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# DOD'S REDUCED DRUG CONTROL EFFORT: TO WHAT EXTENT AND WHY?

## HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

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# DOD'S REDUCED DRUG CONTROL EFFORT: TO WHAT EXTENT AND WHY?

**THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 2000**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY,
AND HUMAN RESOURCES,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Mica, Gilman, Hutchinson, Ose, and Kucinich.

Staff present: Sharon Pinkerton, staff director and chief counsel; Charley Diaz, congressional fellow; Gil Macklin, professional staff member; Lisa Wandler, clerk; Cherri Branson, minority counsel; and Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk.

Mr. MICA. Good morning. I would like to call this hearing of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources to order. We may be joined by additional Members as they come in from the snow and ice in beautiful Washington as it is recovering from the great snowstorm of this week. But I would like to go ahead and get started.

I will start with an opening statement, and then we will have a panel of witnesses that we will hear from and again hopefully we will be joined by some of the other Members, but we do want to proceed. And we do have a vote I believe scheduled for 12 noon, and so we would like to conclude the hearing by then if possible.

This morning's hearing is being held to examine a General Accounting Office report. Do we have copies available? And let us make sure that we have copies for all of the Members.

This is a report which I requested last year to assess DOD's drug interdiction efforts.

This report which was recently released documents a dramatic reduction in the DOD assets committed to reducing the supply of illegal drugs in America.

In fact, while some columnists have pronounced the war on drugs a failure, this report confirms that the war on drugs did not fail, but rather was dismantled piece by piece by the Clinton administration beginning in 1993.

Imagine, if you can, waging a war by slashing the command structure, cutting combat resources in half, dismantling intelligence and surveillance capabilities, ignoring strategic targets and treating only the wounded in battle. Imagine fighting a war where

intelligence information sharing was purposely diminished and denied to both our troops and our allies.

Today, we will hear that this strategy was purposefully implemented by this administration. As this GAO report concludes: "The decline in assets DOD uses to carry out its counterdrug responsibilities is due, one, to lower priority assigned to the counterdrug mission; and, two, overall reductions in defense budgets and force levels."

Both of those commentaries appear on page 4.

This low priority strategy has taken a terrible toll on our country. Indeed, shutting down America's war on drugs has had very grave consequences. Few wars in the history of the United States have taken a greater toll in lives or imposed greater destruction in casualties on our society. Teen use has doubled in the United States since 1992. I think we have a chart on teen use. This is an interesting chart. First, put up the 12th grade drug use and without objection I would like this made part of the record, and it does show the dramatic increase since 1992 in 12th grade drug use.

Teen use as I said has doubled in the United States since 1992; and specifically for teens aged 12 to 17, drug use rose by 70 percent during this time period. As pointed out in the report, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates that almost 14 million Americans now use illegal drugs, and illicit drugs and drug related crimes costs our Nation at least $110 billion annually. More tragic, however, is the fact that since 1993 more than 100,000 Americans have died from drug-related deaths, including 15,973 in 1998.

Now, everyone who will listen to the President tonight is well aware of the rosy picture he will paint for our Nation in his attempt to define a favorable legacy during his final year in office. But the issue before us today and in this hearing is the incredible volume of illegal drugs that are pouring into our Nation and its horrible legacy of death and destruction.

This GAO report confirms our worst suspicions that this administration has neglected our vital national interest in halting the flow of deadly drugs into this country. In fact, it even failed to implement its own national strategy. Two of the five critical goals of the Office of National Drug Control Policy strategy, which were presented to this subcommittee by the head of the ONDCP state—and let me state them for the record. Goal No. 4: shield America's air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat. Goal No. 5, again from ONDCP as our supposed national policy in our national drug control strategy is to break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

We will hear today that beginning in 1993, the administration's policy and its action failed to stop drugs before they entered the United States. The GAO findings are most disturbing and demonstrate a failure to protect our borders from an onslaught of death and destruction. The findings of this GAO report are just another indicator of the Clinton administration's lack of commitment to effectively combat the scourge of illegal drugs. Even the drug czar, General McCaffrey, has attacked the administration for doing too little too late in Colombia. According to a recent news article of December 2, 1999, General McCaffrey stated the situation matter of

factly about Colombia, "Colombia is out of control. It is a flipping nightmare." That is his quote, not mine.

Among GAO's findings in this report are the following data which cover the period from 1992 to 1999: the number of flight hours dedicated to detecting and monitoring illicit drug shipments declined from approximately 46,000 to 15,000, or 68 percent; and we have a chart up there that shows some of the decline in various activities.

In addition, this report also details the number of ship days declined from 4,800 to 1,800, or a 62 percent decline in ship days dedicated to going after illegal narcotics.

Closing down interdiction and surveillance has had serious consequences. One can see how Colombia has spiraled out of control. Recent statistics show that heroin use and deaths are skyrocketing in our cities. In this morning's paper is this article, "Drug use explodes in rural America." This is not from a week ago or a month ago or a year ago; this is in this morning's paper. Let me quote the article from Joseph Califano, president of the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse and a former health secretary, I believe. He says, "drugs are now as available on Main Street as they are in Manhattan." That is his quote, and again some startling statistics even today in what is taking place.

We now know that our air and maritime support for reducing the supply of drugs was purposely and foolishly abandoned. And again that is detailed in this GAO report. Even worse, this occurs at a time when we have lost our air base in Panama, our forward operating locations for surveillance in the war on drugs, and ceded control of this strategic area without first obtaining replacement bases for continued effective air surveillance.

I went down and had a briefing by Southcom during the break, and it appears that we are still in a state of disarray in getting back to even a fraction of the former surveillance flights that we had when we had Panama in operation.

I have another chart up here. This is from this report, and this appears on page 12, and I think on the chart in blue is the request by the Southern Command for assistance in the war on drugs and which was actually provided by DOD. It shows fiscal year 1997, 1998, and 1999. The 1999 figures are most startling; it shows us actually back sliding in a tremendous fashion. Only a small percentage of those assets are being provided to Southcom, again from this report. Without objection, I would also like to make that chart part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

**Figure 2: DOD's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Counterdrug Aircraft Support in Central and South America and the Caribbean, Fiscal Years 1997-99**




Note: Data prior to 1997 was not available.

Source: U.S. Southern Command.

Mr. MICA. Events in Colombia, the source of most domestic heroin and cocaine, indicate that the domestic situation is deteriorating rapidly. Narcoguerillas are killing citizens and police daily. Businesses and foreigners continue to flee, while acts of terrorism increase and their dangers magnified, as evidenced by the recent terrorist disruption of power to nearly one-third of the country. Our subcommittee was briefed last week that coca production in Colombia is double or triple what was earlier estimated. This means that over 400 metric tons of coca are being produced and more cocaine than ever is moving into the United States. And in 1993, Colombian heroin production—and you have to understand this—was basically nonexistent. Now Colombia produces 74 percent of the heroin found in the United States.

Finally, let me state that I continue to monitor military assistance that has been promised to source countries by this Congress. I am increasingly disturbed to learn of the continued delays that prevent assistance from reaching those who desperately need it.

I am particularly concerned about the capability of the State Department to deliver military aid expeditiously. It is almost like the gang that couldn't shoot straight. I think we had one report during the recess, members of the panel, that ammunition that we have been requesting for some 3, 4 years was delivered to the docks at the Department of State rather than delivered to Colombia. It is incredible that volumes of ammunition could end up on the docks of the State Department and not to Colombia.

Our subcommittee staff also informed me that last week we were told that the armor is finally on the way for the helicopters to Colombia, that it was shipped last week. So we have less than one-third of the $300 million actually in Colombia according to our latest staff reports and briefings that we had at the end of last year, and the bulk of that is in three Black Hawk helicopters, which I believe still sit idle because they are not armored and the ammunition and resources have not reached Colombia.

Again, this issue needs to be very closely examined. State Department officials have long been obstacles in committing essential military assistance to countries in combating drug suppliers. I am now afraid the Department is responsible for delays that prevent assistance from reaching countries in immediate need, like Colombia. Colombia has sought basic military wares for years, including fully operational helicopters. The State Department advises me that their delivery of promised combat-ready helicopters may not be completed until year's end. Why the delays?

I don't recall such delays in getting military assistance to Kosovo or to support our troops in Operation Desert Storm. This predicament illustrates why the military has reduced rather than enhanced its counterdrug efforts. GAO is correct in its assessment that reducing drug supply has not been a high priority of this administration. Now I understand why General McCaffrey does not like to describe the current efforts of the administration as a drug war. As a general, he knows very well what war is, and I may say to my colleagues, this is no war. I, however, do refer to our efforts in this campaign as a drug war because our Nation's vital interests are at stake and our citizens continue to die. This report documents a 7-year retreat.

Whether we call this a war or not is less important than the recognition that we must fight it as if we expect to be successful. Congress has made substantial commitments to restart an all-out war and all-out effort against illegal narcotics. We must now ensure that we support cost-effective and proven anti-narcotics programs. At the same time we cannot shortchange our allies who need support and assistance.

Making this effort a priority and fulfilling commitments to rid this hemisphere of drug cartels, narcoterrorism, and illegal drug suppliers will pay huge dividends to protect countless lives. Waiting to stop drugs after they reach our borders and only treating the wounded in battle has proven to be an ineffective combat technique.

Somewhere DOD has either lost the will and the commitment to be engaged in this battle or has simply diverted resources. Today we need to find out what went wrong. Last year this subcommittee held 28 hearings, 16 on drug-related topics. This year I intend to ensure that our oversight in this area, whether through hearings or by other means, continues. Despite certain differences in approach, I know that the members of this subcommittee, majority and minority, feel that our Nation's drug control strategy and its successful implementation is and must remain a priority.

I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today, and I hope that we can, through this hearing, fulfill our responsibilities and see that all of our agencies, including our military and others that are responsible for protecting our citizens, help in this national threat.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John L. Mica follows:]

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## OPENING STATEMENT
## Chairman John L. Mica
### Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
### January 27, 2000 Hearing:

# DOD's Reduced Counterdrug Efforts: To What Extent and Why?

Our Subcommittee is holding this hearing to examine a General Accounting Office (GAO) report, which I requested last year to assess DOD's drug interdiction efforts. This report documents a dramatic reduction in Department of Defense (DOD) assets committed to reducing the supply of illegal drugs in America.

In fact, while some columnists and critics have pronounced the war on drugs a failure, this report confirms that the war on drugs did not fail, but rather was dismantled by the Clinton Administration beginning in 1993. Imagine waging a war by slashing the command structure, cutting combat resources in half, dismantling intelligence and surveillance, ignoring strategic targets and treating only the wounded in battle.

Imagine fighting a war where intelligence information sharing was purposely diminished and denied to our troops and allies?

Today, we will hear that this strategy was purposefully implemented by this Administration. As this GAO report concludes: "**The decline in assets DOD uses to carry out its counterdrug responsibilities is due to (1) the lower priority assigned to the counterdrug mission** [emphasis added]... **and (2) overall reductions in defense budgets and force levels.**" (Page 4)

This low priority strategy has taken a terrible toll on our country. Indeed, shutting down America's war on drugs has had grave consequences. Few wars in the history of the United States have taken a greater toll in lives or imposed greater destruction and casualties on our society. Teen drug use has doubled in the United States since 1992. Specifically, for teens aged 12 to 17, drug use rose by 70% during this time period. As pointed out in the report, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) estimates that almost 14 million Americans now use illegal drugs, and illicit drugs and drug-related crimes cost our nation at least $110 billion annually.

More tragic however, is the fact that since 1993, more than 100,000 Americans have died from drug related deaths, including 15,973 in 1998.

Now, everyone who will listen to the President tonight is well aware of the rosy picture he will paint for our nation, and his attempt to define a favorable legacy during his final year in office. But the issue before us today is the incredible volume of illegal drugs pouring into our nation and its horrible legacy of death and destruction.

This GAO report confirms our worst suspicions that this Administration has neglected our vital national interests in halting the flow of deadly drugs into this country. In fact, it even failed to implement its own national strategy: Two of the five critical goals of the National Drug Control Strategy are :

**Goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.**
**Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.**

We will hear today that, beginning in 1993, the Administration's policy and action failed to stop drugs before they entered the U.S. The GAO findings are most disturbing and demonstrate a failure to protect our borders from an onslaught of death and destruction.

The findings of this GAO report are just another indicator of the Clinton Administration's lack of commitment to effectively combat the scourge of illegal drugs. Even the Drug Czar has attacked the Administration for doing too little, too late in Columbia. According to a recent news article (Washington Times; Dec. 2, 1999), General McCaffrey stated the situation matter-of-factly: "**Colombia is out of control, it is a flipping nightmare**."

Among GAO findings in this report are the following, covering the period from 1992 -1999:

- The number of **flight hours** dedicated to detecting and monitoring illicit drug shipments **declined** from approximately 46,000 to 15,000, or **68%.**

- The number of **ship days declined** from about 4,800 to 1,800, or **62%.**

Closing down interdiction and surveillance has serious consequences. One can easily see how Colombia has spiraled out of control. Recent statistics show that heroin use and deaths are skyrocketing in our cities. Now we learn that our air and maritime support for reducing the supply of drugs was purposely and foolishly abandoned.

Even worse, this occurs at a time when we have lost our air base in Panama, and ceded control of this strategic area without first obtaining replacement bases for continued effective air surveillance.

Events in Colombia -- the source of most domestic heroin and cocaine -- indicate that the domestic situation is deteriorating rapidly. Narco-guerillas are killing citizens and police daily.

Businesses and foreigners continue to flee, while acts of terrorism increase and their dangers magnified -- as evidenced by the recent terrorist disruption of power to nearly one-third of the country. Our Subcommittee was briefed last week that coca production in Colombia is double or triple what was earlier estimated. This means that over 400 metric tons of coca are being produced and more cocaine than ever is moving into the United States. And, in 1993 Colombian heroin production was non-existent - -now Colombia produces 74% of the heroin found in the United States.

Finally, let me state that I continue to monitor military assistance that has been promised to source countries by this Congress. I am increasingly disturbed to learn of continued delays that prevent assistance from reaching those who desperately need it.

I am particularly concerned about the capability of the State Department to deliver military aid expeditiously. This issue needs to be reexamined closely. Top State Department officials have long been obstacles in committing essential military assistance to countries combating drug suppliers. I am now afraid the Department is responsible for delays that prevent assistance from reaching countries in immediate need, like Colombia. Columbia has sought basic military wares for years, including fully operational helicopters. The State Department advises me that their delivery of promised combat ready helicopters will not be completed until year's end.

Why the delays? I don't recall such delays in getting military assistance to Kosovo, or to support our troops in Operation Desert Storm.

This predicament illustrates why the military has reduced, rather than enhanced, its counterdrug efforts. GAO is correct in its assessment that reducing drug supply has not been a high priority of this Administration. I understand why General McCaffrey does not describe current efforts of the Administration as a "drug war."
As a general, he knows very well what war is, and this is no war. I, however, do refer to our efforts as a drug war, because our nation's vital interests are at stake, and our citizens continue to die. This report documents a 7 year retreat.

Whether we call this a "war" or not is less important than the recognition that we must fight it as one if we expect to be successful. Congress has made substantial commitments to restart an all out war and effort against illegal drugs. Now we must ensure that we support cost-effective and proven anti-narcotics programs. At the same time we cannot short-change our allies who need support and assistance.

