[Senate Hearing 106-]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
EAST ASIA IN 2000: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN THE YEAR OF THE DRAGON
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 22, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
64-691 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming, Chairman
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Roth, Hon. Stanley O., Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State................. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Thomas, Hon. Craig, U.S. Senator from Wyoming, opening statement. 2
(iii)
EAST ASIA IN 2000: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN THE YEAR OF THE DRAGON
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asian
and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Craig Thomas,
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Thomas and Kerry.
Senator Thomas. I think we will go ahead and begin. They
are still having conference meetings. We will be on the floor
soon, so hopefully we will be joined by other members, but in
any event I thank all of you for being here. The Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs meets to examine U.S. foreign
policy priorities and challenges likely to emerge in East Asia
during the coming year.
We had a joint hearing recently with our counterparts in
the House. However, this is the first subcommittee meeting of
the second session, and I believe a fitting topic. We want to
talk about where we think we are going and what looks to be
ahead of us this year, as we enter into a new time. For those
of you familiar with the lunar calendar, of course, the year
2000 is a dragon year.
I became chairman of this subcommittee about--well, 5 years
ago, and pundits then were noting the significance, what many
people were predicting is not to be just the 21st century, but
also an Asian century, beginning under the sign of the dragon,
the symbol of Asia.
The regional surge, of course, in East Asia, also economic
as well as political, the economy, tigers of China and Japan
and South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, Hong Kong, growing by
leaps and bounds at that time, and everyone covered them
routinely, suggesting that Japan was going to replace us
shortly, was buying up Hawaii and California, and the economy
in China was pushing 12 percent growth rate, a population that
topped 2.3 billion and so on. Hong Kong and Singapore were
vying with one another for the nerve centers of the region, and
so it really was a very positive thing, one that was really
growing, even the nations like Vietnam and China, Communist
nations, were looking a little bit at democratic reform.
Today, the picture is a bit different. The economic crisis
of 1997, of course, had something to do with bursting the
bubble there. The economies were having troublesome times.
Political stability was threatened from time to time. Indonesia
and Japan continued to hobble along some. ASEAN has lost some
of its momentum. China's growth has slowed, leadership I think
fearful that its initial flirtations with reform would weaken
the party's control over the country, and had cracked down on
some of its minority groups and so on.
So given these, it would seem that the Asian century may be
off to a little slower start, a little more shaky start than it
appeared several years ago. This is, of course, not to minimize
the role of Asia in this century, and so we are going to take a
look at that today, and I feel like it still will be one of the
most important regions of the world. Clearly, China, and by
extension Taiwan, will be talking about WTO and the normal
trade relations.
We will be discussing the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act,
which concerns me some. We are also looking, of course, at
continuous crackdowns in China.
So there are a lot of things to look at, and that is really
what we wanted to do, Mr. Secretary, and I am so pleased you
are here. We certainly have the newly independent East Timor,
which is some concern, and about its ability to fend for
itself. North Korean nuclear questions are still out there,
even though the Perry report still remains unsettled, so we
have issues in a number of places. At any rate, that is our
chore, that is our job, that is what we are here for, so we
appreciate very much your coming to be with us. Please share
with us your views of where we are and where we need to go, and
hopefully we will have some time for some questions when we
finish.
So thank you, Mr. Secretary. Glad to have you here again.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thomas follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator Craig Thomas
Good morning. Today the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs meets to examine U.S. foreign policy priorities and challenges
likely to emerge in East Asia in the coming year. Although we had a
joint hearing with our House counterparts two weeks ago, this is the
Subcommittee's first hearing of the Second Session of the 106th
Congress and is, I believe, a fitting topic for us to begin with. I
will keep my opening brief, so that we can get to our witness this
morning; we have a lot of ground to cover.
For those of you familiar with the lunar calendar, the year 2000 is
a dragon year. In fact, it is a double dragon year--a rare intersection
of the Chinese zodiac with the duodecimal cycle that happens only once
every sixty years. When I became Chairman of this Subcommittee almost 6
years ago, pundits were noting the significance of what many people
were predicting would be not just the 21st Century, but also the
``Asian Century,'' beginning under the sign of the dragon--the symbol
of Asia.
The regional surge in East Asia was both economic and political.
Asia's economies, the Asian Tigers--China, Japan, South Korea,
Indonesia, Singapore, Hong Kong--were growing by leaps and bounds.
Magazine covers routinely predicted the demise of America's economic
preeminence. Japan was going to replace us shortly, and was buying up
Hawaii and California. China's economy was pushing a 12% per year
growth rate, its population topped 2.3 billion, and it began expanding
its military. Hong Kong and Singapore vied with each other to be the
financial nerve centers of the region. Countries began asserting their
own geopolitical interests--a phenomenon best illustrated by the
growing importance of ASEAN in settling regional disputes. And even in
communist nations like Vietnam and China, economic growth began to spur
the first stirring of democratic reform.
But today, as we begin that ``Asian Century,'' the picture is much
different. The economic crisis of 1997 burst the Asian bubble.
Economies began to collapse, and political stability was threatened.
Rather than being surpassed, we found ourselves saving our former
competitors. Economies were gutted; Indonesia's and Japan's still
continue to hobble along. ASEAN has lost its forward momentum. In
China, growth has slowed and the leadership, fearful that its initial
flirtations with reform would weaken the party's control over the
country, has cracked down hard on any perceived threats to its
monolithic stability--most notably on the Falun Gong movement.
Given these developments, it would seem that the ``Asian Century''
is off to a bad start. That is not to minimize the importance Asia will
play in this century. I still firmly believe that, as a region, its
importance both politically and economically will continue to grow; it
may just be that it doesn't happen as fast, or as inexorably, as some
originally thought. As Chairman, I feel that this year, as in the next
decades, we will have to face a majority of our foreign relations and
economics challenges in this particular region of the world.
Chief among these clearly will be China, and by extension Taiwan.
This year we have China's accession to the WTO and China PNTR, both of
which I support, and the dubious Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which
I oppose, on our plate. We also have a Chinese government that is
increasingly cracking down on elements such as ethnic minorities, pro-
democracy advocates, and religious groups.
But China is not the only area of concern. There is a nascent
democratic government in Jakarta which is still somewhat unstable due
both to the country's economic woes and an increasingly restive
military. Nearby, we have a newly-independent East Timor which is still
incapable of fending for itself. The North Korean nuclear question,
even in the aftermath of the Perry report, still remains unsettled. And
there are issues in the Philippines, Cambodia, Japan, and even Mongolia
that will continue to require our attention.
I don't want to go into too much detail; that's what Secretary Roth
is here for today and I am anxious to hear from him. Suffice it to say
that it will be a busy year for both Congress and the Administration.
STATEMENT OF HON. STANLEY O. ROTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Roth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to be back.
Let me begin by thanking the subcommittee for holding such a
broadbased hearing. The overwhelming number of hearings that I
do are country-specific, or problem-specific, and it does not
give the administration an opportunity to try to lay out a more
comprehensive view of what is going on in the region and what
the policy is. Early in the new year it is particularly helpful
to have a session that starts out with the big picture and then
continues on to specific issues of concern.
In my testimony, which is rather longer than usual, I have
tried to cover a number of issues, and even so there are many
countries you will find that are not even mentioned at all. I
hope you will not consider it in any way a slight if a country
is not mentioned, and feel free to ask questions on anything
that is on your mind.
Interestingly, I start out my testimony on a slightly more
optimistic note than your opening statement. My starting point
was not where Asian Pacific region was 5 years ago, or even 3
years ago, but I compare it to the last 2 years, and it strikes
me that one of the major events now that is different from when
I testified a year ago has been the dramatic economic recovery
in Asia. There is a great deal of optimism in the region that
you simply did not see a year ago. We have had growth rates of
almost 10 percent in Korea, compared to a very negative growth
the year before, a growth rate of 5 percent in Thailand, growth
in almost all of the region.
When you go back and read what people were talking about 2
years ago and a year ago, when people were talking about lost
generations, about needing a decade to recover, talking about
the social consequences, and the risk of political instability,
Asia has done remarkably well.
Now, this is not really to differ with you and your facts,
but really to suggest a different perspective. Yes, Asia is
different than it was before the financial crisis. Clearly,
there is more unemployment. There have been more economic
losers than winners in these individual countries.
There is still the possibility that their recovery may not
be as sustained as we would like, and certainly we are not
seeing the kind of pervasive double digit growth rates that
have characterized so much of the nineties. I am not arguing
that Asia is back in the identical sense, but I am arguing that
probably the single biggest change in the region over the last
12 months has been the economic recovery.
Another change, and I will not dwell on it unless you want
to talk about it in the question period, is a rebirth of
interest in regional institutions. You may recall last year
there was a lot of talk about ASEAN being dead, about APEC
being moribund and, not surprisingly, when countries were
preoccupied with their economic survival there was less focus
on the regional institutions.
But as the countries are coming out of their economic
difficulties, you are seeing a lot more interest once again in
these regional institutions and particularly ASEAN, also a
rather vibrant meeting in Manila, the so-called 10 plus 3
meeting last fall, at which there was quite a bit of discussion
about regional architecture and regional problems. They got the
leaders of China, Korea, and Japan to come to the meeting. So
you are seeing a rebirth of Asia thinking of itself as a region
again, and ASEAN regaining some of its confidence. So again the
wheel is turning, and the mood is quite different from a year
ago.
Having said that, what I would like to do is start my tour
of the region with the alliances that we have. Too often we
start with some of the problems, but I would like to start with
some of our strengths, and let me begin with Japan. It is
particularly appropriate, since Foreign Minister Kono was just
in Washington over the weekend and had a series of meetings,
including with the Secretary of the State, the President's
national security advisory, and U.S. Trade Representative.
We covered a wide range of issues, and my basic message
here today is that the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is in
excellent shape. On the security side we have made progress, as
you know, on the defense guidelines. We have made progress on
joint research on TMD. We have the possibility of progress on
Okinawa base issues. There is a new Governor on Okinawa, which
has helped to free up the political atmosphere in a way where
it is now possible to try to come to closure on relocating the
Futenma Base. And of course, we have the G-8 summit meeting
coming up over the summer, which is a real opportunity for
Japan to focus its attention on Asian issues.
