that I have been particularly interested in. When we are
talking about development in Africa, we have to recognize the
impact of the AIDS epidemic there. I would hope that you use
your good offices to place AIDS on the G-7 agenda in a very
strong and positive way, because only then, I think, will there
be the recognition of the impact of AIDS, not only on the
people of Africa personally, but on their economies as well.
Moving on from there, as I mentioned on the question of
China, I commend the Administration for moving on the
resolution at the U.N. There is real need for that. Freedom
House just put out its April report saying that since mid-1998
China has intensified its already harsh persecution of Roman
Catholics and Protestants who insist in worshipping outside
government control. Religious leaders are more likely to be
jailed. Bishop James Su Zhimin and his auxiliary bishop, Ahn
Shushin, from Hebei Province have disappeared after their
arrest in 1996 for carrying out an unauthorized Marian devotion
and are assumed to be in detention. The list goes on and on.
And, as I mentioned earlier Bao Tong, I would hope that the
President or you, Madam Secretary, would have brought the issue
of Bao Tong and Xu Wenli up with Zhu Ronji. Perhaps you could
respond in your answer.
My question is, in light of all that is going on in China
and the continued repression following the President's visit,
what is it that the administration has planned in order to be
successful at Geneva with the U.N. resolution?
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much. Let me say that
you were very kind to comment about the State Department
report. I think that is telling it like it is--something that I
am very proud of. I made the point not too diplomatically at
the Chinese reception honoring the 20th anniversary of our
normalization. I made the points very clearly when I was in
China, and I made the points very clearly here in my visit with
Premier Zhu Rongji as well as Foreign Minister Tang as well as
the President. We have consistently raised the points very
strongly, I can assure you.
On the question of what we are doing in Geneva. There is no
question, Congressman Pelosi, that this is an uphill battle.
The Chinese have been lobbying very strongly with a number of
countries and Europeans generally. There was a sense that there
were those who wanted to have a noncountry specific approach to
China. We have insisted that there be a China specific
resolution. And we have one more week before it comes up for a
vote in Geneva. At this time no other country has agreed to
cosponsor the resolution, which I think is depressing to say
the least. What is going to happen is the Chinese will
introduce a no action motion, and we are now lobbying very
heavily to have countries vote against that.
I have spent an inordinate amount of time with my foreign
minister colleagues over Kosovo, but every single time that I
have that discussion, I also point out the importance of
support on the China, first on the no action and then on the
resolution itself. We have sent out worldwide cables. All of
our ambassadors are making demarches on that subject, and we
are pulling out every stop. But I think in all honesty that it
is not easy. We will continue to pursue the resolution because
it is the right thing to do. I can assure you that I have put a
major effort into that.
Ms. Pelosi. Madam Secretary, I just hope that it is not too
little too late in that regard. Anyway, I know that many of us
on that committee would be very eager to be helpful to you in
any way that we can in talking to some of the other countries.
The Chinese have mixed economics and politics very well on the
Commission while they admonish others not to do that.
The other point I want to make is that it seems so ironic
that at the time when we are coming to defend the credibility
of NATO by putting our young people in harm's way that we can't
get a second to a motion from our European allies when we are
talking about human rights elsewhere.
On the subject of Kosovo, moving on to that briefly, you
have made an excellent presentation. As I listen to the
exchanges here, I am reminded that Napoleon said that one bad
general is better than two good generals. In this particular
case it seems we have, again, 535 generals who know what we
should be doing there. I have never seen a situation where the
Congress is acting as if we know more about the military
situation there than the President would, with the benefit of
the Joint Chiefs and other resources available to him.
Could you for the record tell us what you have alluded to
regarding Milosevic's plan for ethnic cleansing, whether or not
the bombing had taken place, and I might add for my colleagues,
the identity cleansing of the Kosovars by stripping them of
their passports, birth certificates, and burning any place that
would have records of their identity. If you would, Madam
Secretary, for the record tell us about that.
Secretary Albright. Let me summarize it. I actually think
that it would be useful for the record if that article were
included.
Ms. Pelosi. Last Sunday's.
Secretary Albright. Last Sunday's, which I think details in
a way that I can't do now all of the aspects of it. Let me just
say the following thing. If you look at the history of
Milosevic's reign, what we find is that he used the nationalist
card to gain power. It began with Kosovo when he made very
clear in 1989 that he would remove its autonomy. Kosovo is an
area that is an historically important area to the Serbs.
Nobody denies that. But it doesn't mean that the majority
ethnic Albanians and other minorities cannot live there.
Milosevic has had this policy for a long time. What has
happened is that in the last two years he has supervised the
dismemberment of his country because he had lost Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia. He has now returned to turn his
attention to Kosovo.
This article is largely consistent with our data. It is a
subject that I talk about with my colleague foreign ministers.
What Milosevic had planned to do is reengineer the population
of Kosovo to get rid of the Albanians. The Serbs won't even
agree to the number of Albanians that are there. They planned
to replace them with Serbs from other areas where they had been
pushed out as a result of changes within Yugoslavia. Milosevic
began to mass his forces, despite the fact that, as you know,
in October there was an agreement made with him that he would
reduce the number of his military, paramilitary, and the
special police, the MUP, and withdraw them. He did not do that.
He then systematically went and burned the houses of Albanians.
If you fly over the area, you can see where the Serv forces
systemically go after houses where there are Albanians living.
They have pulled people out. They have sent military age men to
what the KLA have described to me as concentration camps. They
have put old women and children on the road. They have
separated families. They have raped. They have used every form
of degradation to destroy a people.
There are those who have asked why are we doing that? Well,
we tried because we knew that he had this plan, that he had
30,000 troops massed on the border, with 300 tanks ready to go.
We tried very hard not to have that happen. It is almost as if
there had been a tape running of what was going on in Kosovo.
What Milosevic did was once the bombing started was to put it
into fast forward and put all of the plans that he had into
place together as rapidly as possible.
As you pointed out, he has taken away the identity cards
and identification of the people so that as people are allowed
to come back in, he determines who is who. These people have
lost their homes and identity.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Madam Secretary. As our colleague,
Mr. Obey, said, it is important for the American people to know
his intentions. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again for
your courageous work.
Mr. Callahan. Chairman Porter.
Mr. Porter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, I can
imagine that you are sitting there saying why couldn't I have
been Secretary of State during the Cold War, when things were
simple and direct. I think we need to remind ourselves that we
are engaged in two wars, at the same time. This morning, you
have already received a lot of questions on Kosovo. I want to
make a statement regarding that. First, however, I want to ask
a question about the other war.
In Kosovo, I think the American people have to put this
whole thing in historical prospective. For the first time in
human history, the world's strongest nation is not using its
power to gain or to conquer for its own self-aggrandizement. We
are using that power to protect the world from ethnic cleansing
and genocide and to extend freedom and self-determination on an
oppressed people. That is the first time that that has ever
happened. I think that the American people can be terribly
proud for the values we are expressing to the world and the
leadership we are providing.
Because you and I share the same commitment on human rights
and democracy and the rule of law, you may think that I would
be sitting here pounding on the table and saying that we have
got to send ground troops into Kosovo right now. Clearly, I
believe that the President should not have said at the very
beginning that we are not going to do that. I think that was a
gratuitous, colossal mistake on the President's part. He should
never have taken that option off the table at the beginning of
these hostilities because it leaves Slobodan Milosevic with the
option of trying to simply wait out our air strikes.
I think the President should begin the process of reversing
that position. He should be working quietly with all of our
NATO allies to bring them together in a united front. To have
complete participation from every NATO nation, even the newest
ones, if ground troops are to be used eventually in Kosovo.
I personally think we ought to continue the air campaign
and destroy every bit of Milosevic's infrastructure that we
possibly can in an effort to bring the removal of his troops
from Kosovo. I think this is the option that we should be
pursuing very strongly at this point in time. If that is not
going to work, I would then, if I were the President, announce
together with my NATO allies that we will in fact use ground
troops and begin mobilization in the hopes that that would
bring him to his senses.
I think that the worst thing that could possibly happen to
the United States and to our values and to our policies in
Kosovo is that we undertake too little and fail. If we send in
ground troops too early and have a lot of casualties, I think
the American people might move back from that commitment. We
must proceed very carefully. But I think the worst thing that
could ever happen is that we end up giving in to a man like
Miloservic, an ethnic cleanser, a dictator, and an instigator
of genocide. In the end, we must have victory in Kosovo.
I want to talk though and I want to ask a question about
the other war that is going on, the one in Iraq. Madam
Secretary, we have lost our allies in the U.N. to a position of
bringing this Iraqi dictator to heel. We have no surveillance
or inspections going on of his building weapons of mass
destruction. We seem to have no policy at all except to destroy
his air defenses and we seem to be totally preoccupied in
Kosovo while Saddam Hussein is left with virtually free rein to
rebuild what has given him power in the past.
I think an argument, a very good argument could be made
that the greater threat to U.S. and regional security is Iraq
and that we have no direction in this area. And I would ask you
specifically, Madam Secretary, what are we doing in this area
other than to provide air cover in the north and south and
destroy some of his air defenses? Is Saddam Hussein taking
advantage of this time when we are preoccupied in Kosovo? What
is our policy there? What are we going to do to change that
situation which could ultimately provide a far greater threat
to the region than the one we face in Kosovo?
Secretary Albright. Thank you, Congressman Porter. You are
right. The Cold War was very dangerous but certainly simpler.
You were mentioning Iraq and we could mention other areas that
are of concern to us. This means that we have to be able to
think about all of these areas at the same time and not deal
with one to the exclusion of the other. I can assure you that
that is not happening.
If I could just say one thing about the ground troops and
then answer you on Iraq. I think that NATO's military
commanders have not recommended the introduction of ground
troops in Kosovo. We are in the third week of an intensive air
campaign, and we have complete confidence that it will work.
What I found again at NATO on Monday is the determination by
all 19 allies now to have a sustained and intensive air
campaign. I do think it is important for people to know that
NATO has done detailed planning for ground troops as part of an
international security presence if an agreement is reached.
Last fall NATO completed an assessment of options to introduce
ground troops in a nonpermissive environment. Both of these
plans could be updated very quickly if it were necessary to do
so.
On Iraq, let me say the no fly zones are being patrolled
and action is taking place. What is interesting in terms of
what you were saying about losing our allies is that the
sanctions do remain in place. And the Security Council is
considering this week the reports of a series of committees
that were set up by the Security Council to assess how the
monitoring of weapons of mass destruction can take place and
their recommendations for intrusive monitoring as well as how
to deal with the humanitarian situation. I have been very
encouraged by the reports of what is known as this Amarand law,
named after the Brazilian ambassador, that these reports are
now being considered by the Security Council. We also have said
that we would be prepared to use force if Saddam Hussein
reconstitutes his weapons of mass destruction because we do
agree that he is a threat to the region. That is why we
undertook the activities that we did, as his threat is
destabilizing to American interests there, and that is why we
have the policy that we have. What is happening also is we are
very concerned about the humanitarian situation and are working
on how to make sure that more humanitarian goods are available
to the people.
Finally, I have asked a very capable diplomat, Frank
Richardelli, to work with the opposition groups, both inside
and outside Iraq, to work towards changing the regime. Thus, we
have not taken our eye off Iraq. What is interesting is that
Saddam Hussein is experiencing some serious difficulties in
southern Iraq among the Shiites. We are watching the situation
very carefully, and the military component is in place. The
regime change component is in place, and we are maintaining the
sanctions and monitoring the regime issues that we are dealing
with in New York.
Mr. Callahan. Mrs. Lowey.
Thank you, Madam Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join my
colleagues in welcoming you to this committee, Madam Secretary,
and I want to express my admiration and my support for your
firm and courageous leadership in handling this outrageous and
colossal disaster in Kosovo, and also that of the President of
the United States.
In my judgment, we had no choice. The United States is the
leader of the free world and, as you have said so articulately,
we cannot and we could not stand by and watch the slaughter and
destruction of families and communities and see the rape and
pillage of life in Kosovo. So I personally want to express my
great respect.
We do have enormous leadership. We are the leader of the
free world. With that leadership, in my judgment, comes great
responsibility. I feel privileged to live in the United States
of America and I have had great confidence in my constituents
and constituents of other colleagues that when they hear of the
slaughter and the inhumaneness that has taken place they rise
to the occasion, and I have been very impressed with the
response to the actions of the United States. I also feel that
the national security interest in remaining engaged in Kosovo
goes much further than the obligation to stop genocide there.
The crisis in Kosovo, as you have expressed so eloquently, goes
way beyond Kosovo and goes to that entire region and can
destabilize other nations in that entire region putting more
lives at risk and threatening the United States's interests
throughout Europe.
Milosevic has chosen to perpetuate his reign of terror. I
hope that we can eventually achieve a diplomatic agreement that
will bring true peace and stability to the Balkans. But I also
believe that it is extremely unwise, and my colleagues have
made that point, to rule out any military options that could
bring this crisis to a successful conclusion. I have had
concern from the start that whether it is this committee or
this Congress, for us to be debating military policy when, in
my judgment, our position should be to win and bring this to a
conclusion.
So I want to commend you again, Madam Secretary, and the
President for your leadership. I think it is extremely
important and I am delighted to know that the President is
planning to make a statement today. I think it is extremely
important that we lay out the facts that were expressed in the
Washington Post article of this past Sunday, and help the
American people understand why this action is so very
important. I believe they feel it. I think they are outraged
and angry when they see those pictures of terror, and I think
it is very important that it be laid out very clearly.
Having just returned from Europe, could you share with us
your discussions and meetings with Russian officials and
enlighten us to their involvement other than what we have been
reading in the newspapers?
Secretary Albright. Yes. First of all, let me say that we
believe very strongly that it is important for us to have an
ongoing relationship with Russia even while it goes through a
difficult period and does not agree with Russia us on the NATO
bombing. We have short, medium, and long-term interests with
Russia that have to do with arms control issues, the CFE
agreements in Europe, general economic issues, and issues of
nonproliferation as well as really long range issues that we
need to deal with them on. I spend a great deal of time talking
with Foreign Minister Ivanov about these subjects. I also
believe, as do our European colleagues, that it is important
that Russia not be isolated totally on the issue of Milosevic,
and that Milosevic should not stand between us and the
Russians. I met with Foreign Minister Ivanov in Oslo for three
hours on Tuesday morning, and I spoke to him earlier today. We
and our NATO allies have agreed, as you know, on the NATO
communique listing five demands, basically, of Milosevic, which
include the need for a ceasefire, the stopping of the killing
and violence; that he has to pull out his military,
paramilitary, and police forces; that the refugees have to be
able to go back; that there needs to be an international
military presence in the region; and that there needs to be
political agreement.
When Foreign Minister Ivanov arrived, he had his versions
of those principles. We managed after some work to agree on the
basic aspects of all of them except on this issue of the
international military presence. The Russian are arguing for an
international presence because that is what they think that
Milosevic will agree to, which would be, I think, something
like the OSCE monitors. This is not possible because the
Albanians are not going to go back there based on what has
happened unless there is a military force there to serve as a
protective mechanism for them. Thus, we have a basic agreement,
one on the bombing and, two, on the military presence. We are
insisting that NATO be the core of that military presence so
that the command and control structure is one that is
acceptable to all of us because we would need to participate in
it. But there are ways that other forces could be attached to
that.
The Russians, I think, want to have Belgrade agree first to
something before they come on board, and I have been saying to
them that doesn't work. That is where Belgrade then has a veto
on moving this forward. But what I have to say is that this is
a sense that I have really gotten from the most intensive
conversations with the Russians is that they do not want to be
isolated on that. We should not isolate them on it. We should
not give up our principles, and I have to continue to work so
that the Russians understand that the Russia of the future is
better off with a stable Europe than on the side of barbaric
behaviors such as Milosevic's.
Mr. Callahan. Chairman Wolf.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, I
welcome you. I wrote out some comments last night and again
that morning that I put on paper, so my words are chosen
carefully. Before I do, let me say that I appreciate your
effort. I support the funding for the refugees and hope that my
party and that Congress gives you the necessary money that you
are asking for.
I have had a special interest in the Balkans for a number
of years. I have been there a number of times. It was my
legislation that took away MFN from Ceausescu in Romanian days
and also my effort that took away MFN from Serbia several
years. More recently I was one of 44 Republicans who voted in
favor of U.S. peacekeeping troops on the ground in Kosovo. I
also--if there had been agreement. I spoke on the floor. I sent
a personal letter to every Member on my side in support of
that, and the other day you sent me a letter thanking me for
that as a matter of fact.
I returned a week ago from Albania, where I spent time with
the refugees at the Kosovo border near the Kukes and Morina.
Before that in February I visited Albania and Macedonia and
Kosovo, where I spoke with many on both sides, Serbs, KLA,
Rugova representatives, NGOs and men and women on the street. I
believe, as Mr. Porter said and you said, human rights are
important. There is a role that only the United States as the
world's sole power can fill. What Milosevic is doing and what
he has done is intolerable. He should have been stopped long
ago. I think that administration has made a botched up mess of
trying to do it. I think there are other options that we should
have pursued.
The longer that we slog around and the more refugees stream
out of Kosovo I think that clearly other options could have
been tried. Why did we not create an airtight economic embargo
around Serbia? Look at the countries surrounding Serbia. They
are all in NATO or want to be in NATO, Albania, Macedonia,
Bulgaria or Romania, Croatia, Slovenia. They are dying to be in
NATO and cooperate with us. Even today we could put a tight
economic embargo on Serbia. We are bombing and killing 19-year-
old Serb soldiers when the real evil doer is Milosevic himself.
Some years ago our government sent a high level team to
Panama, told Noriega that he needed to step down and clear out.
We even had a country that would have taken him and let him go
live there. He said no, and now he is in jail in Florida. Why
don't we try that with Milosevic? He could have gone to Russia.
Why don't we still try that today? Otherwise tell him that he
will be on the war criminal list.
The administration said that the Joint Chiefs supported the
bombing of Serbia. The Joint Chiefs said they were given the
choice between bombing and doing nothing, and at the end of the
day they agreed with the bombing. Some are saying that the
bombing alone worked in Bosnia. Bombing alone did not work in
Bosnia. Bombing in Bosnia was accompanied by a strong ground
force provided by the Croat army. You knew that and you knew
what they did. That is the difference between Bosnia and
Kosovo.
I think the administration misjudged the situation that
brought us to where we are today. Perhaps we should leave it to
historians to work that out but where do we go now. The United
States must do whatever it takes to win that battle. It is
unthinkable that we would settle for less than Kosovo or ethnic
Albanians would live free from fear. I think Milosevic and
others are guilty of war crimes and now must be brought to
justice.
Mr. Rubin mentioned nine generals. He should have had one
more on the list. Milosevic should been on the list. If you are
going to try those nine generals, you certainly have to try
their leader. I think the Western World, including NATO and the
U.S., must come to the aid of the refugees who are living an
unbelievable life. Just the smell and the stench and the
suffering and the pain and the agony as they cross the boarder
and they break down in tears.
That administration misjudged the situation there, too. We
knew it was extremely likely that Milosevic would pounce upon
the ethnic Albanians between the time of a Rambouillet peace
agreement signing and when NATO peacekeepers arrived in Kosovo.
Many of the NGOs, almost every one that I spoke to when I was
in Kosovo a few days before February 20, said that the deadline
they predicted brutal attacks on ethnic Albanians, particularly
those working for the UN, the NGOs and other Western
organizations. The drivers, our interpreters. It was like
Vietnam in 1975 trying to clamor to get on the helicopter to
get out. Unfortunately, they were right and the administration
and NATO did not listen. Little was done to prepare for the
huge exodus of the refugees and if much was done a terrible
mess was made of it. There was really not very much nearby
prepositioning of humanitarian services or supplies. No rating
of care givers, equipment operators, technicians, communicators
and others to deal with the enormous numbers of NGOs and people
coming up there.
I hope now that you will take whatever steps, whatever,
whatever steps, financially and any other way, even
extraordinary steps that are necessary to provide for the
refugees. You are right. Everyone said my documentation was
taken away. My papers were taken away. My license plates were
stripped off as I came across. They are starving. They are
sick. There are still sick today. There has been a measles
outbreak out there and you need to have someone out there who
can make policy decisions to not just go to Tirana but to go to
Kukes and go into the refugee camp and talk to the people and
be prepared to talk to the people and be prepared to get our
military to help with the logistics and the communications.
Other things may have been botched but we ought not to botch
giving them the opportunity to have a life again and to live
again and return to Kosovo and live a normal life. That is too
important.
I would hope that my party and I will do a letter today,
and I just turned to the staff to say to write to the Speaker
and Mr. Armey and Mr. DeLay and anybody in the leadership, that
we have a moral obligation to support the refugees whereby they
can return and lead a normal life. In the Bible in Luke it says
to whom much is given much is expected. We have been blessed in
this country and I think that God has blessed us and we have
the resources here that we have an obligation now to help those
people. In addition to that country, we should make sure that
NATO and Germany and Austria and all of the others participate
too and whereby they put their financial resources to help
these refugees who have absolutely nothing to return home.
I saw a man 65 or 70 who was blind and sitting in a corner.
What future hope does that man have. They need the help.
I really don't have any questions. I just wanted you to
know the way that I felt.
Secretary Albright. Thank you, Congressman Wolf. I admire
everything that you have done about refugees and your
dedication to human rights. We have met in various places
trying to deal with that problem, and I think that we are as
one in our dedication to it. That also goes back to something
that Congressman Porter said: our belief in the goodness of the
American power. I think that we are a unique country in our
desire to help rather than overpower and dominate. I am very
proud to represent the United States.
Let me just say that I have spent a lot of time thinking
about what needed to be done, what could have been done, things
that might have been done differently. And in listening to all
of you, not just here but in the many briefings that we did
earlier when we were talking about a peace implementation force
and reading the papers and thinking about that a lot, there are
suggestions and criticisms that come from so many sides that
there is no way just listening to all of you that having
followed one route might have had a different outcome.
Therefore, I am very confident that what we have done is the
right thing. That is from my perspective of having paid
attention to Kosovo a lot earlier than before a lot of people
even knew where Kosovo was. Not you, but others. My thinking
was that it was untenable for the United States to stand by and
let a massacre happen, which, by the way, a Member did suggest
that it was better to just let a massacre happen. Then we could
do something.
Ms. Pelosi. A Senator.
Secretary Albright. A Senator, yes.
And I am on the record as having said that we should have
done something sooner in Bosnia because I have felt the threat
of Milosevic very strongly for a long time and felt that we
should take the strongest action. I have specifically resisted
taking down any part of what is known as the outer wall of
sanctions that would allow Milosevic to regain his stature
within the international financial community. I believe that we
had to try everything we could diplomatically because otherwise
what Chairman Callahan said is true--that people would say all
she wants to do is use American forces. And we tried. I happen
to believe that to have tighter sanctions, though much desired,
would not have worked because even forces at that stage are
having difficulty getting him out. Plus I have spent a lot of
time with what we called front line states, and the sanctions
affect them. We are very eager to help. They are very loyal,
but they are very concerned about their fragile economies.
There are lots of different options and a lot of 20-20
hindsight and second-guessing. But I have to tell you that I
feel proud of what the United States has done and will continue
to do.
On the refugee issue, we did preposition an awful lot of
food for a lot of people for a long time. But as you and others
have said, the horror of the exodus is in Biblical proportions.
It was hard to predict the huge numbers, but within a couple of
days we got it under control. I am very proud of the way that
our military and NATO and the NGOs are now cooperating to
overcome a lot of the problems in the camps. We will continue
to do so. And I am very, very grateful for what have you said
in terms of helping us get the funds so that we can stand tall
and be proud of what we are doing for the refugees who are the
victims of the most horrendous acts by a brutal dictator.
Mr. Callahan. One of the newest members of our committee is
always so patient. She comes to every hearing, promptly on time
and she sits here patiently while we take 15 minutes and then
tell her that she can't have but 5 minutes. So today, Ms.
Kilpatrick, you can have as much time as you like.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I do like this Chairman. I like this
Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. You have no power to yield.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I will try to stay within the time. Thank
you very much for the opportunity and, Madam Secretary, for
your leadership, as has been mentioned by my colleagues. We
appreciate and thank you for the sacrifices that you make in
your personal life with your family, moving around the world to
represent our country.
I, too, would not want to second-guess the administration,
the President and those of you who have taken an oath to uphold
our Constitution, protect our rights, and see that our country
maintains its number one position in the world. In that vein
and with what you have already spoken, if you believe our
strategy is correct after looking at all the options over
several years and knowing that region of the world as I know
you do, I would totally support you in that effort and
appreciate the work you have done.
Due to the war in Kosovo today we aren't able to talk about
the budget as I would like to talk about it. I think, even
going in, the President's request is underfunded. I know the
Senate wants to cut a certain percentage and the House wants to
cut even more. But the foreign aid needed to maintain our
position in the world is underfunded in the foreign operations
budget. If, in fact, the anticipated 15 percent cut in Foreign
Operations, or some part thereof goes into effect, I do
question our place in the world and how we will meet the crises
that are out there.
