[Senate Hearing 106-344]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-344
WILL Y2K SNARL GLOBAL TRANSPORTATION?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE
YEAR 2000 TECHNOLOGY PROBLEM
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
on
PREPAREDNESS NOT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO AVIATION, BUT ALSO MARITIME
__________
SEPTEMBER 30, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
62-346 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE
YEAR 2000 TECHNOLOGY PROBLEM
[Created by S. Res. 208, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998)]
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah, Chairman
JON KYL, Arizona CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut,
GORDON SMITH, Oregon Vice Chairman
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Ex Officio DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex
Officio
Robert Cresanti, Staff Director
T.M. (Wilke) Green, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
------
STATEMENT BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Robert F. Bennett, a U.S. Senator from Utah, Chairman, Special
Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem.................. 1
Christopher J. Dodd, a U.S. Senator from Connecticut, Vice
Chairman, Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem 2
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF WITNESSES
Mortimer L. Downey, Deputy Secretary, Department of
Transportation................................................. 5
Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, Department of Transportation. 7
Hon. Jane Garvey, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration. 17
Thomas Windmuller, Director, IATA Year 2000 Project,
International Air Transport Association........................ 20
David Z. Plavin, President, Airports Council International-North
America........................................................ 22
Peter Cooke, Year 2000 Coordinator, British Airways.............. 24
Edward Smart, ICAO Representative, International Federation of
Air Line Pilots Organizations.................................. 26
Rear Admiral George N. Naccara, Chief Information Officer, United
States Coast Guard............................................. 38
Richard T. du Moulin, Chairman & CEO, Marine Transport
Corporation.................................................... 42
ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND MATERIAL SUBMITTED
Bennett, Hon. Robert F.:
Opening statement............................................ 1
Prepared statement........................................... 49
Cooke, Peter:
Statement.................................................... 24
Prepared Statement........................................... 50
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J.:
Statement.................................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Downey, Mortimer L.:
Statement.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 53
Garvey, Hon. Jane:
Statement.................................................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Responses to questions submitted by Chairman Bennett......... 61
Mead, Kenneth M.:
Statement.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 64
Responses to questions submitted by Chairman Bennett......... 75
du Moulin, Richard T.:
Statement.................................................... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 76
Naccara, Rear Adm. George N.:
Statement.................................................... 38
Prepared statement........................................... 78
Responses to questions submitted by Chairman Bennett......... 80
Plavin, David Z.:
Statement.................................................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 83
Smart, Edward:
Statement.................................................... 26
Prepared statement........................................... 86
Windmuller, Thomas:
Statement.................................................... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 88
Note: Responses to questions submitted by Chairman Bennett to
Peter Cooke, Mortimer L. Downey, Richard T. de Moulin, David Z.
Plavin, Edward Smart, and Thomas Windmuller were not received
at the time the hearing was published.
WILL Y2K SNARL GLOBAL TRANSPORTATION?
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Special Committee on the Year 2000
Technology Problem,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:43 a.m., in
room 192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert F.
Bennett (chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Bennett and Dodd.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT F. BENNETT, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM UTAH, CHAIRMAN, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE YEAR 2000
TECHNOLOGY PROBLEM
Chairman Bennett. The committee will come to order.
I apologize to the witnesses and to those observing the
committee for our tardy start. We had an emergency conference
called by the Republican leader, the Majority Leader, and I
have been attending that. And I am told that we have a series
of roll call votes this morning.
One of the frustrations of working in the Senate is that
sometimes the Senate does not pay attention to your schedule
and insists on doing its own business, in addition to the
committee business. So we will try to work around that. I
apologize to the witnesses. We have a number of witnesses who
have come here from great distance, from out of the country,
and we're very grateful to them for being here and want to
apologize for any inconveniences that be caused by the
insistence on Senate votes.
In the interest of time, I will forego my formal opening
statement and have it printed in the record. I will make this
kind of introduction.
Of all the discussions relating to Y2K and Y2K
interruptions, potential interruptions, none has been more
persistent or come up more often than the question of travel.
As Senator Dodd and I said quite facetiously, but with a tinge
of seriousness, fairly early on in this process, the three
places you don't want to be on New Year's Eve are in an
elevator, an airplane, or a hospital.
I am now very comfortable about elevators. I am now very
comfortable about hospitals that are connected with large
suburban chains--I'm a little nervous about inner city
hospitals or rural hospitals--and I now tell people I will be
happy to fly on an airline if it is a responsible airline and
they are willing to put the plane in the sky, that they
understand their risks as much as I do.
While proportionately this is not true, in the aggregate
they have more to lose than I do. So if they're willing to take
that risk, I would be willing to fly with them.
Now, there are some international airlines that have
announced they will not have an airplane in the sky over that
weekend, unless they change their plans between now and then. I
think that's an indication of the seriousness with which they
take this.
There are some countries that have said they're going to
solve the problem by insisting that all of their airline
executives be flying that day, and I would just as soon not fly
on those planes, either. But in a properly certificated
international carrier, that has checked out not only the air
traffic control system that it will interact with, but also the
terminals from which it will take off and land, as well as its
own equipment, who is willing to take the risks, I am now
willing to fly. I have no plans, I assure you. I'm going to be
in Salt Lake City.
Nonetheless, I think we ought to make it clear that we have
made tremendous strides in aviation, and Senator Dodd and I are
now telling people that aviation, in most of the world, will be
safe.
So we're going to discuss preparedness not only with
respect to aviation, but also maritime. We welcome our
witnesses here today.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Bennett can be found in
the appendix.]
Chairman Bennett. Senator Dodd, I understand we've got some
votes starting around 10 o'clock.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Right.
Chairman Bennett. I think maybe we ought to do the ``tag
team'' thing, where one of us votes early and then the other
votes late, whatever, to try to keep this going, if you can be
here most of the morning.
Vice Chairman Dodd. I would be happy to do that as well and
accommodate the chairman.
We've got a hearing on Russia in the Foreign Relations
Committee, and I wanted to participate to some degree. But
we'll try and work around that added dimension. That's just a
couple of floors upstairs, so it shouldn't be too difficult.
Chairman Bennett. OK, good. You're up.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
CONNECTICUT, VICE CHAIRMAN, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE YEAR 2000
TECHNOLOGY PROBLEM
Vice Chairman Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very
important and worthwhile hearing. I heard your comments as I
came in the door and I certainly subscribe to those sentiments
and opinions.
The first question that probably Senator Bennett and I get
asked by groups in our respective States around the country, if
they can think of one issue that comes to mind, it is air
travel. Both of us, and I think others who have been involved
and paid attention to this issue, have indicated our conclusion
that, based on everything we've seen, the safety of air travel
around the millennium dates in this country certainly is
nothing for anyone to be concerned about. The airlines
themselves are very much aware and conscious of this issue and
are monitoring it very, very carefully. Even international
travel, you will not have to be deeply concerned about picking
a carrier that's willing to go someplace that hasn't made a
determination that this is going to be perfectly safe.
So, on that issue alone, I agree entirely with the
Chairman's comments. We will continue to monitor and watch it
and make sure that those statements are borne out by even
better information as we get closer to the millennium dates.
The airline and travel industries have gone to great
lengths in my view to ensure that travel on the air, sea and
land is going to be safe. There continues to be some genuine
Y2K-related problems in foreign countries that I suggested.
Recently, the State Department prepared a detailed travel
advisory characterizing the level of safety for 194 countries.
Each country has dealt with the approach of the new millennium
in a different way and will carry in Y2K readiness come January
1. The State Department's public advisories indicate that
certain countries will be much safer than others. The United
States, Canada, England and Australia are expected to fare very
well during and after the date change occurs.
Other countries, such as India, China and Russia may be
more susceptible to Y2K problems. Again, we've talked about
these countries in the context of other issues, so it shouldn't
come as any great surprise, when there are shortcomings in
energy or telecommunications, it shouldn't be a great surprise
to discover that there may be some shortcomings in
transportation. In fact, a number of Asian-based airlines are
drawing up plans for alternative routes to Europe in order to
avoid flying over India, for instance, during that period of
time. It seems that India's own Air Traffic Controllers' guild
is worried about the Y2K readiness status in its own country.
When the State Department issues an advisory for an entire
area of the world, factors such as the continuing availability
of medical services, telecommunications, and utilities are
equally important to travel as actual transportation systems.
Therefore, just because planes will not fall out of the sky and
ships are not going to sink doesn't mean necessarily that all
is going to go well. We must look at the picture as a whole
before making a decision about where to go during this date
transition.
Recently, warnings have circulated within Japan and Great
Britain about the risks involved with traveling during Y2K. In
fact, the British Airline Pilots Association, a union with some
7,000 members, stated this past July that they will not fly to
areas they regard as unsafe. This means that pilots must be
trained and briefed on flying alternative routes, given that
some skies are potentially not as friendly as others.
Indeed, the Department of Transportation's Inspector
General tells us that 34 of 185 nations have not yet responded
to the International Civil Aviation Organization's request for
information. We will want to explore that with you here today.
Approximately one million passengers flew between these 34
countries and the United States last year.
An interagency committee, made up of the Department of
Transportation, Defense and State, reviewing the ICAO
information about the 89 countries that account for 97 percent
of U.S. international passengers, has determined that there is
insufficient information available for assessing the Y2K
readiness of 28 of the countries.
And even in this country, while again we feel pretty strong
about where we are, almost 2,000 of the 3,300 air carriers
surveyed by the FAA did not respond to the FAA's survey. All
were smaller carriers, I might point out. But nonetheless, with
less than 100 days to go, in my view, any carrier, I don't care
how small or big, that didn't respond to these things, there
ought to be immediate, direct contact with them as to why that
hasn't occurred. And if it goes on much longer, I would get
warnings that they're not going to fly. I want to hear what
you're prepared to tell those small airlines today if you don't
get answers back from them.
Despite this last statistic, the United States is more
prepared than any other country in the world, as the Chairman
has indicated. Problems in this country are more likely to
create inconveniences rather than safety issues. A major
concern of the Federal Highway Administration is how ready
State and local governments' traffic management systems,
traffic signal systems, and other intelligent transportation
systems are that make road travel convenient and delay-free.
Mr. Chairman, I was in Stamford, CN a week ago visiting the
corporate headquarters of Champion, International, which I know
you're familiar with. During the lunch on the 13th floor, all
the lights went out. We thought it was just in the building and
it turned out that a construction company in Stamford had gone
through the major cable that provided all the electrical power
for downtown, with all the traffic lights and everything shut
down.
I was leaving that meeting to have a press conference with
the mayor of Stamford, and the fire department, the police
department, about Stamford's Y2K readiness in city hall, what
they had done in conjunction with the local newspaper.
Actually, we had a great crowd, obviously, because everyone was
out of the buildings.
It made the point that while this was not an anticipated
event--we didn't orchestrate it--you got a good idea of what it
could be like when traffic signals and police officers had to
rush into intersections and move traffic around. So it's more
than just air travel, as the Chairman has suggested, and we
want to talk about those issues as well. It's the train
systems, mass transit systems, all matters of concern to us,
and hopefully we'll get into some of that with you today.
Again, I want to congratulate the Chairman for hosting this
important hearing, and to examine some of these issues that are
critically important to consumers in this country and abroad.
[The prepared statement of Vice Chairman Dodd can be found
in the appendix.]
Chairman Bennett. Thank you.
I would want to make one additional comment that was in my
prepared statement, but I think it's important for those who
are following this by television.
Here is a picture that looks very prosaic and unimpressive
of a ship. That is the Susan Maersk, a container ship. It is
the largest to call in an American port, 1,138 feet long, and
it transports the equivalent of 6,600 20-foot trainers. It
doesn't look like the great majestic Man of War of the Yankee
Clipper days, but as bulky and awkward as it looks, it is an
enormously efficient means of transporting goods across water.
I am stunned to realize and report to you that it has a
crew of 15. That demonstrates how dependent we are on computers
in today's world. The ship, we're assured, is Y2K compliant,
but it's just an illustration of how serious this can be in
international commerce if it's not under control.
Vice Chairman Dodd. I'll tell you, I sail a lot, as you
know, in New England waters. I'll tell you something. If you're
out sailing and it's a little hazy and misty--and I've had this
occur--and all of a sudden as the haze lifts and the mist and
the fog pull up, and on your horizon is one of these container
ships, you are convinced you're directly off course and you're
sailing into a city, they are so imposing to see on the water.
Chairman Bennett. Very good.
With that, at 92 days, 14 hours, 1 minute and fifty
seconds, Connecticut time, prior to Y2K, we welcome our
witnesses.
Our first panel will be from the Department of
Transportation, the Honorable Mortimer Downey, who is the
Deputy Secretary and a frequent witness to this committee, a
great friend of this committee. We welcome you, sir, and
congratulate you on your diligence here.
He is accompanied by the Honorable Kenneth Mead, who is the
Inspector General of the Department of Transportation, and
likewise, General Mead, the work that's been done in DOT has
been truly heroic to get us to the point where we're all
feeling as good as we are.
With that, we welcome you as witnesses. Secretary Downey,
we will hear from you first.
STATEMENT OF MORTIMER DOWNEY, DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Downey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Dodd,
for this chance to report on the Department of Transportation's
progress and accomplishments.
The President has made addressing the year 2000 problem a
top priority for the administration, and I am proud to say that
as a result of concerted effort, all 609 mission-critical
systems of DOT are fully 100 percent Y2K ready and have been
verified as such.
Over the next 92 days, we will continue to test, we'll
continue to monitor these systems, to keep them compliant. But
considering where we stood with this complex task a year ago,
or 2 years ago, I think our readiness is a tribute to
extraordinary efforts within the Department. In addition to the
departmental efforts, we have worked with the transportation
industry to assure a safe transition.
Let me briefly summarize the status of some of the
transportation sectors. Federal Highway has conducted extensive
outreach to State and local officials, through conferences,
through regional meetings, through their day-to-day work. We
continue to have confidence about the efforts of larger
organizations to manage traffic control and related systems.
We're still working with some smaller communities. We have
enlisted State and local participation to be part of the
monitoring and reporting system during the transition.
The major automobile manufacturers have reported to our
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that they expect
to Y2K related problems in their vehicles.
The Federal Transit Administration has required a Y2K
status report from all of its grant recipients, and as of
September 21, all but four of the 593 transit agencies in the
United States said they are compliant, or have contingency
plans. The four remaining are in Puerto Rico and we're working
with them. FTA is also requiring operational testing of these
measures, including the contingency plans.
The Federal Railroad Administration has hired a consulting
firm for further review and analysis of the Y2K status of the
major management systems of the nation's four major freight
railroads. Having seen computer problems with their mergers, we
wanted to be sure that their systems will work and that we
don't get into a backup and congestion problem. We'll have that
precautionary evaluation result ready early next month. The
safety issues on the railroads we believe are settled, with
grade crossings and switches not showing any problems.
Administrator Garvey and Admiral Naccara will provide you
with information on aviation and maritime readiness, and it is
generally good, although there is more work to be done in both
areas. I will stay to hear what they have to say.
Let me now address your questions about our plans to
provide information to the public about Y2K status in
international airline travel. Our interagency evaluation
process has reviewed information on the Y2K readiness of
foreign civil aviation entities. Individual country information
is now available as of this morning, at a DOT website. It's
www.fly2K.dot.gov, and it includes all that we know about air
traffic control, carriers serving U.S. routes, and airports
handling international flights. Today there are 90 countries'
information represented on the website, and we'll have some
more in a few weeks.
At this point, the FAA does not anticipate making specific
recommendations as to whether or not individuals should travel,
but we have that information available so that they can make
their judgments.
Safety is the top priority, always, for all of us. The FAA
has found that Y2K problems in civil aviation, to the extent
they may develop, appear more likely to cause disruptions of
service than a serious safety risk. I believe you will hear the
same, and you both mentioned the testimony from the
International Air Transport Association. Their on-the-ground
surveys have found the same. Safety appears to be in good
condition. If not, those airlines will not operate, but one of
the issues that might develop would be congestion.
Should a serious safety consideration arise, or appear to
be arising, involving international aviation, you can be
assured the U.S. Government will take appropriate steps.
At this point we can say, with some confidence, that eight
of the top 20 locations that have direct service from the U.S.,
including the top three--Canada, the United Kingdom and Japan--
are very likely to be ready. The rest of the top destinations
have strong programs underway, but we do not have enough
information to gauge their rate of progress.
We are still working to get more information about other
places that either did not respond to the international survey,
or had gaps in their information, and we will make that
available. But in those cases, travelers should exercise
prudence in making travel plans. We have been in close contact
with State on these issues, and the Department of Defense has
been part of the international evaluation.
Jumping forward to our information dissemination on the
millennium weekends, the DOT headquarters crisis management
center will be linked directly to the interagency coordination
center. We will have liaisons at DOD and State.
As to your question on actions the Congress or others
should take to address Y2K issues, I encourage your continued
efforts in promoting informed awareness of the Y2K issue as you
have done to date.
In conclusion, we are strongly committed to ensuring that
all DOT systems will operate properly. We recognize and will
discharge our responsibility to the public and the need to
continue our efforts to reach out to industry and to the many
public and private entities that operate the transportation
system.
This concludes my testimony. We have a longer written
statement that we provided for the record, and I would be happy
to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Downey can be found in the
appendix.]
Senator Dodd [presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Mead.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Mead. Thank you, Senator Dodd.
I can relate to your experience sailing. I'm from
Connecticut as well, and I can tell you that sailing outside
the Thames River, in the New London area, you come upon
submarines there. It's an equally frightening experience.
I'm going to summarize my testimony and cover three
subjects: departmental readiness, domestic transportation
industry readiness, and international aviation and maritime
readiness.
First, departmental readiness. Just over a year ago, many
of us had serious concerns about the Department, especially
FAA, and its Y2K progress. Our office has worked closely with
senior departmental officials, Secretary Slater, Deputy
Secretary Downey, FAA Administrator Garvey, and Commandant Loy
on the Y2K program.
We could not have asked for more support, Senator Dodd. It
was an extremely constructive working relationship. I think
this committee's oversight, as well as that of the House, and
hard work by departmental employees has resulted in a situation
where we can report an extremely positive situation.
Two cautionary notes about readiness in the Department. In
safeguarding systems that have already been made compliant, by
making changes or upgrades to them, we don't want to make them
noncompliant.
Second, business and contingency plans need to be finalized
with proper training and testing and coordination with labor
unions. At FAA, the controllers' union is participating. To
date, the maintenance technicians have not participated,
although they have been invited to do so.
Moving to domestic-industry readiness, the Department
relies heavily on self-reported data as a key measure of
industry readiness. The responses to departmental surveys have
been mixed, ranging from 36 percent in marine, and 41 percent
for air carriers--although all large air carriers have
responded--to over 90 percent for transit.
Based on survey results, our sense is that large domestic
providers in all transportation modes are making good progress
and they ought to be ready in time. We are disappointed,
though, at the lack of information concerning the readiness of
smaller providers.
An important point here is that getting information from
nonresponding organizations and filling the voids is going to
remain a major challenge for the remainder of the year.
However, it can be done, as Mr. Koskinen mentioned yesterday.
Let me overview the situation by mode. In aviation, all
larger carriers responded to FAA's survey, and 1,900 smaller
carriers did not respond. This is just unacceptable. At this
late hour, the FAA is pursuing these nonresponding carriers,
including a planned action to publish their names after
November 15.
Frankly, Senator, I agree with you. If they want to fly in
this country, they can at least respond to a questionnaire
about whether they're Y2K compliant.
Vice Chairman Dodd. This was a questionnaire from the FAA.
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Dodd. It wasn't from some congressional
office or a newspaper making inquiry. These are carriers that
have already been approved by the FAA to fly, and you're the
regulatory body that gives them that permission to carry
passengers, isn't that correct?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir. And I think that's an important point
for another reason, too. You're going to hear today about
international readiness and how we want more information from
these foreign countries. Certainly we have to have our own
house clean if we're going to be asking foreign countries to
come forward with statements about their readiness.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Let me just tell you, we're maybe only
in session another 3 weeks, but I will use the forum here to
say that if within the week you haven't heard back from these
people, I will offer a piece of legislation on a continuing
resolution that prohibits any airline that has not provided
information to the FAA about its readiness, that will not allow
them to fly after December 31 in this country. I hope they hear
that. But I'm going to draft a bill today, have it ready, and
if they don't respond to the FAA within a week, then I'm going
to introduce the bill. Anyone who has not responded by the
middle of November--As far as I'm concerned, I'm worried about
that point, whether or not the information would be accurate.
So let that be a service and notice here today, that they're
not going to be flying airplanes in this country come December
31 if they can't respond to the Federal regulatory body
responsible for passenger safety.
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
In maritime, the Coast Guard has received information from
43 percent of vessels visiting U.S. ports. I would like to
commend the Coast Guard here because that response rate was not
sufficient, and the Coast Guard has demonstrated that there
will be consequences for failure to respond. In fact, in early
September, the Coast Guard stopped 175 ship movements due to
lack of Y2K-readiness.
In the surface areas, all transit operators, except four
which are in Puerto Rico, responded. They were required to
respond and did so.
For freight railroad companies, the seven largest companies
reported they will be ready by today. We still need information
from a large number of regional and local railroad companies.
I would like to move to international. As of today,
information about some foreign countries' readiness is still
sketchy or too incomplete for to allow assessment, although the
picture has been improving, and clearly so in the last several
weeks.
Just as an illustration, we testified a couple of weeks
ago--and at that point 54 of 185 member countries had not even
responded. When we wrote our testimony, it was down to 34, and
today it's down to 30----
Mr. Downey. Twenty-nine.
Mr. Mead. Twenty-nine. So I think these hearings and the
efforts of the Department are beginning to bear fruit in that
area.
Vice Chairman Dodd. We'll offer a similar admonition to
international carriers who want to fly to the United States.
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
FAA plans to impose flight restrictions only if there's a
known, verifiable problem. But significant uncertainties
continue to exist, where we simply don't know enough to make a
judgment.
I'm not persuaded that approach is going to be sufficient,
because you just won't be able to say, ``well, we know there's
a problem'' if you have incomplete information. So I think it's
becoming exponentially important that we get a complete package
of information. This is not just a case of not having
information from countries where people won't go at that time
of year. Some of the countries where the information is
incomplete are, in fact, places where people will go.
With regard to international maritime readiness, there's a
lack of publicly available international information. I would
recommend you get a classified briefing. The Admiral who will
testify on this later will offer you one, and I think you'll
find that quite useful Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mead can be found in the
appendix.]
Chairman Bennett [presiding.] Thank you.
I apologize for having missed your formal testimony, but
having read your testimony, we do have some questions that we
will like to ask of you.
I want to start by congratulating the Department once again
on the tremendous work that has been done. If you go back and
look at statements made by this committee, by me, Senator Dodd,
a year or year-and-a-half ago, we expressed great, great
concern. The fact that we're all feeling as good as we are
right now is a tribute to the work that's been done.
Of course, the ultimate responsibility is the Secretaries,
and we acknowledge that and pay tribute to the Secretary,
because as I've said repeatedly in this format, this is a CEO
problem, not a CIO problem. If the man at the top doesn't take
it seriously, it doesn't get done.
Secretary Downey, we recognize that you have been the one
within the Department to whom the Secretary has delegated this
responsibility. We extend this congratulation to you.
It's clear from your testimony that you're now a little
more concerned with rail than you are with air. Aviation is the
one that everybody thinks about because we personally fly now,
but from the standpoint of the economy, if the rail system were
to shut down, the impact on goods throughout the country would
be enormous.
Can we talk a little bit more specifically about rail and
where you think the rail situation may be, either one of you?
Mr. Downey. We will know better in a week or two when our
review is completed of the four major freight railroads. I hope
we will be able to say things will be fine. We are comfortable
now with the safety issue. Switches, grade crossings and the
like will operate.
What we had concern about was the experience we all went
through with the various mergers, particularly most recently
the Conrail transaction, where Norfolk Southern and CSX took
over Conrail. We saw again how much the interdependence of the
major railroads is driven by their computer systems. There was
a small problem in the Norfolk Southern on the day of the
takeover. They didn't quite program the computer right and it
cascaded throughout the system because freight cars could not
be sent to the right destination. Trains could not be made up.
This has immediate economic consequences and, when not
corrected, could develop into safety consequences.
The railroads, the major freight railroads, assure us that
they have been working on these systems and that they will be
compliant. But as a precautionary measure, we asked to go in--
and they invited us in--to review the progress that's been
made. We will have a specific report on that very shortly.
Chairman Bennett. Thank you.
Mr. Mead. The only thing I would add is that Amtrak, which
is Y2K ready, is reliant on the rail companies outside the
northeast corridor, where Amtrak doesn't own the track. The
rail companies own the track and the basic infrastructure.
Also, in transit rail, additional work is needed. We had
hoped all of them would be compliant now. All of them are
reporting they will be compliant in the coming months, but
there is still attention needed in transit rail.
Chairman Bennett. That anticipated my next question, which
has to do with transit.
Your recent report said that of the top 30 transit
grantees, which account for 75 percent of the ridership, only
four were Y2K compliant, with the rest saying they would be. Is
that still the latest information you have?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir, that's our latest information.
Chairman Bennett. Of course, the one that immediately comes
to mind--and we get this question all the time--what about
Metro? Are our staffs going to be able to get to work in
January of 2000? Are your staffs going to be able to get to
work?
Mr. Downey. Metro is one of those that is not yet compliant
but will be there by the end of the year.
One of the things we have reminded the transit operators of
is that they will be one of the first public services to be put
to a full-scale test over the millennium weekend, in downtown
Washington, in downtown Boston, in New York, where thousands,
if not hundreds of thousands, of people will be coming to
community celebrations--and they're all going to want to get
home. And they're going to need to get home on the subways.
So if they hadn't thought that through to this point, we
had a meeting at the White House with the major transit
operators, and they're now facing up to it. That is a real
challenge. They have their contingency plans in place, and
they're also working through their compliance and they should
be there.
Many of the rail systems will pause service for five or 10
minutes before and after midnight. That's preplanned. People
should understand that and plan their trips accordingly. But
it's part of their contingency effort.
Chairman Bennett. What's the purpose of service
interruption?
Mr. Downey. In the off chance that something might go wrong
in their dispatch system--We saw it the other morning on the
Metro, the first time in the 20 years of its history, the
computer didn't startup and the trains on the Red Line didn't
startup. So rather than take any risks, they just feel 5
minutes out of their schedule, with each train stopping at a
station, would be a useful precaution.
Chairman Bennett. We're going to hear later from the Coast
Guard, but do you have any general comment about maritime
shipping and the problems--this is not strictly a DOT problem,
but it is connected with transportation. I would hope you would
have some connection with the folks who do handle it.
The computers at Customs need to handle the paperwork, as
container ships like this show up. You don't press hard and
make three carbons as you do the paperwork on 6,600 trailers
packed on that ship. It's got to be done by computer. That's
all part of the international transportation system.
Do you have a sense as to where we are in that?
Mr. Downey. Customs and Immigration have been part of our
transportation Y2K task force. They've been working on their
systems, which are, incidentally, old and somewhat fragile. But
they believe they will be ready.
The maritime side continues to be a bit problematic, in
that there are so many different ships, so many different
owners, so many different configurations. I think the Coast
Guard has done a terrific job of organizing internationally to
set a code of good practice in place. All the major port and
maritime countries have adopted that. The IMO usually takes 5
years to do anything, but got this done in less than a year.
As General Mead said, in the 9-9-99 test that we went
through, the Coast Guard actually stopped a number of ships and
said, ``Let's see your Code of Good Practice compliance
certificate.'' When they didn't have it, they were not
permitted entry until they could get it. So we know how ships
and terminals should be operating, and we are prepared to take
action.
The Coast Guard has also scheduled and carried out drills
in our major ports, on how to deal with any problems that
develop. We also have invited port and maritime officials from
around the world to join us on those drills, and then to go
back and do them in their countries. But there will be a high
state of alert in our ports over the millennium period so the
Coast Guard is ready to deal with any eventualities.
Mr. Mead. The American Association of Port Authorities did
a survey of 83 ports, and the response rate was not what you
would like to see. There were about 33 responses. So it's quite
critical that we get these different transportation entities to
respond as to their readiness.
I again would like to endorse the Coast Guard action, in
which they actually restricted ship movements to show the
consequences of not responding.
Chairman Bennett. One final question going to the area of
vulnerability that has become part of my education with respect
to Y2K.
Do you anticipate, or have you seen any signs at all of any
malicious attempts, either on the part of hackers who want the
thrill, or those who wish this country ill, who want to inflict
some kind of damage, to try to break into the air traffic
control system, produce a malicious result, perhaps under the
guise of a Y2K problems? So that it would be more difficult to
trace the source of that attack and cause you to think, ``Gee,
this is a Y2K failure'' when, in fact, it's a terrorist group
or someone else that wants to disrupt us?
Have you done anything with respect to that, or seen any
signs of that?
Mr. Downey. We're sensitive to that as a potential. We have
seen no signs, but FAA and our other entities will be
monitoring their systems over that period for any potential
intrusions.
We have done some exercises within the Department to be
prepared, and that's the kind of a scenario we have thrown on
the table, to be sure that people are sensitive to it and ready
to respond quickly, and ready to do, in every case, what would
restore safety to the system first, and then restore economic
performance.
Mr. Mead. We are aware of one incident, not involving air
traffic control. It involved involving a pipeline, which is
under the Department's jurisdiction. An individual was
allegedly going to blow up a pipeline. It would masquerade as a
Y2K problem. The reason he was going to do this was to purchase
stock options.
Mr. Downey. Oil futures.
Mr. Mead. Yes, to get oil futures, and then the pipeline
would go up on January 1 and it would look like a Y2K problem.
So this is something we all need to be mindful of in all modes.
Chairman Bennett. The criminal or terrorist mind can be
very inventive sometimes, and we need to be equally inventive
in protecting ourselves against it.
Senator Dodd, if you have no further questions--or did you
not get to ask any?
Vice Chairman Dodd. I didn't get any. We were going to
recess, but the statements were finished.
Chairman Bennett. OK, go ahead.
Vice Chairman Dodd. I understand you raised a couple of
points that I was going to raise, and I will talk with staff
about the responses to them. Let me bring up a couple more, if
I can.
I think it was you, Mr. Mead, who mentioned that flight
restrictions would only be imposed where there was a known,
verifiable safety problem. What I'm curious about is when the
survey was done by an interagency committee, as I mentioned,
assessing foreign nations Y2K readiness, 28 of the 29 countries
most frequently visited by the United States have not provided
sufficient information to adequately assess their Y2K
readiness, 31 percent of those countries.
The question is, is it safe to assume that all the other
almost 70 percent did provide sufficient information, and how
does the interagency committee plan on evaluating countries
with insufficient information, particularly in the statement
that it has to be known, verifiable safety problems?
Am I phrasing that properly enough for you to----
Mr. Mead. Yes, and Mr. Downey will probably want to amplify
on my response.
The Department has five categories of readiness that the
different countries, based on the assessment of their
responses, are plugged into. The first two categories are good
categories. The third category is the country says they're not
going to be ready. I don't think there are any in that category
now. There were last week.
Another category is, ``well, progress is being made, but we
don't have a sufficient package of information to indicate the
complete status of Y2K readiness.'' A fifth category is there
is simply insufficient information available at this time to do
any assessment.
There were, as you said, 28 countries--and this is as of
September 13--that were in that bottom category, and there were
45 that were in the next-to-the-bottom category, and in the
last several weeks that 28 figure has dropped to 18, which is a
very good sign.
But still, the awkward situation, it places the----
Vice Chairman Dodd. The ten, where did they move to? Did
they move to the top category or just one step up?
Mr. Downey. Some moved right to the top category. Others
moved up----
Vice Chairman Dodd. Right to the top?
Mr. Downey. Yeah.
Mr. Mead. And I think this places FAA in an awkward
situation. Having known, verifiable information of a problem is
one thing. But you can't say you have known, verifiable
information about a problem if you don't have any information.
That's the point of concern that we were raising in our
testimony, sir.
Mr. Downey. If I could just add to that, I think you'll
hear from the international air carriers on this. If we know
that a particular country--and there are 17 now in this
category--is one where we have insufficient information, the
airline will still make a judgment as to whether or not they
should fly to that country. My understanding is they would
appropriately protect themselves, enough fuel to get to another
destination, certainty as to when they make the approach to the
country, how they would make the landing. This is not unlike
what they do on any given day, in terms of landing at foreign
destinations. So it is not as if they fly off into a black
hole. They fly to a known destination and they may not have all
the services available that might normally be available, and
they need to be prepared in that circumstance to make a safe
and graceful recovery.
Vice Chairman Dodd. There are a number of recommendations
we may hear from the Federation of Air Line Pilots Association,
representing 120,000 pilots in the country. I see here they
made about five or six recommendations, and you mentioned one
or two of them here.
Do you agree with all of those?
Mr. Downey. I have not seen the five specifically, but in
general, the idea of more training and----
Vice Chairman Dodd. Increasing flight crew contingency
training, do you agree with that?
Mr. Downey. We think that would be a good idea.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Refresher training for aircraft
collision avoidance systems?
Mr. Downey. That sounds to me like something that's always
a good thing to do.
Vice Chairman Dodd. I was hoping you would say that.
Aircraft should have an extra 30-minute fuel supply, which
you just mentioned.
Mr. Downey. Yes.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Noncritical military flights should be
curtailed.
Mr. Downey. I would leave that to DOD to react to.
