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HOW EFFECTIVELY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARING FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

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CONTENTS

	Page
Hearing held on August 22, 2002	1
Statement of:	
Ganske, Hon. Greg, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa	2
Gilchrist, Mary J.R., director, University of Iowa Hygienic Laboratory; Christopher G. Atchison, associate dean for public health practice, College of Public Health, University of Iowa; Dr. Manjit Misra, director, seed sciences, Iowa State University; Richard Hainje, Director, Region VII of the FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency; James F. Bogner, Special Agent in Charge, Omaha Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Paul L. Posner, Managing Director, Federal Budget Issues, Strategic Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office	67
Leach, Hon. James, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa	3
Pate, Paul D., mayor of Cedar Rapids; Ned Wright, director, Linn County Management Agency; Chief Stephen C. Havlik, Cedar Rapids Fire Department; Douglas A. Feil, director, environmental training programs, Kirkwood Community College, Cedar Rapids, IA; and Bruce Lacy, nuclear business assets manager for Alliant Energy, Duane Arnold Energy Center, Cedar Rapids, IA	5
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:	
Atchison, Christopher G., associate dean for public health practice, College of Public Health, University of Iowa, prepared statement of	78
Bogner, James F., Special Agent in Charge, Omaha Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared statement of	115
Feil, Douglas A., director, environmental training programs, Kirkwood Community College, Cedar Rapids, IA, prepared statement of	40
Gilchrist, Mary J.R., director, University of Iowa Hygienic Laboratory, prepared statement of	70
Hainje, Richard, Director, Region VII of the FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, prepared statement of	102
Havlik, Chief Stephen C., Cedar Rapids Fire Department, prepared statement of	31
Misra, Dr. Manjit, director, seed sciences, Iowa State University, prepared statement of	95
Pate, Paul D., mayor of Cedar Rapids, prepared statement of	8
Wright, Ned, director, Linn County Management Agency, prepared statement of	15

HOW EFFECTIVELY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARING FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK?

THURSDAY, AUGUST 22, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Iowa City, IA.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:10 p.m., in the Main Lounge, Iowa Memorial Union, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, Hon. Stephen Horn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Leach and Ganske.

Staff present: Bonnie Heald, deputy staff director; Christopher Barkley, assistant to the subcommittee; Michael Sazonov, staff assistant; Meghan Gutierriez and Curt Mercadante, Dr. Ganske's Staff; Bill Tate, Mr. Leach's Staff; Norine Zamastil, University of Iowa.

Mr. HORN. A quorum being present, this hearing of the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations will come to order.

On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the most devastating attacks ever committed on the U.S. soil. Despite the damage and enormous loss of life, the attacks failed to cripple this Nation. To the contrary, Americans have never been more united in their fundamental belief in freedom and their willingness to protect that freedom.

The diabolical nature of these attacks and then the deadly release of anthrax sent a loud and clear message to all Americans: We must be prepared for the unexpected. We must have the mechanisms in place to protect this Nation and its people from further attempts to cause massive destruction.

The aftermath of September 11th clearly demonstrated the need for adequate communication systems and rapid deployment of well-trained emergency personnel. Yet despite billions of dollars in spending on Federal emergency programs, there remain serious doubts as to whether this Nation is equipped to handle a massive chemical, biological or nuclear attack.

Today, the subcommittee will examine how effectively Federal, State and local agencies are working together to prepare for such emergencies. We want those who live in the great State of Iowa and the good people of the cities such as Iowa City and Cedar Rap-

ids to know that they can rely on these systems, should the need arise.

We are fortunate to have witnesses today whose valuable experience and insight will help the subcommittee better understand the needs of those on the front lines. We want to hear about their capabilities and their challenges, and we want to know what the Federal Government can do to help. We welcome all of our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.

I'm delighted to have with us, and without objection they will be in full matters on this particular subcommittee, and they are Mr. Ganske and Mr. Leach. No State has two statesmen like these two gentlemen, and Iowa should be very proud of both gentlemen.

And I will start with Mr. Ganske and then Mr. Leach.

The first statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. GREG GANSKE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA

Mr. GANSKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you and the House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations for coming to Iowa to examine how the Federal Government is assisting State and local governments prepare for potential terrorist attacks involving biological, chemical or nuclear agents.

This is the latest of many steps taken by our Government to respond to these threats. My own House Energy and Commerce Committee passed legislation based on a bill I introduced in the House, along with my colleague, Senator Bill Frist in the Senate, which the President later signed into law.

Mr. Chairman, on September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the most devastating attack ever committed on our soil. Ever since September 11th and the anthrax attacks on the U.S. Capitol, Americans are, rightly so, concerned about the threat of biological and chemical warfare.

The threat of further chemical and biological agents is real. The ease with which biological and chemical agents can be concealed and their potential to effect large segments of the population beyond those initially exposed only increases their appeal to terrorists.

A terrorist attack using a deadly agent could kill or sicken millions of Americans. Many countries have developed biological warfare capabilities in spite of the fact that there are treaties against it.

While the Center for Disease Control designates 36 different pathogens or germs as extremely dangerous, we are most threatened by about 10 to 15 agents. These agents share the ability to be easily produced, stored and can cause thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of deaths. The most commonly known agents on that list are anthrax and smallpox.

It was my opinion that before September 11th there was no hospital in this country capable of handling an epidemic. Whether we're talking about Johns Hopkins in Baltimore or the University of Iowa Medical Center here in Iowa City—and, Mr. Chairman, I want to point out how appropriate it is to have this type of hearing in Iowa City, with its high concentration of health care providers

and services—our local hospitals have no excess capacity to handle massive numbers of sick patients. In fact, many hospitals do not have the expertise to detect a biologic attack rapidly enough to effectively limit the dispersion.

We need to be able to monitor our air, water, land and fellow humans to promptly detect infection. Once detected, we need resources to treat the disease by containing outbreaks and treating affected people. We need medicines and vaccines to combat these biologic agents.

Recognizing these threats, last year, Senator Frist and I introduced the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act both in the House and the Senate. This legislation strengthened our Public Health infrastructure and enhanced our national security in the wake of the events of September 11th.

Congress used our bill as a template for the bioterrorism protection legislation that President Bush signed into law this past June. The new law strengthens Public Health preparedness, enhances controls on biologic agents and protects our food, drugs and drinking water supplies.

It authorizes increased funding through grants to States, local governments and other public and private health-care facilities to improve preparedness, to enhance laboratory capacity, to educate and train health-care personnel and to develop new drugs, vaccines and therapies. It also increased funding for the CDC and established a national data base of dangerous pathogens and biologic agents.

This bioterrorism bill is much needed, but I should point out that it is the first step in addressing this. It is a bill that authorizes the expenditures. Today, Congress is dealing with the funding of that bill that isn't allowed.

Mr. Chairman, as a Nation, we're taking steps to prevent, detect and respond to those attacks, those potential attacks. We recognize that it is always best to plan for the worst and hope for the best.

As the old adage reminds us, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. As a physician, I know that very well. However, even with extensive spending on Federal programs, I think there still remains a serious concern about the threat of a chemical, biological or nuclear attack.

I'm anxious to learn today from fellow Iowans strategies that they think will help us to prevent such a catastrophe.

There is an old joke, with the saying, "I'm from the Federal Government and I'm here to help." But in this hearing, we are here to help and to learn from you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for coming to Iowa.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much.

The other gentleman from Iowa we're delighted to have here, Mr. Leach.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor to welcome you here to this town.

As many of you know, Steve is a former college president and one of the most distinguished Members of our body.

I will only make a very brief set of comments. One, if you take the Twentieth Century, it was largely about three phenomenons: war, science and communication.

We know about the first world wars that have ever occurred on the planet, we know about the shrinking of the globe in terms of communications. And then, in terms of science, we have the dual dimensions of splitting the atom that has brought us nuclear energy. It's also brought us the capacity to destroy people through weapons. Likewise, symbolically, splitting the gene has brought us the greatest new techniques of treating illness, but it's also brought us weapons of war. And the real challenge is how we are prepared to deal with both the nuclear and the biochemical issues.

I will conclude by saying that it's truly important that America be prepared in the medical sciences. This is far more significant than any kind of nuclear shield.

It is also really important that we deal with the causes of people wanting to develop these weapons. So, in a dual sense, we've got to be concerned with understanding as well as for preparedness for people who don't understand each other.

So this hearing is largely about preparedness, it's a very important hearing, and I appreciate Congressman Horn coming to this State as well as a series of other stops around the Country to develop a congressional response to the issues before us.

Thank you.

Mr. HORN. I thank the gentlemen, and we will now begin with the presenters.

This is an investigating committee, so let me examine a few things here. We're going to ask each presenter, as a group, to have an oath, affirmant for the whole truth and nothing but the truth, in a minute.

We are delighted that you've been here. Your papers are excellent that we've seen and looked at at 12 midnight or 2 a.m., because we moved around, and then we see some of these documents, and it's been excellent in Kansas and other places that we've been.

Iowa is sort of a green carpet of soybeans and corn and everything. And as one person said, he finally found a farmer that's smiling, and this is the year.

So we're delighted to have the Mayor of Cedar Rapids here, Honorable Paul D. Pate.

And, if you will, all of you, raise your right hands.

OK. Clerk will note that the six members have taken the oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. HORN. We'll start with Mr. Pate, and then we'll just go right down the line.

When I call your name, under our rules, your full document is automatically put in the record at that point, and we would like you to summarize somewhere between 5 minutes and 10 minutes to give us the feeling. We've all read it—the staff, myself, so forth and we're glad to have the Mayor.

And so, Mayor Pate, the floor is all yours.

STATEMENTS OF PAUL D. PATE, MAYOR OF CEDAR RAPIDS; NED WRIGHT, DIRECTOR, LINN COUNTY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; CHIEF STEPHEN C. HAVLIK, CEDAR RAPIDS FIRE DEPARTMENT; DOUGLAS A. FEIL, DIRECTOR, ENVIRONMENTAL TRAINING PROGRAMS, KIRKWOOD COMMUNITY COLLEGE, CEDAR RAPIDS, IA; AND BRUCE LACY, NUCLEAR BUSINESS ASSETS MANAGER FOR ALLIANT ENERGY, DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER, CEDAR RAPIDS, IA

Mayor PATE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Leach and Representative Ganske, and distinguished guests.

As mentioned, I am the Mayor of the city of Cedar Rapids. First, let me thank you for holding this hearing here today. This topic is important to the Heartland and in particular to communities the size of that which I am the Mayor.

We all know, many of the terrorists who struck on September 11th of last year entered into the air system through airports in areas smaller than those in major, metropolitan areas, places much like the Cedar Rapids-Eastern Iowa Airport.

We appreciate the efforts made at the Federal level to help secure airports, but many of the mandates have come without funds. For example, staffing the law enforcement officer at the Eastern Iowa Airport 16 hours each day from May 10, 2002 through December 1, 2003 will cost us $300,917. The Transportation Security Administration has only allocated $27,404 in reimbursements due to the rejection of the $5.1 billion in funding designated in the Supplemental Spending Bill as contingency emergency.

The Eastern Iowa Airport also anticipates added security costs of $586,240 for vehicle inspections from September 11, 2001, through September 30, 2002. Their costs have only been reimbursed through April 2002.

For this, and other reasons that follow, I'm asking for more Federal assistance through funding and more freedom at the State level to direct those funds to communities.

In our community, we realize that we are an important part of the food production process also. In watching and listening to and reading the news each day, this point is echoed across the country. The breadbasket of this Nation is in need of additional money for protection of the resources we provide to the world through value-added agriculture. As farm fields are of great importance, the companies and infrastructure that process those raw products are just as important.

Not a day goes by in any metropolitan area that you don't hear a siren. Sometimes those sirens are false alarms; but, many times, the sirens mean there's a life hanging in the balance. People are more mindful than ever of air traffic above them and the ground traffic around them.

Our children see the world differently. Their teachers teach about life skills differently. Schools and communities have been forced to reassess their ability to perform in a disaster situation.

Whether it's from a fire, an automobile accident or other medical emergency, all too often, our men and women in police, fire and EMS are called to someone's last, best hope of survival. These peo-

ple are part of the front lines, the first responders that will take action in the case of a terrorist attack.

Companies, big and small alike, local, State and Federal Government agencies have reallocated precious resources based on what used to be a worst-case scenario, what could become a stinging reality.

During the U.S. Mayors Conference summit in January of this year, I visited Ground Zero. It was a very sobering experience, to say the least. It was humbling to see both the destruction and the dedication in New York and at Washington.

One thing came through loud and clear from that visit, though: By refocusing on public safety, our communities have refocused on one of the essential goals of every governmental body—the safety and security of the individual.

What we are talking about today is the next step. From Iowa's Emergency Management Division through local fire and police department officials, from the proposed National Mass Fatalities Institute in Cedar Rapids to information provided from the point of view of the HAZMAT community, all these messages talk about one thing that is key to making everything work: preparedness.

From our homes to our city halls, preparedness is the key to efficient, timely and effective action and reaction. By making our communities safer in so many different ways, you make them more productive. Our towns become more inviting places to live, build businesses and grow. It's not even about new rules or legislation. It's about funding.

By taking all that you hear today back to Washington, you will take information away that benefits all our communities. It's a strong investment in the future.

Cedar Rapids has the only municipally operated helicopter fleet in the State. In the 30 years that the Cedar Rapids Police Department's Aviation Department has been in operation, it runs from Minneapolis to Kansas City, to the Mississippi River on the East, and by Iowa's borders with Minnesota and Missouri. This area is home to approximately two-thirds of Iowa's population.

The helicopter fleet, and the officers that operate and maintain it have been key in apprehending individuals with Federal and State warrants and prison escapees, as well as locating missing children and adults. The Cedar Rapids Police Department helicopter fleet assisted in 5,548 calls and directly enabled 130 arrests through the end of July of this year.

The fleet has responded to nearly 3,000 calls and directly enabled 124 arrests throughout Eastern Iowa.

The helicopter fleet played a key role in rescue efforts surrounding the severe flash flooding in our area June 4th that damaged more than 500 homes in the Cedar Rapids area alone.

Thanks to dedicated rescue personnel and resources like the helicopter fleet, everyone was evacuated safely from homes surrounding the flood waters.

The maintenance crew also maintains the St. Luke's Hospital LifeGuard, or MediVac, helicopter. In addition, the events of September 11, 2001, make the necessity of this fleet that much more apparent.

Cedar Rapids Police Department has increased air patrols and surveillance over the Duane Arnold Energy Center, Iowa's only nuclear power facility. This has created a situation whereby the already aged fleet is being additionally taxed.

Also, patrols have increased over the water pollution control and the water treatment facilities as well. These facilities serve not only Cedar Rapids but much of the metro area.

The city of Cedar Rapids needs $5.1 million in Federal funding to replace the police department's helicopter fleet, which is nearly obsolete. These funds will assist in purchasing and equipping three new helicopters. We are close to being forced into a situation where these helicopters will be cannibalized in order to utilize parts that are out of production. I would just note that these are Vietnam-era helicopters, 1968 and 1969.

Each time the President, Vice President or cabinet officials travel to Eastern Iowa, our helicopters are called on to provide protection; and for all these missions, we cannot charge the appropriate community or governmental entity for time or resources, because the helicopters are military surplus, and Federal Rules prohibit us from recouping the costs from what is a mutual-aid response on the part of the city of Cedar Rapids.

As a parting comment, I want to inform you that the city of Cedar Rapids and the Linn County Board of Supervisors have provided and pledged nearly $1 million to fund a home for the National Mass Fatalities Institute in our city. This operation serves to aid in the coordination of activities, to protect public safety and to respond in the case of a catastrophic event.

Federal funding for this operation is necessary. It will benefit people nationwide through the cost effectiveness of staff and resources to serve our country.

Ladies and gentlemen, I want to thank you for what you do in deliberating over these issues and the funding connected with them. Much of it goes unnoticed, because no one sees the attack that never occurred or notices the life that was never in jeopardy.

But we trust that because of the efforts you may have made here to learn today by listening, we will be a more safe and secure community, State and Nation.

Thank you for the opportunity to share these remarks.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pate follows:]

Chairman, Representative Leach, distinguished guests…I am Paul Pate, Mayor of the City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa. First, let me thank you for holding this hearing here today. This topic is important to the heartland, and in particular to communities the size of that which I am the Mayor.

We all know many of the terrorists who struck on September 11th of last year entered into the air system through airports in areas smaller than those in major, metropolitan areas. Places much like the Cedar Rapids-Eastern Iowa Airport.

We appreciate the efforts made at the federal level to help secure airports. But many of the mandates have come without funds. For this, and other reasons, which I will detail, I am asking for more federal assistance through funding and more freedom at the state level to direct those funds to communities.

In our community, we realize that we are an important part of the food production process. Watching, listening to and reading the news each day, this point is echoed across the country. The breadbasket of this nation is in need of additional money for protection of the resource we provide to the world through value added agricultural products.

While farm fields are of great importance, the companies and infrastructure that process these raw products are just as important. Not a day goes by in this city, or any metropolitan area, that you don't hear a siren.

Sometimes, the sirens are false alarms. But many times the sirens mean that there is a life hanging in the balance. People are paying more attention than ever to the sounds that come from among us. They are more mindful than ever of air traffic above them and ground traffic around them.

Our children see the world differently. Their teachers teach about life skills differently. Schools and communities have been forced to reassess their ability to perform in a disaster situation.

Whether it be from a fire, an automobile accident or other medical emergency, all too often our men and women in police, fire and EMS are called to be someone's last, best hope of survival. These people are a part of the front lines…the first responders that will take action in the case of a terrorist attack.

Companies, big and small alike...local, state and federal government agencies have reallocated precious resources based on what used to be a worst case scenario…what could become a stinging reality.

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Thank you.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much.

And we now have Ned Wright, the Director of the Linn County Management Agency.

Mr. Wright.

Mr. WRIGHT. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, Congressman Ganske and Congressman Leach. Thank you for the opportunity to speak before this congressional subcommittee.

As you stated, I am Ned Wright, I'm the Director of Emergency Management for Linn County, Iowa. My comments will address the perspective of this committee from a local level. My comments are my own and from my counterparts in the Iowa Emergency Management Association.

The front line on the war on terrorism is right here at the local level. Lives will be saved or lost based on the initial response by local government assets. No matter what the program that is in place at the Federal or State level, the actions that will make a difference are at the local level.

The basic principal of emergency response is, whatever the incident, the local jurisdiction will be the first on the scene. No matter what State and Federal resources are systemically available, it takes time to get these resources to the incident. The better prepared a local jurisdiction is to handle any event, the safer the community will be. This is not to say that State and Federal resources are not needed and that they don't do an outstanding job. They're just not always readily available.

In the Midwest, our communities are protected by a partnership of paid and volunteer organizations, different systems but both professional in their own way. If we were to have an act of terrorism against any of our communities, the call for response will be met by all. This is a fact of life here, and we must ensure that the training and preparedness needs of full-time departments are met with the same vigor as those of our volunteer departments. This is a total-force concept.

My counterparts and I are at the bottom of a big funnel as we address homeland security issues. It appears that at the Federal and State level, staffing for homeland security is growing. Policy and program initiatives are rolling off the presses. Speeches are being made, charts and graphs are everywhere, but at the end of the day, have any of these programs and initiatives made any first responder better trained, equipped or prepared to respond to the next event?

We hear of the billions of dollars coming out of Congress to fight the war on terrorism. We're just starting to receive our nickel. As we approach the anniversary of September 11th, we are getting reports from researchers and consultants on what happened, what went right, what went wrong, and what could have been done better.

I wonder how much money was spent to tell us what the police and fire did and did not do after the fact, and if that money had been spent to train and prepare these heroes, what a difference this could have made.

We at the local level are responsible for the safety of our people, not the State and not the Federal Government. At the end of the

event, when State and Federal resources return to their home locations, I am the guy who will see my friends and neighbors at Wal-Mart or at church. I'm the one who is asked why or why not something happened. I'm the one that's responsible for coordinating their safety, and I take that job very seriously. We must do all in our power to reverse the efforts in the war on terrorism and to fix the local problems before we expand the efforts at the State and Federal level.

We are starting to see funds become available, but we are the last ones at the table. Since we are the front line, the soldiers in this effort, we need to be heard and listened to about our needs. We at the local level know what we need to do. We just don't need our hands tied and hindered from doing what we know is right.

One size does not fit all. What works in New York City and Los Angeles may not be appropriate for Cedar Rapids and Iowa City. Congress needs to listen to our needs, and I appreciate you doing that by your visit here today. The Federal agencies responsible to you for these homeland security programs need to get out of Washington and to get out here and see what is needed and see how the existing programs are working before designing new ones.

The State's first priority should be to get all local communities adequately staffed and provided with resources even though the local public can not see the need. Remember, no matter how great a comprehensive program is in Washington or in Des Moines, it will not be successful until local resources are available to put that program into place.

In my written presentation, I allude to working hard in Linn County to address chemical, biological, and radiological issues. Much of our efforts have come from the bottom up and not the top down.

My community leaders have made a commitment to protect the public by supporting the efforts of the Emergency Management Agency in coordinating community-wide training, education and preparedness efforts. My dream would be that the other 98 counties would enjoy the same support and resources.

But, at the same time, I must be the first to acknowledge that much of our success is based on the strong bond of partnership of over 25 years with the Duane Arnold Energy Center, which is Iowa's only nuclear power plant. Through their continued efforts and resources, we are one of the best prepared communities in the Midwest. Other Iowa communities are not so fortunate.

We built on our successes, and that's why this community has initiated many of the early terrorism preparedness programs and other similar programs, because we knew what we needed to do to be prepared.

As an example, we developed a model Mass Fatalities Incident Response Plan that led to the establishment of the National Mass Fatalities Institute, and we were one of the first mid-sized communities to address biological preparedness.

I hope you will see that no matter what programs are developed at the Federal and State level, unless the local base is strong and solid, you cannot build on a successful homeland security program. Our mission has always been to protect our public from any hazard

from tornadoes and floods to chemical releases and airplane crashes, and now we face terrorism as well.

We will continue to do the best that we can with the resources we are provided. We only ask that you respect the local government to know what is best for each of our communities and to support these efforts that we feel are the best for our community.

Through this support, we will be strong, and we will be prepared to respond to any emergency event, recover from that emergency and continue growing as a strong and vital community. We will be the backbone of our strong Nation.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wright follows:]

Testimony by
Walter E. Wright
Director of Emergency Management
Linn County, Iowa

Before the House Committee on Government Reform's Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations addressing how the federal government is assisting state and local governments in preparing for a potential terrorist attack involving biological, chemical or nuclear agents.

22 August 2002

Iowa City, Iowa

OPENING REMARKS:

Good Afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak before this congressional subcommittee.

I am Ned Wright, I am the Director of Emergency Management for Linn County, Iowa. My comments will address the perspective of this committee from the local level. These comments are my own and from my counterparts in Iowa Emergency Management Association.

The front line in the war on terrorism is right here at the local level. Lives will be saved or lost based on the initial response by local government assets. No matter what program is in place at the federal or state level the actions that will make a difference are at the local level.

The basic principle of emergency response is whatever the event or incident, the local jurisdiction will be the first on the scene. No matter what state or federal resources are systemically available, it takes time to get these resources to the incident. The better prepared the local jurisdiction is to handle any event, the safer the community will be. This is not to say that these federal resources are not needed and do not do outstanding work, they are just not always readily available.

In the Midwest, our communities are protected by a partnership of paid and volunteer organizations, different systems but both professional in their own way. If we were to have an act of terrorism against any of our communities, the call for response will be met by ALL. This is a fact of life here and we must insure the training and preparedness needs of full time departments are met with the same vigor as those volunteer departments. This is a total force concept.

I and my counterparts are at the bottom of a big funnel as we address Homeland Security Issues. It appears that at the federal and state level staffing for homeland security is growing. Policy and program initiatives are rolling off the presses. Speeches are being made, charts and graphs are everywhere, but at the end of the day have any of the programs and initiatives made any first responder better trained, equipped or prepared to respond to the next event. We hear of the billions of dollars coming out of congress to fight the war on terrorism and we are just starting to receive our nickel. As we approach the anniversary of September 11, we are getting reports from researchers and consultants on what happened, what went right, what went wrong, and what could have been done better.

I wonder how much money was spent to tell us what the fire and police did and did not do after the fact and if that money had been spent to train and prepare the heroes, what a difference it could have made. We at the local level are responsible for the safety of our people, not the state and not the federal government. At the end of the event, when sate

and federal resources return to their home locations, I am the guy who will see my friends and neighbors at Wal-Mart or at church. I am the one who is asked why or why not something happened. I am the one responsible for their safety and I take my job seriously. We must do all in our power to reverse the effort in the war on terrorism and to fix the local problems before we expand the efforts at the state and federal level.

We are starting to see funds become available, but we are the last ones at the table. Since we are the front line, the soldiers in this effort, we need to be heard and listened to about our needs. We know what we need to do, we just do not need our hands tied and hindered from doing what is right. One size does not fit all. What works in New York City and Los Angeles may not be appropriate in Cedar Rapids and Iowa City. Congress needs to listen to our needs and I appreciate you doing so by your visit here today. The federal agencies responsible to you for these homeland security programs need to get out of Washington and get out here and see what is needed and how existing programs are working before designing new ones. The state's first priority should be to get all locals communities adequately staffed and provided with resources even if the local public can not see the need. Remember, no matter how great or comprehensive a program is in Washington or Des Moines, it will not be successful until local resources are in place to put the program in place.

In my written presentation, I allude that we are working hard in Linn County to address Chemical, Biological, and Radiological issues. Much of our efforts have come from the bottom up not top down. My community leaders made a commitment to protect the public by allowing the efforts of the Emergency Management Agency to coordinate community wide training, education and preparedness efforts. My dream would be the other 98 counties could enjoy the same support and resources. But at the same time I must be the first to acknowledge that, much of our success is based on a strong bond of partnership of over 25 years with the Duane Arnold Energy Center, Iowa's only nuclear power plant. Through their continued efforts and resources, we are one of the best prepared communities in the Midwest. Other Iowa counties are not so fortunate. We built on our successes and that is why this community initiated many of the early terrorism preparedness programs and other appropriate programs. We developed a model Mass Fatalities Incident Response Plan that lead to the establishment of the National Mass Fatalities Institute and we were one of the first midsized communities to address biological preparedness.

I hope you will see that no matter what programs are developed at the federal and state level, unless the local base is strong and solid you can not build a successful homeland security program. Our mission has always been to protect our public from any hazard

from tornadoes and floods to chemical releases and airplane crashes. We now face terrorism as well. We will do the best we can with the resources we are provided. We only ask that you respect the local government to know what is best for each of our communities and support the efforts we feel will be best for our community. Through this support we will be strong, we will be prepared to respond to any emergency, recover from that emergency and continue growing as a strong and vital community, which will be the backbone of our strong nation.

Thank you.

Community Resume:

Linn County, Iowa, covers 720 square miles with a population of over 194,000, is the second largest county in Iowa. The metropolitan area of Cedar Rapids, Marion, Hiawatha, and Robins includes 165,000. Linn County faces risk from natural, man-made, and civil threats. Because of several public-private partnerships, Linn County has one of the most extensive emergency programs in the country. Linn County leads the State of Iowa in local planning and preparedness issues that includes the development of a "first in the nation" Mass Fatality Incident Response Plan. A proactive emergency management program supports the economic health as well as public safety by helping to make Linn County a safer place to live and work.

Hazards and Risks

- Linn County faces annual natural disaster threats from floods and severe weather.
- Linn County has over 161 business and industrial sites in the community reporting hazardous materials, 86 are considered extremely hazardous and 19 are required to register with the Environmental Protection Agency and perform risk management planning.
- Linn County is the home of the Duane Arnold Energy Center; Iowa's only nuclear powered electric generation facility.
- Linn County has the second highest daily traffic count in the state including over 4,000 trucks, of which over 600 are carrying hazardous material.
- Linn County is served by four rail lines and over 100 trains per day traverse the community including over 1900 rail cars of hazardous material every month.
- Linn County's Eastern Iowa Airport serves both passenger and cargo for the eastern Iowa region. It is on the east-west air traffic route and will be used by the FAA to divert large commercial aircraft in trouble because the airport is not located in an urban area. The airport is also one of two capable of handling large commercial and military aircraft including Air Force One.
- Linn County hosts numerous regional events that drawn in tens of thousands of visitors for recreational, entertainment, sporting, and political events.
- Linn County is the home of numerous nationally recognized business and industry with national or regional offices in the community as well as city, county, state, and federal offices that are potential targets for terrorism.

Linn County has one of the most extensive Emergency Management programs in Iowa. The Emergency Management staff is the largest of any county with four full time, one part time, 15 dedicated volunteers and access to a trained Emergency Operations Center staff of 45 and 500+ from various volunteer emergency response agencies. We also have the largest tax supported emergency management budget in the state. In 1998, FEMA Region VII stated Linn County was the most prepared community in the four state area and one of the top programs in the country. Some of these emergency management programs include:

- Extensive indoor and outdoor warning system
- Special Needs Registration designed to protect those not in group facilities

- Telephone book emergency public education material
- "Reverse 911" Telephone computer aided emergency alerting system
- Response plans for each school building in the county
- Extensive evacuation and sheltering programs
- Two Hazardous Material Response Teams (Cedar Rapids and Linn County)
- Over 2500 emergency workers trained annually (radiological monitoring, fire, hazardous material, traffic and access control)
- Extensive training and exercise program for individuals, organization, and community leaders
- Biannual evaluations by FEMA to assess emergency preparedness
- Extensive multi-hazard emergency plans
- Two-way emergency radio system in school districts, hospitals, and public safety organizations. One way emergency warning radios in child care, adult congregate care facilities, and business and industry locations to alert them to local hazards such as severe weather, industrial incident, hazmat spills and possible radiological releases
- Home of the National Mass Fatalities Institute at Kirkwood Community College

Accomplishments

- Selected by FEMA and EPA to pilot national emergency preparedness and readiness assessment programs
- Selected by DOJ to pilot terrorism training programs
- Selected twice to host Russian Emergency Management delegations to showcase local emergency preparedness programs
- Selected to present program on school preparedness programs by FEMA at National Emergency Training Center
- Designated a "non-funded" Project Impact "Disaster Resistant Community" by FEMA due to our extensive emergency preparedness programs already in place
- Received 4 Innovation Awards for Emergency Management programs from the Iowa State Association of Counties
- Received 2 FEMA "Best Practices in Emergency Management" awards
- Received "Crown Community" Award from American City and County Magazine for Emergency Management Programs
- Received Achievement Award for Emergency Preparedness and Public Safety Programs by National Association of Counties
- Received "STORMREADY COMMUNITY" designation from the National Weather Service for Cedar Rapids, Marion, and Hiawatha for outstanding community severe weather preparedness programs
- Selected by Department of Health and Human Services and the State of Iowa for receipt of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
- Selected by the Department of Veterans Affairs and the State of Iowa to participate in the National Disaster Medical System

- Selected by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to be the site for the National Mass Fatalities Institute

Training:

Linn County has one of the most aggressive training and exercise programs in the Midwest. Linn County conducts between 6-10 full scale, functional, and tabletop community training exercises per year in addition to organizational training exercises.

Examples of annual exercises:

- Nuclear Power Plant Incident
- Hazardous Material Incident
- Airport Aviation Incident
- Severe Weather/Tornado Incident
- Mass Casualty/Mass Fatalities Incident
- Terrorism
- Biological / Health Emergency Incident
- Hospital Emergency
- Numerous Short/Long Courses sponsored by FEMA, EPA, FBI
- Lost or downed aircraft/search and rescue

Linn County Emergency Management coordinates emergency and disaster response from numerous support organizations:

21 Fire Departments, 18 Volunteer, 3 Full-Time

5 Emergency Medical Service Departments, 1 Full-Time, 4 Volunteer

2 Civil Air Patrol Squadrons, 1 senior, 1 cadet

Amateur Radio Club

Red Cross

Salvation Army

Over 400 trained storm spotters on a centralized paging system

Observations:

Observations on how the Federal Government is assisting state and local governments in preparing for a potential terrorist attack involving biological, chemical, or nuclear agents.

Issues under "Homeland Security"

It appears that decisions on funding projects are being based solely on population of a jurisdiction. As an example, the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) is a program through the Department of Health and Human Services that is designed to prepare communities for health and medical response, however, only larger communities are being considered. This was also the case for communities designated to receive funding under the Nunn-Lugar-Dominici Domestic Preparedness Program. In some geographic areas, several communities in the same metropolitan area got funding, while other communities could not qualify. It does not matter if the smaller community has a greater risk, or even the desire to do the program, it is only based on population. These communities, which generally have a greater resource base get additional funds for staff and other support. In my case, our community has met many of the requirements of the MMRS program on its own. When I tried to get considered, I was informed that my community could not qualify because we were too small. Then I get communications from two Midwest communities that were selected and were funded asking for copies of my plans and programs because they heard our programs were good and would save them time, money and effort. Smaller communities, who have the need and desire, can not get the funds they need, so they get pushed farther behind. These programs require an end product that can then be shared or replicated in other communities. Many programs in large communities can not be replicated in mid-sized or smaller communities because of the lack of base resources.