Making this effort a priority and fulfilling commitments to rid this hemisphere of drug cartels, narco-terrorism and illegal drug suppliers will pay huge dividends and protect countless lives. Waiting to stop drugs after they reach our borders and only treating the wounded has proven to be ineffective combat techniques.

Somewhere DOD has either lost the will and commitment to be engaged in this battle or has simply diverted resources. Today we need to find out what went wrong.

Last year this Subcommittee held twenty-eight hearings, sixteen on drug related topics. This year I intend to ensure that our oversight in this area, whether through hearings or by other means, continues. Despite certain differences in approach, I know that the members of this Subcommittee, majority and minority, feel that our nation's drug control strategy and its successful implementation is, and must remain, a priority.

I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today as we seek better ways to fulfill our responsibilities, including the responsibilities of our military, in protecting our citizens from this growing national threat.

Mr. MICA. I am pleased that we have been joined by other members. If I may yield to Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank the chairman for this hearing. As usual, the chairman is focusing on the right issues and is asking the right questions about what needs to be done in order to effectively reduce the illegal supply of drugs in this country.

I think one of the things that is very instructive in the GAO report is where they define the background and begin by outlining that almost 14 million Americans use illegal drugs regularly and that drug-related illness, crime and death cost the Nation $110 billion annually. Between 1990 and 1997 there was more than 100,000 drug-induced deaths in the United States. The United States consumes over 300 metric tons of cocaine per year.

Certainly, the chairman's dedication on this issue is important to people of the United States, and I want to thank you for your holding this hearing.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. I recognize now the chairman of the International Relations Committee and thank him for his continued support and cooperation. He is also a member of our panel. And also for his leadership. He just recently led a congressional delegation to the European Union Interparliamentary meetings; and one of the most lengthy discussions—and I was pleased to participate with him in that presentation with our European allies—was on the question of curtailing narcotics trafficking and stemming illegal narcotics, a very successful effort, and I compliment you on that and recognize you at this time.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We thank you for this issue of keeping illicit drugs on the front burner of our national agenda, and I thank you for your recent participation in our meetings with our European allies and European parliamentarians and stressing to them how important it is to have an effective drug war; it is not a unilateral matter, but it needs international cooperation.

Mr. Chairman, today's hearing is particularly important since it goes to the very heart of keeping illicit drugs out of our own Nation. The effective capacity and the key role of our U.S. military as a lead agency for monitoring and detection of drug trafficking is vital and is an important subject matter, and for that reason I commend you for taking the time of our committee to focus our attention on this very important area.

The appalling reduction in military assets for the war on drugs under the current administration is difficult for most of us to understand. And in reading the GAO report that you've recited—the report that is dated December 1999 entitled drug control assets DOD contributes to reducing the illegal drug supply have declined—there is a statement there that says DOD has not yet developed a set of performance measures to assess its effectiveness in contributing to this goal, but has taken some initial steps to develop some measures but DOD's level of support to international drug control efforts has declined significantly since 1992.

I think that is a warning bell to all of us, and I hope that our panelists can give us some important information as to why this has occurred and what we should do to correct it.

It goes on to say that the lower priority assigned to the counterdrug mission compared to that assigned to other military

missions that might involve contact with hostile forces such as peacekeeping is one of the problems involved in the effectiveness of our military attention to this problem.

There is no clearer role for the Federal Government than protecting our skies and shores from illicit drugs coming from abroad. Many of our Presidents, present and past, have said that these illicit drugs pose a clear threat to our national security as well as our national interest in keeping the well-being of our citizens and communities in the forefront.

One of our key foreign policy goals of the American people has always been keeping illicit drugs out of our Nation, and that certainly entails providing the necessary civilian law enforcement and military assets and the resources to do this very important and vital job. Regrettably, we have not seen that done in recent years.

Today, we are facing an unprecedented onslaught of cocaine and heroin from Latin America onto our shores and intended for our communities and for, regrettably, our youngsters. According to the GAO report of December 1999, the DOD level of support and efforts in the international drug control arena has declined markedly. The GAO reports that the number of military flight hours dedicated to detecting and to monitoring illicit drugs have declined from 46,000 flight hours to 15,000 hours from 1992 to 1999. That is a 68 percent reduction in their monitoring efforts. And it will only get worse with the loss of Howard Air Force that our chairman referred to, the base in Panama near the heart of the drug production area, nearby Peru and Colombia.

The GAO reports that on ship days dedicated to the fight against illicit drugs over the same period of 1992 through 1999 has declined from about 4,800 to 1,800 ship days, or a decline of 62 percent. And while the administration may say some of these cutbacks have been made up by the Coast Guard and Customs Service, the obvious fact is that there has been no effective war on drugs by the administration at this date nor commitment to using our military to help our law enforcement community effectively fight this scourge.

Peru is the classic case of such neglect. In the last few years, we witnessed nearly a 60 percent reduction in coca production based on an aggressive Peruvian shoot-down policy that depended on United States aerial surveillance and data. In 1998 the administration took its eye off the ball and reduced aerial surveillance in that area, resulting in coca leaf prices soaring above the profitability break-even point. We can anticipate increased production in that area unless we turn that neglect around.

Our Southcom commander summed it up when he told GAO that his command can only detect and monitor 15 percent of the key drug trafficking routes in the overall drug trafficking area, only some 15 percent of the time.

Accordingly, is it any wonder that we are in trouble with the supply of drugs and increased use among our people? The administration is now scrambling with an emergency supplemental request to restore some regional resources for Colombia, for Peru and for Bolivia after that appalling neglect. As Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter once said, "Wisdom too often never comes, and one ought not reject it merely because it comes late."

Mr. Chairman, we look forward to the testimony of the witnesses you have assembled today, and we thank you again for providing us with this opportunity.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I thank Mr. Gilman and recognize now the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman: I appreciate your leadership throughout the congressional break in holding hearings across the country and following up in this Congress on the concern about our interdiction efforts and the Department of Defense assets.

I traveled to Mexico and Panama during the break and toured that region and received briefings from our officials there. Let me tell just one simple story. When I was in Mexico, in the Guadalajara area, our agents told me about intelligence information that they have received in which there was a ship on the West Coast which was allegedly transporting large quantities of narcotics and they simply did not have the assets in order to go and try to find that ship. This was good intelligence information, and it is one small example of the problem that we are discussing in this hearing. I have read the Department of Defense report and the testimony that will be presented. I want you to know that I have read this testimony even though I have to leave.

Do we have a copy of the testimony of Ms. Salazar? I would like to make sure that I have that even though I might not be here to hear that. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As always, it is a pleasure to be here with you. You are indeed one of our leaders on this issue. I am looking forward to this testimony today. I find it interesting that if we were engaged in a military conflict that was in effect arguably costing as many lives overseas as this problem costs domestically, this would be getting no shortage—this issue would have more resources than shown on this board.

So I am here today interested in an explanation as to why it is on an issue arguably where we have over 10,000 Americans dying every year, we have a situation where we have declining resources committed to trying to solve it.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. Before some of the members depart—and I know that they will be in and out today—we did conduct during the recess a hearing in New York City at the request of Mr. Towns.

We had scheduled one for yesterday in Baltimore for Mr. Cummings and that was canceled because of the snow. We are working with our colleagues on the other side to reschedule that possibly for the 28th, the afternoon of the 28th. You might circle your calendar.

We have a horrible problem in Baltimore, which experienced 7 or 8 years of liberalization, now has 60,000 heroin addicts, a decline in population and the other effects. We are going to try to reschedule that very important hearing.

And then March 6, Monday, we will be in Sacramento. Mr. Ose has requested a hearing in his district on the narcotics use issue,

and then we will go to San Diego at the request of Mr. Bilbray for a Southwest border hearing.

And Mrs. Mink has requested a hearing and we have put that off for a year. She is our ranking member. That is scheduled now for the Monday after St. Patrick's Day in Honolulu, and that is a long way out and a long way back which I found in scheduling. So I just advise the members of those requested member field hearings and thank you.

There being no further opening statements at this time, I would like to introduce our panel and witnesses today. First is Mr. Jess T. Ford, who is the Associate Director of International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs of the General Accounting Office. Second is Ms. Ana Maria Salazar, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support for the Department of Defense.

The third is Rear Admiral Ernest Riutta, and he is Assistant Commandant for operations with the U.S. Coast Guard.

The fourth witness and panelist is Mr. Charles Stallworth. He is the Executive Director for Air and Maritime Interdiction Division of the U.S. Customs Service.

Some of you have been here before, and some of you have not. Our panel is an investigation and oversight. Specifically, we are part of the Government Reform Committee. In that light, we do swear in all of our panelists and witnesses under oath, and so if you would stand at this time and be sworn.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. MICA. The witnesses all answered in the affirmative. Again for those appearing for the first time, we do try to limit your statements to 5 minutes, your oral statements. You can summarize a lengthy statement. Upon request, we will enter into the record any lengthy documentation or other materials requested.

With that, I will first welcome—and we have the GAO report, which I requested along with Charles Grassley, chairman of the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, and the response by the GAO; and I am going to recognize Jess T. Ford with GAO to review this report for the subcommittee. You are recognized.

**STATEMENTS OF JESS T. FORD, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TRADE ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE; ANA MARIA SALAZAR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND SUPPORT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; REAR ADMIRAL ERNEST R. RIUTTA, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD; AND CHARLES STALLWORTH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AIR AND MARINE INTERDICTION DIVISION, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE**

Mr. FORD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on DOD's contribution to reducing the supply of illegal drugs entering the United States. My statement is based on our December 1999 report, which was requested by your subcommittee and the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics and Control.

This report concentrates primarily on DOD support for international drug control efforts. Today, I plan to cover three main points. First, I will discuss the decline in DOD's aerial and maritime support allocated to counterdrug activities from fiscal years 1992 through 1999. I will also discuss some of the consequences and reasons for those declines.

Second, I will discuss the obstacles that DOD faces in helping foreign governments counter illegal drug activities.

Third, I will also briefly discuss DOD's counterdrug strategy and the need for performance measures to judge its counterdrug program effectiveness.

The Department of Defense has lead responsibility for aerial and maritime detection and monitoring of illegal drug shipments to the United States. It also provides assistance and training to foreign governments to combat drug trafficking activities. DOD supplies ships, aircraft, and radar to detect drug shipments and train equipment and other assistance to foreign governments. DOD's counterdrug activities support the efforts of the U.S. law enforcement agencies such as the Customs Service and Coast Guard, and also foreign governments to stem the flow of illegal drugs. In fiscal year 1998, DOD spent about $635 million to support these supply reduction efforts.

Since 1992, DOD's level of support to counterdrug trafficking in Central and South America and the Caribbean has significantly declined. For example, the number of flight hours devoted to counterdrug missions declined 68 percent and the number of ship days fell 62 percent from 1992 to 1999. In fiscal year 1999 U.S. Southern Command reported that DOD was unable to meet 57 percent of the command's request for intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance flights to support its detection and monitoring responsibilities.

According to the Southern Command, the lack of assets hurt their ability to quickly respond to changing drug trafficking patterns. As a result, coverage in some key drug trafficking routes to the United States is lower, leaving gaps in detection areas. For example, United States officials in Peru told us that since late 1997, there has been little or no aerial support to air interdiction operations between Peru and Colombia. In the eastern Pacific, a key threat area, DOD was unable to sustain its support in 1997 and 1998 to successful interdiction operations due to a lack of available assets.

DOD acknowledges that its coverage in key drug trafficking areas in South America has gaps. DOD ascribes the decline in its support to the lower priority of counterdrug missions as compared to other missions such as war peacekeeping and training as well as decreases in its overall budget and force structure during the 1990's. DOD believes that while the level of assets has declined, its overall operations are more efficient than in the past.

However, DOD faces obstacles in providing support to foreign governments in counterdrug efforts. Over the years we have raised concerns about the limit capabilities of the foreign military and law enforcement organizations to operate and repair equipment and effectively use the training provided by DOD. For example, one concern we raised in our December 1999 report involved the capacity

of the Peruvian police to operate and maintain boats to be used for counterdrug river operations.

Other concerns include human rights and intelligence sharing. DOD cannot give training support to some foreign military units, nor can it share intelligence information with certain foreign counterdrug organizations because of their record on human rights abuses and evidence of corruption in these organizations. Finally, Mr. Chairman, DOD has set plans and strategies that directly supports the goals of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. For example, DOD has developed a 5-year counterdrug plan that broadly describes the military personnel and assets that it will provide to further these goals.

At the regional level, the U.S. Southern Command has a counterdrug campaign plan designed to execute its counterdrug activities. However, DOD does not have a set of performance measures to evaluate its counterdrug activities. In our 1999 report, we recommended that DOD develop such measures, and they have begun to do so.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, that concludes my summary. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. We will hold questions until we have heard from all of panelists.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
10:00 a.m., EST
Thursday,
January 27, 2000

# DRUG CONTROL

# DOD Allocates Fewer Assets to Drug Control Efforts

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division




GAO/T-NSIAD-00-77

Ford

B-282863

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the Department of Defense's (DOD) contribution to reducing the supply of illegal drugs entering the United States. My statement is based on our December 1999 report requested by your Subcommittee and the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control.[1]

My statement today covers three main points:

- First, I will discuss the decline in DOD's aerial and maritime support allocated to counterdrug activities from fiscal years 1992 through 1999 and some of the consequences and the reasons for the declines.
- Second, I will discuss the obstacles DOD faces in helping foreign governments counter illegal drug activities.
- Third, I will also talk briefly about DOD's counterdrug strategy and the need for performance measures to judge its counterdrug program effectiveness.

SUMMARY

The Department of Defense has lead responsibility for aerial and maritime detection and monitoring of illegal drug shipments to the United States. It also provides assistance and training to foreign governments to combat drug-trafficking activities. DOD supplies ships, aircraft, and radar to detect drug shipments; and training, equipment, and other

assistance to foreign governments. DOD's counterdrug activities support the efforts of U.S. law enforcement agencies, such as the Customs Service and Coast Guard, and foreign governments to stem the flow of illegal narcotics to the United States. In fiscal year 1998, DOD spent about $635 million to support these supply reduction efforts.

Since 1992,[2] DOD's level of support to counter drug-trafficking in Central and South America and the Caribbean has significantly declined. For example, the number of flight hours devoted to counterdrug missions declined 68 percent from 1992 through 1999. Likewise, the number of ship days fell 62 percent over the same period.[3] In fiscal year 1999, U.S. Southern Command reported that DOD was unable to meet 57 percent of the Command's requests for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights to support its detection and monitoring responsibilities. According to the Southern Command, the lack of assets hurts their ability to quickly respond to changing drug-trafficking patterns. As a result, coverage in key drug-trafficking routes to the United States is lower, leaving gaps in detection areas. For example, U.S. officials in Peru told us that, since 1997, there has been little to no aerial support to the air interdiction operation between Peru and Colombia. In the Eastern Pacific, a key threat area, DOD was unable to sustain its support in 1997 and 1998 to a successful interdiction operation due to a lack of available assets.