On the foreign policy side of the ledger, cooperation is
strong as well. We have worked very closely with Japan, for
example, both on Indonesia and on East Timor. Japan has been
the largest donor in East Timor, and one of the largest donors
to the Indonesian election campaign, generally supporting the
same goals as the United States in both places.
Japan, of course, was a major contributor to Asia,
particularly Southeast Asia, throughout the financial crisis.
Outside the region it has been very helpful on some of our
issues such as Kosovo and the Middle East peace process in
terms of its financial contribution. So we have strong
cooperation on the security side of the ledger and on the
foreign policy side of the ledger.
Now, I am not suggesting we have no issues. That would be
ridiculous. Clearly, we do. Obviously, one of the key issues
this year will be renegotiating the agreement that provides the
host nation support, which is one of the key components of how
Japan supports our continued forward deployment of troops in
their country. It amounts to roughly $4\1/2\ billion a year.
This agreement needs to be renegotiated this year, and
obviously we are interested in maintaining this very robust
level of support. It has been crucial--and you would certainly
know this better than I--to maintaining support for the forward
deployment of troops in Asia in the Congress that the Japanese
contribution has been so generous. This is really a strategic
issue and not an accounting issue.
On the economic side of the house, you are familiar with
the difficulties of the Japanese economy. Despite huge fiscal
stimulus programs, domestic demand remains weak, and the
economy has had several difficult quarters. This was certainly
a major contributing factor to our record bilateral trade
deficit in 1999, because Japanese demand for our exports
remained depressed even though our burgeoning economy was
having the opposite effect. We continue to urge Japan to use
all tools for domestic-led growth, including fiscal and
monetary policy, deregulation and restructuring, and more
openness to foreign direct investment.
Particular sectors we are concerned about include prospects
for telecommunications liberalization. We are concerned about
cutting telecom interconnection rates. We want to increase
competition in the marketplace.
Let me turn briefly to Korea. This is a major year, marking
the 50th anniversary of the duration of the Korean war. Our
ties are probably in the best shape they have been in recent
memory. I have already mentioned the economic recovery. In
terms of our policy with respect to North Korea, there is great
cooperation between the ROK and the United States as well as
Japan.
You are probably familiar with this horrible acronym, TCOG,
which describes the trilateral process by which the United
States, Japan, and Korea cooperate in formulating policy toward
North Korea. It is a direct outgrowth of the Perry process, and
one of the successes. When you recall where we were roughly a
year ago, when we had concerns about the suspect site, when we
had concerns about the possibility of another North Korean
missile test, when we had concerns about the unity of policy
between the three allies, I we have made a whole great deal of
progress throughout the last year.
Now, obviously, the point you made in your opening
statement is correct. The fact that we have made this progress
does not mean it is immutable, and does not mean the problem is
fully solved. It is not. We are still awaiting the high-level
visit from appropriate North Korean officials to the U.S. We
would like to make progress in the course of that visit on
codifying the moratorium that we now have on the long-range
missile test. We would like to get serious negotiations resumed
both on missiles and on weapons of mass destruction.
So there is a lot of work left, and I do not mean to
minimize it, but again, when you look at it from a short term
perspective I think there has been significant progress over
the past year. We remain supportive of South Korean policy,
which is engagement with North Korea, and we think that this
policy under Kim Dae Jung's leadership has opened up prospects
for more creative diplomacy. We will see if we are able to
collect the fruits of that policy this year.
In my statement, I then go through some of our other
alliance relationships. Mr. Chairman, I do not think we should
just focus on Japan and Korea when we talk about allies, and so
I reviewed the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand. In the
interest of time I suggest I will skip over it orally, but we
can come back to it in the question period, as I think I want
to make some comments moving past our alliances to other
countries, starting with China.
Obviously, 1999 was a difficult year in U.S.-China
relations. I will not take up the committee's time with
detailed explanations about what you already know about the WTO
process, Zhu Rongji's visit, and the accidental bombing of the
embassy. I think you are fully aware of where we are now, that
we have reached the agreement on payments with the People's
Republic of China, subject to congressional appropriations, but
that, I think, is helping us to put that issue behind us. We
have now reached a bilateral agreement on WTO accession, and
the President has publicly enunciated on many different
occasions his commitment to secure permanent normal trade
relations this year.
Obviously, the next step is to see if China completes its
other bilateral agreements during negotiations resuming with
Europe, which will be critical. I cannot give you an exact
timetable, much as I would like to, of when this issue will be
ready for congressional consideration, but we are determined to
deal with it as early in the year as possible.
Too many people, in thinking about the China relationship,
will focus on the negative side. There have been a lot of dire
predictions about the prospects for the relationship in an
election year. I would like to think that we do have
opportunities, building on the WTO agreement, building on the
agreement on the embassy bombing payments, to move the
relationship forward, and there have been some encouraging
signs in that regard.
The fact that there has been a resumption of the military-
to-military dialog, with them sending a high-level official
here, is significant, although I would not want to overstate
the specific accomplishments. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott
just led a high-powered delegation to China to engage in a
wide-ranging strategic dialog on a number of subjects, and they
felt that they had good talks on a wide range of issues.
Not that we closed our differences on everything, but we
made progress, so I think it is possible, despite the coming
election, and despite the seriousness of the issues, for us to
work together with China on some issues this year to try to
keep the relationship on a stable footing. Obviously, our
ability to secure congressional approval for PNTR will be
critical to that effort.
I also should make clear I am not trying to minimize in any
way the significant problems that remain in the U.S.-China
relationship. For example, just to take the issue of human
rights, we obviously have major differences with China. We
believe that the situation went backward over the last 12
months, and there has been a deterioration in the human rights
situation, whether it was the crackdown on Falun Gong, the
handling of political dissidents, the failure to ratify either
of the two covenants that have been signed.
It was not a good year for progress, and for that reason
the administration has announced very early its decision to
cosponsor a resolution in Geneva at the Human Rights Commission
meeting. It is not that we seek a confrontation with China for
the sake of confrontation, but we feel it important that we
speak our mind and call it as we see it on these human rights
issues, even as we are trying to make progress in other arenas.
At this point, Mr. Chairman, in my written statement I turn
to a brief discussion of Taiwan issues. Since my testimony was
put to bed prior to the release of the white paper that came
out yesterday, there is no reference to it in my testimony
itself. I think that may be of the greatest interest, so why
don't I just offer a few comments now on that subject.
Clearly, the PRC white paper statement, particularly the
aspect stating that an indefinite delay in cross-strait
negotiations would be a reason to use force, is a source of
concern to us. We are in the process of expressing this concern
to China, both here through their Embassy and in Beijing
through our Embassy.
The threat of the use of force to resolve the Taiwan
question is contrary to the commitments contained in the
communiques that are the bedrock of U.S. policy, and to
developed longstanding positions that issues between the two
sides should be resolved peacefully. We have a clear and
longstanding position on cross-strait relations, including our
insistence on peaceful resolution of differences between the
PRC and Taiwan. We support cross-strait dialog as the best way
to resolve those differences, and we will continue to adhere to
our one-China policy.
We urge the PRC, as well as Taiwan, to refrain from actions
or statements that increase tensions or make dialog more
difficult to achieve, and to take steps that foster dialog,
reduce tension, and promote mutual understanding. Of course,
the U.S. has consistently stated that it is up to the PRC and
Taiwan to determine what constitutes a basis for dialog, but
again, the key point in U.S. policy is that we have an abiding
interest in the peaceful resolution of differences between the
PRC and Taiwan.
Obviously, I would be willing to come back to this in the
question and answer period.
Finally, in my statement I had a long section on Indonesia
in which I talk about the priority which we are according to
Indonesia as one of the Secretary's four democratic countries
we are focusing on this year. Over the past year much of the
attention was, of course, on East Timor. I will not dwell on
that, since we did hold a separate hearing on that about a week
ago.
But on Indonesia itself I want to emphasize just how much
attention and support the administration is putting into this
account, ranging from what you might call public diplomacy, or
open support for the regime, inviting President Wahid early in
his administration to the White House. We have already had two
Cabinet members out to visit Indonesia, as well as numerous
mid-level officials.
We have increased U.S. aid levels, although they are still
relatively modest compared to the needs. We have been
supporting the IMF and the World Bank, each of which has
resumed disbursements. We have sent out an interagency
assessment team, which is designed to look at our aid programs
and see if they need to be reshaped, restructured, or enlarged
to better deal with Indonesia's many problems, and we are
trying a different concept.
With the relatively modest resources available to us in the
foreign aid budget, we are not going to be doing large-scale
development projects. Instead, the Secretary is trying to focus
on institution-building, strengthening various institutions in
Indonesia where we have a lot of expertise. Whether it is
press, the parliament, the local parliament, or civil society,
we are trying to see how we can strengthen institutions, and
that is where we are going to funnel our resources, rather than
into the traditional kind of large-scale development projects.
That will be much more the purview of the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, and the other multilaterals.
In my statement I list a lot of the positive developments
that have taken place thus far under the new Government. I will
not review them here, but the point I want to make is, there
should not be any expectation, and there certainly never was an
expectation by the administration, that the new Government, no
matter how legitimate, was going to be able to solve all of
Indonesia's formidable problems in the first 100 days.
Many of these problems were created under the 30-plus years
of the Suharto regime, and whether it is reviving the economy,
changing the balance of power between Java and the other
islands, or resolving the very tough regional issues, like
Aceh, whether it is finishing the refugee business in West
Timor, gaining control over the military, and the issue of
civilian supremacy, there is an enormous amount of work
remaining to be done in Indonesia. Our point is, we are in it
for the long haul. This is going to be a very important
country, with a lot of problems and a lot of issues for us for
the foreseeable future.
Why don't I stop at that point, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Stanley O. Roth
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before your
subcommittee this afternoon, and thank you particularly for choosing to
begin the legislative year with an overview of developments in the
region. I hope this hearing will establish a broad framework as we deal
with particular issues across the region in the coming year.