Staffing for "Homeland Security" has increased at the federal and state level to meet the "new" threat concerns. Little is going down to the locals who have to do the work. We are getting tremendous oversight support but no concrete support. We at the local level are at the bottom of a tremendous funnel. While Linn County is at least fortunate to have a staff to address these issues, most communities do not. In Iowa only 20% of the 99 counties are full time with any support staff. Most are "one person shops" or are part-time at best. Many are wearing multiple hats as they juggle doing E-911 coordination, health sanitation, planning and zoning, and landfill management duties as well as emergency management in a 40-hour week. They also have a minimal budget just to meet basic emergency management requirements.

We, at the local level, are seeing a flood of new "terrorism experts" appear at the state and federal levels, but few of these new experts have any local experience. It is easy to devise a plan, but it is generally harder to implement that plan. Recommendations on how to "fix" the problem are coming out of every corner, but no one is asking what the impact on the local office will be, and what benefit or value will be achieved. So, no matter what federal or state programs come out of the Homeland Security initiative, much of it can not be implemented at the local level. **TRUST THE LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COORDINATORS TO KNOW WHAT THEIR COMMUNITY NEEDS, THEN HOLD US ACCOUNTABLE FOR OUR PROGRAMS.** One size-

fits-all or cookie cutter programs do not often work when they hit the field. Most of the local effort has come from local resources. Even though we are getting equipment and support from the DOJ equipment grants, many counties did not apply because they could not meet the burdensome administrative requirements of filing out volumes of paperwork, coordinating numerous meeting and meeting short deadlines, while working part-time, so again, only the strong survive.

We are getting a lot of recommendations on making the key facilities safer. Many of these recommendations are very costly. Since the funding for these improvements are coming from local resources, not much is getting done. So now a community has a dilemma, does it secure its key public facilities from some potential terrorist attack or fix the potholes in the street in front of the courthouse. We are told to establish security for our facilities. If we do it correctly it inconveniences staff and the public. Do we implement security procedures well in advance of any direct threat or do we wait for some type of credible threat then take some action. The answer is we SHOULD take all prudent actions, but without a direct threat, the public will not support the effort, especially if there is any change in routine or any inconvenience.

The Homeland Security Color Coded Warning System is not practical and needs to be redefined at the local level. National concerns and local concerns should be different. We do not have the resources for intelligence gathering to back up these efforts. What does it mean to the local communities when the color changes from "Yellow" to "Orange" to "Red"? Do I alert the public, if so what do I tell them, stay home, shelter in place, evacuate, close the schools, and close business and government offices?

We are trying to implement a four-step sequence that tells us exactly what to do depending on the event or emergency. We see in several cases that based on the threat, actions have been taken to protect key facilities. But when nothing happens, the local or state government looks like "Chicken Little" in the press so when the next threat comes up we then hesitate to take immediate action again. But if something were to actually happen and we did not take aggressive action we are labeled "asleep at the switch". So again we at the local level pay the highest price.

The communication from federal to local is severely broken. No one at the federal level and few at the state level even ask those at the local level what is the impact of a specific program. What sounds good in Washington may not float in Cedar Rapids. We end up with broad initiatives that will not or can not be implemented. Communications need to come from the bottom- up. We need periodic meetings on how we can best implement guidance and initiatives. Share the good, the bad, the ugly so we can all improve on lessons learned. We need to know what works in similar sized communities, not just what has worked in New York or Los Angeles. We can not all compete at the same level.

Concerns:

There are too many regulations that limit me from doing what is best for my community. Don't tie my hands. In the Midwest our first response system is built on a partnership of full-time and volunteer departments; different systems, but both built on the professionalism and dedication of the individual firefighter, law enforcement officer and emergency medical technician. This is different from larger departments built on full-time staffing.

- Training funds currently can not be used to pay for overtime for long courses to back fill full time fire and police. Since the local departments generally do not have the overtime funds, the person who needs the training can not attend so we do not get any better. We rely heavily on our volunteers but currently, training funds can not pay travel and per diem expenses for volunteers. We ask them to give up their time from their job and family, but give them no tangible benefit for their service.
- Training funds can not pay for meals during training events causing loss of training time so we waste time breaking for meals or have to find creative ways to cover meals while maximizing the training opportunity.
- Funds allocated by Congress get salami sliced too many times to provide for oversight before it gets to the local level. From the billions of dollars allocated, only a fraction gets to the local response agency.
- Communities need to be resourced to do annual training exercises and not rely on meeting minimal standards of one every four years. Training is the only way to identify weaknesses and shortfalls so that corrective action is taken. Training takes a commitment in time and resources and the political will to make it happen

Programs:

- We need access to these programs based on community risk and our desire to participate and to do the work. Too many programs such as initial WMD and MMRS are based solely on population. Some metropolitan communities get multiple MMRS, one per community, but others can not qualify.
- We need to encourage local officials to actively participate in training and drills/exercises in order to qualify for federal funds for any programs. It is difficult to get local officials to participate in the training events. But we see successes such as during the Oklahoma City Bombing where the City response agencies worked well because they trained together. This does not happen enough voluntarily so it should be required to qualify for federal assistance.

- Our schools are at great risk and we need to encourage schools to do multi-hazard planning in order to qualify for Education grants. Until the tragedy at Columbine, most schools only did what they were required to do such as fire drill and severe weather drill base on their region. No other emergency planning was done. Our schools are an inviting target from both inside and outside sources. After the Columbine tragedy there was an initial push to make schools safer, but after a period of time this initiative fell victim to other priorities. We as a nation can not afford school tragedies to continue without taking action to make them safer.
- We need to actively encourage local congressional staff to participate in local training and drills in order to be the eyes and ears for Congress. This has been successful in our community. Because of our preparedness efforts for this community, my congressional staff is aware of our efforts, our concerns, our progress and our frustrations. Because of that knowledge, I am presenting before this commission today.

The basic principle of emergency response is whatever the event or incident, the local jurisdiction will be the first on the scene. No matter what state or federal resources are systemically available, it takes time to get these resources to the incident. The better prepared the local jurisdiction is to handle any event the safer the community will be. This is not to say that these federal resources are not needed and do not do outstanding work, they are just not always readily available.

CHEMICAL:
We at the local level feel that any chemical incident will probably be one where the chemicals in the local community are used against that community. In Linn County we have industrial and agricultural storage of large amounts of chemicals and other large amounts are transported through the community on a daily basis through our roads and rail systems. We have been doing hazardous material preparedness for many years under various programs. However most of the Hazmat support comes from the tax base and not from the chemical manufacturers, transporters, or the industrial users. We have been receiving grants from various programs in the past but these grant funds are minimal. We try to get our local industry to pay through a fee system, but in order to accomplish this we have to amend the Iowa Code. This effort is blocked by pressure from the various industry groups so nothing happens. We have recently qualified for DOJ equipment grant funds for the HAZMAT teams which will be a great help. These funds will supplement local funds already targeted to improve local response capabilities.

BIOLOGICAL: This is a new area with little guidance. We in Linn County have taken the initiative to exercise a smallpox outbreak in our community. In cooperation with the

Linn County Public Health Department, our two hospitals, and Kirk wood Community College, we have formed a local task force to address biological issues. Through this task force, we took the initiative to address the concerns in our community. We did the research, we did the coordination, we did all of the work and used local resources to do the training exercise. We had support from the state health and emergency management and on the federal level from FEMA and CDC. There is still a lot of effort needed to address biological terrorism but the effort is being made and I am glad that Linn County has taken a leadership role, since if it does happen here, we must initially deal with the incident before state and federal resources can be assembled. Agri-terrorism is another hazard we see in the Midwest, especially in states that rely heavily on crops and livestock as part of their overall economy. This is another area that is new, but growing and again much of the research and other efforts will come from the local farmers and community agriculture support system to insure the viability of our agriculture from terrorism.

RADIOLOGICAL: The preparation for radiological events has been ongoing for many years for communities with commercial nuclear power plants. Much of our success in having one of the most prepared communities in the Midwest is directly tied to our partnership with the Duane Arnold Energy Center. Even though we have an extensive program with state and federal oversight, we are being required to push the envelope so far out of reality to prepare for events that could not happen without a drastic event. Because of the efforts to make our strongest program almost fool-proof we are wasting time and effort that can be used on other, more pressing and realistic issues. Some of the "initiatives" we are asked to address are air defense batteries around our facilities to shoot down hijacked aircraft flying over a populated area. We are informed that there are initiatives being proposed to extend the Emergency Planning Zone around the facility to fifty miles and to distribute Potassium Iodide tablets out to 200 miles to "protect" the public. We are being required to plan for and train for catastrophic immediate releases from a facility called a "fast breaker". We are told we must plan to alert the public to take drastic protective actions such as a community wide evacuation within 15 minutes. We argue that initiating an uncontrolled evacuation just to meet a regulatory time clock will cause a greater emergency than any release of radioactive material. None of these initiatives will really protect the public, but it looks good on the evening news.

We have done a great deal of work to make our community safe from any hazard. Much of this has been done with local resources, since we are not large enough to qualify for the major programs and their associated funds. The local level is where the "rubber meets the road" and is where the success of most of the homeland security programs will be seen in lives saved, property protected and the food chain preserved. We appreciate the support we have received and we hope this support will increase so that we, at the local level, can better protect our public.

Mr. HORN. Thank you. And we appreciate that, Mr. Wright, right from the grass roots.

Keith Erickson is the director of the Linn County Department of Public Health. So we have the Management Agency and the Public Health aspect.

Mr. ERICKSON. I am Keith Erickson, Director of Linn County Public Health, located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. I appreciate this opportunity to present testimony on how the Federal Government is assisting State and local governments in preparing for a potential attack involving biological, chemical or nuclear agents at this Field Hearing of the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations from a local Public Health perspective.

Concerns of the local Public Health officer:

Local Public Health infrastructure must be strengthened in order to adequately respond to potential terrorist attacks, especially when involving biological agents. The Public Health infrastructure must be based upon core Public Health functions and the essential Public Health Services.

This will involve training and supporting the current work force, hiring additional Public Health workers: for example, epidemiologists, Public Health planners, Public Health educators, information technology specialists, and improving electronic surveillance systems, laboratory capacity and improving local facilities.

Funds allocated for this purpose will have to be dual use so as to respond not only to man-made acts of terrorism, but also to respond to the natural occurrence of emerging infectious diseases. This dual use is important in maintaining a high level of readiness and proficiency. The increased capacity and capability to do disease surveillance, an epidemiologist on a daily basis will prepare us to respond in a timely fashion to a bioterrorism event.

Be reminded that the threat of agroterrorism in Iowa is significant. Any surveillance system must involve agriculture and veterinary medicine.

The anthrax events and hoaxes after September 11, 2001 demonstrated the need for Public Health to respond on a 24-hour/7-day-a-week basis. Indeed, the expectation of our community partners, including fire, law enforcement, HAZMAT and emergency management personnel, is that Public Health will be actively involved in a biological event, even though we are organized on an 8-hour/5-day-a-week operation.

In our local jurisdiction, we have been conducting emergency management drills for more than 25 years because of the Duane Arnold Energy Center, a nuclear power plant in Linn County. These drills, FEMA training and Nuclear Regulatory requirements have prepared Public Health and our community partners to respond to a nuclear event. This has provided a template for action to respond not only to nuclear but chemical and natural disasters as well.

This was clearly demonstrated in July 1985, when Toxic Tuesday, a chemical fire at the old Sewage Treatment Plant, caused the evacuation of thousands of citizens from Cedar Rapids in the middle of the night. These experiences should be incorporated into any biological preparedness plans in the future.

And I just want to show you the headlines from the Cedar Rapids Gazette which talks about mass evacuations in Cedar Rapids. I know the Congressmen remember this.

I'd also piggyback on what the Mayor said. You'll notice the helicopter up here. I was in that helicopter. That was made available to Public Health to lay out the coordinates to coordinate the evacuation, and I thank the city of Cedar Rapids for making that available.

Funding for these activities should be split into two systems: one to the State to address all 99 counties in a coordinated regional effort, and one directly to the metropolitan statistical areas of Iowa, based upon need.

It is important that allocation of these funds be population-based, available when needed, and based upon a national set of goals and objectives with appropriate accountability.

There are more than 3,000 local Public Health agencies in the United States. The National Association of County and City Health Officers is the national voice for local Public Health. I would urge that you listen to this voice in regard to domestic preparedness and bioterrorism.

In summary, we have an unprecedented opportunity to strengthen local Public Health infrastructure so that it has the capacity to respond to both emerging infectious diseases and terrorist attack involving biologic, chemical or nuclear agents in a timely fashion. Provide local agencies with the resources to hire, train and support a Public Health work force, and we will protect the public's health.

Thank you for this opportunity to present this testimony.

Mr. HORN. Thank you. That's very helpful.

We now have Chief Steve Havlik of the Cedar Rapids Fire Department.

We're glad to have you here, Chief.

Chief HAVLIK. Thank you.

Thank you, distinguished members of today's subcommittee hearing, for allowing me to testify today. I would like to take this opportunity to express some thoughts and concerns related to weapons of mass destruction.

We at the Cedar Rapids Fire Department are very grateful for the assistance we have received from the Domestic Preparedness Program sponsored by the Federal Government. These programs have given our Department the opportunity to participate in various training opportunities that have heightened our organization's awareness and capabilities. The training received has given us the ability to expand upon what we believe is a strong chemical response capability.

Hazardous material response for our organization historically has been responding to incidental spills and leaks. We must now be prepared to address multi-dimensional hazards. Assistance from the Federal Government has allowed us to initiate the mandated procedures and training. This will help us better respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

We have been privileged to be the beneficiary of a grant from the Department of Justice. This grant has provided Cedar Rapids Fire Department with some of the essential equipment needed to evaluate and respond to a possible terrorist attack. Aside from providing

more opportunities for procurement of necessary equipment, there exists an increasing need for resources to maintain and buildupon our current capabilities.

There are two very important issues we are currently addressing: What will be the funding source to provide for proper maintenance and upkeep for the equipment furnished, and how can we address the needed staffing costs associated with required training programs?

There are appreciable costs associated with maintaining specific pieces of instrumentation. These expenditures will have to be budgeted for in the future. For example, replacing sensors and consumption of calibration gas is an ongoing requirement and can be an expenditure of approximately $1,000.

Ultimately, the most urgent need is providing adequate staffing levels while personnel are engaged in training for response to these types of incidents.

As part of our bargaining agreement, we compensate our personnel for their scheduled time, as well as additional time outside the normal work schedule. The training that is provided requires significant time beyond scheduled-duty assignments.

Budgetary constraints have made it very challenging for departments such as ours to adequately fund for personnel costs for weapons of mass destruction training. As Fire Chief, I'm often faced with a difficult dilemma. I can ask our responders to participate in training utilizing our own personal resources, or I can cut response capabilities below mandated staffing levels to provide training time. Consequently, this has directly affected our ability to provide the manpower to properly respond to other emergencies.

Oftentimes, our personnel go to great lengths to participate. Our firefighters have incurred personal costs as well as making family sacrifices to assure their participation and attendance. As Fire Chief, it is difficult to consistently ask members to make these sacrifices.

Being located in the Heartland, agriculture is paramount to our economy. Many of the agricultural-based industries use and store chemicals. These chemicals enable them to process their product in a cost-effective manner. Fortunately, technology, innovation, and a strong commitment to process safety management have led to a responsible co-existence in our communities.

Unfortunately, recent events have demonstrated that certain individuals and groups, extreme in their views and cold-blooded in their actions, can impact us in ways we never imagined.

Iowa is one of the largest storers of chemicals that are toxic by inhalation. The chemical hazards that are inherent with an agricultural economy must be addressed and contingencies formulated to properly protect the public. When a bona fide threat is apparent, it is absolutely necessary for information to make its way to the jurisdictional agencies.

When a potential chemical threat exists, a formal communication conduit must be assured. This enables us to move confidential information into the hands of responders without obstructions or delays. Communicating and sharing information such as publishing alerts on a secure, data- sharing network would prove invaluable to responding personnel.

Decontamination remains a broad challenge. Responders need to comprehensively address the possibility of a nuclear, biological or energetic device in conjunction with a chemical event. These devices pose labor- and equipment-intensive circumstances. This type of terrorist activity presents unique challenges to the conventional decontamination process. Assistance is needed to provide decontamination equipment that is lightweight, mobile and has the ability to decontaminate large numbers effectively and efficiently.

Additionally, assistance is needed for equipment that can perform in inclement weather and has capabilities to handle non-ambulatory victims. Equipment with these characteristics is available through several manufacturers. However, they are cost-prohibitive for our agency due to budget constraints at this time and in the foreseeable future.

Once properly equipped, our local responding agencies remain faced with logistical and communication hurdles. Cooperation and integration of response efforts within multiple agencies are very much needed. This includes initial response and advanced medical care, as well as assistance from Public Health agencies.

To ensure a coordinated response, teamwork, communication and interagency training need improvement. Ultimately, this takes time, money and resources to reach the needed level of capability.

Once again, I'd like to thank you for allowing me to offer this testimony to this subcommittee. Hopefully, I've communicated the compelling need to provide the vital resources that will support our current and future capabilities. These resources will better help us prepare for and respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

Thank you.

Mr. HORN. Thank you, Chief.

[The prepared statement of Chief Havlik follows:]

Steve Havlik Testimony
Fire Chief
Cedar Rapids Fire Department

Testimony prepared for the House Committee on Government Reform's Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations.

INTRODUCTION

Thank you distinguished members of today's Subcommittee hearing for permitting me to express some thoughts and concerns related to weapons of mass destruction. We at the Cedar Rapids Fire Department are very grateful for the assistance we have received from the Domestic Preparedness Programs sponsored by the Federal Government. These programs have given our department the opportunity to participate in various training opportunities that have heightened our organizational awareness and capabilities. The training received has given us the ability to build upon what we believe is a presently strong chemical response capability. Hazardous material response for our organization historically has been the responding to incidental spills and leaks. We now must be prepared to address multi-dimensional hazards. Assistance from the Federal

Government has allowed us to initiate the mandated procedures and training to better respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT AND STAFFING COSTS

We have been privileged to be the beneficiary of a grant from the Department of Justice. This grant has provided the Cedar Rapids Fire Department with some of the essential equipment needed to evaluate and respond to a possible terrorist event. Aside from providing more opportunities for procurement of necessary equipment, there exists an increasing need for resources to maintain and build upon our current capabilities. There are two very important issues we are currently addressing . What will be the funding source to provide for proper maintenance and upkeep for the equipment furnished, and how will we be best able to address the needed staffing costs associated with required training programs. There are appreciable costs associated with maintaining specific pieces of instrumentation and these expenditures will have to be budgeted in the future. For example, replacing sensors and the consumption of calibration gas is an ongoing requirement and can be an expenditure of approximately one thousand dollars.

Ultimately, the most urgent need is found in providing adequate staffing levels while personnel are engaged in training for response to these types of incidents. As part of our bargaining agreement we compensate our personnel for their scheduled time as well as any additional time outside the normal work schedule. The training that is provided requires significant time beyond scheduled duty assignments. Budgetary constraints have made it very challenging for departments, such as ours, to adequately fund the personnel costs for weapons of mass destruction training. As fire chief, I am often faced with the dilemma of asking our responders to participate in training utilizing their own personal resources, or cutting response capability below mandated minimum to provide training time. Consequently, this has directly affected our ability to provide the manpower to properly respond. Often times our personnel go to great length to participate. Our firefighters have incurred personal costs as well as making family sacrifices to assure their participation and attendance. As fire chief it difficult to consistently ask members to make these sacrifices.

COMMUNICATION NETWORK

Being located in the heartland, agriculture is paramount to our economy. Many of the agricultural based industries use and store chemicals that enable

them to cost effectively process their product for market. Fortunately, technology, innovation and a strong commitment to process safety management have led to a responsible coexistence in our communities. Unfortunately, recent events have demonstrated that certain individuals and groups extreme in their views, and cold-blooded in their actions can impact us in ways we never imagined. Iowa is one of the nation's largest storer of chemicals that are *Toxic by Inhalation.* The chemical hazards that are inherent with an agricultural economy must be addressed and contingencies formulated to properly protect the public. When a bona fide threat is apparent, it is absolutely necessary for information to make its way to the jurisdictional agencies. When a heightened chemical threat exists a formal communication conduit must be assured to move certain pieces of information into the hands of responders without impediment and delay. Communicating and sharing information such as publishing alerts on a secure, data-sharing network would prove invaluable to responding personnel.

DECONTAMINATION

Decontamination remains a broad challenge. For responders to comprehensively address the possibility of nuclear, biological, or energetic

devices in conjunction with a chemical event pose labor and equipment intensive procedures. This type of terrorist activity presents that presents unique challenges to the conventional decontamination process. Assistance is needed to provide decontamination equipment that is lightweight, mobile and has the ability to decontaminate large numbers effectively and efficiently. Additionally, equipment that can perform in inclement weather and has capabilities to handle non-ambulatory victims. The equipment with these characteristics is available through several manufactures, but are cost prohibitive for our agency due to budget constraints at this time and in the foreseeable future.

INTERAGENCY INTERFACE

If properly equipped, our local responding agencies remain faced with logistical and communications hurdles. Cooperation and integration of response efforts within multiple agencies is very much needed. This includes initial response, advanced medical care as well as assistance from public health agencies. To ensure a coordinated response, harmonization, communication and interagency training need improvement. Ultimately, this takes time, money and resources to reach the needed level of capability.

CLOSING

Once again, I would like to thank you for allowing me to offer testimony to this Subcommittee. Hopefully, I have communicated the compelling need to provide the vital resources that will support our current and future abilities to prepare for and respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. HORN. Our next presenter is Douglas A. Feil, director, Environmental Training Programs, Kirkwood Community College, Cedar Rapids, IA.

Mr. FEIL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to address you on what our Nation's Federal Government is doing and has not yet had the opportunity to do to assist State and local governments in preparing for potential terrorist attack.

Kirkwood Community College has developed a partnership with our city, local industry, the county, and the county Emergency Management Agency and several of Kirkwood's federally funded training programs.

The goal of the partnership is to build and operate a multi-use Community Training and Response Center to prepare and direct our community's response to real and potential terrorist attack and provide a training space for several Kirkwood programs that have a national constituency.

The proposed center will provide an emergency operation center for Linn County area and office space for the Linn County Emergency Management Agency. It will also provide office space for the "first in the Nation" CDC-funded National Mass Fatalities Institute that has a mission to prepare communities to respond to and recover from mass fatalities incidents.

This institute provides advanced-level response training to prepare our emergency planners and responders to plan for and respond to disasters.

The center will also provide classrooms, computer lab and auditorium for the Hazardous Materials Training and Research Institute. The purpose of this federally funded institute is to promote worker protection and the maintenance of a clean and safe environment through education and training. This includes training on response to and the cleanup after a nuclear, chemical or biological attack.

Since 1987, HMTRI has trained over 120,000 workers with our network of 80 partner colleges across this Nation.

The center will also provide office space for CRADLE, an innovative recordkeeping and student assessment center created in direct response to the distance conferencing, education and training needs of the region driven by homeland security issues. We will soon be of the ability to record and track those prepared to assist in a local, State or national emergency.

The mission of the Community Training and Response Center is to draw upon the unique strengths of the organizations it houses in order to prepare communities across the country for a skilled response to emergency situations and provide facilities for a coordinated response to real emergencies in Eastern Iowa.

The Community Training and Response Center will be a $4 million, 16,000-square-foot hardened facility to be built on the Kirkwood Community College campus. The center will leverage resources of college and community operations that have similar missions. In the center, they will share common facilities and equipment to create an efficient and effective regional response that brings benefits to the college, industry, the city, the county, the State and the Federal Government.

At the local level, the efficiency and effectiveness of this approach has been recognized, and 50 percent of the $4 million facil-

ity cost has already been pledged. Now the Federal Government has an opportunity to assist the State of Iowa and our local governments in funding the final 50 percent of the project.

All of the facility's users have similar missions that naturally complement each other. Their personnel have similar skills that can support the missions of all users in a time of need. Each organization is a "best practices" showcase. Co-locating the operations maximizes the best qualities of each while effectively using taxpayer money. The organizations will provide a synergy of time, talent and resources for the betterment of the local community and the Nation.

We ask you to support Federal funding of this multi-use emergency response and training facility for Eastern Iowa and our country. We believe this dual-use facility serves as a model for other communities focused on preparing for terrorist attack.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feil follows:]

Building Opportunity through Partnership

Community Training and Response Center

Our nation shares an exciting but uncertain future. There are thousands of communities across this great nation that must be prepared to respond to crisis. The better prepared we are, the more confident and assured is our response and resilience in the face of terror.

Kirkwood Community College has developed a critical partnership to direct our community's response to real and potential terrorist attack. The goal of the partnership is to build and operate a joint Community Training and Response Center on the Kirkwood Community College campus in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, that will provide:

- An Emergency Operations Center (EOC) for Linn County.
- Office space for the Linn County Emergency Management Agency.
- Office and training space for the "first in the nation" National Mass Fatalities Institute.
- Classrooms, computer lab, and auditorium for the Hazardous Materials Training and Research Institute.
- An auditorium for community activities that is equipped for Iowa Communications Network (ICN) events.

The mission of center is to draw upon the unique strengths of the organizations it houses to prepare communities across this country for skilled response to emergency situations and to provide facilities for a coordinated response to real emergencies in Eastern Iowa. The Community Training and Response Center is a 16,224 square foot facility to be built on the north campus of Kirkwood Community College in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

The proposed community training and response Center will leverage the resources of six college and community operations that have similar missions. In the Center, they will share common resources including facilities and equipment to create an efficient and effective regional resource. The six operations provide a comprehensive approach for preparing, training, assessing and tracking a local community's ability to plan, prevent, mitigate, respond to and recover from emergency situations. In time of emergency, the Center will also draw upon other college capacities including its satellite uplink, fiber optic and microwave communications networks, computer labs, food service, gym and child care center plus many technology programs and laboratories. The six critical operations include:

- ***The Linn County Emergency Management Agency***, which provides a systematic approach to the coordination of emergency response in Linn County as well as supporting surrounding counties on an as-needed basis. It models the best in community response capability. The Center will facilitate a coordinated community-wide response to emergencies resulting from terrorism and natural disasters.
- ***The National Mass Fatalities Institute*** provides a "First in the Nation" training and support to individuals, communities, businesses, industries and agencies across the nation and around the world on the proper management of a disaster involving mass fatalities. The Center will provide facilities for this unique training to respond to a mass fatalities incident in a time of increasing threats of terrorism, transportation, and natural disasters.

- ***The Center for Research and Assessment of Distance Learning and Education (CRADLE)***, which supports the distance conferencing, education and training needs of the region driven by homeland security issues and the need for an institutionalized assessment and record keeping service for the many providers of distance learning programs. There is no other organization in the nation that records and tracks the proficiencies gained from emergency response training.
- ***The Hazardous Materials Training and Research Institute***, which provides training in hazardous materials handling, industrial health and safety, and industrial fire and rescue response for a national audience of trainers, industrial workers, and responders. The Center will allow instruction of trainers to provide both emergency and post emergency response training to municipal, industrial, and construction personnel.
- ***The East Central Iowa Regional Fire Service Training Center***, which provides basic fire fighter training and first responder emergency response to terrorism awareness training. The center also provides emergency rescue technician training and hazardous material operations level training for municipal volunteer fire fighters.
- ***The Environmental Training Center*** provides environmental training and education in the areas of municipal water and wastewater treatment, and solid waste management, public sector operators and responders.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS

The Linn County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) is responsible for coordinating the comprehensive Emergency Management program for all residents and communities in Linn County, Iowa, to include preparation, response, recovery and mitigation activities. The EMA operates under the multi-hazard approach to emergency management operations that addresses all risks that threaten the health, safety and welfare of the community to include natural disasters, man-made or technological incidents, and civil actions. The EMA is a geographic county-wide agency that reports to the Linn County Emergency Management Commission. The Commission consists of the mayor of each jurisdiction, the sheriff, and a member of the Board of Supervisors. The Linn County Emergency Management Commission has 20 voting members. The Director of Emergency Management is the executive agent for the Commission. The Commission is governed by the provisions of Iowa Code 29C and directs the activities of the Agency in the meeting of four functional areas: preparation, response, recovery, and mitigation. The EMA directs community response to incidents involving the Duane Arnold Energy Center near Palo, Iowa's only nuclear powered electric generation facility. Linn County EMA is in need of office, storage and communications space, and a facility that can be used as an emergency operations center in the time of local regional, state, or national emergencies.

Kirkwood's National Mass Fatalities Institute (NMFI), began operation October 1, 2000, with funding from the Iowa Division of Emergency Management and more recently from the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The NMFI provides planning, training, and technical assistance services to state and local governments, the transportation industry, other industries and businesses, community organizations and disaster response agencies. In today's volatile environment, especially with increasing threats of terrorism and natural disasters, the management of a mass fatalities response takes on special urgency for public safety agencies, business and industry, and volunteer organizations. The National Mass Fatalities Institute

provides advanced-level mass fatalities incident response training to prepare emergency planners and responders from all disaster-related professions to effectively manage a mass fatalities incident while providing proper care for the fatalities and surviving family members. Personnel being trained include emergency management professionals, mental health professionals, funeral directors, fire fighters, law enforcement personnel, military staff, medical practitioners, clergy, and representatives of industry and disaster response organizations across the country. NMFI is in need of office and classroom space to support the growing requests for training, planning and technical assistance services.

The Center for Research and Assessment of Distance Learning and Education (CRADLE) is located on the main campus of Kirkwood Community College in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. CRADLE is the outgrowth of the college's more then 35 years of local and national leadership in distance communication, education, and training. Representatives of the college's Internet Technologies Department, Media and Telecommunications Services, Registrars Office, Administrative Computing Services, Learning and Testing Services, Distance Learning Department, Continuing Education and Training Services, and the Environmental Health and Safety Training Program make up the Center's leadership. The Center was created in 2002 in direct response to distance conferencing, education, and training needs of the region driven by homeland security issues and the rapid expansion of federal, state, and local responses to the threat of terrorism. The Center is in need of additional office space and a center to originate distance-learning programs.

The Hazardous Materials Training and Research Institute (HMTRI) was established in 1987 by two Iowa community colleges that have long been active in environmental health and safety education and training. The purpose of the Institute is to promote worker protection and the maintenance of a clean and safe environment through education and training. Sponsor colleges are the Eastern Iowa Community College District, headquartered in Davenport, Iowa, and Kirkwood Community College in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. To deliver state-of-the-art curriculum and staff development programs, the HMTRI maintains one of the largest and strongest environmental, health and safety programs in the nation offering open-enrollment courses on its campuses and contracting with business and industry to deliver customized worker training on-site. HMTRI delivered courses to over 3,500 students and instructors in the past year. Over 80 colleges and organizations regularly purchase or license the use of texts and learning resources from the HMTRI on a regular basis. HMTRI sponsors a national consortium of colleges funded by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) that has trained over 100,000 students since 1987. HMTRI receives funding from the National Science Foundation, the Department of Education, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Health and Safety Administration. HMTRI is in need of an auditorium for train-the-trainer programs and instructor refresher programs for instructors from the more than 80 colleges and universities it supports through its NIEHS programs.

Kirkwood's Environmental Training Center promotes the maintenance of a clean and safe environment through education and training in the areas of municipal water supply, treatment storage and distribution; wastewater collection and treatment; solid waste management; and fire safety for public sector operators and responders. Last year over 3,300 individuals participated in ETC programs. In 1975, Kirkwood received a Clean Water Act appropriation to help fund building a wastewater training facility to serve the state of Iowa. The Center was opened in 1976 as the first EPA-funded wastewater training center in the nation. In 1980 and again in 1990, additions that nearly doubled the size of the facility were added. The 10,500

square foot center contains two general purpose classrooms with a seating capacity of 40 and 16, an analytical lab with 24 workstations; a chemical prep room, an instrument room, offices for 16 staff members, a maintenance lab with 30 workstations, a tool room, and a pilot scale 15,000 gallon-per-day wastewater treatment plant. The Center is in need of an auditorium and large multi-purpose classrooms for conferences and training large groups of operators.

The East Central Iowa Regional Fire Service Training Center provides basic fire fighter training and emergency response to terrorism training. The Center also provides hazardous material operations-level training for municipal volunteer fire fighters. The Center operates hands-on training grounds next to Kirkwood's Environmental Training Center that includes an SCBA building, a burn building, and numerous confined space simulators. The Center is in need of multi-purpose classroom space and an ICN equipped auditorium to present weapons of mass destruction training to first responders from the fire service.

These six organizations have similar missions that naturally complement each other. Their personnel have similar skills that can support the mission of all six organizations in a time of need. Each organization is a "best practices" showcase. Co-locating the six operations maximizes the best qualities of each while efficiently using taxpayer's money. The organizations will provide a synergy of time, talent, and resources for the betterment of the local community and the nation.

THE FACILITY

The construction of the Community Training and Response Center near Kirkwood's present Environmental Training Center will provide a 16,224 square foot, state-of-the-art facility that will draw visitors from all over the world to attend classes, seminars and training opportunities, and to view the operations of a model community training and response center.

The facility will include office space, two general-purpose classrooms, a joint 80-seat auditorium/emergency operations center, a computer classroom, and conference rooms. The security station and restroom facilities will support all users of the center and provide storage and HVAC space, emergency electrical generation and water supply, computer and phone services, and custodial services.