Vice Chairman Dodd. An extra pilot should be in the cockpit
during this rollover period, how do you feel about that?
Mr. Downey. I think I would defer to FAA on that.
Vice Chairman Dodd. I raised earlier--and you weren't in
the room, Mr. Chairman--but I was sort of stunned once again.
We've been through this with a number of other industries, and
the pharmaceutical industry was one back a couple of months
ago.
I was rather surprised to learn how many of our airlines
have not responded to the surveys requested by the FAA. As
suggested, I'm going to draft some legislation and I'm going to
give them a little bit of time to respond to these surveys--
very quickly, not much. Then I will be prepared to submit
legislation which would prohibit any airline that had not
submitted information to the FAA about its Y2K status from
flying after December 31st.
What I want to get at here is, if you don't get this
information quickly--I mean, I can see someone now just saying
``Let's fill out the survey and tell them what they need to
hear''. I want to make sure there's enough time to make an
independent assessment as to whether or not the information
you're getting is good.
How much time would you need? You get these surveys back,
and then I presume someone is going to verify what information
you're receiving; is that correct? Do you verify?
Mr. Mead. They don't directly verify, but the questionnaire
that the FAA has prepared, I think it is pretty good. It will
take them some time. I would defer to them as to how long it
will take. But it's a pretty good questionnaire. You can tell a
lot from the answers, and the questions are not so general that
you could drive a truck through them.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Who is required to sign the survey? Is
the CEO of the company required to sign?
Mr. Mead. I don't know, sir. I would defer to FAA.
Vice Chairman Dodd. I would like to know, because for the
ones who have not responded, I would like to see the CEO's
signature on that. I don't want to see some third or fourth
level accountant doing it. I want the boss's name on that.
Mr. Downey. Senator, in our surveys of the public transit
agencies, which as I noted we have received 99.9 percent
response, that is what we require, the chairman of the agency
to give us his or her assurance.
Vice Chairman Dodd. You know, I have made the suggest that,
if you don't hear back from these people, I'm prepared to try
to put something in that would prohibit these guys from flying.
Now, do you disagree with that?
Mr. Downey. No.
Mr. Mead. I can't speak for FAA or the Department, but
speaking for myself, this recommendation was made months ago.
FAA chose to proceed with a voluntary survey, rather than an
attestation. That was their call. And now, at the 11th hour,
they find themselves in a situation in which all the large
carriers have responded, but 1,900 or so that haven't.
Vice Chairman Dodd. What's the number again that have not
responded?
Mr. Mead. About 1,900, sir.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Out of how many?
Mr. Mead. About three thousand. And these are small
carriers, not to give a misleading impression.
Vice Chairman Dodd. I understand.
Mr. Downey, do you want to----
Mr. Mead. No one is required to sign them.
Vice Chairman Dodd. What's that?
Mr. Mead. No one is required to sign the questionnaire, I'm
advised.
Vice Chairman Dodd. I would want somebody who gets held
accountable. I would suggest that, given the timeframe here, I
would almost recommend that these be signed, maybe a--I would
like the boss to sign those.
Chairman Bennett. Ask Jane Garvey. She's next.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Jane is coming up. All right, we'll ask
Jane. So you know the question is coming. [Laughter.]
Ms. Garvey. I'm worried about the answer, though.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Good.
Mr. Downey, I'll ask Ms. Garvey. But I appreciate your
answer on this. Again, I obviously have to draft something and
have you take a look at it. We'll run the draft piece of
legislation by you.
But I would feel irresponsible, knowing what I know, that
1,900 carriers have failed to respond to the agency responsible
for regulating them, about whether or not they're Y2K ready.
Candidly, frankly, knowing that and not taking some action here
would cause this Congress to be held accountable for lacking
responsibility on this issue. I don't like doing it, but I
don't know how else to get their attention.
What I want to know is, when they send this stuff back,
that there's some way to verify to determine they're OK. It
makes me nervous. An airline that would not fill out a survey
is telling you something. I don't like what I'm hearing on
this. An awful lot of Americans fly on these small airlines
every day, and----
Mr. Mead. That approach worked very effectively in transit.
The reason we are able to report to you today on the status of
all the transit properties in this country is because the
Federal Transit Administration said, if you want to continue
getting money, you will respond.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Yeah. And it worked, didn't it?
Mr. Mead. They did respond.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Just the last thing I would like to do.
Mr. Downey, you mentioned DOT's interface with the Y2K
Information Center. I wonder if you could briefly describe how
the status information will flow among the Department of
Transportation, the ICC, and the transportation industry.
For instance, where should a concerned consumer go for Y2K
status information? Do they go to DOT, ICC, or some other place
to get information as this thing gets closer to the date?
Mr. Downey. As we get closer, we will certainly make
information available through our media outlets, including the
Web. The ICC will duplicate that. The ICC is not generating any
independent information on transportation. We're basically
providing it to them. But that gives them a broader picture of
electric power, communication, transportation and all of the
issues.
But it is a seamless system of information. We have
developed computer programs to store it and display it, and as
we get closer to that time period, we will make the public
aware of how to get it, where to get it, and what it will look
like, so that they can make their judgments.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Thank you both, very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Bennett. Thank you.
Mr. Downey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Bennett. We appreciate your testimony and all of
your work.
Our second panel is the Honorable Jane Garvey, who has been
sitting there taking notes, the Administrator of the FAA; Mr.
Peter Cooke, who is the Year 2000 Coordinator for British
Airways; Mr. David Z. Plavin, who is President of Airports
Council for International-North America; Mr. Thomas Windmuller,
who is the Y2K Project Director for IATA, the International Air
Transport Association; and Mr. Edward Smart, Representative to
ICAO, for the International Federation of Air Line Pilots
Organizations.
We appreciate your being here. You have heard all of the
questions and comments up till now, and we look forward to
hearing your testimony.
Mr. Windmuller, we'll begin with you. Well, let us begin
with Administrator Garvey. She is the ``rose amidst the
thorns''. [Laughter.]
Then we'll start at the end and go down.
Administrator Garvey.
STATEMENT OF HON. JANE F. GARVEY, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Garvey. Thank you very much for both the introduction
and for allowing us to be here, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much. I am really delighted to be with so many of my
colleagues, all of whom we've worked very closely with
particularly over the last year.
The Deputy Secretary has reported on the entire Department,
but I will just make a brief comment or two about the FAA, if I
could.
Let me say, as you have acknowledged--and I appreciate it
very much--the last time I appeared before this Committee I
promised that the FAA would complete its Y2K readiness by June
30th, and I am delighted to say, as the Deputy Secretary
indicated, that we have delivered on that commitment.
Each of our components in which a Y2K fix was required has
undergone multiple testing and validation. On April 10th of
this past year we conducted an end-to-end testing. During this
test, our air traffic control systems were set forward to
December 31 and rolled over to January 1, 2000. The testing
demonstrated that our operational fixes transitioned
flawlessly.
As the Deputy Secretary indicated, the challenge for us now
is to maintain the integrity of our Y2K status by making sure
that any changes that we make to our systems in the normal
course of business are Y2K compliant. We certainly want to stay
the course here.
Moreover, we have established a moratorium on changes to
the National Airspace System during the critical periods of
this transition. That moratorium will be effective from mid-
November through very early January, as well as during
February--because, you know, we have the leap year issue, so we
have a couple of periods where there will be a moratorium on
any changes.
In addition, as the Inspector General has mentioned, we
have developed a comprehensive business continuity and
contingency plan. The plan really builds on our existing
contingency plans to specifically address potential disruptions
caused by Y2K. The contingency plan has been developed with the
participation of our labor workforce. That's been critical from
my perspective. Certainly having that at the table with us has
been very important and very, very helpful.
That's the status of where we are at the FAA, but we
certainly recognize that our efforts do not end at the FAA's
doors. What I would like to do is just briefly outline what we
at the FAA have been doing with the industry over the past 18
months or so.
I know that you're going to hear a great deal from David
Plavin about our domestic airports. I would only say that we've
been monitoring and working very closely with the airports. We
are very focused on 20 computer systems on airports that may be
used to comply with our regulatory safety requirements, so
there are 20 airports system that we really are focused on.
Seven of those have a direct impact on safety, things having to
do with lighting, things having to do with fire trucks, things
of that sort.
We have notified all of our airport operators, our
certificated airport operators, that by October 15 they are
expected to have those systems Y2K compliant. But I will say we
have been very pleased with the kind of relationship and the
kind of work we've been able to do with them.
We visited 150 of the top airports, and they account for
about 97 percent of all the enplanements. We're very pleased
with the progress made in those airports in particular. I'm
sure Mr. Plavin will have more to say on that.
With respect to the U.S. aircraft fleet and airlines, the
FAA, as the IG and Deputy Secretary have mentioned, has
conducted extensive surveys with our certificate holders.
Again, I listened very carefully to the comments and the
questions that you all raised. We have gotten responses to
date, but we are, as you have indicated, concerned about the
ones we have not yet heard from.
Just incidentally, our managers and many of our field
inspectors are in Washington today. Each one of them is very,
very focused on this issue. They are responsible for a certain
number of our certificate holders, and they're going to be
looking at three issues today: what do we know, what
information do we have, what areas are we concerned with, what
specific certificate holders have we not heard from or are we
concerned about the information, and what are we going to do
about it? We are going back to them individually, and quite
honestly, Senator, I think the idea of legislation could be
very helpful to us.
We have worked with the IG on the November 15 deadline. We
are going to tell them categorically that they must get back to
us, that we must have that information early in November, so
that we can analyze it and know quite clearly on November 15
what the----
Vice Chairman Dodd. Just to jump in quickly, what I hear
you saying, then--and obviously, you will want to see what we
draft, and I would run it by your staff and so forth. But the
idea of prohibiting an airline from flying that has not
responded to a survey from the FAA is something you would agree
with?
Ms. Garvey. I certainly think that could be very helpful. I
will tell you that I continue to remain optimistic, that we
will get the information back. But I think there is nothing----
Vice Chairman Dodd. But in a timely fashion, I would
presume, as well.
Ms. Garvey. Absolutely.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Getting information on December 30----
Ms. Garvey [continuing]. Will not be helpful. That's right.
The FAA has been working, as you will hear, with the
International Civil Aviation Organization in raising the whole
issue internationally. I will shift to that, if I could.
We have been very supportive of the efforts of the
International Air Transport Association [IATA]. We are
promoting the IATA Airports Council International airline-
airport business contingency plan, and again, that's very
similar to the contingency plans that we have undertaken
domestically.
We are also doing, as the Deputy Secretary mentioned,
extensive international testing. By December, we will have
conducted testing with 23 countries to ensure adequate
communication exchanges for those countries with which we have
direct interfaces. We already have schedules in place to test
both the voice and the data systems in order to validate the
connections between our air traffic control systems.
We work very closely with the Departments of
Transportation, with Defense and with State, on the interagency
working group to review the information, and the Deputy
Secretary has spoken about that in some detail. I want to make
it clear, as we move forward, should we gain any knowledge at
any point that causes us to be concerned about the safe
operations of the civil air fleet, we are prepared to act
appropriately. If it means issuing Notice to Airmen, we will
take that action.
Again, I think that from what we've heard and the work
we've done internationally with our colleagues there, I think
we are encouraged to date. But I think all of us have said
we'll be very vigilant and be prepared to take whatever
appropriate actions are necessary.
Let me just summarize, because I know we have a very full
panel today and we would like to hear from all of them.
The question you asked in the letter about what Congress
can do, I think I speak for all of us at the FAA. We think that
we owe Congress a debt of gratitude for keeping this issue very
much on the forefront, keeping it very much in the public
domain. We appreciate that enormously.
I also want to publicly again thank the Secretary and the
Deputy Secretary. I don't think I have met with the Deputy
Secretary once in the past year where he hasn't asked about our
Y2K efforts. So they are very, very focused on that. And the
IG's as well. I think we've had an extraordinarily cooperative
relationship with him in working these issues through.
Finally, it is always wonderful to be able to say publicly
how much I appreciate the efforts of the men and women of the
FAA. To meet that deadline of June 30 was an extraordinary
effort. People really worked around the clock to get that done.
I am very proud of the agency and proud of the men and women
who saw that through.
So we're very pleased with our progress to date, but as we
said earlier, we've not overconfident. We will stay vigilant,
stay very watchful. We know that we really can't rest until
we're well into the year 2000.
With that, I will conclude my testimony. Thank you very
much.
Chairman Bennett. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Garvey can be found in the
appendix.]
Chairman Bennett. Mr. Windmuller.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS WINDMULLER, DIRECTOR, IATA YEAR 2000
PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
Mr. Windmuller. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice
Chairman.
I would like to start this morning by thanking this
Committee for providing IATA with an opportunity to explain
what we, on behalf of the international air transport industry,
have been doing to prepare for the year 2000. The international
airline community and the civil aviation industry at large have
a good story to tell about their work in this field.
Having submitted a written statement to the Committee in
advance of today's hearing, I will confine my verbal remarks to
a few highlights, first, with respect to airlines and the Year
2000 problem. In 1996 IATA established the Year 2000 Group, a
forum in which our 265 member airlines could meet regularly to
discuss the Year 2000 preparations in a non-competitive
environment. Participants exchange information about problems
encountered, solutions identified and best practices
established. IATA has also collected information on the
readiness of aircraft systems from the major airframe
manufacturers, Western and Russian, and made this information
available to member airlines, as well as to other airlines
participating in our Year 2000 work. IATA has also been in
contact with the major computer reservation systems. Since
early 1999 they have been accepting reservations for dates
after the rollover. At last count our member airlines are
expected to spend at $2.3 billion in preparing for the
millennium change.
It is with airports and air traffic service providers that
IATA has concentrated the bulk of its work. IATA has been
tracking their progress in preparing for the millennium
transition for the past 15 months. To increase Y2K awareness
amongst airports and air traffic service providers around the
world, we have distributed over 2,500 industry Y2K tool kits in
eight different languages, a copy of which I have brought with
me here today. We have also conducted a series of 26 training
seminars that attracted over 2,000 participants, and I am very
pleased to report that we do not believe there is any major
international airport or provider of air traffic services in
the world that is not aware of the Year 2000 problem and its
potential impact on the air transport industry. We have carried
out visits to the overwhelming majority of the world's air
traffic service providers and to the top 71 airports outside of
North America. Individual airlines, working on behalf of the
entire airline industry, have conducted independent visits to
several hundred more airports. As of last week we had obtained
data covering more than 175 ATS sites around the world, and
from over 1,200 airports.
Based upon this data, we are generally satisfied with the
progress we are seeing amongst all sectors of the air transport
industry. Some 326 airports, for example, report that they have
completed their Y2K preparations on 100 percent of all systems.
Several hundred more report they are nearing completion on 100
percent of all systems. However, IATA will continue, through
the end of the year, to track the progress of those entities
that have not yet completed their work.
IATA has also played a proactive in helping states, ATS
providers and airports to adapt their existing business
continuity and contingency plans to a Y2K environment.
Contingency planning is something the air transport industry
undertakes every day. The aviation industry is committed to
providing safe, dependable service to our passengers and
shippers. Therefore, airlines, airports and ATS providers
always have contingency plans available to cover almost every
conceivable scenario. We implement these plans regularly due to
weather problems, labor strife and other disruptive events, and
we are very accustomed to working with these plans, often with
no discernible impact on the service we provide.
During the rollover ICAO and IATA personnel will jointly be
manning a network of regional coordination units in every
region of the world. These centers will track developments
across the globe as each time zone flips over from December
31st to January 1st.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, IATA is confident that the
international civil aviation industry has solutions to this
challenge in hand. The confidence is based on the good progress
we are seeing amongst our industry partners on the existence of
robust contingency plans, and on the real-time tracking of
developments that will take place during the rollover period.
Our confidence notwithstanding, we are not complacent. We will
continue and even accelerate our work on all fronts over the
remaining 92 days of 1999 and during the first quarter of 2000.
IATA is also confident that sufficient air space capacity
will be available to enable those airlines that choose to do so
to operate their normal year-end schedules, even with the
implementation of contingency plans that have been agreed by
states under the auspices of ICAO.
Notwithstanding all the efforts by airlines, airports and
ATS providers, it would be unwise to predict a flawless
transition into the next millennium. There may be some flight
delays, some cancellations or other disruptions. In the days
that follow the rollover, we will be tracking the lifting of
these contingency measures, as the number of passengers wishing
to travel increases and airlines begin to ramp up their
schedules. We hope and expect that these inconveniences will
not be significantly greater than they are on any other winter
weekend. And it's important to emphasize that these are
inconveniences. We are very confident that there will be no
compromise on safety.
To paraphrase one of my industry colleagues, Mr. Chairman,
if any of your constituents has real concerns about the Year
2000 problem, tell them to book a flight. The one place I know
they will be safe from the bug is on an airplane.
Before closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this
opportunity to recognize the outstanding Y2K work performed by
the Federal Aviation Administration, by our colleagues at the
Air Transport Association, and by the major US carriers. The
very high level of Y2K readiness throughout the airport
industry in this country is to a great extent the result of the
strong programs that these parties have implemented. Equally
significant, however, is the strong leadership that
Administrator Garvey and her team, the Air Transport
Association and the major US airlines have exercised in the
international arena. All of them have extended strong support
to the IATA industry initiative, and the work of all these
entities deserves to be recognized by this Committee.
IATA would also like to commend this Committee, Mr.
Chairman, for its leadership in obtaining congressional passage
earlier this year of the so-called Safe Harbor Legislation.
This legislation serves as a model for other national
legislatures, a model that has been followed by an
unfortunately small number of countries. We would respectfully
request that Members of the Congress use their contacts with
legislators from other countries, through the North Atlantic
Assembly, for example, to encourage their national legislatures
to enact similar laws.
Mr. Chairman, we are grateful for the opportunity to appear
here today to discuss one of the largest challenges ever faced
by civil aviation. We appreciate the continued interest of this
Committee in the problems faced by those who fly planes around
the world and in the welfare of those who are flown.
I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or
the Vice Chairman might wish to pose.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Windmuller can be found in
the appendix.]
Chairman Bennett. Thank you very much.
Mr. Plavin.
STATEMENT OF DAVID Z. PLAVIN, PRESIDENT, AIRPORTS COUNCIL
INTERNATIONAL-NORTH AMERICA
Mr. Plavin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Dodd.
ACI-North America, the Airports Council International, is a
trade association representing about 400 airports, 150 airport
operators, and we handle about 97 percent of the domestic and
virtually all of the international passenger and cargo activity
in the United States and Canada.
Because of the nature of this industry and because of the
nature of the business, we have worked very closely with the
air carriers and with FAA in trying to be sure that our member
airports will be ready for the rollover. We have participated
with FAA and with the carriers in creating seminars and other
forums for airports to exchange information, both with
themselves and with the carriers and with the FAA. We have been
operating this in that mode for about 2 years now.
Because the 18,000 airports in the United States are
locally owned and operated, it has been somewhat difficult to
form a single view of the readiness of the industry. Unlike the
major airlines or the regional airlines, with their relatively
smaller number of operators, this diverse ownership makes it
rather difficult. However, having said that, many attempts were
undertaken by FAA, by the Inspector General, by the General
Accounting Office, and we found that in general the airports
are not only ready, but that they are well ahead of their
original schedules. By and large, we found that at the
commercial airports, at least 80 percent of the systems that
have been identified as critical, have been found to be Y2K
compliant, and the rest are expected to be compliant by the end
of the month of November.
However, having said that, I think there are a couple of
important points to keep in mind. One of them is the
contingency plan approach, which Tom Windmuller referred to. It
is common practice among our member airports to conduct
extensive testing to assure that every affected system will be
made fully compliant. It is also common practice to develop
contingency plans to assure continuation of the functions in
the unlikely event of a failure. Airports do contingency
planning all the time. They have emergency drills. They
participate for disruptions, dislocations of all kind
throughout the course of their business. And so it is natural
to expect that this contingency planning process will be in
place and will be tested in a number of occasions between now
and the rollover date. So we are confident that a high quality
of contingency planning has been done and will continue to be
done between now and the Y2K rollover.
The other part that is important to note is that there are
not very many airport systems that are critical to the
functioning of the system. The aviation system has been
subjected, I would argue, to unwarranted speculation regarding
potential for Y2K failures having an impact on safety, and
fortunately, that speculation is not warranted; unfortunately,
that speculation continues.
ACI has worked with the Air Transport Association of the US
and with the Air Transport Association of Canada, and
particularly with FAA to prepare and distribute to certificated
airports a list of approximately 150 systems commonly owned by
airports that might be susceptible to Y2K failure. Many of the
important systems that people think about are not operated by
airports, but the ones that are have been viewed by FAA and by
the airports and the airlines that use the systems. In FAA's
judgment there were 48 systems that were initially identified
as either critical to airfield operations or useful in
fulfilling some regulatory requirement. We believe that very
few of these actually have the potential for either
significantly affecting operation or safety. Many of the
systems merely serve to increase efficiency by automating
functions formerly performed manually. Others provide
information, or data bases, or record keeping in nature and do
not control operational functions. 3 of these 48 systems have
been the subject of frequent speculation and are worthy of
additional discussion here.
The first of those is the airfield lighting control
systems. These are tools for controlling the thousands of
lights used on a typical airport runway and the taxiway system.
Newer systems are computer controlled. Some of them have been
found to have the possibility of failing in the Y2K
environment. These systems generally have been replaced or
repaired by our members, and subsequent testing indicates that
they are free from risk. However, the important point here is
that airports can still flip the switch and turn them on if
they fail.
The second one of these I think which is important to talk
about are airfield access control systems from a security point
of view. These are used to regulate the secure portion of the
airfield, over many doors that are required to be controlled
for the purpose of protecting the security of the operation. As
is the case with the airfield lighting systems, they have been
repaired or replaced, tested for Y2K readiness, and are felt to
be fully reliable. However, if failure were to occur despite
this testing, they are designed to fail in a closed mode, and
FAA has been providing guidance to airports on how to manually
control access to airport secure areas. Assuming that any
failure could not be quickly repaired, the consequence would be
an increased requirement for staffing and a reduction in the
number of access points to the aeronautical area, all of which
have been planned for, and the contingency plans to accommodate
those are in place.
The third system is the airport rescue and fire fighting
vehicles. The airports have been working with the manufacturers
to identify some of the equipment which may have the
possibility of being affected by Y2K. To this point the
manufacturers have provided fixes to the equipment, and the
testing of those goes on. We are comfortable that the
overwhelming bulk of the equipment will not fail, and that to
the extent that it does, the support equipment, that is in
place at all airports that are required to have it, will be
able to function reliably.
I am comfortable, therefore, that, as Mr. Windmuller said,
the airport system will be able to fulfill its part of the
services required for the continuation of a safe, secure and
effective airport and aviation operation.
We appreciate the kind of direction that we have been
getting from the FAA, which has actually been putting in place
the opportunity to verify the effectiveness of Y2K compliance
measures, and we expect that by the time Year 2000 rolls
around, if there is a failure in the system, it will be because
we have got snow.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Plavin can be found in the
appendix.]
Chairman Bennett. And we cannot blame snow on Y2K.
Mr. Plavin. Right.
Chairman Bennett. Mr. Cooke, welcome, sir.
STATEMENT OF PETER COOKE, YEAR 2000 COORDINATOR, BRITISH
AIRWAYS
Mr. Cooke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning, Mr.
Chairman and Vice Chairman.
I would like to thank the Senate Special Committee for
inviting me, and for this opportunity to add to public
knowledge and confidence on this very important challenge for
the international aviation industry. The position taken by
British Airways on Year 2000 is detailed in our written
submission, but I would like to highlight the following
aspects.
First, some words on the British Airways internal Year 2000
program. British Airways takes the Year 2000 issue very
seriously, and has been working on the investigation,
identification and remediation of its own systems, equipment,
and supplier chains for about 4 years. This has been a
significant task with some 3,000 systems, 800 applications,
30,000 PCs, and 40,000 suppliers in our data base. Throughout
the program the emphasis has been on not simply remediating IT
functions, but insuring that all critical business processes
will continue to operate. Hence we have had line management
involvement and accountability at all levels. Some 70 million
pounds, $112 million, has been committed over the length of the
project, and up to 200 people have been involved in the effort.
The main board takes a keen interest in the project and receive
regular updates.
We have worked closely with our major partners, British
Airports Authority at Heathrow, Gatwick, and other UK airports,
aircraft manufacturers, the national air traffic services,
travel agents and CRS's, banks and many other suppliers. Where
appropriate, joint testing has been undertaken. We have also
cooperated closely with Action 2000, which is the UK Government
agency responsible for reassuring the British public as to the
Year 2000 readiness of key components of the UK economy and
infrastructure. It covers utilities, financial services, fuel
and food distribution, transport and public services. In July
we publicly received their highest rating following an
assessment of our program.
We have currently completed the installation and testing of
contingency plans for our mission-critical and important
business systems and processes. We are by no means complacent,
and we will continue our work up to and through the millennium
period, but we are confident that British Airways is now ready
to meet this unique challenge.
Second, some words about the external environment. Critical
components of our supplier chain are, of course, the air space
we fly through and over and the airports we operate to
throughout the world. This forms a particular challenge to a
global airline like British Airways which is interested in some
150 of the 185 member states ICAO, and which operates to 160
airports in 6 continents with technologies ranging from the
simple to the extremely sophisticated. Our investigations have
included cooperation with ICAO, participation in the IATA
industry project, closely liaison with the CAA and Eurocontrol,
collaboration with our reliance partners in oneworld, and
overlain by our own investigations, knowledge, experience and
assessments.
I would particularly highlight our participation in the
IATA industry project, in which we have been very active since
its initiation and of which we are a very strong supporter. We
have had observers present at many of the site visits, both to
air traffic service providers and to airports. However, we do
not rely solely on the IATA data. We have conducted our own
assessments, and we have engaged a small team of air traffic
systems experts who have provided us with in-depth knowledge
and expertise for our assessment process. We have worked with
air operator committees at airports and have made our own
evaluations of the readiness of airport customer related
systems, including their contingency plans to insure that
regular business continues over the millennium. Finally, we
have devised former routines to analyze data and soft
information from all sources in order to make our assessments.
And last, some words on our conclusions. We are confident
that the methodology and assessment processes we have put in
place are appropriate and adequate to address the Year 2000
challenge. We are very pleased with the progress being made and
reported in all parts of the world. It should be recognized
that not all providers in all countries have yet reported
conclusions to their programs, and these providers will
continue to be monitored and reviewed, both through the IATA
project and by ourselves. I am happy to say that it is a small
and diminishing number that fall into this category, and
looking forward, we do not believe that there will be an
adverse effect on our planned operations. I should say that we
are receiving unprecedented cooperation from industry partners
in all parts of the world in this unique exercise.
On September the 20 we announced our planned schedule of
operations for the millennium. While bookings are some 29
percent up on last year for the last few days in 1999 and the
first week of 2000, the millennium eve itself is quiet, as is
usual on New Year Eves. We shall therefore be operating a
reduced program over the millennium night with no short-haul
flights after 6 p.m. until the next morning. There will be a
long-haul operation, however, with 20 aircraft flying during
the rollover period. Although we have determined the residual
risk is low, since safety is of paramount concern, we will
continue to monitor and review progress up to the rollover
period, including using our operations control center at London
to take any necessary operational decisions on the night
itself, as is our normal practice. We cannot say, of course,
that no delays or disruptions will occur. They are a normal
occurrence in airline life. We believe, however, that we have
adequate experience-based plans to cope with all eventualities
and to mitigate their consequences.
In conclusion, therefore, British Airways approaches the
millennium with confidence. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooke can be found in the
appendix.]
Chairman Bennett. Thank you very much for being here and
sharing that with us. We appreciate it.
Mr. Smart.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD SMART, ICAO REPRESENTATIVE, INTERNATIONAL
FEDERATION OF AIR LINE PILOTS ORGANIZATIONS
Mr. Smart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Dodd. I
am the air line pilot representative to the International Civil
Aviation Organization.
Chairman Bennett. Can you talk a little more into the
microphone?
Mr. Smart. Of course, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Bennett. Thank you.
Mr. Smart. Our organization, the International Federation
of Air Line Pilots Associations is made up of just under 100
national member pilot associations, and we have 120,000 pilot
members, as you said before. Our basic aim is the development
of a safe and orderly system of air transportation.
IFALPA is aware of the efforts expended by states and
international organizations to increase public awareness of the
Y2K problem, as well as their assistance in eliminating or
minimizing its impact. We have full confidence in assurances
given to us by the major aircraft manufacturers that there is
nothing within the aircraft themselves which will jeopardize
flight safety. We are also confident that the measures already
taken or yet still pending will insure continued flight safety
for operations in North America, the Eastern and South Pacific,
and the North Atlantic oceanic regions, and in Western Europe.
We are somewhat less confident about what might occur in
Eastern Europe, and within the air space eastward to
Vladivostok. We noted the recent announcement by the head of
Russian Air Traffic Control of his serious concerns that
Russian flight safety system has been weakening since the early
1990's and may soon become critically deficient. Similar
concerns apply to the former Soviet republics to the north of
Iran and Pakistan.
Also of concern is the fact that the air traffic control
contingency plans developed for Western Europe include the idea
that some states may close their air space in the event of
communications failure. This procedure already exists, but has
rarely been used and never on a large scale. If this occurs for
any extended period of time and involves many aircraft, we
believe that flight safety problems could emerge. There are
some 420 morning daily flights inbound to Europe from overseas.
We were also told that some air space and aerodromes along
the main routes to Europe from Asia could be closed, and we
understand there is a possibility that routes over Afghanistan
and Turkey and that airports in Cyprus, Syria and Turkey might
also be closed if communications fail.
Today over large areas of sub-Saharan Africa, the air
traffic control system is not and has never been fully
functional. Pilots must rely on a do-it-yourself form of air
traffic control, called In-flight Broadcast Procedure, IFBP.
They broadcast their presence and altitude in the blind. Other
aircraft then hopefully hear these calls and minimize the
chances of collision by changing their altitude. This normally
works fairly well in low traffic density areas, but there are
difficulties. Not all aircraft are aware of or use the
procedure, and not all pilots use the English language.
ICAO's Y2K regional contingency plans contain a version of
the In-flight Broadcast Procedure as a primary means for
preventing midair collisions if and when air traffic control
does fail. Pilots will then be expected to revert to
essentially a do-it-yourself air traffic control system.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Mr. Smart, I thought all pilots had to
know English, that it was the international language?
Mr. Smart. No, sir, that is incorrect. It is the
international norm, but it is not a standard. Within South
America, for instance, about all you hear is the Spanish
language, except from North American pilots flying through the
area and European pilots, of course. It is very common in West
Africa they use French while they are airborne as well, and it
does present difficulties for us.
It could be said that at least we still have a last ditch
electronic means for avoiding midair collisions by using the
Onboard Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems, when neither ATC
nor the In-flight Broadcast Procedure worked. But in order to
detect a potential collision, ACAS requires that the threat
aircraft be equipped with an altitude-reporting transponder.
Unfortunately, there is no regional requirement for its
installation until the year 2003. Even then ACAS will not be
required for cargo aircraft. It is also not required for small
commercial or non-commercial aircraft, nor is it required for
the military.
Russian radar transponders used in their domestic aircraft
also cannot be seen by our ACAS. There have been near misses,
and in 1996, a Saudia 747 equipped with ACAS and a Kazakh
Ilyushin 76 cargo plane without a compliant transponder, had a
midair collision over India and we lost 350 people.
Recommendations, which we recently made to ICAO during the
second Global Y2K Contingency Planning Meeting, included the
measures indicated on the chart. These measures were all
accepted except for the additional flight crew manning
recommendation which we had made.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we agree with the view that
both ICAO and IATA have taken all reasonable measures that are
within their means in dealing with Y2K types of events. We are
most appreciative of this opportunity to have presented the
views of the international air line pilot to this eminent
national legislative body. Thank you very much for your kind
attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smart can be found in the
appendix.]
Chairman Bennett. Thank you very much, Mr. Smart, for your
testimony. In reacting, Mr. Plavin, to some of the comments you
made about over-reaction, I've had the experience, and I'm sure
Senator Dodd has as well, when I have been out trying to
reassure people that things are all right with respect to Y2K,
of having my own speeches quoted back to me. Some people who
have a psychological vested interest in seeing Armageddon, tell
me I am now lying to them deliberately when I say things have
gotten better, and, look, my early alarms were the correct
information and nothing has changed. It is very difficult to
break through that kind of mentality.
I think the panel, as a whole, has gone a long way to go in
that direction as we have heard from a number of different
sources, each one affirming the other that the overall system
has made extraordinary progress here. The early warnings were
not improper. The possibility of failure was there, and it was
serious, but the work that has been done has been Herculean,
and we should all recognize that and rejoice in that instead of
being disappointed that we are not going to see the huge
disaster that a lot of people, frankly, are still hoping for.
Now, the first thing I would do would be to ask any member
of the panel if you have any comment on any other member of the
panel's presentation, either correction or amplification. Now,
if you are just going to say, ``Gee, they are all right'', you
can do that very quickly, and we will be happy to have that,
but is there anything any one of you has said that strikes a
button in the other, so we can get a conversation going among
you experts as to where we are?
Vice Chairman Dodd. Or anything that Mr. Downey or Mr. Mead
may have said in the panel before you.
Chairman Bennett. Yes, yes.
Mr. Plavin. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Bennett. Yes?
