

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

HEARING

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Constance A. Morella (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Morella, Norton, and Watson.

Staff present: Russell Smith, staff director; Heea Vazivani-Fales, counsel; Matthew Batt, legislative assistant; Robert White, communications director; Victoria Proctor and Howie Denis, professional staff members; Jon Bouker, minority counsel; and Earley Green, minority assistant clerk.

Mrs. MORELLA. Good morning, the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia welcomes you to its eighth hearing of the 107th Congress.

We have been fortunate to assemble key stakeholders on the topic of emergency preparedness in the Nation's Capital. They have been very patient with us, in spite of one postponement, because we could not get into our offices, and various restrictions on the delivery of testimony.

Today's hearing is extremely important and timely. We have also decided to have another hearing within a few weeks, that will focus entirely on the topic of the economic impact of the emergency situation in the District of Columbia.

I must add that the witnesses for that topic were prepared to be with us today, but because of the issue of economic impact and its importance on our Nation's Capital and a very crowded agenda this morning, we believe that it deserves a separate hearing.

So again, I welcome all of you here today, our witnesses and those of you who have come to hear the testimony of our distinguished witnesses.

As we all know, the events of September 11th shook the world. But just as quickly as America was knocked down, she dusted herself off and stood tall. Americans soon began to talk about reconstructing our lost buildings, responding with force against the attackers, and redoubling our efforts to make certain such a travesty never happens again.

Here in the Nation's Capital, on this subcommittee, our post-September 11th responsibility is to examine how well the District of

Columbia and the region are prepared to handle any future emergencies.

Going hand in hand with that is the matter of security coordination between the Federal and local governments, because I believe the Federal Government needs to do a much better job of communicating and consulting with local officials before taking actions, such as closing streets, that place an extra burden on the District of Columbia.

These are not just academic concerns. The introduction of anthrax as a weapon has illustrated a need for comprehensive regional and inter-governmental cooperation.

Anthrax spores have been found in more than a dozen buildings in the District of Columbia and the surrounding area, including congressional offices and the Brentwood Postal Facility, where two of our Postal workers died after contracting the disease.

The Center for Disease Control and Prevention and the D.C. Department of Health are among the agencies that have responded to this bio-terrorism, and I know some have already raised questions about whether their combined responses were adequately coordinated.

Looking to the future, I am interested in learning how our network of hospitals are prepared to handle the outbreak of an infectious disease such as smallpox. Is there a plan to share resources and costs, to quarantine patients? What is the surge capacity of our hospitals?

The public needs to be assured that the various agencies of the Government are working together to protect the public safety. Miscommunication, confusion, and a lack of coordination are unnecessary hurdles to overcome, when our focus must be on public health and public safety. The Government must speak to the public with one clear knowledgeable voice.

I want to return our attention to the events of September 11th. Although the city of Washington, DC, was spared a direct hit because of the brave actions of the passengers and the crew on United Flight 93, we did see 189 of our friends and neighbors killed at the Pentagon.

Subsequently, there were false reports of explosions or car bombs in various places in the Capital. Rumors abounded that Metro was closed. The evacuation of Capital Hill office buildings was slipshod, with employees in some offices never receiving definite word that they could go home. In short, D.C. was gripped with confusion.

The Emergency Broadcast System, designed precisely for these types of events, was never activated, to my knowledge, at least. Fire fighters, paramedics, police, and other emergency personnel responded quickly to the Pentagon, because they undergo constant training in mutual aid response.

However, there was a lack of high level coordination across jurisdictional lines. In fact, it was not until 6 p.m. on the night of September 11th, that the chief administrative officers, police chiefs and other top officials from across the region, talked to each other on a conference call. By that time, 9 hours had passed, and most of Washington was back at home, searching for news on their television sets.

It is evident that there was no, and there is no, regional emergency plan, at least not one that can be counted on. A plan that exists only on paper is not enough. Employees must undergo training and testing so they will know what to do when the moment of truth arrives.

When it snows or even when there is a threat of snow, regional leaders talk to each other about how they are going to proceed, whether Government and schools will be closed. The plan goes into detail about emergency routes, getting information to the public, and use of the Washington area warning system.

The region has a snow plan, but we do not have a comprehensive coordinated plan to respond to emergencies, such as September 11th.

I find that astonishing and worrisome, and I hope to hear from our witnesses today that they have taken concrete steps to correct this glaring weakness.

As the seat of the Federal Government, Washington must be the most prepared city and region, in the event of a terrorist attack or other emergency. We are an obvious target. We must be prepared to work together.

If the Federal Government decides to send its employees home in the middle of the day, officials in the District, Maryland, and Virginia must know what is happening, so they can prepare for the rush of commuters.

The Federal Government cannot make decisions in a vacuum. It is the largest employer in the region, and its actions have consequences.

Finally, this hearing was, as I mentioned earlier, originally going to examine the economic impact of the terrorist attacks on the District and the region. Congresswoman Norton and I decided to postpone that part of the hearing until another day soon, given the already large scope of this hearing.

But I do want to state for the record that we, in Congress, do recognize that the financial picture for the District, at least in the short term, is not encouraging. The tourism and hospitality industries, which are so vital to the city's economy, face severe weakness. Thousands of jobs and small businesses are in jeopardy, and we are going to continue to closely monitor this situation.

So I thank you for being here this morning. I would now like to yield and recognize the ranking member of this Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, who has obviously done such a great job, Congresswoman Norton, for an opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Constance A. Morella follows:]

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA
8TH DISTRICT, MARYLAND

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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**CHAIRWOMAN CONSTANCE A. MORELLA,
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
“EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL”
OPENING STATEMENT
NOVEMBER 2, 2001**

The events of September 11th shook the world. But just as quickly as America was knocked down, she dusted herself off and stood tall. Americans soon began to talk about reconstructing our lost buildings, responding with force against the attackers and re-doubling our efforts to make certain such a travesty never happens again.

Here in the nation’s capital, on this Subcommittee, our post-September 11th responsibility is to examine how well the District of Columbia and the region are prepared to handle any future emergencies. Going hand-in-hand with that is the matter of security coordination between the federal and local governments – because I believe the federal government needs to do a much better job of communicating and consulting with local officials before taking actions, such as closing streets, that place an extra burden on the District.

These are not just academic concerns. The introduction of anthrax as a weapon has illustrated the need for comprehensive regional and inter-governmental cooperation. Anthrax spores have been found in more than a dozen buildings in the District of Columbia and the surrounding area, including congressional offices and the Brentwood postal facility, where two of our postal workers died after contracting the disease. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the D.C. Department of Health are among the agencies that have responded to this bio-terrorism, and I know some have already raised questions about whether their combined responses were adequately coordinated. Looking to the future, I’m interested to learn how our network of hospitals are prepared to handle the outbreak of an infectious disease such as smallpox. Is there a plan to share resources and costs? To quarantine patients? What is the surge capacity of our hospitals?

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And we must be prepared to work together. If the federal government decides to send its employees home in the middle of the day, officials in the District, Maryland and Virginia must know what’s happening so they can prepare for the rush of commuters. The federal government cannot make decisions in a vacuum. It is the largest employer in the region, and its actions have consequences.

Finally, this hearing was originally going to examine the economic impact of the terrorist attacks on the District and the region. Congresswoman Norton and I decided to postpone that part of the hearing until another day, given the already large scope of this proceeding.

But I do want to state for the record that we in Congress do recognize that the financial picture for the District, at least in the short-term, is not encouraging. The tourism and hospitality industries, which are so vital to the city’s economy, face severe weakness. Thousands of jobs and small businesses are in jeopardy. We will continue to closely monitor this situation.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mrs. Morella. May I say in advance that I regret that I am going to have to leave this hearing for a few minutes around 10:30, because Mr. Gephardt is having a press conference, of which I must be a part, on an amendment to the Victim's Compensation Fund, that we are announcing at 10:30.

There is a Victim's Compensation Fund for those lost as a result of September 11th and, of course, we had many D.C. residents lost at the Pentagon. We had three school children and three teachers lost.

But this fund does not cover people who have been lost out of the anthrax deaths. That is what is being announced this morning, and I simply have to go and come back. I go with my apologies.

I very much appreciate the Chair's willingness to schedule today's hearing. The September 11th attack raised more new and more serious issues for the District of Columbia than for any jurisdiction, except the U.S. Government, itself.

The District has had to contend with escalated local responsibilities to protect its almost 600,000 residents, and unprecedented national responsibilities to help protect the Federal presence. But for both, this city is the first responder.

To add to the challenge, the city was uniquely handicapped in recovering from the attack, when National Airport was closed for 3 weeks, the only airport in the country to experience such a shut-down. By Thanksgiving, only 55 percent of National's planes will be flying.

At this hearing, we originally intended comprehensively to address the spectrum of September 11th issues facing both the D.C. government and our business sector, particularly hospitality. The cascading effects on tourism and other D.C. businesses of the shut-down of the airport, the drought of tourists, and the anthrax scare have been all but lost, as events have rolled over one another since September 11th.

I very much appreciate that because of the length of the comprehensive hearing planned for today, the Chair has agreed to a special hearing, devoted exclusively to our private business sector and to the effect on workers who, along with the D.C. government, have absorbed the brunt of the attack.

Tourism's spectacular growth and ability to fuel even unrelated sectors and commerce in the District is one of the great stories to emerge from the ashes of the 1990's.

However, D.C.'s workers and businesses have been the unsung heroes of September 11th. They deserve to be featured in a hearing of their own, and the Chair has promised to schedule a hearing forthwith. I very much appreciate that.

Today, we look primarily at D.C. government preparedness, and at the effects of the September 11th business slowdown on the D.C. budget, and on the District's economy.

Let me say that I had staff pull the unemployment figures, just released this morning. They are extremely discouraging. What they tell us is that D.C. must be focused on nothing, nothing like it is focused now on its economy, on keeping its government viable.

The unemployment figures for local jurisdictions are going to be issued only November 16th. If we look at where we were, on Sep-

tember 2001, we were at 6 percent unemployment, spectacular for us, and we were at 6 percent a year ago in September. That is what we needed.

I do not know where we will be. But the analysts say that they expected a jump in the unemployment, but they never expected a jump, and this is what the analysts say, in the national unemployment figure of the kind they have now.

Our unemployment rate is 5.4 percent in October. It is the biggest 1 month jump in more than 21 years. To quote from this Post article, "Economists fear that continued fallout from the attacks, new worries about anthrax in the mail, plunging consumer confidence and rising unemployment in the months ahead will keep consumers tight-fisted, further weakening the economy."

This is where the health of the District of Columbia lies in the coming months, and this is where we must be focused, and on other issues.

We are also concerned to know more about the level of cooperation between the Federal and D.C. governments to cope with post-attack and preparedness issues.

To its credit, the House Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management Subcommittee, on which I serve, has already agree to my amendment that makes the District a full partner in Homeland preparedness, coordination, and implementation.

However, the bill is not yet on the floor, and recent actions by Federal and congressional personnel give reason for continuing concern. That concern deepened when, as I understand it, the Sergeant at Arms and the Capital Police declined the Chair's invitation to testify here today. That is exactly the wrong way to protect the Nation's Capital.

Having declined to appear publicly, I shall ask each to come to my office for a meeting to achieve greater coordination on street closures, barricades and other actions, that affect not only the Federal presence, but also the people who live and work here.

The District already has demonstrated that it can handle an unprecedented health crisis and bring it under control. Not only the city, but the country, is indebted to Mayor Williams, Dr. Walks, and their team, for the calm and informed way they have managed and quieted the anthrax crisis, and established a workable precedent that will benefit other jurisdictions.

Today, we may hear a progress report on anthrax, but given the saturation of the news with information and anthrax updates, that is the one issue on which Congress has been informed since the attack.

Notwithstanding the tragic anthrax deaths, anthrax remains a disease that is hard to get and easy to cure, if caught in time. The District will have a more difficult time retaining its own financial health, and calming an unaddressed economic crisis, as thousands of businesses hang on, or are out of business, and as thousands more workers are furloughed or laid off.

What must concern us preeminently is keeping September 11th from taking down the economy of the District of Columbia. We have included \$16 million in the 2002 D.C. Appropriation for emergency preparedness.

We have also been able to get the District raised from a mere \$10 million, in the President's pending \$20 billion supplemental, to \$25 million; still a small fraction of the city's request and needs.

However, our discussions with the House and Senate appropriators lead us to believe that we will be able to significantly expand this amount. Yet, it is not likely that we will replace all of the anticipated \$200 million in lost tax receipts to the District, not to mention the \$750 million in hospitality and travel losses the District estimates.

I hope that at the very least, Congress will not deny the District the full \$250 million it needs to be a fully prepared first responder. I certainly do not intend to go quietly into the night, while much is expected of the District and little is given.

I look forward to hearing more concerning the challenges and the appropriate remedies from today's witnesses. Again, I very much appreciate the work of the Chair and her staff in calling this hearing.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton follows:]

11/06/01 TUE 15:09 FAX 202 225 3002

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**Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

COMMITTEE ON
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL SERVICE AND
AGENCY ORGANIZATION

**Statement of Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton
District of Columbia Subcommittee Hearing on
"Emergency Preparedness in the Nation's Capital"**

November 2, 2001

I very much appreciate the Chair's willingness to schedule today's hearing. The September 11 attack raised more new and more serious issues for the District of Columbia than for any jurisdiction except the United States government itself. The District has had to contend with escalated local responsibilities to protect its almost 600,000 residents and unprecedented national responsibilities to protect the federal presence. For both, this city is the first responder.

To add to the challenge, the city was uniquely handicapped in recovering from the attack when National Airport was closed for three weeks, the only airport in the country to experience such a shut down. By Thanksgiving, only 55% of National's planes will be flying. At this hearing, we originally intended comprehensively to address the spectrum of September 11 issues facing both the D.C. government and our business sector, particularly hospitality. The cascading effects on tourism and other D.C. businesses of the shutdown of the airport, the drought of tourists, and the anthrax scare have been all but lost as events have rolled over one another since September 11.

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Homeland preparedness, coordination, and implementation. However, the bill is not yet on the floor, and recent actions by federal and congressional personnel give reason for continuing concern. That concern deepened when, as I understand it, the Sergeant at Arms and the Capitol Police declined the Chair's invitation to testify here today. That is exactly the wrong way to protect the nation's capital. Having declined to appear publicly, I shall ask each to come to my office for a meeting to achieve greater coordination on street closures, barricades and other actions that effect not only the federal presence, but also the people who live and work here.

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Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton.

Now before we hear the testimony, it is the plan and the policy of this committee and all its subcommittees to swear in all our witnesses. So I could ask you to please stand and raise your right hand. I would also like to ask Dr. Segal and Mr. LePorte, since we may be calling on them, and I understand they are here also, to stand and to be sworn in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mrs. MORELLA. Everybody has responded affirmatively and the record will signify such.

We will start off now and we will proceed in the order that is listed with, first of all, our great mayor, the Honorable Anthony Williams.

STATEMENTS OF ANTHONY WILLIAMS, MAYOR, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; LINDA CROPP, CHAIRMAN, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CITY COUNCIL; KENNETH KASPRISIN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR READINESS, RESPONSE AND RECOVERY, FEMA; ARTHUR J. LAWRENCE, ASSISTANT SURGEON GENERAL/ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; MICHAEL ROGERS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS; AND CHARLES RAMSEY, CHIEF, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

Mayor WILLIAMS. Chairman Morella, Congresswoman Norton, Congresswoman Watson, welcome to the proceedings, and thank you all for being here to discuss the preparedness.

Would you like me to hold for the Congresswoman?

Mrs. MORELLA. That would be very kind of you.

Congresswoman Watson, we are just so pleased with you on the committee. Thank you very much. I recognize we are not in session, so it is a tremendous sacrifice and commitment for other Members to appear on a Friday when we do not have votes. I would love to recognize you for any opening statement you may have.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Morella.

I just wanted to echo the remarks coming from the Congresswoman. I feel that we need to be sensitive to this District in which we operate.

Sometimes, the politics get in the way. I am hoping that all of you representing the District will be able to bring out the facts that will compel us to provide the resources that are going to be so necessary for us to do policy here in this area.

Under the circumstances under which we are all living, it makes it even more and more important that we provide you with what is needed.

Before coming here, I was talking to my staff, and I know you have concerns about the streets that are blocked off, and you wonder how you balance between safety and the precautions you take, and the people's free flow.

I hope that we can think through some of these areas with Congresswoman Norton and the rest of the members, and with all of you. It is going to take us awhile, but I hope that we can come up with policies that would allow our freedoms to continue, but being alert and cautious, allow us to reduce the risk.

I just had a hearing in Los Angeles attended by seven Members of Congress on our preparedness in L.A. County and southern California. I am very proud to say that because we are so used to natural disasters, as we have earthquakes every day and we have fires and other kinds, that we are prepared.

But the problem, and probably the problem here, is that we have not connected the dots. So our problem is how do we coordinate and how do we communicate?

I am hoping that as you give your testimony, we can kind of focus on how we coordinate your efforts, how we communicate them to the public, and how you communicate to the policymaking body, so we then, in turn, can supply you with resources you need to be able to protect your citizens.

Thank you so very much.

Mrs. MORELLA. That was well stated, Congresswoman Watson.

Again, I thank you, Mayor Williams, for the courtesy of allowing her opening statement.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Absolutely.

Mrs. MORELLA. We recognize you, sir.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Madam Chair, for the purposes of the records, I have submitted my entire statement. I have abbreviated it, both in light of the limited amount of time for any one witness, and given the scope of the hearing.

I also will focus on emergency preparedness, as opposed to the testimony that was prepared that dealt with economic recovery, which I understand is a subject of a later hearing. I thank you for holding that hearing, as well as this one.

Mrs. MORELLA. Without objection, the statement you have submitted will be in the record.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Thank you, and like all of you, and like most Americans, the leadership of the District never anticipated the evil of using a passenger airliner as a weapon of mass destruction.

For us, like most Americans, the cowardice of the terrorist attacks on September 11th galvanized our resolve to out-think, out-smart, and out-plan any terrorism that targets the District of Columbia.

Immediately following September 11th, I convened a task force of senior District officials to review and improve the District's existing emergency operations plan. I gave the Task Force to primary imperatives: No. 1, enhance critical linkages and operational relationships with our Federal, state, and regional partners; and No. 2, develop a comprehensive emergency management program capability.

As you know, there already exists a comprehensive Federal Response Plan. My task force established working groups in each of the critical emergency support functions to mirror the Federal Response Plan including: a transportation group to review current evacuations plans; a communications group tasked with planning and implementing the District's emergency communications needs; a law enforcement group tasked with ensuring that public order is maintained during a crisis; and a command control group to oversee and coordinate these working groups.

To ensure cross-jurisdictional coordination and effective resource sharing, these working groups include representatives from Federal

agencies, as well as officials from surrounding jurisdictions in Maryland and Virginia.

We are particularly grateful for the leadership provided by Michael Lowder from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, who has brought resources and representation of the National Capital Response Team to the work of the District's task force. The National Capital Response Team includes FEMA, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

We now have established readiness levels that mirror the readiness levels of the Federal Government. Should disaster strikes tomorrow, God forbid, we have the communications systems in place to provide immediate coordination.

We have comprehensive phone lists and call trees with satellite phone numbers and text pagers, and pocket guides that we all carry around that outline every organization's responsibility in key response areas.

We have created notification processes for all types of incidents and emergencies, ranging from power outages to chemical attacks. We have planned for where all activities will be staged, and how we will move people and emergency equipment in and out of town. We have outlined evacuation routes. We have developed the fundamental architecture of an effective emergency response.

The anthrax contaminations of the last few weeks tested our emergency preparation and response plans. We are coordinating closely with our Federal partners in the Centers for Disease Control to respond to the needs of the Postal Service and other mail handling operations.

While I am satisfied that we are enhancing our organizational capability to respond to emergencies, I am here to tell you that we are not sufficiently resourced.

We do not have the sufficient resources to respond to the full range of disasters we could face, to face responsibilities in an order of magnitude and scope, and I will give you an example, similar in scope to the city of New York, which has 40,000 police officers; to meet similar responsibilities, in terms of scope and magnitude.

Certainly not in population but, again, in terms of potential targets, we have 4,000 policemen. So it is extraordinarily important that we have coordination.

Although the District's emergency preparedness is meeting the current needs the city, it has taken its toll. Over the past 2 weeks, our fire and emergency medical services department has responded to between 30 and 70 hazardous material [hazmat] calls per day.

The MPD has been on a heightened state of alert since September 11th. I am not sure how we can get to a higher state, which has meant greater numbers of officers deployed, using more over-time dollars.

In fact, we estimate that the additional personnel costs alone for police for the next 6 months, in the aftermath of September 11th, will be over \$11 million.

Let me assure you that our citizens notice the diversion of officers away from their neighborhoods, and it has begun to erode the overwhelmingly positive feeling about reduced crime in our city.

I am here to tell you that the men and women of the District's public safety units are doing what needs to be done, but we are depleting our resources.

I will give you an example. Our homicide rate in Washington, DC, was on pace to be down 30 percent over the last year. I was criticized because it was not down in some areas more than other areas.

But what we often lose sight of is the good news. The good news is that homicide was on a trend to be down 30 percent. That is a huge decrease, following decreases over the last couple of years already.

Since September 11th, it is on pace to be down now only 15 percent. So we have lost 15 percent traction, because of the extraordinary responsibilities we are facing as a Federal international center.

We are running our hazmat response on unbudgeted overtime dollars. If we must sustain the current operational tempo over the long haul, we are determined to develop flexibility and depth far beyond what anyone has done before, because, again, we have unique responsibilities in this city. But this is not going to be fast; it is not going to be easy; and it is not going to be without costs. Together with our regional and Federal partners, and with the support of Congress, I am committed to seeing that our city meets and exceeds the newly created national standards for emergency preparedness established by FEMA, the National Emergency Management Association, and International Association of Emergency Management.

Now we have submitted a request for special appropriations in the amount of \$1 billion, which includes \$250 million for emergency preparedness. My testimony includes all the different areas, both in terms of resources and equipment, as well as costs reimbursement. In addition to investing in the personnel that we depend on in an emergency, this request will allow us to better serve the people who live and work in the District.

To give you an example, one of the critical issues in the city on September 11th was traffic control. With the mass exodus of so many Federal employees, and many were mothers and fathers concerned about the children, the streets downtown initially became gridlocked.

This request includes equipment that will enable us to closely monitor traffic patterns and quickly implement new patterns and street light timings, to ensure a safe and orderly evacuation of the city.

As Peter LePorte or Margaret Kellems, my deputy mayor for public safety, or the chief will tell you, we have got to do two things, actually. We have got to ensure an orderly evacuation; and while we are doing that, we have to also manage the same way Montgomery County would manage or Fairfax County or Prince George's.

We have to also manage for the access and accommodation for our emergency vehicles to get to an accident. So you have to plan two route structures or networks.

This investment that we are talking about in the National Capital, and actually in the National Capital Region, will help

strengthen our preparedness to the levels that the citizens of the District expect, to the levels that the citizens of this region expect and, indeed, to the levels that the American people should expect.

Our Nation's Capital will always be a higher risk environment than most cities, and responding to a major emergency, as you have said, Madam Chair and the other members of the committee have mentioned, requires coordination and cooperation among all of our local jurisdictions.

One thing I have learned, it is going to require coordination not only between the city and Maryland and Virginia States, but it is going to require cooperation between the city and the surrounding counties.

I am pleased that Michael Rogers from COG is here today, as well as the city and our private industry, which we often sometimes fail to realize, and which is vitally important.

I want to mention here before the committee the pride that I have for another kind of mutual aid and coordination. I am proud of our Engine 23, that was one of the first responders, in support of Arlington County at the Pentagon on September 11th.

I know that we can depend on a similar level of support from the governments in northern Virginia and the surrounding Maryland counties for mutual aid with fire fighting, to early detection of symptoms in hospitals, to evacuation planning.

We are working together to prepare, prevent, and when necessary, respond. It is accomplished only through regional cooperation, the kind of regional cooperation that we have seen.

I was pleased that one of the first things I did as Mayor was to initiate, and Michael has been a part of this and the Board of Trade has been a part of this, a regular series of meetings with what we call the "Big Four": the county executives of Montgomery, Fairfax, Prince George's and the District, recognizing that we are all joined in all these activities together.

If we are to be successful in safeguarding the Capital, it will require effective communications between the Federal Government and the District.

I am pleased that earlier this week, I had a productive meeting with Governor Ridge, who is personally committed to working with me toward additional improvements in District/ Federal cooperation.

I strongly urge the Congress to give positive consideration to Congresswoman Norton's legislation that would institutionalize a linkage between the District and the Office of Homeland Security on all levels of domestic preparedness.

One of the things that we talked about is the need in the area of better planning and better preparation for the District to be able to meet on some kind of basis with the Homeland Security folks, and have in advance an understanding of what the plans are, for all the Federal departments, for the U.S. Capital, and what they plan to undertake in various levels of alert.

This is so we know ahead of time that if we go to alert status or whatever, you know, Departments 1, 2 and 3 are going to do the following things. Then we can, up front, discuss these issues of balancing an open city with a safe city, and not be diverted into every instance when there is an alert, discussing whether we are going

to have this street closed or that street closed or these parking spaces open or those parking spaces open.

We know now that we are in a new environment. This is the kind of planning that is called for, and I hope that the legislation that Congresswoman Norton has introduced and I hope that the meetings that we have had with the White House, will lead to that kind of effort. I am confident that Governor Ridge is committed to doing that.

I would also like to ask the support of the committee as a wrap up for another proposal, that would give the Mayor of the District of Columbia the same authority that the Governors of the 50 States and the territories have; and certainly that Governor Gilmore and Governor Glendening have. That is to have the authority to mobilize our National Guard.

Currently, in an emergency unique to the District, I go to Major General Freeman of the D.C. National Guard who, in turn, goes to the Secretary of the Army, and then it works up the channel to the President.

I want everybody to understand, I appreciate President Bush's cooperation and partnership with the District in a number of different ways; whether they are economic development or in emergency planning. But I am sure the President has more important things to do in an emergency of national scope and priority, than to sit here and personally check on whether the District needs to bring out National Guard. I would urge the committee's attention to that bill, as well as support for that bill.

I would again close by thanking the committee for its oversight and diligence in a vitally important matter for not only our Nation's Capital, not only our region, but for our country.

[The prepared statement of Mayor Williams follows:]

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
Committee on Government Reform
United States House of Representatives

Congresswoman Constance A. Morella, Chairwoman
Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, Ranking Member

"Emergency Preparedness in the Nation's Capital"

Statement of
Anthony A. Williams
Mayor
District of Columbia

November 2, 2001
2154 Rayburn House Office Building
10:00 A.M.

Good morning Chairwoman Morella, Ranking Member Norton, and members of the Committee. I want to begin by thanking you for calling this important hearing to discuss the District of Columbia's overall emergency preparedness and the impact of the recent terrorist attacks on the District's economy.

As the terrorist attacks that began on September 11 and continued to unfold, I have become profoundly aware of the unique challenges associated with being Mayor of the nation's Capital. Being Mayor of the nation's Capital means making sure that hometown Washington works – picking up the garbage, keeping the streets safe, attracting new businesses and jobs and, of course, doing all that within the available financial resources. Being Mayor of the nation's Capital means much more. It means providing fire and emergency medical services to the White House, Congress, the Supreme Court, and all federal agencies so that the critical work of the government can continue with as little interruption as possible. It means providing public health services to postal workers so that the mail can be delivered, not only to District residents, but also to the more than two million people that work in the District of Columbia daily. It means ensuring that police officers respond to emergencies at the Departments of State, Justice, Health and Human Services when these agencies are threatened, tasks which are above and beyond the regular crime fighting our police must do in our neighborhoods each and every day. Being Mayor of the nation's Capital means more than making sure hometown Washington runs well, it also means making sure that federal Washington is open for business as usual.

As you well know, the District has successfully rebounded from a financial crisis. Congress, and this Committee in particular, have been supportive throughout its financial recovery. With your help, and the support of the recently retired Financial Authority, the District has achieved financial stability. However, because of severe financial limitations placed on the District because it is the Capital, the city operates on a very small margin with revenues staying just ahead of expenditures. Between the decrease in revenue caused by the recent loss of tourism and the increased demands on public safety and public health services, the terrorist attacks have put enormous financial pressure on the District. I am confident that the strong relationship that we have built between the city and Congress during the financial recovery will enable us to work as partners to meet the challenges ahead.

Federal and Local Washington are Intertwined

The District's relationship with the federal government is complex. In many ways, we are a company town. And the company is the federal government. Americans come to the District of Columbia to visit Congress and participate in our democracy through the work of this legislature. School children come here to experience the words spoken by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. on the National Mall. Each year approximately 25 million visitors come to our city to celebrate the freedoms of being an American – the very freedoms that are threatened by recent terrorist attacks.

These visitors stay in our hotel rooms, dine in our restaurants, enjoy banquets and parties catered and decorated by our local business people. They ride in our cabs, dance in our clubs, shop in our stores, and visit our museums. The tourist and hospitality industry is the second largest employer in the city, second only to the federal government.

As we have seen so clearly over the past two months, when terrorist attacks close down the U.S. Capitol, shut down Reagan National Airport, and spread fear of biological warfare, some Americans are afraid to come to their nation's Capital. The loss of revenue to the District since September 11 is staggering – we are projecting a \$750 million hit to our economy, resulting in a loss of about \$200 million in tax receipts.

It is imperative that people feel safe coming to Washington, D.C.