The joint auditorium and emergency operations command center will function as a multimedia auditorium designed for education and training functions for classes of up to 80 students. It will be equipped for computer-assisted training and education, Iowa Communications Network activity, the ability to receive and originate both satellite broadcasts and web-based broadcasts. It will be equipped with four large projection screens capable of displaying video, computer data, transparencies and 35mm slides. Two central podiums will control lighting, the four projection screens, audio for the auditorium, basic ICN network functions and Internet connectivity. Each of the 80 desks in the auditorium, when used in a training and education mode, will have an ICN microphone, power outlet for a laptop computer, and wireless network connectivity.

When the auditorium is functioning as an Emergency Operations Center, student desks become workstations for up to 80 officials. A communications center, command conference room, a 20-person computer lab security/reception access control point, restrooms with showers and a word processing/duplication area will support the command center. Adjacent to the command center is a large multifunction room that may be divided to provide dining, rest and work space for operations center personnel.

Each of the 80 workstations will have a laptop computer, direct phone line, power outlets for computer and desktop light, computer network connections to a dedicated server, an audio jack for headphones and switch to access up to eight audio channels, and a microphone connected to the ICN and to the audio system. The server will be connected to printers, plotter, and Internet recourses. Each workstation computer will be able to transmit data to a projector for display on one of the large projection screens at the front of the room.

Workers at the front two rows of workstations will to be able to face either the front of the room or the rear of the room. One of the rear corners of the room will be designated to facilitate the display of maps and diagrams. The sidewalls of the auditorium will be designed to facilitate the mounting of flat panel video displays controlled from the central podiums for display of weather data, computer-generated data, and television broadcasts.

The two multi-purpose rooms will function as large individual classrooms for classes of up to 35 students at tables. The two rooms can be joined providing seating for up to 80 individuals. With tables stored, the rooms can be used for hands-on demonstrations for water, wastewater, health and safety, hazardous materials, and mass fatalities classes. In support of the emergency operations center, the rooms can be used to serve meals and to provide space for cots for worker rest periods.

Two conference rooms located in the facility are both equipped for video and audio conferencing through the Iowa Communications Network and through phone and Internet-based services.

The computer lab will support 24 individuals working at computer stations. This room is located next to the emergency operations center and can provide workspace for FEMA and or state of Iowa emergency management staff needing to be close to but separate from the emergency operations center.

The relocation of the Linn County Emergency Management Agency from their temporary and inadequate headquarters will greatly enhance the ability of the agency to provide for the continuity of government and coordinated disaster response to ensure community health and safety. The building will provide office space for the NMFI. Access to the auditorium and classrooms will greatly enhance the ability of the ETC, HMTRI, and NMFI to serve larger audiences. The building will also bring a new community resource to the area, providing meeting and conference space to city, county, and state government and area groups.

Facility cost is estimated at four million dollars. Kirkwood Community College, Linn County, and the City of Cedar Rapids have committed 1.7 million dollars to construct the facility. Local industry has indicated a willingness to fund $100,000 of the cost. This totals just less then 50 percent of the needed resourses. Kirkwood and its community partners are asking for federal assistance in funding 50 percent of the facility.

Facility Construction Funding Estimates

Kirkwood Community College	$800,000.00
Linn County	$800,000.00
Cedar Rapids	$100,000.00
Local Industry	$100,000.00
Federal Assistance	$2,200,000.00
TOTAL	$4,000,000.00

Operating costs for the facility are estimated at $4.00 per square foot or approximately $65,000. Community partners will be responsible for operating costs.

Community Training and Response Center



PRELIMINARY FLOOR PLAN

For further information, see the attached document for an overview of the Community Training and Response Center developed by the community partners.

Kirkwood
COMMUNITY COLLEGE
Learning for Your Life Time®

THE COMMUNITY TRAINING AND RESPONSE CENTER



KIRKWOOD COMMUNITY COLLEGE, *Cedar Rapids, Iowa*

- The largest of 15 Iowa community colleges, and the fourth largest college in Iowa; only three public universities are larger.
- Enrolls12,555 students in more than 80 programs and 72,000 persons in annual continuing education courses. Enrolls more first generation college students than any other college in the state, including the public universities.
- In 2002, ranked 38 out of 1,200 community colleges for associate degrees awarded.
- Over one million square feet of facilities.
  - 600 acres of land.
  - A central campus and 10 predominately rural learning centers connected via an advanced technology distance learning system.
- Named *Community College of the Year* by the National Alliance of Business in 2000.
- Dr. Norm Nielsen, Kirkwood President, awarded *Chief Executive Officer of the Year* by the American Association of Community College Trustees in 2001, the top honor bestowed upon community college leaders by ACCT.
- GAO designation to Kirkwood and Cedar Rapids as one of four national *Model Workforce Communities* in 2001.
- A member of the prestigious *League for Innovation in the Community College*, a consortium of 19 of the nation's finest two-year colleges.
- Chosen in 2000 to be one of 12 Pew Foundation-sponsored *Vanguard Learning Colleges* by the League for Innovation for the purpose of modeling a more learning centered culture to other institutions around the world.
- Funded by NIEHS for 13 years to manage a community college consortium delivering environmental health and safety training nationwide.
- Awarded an *NSF Advanced Technology Center in Agriculture* in 2001 and a full partner in the *NSF Advanced Technology Environmental Education Center* since 1994. There are only 13 NSF ATE Centers in the nation.
- Largest two-year agricultural campus in the Midwest, the second-largest in the nation, and headquarters for *AgKnowledge*, a national consortium of major universities, colleges and agribusiness partners focused on geospatial technology and food-chain protection.



STRATEGIC LOCATION

- Cedar Rapids is located near the geographic center of Omaha, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Milwaukee, Chicago, St. Louis and Kansas City.
- The campus is located at the crossroads of Highway 30 and I-380, the Avenue of the Saints. It connects with Interstate 80, twenty miles to the south.
- The Eastern Iowa Airport, minutes away, features eight major airlines with over 80 flights per day.
- Cedar Rapids is the second-largest city in Iowa and number one in manufacturing.





CEDAR RAPIDS

Center for Agricultural Products, Electronics, Insurance, and Telecommunications



Cedar Rapids is the home of major agricultural processing plants including:

- Quaker Oats, the nation's largest cereal mill under one roof
- ADM
- Pillsbury
- General Mills
- Penford
- Ralston Foods
- Cargill



Significant area manufacturers include:

- Rockwell Collins, a major industrial employer of governmental and commercial aviation electronics
- Amana
- Maytag
- Square D
- Intermec
- PMX Industries
- Weyerhaeuser/Cedar River Paper Company



Insurance, communications and energy providers operating in Cedar Rapids include:

- AEGON USA
- McLeodUSA
- MCI Worldcom
- Alliant Energy

Iowa's only nuclear power facility, The Duane Arnold Energy Center, is located within 12 miles of the campus.

THE PARTNERS

- *Kirkwood Community College*
- *City of Cedar Rapids*
- *Linn County*
- *State of Iowa*
- *United States Government*
- *Major Industries*

COMMUNITY TRAINING AND RESPONSE CENTER
Programs and Services

The Linn County Emergency Management Agency is responsible for coordinating the comprehensive Emergency Management program for all residents and communities in Linn County and supports surrounding counties in Iowa. Operations include preparation, response, recovery, and mitigation activities. The EMA directs community response to incidents involving the Duane Arnold Energy Center near Palo, Iowa's only nuclear powered electric generation facility. Its permanent staff of five and many dedicated volunteers model the best in community response activity.

HMTRI
Environmental Health & Safety Curriculum, Education & Training

The Hazardous Materials Training and Research Institute has provided training in hazardous materials handling, industrial health and safety, and industrial fire and rescue response for over 100,000 trainers, industrial workers, and responders since 1987. HMTRI is recognized as a center of excellence by NSF, NIEHS, EPA, OSHA, IMLS, ED, DOE and DOD. Its programming is funded at $3 million dollars annually with an additional $500,000 in training revenues from business and industry. The Community College Consortium for Health and Safety Training, sponsored by HMTRI, is an 80-member network of community colleges with 120 instructors delivering Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response training nationwide. In 2001, CCCHST trained 12,775 persons through 924 courses for a total 156,243 contact hours of hazardous materials training.



The Kirkwood Environmental Training Center is a model for environmental operator training and education in the areas of municipal water and wastewater treatment, and solid waste management for public sector operators and responders. The first EPA-funded wastewater training center in the nation, it features a pilot scale 15,000 gallon-per-day wastewater treatment plant. In 2001, HMTRI and the ETC trained nearly 10,000 local workers and employers. Sophisticated distance learning programs certify operators across the country who cannot access local training programs.

COMMUNITY TRAINING AND RESPONSE CENTER
Programs and Services



The National Mass Fatalities Institute is funded by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the State of Iowa's Emergency Management Division to provide training and support to individuals, communities, businesses, industries, and agencies across the nation and the world on the proper management of a disaster involving mass fatalities. It is a one-of-kind program in the nation and directed by a staff with years of experience in mass fatalities response with the Red Cross, including responses at Sioux City, Iowa, Oklahoma City, Egypt Air, Alaska Air, TWA 200, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Community members being trained include emergency management professionals, mental health professionals, funeral directors, firefighters, law enforcement personnel, military staff, practitioners, clergy, and representatives of industry and disaster response organizations.

The East Central Iowa Regional Fire Service Training Center provides municipal volunteer firefighter training that includes basic firefighter, emergency rescue technician and terrorism awareness training. The training grounds include SCBA skills building, a burn building, and numerous confined space simulators. The Center also provides emergency rescue technician training and hazardous material operations level training for municipal volunteer firefighters.



The Center for Research and Assessment of Distance Learning and Education (CRADLE) supports the distance conferencing, education and training needs of the nation driven by homeland security issues and the need for an institutionalized assessment and record-keeping service for the many distance learners and learning providers. CRADLE is the outgrowth of the college's more than 35 years of local and national leadership in advanced technology distance communication, training, testing and record keeping.

WHY KIRKWOOD?

Existing Infrastructure

- Campus parking for 4,048 vehicles; dedicated parking for 100 at the Center
- Adjacent on-site child care center for 96 children with gym and kitchen
- ICN, satellite uplink and downlink, and radio broadcast facilities
- Helicopter landing area next to the center
- 20 nearby hotels
- 58 nearby restaurants; multiple food service options on campus
- At the crossroads of U.S. Highway 30 and I-380, the Avenue of the Saints
- Minutes away from a major regional airport
- Reduced vulnerability because of location

Complementary Program Staff with National Outreach

- Haz-mat, fire, mass fatalities, and municipal infrastructure expertise
- National consortia in Environmental Health and Safety
- National consortia in Agriscience and Geospatial Technology
- Advanced technology communications capability to reach the nation

WHY KIRKWOOD?

A Rich History of Successful Partnerships.

SIGNIFICANT KIRKWOOD PARTNERSHIPS



Kirkwood Resource Center

Kirkwood operates a 60,000 square-foot urban neighborhood learning center with a one-stop delivery system for employment solutions. Partners include:

- United Way of East Central Iowa
- Department of Human Services
- Workplace Learning Connection
- Promise Jobs/Welfare-to-Work

Heritage Agency

One of 667 Area Agencies on Aging nationwide, the Heritage Agency is one of only 13 in Iowa. Authorized by the Older Americans Act of 1965, the Heritage Agency has been a department of Kirkwood Community College since 1973. It is the only agency on aging in the nation located on a community college campus. Partners include:

- Federal government
- State of Iowa
- Six area counties



Iowa Equestrian Center

Monday through Thursday students learn all aspects of horse science in this dual use facility. On weekends, an estimated 35,000 visitors attend 40 professional equestrian shows and clinics throughout the year. The outcome: A $7 million economic impact. Partners include:

- State of Iowa
- City of Cedar Rapids
- Area equestrian community

SIGNIFICANT KIRKWOOD PARTNERSHIPS



Diamond V Mills
Nutrition and research operations are located in this $1.66 million, 15,000 square-foot complex on Kirkwood's main campus. In addition, the facility houses Kirkwood's Veterinary Technology program.



AGEON USA
This 50,000 square-foot facility on Kirkwood's main campus is home to AEGON USA's National Data Center. Up to 135 AEGON employees use Kirkwood facilities each day.

KTOS Center
AEGON USA reserves the facility for use as an emergency business resumption center. Kirkwood uses this 35,000 square-foot building as a training and education technology center. This is a private-sector model of Kirkwood's Proposed Community Training and Resource Center.

"If you don't care who gets the credit, anything is possible"
Author Unknown

COMMUNITY TRAINING AND RESPONSE CENTER

CONSTRUCTION BUDGET		TOTALS
Kirkwood Community College		
Land, Parking, Grounds —In-kind	$500,000	
National Mass Fatalities Institute Equipment and Furnishings	$100,000	
Hazardous Materials Training and Research Institute/Kirkwood	$200,000	
		$800,000
Linn County	$800,000	$800,000
Community Partners Public/Private	$200,000	$200,000
City of Cedar Rapids		
Local Industry		
Other		
Federal	$2,200,000	$2,200,000
Homeland Security		
GRAND TOTAL		**$4,000,000**

Operational expenses will be assumed by local partners.

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Cedar Rapids, IA 52406

www.kirkwood.edu
1(800)332-2055

Mr. HORN. Thank you. We now have our last presenter of this panel, and that's Bruce Lacy, the nuclear business and assets manager for Alliant Energy, Duane Arnold Energy Center.

Thanks for coming, Mr. Lacy.

Mr. LACY. Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak. I apologize that, given the period of time in which I knew I was going to be here today, I didn't have an opportunity to give you some paper to read along with, but—I represent the owners of the Duane Arnold Energy Center and those people who are responsible for its operation, Iowa's only electric generating plant that received its energy from the splitting of the atom. We've been a safe and reliable part of the electric energy infrastructure here in Eastern Iowa since 1974, and I wanted to speak directly to the issue of the security of our facility and the role that we have in the community.

First off, I'd like to say I appreciate very much the prior comments acknowledging the role that we have played supporting the community in the development of emergency preparedness. Local, county, State, Kirkwood, all of these are people that we've been working with for nearly two decades in terms of emergency preparedness, and we're proud of our role in that.

Specifically regarding security at our nuclear facility, security is not a new issue for us. It was in the late 1970's that security became a major function. Some of you who are familiar with the community for more than two decades might remember the date when the Duane Arnold plant didn't have guards, didn't have fences, didn't have Jersey barriers, things like this.

That all started showing up in 1979. And we have systematically made improvements both in the physical design of security measures and in the staffing ever since then. I think a very good example of that is the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. That resulted in the initial placement of Jersey barriers around the plant that supplemented the already-existing fences and professional security force that we had. So we were already very well prepared prior to September 11th.

But nothing is ever perfect, nothing is ever good enough. September 11th taught us all messages; and after September 11th, we, like everybody else, further improved. It's just, the platform from which we were starting at the nuclear plant was already much higher and much better established than virtually any other facilities around the Nation.

And I speak in that regard on behalf of all of the commercial electric generating plants in the Nation. It's something that we as a Nation can be proud of.

We take our responsibility very seriously.

Some of the improvements that we've made, I will not go into detail on that, but we have increased our staff. We've increased certain types of physical barriers associated with the power plant. In a short quote from our security director at the plant, I like to think in terms of the four D's.

The first D is to deter. And by being well prepared, you deter people from even thinking about coming to your facility and doing something wrong.

Second, for those who are unwise and not deterred, then you want to detect them. We've done various things that will allow us

to detect hostile parties much earlier than what we were prepared to detect before.

Third, you want to defend the facility. By the addition of staff and various measures, we've further enhanced our ability to defend the facility.

And, last, and the most serious point is, should you fail on the first three D's, be prepared to defeat on the fourth D.

We've made improvements in all of these areas associated with our power plant.

I would like to offer the commercial U.S. electric generating industry as a model for the Nation in terms of preparedness, both before and after September 11th, and as a model of cooperation with our local communities, again, appreciating the earlier remarks on this panel for what has been accomplished in Eastern Iowa, and I would say that is no exception across the Nation to other communities that have nuclear power plants in their midst.

As Congress goes forward, I strongly ask that you rely on the best information available regarding the types of potential threats that you want to direct resources and help to.

In the case of my own industry, I am very well aware that it is easy to be misunderstood. That the electric generating activities that take place at our facility are just one of many aspects of nuclear-related issues that might take place around the country, but that we should not make decisions based on fear or manipulation of facts in our response and that, as the Congress has the opportunity to set forth policies, programs and provide resources, that not be done in a manner that is discriminatory, again, based on fear or inappropriate perception.

Now, those of us who own the plant and are responsible for the operation of the plant, we take great responsibility and feel great responsibility in this to ensure that it is a safe and securely operated facility.

I want to say that we're very proud of the people—it's ultimately people, as I'm sure everybody on this panel would agree—it's ultimately people that make the difference. We have a lot of outstanding people that we should be proud of at our power plant, both in the operation of the facility and in the security of the facility.

I'm very pleased at the cooperation and the coordination of local, State and Federal, all levels; and I'm confident that the people who live in our community will not be subjected to any threat of terrorist attack associated with activities at our facility based on what we were doing before September 11th, based on the things that we've done after September 11th and probably, most fundamentally, on the commitment that we all have to always learn and always seek a better way.

As time goes on, we're going to learn and we're going to even further improve, if we're going to keep our community safe, as part of the community.

So, in conclusion, we're counting on Congress to direct the public resources and the public policy in the direction most in need of help; and it appears to me that is for our local, State and Federal infrastructure.

I'm not asking for any money. Based on rational and objective, well-thought-out considerations of the threat, and I commend you

to recognize, again, the outstanding example of the industry that I'm part of, the commercial nuclear electric generating industry in this Nation, be seen as a model for success not just in communities with nuclear plants but communities that may have other issues that require an equal level or comparable level of attention.

I want to thank you very much for the opportunity to speak today.

Mr. HORN. Well, thank you. And now that we've got the individual statements, we're going to turn to questions, and each Congressman will have 10 minutes for questioning, and we'll rotate it until everybody is exhausted. We still have a panel two to come with some very exciting things.

So, the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Leach, the senior member, the one we all go to to get advice, so—he's sort of Socrates.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Steve.

Let me say, as I'm sitting and listening to this group, I'm really struck by the high degree of professionalism. I'm also struck by the notion that we have this society in which there are differing levels of Government. You have local government, State government and National Government, and then different elements.

And I am really impressed with Linn County. I must tell all of you what a wonderful degree of thoughtfulness you've put into where you are.

And then, to a College President/Chairman, let me say that, last year, Kirkwood Community College was rated the No. 1 community college in the United States; and we're very proud of the College in many areas, but you are now becoming a leader in a particular area, in preparedness.

And then, interestingly, when we think about these levels of government—and this is going to apply to the next panel—America also needs some regional responses. That is, there's a local response, a national response, a State response.

As I look at the Kirkwood proposal, it's basically one that is a regional or national dimension. In fact, your Mass Fatalities Center is a national program. Your other efforts in the preparedness area really fit into a regional context.

So, in terms of suggestions, for the report of this subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, I would like to underscore the regionality dimension of preparedness in programs like Kirkwood's, and potentially certain things in the State laboratories I think can be considered in a regional dimension as well as a State dimension.

In fact, when we go with the issues of communication, we all know there—sometimes within agencies, and we had a problem within the FBI with that information going upstream and downstream and how it's being treated, then, between agencies.

But the community colleges, as, again, symbolized by Kirkwood, and symbolized by the State of Iowa with certain commitments the State has made, have the best communications between institutions of any in the country. And I think that's a model that also ought to be a part of—although it's kind of implicit in your particular approaches.

But I really have one precise question, and that relates to the Kirkwood issue, and that is, just what is it that you're requesting

from the Government in terms of funding, in the near term and then on a sustaining basis?

Mr. FEIL. In the near term, we have proposed this $4 million facility. Our local, State, county and industry have come up with a pledge of 50 percent of that.

We are looking for assistance, either directly from the Federal Government or through the State, an additional $2 million to build this facility that will both provide the emergency response capabilities within the area and provide training within the region.

In a long-term basis, we are looking for continual assistance in funding both our National Mass Fatalities Institute and the various programs that the Hazardous Materials Training and Research Institute and CRADLE have in training, and we assist community colleges across the Nation to provide training in their own, say, backyard, in their own localities, and we have community colleges from across the Nation that come to us, and we share Iowa's resources with them, and they take them home to share with their community; so we are looking for assistance there over a long-term basis.

Mr. LEACH. I appreciate that.

And I would also say to the chairman, again, as you prepared in your report, there are aspects that are deeply scientific and deeply health care related——

Mr. FEIL. Yes.

Mr. LEACH [continuing]. At a theoretical level in preparedness; but the community college system in the United States, which is unique in the world, is probably the best system in potential for training at the practical level of local communities, and I think it's something that we shouldn't lose sight of and we ought to be looking for benchmark kinds of approaches.

And as I look at what Kirkwood has been developing, I'm exceptionally impressed as a national model, not simply as a local model.

Before my time expires, I just want to ask one question of Mr. Lacy.

You've given a very strong statement about what your facility in Palo has done in terms of security, and you've mentioned you are not looking for Federal funds, but are there things that Congress and the executive branch can be doing that could be helpful to your facility and your kind of facility at this time?

Mr. LACY. Thank you very much for that question. And, yes, indeed, there are some suggestions that I would offer there.

We understand and accept that we have a responsibility to provide some level of protection at our site. I understand that there's debate by some as to whether that should be changed. I would say that there needs to be Federal legislation, not only just for our facility, but maybe other facilities, where people are expecting a law enforcement-type capability associated with the facility. Then we need Federal legislation to support authority for some kind of law enforcement function at the site, and that does not exist right now for our facility.

I think a second area has to do with background investigations of personnel. Frankly, given the regulatory regime and the state of Federal laws, it's easier for a gun dealer to do a background inves-

tigation on somebody than it is for us. I believe that deserves legislative attention.

And a third area where I believe Federal activity would be appropriate, and this may be the most difficult of all, is the Homeland Security Office and their issuance of threat advisories. I think there's opportunity there and probably some legislative support appropriate for them to help them issue more meaningful threat advisories.

I mean, there's kind of a limit to the number of times that you can say you need to have things at the highest, the most high, the very high, the absolutely high. Somehow or other, that needs to be turned into a more meaningful thing.

And for whatever facilities that the Nation feels it needs to provide individual protection as we accept responsibility for at our nuclear electric plant, the Federal legislation needs to be respectful that we can't expect those individual facilities to be prepared to defend against things that are fundamentally acts of war. At some point, an act of war becomes a national issue, not a local issue.

So those are the suggestions that I would offer.

Thank you very much for the question.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Lacy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. Thank you.

And now we'll yield 10 minutes for questioning by your other fine Congressman, and that's Mr. Ganske.

Mr. GANSKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel.

You know, I detected something of a common theme from all of your testimony, and that was, please give us help, but watch out for the unfunded mandates.

Is that fair to say?

I see the Mayor of Cedar Rapids nodding his head in full agreement right there.

The way that we wrote the Bioterrorism Preparedness Bill was designed to do so. We have a proviso that for a State to apply for grants, then there needs to be a State preparedness plan.

So I was disappointed to find out just before the hearing that Ellen Gordon, the Homeland Security Advisor for the State of Iowa, did not show up today—apparently she had some conflicts, although she had apparently indicated she would be here previously—because I was interested in getting some information from her on how the State Bioterrorism Preparedness Plan is coming along? I mean, is it adequate, is the State getting cooperation from the localities, are the localities getting input into the State, is there any way that we can help in that regard?

Now, as I mentioned before in my statement, we have actually budgeted about $4.4 billion for these types and other types of grants that you're looking at applying for. We need to go through an appropriations process, we need to get that money into the pipeline.

But it's important for you, as we've gotten some indication from this afternoon, that you are also making progress in terms of your analysis of what your needs are.

Chief Havlik, I must say that I was very impressed with my visit recently to the Cedar Rapids Fire Department. The level of commit-

ment of the men and women that you have working in that department, Mayor, I think they're doing a great job.

And, Mr. Lacy, you're working with them, and others have mentioned—Mr. Wright, for instance—the fact that Cedar Rapids has been a little in the forefront of some of this planning simply because you have a nuclear power plant located, really, right up to the city limits for metropolitan Cedar Rapids.

Mayor Pate, maybe you can tell me, it seems to me like that nuclear power plant is located closer to Cedar Rapids than just about any other power plant in the United States. Is that an accurate impression?

Mayor PATE. I'm not sure how every plant is in the country, but it's distinctly close to us, and it's been a significant partner in our efforts to respond with good planning.

And, if I could, Congressman, I just want to give credit where it's due. I think, as Mr. Wright mentioned, it was a template for us; but, you know, we, as an emergency management group collectively, do continually drills.

I'm trying to think—this year alone, we did the airport, in response, you've done the smallpox, three nuclear power plants, an earthquake; so, you know, we're continuing to drill and drill and drill and try to prepare for what might come our way.

Mr. GANSKE. Would anyone on the panel like to address this particular question?

Mr. HORN. I think Mr. Erickson.

Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Erickson, you were nodding your assent about the proximity of the power plant?

Mr. ERICKSON. I believe that if you take the 10-mile EPZ that runs down the middle of First Avenue in Cedar Rapids, and since it splits the city, you have to take the whole city, so that means there's a greater population within a 10-mile EPZ of a nuclear power plant at Duane Arnold than any other facility in the country.

Mr. GANSKE. In the country?

Mr. ERICKSON. Yes.

Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Lacy, I have to ask this question, because I've toured the power plant. I know that you're running out of storage capacity. Do you have an opinion on what we should do with that spent nuclear fuel, and what would be the safest thing to do with it?

Mr. LACY. Yes, If I might just supplement the two prior responses. The Duane Arnold Energy Center does not have the largest population, although it certainly has one of the largest, so, I—not to contradict, but I think we're No. 10 or something like that. I think there are nine other facilities that have a higher populated area than we do. But, certainly——

Mr. GANSKE. The proximity is very close.

Mr. LACY. Yes, certainly, proximity and high population. And I think that's a strong motivation for us, as our role in the community, for this cooperation that we talk about on that.

With regard to the used fuel that has been safely stored at our facility since we started up in 1994, we are developing additional storage capability at our site for the safe storage of that fuel, and that storage will be just as safe there as it is in our existing facility at the site.

I want to commend the U.S. Congress for their action approximately a month and a half ago supporting the President's decision to go ahead and develop a permanent repository for the storage of used fuel at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. And while I will always state with confidence that the fuel on an interim basis is safely stored at our facility, we're talking about decades of interim storage.

If you're going to look at centuries of permanent storage, consolidation at a single, well-designed, well- secured site is something that is absolutely the right thing to do. It's something that we as a Nation are fortunate that we have the opportunity to go forward on, so I want to thank the Congress for their support in that area.

Mr. GANSKE. Mayor Pate, you were talking about several infrastructure needs for Cedar Rapids. Are you in the process of putting together a list of those needs in preparation, for presenting grant proposals for the additional spending that we will provide from the Federal Government?

Mayor PATE. Actually, Congressman, we've already done that and submitted it to our Iowa congressional delegation for their review, and we'll be following up with that.

In fact, I'll be in Washington I believe the 9th or 10th of September—I don't have a calendar in front of me—in an effort to reinforce some of these costs and priorities, and I'll make sure that a copy is forwarded to your special attention, too, but it itemizes, goes through several of the items I mentioned here, goes into more detail on the National Mass Fatalities Facility and, of course, some of the other expenses that we're incurring right now.

The Fire Chief didn't go into a lot of detail, but we've spent—and I'm sure other fire departments have—extensive amount of money on response to anthrax calls when that was going on, and those were costs we absorbed internally, and, again, trying to better prepare for those things, those costs are there, and I'll make sure that those are clearly spelled out for you and the rest of the delegation.

Mr. GANSKE. Chief Havlik, you have a vehicle there, I believe, in your department that is able to respond to chemical-type contaminations. Can you describe that a little bit?

Chief HAVLIK. Well, it's actually a converted pop truck/ vehicle that we've converted into our Special Operations Unit, and it contains all our hazardous material, all our high- and low-angle, confined space, water-rescue equipment, so it's really a very specialized vehicle. It covers a lot of different areas in our department, but we do use it quite a bit, and we actually would like to get something a little newer and a little bigger that we could actually—we have got so much equipment, we don't have room for it in that vehicle, but it is very versatile, does a good job for us. You'd be surprised how many special-operations calls we do have in a city with, obviously, the river running through it and so forth, so—it's a very good vehicle and it gets quite a bit of use.

Mr. GANSKE. Now, in Japan in 1995, in a subway, there was a chemical attack using serin gas. Let's just say that there were a terrorist attack at some major gathering in Cedar Rapids, and so you were called to respond, and you got there and you saw an awful lot of people on the ground. What would you do? How would

you activate the community services to handle 50, 60, 100 people that could be injured at one time?

Chief HAVLIK. Well, first of all, we would initiate an incident command system which we use exclusively on the fire department, and we would get all the players involved that would be able to make choices. Maybe somebody from the council, Linn County Health, police department, fire, all the departments, Ned Wright from EMA, all the departments that would have input, and get together in one spot so we could make decisions based on the events that were happening.

We have some equipment, some monitors, that we've received from the Federal Government—actually, a Department of Justice grant. We would be able to take this equipment and, hopefully, identify the product that we're dealing with. That would be the first step, identify what it is.

And then we have some resources. We should be able to find out what we need to do, how far we need to evacuate, what resources we need to take care of that situation.

But any time something like that is released, it's going to cause some major problems. The main reason there, it's going to take awhile just to identify what the product is.

But we do have some equipment that we just received, and we've been playing with it a little bit, and it's some stuff that's definitely going to help us identify the product and help us determine what to do.

Mr. GANSKE. So would your special team show up in full contamination suits?

Chief HAVLIK. Yes. We have the Level A, Level B, all types of suits. We have a very excellent HAZMAT team, and they would definitely show up, and they would be the ones to actually try to mitigate the situation.

Mr. GANSKE. How many people would be in a team like that?

Chief HAVLIK. Well, they go in in teams of two, but we have about 35 members in our department that are cross-trained in all the different disciplines I mentioned, so we have a pretty good-sized HAZMAT team, and we have some excellent equipment also.

Mr. GANSKE. But, really, what you're pointing out is that, when a team of two arrives, and you may have a room like this——

Chief HAVLIK. Sure.

Mr. GANSKE [continuing]. You're going to need a lot of help, you're going to need pull people out, get extra people there, you're going to need to have additional equipment. You can't just call people in and have them contaminated as well.

Chief HAVLIK. Right.

Mr. GANSKE. You're talking about what hospitals have told us, on a physical plant level, as well as personnel, and that is that you need additional help to be able to handle what we would call a surge.

Chief HAVLIK. Yes, I agree.

Mr. GANSKE. Not just a truck turning over and having some chemicals——

Chief HAVLIK. Yes. Our HAZMAT people, our technicians, would be able to go inside the business or where the truck turned over and actually try to mitigate that, but we're going to need people in

the other zones to take the people as they come out to decontaminate them and so forth, so it is a very labor intense-type situation to handle something like that.

Mr. GANSKE. Now, has anyone talked about our National Guard involvement in any of this?

Mr. WRIGHT. Congressman, just speaking from that, we have been working with our civil support team in Des Moines, and they participated in our smallpox exercises and our other training.

But, as I mentioned, they're several hours away, and a lot of the things that we're looking at right now is ensuring that even though these—support is there, we've got support not only in Des Moines and Kansas City and other places within this total response system, but for the first several hours, this is a local responsibility.

One of the things that we've been doing is training using all of our resources, not only within the city and the county, to be able to meet these things, to ensure that our first responders—and when we talk "first responders," sometimes we're talking about law enforcement, fire and EMS, but we're also talking about the Red Cross, Emergency Management, Public Works, so there's a lot of people that would be coming into play on this. And we're looking at the resources to provide training from across the board, not just for the entry teams.

We have been training and preparing and equipping our two hospitals, because we knew that they also needed that, whether it was weapons of mass destruction, but, as we mentioned, all the chemicals that we have here. We're really looking more at a potential target being the chemicals that we already have existing just being released into the public, not something such as the Oklahoma City, where it was brought into the community.

But we are looking at training across the board, and we are using Kirkwood and other opportunities that we have to spread that training around; and through our mutual aid, we've got 20 fire departments in Linn County, three of which are paid, the rest are volunteers. We are trying to make sure that those, which was the second wave, are also trained, because it does no good for them to also get to a scene and not have the proper equipment. If they can just look at it from afar, that doesn't do any good.

So that's one of the efforts we're looking at, is to provide those resources across the board just because of the risks that we have in our community.

Mr. GANSKE. I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. Does Mr. Leach have any other further questions?

Mr. LEACH. No.

Mr. HORN. OK. We will now, then, have the panel 2 come forward: Dr. Mary J. R. Gilchrist, Director, University of Iowa Hygienic Laboratory; Christopher G. Atchison, Associate Dean for Public Health Practice, College of Public Health, University of Iowa; Dr. Manjit Misra, Director, Seed Sciences, Iowa State University; Richard Hainje, Director, Region VII of the FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency; James F. Bogner, Special Agent in Charge, Omaha Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and then our wrap-up person which we always use, and that will be Mr. Paul L. Posner, the Managing Director, Federal Budget Issues,

Strategic Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office, which reports to the Comptroller General of the United States, has a very fine group here and all around the country, and we ask them to say, are we missing anything. So that will be panel two.

