[House Hearing, 108 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] INVESTIGATION OF MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY ======================================================================= HEARINGS before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS of the COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ FEBRUARY 26 and MARCH 12, 2003 __________ Serial No. 108-13 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/ house __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2003 86-048PS For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana, Chairman MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan JOE BARTON, Texas Ranking Member FRED UPTON, Michigan HENRY A. WAXMAN, California CLIFF STEARNS, Florida EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio RALPH M. HALL, Texas JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania RICK BOUCHER, Virginia CHRISTOPHER COX, California EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York NATHAN DEAL, Georgia FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey RICHARD BURR, North Carolina SHERROD BROWN, Ohio Vice Chairman BART GORDON, Tennessee ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky PETER DEUTSCH, Florida CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming ANNA G. ESHOO, California JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois BART STUPAK, Michigan HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, GENE GREEN, Texas Mississippi KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri VITO FOSSELLA, New York TED STRICKLAND, Ohio ROY BLUNT, Missouri DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado STEVE BUYER, Indiana LOIS CAPPS, California GEORGE RADANOVICH, California MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania TOM ALLEN, Maine MARY BONO, California JIM DAVIS, Florida GREG WALDEN, Oregon JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois LEE TERRY, Nebraska HILDA L. SOLIS, California ERNIE FLETCHER, Kentucky MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey MIKE ROGERS, Michigan DARRELL E. ISSA, California C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho David V. Marventano, Staff Director James D. Barnette, General Counsel Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel ______ Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania, Chairman MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida PETER DEUTSCH, Florida CLIFF STEARNS, Florida Ranking Member RICHARD BURR, North Carolina DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire JIM DAVIS, Florida GREG WALDEN, Oregon JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois Vice Chairman HENRY A. WAXMAN, California MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois MIKE ROGERS, Michigan JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana (Ex Officio) (Ex Officio) (ii) C O N T E N T S __________ Page Hearings held: February 26, 2003............................................ 1 March 12, 2003............................................... 91 Testimony of: Browne, John C., Senior Research Scientist and former Laboratory Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory........ 181 Busboom, Stanley L., Staff Member and former Director, Security Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory.......... 97 Darling, Bruce B., Senior Vice President, University Affairs and Interim Vice President, Laboratory Management, University of California: February 26, 2003........................................ 66 March 12, 2003........................................... 149 Dickson, Frank P., Jr., Laboratory Counsel, Los Alamos National Laboratory........................................ 114 Doran, Steven L., Consultant, Office of the President, University of California................................... 20 Erickson, Ralph E., Manager, Los Alamos National Laboratory Site Office, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Los Alamos........................... 190 Friedman, Gregory H., Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy..................................................... 50 Hernandez, John, former BUS-5 Team Leader, Los Alamos National Laboratory........................................ 171 Marquez, Richard A., Associate Director for Administration, Los Alamos National Laboratory............................. 171 McDonald, Jaret.............................................. 23 McTague, John P., Professor of Materials, Materials Department, former Vice President for Laboratory Management, University of California, Santa Barbara........ 184 Salgado, Joseph F., former Principal Deputy Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory................................. 104 Walp, Glenn A., Consultant, Office of the President, University of California................................... 12 Additional material submitted for the record: Salgado, Joseph F., former Principal Deputy Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory, letter dated April 10, 2003, enclosing material for the record.......................... 209 (iii) INVESTIGATION OF MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY ---------- WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2003 House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 p.m., in room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James C. Greenwood (chairman) presiding. Members present: Representatives Greenwood, Walden, Ferguson, Rogers, Tauzin (ex officio), Deutsch, and Schakowsky. Also present: Representatives Wilson, Radanovich, Markey, Eshoo, Tauscher, and Tom Udall. Staff present: Ann Washington, majority counsel; Dwight Cates, majority staff; Michael Geffroy, majority counsel; Young Choe, legislative clerk; and Edith Holleman, minority counsel. Mr. Greenwood. Good afternoon. I apologize for the delay. This hearing of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee will come to order. Without objection, the subcommittee will proceed pursuant to committee rule 4(e). Is there objection to proceeding pursuant to rule 4(e)? What is it? We need to know that. Committee rule 4(e) is the new rule that allows that those members who are present at the time the hearing is gaveled to order who wish to forgo an opening statement will have an extra 3 minutes accorded to them for questions. Without objection, we will pursue according to rule 4(e). This afternoon we hold the first day of our hearing to examine allegations of mismanagement and theft of government funds and property at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The focus of today's hearing will be on the evidence and allegations of what went wrong. We will hear from the people who first discovered these problems and first investigated the situation at Los Alamos, as well as others brought in to investigate as matters quickly spun out of control. The situation we begin to confront today is not your run of the mill theft and misuse of taxpayer property, as much as that demands our urgent attention in its own right. We also must examine what our committee investigators have learned is a disturbing breakdown in management controls and oversight at, of all places, an institution that pursues research critical to the Nation's security. At our next hearing, which we will hold within the next couple of weeks, we will be able to raise these serious questions directly with the management at the lab, those people charged with ensuring that things like don't happen. But today we turn to the people who identified the problems and their experiences in doing so. By way of background, as many of you know, the committee has been involved in an ongoing investigation of fraud, waste and abuse in government procurement through the purchase card program since July 2001. In fact, we had the Department of Energy before us just last April. At that hearing, DOE testified that they had little or no idea how the purchase card programs are operated at their contractor run facilities such as Los Alamos. Unfortunately, soon thereafter, we all got a close look at what DOE didn't know. The committee quickly became involved in the situation at Los Alamos in November of 2002 when press reports began to surface that several laboratory employees were under investigation by the FBI for misusing a government supply contract to buy goods for personal use. Our investigation soon discovered that was just the tip of the iceberg. We have learned that the property theft and mismanagement problems at Los Alamos extend far beyond the misuse of this one government supply contract by two lab employees. We have learned of a lab employee who allegedly attempted to use her government purchase card to buy a $30,000 Ford Mustang, another employee who used her purchase card at a local casino, and another employee who altered a travel voucher to obtain additional funds. We have learned of hundreds of thousands of dollars in unchecked theft of government property, including scores, if not hundreds, of lab computers and hundreds of other lost items, simply written off the lab's books each year. This property management system is surely in need of an overhaul. I find it astonishing that a laboratory that can develop the most advanced nuclear weapons systems on the face of the earth and technologies to rapidly detect radiological, biological or chemical attacks by terrorists cannot develop a system to simply keep track of its sensitive property and prevent theft of government property by its own employees. Our other key finding is a lack of accountability among both the lab's officers and employees with respect to poor inventory and fiscal controls. Simply put, cases of theft, misuse or loss of government property are not aggressively investigated, and usually no one is held accountable when it occurs. Indeed, the most decisive action taken by the lab to deal with this issue was its decision to unceremoniously fire the two security officials who were aggressively investigating these instances of mismanagement, misuse and theft. These two gentlemen, Mr. Glenn Walp and Mr. Steve Doran, both of whom are very experienced law enforcement officers, are here with us today. I very much look forward to hearing their testimony about their experiences at the lab when attempting to look into allegations of wrongdoing, and their suspicions as to why they were terminated from their positions. Also with us today on the first panel is Mr. Jaret McDonald, who works for a Los Alamos facilities management subcontractor and who was the first person to raise with Los Alamos management the concerns about theft. The determination to see these concerns addressed ultimately led to the current FBI investigation into the misuse of a government supply contract to buy personal camping and hunting equipment, among other things. He will describe his lengthy, until recently, unsuccessful efforts to get anyone at the lab to take his concerns seriously, and why he ultimately decided to contact the FBI directly in June of 2002. We will also hear today from the Honorable Greg Friedman, Inspector General for the Department of Energy. Mr. Friedman's office opened an inquiry in November into the allegations of management coverup of property and procurement problems and the terminations of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. Its initial report, issued last month, clearly expresses strong reservations about the manner in which senior laboratory management responded to these problems, including the terminations. I am pleased to have Mr. Friedman with us today and look forward to a more detailed discussion of his office's findings and recommendations. We are also joined today by Mr. Bruce Darling, the Interim Vice-President of Laboratory Management for the University of California, which operates Los Alamos under contract with the Department of Energy. Mr. Darling also became intimately involved in the matter before us when he traveled to the lab in November at the request of University of California President Richard Atkinson to review management concerns at the lab. We should note that, since UC's direct involvement in this matter began under Mr. Darling, UC has taken a series of personnel administrative actions in an attempt to begin reforming the lab management and systems, including replacing the lab's director and deputy director and the lab's director and deputy director of security. UC has also rehired Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran to advise the Office of the UC President as it continues its investigation into management problems at the laboratory. I am pleased to have Mr. Darling here today to add his insight into what exactly happened at the lab and what further plans UC has to correct these problems in the future. I thank all of the witnesses for attending. I now recognize the ranking member of the committee, Mr. Deutsch, for his opening statement. Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For many years this committee has been investigating the management at the Los Alamos National Laboratory by the University of California. The University and the laboratory's attempt to cover up management failures and its treatment of loyal employees who try to bring problems to management's attention and get them fixed has been a continuing theme of those hearings. Two years ago, the University promised that many changes would be made. It set up a special laboratory management council and committed to making changes in the Security Division. Our first two witnesses, Glenn Walp and Steve Doran, were hired to professionalize the criminal investigations and to make changes. What they found is that the laboratory did not want change. As a senior lab manager warned Mr. Walp a few months before he was fired, the laboratory is famous for eating its own children. Mr. Walp was told that he would be leveled with both barrels if he did not keep management happy and protect the lab's contract with the Department of Energy and, as we will hear later, he was leveled with both barrels. Today, however, we are looking at an unprecedented situation. Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were actually rehired by the University, while the laboratory's director, deputy director, the director and deputy director of security and the head of audits and assessments were removed from their positions because of their management incompetence in controlling procurement and property and their failure to address the problems brought to their attention. This incompetence was only exacerbated when they tried to control Mr. Walp's and Mr. Doran's investigation into what was basically relatively routine criminal activity. The laboratory did not want any of this known, especially by this committee. What we are going to hear today is that in less than 2 years these systems allowed three people in just one division, by using numerous suppliers and procurement vehicles, to buy all kinds of camping and hunting gear, including 251 knives, 18 pair of binoculars, sleeping bags, Arctic jackets, hiking boots, Coleman lanterns, battery operated ice chests, and global positioning systems. They were not cheap. The binoculars cost up to $3,300 each, some of the knives $266 each. There were helmets and boxes of gloves for all-terrain vehicles, floor sanding equipment for facilities that had no wood floors, auto supplies when vehicles were maintained by the GAS, railroad ties for retaining walls that weren't built, welding tools for people who weren't supposed to weld, and over $5,000 of lock picking equipment, plus a CD containing instructions on how to pick locks, enough hand and shop tools to maintain an army. The perpetrators couldn't even figure out how to use it all. In addition, Mr. Chairman, our Federal dollars were going to pay these lab employees--actually, there is a receipt that actually went through the procurement process for Oakley sunglasses that, obviously, as you see from the copy, were approved, directly approved. Thank you. These were all ordered by a small group of people whose main job was to supervise a subcontractor that did the actual maintenance work and brought its own tools and supplies. Shockingly, the manager of this group was given high marks during these years for his ability to control costs. Even more shockingly, these purchases were rarely questioned by any of the contract administrators, even though the purchase of knives, for example, is not allowed in the laboratory, and what conceivable reason could they have for lock picking equipment. Where did all these purchases go? It is difficult to tell, since the majority of them do not appear to have gone through the regular inventory delivery system to be marked, and most of them did not require inventory controls, because they cost less than $5,000. But some of them were found in the houses of the implicated managers when the FBI raided them. How did the lab handle this? When Jaret McDonald, who is one of our witnesses today, went to the Security Division to ask for an investigation, the investigator, who remains on the lab's payroll today, received a list of all these purchases, agreed that they were suspicious, made a call to the FBI. But they did no serious follow-up for 7 months until Mr. McDonald went directly to the FBI. The FBI has focused on one contract, but our investigation shows that these same types of purchases were also made under several other contractors and vendor agreements. This is not the only instance in which procurement and financial controls were weak or nonexistent. Another employee working directly for the head of procurement used her credit card to get cash advances, as has been mentioned by the chairman, at various casinos. Why wasn't this picked up immediately, because like several other employees, she was both the buyer and the approver of purchases on her credit card. The same situation has been mentioned regarding purchase of a Mustang vehicle. Yet another employee was able to convert $1,800 to her own personal use by simply sending electronically a bogus travel plan and asking for an advance check. No supervisory approval was required. However, instead of allowing these instances to be handled by the appropriate law enforcement agencies, Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, Joe Salgado, the lab's principal deputy director, and Frank Dickson, the lab's counsel, quickly and personally took over the management of the investigation. When Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran tried to do their job and work with outside law enforcement agencies to prosecute, Mr. Salgado and Mr. Dickson had them fired based on a flimsy justifications, some of which they knew were false. The real reason was that they were not protecting the laboratory and its contract with the DOE. Mr. Chairman, the procurement and property systems, but more importantly, the entire management of Los Alamos National Laboratory needs a complete overhaul. It is not enough to say that there is a great science at the lab. Employees have to remember that they are public servants with public trust, and those individuals who bring fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement to the lab's attention should be honored, not pursued and ostracized in their community. I hope this hearing will be the beginning of such a process. Thank you. Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes---- Mr. Deutsch. Mr. Chairman, may I also just mention, the ranking Democrat on the full committee, Mr. Dingell, probably will not be here, and if I could submit his statement for the record. Mr. Greenwood. Without objection, the statement will be made a part of the record. [The prepared statement of Hon. John D. Dingell follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, which I understand is the first of three hearings on the University of California's and the Department of Energy's management of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. We have been holding hearings on the lab for many years, with many promises of reform, mostly unfulfilled. Today, we will hear more promises. The question that everyone, including the Department, must answer is whether they are too little, too late. Over two years ago, the University promised the Congress and this Committee that it would make major changes in its management of its Laboratories, particularly in the area of property control. Appendix O was added to the University's contract. A senior laboratory management council was established that was going to shape up the management. Security and safeguard efforts were going to be strengthened. This management council did put the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory back on track, but the day-to- day management of Los Alamos--a billion-dollar business--appears to be worse than ever. There are still no basic controls. It is still operating with its ``unique'' procurement systems left over from the Manhattan Project days and outside of standard University operating practices. I am particularly pleased that Glenn Walp, Steven Doran, and Jaret McDonald are testifying today. They each have compelling stories. For example, Mr. Walp was told when he went to Los Alamos that he was there to change things in security, particularly in the investigation of property theft. But when he tried to make changes that would hold Laboratory employees responsible for their criminal behavior, he was fired because his ``customers''--the top management of the Laboratory-- didn't want the FBI or any other law enforcement agencies on its premises. This management tried to run the investigations themselves, and when the FBI said they had ``screwed up,'' they blamed Mr. Walp, firing him and his colleague Mr. Doran. That was an outrage. So now there is yet another management council and more promises that we will hear about today. Two management consulting firms are at Los Alamos as we speak. They will recommend more changes. But, once again, we cannot know if these are only promises to make us go away, or if they have real meaning and will actually be implemented. And will people who in good faith try to make these changes be held in high repute in the Los Alamos community, or will they be seen as troublemakers and ostracized when the lights of the press fade? Already, one of our witnesses has been told that his actions may not be good for his career. This reactionary attitude must be rooted out. People who bring environmental, safety, procurement and property management, and fraud, waste and abuse to their managers' attention should be rewarded. The University of California must do better, or we must find someone who can. There are many universities, government agencies and businesses that can do research without letting their property management, procurement, travel and other systems be run like the proverbial cookie jar. One last thing, Mr. Chairman. When Bill Richardson was Secretary of Energy, he was pilloried mercilessly, and very often unfairly, by some on this Committee and others for security and property control shortcomings at Los Alamos. The lab and the University were, frankly, largely let off the hook in Congressional hearings. The Department of Energy is ultimately responsible for what happens at Los Alamos, but I also hope everyone now understands the University of California and the lab management played the key role in these chronic management shortcomings. Now the University has one last chance to fix things. Mr. Greenwood. The gentleman from Louisiana, chairman of the full committee, Mr. Tauzin. Chairman. Tauzin Thank you, Chairman Greenwood. Let me first point out, as we've done very often, one of the most essential functions of this subcommittee is to cast the bright light of sunshine upon areas within our full committee's jurisdiction that are susceptible to waste, abuse of taxpayer dollars, and outright fraud and theft, as this case may be. The serious and disturbing problems with management and theft of government property at Los Alamos National Laboratories demonstrate very clearly why this investigative function is so important to this committee, to the Congress, and to the public at large. The facts that this committee and its investigation have uncovered, which we will begin to explore today, reveal a troubling story of looting at the lab. They also reveal what appears to be an utter lack of interest by senior laboratory managers to do anything the theft and fraud that was apparently going on right under their noses. In fact, we will hear today that the lab's management not only ignored this malfeasance, but in some cases actually tried to prevent others from exposing this malfeasance. Management actually turned its back on the good guys trying to make matters right. I won't repeat the chairman's discussion of the committee's findings in detail except to say there appears to have been inadequate inventory controls and oversight at Los Alamos. Now I do have two other questions. How long has this gone on at the facility, and what other gaps in property management and, by extension, what other gaps in security exist at this vital lab? What I found most astonishing in this investigation is that this theft, this fraud, this abuse, takes place in such a vital facility for this Nation. It is a facility this country, this Nation, puts an awful lot of trust in with some of the most sensitive information that our government and our people are entrusted with. Mr. Chairman, we will begin the examination today, as you suggested, and give this our most close--our closest scrutiny, but we must understand as best we can what happened and why, and then do everything in our power to fix it. Now we have some serious matters, obviously, before us, but I am confident that you as chairman of this important subcommittee--I've seen your work before. We are going to get to the bottom of this, and we will have some recommendations about how to make sure this doesn't happen anymore. But I want to extend my personal welcome to the witnesses before us. I want you to know how much the committee appreciates the fact that some of you had to go through an awful lot in recent months as you've tried to do what was right, and particularly to Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, I want to thank you for being here and for doing your job. I was pleased that our committee--our committee letter insisting that you be rehired and put back on the job was honored and that you've had a chance to follow through on your investigation. I am particularly pleased to welcome Mr. McDonald. Like Sherron Watkins before us in the Enron investigations, we learned the importance of whistleblowers, of people who put themselves in the terrible, awkward position we know you feel yourself in today, Mr. McDonald, who went not once, but twice, to management trying to tell them what was going on and, frustrated with the lack of response you got, eventually had to go to the authorities, as you have to the FBI. I realize you are here under friendly subpoena, and that is kind of interesting that we had to do this to facilitate your attendance here, and the information you bring us also had to be delivered by subpoena. I note that for the record, but I most of all want to say thank you to you and emphasize again, Mr. Chairman, and to all the members of this most important committee of our full committee how critical it is that this country protect whistleblowers who try to do the right thing and who come forward, as you have, Mr. McDonald, and try to protect investigators such as the other two, to make sure that we honor and respect the role you play in this most awkward circumstance. I want to say one more time that we will not tolerate any ill treatment of any DOE, Los Alamos or subcontract employee who is willing to assist this committee as we move forward with this investigation. We will not tolerate it. We will insist that you be treated fairly and that anyone else who wants to assist us is not harmed in any way by their willingness to assist this committee in its work, and this country in solving the problems that are presented to us in this awful mess. Again, Mr. McDonald, you are to be commended, as we commended Sherron Watkins, and I notice that Time magazine commended whistleblowers like yourself. You are critical to this country and to the taxpayers of this country, and we honor and respect you for being here today. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Hon. W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce Thank you, Chairman Greenwood. You know that I've pointed out before that one of the essential functions of this Subcommittee is to cast a bright light on areas within the Full Committee's jurisdiction that are susceptible to waste and abuse of taxpayer dollars--and outright fraud and theft, as this case may be. The serious and disturbing problems with mismanagement and theft of government property at Los Alamos National Laboratory demonstrate very clearly why this investigative function is so important to the Committee and to the public. The facts that this Committee's investigation has uncovered, which we will begin to explore today, reveal a troubling story of looting at the lab. They also reveal what appears to be an utter lack of interest by senior laboratory managers to do anything about the theft and fraud going on right under their noses. In fact, we'll hear today that the lab's management not only ignored this malfeasance, but in some cases actually tried to prevent others from exposing this malfeasance. Management actually turned its back on the good guys trying to make matters right. I won't repeat the Chairman's discussion of the Committee's findings in detail, except to say that there appears to be very inadequate inventory controls and oversight at Los Alamos. But I do have two other questions: How long has this gone on at this facility? And what other gaps in property management and--by extension--security exist here? What I find most astounding about this management and oversight mess, this fraud and theft and abuse, is that it takes place at such a vital facility. It takes place at a facility that our Nation trusts with some of our most sensitive information. Mr. Chairman, what we begin to examine today, as you suggested, requires our closest scrutiny. We must understand as best we can what has happened and why--and then do everything within our power to ensure that it is fixed. We have serious matters before us. But I am confident that, with the help of Members on both sides of the aisle, this Committee will pursue them and help fix them. Let me extend my welcome to the witnesses. And let me also add that the Committee appreciates very much that some of you have gone through quite a lot in recent months as you tried to do what was right. Sometimes it does just take a few good men (and women, of course) to set things right. We commend you for that. And let me assure you that this Committee will not tolerate any ill treatment of any DOE, Los Alamos or subcontractor employee who assists this Committee and this Nation in getting to the bottom of this mess at Los Alamos. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony and the questions, and yield back the remainder of my time. Mr. Greenwood. But we can't guaranty you to be on the cover of Time magazine. The gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Schakowsky. Do you wish to make an opening statement or have 3 extra minutes? Ms. Schakowsky. I would like to. Mr. Greenwood. The gentlelady is recognized for an opening statement. Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member Deutsch, for convening today's hearing and for your leadership on this important subject. In my previous role as the ranking Democrat on the Government Reform Subcommittee on Government Efficiency and Financial Management, I had the opportunity, along with my chairman, Steve Horn, to look at government procurement practices and, unfortunately, the numerous cases of abuse that exist. We were particularly focusing on the Department of Defense, but it suggested that this may be occurring throughout the U.S. Government. The committee today will review findings that are even more concerning, because it suggests a lack of attention to critical information at one of the Nation's most critical national security installations, the Los Alamos National Laboratory. We will hear about illegal use of taxpayer funds, theft of government property, lax to nonexistent inventory controls, and a culture of denial and deceit at Los Alamos. What is most troubling to me, though, is the fact that management at the Los Alamos National Laboratory knew about the problems and were more concerned with self-preservation and the image of the lab than with their responsibility to the American public. One would think that news of individuals using government funds to procure items such as lockpicking sets, hunting knives, golf equipment, and numerous other illegitimate purchases would immediately raise flags and touch off disciplinary and other actions. What little we have seen at Los Alamos in that regard came only after inquiries by this committee, the press, and the Department of Energy's Inspector General. Energy and Commerce Committee staff uncovered serious problems. The staff investigation brought to light the fact that Los Alamos National Laboratory has no system in place to conduct inventory review for items that are either not sensitive, computers and the like, or cost less than $5,000. In fact, the Department of Energy does not require inventory controls for such items. According to committee documents, as of February 2002 items that were either sensitive or worth more than $5,000 went unaccounted for to the tune of $723,000, and millions of dollars worth of very expensive equipment were stolen as well. This leads me to the question whether the problems we are seeing at Los Alamos extend to the broader Energy Department, and Mr. Chairman, I hope you will consider calling Secretary Abraham and Acting National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator Brooks to come to discuss these issues with the subcommittee. Beyond the staff mismanagement and illegal procurement issues, what troubles me most is the retaliation against Los Alamos personnel who tried to investigate allegations of abuse of taxpayer funds, and it sounds like from the opening statements so far that this is a major concern to the committee and its leadership. These individuals were doing their patriotic duty by raising concerns over Los Alamos' serious management failures, and instead of being commended and encouraged, they were fired. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for convening this important hearing. Improving homeland security and taking care of our struggling economy are top priorities for my constituents and those around the country. What went on at Los Alamos undermines both of those important efforts, and I look forward to working with you to improve the situation. If we cannot at least root out theft and mismanagement at Los Alamos, how can we confidently guaranty the security of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile to the American people? I welcome our witness and look forward to their testimony. Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. The gentleman from Oregon, the vice chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Walden, do you wish to make an opening statement? Mr. Walden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to waive my opening statement under our rules to give my time at Q&A. Mr. Greenwood. Very well. Mr. Ferguson has come and gone. Mr. Rogers? Mr. Rogers. I will waive my statement, Mr. Chair. Mr. Greenwood. All righty. Now we are joined by other members of the full committee who are not members of the subcommittee, Mr. Radanovich, Ms. Wilson, Ms. Eshoo. Mr. Markey is expected. We are also joined by Ms. Tauscher of California and Mr. Udall of New Mexico who will be observing. Glad to have their presence as well. [Additional statements submitted for the record follow:] Prepared Statement of Hon. George Radanovich, a Representative in Congress from the State of California Mr. Chairman, today's hearing is a vital step in restoring and maintaining confidence in the national security of our nation. I strongly believe in the outstanding work of Los Alamos and in its employees. The most unfortunate aspect of the issue before us today is that the apparent wrongdoing by a few employees has reflected badly on the exceptional work by so many others who devote themselves to the nation's security. I continue to have confidence in the high quality of the weapons program and the scientific and technical work of Los Alamos. By taking many corrective steps, I believe the lab recognizes that the business and administrative practices of the laboratory need to be revamped so that they will rise to a level of quality similar to the quality of the science at the lab. In order to restore the confidence of the nation, the lab has implemented numerous oversight changes involving administrative and business operations:The University has made sweeping management changes at Los Alamos, and senior University administrators have taken on direct, personal responsibility for managing Los Alamos functions; President Atkinson has established an interim Oversight Board of University Regents and scientific experts to guide the Interim Director; All administrative and business operations will report to the University of California Office of the President, for the purpose of ensuring that the recommended changes to laboratory business practices are implemented in a timely and effective manner; the University has directed an External Review Team to expand its recently completed review of the Lab's purchase card system; As soon as the expanded work is done, the Lab will report the results to the Committee and to the public and will immediately address any deficiencies identified by the External Review Team. These changes reflect the University's deep concern about the allegations that have been made about Los Alamos business practices and their absolute and steadfast commitment to addressing them in a timely manner. I trust the Lab will continue to cooperate fully with the legislative bodies and agencies investigating these matters, and to support the thousands of dedicated employees at Los Alamos so that they can remain focused on their valuable work on behalf of the American people in a time of war. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you to ensure that Congress and this committee are satisfied that the University of California lives up to its long history of exceptional service to this nation. ______ Prepared Statement of Hon. Mike Ferguson, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey I would like to thank the Chairman for holding this important hearing and for his ongoing work investigating fraud and the abuse of government procurement procedures. My constituents expect their tax dollars to be managed properly, and I know they appreciate the Chairman's scrutiny of matters where the public's trust is broken. We are here today to investigate possible wrongdoing at a vital national institution, where order, secrecy and adherence to regulation are essential. Last fall, word of procurement improprieties at the Los Alamos National Laboratory came to the Committee's attention, prompting swift and necessary action. The allegations surfacing from Los Alamos are startling. It is reported that audits have revealed that the lab has lost $2.7 million in computers and other technical equipment. In addition, a lab- sponsored audit has uncovered millions of dollars in unsubstantiated procurement credit card purchases, allegedly ranging from camping equipment to a Ford Mustang. Mr. Chairman, Homeland Security must be one of our highest priorities, and it goes without saying that security at our nation's nuclear institutions is essential. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today, identifying the problems at the lab and working to continue the process of securing the Los Alamos facility. It is crucial that corruption and wrongdoing are rooted out from our most sensitive facilities, and I believe that this hearing is a step toward that goal. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman for you continued scrutiny of this matter. ______ Prepared Statement of Hon. Anna G. Eshoo, a Representative in Congress from the State of California I'd like to thank Chairman Greenwood and Ranking Member Deutsch as well as the Chairman and Ranking Member of the full Committee Mr. Tauzin and Mr. Dingell for allowing me to participate in this important hearing. The accusations of fraud, mismanagement, and reprisals against whistleblowers at the labs managed by the University of California, both Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore Labs, are extremely serious and sobering. Clearly, there have been errors that the University of California must take full responsibility for. Systemic changes must be instituted to ensure that whistleblowers are protected, respected and never against. The University of California must also resolve these serious abuses in a way that provides the Members of this Committee, the full Congress and the American people a certainty that they will not occur again. This hearing offers the University of California the opportunity to tell the Congress and the American people what it has found and what they are doing to remedy the serious problems at Los Alamos. It is important for this hearing to be followed by six-month progress reports for the foreseeable future. It is critical that the University of California demonstrably reaffirm that the protection of our national security is its highest priority and that it has not been compromised. The work done by the labs includes some of our nation's most guarded secrets. We must be confident that these secrets and the work of the labs has not and will not be compromised. As we examine the management problems that have been uncovered by this Committee, the Inspector General, and through the University of California's own internal investigation, we must also keep the important work done at the labs in proper perspective. This important work and the research that the labs conduct are critical to protecting America from hostile regimes and terrorist organizations. Recent events have illuminated this work. For example, shortly after the September 11th terrorist attacks, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory reported that North Korea was resuming its nuclear weapons program. The International Atomic Energy Agency weapon's inspectors who are currently in Iraq were trained at Los Alamos. We've recently read about a new weapon developed jointly at Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos that could knock out a region's electric circuitry without harming civilians. The work the Labs is ongoing and critically important to our collective homeland security. Finally, the University of California must demonstrate their commitment to changing the culture of mismanagement that has existed at the Labs over the years. This is indisputable. I encourage this Committee to continue its important role in overseeing this commitment, affording the University of California the opportunity to see them through. Mr. Greenwood. With that, I would ask unanimous consent. One of the witnesses, Mr. Jaret, has photographs that supplement his testimony, and without objection--well, I would ask for unanimous consent that he be permitted to show the photographs. Seeing no objections, that will be in order. At this time, I would advise our witnesses that, pursuant to the rules of this subcommittee and the rules of this House, you are entitled--well, we take our testimony under oath here. Do you have any objections to giving your testimony under oath? Okay. You are also entitled to be represented by counsel. Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel this afternoon? In that case, if you would stand and raise your right hands, I will swear you in. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Greenwood. So saying, you are all under oath, and we will recognize Mr. Walp first for your opening statement, sir. Welcome. TESTIMONY OF GLENN A. WALP, CONSULTANT, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA; ACCOMPANIED BY STEVEN L. DORAN, CONSULTANT, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA; AND JARET McDONALD. Mr. Walp Thank you. Honorable Chairman Greenwood and Honorable Members of the subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. My name is Glenn Walp. I was Director of the Office of Security Inquiries (OSI) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory from January 22, 2002, until Laboratory officials terminated my employment on November 25, 2002. I hold a bachelor's and a master's degree in criminal justice, and I am in the proposal stage of my doctorate in criminal justice. I am graduate of the FBI National Academy, the FBI National Executive Institute. Among the many law enforcement positions I have held, I was Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police, the largest State police organization in America, a member of the Governor's cabinet, and responsible for administering a budget of over $400 million. When I first came to Los Alamos, Mr. Stanley Busboom, my second level manager, and Mr. John Tucker, my immediate supervisor, told me that I was hired because of my expertise in law enforcement. They told me to professionalize all OSI operations, and candidly acknowledged to me that much of the OSI staff was incompetent, and their work product was severely deficient. They told me to bring in new staff, which I did. In the first few months, I improved the OSI reporting system, which was in disarray, ensured training of OSI personnel in good investigative practices, and initiated investigations on major security and safeguards issues. Although many lab employees told me that they were delighted to see my office address the serious and pervasive problems of theft and gross waste of government funds, it was not long before my supervisors began to obstruct my efforts and those of other OSI employees. With the encouragement of senior management, on March 26, 2002, I completed a report that identified the total failure of laboratory management to do anything about massive theft at the laboratory. I later proposed to Mr. Tucker a plan to have the FBI get involved in investigating these problems. Mr. Tucker adamantly rejected my proposal on the ground that the lab did not want the FBI back at the lab after the Wen Ho Lee case and missing hard driver computer case--or missing hard drive incident. Mr. Tucker also told me, in what became a very common refrain, that if I pursued the theft problems, it could not be good for upper management or the laboratory's image. When I found that much of the stolen property at the lab was deliberately mischaracterized as lost, salvaged or dismantled, my findings were ignored. When Mr. Steve Doran, working under my supervision, corroborated that two facility managers had purchased almost $400,000 in questionable goods through the laboratory's purchase order system, Mr. Frank Dickson, the lab's chief counsel, told me that Mr. Joseph Salgado, the Deputy Director, and he were concerned that my investigation could bring negative publicity to the lab and adversely affect the University of California's contract with the Department of Energy. When I continued to pursue the issue, Mr. Dickson obstructed my office and the FBI's efforts to obtain necessary documents. When we persevered in our efforts, Mr. Busboom told Mr. Doran and me directly that Mr. Dickson would level me with both barrels and would fire Mr. Doran if we interfered with Mr. Dickson's relationship with the FBI, the DOE IG or the U.S. Attorney. It was the same with all of our other investigations. That is, inquiries into problems with local vendors, the credit card system, and the purchase order system. Mr. Salgado, Mr. Dickson, Mr. Tucker and Mr. Busboom obstructed our investigations, administratively resolved matters so as to cover up Federal felonies, and ultimately fired Mr. Doran and me. The reasons the managers gave for their actions were always the same: Our job was to protect UC and UC's contract, not the United States taxpayer. What we know now is that Mr. Salgado and other lab managers believed that Mr. Doran and I were the source of documents leaked to the press that revealed massive fraud by lab employees, and in order to prevent us from talking to DOE Inspector General investigators which came to investigate the fraud allegations, they willfully fired Mr. Doran and I. The only reason they gave later was that we did not fit. They were accurate about that. We did not fit. We were intent on doing our jobs with integrity and stopping the massive fraud and mismanagement at the lab. Even today, despite all the publicity, the Congressional interest, and the DOE investigations, the lab has not changed. Many of the same lab managers responsible for obstructing us and the FBI are still at the lab, drawing their same salaries. Although administrative regulations and laws have been violated, no action has been taken against these individuals. It is time for Congress, the DOE, and the American public to call a halt to the lab's activities and make a long overdue change. A written statement is attached to my opening statement, clarifying the details of the obstruction and the mismanagement, and I will gladly respond to any questions that you may have in this matter, and I thank you for inviting me here today to this assembly. [The prepared statement of Glenn A. Walp follows:] Prepared Statement of Glenn A. Walp, Consultant, Office of the President, University of California In mid-2001 I applied for a nationally advertised position as Office Leader of the Office of Security Inquiries (OSI) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Publicized responsibilities included conducting investigations into thefts, protecting property, and being responsible for the strategic and tactical planning of all OSI operations. I was selected for the position with a $10,000.00 bonus if I could arrive by mid-January, 2002; I was hired on January 22, 2002. I learned that one of the reasons I was hired, and with specificity prior to the end of January, was because my employment fulfilled a standard within the Department of Energy (DOE) Appendix O mandate, ensuring the Lab would receive supplemental funding (multi-million dollars) from DOE. I was advised by my Division Leader, Stanley Busboom and my Deputy Division Leader, John (Gene) Tucker that the reason I was hired was because of my extensive law enforcement experience and expertise, especially in criminal investigations. I was told by Busboom and Tucker to professionalize all OSI functions as I deemed appropriate, and they would support me in my efforts. I fulfilled all job requirements and supervisory directions in totality, receiving a 100%-plus rating for my performance of duty on October 2, 2002. Statements within that rating included: ``Mr. Walp has not faltered''; . . . ``applied . . . hands-on leadership and management''. ``A pro-active and caring leader . . . a strong and professional manager . . . very effective performer''. Shortly after my arrival I was contacted by the Office Leader of the Office of Internal Security, Ken Schiffer, who proposed there was significant theft occurring at the Lab. Tucker agreed with Schiffer's postulation, stating theft has been so rampant at the Lab ``it has been making the valley green for years''. Subsequently I was ordered by Busboom to conduct research and submit a written report on the theft issue. Preliminary data disclosed that OSI inquiry reports were severely lacking in investigatory analysis; property was inappropriately handled as lost, salvaged or dismantled when in fact it was stolen; major theft occurred at unsecured drop points; and most importantly, there was a severe problem with lost property. That is, although it was the spring of 2002, the Business Division did not have accountability of over 700 pieces of property that was identified as lost in 1999 through 2001, amounting to approximately $2.7 million. Lost items included: nearly 260 computers; 124 printers; 48 radios; 37 cameras; a $25,000.00 thermal analyzer; $25,000.00 control milling machine; $35,000.00 2-ton magnet; $32,000.00 magnet lifting unit; $33,000.00 wire brush; $23,000 water tank; $27,000 remote terminal; $11,000 copier; $20,000 spectometer; $20,000.00 module oscillator; 2 work stations worth $47,000.00; $11,000.00 cryogenic refrigerator; 2 trailer vans worth $19,000.00; and a $6,000.00 forklift. It was investigatory speculation that many of the items reported as lost were actually stolen. The requested theft report was submitted to Busboom on March 26. After submitting the March theft report I learned that theft was occurring within the purchase card and purchase order programs, but the most egregious area was most likely in the Local Vendor Agreement (LVA) and Just In Time (JIT) systems. The LVA and JIT systems allows a Lab employee to use their personal identification badge as a credit card, with little to no audit controls. Lab personnel proposed that the LVA and JIT systems were so flagrant that any employee, for example, could have a computer installed in their residence and no one would ever know. These same personnel advised me that they had been telling their supervisors and administrators about this theft for years, but these Lab officials would not take any action to resolve the problems. Memorandums had been prepared by Business Division personnel in the fall of 2001, warning of the problems associated with the purchase card system, yet their supervisors failed to take any action. Other BUS Division memorandums were prepared after the release of the March theft report, confirming the severity of the theft, and the egregious mismanagement of Lab auditing and property control systems. I asked Tucker to allow me to work with the FBI to address this blatant theft. Tucker rejected my request, stating that because of the Wen Ho Lee and hard drive cases the Lab did not like the FBI coming into their domain. Tucker also proposed that if I continued in my efforts I am liable to determine that high level Lab management are involved in these thefts and that would not be good for the Lab's image. criminal incidents uncovered Between June and September, 2002, five major criminal incidents were disclosed. NIS Incident Unbeknownst to me, during 2001, major theft was occurring in the Nonproliferation International Security (NIS) area. Information on this criminal activity had been given to Lab authorities Bill Sprouse, Tucker, Katherine Brittian, and Scott Gibbs, by certain Lab employees, but these authorities failed to take any substantive action. The employees became disenchanted with the cavalier approach of these Lab officials, consequently making a complaint with the FBI on June 24, 2002. On July 1, 2002, the FBI assumed the NIS investigation in conjunction with OSI. The major method of theft used by the NIS suspects was the purchase order system. A review of purchase order transactions by the suspects in the last 18 months revealed over $400,000.00 in questionable purchases. Purchases included: Ninety-two hunting knives; 72 hunting-type jackets and shirts; 26 GPS systems; 32 pairs of fishing/hunting-type boots; 22 cameras; 6 Rototillers; and 56 different types of lock pick and glass cutting devices. Other items included a go-cart; motorcycle helmets (2 children); model airplanes; sleeping bags; plumbing fixtures; truck beds; and shock absorbers. The FBI apprehended two suspects in this case on October 31, 2002. Mustang Incident Lab employee Lillian Anaya was suspected of attempting to purchase a Ford Mustang with parts, amounting to nearly $30,000.00, using a government credit card. Stanley Hettich, a Business Division administrator willfully failed to report this crime to OSI, indicating he had not reported any similar type situations to OSI in the last three years. Hettich suggested that the ESA Division had gone native, and the whole system of property purchase was out of control. Hettich blamed Mr. Richard Marquez and Mr. Joseph Salgado for this failing, because they ordered him to give Lab employees anything they wanted; customer satisfaction was the key. Casino Credit Card Incident Lab employee Mary Wood used a government credit card to purchase personal items, and secure cash at local casinos. Salgado directed that Wood should not be interviewed and she should just be fired. Tucker recommended that she not be interviewed because she would not confess and it would be a waste of time. Security Specialist Steven Doran, OSI, interviewed the subject at which time she confessed. Immediately after the confession Dickson ordered that all the reports be submitted to him and he would determine what would happen to the case. Tool Incident Lab employee Orlando Smith was suspected of improperly purchasing tools amounting to approximately $1.2 million in 12 months, from an unauthorized vendor, while misusing a government vehicle. Forged Voucher Incident Lab employee Clarissa Rodriguez forged a government voucher for $1,800.00. The aforesaid investigations were initiated in accordance with professional investigatory processes, but were quickly tainted by persistent interference and obstruction by multiple Lab officials. This interference and obstruction included: overall interference and obstruction Contrary to an original agreement between the FBI and the Lab, all documentary reports needed by OSI or the FBI had to be reviewed and approved by Frank Dickson, the Lab Chief Counsel prior to distribution. This system severely hampered investigative processes, and in one case the FBI waited for approximately six weeks to receive a much-needed report because Dickson failed to act on the request. Dickson verbally oppressed Doran and me to reveal all confidential FBI investigative information to individuals who had no need to know and should not have known. Dickson had been previously warned by the FBI not to tell anyone about this information especially anyone in the Audits and Assessments Division because there was suspect in that division. Notwithstanding, Dickson forcefully ensured confidential information was given to a member of the Audits and Assessments Division, placing multiple OSI/FBI investigations in jeopardy. Ms. Chris Chandler, an employee of Dickson, attempted to forcefully secure confidential FBI investigative notes from me, through verbal intimidation; she was refused access to the notes. During the discourse she stated that she did not care about anyone's constitutional rights or the successful prosecution of an FBI investigation. If Chandler would have obtained these notes it could have jeopardized multiple OSI/ FBI investigations. Dickson attempted to force the FBI to take premature investigative action against multiple suspects, threatening he would place the suspects on investigative leave unless the FBI acquiesced to his demands. The threatening action of Dickson, if brought to fruition, would have placed the NIS and Mustang cases in jeopardy. nis incident Dickson attempted to gain entry into an area that contained suspected NIS stolen property placing an FBI investigation in jeopardy. After being refused by the FBI, Dickson became irate at Doran and Walp because they failed to cajole the FBI into allowing him access. Salgado and Dickson directed, through Busboom and Tucker, to remove Doran and Walp from the NIS investigation two days before culmination of that investigation. Despite the pleas of the FBI to allow Walp and Doran to remain on the case because they were integral to the success of that investigation, Busboom adamantly refused. The only reason given by Busboom for this action was that it was ``Dickson's payback against Walp'' for Walp challenging Dickson's improprieties in the forged voucher incident. mustang Dickson directed that potential FBI criminal evidence held in official OSI investigatory control, be taken from OSI, thereby breaking the chain of evidence and jeopardizing an FBI investigation. Chandler conducted a dual inquiry on this case that had the potential of obstructing the FBI investigation. forged voucher Dickson, Tucker and Phillip Kruger of the Laboratory Human Resources Division, conspired to cover up this federal felony by failing to immediately notify an appropriate criminal justice authority, and handled the case administratively. Although Tucker originally agreed this was a federal felony that must be investigated by a federal law enforcement agency, he then recanted, explicating to me, since the property did not belong to the United States taxpayers, but rather the University of California (UC), there was no crime. Hence, that is why Dickson has the authority to do anything he wants with any crime that occurs on Lab property. Tucker also said that all property and monies in control of the Los Alamos National Lab does not belong to United States taxpayers because it is UC property and monies. walp and doran warned to comply with lanl's corporate philosophy/ culture Doran and I were consistently warned that our major job was not inquiry into crime, but rather, protection of the Lab, its image, and ultimately the UC contract. Concerning this issue paraphrased comments included: Dickson stated to Walp-- Salgado is concerned about the NIS case bringing negative PR to the Lab, which may negatively affect the UC contract, therefore I (Dickson) will keep a pulse on all FBI activity. While preparing a news release on the Anaya and Wood cases, Dickson wanted to keep information out of the release concerning the total amount of thefts committed by Wood, stating ``what we're looking at is protecting the Lab here''. Dickson stated to Walp and Doran-- We need to remember who we work for, who is our boss and that is the Lab, not the FBI. That is the way it is, we must look out for the Lab and its image first, not the FBI investigation. Salgado stated to Walp-- I am concerned that the Mustang and tool cases may generate bad PR for the Lab, which may negatively affect the Lab's contract. The critical aspect of the Mustang case is the bad PR for the Lab, not the illegal attempt to purchase the vehicle. Chandler stated to Walp-- I am not concerned about violating anyone's constitutional rights or interfering with an FBI prosecution; my job and your job is to protect our employer, the Lab. Busboom stated to Walp and Doran-- Of critical importance is protecting the UC contract, and it should be the primary concern of you as you perform your OSI functions; your major job is not law enforcement or helping the FBI, but to protect the Lab and its contract. Tucker stated to Walp-- If you continue your efforts in ferreting out Lab theft you may find that high management personnel are implicated and that would not be good for the Lab's image. Dickson doesn't want UC to be embarrassed concerning the Mustang case, so they are going to take action that forces the FBI to move on the case, because Lab officials must look out for the Lab first, its image, and not the FBI investigation. Your main job and that of OSI is to protect the Lab, Lab people, the Lab contract and the Lab image above anything else; Tucker identified this concept as ``corporate philosophy'' and/or ``corporate rules''. The corporate rules must be followed by you and other OSI members if they are to be successful as Lab employees. Tucker states to Walp and Doran-- You need to know that your major responsibility is to your employer, the people who pay your checks, therefore you must ensure that you protect them, their image, and the UC contract. reason for terminations Lab officials have progressively espoused multiple reasons for the terminations of Doran and Walp, to include: (a) They didn't fit (contained in their termination papers); yet Busboom refused to elaborate on what that meant; (b) Doran and Walp didn't get along with certain groups and/or individuals at the Lab. The groups and/or individuals identified in a Lab press release as the groups and/or individuals they did not get along with, were groups or individuals who were either suspects in crimes, or were interfering or obstructing OSI/ FBI investigations; (c) Salgado proposed that the reason was that a chronology of the Mustang case contained incorrect telephone data obtained from OSI. This insignificant issue was an inadvertent error of an OSI employee, not Walp or Doran. The issue was quickly corrected, and had no significance to the relevant factors associated with the case; (d) Salgado said it had to do with FBI investigatory issues concerning the wearing of a body wire, and the number of suspects involved in the NIS case. All data on these matters were accurately and completely forwarded to Salgado in a timely manner, with the clarification that these issues were under the control of the FBI, not OSI; and (e) Dickson proposed the reason was because Doran and Walp had a poor relationship with the FBI. Recent investigation into this allegation by a federal investigator found this accusation to be totally erroneous. In January of 2003, it was disclosed by a UC official that the actual reason for our terminations was, as originally proposed by Doran and Walp, a willful attempt by Lab officials to prevent Doran and Walp from talking to DOE Inspector General Investigators. The reason, according to the official, was because they were fearful of what we would reveal to these investigators concerning the crime, mismanagement and corruption at the Los Alamos National Lab. threats During the course of our employment Doran and I were consistently threatened that our efforts to approach our responsibilities from a point of integrity, without regard for the Lab contract, would cause us problems. For example: 1. Tucker stated to Doran and me, that we must be careful in challenging the ethics of Lab officials because the Lab is famous for sacrificing its children for the sake of its image. 