It is clear that economic health of the District is tied to the perception that the District is prepared for the threat of terrorism and capable of responding to national emergencies

Emergency Preparedness and Response

Like most Americans, the leadership of the District never anticipated the evil of using a passenger airliner as a weapon of mass destruction. For us, like most Americans, the cowardice of the terrorist attacks on September 11 galvanized our resolve to out-think, out-smart, and out-plan any terrorist that targets the District of Columbia.

Immediately following September 11, I convened a Task Force of senior District officials to review and improve the District's existing Emergency Operations Plan. I gave the Task Force two primary imperatives:

- Enhance critical linkages and operational relationships with our federal, state and regional partners; and
- Develop a comprehensive emergency management program capability.

As you know, there already exists a comprehensive Federal Response Plan. My Task Force established working groups in each of the critical emergency support functions to mirror the Federal Response Plan including: a transportation group to review current evacuations plans; a communications group tasked with planning and implementing the District's emergency communications needs; a law enforcement group tasked with ensuring that public order is maintained during a crisis; and a command control group to over see and coordinate these working groups.

To ensure cross-jurisdictional coordination and effective resource sharing, these working groups include representatives from federal agencies as well as officials from the surrounding jurisdictions in Maryland and Virginia. We are particularly grateful for the leadership provided by Michael Lowder from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), who has brought the resources and representation of the National Capitol Region Response Team to the work of the District's Task Force. The National Capitol Region Response Team includes FEMA, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

In addition, we are working closely with private sector organizations that are vital to our ability to respond in an emergency -- the American Red Cross and the Washington Area Hospital Association.

We now have established readiness levels that mirror the readiness levels of the federal government. Should disaster strike tomorrow, God forbid, we have the communications systems in place to provide immediate coordination. We have comprehensive phone lists and call trees with satellite phone numbers and text pagers, and pocket guides that outline every organization's responsibilities in every key response area. We have created notification processes for all types of incidents and emergencies ranging from snowstorms, to power outages to chemical attacks. We have planned for where all activities will stage and how we will move people and emergency equipment in and out of town. We have outlined evacuation routes. We have developed the fundamental architecture of an effective emergency response.

The anthrax contaminations of the last few weeks tested our emergency preparation and response plans. We are coordinating closely with our federal partners and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to respond to needs of the Postal Service and other mail handling operations.

While I'm satisfied that we are enhancing our organizational capacity to respond to emergencies, I am here to tell you that we are not sufficiently resourced to respond to the full range of disasters we could face. Although the District's Emergency Preparedness is meeting the current needs of the city, it is not without its toll. Over the past two weeks, our Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department have responded to between 30 and 70 hazardous material (hazmat) calls per day. The Metropolitan Police Department has been on a heightened state of alert since September 11 – which has meant greater numbers of officers deployed, using more overtime dollars. In fact, we estimate that the additional personnel costs alone for police for the six months subsequent to September 11 will be over \$11 million dollars.

I am here today to tell you that the men and women of the District's public safety units are doing what needs to be done, but we are depleting our resources, and it is taking a toll. Our homicide rate was on pace to be down 30% over last year. Since September 11, it is on pace to be down 15%. We are running our hazmat response on unbudgeted overtime dollars. If we must sustain the current operational tempo over the long haul, we are determined to develop flexibility and depth far beyond what anyone has done before because of the unique responsibilities of this city as home to the federal government.

But this is not going to be fast; it is not going to be easy; and it is not going to be without cost. However, together with our regional and federal partners, and with the support of Congress, I am committed to seeing that our city meets – and exceeds – the newly created national standards for emergency preparedness established by FEMA, the National Emergency Management Association, and the International Association of Emergency Management.

We have submitted a request for special appropriations in the amount of \$1 billion that includes \$250 million for emergency preparedness. From our first responders at the Pentagon through our work with the CDC on the anthrax attacks, we have learned much over the past two months. Therefore, this request includes investments in:

- Protective clothing, breathing apparatus, and specialized detection equipment for our

police officers, fire/emergency medical and public health personnel who will be first responders in a chemical or biological emergency;

- Heavy equipment such as urban search and rescue tools, a mobile laboratory for testing and detecting chemical and biological risks and containment units at local hospitals;
- Specialized training for police, fire/EMS and public health personnel; and
- Technological and communications infrastructure to support domestic preparedness and emergency responses.

In addition to investing in the personnel that we depend upon in an emergency, this request for will allow us to better serve the people who live and work in the District of Columbia. For example, one of the critical issues in the city on September 11 was traffic control. With the mass exodus of so many federal employees – many were mothers and fathers who were concerned about their children – the streets downtown initially became grid locked. This request includes equipment that will enable us to closely monitor traffic patterns and quickly implement new patterns and streetlight timings to ensure a safe and orderly evacuation of the city.

This investment in the National Capital will help strengthen our preparedness to levels the American people should expect. While our nation’s capital will always be a “higher risk environment” than most cities responding to a major emergency requires coordination and cooperation among all the local jurisdictions. I am proud that our own Engine 23 was one of the first responders in support of Arlington County at the Pentagon on September 11. I know we can depend on a similar level of support from the governments in northern Virginia and the surrounding Maryland counties. From mutual aid with firefighting, to early detection of symptoms in the hospitals, to evacuation planning, we are working together to prepare, prevent, and when necessary respond. It is only through regional cooperation and our collective resolve that we will succeed in the war on terrorism.

If we are to be successful in safeguarding the Capital, it will require effective communications between the federal government and the District. Earlier this week I had a productive meeting with Governor Ridge who is personally committed to working with me towards additional improvements in District-federal cooperation. I strongly urge the Congress to give positive consideration to Congresswoman Norton’s legislation that would institutionalize

the linkage between the District and the Office of Homeland Security on all elements of domestic preparedness. For example, if a federal entity is considering closing a street, it should coordinate with the District so traffic will flow more smoothly. If there is a suspicion of biological terrorism, federal officials should continue to coordinate with the District so that doctors and nurses will be on standby. If the federal government had to close, coordination with the District will ensure that major thoroughfares will be accessible. The highest level of coordination will reassure the American people that their Capital city is open and safe for all.

I would also like to urge your support for the ranking member's other proposal: giving the Mayor of the District of Columbia the same authority that the governors of all 50 states, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, and Guam have – the authority to mobilize the National Guard. Currently, in an emergency unique to the District, the Mayor must ask the Major General of the DC National Guard, who must then go through the Secretary of the Army, who then gets permission from the President of the United States to activate the National Guard. While I appreciate the support that President Bush has given to the District, I believe that during a local emergency he has more important matters to handle than to activate the DC National Guard at my request.

Economic Recovery and Stimulus

I understand that Mayor Guiliani has estimated the loss of local revenue to New York City since September 11 at close to \$1 billion – or about *2.5 percent* of the city's fiscal year 2002 budget. The searing images of Ground Zero help the public to understand the magnitude of the loss to New York.

There are no compelling images that capture the impact of the recent terrorist attacks on Washington, DC, but the proportionate loss of local revenues is staggering. The District government will lose about \$100 million in tax revenues for fiscal year 2002 as a result of the September 11 attacks, which translates to a projected a *3.5 percent* loss of revenue.

Those numbers do not begin to tell the story of the devastation our economy has suffered. That story can be found in the faces of thousands of unemployed workers struggling to support their families. Let me outline several key indicators that help illustrate the impact to our local economy:

- Reagan National Airport, the front door to our city, is a shadow of its former self. The Airport is operating at about 50 percent of its usual flights.
- The Senate and House buildings have been closed for almost three weeks. Each year, thousands of businesses and organizations sponsor meetings in the District so that participants can do business with members of Congress. Countless conferences and meetings have been cancelled over the past two months. As a result, our hotel occupancy rate is at 40 percent.
- Many streets have been closed, barricaded, or clogged with security checkpoints since September 11, choking access to many of our businesses.

According to economic projections, the D.C. economy will lose \$750 million dollars in only the first six months following September 11th. At least 10,000 small businesses are at risk. And as we all know, small business is the engine that generates economic growth. To put our economic crisis in human terms, the District is projected to lose up to 24,000 jobs at some point over the next six months, and these are jobs held not only by District residents, but also by residents of Maryland and Virginia. At least half of these jobs are front line jobs in the hotel and restaurant business, the dreams and aspirations of the many lower paid workers are on hold, and families are struggling to make ends meet. Right now, approximately half the members of the local hotel and restaurant employees union are unemployed. Worse yet, this industry has experienced these setbacks at a time when they usually experience their highest incomes. This revenue typically provides the funds with which their employees, suppliers, and owners “tide themselves over” the less busy portions of the year. This year, there will be no tide.

To respond to these economic challenges, the District is working in partnership with local lending institutions to set-up a \$100 million loan program to assist businesses that can demonstrate a direct impact due to the terrorist attacks. In addition, we have established a “one-stop-service” office to help affected residents and businesses in finding needed services such as unemployment compensation, rent and subsidies during these economically challenging times.

Like the District, many of our local businesses and employers operate on a very small margin. They cannot survive long without a thriving, bustling tourist industry.

I am asking Congress to support a series of proposals for targeted support to residents and businesses in need. These proposals have two components, an economic recovery package and

an economic stimulus package totaling just over \$750 billion. The Economic Recovery package includes:

- Expanded unemployment benefits to displaced workers, so that those affected by this crisis receive temporary support until our economy recovers;
- Loans and grants to small businesses, because we recognize that small businesses are key to restarting a stalled economy;
- Extension of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) benefits to people who rely on our safety net;
- A federal credit enhancement of tax-exempt Tax Increment Financing bonds would support the development of new businesses that otherwise may not have the capital to locate in the District
- Homeowner mortgage assistance to those individuals in danger of loan foreclosure due to the economic impact of the attack; and
- Revenue relief to the general fund to mitigate the anticipated reduction in sales and income taxes as well as other revenue sources.

The Economic Stimulus package includes:

- Infrastructure investments to enhance the overall security of the city, such as lighting and road improvements and improving security at our schools, while at the same time stimulating the local economy.
- Technology modernization that would enhance the government's procurement process and reduce administrative review time;
- Capital improvements that would enhance the overall learning environment for the city's youth;

I will convey to Congress several proposals whereby the U.S. Tax Code could also contribute to city's revitalization and buttress our capacity for overall security and preparedness.

- An extension of the DC Enterprise Zone designation to correspond with the ten year period granted to other congressionally designated areas;
- Expansion of the DC Enterprise Zone to encompass the entire District of Columbia;

- Removal of the barriers to capital gains tax exclusion by making the zero capital gains temporarily available to promote investment in new economy technologies;
- Exemptions for Enterprise Zone bonds from the private activity bond volume limit;
- and
- Triple tax exemptions for District securities.

Through these and other investments, the federal government would provide critical assistance to ensure the District can recover economically from the attacks that began on September 11th.

While I believe that the emergency preparedness improvements we are making combined with the economic recovery package we are proposing will address the most pressing needs of the District in the wake of September 11, I am left with a recurring images that remind me of the challenges we face and the longstanding and more acute problems caused by the still as yet unresolved nature of how the federal government ought to relate to the District of Columbia.

I walked through the halls of Post Offices and talked to scared postal employees. I have spent time with minimum-wage hospitality workers at employment services office who would rather earn a paycheck than accept unemployment insurance. I have been to community meetings where residents are frightened because there are more police officers patrolling federal facilities than neighborhood streets.

In short, I have seen first hand the devastation our city has experienced these two short months. Two things are clear: short term this funding is critical to address issues relating to the current terrorist attacks and long-term we must develop an annual funding source that will adequately compensate the District for municipal services that serve the federal government and the hundreds of thousands of people who work, but do not live, in this city.

I am deeply proud of how far the city has come in the last few years, but I fear that we continue to operate at one-emergency away from financial difficulties. This will never be resolved until we address the core problem – congressionally imposed restrictions on our tax base. I strongly believe that the District's economy will continue to be vulnerable as long as we must provide services to a city that serves two million people each day with a tax base of only 572,000 residents for support.

From the perspective of the federal government, these restrictions represent a reasonable exercise of federal prerogative in the nation's capital. For the District, however, these restrictions prevent the collection of fair compensation for services rendered - compensation that proves critically necessary for (a) investing in infrastructure and service improvements, and (b) maintaining a structurally balanced budget.

To remedy this issue, Congress should compensate the District for these restrictions. To this end, Congresswoman Norton has presented the District of Columbia Non-Resident Tax Credit Act. This option would allow the District to tax income of non-residents, then offset these taxes with a federal credit. In its anticipated form, this proposal would yield approximately \$400 million in FY 2003. The advantage of this proposal lies in its reflection that the District, like states across the country, merits the opportunity to tax local income at its source. In so doing, however, it ensures that this provision does not unduly harm the residents of Maryland and Virginia by offsetting the local taxation of their wages with a federal credit.

To maximize the prospect of gaining compensation, the District is also considering modified versions of this proposal. Under one alternative, the federal government would provide a 2% credit to the District government on federal taxes paid by District residents. This amount, approximately \$500 million in FY 2003, would compensate the District for federal restrictions appropriately. Under a second alternative, the federal government would establish a fund on behalf of the District to support critical needs.

Regardless of the compensation mechanism selected, the District would focus a substantial resources on infrastructure needs related to transportation, information technology, capital construction and renovation. Through these options, or some appropriate alternative, the federal government should provide compensation for restrictions that have resulted in the structural imbalance of the District's budget.

In closing, I thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to our ongoing discussions about protecting our beloved city and the nation's Capital and long term and short term federal assistance to the District. I will now be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Mayor Williams, for your testimony. We look forward to a discussion and questioning after we hear from our first panel.

Chair of the Council, Linda Cropp, thank you for being here with us. We look forward to hearing your comments.

Ms. CROPP. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Morella, Congresswoman Watson. It is indeed a pleasure for me to be here today and testify before the subcommittee. Thank you very much for holding this hearing.

The District of Columbia enjoys many of the benefits, but we also bear several unique costs, because of its status in the Nation's Capital.

I am not going to read all of my testimony. Quite a bit of it deals with the economic development portion, so I will omit that, and concur with a lot of what the Mayor said. I will submit my entire testimony for the record.

While we, in the District of Columbia, are part of the Nation's Capital, with regard to the effects of the devastating terrorist attack of September 11th and the continuing aftermath, let me just review a few of the costs that are being borne by the District government and its citizens, and why we need the Federal assistance and their dollars to assist us, both directly with these costs and also to help with our economic survival, so that the District has sufficient revenue to pay for the vital services that we provide to the Federal Government.

As you know, it is primarily local resources that have been used to protect the public safety and the public health of not only the 600,000 people who live within the District; and not only the 2 million people, mostly from Maryland and Virginia, who work here every day; but also the entire Federal establishment, which is headquartered within the Nation's Capital.

The reality is that the local governments everywhere are the first responders in this new war against terrorism on our homeland. It has been local police officers, local fire fighters, local emergency medical technicians, local emergency management directors, and local public health officials, who have been the first responders to the attacks and threats against America.

Here in the Nation's Capital, which has been and will continue to be one of the primary targets for terrorism, it has been locally raised revenue that has been paying, in large amounts, for the safety and health of our Federal Government, its work force, and our visitors.

While our fervent patriotism and responsibility demands that we protect our Federal Government, our fervor and responsibility is not diminished to protect our local residents and businesses.

Therefore, Congress and the President must recognize that when, for example, our police force is deployed from our neighborhoods, to protect Federal facilities and Federal officials more than what was previously normal, our local residents and businesses become less protected than previously.

When demand by the Federal Government for the District first responders is greater than can be paid for by locally raised revenue, the Federal Government has a special responsibility to help address these financial needs.

Other cities have States that step up to the plate, and other cities do not have the same level of Federal presence as we do.

As Mayor Williams has indicated, the District is expected to lose \$750 million in just the first 6 months following September 11th. At least 10,000 small businesses, the engines that generate economic growth, are at risk.

As a result of this economic disaster, the District itself is currently projected to lose \$200 million in tax revenue over the next year. Moreover, the cost to District agencies to enhance emergency preparedness is \$250 million. This amount, as I stated, does not include the substantial cost of increased protection to our Federal establishment.

To quantify our post-September 11th economic loss in human terms, the Mayor has submitted documentation as to why we need the \$766 million in economic recovery assistance.

Let me say that this was one of those joint efforts by the executive branch and the legislative branch. The Council of the District of Columbia, its public services, public works, government operations, judiciary, finance, and revenue committees had joint committees working with the executive branch, so that we could really look at our true needs, scrub the numbers, and get everyone involved in a very thoughtful and comprehensive process, to very clearly define what our needs are.

So the document that is being presented by the Mayor is a joint document by the executive and legislative branch. Let me say that both branches of Government also extended their hands out into the community, to also get additional information and input on that.

As the Mayor stated, it has not gone unnoticed by our citizens, the people whom we represent every day, that during this national crisis, in some PSAs, the local police units in our community, that there may have been one or two police officers almost on duty, where the police were diverted to Federal facilities.

My e-mail was almost jammed with outraged citizens, with regard to the fact that they felt totally unprotected, because our local resources had been drained and diverted elsewhere.

We need to develop a process where our citizens are not left vulnerable, while at the same time, as stated earlier, we protect the Federal Government that we all love so very much.

You are quite aware that the District is recently getting its legs back, our strength back, from the financial instability that we have had in the past. The reality is that during our period of instability with regard to our finances, we had deferred maintenance in so many areas with regard to our public safety units.

We did not purchase the equipment during the time when we were just trying to come back from being in debt. So finally, when we saw light at the end of the tunnel and it was not a train, we finally could start purchasing some of the equipment that we needed.

But rest assured, our police department, our fire department, our other emergency teams are not equipped at the level that we may have to face with future attacks. We are equipped to just about handle the day-to-day operations of the city and the needs of the

city. We were starting to build the budget back up for them to do that.

If we are going to continue to be on the high alert that will be mandated by what the city and this Nation is facing, we need to look very carefully at how we are equipped; our fire department, our police department, and our other first responders.

Let me again reiterate that these individuals are the individuals who not only protect the 600,000 people who make Washington, DC, their home, but they are also the protectors for the Federal presence in the District of Columbia, and the 2 million people who come here every day to work.

The amounts that the Mayor had detailed fall short of the city's need. The Council joins with Mayor in asking for your support and advocacy in obtaining the District's full request of \$1 billion in emergency preparedness for economic assistance funding.

This is not just for the District of Columbia. Once again, this is also for the Federal presence here in the District of Columbia. We need to look at the funding for the District in a very unique way, for it is also the fire department for the Federal Government, the police department for the Federal Government, the emergency response team for the Federal Government.

So we need to have that assistance much more than any other place; and in this instance, the Federal Government must act as the District's state.

These funds are crucial to the District's survival and to the Federal Government needs, as emergencies come up. The specific purposes of each of these dollars are detailed in documents provided by the Mayor to you.

We once again join with the Mayor in urging Congress and the White House to support Congresswoman Norton's legislation to provide an annual funding source for the District of Columbia; one that adequately compensates us for the annual cost of services provided and revenue denied as a result of the Federal presence, and the unique congressional prohibition on taxing the income of two-thirds of the income earned in the District of Columbia.

We also join with the Mayor in asking support for the bill that will give the Mayor the ability to call out the National Guard in times of an emergency, just as other jurisdictions and Governors have.

Once again, we thank you so very much for your concern and your interest in this very crucial matter that impacts all of us directly.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cropp follows:]

**TESTIMONY OF
CHAIRMAN LINDA W. CROPP
COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

**BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE**

**FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2001
10:00 A.M.
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
ROOM 2154**

Good morning, Chairwoman Morella, Congresswoman Norton and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for your invitation to testify at this hearing today on the security and economic well-being of the District of Columbia in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States.

The District of Columbia enjoys many benefits but also bears several unique costs because of its status as the nation's capital. With regard to the effects of the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11 and their continuing aftermath, let me review some of the unique costs that are being borne by the District government, and why we need uniquely high Federal dollars to assist us both directly with these costs, and to assist with our economic survival so that the District has sufficient revenue to help pay for vital services that we provide to the Federal government.

As you know, it is primarily local resources that have been used to protect the public safety and public health of not only the 600,000 residents who live within the District, and not only the two million people (mostly from Maryland and Virginia) who work here every day, but also the entire federal establishment which is headquartered here in the nation's capital.

The reality is that local governments everywhere are the first responders in this new war against terrorism on our homeland. It has been local police officers, local firefighters, local emergency medical technicians, local emergency management directors, and local public health officials who have been the first responders to the attacks and threats against America. Here in the nation's capital, which has been and will continue to be a primary target for terrorism, it has been locally raised revenues that have been paying in large amounts for the safety and health of the federal government and its workforce.

While our fervent patriotism and responsibility demands that we protect our federal government, our fervor and responsibility is not diminished to protect our local residents and businesses. Therefore, the Congress and the President must recognize that when, for example, our police force is deployed from neighborhoods to protect federal facilities and federal officials more than what was previously normal, our local residents and businesses become less protected than previously. When demand by the federal government for the District's first responders is greater than can be paid for by locally raised revenue, the federal government has a special responsibility to help address these financial needs.

Other cities have states that step up to the plate, and other cities simply do not have the federal presence to protect as we do.

As Mayor Williams has indicated, the District is expected to lose \$750 million in just the first six months following September 11. At least 10,000 small businesses – the engine that generates economic growth – are at risk. As a result of this economic disaster, the District government itself is currently projected to lose \$200 million in tax revenue over the next year. Moreover, the cost to District agencies to enhance emergency preparedness is \$250 million. And this amount, as I've stated, does not include the substantial costs of increased protection to the federal establishment.

To quantify our post-911 economic loss in human terms, the Mayor has submitted documentation as to why we need approximately \$766 million in economic recovery assistance. Twenty-four thousand District jobs are projected to be lost during the next 6 months – jobs held not only by DC residents but also – in fact a majority – by residents of Maryland and Virginia. At least half of these jobs are in the hotel and restaurant business. Right now, about half of the local travel, hotel, restaurant and tourism-related employees are unemployed. The projected

loss of these tens of thousands of jobs in the District completely wipes out all of the employment gains that we had finally made in the District during the past few years after decades of job loss.

These gloomy projections were made prior to the most recent anthrax scares and deaths, which of course shut down this and other Congressional buildings last week, along with mail delivery service throughout the entire city, further negatively impacting both businesses and residents.

Reagan National Airport, which is thankfully open again and which during the past week has thankfully resumed service to 12 more cities, is still today running at only one-third of the commercial jet service it provided prior to September 11th. We need to establish benchmarks and timetables to restore full service to National Airport -- what the Mayor has accurately described as our front door.

Tours of our most popular destinations, particularly for schoolchildren -- the White House, the U.S. Capitol building, the FBI, the Supreme Court, and the Bureau of Engraving and Printing -- have been suspended indefinitely, and of

course the Washington Monument has been closed for a long time due to renovations. This of course sends an inaccurate message to the nation that all of Washington is closed, and it obviously has a downward ripple effect on the entire hospitality sector.

Although other monuments and museums on the Mall and elsewhere are in fact open, there are currently few visitors. Other than the federal government, tourism is the District's most important industry, with over 25 million visitors a year to Washington. We must do everything we can to return to an image of being safe and open for business and pleasure travellers to visit Washington.

Of course we are a nation at war, and unlike any war we have ever experienced, because it is a war against terrorism on our own homeland. And the nation's capital is at the epicenter of this war. We, who live here with the nightly roar of F-15 Air Force jets flying overhead, with our main post office and many mailrooms closed due to anthrax contamination, and with the constant uncertainty of when and where and in what form the next terrorist attack will take place, are painfully aware of what a prime target we are to our enemies. And yet those jets and other security precautions that are being taken actually make us one of the

most protected cities in America today.

The federal government certainly must take all necessary steps to ensure the security of federal facilities and officials in Washington. And the District government, with our police, fire, public health, emergency management and other agencies, is certainly doing our part to assist with this security -- costs for which the District has not been adequately compensated.

However, as we increase security against terrorism, which we are doing, and as we prepare for and respond quickly and comprehensively to various emergencies and ensure the public safety and health, which we also are doing, we must be equally vigilant about maintaining our free, open and economically prosperous society which this war is all about. Security must be balanced with public accessibility and democratic values. Because if we continue falling too much into a fortress mentality -- where, for example, we allow the proliferation of ugly concrete jersey barriers which shut off citizens from their public streets, their national symbols, and their daily commerce -- we will continue to project the wrong negative image of a city under siege, thereby killing the economic vitality of Washington DC and providing the terrorists with a huge victory. That is why urge you to support the request by the National Capital Planning Commission for

Federal funding of security measures which are comprehensive designed and built to increase public safety while also maintaining public accessibility and the physical beauty of the nation's capital.

We appreciate the President's recent request for \$25 million in emergency management funds for the District of Columbia out of the first \$20 billion in supplemental funds that were authorized by Congress to address the immediate needs of affected jurisdictions following the September attacks. We also appreciate that this amount is in addition to the \$16 million already included in both the House and Senate versions of the FY 2002 D.C. appropriations bill for the District to respond to the attacks, and in addition to the \$6 million received by the District in FY 2001 emergency supplemental appropriations to pay for police overtime in advance of the IMF/World Bank meetings in Washington that were ultimately cancelled.

However, these amounts, as the Mayor has detailed, fall far short of the city's needs. The Council joins the Mayor in asking for your support and advocacy in obtaining the District's full request for \$1 billion in emergency preparedness and economic assistance funding. These funds are critical to the District's survival. The specific purposes of each of these dollars are detailed in documents provided

by the Mayor to the Congress and the White House, and their importance will be emphasized later today by representatives of our labor and business communities. The Council calls upon Congress to support Congresswoman Norton's legislation to require the District government to be included in all aspects of federal emergency planning, domestic preparedness and homeland security which affect the nation's capital. The Council also urges your support of her legislation to provide the Mayor of the District of Columbia with the authority to mobilize the National Guard -- the same authority that the governors of all 50 states have. We have all realized that more systematic consultation, cooperation and coordination amongst federal, District and regional officials are essential to better anticipate, prepare for and respond to the array of emergencies with which we are challenged as the nation's capital community.

The Council joins with the Mayor and Congresswoman Norton in urging this subcommittee's advocacy of not only this short-term federal funding necessary to pay for the federal government's fair share of the District's immediate and substantial costs as a result of the recent terrorist attacks -- costs for emergency preparedness, public safety, public health and economic recovery assistance in the nation's capital. We also once again join with the Mayor in urging Congressional

and White House support for Congresswoman Norton's legislation to provide an annual funding source for the District of Columbia -- one that adequately compensates us for the annual costs of services provided and revenue denied as a result of the federal presence and the unique Congressional prohibition on taxing the income of two-thirds of the income earned within the District of Columbia.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify before the subcommittee today. As always, I look forward to working with you to ensure a brighter tomorrow for the nation's capital and for all who live, work and visit here.

Ms. WATSON. Congresswoman Morella.

Mrs. MORELLA. Yes, Congresswoman Watson.

Ms. WATSON. This is a question to the Chair to see if it would be possible for us to recommend to Appropriations that during emergencies, that the Mayor and the Council have the authority to bypass and to make their requests known for the resources.

I do not know why you have to go through all that you do in an emergency. I think if we can look at it in some way, so the resources can be obtained immediately, and then afterwards, we could work it out. I understand that your process is that you have to go to Appropriations, if it is supplemental to your budget?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Congresswoman Watson, I think Congresswoman Norton, in conjunction with the committee, has proposed a plan whereby an account would be set up, that the District could draw on, to meet these extraordinary national responsibilities, ranging from the predictable, like inaugurations and big protests and activities, to the unpredictable.

Ms. WATSON. Yes, that is a provision in her proposal.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, it is something that has been proposed. I think I speak for the city, that we strongly support it.

Ms. WATSON. Well, let me suggest that if it is not in her proposal, maybe this is something the committee would want to have.

Mrs. MORELLA. We can look into it, but we do have legislation that has been introduced.

Ms. WATSON. All right.

Mrs. MORELLA. I am a sponsor with Congresswoman Norton, dealing with emergencies, the exigencies over which you have no control; whether they are emergencies, inauguration, or whatever the special burden is, it falls on the District.

I am glad you brought that up. With your consent also, we will go to the rest of the panel, and then we will fire away at questions, thank you.

Ms. WATSON. I just have one more question, based on the two.

Mrs. MORELLA. You are going to use up the time that I am going to give you later, though. [Laughter.]

Ms. WATSON. Just really quickly, in your presentations, you might talk about how you coordinate with the Federal law enforcement officers that service here.

Mrs. MORELLA. Can you let her answer that later on? Because that is a very good question for all of them as to how are we really coordinating.

Ms. WATSON. Yes.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, and I am now going to recognize Kenneth Kasprisin, who is the Assistant Director for Readiness, Response, and Recovery at FEMA. Thank you for being with us.

Mr. KASPRISIN. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee. I am honored to be here today.

When the hijacked American Airlines flight crashed into the Pentagon on September 11th, it triggered a range of actions across the region by Federal, State, local, and private agencies.

The challenge we faced then and continue to face today lies in effectively coordinating the multi-jurisdictional efforts, so that all the individual efforts are synchronized into a single, cohesive emergency response.

The September 11th events caused a quick escalation in emergency response at all levels, from local to the Federal. Governor Gilmore immediately requested and the President declared a major disaster under the Stafford Act. FEMA then implemented the Federal Response Plan to manage and coordinate the Federal assistance.

The Federal Response Plan is designed to support, not supplant, State and local efforts. As the lead Federal agency, FEMA manages the allocation of Federal resources to support these disaster responses.