If you will stand up and raise your right hand, we'll have you take the oath. And any staff that go with you, just bring them in, too, so we don't have to go through this again.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. HORN. The clerk will note that all six witnesses have affirmed.

So we will start here with Dr. Gilchrist, and we're delighted to have you here.

STATEMENTS OF MARY J.R. GILCHRIST, DIRECTOR, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA HYGIENIC LABORATORY; CHRISTOPHER G. ATCHISON, ASSOCIATE DEAN FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, COLLEGE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA; DR. MANJIT MISRA, DIRECTOR, SEED SCIENCES, IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY; RICHARD HAINJE, DIRECTOR, REGION VII OF THE FEMA, THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; JAMES F. BOGNER, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, OMAHA DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; AND PAUL L. POSNER, MANAGING DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUDGET ISSUES, STRATEGIC ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Ms. GILCHRIST. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Iowa delegation, thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony regarding the Federal role in support of local and State preparedness for bioterrorism, chemical terrorism and nuclear terrorism.

The University Hygienic Laboratory, which I direct, is a member of the LRN, the bioterrorism response network instituted by the CDC and the Association of Public Health Laboratories. The Laboratory Response Network was formed during the years 1999 through 2001, when we met our first real challenge dealing with anthrax letters and many thousands of hoaxes and perceived threats. We were modestly funded during those years of preparation.

Our laboratory was funded for $100,000 last year to meet the threat of bioterrorism. One industry alone told us that we had saved them "millions of dollars," because our testing kept their assembly lines running when questionable powders were detected on devices and parts.

Because we served our local populace, we stretched ourselves far beyond capacity. We would not expect a remote laboratory serving many jurisdictions to have done as well. I recognize and honor the Federal Government for its wisdom in making bioterrorism response a local issue for the laboratories.

Across the country, the LRN tested thousands of specimens and allayed much fear and panic, but it did not serve our populace fully. In Iowa, those who were not well served must balance our success stories. Because we had limited resources, law enforcement and local communities evaluated each case and ruled out powders that did not constitute a credible threat.

We understand that some powders that were not tested, while not a real health threat, caused panic and shutdown of assembly lines at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars. It's good to note that our funding has been increased by some 15 fold, to approximately $1.5 million this year, and we are hiring additional staff so we can provide broader testing. We were lucky that our wake-up call involved few who were truly ill, and we managed to minimize fear and panic in the situation of perceived threat that swept our country.

The Government was wise several years ago when it abandoned its concept of solely providing regional laboratory support and instead funded bioterrorism response laboratories in each State. Capacity for local response to bioterrorism is critical. When airlines shut down or refuse to carry specimens perceived to be risky, a laboratory must be available within driving distance of a few hours.

No matter the means of transport, the turnaround time would be increased if regional laboratories were instituted for any subset of the testing. Now, our laboratory is called a regional laboratory for surge capacity, but we don't displace the capacity of the local laboratory for basic testing.

I'm concerned that we need smallpox testing in our States. In the event of a smallpox threat, every rash will be suspected to be a case of smallpox. Specimens sent out of State will mean increased turnaround time and costs of health care to those who are ill or exposed. Moreover, fear will be prolonged beyond need. We must be able to do the testing locally.

I have great concern about the need to bring local capacity to the States for the detection of chemical and nuclear threats. When a powder is found, its identity as a biological, chemical or nuclear agent is not obvious until it has been tested. Even if labeled as anthrax, it might be a chemical agent or a mix of biological and chemical and even nuclear materials.

The capacity for detection and identification of the three types of agents should be present in each lab for at least two reasons:

Firstly, it may not be possible to split a small specimen, and tandem testing in different facilities would require too much time.

Second, a mixed specimen would risk the safety of the laboratory people who could only identify one type of agent and could not safely handle the other types.

The responsibility for testing for chemical agents is split at the current time. The EPA has primary responsibility for testing for chemical agents and environmental samples, and the National Center for Environmental Health takes the lead if the material is a clinical specimen such as blood or urine.

The matrix in which the specimen occurs, e.g., blood or soil or water, may play some role in the extraction of the sample, but the identification of the chemical is unified by the need for sophisticated instrumentation that will identify the agent, whether from environmental or clinical samples. Currently there is no program in place to test environmental samples, and this is a major gap.

The NCEH has begun the process of placing testing in localities by providing funding to 5 pilot States and planning grants to 25 States that are planning to be engaged in biomonitoring in the future.

I advocate that the LRN concept be expanded to include chemical testing and nuclear testing. The food laboratories of the Nation have asked to join the LRN, as have many others. Let us make this testing universal so that in the event of an outbreak, chaos does not reign, because the type of test that is done dictates where the specimen must be delivered and the identity of the laboratory where the result is available.

Thank you very much for your interest in the laboratory component of our response to terrorism.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gilchrist follows:]

Testimony of Mary J. R. Gilchrist, Ph.D.
Director,
University of Iowa Hygienic Laboratory
Before the
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency,
Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations of the
Committee on Government Reform

August 22, 2002

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony regarding the federal role in support of local and state preparedness for bioterrorism, chemical terrorism and nuclear terrorism.

I direct the University Hygienic Laboratory at the University of Iowa. Our laboratory serves the state for bioterrorism detection as part of the Laboratory Response Network or LRN, which links the private clinical laboratories, the public health laboratories, and the CDC along with other federal agencies. In addition, I am the immediate Past President of the Association of Public Health Laboratories. I also serve on the National Center for Infectious Diseases' Council of Scientific Advisors at the Centers for Disease Control. This past year I was engaged with NTI, the Nuclear Threat Institute, to provide planning and advice on the federal response to bioterrorism. Recently, I was named to the 20 member Advisory Council on Public Health Preparedness, which will advise Secretary Thompson on issues regarding terrorism. We convene for our first meeting next week in Washington.

The University Hygienic Laboratory is a member of the LRN, the bioterrorism response network instituted by the CDC and the Association of Public Health Laboratories. The Laboratory Response Network was envisaged in 1998 and actively formed during the intervening years 1999 through 2001 when we met our first real challenge dealing with anthrax letters and many thousands of hoaxes and perceived threats. We were modestly funded during those years of preparation. Our laboratory was funded for $100,000 last year to meet the threat of bioterrorism. One industry alone told us that we had saved them "millions of dollars" because our testing kept their assembly lines running when questionable powders were detected on devices and parts. Because we served our local populace, we stretched ourselves far beyond capacity. We would not expect a remote laboratory serving many jurisdictions to have done as well. I recognize and honor the federal government for its wisdom in making bioterrorism response a local issue.

Across the country, the LRN tested thousands of specimens and allayed much fear and panic but it did not serve our populace fully. In Iowa those who were not well served must balance our success stories. Because we had limited resources, we employed an evaluation of whether a powder constituted a credible threat. Law enforcement in local communities evaluated each case and ruled out powders that did not meet the criteria. We understand that some powders that were not tested, while not a real health threat, caused panic and shut down of assembly

lines at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars. It is good to note that our funding has been increased by some 15 fold, to approximately $1.5 million dollars this year and we are hiring additional staff so that we can provide broader testing. We were lucky that our wake up call involved few truly ill and we managed to minimize fear and panic in the situation of perceived threat that swept our country.

The government was wise several years ago when it abandoned its concept of solely providing regional laboratory support and funded bioterrorism response laboratories in each state. Capacity for local response to bioterrorism is critical. When airlines shut down or refuse to carry specimens perceived to be risky, a laboratory must be available within driving distance of a few hours. Regional laboratories would likely not respect or honor the needs of the local jurisdiction. The specimen would be put in a queue based on time of arrival rather than criticality of an early result. The laboratory technicians might not be able to stretch their capacity to work long hours to meet the needs of various jurisdictions as they did for their local jurisdiction. No matter the means of transport, the turn around time would be increased. We suggest that regional laboratories might be employed for surge capacity when a local jurisdiction is affected and exceeds its capacity but there must be local capacity available at a base line level. We are concerned that we need smallpox testing in our states and that in the event of a smallpox threat every rash will be suspected to be a case of smallpox. Specimens sent out of state will mean increased turn around time and costs of health care to those who are ill or exposed. Moreover, fear will be prolonged beyond need. We must be able to do the testing locally and we need for that capacity to be delivered to us rapidly.

The bioterrorism response capacity in the state laboratories is tied to the emerging infectious disease capacity. When not busy responding to a bioterrorism outbreak, the laboratory resources are directed toward identifying newly emerging infectious agents such as West Nile Virus. Indeed, until an agent is identified and characterized, it is not possible to determine whether it has been disseminated naturally or by malfeasance. Thus, government adopted the concept of "dual use". Simply put, with dual use we get two birds with one shot and don't sit twiddling our thumbs between outbreaks of bioterrorism but seek other infectious agents and hone our skills on the universe of possible infectious agents. Laboratory personnel must be skilled in identifying all infectious agents so that they can identify a given agent. Thus, it is not possible to separate the two functions. An instrument that is purchased to detect bioterrorism agents can also detect West Nile Virus or anthrax that occurs in our soil and infects our population naturally. Once again, I recognize and salute the wisdom of the federal government in not restricting the recent funding to a narrow path directed solely at bioterrorism.

I have great concern about the need to bring local capacity to the states for the detection of chemical and nuclear threats. Firstly, when a powder is found, its identity as a biological, chemical or nuclear agent is not obvious until it has been tested. Even if labeled as anthrax, it might be a chemical agent or a mix of biological and chemical and even nuclear materials. The capacity for detection and identification of the three types of agent should be present in each lab for at least two reasons:

1. It may not be possible to split a small specimen and tandem testing in different facilities would require too much time
2. A mixed specimen would place at risk the safety of the laboratory people who could only identify one type of agent and could not safely handle the other types.

The responsibility for testing for chemical agents is split at the current time. The EPA has apparent primary responsibility for testing for chemical agents in environmental samples and the National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH) takes the lead if the specimen is in a clinical specimen such as blood or urine. The matrix in which the specimen occurs, blood or soil or water, may play some role in the extraction of the sample but the identification of the chemical is unified by the need for sophisticated instrumentation that will identify the agent whether from environmental or clinical samples. Currently there is no program in place to test environmental samples and this is a major gap in testing.

The NCEH has begun the process of placing testing in localities by providing funding to five pilot states and planning grants to 25 states that are planning to be engaged in biomonitoring in the future. We advocate that this funding be increased so that full capacity can be available in half or all of the environmental and public health laboratories in the nation. We would advocate that the LRN concept be expanded to include chemical testing and nuclear testing. The food laboratories of the nation have asked to join the LRN, as have many others. Let us make this testing universal so that in the event of an outbreak, chaos does not reign because the type of test that is done dictates where the specimen must be delivered and the identity of the laboratory where the result is available.

Much remains to be done to optimize the communications network among and between laboratories and their partners in emergency response. Because Iowa is not large and its agencies work well together, we were able to function during the fall of 2001 without sophisticated communications systems. The Olympics in

Salt Lake City and previous such events may supply a prototype communications system that could be employed to optimize communications among the multitude of agencies that will function in the event of another terrorism attack. The government should proceed to optimize a communications network that will function securely and is backed up with systems that will endure power outages as well as telephone and Internet system failures.

The complexity of response to terrorism with its many agencies at the federal, state and local level makes the response very complex. The homeland security offices that are evolving as we speak will encounter many challenges in coordinating the efforts in protecting our nation. We need to identify means to minimize conflicts and maximize outcome in preventing and responding to terrorism. Thank you very much for your interest in the laboratory component of our response to terrorism.

Mr. HORN. Thank you. We appreciate it.

Maybe some of you didn't hear, because you weren't here at the first panel, but we have a little problem here on the flights. Our 6:30 flight has been canceled to get us to Denver, where we've got a hearing tomorrow, and we must make the 5 o'clock flight; and we can leave it in good hands, but it's a little difficult; and so, whence I mentioned to the first panel, the minute I put your name on there, that's—a full statement is already in the record at that point, and we need to just simply summarize it. We can't read it, and we've got to talk from the heart. Much better anyhow.

So, Christopher Atchison, associate dean for public health practice, College of Public Health at the University of Iowa.

Mr. ATCHISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

If the goal of terrorism is to disrupt a society, there's little question that an assault on America's Heartland would have a significant effect not only on the region but on the Nation. As the former Director of the Centers for Disease Control, Dr. Jeff Koplan has said, "Either we are all protected or we are all at risk."

Today I suggest the need for clearer guidance from the national level and will identify some strategies that should be considered.

Today's discussion should not be limited to the efforts of the last 11 months. Indeed, Congress took a major step well before September 11th. The Public Health Improvement Act, House Resolution 2494, which I believe Congressman Ganske referred to, established the national policy of "reasonable capacities" for Public Health across the Nation.

Subsequently, the Centers for Disease Control, working through the Association of Schools of Public Health, established centers for Public Health preparedness. My school, the University of Iowa and its College of Public Health, is one of 15 of these centers, and we have been working diligently at our task for more than a year in bringing people together to meet this challenge.

For example, on April 8th of this year and in this very room, we hosted a conference on bioterrorism where both Senator Tom Harkin, who has repeatedly demonstrated his commitment to our Nation's Public Health system, and our own Congressman, Jim Leach, gave clear evidence of their desire to see our agenda succeed.

We've also established several mechanisms, such as a train-the-trainer model involving over 65 individuals from different professions around the State, in a concerted effort to bring them together to have a coordinated preparedness plan.

However, our experience is making clear other important objectives, and I want to bring these to the committee's attention.

First of all, we need to promote overall preparedness through an outcomes orientation. Funding for bioterrorism preparedness is currently being distributed through multiple national agencies and multiple programs within many of those agencies.

However, maximum coordination between all responders is essential for timely identification and response to a threat. This goal can best be accomplished if there's a clearly established national set of goals and objectives and competencies which will serve as a coordinating point for all preparedness-related grant and training programs.

Schools especially need more information on where the practice community wants our educational resources to be directed and the outcomes of those educational offerings.

Second, we need to assure a comprehensive research capacity. The Nation's response to last fall's anthrax assault demonstrates how front-line Public Health professionals face unknown challenges due to the mutation of biologic agents. Yet according to Dr. Gregory Gray, who is a partner in our Public Health Preparedness Center, and quoting him here, "With the increasing threats of bioterrorism so real, our negligence to conduct routine surveillance for non-influenza causes of influenza-like illnesses seems tragic."

We recommend that a national network of influenza-like illness surveillance be established. Such a system would provide earlier detection of naturally occurring emerging viruses and also provide warning in times of covert bioterrorism acts.

Third, we must assure the availability of and accountability for an appropriately trained Public Health work force. Establishing national standards would provide the strategic framework for coordinating this Public Health work force. However, it does not establish the assurance that those who would be in the work force are adequately prepared to carry out their responsibilities.

In their strategic plan for the Public Health work force, CDC has laid out a comprehensive agenda for preparedness. This document should be evaluated by Congress and serve either as the framework for progress or lead to one that will.

Second, CDC's strategic plan stresses the need for incentives, including credentialing or certification of the Public Health work force. If there are no standards and documentation of baseline capacity, there is little ability to assure the appropriate distribution of the Public Health work force development resources.

Congress should also take steps to ensure that funding going to the States for terrorism and Public Health preparedness is coordinated with and supports the extension of resources like the preparedness centers to every State.

Fourth, we should promote an atmosphere of continuous learning. Threats to the health and strategies to address those threats are continually evolving, and we must be committed to a strategy of continuous learning. However, it does not appear that this common-sense approach is always governing our preparedness efforts. Allow me to give an example summarized from a local Health official who submitted testimony to us in Iowa:

Our county was visited by the Office of Inspector General, which conducted a nationwide study for the Department of Health and Human Services about State and local Health Departments' ability to detect and respond to a bioterrorism event.

Our Department inquired about having access to the results of the survey we participated in and were told that they would not be made available. I feel this would have helped our Department in planning and development to share this information, truly an opportunity wasted.

This example provides a final perspective on the challenge we face. The emergence of biologic threats through terrorist activity should not change Public Health's responsibility for the health of the public. Public Health officials must be seen as essential part-

ners not only in the health system's response to terrorism but in the public safety response as well.

Thank you for this opportunity to contribute to this important endeavor.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Atchison follows:]

Testimony

Submitted To

The House Committee on Government Reform
Sub-Committee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations

Field Hearing, Iowa City, Iowa

August 22, 2002

Submitted By

Christopher G. Atchison
Associate Dean for Public Health Practice and
Director, the Iowa Center for Public Health Preparedness
The University of Iowa, College of Public Health

The Midwest is Vulnerable to Bio-Terrorism

If a goal of terrorism is to disrupt a society, there is little question that an assault on the Midwest, America's Heartland, would have a significant effect not only in the region but on the nation. Furthermore, the Midwest provides several conditions which provide opportunity for terrorism and are generally vulnerable to a concomitant concern about emerging infectious disease. For example, the region has a significant population that is elderly. Iowa ranks number two nationally in the percentage of its residents who are over 85 years of age.[1] This phenomenon is only expected to grow as the percentage of the population over 85 is expected to increase by 71.3 percent over the next twenty years.

At a broader level, assuring the health of older residents is an important challenge for Upper Midwestern policy makers and health systems. A disproportionate percentage of these older residents live in rural communities. For example, in Iowa, while the demographics of the state are changing, the majority of the state remains rural by definition. Using the average annual population from 1988-1996 there were 18 counties with less than 10,000 population, 47 counties with 10,000 to 20,000 residents, 24 counties with 20,000 to 50,000 residents and only 10 Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) counties.[2] Although 91 of Iowa's 99 counties have hospitals, the majority of these hospitals (93 of 117) reflects the rural nature of the state and have fewer than 100 beds. Delivering efficient and effective public health services in rural areas is always challenging and is further impacted by the lack of modern information technology to facilitate essential communications between public health nurses and clients and other health care providers.

In addition, with the threat of bioterrorism now so apparent, the Midwest's attention has focused on the possibility that our nation's food supply could be targeted for assault with tremendous effects on both our nation's economy and health. According to health professionals at our sister Regent's institution, Iowa State University:

> "Agriculture is considered by many to be the perfect target for bioterrorism, also called agroterrorism. Why? A hard look at the data will show us that the agriculture industry is unmatched in revenue and scope. Food and fiber account for approximately 13% of the GDP and 24 million Americans are employed in agriculture directly--that's 2% of the population. In 1997, the agriculture industry generated over $1 trillion worth of business, a large portion (roughly $140 billion) of which was derived from export markets. America has nearly 2 million farms where crops and animals are raised to provide the steady flow of high-quality, safe, and inexpensive foods to our tables and to those around the world. America has become the world's leader in food production. In 1997, corn generated nearly $20 billion in sales; soybeans $16 billion; cattle $40 billion; and poultry $22 billion. In Iowa alone there was over $3 billion in sales of corn; $2.7 billion in soybeans; and $3 billion in pigs in 1997. If any one of these commodities were to be significantly impacted by a bioterrorist event the results could be

[1] http://www.state.ia.us/elderaffairs/aging_pop.html
[2] http://www.soc.iastate.edu/census/Data/Counties/county%20hist%20pop%201860-2000.xls

> catastrophic…In Iowa alone there was over $3 billion in sales of corn; $2.7 billion in soybeans; and $3 billion in pigs in 1997. [3]

The range of targets for bioterrorism through the agricultural community is daunting, reaching from the farm to the market through to the consumer in a range of forms. Opportunities for the utilization of biological agents within these areas are similarly extensive including such activities as the use of crop dusting planes for the spread of material to the contamination of food service products in restaurants.

Within the broader context, the threat of terrorism only amplifies the public health concerns that have begun to galvanize attention in the Midwest. The emergence of new vector borne diseases such as West Nile Virus and concern over animal diseases such as Hoof and Mouth disease have already produced collaboration between animal and health laboratorians and other health professionals. In addition, the previously discussed aging of the population has brought attention to the fact that Midwesterners face threats from a range of chronic diseases that come from both environmental exposures and health behaviors including diet and exercise. The public health agenda is large.

All of these factors describe the public health challenge in the Upper Midwest and add to the traditional concerns about aging, chronic disease, and health effects from one of the most dangerous industries in the United States, agriculture, as well as access to the health services necessary to address this range of health issues made more complex by the changing racial and ethnic background of the region. In the Midwest, as across the nation, new cultural and belief paradigms are challenging the public health system to become more sophisticated in strategies to promote health.

An Effective Public Health Workforce is Essential to meet this Challenge

The events of September 11th 2001, as well as the subsequent use of the *Bacillus anthracis*, have heightened the national concern over the condition of the nation's public health system and workforce that had already been identified in the Public Health Improvement Act (HR 2494). This Act, also known as the Frist-Kennedy Act, was signed into law on November 11, 2000 and established as a national policy goal the assurance of "reasonable capacities" for public health with the expectation that these capacities should be in place across the nation. This legislation was built on a 20 year effort to develop public health standards, principles and core competencies among the nation's public health workforce

In addition, as the former Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Dr. Jeff Koplan, has stated: "Either we are all protected or we are all at risk. We must ensure that every health agency is fully prepared and that every community is served by an effective public health system."[4] At the heart of his strategy for preparedness was the assurance that all providers who have formal or informal public health responsibilities understand and become proficient in the core principles and essential services of public health, including the ability to quickly ascertain and appropriately respond to a case of bio-terrorism or the emergence of infectious disease.

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[3] http://www.vetmed.iastate.edu/faculty_staff/users/rdavis/publichealth/templates/bioterrorism.html
[4] Jeffrey Koplan, Director of CDC, September 21, 2001

Acting on Dr. Koplan's admonishment, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has undertaken a comprehensive effort to prepare state and local public health officials to respond to a bio-terrorist attack, including an important national asset, accredited Schools of Public Health (SPH). Working with these schools, it is CDC's goal to generate new knowledge about the threats from infectious disease and adopt new education and training protocols that are maximally relevant to public health workers. For this purpose, the CDC developed a national network of Centers for Public Health Preparedness. Three types of centers are in place: 1) *Local Exemplar Centers*, established in local health departments to develop models of integrated communications and information systems, advanced operational readiness assessments, and comprehensive and skills-based training programs; 2) *Specialty Centers*, established in colleges or universities to focus on a specific topic area or professional discipline (e.g., bioterrorism, public health law, informatics); and 3) *Academic Centers*, the largest group of centers established in schools of public health, link schools with state and local health agencies and other partners to train the front-line public health professionals who will respond to bio-terrorist incidents and other emerging infectious diseases, the critical component in protecting the nation's health. I have the privilege of directing the Academic Center at the University of Iowa, College of Public Health.

This network of academic centers for public health preparedness (A-CPHP) is a joint collaboration of the schools of public health, Association of Schools of Public Health (ASPH), CDC/U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The power of this network lies in its ability to function in a coordinated fashion across the country to achieve shared goals and by working together to create a strong lattice of public health preparedness. For example, at the Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University the A-CPHP is working with Kristine Gebbie and the Columbia School of Nursing to develop a set of emergency preparedness competencies for all public health workers. Through the national network of Centers these competencies have been reviewed and revised and will serve as a platform for the subsequent development of CDC guidelines and individual Center training program development.

Since the foundation of the A-CPHP was already operational prior to September 11, 2001, this network was able to assist the public health system in its response efforts by providing necessary and immediate information and training. For example, to prepare to meet the challenge of emerging infectious disease, which can serve as a platform for bioterrorism preparation, St. Louis University has established a CDC funded specialty preparedness center. This center has already constructed a significant body of work which is providing baseline educational resources for all of the other preparedness centers. Educators from this Center have come to Iowa a number of times to help spread information and "lessons learned" with guidance on how this information can be translated into plans and preparations for likely future threats that will affect the nation's health and which will require an immediate response from the public health infrastructure.

Key among these "lessons learned" is the importance of skilled training, drills, and practice in early detection, response, and disaster management. This training must account for the fact that response systems - to include public health officials, public safety officials, law enforcement agencies, and national security authorities who are not accustomed to coordinated efforts across professional lines - must quickly join forces. Each of these systems must be acutely ready and prepared. Reliable public health surveillance and communication activate the first alert and

response to a biological threat. Schools of Public Health are uniquely capable of providing the public health infrastructure with the expertise, training, and dissemination of information necessary for this sort of early, practiced, skilled, and comprehensive strategy of public health workforce preparedness.

Clearly, it is the responsibility and a crucial role for A-CPHPs to link academic expertise with the needs of public health workers in the field. The A-CPHPs bring to this task unique capability, including expertise in adult education, learning technologies, and systems change. The A-CPHPs will translate the expertise residing within the SPH into the language of timely, relevant, and effective training programs for public health workers. A-CPHP will also help to increase the capacity in accredited SPH to meet the professional education and training needs of the state and local public health agencies.

These concepts have been incorporated into the two documents. The first is an inventory of the assets of accredited SPH available from the ASPH. The second is the framework for the future relationships between the SPH and official public health agencies completed pursuant to a recent agreement between ASPH and CDC. It is essential that this kind of identification and coordination of academic resources be continued to ensure the development of the best in infectious disease and bioterrorism research is organized and provided to people that are at the frontlines of our nation's public health system.

The role of the University of Iowa, College of Public Health, Center for Public Health Preparedness

As previously discussed, the Midwest offers some unique challenges for national bioterrorism and infectious disease preparedness. This is most relevant in the area of animal to human disease transmission as well as the threats to the nation's health and economy that come from an assault on our nation's agricultural industry. Furthermore, this threat is compounded by a more vulnerable aging population in rural communities who would more than likely serve as the first victims of any rurally-based bioterrorism assault. Within this context, the A-CPHP are expected to bring unique expertise to the national network. We believe, the University of Iowa, College of Public Health is uniquely positioned and has in its mission a focus on strengthening the public health workforce in rural America. This clearly includes preparing the workforce for contemporary public health threats such as acts of bioterrorism. This workforce is widely dispersed and the challenge to identify and support this workforce is great.

Given that acts of bioterrorism begin locally, it is critical that local public health agencies and professionals are trained to identify and respond appropriately. Most recently, in conjunction with the establishment of the CDC funded Iowa Center for Public Health Preparedness (ICPHP) has established an agreement with the Iowa Association of Local Public Health Agencies (IALPHA) for the development of case-based training materials which will have immediate and practical relevance for our public health workforce.

In addition, state coordination for local public health activities is being promoted through a Memorandum of Understanding between the College of Public Health and the Iowa Department

of Public Health (IDPH). This agreement led to the establishment of a jointly funded training coordinator position employed by the College but housed at the IDPH.

The ICPHP has established with CDC the nature of its regional responsibility. It includes the following fundamental goals:

1. Develop a comprehensive public health preparedness system including a process to identify, assess, develop, and maintain a well prepared public health workforce in Iowa. In Appendix 1 are some preliminary estimates of the number of professionals involved in public health Iowa. In Appendix 2 is a survey of the self-identified need and skill levels of a number of these health professionals based on the Ten Essential Services of Public Health. This material will be shared with I-ALPHA and the state health department in developing our joint training plans.

2. Identify and engage in training front line workers involved in professional or voluntary activities who are essential to timely public health response and evaluate their individual and inter-disciplinary preparedness. To enable this activity the Education and Training Advisory Committee (EdTrAC) has been established. As demonstrated in Appendix 3, EdTrAC will function to identify and advise on the matching of content specific information to individual profession requirements.

3. Establish multi-dimensional and discipline relevant curricula and identify appropriate faculty to provide the public health workforce with basic competency in public health practice. A computer-based matrix has been established to enable the delivery of specific content, utilizing the educational concept of learning objects, to individuals and professions based on needs as identified in the workforce assessment or as self-identified by individuals or health professional organizations.

4. Carry out a program of education and training utilizing both on-site and distance learning techniques aimed at meeting the needs of both traditional and non-traditional students. This has included general information provided through a state conference on bioterrorism held April 8, the development of Grand Rounds on cutting-edge preparedness topics and challenges (see http://www.public-health.uiowa.edu/icphp/grand_rounds/gr_index.html), and a Train-the-Trainer program (see http://www.public-health.uiowa.edu/icphp/TTT/trainer.htm) that currently involves 65 individuals throughout the state who have committed to a 8 month preparedness training program. We anticipate many of these individuals will become associates of the ICPHP and will help us work with the health professions at a community level.

5. Periodically evaluate the preparedness of Iowa's public health work force as well as the quality and contribution of the training services to preparedness. This activity, which is essential to the long-term development of this effort, is based on individual program evaluation as well as an overall evaluation of the ICPHP.

6. Finally, collaborate with other state and national public health preparedness organizations to further develop or share effective models or best practices. Currently this is best shown by the earlier references to the Columbia and St. Louis University's project.

Issues the Federal Government Should Address

The CDC funded academic preparedness centers (A-CPHP) provide an essential link between the nationally funded research and front-line public health workers. We have attempted to describe the work already underway to carry-out this responsibility. At the Center level important work remains to be done to acquire new knowledge about the threats we face from emerging infectious disease and the risk of bioterrorism. In addition, because these threats do not respect geopolitical lines there must be a coordinated nationally strategy around workforce preparedness that will ensure a consistent understanding and workforce performance to anticipate, identify, and respond to any biologically based threat. As federal programming is currently established, there are several challenges to this vision.

Diffused funding without coordinated national objectives
Funding for bioterrorism preparedness is currently being distributed through multiple national agencies and multiple programs within many of those agencies. While this strategy has the laudable goal of ensuring the targeted development of specific activities, the reality of potential threats is that maximum coordination between all responders is essential is an effective response is to be delivered. This goal can best be accomplished if there is a clearly established national set of goals and objectives which will serve as a coordinating point for all preparedness-related grant programs. Congress should act to either affirm or replace such existing and baseline coordinative tools such as the Ten Essential Services and Public Health Competencies as well as endorse or promote the development of next generation public health workforce strategies such as already been proposed by the CDC.

Assuring a comprehensive research agenda
The challenge of bioterrorism and the overarching challenge of emerging infectious diseases, such as West Nile Virus, require that the best of science be developed and translated into practice formats so that the responsibilities of every health professional are carried out and the needs of the people they serve are best met. The University role as a laboratory for scientific research and as the institution responsible for training health professionals has a greatly heightened responsibility in this new era of threats. The nation's response to last fall's anthrax assault demonstrates how frontline public health professionals face unknown challenges due to the mutation of biologic agents. This requires that all areas of biologic research be evaluated and gaps addressed.

Assuring the availability of an appropriately trained workforce
Establishing national standards will provide the strategic framework for coordinating the public heath workforce. However, it does not establish the assurance that the workforce is adequately prepared to carry out these responsibilities. As the Institute of Medicine has repeatedly asserted, much work remains to be done to develop an appropriately trained public health workforce. The threat of bioterrorism and emerging infectious disease only amplifies this well recognized need.

According to the CDC's strategic plan there are six elements to workforce development. The first of these elements is to identify who the workforce is and where they work. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) has begun the effort to quantify this workforce.

Their efforts through the HRSA funded training centers must continue or we will lose track of who the market is for all the training and preparation that are being developed.

Secondly, CDC's strategic plan stresses the need for incentives including credentialing or certification of the public health workforce. Discussions between public health practice organizations such as ASTHO and NACCHO and national organizations such as the CDC and ASPH to develop the criterion by which the sufficiency of workforce preparedness can be demonstrated must also be continued and completed. This may lead to credentialing or certifying that individuals or organizations have met reasonable standards and therefore are expected to provide appropriate levels of preparedness service to their states and communities. Among these incentives should be guidance that federal funding for preparedness efforts meet the objectives of this nationally based and endorsed workforce development strategy.

Finally, the discussion presumes a commitment to continuous quality improvement. This business concept presumes that when deficiencies are identified, the knowledge of those deficiencies is shared with those who can make a difference. Allow me to cite the following example of where this commitment to continuous quality improvement is lacking. We have paraphrased the following correspondence from a local health official in Iowa.

> "As you may know our county was visited by the Office of Inspector General which conducted a nationwide study for the Department of Health & Human Services about State and Local Health Departments' ability to detect and respond to a bioterrorism event. This study was requested by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Our department inquired about having access to the results of the survey we participated in and were told they would not be made available. I feel this would have helped our department in planning and development to share this information. Also, we felt it was important that the residents of our county know we were participating in such a study and how we were coordinating with the Federal Government to address this issue. News media including television wanted information, pictures etc. Our local newspaper editor wanted a picture with all of the team players involved with the study this included EMS, Public Health, Medical Examiner etc. For a small community like ours we couldn't have asked for better publicity and public awareness about this issue. I was surprised when I heard the surveyors could not pose for such pictures or even answer questions. It was like they were on an overt combat mission of secrecy. They referred our local editor to a phone number which he states, "Was a waste of time and energy." They refused to answer questions too. I feel instead of putting up barriers, this could have been a positive opportunity to inform people of what the Federal Government is doing. After all, it's not often when the Feds come to town. Truly an opportunity wasted. As it was they came, we participated and nobody knows."