I recently returned from overseas, where I visited the
continent of Africa. This was my eighth or ninth visit there.
As the ranking member mentioned, AIDS/HIV has no boundaries. I
am always wary about what our servicemen and women face
regarding the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa, India, close by and
around the world. I wish our budget were able to talk about
that and do something about it.
We did have a President's representative from USAID and
others on the Africa tour with us, and some things they are
doing very well. Senator Hatch and others who attended know of
the good work they are doing. But there is so much more that
needs to be done. I want to see USAID and the other African
development banks and foundations be properly funded so they
can address this crisis. HIV infection is a global crisis. We
have to remove the stigma of the illness and begin to educate
not just abroad but within our country. It as a major crisis as
we move to the new millennium.
Having said that, I want to move to the prisoners. We had
some discussion, you and I.
Of the three prisoners who are captured, one is from the
State of Michigan. We are at war. The family has been up and
down. I think the news media erroneously lets them believe
something is going to happen. Then nothing happens and they
tend to fall back into disbelief in what is happening when we
are at war.
What is the status of the three prisoners? How hopeful can
we be? What is the Administration's position? What can I tell
this family, if anything?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, let me go to the
point that you made about HIV/AIDS, and Ms. Pelosi made. It is
a major concern to us. It is a priority in terms of dealing
with issues at AID and within the Department. We have supported
activities at the United Nations with their pressure to try to
deal with the issue, only not enough. But I can just assure you
both that it is a priority issue for us for all the reasons
that you have stated. Unfortunately, as with many programs, we
do not have the kind of money that we need to pursue all of the
things that we need to do.
On the three soldiers, we have made very clear that we want
them back unconditionally, that they are entitled to be treated
according to the Geneva Convention, and that they cannot be
mistreated. They have not yet been able to have access by the
ICRC, which they are entitled to have.
I must say, I get increasingly irritated every time I see
the Yugoslav representative to the United Nations being asked
politely by our press as to whether the ICRC has been allowed
to see them, and he says I have to check. Well, it seems to me
that there should be a follow-up question as to how long does
it take, and why are you lying to me every time that you are on
television?
But I think that we need to continue to insist on that. I
think the difficult part occurs when there are attempts to get
them out but there is a condition on something which puts the
President and the American people and, obviously, the families
into a dreadful position, as we look at this as a human
problem. To start bargaining over them is an unacceptable way
for us to pursue our goals as well as to try to get them out.
We are working very hard in every way, but they cannot become
pawns. They must be released unconditionally.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And you do let the families know that last
statement.
Secretary Albright. Yes, we do.
Ms. Kilpatrick. This $400 million supplemental that is
coming through--I hope I heard no offsets, did I not?
Secretary Albright. Well, yes, I hope I did, too.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Because offsets will again cut away at the
domestic programs we like to see funded. That is the position
of the President?
Secretary Albright. Yes, no offsets.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I think I heard the chairman of the full
committee say that, but not my subcommittee chairman.
Mr. Callahan. To respond to that, I agree that this money
should not be offset. The budget agreement specifically
excluded emergency disaster assistance. Although I do not make
that decision, if I am asked for input, I would certainly
recommend that we do not have offsets.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Mr. Callahan. Chairman Packard.
Mr. Packard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and welcome, Madam
Secretary. I have the highest regard for your professionalism
and the way you represent our country as you go around the
world with these very difficult problems.
I opposed sending the bombers. I oppose sending the ground
troops as the administration still seems to oppose, but we are
there. I felt that we had not exhausted all of our options, our
diplomatic options.
Mr. Wolf expressed very much my feelings that we could have
tried sanctions, strict embargoes like we have done in other
places. We could have considered the policy that we have had in
the Middle East for a long time, and that is to try to develop
a balance of power so that no one would gain by attacking the
other. It has worked in the Middle East to a large extent over
a long, sustained period of time. I am not sure whether there
was any consideration of arming the Albanians or others to make
a balance of power.
But the fact is, the destruction of homes, the displacement
of families, the loss of lives, and terrible rapes and
atrocities have greatly increased since the bombs have fallen.
Of course, our hearts go out to the refugees and the
Albanians. There isn't anyone that couldn't help but feel for
them. But yesterday, this administration considered the KLA,
the Albanian army, as a terrorist group; and today we are
prepared to do their fighting for them.
We have spent years and years and billions of dollars in
developing a compatible relationship with Russia and to a huge
extent in recent days that has been grossly and greatly
undermined. There is a significant anti-American attitude in
Russia that didn't exist before.
We have not achieved our objectives in Bosnia. And of
course the killing has stopped, but that could easily return if
we withdrew. We have not achieved our goals, and we are not
winning in Iraq, as has been mentioned. I see a long-drawn-out,
sustained campaign here with no assurance of success; and, of
course, it greatly concerns me.
I have met with Milosevic, and he is a thug. He is a crafty
thug, one that I believe will not be any easier to deal with
than Hussein or Qadhafi or others that are still in power. I
have really deep concerns about where we are going with this.
But we are there. We have sent our planes, and we are
considering sending ground troops, and maybe that is the only
solution. But I still believe that there are other options,
that strict embargoes, sanctions, perhaps even considering
arming to bring about a balance of power would be a cheaper,
certainly a less destructive and more humane way.
Did we consider at all the policy that we had in the Middle
East in terms of developing a balance of power? Because that
would have solved perhaps or could perhaps solve the problems
we have had in Bosnia and certainly in Kosovo.
Secretary Albright. Thank you. Let me say again--and I
really feel it very important to say this--all the suggestions
that you have made and Congressman Wolf made about did we
consider this, or did we consider that--we did. This is a very
difficult problem, and we have looked at every aspect of this,
and we are concerned about the relationship with the Russians.
Everything that you have said, I can assure you that we have
looked at and have, for one reason or another, felt that it
would not work.
As I sit here, and I think, you know, that you are critical
of our using force, there are those who have also been critical
of me for having tried diplomacy, saying that Rambouillet was a
mistake. Why were we even thinking of dealing with them there?
And there are those who are now saying, why did we ever make
any agreements with Milosevic? Are we going to make any
agreements with him now?
For these reasons I return to the answer that I gave to
Congressman Wolf. I feel that we are doing the right thing
because we have tried and thought about all of these aspects,
and it is a really intractable set of problems that are not
soluble.
Let's talk about the KLA, for instance, and arming them.
First of all, we didn't consider them a terrorist
organization. We thought that some of their actions were
questionable in terms of what we thought of as being
provocative, and there were certainly those who felt that they
should not have been doing what they were doing.
Mr. Packard. But I think it is very difficult to know who
the bad guys and the good guys are in that region.
Secretary Albright. Yes, that goes to exactly your point.
You are now saying, why didn't we begin arming them to have a
balance of power? Then you are also saying that we should have
an embargo. Well, there is an embargo. It is an arms embargo.
And if we were to arm the KLA, and there are those who suggest
it, then you know very well that tomorrow others would be
arming the Serbs.
It is possible now at some stage that we can have a balance
of forces. But the Serb army, as we know, and knew before, is a
very powerful army. They had a very strong force. And they are
resisting. There is no way you could have a balance of forces,
without having broken the back of that army which we are in the
process of doing.
While it would be nice to have an embargo, you can't be
saying that you want to arm them in order to break the embargo.
And there are a lot of economic sanctions on the Serbs.
Believe me, we have looked at all these angles. I really
appreciate having this kind of a discussion, because I think
that when we talk about it, I think that the American people, I
hope, understood the difficulties of dealing with what is a
multiple dimensional problem, where you have to look at where
these people are, how you deal with it, how it affects other
policies.
Mr. Packard. I appreciate very much your competency and
your ability. I have no questions about that. And it is easy to
go back and try to review.
Secretary Albright. Thank you.
Mr. Packard. But I recognize the difficulty of your
position.
Secretary Albright. Thank you.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Knollenberg.
Mr. Knollenberg. Madam Secretary, welcome. Good to see you.
I have one issue which I think you have had several
questions on. It has to do with burden sharing in the conflict
in Kosovo. I think you basically declined in previous
questions, and maybe that is because you don't have that data.
I am not suggesting that you should have it this morning, your
staff may, but this is something I would really like to know.
The early reports indicate that we were burdened with about 55
to 80 percent, depending upon who was counting, when it comes
to munitions, airplanes, and in fact, even humanitarian aid.
You don't have to respond at this time unless you have got
something on hand, because I really want to focus on another
question with respect to Russia. That will take some time and I
would like to move forward. But please answer if you can do it
quickly, to give me some semblance of numbers.
Secretary Albright. Well, let me just say that there really
is a considerable amount of burden sharing in the air campaign.
I won't go through this with you, but we will provide the
material to you.
There are a number of countries that have contributed.
Naval contributions have been made. We do have the best Air
Force in the world, and I think that a lot of the choices
having been made are made on the basis of trying to accomplish
the mission.
But I will get this to you as well as the burden sharing in
terms of the future reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.
[The information follows:]
Question: Are the Europeans bearing their share of the burden in
Kosovo? What is their share and what is the U.S. share on the military
effort, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance respectively?
Answer. Yes. The Europeans are bearing their share of the burden in
Kosovo on the military effort and on humanitarian assistance, and they
have committed to take the lead in reconstruction, which has not yet
begun.
On the military effort, our NATO allies provided significant
military assets to the air campaign against the FRY (``Allied Force''),
and are providing far more ground troops than we are in KFOR.
During Operation Allied Force, fourteen of the other eighteen
Allies contributed over 325 aircraft to the air campaign. Although the
U.S. contributed 80 pct of support aircraft, Allies flew over 40
percent of strike sorties. Nine Allies also contributed naval assets,
including aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and frigates.
Our European Allies are contributing the vast majority of KFOR
troops. Approximately 7,000 U.S. troops will participate in KFOR, which
will number 52,000 at full strength. Fewer than one in seven soldiers
will be American.
On the humanitarian and reconstruction side:
As of April 1999, the European Commission had already put aside an
extra 250 million Euros (approximately $260 million) for economic and
humanitarian emergency assistance to states neighboring Kosovo--at a
time when you will remember that humanitarian assistance in Kosovo
itself was not possible, but when assistance was desperately needed for
the Kosovar refugees flowing to the neighboring states. The budgeted
total EU non-military assistance (i.e. economic support and
humanitarian aid) to these States adds up to over $1.5 billion in CY
1999. This is far more than what the U.S. will pay for this calendar
year.
At their Summit in Cologne on June 3-4, the Heads of State or
Government of the European Union reiterated the European Union's
commitment to take a leading role in the reconstruction efforts in
Kosovo, under the auspices of the U.N. provisional administration. A
European Kosovo Reconstruction Agency is in the process of being set
up. It will allow for more flexible and more rapid disbursement of
funds than with present mechanisms.
In sum, the U.S. will do its share, but our effort will be
coordinated with a far larger effort by our European partners and the
International Community. Just what is our fair share will need to be
decided in consultation with the Congress. As we re-establish a ground
presence in Kosovo, we will also get a better feel for short-term and
longer-term needs.
Europe's willingness to assume a larger role in Kosovo today is to
be welcomed. However, with greater European responsibility for peace-
keeping and reconstruction will also come a proportionately greater
leadership role than we have seen in the past.
Mr. Callahan. If the gentleman would yield, I wonder if we
could ask respectfully that you give us these burden sharing
reports on a monthly basis.
Secretary Albright. We will do so, if it is possible. I
think the Pentagon has to provide a lot of that.
Mr. Knollenberg. I am sure it is. That is to be expected.
I want to thank you for your candid perspective on the
state of the U.S.-Russian relations regarding Kosovo. As you
said, we do find ourselves at an impasse with a few basic
disagreements. I am concerned about the possible U.S. relations
to Russia's intransigence with respect to this campaign.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has pledged
billions of dollars in foreign aid to support Russia. Now, we
have an interesting situation developing in this campaign.
Russia is making it very clear it will not support our allied
efforts there. In fact, some reports allege that Russia is
already actively helping Milosevic's efforts against NATO.
Do you have any knowledge which you can share with this
committee on Russian activities in support of Milosevic? I know
you have been talking at length with Foreign Minister Ivanov.
Perhaps from some of those conversations, you can tell us what
Russian action, if any, is there that would embrace Milosevic
or support him in his current endeavor?
Secretary Albright. Well, I think there is not a united and
monolithic, quote, Russian approach to this.
First of all, the Russian leadership has said that they do
not wish to be drawn into a military assistance to Milosevic.
There are, however, as you know, groups within Russia, who are
also playing their nationalist card. There is some evidence of
volunteers going there. But, I have been told that is not a
government supported activity.
I think where the Russians find themselves, frankly, is--
and I found this in my dealings with them at Rambouillet or in
contact group activities or in personal conversations--with a
great deal of frustration with Milosevic. And they agreed when
we were at Rambouillet on the fact that the Serbs had said that
they would go along with the political parties to this
document. When all of a sudden Milosevic said that he wouldn't,
the Russians knew that the Serbs had walked it back. There has
always been a disagreement about the implementation of a peace
agreement by the presence of a NATO core force, and we have
disagreed on that. We are also concerned about Russian
humanitarian assistance going to the Serbs.
Mr. Knollenberg. The Russian convoy that was intercepted.
Secretary Albright. Right, I was speaking to that. And what
I found very interesting is that this convoy is going through
Hungary, and Hungary, as a new NATO member, is taking
incredible care with examining that convoy, stopping certain
portions of it that they felt had an overly large amount of
fuel. And I think that for those who questioned the value of
new NATO membership, I think that Hungary has already shown
that it is a good ally and partner because they have done that.
Mr. Knollenberg. And I think they should. The way I look at
it is we are giving huge amounts of aid, to Russia, and have
been for several years. At the same time, we see Russia
providing aid; to Milosevic. In addition some of that aid was,
stalled because it was fuel which could have been used in the
war effort. And I commend Hungary for doing just that.
But there is something about money. Money is fungible. We
give aid to Russia. They give aid to Serbia, who is challenging
us, who is our opponent. It gets a little bit scary, a little
bothersome. This fungibility issue is one we must pay close
attention to.
I applaud what Hungary is doing to stop, to screen, to
oversee everything coming in through the country; but I would
point out, and I hope you have some concerns about, this issue.
Secretary Albright. Yes.
Mr. Knollenberg. Because when you give money to Russia,
they can spend it pretty much anyway they want.
Secretary Albright. Believe me, it is something that we are
concerned about. And I have made very clear, as has the
President, that they should not let their sympathy for some for
their Slavic brothers to be translated into any kind of genuine
military assistance, and we will continue to press them.
Let me just make some comments about Russia. We have worked
very hard to try to develop a new kind of relationship with a
new kind of Russia; and a lot of the assistance has to do with
something that is in our national interest, such as the Nunn-
Lugar program of trying to buy up their nuclear weapons. And,
as I mentioned in my testimony, the initiative of the President
to try to reduce the threats of loose nukes to try to make sure
that the scientists don't go to the highest bidder. Thus, we
have our own national interests to pursue in dealing and
targeting our assistance to them.
Also, we are trying to build up the democratic forces in
Russia versus what are clearly resurgent nationalist or
communist forces.
I pride myself on my day-to-day contacts with the Russians
of trying to walk the line of saying we have long-term
interests here, but what you are doing vis-a-vis Serbia with
the ship that they sent or their providing assistance is
counterproductive to where we are trying to go. But I am trying
not to crater this relationship. It is too important to us.
Mr. Knollenberg. Mr. Chairman, one 30-second question. Are
we doing anything to ensure that the friendly Serb government
of Montenegro led by Mr. Djukanovic remains in power? Is that
relationship strong?
Secretary Albright. Yes.
Let me just add one point on the Russian part. Very little
of the assistance that we have goes to the government. It goes
to a variety of entities that are in support of democracy
programs.
On Montenegro, we have been very concerned about that
situation. We have a very good relationship with the
democratically elected President of Montenegro, Mr. Djukanovic.
And we see Montenegro as key to the stability of the region;
moreover, Mr. Djukanovic's is the only democratic regime within
the former Yugoslavia now.
We are staying in very close touch. We are also trying to
be helpful in terms of dealing with the refugees that have gone
into Montenegro. We have given them $10 million--you all know
this--in assistance recently in order to underline the
importance of the region and to help Djukanovic.
There is no question that the situation in Montenegro is
very tense. Djukanovic has made clear that he opposes the
military campaigns of Milosevic, and that he is supporting what
we are doing.
In my conversations with my fellow foreign ministers we
have made it very clear in the various statements that any
action that spreads this to Montenegro would have the gravest
consequences. They are as concerned as Djukanovic and we are.
While he is in a very delicate situation, he is aware of our
support for him.
Mr. Knollenberg. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. I would echo Mr. Knollenberg's sentiments
about Montenegro. They are desperately trying to create some
degree of democracy there. And when I see that our war planes
or NATO war planes are bombing Montenegro, I am sure it gives
President Djukanovic heartburn. I understand the strategic
necessity in what NATO is doing, bombing facilities in
Montenegro, but I hope it does not create a perception that the
President in Montenegro is desperately trying to convince the
people that America's ideas are the right way to go, and then
wakes up the next morning and sees in a sense NATO and American
bombers bombing his country. So I hope we can get the message
out that we are very supportive of the regime in Montenegro and
that we want to assist them as the $10 million has done.
Secretary Albright. Mr. Chairman, if I might just comment
on this, President Djukanovic does not support the NATO
bombing. He supports generally our approach to trying to deal
with the Kosovo ethnic cleansing. And on the bombing within
Montenegro, we are very sensitive to exactly what you are
saying. But part of the problem is that some of the air
defenses were in Montenegro and in order for our pilots to
operate that was necessary.
Also, if our pilots are illuminated by air defenses out of
Montenegro, or if there are MiGs flying, they have to take that
action. But I have to tell you that we have worked very hard to
be sensitive to Djukanovic's problems.
Mr. Callahan. I know, but I don't know what the media
situation is, the news situation in Montenegro is. I know that
Milosevic has cut it off, and the Serbian people in Belgrade
are only receiving what he wants them to hear. And I don't know
in Djukanovic's case if that is the case there, that his people
have been told by him that America's friendship is the way to
go for the future of Montenegro; and if there is no media and
all they know is what Milosevic is telling them, that the
Americans are bombing you, which is probably what he is saying.
It could create a political problem for the president there.
Secretary Albright. On the point of the media, if I just
might take a minute, I think there is no question that the
propaganda machine that Milosevic has is very powerful. We are
working in every way to break through it.
I have, in my Czech-accented Serb, broadcast a message. I
am now going to do it on a daily basis in order to try to have
people understand that we have no fight with the Serbian people
or the Montenegrins, for that matter. We are doing everything
we can in terms of our ability to penetrate through this
propaganda-airtight environment that he has. It is a major
problem, but we are working on it. We have a whole program.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you.
Mr. Jackson.
Mr. Jackson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me also begin by apologizing for having to be in many
places at the same time.
I want to start by welcoming Secretary Albright and thank
her for her testimony.
Madam Secretary, I share some of the concerns regarding the
conflict in the Balkans that many of my colleagues on the
subcommittee have expressed today. Also, it is important--I am
concerned and actually troubled by the critically low funding
provided for the Function 150 account in the budget resolution
adopted yesterday. I want to work with other members of this
subcommittee and the full committee to ensure that the State
Department receives the funding it needs to carry out its very
important mission throughout our world.
I want to shift, if I can for just a moment, to the issue
in the Balkans; and I don't want my line of questioning to be
confused at all with my support of the troops in this vital
part of the world.
However, Madam Secretary, I am not totally convinced that
our political military expectation can produce the result that
we expect. I am more than convinced that we can punish people
with an air campaign and cruise missiles, but to take land, it
is becoming increasingly clear that we possibly need ground
troops. We control the skies above Yugoslavia, but the refugees
need their land back.
In the Gulf crisis, we saw that in order to regain Kuwait
it was very important that we send in ground troops in order to
get land back for the Kuwait government and the people of
Yugoslavia.
Congressman Rod Blagojevich from Illinois, as reported by
Mike Dolning of the Chicago Tribune, has suggested that the
partitioning of Kosovo will potentially likely be part of any
end game solution. I am wondering, has the administration
considered this approach or have they talked with Congressman
Rod Blagojevich?
Secretary Albright. Let me just say that, as we look at
potential solutions, there are those who have talked about
partition. However, I specifically asked for a map that would
indicate to me whether that was possible to have one part be
Serbian and the rest be Albanian.
The Serbians have spoken a lot about the fact, and
rightfully so, that they have monasteries and holy places in
Kosovo that have great historical and cultural significance to
them. This map, however, shows that it is impossible to do
anything like that. It is too small for me to display it. But,
I basically, the monasteries and the various other historical
sites are scattered throughout Kosovo. It is a checkerboard. It
is not one area that can be partitioned to be under Serbian
control.
I think that we also have felt that partition is not an
approach that is useful as we have dealt with Bosnia and the
messages that it sends about the fact that the future should be
democratic and multiethnic. I have not spoken to the
Congressman myself, I specifically asked to try to get an
ethnic and a religious site map, so to speak, and there is no
way to partition unless you just artificially decide that a
certain area should be Serb, and I don't know what you would do
with all these various ways of trying to allocate the
monasteries on the other side.
Mr. Jackson. I thank you for your answer.
There are those who have argued--I have seen it in the
press--that so far our military strength; our air campaign, has
not equalled our goal of a free Kosovo. That our military
strength; the air campaign at this stage of the game has
created and had some role to play in the present refugee
crisis; whether it is increased Serb aggression, Mr.
Milosevic's determination to take control over all of Kosovo.
My question again is, around the end game of refugees, was
there ever an anticipation or discussions about the possibility
within the administration of the likely human catastrophe that
could be the end result of a sustained air campaign without
forces on the ground?
Secretary Albright. First of all, let me say that the main
discussions that we had were about the humanitarian disaster
that would be caused if we didn't do anything because of the
plans that we now know even more about were set up and planned
by Milosevic to systematically reengineer the ethnic
composition of Kosovo. What his policy was earlier, before
Rambouillet, was basically a village a day. He was going in
with his people and torching villages with the idea that that
would keep NATO away because it was being done just one village
at a time. Now we know that he had this plan to really
ethnically cleanse the whole place.
What I do think happened as a result of bombing, as I have
said previously, was that this was like a videotape that he
then put into fast forward so that really the number of
refugees that were created immediately after the bombing was
something that happened because he had a systematic plan
already. There is no way they could have done what they did
going from house to house if they had not had a systematic plan
in place before hand.
We do think it is important for the refugees to be able to
go back. They are not the cause of this, but they are the
reason that we have to pursue the objective that they can go
back. They will need to have a protective force. That is why we
are arguing for an international military force in order that
they can live where they belong.
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Madam Secretary; and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I think you do know of my very high regard
for your expertise in foreign policy and what you bring to this
job. We have had some differences over the years perhaps about
our approaches on the Oslo accords and other things, but I have
tremendous respect for you, and I appreciate what you are doing
now, and I am proud to have erred on the side of giving the
President the discretion that he needs to approach the very
difficult crisis we have in Yugoslavia.
But, having said that, if you would permit me for a second
here, I find it really ironic, Madam Secretary, that for most
of this century we have pursued what we can only best call a
``big stick'' approach, having a secure and well-funded
national security apparatus so that our Secretaries of State
can pursue with great vigor a peace and freedom-oriented
foreign policy. So I do find it a little bit ironic that there
is a little bit of lamenting about how we are funding our
foreign policy here in the Congress over the last several years
and yet many of my colleagues and even the Clinton
administration itself has underfunded our national defense
needs.
This is no more obvious, I think, than where we are today
with this crisis in Yugoslavia, we have got a situation in Iraq
where we have got a very tenuous situation, the situation in
Bosnia, and of course numerous other potential hot spots. So I
do find it a little ironic that there are many of my colleagues
today who are arguing for ground troops to support the air
campaign and yet these are the very people who have not thought
anything of actually taking money away from the Defense budget
in support of what they feel are more important priorities.
So we are dealing with a hollowed out defense. I know that
that is more the purview of your colleague, Secretary Cohen,
and others, but I think it does serve to undercut your ability
as an effective Secretary of State.
But if I may, Madam Secretary, have you recommended and can
we expect that the President of the United States will come to
the Congress and officially lay out for the American people and
their representatives our mission in Yugoslavia and what we can
expect? And I say that again after 2 weeks of spending a lot of
time in my district, Long Island, New York, where there is a
rising degree of anxiety that we are sliding into a situation
that I can only best describe as a ``Vietnam phenomenon'' and
there is great, great anxiety by Americans and I think my
constituents that, if we don't finish, we are sliding into that
situation.