At this time last year, an overview of the region would have been
cast in tones of measured pessimism. The continuing effects of the
financial crisis seemed to offer the inevitable prospect of a long and
difficult recovery. Talk of a coming Pacific century seemed to be an
inconvenient relic of another time. Instead, regional leaders were pre-
occupied with the consequences of economic crisis and the potential for
political instability. Some spoke darkly of a lost generation. But that
pessimism has largely disappeared in the wake of the surprising
economic recovery in most of the region. So I thought it would be
appropriate, Mr. Chairman, to begin my testimony with some comment
about the regional economy. After that I will briefly review some
salient developments in countries of particular importance to U.S.
interests in the region.
economic recovery
This past year has seen a remarkable recovery from the Asian
financial crisis. It was, by any measure, the major regional
development of the past year. Two of the countries worst hit by the
crisis--Thailand and the Republic of Korea--posted robust GDP growth
figures of five and ten percent respectively. Other countries,
including China and the Philippines, also ended the year with higher
GDP growth than had been predicted at the beginning of the year.
Inflation was reduced substantially across the region. With returning
growth came renewed optimism.
To be sure, we are not back to pre-crisis economic levels. Clearly
there are challenges remaining. The financial crisis was a harsh
reminder that economies must be transparent and financial institutions
must lend responsibly. Market discipline and the rule of law must be
strengthened to curb the corruption and cronyism that were responsible,
at least in part, for the economic suffering of the recent past. Some
Asian leaders and economists have ruefully suggested that the recovery
may have come too soon, that in some countries the recovery may
dissipate the motivation to make reforms that are still required to
ensure the long-term health of the economy.
In addition, workers in a number of countries have yet to regain
the standard of living they had enjoyed during the previous boom times.
Even in Korea, the fastest recovering economy, unemployment is still
higher than it was before the crisis. Where workers have secured new
jobs, many are earning less than they did before, while prices have
risen. The social safety nets, which were so clearly and painfully
absent during the financial crisis, have yet to be put in place in a
number of countries.
Finally, it should be recognized that there are two wild cards,
which could slow or even derail the regional recovery. If U.S. economic
growth should falter or Japan's economy take a severe downturn, this
could significantly reduce markets and investment sources important to
regional recovery.
the revival of regional institutions
When they faced economic difficulties, countries in the region
quite understandably turned inwards. As their economies have revived,
there has been an equally understandable renewal of interest in
regional institutions, such as APEC and ASEAN. To cite just one
example, the ASEAN summit in Manila last November was the occasion for
a successful ``ten plus three'' meeting between ASEAN, China, Japan and
Korea which offered an opportunity for an unstructured dialogue on both
economic and security issues which concern both Northeast and Southeast
Asian nations.
alliance partnerships
With that, let me turn to some of the specific countries and
bilateral relationships that I know are of interest to the Committee.
Let me begin with the alliance partnerships, which have been the firm
bedrock of U.S. interests in the region since World War II. And, let me
offer an unequivocal assessment: our alliance partnerships have never
been stronger, have never been more important than they are today.
Japan
No relationship is more important to the stability of the Asian
Pacific region than the U.S.-Japan alliance. This statement has become
such a mantra that we sometimes skip past it, but we cannot afford to
do so for one simple reason: our security depends on it. Our bilateral
security relationship with Japan is as strong as it has ever been, and
our bases in Japan remain fundamental to our strategic presence in
Asia. Japan is host to 47,000 U.S. troops, second only to Germany, and
is home to the only carrier group home ported outside the United
States.
We have worked hard with the Obuchi government to strengthen the
U.S.-Japan security alliance. We agreed on revising the Defense
Guidelines to enable us to cooperate more effectively in response to a
regional crisis. We agreed to fund joint research on Theater Missile
Defense (TMD). With the 2000 G-8 Summit scheduled to take place next
July in Okinawa, the Obuchi government has also been working hard to
resolve U.S. basing issues on the island, particularly the relocation
of the Marine Airstation in Futenma. On November 22, Okinawa Governor
Inamine announced his support for relocating this base to a less
crowded site in northern Okinawa. On December 28 the Japanese cabinet
formally approved the Futenma relocation.
The U.S.-Japan cooperation on a range of foreign policy issues
remains a key aspect of our partnership. Japan has played a critical
role in KEDO. It has agreed to fund a significant portion of the costs
of the light water reactor, which KEDO will build at Yongbyon in North
Korea, and it has joined in cementing a firm resolute trilateral
approach with South Korea and the U.S. toward North Korea.
In Southeast Asia, Japan assisted both Thailand and Indonesia in
responding to the Asian Financial Crisis. Japan has also supported the
referendum process in East Timor and helped fund the redevelopment of
East Timor and its transition to nationhood. A Japanese official now
serves as the Deputy UNSYG Special Rep for the UN Transitional
Authority in East Timor under De Mello.
Outside the region, Japan has provided political and financial
backing for peace implementation and reconstruction efforts in Kosovo
and is a major supporter of the Middle East Peace Process. In short,
Japan's interests are global in scope, and as close allies, the U.S.
and Japan share many of the same goals and work together on a broad
range of issues.
Let me turn now to issues that we and Japan are working to resolve,
but let me underscore that these issues occur within the context of a
strong and vibrant relationship.
On the security side of the ledger, we must complete successfully
negotiations begun earlier this month at the working-level to renew the
five-year Special Measures Agreement, one of the two key components of
Japan's Host Nation Support (HNS) for our troops stationed in Japan.
Japan provides the most generous HNS of our allies, some $4.5
billion. This is not merely a financial contribution, but, as Amb.
Foley noted in an op ed in ``The Asahi Shimbun'' last week, it is
Japan's investment in its own security and in the stability of the
region in which it lives and which is essential to its economic well-
being.
On the economic side, the health of the Japanese economy remains a
continuing concern both for the government of Japan and for its trade
and investment partners, including the United States. Despite
continuing fiscal stimulus efforts by the Obuchi government, domestic
demand remains weak, and Japan's economy continues to sputter. Japan's
economic malaise was an important factor in our record high bilateral
trade deficit in 1999, as Japanese demand for our exports remained
depressed, while our strong economy continued to absorb their imports.
We continue to urge Japan to use all tools for domestic demand-led
growth, including fiscal and monetary policy, deregulation and
restructuring, and more openness to foreign direct investment. We are
particularly concerned about prospects for telecommunications
liberalization, which would generate new jobs and business formation in
Japan and opportunities for U.S. firms; in high level negotiations, we
are asking Japan to cut telecom interconnection rates, to increase
competition in the marketplace.
The Republic of Korea
Later this year we will begin commemorating the fiftieth
anniversary of the Korean War. This anniversary finds our relationship
with the Republic of Korea closer than it has ever been. I discussed
earlier Korea's remarkable economic recovery. Here I would like to
focus on our continued and growing cooperation in managing the threat
posed by North Korea.
Dealing with the threat of North Korean nuclear and missile
proliferation is one of the greatest challenges we face in East Asia.
Thanks to the Agreed Framework and the Korean Energy Development
Organization (KEDO), the very dangerous nuclear facilities at Yongbyon
are frozen and under international inspections. South Korea and Japan
have both assumed the vast bulk of the cost of the light water reactor
(LWR) project. It is essential that the U.S. continue to fund our
contribution to KEDO for heavy fuel oil. Only then will this freeze
remain in place.
However, a year ago, we faced a new crisis: North Korea's launch of
a Taepodong missile over Japan in August 1998. Intelligence had also
indicated that North Korea might be developing an underground nuclear
site in violation of its Agreed Framework obligations. Amb. Chuck
Kartman engaged in intense negotiations with North Korea to gain access
to that suspect site to deal with our concerns. As you know, our
determined pursuit of our concerns regarding the underground site
resulted in access to it last year, and confirmation that it did not
contain a reactor or nuclear processing facility, nor was it suitable
to house either one. We will return to the site again this year.
Over the past year, we undertook a fundamental review of our policy
towards the DPRK. Thanks to the leadership of former Defense Secretary
Bill Perry and State Department Counselor Ambassador Wendy Sherman, we
have created a new framework for our approach to North Korea, built
upon the principle that the U.S. remains ready to markedly improve its
ties with the DPRK, but only as the DPRK deals with issues of concern
to the U.S., particularly in the missile and nuclear areas.
Significantly, as we pursued the policy initiatives recommended by
Dr. Perry, North Korea agreed to suspend long-range missile testing
while we carry on high-level talks to improve relations with Pyongyang.
We have also laid the groundwork for the visit to Washington by a high-
level DPRK official--a visit which we expect will fix the dates for
renewed talks aimed at eliminating the DPRK's long-range missile
program, and new talks aimed at dealing with our remaining concerns
about their nuclear weapons program.
At every step along the way, we are consulting closely with our ROK
allies, as well as with Japan, building a solid structure of greatly
enhanced allied coordination and cooperation. The new policy approach
we have developed is the product of that unprecedentedly close
coordination.
None of the progress we have made would have been possible without
the visionary leadership of President Kim Dae Jung. Taking office in
the midst of Korea's unprecedented economic crisis, he has not only led
Korea through the challenges of economic recovery and restructuring, he
has also undertaken a resolute engagement policy designed to expand
contacts with the DPRK and seek reconciliation with Pyongyang.
U.S. policy strongly supports and complements ROK efforts to engage
North Korea in a process that holds the hope of reducing tensions,
defusing distrust and misunderstanding, promoting dialogue, and
enhancing stability on this troubled peninsula. Ultimately, the
problems of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula must and should
be resolved by Koreans.
Pyongyang should be clear that we and our allies are serious in
desiring to engage positively and build new ties. But we and others who
seek better ties with the DPRK are under no illusions. Whether we are
able to make further progress on these issues will depend on the
North's willingness to engage seriously with us and to honor its
commitments, including its Agreed Framework obligations. We have
extended a hand of cooperation to Pyongyang. We trust the DPRK will
have the wisdom to grasp it.