This example provides a final perspective to this testimony to the challenge we face. Bioterrorism represents a new challenge for system integration between public safety and public health. When it comes to infectious disease, public health has a long history of legal responsibility to address this threat. The emergence of biological threats through terrorist activity should not change public health's responsibility for the health of the public. Public health officials must be seen as essential partners not only in the health system's response to

terrorism but the public safety response as well. This example, which suggests that public health officials cannot address issues of national security, flies in the face of a long history of public health officials' protecting confidential information. National policy should address the need to bring these two essential elements of our nation's security system together.

Thank for this opportunity to contribute to this vital national endeavor.

Appendix One – Estimate of Professionals anticipated to participate in a BT event

Active Patient Care Physicians	4,400
Licensed registered Nurses	32,300
Pharmacists	1,990
Environmental Health	155
PH Administrators	225
Veterinarians	12
Laboratories	90
Public Information/Extension	5
Epidemiologists	10
Emergency Responders	10
Emergency Mgmt Coordinators	100
Health Services Administrators	175

Source: Iowa Board of Nursing, Iowa Medical Services, Iowa Health Association, University of Iowa Hygienic Lab, Iowa Department of Public Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, Bureau of Health Profession, National Center for Health Workforce Information and Analysis.

(Appendix 2)

Bioterrorism/Terrorism
Public Health Preparedness Questionnaire

We would like to know how important each of these activities is to your job, and the level of need you have for more training to do this activity. Please circle the number indicating the level of importance and need.

Activity	How important is this skill to your job? 1 = Not Important 4= Very Important				Rate your level of need for training in this area. 1 = Low Need 4 = High Need			
A Monitor health threats in the community								
1. Acquiring and analyzing data to determine if there are significant health threats in your community.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
2. Communicating information on health threats to providers and agencies in your community.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
B Diagnose and investigate health threats in the community								
3. Being aware of research and other literature to help you understand the nature of potential health threats in your community.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
4. Acquiring additional information to better understand the potential health threats in your community.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
C Inform, educate, and empower people about health threats								
5. Taking scientifically based information on health threats and finding ways to make it relevant to providers and agencies in your community.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
6. Developing educational programs for providers and agencies in your community that cover material on potential health threats.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
D Mobilize community partnerships to address health threats								
7. Using community development models (e.g., APEXPH, MAPP) to maximize your community's assets.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
8. Organizing providers and agencies in your community to carry out programs related to health threats.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
E Develop polices and plans that enable an appropriate response to health threats								
9. Knowing existing policies and protocols that are related to potential health threats.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
10. Implementing effective emergency response services.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4

Activity	How important is this skill to your job? 1 = Not Important 4 = Very Important				Rate your level of need for training in this area. 1 = Low Need 4 = High Need			
F Enforce laws and regulations that protect health and ensure safety								
11. Knowing public health laws and regulations.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
12. Working with other state agencies/organizations (e.g., law enforcement, IDPH, DNR, DIA) to enforce regulations that protect health and ensure safety.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
G Link people to needed emergency health services								
13. Knowing the resources that are available in your community to respond to a health threat.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
14. Adapting emergency service programs to take into account differences in the population (e.g., need for translators, transportation).	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
H Assure a prepared public health workforce								
15. Identifying the emergency response workforce in your community.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
16. Making sure that the emergency responders in your community have the knowledge and skills to respond to a health threat.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
I Evaluate the emergency response network								
17. Conducting surveys and studies to measure the timeliness, appropriateness, and effectiveness of the emergency response network in your community.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
18. Analyzing results to determine the timeliness, appropriateness, and effectiveness of the emergency response network in your community.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
J Research new strategies for emergency response								
19. Educating decision-makers at a local, state or national level on new policy and response options regarding health threats.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
20. Creating new partnerships between public and private organizations to deliver emergency health services.	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4

How likely are you to participate in one of the following?	Not at all Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Unsure
21. A Certificate in Public Health Preparedness (a 1-year program with on-site and distance learning components)	1	2	3	U
22. Courses that can be applied toward an undergraduate degree	1	2	3	U

How likely are you to participate in one of the following?	Not at all Likely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Unsure
23. Courses that can be applied toward a graduate degree Specify type of degree_____ Specify field_____	1	2	3	U
24. Continuing education courses that provide professional CE credits but do not lead to a degree or certificate	1	2	3	U

How much are the following factors likely to be barriers to your participating and completing a public health preparedness training program?	1 = Not At All a Barrier 4 = Very Much a Barrier			
25. Family or personal commitments	1	2	3	4
26. Taking a course away from the worksite	1	2	3	4
27. Having to take vacation time to attend course	1	2	3	4
28. Relevance of course offerings to my daily job	1	2	3	4
29. Please list other barriers to your participation in a public health preparedness training program.				

How preferable are the following for receiving training programs?	1 = Not Preferable 4 = Highly Preferable			
Internet (web-based)	1	2	3	4
31. Iowa Communications Network (ICN)	1	2	3	4
32. CD Rom	1	2	3	4
33. Evening course	1	2	3	4
34. Weekend course	1	2	3	4
35. 2 day course during work week	1	2	3	4
36. Videotapes	1	2	3	4
Please specify other ways you would like to receive training:				

Do you have access to the following computer technology that you could use to complete a training program?	AT WORK?	AT HOME?
37. A computer	1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Not sure	1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Not sure
38. A telephone line modem	1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Not sure	1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Not sure
39. DSL or cable modem connection	1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Not sure	1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Not sure
40. An internet service provider account (for example AOL, MSN, Earthlink)	1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Not sure	1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Not sure
Software to browse internet such as Netscape or Internet Explorer	1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Not sure	1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Not sure
42. Software such as Word, Powerpoint	1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Not sure	1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Not sure

Demographic Information

43. **Are you?**

1. ☐ Male 2. ☐ Female

44. **Which of the following categories includes your current age?**

1. ☐ 24 years or below
2. ☐ 25-34 years
3. ☐ 35-44 years
4. ☐ 45-54 years
5. ☐ 55 years or above

45. **Which category best describes your primary worksite?**

1. ☐ Local health department
2. ☐ Hospital
3. ☐ Private clinic
4. ☐ Community health center
5. ☐ Public health nursing agency
6. ☐ State health department
7. ☐ Academic institution
8. ☐ Environmental health department
9. ☐ Other, please specify _____

46. **Which best describes your current position?**

1. ☐ Administrator
2. ☐ Emergency/first responder
3. ☐ Environmental health specialist
4. ☐ Laboratory personnel
5. ☐ Nurse
6. ☐ Physician
7. ☐ Veterinarian
8. ☐ Pharmacist
9. ☐ Other, specify_____

47. **Including this year, how many years have you been:**

1. Working in your current job position? _____ Years
2. Working for your current agency? _____ Years
3. Working in public health? _____ Years
4. Working in health care/emergency services? _____ Years

48. **Which best describes your highest educational level?**

1. ☐ High school diploma or equivalency
2. ☐ Associate/Technical Degree (e.g., AA)
3. ☐ Bachelor's Degree (e.g., BSN, BS, BA)
4. ☐ Master's Degree (e.g., MA, MS, MPH, MHS, MBA)
5. ☐ Doctoral Degree (e.g., MD, DVM, PhD, EdD, JD)

49. In which county do you work? _____

50. Would you be interested in participating in the Iowa Center for Public Health Preparedness Training Program?
1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Maybe

51. Name and Address (Optional) _____

Thank you for your assistance! Please return survey in enclosed business-reply envelope.

Mr. HORN. Thank you. That's very helpful.

Dr. Misra, can we get a good summary? We've got your paper, and we need to move a little, so—it isn't our problem, but you know airlines——

Dr. MISRA. OK, I'll—yes.

Mr. HORN [continuing]. And small parts of the Nation, they just decide to quit, so——

Dr. MISRA. And you need to be there early.

Mr. HORN. Yes.

Dr. MISRA. Yes, I will then summarize from my heart.

Mr. Ganske spoke about monitoring the air, water and soil for human pathogens. Mr. Leach spoke about splitting the atom and technology that has revolutionized agriculture. I'm also here to tell you that those are wonderful and good things.

We also need to pay attention to the plant pathogens and pests that can be a target of agroterrorists. That's the summary, the gist of my talk, and what we need to do is to work on four areas:

One is the rapid detection technology. The other is the information technology. The third is the genetic technology that Mr. Leach talked about. The fourth is seed science and technology. Being the Director of Seed Science, I must speak a little bit on seeds.

Let me begin with that, seeds. United States is the largest producer and consumer of seeds in the world. And because of that position we have, seed can be a target of agroterrorists. The important thing about this is, we are not speaking of loss of human life here but loss of public confidence in our export and economic decapitation that can come due to the export of everything being shut down.

The USDA very recently funded a plant laboratory diagnostic network, which is a wonderful thing and a slow beginning step toward this, but we need a seed laboratory network. There are approximately 150 seed laboratories in the country, and they are not networked.

A lot of these plant disease pathogens and pests can have the very symptoms of those can be observed in the seed- testing operations. The USDA very recently designated Iowa State University to manage a national seed health system, so we have infrastructure, we have the capacity, and we have the interest to develop a seed security program.

There is quite a bit of new technology, such as nanotechnology, spectroscopy, and micro-electro-mechanical technology, which can be used for sensing the air, water and soil that Mr. Ganske spoke about. Also for plant pathogens and pests.

Further, what we need to do is to integrate these technologies with information technology so that whatever we find is transmitted in real time to the Federal officials and officials who can take action.

The other thing that is quite important is that this information must be very truthful and valid information. Otherwise, it can also create a problem in creating fear in our consumers.

So, combining the information technology with the sensing, detection technology in the real time is something that needs to be done.

Regarding genetic technology, what we need to do is to develop fingerprinting for these plant pathogens and pests that are exotic that we do not want to be introduced here in a deliberate, mischievous manner. The one example that comes to mind is soybean rust. Soybean rust has created havoc in Africa and has been detected in Brazil, and there is quite a bit of concern that it can appear in our agriculture.

So, how do we develop some of this technology for detecting such kind of microorganisms and microtoxins that can create problems for our food safety and security? Each year, Iowa is near the top of the Nation in production of corn and soybeans. Iowa State University has a strong tradition of serving and protecting U.S. Agriculture.

Our unique strength is that we have extensive collaboration with USDA laboratories which are the germ plasm resources and also quite a bit of genetic research that is going on on campus.

So these collaborations form a crucial partnership for bringing resources to protect our plant agriculture.

You will notice that I did not speak too much on animal agriculture. That is deliberate. Our concept paper that we submitted to the Iowa delegation integrated animal agriculture and plant agriculture issues, but, very fortunately, we have received quite a bit of attention and funding and resources for animal agriculture.

Mr. HORN. Well, if you send that to us, we'll be glad to put it in the record at this point.

Dr. MISRA. I'll be glad to do that.

So my request is that we need significant attention to the plant agriculture.

Thank you.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Misra follows:]

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A National Security Program for U.S. Plant Agriculture

The US is not adequately prepared for a terrorist attack against plant agriculture, making the nation's food supply vulnerable. Significant activities are being undertaken to protect our animal agriculture and it should be so. At the same time, investments need to be made for protecting our plant agriculture, which provides the foundation of our food system and bioeconomy. The specific areas that need attention are: a) Rapid detection technology b) Information technology and network c) genetic technology and d) Seed technology.

Simple, rapid, on-site biosensors need to be developed that supply vital information on the safety and origin of food, from seed to consumption. Data from multiple sensors need to be combined with precision agriculture and information technologies to ensure the identity, traceability and safety of foods in the entire supply chain as a forceful counter strategy to agroterrorism (Figure 1).

The recent funding of a plant diagnostic network by the USDA is a solid first step in combating terrorism against plants. In addition, a systematic monitoring program for crop pathogens and pests that poses the greatest threats for US plant agriculture need to be developed. The geographic origin of a deliberately introduced pest or pathogen need to be determined to pinpoint where the threat may have come from, and what potential host range and biological impact might be expected. Methods for fingerprinting to identify individual strains of pathogens need to be developed. Any changes in the fingerprint will alert researchers to potential agroterrorism activity.

Because the United States is the world's largest seed producer and consumer, our seed supply can be a target by agroterrorists. This could impair domestic food production and shut down our export markets. A Seed Laboratory Network similar to the plant diagnostic network needs to be developed. Conventional and molecular methods need to be used to verify that seeds ready for commercialization do not contain harmful microorganisms. ISU has been designated by the USDA-APHIS to administer the new National Seed Health System (NSHS), has the world's largest public seed testing laboratory and can provide leadership in development of a seed security program.

Emerging technologies, including nanotechnology, spectroscopy, and MEMS (micro-elctro-mechanical systems) need to be used for rapid detection of food-borne hazards. Biochip-based nanosensor technology can provide instant, on-site monitoring of specific hazardous chemicals in foods. Smart packaging technology need to be investigated to alert the consumers of the hazard with a simple color change on the surface of the package, which also will be applicable to armed forces in the battlefield.

Each year Iowa is at or near the top of the nation in production of corn, soybeans, pork and eggs, and in exports of agricultural products. Iowa State University has a strong tradition of serving and protecting U.S. agriculture. A unique strength of ISU is its extensive collaborations with USDA laboratories in Ames and the State department of Agriculture. These collaborations form a crucial partnership for bringing resources to bear on protection of plant agriculture from agroterrorism activities. In the plant sciences, ISU College of Agriculture and the Plant Science Institute have extensive infrastructure and capacity in the areas of genetics, biology and ecology of pathogens and pests, biosensing of hazardous materials in the food supply chain and protecting the nation's seed supply.

Agroterrorism: A National Security Program for U.S. Agriculture and the Food Supply

The US is not adequately prepared for a terrorist attack against agriculture, making the nation's food supply vulnerable. This vulnerability has been acknowledged by the USDA, the Department of Defense, commodity groups and associations, and by the US Senate.[a] With one in eight jobs and 13 percent of the gross national product dependent on US agricultural productivity, the health and the economic stability of our country depends upon a bountiful and safe food supply system.

Iowa State University proposes that the US establish a National Security Program for US Agriculture and the Food Supply (NSP-USAFS) to protect the US food supply and agriculture from biological attacks. The NSP-USAFS will have three areas of emphasis: 1) combating agroterrorism against animals, 2) Combating agroterrorism against plants, and 3) Training to enhance preparedness for agroterrorism.

The proposed first step in establishment of the NSP-USAFS is the organization of a symposium to bring together prominent experts in animal and plant sciences with those from backgrounds in prevention and mitigation of bioterrorism. University personnel will join with selected members from the USDA Plant and Animal Health Safeguarding Review Boards, experts from the Department of Defense, the Centers for Disease Control, the National Institutes of Health, the Department of Justice and experts from other governments who are favorite terrorist targets (Israel for example). This group will identify potential threats and develop an action plan. From this group, an advisory committee will be selected for the NSP-USAFS.

National Security Program to Combat Agroterrorism Against Animals

Unique genetic sequences of pathogens will be identified to enable rapid detection of exotic pathogens and produce the information needed to "fingerprint" pathogens to help identify their source. Rapid diagnostic assays for detecting potential bioterrorism agents utilizing microelectronic and computerized technology will be developed.

Vaccines for emerging pathogens and safer and more effective vaccines for diseases with bioterrorism potential need to be developed. Vaccine development would take advantage of the rapid advances in molecular biology, biotechnology, and vaccinology that have occurred in recent years. There has been very little concerted effort to apply advances in biotechnology to the development of vaccines against exotic diseases because they are not currently a problem for US livestock.

Technologies to track animals (identity preservation) from birth to the grocery store need to be developed to track outbreaks and provide consumer assurance of food safety. Adequate biosecurity measures are essential to prevent the spread of exotic animal diseases. Biosecurity levels of state diagnostic laboratories who are likely to encounter exotic disease agents need to be assessed and security needs to be enhanced.

The NSP-USAFS will work in collaboration with international agencies for animal health to build strong partnerships to enhance protection of US agriculture. ISU is already designed, with the USDA Animal and Health Inspection Service (APHIS) as an OIE Collaborating Center for the Diagnosis of Animal Disease and Vaccine Evaluation in the Americas. The OIE (Office International des Epizootics) is the world organization for animal health. As a collaborating center, the Ames institutions conduct diagnostic testing for foreign countries, supply reagents to foreign countries, collaborate on international research projects, and provide training for international officials.

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[a] References: USDA APHIS web site – http://www.aphis.usda.gov; DOD *Proliferation: Threat and Response* – http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf released January 2001; USAHA website – http://www.usaha.org; and April 20, 2001 letter to President Bush, signed by 22 Senators.

NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM TO COMBAT AGROTERRORISM AGAINST PLANTS

A systematic monitoring program for crop pathogens and pests that pose the greatest threats for US agriculture will be developed. The geographic origin of an introduced pest or pathogen will be determined to pinpoint where the threat may have come from, and what potential host range and biological impact might be expected. Methods for fingerprinting to identify individual strains of pathogens will be developed. Any changes in the fingerprint will alert researchers to potential agroterrorism activity.

Emerging technologies, including nanotechnology, spectroscopy, and MEMS (micro-electro-mechanical systems) will be used for rapid detection of food-borne hazards. Biochip-based nanosensor technology will provide instant, on-site monitoring of specific hazardous chemicals in foods. Smart packaging technology will be investigated to alert the consumers of the hazard with a simple color change on the surface of the package, which also will be applicable to armed forces in the battlefield.

Because the United States is the world's largest seed producer and consumer, our seed supply can be a target by agroterrorists. This could impair domestic food production and shut down our export markets. Conventional and molecular methods will be used to verify that seeds ready for commercialization do not contain harmful microorganisms. ISU has been designated by the USDA-APHIS to administer the new National Seed Health System (NSHS) and has the world's largest public seed testing laboratory.

Simple, rapid, on-site biosensors will be developed that supply vital information on the safety and origin of food, from seed to consumption. Data from multiple sensors (spectroscopic and electronic nose data for example) will be combined with precision agriculture and information technologies to ensure the identity, traceability and safety of foods in the entire supply chain as a forceful counter strategy to agroterrorism.

EDUCATION TO COMBAT AGROTERRORISM

The public, plant and animal producers and processors, veterinarians, plant and veterinary diagnostic laboratories, the scientific community, and government officials in the US and other countries will be trained in recognizing, preventing and responding to agroterrorism. The ISU Colleges of Veterinary Medicine and Agriculture are leaders with recognized excellence in extension and outreach programs.

WHY ISU SHOULD BE THE LEAD INSTITUTION OF THE NSP-USAFS

Iowa State University has a strong tradition of serving and protecting U.S. agriculture. Each year Iowa is at or near the top of the nation in production of corn, soybeans, pork and eggs, and in exports of agricultural products. A unique strength of ISU is its extensive collaborations with USDA laboratories in Ames (see Appendix D). These collaborations form a crucial partnership for bringing resources to bear on protection of agriculture from agroterrorism activities. ISU will partner with collaborators from the USDA, Department of Defense, the Centers for Disease Control, the National Institutes of Health, the Department of Justice and other agencies. ISU will also partner with scientists at other universities to ensure that the nations top intellectual talent participates in the NSP-USAFS. ISU has unique strengths and capabilities in the areas of diagnostics, vaccines and training for agroterrorism related to animals. In the plant sciences, ISU has extensive infrastructure and capacity to apply in the areas of genetics, biology and ecology of pathogens and pests, biosensing of hazardous materials in the food supply chain and protecting the nation's seed supply.

CONCLUSION

ISU is the oldest land grant university and is technologically poised to serve and protect U.S. agriculture. An appropriation of $10 million per year to ISU targeted to the areas outlined above in the NSP-USAFS program would leverage the extensive state and federal investments in ISU to focus its efforts on the urgent need of protecting U.S. agriculture from the threat of bioterrorism.

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Mr. HORN. Now, we have Richard Hainje, Director of FEMA in the Region VII. He and I have been following each other into how many States now? Because you've got quite a big jurisdiction.

Mr. HAINJE. We're up to three so far.

Mr. HORN. Yeah.

Mr. HAINJE. In a former life, I was chairman of a Senate tax committee in the State legislature, so when the chairman tells me to hurry up, here we go.

Thank you, Chairman Horn, Representative Ganske and Representative Leach, for the opportunity to testify today.

I'm pleased to be with you to discuss the challenges facing emergency managers and first responders in their efforts to better be prepared to respond to acts of terrorism.

FEMA provides the management expertise and financial resources to help State and local governments when they are overwhelmed by disasters. The Federal Response Plan forms the heart of our management framework and lays out the process by which interagency groups work together to respond as a cohesive team to all types of disasters.

The Federal Response Plan's success is built by using the existing professional disciplines, delivery systems and relationships among the participating agencies of the plan.

The national strategy for homeland security proposed by President Bush builds on the experience of the Federal Response Plan to develop one all-discipline, all-hazard plan to cover events of national significance and clarify the roles and responsibility of different levels of government.

FEMA takes an active role in preparing to respond to a terrorism event. Prior to September 11th, the President tasked the FEMA Director with creating the Office of National Preparedness. The mission of the Office of National Preparedness is to provide leadership in coordinating and facilitating all Federal efforts to assist State and local first responders in emergency management organizations with planning, training, equipment and exercises.

To further these efforts, the President has requested $3.5 billion in the 2003 budget to support first responders. In the recently passed 2002 Spring Supplemental, Congress provided FEMA with $100 million for State and local governments to update and enhance existing emergency operation plans.

The funds for the planning initiative will be allocated to the States and other State-level entities on the basis of population. These comprehensive plans will form the foundation for the work to be done in 2003 to prepare first responders for terrorist attacks.

The unique challenges that a biological or chemical scenario would present to the first responder community point out the need for effective planning. With the covert release of a biological agent, the first responders could be physicians or animal control workers instead of the traditional first responders.

Across the Government, we are working to enhance our ability to detect biological attacks, better link the Public Health and emergency response communities and training equipment traditional to first responders to respond to bioterrorism.

The President's proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security would strengthen the linkages that are critical to our capac-

ity to respond to terrorism. Furthermore, the structure of this newly proposed department recognizes that FEMA's mission and core competencies are essential components of homeland security.

Terrorism presents tremendous challenges, and in recent years, we've made great strides in our efforts to increase cooperation between various response communities.

I have a few more comments, but I would like to just summarize and thank you for the opportunity to be here in Iowa, where I have seen many great examples of cooperation, State, local and Federal.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hainje follows:]

STATEMENT OF

RICHARD HAINJE

REGIONAL DIRECTOR

REGION VII

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FIELD HEARING

IOWA CITY, IOWA

AUGUST 22, 2002

Introduction

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am Dick Hainje, Regional Director, Region VII of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). I am pleased to be with you here today to discuss the challenges facing emergency managers and first responders to be better prepared to respond to acts of terrorism. Having served as a member of the South Dakota state legislature and 24 years as a first responder with the Sioux Falls Fire Rescue Department prior to my appointment with FEMA, I can offer you firsthand experience and a unique perspective of the monumental tasks ahead of us in the emergency management community.

FEMA's Coordination Role

FEMA is the federal agency responsible for leading the nation in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters. Our success depends on our ability to organize and lead a community of local, state, and federal agencies and volunteer organizations. We know whom to bring to the table when a disaster strikes in order to ensure the most effective management of the response. We provide management expertise and financial resources to help state and local governments when they are overwhelmed by disasters.

The Federal Response Plan (FRP) forms the heart of our management framework and lays out the process by which interagency groups work together to respond as a cohesive team to all types of disasters. This team is made up of 26 federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross. It is organized into interagency functions based on the authorities and expertise of the members and the needs of our counterparts at the state and local level.

Since 1992, and again in response to the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the FRP has proven to be an effective and efficient framework for managing all phases of disasters and emergencies. The FRP is successful because it builds upon existing professional disciplines, expertise, delivery systems, and relationships among the participating agencies. FEMA has strong ties to the emergency management and fire service communities and we routinely plan, train, exercise, and operate together to remain prepared to respond to all types of disasters. The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* proposes to build on the experience of the FRP to develop one all-discipline, all-hazard plan to cover all events of national significance and clarify the roles and responsibilities of different levels of government.

State and Local Relationship

Much of our success in emergency management can be attributed to our historically strong working relationship with our state and local partners. Through our preparedness programs we provide the financial, technical, planning, training, and exercise support to give state, local, and Tribal governments the capabilities they need to protect public health, safety, and property both before and after disaster strikes. Our programs foster the partnerships that are so critical to creating a strong comprehensive national emergency preparedness system.

Region VII includes the states of Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska representing a population of approximately 13 million people, with the majority residing in urban areas. We have significant disaster activity within the region having administered 25 Presidential Disaster Declarations within the last five years, with many events impacting multiple states. While we are vulnerable to a broad range of natural and technological hazards, our greatest threats are a result of severe weather and the potential for terrorist attack. Specifically, our severe weather

events are primarily tornadoes and floods. The Mississippi River runs the length of the eastern border of the region, along Iowa and Missouri. The Missouri River is the boundary between Nebraska and Iowa. Because of these large waterways and their numerous significant tributaries and associated drainage basins, riverine flooding is the major emergency event Region VII has to anticipate. The four-state region is also situated in the heart of what is called "Tornado Alley." Severe spring and summer storms frequently spawn killer twisters. The most recent example of the devastation caused by tornadoes occurred in Bollinger County, Missouri in April 2002. In addition, severe thunderstorms cause frequent flash flooding throughout the Midwest.

In 2000, two of our states ranked in the top ten of states with the highest damages from flooding. Iowa ranked 4th in the nation with an estimated cost of $313M and Missouri ranked 6th with $272M. Our remaining states, Kansas and Nebraska, ranked in the top thirty. All four states ranked nationally in the top twenty for damages resulting from tornadoes in the same period. Missouri was the 4th highest in the nation and Kansas was 10th.

A key component of Region VII's readiness to respond to any disaster event is our relationship with our state and federal partners. Quarterly we assemble a Regional Interagency Steering Committee, which is comprised of all twelve of the Emergency Support Functions identified in the Federal Response Plan, and all of the state emergency management agencies. This forum discusses disaster specific issues, provides training on policy changes that might affect disaster operations, and conducts tabletop exercises to practice response operations and to identify new issues. This quarterly assembly, along with quarterly meetings held to discuss program issues, facilitates interagency communication, fosters a constructive working relationship, and benefits the citizens who deserve a responsive emergency management agency.

There are five nuclear power plants located in Region VII. The region also includes a portion of the emergency planning zone and the ingestion pathway zone for two power plants located in an adjoining region. To enhance the federal, state, Tribal and local government's emergency preparedness for radiological incidents, the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program was begun in 1979. The REP program ensures that adequate off-site emergency plans are in place and that these plans can be implemented by the local jurisdictions to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of commercial nuclear power plants. The plans are reviewed and evaluated annually and evaluated exercises are conducted to ensure that the plans can be implemented. The program submits findings and determinations on the adequacy of the off-site emergency preparedness to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In addition, REP conducts hospital and ambulance drills, reception center drills, emergency worker monitoring and decontamination drills, school drills, and radiological laboratory evaluations.

Region VII is home to nine federally recognized Tribal Nations. We have conducted workshops with the Tribes focused on all-hazards planning and hazardous materials, and are in the beginning stages of planning a Community Emergency Response Team training session. Recently, the region signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Tribes that will facilitate the sharing of information and resources. We are also working with the Tribes to establish Tribal Emergency Response Commissions.

The management and control of hazardous materials is a major issue in Region VII. The region has nearly 20 percent of the facilities in the nation that use certain flammable and toxic

substances and are required to file Risk Management Plans. The region is also home to the top three railroad terminals in the nation and consequently is a leader in the transportation of hazardous materials.

Region VII takes an active role in preparing to respond to a terrorism event. FEMA's responsibility is to coordinate federal, regional, and state terrorism-related planning, training, and exercise activities. This includes supporting the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program in which seven Region VII communities, including Des Moines, Iowa, participate. We are also working with states to build response capability and keep them informed of federal initiatives as well as participating in state sponsored conferences, training, exercises, task forces, and workshops. We are hosting planning meetings on a regular basis and conducting tabletop exercises with key stakeholders at the state and federal level.

Terrorism consequence management is just one component of our overall emergency management effort. For example, after September 11, Governor Ridge and Director Allbaugh agreed that there was a need to quickly assess state capabilities to effectively respond to acts of terrorism. FEMA assembled an interagency team with members from Department of Defense, Department of Education, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Justice, and the Environmental Protection Agency to visit the states and territories to assess their readiness against 18 criteria and to identify priorities and shortfalls. We examined several categories such as critical infrastructure, personnel, plans, equipment, and supplies communications and related capabilities. The results were provided in a classified report to Governor Ridge right before Thanksgiving.

All of the states in Region VII have implemented proactive and aggressive actions in response to the terrorism threats that have emerged since September 11. Many states have committed substantial amounts of staff and their own financial resources towards preparing for weapons of mass destruction events. All states have designated homeland security directors. Groundwork has been laid or accelerated to develop interstate and intrastate mutual aid agreements. Specialized response teams are being formed, training is being conducted, and equipment is being purchased.

State government has spent millions of dollars directly responding to homeland security needs and the anthrax crisis. While much has been done, we have only begun to scratch the surface of what needs to be done. We have identified many shortfalls in our nation's ability to respond to weapons of mass destruction events. These shortfalls must be addressed. Homeland security initiatives must be sustainable and will require an ongoing commitment of federal, state, and local resources.

Nearly a year ago, several thousand people lost their lives in the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and when United Airlines Flight 93 crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania. Four hundred and fifty of them were first responders who rushed to the World Trade Center in New York City--firefighters, police officers, and port authority officers. These events have transformed what was an ongoing dialogue about terrorism preparedness and first responder support into action. Since September 11, our responsibilities have been greatly expanded in light of the new challenges and circumstances.

Meeting The Challenge Ahead--Creating the Office of National Preparedness

On May 8, 2001, the President tasked the Director with creating the Office of National Preparedness (ONP) within FEMA to "coordinate all federal programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction consequence management within the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal agencies." Additionally, the ONP was directed to "work closely with state and local governments to ensure their planning, training, and equipment needs are met."

The mission of the ONP is to provide leadership in coordinating and facilitating all federal efforts to assist state and local first responders (including fire, medical, and law enforcement) and emergency management organizations with planning, training, equipment, and exercises. By focusing on these specific areas, we can build and sustain our nation's capability to respond to any emergency or disaster, including a terrorist incident involving chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons of mass destruction and other natural or manmade hazards.

FEMA has made the following changes to support this expanded mission to support the Office of Homeland Security:

- Realigned preparedness activities from the Response and Recovery Directorate to ONP;
- Realigned all training activities into the U.S. Fire Administration to allow greater coordination between training for emergency managers and training for firefighters;
- Moved the authority for credentialing, training, and deploying Urban Search and Rescue teams from the Response and Recovery Directorate to the U.S. Fire Administration.

ONP Organization

The ONP is organized in FEMA Headquarters under a Director (reporting directly to the FEMA Director) and supported by a Management Services Unit and four divisions to carry out its key functions to coordinate and implement federal programs and activities aimed at building and sustaining the national preparedness capability. The divisions and their functional responsibilities include the following:

- Administration Division--Provide financial and support services, and management of the grant assistance activities for local and state capability building efforts.
- Program Coordination Division--Ensure development of a coordinated national capability involving federal, state, and local governments, to include citizen participation, in the overall efforts to effectively deal with the consequences of terrorist acts and other incidents within the United States.
- Technological Services Division--Improve the capabilities of communities to manage technological hazard emergencies--whether accidental or intentional--and leverage this capability to enhance the capability for dealing with terrorist attacks.
- Assessment and Exercise Division--Provide guidance, exercise, and assess and evaluate progress in meeting national goals for development of a domestic consequence management capability.

We continue to work with all states, territories, and federally recognized Native American Tribes and Alaskan Native Villages to implement our current and other grant programs to assist state, Tribal and local governments in enhancing their capabilities to respond to all types of hazards

and emergencies, such as chemical incidents, incidents involving radiological substances, and natural disasters.

First Responder Initiative

One of the most important lessons learned from the response to September 11 is the value of a strong, effective local response capability. The President has requested $3.5 billion in the 2003 budget to support first responders. These funds would help them plan, train, acquire needed equipment, and conduct exercises in preparation for terrorist attacks and other emergencies. Right now, we are developing a streamlined and accountable procedure that would speed the flow of funds to the first responder community.

Specifically, the funds would be used:

- To support the development of comprehensive response plans for terrorist incidents.
- To purchase equipment needed to respond effectively, including better, more interoperable communications systems.
- To provide training for responding to terrorist incidents and operating in contaminated environments.
- For coordinated, regular exercise programs to improve response capabilities, practice mutual aid, and evaluate response operations.

In the recently passed 2002 Spring Supplemental, Congress provided FEMA with $100M for state and local governments to update and enhance existing emergency operations plans. The funds for the planning initiative will be allocated to the states and other state-level entities on the basis of population. These comprehensive plans will form the foundation for the work to be done in 2003 to prepare first responders for terrorist attacks. The supplemental also includes $56M to help state and local governments make improvements to their emergency operations centers (EOC). The funding for EOCs will be awarded in two phases. Each state will be allocated a $50,000 Phase 1 grant, to conduct an initial self-assessment of their existing EOC. The remainder of the supplemental EOC funds will be used to fund measures to address the most urgent EOC needs across the nation.