Other Federal agencies are, in many cases, able to meet a variety of the requirements under their own authorities and their own funding; if not, FEMA issues a mission assignment, or reimbursable work order, to cover the cost.

The Federal Response Plan that we have works, and it works well, because it is simple and it is understood. Over the past 5 years, we have implemented the plan over 300 times.

As you know, the Metropolitan Council of Governments includes all the National Capital Region jurisdictions, plus other key regional players. The Council helped develop a number of regional plans, including the planning guidance for the public health system response to a bio-terrorism event and a unified regional snow emergency plan.

The snow plan provides a coordinated decisionmaking process among local jurisdictions for early dismissal, emergency routing, and snow-related closures across the region.

Decisions and coordination under the plan are accomplished through a process that includes teleconferences, public information dissemination, and the Washington area warning system. We can build on that snow plan model to help coordinate aspects that we would face in the event of another attack.

The District of Columbia lies at the heart of the region, and has its own Emergency Response Plan. As the Mayor indicated, the D.C. Emergency Management Agency recently updated their plan to mirror the Federal Response Plan.

That effort was initiated as a result of lessons learned both from the August flooding and the September 11th events. Mr. Mayor, thank you for acknowledging Mike Lowder's efforts in that regard.

Over the past 7 weeks, we have been working even more closely with our national, regional, and local partners, to enhance FEMA's ability to respond to any future event.

To that end, and to shorten Federal response times in a weapons of mass destruction event, in the National Capital Region, we have [1] developed the National Capital Region contingency plan; and [2] formed an emergency response team, dedicated to the National Capital Region.

As part of this effort, we have established an initial operating facility that is ready to begin operations immediately to coordinate any necessary response activities. The facility will be staffed by personnel who can rapidly respond.

In addition, we have pre-positioned various resources at the facility, including communications equipment, which will enable us to begin operations much more quickly and more effectively.

At the same time, we have been working closely with the Domestic Preparedness Task Force established by Mayor Williams, as well as with the Emergency Planning Task Force, established by the Council of Governments. We will continue to do so, to ensure that we maximize the expertise at all levels of Government.

Madam Chairwoman, you convened this hearing to discuss emergency preparedness in the National Capital Region. Under the circumstances, local, State, and Federal agencies in the region have responded extraordinarily well, and we continue our work together to improve that response.

We are coordinating with the D.C. Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Capital Police and others, to monitor the anthrax testing, gather the information, provide advice and assistance where necessary, and update our contingency plan, as appropriate.

It is our constant duty to look for improvements and, as previously indicated, the challenges lie in our ability to coordinate the multi-jurisdictional efforts.

FEMA has a role to play. We are not a regulatory agency. We do not approve their plans, but we constantly strive to improve the process. At present, we are leading a national assessment of the State's capabilities to response to a weapons of mass destruction event.

FEMA regional staff, along with officials from the Department of Justice, Department of Health and Human Services, and the Environmental Protection Agency, are visiting every State and territory, including the District, to jointly assess the capability, and to determine where they need to improve, and how we can best get there.

I appreciate your concerns and leadership during this difficult time. I assure you that we are working shoulder to shoulder with Governor Ridge, other Federal agencies, and the States to provide the best preparedness and response for the American people.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for convening this important hearing. This concludes my remarks, and I will be glad to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kasprisin follows:]

**STATEMENT OF
KENNETH S. KASPRISIN
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
READINESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY DIRECTORATE
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NOVEMBER 2, 2001**

Introduction

Good morning Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee. I am Ken Kasprisin, Assistant Director of the Readiness, Response, and Recovery Directorate (RRR) for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). I thank you for this opportunity to discuss FEMA's role in emergency preparedness for the Nation's Capital.

Federal Response

A total of 189 people died when hijacked American Airlines flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon on September 11th, as part of the most lethal terrorist attack in world history. Shortly after the attack, FEMA activated a full interagency Emergency Support Team at the National Interagency Emergency Operations Center at FEMA Headquarters. Federal officials immediately began arriving at the Center to coordinate the nationwide response and recovery effort for both the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. At the same time we activated all 10 of our Regional Operations Centers across the country and a backup Emergency Support Team at FEMA's Mt. Weather Emergency Assistance Center in Berryville, Virginia. The Emergency Support Teams operated around the clock, working two 12-hour shifts.

In response to the tragic events at the Pentagon, Governor Gilmore requested and President Bush declared a major disaster under the Stafford Act for Virginia. The President authorized Federal assistance for emergency response and recovery programs to provide individual assistance, public assistance, and hazard mitigation. Normally, the Federal government covers 75 percent of the disaster response costs with the remaining 25 percent the responsibility of non-Federal entities. However, in this disaster FEMA is reimbursing Virginia and the affected local governments for 100 percent of the eligible costs for debris removal, emergency protective measures, and public infrastructure rebuilding costs in response to the terrorist attacks.

FEMA established a Disaster Field Office (DFO) in Arlington, Virginia, to manage and coordinate the disaster response and recovery effort for the Pentagon. As part of our response we deployed one of our Mobile Emergency Response System Detachments (MERS) to Virginia to support the DFO and other facilities, primarily to enhance communications capabilities. In addition, five of our 28 Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces were deployed to the Pentagon as part of our response and we dispatched liaisons to support the FBI's Joint Operations Center in Arlington and Strategic Information and Operations Center at FBI Headquarters in Washington.

Our Federal partners played extremely important roles in the response to the terrorist attacks and I want to acknowledge and thank them for their tremendous support, which included such things as:

- transportation assistance from the Department of Transportation;
- telecommunications assistance from the National Communications System;
- debris management support from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;

- logistics management support from the U.S. Forest Service;
- facilities, supplies, and telecommunications support from the General Services Administration;
- medical, mortuary, and mental health and other services from the Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, and other agencies;
- environmental monitoring and sampling support from the Environmental Protection Agency;
- food stamp program services from the Department of Agriculture
- power restoration assistance from the Department of Energy;
- invaluable support from the various branches of the Department of Defense; and,
- mass care, feeding, and counseling services from the American Red Cross and other volunteer organizations;

There is no doubt that the disaster recovery will be a long-term process, but the President has said that we will provide whatever assistance is needed to get the job done. We continue to work closely with the Commonwealth of Virginia and the departments and agencies to address some special coordination requirements. First of all, we are coordinating with the Department of Justice Office for Victims of Crime (OVC), because this disaster involves victims of crime and their families. Second, we are coordinating with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) because this disaster involves an airplane crash and assistance from American Airlines to the families of the victims. Finally, the outpouring of donations that non-governmental organizations have received in the aftermath of the attacks is unprecedented. As a result, to be as responsive as possible to the unique aspects of this situation, we have closely coordinated with OVC, the NTSB, and the non-governmental recipients of donated funds to put in place as coordinated and efficient response structure as possible to ensure that there is no duplication of disaster assistance.

I am grateful to the Congress for their swift action in approving the \$ 40 billion President's Emergency Response Fund in response to these events.

National Capital Region Activities

Following the September 11th attacks, FEMA established a specific emergency response team for the National Capital Region. Normally, we would deploy a team from our regional office in Philadelphia, but in order to shorten response times, FEMA put together a new team comprised of FEMA and other key agency personnel who live and work in the D.C. Metro area. This team has developed a National Capital Region Contingency Plan, working with counterparts in D.C., Virginia, and Maryland. The Plan builds on the Federal Response Plan and existing plans of the local jurisdictions, by filling in the blanks on operational details that are oftentimes situation dependent. For example, we have already identified initial and surge staffing, set up our initial operating facility, and pre-positioned some response resources in the area, including communications equipment. The intent of the contingency planning effort is to ensure a higher state of preparedness, identify information needs in advance, and prescript as many response actions as possible.

In addition, the D.C. Emergency Management Agency has revised its District Response Plan so that it more closely mirrors the Federal Response Plan. Development of this Plan grew out of lessons learned during the response to the flooding here in the District in August. Mayor Williams has also established a Domestic Preparedness Task Force. We have been meeting with officials of the D.C. Emergency Management Agency and the Mayor's Domestic Preparedness Task Force on a regular basis.

On a daily basis we are coordinating with appropriate officials and agencies and monitoring the testing of the Brentwood postal facility and workers for anthrax so that we can immediately incorporate new information into the contingency plan. FEMA and other agencies also continue to support operations in response to the anthrax incidents at the U.S. Capitol complex. Our liaison officers have been on site at the command center since the beginning of the incident. We participated in meetings to discuss sampling and decontamination options with representatives of the U.S. Capitol Police Board, Department of Health and Human Services, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Defense, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). We also provided advice and assistance in the development of an organizational structure for the response effort based on the incident command system, which was fully approved by the Capitol Police Board. And our liaisons assisted the Office of the Architect of the Capitol by coordinating with our partners to establish feeding operations for the responders and locate furniture and equipment for the temporary operations center established at the U.S. Botanic Garden.

The FEMA Headquarters Emergency Support Team is operating on a 24-hour basis. FEMA staff along with experts in health and medical services, hazardous materials, and energy and representatives from the Department of Defense are activated. A second team is on alert to deploy if necessary to the alternate emergency operations center in Berryville, Virginia. Liaisons are also on duty at the Capitol Operations Center at the U.S. Botanic Garden and the Strategic Information and Operations Center at FBI Headquarters. Two National Emergency Response Teams remain on alert. One of those teams is dedicated to the National Capital Region and continues to review and update information for the contingency plan.

Lessons Learned

The events of September 11th tested the emergency response capability of the local, State, and Federal governments. As I said, this was the worst disaster we have ever faced as a nation. Overall we responded extraordinarily well. Members of my staff toured the site at the Pentagon and spoke with command officers who commented on the extraordinary organization, cooperation, and professionalism among response agencies at the scene. Oftentimes we hear that there are arguments at the scene about who's in charge. I am proud to tell you that the military, Arlington County fire services, the FBI, and all of the supporting agencies pulled together beautifully as a solid team in this response. Some of this cooperation of course was a result of the fact that many of the key players were not meeting for the first time. They had planned, trained, and exercised together.

As you know, the anthrax incidents and additional threats continue to test us. We are working very hard with the D.C. Emergency Management Agency and the Capitol Police Board to help ensure that the National Capital Region continues to improve its readiness posture. As part of our responsibility, we are also facilitating a larger coordination effort that involves counterpart local and Federal agencies.

We learn valuable lessons from each of our disaster responses and after each one we try to identify areas where we can improve. Recent terrorist events are no exception. FEMA convened the interagency Catastrophic Disaster Response Group to review the Federal response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks and identified several areas that we want to review further:

- Medical response capabilities, including pharmaceuticals.
- Information collection and dissemination.
- Comprehensive resource packages for responding to biological scenarios.
- Communications improvements.
- Equipment and training for teams to operate in contaminated environments.
- Improved coordination of evacuation procedures.

I know you are concerned about the evacuation out of the Downtown area on September 11th. We all remember what happened that morning. The media was saturated with coverage of the events. Agencies with roles in emergency response mobilized teams and resources from across the region. At the same time, employers and government agencies made decisions regarding early dismissal and closure. Some individuals in the Downtown area chose spontaneous evacuation.

FEMA advocates an all-hazards approach to emergency preparedness and response. I want to mention a plan that many of you are familiar with that works--the Metropolitan Council of Governments Unified Regional Snow Emergency Plan for the Washington Metropolitan Area. This plan is familiar to us and has been used for coordinated decision-making regarding early dismissal and closure across the region. The plan addresses emergency routes, teleconferencing, the Washington Area Warning System, and public information. We can use this plan as a model and build on it.

The Council of Governments provides an appropriate forum for coordination of emergency preparedness and response for issues affecting the region as a whole. The Council includes the governments of the District of Columbia and 16 local jurisdictions surrounding the Nation's Capital, plus area members of the Maryland and Virginia legislatures, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives. The Council has coordinated the development of planning guidance for the public health system response to a biological event in the National Capital Region. I will defer to the Council of Governments to update you on that effort.

The Office of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services are leading our Federal efforts regarding pharmaceuticals and I will defer to them to give you an update on their activities.

On October 19th, the White House announced the establishment of an interagency Homeland Security Emergency Support Team. The team began operations at FEMA headquarters at noon on Friday, October 19, 2001. The team is currently operating around the clock with representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs, the Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Postal Service. Representatives from other agencies may be added as required. This interagency team serves as the central coordination point for the collection of consequence management information for the Office of Homeland Security.

The Homeland Security Emergency Support Team reports directly to Governor Ridge's office with the latest information from Federal agencies, State and local governments. I should point out that the team is not responsible for making public statements. Public announcements are the responsibility of Governor Ridge, his office, the White House, or the relevant agencies.

Before I close I want to mention that FEMA is currently working on a capability assessment plan for all 50 States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and D.C. Our teams will meet with them to assess their capability to respond to an event, and to assess where we think they should be and/or how they should get there. We will be working shoulder-to-shoulder with Governor Ridge, the other Federal agencies, and the States to provide the best protection and response for the American people.

The Office of Management and Budget has submitted an emergency funding request to Congress for an additional \$5.5 billion for FEMA. Of this amount, \$550 million will be administered as grants to States and local communities to provide first responders with training and equipment for enhancing chemical and biological response capabilities, \$30 million will support the new Office of National Preparedness, and the remaining \$4.9 billion will go to the President's Disaster Relief Fund.

Conclusion

Madam Chairwoman, you convened this hearing to discuss emergency preparedness in the Nation's Capital. The attack on the Pentagon and subsequent threats have dramatically altered our sense of security in the District of Columbia and the National Capital Region. FEMA is responsible for ensuring that the national emergency management system is adequate to respond to the consequences of disasters of all types, including acts of terrorism. The Federal family has focused its efforts on providing assistance to those affected by these terrible events and has done so swiftly and successfully, in part, because of the strong partnerships fostered through years of planning, training, exercises, and operations for other types of disasters. Terrorism is one threat among many and we need to build on an all-hazards approach.

This Country is blessed with a resilience and incredible spirit and we have witnessed this during the past seven weeks. We appreciate your leadership during this difficult time. The cooperation and support provided by the Congress is welcome and necessary.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I would be happy to answer any questions.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Mr. Kasprisin. It is a pleasure to have FEMA with us and to hear your comments.

Mr. KASPRISIN. Thank you.

Mrs. MORELLA. I am now pleased to recognize Admiral Arthur Lawrence, the Assistant Surgeon General/Acting Principal Deputy Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services. That is a long title.

Dr. LAWRENCE. That is not all of it, either. [Laughter.]

Good morning, Madam Chair and members of the subcommittee. I am Dr. Arthur Lawrence, Assistant Surgeon General and Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health of the Department of Health and Human Services.

In this regard, I perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary for Health, as the head of the Office of Public Health in Science, and supervise the activities of the Office of Emergency Preparedness.

Recently, the emergency response capabilities of HHS have been mobilized to assist local governments in New York, Pennsylvania, and the Washington Metropolitan Area, to address health consequences of unprecedented terrorist attacks against the citizens of the United States.

Our department, with our partners in the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense, are in the best position at the national level to supplement the resources of State and local governments in mass casualty situations, regardless of their cause, as we have done continuously since September 11th.

HHS is a signatory agency of the Federal Response Plan that was just referred to, that provides a structure for Federal response assistance to other levels of government, when resources are overwhelmed. In particular, our department is responsible for leading the health and medical services emergency support function of the plan, also known as ESF-8.

We are supported in that responsibility by 12 other departments and agencies. The functions that we carry out through the Office of Emergency Preparedness include medical services, mental health services, preventive health services, and environmental health services.

All of the agencies of HHS participate with OEP in executing the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services under the plan.

One of our most important assets for providing emergency health support to our citizens during disasters is the National Disaster Medical System [NDMS]. NDMS is a partnership of the Departments of Health and Human Services, Defense, and Veterans Affairs, as well as the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

In this partnership, more than 7,000 health professionals—doctors, nurses, pharmacists, emergency medical technicians, etc.—are organized into approximately 80 teams around the country, to provide medical mental health and specialized services at or near the scene of a disaster.

Furthermore, the system provides the capability to transport patients to other locations away from the disaster region, in order to meet victims' definitive health care needs, should that be necessary.

Additionally, under the system, both DOD and the VA manage approximately 2,000 private sector hospitals, which have volunteered and can be called upon to accept patients from other disaster areas, who might not otherwise be able to receive care in locally overwhelmed facilities.

Another resource that we can access is the Public Health Service's Commissioned Corps Readiness Force [CCRF], a group of approximately 1,400 Public Health Service Officers, that can be mobilized to respond to disasters or other public health emergencies immediately.

Immediately after the attack on the World Trade Center, the Secretary of HHS, Tommy Thompson, placed these systems on their highest state of readiness to respond, and they did.

Since September 11th, we have mobilized over 1,300 members of the National Disaster Medical System, commissioned officers under the Commissioned Corps Readiness Force, and Public health professionals, from the Centers from Disease Control to augment local resources available in response to respond to these calamities.

For example, in New York City, we are still providing medical support for the teams working at the site of the destruction of the World Trade Center, augmenting the resources of the medical examiner to identify the victims of the attack, supplementing nursing staff at the burn center that is taking care of some of the survivors, assisting the Department of Health with its public health surveillance, and providing support for the immediate crisis counseling needs that have been identified, among other activities.

In addition to continuing to support the city in response to the World Trade Center, we have deployed over 100 NDMS and CCRF members to assist in distribution drugs to the U.S. Postal Service workers, to protect them from potential exposure to the anthrax that was used to contaminate letters sent to the major television networks, that passed through mail processing centers.

Today and tomorrow, these teams are back in New York to assist in distributing the pharmaceuticals that will be necessary to complete the prophylaxis of more than 5,000 postal workers and contractors similarly exposed.

Similarly, we are still assisting the District Government in investigation and controlling the health risks to U.S. Postal Service and other mail room workers, and visitors in the District and surrounding jurisdictions, that were exposed to anthrax, that was contained in one or more letters processed through the Brentwood Postal facility or the State Department Annex 32 mail handling area.

In support of the District Government, we have provided the majority of health professionals that have staffed the anthrax prevention clinics that were set up at D.C. General Hospital to assure that mail handlers exposed to anthrax in Washington received the necessary pharmaceuticals; in this case, ciprofloxacin and doxycycline.

Although we also provided these drugs to Maryland, Virginia, and New Jersey, for their affected Postal workers, their health departments decided to make the distributions without our direct assistance.

Our department has had a long experience with both Federal, State, and local governments in the Washington Metropolitan Area

in preparing for terrorist attacks. For example, here in the Capital, our teams support the attending physician during major events, such as the State of the Union Address, assuring that the availability of health services for Members of Congress, their staffs, and visitors, should a significant disaster occur.

In recent weeks, we have provided continuance support to the Office of the Attending Physician, in testing and providing preventive services and pharmaceuticals to Members of Congress, their staffs, and visitors, to areas affected by the release of anthrax in the congressional mail system.

Likewise, we have worked with all of the Washington area jurisdictions to create a National Medical Response Team that can supplement the available resources in any one of the jurisdictions of Montgomery County, Prince George's County, Arlington County, Alexandria, Fairfax County, or the District, should there be a release of a chemical weapon.

Sufficient antidotes are stockpiled here to treat 5,000 victims, using a team that can respond within 90 minutes of activation.

We are now in the final stages of completion of a plan, expected within 2 weeks, for the distribution of pharmaceuticals in the District, in the event of a biological attack that is directed against the general population.

These most recent events have not been the initiator for our local actions. In fact, we have been working with the governments in Maryland, Virginia, and the District since 1995, in strengthening public health responsibilities. We are looking forward to continuing these close working relationships.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for the opportunity to testify today.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lawrence follows:]



Testimony

**Before the Committee on Government Reform,
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
United States House of Representatives**

**Emergency Preparedness in
the Nation's Capital**

Statement of

RADM Arthur J. Lawrence

*Assistant Surgeon General and
Acting Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Health
Department of Health and Human
Services*



**For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 am
on Friday, November 2, 2001**

Good morning Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee. I am Dr. Arthur Lawrence, Assistant Surgeon General and Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). In this regard I am the head of the Office of Public Health and Science and supervise the activities of the Office of Emergency Preparedness.

Recently, the emergency response capabilities of HHS have been mobilized to assist local governments in New York, Pennsylvania, and the Washington metropolitan area address the health consequences of unprecedented terrorist attacks against the citizens of the United States. Our Department, with our partners in the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs, are in the best position at the national level to supplement the resources of State and local governments in mass casualty situations, regardless of their cause, as we have done continuously since September 11.

HHS is a signatory agency of the Federal Response Plan that provides a structure for federal response assistance to other levels of government when their resources are overwhelmed. In particular, our Department is responsible for leading the health and medical services emergency support function of the Plan, known as ESF 8. We are supported in that responsibility by 12 other departments and agencies. The functions that we carry out, through the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), include medical services, mental health services, preventive health services, and environmental health services. All of the agencies of HHS participate with OEP in executing the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services under the Plan.

One of our most important assets for providing emergency health support to our citizens during disasters is the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). NDMS is a partnership of the Departments of Health and Human Services, Defense (DOD), and Veterans Affairs (VA), as well as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In this partnership, more than 7000 health professionals (doctors, nurses, pharmacists, emergency medical technicians, etc) are organized into approximately 80 teams around the country to provide medical, mental health and specialized services at or near the scene of disasters. Furthermore, the System provides the capability to transport patients to other locations away from the disaster region in order to meet victims' definitive care needs, should that be necessary. Additionally, under the System, both DOD and the VA manage approximately 2000 private sector hospitals which have volunteered and can be called upon to accept patients from the disaster area who might not otherwise be able to receive care in locally overwhelmed systems.

Another resource that we can access is the Public Health Service's Commissioned Corps Readiness Force (CCRF), a group of 1400 Public Health Service Officers that can be mobilized to respond to disasters or other public health emergencies. Immediately after the attack on the World Trade Center, the Secretary of HHS, Tommy Thompson, placed these systems on their highest state of readiness to respond. And they did.

Since September 11, we have mobilized over 1300 members of NDMS, commissioned officers under CCRF, and public health professionals from the Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention (CDC) to augment local resources available to respond to these calamities. For example, in New York City, we are still providing medical support for the teams working at the site of the destruction of the World Trade Center, augmenting the resources of the medical examiner to identify the victims of the attack, supplementing the nursing staff at the burn center taking care of some of the survivors, assisting the Department of Health with its public health surveillance, and providing support for the immediate crisis counseling needs that have been identified, among other activities.

In addition to continuing to support the City in response to the World Trade Center attack, we have deployed over 100 NDMS and CCRF members to assist in distributing drugs to United States Postal Service (USPS) workers to protect them from potential exposure to the anthrax that was used to contaminate letters sent to the major television networks and that passed through their mail processing centers. Today and tomorrow, these teams are back in New York to assist in distributing the pharmaceuticals that will be necessary to complete the prophylaxis of more than 5000 postal workers and contractors potentially exposed.

Similarly, we are still assisting the District government in investigating and controlling the health risks to USPS and other mail room workers and visitors in the District and surrounding jurisdictions that were exposed to anthrax that was contained in one or more letters processed through the Brentwood postal facility or the State Department Annex 32 mail handling area. In support of the District Government, we have provided the majority of the health professionals

that have staffed the anthrax prevention clinics that were set up at DC General Hospital to assure that mail handlers exposed to anthrax in Washington received the necessary pharmaceuticals, in this case ciprofloxacin and doxycycline. Although we also provided these drugs to Maryland, Virginia and New Jersey for their affected postal workers, their health departments decided to make the distributions without our direct assistance.

Our Department has had a long experience with both federal, State and local governments in the Washington metropolitan area in preparing for terrorist attacks. For example, here in the Capitol our teams support the Attending Physician during major events (such as the State of the Union Address), assuring the availability of health services for Members of Congress, their staffs and visitors should a significant disaster occur. In recent weeks, we have provided continuous support to the Office of the Attending Physician in testing and providing preventive services and pharmaceuticals to Members of Congress, their staffs and visitors to areas affected by the release of anthrax in the Congressional mail system.

Likewise, we have worked with all of the Washington area jurisdictions to create a National Medical Response Team that can supplement the available resources in any one of the jurisdictions (Montgomery County, Prince Georges County, Arlington County, Alexandria or Fairfax counties, or the District) should there be the release of a chemical weapon. Sufficient antidotes are stockpiled here to treat 5,000 victims, using a team that can respond within 90 minutes of activation. Now we are in the final stages of completion of a plan, expected within

two weeks, for the distribution of pharmaceuticals in the District in the event of a biological attack directed against the general population.

These most recent events have not been the initiator for our local actions. In fact, we have been working with the governments in Maryland, Virginia and the District since 1995 in strengthening public health responsibilities. We are looking forward to continuing these close working relationships.

Thank you, Madam Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today. I would be pleased to address any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Admiral Lawrence, for your testimony, in terms of the coordination with the entire region.

I am now pleased to recognize Michael Rogers, the executive director of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments. Welcome, it is good to see you, again.

Mr. ROGERS. Madam Chair, Ms. Norton, and Ms. Watson, I am very pleased to be here on behalf of the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments to discuss emergency preparedness for the Washington Region and what we, at COG, are doing to assist in making EMS or emergency preparedness plans effective, complete, and coordinated.

As you know, the Council of Governments is the association of 17 major cities and counties in the Washington Metropolitan Region. COG provides a forum for regional cooperation. At COG, elected officials work together to find solutions to our shared challenges, and then continue to work together to implement those solutions.

This organization also serves its members by acting as a think tank for local governments and a regional information source on the environment, transportation, and human services.

COG represents a partnership that provides solid research, planning, and leadership, and can ensure that this region speaks with one voice.

As we confront the aftermath of September 11th, I believe there is no other time in COG's 44-year history when those services, the services we provide, have been more valuable to the region.

In recent weeks, COG has brought together the emergency management and public safety officials from our member governments, State and Federal officials, and local health organizations. Our purpose has been to coordinate the work that is being done by each of these entities into an effective, complete regional plan of action, to be used in the event of major emergencies.

COG continues to do what we do best, and that is serve as a forum for interested parties to come together to discuss and plan for a specific emergency. We can do this because COG's committee support structure provides a place and mechanism for public safety officials to come together to address common needs and concerns.

In addition to the committee structure, the concept of a forum has been extended to COG, serving as a moderator of regional conference calls of public officials getting together to discuss event-related topics, such as government and school closings and openings, and the need for information hotlines and mutual aid.

COG facilities are available for emergency meetings at the time of disaster, and have been used periodically. We have also set up hotlines, to give information to the public regarding the nature of the emergency, when called upon.

To give local governments the tools that they need to manage an incident, COG has developed agreements, plans, and communication systems to aid them.

Basic to contingency planning are the police and fire mutual aid agreements. When one jurisdiction has an emergency and has committed or foresees that it will commit all of its resources, it can request aid from its neighbors. This was ably demonstrated on September 11th at the Pentagon, as we all know. But there is work

that remains in the emergency management area, particularly with mutual aids.

We have been using, since the Air Florida crisis crash, an incident command system as the basis for responding to incidents. That has been a very effective way of proceeding.

The question has been asked, if COG has a terrorism plan. The short answer is no. The mutual aid operational plan developed after Air Florida is an all hazards plan. At the regional level, the planning principles contained in the Incident Command System are applicable to a whole host of contingencies, from a simple car crash to an aircraft incident.

Specific planning remains the responsibility of local governments, and we work with them in doing the regional coordination.

One role that COG has played is developing a communications system that allows and facilitates the regional leaders to talk to each other and to the public. A variety of systems exist for police, fire, and D.C. hospitals. This is called the Mutual Aid Radio Systems. That is tested daily and is used regularly, and was definitely used on September 11th.

I am going to skip over some of the details about the systems, but the testimony is submitted for the record. But I want to make this point. COG's role in an emergency is fairly limited, but effective where we are involved.

In the September 11th incident at the Pentagon, the city and county administrators and schools officials talked in four COG-arranged conference calls to decide government and school closings and openings.

For future events, a recommendation was made for emergency management officials to confer on a regular basis by conference call, rather than rely solely on the Washington Area Warning System.

Since September 24th, the COG Board has been very much involved in directing the staff to work with our regional governments to produce a regional response plan and to look at that aftermath of September 11th.

At a special meeting on September 25th, the COG Board encouraged the Mayor of the District of Columbia and chief executives from the region's jurisdictions to work with COG to ensure that our regional infrastructure was prepared to respond to catastrophic events.

At that meeting, we began the process of reviewing police and fire mutual aid agreements that COG has had in place. The system had worked well on September 11th, but we will be coming to you for some assistance on legislation, to make sure that in the future, those mutual aid agreements can work even more effectively.

On October 10th, COG Chair, Carol Schwartz, an at-large member of the District of Columbia Council, sent a letter to Secretary Tom Ridge of the Office of Homeland Security, asking him to make security plans for this region a model for the Nation.

On October 25th, Chair Schwartz convened the first meeting of the COG Board Ad Hoc Task Force on Emergency Preparedness. The Task Force will continue to meet to coordinate the Emergency Response Plan into a unit that addresses policymaking, public safety, transportation, evacuation, communications, and public utilities.

As I wrap up, let me simply say that we are at a point now where we have worked with the regional governments on their mutual aid plans. We are engaged with FEMA, looking at the National Capital Region plan for mass destruction contingency. We expect that FEMA will be involved in working with the COG Task Force.