The Philippines
Our security alliance with the Republic of the Philippines is among
our oldest in the Pacific, and 1999 saw a significant revitalization of
this relationship. On June 1, 1999, the Visiting Forces Agreement
between the Philippines and the United States entered into force. Due
in no small part to the strong support of Philippine President Estrada,
the VFA has made it possible for us to resume normal military-to-
military contacts, including numerous ship visits and exercises. Last
month, our two countries held the first large-scale joint exercise
since 1993, one which involved over 2,500 U.S. military personnel.
The Philippines has played an important part in the international
effort to assist in East Timor. It provided 750 troops for INTERFET.
Now, a Philippine general, Jaime Los Santos has taken command of the
military component of UNTAET.
The Philippine military requires significant modernization, yet
faces very real funding constraints. We have agreed to help assess the
Philippines' defense needs so that it can plan a cost-effective
acquisition and training program over the next several years. We have
already provided a number of excess defense articles, including coastal
patrol craft and trucks. For the last two years, we have allocated $1
million in FMF for the Philippines, and we are seeking an increase in
FMF to $2 million for FY 01. This will support the Philippines' need
for modern equipment as it expands its participation in peacekeeping
while providing for its external defense and internal security in the
face of an ongoing Communist insurgency.
Australia
Australian-American cooperation is so consistently strong that it
is hard for it to generate the kind of public attention it deserves.
Australia has been by our side in every battlefield from Korea to
Desert Storm. This past year, Australia demonstrated once again why it
is such a valuable partner and leader in the region. When violence
erupted in East Timor in September, Australia stepped forward to
organize and provide the bulk of the personnel for the multinational
force that was sent to East Timor under the authorization of the UN
Security Council.
By its actions, Australia provided a role model about how nations
can take the lead in responding to crises in their own region.
Expressions of support for Australia's initiative by you, Mr. Chairman,
and others in the Congress were much deserved and, I believe, much
appreciated.
Thailand
Thailand was the first country to be hit by the Asian Financial
Crisis, and the economic crisis led to a political crisis. One of the
strongest democracies in the region, the Thai responded by installing a
new government committed to making the tough economic choices necessary
to enable recovery. Over the past two years, the government of Chuan
Likphai has won international praise for its willingness to press
forward with the reforms necessary to ensure renewed growth and greater
prosperity for all Thai.
Prime Minister Chuan has also led his country into a more active
role on the international stage. We are pleased that Thai Deputy Prime
Minister Supachai will succeed Mike Moore as Director General of the
WTO in 2002. We have also welcomed Thailand's participation and
leadership in INTERFET for which it provided the deputy commander. We
are looking forward to Thailand hosting the ASEAN Regional Forum and
Post-Ministerial Conference Meetings this summer.
other countries in the region
China
To put it simply, U.S.-China relations went through difficult times
in 1999. Despite enormous efforts and high expectations on both sides,
it proved impossible to conclude a WTO bilateral agreement at the time
of Premier Zhu Rongji's visit last April. In May, U.S. planes
accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade; Chinese
demonstrators damaged a number of U.S. diplomatic facilities in China.
The combination of these two events led to increased bilateral tensions
and the suspension of much of our engagement efforts.
President Clinton's meeting with President Jiang in Auckland in
September turned the tide and provided the impetus for the conclusion
of the WTO bilateral on November 15. This was followed by our December
15 agreement on handling property issues connected with the bombing,
helping to close that regrettable chapter. On January 10 of this year,
President Clinton announced the Administration's determination to win
permanent normal trade relations for China, stating the obvious but
essential fact: ``Bringing China into the WTO is a win-win decision. It
will protect our prosperity, and it will promote the right kind of
change in China.'' We look forward to working with the Congress in
coming months to make that win-win a reality.
With bilateral relations on a positive course, we are working to
engage China in a number of areas of fundamental national interest to
the United States. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, led an
impressive group--including Under Secretary of Defense Slocombe, Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Ralston and Deputy
National Security Advisor Steinberg--to Beijing last week for a
strategic dialogue with senior Chinese officials. They discussed our
respective strategic views of the world, including regional issues such
as the Korean peninsula, Indonesia, and the strategic equation in South
Asia as well as our concerns over the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. While we should not have any illusions about our
differences on some of these subjects, I think it is worth remembering
that China believes its national interests, like our own, are best
served by a world where stability and security are the norm.
We are also carefully resuming our military-military contacts with
China, in a manner consistent with U.S. national interests. It is
important that our military leaders are able to clearly understand one
another, avoid potential problems from lack of communication and be in
a position to work together in areas where we have mutual interests,
such as avoiding incidents at sea.
Within this overall context, I should be clear that I am not in any
way trying to minimize the significant problems that remain. Clearly
there remain difficulties in our relationship with China. With regard
to human rights, for example, we have regularly and vigorously
expressed our concern with China's violation of internationally
recognized standards of human rights. On January 11, the Administration
announced that the United States would sponsor a resolution at the UN
Commission of Human Rights when it meets in Geneva in March. We took
this step because of the clear evidence that China's human rights
record has deteriorated seriously over the past year.
At this point, Mr. Chairman, let me offer a few points about Taiwan
and cross-strait relations. I want to underscore once more the three
principles that underlie the Administration's position on cross-strait
relations:
Our ``One China'' policy is unchanged;
We have an abiding interest that there be a peaceful
approach by both sides to resolving differences; and
We support dialogue as the best way for differences between
the two sides to be resolved.
With that, let me review briefly some other issues regarding
Taiwan. First, the Administration supports Taiwan's accession to the
WTO on its merits, and we hope both Taiwan and the PRC will accede this
year. Second, Taiwan is in the midst of an open democratic and
energetic campaign to select a successor for Li Teng-hui as president.
It is a fascinating and encouraging example of the democratic process
at work. All three candidates have expressed their support for stable
cross-strait relations. I hope that whoever wins--and, of course, the
PRC's leaders as well--will set a high priority on restoring a
meaningful cross-strait dialogue. Such a dialogue, more than any
military equipment, is the key to Taiwan's stability and security.
At the same time, there should be no doubt that the Administration
will continue its faithful implementation of the security, arms sales,
and other provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act. The efforts of some
to amend this successful framework for our unofficial relations with
Taiwan are not merely unnecessary, they actually weaken Taiwan's
security. That is why, Mr. Chairman, like you, the Administration is
strongly opposed to the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.
Indonesia
As you and I have discussed before, Mr. Chairman, Indonesia is a
country of considerable importance to U.S. interests in the Asia
Pacific region. The past twelve months have witnessed a successful
transition from an authoritarian regime toward a pluralistic,
representative democracy. Successful parliamentary elections in June
and the selection of President Abdurrahman Wahid in October enabled
Indonesia's first democratic government to take office since the 1950s.
The new government came into office with the broad-based legitimacy
necessary to begin to confront Indonesia's daunting economic and
political difficulties. No one ever expected that President Wahid or
his new government would be able to resolve all of Indonesia's problems
in the first 100 days, or even 1000 days.
With that caveat, the Government has made a promising start in a
number of areas:
President Wahid has successfully asserted civilian control
of the military. The suspension of General Wiranto from the
cabinet to await possible legal action for his role in East
Timor is only the most dramatic sign of this important
transformation.
Indonesia signed a memorandum of agreement for a new IMF
program with the IMF on January 20, 2000, leading to the
release of a new tranche of IMF funding, and coinciding with
renewed disbursements from the World Bank.
President Wahid freed virtually all the remaining political
prisoners from the Suharto era by December 1999, a total of 196
prisoners.
In Aceh, the government has initiated a complex negotiating
process with some of the many different factions demanding a
new political arrangement for that troubled province. While the
outcome of the process is uncertain, the government deserves
considerable credit for seeking to resolve these difficulties
through negotiation rather than repression.
In all of these areas, significant challenges remain ahead, but the
crucial first steps have been taken, and I am convinced that
Indonesia's prospects are positive.
The U.S. has a profound interest in seeing a successful democratic
transition in Indonesia--a fact reflected in the Secretary having
identified Indonesia as one of the world's four priority emerging
democracies. Nor is our commitment merely rhetoric. The President
welcomed President Wahid to the Oval Office shortly after he assumed
the Presidency. UN Ambassador Holbrooke and Secretary of the Treasury
Summers have both visited Indonesia since President Wahid took office.
In response to the urgency and importance of the need, U.S.
bilateral assistance to Indonesia is being increased to $125 million
for FY 2000. The bulk of this assistance will likely be used to help
strengthen Indonesia's nascent democratic institutions. We are awaiting
the recommendations of an inter-agency team that visited Indonesia in
January to gauge how this U.S. investment can most effectively
accomplish this and other goals. Helping the Indonesians build an
effective and just judicial system, promote civil society, spur
continued economic reform, and professionalize national and local
parliaments will be among our priority concerns.
Mr. Chairman, I recently had the honor to testify regarding East
Timor before this subcommittee in joint session with its HIRC
counterpart, so I will generally leave any concerns you might have on
that subject to question and answer. There is, however, one issue
affecting our future relations with Indonesia, which must be considered
in the context of Indonesia's actions in East Timor. That is the issue
of accountability for past atrocities. The President suspended U.S.
military-to-military relations with Indonesia last September because of
our concern over the actions of the Indonesian military in East Timor.
Subsequently, as you know, the provision of certain types of military
assistance was conditioned by the Leahy language contained in section
589 of the Foreign Operations Appropriation for FY 2000. Until these
conditions can be met, there will remain significant constraints on our
ability to have a full normal relationship with Indonesia.
concluding remarks
In the interest of time, I have not sought to comprehensively cover
all of the countries within my jurisdiction, including some that I know
are of interest to members of this Committee. I would be happy in the
question and answer period to redress this selective focus to encompass
all of the countries of the Asia Pacific region.
Senator Thomas. OK, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.
We have been joined by Senator Kerry. Do you have any
comment, Senator?
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Thank you
for holding this hearing. I know we had the joint hearing with
the House the other day, but this is this committee's first
effort to begin examining our policies in the region, East
Asian region in the year 2000, and I think it is important that
we do so on our own.