DOD acknowledges that its coverage of key drug-trafficking areas in South America and the Caribbean has gaps. DOD ascribes the decline in its support to the lower priority of

[3] Drug Control: Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply Have Declined (GAO/NSIAD-00-9, Dec. 21, 1999).

the counterdrug mission as compared to others such as war, peacekeeping, and training, as well as decreases in its overall budget and force structure during the 1990s. DOD believes that, while the level of assets it provides has been reduced, its overall operations are more efficient. However, data is lacking to back up this position.

DOD faces obstacles in providing support to foreign government counterdrug efforts. Over the years, we have raised concerns about the limited capabilities of foreign military and law enforcement organizations to operate and repair the equipment and effectively use the training provided by DOD. For example, one concern we raised in our December 1999 report involved the capability of the Peruvian police to operate and maintain boats to be used for counterdrug river operations. Other concerns include human rights and intelligence sharing. DOD cannot give training support to some foreign military units nor can it share intelligence information with certain foreign counterdrug organizations because of their record on human rights abuses and evidence of corruption within these organizations.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, DOD has a set of plans and strategies that directly supports the goals of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy to reduce the demand and supply of illegal drugs. For example, DOD has developed a 5-year counterdrug plan that broadly describes the military personnel and assets that it will provide to further the national goals. At the regional level, the U.S. Southern Command has a counterdrug campaign plan designed to execute its counterdrug mission in Central and South America and the

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[3] Data prior to fiscal year 1992 was not available.
[4] "Ship day" refers to each day a ship was working on counterdrug efforts.

Caribbean. However, DOD does not have a set of performance measures to evaluate its counterdrug activities. In our 1999 report, we recommended that DOD develop performance measures to determine the effectiveness of its counterdrug operations and make better use of its limited resources. DOD concurred with our recommendation and has initiated steps to develop performance measures.

## BACKGROUND

According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, almost 14 million Americans use illegal drugs regularly, and drug-related illness, death, and crime cost the nation approximately $110 billion annually. The United States consumes over 300 metric tons of cocaine per year. Coca is grown for market distribution almost exclusively in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. In 1998, of the estimated cocaine flow to the United States, about 89 percent transited through the Caribbean corridor and the Mexico/Central America corridor. The remaining 11 percent flowed directly to the United States from Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru (see fig. 1).

Figure 1: Estimated 1998 Cocaine Flow to the United States




Note: Percentage figures refer to total cocaine shipped through Central America, the Caribbean, or directly to the United States from Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.

Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy.

To address this threat, the Office of National Drug Control Policy has established a national strategy with goals to reduce the demand and flow of drugs entering the United States. Since 1988, DOD has been tasked by Congress to lead the federal efforts to detect and monitor aerial and maritime shipments of illegal drugs and provide support and training to foreign governments to combat drug-trafficking activities.[4]

## DOD DEVOTED FEWER ASSETS TO COUNTERDRUG ACTIVITIES

From fiscal years 1992 through 1999, there was a decline in the number of flight hours and ship days DOD devoted to detect and monitor transshipments of illegal drugs headed to the United States from Central and South America and the Caribbean. DOD officials have indicated that there are detection gaps in key drug-trafficking routes to the United States. DOD attributes the decline in its support to the lower priority of this mission as compared to others, such as war, peacekeeping, and training, as well as to decreases in its overall budget and force structure. DOD officials state that the greater efficiency of its operations and other efforts have made up for this decline. However, DOD has not presented data to confirm this claim.

### Flight Hours and Ship Days Have Declined

According to U.S. Southern Command data, the number of flights dedicated to collecting intelligence, providing surveillance, and engaging in reconnaissance decreased by over

[4] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989 (P.L. 100-456 [Sept. 29, 1988]).

30 percent from fiscal years 1997 through 1999 in Central and South America and the Caribbean (see fig. 2). As a result, DOD could only meet 43 percent of U.S. Southern Command's requests for these flights in fiscal year 1999. DOD uses intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft to provide timely, specific intelligence information to forces involved in detecting, monitoring, and interdicting illegal drug activities. Without this information, which includes signal and imagery intelligence, forces cannot react quickly to changes in drug-traffickers' patterns throughout the region that Southern Command covers.

Figure 2: DOD's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Counterdrug Aircraft Support in Central and South America and the Caribbean, Fiscal Years 1997-99




Note: Data prior to 1997 was not available.

Source: U.S. Southern Command.

In addition, the number of flying hours devoted to tracking suspect shipments in transit to the United States declined 68 percent, from 46,264 to 14,770, from fiscal years 1992 through 1999. Some of this reduction is attributed to drug-traffickers' shift from aerial to maritime methods. Beginning in fiscal year 1993 and continuing through fiscal year 1998, air drug-trafficking events decreased by 42 percent, while maritime events increased by 55 percent. During this period, the U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Coast Guard

independently increased aircraft flight hours that, as shown in figure 3, offset some of the decline in DOD's flight hours.

Figure 3: DOD, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Coast Guard Flight Hours Allocated to Tracking Illegal Drug Shipments in Transshipment Areas, Fiscal Years 1992-99




Note: U.S. Customs Service data prior to 1993 was not available.

Source: Joint Interagency Task Forces East and West, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Coast Guard.

While drug traffickers have shifted from primarily airborne to mostly maritime drug transshipment methods, DOD also reduced the number of ship days devoted to interdiction efforts by 62 percent from 1992 through 1999. These declines in maritime interdiction were partially offset by the increase in U.S. Coast Guard ship days during the same period[5] (see fig. 4).

[5] The increase, due in part to congressional funding decisions to enhance law enforcement interdiction capabilities, was not planned as a direct response to DOD reductions.

Figure 4: DOD and U.S. Coast Guard Counterdrug Ship Days, Fiscal Years 1992-99




Source: Joint Interagency Task Forces East and West and U.S. Coast Guard.

Limited Coverage, Gaps in Monitoring Illegal Drug Activities Exist

As DOD's flight hours and ship days devoted to covering illegal drug shipments have declined, DOD officials indicated that gaps in coverage of high-threat, drug-trafficking routes in South America and transit routes to the United States have occurred.

Reductions in DOD's air coverage to interdict drug traffickers have particularly affected the cocaine source countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Between fiscal years 1998 and 1999, detection and monitoring flight hours over these countries declined from 2,092 to 1,090, or 48 percent.[6] U.S. officials in Peru told us that there has been little or no U.S. airborne intelligence or surveillance of air traffic routes between Peru and Colombia since 1997. And, in an October 1998 letter to the State Department from the U.S. Ambassador in Peru, the Ambassador warned that the reduction in air support could have a serious impact on coca price. DOD's difficulty in maintaining aerial detection capabilities was further exacerbated by the closure of Howard Air Force Base in Panama in May 1999. The base provided a position close to cocaine-producing countries for launching U.S. counterdrug aircraft. To offset this loss, DOD has established two forward operating locations in the Caribbean and South America. The Department is seeking to establish a third location in Central America.

## Low Priority, Reduced Funding of Counterdrug Missions

DOD sets priorities for the use of its aircraft, weapons systems, and personnel that are in continual high demand worldwide. The counterdrug mission, according to DOD, is the fourth priority, after (1) war, (2) other military operations that might involve contact with hostile forces such as peacekeeping, and (3) training. In addition, DOD does not purchase major equipment such as aircraft and ships especially for the counterdrug

mission. Instead, it carries out counterdrug activities using assets that are purchased mainly for other missions.

DOD's budget for counterdrug activities has generally declined since 1993 as well. From fiscal years 1993 through 1999, DOD's overall counterdrug budget fell from $1.3 billion to $975 million, or 24 percent.[7] At the same time, DOD's overall budget declined by approximately 14 percent during this period, from $300 billion in fiscal year 1993 to about $260 billion in fiscal year 1999.[8]

Further, DOD made corresponding force structure reductions which included reductions in military personnel and equipment levels. The number of ships and aircraft frequently used for counterdrug missions also declined. For example, from 1992 through 1999, the inventory of Navy P-3C and E-2 airborne early warning aircraft by four percent and 38 percent, respectively.

DOD Cites Greater Efficiency, Other Efforts as Mitigating These Declines

DOD officials acknowledge that reducing support to the counterdrug effort has hampered its coverage of key drug-trafficking routes. However, they note that their activities are more efficient today because U.S. counterdrug organizations better understand the drug threat. They also say that U.S. and host nations' antidrug

[6] Data prior to fiscal year 1998 was not available.
[7] This amount includes DOD support to both domestic and international counterdrug activities.

organizations are improving their coordination in planning and conducting regional counterdrug operations. For example, Panama supported the United States in the seizure of 27 kilograms of cocaine off the Panamanian coast in 1999. In addition, Panamanian and Nicaraguan law enforcement officials eradicated 1.7 million marijuana plants during that same year.

## DOD FACES CHALLENGES IN SUPPORTING HOST-NATIONS' COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS

DOD supports host-nations' counterdrug activities in many ways but has encountered a number of challenges in doing so. DOD provides a variety of support, such as detection and monitoring, intelligence, training, logistics, and equipment. Among the challenges to supplying this assistance are (1) host-nations' limited capability to operate and repair U.S.-supplied equipment or to effectively utilize U.S. training, (2) host-nations' difficulties in meeting U.S. eligibility conditions for providing training aid to military units, and (3) U.S. restrictions on sharing intelligence with some host-nation counterdrug organizations.

### Equipment Maintenance, Human Rights Concerns, and Information-sharing Are Challenges

A number of counterdrug organizations in host nations have not always been able to use the equipment and training DOD provides. For example, Congress has appropriated $89

[8] All figures are in 1999 constant dollars.

million over 5 years (1998-2002) for a program to interdict drug shipments on the rivers of Colombia and Peru. However, according to U.S. embassy officials in Peru, the Peruvian police (the lead agency for counterdrug enforcement) does not have maintenance capabilities or adequately trained staff to manage its own or U.S.-provided boats designed for river operations. For example, in 1998, boats purchased by the Peruvian police were accidentally beached because of lowered water levels. The Peruvian police lacked adequately trained staff and/or parts to repair the boats. DOD officials told us that they are working with the Peruvian police to improve the situation.

In addition, human rights concerns also limit DOD's counterdrug assistance to foreign governments. U.S. law prohibits giving such assistance to personnel or units in foreign countries that have credible evidence against them of having committed gross human rights violations.[9] U.S. officials have raised concerns about human rights problems with Colombian and Peruvian military and police units. Indeed, U.S. embassy personnel in Colombia told us that it would be difficult to provide support for counterdrug efforts to the Colombian military unless its units pass State Department screening for human rights abuses. So far, only three of six army brigades operating in drug-trafficking areas have passed the screening.[10]

Furthermore, concerns over evidence of corruption within foreign government counternarcotics units have caused the United States to limit the amount of intelligence information it will share with other governments. Thus, although DOD may have such

[9] 22 U.S.C. 2304 (a) (2).

information, it cannot always provide it to the host nation. Another problem arises from internal situations in host nations. For example, in Colombia, where DOD can share information on insurgent activity if it is directly related to an approved counterdrug operation, U.S. embassy officials sometimes have difficulty distinguishing insurgents from drug traffickers.

## DOD HAS COUNTERDRUG PLANS AND STRATEGIES BUT NO PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Although DOD has designed counterdrug plans and strategies that are linked to the National Drug Control Strategy, DOD has not yet developed a set of performance measures to assess the impact of its counterdrug operations. Without such measures, DOD cannot clearly evaluate the effectiveness of its strategy, operations, and limited counterdrug assets. DOD is aware of this problem and has taken some steps to improve its ability to judge its performance.

### DOD's Counterdrug Plans and Strategies

DOD's Office for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support has developed a 5-year counterdrug plan that is based on the goals of the National Drug Control Strategy.[11] The plan broadly describes the military personnel, detection and monitoring assets, intelligence support, communication systems, and training DOD will provide to domestic

[10] See our report, Drug Control: Narcotics Threat From Colombia Continues to Grow (GAO/NSIAD-99-136, June 22, 1999).

law enforcement agencies and foreign counterdrug military and policy forces to help reduce drug-trafficking activities. Regional commanders in the field develop more detailed plans and strategies that are crafted for a specific purpose and that support the high-level strategies. For example, the U.S. Southern Command's August 1999 counterdrug campaign plan describes the illicit drug threat, the command's counterdrug mission, objectives intended to counter the threat, and some of the key resources available to achieve the plan's objectives. While the campaign plan assumes that these resources will be available, DOD told us that assets for counterdrug purposes would continue to be constrained by other DOD requirements.

## No Performance Measures Developed; Initial Steps Taken

While DOD has not yet developed performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of its counterdrug activites, the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act incorporates performance measurement as one of its most important features.[12] Under the act, executive branch agencies are required to develop annual performance plans that use performance measurement to reinforce the connection between the long-term strategic goals outlined in their strategic plans and their day-to-day activities. According to DOD, the Department supports the goals and measures of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. However, we found that the Office's measures are intended to determine progress in achieving national counterdrug-related goals, not to measure the

[11] Two key goals of the National Drug Control Strategy are to interdict drugs in transit to the United States and to stop drugs at their source.

performance of individual federal agencies. None of the Office's measures relates directly to DOD's current detection and monitoring efforts.

We recommended in our report that DOD develop performance measures to assess its counterdrug operations. DOD concurred with our recommendation and told us that it is currently working with groups within its agency to help develop performance measures and that it will use its Consolidated Counterdrug Data Base to help judge the performance of its detection and monitoring assets. The data base tracks information on the detection, monitoring, and interdiction of illegal drug traffic. DOD officials believe these initial steps will enable them to begin the process of establishing Departmentwide counterdrug performance measures.

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

Contact and Acknowledgments

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford at (202) 512-4268. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Lawrence Suda, Janice V. Morrison, David Bruno, and Rona Mendelsohn.

[12] Public Law 103-62 (Aug. 3, 1993).

Mr. MICA. I would now like to recognize Ms. Ana Maria Salazar, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, Department of Defense.

Ms. SALAZAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you pointed out, we have also had some problems with the weather in trying to—although many of us did go to work in the last few days, we are unable to provide a written statement. We will provide in the next 2 days a written statement for the record.

Mr. MICA. If you will, submit that to the committee. We will leave the record open for at least 10 days, and hopefully your written testimony will be provided to the subcommittee before then.

Ms. SALAZAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the opportunity to come again and testify before this subcommittee and to share DOD's perspective on the recently released GAO report titled, "Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply Have Declined."

The Department is finalizing our formal response. However, I would like to take this opportunity to summarize our thoughts to date, regarding this report. I would like to say that we agree with a number of the aspects presented in the report and we appreciate GAO's year-long efforts and work. Although there are a number of issues the GAO report raise regarding DOD, I must note that the GAO did not find that the Department was not continuing to effectively carry out its congressional mandate for counterdrug missions.

In the report, the GAO makes a single and very important recommendation. DOD needs to develop more fully its measures of effectiveness in order to adequately assess its contributions to the counterdrug detection and monitoring efforts. We agree that this is a legitimate concern, and the Department is working with Joint Interagency Task Force East and Joint Interagency Task Force West to develop these measures.