That National Capital Plan can serve as a framework for a regional contingency plan, which all local governments can be a part of, so that the National Capital Region is, in fact, very secure and we can respond to any type of emergency.

I look forward to answering any questions that you have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers follows:]

*Testimony on Emergency Preparedness to the
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, Committee on Government
Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
By Michael Rogers, Executive Director
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
November 2, 2001*

Good Morning Chairwoman Morella and Members of the Subcommittee. I'm pleased to be here today to discuss emergency preparedness for the Washington region and what the Council of Governments is doing to make sure those plans are effective and complete.

As you know, the Council of Governments, or COG, is the association of 17 major cities and counties in the Washington metropolitan area. COG provides a forum for regional cooperation. At COG, elected officials work together to find solutions to our shared challenges, and then continue to work together to implement those solutions. This organization also serves its members by acting as a think tank for local

governments and a regional information source on the environment, transportation and human services.

COG represents a partnership that provides solid research, planning and leadership, and can ensure that this region speaks with one voice. As we confront the aftermath of the September 11 tragedy, I believe there has been no other time in COG's 44-year history when those services have been more valuable to the region.

In recent weeks, COG has brought together the emergency management and public safety officials from our member governments, state and federal officials, and local health organizations. Our purpose has been to coordinate the work that is being done by each of these entities into an effective and complete regional plan of action to be used in the event of major emergencies.

COG continues to do what we do best - serve as a forum for interested parties to come together to discuss and plan for a specific emergency. We can do this because of COG's committee support structure that provides a place and mechanism for public safety officials to come together to address common needs and responses.

In addition to the committee structure, the concept of a forum has been extended to COG serving as moderator of regional conference calls of public officials getting together to discuss event-related topics, such as government and school openings and closings, need for information hotlines, mutual aid, etc.

COG facilities also are available for emergency meetings at the time of a disaster, such as those held during the Cryptosporidium scare in December 1993 and recent meetings regarding the re-opening of National Airport. If called upon COG can and did serve as the location for a hotline, with the

attendant call takers, to give information to the public regarding the nature of the emergency.

To give the local governments the tools that they need to manage an incident, COG has developed agreements, plans, and communication systems to aid them. Basic to contingency planning are the police and fire mutual aid agreements developed in the early 1970's. When one jurisdiction has an emergency and has committed or foresees that it will commit all of its resources, it can request aid from its neighbors. This was ably demonstrated at the Pentagon on September 11th and continues as the FBI takes over the investigation at the disaster site. Work remains to be done at COG that would allow mutual aid to be used in a non-emergency, pre-deployment situation, such as the now canceled IMF/World Bank meeting.

After the Air Florida Crash, COG took advantage of lessons learned and greatly improved the mutual aid operational plan

called for in the police and fire mutual aid agreements. Using the Incident Command System as a basis, the operational plan spelled out how mutual aid would be provided to ensure that only legitimate aid was provided. The principles of incident command - with a single incident commander in charge and assisted by supporting staff - is being taught to responders at all levels of government.

The question has been asked if COG has a terrorism plan. The short answer is no. The mutual aid operational plan developed after Air Florida is an all hazards plan. At the regional level, the planning principles contained in the Incident Command System are applicable to a whole host of contingencies, from a simple car crash to an aircraft accident. Specific planning remains the responsibility of the local and state governments. Disaster response in this country flows from city or county to state and then to the national level. A regional organization such as COG is an anomaly in the process and thus is limited

in what it can do. We help where our local governments perceive a role for COG.

One such role for COG has been to develop the communications systems needed to talk to each other and to the public. A variety of systems exist. Police, fire, and DC hospitals have Mutual Aid Radio Systems that are tested daily and used with some regularity and most definitely on September 11th. In the planning stage are systems such as CapWin and PSWN, both are intended to provide communications interoperability in this region. We are getting close to when every public safety and transportation entity will be able to talk to each other at the scene of an incident - a condition that didn't exist at the time of the Suicide Jumper on the Woodrow Wilson Bridge in November 1998.

The quickest way for local, state and federal government agencies to disseminate information is by use of the

Washington Area Warning System - a landline phone system known as WAWAS. WAWAS is a special circuit of the National Alert Warning System (NAWAS). FEMA has given this capability to the Washington area because the seat of government is here in Washington and as such, is very vulnerable to attack - nuclear in the past - terrorism in the present. Mostly this system is used by the National Weather Service for weather warnings. This system was used extensively in the recent disaster.

Whereas WAWAS is for inter-governmental communications, the Emergency Alert System (EAS), formerly known as the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS), is for communicating with the public. A public official with a message for the public can interrupt radio and TV broadcasting in the metropolitan region by arranging with their emergency management agency to contact the primary EAS stations in the area, WTOP and WMAL. Through a daisy chain arrangement, stations all over

the region will transmit the official's message to the listening and viewing public. This system was not used at any level of government on September 11th.

As you can see COG's role in an emergency is fairly limited but effective where we are involved. In the September 11th incident at the Pentagon, city and county administrators and school officials talked in four COG-arranged conference calls to decide government and school openings or closings. For future events, a recommendation was made for emergency management officials to confer on a regular basis by conference call rather than rely solely on the Washington Area Warning System.

My final point is that COG provides a ready-made forum for investigating and solving the region's disaster preparedness needs. As such, the federal government is favorably inclined to deal with a single entity rather than 17 individual

governments. This was the case with the Snow Plan, the Metropolitan Medical Strike Team and the recently completed Planning Guidance for the Health System Response to a Bioevent in the National Capital Region COG through the Bio-terrorism Task Force developed the planning factors and the guidance was passed on to the individual jurisdictions for implementation.

The COG Board and Chief Administrative Officers Committee have both held extensive briefings on lessons learned from September 11th and have begun to outline follow up plans for COG so that we may improve regional coordination and communication in the future. Areas of focus include:

- Developing a real-time communication capability to gather information and coordinate decision-making.**
- Improving communication equipment and system interoperability.**

- **Exploring guidelines for use by public and private employers, including schools for any closure or early dismissal decisions.**
- **Accelerating COG's efforts to revise mutual aid agreements to allow for pre-deployment in non-emergency situations of mutual aid.**
- **Identify the essential outcomes of various local, state and federal agency after action efforts, and organize a regional effort to strengthen our region's overall emergency preparedness and response capabilities.**

In each of these areas, COG anticipates working closely with key local, state and federal emergency management and public safety agencies to ensure that our regional efforts are carefully coordinated with all relevant stakeholders.

This morning I would like to outline the major steps COG has taken, and discuss how we plan to address the key issues and questions regarding emergency preparedness that confront the region. I'll also answer any further questions members of the committee may have.

THE STEPS COG HAS TAKEN

At a special meeting on September 25, the COG board encouraged the mayor of the District of Columbia and the chief executives from all the region's jurisdictions to work with COG to ensure that our regional infrastructure was prepared to respond to catastrophic events like those of September 11.

At that meeting, we began the process of reviewing the police and fire mutual aid agreements that COG has had in place since the early 1970's. The system worked very well on September 11, but we realize they need to be widened to

address the new types of threats that can be directed at the Washington area.

On October 10, COG's Chair Carol Schwartz, an at-large member of the District of Columbia Council, sent a letter to Secretary Tom Ridge of the Office of Homeland Security, asking him to make security plans for this region a model for the nation.

On October 24, Chair Schwartz convened the first meeting of the COG Board Ad Hoc Task Force on Emergency Preparedness. The task force will continue to meet to coordinate regional emergency response plans into a unit that addresses policy-making, public safety, transportation, evacuation, communications, public utilities and health systems.

On October 25, COG's Energy Policy Advisory Committee, which will report to the Board task force, met with the region's energy providers and distributors to get an assessment of the state of security for energy generation, transmission and distribution facilities in the region. We have the participation of the major utilities in the area and the senior-level energy managers of our local governments. Efforts are underway to coordinate the committee's work with federal officials.

On October 30, another major part of the COG task force began working as transportation officials from around the region met to consider transportation plans in the event of an emergency. They discussed the need for new radio systems to let police and transportation officials from different jurisdictions contact each other directly, as well as devising a plan to let the public know how to get home in the event of an emergency.

At the next COG Board meeting, we will be very pleased to present the recently completed regional Planning Guidance to help health care systems handle bioterrorism. This document is a model of the kind of coordination that COG helps to sponsor in the region. It is designed so that every health official in the region knows the lines of authority in each jurisdiction. More importantly, it details the relevant information that must be gathered during what is termed a “bio-event,” the methods of analysis to be used and the actions that must be taken. It is designed to ensure that regional health officials are responding in an organized, coordinated manner.

COG will also take a fresh look at its overall communications and coordination role during emergencies. We have in place a system of conference calls and notification systems among government officials that will be strengthened and kept up-to-date. Finally, COG is working on a critical issue that will

require Congressional action. That is the passage of legislation to address liability issues between jurisdictions when the region's police and fire mutual aid agreements must be used.

In conclusion, I want the committee members to know that the Council of Governments is committed to working with the federal government, through FEMA and the Office of Homeland Security and with every jurisdiction in the region to develop the emergency preparedness plans that we need in the region. I know I speak for all of our board members when I say we regard this task as our goal and our duty.

We are working with caution, care and all deliberate speed and we will remain in close contact with this committee and the relevant federal offices as we move forward.

Thank You.

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KEY ISSUES AND QUESTIONS ON EMERGENCY**PREPAREDNESS**

Q. Is there a plan for the metropolitan region with the goal of protecting the lives of citizens? What are the elements of the plan? If a plan does not exist, why not?

A. One regional document - that reflects input from all the local jurisdictions – does not exist. That is because, as you know, we have many different jurisdictions in the region and many state and local government offices with different statutory responsibilities.

Two documents address the entire region. One is the Federal Emergency Management Agency's "Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Contingency Plan" for the National Capital Region. That document is, in my judgment the best starting point for developing a coordinated regional plan. It includes all major elements of disaster planning

from firefighting and communications to evacuation, food and energy concerns. It still needs a great deal of input from and coordination with local and regional officials, however.

COG's "Planning Guidance for the Health System Response to a Bioevent in the National Capital Region," is the recently completed document I mentioned earlier. Elements of the plan include surveillance and detection, the medical and health systems response, mass patient care and immunization, and environmental recovery. We are in the process of coordinating that plan with federal officials.

Q. What is the role of COG in developing a plan?

A. COG is moving on several fronts as I have outlined to bring together local officials to address public safety, transportation, communications, etc.

Q. Does COG have sufficient authority to implement the plan?

A. COG's members and other regional organizations have responded very well to COG's effort to coordinate an overall plan. However, COG does need additional authority to carry out parts the plan. As I mentioned, we are pursuing the development of legislation that would waive liability between local jurisdictions when police and fire departments work together without the involvement of federal officials. We have prepared draft legislation that would accomplish that goal. By the middle of this month, I hope to have this draft approved by COG's committee of Chief Administrative Officers and COG's Board. Chair Schwartz would then forward it to the appropriate congressional committees.

Q. Is there an interim plan that can be used until we have a complete plan?

A. After all local jurisdictions review the FEMA plan, it should be used as an interim response plan for a massive attack.

Q. What has been the economic impact of the terrorist attacks on this region?

A. The September 11th attacks have had a very serious impact on tourism and travel in the Washington metropolitan region. Obviously, the recent discovery of anthrax in the U.S. Postal Service has slowed our recovery for the first attacks.

The national economy had been declining significantly in the months before the attacks. The high-tech companies across the nation were in the process of making massive layoffs. The high-

tech industry in our region has been no exception. Still, unemployment in the metropolitan Washington region had increased by only one tenth of a percent while the national average was four tenths a percent, according to a September 21st Labor Department release of state unemployment figures. This indicates, for many, that the metropolitan Washington region has inherent strengths such as the security of the federal government-induced business. These strengths will surely be tested in the months ahead.

The re-opening of Reagan National was a crucial step for our economy. Hotel occupancy rates are already climbing from the lows reached in the weeks following the attacks. But the industry cautions that the next couple of months will be rough. Many hotel employees have lost their jobs or have had their schedules cut in proportion to the decreased occupancy rate. Stephen Fuller, a regional economist at George Mason University, estimates that 24,000 or 3% of the city's job base

could be eliminated, including jobs held by 9,000 DC residents. Regionally, 50,000 or 1.5% the job base is projected to be cut.

Certain sectors show the promise of growth. Security companies will likely see an increase in business as organizations assess and enhance their physical security. The greatest stimulant for our region may be increased government spending. However, new jobs generated through the federal government will likely require technical skills, specialization, and/or security clearances, leaving a significant number of people laid off and depending on unemployment checks and their social networks.

In the long run, this increased federal government spending in technical fields may trickle down to stimulate those industries hardest hit by the attacks. Until then, we need to work together to provide security to the other victims of September

11th to minimize the impact of any regional economic downturn.

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Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Mr. Rogers. Your entire testimony, of course, is in the record. I noted it is very thorough, and we appreciate that.

I am now pleased to recognize our Police Chief, Charles Ramsey, chief of the Metropolitan Police Department. Thank you for being with us today, Chief.

Mr. RAMSEY. Thank you and good morning Madam Chair, Congresswoman Norton, Congresswoman Watson, staff, and guests.

I appreciate the opportunity to present this statement concerning emergency preparedness in the District of Columbia from the perspective of the local law enforcement.

As I look back on the horrific and unprecedented events of September 11th, I am very, very proud of how the members and leaders of the Metropolitan Police Department responded. Our members displayed much the same type of determination and agility, bravery, and creativity that were so evident in New York City and northern Virginia on that date.

Our members helped send a reassuring message to the residents, visitors, and workers in the District of Columbia that their safety was of paramount importance to us. Allow me to provide just a few quick examples.

On the morning of September 11th, our department quickly recalled all officers and essential civilian personnel, canceled their days off, and put all of our sworn members in uniform on 12 hour shifts.

Our immediate priority was to ensure that we had all of our personnel resources available and ready to deal with any threats or attacks on the District of Columbia, while also continuing to patrol our neighborhoods. We met that priority quickly and effectively, I believe.

We got our state-of-the-art Joint Command and Control Center up and running immediately after the second World Trade Center attack. In fact, it was already operational before the hijacked plane struck the Pentagon.

The center includes both Metropolitan Police Department members and personnel from our critical partners in the Federal and regional governments, including the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the State Department, U.S. Marshall's Service, Coast Guard, Amtrak, Metro, and others.

Having this joint Command Center operational from the earliest moments following the attacks allowed us to access, filter, verify and disseminate critical law enforcement information in the very hectic and confusing moments as these events were unfolding. We have kept the center up and running, at various levels of activation, since September 11th, and we are prepared to ramp it up, as needed, at a moment's notice.

We put officers at critical intersections throughout the city, both to enhance our visibility and to help direct traffic, to the extent possible.

I think we all recognize the Herculean task the District faced in trying to get that many people out of the city at one time. That we did so, in a safe and mostly orderly manner, is a testament to our police officers and other traffic safety personnel.

Our department sent resources to assist with the Pentagon rescue and recovery efforts: mobile crime officers, search and rescue dogs, and some of our CDU or civil disturbance unit platoons.

These members worked long hours, under very grueling conditions, to assist the FBI and local law enforcement authorities. We continue to assist with the protection of critical Federal and local installations here in the District.

That our department carried out these and other missions, while continuing to provide some level of basic police services in our neighborhoods is an illustration of our commitment and professionalism. That commitment and professionalism have continued in the weeks following the attacks, as new developments have arisen.

I am confident that our department, working with others in local and Federal Government, is fully prepared to address any threats our Nation's Capital may face in the future.

Earlier this month I, along with Deputy Mayor Margaret Kellums and members of my command staff, traveled to New York City to tour Ground Zero in lower Manhattan. We wanted to see first-hand the extent of the damage and the nature of the recovery operation, both of which are almost indescribable.

Command members and I took a similar tour of the Pentagon attack site, as well. Both sites are sober reminders of the threats we continue to face, especially here in the Nation's Capital, and the need to be prepared.

We also wanted to talk face-to-face with officials from New York City Police Department and other public safety agencies, who have been involved with, and so deeply affected by this national tragedy. Their stories of individual courage and organizational resolve are not only moving, but very instructive to our efforts here in the District.

One theme we heard over and over again in New York was that when the attacks on the World Trade Center occurred, the Police Department and the public safety agencies did not have the luxury of waiting to consult their emergency operation plans.

First and foremost, they did what police officers and fire fighters and emergency medical personnel do in any incident approaching this magnitude. They rushed headlong into danger. In doing so, they saved countless lives, even as many of their own did not survive.

I am confident that our police officers, fire fighters, and emergency medical personnel here in D.C. would show the same courage and selfless dedication to service, as we saw in New York and northern Virginia.

Still, our trip to New York did reinforce the need to have a comprehensive, well thought out plan to support not only the initial responders, but also the entire range of individuals touched by events such as these: the victims, their families, other agencies that take part in the rescue and recovery efforts, neighbors, school children, and the list goes on and on.

In other words, our plans need to build the type of support network that will enhance the safety and effectiveness of the initial responders, while creating a broad safety net for those who come in behind us. Through our local planning efforts, the Mayor has moved the entire city government in that direction.

For the Metropolitan Police Department, there are a few critical areas that we are focusing on, as we work to update and improve our Emergency Response Plan. The Mayor has placed me in charge of what we call ESF, or Emergency Support Function No. 13, which covers law enforcement.

These are just some of the areas that we are really focusing on, if I may. Equipment is very, very critical, especially given the potential threat posed by biological or chemical attack.

Like police departments in major cities across the country, we are now looking to upgrade the clothing, masks, and other protective gear that we issue to our officers, particularly those in specialized assignments that would be among the first responders to these types of critical incidents.

Training is another critical area. In fiscal year 2000, we provided all sworn members of the Metropolitan Police Department with a basic 4 hour training on weapons of mass destruction as part of their regular in-serve training, but we need to do much more.

We are now in the process of implementing a 3-year training plan, that will build on the basic awareness course with more specifics on how to handle biochemical and related events.

I mentioned traffic earlier. As part of the Mayor's city-wide plan, our department is working closely with the District Division of Transportation, first to develop an evacuation plan for the District, should the need arise in the future.

Then we will be going to neighboring jurisdictions to ensure that our plans are coordinated with theirs. Traffic management is a regional issue, and we must deal with it in a comprehensive regional manner.

Coordination with our Federal partners in traffic plans and street closures is also crucial. Our department will continue to support the Mayor and other District officials in their efforts to ensure that security needs are balanced with the imperative to keep traffic in our city moving smoothly and safely.

These and other changes have been incorporated into a General Order that updates and improves our basic Emergency Response Plan. This order establishes three different levels of emergency response to different situations, and it includes a matrix of decisions and activities that will occur within each level.

We are also in the process of developing more detailed Standard Operating Procedures for major operational support units. These SOPs will put an overall plan into action. This is in addition to the city's overall Emergency Response Plan.

Of course, there are no rules for the type of heartless attacks that occurred on September 11th. Because of that, there can be no hard and fast rules for how police officers and other first responders will react.

Responding to the threats we face today will necessarily entail a great deal of quick thinking, ingenuity and improvisation on our part. Our Emergency Response Plans will play an important role

in ensuring that we can respond as safely and effectively as possible, and that our officers will have all the support mechanisms in place to carry out our unique and heroic responsibilities to the community.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ramsey follows:]

**Hearing on Emergency Preparedness
In the Nation's Capital**

**United States House of Representatives
Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia**

**The Honorable Constance A. Morella
Chairwoman**



**Charles H. Ramsey
Chief of Police
Metropolitan Police Department**

November 2, 2001

Madame Chair, Congresswoman Norton, other members of the Subcommittee, staff, and guests – I appreciate the opportunity to present this statement concerning emergency preparedness in the District of Columbia from the perspective of local enforcement.

As I look back on the horrific and unprecedented events of September 11th, I am very, very proud of how the members and leaders of the Metropolitan Police Department responded. Our members displayed much the same type of determination and agility ... bravery and creativity ... that were so evident in New York City and northern Virginia on that date. Our members helped to send a reassuring message to the residents, visitors and workers in the District of Columbia that their safety was of paramount importance to us. Allow me to provide a few examples:

On the morning of September 11th, our Department quickly recalled all officers and essential civilian personnel, cancelled their days off, and put all of our sworn members in uniform, on 12-hour shifts. Our immediate priority was to ensure that we had all of our personnel resources available and ready to deal with any threats or attacks on DC, while also continuing to patrol our neighborhoods. We met that priority quickly and effectively, I believe.

We got our state-of-the-art Joint Command and Control Center up and running immediately after the second World Trade Center attack. In fact, it was already operational before the hijacked plane struck the Pentagon. The center includes both MPD members and personnel from our critical partners in the federal and regional governments, including the FBI, the US Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the State Department, US Marshal's Service, Coast Guard, Amtrak, Metro and others. Having this joint Command Center operational from the earliest moments following the attacks allowed us to access, filter, verify and disseminate critical law enforcement information in the very hectic and confusing moments as these events were unfolding. We have kept the center up and running – at various levels of activation – since September 11th, and we are prepared to ramp it up as needed at a moment's notice.

We put officers at critical intersections throughout the city – both to enhance our visibility and to help direct traffic to the extent possible. I think we all recognize the Herculean task the District faced in trying to get that many people out of the city at one time. That we did so, in a safe and mostly orderly manner, is a testament to our police officers and other traffic safety personnel.

- Our Department sent resources to assist with the Pentagon rescue and recovery efforts – mobile crime officers, search and rescue dogs, and some of our CDU platoons. These members worked long hours, under very grueling conditions, to assist the FBI and local law enforcement authorities.

And we continue to assist with the protection of critical federal and local installations here in the District.

That our Department carried out these and other missions – while continuing to provide basic policing services in our neighborhoods – is an illustration of our commitment and professionalism. That commitment and professionalism have continued in the weeks following the attacks, as new developments have arisen. I am confident that our Department – working with others in local and federal government – is fully prepared to address any threats our Nation’s Capital may face in the future.

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Earlier this month, I – along with Deputy Mayor Margret Kellems and members of my Command Staff – traveled to New York City to tour “ground zero” in lower Manhattan. We wanted to see firsthand the extent of the damages and the nature of the recovery operation – both of which are almost indescribable. Command members and I took a similar tour of the Pentagon attack site last month. Both sites are sober reminders of the threats we continue to face – especially here in the Nation’s Capital – and the need to be prepared.

We also wanted to talk face-to-face with officials from the New York City Police Department and other public safety agencies who have been involved with – and so deeply affected by – this national tragedy. Their stories of individual courage and organizational resolve are not only moving, but very instructive to our efforts here in the District.

One theme we heard over and over again in New York was that when the attacks on the World Trade Center occurred, the Police Department and other public safety agencies did not have the luxury of waiting to consult their emergency operations plans. First and foremost, they did what police officers and firefighters and emergency medical personnel do in any incident approaching this magnitude: they rushed headlong into danger. And in doing so, they saved countless lives, even as many of their own did not survive. I am confident our police officers, firefighters and emergency medical personnel in DC would show the same courage and selfless dedication to service as we saw in New York and northern Virginia.

Still, our trip to New York did reinforce is the need to have comprehensive, well-thought-out plans to support not only the initial responders, but also the entire range of individuals touched by events such as these: the victims, their families, the other agencies that take part in the rescue and recovery efforts, neighbors, school-children ... the list goes on. In other words, I think our plans need to build the type of support network that will enhance the safety and effectiveness of the initial responders, while creating a broad safety net for those who come in behind us.

For the MPD, there are a few critical areas we are focusing on, as we work to update and improve our emergency response plans.

- Equipment is certainly critical, especially given the potential threat posed by biological or chemical attack. Like police departments in major cities across the country, we are now looking to upgrade the clothing, masks and other protective gear we issue to our officers – particularly those in specialized assignments that would be among the first responders to these types of critical incidents. As we continue this process, I think we need to look to the military and other parts of the federal government for standards and other guidance.

Training is another critical area. In fiscal 2000, we provided all sworn members of the MPD with a basic, four-hour training on weapons of mass destruction, as part of their regular in-service training. But we need to do much more. So we are now in the process of putting together a three-year training plan that will build on the basic “awareness” course with more specifics on how to handle “bio-chem” and related events.

- The World Trade Center attacks demonstrated the importance of communications – both primary and backup – in events such as these. New York, like most cities, relies on a single vendor for its telephone service – in this case, Verizon. When Verizon’s main switching station in lower Manhattan was rendered inoperable, telephone communications for the Police Department broke down. We need to be looking at backup procedure – possibly backup providers – to help us operate when the primary provider goes out.

I mentioned traffic earlier. Our Department is working closely with the District Division of Transportation, first, to develop an evacuation plan for the District should the need arise in the future. Then, we will be going to neighboring jurisdictions to ensure that our plans are coordinated with theirs. Traffic management is a regional issue, and we must deal with it in a comprehensive, regional manner. Coordination with our federal partners on traffic plans and street closures is also crucial. Our Department will continue to support the City Administrator, the Deputy Mayor and other District officials in their efforts to ensure that security needs are balanced with the imperative to keep traffic in our city moving smoothly and safely.

These and other changes have been incorporated into a new General Order that updates and improves our basic Emergency Response Plan. This order establishes three different levels of emergency response to different situations, and it includes a matrix of decisions and activities that will occur within each level. We are also in the process of developing more detailed Standard Operating Procedures for major operational and support units. These SOPs will put the overall plan into action.

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Of course, there are no “rules” for the type of heartless attacks that occurred on September 11th. And because of that, there can be no hard-and-fast “rules” for how police officers and other first responders will react. Responding to the threats we face today will necessarily entail a great deal of quick-thinking, ingenuity and improvisation on our part. Our emergency response plans will play an important role in ensuring that we can respond as safely and effectively as possible – and that our officers will have all of the support mechanisms in place to carry out our unique and heroic responsibilities to the community. Thank you very much.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Chief Ramsey.

You have all made us feel pretty confident and secure with the plans and coordination and communication. I think we have learned a lot from September 11th.

I would like to ask you a very simple question that may be somewhat complex. That is, could you walk us through what you would do if another terrorist attack of some nature occurred; specifically what would happen.

I mean, you can all respond, but I was thinking perhaps the Mayor and FEMA and perhaps the police; however you see that you should structure it. But specifically, what would happen? It all sounds great, the coordination, but what would happen?

Would you like to start us off, Mr. Mayor? While you think about it, too, I was thinking about what you and Councilwoman Chair Cropp commented on the Homeland Security. I certainly do believe that the District of Columbia should be involved with that, too.

But since the Office of Homeland Security is not in statute, it may be difficult to create a link that it would be in statute, if it is not. So maybe we could do a memorandum of understanding or something to provide that kind of linkage.

But I just wanted to comment on the fact that because it is not in statute, even though there has been some legislation that has been submitted to do that, it has been so very difficult to delineate specifically what the jurisdiction is.

But if you would try to walk us through what would happen if an emergency such as we experienced or similar to what we experienced on September 11th occurred.

Mayor WILLIAMS. If I could just summarize, Madam Chair, I think first of all, we would want to see, in advance of coordination, that there would be the proper level of coordination with the Federal Government, and certainly, having our Emergency Response Plan aligned with the Federal Response Plan helps with coordination.

Having an ongoing, working, organic, if you will, relationship with the Homeland Security people, in terms of coordination, is important.

Again, I mentioned, if we knew in advance what the plans for the different Federal agencies and the Capitol were for security at different levels, we could all plan accordingly, and know in advance what balance we are going to strike between public safety and open city and open transportation.

We would want to know in advance in coordination what our citizens should expect. We have handed out thousands of these disaster preparedness kits to our citizens that talk about what we expect our citizens to do in different environments and different situations.

We would expect, second, that there be better communication, frankly, then there was on September 11th. For that purpose, as part of our plan, which is right here, our expanded disaster plan, we have something fancy called the District Notification Protocol.

This is a fancy way of making sure that everybody in the District Government is notified appropriately in certain situations, and that there be systems in place, ranging from satellite phones for key of-

ficials, to use of "1-800" for communication; and the use of Verizon in certain circumstances.

We have made provisions now with Verizon so that, for example, District agencies have bumping rights. So if one of our kids is on the phone planning a party, that does not take precedence over District officials and regional officials trying to plan their business in an emergency situations; and then finally use of pagers and cell phones.

Also in terms of communication, one lesson that I have learned from September 11th is on a number of different levels. No. 1, you cannot provide, I believe, too much information too soon to people, and that you should not wait to provide information to people until you have perfect information, or even halfway decent information. You should not wait to get information to people until you have removed the level of uncertainty to a certain level.

There is always going to be uncertainty. You are never going to have perfect information, and you need to get out there quickly with that information. Under the protocols as routines that we have established in our Emergency Response Plan, at a Level 3 emergency, which would be the highest level of emergency, we would introduce and use the FCC-approved Emergency Broadcast System.

Just so the record is clear, if I had to do it over again, and we had the coordination at the level that we have now in place, I would have used the Emergency Broadcast System back on September 11th.

You know, what you are trying to avoid, as an official in my situation, on the one hand, you want to avoid the horrible tragedy of that guy in the World Trade Center, who was on the megaphone telling everybody to go back to their desks. That is an example of getting information out to people quickly that is clearly the wrong information.

On the other hand, you do not want to have a situation where you are waiting for hours to get some kind of information to people. So using that system, I think, as we have done with the anthrax crisis, with regular briefings to the press, where you are providing open information, is important.

Having said that, I think it is critically important and another lesson that we have learned, in terms of communication, is not to mix our messages.