Secretary Albright. Congressman, thank you very much for
your kind words and our previous discussions on the subject.
Let me say that I think the President, as you know, has
already given a speech today in which there will be a fuller
discussion of Kosovo. He has spent a great deal of time with
Members of Congress. He will continue to do so.
Mr. Forbes. We expect him to formally come up here and make
that case. I think that is the least that can be done,
particularly for those who are wanting to err on the side of
supporting the President's discretion.
Secretary Albright. I am not going to predict, where the
President makes his speeches, but I can tell you that he has
been making more speeches and statements on this in the last
several weeks than I think many previous presidents have in
talking about foreign policy issues, and he will continue to do
so.
I will pass on your suggestion to him. I do not know where
and how he is going to continue making his case, our case.
Mr. Forbes. Madam Secretary, another issue that has
arisen--some of my constituents at a number of town meetings--
is that we feel the need to be involved in Yugoslavia for some
very correct reasons articulated by many of my colleagues and
most particularly Mr. Wolf and others. The same question could
be asked about our involvement in Africa and the genocide that
has taken place there and what the United States approach is
there vis-a-vis the same need to be in Yugoslavia.
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, I think that we are
all very concerned about the spreading of violence in Africa
and are doing our best to work with the African countries, the
OAU, in an attempt to solve as many of those problems as we can
diplomatically, and work on supporting an African crisis
response force.
I think one of the reasons that there is a difference is
that this is within Europe, a NATO area, where there is a
military organization of which we are the leader. But it does
not say that we are not interested in trying to help as much as
possible in resolving many of the problems that we now see in
Africa. Part of our request to all of you is to figure out how
to give greater support to African justice initiatives, trade
initiatives, and a variety of other ways to help democracies in
Africa prosper.
I spoke in my opening remarks about the need now to support
the new democracy in Nigeria.
I think that this is one of those damned if you do, damned
if you don't circumstances. If I came here and asked you for
money for every conflict in the world, you would say the U.S.
is trying to solve everything. And if I don't, then you say
that we are not paying attention to them. There is no cookie-
cutter approach to this. We are trying different methods in
different places, but we are equally concerned about the
killings in Africa and the cross-border activities and the
spread of violence there.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, I would hope--that perhaps a
bipartisan leadership of this Congress could send a letter to
the President inviting him to come up here to fully explain our
policy and our objectives. While I personally oppose ground
troops, I do want to err on the side of giving the President of
the United States the discretion to conduct foreign policy, but
I would feel more comfortable if we could get the President to
come to the Congress and play out our policy in a proper forum.
Mr. Callahan. The gentleman makes a good point.
Madam Secretary, you, Secretary Cohen and the President
have been very generous in your time keeping some of us
informed about what is taking place. And I know that Tuesday in
a White House meeting Speaker Hastert suggested to the
President that he better inform the American people.
And your suggestion that he address the entire House and
Senate is excellent. I think that we should convey, maybe
through our conference, to the Speaker, to invite the President
to come to Capitol Hill so he can talk to all Members of
Congress. Because those of you who have not had the opportunity
to be briefed or attend classified meetings, you have to answer
the same questions in Long Island I have to answer in Alabama.
It is unfair that some Members of Congress know what is going
on and some people have not been apprised of anything but what
we tell them or what they read in the paper.
So it is an excellent suggestion, and I will convey that
along with you to the Speaker. I will draft a letter, and you
and I can sign it this afternoon. Maybe we can get some input
from Chairman Lewis as to whether or not this is the time for
the President to come and explain our direction and our exit
policy in Kosovo.
We are going to go, Madam Secretary. I don't know what your
time schedule is. I know you are very busy and rightfully so.
We had very little time in which to----
I am sorry, Jack. Are you off the phone now?
Mr. Kingston. Are you through talking now, Mr. Chairman?
Madam Secretary, I, too, am having trouble following this
administration's foreign policy. Cambodia, 2 million people
were slaughtered; Rwanda, 500,000 died. There is a war right
now between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and women are being raped
over there, civilians are also being killed. At what point does
something become an American peril? And I guess if you could
define that generally and tell me what the American peril is in
Yugoslavia right now.
You know, I have heard that question answered several
times, but it is interesting, different members of the
administration answer it differently, and I am never quite sure
it has kind of hit the bull's eye in maybe what I am looking
for or maybe I am just missing it.
Secretary Albright. First of all, let me say that there are
a number of component parts I think that come into play. Some
of it has to do with the ability to influence the situation.
You choose your tools depending upon your ability to do that.
If you take Ethiopia and Eritrea, we have sent envoys and
negotiators and are supporting the OAU in trying to deal with
that problem.
I think one of the hardest issues that I feel personally
about is Rwanda where we did not have the ability to move more
swiftly, and the President has made that point. That was
something that exploded like a volcano, and we tried very hard
to make up for it later. But I do think that is one that I
always have a hard time with myself.
I think as far as Yugoslavia is concerned that, as I said
earlier, there is a humanitarian interest that is important but
also a strategic interest as far as the Balkans are concerned.
We have been talking about the importance of having a stable
and secure Europe. A stable and secure Europe is important for
the United States. We have spent large amounts of money during
this century either fighting wars in Europe or trying to
prevent them and developing an alliance that is the most
powerful in the world, that has deterred the Soviets during the
Cold War, and now is there in a leadership role. A mechanism
exists for dealing with a problem as horrendous as the ethnic
cleansing in Yugoslavia.
But let me say that this is not the way it was during the
Cold War, where you could make a list. I was a professor, and I
did this. Do you know where our vital national interest are?
Are there certain strategic choke points to prevent the
movement of arms?
We are dealing with a very different kind of a world where
there are huge problems that we can deal with bilaterally or
through an alliance or through the United Nations or through
various other organizations. We have to choose our tools, and
we have to choose what our interests are. We may not agree, and
we may not have the resources to deal with everything that we
want to, but I can just assure you that we think very carefully
about where to involve ourselves and the resources that we have
to do it.
Mr. Kingston. Well, then, are you inferring that the
administration has sat down and carefully decided that Rwanda
we did not need to get involved in, Cambodia we did not need to
get involved in, but here we did? Is that the balance?
Secretary Albright. No. I mean that the point here is that
we try to use the best tool that we can to be involved at the
level that we should be. I am saying to you that I have always
felt on Rwanda that we should have done more.
Mr. Kingston. But not in Cambodia?
Secretary Albright. In Cambodia we went at it a different
way. Let me just say that I think, that because we can't do
everything everywhere doesn't mean we should do nothing
nowhere. I think that is English.
Mr. Kingston. I understand. I understand. I am just trying
to--I guess on the tier of reality there was a judgment call
that a stabilized Europe was more important than a stabilized
Africa or a stabilized Southeast Asia.
Secretary Albright. No, I don't want to be put in that
position. I think that a stabilized Europe is something that
has been important to us; a stabilized Asia, which is why we
are paying so much attention to what is going on in Korea. I
think that we really look at the issues and try to deal with
them on the basis of what tools we have available and what the
situation is at the time.
Do we do it perfectly? No. Did previous administrations?
No. Will the next administrations do it perfectly? No. But I
think that we have to look at each of these situations and
assess where we think we need to apply pressure.
Mr. Kingston. I think, as you said, there is a ``damned if
you do, damned if you don't'' that all administrations are
faced with. But this underscores the purpose of the President
communicating with the Congress as to what the policy is and
what some of the judgment calls, so that there is less maybe
suspicion or second guessing.
Let me address something on offsets, and I know that we
have made the statement already: No offsets. Personally, I
agree with that. I think that if there is an American peril,
then it is in our interest to say, you know what? This is so
vital to the American interest that this year we are going to
have to cut the budgets of some things which we deem less
important than the economic stability of Europe. And I am only
making that statement on the record.
I believe there are other Members of Congress, and I
realize it is the minority, but I believe there are Members on
both sides who feel that if we are going to engage, we have
already spent $10 billion in the Balkans, we need to start
looking about where we are going to spend this.
Because at some point, just as in a household, you have to
make a decision: Do you fix the washer or tune up the car. I
know, how could he compare that? I don't know. I just have the
common sense of a normal American. But we need to give the
American people that debate instead of just spending and
spending.
Secretary Albright. With all due respect, Congressman, you
have just contradicted yourself. You have asked me, why we
didn't do anything in Rwanda or Cambodian, and yet you are
saying that we have to choose our priorities. I am here asking
you for some money for Africa; and you are telling me that,
because of an emergency in Kosovo, you want to take that money
away from Africa.
Mr. Kingston. Reclaiming my time, that is not what I said.
But what I did say is that, if you want to do that, then you
should as an administration suggest where we can reduce
spending. If you decide to spend money in Africa and Cambodia
and in Europe and in Korea and everywhere else, I just think
that if it is worth American dollars being spent there then we
ought to also say, you know, what--here is where we have
identified areas in the bureaucracy that can be reduced in
spending. That is a different philosophy.
Secretary Albright. It would be great to do if we had more
money in the first place. But, as I have said, we are in the
process of not only robbing Peter to pay Paul, we are robbing
Paul. There is no money.
Mr. Kingston. And I think the American people are keenly
aware of it, and that is what makes the question what is the
American peril. If Americans are, you know, committed to the
peril, if it is defined to them and they are saying we have to
spend this money and it is worth sacrificing down the road,
getting further in debt or spending Social Security surplus or
whatever it is, okay, because I understand how important this
is. And I don't think at this point that debate has taken place
fully.
Let me ask you this, Russian TV. One of the motivations in
America, the humanitarian side of being there, is seeing the
refugees. Now Russia is doing the same thing with refugees, as
I understand it. And yet they are using it to show the American
policy is causing the refugees, and they are using it to kind
of motivate their people against us in a different direction.
And maybe I am not correct about that, but can you comment on
that? Is that--you know the refugee filming is a motivator,
probably both ways.
Secretary Albright. I believe, first of all, the Serbs are
certainly using the refugee filming from their own perspective.
I think the Russians may be, also. It happens, I think, too,
that we have to make clear to the Russians that we also have
abilities to influence them, but I am not here to say that
Russian TV is objective. I think that----
Mr. Kingston. Unlike American TV.
Secretary Albright. Well, it depends on the subject.
Mr. Kingston. I am sure we have some good bipartisan
agreement on that.
Secretary Albright. I think for us that the pictures of the
refugees are a visible example of a horrendous policy. And I
would maintain, as I have throughout, that we did not create
the horror of the refugees. We were trying to prevent it. And
we have, in fact, I think, made a very clear point that the
kinds of things that Milosevic was planning are unacceptable. I
believe that things would have been much worse had we waited,
and I feel very strongly that we have done the right thing.
Mr. Callahan. The gentleman will yield back the balance of
his 15 minutes.
Mr. Kingston. I have some other questions Mr. Chairman, I
would love to submit for the record.
Mr. Callahan. Hopefully, we will get around to a brief
second round.
Let me comment on one thing that you said with respect to
the offsets. When I said I do not support offsets, that is for
this fiscal year. Because of the efforts of the gentleman from
Georgia and others, we have created a surplus. We also created
a budget resolution which gave us the authority to spend that
surplus in the event of an emergency. So it is a compliment to
the efforts of the Congress that we have already exercised
great compassion and great concern and fiscal responsibility in
cutting spending for this fiscal year to its lowest possible
level. So we did that already for this year. This money that we
are talking about for the supplemental comes out of money we
appropriated last September.
So I agree with you that for the next fiscal year it will
be a different situation. We can cut back on other activities
but, for this year, we have to come up with monies that we have
already appropriated. And to say that we didn't do a
responsible job last year is wrong. We did a responsible job.
We reduced spending. We created a surplus. The surplus is
there. And now we are asking that we use the benefits of our
efforts last year, thanks in great part to the gentleman from
Georgia and some of the organizations and groups he belongs to
insisting that we do that.
We want to--Madam Secretary, I don't know what your
timetable is. We know that you are busy. I would like to give
each member an opportunity to go back just for a few minutes
and talk about anything they want.
But we still have not talked about your budget request. I
will have the opportunity to discuss some of the particulars of
your 2000 budget request at a later time.
But we do want to give other members the opportunity to ask
questions. But let's respect the Secretary's time as well as
the other members' time and hold down the second round to as
little time as possible.
Mr. Lewis?
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your yielding just
for a moment. I am not going to take up much time.
But the suggestion that there might be a display on Russian
TV showing the plight of these refugees and blaming the refugee
crisis on American policy, troubles me greatly. I would
certainly hope that you would be discussing that directly with
them at the highest levels, Primakov and otherwise, for if
there is veracity to it, that portends disastrous circumstance
in terms of our relations.
And, Madam Secretary, one more item. During this whole
meeting there has been so much overlap between the work I do on
another subcommittee. I am not sure if there has been a time
that the Secretary of State, at least when I have been here,
has appeared before the Defense Subcommittee, but I have a mind
to ask you as well as Secretary Cohen to come together before
the subcommittee at some time in the near term.
Secretary Albright. On the last point, Secretary Cohen and
I have appeared together previously, I think, before the whole
committee and the Senate side. I am sure we would be pleased to
do that.
Let me, on the other point, say that I will raise it,
obviously; but the independent TV stations in Russia have a
different view of this. The situation is improving. But I will
raise it. Yes.
Mr. Callahan. Mrs. Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Picking up on points raised by our distinguished colleague,
the Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee, I would hope that we
will extend an invitation to Secretary Cohen to our committee
as well. I would like to talk to him about some of the issues
before us and some that we didn't talk about today like
military sales, et cetera.
I have a couple of observations further to Mr. Lewis'
point. I think that what we have heard here today about
propaganda speaks to the importance of Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty.
Some of us were with Leader Gephardt in Prague last Monday
where we met with the editorial board of Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty. And given the need for information in the
frontline states and what is happening perhaps in Russia and in
some of the fragile democracies in Europe, I think that while
it is another committee's jurisdiction, certainly as members of
the full Appropriations Committee, I hope that we will
recognize RFE/RL's importance and continuation.
For our colleague, Mr. Wolf, who had to leave, I wanted to
put on the table a concern he had about the Sudan. More than 2
million people have died in the Sudan because of ethnic
conflict. That is more than in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo all
combined. Mr. Wolf wanted to suggest that the Administration
consider a special envoy for the Sudan.
Just to wrap up on Kosovo, I again want to offer my
commendations to the Administration, particularly to the
Secretary for her courageous leadership and for her firmness. I
want to be helpful to the Administration in any way I can.
In that vein of friendship I want to move on to another
subject, which is China. You mentioned the word engagement;
and, in friendship again, I want to suggest that the President
does a grave disservice to the issue of the U.S.-China
relations debate when he says that he wants engagement and the
rest of us want isolation. Nothing could be further from the
truth, certainly for the dissidents who are aspiring in China
for the ability to speak freely about their political and
religious beliefs, certainly for those who have been exiled
from China who wish to return there.
And all of us want to see a brilliant relationship with
China--economically, politically, diplomatically, culturally
and otherwise. But that can only happen when there is respect
for the Chinese people. That is why I was disappointed that
there wasn't a stronger mention when Zhu Rongji was here about
reversing the verdict of Tiananmen Square so we can put that
behind us, freeing the prisoners still in prison because of
their peaceful demonstration at the time of Tiananmen, stopping
the harassment of those who seek to speak freely about their
political and religious beliefs in China and honoring the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This is
the call that the dissidents within China have made. These are
freedoms guaranteed by the Chinese constitution. It is not
about us inflicting anything on them. Their own constitution
guarantees these rights. These rights are also internationally
recognized human rights.
I would have hoped that the President would have associated
himself with the aspirations of those in China who speak out
bravely for freedom and who are arrested for doing that, even
with the assurances that they thought they had after the
President's visit.
As I said, it is not about whether we engage with China or
not. We all know that we want to engage with China and we
should engage with China.
It takes me now to my final point on the WTO. Certainly
nothing would be better for the world trade regime than to have
China finally playing by the rules. That is why it would be a
good thing if China were willing to play by the rules, for them
to be in the WTO. So this barrage of activity on the part of
the business community to give China whatever it wants on the
strength of its promises to do, this, that or the other without
any demonstration of performance on the part of the Chinese
makes one wonder, who are they speaking for? The Chinese regime
or the American worker and the American people?
Maybe when the business community gets everything it wants
for China, it may one day speak out for human rights in China.
We may never know because the appetite, as we know, is
insatiable. I would certainly hope that, as this debate goes
forth, the understanding is not to isolate, but it is also not
to be unquestioning.
China has not honored anything it has signed, whether it
was promises to stop proliferating missile technology to
Pakistan in the Bush administration where your predecessor,
Secretary Baker, in his memoir said there was no way to get
them to honor their word; whether it was the Memorandum of
Understanding on intellectual property; whether it was the
signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which they have not ratified and is certainly not
implemented; whether it was the Memorandum of Understanding on
the use of prison labor.
It is not about saying they shouldn't be in. It is about,
where is the performance to demonstrate when they come in that
they will not wreck the WTO because they will once again refuse
to play by the rules?
So I hope, as this debate goes forward, we could find our
common ground. Nothing could be more important in the
relationship between the two countries than to have a unified
voice between the Executive branch and the Congress about
sustainable engagement, engagement that sustains our values of
promoting democratic freedoms which you have described as the
pillar of our foreign policy; of promoting our economy through
exports, by lowering tariffs and nontariff barriers to products
from the United States going into China, as well as promoting
our national security by stopping the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.
So this debate is not about whether to engage or not. It is
about what the successes of that engagement could be. I see in
the Congress the willingness of people to work together to find
common ground. I would hope that that would be shared by the
White House. With that, I once again call for the President to
speak directly to the Chinese regime about Xu Wenli and Bao
Tong and about reversing the verdict of Tiananmen Square.
Mr. Callahan. Madam Secretary, the staff has just informed
me that you requested you be able to depart at 12:30. Is your
schedule such that you can entertain additional questions or is
it pressed?
Secretary Albright. It is pressed. If we could make it
brief.
Ms. Pelosi. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry. I was just finishing,
and I wanted to say as well that the President should be
calling upon the regime to have conversations between the
representative of His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, and the Chinese
government for a resolution of the situation in Tibet.
Secretary Albright. Could I just comment to Congresswoman
Pelosi? You are assuming that we haven't done all of these
things, and we have. And I agree with you.
Ms. Pelosi. I am just concerned about the effectiveness of
it.
Secretary Albright. We have made very clear that there can
never be totally normal relations with them until we work out
these issues and also on the WTO, that it is not a favor to
them. It has to be commercially viable, and they have to abide
by the rules.
I would just make one point about the business community. I
met with some of the members of it when I was in Beijing. While
I do not think that this is a solution, I did find it very
interesting that American businesses there are providing an
example to how you deal with workers in terms of a lot of their
own programs. I think that there is a sense in the business
community that they are American--I can't speak for all of
them--but for some who basically see that as part of their
responsibility.
Mr. Callahan. Let's just try to briefly go down and ask the
members just to respect the Secretary's time and at the same
time, give each member an opportunity to either make a brief 1-
minute statement or a 1-minute question with a 1-minute
response.
Secretary Albright. I will try.
Mr. Porter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, the OSCE has put on the table a compromise
peace proposal regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia has accepted
that proposal. Azerbaijan has summarily rejected it and refused
to even come to the table for further negotiations. Yet the
administration's budget, your budget, suggests that we decrease
aid to Armenia and increase aid to Azerbaijan. Isn't that going
to send exactly the wrong signal? Isn't our policy there to try
to get these two countries to come together and to negotiate
and to resolve their differences and end the state of war that
exists virtually between them?
I can't understand the policy. It doesn't seem to make any
sense to me at all.
Secretary Albright. Well, let me just say that we have a
high frustration level over the fact that we have not been able
to resolve this issue. During the NATO summit next week when
there are groupings of the EAPC, we will have members here. We
are planning to have a meeting with the Minsk group to be able
to put some more pressure on this.
It is a frustrating problem. I agree with you.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Jackson.
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is very brief.
Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions for the
Secretary regarding her budget requests and will submit them
for the record.
Mr. Jackson. But my last question in my 45 seconds that
remain are really back to Kosovo. I am having a little problem,
Madam Secretary, figuring out how we get this land back and how
we get our boys back, because we do have three boys who are,
unfortunately, prisoners of war in this conflict, without
committing troops and possibly losing life.
And so I guess as I have heard amongst many of my
colleagues, I guess that many of us are looking for the deal,
we want to hear what that deal is. Congressman Blagojevich put
forward the idea that partitioning may be part of an offer to
the Yugoslavs. I am interested, one, in whether there has been
any such offer of a deal to the Yugoslavs so that we can put
this process behind us. And I am also very interested in
whether or not it is the position of the administration to
begin some diplomatic reaching out so that we might move
towards an end game.
Those are my questions, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Albright. Briefly, President Milosevic knows that
the diplomatic channels are open. We don't want to deal just
for the sake of a deal because that will undermine what we are
trying to do. But he knows that he can stop this by making
clear that the refugees can come back, that the killing and
violence has to stop, and that there is self-government for the
Kosovars. Those are the terms we have talked about, and he
knows that the diplomatic channels remain open. I don't think
that we can make a deal just for the sake of making a deal.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Packard.
Mr. Packard. Madam Secretary, I chair the Energy and Water
Subcommittee, on Appropriations, and the Energy Department has
requested funding to keep the Russian scientists in Russia. You
have requested funds from this committee for the same purpose.
Why the overlap?
Secretary Albright. I think that we are asking for various
parts of the program. I don't think it is an overlap. I think
it is a different approach but I will get you an answer to
that.
Mr. Packard. Please do.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Knollenberg.
Mr. Knollenberg. Madam Secretary, this is a budget item
that bothers me. You and I have had conversations before about
KEDO. With this dollar crunch, with Kosovo requiring additional
money and dollars in short supply, the administration has asked
for a 20 million dollars increase in KEDO. I am of the belief,
frankly, maybe they shouldn't have anything because I have had
some concerns about this agreement from the very beginning. I
know you and I probably differ on that. But KEDO was designed
before you became Secretary of State. My concern though is
whether this is the time to reward North Korea with more money
at the very time when they are having all of these problems
around the world. We have given them--going back to the
agreement which I think is flawed, light water reactors and
fuel. We also involved South Korea and Japan. I think that you
are right about saying that we did freeze plutonium production
at one facility. But we didn't safeguard against construction
of similar facilities underground. That is the part that we
don't know about. But we do know they have the technology to
shoot three-stage missiles in the direction of the U.S.
Here we are five years later after the agreement was signed
and now we are trying to dump more money into a situation that
frankly I think has failed because we are no safer today. In
fact, we are less safe now with respect to North Korea than we
were five years ago. That is a tough question, but that is my
question.
Secretary Albright. First of all, let me say that we are
obviously very concerned about the developments in North Korea.
As I said in my testimony, we have asked former Secretary of
Defense Bill Perry to do a review, and we are in the midst of
that. At the same time I have to say that as far as I am
concerned, the KEDO agreement, the agreed framework, is very
useful because it has in fact frozen a portion of the plutonium
production. This is very important. We have gained access to
the suspicious site. And I believe that while there are serious
concerns, we have managed as far as the nuclear aspect of this,
to get some control over it, but not totally. I think that the
Agreed Framework has made us safer in that regard, but I do not
deny the fact that there are serious problems with the
development of missile technology and suspicious sites with the
DPRK, which is why we are doing the review.
On the lightwater reactor itself, we have in fact developed
a cost sharing approach on this with Japan and Korea. We have
made no commitments to help finance the cost of the lightwater
project. The whole issue of Korea is one that we need to spend
a lot more time with all of you on as we go through this review
and complete it because I can assure you that this is an issue
of major concern to us. We spent a great deal of time on it
already and will continue to do so, but we very much welcome
your input.
Mr. Knollenberg. I will submit some additional questions,
but this is a concern that many of us share. I am not alone in
this.
Secretary Albright. And we share it with you.
Mr. Knollenberg. We do want to work toward something
constructive.
Mr. Callahan. All Members have permission to submit
questions for the record and in the absence of a real hearing
on the Fiscal Year 2000 budget request, it is going to be
imperative that you or your staff respond as expeditiously as
possible to these written questions because that is going to
have to take the place of the real hearing. I have many
questions, for example, that maybe we will be able to talk
about later, questions on North Korea, Haiti, Central America,
Africa, debt forgiveness, which is sort of out of your purview
but still a part of your request. The Ukraine, your comments
about Russia. You said not to terminate Russia because of their
involvement in this situation in Kosovo, but the question is
not whether or not to terminate assistance to them but whether
or not to reward them with an increase. You have requested an
increase for Russia. We have a lot of questions that still need
to be answered with respect to the primary reason that we
prescheduled this hearing with you to discuss your budget.