However, the difficulty of developing measures of effectiveness cannot be understated. This is evidenced in a 1993 GAO report which identifies the difficulty of developing quantitative measures for the detection of the monitoring missions. Nonetheless, the Department of Defense has not neglected this area, and we are currently funding a consolidated counterdrug data base which involves efforts by all of the agencies involved in the counterdrug efforts. This data base has served us as a statistical foundation for a number of interagency products to analyze the illegal flow of cocaine from South America, and you may have seen some of those products. We use this data base to produce the cocaine movement, the semiannual report that comes out on an annual basis and is used to make strategy decisions as to how to proceed with certain missions.

We also use this data to evaluate the performance of our systems in executing the counterdrug detection and monitoring missions. The data shows that the interagency success in detecting and monitoring airborne cocaine trafficking events in the transit zone increased from 68 percent of known smuggling events in fiscal year 1995 when we started collecting this data to 91 percent in fiscal year 1999.

Other major issues addressed in the report with regards to the counterdrug efforts since 1992; and they focus, as my GAO colleague stated, in two particular areas, the OPTEMPO and the dollars. The analysis of the report focuses on these two issues in looking at the number of flying hours or ship days devoted to the monitoring and detection of illicit drug shipments and the size of the DOD budget. And as he stated, there has been a reduction on both of these issues.

However, I would like to suggest that these areas must be considered in the context of what has happened since 1992. There has been an ongoing debate over two administrations regarding the level of support DOD should provide to the counterdrug mission. I am just going to give you an example. In 1993 at the height of our dedicated OPTEMPO and sizable DOD budget for counterdrugs, GAO recommended in its report, "DOD's counterdrug flying hours and steaming days should be significantly reduced to bring DOD's effort more in line with law enforcement in host nation end game capabilities." this is a 1993 report.

I would also like to point out in 1994 we received the largest budgetary cut to our counterdrug budget which was—it was mandated by Congress and this reduction was approximately $200 million. So when you look at the statistics and you see that our budget suddenly goes down, it is in part because of this budgetary reduction that we received in 1994.

In addition to this debate, there are three other considerations that I believe it is important to outline. There have been three major changes which have occurred since 1992 to 1999. Among them is, one, the overall decline in defense resources. Two, the increased competing demands from other—from other missions for these limited assets that are used currently for detection and monitoring mission. And three, there is an evolving U.S. Government counterdrug strategy in light of changing trafficking threats.

I would like to briefly touch each one of these. The decline in resources. Although we saw the dip as pointed out in the GAO report in our resource level, over the last 6 years we have maintained a stable funding level between $800 and $900 million. Our ability to maintain this funding has been in part a result of Congress' interest in this mission, and we thank you for this support.

Also I would like to point out that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was quite clear that the Department of Defense could expect a reduction in its force structure and funding. Counterdrug programs would not be exempted. We have competing demands, as stated by the GAO report. We also are aware that we would have, as we were feeling the problem of a reduction in force, we knew this would be compounded by the fact that the assets used for detection and monitoring were also important assets for these other missions that may involve the protection of United States personnel, and I think some examples were presented—were mentioned by another member, Bosnia, the Balkans, northern watch, southern watch.

However, the Department has never neglected its counterdrug congressional mandate responsibilities. Instead, we have looked for different ways to meet these responsibilities in an era of reduced resources, and this is what we have done. And many of these issues

have already been—and programs have been indicated by the GAO report.

Since 1992, we have fielded a number of highly sophisticated air, ground, and monitoring detection systems. These include two ROTHRs and ground-based radars. We have upgraded various systems for this new role of counterdrugs. We have used patrol coastal vessels and TAGO ships to support transit zone interdiction activities. We have also modified the P–3 aircraft for its counterdrug mission. We have also increased our direct support to host nations to assist them in increasing their end-game capabilities, and you may have seen a report in the newspaper today where we currently have a team of SEALS that are training with Colombians in order to prove their capability of interdicting drugs.

Also, our Riverine program, which I believe you are very aware of, is another example of the type of programs that we are currently—that are going the way that we are assisting the Colombians. We have increased our information sharing with law enforcement, and we also are looking for ways to be able to replace the loss of Howard Base by the installation of new forward-operating locations in different parts of the source zone and the transit zone.

In closing, I would like to conclude my remarks highlighting the constant balancing act we perform at DOD. On the one hand, we recognize the importance of DOD's support to the law enforcement community so they can adequately execute their role in the counterdrug efforts. However, in an age of reduction in force, in an age where we see law enforcement participating more and more with assets in the detection monitoring, we also have the responsibility of making sure that the armed forces' primary role is not affected. Once again, I want to assure you and this subcommittee that DOD has not lost its will to its commitment to the counterdrug mission in fulfilling our responsibility to the American people.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering any of your questions.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, and we will have questions when we have heard from all of our witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Salazar follows:]

**ANA MARIA SALAZAR**

**DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND SUPPORT**

**UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY,
AND HUMAN RESOURCES**

January 27, 2000

**STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD**

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this Subcommittee in order to share the Department of Defense's perspective on the recently released GAO report, *Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply Have Declined.* The Department is in the process of finalizing its formal response to the report. While we agree with several aspects of the analysis, we feel that the report does not take into account the complete impact that the significant resource and budget reductions had on the Services over the previous eight years. By focusing primarily on the Department of Defense's contribution, we feel that the report understates the integrated interagency detection and monitoring (D&M) effort. As you know, the ability of participating nation and US law enforcement agencies to utilize the information derived from D&M activities is crucial to the conduct of successful end-game operations and seizures. However, I am pleased to note that nowhere in the report, after a year of year of in depth research, did the GAO state that they felt that the Department of Defense was not meeting fully its congressionally mandated D&M mission.

As noted in the GAO report, and acknowledged in the Department of Defense's (DoD) November 22, 1999 reply to the draft report, our measures of effectiveness need to be developed more fully so we can assess the Department's contribution to the counterdrug D&M effort. This was the only weakness cited by the GAO report and served as the basis for its sole recommendation. To this end, the Department is participating with US Southern Command, Joint Interagency Task Force East and Joint Interagency Task Force West in the development of their measures of effectiveness (MOEs).

Nonetheless, DoD has not neglected this area. The Department's Office of Drug Enforcement Policy and Support (DEP&S) is currently the sole funding sponsor for the interagency-vetted Consolidated Counterdrug Data Base (CCDB). The CCDB serves as the foundation for such products as the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM), which analyzes the illegal flow of cocaine from South America as well as drug smuggling patterns, to include the trafficker's response to interagency interdiction efforts. Internally, DEP&S uses this interagency-vetted data in a DoD database to evaluate the relative performance of its systems in executing the counterdrug D&M mission. While the information in this DoD database does not qualify as a measure of effectiveness in the strictest terms, it does provide valuable insight into D&M performance. For instance, the data shows that the interagency success in detecting and monitoring airborne cocaine trafficking events in the transit zone increased from 68 percent of known smuggling events in FY95, when this data collection process started, to 91 percent in FY99. Similarly, the detection of known non-commercial maritime cocaine smuggling in the transit zone increased from 25 percent in FY95 to 56 percent in FY99. As an example of the monitoring of a specific DoD D&M system, the data show that the

Department's Relocatable-Over-The-Horizon Radar (ROTHR) accounted for 73 percent of those transit zone detections in FY99, as compared to 28 percent in FY95 – which underscores the value of ROTHR for this particular mission. This improved D&M performance is not due solely to DoD efforts and resources. D&M is very much a shared mission area throughout the transit zone and key elements of the network are filled by our interagency partners, most notably the US Coast Guard and the US Customs Service.

This data, which was shared with GAO investigators, also show that while DoD and the interagency successfully detected and monitored 91 percent of the known airborne events and 56 percent of the maritime events in FY99, only 17 percent of the airborne events and 41 percent of the maritime events that were detected were interdicted successfully by host nation and US law enforcement agencies. The GAO report suggested a performance measure that would monitor the percentage of detected shipments "successfully handed off to law enforcement organizations." With a significant amount of confidence, it can be assured that the command and control system at Joint Interagency Task Force East ensured that the target information for each of these detected events was "successfully handed off" to law enforcement organizations virtually 100 percent of the time. However, the responsibility for positioning law enforcement assets and executing end-game operations does not rest with DoD, nor does the Department have the legal authority to execute such missions. In a September 1993 report, *Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance Is Not Paying Off*, the GAO stated that DoD's D&M capabilities "....exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies ability to apprehend smugglers." This is still the case today.

The Department most assuredly wants to improve its ability to detect drug smugglers, especially non-commercial maritime "go-fast" traffickers. However, improved DoD MOEs aside, interagency vetted data indicates that there is greater potential benefit in successfully interdicting the targets that are detected rather than detecting a larger percentage of traffickers that could not subsequently be interdicted. In other words, the payoff is greater when we focus our efforts on targets we can capture than those we can not.

As the GAO report notes, there are numerous challenges to the interagency's ability to conduct successful end-game operations. These challenges include host nation counterdrug capabilities as well as the availability of US end-game assets. It would seem more responsible to focus additional effort towards addressing these challenges prior to increasing the resources applied to the D&M mission.

The GAO report accurately assesses the force structure reductions that the Department has undergone since 1992. The report also correctly notes that there are D&M gaps in drug production and trafficking areas. However, the report dismisses any link between these two variables, which the Department views as unrealistic. The Department continuously reviews resource requirements on a worldwide basis. U. S. Southern Command, with DEP&S support, routinely requests additional D&M and intelligence resources with which to conduct counterdrug missions. Each of these requests, along with those of the other combatant Commanders in Chief (CINCs), is reviewed at the highest levels in the Department and each CINC is required to justify his requirements. Competing requirements, especially for assets that are limited in quantity yet in high demand world wide, are closely scrutinized. Resource allocation decisions are difficult

and center on national requirements, taking into consideration the risk to US forces conducting operations around the world. Needless to say, in this era of reduced assets, many of the resources requested by the unified CINCs go unfulfilled. However, in light of US Southern Command's critical requirement for organic airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, the Department is pursuing the development of alternative platforms to support this counterdrug mission.

The GAO report notes that the Department's counterdrug budget has declined by approximately 24 percent since 1992. The report failed to note, however, that the most significant cut occurred in FY94 when Congress reduced the DoD counterdrug budget request by $300 million, a single year legislated reduction of almost 26 percent. In fact, since the congressional reduction in FY94, DoD counterdrug funding has actually increased by 11 percent through FY2000. However, DoD funding, in and of itself, should not be construed as an accurate measure of the Department's overall performance in executing its counterdrug mission. What should be noted is that during this period of reduced funding, when compared to pre FY94 budgets, the percentage of traffickers detected and monitored by DoD and the interagency increased, even while smugglers became more elusive and flexible.

Increased funding may not prove to be the panacea that one might expect. Additional funding will not yield more steaming days or flight hours from ships and aircraft that no longer exist. Aircraft currently utilized for counterdrug D&M and ISR missions, such as the P-3, have been assigned more restrictive deployment flight hours in order to extend the operational life of these platforms. Again, money cannot address issues such as these. It should be noted,

however, that when critical requirements specific to the counterdrug mission necessitate additional Department funding, that funding is provided. As a case in point, DoD will increase funding over the next couple of years to support the establishment of the forward operating locations required to replace Howard Air Force Base. From a historical perspective, the deployment of the ROTHR system was supported by a significant amount of DoD funding, which current data indicates was a judicious investment.

In conclusion, while the GAO report is essentially accurate, it analyzes only part of the picture because of its narrow focus on DoD assets, which play only a supporting role in the much broader interagency interdiction effort. By ignoring the critical link between D&M and effective end-game operations, the report easily leads the uninformed reader to conclude that the allocation of additional DoD D&M resources would improve the interagency's interdiction performance, which it clearly would not in the absence of enhanced interagency and foreign nation end-game capability. The ultimate success of the interagency's supply reduction effort will be achieved as a result of the coordinated, flexible and sustained strategic efforts directed against all facets of the drug trade -- cultivation, production, and transit. I want to assure you, in no uncertain terms, that DoD is committed to fulfilling its congressionally mandated counterdrug responsibilities in support of this country's National Drug Control Strategy. With continued congressional support, I am confident that the Department will continue to play an appropriate supporting role in the U.S. counterdrug effort.

Mr. MICA. The next witness is Rear Admiral Ernest Riutta, Assistant Commandant for Operations of the U.S. Coast Guard. Welcome, and you are recognized, sir.

Admiral RIUTTA. Good morning, sir. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am Rear Admiral Riutta, Coast Guard Assistant Commandant for Operations. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the resource issues raised in the recent General Accounting Office report. Like the Department of Defense, our written statement has been snowbound, and with your permission, sir, we would like to submit that.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, it will be made a part of the record.

Admiral RIUTTA. Sir, in general, the Coast Guard concurs with the GAO report. It is true that there has been a decline in DOD aircraft hours and ship days over the past year. While at the same time there has been a Coast Guard increase in drug interdiction operations. However, these have not been directly targeted at detection and monitoring. It is true that we have assisted to some degree in detection and monitoring, but our effort in the past several years in the increase has been targeted at our end-game capabilities, trying to take down the targets that the Department of Defense has so ably brought our way.

I would also like to point out that there has been, over the last 5 or 6 years, a significant increase in maritime drug smuggling. Various resource assessments have consistently reported shortfalls in air and service assets, and these gaps continue to grow. The success of an end-game effort is absolutely dependent on the assets that the Department of Defense provides. Interdiction requires a robust detection and monitoring capability and a credible interdiction and apprehension capability. We expect in the Coast Guard to be very challenged to try to meet the national drug control performance goals whose targets are to reduce the flow of drugs 10 percent by 2002 and 20 percent by 2007. The Coast Guard's target is an 18.7 percent seizure rate by 2002 and a 28 percent seizure rate by 2007. Currently we are about 11 percent.

The Department of Defense plays a vital role in the air and maritime drug interdiction. Department of Defense provides very capable patrol assets for detection and monitoring. By comparison, Coast Guard assets are old, slow, and I would define them as half-blind compared to what the DOD provides in this particular role. Navy assets also involve Coast Guard law enforcement potential, which greatly add to the end-game capability for us. The Department of Defense supports drug interdiction efforts through intelligence collection and cueing, command and control capability, training infrastructure, and international engagement activities. Clearly, these contributions cannot be replicated from within the law enforcement community itself.

Coast Guard resource hours have increased over the last few years, but they are still less than they were 10 years ago and have not offset the decline in DOD assets. Some of this increase has been from a reallocation of effort from other missions, such as fisheries in New England, Alaska, and Hawaii. Recent readiness trends indicate that we may be very challenged to maintain this pace.

Increases in our efforts are focused on end-game, and have been directly associated with Campaign STEEL WEB, which is a sequential pulse operation in the Caribbean. Although we have contributed some of our assets to increased detection and monitoring, we have not focused on that, as our focus has been on end-game. Our ability to continue to respond is of increased concern as we address some other readiness problems. Our operational tempo has been extremely high over the last few years, and our ability to maintain this is significantly in question. We must be able to maintain our equipment and the facilities and begin to recapitalize our resources for future mission requirements. We are addressing these modernization concerns through the innovative Deepwater Capability Replacement Project.

In conclusion, sir, I would like to say that the declining resources available from DOD have impacted our ability to meet our national supply reduction objectives. Transit zone interdiction is one of the essential elements of our national strategy and complements other supply reduction efforts as part of a balanced national strategy. Finally, neither the Coast Guard nor other law enforcement agencies can fill the shortfalls created by declining numbers of the DOD assets.

I thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important issue and I would be happy to answer any questions you have.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Again, we will hear from all of our witnesses after we have heard from our last panelist as far as questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Riutta follows:]



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**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

**U. S. COAST GUARD**

**STATEMENT OF**

**REAR ADMIRAL ERNEST R. RIUTTA**

**ON**

**THE DECLINE OF DOD ASSET SUPPORT FOR COUNTERDRUG ACTIVITIES**

**BEFORE THE**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES**

**COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM**

**U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**JANUARY 27, 2000**

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
U.S. COAST GUARD
STATEMENT OF
REAR ADMIRAL ERNEST R. RIUTTA
ON
THE DECLINE OF DOD ASSET SUPPORT FOR COUNTERDRUG ACTIVITIES
BEFORE THE
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 27, 2000

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. I am Rear Admiral Ray Riutta, the Coast Guard's Assistant Commandant for Operations. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Coast Guard's role in the interagency effort to reduce the flow of illegal drugs entering the United States.

My purpose in speaking to you today is to discuss the resource issues raised in the recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report "Drug Control: Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply Have Declined" concerning the Coast Guard's level of drug interdiction operations and the decline of Department of Defense (DOD) effort in counterdrug operations, and to qualify several points regarding the impact these realities have on Transit Zone drug interdiction. I will also offer brief insights on current Coast Guard capabilities and the challenges we face in meeting drug interdiction mission requirements.

In general, the Coast Guard concurs with the GAO report. Over the past eight years, there has been a decline in DOD aircraft hours and ship days, as well an increase in overall Coast Guard drug interdiction operations, although not specifically for detection and monitoring to replace DOD efforts, and there has been an increase in maritime drug smuggling. The overall reduction in effort is of significant concern. The success of interagency and Coast Guard end-game efforts is dependent on the air and surface assets that DOD provides. Successful counterdrug operations require both a robust detection and monitoring capability, and a credible interdiction and apprehension capability. Given

the realities in the report, we will be extremely challenged to attain the Coast Guard's performance goal of an 18.7 percent seizure rate by the year 2002, and I have concern about our capacity to achieve the Coast Guard's goal of a 28.7 percent seizure rate by 2007.

The Department of Defense plays a vital role in air and maritime drug interdiction. DOD provides very capable patrol assets that conduct detection and monitoring, and these assets also embark Coast Guard law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) to enhance end-game efforts. DOD also supports drug interdiction efforts with intelligence collection and cueing, command and control capability, training infrastructure, and international engagement activities. Clearly, these contributions cannot be replicated from within the law enforcement community. For example, a Coast Guard HC-130 cannot replace the capability of an Air Force E-3 with its sophisticated suite of radar, sensors, and communications equipment. While I believe interdiction efforts are more efficient today than they were 10 years ago, interdiction effectiveness does suffer with the decline in DOD presence.

Coast Guard resource hours dedicated to the drug interdiction mission have increased in the recent past, but today's levels have certainly not offset the decline in DOD resource employment. The Coast Guard has lead agency responsibility for maritime interdiction and has increased resource hours in recent years to help satisfy national performance targets. Some of this increase is the result of a reallocation of effort from other mission areas such as migrant interdiction and fisheries enforcement, but recent trends in those missions areas indicate we may be challenged to maintain this pace. In other cases, the increased hours are the result of the Coast Guard reactivating HU-25 aircraft and adding flight hours, or augmenting operations, on current aircraft and patrol boats. In all cases, these increases were focused on end-game requirements and have not been employed specifically for detection and monitoring. Our increases in annual effort have been directly associated with the initiation of Campaign STEEL WEB, the Coast Guard's multiyear maritime drug interdiction strategy, highlighted by a sequence of "pulse and maintain" operations such as FRONTIER SHIELD around Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and FRONTIER LANCE in the maritime approaches to Hispaniola.

It must be made clear that the Coast Guard has not absorbed detection and monitoring responsibilities, nor have the requirements for detection and monitoring declined. In this regard, the GAO report is somewhat misleading in presenting a comparison of annual flight hour totals for the Coast Guard, Customs, and DOD. The data for the Coast Guard is the total of all aircraft hours dedicated to counterdrug operations, including hours for helicopters, which have limited utility for long-range detection and monitoring. It is also important to note that any increases in Coast Guard fixed-wing surveillance hours have been directly related, for the most part, to supporting our pulse operations in the Eastern Caribbean. In contrast, the vast majority of detection and monitoring is conducted in the deep Caribbean and Eastern Pacific to maximize advanced warning to end-game interdiction forces.

The GAO report presentation of increased Coast Guard surface resource hours also warrants some qualification. The reported increase in annual cutter resource hours includes the complete spectrum of Coast Guard cutters, from 378-foot high endurance cutters to 82-foot patrol boats. As stated previously, some of these increases are from reallocations from other mission areas. The only increase to total Coast Guard cutter hours during this period was achieved by adding hours to existing patrol boats and increasing the total number of patrol boats. These patrol boats are equipped to operate in high-threat trafficking routes around the Caribbean island nations, but are not capable of operating deep in the Transit Zone for detection and monitoring. Patrol boats are response assets that have limited endurance, lack sophisticated command and control systems, do not have flight decks, and must rely on shore-based aircraft for surveillance support. They are no substitute for deepwater Navy ships.

Rising demands for credible law enforcement presence associated with changes in the smuggling threat, and our own interdiction strategy, mandate greater effort to keep the pressure on smugglers. In the Transit Zone, this means maintaining a credible presence in high-threat areas, diverting assets to respond to all actionable information, and conducting combined operations with our foreign law enforcement counterparts. These activities involve both surface and air assets. In addition, we must maintain an agile and flexible end-game capability that is credible and able to respond to intelligence cueing. At present, we are not able to respond to all cues, but we are taking steps to improve our

end-game capability with initiatives such as Airborne Use of Force, Deployable Pursuit Boats, and Maritime Interdiction Support vessels.

Readiness is the foundation of all Coast Guard operations and is especially critical for drug interdiction operations, since they require my most capable ships and aircraft, and my most skilled people. We must ensure we remain "Always Ready," not only in the near-term, but in the future as well. People are the backbone of the Coast Guard and we must be able to recruit, train, and retain those people who we ask on a regular basis to endure dangerous and challenging pursuits to stop drug deliveries destined for our shores. We must be able to maintain the equipment and facilities required to meet national objectives and we must give our people the right equipment to do their jobs safely and effectively. Maintenance is only part of the story, as we must also recapitalize to meet future mission requirements. The Coast Guard is addressing readiness concerns by investing in recruiting and retention initiatives to fill critical positions in our work force. The fiscal year 2001 budget continues these efforts and will make an investment in vessel and aircraft maintenance to improve operational readiness. We are addressing modernization concerns through an innovative Deepwater Capability Replacement Project. This project is designed to ensure the timely acquisition of a system of assets that will leverage technology to meet the demanding future mission needs in the offshore environment, such as those required for drug interdiction operations.

Conclusion

Declining resources from DOD have an immediate and negative impact on national supply reduction objectives. Transit Zone interdiction is an essential element of our national strategy and complements other supply reduction efforts as part of the balanced national strategy. Finally, neither the Coast Guard nor the other law enforcement agencies can fill shortfalls created by declining DOD asset support.

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important issue with you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Charles Stallworth is the Executive Director of the Air and Maritime Interdiction Division of the U.S. Customs Service. Welcome, sir, and you are recognized.

Mr. STALLWORTH. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Chairman Mica, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. I will submit a formal statement that I may ask be made a part of the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, that will be made a part of the record. Thank you.

Mr. STALLWORTH. I will now make a few brief opening remarks.

With a fleet of 114 aircraft and 88 vessels, the mission of the U.S. Customs Air and Marine Interdiction Division is to guard our Nation's borders and protect its people from the smuggling of narcotics and other contraband. Unlike other Federal programs involved in drug interdiction efforts, the primary mission of the Air and Marine Interdiction Division is drug interdiction. We carry out this commission from our continental boundaries, in the skies over the coca fields in Colombia and Peru.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense has a lead role for the detection and monitoring for all counternarcotics operations in the transit and source zones. Southcom has designated the Joint Interagency Task Force East, JIATF-East, as the controlling facility for U.S. agencies involved in the air and marine interdiction in its area of responsibilities. JIATF-East determines which assets are best suited to meet the program objectives. They also coordinate on the integration and execution of passing those assets on interdiction missions.

Over the past 2 years, Customs has provided approximately 90 percent of our P–3 operational flight hours to JIATF-East task missions. JIATF-East allocated 33 percent of those hours to source zone missions in 1998 and 35 percent in 1999. As additional P–3 aircraft come on-line, we are committed to providing more operational P–3 flight hours in support of JIATF-East missions. U.S. Customs also provides Citation tracker aircraft in the transit and source zones. Two Citations are based in Mexico in support of the Government of Mexico's drug interdiction program. Significant seizures have resulted from that cooperative effort, particularly in Hermosillo, a city in the area south of Arizona.

Another critical component of our drug interdiction effort is our marine program. Smugglers are increasingly using both air drops and high-speed boats to move illegal drugs from South America through the Caribbean and on to the United States. In response, Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly has consolidated the marine assets with aviation operations to provide an integrated strategic and tactical response to this threat. As a primary force provider of detection and monitoring assets in the source zones, U.S. Customs is working closely with DOD to provide long-term solutions to the loss of Howard Air Force Base in Panama. Since the closure of Howard in April 1999, U.S. Customs has been conducting P–3 and Citation operations from Aruba. DOD recently negotiated a long-term agreement to use Aruba for forward operations. Southcom has also completed negotiations to provide an FOL in Manta, Ecuador. We support DOD and are confident that Manta will provide a viable for-

ward operating location to meet our current and future requirements.

Mr. Chairman, we thank you and other Members of Congress for your leadership and support. With your support, U.S. Customs has been able to maintain our aging aviation and marine fleet and begin planning the addition of assets critical to improve counter-narcotics detection and monitoring throughout the Western Hemisphere. I thank the committee for the opportunity to appear before you today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stallworth follows:]

**Statement of Charles E. Stallworth II**
**Executive Director Air Marine Interdiction Division**
**Office of Investigations**
**U.S. Customs Service**

**Before the**
**House Government Reform Subcommittee on**
**Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources**
**On**
**"The Decline of Defense Department Assets in Reducing Illegal Drugs"**
**Thursday, January, 27, 2000, 10:00 AM**

Good Morning, Chairman Mica and other distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify today on Department of Defense assets dedicated to counter-drug activities and the impact this has had on the role of the U.S. Customs Service.

With a fleet of 114 aircraft and 88 vessels, the mission of the U. S. Customs Service Air and Marine Interdiction Division is to disrupt and dismantle narcotics smuggling organizations attempts to bring drugs and other contraband into the United States by vessel and aircraft. Unlike other Federal programs involved in anti-drug efforts, the primary mission of the Air and Marine Interdiction Division is dedicated to drug interdiction. We carry out this mission by integrating the assets of our air and marine division to identify, target, penetrate, investigate and dismantle core marine and air smuggling operations.

Under the guidance of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the U.S. Customs Service has a full-time presence in the source country area of responsibility. Since 1991, the U.S. Customs Service has conducted P-3 and C-550 air interdiction missions to source zone countries. U.S. Customs P-3 aircraft account for the vast majority of U.S. airborne detection and monitoring assets in the source zone. Our efforts, beyond their obvious operational value, are also valuable in developing host nation cooperation and capabilities.

All our missions support SOUTHCOM's "Andean Ridge" strategy to reduce airborne drug trafficking. During those missions, we carry onboard host nation riders from the nations we overfly to assist in the "end game" of interdicting and apprehending suspect targets. We also provide training to host nation countries and have developed an air-intercept training syllabus for the Colombian Air Force.

Additionally, the U.S. Customs Service deploys assets and personnel to Peru and the support from the Peruvian government has been excellent. In order to enhance the effectiveness of our drug interdiction operations there, we dispatched key planners and other experienced personnel to conduct training with both the Peruvian Air Force and the Country Team. The results of those efforts have been outstanding.

The Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF-East) located at Key West, Florida, is the controlling agency for all U.S. tasked agencies involved in air and marine interdiction in the source and transit zones. The single controlling agency concept optimizes the effectiveness of available assets. JIATF-East determines which assets can best meet the circumstances presented at the time a target of interest is spotted. They also coordinate the integration on interdiction missions amongst the agencies.

In 1998 U.S. Customs provided 92% of our P-3 operational flight hours to JIATF-East and about 88% in 1999. JIATF-East allocated about 33% of those hours to source zone missions in 1998, and about 35% in 1999. As additional P-3 aircraft come on line the United States Customs Service is committed to providing approximately 90% of all operational P-3 flight hours to JIATF-E missions.

Closer to home, U.S. Customs also operates two Citation aircraft in Merida and Hermosillo, Mexico. A total of eight aircrew personnel and a requisite number of support personnel are detailed to this operation on a continuous basis. To date

the Aviation program continues to receive unwavering support from Mexico. Obtaining authorization to move the place of deployment for one of our Citations from Puerto Vallarta to Hermosillo, Mexico is just another example of the effective relationship we have built over the years. Since moving Hermosillo on August 17, 1999, 17 aircraft, 10 vehicles and over 3,763 kilograms of marijuana have been seized by Mexican Government personnel. A number of marijuana fields were also discovered and were estimated to have been able to produce at least 195,000 kilograms of marijuana with an estimated wholesale value of $430,000,000. At least 19 arrests have also been reported. In addition to serving as operational interdiction platforms, these aircraft and crews have served as an intensive training program to aid the Mexican government in developing its own tracker/interceptor capabilities. Mexico has provided a liaison officer to work at our Air and Marine Interdiction Coordination Center in Riverside, California.

In the remainder of the transit zone, U.S. Customs aircraft, based at our air and marine units and branches, operate from the Bahamas to the eastern Pacific. They similarly make an invaluable contribution to our International drug control strategy.

Another critical component of our drug interdiction effort is our marine program, comprised of 88 vessels, deployed primarily along the Southern Pacific, the Gulf Coast, South Florida and in Puerto Rico. Smugglers are increasingly using both airdrops and high-speed boats to move illegal drugs from South America through the Caribbean and on to the United States. In response to that threat, U.S. Customs initiated Operation Two Dozen, a multiagency interdiction operation involving U. S. Customs marine and air assets, OPBAT and the Bahamian Police Force. This 13 -day operation culminated in the seizure of 5 vessels, 1 aircraft, approximately 900 kilograms of cocaine and approximately 386 kilograms of marijuana.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) report, which is the focus of this hearing, provided some valuable insight into the resource limitations and problems currently impacting our mission. Of particular concern to the U.S. Customs Air and Marine Program is the issue of forward operating locations (FOL's). As the primary force provider, U.S. Customs is working closely with DOD to provide long-term solutions to the loss of Howard Air Force Base, Panama. Since the closure of Howard AFB in April 1999, U.S. Customs has been conducting operations from Aruba, Netherlands Antilles, while continuing to use NAS Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Lima, Peru, as forwarding operating sites. Site surveys of Cartagena, Colombia, and several other areas in Peru are underway and the results will be forthcoming. Additionally, the U.S. Southern Command is in the process of establishing a model FOL in Manta, Ecuador, which the U.S. Customs Service fully supports. We are confident that, with proper planning and design, Manta will provide a viable forward operating location, which will meet our current and future requirements.