We have to avoid mixing the message of preparedness and security. In other words, these are the facts, ma'am, and only the facts, and they may not be pretty. We cannot mix the message with a message of reassurance. Do not try to mix the messages.

Often what the current situation is, it is not a pretty picture, and we should not try to pretty it up. We need to reserve that time for reassurance for another time, and that communication is vitally important.

Finally, to wrap up, I think one area that clearly could be tightened up, I think, looking back on September 11th, again, is the coordination with the Federal Government, and we have mentioned that. But also it is the coordination with the private sector and coordination with our regional partners.

I believe that the steps are being put in place where, God forbid, if we had this crisis again, there would be immediately continual consultation and coordination with our regional partners, as is required.

Mrs. MORELLA. That is exactly what we would like to get at, what needs to be done to do that. First of all, I have always had the feeling that it would be great, if you were the spokesperson every day, to get on the radio or communicate on a daily basis what the situation is, as it is fed into you.

You have done a great job as the spokesman, but I think for the people to expect it regularly would give them the feeling that they are getting the accurate information from the person who knows it.

Second, you started off your statement about the fact that the Federal agencies are somewhat derelict in not having a plan that would coordinate with the District plan, if anyone wants to comment on that.

Because, again, we hope to come up with maybe some action items or some things we can move forward, to make sure there is the synchronization of the Federal Government fitting in with the Emergency Response System in the District of Columbia, as well as with the regions.

Ms. CROPP. Madam Chair, if I may just make one statement, as I looked at it. It is very clear that I think that the District has to be at the table in the form of our Mayor for any decisions that are being made, particularly as they impact local government.

Just to show you one big example, when everyone went home on September 11th, everyone let all of the Federal Government workers out and the private sector was going out, but then bridges were closed. So there was no coordination along those lines. So you had a huge traffic jam.

The Mayor must be at the table for any decision that is being made within the District of Columbia, in order that you can have that kind of coordination that you are talking about.

I think the recent example with the anthrax case was really wonderful. I have watched or attended quite a few of the daily briefings, where you have coordination. You have the Federal Government and the local government working together, the Post Office working together, and the Mayor coordinated it. I think there was a sense of calm that was sent out clearly through everyone in the District.

If I saw a lesson learned, the Mayor has to be at the table, and the Mayor has to be one of the major decisionmakers, as we look at what happens in this particular area.

Mrs. MORELLA. Would you like to make any comment, Mr. Kasprisin?

Mr. KASPRISIN. Madam Chairwoman, I think we have to look at this in three distinct phases. One is the preparation phase. The second is the crisis phase, when it actually occurs and the response takes place, and then the consequence management piece toward the end.

During the preparation phase, as the Mayor has indicated and others, there are a number of ongoing actions. One is updating the current plans to ensure that they are well coordinated at all levels of government.

The issue of multi-jurisdictional potential conflicts, I think, is only cleared up through a series of exercises, tabletop exercises and others, to ensure that we are past there. I think we have in place a number of events that will help address some of that, at least at the Federal level.

The response piece is broken down into two pieces: the crisis management and consequence management. At the Federal level, for the crisis management, the lead Federal agency is really the Department of Justice and FBI.

They set up a joint operation center with representatives from the local communities and the States, if necessary, and have in there a joint information center that helps to coordinate the information that you are looking for.

We have a liaison at all levels during that phase, both the local and the State, if appropriate, as well as within the strategic information operations center within the FBI, the SIOC.

At the consequence management piece, it is really how do you respond to do the recovery. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, at that point, is the lead Federal agency.

To walk you through what would happen there, we are really designed to support the local efforts, to identify where really a gap analysis is, the difference between what their capabilities are and what really needs to be done.

In that regard, the Emergency Management Operation here locally with Peter LePorte really is driving the train for us, helping to identify where those needs are. We have been working very closely with him in their efforts. As the Mayor indicated earlier, Mr. Mike Lowder has helped work that.

We have in place now a very specific plan to help address some of those perceived needs. In fact, we have created what we call a TIPFD, a time phased forced deployment list of the types of resources that would be needed in an emergency and have, in fact, moved some of those resources into place already.

At the Federal level, we would immediately stand up a catastrophic disaster response group, with representatives from all Federal agencies, all key Federal agencies; an emergency support team; and an emergency response team for the National Capital Region, that would really create an office to help coordinate all the different types of emergency responses that would be required. We would have liaisons in all the appropriate places.

With that, the key then is to identify what can the locals do, and what is the Federal Government needed to do, to support that.

Mrs. MORELLA. What I am doing is taking two blocks of my questions, so I will let you each have 10 minutes also to ask, because I wanted to hear from the Council of Governments, Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Madam Chair, I understand your question to be the regional responses; if something happened today, what would be different about our response?

Well, as I pointed out, the Council of Governments, with respect to our Regional conference calls, usually has advance notice, you know, from the National Weather Service, because it is involved with the snow plan. So we have time to arrange a conference call over a couple of hours.

On September 11th, the conference call was initiated about 2 p.m. and took place at 6 p.m., and of course, everyone was at home, and the focus was about the next day, whether the Government was going to be open, whether schools were going to be open or closed.

We will change those procedures, and if an event occurred, we would immediately seek to set up the conference call, and engage the appropriate local officials, so that we could start the sharing of information.

One of the first calls that would be made would be to the Federal Government, to the Office of Personnel Management. Because key to this equation is what is the Federal Government is going to do with respect to early release of the Federal work force.

Because if that release is all at the same time and that may be necessary, someone ought to know it, so that appropriate plans can be made for the traffic management in the city, and so that there could be appropriate coordination with respect to bridges.

So there would be earlier engagement with appropriate decision-makers to do that. That is a service that we perform, and that is something that we will work with FEMA and the District and the Regional Governments to make sure we can implement.

Mrs. MORELLA. I know that the OPM Director is working out a system with regard to the Federal employees.

Mr. ROGERS. Right.

Mrs. MORELLA. Because that was a real difficulty on September 11th.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mrs. MORELLA. Did you want to make any comments on that, Chief Ramsey?

Mr. RAMSEY. Yes, ma'am, in response to your question as to what we would do immediately, and this is presuming that it has already taken place, the first thing that we would do is, we would activate our Joint Operations Command Center immediately, and begin our protocol of notifying all the agencies that need to be notified, to make them aware of the situation, and get them to respond to the Center.

Simultaneously, we would be gathering information to determine the nature and extent of the threat. It is hard to respond to something if you do not know what it is.

If September 11th taught us anything, it is that a lot of information that comes in initially is bogus information, and you need to filter through it to find out exactly what it is that you are up against.

We would activate a Level 1, 2, or 3 response, depending on the nature of the threat, and presuming it is Level 3, which it was on September 11th, we would begin a recall of personnel.

We have recall rosters already there. We would recall all personnel with the exception, if it was like September 11th, we did not recall midnight personnel. They had gotten off work, and you need to start thinking about relief.

So you do not need to burn everybody out at the same time, because we automatically go to 12 hour shifts, and we put everybody in uniform. So we need to have a group of people that we keep at home resting, to come in to be the relief of the initial responders.

Our on-duty personnel would automatically be in route. We have our people already carrying all of their emergency equipment in the trunks of their vehicles, readily accessible, so they can respond. We immediately coordinate all of our actions through EMA, to make sure all the other city agencies that are responding were utilizing the plans that we have.

If, for example, the traffic plan needs to be put into effect, what are the evacuation routes that would be determined, based on the nature of the problem? Obviously, some sections of the city may be closed off. There may be a need for a partial evacuation, full evacuation. What would be the emergency access routes?

As a lot of people were leaving, we have got to have some way of getting people into the city, and that needs to be established very, very quickly. We need to get that information out to the public.

We can get that out through the Emergency Broadcast System, and also through the media, using traffic reporters that know the city very, very well, and can assist in getting information out to the public.

We will work with transportation. We are charged with determining staging areas for equipment and personnel, and getting that particular information out. If there is a need for a field command post, we will establish that.

I would like to say that the Joint Operation Command Center is a joint FBI/Secret Service/MPD command center. So we do have direct access to the FBI data base. We have liaisons that we send to EMA, to the SIOC, and to various other command posts, so that we are completely linked, and we know exactly what is going.

Those would be some of the immediate things that we do.

Mrs. MORELLA. We do not have emergency evacuation routes already?

Mr. RAMSEY. Oh, we do have emergency evacuation routes, ma'am, but depending on the nature of the problem, you do not want to send people toward a hot area.

So what you have to do is know exactly what is taking place, so you know which routes to use, so we do not put people in harm's way unnecessarily.

Mrs. MORELLA. I want to thank you.

I now want to recognize Congresswoman Norton. I do want to also indicate that I think our Fire Chief, Ron Few, is here, very good. Thank you for being here.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mrs. Morella.

I am trying to find out how much of the planning is operational. The Mayor says in his testimony that there already exists a comprehensive Federal Response Plan. All I can say is, I sure did not see any evidence of it on September 11th.

It is interesting to note that the District was criticized for not having a plan that was operational. But when the OPM just let people out into the street, there was no communication with the District. Whatever Federal plan existed was no more operational than what the District is accused of not having.

It does seem to me that the real thing is not, do you have a plan; but do you have an operational plan; have you practiced the plan;

how does the plan operate? So let me just ask a few questions that occur to me.

I know that Mayor Williams has had a meeting, or at least one meeting, with Tom Ridge. Is that right?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. NORTON. Would you tell us what occurred at that meeting, the nature of that meeting, what was discussed at that meeting, and has there been more than one meeting?

Mayor WILLIAMS. There has been one meeting. We talked about the requests that we have already submitted, as you know, concurrent with the council, in coordination with you, to the White House and the Congress, for emergency preparedness and the details of that emergency preparedness plan.

As we all discussed, the fact that the District public safety people, as well as public health and transportation, are the first responders that need that resource to do their jobs.

We talked about not just consultation, but better planning; and not just better coordination, which I think we are already seeing with the Feds on emergency response, but better coordination and planning with the Feds in the different branches of government, although you cannot speak for the Congress, obviously, but on security arrangements.

This is so that we know ahead of time, if they say we are on a higher state of alert for Cabinet A, B, or C, what does that mean in advance?

Ms. NORTON. What did that mean to you, when you and the Police Chief heard that, again?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, we talked about that. I mean, when you hear a greater state of alert, what does that mean? Is it credible or not credible, and on what source is it based? How are we supposed to plan?

Ms. NORTON. I am sorry, did I miss something? Did you all take immediate actions that you were not taking?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, we are at a Level 1 state of preparedness right now. This is similar to the state of preparedness we were on or the alert we were on when we began the actual war effort.

Ms. NORTON. So you never got off of that other alert?

Mayor WILLIAMS. I think we stepped down slightly, but we are back on Level 1, based on the alert we just heard this week.

But I guess the long and short of it was, how can we, in advance, get some agreement on what we are going to do, in terms of security arrangements in advance, so all of us are not spending all of our time talking about this street closing or that street closing. We can have these arguments and discussions ahead of time.

He seemed to be in support of that, and actually generally supportive or certainly understanding of our economic recovery needs. He was committed to working with us on an ongoing basis. I am hoping that we will be able to build on this working relationship.

Ms. NORTON. Yes, that is certainly my impression about Mr. Ridge who, of course, has the handicap of having to get his staff and having to get an operation together. He is not a Cabinet official, yet.

He has come to speak to Members of Congress, and has said to us that it may be 6 months before he gets a sense of the statute

and what it is that it really should require; since I think he may want to do things like put some agencies together, or ask Congress to do that, that are not together now. He may not simply want to work off of the grid.

But I am concerned, especially since we keep getting these alerts. I do not want to criticize these alerts. I think that we have got to leave it to people who are there. I am told that some of the alerts may be because they want to throw off folks who are planning stuff. So I have to assume that people are not just doing this for practice or for the fun of it.

Meanwhile, of course, resources get expended at local levels and all over the country. People are crying poor and saying they cannot continue to operate this way. Well, here, of course, an alert would have very special meaning.

Now if the statute is not going to lay this out for another 6 months or so, the statute that has already gotten the District in, I have a hesitation about how operational our city agencies can be with the Federal agencies.

I am looking at the Mayor's testimony on page 3, in which you talk about your own Task Force to mirror the Federal Response Plan. Then you talk about a transportation group for evacuation plans, a law enforcement group and the like, and a communications group.

Then later on, you expressed your gratitude to FEMA, and I want to express mine, as well, because obviously, FEMA is moving to do what FEMA always does. I mean, everybody else may not be prepared for a crisis, but FEMA is in the crisis business. Well, FEMA has brought resources apparently from EPA, HHS, and the Army Corps of Engineers.

Now what is wrong with this picture is that those agencies are not directly related to evacuation. That would seem to me to be DOT or the public order which, of course, is FBI and DOJ.

So I am seeking to find out whether or not there exists an operational plan, which means that the District of Columbia is in touch with the Federal agencies in this town, who have an overall jurisdiction, and what we can do to put the District into operational touch with those agencies; yes, Mr. Mayor?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, I think through FEMA and the gentleman that I spoke of, who has, I think, played a critical role in this, we have been updating I think this is the fifth draft now of the District's plan that we are aligning with the Federal plan. I consider it constantly evolving. This plan will be constantly updated as new information comes in.

In working with FEMA, we have been able to isolate a number of different functional areas that really outline how we would respond in certain situations.

One of the functional areas is transportation. There has been coordination with the Federal Transportation Department, which is designated as the lead Federal agency in a transportation situation.

Other Federal agencies are designated as the lead Federal agencies, in everything from public health to feeding situations. So there is, through the FEMA route at least, coordination with the Federal Government.

I think what we are looking for, from Governor Ridge, is in advance of an actual emergency, just better consultation and preparation on general security, in a way that balances, as you all know, again, the needs of a safe city and an open city. I hope that helps.

Ms. NORTON. It does.

Mr. Kasprisin, do you feel that pending whatever Congress decides to do, or whatever Mr. Ridge does, as he gets organized across the agencies, do you feel yourself to be the central coordinating authority within the Federal Government for these functions: law enforcement, transportation?

OPM put people out in the streets. Are you the one that we go to next time to make sure that does not happen? I mean, are you "the man?" [Laughter.]

Mr. KASPRISIN. I do not know if I would ever describe myself as the man to do all that. Again, I think it is a very valid question and very insightful. But there is really a distinct break in time between the crisis management and the consequence management.

We are the "go to" organization, the lead Federal agency, from the consequence management side of the house. But from the law enforcement side and all those activities that are rolled up on that from the Federal side, it is really the Department of Justice and FBI. It would be very presumptive of me to try to answer that question for them.

I suspect the Police Chief would probably have some better insights in that regard.

Ms. NORTON. I take it the Police Chief would just do what he had to do, and use his existing routes to the FBI and other Federal agencies.

Mr. RAMSEY. Yes, ma'am, we have had very close coordination with the FBI. For example, just yesterday, Director Mueller actually came by and visited my office for about an hour.

We spent a great deal of time talking about these alerts and various other things that are a concern to not only myself, but police chiefs throughout the country. He visited our Joint Command Center, and it was a very productive meeting.

We meet and we speak not with Director Mueller, but with the FBI on a daily basis. MPD hosts a conference call at 8:45 every morning with all the regional police chiefs in Virginia, Maryland, the Federal agencies such as FBI, Secret Service, ATF, Capital Police, Park Police.

All these agencies participate in this conference call to talk about the situation, to go over the latest intelligence information that we have through our Joint Terrorism Task Force, so that we know that we are all in sync on the same page, and that we all know exactly, at least to the extent possible, what to expect during the next 24 hours and what security precautions we need to be taking.

So it has improved greatly. I realize there are still some issues in some jurisdictions. But as far as it goes here, the communication is very strong. I am in charge of ESF-13, as we call it, which is the law enforcement emergency support function. As part of our plan, having that kind of coordinated response is very much a part of that plan.

Ms. NORTON. The Chair suggested, and I think it is something that we should get into, to see whether or not, in the interim, espe-

cially since there may not be any statute for some time, that there ought to be some memorandum of understanding between the Federal Government and D.C., so that we would feel more secure about overall coordination. That is something that I would like to discuss with the Chair later.

Let me just give an example of regional coordination. The District of Columbia, I think wisely, left the children in school on September 11th. I think that now, after the fact, they know that was the right decision.

The regions did not do that. I do not know what the regional thinking was, or whether issues like that are left on a school by school, case by case basis. But the last time I heard, people in the suburbs had to pick their children up and somehow help them get off to school. They may have different arrangements, because they do have school buses that many of them ride on.

But are issues like that on the regional level discussed, or should that all be left, as it always has been, on a case by case, region by region, or district by district basis?

Mr. ROGERS. If I may, on September 11th, the decision about schools was made individually, because the conference call did not take place, you know, until 6 p.m. So schools acted on their own.

Ms. NORTON. You see, there are not going to be any conference calls. That is the whole point.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Ms. NORTON. Nobody is ever going to be able to get a land line again. So somebody at the school districts have got to meet and decide whether, look, we are going to have to leave this to each school district, ahead of time; or they are going to have to decide that they want to coordinate this kind of thing; Ms. Cropp?

Ms. CROPP. If I could use my old school teacher counselor hat, one of the problems in schools being let out during an emergency such as that, right now, most of the parents, where the children are, they are working. Particularly for the elementary schools, there is no one home to even receive them. On September 11th, many of the parents were still trying to get home, themselves.

I would think that this is an opportunity for the schools to get together and to talk about a process whereas if, in fact, the offices are being let out, that there should be at least a staggered time for the schools to be let out, so that the children will not go home to an empty house, or that the children will not be kept on the road, trying to get home at the same time.

So there needs to be some type of coordinated effort. There needs to be contact with the Federal offices, with the District offices, with the State offices, as to whether or not they are letting their work force out. My immediate recommendation would probably be that the schools should be kept in. At least the children are safe there.

Ms. NORTON. Well, that is my instinct, too. But has anybody met to make those decisions? Has anybody met between OPM and D.C. to make a decision on what will happen with Federal workers, or how you will make that decision, and what is it, then? What is the decision on schools, and what is the decision on Federal workers and D.C. workers?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, Congresswoman Norton, in an emergency situation, on a Level 3, you would have a declaration of emergency.

The schools and every otherwise independent agency would fall under the authority of the Mayor.

My first instinct would be to keep the schools in place while we then, as quickly as possible using communications that we have now put in place, get in touch with regional authorities to consult on the matter.

I can have Peter LePorte respond to you on where we are in terms of consultations with OPM. Can we do that?

Ms. NORTON. Yes, that would be fine, if he would be willing to speak on the Government workers and on school.

I mean, since students cross these jurisdictional lines, if one jurisdiction has one rule and another has another rule, does that matter?

I would think that the children, in particular, would be of the greatest concern to us at a time like this. If we did not have a plan for anybody else, it ought to be what to do with children, or how to at least make a decision quickly on what to do about children.

Mr. LEPORTE. Let me first talk to you about OPM, because I think that was one of the major challenges on the 11th. If you talk to OPM, they will readily admit, their communications were ineffective to their other Federal workers in those other buildings, as well as to the White House, and to the District, specifically, trying to get in touch with this.

What we have put in place is some redundant systems. We provided them with one of our 800 megahertz radios so, in the worst case scenario, if phones did not work and pages did not work, we would be able to contact them through radio.

They have also met with regional partners from around the jurisdictions of OPM. The Director met and discussed some of her thinking about dismissal of Federal workers, and how they would go about that.

They also needed a little bit of education and understanding of how the Metro system was to work in a crisis, because many people take public transportation.

On the 11th, the Metro was closed down for 15 minutes, until the system was cleared and checked. Many people went to the Metro, thinking it was closed, and then proceeded to walk, stay out in the street, and that can cause much confusion.

Ms. NORTON. Excuse me, they did that on their motion?

Mr. LEPORTE. In many cases, they did.

Ms. NORTON. I am talking about the Metro. The Metro decided to close down?

Mr. LEPORTE. No, Metro has a phenomenal system, but they put in a check, that they check their system. They go through the system for 15 minutes to make sure it is safe, and then they opened it up.

But a lot of people were confused, when they went to the system and it was closed for 15 minutes. Including up here on Capitol Hill, the station was closed for 15 minutes.

So OPM has now put a better mechanism in place to consult No. 1, with the White House; No. 2, with FEMA, and with the District. Specifically, they would send us a liaison from the Office of Personnel Management from the Federal Government into our Emergency Operations Center, and we have a place for them in the center.

So we would have direct contact, face to face, as well as if they could not make it there, we would have the redundancy to be able to communicate with them.

Regarding schools, which you are right, schools were in many ways heroes on September 11th by keeping those kids in school; but they also have redundant systems with communication back to the Emergency Operations Center, as well as into the Operations Center that the Police Department has.

We have met with schools several times. We talked about their emergency planning. For each school, we have met with principals. We have actually provided them with some sample plans and some best practices from around the country.

The State of Georgia pretty much has the best school planning system that I have recognized. We have shared that information with our schools, and we have engaged them in disaster planning, as well as introduced a curriculum called, Masters of Disaster, from grades one through eight throughout the schools.

Ms. NORTON. You are working with the region, as well. Does your work with the region involve schools, or is that left to each individual school district?

Mr. LEPORTE. In an emergency situation in the local jurisdictions, the executive would be making that decision, in consultation with those specific superintendents, similar to here. If we were at Stage 3, with an independent agency, the decision would be made by the Mayor, but that would be done in consultation with the superintendent.

Ms. NORTON. Could I ask that a meeting be held of superintendents of the various school districts? These children go across lines. The children are all across lines. This is an example of where you need regional planning. At least people need to know why they are doing it, only on a case by case basis, if they decide to do that.

But if there is regional planning, and if we are talking about children, I would simply like to request that those in charge of these school districts, since we are supposed to be doing regional planning now, have a meeting and have the District of Columbia experience shared with them, so that we will know whether, if a child comes from Montgomery County or if a child from D.C. is out there, whether or not it really makes sense for us not to be doing the same thing, or at least not to have the kind of communication to do the same thing.

Madam Chair, I have other questions, but I may be over time.

Mrs. MORELLA. I think what we will do, we will go just one more round after this, and then go on to our second panel. We could spend a long time with you, asking you questions. So we will be directing some of them to you in writing. Thank you.

Congresswoman Watson.

Ms. WATSON. I think that all of those of you who are here today seem to have laid out your plans.

What is really bothering me is the position that the new Director of Homeland Security is in. When he came to speak with us, it was obvious that he needed the resources and, I guess, the authority.

What I still feel is missing is the coordination. In each one of your units, you have that coordination figured out, or at least that is the way it sounds.

But I think putting it all together, connecting all the dots through the new Director of Homeland Security, is needed. I would think, like Congresswoman Norton, that the school districts should be involved.

I know when we had our panel in Los Angeles, we had school personnel there. I am very sensitive to the fact that children cannot be let go out on the streets, because their parents indeed are working. Without that supervision, we are at higher risk.

I really feel that maybe we ought to have one of you take the lead with sitting down with the new Director of Homeland Security, and talking about all the agencies that ought to be involved. Certainly, your agencies are just naturals.

But somewhere, we need to feel assured that all of you are working under the direction of one person. I do not know if that is FEMA, but I would think that Director should have the responsibility of bringing all these agencies together.

I understand there are 17 agencies that relate to the intelligent unit or family. But we are not hearing what is happening with coordinating all of these. I think that is the missing link, the weakest link.

So all of you, I have to commend you for coming and expressing your plans. We have your written statements, and it seems like you are thinking ahead. But how do we bring it all together, and maybe that is his job?

I do not envy Governor Ridge. He said to us, when he spoke to a combined caucus, that you ought to have caller ID. on your telephone, so you will know when to answer the phone. That was probably in reference to the fact that, you know, when the President calls, you respond. On second thought, what are you responding to?

So I would hope that as a result of this hearing, we could have the lead, Madam Chair, of trying to all meet together. I think I like Congresswoman Norton's suggestion that we bring in the superintendents of the surrounding area within the region, and all of you meet and find out, you know, who is on the team, and do we have plans for the team to coordinate, when needed?

That is just a general statement to whoever wants to respond. I hope all of you will. Thank you.

Mr. ROGERS. Madam Chair, if I may, with respect to the regional response, the area and local governments and the District, we are meeting together. The District has taken the lead in developing a new response plan, in conjunction with FEMA.

I met yesterday with representatives of FEMA, and they will be joining the Regional Task Force. Because it is my view that FEMA National Capital plan and the District plan can very well serve as the foundation for a regional plan, as well.

With respect to the superintendents, that is an excellent suggestion. They have not been at the regional table in a formal way through COG, although the superintendents were on the conference call, as I pointed out, with respect to school closings.

But I think that the suggestion that we incorporate perhaps one of the emergency support teams; that includes an educational link, Peter, where we look specifically at what needs to be done in the educational area. With the superintendents, that is an excellent suggestion.

So we will continue our work at COG. This Task Force is moving forward quickly, working with local jurisdictions, and working with FEMA and the Federal partners.

Let me just say that I think that it is a positive development that we now have the Federal Government as an entity engaged in a regional discussion. That is a positive development, because we are a National Capital Region. But in the past, that level of interface has been far less than desired.

I think going forward, we can finally, with all of the stakeholders at the table, think and plan for how we can prepare the National Capital Region in a coordinated way, so that we respond and are protected in a coordinated way.

Ms. WATSON. Madam Chair, if I might conclude my inquiry, can this subcommittee ask for a meeting of all these different agencies, with the National Director of Homeland Security, and report back to us on the coordinated effort?

We need something to assure this Nation. Every time we meet, we are meeting with a single unit. We tried to bring them all together in California. But we need to reassure people that we have got plans laid out that include A, B, C, D, and so on. Everyone is ready. Everyone is up to the task. We do not have to let them know how it works, because we do not know, yet.

But if we can ask for a report from that meeting and who all is included in the meeting, so that we might report back. As representatives of the Federal Government, as we go back to our respective districts. They want information, as accurate as we can give it to them, as to what we are doing. Are we in charge? Are we taking command?

I think that maybe this subcommittee, the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia and Government Reform, might be the one to actually ask for a report. It is going to be just a draft, because it is developing. We are doing OJT with this, on-the-job training. You know, we are making it up as we go along.

But I think what we need is some assurances to the people that you indeed are in charge and we have a plan.

Mrs. MORELLA. You know, we will look into how we can do that kind of coordinating. But I was thinking, I would certainly like to have a charge from each of you, with regard to specifically what the steps are and who the people are, who are in those particular positions.

If we could get in touch with you about how we could do this, it would be awfully good to see a graph and see what happens with the emergency, who does what and where it goes. If you would consider that, I think it might be very helpful.

I want to ask, I guess this would be Mayor Williams and Councilwoman Cropp, the District has requested, from the Office of Management and Budget, and you mentioned that in your opening statement, \$250 million for emergency preparedness.

How would the requested funds be used, as OMB, at this point, is only recommending \$25 million? What potential risks will not be addressed, if only \$25 million in funds are provided?

Ms. CROPP. Well, the listing that we submitted to you very clearly talks about different issues such as the types of engines and trucks that we would need, the training that we may have to have

with regard to chemical and biological and radioactive hazards that we may have to have; what we would need to have with regard to equipment for our police department, for our fire department; crime scene investigation.

It talks about, in the report that we have asked for, the different types of radio and transportation needs that we have for us to contact each other.

I guess the question is, which one of those things do we want to give up? Do we give up transportation, so that we do not have the appropriate vehicles to respond?

Do we give up the appropriate type of equipment for our fire and police department, so that if a building was on fire or if they needed to come and rescue people, they do not have the equipment so that they could go into the appropriate building to rescue those individuals?

So if, in fact, we do not get the dollars that the city has identified, that we need to protect the citizens here and also the Federal presence here, which building will we not be able to respond to; which Federal building; which local building? The Mayor can give more specifics on that.

But the reality is that we are trying to buildup our fire and police department. While we are trying to buildup our fire and police department, we are also trying to address new needs that none of us had anticipated that we would need to identify.

So it means that we would have to go back to our list, eliminate some things that we think are needed, and pick and prioritize. I would hope that you would look at our entire list.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Just to expand on what Chairwoman Cropp has just said, I wanted to get the exact figures for you, to really make the case that she has already made.

That is, we have requested \$250 million. If we were to get \$25 million, this would be like a nightmare game show. I mean, which door are you going to pick. No one likes this choice. We are going to pick fire and EMS and police, because that is your first order of public safety, security response.

But having said, it is a horrible choice, because what are you giving up? Well, for example, in case anyone has been paying attention, we have just had a major health situation in this city. We are giving up a major expansion of our health response. That was \$23 million.

We just finished talking about evacuation and the need to do a better job in managing these intersections in our evacuation routes and emergency access routes.

One of the things we have learned, for example, is that the best thing to do in an emergency, in terms of an evacuation, is to use your police personnel to allow the signalization to work.

You know, a law enforcement person may have the best intentions, but basically, if they are sitting here managing one intersection, and someone down the road is managing another intersection and there is no coordination, no one is really helping. So we need the signals to work.

But for the signals to work and for that traffic management plan to work, we need the resources to put it into place.

We have all talked about communications. How are we going to get better communications in place without a technology investment?

As an example of communications, all the many, many law enforcement agencies need to better communicate. Right now, we do not have any single frequency on which to communicate. We need communication.

You talk about the emotional trauma of all this; mental health. We talk about the schools' involvement in all this. How are we going to get our schools in the situation they should be in, without a major investment in preparedness and security arrangements for our schools? That was \$76 million.