I appreciate you taking the time to meet with us today and
to explain this serious situation facing us in the Balkans
because it is important that we have the knowledge you have
shared with us today in order that we can share it with our
colleagues, because we are going to be trying to get
humanitarian assistance for the refugees probably before we
even bring your 2000 year budget request up for consideration
on the floor. So it is an important and timely hearing today.
We appreciate very much your time and I don't think you
have to be reminded of my admiration for you. I think that you
are a great lady. I think that you are well respected worldwide
and I think that you are doing a good job. But occasionally
people need to be questioned. I disagree with a lot of your
policy. I disagree, as I said, with U.S. ground troops. But
that is my right. It is also your constitutional right as part
of the executive branch of government to not only direct
foreign policy, but for the President to direct the military
activities worldwide. I respect that and I am going to continue
to do that. I am going to continue to respect you, but I am
going to continue to respectfully occasionally disagree with
your policies.
Secretary Albright. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I
must say that you and this committee are the best friends that
the State Department has. I appreciate very much the
opportunity to work with all of you. I appreciate the questions
and I think that we had an excellent hearing. I will make sure
that the questions are answered as rapidly as possible. If any
of you need to speak to me on the phone on any part of this, I
would be more than pleased to do that. I am very grateful to
you and to the members of the subcommittee for this. Thank you.
Mr. Callahan. We thank you.
[Questions and answers for the record follow:]
Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman Callahan
__________
Rule of Law Programs
Question. Under section 481(a)(4), the President is authorized to
provide counternarcotics assistance Notwithstanding any other provision
of law for a variety of purposes, including for ``other anticrime
purposes''. Please provide a list of each instance during fiscal years
1996, 1997, 1998, and so far in 1999 in which this waiver provision was
exercised, including the purposes of which the funds were used; the
amount of funds obligated; and the countries in which the programs were
conducted.
Answer.
USE OF SEC. 481 ``NOTWITHSTANDING'' PROVISION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Country Program Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. COUNTRY PROGRAMS
April, 1996--Guatemala............. 1996 Bilateral CN $2.1M
Program.
1997 Bilateral 2.0M
Program.
1998 Bilateral CN 3.0M
Program.
------------
Total........................ ...................... 7.1M
Dec., 1996--Vietnam................ 1996 training--demand 21K
reduction.
1997 training--demand 97K
reduction Coast
Guard, Secret Service.
1998 training--demand 209K
reduction DEA, Coast
Guard.
1999 training--demand 96K
reduction FBI.
Total........................ ...................... 423K
Dec., 1996--China.................. 1997 training--demand 37K
reduction Secret
Service.
1997 contribution to 480K
UNDCP.
1998 training--demand 124K
reduction US Customs.
------------
Total........................ ...................... 641K
Oct., 1998--chine.................. 1999 training--damand 458K
reduction US Office
of Govt Ethics, DEA,
FBI, Coast Guard, DOJ.
------------
Total........................ ...................... 458K
II. PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTS FOR SERVICES IN THE U.S.
1996 Sr. Narcotics $103K/yr.
Advisor.
1996 Sr. Aviation 87K/yr.
Advisor.
1997 Sr. Law 107K/yr.
Enforcement Policy
Advisor.
1998 Civilian Police 69K/yr.
Program Advisor.
1998 Telecommunicatio 56K/yr.
ns Advisor.
1998 Telecommunicatio 58K/yr.
ns Advisor.
1998 Anticrime 91K/yr.
Program Advisor.
1998 Maritime 94K/yr.
Surveillance
Specialist.
1998 Sr. Law 30K/yr.
Enforcement Training
Advisor (part time).
1998 International 54K/yr.
Narcotics Control
Strategy Report
Analyst.
1999 Rotary Wing 75K/yr.
Standardization Pilot.
1999 International 71K/yr.
Law Enforcement
Academy Program
Officer.
1999 Civilian Police 35K/yr.
Program Analyst.
1999 Fixed Wing 75K/yr.
Standardization Pilot.
1999 Maintenance Test 67K/yr.
Pilot.
1999 Sr. Law 39K/yr.
Enforcement Training
Advisor (part time).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule of Law Programs
Question. Has the Bureau of International Narcotics Control, or any
other Bureau of the Department of State, transferred to, or otherwise
obligated funds for, the Office of Inspector General for programs,
projects, or activities in China, including any rule of law programs or
activities? Please include funding for any person or persons that may
have accompanied the Inspector General on any travel to China (such as
employees of the Office of Government Ethics), and include an itinerary
of the trip and all activities conducted during the trip.
Answer. The Department of State has neither transferred nor
obligated any funds to the OIG for programs, projects, or activities in
China.
Question. Please provide the Committee with a detailed listing of
all anticrime programs, projects, and activities to be funded in fiscal
year 1999 through the Bureau of International Narcotics Control, and
those proposed for fiscal year 2000.
Answer. Attached is a summary of INL funded training programs in FY
1999. Program plans for FY 2000 have not as yet been identified.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Wye Supplemental
Question. How do you want us to pay for Wye, Madam
Secretary? Should we fund it:
a. Within the current level of $5.4 billion for the Middle
East?
b. From funding allocated to other regions of the world?
c. Or should it come out of the budget surplus?
Answer. We view funding related to implementation of the
Wye agreement as an extraordinary expense. Rather than
requesting the funding in a one-time lump sum, it is structured
as a supplemental request and advance appropriation for FY 99,
00 and 01. That structure allows us to meet our commitment to
the peace process parties, while at the same time easing the
burden on the budget. I would also note that funding for Israel
and the Palestinians is clearly linked to implementation of the
Wye Agreement.
Question. If the peace process resumes, and includes
negotiations with Syria on the Golan Heights; negotiations with
Israel on the removal of certain settlements in the West Bank
or the Golan Heights; and negotiations with Israel and her
neighbors on the resettlement of refugees; do you believe the
United States should provide sizable additional funds to
implement or in connection with such a peace agreement or
agreements: Do you believe, for instance, that any peace
agreement between Israel and Syria will include, or should
include, Camp David-style payments to Syria.
Answer. One of our key strategic goals is achieving a just,
lasting an comprehensive peace between Israel and all its Arab
neighbors, based on UN resolutions 242 and 338. Over the next
year, the United States intends to encourage progress on the
Israeli/Palestinian and Israeli/Syrian tracks of the Middle
East peace process. We intend to consult closely with Congress
on the progress of these negotiations, including any financial
requests from the parties which might emerge as the
negotiations move forward.
Support for Front Line States
Question. What role can or should international banks play
in the reconstruction of Kosovo in the context of an
independent or UN protectorate status?
Answer. It is premature to define a role for the
international banks in a post-conflict Kosovo. Much depends on
the political arrangements made for Kosovo and with the FRY. In
a post-conflict Kosovo, the IFIs could play a role in
structural reform and macroeconomic stabilization. Although
every situation is unique, designers of any program would
undoubtedly draw on ideas and lessons learned in similar
economic assistance efforts in Bosnia and the West Bank/Gaza.
Impact on Montenegro and Macedonia
Question. Prior to the beginning of the air campaign against
Serbia, did we consider the political implications for the pre-Western
governments of Montenegro and Macedonia?
What contingency plans were made to deal with either:
A. an attempt by the Serbian government to destabilize these
governments;
B. the impact of huge numbers of refugees; and
C. a popular backlash against these governments due to the bombing
campaign?
In summary, has our policy had the effect of undermining the pro-
democracy, pro-Western governments of these two nations?
Answer. NATO's successful air campaign against Serbia has
reinforced the democratic governments in Montenegro and Macedonia and
made clear the need to integrate the Balkans into the European
mainstream. Milo Djukanovic continues to exercise authority as
President of Montenegro and the Macedonian government remains strong
and unified.
Prior to the decision to initiate the air campaign we looked
closely at the possible ramifications and discussed this issue in
detail with our European Allies. Milosevic's brutal ethnic cleansing
and deportation campaign against the Kosovar Albanian population was
surprising only in its size and speed. The international community was
forced to move rapidly to respond to the massive outflow of refugees
from Kosovo. This included the provision of significant assistance to
both Montenegro and Macedonia.
Podogrica and Skopje rose to the challenge of handling the refugee
crisis. Their leaders steered a consistently pro-Western course through
a difficult period and have emerged the stronger for it.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Mr. Porter
__________
Kosovo: Peace Terms
Question: What is the ultimate peace agreement and final state of
Kosovo that we are now working towards? What are our core demands from
Milosevic to stop the bombing? Are we insisting that he accept the
Rambouillet Accords or are we open to negotiating?
Answer. NATO has stated clearly it will not suspend air strikes
until Belgrade has unequivocally accepted the NATO conditions and
demonstrably begun to withdraw its forces from Kosovo according to a
precise and rapid timetable.
President Milosevic knows what he must do:
Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and to immediate
ending of violence and repression;
Withdraw from Kosovo his military, police and paramilitary forces;
Agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military
presence;
Agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and
displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid
organizations;
Provide credible assurance of this willingness to work for the
establishment of a political framework agreement abased on the
Rambouillet accords.
Our goal remains to create the conditions required for a
sustainable peace, conditions such as military stability and the
development of legitimate political institutions. We seek to help end
Serb repression and give Kosovars control over their lives through
effective self-government.
This has become more difficult in the wake of the atrocities of the
recent Serb offensive in Kosovo. However, our goal remains a peaceful,
multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo in which all its people can live in
security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal
basis.
Ally Support for Campaign Against Kosovo
Question: Although the campaign against the Serbs is in the name of
NATO, what is the overall feeling within the alliance? With the
exception of Greece, are other countries in the alliance actively
supporting the attacks?
Answer. NATO heads of government declared unanimously at the Summit
in Washington that NATO would not allow the campaign of terror pursued
by the Belgrade regime under the direction of Slobodan Milosevic to
succeed.
The first point of the April 23 summit statement closed with the
words, ``NATO is determined to prevail.'' Nothing has deterred Allies
from that commitment.
Fourteen of eighteen allies have contributed over 270 aircraft to
the air campaign, including fighters, bombers and support aircraft.
Nine Allies have also contributed naval assets, including aircraft
carriers, submarines, destroyers and frigates.
Troops Without a Peace Agreement
Question. At Rambouillet, I believe that there was a commitment
made by NATO to the ethnic Albanians to provide troops to enforce a
peace agreement. Evidently, the Albanian Kosovars were under the
impression that ground troops would be provided regardless of a peace
agreement. How did this misunderstanding come about? Do the Albanian
Kosovars feel that NATO is holding up their end of the agreement?
Answer. Neither at Rambouillet nor at any other time did the United
States agree to send ground troops into Kosovo except in a permissive
environment. With FRY acceptance of NATO's conditions as specified in
UNSC Resolution 1244 and the Military-Technical Agreement between the
Yugoslav military and NATO, the United States has begun to deploy
troops into Kosovo as part of KFOR. Kosovar Albanian leaders appear to
be satisfied with NATO's course of action.
Kosovo
Question. Needless to say, the NATO attacks on Kosovo have
significantly strained our relationship with Russia. What do you see as
the future for this relationship? In your recent discussions with Prime
Mister Primakov and Foreign Minister Ivanov, do you still hold out
hopes for Russia to assist in peace negotiations or are relations too
sour at this point?
Answer. The crisis in Kosovo has strained U.S.-Russia relations.
However, we place a high value on this relationship and we continue to
work intensively with the Russians on Kosovo, as well as a wide range
of regional, international, and bilateral issues. For example, we
worked with the Russians and other treaty members of achieve a far-
reaching Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement. We also
recently signed a highly enriched uranium agreement and continue to
work on issues such as non-proliferation. As I have said before, an
effective relationship is one where we move forward together on the
issues where we agree and manage those where we may have differences.
When it comes to Kosovo, the Russians agree with us on the
importance of a negotiated settlement for long-term peace and security
in Kosovo. That is why we are working closely with the Russians both
bilaterally and multilaterally. President Clinton has spoken with
President Yeltsin about the matter by phone on Several occasions. The
Deputy Secretary was just in Moscow for the second time in two weeks to
continue the process of working with Russia to find a diplomatic
solution to the situation in Kosovo based on the principles set out by
the G-8.
Cyprus
Question. With Kosovo and President Milosevic's ethnic cleansing of
the Kosovars being in the forefront of the discussions here today, I am
curious about the effect this situation will have on U.S. policy in
other parts of the world were similar atrocities are occurring.
Specifically, I am interested in Turkey and their persecution of the
Kurds and their occupation of and colonization of Cyprus in violation
of international law. In the aftermath of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus
in 1974, one-third of the island's population became refugees, somewhat
similar to what is occurring in Kosovo. Yet Turkey has gone unpunished
for these actions. When is the administration going to seriously
address the reunification of Cyprus and the end of the Turkish military
occupation of this island?
Answer. Serb ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians, the status of
Kirds in Turkey, and the Cyprus dispute are not comparable situations.
Finding a political solution to the division of Cyprus that
addresses the concerns of both sides remains a high priority for this
Administration. We are working hard to bring the two sides into
comprehensive settlement negotiations under U.S. auspices. The U.S.
remains committed to a solution on the basis of a bizonal, bicommunal
federation.
With respect to the status of Turkey's Kurds, we have said for many
years that we do not believe there is any purely military solution to
Kurdish issues in Turkey. Any enduring solution lies in the expansion
of democracy, including full democratic political participation by all
of Turkey's citizens and protection of their human rights.
Palestinians Meeting Wye Commitments
Question. The State Department spokesman and others have said on
several occasions that the Palestinian Authority is in compliance with
many of the commitments it entered into at Wye. I have some specific
questions about the commitments under Wye that have met (sic) How have
the Palestinians worked to end terrorism in Gaza and the West Bank?
Have they outlawed all organizations of a military, terrorist or
violent character? In terms of bringing an end to incitement, have the
Palestinians ceased teaching children about hate and violence. Have
sermons in mosques attacking both Israel and the U.S. been stopped?
Answer. We believe the Palestinian security organizations are
making a very serious and credible effort to combat terror.
For example, acting on information developed through their own
investigations, PA security forces have prevented a number of terror
operations, including what could have a very serious attack in Tel Aviv
in March. The Israeli government commended this PA security operation
and others.
On the question of outlawing terrorist organizations, the Wye River
Memorandum obligated the Palestinian side to ``inform the U.S. fully of
the actions it has taken to outlaw all organizations (or wings of
organizations, as appropriate) of a military, terrorist or violent
character.* * * ''
The Palestinians have provided to us a March 3, 1996 statement
issued by the Palestinian Authority stating that a meeting of the
Higher Palestinian National Security Council, chaired by Chairman
Arafat, had decided to ban the activity of all paramilitary groups,
including the armed wings of HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
We have some questions regarding the legal status of this statement. We
are discussing this with the Palestinians.
The Palestinian security services have been effective in taking
action against those terrorist groups.
We continue to press the PA to do everything possible to prevent
terror and to cooperate fully with the Israelis.
Regarding incitement in Palestinian textbooks, a recent study did
reveal some anti-Semitic content. Obviously, there can be no place for
such material.
We have raised our strong concerns directly with Chairman Arafat
and the PA, which is in the process of creating new textbooks to
replace those published prior to the advent of the PA. We will continue
to pursue this issue with the PA. This problem has also been raised in
the Anti-Incitement Committee.
Iran
Question. While some improvements in Iran have taken place, many
problems still remain. I am concerned that the Administration gestures
towards improving relations with Iran could be very premature. To
better assess the current situation in Iran, I have a few questions.
Does it appear that President Khatami is in control and if so, does he
participate in security-related decision making? Are you aware of the
amount of assistance Iran is currently providing to Hamas and
Hezbollah?
Answer. President Khatami exercises authority over much of the
Iranian government, but is outranked by Supreme Leader Khamanei on
issues involving the Iranian armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards,
the Judiciary and the Ministry of Intelligence. In addition, powerful
foundations called ``bonyads,'' which control the holdings of the
former Shah and figures associated with his regime, report directly to
the Supreme Leader, and not President Khatami. The bonyads exercise a
significant impact on Iranian economic activity.
Khatami's election two years ago alarmed conservative elements in
Iran. As Khatami has pressed for change in both domestic and foreign
affairs, these conservatives have resisted. The outcome of this
struggle will depend in great part on the evolving power relationships
among Khatami, Supreme Leader Khamanei and Expediency Head (and ex-
president) Rafsanjani.
The Iranian public apparently supports Khatami and his agenda of
promoting the rule of law, reducing government intrusion into people's
lives, and increasing freedom of expression.
With regard to Iran's support for Hamas and Hizboliah, I would cite
the State Department's ``Patterns of Global Terrorism'' report for
1998, released April 1999:
``Iran continued to provide support to a variety of terrorist
groups, including the Lebanese Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, which oppose the Middle East peace process through
violence. Iran supports these groups with varying amounts of training,
money, and/or weapons.''
Question. We have seen for some time Iranian development of
advanced missiles such as the Shahab 3 designed to threaten U.S. forces
and allies in the Middle East. We also have seen significant signs of
an Iranian effort to develop a nuclear weapons program. What is your
assessment of Iranian progress in the missile and nuclear arenas? What
action are we undertaking to address these developments?
Answer. Iran continues its efforts to develop a nuclear weapons
capability, but has made little progress to date due to the reluctance
of most nuclear suppliers to provide any assistance to Iran. It also is
pursuing a multi-track effort to develop both liquid and solid
propellant missile systems and is aggressively seeking equipment and
technology from foreign sources for these programs. Iran has made
significant progress in the last few years toward its goal of becoming
self-sufficient in ballistic missile production, as demonstrated by its
indigenous productions of Scud missiles and the July 1998 flight test
of the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile.
We strongly oppose any cooperation with Iran's nuclear and missile
programs, and have engaged for many years in aggressive efforts to stop
the proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to Iran, including
through the imposition of sanctions. During the past five years, we
have worked multilaterally, through the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and bilaterally
through discussions with supplier governments, to restrict their
missile and WMD-related exports and cut off sources of outside supply
to Iran's missile and nuclear programs. We have held four rounds of
talks with North Korea to convince it to restrain its missile
technology exports, and we are pursuing an intensive high-level effort
to impede Iranian efforts to obtain missile and nuclear technology from
Russian firms. In addition, we continue to engage China in extensive
nonproliferation discussions, and raised our concerns about Chinese
cooperation with Iran at the highest levels. We also continue to press
China to bring its export policies and practices better in line with
international standards.
These efforts have produced results. Over the past year, Russia has
put in place new legal authorities to control the export of any item
destined for a program of proliferation concern, has stopped several
activities of concern, and has investigated others, including reports
of Russian firms cooperating with Iran. China has pledged not to assist
unsafguarded nuclear facilities, to phase out its nuclear cooperation
with Iran, and not to export MTCR-class ground-to-ground missiles.
China also has announced that it is studying the possibility of joining
the MTCR and has stated that it would not sell missiles to Iran.
The Administration also uses sanctions and other tools to combat
proliferation. During the past year, the USG imposed penalties on ten
Russian entities. In January, the Administration imposed administrative
measures against three Russian entities for their nuclear- and missile-
related cooperation with Iran. Last July, we took the same action
against seven Russian entities involved with Iran's ballistic missile
program. And in 1992 and 1996, we imposed missile sanctions on North
Korea for selling missile technology to Iran.
Idonesian Elections
Question. Is the U.S. Government planning to fund observer missions
by the Carter Center or any other U.S. entities for the Indonesian
elections? If so, what type of observer mission do you foresee and what
will be the funding mechanis
Answer. The U.S. Government is funding a joint Carter Center/
National Democratic Institute (NDI) delegation to observe the
Indonesian elections through a grant to NDI. The delegation will not be
official, but will play an important role--along with delegations from
many other nations and the people of Indonesia themselves--in assessing
the fairness of the ballot. NSAID has approved an NDI grant of $750,000
to form the 80-member delegation, which will be led by former President
Carter and a prominent Republican, and possibly include several members
of Congress.
Question. These elections, while important, are a single point on a
long continuum in the democratic development that will need to take
place at multiple levels in Indonesia in the coming years. What will be
the focus of our democracy and governance programs in Indonesia in
FY2000 and beyond?
Answer. We have emphasized that these elections are a necessary,
but not sufficient condition for democracy to take hold in Indonesia.
They are a first step in what will be a prolonged democratization
process.
Though the elections have become the focus of much attention in
recent months, the U.S. Government has been actively supporting
Indonesian efforts to improve governance and strengthen civil society
efforts for some time. These efforts will continue and expand under our
``Emerging Democracies'' initiative, which is designed to focus
attention on Indonesia's democratization over the coming years.
In particular, we plan to continue our support for Indonesian
private sector and government efforts to foster Institutional reform
and constructive change, while also supporting development of a Non-
governmental organizations and the media.
Question. Given the history of U.S. training for the Indonesian
military, there is understandable concern about the future of this
issue and the future of military to military relationships in
Indonesia. How does the proposed police training program fit into our
goals in Indonesia and how has it been designed to deal with the
suspicion that has come to be attached with any effort to provide this
kind of training in Indonesia?
Answer. The administration has moved quickly to support Indonesia's
democratic transition, focusing most of our assistance on activities
relating to the elections and the strengthening of civil society.
However, we also recognized that violent, potentially lethal
demonstrations like those that led to Soeharto's ouster last May and
that accompanied the convening of the parliament in November could
undermine the country's democratic transition. We have proposed
training Indonesian police leaders in non-confrontational crowd control
tactics in an effort to help Indonesia reduce such violence and better
ensure a peaceful democratic transition.
The training program has been designed to help police managers
counter the overtly confrontational crowd-control tactics that have
brought justifiable criticism and suspicion upon the Indonesian
security forces. It will focus on teaching police leaders modern, non-
frontational crowd management tactics and techniques and improving
police-community communication. We believe it has real, if modest,
potential to reduce violence, protect lives, and help ensure a peaceful
democratic transition.
On April 1 the police separated from the Indonesian military
structure in an initial step toward a fully independent status. This
training will target police leaders only, not the military. For this
reason, it also represents an opportunity to provide early
institutional support for the Indonesian police as an organizational
entity separate from the military.
Burma Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance:
Question. To what can you attribute the continued delay in
processing what should by now be a pro forma request for proposals for
the support of the Burmese democratic opposition?
Answer. We want to ensure that USG funds are being put to optimal
use to pursue our policy goals. Because the political, economic and
humanitarian situation in and around Burma does not remain static, we
are very careful to have a serious and thorough process each year.
We consider it necessary that all nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) submit formal applications describing their prospective
activities for an interagency committee review (DOS, USAID, USIA), even
if they have qualified for USG funding in the past. The reviews are
completed as expeditiously as possible.
We consult regularly with the democratic opposition regarding
current and potential uses of earmark funds. Kyi and other leaders of
the democratic opposition prior to issuing this year's request for
applications. As soon as the interagency committee's tentative funding
determinations are made, these will be conveyed to the democratic
opposition leaders for comment, and then finalized. While these
consultations have added additional steps to the grant-making process
this year, they are necessary in order to ensure that the funding is
appropriately targeted to help us accomplish our goals in Burma.
We will make final funding decisions on the FY 99 funds by mid-
summer.
Question. What is the position of the Department with regard to the
use of these (appropriation) funds for development projects within
Burma?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon is in close contact with Aung
San Suu Kyi and has discussed the issue of humanitarian assistance to
Burma with her many times. She has indicated that she supports
humanitarian assistance in principle and would projects in Burma that
could be closely monitored to ensure that they function without
interference by the authorities and that assistance is delivered on a
non-discriminatory basis.
We share Aung San Suu Kyi's belief that judicious use of assistance
funds in Burma could advance prospects for democracy there.
Colombia
Question. I understand that Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Harold Koh, recently visited
Colombia. What steps is the United States taking to pressure the
Colombian government to protect individuals working to protect the
environment and defend human rights, who operate under constant death
threats?
Answer. The threat to human rights activists in Colombia is well
documented. We noted this concern in our annual Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1998, while the non-governmental
organization Human Rights Watch recently reported that more human
rights defenders were killed in Colombia than in any other country in
1998. In addition to those killed, many more have been threatened, and
some have fled the country.
Due to the high level of violence in Colombia and the long-running
internal conflict, the Department of State has advised Americans not to
travel there. Guerrillas and paramilitaries have targeted and killed
non-combatants, including human right defenders, for years. The recent
murder by FARC guerrillas of three Americans working with an indigenous
group on environmental issues underscores the dangers posed by the
ongoing conflict. There is no quick or easy solution to the very
complex problems confronting the government of Colombia.
Protecting human rights defenders is a high priority of the U.S.
government, which we demonstrated by our strong support for a
resolution on human rights defenders at the United Nations Human Rights
Commission in Geneva in 1998.