There is one other area of DOD responsibility, which is currently impacted by diminished resources but is not discussed in the GAO report. This is the funding and support for the source zone C-550 Tracker Program.

Over the past several years, U.S. Customs has satisfied the U.S. Southern Command's requirements for tracker aircraft in northern Colombia and the Caribbean. Originally, this arrangement was to be a interim solution until sufficient DOD tracker aircraft could be procured and deployed. Because of shifting national priorities and funding constraints, DOD has not provided the number of aircraft needed and U. S. Customs assets have continued to perform this mission. In addition, there has been no permanent or consistent funding source for the operations and maintenance costs for operating the U.S. Customs trackers. This funding shortfall was addressed in the 1999 Omnibus Emergency Supplemental to sustain the program through the end of fiscal year 2000.

I would like to reiterate that the only reason that U.S. Customs has been able to provide the majority of the flight hours in support of the source zone, is because of the passage of the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act and provision of related emergency supplemental funding. Without your leadership, Mr. Chairman, and the support of other members of Congress, the declining DOD assets would have had a much more deleterious effect on our ability to control illegal drug entry into the United States. Because of the support we have received, U.S. Customs has been able to maintain our aging aviation and marine fleet and begin planning the addition of assets critical to effective detection and monitoring both in the source and transit zones. Once the additional P-3 aircraft come on line, the U.S. Customs Service will continue to provide approximately 90 percent of all operational P-3 flight hours to JIATF East for scheduling within the applicable area of operation. With the ongoing support from Congress, U.S. Customs is fully committed to ensuring the success of the Western Hemisphere Counter-drug Initiatives pursuant to both the spirit and the intent of our National Drug Control Strategy objectives.

I thank the committee for the opportunity to provide U.S. Customs Air and Marine Division perspective and concerns regarding diminished DOD assets being assigned in support of the counter-drug program.

Mr. MICA. I thank all of our witnesses for their testimony. Particularly, I want to thank the Customs Service and Coast Guard. I call your attention to page 14, and also to page 16, the charts there that show both Customs and Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has done an incredible job in counterdrug ship activities. But as I said, their mission is the end game, and I do notice some slight downturn from 1998 to 1999. That's another reason that we wanted this hearing. But at least since 1995, we have seen some very good activity in the part of both of those agencies and I appreciate it. I think you have been handicapped by the information that we find here about DOD's lack of attention and emphasis on going after the mission that Congress has assigned, and this report details that they have ignored it.

First of all, if you could put up General Wilhelm's quote. General Wilhelm, who I met with during the recess, is quoted in this report and confirmed this commentary to me when I met with him a few weeks ago in Miami. He said that "command can only detect and monitor 15 percent of key routes in the overall drug trafficking area about 15 percent of the time." These are his quotes.

Is this correct, Ms. Salazar?

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes, it is correct. We are very aware of General Wilhelm's concerns about being able to provide the sufficient intelligence platforms in order for him to do his job, and we are responding to that concern. If you would allow me—and I think it is briefly mentioned in the GAO report—this year we are going to be providing Southcom with a number of assets that will be the exclusive use of General Wilhelm and upcoming CINCs in order to be able to support the intelligence collection that he requires.

Mr. MICA. Put the other chart up there on page 12 that I referred to in my opening comments. We have—I can't think of any sessions of Congress other than the last few that have put more and more assets into DOD, including supplementals. We have requests by Southern Command and reported in this report—we have requests that actually seem to be ignored or diminished. Is this information correct on page 12, the number of requests and what DOD has provided, Ms. Salazar?

Ms. SALAZAR. I believe it is, sir. I would have to go back and talk to Southcom on what was the basis of some of the assumptions they made.

Mr. MICA. One of the things that you told me is you tried to move your assets around, according to threats. On page 17 it says, "However, in late 1997, U.S. aerial support for the program declined. U.S. officials in Peru"—and this was brought out by GAO—"told us that there had been little or no U.S. airborne intelligence or surveillance of air traffic routes between Peru and Colombia since 1997, even though recent changes in smugglings tactics and communications have made sophisticated airborne surveillance increasingly important."

In addition, it says the United States Ambassador to Peru warned in an October 1998 letter to the State Department that reduction in air support could have a serious impact on the price of coca. Were you all aware of this change in pattern?

Ms. SALAZAR. Absolutely. We have been in discussions with the Peruvian Government and the United States Embassy trying to understand what is that change in pattern.

Mr. MICA. What is startling to me is I met with Southern Command. They haven't announced this publicly, but this details what was going to happen. We were told—our agencies were told what was going to happen. They told me that now production for the first time—we have been diminishing that through small amounts of money that we have provided since 1995 to Peru and Bolivia, 50 percent reduction in Bolivia, 60 percent reduction in Peru—now for the first time we are seeing an increase. They are going to report an increase in production of coca which is predicted here in this trafficking pattern. And it appears that we have not paid attention or moved our assets or had the flights and capability of surveillance to even assist them in combatting this. So now this prediction has come true.

Ms. SALAZAR. There are a couple of issues here. On the one hand, we have raised concerns with the Peruvian Government in regards to the potential raise of coca leaf price. In our conversations with them, there is a number of things that may be happening. It may be because there has been increased flights leaving Peru. It may be because the transit of drugs has changed. That is, instead of using flights to bring the coca leaf out of Peru, they may be using both roads and maritime. What we are trying to understand, sir, is: why is it rising; how much it will rise; and what we can do for the Peruvians.

Mr. MICA. The question is, the production is up that is predicted here. You said one of the things that you tried to do, again, from your testimony, is move these assets as you learned about it, about activities. This was clearly something that was pointed out to us, and it doesn't appear that we responded. And now we are seeing an increase in production and trafficking.

Ms. SALAZAR. What I am trying to say, sir, is that even if we were able to provide the dome requirement that has been suggested by the Embassy, we are not too sure it would have a big impact on the effect on the rising price of cocaine leaf. We are—as I said before, we are talking to the Peruvians. They may need more assistance, for example, in the Riverine program because this coca leaf may be leaving through the rivers. It may be because there are trucks that are taking it out. It may not be necessarily through flights. So we are concerned. We are talking to the Peruvians, and we are also talking to our law enforcement colleagues; and they have been very supportive. I believe that Customs has provided, at least this last year, some support in dome support in trying to establish what is the flight patterns, if any, through Peru.

Mr. MICA. We have had these predictions. We have had requests for Riverine equipment. I went with Speaker Hastert into the Peruvian jungles with some of my other colleagues, and they requested assistance there. We found, even as late as December, Riverine equipment had—the contracts had not been let. I think they finally had been let on some of them from 1997; is that correct? They have been let now?

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes, I believe they have.

Mr. MICA. But they were pending from 1997. We cannot get the equipment or resources there, which is highlighted by this report; and you bring up Riverine, which is even a bigger disaster in my opinion. We have met with you behind closed doors and some of the other agencies trying to figure out why we were not getting our assets that Congress has appropriated or we have requested or even the administration has offered as far as surplus to Colombia. We have also discussed the problem of the gap now by Howard Air Force Base, my colleagues referred to that, and I did. What level are we up to of flights from Manta and Aruba? What percentage of flights are we up to right now this month as opposed to what we had when Howard was open prior to May 1999?

Ms. SALAZAR. I believe we are up to about 85 percent. Now, I will agree with some of the statements made not only by you but by the GAO that many of these flights have been within the transit zone and that we need to increase the number of flights in the source zone.

Mr. MICA. You are testifying today 85 percent?

Ms. SALAZAR. Eighty-five—I am looking for the exact number because the last time I testified before you I was off.

Mr. MICA. I don't think it is anywhere close to that according to the reports that we have had. In your testimony before our subcommittee last May, you stated that the over-the-horizon radar site in Puerto Rico would be operational by January 2000. I believe we are in January 2000, well into it. What is the current status of that radar site?

Ms. SALAZAR. We believe it will be March 2000 this year. We did not anticipate some of the hurricanes that took place, and it did put us back about 3 or 4 months.

Mr. MICA. Also, during the holidays I was informed that the Air Force is taking down or plans to take down the aerostats, some in Florida. I believe Customs has one and DOD has nine, something like that, plus the ones in the Southwest border. There is great concern that the over-the-horizon radar, even if it is in place, I am told by technical folks, will not fill the gap that would be created by taking down these aerostats. What is the status of the aerostats?

Ms. SALAZAR. We are now in discussions with the Air Force, sir, in trying to establish how we are going to continue funding the aerostats, in particular the aerostats that basically protect and identify the illegal threat of drugs into the United States. We believe that most of the aerostats are going to stay up. It is just an issue of funding, who is going to fund it, whether it be the counterdrug budget or the Air Force. As of recent conversations, the Air Force has been guided—has been instructed by the Department of Defense to fund the three aerostats in the Gulf Zone.

Mr. MICA. So they will stay up? The recommendation is they are going to stay up?

I think there will be other members you will be hearing from. I have already heard from some that are very concerned about this potential action, but you are telling us today they will stay up?

Ms. SALAZAR. That is my belief, yes.

Mr. MICA. Final question. One of the things that concerns me in talking with our folks out in the field or during the break is it ap-

pears that this drug mission—and DOD, does not interdict drugs. They provide intelligence and information surveillance which seems to be absolutely critical in the war on drugs. It can tell us where narcotics are being grown. It can tell us where planes take off that are carrying narcotics. It can allow our allies to do most of the combat and hands-on work in stopping drugs closest to their source, most cost effectively.

But the thing that I picked up during the break is there doesn't seem to be any will, either from the Secretary of Defense office, or, as a policy, the U.S. Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It appears there is just a lack of any effort to participate in this program. This report is devastating. It shows that we have put more money into DOD, and we have a fraction of activity to provide the vital information to combat any kind of a real war on drugs. Instead of getting better, it is getting worse. I have also heard reports of diversion of assets, which I won't get into at this hearing.

What is the Secretary of Defense and what is the Department of Defense's policy? Are you on board with us or are you retreating from this battle?

Ms. SALAZAR. Sir, as I stated in my remarks, the Department of Defense is committed to not only to the counterdrug strategy but being able to support our drug enforcement colleagues so they can perform their primary mission.

Mr. MICA. It would be hard pressed for me to believe that you could come before Congress and say that when you see again from this report detailed by GAO that in fact there has been less effort on every front. I can't imagine fighting a battle in Kosovo or someplace where we are sending fewer surveillance flights out, where we are getting less information, where there is less participation, less cooperation with allies and we are not even getting assets into the arena of battle. This—I see why our streets and our communities are flooded with drugs because one of the major ingredients, which is DOD providing this vital information and cooperation, is not there.

Ms. SALAZAR. As you stated, sir, we are one of the ingredients. DOD's participation in the counterdrug strategy is one part of the equation in order to have an effective counterdrug war. I like using the word "war" in this sense. But when you look at budgetary numbers and the fact that we were cut in 1994 and there has been a number of intents to bring up the budget to at least stabilize the budget at a number where we can appropriately provide the support required, not only by law enforcement but also for our domestic programs, I believe we have done very well, sir.

I understand your concern in the sense that some of these assets have been diverted, particularly in AWACs, to other missions. But when we have the Secretary of Defense and the chairman telling us that they need these assets because they have U.S. personnel who may be in imminent danger—and these are the type of discussions that take place in the Department of Defense, and they make these decisions based on this type of information. So once again, sir, I want to reassure you that the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense, the chairman are committed to the counterdrug strategy and to their responsibilities.

Mr. MICA. Well, I thank you. I find this hard to believe. I have concerns that the war on drugs has been sabotaged, and this report confirms my worse suspicions about that. Mr. Gilman, you are recognized.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Salazar, the joint chiefs stated that the level of DOD assets committed to counterdrug activities is unlikely to change. In light of that, how does your office intend to deal with the problems that we are seeing come out of Latin America?

Ms. SALAZAR. We have done a number of things, sir, in anticipating that it would be unlikely to change. I guess we should explain why it is unlikely to change. As you are aware, there are not very many AWACs. The Cadillac premier asset for the detection and monitoring is the AWACs. There is not that many of them flying around the world. So every time we have missions like in the Balkans, Somalia, Iraq, these types of assets become premier assets.

Mr. GILMAN. Let me interrupt you. How long has it been since AWACs aircraft operated in and around the source countries in Southcom's area of responsibility?

Ms. SALAZAR. Can I talk to you off-line about the specific numbers, sir? We will come and brief you on that.

Mr. GILMAN. Yes, but it has been a long time as I understand since they have operated in that area.

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes. That's why in conversations with our colleagues from Customs we have talked about this deficiency, and we are trying to coordinate efforts with Customs in order to assure that we get the necessary coverage that the strategy requires.

Mr. GILMAN. I interrupted you, and you were telling us why the joint chiefs have said there will be no change in their commitment.

Ms. SALAZAR. These assets, most of these assets are purchased or acquired based on the premier mission of the Department of Defense, which is defending our Nation.

Mr. GILMAN. If there is a need for more AWACs, why isn't there a request made for more AWACs?

Ms. SALAZAR. I would talk to other persons in the Department of Defense, mainly the services. We depend on the services to tell us what their requirements are.

Mr. GILMAN. Don't you have requirements that you set forth?

Ms. SALAZAR. We do, absolutely. And we set forth every year——

Mr. GILMAN. Have you made a request for more AWACs?

Ms. SALAZAR. Absolutely, yes. And the response from the services has been with the numbers of assets we have right now, there are other requirements of higher priority.

Mr. GILMAN. So then the drug issue gets down the totem pole on the priority list. Is that right?

Ms. SALAZAR. It has a lower priority in consideration of other types of missions where eminent——

Mr. GILMAN. That's what our chairman is saying, we don't have a high enough priority for our drug war. We look to you to assert yourself and insist that it be given a higher priority.

Ms. SALAZAR. Sir, I have added my voice to these discussions. My predecessor has added his voice to these discussions. The main problem as I see it, as a person who has done counterdrug programs for a number of years now, is that the Department of De-

fense has other missions which is very different than, for example, our law enforcement colleagues. Our premier mission is not counterdrugs.

Mr. GILMAN. We gather that. Mr. Ford, you stated it is clear that setting of priorities is the key to getting DOD assets committed to the war on drugs. Whose responsibility is it to set the higher priority for the use of these DOD assets?

Mr. FORD. As far as I know, that is an internal decision made by the Department of Defense. We didn't challenge their reasoning.

Mr. GILMAN. Who in the Department of Defense has that responsibility?

Mr. FORD. Again, I would attribute that to the joint chiefs of staff, the office of the Secretary of Defense. In determining what their overall priorities are, they apparently have decided that other missions are of a higher priority than this one.

Mr. GILMAN. So I guess the ball that—the responsibility would stop at the President's desk on this of setting a higher priority in DOD. Would you agree with that?

Mr. FORD. Well, to the extent that the White House is involved in this, I would guess at least that at General McCaffrey's level he would weigh in on this decision.