I was on a trip to the region in December, and I had gotten
to Myanmar and had a very interesting luncheon with Ang San
Suchee and some meetings with the junta there and proceeded to
Bangkok, having stopped in India for the World Economic Forum,
and regrettably the events of the fire in Worcester,
Massachusetts require that I cancel my trip and return, which I
regretted enormously, because I had an important meeting with
the prime minister on the tribunal and some meetings with
President Wahid and Senior Minister Lee Kwan Yu, who we will
receive here, I believe tomorrow, Mr. Chairman, and whom I look
forward to meeting with again.
So much of the purpose of my trip, which was also to visit
East Timor, and perhaps Aceh, and come back with a better sense
of things personally, had to be postponed, and I regret that. I
was hoping to be able to think about these issues in that
context.
I also had the privilege of being invited to speak before
the Woodrow Wilson Institute on China a couple of weeks ago,
and we had a massive snowstorm in the city, and so I did not do
that, and so it seems that my efforts to try to move forward
here are--Mother Nature has other notions.
Senator Thomas. We are delighted you are here today.
Senator Kerry. But let me just say a couple of things, if I
may, because we are gathered here in a very different context,
and I think it is refreshing that we are. The region we are
talking about has been through a huge amount of turmoil in the
last few years, financial, economic turmoil, and I think we
ought to feel pretty good about where we now find ourselves, by
and large, and there is one large caveat there, and I will
speak about it in a moment.
But the experience of Thailand and South Korea particularly
where they vigorously embraced the suggestions of the IMF, the
international community, where they undertook banking reforms,
where they put in place transparency, accountability, really
has resulted in a very significant turn-around markedly ahead
of those other countries that have resisted that, and I think
we are beginning to perhaps see some lessons coming out of that
that I hope other countries will note. Obviously, the story is
not fully written, but the strength of the recoupment, if you
will, and the general investor confidence that has returned to
those economic arenas is not insignificant.
Japan, on the other hand, I think many of us remain very
worried about, and I think in your statement, Mr. Secretary,
which I just read quickly, you reflect that. I mean, you are
very diplomatic about it, as you ought to be and need to be,
but the bottom line is, there are some real fundamentals of
deregulation, of market access, of some of the other kinds of
structural reforms that other countries have embraced which
Japan still resists, and which I think does not auger well for
the sort of longer-term transition that Japan faces, and I know
there are great tensions in Japanese society between
generations about their expectations and how they will approach
these issues.
So I think it bears watching, and we need to cooperate.
There is the summit there coming up, and there are many
opportunities for us to continue to do that, and I know you
share that belief.
In Indonesia, I think President Wahid's approach has
generally been salutary, and I think you appropriately point to
the positive measures that he has taken which, if there is
sufficient follow-through with respect to the accountability
for the military actions in Timor, as well as for the process
of holding the Suharto years accountable and so forth, I think
augers well, and I think we can hopefully hold some very
fragile threads together and perhaps even weave a stronger
cloth.
Let me speak to the one issue--I was going to talk at great
length, I said a couple of weeks ago, and I will be speaking
next month in New York at the Foreign Relations Council on the
subject of China, and I am not going to go into it all now, but
I was a little disappointed in your comment today. The white
paper comments are unacceptable. There is no other way to pout
it, and the United States has to be very clear in my judgment.
There is a clarity that to some degree has not always been
present in our relationship.
It is clumsy. Perhaps that is a charitable word, to suggest
that it is merely clumsy. We know the leaders of China, whom we
have great respect for in many ways, though we disagree with
them deeply in many ways, are usually more strategic, and I
think many of us were surprised by the bluntness and
inappropriateness of this particular challenge.
Now, if it is merely an effort to try to affect the
elections in Taiwan in a month, it is not a very shrewd way to
do that, and it carries with it far more profound dangers for
the longer-term interest of the United States and China and,
indeed, the globe, which expects more from our relationship
than this kind of saber-rattling. It is inappropriate in terms
of how it ties the use of force to negotiations, and the
negotiating process, and it is inappropriate with respect to
the expectations that it places on arms sales and on our rights
with respect to the Government of Taiwan that we have asserted
over a longer period of time.
I think you are correct, and I do not argue at all with
your reassertion of the one China policy, nor even with our
hope for negotiations, but where we disagree in the most
stringent, urgent sort of terms, it is very important for China
not to misinterpret where we are in any way whatsoever, not
just behind the scenes in diplomatic communication, but in
public, a clear and unconfused forum, and I think the
administration has to be absolutely clear and adamant about
this, lest it somehow escalate and, more importantly, lest it
give rise to forces in the U.S. Congress that could have a
profoundly negative impact on all the other things we want to
try to achieve in the course of these next months, which are
vitally important to our countries.
I would hope China's leaders would rethink and perhaps
rearticulate, as they sometimes do, what they mean in hopes of
clarifying for everyone concerned where this might take us,
because I think that it is a most inadvisable and unfortunate
statement, with potential serious implications to America's own
policies over the course of the next months.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Thomas. Let me followup on that a little bit.
First, let me say that I agree entirely. And I know it is
difficult, but I do think that we need to articulate more
clearly where we are in terms of our policy so that we
understand it and they understand it.
My question is, do you have any feel for what prompted the
timing of this so-called white paper? Would it have been the
election, do you think? Is it the efforts on the Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act? What is your notion as to the timing
here, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Roth. It is obviously difficult for me to speak on
behalf of the Chinese Government in terms of their exact
motives. Clearly there has been a lot of supposition that this
was related to the election. In fact, the most important point
is that we have seen a great increase in the number of
statements and the breadth of the statements on Taiwan for a
period of time now.
In other words, this is not, in and of itself, out of the
blue. There was a major speech by Vice Premier Qian Qichen on
Taiwan that attracted a lot of attention a couple of weeks ago.
Zhu Rongji met with a prominent group of American businessmen
around the Shanghai conference and had some significant things
to say. And I think what this is is the cumulative impact of
the enormous angst in China itself about the outcome of the
election, where they do not know who is going to emerge.
China obviously has a hard time with democracy, and they
are indicating their concerns that, whatever regime it is had
best stick to the one China policy and come back to the table
on the cross-strait dialog. I give you this analysis not by way
of agreeing with it, and please do not associate me with those
comments, but I'm just trying to answer your question as best I
can about what might be motivating them.
The important point from our side is we have been as clear
as we can be--and I am sorry I did not meet your standards,
Senator Kerry--on the absolute priority which we give to
peaceful resolution of the issue. Ultimately, we have said,
China needs to avoid provocative actions in the period leading
up to the election, and needs to avoid trying to interfere in
the election. We have called for restraint on both sides, and,
afterwards, for pragmatism on both sides, in order to get the
cross-strait process restarted.
What is very striking to me has been the moderate positions
on the cross-strait issue taken in the Taiwan election
campaign. We have seen remarkable statements. When the DPP
party comes out and the leader says, we will not declare
independence unless Taiwan is actually attacked, that is a
major change in policy and a very moderate step.
Last week the KMT candidate came out with a 10-point
proposal, including suggested confidence-building measures for
cross-strait relations. So we are at a moment where all three
candidates in Taiwan have been trying to emphasize pragmatic,
flexible positions that could get the two parties back to the
negotiating table. We believe that that is the aspect that
should be encouraged, and that Chinese policy should encourage
this rather than discourage this with the type of statements we
saw in the white paper yesterday.
Senator Thomas. Sometimes it is hard to detect whether or
not these statements that are being made are for outside
consumption or whether they are simply expressing the sort of
insecurity in terms of the leadership as some changes occur in
China, in terms of retaining control. How do you react to that?
Mr. Roth. My guess is that it is both. You cannot go to
China and talk to the senior leaders without seeing how
intensely important the Taiwan issue is. I would call it a
preoccupation with them, both in its own terms--meaning cross-
strait--and in terms of its relationship with the United
States. In both cases, it dominates the issues.
At the same time, I think they are looking at the impact
that it might have in Taiwan itself as they approach the March
18 election. So I do not think it is either/or.
Senator Thomas. Well, I hope we make our position clear. I
am sometimes a little confused by--even the President visited
last time--make it clear and then stay with that. It seems to
me that we ought not be excited about every statement that is
made.
On Indonesia, tell me what kind of success you think the
new President is having in terms of repositioning the military
into more of a civilian police role as opposed to as much
leadership as they have exercised in the past and control over
government.
Mr. Roth. There has been significant progress, but I do not
want to overstate it--meaning there is a long way to go. Let me
add some details on that. First of all, President Wahid has
started the process and had quite a bit of success in
demonstrating the principle of civilian supremacy. That is a
new concept in Indonesia, and not one that was built into their
political structure, where the military was really built into
the politics under the so-called dual function policy, and was
the key institution at least under Soeharto.
Now you have a position where, by his appointments, whether
it was of a civilian defense minister for the first time in
decades, whether it was the appointment of an admiral to be
commander of the armed forces rather than an army general, the
replacement of some key generals, including the Jakarta
command, including in the intelligence side, with his own
people, and of course the confrontation with General Wiranto,
which has led to his suspension, all I think is a pretty
impressive package, in a total of 4 months, in terms of
reasserting civilian supremacy.
And, interestingly, despite all the talk about coup
attempts, we never saw any evidence that the military was
actually contemplating it or that Wiranto was trying to
organize it. It was a feared outcome and one which we warned
about very forcefully, publicly as well as privately, but the
good news is they really did not seem to be planning it. So
even within the Indonesian military, there appears to be a
recognition that the Wahid Government has tremendous legitimacy
and that a coup is not the way to go if they have problems with
the government's policies.
So, in that sense, they are off to a good start. That does
not begin to deal with the whole dimension of your question,
however, which is, how do you restructure the Indonesian
military and the Indonesian police to get them out of politics,
to get them playing more professional military roles, and to
separate the police function from the military function?
They have started down that path, but are not finished, in
terms of separating the police from the military. And they need
to expedite that. We will be working to see if we can find ways
to help them with training the police, which is one of the
greatest problems they have in maintaining law and order.