Assistant Secretary Koh has raised our concern about the plight of
human rights defenders regularly in meetings with Colombian officials,
including Vice President Bell, who is in charge of the Colombian
government's efforts to improve its human rights record. On his trip to
Colombia in March, Assistant Secretary Koh highlighted the need for the
government of Colombia to do more to protect human rights defenders in
a speech he gave at a human rights conference in Medellin. He also
raised the topic with President Pastrana during that trip, and met with
human rights leaders to hear their concerns first hand and show our
support for their efforts.
The highest officials of the government of Colombia, including
President Pastrana, have stated their commitment to improve the human
rights climate in Colombia, and to pay special attention to improving
security for human rights defenders. The government is implementing a
plan to increase security at the offices of the most threatened human
rights organizations, and to enhance the personal security of
individuals specifically threatened.
We support those measures and will continue to monitor the
situation closely.
Question. Providing counter-narcotics assistance and training to a
military unit operating in the area of intense fighting could put the
U.S. in the position of becoming further involved in this intractable
conflict. How do you intend to keep our counternarcotics assistance
from becoming counter-insurgency assistance?
Answer. Colombian military participation in counternarcotics law
enforcement operations is necessitated by the nexus between heavily-
armed insurgents and narcotics traffickers. USG counternarcotics
assistance to the Colombian military will be closely monitored by the
U.S. Embassy to ensure its use for counternarcotics purposes. We are
working closely with the Colombian military to designate specific units
to be used only for counternarcotics operations.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Mr. Packard
__________
Kosovo: Arming the KLA
Question. There are some here in Congress that are advocating that
we arm the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). It would seem logical to me
that arming the Kosovo Albanians so that they can defend themselves is
a better alternative than sending in American ground troops to do it
for them. Do we have any plans to arm them? Would this be a good idea?
Answer. There is no military solution for either side to the Kosovo
conflict. Arming the KLA would be a violation of the UN arms embargo in
effect against Serbia, and we believe it is imperative to respect these
UNSC resolutions.
Moreover, if we arm the KLA in defiance of the UNSCR, others may
consider themselves justified in arming Serbian forces.
NATO's military actions against Serb forces are the most effective
way of degrading and ultimately defeating Belgrade's plan for ethnic
cleansing of Kosovo. Outside arms supplied to the KLA could detract
from that effort by making refugees and IDPs more vulnerable to Serb
attack.
Kosovo/Russia
Question. How far do you think Russia will go on supporting the
Serbs? Is it a possibility that they may become militarily involved as
well if we continue our intervention on Yugoslavia?
Answer. President Yeltsin has repeatedly stated, both publicly and
privately, that Russia will not become militarily involved in the
Kosovo conflict. In fact, Russia continues to engage actively with us
in an attempt to find a diplomatic solution to the situation in Kosovo
based on the principles put forth by the G-8 in Bonn.
Russia is supplying humanitarian assistance to Yugoslavia.
Emergency Minister Shoygu has pledged that this aid is for all refugees
regardless of ethnicity or nationality.
Kosovo
Question. Can you provide us with an update on our efforts in
regard to the refugee situation? Are there still plans for the United
States to accept some of these refugees?
Answer. Funding. Since March 1998, the U.S. has provided over $188
million in Kosovo-related assistance: nearly $60 million from State/
PRM, $80 million from USAID, and $48 million from the Defense
Department. Much of our funding has been funneled through international
organizations such as the UNHCR and IOM, where it has a multiplier
effect, and is implemented by U.S.-based non-governmental
organizations.
Camp Hope. The U.S. military assigned in Albania has contracted for
the construction of camps for Kosovar refugees, beginning with Camp
Hope, near the coastal town of Fier, which will ultimately have a
capacity of 20,000. Camp Hope began accepting refugees on May 13. U.S.
construction of at least two additional camps is under consideration.
Refugees to U.S. on April 21, the administration announced the U.S.
plan to admit up to 20,000 Kosovar Albanians to the U.S. as refugees.
The first priority of the program is to relieve the pressure on the
Government of Macedonia by moving refugees from FYROM. The program
consists of two tracks: one that will reunite families in Macedonia
directly with relatives in the U.S. and a second that will move
refugees out of vulnerable situations in refugee camps. We are prepared
to reunite relatives with refugee families in Albania as well. Our
first priority, however, is to relieve the pressure on Macedonia.
Question. What type of humanitarian assistance are we providing to
the refugees? Do you have a cost estimate at this time of the
humanitarian assistance that has been provided thus far?
Answer. Funding. Since March 1998, the U.S. has provided over $188
million in Kosovo-related assistance: nearly $60 million from State/
PRM, $80 million from USAID, and $48 million from the Defense
Department. Much of our funding has been funneled through international
organizations such as the UNHCR and IOM, where it has a multiplier
effect, and is implemented by U.S.-based non-governmental
organizations.
Macedonia. The most pressing of the myriad problems in the Kosovo
crisis is to move people out of Macedonia. The total number of refugees
in Macedonia is over 230,000, more than ten percent of the country's
population. The USG has begun providing refuge in the U.S. to up to
20,000 Kosovar refugees. Preference is being given to refugees with
relatives in the U.S., to vulnerable populations, and to those in
Macedonia.
Albania. The U.S. military assigned in Albania has contracted for
the construction of camps for Kosovar refugees, beginning with Camp
Hope, near the coastal town of Fier, which will ultimately have a
capacity of 20,000. Camp Hope began accepting refugees on May 13. U.S.
construction of at least two additional camps is under consideration.
Whereas in Macedonia the political optics are uppermost, in Albania the
constraining factor in refugee capacity is the country's antiquated
infrastructure. UNHCR has begun providing cash payments to the host
families in Albania that have been gracious enough to take Kosovars
into their homes. New refugees are entering Albania from Kosovo and
Montenegro. Albania now has over 430,000 Kosovar refugees.
Russia/IMF
Question. Russia is interested in obtaining yet another loan from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). I have deep concerns about this
considering earlier press reports that a lot of money from a previous
IMF loan ended up in a Swiss bank. What type of oversight do we have in
making sure our assistance is used for its intended purposes?
Answer. As a precondition of the IMF program currently under
discussion, the Russian Office of the Prosecutor General must provide
the Managing Director of the IMF with a written legal opinion on the
handling of the IMF tranche disbursed in July 1998. The accounting firm
of PricewaterhouseCoopers is also participating in the investigation of
this disbursement as part of its audit of the Russian Central Bank.
IMF Board approval of disbursements is contingent on Russia's
implementation of a range of measures, including ones aimed at
increasing government revenues and restructuring the banking system. In
response to our repeated insistence on transparency in the management
of these funds, Russia agreed that disbursements would be made in the
form of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) rather than dollars. These funds
would be held in an SDR account at the IMF for the purpose of making
payments on its obligations to the Fund as they come due.
U.S. Assistance to Ukraine
Question. The Administration has requested an increase in FY 2000
aid to Ukraine. In the past, this committee has pushed them to enact
economic reforms. American business people have testified that
corruption is rampant, and they themselves have been the victims of
this corruption, which makes it difficult for them to do business
there. Is this increase justified and are you convinced that Ukraine
has made some progress in this area?
Answer. I share your concern about Ukraine. The truth is that its
transition is not easy and will take a long time. We have made a long-
term commitment to assist Ukraine in this process. I dealt with these
issues, including Ukraine's difficult business climate, in a Report to
Congress on February 18, 1999. I certified then that Ukraine has made
``continued progress'' with respect to the resolution of U.S. investor
complaints.
Our focus on helping Ukraine meet the challenge of transition
obscures the fact that hundreds of U.S. and other foreign companies are
active in Ukraine. We have worked hard with Ukraine's government to
resolve U.S. investor complaints. These are thorny issues typical of
many economies in transition. But we have seen progress this year,
particularly in GOU efforts to address a range of systemic problems
which impede both foreign and domestic investment.
We are asking for more money for Ukraine because of its importance
to our interests, because it needs our help, and because we can and
should do more in Ukraine especially at the grassroots level. We will
focus on the nascent NGO community, independent media, and municipal
and regional governments, where by working with progressive local
leaders we can make sure that our help works in support of Ukraine's
democratic and market development.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Mr. Knollenberg
__________
Kosovo and U.S. Assistance to Russia
Question. Given the current state of affairs, do you foresee the
Administration taking any action affecting the U.S. foreign assistance
program in Russia? If Russia were to enter this conflict on behalf of
Yugoslavia, what action, if any, would the Administration take
regarding future U.S. assistance programs in Russia?
Answer. Assistance to Russia continues to be in the national
interest of the United States. It is important that the USG continue to
support security and democracy building efforts in Russia. This
includes U.S. assistance in the areas of security (threat reduction,
nuclear safety and export control activities); humanitarian aid (food
aid, orphanages, combating TB and HIV); democracy and civil society
(independent media, law enforcement, exchanges); and other grassroots
programs that support small business and NGO development.
We are working through the G-8 process with Russia to seek
resolution of the Kosovo conflict. President Yeltsin has stated
repeatedly that Russia will not be drawn militarily into the conflict
with the FRY.
Kosovo
Question. Initiation of NATO's Operation Allied Force significantly
accelerated the inevitable large movement of refugees from the war
zone. As the State Department planned for the fall-out of this
operation what were your estimates of population migration, and what
were your expected resource requirements to aid the refugees? What
period of time did your estimates assume would require sustained
support to refugees?
Answer. While we expect that there would be some population
movement out of Kosovo based on Serbian military repression, we did not
anticipate the pace and scale--and above all the Yugoslav
determination--of the most systematic ethnic cleansing seen in Europe
since the Second World War.
Even aid agencies did not predict that there would be ethnic
Albanians herded on trains and dumped at the Macedonia border.
We were prepared and had in place in the region enough personnel,
food, and logistical support for 400,000 people for six months.
International Organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), in coordination with numerous non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) both international and local, such as the Mother
Theresa Society, were doing an excellent job of assisting the hundreds
of thousands of people Milosevic had displaced internally.
Frankly, the international aid community does not pre-position food
for every potential outflow, but rather is prepared to respond
throughout the world, very quickly. That is what was done.
In addition, that much food and that many supplies would have been
seen as some kind of magnet--a pull factor.
We couldn't have gotten the political, financial, or logistical
support for that kind of operation. A crisis of this proportion
mobilizes the entire world--but unfortunately, that doesn't happen
until the crisis is at hand.
Caspian Oil Basin
Question. Does the Administration deem it necessary to adjust its
policy toward the Caspian, in order to adequately reflect the current
reality and broader U.S. interests?
Answer. U.S. energy policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia aims to
develop a network of multiple pipelines and an east-west energy transit
corridor in pursuit of four key objectives: Fostering the independence,
prosperity and stability of the new states of the Caspian region;
Establishing economic linkages between these new states to mitigate
regional conflicts, foster their integration into the global economy,
and encourage their evolution toward market-based democracies;
Bolstering global energy security by ensuring the free flow of Caspian
energy resources to world markets; and Enhancing commercial
opportunities for companies from the United States.
Realization of an east-west corridor of multiple pipelines is
moving ahead at a healthy pace. Two ``early oil'' pipelines are now in
place to carry oil from the Caspian to Black Sea ports; the Caspian
Pipeline Consortium (or CPC) broke ground on May 12 for its project to
transport oil from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea; and efforts to promote
trans-Caspian, trans-Caucasus pipelines for oil and gas are succeeding
because, among other reasons, the oil and gas companies recognize the
long-term importance of these routes.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Mr. Kingston
__________
Kosovo
Question. As you know, the four elements of National Power include
Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic strategies, and the
conduct of Foreign Policy and National Security policy must carefully
employ these assets, fully understanding that the most costly in
resources and lives is the use of Military Power and should thus be
used as a last resort. Do you believe that we fully exhausted employing
the other three elements before we engaged military power to solve our
dispute with President Milosevic? How were these elements employed?
Answer. Yes, I believe that we fully exhausted the other three
elements before we engaged military power. As you will recall, for
nearly an entire year before the start of the air campaign, Ambassador
Chris Hill had been engaged in an intensive shuttle diplomacy in the
region. He and his EU and Russian counterparts were backed up
diplomatically by the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia (the
Contact Group), as well as NATO, the European Union, the OSCE and other
organizations.
We employed a host of non-military methods before resorting in the
final instance to military action. The U.S. and EU imposed an arms
embargo, but also imposed an investment ban and assets freeze, as well
as a visa ban. In addition, ``outer wall'' sanctions (denial of
membership in international organizations and access to international
financial institutions, or IFIs) remained in effect and were partially
used as leverage with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on
Kosovo. Public diplomacy by the U.S. and others made clear to the Serbs
and to neighboring states Belgrade's responsibility for atrocities and
repression against civilians, and that international patience was
running out, as well as the ruin and isolation that the policies of the
Milosevic regime were bringing on the people of the FRY. The strong
support NATO has received from all of the FRY's neighbors is proof
positive that these efforts worked.
When last year Belgrade began its brutal repression of ethnic
Albanian civilians in Kosovo, we led other concerned countries to pass
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1160 calling upon
the parties to settle the crisis peacefully and imposing an arms
embargo. As the crisis deepened, we worked with our Contact Group
partners to gain Belgrade's acceptance of a Kosovo Diplomatic Observer
Mission (KDOM). Despite continued diplomacy by Hill and others, by
September it had become clear that, if the Serbs continued their reign
of terror in Kosovo, a humanitarian catastrophe would occur as winter
set in. Tens of thousands of Kosovars were living in the open, while
many more thousands had been displaced from their homes.
Reflecting international anxiety over the situation, we again led
the effort to obtain a UNSC resolution, 1199, which set a standard of
compliance for Belgrade to avert violence and a potential humanitarian
catastrophe. We and our NATO Allies were especially worried about the
deteriorating situation and at the North Atlantic Council voted to
approve taking military action if no other course was possible. In
October, Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, backed by the military power
of NATO, was able to convince President Milosevic to accept the
international community's terms. This paved the way for agreements with
NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
for air and ground verification missions, AVM and KVM, respectively.
Once Generals Clark and Naumann laid down the terms for the withdrawal
of Serb forces from Kosovo, KDOM was on the ground to verify the
withdrawals. AVM and KVM were endorsed by the UN Security Council in
resolution 1203.
As part of the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, Belgrade agreed to
pursue a political solution to the Kosovo crisis. Chris Hill
reinvigorated his shuttle diplomacy, presenting draft after draft of
proposed texts to both sides. Meanwhile, OSCE's KVM reported increasing
noncompliance with the October agreements.
Following the massacre of 45 unarmed civilians in the village of
Racak on January 15, 1999 (later proven by a Finnish forensics team),
it became apparent that Serbs were stalling on the diplomatic front in
order to resume their repression. The Contact Group agreed to attempt
to short-circuit the Serbs' bad faith in the negotiations by convening
the parties for intensive discussions at Rambouillet on the basis of
proposed texts which met all previously agreed principles. We made
clear along with our NATO allies that failure to respond positively
would have serious consequences. Belgrade responded and appeared at the
Rambouillet talks.
The Serbs' perfidy at Rambouillet is a matter of record. They
dragged out the negotiations and refused to engage on key substantive
issues, all the while building up a massive force in and around Kosovo
with which they intended to ethnically cleanse the province of ethnic
Albanians. The Kosovar delegation accepted ad referendum the
Rambouillet accords. The Serbs, however, only agreed to the political
aspects. When the parties met several weeks later in Paris, the Serbs
walked back even on what they had previously agreed.
Despite intense diplomatic pressure from the Contact Group, a
military threat from NATO, last minute visits by high-level diplomats,
and his own repeated promises to seek a political solution, Milosevic
persisted in seeking to use force to repress and terrorize Kosovo's
civilian population. By the time NATO began its air campaign, the Serbs
had been engaged for months in the advance stages of their plan to rid
Kosovo of its Albanian residents, including a return to shelling of
villages, summary executions, beatings, systematic looting, robbing,
extortion, and terror. Their actions had displaced tens of thousands of
Kosovar Albanians and had created such a dangerous environment
throughout the province that the OSCE KVM had to withdraw for its own
safety.
Question. The Washington Post reported ``Clinton administration
officials have expressed concern that any move to constitute an
alliance invasion force would trigger a divisive debate that could
undercut support here and in Europe for the air operation.'' (NATO
Forces Staging, But Not For Invasion, 4/9/99) One of the
administration's stated ``important interests at stake in the Kosovo
conflict (includes) maintaining the credibility of NATO as guarantor of
peace and stability in Europe'' (White House, Information Regarding the
US/NATO Action in Kosovo, 4/9/99). Although the campaign against the
Serbs is in the name of NATO, what is the overall feeling within the
alliance? With the exception of Greece, are other countries in the
alliance actively supporting the attacks?
If NATO is unable to unite behind a resolution to use all means of
force to meet their objectives and end this war with Yugoslavia, will
it's credibility not be lost?
Weren't these contingencies negotiated with our allies and planned
for in advance--before the commitment of force?
Answer. NATO's credibility is at stake. But nothing has deterred
NATO's commitment to the unanimous declaration by NATO heads of
government at the Washington Summit that NATO would not allow the
campaign of terror pursued by the Belgrade regime under the direction
of Slobodan Milosevic to succeed.
NATO is determined to stop the humanitarian crisis, bring long-term
stability to Southeastern Europe, and defend the values for which the
Alliance has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights, rule
of law.
We and Allies closely considered all options before selecting the
current course of action and continue to monitor progress and evaluate
alternatives to ensure the mission is accomplished. We expect the air
campaign to achieve NATO objectives.
Question. The long slow escalation of the War in Vietnam, and the
restraints imposed on the military by the U.S. administration in the
1960s and 1970s cost our country dearly in American lives and in
resources. Does your budget reflect the potential costs associated with
the current war over Yugoslavia and what is the Foreign Policy and
National Security Strategy you will implement to avoid similar costs in
this escalating conflict with Yugoslavia?
Answer. I can only comment on the non-military aspects of the
budget, but I believe our budget takes into consideration most
potential costs associated with the current war over Yugoslavia. Our
Allies and we are convinced that the air campaign will be successful,
(delete) and that subsequent events will show this to be true. Those
actual and anticipated costs are expected to be covered by the
requested supplemental, as well as most of our share of the costs in
providing humanitarian and other support to countries in the region
through the end of the current fiscal year.
Once the conflict is over, there will be a large reconstruction
task in Kosovo. While we should pay our fair share, the Europeans have
agreed that they will be responsible for the vast majority of it. Once
we have a better sense of the damage, however, we may need additional
funds to meet our share of KFOR, provisional administration,
humanitarian relief, war crimes prosecutions, and reconstruction costs
for Kosovo and administrative overhead for the USG civilian agencies
involved.
Kosovo: Diplomacy Backed by Force
Question. I agree with your piece in Foreign Affairs last year
saying that U.S. diplomacy requires not only vision and anticipation,
but also the spine to honor our commitments and back our words with
actions. If our earlier threats of lower-intensity force had been
exercised when our conditions or deadlines were not met, I believe our
coercion of Milosevic would have been more effective. Possibly avoiding
today's all out war. Am I wrong?
Answer. Diplomatic engagement backed by the credible threat of
force is the most realistic formula for stabilizing the Balkans and
protecting United States interests in that region. That is the formula
we used to end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that is the
approach used in pursuing a diplomatic solution to the crisis in
Kosovo.
I agree that in order for the threat of force to be credible, it
must be backed by determination and commitment. That is why we have
clearly spelled out for Milosevic what actions he must take and the
consequences for failing to meet them. When he failed to accept the
Rambouillet Accords, NATO had no choice but to follow through on its
threat to take military action.
Kosovo: National Interests and the Use of Ground Troops
Question: Did your strategy for a recommendation to commit American
forces into the conflict with Yugoslavia include a conscious decision
that we would have to use all means possible to achieve a favorable
outcome and the realization that winning this war could mean a
commitment of overwhelming force, including the use of a large ground
force to win? Is not such an assessment essential to fully evaluate if
this is a vital national interest before committing military power
under any circumstances?
Answer. NATO is unified in its determination to resolve the
conflict in Kosovo based on its five conditions, including the
requirement for an international military presence.
NATO is currently updating its plans for KFOR, which would enter
Kosovo after a suspension of NATO air strikes and the withdrawal of
Serb military, police and paramilitary forces.
This is a prudent step and does not constitute a change in policy.
NATO's strategy is aimed at disrupting and crippling the assets
Milosevic uses to carry out atrocities in Kosovo. The air campaign--
central to achievement of that objective--is working and with time is
increasingly effective. We are confident that it will succeed.
Kosovo Strategic Objectives
Question. Our current strategy to reach our objectives and end the
conflict in Yugoslavia requires the capitulation by our enemy,
President Milosevic. Our goals can only be reached by his decision to
accept our demands. There is no strategy in place to meet our
objectives if he does not. Our objectives in the 1990 Gulf War set four
clear objectives, while Saddam Hussein could have capitulated and
removed his forces from Kuwait, our strategy allowed us to accomplish
our objectives independent of the enemy's decision process. We had a
course of action, employing overwhelming ground forces, to obtain our
objectives. We were in control. Could you please address the open
available in our current strategy to end the conflict in Yugoslavia,
independent of the enemy's decision process, that would allow us to
meet our objectives? What are the potential costs associated with an
open ended commitment that remains dependent upon Mr. Milosevic's
capitulation to end this crisis?
Answer. NATO air strikes against the FRY will continue until
Milosevic accepts the five conditions agreed to at the Washington
Summit. Those air strikes have already damaged the military, internal
security forces, and other pillars of Milosevic's regime, making it
much more difficult for him to pursue his brutal policy of ethnic
cleansing.
At the same time, we are pursuing a diplomatic strategy designed to
maintain the Alliance's unity, and demonstrate to Milosevic that he is
totally isolated.
Intensified air strikes will cause even greater damage to
Milosevic's regime.
NATO's ability to seriously damage Milosevic's government enable it
to deal from a position of strength.
While we have chosen a different strategy from the Gulf War, our
strategy, which will not require the same commitment of resources as
the Gulf War, is appropriate given the circumstances in Kosovo, and
will be successful if we give it enough time.
Kosovo Reconstruction
Question. Following hostilities in Yugoslavia, Kosovo will require
substantial funds to provide for resettlement and reconstruction. Is
the State Department currently developing cost estimates associated
with this need? What levels of funding are expected? What contributions
do you expect to be provided by the United States? By other nations?
Answer. At the time of the peace talks in France last March, the
United States Government had, along with the UNHCR and the European
Commission, conducted extensive assessments of infrastructure
reconstruction needs in Kosovo to repair damage incurred since March
1998. We had, along with the OSCE, also begun to look at the costs
related to the implementation of the civilian components of an interim
peace agreement. Best estimates put total costs around $750 million,
with over half of this sum for housing repair.
At present, without the possibility for donors, NGOs, or
International Organizations to be present in Kosovo, there is simply no
way of assessing the damage done to the hundreds of villages that have
been shelled and burned by the VJ and the MUP since the beginning of
the current offensive. That damage is continuing.
The EU has already agreed to assume leadership in coordinating
international reconstruction assistance and in managing the
reconstruction and development effort in Kosovo once a peace settlement
is secured.
While we expect our European allies and partners to contribute the
bulk of the resources towards this effort, the U.S. should pay its fair
share.
Countering Serb Propaganda
Question. In what ways were psychological operations used, if at
all? When did they begin? Have you sustained this effort? Were leaflets
dropped? Is VOA engaged?
Answer. Milosevic has closed down all sources of independent and
objective news and information in the FRY and replaced them with
shameless propaganda and vicious misinformation. To counter this, we
are actively providing additional sources of accurate news and
information to the Serbian people, allowing them to better make the
informed decisions that will help shape their own future.
Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America are already available
throughout Serbia on the AM and short-wave bands, but we are working to
make this programming available on the more popular FM band as well. We
are currently broadcasting RFE/RL into Serbia 24 hours a day from radio
towers we have built for this purpose in Bosnia. We will begin
broadcasts from FM transmitters in Croatia and Bulgaria this week.
Programming from these FM transmitters includes VOA, RFE/RL, BBC, and
Deutche-Welle.
Direct satellite broadcasts and Internet materials are also being
used to reach select populations within Serbia. NATO is also
broadcasting three hours per day into Serbia from military aircraft on
both FM and AM bands, as well as on television. I have personally made
four direct addresses to the people of Serbia, and other administration
and U.S. Government officials have addressed this population. These
addresses are carried via radio and satellite television, and are also
audio-streamed over the Internet. To focus our counter-propaganda
efforts, we have established a Serbia Intelligence Group in the State
Department, which consists of USIA officers with long experience in
Yugoslavia and the FRY to develop appropriate messages to the Serb
people.
Forty-two million leaflets have been dropped on Serbia and Kosovo
since this operation began. Although the civilian International Public
Information campaign has been ongoing, the military information
campaign began the week following the first NATO airstrikes.
This sustained International Public Information (IPI) and
International Military Information effort are key components of our
overall effort to achieve our broad objectives in the region.