Mr. Plavin. If I may, I want to take exception to you
having exempted the administrator from the description of the
rest of us as ``thorns.'' Chairman Bennett. I see. I can live
with that.
Mr. Plavin. From the airports' point of view, I just want
to say that one of the things that has made it possible for the
airports to do what they have done is very significant
oversight by the FAA in making sure that the systems are
compliant as they seem to be. And the second part of that is to
make it clear that the air carriers have taken a very, very big
role in--because they have a network which is able to spread
across most of the airports in the world, they have been the
logical place, and they have stepped up to the table to take
that responsibility of sharing information and assessing
information. I have trouble saying that because airports and
air carriers are not supposed to be doing things in the same
direction, but in this case at least, we are.
Chairman Bennett. Yes, sir?
Mr. Windmuller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I can just
build on Mr. Plavin's point, I think there is something that
you have touched on, Mr. Chairman, that was implicit in a lot
of what we were saying but bears further scrutiny because I
think there is a lesson to be learned here.
I think you were right about the early warnings being
justified. I think you were equally right about the progress
that has been made, and the result of that progress being that
it is a very different world out there from what it was a year
ago or even just a few months ago, but I think one of the
reasons for that is the way in which this industry has
approached this issue. The cooperation that we have all seen
amongst regulators, airlines, air traffic control providers,
airports, pilots, air traffic controllers, in my personal view,
has been either unprecedented or unsurpassed, and matched only
by our common approach toward safety. That I think is not only
to be commended, but also to be remembered and built upon when
we have other issues like this, non-competitive issues, to face
in the future. Thank you.
Chairman Bennett. Thank you.
Yes, sir, Mr. Smart?
Mr. Smart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to comment on a
previous statement that was made with regard to the paucity of
information available. We feel that this is an important aspect
and perhaps we have learned a lesson from all this. The final
authority for insuring the safety of flight rests properly with
the pilot in command, and we have to have the information that
is required in order to make that final decision, and it is
sometimes terribly difficult to dig it out. We hear
generalities for the most part with regard to the important
airports, the important aviation states, the important
aerodromes, the information there are no difficulties involved.
I am afraid that if I was flying on an unimportant airline in
an unimportant aviation state, I would still feel relatively
important and that it was necessary for me to get the proper
information. So I do think we have perhaps learned a lesson
here. We have not yet, I do not believe, solved the problem,
but at least I have identified the problem.
For the pilot, the information that we need is available in
flight publications. We have the Airman's Information
Publication, AIPs and AICs, but they are not available in the
cockpit to us. We rely on major chart producers to produce, of
course, in making that available. Time is becoming very, very
short. We are now under 90 days. Thank you.
Chairman Bennett. I have been interested in Senator Dodd's
indication of drafting legislation and your reaction to that,
Administrator Garvey. I think that will have a salutary effect,
and we have never had to issue a subpoena in this Committee to
get any witnesses, but I have threatened to issue a subpoena on
occasion, and it is amazing how quickly the use of that word
changes some people's attitude toward cooperation with the
Committee. And I think the dreaded word ``legislation'' can
have the same impact here. But do you not have some authority
in the FAA to shut down an airline if you come to the
conclusion that they are in fact stonewalling you on
information? Can you not, administratively, without
legislation, take some action in this area?
Ms. Garvey. Well, certainly. Let me answer that in two
ways. First of all, our major focus, as everyone at the table
has said, and as the Deputy Secretary said this morning, is
safety. So at any point, if we believe that an action being
taken, or we have enough concern raised, we can certainly take
very strong action, so we absolutely have that. I think that is
an important distinction to make. We have heard a lot of
discussion early on, well, if a company or an airline is not
Y2K compliant, should we take an action? We have said we should
take an action if safety is affected, because, for example,
someone could have very appropriate contingency plans, or it
maybe, as Mr. Plavin said, it may be a system that is not Y2K
compliant, but quite frankly does not affect the safety. So we
want to stay within what is regulatorily responsible, I
believe, and I think we absolutely can take the action.
The second point I wanted to make is that our inspectors,
which--and I mentioned that many of them, in fact, nearly all
of them are in town today to really talk about the Y2K, the
managers and so forth. They are out there working with these
certificate holders weekly, sometimes daily. So we have a very
good sense--and I think a lot of the discussion we are going to
hear today is, ``Well, you know, maybe the information may not
be sufficient, but we have got a good sense of what is
happening with that particular certificate holder.'' So, we are
really building on a structure which I think has served us very
well in aviation safety, and I want to make that point, because
we have some very good folks out there who are working these
issues daily.
But to answer your question, we absolutely can take some
strong action. The Inspector General has made the point that
sometimes even just the exposure on the website, knowing you
are going up because you have not provided the information, is
very compelling, and we are going to do that. But certainly any
encouragement, and we certainly appreciate the offer to work
with you on the legislation so that we are making sure it is
within the bounds of what we think is appropriate from a
regulatory point of view, but you are right. I remember a great
quote from a Senator from this body, who once said that, ``When
I feel the heat, I see the light.'' And that may be a little
bit of what the Senator is talking about. That certainly does
have an effect.
Chairman Bennett. Yes. Mr. Cooke.
Mr. Cooke. Yes. Can I just add to what the FAA
Administrator said. I agree entirely that the issue that should
concern legislators is one whether any airline is likely to be
indulging in unsafe practices. If an airline just has not got
its act together and has not produced a very good Y2K program,
it is most likely not to be able to operate itself. So I think
the main issue is whether it is unsafe, not whether or not it
has got a good business program going.
Chairman Bennett. Senator Dodd?
Vice Chairman Dodd. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Let me just pick up on the last part, Ms. Garvey. We are
working on drafting this, and I would like to get the names, by
the way, of the 1,900 airlines, because I want to put them in
the congressional record today. And I find it does--I mean I
understand you have the authority. My concern would be,
obviously, from a customer point of view, that you get down
here toward the end and people have made plans to travel and so
forth, and all of a sudden they find at the last minute
airlines are not going to be able to fly. I would like an
earlier termination for the benefit of the flying public here
as well.
I take this very, very seriously. I appreciate the fact
that they may be operating well and fine and it may not be a
problem, but I am not going to take that chance. My view here,
if someone is not doing the basic thing of responding to the
Federal Aviation Administration's request for a survey on
whether or not they are going to be compliant when dealing with
a problem that has raised tremendous concern with the American
public, I think we would be tremendously recalcitrant. So my
concern would be, in the absence of legislation, and of course
you have the authority I think in a lot of areas, but I presume
that decision may also be subject to some legal action, where
it could be contested, I suppose, and you could end up with
courts and decisions in courts, whereas a piece of legislation
might have a more beneficial impact.
I hope it does not come to this. I hope the 1,900 are
getting the message today, and that before the week is out or
the early part of next week, you are going to find full
compliance here. But I just want to make it very clear that
from my standpoint alone, I am not going to sit here wondering
for the next 92 days or 94 days, whatever we have got left
here, whether or not constituents of mine get on an airline
someplace, and I knew that they had not complied with a survey
on Y2K, and the question comes back, ``Senator, what were you
thinking of?'' So I am hopeful this can be resolved.
Ms. Garvey. Senator, one point I will just add, that a
staff person, as I was coming to the table, said, ``You know,
sometimes even when the airlines want to''--and this gets to
your point about the legality--``sometimes even the corporate
structure says, ''Well, there are legal issues and we perhaps
should not give information out.``'' And so the staff person
said, ``You know, the legislation is helpful in that sense.''
And I think sometimes this is the case for even very big
corporations.
Vice Chairman Dodd. No, that is a good point. I actually
found that happened in the past. You know, ``If I share any
information, then I am subjecting''--I have co-authored the Y2K
legislation on tort issues here to try and minimize the
possibility of just an overwhelming amount of litigation in
this area. So I have tried to do my best over there to minimize
this specifically so it would reduce the kind of argument that
some people are making about how do you not share information.
I mean, that to me is just so unacceptable, particularly with
something where the American public, during a holiday season,
where people have to sit there. I have made the statements over
and over again, ``I think they are perfectly safe and you ought
to be flying if you want to fly.'' But I did not know about
1,900 airlines that had not complied with the survey.
Ms. Garvey. Just to be correct, it is a number of very
small ones.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Yes. I appreciate that.
Let me jump, if I can, to--there is the survey, the
Airports Council International, Mr. Plavin, states that the
most authoritative data on US airports rests with survey
information that the FAA gathered in the spring and summer of
this year. Now, in spite of the fact--I do not think that was
originally collected with the idea of confidentiality in mind,
at least I know of nothing that indicates that. You can correct
me if that is the case. I wonder if you might clarify it for
the Committee, is there not some point when that information
should be released to the traveling public? We have made
similar requests of other surveys that have been done across
the board so that we get an idea here. This information will
become public at some point, and I would be, again feel
negligent, if that information becomes available after January
1, and for some reason there were problems in some place and
that information had not been made available to the public.
Now, is there some reason why it cannot be made available?
Mr. Plavin. Mr. Chairman, I think there are two separate
sets of information streams that are at issue here. One of them
is a body of work that the ACI has been doing with the airlines
that actually looks at certain kinds of systems within airports
that airports and airlines use jointly. It is that package that
was gathered with the assurance of confidentiality.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Why?
Mr. Plavin. Because of--the point you made a moment ago,
because are saying, ``I do not want that information to be used
in legal action against me. I want to share it in a way so that
in the interest of everybody knowing what everybody else is
doing, but I do not want to give that to somebody else as a
basis for saying, ''We are going to sue you.``'' Now, having
said that thought, the more important issue is the work that
FAA has been doing. That is clearly not gathered under the
assumption of confidentiality. The airports have responded in
the spirit, I think, in which you identified earlier, that FAA
is the regulatory body, they are the ones who have to make the
determination whether the airport is operating safely and
properly in accordance with its certificate, and it is FAA's
responsibility, and the airports know they have an obligation
to respond and to respond timely and accurately. So I do not
think that there is any assumption that failure to respond is
not going to be public.
Vice Chairman Dodd. You know, we worked very hard to pass
the Y2K Litigation Reform Bill, and I found very hard. It took
a week of activity, and the President, to his credit, signed
it, despite a lot of opposition in doing so. I do not buy the
argument that because someone is afraid of maybe some legal
action here, that that information, the consuming public would
like to know. And if you have information that some airport is
not safe, somehow that information ought to be made to the
public. I do not buy the argument any longer. I think you had a
good case before, but today, the idea that that information
should be kept in-house and not shared with the consuming
public, I do not think is right. I do not know what deals were
struck to get that information, but is there some problem in--
--
Ms. Garvey. Senator, actually, we are going to be putting
that information up on the website. Mr. Plavin is right, we did
the site surveys of the 150. We have additional information
that is coming by October 15th, and that information, as we
analyze it, will be up on the website for the reasons that you
stated.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Thank you. Let me jump if I can. I do
not want to take too much time, but I raised the issue of the
Pilots Association had that list, and again, Mr. Downey
properly threw the ball to you, Ms. Garvey, in terms of
responding to a couple of those question. How do you feel about
the--I gather the extra pilot in the aircraft is the one that
you are least attracted to, is it not?
Ms. Garvey. That may be, and I would like a little bit more
time to take a look at that. That was not one I was familiar
with. Some of the others though, additional training, as the
Deputy Secretary said, in fact we are doing that with our
controller work force. Extra fuel and so forth, those are
definitely, yes.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Well, great. That is very helpful.
A couple of more here if I could. You had a directive. The
FAA has given a certified--I understand that the FAA has given
certified airports until October 15 to be compliant or to have
alternate means of compliance. And I am just wondering how you
expect that situation to evolve, initiating action? Again, the
suggestion was made earlier about funding and so forth to make
the point clear. What do you do on October 16, I guess is what
I am asking, if you do not have compliance?
Ms. Garvey. Well, if we do not have compliance, we have
some teams ready. We would be going out and doing individual
visits. We have regional offices where there are airports
people. So we are prepared to take action if we have to, if we
were convinced that those 7 or so systems where safety is
really affected have not been satisfied. We would be prepared
to take action, but we certainly have time between October 15,
or after October 15 for the site visits to work with the
airports. And our hope is, as you indicated earlier, that
everything will be in compliance.
Vice Chairman Dodd. I would be very interested, and I feel
the Committee would be, to get a briefing as to--shortly
thereafter as to what the status is with regard to that
information.
I mentioned earlier, it has been mentioned here that 28 of
the 89 countries providing data to the ICAO did not provide
sufficient information to allow adequate Y2K readiness. Again,
the obvious question here, and the lack of information raises
obvious concerns in these areas, although I gather things may
be improving almost as we speak, but nonetheless, our concern
here is the absence of information. To what extent does that
raise warning signs to you as the Administrator?
Ms. Garvey. Well, Senator, I think any time that you do not
have adequate information, it does give you pause, and I think
the next few weeks or the next several weeks are going to be
critical and very important as we are gathering the
information. As we have said before, and as the Deputy
Secretary has also testified, we will take appropriate action
if either because insufficient information leads us to believe
that there are problems, focused again on the safety problems
as opposed to whether or not there may be some flight
disruptions. But if we have cause for concern, we can issue the
notice to travelers, the Notice to Airmen, which is something
that the FAA is able to do, obviously, very much in
consultation with the State Department and of course with the
Secretary's Office. But we would not take that lightly, but we
have that ability.
And the Inter-Agency Committee is working very hard and
analyzing the material, looking at it, and as you suggested, it
is changing daily. We are getting new information every day.
Vice Chairman Dodd. That's great.
Mr. Cooke, I must say I was deeply impressed with what
British Airways has been doing, and I really appreciate your
presence here today. This is very, very helpful. I wonder if
you might just comment on what Mr. Smart and his organization
have recommended in the area during the rollover period as some
of the safety precautions. Are these the ones up over here?
Yes. Do you have any reaction to those?
Mr. Cooke. Yes, sir, I have seen them. My first reaction is
that I am absolutely confident that within the normal training
procedures of an airline, as they are required to do, they will
take account of--they will make sure that air crews are
absolutely adequately trained to operate all the equipment that
they have on board the aircraft. Nevertheless, I do note the
points that Mr. Smart has raised, and I will check with my
organization to make sure that all of these are incorporated in
our plans. But I am absolutely confident they are, because I
think they are part of the duty of an air operator to insure
that we comply with those.
Vice Chairman Dodd. You have done something that the
Chairman and I and others have recommended across the board,
not just in dealing with travel, but in every area, and that is
the independent assessments. I guess we do it sort of naturally
here in this country, that institutions that want an assessment
made will do in-house, but it is not uncommon for us to ask
others to take a look over our shoulder to determine whether or
not what we have concluded is in fact appropriate and proper,
and I was impressed with the fact that British Airways had an
independent done, as I understand it anyway, of its Y2K
program, which I applaud you for. Can you tell us if this
practice is being widely used by other airlines; are you aware
of that?
Vice Chairman Dodd. Well, it certainly applies--if you are
referring to the UK Government audit in the UK, that applies to
all UK operators; they are all being audited.
Vice Chairman Dodd. What about outside of the UK?
Mr. Cooke. I honestly do not know what the position is in
other countries. I think it is probably patchy. I think some
countries, their governments have instituted audits; others
have not, so I really do not know the specifics.
Vice Chairman Dodd. How about airports and air traffic
services around the world, independent audits?
Mr. Cooke. There again, I do not know whether independent
audits are being carried out. I think Tom might be able to give
you better data on that from an audit point of view.
Vice Chairman Dodd. How widespread is that?
Mr. Windmuller. Mr. Vice Chairman, first of all, on the
subject of air carriers on the international scene, we are not
systematically tracking them one-by-one in this area. But the
kind of independent audit that Mr. Cooke has referred to is not
at all uncommon amongst the IATA member airlines.
With respect to the airports and air traffic service
providers, while we are not undertaking formal audits of these
entities through the IATA program, we are independently
visiting these entities, independently gathering data, and we
feel pretty confident about the thoroughness of it, and the
accuracy of it, because we do not simply take an air traffic
service provider's word for it, for example; we cross-check the
data we get from an air traffic service provider with that that
we receive from the manufacturer of the equipment that he uses,
from what his national safety regulatory authority is saying in
the AICs being delivered to ICAO and so forth. So we are cross-
checking the information that we get from a number of different
sources, looking for inconsistencies and then following up with
the air traffic provider organization if and when we see one.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Mr. Cooke, coming back to you a second
if I can. You partner with a number of airlines around the
world.
Mr. Cooke. Yes.
Vice Chairman Dodd. And I wonder if the assessments that
you have done, the independent assessments and so forth that
you have done with British Airways, does that also apply to
your partners?
Mr. Cooke. Yes. We have, as part of our program of working
together, we have conducted an assessment of each of our
partner airlines. Each one has assessed each of the other
partners, and we have all agreed to methodology and satisfied
ourselves with the degree of readiness of all our partners.
Vice Chairman Dodd. That is very good, appreciate that.
Just again coming back to Mr. Windmuller, again I
appreciate your last comment there. You made it clear that the
IATA and ICAO have gathered an enormous amount of information
about the readiness of the air transport industry, and I
appreciate that, and I do appreciate the confidentiality
questions. I mean, I am not unmindful of those concerns, but
you have to weigh those concerns versus others, and I am trying
to balance them here. Is not there some way that we can offer
more concrete and specific assessments of troubled areas in the
industry at this time, with a few days to go; is not that
possible, without violating--I mean there has got to be some
way of doing this.
Mr. Windmuller. I fully take on board the concerns you
express, and we recognize that there is also a very legitimate
interest by national safety regulatory authorities in knowing
what their partners are doing. For example, for two states
which adjoin one another, to carry out a regional contingency
plan. They have to have a pretty high degree of confidence in
each other. And it was for that reason that IATA and ICAO
agreed that all of the information that we collect now
concerning air traffic service providers is now being conducted
as joint ICAO/IATA information. We make all the information
that we collect on these visits available directly to ICAO,
whether they are with us or not. ICAO then takes that into
account in terms of the information that it passes on to each
individual state to its national safety regulatory authorities.
On the airport side as well, we have an obvious interest in
insuring safety above all. And I think our only hesitancy about
the confidentiality of information from airports is mainly in
the area of business confidentiality. In addition to these
safety systems, we have been collecting quite sensitive
business confidential information from airports, which outside
the US is an increasingly competitive business. If in Europe--
you take the example of Europe, Heathrow, Charles de Gaulle,
Frankfurt, Amsterdam, are all fierce competitors now for
traffic, especially transit traffic. And the information they
have quite openly been providing us is information about
individual components and systems they have that they would not
want their competitors to be privy to, and it was for that--it
has nothing to do with Y2K; it really is to do with their
competitiveness as a business. And it was for that reason that
we were willing to undertake these often written pledges of
confidentiality with them, that we would only use this for Y2K
purposes, that we would only share it with our member airlines,
and that we would not be using this type of information, for
example, on airports and user charges negotiations that we
carry out with them.
Vice Chairman Dodd. As someone who may fly to Europe around
that time, I sure as hell would like to know. If I had a choice
of airports to fly into, and you had information that indicated
that one of those airports was a cause of concern for you, that
you had information, Y2K information that raised concerns in
your mind about it, and that was being held and not shared, and
something happens, I do not need to tell you what the reaction
is going to be.
Mr. Windmuller. That is absolutely right, Senator, and the
best assurance I can give you is that if any airline has
concerns about safety at an airport, you will not be flying
into that airport because that airline will not be landing
there.
Vice Chairman Dodd. But if I choose the wrong airline who
decides not to make that decision.
Mr. Windmuller. I cannot imagine that any one of our member
airlines would ever compromise on safety.
Vice Chairman Dodd. No, no, I know. But I would like to
know as a consumer. Can I not have--should I not know that too?
I mean I appreciate the airline knowing it, but should I not
know that you have concerns about certain airports?
Mr. Windmuller. Yes, by all means. We are not trying to
withhold information about concerns we might or might not have
at airports. And as I have said, we feel very good about the
progress we are seeing in every region of the world. That is
not any kind of information that we would withhold.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Are there areas of the world you do
have concerns about?
Mr. Windmuller. No, there are not. Right now we feel very
confident about the progress we are seeing in every region of
the world.
Vice Chairman Dodd. OK, all right. Mr. Chairman, let them
move along. There are a lot more questions, but I will submit
them to you in writing. But I thank you very much. And I thank
you, Ms. Garvey, for being very forthcoming.
Let me make this--I would like the list of the 1,900
companies. I would like to get that today. Today is what,
Thursday?
Chairman Bennett. Yes.
Vice Chairman Dodd. I will tell you what. I will be back on
Monday, back in session on Monday, and I will use it today and
over the next three or 4 days--in fact, I will wait until
Tuesday morning, but I will not put that list in the
congressional record until Tuesday morning, to give those 1,900
companies--I am sure they will find out today; there are plenty
of people sitting in the audience who know who they are--today
is Thursday. You have got till Tuesday morning, and if you have
been in touch with the FAA and complied, then that list does
not go in the record. But I am still going to draft the bill,
and I do not want to cause undue embarrassment to a company
that may have submitted the survey, you have not received it
yet, so apply a little lag time here for them to comply without
necessarily embarrassing someone who is complying with your
request, but Tuesday morning that list--and I would like to
have an updated list by Tuesday morning.
Chairman Bennett. I had to step out, was interviewed. And
the first question I was asked was, ``Is any one of those 1,900
in Utah?'' I will have to wait until Tuesday morning to find
out.
Ms. Garvey. None of them are in Utah or Connecticut.
Chairman Bennett. OK. We thank you all very much.
Our final panel will change subjects totally. While our
panel is sitting down, Paul Hunter, boy, you have done a great
job. It is a very well prepared hearing. Good work.
If we could have a little more order in the room.
As I said, this last panel is going to change the subject,
totally, except that I do remember, when I worked at the
Department of Transportation, flying on Coast Guard I. Now we
called it Coast Guard I for a while, until they found out we
were doing that from the White House, and they told us, ``No,
it's Coast Guard I only when the President is flying on it, not
when the rest of you are flying on it.'' But it was a
Gulfstream III, I think at the time, II or III, back in the
1960's, a very luxurious airplane, and made me want to be
Secretary of Transportation at some point in my life. I do not
think I want to do that anymore.
Do you still have Coast Guard I, or----
Admiral Naccara. Yes, sir, we do. It's a Gulfstream III,
currently. It was probably a Gulfstream I, I think back then,
sir.
Chairman Bennett. Yes. OK.
Well, so you do have an air force of some sort concerned
about air traffic.
Chairman Bennett. But we are here today to talk about the
Y2K preparedness in the maritime world, and we welcome Admiral
George Naccara, who is the Chief Information Officer for the
Coast Guard, and Mr. Richard Du Moulin who is Chairman and CEO
of Marine Transport.
Admiral Naccara, we appreciate your leadership on Y2K. We
understand you have some family members with you here today and
we want to welcome them as well as you, and tell them they
should be proud of their daddy, or whatever, cousin, brother,
and so on, husband, for the work that you have done. We will
start with you, Admiral.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL GEORGE N. NACCARA, CHIEF INFORMATION
OFFICER, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral Naccara. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, sir. Good morning, Mr. Vice Chairman.
I have responsibility for the Coast Guard's Year 2000
Project, and as you said, I am the Chief Information Officer
for the Coast Guard.
I certainly welcome this opportunity to give the Committee
an update on the Coast Guard's Y2K preparedness, and the
readiness of the global Marine Transportation System, which
have steadily improved since I last testified before you in
April.
As Mr. Downey mentioned earlier, I am happy to report 100
percent completion of all of the Coast Guard's 74 mission-
critical systems, and despite this, we will not relax our
efforts. We will continue our end-to-end testing as well as
work on non-mission-critical systems. We have contingency plans
in place for all of our mission-critical systems and we have
business continuity contingency plans in place for 100 percent
of our operational units, and we will continue to update these
as we exercise them.
We used the recent end-of-week rollover of the Global
Positioning System and the rollover of computers to 9-9-99 to
test and modify our Incident Command Center organization and
our communications procedures.
At the end of the year, the Coast Guard intends to be ready
to perform its missions in a Y2K environment, whatever that
environment proves to be.
In addition to our own readiness, we have pursued a 2-year
ambitious strategy of outreach to the Marine Transportation
System, both domestically and internationally. This outreach
has included an Assessment of the readiness of the Global
Marine Transportation System. Government and private sector
assessments of the readiness of this Global Transportation
System have been completed, including one, recently, from the
CIA, with a section on maritime shipping and ports.
Additionally, the Coast Guard has been partnering with the
United States Transportation Command [TRANSCOM], in collecting
information on the readiness of some key world ports. Summed
up, the studies show a high level of Y2K preparedness in the
shipping industry, and a steadily improving picture in the
world's ports.
I will not review these classified assessments in detail,
here, because they are available to the Committee. While we are
guardedly optimistic about the emerging picture for world
ports, I will continue to sound a cautionary note that this
Marine Transportation System is a very complex, fragmented, and
intermodally connected system.
Of course, particularly because of the wide dependence on
technology, as you mentioned before concerning the M/V SUSAN
MAERSK, we have so many embedded chips in this industry, a
level of uncertainty will remain until the new century arrives.
Next is our outreach to the Marine Transportation System.
As I have said, the Coast Guard has pursued a 2-year program of
outreach to the industry. This has included many Y2K
conferences; special industry days around the country;
distribution of nearly 500,000 brochures to ships' masters,
port facility operators, marina operators, and recreational
boaters; as well as a busy schedule of speaking engagements,
both domestically and internationally.
We also maintain numerous Web sites and an 800 info line
for mariners. Characteristically, we took many additional steps
to inform the public during the GPS end-of-week rollover in
August.
Next, our Y2K enforcement policy. Our goal in enforcement,
in addition to safety on the waterways, has been to minimize
disruptions to commerce. This explains the active role that we
took in developing the Year 2000 Code of Good Practice, which
was issued by the International Maritime Organization as its
Circular Number 2121.
This circular fosters an open exchange of information among
many elements of the Marine Transportation System and the
stakeholders. In fact, a growing number of nations, including,
among many others, Canada, the U.K., Japan, Germany, the
Netherlands, Russia, Australia, Singapore, and many others,
have adapted the enforcement policy in Circular 2121.
The Coast Guard published the U.S. enforcement policy in a
Federal Register notice back in June, and we based our approach
on this information exchange from the IMO Circular.
We also issued policy guidance to each of our Captains of
the Port, including a risk assessment matrix and a risk
management process.
In essence, our Captains of the Port take the information
provided by the companies and determine the level of risk
associated with each vessel movement, or each terminal cargo
operation.
When our Captains of the Port used this matrix during the
first designated Y2K critical period of September 7 through
September 9, incomplete information from many ships and
facilities really was the principal cause for our issuing the
175 Captain of the Port Orders to Ships, and about 85 Orders to
Facilities. Many of these Orders, which reflected some level of
restriction on vessel movement or cargo operations, were
quickly rescinded as these outstanding issues were resolved. It
was extremely beneficial. I must emphasize that.
While the Coast Guard took no pleasure in requiring even
brief delays of this type, which I know are very costly to
industry, I felt it demonstrated the seriousness of our intent
to ensure safety, and will really enhance preparation for the
industry at the end of the year.
It did prove that U.S. ports can remain open, with commerce
proceeding safely. It also sent a clear message to other
nations that a viable process is available, and it also
reinforced our international leadership in Y2K readiness.
Last, the port exercise program. As mentioned earlier, we
have led port-level exercises in a large number of U.S. ports.
However, since our view is cast on a global industry, we have
urged other world ports to carry out similar Y2K exercises.
Some, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, already have done
so. To further this approach, we invited representatives from
several nations, including all the G8 member nations, and our
primary oil supplying countries of Saudi Arabia, Mexico, and
Venezuela, as well as China and Korea, to attend our port
exercises in New Orleans, in San Francisco, and in New York.
Just last week in Berlin, I urged maritime representatives
of the G8 nations to hold their own exercises. I distributed a
playbook which we have compiled from our exercises, with
guidelines on how to develop an exercise, as well as best
practices and lessons learned.
Subsequently, I met with the Secretary General of IMO in
London, just the very next day, and I am happy to report that
he has distributed these materials as another IMO Circular,
2158, which urges all IMO member nations to hold similar port
exercises.
By the way, IMO published both of those documents the very
next day after I delivered them. I think it really was a very
clear example of the seriousness with which they address the
Y2K issue.
The Coast Guard will not relax its efforts during the 92
days remaining until December 31. We will continue to
reevaluate systems and refine contingency plans. Port exercises
will continue and we will assist all Marine Transportation
System stakeholders who request our help with their own
exercises.
We will continue our DOT interagency and interdepartmental
cooperation to maximize responsiveness. All the tools that we
have developed, including our playbook, our data base of
industry readiness information, and our risk assessment matrix,
will be made available to any public entity who desires to use
them.
On December 31, the Coast Guard will be in a heightened
state of readiness, nationwide, to respond to any threat of
maritime emergency or disruption to the marine environment.
I also want to thank Mr. Downey and the Department for
their constant support and belief in the Coast Guard. I want to
thank the Department of Transportation Inspector General and
his staff as a constant source of constructive comments. I
should thank Administrator Garvey as being the lightning rod,
perhaps, in the Department, for what they have done.
I want to thank, mostly, the men and women of the Coast
Guard who took the challenge of Y2K on, as we do just any other
emergency. Thank you for the opportunity, sir.
[The prepared statement of Rear Admiral Naccara can be
found in the appendix.]
Vice Chairman Dodd. Mr. Chairman would you mind if I just,
for 1 second----
Chairman Bennett. No; go ahead.
Vice Chairman Dodd. I am going to scoot. But I just want
to--I am not objective about the Coast Guard at all. I
represent, you know, the State of Connecticut, the home of the
Coast Guard Academy, and over the years it was my congressional
district, and, now, of course, in the state----
Chairman Bennett. We do not have a lot of Coast Guard----
[Laughter.]
Vice Chairman Dodd. Well, we are prepared to help out. I
been out. You have got Lake Utah, you have got the Great Salt
Lake. I think you could make a case. Of all the Western states,
we could make a case with Utah. But they just do a fabulous,
fabulous job, and I was on the Board of Visitors there for a
number of years, but urged my colleagues to come up and to meet
these young cadets, and now we have incorporated at the
Academy, in fact, consolidation here. We have the NCO's who are
going through training there as well, which I think was a great
move to have, and just done a wonderful job.
I particularly, Admiral, want to commend you for what you
did with regard to these vessels and facilities that were not
complying. I mean, that's exactly the thing to do, and I am
just curious. Staff tells me--and you want to maybe update
this. I do not know if this is as of today, or whether it was
back earlier. That you still have only 36 percent of the 5,000
marine facilities, and 43 percent of the 33,000 vessels that
come to U.S. ports, have complied with your survey as of this
date in September.
Is that an accurate number?
Admiral Naccara. It is accurate as of last week, Senator,
but there have been improvements. I am concerned about that
number, but I feel we have the necessary mechanism in place to
take appropriate action.
Vice Chairman Dodd. I am prepared to add what I want to do
with these airlines, particularly; but if you have got some
ideas and you question whether or not the Department of
Transportation or the Coast Guard has the authority, for
instance, to deny a vessel access to our ports, or to close
down a facility because of your concerns, I would like to know
that. If you have any doubts about that, and you think you may
need some legislative authority to do so--I do not know how the
Chairman feels, but I think we would be prepared--we are going
to leave here soon and we will be out of here when these events
occur.
But if you are lacking any authority to take any action
that could jeopardize our facilities, or our marine
environment, or a variety of other issues, then we would like
to know it. I would like to know it in the next few days.
Admiral Naccara. Yes, sir. Absolutely. Thank you very much
for that offer, sir. We have absolutely no doubt that we have
that authority. We did just that. We denied entry to a number
of vessels. We denied departure to a number of vessels on 9-9-
99.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Yes.
Admiral Naccara. We also shut down many facilities. I think
the value in running through the 9-9-99 date was that people
got a very clear message the Coast Guard is serious about this,
and as we mentioned before, noncompliance can result in very
substantial, costly penalties.
Vice Chairman Dodd. Well, I commend you, again, for it.
Admiral Naccara. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Dodd. A job well done.
Admiral Naccara. Thank you very much.
Vice Chairman Dodd. I apologize to you, Mr. Du Moulin, but
I have read your testimony and will submit some questions to
you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Bennett. Thank you.
Mr. Du Moulin, we appreciate you being here. I understand
you wear several hats, so you might want to explain in whose
behalf you are testifying.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD T. DU MOULIN, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, MARINE
TRANSPORT CORPORATION
Mr. Du Moulin. First of all, I am Chairman and CEO of
Marine Transport Corporation which is a New Jersey-based owner-
operator of 35 ships, mostly U.S. flag. None of them call on
Utah, though they do pass by Connecticut. I recently completed
a 3-year term as Chairman of INTERTANKO, which is the
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners. It is
made up of about 600 members, over 2,000 tankers, and about 70
percent of the oil imports to the United States, crude oil
products, come in on our ships.
I am also, now that I am retired from that, I am still
Chairman of the North American panel, so we stay involved with
Coast Guard, and other parts of the U.S. Government.
I am serving on the President's Council on Y2K, headed by
John Koskinen, also, and in working with the President's
Council and with the Coast Guard, I think it is a very good use
of Federal leadership and they are doing a very good job.
As far as Y2K and how it relates to shipping, first of all,
the shipping I am talking about are ocean-going vessels trading
to and from the United States and along the coast of the United
States. These could be container ships, passenger vessels,
tankers, dry cargo.