Senator Thomas. Let me just ask this, and I know it is a
broad issue. You mentioned the Perry report. How would you
summarize the Perry report? What did the Secretary suggest that
we do, other than to continue to communicate?
Mr. Roth. The key point of Secretary Perry's initiative was
to suggest to the North Koreans when they address our serious
concerns, particularly relating to missiles and weapons of mass
destruction, than we are prepared to have a different
relationship with them, a relationship that was not
fundamentally adversarial, that was not committed to trying to
bring them down. Instead we are saying, we are prepared to
accept, as is the ROK, the existence of the DPRK as long as it
is addressing our concerns on the security side.
It is an effort to try to change the relationship
fundamentally away from the patterns of the past 50 years. We
are requiring them to address our hard core security concerns.
In that regard, we have made some initial progress,
particularly the testing moratorium, on long-range missiles. If
you think back to last summer, there was a lot of speculation
that there was going to be another missile test. That has not
taken place.
Ambassador Kartman was able to get the agreement in Berlin
that this would not happen. So there has been some initial
progress. It is not all rhetoric. But it is still in an early
stage and we need to try to move on it. That is why we are
seeking the high-level visit, which would be the reciprocal
visit by the North Koreans responding to Perry's earlier visit
to the DPRK. In that context, we would hope to make more
progress on these security issues that I just mentioned.
Senator Thomas. Senator Kerry, would you like to ask some
questions?
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me pick up a little bit on China. Mr. Secretary, I
certainly do not want to be in some kind or any kind of
contentious exchange with you. I am not trying to hold up some
sort of silly standard or something or take some senatorial
position here that somehow we have a different view of this.
My point is simply that if our response is merely--and it
is interpretive as much as anything perhaps--if our position
is, in response to something they do like this, to simply say,
well, we hope for a peaceful resolution, we have said that
100,000 times. I mean we have always said--that is our policy--
we hope for a peaceful resolution. So there is really no change
in tone, tenor or sort of substance of what we are saying. So
they come out raising the ante, at least in my judgment, and
other people's, and our response is the same: Oh, we hope for a
peaceful resolution.
Whereas what I think we should be saying is what I said in
my statement, a more clear calling to account for this
unilateral escalation. Now, some might argue that this is not
that much of a unilateral escalation. Last time it was
missiles; this time it is words. In 1996, they required us to
put two aircraft carriers into the region. And this time they
are firing a paragraph right before the election instead of
doing the missiles.
So I suppose someone could turn around and say, hey, it is
a change for the better. The problem is that, if you read the
paragraph, it says that if the Taiwan authorities refuse sine
die, and I suppose it is subject to interpretation when that in
fact is--the end of the final negotiations--and that could be
years from now, the peaceful settlement of cross-strait
reunification through negotiations, then they will be forced,
forced, to adopt all drastic measures, including use of force,
to fulfill the great cause of reunification.
I have heard private statements to that effect. I
personally, after discussions with former Secretaries of State
and others who have held your position, I have no doubt that if
Taiwan declared independence unilaterally, China would go to
war. I have no doubt of that. And I think the leaders should
know that some of us in the United States believe that indeed a
unilateral action by the Taiwanese would probably invite that
reaction.
That is one of the reasons why we bend over backward to try
to make certain that no Taiwanese leader could misinterpret our
interpretation of that potential or the Chinese interpretation
or what it might do in terms of our role in the region. And
that is obviously quite different, if they were to invite that,
from a sort of unilateral declaration by the Chinese, oh, we're
frustrated over the negotiations, to hell with all of you, we
are taking it.
And indeed, there, there is a different level of what our
response might be. And I agree with all of that. But I think we
have got to be, again I say, much more clear about their
responsibility for these kinds of words and these kinds of
unilateral departures from a lot of hard work that has tried to
bring the parties together at this point.
Now, let me ask you, with respect to the region and our
current relationship with Taiwan, does the administration at
this point have any list of quality or quantity of weapons that
we believe we ought to be selling to Taiwan that we are not
that might have an impact on their security, or do we believe
that the current status is sufficient to ensure Taiwan's self-
defense as specified in the Taiwan Relations Act?
Mr. Roth. As you probably know, there is an annual process
by which we review, with Taiwan, what their requirements are,
and make our decisions for each year about what we are prepared
to sell. It is not a static process. We never take the position
that simply the status quo is adequate.
We look at it in terms of, on the one hand, Chinese
military modernization, how their capabilities are changing on
one side of the strait; second, we look at what are the
defensive requirements on the Taiwan side, what is their
absorptive capacity, financial capacity. And we have a pretty
vigorous process which results, each year, in decisions on arms
sales, which, as you know, are always protested by the PRC.
But at no point have we ever suggested that we can simply
afford to freeze the arms sales given current developments
going on.
Senator Kerry. No, I am not asking about freezing. I
understand the fluidity of it. I am just asking about the
assessment, as we are here today in February 2000, what is the
assessment?
Mr. Roth. All I can say in general terms is we have not met
and decided as a government yet on what the specific arms sales
package is going to be this year. That is something that
happens later on in the session. But I believe that there are
requirements on Taiwan's side that need to be addressed. And
there will be recommendations and you will see additional
sales.
Senator Kerry. So are we currently considering sales of
additional type and/or quantity that would affect the balance
in our judgment?
Mr. Roth. I am not quite sure how to answer that question,
because each sale is, in and of itself, incremental. I do not
think that we are talking about anything which so dramatically
shifts it in one way or another. Your question seems to imply
some dramatic shift, and I do not think that is the case. We
are talking about a steady process.
If you would like, I can submit for the record a list of
the very significant arms sales over the 7 years of the Clinton
administration.
[The following information was provided subsequent to the
hearing:]
Major Systems Notified/Reported to Congress
FY 1993-2000 \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Listings are for notifications of Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
cases pursuant to Sec. 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and
for sales of Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under Sec. 524 of the
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2000, and previous.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993
C-13OH aircraft (12)
HARPOON anti-ship missiles (38)
Supply Support Arrangement (FMSO II)
Logistic Support Services for 40 leased T-38 Aircraft
Modified Air Defense System (MADS)
1994
MK-46 MOD 5 torpedoes (150)
MK-41 MOD (Short) Vertical Launch System
KNOX-class frigates (3) (lease to sale)
AN/ALQ-184 ECM pods (80)
MK-45 MOD 2 5"/54 gun system
Weapons, Ammunition, and Support for 3 leased Frigates
1995
PHALANX shipboard weapons system (MK-75 gun)
Supply Support Arrangement (FMSO II)
1996
Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment (communications)
M60A3TTS tanks (300)
TH-67 training helicopters (30)
STINGER missiles (465)
MK-46 MOD 5(A)S torpedoes (110)
STINGER-RMP missiles (AVENGER)
1997
HARPOON anti-ship missiles (54)
TOW 2 anti-tank missiles (1,786)
AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters (21)
OH-58D helicopters (13)
1998
PATHFINDER/SHARPSHOOTER navigation/targeting pods (26)
Dual mount STINGER missiles (61)
KNOX-class frigates (2) (sold)
MK-46 MOD 5(A)S torpedoes (131)
HARPOON anti-ship missiles (66)
Chaparral anti-aircraft missiles (50)
STANDARD SM-1 surface-to-air missiles (100)
Supply Support Arrangement (FMSO II)
Pilot training
1999
CH-47 SD Chinook helicopters (9)
AGM-114K3 HELLFIRE II missiles (240)
SINCGARS (5) radios with IEW systems (5)
E-2T Hawkeye 2000E aircraft (2)
LSD-38 ANCHORAGE-class landing ship (1)
Newport-Class Landing Ship Tank (2)
Supply Support Arrangment (FMSO II)
2000 (through May)
HAWK anti-aircraft missiles (162)
Radar modernization: TPS-43 to TPS-75
Senator Kerry. I understand that. I am just trying to
understand where we are going from here in the context of this
current standoff.
Mr. Roth. More of the same I would say, that we will
continue to try to----
Senator Kerry. With respect to China itself, Strobe Talbott
has just visited. I would assume some of the substance of his
conversation was, do not do anything to upset the apple cart.
Or in fact, he may have proffered ways in which we could be
more helpful in sort of working through the problems we have.
Specifically with respect to that, there has been an increase
in arrests, an increase in the crackdown on religious
activities. Those areas where you most have an ability to stir
emotions around the world and in the United States, they seem
to have been the least respectful of recent times.
Can you speak to that a little bit? Can you assess for the
committee what insecurities and/or, if they are not, what
judgments is the leadership of China making that in the face of
the difficulties we have on permanent status, on other issues--
you are familiar with them all--they would choose to act this
way? What is your judgment about that?
Mr. Roth. Again, without putting myself in the position of
speaking for the Chinese Government, I will try to offer an
explanation. It is not an endorsement of Chinese actions.
Clearly, some of the developments in China over the past year
have created a sense of threat to the leadership.
Obviously the appearance of 10,000 Falun Gong
demonstrators--or ``supporters'' is a better word--outside the
gates of the leadership compound greatly rattled the
leadership, particularly the fact that it was not predicted or
known about in advance. This led to a decision at the very
highest levels to pursue what we call a crackdown on Falun
Gong, despite enormous international criticism.
I must say it really is one of the more extraordinary
issues that I have worked on. When I went out to China in July,
the foreign minister, who does not always receive me, not only
received me but literally spent 30 minutes talking about Falun
Gong, trying to persuade me that it was a cult and a danger and
we would do the same thing.
When President Clinton met President Jiang in Auckland in
September, President Jiang spoke about Falun Gong at great
length and gave the President several books laying forth his
position. So this is clearly something that at the highest
level has struck a nerve and therefore led to this crackdown,
which, I should say again, I am by no means justifying. We
think it is completely unjustified and represents a suppression
of people trying to peacefully represent their views that pose
no security threat whatsoever to the regime and are not a
political movement.