Haiti
Question. The U.S. military has maintained forces in Haiti since
the September 1994 mission to restore democracy. Reports have indicated
the cost of these operations is about $22 million a year, that the
current political situation has become increasingly unstable and that
Gen. Charles Wilhelm, Commander of the US Southern Command, has
recommended to end the permanent U.S. presence there. (Washington Times
March 24, 1999, GOP Lawmakers Propose Pulling Troops from Haiti).
What is the State Department's current assessment of the situation
in Haiti, what are our specific military roles and missions in Haiti,
what is the funding level for this ongoing operation, what are the
specific objectives that must be achieved before the State Department
will recommend an end to the military mission, when do troops come
home?
Answer. With the recent formation of a Provisional Electoral
Council (CEP) and a new Cabinet, Haiti is moving towards holding
legislative and local elections pending from last year. Free,
transparent, and inclusive elections, in consonance with the Haitian
constitution, will be the best path forward for resolving Haiti's
prolonged political impasse and restoring fully the parliamentary
branch. Several incidents of violence against politically-linked
Haitian citizens--including the killing of an opposition senator--have
raised concern that some may seek to prevent elections through
intimidation. The motives behind the incidents remain unclear, although
investigations continue.
The U.S. Military presence has contributed to continued stability
and served as a visible manifestation of U.S. support for Haiti's
democratic transition and economic development. As preparations for the
long-awaited elections get underway, this role will continue to be
important to U.S. interests. Currently, the roughly 400-strong U.S.
military support group conducts civil engineering and humanitarian
assistance projects. It has dug dozens of wells; its medical clinics
have provided care to tens of thousands of Haiti's poor. These projects
provide important training for U.S. troops as well as essential
services to the Haitian people.
For the time being, these mutually beneficial exercises will
continue in Haiti with gradual reductions and eventual withdrawal.
Consistent with our commitment to reduce and eventually withdraw our
troops from Haiti, in August 1998 the President approved a modest
reduction in force strength and in the frequency of engineering
projects undertaken.
Terrorism
Question. Following the U.S. Strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan, you
conducted a press briefing on 20 August 1998 and stated ``Today the
United States is asking every nation to stand publicly against those
who perpetrate, finance or otherwise support terrorism. We're asking
governments to join us in taking the actions necessary to deter and
defeat terrorists acts. And we recognize that this is a long-term
struggle, as the President said, but we recognize as well as that it is
a struggle we must win.''
What is our current strategy in this campaign and what funds and
resources are you asking to sustain this campaign?
How would you rate our progress to date?
Answer. The United States has a long range strategy against
terrorism which includes bringing terrorists to justice and working
with other countries to deter and contain terrorism; applying pressure
to terrorist states that sponsor terrorism to change their behavior and
make no deals with terrorists, so as to avoid encouraging additional
acts of terrorism.
We employ a variety of tools in this effort, including economic
sanctions, diplomatic pressures, intelligence assets, training to
enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of friendly countries, and
military resources if appropriate.
The specific resources for this effort include the request of $33
million for the antiterrorism assistant program for FY 2000. The ATA
program is launching new initiatives to help terrorist fund raising and
potential use of weapons of mass destruction, programs that received
initial funding in the FY 1999 emergency supplemental. The ATA program
is financed through the Foreign Operations Appropriation. Other
specific programs include the counterterrorism research and development
program and the terrorism rewards information program, both funded
through the State Department budget.
These specific programs, however, reflect only part of our effort
to fight terrorism. A wide variety of posts overseas and bureaus and
offices in the State Department are involved in the efforts to enlist
the cooperation of other nations in the fight against terrorism.
Without strong embassies overseas, which, for example, can develop good
working relationships in advance with the host country, it would be
impossible to obtain the kind of close cooperation needed.
The rate of progress in countering terrorism is difficult to
measure. State sponsorship is in decline and the number of
international terrorism attacks had been falling markedly during the
past five years. But we are seeing more mass casualty attacks, such as
those that took place against the U.S. embassies in East Africa. The
emergence of loosely affiliated and previously unknown small groups,
which often are composed of radical religious fundamentalists and whose
members are willing to commit suicide to further their ``cause'' has
greatly complicated the intelligence gathering effort. These groups are
more difficult to penetrate and disrupt.
North Korea
Question: The State Department is requesting $55 million this year
for KEDO. I am opposed to this large increase for basically two
reasons: it is much more than the U.S. share was promised to ever be,
and--from what I hear in media accounts--we are buying a pig in a poke.
We provide the oil while North Korea apparently proceeds to develop an
underground nuclear program.
Does any semblance of compliance from North Korea with the Agreed
Framework remain to justify this enlarged request?
Will the Department of State and/or appropriate authorities explain
to me what kind of structure they believe is being developed
underground?
I will continue to oppose this appropriation strongly until I am
convinced our national interest is still being advanced with it instead
of compromised through the enrichment of a nation providing sensitive
technology to Iran, threatening Japan, and stealing food from its own
starving citizens.
Answer. The Administration request of $55 million for KEDO in FY
2000 is designed to maintain the Agreed Framework between the United
States and North Korea by ensuring deliveries of heavy fuel oil (HFO)
to the DPRK while seeking to pay off KEDO's HFO debt.
While the Agreed Framework has not removed all questions about
North Korea's nuclear activities, it has succeeded for the past four
and one-half years in freezing the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors
and related facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon, placing these
facilities under continuous IAEA monitoring, and canning the spent fuel
from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor. IAEA monitoring, along with
National Technical Means, has allowed us to determine that the DPRK is
complying with the freeze provisions of the Agreed Framework. Canning
operations, undertaken jointly with a team of U.S. experts, have been
largely completed, and the current clean-up of remaining spent fuel rod
fragments is expected to be finished in the next few months.
On March 16, 1999, U.S. negotiators reached agreement providing
access for a team of U.S. experts to the suspect underground site at
Kumchang-ni. This team will visit the site beginning May 20, 1999, and
will attempt to determine the present state, precise dimensions and
configuration of the site. Following this visit, the Administration
will be prepared to brief you and your colleagues on the team's
findings. In accordance with the agreement, another visit will take
place in May 2000, with follow-up visits continuing as long as needed
to allay our concerns that the site could be used for nuclear-related
activities.
In 1994, we faced the prospect of war. The Agreed Framework has
moved us from war to negotiation. While not eliminating the threat of a
North Korean nuclear program, the Agreed Framework has succeeded in
freezing activity at Yongbyon. Seen in this light, the $55 million cost
is small. This amount is larger than originally estimated because our
expectation of others' contributions for the HFO program has been
changed--due in part to the Asian economic crisis. It should also be
compared with the $4 billion committed to KEDO by South Korea and
Japan, which are together taking the primary responsibility for the
light-water reactor project.
U.S. policy toward North Korea is currently undergoing review by
former Defense Secretary Perry. We expect him to make his
recommendations this spring. Our policy toward the DPRK under the
Agreed Framework is supported by, and the subject of close
consultations with, our South Korean and Japanese allies.
Development Assistance Priorities
Question. Can you outline for me the role our embassy officials
have in the establishment of USAID's in-country development assistance
priorities? Richard Armitage, in a Christian Science Monitor (3-20-98)
criticized U.S. assistance by saying there was not a close enough link
between development and U.S. foreign policy goals. He charges that in
many cases AID does not get the input of other embassy sections as it
develops its country aid strategy, resulting in ``development for
development's sake'' without a clear link to overarching objectives.
What is your reaction to this? Is folding USAID into the State
Department a solution or remedy?
Answer. While some may have felt this way in the past, in fact,
USAID and the Department of State have been working closely together to
identify and implement improved coordination mechanisms at both country
and headquarter levels. We have made excellent progress, and will
continue this, consistent with integration legislation on State-USAID
cooperation.
The first step was to clarify goals and objectives. In September
1997, the International Affairs Strategic Plan (IASP) was issued to
provide an overarching framework for the international affairs goals of
all executive agencies of the United States Government. This plan was
developed with extensive participation of the various foreign affairs
agencies, including USAID, and was also vetted with stakeholders in
Congress. The plan describes seven core U.S. interests and sixteen
strategic goals in the areas of national security, economic prosperity,
protection of American citizens and border security, law enforcement,
democracy, humanitarian assistance, environment, population, and
health. Both USAID's and the Department of State's Agency Strategic
Plans are fully consistent with the IASP.
Having clarified higher level goals, we then developed and put in
place better coordinating mechanisms at the country level. Starting in
1998, each Embassy Country Team (comprising the heads of all USG
agencies at a post) was required to produce a strategy document, the
Mission Program Plan (MPP), which summarizes how the IASP is being
implemented in a given country. MPPs incorporate the work of all
agencies working in a country, including USAID. they represent the
combined efforts of the Country Team and are approved by the
Ambassador. They are then reviewed in Washington and used to agree on
program priorities and resource requests.
USAID requires that all of its strategic planning documents
prepared at the country level are both fully consistent with the MPP,
and approved by the Ambassador before being submitted to Washington for
review. USAID prepares detailed country Strategic Plans covering
several years of operations in a given country. The USAID strategic
plans are more detailed than the MPPs and provide the information
necessary for Washington review and approval of multi-year programs.
The Department of State participates closely in reviews of USAID
country Strategic Plans at the Washington level.
Both the MPP, which is prepared annually, and USAID's more detailed
Results Review and Resource Request or ``R4'' document provide annual
performance assessments of each strategic goal pursued in a country.
Both documents are shared by USAID and Department staff and are used to
coordinate budget requests as well as approve any changes in strategy
direction at the Washington level. USAID and Department staff
coordinates preparation of annual guidance on both the MPP and the R4
and are continually assessing the adequacy of coordination and
identifying improvements.
The recent plan developed pursuant to the Foreign Affairs Reform
and Restructuring Act has strengthened the relationship between the
Department of State and USAID. This new relationship and strengthened
coordination in the field will ensure strong development objectives
without the need for further reorganization.
Iran
Question. Have there been any signs that Iran is decreasing its
support for terrorism or its efforts to acquire weapons of mass
destruction and the missiles to deliver them?
Answer. Iran is continuing its efforts to develop a nuclear weapons
capability. It also is pursuing indigenous ballistic missile and
chemical and biological weapons production capabilities and is
aggressively seeking equipment and technology from foreign sources for
these programs.
Iran continues to sponsor terrorism. Despite public statements
condemning certain terrorist acts, Iran supplies training, funding, and
other means of support to a variety of terrorist groups.
Iran
Question. How much assistance is Iran currently supplying to Hamas
and Hizballah?
Answer. Iranian assistance to these terrorist organizations takes
many forms, including money, weapons, munitions, and training. It is
impossible to affirm a single figure for the total amount of Iranian
aid to Hamas and Hizballah. In the case of Hizballah, we estimate this
support to be in the $50-100 million range per year. In the case of
Hamas, total Iranian support probably amounts to $2-3 million per year.
Question. Last month, the Administration publicly announced that it
would not raise the quota on Russian launches of American satellites
until we began to see serious Russian efforts to restrict the transfer
of missile and nuclear technology to Iran. What is your assessment of
current attitude and performance of the Russian government in terms of
the transfers of dangerous technologies to Iran? Do you agree with
reports of notable decline in Russian responsiveness on this issue in
the last six months? If so, what do you attribute this decline?
Answer. Since January 1997, the Administration has informed the
Russian Government that we will be unable to raise the current quota
for launches of commercial satellites to geostationary orbit until
Russia halts cooperation with Iran's ballistic missile program. We
believe the commercial space launch quota limitation gives the Russian
government a strong incentive to halt these technology transfers.
Despite the Russian government's nonproliferation and export
control efforts, Russian entities continue to cooperate with Iran's
ballistic missile program, and to engage in nuclear cooperation with
Iran beyond the Bushehr nuclear reactor project. Although we had seen
some improvement in Russia's efforts to crack down on missile-related
activities during the first half of 1998, we have seen backsliding
since then. We continue to receive reports of ongoing contracts,
cooperation, and assistance by Russian entities to these Iranian
programs.
During the past year, the USG imposed penalties on ten Russian
entities. In January, the Administration used existing authority to
impose administrative measures against two Russian entities for
nuclear-related cooperation with Iran and one Russian entity for
missile-related cooperation. Last July, we took similar action against
seven Russian entities involved with Iran's ballistic missile program.
In addition, we are continuing our longstanding, broad, and
intensive efforts with the Russians to stop proliferation-related
activities. We and our allies continue to press the Russian government
to end cooperation between Russian firms and the Iranian missile and
nuclear programs and to bolster its export control and enforcement
capabilities.
As part of this effort, U.S. and Russian experts in the past two
months have developed an action plan to address some of our most
pressing missile proliferation concerns, including development on a
priority basis of internal compliance offices at several Russian
entities. We have developed a similar plan for the nuclear area that
also includes enhanced export control measures. U.S. and Russian
experts met in late April to begin implementation of these plans.
Question. What steps are we undertaking to persuade Russia to
improve its performance? Are we prepared to sanction additional Russian
entities, beyond the ten already under penalties, if there is hard
evidence implicating them in the Iranian programs. On the other hand,
are we prepared to offer incentives for good behavior on the part of
Russia?
Answer. During the past year, we imposed administrative measures
against ten Russian entities for their nuclear and/or missile-related
cooperation with Iran. In doing so, we banned U.S. exports to and
Russian imports from these ten entities. We also banned U.S. government
procurement from and assistance to these entities. These measures will
remain in force until we determine it is in the foreign policy or
national security interests of the United States to lift them in whole
or in part, or until we determine there has been reliable evidence that
the entities' proliferation behavior has ceased.
We believe these measures also helped to motivate the Russians to
agree to two action plans aimed at curtailing cooperation by Russian
entities with Iran's missile and nuclear programs. The establishment of
effective internal compliance offices in entities of concern is at the
heart of the action plans. U.S. and Russian experts met last month to
begin implementation of these plans.
We are continuing our longstanding, high-level intensive effort to
press the Russian Government to end cooperation with the Iranian
missile and nuclear programs and to bolster export control enforcement.
We will continue to raise missile and nuclear cooperation in our
discussions with the Russian side until all of our concerns are
resolved.
We remain prepared to impose administrative measures in additional
cases, when we believe that doing so is in the national interests of
the United States, and to implement the requirements of U.S. sanctions
legislation.
Russia/Iran
Question. How firm is the Administration with respect to the policy
on satellite launchers?
Answer. We have linked decisions on the space launch quota to
Russian performance on curbing missile cooperation with Iran in order
to provide a strong incentive for the Russian government to take
affective action against transfers of missile technology to Iran.
Future decisions on the space quota will depend on Russian actions
with respect to our missile proliferation concerns.
U.S. Army School of the Americas
Question. I support the goals of our International Military
Education and Training program and particularly recognize the important
role of the School of the Americas in our own hemisphere. With our
armed forces spread so thin and dollars so limited, we need approaches
like the school to fully implement our foreign policy. Do you agree
with this view, that this kind of direct contact with foreign
militaries is just as critical as ever?
Answer. Yes. Military professionalization is a fundamental
component of our foreign policy efforts to promote stability and
strengthen democratic institutions of civilian government. The U.S.
Army School of the Americas contributes to this effort by providing
training and instruction to Latin American military members on civilian
control of the military, promotion of democracy, and respect for human
rights.
The School encourages cooperation among military and police forces
by training both groups together, providing what is often the first
exposure these security forces have had in working together. The School
also provides training programs in areas that enhance regional
cooperation, such as peacekeeping, demining operations, counterdrug
operations, medical assistance, leadership development, and military
justice.
In order to ensure that only students with a clean human rights
record receive training, we have worked with DoD to develop and
institute procedures to vet every student being considered for the
school. Additionally, the School ensures that human rights issues and
respect for civilian authority are integrated throughout the coursework
and in field exercises.
Iran
Question. Does it appear that President Khatami is in control? Does
he even participate in security related decision-making? What are the
prospects that he can prevail in his efforts?
Answer. President Khatami exercises authority over much of the
Iranian government, but is outranked by Supreme Leader Khamanei on
issues involving the Iranian armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards,
the Judiciary and the Ministry of Intelligence. In addition, powerful
foundations called ``bonyads,'' which control the holdings of the
former Shah and figures associated with his regime, report directly to
the Supreme Leader, and not President Khatami. The bonyads exercise a
significant impact on Iranian economic activity.
Khatami's election two years ago alarmed conservative elements in
Iran. As Khatami has pressed for change in both domestic and foreign
affairs, these conservatives have resisted. The outcome of this
struggle will depend in great part on the evolving power relationships
among Khatami, Supreme Leader Khamanei and Expediency Head (and ex-
president) Rafsanjani.
The Iranian public apparently supports Khatami and his agenda of
promoting the rule of law, reducing government intrusion into people's
lives, and increasing freedom of expression.
Question. What is your assessment of Iranian progress in the
missile and nuclear arenas? What action are we undertaking to address
these developments?
Answer. Iran continues its efforts to develop a nuclear weapons
capability, but has made little progress to date due to the reluctance
of most nuclear suppliers to provide any assistance to Iran. It also is
pursuing a multi-track effort to develop both liquid and solid
propellant missile systems and is aggressively seeking equipment and
technology from foreign sources for these programs. Iran has made
significant progress in the last few years toward its goal of becoming
self-sufficient in ballistic missile production, as demonstrated by its
indigenous productions of Scud missiles and the July 1998 flight test
of the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile.
We strongly oppose any cooperation with Iran's nuclear and missile
programs, and have engaged for many years in aggressive efforts to stop
the proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to Iran, including
through the imposition of sanctions. During the past five years, we
have worked multilaterally, through the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and bilaterally
through discussions with supplier governments, to restrict their
missile and WMD-related exports and cut off sources of outside supply
to Iran's missile and nuclear programs. We have held four rounds of
talks with North Korea to convince it to restrain its missile
technology exports, and we are pursuing an intensive high-level effort
to impede Iranian efforts to obtain missile and nuclear technology from
Russian firms. In addition, we continue to engage China in extensive
nonproliferation discussions, and raised our concerns about Chinese
cooperation with Iran at the highest levels. We also continue to press
China to bring its export policies and practices better in line with
international standards.
These efforts have produced results. Over the past year, Russia has
put in place new legal authorities to control the export of any item
destined for a program of proliferation concern, has stopped several
activities of concern, and has investigated others, including reports
of Russian firms cooperating with Iran. China has pledged not to assist
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to phase out its nuclear cooperation
with Iran, and not to export MTCR-class ground-to-ground missiles.
China also has announced that it is studying the possibility of joining
the MTCR and has stated that it would not sell missiles to Iran.
The Administration also uses sanctions and other tools to combat
proliferation. During the past year, the USG imposed penalties on ten
Russian entities. In January, the Administration imposed administrative
measures against three Russian entities for their nuclear- and missile-
related cooperation with Iran. Last July, we took the same action
against seven Russian entities involved with Iran's ballistic missile
program. And in 1992 and 1996, we imposed missile sanctions on North
Korea for selling missile technology to Iran.
The Middle East Peace Process
Question. The State Department spokesman and others have now said
on several occasions that the Palestinian Authority is in compliance
with many of the commitments it entered into at Wye. What commitments
are the Palestinians complying with and which ones are they not
implementing?
Answer. Our position is that both Israel and the Palestinians
fulfilled all their commitments required under the first phase of the
Wye River Memorandum. Under phase two, the Palestinians have fulfilled
many of their commitments, including the annulment of the objectionable
portions of the PLO Charter and the fight against terror. The
Palestinian security services have been effective in taking action
against those terrorist groups. We continue to press the PA to do
everything possible to prevent terror and to cooperate fully with the
Israelis.
There are other commitments under phase two that they have yet to
fulfill.
The Palestinians have also continued to work with the Israelis in
the Anti-Incitement Committee. The Palestinians put an effective legal
framework in place for the collection of illegal weapons, but more work
needs to be done in this area. The U.S. agreed in the context of the
Wye Memorandum to assist the Palestinians in this effort. We have
consulted with Congress and are now moving ahead to deliver this
assistance as quickly as possible.
We believe that renewed efforts by both sides aimed at implementing
the Wye Memorandum will facilitate further progress.
Question. Have the Palestinians outlawed all organizations of a
military, terrorist or violent character as required by the Wye
Memorandum?
Answer. The Wye River Memorandum obligated the Palestinian side to
``inform the U.S. fully of the actions it has taken to outlaw all
organizations (or wings of organizations, as appropriate) of a
military, terrorist or violent character . . ..''
The Palestinians have provided to us a March 3, 1996 statement
issued by the Palestinian Authority stating that a meeting of the
Higher Palestinian National Security Council, chaired by Chairman
Arafat, had decided to ban the activity of all paramilitary groups,
including the armed wings of HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
We have some questions regarding the legal status of this
statement. We are discussing this with the Palestinians.
The Palestinian security services have been effective in taking
action against those terrorist groups.
We continue to press the PA to do everything possible to prevent
terror and to cooperate fully with Israel in this effort.
Question. Has the PA provided the detailed programs for
implementing the work plan for fighting terrorism as agreed to at Wye?
Answer. We believe that the Palestinian security organizations are
making a very serious and credible effort to combat terror. The
Palestinians have shared with us security work plans.
We are asking the Palestinians to do all they can to prevent
terror. We will continue to press the Palestinians to meet that
standard.
Question. Are PA efforts consistent in West Bank compared with the
Gaza Strip?
Answer. We believe that the Palestinian security organizations are
making a very serious, systematic and credible effort to combat terror
in both the West Bank and Gaza in which they operate.
We continue to press the PA to do everything possible to prevent
terror and to cooperate fully with Israel in these efforts.
Question. Are arrested security offenders held the required amount
of time and is this being coordinated with the U.S. as required?
Answer. The U.S. is unalterably opposed to unwarranted releases of
people involved in terrorist activities. We have made this absolutely
clear to the Palestinian authorities.
We explored the releases of Palestinian prisoners that took place
early this year thoroughly with both the Palestinians and the Israelis.
Based on everything we know, we do not believe that those released pose
a threat.
Regarding some court-ordered releases that took place at the time
of the Muslim religious holiday in late March, a small number caused us
serious concern. We expressed those concerns to the Palestinians. The
Palestinians reviewed these cases and re-arrested some of the
individuals on the basis of new charges.
We are continuing to discuss with the PA the remaining cases of
concern.
We will continue to follow up on this issue in a systematic way.
Question. Can you also describe Israel's status vis-a-vis Oslo and
Wye?
Answer. We are asking that both parties fulfill all their
obligations and implement the Wye Memorandum completely.
Both parties implemented their commitments in phase one. In phase
two, the Palestinians have implemented many but not all of their
commitments cited in the timeline. The Israelis have not carried out
their objections in the second phase. These include: prisoners'
releases, acquainting the Palestinians with areas from which Israel
would redeploy, and the second stage of further redeployments.
This is a factual assessment of Wye implementation to date.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Ms. Pelosi
__________
Assistance to Front Line States
Question. The Kosovo supplemental request contains about $90-$100
million to help the front line states of Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and
Macedonia. In addition, $10 million in additional funds are intended to
continue our assistance to the government of Montenegro. Can you
comment on the rationale for helping these countries and what the funds
will be used for?
Answer. The Administration has requested emergency supplemental
appropriations of $100 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $50
million in Support for East European Democracy (SEED) funds for the so-
called ``front-line'' states--Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Romania, Macedonia, and the government of Montenegro.
The Kosovo crisis has generated severe political, economic and
social strains in the neighboring states. Politically, reform-minded
governments are under attack, particularly in neighboring countries
with religious or ethnic ties to Serbia, as nationalist leaders exploit
ethnic divisions to gain support. Socially, community-level pressures
from massive influxes of refugees are also fraying social safety nets
and straining local infrastructure beyond capacity.
An April World Bank and IMF assessment of the economic consequences
of the Kosovo crisis estimated lost export earnings, trade diversion,
weaker capital accounts, and potentially higher debt service costs will
cause balance of payments deficits in Southeast Europe of $1.5 billion
in 1999. This is in addition to an estimated overall humanitarian cost
in 1999 of $300 million related to assisting refugees.
SEED monies would address the political, economic and social
consequences of the conflict. For example, programs would increase
public security by training law enforcement officers; fight corruption
and crime that preys on refugee populations; promote political
participation by all ethnic groups; improve responsiveness of local
governments; provide financial advice to governments as they cope with
economic stress created by the emergency; help create conditions for
the return of foreign investment; and support labor redeployment
programs to ease high levels of unemployment.
ESF funds would be used to cover balance of payments financing gaps
in the purchase of imports, or would be given as budgetary support to
the Ministry of Finance for government purchases. USAID would oversee
and audit the program. The World Bank, IMF, EU, and other major donors
will contribute the majority of funds to cover the financing gap of
these countries (except for Montenergro, which is not eligible for
World Bank/IMF funding); the U.S. contribution is under ten percent.