My specialty is tankers but I will try to be general when I
make my comments.
You cannot think of ships only when you look at Y2K and
shipping. You have to look at the Marine Transportation System
[MTS], as Department of Transportation has coined it.
It is a chain of people, equipment, facilities, services,
that's a logistics chain, and looking at the elements of the
chain, reviewing them briefly to see areas of potential
disruption, first, obviously, is on board the ship, mainly
navigational and operating systems, navigating systems such as
radar, GPS, Loran, communications systems, radio, satellite,
both voice and telex, propulsion and maneuvering systems.
The goal for a ship obviously is to get from point A to
point B without colliding with anything, without going aground.
So this is really the area one would think of in terms of
safety.
The other element of the system would be the port system.
Four years ago, INTERTANKO did a port and terminal safety study
looking at ports in the United States, more related to safety
and preventing pollution, and that became one of the initial
building blocks of the MTS initiative by the Secretary of
Transportation.
In that, we pointed out that safe navigation, including
Y2K-related safe navigation, depends on the role of the pilots,
the navigational aids in the channels, vessel traffic control
systems, third party traffic in the waterways, terminals, and
then the intermodal hookups to rail and road. For the Y2K, it
is the same, that these are the areas that have to coordinate
for the system to work.
There are also support systems that deal with cargo
booking, documentation, tracking, financial services, movement
of funds. These are not necessarily marine. They are really for
the entire U.S. infrastructure but the shipping business does
depend on them.
In terms of the status, I would say the bad news is it is
very difficult to quantify where the shipping industry stands.
We have the interdependence of the elements, of the chain I
described. We have a lot of fragmentation, meaning there's
many, many participants in each of the elements of the chain.
The tanker industry, in our membership, we have over 600
members in INTERTANKO, but in dry cargo, there is even more
fragmentation. Container shipping is not quite as fragmented,
but still many companies, and so on and so forth.
So you have many, many companies domiciled in many parts of
the world, all operating to and from, around the United States.
So it is hard to determine, statistically, where things stand.
The good news is we have had the leadership of the U.S.
Coast Guard, of the International Maritime Organization, trade
associations like INTERTANKO, the Chamber of Shipping here in
the United States. So the shipping industry is very aware of
the Y2K problem and it has been for a few years.
Charterers who charter ships, such as the oil companies
chartering ships, have also been aware of it. So there has been
a lot of attention paid to Y2K.
The companies doing business in the United States tend to
be the bigger, more sophisticated, more serious operators in
the world, and they are the ones who I believe are dealing the
best with Y2K.
So from the U.S. point of view, we tend to be dealing with
the best companies. Shipboard, I think we are in good shape.
Shipping companies and crews of ships are trained to deal with
routine crises. That is the nature of being out on the ocean.
So whether it is an oil pollution situation or a collision,
or a breakdown of a piece of equipment, shipping companies are
always responding to needs of the ship and Y2K would be the
same thing.
So I think that shipping companies are prepared to deal
with the situation, if it develops.
Over the past few years the shipping industry has adopted
International Safety Management [ISM], which is a documented
form of total safety management, and this has also set up the
shipping industry to be better prepared with Y2K or any other
event.
Finally, ultimately, the crew of the ship rely on their
seamanship to handle a vessel. Systems such as gyro compasses,
magnetic compasses, charts, parallel rules, binoculars,
anchors, are not Y2K dependent. So the basic means of
navigating a ship, based on traditional seamanship, is still
what one can fall back on, if needed.
In terms of United States' dependence on resources and
manufactured goods, fortunately, there is a diversification of
sources for most of what comes into the United States.
Finally, the U.S. ports, AAPA, the American Association of
Port Authorities, has also done a lot to make its members aware
of the situation.
Looking at each of the basic sectors of shipping
individually, just to look at a particular vulnerability, again
my expertise is tankers but I will take a shot at the others
also.
With cruise and ferry, the issue here is the safety of the
passengers. The Coast Guard is very aware of this and they are
focusing on this industry. Probably the biggest challenge for
the cruise industry is their very high technology, modern,
large cruise ships which would be susceptible to a Y2K type
glitch.
Fortunately, these large, very-well-capitalized companies
do business regularly in the United States, many of them
headquartered here, and it would be my estimation that they are
doing a pretty good job on it. But, again, I do not have any
statistics.
As far as crews and ferry, just one other interesting note
is those who are out on these vessels on New Year's Eve, when
the lights go out at midnight to sing ``Auld Lang Syne,'' if
they come back on, they know they passed through the Y2K OK.
In terms of container ships, almost a 100 percent of our
manufactured goods come in and out of the United States via
container ships, and this is intermodal. It is very logistics-
oriented, very dependent on the chain of communication,
financial services, and ports.
Fortunately, there you have some very large, very
sophisticated companies who make up the bulk of the container
ship industry, and they are definitely aware of Y2K, and I am
pretty confident they are in good shape.
In terms of tankers, my special area, our industry's been
very aware of the problem, we've been working on it, and
INTERTANKO's efforts are focused on awareness. It's up to each
individual owner to look at their specific ship, and systems,
to make sure they comply. Generalizations really don't work.
You have to get very specific into each piece of equipment, and
each vessel.
The GPS which most ships nowadays use to navigate has
already gone through its Y2K, and, again, that's just one
method of navigation. It's not the only one. I am optimistic
the ship side will be OK. One interesting possibility, though
unlikely for a problem, is not so much with the ship, but it is
with the logistics chain that brings oil into the United
States, and that is, we are dependent largely on Third World
countries for our oil, and it is very hard to determine where
they stand in their ports, in their internal pipeline systems
for Y2K.
If you remember, 1974, the lines, the gasoline crisis, or
the perception of a gasoline crisis. The year 2000, it is
theoretically possible the same thing would happen. We have
high oil prices today. We have low crude oil inventories, and
consumers cannot plan ahead. You cannot stockpile your gasoline
other than by filling your tank, and, again, much of our oil
comes from third parties, Third World countries.
If there was a serious export stoppage from Venezuela, or
Mexico, or Nigeria, or the Middle East, in theory, you could
have a public perception of an oil problem, even though our
sources are very diversified.
We have the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and we have oil
companies who are very well organized to deal with crises
themselves. But one area that would be an interesting
possibility or problem would be a perception of a gasoline
shortage, and it probably would not be a bad idea for the oil
industry to start building up its inventories as we approach
the end of the year. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Du Moulin can be found in
the appendix.]
Chairman Bennett. I want to pick up on your last comment
because one of the issues that we are having a very hard time
getting our arms around, here, on the committee, is this whole
question of stockpiling, and how much is going on, and will it
produce an economic impact in the first quarter of 2000.
Theoretically, Y2K could cause a classic inventory
recession, where everybody builds up his inventory in
anticipation of it, in the last quarter of 1999, and then says
to his suppliers, ``Well, I have to work off this excess
inventory, so I will not be buying anything in first and second
quarter 2000.'' That is the core of the ``gloom and bust''
cycle that we have learned to live with and hate during the
Industrial Revolution.
Now, do you see--INTERTANKO members handle shipments--do
you see any stockpiling going on by virtue of demand being
higher than normal in this quarter? Any indication of that
going on, that would come through your members?
Mr. Du Moulin. That is a good question, Senator. First of
all, INTERTANKO members serve the customers. Their ships carry
the oil owned by, whether it's exporting countries, oil
companies, traders. So our ships go wherever they're ordered to
go, based on the contract we have with the charterer.
But what we have seen in terms of the oil markets in recent
months is that the Asia economy has picked up, they seem to be
through the worst of their crisis, so demand there has picked
up for crude oil and refined products.
The United States economy is still very strong and
consuming quite a bit. There is really no significant recession
anywhere, perhaps other than Russia, and so there is a high
demand for oil.
OPEC has gotten its act together, so the prices are now up
over $25 for the first time in over 3 years. So that what we
have seen is a draw-down of oil inventory, probably due to the
buyers of oil trying to wait till prices drop off a little bit.
That is just my guesstimate.
With winter coming, and Y2K lurking at the end of the year,
it is my opinion that it is not a great time to have lower
inventories. It is a better time to have normal or solid
inventories.
In terms of the oil industry, high or low inventories of
itself I do not think can trigger the kind of recession you are
talking about, because it is not the consumer that holds
inventory. It is really an industrial inventory.
I think that it is not a convenient time, if there were a
problem in the Third World, to have low inventories. So one
would hope inventories would buildup both for the winter and
for Y2K. Building of inventories would not of itself be any
economic hardship on the consuming public.
Chairman Bennett. Well, go out of the oil industry for a
minute into container ships. Here are some quotes from an
``Information Week'' survey.
``Cargo shipments that would have normally been scheduled
for the first quarter of 2000 are being booked for the second
half of this year.'' A shipping company official said, ``Eighty
percent of our customers want to import now rather than take a
chance early next year.'' Are you seeing any indication of that
by virtue of traffic?
Mr. Du Moulin. I am not an expert at the statistics and
container ship industry, so I cannot comment on that. I do know
the industry has lots of capacity to move cargo. But what you
are interested in is really the effect on the consumer and the
manufacturers. The shipping industry itself I am sure could
handle the load, but I cannot speak to the other part of the
issue. I do not know whether the Coast Guard may have any data
on that.
Admiral Naccara. Mr. Chairman, I do not have hard data on
it, but I know from many of my conversations with senior
executives in the shipping industry, that they have repeatedly
said they would not be operating on the critical dates. They do
not want me to repeat their names or their companies for
competitive reasons, but I suspect that they are planning to
work around that issue. Given that as part of their contingency
plan, they do not intend to be in restricted waters, they do
not intend to be moving within harbors on the critical dates.
So that may result in the stockpiling or the planning around
that. That is as much as I have on that.
Chairman Bennett. That would be a matter of a day or two,
and I realize this is a question that is almost impossible for
you to answer. I am not expecting any kind of hard numbers.
There is a sense of smell out there, that tells me that
more stockpiling is going on than anybody wants to admit. All
of the evidence for that is anecdotal. I have not been able to
get my hands around any kind of firm information that says we
are seeing worldwide a major inventory buildup. We had the
gentleman from British Airways. I have reports from business
associates who tell me that there is a fairly significant
amount of stockpiling going on in the United Kingdom. Very
quietly, companies are building their inventories, so that they
will not be vulnerable.
I have no way of, as I say, quantifying it, but I am just
looking to see if there is any more anecdotal information that
goes in that direction, or goes in the opposite direction, and
I would think traffic in international maritime facilities
would be part of the anecdotal evidence that would suggest that
maybe some of that stockpiling is going on.
But neither one of you can give me a sense of smell, either
way?
Admiral Naccara. Not at the moment, Mr. Chairman, but what
we can do is to check on port entry data and we can compare
that to previous years' benchmarks, perhaps. I can also check
with pilots' associations to get a sense for the number and the
capacity of cargo being moved and compare it to previous years.
Chairman Bennett. Yes, I think it probably would be more of
a capacity issue than number issue, that they just fill the
ship up a little more.
Admiral Naccara. Yes, sir. I will look into that and report
back to the Committee.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix.]
Mr. Du Moulin. I am just advised by one of my companions,
there is some selective placement of cargos in the fourth
quarter rather than the first quarter in the container ship
industry. This is not my own knowledge but my companions have
some better ideas on this. But it does not sound like massive
amounts we talked about.
Chairman Bennett. Around the world, there are some choke
points to marine navigation--Suez Canal, Panama Canal, Straits
of Hormuz, and so on. I am sure there are others that I am not
familiar with.
Do you have any comment on these various choke points, and
what you are looking for there?
Mr. Du Moulin. I have a comment. I would like the Admiral
to follow me because he may know more on certain of these. I
have been down to Panama, and what impressed me there was the
seriousness they are taking the hand-over. What also I found
fascinating was that much of the control equipment dates back
to the first 10 years of the 20th Century, and so maybe that's
a good defense against Y2K.
Chairman Bennett. The ghost of Teddy Roosevelt is still
there.
Mr. Du Moulin. So I would hope the canal is all right. In
terms of Suez Canal, for crude oil shipments, there is a choice
of going around Africa or going through the canal. It is really
an economic choice of an extra week of steaming versus the cost
of the transit of the canal.
So it would certainly be somewhat disruptive if the Suez
Canal ever closed, but it would not be a catastrophe if it
closed. There is a lot of tanker capacity out there now.
In terms of other navigational bodies, like Straits of
Singapore or others, it is not a matter of physical closure as
much as the advice you can get from some vessel traffic control
facilities that are located in some of these areas.
I would think that the ships operating with their own due
diligence would be able to still navigate.
Admiral Naccara. Sir, on an interdepartmental basis, the
Coast Guard attempted to identify the critical ports in the
world for military purposes and as our key trading partners,
and all of the key choke points as you just mentioned.
We have taken this list to TRANSCOM, and together with a
contractor, they have developed an assessment of most of these
critical ports and the choke points.
That is part of their classified assessment. I can say,
generally, that we have seen through three briefings, during
the last 8 months, that there has been a great improvement in
awareness of Y2K and preparedness, and generally actions have
been taken in all of our critical ports and choke points.
I can have arrangements made for that briefing to be made
to you, sir, and your staff.
Chairman Bennett. We would appreciate receiving that
information.
[The information referred to can be found in the appendix.]
Finally, the same kind of general question that I have
asked before of the aviation people. One of the concerns in the
Department of Defense is that someone who wishes us ill will
try to slip some sort of computer problem into the system,
disguising it as a Y2K system, when in fact it is a computer
attack.
Now the Department of Defense is the center of most of the
computer attacks against this country that are going on. Some
of them have turned out to be 16-year-old boys who are simply
out to prove that they can do it, and do not realize the
enormous damage that they cause.
But some of them are coming from much more sophisticated
and powerful sources. It would seem to me that if there were a
source that wished this country ill and wanted to create
disruption in the Western world, generally, for whatever
reason--religious ideology or fundamentalist zeal, or whatever
reason--that disrupting shipping would be a very, very good
thing for them to do to achieve their goal.
How secure do you think some of the critical systems are?
Mr. Du Moulin, you probably have not focused on this as much as
the military people, but I would like you to think about it, if
you have not, and get your various associates to do the same.
How secure, Admiral, do you think you are against some kind
of an attack that would be made over the Y2K period, to try to
create this disruption and make it look as if it were something
other than an attack?
Admiral Naccara. A difficult question to answer, Mr.
Chairman. I can say, through experience, that we have rather
sophisticated intrusion detection equipment installed on Coast
Guard software systems. In fact, we are probably susceptible to
about 40 attempted intrusions per month, most of which have
been unsuccessful, I must say, during the last 6 months.
We will have a heightened state of awareness and have more
people on watch and prepared, looking for those types of
problems, as we pass the millennium.
I would like to think that we are fairly secure in the
Coast Guard. That does not ensure that level of security on
those systems that are beyond our control. The other key
systems that are operated by other Government agencies I would
believe have similar intrusion detection equipment in place.
Chairman Bennett. Are you in touch with DOD and the work
that they are doing?
Admiral Naccara. Yes, sir; absolutely.
Chairman Bennett. I would assume that would be the case,
that the uniformed services----
Admiral Naccara. Yes, sir. Interoperability and
compatibility are very critical to all of our services.
Chairman Bennett. Thank you very much for your patience. We
appreciate you sitting through a long morning, but we learned a
great deal on the committee through the morning, and your
testimony, the two of you, was very, very helpful. Thank you,
again.
The Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND MATERIAL SUBMITTED
______
Prepared Statement of Chairman Robert F. Bennett
The movement of people and goods safely, rapidly, efficiently, and
economically is both a major accomplishment and an essential
requirement of modern times. People can now take short trips to far off
destinations for personal or business reasons that in the earlier part
of this century would have required the commitment of many days or even
weeks. Businesses have now developed more efficient means of production
that rely on just-in-time inventories and lean manufacturing where
trains, trucks, and tankers serve as moving warehouses of supplies and
finished goods. And the transportation infrastructure makes possible
the rapid deployment of US armed forces--power projection forces--in
times of conflict to any part of the world as needed, precluding the
need for greater ``forward deployment'' of American troops on foreign
shores.
However, transportation vehicles and systems increasingly rely on
automation and information technology as many other industries do.
Everyone is aware of the computers that manage air traffic, and we are
increasingly reminded of the computers in our automobiles, but few of
us have experience with other modes of transportation that are also
heavily dependent on information technology and embedded systems.
A good example of this is the ``Susan Maersk,'' a container ship
operated by the Maersk Line (shown in a poster on my right). This ship,
the largest to call on an American port, is 1,138 feet long and
transports the equivalent of 6,600 twenty-foot trailers. Amazingly,
through technology, it manages to accomplish its tasks with a crew of
only 15. It does so with a computer system that connects and monitors
some 8,000 sensors in the engine room, cargo-containers, and elsewhere
that enables safe navigation and operations.
This computer dependence has made transportation systems
potentially vulnerable to the Y2K bug unless the technology is fixed.
So far, this sector has been faring well, having passed several suspect
dates in the past year with minor problems at best. The problems that
have shown up so far could be classified as nuisances, such as lost
luggage, broken taxi meters, erroneous traffic citations, premature
cancellation of registrations, and failure of GPS receivers in a small
number of automobiles last August. However, we know the potential is
there for much greater problems. We've seen what can happen to air
traffic when the radar systems and computers fail, and we've
experienced in this city the commuting headaches that occur when the
computers that control the D.C. Metro fail.
Today, we will examine how the Y2K problem may interfere with the
global network of transportation systems and what steps Governments,
industry, and trade associations are taking to minimize Y2K's impact.
We will focus mainly on international issues, having looked at the
domestic issues in detail last year. It is very important that air,
sea, and land transportation systems be ready in other nations for
Americans to travel safely as well as for the uneventful import and
export of raw materials and finished products that our economy depends
upon. Nonetheless, there are a few loose ends in the domestic area,
such as the readiness of domestic airports and marine terminals, which
we expect our witnesses will address today.
Information that has only recently surfaced concerns us that there
may be a lack of serious attention to Y2K by many entities within the
transportation sector. For instance, the Coast Guard received only a
43% response to its request for Y2K status information from the 33,000
vessels that visited U.S. ports over the last two years and only a 36%
response from the 5,000 marine facilities surveyed. Also, only 33 of
the 83 U.S. members of the American Association of Port Authorities
responded to its August 1999 survey. Finally, 22 of 168 U.S. airlines
providing international service did not respond to the International
Civil Aviation Organization's request to member states to publish
information on the Y2K readiness of their aeronautical services, while
another 27 of the 168 failed to report Y2K completion dates. I could
cite further examples, but I think the trend is clear.
Finally, with New Year's Eve just three months away, it is
important to understand how Government and industry plan to manage the
transition to the new century at the end of the year in a way that
keeps the public appropriately informed while minimizing the potential
for panic. The Department of Transportation is fulfilling several key
roles to this end. For example, it is leading the team evaluating
foreign aviation systems, working with the Department of State on
travel guidance for U.S. travelers, and assisting the Information
Coordination Center under the President's Council on Y2K Conversion to
assess the transportation sector's response to Y2K at the end of this
year. We look forward to hearing how the Department will accomplish
these difficult and critical tasks.
__________
Prepared Statement of Peter Cooke
I am Peter Cooke, appearing on behalf of British Airways Plc. I
would like to thank the Committee for offering British Airways the
opportunity to explain the steps we are taking to deal with the unique
challenge posed by the Year 2000 issue.
BRITISH AIRWAYS READINESS FOR THE YEAR 2000
The British Airways Year 2000 programme began in 1995. The
programme encompasses computer systems, applications and equipment for
which the airline is responsible, as well as embedded chip technology,
business partners and supplier chains. The two basic programme
principles are:
the application of rigid project management
disciplines and
line management accountability for business
continuity.
The project is regarded as a business issue rather than purely an
IT problem, hence the appointment of myself, a generalist line manager
rather than an IT specialist, as Project Director. Our Director of
Customer Service and Operations sponsors the project at executive
management level and I have open access to the Chief Executive. The
Main Board is keenly interested in the project and receives regular
reports both verbally and in writing.
We have had up to 200 staff assigned to the programme both in the
Central Project Office and across Departments and our estimated spend
over the length of the project amounts to 70 million sterling
(approximately $112 million). Specialist consultanices have been
engaged, principally in the fields of business continuity and embedded
chip technology, All findings have been subjected to independent
quality audit.
Current Status
Over 99% of British Airways systems and infrastructures have
finished their compliance projects and are back in production. This
programme has involved more than 3,000 systems and environments, over
800 applications and some 30,000 PCs. The small number of systems
remaining are either not business critical or have tested business
continuity plans.
Successful large-scale tests of our business processes, with system
clocks set in 2000 mode, have been carried out. These include such
routine airline operations as check-in, reservations, ticket sales,
cargo, crew scheduling, airport arrivals and departures and flight
tracking across the network. Systematic and close liaison has been
established with major business partners such as British Airports
Authorities (BAA Plc) with joint testing of common systems at our base
airports of Heathrow and Gatwick--e.g. baggage delivery systems.
Our Engineering Department, in conjunction with Boeing, Airbus and
avionics suppliers, has undertaken a thorough audit of aircraft systems
inclusive of British Airways originated modifications. Flight tests
have been conducted on each aircraft type. As expected, normal system
and aircraft operation has been demonstrated.
With regard to supplier chains, our database originally comprised
some 40,000 entries worldwide. All have been categorized according to
business importance, investigated and certified compliant or
alternative arrangements put in place.
We have monitored and will continue to monitor the Year 2000
programmes of our franchise and codeshare partners.
As safety regulator the Safety Regulation Group of the United
Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) is required to be satisfied that
UK airlines are addressing the Year 2000 issue, that adequate resources
are provided and that airlines provide safety assurances of readiness
in respect of services and products covered by the UK CAA approval held
by the Operator. No safety concerns have been raised.
British Airways has collaborated closely with Action 2000, the
United Kingdom Government Agency established to ascertain Year 2000
readiness of key components of the United Kingdom economy and
infrastructure. In July, following audit of our programme by
independent assessors appointed on Action 2000's behalf, we were
accorded their highest rating--BLUE--which means that we met the
following criteria for business processes of importance to UK
infrastructure.
the organization's critical systems programme is
complete.
the organization has addressed its exposure to
suppliers and has an adequate and on-going supplier assurance
programme in the judgement of the assessor.
the organization has reasonable risk based
continuity plans in place or on course to be in place and fit
for purposes by 1 January 2000 in the judgment of the assessor.
A freeze on all systems implementation has been in place since the
beginning of September 1999. This will continue until end of January
2000.
In conclusion, therefore, British Airways is satisfied that it is
ready for the new Millennium as far as all systems and processes that
it controls are concerned.
READINESS OF AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES AND AIRPORTS
Air Traffic Services
Ensuring Year 2000 readiness of overseas air traffic service
providers has been a significant exercise for an airline with global
operations like British Airways. there are over 180 ICAO States of
which some 150 are of relevance to British Airways. Our process has
included co-operation with the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), participation in the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) industry project, collaboration with our alliances
partners (oneworld) and our own assessments, knowledge and experience.
Firstly, an assessment has been made of State responses to the ICAO
request for assurances of programmes to audit date sensitive systems,
action taken by States and declarations of readiness.
Secondly British Airways has been a very active supporter and
participant in the IATA industry Year 2000 programme, unanimously
adopted at the Annual General Meeting in May 1998. In fact, I have the
honor of being the Chairman of the Steering Group of airlines who have
given direction to the IATA programme as it has developed, and
continues to develop. Our Flight Operations department was involved in
developing the ATS programme methodology and we have had observers at
many site visits, either our own Flight Ops personnel or specialist ATS
consultants under contract to us. We have also taken into account
report from the IATA Regional Technical Offices. In some cases very
positive discussions have been held directly with suppliers to ATS
authorities.
In some areas we have conducted our own assessments and have also
taken reports from our oneworld partners.
A formalized company assessment process has been developed to
determine degree of readiness, that contingency plans are in place or
being formalized within the region and the potential impact on safety.
The scope of assessment comprised:--
a) Air Traffic Service Providers.
b) Operational systems related to Air Traffic services at
airports.
c) Destinations and Alternates.
d) Focus on Millennium transition period 31st December to 4th
January.
e) Safety and Operational viability.
To determine the potential impact to aircraft in flight a database
was created with assessment criteria for each ICAO State. A computer
routine was developed to determine the location of British Airways
flights (en-route and the ground) at midnight local time and GMT.
The monitoring of readiness will remain on-going up to 31st
December and the assessment code given to each State will be reviewed
and revised as further information is received. Our normal Operations
Control Centre at London, which controls our operations on a 24 hour
basis, 365 days a year, will be responsible for monitoring and taking
any necessary decisions on flights during the Millennium rollover
period. It will begin to receive information from early on 31st
December through direct communication links which are being established
with ICAO, IATA, Eurocontrol and oneworld partners. These links are
currently being defined, installed and tested.
Airports
With regard to the operational readiness of airports worldwide,
British Airways has also been a very active supporter and participant
in the IATA industry Year 2000 investigation. British Airways
representatives have observed many of the site visits, and we have been
lead airline, responsible for ensuring data collection, at a number of
airports both in the UK and overseas.
Our assessments have been based on IATA data, and on information
gained through the Regional Task Forces which have been instituted by
IATA to assemble regular meetings of regional airlines and to pool all
available knowledge on Year 2000 readiness. We have also taken account
of reports from our own overseas managers at each airport and
collaborated with our oneworld partners. We have concentrated in our
assessments on contingency plans at each airport we operate to and we
have participated, wherever possible, in the testing of such plans. We
have developed a route-by-route database to co-ordinate all
assessments.
Conclusions
We continue to track progress worldwide and will do so up to the
Millennium itself.
Our assessment is that we are very satisfied with progress being
made in all parts of the world and we do not currently anticipate that
our planned Millennium period operating schedules will be impacted by
Year 2000 readiness issues at ATS providers or airports.
CONTINGENCY PLANS
The British Airways Year 2000 programme calls for Business
Continuity Plans to be in place, confirmed and tested by the end of
September 1999 for mission critical and important processes. We are
also taking into account the regional contingency plans being put in
place by ICAO and, as mentioned, the BCPs of individual airports. Our
conclusion that there are currently no impediments to operating our
planned schedules takes into account our assessment of the contingency
plans of key suppliers and business partners.
RELATIONS WITH ICAO, IATA AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
British Airways believes that the Year 2000 programme undertaken by
IATA with participation, support and funding from all member airlines
(and including some non IATA carriers) is a striking example of the
airline community taking the lead, collaboratively and proactively, in
an important initiative in the public interest. Some $28 million has
been provided by airlines for this programme and we believe that no
other international industry has demonstrated a more responsible
approach to the Year 2000 challenge.
The programme has received unprecedented co-operation from our
industry partners and a vast amount of relevant and useful data has
been assembled.
The industry programme has worked closely with ICAO, Airports
Council International (ACI), Air Transport Association of America (ATA)
and other representative international organizations from related
industries and service providers. British Airways is pleased with the
co-operation offered by all concerned.
SUMMARY
British Airways is confident that its methodology and assessment
process is appropriate to address the safety related issues posed by
Year 2000. We have determined that the residual risk to operations is
low and that adequate contingency plans are in place. On September 20th
we announced our schedule of operations for the Millennium. There will
be a reduced schedule over the Millennium eve, reflecting expected
demand. New Year's eve is traditionally a time of reduced passenger
loads. However, there will be a worldwide operation including some
flights during the rollover period.
We shall, of course, keep all aspects of our assessment of Year
2000 readiness under continuous review up to and during the rollover
period and, since safety is of paramount importance, we will not
hesitate to review our planned operations in the light of latest
information and will take appropriate action if necessary. This is
normal practice for an airline with global operations 24 hours a day.
It is never possible to say that no delays or operational disruption
will occur but we have well established procedures to mitigate both the
likelihood and the consequences of any disruption to our passengers.
__________
Prepared Statement of Vice Chairman Christopher J. Dodd
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Y2K has the capacity to severely disable
the transportation industry. Luckily, however, the airline and travel
industries have gone to great lengths to ensure that travel on the air,
sea, and land will be safe and uninterrupted on New Year's Day. To a
very great extent, I believe this will be the case. However, there
continues to be genuine Y2K-related problems in foreign countries that
are significantly less prepared.
Recently, the State Department prepared a detailed travel advisory
characterizing the level of safety for 194 countries. Each country has
dealt with the approach of the new millennium in a different way, and
will vary in Y2K readiness come January 1. The State Department's
public advisories indicate that certain countries will be much safer
than others. The U.S., Canada, England and Australia are each expected
to fare well during and after the date-change. Other countries such as
India, China and Russia may be more susceptible to Y2K problems,
therefore it would be appropriate to caution people against traveling
to those areas. In fact, a number of Asian-based airlines are drawing
up plans for alternative routes to Europe in order to avoid flying over
India. It seems India's own Air Traffic Controllers' Guild is worried
about the Y2K readiness status of its aviation and airport industry.
When the State Department issues an advisory for a certain area of
the world, factors such as the continuing availability of medical
services, telecommunications, and utilities are equally important to
travel as actual transportation systems. Therefore, just because planes
will not fall out of the sky and ships will not sink, it does not
necessarily mean that all will go well. We must look at the picture as
a whole before making a decision about where to go during the date
transition. Recently, warnings have circulated within Japan and Great
Britain about the risks involved with traveling during Y2K. In fact,
the British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA), a union which has 7,000
members, stated this past July that they will not fly to areas they
regard as unsafe. This means that pilots must be trained and briefed on
flying alternative routes given that some skies are potentially not as
friendly as others.
Indeed the Department of Transportation's Inspector General tells
us that:
34 of 185 nations have not yet responded to the
International Civil Aviation Organization's request for status
information on aeronautical services (airlines, airports, and air
traffic control). Approximately one million passengers flew between
these 34 countries and the U.S. last year.
An interagency committee (DOT, DOD, and DOS) reviewing
ICAO information about the 89 countries that account for 97% of U.S.
international passengers, has determined that there is insufficient
information available for assessing the Y2K readiness of 28 (or almost
1/3) of the countries.
And, even in this country, almost 2,000 of 3,300 U.S. air
carriers surveyed by FAA did not respond to the FAA survey. All were
smaller carriers.
Despite this last statistic, the United States is more prepared
than any other country in the world. Problems in this country are more
likely to create inconveniences rather than safety issues. A major
concern of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is how ready state
and local governments traffic management systems, traffic signal
systems, and other Intelligent Transportation Systems are that make
road travel convenient and delay-free. These systems are operated
solely by state and local governments, and do not depend on the Federal
government for supervision or maintenance. This is not to say that
travel should be avoided over the holiday season, only that you should
factor Y2K into travel plans much as you would factor in other
potential problems such as bad weather or holiday traffic.
Here in the District, and in other large cities across the nation,
people will use trains as part of their means of holiday
transportation. The railway system is a highly interconnected system
and citizens should be aware of potentialities that may exist there.
During Hurricane Floyd the central operations center of CSX railway was
understaffed, causing a total shutdown of commuter trains as far as
eight hundred miles away. Though Y2K related problems are not
necessarily expected to occur in this area, no one can really be sure
until we get there, and even then, no one can be sure how far-reaching
problems may be. The possibility always exists for unanticipated
problems to erupt in one place, causing disruptions in another, which
is the very nature of the Y2K problem. A more thorough assessment will
be provided by the Department of Transportation, which will give us a
better understanding of how contingency plans would be followed in the
case that disruptions actually occur. In any case, people should
remember that Y2K could cause normally heavy travel days to be wrought
with disruptions and delays.
A hundred million Americans travel to work everyday in planes,
trains and automobiles. Millions of students depend on buses and trains
to get to school. During and after the New Year there will be
potentially millions of people traveling to various destinations
nationwide and worldwide. There is no question of the importance of
this issue. We look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
__________
Prepared Statement of Mortimer L. Downey
Chairman Bennett, Vice-Chairman Dodd, and Members of the Committee:
thank you for this opportunity to report on the Department of
Transportation's (DOT, or the Department) accomplishments in resolving
the Year 2000 (Y2K) challenge. I appear before you today fully
confident that all of DOT's vital computer systems will effectively
make the transition on January 1, 2000.
Over the past two years, the Department has put forth a concerted
effort to ensure that its mission-critical systems will function as
expected before and after the century change. The safety and well-being
of the traveling public, and the crucial role that the transportation
industry plays in our Nation's commerce, have been uppermost in our
minds as we've gone about the business of remediating the Department's
vital systems.
Today, I am pleased to report to you that the Department has
completed remediation efforts on 100% of its 609 mission-critical
systems. These systems function in every Operating Administration (OA)
in DOT: the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG), the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the
Maritime Administration (MARAD), the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), the Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA), the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation
(SLSDC), the Surface Transportation Board (STB), the Transportation
Administrative Service Center (TASC), the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (BTS), the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and the
Office of the Secretary (OST).
Considering where we stood with this complex task a year or so ago,
this achievement is a testament to the extraordinary efforts of a truly
dedicated team of professionals determined to ensure that our
transportation system remains ready and safe.
We are still working hard to complete work on our non mission-
critical systems. In our August quarterly status report we reported
that remediation has been completed for 100% of these systems operated
by the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Highway
Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal
Transit Administration, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, and
the Surface Transportation Board. The remaining OAs continue to make
progress with their non mission-critical systems, and most project
completion of this work by October.