In trying to answer you, again, I am not trying to justify
Chinese behavior. But when you look at the pattern, whether it
is the Falun Gong crackdown, actions taken against the
democracy activists, some of the steps on the house churches,
recent steps on Tibet, there is a general pattern of
retrenchment, of pulling inwards, and of consolidating control.
It seems to be internally driven, with that dominating over the
external aspects of the foreign policy costs.
Senator Kerry. I probably have some followup, but, Mr.
Chairman, my time is up.
Senator Thomas. Thank you.
Today's paper talks of a group called the Blue Team. And,
among other things, in the paper at least, it says that this
team of chronic, frustrated Hill aides says the lack of access
to raw intelligence about China many suspect the administration
holds back data that might put Chinese developments in a more
ominous light. How do you react to that?
Mr. Roth. They should read the Washington Times.
Really, I am kind of astonished by it. I think that there
has been an incredible amount of information out, both through
open sources and of course through leaks. For example, there
has been quite a bit of discussion of Chinese missile buildup.
I really do not think there has been any repression at all of
information.
Senator Thomas. Another from this says America's weakness
is the real danger. Again, how do you respond to that?
Mr. Roth. I am tempted to say that that is a better
question for Secretary Cohen, but the reality is, when you look
at the trends in the military budget and some of the things
that are being done to increase readiness, to improve O&M and
the like--all things out of my jurisdiction--I do not find that
an acceptable way of characterizing our policy. I also think
that we have a pretty good track record in terms of cross-
strait issues about our strength. It is not that long ago since
March 1996, and I think that act still speaks for itself. So I
do not accept that characterization of our own weakness.
Senator Thomas. What is the plan for the administration
with regard to normal trading relations? I presume that is an
element that is necessary if you want to move forward with WTO
or closer trade relationships.
Mr. Roth. The difficulty is in determining at what point to
present the legislation to the Congress. The desire has been to
get this done as early in the year as possible, as far away
from the election and the polemics as possible. But at the same
time there has been a very strong desire, for understandable
reasons, in the Congress to see the exact deal. They want to
see China concluding its negotiations with Europe and with
several others, and to see the protocols before voting on
something as significant as PNTR.
So there has been a bit of a race between a desire to get
the vote as early as possible and the desire to see the package
completed. The initial wisdom was that the Congress would
insist on waiting until all the t's have been crossed and all
the i's have been dotted. Now there is some consideration as to
whether there could be a conditional package. But that is being
debated at a higher level in the White House. I cannot give you
a specific plan yet. We are still in consultation with the
Congress.
Senator Thomas. I see. Malaysia, there seems to be signs
that the prime minister there is beginning to snuff out
political opposition by arresting opposition leaders, as was
the pattern before. How do you react to that? Do you think that
is a fact? And if so, what position do we take with respect to
that?
Mr. Roth. Well, it is clearly a fact, regrettably. If we
look at the arrests of people from the opposition party, not to
mention the treatment of Anwar Ibrahim, it is very clear that
there has been a policy now for over a year of crackdown on
people that could be labelled the opposition. And we have been
quite open as an administration in deploring this crackdown.
Each time we do, we get a complaint from the Malaysian foreign
minister or deputy prime minister, but I think that is a price
we are prepared to pay.
We regret the notion that commenting on the human rights
situation in Malaysia is interference in their internal
affairs, which is, of course, what they insist. This time the
real shock was the fact that most people, most Asians that I
have talked to about Malaysia, including many of their
colleagues in ASEAN, assumed that once the election was over,
once Prime Minister Mahatir had won reelection and his party
had done well, that that would be the occasion for lightening
up, for ending any further crackdown and possibly finding a way
out with respect to Anwar Ibrahim himself.
Instead, quite unexpectedly, there was an additional
crackdown, with more individuals arrested, and the pursuit of
further charges against Mr. Anwar. So this has taken even ASEAN
by surprise, and I think damaged Malaysia's reputation and
image in the region.
Senator Thomas. A shift a little bit again. If East Timor
is to successfully become an independent country, with 700,000
people, with no real economic base, apparently not any real
guideline as to how they will establish a democratic government
and so on, who is going to move in there to provide the kind of
assistance that apparently they are going to need to make this
a successful venture?
Mr. Roth. First of all, we have to define what is success.
I think East Timor is never going to be a wealthy place, and
that we have many poor island countries throughout the South
Pacific and Western Pacific, many with smaller populations than
700,000, if you look at some of the countries around. So it is
not as if one cannot be an independent country without being
prosperous.
My sense is that it is going to take a long time to try to
create some kind of industry in East Timor, whether it is
tourism, or whether it is coffee agriculture, which has started
but needs to be expanded. In the short term, they are going to
be very heavily dependent on foreign assistance. I mentioned at
the hearing last week that we are talking about international
pledges of over $500 million for the next 2 to 3 years.
That is a lot of money when divided amongst 700,000 people.
So I think there will be significant aid. From the perspective
of the American taxpayer, there is a good distribution. The
majority of this money is coming from others, not from us.
Japan is playing a large role, Portugal, Australia, the
international development banks. And so this is not a burden
that is falling primarily or solely on U.S. shoulders.
But one cannot project that those levels will continue
indefinitely into the future. Timor is going to have to work
hard to develop sources of income. One of the most important
that is just being negotiated now is the question of access to
revenues from the Timor Gap oil and gas reserves that may be
out there in the waters between Australia and Timor. There had
been an agreement between Indonesia and Australia about these
revenues, and now this has to be renegotiated to reflect East
Timor's independence. That could be a very significant source
in and of itself.
Senator Thomas. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Just quickly, and I am not sure you can
answer it, what is your current readout on the Aceh and Irian
separatist efforts?
Mr. Roth. Aceh is at a slightly more hopeful moment than it
was a couple of months ago, because I believe the government
has been able to create the belief amongst the opposition
factions, of which there are many, that it is prepared to
negotiate, unlike all of previous history. So you now have
several different processes going on.
While we were in Davos, there were very important
negotiations taking place between a Swiss NGO and two of the
armed resistance movements that sent representatives there. And
they are trying to work out an agreement for a cease-fire and
then humanitarian aid. They did not reach an agreement yet, but
they agreed to meet again. And if it happens, that would be a
major breakthrough.
There is also an element, through the minister of state for
human rights, Hasballah Saad, who is Acehnese, to negotiate
with the Acehnese, first of all, on a delegation. There are so
many different factions--students, armed resistance, religious
leaders, businessmen--that Gus Dur says all the time, what is
the address? You tell me I am supposed to negotiate, but with
whom? About what?
So there is an effort, a creative one, to try to come
together with a group that is not determined by the Indonesian
Government, but rather is representative of most players--they
may not get unanimity--in Aceh to negotiation. But that has
changed the notion that this will inevitably be fought out on
the ground.
So, in that sense, things appear slightly more hopeful. At
the same time, you should be aware that there is still
significant fighting taking place in Aceh, that a lot of people
are being killed every week, and that the fighting is in both
directions. Partially, it is an effort by the government to
reassert control which had lapsed in much of Aceh at the end of
last year. So there has been a counteroffensive.
Part of it is violence by the GAM, the free Aceh movement,
against the government forces and the police. So there are high
levels of violence on each side. I cannot tell you that we are
at the point of a solution, but at least a solution is
theoretically possible now, and the government appears
committed to trying to get it. And more Acehnese seem
interested in this than just a few months ago.
On Irian, the situation is not as far along either respect.
The good news is in terms of the violence, there is some, but
not at the levels in Aceh. In terms of the political demands,
Irian leadership is far more fractious. And so it is not quite
on the same front burner as is Aceh.
Nevertheless, it is clear to us that the conceptual
solution has to be the same combination as in Aceh. It is going
to have to be some mix of increased political autonomy, greater
control over natural resources, accountability for human rights
abuses of the past, something that is a comprehensive package
that can address Irianese concerns within the context of
remaining with Indonesia and preserving its territorial
integrity.
Senator Kerry. It is probably dangerous to do it, but are
there any kind of hopes? How would you characterize our
expectations or hopes with respect to either Aceh or Irian?
Mr. Roth. I would say--this makes me sound like a
diplomat--cautiously optimistic. Which is different from where
I would have been under the two previous regimes. But I do
think the government wants to settle these. I think the Gus Dur
government recognizes the previous behavior is a blot on
Indonesia's record and, furthermore, that if they are going to
preserve the country's territorial integrity, they have to
address some of the concerns. So you do have the President
involved himself. You do have the creation of a new minister of
state for human rights.
Conceptually, they are on the right track. But now the
question is, can they get to closure on two difficult sets of
issues?
Senator Kerry. Let me just explain that the chairman is
testifying at another committee. He had expected to be
testifying a little bit later, but they have just called him to
go now. So in a rare display of bad judgment, a Democrat holds
power. And I promise not to abuse it.
My sense is that President Wahid has surprised, pleasantly,
that he has taken steps that were more forceful and more prompt
than one might have anticipated. I think he has shown a sort of
clarity here about some of the things he needs to do to pull it
together that is positive in terms of the international
community's assessment certainly. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Roth. Absolutely.
Senator Kerry. Would you say also that, at least till this
moment, the suspension of General Wiranto and the efforts to
perhaps hold the military accountable are also bona fide and,
if there is follow-through, that that could be a very positive
step in helping to restore credibility to the government?
Mr. Roth. Once again, absolutely. And you have identified
the key point, which is follow-through. As good as the report
of the human rights commission was, that, in and of itself, is
not justice or accountability. It has to be followed through to
the next steps. It is now in the hands of the attorney general,
whom I believe you know personally, Marzuki Darusman, to make
recommendations for prosecution. And then there is the court
process.
But I agree with you, it is a very good start. To get a
report from an Indonesian institution that names names,
including senior generals, the Governor of the province, and
key militia leaders. If you had sat down to make a list and
asked staff to draw up who they thought should be looked at,
those are the names that were in that report. So that is a very
good start.
Senator Kerry. Good. With respect to North Korea and the
delegation visiting here next month and the talks that we will
have, can you share with us perhaps what assurances and/or
verifiable actions we might want the North Koreans to take
regarding the missile program, sites of weapons-related
technology and support for terrorism in order to achieve their
goal of lifting economic sanctions and treating them
differently with respect to the terrorism, state sponsored
terrorism?