Support for Front Line States
Question. The IMF and the World Bank are apparently working on a
financial package for these countries. Can you comment on the elements
of this plan?
Answer. The Fund and the Bank are collaborating closely with other
international financial institutions, the donor community, and the
affected countries to refine the estimates of regional and country
specific financing needs and to assess the availability of external
financing. The World Bank and the European Union have agreed to lead a
task force to undertake needs assessment, formulate economic
development strategies and coordinate the international donor process
in the affected states.
The IMF and World Bank produced preliminary balance of payments and
budgetary gaps generated by the effects of the conflict, as well as an
assessment of the humanitarian cost. Donors group meetings have been
held for Bulgaria (April 21) and FYROM (May 5) to address the financing
gap identified by the Bank/Fund paper; meetings are planned for Albania
(May 25) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (May 20-21).
While all humanitarian relief costs should be financed by external
aid and grants, other financing needs arising from the crisis should be
met from both bilateral and multilateral sources, and the international
financial institutions (IFIs) should play an important role in this
effort. The IFIs ought to take the lead in meeting emergency BOP/
budgetary financing gaps, through expanding financing under existing
country programs and through adapting emergency mechanisms. External
financing of BOP and budget costs in surrounding countries that are
ESAF eligible should be provided on concessional terms.
Specific information about Bank/Fund programs, which is subject to
change, follows:
Albania: The IMF believes that Albania is sufficiently on track
with its three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility to go ahead
with the second disbursement under the $47 million program, although an
increase of up to 25% in reaction to Kosovo is contemplated. The World
Bank is planning $95 million in lending, of which $30 million has been
approved, plus a $1 million grant.
Bosnia: The Bank plans $94 million in new lending, if the IMF
completes a successful Stand-by review. A donors conference is
scheduled for May 20-21.
Bulgaria: The IMF is considering an augmentation of Bulgaria's
existing Extended Fund Facility, but no decision has been made. The
World Bank will increase and accelerate existing lending, for a total
of $175 million in adjustment lending this year.
FYROM: The May 5 donors meeting resulted in pledges totaling $252
million towards an estimated financing gap of $400 million; donors have
promised additional funds to meet the total need. The Bank plans $50
million in new lending, while the Fund expects to conclude a $32.6
million Stand-by Credit shortly.
Question. What role can or should international banks play in the
reconstruction of Kosovo in the context of an independent or UN
protectorate status?
Answer. It is premature to define a role for the international
banks in a post-conflict Kosovo. Much depends on the political
arrangements made for Kosovo and with the FRY. In a post-conflict
Kosovo, the IFIs could play a role in structural reform and
macroeconomics stabilization. Although every situation is unique,
designers of any program would undoubtedly draw on ideas and lessons
learned in similar economic assistance efforts in Bosnia and the West
Bank/Gaza.
Kosovo
Question. I want to first concentrate on the plight of refugees in
Kosovo. As the situation with the 500,000 refugees who have left Kosovo
stabilizes in surrounding areas, we have reports of over 700,000
refugees left homeless without any visible means of support. What
options are being considered to get assistance to these people? New
reports indicate that airdrops and use of Greek non-governmental
organizations has been considered.
Answer. We are extremely concerned about the fate and conditions of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kosovo. Various sources
estimates that there could be up to 700,000 IDPs in Kosovo, all of whom
have been cut off from international food assistance since Belgrade
began its most recent oppression.
The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) is working
with the Government in Belgrade to develop an operational plan to
distribute food and relief supplies to the displaced Kosovars still in
Kosovo. The Greek government has been providing relief supplies across
the border through the use of Greek NGOs. We, of course, support any
efforts along these lines. Commercial airdrops are an option that is
being explored along with other means to reach IDPs. It is estimated
that airdrops could begin as soon as two weeks after a decision to
implement them has been made.
Our efforts on this front will not change our political or military
objectives in Kosovo. We reject any such proposal that calls for an
extended pause in NATO's operations.
The ultimate responsibility for the situation faced by these IDPs
rests solely with Slobodan Milosevic, and he knows what he must do.
Question. UNHCR has recently decided to concentrate on caring for
the refugees in the region rather than moving them outside the region.
This will mean a continued heavy burden on Albania particularly. Can
you comment on the flow of refugees from Kosovo, the situation in
Albania, and the extent to which Macedonia is cooperating with
international efforts to care for refugees?
Answer. UNHCR is currently supporting efforts to move refugees out
of the region. Since early April, 44,500 refugees have been evacuated
from Macedonia for third countries. UNHCR has received offers for
135,000 places in 39 countries.
There are currently over 230,000 refugees on Macedonia and 430,000
refugees in Albania, as well as 64,000 internally displaced persons in
Montenegro. We appreciate the efforts of the governments of Albania and
Macedonia in taking in refugees and the efforts of the government of
Montenegro in taking in internally displaced persons from Kosovo.
Relatively early in the present crisis, Macedonia did close its
border with Kosovo intermittently. After hearing the concerns of the
U.S. and others, however, Skopje reopened the border and has kept it
open.
Macedonian police violated the 1951 Convention on Refugees on one
occasion by sending refugees involuntarily to Albania. Following our
protests, that did not recur. In general, we believe the government is
making a good-faith effort to respond to this crisis.
We know from refugee accounts that the Serbs have, in the past,
told passengers on trains that were turned back that the Macedonians
had closed the border, even when that was not true.
Kosovo: Police Training
Question. Separate camps have apparently been set up in Albania for
the KLA. The administration's request will contain about $30 million to
begin training a new police force for Kosovo. Can you comment on what
our policy will be towards helping the KLA and how you intend to
recruit and train a new police force for Kosovo?
Answer. No international refugee camps have been set up
specifically for the KLA.
A local civilian police force is a fundamental element in a
solution to the situation in Kosovo. We want to speed development of
such a force, and limit the time the international community will have
responsibility for public security in Kosovo. We are considering
identification and training of police from the general populations of
the Kosovar refugee camps. An international team of police experts is
currently in the camps assessing: the feasibility of such a program;
the best means for pursuing it; the process for identifying candidates;
possible training sites within the region.
Refugee Children
Question. Madam Secretary, yesterday's Washington Post has a front-
page article on the plight of refugee children in Kosovo. The Foreign
Operations Committee has recommended special funding for vulnerable
refugee children especially those that are separated from their
parents. Could you give us the status of that program?
Answer. The Administration is pleased to have strong Congressional
support for promoting greater attention to the special needs of refugee
children.
The U.S. has taken a leadership role in promoting attention to
refugee children and their protection and will continue to do so. Our
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration works closely with
international and non-governmental organizations to ensure that
programs are designed to recognize and meet the special needs of
refugee children, including those responding to the crisis in Kosovo.
We are providing funding for NGOs, such as the American Refugee
Committee, the International Rescue Committee, and the Save the
Children Alliance which are focusing much of their efforts on providing
health care and psycho-social counseling for children in Macedonia and
Albania. We are also providing funding to UNICEF as well as to UNHCR
which has the lead responsibility for the protection of children.
Last year, we contributed over $7 million towards specific programs
for children throughout the world. Activities included the promotion of
girls education, the rehabilitation of child soldiers, assistance to
and tracing for unaccompanied children, open education and training for
adolescents. Of particular note is the Liberian Children's Initiative,
a groundbreaking cooperative effort by UNHCR and UNICEF to focus on
children in post-conflict Liberia.
It is important to add that all our funding for refugee protection
and assistance helps refugee children either directly or indirectly.
We are presently working with UNHCR, UNICEF and interested NGOs on
their funding priorities for 1999. We anticipate funding specific
projects for refugee children at a level similar or higher to that of
last year. We will also continue to encourage UNHCR's efforts to
mainstream its programming for women and children by working closely
with the organization, by providing targeted funding, and by raising
this as a priority in the organization's governing bodies.
Question. The Committee is also concerned that UNHCR is changing
the emphasis on children and women's issues by reorganizing and
downgrading the positions of children and women's coordinators. Has the
Department of State taken a position that indicates the importance of
these positions and these issues?
Answer. I share your concern that UNHCR maintain the positions of
Children's and Women's Coordinators at a senior level with direct
access to the most senior management of UNHCR. Assistant Secretary Taft
has raised this matter directly with Mrs. Ogata. We understand that the
decision has now been made that the Coordinators should retain their
visibility and remain in the Office of the Director of Operational
Support and report to her directly. We are pleased with this decision
and will continue to follow this matter closely.
The Department of State has worked hard over the past years to
ensure that the needs of women and children are fully incorporated into
every policy and program of UNHCR. While there has been progress and
while we share UNHCR's desire to see these policy objectives further
put into place at the field level, we have said repeatedly that this is
not the time to eliminate the visibility and focus that the
Coordinators provide.
We further believe it is imperative that the leadership of UNHCR
continues to take direct responsibility for ensuring that the challenge
facing refugee women and refugee children are central to UNHCR's
programming.
Kosovo--FY 2000 costs
Question. The anticipated supplemental request will address only
the FY 1999 costs for Kosovo and contains little or no funding for
reconstruction. While it may be premature to ask about FY 2000
reconstruction budgets, I would ask what role will the U.S. play in
ongoing refugee care and reconstruction, and what financial role do you
expect that European allies to play?
Answer. There will be a major international effort to rebuild
Kosovo so that people can return to their homes once conditions permit.
The EU has already agreed to assume leadership in coordinating
international reconstruction assistance in Kosovo once a settlement is
secured.
While we expect our European allies and partners to contribute the
bulk of the resources towards this effort, the U.S. should pay its fair
share. Returning refugees to their normal lives will not be possible
until reconstruction is well underway. A rapid response requires a
prominent U.S. role given our special experience in working with local
groups, since bringing to bear our expertise in such disciplines as
strengthening civil society will be critical. Above all, we must do our
fair share if we expect our European allies to continue to play an
important role in reconstruction in the Western Hemisphere, as they are
in Central America following Hurricane Mitch.
Because the FRY is not a member of the World Bank or IMF, their
resources will not be available for the most part for this effort.
UN Arrears
The effort to obtain Congressional approval of the $1 billion the
U.S. owes to the UN has been underway for two years now. In that time
the U.S. has lost the opportunity to secure reductions in the
assessments for both general dues and for peacekeeping operations. Thus
the arbitrary linkage put in place by the Republican leadership to
Mexico City has already cost the American taxpayer over $100 million
and the amount grows every day.
Question. The delay has also cost the U.S. in terms of lost
leadership positions the lost influence within the institution. Madam
Secretary, I would appreciate your comments on the need for
Congressional action on UN arrears and on what the delay has cost the
U.S.
Answer. We are eager to pay the outstanding U.S. arrears to the
United Nations, and urge the Congress to approve our request to meet
this obligation this year. We must--as the President proposes in his
budget--pay our bills. This delay in paying our arrears is not just a
question of dollars and cents, it is a matter of honor, of keeping our
word. It is also a question of national interest. We will be far more
influential--and far better able to spur further reforms--within the UN
system and other international organizations if we are meeting our
obligations to them.
The delay in paying our arrears costs us in many different ways.
One is financial: We lost the opportunity to reduce our annual UN
assessments during negotiations in 1997. We have another chance next
year, but cannot succeed in lowering our assessment rate until arrears
funding lost is on the table. After these rates are lowered, the amount
we are assessed for the UN, peacekeeping, and three major UN
specialized agencies will be reduced by over $100 million per year.
There are also other ``costs.'' Our negotiations in all reform
areas are set back by the arrears. We lost a seat on the UN's key
budget committee. Many argue that we are not trying to improve the UN,
but simply save ourselves money. This gives our opponents a cheap point
on virtually every substantive and financial issue.
The Administration remains dedicated to meeting our international
commitments. The U.S. needs to be viewed as a reliable partner in
multilateral fora. Only by paying our arrears will we demonstrate our
commitment to the UN and other international organizations which serve
as invaluable tools in conducting our foreign policy.
Military Training
Question. The subcommittee held a separate hearing on military
training based upon an extensive report on DoD foreign military
training activity. Specifically Madame Secretary the report detailed
numerous deployments of U.S. troops for Joint Combined Exercise and
Training (JCET). There currently is no mechanism for the DoD or State
Department to consult with Congress prior to deciding upon JCET
deployments. There have been several controversial deployments to
Colombia and Indonesia in particular, from which Congress has been
excluded from consultation. What in your view is the appropriate role
for the Congress in making policy decisions about JCET deployments, and
how and when should we be consulted?
Answer. Joint Combined Exchanges for Training (JCETs) are
operational deployments authorized by legislation and are activities
under the operational control of the Unified Commands.
We are sensitive to Congressional interest in, and concerns about,
such activities, as evidenced in the application of a similar Leahy
amendment provision regarding human rights to DoD-funded training.
DoD and the State Department have strengthened procedures for human
rights review of all JCETs. As part of the planning process, the
Unified Commands, our embassies, and the Department review all proposed
JCETs. There has been a further refinement of review procedures due to
implementation of section 568 of the FY99 Foreign Operations
Appropriation Act and section 8130 of DoD's FY99 Appropriations.
We believe these procedures provide adequate policy review and
oversight, in accordance with Congressional guidance. We further
believe these procedures will ensure that JCETs are conducted
consistent with US policy objectives and Congressional human rights
concerns.
Central America Disaster
Question. Madame Secretary the President requested the Central
America supplemental in February with the hope that Congress would act
expeditiously. It is now mid-April and the rainy season begins in the
region in May. Can you indicate for us the impact of the absence of
Congressional approval for this funding?
Answer. We are very pleased that the Central America Supplemental
Budget Request has now been approved and programs can be implemented to
help the region recover from the devastation of Hurricane Mitch. While
it is difficult to specifically quantify the impact of the delay in
approving the Supplemental, clearly, the delay has prolonged the
hardships of those hit hardest by the hurricane. For instance,
thousands of people have had to cope for two or three additional months
with unclean water, no access to health services, poor or non-existent
roads, temporary housing and other difficult conditions. With the
Supplemental Budget Request approved, the United States Agency for
International Development will quickly implement programs to mitigate
these hardships and help the Governments of Honduras, Nicaragua, El
Salvador and Guatemala reclaim agricultural lands, more effectively
manage the watershed and ensure transparency in the reconstruction
process.
Question. Can you further delineate what the impacts of a month's
delay on the Central America supplemental would be?
Answer. Again, the delay in funding the recovery of Central America
prolonged the hardships of those hit hardest by the hurricane. The
delay has also pushed implementation of programs into the rainy season
and, as the rains increase, this will complicate and delay
implementation of the programs.
Russia/Kosovo Peacekeeping
Question. Do you feel there is an appropriate role for Russia to
play, and under what circumstances should it take place?
Answer. We are actively engaged with the Russians in an attempt to
find a diplomatic solution to the situation in Kosovo based on the
principles set forth by the G-8. One of those principles calls for
deployment of an effective international civil and security presence,
endorsed and adopted by the UN and capable of guaranteeing the
achievement of the common objectives. We would welcome Russian
participation in such a security presence.
China
Question. What is the status of U.S. efforts to obtain the support
of other countries on the UN Human Rights Commission for the resolution
condemning China's human rights abuses?
Answer. On April 16, we tabled a resolution on China's human rights
record at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Poland subsequently
joined the United States as a co-sponsor. On April 23, when the
resolution was scheduled to come to the floor for a vote, the Chinese
delegation introduced a no-action motion which carried by a vote of 22
(PRC), 17 (U.S.), 14 (abstain), effectively cutting off formal debate
on the resolution.
The Administration had mounted an aggressive lobbying effort with
many high-level interventions to broaden support for the resolution and
counter the anticipated no-action motion. Although we were able to
narrow the margin of the loss on the no-action motion as compared to
1997 when we last supported a resolution, we were very disappointed by
the final outcome. We believe the resolution should have been debated
on its merits.
Question. As I mentioned in my opening statement, as Zhu Rongji was
here in the U.S., Chinese Public Security Bureau officials visited Bao
Tong, a former high ranking government official and supporter of
democratic reforms, to warn him that his recent letter calling for a
reversal of the Tiananmen Square verdict ``endangered state security.''
This warning is a serious one as ``endangering state security'' has
been used against many critics of the Chinese government. Have you or
anyone in this Administration raised concern about Bao Tong with Zhu
Rongji or other high ranking officials travelling with him?
Answer. We raised Bao Tong's case with officials in Premier Zhu's
party on April 14, in response to reports that Bao Tong had received a
warning that his letter calling for a reversal of the Tiananmen Square
verdict ``endangered state security.'' We also conveyed our concerns to
the Chinese government in Beijing and here in Washington on April 15.
We will continue to urge China to respect fundamental human rights
such as the freedom to peacefully express political views.
Middle East
Question. Israel is the only country in the United Nations that is
denied access to a regional grouping--the mechanism by which U.N.
member states are chosen to sit on powerful committees, including the
Security Council. What is holding up Israel's efforts to gain
admittance to the Western Europe and Others Groups?
What are we doing to correct this situation?
Answer. The United States has worked hard to end this anomaly by
pressing for Israel's inclusion in the Western European and Others
Group (WEOG) at the United Nations. The members of the European Union
continue to oppose the inclusion of Israel in WEOG. This unified EU
position effectively precludes Israel's admittance by eliminating the
possibility of a WEOG vote in favor of Israel's candidacy. The EU bases
its opposition to Israel's candidacy on the view that Israel's actions,
including ongoing settlement activity, are responsible for the lack of
progress in the Middle East peace process.
Representatives of the United States Government have made numerous
interventions to support Israel's efforts to gain admission to WEOG.
These efforts were undertaken primarily in New York by members of the
U.S. Mission to the United Nations supported by approaches in
Washington, to the EU Troika in Brussels, and in other capitals. To
date, these efforts have not been successful. Recognizing the
importance of the regional groups to effective participation in United
Nations activities, the Administration will continue its efforts in
support of Israel's admittance to WEOG.
Specific interventions in support of Israel's candidacy include:
In July 1997, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN met with
two Members of Congress to outline the positions of other UN members
regarding Israel's admittance to the WEOG and to discuss the Mission's
plans to support Israel's efforts.
In October 1997, the U.S. Deputy Representative to the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) addressed WEOG to encourage Israel's admission
as a temporary member, emphasizing the strong U.S. support for Israel's
admittance.
In November 1997, the U.S. Permanent Representative made a formal
statement to the WEOG regarding Israel's discriminatory treatment in
the UN and urged the WEOG members to admit Israel as a temporary member
to help address that problem.
In January 1998, the U.S. Permanent Representative and two other
Ambassadorial rank officials met with the European Union (EU) Troika to
press the EU to support Israel's admittance to the WEOG as a temporary
member.
In May 1998, U.S. officials (in both New York and Geneva) expressed
strong support for Israel's admittance to group B of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The representatives also
used this forum to press for Israel's full participation in all
international organizations of which it is a member, including the
regional groups in the UN General Assembly.
Also in May 1998, the U.S. Mission to the UN arranged a meeting
between Members of Congress and representatives of the EU Troika to
address the issue of Israel's temporary membership in WEOG.
In October 1998, the U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative met with
EU permanent and deputy permanent representatives to encourage them to
support Israel's temporary membership in the WEOG. The Deputy Permanent
Representative argued that Israel's admittance was long overdue,
particularly given positive developments in the Middle East peace
process.
Budget Caps
Question. If the huge cuts mentioned in the Budget Resolution for
international affairs are translated into a corresponding low 302(b)
allocation for this subcommittee, foreign affairs spending will be
devastated. Madame Secretary, I would appreciate your comments on the
effects that a cut of $2 to $3 billion below last years' level of
foreign operations spending will have on our national security. (This
level of reduction is actually less than the amount of $4 to $5 billion
cut in the Budget Resolution). In my view no region of the world would
be exempt from cuts with this level of reduction. While the additional
dollars needed in Defense to resolve worldwide conflicts will
undoubtedly be provided, there will be little or nothing to pick up the
pieces and reconstruct countries devastated by war and natural
disasters.
Answer. While the Senate's allocation level is about $2 billion
below the President's request, I understand that and your Committee's
302(b) allocation is $4.2 billion below the President's request. This
unrealistically low allocation level coupled with associated outlay
(spending) reductions would put a straightjacket around American
leadership and gravely imperil U.S. interests around the world.
For example, under the Committee's allocation, we could cover our
commitments to the Middle East Peace Process and spending related to
programs initiated in previous years. However, it would necessitate
significant reductions in, or elimination of, most other programs
funded in the bill. We would need to: begin to shut down USAID and the
Peace Corps in many parts of the world; cut off most aid to Eastern and
Central Europe, the NIS, Asia, Africa and Latin America; end most of
our counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism programs; and cease
voluntary contributions to organizations like UNICEF.
Given the scope of our interests, the range of threats to our
security, and America's role as a champion of freedom and defender of
human rights, we must have sufficient resources for the implementation
of our foreign policy.
In the weeks and months to come, I hope to work closely with you
and members of the Committee to assure adequate funding levels for
international affairs. I must emphatically state that the current
allocations will cripple, perhaps irreparably, our prestige,
credibility, and influence at the very moment that U.S. leadership is
looked for by our allies and questioned by our foes.
______
Questions for the Record Submitted by Ms. Lowey
__________
Family Planning
Question. I would like you to comment on our international family
planning programs. Access to family planning services is the most
effective way to prevent abortion. Yet, some of my colleagues have
difficulty distinguishing between supporting funding for critical
family planning services and supporting abortion. Could you clarify for
us current law regarding the use of federal funds for abortion? And can
you explain the effect that these family planning services have on the
incidence of abortion around the world?
Answer. Current law prohibits use of U.S. foreign assistance funds
to pay for the performance of abortion as a method of family planning
or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions.
Support for family planning services, which reduce unintended
pregnancies, is essential to reducing abortions. For example, family
planning programs in Russia and Central Asia, supported by the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) and other donors, have
resulted in a dramatic decline in the incidence of abortion in the
1990's. In Russia, abortion rates have declined more than one-third
during this period.
A 1998 study of the replacement of abortion by contraception in
three Central Asian countries--Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the Kyrgyz
Republic--found that the use of contraception increased by one-third to
one-half between 1991 and 1996. During that same period, abortion rates
declined by as much as one half.
A comparative study of Colombia and Mexico, countries where USAID
was a major donor in family planning, found that large increases in
contraceptive use in urban areas in the 1970s and 1980s were
accompanied by declines of 40 percent or more in abortion rates.
Question. I want to commend you for including $25 million for the
United Nations Population Fund in your budget request. As you know,
about 50% of UNFPA's assistance is devoted to maternal and child health
programs, including the provision of family planning services. UNFPA is
a major supplier of modern contraceptive methods and it is engaged in
the fight to stop the spread of AIDS and other sexually-transmitted
diseases. Could you comment on the impact that our lack of funding for
UNFPA in FY99 has had on the organization and the United States'
influence within the organization?
Answer. The zeroing out of U.S. funding in FY99 is a significant
loss for UNFPA, which works with a small annual budget ($309 million in
1998). UNFPA already has fully designed projects in almost 50 of its
program countries that it cannot execute without additional funds.
UNFPA estimates that a $20 million loss of funds will result in
program cutbacks that deprive 870,000 women of effective contraception.
They are likely to experience a half-million unwanted pregnancies
(200,000 of which will be aborted), 1200 maternal and 22,500 infant
deaths, and 15,000 life-threatening illnesses and injuries during
pregnancy and childbirth.
Lack of U.S. funding also hurts UNFPA's efforts to curtail the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS, limits its
work against the practice of female genital mutilation, and damages its
programs aimed at supporting better health, equal access to health and
education for women, and economic security.
Our extensive bilateral experience in international population
assistance gives the U.S. a respected voice on UNFPA program issues.
However, our ability to influence key budgetary and management issues
within UNFPA is endangered by the absence of a U.S. contribution to the
organization.
United Nations
Question. As you know, funding for our arrears to the United
Nations is not within the jurisdiction of this Subcommittee. But since
we have you here today, I feel obligated to mention the terrible
situation of our debt to the UN. I believe it is outrageous and
embarrassing that the United States--the wealthiest country in the
world--is the biggest deadbeat at the UN. The U.S. has a tremendous
amount of influence within the UN, but that level of influence is
decreasing with every day that we don't pay our arrears. In fact, as
you know very well, at the end of this year we face the unimaginable
prospect of losing our vote in the General Assembly under the
requirements of Article 19. Few people in the U.S. government are more
qualified than you to talk about what our debt to the UN has done to
our ability to lead in that organization. Can you comment on this
matter?
Answer. The U.S. must pay its debts to the United Nations. Until we
do, our negotiations in all areas are set back by the U.S. arrears to
the United Nations.
The U.S. has important interests in the work that the UN and other
international organizations do. These include our security interests in
UN peacekeeping in Lebanon, Cyprus, and elsewhere, and in multilateral
sanctions against Iraq; our economic interest in the protection of
intellectual property rights and fair worker standards; and our
humanitarian interest in feeding children, fighting disease, and caring
for the world's refugees.