We recognize that despite our best efforts, some services provided
by business partners and the public infrastructure may be disrupted
during the millennium rollover due to Y2K system failures. We must be
prepared to deal with system failures that could disrupt vital
services, whether or not they are within our control. Therefore, the
Department's OAs have developed Business Continuity and Contingency
Plans (BCCP) so that our core business functions will continue
uninterrupted. Our OAs are in the process of testing their contingency
plans and making necessary adjustments to these plans. Current versions
of each plan have been provided to you.
In addition, the Department has conducted two tabletop exercises
with the Secretary, OA Administrators, and myself, and we plan to
conduct an additional such exercise in November. During these
exercises, various failure scenarios are introduced to the participants
and they are required to elaborate on how their contingency and
staffing plans might deal with these failures. These exercises are
proving very useful for identifying problems and circumstances that
might arise, and the strategies to deal with them.
While we feel confident about the Department's own remediation and
contingency planning activities, we recognize the need to continue
vigorous outreach activities with our domestic and international
industry partners. Under the auspices of the President's Council on
Year 2000 Conversion, I chair the Transportation Sector Working Group.
This group includes the Department of Defense, the Department of
Agriculture, the Department of the Interior, the Department of State,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Customs Service,
and the U.S. Postal Service. The group is charged with promoting action
on the Y2K problem and gathering information on Y2K readiness of
entities in the transportation sector. This sector includes air
carriers, airports, shipping companies, port operators, freight
railroads, automobile manufacturers, trucking companies, and mass
transit authorities. Through this group, there has been a full exchange
of information on many levels across the globe, and from this exchange
we have been able to determine several common themes regarding the
transportation sector's readiness:
there is a high degree of awareness of the problem
and its potential consequences;
there are aggressive efforts being made to address
the problem, although better progress is reported by large
organizations than by small and medium-sized organizations;
possible disruptions are expected to be generally
local in nature; and,
there is a greater potential for international
failures that could adversely affect our own domestic and
cross-border operations (many of the world's smaller and
emerging nations are struggling to meet the challenge).
More specific information regarding the transportation sector has
been included in the Quarterly Summaries of Assessment Information
issued by the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion. The most
recent Summary was issued in August, and the final Summary will be
issued in November. The following represents transportation sector
status information as of the August report:
Highway--Automotive/Trucking
A spring 1999 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) survey of major automobile manufacturers did not identify any
potential Y2K impacts for the safe operation of motor vehicles. Auto
manufacturing companies representing approximately 90 percent of cars
and light trucks sold in the United States all stated that the Y2K
problem would not affect the safety or performance of their motor
vehicles.
Many manufacturers voluntarily submitted Y2K Readiness Disclosures
in addition to their survey responses. These disclosures, available to
the public on the NHTSA web site, indicate that most manufacturers are
addressing all aspects of the automotive industry with their Y2K
efforts, including coordination with business partners such as vendors,
suppliers and dealers.
The American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA) surveyed its 3,600
member companies in February 1999. The 190 respondents represented a
cross-section of the industry, from small regional companies to large
national and international companies. A summary of responses showed
that 95 percent of respondents had Y2K plans in place. Of 170
respondents, system assessments, on average, were 89 percent complete
with over half reporting 100 percent completion. Renovation was
reported as 74 percent complete; validation 61 percent complete; and
implementation 61 percent complete. Eighty-one percent reported having
designed contingency plans, 56 percent said they had tested those
plans. ATA distributed another survey to its members in September and
results are expected in October.
Within the trucking industry, large and small businesses are
expected to be the most prepared for the date change (small businesses
in the industry are not heavily automated), while mid-sized companies
are thought to be vulnerable due to a lack of funding and experts to
make Y2K repairs to business systems. There are no known Y2K problems
for truck engines. Members of the major trucking associations were
alerted to the Global Positioning System (GPS) end-of-week rollover
issue that could have affected some GPS receivers after August 21,
1999. No GPS incidents were reported to us by trucking associations. We
recognized that the GPS, which is operated by the Defense Department,
is relied on by virtually every mode of transportation and by
recreational users such as hikers, and campers. Therefore, the DoD and
DOT worked together and with many other organizations, to ensure that
GPS users were aware of this date-related GPS event and avoided any
situations where loss of the GPS could cause a hazardous condition. I
am pleased to report we were successful--GPS anomalies were few and
minor and we know of no incidents arising from this event.
Rail
In general, because of the design of safety-critical railroad
signaling, dispatching, and telecommunications systems and the
operating rules that accompany them, the railroad industry does not
anticipate that there will be any Y2K problems associated with these
systems. The systems are all event-driven. Similarly, no Y2K problems
are expected with grade crossing signals because they are event-driven,
rather than time- or date-driven. Electronic event recording systems
keep track of grade crossing signal operation, but the signals
themselves are designed to operate even if the event recorders
malfunctioned due to a Y2K problem.
Amtrak and the commuter railroads examined their mission-critical
operating systems (dispatching, signals, grade crossings, etc.) and
their mission-critical business systems (ticketing, reservations,
scheduling) and reported that they successfully corrected those few
systems where a Y2K problem existed. They anticipate that trains will
run as planned on Jan. 1, 2000 and the following days, and that
customers will continue to be able to obtain information, tickets, and
reservations. However, Amtrak and most of the commuter railroads carry
out operations on tracks by the major freight railroads and are
therefore dependent on the Y2K readiness of these railroads.
Serious Y2K problems are not anticipated in the short-line
railroads since they are primarily small businesses that rely on older,
less technology dependent, equipment. For example, most short line
railroads do not have signal systems and operate older locomotives that
do not have on-board computers. However, they also rely on the larger
railroads with which they connect to provide them with traffic data and
other automated support.
Because of the dependence of the smaller railroads on the larger
ones, as well as the serious safety issues that have arisen as a result
of computer problems occurring in connection with railroad mergers in
recent years, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is taking a
more proactive role with regard to potential Y2K-related computer
issues with the major railroads. FRA hired a consulting firm with a
background in Y2K conversions to visit the nation's four major
railroads (Burlington Northern Santa Fe, CSX, Norfolk Southern, and
Union Pacific), which together account for almost 90 percent of freight
revenues. The consulting firm was tasked with the following: to review
the steps the railroads have taken to make their operating data
systems, yard management systems, dispatching systems, and electronic
data interchange systems Y2K compliant; to analyze what steps remain to
be taken at each company before full compliance is achieved; to review
logs and records regarding the railroads' Y2K compliance activities in
terms of independent validation and verification, remediation, testing,
and implementation; to observe end-to-end tests; and to review each
railroad's contingency plans and evaluate their likely effectiveness.
The results of this effort will be available at FRA's upcoming Y2K
Readiness Workshop on October 8, 1999.
Transit
In July 1999, the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion
convened a meeting to gather information on the Y2K efforts of transit
providers and suppliers. DOT, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA),
and a cross-section of transit industry representatives identified the
following issues affecting the industry:
transit will be one of the very first public
services to be utilized in the New Year, serving everyone from
revelers to shift workers conducting Y2K coverage;
some authorities in metropolitan areas have
extensive contingency plans to address unprecedented ridership
increases expected for the New Year's celebrations;
Y2K does not appear to pose any insurmountable
technological hurdles for the transit industry and, as a
general business practice, most transit providers have existing
contingency plans (non-Y2K specific) addressing various
scenarios; and,
some transit providers are planning to pause either
rail or rail/bus operations briefly around midnight until it is
clear they may safely resume normal operations.
The participants at the July meeting agreed that Y2K readiness
remains a major focus of top-level management attention in the transit
industry, requiring the continued personal direction of transit agency
board chairs and chief executive officers as well as Federal, state and
local officials through January 1, 2000 and beyond.
For its part, FTA has accelerated its industry outreach, management
oversight and survey of the Y2K compliance of the nation's transit
systems. FTA transit agencies unable to meet a June 30, 1999, Y2K
compliance deadline established for Y2K grantees were required to
submit a contingency letter outlining their plans for continuation of
system operations while repairing or replacing non-compliant elements.
Of 550 grant recipients required to report, all but four have responded
that they are either Y2K compliant or have required contingency plans.
Of those responding, 403 (73%) reported Y2K compliance, and the
remaining 143 reported that they will be complaint by 12/31/99. The
remaining four grantees (all in Puerto Rico) either did not respond to
the survey or responded incorrectly. FTA is following up with these
recipients.
Air and Maritime
Administrator Garvey and Admiral Naccara will provide you with
detailed information regarding their agencies' readiness and the
readiness of the FAA's and Coast Guard's domestic and international
industry partners. Both organizations have been working Y2K issues
aggressively and extensively with the aviation and maritime
communities.
However, I would like to take this opportunity to address your
specific questions regarding our strategy for advising the public of
Y2K related problems in the airline industry, particularly in the
international arena. In cooperation with the President's Council on
Year 2000 Conversion, the Office of the Secretary of Transportation,
the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department of Defense have
reviewed available information gathered through the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and other sources on the Y2K readiness of
foreign civil aviation entities. Information on whether an individual
country is Y2K ready is available on the DOT website at the following
address: www.dot.gov/fly2k.
The whole Y2K phenomenon is characterized by uncertainty as to its
effects and we cannot fully predict what will happen during the
millennium transition. Y2K non-compliance in a system or entity does
not necessarily translate into a safety problem or regulatory
violation. To date, FAA's analysis of available data has not identified
any aircraft safety problem associated with Y2K that would justify
prohibition of aircraft from U.S. airspace.
Furthermore, civil aviation is inherently capable of addressing
contingencies every day. Before any flight is conducted by U.S.
carriers/crews they must carefully assess all information pertaining to
the flight including weather, Notice to Airmen advisories, performance
data, suitability of destination airfield, and other factors affecting
safe operations. In the event adverse conditions are expected,
contingency plans are required which might include additional fuel, use
of alternate airports, restrictions on operations to daylight only, or
any other number of possibilities. It is expected that the millennium
transition will be no different, and contingency plans will be in place
at each facility and for each flight to address Y2K impacts.
International contingency planning efforts and our encouragement of
business continuity planning at international airports should mitigate
potential disruptions in service. The current expectation is that
conditions related to Y2K transition will give rise to isolated service
disruptions that could subject passengers to inconvenient delays or
diversions.
However, if the FAA has credible, verified information that
aviation operations in a foreign country would not be safe due to Y2K
problems, the Administrator would take appropriate action. FAA can
proscribe flights to an area and provide notices about conditions, if
the responsible aviation authority for that area for some reason
doesn't. However, flight proscriptions or other proscriptions on air
carriers traveling to foreign destinations will not be made solely on
the basis of Y2K compliance statements which cannot be verified through
first hand inspection and whose effects cannot be clearly identified or
measured. The FAA would also provide information concerning unsafe
conditions to the Department of State, which is responsible for issuing
Travel Advisories.
You also asked me to address our plans to coordinate with the
Information Coordination Center (ICC), the Department of State, and the
Department of Defense regarding assessments of the international travel
situation. Both the FAA and the U.S. Coast Guard will closely
monitoring international activities through a variety of information
networks. The FAA has normal operational links with the Department of
State and Defense whereby information affecting civil aviation is
reported and acted on as appropriate. We will be increasing our
vigilance for the millennium rollover. This increased activity will
include direct contact with the ICAO Y2K Global Command in Montreal,
which, in turn, will be contact with the seven ICAO Y2K Regional
Information Centers around the world. We are also reviewing our links
to DOD and DOS to ensure exchange of Y2K information related to foreign
air traffic service, airports and air operators.
The U.S. Coast Guard has established a large and diverse set of
international partners. These partners range across the entire industry
and include international terminal operators, shipping companies,
indemnity clubs, appropriate government agencies and bodies such as the
International Maritime Organization. Meetings were held this past week
with the G-8 nations and international trade organizations to establish
the turn of the century communications plans, as well as to share
preparation information for the event. In addition, the Coast Guard has
personnel stationed in Rotterdam, Guam, Japan, and the Panama Canal who
will report on scene information. Similarly, liaisons will be at the
DOD and State Department command centers during the event to observe
conditions and report relevant information.
The FAA's Communication and Information Center (CIC) and the Coast
Guard's Incident Management Team (IMT) will be linked to the DOT
Headquarters Crisis Management Center (CMC), which, in turn, will be
the direct line of communication with the ICC. Key personnel will be on
duty at all locations to augment normal staffing to ensure flow of
information and appropriate response to any problem caused by Y2K.
Overall, we have been working closely with the ICC and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to establish a coordinated
information management capability for the days immediately preceding
and following key date changes. We have a full-time detailee assigned
to the ICC office as of September 1, 1999, through the end of February
2000. It is anticipated that we will have an additional five
individuals assigned for the rollover period. In addition, we are also
working with the Public Affairs component of the ICC, the Joint Public
Information Center (JPIC), which will be operational during the
rollover period. We have already participated in two exercises
conducted jointly with the ICC and we anticipate that we will
participate in additional readiness exercises conducted by the ICC
beginning in mid-October. In addition, ICC representatives attended the
two DOT tabletop exercises conducted with our OA Administrators.
We also serve on two policy bodies organized by the ICC--the
Interagency Domestic Working Group and the Interagency International
Working Group. In the international arena, DOT will be collecting
supplemental information through our FAA offices and Coast Guard
liaisons located in a number of world capitals. In addition, we have
operational ties to Transport Canada through our Crisis Management
Center and its Canadian equivalent and we participated in Canada's
major national exercise held September 27-28. We will continue to fully
support the activities of the ICC.
In response to the question regarding actions the Congress or
others should take to address international Y2K issues, I encourage
your continued diligence in emphasizing the importance of the issue and
the general state of readiness. With respect to Y2K in general, I would
like to acknowledge this Committee for its pragmatic approach to the
problem and its realistic portrayal of the status of Y2K efforts.
Considerable misinformation regarding Y2K status has been generated on
a variety of fronts, but this Committee has consistently sought to
provide an accurate and objective picture of the facts.
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that we are committed to
ensuring that all DOT systems will operate properly before, during, and
after the millennium change. Further, we recognize our responsibility
to the traveling public and the need to continue our efforts to reach
out to the transportation industry and all those responsible for our
transportation infrastructure.
This concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
__________
Prepared Statement of Jane F. Garvey
Chairman Bennett, Senator Dodd, and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning to
discuss the status of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Year
2000 (Y2K) compliance efforts. I had the honor of appearing before you
last year to apprise the Members of our efforts, and it gives me great
pleasure to inform you today that the FAA has completely implemented
all Y2K fixes in our systems as of June 30, 1999, the date that we
promised we would.
We have worked tirelessly to ensure that the transition of air
traffic services to the new year would be as smooth as possible. All
FAA computer systems, mission-critical and non-mission-critical, are
now Y2K compliant. An independent contractor has reviewed the
documentation on the repairs we have performed on all of these systems
and verified our work based on engineering judgment. The Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Transportation (DOT) has
also validated our compliance. I am confident that the FAA will make
the transition to the year 2000 smoothly and without compromising
aviation safety in the National Airspace System (NAS).
Our confidence in this was reinforced by one of our most important
checks on our Y2K efforts. On April 10 of this year, we conducted an
``end-to-end' test of our systems at the FAA's operational facilities
in Denver, Colorado. This event used an FAA flight check aircraft to
fly from Colorado Springs to Grand Junction to Denver International
Airport. During this flight, the FAA's air traffic control systems were
set forward to December 31, 1999, and rolled over to January 1, 2000.
We recorded all of the tracking data, examined the data, and discovered
that there were no problems attributable to the Y2K transition. This
was a particularly important step in our testing, since it provided us
with the assurance that our individual system fixes were able to work
together in an operational environment.
Although our systems are Y2K compliant, we all know that the FAA
must continue to conduct business from now through the new year, and
that as our business needs change, so will our systems. Hence, we have
added a Post-Implementation phase to our Y2K repair approach. During
this phase, we will ensure that as changes are applied to our systems,
the system will remain Y2K compliant. Additionally, we are
strengthening our efforts in testing and quality assurance to ensure
that NAS will continue to function through the year 2000.
We are committed to making sure the NAS will remain safe and
efficient through the Y2K change. We are keeping a vigilant eye on our
systems, testing and retesting them to assure ourselves, you the
Congress, and the traveling public, that our Y2K repairs really do
work. We continue to perform interface and system integration tests.
Again, our focus is the maintenance of the integrity of our Y2K-
compliant status. All enhancements, changes to the system, and
deployment of new systems that the FAA would normally undertake are
closely monitored to ensure continued Y2K compliance. We will maintain
this focus until March 30, 2000, one month after the date of the last
potential Y2K problem, the leap year date of February 29, 2000.
As an added precaution, the FAA has hired two independent
contractors, one to conduct additional analyses of high-profile
systems, such as the Common Automated Radar Tracking System (Common
ARTS) and the Display System Replacement (DSR), to ensure that there
are no obscure problems that we may have missed. The other independent
contractor is currently auditing our change management process to
ensure that retesting and recertification for Y2K is conducted where
necessary. Moreover, we have developed a moratorium on changes to the
NAS around the critical year-end period. This is yet another precaution
to maintain the stability and the Y2K integrity of the NAS during
potentially risky time frames.
In our ongoing Y2K efforts, our contingency planning continues to
develop. The FAA published a Business Continuity and Contingency Plan
(BCCP) Version 1.0 on April 15, 1999, and published Version 2.0 on July
15, 1999. Despite our confidence in the Y2K fixes implemented at the
FAA, the BCCP details what actions the FAA would take should problems
associated with Y2K arise. The FAA has always had strong contingency
plans in place to deal with eventualities, such as inclement weather
and power outages, and the BCCP builds on those contingency plans to
address potential Y2K-specific problems. We will publish Version 3.0 of
the BCCP by October 15, 1999. As the BCCP develops, we have made sure
that our labor partners are fully informed and invited to contribute to
that development.
The FAA has been reviewing and testing the BCCP, making sure that
the various operational functions of the FAA work individually and
coherently. We have identified the personnel and communications
structures required to support ``Day One'' (January 1, 2000) operations
as defined in the FAA BCCP, developing and executing the contingency
plan by training and testing to the level suitable to various
operations. This effort ranges from a review of existing manual methods
to full ``war games.'' Local facility contingency plans continue to be
tested on a regular basis. We conducted a tabletop exercise earlier
this month to practice sharing of Y2K information throughout the
agency, recording of Y2K incidents, and reporting of aviation
infrastructure failures to DOT.
I should note at this point the invaluable service that the OIG and
the General Accounting Office (GAO) have rendered us in validating our
systems. We have asked them to continue to conduct site visits to our
field facilities, and they bring to our attention any concerns or
issues they may find.
But our efforts do not end at our own front door. As our confidence
in the compliance status of our own systems grows, we have aggressively
increased our efforts related to our aviation industry partners, not
just from a regulatory role, but by providing leadership and
facilitation in the industry. I would like to take this opportunity to
tell you about the status of some of our work with airports, air
carriers, and foreign countries.
As of July 31, 1999, the FAA completed visits to the top 150
airports in the United States. The vast majority of those reported to
us that they plan to complete their Y2K repairs by the end of
September, and all of them expect to be completed by December. The FAA
has identified 20 systems that may be used to comply with Part 139
regulatory requirements. We have also identified which of these systems
exist at each airport. Of the 20 systems, we have identified 7 that
could have an immediate impact on safety. We have told airport
operators that we expect these systems to be Y2K compliant by October
15, or that an alternate means of compliance needs to be developed to
meet the requirements of the regulations. For example, FAA regulations
require the control of runway lighting. If that lighting is controlled
by a computer system, we would expect that computer system to be Y2K
compliant. The airport operator may, however, decide to control runway
lighting manually in order to successfully maintain compliance with FAA
regulations. We also have a plan in place for continued contact with
airport operators on a regular basis to monitor the status of their
systems. For those operators that do not meet the October 15 date, we
will take the necessary steps to ensure that safety will not be
impaired. This may involve restricting or suspending air carrier
operations at the airport.
With respect to our certificate holders, the aircraft manufacturers
and the airlines, the FAA developed aggressive Y2K plans to address
issues that may arise over the critical date change. These plans stress
the importance of safety and continued regulatory compliance. Our
primary focus was on raising awareness among manufacturers and airlines
that there may be Y2K errors that result in regulatory non-compliance
and that may have safety impacts.
With that in mind, the FAA developed questionnaires that were sent
to all their airlines, manufacturers and other certificate holders
(approximately 15,000 total). There was a 98% response rate to the
questionnaire that was sent to manufacturers. Those results indicated
there were no impacts to safety based on Y2K for airborne products with
embedded software or digital hardware, or aviation products utilizing
tools controlled by digital systems. Aircraft certification inspectors
will conduct pre- and post-Y2K audits of manufacturers to evaluate any
risk that may be associated with the turn of the century.
For aircraft operations, we developed a detailed questionnaire that
sought specific data on the status of automated systems that may be
impacted by Y2K. The questionnaire specifically asked for information
on 44 systems, including aircraft systems, computer record systems,
flight operations systems, and others. We designed the questionnaire to
gain information on the operator's Y2K planning, their Y2K program
status, and whether they anticipated requesting the FAA to approve
changes or deviations to their approved programs. There is a 42%
response rate to the questionnaire that was sent to more than 13,000
certificate holders, including the airlines and repair stations. I
should note that many of the non-respondents represent operators which
have unsophisticated systems and we anticipate the Y2K impacts will be
minimal to none. The top ten air carriers however, all reported they
would be Y2K ready by September 1999.
Based on the data we have gathered, our inspectors are contacting
operators who have not responded or have raised Y2K concerns. In many
cases, inspectors will visit certificate holders to discuss potential
issues or concerns. We have categorized all the questionnaire responses
and established deadline dates when inspectors must complete their
follow-up with certificate holders. By October 1, our inspectors will
contact any certificate holder who did not respond to the
questionnaire. By October 15, inspectors will follow-up with those
certificate holders whose responses have been analyzed in which we
identified a Y2K concern. By November 15, our inspectors will follow-up
with those certificate holders whose responses were analyzed and we
identified possible risks that need additional clarification. When we
complete these inspections, our inspectors will determine whether we
need to focus additional attention on particular operators.
We have also informed our manufacturers and air carrier certificate
holders that we expect them to meet their regulatory requirements on
and after January 1, 2000, and that we are working with them to
minimize Y2K impacts that could affect their compliance. It does not
appear, based on the data that we have gathered and analyzed so far,
that Y2K problems are likely to result in the need for drastic action
such as suspending certificates. We expect the need for enforcement to
be minimal if the need exists at all. We are prepared, however, to
issue emergency airworthiness directives over the critical holiday time
frames, if necessary, to inform aircraft owners and/or operators that a
safety issue has arisen as a result of a design problem.
Supplementing these efforts, the agency chairs an FAA-Industry Y2K
Outreach Steering Committee, formed at the request of the President's
Council on Y2K Conversion. This committee includes members from six key
organizations representing the major segments of the aviation
community: air carriers, airports, and manufacturers. This Steering
Committee provides a crucial gateway to 23 other aviation industry
partners. The resulting partnership provides an arena for exchanging
information and identifying and resolving major issues that could
impact the safety, security, and efficiency of the aviation and
commercial space transportation sectors.
A critical focus of the Steering Committee is the need for
coordinated contingency planning across the aviation industry. The
committee has published a guide, the Airline-Airport Operations
Contingency Planning Guide, that provides a self-assessment template to
ensure the industry is prepared and can provide a uniform response to
situations which may arise. This guide was distributed to trade
association members as well as to some international entities, and is
also available on the FAA's Y2K website. In addition, the Steering
Committee has sponsored two workshops, the first of which focused on
presenting the FAA's BCCP. The second workshop, conducted on July 19-
20, 1999, brought together major service providers such as electrical
power and telecommunications with airport and airline operators to
discuss in-depth the process for coordinating contingency planning. The
workshop helped to define the core elements of an airline-airport
contingency plan for use at the national, regional, and local levels
and for coordinating contingency plans across government and industry.
With less than 100 days to the new year, we know that there is an
increased awareness and concern with the readiness of international
aviation. The FAA has been a global leader in creating awareness of the
problem and of supporting programs to mitigate any impact of Y2K
problems. We have widely distributed information about our Repair
Process and GAO's Business Continuity Planning process. A year ago last
June, I spoke to the world's airlines and encouraged them to support
the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Y2K program. IATA
and the FAA worked together to have the International Civil Aviation
Organizations (ICAO) address the Y2K problem. The FAA sponsored the
resolution that lead to ICAO's Y2K assessment criteria and the
reporting of Y2K readiness. The FAA has supported ICAO's international
regional contingency planning. We are promoting the IATA-ACI airline-
airport business continuity planning project which parallels the effort
of the FAA-Industry Y2K Steering Committee domestically.
The FAA is also conducting extensive international testing. By
December, we plan to have conducted testing with 23 countries to ensure
adequate communication exchange for those countries with which we have
direct interfaces. We already have schedules in place to test both
voice and data systems in order to validate the connectivity of air
traffic control communication systems. This is an aggressive schedule
intended to provide an extra measure of assurance for ourselves and our
foreign counterparts.
In order to better inform the public, the FAA, the Office of the
Secretary of Transportation, and the Department of Defense are
reviewing available information gathered through ICAO and other sources
on the Y2K readiness of foreign civil aviation entities. The purpose of
this review is to provide useful travel planning information to the
American public.
This effort is in support of the President's Y2K Conversion Council
which is looking at global impact of Y2K. Based on the information we
have seen and collected to date, it appears that if any Y2K impact is
felt, it would take the form of limited disruption of service in some
locations. Should a serious safety consideration arise involving
international aviation, you may be assured that the FAA, in conjunction
with other government agencies, will take appropriate steps to mitigate
the problem. Since civil aviation is inherently capable of addressing
potential problems, it is unlikely that serious safety issues would be
a problem. In addition, international contingency planning efforts and
our encouragement of business continuity planning at international
airports should mitigate potential disruptions in service.
The FAA has worked diligently, not only to ensure Y2K readiness of
our own systems, but to do whatever we can to help our industry
partners and counterparts, domestically and internationally, to
experience a smooth transition into the next year 2000. As I have told
you in the past, I am proud of our accomplishments, and I have already
booked my coast-to-coast flight on the evening of December 31, 1999, to
demonstrate my confidence in these accomplishments. We are continuing,
more aggressively than ever, to continue our outreach activities to
ensure a seamless transition to the year 2000.
Knowing of your interest about further actions that the Congress
may take, I would simply reiterate what the Deputy Secretary has
already stated: continue the efforts of this Committee to publicize the
importance of this issue. Indeed, the Committee's efforts, through
these hearings and its reports, have been instrumental in keeping this
issue on the forefront of our public policy.
Thank you, Senator Bennett, Senator Dodd, and Members of the
Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to address the Committee this
morning, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
__________
Responses of Jane F. Garvey to Questions Submitted by
Chairman Bennett
Question 1. The FAA is to be commended for successfully pulling off
what seemed, a year ago, to be an impossible task. Very few people
believed that so many systems could be fixed, tested, and fielded in
the time remaining. The FAA personnel who made this happen should be
very proud of themselves for their accomplishment. It now seems the
challenge will be to keep the system fixed through the changeover; that
is, care must be taken in making changes or incorporating new
technology so that components of the National Airspace System don't
reacquire a vulnerability to the Y2K bug. Please describe how the FAA
will manage the Air Traffic Control system so this problem will not
occur.
Answer. The FAA ensures that certified systems remain compliant by
enforcing rigorous change management processes and revalidating changed
systems. The deployment of new systems and components is also monitored
in order to ensure that they satisfy the same Y2K compliance criteria
used for the existing systems. Finally, in order to minimize potential
disruption system change, moratoria are being implemented for the
National Aerospace System around the century transition (November 17-
January 7) and around the leap year transition (February 1-March 8).
Question 2. The Airports Council International witness, Mr. Plavin,
states that the most authoritative data on U.S. airports rests with
survey information that the FAA gathered in the spring and summer of
this year. It is our understanding that this information has not been
made public, in spite of the fact that it was not originally collected
with promises of confidentiality to the parties that provided the data.
Please clarify this situation for the Committee. Isn't there some point
when this information should be released to the traveling public?
Doesn't it make sense to provide travelers with the best information
available before they make their travel plans for the end of the year?
Answer. Airport information was originally posted on the web
(www.dot.gov/fly2k) as of November 2, 1999 and is updated regularly.
Question 3. The witness from the International Federation of Air
Line Pilots' Association has called for several actions to be taken,
such as more flight crew contingency training, more fuel on board, and
an extra pilot flying in the jump seat--although IFALPA says this
shouldn't be necessary for flights over North America. What is FAA's
position on its recommendations for American airlines that may be
operating in December and January in regions where IFALPA believes this
is the prudent course?
Answer. The airlines are well aware of the matters IFALPA raises.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) international
contingency planning included such operations considerations. Airlines
and their trade association, the International Air Transport
Association (IATA), have participated in the ICAO international
contingency planning efforts. The FAA considers that operational
decisions such as those suggested by IFALPA are best left to the
airlines, who are in the best position to determine what needs to be
done on a specific route for safe operations.
Question 4. Mr. Mead stated in his testimony that the DOT Office of
Inspector General recommended that the FAA require Y2K compliance of
the entire aviation industry. The FAA did not follow this suggestion.
Would you explain to us why this was not done? Is it practical to still
do it at this time and to ``require Year-200 readiness statements from
the air carriers'' as he suggests?
Answer. The FAA did not require Y2K certification by the aviation
industry because doing so would not improve the FAA's position to take
enforcement action against Y2K-related incidents. If an industry
component is not Y2K compliant by January 1, 2000, the FAA's current
regulatory authority is more than sufficient to take enforcement action
and effectively deal with Y2K-related contingencies or emergencies.
Furthermore, the relevant FAA lines of businesses (airports, flight
standards, civil aviation security) have been surveying their industry
components for Y2K status, and have assurances that all entities
currently are, or will be, Y2K compliant before the end of 1999.
Accordingly, the actions that have been taken by the FAA effectively
fulfill the purpose of an industry certification.
Question 5. The Committee understands that the FAA has given the
certified airports until October 15, 1999 to be compliant or to have
alternate means of compliance. Would you tell us how you expect the
situation to evolve after the date for airports that may not comply to
your directive? How soon would they know that the FAA was initiating
action? At what point would the traveling public and airlines know? Do
you envision that it is going to take firm action such as the Coast
Guard did on September 9, 1999 with vessels who had not responded to
their requirement for Y2K information to show that the FAA is seriously
going to act on this?
Answer. As of November 2, 1999, all airports surveyed had their
critical systems certified Y2K-compliant or had developed alternate
plans for meeting regulatory safety requirements. Consequently, no
enforcement action is necessary with regard to the October 15, 1999
deadline.
Question 6. The Inspector General of the Department of
Transportation pointed out in his statement the fact that the FAA plans
to impose flight restrictions only in those cases in which there are
known, verifiable safety concerns. He has voiced his opinion that he
does not believe this approach will be sufficient in light of all that
is unknown or uncertain regarding Y2K readiness in foreign countries.
In fact, twenty-eight of the eighty-nine countries providing data to
ICAO did not provide sufficient information to allow adequate Y2K
readiness assessments by the DOT, State Department, and DOD. Shouldn't
this lack of information serve as a serious warning sign to which the
FAA should actively respond? In the absence of information, can we
afford to take a risk where safety may be concerned? Are there other
ways we can get at this information so that FAA can make truly well-
informed decisions in this area?
Answer. In issues such as Y2K readiness, where the direct impact on
safety or security is unclear, the FAA requires U.S. airlines to ensure
their operations are conducted in a safe and secure manner, whether
domestic or international. To accomplish this, U.S. air carriers,
through the International Air Transport Association (IATA), have
developed information worldwide on specific air traffic and airports
where they operate. While not available to government regulators like
FAA due to confidentiality issues, IATA has shared this with over 300
airlines worldwide. U.S. airlines, with this verified information, are
well positioned to ensure the responsibility for their passengers'
safety and will not fly anywhere safety is believed to be compromised,
regardless of the reason. The FAA remains ready to impose flight
restrictions as necessary to respond appropriately to known safety and
security problems.
Additionally, actions taken by FAA internationally have not only
raised awareness, but has greatly influenced Y2K preparedness around
the world. Direct actions taken by FAA influenced the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to establish a worldwide Y2K program
that encouraged compliance action and gathered considerable Y2K
preparedness information about most of its 185 member States. Our
direct actions with ICAO resulted in the development and harmonization
of a worldwide Y2K contingency plan. That, accompanied by a strong Y2K
program exercised by the International Air Transport Association
(IATA), has greatly reduced any potential major impact on aviation
operations around the world. As noted above, IATA has gathered first-
hand information from most all countries regarding the Y2K preparedness
of each country. This information is only being shared directly with
over 300 member airlines.
With the proactive approach taken by the international aviation
community, as well as the fact that there has been no clear indication
within the aviation industry that a Y2K problem equates to a safety
risk, we are confident that US passengers flying over the millennium
will not be put at risk. Given the inherent safety of the system and
the continuing indications that the Y2K problem is being successfully
addressed, the FAA does not believe that flight prohibitions made
solely on the basis of foreign country Y2K readiness information which
cannot be independently verified by the FAA through direct inspection
are justified.
Question 7. What benefits have been learned from Y2K projects and
can they be applied to current or future projects? Please be specific.
Answer. A full report detailing the lessons learned from the FAA
Year 2000 Program is being finalized and will be made available in
January 2000.