Citizen Corps

An important component of the preparedness effort is the ability to harness the good will and enthusiasm of the country's citizens. The Citizen Corps program is part of the President's new Freedom Corps initiative. It builds on existing crime prevention, natural disaster preparedness, and public health response networks. It initially will consist of participants in Community Emergency Response Teams (FEMA), Volunteers in Police Service, an expanded Neighborhood Watch Program, Operation TIPS (Department of Justice), and the Medical Reserve Corps (Department of Health and Human Services).

The initiative brings together local government, law enforcement, educational institutions, the private sector, faith-based groups, and volunteers into a cohesive community resource. Citizen Corps is coordinated nationally by FEMA, which also provides training standards, general information, and materials. We also will identify additional volunteer programs and initiatives that support the goals of the Corps. In the future, Region VII will host a Citizen Corps workshop for state and local Citizen Corps points of contact.

Broader Challenges

In addition to our First Responder and the Citizen Corps programs, we are implementing a number of other important, related initiatives. These include:

- Mutual Aid: In conjunction with the First Responder Initiative, we are working to facilitate mutual aid arrangements within and among states so the nationwide local, state, Tribal, federal, and volunteer response network can operate smoothly together in all possible circumstances. This idea is to leverage existing and new assets to the maximum extent possible; this involves resource typing for emergency teams, accreditation of individuals using standardized certifications and qualifications, and equipment and communications interoperability.
- National Exercise Program: This National Exercise Program involves the establishment of annual objectives, a multi-year strategic exercise program, an integrated exercise schedule, and national corrective actions.
- Comprehensive Baseline Assessments. We are working with the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) Commission to use their state-approved EMAP Standard assessment process to obtain, over the next two years, comprehensive baseline emergency management capability assessments of all states and territories.

The Approach to Biological and Chemical Terrorism

We recognize that biological and chemical scenarios would present unique challenges to the first responder community. Of these two types of attacks, we are, in many ways, better prepared for a chemical attack because such an incident is comparable to a large-scale hazardous materials incident.

In such an event, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Coast Guard are well connected to local hazardous materials responders, state and federal agencies, and the chemical industry. There are systems and plans in place for response to hazardous materials, systems that are routinely used for both small and large-scale events. The EPA is also the primary agency for the Hazardous Materials function of the Federal Response Plan. We are confident that we would be able to engage the relevant players in a chemical attack based on the hazardous materials model.

Bioterrorism, however, presents the greater immediate concern. With a covert release of a biological agent, the 'first responders' will be hospital staff, medical examiners, private physicians, or animal control workers, instead of the traditional first responders such as police, fire, and emergency medical services, with whom we have a long-term relationship. On June 12, 2002, the President signed the Public Health and Bioterrorism Bill into law (H.R. 3448). The legislation includes $1.6 billion in grants to states for hospital preparedness and assessments on the vulnerability of local water systems. Across the government, we are working to enhance our ability to detect biological attacks, better link the public health and emergency response communities, and train and equip traditional first responders to respond to bioterrorism. The President's proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security would strengthen the linkages, detailed below, that are critical to our capacity to respond to bioterrorism.

In exercise and planning scenarios, the worst-case scenarios begin with an undetected event and play out as widespread epidemics, rapidly escalating into a national emergency.

Response would likely begin in the public health and medical community, with initial requests for federal assistance probably coming through health and medical channels to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In July 2002, Region VII participated in a bioterrorism tabletop exercise in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, involving a smallpox outbreak.

The Department of Health of Human Services (HHS) leads the efforts of the health and medical community to plan and prepare for a national response to a public health emergency and is the critical link between the health and medical community and the larger federal response. In particular, FEMA has worked with HHS for several years on the Metropolitan Medical Response Systems, which bring together various local medical response elements that have effectively planned, trained, and prepared to respond to treat victims of mass casualty events, including chemical, radiological, and biological terrorism. Under the program, participating cities plan for the equipment, supplies, training, and transportation requirements for emergencies including possible terrorist attacks.

FEMA also works closely with the Public Health Service of HHS as the primary agency for the Health and Medical Services function of the Federal Response Plan (FRP). We rely on the Public Health Service to bring the right experts to the table when the FRP community meets to discuss biological scenarios. We work closely with the experts in HHS and other health and medical agencies, to learn about the threats, how they spread, and the resources and techniques that will be needed to control them.

By the same token, the medical experts work with us to learn about the FRP and how we can use it to work through the management issues, such as resource deployment and public information strategies. Alone, the FRP is not an adequate solution for the challenge of planning and preparing for a deadly epidemic or act of bioterrorism. It is equally true that, alone, the health and medical community cannot manage an emergency with biological causes. We must work together.

In recent years, federal, state, and local governments and agencies have made progress in bringing the communities closer together. Exercise Top Officials (TOPOFF) 2000 conducted in May 2000 involved two concurrent terrorism scenarios in two metropolitan areas, a chemical attack on the East Coast followed by a biological attack in the Midwest. This was a successful and useful exercise and we continue to work to implement the lessons learned. Currently, FEMA is in the planning stages of TOPOFF 2.

In January 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and FEMA jointly published the U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operation Plan (CONPLAN) with the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency. These agencies have pledged to continue the planning process to develop specific procedures for different scenarios, including bioterrorism. The FRP and the CONPLAN provide the framework for managing the response to an act of bioterrorism, but we need to continue to practice our response to events of this kind.

The Approach to Nuclear Terrorism

There are 63 commercial nuclear power plant sites in the United States, located in 33 states. These states and their local governments have radiological emergency response plans for the 10

miles surrounding the plants and 36 states have plans for the 50 mile radius surrounding the plants.

The federal response to a nuclear power plant incident is documented in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), which has 17 federal agency signatories. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the lead federal agency for coordinating the overall response and FEMA is responsible for coordinating non-radiological support.

The FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program routinely tests and evaluates the off-site plans for each commercial nuclear plant. The 10-mile plans for the 63 sites are tested at biennial exercises (approximately 32 exercises per year), and the 50-mile plans for the 36 states are exercised once every six years (approximately six exercises per year). An evaluated exercise was conducted for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station located in Cordova, Illinois, on July 10, 2002. Two Iowa counties are within the 10-mile emergency planning zone. A full-scale ingestion exercise is scheduled for Duane Arnold Energy Center in Pelo, Iowa, on October 23-24, 2002.

The events of September 11 have now horrifically demonstrated that these plans need to be expanded further. When September 11 showed us how a commercial jetliner can be used as a weapon of mass destruction, the NRC and FEMA began to work jointly on the preparation of protocols and procedures for dealing with the consequences of a similar attack on a nuclear power plant--a scenario previously not addressed. While some amendments to the emergency response plans may result from this review, it is important to note that the current plans are a valid approach to any nuclear power plant incident, regardless of the cause: terrorism, human error, technological failure, or a natural hazard.

The Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC) has also conducted tabletop exercises of the FRERP in order to determine federal agency resources for responding to a terrorist attack, or multiple attacks, with a radiological component. In addition, the FRPCC is evaluating the nuclear/radiological threat posed by improvised nuclear devices and radiological dispersal devices, and the preparedness of FRPCC member departments and agencies to deal with these threats.

Furthermore, the Federal Response Subcommittee of the FRPCC has developed information on radiological terrorist devices--such as radiological dispersion devices, improvised nuclear devices, and radiological exposure devices--for the use of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as background and public information.

Finally, FEMA's Technological Services Division of the Office of National Preparedness has asked the FEMA regions to provide (1) information on what the region has done to review and modify state and local REP plans for a response to a sudden catastrophic event; (2) recommendations on improving the realism of REP exercises; and (3) recommendations on how to improve/enhance public education within the REP planning zones.

We are also working with our Canadian neighbors through the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in Comprehensive Civil Emergency Planning and Management. In the past, our collaboration under this agreement has focused on natural and technological hazards. The Agreement does,

however, include language regarding "deliberate acts" and "undeclared hostilities including armed enemy attack."

Since September 11, both countries are applying the broadest interpretation of those aspects of the Agreement. The United States government and Canada seek to strengthen cross border planning and management against the possibility of future chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear events and/or incendiary attacks targeted on either of our countries or on both of our countries simultaneously. To that end, FEMA participated in a U.S. Department of State-Canada Solicitor General sponsored Senior Level Workshop that was held in Ottawa on 4-5 February 2002. FEMA is also working with Canada's Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness to help improve existing communications and operational levels for all disaster situations, including terrorism.

Department of Homeland Security

The functions that FEMA performs will be a key part of the mission of the new Department of Homeland Security. The new Department will strengthen our ability to carry out important activities, such as building the capacity of state and local emergency response personnel to respond to emergencies and disasters of all kinds. A core part of the Department's emergency preparedness and response function will be built directly on the foundation established by FEMA. It would continue FEMA's efforts to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect our nation's institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive, risk-based, all-hazards emergency management program of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. It will also continue to change the emergency management culture from one that reacts to terrorism and other disasters, to one that proactively helps communities and citizens avoid becoming victims.

In July 2002, President Bush released the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. A major goal of the new Department of Homeland Security will be to blend the current mix of federal response plans into one, all-hazard federal response plan, known as the Federal Incident Management Plan. This plan will be used to direct the response of the federal government to all major events of national importance, and will allow for a more cohesive federal response. Currently, there are at least five different plans that perform this function, including the Federal Response Plan, the National Contingency Plan, the Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, and a developing bioterrorism response plan.

In addition, the new Department of Homeland Security would address head-on the problem of fragmentation and duplication in federal terrorism training programs. And FEMA's current efforts in developing and managing a national training and evaluation system would be absorbed into the new Department. The Department would make interoperable communications a top priority just as FEMA is doing.

The structure of this newly proposed Department recognizes that FEMA's mission and core competencies are essential components of homeland security. For this reason, Congress can continue to be assured that the nation will be prepared to respond to acts of terrorism, and will coordinate its efforts with the entire first responder community. In fact, FEMA's mission to lead the federal government's emergency response to terrorist attacks and natural disasters will be greatly strengthened by the new Department of Homeland Security. By bringing other federal

emergency response assets (such as the Nuclear Emergency Search Teams, Radiological Emergency Response Team, Radiological Assistance Program, National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, the National Disaster Medical System, and the Metropolitan Medical Response System) together with FEMA's response capabilities, the new Department will allow for better coordination than the current situation in which response assets are separated in several Departments. The new Department will have complete responsibility and accountability for providing the federal government's emergency response and for coordinating its support with other federal entities such as the Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Conclusion

It is FEMA's responsibility to ensure that the national emergency management system is adequate to respond to the consequences of catastrophic emergencies and disasters, regardless of the cause, and that all catastrophic events require a strong management system built on expert systems for each of the operational disciplines.

Terrorism presents tremendous challenges. We rely on our partners in the Department of Health and Human Services to coordinate the efforts of the health and medical community to address biological terrorism, as we rely on the Environmental Protection Agency and the Coast Guard to coordinate the efforts of the hazardous materials community to address chemical terrorism, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to address nuclear events. And we rely on our partners at the state and local level. Without question, they need support to further strengthen capabilities and their operating capacity.

FEMA must ensure that the national system has the tools to gather information, set priorities, and deploy resources effectively in a biological scenario. In recent years, we have made tremendous strides in our efforts to increase cooperation between the various response communities. And now, we need to do more.

At FEMA, the creation of the Office of National Preparedness and our emphasis on training, planning, equipment, and exercises will enable us to better focus our efforts and will help our nation be better prepared for the future. The President's proposal to create the Department of Homeland Security will integrate these capabilities into a broader whole that will help our nation respond to the terrorist threat.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to answer any questions you have.

Mr. HORN. Well, we appreciate that, and with your legislative background, that helps us all.

Now we have another fine person that follows us around, James Bogner, Special Agent in Charge, Omaha Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The FBI has done wonders with various things that this subcommittee has done, generally with the Y2K situation, which was difficult 2, 3 years ago, and has also been very helpful in getting with the intelligence in relation to law enforcement at local areas. They've worked very good to get that growing.

Thank you.

Mr. BOGNER. Thank you and good afternoon, Chairman Horn and members of the subcommittee.

The previous mission of the FBI was generally considered to be investigate criminal acts and terrorist acts after they had occurred; but since September 11th, we understand, and Director Mueller, our Director, has ensured that we understand that our mission is now to prevention, too. It's more important to prevent an act than investigate it after the fact.

In that regards, we have shifted a substantial number of resources to that end. Director Mueller has provided Congress with a reorganization plan which you have approved, and we are putting that plan into effect. We are doing that in Iowa, as well as the rest of the country, and shifting a substantial number of resources to fight counterterrorism, not only the prevention side, training side, but the many components of fighting terrorism.

One component in that regard is forming a joint terrorism task force. We have done that in the States of Iowa and Nebraska. I am responsible for both States. For our area, we chose one team or one joint terrorism task force but divided it into five teams, regional teams.

We did that because, in discussing this issue with about 171 law enforcement officials throughout the two States, we fully understood that it's very difficult for the law enforcement officials in one part of the State of Iowa to let their resources go, to conduct investigations, and work with us in other parts of the State or, in fact, another State.

So our intent is to ensure that they are able to be responsive to their region in this State with our help and with the other Federal and State authorities there.

Training is another very important component, and it's important to conduct that training at all levels and have full interaction with all of the partners, and we are a full partner in that.

There are training sessions going on not only that we put on, the U.S. Attorney's office puts on through their antiterrorism task force within the State of Iowa, but, also, the Department of Justice, the Office of Domestic Preparedness is a frequent visitor to Iowa and helps with those exercises.

One of the things we've also learned post September 11th is that I think previously, we concentrated on the exercises on preparation for single incidents. I was assigned to Oklahoma City in 1995, and so I understand the full impact of that particular incident, but what we are dealing with in this century is multiple incidents.

And so, in our training sessions, we have shifted focus to not only looking at one problem and trying to deal with that but multiple problems, as we saw with the mailbox pipe bombs which occurred over a five-State area that we had to deal with.

So that's very important in the shift in focus, and not only that, but the coordination of resources to deal with multiple events occurring within a short period of time. It's also important to develop those plans, response plans, communication plans not only at the Federal level, the State level, local level and integrate all of those.

We have all found new partners that we didn't necessarily rely upon in the past, because we have had these new challenges of the nuclear, biological and chemical agents introduced into the criminal acts.

And so we continue to form those new partnerships, train with them and develop contingency plans with them.

I'd be happy to take any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bogner follows:]

STATEMENT OF JAMES F. BOGNER
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
BEFORE
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
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Good afternoon Chairman Horn, Members of the Subcommittee and distinguished guests. I appreciate and value the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the FBI's efforts in terrorism prevention and preparedness in the Omaha Division. I will focus on what the FBI is doing here to assist state and local governments in preparing for potential attacks involving biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, which we collectively refer to as Weapons of Mass Destruction or the acronym "WMD." I will also address measures being taken by the FBI and our law enforcement partners to address terrorism and WMD threats in Nebraska and Iowa, the "heartland" of America.

Introduction

As part of his reorganization plan, FBI Director Mueller stated, in a communication to all FBI employees on May 20th of this year, the FBI's goal in counterterrorism is prevention. It is not, as in the past, only reacting to attacks with excellence and bringing terrorists to justice. While investigating terrorist acts remains the FBI's highest priority, our primary goal is prevention of future acts of terrorism. This does not mean that prosecution is not important. Prosecution is an absolutely critical element of prevention. But making clear that the goal is prevention rather than prosecution will mean enhanced emphasis on intelligence, analysis and proactive initiatives. Counterterrorism is the top priority of the Omaha Division, as it is for every single field office of the FBI and of every component of headquarters that supports these efforts in any way. This means a constant need to reassess--and as necessary shift--resources to address counterterrorism. The FBI will need to be more flexible and agile in addressing the constantly shifting terrorism threat. Our enemy is not static and we must not be either.

We in the Omaha Division of the FBI have embraced Director Mueller's message. We have implemented numerous initiatives in the months since the 9/11 terrorist attack on our country to ensure that we are doing all that we can to prevent another such attack. We maintain an aggressive program of preparedness training and coordination for potential WMD attacks which we

initiated well before the 9/11 attack. We have also had some notable successes in counterterrorism investigations. Before I tell you about what we're doing, I wish to take a moment to describe some unique aspects of the territory for which the Omaha Division of the FBI is responsible.

The Omaha Office of the FBI

While the Omaha Office is one of the smallest of the 56 field offices in the Bureau in terms of staffing, it has one of the most expansive and diverse geographic territories in the FBI. Indeed, the geography and demographics of the Omaha Division's territory pose unique challenges in effectively fulfilling the FBI's mission.

The Office covers the two states of Iowa and Nebraska, a territory spanning two time zones and extending from the Mississippi River to the foothills of the Rocky Mountains. It is approximately 800 miles from the eastern border to the western border of the division. The Omaha Division encompasses three Federal judicial districts: the District of Nebraska, the Northern District of Iowa and the Southern District of Iowa. In order to properly serve this vast territory, the Omaha Division has a headquarters city office in Omaha, Nebraska, and eight resident agencies throughout the two states. Three of the eight resident agencies are in Nebraska and five are in Iowa.

Omaha's territory includes distinctly different regions of the country ranging from urban industrial centers to Midwest farmlands and agricultural communities to the ranch lands of the Great Plains. The vastness of the territory and the resulting differences in regional culture and crime problems require the Omaha Division to maximize the leveraging of its resources and to exercise flexibility and innovation in its investigations and operations.

Omaha Division Counterterrorism & WMD Initiatives

The foundation of the Omaha Division's Counterterrorism and WMD efforts consists of the triple building blocks of communication, coordination and cooperation. These building blocks result in a solid partnership between the FBI and front-line law enforcement agencies. Here in the Midwest, the law enforcement community has traditionally enjoyed a true spirit of partnership and inclusiveness. Perhaps this is due to the pioneer and agricultural heritage of this part of the country which gave rise to such traditions as barn raisings, cooperative livestock drives and mutual harvesting operations. Regardless of the origins of these characteristics, we and our city, county, state and other Federal

counterparts recognize that an inclusive partnership is the most effective means of countering terrorism. This partnership, when formalized, takes the shape of a Joint Terrorism Task Force or "JTTF. "

The Nebraska/Iowa JTTF

The process of forming the Nebraska/Iowa JTTF reflected the unique and expansive nature of our territory and embraced the ideals of an inclusive partnership. As I am sure you already know, the first JTTF in the country was formed in 1980 by the FBI in New York. Every FBI field office that did not already have a JTTF has since formed one or is in the process of doing so. Most JTTFs consist of one main investigative entity with one or two sub-elements or annexes. We in the Omaha Division recognized that a JTTF with one main component and only one or two annexes could not properly serve our nearly 800-mile-wide, two-state territory.

To validate this premise, we sought the input of our city, county, state and other Federal agency counterparts by conducting a series of information gathering and organizational meetings throughout our two state territory. We held five (5) such meetings to which we invited every single law enforcement agency in Nebraska and Iowa via multiple National Law Enforcement Teletype messages to all agencies and we sent personal letters of invitation to heads of law enforcement agencies serving populations of 5,000 or greater. The meetings were held in Cedar Rapids, Iowa; Des Moines, Iowa; Omaha, Nebraska; Grand Island, Nebraska and Ogallala, Nebraska over a two-week time period in March 2002.

The response of the Nebraska and Iowa law enforcement communities was gratifying: one-hundred-seventy-one (171) representatives of various local, county, state and other Federal law enforcement agencies attended our meetings. During these meetings, we gave detailed presentations about the overall terrorism threat, the FBI's counterterrorism strategy, the function and structure of the typical JTTF and local terrorism threat assessments focused on each of the regions of our territory in which meetings were held.

We proposed, and our law enforcement partners universally agreed, that the Nebraska/Iowa JTTF should have multiple, regionally focused teams because of the tremendous expanse of territory in Nebraska and Iowa. As a practical matter, one investigative entity cannot possibly cover the entire, two-state territory. Therefore, the Nebraska/Iowa JTTF was formed with five (5) regional teams that focus on regions of the two states corresponding to areas served by

the various offices of the Omaha Division of the FBI. Each team conducts investigations in its geographic region; however, there is centralized intelligence sharing, coordination and administration of the overall JTTF. The five Nebraska/Iowa JTTF teams are: Eastern Nebraska /Omaha-Lincoln Metro Area, Central Nebraska, Western Nebraska, Eastern Iowa, and Central/Western Iowa. I have provided a map showing the areas of our territory covered by each of our five JTTF teams as an attachment to my written statement provided to the committee.

The Nebraska/Iowa JTTF was officially approved and funded by FBI Headquarters on May 1st, 2002, and currently consists of 110 law enforcement agents or officers from more than 50 different agencies. Of the 110 JTTF agents or officers, 21 are full-time participants and 89 are part-time. We are currently in the process of finalizing security clearances and Federal deputations for the JTTF officers.

We already conducted one training session in Omaha and are in the process of scheduling a series of two-day, initial training seminars to be conducted in various regions of our territory in late July and early August of this year. This initiative is intended to provide initial, basic counterterrorism training for our 110 JTTF officers. Our planned curriculum includes the topics of: JTTF objectives and operations, interviewing and report writing techniques, the Attorney General Guidelines for preliminary and full counterterrorism investigations, an overview of the international and domestic terrorism threats, asset and informant development and operation, legal matters, counterterrorism investigative methodology, cyber-terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction.

After the initial, two-days of training, we plan to implement a continuing training program under which we will conduct training conferences three or four times each year and also take advantage of Department of Justice-funded State and Local Anti-terrorism Training or "SLATT" programs. In so doing, we will build a cadre of trained and experienced JTTF officers throughout our two-state territory to maximally leverage the FBI's counterterrorism resources .

In addition to the training specifically designed for our JTTF partners, we have provided Counterterrorism training to city, county, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies throughout Iowa and Nebraska. These training sessions, to attendees of the Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee Conferences, Iowa 'All Agents' Conference, co-sponsored by both U.S. Attorneys in Iowa, State-wide National Academy Associates Training Conferences, The Iowa Chiefs of Police Association annual state-wide meeting, The Police Chiefs Association of

Nebraska meeting, and Attorney Generals Anti-Terrorism Task Force meetings in Iowa and Nebraska, have provided the attendees with historical and background terrorism information, investigative and intelligence information, as well as table-top planning and response exercises.

The Nebraska/Iowa JTTF addresses both domestic and international terrorist threats, to include the WMD threat. While the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have clearly shown that the most urgent terrorist threat currently facing our Nation is that from radical Islamic Fundamentalists, the Nebraska/Iowa JTTF will also devote appropriate efforts to domestic terrorist threats and WMD preparedness in the long term.

NE/IA JTTF Success: Lucas Helder / Mailbox Pipe Bomb Case

The Nebraska/Iowa JTTF has already conducted a very successful, high profile domestic terrorism investigation despite the fact that this JTTF is still in its nascent stages. Starting on Friday, May 3, 2002, just two days after the Nebraska/Iowa JTTF was formally approved, a series of improvised bombs was left inside mailboxes in rural areas of Eastern Iowa and Northwest Illinois. Accompanying each pipe bomb was a letter addressed to the public that offered comments about life, death, pain and the impact of government on the individual. The letter suggested that the author had a grievance against some level of government. By the end of the day on May 3rd, bombs had been discovered in eight separate mailboxes and six people were injured by these pipe bomb attacks. The injured included a 70-year-old woman who was seriously injured when she opened her mail box and several rural mail carriers who were injured when trying to deliver mail.

The Nebraska/Iowa JTTF mobilized within hours of the first pipe bomb explosion. The Eastern Iowa and Central Iowa JTTF teams jointly established a multi-agency command post at the FBI Resident Agency in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, which was staffed around the clock by all agencies involved in the investigation. The FBI Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters instituted a watch desk in the FBI Strategic Information and Operations Center, or "SIOC." The JTTF command post in Cedar Rapids coordinated the efforts of evidence recovery and investigative teams from the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, U.S. Postal Inspection Service and various state and local agencies.

On Saturday, May 4th, bombs accompanied by letters identical to those found in Iowa were discovered at six locations in Nebraska. In response, the Omaha/Lincoln Eastern Nebraska JTTF team swung into action. A second,

multi-agency command post was established at the FBI Omaha Division headquarters city office in Omaha, Nebraska which was also staffed 24 hours a day by all agencies involved. A seventh pipe bomb was found in Nebraska on Sunday, May 5th and an eighth was found in Nebraska on Monday, May 6th. Two additional bombs were found on Monday, May 6th: one in rural Colorado and one Texas, yielding a total of 18 bombs in five states.

At this point, overall command of the investigation shifted from the Cedar Rapids, Iowa command post to the Omaha, Nebraska command post, where the Nebraska/Iowa JTTF coordinated the investigation and evidence recovery efforts in the five states in which pipe bombs had been found. The full resources of the FBI, to include specialized bomb scenting dogs, the FBI Bomb Data Center, the FBI Laboratory, national FBI aviation assets, and the FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit were applied to the investigation of the 18 pipe bombs. The efforts of all of these national level resources and of the hundreds of federal, state and local law enforcement officers were all coordinated and directed by the Nebraska/Iowa JTTF through the Omaha command post. Seven (7) different FBI field divisions were involved in the investigation which resulted in the apprehension and filing of charges against Lucas John Helder. This investigation, and the national media coverage seeking the public's assistance were also coordinated by the Nebraska/Iowa JTTF.

The Nebraska/Iowa JTTF is justifiably proud of this investigation. The identification, location, apprehension and filing of charges against an individual within five days of the first bomb being found proved that the building blocks of our JTTF foundation are indeed strong. The communication, coordination and cooperation between the dozens of law enforcement agencies and hundreds of agents and officers demonstrated by this very successful investigation will continue to be the hallmarks of Nebraska/Iowa JTTF counterterrorism efforts in the future.

Other Nebraska/Iowa JTTF Initiatives

There are other ongoing counterterrorism investigations being conducted by the Nebraska/Iowa JTTF in addition to the training initiatives and successful investigation of the mailbox pipe bombings described above. Because these investigations are still ongoing, I am unable to provide any details about them.

However, there is one Nebraska/Iowa JTTF communications initiative I wish to briefly tell you about. We are working closely with the Nebraska State Patrol and the Iowa Department of Public of Safety to establish secure, web-

based communications channels that will be used by JTTF officers in both states. Both the Nebraska State Patrol and the Iowa Department of Public Safety have existing, secure, web-based intelligence sharing and communications systems accessible to law enforcement agencies. Special counterterrorism sites have already been established on each system. We are working to establish secure, JTTF subsites on these systems to which JTTF agents and officers in each state will have access. Ultimately, we hope to link the Nebraska and Iowa state systems to further enhance coordination and intelligence sharing.

WMD & Counterterrorism Preparedness

In addition to JTTF activities, the FBI Omaha Division has been involved in WMD and counterterrorism preparedness and training that predates the terrorist attacks of September 11. The FBI Counterterrorism Division's Weapons of Mass Destruction Countermeasures Unit plans and conducts WMD exercises which address the specific needs and objectives of state and local emergency responders. State and local emergency management officials may request this assistance through their respective FBI WMD Coordinators who forward the request to FBI Headquarters. Every FBI Field Division, including the Omaha Division, has a WMD Coordinator.

In order to ensure that the various state and local agencies in Iowa and Nebraska are familiar with the assistance the FBI can provide as well as our protocol for responding to a WMD incident, Omaha's WMD Coordinator has conducted or participated in nine (9) preparedness or training events in the last three years, as set forth below.

2/1999 - Participated in Nunn/Lugar/Domenici training in Omaha.

6/1999 - Coordinated and planned a three-day WMD needs assessment for the Department of Justice.

10/1999 - Participated in Domestic Preparedness Senior Officials Workshop in Lincoln.

11/1999 - 3/2000 - Assisted the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency in training all Nebraska state supervisors and managers in terrorism and preparedness issues. Training held at various locations throughout the state.

1/2000 - Participated in Nunn/Lugar/Domenici training in Lincoln.

11/2000 - Provided domestic preparedness training for Iowa emergency managers.

2/2001 - 4/2001 - Assisted the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency with terrorism awareness training. Training held at various locations throughout the state.

12/2001 - Assisted University of Nebraska Extension Coordinator with chemical/pesticide safety and security training program.

1/2002 - Provided WMD response training for Iowa emergency managers and law enforcement.

WMD Response training for Iowa emergency managers and law enforcement conducted in January 2002 (the last entry in the listing above) merits some additional discussion because of the innovative manner in which it was conducted. This training was jointly produced and conducted by the Omaha FBI in partnership with the Iowa Emergency Management Division. The focus of the training was crisis management and coordination of responses to WMD incidents with an emphasis on bio terrorism incidents. This training was televised and broadcast live throughout Iowa on the Iowa Cable Network. All Iowa law enforcement, fire and rescue agencies were invited to participate in the training which featured an interactive, call-in question and answer period after the formal presentations. In addition to the FBI, the Iowa Emergency Management Division and the Iowa Public Health Laboratory presented blocks of instruction.

The FBI's portion of this training dealt with its response protocol and the FBI's interagency threat assessment process. The FBI's WMD Operations Unit, which is in the Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters, coordinates this threat assessment to determine the credibility of the threat received, the immediate concerns involving health and safety of responding personnel, and the requisite level of response warranted by the federal government. To conduct the threat assessment, the FBI obtains detailed information from the on-scene personnel and input from the necessary federal agencies with responsibility in the particular incident. In a biological event, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), including Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and Food and Drug Administration (FDA), as well as the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) are the key agencies called upon to assist FBI personnel in assessing the particular threat. Based upon the assessment, a determination is made as to the level of response necessary to adequately address the particular threat, which could range from a full federal response if the

threat is deemed credible, to collection of the material in an effort to rule out the presence of any biological pathogens if the threat is deemed not credible. A similar threat assessment process occurs in the event of a chemical or nuclear threat.

The Omaha FBI WMD coordinator is also a member of the steering committee for the Omaha Metropolitan Medical Response System, or "OMMRS." Representatives of all major health care facilities and public health officials in the Omaha metropolitan area participate in the OMMRS. The OMMRS mission is to maximize preparedness and coordination in the health care community to ensure effective responses to major public health incidents, including bio terrorism and WMD attacks. The OMMRS meets on a monthly basis.

Our counterterrorism preparedness efforts include regular participation in field and table top exercises to test the response capabilities of agencies who would participate in a disaster involving biological, chemical, or nuclear attack. The Omaha Division has participated in 10 exercises in the past three years, as set forth below.

2/1999 - Participated in chemical weapons attack tabletop exercise in Omaha

9/1999 - Practical chemical weapons attack exercise in Ames, IA.

11/1999 - Planned and participated in a chemical weapons attack tabletop exercise in Lincoln, NE.

1/2000 - Participated in chemical weapons attack tabletop exercise in Lincoln, NE.

2/2000 - Planned and participated in a functional chemical weapons attack field exercise in Lincoln, NE.

3/2000 - Participated in a chemical weapons attack tabletop exercise in Omaha, assisted in exercise planning.

5/2000 - Participated in a functional chemical weapons attack field exercise in Omaha, assisted in planning.

9/2000 - Participated in an airport security tabletop exercise.

3/2002 - Participated in a biological weapons attack table top exercise in Lincoln, NE assisted in planning.

5/2002 - Participated in a functional chemical weapons attack field exercise in Lincoln, NE assisted in planning.

In addition to the formal training provided and participation in various exercises, the Omaha FBI WMD Coordinator maintains liaison on a daily basis with city, county and state law enforcement and emergency management agencies.

WMD Investigations and Operations

In the area of WMD investigations and operations, the Omaha Division is in constant communication with members of the law enforcement, fire, emergency management, and medical communities. This partnership was clearly evident in the cooperation during the time period after September 11, 2001, when anthrax hoaxes occurred in Iowa and Nebraska. In addition to those hoaxes, well-meaning citizens reported hundreds of suspicious packages and other items. Since October 2001, nationwide the FBI has responded to more than 16,000 reports of use or threatened use of anthrax or other hazardous materials and the Omaha Division has had its share of these. We have provided advice and guidance on more than 800 incidents of suspected anthrax, physically responded to the scene approximately 75 times, and have several pending investigations related to various WMD threats.

Another example of the high degree of interagency cooperation we enjoy here in the Omaha Division is that the local ATF office provided agents who worked hand-in-glove with the FBI to handle the federal response to anthrax reports in the Omaha metropolitan area. FBI Agents and ATF Agents responded to the calls on a rotational basis with such seamless cooperation that the general public was not even aware that different agencies were responding. The Omaha FBI also coordinated and facilitated the laboratory testing of suspicious parcels throughout Iowa and Nebraska.

National Infrastructure Protection and Cyber Terrorism

Because of its relevance to the topic of this hearing, specifically the threat to nuclear and chemical facilities, I would like to briefly discuss the Omaha FBI's efforts in support of the FBI's National Infrastructure Protection mission. I know that you have already received a number of briefings about the National

Infrastructure Protection Center, or "NIPC," which is an interagency center that serves as the focal point for the government's effort to warn of and respond to cyber intrusions, both domestic and international. NIPC programs have been established in each of the FBI's 56 field divisions, including the Omaha Division.