Mr. GILMAN. I would hope that someone would be weighing in on it. Let me ask you, Admiral Riutta, on Peru when are we going to restore aerial surveillance so we can make the shoot-down policy more effective and drive home those coca leaf prices below profitability? I had a chart here that showed how the Peruvian leaf prices climbed dramatically after we stopped the surveillance from $1.50 for a kilo to $3.50. Can you tell us when you are going to be doing some of that?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Sir, is that question for Admiral Riutta or for Customs——

Mr. GILMAN. Or Customs.

Mr. STALLWORTH. Sir, Customs, after having meetings with the Peruvian delegations and having discussions with JIATF-East, actually went on two deployments which had not been scheduled last year to Peru to investigate the possibility or try and figure out what was going on with air assets in Peru as far as the——

Mr. GILMAN. What is going on with those air assets?

Mr. STALLWORTH. As a result of our first deployment, we really didn't get anything other than we did conduct training with the Peruvian air force and do our coordination for intercept. In the second deployment, which was in November, late November, we did look at the Bolivia-Peru border and we did see activity there, sir. We are still going through the analysis with JIATF-East on what information we did get on that, but there is activity.

Mr. GILMAN. Whose responsibility is it to restore the aerial surveillance in Peru?

Mr. STALLWORTH. The responsibility is with whoever has the assets. We are a force provider because of the role that DOD has. And in fact in these deployments we had to take the initiative, sir, to go there. We had to go and convince DOD that we did want to put these aircraft there because——

Mr. GILMAN. Have we put the aircraft there?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Sir, we deployed the aircraft on from 8- to 10-day deployments there. We could not leave them there. That's not something that we can do at this time.

Mr. GILMAN. When did we do the 8 to 10 days?

Mr. STALLWORTH. We did one in August. I don't have the dates right now, sir. We had another in late November 1999.

Mr. GILMAN. So between August and November there was no deployment; is that right?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Not in Peru itself, not from Lima.

Mr. GILMAN. Since November have we had any deployment?

Mr. STALLWORTH. No, sir, we are supposed to go a little bit later this month.

Mr. GILMAN. Haven't the Peruvian people been asking for more aerial coverage and what are we telling them?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Yes, sir, they have. They have been cooperating with us as we have tried to conduct site surveys for different landing sites in Peru.

Mr. GILMAN. I am talking about aerial surveillance now. They asked for more aerial surveillance, did they not?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Yes, they did.

Mr. GILMAN. We haven't done anything since November?

Mr. STALLWORTH. No, sir. We have plans to go there again this month.

Mr. GILMAN. Plans to go in February?

Mr. STALLWORTH. No, sir, this month, sir, in January.

Mr. GILMAN. Is that sufficient, to only go 3 or 4 months without surveillance and then go down for just a few days? Does that accomplish very much?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Sir, again, we are force providers. We have limited assets, but we are doing what we can——

Mr. GILMAN. I realize you are doing what you can, but I am asking now, is that effective to leave that big gap of time without aerial surveillance?

Mr. STALLWORTH. No, sir, it isn't.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Mr. Stallworth, with a deteriorating situation or the problems of flying missions with civilian fields in the region have been an increasing problem, when do you envision, if ever, that we are going to be back to aerial coverage levels before we gave up the Howard Air Force Base?

Mr. STALLWORTH. As to the first part of your question, regarding the civilian situation in Ecuador, sir, I am not at liberty or don't have the basic knowledge to tell you when that would be better. As to Manta, my understanding is that as soon as funding is provided that DOD will move forward as far as preparing that area for——

Mr. GILMAN. Has funding been requested, Mr. Stallworth, for Manta?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Yes, sir, it has.

Mr. GILMAN. What is the status?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Part of it is in the emergency supplemental that has been provided. I would rather DOD answer that question because they have more of the specifics on that, sir.

Ms. SALAZAR. If you would allow me, we have included funding for Manta in the Colombian supplement. We have also included funding for Aruba and Curacao in our request. As you may remem-

ber, sir, we have requested MILCON construction in our fiscal year 2000 budget and we didn't get it, basically.

Mr. GILMAN. So how much funding has been requested now for Manta and the other forward bases?

Ms. SALAZAR. In fiscal year 2000, we are requesting approximately $39 million. In fiscal year 2001, we are requesting, I believe—I will give you the exact number——

Mr. GILMAN. Just give us a ball park figure.

Ms. SALAZAR. $100 million.

Mr. GILMAN. How long would it take you to get these forward bases in operation?

Ms. SALAZAR. Depending on which ones and at what level, as was mentioned before, our priority is trying to get Manta fully functioning, and we have been doing that at different steps. We believe we are going to be flying more P–3s out of Manta in the next month; and then it would be fully functional, be able to do night flights, I believe, in about March. So we are going to be able to do much more than we are now. At one point we are going to have to do major repairs on one of the runways.

Mr. GILMAN. When do you envision that you will be back to aerial coverage levels prior to our giving up Howard Air Force Base?

Ms. SALAZAR. We will probably be at that level, if not higher, since we are going to be doing more flights out of the source zone, I would say in about a year, year and a half.

Mr. GILMAN. So a year and a half to get back to the Howard Air Force Base level of aerial coverages; is that correct?

Ms. SALAZAR. We would have an increased level, in fact. We would have a better coverage level——

Mr. GILMAN. How long would it take you to get back to where we were at the Howard Air Force level.

Ms. SALAZAR. I would say a year and a half. The reason that I say that is we have to finish—once we are done with all of the infrastructure construction that we are going to be doing in these FOLs, once they are completely done, we will have much better coverage, improved coverage.

Mr. GILMAN. Have we given up our negotiation to try to retain our Howard Air Force Base?

Ms. SALAZAR. I believe so, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. That is a dead issue?

Ms. SALAZAR. We have not had conversations with the Panamanians on this issue.

Mr. GILMAN. I had spoken with the Panamanian President not too long ago, and it seemed that the door was open for further negotiation, but you are saying that we are not doing anything?

Ms. SALAZAR. I am not aware of any conversations that are taking place right now, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Gilman. It is good to be on some of these panels for a number of terms because you hear different figures counted by different folks at different hearings. Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the questions that I have—and I imagine this goes to Mr. Ford—is you have a comment on page 15 of your report that the trafficking methods have primarily gone toward maritime. I look at the charts between the

air hours and the ship days, and I am trying to reconcile whether or not there is an interchangeability or ratio of ship days that equals to so many air hours, if you will. Do you have any such information?

Mr. FORD. If I understand your question, in terms of dealing with the maritime threat?

Mr. OSE. Yes.

Mr. FORD. Actually, I am going to defer to the Admiral on this, but basically obviously you need ships on the water to interdict maritime vessels, like go-fast boats, which is one of the major means of travel by the drug traffickers. But you also need some air assets. You need helicopters to be able to track them and you also need tracking aircraft so you can hand them off to someone on the ocean. I don't know what the appropriate ratio is. I don't want to put the Admiral on the spot, but I think he might know better, as this is a main Coast Guard responsibility.

Clearly, the data that we show in the report indicates that the threat in the 1990's has generally shifted more toward maritime, there are more maritime-type incidents, you would expect to see perhaps an increase in the amount of ship days. But we don't see that in our data with the exception of the plus-up in the Coast Guard. So it seem as little anomalous to me as to why that situation exists.

Mr. OSE. In that we have the information, that the trafficking methods have gone, if you will, to a maritime route, but we haven't responded with additional assets to deal with it? Is that your point?

Mr. FORD. Well, the data clearly shows that the number of ship days that you might expect to see, to jive with the threat, doesn't seem to be there or at least it is not there at the same level of what you would expect, given the fact that maritime is now about three-quarters of the threat.

Mr. OSE. Is the evidence as to the threat from the maritime sources unequivocal, clear?

Mr. FORD. I think it is based on the known intelligences that our people have. Obviously, there could be things going on out there that we are not aware of. That's always the situation. But based on the data that the interagency community uses, clearly they have a rough idea of what the trends are. And the trend clearly has gone toward maritime.

Mr. OSE. Admiral, would you agree with that?

Admiral RIUTTA. Yes, sir, I would certainly agree with that. It has clearly gone maritime.

Mr. OSE. So in response—with the exception of the Coast Guard that peaked in 1997, in response to evidence that our agencies have collected, we in effect have reduced, if I understand correctly, air hours in favor of ship days; but in fact according to the chart on page 14 of the GAO report, the number of ship days has also been reduced?

Admiral RIUTTA. You are correct. We have reduced both. I would like to point out that to find go-fast you need aircraft. You can't offset aircraft with ships and hope to efficiently find these go-fasts, particularly in the eastern Pacific coming off the west coast of Colombia, off the west coast of Central America, which is a very wide

open space. Just putting a few extra ships down there doesn't solve the problem. You need good aircraft coverage in order to find the targets and then you go after them.

Mr. OSE. Let me go on, if I might. I appreciate you guys trying to quantify how to balance those assets and their use. One question, Ms. Salazar. One thing you kept referring to was a reduction in 1994 in terms of the resources committed to this effort. I just wanted to make sure I understood. That would have been a budget passed in 1993 pursuant to the President's request submitted in January 1993? The resources for fiscal year 1994 followed appropriations bills, bills passed in late 1993?

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes. This is a fiscal year 1993 appropriations, conference report, November 9, 1993.

Mr. OSE. I do want to point out just the interesting dynamic is that since the majority of the House and Senate changed there has been no intention or policy on the part of the majority now existent in the House to reduce assets. So I find it interesting, and I take considerable exception to a constant reference to a reduction in 1994 that flowed from one side of the aisle as opposed to the effort on this side of the aisle to give more assets to this effort.

Ms. SALAZAR. That was not my intention. What I was trying to highlight to the subcommittee is that throughout the years there has been a bipartisan—through two administrations—ongoing debate as to what is the level of support that the Department of Defense should provide to the counterdrug strategy. As I mentioned earlier, there was a 1993 report that strongly suggested that we were providing way too many flying hours, way too many steaming days for the detection and monitoring efforts. That was the recommendation in the sense of that report at that time.

There have been different hearings throughout the years in many ways going back and forth. I sit in some of the other committees, the defense committees; they would suggest or they would—some of them would suggest that perhaps that we are providing too much of DOD's efforts to the counterdrug strategies. So the reason I did this, sir, is not to point a finger to one of the others, but to suggest this is an ongoing debate. But despite the debate and despite there has been some fluctuation in our budget and in the amount of resources we receive, we have sought different ways of trying to support General Wilhelm's Southcom and to support our law enforcement community and to support host nations in their capability to interdict drugs.

Mr. OSE. If I might just make one observation. I can't help but go to the empirical data that indicates very clearly from the early 1990's to today, an increase in drug usage, increased mortality rate in terms of Americans using drugs, and a battle here about making sure sufficient resources get committed to that effort to combat this problem. I find it intellectually very challenging to balance the lives of American citizens with somebody's disconcernment, if you will—that's not even a word—but it is just very interesting to me. I get calls at home about this. I go home every weekend. I get calls on this regularly. I wanted to express that to you. I think this Congress is ready to give you the resources that you need to take this effort to the Nth degree, if I have any sense of the chairman and the others here.

Ms. SALAZAR. We are very appreciative of that. In many ways, some of the pluses we have received throughout the years have been, thanks to the chairman, and to a number of people who believe that the Department of Defense should have an important role in the counterdrug strategy, not only in the international or early detection and monitoring, but also in our domestic programs. We are very grateful for that, sir.

Mr. OSE. Let me ask a question. You mentioned the interaction to some of our host nations. We have been providing up until July 1999 the aircraft for Peru to monitor flights originating there. Unfortunately, we had a plane go down. We lost a number of people there. Is that aircraft or is that asset still being provided to the country of Peru?

Ms. SALAZAR. The asset that you are talking about is an ARL which crashed in Colombia. Is that the asset that you are talking about, sir? It is an Intelligence asset. We coordinate the flights with host nations, and we do provide that type of support. However, it is also one of those premier assets that if there is other missions that have higher priority, the Department of Defense could very easily be taken away and used for some other mission or in different parts of the world. In general, we fight very hard to obtain an ARL for ARL coverage for the source zone.

Mr. OSE. I guess that was a no?

Ms. SALAZAR. I am going to ask someone to look at my data right now, but we continue to provide ARL support. What I don't know is if after the crash that there has been another deployment down there.

Mr. OSE. Assuming there hasn't been, have there been ARL deployments elsewhere in the world?

Ms. SALAZAR. I believe so, sir.

Mr. OSE. I would be interested in that information. I want to nail down, A, have we or have we not continued to provide this assistance to the Colombians and Peruvians; and, B, if we haven't, where have those resources gone?

Ms. SALAZAR. I think we would be delighted to brief you, not only on this particular asset but on the different assets and the types of capabilities they have and what other parts of the world they have been used. I have just been advised that yes, we have had an ARL deployment to the source zone since the crash.

Mr. OSE. Are they flying?

Ms. SALAZAR. They don't fly, sir, constantly. These are for all of the assets. I think my colleague from Customs was trying to explain. The way that we program the use of these assets is that decision is made that they are going to fly for 10 days, 15 days, they go down there, they do the coverage and then they return. This is the way that we have been performing these types of deployments, as far as I know.

Sometimes they will work out of the Nation or they will land there, but it is not permanent. They will basically land there, be there for a number of days and then return.

Mr. OSE. Let me do a little housekeeping, if I may. The chairman asked for a report in late July or early August regarding the unfortunate crash in Colombia. And now it is January 27. Where is that report?

Ms. SALAZAR. I will have to come back and give you further information. I don't know right now, sir.

Mr. OSE. It is my recollection from our hearing in that time period that's just about what you told us then. I have got to tell you, we were in Miami and we were told the same thing. That is January 3. At what point is the report going to be here?

Ms. SALAZAR. I apologize, sir. I don't have that information. My office is not the office that would be drafting that report.

Mr. OSE. Who does?

Ms. SALAZAR. I think it is probably the Secretary of the Army. This would be an Army report. I will come back to you, sir, with that information.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the time. Excuse me, I'm sorry.

Mr. MICA. Go ahead.

Mr. OSE. The GAO report cites, again, the shift from airborne to maritime using the go-fast boats. For the Admiral, in 1998 the Coast Guard was authorized to acquire some new armed helicopters to counter this new maritime activity. What is the current status of that effort?

Admiral RIUTTA. Sir, we have deployed those armed helicopters on two occasions in a daylight operation. As you can see, this is a fairly complicated mission to put together a package like this. We are currently undergoing nighttime training, and expect to deploy them in the fairly near future to do a complete 7 by 24 operation down in the Caribbean.

Mr. OSE. Are we providing any assistance to Colombia of a similar nature with these assets?

Admiral RIUTTA. With these particular assets, not in-country. Off the coast of Colombia they will certainly operate. We have a limited fielding this summer when we will get the assets back in theater. They will work off the coast of Colombia.

Mr. OSE. One of the concerns I have is we were recently briefed by State OMBCP people that the administration's latest package of assistance to Colombia cut this out. Is that true?

Admiral RIUTTA. As far as I know, it is, yes.

Mr. OSE. It is true that it was cut out?

Admiral RIUTTA. I have not seen the package; but as far as I know, it was reduced, yes, sir.

Mr. OSE. As it relates to this particular program as we go forward, it will be ending in terms of assistance to Colombia of this nature?

Admiral RIUTTA. This program is funded in 2000. Depending on the budget notions in 2001, it will continue forward.