Question 8. The industry response to your certification survey is
less than 50%. With less than 100 days to go, wouldn't it make sense to
take the Inspector General's suggestion to require compliance
certification from the parties you regulate similar to what the Federal
Transit Administration has done to transport operators?
Answer. As of November 30, 1999, the industry response to FAA's
Flight Standards questionnaire (which was sent to 13,708 certificate
holders) was sixty-three (63) percent. However, seven (7) percent of
the 13,708 are no longer operating (i.e., out of business). Please see
the response to question number 4 regarding the issue of the FAA
requiring Y2K compliance certification from the aviation industry.
Question 9. What is the status regarding international testing?
Will FAA be able to complete all planned interface testing with foreign
air traffic control service providers?
Answer. Overall FAA has had a strong response from our
international partners for international testing of voice and data
circuits with those countries where we have direct connectivity.
However, we have learned that some countries cannot test because their
equipment is not date sensitive or they do not have test bed facilities
and therefore cannot separate tests from live traffic. There are also
some countries who have upgraded to compliant systems, completed their
internal Y2K tests, and do not want to test further with us. The lack
of testing in these few instances does not impact international Y2K
readiness because they have satisfactorily completed internal testing
or their equipment does not have date issues. Also the Y2K contingency
plans are in place to address any unforeseen problems.
Question 10. ICAO Assembly Resolution A32-10, which I believe you
introduced last year, calls for countries to publish appropriate
aeronautical information on the Y2K compliance status of their
aeronautical services, air navigation services, and aerodrome services
of designated international and alternate aerodromes. ICAO is
collecting and reporting on their web site the compilation of the
reported country assessments. Because individual countries are
voluntarily reporting their Y2K compliance, what confidence do you have
in the self-assessments survey results reported by ICAO? Once you have
finished, I would like to invite the other panels to share their
confidence level.
Answer. FAA has been able to collect information on 136 of 138
countries it is tracking for Y2K readiness. This represents 99.4
percent of the commercial aviation operations worldwide. While A32-10
has been the best source of information, other sources such as
Department of State, the International Air Transport Association
(IATA), and FAA-lead international contingency planning efforts has
netted a tremendous amount of information which the agency has used to
cross-check that provided under A32-10 to the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO). Our findings to date indicate factual
reporting which has greatly raised the agency's confidence level. The
sense within the international aviation community is one of trust with
the understanding that if the problem is not solved prior to the
rollover, it certainly will be evident immediately.
__________
Prepared Statement of Kenneth M. Mead
Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Members of the Committee:
We appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the Department of
Transportation's (DOT) Year-2000 readiness for safe and efficient
operations. We also will comment on the readiness of the aviation,
maritime, and surface transportation industries. Our testimony
addresses these areas:
Status and issues concerning DOT's readiness,
Status and issues concerning aviation, maritime,
and surface transportation industries' readiness,
Status and issues concerning international aviation
and maritime readiness.
Overall, DOT has fixed all mission-critical systems used to support
critical functions such as separating aircraft, searching for and
rescuing ships, and performing safety inspections. DOT has responded
positively and promptly to nearly all of our recommendations. Our
validation work has consistently received the support of top DOT and
agency management.
Although it is unlikely that there will be major Year-2000 related
system failures in DOT's own systems, we know there are no absolute
guarantees because of the interdependency among computers, both
internal and external. Therefore, DOT needs to continue testing its
contingency plans and be prepared to activate them.
While DOT has first hand knowledge about its own systems, it
primarily relies on industry self-reporting to assess industry
readiness. We agree with the Committee that there is an inherent
concern with self-reported data because it tends to represent the
proactive and well-prepared organizations' work, and obviously cannot
be counted on to represent non-responding organizations or
organizations whose Year-2000 readiness data are sketchy or incomplete.
Getting information from non-responding organizations and filling the
voids will remain a major challenge for the rest of this year.
Based on survey results, our sense about industry readiness is that
most large domestic providers in all transportation modes are making
good progress and should be ready in time. Since large providers handle
the majority of transportation services, Year-2000 related failures or
disruptions are likely to be isolated local events in the U.S.,
provided that external interfaces such as power grids and fuel lines
operate satisfactorily.
We are disappointed at the lack of information concerning the
readiness of many smaller providers. This information void needs to be
filled, particularly for those in aviation, maritime, and railroad
transportation modes.
We also share the Committee's concern about international
readiness. Over the past year, we raised concerns about Year-2000
readiness in the context of international air travel. With only 93 days
to go, there is little time left to obtain credible information about
Year-2000 readiness in the international arena. A major issue now
facing FAA is what action, if any, it will take when a foreign country
does not provide sufficient information for independent assessment.
DOT Systems: DOT had 609 mission-critical systems, 310 of which had
Year 2000 problems that had to be fixed. These include 152 aviation-
related, 87 maritime-related, and 34 surface transportation-related
systems. With strong congressional oversight, leadership by the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Transportation, modal administrators,
and hard work on the part of DOT employees, DOT has fixed all 310
mission-critical systems. With the repair work done, DOT now is
focusing on safeguarding compliant systems and finalizing business
continuity and contingency plans.
Upgrades continue to be made to Year-2000 compliant systems after
they were installed at field sites. For example, after Year-2000 fixes,
FAA modified the Oceanic Automation System software to achieve a better
data transfer. Coast Guard also modified the Vessel Traffic System,
which is used to direct ship movement at major domestic ports, to fix
software glitches. DOT must exercise extreme caution to ensure these
upgrades do not ``undo'' the compliance work. DOT is putting plans in
place to ensure this does not happen.
It is impossible to guarantee that there will be no system
failures. Therefore, having workable contingency plans should be an
area of focus. For FAA, air traffic controllers need refresher training
on non-radar procedures, all key labor unions should be participating
in contingency planning, and more hands-on testing of contingency plans
should be accomplished. The controllers' union has been participating
in this effort; although invited, the major union representing system
maintenance employees are not.
Domestic Transportation Industry: DOT has adopted a dual approach
to ensure the private sector's Year-2000 readiness. In areas where DOT
has regulatory responsibilities, it has done independent readiness
surveys. The response rates were mixed, ranging from 36 percent for
marine facilities, to 41 percent for air carriers (all large carriers
responded), to over 90 percent for public transit. The Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) took the commendable step of requiring transit
operators to provide support for their Year-2000 readiness, and this
accounts for the high response rate in the transit area.
In March 1999, we stated that our confidence level with respect to
the entire aviation industry, particularly small carriers and
suppliers, would be stronger if certification of Year-2000 readiness
was required of them. FAA chose not to do this, and at this late stage,
is now trying to obtain some assurance that smaller providers are ready
for the Year 2000.
DOT also relies on transportation trade association surveys of
their members' readiness. These associations generally represent the
larger service providers that are responsible for the majority of
transportation services. However, information concerning the status of
smaller service providers is limited because they frequently do not
belong to trade associations conducting surveys of their members'
readiness.
Aviation: Based on associations' reporting, the
airports handling about 90 percent of passenger enplanements
will be ready by the end of the year. Air carriers handing
about 95 percent of passenger and cargo services reported they
should be ready as of September 30, 1999. However, more
information about smaller airport/air carrier operators is
needed. As part of its regulatory role, FAA surveyed the
readiness of about 500 airports' safety systems and 3,300 air
carriers. FAA received information from all airports it
surveyed. While all large carriers responded, over 1,900
smaller carriers did not respond. It still is not too late for
FAA to take action on our recommendation and require Year-2000
readiness statements from the air carriers.
Maritime: Ships rely on computer systems for
communication, navigation and ship movement. The U.S. Coast
Guard (Coast Guard) requested shipping companies to provide
information about their Year-2000 readiness. The response rate
of 43 percent was not sufficient. However, Coast Guard has
demonstrated that failure to respond will have consequences. On
September 9, 1999, Coast Guard took 175 actions against ship
movements based on lack of required Year-2000 paperwork. Coast
Guard is to be commended for this action. It is prepared to
restrict high-risk vessels from moving into, or from, U.S.
ports when transitioning to the new millennium.
Port operations, such as crane movement and cargo transfers,
are highly automated. There are over 300 U.S. ports, of which
about 100 are managed by port authorities. The American
Association of Port Authorities--an association of port
authorities in North and South America--surveyed its members'
readiness, including 83 U.S. port authorities. Thirty-three
U.S. port authorities reported they are making good progress.
However, there was insufficient information as to when their
work will be completed and how much traffic they handle for
U.S. maritime commerce. The remaining 50 U.S. port authorities
did not respond. Coast Guard also surveyed readiness of marine
facilities located at U.S. ports. The response rate was 36
percent. More information about ports' readiness, both large
and small, is needed.
Coast Guard, port authorities, and shipping companies have
been conducting joint port exercises. To mitigate the unknown
about ports' readiness, the scope of future port exercises
should be expanded to cover contingencies for not only ship
movement but also port operations supporting cargo movement.
Surface: Both railroad and transit operators rely
on computers to dispatch and operate trains. FTA surveyed over
500 transit operators. All but four operators (all in Puerto
Rico) responded, 73 percent of which reported being ready, and
the rest reported they would be ready in time. All commuter
railroad companies provided responses to FTA's survey. Amtrak
(the National intercity passenger railroad), which was not
included in the FTA survey, recently reported its mission-
critical systems are Year-2000 ready.
There are about 550 freight railroad companies in the U.S.
The Association of American Railroads surveyed the seven large
companies. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) also
surveyed four of the largest companies and plans to release the
results in early October. Information about regional and local
freight railroad companies is needed.
International Aviation and Maritime: DOT has taken an active role
working with international associations in raising Year-2000 awareness
and assessing international aviation and maritime readiness. As
examples, FAA helped the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) prepare its members for business continuity and contingency
planning, and Coast Guard took a lead role in helping the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) prepare its members to do Year-2000 risk
assessments and contingency planning. The international maritime
industry accounts for over 90 percent of U.S. overseas trade. The only
association survey was by the International Association of Ports and
Harbors. It surveyed 224 members and received 110 responses, but did
not make the results public.
Since March 1999, DOT has established an interagency committee with
the Departments of Defense and State to evaluate foreign countries'
aviation Year-2000 readiness and make recommendations on international
air travel. However, significant challenges still exist with
international air travel. First, 34 of the 185 ICAO member countries
have not responded to the ICAO survey as of September 23, 1999. Most of
these countries are in Africa and Asia. Secondly, numerous other
countries that responded to the survey did not provide sufficient
information to allow for adequate Year-2000 readiness assessments.
According to the DOT/Defense/State interagency committee, 28 of the 89
countries most frequently visited by U.S. carriers fall into this
category.
As pointed out in the Deputy Secretary's statement, the whole Year-
2000 phenomenon is characterized by uncertainty as to its effects. This
is especially true if Year-2000 readiness on the part of a foreign
country is unknown, sketchy, or known to be inadequate. As we
understand the approach FAA plans to take, flight restrictions will
only be imposed if there is a known, verifiable safety problem. Where
there are significant uncertainties about a foreign country's Year-2000
readiness, we are not persuaded this approach will be sufficient
because FAA is not likely to have verified evidence of problems until
after December 31, 1999.
Status and Issues Concerning DOT
As of September 30, 1999, DOT has fixed all 310 of its mission-
critical systems that had Year-2000 problems. We verified, on a sample
basis, that documentation supported system implementation, validation
problems had been resolved, independent verification and validation was
performed for critical systems, data exchange issues were resolved,
vendor-supported systems were compliant, acceptance testing was
performed, and affected databases had been addressed. With the repair
work done, DOT now is focusing on safeguarding compliant systems,
finalizing business continuity and contingency plans, and preparing for
unexpected emergencies.
Modifications to Year-2000 Compliant Systems
Upgrades continue to be made to Year-2000 compliant systems after
they have been installed. For example, FAA modified the Oceanic
Automation System software, after being made Year-2000 compliant, to
achieve better data transfer between the Oceanic and Host computers. In
June 1999, the Coast Guard also made changes to its Vessel Traffic
System, which is used to direct ship movement at major domestic ports,
to fix software glitches.
DOT has issued policy on modifications to Year-2000 compliant
systems. This policy advises, when a Year-2000 compliant system is
modified, that stringent management controls should be applied to
include testing for Year-2000 compliance. FAA issued its own guidance
requiring the monitoring of changes made to Year-2000 compliant
systems. FAA's policy requires, when a Year-2000 compliant system is
modified, that the system owner assess the modification to determine if
it affects Year-2000 compliance. If the assessment identifies problems,
the system owners need to revalidate and re-certify the system. During
our on-site review of 10 FAA systems, we found 3 systems were modified
subsequent to the Year-2000 modification without support to show the
changes did not ``undo'' the compliance work. FAA is working on
strengthening controls over system modifications and will now place a
moratorium on changes to the National Airspace System from November
1999 to January 2000, and February to March 2000.
Coast Guard's Chief Information Office did not issue separate
guidance. However, we found Coast Guard system owners were not aware of
the DOT guidance requiring comprehensive testing when Year-2000
compliant systems are modified. We were told Coast Guard system
modifications were being reviewed to ensure Year-2000 compliance.
Business Continuity and Contingency Plans
No matter how extensive the review efforts, there are no guarantees
that all Year-2000 glitches have been found in internal systems, or
external systems such as network service providers. Each Operating
Administration has developed a business continuity and contingency plan
for its critical missions such as air traffic control, maritime search
and rescue, and vessel traffic movement. DOT continues to refine and
test its contingency plans.
FAA developed a business continuity and contingency plan to ensure
continued air traffic operations in the unlikely event of major Year-
2000 related system failures. The plan is composed of two parts--FAA's
existing contingency procedures and a newly developed Business
Resumption Process. We found improvements are needed concerning non-
radar procedures training, union participation, and testing.
The air traffic control systems contain six core processes--
automation, surveillance, communications, navigation, traffic flow
management, and infrastructure, such as public utilities. All core
processes are supported by automated systems subject to potential Year-
2000 failures. Major system failures in automation and surveillance
areas would have the most significant impact on air traffic control
operations.
In the unlikely event of major Year-2000 related system failures in
either automation or surveillance areas, FAA plans to rely on non-radar
procedures to direct air traffic. According to FAA, non-radar
procedures are rarely used to support normal traffic operations, let
alone high traffic volume. Representatives of the National Air Traffic
Controllers Association (NATCA) have expressed concern that its members
are not proficiently trained to use non-radar procedures on a large-
scale basis.
FAA's Business Resumption Process calls for each system failure,
regardless of type or impact, to be resolved quickly. FAA established a
business resumption team that is responsible for determining causes of
system failures, the severity of failures, and the actions to restore
operations. Union participation in development of this plan is
important to FAA's success. NATCA is now participating. Although
Professional Airways System Specialist (PASS)--a major union
representing employees responsible for maintaining air traffic control
systems--has been invited to participate in this important effort, it
has not yet played a significant role. In the event of Year-2000
related system failures, these union members will have to restore the
systems.
FAA, with the assistance of contractors, recently conducted a
small-scale contingency planning exercise. Preliminary results indicate
the exercise went well. However, this exercise provided no hands-on
practice for controllers. FAA is in process of preparing a lessons-
learned document to incorporate the information learned to be used for
a larger-scale exercise. FAA should use these opportunities to test the
use of non-radar procedures.
The Coast Guard is in the process of completing and testing
contingency plans for over 600 facilities nationwide. To date,
contingency exercises have been useful and informative.
Emergency Preparedness
DOT has taken an active role in preparing for emergency responses
to unexpected disruptions of transportation services during the
millennium rollover. DOT used its Crisis Management Center (CMC) to
conduct exercises such as activating the CMC during two sensitive date
periods (The 99th day of the year 1999 and 9/9/99), and conducted
contingency exercises at the senior management level to test its
response capabilities based on specified Year-2000 failure scenarios.
These exercises provided training for people who will monitor and
report on the operational status of critical facilities during the
transition to the next millennium. The exercises also have resulted in
valuable ``lessons learned'' regarding responsibility assignment,
contingency plans, and resource allocation. One critical success factor
for emergency response is to have the technical expertise to quickly
determine differences among non-Year-2000 related operational failures,
genuine Year-2000 failures, or other problems masqueraded as Year-2000
failures. Only then can DOT response appropriately.
Actions Needed for DOT Year-2000 Readiness
To ensure Year-2000 compliant systems remain
compliant, FAA needs to continue working with its system owners
to adequately assess modifications to Year-2000 compliant
systems. The Coast Guard needs to issue its own policy or
quickly deliver the Department's policy to its system owners.
The Coast Guard also should consider a moratorium on system
modifications, similar to the policy issued by FAA, to ensure
that compliance is maintained.
FAA needs to provide adequate non-radar procedures
training to the controller workforce. This training is
necessary since FAA's contingency plan relies on non-radar
procedures in the event of major loss of surveillance and
automation capabilities. Both FAA and its unions need to
develop a plan acceptable to, and agreeable by, all parties.
DOT Operating Administrations need to continue testing of the
contingency plan, including hands-on practice, and resolve any
deficiencies that are found.
As part of its emergency preparedness, DOT needs to
ensure technical expertise is available to quickly determine
whether system failures, if any, are genuinely related to the
Year-2000 roll-over and take actions accordingly.
Status and Issues Concerning Domestic Industry
To ensure the transportation industry's Year-2000 readiness, DOT
has adopted a dual approach. In areas where DOT has regulatory
responsibilities, it has done independent readiness surveys. The
response rate percentages were mixed, ranging from 36 percent for
marine facilities, to 41 percent for air carriers (all large carriers
responded), to over 90 percent for public transit. FTA took a
commendable step of requiring transit operators to provide assurances
of their Year-2000 readiness, which accounts for the high response rate
in the transit area. In our March testimony before the House
subcommittees, we recommended that our confidence level with respect to
the entire aviation industry, particularly small carriers and
suppliers, would be stronger if certification of Year-2000 compliance
was required of them. FAA chose not to do this, and at this late stage,
is now trying to obtain some assurance that smaller providers are ready
for the Year 2000.
DOT also relies on transportation trade associations' surveys of
their members. These associations generally represent larger service
providers that are responsible for the majority of transportation
services. However, information concerning the status of smaller service
providers is limited because they frequently do not belong to trade
associations conducting surveys of their members.
Associations' Survey of Aviation Readiness
Under the direction of the President's Council on Year 2000
Conversion, an FAA-Industry Year-2000 Steering Committee was formed to
coordinate industry-wide progress reporting. Major airport associations
include the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) and
Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA). AAAE and ACI-NA
surveyed their member airports.
Major air carrier associations in the FAA-Industry Year-2000
Steering Committee include the Air Transport Association (ATA)
representing major carriers, Regional Airline Association (RAA)
representing regional air carriers, and the National Air Carrier
Association (NACA) representing charter and small airlines. ATA, RAA,
and NACA surveyed their member carriers.
Table 1 and 2 on the next page show the break down between member
and non-member airports and U.S. carriers. Table 1 shows the 728 member
airports account for 14 percent of U.S. public airports. Table 2 shows
the 101 member carriers account for 3 percent of the 3,343 U.S. air
carriers.
Based on the AAAE/ACI-NA status report to the Steering Committee,
and FAA's status report for submission to ICAO, the most current status
is that airports handling about 90 percent of U.S. passenger
enplanements reported they should be ready by December 31, 1999.
However, there are two issues concerning airports:
Of the 579 non-hub and general aviation airports,
only 107 reported completion of Year-2000 work as of March 15,
1999. More current information is needed.
Other than getting a letter from FAA alerting them
to Year-2000 problems, the 4,624 public airports not associated
with AAAE/ACI-NA were not surveyed by either FAA or the trade
associations. Year-2000 readiness of these smaller airports
still needs to be reported.
For air carriers, the most current status indicated major carriers
handling about 95 percent of U.S. passenger and cargo services reported
they should be Year-2000 ready by September 30, 1999. While ATA and
NACA reported when their members plan to complete Year-2000 work, RAA
had not yet provided such information.
FAA's Survey of Airports and Carriers
In June 1998, FAA sent a letter to over 5,300 public airport
operators to alert them to Year-2000 computer problems. Of these, under
the Federal Aviation Regulation, about 500 airports are required to be
certified by FAA for safe operations, adequate airport security, and
adequate screening of passengers, baggage, and cargo. Automated systems
often are used to meet these objectives.
Airport Safety Systems: In October 1998, FAA sent a
letter to 563 public airport certificate holders indicating FAA
was going to conduct on-site visits or telephone interviews of
Year-2000 readiness of systems used to ensure safe airport
operations, such as runway lighting. FAA performed on-site
reviews at the top 150 airports and conducted telephone
interviews with the remaining 413 airport operators.
As of September 23, 1999, survey results showed 83 percent of
airport safety systems are Year-2000 compliant. The remaining
systems are still being evaluate. In November 1999, FAA plans
to issue warning letters to airport operators, who failed to
provide the readiness assurance by October 15, 1999, that FAA
will consider appropriate actions on January 1, 2000, including
emergency certificate suspension or issuance of a Notice to
Airmen restricting airport operations.
FAA also has proposed a rulemaking requirement for airports
to perform a one-time readiness test of systems critical to
airfield safety and efficiency, such as airport lighting and
emergency services. These tests would be performed within the
first few hours on January 1, 2000 to confirm that the Year
2000 rollover had no impact on these critical systems. FAA is
analyzing suggestions and plans to finalize the requirement by
early October 1999.
Airport Security Systems: In 1998, FAA collected
information from 459 certified airport operators relating to
Year-2000 readiness of computer systems used to support airport
security, such as access systems. As of September 23, 1999, 51
airport operators still are working on their security systems
to become Year-2000 compliant.
In recent years, FAA has sponsored development of three
advanced security systems to enhance airport security,
including two explosive detection systems and one trace
detection equipment. One of the explosive detection systems had
to be upgraded to become Year-2000 compliant. According to FAA,
all detective explosive systems requiring a Year-2000 upgrade
are compliant.
In April 1999, FAA sent a questionnaire to all 3,343 certified air
carriers requesting information about their systems and components that
may be affected by Year-2000 computer problems. Submission of the
information is voluntary. As of September 23, 1999, all large carriers
had reported. However, FAA received an overall response rate of only 41
percent.
The 100 percent response rate from large carriers confirmed the
general observation that they are managing the Year-2000 preparation
well. The large carriers provide about 95 percent of U.S. passenger
service. Status of many medium and small carriers still needs to be
reported.
FAA is in process of compiling the data it received. FAA has not
yet determined how to report the survey results, but plans to provide
specific guidance to its inspectors for follow-up review. FAA will
concentrate its activities on air carriers not responding to the
survey, air carriers that submitted inconsistent data, or air carriers
identified as having significant Year-2000 problems. With 93 days left
to go, obtaining Year-2000 readiness assurance from the non-responding
certificate holders will be a very challenging plan to accomplish.
Coast Guard's Survey of Vessels and Marine Facilities
Coast Guard established temporary regulations to require U.S.
owners and operators of marine facilities and vessels to report Year-
2000 readiness information based on the Year-2000 questionnaire issued
by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The survey results
were due to the Coast Guard by August 20, 1999. As of September 23,
less than 50 percent of the marine facilities and vessel owners had
responded.
Vessels: Vessels rely on computer systems for
communications, navigation, and ship movement. The Coast Guard
controls how, when, and where the commercial vessel can move in
the ports. For example, the Coast Guard can direct that the
movement of the commercial vessel be under control of tugboats
or be restricted to daylight hours. For the 33,000 vessels
which visited U.S. ports in the past 2 years, Coast Guard
received a 43 percent response rate. However, Coast Guard has
demonstrated that failure to respond will have consequences. On
September 9, 1999, the Coast Guard took 175 actions against
ship movements based on vessel or ship operators not submitting
required Year-2000 paperwork to the Coast Guard. Coast Guard is
to be commended for this action. It is prepared to restrict
high-risk vessels from moving into, or from, U.S. ports when
transitioning to the new millennium.
Marine facilities: Marine facility equipment, such
as cranes for loading/unloading cargo, are highly automated.
The Coast Guard surveyed over 5,000 facilities and received
only a 36 percent response rate (see table 4). This information
will assist the Coast Guard's Captains of the Port assessments
of potential Year-2000 related malfunctions of equipment and
systems.
Associations' Survey of Port Authorities
Ports provide critical infrastructure (e.g., power, security,
intermodal connections to rail) enabling efficient cargo shipment.
There are 326 U.S. public ports, with port authorities established at
about 100 larger ports. The American Association of Port Authorities
(AAPA)--representing port authorities in the United States, Canada, the
Caribbean and Latin America--surveyed its members' readiness, including
83 U.S. Port authorities.
Only 33 of the 83 U.S. port authorities responded to AAPA's August
1999 survey. These 33 reported 81 percent completion of Year-2000
preparation work. However, the survey did not ask the important
question of whether the port expects to be ready by December 31, 1999.
There also is no indication about the volume of maritime traffic
handled by these 33 port authorities since AAPA did not require the
respondents to identify themselves. More information about domestic
ports' readiness, both large and small, is needed. Coast Guard has been
working with port authorities and shipping companies in conducting port
exercises. These exercises have been successful in testing contingency
for ship movement in case of breakdowns of communications or ship
operating systems. However, contingency for port operations, such as
port infrastructure or connection with other transportation modes
(e.g., trucking, rail) has not been included. Expanding the scope of
future port exercises could help mitigate the unknowns of port
readiness.
Survey of Transit Readiness
FTA assists in developing improved mass transportation systems for
cities and communities nationwide. FTA provides financial, technical,
and planning assistance to about 550 public transit authorities. FTA
required these grant recipients to report their Year-2000 readiness.
All but four (all in Puerto Rico) responded to FTA's request--403 (73
percent) grantees reported being compliant, and 143 grantees reported
they should be ready by December 31. FTA is following up with the four
grantees. FTA's analysis of the top 30 grantees, handling 75 percent of
transit ridership, showed 4 were reported compliant and 26 should be
ready by the end of the year.
Survey of Rail Readiness
The seven major freight railroads were surveyed by the Association
of American Railroads (AAR) in September 1999. These railroads,
accounting for 91 percent of U.S. freight revenue and 71 percent of
miles operated, reported they should be ready by September 30, 1999.
The other 541 railroads, made up of regional and local freight
railroads, have not been surveyed regarding their Year-2000 readiness.
In response to safety issues that arose as a result of computer
problems with a recent railroad merger, the Federal Railroad
Administration hired a contractor to perform a Year-2000 Preliminary
Readiness Review for four of the seven largest freight railroads. The
results are expected in early October 1999.
There are 15 commuter rail companies in the U.S. All are FTA grant
recipients, and responded to FTA's survey. Amtrak, the national
intercity passenger rail company, recently reported its mission-
critical system as being compliant.
Actions Needed for Continued Industry Outreach
The following actions are needed to ensure the transportation
industry's readiness:
FAA needs to take action to obtain information on
nearly 2,000 carriers that did not respond. It still is not too
late for FAA to take action on our recommendations and require
Year-2000 readiness statements from air carriers.
Coast Guard needs to direct the non-responding
marine facility and vessel owners to answer the Year-2000
questionnaire specified in the temporary regulations.
Coast Guard needs to consider expanding the scope
of port exercises to include contingencies for port operations.
Status and Issues Concerning International Aviation and Maritime
DOT has taken an active role working with international
associations in assessing international aviation and maritime
readiness. As examples, FAA helped the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) prepare its members for business continuity and
contingency planning, and the Coast Guard took a lead role in helping
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) prepare its members to
perform Year-2000 risk assessments and contingency planning. DOT also
established an interagency committee with the Departments of Defense
and State to evaluate foreign countries' aviation Year-2000 readiness
and make recommendations on safety of international air travel.
International Aviation
In March 1999, we recommended that FAA develop a policy as to
whether U.S. carriers will be allowed to fly to countries that are not
known to be Year-2000 compliant. FAA has since developed the
International Year-2000 Civil Aviation Readiness Information Review
process. DOT is leading an interagency committee, with the Department
of Defense and the State Department, to evaluate the Year-2000
readiness for flying to foreign countries.
DOT's interagency committee developed a comprehensive process which
places emphases on collecting information from multiple sources, having
representatives from multiple agencies review the information, sharing
evaluation results (scoring) with all related parties, and giving
countries the opportunity to enhance Year-2000 readiness through the
consultation process described in the table below.
ICAO Survey on Year-2000 Status
ICAO surveyed its 185 member countries to identify Year-2000 issues
and readiness. DOT's interagency committee plans to rely on ICAO's
survey as a key information source for evaluating the international
aviation community's readiness for the Year 2000. Survey results were
due from ICAO member countries by July 1, 1999. ICAO planned to issue a
report summarizing members' status by the end of July 1999. Significant
uncertainties still exist regarding foreign countries' readiness and
how DOT and FAA evaluate safety of international air travel. First, 34
of the 185 member countries have not responded to the ICAO survey as of
September 23, 1999. About one million passengers were flown between the
United States and the 34 countries in 1998. These countries are located
in the regions specified in Table 7.
The interagency committee planned to issue its first review results
for the 89 countries (accounting for 97 percent of U.S. international
travel passengers) by September 30, 1999. However, based on preliminary
review results, the committee concluded that 28 of the 89 countries
most frequently visited by U.S. carriers did not provide sufficient
information to allow for adequate Year-2000 readiness assessment. These
countries are in the Caribbean and Central America (14), South America
(5), Asia and Pacific (4), former Soviet Union (3), Africa (1), and
Europe (1).
With only 93 days left to go, providing timely and quality
information to the traveling public remains a challenge to DOT and FAA.
As pointed out by the Deputy Secretary, the whole Year-2000 phenomenon
is characterized by uncertainty as to its effects. This is especially
true if Year-2000 readiness on the part of foreign countries is
unknown, sketchy, or known to be inadequate. As we understand the
approach FAA plans to take, flight restrictions will only be imposed if
there is a known, verifiable safety problem. Where there are
significant uncertainties about a foreign country's Year-2000
readiness, we are not persuaded this approach will be sufficient
because FAA is not likely to have verified evidence of problems until
after December 31, 1999. A major issue now facing FAA is what action,
if any, it will take when a foreign country does not provide sufficient
information for independent assessment.
International Maritime
The international maritime industry accounts for over 90 percent of
U.S. overseas trade. The Coast Guard has done a commendable job
reaching out to the international maritime industry making them aware
of the Year-2000 problem. For example, as a result of the IMO meeting
coordinated by the Coast Guard in March 1999, IMO Circular 2121 was
issued to all its members. The circular contains a Year-2000 readiness
questionnaire recommended by the Coast Guard for assessing Year-2000
related risks associated with vessels and port facilities.
Notwithstanding the Coast Guards outreach efforts, the Year-2000
readiness of foreign ports is largely unknown. In February 1999, the
International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) conducted a Year
2000 survey with its 224 harbor authority members and received 110
responses. The results for individual ports were not made public.
Actions for International Year 2000 Readiness
ICAO needs to continue working with its member
countries to obtain information from the 34 countries that did
not report on their Year-2000 readiness.
FAA should reconsider its planned approach--i.e.,
only imposing flight restrictions when there are known,
verifiable safety problems--where a foreign country does not
provide sufficient information about its Year-2000 readiness
for independent assessment.
The Coast Guard should continue working closely
with international organizations to obtain more information on
the international maritime industry, especially for port
readiness.
Mr. Chairman and Vice Chairman, this concludes our statement. I
would be pleased to answer any questions.
__________
Responses of Kenneth M. Mead to Questions Submitted by
Chairman Bennett
Question 1. You noted that DOT has fixed all mission-critical
systems used to support critical functions. However, you also noted its
need to continue contingency plan testing. What is the status of DOT
continuity of operations and contingency plan testing? Are there any
particular weaknesses found during testing that should be highlighted?
How prepared is DOT to activate these plans if necessary?
Answer. DOT's continuity of operations and contingency plans
continue to be tested through tabletop exercises, war games, and port
exercises. DOT's Crisis Management Center (CMC) conducted tabletop
exercises with its senior management (Secretary/Deputy Secretary and
heads of operating administration) in May and September. FAA has
conducted ``war games'' to test its contingencies and plans to conduct
a dry run in its command center in early December. All Coast Guard
captains of U.S. ports have conducted some form of Y2K drill or
exercises. DOT continues to modify contingencies based on these
exercises. Areas for improvement include communication coordination,
availability of back-up power supplies (such as generators), and the
need to have subject-matter experts on hand. DOT is well prepared to
activate contingency plans.
Question 2. The Committee has struggled with the difficulty in
getting information, of any type, on the Y2K readiness of small and
medium-sized enterprises across all industries creating serious gaps in
the collective Y2K knowledge base. You have mentioned this same
difficulty a number of times in your testimony. Do you have any
recommendations on what can be done to fill the information void in
this area or an assessment of the risk posed within each mode due to
this void?
Answer. Important actions to obtain necessary Y2K information
include DOT maintenance of ongoing communication with trade
associations and attaching consequences to regulated-industry
enterprises that do not respond to Y2K information requests. This has
worked well, for example, with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
in requiring transit authorities to provide certificates of Y2K
readiness.
Question 3. One area that is outstanding for DOT, as for other
federal agencies, is that of instituting a policy to ensure compliance
work is not ``undone'' and compliant systems are ``safeguarded.'' Your
testimony noted examples of management control issues. Are you now
satisfied that management controls are in place to ensure that the DOT
Y2K modification policy is adhered to and that there is sufficient
awareness of the policy within DOT?