Mr. Roth. What I would really like to do is offer you a
classified briefing so I can give you an exact answer rather
than speak around it in open session. I do not want to preview
our tactics with the North Koreans in a public hearing.
Senator Kerry. Fair enough.
Mr. Roth. But there is no desire to withhold that
information from you.
Senator Kerry. Fair enough. I understand that. Can you
share at all publicly whether or not the North Korean
negotiators are mindful of U.S. efforts to develop a defense
program with respect to their missile program and how that
might bear on missile defense itself and the ABM treaty?
Mr. Roth. Well, of course, one of the interesting things
when you talk to the North Koreans is they view themselves as
the threatened party, not the threatening party. So they always
refer to the predominance of American military power, U.S.
nuclear weapons and the threats we pose to them rather than
ever conceding that any weapon system under development there
could possibly be a threat to us. So it is a bit of a dialog
that passes each other in the night.
Nevertheless, we make sure they understand just how
important these issues are to us. While I would not want to bet
on how precise their understanding is of the American political
system I think they are getting the message that this issue is
hugely important, not just to the administration but to the
Congress and the American people.
Senator Kerry. Is there some effort with respect to China
at this point, which has proven to be a successful interlocutor
with respect to North Korea in the past? It would seem to me
they also have interests in perhaps seeing their acceptance of
that reality. And I wonder if initiatives are underway to try
to assist in making that happen.
Mr. Roth. We hold regular, extensive and detailed talks
with China making exactly that point. They should have
identical interests with us in this regard. They do not want to
see missile proliferation or proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. And furthermore, if North Korean programs threaten
other countries, that is going to heighten the pressure for a
TMD, if it is in Japan, or heighten the pressure for NMD in the
United States, two things which China does not want to see. But
China cannot insist that other countries make themselves
vulnerable to threats. That is not an acceptable position.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Secretary, I would just like to say to
you I underscore your own answer to that. As a 16-year veteran
here now, I can remember when we first began on this committee,
arms control was at the height of our concerns, and we were
obviously still in the high throes of the cold war.
We have just reconstituted the arms control observer group
here--under a new name, but nevertheless. Many of the more
senior Senators--Carl Levin and John Warner and many others--
are involved in it, and I am pleased to be part of that. And I
simply want to assert that it seems to me this is a very
propitious moment for the administration to raise the
visibility level a little bit of these kinds of efforts.
I think the President has to do it personally. I am going
to personally chat with him to do that. I know the stakes are
always high when you do engage in that kind of high profile
effort. But I think, given the stakes with respect to the ABM
treaty, the summer decision timing and the current relationship
with China, it seems to me that here is an area of mutual
cooperation, that if it were to be more augmented might produce
enormous results for all of us. And I would encourage every
member of the administration to try to see if we could find
creative ways to raise the profile and energize our
nonproliferation efforts and particularly focused on North
Korea, but obviously elsewhere, too.
Mr. Roth. Fair enough. That was one of the objectives of
Strobe Talbott's trip, but it is something we do across the
board. The Secretary has done it. The President has done it at
some of his meetings. But I will relay your advice back, as
well.
Senator Kerry. I respect that, and I know that is going on.
As I say, there is always a measured danger of raising the
public profile before all the ducks are lined up. On the other
hand, when you raise the public profile, sometimes it creates a
global impetus that helps to line the ducks up. And there is
always that balancing act; I understand that. The stakes are
high enough now, with the pressures we have internally in the
Senate and elsewhere with respect to large financial and long-
term arms control commitments that may or may not be made, that
I think one cannot expend enough energy in the next few months
on this effort, personally.
Is there any area that you wanted to retouch on that either
of us asked about?
Mr. Roth. Just an area of personal interest to you, where
we are probably going to continue to need your help, which is
Cambodia and the tribunal. Thanks to your initial conversation
with Hun Sen that started the process of getting people focused
on a possible compromise, we have been pursuing that diligently
and it has been a roller coaster, up and down.
But the most important recent development is that UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan was in Cambodia. He met with Prime
Minister Hun Sen, and agreed that they would send a team out to
talk. So rather than reaching deadlock or getingt into a battle
over what is acceptable or unacceptable, there is a process
which we of course have encouraged on both sides to try to get
this to ``yes'' and come up with something that fully respects
Cambodian sovereignty and at the same time fully respects the
legitimacy of international concerns. This has to be not a show
process but a genuine judicial process.
We are not there yet, but, as of today, the process is on
the right track in terms of this team going out.
Senator Kerry. Well, I am very appreciative of that. I know
you have expended energy on it, as has the Secretary General.
In my conversation with the prime minister, he made some
mention of perhaps my being out there in a month or so. And I
suggested that if I thought it could be helpful, I was willing
to try to do that.
Mr. Roth. We may call on you.
Senator Kerry. If it is, I would be happy to try to do
that, and see if we could leverage that. It would be good to
get it included.
A final question just very quickly. When we were both in
Davos, there was some conversation with people there about the
transition of Hong Kong and what that might or might not augur
with respect to Taiwan ultimately. Do you have any concerns
about the ways in which things have transpired with respect to
Hong Kong since the hand-over? And what would your judgment,
just quickly, be about the status of Hong Kong at this point in
time?
Mr. Roth. Well, let me give you a quick snapshot and give
you a longer answer for the record, because I think it is
complex.
[The following response was received subsequent to the
hearing:]
Question When we were both in Davos, there was some conversation
with people about the transition of Hong Kong and what that might or
might not augur with respect to Taiwan, ultimately. Do you have any
concerns about the ways in which things have transpired with respect to
Hong Kong since the hand-over? What is your judgment about the status
of Hong Kong at this point in time?
Answer. The transition of Hong Kong from British to Chinese control
has gone very well. Before July 1997, many people expressed concerns
about freedom of the press, the ability to conduct business, and the
presence of the PLA. On each count, the record has been quite
encouraging. Many of the unique characteristics of Hong Kong have
continued to flourish.
While we have some concerns, Hong Kong remains a free place that
extends basic civil liberties to its citizens, defines its identity in
terms of being an open international city, and largely continues to
make its own decisions in terms of its vision, identity, and economic
interests. Its export control policy and procedures remain world
class--centered on its interest in access to high technology from the
industrialized countries in order that Hong Kong can develop into a
leading international information technology center. Bilaterally, we
continue to work closely with the Hong Kong authorities to counter
transnational crime, including narcotics trafficking and alien
smuggling. We coordinate efforts to block the illegal transshipment of
arms and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
At the same time, there have been some developments that cause
concern. The Hong Kong Government's request in June for an
interpretation of the Basic Law by the National Peoples Congress in
Beijing in order to change the prospective effect of a particular Hong
Kong Court of Final Appeal ruling, no matter how understandable in
terms of motivation, raised questions about the authority of Hong
Kong's highest court--questions that can only be resolved by looking at
how subsequent cases are being handled. The jury is still out. If this
use of the interpretation mechanism were truly exceptional, then the
impact on Hong Kong's autonomy could be negligible. In this regard, I
would note that Hong Kong's particular strength is the large number of
individuals and organizations (such as civic organizations, Legislative
Council, the Court of Final Appeal) that speak up about their concerns
on a regular basis and whose voices are fully reported by Hong Kong's
active media.
We have also been disappointed by Beijing's unwillingness, after
our accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, to leave
Hong Kong out of the vicissitudes of U.S.-PRC relations by suspending
for a period approvals for U.S. naval ship and aircraft visits to Hong
Kong. Fortunately, these visits appear to be back on track now; Hong
Kong recently received both the U.S.S. Blue Ridge and the U.S.S.
Stennis carrier task force. Again, further recourse to this sort of
action raises questions about Hong Kong's status as an open,
cosmopolitan city.
Overall, we continue to watch developments closely. The United
States has a significant interest in Hong Kong's future stability,
prosperity, and democratic development. Like many economies emerging
from the Asian financial crisis, Hong Kong faces challenges on this
score.
Mr. Roth. If you asked me the bottom line, the Hong Kong
transition has gone very well. When you look at some of the
fears prior to reversion and the actual situation now, in terms
of freedom of the press, in terms of the ability to do
business, in terms of not importing Chinese styles of
corruption, in terms of not having a heavy handed military
presence, there are many different indicators that lots of
aspects of Hong Kong have stayed the same.
There are some areas where there has been trouble,
particularly some of the questions of the courts and the
question of the applicability of Chinese law to Hong Kong and
whether China serves as a final arbiter on the right of abode,
a contentious case. So it has not been perfect, and I will give
you a more detailed answer for the record, but, in general, it
has been good.
Unfortunately, in terms of your specific question, though,
it is largely irrelevant. Taiwan repeatedly insists that it is
not interested in Hong Kong as a model, that a one country/two
systems is an irritant, not a solution, and that they do not
view themselves as in any way comparable to what took place in
Hong Kong. Therefore they resent the notion that the same
formula should be applied to them.
We have suggested to the parties that they try getting
beyond the semantics. It is not a question of one country/two
systems, because China has already made it clear that it is
prepared to do some things very differently vis-a-vis Taiwan--
for example, in relationship to military forces. So rather than
get stuck on the label, where they are stuck, they should try
to come up with pragmatic solutions. But I suspect that Taiwan
is not looking at Hong Kong really, much, one way or the other.
A very negative situation in Hong Kong would affect Taiwan, but
the positive side of the ledger does not change their basic
view.
Senator Kerry. I think that is good advice. On that, Mr.
Secretary, thank you very much for taking time to appear before
the committee. And thank you for your good work.
And would you also pass this along. I think the
administration should be thanked and congratulated for the
initiative which you have asked Bill Perry to follow through
on. And he and Wendy Sherman I think have done a terrific job
of helping to steer us in the right direction there. And
hopefully that will bear fruit. He has been a wonderful
communicator with the Congress on all sides, and we are very
appreciative of that initiative.
Thank you. We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]