Our ongoing arrears undermine our leadership at the UN, often
precisely in those areas where we are trying to institute improvements.
Our negotiations in all reform areas are set back by the arrears. We
lost a seat on the UN's key budget committee. Many argue that we are
not trying to improve the UN, but simply save ourselves money. This
gives our opponents a cheap point on virtually every substantive and
financial issue.
We must not hazard losing our vote in the General Assembly due to
the arrears. We would lose our ability to shape Assembly decisions on
such matters as the UN budget, the selection of Security Council
members, and ensuring a fair deal for U.S. business in UN procurement.
We would be less able to advance our interests in the UN's major
policy-setting bodies and face greater resistance to the selection of
our candidates for UN posts. We would have less credibility as a
proponent of UN reform, and the steady barrage of criticism we already
receive for our failure to meet UN obligations would become an
avalanche.
This does not have to be, and we hope it will not be. We remain
determined to persuade Congress to make the payments we owe. The
success of the United Nations matters greatly to the United States.
Iran
Question. The State Department report I read from earlier also
talks about Iran's continued support of terrorism. It states, ``Iran
continues to support terrorist groups that use violence to oppose the
Middle East peace process.'' The report also accuses Iran of using its
diplomatic facilities to plan and facilitate activities. Does Iran
still provide support to Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad? If Iran
is successful in gaining nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, it
could change the face of modern terrorism. Is it possible that Iran
will use these weapons in terrorist attacks? What are we doing to stop
them?
Answer. As stated in the recently released State Department report
1998 Patterns of Global Terrorism, Iran continues to furnish assistance
to Hamas, Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, and other groups in the form of
money, weapons, munitions, and training.
Iran is also continuing its efforts to develop a nuclear weapons
capability, but we believe the reluctance of most nuclear suppliers to
provide assistance to Tehran has impeded these efforts. Iran is also
pursuing its indigenous chemical and biological weapons production
capabilities. We vigorously oppose Iran's efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction and are using every means at our disposal, including
sanctions and diplomatic pressure, to stop other governments from
assisting Tehran.
Question. On the question of Iran's acquisition of advanced weapons
technology, I remain concerned about Russian proliferation of ballistic
missile technology to Iran. I commend you for the aggressive role the
Administration has played in pressuring the Russian government to
combat the transfer of ballistic missile technology to Iran. Can you
update us on the status of U.S. efforts--and the Russian response--on
this matter?
Answer. Despite the Russian government's nonproliferation and
export control efforts, Russian entities continue to cooperate with
Iran's ballistic missile program, and to engage in nuclear cooperation
with Iran beyond the Bushehr reactor project. Although we had seen some
improvement in Russia's efforts to crack down on such activities during
the first half of 1998, we have seen backsliding since then.
During the past year, the USG imposed penalties on ten Russian
entities. In January, the Administration used existing authority to
impose administrative measures against three Russian entities for their
nuclear- and missile-related cooperation with Iran. Last July, we took
the same action against seven Russian entities involved with Iran's
ballistic missile program.
In addition, we are continuing our longstanding, broad, and
intensive efforts to stop proliferation. We and our allies continue to
press the Russian government to end cooperation between Russian firms
and the Iranian missile and nuclear programs and to bolster its export
control and enforcement capabilities.
As part of this effort, U.S. and Russian experts in the past two
months have developed an action plan to address some of our most
pressing missile proliferation concerns, including development on a
priority basis of internal compliance offices at several Russian
entities. We have developed a similar plan for the nuclear area that
also includes enhanced export control measures. U.S. and Russian
experts met in late April to begin implementation of these plans.
East Timor
Question. The negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal over the
political status of East Timor have made tremendous progress in recent
months. I (Rep. Lowey) am hopeful that these talks, when completed,
will result in a framework for East Timorese independence. But I remain
concerned about ensuring a peaceful transition process that protects
human rights and democratic principles in East Timor. I strongly urge
the Administration to make it very clear to the parties to the
negotiations and East Timores leaders that the United States stands
ready and willing to assist in this transition. To ensure a successful
and peaceful transition to an independent and democratic East Timor,
the United States must be ready to offer bilateral political and
economic assistance to East Timor and Indonesia. We must also support
United Nations and international community efforts to encourage a
careful and measured transition that avoids creating a power vacuum in
East Timor, which would almost certainly lead to bloodshed. In the next
several days, I will be sending President Clinton a letter--signed by
55 of my colleagues--asking him to make our support for this transition
process clear. Would you like to comment on this matter?
Answer. We share your concerns. The U.S. welcomed the formal
signing on May 5 in New York of a U.N.-mediated agreement between
Indonesia and Portugal on East Timor. We have strongly supported these
negotiations and believe that the agreement to have the U.N. conduct an
August 8 ballot by East Timorese on an Indonesian autonomy proposal is
the best approach to achieving a peaceful resolution of East Timor's
status.
President Habibie has said that, if the East Timorese reject
autonomy, he will recommend that the Indonesian People's Consultative
Assembly (MPR), the nation's highest legislative body, revoke its
annexation decree and allow East Timor to separate for Indonesia. We
strongly support a peaceful transition in East Timor, whether the
people choose autonomy or independence.
We also are deeply concerned over continuing violent activities of
civilian militiamen who seek to bias the August 8 vote through terror
and intimidation. President Clinton has written President Habibie about
the militia situation. I and other senior U.S. officials have discussed
the matter with Indonesian government and military authorities and will
continue to do so. We believe it essential that the Government of
Indonesia take immediate steps to ensure overall security for all in
East Timor, to protect U.N. personnel, and to create an atmosphere in
which the vote can be fair, peaceful and free of intimidation,
consistent with its agreements.
We are finalizing details of our voluntary contribution to support
the U.N. mission in East Timor. We appreciate efforts in Congress to
provide new money for this purpose. We are working closely with other
interested states to ensure that the U.N. has the financial means and
diplomatic support to make its effort a success.
Middle East
Question. Last year, then Israeli Finance Minister Ne'eman--
encouraged by Chairman Callahan--developed a plan to restructure U.S.
foreign assistance to Israel over the next decade. This plan gradually
eliminates U.S. economic assistance to Israel over ten years, while
bolstering security assistance to Israel. Under the plan, Israel should
receive $960 million in Economic Support Funds and $1.92 billion in
Foreign Military Financing in FY 2000. While the Administration's
request for Israeli FMF was at the agreed upon level--for which I
commend you--the ESF request was $30 million less than the Ne' eman
plan called for. Can you explain this disparity?
Answer. We continue to discuss with the Israeli Government the
future reductions in U.S. economic assistance to Israel.
In late January 1998, Israeli Finance Minister Yaacov Ne'eman began
discussions with Members of Congress and Administration officials on a
proposal that would gradually reduce Israel's annual $1.2 billion
economic assistance to zero, while phasing in a $600 million increase
in military assistance over the same period. We welcomed the Israeli
government's initiative and have been working closely with Israel and
the Congress to further develop the concept.
While we agreed that it was time to adjust the level of assistance,
negotiations continue on the exact funding levels for each year. The
key elements, a gradual ten-year reduction in ESF combined with a
steady increase in FMF, however, remain the same. Discussions continue
between the Administration and the Government of Israel on this
proposal.
Question. Can you update us on the peace process in the Middle
East? Specifically, I'd like to know the status of the security
cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority? In the past,
PA cooperation with Israeli officials in the fight against terrorism
has been somewhat inconsistent and uneven. Has the situation improved
at all?
Answer. We believe the Palestinian security organizations are
making a very serious and credible effort to combat terror.
For example, acting on information developed through their own
investigations, PA security forces have been prevented a number of
terror operations, including what could have been a very serious attack
in Tel Aviv in March. The Israeli government commended this PA security
operation and others.
Our standard is that the Palestinians must do everything they can
to prevent terror, both unilaterally and in cooperation with Israel.
We will continue to insist that the Palestinians meet that
standard.
Russia/Israel
Question. I want to thank you for the Administration's continued
strong support of the program to resettle Jewish refugees in Israel
from the former Soviet Union, Ethiopia, and other nations. The FY 2000
request of $60 million, which Congress suggested in the FY99 Foreign
Operations Report, will ensure the continued success of this critical
program. I am concerned about recent reports of increased anti-Semitism
in Russia. Could you comment on the situation there and how it might
affect the number of Jews emigrating from Russia to Israel?
Answer. President Clinton and I share your concern about the
increased anti-Semitism in Russia. Anti-Semitism is unacceptable and
damages Russia's reputation. We have made senior Russian officials
aware of our views, and this issue figures prominently in our bilateral
agenda. When I was in Moscow in January, I raised this issue many times
in both public and private meetings.
Anti-Semitism, racism and extremism must be opposed firmly and with
vigilance. In this connection, we commend the resolute statements of
President Yeltsin and his government condemning anti-Semitism and other
expressions of ethnic or religious hatred. Unfortunately, weaknesses in
Russia's law enforcement capability have made it more difficult to
combat anti-Semitism.
As for Jewish emigration, it is difficult to predict how anti-
Semitism might affect the number of Jews emigrating from Russia to
Israel. However, the Department of State continues to monitor the
situation closely, and to seek opportunities to promote tolerance in
Russia.
Middle East
Question. Last year, you expressed the hope that the U.S. could
begin the process of improving its relationship with Iran. We had
reason to hope that Iranian President Khatemi would take a more
conciliatory approach to bilateral relations between our two countries.
Unfortunately, Iran's actions in the last year have suggested that it's
business as usual there. In fact, the State Department reported last
month that ``Iran continues to pursue policies that threaten the
interest of the U.S.,'' and ``Iran continues its drive to acquire
[weapons of mass destruction] and recently tested a medium-range
ballistic missile capable of hitting our allies and U.S. forces
abroad.'' When we compare President Khatemi's comments last year with
Iran's actions since then, something is not right. Can you comment? Is
President Khatemi actually in charge in Iran, or does he follow
marching orders from the more extreme clerical leaders in the country?
Answer. While President Khatemi has undertaken a reform agenda
domestically in Iran that has seen some success, we have not observed
similar changes in those policies of greatest concern to us. We
continue to be concerned about Iranian support for terrorism,
opposition to the Middle East Peace Process, development of weapons of
mass destruction and their delivery systems and Iran's human rights
record.
President Khatami exercises authority over much of the Iranian
government, but is outranked by Supreme Leader Khamanei on issues
involving the Iranian armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards, the
Judiciary and the Ministry of Intelligence. In addition, powerful
foundations called ``bonyads,'' which control the holdings of the
former Shah and figures associated with his regime, report directly to
the Supreme Leader, and not President Khatami. The bonyads exercise a
significant impact on Iranian economic activity.
Khatami's election two years ago alarmed conservative elements in
Iran. As Khatami has pressed for change in both domestic and foreign
affairs, these conservatives have resisted. The outcome of this
struggle will depend in great part on the evolving power relationships
among Khatami, Supreme Leader Khamanei and Expediency Head (and ex-
president) Rafsanjani.
The Iranian public apparently supports Khatami and his agenda of
promoting the rule of law, reducing government intrusion into people's
lives, and increasing freedom of expression.
______
Questions for the Record Submitted by Ms. Kilpatrick
__________
Kosovo
Question. Could you explain President Clinton's designation of the
airspace above and the water's adjacent to the FRY and Albania as
combat zones in his April 1999 Executive Order?
Answer. Pursuant to section 112 of title 26, U.S. Code, a member of
the Armed Force of the United States may exclude from gross income
compensation received (subject to a dollar limit for commissioned
officers) for active service for any month during any part of which is
served in an area that has been designated by the President as a combat
zone for purposes of this section. Executive Order 13119 (April 13,
1999) was issued to allow service members to benefit from this income
tax benefit.
Question. Has the Administration asked the government of Yugoslavia
to consider the three captured Marines as prisoners of war and
therefore treat them according to the Geneva Convention? If so,
wouldn't this suggest that they were involved in a war? Are we in fact
at war with the government of Yugoslavia? Since the Constitution says
that only Congress can declare war, why has it not been asked to
declare war?
Answer. We believes that the three captured servicemembers were
entitled to the protections accorded by the Geneva Convention of 1949
as prisoners of war. Their status does not suggest that we are ``at
war.'' Indeed, the Geneva Conventions apply to all armed conflicts, and
bind all parties to such conflicts, regardless whether the conflicts
are labeled as wars. We do not consider ourselves to be ``at war'' with
Yugoslavia or its people. NATO is acting to deter unlawful violence in
Kosovo that endangers the stability of the Balkans and threatens a
wider conflict in Europe.
We believe that a Congressional declaration of war would be
unnecessary and unwise. As you know, the House of Representatives
rejected a resolution to declare war on April 28, 1999. A declaration
of war could have serious negative effects on NATO cohesion, regional
stability, and relations with Russia. The President has taken his
actions pursuant to his broad Constitution authority as Commander-in-
Chief and Chief Executive and to conduct the foreign relations of the
United States. The President has taken into account the views of
Congress. He has complied with the Roberts Amendment by consulting with
and reporting to Congress prior to deploying additional ground forces
to the region, and, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, he has
kept Congress informed concerning deployments of U.S. forces to the
region.
Question. The American naval base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba has
been criticized by some refugee groups as more like a prison than the
``safehaven'' described by the Clinton administration. Is where the
refugees will be relocated to still up for debate?
Answer. The administration is no longer considering the use of
Guantanamo Bay as a transit site for these refugees. Refugees are being
processed for admission to the United States on two tracks. Those with
relatives in the U.S. who have applied to sponsor cases with
appropriate resettlement agencies in the U.S. are undergoing full
refuge processing in Macedonia and are arriving to be immediately
united with their family in the U.S. Those who have been identified as
vulnerable and in need of resettlement due to conditions in refugee
camps are being moved to Fort Dix, New Jersey, following a brief
process including INS adjudication interview in Macedonia. At Fort Dix
they undergo final processing (medicals, etc.) and sponsorship is
arranged. They are expected to move into U.S. communities two to four
weeks after arrival at Fort Dix.
Question. What steps are being taken with regard to family
reunification? What will be the distribution of responsibility among
NATO, the U.S. military, and Non-governmental organizations for the
care and maintenance of refugees at Guantanamo Bay or elsewhere?
Answer. The U.S. program emphasizes family reunification. First, we
do not unduly separate families in the region during processing for
relocation. Second, we are making efforts to unite refugees with
relatives in the U.S. The program for moving refugees in vulnerable
circumstances from refugee camps in Macedonia to Fort Dix, New Jersey,
involves the cooperation of the UNHCR and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) overseas. Domestically the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) coordinates the effort with the
support of DOD, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and
the American Red Cross. Refugees with family in the U.S. complete
processing overseas and are not required to transit Fort Dix.
Question. Western officials and human rights groups say that scores
of women have reported being raped since the Belgrade government
started waging all-out war in Kosovo. Within our humanitarian relief do
we address any rape-related concerns?
Answer. There have been repeated reports of the Serbian army raping
Kosovar Albanian women and our humanitarian efforts do address rape-
related concerns. In addition to health care, several of the NGO and UN
agency programs funded by the USG provide psychosocial counseling to
traumatized women.
U.S. Contribution to UNDP
Question. I am concerned about the drastic dip in United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) funding from $100 million in FY 1999, to an
Administration request of $80 million for FY 2000. I am also concerned
that linked to this anticipated drop in funding is a decrease in
leveraged influence regarding selection of the new Program
Administrator. This post has traditionally been held by an American. It
is the highest ranking position an American has held in the UN system
and carries the rank of Deputy Secretary General. As you know, ninety
percent of UNDP's core resources reach countries that are home to
ninety percent of the world's poorest people. UNDP helps people in 174
countries and territories to help themselves, focusing on poverty
elimination, environmental regeneration, job creation and the
advancement of women. Contributions to UNDP come from nearly every
government in the world and for every dollar contributed by the U.S.,
we receive a return of more than 2:1 in procurement of American goods
and services. This funding is both socially effective and fiscally
responsible. It helps the poor, fosters democracy, and ultimately it
helps Americans. Recognizing all of this, why did the Administration's
UNDP funding level request drop so drastically?
Answer. Our reduced FY 2000 request for the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) is an unfortunate consequence of the severe
funding constraints under which we continue to operate and our efforts
to keep spending within the limits established by the 1997 budget
agreement.
We agree that UNDP programs serve a number of very important U.S.
national interests, and continued U.S. support for UNDP efforts remains
essential. UNDP is aggressively promoting broad U.S. objectives such as
democracy, good governance, sustainable development and peace building.
Over the last five years, UNDP has made a number of management
reforms and cooperated in strengthening the coordination of UN
development activities both at headquarters and in the field. We expect
this process to continue under the leadership of Mark Malloch Brown,
who the Secretary-General has chosen to be his new Administrator.
Refugees
Question. I would like to thank you for focusing on improvement of
the first asylum conditions in terms of basic health, water and
sanitation, and shelter--for the most vulnerable refugee populations,
particularly in Africa. Recognizing the devastating impact that HIV/
AIDS is having on Africa's population, it seems that refugee camps
would be an important location to access and educate a dense and
particularly vulnerable population regarding how to reduce the spread
of HIV. Is the U.S. involved in any HIV/AIDS education or prevention
efforts in refugee camps in Africa?
Answer. Yes, indeed, HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention is included
in the basic primary health care (including reproductive health) and
community services programs (including education) in almost every
refugee camp setting in Africa. We fund such health care programs in
all of the major refugee situations in Africa through the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organizations
such as the International Rescue Committee, the American Refugee
Committee, and the International Federation of Red Cross/Crescent
Societies. I would note that this is also true in other regions of the
world given the universality of the threat.
The methodology may differ among refugee populations For example,
all of the reproductive health care programs fro West Africa to the
Horn--a sector where common minimum standards have been developed and
are carefully implemented--would include an element on HIV/AIDS. In
some settings, such as Guinea, health education (including HIV/AIDS) in
the refugee schools is part of the program for adolescents from Liberia
and Sierra Leone. In Cote d'Ivoire, refugee women engaged in
International Rescue Committee--implemented income-generating
activities and business skills classes decided to add HIV/AIDS
education/prevention to their sessions.
Refugees: Africa/Sierra Leone
Question. I would like to commend you and thank you for increasing
the refugee ceiling for Africa from 6,888 in 1998 to 12,000 in 1999. As
you know, in countries such as Sierra Leone, people are trying to leave
the country and flee to safety en masse. I have many constituents with
family members trapped by the conflict. They are concerned about the
loss of relatives who are trying to leave the country. Are we currently
doing anything beyond the norm to help these refugees?
Answer. Sierra Leon is in the ninth year of a tragic civil war.
Last year, the USG gave over $60 million for Sierra Leonean refugees
and regional peacekeeping. So far this year, we have spent nearly $43
million, including emergency aid following the violent rebel attack on
Freetown in January. This includes over $2 million in additional
emergency fund for refugees in Guinea and Liberia.
Security and access remain serious constraints in Sierra Leone,
both in terms of supplying aid to the needy and in allowing refugees to
flee danger. We have pressed both sides to allow humanitarian access.
In the meantime, we have encouraged negotiations while reinforcing
ECOMOG, and sought to halt the flow of arms in the region. Until the
parties reach a political settlement, the people of Sierra Leone will
remain desperate for the assistance we provide.
We are continuing to resettle Sierra Leonean refugees in the United
States, including a number of the atrocity victims who managed to flee
to Guinea. As refugee resettlement is available only for those who have
fled their country it is not a mechanism for rescuing those still
inside the country.
W I T N E S S E S
----------
Page
Albright, Hon. M.K............................................... 281
Bodner, James.................................................... 69
Holum, J.D....................................................... 69
Newsom, E.D...................................................... 233
Rubin, Hon. Robert............................................... 1
Schuerch, W.E.................................................... 1
Slocombe, W.B.................................................... 233
I N D E X
----------
Secretary of the Treasury
(Hon. Robert E. Rubin)
Page
Adjustment Programs.............................................. 65
Bilateral vs Multilateral Debt Policy............................ 66
Budget Request................................................... 15
Chairman Callahan's Opening Statement............................ 1
Core Labor Standards............................................. 26
Debt Relief...................................................... 62
Exceptional Performers........................................... 64
HIPC Debt Relief................................................. 31
HIPC Expansion................................................... 63
HIPC Export Ratios............................................... 64
IMF Gold Sales................................................... 63
RI Responsibility for Bad Loans.................................. 67
Marshall Plan for Africa......................................... 62
Mobutu Debts..................................................... 66
Mozambique....................................................... 66
Ms. Pelosi's Opening Statement................................... 3
President's Initiative........................................... 63
Secretary Rubin's Opening Statement.............................. 4
South Africa..................................................... 67
Standards for Sound Performers................................... 64
Uganda Experience................................................ 65
Security Assistance
(James Bodner, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
John Holum, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs)
Africa........................................................... 138
African Crisis Response Initiative............................... 165
Agriculture...................................................... 156
Azerbaijan....................................................... 157
Black Hawk Helicopters........................................... 146
Bosnia........................................................... 141
Chairman Callahan's Opening Statement............................ 69
Colombia......................................................... 127
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)..................... 155
Egypt Arms Deal................................................163, 229
Environmental Diplomacy........................................132, 161
Export Import Bank............................................... 147
Foreign Military Training........................................ 162
Human Rights Vetting............................................. 167
IMET...........................................................144, 165
Indonesia........................................................ 136
Israel.........................................................143, 229
Jordan........................................................... 229
KEDO.......................................123, 130, 133, 148, 160, 164
Landmines........................................................ 144
Latin America.................................................... 230
Military Training Report...................................35, 165, 230
Mr. Bodner's Opening Statement................................... 99
Mr. Holum's Opening Statement.................................... 72
Ms. Pelosi's Opening Statement................................... 70
No Sweat Shop Initiative......................................... 161
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Fund........................... 162
North Korea...................................................... 154
Peru-Ecuador Peace Agreement...................................130, 160
Resources/DOD.................................................... 226
Russia/Iran...................................................... 158
Russian Arms Transfers to Iran and the Middle East............... 151
School of the Americas.........................................145, 226
Security Assistance Policy....................................... 163
Voluntary Peacekeeping Operations................................ 153
West Bank and Gaza............................................... 153
Military Training Report
(Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Eric D.
Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs)
Allocation of Resources and Appropriated Funds.................272, 279
Benin Training................................................... 274
Colombia.......................................................257, 275
Decision on Training............................................. 273
Foreign Military Training........................................ 254
Guatemala.................................................256, 267, 271
Human Rights..................................................... 256
IMET............................................................. 256
Indonesia........................................................ 277
JCET Training..................................................269, 278
Kopassus......................................................... 259
Military Training Activity....................................... 263
Mr. Callahan's Opening Statement................................. 233
Mr. Newsom's Opening Statement................................... 247
Mr. Slocombe's Opening Statement................................. 236
Ms. Pelosi's Opening Statement................................... 234
Oversight........................................................ 263
Readiness........................................................ 278
Reporting Requirements........................................... 274
Responsiveness of Training Report................................ 280
Safeguards on Use of Funds in Both Bills......................... 272
Sandia Nuclear Lab............................................... 254
Service Sponsored Academy Scholarships........................... 276
Secretary of State
(Hon. Madeleine K. Albright)
Budget Caps...................................................... 393
Budget Resolution................................................ 333
Burma............................................................ 373
Caspian Oil Basin................................................ 376
Central America Disaster......................................... 391
Chairman Callahan's Opening Statement............................ 281
China............................................................ 392
Colombia......................................................... 373
Development Assistance Priorities................................ 382
Diplomacy........................................................ 332
East Timor....................................................... 396
Family Planning.................................................. 394
Front Line States.........................................368, 387, 388
Funding Concerns...............................................327, 331
Haiti............................................................ 380
Importance of Foreign Aid........................................ 332
Indonesian Elections............................................. 372
Iran............................................371, 383, 384, 385, 395
Israel........................................................... 397
Kosovo......................323, 330, 374, 376, 377, 379, 388, 389, 390
Macedonia........................................................ 368
Middle East...............................................393, 396, 397
Military Training................................................ 391
Montenegro....................................................... 368
Mr. Young's Opening Statement.................................... 322
Ms. Pelosi's Opening Statement................................... 283
NATO............................................................. 326
North Korea...................................................... 382
Opposition to Ground Troops...................................... 327
Refugee Children................................................. 389
Refugees.......................................................399, 400
Rule of Law Programs............................................. 365
Russia...............................................375, 384, 392, 397
School of the Americas........................................... 385
Secretary Albright's Opening Statement........................... 284
Serb Propaganda.................................................. 380
Terrorism........................................................ 381
The Middle East Peace Process.................................... 386
Ukraine.......................................................... 375
UN Arrears....................................................... 390
UNDP............................................................. 399
United Nations................................................... 394
Wye............................................................368, 370