Mr. OSE. But the administration's proposal has been to remove this funding?

Admiral RIUTTA. I believe the administration proposal has been just not to support it in the Colombian supplemental.

Mr. OSE. That sounds like they are removing this funding. Now, I want to go back to the over-the-horizon radar with Mr. Ford. We have gaps in our coverage. We have covered 15 percent. That's like 2.8 percent, or something like that, of the time. Do the over-the-horizon radars in Puerto Rico take care of the gaps on the aviation routes that we are attempting to cover?

Mr. FORD. What I know about—they are supposed to extend coverage down to the southern part of Colombia. I don't know how far it goes in terms of whether it covers the entire area down there, so I can't say that there will be 100 percent coverage in that area. The other area, I believe—ROTHR does not always touch, is in the eastern Pacific. I am not sure whether the Puerto Rico radar would cover that or not. I guess I have to defer that to my colleagues here. But it would definitely expand coverage down into the Colombia area, which is going to be part of our new program down there.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Stallworth, do you have any observations on that, whether or not the over-the-horizon radar fills the gaps that we otherwise might have?

Mr. STALLWORTH. I think the best answer for me at this point, since I don't have specific data and it hasn't—no one, engineers or anyone else, can assure us that it will and so I can't answer that question; and I would have to defer to DOD. But no one has assured us that it will cover the gaps. We just don't know.

The design—let me say it like this. The design of the ROTHR is optimized for over water to bounce off the ionosphere and do the things it does. It is optimized for—other than the modifications that they might have made for it, to B–52 sized targets. It does not give correlated data as to identification friend or foe or altitude. So it is better than nothing, but it is not necessarily the best for the conditions. And then when you shoot that over the jungle or over land, we just don't know what it is going to bring us in results.

Mr. OSE. That begs the question. Given the inadequacies that you've described, are we using something less than the best in terms of providing coverage? And if that is the case, do we have something that is better that we are not using?

Mr. STALLWORTH. I would have to defer that to DOD.

Mr. OSE. Admiral, do you have any input on this?

Admiral RIUTTA. Actually, I am not an expert in ROTHR. I don't work in that area.

Mr. OSE. Ms. Salazar.

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes, I am also not an expert in ROTHR, but I do have some comments. The Puerto Rico ROTHR will actually provide extensive coverage—it actually covers Ecuador, goes down into Peru and parts of Brazil. So we will have coverage of an area that we did not have before.

I think what Mr. Stallworth was trying to explain is that as any system, they have certain capabilities and can do certain things, and there are other things that they cannot do. There is not one single radar or asset that can basically satisfy all of the needs that law enforcement and DOD has in regards to detection and monitoring. The secret is being able to coordinate the existing systems, provide more systems that can support what we are trying to do, but at the same time improve our coordination not only with the end-game capability of law enforcement but also what the host nations have in the way of end games and the assets that they have.

What I am trying to say, sir, is that the Puerto Rico ROTHR is going to provide us an enormously increased capability. But does it resolve all of our problems? No, it doesn't.

Mr. OSE. You have been very kind, Mr. Chairman; and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MICA. Just in a final couple of questions, the GAO report highlights—and that concerns me is that there doesn't seem to be a coordination between the Secretary of Defense's DOD Office of National Drug Control Policy to coordinate with the JIATFS, the Joint Interagency Task Force and ONDCP. Also, having been involved in this since about 1981, I have found after years and years of trying to get everybody trying to work together, DOD, Customs, Coast Guard, all of the different agencies that are involved—there are 19 or 20 agencies I think involved—and all of that seems to be falling apart. That is one of the criticisms that I see here. DOD does not have measures of performance, and also the problems with working with these other agencies. And then the other thing is that nobody seems to be in charge of coordinating. Ms. Salazar, did you want to respond?

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes. I was looking for that comment because I did not read that from the report.

I believe that there has been more coordination than ever, and I haven't been working in counterdrug programs as long as you have, but I have seen an increased coordination in the programs in part because of the role ONDCP plays, and in part from the detection and monitoring aspect—I am not going to call it an organization, but we have created a committee, the U.S. Interdiction Committee headed by Admiral Loy, that basically brings in all the law enforcement community, DOD, the JIATFs, SOUTHCOM, anyone who has any role in the detection and monitoring. We all sit in a room quarterly and we basically have—our job is to not only set priorities but we also have something that is called the "neighbors." We have an outline each one of these agencies must take to support the counterdrug strategy.

Mr. MICA. I am telling you what I am hearing out there as far as overall coordination. Within DOD, GAO has stated here today—and I think they have a recommendation—and one of their recommendations in their report was that DOD adopt performance measures. And you said—someone said that they had started.

Wasn't that one of your criticisms or recommendations, Mr. Ford?

Mr. FORD. Yes, it was. In fact, I am going to refer back to our 1993 report, which has been mentioned a couple of times.

Mr. MICA. Yes, I finally found out who is responsible for the dismantling of the war on drugs. It is GAO.

Mr. FORD. We apologize, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter].

Mr. MICA. That is my next question.

Mr. FORD. I just want to comment, in 1993 we did in fact question DOD's involvement; but that was because back then they were spending a lot of money and there wasn't anywhere near the amount of data available to show what we were getting for the amount that they were spending. Some of their operational concepts back then are much different than they are today. Today we use a lot of queued intelligence, and back in those days they didn't.

As far back as then we indicated that DOD needed to do a better job of articulating what we are getting for the investment we are making. We are basically making the same point today. We want DOD to do a better job of articulating what types of outputs and

what type of efficiencies, what types of effectiveness we are getting for the investment that we are making for the DOD dollar.

I will say that DOD now has made some efforts to try to do that. In the past, I would say that they resisted trying to measure their effectiveness, but I think now they have some efforts underway which might get us there. We recognize that it is hard to do, particularly when you are a support organization. But the Government as a whole has a mandate to report on results, and we think that this is something that DOD ought to be able to do. We hope to see down the road some more tangible outputs on their part.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Let me try to fill in a couple of missing links here.

There was some talk about status of material to Colombia and also to the source countries.

Ms. Salazar, the 506 which would be surplus materials that had been promised in 1996, I am told were finally delivered in November; is that correct?

Ms. SALAZAR. I can't give you the specific details, mainly because these types of programs are led by the State Department although we provide the assets.

Mr. MICA. Can you tell me whether those assets have been provided? The information I have is 1996, it was finally provided, and 60 percent of the 1997 promised assets have been provided to date to Colombia. Is that correct?

Ms. SALAZAR. Sir, I will have to come back with the information.

Mr. MICA. And can you also give us 1998 and 1999?

Ms. SALAZAR. We will talk to our State Department colleagues.

Mr. MICA. I am not interested in State Department. I am interest in what DOD has done. We can get information from them. I would like to know the status of all of these 506 equipment promises to Colombia in particular. The others, if you can provide that, fine, but Colombia.

The cost of Mantas seems to have jumped from $43 million. Did you tell me $39 in 2000 to 2001 and then to $100 million the next year?

Ms. SALAZAR. These are for all three of them. Let me give you the exact numbers.

We have received as of this year—for all of the facilities, all three, Aruba, Curacao, Manta, we are requesting $128.4 in total.

Mr. MICA. This year?

Ms. SALAZAR. In total. For this year we would be requesting approximately $38 for FOL Manta in the supplemental. In our fiscal year 2001 budget, we would be requesting the rest. I have to make a calculation of the difference. For Aruba, Curacao—and I believe it comes to $122. I have that number in my mind. If you give me 10 minutes, I can provide you the exact numbers.

Mr. MICA. Can you provide that information?

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes.

Mr. MICA. Also there were discussions in addition to Antilles and Ecuador, Costa Rica. Is that anticipated in the expenditures if an agreement is reached with Costa Rica?

Ms. SALAZAR. If we do reach an agreement with Central America, we would anticipate that there would be some costs. It depends on

which one of the FOLs we would be using. So that is not included in that figure. Only Antilles and Manta. Correct?

Ms. SALAZAR. Correct, sir. For fiscal year 2000 and 2001. I believe we may be including that in our fiscal year 2002.

Mr. MICA. And we have one 10-year agreement now with Ecuador, and we still have not reached a conclusion on the agreement with Antilles?

Ms. SALAZAR. They have concluded the negotiations and initialed the agreement, and now it is following the process by which they take it to their minister who signs it, and then, it is presented to their legislators. We have an initialed agreement with the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Mr. MICA. Right. Because we met with them in September and encouraged them to sign.

Ms. SALAZAR. We appreciate that because the negotiations went very well.

Mr. MICA. One of the problems with the Antilles is I am told that our planes there are delayed now in the tourist season for takeoff, that we don't have runway access when we need it. Can you respond to that?

Ms. SALAZAR. Sir, can I come back to you. I have not heard that statement. I would defer to my Customs colleagues since they are flying out of Aruba whether they are having any problems of that sort. Part of the infrastructure construction is to avoid some of these problems because we acknowledge that they are international airports and that they have their flights that they need to do.

Mr. MICA. Finally, despite the White House press release of January 11, the $1.6 billion aid package for Colombia still has not been presented to us. Do you have any idea when we are going to get the details of the package? General Wilhelm did give me the DOD—at least his request. I don't know if that was all included in the final package. When will we see the final package?

Ms. SALAZAR. I believe the formal rollout—and I may be wrong—is February 7th or 8th. And of course once the rollout takes place, we would come in and do the necessary briefings.

Mr. MICA. Sort of a slow emergency package, but we will get there.

We appreciate your assistance. There is a vote on the floor of the House. We will leave the record open, as I said, for 10 days. We ask also that further questions be submitted to the witnesses.

There being no further business before the subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, this meeting is adjourned.

[NOTE.—The GAO report entitled, "Drug Control, Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply Have Declined," may be found in subcommittee files.]

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COORDINATOR
FOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND SUPPORT

1510 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1510

11 FEB 2000

The Honorable John L. Mica
Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy
and Human Resources
House Committee on Government Reform
The House of Representatives
B-373 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before your Subcommittee to share the Department's views on our strong commitment to counterdrug operations. Hopefully we were able to place the GAO report in the proper perspective. I have included the Department's response to the follow-up questions that you forwarded with your January 31, 2000 letter.

I look forward to continuing to work with you and members of your staff on counterdrug issues pertinent to the Department of Defense. If I can be of any further assistance please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

Ana Maria Salazar
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Drug Enforcement Policy and Support

Attachment:
As stated

CF:
Ranking Member

FEB 2 0 2000

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources
Hearing January 27, 2000
GAO Report: "Assets DoD Contributes
to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply
Have Declined"

1.
Q. The December 1999 G.A.O. report made a single recommendation that the DoD develop Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PMEs). Please explain DoD's efforts to comply with this recommendation. How and when will DoD implement these new PMEs?

A. The Department is participating with U.S. Southern Command, Joint Interagency Task Force East, and Joint Interagency Task Force West in the development of their measures of effectiveness (MOEs). No explicit timeline has been set at this time, however, the individual organizations are currently evaluating draft versions of their programs. The Department will continue to fund the Consolidated Counterdrug Data Base (CCDB) and participate in the interagency data collection and analysis process. These programs will address the recommendations made by the GAO report.

The Department will use this information to determine which assets are the most effective Detection and Monitoring (D&M) and intelligence platforms to ensure that available resources continue to be used efficiently.

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
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2.
Q. Please explain the dramatic reduction in DoD intelligence flights in the source countries (esp. Colombia and Peru) since 1997 which was cited in the GAO report. What steps is DoD taking to renew this support in order to reinvigorate the air suppression program?

A. The driving factor in reduced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) flights prior to May of 1999 was the lack of available DoD assets, driven by both overall force reductions and higher priority missions in other parts of the world. After May of 1999, the closure of Howard Air Force base became an additional factor. Also, as depicted in Figure 2 of the GAO report, US Southern Command significantly increased the requested number of ISR flights in both the source and transit zones in fiscal years 1998 and 1999.

In the area of classical intelligence, the Department is pursuing several programs to enhance US Southern Command's airborne collection capability. Two specific airborne platforms will be operational in April and July of this year. These two aircraft will carry reconnaissance and surveillance equipment designed to enhance source zone intelligence collection. These will be dedicated US Southern Command assets.

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3.
Q. How is DOD compensating for the loss of surveillance flight hours following the cessation of flight operations from Howard Airforce Base? What percentage of coverage is currently available (compared to the coverage available when Howard was fully operational)? Distinguish between Source Zone and Transit Zone coverage. Also what has been the effect of the closure of Rodman Naval Base, Panama on U.S. Counterdrug efforts in the region?

A. Since the closing of Howard AFB, surveillance flights have been flown from a variety of locations, primarily the Forward Operating Locations (FOLs --Curacao/Aruba; and Manta, Ecuador) as well as Puerto Rico and some CONUS bases.

In 1997 and 1998 the interagency dedicated an average of 830 monthly flight hours (time over target) to counternarcotics missions, roughly 69 percent of the flight time was dedicated to the source zone. Shortly after commencing flight operations from the FOLs last May, the interagency achieved a sortie rate that generated over 950 monthly flight hours (time over target) on counternarctoics missions – exceeding the Howard base line by 15 percent. However, due to the location of the FOLs, and the lack of all weather capability at the Manta FOL, only 20 percent of this total flight time was over the source zone. Manta is scheduled to be ready to support all weather operations in April, whereupon the number of flight hours over the entire source zone will increase significantly.

There has been no impact on DoD CD operations as a result of the closure of Rodman.

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4.
Q. When will the Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar (R.O.T.H.R.) system be operational in Puerto Rico? Please elaborate on the reasons for the delays in bringing this important radar on line. Also, describe the impact this radar system will have on the execution of the drug war in the source and transit zones.

A. The Puerto Rico Relocatable Over The Horizon Radar (ROTHR) is in the sub-system testing phase and is scheduled for initial operational capability (IOC) on 24 March 2000. System performance measurements using targets of opportunity and dedicated flights will be conducted in April 2000.

When the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) was approved and the construction contract awarded to a local Puerto Rico firm, the ROTHR IOC was scheduled for 30 September 1999. Reasons for delays in bringing the system on line have been as follow:

- System shipment to Puerto Rico was delayed six weeks because of Hurricane Georges, a Category III hurricane in September 1998.

- Construction delays on the Vieques island transmit (Tx) site occurred due to continuing problems with hiring local skilled labor (forced to bring from mainland and house on Vieques) and delays in transportation of construction equipment and materials to Vieques (only one small ferry that catered to local needs).

- Above average rainfall in the July-November 1999 time frame slowed final grading of the 75 acre receive (Rx) site reflective area.

- Short-term work stoppages after the bombing accident in April 1999 occurred when threats of protests or actual protests were staged on Vieques.

- System integration work was interrupted by Hurricanes Jose and Lenny in October and November 1999, respectively.

The Puerto Rico ROTHR will provide 24-hour, all-altitude coverage of Colombia, Venezuela, and most of Peru. It will provide an unequaled capability to view the entire region's air picture for both detection and monitoring as well as intelligence and will serve as a critical component of the interagency air interdiction effort in Colombia. The Puerto Rico ROTHR covers the portion of the transit zone off the west coast of South America from the Colombia to southern Peru however there is little known aerial smuggling in this area.

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