Answer. We are satisfied that management controls are in place. DOT
has issued ``post-implementation'' policy addressing the need to ensure
that compliance is maintained on certified Y2K-compliant systems. FAA
and Coast Guard have also issued their own guidance advising their
organizations how to handle and report on all modifications made to
Y2K-compliant systems. FAA has issued a moratorium on any changes to
the National Airspace System during critical Y2K periods to ensure
compliance is maintained. We found they were controlling modifications.
Question 4. Looking domestically, you commend the Federal Transit
Administration's efforts to assess Y2K readiness. What were the key
factors that you attribute to its success? Are these applicable to
other areas with poor response and is there sufficient time remaining
to leverage these ideas?
Answer. We found a key success factor for gathering information on
Y2K readiness is to attach consequences to non-responders. FTA
stipulated that a response from transit authorities was necessary to
continue funding. Similarly, Senator Dodd's mentioning that air
carriers non-responsive to FAA's request for information about their
Y2K status would not fly resulted in non-respondents going from 1,758
to 31 as of November 17, 1999.
Question 5. Your testimony indicated that the Federal Railroad
Administration was planning to release survey results from four of the
largest railroad companies in early October (results were expected this
month). Tomorrow is October 1, do you have any preliminary information
on this survey? If not, why is it taking so long to assess results of
four companies? What is being done to refine the status information on
regional and local freight railroad companies--an information problem
area you pointed out?
Answer. An independent assessment of Y2K readiness of the four
major freight railroads (Burlington Northern Santa Fe, CSX, Norfolk
Southern, and Union Pacific) in the United States was issued on October
8, 1999. According to the report, all four companies had well-managed,
well-funded Y2K compliance programs. We are following up with the
Federal Railroad Administration on the status of regional or local
freight-railroad companies.
Question 6. I must say, your testimony paints a dark picture of
areas that are cause for concern. This stands in stark contrast to the
picture painted by the President's Council on Y2K Conversion and to an
extent, that of this Committee. How do you reconcile these differences?
How would you characterize the transportation industry preparedness and
how concerned Americans and US businesses should be?
Answer. Our view is similar to that of the President's Council on
Y2K Conversion and that of the committee. Overall, we believe that the
transportation industry is prepared for Y2K. DOT systems are ready and
transportation industry preparedness is good in that large providers
have reported they will be ready in time. However, there might be
isolated events with smaller providers. Although the number of small
providers not responding has been high, they represent only a small
fraction of the total transportation picture.
Question 7. Has the Office of the Inspector General performed any
work on assessing US port readiness and what is your overall
assessment?
Answer. Our work in this area was limited to observing three port
exercises conducted by the Coast Guard, at the ports of Los Angeles/
Long Beach, New York/New Jersey, and Hampton Roads, Virginia. These
exercises were successful in testing ship-movement contingencies. We
recommended the Coast Guard expand port exercises to cover port-
operation contingencies to help mitigate the unknowns of port
readiness. We will provide you with the Coast Guard's action plans upon
receipt of this information.
Question 8. In your testimony, you mentioned a need to distinguish
between operational failures, Y2K failures, and problems masqueraded as
Y2K failures. What failures, other than Y2K should we be considering
during the critical periods surrounding the millennium rollover?
Answer. A critical area for consideration during the millennium
rollover is that of terrorist activities, including cyber-attacks,
perpetrated under the guise of Y2K problems. The Crisis Management
Center at DOT needs to ensure it has the right expertise available for
early recognition of potential terrorist attacks.
Question 9. To date the Department has spent over $425 million for
Y2K repairs. Has your office assessed whether the money has been
properly spent? If so, what have the results been?
Answer. Our office is conducting a review of FY 1999 Y2K funding in
FAA and Coast Guard. We will provide our results upon completion.
Question 10. Based on the Y2K work that you have done and the
apparent successful implementation of the FAA project, do you see any
lessons learned that could be used in future or ongoing FAA projects?
Answer. Yes. The successes of the Y2K project include the
communications structure, the way multiple FAA organizations
successfully worked together to ensure Y2K compliance, and the support
and commitment of top management to the project's success. These same
communications lines, organizational structure, and top management
support could be used for managing the next critical area in the
information-technology field-information security.
__________
Prepared Statement of Richard T. Du Moulin
My name is Richard du Moulin. I have recently completed my tenure
as Chairman of the International Association of Independent Tanker
Owners (``INTERTANKO'') and now serve as Chairman of INTERTANKO's North
American Panel. INTERTANKO consists of approximately 300 tanker owners
and operators and another 300 related organizations around the world.
The INTERTANKO fleet is comprised of approximately 2000 tank vessels.
We estimate that roughly 70 percent of all the petroleum and petroleum
products imported by the United States are carried by INTERTANKO. I
also am the Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Marine
Transport Corporation. We are the nation's oldest shipping company and
operate a mixed fleet of U.S. and foreign flag vessels.
Like every other industrial sector, the maritime community faces
significant potential for business disruption as a result of the Y2K
problem. Like other sectors of the maritime industry, the tanker sector
which I represent through INTERTANKO has developed action plans
intended to identify vulnerabilities and to put in place hardware,
software and procedures that will avoid adverse Y2K impacts. The major
difficulty we face with Y2K is that it is easy to see the potential for
harm, but it is very difficult to know whether the impacts will be as
dire as some predict. The only prudent course is to be as thorough as
possible identifying the potential problems while at the same time
methodically replacing systems elements that might be vulnerable.
The Y2K issue is of particular concern to tanker owners because of
their commitment to and responsibility for the safe operation of
vessels and the avoidance of casualties that could result in the loss
of human life and the despoliation of the marine environment. The
tanker industry has made tremendous strides in the last 15 years
through industry-driven reforms toward eliminating mechanical fault and
human error. Much of this progress has come from revisions of training
and operating regimes. We also have explored changes in vessel design,
construction and procedures. The spill response capabilities of most
major maritime nations, including the United States, have increased
dramatically in the last 10 years.
The Y2K issue is an excellent example of the interdependence of
transport systems and their components. INTERTANKO has encouraged its
members to promote attention to all links in what we call the ``Chain
of Responsibility.'' This chain includes not only the tanker owner but
government agencies responsible for marine safety and waterways
management, insurers, charterers, pilots, classes, societies, terminal
operators, and the salvage industry. A failure at any link of this
chain, while unlikely as a matter of statistical probability, can
compromise other elements of the system. We are fully aware that these
links, if damaged, can lead to serious safety and environmental
threats.
Modern vessels, like modern aircraft, depend on an intricate series
of sensors, monitors, and activators that are in turn linked to the
operation of many systems that navigate, propel, steer and monitor a
ship. This chain can be extremely intricate. It has many small links,
many of its links are obscured from ready view beneath other system
elements and, like the very visible components of Chain of
Responsibility, a failure at particular points in this chain can expose
the vessel to risk.
The Y2K problem, despite its high-tech origin, requires decidedly
low-tech values in order to be countered. Good organization practices,
thoroughness, and attention to detail are the ways the maritime
industry, like every other industry, will avoid catastrophic impact
from this potentially dangerous issue.
The primary concern for mariners and internal management is to
identify accurately the sources of exposure. Our member companies and
their consultants have spent untold hours locating system software and
equipment that are potentially affected by Y2K. We have accompanied
this inventory approach with the establishment of new and different
relationships with vendors and consultants. Tanker owning companies
face precisely the same kinds of concerns about Y2K as any other
business concern with regard to the internal management of their
companies. However, I believe these issues are well appreciated by the
Committee and will be well covered by other witnesses. It is the search
for vulnerabilities aboard the ship and in closely related systems that
is the focus of this testimony. Our members have cooperated with the
U.S. Coast Guard and other national safety agencies overseas to think
through potential sources of problems and to make vessels available for
testing.
It has been estimated that a typical tank vessel may contain
between 50 and 200 micro-processors. This is a relatively low number
compared to aircraft or even some other vessel types. As you might
expect, systems controlled by Y2K-vulnerable micro-processors include
the following:
navigational systems
telecommunication systems
real time process controls such as engine room and
cargo monitoring systems
strength and stability monitors
alarm systems
Within our industry, there have been reports of documented Y2K
failures of ship main control, radar mapping, ballast monitoring, cargo
loading, engine room vibration, and ship performance monitoring
systems. None of these failures to date has resulted in major losses
and some were intentionally induced as part of Y2K assessment
procedures.
As has been the case with other industrial sectors, the
identification of Y2K problems and their fix has been enormously
expensive. About 80 percent of the costs incurred to date have arisen
in the equipment and chip replacement area.
We are very concerned about problems that may occur at the links
between different sectors of our industry both here and abroad. A
tanker company may successfully resolve its Y2K problems, but find that
a terminal cannot load or receive a cargo discharge. Aids to navigation
and vessel traffic control systems could be affected in ways that will
adversely impact our abilities to navigate safely. I cite these
examples to indicate that there will be no partial victories in the
race to identify and resolve Y2K problems. We will only succeed if
everyone in every sector succeeds. We won't know until early in the
year 2000 how well we have done. If there is a major spate of costly
damages caused by Y2K, the absence of insurance coverage and the
complex debates over fault that will ensure could have significant
negative consequences for the world's economy.
Among our member companies, the matter is receiving attention at
the highest level. We are receiving incentives, positive and negative,
and prods from insurers, class societies, flag state authorities and
port state control authorities. Every one of these entities not only is
trying to make sure that vessel owners meet this challenge, but must at
the same time see to its own Y2K needs. INTERTANKO notes that the U.S.
Coast Guard has provided an excellent outreach and public awareness
program to the industry. They have provided the industry with an
information resource and a stimulus to be thorough in our systems
review.
Communications between industry and maritime authorities around the
world have, on this subject, generally been positive and open. For
better or worse, industry and government are equally afflicted by
potential problems of Y2K. We are truly all in this together.
INTERTANKO appreciates the attention that this Committee has brought to
the problem.
I will be pleased to answer any questions that the Committee may
have.
__________
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral George N. Naccara
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
Committee. I am Rear Admiral George Naccara, the Coast Guard's Chief
Information Officer (CIO). I have responsibility for the Coast Guard's
Year 2000 (Y2K) project.
I welcome the opportunity to give this committee an update on the
Coast Guard's Y2K readiness and the readiness of the global marine
transportation system (MTS), which have steadily improved since I last
testified before you in April.
The Coast Guard reports the status of 74 mission-critical systems
to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) quarterly. As of today, we
are happy to report 100 percent completion of Coast Guard mission-
critical systems. Additionally, I have ordered a special tertiary level
of verification on the majority of these systems, and this initiative
will continue until shortly before the end of the year. This is our CIO
verification program, a comprehensive test performed with a contractor
and our own Coast Guard personnel. Successful end-to-end testing of
several of our systems has been accomplished. I plan to conduct several
more end-to-end tests before the end of the year. We are continuing
work on other, non-mission-critical systems to absolutely minimize Y2K
impact on those that serve primarily administrative functions.
Contingency plans are in place for all the mission-critical systems,
and Business Continuity Contingency Plans (BCCPs) are in place at 100
percent of our operational units. Our units have been directed to
exercise their plans and modify them as necessary in the time that
remains. Though the recent end-of-week rollover of the Global
Positioning System (GPS), and the rollover of computers to 9/9/99
proved to have very little impact on our systems or our ability to
operate, we used both events to test and modify our incident command
center watchstanding approach, as well as our procedures for passing
information up and down the chain of command. At the end of the year,
the Coast Guard intends to be ready to perform ``Coast Guard missions
in a Y2K environment,'' whatever that environment proves to be. As I
stated to you in April, our motto is ``Semper Paratus''--Always Ready--
and in keeping with that, we will ensure that our systems and
equipment, as well as all our processes, are ready.
As I also stated to you in April, we are keenly interested in the
Y2K readiness of the industry we regulate, not only because we are
charged with maintaining safety on our waterways and protection of the
marine environment, but also because we are aware of the impact of this
industry on the global economy. In keeping with this, we have pursued
an ambitious 2-year strategy of outreach to the MTS, both domestically
and internationally. The outreach has consisted of the following
elements:
a) Assessment of the readiness of the global MTS. A number of
initiatives are underway both in the government and private
sector to assess the readiness of the MTS. Some government-
contracted surveys have been completed, (such as one we
recently received from the Central Intelligence Agency, which
has a section that specifically assess maritime shipping and
ports). The Coast Guard has also partnered with the United
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in collecting
information on the readiness of some key world ports. Summed
up, the studies show a high level of Y2K preparation in the
shipping industry, and a steadily improving picture in the
world's ports, an area I will address further when I summarize
our port exercise program. Some areas of the world do raise a
slightly higher level of concern than I have for U.S. ports. I
do not intend to review these assessments in detail here
because they have been prepared with a security classification,
but they are available to this committee. Should that not be
the case for some reason, I will be happy to assist you in
obtaining releasable portions of them, and I also invite any
member who is interested to attend, or send an appropriate
representative to attend, the next classified briefing I
receive from USTRANSCOM. While I am guardedly optimistic about
the emerging picture for world ports, I will continue to sound
the cautionary note that the MTS is a tremendously complex and
fragmented, intermodally connected system. I believe,
particularly because of the wide dependence on technology
(particularly embedded chips) in the industry, that a level of
uncertainty will remain when the new century arrives.
b) Outreach to the MTS. As I have reported previously, the
Coast Guard has pursued a multi-faceted, 2-year program of
outreach to the industry. This has included: Y2K conferences
and industry days on all coasts, the Great Lakes, and the
inland rivers; the distribution of nearly 250,000 brochures to
ships' masters and port facility operators, and another 250,000
to recreational boaters; and an ambitious and continuing
schedule of speaking engagements by myself and senior Coast
Guard officers domestically and internationally. We also
maintain websites and an (800) infoline where mariners can
obtain relevant Y2K information. Characteristic of our level of
effort, we undertook an especially aggressive informational
campaign, including additional Notices to Mariners and press
releases, concerning the GPS end-of-week rollover in August.
c) Y2K Enforcement Policy. The Coast Guard has recognized
from the start of its Y2K outreach program that a consistent
approach to enforcement in the global MTS is crucial, given the
tremendous impact this industry can have on the world economy.
Our goal, in addition to our primary focus of safety on the
waterways, has been to minimize disruptions and interruptions
in commerce. That is why we agreed to host the meeting of 16
international maritime trade organizations at the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) in London last March. This group
was representative of virtually all shipping interests and
ports in the world. I have already reported to you the success
of this meeting in producing a Year 2000 Code of Good Practice,
which the IMO immediately issued as its IMO Circular Letter
2121. Central to the philosophy of the Circular is the open
exchange of information among MTS stakeholders. I am now
pleased to report that a growing number of nations have adapted
their enforcement policies to Circular 2121, including among
others Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, the
Netherlands, Russia, Australia, and Singapore. The Coast Guard
published its enforcement policy in a Federal Register notice
in June, also basing its approach on the required exchange of
information using the questionnaires in the INO Circular. We
also issued policy guidance to our Captains of the Port, which
contained a risk assessment matrix and risk management process.
In essence, the Captain of the Port takes the information
provided by the company and scores the level of risk associated
with the vessel's movement or the cargo operations of a
terminal. A large number of shipping companies and facilities
operators have now filed their information with us. I should
point out, however, that not all had filed, or filed
completely, as of the 20 August filing date. So when our
Captains of the Port assessed risk using the matrix during the
first designated Y2K critical period of September 7-9,
incomplete information was the principal cause for the issuance
of 175 Captain of the Port orders to ships and 85 to
facilities. Many of these orders, which reflected some level of
restriction on vessel movement or cargo operations, were
rescinded as the outstanding issues were resolved to our
satisfaction. While the Coast Guard takes no pleasure in
requiring even brief delays of this sort, which are costly to
industry, we felt it served as an indication of the seriousness
of our intent to ensure safety, and will prove beneficial in
the overall preparation of the industry for the end of year. I
am convinced this proved that U.S. ports can remain open, and
that commerce can proceed safely in and out of our ports. It
also sent a clear message to other nations that a viable
process is available and reinforced our international
leadership in Y2K readiness.
d) The port exercise program. As I told you in April, I was
successful in ensuring that contingency planning information
was included in IMO Circular 2121. The Coast Guard does not
view these plans as passive instruments. Just as we require an
operator of a passenger vessel to actually launch lifeboats
when we carry out their annual inspection, we have taken a
strong position on the exercise of Y2K contingency plans on
ships and in ports. As of this date, we have carried out port-
level exercises in a large number of U.S. ports, including
some, such as Los Angeles/Long Beach, New Orleans, San
Francisco, and New York, which have received considerable media
attention. However, since our view is cast on a global
industry, we are interested in seeing other world ports carry
out Y2K port exercises. Some, such as Hong Kong and Singapore,
have already done so. To further champion this approach, we
invited representatives from several nations, both G-8 nations
and our primary oil supplying countries of Saudi Arabia,
Mexico, and Venezuela, as well as China and Korea, to attend
our port exercises in New Orleans, San Francisco, and New York.
Last week in Berlin, I made a presentation advocating port
exercises to representatives of G-8 countries attending a
workshop on maritime and aviation contingency planning. I
distributed to these representatives a playbook we have
compiled from our U.S. port exercises, containing information
on how to design an exercise, as well as some best practices
and lessons learned from our exercises. A week ago, I met with
the General Secretary of the IMO in London and presented him
with a summary of our meeting in Berlin, and a copy of the
playbook. I am happy to report that he has distributed these
materials as IMO Circular 2158 that urges IMO member states to
consider holding port exercises of their own during October and
November. We also distributed copies of the contingency plan
exercise playbook to 13 Caribbean countries last week. In
addition, I will make the playbook widely available to any
other MTS interests who desire it.
The Coast Guard will not relax its efforts during the 91 days that
remain until December 31. If one were to view the Coast Guard in a
corporate perspective, our primary commodity is readiness and
responsiveness, and we will ensure our commodity is available to the
American taxpayer. We will continue to re-evaluate all systems, both
mission-critical and non-mission-critical, and continue to refine our
own contingency plans. We will hold a major port exercise in Hampton
Roads on October 28 in cooperation with the Navy. We will continue to
assist MTS stakeholders who request our help with port exercises or
other contingency planning issues, providing training, guidance, and
even a Coast Guard planner as necessary to our trading partners. And we
will continue our DOT interagency and interdepartmental cooperation to
maximize the responsiveness and information sharing of the Federal
government. All of the tools that we have developed, including the
playbook, our database of industry readiness information, and our risk
assessment matrix, will be made available to those public entities who
desire to use them. And on December 31, the Coast Guard will be in a
heightened state of readiness nationwide to respond to any threat of
maritime emergency or disruption in the marine environment.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important issue with
you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
__________
Responses of Rear Admiral George N. Naccara to Questions Submitted by
Chairman Bennett
Question 1. The Maritime Safety Committee of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) has promulgated a number of guidance
documents--really advice--for worldwide Y2K readiness of the shipping
industry that are non-binding. Have these been effective in causing
shippers to take notice of the need for Y2K remediation? Could you
estimate to what extent these have been followed by the industry?
Answer. There have been four IMO Y2K Circulars calling for
increased attention to resolving potential problems related to the
year-end roll over. The IMO circulars are effective and are a very
positive component of the international maritime Y2K awareness effort,
which must be seen in the context of a much larger effort undertaken on
multiple fronts worldwide to alert the maritime industry. Major
international corporations have given serious attention to the issue
and leadership has been displayed by a large number of international
maritime trade associations and maritime nations. Notable efforts
include:
a) Worldwide seminars on Y2K issues by the United Kingdom
Group of Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs; this
organization also participated in the creation of the Ship2000
website, along with several other major maritime trade
associations;
b) Distribution at the above mentioned seminars, and
elsewhere, of a Ship2000 Toolkit for the design of a maritime
Y2K project, by the United Kingdom P&I Clubs;
c) Conferences and industry days around the United States led
by the U.S. Coast Guard, focused on Y2K;
d) Distribution by the Coast Guard of a Y2K brochure to all
vessels calling at U.S. ports, as well as to facilities and
recreational boaters;
e) A publication on Y2K contingency planning for ships by
Lloyd's Register in cooperation with a number of other trade
associations;
f) A publication on Y2K contingency planning for ports
sponsored principally by the International Association of Ports
and Harbors;
g) Worldwide seminars by the International Energy Agency on
Y2K and the oil industry, including a maritime component;
h) A meeting convened by the U.S. Coast Guard of 16 major
international maritime trade organizations at the IMO in March
1999, which produced the Year 2000 Code of Good Practice (later
issued as IMO Circular 2121);
i) Addresses by the U.S. Coast Guard Chief Information
Officer to two United Nations meetings of national Y2K
coordinators in December 1998 and June 1999; and
j) Y2K port contingency exercises in 26 U.S. ports, several
of which received considerable press attention, and some of
which were attended by foreign observers.
These are just a sampling of the many efforts that have contributed
to a high level of attention to the Y2K issue in the maritime industry.
It would be difficult to determine which of the many forms of guidance
on maritime Y2K projects have most influenced industry. Though the IMO
has doubtless played a significant leadership role, it has likely been
the combined influence of all these initiatives that have led to the
industry's serious efforts on Y2K.
Question 2. Please describe the nature of projected/likely failures
at ports, the level of seriousness, and anticipated duration?
Answer. The Coast Guard expectation is that U.S. ports will be open
and operating during Y2K critical periods. Captain of the Port surveys
indicate that self-imposed curtailment of operations by industry at the
century rollover may run above 50 percent, but only for a few hours
during the actual rollover period. As to the nature of failures that
may occur in ports, it is extremely difficult to predict what might
fail. Port information technology and infrastructure reflect many of
the same risks that affect other sectors of the economy. Port
businesses have complex IT systems and embedded processors, and some
level of failure in such systems continues to be predicted by leaders
in the industry. Ports are also vulnerable to disruptions in power,
water, telecommunications, financial services, and supply chains to the
extent that any of these occur. Minor, not major, disruptions are
anticipated. An important difference is that ports are key intermodal
nexus points, and disruptions in other modes, such as rail or
transport, can cause slowdowns in the movement of cargo through ports.
While it is impossible to predict where such disruptions might occur,
the intermodal factor may have a slight magnifying effect. It is
equally difficult to predict the anticipated duration of any
disruptions that ports might experience, other than to say that they
are more likely to be of short duration, since the overall state of
readiness of the industry will undoubtedly allow affected parties to
correct failures they encounter fairly quickly.
Question 3. Will the Coast Guard have additional monitoring to
watch for pollution from ships with malfunctioning systems in U.S.
coastal waters?
Answer. No. The Coast Guard already maintains a high state of
vigilance for pollution incidents 365 days a year on a 24-hour, 7 days-
a-week basis. All incidents from a minor sheen to a major spill that
come to Coast Guard attention, usually through our National Response
Center, are quickly investigated. As the Coast Guard intends to be at a
high state of readiness for the Y2K critical periods, our vigilance
will, if anything, be slightly enhanced by our increased attention to
all activities in our ports and waterways. In addition, since we are
reviewing the risk associated with all vessel and cargo movements in
ports during the critical periods, these activities will be subject to
an added level of scrutiny. In cases where factors such as weather,
hazardous cargo, or previous vessel history generate a high risk
rating, operational restrictions may be imposed by the Coast Guard
Captain of the Port to further mitigate that risk. On balance, the
potential increase in risk posed by the Y2K problem is being met with
monitoring and measures that mitigate that risk.
Question 4. What confidence is there in the efficacy of commercial
shipper remediation and contingency planning? That is, is it generally
perceived to be thorough and effective, or cursory and ineffective?
Answer. Captains of the Port have confidence that the remediation
and contingency planning actions of most of industry are thorough and
effective. Coast Guard Headquarters surveyed Captains of the Port to
determine the level of preparation of the industry in their zones. The
latest in a series of surveys was conducted at the end of September.
Responses were based upon extensive cooperation in preparing for Y2K
between Coast Guard personnel and other port stakeholders, which
included representatives of maritime associations, port safety advisory
groups, piloting associations, state and Federal agencies, and
individual companies doing business in the port. The responses reflect
a high level of awareness of the problem within the industry, and a
better than 80 percent completion rate for repair, testing, and
Business Continuity Contingency Planning actions. In addition, 56
percent of those surveyed considered their ports at a low state of
risk, 41 percent at a medium level of risk, and 3 percent did not
respond; no ports were rated at a high state of risk.
Question 5. Does a central Y2K data remediation coordinating or
data collection authority (similar to ICAO or IATA) exist for ports? If
so, where and how is its information made available?
Answer. Yes, a central Y2K data authority (similar to the
International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] or the International
Air Transport Association [IATA]) exists for ports. The Coast Guard
established itself as a central Y2K data collection authority for
carriers and facilities operating in U.S. waters for a 48-hour period
surrounding January 1, 2000 and February 29, 2000. This was done
through publication of an Interim Rule on June 23, 1999 requiring the
filing of Y2K readiness information by shipping companies and certain
facilities operators. This data, which is being stored on a Coast Guard
database, is now virtually complete for companies that plan to operate
during the designated Y2K critical periods. However, a word of caution
is necessary since this data only represents a percentage of the total
number of stakeholders operating in the maritime environment. This
information is based on International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Circular 2121 and represents self-reporting by the Marine
Transportation System (MTS). As such, it has limited value for overall
calculation but provides good ``due diligence'' information for Coast
Guard Captains of the Port in performing risk assessments.
On an international scale, the Coast Guard is unaware of any
central data collection initiative in the maritime industry that
corresponds to the comprehensive data collection for the aviation
industry recently undertaken by ICAO. Though an agency of the United
Nations like ICAO, the International Maritime Organization has
undertaken no similar assessment, undoubtedly due to the vastly more
diverse and complex nature of the MTS. Numerous MTS trade associations
have polled their membership, but the data, mostly incomplete even for
the segment of the industry in question, cannot represent comprehensive
data for all of the MTS.
Question 6. What kinds of delays might develop at the nation's
ports if maritime traffic must be slowed down due to Y2K problems with
ships or traffic systems? Are we talking days or hours of delays?
Answer. If delays occur at all, they are more than likely to be
measured in hours. Extensive contingency plans have been prepared to
deal with potential failures on board vessels and in systems and
equipment ashore. For this reason, even if minor failures and
disruptions occur, invocation of contingency plans should permit ship
and port operations to continue at near to normal levels with little
delay. A ship with a failure on the bridge, for example, should still
be able to get to the dock even with Coast Guard imposed operational
restrictions, such as a requirement for tugs alongside. Further, since
more than 50 percent of industry has indicated that it is likely to
voluntarily curtail or halt operations during Y2K critical periods,
this will serve to lower the level of operations in the ports and lower
the impact of any disruptions that do occur, thus mitigating delay
factors. Should individual operators have more extensive disruptions to
their systems, they might experience correspondingly longer delays to
their operations, but in most cases these would not delay overall port
operations. An important additional factor is that ports are key
intermodal nexus points, and disruptions in other modes, such as rail
or transport, can cause slowdowns in the movement of cargo through
ports. While it is impossible to predict where such disruptions might
occur, if they do, they might result in delays in the port. But only if
the disruptions were major would we expect intermodally caused delays
of more than several hours. A larger unknown for U.S. port operations,
of course, is the potential impact of more significant disruptions
offshore. Delays in key international ports could clearly delay cargoes
bound for U.S. ports, as well as delay outbound cargoes.
Question 7. Where is your biggest Y2K concern in regards to
international maritime activity and what is the Coast Guard doing to
mitigate the risk to the U.S.?
Answer. The Coast Guard's two biggest Y2K concerns in regards to
international maritime activity are:
a) The unknown impact of embedded technology. These
uncertainties posed by the extensive use of embedded chips in
modern ships have undergone public discussion in the past
months and require no additional review. The only way to ensure
Y2K compliance of an embedded microprocessor assembly is to
replace these components in favor of assemblies whose
functionality is absolutely known. This uncertainty will
remain, and could possibly account for some disruption in the
Marine Transportation System (MTS). We have, through
discussions within the MTS, learned that many larger carriers
and facilities have performed extensive testing of embedded
systems and replaced non-compliant processors.
b) The interconnectivity of the complex MTS. Multiple modes
and many stakeholders have a role in getting cargo to its
destination through the MTS. Disruptions in any segment of the
domestic or international transportation system, or in the
worldwide infrastructure that supports the MTS, can cause
disruptions elsewhere in the chain.
Extensive Coast Guard outreach activities to the
international MTS continue. Recognizing early on that the MTS
had to be approached as an organic whole, the Coast Guard
encouraged all segments of the international MTS to prepare for
Y2K.
Question 8. During the period of September 7-9, the Captains of
Port issued 175 orders to ships related to Y2K. What does the Coast
Guard expect will happen as it relates to vessels' movements at U.S.
ports over the period of December 30, 1999 to January 1, 2000? Do you
have any expectations for February 29, 2000 to March 1, 2000?
Answer. The majority of the Captain of the Port orders issued
during the September 7-9 period were the result of incomplete
information on file with the Coast Guard for the ships in question. As
a result of the September 9 enforcement actions, ship and port
information is being provided at an increasing rate, and the Coast
Guard anticipates all companies that plan to operate during the next
two critical periods will file the appropriate information by early
December. A high percentage of companies have indicated that they
intend to curtail or halt operations during the next two critical
periods. For those that do operate, there is now widespread familiarity
in the industry with the Coast Guard risk assessment process. These
operators are expected to have corrected any known problems before
attempting operations in the critical period, and ensure executable
contingency plans are available. For this reason, though some
disruptions may occur, they are expected to be manageable.
Question 9. The port exercises conducted by the Coast Guard and the
maritime industry have been successful. However, as we have heard from
the Inspector General, the scope has been limited to testing the
contingency for shipment movement. Are there plans for future port
exercises? Do you plan to expand their scope?
Answer. Contingency plans for more than ship movements have been
tested during U.S. port exercises. Contingency plans for
communications, vessel traffic services, power loss, police and fire
department response, chemical facility spills, customs systems failure,
and U.S. Navy interface, among others, have been exercised around the
country over the summer and fall. Most of the exercises in the U.S.
have now been completed, though a few remain to be conducted. For
example, a joint Y2K spill exercise will be conducted with the
Canadians in Detroit on November 22, 1999 and a small number of
exercises in foreign ports will occur in the time remaining until the
end of the year. The Coast Guard will also have representatives at a
port exercise to be conducted by the Mexicans in Altamira on November
27, 1999. As the need arises, we will continue to assist trading
partners with port exercises upon their request through the end of the
year. And though the major U.S. port exercise phase is now virtually
past, we will continue not only to test and refine our own contingency
plans, but continue to encourage, or in some cases require, our
industry partners to do the same.
__________
Prepared Statement of David Z. Plavin
The Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA)
represents local, regional and state governing bodies that own and
operate commercial airports in the United States and Canada. ACI-NA
Member airports enplane more than 97 percent of the domestic and
virtually all the international airline passenger and cargo traffic in
North America. We are pleased to be able to share our thoughts on the
issue of Y2K readiness with the committee.
Our association's Y2K activity began in the spring of 1997 with the
first of a series of educational seminars organized to assist our
members in developing their Y2K awareness and implementing programs
leading to assure readiness of our nation's airports. During the
intervening two years, we organized Y2K informational meetings in
Denver, Detroit, San Francisco, Cincinnati, Orlando, Washington,
Dallas/Fort Worth, Seattle, Phoenix and Tampa. Many of the meetings
were conducted jointly with the Air Transport Association and
individual air carriers in support of an agreement between ACI-NA and
ATA to cooperate extensively in this area.
ACI-NA is represented on the President's Council on Year 2000
Readiness and participates with other industry associations in the FAA
Y2K Industry Steering Group. The steering group has representatives of
the major airlines, regional airlines, general aviation, aviation
manufacturers, and airports and is fulfilling a particularly effective
role by providing a mechanism for the various elements of the aviation
industry to coordinate their Y2K activities.
We would like to make several points, which often go unrecognized
in discussing airports' readiness for the year 2000 transition.
STATUS OF AIRPORTS' READINESS
Because the nation's 18,000 airports are locally owned and operated
it is more difficult to form a single view of their readiness status
than is the case in many other industries that are more concentrated.
Unlike the major airlines or the regional airlines, with their limited
numbers of operators, this diverse ownership makes it infinitely more
difficult to track readiness status.
Several attempts to survey airports during the past year have been
unsuccessful, in part because of the large numbers of airports involved
and, in part, because of the rapidly changing status of airports'
readiness. In the beginning of this year the General Accounting Office
reported on the status of airports based on a large survey conducted by
GAO during 1998. However, that survey data was badly outdated by the
time the GAO analysis was completed and the results did not accurately
reflect airports' status at the time the report was published. We
joined with the American Association of Airport Executives in several
attempts at surveying our members earlier this year and also found that
the status was changing so rapidly that consistent results were
difficult to obtain. The FAA Office of Airports Safety and Standards
conducted a survey in June of this year that was updated as recently as
mid-August. We believe that survey will provide the most comprehensive
information on the status of certificated airports. Finally, the Air
Transport Association is attempting to maintain information on the
status of airline suppliers, including airports. The ATA data is
collected under assurances of confidentiality and has not been released
to anyone other than their airline members. However, based upon
discussions with ATA and FAA staff, as well as through frequent contact
with our member airports, we believe the overwhelming majority of
airports have completed the bulk of the remediation and testing of
their affected systems and they will all be ready for the year-end date
rollover.
CONTINGENCY PLANNING
It is common practice among our member airports to conduct
extensive testing to assure that each affected system has been made
fully Y2K compliant. It is also common practice to develop a
contingency plan to assure continuation of the functions of computer
systems in the unlikely event that a failure occurs that was undetected
during the testing.