A key component of the FBI's infrastructure protection efforts is the InfraGard Program which incorporates a variety of entities, all of which have a stake in protecting our national infrastructure against cyber attacks, into a system similar to a Neighborhood Watch. InfraGard is a national, cooperative undertaking between the FBI and non-FBI members which typically include businesses, academic institutions, military installations, state and local law enforcement agencies and other selected participants. InfraGard is dedicated to increasing the security of the critical infrastructure of the United States. InfraGard chapters engage in various training and coordination activities, share intelligence related to computer issues, and operate a self warning system.

The Omaha Division of the FBI has initiated InfraGard chapters in Omaha, Nebraska and Des Moines, Iowa. Members of the Omaha InfraGard chapter include the U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base, which controls the entire nuclear arsenal of the United States; and the Peter Kiewit Institute, a world leader in technology research and development.

Conclusion

Despite the recent focus on international terrorism, it is important to remain cognizant of the full range of threats that confront the U.S. These threats continue to include domestic and international terrorists. Terrorism represents a continuing threat to the U.S. and a formidable challenge to the FBI. In response to this threat, the FBI has developed a broad-based counterterrorism program, based on investigations to disrupt terrorist activities, interagency cooperation, and effective warning. While this approach has yielded many successes, the dynamic nature of the terrorist threat demands that our capabilities continually be refined and adapted to provide the most effective response.

In the Omaha Division, all of the FBI's investigative and preparedness responsibilities are conducted jointly with other law enforcement agencies and often with the appropriate fire, emergency response, and medical agencies. It is impossible for the FBI to conduct investigations and obtain intelligence without the assistance of all Iowa and Nebraska federal, state, and local agencies. Communication, coordination and cooperation are exceptional in all areas and the Omaha Division consistently strives to maintain and improve upon these building blocks to maximize the effectiveness of our counterterrorism investigations and preparedness.

Chairman Horn, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would like to express appreciation for this subcommittee's concentration on the issue of terrorism preparedness and I would be happy to respond to any questions at this time.

Mr. HORN. OK. Let us get Mr. Posner to give us some thought to what we didn't do. He's the Managing Director of the Strategic Issues for the Budget Matters of the U.S. General Accounting Office and reports to the Comptroller General of the United States, a very excellent person, Dave Walker, and he also has a 15-year term, so nobody can mess with him, including the President, the Congress and everybody else. He's got a very good group, and we're delighted to have you here today, if we can get out of town.

Mr. POSNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I think I'm the only member of this panel who shares your interest in making that 5 o'clock flight.

We've heard today valiant efforts at all levels to address, really, a novel, unique threat. We've also heard, just to reflect, that each level is stressed, because the challenge really goes beyond one level of government, one actor in our system. The scale, the size, the complexity, the consequences simply are something that every level of government and the private sector have got to figure out ways to work together.

I mean, in some respects, integration is the next step following enthusiasm; and what we really need is a national, not a Federal, set of initiatives. We need to overcome stove pipes within the Federal Government. Over 40 Federal agencies are involved in this problem. That's what the Department of Homeland Security is partly addressing. We have multiple players at State, local, regional levels of government.

State and local governments are absolutely critical to anything we do at the national level in this area. Beyond just first responders, which we've heard a lot about, on page eight of our statement, we go through the six major priorities of the President's Homeland Security Strategy; and each one of them, you've got to address and work with State and local governments. The Federal Government simply does not have the resources, for example, to address security of drivers' licenses, a critical element of counterterrorism protection.

The Federal Government does not hire 650,000 policemen like the State and local communities do, who are really out there, close to the local issues.

The Public Health community is absolutely critical to protecting the Nation against bioterrorism. Largely, that's a function of State and local leadership.

So, fundamentally, we have to figure out ways to gain State and local involvement in this issue through partnerships, and there are clear opportunities from the Federal standpoint in gaining State and local involvement and engagement and from the State and local standpoint in gaining money and expertise, but there are also risks. There are risks that the Federal Government might find its money devolved and substituted for State and local funds.

Local governments face the risk of new Federal mandates, as we've heard today, in such areas as drinking water and port security and other areas that they used to own almost exclusively are now gaining new national attention.

And there's a risk in public accountability of having many players involved in, say, airport security. When you think about how many different players are involved in securing airports, you have

the TSA; you have the FAA; you have the State governments and local governments responsible for perimeters; you have the National Guard; you have the airlines. So the question is, who does the public turn to when something goes wrong? That's a critical issue in partnerships that we all have to face.

We've seen much evolution in the past year of roles and responsibilities in this area. We've seen at the Federal level not only the Office of Homeland Security Strategic Plan but the proposed department. At the State and local level, we've seen tremendous change already in work we're doing, looking at local level. Regional compacts are starting to be discussed, mutual-aid agreements.

King County, Washington, for example, in Seattle, is working through a county plan involving over 40 local governments within the county, so it's not just a Federal issue, as we've heard today. It's State and local governments, really, taking initiatives on their own.

And in some ways, we are kind of evolving, in an ad hoc, pragmatic way, a national strategy without the benefit of, really, a comprehensive kind of overview in this area.

What we need in this arena is, as we've heard, we have too many needs chasing too few resources, and that's a common problem as well. In this regard, we need to make sure that whatever we do as a Nation, not just the Federal Government, the State and local governments, is addressing clear goals that we all can agree on and that we have clear measures that assess how are we doing, and we don't really have those yet at the national level, and we really need to start getting on with that task. Partly, it's involving how much is enough security and how will we know it when we get it.

We also need to ensure, particularly from the Federal level as well as States and local governments, that whatever we do in the area of funding is well targeted, that the Federal money in fact goes to enhance things that otherwise wouldn't be done at the State and local community.

We've heard lots of needs that are really beyond the resources here, and we need to build in protections as we design these grants to ensure that those grants in fact go to promote the highest value. And so we need to make sure that we design accountability provisions to make sure that we at the national level have some comfort that's happening.

So, fundamentally, the challenge is to integrate, to capitalize on the advantages that each level brings, the initiative and values of the local level, the coordination of the States and the regions in this country, and then the expertise and funding at the national level.

And I would add that what we really do want is institutional capacity and leadership at the Federal level. One of the odd things is, just as the interest in intergovernmental relationships has increased, why, we no longer have the one institution we used to have that met and hashed over these things.

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations went out of business a number of years ago, where Governors, mayors, county executives, State legislators and Federal cabinet secretaries would get together periodically with a very good staff to address these issues in concert comprehensively. We need to think about

how we can, at the Federal level and the national level, have that kind of debate, and we need personal leadership.

Epitomized most directly, as I was talking to the chairman earlier, by Harold Seidman, a person who many of us knew very well in Washington, just passed away this week, was a former major management leader at the national level, an OMB in the National Academy of Public Administration, was a mentor to many of us in showing us the way of how you respond to national challenges with humility, compassion, intelligence and wisdom, and his leadership will be sorely missed.

Thank you.

Mr. HORN. Thank you, and I'm delighted that you mentioned that statement. I'm sorry that he's passed away. So thank you for mentioning him. He deserves it.

We will ask the gentlemen, Mr. Leach, Mr. Ganske, as to what questions, please feel free, just any one of the presenters.

Mr. LEACH. First, Dr. Gilchrist, I'm very impressed with your long-term leadership of the State Lab and also of your commitment to the State Lab system, and I think it's the bedrock of communications to a State.

But I'd like to ask both you and Dr. Atchison about, do we have too much concentration at the CDC? And by that, I mean, the CDC, which I consider to be one of the truly wondrous U.S. Government institutions, is kind of like a pentagon for a given kind of security; and what happens if there's vulnerability? Do we have adequate backup? And should there be more decentralization?

And there was an example of Dr. Misra, I mean, in the field of aspects of agriculture, that Iowa State has been designated as the Seed Health Center for the Nation. And so, as we look at various new diseases or new threats, should there be a decentralized approach where the State of Iowa might have a specialization, the State of New Hampshire another specialization, or is that totally impractical? And do you have any sense for that?

Ms. GILCHRIST. Thank you for that question.

When September 11th happened last year, the CDC did close down, because they understood that the last plane that ended up in Pennsylvania was heading toward Atlanta. They came back to work, they worked very hard.

They have one of the few biosafety Level Four facilities that currently stand in the Nation. We have one in the military in the beltway region of the United States, which is also somewhat vulnerable to—perhaps focused in an area that might be closed down.

The IH agency has announced they're going to fund the building of about four new biosafety Level Four facilities to be distributed around the Nation and that they will be used not just for research but will be converted to diagnostic facilities as soon as it is necessary, if it would become necessary.

In terms of then assessing, do we have enough distributed capacity, I think it's a very good question. I would advocate that we tend to increase the biosafety Level Three capacity in each of our States and improve it as much as we can. We need to assess that. We need to have some really wise decision trees to be made about, what's your initial and immediate surge capacity, what is your long-term surge capacity?

We're concerned about the distribution of smallpox diagnostics to the States. We believe that the military may have some analyses that would be good to be shared and distributed to the States. We would like to see the States receive that type of diagnostics if, and only if, they are accurate—adequately accurate to be performed there and don't create some sort of a security or safety issue, and we think that's feasible.

So I hope I've adequately answered my part of it.

Mr. LEACH. Dr. Atchison.

Mr. ATCHISON. I think that it's more a question of role. I think the CDC has demonstrated its responsibility in serving the cutting edge of the research, particularly around infectious disease and the steps that need to be undertaken in order to identify and respond to infectious diseases. I don't believe that should be diminished. I don't think having too much knowledge in one place is bad. I think, rather, what I'm trying to articulate is the need to ensure that knowledge is appropriately distributed to people at the front lines.

And I would submit that the one distinction that bioterrorism perhaps brings to the debate over the threats that we face through a terrorist activity is that it is a public and private system; that it involves physicians and other health professionals at the very, very front line who may not have, as a routine matter of governmental exchange of information, opportunity to participate in conferences and the other things that seem akin to government service.

We need to establish a system, then, that extends the knowledge forward from CDC to those people at the front lines, and I think that's what they're trying to do with the Centers for Public Health Preparedness. The CDC, as leader, States maybe in a tactical way, looking at, how are we organized to ensure that it's distributed across the State effectively. And then the good kind of local implementation that you heard of discussed here from Cedar Rapids, we need to have that same kind of capacity in every village and town across our country.

Mr. LEACH. Let me just conclude, because I know the chairman has time constraints, but I'm very impressed with the movement of the University of Iowa into the Public Health domain and in the way it has with the Public Health School, I think that really has a lot of implications for sharing of knowledge.

Also, we are extremely grateful for what, Mary, your lab has done in the last year; and as we look at these alternatives for the future, where the Federal Government has made a very minor contribution to some planning options, I'm for the maximum options. I hope that we can go forth on that basis. Your lab does fabulous work, and it's fabulously important, and it's got to be supported.

Ms. GILCHRIST. Thank you from—everybody in our laboratory wished they could have been here to hear it.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. The gentleman from Iowa, Dr. Ganske.

Mr. GANSKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, this is typical for hearings in Washington. Sometimes you get the most interesting testimony on the last panel. Nobody's around, everybody has left, but I really appreciate this panel's testimony.

Maybe I can ask an interesting question that would make the people who have left already wish that they had stayed.

Dr. Gilchrist—and I'll try to be brief, Mr. Chairman. I know you need to catch a plane.

Mr. HORN. Take your time.

Mr. GANSKE [continuing]. In an emergency situation, could you use the military or VA Laboratories to augment the existing capacity here at the State level?

Ms. GILCHRIST. We're doing everything we can to distribute that type of responsibility and technology. You have security issues, and you have safety issues, and you have expertise issues, so it has to be thought out very well. The anthrax strain that we had in our lab was reputed to be the Ames strain, and people were very worried about us having it, and the National Guard surrounded our building for 6 weeks as a result of it.

So not every hospital laboratory in the country can contain that——

Mr. GANSKE. That wasn't exactly what I was talking about, for the National Guard to——

Ms. GILCHRIST. There's a move to localize everything you can distribute. I've always said, distribute it as close to the patient as you can get it, and it's a challenge, it's a big challenge. We'll do the best we can.

Mr. GANSKE. All right. How many labs are there in Iowa that can test for nuclear agents?

Ms. GILCHRIST. I would say very few. Our laboratory is actually testing for a number of other States, because we have expertise that they don't have. And I would assume that there are research laboratories; I would assume that in Palo, they have that type of capacity.

Our staff that do this type of work could tell you even more about it than I can, but I would say it's a handful. We need, at a minimum, to be prepared for that.

Mr. GANSKE. How about chemical agents?

Ms. GILCHRIST. You have the little black box-type devices that can be used——

Mr. GANSKE. Right.

Ms. GILCHRIST [continuing]. For agents 1 through 10; and if it's not agents 1 through 10, what do you do?

Minnesota is the source of two cases that were interesting during September 11th, and one was a greasy suitcase going around on the baggage delivery carousel that shut down the airport, because it had oozing stuff coming out of it.

They took it to the Health Department laboratory, and they finally got a call from somebody who was missing a suitcase, and he said it's Ethiopian curry butter, and, you know, the FBI said, "I don't believe it."

So the Lab tested it, they went to the Ethiopian restaurant, and they got some Ethiopian curry butter, and they put them both in the instrument, and they determined that it was Ethiopian curry butter, and the airport opened up again. That's what we had a lot of last year.

Mr. GANSKE. Right.

Ms. GILCHRIST. We were identifying things that aren't in the little box. The little box sometimes, in Minneapolis, told them it was cyanide when it was a minuscule amount of cyanide, shut down the restaurant, you know.

Mr. GANSKE. Well, if we had a bag come off a plane in Des Moines, Iowa, and it had something oozing out of it, and somebody made a phone call and said, "We're worried about this," now, there would be ways to test it—I know there are lots of labs that have mass spectometry, etc., that could test what the compound is; but if they were worried about a chemical terrorist agent, I don't know that they'd really want to take that in and do that.

Is that the problem, part of the problem?

Ms. GILCHRIST. That's definitely part of the problem. Each of these is a new challenge. You have to figure out how to extract it from something. It may also extract the suitcase material, you know. So you need relatively high levels of sophistication. There probably are a few laboratories——

Mr. GANSKE. What you're saying is, we don't have very much here in Iowa, and we need more capability.

Ms. GILCHRIST. Right. Our laboratory would be probably near the top of the list or at the top of the list of capabilities that could do it, because we do soil, water, air and clinical specimens, but we would sometimes be challenged also.

Mr. GANSKE. All right. We'll probably finish this up in about 10 minutes. So I just want to—is it—Dr. Atchison, am I pronouncing your name correctly? Or Atkinson?

Mr. ATCHISON. Yeah. And, please, it's Mr. Atchison, like Atchison, Kansas.

Mr. GANSKE. OK. Some of my physician colleagues say that they would like to be able to vaccinate themselves and their families for smallpox, and other Public Health officials say no. Maybe we only vaccinate first responders, emergency people, but not the general public; and then if something happened, we'd put a ring around this area geographically and then we'd vaccinate everyone.

Do you have an opinion on that? [Laughter.]

That you can give us in about 60 seconds.

Mr. ATCHISON. Well, as a nonphysician, I hesitate to make a——

Mr. GANSKE. Well, go ahead, take a stab.

Mr. ATCHISON. OK. I believe at this point, the threat, the risk is appropriate to a ring vaccination strategy; and I'm satisfied that Dr. Quinlisk, from the State Health Department who has articulated her opinions on this, is speaking from the point of view that seems to be prevailing across the infectious disease community at this time.

Mr. GANSKE. OK.

Mr. Chairman, I have one additional question.

Mr. HORN. Certainly.

Mr. GANSKE. And this will be directed to Messrs. Hainje, Bogner and Posner, and that is this:

If each of you could give Congress and President Bush one suggestion for organizing our new Department of Homeland Security—maybe you've had a chance to see what we've passed in the House, maybe you haven't, but—if you had just 30 seconds each with

President Bush, general or specific, what would you suggest in terms of our creation of this Department?

Mr. HAINJE. I'll go ahead and go first.

I'm sure that I would suggest that the final product be an organization that would develop a one-plan approach to major disasters, acts of terrorism, to address as many of the scenarios as possibly can be addressed in one plan. You can't have—you can't do the exact same thing for each type of incident; but, for example, the Federal Response Plan that exists now has emergency support functions.

In some cases, FEMA is just a facilitator and Public Health is the issue, and they're able to facilitate basically the business side of attempting to deal with an issue, and Public Health does their expertise. At other times, we bring in others.

Mr. GANSKE. So you would like something uniform and simple.

Mr. HAINJE. It is suggested in the strategy that there would be one plan.

Mr. GANSKE. OK.

Mr. HAINJE. I'm not sure if it's in the legislation itself, but the one plan I think would be an excellent idea.

Mr. GANSKE. OK. Mr. Bogner.

Mr. BOGNER. Well, I know our Director has met with President Bush and Governor Ridge on a regular basis and provided input to him. I'm not familiar with all of the intricacies regarding the plan and division of the work. I think that is going on at that level, and so I'll defer to our Director.

Mr. GANSKE. No. Now, look, this is your chance. Nobody is going to say you're doing something wrong if you—is there any one thing, when you've been thinking about this, that strikes you as being exceedingly important so that if you were there on Air Force One with the President and you've got 30 seconds, do you have—have you thought about it? Is there anything that has struck you in particular that would be important?

Mr. BOGNER. I think the two most important areas are absolute coordination of activities and accountability. Whether it be for the investigation, prevention or the overall homeland security issue, accountability is the key, so that whether it's the President or the citizens of the United States, know who's in charge of that particular segment of it and who is responsible for coordinating it and making sure that it gets done.

Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Posner.

Mr. POSNER. Well, I'll repeat what we have said—my boss has said, which is, let's not have management be the stepchild and the afterthought. Let's put management up front here, because that's where the devil is going to be.

So let's have a deputy secretary for management right up front in the creation of the Department. That's No. 1. Someone who is a professional, who is appointed possibly for a fixed term, with possibly a contract with specific performance goals, and then let's think about creating those performance goals and not just articulating a bunch of initiatives, but let's try to baseline where we are and where we want to go.

Mr. GANSKE. I thank you.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

Mr. HORN. Well, thank you.

And particularly that last part, Mr. Posner. Your boss and me, we've talked about management. And last year, the appropriators that deal with the Department of State did put in a secretary for management, and the new one that is going through the Senate now, and we need to get that back in, and it is similar to the Department of State. Otherwise, it's just going to collapse.

And we thank you, all of you, for coming, and we're sorry we're rushed a little bit, but we're trying to also solve some of the problems of Colorado.

I'd like to thank the people here that helped us the most in terms of their staff:

Mr. Ganske's staff, Meghan Gutierriez, and then Curt Mercadante.

And Mr. Leach's staff, Bill Tate, and then Norine Zamastil of the University of Iowa, and the University staff, in general, from the desks on.

Then we have the staff director and acting, to my right and your left—she's had her hands full on this trip—Bonnie Heald.

And Chris Barkley, assistant to the subcommittee.

And Michael Sazonov, staff assistant, has been very helpful.

And our court reporter has had a tough day, I'm sure. It's very difficult when you have a lot of speakers, you've got echoes in the chamber and everything else, but, boy, there she is, right on the spot, so we thank Bev Herring for being here. Appreciate it.

And with that, gentlemen, if there are no other questions, we are now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

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HOMELAND SECURITY

Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to Success

Statement of Patricia A. Dalton,
Director, Strategic Issues

GAO-02-1011T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to be here to discuss issues critical to successful federal leadership of, assistance to, and partnership with state and local governments to enhance homeland security. As you are aware, the challenges posed by homeland security exceed the capacity and authority of any one level of government. Protecting the nation against these unique threats calls for a truly integrated approach, bringing together the resources of all levels of government. The President's recently released national strategy for homeland security emphasizes security as a shared national responsibility involving close cooperation among all levels of government.[1] In addition, as you know, Mr. Chairman, the House has passed (H.R. 5005), and the Senate will take under consideration, after the August recess, legislation (S. 2452) to create a Department of Homeland Security. Although the bills are different, they share the goal of establishing a statutory Department of Homeland Security.

In my testimony today, I will focus on the challenges facing the federal government in (1) establishing a leadership structure for homeland security, (2) defining the roles of different levels of government, (3) developing performance goals and measures, and (4) deploying appropriate tools to best achieve and sustain national goals. My comments are based on a body of GAO's work on terrorism and emergency preparedness and policy options for the design of federal assistance,[2] our review of many other studies,[3] and the Comptroller General's recent testimonies on the proposed Department of Homeland Security (DHS).[4] In addition, I will draw on GAO's ongoing work for this Subcommittee, including an examination of the diverse ongoing and proposed federal preparedness programs, as well as a series of case studies we are conducting that

[1] *National Strategy for Homeland Security.* The White House. Office of Homeland Security, July 16, 2002. In addition, the Office of Homeland Security has issued a companion publication titled *State and Local Actions for Homeland Security* (Washington, D.C., July 2002), which identifies measures state, and local governments are taking to improve homeland security.

[2] See attached list of related GAO products.

[3] These studies include the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Third Annual Report* (Arlington, Va., Dec. 15, 2001); and the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, *Road Map for Security: Imperative for Change* (February 15, 2001).

[4] *Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues.* GAO-02-957T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002) and *Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success.* GAO-02-886T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002).

examine preparedness issues facing state and local governments. To date, we have conducted interviews of officials in five geographically diverse cities: Baltimore, Maryland; Denver, Colorado; Los Angeles, California; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Seattle, Washington. We have also interviewed state emergency management officials in these states.

In summary:

- The proposed Department of Homeland Security will clearly have a central role in the success of efforts to enhance homeland security. Many aspects of a consolidation of homeland security programs have the potential to reduce fragmentation, improve coordination, and clarify roles and responsibilities. Realistically, however, in the short term, the magnitude of the challenges facing the new department will clearly require substantial time and effort and will take additional resources to make it effective. The recently released national strategy is intended to guide implementation of the complex mission of the proposed department and the efforts of other federal and non-federal entities responsible for homeland security initiatives.

- Appropriate roles and responsibilities within and between the levels of government and with the private sector are evolving and need to be clarified. New threats are prompting a reassessment and shifting of longstanding roles and responsibilities. Until now these shifts have been occurring on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis without benefit of an overarching framework and criteria to guide the process. The administration's national strategy recognizes the challenge posed by a complex structure of overlapping federal, state, and local governments—our country has more than 87,000 jurisdictions. There are also challenges in defining the appropriate roles and responsibilities of the private sector.

- The national strategy's initiatives often do not provide a baseline set of goals and measures upon which to assess and improve preparedness. Therefore, the nation does not yet have a comprehensive set of performance goals and measures upon which to assess and improve prevention efforts, vulnerability reduction, and responsiveness to damage and recovery needs at all levels of government. Given the need for a highly integrated approach to the homeland security challenge, national performance goals and measures for strategy initiatives that involve both federal and non-federal actors may best be developed in a collaborative way involving all levels of government and the private sector. Standards

are one tool the national strategy emphasizes in areas such as training, equipment, and communications.

- A careful choice of the most appropriate assistance tools is critical to achieve and sustain national goals. The choice and design of policy tools, such as grants, regulations, and tax incentives, can enhance the capacity of all levels of government to target areas of highest risk and greatest need, promote shared responsibilities by all parties, and track and assess progress toward achieving national preparedness goals. The national strategy notes that until recently, federal support for domestic preparedness efforts has been relatively small and disorganized, with various departments and agencies providing money in a "tangled web" of grant programs. It notes the shared responsibility of providing homeland security between federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector and recognizes the importance of using appropriate tools of government to improve preparedness.

Background

Homeland security is a complex mission that involves a broad range of functic performed throughout government, including law enforcement, transportation, food safety and public health, information technology, and emergency management, to mention only a few. Federal, state, and local governments have a shared responsibility in preparing for catastrophic terrorist attacks as well as other disasters. The initial responsibility for planning, preparing, and response falls upon local governments and their organizations—such as police, fire departments, emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies—which will almost invariably be the first responders to such an occurrence. For its part, the federal government has principally provided leadership, training, and funding assistance.

The federal government's role in responding to major disasters has historically been defined by the Stafford Act,[5] which makes most federal assistance contingent on a finding that the disaster is so severe as to be beyond the capacity of state and local governments to respond effectively. Once a disaster is declared, the federal government—through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—may reimburse state and local governments for between 75 and 100 percent of eligible costs, including response and recovery activities.

[5]Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 121 et seq.) establishes the process for states to request a presidential disaster declaration.

In addition to post disaster assistance, there has been an increasing emphasis over the past decade on federal support of state and local governments to enhance national preparedness for terrorist attacks. After the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system on March 20, 1995, and the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995, the United States initiated a new effort to combat terrorism. In June 1995, Presidential Decision Directive 39 was issued, enumerating responsibilities for federal agencies in combating terrorism, including domestic terrorism. Recognizing the vulnerability of the United States to various forms of terrorism, the Congress passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program) to train and equip state and local emergency services personnel who would likely be the first responders to a domestic terrorist event. Other federal agencies, including those in FEMA; the departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, and Energy; and the Environmental Protection Agency, have also developed programs to assist state and local governments in preparing for terrorist events.

As emphasis on terrorism prevention and response grew, however, so did concerns over coordination and fragmentation of federal efforts. More than 40 federal entities have a role in combating and responding to terrorism, and more than 20 in bioterrorism alone. Our past work, conducted prior to the establishment of an Office of Homeland Security and the current proposals to create a new Department of Homeland Security, has shown coordination and fragmentation problems stemming largely from a lack of accountability within the federal government for terrorism-related programs and activities. Further, our work found there was an absence of a central focal point that caused a lack of a cohesive effort and the development of similar and potentially duplicative programs. Also, as the Gilmore Commission report notes, state and local officials have voiced frustration about their attempts to obtain federal funds from different programs administered by different agencies and have argued that the application process is burdensome and inconsistent among federal agencies.

President Bush has taken a number of important steps in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th to address the concerns of fragmentation and to enhance the country's homeland security efforts, including creating of the Office of Homeland Security in October 2001, proposing the Department of Homeland Security in June 2002, and issuing a national strategy in July 2002. Both the House and Senate have worked diligently on these issues and are deliberating on a variety of homeland security proposals. The House has passed (H.R. 5005), and the Senate will take under consideration, after the August recess, legislation (S. 2452) to create a Department of Homeland Security. While these proposals would both transfer the functions, responsibilities, personnel, and other assets of existing agencies into the departmental structure, each bill has unique provisions not found in the other. For example, while both bills establish

an office for State and Local Government Coordination and a first responder council to advise the department, the Senate bill also establishes a Chief Homeland Security Liaison Officer appointed by the Secretary and puts federal liaisons in each state to provide coordination between the department and the state and local first responders.

Proposed Department and National Strategy Will Guide Homeland Security

The proposal to create a statutorily based Department of Homeland Security holds promise to better establish the leadership necessary in the homeland security area. It can more effectively capture homeland security as a long-term commitment grounded in the institutional framework of the nation's governmental structure. As we have previously noted, the homeland security area must span the terms of various administrations and individuals. Establishing homeland security leadership by statute will ensure legitimacy, authority, sustainability, and the appropriate accountability to the Congress and the American people.[6]

The proposals call for the creation of a Cabinet department that would be responsible for coordination with other executive branch agencies involved in homeland security, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. Additionally, the proposals call for coordination with nonfederal entities and direct the new Secretary to reach out to state and local governments and the private sector in order to: ensure adequate and integrated planning, training, and exercises occur, and that first responders have the necessary equipment; attaining interoperability of the federal government's homeland security communications systems with state and local governments' systems; oversee federal grant programs for state and local emergency response providers; and coordinate warnings and information to state and local government entities and the public.

Many aspects of the proposed consolidation of homeland security programs are in line with previous recommendations and show promise towards reducing fragmentation and improving coordination. For example, the new department would consolidate federal programs for state and local planning and preparedness from several agencies and place them under a single organizational umbrella. Based on our prior work, we believe that the consolidation of some homeland

[6]U.S. General Accounting Office, *Homeland Security: Responsibility And Accountability for Achieving National Goals.* GAO-02-627T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2002).

security functions makes sense and will, if properly organized and implemented, over time lead to more efficient, effective, and coordinated programs, better intelligence sharing, and a more robust protection of our people, borders, and critical infrastructure.

However, as the Comptroller General has recently testified,[7] implementation of the new department will be an extremely complex task, and in the short term, the magnitude of the challenges that the new department faces will clearly require substantial time and effort, and will take additional resources to make it effective. Further, some aspects of the new department, as proposed, may result in yet other concerns. For example, as we reported on June 25, 2002,[8] the new department could include public health assistance programs that have both basic public health and homeland security functions. These dual-purpose programs have important synergies that should be maintained and could potentially be disrupted by such a change.

The recently issued national strategy for homeland security states it is intended to answer four basic questions: what is "homeland security" and what missions does it entail; what does the nation seek to accomplish, and what are the most important goals of homeland security; what is the federal executive branch doing now to accomplish these goals and what should it do in the future; and what should non-federal governments, the private sector, and citizens do to help secure the homeland. Within the federal executive branch, the key organization for homeland security will be the proposed Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Defense will contribute to homeland security, as well other departments such as the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, and Health and Human Services. The national strategy also makes reference to using tools of government such as grants and regulations to improve national preparedness.

The national strategy defines homeland security as a concerted national effort to 1) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, 2) reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, 3) minimize the damage, and 4) recover from attacks that do occur. This definition should help the government more effectively administer, fund, and coordinate activities both inside and outside the proposed new department and ensure all parties are focused on the same goals and

[7]U.S. General Accounting Office, *Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, but Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success*, GAO-02-886T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002).

[8]U.S. General Accounting Office, *Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May Complicate Public Health Priority Setting*, GAO-02-883T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002).

objectives. The three parts of the definition form the national strategy's three objectives.

The strategy identifies six critical mission areas, and outlines initiatives in each of the six mission areas. It further describes four foundations that cut across these mission areas and all levels of government. These foundations— law; science and technology; information sharing and systems; and international cooperation— are intended to provide a basis for evaluating homeland security investments across the federal government. Table 1 summarizes key intergovernmental roles in each of the six mission areas as presented in the strategy.

Table 1: National Strategy: Six Critical Mission Areas and Key Intergovernmental Roles

Mission Area	Key Intergovernmental Roles
Intelligence and Warning	• Work with state and local law enforcement to leverage critical intelligence information, and provide real-time actionable information in the form of protective actions that should be taken in light of terrorist threats, trends, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. • Provide announcements of threat advisories and alerts to notify law enforcement and state and local government officials of threats through the Homeland Security Advisory System.
Border and Transportation Security	• Implementation of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 requires partnerships among federal, state, and local government officials to assess and protect critical transportation infrastructures and reduce vulnerabilities.
Domestic Counterterrorism	• Expand access to information in federal databases such as the FBI National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. • Expand the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, representing numerous federal agencies and state and local law enforcement, to all 56 FBI field offices.
Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets	• Work with state and local governments to implement a comprehensive national infrastructure protection plan to ensure protection for critical assets, systems, and functions, and for sharing protection responsibility with state and local government. • Provide state and local agencies one primary federal contact for coordinating protection activities with the federal government (e.g. vulnerability assessments, strategic planning efforts, and exercises).
Defending Against Catastrophic Threats	• In cooperation with state and local governments, develop additional inspection procedures and detection systems throughout the national transportation structure to detect the movement of nuclear materials within the U.S. • Expand and modernize the Centers for Disease Control Epidemic Intelligence Service to better train local and state officials in recognizing biological attacks, and state and local jurisdictions with a population of 500,000 or more will be provided with resources to hire skilled epidemiologists.
Emergency Preparedness and Response	• Working with state and local public safety organizations, build a comprehensive national incident management system to respond to terrorist incidents and natural disasters, and encourage first responder organizations to adopt the already widespread Incident Management System by making it a requirement for federal grants. • Provide grants in support of state and local preparedness efforts in areas such as

	mutual aid agreements; terrorism-related communications equipment; training and equipping of state and local health care personnel to deal with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism; planning for the receipt and distribution of medicines from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile; equipping, training, and exercising first responders to meet certification standards. • Proposed grant requirements include: compliance with a national emergency communication plan, progress in achieving communications interoperability with other emergency response bodies, and annual certification of first responder preparedness to handle and decontaminate any hazard. • Consolidate all grant programs that distribute federal funds to state and local first responders. The First Responder Initiative proposes to increase federal funding levels more than tenfold to $3.5 billion in fiscal year 2003.

With regard to the costs of Homeland Security, the national strategy emphasizes government should fund only those homeland security activities that are not supplied, or are inadequately supplied, in the market, and cost sharing between different governmental levels should reflect federalism principles and different tools of government. In terms of the financial contributions made by state and local government to homeland security, the strategy acknowledges that state and local governments are incurring unexpected costs defending or protecting their respective communities. These costs include protecting critical infrastructure, improving technologies for information sharing and communications, and building emergency response capacity. At this time, the National Governors' Association estimates that additional homeland security-related costs, incurred since September 11 and through the end of 2002, will reach approximately $6 billion. Similarly, the U.S. Conference of Mayors has estimated the costs incurred by cities during this time period to be $2.6 billion.