So the \$25 million would force us to make some, I think, draconian and really tragic choices, in terms of our emergency preparedness. We are hoping that the Congress will see to expand this effort, at a minimum, to the order of magnitude of around \$100 million.

I forgot to mention this, and this is a horrible thing to talk about. But we are talking about the horrible situation of contingencies here. With our Chief Medical Officer, we are trying to get our Chief Medical Officer on his feet to begin with.

We at least ought to be able to designate \$2 million for those critical functions in these kinds of emergency situations: communication, scene investigation, supplies in terms of all the supplies needed for, God forbid, a crisis situation as could be faced; additional vehicles. We have got vans and vehicles right now that need replacement at incident command systems. These are just examples of where the resources are really critically needed.

Mrs. MORELLA. Does FEMA get involved with doing an assessment of the need of the various items that are on this list?

Mr. KASPRISIN. Madam Chairwoman, we do. We have a system in place that is known as a capability assessment. It was really a self-assessment, prior to September 11th.

Last week, we launched, from our regional teams, representatives from a number of different agencies to look at all State and not all local plans, but certainly the District is included.

In fact, our Region 3 had just finished that with the Emergency Management shop in the District. We are going to prepare a report for Governor Ridge of the results of those investigations or assessments.

Within such a short period of time though, we are going to be unable to get down to the level of detail, as the Mayor has already articulated, that is needed.

Mrs. MORELLA. You have got the Appropriations Committee that will be looking at this. I guess you have got a hearing next week. So we wish you well on that.

My final question is just simply because I have HHS here. I want to ask about whether or not there has been an assessment of the District's health care system, in order to determine whether or not the health care system has the capacity to handle the various health care risks.

I know on our next panel we have Mr. Malson, who is going to be talking about the Hospital Association. But I wanted to get it,

maybe from your point of view, or if anyone else wants to comment on it.

Mr. LEPORTE. Sure, the current process has been to develop guidelines for bio-terrorism and bio-agents.

Of course this is an interactive process, but one of the next steps is to start to focus in on what we are calling a surge capacity. In some senses, there is already a capability to deal with surge capacity, through the National Disaster Medical System.

This is where beds in concentric rings going out from the District are identified as beds to which patients can be moved to allow for space for more critical patients or more emergency patients to be handled.

We started looking at capacities in the national area back in 1995, actually, in establishing the first National Medical Response Team here in the District, which has now served to be the model for not only the other NMRTs in the United States, but also the Metropolitan response systems. We have been doing these assessments and responding by providing capacity since 1995.

We are at the stage of guidance for health response, in the event that a bio-event has been issued. The jurisdictions around the District and in the District are using this guidance by which to formulate plans.

We now have four standing subcommittees that are working on these issues. There is a blood subcommittee, which is headed by the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services.

There is a communications subcommittee that is being headed by the D.C. Hospital Association. There is a response subcommittee, which is being headed up by the Virginia Department of Health. Then there is a surveillance subcommittee, that is being headed up by the D.C. Department of Health.

As we move forward, we will be integrating more and more specific planning into our ability to respond, as well as identifying the resources that we need for a specific type of event.

What I mean is that a bio-event generates different needs than an airplane crash, which generates different needs from other kinds of natural disasters.

So this is an evolving process, and our next step will be looking at the surge capacity, and how we would specifically deal with that within, first, the National Disaster Medical System, which we are confident will give us a robust response; but also identify if there are any peculiar needs that have gone undetected, as yet.

Ms. CROPP. Madam Chair, in the request that the Mayor has submitted, there are specific items with regard to health requests.

For example, chemical/bio equipment for onsite response is something that we did not have a need for in the past, that we obviously need now; to have bio-equipped vehicles, mobile laboratories, so that the appropriately trained personnel would be able to respond immediately; so that we have the pharmaceuticals necessary for treatment.

We have seen with the anthrax that there was a definite need for certain pharmaceuticals. We need to have a sufficient supply for our Department of Health responders and the MPD responders and others in distribution.

The hospitals need to have containment facilities at their local hospitals, and for the containment facilities that they are talking about, there is a cost that is associated with that.

As the Mayor spoke just previously, unfortunately, there will also be a need to strengthen our Medical Examiner's Office. Our Medical Examiner's Office was not at a level that it should have been in the past, and we were just trying to catch up with it. Well, now there may be a need for us to do more things with that.

So there are specific health needs that are part of the plan that the Mayor has submitted to you, and they are identified with the costs associated with them.

Mrs. MORELLA. And there is the need to know what hospitals can handle what kinds of problems, or what kinds of cases, so I will be exploring that later on with you. But I see that this is critically important in the region, that we know who does what, how many beds are available, etc.

Do you want to comment, Mr. Rogers?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, Madam Chair, in my testimony, I refer to a planning guide, and it is for a bio-event in a metropolitan area.

COG has had a Bio-terrorism Task Force for the last 18 months. They finished their report on September 6th. Mr. Malson, who is Chair of that Task Force Committee, is on the next panel, I believe, and will tell you more specifically about it. But that kind of information is included in that bio-event planning guide and its report.

Mrs. MORELLA. I just heard that the report has not been issued, yet.

Mr. ROGERS. No, it has not, and it will be issued in about a week. It is an important document. But more importantly, as Mr. Malson said to me, was the process of all of the right people being at the table to develop this document. That is because having the right people at the table laid the foundation for the relationships that have helped the region deal with the current crisis.

That document will be available. I think it is an excellent framework for addressing the health issues in a bio-event or bio-chemical situation.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much.

Congresswoman Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mrs. Morella.

The District is going to get \$16 million from this appropriation, if we ever get it out of the Senate. You are going to have to decide, because that is money that was not anticipated. So if we can go back to be as specific as we can on this minimal \$100 million that we have now.

I believe that the Mayor mentioned something about anthrax and \$23 million. Did I hear you correctly on that; the health component of the plan?

Mayor WILLIAMS. I was just saying that the past couple of weeks have highlighted the necessity that in working with the private hospitals and our Health Department, we have a network response capability to meet a bio-terrorism threat.

Ms. NORTON. Dr. Walks mentioned to me that there were direct expenses flowing from that. I asked him to get me information on that.

The reason is, we were able to get \$6 million. I do not know how much of that is left now, but the President can write out the first \$20 billion. We got that for your overtime, for the police. It does seem to me that this falls into exactly the same kind of category: a completely unanticipated expense, that nobody should have to pay for, up front.

Mayor WILLIAMS. I think we provided you with a list of all the agencies and their expenses in all these different areas, and the need, you are right, to tap into Federal resources, without triggering, I think it is the Stafford Act, in a declaration of emergency, which I think none of us wants.

Ms. NORTON. Yes, I would just like to get as much as possible out of this first \$20 billion, because everybody is coming in on the second. What we have had is up-front expenses, that nobody else has had.

I am particularly interested, as I said in my opening statement, in the pressure you are under as a government, as a result of this. Mayor Williams, you say that New York anticipates a 2.5 percent of city revenue lost, because of September 11th, and you anticipate a 3.5 percent loss of revenue.

Now I have got a question about that. Your testimony says 10,000 small businesses are at risk, and 24,000 jobs could be lost. That is before these figures were in, so I do not know if you were basing that on anticipated unemployment figures of the kind we received today or not.

It is an astounding figure in your testimony; almost half of the members of the local hotel and restaurant employees union are unemployed. That is astounding.

Because even leaving out all these other businesses in this town, because if you look at almost any business in this town, and it is not two-thirds, but 80 to 90 percent of the other businesses employ people from the region. Many of these people live in this town.

That is a figure that is extremely alarming. I have seen some reports that during the Persian Gulf war, it took the District about a year to get back to normal in tourism.

So I am going to ask you, therefore, how much of your reserve do you anticipate using in 2002; and whether you think there will be any difficulty paying it back in 2003, as you are required; and whether you are anticipating doing what apparently others in the region have done?

For example, in Maryland, they are doing anticipatory budget cuts. You wait until you get hit, and then you cut far more than if you do cuts early on. That is why the District went down. The District went down because it waited until the very end, and then the whole Government went down with it.

So first I am going to ask you about the reserve for 2002. Are we going to use it all; is there going to be anything left in it; are we going to be able to pay it back in 2003; and are you, the Council and the Mayor, contemplating where you can cut back, or are you waiting to see whether you will have to cut back?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, first of all, Congresswoman Norton, I think you know better than anyone else the fragile nature.

While it is substantial, we are so proud that we were leading the country, for example, in our office economy; leading the country

prior to September 11th in our hotel occupancy; leading other major cities in our unemployment rate.

I mean, there are so many different indicators. For the District to be noted by many business magazines as the No. 1 place for doing business really spoke volumes about where we were prior to September 11th.

Now after September 11th, you are right, it has had a major effect on our hospitality/tourism industry, which as you know is our No. 2 industry in the city.

The immediate attack on the Pentagon, the closure of Reagan National Airport, the closure of various streets, the messages that are inadvertently sometimes sent, the limited access to the White House now and to the Capital, have all had a big effect on these visitors that would otherwise come to the city.

What has the District done? I am proud to say that even though the District, despite its recovery, recognizes that we have a fragile budget balance, and you know that our tax base is not really a tax base to brag about; while our economy was strong, and I think it will become strong again, we are artificially structured in terms of our access to our tax basis.

Fifty percent of our property is off limits. Our income tax base is off limits. We are forced to serve a huge population of millions, with a tax being provided only by our District citizens.

That tailors and colors everything we do going forward. So despite all this the District on its own, I am proud of the fact that the Mayor and the Council have had an unprecedented level of cooperation since October 1st.

They have come together, for example, to construct a loan guarantee program for our small businesses to the tune of \$100 million. We have come together to expand unemployment insurance for our workers who have been unemployed. We give them 75 percent of their wages, and allow them, if they have part-time employment, to supplement that, to get them somewhere back on their feet.

I am proud, for example, that working the Council and our corporate leadership, we have put together a disaster relief fund of now approaching, I think it is \$2 million, to provide, in addition to measures we have already talked about, transition assistance for people.

So we are doing what we can on our own to provide the needed relief, but we need the help of the Federal Government, because all of this has been occasioned by national circumstances and/or national decisions. We really need that help.

Going into this next year, we are looking at anywhere from, I have heard, figures of \$80 million to \$150 million. We are able to absorb a figure of the order of magnitude of \$100 million with the reserves that we have built up.

Be reminded, and it turns out to have been prophetic now, we have very strict requirements on our budget reserves, and very strict requirements on our cash reserves. Our cash reserves, at 7 percent, are leading the country in State and local governments, in the amount of money set aside in cash.

That is a good thing now, because those cash reserves are able to satisfy this immediate hit of around \$100 million. That, with spending plans, unless things get dramatically worse, I think will

allow us to get through 2002 with spending plans and cash reserve arrangements that are already in place.

But then what do we do in 2003? Obviously, if we are using the cash now, that puts pressure on 2003. I think we may have to look at the rate and the pace at which we were meeting our cash reserve requirements, because of this impact.

We certainly have to look at it again. I cannot say this enough. Federal help in meeting these responsibilities; when you have a limited tax base, for the District to be going the extra mile with local self-help efforts to meet these responsibilities, I think it would be tragic if we did not get any Federal help to meet our answer to what is, in fact, a national/Federal challenge.

Then finally, I think the legislation that you have proposed, and we can get into this in the next hearing, but the legislation that you have proposed over the years in terms of tax incentives for the District, I think clearly ought to be part of our stimulus approach.

The measures that you have talked about, in terms of a tax credit to address firmly and decisively, once and for all, the structural imbalance in our budget is clearly called for over the long run. Because what I am saying is, we may be able to meet the needs in 2002, but all it does is just radiate out in 2003/2004, because of this fragile budget balance we have.

Finally, I think I can speak for the Council very emphatically on this. One thing that we have learned is, the last thing we want to do is bring back the Control Board. I think we are willing to take the political hits that are necessary to see that we are working in advance.

We already have our financial people, both the Council and the CFO staff, working on contingency plans now, and if necessary, apportionment plans now, to see that we are working ahead of time to avoid coming up in July or August saying, oh, we have got a big problem; what are we going to do?

Ms. NORTON. I noticed you have a tax cut that has a trigger to it. Do you think that if the economy, in fact, goes sour, that these tax cuts do not need to automatically go forward? That was put in there as a safeguard. What do you anticipate with respect to those tax cuts? Are you still going to keep giving tax cuts with this happening, is what I am asking.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Yes, obviously, if the situation were to deteriorate to a very ominous level, everything is on the table.

But if it were to deteriorate beyond our projections, and these triggers in the tax package are put in place, then I think we ought to honor those triggers.

Ms. NORTON. Part of what is happening in the region is that the tax cuts went out. You have got a deficit in Virginia, and you had more of a surplus than Maryland did. That is how prudent you were. Part of it is because D.C. did not go out and spend a lot of its money, and you wisely put in a trigger.

I am very pleased with what you have done with unemployment insurance. I have just issued a release, given the unemployment in this town and how it is galloping along, to creditors, to say that in light of what is happening to the mail in D.C., that they not entertain an interest and late payment windfall at the expense of the mail.

There is no ward in the District of Columbia that has not had its mail delayed. We did research and found that the average late payment is \$24. On top of the unemployment that we are experiencing, that seems to me to be terrible. I am asking the Mayor and the Council to pass a resolution or do something that would also call upon local business, utilities, government, not to charge for these October/November problems, as Brentwood still is not open.

I am almost through. Could I ask you, the Council passed some legislation for loans and loan guarantees. I must say, I look with a jaundiced eye, if only because the District had one of the most atrocious rates in the country, on people giving loans to people and never getting the money back. I understand that yours would go through banks and so forth.

But the SBA has loans, and apparently District small businesses have come forward in greater numbers than elsewhere in the region. They give people 30 years to pay back. They have obviously 100 percent Federal money, and up to \$1.5 million per business.

Did anybody in the city look to make sure you were not redundant to a 100 percent federally funded program? If you are not redundant, in what way are you different?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, I could get you the exact parameters and details, Congresswoman, on how we are different. But I know, and we talked about this, that this is what you always have in these programs. It is a gap analysis of "but for." But for this loan program, your business is going to have a cash-flow situation.

Implicit in that is that you have to have gone to the SBA and made your request to SBA, and then show us your analysis, as opposed to just coming to us, asking for easy, free money, without any of the necessary due diligence that you mentioned.

Ms. NORTON. I think that is important, because it is D.C. money.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Absolutely.

Ms. NORTON. And to the extent that we can make the Federal Government pay for the losses to our businesses, I hope we are going to make them do it, rather than step up to the plate ourselves.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Absolutely, and I am sure you understand the local level of effort, as well.

Ms. NORTON. Yes, and I think it is a very important initiative.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Right.

Ms. NORTON. I just want to make sure that we are not paying for what the Feds ought to be paying for, for losses that they inflicted upon us.

My last question is, I know that the city had taken a very important initiative. For the first time, the city was going to have to advertise to get tourists. This was after September 11th, when people were afraid to get on planes. The Congress had done almost nothing to encourage people to get back on. Our airport was closed.

Then that got stepped on by the anthrax scare. Now we have got the message going out that, hey, we are not sure whether the planes are safe yet; and remember, their airport was closed down, which means that they may really not be safe; and by the way, there is something called anthrax there.

At a town meeting that I had on Monday, it was a huge meeting, and over 500 people came. A teacher from Prince George's County

said that there was a directive out in the region not to bring children to our museums. This is a region which is suffering from the same kind of tourist drought that we are suffering from.

Of course, the last time I heard, there was not any anthrax found in any museum. The House was closed down before any anthrax was even found here. So, obviously, that sent a message out to everybody, do not even wait to see if there is anthrax. Just close the joint down. These folks are closing the District of Columbia down. That is very, very disconcerting to see this.

I would like to know what you think you can now do, now that you appear to have gotten the anthrax business under control and our airport is open. Did these ads go out? Were they used anywhere in the country?

Are there any more ads now going out? Who is paying for them? What are we going to do? How can we get a counter-message out there, which I think is the right message? I think the District is the safest city in the United States.

Mayor WILLIAMS. I agree.

Ms. NORTON. I truly believe that. It is being patrolled in the air, in the waterways, in the streets, like no city. If you want to be safe, leave where you are and come to the District of Columbia.

As for anthrax, your mail is not being sanitized. Ours is going to go to Ohio, and I cannot tell you about your mail. Anyway, it is not catching. All of these messages, if we do not get those messages out there, I am not sure when we are going to recover.

So I have got to ask you, Mr. Mayor, in the midst of all of this, of the expert handling of the anthrax crisis, of having taken proactive steps to get tourists back, and then having that message stepped on, stomped on, by anthrax, what are you going to do now to make people understand that they should visit their Nation's Capital?

Mayor WILLIAMS. Well, I think people put this in perspective. I mean, you were out with us and some other Congress people, when we were out at D.C. General, where they were doing treatment, where they have now treated over 10,000 people.

I remember my mother was talking to one of the doctors. She says, you know, you have got to get me these pills, honey, because, Lord knows, I do not want to catch Amtrak. [Laughter.]

So to your regular citizen, this is just all one big blur, and I think it is really important. I think the point is, it is really important for us to bring this into focus, and then bring this into perspective.

Shortly after this, and Chairman Cropp was involved and you were involved, we brought together a business task force. They are helping us assess the economic damage. They are helping us with tourism promotion.

Together with the Council, we have now put together with our business and industry people \$2 million for a marketing and promotion effort.

This was really planned kind of in concentric circles. There was going to be an initial local effort. We had the Metro free fare weekend, which was actually very, very successful. Moving from a local effort, it was then to go into a kind of regional Mid-Atlantic effort, and then to a national global effort.

So I think the good news here is that we have not yet launched that national global effort. So major expenditures have not been trumped by this anthrax situation.

I guess I would leave you with this major point. The same kind of coordination that is needed in terms of our security arrangements and the balance that has to be struck there, we are going to need the same kind of coordination on the marketing and promotion front.

So, for example, you need a high level of coordination between the different branches of the Federal Government and the District, if you are going to get school kids back. The school kids, as you say, they are not going to come back if the Capital has got limited access and/or is closed, and the White House has got limited access and/or is closed.

That has to all be coordinated ahead of time. We need the same kind of political leadership, coordinated and working together with a message, in the same way that Rudy Guiliani brought together all the Broadway stars saying, come to New York.

We need to get all the political leaders of this city, regardless of partisanship or background, standing somewhere with the President and saying, come to Washington, DC. That is the level of coordination that we have not yet had, but I am confident we can produce with your help.

Mrs. MORELLA. I see that as your role, Mr. Mayor. We will rally around you.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Yes.

Ms. NORTON. If I may say, Madam Chairman, we do not have quite the talented and good looking stars that they have in New York in that wonderful advertisement that they did.

But I promise you this, I am going to ask Speaker Hastert and Minority Leader Gephardt to stand with you and me, to invite people to come back here, when this place opens for tourism, and to say, do not simply come to your Congress; come back to your Nation's Capital.

Mayor WILLIAMS. Absolutely, and we are looking forward to Council Chair Cropp being with us.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much.

Mrs. MORELLA. We will go to Congresswoman Watson for the last questioning, if you have any.

Ms. WATSON. I have no further questions.

Mrs. MORELLA. Well, I want to thank this wonderful panel. I know we kept you a long time. I think you know that we will be submitting some further questions.

This is a very complex project and program and hearing that we have today. The issues are so very important and we have never faced them before, but you have been just terrific.

I want to give my thanks to the Mayor, my thanks to the Council Chair, my thanks to FEMA and HHS, COG, and our Police Chief, for being here. You have done a great job. I look forward to further communications and working with you. Thank you very much.

Now we have our second panel that has been ever so patient. Please know that we appreciate it enormously. This has been such a very important topic. Having all of the stakeholders on the first

panel and the second panel has just taken an inordinate amount of time. But I thank you all very much.

As I had done with the first panel, it is the policy of the committee to swear you in, so if you would stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mrs. MORELLA. It is now recorded as an affirmative response.

Mr. Cogbill, we were just with you yesterday, is the chairman of the National Capital Planning Commission; Joseph Moravec, Commissioner of the Public Building Service, GSA; and Robert Malson, president of the D.C. Hospital Association; thank you, gentlemen.

I will start off with your testimony, Mr. Cogbill.

STATEMENTS OF JOHN COGBILL, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMMISSION; JOSEPH A. MORAVEC, COMMISSIONER OF THE PUBLIC BUILDING SERVICE, GSA; AND ROBERT MALSON, PRESIDENT, D.C. HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION

Mr. COGBILL. Thank you, Congresswoman Morella; and thank you for inviting us here today, Congresswoman Norton and Congresswoman Watson.

As you noted, my name is John Cogbill, and I am the chairman of the National Capital Planning Commission, and a member of its Interagency Task Force, which examined the impact of security measures on the historic design of our Nation's Capital.

The Commission recognizes that security has become a necessary and fundamental requirement of daily life in this city. At the same time, we are concerned about the effect of closed streets, hastily erected jersey barriers, concrete planters, and guard huts on Washington's Monumental Core. These installations are unsightly, and do not reflect the landscape of a free and open democratic society.

For this reason, in March of this year, the Commission established an Interagency Task Force to examine the future of Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House and, more generally, the impact of existing security measures.

Serving on the Task Force, in addition to myself, are senior representatives of the Secretary of the Interior, the Administrator of General Services, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, and the chairman of the District of Columbia Council. Richard Friedman, a presidentially appointed member of the Commission, serves as the Task Force chairman.

In addition to senior representatives of other Federal agencies, who also serve and participated as members of the Task Force, were participating agencies such as the U.S. Secret Service, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Federal Highway Administration, the Commission of Fine Arts, the U.S. Capitol Police, the Architect of the Capitol, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation.

In addition, the chairmen of the House Committee on Government Reform and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the Federal City Council, and the Downtown BID have all been represented in these deliberations.

Our Task Force convened on March 23rd, and members agreed that their objective was to identify urban design solutions that

would set a benchmark for security design throughout the Federal city.

The Task Force recognizes that although, in the wake of September 11th, increased security measures will be necessary to protect Federal facilities throughout the Nation's Capital, such measures can and should be implemented in a manner consistent with our democratic values.

The Task Force has forwarded its recommendations to the full commission yesterday, and at that time, our commission approved those recommendations for transmittal to the Congress and to the administration. I would like to briefly highlight those recommendations.

First, our commission proposes to prepare and implement, with the help of other Government agencies, the Urban Design and Security Plan, which will identify permanent security and streetscape improvements to ensure a secure and distinguished public realm in the Nation's Capital.

We are pleased to report to you that the administration has requested nearly \$800,000 as part of the emergency supplement now awaiting congressional approval to fund this plan.

The plan will include an array of landscape treatments, street furniture, bollards, and recommend design solutions for Pennsylvania Avenue, President's Park, the Federal Triangle, and our National Mall.

Security measures must protect our citizens and the environments that honor and house our democracy. However, we believe that security measures should enhance the public environment of the city, and they can do so when conceived with sensitivity and imagination, and implemented with good urban design as one of their major objectives.

Our commission has also recommended that NCPC, along with one or more nationally recognized urban designers, undertake the planning and concept design for the proposed plan. Project design and construction would be undertaken by an appropriate agency, such as GSA, the National Park Service, or the District government. This unified approach would ensure that the work is done properly, professionally, and not in a piecemeal fashion.

The commission also recommends that Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House remain closed to normal city traffic at this time. If, in the future, the security environment or security technology improves, this recommendation could be reconsidered.

Because the closure of this part of Pennsylvania Avenue removes a major east/west traffic artery, we recommend the implementation of traffic improvements such as synchronizing traffic lights, more strictly enforcing parking rules, and redesigning intersections. Based on the experience in other cities, we know that these simple steps can greatly help to relieve traffic congestion.

Pennsylvania Avenue between 15th and 17th Streets has been unsightly for too long. We envision it redesigned as a beautiful, landscaped civic space that welcomes pedestrians and that respects the historic setting of the White House.

We believe it is possible to create a distinguished public space and promenade that maintains the historic integrity of the street, and permits the Inaugural Parade to follow its traditional route.

Finally, we are commended that the Federal Government fund all costs associated with the development and implementation of the Urban Design and Security Plan. This would provide us the opportunity to implement the traffic improvements, the Circulator, and the tunnel assessments, which were set out in our report. If the tunnel is built, its funding should also be part of a Federal obligation.

I mentioned briefly the Circulator system. This is a new transit service, which is now being planned for our downtown area. This is actually first described in the NCPC Legacy Plan.

Our Commission recommends implementation of the Circulator to permit the partial and limited use of Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House. This would help mitigate traffic congestion by restoring an important cross-town transportation link.

The city's long-term viability requires adequate east-west transportation capacity. The loss of Pennsylvania Avenue restricts that east-west access.

Therefore, we are calling for serious consideration of a tunnel within the Pennsylvania Avenue or the E Street Corridors, combined with the Circulator and combined with wider application of traffic improvements, as I have previously mentioned. We believe that a study of this tunnel and its potential impacts should be undertaken immediately and completed within 18 to 24 months.

In summary, we believe that the Urban Design and Security Plan will promote the safety of those who live in, work in, and visit the Nation's Capital, while preserving the openness and historic design that have made Washington an expression of American ideals.

Madam Chairwoman, that concludes my formal remarks. I will be happy to answer any questions that you or the other members of your panel might have. I would like to thank you for allowing us to appear here today.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Mr. Cogbill. I also want to congratulate you on assuming the Chair of the National Capital Planning Commission. Little did you know that you would have so many challenges that you would be facing.

Mr. COGBILL. It is a challenge and a privilege, Madam Chair.

Mrs. MORELLA. That is very nicely stated.

Mr. Moravec of GSA has been very much involved, and I thank you for being here for us. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cogbill follows:]

TESTIMONY BY
JOHN V. COGBILL, III, CHAIRMAN
THE NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMMISSION
Before the
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
November 2, 2001

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Committee, my name is John Cogbill and I am Chairman of the National Capital Planning Commission and a member of its Interagency Task Force examining the impact of security measures on the historic design of the Nation's Capital. The Commission recognizes that security has become a necessary and fundamental requirement of daily life in this city. At the same time, we are concerned about the effect of closed streets, hastily erected jersey barriers, concrete planters, and guard huts on Washington's Monumental Core. These installations are unsightly and do not reflect the landscape of a free and open democratic society.

For this reason, in March of this year the Commission established an Interagency Task Force to examine the future of Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House and, more generally, the impact of existing security measures. Serving on the Task Force in addition to myself are senior representatives of the Secretary of the Interior, the Administrator of General Services, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, and the Chairman of the District of Columbia Council. Richard Friedman, a presidentially appointed member of the Commission, serves as the Task Force Chairman.

In addition, senior representatives of other federal agencies serve as participating members of the Task Force. Among these participating agencies are the U.S. Secret Service, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Federal Highway Administration, the Commission of Fine Arts, the U.S. Capitol Police, the Architect of the Capitol, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. In addition, the Chairmen of the House Committee on Government Reform and the Senate Committee on

Governmental Affairs, the Federal City Council, and the Downtown BID have all been represented in these deliberations.

The Task Force convened on March 23 and members agreed that their objective was to identify urban design solutions that would set a benchmark for security design throughout the federal city. The Task Force recognizes that although, in the wake of September 11th, increased security measures will be necessary to protect federal facilities throughout the Nation's Capital, such measures can and should be implemented in a manner consistent with our democratic values. The Task Force has forwarded its recommendations to the full Commission and yesterday, the Commission approved those recommendations for transmittal to the Congress and the Administration. I would like to briefly highlight those recommendations.

- The Commission recommends that Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House remain closed to normal city traffic at this time. If in the future the security environment or security technology improve, this recommendation could be reconsidered.
- Because the closure of this part of Pennsylvania Avenue removes a major east/west traffic artery, we recommend the immediate implementation of traffic improvements such as synchronizing traffic lights, more strictly enforcing parking rules, and redesigning intersections. Based on the experiences in other cities, we know that these simple steps can greatly help to relieve traffic congestion.
- Pennsylvania Avenue between 15th and 17th Streets has been unsightly for too long. We envision it redesigned as a beautiful, landscaped civic space that welcomes pedestrians and that respects the historic setting of the White House. We believe it is possible to create a distinguished public space and promenade that maintains the historic integrity of the street and that permits the Inaugural Parade to follow its traditional route.

- A new transit service is now being planning for the downtown area. This system is a “Circulator System” that was actually first described in NCPC’s Legacy Plan. The Commission recommends implementation of a Circulator that would permit the partial and limited use of Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House. This would help mitigate traffic congestion by restoring an important cross-town transportation link.
- The city’s long-term vitality requires adequate east-west transportation capacity. The loss of Pennsylvania Avenue restricts that east-west access. Therefore, we are calling for serious consideration of a tunnel within the Pennsylvania Avenue or the E Street Corridors, combined with the Circulator and wider application of the traffic improvements that I mentioned earlier. We believe that a study of the need for a tunnel and its potential impacts should be undertaken immediately and completed within 18 to 24 months.
- E Street on the south side of the White House was closed following the September 11 attacks. The Commission would like to see it reopened as soon as possible, and we believe we can help find better ways than simply closing streets to ensure our safety.
- One better way is the Urban Design and Security Plan that the Commission is now proposing. This comprehensive plan will identify permanent security and streetscape improvements to ensure a secure and distinguished public realm in the Nation’s Capital. We are pleased to report to you that the Administration has requested nearly \$800,000 as part of the emergency supplemental now awaiting congressional approval to fund this Plan. The Plan will include an array of landscape treatments, street furniture, bollards, etc., and recommend design solutions for Pennsylvania Avenue, President’s Park, the Federal Triangle and the National Mall. Security measures must protect our citizens and the environments that honor and house our democracy. We believe that security measures should enhance the public environment of the city and they can do so when conceived

with sensitivity and imagination and implemented with good urban design as one of their major objectives.