Many segments of American industry seldom experience large-scale
disruptions of their operations and, therefore, do not regularly
conduct contingency planning on the scale required for Y2K readiness.
This is not the case with our nation's airports. Airports regularly
develop and test contingency plans for disruptions caused by major
winter storms, airfield construction programs and emergency response to
accidents. These plans are formally coordinated with airlines, other
airport tenants, FAA and outside emergency response agencies and are
updated frequently. It is common for an airport to conduct live drills
of its snow removal and emergency response plans each year. Planning
major construction programs to minimize airfield disruptions has also
become an annual process at many of our major airports. Y2K contingency
plans are but a variation on existing emergency response, construction
and winter storm plans. We are confident that high quality contingency
plans will be in place at our member airports in the unlikely
circumstance of an unanticipated Y2K failure.
FEW AIRPORT SYSTEMS ARE CRITICAL
The aviation industry has been subjected to unwarranted speculation
regarding the potential for Y2K failures having an impact on safety.
Fortunately, that speculation is completely false. Unfortunately, the
speculation continues.
FAA has prepared and distributed to certificated airports a list of
approximately 150 systems commonly owned by airports that might be
susceptible to Y2K failure. Many other important systems (such as
navigation or landing aids, baggage and fueling systems are commonly
owned either by FAA or by airlines, rather than airports). Included on
that list are approximately 48 systems that, in FAA's judgement, are
considered critical to airfield operations or might be used in
fulfillment of regulatory requirements. We believe that very few of
these systems actually have potential for either significantly
affecting operations or safety. Many of the systems merely serve to
increase efficiency by automating functions formerly performed
manually. Others provide information, are databases or record keeping
in nature and do not control operational functions. Three of the 48
systems have been the subject of frequent speculation and are worthy of
additional discussion here.
Airfield Lighting Control Systems: These are tools for controlling
the thousands of lights used on a typical airport runway and taxiway
system. Newer systems are controlled by computers, some of which have
been found to exhibit Y2K failure modes. Those systems generally have
been replaced or repaired by our members and subsequent testing
indicates that they are free from risk. However, given the speculation
about lighting failures having the potential for catastrophe, you
should understand how the regular procedures that are in place to
assure safety would be applied in this case.
Even if one of these computerized systems were to fail the
electrical switching gear could be operated manually, to restore
airfield lights. Furthermore, if the system were to fail, aircraft
would not be dispatched to that airport, flights in progress would be
diverted to the alternate airport filed in the flight plan and flights
on final approach would perform a missed approach if a lighting failure
were to occur. In the case of low visibility landings, current
requirements call for automatic switching to emergency generator within
15 seconds, if critical lighting system fails. These emergency
generators are typically not controlled by computers.
Because these systems have been thoroughly assessed and tested and
because the lighting can be manually operated, we feel that the risk of
disruption due to a Y2K failure is minimal.
Airfield Access Control Systems: These are used to regulate access
to the secure portion of the airfield by the thousands of airport,
airline and other employees at a typical large airport. These systems,
too, use computers to activate the hundreds of doors involved and some
have been found to be subject to Y2K failure modes. As in the case of
the airfield lighting control systems, the susceptible systems have
been repaired or replaced, tested for Y2K readiness and are felt to be
fully reliable. However, if a failure were to occur, despite this
testing, FAA has provided guidance to airports on how to manually
control access to secure areas. Assuming that any failure could not be
quickly repaired, the consequence would be increased staffing and
manual operation of access doors.
Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) Vehicles: These may contain
microprocessors used in their diesel engine fuel controls or to perform
data collection for maintenance functions. There has been speculation
that Y2K failures may affect their performance. As in the other case
described, the affected vehicles have been identified and repaired with
the help of the manufacturers involved. Many airports maintain more
than the minimum numbers of vehicles and, if an unanticipated failure
were to occur would continue to meet the minimum regulatory
requirements with spare fire engines. Even if an airport does not have
a spare vehicle, the impact of a failure would most likely be the
reduction in the number of vehicles available, not the loss of all fire
fighting services, since few airports have fleets composed of entirely
the same make and model of vehicle. Given the extremely low probability
of ever needing the full fire fighting capability available at an
airport and the remarkably low accident rate at our nations' airports,
we are confident that the potential for a Y2K problem is minuscule,
even if a failure were to occur.
However, we are concerned that a proposed change to the regulations
governing ARFF preparedness being considered by FAA would increase the
potential for disruption if a vehicle failure should occur at an
airport without a spare vehicle. FAA is proposing to eliminating the
48-hour grace period currently allowed by 14 CFR Part 139.319(h)(3)
during the first few days of the year 2000, presumably to address
potential Y2K failures. The 48-hour provision is intended to allow
airport operators sufficient time to acquire parts to repair a required
ARFF vehicle or arrange for a replacement vehicle. By eliminating the
grace period, FAA would force cancellation of flights at those airports
without spare vehicles, if a failure were to occur...even if the
failure is unrelated to Y2K. Perversely, rescinding the grace period
would reduce the chances that an airport without a backup ARFF vehicle
would be able to arrange to borrow an excess vehicle from a neighboring
airport if they experienced a failure. Under FAA's proposal, the lender
would also be at immediate risk of flight cancellations, should they
have an unanticipated ARFF vehicle failure and would, therefore, be
much less likely to lend their spare vehicle as a replacement to a
neighbor.
SUMMARY
As we noted above, we feel confident that our nation's airports are
fully prepared for the millennium date roll over. We feel that even if
failures occur, despite the extensive testing that has been done,
airport contingency plans will prevent significant disruption. We are
strongly convinced that there is no safety risk from potential Y2K
problems because of the excellent system of redundant safety measures
that are used in aviation. We are, however, concerned that FAA should
not remove the 48 hour grace period for the repair of ARFF vehicles
because that would increase the potential for disruption in the event
of failure.
Finally, we are concerned that an increased public perception of
risk from the millennium date change could negatively affect travel if
past misperceptions of Y2K readiness is allowed to continue. It is our
opinion that the US aviation system is fully prepared for the year 2000
date change, and airports have contributed their share to that success.
__________
Prepared Statement of Edward Smart
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Ed Smart and I am the air line
pilot representative to the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) where we, along with IATA, have a Permanent Observer seat on the
Air Navigation Commission. Our organization, the International
Federation of Air line Pilot Associations (IFALPA) is made up of just
under 100 national member pilot associations, has approximately 120,000
air line pilot members out of the estimated 150,000 active pilots who
are flying the line today. Our relations with other international
organizations includes affiliation with the International Flight
Engineer Organization, and we maintain a close working relationship
with the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers
Associations.
While our member associations are often air line pilot unions,
IFALPA is not a union, nor is it a union of unions. It has as its basic
aim the development of a safe and orderly system of air transportation
as well as the protection of the professional interests of air line
pilots, focusing its attention and efforts on matters involving
aviation related technical, safety and security issues. It may be of
interest to note that IFALPA is also the trusted agent of the
membership of the International Airline Passenger Associations for the
detecting and reporting of safety and security deficiencies on the air
side and outside of the aircraft cabin.
IFALPA is well aware of and most appreciative of all of the fine
efforts which have been expended by the world's States and
international organizations in increasing public awareness of the
potential threat posed by Y2K related problems and in providing
valuable assistance to national and international authorities, the
world's airlines and airports in their efforts in taking the proactive
measures necessary to eliminate or to at least minimize the potential
for flight safety problems. We have received, and we have full
confidence in, the assurances given to us by the major aircraft
manufacturers, both in the western world and in the Former Soviet
Union, that there is nothing internally within today's civil air
transport aircraft or its essential which will jeopardize fundamental
flight safety when the date rollovers occur.
Outside of the aircraft, we are confident that the measures already
taken and still pending for completion by the end of the year will
ensure continued safe flight safety for operations in the North
American, and the Eastern and south Pacific and North Atlantic Regions.
However, some concerns remain regarding other Regions of the world.
While we are reasonably confident that the Y2K situation is well
under control regarding air traffic in the Western European area, we
are somewhat less confident that the same situation exists in Eastern
Europe which includes airspace eastward to Vladivostok. We noted with
some consternation the recent announcement by Col. Gen. Anatoly
Kornukov, who heads Russian Air Traffic Control, of his serious
concerns that Russia's air traffic control system has been in critical
condition since the early 1990s; and that, in his view, flight safety
levels will continue to fall drastically until they are 80% below the
levels of the western world. ICAO and IATA have been in the process of
opening up new trans-Arctic air traffic control routes which transit
remote areas over Russia and we now have some concerns as to their
continued viability in light of the recent Russian government,
particularly in light of the potential for additional Y2K
complications. These same concerns also apply to former Soviet
Socialist Republics to the north of Iran and Pakistan. The old adage
that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link is also applicable
in the instance of international flights.
Among our concerns is the fact that the Y2K air traffic control
contingency plans developed for western Europe include the idea that
some European States may close their airspace in the event of a failure
of air-to-ground communications. This is something which already exists
but has only rarely used and has never been employed on a large scale.
In the event of implementation of this procedure for an extended time
period and involving large numbers of aircraft, we believe that flight
safety problems could occur due to the fact that there are some 300
daily flights inbound from North America via the North Atlantic and an
additional 30 or so flights each coming across from South and Central
America, and another 60 or so daily flights inbound to Europe from
Asia.
We also understand that the airspace and aerodromes along the
limited number of main routes between Asia and Europe could also be
closed in the event of air-ground communications failure and that there
is also a possibility that the routes over Afghanistan and Turkey might
become unavailable and that aerodromes in Cyprus, Syria and Turkey
might also become unavailable. We are suggesting that pilots require
carriage of a minimum of an extra 30 minutes of fuel over and above the
normal and contingency fuel usually carried in order to assist them in
coping with Y2K induced delays and diversions.
Moving outside of the areas already mentioned, we become a little
less sure of the air traffic control systems in some areas to cope with
the Y2K events. Over large areas of sub-Saharan Africa, for instance,
the air traffic control system has never become fully functional and
pilots rely on a ``do it yourself'' form of air traffic control called
In-flight Broadcast Procedure (IFBP) by broadcasting their flight's
crossing times and altitudes ``in the blind'' on a common radio
frequency. Other aircraft then listen for these broadcasts and to
minimize potential conflicts by changing their altitude so as to avoid
the other aircraft.
IFBP normally works in low traffic density areas such as Africa but
still there but there are difficulties. Firstly, not all aircraft are
aware of or use the blind broadcast procedure as in the instance of
State aircraft. This actually happened when a US Air Force C-141 and a
Luftwaffe Tupelov aircraft which had a mid-air collision off the coast
of Namibia some time back. Neither aircraft was aware of the existence
of the IFBP procedure or of each other's presence, primarily because
the procedure is not recognized or promulgated by State authorities for
fear that it would be a de facto admission that their air traffic
control systems were critically deficient. Secondly, not all pilots
using the blind broadcast procedure use the English language, so the
effectiveness of the procedure is degraded.
The reason that I am dwelling on this particular procedure as it
applies to the airspace over Africa is because it is in the ICAO Y2K
regional contingency plans as the primary means which will be
implemented to prevent midair collisions if and when the Y2K problem
becomes real and results in a complete collapse of air traffic control
occurs. If ground based air traffic control does fail, pilots will be
expected to revert to what is essentially a ``do it yourself'' air
traffic control system.
One might say that we at least have a last ditch electronic means
for detecting other aircraft which pose a threat and avoiding midair
collisions through the use of on board Airborne Collision Avoidance
Systems (ACAS) in the event air traffic control fails and the In-flight
Broadcast Procedure doesn't work. However, again, there are impediments
to its full effectiveness even when ACAS is installed. In order to
detect a potential collision, ACAS requires that the threat aircraft be
equipped with an ICAO compliant altitude reporting radar transponder;
and, at present there is no mandatory requirement for the carriage of
this equipment by all aircraft. Internationally, the system is not
required for installation until 2003. Even then, ACAS will not be
required for cargo aircraft, nor is it required for installation in the
smaller commercial and non-commercial aircraft or in the instance of
State aircraft which are all aircraft in use for military, police or
customs purposes.
Aircraft manufactured in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and flown
domestically and in national airspace where ICAO compliant transponders
are not required simply cannot be detected by ACAS. Russian
transponders are coded differently and utilize meters instead of feet
as their basis. As a result, there have been several near-misses in
former Soviet Union airspace and there was a tragic midair collision
between a Saudia 747 ACAS equipped aircraft and a Kazakh Illyushin 76
cargo airliner over India in 1996 which 350 fatalities.
In response to the unsure nature of what will occur during Y2K type
of rollovers, and as a means for facilitating a safe landing at
unplanned diversion airports, it was suggested to States via ICAO that
during sensitive times that they consider making military aerodromes
available to civil aircraft which require their unanticipated use and
that civil aerodromes which have limited times of normal use extend
their availability so as to make them immediately available to aircraft
which are experiencing difficulties.
Our specific recommendations made to ICAO during their 7 to 9
September Second Global Y2K Contingency Planning Meeting aimed at
dealing with potential flight safety problems during the Y2K rollover
dates were accepted by the meeting for inclusion in an ICAO State
Letter. I commend them to you for consideration:
--Additional flight crew training for crews engaging in
international flights which are specific to the Y2K contingency
measures that will be implemented should be undertaken. These
procedures will have subtle differences in application between
different ICAO Regions. The training should also cover alternative air-
ground communications methods and procedures such as the use of HF
radio patches and ACARS for communicating with ATC through the company;
--In consideration of the fact that there are currently several
versions of ACAS equipment and software now in existence and that audio
and visual warnings displayed to flight crews can vary widely, it is
believed that special emphasis should be given to flight crew training,
to include flight simulator training so as to ensure that currently
installed systems and indications are covered;
--Aircraft which are flying during the rollover dates and times
should carry an extra fuel reserve, perhaps an additional minimum of 30
minutes, over and beyond the normal and contingency fuel which is
normally carried so as to permit flight crews to deal with situations
such as diversions around closed airspace and landing at unanticipated
aerodromes;
--An extra pilot should occupy the ``jump seat'' on the flight deck
during rollover flights to assist in coping with the increased
communications load during the potential application of ATS contingency
measures and to assist in visually detecting potential traffic
conflicts, particularly in areas where aircraft without Mode C
transponders are permitted to operate and to mix with civil air
transport traffic;
--States will be encouraged by ICAO to curtail non-essential
flights by military aircraft during the rollover period in order to
minimize potential traffic conflicts;
--States will also wish to maintain their guard against any
possible rollover type failures associated with the unscheduled leap
year rollover occurring on 28-29 Feb 99.
We agree with the view that both ICAO and IATA have taken all
reasonable measures that are within their means in dealing with the Y2K
type of events. Mr. Chairman, we are most appreciative for the
opportunity to have presented the views of the international airline
pilot profession to this eminent national legislative body.
__________
Prepared Statement of Thomas Windmuller
I am Thomas Windmuller, appearing on behalf of the International
Air Transport Association (IATA). I would like to thank the Committee
for providing IATA with an opportunity to appear here today and explain
what we and the international air transport industry have been doing to
prepare for the Year 2000. The international airline community and the
civil aviation industry at large have a good story to tell about their
work in this field.
The International Air Transport Association (IATA)
IATA is the trade association of the world's airlines. Its 265
Member airlines account for 98% of scheduled international traffic.
Virtually every major international scheduled carrier, including all
the major US carriers that provide international service, are Members
of IATA. Many other carriers regularly use IATA standards and services.
IATA's mission is to represent and serve the airline industry and to
promote improvements in aviation safety and security.
IATA and Y2K
IATA has had a Y2K project underway since 1998 involving a range of
both internal \1\ and external activities. The Committee has asked that
we focus today on the readiness of airlines, airports and air traffic
service providers around the world to meet Y2K disruptions. These are
the subject areas that we, too, have at the top of our priority list
since each is critical to the safety of flight.
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\1\ In regard to the internal activities, IATA provides a number of
services to the international airline community, including several
technical, operational, and financial services like the settlement
systems in which airlines settle accounts with passenger and cargo
agents. It is vital, both to consumers of airline services and to the
airline industry itself, that these systems continue to operate
smoothly through the millennium change. In addressing the Year 2000
problem we have used widely-accepted methodologies and standards. IATA
fully anticipates that all of its services will continue to operate
smoothly through the millennium transition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IATA Member Airlines
Although IATA is not systematically tracking individual airline Y2K
readiness, we have been working with our Member airlines on the Year
2000 issue for more than three years. In 1996, we established the Year
2000 Group, a forum in which Member airlines could meet regularly to
discuss their Year 2000 preparations in a non-competitive environment.
Participants exchange information about problems encountered, solutions
identified, and best practices established. Over the past three years
the size of this group has grown steadily, and we now have Y2K contacts
at all of our Member airlines, as well as at many non-Member airlines.
IATA has collected information on the readiness of aircraft systems
from the major airframe manufacturers, Western and Russian, and made
this available to Member airlines as well as to other airlines
participating in our Year 2000 work. IATA has also been in contact with
the major computer reservation systems, which since early in 1999 have
been accepting reservations for dates after the rollover.
The IATA Year 2000 Industry Project
In early 1998, IATA's Member airlines were already making
substantial progress with their own Y2K preparations. However,
knowledge about counterpart action by their key air transport industry
partners was not widely available. The airlines realized that unless
these partners--airports, air traffic service (ATS) providers,
manufacturers and other key suppliers--were similarly active in their
own Y2K preparatory work, the efforts of individual airlines would be
insufficient by themselves. The Year 2000 problem is one that affects
the entire air transport industry. Given the complex network of
interlocking dependencies within the industry, it is important to
ensure that all parts of the industry are moving forward together on
this critical issue.
It was with this objective that a group of airlines united behind a
proposal to ask IATA to undertake a global, industry-wide initiative
with our key air transport industry partners. In June 1998, the IATA
Members at the Annual General Meeting voted unanimously to fund this
initiative and to open participation in it not only to IATA Member
airlines but also to non-Member airlines as well. Presently, about a
dozen non-Member carriers, scheduled and charter alike, are
participating in the project.
Goals
IATA's overriding goals for its Y2K Project are:
First, to maintain the safety of the international aviation
industry. Safety is always the air transport industry's highest
priority. This is true of every aspect of our work. This priority will
not change on December 31st. There will be no compromise on safety
during the transition period, just as there is no compromise on safety
on any other day of any year.
Second, to ensure business continuity. To the maximum extent
possible, consistent with safety, we want airlines to be able to meet
the needs and preferences of their customers on January 1st as on any
other day. While the evening of December 31st is traditionally a
relatively ``slow'' period for the industry, there are always people
who must or wish to fly on any given day for a variety of reasons.
IATA's goal, as always, is to help our airlines provide a service that
is responsive to this demand and to do so safely, reliably and
conveniently.
Third, to minimize inconvenience. Congestion and delays have become
a regrettably increasing part of air travel, especially in regions of
the world such as North America and Western Europe. Airport and air
traffic control delays, snowstorms and other weather disturbances are
problems that airlines face every day, particularly during the holiday
season. Mechanical problems, labor disputes and other factors also play
a role in the life of this industry on a daily basis. We know we will
face these problems on January 1, 2000, just as we do on every other
day. Our goal, therefore, is simply to minimize any additional impact
on the industry--and more particularly on the passengers and shippers
that rely upon this industry--by the so-called Millennium Bug.
Specific Objectives
When IATA first began this project in June 1998, we established
five specific objectives:
Create awareness amongst airports and ATA providers \2\
served by IATA Member airlines as well as amongst key industry
suppliers;
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\2\ For those unfamiliar with the term, ``ATS provider'' is an
acronym for Air Traffic Service provider. It is usually a government
entity, like the FAA, that provides air traffic control services to
aircraft operators making use of its airspace. This space typically is
above sovereign territory, but may include oceanic airspace or even
space above adjacent territory, if that space has been assigned to it
by specific international agreement. An ATS provider's tools include
surveillance radars and telecommunications systems that permit the
provider to observe, communicate with, and direct the operations of the
aircraft flying in its airspace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Provide a common methodology to airports, ATS providers
and cargo customs authorities to help them recognize and assess the
impact of Y2K on their operations;
Collect data from these industry partners about the Y2K
programs they have in place and track their progress toward full Y2K
readiness;
Present this data to participating carriers in an
electronically accessible form; and
Encourage all industry partners to address and resolve
these issues as quickly as possible.
In June 1999, the IATA Member airlines unanimously voted to extend
and expand the program through the first quarter of 2000. As is
appropriate at this stage, we are now focusing our efforts on:
Tracking the progress of our key industry partners in
every area of the world;
Encouraging airports and ATS providers to fulfill their
responsibilities for ensuring the Y2K readiness of their operations;
Working closely with the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and individual countries to develop or adapt
existing ATS contingency plans to a Y2K environment;
Promoting the development of airport business continuity
plans as a joint activity between airports and the airlines that serve
them; and
Establishing ``Regional Coordination Units'' around the
world to track developments on a real-time basis as each time zone
rolls over on New Year's Eve.
Project Partners
Since its inception, the IATA industry initiative has been
conducted with the full support of the ICAO. Over the past 15 months
this cooperation has intensified, and we are now sharing all ATS-
related data with ICAO. Since Spring 1999, all visits to ATS providers
have been conducted as joint ICAO/IATA visits, and the results have
been shared with both organizations.
IATA's key industry ally throughout this process has been the Air
Transport Association of America (ATA). The ATA, in close cooperation
with the Air Transport Association of Canada, is monitoring the
progress of airports and ATS providers (FAA and NAV Canada) in the
United States and Canada while IATA is performing this work throughout
the rest of the world. All information collected under the auspices of
ATA, ATAC or IATA is posted in a common database and is available to
the Members of all three associations and other participating airlines.
IATA has also developed a special relationship with the Airports
Council International (ACI) on Year 2000 issues. ACI has been a firm
supporter of the IATA initiative, promoting strong airline-airport
cooperation on Y2K issues. Our ``Airline-Airport Liaison Program,''
which promotes the development of airport business continuity plans by
airports and the airlines that serve them, is a joint IATA/ACI
initiative.
This project would not have been nearly as successful as it has
been without the active support and participation of a number of other
important industry players. These include various regional airline
associations, such as the Association of Asia Pacific Airlines (AAPA),
AITAL in Latin America, AFRAA in Africa and AACO in the Middle East.
Several regional governmental organizations, including the European
Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) and EUROCONTROL in Europe, as well as
the Latin American Civil Aviation Conference (LACAC), have also played
very helpful and constructive roles. In the United States, ACI--North
America, the Regional Airline Association (RAA) and other industry
groups have actively supported the ATA's Aviation Millennium Project.
Finally, and most importantly of all, it must be emphasized that
this IATA program is not one that has been carried out exclusively by
the Association on behalf of its Members, but through a team effort
that had the active support and participation of our Member airlines
themselves. Our Members not only funded the project, but committed
staff, time and a great deal of hard work to carry out the data
collection visits. These participating carriers continue to follow up
with our industry partners to ensure that the information flows back to
IATA on a regular and ongoing basis.
Results to Date
Raising Awareness: IATA does not believe there is any international
airports that is not aware of the Y2K problem and its potential impact
on the air transport industry. On the air traffic service provider
side, we are certain that every ATS provider in every region of the
world is aware of the problem.
Common Methodology: IATA has distributed over 2,500 ``toolkits'' to
airlines, airports and ATS providers around the world. These toolkits
not only provide these organizations with the preferred IATA
methodology--a methodology which conforms to all the widely accepted
international standards on Y2K--but also includes an explanatory video
to help these organizations through the Y2K preparatory process. These
toolkits and videos were provided in a number of major world languages
including English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, Chinese
(Mandarin), Korean and Japanese.
Throughout the second half of 1998, we also conducted 26 training
seminars for airports and ATS providers on each of the major
continents, attracting over 2,000 participants. These seminars were
conducted in each of the eight previously mentioned languages plus
German, Italian and Greek.
Data Collection: To track the progress of our major industry
partners as they address the Y2K problem, IATA has been collecting data
on airports, air traffic service providers and cargo customs
authorities around the globe. IATA's role is to serve as a central
point of collecting this data and providing it to participating
airlines. We do not provide an independent assessment of the data
collected. Over the past 15 months, IATA teams, including airline
representatives and specially trained external consultants, carried out
visits to a majority of the world's ATS providers and to the top 71
airports (as measured by annual passenger throughput) outside North
America. Individual airlines, working on behalf of the entire airline
industry, have carried out independent visits to several hundred more
airports. North American airports were covered by our colleagues at the
Air Transport Association (ATA) and the Air Transport Association of
Canada (ATAC).
As of early September we had obtained data covering more than 175
ATS sites around the world, well over 1,200 airports (including North
America) and over 100 cargo customs authorities. Information on many
other key industry suppliers is also available to participating
airlines in this rapidly growing database. The 1,200 airports from
which we have received information include well over 90% of the top 330
airports outside North America. (These figures were as of 3 September;
additional airport information is being received and entered into the
database.) One of the most important current objectives of the project
is to obtain regular follow-up progress reports from each of the
participating airports and ATS providers so that the data available to
airlines is as accurate, complete and up-to-date as possible.
All of this data is stored on a password-protected database that is
jointly owned by the ATA and IATA. Participating carriers can access
the database either through the worldwide web or with CD-ROMs that are
updated twice per month. IATA's pledge to maintain the confidentiality
of this database and disclose this information only to airline users
has been critical to the success of our work in this area. It has
enabled airports and ATS providers to be remarkably open with us about
their Y2K programs. They have provided us with a great deal of
confidential business information about their systems and individual
components in these systems--information that they would not normally
provide even to one another, let alone to their airline customers. This
pledge of confidentiality has been respected throughout the project,
thereby adding to the trust and cooperation that has grown with this
initiative. IATA has not and will not publish any data, nor create any
``blacklists'' or travel advisories, which would compromise the pledge
of confidentiality we have given to all parties that have cooperated
with our requests for information.
We recognize the legitimate interest of national ATS authorities in
each country, on behalf of their publics, in receiving information
regarding neighboring states, particularly in the context of developing
regional contingency plans. Therefore, and with the consent of the ATS
provider organizations, we have been sharing with ICAO the information
we obtain on ATS providers since the Spring of 1999.
Contingency Planning: Over the past six months the breadth of the
IATA industry initiative has increased significantly from data
collection and updating to a number of new areas, one of the most
important of which is business continuity and contingency planning.
Contingency planning is something that the air transport industry
undertakes every day of every year. Since this is an industry for which
safety is the highest priority and which is committed to providing
dependable service to its passengers and shippers, airlines, airports
and ATS providers always have contingency plans covering almost every
conceivable scenario.
The existence of such plans provided this industry with a
significant advantage in preparing for the millennium transition.
Nonetheless, in every sector of the industry the existing plans have
had to be adapted to a Y2K environment to envision the possibility in
which multiple failures may occur and where the fallback for a failed
piece of equipment cannot be an identical make and model on ``hot
standby''.
In the air traffic services arena, regional contingency plans,
developed by sovereign states under the auspices of ICAO, have been
finalized. ICAO and IATA have worked together in the development and
adaptation of these plans in each of the major world regions. We are
now working with ICAO to ensure that these regional plans fit together
into a global network. Bilateral and multilateral letters of agreement
will enable these contingency plans to be implemented, even across
national boundaries, quickly and seamlessly from a pilot's perspective.
To enable our participating airlines to remain informed about the
development of the contingency plans, we have recently made available
to them a contingency planning database which gives details on the
ICAO-approved plans in each region.
IATA is also working with major international airports around the
world to ensure that they, too, are reviewing their existing
contingency plans and adapting them to a Y2K scenario. It is important
that this work be done in close coordination with the airlines serving
an airport and with other key industry suppliers, such as those
providing telecommunications, electrical power, aviation fuel and so
forth. This ``Airports-Airlines Liaison Program,'' developed jointly by
IATA and ACI, seeks to ensure that airports have the necessary business
continuity plans in place, that they have been tailored to a Y2K
environment in which multiple failures have been envisaged and planned
for, and that these plans have been coordinated with the airlines
serving the airport. A business continuity-guidelines booklet has been
developed and distributed globally, both by IATA and by ACI.
Rollover Coordination: During the actual transition period December
31, 1999-January 1, 2000, ICAO and IATA personnel will be jointly
manning a network of ``Regional Coordination Units'' in every part of
the world. These centers, located in Bangkok, Brussels, Cairo, Dakar,
Nairobi, Lima and Miami, will track developments across the globe as
each time zone flips over from December 31, 1999, to January 1, 2000.
ICAO's role in these regional centers will be to ensure an efficient
flow of aviation-related information through official channels, from
individual nations to ICAO and then out to all countries. IATA's role,
in parallel with that of ICAO, will be to ensure that airlines, many of
which will have aircraft in the skies at the time, will have access to
this information as soon as possible. ICAO and IATA will each be
manning their own ``Global Coordination Units'' in Montreal. These
global centers will not only coordinate the work of the regional
centers but will also maintain links with other global command centers,
including one in Herndon, Virginia, that will be manned by the FAA, by
our colleagues at the Air Transport Association (ATA) and by IATA.
Other links will be established with the major aviation manufacturers,
providers of services such as telecommunications, and the International
Y2K Coordination Center.
What we are Finding
Based upon the data available to us, we are generally satisfied
with the progress we are seeing amongst all sectors of the air
transport industry. With regards to ATS providers, there has been a
remarkable effort and progress in all regions of the world toward Y2K
readiness. As part of the ongoing tracking of progress, IATA will
continue to pay particular attention to the steadily declining number
of ATS providers who have yet to complete their programs to ensure
there are no significant operational concerns during the rollover.
Similarly, approximately 70% of the airports that have provided us
with information report that Y2K readiness work has been completed on
over 60% of all systems. Indeed, 326 airports have already reported
that they have completed work on 100% of all systems, and other
airports are waiting until they have completed their work to report
their status. IATA will continue updating this database until the end
of 1999.
IATA has a high level of confidence that the data we are collecting
and updating is comprehensive. For example, in addition to the reports
we receive from individual governments on air traffic services, we have
also obtained information from the ATS providers themselves, from the
manufacturers and suppliers of ATS equipment and from more than 140
individual site visits we ourselves conducted. We are constantly cross-
checking our facts and our sources to ensure that our information is as
accurate, complete and current as possible.
Conclusions
In summary, IATA is confident that the international civil aviation
industry has solutions to this challenge well in hand. This confidence
is based on the good progress we are seeing amongst our industry
partners, on the existence of robust contingency plans--many of which
get implemented successfully on a regular basis--and on the real-time
tracking of developments that will take place during the rollover
period. Nonetheless, we are not complacent. We know many organizations
have not yet completed their Y2K preparations, and we will continue to
monitor their progress through the end of the year.
IATA is also confident that sufficient airspace capacity will be
available under the ICAO ATS contingency plans for airlines to meet the
projected levels of traffic during the rollover period. Airlines that
choose to do so will be able to operate their normal year-end
schedules.
Notwithstanding all efforts by airlines, airports and ATS
providers, it would be unwise to predict a flawless transition into the
next millennium. There may be some slight delays, cancellations or
other disruptions. We hope and expect that these inconveniences will
not be significantly greater during the initial stages of the new
millennium than they are on any other winter weekend in the Northern
hemisphere. In the days that follow the rollover, as airlines begin to
ramp up their schedules, congestion and delays could increase if these
contingency plans are still in effect. IATA will therefore be pressing
for an early return to normal operations as soon as we are confident
this can be achieved without any compromise to safety.
It is important to emphasize that these are inconveniences. We are
very confident that with the progress being made by the air transport
industry and the contingency plans that will be in place should
anything unforeseen arise there will be no compromise on safety. As the
head of one European air traffic service provider was quoted as saying
recently, ``If anyone has real concerns about the Year 2000, tell them
to book a flight. The one place I know they will be safe is on an
airplane.''
A role for the United States Congress
IATA would like to take this opportunity to recognize the
outstanding Y2K work performed by the Federal Aviation Administration.
Above and beyond the excellent work FAA has carried out with its own
Y2K program, Administrator Garvey and her team, including Ray Long,
Mary Powers-King, Joe Morgan and Craig Lindsay, should be congratulated
for the leadership they have demonstrated in the global arena. We are
deeply grateful for the unwavering support they have provided to the
industry worldwide on Y2K.
IATA would also like to salute the work of our colleagues at the
Air Transport Association (ATA) here in Washington. The very high level
of Y2K readiness on the part of the air transport industry in this
country is to a great extent the result of the leadership ATA has
demonstrated through its Aviation Millennium Project. Both the ATA and
the FAA deserve to be recognized by this Committee for their highly
successful Y2K initiatives.
Finally, IATA also wants to commend this Committee for its
leadership in obtaining Congressional passage earlier this year of the
so-called ``safe-harbor'' legislation, which provides limited liability
protection for companies that voluntarily disclose the work they are
undertaking to prepare for the millennium change. This legislation
serves as a model for other national legislatures, a model that we have
cited repeatedly over the past months. While a handful of countries,
such as Australia, have passed similar legislation, their number is all
too few. We would ask that members of the U.S. Congress use their
contacts with legislators from other countries, through the North
Atlantic Assembly for example, to encourage their assemblies to enact
similar legislation.
We appreciate the opportunity to appear here today to discuss one
of the largest challenges ever faced by civil aviation, and we thank
you for your continued interest in the problems faced by those who fly
planes around the world and in the welfare of those who are flown.
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