Challenges Remain in Defining Appropriate Intergovernmental Roles

The proposed department will be a key player in the daunting challenge of defining the roles of the various actors within the intergovernmental system responsible for homeland security. In areas ranging from fire protection to drinking water to port security, the new threats are prompting a reassessment and shift of longstanding roles and responsibilities. However, until this time, proposed shifts in roles and responsibilities have been considered on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis without benefit of an overarching framework and criteria to guide this process. The national strategy recognizes that the process is challenging because of the structure of overlapping federal, state, and local governments given that our country has more than 87,000 jurisdictions. The national strategy further notes that the challenge is to develop interconnected and complementary systems that are reinforcing rather than duplicative.

The proposals for a Department of Homeland Security call for the department to reach out to state and local governments and the private sector to coordinate and

integrate planning, communications, information, and recovery efforts addressing homeland security. This is important recognition of the critical role played by nonfederal entities in protecting the nation from terrorist attacks. State and local governments play primary roles in performing functions that will be essential to effectively address our new challenges. Much attention has already been paid to their role as first responders in all disasters, whether caused by terrorist attacks or natural hazards.

The national strategy emphasizes the critical role state and local governments play in homeland security and the need for coordination between all levels of government. The national strategy emphasizes that homeland security is a shared responsibility. Table 1 provides several examples of areas with key intergovernmental roles and coordination. . In addition, the national strategy has several initiatives designed to improve partnerships and coordination. For example, there are initiatives to improve intergovernmental law enforcement coordination and enabling effective partnerships with state and local governments and the private sector in critical infrastructure protection. States are asked to take several legal initiatives, such as coordinating suggested minimum standards for state driver's licenses and reviewing quarantine authorities. Many initiatives are intended to develop or enhance first responder capabilities, such as initiatives to improve the technical capabilities of first responders or enable seamless communication among all responders. In many cases, these initiatives will rely on federal, state, and local cooperation, some standardization, and the sharing of costs.

National and Regional Partnerships

Achieving national preparedness and response goals hinges on the federal government's ability to form effective partnerships with nonfederal entities. Therefore, federal initiatives should be conceived as national, not federal in nature. Decision makers have to balance the national interest of prevention and preparedness with the unique needs and interests of local communities. A "one-size-fits-all" federal approach will not serve to leverage the assets and capabilities that reside within state and local governments and the private sector. By working collectively with state and local governments, the federal government gains the resources and expertise of the people closest to the challenge. For example, protecting infrastructure such as water and transit systems lays first and most often with nonfederal levels of government.

Just as partnerships offer opportunities, they also pose risks based upon the different interests reflected by each partner. From the federal perspective, there is the concern that state and local governments may not share the same priorities for use of federal funds. This divergence of priorities can result in state and local governments simply replacing ("supplanting") their own previous levels of

commitment in these areas with the new federal resources. From the state and local perspective, engagement in federal programs opens them up to potential federal preemption and mandates. From the public's perspective, partnerships if not clearly defined, risk blurring responsibility for the outcome of public programs.

Our fieldwork at federal agencies and at local governments suggests a shift is potentially underway in the definition of roles and responsibilities between federal, state, and local governments with far reaching consequences for homeland security and accountability to the public. The challenges posed by the new threats are prompting officials at all levels of government to rethink long-standing divisions of responsibilities for such areas as fire services, local infrastructure protection, and airport security. Current homeland security proposals recognize that the unique scale and complexity of these threats call for a response that taps the resources and capacities of all levels of government as well as the private sector.

In many areas, these proposals would impose a stronger federal presence in the form of new national standards or assistance. For instance, the Congress is considering proposals to mandate new vulnerability assessments and protective measures on local communities for drinking water facilities. Similarly, new federal rules have mandated local airport authorities to provide new levels of protection for security around airport perimeters. The block grant proposal for first responders would mark a dramatic upturn in the magnitude and role of the federal government in providing assistance and standards for fire service training and equipment.

Additionally, the national strategy suggests initiatives for an expanded state role in several areas. For example, there are no national or agreed upon state standards for driver's license content, format, or acquisition procedures. The strategy states that the federal government should support state-led efforts to develop suggested minimum standards for drivers' licenses. In another example, in order to suppress money laundering, the strategy recommends that states assess the current status of their regulation regarding providers of financial services and work to adopt uniform laws as necessary.

Governments at the local level are also moving to rethink roles and responsibilities to address the unique scale and scope of the contemporary threats from terrorism. Numerous local general-purpose governments and special districts co-exist within metropolitan regions and rural areas alike. Many regions are starting to assess how to restructure relationships among contiguous local entities to take advantage of economies of scale, promote resource sharing, and improve coordination of preparedness and response on a regional basis. In our

case studies of five metropolitan areas, we have identified several common forms of regional cooperation and coordination including special task forces or working groups, improved collaboration among public health entities, increased countywide planning, mutual aid agreements, and communications. These partnerships are at varying stages of development and are continuing to evolve. Table 2 summarizes these initiatives.

Table 2: Case Study Examples of Metropolitan Cooperation and Coordination

- **Task Forces and Working Groups:** To facilitate emergency planning and coordination among cities in a metropolitan area, officials have joined together to create task forces, such as terrorism working groups, advisory committees, and Mayors' caucuses. For example, the Metropolitan Safety, Security, and Anti-terrorism Task Force in New Orleans includes officials from the city and four surrounding parishes.
- **Collaboration with Public Health Entities:** Public health departments, emergency medical services, and hospitals are participating in planning efforts to coordinate use of limited resources such as emergency room capacity, hospital beds, and medical supplies. For example, in Denver, the Front Range Emergency Medical Service and Trauma Advisory Council involves all hospitals and rescue squads in a six-county metropolitan area.
- **Countywide Planning:** In some states, counties serve as the primary coordinating agent and work with cities within their jurisdiction, other counties, and the state to ensure that they develop and update emergency and disaster plans, provide training, conduct assessments and exercises, and have adequate emergency resources. For example, King County, Washington has coordinated development of a Regional Disaster Plan, which includes Seattle and 15 other cities within the county as well as 15 fire districts, 15 hospitals, 21 water and sewer districts, 12 school districts, and the private sector.
- **Mutual Aid Agreements:** Cities and counties have used mutual aid agreements to share emergency resources in their metropolitan areas. These agreements may include fire, police, emergency medical services, and hospitals and may be formal or informal. For example, Los Angeles has mutual aid agreements between police and fire departments in surrounding jurisdictions and a range of private sector entities. The state has a Mutual Aid Regional Advisory Commission that facilitates agreements, and the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) law requires mutual aid agreements for state reimbursement.
- **Communications:** Cities and counties currently use a variety of methods for communicating among first responders, such as command centers, using radio, cell phones, and pagers; amateur radio operators; and community alert systems, and are considering moving towards interoperable radio systems and mobile incident command centers to direct communications. King County, Washington has a countywide 800 MHz system and uses amateur radio operators to provide a redundant emergency communications system.

Although promising greater levels of protection than before, these shifts in roles and responsibilities have been developed on an ad hoc piecemeal basis without the benefit of common criteria. An ad hoc process may not capture the real potential each actor in our system offers. Moreover, a piecemeal redefinition of roles risks the further fragmentation of the responsibility for homeland security within local communities, blurring lines of responsibility and accountability fo

results. While federal, state, and local governments all have roles to play, care must be taken to clarify who is responsible for what so that the public knows whom to contact to address their problems and concerns. Current homeland security initiatives provide an opportunity to more systematically identify the unique resources and capacities of each level of government and better match these capabilities to the particular tasks at hand. If implemented in a partnerial fashion, the national strategy can also promote the participation, input, and buy in of state and local partners whose cooperation is essential for success.

Performance Goals and Measures Needed in Homeland Security Programs

The proposed department, in fulfilling its broad mandate, has the challenge of developing a national performance focus. The national strategy is a good start in defining strategic objectives and related mission areas, plus foundations that cut across the mission areas. The national strategy's initiatives to implement the objectives under the related mission and foundation areas extend from building capabilities to achieving specific outcomes.

According to the national strategy, each department and agency is to be held accountable for its performance on homeland security efforts. However, the initiatives often do not provide a baseline set of goals and measures upon which to assess and improve many of its initiatives to prevent attacks, reduce the nation's vulnerability to attacks, or minimize the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur. For example, the initiative of creating "smart borders" requires a clear specification of what is expected of a smart border, including consideration of security and economic aspects of moving people and goods.

Specific performance goals and measures for many initiatives will occur at a later date. The strategy states that each department or agency will create benchmarks and other performance measures to evaluate progress and allocate future resources. Performance measures will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of each homeland security program, allowing agencies to measure their progress, make resource allocation decisions, and adjust priorities. As the national strategy and related implementation plans evolve, we would expect clearer performance expectations to emerge. Given the need for a highly integrated approach to the homeland security challenge, national performance goals and measures may best be developed in a collaborative way involving all levels of government and the private sector.

Assessing the capability of state and local governments to respond to catastrophic terrorist attacks is an important feature of the national strategy and the responsibilities of the proposed new department. The President's

fiscal year 2003 budget proposal acknowledged that our capabilities for responding to a terrorist attack vary widely across the country. The national strategy recognizes the importance of standards and performance measures in areas such as training, equipment, and communications. For example, the national strategy proposes the establishment of national standards for emergency response training and preparedness. These standards would require certain coursework for individuals to receive and maintain certification as first responders and for state and local governments to receive federal grants. Under the strategy, the proposed department would establish a national exercise program designed to educate and evaluate civilian response personnel at all levels of government. It would require individuals and government bodies to complete successfully at least one exercise every year. The department would use these exercises to measure performance and allocate future resources.

Standards are being developed in other areas associated with homeland security, yet formidable challenges remain. For example, national standards that would apply to all ports and all public and private facilities are well under way. In preparing to assess security conditions at 55 U.S. ports, the Coast Guard's contractor has been developing a set of standards since May 2002. These standards cover such things as preventing unauthorized persons from accessing sensitive areas, detecting and intercepting intrusions, and checking backgrounds of those whose jobs require access to port facilities. However, challenges remain in finalizing a complete set of standards for the level of security needed in the nation's ports, resolving issues between key stakeholders that have conflicting or competing interests, and establishing mechanisms for enforcement. Moreover, because security at ports is a concern shared among federal, state, and local governments, as well as among private commercial interests, the issue of who should pay to finance antiterrorism activities may be difficult to resolve.

Communications is an example of an area for which standards have not yet been developed, but various emergency managers and other first responders have continuously highlighted that standards are needed. State and local governments often report that there are deficiencies in their communications capabilities, including the lack of interoperable systems. The national strategy recognizes that it is crucial for response personnel to have and use equipment, systems, and procedures that allow them to communicate. Therefore, the strategy calls for the proposed Department of Homeland Security to develop a national communication plan to establish protocols (who needs to talk to whom), processes, and national standards for technology acquisition. According to the national strategy, this is a priority for fiscal year 2003 funding which ties all federal grant programs that support state and local purchase of terrorism-relate communications equipment to this communication plan.

The establishment of specific national goals and measures for homeland security initiatives, including preparedness, will not only go a long way towards assisting state and local entities in determining successes and areas where improvement is needed, but could also be used as goals and performance measures as a basis for assessing the effectiveness of federal programs. The Administration should take advantage of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and its performance tools of strategic plans, annual performance plans and measures, and accountability reports for homeland security implementation planning. At the department and agency level, until the new department is operational, GPRA can be a useful tool in developing homeland security implementation plans within and across federal agencies. Given the recent and proposed increases in homeland security funding, as well as the need for real and meaningful improvements in preparedness, establishing clear goals and performance measures is critical to ensuring both a successful and fiscally responsible effort.

Appropriate Tools Need to Be Selected for Providing Assistance

The choice and design of the policy tools the federal government uses to engage and involve other levels of government and the private sector in enhancing homeland security will have important consequences for performance and accountability. Governments have a variety of policy tools including grants, regulations, tax incentives, and information-sharing mechanisms to motivate or mandate other levels of government or the private sector to address security concerns. The choice of policy tools will affect sustainability of efforts, accountability and flexibility, and targeting of resources. The design of federal policy will play a vital role in determining success and ensuring that scarce federal dollars are used to achieve critical national goals. The national strategy acknowledges the shared responsibility of providing homeland security between federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector and recognizes the importance of using tools of government such as grants, regulations, and information sharing to improve national preparedness.

Grants

The federal government often uses grants to state and local governments as a means of delivering federal assistance. Categorical grants typically permit funds to be used only for specific, narrowly defined purposes. Block grants typically can be used by state and local governments to support a range of activities aimed at achieving a broad, national purpose and to provide a great deal of discretion to state and local officials. In designing grants, it is important to (1) target the funds to states and localities with the greatest need based on highest risk and lowest capacity to meet these needs from their own resource bases, (2) discourage the replacement of state and local funds with federal funds, commonly referred to as supplantation, with a maintenance-of-effort requirement that recipients maintain their level of previous funding, and (3) strike a balance between accountability and flexibility. At their best, grants can stimulate state and local governments to

enhance their preparedness to address the unique threats posed by terrorism. Ideally, grants should stimulate higher levels of preparedness and avoid simply subsidizing local functions that are traditionally state or local responsibilities. One approach used in other areas is the "seed money" model in which federal grants stimulate initial state and local activity with the intent of transferring responsibility for sustaining support over time to state and local governments.

Recent funding proposals, such as the $3.5 billion block grant for first responders contained in the president's fiscal year 2003 budget, have included some of these provisions. This grant would be used by state and local governments to purchase equipment; train personnel; and exercise, develop, or enhance response plans. Once the details of the grant have been finalized, it will be useful to examine the design to assess how well the grant will target funds, discourage supplantation, and provide the appropriate balance between accountability and flexibility, and whether it provides temporary "seed money" or represents a long-term funding commitment.

Regulations

Other federal policy tools can also be designed and targeted to elicit a prompt, adequate, and sustainable response. In the area of regulatory authority, the federal, state, and local governments share authority for setting standards through regulations in several areas, including infrastructure and programs vital to preparedness (for example, transportation systems, water systems, and public health). In designing regulations, key considerations include how to provide federal protections, guarantees, or benefits while preserving an appropriate balance between federal and state and local authorities and between the public and private sectors. Regulations have recently been enacted in the area of infrastructure. For example, a new federal mandate requires that local drinking water systems in cities above a certain size provide a vulnerability assessment and a plan to remedy vulnerabilities as part of ongoing EPA reviews, while the Transportation and Aviation Security Act grants the Department of Transportation authority to order deployment of local law enforcement personnel in order to provide perimeter access security at the nation's airports.

In designing a regulatory approach, the challenges include determining who will set the standards and who will implement or enforce them. Several models of shared regulatory authority offer a range of approaches that could be used in designing standards for preparedness. Examples of these models range from

preemption through fixed federal standards to state and local adoption of voluntary standards formulated by quasi-official or nongovernmental entities.[9]

Tax Incentives

As the administration noted, protecting America's infrastructure is a shared responsibility of federal, state, and local government, in active partnership with the private sector, which owns approximately 85 percent of our nation's critical infrastructure. To the extent that private entities will be called upon to improve security over dangerous materials or to protect critical infrastructure, the federal government can use tax incentives to encourage or enforce their activities. Tax incentives are the result of special exclusions, exemptions, deductions, credits, deferrals, or tax rates in the federal tax laws. Unlike grants, tax incentives do not generally permit the same degree of federal oversight and targeting, and they are generally available by formula to all potential beneficiaries who satisfy congressionally established criteria.

Information Sharing

Since the events of September 11th, a task force of mayors and police chiefs has called for a new protocol governing how local law enforcement agencies can assist federal agencies, particularly the FBI. As the U.S. Conference of Mayors noted, a close working partnership of federal and local law enforcement agencies, which includes the sharing of information, will expand and strengthen the nation's overall ability to prevent and respond to domestic terrorism. The USA Patriot Act provides for greater sharing of information among federal agencies. An expansion of this act has been proposed (S1615; H.R. 3285) that would provide for information sharing among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. In addition, the Intergovernmental Law Enforcement Information Sharing Act of 2001 (H.R. 3483), which you sponsored, Mr. Chairman, addresses a number of information-sharing needs. For instance, the proposed legislation provides that the Attorney General expeditiously grant security clearances to Governors who apply for them and to state and local officials who participate in federal counterterrorism working groups or regional task forces.

The national strategy also includes several information-sharing and systems initiatives to facilitate dissemination of information from the federal government to state and local officials. For example, the strategy supports building and sharing law enforcement databases, secure computer networks, secure video teleconferencing capabilities, and more accessible websites. It also states that the

[9]For more information on these models, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Regulatory Programs: Balancing Federal and State Responsibilities for Standard Setting and Implementation.* GAO-02-495 (Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2002).

federal government will make an effort to remove classified information from some documents to facilitate distribution to more state and local authorities.

Conclusion

The recent publication of the national strategy is an important initial step in defining homeland security, setting forth key strategic objectives, and specifying initiatives to implement them. The proposals for the Department of Homeland Security represent recognition by the administration and the Congress that much still needs to be done to improve and enhance the security of the American people and our country's assets. The proposed department will clearly have a central role in the success of efforts to strengthen homeland security, and has primary responsibility for many of the initiatives in the national homeland security strategy.

Moreover, given the unpredictable characteristics of terrorist threats, it is essential that the strategy be implemented at a national rather than federal level with specific attention given to the important and distinct roles of state and local governments. Accordingly, decision makers will have to balance the federal approach to promoting homeland security with the unique needs, capabilities, and interests of state and local governments. Such an approach offers the best promise for sustaining the level of commitment needed to address the serious threats posed by terrorism.

This completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.

Contacts and Acknowledgments

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House Committee on Government Reform
SUBCOMMITEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Statement by Ellen M. Gordon
Iowa Emergency Management Division Administrator
Homeland Security Advisor to Governor Thomas J. Vilsack

INTRODUCTION:

Thank you Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, for the opportunity to testify before you concerning federal government assistance to state and local governments in preparing for a potential terrorist attack involving biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.

State and local emergency management has a long history of preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and mitigating the effects of disasters whether natural, man-made, or technological. Our success is based on taking a multi-hazard approach, analyzing the hazards that face our state, determining the level of vulnerability to these hazards and preparing and coordinating the appropriate response. The events of September 11, 2001 emphasized the need many times over, to increase our efforts on terrorism preparedness.

Growing concern about the threat of terrorism began after the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in April 1995. At that time the emergency management began working with key state and federal agencies to develop a strategy for dealing with terrorism and use of weapons of mass destruction. In December 1999 the Emergency Management Division worked with key stakeholders to develop and publish the *State of Iowa Strategic Plan for Domestic Preparedness*. This plan was submitted to the Iowa General Assembly in January 2000, was revised in 2001, and became the basis for further strategic planning in the wake of the September 11 attacks.

Prior to September 11 the we began working with stakeholders, including federal, state, and local agencies such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Iowa Departments of Agriculture, Public Safety, Public Defense, Transportation, and Public Health, and local emergency management agencies to develop a Foot and Mouth Disease disaster plan. While not considered a terrorist threat at that time, it was recognized that the threat of foot-and-mouth disease, regardless of how it was introduced, could seriously impact the economic stability of the state and the nation.

While we have been working with federal, state and local agencies regarding the threat of terrorism prior to the attacks of September 11, the Iowa Homeland Security Initiative began in earnest in October 2001 when Governor Vilsack appointed me his Homeland Security Advisor. In this capacity I am authorized by state statute to administer all of Iowa's emergency management and homeland security affairs.

At the time of my appointment, the Governor issued to all state department directors and agency heads a memorandum outlining both the mission of the homeland security initiative and the responsibilities of the Advisor. The Governor directed that I "coordinate the executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the State of Iowa."

Iowa Homeland Security Initiative – Phase One

While Iowa was not directly affected by the attacks of September 11, the impacts to the state were significant. Not only did the state begin to suffer the adverse economic impacts resulting from the attacks, but the Iowa National Guard moved to provide security at Iowa's seven commercial airports. State agencies deployed personnel under the provisions of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to New York and Washington, D.C. Security was bolstered at state and local facilities and we monitored the actions of the federal government and the country.

One of the first tasks was to compile an inventory of the state's most critical public and private sector assets. An initial list of over 12,000 assets was assembled and later assessed against a model developed that uses a series of factors to measure asset criticality and vulnerability. Through this process the inventory was reduced to approximately 1000 critical assets. These assets represent governmental, economic, and symbolic elements in the state, including major utility, communication, water, and transportation infrastructures, primary public health facilities and symbolic targets.

The model was developed through a cooperative effort of the Division, the Department of Public Defense, and Iowa State University, as well as input from many state, local and private agencies. This model has been discussed with the federal Office of Homeland Security and was adopted by the American Association of State Highway Traffic Officers (AASHTO) as a method for assessing critical transportation assets.

At the same time the critical asset inventory was being compiled and assessed, the state also conducted a preliminary evaluation of the adequacy of the security features within its own

electronic infrastructure system. This evaluation led to the development of electronic intrusion prevention and attack protection recommendations that are now included in the proposed state strategy document, *The Iowa Homeland Security Initiative: Envisioning the Future.*

A major component of the initial asset protection effort was a comprehensive review of the security requirements for the State Capitol Building and the Capitol Complex. Led by the directors of the Departments of General Services and Public Safety, this important appraisal resulted in the Governor requesting and the Iowa General Assembly appropriating $1.85 million to upgrade these facilities to meet new security demands.

A community-oriented toolkit was prepared to assist local officials, law enforcement personnel, public health and school administrators, and concerned citizens in identifying specific action steps that communities could take to develop and maintain local preparedness programs. The community-based resource notebook was made available to all of Iowa's counties through the state's network of county emergency management coordinators.

The state escalated the timeframe to complete a comprehensive rewrite of the *State Emergency Plan*, coordinating more than 25 multi-agency teams charged with refining each functional area of the plan and developing a terrorism annex. This updated plan will soon be submitted to involved agencies for their final review and it is expected that the plan will be finalized by November 1, 2002.

The Emergency Management Division coordinated a number of training and informational sessions for state and local agencies, civic groups and citizens. Subjects ranged from terrorism awareness and response to incident command and emergency operations center operations, to bomb detection.

In response to the anthrax contamination in the northeast United States and Washington D.C. and the threat of contamination in Iowa, the state worked with the FBI, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the U.S. Postal Service, the Iowa Departments of Public Safety, Public Health and General Services to develop mail and package handling procedures for distribution to state and local public agencies. The FBI, Iowa Departments of Public Safety and Public Health responded to a number of cases of threats of anthrax contamination and the University of Iowa Hygienic Laboratory conducted testing for cases that were believed to be a credible threat.

Finally, the Department of Public Health developed a robust, comprehensive public health strategy in response to criteria established by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in anticipation of federal counter bio-terrorism funds. As a part of this initiative the director of the department established the Office of Disease Epidemiology and Disaster

Preparedness which has two centers: 1) The Center for Acute Disease Epidemiology and 2) The Center for Disaster Operations and Response. This public health strategy contemplates virtually every facet of Iowa's healthcare industry and fully complements the State's broad domestic preparedness approach articulated in the *Homeland Security Initiative; Envisioning the Future* report.

Iowa Homeland Security Initiative – Phase Two

The second phase of Iowa's homeland security initiative addressed the degree to which the critical assets in the inventory exhibited vulnerability against an array of threat scenarios and conditions. A matrix of 32 progressively prohibitive security measures, keyed to the national Homeland Security Advisory System, was designed to provide a graduated deployment of protection resources as threat levels increased.

These and other measures, intended to either eliminate or mitigate known vulnerabilities, were contained in a Critical Asset Protection Plan submitted to the Governor late last year. The plan outlined preliminary areas of concern that could be addressed within six to eighteen months, but it also recognized that a long-range plan, encompassing goals and objectives over the next three years and beyond, was needed to provide focus and direction for all state and local programs.

The gathering and sharing of information and intelligence between public safety, public defense, public health, and animal and environmental health sectors represents the single most important prevention strategy in Iowa's domestic preparedness efforts. The Homeland Security Information Sharing Task Force was established with 35 members representing federal, state, and local governmental entities, as well as the private sector. This task force first met in May 2002 to consider how best to meet the information needs of both state and local agencies. The task force is guided by the requirement to address the following minimum outcomes:

- The development of information sharing protocol between federal, state and local agencies in primary sectors of public safety and human, animal, and environmental health.

- The development of a homeland security information coordination center to assess information and intelligence.

- The development of information dissemination and threat notification procedures for local fire and emergency medical service personnel, emergency management coordinators, local public health officials and other medical professionals, critical asset holders, the media, and the general public.

Early this year the State of Iowa was selected by the National Governor's Association to be one of eight states to participate in a year-long bio-terrorism policy academy. The state team includes representatives from the Governor's office, the Attorney General's office, the Department of Public Health, the Department of Public Safety, and local public health and law enforcement agencies. This team has chosen to address and develop policy around the issues associated with quarantines.

The Emergency Management Division has processed and delivered more than $2 million FFY 1999-2001 dollars worth of personal protective, communications, and detection equipment to state and local first responders under a grant program provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Forty-one counties participated in the first three fiscal year grants. First responder organizations in those counties and at the state level identified well over $25 million in equipment needs. This program will be expanded in distributing an additional $4.3 million in FFY 02 grant money. All of Iowa's 99 counties have now expressed and interest in participating in the program.

The Iowa Department of Public Health has received and is distributing $11.5 million in Centers for Disaster Control and Prevent grants to address a number of public health-related focus areas to include: Preparedness Planning and Readiness Assessment; Surveillance and Epidemiology Capacity; Laboratory Capacity – Biological Agents; Health Alert Network and Communications and Information Technology; Risk Communication and Health Information Dissemination; Education and Training. An additional $1.3 million in Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) grants is being distributed to hospitals to enhance their capabilities and capacities.

Iowa Homeland Security Initiative – Phase Three

On Friday, August 9, 2002, I released Iowa's proposed domestic preparedness strategy, *The Iowa Homeland Security Initiative: Envisioning the Future,* to the stakeholders and general public for review and comment. This comprehensive strategy recognizes the need to address issues related to the terrorist threat to infrastructure and symbolic targets but understands the threat of agro-terrorism and the impact that an attack on agriculture and the nation's food supply would have on the physical, economic, and psychological well-being of Iowans and the nation. This strategy includes the following broad components:

- Consequence management planning that incorporates leadership succession procedures for the chief executive, key state elected officials, and primary department heads; incident management training for top executives in state government; and enhanced Capitol Complex disaster response plans that contemplate asset destruction scenarios.

- Establishment of state and local readiness benchmarks in areas of planning, training, equipment, and exercising.

- A Domestic Preparedness Response Network that provides for the gathering and sharing of sensitive information; an information threat assessment center; and information dissemination process for the general public, emergency response units, the media, and critical asset holders; real-time monitoring of air quality, drinking water supplies, and other human, animal, and environmental health areas; infectious disease surveillance, epidemiology, and response; and real-time, in-field emergency and database information for first responders.

- A comprehensive agro-terrorism and food security program that involves a Midwest regional agro-terrorism compact; a Midwest regional animal pharmaceutical stockpile; strategic state and regional animal vaccination plans; rapid response veterinary teams; and health alert protocols.

- Web-based planning tools for local governments and the private sector to inventory and assess critical assets and develop appropriate critical asset protection plans; Web-based training for health professionals, veterinarians, law enforcement, and fire officials; Web-based databases specific to law enforcement and human, animal, and environmental health sectors; and the utilization of other technologies that increase the communication capability between law enforcement, first responders, hospitals and other health clinics, and human, animal, wildlife, and environmental laboratories.

- Terrorism specific training for hospitals and other health care facilities that covers bio-terrorism emergency protocols for patient care, staffing, resource conversion, security, surge capacity, and alternative medical sites; mass casualty report training for all medical professionals; and specialized law enforcement training that involves developing written policies and procedures for managing various aspects of terrorism preparedness, including managing a critical incident, coordinating threat assessment information, acquiring and utilizing new technologies; enhancing intelligence gathering capabilities, and forming multi-jurisdictional agreements and counter-terrorism units.

- An expanded multi-year strategic exercise program within the Iowa Emergency Management Division to include annual exercise objectives that incorporate multi-state, statewide, regional, multi-county, and county exercises; integration with Iowa's statewide fiber optic network (Iowa Communications Network – ICN) to test real-time, in-field reporting to the State Emergency Operations Center; and exercises involving a biological release, a foreign animal disease outbreak, anthrax, the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, and a coordinated, multi-dimensional scenario.

- A comprehensive bio-terrorism initiative that implements a forensic public health model to provide greater communication and coordination between public safety and public health officials; that enhances and enlarges the local public health response infrastructure; that develops rapid surveillance and epidemiological detection and response systems that focus on hospital surge

capacity and mass immunizations; and that improves and equips the state's entire human, animal, wildlife, and environmental health laboratory system for a wide range of biological and chemical agents.

Iowa Homeland Security Initiative – Next Steps

An organizational plan for the Homeland Security Initiative will now be developed for implementing and coordinating the objectives outlined in the strategy. The organizational plan will explore current state government systems and structures to determine if they are adequately positioned and resourced to fulfill the homeland objectives.

An operational plan will also be developed to help prioritize the implementation schedule for the many objectives included in the Initiative. All recommendations are considered the state's priorities, but they cannot all be implemented simultaneously. The operational plan will identify those objectives that should take precedence over others.

Federal Issues of Concern

As Iowa moves forward with its Homeland Security Initiative we understand that our success will rely heavily on the coordination, cooperation, and assistance we receive from all levels of government and private enterprise. The federal government has been providing some financial resources, technical assistance, and leadership in a number of key areas.

Iowa has benefited from participation in the U.S. Department of Justice equipment grant program, grants from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and a single grant from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. We also recognize that in each case the expressed need far exceeds the amount of assistance that has been made available.

Earlier this year, the State of Iowa joined the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), the International Association of Emergency Management (IAEM), and others in requesting funding as part of the FFY 02 supplemental appropriation that was being discussed by Congress. At that time, a national survey conducted by NEMA showed an unmet need of $2.1 billion in the areas of support for state and local emergency management, emergency operating facilities, and interoperable communications and warning systems.

While current discussion is primarily focused on assistance to first responders – police, fire, and emergency medical agencies we cannot afford to forget others that play a vital role in the implementation of homeland security initiatives. We recognize and strongly urge the support for local response agencies who have incurred a tremendous cost in focusing their time and resources

to ensure we have a strong homeland security posture. However, we must also recognize the efforts and costs incurred by our human services and public health agencies as they become more immersed in homeland security and domestic preparedness.

Local emergency managers have a vital role in coordinating mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery functions at the local and state levels. A primary source of funding for these agencies is the FEMA Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG). This program provides "pass-through" dollars from state to local governments to provide a foundation for emergency management functions.

The EMPG program is intended to be a 50/50 matching contribution program between federal, state, and local governments. Unfortunately, EMPG funds have been virtually the only area where FEMA has not received an increase in the past eight years, thereby eroding state and local emergency management capabilities. The estimated shortfall in Iowa alone exceeds $13.3 million.

Of course, matching fund programs do require match dollars. However, with declining or stagnant state and local economies, it is increasingly difficult to meet the match requirements. Even if Congress were to approve substantial increases in matching grant programs such as EMPG, states and local governments may be unable to access these funds because of their inability to budget matching funds. For this reason we request that Congress carefully review and consider any requirements for matching funds as a condition to participation in grant programs.

The federal equipment program continues to be a critically important funding stream to help build local, regional, and state emergency response capabilities. The State of Iowa is projected to have received an estimated total of $6.7 million by the end of FFY 2003. While these federal allocations are indeed helping the state build its response capacity, they are overshadowed by an unmet equipment need over of $25 million that was estimated in just 41 or Iowa's 99 counties.

Congress should not loose sight that while money for equipment is necessary, state and local governments must also have the money to provide the personnel to manage and implement Homeland Security initiatives and programs.

The federal government must take a leadership role in helping to solve problems that are of mutual concern to all state and local governments. They must take the lead in evolving integrated technologies and in solving telecommunications interoperability problems. The basic ability to communicate is essential for a coordinated and effective emergency disaster response effort. In addition, there is a need for adoption of a national requirement for a standardized

Incident Management System to be used by all response organizations at all levels of government.

Congress should strategically invest in initiatives and programs and enhance the nation's capability to respond to and recover from terrorist attack. National standards should be established requiring exacting levels of expertise and capability for emergency response and management organizations. National focus should be given to current accreditation programs for fire, police, and emergency medical personnel and organizations, as well as to the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) developed by NEMA. Congress should invest in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) as a ready mechanism for promoting mutual aid between the states and territories.

When Congress looks at the coordinated effort required to combat an array of terrorist threats, it needs to look beyond traditional first responders (police, fire, and emergency medical) and begin to include public works, state and local emergency management officials, state transportation teams, Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), Disaster Mortuary Assistance Teams (DMORTs) and others that play an integral role in a total response and recovery effort.

Finally, we support the concept for the establishment of the new Department of Homeland Security. We feel that bringing together the diverse agencies and functions to form a coordinated, integrated, and comprehensive approach to address the issues of homeland security and domestic preparedness is essential. For too long we have experienced the piece-meal, stove-piped, confusing, and often bureaucratic approach to attacking this issue. We strongly urge Congress to embrace a national strategy that examines and joins all functions and agencies responsible for homeland security into a cohesive unit. We urge you to continue to gather information and input from response organizations, emergency managers, private enterprise and other stakeholders as you deliberate and make decisions on this critical initiative.

Thank you for your time and the opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to respond to any questions you might have.