- The Commission has recommended that NCPC, along with one or more nationally recognized urban designers, undertake the planning and concept design for the proposed plan; project design and construction would be undertaken by an appropriate agency such as GSA or the National Park Service or the District government. This unified approach will ensure that the work is done properly, professionally, and not in a piecemeal fashion.
- And, finally, we are recommending that the federal government fund all costs associated with the development and implementation of the Urban Design and Security Plan, the traffic improvements, the Circulator, and tunnel assessments. If the tunnel is built, its funding should be a federal obligation.

We believe that the Urban Design and Security Plan will promote the safety of those who live in, work in, and visit the Nation's Capital while preserving the openness and historic design that have made Washington an expression of American ideals.

Madam Chairwoman, that concludes my formal remarks. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. MORAVEC. Madam Chairwoman, Congresswoman Norton, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify on behalf of GSA at this hearing on emergency preparedness in our Nation's Capital.

I am pleased to discuss with you the role and responsibilities of GSA in preparing for and responding to domestic disasters and national security emergencies, and on GSA's efforts to coordinate its role and responsibilities in the Nation's Capital with local and Federal Government agencies.

GSA is assigned specific responsibilities for domestic and national security emergency preparedness under Executive Orders 12656 and 12472. These key responsibilities include: providing rapid and efficient logistical support and telecommunications; assisting client agencies in their recovery efforts; providing support to those Federal agencies that assist victims of disaster or emergencies; and ensuring the continuity of GSA operations.

These responsibilities are the same in peace time or war time emergencies. Since September 11th, GSA has faced its greatest challenge yet in carrying out these responsibilities.

In the immediate aftermath of the terrible terrorist attacks in New York City and in the Washington, DC, area, GSA personnel nationwide went into action in accordance with our Continuity of Operations plans.

Within 2 hours of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, GSA had set up an emergency command center in New York, to begin providing affected agencies with the supplies and services needed to restore operations. GSA associates literally worked around the clock to produce logistical miracles within a matter of days.

In the Washington, DC, area, soon after the attack on the Pentagon, officials at the Department of Defense asked GSA to locate, make ready for occupancy, and totally equip nearly 850,000 square feet of space, to relocate DOD employees displaced from areas within the Pentagon affected by the attack. By September 17th, GSA had located and begun preparation for occupancy of 850,000 square feet for DOD in northern Virginia.

At the same time, GSA has been called upon to provide additional space, facilities, and a wide variety of services to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, both in New York City and Washington, DC.

Just 2 weeks ago, GSA also responded to a call for assistance from the Architect of the Capitol, as he sought furniture, computers, and other office equipment necessary to set up alternative office space for the Congress to carry out its critical functions.

At the same time, GSA has responded with a security awareness and response posture that has been consistently at or near the highest levels called for by this national emergency.

Madam Chairwoman, in national disasters like these, or in other national or regional emergencies requiring rapid agency action, GSA has attempted to coordinate its actions with other affected Federal, State, and local governmental agencies.

GSA has been coordinating with representatives of the District of Columbia City Council and the D.C. Protective Services, prior to and following the September 11th attacks, to outline security and

access requirements for certain common areas in the District of Columbia.

Historically, when it is necessary for GSA to close a public thoroughfare or a public space in the District, GSA has coordinated its actions with the D.C. Department of Public Works and with other Federal agencies. We will continue these coordination efforts to develop the most viable solutions.

We note that the District of Columbia, as the seat of our Federal Government, also has some unique authorities that allow Federal agencies and D.C. agencies to better coordinate their emergency preparedness.

Section 1537 of Title 31 of the U.S. Code allows Federal and D.C. agencies to provide services to one another. While this inter-governmental authority is not limited to specific domestic or war time emergencies and disasters, it can nevertheless be used to rapidly address services-related needs that might arise in these situations.

For instance, GSA could use this authority to assist District officials with many types of services, from snow removal during blizzards, to crowd control, to telecommunications support during Presidential Inaugurations.

Finally, in response to a recent Federal law, and in an effort to better coordinate the jurisdiction of D.C. Metropolitan Police and certain Federal law enforcement agencies, and to assist in crime prevention and law enforcement activities, GSA recently entered into a Cooperative Agreement with the Metropolitan Police.

In addition to enhancing our law enforcement abilities in and around our Nation's Capital, this Cooperative Agreement also should enhance our abilities to coordinate law enforcement activities and prepare for national emergencies like those we recently experienced.

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I will, of course, be glad to answer any questions that you or Congresswoman Norton may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moravec follows:]

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**STATEMENT OF
F. JOSEPH MORAVEC
COMMISSIONER
OF
PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE
U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NOVEMBER 2, 2001**



Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Committee, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify on behalf of the United States General Services Administration (GSA) on this hearing on "Emergency Preparedness in the Nation's Capital." I am pleased to discuss with you the role and responsibilities of GSA in preparing for and responding to domestic disasters and national security emergencies, and on GSA's efforts to coordinate its role and responsibilities in the Nation's Capital with local and Federal governmental agencies.

GSA is assigned specific responsibilities for domestic and national security emergency preparedness under Executive Orders 12656 and 12472. These key responsibilities include:

- Providing rapid and efficient logistical support and telecommunications;
- Assisting client agencies in their recovery efforts;
- Providing support to those Federal agencies that assist victims of disaster or emergencies; and
- Ensuring the continuity of GSA operations.

These responsibilities are the same in peace-time or wartime emergencies.

Since September 11, 2001, GSA has faced its greatest challenge yet in carrying out these responsibilities.

Direct Response to Terrorist Attack

In the immediate aftermath of the terrible terrorist attacks in New York City and in the Washington, D.C. area, GSA personnel nationwide went into action in accordance with our Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans. Within two hours of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, GSA had set up an emergency command center in New York to begin providing affected agencies with the supplies and services needed to restore operations. GSA associates literally worked around the clock to produce logistical "miracles" within a matter of days.

In the Washington, D.C. area, soon after the attack on the Pentagon, officials at the Department of Defense (DOD) asked GSA to locate, make ready for occupancy and totally equip nearly 850,000 square feet of space to relocate DOD employees displaced from areas within the Pentagon affected by the attack. By September 17th, GSA had located and begun preparation for occupancy of 850,000 square feet for DOD in Northern Virginia.

At the same time, GSA has been called upon to provide additional space, facilities and a wide variety of services to the Federal Emergency Management Agency both in New York City and Washington, D.C. Just last week, GSA also

responded to a call for assistance from the Architect of the Capitol as he sought furniture, computers and other office equipment necessary to set up alternative office space for the Congress to carry out its critical functions.

At the same time, GSA has responded with a security awareness and response posture that has been consistently at or near the highest levels called for by this national emergency.

Coordination Efforts in our Nation's Capital

Madam Chairwoman, in national disasters like these, or in other national or regional emergencies requiring rapid agency action, GSA has attempted to coordinate its actions with other affected Federal, State and local governmental agencies. GSA has been coordinating with representatives of the District of Columbia City Council and the D.C. Protective Services prior to and following the September 11th attacks to outline security and access requirements for certain common areas in the District of Columbia. Historically, when it is necessary for GSA to close a public thoroughfare or a public space in the District, GSA has coordinated its actions with the D.C. Department of Public Works and with other Federal agencies. We will continue these coordination efforts to develop the most viable solutions.

We note that the District of Columbia, as the seat of our Federal government, also has some unique authorities that allow Federal agencies and DC agencies to better coordinate their emergency preparedness. Section 1537 of title 31 of the United States Code allows Federal and DC agencies to provide services to one another. While this intergovernmental authority is not limited to specific domestic or wartime emergencies and disasters, it can nevertheless be used to rapidly address services-related needs that might arise in these situations. For instance, GSA could use this authority to assist District officials with many types of services, from snow removal during blizzards, to crowd control, to telecommunications support during Presidential Inaugurations.

Finally, in response to a recent Federal law, and in an effort to better coordinate the jurisdiction of DC Metropolitan Police and certain Federal law enforcement agencies and to assist in crime prevention and law enforcement activities, GSA recently entered into a Cooperative Agreement with the Metropolitan Police. In addition to enhancing our law enforcement abilities in and around our Nation's Capital, this Cooperative Agreement also should enhance our abilities to coordinate law enforcement activities and prepare for National emergencies like those we recently experienced.

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I will be glad to answer any questions that you or the Committee members may have.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Mr. Moravec.

I am now pleased to recognize Robert Malson, president of the D.C. Hospital Association.

Mr. MALSON. Madam Chairman and Mrs. Norton, I am Robert Malson, president of the District of Columbia Hospital Association, and I chair the Metropolitan Washington Council of Government's Bio-terrorism Task Force.

DCHA represents all full service and most specialty hospitals in the District of Columbia, plus four Federal hospitals: the Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Malcolm Grew Medical Center at Andrews Air Force Base, and the National Navy Medical Center in Bethesda, MD.

Your invitation to testify asked how the Federal and local governments coordinate to defend the Nation's Capital, and that you would examine the coordination of decisions and actions of Federal and local governments to ensure security.

We coordinate through memorandums of understanding, planning, and frequent exercises. We coordinate vertically through private hospitals, universities, city and county governments, and the Federal Government. We coordinate horizontally, through regional MOUs, particularly through the Council of Government.

Our Council of Government's Bio-terrorism Task Force, for example, has two members here today, who we just met in the audience. Behind me is Captain Elliott Grollman of the Federal Protective Service, who served with us for the 19 months in writing our plan. Over to our right, with his elbow on the chair, is Dr. Michael Soto, from the George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Sciences.

DCHA hospitals were prepared to receive about 150 to 200 victims from the attack on the Pentagon. We actually ended up receiving about half that many. Approximately 95 or so living victims came out of the Pentagon. The majority of those went to the hospitals in northern Virginia, and a few less than that came to the District of Columbia. Our colleagues in Maryland, particularly in Prince George's and Montgomery County, were standing by.

Since the anthrax was discovered in the Hart Senate Office Building, DCHA has initiated and coordinated the National Capital Region's health systems' response by hosting daily conference calls among Federal, State and local health officials and hospital representatives, to enhance the metropolitan area's communications ability to share real time status reports on the current anthrax crisis.

In addition, DCHA and our hospitals have added additional personnel, security, pharmaceutical, and other supply expenses for these essentially public health and public safety functions.

For the last few weeks, our hospital emergency rooms have been inundated with concerned and frightened residents, who want to be screened for anthrax at the same time that the yearly influenza season is about to begin.

We were pleased that the D.C. Department of Health began using D.C. General Hospital to administer testing and treatment in the early stages of the Brentwood Postal Service situation.

However, if a more serious biological or chemical attack occurs, our hospitals are not prepared for a surge of inpatients that may require decontamination and/or isolation.

While all of our hospitals have reviewed and updated their emergency response plans, the city must also be prepared to enhance the capacity of the D.C. General facility to accommodate mass casualty patients.

It is not easy to reverse the trend of the last 10 years that dramatically reduced bed capacity at all District hospitals. It will take Federal Government assistance to provide the necessary resources.

Furthermore, we urge the Federal Government, the Governors of Maryland and Virginia, and the Mayor of the District of Columbia to coordinate closely with the hospitals of D.C., Maryland, and Virginia, to provide immediate assistance to all hospitals that have tirelessly fulfilled these public health and safety functions since September 11th.

None of the State and local governments or the hospitals of the region anticipated the added burdens that we are experiencing. Nonetheless, we are responding to ensure that the National Capital area residents have access to the required medical and health services.

Our hospitals believe that there are a number of concrete steps that should be taken immediately. First, we need enhanced communication and coordination for all levels of alert.

The D.C. Emergency Management Agency's Emergency Operations Center can be upgraded to facilitate the connection between the District's Department of Health officials with the hospital and private medical community.

Second, health care professional credentialing during emergencies can be accelerated. Third, medical liability relief during emergency conditions will enable us to act more quickly and yet just as safely.

Fourth, increased pharmaceutical reserves and medical supplies will ensure that our people will have what they need, should it be required. Fifth, under any one of a number of predictable scenarios, our hospitals will simply not have adequate security. The Metropolitan Police Department and the D.C. National Guard should be tasked and funded to address those requirements.

Further, our hospitals fully support the Mayor's request made earlier this morning that he be given the authority to activate the National Guard in a wide-spread emergency.

Finally, clear and precise public service announcements must be disseminated quickly, to ensure that our citizens have the right information to protect their health and safety and that of their families.

I can assure you, Madam Chair, that the hospitals of the District of Columbia and the nearby suburbs of Maryland and Virginia continue to be committed to enhancing the coordination among the Federal, State, and local governments, and our private and Federal hospitals.

We cannot continue at this pace without help. We are developing a detailed proposal on the specific types and amounts of resources needed, and will share it with the committee in the next 2 weeks.

Again, we thank you for this opportunity to provide comments about emergency preparedness in the Nation's Capital. This concludes my formal comments. I would be happy to answer any questions that the committee may have, or to provide any information that the committee might need.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Malson follows:]



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Robert A. Malson
President

**Testimony before the
Congress of the United States
United States House of Representatives
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
on
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL
by
Robert A. Malson
President
District of Columbia Hospital Association
November 2, 2001**

Children's National Medical Center • District of Columbia General Hospital • George Washington University Hospital • Georgetown University Hospital
Greater Southeast Community Hospital • Hadley Memorial Hospital • Howard University Hospital • National Rehabilitation Hospital • Providence Hospital
Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D.C. • Riverside Hospital • Saint Elizabeths Hospital-Commission on Mental Health Services • Sibley Memorial Hospital
Veterans Affairs Medical Center • Walter Reed Army Medical Center • Washington Hospital Center
Affiliate Hospitals
Malcolm Grow Medical Center, Andrews AFB, MD • National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD

Chairwoman Morella, and committee members, I am Robert A. Malson, President of the District of Columbia Hospital Association (DCHA) and Chairman of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) Bioterrorism Task Force. DCHA represents all full service and most specialty hospitals in the District of Columbia, plus four federal hospitals – The Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Malcolm Grow Medical Center at Andrews Air Force Base and the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland.

Your invitation to testify asked how the Federal and local governments coordinate to defend the Nation's Capital and that you would examine the coordination of decisions and actions of Federal and local governments to ensure security.

Since anthrax was discovered in the Hart Senate Office Building, DCHA has initiated and coordinated the National Capital Region's health systems' response by hosting daily conference calls among federal, state and local health officials and hospital representatives to enhance the metropolitan area's communication ability to share "*real time*" status reports on the current anthrax crises. In addition, DCHA and our hospitals have added additional personnel, security, pharmaceutical and other supply expenses for these public health and safety functions.

All of our hospital emergency rooms are inundated with frightened residents who want to be screened for anthrax at the same time as the yearly influenza season is about to begin. We were pleased that the Department of Health began using DC General Hospital to administer testing and treatment in the early stages of the Brentwood Postal Service situation. However, if a more serious biological or chemical attack occurs, our hospitals are not prepared for a surge of inpatients that may require decontamination and/or isolation. While all of our hospitals have reviewed and updated their emergency response plans, the city must also be prepared to enhance the capacity of the DC General facility to accommodate mass casualty patients. It is not easy to reverse the trend of the last ten years that dramatically reduced bed capacity at all District hospitals. It will take Federal government assistance to provide the necessary resources.

Furthermore, we urge the federal government, the Governors of Maryland and Virginia and the Mayor of the District of Columbia to coordinate closely with the hospitals of DC, MD, and VA to provide immediate assistance to all hospitals that have tirelessly fulfilled these public health and safety functions since September 11th. None of the state and local governments or the hospitals of the region anticipated the added burdens we are experiencing. Nonetheless, we are responding to ensure that National Capital area residents have access to the required medical and health services.

Our hospitals believe that there are a number of steps that should be taken immediately:

1. We need enhanced communication and coordination capacity for all levels of alert. The D. C. Emergency Management Agency's Emergency Operations Center can be upgraded to facilitate the connection between the District's Department of Health officials with the hospital and medical community;
2. Health care professional credentialing during emergencies can be accelerated;
3. Medical liability relief during emergency conditions will enable us to act more quickly and just as safely;
4. Increased pharmaceutical reserves and medical supplies will ensure that our people will have what they might well require;
5. Under any one of a number of predictable scenarios, our hospitals will simply not have adequate security. The Metropolitan Police Department and the DC National Guard should be tasked and funded to address those requirements; and
6. Clear and precise public service announcements must be disseminated to ensure that our citizens have the right information to protect their health and safety and that of their families.

I can assure you, Madam Chair, that the hospitals of the District of Columbia and the nearby suburbs of Maryland and Northern Virginia continue to be committed to enhancing the coordination among the federal, state and local governments and our private and federal hospitals. We cannot continue at this pace without help. We are developing a detailed proposal on the specific types and amounts of resources needed and will share it with the committee in the next two weeks.

Thank you again for this opportunity to provide comments about Emergency Preparedness in the Nation's Capital. This concludes my formal comments. I am happy to answer any questions that Committee may have or provide information the Committee may need.

Mrs. MORELLA. The three of you have presented excellent testimony. It is just too bad that we did not start at 7 a.m., so that we would have a full array of people, as well as the press. [Laughter.]

I am going to ask each of you a question, and I will start off then with Mr. Cogbill. Again, congratulations on the Task Force report. Good luck with getting the kind of money that you need for the study of the tunnel.

As I mentioned yesterday, I think that you have to have some assurance from the administration that there will be some funding for a tunnel, if that were to take place.

But I agree with what Congresswoman Norton had said to, let us not give up on opening Pennsylvania Avenue. We think the traffic management changes are excellent, and the Circulator is excellent in opening E Street. But I would still like to think of it as temporary, and that maybe technology will allow us to open it.

Here was something that we noted. The District of Columbia Home Rule Act established a National Capital Service Area, which covers the Federal Enclave, and it requires the President to appoint a National Capital Service Area Director, who would be responsible for obtaining police protection and maintain streets, with the exception of the grounds of the U.S. Capitol buildings, the Library of Congress, and the Supreme Court.

To your knowledge, has this charter provision ever been implemented; and should a National Capital Service Area be established, in order to better coordinate street maintenance and physical security planning in that Federal monumental core?

Mr. COGBILL. Madam Chairwoman, as I understand it, that position remains unfilled, I think, since the inception of that legislation, or at least the Chair position.

With respect to the second part of your question about what should be done, certainly, from our role in the National Capital Planning Commission, as the professional planners for the Federal properties within the District, and having the advisory responsibility for other properties, we would certainly support and participate in that process, given the opportunity.

We work very closely with the city. In fact, one of the things that I have tried to do, since coming to the Chair of this important body, is to work more closely with the city. We are reaching out, as you would expect, through the normal planning process, directly to the Planning Department, to the city's Department of Transportation, and to the other agencies, with whom we would interact on a regular basis.

Mrs. MORELLA. Now in terms of that National Capital Service Area Director, who would appoint that person? Is that a Presidential appointment? Would it be your appointment, or the Commission's?

Mr. COGBILL. No, ma'am, I do not believe it would be my appointment. I honestly cannot speak to that specific question. I just do not have an answer to that.

Mrs. MORELLA. It might be worth, given the context of the current situation, to look into that. If you would share that with us, we would greatly appreciate it.

Mr. COGBILL. We would be happy to respond.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you.

I will ask our representative from GSA about Federal agencies. Are they following the GSA guidelines regarding the installation of security barriers, Mr. Moravec?

Mr. MORAVEC. First, let me say that no one who cares about this great city, including me, can observe dispassionately or without pain the closure of streets, which are vital to its life and commerce. I want you to know that I feel that way.

The reality is that the Federal Government is not a monolithic command and control hierarchial organization. It consists of many agencies and branches.

Agency heads, Congress, and judges can and do make decisions that they feel are necessary to protect their people. GSA cannot direct a Cabinet Secretary to do anything. We can advise and coordinate, and we do.

In a couple of instances, in the case of the Treasury Department and the Department of Justice, they have authority to remove parking and to close streets, without even consulting with GSA.

In all other instances, including instances where we have delegated the authority, as we often have in the case of the department's headquarters to manage and provide security at their facility, we are in contact with those agencies.

We can direct an agency to the right people: to the Fine Arts Commission, to the National Capital Planning Commission, to the city agencies, to coordinate proposed closings. We can use what guidance we can to make sure that process is facilitated.

Mrs. MORELLA. If they just neglect it, ignore it, or do not go to the relevant source to assist them, what would you do?

Mr. MORAVEC. Well, as I say, we do our best to coordinate and advise and cajole.

Mrs. MORELLA. That is the extent of your authority?

Mr. MORAVEC. In reality, it is, yes.

Mrs. MORELLA. Should it be changed?

Mr. MORAVEC. Far be it for me to ask for a wider range in powers for GSA. But it is clear that there needs to be a broader coordinated effort amongst Federal agencies with regard to this decision-making process.

Mrs. MORELLA. GSA is in charge of telecenters, right? You find the place where they do the telework that takes place with our Federal employees, and we are trying to promote more and more of it?

Mr. MORAVEC. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. MORELLA. And I hope you are going to find a couple of them in Montgomery County, MD. It is a perfect location, to keep cars off the road.

But I was speaking to the OPM Director, and there are benefits of telecenters for emergency response for Federal employees and probably for other essential workers.

But can you see some merit in that? If you had an emergency, and you had to put people up places, like GAO tired to do with Longworth being closed and Hart being closed; what if you used the telecenters?

Mr. MORAVEC. I can absolutely see merit in the existence of telecenters, even in the absence of an emergency. That is a very good, common sense way of deploying the Federal work force and making

it convenient for people to be productive, and at the same time, to have other dimension to their lives.

Mrs. MORELLA. And also as part of an emergency preparedness plan.

Mr. MORAVEC. Certainly, anything that takes pressure off of dense urban areas in a time of crisis, in terms of people needing to be there would be a welcome relief valve.

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Malson, we look forward to seeing that report that you worked on. I am delighted to know that there was such great coordination that took place there.

I have just a couple of questions for you. One that I began to pose about is, is there an assessment of, let us say, the District of Columbia, and I would certainly think about it in terms of the region, too, the health system with regard to the capacity of each of these hospitals to handle the health care risks, the number of beds, isolation capacity, infection control, special centers for care, mass casualty plans, medical personnel employed, list of site, quarantine.

I mean, there is a whole litany, and you could go on and on with that. But has any assessment been done, and if not, should there be more intensive and extensive assessment?

Mr. MALSON. Madam Chair, the overall answer is yes. Our hospitals in the District of Columbia are connected. Our emergency rooms are connected by a radio system, which we call the HMARS, the Hospital Mutual Aid Radio System. Every day, we do random radio checks on a 24/7 basis.

Mrs. MORELLA. I did not mean to interrupt, but was done also before September 11th.

Mr. MALSON. Oh, we have been doing it for years.

Mrs. MORELLA. So you have always done that.

Mr. MALSON. That is one of the reasons that on September 11th, our system was, as reported by the Post and not by us, the only one that was really functioning in real time within the city. That is not including Maryland and Virginia. That was in real time within minutes of the attack on the Pentagon.

We do bed checks. We had been doing bed checks once a week. But since the anthrax was discovered in the Hart Building, I started doing bed availability checks daily.

Yesterday, for example, with the DCHA hospitals alone, those that I mentioned, which are also at the bottom of my testimony and you can see it at the bottom of the page, within that hospital grouping alone, as of 9 a.m. yesterday, we could have taken 119 major trauma patients and 310 minor trauma patients.

We do that every day, and trauma is a very specific type of injury, which requires not only the bed, but also the people who are technically qualified to serve people who need those services. So we have to have the surgeons there and the radiologists and the others who can actually accommodate the needs of people who have those kinds of needs.

So we are doing that daily now, and we will continue to do it until we begin to feel that we can stand down that level of alert.

Mrs. MORELLA. You see, I have a concern that hospitals, because they compete, may not cooperate or share as much as they could, because of the specter of competition.

So if you had an emergency in the District of Columbia, say anthrax, do you know where these people should go, which hospital; so that you have specialty hospitals and they are sharing and not all trying to have the equipment for everything?

Mr. MALSON. Absolutely, and let me describe two systems that compliment each other. In Maryland, for example, in your State, if someone dials 911, they get the local 911 responder, and an ambulance or a helicopter, as appropriate is dispatched to that victim.

Once they get the victim, they come under the control of the Maryland Institute of Emergency Medical Services out of Baltimore. So where that victim is taken, the hospital that victim is taken to in Maryland is actually controlled by a central source throughout the State. It is probably one of the most advanced, if not the most advanced system of that type in the country.

In the District, by comparison, when you dial 911, we are much more contained geographically and we do not need that kind of breadth in geography that Maryland has. But we are also able to dispatch our victims through the D.C. fire and EMS to the nearest appropriate facility.

Now I would like to spend a moment on what constitutes appropriate. Appropriate may or may not be the closest hospital. If there is already a line of ambulances at the closest hospital, then you want to pass that one to go to the next hospital, because there may not be a line there, just to cite a single example of the kind of coordination that takes place all the time.

So we have these systems in northern Virginia, and while I am not as familiar with their practices, there are best practices standards in the hospital industry, where we look at what each other does, and we try to adopt the best practices, and we tend to move in that direction.

On the subject of competition, you struck two chords with me. The first is, you heard the first panel speak in terms that made my hospital salivate, if we could just get in line for a little bit of that money.

But the truth of the matter is, Madam Chair, as you have seen and has everyone has seen on television for the last 3 weeks, the first responders for bio-terrorism are our hospitals and private physicians' offices.

That is where people go, when they think they have anthrax or are sick or afraid. Most of them are simply afraid that they may have it, and they want to be told by a physician that after a discussion about what they are feeling, that they are, in fact, safe.

The import of my comment is that all levels of government, city, county, State, and Federal, have to recognize that in this era of bio-terrorism, the front line first responders are the private sector; the private physicians in their offices and our private hospitals. We have not, in this country, thought about that in that way.

Forty years ago this Fall, I raised my hand and promised to defend this country when I joined the Navy. We have always thought of defending this country as something we did beyond the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Now we are having to re-think that. We are on the front lines, here in the Nation's Capital and around the country. We are on the front lines in our private hospitals, and our physicians are, as well.

How do we make sure that the Federal Government plays the proper role in assisting our private sector first responders to give the kind of care that we all expect them to give? They cannot do it on their own.

Mrs. MORELLA. We will have one more quick round, after Congresswoman Norton asks her questions. Congresswoman Norton, thank you.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mrs. Morella.

I appreciate all your efforts in the wake of September 11th. I have some urgent concerns with the GSA, in particular.

We had a situation to occur where an agency put up a barricade and then had to take it down because of violation of D.C. law in effect.

You say in your testimony, GSA has been coordinating with representatives of the District of Columbia City Council and the D.C. Protective Services.

Mr. MORAVEC. Right, that is specifically in relation to the Ronald Reagan Building and the Wilson Building, right in that area.

Ms. NORTON. Oh, I see, and you also imply that you do not have a lot to say as to what an agency does itself. I mean, I can understand how an agency can make an ad hoc decision about barrier. That would not be a very permanent barrier, if they were making an ad hoc decision in the face of an impending emergency.

But do you mean, somebody can, except for those two agencies that you named who had their own independent authority, that other agencies can go out and say look, I want this or that barrier up, and take these parking meters out, and that is what I say, because I am a Cabinet officer?

Mr. MORAVEC. We advise them of the law, and we have and will continue to play a role, to the greatest extent possible, in reminding agency heads, for example, of what the laws are of the District of Columbia. We can be quite strident in giving our advice to them in that regard.

But as a practical matter, for example, in the instances that you just mentioned, the action is taken, then we are informed, and then we intercede. So it is not as smoothly coordinated as we would like it to be.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Moravec, can I ask that you send a memo to agencies, describing what the law is, and that we act pro-actively in asking them to work through your offices? I think some of them have never had to do this before, so they are not aware of how they ought to proceed.

Mr. MORAVEC. Well, we are working with them. I do not want to give you the impression that we are not.

For example, we have had preliminary, not formal requests, but preliminary requests from several departments, to investigate whether they can remove parking meters on streets adjacent to their buildings. Obviously, that is not a possibility that we take lightly.

We are working at GSA to establish guidelines as to when that may be appropriate. We also will be, in that case, trying to establish proper compensation for the District of Columbia, in the case where that were to take place. So we are giving guidance to agencies with regard to those kinds of requests.

Ms. NORTON. I just think there needs to be written guidance. I am very concerned and the city has been particularly concerned. You do not indicate that you specifically coordinate with any official of the D.C. Government for these.

Mr. MORAVEC. No, but I would hasten to point out that we do have a very close working relationship, both personal and professional, with the Mayor, with deputy mayors, with the city administrator, and with a number of different department heads within the municipal government, at my level, as well as at the regional office level.

Ms. NORTON. In fact, I know that. I have no complaints about the way in which you deal with the D.C. government.

I am asking for a point person in GSA to work with the District Government, when it comes to barricades, to help coordinate that.

Mr. MORAVEC. That person is our Assistant Regional Administrator for the National Capital Region, Tony Costa.

Mr. COGBILL. Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Yes.

Mr. COGBILL. If I could interject here, the NCPC is also playing a role in this. We have a draft letter which will be going out probably early next week. It is going to all the Federal agencies, reminding them of their responsibility to come back to the NCPC for any approvals of barricades that are established along the streets.

We have no jurisdiction within the street, and certainly with respect to removing parking meters. But we have a policy that is in place, and we intend to remind all of the Federal agencies of that, as early as next week.

Ms. NORTON. If agencies think they can continue to ignore what the GSA says or what the NCPC says, then we can make that a matter of law.

We simply cannot allow ad hoc barricades to go out, agency by agency, or for them to say, well, you know, GSA really cannot tell us what to do; not at a time, when it seems to me that the NCPC has come up with a perfect way to do this.

We can get you a barrier. We can get you a barrier that is attractive. We can get you a barrier in keeping with the LaFonte plan. That is the way to do it, unless you have an emergency, in which case, people ought to be able to operate immediately. But we are not independent actors in the Federal presence, and a Cabinet official does not have the jurisdiction, in my judgment, to make these decisions.

If they think they have, then I think we can make sure that they understand they do not. I understand how your hands may be tied there. I understand how GSA has to work. Let me go on, because I know the time is fleeting.

Mrs. MORELLA. On that, Congresswoman Norton, we may want to explore legislation. But in the meantime, you and I may want to sign a letter to him, asking him to reach out to the agencies. Would that help you to give you that kind of thrust?

Mr. MORAVEC. That would help.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you.

Ms. NORTON. So the agencies can then get a copy of that. Thank you, Mrs. Morella.

Very serious concerns have been raised by the major public building when it comes to costs in a new building. That, of course, is the Ronald Reagan Building. We may have to have a specific hearing on the Ronald Reagan Building.

We know that you have taken specific steps with respect to security in the Ronald Reagan Building, about which there were long-term concerns about security, long before September 11th.

I also know, and I am in sympathy with GSA on the public parking, because I know that the public parking is necessary in order to pay for the building. But I do think that presents an extraordinary challenge to you.

Let me ask you how you are dealing with this. Here is this target, virtually. It costs us almost \$1 billion to put that building up. Yet, we need the public in it, and we need the public parking in it.

It may not have been built architecturally with any of this in mind. But let me ask you if you can assure us that the public parking will be made available, and yet employees and others in the building will remain safe, because you have checked people as they go, or otherwise made sure that the public parking does not carry with it any dangers to people in that huge building?

Mr. MORAVEC. First of all, it is GSA's security philosophy to tailor individual counter-measures and protocols with regard to the security of buildings on an individual basis to each building individually.

The Ronald Reagan Building, not only because of its size, but because of its location and because of its iconic nature, if I may say so, represents a very special kind of situation.

I can say to you that I am confident, not complacent, but confident that the most stringent security counter-measures and security procedures that we have available to us are in place at the Ronald Reagan Building.

I have met personally with a number of the agency heads in that building. I think, for the most part, they have been reassured, when we have explained exactly what we are doing.

That does not include the matter of public parking, which is the matter that you are raising. The problem, as you point out, is that the Ronald Reagan is, by law, a public building. Therefore, it is accessible to members of the public.

Ms. NORTON. No, no, that is not the definition. I mean, public parking is not available in the House of Representatives. Public parking is not available in many, if not most, Government buildings, because public parking is not used to help pay for the building. You have a special situation there.

Mr. MORAVEC. It is really not a matter so much of revenue, as of the purpose of the building. The building is used for international trade shows, for cultural events, for entertainment events. It is a very important civic venue for these activities.

Ms. NORTON. It is a multi-purpose building. Understand, I am on your side. There has got to be public parking there. But the fact is, to even get into this building, I cannot even get into my own House of Representatives, without having cops look under my car to make sure there are no bombs and look into my trunk.

Mr. MORAVEC. Congresswoman Norton, I do not know if you have tried to drive into the Ronald Reagan Building lately, but it is a pretty stringent lately, but it is a pretty stringent protocol.

The car is stopped. It is surrounded. You are asked to show identification. A mirror is used to pass underneath the carriage of the car, to make sure there is nothing underneath. The trunk is opened.

Ms. NORTON. This is for members of the public, as well?

Mr. MORAVEC. This is for members of the public, all vehicles. There is a test called the Barringer test, which is applied to make sure there are no explosive devices on board. We have bomb sniffing dogs there.

The Ronald Reagan Building has not only its only Security Director, who is probably one of the top people in our force, but its own police station present.

So I want to assure you that every car that enters the Ronald Reagan Building is subjected to a very high level screening.

Ms. NORTON. That is very good news. We have had calls from employees saying that there was a difference between public parking and employee parking. If every car that goes in there is having the same treatment that we are getting in the House of Representatives, that is the best you can do.

Mr. MORAVEC. Not since September 11th, I am pretty sure.

Ms. NORTON. Not since September 11th; that is very important.

Let me ask Mr. Cogbill, the administration has responded to the cost items and essentially said, no way, because of two reasons. It says, we are not going to have that area around the White House dug up during this kind of war, and with all the call on revenue, we are not about to spend money on a tunnel, when there are other urgent matters. I mean, that is what they have said.

When the administration, which has not been unkind to us, says that, I must tell you, I am putting the tunnel aside. And I am, as I said at the press conference yesterday, focusing on your very good recommendations that could be done now.

Let me ask you, what are you doing or will you do to operationalize your recommendation to open E Street both ways? I mean, you recommended it. The idea stands in the air there. Nothing will happen unless somebody does something about it.

What are you going to do about it? I take that one, because it is one of the easiest ones, because nobody has said that E Street was closed down because of security concerns. It was closed down for the same reasons that a whole bunch of places were closed down; just to make sure nothing else would happen.

Every day that goes by, Mr. Cogbill, and I really emphasize this, it leads to permanent closing. It has not been opened in a year, yet. Unless there is somebody that keeps pushing, it is not going to be opened again. We will be back where we were after all the work we did to get E Street widened and opened two ways.

The rest of it will be for nothing, because there will not be any pressure to open it. What will the NCPC do to do more than have a recommendation out there somewhere, hanging in the air, where nobody has to pick it up and move on it?

Mr. COGBILL. The short answer is that we are in contact, on a regular basis, with our contacts at the Secret Service, as a result

of the Task Force and the Commission hearings on this plan that we have just presented to you, yesterday.

When this matter first occurred, we had very extensive discussions with the Secret Service about the whys and wherefores of the E Street closing. We were told, at that time, that it was different from Pennsylvania Avenue, and that there had been an Executive order that had been issued with respect to Pennsylvania Avenue, and that no such order had been issued or was anticipated to be issued with respect to E Street. Therefore, the closing was on a day-to-day basis.

Based upon the comments that were made by you and Congresswoman Morella yesterday, I did contact Secret Service again to express to them our strongest indication and belief that we wanted that street opened, as is set forth in our report.

Ms. NORTON. And what did they respond, Mr. Cogbill?

Mr. COGBILL. Their response was, we are looking at it on a day-to-day basis.

Ms. NORTON. I am going to ask the Chair if she will sign off on a letter with me then, to say if they are not going to open it, then we need to know why. There is a clear and present danger that that not reopen.

Mrs. MORELLA. I could not agree more. In fact, I was going to ask who has the ultimate authority? It is the President, is it not?

Mr. COGBILL. Yes, ma'am, I think that is the ultimate authority.

Ms. NORTON. Maybe that is who we ought to write. This is really very important, given what you have recommended on Pennsylvania Avenue. I do not fault you on that. Nobody expected you to recommend otherwise.

Let me finally ask you about my letter. I appreciate your response to my letter. On October 10th, I wrote to Chairman Nay of our House Administration Committee, and to Chris Dodd, the Chair of the comparable Senate Committee, actually trying to use your work as a model.

Just let me quote a little bit from it. "For several months, the National Capital Planning Commission has been preparing a major study and recommendations concerning the impact of Federal security measures around national memorials and Federal buildings in the city's core and around the White House. I would like to recommend coordination of efforts by the Congress, the executive branch, and the District of Columbia to assure appropriate information and action among the several entities that are hurriedly erecting barricades."

Then essentially, I am asking for everybody to get together, so you do not have the Congress and the Supreme Court, and these are two independent branches of government; so that under our Constitution, they can all decide for themselves.

You responded to me on October 31st, and you sent copies to all the relevant congressional officials who would be involved in this matter. Then you say in here, "We appreciate the participation of the Architect of the Capitol and the U.S. Capitol Police in the workings of our Task Force."

You do not say that they were on your Task Force, but you have had some contact with them. What did they have to do with your Task Force, and how can you draw them operationally more into

your work, so that we have them involved in your urban design recommendations that you put forward yesterday.

Mr. COGBILL. Well, first we want to thank you for writing that letter, and offering us the opportunity to help with your process here on Capital Hill.

We did have presentations by the Architect of the Capitol and by the Capital Police. They came to our meetings. They were part of the participating Task Force members that made contributions.

Ms. NORTON. But they are not listed as members of the Task Force. They are listed as people who were involved in the workings. But then as I read it, I do not read their names on the Task Force.

Mr. COGBILL. Yes, ma'am, and I am looking at the book that we provided or the plan that we provided yesterday. We did list them as participating members. They were not voting members.

Ms. NORTON. I see.

Mr. COGBILL. But they did participate.

Ms. NORTON. Go ahead; I am sorry.

Mr. COGBILL. I was going to further say that we have followed up with the Architect of the Capitol, in order to try to start the dialog with the Architect of the Capitol and the Capitol police, to try to move this matter forward, as you suggested.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, and you will see what is being done around the Senate buildings. There is some sense of elegance there.

If you look at Russell, where they are closed off there. But look at the other end of the street, where they have finished, there is a huge oval there. But the Architect has always had a sense of beautification here.

I do not know anything about the barricades on C Street, except they must be temporary. Are they, Mr. Moravec?

Mr. MORAVEC. I am not sure I understand; which one, specifically?

Ms. NORTON. If you go down C Street, there are these terrible things that Connie and I have to go through, and all staff have to go through. You have to go around. You have to go through a maze. They are uglier than anything we have ever seen before. They have got to be temporary.

Mr. MORAVEC. Congresswoman Norton, I have been informed that those are within the purview of the Capitol.

Ms. NORTON. Well, I know they are.

Mr. MORAVEC. I do not know whether they are temporary or not.

Ms. NORTON. I know they are. But you seemed to know whether they were temporary. That is the only reason I turned to you. You are absolutely right. A separate branch of Government, which is mainly the Congress, does not have to coordinate with the Executive, which is who you are, has done that.

Mr. MORAVEC. Right.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Cogbill, however, has to do with the Federal presence. He can step, one, to understand what in the world is going on there and how long will it be that way, and whether they can be a part of the urban design plan that the NCPC has put forward.

Mr. MORAVEC. I am proud the role that GSA is playing in the NCPC plan. I mean, unfortunately we are experts, since Oklahoma City, in how to design, build, and secure buildings in such a way

that protects the occupants and visitors to the building, and at the same time, does not create an oppressive climate of fear.

We really, if I do say so myself, have produced some really marvelous dynamic buildings that do not look like medieval fortresses.

We have also learned a lot about, for example, if something is mundane, for example, as to how to make a bollard look beautiful. We are ready, willing, and able to work with the National Capital Planning Commission, as we have been, to give them the benefit of our expertise in this area.

Ms. NORTON. GSA has a problem, not of its own making. It has the same problem with barricades that it has with security.

That is, if the Federal Government had dumped on you, as security problems have emerged, and they did not emerge on September 11th, matters that were never included in your mission; you were never to be the super security agency for the Federal Government. Yet, you had to make them secure.

I agree that you have done very good things with buildings, and we are working with you now in the Department of Transportation building, on the ATF building, with setbacks and all the rest of it.

But I have to say that one of the reasons that the NCPC has done the work it has done is that over and over again, people do say, I think justifiably, that the District of Columbia increasingly looks like an armed camp; that it looks like an ugly armed camp.

The Chair has said we have got to make sure it does not become Ft. Washington. Obviously, she is very kind in the way she approaches it. [Laughter.]

That is not anything I would blame on the GSA. That is why the NCPC work is so important, and I appreciate that. Was GSA a part of the Task Force?

Mr. COGBILL. Yes, ma'am, and I would like to just comment on that. Specifically, the GSA was a very, very strong player on that task force and a very strong contributor.

In fact, we were very sympathetic to their issues in dealing with their customers in clients, that come to them on a regular basis, asking for these security measures, and the coordination that was going on between GSA and the NCPC in trying to make sure that we do the best job that we can, in the amount of time that we have to make Washington safe; but at the same time, achieve our overall purpose of going back to a beautiful urban environment.

Ms. NORTON. The Urban Design Plan that NCPC revealed yesterday is the first time in 200 years that any work has been done that tries to coordinate security with the elegance associated with the LaFonte Plan. That is not the work of GSA. That is the kind of initiative that the NCPC, which is essentially the planning agency for the Federal Government, is supposed to do. It was its own initiative. It deserves great plaudits.

Now I know that the Chair and I will be working together to make sure that plan does not simply lie on the table. It is a plan. It is just too valuable to simply lie there. That is why I asked you questions about E Street, in particular. If people see E Street open, they will understand that it is not just a plan.

Madam Chair, if I could ask that my letter to Chairman Nay and Chairman Dodd, and the response of the NCPC be made a part of the record of this hearing.

Mrs. MORELLA. So ordered.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Madam Chair.

[The information referred to follows:]



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Commission Members

Appointed by the
 President of the United States
 John V. Cooney, III, Chairman
 Richard L. Friedman
 Robert A. Gaines

Appointed by the Mayor of
 the District of Columbia
 Arrington Dixon
 Dr. Patricia E. Wood

Secretary of Defense
 The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

Secretary of the Interior
 The Honorable Gale A. Norton

Administrator of General Services
 The Honorable Stephen A. Perry

Chairman, Committee on
 Governmental Affairs
 United States Senate
 The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Chairman, Committee on
 Government Reform
 U.S. House of Representatives
 The Honorable Dan Burton

Mayor, District of Columbia
 The Honorable Anthony A. Williams

Chairman, Council of the
 District of Columbia
 The Honorable Linda W. Cropp

Executive Director
 Patricia E. Gallagher, AICP

October 31, 2001

The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton
 United States Representative
 2136 Rayburn House Office Building
 Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congresswoman Norton:

Thank you for the copy of your letter dated October 10, 2001 to the Committee on House Administration and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration concerning the implementation of security measures around federal buildings in the Nation's Capital in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attack.

As you know, the National Capital Planning Commission's Inter-Agency Task Force on Security has, for the past several months, been meeting to examine the impact of street closures, barricades, and other security measures around federal buildings in the District of Columbia. The Task Force includes representatives from a number of federal and District agencies, including the Department of Interior, the Department of Defense, the Secret Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as the Architect of the Capitol and the U.S. Capitol Police. The recommendations of the Task Force, are currently scheduled for release at a meeting of the Commission on Thursday, November 1, 2001, and will likely include a recommendation for the preparation of an Urban Design and Security Plan for the Monumental Core. By specifying permanent security and streetscape improvements, including a "kit of parts" for a compatible array of landscape treatments, street furniture, light standards, bollards, and planters, such a plan would present a unified and integrated approach for security measures in the Nation's Capital and help create a secure and distinguished public realm.

Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton
Page Two

We agree that a coordinated approach for the development and implementation of such measures throughout the entire city, including the areas around the U.S. Capitol and the House and Senate office buildings, is desirable. We appreciate the participation of the Architect of the Capitol and U.S. Capitol Police in the workings of our Task Force, and would welcome the opportunity to coordinate our efforts with the Committee on House Administration, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, the Sergeant at Arms of the House and Senate, and any other appropriate congressional offices with regard to this matter.

We appreciate your continued support on this important national issue.

Sincerely,


John V. Cogbill, III
Chairman

cc: The Honorable Robert Ney
The Honorable Chris Dodd
The Honorable Mitch McConnell
The Honorable Steny Hoyer
The Honorable Anthony Williams
The Honorable Richard Friedman

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND
INFRASTRUCTURE
SUBCOMMITTEES
AVIATION
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC
BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEES
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL SERVICE AND
AGENCY ORGANIZATION

October 10, 2001

The Honorable Robert Ney
Chair
Committee on House Administration
United States House of Representatives
1024 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Christopher Dodd
Chair
Committee on Rules and Administration
United States Senate
305 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Ney and Chairman Dodd:

I write to thank you for your continuing commitment to solving the troubling issues raised by the September 11th attack, including street closures and barricades. As you know, several streets have been closed and barricades erected to protect residents, federal employees, and visitors. There have been many questions and complaints concerning how decisions are being made, however, and whether all the factors necessary for normal life and work are being considered. The street closing and barricade problem is particularly complicated by overlapping jurisdictions among several federal and District entities.

Fortunately, for several months, the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC) has been preparing a major study and recommendations concerning the impact of federal security measures around national memorials and federal buildings in the city's core, and around the White House. I would like to recommend coordination of efforts by the Congress, the executive branch, and the District of Columbia to assure appropriate information and action among the several entities that are now hurriedly erecting barricades. For example, barricades put up in front of some federal buildings yesterday had to be taken down because necessary permissions had not been received.

In my conversations with House Administration Chairman Ney, he and I have agreed that barricades, of course, should be established temporarily in the wake of danger. However, especially considering that the nation's capital is one of the world's great planned cities, it is impossible to overestimate the importance of resident and federal employee mobility, normal commerce, and consistency of design and attention to attractiveness. I believe that it would be highly useful for the Sergeant at Arms of the House and Senate and the Capitol Police to meet

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Chairman Robert Ney
Chairman Christopher Dodd
October 10, 2001
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with the NCPC on a regular basis to get the benefit of the considerable study concerning barricades and street closings that has already occurred and to coordinate security planning in the nation's capital to the extent practicable. I recognize, of course, that jurisdictions, which are fully empowered to act on their own, are involved, but for that reason as much coordination as is possible is desirable and has now become necessary to avoid duplication of effort, confusion, and waste of money and time. If you agree, I would be interested in your advice concerning how best to assure coordination, including perhaps a resolution of the House and Senate.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,



Eleanor Holmes Norton

cc: The Honorable Mitch McConnell
The Honorable Steny Hoyer
The Honorable Anthony Williams
The Honorable John V. Cogbill, III

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you.

Well, we are in accord on the results that we look for, and our congratulations to you on the work that you are doing and may you continue.

I would like to ask Mr. Malson about the employees at the various hospitals. Are they expected to stay on the job, in the event of another emergency or terrorist attack, or something of that dimension?

Mr. MALSON. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. MORELLA. In an emergency evacuation, they do not evaluate?

Mr. MALSON. I understood your question initially a little differently. I thought you were asking me, would our hospital employees be expected to stay on the job if there were victims coming to them.

Mrs. MORELLA. If there were a terrorist attack, such as September 11th.

Mr. MALSON. Oh, absolutely, yes.

Mrs. MORELLA. They would?

Mr. MALSON. Yes.

Mrs. MORELLA. Here is the second part of the question then. What if there were an emergency evaluation?

Mr. MALSON. There are many different types of evacuations, and there are many different types of terrorist attacks. Bio-terrorism differs from most in that most attacks are essentially circumstances that go "boom" or "bang" and everyone is either a victim, a responder, or an observer. It is in an instant, and you know which category you are in.

With bio-terrorism, and in many instances, chemical terrorism, you do not know which category you are in; which is why it is called terror. Because the fright exists for quite awhile. That extends not only to the people who are victims or may be victims, but also the responders, as well.

That overlay also applies to evaluation plans, both within the hospitals, as well as within the city or the region.

So in many ways, it sort of beds for more detail on your question, in order to be able to respond.

Mrs. MORELLA. Well, what it beds for is the idea that education is needed and training.

Mr. MALSON. Absolutely.

Mrs. MORELLA. Therefore, do you have training, in terms of bio-terrorism and the various faucets at the hospitals?

Mr. MALSON. Yes, we do. Our hospitals have many different kinds of plans, all hazards plans. We deal with floods, fires, hurricanes, as well as acts of war or natural events, yes, and we have to exercise those.

Mrs. MORELLA. I have one final point. Do you think that at some point it would be very helpful if the ranking member and I met with the leaders of the various hospitals, the administrators?

Mr. MALSON. It would not only be helpful, but this is a new area. In defense of our Federal colleagues on the executive branch, they have been doing an enormous job in attempting to coordinate with us in the private sector under very difficult circumstances, and every day, they get better at it.

But my 18 hospitals, with 26,000 employees within the District of Columbia, plus Bethesda Naval and Malcolm Grow at Andrews, are in constant need of daily contact with our State and local health departments and CDC. We are the front line troops, and we need to know what our commanders want us to do daily.

Frequently, they are torn by the need to coordinate a Federal response, before they can come to our local responders with the plan of the day. We get better at it every day. We are no where near where we ought to be, and the frustration levels within our hospitals are extraordinary.

So I can tell you unequivocally, yes. Our hospital chief executive officers, our medical directors, and I can get you as many people as you want, Madam Chair, and they would be delighted to share with you their needs, under these circumstances.

Mrs. MORELLA. I would like to follow through with you, and maybe you could discuss this with the staff, and see what you think we could achieve, how it could be done, and what the idea would be.

I just simply want to ask, if any of you have any statement you would like to make, particularly since you were here all morning and heard what everybody else had to say, is there anything you want to refute or you want to add?

Mr. MALSON. May I go first? The country has not yet come to grips with the fact that America's physicians and America's hospitals are on the front line for what has historically been a Federal responsibility. That is the defense of the homeland.

Because we are on the front line, it is incumbent upon our legislators and our executives to figure out how to make the transition. As the Chair so eloquently put it, since we are the private sector, even our nonprofits are frequently in competition with each other.

So the complexities are there, and they are very real. But yet, I cannot express how proud I have been of all of our hospitals, private, public, for profit, not for profit, and military hospitals, working together for the common good.

But that does not address the need for resources. We have to figure out what those needs are, the extraordinary needs of these circumstances, and then how to adequately and appropriately fund them, in the context of most of the hospitals being in the private sector.

Mr. MORAVEC. I would like to say that in the present climate, while we all need to do everything possible to protect our people, I would hope that we would allow emotion to ebb. Descartes once said that life is a comedy to those who think, and a tragedy to those who feel. We have all been doing a lot of feeling. I think it is very important for us to think rationally in the cold grey light of dawn, of what we are doing.

Before we make long-term, expensive, irreversible decisions, I think it is very important that we, in sense as a society, get a grip, and I think that is especially important here.

I do believe that the Federal Government has a leadership role to play in helping society deal with this new reality. The fact is that September 11th was, in a way, kind of the Oklahoma City for the private sector.

GSA understands that responsibility. Among other things, we are convening a national symposium with the American Institute of Architects to involve people in focusing on the built environment in urban planning, in the wake of September 11th. I think we have a lot to add to that dialog, and we will be hopefully showing some leadership in that area.

I would also just like to say that as a relatively recent convert from the private sector to public service, I just wanted to say how terribly proud I am of the women and men of GSA, and of the people in the Federal Government, during this very difficult time, when people need their Government more than they ever have before in my lifetime.

Mrs. MORELLA. We are proud of them, too. You can see from the polling that the American public have the confidence in Government, and they have continued to increase. Thank you.

Mr. Cogbill.

Mr. COGBILL. Congresswoman Morella, when you started this proceeding today, you talked about working together. I think that is what I would say is the new word for the relationship between NCPC and the District of Columbia.

We believe we are entering a new age of partnering with the District, and we want to push that forward so that we can work together to achieve these very important goals that are outlined in our Urban Design and Security Plan.

You talked about the economics. I realize that is another day. But that is one of the things that our plan is designed to do, to make people feel comfortable in this environment, and make them want to come back.

Certainly, as a resident of Richmond, VA, I love to come to Washington, and I always have. I intend to put my dollars into the economy, when I bring my wife and my daughter and my mother-in-law back here at the end of this month, to again do what we like to do, which is visit and be a part of our Nation's Capital and the glory that is this country.

Finally, I would like to say thank you to both of you, for all of the help that you have given to NCPC, by providing leadership, by helping us to work through and to get it to the point where we are today, with this Urban Design and Security Plan. We look forward to implementing it.

We will continue to work with you and with the other people in our Government, to continue to make Washington a beautiful place and a wonderful place to live, visit, and work.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, and we do look forward to continue working together with all of you. Thank you, Mr. Cogbill; thank you, Mr. Moravec; and thank you, Mr. Malson.

As we adjourn our subcommittee hearing, I want to thank some great staff: Russell Smith, Heea Vazirani-Fales, Rob White, Matthew Batt, Shalley Kim, Earley Green, Jon Bouker, M.K. Hallahan, Howie Denis, Victoria Proctor, and, of course, my good friend, our ranking member, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes-Norton.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:47 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

NCPC Responses to Questions

1. What lessons can we learn from September 11th and the anthrax attacks about the adequacy of the District of Columbia's Emergency Response Plan and the coordination and collaboration with federal agencies? Does the current organization arrangements facilitate the level of communication that is needed for good decision-making?

September 11th and the anthrax attacks clearly illustrated the need for the District, regional, federal and military agencies to integrate emergency response systems. Data sharing of maps, road conditions, and contaminated areas, for instance, must be better coordinated among the various agencies. The Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments (WMCOG) is leading an effort to create a web enabled, GIS based, Regional Emergency Response System. The overall goal of this initiative is provide one portal by which various agencies can access real-time information during a catastrophic event, regardless of the jurisdictional boundaries, thus greatly enhancing communication among the various agencies. The National Capital Planning Commission is working with WMCOG on this initiative and will host representatives from the District of Columbia, surrounding jurisdictions, and the federal government to discuss implementation of this system at a meeting on March 26.

2. Should we also be concerned about investing funds in adequate ingress and egress of the city's transportation routes? What is NCPC's role in planning for adequate movement of traffic around federal facilities – such as in the case of Pennsylvania Avenue?

Transportation issues in the National Capital Region are more relevant today than ever before. Many of us learned first hand on September 11th just how important adequate ingress and egress of the city's transportation routes are. Funding is critical if we are to improve and develop transportation systems within and to and from Washington.

The federal government remains the region's largest employer and has a critical interest in ensuring that the region has an effective transportation system to meet the needs of workers and visitors. Traffic congestion, closed streets and the ongoing repair of aging infrastructure, have all highlighted the need for improvements to the existing transportation systems. NCPC's role is to partner with the District and other federal agencies to develop solutions that benefit federal and nonfederal workers, residents, and tourists to the city.

In preparing its recent report, *Designing for Security in the Nation's Capital*, NCPC commissioned a detailed analysis of Pennsylvania Avenue traffic alternatives. As you are aware, this report recommends implementing a variety of transportation system management initiatives (TSM), a circulator transit system that would permit a partial and limited use of Pennsylvania Avenue for controlled and secure vehicular traffic in front of the White House, and a study to consider design alternatives and examine the environmental and preservation impacts of a tunnel within the Pennsylvania Avenue or E Street corridors. NCPC has been working with the Administration and Congress regarding funding for these initiatives, and we are pleased that the President has included \$1 million for the District to implement TSM in the Administration's FY 2003 budget request.

3. The District of Columbia Home Rule Act established a National Capital Service Area, which covers the federal enclave, and requires the President to appoint a National Capital Service Area Director, who would be responsible for obtaining police protection and maintaining streets, except for the grounds of the U.S. Capitol Buildings, the Library of Congress, and the Supreme Court. To your knowledge, has this charter provision ever been implemented? Should a National Capital Service Area be established in order to better coordinate street maintenance and physical security planning in the federal monumental core?

Section 739 of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act (40 U.S.C. § 136) establishes a National Capital Service Area and calls for the appointment of a National Capital Service Director who is charged with the responsibility of ensuring adequate police protection and maintenance of streets and highways within the National Capital Service Area. In accordance with the Executive Order signed by President Gerald Ford on October 23, 1974, the National Capital Planning Commission is authorized to establish the metes and bounds of the National Capital Service Area, but has no additional authority with regard to the implementation of this Section.

We are not aware that the provision of the Act calling for the appointment of a Director has ever been implemented. Just as it does for other areas of the city, the District government has maintained responsibility for ensuring adequate police protection and the maintenance of streets and highways within the National Capital Service Area. This police protection is, of course, supplemented by the U.S. Secret Service, the Federal Protective Service, the U.S. Park Police, and other federal agency security personnel in and around federal facilities located within the Service Area. As you are aware, NCPC is working to prepare an Urban Design and Security Plan to coordinate security measures around federal facilities in the District, including within the National Capital Service Area. It may be useful to explore whether the implementation of this provision could facilitate greater coordination among federal and District agencies with regard to physical security planning and street maintenance in this Service Area.

4. What is the current status of E Street running between the White House and the Ellipse? If this street is closed for security purposes, coupled with the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue, how will this impact transportation in the heart of the city?

E Street between the White House and the Ellipse remains closed. When NCPC released its security report on November 1, the Task Force called for the immediate reopening of E Street. This has not happened. The Task Force contracted for a supplemental traffic analysis to evaluate the impacts of closing this segment of E Street. It is NCPC's opinion that the closure of E Street, coupled with the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue, has created an additional, and unnecessary hardship that significantly impacts traffic in and around the area near the White House.

The supplemental traffic analysis concludes that the closure of E Street imposes limitations on east/west travel in the vicinity of the White House. The results of the closure are most notable on Constitution Avenue, and to a lesser degree, on H and Eye Streets. The analysis determined that the additional closure of E Street causes congestion on both the 17th Street and Constitution Avenue corridors to increase during morning and afternoon peak hours. We would be glad to provide a copy of this analysis to the Subcommittee upon request.