2. Busboom told Doran and me, Dickson would level me with both barrels and would fire Doran if we interfered with Dickson's relationship with the FBI, the DOE IG, or the U.S. Attorney. 3. Busboom, Tucker and John Tapia told Doran and me they believed Dickson was attempting to make us scapegoats; that Dickson was trying to blame Walp and OSI for his own shortcomings; and Dickson was conspiring to get people to falsely accuse Walp of being uncooperative. issues that still need to be addressed Although much has been accomplished in addressing the theft, mismanagement and corruption of the Lab, there is still much to do. For example: 1. All lost reports for the last decade need to be reviewed item-by- item, to ascertain, with specificity, their locations. The Lab uses a classification system that identifies property as salvaged, dismantled and retired. It is hypothesized that these classifications have been used to cover up for lost and stolen items. It is speculated that if these classification reports were reviewed, the microscope would reveal significant fresh ink. 2. Since Johnson Control of Northern New Mexico never reported any item of theft under $5,000, the details of this unknown needs to be analyzed. 3. A November 7 Price-Waterhouse-Coopers (PWC) perfunctory report, illustrated $153 million dollars of questionable ``purchase card'' transactions, while a review of questionable ``purchase order'' transactions by NIS personnel amounted to approximately $400,000. Thus, all Lab ``purchase card'' and ``purchase order'' transactions need to be analyzed item-by-item, purchaser-by- purchaser, for at least the last decade. It is theorized that the attempted Mustang purchase and the illegal purchase orders within NIS were not the first situations of this type effectuated by these illegal processes. 4. All voucher transactions for the last decade should be reviewed for illegalities. 5. It is proposed that the most egregious area of theft is contained within the LVA and JIT systems. A comprehensive analyses of these purchases for the last decade needs to be completed. Doran and I had multiple cases we had no opportunity to investigate, but need to be addressed. They include: 1. Significant theft of gasoline. 2. Two cases of potential fraud that may involve kickbacks to present and former employees of the Lab. 3. Steve and I were recently contacted by multiple individuals, proposing that they were aware of major fraud and theft that had occurred at the Lab in previous years, amounting to multiple millions of dollars in theft and fraud. 4. There are outstanding issues concerning criminal matters. Such as: (a) theft of FBI evidence from an OSI office; (b) the possibility of federal/state crimes being committed by Lab officials; and (c) that crimes although known by Lab officials, were never reported to an appropriate authority. As of this date, Security Specialists James Mullins and Doran, and I, have never been contacted by any law enforcement agency for official interviews, notwithstanding we are critical witnesses to these matters. I attempted to effectuate a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigative task force to address these blatant failings, but the plan was soundly rejected by my immediate supervisor. Between June 24th and September 20th five major criminal investigations were unraveled. Although these investigations commenced in accordance with professional investigatory processes, by August these systems began to be tainted by interference and obstruction by certain Lab officials. Namely: 1. Contrary to an original agreement between the FBI and the Lab, Frank Dickson, the Lab Chief Counsel, ordered that all documentary evidence had to be personally approved by him prior to distribution; he attempted to force the FBI to take premature investigative actions; he verbally oppressed Steven Doran and I to reveal confidential FBI investigative information to people who should have not known; he directed that potential FBI criminal evidence held in official OSI investigatory control be forcefully taken from the custody of OSI, thereby breaking the chain of evidence control; and he ineptly attempted to gain access into an area where suspected stolen property was stored. These acts either hampered or had the potential of obstructing FBI investigations. 2. Chris Chandler, an employee of Dickson, through verbal intimidation, attempted to secure confidential FBI written notes from me, indicating within that discourse that she was not concerned about a person's constitutional rights or a successful FBI prosecution; and, she conducted a dual inquiry that had the potential of obstructing an FBI investigation. 3. Stanley Hettich, a Business Division administrator, willfully failed to report criminal activity occurring within his area of responsibility, admitting he had not reported any similar situations in the last three years. 4. John (Gene) Tucker, my immediate supervisor inappropriately forced Doran and me to remove certain ``spy type'' information from an official OSI inquiry report; and, advised Doran and me that we would be sacrificed as children of the Lab for the sake of the Lab's image, if we challenged the ethics of Lab officials. 5. Dickson, Tucker, and Phillip Kruger of the Laboratory Human Resources Division, willfully failed to immediately notify an appropriate criminal justice authority, as it pertained to the crime of forgery of a federal voucher. 6. Stan Busboom, my Division Leader, and Tucker, removed Doran and myself from an official FBI investigation two days before culmination of that investigation, and to the potential detriment of that investigation. 7. Busboom stated to Doran and me that unless we ensured there was a positive relationship between Dickson and the U.S. Attorney and the FBI, Dickson would level me with both barrels and Doran would be fired. 8. Busboom and Tucker opined that Salgado and Dickson were attempting to make Doran and me scapegoats. 9. Doran and I were warned by a Lab official that Dickson was attempting to fabricate negative information against Doran and me and that Tucker was involved in this conspiracy. Doran and I were consistently advised by multiple Lab officials that our major role was not inquiry into crime, but the protection of the Lab and its image, for the purpose of protecting the University of California contract. Although much has been accomplished in addressing the theft, mismanagement and corruption of the Lab, there is still much to do. For example: 1. All lost reports for the last decade need to be reviewed item-by- item, to ascertain, with specificity, their locations. The Lab uses a classification system that identifies property as salvaged, dismantled and retired. It is hypothesized that these classifications have been used to cover up for lost and stolen items. It is speculated that if these classification reports were reviewed, the microscope would reveal significant fresh ink. 2. Since Johnson Control of Northern New Mexico never reported any item of theft under $5,000, the details of this unknown needs to be analyzed. 3. A November 7 Price-Waterhouse-Coopers (PWC) perfunctory report, illustrated $153 million dollars of questionable ``purchase card'' transactions, while a review of questionable ``purchase order'' transactions by NIS personnel amounted to approximately $400,000. Thus, all Lab ``purchase card'' and ``purchase order'' transactions need to be analyzed item-by-item, purchaser-by- purchaser, for at least the last decade. It is theorized that the attempted Mustang purchase and the illegal purchase orders within NIS were not the first situations of this type effectuated by these illegal processes. 4. All voucher transactions for the last decade should be reviewed for illegalities. 5. It is proposed that the most egregious area of theft is contained within the LVA and JIT systems. A comprehensive analyses of these purchases for the last decade needs to be completed. Doran and I had multiple cases we had no opportunity to investigate, but need to be addressed. They include: 1. Significant theft of gasoline. 2. Two cases of potential fraud that may involve kickbacks to present and former employees of the Lab. 3. Steve and I were recently contacted by multiple individuals, proposing that they were aware of major fraud and theft that had occurred at the Lab in previous years, amounting to multiple millions of dollars in theft and fraud. 4. There are outstanding issues concerning criminal matters. Such as: (a) theft of FBI evidence from an OSI office; (b) the possibility of federal/state crimes being committed by Lab officials; and (c) that crimes although known by Lab officials, were never reported to an appropriate authority. As of this date, Security Specialists James Mullins and Doran, and I, have never been contacted by any law enforcement agency for official interviews, notwithstanding we are critical witnesses to these matters. Most recently Steve and I, and our attorney were informed by a top administrator of the University of California that he has direct evidence that we were wrongfully terminated because Lab officials did not want us speaking to DOE Inspector General Investigators. The aforesaid is an overview of the issues I encountered when employed by the Lab. I am prepared to answer any questions that you may have concerning these and associated matters. Thank you. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Walp. Mr. Doran. TESTIMONY OF STEVEN L. DORAN Mr. Doran. Good afternoon, Chairman Greenwood, members of the subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for inviting me here to testify. My name is Steven Doran. Los Alamos Laboratory recruited me to work as an investigator in the Safeguards and Security Division in the spring of 2002. The recruiter who approached me told me the lab was having serious problems with national security and theft and needed people like me to come in and help them clean it up. The lab recruiter encouraged me to take the job, because working at the lab would be a service not only to the laboratory but to my country as well. I went to Los Alamos with the hope that I could be part of a broad effort to stop the rampant theft at the lab and protect the security of the country's most important nuclear secrets. I started work on July 15, 2002. A few days later I began work with the FBI on the Bussolini and Alexander case where the two managers at the lab had misused the government purchase order system to steal hundreds of thousands of dollars in property. In the following days and months, I saw the FBI and my successful investigative efforts in this case and all other cases I was working on thwarted by the lab's upper level management, Joseph Salgado, Frank Dickson, Gene Tucker and Stan Busboom. Lab managers from other departments including Richard Marquez, Stan Hettich, Dick Stickler, Vernon Brown and John Tapia attempted to cover up, change and conceal information from our office. These lab managers and lab counsel Dickson continue to make innuendos and threats to Mr. Walp, and my employment could be in jeopardy if we continued investigating the rampant misuse of government credit cards and the purchase order system. Because of the productive working relationship that I developed with the FBI, Special Agent Jeffrey Campbell, Mr. Busboom told me specifically I had to protect the lab's relationship with the FBI and the United States Attorney or I would be fired. He made it clear that he wanted me to participate in the cover-up of major crimes at the lab and use my good relationship with the FBI to prevent them from investigating these matters on their own. Although I always followed orders given to my by my superiors, I refused to cooperate in their cover-up. My upper level managers refused to provide me and the FBI with documents we needed for our investigations, discouraged me from interviewing key witnesses, disseminated information about our investigation to the targets of those investigations, and administratively settled cases so that the United States government could not criminally prosecute the wrongdoers. By October, almost all of my investigations had been stopped or bottlenecked in Mr. Dickson's office. Less than 3 months after I started work at Los Alamos, I spent most of my day defending my position that we were working to protect the taxpayer funds and national security rather than the University of California contract. This meant I had to do my real work at night and on the weekend. Despite the FBI's repeated requests that the laboratory management reconsider and assign us to help them, the managers refused to let us help the FBI. Dedicated former and current employees at the laboratory supported us and kept on reporting things to us, even after management began to retaliate against us. I received a call about a possible espionage matter which I passed on to the Counterintelligence Division. When the division did nothing, I called and e-mailed again. As far as I know, the laboratory never followed up on this matter. After I was terminated I got calls from former employees who had documented millions of dollars in frauds but were ignored by lab management. All of these people responsible for management of the lab, all but one, still have a job at Los Alamos. A number of the managers who thwarted our investigations remain in positions of authority, and are working actively to conceal the enormity of the problem of theft and misuse of government monies. Just before I left New Mexico to come to this hearing, a number of Los Alamos employees brought me new documentation that they believe demonstrate that these same managers are giving false information to UC and the Department of Energy about expenses charged on purchase cards as late as January of 2003. To me, this demonstrates why UC needs to take these managers out of their positions of responsibility at the lab. It is unfortunate that it took the current crisis of competence to put the lab's problems on the national agenda. By now Congress and DOE are actively exercising oversight and requiring accountability. It looks as though the University of California is trying to do something about these problems. Another step in UC's accountability to the lab has to be to take these managers out of their current jobs and put in fully reliable and honest employees. I hope that Mr. Walp and my termination has a silver lining. It brought Los Alamos to its senses about putting some order into its house so that it can go about doing important work in the way that best serves the citizens of the United States. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Steven L. Doran follows: Prepared Statement of Steven L. Doran, Consultant, Office of the President, University of California Good afternoon. Chairman Greenwood, members of the Subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen: Thank you for inviting me here to testify. My name is Steven Doran. Los Alamos Laboratory recruited me to work as an investigator in the Safeguards and Security Division in the Spring of 2002. The recruiter who approached me told me that the Lab was having serious problems with national security and theft, and needed people like me to come in and help them clean it up. After interviewing with Mr. Walp, Mr. Michael Wismer and Ms. Nina Epperson, the Lab offered me the job. The Lab recruiter encouraged me to take the job, because working at the Lab would be a service to the Laboratory as well as the country. I went to Los Alamos with the hope that I could be part of a broad effort to stop the rampant theft at the Lab, and protect the security of the country's most important nuclear secrets. I started work on July 15, 2002. A few days later, I began to work with the FBI on the Bussolini and Alexander case, where two managers at the Lab had misused the government purchase order system to steal hundreds of thousands of dollars in property. In the following days and months, I saw the FBI's and my successful investigative efforts in this case and all the other cases I was working on thwarted by the Lab's upper level management--Joseph Salgado, Frank Dickson, Gene Tucker, and Stan Busboom. Lab Managers from other departments, including Richard Marquez, Stan Hettich, Dick Stickler, Vernon Brown, and John Tapia attempted to cover up and change and conceal information from our office. These managers and Lab counsel Dickson continued to make innuendos and threats that Mr. Walp's and my employment could be in jeopardy if we continued investigating the rampant misuse of government credit cards and the purchase order system. Because of the productive working relationship that I developed with FBI special agent Jeff Campbell, Mr. Busboom told me specifically that I had to protect Lab counsel's relationship with the FBI and the United States Attorney, or I would be fired. What he meant was that I should participate in the cover-up of major crimes at the Lab, and use my good relationship with the FBI to prevent them from investigating these matters on their own. Although I always followed the orders given me by my superiors, I refused to cooperate in their cover-up. My upper level managers refused to provide me and the FBI with documents we needed for our investigations, discouraged me from interviewing key witnesses, disseminated information about our investigations to the targets of those investigations, and administratively settled cases so that the United States government could not criminally prosecute the wrongdoers. By October, almost all of my investigations had been stopped, or bottlenecked in Mr. Dickson's office. Less than three months after I started work at Los Alamos, I spent most of my workday defending my position that we were working to protect taxpayer funds and the national security, rather than the University of California contract. This meant that I had to do my ``real work'' at nights and on the weekend. Despite the FBI's repeated requests that Lab management reconsider and assign us to help them, the managers refused to let us help the FBI. Dedicated former and current employees at the Laboratory supported us, and kept on reporting things to us, even after management began to retaliate against us. I received a call about a possible espionage matter, which I passed on the Counterintelligence Division. When the Division did nothing, I called and e-mailed again. As far as I know, the Laboratory never followed up on this matter. After I was terminated, I got calls from former employees who had documented millions of dollars in fraud, but were ignored by Lab management. It is unfortunate that it took the current crisis of confidence in the University of California to put these problems on the national agenda. But now that Congress and the DOE are actively exercising oversight and requiring accountability, it looks as though the University of California is trying to do something about these problems. I hope that Mr. Walp's and my termination has a silver lining--it brought Los Alamos to its senses about putting some order in its house so that it can go about doing its important work in a way that best serves the citizens of the United States. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Doran. Mr. McDonald. TESTIMONY OF JARET McDONALD Mr. McDonald. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Jaret McDonald, and I am an employee of KSL at Los Alamos National Laboratory. KSL is a joint venture between the following companies: Halliburton, Kellogg, Brown & Root; Shaw, and Los Alamos Technical Associates. KSL holds the support service subcontract for the maintenance and construction operations of LANL facilities. My current job duties include oversight of more than 70 maintenance and construction employees. I have been an employee of KSL since January 2003. Prior to my employment with KSL, I was an employee of Johnson Controls Northern New Mexico, a subsidiary of Johnson Controls, Incorporated. JCNNM held the support services subcontract prior to KSL. Prior to my current work assignment as Zone Manager for Zone 13, I worked at TA-35 and Technical Area 33. My duties were very similar to my job responsibilities. While working at TA-35 and TA-33, I became suspicious of purchases made by University of California employees that did not appear to be related to facility maintenance tasks or general LANL business, as it related to the operations and maintenance of the facilities under their oversight. I suspected that these purchases were made using blanket purchase orders, BPOs. The items I saw being purchased struck me as highly unusual. In approximately January 2002, I brought my suspicions to the attention of my Johnson Controls supervisor, who instructed me to contacted an individual at Safeguard and Securities Division at the University of California, which I did do. After a couple of months and several communications with authorities at the University of California, it did not appear that action was being taken to address the situation. Consequently, in March 2002, I contacted the FBI through the agency's anonymous online tip. Subsequently, I was contacted by the FBI and a representative from the University of California's Security and Safeguards Division. I was instructed by the University of California and Johnson Controls to cooperate with the FBI in their ensuing investigation into the suspicious purchases. The FBI asked me to provide information and documentation accordingly, as that information related to the suspicious purchases, which I did. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any questions. [The prepared statement of Jaret McDonald follows:] Prepared Statement of Jaret McDonald Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is Jaret McDonald and I am an employee of KSL at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). KSL is a joint venture between the following companies: Halliburton, Kellogg, Brown & Root; Shaw, and Los Alamos Technical Associates. KSL holds the support services subcontract for the maintenance and construction operations of the LANL facilities. My current job duties include oversight of more 70 maintenance and construction employees. I have been an employee of KSL since January 2003. Prior to my employment with KSL, I was an employee of Johnson Controls Northern New Mexico (JCNNM), a subsidiary of Johnson Controls Incorporated (JCI). JCNNM held the support services subcontract prior to KSL. Prior to my current work assignment as Zone Manager for Zone 13, I worked at Technical Area 35 and Technical Area 33 and my duties were similar to my current job responsibilities. While working at TA-35 and TA-33, I became suspicious of purchases made by University of California employees and that did not appear to be related to facility maintenance tasks or general LANL business as it related to the operations and maintenance of the facilities under their oversight. I suspected these purchases were made using blanket purchase orders (BPO). The items I saw being purchased struck me as highly unusual. In January 2002 (approximate date), I brought my suspicions to the attention of my JCNNM supervisor who instructed me to contact Safeguard and Securities Division at the University of California, which I did. After a couple of months and several communications with authorities at the University of California, it did not appear that action was being taken to address the situation. Consequently, in March 2002 (approximate date), I contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) through the agency's anonymous on-online tip/ hotline. Subsequently, I was contacted by the FBI and a representative from the University of California's Security and Safeguards Division. I was instructed by the University of California and JCNNM officials to cooperate with the FBI in their ensuing investigation into the suspicious purchases. The FBI asked me to provide information and documentation accordingly, as that information related to the suspicious purchases--which I did. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer questions. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. McDonald. I appreciate that. You have provided us with photographs of items purchased by lab employees using one of the several available procurement tools at the lab, such as purchase order, Just-in-Time contract, blanket purchase agreement or government purchase card. I would like to look at these items now and ask you to explain what each of them is and why someone might need or not need this item for work purposes at the laboratory, particularly interested in knowing why they needed fly rods. Mr. McDonald. Mr. Chairman, would you like to ask me questions or would you like to narrate? Mr. Greenwood. Why don't you just go right ahead and narrate what you see in the pictures there. Mr. McDonald. Okay. Mr. Chairman, members, basically what we are looking at here is some of the questionable items concerned. As an example, if you look, you can see a Ramsey winch on the back of this John Deere mower and John Deere trailer. To the left, you see some snowblowers and perhaps another tractor around behind some Craftsman boxes. As far as what this could be used for at the laboratory, I think it would be difficult to make a judgment what a person could use this for at the laboratory in a work related environment. Mr. Greenwood. Let me understand that. Did the gentleman who purchased these items and who had them placed in this storage facility have responsibilities that would include mowing the lawn or blowing snow? Mr. McDonald. No, sir. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Why don't you proceed? Mr. McDonald. I guess that's about all I really have to say about this picture. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Mr. McDonald. Moving on to picture number 2, one of the items that struck my eye as I was taking these pictures was a sleeping bag. I am pretty sure that most laboratory folks do not need a sleeping bag. Mr. Greenwood. They sleep on the job without a sleeping bag? Mr. McDonald. Yes, sir. Mr. Greenwood. Do you have any idea what the cost of that sleeping bag was? Mr. McDonald. I do not, sir. Mr. Greenwood. What is this facility? If you could also name the facility, the buildings, if you could explain what they are. Mr. McDonald. Sure. This facility that we took pictures of is Technical Area 33. This is, I believe, Bunker 23. Mr. Greenwood. What is it used for? Mr. McDonald. This particular bunker is used for a shop for the University of California employees and storage area. Some of the other items that I thought were questionable was--I believe that's a cooler, an Igloo cooler, and a Coleman heater. Mr. Greenwood. Okay, next slide. Mr. McDonald. Once again, sir, more coolers that I found questionable, automatic plug-in coolers. Mr. Greenwood. Go back. That toolbox on wheels there, is that an item that you suspected was purchased improperly, or not? Mr. McDonald. I don't have an opinion, sir. I guess you can read from the box here, American Angler fishing type equipment. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Mr. McDonald. Lawn mowers--you know, KSL or Johnson Controls, we do perform, you know, facility maintenance and such at the laboratory, and we do use lawn mowers. However, I took this picture because I didn't understand why laboratory folks would need a lawn mower. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Mr. McDonald. We are looking at some Rancho shocks and some DeWalt tools. The Rancho shocks---- Mr. Greenwood. These are shock absorbers for a motor vehicle? Mr. McDonald. Yes, sir, would be used, you know, obviously, on a motor vehicle, and since the facility--vehicle maintenance was done by GSA. It didn't really make sense that somebody would have shocks. Mr. Greenwood. Were those the same shock absorbers that were found on Mr. Alexander's car? Do you know? Mr. McDonald. I do not know that. This picture--I found it ironic that laboratory folks would need CDs on how to instruct lockpicking. Mr. Greenwood. How to instruct lockpicking? Mr. McDonald. This picture was taken. I questioned the volume of gloves in the drawer, and I couldn't imagine. We didn't have nearly that many people working out there. So I took this picture, really, with trying to get some sort of understanding why you would need so many pairs of gloves. This might be self-explanatory. I felt that this was questionable as well. Mr. Greenwood. It's a tool for breaking into an automobile? Mr. McDonald. Yes, sir. Mr. Greenwood. In case you couldn't pick a lock. Mr. McDonald. automatic gate opener--I don't know of an area where we could have used one of these. Mr. Greenwood. All right. Mr. McDonald. Some miscellaneous Honda engines. I don't want to speculate, but anyway, the Honda engines could be used for any number of things. Like I said, the majority of the facility and maintenance work my people actually performed, and we didn't have any Honda generators. So---- Here is another picture of a Warren winch. I believe these are all-terrain vehicle or four-wheeler winches that you are seeing there. There's two of them stacked on top of each other. Then off to the left, of course, there is a Big Cot. Mr. Greenwood. Your big sleeping bag? Mr. McDonald. Yes, sir. Inside this bunker, I believe this is Bunker 22--housed some TVs and VCRs, questionable items. Coleman equipment, Cabela's equipment, more coolers. Looks like an air conditioning unit. I took some pictures of the internal, and here are some Cabela's armchairs, which struck me as unusual. Mr. Greenwood. Deluxe armchairs? Mr. McDonald. Yes, sir. Motorola two-way radios, not something that we can typically use at the laboratory. Mr. Greenwood. Why? I've been at the laboratory. I can imagine--I'm sure that security personnel, for instance, may have had need for portable radios. Explain why the responsibilities of the gentleman in question would not--could not be presumed to include the need for these kinds of radios. Mr. McDonald. I believe that all the Federal communications there at University of California is regulated, and we are not allowed to just use any type of two-way radio in order to communicate. The facility that I was with, we actually did have, you know, very expensive radios which to use to communicate with each other. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Is that the last slide? Okay. Thank you. We understand that you wished to appear here voluntarily and offered to provide this committee with these photographs, the property being observed being purchased with government funds, but kept for personal use by lab employees. Yet the committee had to issue you a subpoena both for your personal appearance and also for the photographs that you brought with you, and that was at the request of your current employer. What exactly did your employer advise you regarding your appearance here, and what did he advise you regarding your photographs? Mr. McDonald. Sir, my employer didn't especially advise me at all on this particular matter. Part of the reason why I needed a subpoena to get here, I guess, is I wanted to make sure that I was friendly to the committee and the members. But I also did not want to appear to be too familiar or--sorry--too friendly. So---- Mr. Greenwood. Okay. In your statement to the committee, you stated that you approximated your first contact with lab security personnel regarding the Bussolini and Alexander situation as around January 2002. Through staff interviews, we have been told that the Office of Security Inquiries, OSI, was first contacted by you in September of 2001. Do you believe that to be correct? Mr. McDonald. Yes, sir, that could very well be correct. Mr. Greenwood. What did you tell the OSI inquirer? Mr. McDonald. The individual--I met with him, and originally it was via e-mail, and then we met a number of times after in person. But the first time we met in person, I mentioned to him what was going on in my particular area as far as what I thought was waste, fraud and abuse, theft. He said people have turned these people in before, and I didn't believe it. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. All right. During the course of our investigation, staff were told in interview with Robert Garcia, who is the Mesa Equipment representative for the lab, that Bussolini and Alexander advised him they were setting up a secret and anti-terrorism center out at TA-33 or TA-35. This was the reason for their excessive purchases and the reason that some of the items' descriptions on invoices had to be changed. Do you know anything about this anti-terrorism center, and were Bussolini and Alexander ever given that kind of direction from management? Mr. McDonald. I did not know anything about that, sir. As far as I know, they did not get direction from the laboratory to do anything like that. Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Walp, according to your statement, you were told that when you were hired at LANL, you were selected because of your expertise in law enforcement. What did your management team, Mr. Busboom and Mr. Tucker, advise you would be your daily role? Mr. Walp. They told me that, as indicated, they hired me because of my background and my expertise, made comments that one of the reasons I was hired, because they didn't have that knowledge in that area, told me to basically go over into OSI, if you will, and professionalize and bring expertise to it, do whatever you feel is necessary to bring it under appropriate professionalism, and that they would support me in that effort. Not really definitive as to specifics other than saying that the current individuals that were there doing an investigation didn't really have the backgrounds or the expertise to do the jobs the way they wanted them done, and there were problems with reporting systems, and just basically go over there and do the job that was necessary to professionalize it. Mr. Greenwood. What kind of problems did they identify? Mr. Walp. They identified, again, the weaknesses in the current investigators. They touched on the reporting system to a degree, but had also told me--In my posting, it was indicated that part of my job would be the investigation of theft, the protection of property, but didn't go anything with specificity as to exactly what I should do in that arena. Mr. Greenwood. What is your understanding of the reasons you were asked to resign and you were subsequently terminated? What did they say to you? Mr. Walp. Well, through the course of the multiple months they said a lot to me. I guess I could couch it in the terms that, when I began to--when I first arrived there, I was approached within a few days by a gentleman, Mr. Ken Shiffer, who indicated--former FBI agent--that he felt there was a lot of theft going on. He arranged a meeting between Mr. Tucker and myself, at which time he talked about theft of a whole truckload of lumber and many other ideas. Mr. Tucker agreed, and made the statement to me that he agreed there was rampant theft, that it had been making the valley green for years. Therefore, they were knowledgeable, and then asked me to go on my way of trying to find out and get a grasp on what was going on there. Later on, Mr. Busboom asked me actually to make an official report on that. Then when I found out through my efforts as to the degree of the theft and the mischaracterization of actually lost property, missing property, dismantled, salvaged or whatever, was actually stolen, I attempted to approach it from an FBI investigative perspective. In fact, Mr. Shiffer and I--Mr. Shiffer felt there may-- wanted to approach it from a RICO perspective, felt that it may tied in with the drug trade in that area, and asked me to approach Mr. Tucker, which I did, because I knew at that point, having experience in white collar crime, that my evidence would be buried in the bowels of the reports. It took me a while to find out where those reports were, because in law enforcement you have the uniformed crime reports which are easy to go to, to get a profile, but I finally found out after some consternation that it was buried in BUS 6 and BUS 5, the Business Division, and that's where I got my report then when I submitted a report on March 26. When that happened and I approached Mr. Tucker, because I knew I had to have enough personnel, I needed quality personnel that would do investigative audit, not just audit but investigative audit, and the FBI certainly has that expertise, I was soundly rejected at that time. The first inclination that there were some problems there, because I'm beginning to unravel things, and the more I unraveled, the more disturbance it caused by higher command like Mr. Dickson and Mr. Salgado, that if this stuff is revealed--constantly, from the time we were there before Steve got there and then, of course, while Steve was there, we were constantly reminded that our job, even though you help the FBI, your main job is to protect the lab, its image, its PR, and ultimately the protection of the contract. That was our main job. We were told that on multiple occasions. We were warned on August 14 that, if I--Steve and I were in a meeting--that if we continued to pursue this, that the lab is famous for sacrificing its children for the sake of its image. When I tried to get the FBI task force, Tucker, the caveat to that was--and he said, Glenn, if you continue in these efforts of trying to find the theft, you are liable to find that high management is involved, and that is not good for the lab's image. So we ultimately ended up in, oh, around the month of September where Mr. Tucker explained to me in detail what corporate philosophy meant there, and again very distinct said it was protecting the lab, its image, its PR and ultimately the contract. Of course, as we unraveled these things, we had interference from Dickson, Busboom and Tucker. I'll just give you a few examples what I felt led up to this termination then. For example, the first problem we encountered was the reporting. When we first established the system would work with the NIS case--that is the Bussolini and Alexander case--we had a plan set up where the FBI could easily get reports, and that worked well for about 2 weeks, and then Dickson passed an order down that before we could get those reports, he had to personally review them before they would pass down. In one case, the FBI was waiting over 6 weeks for a report and never did get it until they made a complaint to Mr. Salgado, because Mr. Dickson was sitting on it, refused to pass that information down. Mr. Dickson wanted personally to get in one of these bunkers, to go down one night and get into the bunkers, and the FBI did not want him to, in fact refused to allow him, because he said all they need is to see the lab counsel down there looking at this stolen property, and it would jeopardize the case. We collected evidence on the Mustang case. I personally went in with my people and collected evidence out of Lillian Anaya's office. Immediately upon collecting that evidence--and at that time they didn't have an evidence control system; they had evidence in lockers and in drawers and under desks and whatever. So I set up a specific law enforcement type structured system. Immediately Dickson wanted to get into those evidence boxes, and I told him that the FBI needs to review them first, because there may be prosecutorial evidence in those boxes. Ultimately, the FBI was going to serve a search warrant, and their comment to me was they had become so frustrated with Dickson interfering with it that, if we could do it in OSI, look and see what's in those boxes and pass it on to them. The day I appointed two investigators to look into it, Mr. Tucker called me and said they are coming over and grabbing all those boxes and taking them from my official investigatory control, which they did that day. The FBI was not pleased with that, even though I warned Tucker that they may be ordering an obstruction of justice, because the FBI had just sent Dickson a letter indicating that, before they would go into the boxes or interview anybody, they would need to get together with them to make sure they weren't interfering with their cases. We had Chris Chandler, who works for Mr. Dickson. She came to me 1 day, and the FBI in the beginning said that they would give me their official notes, because of my law enforcement experience that I may be able to help them tell them where to go in this direction. She came into my office 1 day and demanded to have those notes so she could take them back to her office, and I refused her, I said, because they can't--that wasn't the deal, and I can't let them out of my possession. At that time she became argumentative with me and said that she did not care about anybody's constitutional rights or that it would interfere with an FBI prosecution. She began to do an investigation behind the back of Steven Doran--this was on the Mustang case--and the FBI, interviewing people that she shouldn't have interviewed. She may have interfered, totally obstructed with that case. One of the most egregious things that Mr. Dickson did 1 day, even though he was previously warned by the FBI, once we got into these investigations, that he was not to reveal any information to anybody, especially anybody in Assessments and Audits, because there was a suspect that was connected to the NIS case in there, Mr. Dickson arranged a meeting which Steve and I attended, and he verbally intimidated us, that we tell everybody in that room everything we know about every case we have, including all FBI confidential information. I challenged him at that time again that they may be bordering on obstruction of justice, this is an FBI case. His comment was to me--and I'll paraphrase, but it is in my batch notes--was--the way he quoted was this way. He says don't go there, boys. He says you need to know who you work for, who pays your check, and that's the University of California. Your job is to protect the lab, its contract, and not the FBI investigation. He made it very clear at that time. Obviously, we were given threats that, again, we would be leveled or fired. The FBI--Mr. Dickson gave them an ultimatum on the Mustang case with Lillian Anaya that either they interview her by August 19 or they were going to put her on investigative leave. They were going to seal her office and, if you will, blow the case before they had the opportunity of interviewing her. On the Bussolini-Alexander case, they gave them another 48 hour ultimatum. Either they bring this case to a conclusion within that 48 hours or they were going to put them on investigative leave before they even had the opportunity. The FBI was extremely upset about that, that they were interfering with their case, because their timetable wasn't ready at that point. So all these things culminating together ultimately ended in the Clarissa Rodriguez case where it was a forged voucher. On September 20, we---- Mr. Greenwood. I'm going to cut you off here, because there are other members that need to ask questions. Just one question, and I ask you to answer it just very briefly, because my time has long expired. There was mention of early on being told that this lab, this theft at the lab had been making the valley green for a long time. Do you have any sense as to how--we talked about specific cases, but how rampant this problem is? Mr. Walp. The theft? To me, my observation, sir, was the lab was riddled with theft. I believe it still is riddled with theft. You have yet to uncover the real theft, and I believe that is in the LVA systems and the just-in-time systems. I think that is going to be hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dollars of theft when you finally get into it. But most egregious of all was management knew about it. Tucker--I was only there a few days. It's been going on for years. Shiffer says it's been going on for years. Tucker never said it wasn't going on. Mr. Tapia agreed it was going on for years. They knew about it, but they did nothing about it. Then when I tried to do something about it, that's when they tried to shut us down and stop us. Mr. Greenwood. Okay, thank you. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Deutsch. Mr. Deutsch. Mr. Walp, really just to continue exactly on that line of questioning, when you say they knew about, did they know specifics or just--I mean, it was so flagrant that it was obvious it was going on? Mr. Walp. I think the one thing--you need to go back to Mr. McDonald's statement. In the fall of 2001, this information was reported to Bill Sprouse who worked in OSI at that time before me getting there. He said--I have a memo from him--he told Tucker. They were aware of it. There also was information given to a Mr. Scott Gibbs who works in the Associate Director's office under Mr. Holt who was given an e-mail on it. He did nothing about it. They gave it to Katherine Brittian in Assessments and Audits, and they did nothing about it. So they were very well aware of the NIS case in 2001. Mr. Sprouse told me that he told the FBI. The FBI says they never told us anything. So as it deals with NSI, to me they definitely knew about that. There is no doubt, because the property manager regarding a report with the lost property, was identified as lost, the 2.7 between 1999 and 2001--the property manager in S Division when I questioned him trying to get a background on this, his comment was, well, the way they take are of that is there is a form you fill out, and you can either put dismantled, salvaged, missing. They even have one called retired. He says, the way you take care of it is, if you are doing an audit and you can't find it, you just fill out a form, and that takes care of it. It just goes away. As it dealt with the LVA systems and the JIT systems---- Mr. Greenwood. Explain what LVA is. Mr. Walp. Yes. Local Vendor Agreements, and the JIT is the just-in-time where, if you need something in a hurry, you can buy computers or clothing, shoes or whatever. In my meeting in July with Mr. Tapia and his crew, when I explained to him what we were going to do to try to correct this problem, there was about 12 people in that room from the Business 6 unit, and they almost stood up and cheered. They said, finally, finally someone is interested in this. We've been telling our supervisors and administrators for years. They won't help us, and they gave me a sample of how bad it is. They said, Glenn, we can take you down to Santa Fe today. We can have a whole computer system in your house this afternoon, and no one will know, and no one will ever know, because of the system that is set up and the controls that are not there. Paul Mirey, financial area, attempted to send a memo out after my report in March to try to get people to comply with the way it should be done, and that was rescinded. I attempted to get a young lady by the name of Meredith Brown to put out this information in a--it's a LANL pamphlet to tell people to report thefts. I went to Tucker, and Tucker said, no. He said, that's not good to distribute that information lab-wide; you shouldn't have that information. A Ms. Roybal and a Mr. Martinez in the fall of 2001 identified severe problems with the purchase card system, made three memos, sent it to their bosses, and their bosses rejected it: Basically, thank you, but no, thank you, we don't want to know about it. When I interviewed Mr. Stanley Hettich, who is currently working in the same position in Procurement in BUS 5, when Steve and I went to interview him regarding the Mustang case, because he had no intentions of telling me--Mr. Tapia had called me, and he asked me, he said, did Mr. Hettich call you yet about that Mustang case. I said, no. He said, well, he doesn't want to; he doesn't want to tell you anything, but he said, I told him, because he was a higher authority. So I went to interview him---- Mr. Deutsch. Again, I was focusing--I'm convinced. Okay? I'm convinced. Mr. Doran, I understand that you were in a little convenience store recently where a Los Alamos employee was using his credit card to buy a bunch of little flashlights. Can you describe that interaction? Mr. Doran. Actually, he was using his ID card to buy flashlights. They have a system set up at the laboratory where you use your employee identification number, known as a Z- number, your identification card, and they have what they call cost codes and program codes to make purchases. He had a basket full of the little Mini-Mag flashlights and, when he approached the register, the girl behind the counter said to him, you better purchase everything that you need or want, because this program will probably be ending very soon, and they just laughed. Mr. Deutsch. You have settled your case the University and going to be the Director of Security work out at the President's office. In that new position, what do you hope to accomplish, and do you think you can actually fix what is going on? Mr. Doran. Well, I hope with this new position that I will be very instrumental in fixing these problems. As I've said from the beginning, I don't care who does it, as long as it gets done. Mr. Deutsch. Mr. Salgado, then the lab's deputy director, and Mr. Frank Dickson, the legal counsel, said several times that you and Mr. Walp gave them incorrect information. One of the often repeated allegations is that you said there were three suspects in the TA-33 case, and there were only two. Who told you that there were three? Mr. Doran. From the beginning, sir, there were three individuals identified as prime suspects, Mr. Bussolini--sorry. Mr. Deutsch. Oh, okay. Actually, apparently, you are not supposed to identify those people. Mr. Doran. Okay. Mr. Deutsch. Not the third person. Mr. Doran. Okay. There were three suspects identified initially. One of those suspects actually is now a witness for the government. Mr. Deutsch. There was some discussion about that witness wearing a wire. Is that correct? Mr. Doran. There was a discussion early on that, if we were able to turn that suspect into a witness, that we would ask him to wear a wire as part of an investigative technique. However, that never occurred. Mr. Deutsch. And it never occurred, because? Mr. Doran. There was no need to have him do that. Mr. Deutsch. You've spent a great deal of time learning about the control system at the lab. Is that correct? Mr. Doran. Yes, sir. Mr. Deutsch. Can you explain to us the bar coded inventory control system? Mr. Doran. The bar coded inventory control? Basically, bar codes are placed on items that are considered either sensitive and/or over the $5,000 dollar amount. Mr. Deutsch. Okay. And is that in a central location or how does it actually function? Mr. Doran. Once the items are bar coded, they are placed on what they call an accountability statement, so that they can be tracked throughout the system, and those items can be anywhere within the laboratory and even off of laboratory property, depending on what their use is. Mr. Deutsch. Okay. Now Mr. Alexander and another employee purchased several cameras and pairs of binoculars. Should they have been bar coded as attractive items for the supplier who delivered them not to the central receiving point but directly to Mr. Alexander, or were they bought by local vendors in an attempt to avoid the bar coding system? Mr. Doran. Okay. You know, that brings us to a whole 'nother set of problems, because Mr. Bussolini and Alexander were purchasing items through Mesa, Mesa Contracting, which was not an approved vendor to sell those types of items, like the high speed digital cameras and what-not. Those items were able--they were able to sneak those items through without having them bar coded. Mr. Deutsch. The tractors and the asphalt pavers, would they be bar coded as well? Mr. Doran. If they were over $5,000, yes, they should have been. Mr. Deutsch. Okay. And when property is bar coded, is it assigned to a certain person? Mr. Doran. Typically, it is. Whenever--they have what they call accountability statements, and whatever is issued to you for your own use is assigned to you. If it is something that is used like within an office like a copy machine as an example, it is assigned to that office. Mr. Deutsch. Now Mr. Alexander--we have actually--our staff has looked at his assigned property list, and it doesn't include the asphalt paver and the cameras. What would make you believe it is outside of the lab's inventory system? He did not have that, obviously, through the system. Again, it's a conscious effort to keep it out of the system? Mr. Doran. Okay. In a lot of cases, you know, like Glenn has mentioned and Mr. McDonald has mentioned, it just--because the system is so archaic and in such disarray, just about anything can slip through the system at any one time, and it doesn't take a whole lot of effort to do that. Mr. Deutsch. I guess also, Mr. Alexander had a Rototiller. What is a Rototiller? I mean, how would you use that? Mr. Doran. A gardening tool. Mr. Deutsch. I mean, is there any use that you can envision it being in the---- Mr. Doran. No, not in his division. Again, as Mr. McDonald mentioned, JCNNM is the contractor who provides those services, and they provide their own tools and equipment. So there would be no need for Mr. Bussolini and/or Alexander to have any of those items. Mr. Deutsch. Mr. McDonald, would you want to respond to that as well? I mean, why would Mr. Alexander have a Rototiller? Mr. McDonald. To me, it doesn't make sense. Mr. Deutsch. Okay. And why is that? Mr. Mcdonald. Well, just the fact that, as far as Johnson Controls or KSL that I currently work for, if there was going to be some need for that type of work to be done, we would do it. It would not be a University issue. So for having Rototillers, it would be pretty difficult to be able to use. Mr. Deutsch. What about the type of grounds? I mean, is there an issue about the grounds themselves being toxic or radioactive? Apparently, my understanding is that an actual environmental plan would have to be implemented before the use of that type of equipment? Mr. McDonald. That is correct. Mr. Deutsch. Did you ever see anyone use a Rototiller at the lab? Mr. McDonald. No, never have. Mr. Deutsch. Last night you showed the staff a picture of several fire extinguishers just lying on the ground. What would be the environmental issues of that? Mr. McDonald. Certainly not good. I believe that, if the New Mexico Environmental Department could get hold of that, there could be some serious issues, since the fire extinguishers were Halon. Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Walden. Mr. Walden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. Mr. McDonald, I want to ask you what you are feeling right now about being here. Are you concerned that--given what I've heard already about retribution and all and all the threats, intimidation, are you concerned about being here today and what it may mean to the company for whom you work? Mr. McDonald. I am, but not to the point, I guess, where I would lose my job. I am still concerned. Mr. Walden. All right. Mr. Doran, I want to ask you a little bit about what you do now for the system, but especially as a result of the meeting with UC officials, you and Mr. Walp were rehired, I understand, by the University? Mr. Doran. Yes, sir. Mr. Walden. As consultants to the Office of the President? Mr. Doran. Yes, sir. Mr. Walden. And are you dealing with the current problems at the lab? Mr. Doran. To be perfectly honest with you, sir, I just accepted the Director of Security for the President's office yesterday. So I haven't been assigned any files at this time. Prior to that, Mr. Walp and myself have been generating reports based on our previous investigations at the laboratory and meeting with the UC investigatory team and providing them with information to move forward. Mr. Walden. One the reasons that was cited for your firings was perhaps the way the Mustang was handled. Mr. Doran. Yes, sir. Mr. Walden. Or some would say mishandled, and that that hurt the lab's relationship with the FBI. Mr. Doran, how would you describe the relationship you had with the FBI? Mr. Doran. I have a wonderful relationship with the FBI. It has been stated by all of the agents that we've worked with that the relationship that they had with Glenn and myself was the best relationship that the FBI has ever had with the laboratory in its history. Mr. Walden. I was reading through your report dated February 14, the Los Alamos National Laboratory investigative summary. You make some comments at the beginning of it about how it is mainly written from memory, that you haven't had access to personnel records. You don't know what's been destroyed or not. Mr. Doran. Right. Mr. Walden. Will you have access to personnel and records under your current hiring arrangement? Mr. Doran. I can't answer that question, sir, because it hasn't been discussed. Mr. Walden. One of the incidents that you discuss here is the G&G Industrial Supply. Mr. Doran. Yes, sir. Mr. Walden. Now I've been in small business 17 years nearly. If I were the only employee in my company, as apparently Mr. George is in his---- Mr. Doran. Yes, sir. Mr. Walden. [continuing] I think I would know that a lab had spent $800,000 with my company. Mr. Doran. I think you would, too, sir. Mr. Walden. Yet you indicate he didn't seem to know that. Mr. Doran. He claimed not to. Mr. Walden. Can you describe--I mean, I understand some of these tools were allegedly just basically bought from K-Mart or other local vendors and then he was the middle man, basically. Mr. Doran. Yes, sir. Mr. Walden. Because of his, ``tremendous customer service.'' That is what is reported. Mr. Doran. I was hoping he would take me on as a partner, sir, but---- Mr. Walden. Does he have a profit sharing plan? That's a serious question. Mr. Doran. Well, I guess when you are the sole owner, you do. Mr. Walden. Is this something that is going to be investigated as to--what was the 800,000 in tools for? What was purchased? Where did they go? Mr. Doran. We have no idea sir. None. Mr. Walden. Is that something the FBI is looking into? Mr. Doran. I believe, at the point we were terminated, the Inspector General's Office had that file. Mr. Walden. This is so outrageous, it's hard to know where to start, frankly, as a taxpayer. Mr. McDonald, have you in your other work--have you worked with other labs or other Federal facilities over time? Mr. McDonald. No. Los Alamos National Laboratories are the first one I've worked with. Mr. Walden. And at what point--these photos that we saw here, at what point in your work there at the lab did you decide to start taking photos? Had you witnessed other things that raised alarm bells first? Mr. McDonald. Yes, sir. Initially, the first thing that raised an alarm for me was having one of these people that you guys referred to before had taken me out to one of these bunkers for the first time to see what was sort of out there, and that struck me odd as some of the materials, tools and equipment that were inside or housed within this bunker. One of the things that really caught my eye was some aluminum tubing, because we just hardly have a use for aluminum tubing, you know. Electricians use steel conduit and so on and so forth. I asked somebody what it was used for. A man told me that it was used to build a go-cart for his nephews. Mr. Walden. A go-cart for his nephews? Mr. McDonald. Yes, sir. Mr. Walden. What about--there's some reference in the materials about some organization approaching the lab for donations of used equipment or things that they were going to get rid of, and it is reported that, well, they already donated it to a nonprofit or they have a specific nonprofit or Pueblo that they donate to. Mr. Mcdonald. I believe that was the State of New Mexico had approached the laboratory for donations. Mr. Walden. Okay. And can you describe more fully what you have witnessed, either--any of you, in terms of that relationship and where equipment went? Mr. Walp? Mr. Walp. Right before our terminations, a gentleman came forward to us. I had spoken at a national property managers meeting in Albuquerque. After I gave my presentation, he came forward to Steve and explained it to him. Quite frankly, we never had the opportunity to investigate it. It is still sitting on the table at Los Alamos to be investigated. Never had the opportunity. Mr. Walden. Speaking of Los Alamos, you add in your testimony that part of what you were encouraged to do when you got there was to hire new people as inspectors, according to Mr. Doran. Correct? I mean, you brought him in as associate. Mr. Walp. Yes. Mr. Walden. How many new people did you hire? Mr. Walp. They originally gave me the authority to hire one. I had two individuals who were extremely qualified, and I convinced Mr. Busboom to allow me to hire the two, which I did, Mr. Doran and a Mr. Mullins. Then we brought in an entry level individual, Mr. Thanh Nguyen, who was helping me. Then I also brought in some secretarial help. So probably about four or five in all. Mr. Walden. what is their status today? Mr. Walp. Mr. Mullins left. Mr. Walden. Why? Mr. Walp. He was not satisfied. He was only there a few short weeks and got involved in these situations. In fact, he was the investigator in the Clarissa Rodriguez case, the voucher case, and he got so disgusted, he said I'm out of here. Mr. Walden. When did he leave? Mr. Walp. He left about a week after we were terminated. Mr. Walden. So last fall or last winter? Mr. Walp. Yes, and Mr. Thanh Nguyen--I spoke to him, and he may be leaving. Mr. Walden. Why? Mr. Walp. Same thing. He felt there was corruption. Mr. Walden. Still? Mr. Walp. That's what he told me. Yes. Mr. Walden. Mr. Doran, you are at work for the President now, but you don't know what your authority is going to be? Mr. Doran. The agreement was just made yesterday, sir, actually late yesterday evening. So in preparing for this session today, we haven't had an opportunity to discuss it. Mr. Walden. So you agreed to take the job without really knowing what the responsibilities are? Mr. Doran. I have a basic knowledge of what the responsibilities will be. Mr. Walden. Does the timing of that agreement have anything to do with the date of this hearing? Mr. Doran. No, sir. Mr. Walden. Okay. I guess I have heard so much about how things have been suppressed over time, allegedly, and I am hearing today that there are still employees perhaps still working there today doing these same investigations you two gentlemen were doing and then subsequently got fired for after you talked to the Inspector General, and those individuals now are concerned they are not getting anywhere. Why should the University of California continue to have this contract? Maybe you are not the ones to ask that question, especially you, Mr. Doran, since you are working for the big President. Mr. Walp. I can answer it, if you want me to. Mr. Walden. You bet. Are you working for UC? Mr. Walp. No, just as a consultant to the President. Mr. Walden. You're working for UC then. Mr. Walp. I'm working for UC, but I'll certainly answer that question. Mr. Walden. All right. Give me your answer. Mr. Walp. Okay. I would preface my statement by saying with specificity, Mr. Darling, I met him and I think he is a very honorable man. Mr. Walden. And he is? Mr. Walp. And he works for the University of California directly under the President, and I think he is attempting to correct problems there. I never met Mr. Nanos, but he appears to be attempting to make some changes there, but my personal opinion is I think it's time to gut the place. I think it is so infected, it's a culture that has been ingrained in that place for decades, and I think it's a time for change. Again, I would say as I said before that, if they are truly serious about changing this, then they need to get rid of the people that are there. These are the same people who interfered and obstructed. Mr. Walden. I couldn't agree more. Are any of the people who have been removed from their positions being personally held accountable for what walked away from facility at taxpayer expense? Mr. Walp. Not to my knowledge. In fact, I think there's Federal crimes that have been committed that need to be investigated. Mr. Walden. Well, Mr. Doran, I hope when you go to meet with whoever is going to tell you what your authorities are that you will press the limits and get back into the case you know well. Mr. Doran. Yes, sir. Just to answer your question, since the beginning of this entire situation, you know, I have been upright and honest. I was in the process of losing my home over this entire ordeal. I have said this time and time again. My accepting this position has nothing to do with the situation that has occurred or any situation that will occur in the future. Mr. Walden. Have they made up your salary from the past, and have they paid you any kind of lump sum to come back? Mr. Doran. Yes, and they did recover my home. But it has-- there was no agreement that I would, you know, not continue to---- Mr. Walden. Right. I'm not questioning your ethics on this at all. I'm just curious. Mr. Doran. Yes, they did. Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman. Mr. Walden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Greenwood. The gentlelady from Illinois is recognized. Ms. Schakowsky. First of all, let me reiterate my great thanks to you for having the courage to pursue this and to bring this to the public light. I think that the notion that you work for the American taxpayers, first and foremost, is so important, and it is so unacceptable that you would get punished for doing just that. So let me express my personal thanks, and on behalf of my constituents as well. Knives, 451 knives costing $19,127, were purchased. In 1 week, 27 boning knives were purchased. Is there any use for boning knives at the lab? Mr. Doran. Not to our knowledge, no. Ms. Schakowsky. When you discovered these things and you brought--what exactly was said to you? What was the response? I mean, there clearly is no excuse for it. So what was the response? Mr. Walp. The response was, as we encounter from the very beginning, they took a very cavalier approach. I was in a meeting one time. It was a supervisory meeting, and they talked about an individual who every year bought a full set of hunting clothes and boots and knives through the JIT and the LVA systems, and I was just young there at that time, and I ask him. I said, do you ever approach this. Actually, there was laughter in the room: Oh, he does this every year. There was that type of approach, a very, very cavalier approach. When we began to check the items these people were purchasing, the people in the---- Ms. Schakowsky. But let me just ask you this. This is in the context of some sort of a management meeting. I'm trying to picture a room where people are laughing at these inappropriate expenditures. What was the context and the setting for that kind of conversation? Mr. Walp. That specific conversation was in a training room, probably contained about 40 to 50 people and a presenter who was actually in charge of the audit system, and it was brought up. Again, I'm a new kid in the block, and to me, I mean, I was astonished that they were even laughing about this. But it was a comical approach. It was a cavalier, comic one. When I brought to Mr. Tucker's attention how serious the problem in NIS, and understand, the FBI through the U.S. Attorney had identified $50,000 just to reach that standard. I said, you know, this is a major crime. His response to me was, Glenn, that's not a major crime. He said, it's only $50,000. I said, well, any law enforcement environment I worked, $50,000 is a big theft. But it was the cavalier approach to--and quite frankly, comical, that that's the price of doing business here. Ms. Schakowsky. To me, it's reflective of a culture--we dealt with this at the Department of Defense, too--a culture that would allow this. You are saying that there are 40 people in the room. They are all involved in some way or another with auditing? Mr. Walp. No. No, the subject dealt with auditing, but the other people represented a multiplicity, scientists, you know, S Division, whatever. It was a multiplicity within that room, but that was the attitude that was taken. It was not a serious issue. To those, as I indicated, that were involved in it--it's like when I had another meeting with BUS 6 people and I told them what my plan was to begin to develop evidence to try to prosecute these people and bring a halt to it, those people cheered me, if you will, and indicated finally someone is interested in taking care of these thefts, because nobody cares about it. We've been telling our supervisors for years, and no one cares, because they just didn't care. It's an ingrained culture. It's ingrained within the philosophy of the people there. It wasn't a big issue. Ms. Schakowsky. And so explicit that people felt free to talk about it in any setting, really, that it wasn't something that just some managers would get together and whisper about. But you could say in a public setting, ha, ha, ha, what's the big deal. Mr. Walp. Yes. In fact, as I indicated, my property manager when I began to look into this, his comment was, well, this is how you take care of it; you just make up a dismantled report or salvage report, and I would get a lot of them, and I would go back to the people and say, well, show me the salvage report; because there is supposed to be, by the rule, a salvage report. We don't have any. We had people who are scientists who are retired, and all their computer equipment went with them. I said, well, you know, that's Federal taxpayer money. Said, no, he's retired, he's retired. Retired with him. Goes with him. That's just the attitude here. Ms. Schakowsky. So as a consequence, we are--let's go back to these 40 people. How did they react to you then, too? Were you just kind of this odd man out, and that was not the way we do things around here? Did they scorn you? How were you treated by those individuals? Mr. Walp. I wasn't scorned, but I knew I was a loner. It just jumped from that when I brought my philosophy to the fore. It was like, you know, okay, but we're moving on. It was just the way it was. Ms. Schakowsky. Two hundred twenty-five pairs of gloves costing over $7,000. Were 255 pairs of the most expensive gloves really needed in any way? Mr. Doran. Part of the information that came out of this investigation was the theft, but the waste as well. We found garbage cans full of those expensive gloves with just minimal amounts of dirt on the fingertips. They were just almost used like---- Ms. Schakowsky. They were being tossed? Mr. Doran. Yes. Basically, almost being used like disposable latex gloves. We found garbage cans full of them. We found them still sealed in their packages, scattered around the different work sites and things of that nature. Ms. Schakowsky. So what were they purchased for originally? Mr. Doran. Well, again it was just, because they had this budget that was almost a bottomless pit, a lot of things that they were purchasing were just misused and abused. I mean, we found air conditioning units that were worth thousands of dollars just rotting in the boxes, and power washers. They just had such a free hand with purchases and equipment, a lot of it was just wasted. Ms. Schakowsky. And did you talk to--in addition to the people who were--I'm trying to get at this culture question, how deep it goes, how embedded it is. When you would have conversations about this, what was just the general tone? Mr. Doran. Well, the general tone, at least in my case, not with Glenn, of course, but with most of the employees that I spoke with, was you know, Steve, you make good money; you got an easy job, if you want it to be an easy job. Just keep your mouth shut, and come into work, spend the day, you know, play on the Internet and go home and don't worry about it. It's the way it's always been, and nobody cares. Ms. Schakowsky. So this was a tone that was pretty pervasive throughout? Mr. Doran. Pretty much. We were constantly being thwarted, you know, by saying, well, you know, you are not a policeman anymore, which we understood. You have no law enforcement authority anymore, which we understood. But the main issue was, even though we didn't take the crime to the prosecutorial stage, we did report crime, and what we were seeing was a tremendous amount of crime, a tremendous amount of waste, and it was our duty to report it, and we told them we were going to report it. Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. McDonald, how did Mr. Alexander and Bussolini buy so much stuff they didn't use at the lab? Didn't they ever run out of money? Mr. McDonald. It did not appear so. They would use these blanket purchase orders. These people had always been commended in the past for having such a great budget. So---- Ms. Schakowsky. So don't you think we ought to be taking a closer look at that budget? Mr. McDonald. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Schakowsky. I wondered if you wanted to comment at all on this question of a pervasive culture. Mr. McDonald. Other than that I would agree with these gentlemen, that is correct. I would see that throughout the hill, even at a support service subcontract level. Ms. Schakowsky. And does anyone want to comment? What do we need to do first? Do we need to change the leadership at the top, just wholesale, in order to improve this situation? Mr. Walp. Quick answer, yes. That is my opinion. I think it even goes further than that as it deals with property. I know we are zeroing in on property, but to me, it is also a security incident, and I will not go into any specifics. That wouldn't be appropriate for this forum, but an extreme concern of Steve and I dealt with the NIS case, Bussolini and Alexander. Here we people who changed the light bulbs, who had keys to the kingdom of the blackest area. They had items in their possession such as GPS systems, GPS locator systems. If you lose something, you can find it. The high tech night vision binoculars, high tech cameras, RF detectors which means that you can--you identify if someone is in the room with you that has a bug on, it would be identified. I know the lab has come out and attempted to defend that and, as we hear, gee, this can be--this is hunting stuff. That may be true for certain items, but my question is when is the last time, because they bought over 56 different type of lock- pick items and glass cutting--you know, when is the last time a hunter needs a lock-pick to get into a national forest, and when is the last time a hunter needs an RF detector to find out if an elk is wearing a bug? So we are concerned from a security perspective. So we asked ourselves this question: How can the premier lab in the world allow this to happen for almost 2 years where anything was purchased, and without reservation, and the people doing the auditing--we had to show it to them, that they didn't even know they bought model airplanes, and they said, you know, what's the big deal? And you say, well, what about this, and what about this, and what about this? They said, well, you know--they never challenged it. So I have great concern that that lab that was supposed to be producing--you know, it deals with national defense, and there are many people there doing an outstanding job, but yet the unit, the Security and Safeguards Division that are supposed to be the guardians of the gates to make sure that those types of evidence does not get out to the enemy, and that high tech accomplishments that they make, they are the same ones that were involved in the cover-up, self-preservation and protectionism. They were the ones that are there. It is our position, and I think Steve will confirm this, that we wholeheartedly believe, just as--when the 1978 Inspector General Act was passed, in Chapter 5 it states words to this effect. It makes no sense to have the people who are doing the auditing and investigating report to and be supervised by people you are auditing and investigating. That's exactly what is happening when you deal with safeguards and securities under the umbrella of a contractor. It is time to take--I'm sorry, sir. Mr. Walden [presiding]. Yes. We have gone over a couple of minutes. So now we will need to go to Mr. Rogers. Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to follow up on that thought that you are having there. My concern is, if you are willing to steal, you are willing to sell information as well. How close are they to the information? Well, let me back up. You did not have a security clearance when you arrived, but I understand you have attained one. Mr. Walp. I did, yes. Mr. Rogers. So you would understand which individuals involved in this would have security clearances and those who would not? Mr. Walp. Yes. Mr. Rogers. To the best of your knowledge, which individuals--not by name, but give me a number of individuals who had security clearances that may have in some way been involved in this? Is it pervasive? Mr. Walp. I would say this. I'll take--I will couch it in these terms. There were seven that I knew of. However, it is down to these two individuals that Mr. McDonald was speaking about, and the other ones may be used as state's evidence, but yet you had that arena of seven. Also important to me, in addition to the equipment, was the vulnerability. These people had the highest clearance you can get, and one of the factors when you do background is to make sure people are not involved in gambling, prostitution, because they are vulnerable. Here are individuals who are walking away with the farm and, if you had someone from the outside walk up to them and say, look, I know what you are doing and you either give me what I want or we are going to report you to the police, it placed these individuals in an extremely high vulnerability. Did anything like that happen? Probably not. Could have? Yes, it could have happened. How can you let that happen in the premier lab in the world, to let that go on without anybody knowing about it? Mr. Rogers. Well, you say probably didn't happen, but you don't know for sure if it did or did not. Mr. Walp. I do not know. I do not know. Mr. Rogers. How does a clerk in the store know when a program is coming to an end? Mr. Doran. Since our termination, a lot of program changes have been made, and one of the things that we have noticed around town--I live in Los Alamos--is that, where before you could pretty much purchase whatever you wanted using the ID card system--I'll put it in those terms--now they have like lists of what you can buy and what you can't buy. So they see that the noose is tightening and that, more than likely, that program will come to an end relatively soon. Mr. Rogers. To the best of any of your knowledge, is any of the security clearances been on hold? Is anyone getting rechecked at this time, given any information that's been provided? Mr. Doran. Not that I am aware of, sir. Mr. Rogers. So anybody that was close to this still continues to hold and enjoy the privileges of a security clearance with sensitive information? Mr. Doran. As far as I know. Mr. Rogers. That concerns me greatly, Mr. Chairman. That gets my blood going. I used to be an FBI agent. So I know what you do. Second, if you would, Mr. Doran, you worked on the Mary Frances Wood case. Mr. Doran. Yes, I did. Mr. Rogers. This is the individual who used the card at a casino. Mr. Doran. Yes. Mr. Rogers. You were given some direction on that case from your management. Is that correct? Mr. Doran. Yes, sir, I was. Mr. Rogers. Can you tell me what direction that was? Mr. Doran. Originally when that information was brought to our attention that the credit card was being used at casinos for cash advances, I was basically given a green light to do whatever necessary to bring that case to fruition. Once I started gathering information that proved she was guilty of those crimes, I was advised through Mr. Tucker--or Mr. Tucker advised me that Mr. Salgado had advised him that I was not to go through with an interview of Mrs. Wood. Mr. Rogers. So you conducted that interview anyway, as I understand it. Mr. Doran. Well, basically, what happened is I conducted the interview of Ms. Anaya with the FBI agent, Jeff Campbell, and at that time she refused to give us any information. I called Mr. Tucker, gave him a brief of what had occurred during that interview, and he said, well, go ahead and interview Ms. Wood, because, you know, she probably won't tell you anything either. When I brought her in for the interview, she gave us a full confession of what she had done. So I think it kind of backfired on them. Mr. Rogers. Interesting. Is she still employed? Mr. Doran. No. She worked for a contractor. She didn't work for the University of California, and the day that they asked me to take her credit card, keys, ID card, and then they just told her or had me tell her not to report to work the following day. So as far as I know, she could still be working for that contractor. Mr. Rogers. To the best of your knowledge, does she have access to any confidential, secret or elevated material? Mr. Doran. No, sir. Mr. Rogers. What is the status--well, before I do that, I know we've got a vote here, and I want to get this on the record. You were also investigating the fact that some of the vehicles that belonged to the lab were being fueled twice, in some cases three times every day. Mr. Doran. Yes, sir. I just got the peripheral information on that. We were terminated just as we began that investigation. Supposedly, the P-cards were being used to purchase large quantities of fuel for like fuel tanker type trucks. You know, they were using the credit cards to purchase that. Also, we were told that the GSA cards were being misused. Vehicles were being filled two and three times a day. Fuel purchases exceeded the amount of fuel that the vehicle could hold, and that type of thing. But I have no--again, we never started that investigation. So I have no hard copy documentation to prove any of that. Mr. Rogers. But on the face of what you were told and on the basis of that information that you received in the receipts of those, it indicated to you that there was probably some misuse of those gas cards, in your estimation? Mr. Doran. If the statements that were given to me by the individuals who gave them to me were true, yes. But we never-- we continued to request the hard copy documentation. We wanted receipts. We wanted to know which--we wanted them to identify the vehicles, identify the vendors, and we never got any of that. Mr. Rogers. Mr. McDonald, to your knowledge, what is the status of the equipment that you showed us here in the slides? Mr. McDonald. After--I have actually met with some of the people who are still in kind of control of the equipment, and the equipment that we've seen in the pictures, for the most part, are still there where it is being inventoried and so on and so forth, and determined in some means of property redistribution. Mr. Rogers. At this point, do you think it is being handled properly? When you say redistribution is being handled, sent to another institution that may be able to use that equipment in its proper use? Mr. McDonald. Correct. Mr. Rogers. Someone, I think, mentioned, and forgive me-- you said it is easy to sneak through on the bar code. Maybe it was you, Mr. Doran. Mr. Doran. Yes. Mr. Rogers. When you say that, did you identify any process that they were using that was consistent throughout the lab to avoid getting on the accountability statement? Mr. Doran. Basically, what Bussolini and Alexander used is they had the equipment delivered to an unauthorized location so that it didn't go through the central warehouse and, therefore, it wasn't accounted for. Mr. Rogers. So, obviously, they had other individuals involved who were receiving that as well. Mr. Doran. The salesman at Mesa was definitely helping them to purchase items, changing invoices, you know, using part numbers versus what the actual item was, and delivering it to offsite locations. Mr. Rogers. Now was there any investigation? Do you have any information on where this material went after it left the lab? Was it in people's homes? Could you determine if it was resold? Mr. Doran. Well, the only thing I can give you is just hearsay. After Glenn and I were ordered not to deal with the FBI, some of the individuals who were then assigned to deal with the FBI said a good deal of those items were found in the homes of Bussolini, Alexander, Mr. Bussolini's girlfriend, and other offsite locations. Mr. Rogers. Thank you for being here today. Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the time. Mr. Walden. The gentleman yields back his time. For the witnesses, the audience, and the members, we have two votes on the floor. We have about 10 minutes to go. So we will recess for approximately 30 minutes to accommodate those two votes and time to get back to resume. If there are no other subcommittee members who haven't already done a round of questioning, we will go to full committee members, and Ms. Eshoo will be the first member. [Brief recess.] Mr. Walden. Ladies and gentlemen, why don't we resume the hearing. Before we give Ms. Eshoo an opportunity to ask questions, I understand Mr. Doran wanted to make a clarifying comment regarding a question that Mr. Rogers raised. So I would like to give you the opportunity to do that, and then we will go to Ms. Eshoo, who is a member of the full committee. I would remind you all that you are still under oath. Mr. Doran, if you would like to go ahead and clarify for the record. Mr. Doran. Okay. So far as the gas purchases were concerned, it was an issue where my last contact on that issue was with Mr. Jay--I am drawing a blank on his last name. Mr. Walden. Johnson? Mr. Doran. Jay Johnson, thank you. We were told by Mr. Johnson that Mr. Marquez had shut down that investigation for the time being, that they had pretty much bigger fish to fry and that they would be gathering the documents at a later date to give to us to begin our investigation. Mr. Walden. It's my understanding Mr. Johnson was fired a week--no, you were fired a week---- Mr. Doran. I was fired a week--or actually, 2 weeks later. Mr. Walden. Thank you. Ms. Eshoo, for your round of questioning, the full committee, 10 minutes. Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by thanking you, the chairman of the full committee and the ranking member of the full committee as well as the subcommittee chairman and ranking person of the committee for extending the legislative courtesy to me to join you in the very important investigation in oversight committee hearing today. I appreciate it, and I believe that my constituents do as well. So my thanks to you. To the panelists, thank you to you. Since I didn't get to make an opening statement, let me just make a couple of observations about where we are and what has brought us here today. As a Californian, I think I speak for many, not only in California but across the country and around the world, that the University of California is one of the great public universities of the world. This hearing today is not a source of pride to us. The mismanagement that has been spoken, the evidence of abuse, of neglect, of fraud--these are not things that we value. This is not a source of pride to us. So I commend you for coming forward. It is important that we have brave citizens, I think, that are willing to stand up publicly and say we are here to protect the investment of the American people through their tax dollars, and that is what this contract represents. So I salute you for doing it. I think that you have paid a price for it, but I think that at the end of this, what I hope and, I believe, will be or is the case is that we will come through this better, because we can weed this out. So my questions to you are in that arena. In your testimony you have done, I think, an excellent job of informing the subcommittee of the mismanagement, of the abuse, all of the things that have been part of your testimony. I am not going to repeat it. I think it just sounds in many ways that the wheels have come off. I mean, I don't know all of this equipment and whatever--this just doesn't belong anywhere. In your work at the lab, can you establish any kind of nexus between what you uncovered, what you blew your whistle about, with great legitimacy, with the issue of anything that impinges on our national security? Either Mr. Walp or Mr. Doran? Mr. Walp. Okay. From my position---- Ms. Eshoo. And I have some more questions. So if you could just be as brief as possible. Mr. Walp. I'll be brief, and perhaps I won't go into it. As I explained, I believe, to Mr. Rogers, our extreme concern as it dealt with security was the NIS, the spy type of equipment, these people having the keys to the kingdom, and just very quickly, it happened about the end of October where Mr. Bussolini was taken on a tour and was not allowed into a certain area. He immediately goes back and attempts to get keys to get in there, making the statement I need to know what's behind that door. Putting all that together, this whole situation, how it was let to happen, has extreme concern to us as it deals with national security, with the caveat that the people in charge, Safeguards and Securities, who are supposed to protect us from our secrets getting out, allowed this to happen, if you will. They knew about it in 2001 and did nothing about it, and then after we bring it to the fore, accept it. Ms. Eshoo. I'm going to ask--because I have some follow-up questions--Mr. Doran, if you would like to add anything to it. Mr. Doran. No. I mean, basically, it is just the--it's a situation where it is more of a campus environment than a national laboratory environment, and that is, in fact, a major problem. Ms. Eshoo. Do you find this to be the case in all departments or in specific areas? I know that you used some acronyms to describe different parts of the organization in your testimony. I am not so sure if you are referring to the entire lab or the business/bookkeeping/supervisorial oversight of employees. What is it that you--I mean, is it all of it? Is it some of it? Mr. Walp. As it deals with the theft and mismanagement, you are talking about? Ms. Eshoo. Well, all the things that you have testified about. Mr. Walp. Yes. The theft and mismanagement, to me, covers the whole spectrum of the lab as it deals with all the different systems, purchase cards, purchase orders. Ms. Eshoo. But is it throughout the lab or is it in that purchasing area? Mr. Walp. No, because the people who are doing the illegalities are beyond the purchasing area or the procurement area. It's just that---- Ms. Eshoo. Which leads me to my next question. Of the people that have been relieved or fired to date, I think that your testimony, both of you, said that you still believe that there are some or many others that still have to go. Do you want to comment on that? Is it a whole layer of management? Are they rank and file? I hope that a lot of people from the lab are tuned in today, most frankly, and I'm glad the cameras are here, because I think everyone at that place needs to know how seriously we are taking this and that we are committed to cleaning it up. So is it certain departments or is it pervasive to the entire lab? Is it purchasing? Mr. Walp. Okay. To me, it deals with the top layer. I'll give you one specific example. Mr. Stanley Hettich, the individual we had the Mustang case on, told Steve and I very emphatically he had no intentions of telling us about that Federal crime. In fact, he has not told us---- Ms. Eshoo. Mr. Walp, what I am looking for is I want to just--it's very important to give the specifics, and I appreciate that, but because of the time constraints, I want your big picture thinking about--and advice to the Congress. That is, do you, either one of you, see that all of this has been taken care of in terms of the people that have been fired or put on leave or are there many more to go? The point that I am trying to get at is how much do we need to do to cut the cancer out of the organization? Mr. Walp. Two quick things from my end: You need to get rid of the whole top layer in order to---- Ms. Eshoo. And how many does that represent? Mr. Walp. It might be 15 to 20, and then change the culture. Ms. Eshoo. Do you agree, Mr. Doran? Mr. Doran. Yes. I believe everybody in the upper echelons of the financial area should be removed. They were there before the problems started. They were there during the problem, and they continue to hold their positions today. Ms. Eshoo. Do you believe, with your considerable knowledge and investigation and experience to date at the lab, that if this were the case, what you just stated to us--do you believe that that would cleanse the culture that one of the members, or more than one member, touched on, to cut this out of the organization so that it can move on under leadership that is committed to not only reforms but also to sustain the reforms? Mr. Walp. If you've got it, and bring in leadership, you need leadership who will change that culture. If you bring in the same type of thinking, it is going to go back to exactly where it was before. Mr. Doran. And I would concur with Glenn. I mean, basically, they need strong financial leadership, people who are concerned about the taxpayer dollar, who know how to manage money on a grand scale. Ms. Eshoo. Again, I want to go back to this, because the labs do the critical, important work. They provide the research. They are critical to protecting our country. So I want this to be as clear as possible, and I know that you don't have knowledge about every single thing. I understand, and I know that you said for the record that you have an anxiety and concerns about the national security area based on what you observed, and I think that that is legitimate. Is there anything else that you need to add to that, because if you don't, I think that is a consideration in this as well. Mr. Doran. Well my only comment would be is that the entire system needs to be looked at from top to bottom. Some very common sense, basic security procedures can be added and changed to make it tremendously more effective than what it is today. Ms. Eshoo. See, I think that when you look at an organization and they have trouble keeping their books, you can't help but raise the question, and the American people would legitimately raise the question, well, why would we have confidence on this other side. But I do think, given this mismanagement and all of the other things that are a part of it that are not pretty, that are not good and that we have to clean out and get rid of, should not impinge on the whole national security area. So I appreciate that. I also want to, for the record, state today that there are recent events that have illuminated the critical work that the lab does. One of them is that, shortly after September 11 and the attacks on our country, the Lawrence Livermore national Laboratory was the one that reported that North Korea was resuming its nuclear weapons program. Many of the International Atomic Energy Agency weapons inspectors were trained at Los Alamos and are in Iraq today. So I think that, as we seek to root this out, we've got to appreciate the larger picture and the larger stage that we set this up. Again, I want to thank the chairman, and I hope that someone is going to ask some questions about the whistleblowers and if what the University of California has put into place is satisfactory, but that will have to wait. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the courageous witnesses that are here today. Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and recognizes for 10 minutes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey. Mr. Markey. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and I thank you so much for the courtesy in allowing us to ask questions. They are courageous. I agree with the gentlelady from California. I think everyone here admires the courage of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran and what they have gone through to bring this information to us. You are like latter day Paul Reveres, bringing the warning. You are whistleblowers. It is a very difficult position to place yourself and your families in. With apologies, Mr. Chairman, to Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, I would like to offer the following brief remarks. Listen, my children, and you shall hear tales of two latter day Paul Reveres, who were asked by Los Alamos to expose fraud and security weaknesses and dangerous flaws, and to blow the whistle when danger appeared. Today Paul Revere is a hero for all, and those here today have echoed his call. They've risen up to warn of dangers that prey on the nuclear lab near Santa Fe. They warned DOE of problems galore. Yet at first their warnings were largely ignored. They warned of theft, lost computers, and more, and instead of rewarding these brave two, they were fired. Their careers were through. Through day and night ride these Paul Reveres, and we must protect their right to sound the alarm, instead of causing them personal harm. A cry of warning when trouble is near. They are a voice in the darkness, a warning at the door, and their rights should be protected forevermore. But borne on the night wind of the past through all of our history to the last. In the hour of darkness and peril and need, the people will waken and listen to hear warnings of waste, wrongdoing and greed to protect our modern day Paul Reveres. And you can be assured that from this day forward, this committee will be monitoring anything and everything that does happen to you. Now let me ask this. In your opinion, has the University of California accepted the reality that national security may have been compromised, in your opinion? Do you think they now accept that? Mr. Walp. Of course, I can't speak for them, sir, but I would say in the meetings that I had, I believe there is extreme, grave concern on the part of Mr. Darling and his staff as to the functions that were effectuated at Los Alamos. Quite frankly, I would couch it in these terms. I believe they would say that, in many senses, it was a rogue aspect of their whole operation. Mr. Markey. But they do accept it? Mr. Walp. I believe they do. Mr. Markey. Do you agree with that, Mr. Doran? Mr. Doran. I would have to agree. And I would just like to make one quick comment. Glenn and myself have never insinuated that the people at the laboratory--that everyone at the laboratory is corrupt and, you know, that they do not love their country, that they do not do their jobs. There are a lot of tremendous employees at that laboratory who have helped us tremendously in doing our job and in bringing this thing to you. So I would never want anyone to think that the people--that the majority of the people at that laboratory do not work to the better ends of their country. Mr. Markey. Do you believe that any criminal laws have been broken? Mr. Walp. There is no doubt, absolutely. From a Federal end, Title 18, Section 641, as it deals with theft, obviously; Title 18, Chapter 1.4, misprison of a felony, not reporting a felony, absolutely. Mr. Markey. How about in the national security area? Mr. Walp. I would say this, that those laws that were violated--you know, it may not deal with specificity with an issue that deals with security, but holistically I believe it does, because these are crimes that occurred at the premier lab in the world. Therefore, I think, holistically, it certainly has an umbrella effect over all security. Mr. Markey. Do you agree with that, Mr. Doran? Mr. Doran. Yes, I would agree. Mr. Markey. My understanding is that seven desktop computers, three laptop computers, and other equipment was reported stolen. Other computers were reported lost. Could there have been any classified information on any of those computers or other devices? Mr. Doran. There's always a possibility that that information was contained on those computers. Mr. Markey. Mr. Walp? Mr. Walp. And I would agree with Mr. Doran. We don't have any specific case saying this case had classified information on it, but if there are computers out there, which there are, that they have no idea where they are at, that possibility certainly exists, that it could occur. Mr. Markey. Mr. Walp, the University of California has announced that they are reorganizing the division which you worked in, to report elsewhere in the lab. Is that a good idea? Mr. Walp. No. It is my very adamant position that, if the United States citizens want true security of their labs as it deals with national security, they must take action to take that division out of the umbrella of a contractor. Absolutely imperative, because it was infested with self-preservation and protectionism for the bottom line of their salaries and their retirements. You must take it out of that environment. That's my opinion. Mr. Markey. I want to thank both of you. You are each patriots, and I very much appreciate the courage it took to do what you have done. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman. Someday you will tell me how long you tried to find a word that rhymed with Los Alamos before you gave up. You know you did. We thank all three of our witnesses for your time and for your service to your country. It is appreciated. It will enable--and only because of your cooperation will we be enabled to do our job and make sure that this doesn't happen in the future at Los Alamos, at any other lab or, in fact, at any other Federal facility or program. So thank you again, and you are excused. We will now call the Honorable Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy. Mr. Friedman, thank you for joining us. I believe you are aware that the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee takes testimony from witnesses under oath. Do you object to giving your testimony under oath? Mr. Friedman. I do not. Mr. Greenwood. Pursuant to the rules of the committee, you are entitled to be represented by counsel. Do you choose to be represented by counsel? Mr. Friedman. I do not. Mr. Greenwood. If you would raise your right hand. [Witness sworn.] Mr. Greenwood. You are under oath, and we look forward to your opening statement, and you are recognized. TESTIMONY OF GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Mr. Friedman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to testify on the Office of Inspector General's recent inquiry concerning Los Alamos National Laboratory. In February 2002, my office issued a report entitled ``U.S. Department of Energy's Purchase Card Programs--Lessons Learned.'' In May 2002, I testified before this subcommittee regarding the results of that effort. Specifically, we identified a number of concerns with respect to the Department's management of purchasing activities. In recent months, of course, our focus has turned to Los Alamos in light of allegations about potential abuses at that facility. On November 5, 2002, the Acting Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration requested that the Office of Inspector General review allegations that management of the laboratory was engaged in a deliberate cover-up of illegal activity and security concerns. We interviewed over 60 laboratory officials and other parties, and reviewed thousands of pages of pertinent records. One of our first steps was to interview two laboratory security officials, Glenn Walp and Steve Doran, who testified just a few minutes ago. Both men are former law enforcement officers and had been hired by the laboratory in 2002 to help address an acknowledged deficiency in Los Alamos' handling of property loss and theft. Both men were vocal in their criticisms of the laboratory's management of these issues. Approximately 1 week after we interviewed the two security officials, the laboratory terminated their employment. This raised the specter that the terminations could have been retaliatory. Consequently, we incorporated these actions into our inquiry. Our recently issued report disclosed a series of actions by laboratory officials that obscured serious property and procurement management problems and weakened relevant internal controls. These actions created an environment in which Los Alamos employees were discouraged from, or had reason to believe they were discouraged from, raising concerns to appropriate authorities. In short, management's actions resulted in delayed identification and resolution of underlying property and procurement weaknesses and related security concerns. For example, we found that laboratory management published materials distributed to laboratory employees in advance of a 2002 Department of Energy cyber security review. These materials contained such phrases as ``resist the temptation to spill your guts;'' ``Handwritten notes can be especially damaging; they are not easily disavowed;'' and ``Finger pointing will just make the program look bad.'' Our inquiry also corroborated a number of the concerns expressed by the two terminated security officials. The laboratory's decision to terminate the employment of the two security officials during ongoing external reviews that were addressing some of the very same issues raised by these officials was an incomprehensible action on the part of the University of California. In our view, these events raised doubts about Los Alamos' commitment to solving noted problems, and fostered a chilling effect on employees who may have been willing to speak out on matters of concern. Our inquiry also disclosed that, even after considering recent events at Los Alamos, in December 2002 the NNSA rated Los Alamos excellent in both procurement and property management. Although we did not review the particular process by which NNSA arrived at such a rating, we believe the process should be reevaluated in light of events. Our report of inquiry contained specific recommendations for corrective action. We feel it is especially important that Department of Energy officials ensure that the University of California and the laboratory's management are held accountable for implementing and executing corrective actions resulting from the situation at the laboratory. In addition to this special inquiry, we have a number of ongoing efforts at the laboratory. Our most recent report issued on February 21, 2003, examined internal controls over firearms at Los Alamos. We found weaknesses in the administration of the firearms inventory, which included over 1600 guns. We noted, for example, that 12 firearms received in 1999 were not entered into the laboratory's inventory. Also, separate firearms inventories maintained by Los Alamos and the security subcontractor were inconsistent and had not been reconciled. In addition, all firearms were not processed through a central receiving point, resulting in delays in entering some firearms into the Los Alamos property management data base. In fact, some firearms never made it into the data base. Management asserted that the problems we encountered concerned receipt of firearms and not accountability of firearms. However, in our judgment, the failure of Los Alamos to provide an accurate firearms inventory, the lack of reconciliation of the Los Alamos inventory with the security force inventory, and the acknowledged problems in the process for receipt of firearms and their inclusion in the official laboratory inventory raised doubt about the property control system at Los Alamos. In response to our report, management indicated that corrective actions would be taken. Other ongoing Office of Inspector General reviews and investigations, as well as matters under the purview of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are continuing to address a number of the related concerns. These efforts include: A review of laboratory controls over laptop and desktop computers; a review of allowability of costs claimed by the University of California under its contract to manage the laboratory for the Department of Energy; and a number of criminal investigations regarding misuse of purchase authority. The criminal investigations are being closely coordinated with the United States Attorney's Office in New Mexico. Due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing investigations, we will be unable to provide specific information on individual cases. Mr. Chairman, as I indicated previously, our work at Los Alamos continues. Our objective is to address the concerns that have been raised regarding laboratory operations. This concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to answer any questions. One apology at the outset, if you will. I am suffering from a chest cold and a head cold. So if my voice is especially unappealing, I trust you will understand why. Mr. Greenwood. No, it's just normally unappealing. Mr. Friedman. You must have been speaking to my wife, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Gregory H. Friedman follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Gregory Friedman, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to testify on the Office of Inspector General's recent inquiry concerning Los Alamos National Laboratory. introduction For 60 years, the University of California (University) has operated the Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) for the Department of Energy (Department) and its predecessor agencies. Among its many important missions and functions, Los Alamos has critical national security responsibilities, including helping to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. In recent years, Los Alamos has been the subject of intense scrutiny during a number of controversies regarding allegations of espionage, lax security, and related internal control failures. The Department and Los Alamos initiated actions intended to ensure that the Laboratory was carrying out its missions with a heightened emphasis on protecting national security interests. Realignment of Los Alamos' security function, or ``S'' Division, was one such action. On a broader scale, Congress and the President created the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as a semi-autonomous agency within the Department. In 2001, Los Alamos undertook a nationwide search to recruit an experienced leader for the Office of Security Inquiries within the ``S'' Division. In addition to various security responsibilities, the job announcement for this position provided that the person hired would conduct investigations into theft and property protection. Given the sensitive nature of much of the work at Los Alamos, imbuing this position with a sense of urgency for the protection of property-- especially computers and other technology that may store classified and other national security information--was consistent with the Laboratory's stated goal to heighten national security awareness. The nationwide search culminated with the hiring of a new Security Inquiries Team Leader (Security Inquiries Leader) in January 2002. In February 2002, my office issued a report entitled, ``U.S. Department of Energy's Purchase Card Programs--Lessons Learned.'' In May 2002, I testified before this Subcommittee regarding the results of that effort. Specifically, we identified a number of concerns with respect to the Department's management of purchasing activities. In recent months our focus has turned to Los Alamos in light of allegations about potential abuses at that facility. On November 5, 2002, the NNSA Acting Administrator requested that the Office of Inspector General review allegations that management of the Laboratory was engaged in a deliberate cover up of illegal activity and security concerns. We interviewed over 60 Laboratory officials and other parties, and reviewed thousands of pages of pertinent records. One of our first steps was to interview two Laboratory security officials, Glenn Walp, the Security Inquiries Leader, and Steven Doran. Both men are former law enforcement officers, and had been hired by the Laboratory in 2002 to help address an acknowledged deficiency in Los Alamos' handling of property loss and theft. Both men were vocal in their criticisms of Laboratory management's handling of these issues. Approximately one week after we interviewed the two security officials, the Laboratory terminated their employment. This raised the specter that the terminations could have been retaliatory. Consequently, we incorporated these actions into our inquiry. summary of inquiry findings Our recently-issued report of inquiry disclosed a series of actions by Laboratory officials that obscured serious property and procurement management problems and weakened relevant internal controls. These actions created an atmosphere in which Los Alamos employees were discouraged from, or had reason to believe they were discouraged from, raising concerns to appropriate authorities. In short, management's actions resulted in delayed identification and resolution of the underlying property and procurement weaknesses, and related security concerns. Specifically, we found that Laboratory management: Failed to take appropriate or timely action with respect to a number of identified property control weaknesses. There was: (1) inadequate or untimely analysis of, and inquiry into, property loss or theft and security issues; (2) lack of personal accountability for property; (3) a substantial degree of dysfunction in the Laboratory's communication and assignment of responsibilities for the handling of property loss and theft concerns; and (4) inadequate controls over procurement and property systems. We also found that Laboratory management: Had inadequate policies governing when and under what circumstances activities must be reported to law enforcement. Issued, then immediately rescinded without adequate explanation, a memorandum requiring corrective actions to address ``disturbing negative trends regarding Laboratory management of Government property.'' Another memorandum was later reissued in modified form, but a number of the corrective action mandates were never fully effectuated. We found, as well, that the Laboratory: Published certain materials distributed to Laboratory employees, in advance of a 2002, Department cyber security review, containing such phrases as 1. ``Resist the temptation to `spill your guts' ''; 2. ``Handwritten notes can be especially damaging . . . They are not easily disavowed''; and 3. ``Finger pointing will just make the program look bad.'' Our inquiry corroborated a number of the concerns expressed by the two terminated security officials. The Laboratory's decision to terminate the employment of the two security officials during ongoing external reviews that were addressing some of the very same issues raised by these officials, was, in our judgment, an incomprehensible action on the part of the University of California. These events: Raised doubts, in our judgment, about Los Alamos' commitment to solving noted problems; Fostered a chilling effect on employees who may have been willing to speak out on matters of concern; and Were inconsistent with Laboratory and University of California obligations under its contract with the Department of Energy. As you know, the University recently announced that the two security officials had been re-hired, albeit on a temporary basis, as a part of the Office of the President. Our report of inquiry contained specific recommendations for corrective action. In particular, responsible Department officials must ensure that the University of California and the Laboratory's management is held accountable for implementing and executing corrective actions resulting from the current situation at the Laboratory. details of inquiry findings A. Allegations of Cover-up/Questionable Management Actions Laboratory officials took a number of actions that, in our judgment, obscured serious property management and security problems. These actions created an atmosphere in which Los Alamos employees were discouraged from, or had reason to believe they were discouraged from, raising concerns about property loss and theft, or other concerns, to the appropriate authorities. In short, management's actions made successful identification and resolution of the underlying property, procurement, and security weaknesses problematic. The most overt action taken by Los Alamos was the firing of the two security officials. This action, taken amidst ongoing reviews of allegations of lax security controls, was clearly and predictably controversial. Moreover, the officials were fired soon after they spoke with the Office of Inspector General. It is impossible to imagine that this action would not have had a chilling effect on other employees who might have contemplated speaking out about problems at the Laboratory. In our judgment, the terminations undermined management's actions to address the core issue: identifying and correcting weaknesses in controls over national security assets. In addition to the firings, our inquiry disclosed that Laboratory management: Issued, then immediately rescinded, a memorandum requiring corrective actions to address problems regarding the management of Government property. Published Laboratory documents that could be interpreted as discouraging Los Alamos employees from reporting on the extent or severity of control weaknesses. Rescinded Memorandum In an April 2002, memorandum, addressed to all Laboratory ``Leaders,'' the Laboratory's Office of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO Office) cited the need to ``call your attention to disturbing negative trends regarding Laboratory management of Government property and to engage your support in taking corrective action.'' According to the CFO Office, the concerns were that the amount of property missing during the Fiscal Year 2001 inventory had nearly tripled from the previous year, to $723,000; and, that substantial amounts of property, valued at $533,000, had been reported lost or stolen during Fiscal Year 2001. The CFO Office's memorandum further stated that neither Los Alamos nor the Department could accept $1.3 million (the approximate total of the two categories listed previously) in unaccounted property. The CFO Office noted that the issue would negatively impact the Laboratory's rating in property management. Attached to this memorandum was organization-specific listings reflecting property losses. To address these concerns, the CFO Office described four new quarterly tracking and trend reports that this office would be responsible for issuing. The memorandum requested that each Los Alamos division develop a corrective action plan to raise awareness of property accountability and safeguards. The memorandum also suggested the initiation of a root cause analysis and planned training, and recommended review of instances of multiple losses or lack of accountability by the same individual. On December 18, 2002, we asked the CFO Office to provide us copies of each of these reports, including copies of each division's corrective action plan. In a memorandum dated December 19, 2002, we were informed that the April 10, 2002, memorandum had actually been rescinded the day after it was distributed. We were told that Los Alamos management decided that it would be more appropriate to provide each division leader only the information relevant to his or her division and that it served no purpose and was insensitive to people's privacy to publish the entire list. Thus, an e-mail was sent asking division leaders to disregard the memo of the previous day. Although a version of this memorandum was subsequently reissued a number of the corrective action mandates were never fully effectuated. This chain of events raised doubts as to management's commitment to address identified control weaknesses. Laboratory Documents During our inquiry, two other significant documents came to our attention that could be interpreted as discouraging Los Alamos employees from reporting on the extent or severity of control weaknesses. We reviewed briefing materials for a training course to be attended by Los Alamos employees in anticipation of a November/December 2002 Department of Energy Inspection & Evaluation (I&E) review on Laboratory cyber security. The briefing materials, which were prepared by the Laboratory's Office of Chief Information Officer (CIO Office), were titled, ``Surviving the [I&E] Audit,'' and included the following suggestions: ``Resist the temptation to `spill your guts'.'' ``Handwritten notes can be especially damaging . . . They are not easily disavowed.'' ``Finger pointing will just make the program look bad.'' When shown these materials, a senior Los Alamos management official said that he had not previously seen them and that they were ``stupid.'' Subsequently, on December 16, 2002, a memorandum was sent to certain employees clarifying the purpose of these materials in light of their ``potential for misinterpretation.'' A second document was a Code of Ethical Conduct statement. The document was based on the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) Code of Ethics, but departed from the IIA code by requiring auditors not to use information in a manner that could be perceived as ``. . . detrimental to the University of California, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, or the Audits and Assessments Office.'' While it may not have been the intent of the document, reporting erroneous payments or surfacing other internal control weaknesses--traditional responsibilities of internal auditors--could be perceived as ``detrimental'' to Los Alamos. Los Alamos auditors were also asked to ``exhibit loyalty in all matters pertaining to the affairs of the University of California, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Audits and Assessments Office . . .'' The conduct statement created, in our opinion, the appearance of a lack of independence for Los Alamos auditors. B. Security Officials' Terminations We endeavored to evaluate the Laboratory's decision to terminate the employment of the two security officials consistent with the Department's standards for protecting contractor employees from retaliatory actions. Based on our evaluation, we believe it will be difficult for the University of California to sustain its burden under the prevailing standard for adjudicating these matters. Specifically, under the Department's procedures, once an initial case of retaliatory termination is established, the burden shifts to the contractor entity to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the contractor entity would have taken the same action without the contractor employee's disclosure or other protected activity. In this regard, our inquiry disclosed that: The two security officials were vocal in their criticisms of the Laboratory's management of property loss and theft concerns. Laboratory management acknowledged that prior to the arrival of the Security Inquiries Leader, Laboratory efforts to inquire into these matters were inadequate. Recent external reviews, including this inquiry, corroborated a number of the fundamental concerns previously expressed by the two terminated security officials relating to property and management systems. As late as October 2002, the Security Inquiries Leader had received a favorable performance evaluation. The timing of the terminations was, itself, suspect. A memorandum documenting the Laboratory's stated rationale for the terminations is dated the same day (November 20, 2002) as the Office of Inspector General's interview of one of the two security officials. We were advised by the Security Inquiries Leader, and Laboratory documentation confirmed, that he had informed his management, in advance, that he and his staff were to be interviewed by the Office of Inspector General inquiry team. In the November 20, 2002, memorandum cited above, a senior Los Alamos official documented what he believed to be valid reasons for the terminations. We evaluated these reasons, and concluded that a substantial number of them do not withstand scrutiny. C. Internal Control Weaknesses In a March 26, 2002, memorandum to Los Alamos management, the Security Inquiries Leader expressed significant concern with the manner in which Los Alamos addressed property loss and potential theft. Our inquiry corroborated a number of those concerns. Specifically, we found: (1) inadequate or untimely analysis of, and inquiry into, property loss or theft and security issues; (2) lack of personal accountability for property; (3) a substantial degree of dysfunction in the Laboratory's communication and assignment of responsibilities for the handling of property loss and theft concerns; and (4) inadequate controls over procurement and property systems. Property and Security Issues We noted that property loss and theft issues, and related security considerations, were not subject to thorough and consistent analysis. For example, in 2001, a report documenting the loss of a security radio was inadequate. It did not provide information concerning what frequencies might have been compromised. The Security Inquiries Leader expressed this and related concerns in his March 2002 memorandum, including those with respect to the entry into a law enforcement tracking system of Laboratory property theft reports. Although he noted that such reports were being provided to the Los Alamos Police Department and the FBI, the Security Inquiries Leader asserted that those agencies were not entering the property information into the National Crime Information Center records because the reports were of poor quality. As noted by a counterintelligence official, the theft of Laboratory property can have national security implications. In this vein, with respect to previous Laboratory property reports he reviewed, the Security Inquiries Leader observed: ``The reports indicate that no questions were asked pertaining to the type of data that may have been on stolen computers, laptops, PDAs,1 and digital cameras. It is possible that they may have had sensitive or proprietary materials on those systems, but inquiry personnel failed to explore that potential; at least one can assume this view based on the data contained in the inquiry reports.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ ``Personal Digital Assistants.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Based on these concerns, we requested that Los Alamos explain the steps taken to account for lost computers and other sensitive equipment. We also inquired as to any efforts made to evaluate whether classified or other protected information had been compromised as a result. The Laboratory produced a draft memorandum, dated December 18, 2002, in which the Chief Information Office (CIO) concluded that none of the lost, stolen, or unlocated computers identified by Los Alamos contained classified information. The CIO's memorandum also concluded that there were at least 258 computers lost, 44 computers stolen, and 61 computers unlocated for Fiscal Years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002.2 We did not validate these numbers, or the CIO's conclusion concerning the non-compromise of classified information. In fact, a CIO official told us that there were inconsistencies between these numbers and previous reports provided by the CFO and the Office of Security Inquiries. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ The memorandum identified an additional 75 computers requiring follow up and resolution status. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A CIO official acknowledged that the Laboratory's processes for reporting lost, stolen, and unlocated computers are ``fragmented.'' He noted inconsistencies between computers reported lost and stolen to the Office of Security Inquiries and data available to property management officials. Another Laboratory official confirmed that these reporting mechanisms are not integrated throughout the Laboratory, and both of these key officials asserted that they have recently recommended corrective action to ensure that appropriate systems are integrated. The timing of the Laboratory's effort to reconcile these important questions is, in and of itself, troubling. It was not until the November-December 2002 timeframe that there was intensive effort in this regard. Property Accountability According to a Los Alamos official, Laboratory employees have not been routinely held liable or accountable for lost property under their control. This official explained that when an employee first takes custody of an item of property, the employee signs an ``accountability'' statement. However, Los Alamos management generally chose not to enforce the statements, according to this official, but rather chose to ``write off'' the missing property at the end of an inventory cycle. An accounts receivable official could not recall ever receiving any restitution from any Los Alamos employee for a lost or stolen item for which he or she was responsible. The Security Inquiries Leader made a similar point in his March 2002 memorandum. Another issue we identified relates to Los Alamos' use of ``drop points'' for the delivery of new equipment. Under the drop point system, Laboratory property is not delivered, uniformly, to a central, secure location. At such a secure central location, the equipment can be tagged, inventoried, and consistently tracked. We were told that many of these Laboratory drop points are in open spaces with little or no security. A number of key officials advised that there have been insufficient Laboratory efforts to ensure that equipment delivered to Laboratory drop points is safeguarded. We were also told that property would be left at these locations for inordinate amounts of time, without being checked by property administrators. Communication and Responsibilities Our inquiry disclosed a substantial degree of dysfunction in Los Alamos' communication and assignment of responsibilities and authorities for the handling of property loss and theft concerns. For example, Laboratory management sent mixed messages to the two former security officials with respect to the scope of their authorities and responsibilities. Security Inquiries officials were told that they were not ``investigators.'' At the same time, our inquiry disclosed that one of the terminated security officials was directed by a senior Los Alamos official to travel off site, to another state to interview a private citizen, to obtain information concerning a matter (the alleged improper purchase of a Mustang automobile), which included the possibility that it was criminal in nature. This appeared inconsistent with previous direction, and other management communications to these officials, about the scope of their responsibilities and authorities. Further, Laboratory management acknowledged that there were inadequate Laboratory policies that governed when and under what circumstances Laboratory activities must be reported to law enforcement. Laboratory officials had been drafting such a policy since the spring of 2002, but the policy remained in draft at the time of our inquiry. Our inquiry also disclosed organizational inconsistency between the roles of the Office of Audits and Assessments and the Office of Security Inquiries. The Office of Audits and Assessments was tasked with the internal review of Laboratory ``waste, fraud, and abuse'' concerns, whereas the Office of Security Inquiries was responsible for reviewing alleged ``theft.'' This left not only the potential for ``overlap'' in responsibilities, but ``underlap,'' as one senior security official characterized this condition to our inquiry team. Procurement and Property Systems As we completed our inquiry fieldwork, the final report of the Laboratory's external review team was completed. That report noted a number of Laboratory ``programmatic weaknesses'' with respect to Los Alamos' controls over purchase cards, including: Failure to reconcile and approve monthly statements; Failure to resolve disputed transactions; Failure to properly account for controlled property; Purchase of restricted items in violation of Laboratory policies; Insufficient documentation of items purchased; Inadequate or ineffective sanctions for non-compliance; Insufficient training, especially for approvers; Insufficient program audit and review procedures; Failure to properly manage cardholder spending limits; and, Failure to safeguard card information. The external review team recommended a number of corrective actions, and noted that they had not validated the Laboratory's implementation of recent corrective actions. We also noted during our inquiry that NNSA had completed an assessment of the Laboratory's ``Personal Property Management'' and ``Procurement Management,'' in December 2002, and rated the Laboratory as ``excellent'' in both categories. Although we did not evaluate the process by which NNSA arrived at such a rating, we believe the process should be re-evaluated in light of events. recommendations In our report, we made specific recommendations for corrective action. In particular, responsible Department officials must ensure that the University of California and the Laboratory's management are held accountable for implementing and executing corrective actions resulting from the situation at the Laboratory. other oig reviews Beyond this special inquiry, Mr. Chairman, we have a number of recently completed reviews and ongoing efforts at the Laboratory. Our most recent report, issued on February 21, 2003, examines internal controls of firearms at Los Alamos. We concluded that weaknesses exist in the administration of the firearms inventory, which included over 1,600 guns. We found, for example, that 12 firearms received in 1999 were not entered into the Laboratory's inventory. Also, separate firearms inventories maintained by Los Alamos and the security subcontractor were inconsistent and had not been reconciled. In addition, all firearms were not processed through a central receiving point, resulting in delays in entering some firearms into the Los Alamos property management database. In fact, some firearms never made it into the database. Management asserted that the problems we encountered concerned receipt of firearms and not accountability of firearms. However, in our judgment, the failure of Los Alamos to provide an accurate firearms inventory; the lack of reconciliation of the Los Alamos inventory with the security force inventory; and the acknowledged problems in the process for receipt of firearms and their inclusion in the official Laboratory inventory raised additional doubt about the property control system at Los Alamos. In response to our report, management indicated that corrective actions would be taken. Other ongoing Office of Inspector General reviews and investigations, as well as matters under the purview of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are continuing to address a number of relevant concerns. The OIG efforts include: A review of laboratory controls over laptop and desktop computers; A review of the allowability of costs claimed by the University of California under its contract to manage the Laboratory for the Department of Energy; and A number of criminal investigations regarding misuse of purchase authority. The criminal investigations are being worked in coordination with the United States Attorney's Office in New Mexico. Due to the sensitive nature of ongoing investigations, we will be unable to provide specific information on the individual cases. Mr. Chairman, as noted previously, our work at Los Alamos National Laboratory continues with the objective of addressing a number of concerns that have been raised regarding Laboratory operations. This concludes my statement and I would be pleased to answer any questions. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Friedman. Your special inquiry report points out that you corroborated a number of Mr. Walp's and Mr. Doran's fundamental concerns about property controls at the laboratory. What was the most significant concern there that you were able to corroborate? Mr. Friedman. Well, over and above the notion that the laboratory did not countenance very well whistleblowers, people who brought problem information to their attention. There was the general lack of accountability, and I think they had a very good point on that, and that is the main point that we have corroborated through our reviews. Mr. Greenwood. Did you sense this culture that Misters Doran and Walp referred to? Mr. Friedman. There was a tone at the laboratory that, I think, parallels the description that they gave you today. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. In its letter in response to a list of questions from the committee, the University of California asserts, ``No classified information was contained on the hard drives of the hundreds of computers that have been lost or stolen at Los Alamos over the past 3 years.'' Do you believe that Los Alamos has accurately accounted for these computers and can rightly assert that none of them contained classified information? Mr. Friedman. Well, at this point, given what we have found to date, Mr. Chairman, I don't have any confidence that they have the total number, and I am not sure they ever will get the total number. As has been indicated, there may very well have been computers that were procured but never made it into the inventory data base. So, therefore, I don't know how you necessarily would know they are missing. With regard--did your question pertain as well to the question of the classified information? Mr. Greenwood. Yes. Mr. Friedman. We found, or they have identified that at least 400 computers in 3 years were lost, missing or stolen or unlocatable. Given the fact that they don't have the computers, I would not necessarily express a great deal of confidence in the final conclusion that there was no sensitive or classified information compromised. I don't have an instance in which that was the case, but I certainly couldn't assure you that that was not the case. Mr. Greenwood. According to a February 5, 2003, memo from you to Acting Administrator Linton Brooks at the National Nuclear Security Administration, your office encounter, ``significant dysfunction at Los Alamos during your review.'' Specifically, you note that lab management failed to comply with your request for information regarding an April 10, 2002, internal lab memo. Could you describe the significant dysfunction that you encountered in your review? Mr. Friedman. Well, the memo in question, Mr. Chairman, came to our attention through a third party and, when we talked to the purported author of the memo, he didn't have a copy of the memo nor was he able to provide the five data points that had been requested as a result of the memo. He was not able to provide any of that information. We departed that day with a commitment on his part to get us the information and to provide it to us. It was very surprising that this person, who was in a fairly senior position at the lab, could not provide us the information at that instant. Subsequently, in fact, we received an e-mail message from this individual stating that, in fact, the earlier memorandum that had been referred to had been withdrawn. We still have a data request, and we do to this day have a data request for all the information that may have resulted, as had been requested by the original memorandum. Basically, we then found after our review had been completed that, in fact, the memo had been re-issued subsequently. We still have not received the substance of the information. Of the five data points, three of the five data points, we don't believe, have ever been fully complied with. So as a result, we don't have confidence in the system. Even if there was a significant misunderstanding, a lack of candor with the Office of Inspector General or a miscommunication within the lab, that is a dysfunction in and of itself. Mr. Greenwood. The committee's investigation of problems at Los Alamos has focused on the University of California, the contractor in charge of operating Los Alamos. In your opinion, is the Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration also at fault for management breakdowns at Los Alamos? Mr. Friedman. There certainly are shared responsibilities. The Department of Energy and the NNSA specifically is the contract manager for the University of California contract at Los Alamos. So absolutely, they have a responsibility. Mr. Greenwood. You have looked at this pretty thoroughly. If it was your job to make sure that this kind of thing doesn't happen, not only at Los Alamos or anywhere else within DOE or, for that matter, the Federal Government, what kinds of things would you do? How do we fix this? Mr. Friedman. Well, first, there needs to be--and this is going to require a sustained effort, Mr. Chairman--a change in the culture with regard to encouraging people who have legitimate concerns to raise those concerns, and they should know that it is done in an environment in which they will not be retaliated against. Second, it is the responsibility of management to act on those concerns. Once they are brought to your attention, they need to be addressed. Third, it seems to me, we have to make sure that the processes, or at least the University of California at this point needs to make sure that the processes that are in place, procurement, financial, inventory, at the various laboratories under its management are first class, that they operate as intended, and that they are doing the job, and that the interest of the taxpayers is ensured as a result of those processes. Mr. Greenwood. Just wondering what would happen if we had an immunity day and asked everybody to just please bring back all the stuff they have stolen over the last 20 years, and make a big pile. Are you satisfied the University of California has recently announced corrective actions? Mr. Friedman. Well, this is going to take some time. It is a good start. The jury is out, and we will go back and take a look at it at some point in the future to see if, in fact, they are operating as intended. Mr. Greenwood. I would like unanimous consent to enter these documents into the record. Without objections. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida for 10 minutes. Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now I think underlying all of our investigations is actually what the laboratory does, and I think all of us have this concern, that if this level of scrutiny is done on the criminal activity in terms of devices, how much serious is there out there that we don't know about? I think that really is the anxiety I think all of us has, is as awful as all of this is, whether it is a Rototiller or a sleeping bag, it would be a lot worse if it were enriched uranium. Have you independently looked at those issues in terms of the entire structure and the system that they have in place for protection of not just, as you had acknowledged, with stolen or the unaccounted for computers. We have no idea what was on those computers. It just raises the stakes more than just criminal activity, but really espionage and national security, which obviously are, in fact, as significant as all these other issues are, much more troubling. Mr. Friedman. Well, we are attempting to address that, Mr. Deutsch, and let me give you one example. One of the reviews that we have ongoing right now, as I indicated, is a comprehensive review of the controls over desktop and laptop computers, and we are going to follow them to the core, as they were purchased, through the process, as they are disposed of. Those that are identified as being stolen, lost or unlocatable, we will follow those as well and really examine the controls over those computers. So I hope we will get to the issue, the core issue, that you are referring to. Mr. Deutsch. Do you feel you as the Inspector General have enough resources to do that? Mr. Friedman. That is a loaded question. The answer, Mr. Deutsch, is that we don't have enough resources. We are doing the best we can with what we have. We are spread over 14 different Department of Energy locations around the country. Our objective is to do the maximum with the people that we have. We recognize the fact that resources are tight throughout government. Mr. Deutsch. But again, let me just kind of--have you seen any change in the resources available to you post 9-11, either in last year's budget or in this year's budget? Mr. Friedman. This year's budget, I am pleased to say, we had a fairly substantial increase. But the delay in getting the budget has worked against us in terms of hiring. Mr. Deutsch. I mean, could you be more specific with what that increase was? Mr. Friedman. I am embarrassed to tell you, I don't know the precise number. Mr. Deutsch. Do you have a ballpark, 10 percent, 20 percent? Mr. Friedman. It was about a 20 percent increase. Mr. Deutsch. And is that more directed toward these types of issues that we are discussing? Mr. Friedman. Unfortunately, we have an obligation under statute to audit the financial statements of the U.S. Department of Energy, and that is the most labor intensive and dollar intensive effort that we undergo. So a disproportionate part of our budget is directed toward the financial statements of the Department of Energy. Mr. Deutsch. And what percentage of your budget, would you say, is directed toward that versus these other type of activities? Mr. Friedman. Well, it is about 20 percent of our entire budget, and we think that is quite high. Mr. Deutsch. Now can I--I mean, just to try to get a feel for this, how many people would you say--how many person time are you allocating to the Los Alamos situation at this point? How many full time positions? Mr. Friedman. How many full time positions? Probably 20 to 25. Let me just expand on that for a second. We are also doing sensitive property reviews at the other University of California labs as well. Mr. Deutsch. And in terms of the other facilities that you have responsibility for, do you have any sizable people in terms of property evaluation at any of the other locations? Mr. Friedman. Well, yes. You know, obviously, we have---- Mr. Deutsch. You have jurisdiction, but I mean, is there anything that large in terms of numbers of people? Mr. Friedman. No. No, there is nothing that large, not by a long shot. Mr. Deutsch. Have you uncovered anything similar to what's happened in Los Alamos? Mr. Friedman. Well, it is too early to tell, but the firearms review was the first step in a series of steps to look at property controls. Mr. Deutsch. At this point, do you think the laboratory has taken sufficient personnel action to deal with the problems that you've identified? Mr. Friedman. Well, as I indicated earlier, certainly, a number of personnel actions have taken place. There are a number of reorganizations that have taken place. But it is too early for us to judge whether those are really effective in addressing the problem. Mr. Deutsch. When would you want to come back for us where you feel you can actually judge those? Mr. Friedman. Well, let's look at 6 months, and maybe we will have a chance to look at it in that timeframe. It may be a little longer than that. Did you ask for a timeframe? Did I answer you correctly? Mr. Deutsch. Yes, you did. In your longer statement you said that the firing of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran while they were ongoing reviews of property and procurement controls undermined management's action to address the core issue, identifying and correcting weaknesses in controls over national security. Would you explain how exactly this undermined the core issue? Mr. Friedman. Well, basically, we felt that these people were on the front line of identifying these problems, and taking them out of the loop undermined this very process that was designed to get to the bottom of these issues and to investigate and prosecute those cases where there was wrongdoing. Mr. Deutsch. And the core issue being? Mr. Friedman. The core issue being people on the inside with the investigative information to provide to us or to the FBI as to wrongdoing at the laboratory. Mr. Deutsch. Right. But I guess the thing that raised just my concern again is that weakness in controls over national security, not over theft but over national security. What were you alluding to there? Mr. Friedman. Oh, what we were alluding to is--and as I indicated, we have not found a computer that contained classified information that was lost or stolen. What I am alluding to is that the national security mission of Los Alamos is inextricably tied to the day to day business of the laboratory. So to the extent that you have people who are involved in misdeeds, who are even responsible for common inventory, it sends a very, very important message to the rest of the laboratory. Mr. Deutsch. How helpful would Mr. Palmieri's April 10 memo have been in implementing the necessary correction actions? Mr. Friedman. He laid out five different steps. I thought they were good steps, the most important of which was corrective action plans for all of the divisions at the laboratory in terms of their dealing with property. I thought that was the most impressive. To date, we have not received any of those corrective action plans. Mr. Deutsch. And controlling the property on the inventory list really doesn't address the abuse in the procurement system. Most of the property isn't even on that list. Is that not correct? Mr. Friedman. I don't think it is most of the property. I think there is a fair amount of the property that is not on that list. I don't know the precise percentage. Mr. Deutsch. And finally, under the new reorganization plan, Mr. Walp's former office is going to be merged into the Audits and Assessments Section. Audits does not have a good reputation for prosecuting fraud, waste and abuse, particularly criminal cases. Does this appear to just be another attempt to put the investigators into an office much more acceptable to upper management? Mr. Friedman. Frankly, until I heard it today, I did not know that is the way it was going to be reorganized, and I'd like to take a look at that, and I would be more than happy to give you my opinion after I have done that. I don't have an opinion on it right now. Unless the Audits and Assessments unit is girded up and given authority, I'm not sure that it is a good idea. Mr. Deutsch. Thank you. Mr. Greenwood. Before we go to Ms. Eshoo, just one quick question. I want to understand something. University of California manages about $2 billion worth of Federal money in this program, and they get a performance fee that totals around $8- $9 million. If property is stolen from the lab, does that come out of the funds that would otherwise enure to the benefit of the University of California or, in fact, does it just get moved--pushed along to the Treasury? Mr. Friedman. This is a question, Mr. Chairman, that really ought to be addressed to the Department itself. But in general, unless the most senior members of the contractor staaff are aware of the fraud, the taxpayers carry the burden of those losses. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you. The gentlelady from California. Ms. Eshoo. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. for the legislative courtesy that you have extended to me. Thank you, Mr. Friedman, for your excellent testimony and your very important work. I have two questions. Are you aware of the reforms that the University has undertaken relative to this scandal and, if so, do you believe they are the soundest policies to cure the ills that you have investigated and reported? Mr. Friedman. Well, as I indicated, there have been a number of personnel changes. There have been a number of reorganizations. For example, the University's auditor is now directly involved at Los Alamos. So it's impressive, Congresswoman, but I want to withhold judgment on the final analysis until we have a chance to look at it after it has been executed for a period of time to see if it is doing the job. Ms. Eshoo. In the analysis that you did, can you tell us what the dollar figure is that--as you just mentioned in the answer to the last question that was posed to you, who picks up the tab. The American taxpayer. How much have they been ripped off? Mr. Friedman. Well, I don't have an independent number, but relying upon the number that has been referred to in the April 10 memorandum, at least $1.3 million. Ms. Eshoo. And the contract is for how much? Mr. Friedman. The contract is in the nature of about $1.3 billion a year. I am not precisely sure of the exact amount. Ms. Eshoo. And it is a 5-year contract? Mr. Friedman. I'm sorry? Ms. Eshoo. Is it a 5-year contract? Mr. Friedman. It is a 5-year contract, as I understand it. Ms. Eshoo. I would still like to have that amount in my checking account, but I think that context is also important here. do you believe that, with the most stringent reforms and the commitment to sustain them, that what has been uncovered can be permanently eradicated? Mr. Friedman. I'm sorry. I'm not sure I understand your question. Could you repeat it? Ms. Eshoo. Reforms placed on the books that University of California has to accept this, and it's up to them to do, to put the reforms into place, to develop the confidence of the Congress that they can indeed sustain the reforms. I mean, some reforms sound terrific, but they are not worth the paper that they are written on. Mr. Friedman. Right. Ms. Eshoo. So not only to recognize that reforms need to be made, that they can indeed and will be sustained. Do you believe that those reforms can actually cure the ills that we know about? So much talk, excuse me, about the culture, and that's a lot of times a lot more difficult to get at. Do you believe it can be weeded out? Mr. Friedman. I think, if there is a sustained effort, it is going to take a fair amount of time. It is not going to be a quick fix, and I suspect that the changes proposed by the University of California are evolving, and there will be more of them, is my expectation. Mr. Darling, I think, is going to succeed me on the panel, and I think he can answer that more directly, but I think there is a chance they can address the underlying issues, sure. Ms. Eshoo. Well, that's positive. In the examination of security and audit divisions or departments, whatever the right word is, I don't have the sense that moving one person from one to the other is really what is going to fix this. Do you think that an outside--a private security company would be better and that you wouldn't have the situation that sounds to me like the fox in charge of the chicken coop. It is very difficult to, I think, given the situation, and I think under a whole set of normal circumstances, that that is an easy thing to carry out. Do you think the University would be better off going outside to do this? Mr. Friedman. Well, respectfully, there are at least two outside investigative organizations with appropriate authority. One is my office. The other is the Federal Bureau of Investigation. One of the findings which is most unfortunate is that there was a reluctance to share information with our office, a delay in sharing with our office and the FBI. Ms. Eshoo. How do you think that is best addressed, though? Mr. Friedman. Well, I think in part that is a cultural issue---- Ms. Eshoo. They have probably learned by now. Mr. Friedman. And I suspect, with Congressional pressure, and more emphasis on the part of the NNSA, I think those issues can be addressed. Ms. Eshoo. I think that investigation and oversight--and I always say this to my constituents in town hall meetings--is really one of the most important roles that the Congress can play, and I think that what I have learned from you and from the other witnesses, but especially from you, is that the accountability in the review that comes with investigation and oversight can indeed happen. I am pleased to hear you say that you--to give you 6 months or a little more to take a look and to come back. But I think the seriousness with which this situation is taken and then turn that into something is really very important. Let me just ask you one more question, and it is one that I have continued to pursue with whomever is testifying, and I plan to ask this of the University people as well. I think it is very, very important to know about this nexus of national security and the work, the contract that the University has. While there is a question about the computer that contained classified information, and I think that is still part of the work that you are doing, to pursue that, to chase that down, is there anything else that you can point to that raises serious questions about what I am asking you? Mr. Friedman. There is nothing that comes to mind. Let me clarify one thing so I'm not misleading you. We are not investigating the loss of a particular computer that we think may have had classified information at this time. Ms. Eshoo. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your good work. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you. One final question, Mr. Friedman. The University of California has operated Los Alamos for 60 years. It is my understanding that each time the contract comes up for renewal, it has been extended noncompetitively to the University of California. Do you think that it is time for the Department of Energy to put the Los Alamos contract up for competition? Mr. Friedman. Well, I don't have a position on this particular contract, Mr. Chairman, but my general position is and the position of my office has been, based on the work that we've done, is that maximizing competition is in the best interest of the taxpayers. So, certainly, you never know who is out there or who might have some good ideas. So I wouldn't rule it in or rule it out, but I think generally, maximum competition is in the best interest of the taxpayers. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Well, thank you, sir. We appreciate your testimony. I call our final witness, Mr. Bruce Darling, Senior Vice President, University Affairs, and the Interim Vice President for Laboratory Management at the University of California. Welcome, Mr. Darling. Thank you for being with us. Mr. Darling. Thank you, sir. Mr. Greenwood. You may have heard me say to the other witnesses that it is the custom of this committee to take testimony under oath. Do you object to giving your testimony under oath? Mr. Darling. No, I do not. Mr. Greenwood. Also pursuant to the rules of the House and this committee, you are entitled to be represented by counsel. Do you wish to be represented by counsel? Mr. Darling. I do not. I should note, however, that the University has retained Covington & Burling in the person of Lanny Breuer. He has been assisting the University and the committee in its investigation, but I do not wish counsel. Mr. Greenwood. Okay, thank you. In that case, if you would rise and raise your right hand. [Witness sworn.] Mr. Greenwood. You are under oath, Mr. Darling, and you may give your statement. TESTIMONY OF BRUCE B. DARLING, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY AFFAIRS AND INTERIM VICE PRESIDENT, LABORATORY MANAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Mr. Darling. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Deutsch, and members of the committee. I'd like to thank you for this opportunity to address the business, property management, and procurement problems at Los Alamos National Laboratory. With your permission, I'd like to give you a brief summary of the written testimony that I have submitted for the record. First, let me say that I am not here to offer any excuses whatsoever. To the contrary, the University of California accepts full responsibility, and we are aggressively making the changes to restore public confidence in Los Alamos and in the University of California. Our efforts have benefited greatly from the information made available to us by Glenn Walp and Steven Doran, other laboratory employees, the Department of Energy Inspector General, and this committee. All of you have helped us identify problems, expose abuses, and to begin to resolve them in an effective and decisive manner. If I may say, along with Mr. Tauzin, I, too, would like to recognize Jaret Mcdonald for identifying the thefts at the facility known as TA-33 and for fully pursuing the matter, including when he had to go to the FBI outside of the laboratory. In particular, Mr. Chairman, I would like to acknowledge your leadership, and I would like to say that the information-- new information that has come out of today's hearing is something that we will pursue vigorously and immediately. In my remarks, I will briefly describe what actions we have taken to date to resolve the problems at Los Alamos. In doing so, I would like to touch on personnel changes, increasing financial integrity at the lab, property controls, as well as the University's governance of these three national assets. The University's actions began last August with the appointment of an external review team to examine the lab's purchase card program. Then late last year President Atkinson dispatched a team of senior University officials, first to review the laboratory business practices, and subsequently the dismissals of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. As a result of our findings, the University has made sweeping management changes, beginning in late December with the appointment of Vice Admiral George P. Nanos as Interim Director of Los Alamos. Admiral Nanos brings to Los Alamos a strong management background as commander of the Naval nuclear weapons program as well as the Naval Sea Systems Command which had more than 40,000 employees and over a $20 billion annual budget--so a factor of 10 greater than Los Alamos in terms of budget. To date, 15 lab managers and employees have either been terminated, removed from management positions and/or reassigned to new positions. These include the laboratory Director, the Principal Deputy Director of the laboratory, the Chief Financial Officer of the laboratory, the Security Director and Deputy Director of the laboratory, and the Audit Director of the laboratory. In addition, the University rehired Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, as you heard previously. Among the other steps we have taken, Senior University officials are directly managing Los Alamos' business functions, both the business activities and the audit activities. We have strengthened the independence of the audit office. We have rescinded the audit office's so called loyalty oath that you may have read about in Inspector General Friedman's report, and we have activated an independent whistleblower hotline. In addition, we initiated a comprehensive property inventory that is now underway, and we have reviewed every property delivery site, known as drop points, an issue that was brought to our attention by Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran; and we have improved the lab's business organization, procedure and financial systems and controls. In addition, we have brought in external resources to bear on these problems. First, we created an external review team, which you know began in August, looking at the purchase card program. It was made up of two former Federal Inspectors General, along with a dozen forensic auditors from PricewaterhouseCoopers, and we have recently expanded that effort to include all procurement at the laboratory, not just the purchase card system. So the just-in-time contracts, regular procurement, blanket purchase orders, as well as the local vendor agreements that you heard about earlier from Mr. Walp and Doran. I should also add that another external resource we have brought to bear is Ernst & Young that currently have 30 consultants on the ground at Los Alamos today, looking at business processes, financial controls and organization structure to do a comprehensive review of the entire business operations of the lab, for many of the reasons you have heard from the previous witnesses. To sustain these changes, and I do mean sustain them, President Atkinson has established an interim oversight board for Los Alamos. We are revamping the University's laboratory governance structure. What we want to do is create a clear set of expectations for everyone involved and a very clear culture of accountability for all of us in this process. Let me underscore that the lab financial controls did indeed have serious weaknesses. The purchase card program differed from those at the University's 10 campuses and the 2 other laboratories that we manage for the Federal Government. It lacked strong controls and, unfortunately, the controls that did exist were not enforced adequately. It is also clear that Los Alamos did not impose the kind of sanctions that would have encouraged employees to better account for laboratory property in the way that all of us should be doing. And the dismissals of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were both unwarranted and, to use the Inspector General's words, incomprehensible. While we address these problems, I want to assure you that we are also focused on fulfilling the mission of the laboratory to the Nation, especially at this critical time in world events. The lab's science and weapons programs must meet their objectives, and the security operations must meet the Nation's expectations. Managing Los Alamos is a privilege for the University of California. It allows us to contribute to the Nation's defense in innumerable ways, from weapons development to the stewardship of the Nation's nuclear stockpile, and to homeland security. Our challenge is now to raise the business practices to the quality of our science and our weapons programs. We owe this to the American people who, after all, are paying for it, and whose security is also dependent upon the work of the laboratory. Finally, let me just say that Interim Director Nanos, joined by many honest and hard working lab employees, are working diligently to bring about a change in the culture of the laboratory. The challenge now is to solidify his efforts and to sustain them over the long term. In conclusion, I would like to apologize to you on behalf of President Atkinson, myself, and the University's Board of Regents for these business practice failures. They detract from the very real and valuable contributions that thousands of Los Alamos scientists, technicians and support personnel are making to our Nation. We are a stronger and safer Nation because of their efforts, and we regret what has taken place. Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or members of the committee may have. [The prepared statement of Bruce B. Darling follows:] Prepared Statement of Bruce B. Darling, Senior Vice President of University Affairs, University of California Mr. Chairman, Mr. Deutsch and members of the Committee: My name is Bruce Darling, Senior Vice President of University Affairs for the University of California. On January 8, President Atkinson also appointed me interim Vice President for Laboratory Management. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee today to address the management problems at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Let me assure you at the outset that I am not here to offer any excuses for the business, property management, and procurement problems at the Laboratory. On the contrary, the University of California takes full responsibility for these problems and is aggressively implementing the changes necessary to strengthen financial controls and restore the American public's confidence in Los Alamos and the University's management of it. Our efforts have benefited greatly from the information made available by Glenn Walp and Steven Doran, other Laboratory employees, the Department of Energy Inspector General, the media and this Committee. All have been invaluable in the University's effort to identify problems, to expose abuses, and to resolve them in an effective and decisive manner. I want to acknowledge in particular the leadership of Chairman Greenwood in this effort. If additional information becomes available today or at any other time, we will pursue it immediately. And we will continue to work with the Committee, the Department of Energy, and current and former employees at Los Alamos, including Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, to accomplish our corrective actions. Since the problems at Los Alamos have been reported in the media and discussed at this hearing, I will focus initially on the actions we have taken to date and then I will describe why we did so: sweeping management changes The University made sweeping management changes at Los Alamos starting in late December with the appointment of Vice Admiral George P. Nanos as Interim Director following the resignation of the Laboratory Director and the removal, and later termination, of the Principal Deputy Director. Admiral Nanos brings to Los Alamos a strong management background and valuable experience leading the U.S. Navy's nuclear weapons program. He also commanded the Naval Sea Systems Command, the Navy's largest acquisition command responsible for the design, construction, support and maintenance of all Navy ships and shipboard weapons systems, with four nuclear repair shipyards, seven Navy laboratories, 40,000 employees, and a $23 billion budget. Soon thereafter, we removed the director of the Lab's Audit Office. We removed and reassigned the Chief Financial Officer and his two deputies, and both the director and the deputy director of the Lab's Security Division. We also rehired Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, with full back pay to the date they had been dismissed by the former Laboratory management. At the same time, senior University administrators took on direct, personal responsibility for managing Los Alamos functions. university management of los alamos audit office The University Auditor is now directly managing the Audit Office. In that capacity, he has already taken a number of significant steps: He has strengthened the independence of the audit function by having the auditors of all three laboratories report directly to him. He rescinded the so-called ``loyalty oath'' prior to its mention in the DOE Inspector General's Special Inquiry on Los Alamos operations. He has commenced peer reviews of the critical audit and assessments functions and redefined the internal audit reporting structures. He has developed a plan to bring current the substantial backlog of audit and investigation work utilizing existing staff, UC audit managers, and outside experts. He added an independent whistleblower hotline (1-800-403-4744) that improves confidentiality in order to encourage employees to report improper activities without fear of retaliation. This is intended to give employees confidence that their concerns will be investigated fully and in a timely manner. He is also implementing at Los Alamos recent University policies for reporting and investigating irregularities and protecting whistleblowers from retaliation. university management of los alamos business and finance The Laboratory's finance and business operations are also now being managed by the University's Vice President for Financial Management, who has extensive corporate finance experience. In that capacity, she has taken the following actions: She organized a ``red team'' consisting of property, procurement and technology specialists from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to conduct a high level review of the organizational structure, business procedures and financial systems of the procurement and property functions. She is conducting an internal risk assessment of key financial and business processes, including a ``cradle-to-grave'' assessment of property acquisition. She adopted a more effective transitional organizational structure in the Business Division that includes enhancements to financial controls and business processes. She will integrate the financial control and business process improvements with the Enterprise Resource Project of the Laboratory. She named a senior procurement officer from the University as interim head of the Procurement Office and installed a new administrator to lead the purchase card program. external review of purchase cards and procurement Meanwhile, the University has directed an External Review Team-- made up of two distinguished former federal Inspectors General and more than a dozen forensic accountants from PricewaterhouseCoopers--to expand its recently completed review of the Lab's purchase card system to include all other procurement practices at the Laboratory, including Just-in-Time contracting, blanket purchase agreements, and local vendor agreements. As soon as the expanded work is done, we will report the results to the Committee and to the public and we will immediately address any deficiencies identified by the External Review Team. external review of key business processes The University has also retained Ernst & Young to conduct a comprehensive review and validation of the Laboratory's key financial processes; to review systems integration and controls; to assess the business organization and recommend the optimal organizational structure; to evaluate core competencies of the business organization personnel; and to recommend required employee skill sets. A team of over 30 Ernst & Young consultants has been at Los Alamos for several weeks now and is expected to report back to us next month. property inventory Property management is another high priority. To that end, we are moving forward with a comprehensive property inventory--the first since 1998. As you can imagine, at a facility like Los Alamos, which covers 43 square miles and includes some 2,000 buildings and $943 million in controlled property inventory, a wall-to-wall inventory is a massive but important and necessary undertaking. We have also conducted a survey of all Laboratory delivery sites, known as ``drop points,'' in order to assess vulnerabilities in security. Our external consultants will recommend additional property management controls that we will be instituting. interim oversight board More strategically, President Atkinson has established an interim Oversight Board of University Regents and scientific experts to guide Interim Director Nanos and to ensure that necessary reforms are vigorously pursued at Los Alamos. Its membership includes three members of the Board of Regents, Richard Blum, Peter Preuss and Gerald Parsky; UC San Diego Chancellor Robert Dynes, a physicist; and Sidney D. Drell, a Stanford University professor emeritus and a noted arms control advisor. Both Blum and Parsky are highly regarded financial experts with long experience in financial management. Parsky's firm acquires and builds middle-market companies in the industrial sector of the economy. Under his leadership, Blum's firm has helped to build numerous publicly- and privately-owned companies both in the United States and abroad. Drell served in 2001-2002 as chair of the senior review board for the Intelligence Technology Innovation Center and also served from 1992-2001 as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Dynes is a physicist specializing in semiconductor research. He came to UC San Diego in 1991 after a 22-year career with AT&T Bell Laboratories. He has two decades of experience consulting and advising on national laboratory oversight issues, including as vice chair of the President's Council on National Laboratories. Preuss is President of the Preuss Foundation, which is involved in brain tumor research. In 1970, he founded Integrated Software Systems Corporation, the first software company specializing in computer graphics. He is chairman of the Regents' Committee on Oversight of Department of Energy Laboratories. university governance and oversight At the same time, we are working on a larger revamping of the University's governance structure for the three national laboratories it operates for the federal government. External Oversight. We are examining various national laboratory management models for elements that we can draw upon to improve our own oversight: DOE's Sandia National Laboratories, Argonne National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Brookhaven National Laboratory; DOD's Draper Laboratory; and NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Our goal is stronger oversight by people with expertise in science and weapons, technology businesses, and corporate governance who will hold the Labs and the University accountable. For the new governance board, we are currently developing a list of candidates with experience relevant to national security laboratories. We are developing a charter and initial definition of roles and responsibilities for this oversight structure and its relationship to the UC Board of Regents, to the University President and Vice President for Laboratory Management, and to the Laboratory Directors. We will include a list of expectations for Laboratory Directors in creating and maintaining a culture of accountability at the Laboratories. Internal Oversight. To ensure that the University remains fully engaged in oversight, not just at Los Alamos but also at the other two Laboratories, we are designing an improved internal University structure. It will integrate a broader array of University management expertise--business and finance, audit, legal counsel, and human resources--into the oversight of the Laboratories, create a strong support function and staff for the external oversight body, integrate external expertise into the University's oversight, and create our own clear set of expectations and culture of accountability. That's where we are today. Now let me explain the events that led us to this point. Without addressing every allegation you may have read about in the press or heard about in the hearing today, we clearly determined that the general thrust of many of the allegations concerning control weaknesses are valid. It is clear, for example, that the purchase card program at Los Alamos, which differed from the program used at the University's ten campuses and two other UC-managed laboratories, lacked strong controls. The controls that did exist were not adequately enforced. It is also clear that Los Alamos did not impose the kinds of sanctions and accountability that would have encouraged employees to keep track of property for which they were responsible. And it is clear that the dismissals of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were unwarranted. As I explained earlier, we have been aggressively correcting these problems. We also accept the challenge posed to us by Chairman Greenwood during his visit to Los Alamos last month to make our purchase card program a model for the nation. purchase card external review team Last August, when we first heard allegations of procurement card abuse at Los Alamos, the University immediately directed the Lab to establish the External Review Team (described on Pages 4-5) to examine the Lab's purchase card program. This team reviewed 45 months of transactions totaling $120 million and 170,000 separate transactions. Following issuance of the External Review Team's final report in December 2002, the University Auditor, Patrick Reed, was dispatched to verify the Lab's efforts to reconcile and review all questionable transactions raised by the External Review Team. The University Auditor, in turn, submitted his interim report in February. It concludes that there were approximately $320,000 in costs that were questioned as to allowability. These costs, including some that cannot be documented because of records lost in the 2000 Cerro Grande fire, will be fully reimbursed to the Department of Energy immediately upon a determination by the DOE contracting officer that this represents a full and fair accounting of the questioned transactions. In addition, the Lab adopted the University's purchase card program in June 2002 and has reduced the number of purchase cards in use by the Lab's 8,500 employees from 1,100 to 561. Furthermore, all current cardholders and ``approving officials'' have been trained on purchase card policies and procedures. Numerous changes have been made in the policies and procedures governing the purchase card program in order to tighten internal controls and reduce the risk of fraud. We have decreased cardholder-spending limits and imposed requirements that each transaction be approved by a supervisor. We have also banned the use of purchase cards to buy inventory-controlled items. Finally, we have implemented sanctions such as revocation and suspension of cards for inappropriate card usage or non-completion of training requirements. university special review team While the External Review Team was conducting its initial review, President Atkinson directed me on November 21, 2002 to lead a Special Review Team of senior University administrators to assess first-hand the scope of the problems at the Laboratory. During our visit to Los Alamos four days later, we identified weaknesses in the Laboratory's purchasing, property management, audits and assessments, financial management, security, and public communications programs and issued a report with nine findings and recommendations. To cite a few examples, we learned that: $4.9 million in purchase card transactions either had not been electronically reconciled in a timely manner or were otherwise under question; There was no systematic process to ensure that controlled property items purchased via alternative procurement methods (e.g., purchase cards, Just-in-Time contracts), were entered into the property inventory; There was an urgent need to evaluate the Laboratory's business systems, financial controls and accountability; There were ineffective processes to ensure that senior Laboratory officials were notified of inappropriate business activity at the Laboratory. In addition, there was an inadequate process to ensure that inappropriate activity, such as waste, fraud, abuse or theft, was reported to Laboratory management, the DOE Inspector General, and UC officials. There were unacceptable audit practices, both in terms of the timeliness of addressing audit findings and a serious backlog of unresolved repetitive audit findings. termination and subsequent rehiring of mr. walp and mr. doran In addition, our report to the President strongly recommended that the circumstances surrounding the dismissals of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran--which, unbeknownst to us, occurred the morning of November 25 when the first Special Review Team met in Los Alamos--be referred for investigation to the Inspector General and that the University also investigate the dismissals, but in a way that would not interfere with the Inspector General's investigation. Both investigations subsequently concluded that the dismissals were unwarranted. On December 16, President Atkinson directed me to lead a second University Special Review Team to explore the circumstances related to the dismissals of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. We had already written both gentlemen on December 11 to request their assistance in addressing the procurement and property problems. On December 18, we interviewed ten Los Alamos officials and departed with serious questions about the events leading to, and the judgments exercised in, terminating their employment. We interviewed four additional witnesses the following day and, as a result, on December 20 we took two actions: First, we placed a call to their attorney to arrange a meeting to hear their allegations and to understand their views of the Laboratory and its management; Second, we hired a former U.S. Attorney to contact the U.S. Attorney and the FBI in New Mexico to seek a better understanding of the Laboratory's on-going relationships with the FBI and the U.S. Attorney, and to discuss steps necessary to solidify a good working relationship for the future. fulfilling the laboratory's mission to the nation I want to assure you that, while we have been identifying and remedying these problems at Los Alamos, we have also been focused on fulfilling the Lab's and the University's mission to the nation, especially at this critical time in world events. We are focused on ensuring that: Los Alamos' scientific and weapons programs continue to meet their objectives; Security operations of the Laboratory meet the nation's expectations; The Lawrence Livermore and Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories, which the University also manages, meet the same high standards the University is setting for Los Alamos; The University continues to strengthen its governance and oversight of the three national laboratories it manages for the Department of Energy. And, lastly, that there are open and timely communications with the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration, this Committee and Congress, as well as the media, to promptly apprise all interested parties of our findings and actions. As you know, since the days of Professor and Nobel Laureate Ernest O. Lawrence and his colleague Robert Oppenheimer, the University of California has had the privilege of managing Los Alamos to contribute to our nation's security. Over the last 60 years, the University and the Lab have become an integral system, both through the research collaborations conducted with our ten campuses, as well as the lasting ties to the Los Alamos workforce. Through this unique partnership with the federal government, the University is proud to have contributed to every area of science and technology related to national defense. The Lab has developed two-thirds of the nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal. When nuclear weapons testing ended, the nation looked to Los Alamos and Livermore to find ways to use the most advanced scientific and computational assets to simulate nuclear testing and to ensure the continued viability of our nuclear weapons stockpile. And today, as the Committee knows, Los Alamos is front-and-center in the effort to bolster homeland security, especially in the areas of counter- terrorism, non-proliferation, and prevention and preparedness for nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks. The International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors that are in Iraq at this very moment were trained at Los Alamos, and scientists at the Lawrence Livermore Lab provide broad country analyses of potential proliferant countries, such as recent information about North Korea's nuclear developments. I raise all this to underscore the University of California's continuing commitment to the nation even as we resolve the business and administrative deficiencies at Los Alamos. The business practices need to be raised to the same level of quality as the science and weapons programs. We owe this to the American people, who are paying for the work of the Lab, and whose security is dependent on the Lab. Let me reemphasize that managing the national security laboratories for the last 60 years has been an honor and an awesome responsibility, and we will address any challenges that might detract from our ability to fulfill our obligations to the American people. Finally, I would be remiss not to mention the dedication and commitment with which Interim Director Pete Nanos has tackled his responsibilities at such a difficult time. He and Los Alamos National Laboratory's employees are energized and working diligently to bring about a change in the culture of Los Alamos to one that welcomes open communication and encourages employees--without threat of retaliation-- to step forward with their concerns. Every indication is that he is succeeding, but the challenge will be to solidify his efforts and sustain them over the long-term. In conclusion, let me apologize to you on behalf of President Atkinson and the University's Board of Regents. The problems I have outlined reflect poorly on Los Alamos and on the University, and detract from our many accomplishments on behalf of the nation. Moreover, they are a disservice to the thousands of honest and hardworking scientists, technicians and support personnel who are working to protect American troops and the American homeland. They deserve better from the Laboratory's management and the University of California. Let me assure you that the University of California, including the new management team at Los Alamos, shares with the Committee, the Department of Energy, and the National Nuclear Security Administration the urgency to fix the problems that have emerged. This has been a difficult time, both for the University and for the Laboratory, but we have benefited enormously from the intense scrutiny and from the active involvement of the Secretary of Energy, the NNSA Administrator, and this Committee in helping to identify the problems we are discussing today and to develop appropriate remedies. Far from weakening us, this experience has strengthened us; it has further bolstered our resolve to restore the confidence of the Nation in the service we are determined to perform in time of peace and in time of war. Thank you again for this opportunity to address the Committee. I would be pleased to answer your questions. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Darling. Appreciate that. Let me ask you a general question before I get a little bit more specific. You have been here since 1 o'clock, and you have listened to the other witnesses, and particularly the first panel talked about a longstanding culture, an endemic system here where it was widely understood that, for years, the lab had been, ``greening the valley.'' The question is: How could this have been so widely understood at the site and the University of California oblivious to it? I'm assuming that the University of California was oblivious to it, but you tell me. Mr. Darling. Yes. I believe we were. I first heard the term ``greening the valley'' from Mr. Shiffer, the Director of Counterintelligence at Los Alamos on November 25 when we interviewed him. That was a very troubling assertion, because the point was that the lab is one of the largest economic forces in that part of northern New Mexico, and therefore, he said it made a very attractive target for thieves, drug trade or others who might want to prey on the laboratory. So that was a very troubling assertion. This was the first time that I had ever heard about it. When I asked others in the University of California, President's Office, it was the first time that they had. I will just say very bluntly that I don't think the lab was forthcoming to the University about the extent of the problems that have been revealed to date, and indeed on occasions rebuffed the University when it sought to inquire and obtain further information. Mr. Greenwood. Do you mean by that last statement with regard to these most recent allegations or do you mean that with regard to allegations in previous years? Mr. Darling. No, I mean with regard to the allegations that have come forward today. I do know that at times the University's auditor sought to obtain information from the lab auditor. I know that that was not forthcoming. I know---- Mr. Greenwood. With regard to these issues or in previous years? Mr. Darling. These issues. Then I will just give you an example of that. I think it was December 24 when suddenly a large number of so called G-29 reports that are required to be filed by the audit office suddenly landed on the University auditor's desk for the first time with no prior warning or no prior information. That was only because we were moving, and we had already--although we did not announce it until January 6, we had already made a number of the management changes that I have outlined here on December 21. Mr. Greenwood. At the conclusion of your written statement, you noted Admiral Nanos' efforts to change the culture at LANL. Testimony we heard earlier today indicates that the culture problems so widely examined during the Wen Ho Lee and missing hard drive investigation are alive and well. What are your views on the culture that Admiral Nanos is attempting to change, and what is the University of California to effect that profound change? Mr. Darling. As you know, sir, my involvement with the laboratories is very recent. It dates only to January 8. So I cannot give you a historical perspective, but what we have observed is that there is a lack of accountability, personal and institutional; and I think that is a cultural issue that needs to change. I think that---- Mr. Greenwood. To what would you attribute that? How does that happen? What is your sense of how that came to be? Mr. Darling. I can only speculate, but I think the only thing that I can say is to have a culture of accountability requires rigor, discipline, and relentlessness, day in and day out, year after year after year. And, sir, I do not think that was there. I do not think the senior managers of the laboratory created those expectations, enforced those expectations, and demanded those expectations. Mr. Greenwood. Do you think it has anything to do with who, if anyone, had anything at risk? In other words, in most enterprises, particularly in the private sector, shoplifting, theft by employees has a real and serious impact on the bottom line, and management works assiduously to rout it out, because it has to. As you heard me ask Mr. Friedman and based on his response, quite frankly, the University of California had, as I understand it, nothing at risk economically, nor, obviously, did the management at the laboratory. Everything that walked away from the laboratory just was picked up by the taxpayers, and there was no limiting factor whatsoever. Mr. Darling. Well, I think the best way for me to answer your question is to draw a comparison with our other two laboratories and our 10 campuses of the University of California. The University is a $16 billion enterprise, one of the largest organizations in the Fortune 500, were it a company. We do not permit that at our campuses. We do not permit that at our other two laboratories, nor do we see the extent of the problems at those other campuses or laboratories that we have seen here at Los Alamos. So I don't think it is the matter of having financial resources at risk. We are able to invest that without having financial resources at risk at those other elements of the University. Mr. Greenwood. And how do you know that it is not happening at other labs that you supervise? Mr. Darling. The day that we--well, let me back up. The day that the President asked me to take a team to Los Alamos, I included a representative of Livermore National Laboratory, the Executive Officer of the lab, for exactly that purpose. We wanted someone who knew the labs. From that day forward, we have informed both labs about exactly what we found. We have asked them to look into the issues there. We have asked the University auditor to pursue each of the issues that were brought up at Los Alamos that you have heard about today, and thus far--we are not completed, but thus far, we do not see the extent of the problems that we've seen at Los Alamos. Mr. Greenwood. Following the allegations raised by Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, Dr. Browne sent an e-mail to LANL employees that states in part, ``Allegations currently being made about the laboratory by two individuals who do not know the laboratory's operations or its people are simply wrong. I am confident that current investigations as well as future reviews will find that allegations of widespread theft, cover-up or interference with law enforcement at the laboratory simply are not true.'' The allegations, of course, were accurate. Do you agree that Dr. Browne's e-mail is part of the problem? Mr. Darling. I don't know if it is part of the problem or if it is reflective of the problem, but it is certainly true that it seemed to have excused behavior and issues that should not have been excused. It seemed to have failed to look into issues in adequate depth, because I believe that, had that happened, I think that this information would have come out before Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were dismissed, and the laboratory could have done something about it. Mr. Greenwood. Over the past 3 months, the University of California has dismissed or reassigned a number of LANL employees. Indeed LANL's former Director, Dr. Browne, just referred to, stepped down from his position as a direct result of the investigation of the matters before the committee. Can you tell me why the following individuals moved from their positions at LANL, their current status and, if you can, the salaries of those who remain there: Dr. Browne, the former Director, what is he doing now? Mr. Darling. He has returned to being a scientist. He is a very eminent scientist in nuclear weapons and other scientific areas. His salary was reduced. That was effective January 6. His salary was reduced from $335,700 to $272,500. Mr. Greenwood. Joe Salgado, the former Deputy Lab Director? Mr. Darling. Joseph Salgado was terminated from the laboratory on January 31 of this year. Mr. Greenwood. Why was he treated differently than Dr. Browne? Mr. Darling. Because he was responsible for the--in a very--he was responsible for the business and operational aspects of the laboratory. Mr. Greenwood. Wasn't Dr. Browne responsible as well? Mr. Darling. Yes, he was, but he was responsible for, you know, both the scientific and the business, and we felt the responsibilities fell more squarely on the shoulders of Mr. Salgado. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Katherine Brittian, the former head of Audits and Assessments? Mr. Darling. Yes. She was removed from her position as Director of Audits and Assessments on January 13 of this year. We are reassigning her to another position. If that occurs, her salary will decline from $175,000 per year to $140,000 per year. The adjustment---- Mr. Greenwood. Say that again. Mr. Darling. From 175 to 140. I'm not sure what I said, but that is what I meant to say. Mr. Greenwood. I thought you said from 174 to 240. Mr. Darling. I may have, and I apologize, if I did. Mr. Greenwood. Stanley Busboom, former head of security. Mr. Darling. Yes. A position has been identified for Mr. Busboom outside of the security area, but we are in negotiations with Mr. Busboom's attorney. So I can't speak to what the status is beyond that, but if that position--if he stays, salary will go from $190,000 per year to $140,000 per year. Mr. Greenwood. Now did he make the decision to fire Misters Walp and Doran? Mr. Darling. I think that is a very good question, Mr. Chairman. I think he--he certainly signed the letter, and whether he made the decision or whether Mr. Salgado made the decision, I think there is some difference of interpretation about. I think both might claim responsibility. Mr. Greenwood. Well, why wouldn't he be out on his ear? Mr. Darling. Well, I am told that he has a long track record of--I'm too distant from this to speak from personal experience, but of high service to the laboratory, and I should say that that is one of the reasons--the policies provide that people who have had distinguished service and who are no longer effective managers but can serve the lab in another role, not in a management role, have that opportunity. But I would also just say that that is why we are in negotiations. Mr. Greenwood. Gene Tucker, former Deputy head of LANL security. Mr. Darling. Yes. He was removed from his position as Deputy head of security on January 8 of this year. The situation is exactly the same as for Mr. Busboom. Mr. Greenwood. In negotiation? Mr. Darling. In negotiation. Salary would drop from 165 to 130, $1,000 per year, if he were to stay. But negotiations are underway. Mr. Greenwood. By the way, have you looked at whether these salaries are comparable to the private sector, to begin with? Mr. Darling. Yes, sir. They are considerably below the private sector. Mr. Greenwood. I'm in the wrong business. Thomas Palmieri, former Business Operations Division leader and Chief Financial Officer? Mr. Darling. Yes. Mr. Palmieri was removed from the position of head of--I'll just call him the CFO for that shorthand title on January 24 of this year. His salary, effective March 2, will decline from 180,000 to 140,000, and he would become manager of the budget but not of all the financial operations. He has a long distinguished history in doing budgeting and is viewed as someone who is very capable in that area. Mr. Greenwood. As part of UC's effort to address LANL's most recent problems, the University has retained several law firms, consultants, independent investigators and accountants. Does UC intend to seek reimbursement from the Department of Energy for the costs of these firms and, if so, on what grounds does the University intend to base such claims? Mr. Darling. We do not intend to seek reimbursement from the Department of Energy. Mr. Greenwood. Whose idea was that? Mr. Darling. The President's and mine. Mr. Greenwood. During your own inquiries, did you learn of any support---- Mr. Darling. I should also say--excuse me for interrupting--but the Board of Regents shares that opinion as well. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. During your own inquiries, did you learn of any support for the claim made by certain LANL officials that the FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office is dissatisfied with the assistance provided to them by Misters Walp and Doran? Mr. Darling. We have not, and I would say that this is a very important issue, because one of the reasons given for dismissing Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran was exactly that matter. So on December 18 when we met with 10 lab--on our second visit to Los Alamos to meet with 10 lab managers to inquire about the dismissal of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, that was an issue that was very much on our mind. So we sought immediately thereafter to open a dialog with the U.S. Attorney and with the FBI in New Mexico to find out what their perspectives are. That has not yet occurred. I believe it is occurring in early March. Our Deputy General Counsel and the former U.S. Attorney that we have hired to assist us in opening that door will be meeting with them for exactly that reason. Mr. Greenwood. And who was it that said that, in fact, the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office were dissatisfied with the gentlemen? Mr. Darling. I may get this wrong, but there was a--I believe there was a November 18 meeting between Mr. Salgado and Mr. Dickson of the laboratory with the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI and the U.S. Attorney. Upon return from that meeting, there were two different versions of what the FBI had said. Mr. Salgado told us that the FBI thought that the laboratory had blown the so called Mustang case, the Lillian Anaya attempt to purchase a Mustang using a purchase card, and he attributed the blame to Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran for not pursuing it aggressively enough. Mr. Dickson returned from that meeting and told us in our private interview that he felt the FBI was saying that Mr. Salgado had blown the case by pushing too hard and preventing the FBI from doing the necessary investigative work that it needed to do before having a case that it could refer to long enforcement officials. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, sir. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Eshoo. Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Darling, for the work that you have done and for your testimony today. Given the testimony of both Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran--and I note that Mr. Doran's son is here. It is your son with him? Mr. Darling. Louis. Ms. Eshoo. I think that he has a lot to be proud of in his father. Talk about role models. Given their testimony relative to what is needed in addition to some of the action that's been taken relative to personnel, and I have found it quite interesting the list that you just went through with the chairman, do you agree that more need to go? Mr. Darling. What I'd like to do, Congresswoman Eshoo, is reserve judgment until we have had an opportunity for the external review team that is looking into procurement and the Ernst & Young consultants that are looking at all of the business practices to report on their findings and recommendations. But I would say, as Mr. Friedman said, this is only a beginning. I would urge you to also reserve judgment about our performance, and I would urge you to be skeptical about our reforms until you have had a chance to see us implement them over time in a sustained way. Ms. Eshoo. The reason I raise the question is because I think that it was offered as a reform, in the reform column, and it was relative to culture and how this is going to change and that, if it is going to change, that that needed to be done. So that's why I offer the question to you. Do you believe that there needs to be any outside security company that is brought in rather than the internals that you have? Mr. Darling. I do understand---- Ms. Eshoo. Internal mechanisms. Mr. Darling. Yes. I do understand why Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran have expressed skepticism about transferring their former office, OSI, into Audits and Assessments, given the past history. So I share on a historical perspective their concerns. I will tell you that the University of California auditor who is heading up that office at the moment has done a number of the things I indicated to you, rescinding the loyalty oath in the audit office, establishing hotlines, demanding that the auditors act in the way that they should. He is an individual who is above reproach. He has had 22 years of experience at KPMG and auditing financial and governmental institutions. But again, we have begun, and I think over time you should ask us to prove to you that we are going to make the changes that will cause Mr. Walp and Doran perhaps to change their minds over time. Ms. Eshoo. Did you find the timeframe that the Inspector General mentioned when I asked him the question about the amount of time that it would take--does that fit with what--the reforms that you are putting in, and then a review of them, 6 months to a year? Mr. Darling. I think 6 months to a year would be a very good time for us to come back and have this further discussion and for you to ask us not only what we have done but how we have sustained it and how we intend to sustain it for the future. Ms. Eshoo. Are there golden parachutes that are offered to the employees that are asked to leave? Mr. Darling. Well, there may be negotiated settlements. I indicated that we---- Ms. Eshoo. Well, I mean---- Mr. Darling. But no golden parachutes that I know of. Ms. Eshoo. Well, what is a negotiated settlement? Is it something other than what someone's salary is? I mean, do they get something more than their salary when they are asked to leave? Mr. Darling. The University, in negotiations--the University--if employees have a long service with the University, the University upon settlement will occasionally contribute as much as 1 month of salary per year of service. Ms. Eshoo. Well, the reason I ask this is obvious. The chairman asked the question about, you know, why wasn't someone, whomever it was, just put out of the organization. So it seems to me that, if in fact this is going to be reformed, that fresh air is brought in. I mean, you have the job of Pope John XXIII who had to throw open the windows and say that we are going to have some fresh air come through this institution, which is a very difficult thing for institutions to do, first to acknowledge, which I applaud you for doing. It seems to me that, if part of the organization looks over their shoulder and sees people that have not served the organization well being somehow rewarded, then that doesn't clean out the culture that we want to reform, you see. That is the intent with which I ask the question, and while I don't want to get into specific personnel issues, that is why I offer it. So I---- Mr. Darling. Well, I appreciate--sorry to interrupt. I appreciate your raising the issue. There are also a number of other individuals who have been terminated whose names I was not asked about, including the two individuals involved in the TA-33 case, including Mary Wood, and there are a number of other names. But I am very sympathetic with your point. Indeed, I have been making the same case internally. Ms. Eshoo. I think it needs to be taken very seriously, because we don't want to come back here and revisit these things. My final question, and the same question I have asked of everyone: Do you have any knowledge of, in terms of these shortcomings, the abuse, the fraud, that can be connected to a diminishment of the national security of our country? Mr. Darling. Thank you for asking the question. I do not, and I would like, if I may, just give you a few points of recent reviews. In August the Department of Energy site office reviewed security at Los Alamos. In December there was an in depth review by the DOE office headed by Mr. Glenn Podonsky, I'm told, involved 30 to 45 experts who concluded that there was effective national security performance. Third, in January we brought in an outside firm that we use to assist us with security, a firm by the name of ManTech Aegis, to review Los Alamos and Livermore and to help us improve any reporting of security incidents. They did not identify any issues. We also brought in security experts from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to Los Alamos, again to look at this issue. We have had a work group on cyber security probing to make sure that, in terms of computer and other kind of access, we don't have vulnerabilities, and we are issuing this week a strategic plan for security at both of our national security laboratories. It has been in development for the last year. As I indicated, we have removed the Director and the Deputy Director of the Security Division, and we have also examined every one of the security issues that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran raised with us in our last meeting in late January to make sure that we left no lead uninvestigated in exploring these issues. Thus far, we have not found an issue, but I can't go beyond that. Ms. Eshoo. Thank you. Has my time expired, Mr. Chairman? Mr. Greenwood. Well, apparently, we didn't start the clock. Ms. Eshoo. All right. Can I ask one more quick question? Mr. Greenwood. Certainly. Ms. Eshoo. Thank you very much. Can you comment on--let me just back this up with an observation first before I ask the question, very quickly. That is that, if in fact--going back to the culture of an organization, if whistleblowers are not honored, respected, and paid attention to, that sends a very broad and bad message. Can you enlarge upon the whistleblower issue and how people in the organization will have confidence that, when they make an observation and they act on it, that there won't be punitive action taken against them. In fact, I don't want to say celebrated, but honored--honored. It takes a lot of guts to step up and say something. So there has to be confidentiality. In many ways, there is a parallel to be drawn with the whole area of sexual abuse in the workplace, and I've had some experience in setting up systems in what I did before I came to the House. So can you tell this committee with some confidence what you have set up and why you have the confidence that it is going to work, because it has these principles built into it? Mr. Darling. Yes. Ms. Eshoo. Thank you. Mr. Darling. Congresswoman, I agree that terminating a whistleblower sends a chilling message. It creates a climate in an organization that is ultimately very destructive to the organization itself and to the mission that it carries out. So we have attempted to, both at the University and at the three labs that we manage for the Federal Government, to set up whistleblower information and reporting and protection systems to accomplish the very goals that you have outlined. Now the University has had in place for some time a whistleblower policy. It was just updated in October because of a new State law that was passed in California to strengthen that, and it does apply to our three labs, including the one in New Mexico, because we as the contractor in California impose those same requirements. What it provides is that any person may report allegations of improprieties, whether they are known or suspected, that any good faith disclosure automatically triggers an investigation. It automatically triggers protection of the individual, and it also provides for a follow-up system so the individual has a way to find out what action the institution is taking on it. Similarly, for anonymous whistleblowers--for example, we have implemented a Pinkerton Company whistleblower hotline. An individual may call up on that hotline, never mention their name, provide the information. Pinkerton will relay it immediately to the University's corporate audit office. A case number will be assigned to it. The individual who called anonymously will be informed of that case number, and the individual may then call to follow-up to find out what has been done on that case number and still maintain the individuals anonymity. Furthermore, we will provide information to Pinkerton so that, when that individual does call, they will know on a regular basis what the status of that is. Second, we have tried to make reporting very easy. It doesn't have to be in writing or to a designated person. We want people to complain through the chain of command, because as I told your investigators, if people do not step forward, if people do not express their concerns, it really does create a chilling environment, and all of us have the obligation to do that up the line, and we also have the obligation to create an environment in which people who work for us may do that, and we must listen to them carefully, because if not, we have the kind of incidents that occur here. I will just say that Admiral Nanos has been very open about this. He has held a number of all-hands meetings at the lab where more than 700 people at each time come in to an auditorium. He said he has been receiving regular e-mails from people. So he is reassured that, at least for the time being, people feel comfortable. They are coming directly to him. Our auditor is also receiving those. I can't remember. We have received in the last few weeks 156 different reports from people. Now that may send a shock wave through you, but I think that is a very, very healthy statement. Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, Mr. Darling. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy. Mr. Greenwood. The gentleman from California, Mr. Radanovich. Mr. Radanovich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Darling, thanks for being in front of the panel today. Please forgive me for being gone for a portion of this hearing. We were having a security briefing on the House floor, and some of these questions you may have answered, but I just want to kind of reiterate some of them just to make sure, just so I am clear that there were no confirmed security breaches or loss of classified information as a result of these reported thefts at Los Alamos. Am I correct? Mr. Darling. That is correct, Mr. Radanovich. I think you walked in as I was walking through the list of security steps we have taken to ensure that. So I won't repeat it, but the answer is we know of nothing. Mr. Radanovich. Okay. And in your protocol in the structural steps that you have taken for stronger oversight on the laboratory, I would imagine that would be of general--well, say, for example, there was a Frank Dickson, who is LANL's long time General Counsel, who could not give a straight answer about the proper means to report a potential situation of fraud, waste, and abuse. I assume that you have taken the time to explain all that. Mr. Darling. I have not, and I appreciate your raising that. On our November 25 visit one of the disturbing issues that we faced was, when we asked how do people report issues, and how do they get followed up at the laboratory, we found a disconnect between the Office of Security Investigations, the Audits and Assessments office, and the General Counsel's office, and I believe that is one of the reasons that Mr. Walp and Doran found the kind of resistance that they did, because they were both people--one office elbowing the other out of the way, and other cases where they simply weren't addressed at all. So we are--that is why we have put all of this into the Office of Audits and Assessments under new leadership to try to make sure that we address that for the long term in a clear, simple, easy way that every employee will know how to pursue. Mr. Radanovich. Okay, thank you. You may have addressed this one also. I do need to ask it. Am I correct in understanding that the University and the laboratory were both investigating through internal and external review teams the procurement fraud issues at Los Alamos as early as August 2002, several months prior to the publicity surrounding Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, and this committee's own investigation? Was this a case of your sweeping the issues under the rug until they appeared in papers? Mr. Darling. No. I don't--again, my involvement is quite recent, but my understanding, as soon as the lab became aware of purchase card programs in August and the University was notified, we demanded that an external review team chaired by two former Federal Inspectors General and PricewaterhouseCoopers get involved to review that. So I don't believe that the University of California, Office of the President, did anything other than act immediately to bring an outside group in to review these issues the moment it heard about them. Mr. Radanovich. Okay. Thanks. Also, in the case of Lillian Anaya who tried to buy the Mustang, I hear she never got it, but what was the status of that investigation as it is right now, briefly? Mr. Darling. Yes. My understanding, and I hope I am clear in my own mind about this--forgive me if I misstate the matter, but my understanding is, first, the matter was referred to the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office. I believe--I hope I am right in saying they decided not to prosecute. My understanding was then it was referred to the DOE Inspector General, and just, I believe, either earlier this week or the end of last week, it was referred back to the lab. We are now pursuing the issue. We have put together a case review board to investigate the charges, and we will be taking action, personnel actions, based on that case review board's determination. Mr. Radanovich. Thank you very much. Now we all agree that the missteps and the theft and fraud is intolerable under situations like that, but I do want to kind of want to put an emphasis on the research, the critical research that is important to national security that is conducted in the UC labs right now. Could you do me a favor and summarize the key areas of research currently underway at Los Alamos and the extent to which they relate to counterterrorism and homeland security missions, and also please highlight to me to what extent a change in the management during wartime would risk disrupting research. Mr. Darling. Yes. I will just cite three examples. The Los Alamos laboratory has trained the International Atomic Energy nuclear inspectors who look at how it is that nations use nuclear reactors and what they do with the spent fuel rods. Of course, that is a concern, because one doesn't want to have those available to be transformed into nuclear weapons. Second, both of our laboratories in cooperation have developed a very small miniaturized biological threat detection devices which have been installed around this city and around the 2002 Winter Olympics, for example, to detect any potential biological threats through airborne means. Third, we have developed a so called EMP weapon, electromagnetic pulse weapon. You may have read about it in the newspaper recently, that if we do send in troops to Iraq, this weapon will enable the U.S. forces to knock out any system that uses either electricity or computer chips and, therefore, disable the ability of Iraqi or any other opponent forces to communicate and coordinate their response to a U.S. attack. I am told that it does that without harming individuals. So these are just a few examples, but you know, the core mission is really developing nuclear weapons in the past and then maintaining the current stockpile of nuclear weapons so that, if they are ever called upon to be used, we are able to do that. In addition, we monitor nuclear proliferation in countries around the world to make sure that the U.S. is fully informed about the status and, as Congresswoman Eshoo said earlier, it was the Lawrence Livermore lab that notified the U.S. Government about the developments in North Korea. As to what would happen if the contract were changed, let me just say that the University employs the vast majority, if not all, of the Nation's nuclear weapons physicists. The Nation as a whole, 44 percent of the Nation's PhDs in science and engineering are over the age of 50. So we are going to experience a generational shift. That is true also of the Nation's nuclear weapons designers. The older ones are the only ones who have ever had a chance to test a nuclear device, because the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has since prevented any further testing. The younger scientists who have come forward to develop weapons have only designed them on computers. They have never seen them actually work. The younger ones are worried that, if the University's contract expires or the University is terminated, that the older ones will do what many of them have indicated they might do, which is to simply retire, and we would leave the Nation denuded of one of its most strategic scientific and weapons manpower forces that we have. Mr. Radanovich. Mr. Darling, how long has UC had the contract to do this research? Mr. Darling. It began in 1943 when the U.S. Government turned to Ernest O. Lawrence, the Nobel Laureate in physics, and at the Berkeley campus of the University, and asked him first to organize our radar effort in World War II, and then asked him to develop an atomic bomb, because the Germans had one of the leading nuclear fission research programs. They controlled most of the heavy water supply of the world. They controlled occupied France where the Curie laboratory and the Curies were, and they had an armaments and munitions capability that was frightening to the rest of the world, and had we not developed the atomic bomb first, I think all of us only have to pause and imagine what our world and our lives would be like if the Nazis had done so first. So it has been since 1943. Mr. Radanovich. And as I understand it, the contracts dome due every 5 years, a 5-year period, and it's really not under competitive bid? Mr. Darling. That is correct. Mr. Radanovich. I'd bid on it but, you know, I had the opportunity. I chose Congress instead of nuclear physics. But can you answer for me or give me other examples of different types of contracts like these that are so specialized that they are not put up for bid? Mr. Darling. Yes. I'll give you one example. Admiral Nanos who used to head the Navy nuclear weapons program has indicated that Lockheed Martin has had a contract for the Trident missile program for more than 20 years. The reason is that, for these very strategic assets of the Nation, it is not like buying shoes where you can find quality and determine the best price. You have an asset. You have given a challenge that is one of the most difficult challenges that human beings know how to achieve, and turning over the contractors on any kind of a regular basis creates a real threat of disruption to our basic security. So Lockheed Martin has had this Trident contract, I'm told, for more than 20 years, and there may be other examples that we could give you later. That's the one I know off the top of my head. Mr. Radanovich. One last question, if I may. Is the University making a profit off these contracts? Mr. Darling. The University, from 1943 until today, has done this on a no gain, no loss. We have not wanted to receive any additional money beyond our costs, and we have not wanted to spend any University money beyond what it cost to run these programs. Mr. Radanovich. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Darling. Appreciate your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman. Just on that last point to clarify something: I was told by our staff that the University receives a performance fee in the vicinity of $8-$9 million. Is that---- Mr. Darling. That is correct. But can I explain how it's used, to show you? Mr. Greenwood. Yes. Mr. Darling. The University decided it never wanted to be financially dependent upon managing these laboratories, partly because at the beginning it was viewed as something that would just be done for a few years, and after the war was over, there would be no further need for nuclear weapons. So the University does two things with its fee. One is it pays for the Office of the President's Oversight Office for the laboratory administration, and then it takes the majority of that money, and we give it back to the Directors of the two nuclear weapons laboratories so that they may use it to do science where a scientist has a very good idea. They are not yet able to obtain funding, and so initiate new scientific programs that in many cases have turned out to be the core, the bedrock, of future nuclear weapons work. So we put it all back into the mission for which the Nation has hired us, in the first place. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. A couple of more questions that I have, and then we will let you go, Mr. Darling. What did Mr. Salgado tell you about his concerns about Walp and Doran obtaining whistleblower status? Mr. Darling. He informed us that the timing of their termination related to an impending Washington, DC, DOE Inspector General visit to the laboratory, and that he was concerned--he felt that their performance was not adequate, and he was concerned that, if they were allowed to meet with the DOE inspector on that occasion, that that would give them in some technical sense whistleblower status, and it would make it harder for the laboratory to terminate them for the reasons they felt they should be terminated. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. You made reference to the loyalty oath that you have dispensed with. Could you tell us what that is? Mr. Darling. I don't recall it well, but I think the DOE Inspector General's report said that, in addition to the professional standards and code of conduct of auditors, which all auditors in all organizations follow, there was a statement that one should--that auditors should be loyal to the laboratory. That's a despicable comment. That is unacceptable. It is intolerable, and it is outrageous. Mr. Greenwood. Where did it come from? Was that the University that inserted that? Mr. Darling. No. It was a Los Alamos audit employee, and I'm glad you asked the question. I don't know, but I will pursue it to find out who put that in. Mr. Greenwood. And to your knowledge, do any of your other facilities that you manage have comparable loyalty oath? Mr. Darling. I'm not aware of it, and it would be reprehensible if we did, and we will stop it immediately, if we do. Mr. Greenwood. Yes, I would appreciate if you would check on that. My final question is this. With regard to cases of, for instance--I think her name is Mary Wood who apparently has been accused of using a purchase card to obtain funds at a casino, and I believe there were $2500 worth of inappropriate charges they attributed to her. Is the University making an effort to get recovery of funds in these cases such as hers? Mr. Darling. I need to look into that. I don't know the answer, but we certainly should. And now that you have brought up the question, we will investigate that and see if we can do so. Mr. Greenwood. I'm asking you one more question now, because I am curious, because Mr. Deutsch is on his way here, and he will be here in a second. Gene Tucker, formerly Deputy Director of LANL Security, told Mr. Walp that the money involved in the situation was UC money and not taxpayer money. So LANL could handle this matter in any way it saw fit. Do you agree with that statement? Mr. Darling. No, I do not. The University of California is a public trust organized under the constitution of the State of California. Every dollar, whether it comes from public or private sector sources, should be treated as though it were a public dollar and given the utmost respect. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. What is the status of the Lillian Anaya case involving the attempt to purchase a Ford Mustang, which I believe was valued at about $30,000? Mr. Darling. Yes. First of all, that purchase never occurred, because, fortunately, a check and balance did work, and that is that the Bank of America, I believe it was, did not permit the transaction to go through. So there was never a car delivered, and there was never any loss of money by the lab or the U.S. Government. As I think I said to Mr. Radanovich, the case was referred to the FBI and the U.S. Attorney. I believe they did not choose to prosecute, and--oh, I'm sorry. I was thinking about--I am confusing this with the Clarissa Rodriguez case. Excuse me. Am I right? I'm glad they think I'm right, because I'm a little confused at the moment. So I believe it has been referred to the FBI and the DOE Inspector General, and I'm sorry, I just don't recall what the status is, but I believe it is with them. Mr. Greenwood. What about the Rodriguez matter then? What is the status of that? Mr. Darling. As I informed Mr. Radanovich, it has now been back--it is back in the hands of the laboratory, and we are pursuing a personnel action through our case review board. Mr. Greenwood. Now I'm getting you even more confused. The first case that I asked you about was the Anaya Mustang case. Mr. Darling. Yes, and here I have---- Mr. Greenwood. The Rodriguez case is a separate case. Can you tell us the status of that investigation? Mr. Darling. Yes. So the Anaya case is the Inspector General. As of the 19th of February, we are commencing an investigation to determine whether discipline is appropriate and what it should be, and that is for Lillian Anaya. Clarissa Rodriguez, I am now recollecting, was the woman who falsified a travel voucher. She was allowed to resign by the laboratory, I believe, inappropriately. There are other people who have different opinions. And she is prohibited--she was allowed to retire-excuse me--yes, resign in lieu of termination. She is prohibited from being employed by the laboratory for a period of 7 years, and I need to see whether we are seeking--no, no, I'm sorry. We did receive $1800. Her check did clear, and the laboratory has been repaid. Sorry, I'm stumbling a bit here. Mr. Greenwood. That's okay. Are criminal prosecutions anticipated in either one of these two cases? Mr. Darling. Criminal prosecution? We have reported both of them to the proper law enforcement authorities, and my understanding is that that is a decision that rests with them and that we really have no jurisdiction to be able to determine that. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Mr. Darling. The Clarissa Rodriguez case, I'm told, as of February 19 does reside with the FBI. That is the $1800 case. We are getting a little below my level of knowledge here. Mr. Greenwood. Recently, the Inspector General at Department of Energy issued a report regarding firearms inventory control at LANL. The IG concluded, ``Significant internal control weaknesses exist in the receiving process and the administration of the firearms inventory.'' Further, the report noted that, ``The inability of LANL to provide accurate firearms inventory, the lack of reconciliation of the LANL inventory with the protective force inventory, and the acknowledged problems in the process for receipt of firearms and their inclusion in the formal LANL inventory raise additional doubt about the property control system at LANL.'' Does anyone at LANL have an accurate account of the lab's firearms? Mr. Darling. I'm told, first of all, that all of the firearms were properly controlled in secure areas and were never out of control. There was, clearly, a lack of proper systems inventory accountability. I am told, for example, that the name and make of each of the weapons was listed rather than saying weapon, and then with a subheading. So when they searched the data base, they were not able to find them on the data base, but they were under proper control. I'm told that, although there was an initial large discrepancy between our records and the DOE's, I'm told those have been reconciled, and that we now understand that they are not only under control, but we have the full count. We will not permit anyone to purchase a firearm in the future without proper management authority, and they will have to be accounted for in the way that we and you would expect of us. Mr. Greenwood. The gentleman from Florida. Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Deputy Director of the laboratory has been removed, but the legal counsel, who insisted that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran be fired, is still in his position, even though, obviously, his role in this issue. Could you explain why that decision? Mr. Darling. Yes. As I explained a few moments ago, one of the confusing points about the dismissals of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran was a difference of opinion between the general counsel and the principal deputy director of the laboratory about the FBI's and U.S. Attorney's views of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran's performance. That is something we sought immediately to try to find out the FBI and U.S. Attorney's perspective. That meeting will take place early next month. I think that meeting will provide us the kind of information about Mr. Dickson's role that will allow us to make a decision. But just like with Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, we feel the need to collect the information before we make a decision. So we are reserving judgment. Mr. Deutsch. I guess the question really is focus, apparently at least, based upon what we are aware. This gentleman actually was working on a daily basis to try to get these two gentlemen fired. Mr. Darling. I don't know that, but I do know that there was certainly--I think that the general counsel, instead of providing legal advice, also had an operating role. I think it confused the role of the general counsel at the laboratory, and that is among the issues that we will be looking at and discussing as we go forward. Mr. Deutsch. You stated in your testimony that only $3,000 in fraudulent purchase card purchases had been referred to the authorities. Our staff, just by looking at invoices, there are big differences between allowable purchases and legitimate ones. If your operation didn't direct me to buy something, I'd buy it myself. Whether it was allowable or not is irrelevant. So how do you make that distinction between allowable and legitimate? Mr. Darling. I'm sorry, Mr. Deutsch. I don't remember that in my testimony. Mr. Deutsch. It's actually apparently--you know, what I'm told is in your written statement, it actually is included in that. I mean, at this point---- Mr. Darling. I would not make a distinction between allowable and appropriate. Mr. Deutsch. All right. But apparently, again the audit did. I mean, at this point--you know what. At this point on that particular issue, you know, if you want to get back to us in writing on that. Mr. Darling. Thank you, sir. I'd be pleased to. Mr. Deutsch. We've been told that no other University operation has a purchase card program where people can go to local vendors and give their Z-number and buy things. Is that correct? Mr. Darling. You mean no other University of California? Mr. Deutsch. No other operation at the University. Mr. Darling. I believe that is true. To the best of my knowledge, yes. Mr. Deutsch. And we have been told that this is a way to support local vendors. I mean, is that the purpose of it? Mr. Darling. I believe there are two purposes. One is, I believe, under the contract we are required to provide business opportunities for business in the immediate area around the laboratory. Second, because when the lab--the lab was purposely sited there, because it was a remote area for both security reasons and given the nature of the work, and over time as the lab has grown, it needs a business and other kind of infrastructure nearby to meet its needs. This was an attempt to do that, but the controls are not adequate, and that is something we are having an external review team review now as they expand their review beyond the purchase card program into all areas of procurement. Mr. Deutsch. And again, I mean, obviously, it is self- evident that the other way is to help the local economy. Mr. Darling. Absolutely. Mr. Deutsch. Again, just to save a little bit of time, my understanding is Pricewaterhouse is going to be looking at the whole process of this local vendor agreement where right now, I guess, there is no oversight on that. Is that also correct? Mr. Darling. When you say no oversight---- Mr. Deutsch. Well, we have been told that no one looks at what is being bought through the local vendor agreements. Is that accurate? Mr. Darling. Well, Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were extremely helpful to us in understanding the local vendor agreements and both how they have been used and perhaps how they have been misused. So that is an area that we immediately responded to, we are looking into. We have brought in PricewaterhouseCoopers to look at it, and we will be--we have already begun to tighten up what can be purchased and making sure---- Mr. Deutsch. Let me just ask a quick question. Could you purchase Nike sneakers? Mr. Darling. Pardon me? Mr. Deutsch. Nike sneakers? Mr. Darling. Sir, you've gotten beyond my level of detailed knowledge. I do know that safety boots, safety goggles, and other things that are needed on a very quick turnaround time, for obvious reasons, are available to be purchased, but I cannot tell you about whether Nike---- Mr. Deutsch. Just yesterday our staff discovered that, until August of this year, lab employees could get a travel advance just by filling in an electronic form. It did not require any supervisory approval. One of your former employees just did that--in fact, did that, and we still have to find the form. That employee falsified a travel statement and converted $1800 in Federal funds to a personal use which, obviously, are Federal crimes. The lab Human Resources Department, reporting this to Mr. Walp's unit but without checking with anyone, has decided that it would take a restitution check, and allowed the employee to resign before any investigation was done, and no investigation was done. Would you view that as an appropriate decision? Mr. Darling. No. I have told the committee staff, and I will say it to the committee as well, I do not believe that was an appropriate decision. I believe that she should have been terminated. Mr. Deutsch. Okay. My last question: There is a former whistleblower from the S Division who was fired. An administrative law judge found that the dismissal was based on untruths of Mr. Busboom and Mr. Tucker. During this investigation, we heard from a person involved in the lab's action that he just went along with the others. We want to look at this case, and we would like your cooperation. The man's name is James Russell. Are you familiar with that at all? Mr. Darling. I am not, but we would be happy to cooperate with you. Mr. Deutsch. All right. Thank you very much. Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman. The chair would ask unanimous consent that the opening statement of Representative Anna Eshoo be incorporated into the record. Without objection, it will, and also unanimous consent that the disk, the CD with the photographs presented by Mr. McDonald be part of the record. Without objection, it will be. Without objection, a statement by Mr. Waxman will be incorporated into the record as well. With that, we thank you again, Mr. Darling, and the other witnesses for their participation. This hearing is adjourned. Mr. Darling. Thank you, Mr. Greenwood, Mr. Deutsch, and other members of the committee. Thank you very much. [Whereupon, at 5:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] INVESTIGATION OF MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY ---------- WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2003 House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2322 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James C. Greenwood (chairman) presiding. Members present: Representatives Greenwood, Walden, Deutsch, and Davis. Also present: Representative Radanovich, Markey, Eshoo, and Udall. Staff present: Ann Washington, majority counsel; Michael Geffroy, majority counsel; Yong Choe, legislative clerk; Edith Holleman, minority counsel; and Turney Hall, minority staff assistant. Mr. Greenwood. The hearing will come to order. I ask our guests to find seats, please. Let me alert everyone to the fact that Mr. Deutsch and I will make opening statements. Then, unfortunately, we are going to have to recess for about a half an hour and come right back and take testimony. I apologize for that in advance. The Chair recognizes himself for an opening statement. This morning we embark on the second day of our hearing concerning reports of mismanagement and theft of Government property at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Two weeks ago we heard very troubling testimony from investigators at the lab who uncovered an amazing level of problems given the sensitive operation at this facility. For example, at that hearing we were presented with a pictorial essay on the alleged theft perpetrated by two LANL employees to include sleeping bags, cots, coolers, automatic gate openers, compact disks describing how to operate lock- picking equipment, and Slim Jims, devices used to break into locked cars. I am still waiting to hear how one could possibly explain the use of these items for lab related business. Or, to go a step further, to hear if anyone even asked these employees to explain their questionable purchases. Although we have evidence of a few peripheral inquiries into some of their actions, it does not appear that anyone took a serious look at this until an employee was forced due to lab securities in action to go to the FBI. To take another example, committee staff recently received a report generated in December 2002 that identifies all the lap top computers purchased in fiscal years 2001 and 2002 that did not get the property barcode. The report identified more than $1.5 million in lap tops all deemed sensitive property that were not correctly tagged which meant the computers would not be tracked in LANL inventory. Of course, we also have the treatment of the two expert investigators who did attempt to bring procurement and theft problems to management only to be shown the door for doing so. These are just a few reasons why this committee has serious questions about procurement and property management oversight at LANL. Our search for answers leads us, first of all, to the lab's management. We will turn today to the people who are supposed to make sure the problems we have been investigating did not happen. We will hear their response to the evidence and allocations of theft and abuse of funds and property. We will also hear from the people with responsibility for the lab's overall management which will allow us to review more broadly the effectiveness of oversight of the lab by both the University of California and the National Nuclear Security Administration. We have serious questions on this level as well. The NNSA's fiscal year 2000 appraisal of Los Alamos states in part, ``Notwithstanding the NNSA original assessment of outstanding in the procurement and property management areas, systemic weaknesses demonstrated in these two areas dictate that these functional areas should be rated no higher than excellent.'' I have to ask how could NNSA rate any part of the procurement and property management areas as excellent given the testimony we heard 2 weeks ago from Jaret McDonald, the man who frustrated by lab inaction, brought his concerns to the FBI. Our witnesses today can expect some tough questions. Let me note that they all come before us voluntarily and I appreciate their cooperation as we get to the bottom of this mess. Their views of events and answers to our questions should help fill out the picture of what was going on at Los Alamos. Our first panel today consist of individuals who had immediate oversight of the issues at hand. We will hear from Mr. Stan Busboom who hired Glenn Walp and Steve Doran, the two lab investigators who were fired after they raised concerns about management's response to these crimes. Mr. Busboom ultimately signed their termination letters. He says he was ordered by his supervisor to do so. In his previous role as Director of Security he was involved in the inquires into many of the cases discussed in our first hearing. He also is responsible for investigating security incidents such as a recent missing hard drive case, as well as other incidents involving unaccounted for classified media that this committee has uncovered during the course of our investigation. Mr. Busboom is joined by Mr. Frank Dickson, Laboratory Counsel; Mr. Joe Salgado, former Principal Deputy Director of LANL. Both of these men took on roles in these procurement and property cases that were seemingly outside the scope of their regular job responsibilities. They were also instrumental in the termination of Walp and Doran. Our second panel will have officials responsible for managing procurement at the lab. We will hear from Mr. John Hernandez who oversaw the contract administrator responsible for the Mesa blanket purchase agreement which was the primary procurement tool two employees used to purchase tens of thousands of dollars of goods for personal use. Additionally, we have Mr. Stan Hettich, LANL's Director of Procurement. Mr. Hettich was also involved to some degree in one of the procurement abuse cases last year when his own secretary was caught using her procurement card at local casinos. We will have Mr. Richard Marquez, LANL's Associate Director for Administration, who oversees all procurement and property management programs at the lab. Mr. Marquez has advised our staff that he believes the recent steps taken by the lab to improve its procurement card system will help solve many of the current problems. I look forward to hearing exactly how he believes these procedures will succeed where so many past attempts have failed. Finally, we will take testimony today from higher level management. We will hear on our third panel from Dr. John Browne who was the lab's director during the relevant time and has since been replaced. We also have the former and current University of California Vice President of Laboratory Management, Dr. John McTague, and a reappearance, Mr. Bruce Darling. This lab management position was actually created to ensure that the improved management provisions required in what is known as Appendix O to the lab DOE contract was carried out. Joining them is Mr. Ralph Erickson from the NNSA's LANL site office. I am looking forward to their testimony that what was going on at a facility that pursues some of the Nation's most sensitive research. We thank the witnesses for attending this important hearing and recognize the ranking member for his opening statement. Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the fall of 2000 the University of California agreed to amend its contract with the DOE to add more performance requirements for the management of its two national nuclear weapons laboratories. These commitments known as Appendix O were made to save California's contracts when it went alee in the lost hard drive security debacles at Los Alamos and the repeated mismanagement which resulted in huge hidden cost overruns at the facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. According to the contract Appendix O was intended to strengthen the university's management of and accountability for Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in three areas. Those were management accountability safeguards, security management, and facility safety. It required the use of outside subject matter experts to establish a Vice President for Laboratory Management, provide leadership management and integration of the initiatives in Appendix O, and be accountable for institutionalizing the changes, improvements, and the benefits gained from infusion of industry expertise. The vice president would also chair a new Laboratory Senior Management Council which would be an effective forum to review issues. The president of UC himself would be accountable to DOE for overall management and operating performance. All the requirements in Appendix O had to be completed for the university to be eligible for any of its at-risk fee of $4.7 million. On October 9, 2002, DOE stated that all the requirements of Appendix O had been met and UC received $3.7 million of its performance rating. UC said it had received the highest rating ever from DOE, even though there were significant procurement and property fraud of control allegations at Los Alamos. PricewaterhouseCoopers and two former inspector generals had already been hired to review the entire purchase card system because of systemic weaknesses. The investigation subsequently would be expanded to the entire procurement system. Within 6 weeks of this finding the new staff hired to professionalize the security division were fired because they did not fit in with the lab's self-protective culture. Within 3 months most of the top leadership of the Laboratory would be removed from their positions because they had refused to confront and fix management and security problems as they surfaced. The two security professionals were rehired. Have the goals of Appendix O been met? Not according to Joseph Salgado, the former Principal Deputy Director of Los Alamos. His testimony refers repeatedly to the lack of management accountability in the security area, although the key purpose was to instill public confidence and safeguards in security at both labs. The implementation under Appendix O appears to have been incomplete at best. The final strategic plan prepared by Mantac Ajas, the outside expert, were not ready for review until December 2002. By July 2002 the lab had deleted all work requirements on promising best management practices, assessment of training needs and review of outsourcing possibilities. Although Mantac Ajas was required to brief the Laboratory Counsel and its vice president only once a year, the university decided after the first briefing that it did not need another briefing at the end of the contract. DOE apparently made Los Alamos' last quarterly report the final one. Based on this information of our investigation, I would argue that the security operation was, and is, in shambles. In addition to the well-publicized shortcomings in the criminal area, our staffs are finding disturbing issues in the handling of security incidents including the handling of missing hard drives and flash cards. In 2001 Stanley Busboom, then head of Safeguards and Security Division, decided to readdress the situation that resulted from internal failures to implement an earlier reorganization. Mr. Busboom stated in his 2001 division reengineering memorandum that we have had several organizational structures that failed over the last 18 months of crisis. The computer and technical security section and information on personal security had not removed from the security and stand-downs during 1999 and the hard drive incident of 2000. The Special Projects Office, the predecessor to the Office of Security Inquiries, was described as ineffective with little cooperation of local law enforcement agencies and property protection investigations that were neither thorough or timely. Mr. Busboom proposed true strategic staffing with nationwide advertising to find a new OSI office leader to organize investigations and inquiries. He wanted someone who could investigate and develop root cause analysis and solutions. The white hats, consumer service, and the black hats, inquiries, were to be sharply defined and organizationally separated. The hiring of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran as black hats was a direct result of this effort. Quickly they were expected to serve Mr. Dickson and Mr. Salgado, the main customers inside the Laboratory, rather than to work with law enforcement agencies to root out and fix the problem. Despite Mr. Busboom name if black hats, they just did not fit in. Mr. Chairman, one of the reasons people like Glenn Walp and Steve Doran did not fit in was because they uncovered problems and told people about them. They did not put their loyalty to UC above that of the taxpayer. The university, the Department of Energy, and these laboratories have a long and, frankly, vicious record of pursuing employees who try to fix problems. Demoting the Laboratory Director will not stop that, nor will hiring back Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. Mr. Darling, your employees are afraid to speak out. That is why you have the management by accommodation that Mr. Salgado refers to. If you are really committed to change, I suggest you revisit each of the whistleblower cases in the past 10 years and report back to this committee on whether you think they were treated fairly. Thank you. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you. Mr. Deutsch. Mr. Chairman, Ms. Eshoo, I believe, by combination will be able to sit in the hearing? Mr. Greenwood. Ms. Eshoo can sit in on any of my hearings any time she wishes. Mr. Deutsch. Thank you very much. [Additional statements submitted for the record follow:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Greg Walden, a Representative in Congress from the State of Oregon Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend you for holding this hearing today. It is my hope that by the end of today's hearing we will have gotten to the heart of what led to the acute problems that the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the University of California (UC), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Energy (DOE) had in handling issues pertaining to the severe procurement irregularities, gross property mismanagement and theft at the laboratory. To say the least, today's hearing will be interesting. Two weeks ago members of the subcommittee were able to learn from Messrs. McDonald, Walp and Doran how senior officials at LANL reacted to serious allegations of theft and loss of government property and how they responded to the misuse of government procurement mechanisms by personnel at LANL. The subcommittee subsequently learned how these allegations led to the start of an alleged cover-up by senior officials at LANL, which, amongst other things, led to the dismissals of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. These terminations by the laboratory were later characterized by the DOE's Inspector General as being ``incomprehensible,'' and moreover, he found LANL's reasons for these terminations to be unsupported by the available evidence. I will be particularly interested to hear how Mr. Busboom explains the rational behind these firings. How could these two security officials be terminated from their positions in light of the fact that about a month and a half prior to their respective terminations, on November 25, 2002, Mr. Walp was given a performance evaluation and subsequently received a $5,000 raise? It is also important to note that the FBI thought very highly of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, which is highlighted in Mr. Busboom's notes from a conversation he had with an FBI agent in which the latter states that ``Steve and Glen are the most professional.'' That compliment coupled with DOE's IG characterization of the terminations definitely leaves some questions to be answered by our witnesses on the rational behind these firings. Though an explanation of what led to the terminations of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran is important, I also hope the subcommittee gets answers from our panelists about what the laboratory, UC and the NNSA have done to remedy the acute procurement problems that have existed at LANL. I will be particularly interested to understand how the NNSA fiscal year 2002 appraisal of LANL rated the lab's procurement and personal property management areas as ``excellent'' despite the fact that this same system had such critical flaws that two lab employees were allegedly able to walk off LANL grounds with over $50,000 in government property. I will be even more interested in learning how a Los Alamos employee could use their government provided purchase card to not only buy miscellaneous items at local retail establishments, but also at several area casinos. I imagine Mr. Hettich might be asked to shed some light on this particular incident. With that said, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today and I look forward to hearing their answers to the issues I have raised in my statement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. ______ Prepared Statement of Hon. W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce Thank you Chairman Greenwood. And let me say, once again, that the thorough, bipartisan work you are doing here--the evidence and information and explanations you are gathering--is going to be very helpful in resolving what is a very, very disturbing situation at Los Alamos National Laboratory. At the first part of this hearing into theft and mismanagement two weeks ago, I explained why I was so alarmed about what amounts to looting at the lab. Theft of taxpayer dollars and property is bad enough, but this goes beyond that. This is not some insignificant facility. Los Alamos is considered to be one of the gems of our national research infrastructure--and a facility that Americans trust to perform some of our most valuable national security research. It doesn't take a nuclear physicist to understand why this is so important. Just look at the world situation today. We cannot afford to have slipshod management at a facility that performs such sensitive national security work. What I learned from the first part of this hearing did not ease my concerns. We heard sworn testimony about efforts to obstruct special Lab investigators and the FBI. We heard what was described as a total failure of Laboratory management to do anything about, and I quote, ``massive'' theft at the Lab. We heard descriptions of a permissive atmosphere that sought to protect the Lab's image by ignoring evidence of deep-seated problems-- for fear that exposure of the problems would generate negative publicity that would harm the Lab, its management, and ultimately its billion-dollar contract with DOE. Mr. Chairman, I can tell you what was harming the Lab, and it was not the efforts of the few to fight fraud and expose waste. Rather, it was what was allowed to go on outside the public eye, within the walls of this facility, a culture of permissiveness and lack of discipline. Today we hear from the people who were in charge. I look forward to learning why they at one point hired special investigators to reform security at the Lab and then decided, essentially, to fire these investigators after the theft was identified. I look forward to learning why management and procurement procedures failed, why employees were able to get away with the purchases they made. We do have some tough questions. The witnesses before us today are among those who were accountable for what was happening at Los Alamos. Let me say that I also appreciate the witnesses coming before this Committee, voluntarily, to account for their actions and to explain what reforms are under way. It's not always pleasant to come before this Subcommittee as a witness to answer tough questions, and it's not always pleasant to be up here asking the tough questions. But this process is a good one, and one that over time will help to ensure that gaps in security and fraud protection at the Lab are closed. Today's hearing, Mr. Chairman, should help us move in this positive direction. I yield back the remainder of my time and look forward to discussing our concerns with the panels. Thank you. Mr. Greenwood. As I mentioned at the outset of the hearing, unfortunately we have to recess now because of an unavoidable obligation that I have. We should readjourn in about 30 minutes. Please be back here at 10:45 and we will hear from our first panel then. The hearing is recess. [Whereupon, at 10:20 a.m. the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 10:45 am.] Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Now you know why not much gets done here in Washington but we should have a good solid 1\3/4\ hours without further interruptions. Again, I apologize to all. Let me welcome our first panel which consists of Mr. Stanley Busboom, Staff Member and Former Director of the Security Division at Los Alamos. Welcome, sir. Mr. Joseph Salgado, former Principal Deputy Director at Los Alamos. Thank you for being with us this morning. And Mr. Frank Dickson, Laboratory Counsel at Los Alamos. I thank all of you for your presence and for your patience. You should be informed this is an investigative hearing and it is our practice to take testimony under oath. I would ask if any of you have any objections to giving your testimony under oath? Witness. No objection. Witness. No. Mr. Greenwood. No objection? Okay. Pursuant to the rules of this committee and the rules of the House, you are entitled to be represented by counsel. Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel this morning? Witness. Not at this time Witness. Negative. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. If you would stand and raise your right hands. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Greenwood. You are under oath and we will start with you, Mr. Busboom. You are recognized for your opening statement. TESTIMONY OF STANLEY L. BUSBOOM, STAFF MEMBER AND FORMER DIRECTOR, SECURITY DIVISION, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; JOSEPH F. SALGADO, FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; AND FRANK P. DICKSON, JR., LABORATORY COUNSEL, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY Mr. Busboom. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Deutsch, and members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to address the issues that your committee has been looking into. Mr. Greenwood. Can I ask you to bring the microphone a little bit closer to you and point it toward your mouth. Thank you very much. Mr. Busboom. My name is Stan Busboom and I was the Director of Security at Los Alamos for 5 years up until January 8 of this year. Prior to that, I served my country in uniform retiring at the rank of Colonel from the United States Air Force. My record in the military service was exemplary, and my service at Los Alamos was recognized as outstanding for my entire tenure. To fulfill its promise of full cooperation with Congress and its investigation, Los Alamos National Laboratory and the University of california have ordered me to appear here to give testimony under oath today as a condition of my employment. The terms of this order are contained in a letter from James L. Holt, Laboratory Associate Director for Operations, which I have attached to my written testimony. At this time I would like to give you a brief summary of the written testimony that I have submitted for the record. The Office of Security---- Mr. Greenwood. I should remind you that you do have the right to invoke your 5th Amendment rights if you do not wish to testify this morning. Mr. Busboom. I am aware of that, sir, and I understand I am entitled to counsel as well. Mr. Greenwood. Very well, sir. Mr. Busboom. The Office of Security Inquiries, commonly called OSI, came within my purview. This office is where Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran worked. The members of this office work directly for my deputy, Mr. Tucker, and they had a broad range of duties at the Laboratory which did include providing inquiries into property theft and liaison to law enforcement. I first became aware of serious problems in OSI in September of last year. Mr. Tucker reported to me on several occasions during that period that there were ongoing disputes between his OSI staff and the lab's legal counsel. At one point in mid-September Mr. Tucker had to intercede with the lab's Chief Operating Officer on Mr. Walp's and Mr. Doran's behalf to prevent them from being taken off ongoing inquiries. That incident led me to meet with Mr. Tucker, Mr. Walp, and Mr. Doran to express my concern that the disputes be resolved professionally, quickly, and permanently. I also met with the Chief Operating Officer and the Senior Legal Counsel around this time who expressed concerns about the suitability of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran for those positions. Approximately 6 weeks later I was directed by the Chief Operating Officer to remove Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran from their law enforcement liaison duties with the FBI. I did that and then I moved quickly to provide the FBI with alternative points of contact. This incident occurred after a meeting between senior lab management, the FBI, and the U.S. Attorney which I did not attend. I was told at the time that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran no longer had the trust of senior management. At that point I began to seriously consider Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran's position as probationary employees and to contemplate their future with the lab. On November 20 the issues surrounding Mr. Walp's and Mr. Doran's performance came to a head when my supervisor handed me a draft memorandum that provided detailed justification from senior management for terminating the two under their probationary period. I consulted in detail on this with my supervisor, his deputy, Senior Laboratory Legal Counsel, and the Deputy Director for Human Resources. I also met with the Chief Operating Office and expressed my concern about the inevitable media and political firestorm. I was given assurances that that had been taken into consideration and with those assurances I accepted my responsibility as division leader to take the determination actions. On November 25 with my supervisor in attendance, I asked for Mr. Walp's and Mr. Doran's resignations. When they were not forthcoming, my supervisor and I signed the terminations approximately 2 weeks later. The media and political fallout that I was concerned about occurred almost immediately and a number of investigations and inquiries were launched including your committee, sir. On January 3 of this year my supervisor told me that I would be removed from my position. On January 8 that did occur. For my part in this matter I have acted in good faith every step of the way and I have taken my actions based on the best information I had at the time. I have cooperated fully with all investigating agencies including your committee, sir. I have kept a complete an accurate record of all the proceedings I was involved in which was provided to your committee's staff. Thank you for your time. [The prepared statement of Stanley L. Busboom follows:] Prepared Statement of Stanley L. Busboom, Special Staff Member, Los Alamos National Laboratory To fulfill its promise of full cooperation with Congress and its investigation, Los Alamos National Laboratory and University of California have ordered me to appear here and give testimony under oath as a condition of my employment. The terms of this order are contained in a letter from James L. Holt, Laboratory Associate Director for Operations, which I have attached to my testimony. I was the Director of Security at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for 5 years, up until January 8th of this year. Prior to that, I served my country in uniform for 26 years. My record as a Colonel in the Air Force was exemplary, and my service at Los Alamos was recognized with outstanding performance ratings for my entire tenure as a division leader. The Office of Security Inquiries (OSI) at Los Alamos came within my purview. OSI members worked directly for my deputy, Gene Tucker. I did not supervise this function on a day-to-day basis, but I did have supervisory contact with them when Mr. Tucker was absent from the Laboratory. I was also involved in the terminations of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. I first became involved in events leading up to the termination of these two persons in mid-September of 2002. On September 17th, Frank Dickson, LANL Chief Legal Counsel, informed my deputy (Mr. Tucker) that he was dissatisfied with the work of OSI on the pending property cases and that he wanted Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran off the cases. Mr. Tucker told me he would handle the situation and he interceded directly with Joe Salgado, LANL Chief Operating Officer, on Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran's behalf. The next day (September 18th) I met with Mr. Dickson at 11:30AM, and he outlined his dissatisfaction with the OSI staff in no uncertain terms, saying that Mr. Doran was not trusted by the legal office and that the ``jury was still out'' on Mr. Walp. He expressed particular concern that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran's contacts in the field should not be inconsistent with his interface with the FBI and the U.S. Attorney offices in Albuquerque. I was extremely concerned by this discussion and I arranged to meet with Mr. Tucker and Mr. Walp later that afternoon at 4:00PM. During that meeting, Mr. Tucker asked Mr. Walp straight out if he was being asked to anything improper, illegal, or unethical. Mr. Walp said ``no.'' Mr. Tucker also confronted Mr. Walp about an incident that Mr. Tucker considered to be insubordination. Mr. Tucker said that Mr. Walp had denounced Mr. Dickson in front of his OSI subordinates, and that this was an inappropriate way to handle a dispute with a colleague. Mr. Tucker also made the point that he had just gone to bat for Mr. Walp. I told Mr. Walp that Mr. Dickson regarded him as uncooperative and that OSI could not be successful in the long run if they did not have a good working relationship with the LANL Chief Legal Counsel and his staff. We then asked Mr. Doran to join the meeting. I repeated Mr. Dickson's concerns to Mr. Doran, including the express concern that the relationship with the FBI and the U.S. Attorney must be maintained. At one point in the conversation, when I did not think Mr. Doran was listening to me, I did offer my opinion that Mr. Dickson would ``level you him both barrels'' if the dispute between OSI and LC continued. I believe later events have proven my observation to be correct. I did not threaten to fire Mr. Doran. I did tell him that Mr. Dickson was inquiring about his status as a probationary employee, and I am certain that Mr. Doran found that to be of great concern. I also found it to be of great concern, as I wanted Mr. Tucker's efforts on his behalf to be successful. As a manager, I was obligated to let Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran know where they stood with Mr. Dickson, without sugar coating it. The context of this conversation was forward-looking, not punitive. My view was that Mr. Tucker had successfully interceded on their behalf and that if they took the time and made the effort to rebuild their relationship with LC, we could put the disputes behind us. None of this discussion in any way touched on Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran not being allowed to do their jobs or not pursuing the cases they were working. It was only about learning to cooperate with LC. My next personal encounter with Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran came about six weeks later. On October 24th, 2002, at 10:20AM, I received a message that Mr. Dickson needed to speak with me urgently. I got through to him 20 minutes later on his cell phone number and answered this question from him: ``When did the FBI first begin investigations into thefts at Los Alamos, and when did management know about it?'' The answer I gave him, after consulting with Mr. Walp, was, ``Sometime around June 24th and July 1st, respectively.'' I asked him where he was, and he said that he and Mr. Salgado were meeting with the US Attorney and the FBI in Albuquerque. Later that day, at 4:00PM, Mr. Salgado held a meeting in his office with Mr. Dickson, Mr. Marquez, Associate Director for Administration, Mr. Holt, Associate Director for Operations, and me. Mr. Salgado said words to the effect of, ``We screwed up the `Mustang' Case,'' and therefore, the US Attorney would not prosecute it. He then immediately directed me to take Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran out of liaison with the FBI and therefore off the remaining FBI case, the so-called ``TA-33'' case. By ordering Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran off FBI liaison just after describing the screw-up of the ``Mustang'' case, Mr. Salgado implied that that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran's handling of the case caused their removal from FBI liaison. I suggested that it was not wise to ``change horses in the middle of the stream'' but was told that based on the meeting in Albuquerque, Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran no longer had the trust of senior management. The rationale was that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran had provided incomplete and inaccurate information to Mr. Dickson and Mr. Salgado. Accordingly, I told Mr. Walp that evening at about 5:45PM that he was off liaison with the FBI. Mr. Doran was not available, so he was told the same thing the next day, October 25th, around noon. I could only tell them that senior management had lost confidence in them. At 09:30AM, I had an acrimonious meeting with Mr. Dickson about being ``ambushed'' the day before. I had not known about the meeting with the US Attorney or the FBI the day before and that left me completely unprepared for the outcome affecting my employees. In that meeting, he explained that there would be a meeting the following Tuesday (October 29th), in which the roles of LC, OSI, the FBI, and the DOE IG would be sorted out. At 2:35PM that same day, Agent Jeff Campbell, FBI, telephoned me and asked for assistance on an inquiry about an Australian citizen who had once visited Los Alamos. He said Mr. Doran, who had informed him that he was no longer in the position of FBI liaison, had referred him to me. I told Agent Campbell I would assist him personally. At the close of our conversation, Agent Campbell said: ``Nothing I said at yesterday's meeting should have gotten Steve [Doran] in trouble,'' and ``Steve and Glenn [Walp] were very professional in my dealings with them.'' I only told him their removal from liaison was a decision by senior laboratory management. I met again with Mr. Dickson later that day, to go over where we stood on each area of concern. Following the meeting, I emailed Mr. Dickson and my supervisor, Mr. Holt, that 1) Mr. Doran and Mr. Walp had been removed from FBI liaison as directed by senior management; 2) we would hold new liaison appointments in abeyance until the Tuesday meeting per Mr. Dickson's direction; and 3) I passed on my conversation with Agent Campbell. The next Monday, October 28th, I telephoned Agent Campbell and gave him everything he needed on the ``Australian'' case. As we closed the conversation, he proposed to have Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran participate in pending interviews and search warrants on the ``TA-33'' case (the sole FBI case at LANL at that time, to the best of my knowledge). I told him I could not agree to that. As I have described, the decision to remove them had been made by senior management, and it was clear to me that I did not have the authority to change that decision. I did leave it open ended and told him ``we'll back to you,'' reasoning that the next day this could be resolved in the joint LANL/IG/FBI meeting, where senior management would attend. Agent Campbell said that without Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran's participation, he could not assure me we would have 24 hours notice prior to the warrants being served in the ``TA-33'' case. I made note of this, as at the time, I did not know any such agreement was in place. I had only one purpose in my dealings with Agent Campbell as liaison in the absence of Mr. Tucker, who was away on vacation: to assure that the removal of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran did not in any way impede, obstruct, hinder or thwart any FBI investigation at the Lab. The following day (October 29th, at 1:45PM) when I attended the joint meeting, the FBI was not present. Mr. Salgado said that the FBI had ``backed out.'' The first input I made at the meeting was to recount my conversation with Agent Campbell and point out that a firm FBI liaison was needed. Mr. Salgado said he didn't care if we had prior notice of the warrants being served, but to go ahead and appoint new liaisons. I appointed Mr. Tucker and Mr. Mullens to those duties following the meeting, succeeding my own personal stint of three working days as the liaison. At 9:00AM on the morning of Thursday, October 31st, the FBI conducted the interviews and served the warrants without prior notice to LANL. Between Mr. Tucker and me, we immediately assembled a team from OSI, produced the suspects, and provided full and successful support to the FBI effort. I noted this on my calendar for the day: ``Where are Glenn and Steve?'' It turned out that Mr. Doran had scheduled that day off, and Mr. Walp had called in sick. I was later questioned by the DOE IG on this entire matter. The inspector asked me if I had prohibited Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran from speaking to the FBI. My reply was ``no,'' and I characterized that proposition as ``ridiculous.'' If Agent Campbell needed any assistance from anyone in OSI, he could have contacted Mr. Tucker or me, and we would have provided whatever information or access he requested. Alternately, he could have treated Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran as material witnesses, and if they cooperated he would have all the access he wished, without ever needing my consent or knowledge. In my 32 years of experience in law enforcement, the FBI will label such persons as supportive witnesses and/or criminal/confidential informants, and do whatever they legally need to do in terms of access and interviews. What I did not do was to interfere with Agent Campbell's investigation. What I did do, and the only thing I did, was instruct Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran not to interact with the FBI as liaisons on behalf of the Laboratory, as I was instructed to do so by Mr. Salgado and Mr. Dickson. The IG also asked me if I had been told by anyone that I was not cooperating with the FBI. My answer was ``no,'' and the facts are that the FBI got everything they needed in terms of support from my division, when they needed it. Throughout the period of late October and early November, both Mr. Salgado and my immediate supervisor, Jim Holt, had discussions with me about the probationary status of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. I was under pressure to make a decision on them, and it was clear to me that preferred outcome was to let them go. What I did not know at the time was that plans to terminate Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran had been made at meetings where I was not present, and did not know about. The matter came to a head on November 20th, at 8:30AM, when Mr. Holt handed me a draft memorandum that outlined senior managements' concerns on Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. It was in the form of a memo from me to Mr. Holt, recommending their termination, and he told me to work on it on a ``close hold'' basis. That same morning, I met with Mr. Holt and his deputy, Barb Stine, at 10:00AM, and we edited the memo line-by- line. The next morning, I took the memo to Mr. Dickson at 8:30AM, and he edited it line-by-line with me. I asked for an explanation of each point in the memo and Mr. Dickson attributed most of the points to himself and Mr. Salgado. I finalized the memo and sent it to Mr. Holt on November 21st, recommending that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran be terminated. I was prepared to accept my responsibility under the LANL Administrative Manual, which says dismissing probationary employees is done at the division leader level, but I nevertheless had serious concerns. At 10:00AM, I met with Mr. Salgado, and expressed the following reservations: 1) that this action would start a media and political firestorm; 2) that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran would almost certainly become ``whistleblowers,'' and; 3) that a senior management must participate in the actual terminations as I was relying on their input for taking the action. He acknowledged my concerns, but told me that these matters had been taken into consideration. At 3:25PM that same day, Mr. Salgado told Mr. Holt and me to proceed with the terminations on Monday and to start on restructuring the OSI office; it was specifically agreed at this meeting that Mr. Holt would be present during the terminations. The next day, November 22nd, I received instructions from the Deputy Division Leader of Human Resources (Phil Kruger) on how to conduct the termination session. He advised me, among other procedural matters, not to have Mr. Holt present. I certainly thought otherwise and on Sunday, November 24th, at 3:05PM, I telephoned Mr. Holt at his home to receive an assurance that he would be participating in the action. On Monday, November 25th, commencing at 8:45AM, I asked both Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran for their resignations, with Mr. Holt present as a witness. Two weeks later, when no resignations were forthcoming, Mr. Holt and I both signed the personnel action forms that formally terminated them. Almost immediately following the dismissal of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, the media and political firestorm I had predicted materialized. As I also forecast, they assumed the status of ``whistleblowers'' and took their side of the story effectively and continuously to the media and eventually, to this committee. I was told on January 3rd, 2003, that I would be removed from my position as Director of Security, and that did take place on January 8th. I believe this action was taken as a direct result of the media coverage and political ``fallout'' I had specifically warned senior management about. The news media coverage of my removal at one point centered on the alleged loss of a hard drive in my division in October of 2002. On October 24th, 2002, at 4:30PM, I met with Mary Margaret Trujillo (OSI) and Steve Croney (S-4 Group Leader), and they told me that an ongoing inventory of classified removable electronic media (CREM) in Mr. Croney's group had not been reconciled. I believe Mr. Croney had first discovered the problem sometime earlier in the day. Mr. Croney said that a bar coded CREM was not in the safe it should be, and that a search of that safe did not result in finding it; the item was listed as a hard drive. At 4:45PM the same day, I telephoned Frank Ward of the local DOE office, and informed him that I was formally reporting an incident of security concern (a ``security incident''), and explained an item in the S-4 CREM inventory was not where it should be. I told him that we would be reporting it in writing the next morning, within 24 hours, as procedures called for. I immediately called in Leigh Barnes to assist. Mr. Barnes' group was in charge of the CREM inventory lab-wide, and were on-call, like a SWAT team, to respond to any anomalies during inventories. At 5:15PM, I met with Mr. Croney, Mr. Barnes, Ms. Trujillo, and Ms. Trujillo's supervisor, Mr. Walp. I sent Mr. Barnes and Mr. Croney off to continue the search in S-4, and we agreed to reconvene in the morning. At about 7:30PM, I reached Ken Schiffer, head of the Internal Security Office, by telephone. I told him I had a security incident in my own division and that I might need an inquiry official from his office (An inquiry official investigates a security incident). To avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest in the inquiry, I wanted an inquiry official from outside S Division. Mr. Schiffer agreed to assist. The next morning, October 25th, at 7:00AM, Mr. Croney and Mr. Barnes came to my office and presented a plan to do a wall-to-wall search of the entire group. They estimated it would take well into the weekend to check and recheck all of the inventory and to search all of the physical space. I told them to proceed and sent Mr. Croney to get started. At this meeting, Mr. Croney could not articulate in any way what the missing item was used for, or what information it might contain. At 7:45AM, I met with Mr. Barnes, Mr. Walp, and Ms. Trujillo and told them we would putting the report in writing, but also that I was going to ask Mr. Holt to appoint an outside inquiry official to avoid a conflict of interest in ``investigating ourselves.'' A draft of the written report was reviewed at this meeting, and it did not make sense to me on two accounts: 1) It said the hard drive was lost or missing, when clearly in point of fact, the search was still ongoing; and 2) That someone was in the hospital, and that is why we could not explain the inventory difference. In either case, it would require a full inquiry to determine if something was lost or missing, and if all pertinent witnesses had been contacted. I asked Mr. Walp, Mr. Barnes, and Ms. Trujillo to come up with more factual wording for the report. I signed out the written report within two hours, and Mr. Walp faxed it to DOE. It now correctly stated that we could not locate the item and that we were continuing to attempt to reconcile the inventory. I approved the classification of Impact Measurement Index 2 (IMI-2), the highest and most serious classification I could assign without knowing for certain that there was a confirmed compromise of classified information. Mr. Barnes and I met with Mr. Holt at 10:15 AM, and he agreed to appoint an inquiry official outside of S Division for the reasons I had put forward: I was both the responsible line manager and the Director of Security and that constituted at least the appearance of a conflict of interest. He communicated with a Mr. Roth in Mr. Schiffer's absence, and then appointed Ms. Mary Ann Lujan from the Internal Security Office as the inquiry official for the incident. On Sunday, October 27th, I met with Mr. Croney and Mr. Barnes to hear their report on the wall-to-wall search. They explained their methodology for the search and detailed their activities over the previous 72 hours. They then told me that they had found the bar coded item and that it was a carrier without a hard drive in it. This was an interesting development in terms of reconciling the inventory, but it did not address the fundamental question of whether or not classified information was potentially compromised. On October 28th, Mr. Walp, Mr. Barnes, and I met with Ms. Lujan as she started her inquiry. They told her what they knew up to that point, and I instructed them to give her all necessary support. On November the 1st, I was present when Ms. Lujan gave an update to Scott Gibbs, who was acting on behalf of Mr. Holt. I asked Ms. Lujan if my people were cooperating, and although she said ``yes,'' she also said words to the effect that some people could be more forthcoming. As I recall, her point was that some were not volunteering information, but only answering direct questions. I immediately took this back to Mr. Croney and instructed him to reinforce with all of his people that full cooperation was essential, and I would not tolerate anything less. I followed up with Mr. Croney from time to time after that to ensure this was done. On November 15th, I performed a second-level managers review of Mr. Croney's CREM inventory, checking safes and inventory records along with him and his custodians. I found no issues. I believe I sat in on one other update, but I do not recall the date or the specifics discussed. After being removed from the position of Director of Security, I was questioned about taking part in, as it was described to me, rescinding this report. This is completely untrue; I did not in any way, orally or in writing, rescind the report. The ``rescission'' was also attributed to Mr. Tucker, my Deputy. This is also patently false, as he was out of town on vacation; in fact, the only reason I was involved in reporting this incident was that in his absence, I was covering his duties as the supervisor of OSI. Further, I cannot understand why anyone would credit this assertion of a ``rescission,'' as clearly a full inquiry proceeded to its conclusion. What I did do was immediately launch a massive effort to reconcile the inventory, properly report the incident, classify it at the highest level of concern I could, appropriately remove myself from the inquiry chain at the earliest opportunity, keep careful records of the proceedings, and ensure the cooperation of my division in the inquiry. This committee's staff questioned me for the first and only time to date about these matters on February 7th, 2003. Although I have first hand knowledge of these events, no one at LANL or UC has interviewed me. To the best of my knowledge, no one has interviewed Mr. Barnes either, although he clearly has first hand knowledge of what happened during the initial stages of the inquiry. I have never seen Ms. Lujan's report; she completed it after I was removed from my position, and in any case it was prepared on behalf of Mr. Holt. I have not read it, nor have I been consulted on its content or conclusions. I therefore have no knowledge of actions pending or taken as a result of the inquiry. In conclusion, throughout all of these matters, I have not participated in, nor observed, any actions that could remotely be described as a management cover-up. I never harbored any motive of ``thwarting'' Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran's work. On the contrary, I provided appropriate resources and support for OSI throughout this period, and assisted Mr. Tucker in interceding with legal counsel and senior management when they needed support. I kept an extensive record of the events as they occurred and I have shared that record fully and cooperatively with all the concurrent investigations. For my own part, I participated in the terminations with caution and reservation; Mr. Tucker did not participate in the terminations at all. I took all of my actions with consistency and in good faith and I used the information provided to me about Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran in a manner appropriate to the seriousness with which it was presented to me. I took no independent action in this matter; I recommended the terminations based on what I was told, but I did not make the decision. I had no reason at the time to suspect the motives of my chain of command or the veracity of the information they gave me. When the terminations were effected, I saw to it that the extraordinary steps were taken of having a senior manager present, and of having him sign the personnel action forms. Thank you for the opportunity to assist in you investigation of this matter. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Busboom. Mr. Salgado. TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH F. SALGADO Mr. Salgado. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, My name is Joe Salgado. I am here voluntarily and at my own expense. I was the former Principal Deputy Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory. I had been at the Laboratory approximately 3 years. For brief moments here I would like to address a little bit of my background since that is germane probably to the ongoing inquiries of this committee. I have over 17 and close to 20 years of law enforcement experience starting as a police officer in Oakland, California as Sergeant of Police. Ten years as a prosecutor in Alameda County as senior trial attorney. As a branch manager and special prosecutor in Humboldt County in an impeachment trial of a duly elected law enforcement official. I had the privilege to come to the Department of Justice after approximately 10 years as a prosecuting attorney and served as the Associate Director for Enforcement at the Immigration and Naturalization Service. I sat on the board of directors of EPIC, El Paso Intelligence Center. Then the Associate Attorney General on the Coordinating Committee on Organized Crime. I served in the Reagan Administration as the Chief Operating Officer of the Department of Energy for 4 years. In that capacity had the ability and the responsibility for the management of the National Laboratory and ironically also with part of the decisionmaking process for the extension of the contract with the University of California in 1985. I would like to make five brief points if I might, Mr. Chairman, pursuant to my testimony. I would ask that my submitted testimony be incorporated and part of the official record. Mr. Greenwood. It will be. Mr. Salgado. Thank you, sir. The first point I would like to make is on a personal basis and professional basis there was absolutely no cover-up or attempted cover-up of theft or criminal activity at Los Alamos Laboratory via myself and, as far as I know, by anyone else at the Laboratory. I believe that these allegations are absolutely not true and I categorically reject all such statements. I have described in my statement Dr. Browne and I promptly and completely informed all appropriate authorities at the University of California, NNSA, DOE, and appropriate law enforcement agencies. We kept them informed of our activities and progress through all the issues that are before this committee today. The second point that I would like to make is that I firmly believe that the descriptions of the Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, as a Den of Thieves, or having a culture of crime and theft that has been keeping the valley green for years, is inaccurate and not founded on fact. I believe, sir, that it does a disservice to the thousands of honest, dedicated science, technical and support people at the Laboratory. Obviously the improper and illegal activities and criminal activity of a few individuals out of a work force of over 10,000 are extremely serious and should be well investigated. But they should not be used to tarnish the entire Laboratory and its work force. Personally I am disappointed that the University of California has chosen not to defend the Laboratory and its work force. Point No. 3. In late 1999 when I joined the Laboratory I did bring a well-founded belief that the historical culture of the University of California and the Los Alamos Laboratory had to change to ensure that it is management performance would be as excellent as its scientific performance. It was my personal opinion and voice within the institution, as well as the University of California, that the Laboratory had lost its credibility and was losing its credibility with both the executive and legislative branches of government. My views were consistent with Dr. Browne's vision of transforming the Laboratory into a disciplined organization capable of meeting the public expectation for accountability with fiduciary relationship with the American taxpayer. As a result of my prior service at the Department of Energy, I firmly believe that the University of California Lab had to regain its lost confidence and could only do so by substantially transforming the culture of the Laboratory and its management practices. Management practices have historically been one of management by accommodation to one marked by formality of operation, openness, and, among other things, that it was variably free from a culture of theft including theft and mismanagement. Fourth. I take the responsibility for the dismissals of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. I believe their dismissals were warranted based on repeated instances of inaccurate and incomplete reporting, their apparent inability to gain the trust and confidence of executives and senior managers at the Laboratory, as well as external reviewers with backgrounds both in law enforcement and the Federal Government. And management failures in properly securing, I believe, sensitive information dealing with ongoing criminal investigations. I am aware that Mr. Walp and Doran have accused me of significant obstruction and interferences with their work. It would be worth nothing that over the period of the 6 months to a year that Mr. Walp and Doran were at the institution I personally met with Mr. Walp twice for approximately 60 minutes and Mr. Doran attended a meeting I was in. There were issues concerning the October 24 meeting with the FBI and the U.S. Attorney that did lead me to the position of requesting and demanding that they be removed from liaison on that particular case. Mr. Doran and Mr. Walp see the Laboratory and its issues on one hand, and I see it on another hand that the conditions at the Laboratory must and need to be improved. We are diametrically opposed, I believe, as to our conclusions as to those conditions. Finally, Mr. Chairman and members, this committee would have no way of knowing what I refer to as an insidious and prejudicial phrase of ``keeping of the valley green'' and similar expressions. I have discussed this issue at length in my statement. Let me summarize it here by saying that the phrase is tantamount to racial profiling of the Hispanic workers at the institution of Los Alamos and the Hispanics residents of the Espanola Valley. Uses of phrases like ``greening the valley'' as our surrogate for accusation of thief in connections to the drug trade and absent any substantiating evidence or wrong. As an individual who has lived in the valley and is of Hispanic decent, I personally, professionally are offended and believe that the university and the Laboratory ought to cease using these phrases unless they can demonstrate substantial evidence they are, in fact, true. I am not aware that such evidence does exist. I welcome your questions, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here. [The prepared statement of Joseph F. Salgado follows:] Prepared Statement of Joseph F. Salgado, Former Principal Deputy Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to testify about performance failures at Los Alamos National Laboratory and related issues. I am here without subpoena and at my own expense because I believe these hearings are important to the future of the Laboratory. introduction I came to the Laboratory in August, 1999 as an ``outsider'' and a manager, with a successful track record in the private sector and before that in the public sector, including 17 years in law enforcement as a police officer, prosecuting attorney, and Associate Commissioner for Enforcement at INS in the Department of Justice. While at the Department of Energy in the late 1980s as Under Secretary and Deputy Secretary, I was involved in the decision to extend the University of California's contract to operate three national laboratories, including Los Alamos. When I joined the Laboratory, it was with a well-founded belief that it is important for the country that the University of California continue to manage Los Alamos Laboratory. BUT, I also believed that it was imperative that historical cultural issues at the Laboratory needed to change. These beliefs were consistent with John Browne's vision for transformation of the Laboratory. As Director, he realized that the culture that had existed at the Laboratory for nearly 60 years could not satisfy public expectations for accountability and management excellence and therefore that change was imperative. Long-standing cultural issues at Los Alamos included: Lack of operational formality; Lack of a sense of the fiduciary relationship between the Laboratory and the taxpayers; Lack of responsibility and accountability; Lack of management discipline; Lack of an understanding that competent managers and good science are not incompatible. During the three years I was employed at the Laboratory, I spoke out frequently about the need to transform the Laboratory from what one DOE official correctly observed was ``13 labs with one name'' and a system of management by accommodation to an organization that would speak with one voice and be governed by disciplined management. There is nothing I am testifying to today regarding the need for change that I have not repeatedly said to Laboratory employees, the University of California's Office of the President, and, as well, to the NNSA and DOE. allegations of cover-up and obstruction Before proceeding with the details of my statement, I want to address allegations of cover-up, attempted cover-up, obstruction, and interference with fact-finding and investigative processes. These allegations are absolutely not true, and I categorically reject all such statements as they relate to my actions. To the best of my knowledge, no one else at the Laboratory engaged in any cover-up or interference with investigative processes. As will be clear throughout my testimony, Director Browne and I promptly and consistently took the initiative to fully inform the University of California, the NNSA, and, as appropriate, the DOE Inspector General's office of all of the information available to us about proven or alleged misdeeds at the Laboratory. We were determined and proactive in addressing each issue as it came to our attention. As soon as these allegations appeared in the November 5 edition of The Energy Daily, I discussed the matter with DOE Inspector General Greg Friedman and then recommended to Director Browne that we ask NNSA to request a review by the Inspector General. Director Browne, who was in Washington, D.C. at the time, made the request to Linton Brooks, Acting NNSA Administrator, that day. These calls were completed within a period of 4 to 6 hours on November 5. Mr. Brooks asked for an IG review on the same day, and the Laboratory received written notice from the IG on the following day that an investigation would be done. Mr. Friedman called me a day later to acknowledge that the Laboratory had acted very quickly. As I will discuss later, I believe that in the specific instances of misconduct--TA33, purchase card activity and property management-- the Laboratory moved aggressively and proactively to address these issues. In the discussion that follows, ``executives'' refers to the Director, Deputy Directors, Associate Directors, and Laboratory Counsel. ``Senior managers'' refers to Division Leaders; ``managers'' refers to all other managers. laboratory is not a ``den of thieves'' I have been deeply disappointed that so few efforts have been made over the past several months to acknowledge what is right with Los Alamos National Laboratory. Notions that the Laboratory is a ``den of thieves'' which has been ``keeping the Valley green'' for years, or that its culture is one of ``theft and criminality,'' I believe are wrong, and should be explicitly and firmly rejected. The fraudulent activities of a few individuals out of a workforce of over 10,000 in a half dozen specific cases are extremely serious. But they are not reason for condemning the entire Laboratory or its culture. The workforce at the Laboratory is among the most rigorously screened workforces in the country. It consists of literally thousands of dedicated, hard-working, honest individuals. Among them are some of the brightest minds and most accomplished scientific and technical talents in the country--probably in the world. But the scientists and engineers are not the only honest, committed workers at the Laboratory. There also are thousands of non-scientists and non-engineers who are every bit as committed and patriotic as their scientific and engineering colleagues and who work extremely hard to support the fundamental science, technology and national security missions of the Laboratory. I believe they have been unfairly tarnished by the events of the recent past, by the near exclusive focus of personnel actions on administrative and support personnel, and by the failure of the University to defend their work and their contributions. how the performance failures happened Given its exceptionally strong workforce, why did Los Alamos Laboratory have the kinds of performance failures that it did? The cultural issues I described above led to several root cause problems: Management excellence and good managers have not been highly valued, either by the University or at the Laboratory itself. Skills that are not valued will not thrive in any organization. In my judgment, Los Alamos National Laboratory does not have the depth and breadth of managerial skills that one of the Nation's premier national security installations with an annual budget in excess of $1.5 billion must have. The culture over many years at Los Alamos has been one of ``management by accommodation''. Administrative and operational policies were often converted to ``guidance'' rather than ``requirements''. Procedures were modified to accommodate the preferences or conveniences of program managers and division leaders. And, administrative and support staff were led to believe that aggressive enforcement of policies and rules would be criticized, not supported, by successive levels of management. Insufficient management skills and a long-standing culture of accommodation affected--undermined, in fact--a broad range of controls and checks and balances that were on the books, but in many cases were not rigorously observed. Too often, dollars were used almost like ``monopoly money'' instead of as a fiduciary trust. These conditions are not new. They have been typical to a greater or lesser extent of Laboratory operations for most of its history. In part, they have their origins in past federal management systems that involved less demanding public expectations and therefore less rigorous accountability. And, I want to be very clear on one point: Throughout my tenure at the Laboratory, I saw no evidence that these conditions resulted in a ``culture of theft'' or widespread personal aggrandizement. I say this not just as a former Laboratory manager but as a former law enforcement official with extensive investigative experience. Each of the performance failures that have lately been the subject of intense attention by the Congress, the press, and more recently the University of California illustrate clearly the cultural issues at the Laboratory. Each case also demonstrates our prompt, proactive determination to address wrongdoing and to assure immediate and continuous reporting of problems and what we were doing about them. ta-33, use of purchase orders to acquire items for personal use The Director and I first learned of this case in July 2002 when Laboratory Counsel Frank Dickson informed me that the FBI had opened an investigation at TA-33. Throughout the course of this investigation, we were faced with the need to balance cooperation with the FBI's criminal investigation and our obligation to protect national security interests at this highly classified site. I had three separate meetings with the FBI, one of which included the U.S. Attorney's office, between July and October in order to insure maximum cooperation and to raise issues and concerns in an expeditious manner. As soon as we became aware of the investigation, we immediately informed Laboratory executives and senior managers and took steps to assure that national security interests would be protected while the investigation proceeded. At the same time, Dr. Browne and I notified the University of California and the NNSA of what we knew. No system of internal controls will guarantee against conspiracies to circumvent it. Alexander and Bussolini were apparently able to do what they did because they conspired to violate procurement regulations. Management vigilance and the honesty of fellow workers are the best hope for thwarting conspiracies. In this case, management was not vigilant. Had it not been for Jaret McDonald's determination to do what he could to end wrongdoing by Alexander and Bussolini, it is possible that their fraudulent activities would have continued for years, inadvertently abetted by a culture of accommodation. The result would have been far greater losses than will finally be determined in this case. I believe that McDonald deserves to be commended for his report and for his persistence in pursuing it. My understanding is that Mr. McDonald made his first report to the Office of Security Inquiries in S Division in September 2001. The mishandling of that report is an example of the lack of discipline and formality of operations that has typified Laboratory operations. The fact that the Director's office did not learn of McDonald's report until October 24, 2002, and that we learned of it, not from Laboratory managers, but from the U.S. Attorney's office, is indicative of the vulnerabilities that the absence of formality and discipline creates. When I asked about the history of this case after my meeting on October 24 with the FBI and the Deputy U.S. Attorney, I was told that McDonald's report had been discussed with the FBI in September 2001 and that the FBI had decided against opening an investigation at that time. When I asked for documentation of these discussions, I was told there was none. None of the line managers responsible for program activities at TA- 33 or for the procurement function were informed of Mr. McDonald's report until I did so after learning of the FBI investigation in July 2002. As far as I know, there had been no report to the Associate Director whose responsibilities include security, in spite of the fact that TA-33 is arguably among the most highly classified sites at the Lab. There had been no report to the Office of Audits and Assessments, the Laboratory's official point of contact with the DOE Inspector General. There had been no report directly to the DOE Inspector General. There had been no report to local law enforcement. To the best of my knowledge, even after Mr. Walp joined the Laboratory in January 2002 and reportedly learned of this major theft case within a couple of weeks of starting on the job, there were no reports to the Associate Director responsible for security, or to other executives, the Inspector General, or local law enforcement. The Laboratory had a breakdown of process that should never have happened. Alexander and Bussolini were able to conduct their fraudulent activities partly because of procurement actions intended to accommodate the Division to which they were assigned. A blanket contract award for specified types of equipment was issued with a ceiling of $100,000 in November 2000 to support requirements at TA-33. This was to have been a temporary contract for no more than 6 months. As an accommodation to facility managers and program offices, the contract term was repeatedly extended by the procurement staff to a final term of 24 months. In addition, it was modified 4 times to increase the ceiling from $100,000 to $2.7 million. None of these modifications, to term, scope and ceiling, as far as I know, received any review by the group leader or higher level management. More intense management vigilance by those responsible for facilities, program management, and procurement at TA-33 might have uncovered the activities of Alexander and Bussolini before Mr. McDonald felt compelled to report them. Certainly, formality of operations in terms of reporting and documenting allegations of wrongdoing would have assured prompt response to Mr. McDonald's first report in the fall of 2001. If the information available to me is correct, I cannot explain why the Office of Security Inquiries, under either of its 2 previous directors ( Sprouse and Walp), did not feel compelled to assure that Laboratory executives were aware of McDonald's report. attempted purchase of a mustang automobile As in the TA-33 case, as soon as we became aware of the attempted purchase of the Mustang, we took prompt, assertive action: We immediately established an internal review team to determine whether there were systemic problems with the purchase card program. As a result of this review, we implemented a series of reforms and controls, including limits on authorization levels for all cardholders to $2,500 per transaction and $25,000 per month. I also personally discussed with Inspector General Friedman at the Department of Energy our intent to establish the External Review Team and to have it chaired by a former Inspector General. John Layton, former Inspector General at the Department of Energy agreed to chair the External Review Team and recommended that another former IG, Charles Masten, be added to the team. We agreed with Mr. Layton's recommendation. A letter for UC Vice President McTague's signature confirming these discussions and authorizing us to proceed was drafted in my office; faxed to Dr. McTague; signed by him; and returned to the Laboratory Director. I notified the FBI and discussed the case with them in the 2nd of the three meetings I had with them between July and October. Dr. McTague followed our progress closely and expected frequent reports on the status of the investigations and the related reviews of procedures and practices. But, it was Dr. Browne who took the initiative to propose the External Review Team and to have it chaired by a former Inspector General. We learned about the attempted purchase of the Mustang automobile about a month after the TA-33 case had come to our attention. The bank that administered the purchase card program on behalf of the Laboratory initially reported the matter to the Laboratory Procurement Group. The Mustang case provides a near textbook-quality illustration of the culture of accommodation at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The policies governing purchase card use, all of which are easily accessible on the Laboratory's web page, could not have been more clear: the standard authorization limit was $2,500/transaction and $25,000/month. These limits could be raised to $5,000/transaction and $50,000/month if the Group Leader provided justification and the cardholder completed special training and there were no findings in an audit of their account. The policies on the web page also explicitly prohibited the purchase of tools with purchase cards. In the Mustang case, Division managers requested and procurement managers agreed to raise the authorization limits for the card-holding individual to $50,000/transaction and $900,000/month, based on the high volume of purchases made in the Division. This decision did not come to the attention of the Laboratory's executives until after we learned of the Mustang issue. It is worth noting that these authorization levels were granted not to a manager, but to an individual classified as an OS/7--approximately the equivalent of a GS-7 to GS-9 administrative secretary in the federal service. There was no formality requiring review of purchase card authorization limits or of the performance of those to whom higher-than-standard limits had been granted. Division managers also requested and procurement managers agreed to provide an exception to the prohibition against acquiring tools with purchase cards. The exception was accompanied by certain conditions to which Division management agreed. However, I know of no indication once the exception was in place that either Division or procurement management paid any attention to whether the conditions on which the exception was based were being observed and, if they were, whether they were effective. When we reviewed the cardholder's account, we found that an exceptionally large number of tools had been purchased with the same card used for the Mustang. The volume of the purchases, the fact that all were made from a single vendor who was located in Albuquerque, and the fact that a Laboratory employee apparently always drove to Albuquerque to pick up the tools raised a number of questions. I discussed these issues with the FBI in the 2nd of the three meetings I had with them and sought their assistance, given that they had opened a case on the Mustang and the fact that the tools had been purchased by the same cardholder. Mr. Dickson and Mr. Tucker subsequently met with the Bureau's white collar crime unit regarding the tools, but the Bureau decided not to pursue the matter. At the time I left the Laboratory, these issues were still under review by the DOE Inspector General. Taken together, the TA-33 and Mustang cases are examples of a historic pattern of operations at Los Alamos Laboratory: Exceptions to established policies and controls were made to accommodate group and division managers. The exceptions were not reviewed or approved by executives--in part because the culture had long since made such exceptions part of routine activity. missing property Los Alamos National Laboratory covers an area of about 43 square miles (roughly the size of the District of Columbia) traversed by about 200 miles of roads and occupied by roughly 2,000 buildings. These conditions make property management at Los Alamos far more complicated than at more compact sites, such as Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories. This does not mean that the standards for property management ought to be less stringent at Los Alamos; it does mean that management rigor, discipline and formality of operations are critically important. The first time the Director and I became aware of or saw the property reports attached to Mr. Walp's March 26, 2002 memorandum was on November 8, 2002 when a copy was faxed to the Laboratory by Adam Rankin of the Albuquerque Journal. As the Committee knows, Mr. Walp's memo alleged widespread theft based on the subject reports, all of which, I was told, had been previously filed with and reviewed by DOE/ NNSA. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Walp's memo had never been brought to the attention of anyone above Division management at the Laboratory or to anyone in NNSA or to the DOE Inspector General despite the seriousness of his allegations. As soon as we became aware of the property reports attached to Walp's March 26 memorandum, we established an internal task force to review property management procedures and reporting. As a result of this review, Director Browne directed that a wall-to-wall inventory be conducted. This is a time-consuming and expensive procedure and therefore requires approval by NNSA. NNSA approved the proposed inventory, and I understand it is now in process. In addition, I ordered a review of classified computers to determine whether any of the computers listed as lost, stolen or otherwise unlocated contained classified information and to validate that all classified computers in the current inventory could be located. That report had not been completed prior to my leaving the Laboratory. A preliminary report in mid-December 2002 indicated that one computer used for classified work--a Sun Microsystems workstation that did not contain a hard drive--had been tagged for destruction but could not be verified as having been destroyed. The mid-December report indicated that all other computers used for classified work had been located and that none had been reported as missing or stolen. I was informed that because the Sun machine contained no hard drive, it was not possible that it contained any classified information. It should be noted that computers used for classified work are controlled separately from all other computers at the Laboratory. Earlier in the year, in an effort to verify controls on classified information, Director Browne had implemented an inventory of so-called CREM (Classified Removable Electronic Media) as recommended by a Strategic Security Working Group he had chartered. I asked for signed statements certifying the results of the CREM inventory from the leaders of all Divisions to which CREM were assigned. Questions have been raised about my decision to rescind a memorandum on property management issued by the BUS Division Leader to Laboratory's ``leaders'' in April. By issuing the memorandum directly to ``leaders''--rather than through line management--the Division Leader circumvented the management chain and undermined the accountability structure that I had emphasized for the past three years. Therefore, I instructed him to withdraw his original memorandum and then to re-issue it through the Associate Director for Administration to the cognizant Associate Directors. The memorandum was re-issued within a few days with an explicit statement that Associate Directors would be accountable for property management performance in the Divisions within their line management responsibilities. The Inspector General's January 2003 report cites the rescission of this memorandum as indicative of management's failure to create a climate that encouraged prompt and open reporting by Laboratory employees. Unfortunately, the IG's report does not note that the memorandum was re-issued a few days later and that there were subsequent quarterly property management reports to all Associate Directors. termination of messrs. walp and doran I take responsibility for the dismissal of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran before the end of their New Employee Evaluation Periods. I view the issue of their dismissals as strictly a management issue. I believe the decision to dismiss them was the right one, based on: Repeated instances of inaccurate and incomplete reporting; Their apparent inability to gain the trust and confidence of executives and senior managers at the Laboratory as well as external reviewers with backgrounds in law enforcement; and Management failure in the custody of investigative information. I had no knowledge that they had claimed whistleblower status and no reason to believe that they had any legitimate grounds for doing so.It is important to recall the circumstances as they existed at the end of November 2002, without benefit of today's hindsight. We were faced with two on-going criminal investigations involving Divisions in which classified work on sensitive matters was the norm. In the recent past, the Laboratory, and Director Browne specifically, had been severely criticized for what was viewed as a failure to act promptly and effectively in two other cases: Wen Ho Lee and the missing hard drives. I was determined that the Laboratory not do or fail to do anything that would, once again, result in criticism of our management of national security or of investigative processes that might involve national security. Members of this Committee, as well as others, have expressed similar concerns or raised questions about the reliability of security management in light of the apparent failure of controls in connection with functions less complicated than the protection of classified information, materials, and equipment. It was in this context that the Laboratory was confronted with what action to take in connection with Walp's and Doran's New Employee Evaluation Periods. My judgment that the decision to dismiss Messrs. Walp and Doran was the right and best course of action was based on several factors: Repeated instances of inaccurate or incomplete information. These mistakes, individually and together, are not consistent with good investigative performance. Laboratory Counsel Frank Dickson reported on several occasions that information provided to him by Messrs. Walp and Doran about the progress and status of the TA-33 and Mustang investigations turned out to be wrong or incomplete. In the Mustang case, Walp and Doran inaccurately reported the number of phone calls made by the card holder to the vendor; and mistakenly identified the address to which the Mustang either was delivered or was scheduled to be delivered, having confused the cardholder with another lab employee with the same name but different middle initial. Ten days to 2 weeks after we learned of the attempt to purchase a Mustang, we still had not acted, in my judgment, to preserve whatever evidence was at or available to the Laboratory. I was increasingly concerned that evidence at or available to the Laboratory might be lost due to delay and inaction. Walp and Doran incorrectly accused a Laboratory manager of having obstructed justice and committed a federal felony for having accepted a resignation and personal check from an individual who had filed a fraudulent travel claim. Walp incorrectly identified as ``larceny'' all property on a list of missing property that included items unlocated at the time the list was prepared and/or items known to be lost. On October 24, I met with the FBI and the US Attorney's Office to discuss the TA-33 and Mustang investigations. Information provided at that meeting reinforced my judgment that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran had continued to report inaccurate information to Mr. Dickson and to me concerning issues such as the number of suspects, the investigative approach being used at the Laboratory, timing and related matters. Inability to earn and maintain the trust and confidence of executives and senior managers at the Laboratory or on the part of external reviewers. From about mid-September until late November, Lab executives and senior managers I knew to be individuals who consistently worked well with others expressed a lack of trust and confidence in Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. These problems were reported to me, either directly or indirectly, by S Division managers, the Laboratory Counsel, other attorneys within the Lab Counsel's office, and the Deputy Director of Human Resources. Two former Inspectors General, both of whom are ex-FBI agents, and who were at Los Alamos as members of the External Review Team, expressed similar judgments about lacking trust and confidence in Messrs. Walp and Doran. Walp and Doran first refused to cooperate with the External Review Team's examination of purchase card procedures and then made access to purchasing documents by the Team's forensic auditors subject to unnecessary and burdensome conditions. My understanding is that S Division managers counseled Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran about their performance and their working relationships sometime in the September timeframe. Lack of trust and confidence in their work did not improve, however. In fact, if anything, it continued to deteriorate. Custody of investigative information. On November 8, 2002 we learned that a 30-lb. box of documents apparently related to on-going investigations and property management at the Laboratory had been anonymously delivered to Adam Rankin, a reporter for the Albuquerque Journal. To the best of my knowledge, no one at the Laboratory has ever seen the contents of the box. We do not know if it contains any classified information. We know that it contains evidence about on-going criminal investigations. What we know about the contents is information that has been shared with us by Mr. Rankin. I do not know who sent the box to Mr. Rankin, nor do I know who copied the documents in the first place. I am certainly NOT accusing either Mr. Walp or Mr. Doran of having done so. In fact, my first instinct was that as former law enforcement officers, they were least likely among those who had access to the information to have sent it to a reporter--a judgment that reflects my past experience in law enforcement. I know something about the culture of law enforcement, and I know that leaking information to reporters runs contrary to that culture. Regardless of who sent the box to Mr. Rankin, I was very concerned about two things: First, the information had been sent to a reporter and not to the Inspector General, law enforcement authorities or even Congressional investigators. Second, the only place in the Laboratory where all of this information was collected and maintained was the Office of Security Inquiries in S Division, headed by Mr. Walp. The fact that adequate controls of sensitive and potentially classified information related to on-going criminal investigations were not maintained is a serious management failure. I was not aware at any time that Walp and Doran had claimed whistleblower status. I also had no reason to think they might legitimately be whistleblowers because from my perspective all of the information about wrongdoing that they claim to have uncovered had been identified and reported to appropriate authorities by others before it was noted by Walp and Doran. I am well aware that this view runs counter to news accounts and, I am told, to public comments and testimony. My view is based on the following: The TA-33 case was reported to OSI by Mr. McDonald in September 2001, before either Walp or Doran had been hired. As I understand, McDonald repeated his report directly to the FBI in March 2002. I reported the TA-33 case to the University's Office of the President and Dr. Browne reported it to NNSA as soon as we learned of it. The Procurement Group reported the Mustang case to the Director and me in August 2002 after the bank had alerted them. I reported the Mustang case to the University's Office of the President, the NNSA, the DOE Inspector General and the FBI as soon as we learned of it. I was told that all of the property reports attached to Mr. Walp's March 26, 2002 had previously been filed with and reviewed by NNSA and/or the Department of Energy. For each of the fiscal years involved, I was shown memoranda from NNSA/DOE acknowledging receipt and approval of property reports. I notified the University's Office of the President about Walp's memorandum as soon as I was aware of it. I know of no other cases that were identified, opened or pursued by Messrs. Walp or Doran. All of the information available to me about Messrs. Walp and Doran led me to conclude that the chances for a successful employment relationship were virtually nil. Accordingly, I approved their dismissals. Once the decision was made, Mr. Dickson, Laboratory Counsel, and I, in separate conversations with different individuals, notified the University's Office of the President of the decision. I believe that reasonable people can and do disagree, and I respect the opinions of those who believe the decision to dismiss Walp and Doran was wrong. Messrs. Walp and Doran on the one hand, and I on the other hand see conditions and practices at the Laboratory that need to be changed. Our judgments about what those conditions represent, however, are diametrically opposed. I believe that the notion of ``greening the Valley'' accounts in some measure for our different perspectives and may even have influenced Walp and Doran to have less than full trust in me and the senior managers who reported to and were accountable to me. ``keeping the valley green'' Members of this Committee would have no way of knowing the particular significance of statements like ``keeping the Valley green'' or that these statements, as made in the previous hearing, may unfortunately prejudice some of the judgments and conclusions about theft at the Laboratory. At Los Alamos National Laboratory, ``the Valley'' is a very specific and clearly understood term that refers to the Espanola Valley of Northern New Mexico. It is an area that is overwhelmingly Hispanic. By far the largest portion of the Laboratory's Hispanic employees, most of whom are not scientists and engineers, come from Espanola and surrounding areas, collectively referred to as ``the Valley''. Many of its inhabitants' ancestors settled the area 300 or 400 years ago. They are extremely and justifiably proud of their heritage and the contributions they have made to the State, the Laboratory, the Nation and national security over the years. Overall, ``the Valley'' is a place of significant rural poverty. It has none of the natural resources that are more common to southern New Mexico; it does not have a robust industrial base; and it does not share in the benefits of the tourism industry enjoyed by Santa Fe and Albuquerque to the south. Unfortunately, parts of ``the Valley'' are plagued by the types of drug problems that accompany poverty in too many areas of the country. The Laboratory, and the State Government located in Santa Fe, are the principal employers for ``the Valley's'' residents. And, I am sorry to say, there are those at the Laboratory who assume that the drug problem in ``the Valley'' and the fact that many employees come from ``the Valley'' means there is an inevitable problem of theft at the Laboratory and a connection to the drug problem. These assumptions are expressed by phrases such as ``greening the Valley.'' Might the Laboratory be a target for thieves involved in drug use? Common sense would say that it might. But, allegations that it is actually happening, without substantiating evidence or clear indications of such, are irresponsible and risk a kind of ``racial profiling'' that all of us ought to reject out of hand. Such allegations ignore the rigorous screening of the Laboratory's workforce, including random drug testing. If the alleged problems were as common as some suggest, there should be security clearance, drug test, and performance statistics that would, at least, give credence to such suspicions. To the best of my knowledge, no such statistics exist. If they do, they were never brought to my attention. As a result, I find statements like ``keeping the Valley green'' personally and professionally offensive. Throughout my tenure I worked to improve the University's record of providing opportunities for Hispanic and other ethnic and minority employees who work at Los Alamos and who are under-represented in management positions relative to their proportion of the total workforce. I am confident that there are others who will continue to advocate for more opportunities for all of the Laboratory's minority and ethnic populations. And, I hope that the University and the Laboratory will cease using terms like ``greening the Valley'' that result in stereotyping and profiling Hispanic employees and the Espanola Valley. conclusion I am extremely proud and honored to have worked with the exceptionally fine people at Los Alamos National Laboratory. I regret that time and circumstances prevented Director Browne and me from completing the efforts we began to transform the culture and management practices of the Laboratory. I categorically reject and deny that there was any cover-up, attempt to cover-up, obstruction or interference by me or, to the best of my knowledge, by others at the Laboratory. Such statements are absolutely wrong as evidenced by the consistently proactive approach to reporting and review taken by me and by Director Browne. I left the Laboratory with the same beliefs I brought when I started working there in 1999: that it is in the national interest and important for national security that the University of California continue to be involved in the science and technology mission of the Laboratory; that longstanding Laboratory cultural issues must be addressed, including: operational formality and management discipline; fiduciary responsibility; accountability; and a commitment to train and develop competent managers. I take responsibility for the dismissal of Messrs. Walp and Doran. From my perspective, their dismissal was strictly a management issue. I believe the decision to dismiss them was the right one based, as it was, on repeated instances of inaccurate and incomplete reporting; apparent inability to gain the trust and confidence of executives and senior managers at the Laboratory as well as external reviewers with backgrounds in law enforcement; and management failure in the custody of investigative information. I had no knowledge that they had claimed whistleblower status and no reason to believe that they had any legitimate grounds for doing so. The term ``keeping the Valley green'' as a surrogate for allegations of theft and a presumed connection to the drug problem in the Valley should either be immediately substantiated with evidence or publicly rejected by the University and the Laboratory. Much more is right than is wrong at Los Alamos National Laboratory. And, I firmly believe that we should all be grateful to the thousands of dedicated, honest, patriotic workers at Los Alamos, present and past, who are committed to making the world a better and more secure place. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Salgado. Mr. Dickson. TESTIMONY OF FRANK P. DICKSON, JR. Mr. Dickson. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Greenwood. Good morning. Mr. Dickson. Distinguished members of the committee. My name is Frank Dickson and I am a lawyer. After 24 years in private practice I joined the legal staff of the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1990 and was named its Laboratory Counsel in 1997. I am proud to serve in this position and I view it as a significant opportunity for public service. I am very conscious of the important responsibility that we at the Laboratory have to the Federal Government and I believe that the great majority of my colleagues at the Laboratory share those beliefs. It is staggering to me that I am accused by men who worked with me for a very few weeks of dishonesty and conduct bartering on obstruction of justice. These allegations are false. Because of the attorney/client privilege I have not previously spoken out publicly on these matters. I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, testify under oath as to my impressions, and to answer your questions. I first became aware of the various investigations at the Laboratory in late June 2002 when the FBI began investigating theft at TA-33. Later Lab management put our office, the Office of Laboratory Counsel, in charge of coordinating with the FBI our mutual efforts in these cases. This coordination role is an important responsibility and one that I take very seriously. Any review of my interactions with the FBI will, I believe, show that our office carefully coordinated the Laboratory's efforts with those of the FBI in all respects. I do acknowledge that I was anxious for the TA-33 and Mustang investigations to proceed. These cases involve long-term Laboratory employees in sensitive positions and we could not allow them to remain indefinitely. I knew from past experience that the University could not count on the availability of an FBI investigation to address national security concerns for the Laboratory's administrative needs, and I knew the Laboratory would need its own independent investigation. The Laboratory Office of Security Inquires was charged with being the lab's day-to-day liaison with the FBI when Walp was the OSI's office leader and Steve Doran worked with him. I welcomed their investigative skills. Our office was also directed to facilitate the external review team, the team that was looking into the purchase card issues to expedite their efforts in support of that review. OSI was assigned to assist my office in doing this job. In August Messrs. Walp and Doran and I met to discuss the status of the TA-33 and Mustang investigations. I outlined for them the need for an independent investigatory file for the Laboratory and for the need for full cooperation with the purchase card review team. As time passed I found the information they provided both insufficiently thorough and unreliable. More importantly, on the external review team assignment, OSI made it unreasonably difficult for the team to have access to information it needed to perform its important work despite the fact that Mr. Salgado and I had made specific arrangement with the FBI's Special Agent-in-Charge in Albuquerque for the review team's access to the records pertaining to the investigation. Mr. Walp did not accept this in spite of the arrangements that had been made. In my conversations I am sure I did say that our employer was the University of California and the university had independent interest in obtaining the facts. I see nothing wrong with those statements even today. I never told Mr. Walp nor Mr. Doran that our job was to protect the Laboratory's image and the university's contract. That is not the way I look at my job. In mid-September Stan Busboom, Mr. Walp's division leader, met with me and asked for my opinion on the performance of Messrs. Walp and Doran. I told Mr. Busboom that I was concerned that I no longer felt I could work with them. After discussing the matter further with their immediate supervisor, Mr. Gene Tucker, I relented and agreed to try again to work with them, which I did. About a month later Deputy Director Salgado and I attended a meeting at the U.S. Attorney's Office in Albuquerque with both representatives of the FBI and the U.S. Attorney. Our purpose was to learn the status of anticipated prosecutions in the TA-33 and Mustang cases. At that meeting we were told that a third TA-33 employee was neither a suspect nor cooperating witness in the investigation. This was directly contrary to information provided to me by Messrs. Walp and Doran and was especially troubling to me because it raised the possibility that this third employee would have to be dealt with by the Laboratory after the FBI investigation with little help from the thin investigative record compiled by Messrs. Walp and Doran. I concurred that day with Mr. Salgado's judgment that they should be removed from their FBI liaison roles. I did not make the decision to terminate Messrs. Walp and Doran. However, it is very clear that my stated observations about their work were important factors in the decision relating to their termination. Putting aside the concerns that I have expressed regarding Messrs. Walp and Doran, I do recognize that the circumstances that these men confronted when they came to the Laboratory were less than ideal. Upon reflection I realized that we could and should have done more to provide them with a better understanding of the Laboratory and their roles. In retrospect I believe the Laboratory should have attempted to work through the difficulties with Messrs. Walp and Doran. In closing, I want to emphasize that my sole intention in connection with all the matters being discussed today was to ensure that thorough investigations were conducted that appropriate remedial actions were taken at the Laboratory with respect to the problems that were identified. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Frank P. Dickson follows:] Prepared Statement of Frank P. Dickson, Laboratory Counsel, Los Alamos National Laboratory Mr. Chairman, Mr. Deutsch, and distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee today. My name is Frank P. Dickson. I am a native of Corsicana, Texas, and I graduated from Baylor University Law School in 1965. From 1966 until 1990, I practiced law in Santa Fe and Albuquerque, New Mexico; and in 1990, I came to the Los Alamos National Laboratory where I became Laboratory Counsel in 1997. Throughout 2002, I had a ``dual report'' to the General Counsel of the University of California, and to the Director of the Laboratory (including his Principal Deputy Laboratory Director). Messrs. Walp and Doran have testified to this committee that I obstructed justice, interfered with FBI investigations, impeded their investigations, and attempted to cover up fraud, theft, and wrongdoing at the Laboratory. These allegations are incorrect and misstate the complex role relating to these investigations assigned to me and the Office of Laboratory Counsel. In all of my actions as Laboratory Counsel on these matters, I had three goals: (1) to make sure the Laboratory had accurate and sufficient information to make appropriate decisions regarding national security concerns; (2) to make sure I provided accurate and timely information to the various entities (the FBI, the DOE, and the United States Attorney's Office) so they could take appropriate actions; and (3) to make sure the Laboratory had accurate information upon which to make appropriate employment decisions regarding its workforce. Shortly after discovery of the ``Mustang case'' which involved the apparent use of a Laboratory purchase card to acquire a Mustang automobile, Laboratory management recommended that the University undertake a comprehensive, independent review of its entire purchase card program to identify vulnerabilities and develop recommendations designed to prevent future abuses and to identify cases of fraud, waste and abuse. Based upon this recommendation, the University directed the charter of a review team consisting of two former and highly regarded inspectors general from federal agencies and a forensic unit from the University's outside auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, to conduct the review. Because this review team would be working in areas that would overlap with known or expected federal investigations, I was asked to coordinate with these external agencies and within the Laboratory to assure that the Purchase Card Review Team had the information it needed to perform its important work and to assure appropriate coordination with affected law enforcement and other agencies. As Laboratory Counsel, I represented the Laboratory's legal interests throughout the Wen Ho Lee investigation in 1999-2000, and during the ``missing hard drive'' incident in the spring and summer of 2000. Both of these cases involved extremely complicated interactions with people throughout the government, the University and the Laboratory. Through this experience, I developed a thorough understanding of the multiple important issues that arise in these situations and an understanding of the requirements and limits on what we should and should not do. Although cooperation with law enforcement, including the FBI, is of prime importance, there are other issues of extreme importance to the Laboratory and the government in these situations, including: (1) the Laboratory's responsibility for national security, which includes ensuring that only reliable persons have access to classified information and sensitive facilities; (2) the Laboratory's responsibility to keep DOE and other program sponsors fully informed of unusual events that might impact the safety and security of their programs; (3) the Laboratory's need to have accurate information to make appropriate employment decisions and protect the safety and security of its workforce; and (4) the Laboratory's responsibility to protect government property. There are often no easy answers to many of the situations that arise, because of the multiple, parallel and somewhat competing interest of the various individuals and entities that may become involved; and the role of Laboratory Counsel is to help chart a path that deals with all of these issues as effectively as possible. I believe that a careful study of all of the facts will demonstrate that I and the members of Laboratory Counsel staff carefully coordinated our efforts with the DOE Office of the Inspector General and the FBI. I believe that the facts will demonstrate that our efforts were directed to advancing the work of the purchase card review team and following up on efforts to deal with problems disclosed by its work. Another major effort was to assure that Laboratory management had access to all information necessary to perform its role. It was clear to me that Messrs. Walp and Doran were primarily focused on possible criminal prosecutions and did not agree with, appreciate or understand the importance of the other elements of my responsibilities. The resistance I encountered from Messrs. Walp and Doran, and the inadequate information I received from them, impeded my ability to do my job. I have never prevented anybody from uncovering fraud, theft or other wrongdoing at the Laboratory. In fact, the Purchase Card Review Team was publicly announced and its work was, from the beginning, intended to be fully disclosed to all interested government entities as well as the public. I believe the aggressive response to the Mustang issue designed by the University and Laboratory management was a strong, open and creative response to the obvious concerns raised by the Mustang issue; and my goal has been to do what I could to assure that the review team had everything it needed to do its work completely and in a timely fashion. My goal was, is, and will be to provide complete and accurate information to the FBI, the United States Attorney, the DOE, and the University, to assist them in their roles. Principal Deputy Laboratory Director Joseph Salgado directed that information and documents be sent to my office for transmittal to the interested agencies. This was done not to censor or withhold information, but to keep track of what information was being provided, and to ensure that information was provided. The following narrative describes my involvement in the specific matters that have been the subject of this committee's investigation. the ``ta-33 incident'' I first became aware of the ``TA-33 incident'' around July 1, 2002, from S Division Leader Stanley Busboom, shortly after the FBI decided to open a criminal investigation into the matter. The allegations were that several (three to eight) Laboratory employees were stealing government property and storing the material at TA-33. TA-33 is a highly sensitive area at the Laboratory. The Laboratory's Office of Security Inquiries (OSI) was responsible to act as liaison with FBI Special Agent Jeff Campbell. Mr. Walp, as office leader at OSI, was directed by Laboratory management to work closely with the Office of Laboratory Counsel and to keep me advised of the progress of the investigation. The continuing presence in the workplace of Laboratory employees who were suspected of theft and who worked in a highly sensitive and secure location was of great concern to me. It raised national security concerns and employment concerns. I remember that Congress criticized the FBI and the Laboratory for permitting Wen Ho Lee to remain in a position where he had access to classified information. In order to understand the issues involved and to determine the appropriate action to take, it was necessary for the Laboratory to investigate and have access to information regarding these allegations. Therefore, at my request, a senior staff attorney, Christine Chandler, initiated discussions with Mr. Walp and Mr. Campbell, and it was agreed that Mr. Walp or Mr. Doran would be permitted to participate in FBI interviews on this matter, and would develop and make available to my office written summaries of those interviews. The FBI recognized the need for the Laboratory to have access to this information, and to conduct a parallel investigation with the FBI. However, Messrs. Walp and Doran apparently viewed my efforts to obtain this information as unwarranted interference with their role in assisting the FBI, and they were reluctant to share the information they gathered with me. On August 7, 2002, Mr. Salgado and I met with the FBI's Special Agent-in-Charge for New Mexico at his office in Albuquerque to coordinate the TA-33 matter, the Mustang case, and other related issues. The principal results of that meeting were an agreement that representatives of OSI would assist the FBI in its investigations, conduct a parallel investigation to keep management informed of the circumstances and assure the Laboratory of an investigatory record if administrative action were required. An agreement was reached that OSI staff would keep a parallel set of notes. During that meeting, the FBI was informed of the very sensitive nature of the activities at TA-33 and the Laboratory's concerns about leaving employees suspected of criminal conspiracy in that location. On August 12, 2002, I met with FBI Special Agent Mike Lowe, Special Agent Jeff Campbell, John E. ``Gene'' Tucker, Deputy Director of the Laboratory's Security Division, and Kenneth Schiffer, the Laboratory's Internal Security Officer, to talk further about security and counterintelligence concerns that might exist at TA-33 and how that might effect the on-going investigation. The FBI was informed that the Laboratory had certain reporting requirements regarding highly sensitive work and that at some point, the sponsors of the work in TA- 33 would need to be informed of the situation there. Because of security concerns, the Laboratory wanted to remove the suspects from the workplace as soon as possible. I had several discussions with the FBI about their plans to serve search warrants on the suspects and search their residences. We were told that until the warrants were served, it was important that the suspects remain unaware that they were under investigation. Because of the continuing presence of suspects at TA-33, Mr. Salgado and I met with the FBI Special Agent in Charge in Albuquerque and representatives of the Office of the U.S. Attorney on October 24, 2002. The FBI indicated that it was not yet prepared to serve the warrants, and requested that the Laboratory not take any action against the suspect employees for another forty-five days. In response to our questions concerning the status of the investigation, Mr. Salgado and I were informed (1) that the investigation focused on two Laboratory employees only, (2) that sufficient evidence existed for the indictment and conviction of those two employees, (3) that the FBI was not inquiring into other potential suspects which might delay the investigation and (4) that the purpose of the requested delay was to see if the suspects would take more property which might enhance the possibility of a conviction or the severity of the sentence. Mr. Salgado asked the FBI and the U.S. Attorney whether we were being told to defer action to remove the suspects from the sensitive areas. After some discussion, we were told that the decision rested with the Laboratory and we were not being directed to do anything. Mr. Salgado informed the FBI and the U.S. Attorney that we needed to discuss the issue with other Laboratory managers and would reply after having met with those managers in Los Alamos. Upon returning to the Laboratory, Mr. Salgado convened a series of meetings with involved Laboratory managers to assess the magnitude of the security issues. Those managers conferred with program sponsors who were concerned about the presence of the suspects in the sensitive areas and wanted them removed. I was instructed by Mr. Salgado to inform the FBI that the Laboratory would read the two suspects out of the program, thereby denying them access to TA-33, and assign them to other work, on October 31, 2002. This was not an effort to ``force the FBI to take premature investigative action,'' as Mr. Walp alleges. It was an effort to remove criminal suspects from access to ultra- sensitive classified information while the FBI continued its investigation. Mr. Walp has told this committee that I ``attempted to gain entry'' into TA-33, thereby placing the FBI investigation in jeopardy. John Tapia, a Laboratory employee who was working with Messrs. Walp and Doran, told me that Messrs. Walp, Doran and Campbell thought it was important that I personally visit TA-33. I agreed to the request; however, on the evening scheduled for the visit, I received a call from Special Agent Campbell asking me not to make such a visit, because of the risk of being observed. The FBI was concerned that the suspects not be alerted that they were under suspicion. I readily agreed with Mr. Campbell, and never visited the site. Mr. Walp's statement that I ``became irate at Doran and Walp because they failed to cajole the FBI into allowing [me] access'' is not correct. I have never discussed this issue with either Mr. Walp or Mr. Doran. The Laboratory's Audits and Assessments Office was also conducting investigations into activity at TA-33. I informed Katherine Brittin, the director of Audits and Assessments, that an employee on her shift was a potential suspect. I informed her of this after consultations with the FBI and senior Laboratory managers, because I did not want Ms. Brittin inadvertently to make any statements to this potential suspect that might alert him to the ongoing criminal investigation, and thereby compromise it. My action was an effort to protect, not to jeopardize, the FBI's investigation. the ``mustang case'' I became aware of the ``Mustang case'' on or about July 29, 2002, when I returned from vacation. I was told that a Laboratory employee was suspected of having attempted to purchase a Ford Mustang automobile, and various auto parts, on a Laboratory credit card from a company in Arizona named ``All Mustang.'' Mr. Salgado took an active interest in the investigation of this case. He directed Mr. Walp or Mr. Doran to travel to Phoenix to interview the company that had recorded the charge, and directed OSI to provide its investigative reports directly to me. The FBI took over investigation of this case on or about August 2. I informed the DOE OIG of the case in late August. On August 7, 2002, Mr. Salgado and I met with FBI Special Agent in Charge Andreas Stephens and Mr. Campbell at FBI headquarters in Albuquerque. There were several topics of discussion at the meeting: (1) Mr. Salgado informed the FBI of the importance of the Mustang case to the Laboratory and the need for the FBI to move forward with the investigation as quickly as possible. (2) Mr. Salgado informed the FBI that he was concerned about the national security implications of having suspected felons continuing to work in TA-33, a sensitive area, and that there was a need to move the TA-33 investigation forward quickly, as well. (3) Mr. Salgado informed the FBI that the Laboratory had security responsibilities that may impose limitations on FBI access to people and facilities, and that may require the Laboratory to make reports of the situation through their own chain of command. It would be important for the Laboratory and the FBI to coordinate. (4) Mr. Salgado and I informed the FBI that the Laboratory was conducting internal investigations into the purchase card program and the Mustang case, and that we would need to review our own records and meet with our own employees to gather information. Mr. Stephens agreed that the Laboratory should have access to its own records, but that it should coordinate with the FBI before interviewing witnesses. (5) The Laboratory was interested in getting reports of information discovered in the FBI investigations and would either need access to FBI reports, or be allowed to prepare its own reports. We agreed that Mr. Doran would accompany Mr. Campbell on witness interviews and prepare his own investigation reports for Laboratory internal use. Finally, we agreed to meet again on August 12, 2002. On August 12, I met with Mr. Walp, Mr. Doran and Mr. Tucker to discuss the status of the Mustang investigation and other ongoing investigations. The two purposes of the meeting were (1) to obtain the latest, most reliable information about whether the suspected employee had committed fraud; and (2) to explain to Messrs. Walp and Doran specifically what the Laboratory needed from them in terms of providing reports on the status of the investigations so that the Laboratory could fulfill its national security obligations to the DOE and take whatever personnel actions were necessary. During the August 12 meeting, I asked Mr. Walp for records that had been collected as part of the investigation. Mr. Walp specifically said he would not discuss what had been learned about the Mustang case and that he would not produce the records to me unless and until the FBI approved it. I explained that at a meeting on August 7, the FBI had already given the Laboratory permission to get information about the Mustang and the TA-33 incidents. It was apparent to me that Mr. Walp did not appreciate that as liaison for the Laboratory his duties included sharing information with senior Laboratory managers, not withholding information. I re-emphasized to Messrs. Walp and Doran the importance of their keeping their own investigation notes and providing that information to me as it was generated. I believed that at this August 12 meeting, I had sufficiently explained OSI's liaison role to Mr. Walp and that there would be no further problems with getting current information from him and Mr. Doran. Although Mr. Walp agreed to provide me with the records and reports, he argued against having to do so. Nevertheless, there continued to be substantial delays in my receipt of written reports prepared by Messrs. Walp and Doran, and in some important cases I received no report of their investigative activities. Current information was necessary for Laboratory managers and me to do our jobs. casino credit card incident In early August 2002, in the course of an internal inquiry into purchase card use arising from the Mustang investigation, a Laboratory Purchase Card Administrator discovered that a Laboratory sub-contract worker had used her purchase card to buy gas and groceries and obtain cash advances at local casinos. The total suspected loss has been determined to be approximately $2,000. On August 12, 2002, the Purchase Card Administrator notified OSI of her discovery and Doran immediately opened an inquiry. The FBI was notified and FBI Special Agent Campbell attended the interview of the worker. On August 19, 2002, the worker admitted that she had used her purchase card to obtain cash advances at a casino, and that she had used the cash to gamble. Because she was a contract worker, and not a Laboratory employee, the Laboratory could not fire the worker. However, the worker's contract employer was immediately directed to remove the worker from the Laboratory, which it did. She is not eligible to work at the Laboratory either as an employee or as a contract worker. I notified the DOE OIG of this case verbally on August 27, and in writing on September 12, 2002. Contrary to Mr. Walp's and Mr. Doran's assertions, there was no effort to cover up this matter. The matter was investigated, the appropriate agencies were notified, and the worker was removed from the work site. Efforts are under way to recover the misappropriated amounts from the contract employer. the forged voucher incident In September 2002, a Laboratory employee reported to the Laboratory's Human Resources Division that an employee had wrongfully authorized, drawn and cashed a Laboratory check to herself for $1,800. It is my understanding that HR immediately referred the matter to S Division, so OSI could investigate. On September 23, the employee appeared at work, admitted to the misappropriation, tendered a check to reimburse the Laboratory for the entire amount of the misappropriation, and resigned. The Laboratory told the employee she might be criminally prosecuted, and made no agreements whatsoever about whether any other action would be taken against her. The record of the employment separation states that this was a ``resignation in lieu of discharge.'' The employee is not eligible for re-employment at the Laboratory for a period of seven years. This matter was handled by the HR and S Divisions. I did not become aware of the case until after the employee had resigned, and did not have knowledge of the circumstances before the check was accepted. Upon learning that the employee had resigned and tendered back the misappropriated funds, Mr. Walp told HR Deputy Division Leader Philip I. Kruger that he may have committed the federal criminal offense of obstruction of justice. Mr. Kruger consulted with me and asked my legal opinion about whether he had acted inappropriately or had committed the federal offense of obstruction of justice by allowing the resignation and repayment. I responded that in my opinion there was nothing illegal or inappropriate about how Human Resources had handled the matter, and that Mr. Walp was wrong in his assertions. By resigning, the employee had relinquished any right to file an internal grievance, as she could if she had been terminated. The Laboratory had recovered the misappropriated money. Nothing prevented law enforcement from going forward with criminal charges. The employee had admitted her guilt. The Laboratory treated the resignation as an involuntary termination for cause, and the employee is ineligible for rehire. The DOE OIG was informed of the matter, and the matter was referred to the DOE OIG for investigation. This event contributed to the erosion of my confidence in Mr. Walp's judgment and his ability to interact and communicate effectively with personnel at all levels at the Laboratory. Media reports have suggested that because these employment terminations were not made public, there must have been some attempt to cover up their crimes. This allegation is incorrect. The Laboratory, as part of the University of California, substantially complies with the California Information Practices Act and does not disclose personal information, including performance assessments and corrective or disciplinary actions, to the general public, except under limited and specific circumstances. The Laboratory does not disclose to the general public the details of the basis for a termination or information about the circumstances leading to a resignation, unless that individual authorizes such a disclosure. By not disseminating the circumstances of individual personnel actions, the Laboratory is simply observing best employment practices and acting consistently with California law. purchase card and procurement investigations When the Mustang case surfaced, Mr. Salgado instructed me to lead a team to conduct an internal review of the Laboratory's purchase card program. The team and I collected and reviewed relevant records, including purchase card procedures and memoranda from other agencies such as the U.S. Navy regarding their own experiences with purchase cards. As a result of this internal review, the Laboratory instituted an immediate corrective action plan to mitigate misuse and abuse. On August 23, 2002, Associate Director of Administration Richard Marquez ordered specific revisions to the purchase card. The revised procedures included new requirements for purchasing authority, review and approval of monthly statements and training for cardholders and business team leaders. Mr. Salgado and I also recommended to Laboratory Director John Browne that an external review team be appointed to conduct a more comprehensive review of the purchase card program. Director Browne requested University approval for an independent review. The University agreed and on August 16, 2002, UC Vice President John McTague instructed Director Browne to proceed with the proposal to establish an external review team to examine irregularities in the Laboratory's purchase card program. The team included auditors from the firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers (``PwC''). Former DOE Inspector General John Layton chaired the team, assisted by former Department of Labor Inspector General Charles C. Masten. The team was charged with conducting a comprehensive review of the purchase card program. By charter, the external review team was to have access to all LANL documents and records. All Laboratory leaders were informed to cooperate fully with the team, provide the team documents and be interviewed as requested. So as not to interfere with the FBI's ongoing investigations, the external review team's activities were carefully coordinated with the FBI, as evidenced by the numerous communications (meetings, telephone calls and correspondence) between the Laboratory and the FBI on this subject. On August 22, 2002, Mr. Salgado, Mr. Tucker, Mr. Doran and I met with the FBI, to inform it about the external review team. We told the FBI that the team would be investigating fraud, waste and abuse in the purchase card program, including the Mustang case and the purchase of tools from G&G, a vendor in Albuquerque. We told the FBI that the team would conduct an end-to-end review of the purchase card program and a forensic evaluation of whether there had been any misappropriation. The FBI was invited to provide input so that its investigation would be coordinated with the external review team's investigation. We specifically discussed the boxes of documents that had been collected from the office of the suspect in the Mustang case and the fact that the external review team would review those documents as part of its investigation. The FBI agreed that it was appropriate for the external review team to review those documents. The FBI requested that the Laboratory preserve the documents as they would any other business record. In September, October and November, there were correspondence and meetings between my office and the FBI to establish the external review team's interview list and to insure that it did not interfere with the FBI's investigation. By letter dated September 11, 2002, FBI Special Agent in Charge Andreas Stephens concurred with the Laboratory's decision to have the external review team audit purchase card program records and, with advance approval, conduct interviews. My office provided the FBI with lists of Laboratory employees whom the external review team wished to interview and the FBI approved the list, with some exceptions. Any allegation that the Laboratory was not cooperating with the FBI in the investigation of purchase card misuse completely ignores these numerous interactions between my office and the FBI. Indeed, Agent Stephens specifically expressed his gratitude to me for the Laboratory's continued cooperation in coordinating the investigations. The OSI was reluctant to permit the external team access to the suspect's records, asserting that the records were FBI evidence. Mr. Walp permitted PwC auditor Kristin Rivera to examine the documents, but under such stringent conditions that it was difficult for the team to effectively review the material. Eventually, Mr. Layton directed Mr. Masten (himself a former FBI agent) to go to OSI and determine whether the records appeared to be impounded by the FBI and whether the tape protecting the records was FBI tape. Mr. Masten inspected the records and determined that the FBI had not taped the records, that they were not FBI records, and that they had not been impounded by the FBI. After several phone calls, the records were transferred that day to the Office of Laboratory Counsel for the external review team to examine there, without restriction. Thus, although the external review team did eventually get to review the documents it needed, it was only after a prolonged struggle with OSI, which appeared to mistakenly believe that its investigation work was immune from review and use by Laboratory managers. In my opinion, this demonstrates a fundamental misconception by Mr. Walp about his job duties and responsibilities. It is also inexplicable to me, because I had previously obtained FBI permission to review these records, and I had so informed Mr. Walp. This incident was one of the final factors that led to my request that Messrs. Walp and Doran be removed from their roles as liaison with the FBI. the employment terminations of messrs. walp and doran Initially, I welcomed the opportunity to work with investigators with the backgrounds and experience of Messrs. Walp and Doran, However, as I continued to try to work with them on the purchase card and related investigations, I became increasingly disappointed and frustrated over my inability to secure the cooperation and assistance I expected from OSI. I frankly did not understand their reluctance to cooperate with what I perceived to be our common goals. Their resistance hampered my ability to do my job, which was to provide the FBI, the DOE and the University with accurate and timely information about possible misconduct, so those entities could make appropriate decisions regarding criminal prosecutions, national security, and employment matters. It was never my purpose or intent to cover up or withhold any information, nor to impede the FBI or DOE from investigating any misconduct, and I never did so. In October 2002, following a meeting with the United States Attorney in Albuquerque, I concurred with Mr. Salgado's decision to remove Messrs. Walp and Doran from their roles as liaison with the FBI. They did not appear to understand that my office had a legitimate interest in obtaining the information necessary to determine the Laboratory's legitimate concerns. Instead, Messrs. Walp and Doran appeared to view me, the Office of Laboratory Counsel, and the purchase card review team as adversaries. I did not make the decisions to terminate the employment of Messrs. Walp and Doran. However, it is clear that my complaints about their assistance and cooperation were important factors in the ultimate decision. I provided information and opinions about their performance, I expressed my frustration in working with them, I participated in discussions about their removal, I reviewed and commented on documents regarding their termination, I told Mr. Salgado I could not work with them on the assignment he had given me, and I provided legal advice to the Laboratory about the risks of terminating their employment. Putting aside the concerns that I have expressed regarding the performances of Messrs. Walp and Doran, I do recognize that the circumstances these men confronted were less than ideal. Upon reflection, I realize that we at the Laboratory could and should have done more to provide Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran with a better understanding of the Laboratory and their roles, including an understanding of all the parties with a legitimate oversight interest at the Laboratory, and the importance of comity between these parties. If they had been provided with adequate guidance regarding the specifics of their job duties, perhaps they might have better appreciated the inter- relationship between law enforcement concerns and national security and other legitimate concerns. In retrospect, I believe the Laboratory should have attempted to work through the difficulties with Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. It has always been my sole intent to preserve and protect the law, and to provide my client, the University, with my best legal advice and services, to promote and protect the interest of the government in the performance of my job, and to uphold the ethics of my profession. I have tried very hard to do that, and I believe I have done so. Thank you for the opportunity to present my views on these matters. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you. We thank Mr. Udall for joining us and Mr. Walden for joining us as well. The Chair recognizes himself for 10 minutes for questions. Let me address a question to Mr. Salgado first. Several times in your written statement you claim that you had ``no knowledge that Walp and Doran had claimed whistleblower status and no reason to believe that they had any legitimate grounds for doing so.'' I think that is a direct quote. During our first hearings on these matters, Mr. Darling testified that shortly after the firings he asked you to explain why you fired Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. He told this to me, that you said you were afraid that Walp and Doran would achieve whistleblower status and that you felt that their new status would prevent LANL from firing them within their 1-year probationary period. Mr. Darling also told committee staff that you told him that you suspected Walp and Doran had anonymously sent the 30- pound box of documents to the Albuquerque Journal and that you wanted to stop the leaks so you fired Walp and Doran. Your testimony is inconsistent with Mr. Darling's. I would remind you that you are under oath here. Do you wish to amend your testimony in anyway or can you explain these differences? Mr. Salgado. No, I do not care, Mr. Chairman, to amend my testimony. Let me address the first issue. The first issue dealt with timing. The question by Mr. Darling and his staff, as I recollect, during the course of their investigation is they wanted to know why was the timing important in the process. I indicated to Mr. Darling that the discussion about the release of Mr. Walp and Doran, they were on probationary status and the Laboratory needed no justification to let them go. I said that we had had this discussion on their status in the early part of September and October timeframe. I indicated to him that with the IG coming out and with the IG that we at the institution had requested to come out pursuant to the article that appeared in Energy Daily about the senior management cover-up. I indicated to him that one of the reasons for the timing of that was that I wanted to make sure that we did it so that it did not appear to be that they were being terminated because of a retaliatory component, i.e., whistleblower status. To this day, sir, I still have no indication, No. 1, that they either have claimed and/or are whistleblowers pursuant to the instructions of the California sketch or the administrative process. The second component dealt with, sir, as to the 30-pound box of documents. I do not believe that I have ever accused--I have ever accused Mr. Walp or Doran of releasing those documents. But what I have addressed is I believe that the documents that were released, the 30 pounds of pages or 30 pounds of documents were released did come out of the OSI or into that group of which Mr. Walp had supervisor responsibilities. The issues with those documents were twofold, sir. No. 1, that obviously any time that 30 pounds of internal documents are released it would be a concern to any institution. Second point is I did not know, and still to this day do not know whether those documents being released that were, in my opinion, in the supervision of that unit within the security division had any classified material in them whatsoever. That, of course, would be a concern both to this committee and other committees at the Hill. The second component of that box that was released, it did raise issues and concerns to me that I was led to believe, and do believe, that that box contained sensitive information concerning ongoing criminal investigations that were undertaken both internally and externally by the Laboratory. Nowhere have I ever indicated that I thought that I would personally accuse, as my statement indicates, that either Walp or Doran were responsible for the release of those documents, though there is a responsibility if the documents came from that group. Mr. Greenwood. Did you tell Mr. Darling that you suspected--I heard you clearly say twice that you did not accuse them. Did you tell Mr. Darling that you suspected that they were the source of this document leak? Mr. Salgado. I believe and my indication to Mr. Darling is that out of that unit upon which Mr. Doran was employed and being supervised by Mr. Walp that out of that unit it was my professional opinion, and I believe supported by other members at this table, that is where the information came from. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. So you did not accuse them but you did suspect them? Mr. Salgado. I suspected it was out of that unit. As my statement indicate, as prior law enforcement, and I mentioned to various staff members, I have not and will not impugn their integrity as to releasing those documents. It is not the culture of law enforcement and, as a ex-cop, I would not do that. Mr. Greenwood. And you just raised the issue of the possibility of there being classified information among those documents. Did you raise that concern with anyone in law enforcement or anyone else? Mr. Salgado. Yes, sir. I did. Before I left it was an issue. I raised it with the University of California. During this time things were moving quickly. I personally contacted the IG and raised the issue. They were not sure how to handle it given 1st Amendment rights and reporters. Then I also contacted NNSA and put it in DOE's court basically to assume any responsibility for follow-up indications on were there any classified documents in there or additional sensitive documents. Mr. Greenwood. When did you make the decision to fire Walp and Doran? Mr. Salgado. Actually, Mr. Busboom probably has the better dates. The discussion and the decision, I do not have the exact date, sir. I really do not. It was sometime obviously after the October 24 meeting with the U.S. Attorney and the FBI. It was sometime in the first part of November is my recollection. There was a decision made for the termination of Mr. Walp and Doran. Then it was delayed at least a week plus because one of the individuals, I believe, had gone on vacation so we backed that up a week. Mr. Greenwood. Who participated in making the decision to fire these two gentlemen? Mr. Salgado. There as a meeting, I believe, that took place between myself and Mr. Dickson. I believe Mr. Busboom was there. I believe that Mr. Holt was there and I believe that Mr. Marquez was at the meeting when the discussions took place about, No. 1, the underlying reasons for the terminations and, No. 2, the process that should be engaged in. Mr. Greenwood. Who drafted the letter that ultimately went to them? Mr. Salgado. There was a draft letter that was proposed out of my office that accumulated the information from various components of the Laboratory. That draft letter was sent through the chain of command through Mr. Holt down, I believe, to Mr. Busboom. Mr. Busboom deleted some areas and added additional facts in that letter and I believe that is the final document that went forward, if I am not mistaken. Mr. Greenwood. Did you have conversations with Mr. Busboom about whether or not he should sign that letter? Mr. Salgado. Whether he should sign the letter? I do not believe that I had conversation with Mr. Busboom about if he should sign that letter. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Mr. Salgado. I do not recall. Mr. Greenwood. What conversations did you have with Mr. Dickson regarding the November 20 letter? Mr. Salgado. If it was the November 20 letter, there were conversations that took place in a general form. I believe that the draft letter that was submitted was vetted through the appropriate individuals that had input into the letter and the meeting that we had with a discussion over the termination. Mr. Greenwood. Did you have conversations with Dr. Browne about this matter? Mr. Salgado. Yes, sir. Mr. Greenwood. Could you describe those conversations for us? Mr. Salgado. Yes, sir. My recollection is that after we had the meeting when there was the decision made about the termination of the individuals. I would like as a sense of background to backup that the first part in the October/ September timeframe I had a discussion with Mr. Holt through the associate director and Mr. Busboom of trying to get to a reasonable position of a path forward for Walp and Doran to see whether or not their tenure within the Laboratory could be successful. Subsequent to that I had asked--I did ask them to make a determination whether they were going to keep them or not. After the Dr. Browne conversation, as I recollect, it took place in an evening. Mr. Dickson was there with myself. We had a discussion about the reasons, the rationale for the terminations. That was in the evening. We went through what I have articulated partially in my statement. Mr. Greenwood. You made the statement that there seemed to be an attitude among various lab managers that they were playing with, these are your words, Monopoly money. What do you mean by that? Mr. Salgado. I want this to come across. I was brought to the lab--as I indicated in my oral statement, there was an awareness by the director of the Laboratory, John Browne, that the transformation of this Laboratory was important. There were cultural issues to deal with at the institution, sir. These are cultural issues that maybe some would like to believe started with me but they did not. They go back 30, 40, 50, 60 years. What I am saying now before this committee I have said to every senior manager at the institution. I have said it to the University of California. I have said it in training classes and I have said it to NNSA. The Laboratory had a culture, in my opinion, that the money that the taxpayers give them, a fiduciary relationship that we should have with the taxpayers, was not treated in an appropriate fashion. At times it was treated like Monopoly money, play money. It was part of the theme of trying to transform and change the management of the institution. Again, what I am saying today---- Mr. Greenwood. Let me understand what you mean by that. Do you mean that it was spent with disregard to its value? That managers paid too much for things? That managers bought things that weren't necessary? Mr. Salgado. Yes. Mr. Greenwood. Does that include concern about taking personal possessions of property? Does it include a culture that includes--are you describing a culture in part that has to do with misappropriating Federal property for personal use? Mr. Salgado. No, it is not. This is where it is a delegate balance. Let me, if I might, because I know it is important to the committee and it is important that I be reasonably clear. There is a fiduciary relationship and the relationship that deals between the taxpayers and us to spend their money is one that it should be spent efficiently and effectively in the best manner possible. That leads us into a gray area of activity. If you move into a new office you use the furniture that is there or you go off and have a brand new set of furniture and design furniture put into your office. It means to me the fact of the matter is when I came to the institution little things like if you are going to have food delivered, do you know how much it is costing you to do these things. The question of meals at the institution. The question of gray areas. Again, I have said this to everybody up front. The question of if we have a great safety record, is it efficient and effective to spend $15,000 to buy ourselves shirts. That is the type of thing that I am addressing, Mr. Chairman. It is a mindset and it is a culture that has existed, I believe, at that institution since Oppenheimer and Graves established it. It is important because the world changed. The executive branch, the legislative branch, and the taxpayers of this country expect more. They do great science. They do great engineering but we need to do it effectively and efficiently. I have lectured on this issue of Monopoly. In fact, one particular time I paid out of my own pocket, bought a Monopoly game and laminated it and I was going to hand it out to managers to try to raise the awareness of this fiscal responsibility and this fiduciary relationship. I think it underpins and undermines our credibility as an institution and does a disservice to the taxpayers. Mr. Greenwood. Let me understand one other thing because you made a comment that could be considered as controversial about others who have described a culture that included in that description harsher charges about personal misappropriation of funds and materials. You referred to those kind of comments as being racially profiling of Spanish Americans, I think you said. I am trying to understand how it would be that describing a culture as you have is different than describing the culture as others have and why one is a racial matter and one is not. Mr. Salgado. Well, do the racial component of ``greening of the valley,'' the valley itself has been well defined as the Hispanic population that primarily is in support service of the institution. That has a racial connotation to is. The ``greening of the valley'' as I interpret the phrase, No. 1, is in connection with a culture of theft which there is not at the institution. I respectfully will believe that sincerely. There is not a culture of theft. The ``greening of the valley'' on the assumption of the culture of theft is that there is a nexus between that and the drug activity in the valley which is, in my personal opinion, tantamount to racial profiling. The distinction I am making, Mr. Chairman is the fact that the culture that I have talked about, the culture of this lack of a sense of fiduciary relationship is not for personal gain of individuals. It is not that people are buying computer and taking them home for their children. But it is a culture by which I think people have failed to release that they are-- there is a responsibility of the institution to effectively and efficiently spend those dollars. Hypothetically if it is costing $15,000 to buy everybody shirts because we did a great job, that may be a morale issue but is that what the taxpayers expect of us to do, particularly if it is not pursuant to our contract and is that mindset--our meal policy and things of that nature. I mean, there are constant issues here of that issue and trying to change to the mindset. When you sign off on something to pay for it, are you doing with a mindset that you do have that relationship and that responsibility. That culture has not been there. It is not a criminal culture but it is culture that has to be addressed. Dr. Browne has noted it. It was part of Dr. Browne's vision of where this Laboratory had to get to. But there is a distinction, sir, between a criminal culture of theft and stealing and taking money and doing those things as evidence in the TA-33 issue versus what I would call this area of this lack of real awareness of our fiduciary relationship. As I said, I have said this in front of God, country, and everybody at that institution for the 3 years that I have been there. I believe it firmly. Mr. Greenwood. I think it is not hard to imagine how loose fiscal controls that allow the kind of waste and abuse of taxpayer's dollars that, as you have described, could slide in among those who are so constituted toward personal misappropriation because the fiscal controls were not there to protect against it. My time has expired. I recognize the gentleman, Mr. Walden, for 10 minutes. Mr. Walden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Salgado, I want to pick up on a point of a statement you made and just see if I understand it. You said that the Inspector General request is one that you made, or your folks made, to have the Inspector General come in. Mr. Salgado. Yes, sir. Mr. Walden. If I heard you right, you said that was after the story ran in Energy Daily. Mr. Salgado. If I may clarify, there were two requests of the Inspector General, the Department of Energy Inspector General, the very day, the morning that there was an allegation in print concerning that their senior management cover-up or criminal activity of the Laboratory. I personally contacted Greg Freedman, the IG, seeking some advice and council on how to address it. He rightly told me, sir, that I could not request an IG investigation. Within an hour I contacted Dr. Browne within Washington, DC that was going in to meet with the acting administrator for NNSA, Ambassador Brooks. I discussed the issue with Dr. Browne and Dr. Browne immediately made a request that afternoon, the very day the article ran, to have the NNSH request the IG on our behalf to come in and institute an investigation on senior management coverup. Mr. Walden. The Energy Daily story, was its genesis clear back to the Albuquerque leaks? Mr. Salgado. No, sir. I believe the Energy Daily story, as far as I know, and some of this is hearsay, was a first letter. There was a letter sent out with a series of allegations, an anonymous letter. I have never seen the original letter. That was the first time that we heard about that. The box of documents was subsequently--I believe approximately a week later is that I learned that this box of documents. Mr. Walden. You believe that the two are connected or came from the same individuals or same part of---- Mr. Salgado. I think they probably came--I have not read the entire letter, to be honest, but I believe that the genesis and much of the information appears to be in the same vein. Mr. Walden. Would it be appropriate to say then that the IG request never would have taken place had these stories never been leaked or the anonymous letter sent? You would have had no reason to ask the IG to come in otherwise? Mr. Salgado. I would have had no reason, nor would I have believed that there was any coverup or criminal activity going on at the institution. Mr. Walden. I want to go to the issue of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. Mr. Doran testified in front of this committee under oath about 2 weeks ago that he was advised by FBI agents that he worked with in New Mexico. The FBI's relationship with Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran was the best relationship the FBI has had with the lab in its history. I am told in your calendar notes for October 28, 2002, you indicate a conversation with the FBI agent, Jeff Campbell, where he states, and I quote, ``Steve and Glenn are the most professional, etc.'' I am sorry. This is Mr. Busboom. My apology. ``Steve and Glenn are the most professional.'' Additionally, DOJ has advised this committee that to its knowledge no law enforcement agency has had any concerns about Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran's performance. However, one of the circumstances constantly used an example of why Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were fired as the U.S. Attorney and the FBI advised the lab, ``Blew the Mustang case.'' Senior management blamed Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran for this statement. Did you relay to senior management the excellent report given to you by the FBI of Mr. Walp's and Mr. Doran's performance, Mr. Busboom? Mr. Busboom. Did I relay that particular comment? Mr. Walden. To senior management. Mr. Busboom. I believe I did. We had a meeting that Tuesday. I received that comment, I believe, on a Friday. We had a meeting that next Tuesday to discuss the role of the FBI, the IG, and our own staff. The FBI, it turned out, was not at that meeting, but at that meeting we discussed the need to appoint a new liaison. I am certain that it did come up. Yes, sir. Mr. Walden. How could senior management place the blame on them for blowing the case? Mr. Salgado. Two things. I think, first of all, that-- first, in fairness, I will indicate in the October 24 meeting that I requested, and that was the FBI and the U.S. Attorney, I was personally advised by Jeff Campbell, not by his supervisors, that he was very comfortable and felt that Walp and Doran were doing a competent job. That was on the 24th. I don't recollect the meeting that Mr. Busboom engaged in. Mr. Walden. So you both heard basically the same thing from the FBI. Mr. Salgado. I heard that from Jeff Campbell, the agent in charge, that had the day-to-day liaison going forward, No. 1. The issue of the case being blown was an issue that was raised in passing during a whole series of other activities taking place at the October 24 meeting between myself and the U.S. Attorney and the FBI. It was a statement made not by the FBI. It was a statement made by the U.S. Attorney. I never pursued what was actually meant by that statement given the other tenor of the conversation that was taking place on some other matters. The U.S. Attorney merely looked at me and said, ``You, the Laboratory, blew the case.'' That was essentially what they said. It has been--I am not sure whether I--I do not know if I ever put credence in part of the issues of the termination of Walp and Doran on that particular aspect. Mr. Walden. If you have got somebody telling you that you, the lab, blew the case, did you ask for specifics? What they-- -- Mr. Salgado. No. I am sorry. Mr. Walden. My natural reaction would be, ``What do you mean we blew it? How did we blow it? Tell me more.'' Did anybody ask that of them? Mr. Salgado. No. At that particular time we were engaged in a series of other activities. That was minor in passing. It was really dealing with whether or not the FBI that had assumed the Mustang case, whether they were going to pursue this or whether we were going to take it and refer it to the IG or local law enforcement officials. We tried to get to closure on several issues at that meeting. One of them was, ``Either you are going to decline the Mustang case or not.'' They indicated they were going to decline the Mustang case after a brief conversation given the facts of the case, the evidence in the case, and the lack of criminal history on proposed suspect. The declination with an offhand comment that the U.S. Attorney said, ``We are not going to pursue the case because A, B, C. Besides that, you blew the case.'' To be honest, Congressman, we moved on to some other areas that were of much more importance to us at that particular date and time. Mr. Walden. I want to go to the issue of Mr. Walp's termination because I got a copy of his performance summary that was done here that I understood was supposed to be done by July that was actually conducted, I believe, in October. Is that correct? As I look at it, and I am not familiar with these, but if you go through it says, ``Implement ISSN, 100 percent effort effectuated. Safety performance, 100 percent effort. Human capital, 100 percent effort. Walk-arounds, 100 percent accomplishment. Employee communications, over 100 percent accomplishment. Effective cost schedule management, 100 percent attainment. Financial management, 100 percent attainment. Time management, office leader visible to all SI personnel on a daily basis.'' It is a pretty positive finding. Is it not? Mr. Busboom, did you do the evaluation? Mr. Busboom. Yes, sir, I did, in conjunction with my deputy, Mr. Tucker. I believe I did sign it, yes. Mr. Walden. I understand this is supposed to be for the first 6 months but if you are doing it in October, were there issues on your mind then about performance that would differ from this? Mr. Busboom. At that time the answer is yes, sir. That report closed out on July 31 as did every other employee in the lab. That is the normal cycle. Then there is a period of time while salaries are considered before the information is actually present to the employee. That was presented to Mr. Walp in late September of early October, but the closeout period was for July 31. It is a very positive report. The overall rating, I believe, is an eight. That was consistent with his peer group. That was an average score within his peer group. Mr. Walden. And that is on a scale of one to 10? Mr. Busboom. That is correct. The managers tend to get higher aggregate scores. Mr. Walden. It is a good report, sir? Mr. Busboom. Yes, sir. Mr. Walden. He also got a $5,000 year bonus or raise or something at that point? Mr. Busboom. He received a pay raise and it is not a bonus. It was a pay raise consistent with that score during that salary exercise. Yes, sir. Mr. Walden. What happened between then and when he was dismissed that turned this all upside down? Something must have gone dramatically different the following couple of months. Right? Mr. Busboom. Yes, sir. As I have noted in my testimony, it was first brought to my attention in mid-September that for the previous few weeks there had been an ongoing dispute between some of the outside auditors, our own legal counsel, and our staff, OSI, which includes Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. The principal matter was about access of records and information by a PricewaterhouseCoopers group. That had been an issue of great discussion and great debate between my staff, our own legal counsel, and the forensic auditors who were on the ground. Mr. Walden. My time has expired. Thank you, sir. Mr. Greenwood. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Eshoo, recognized for 10 minutes. Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Once again, I appreciate your extending legislative curtesy to me to take part in these very, very important hearings relative to the University of California and the operation of the labs. I appreciate it. I would like to begin by just asking each one of you how long you have served at the lab. Mr. Busboom. Mr. Busboom. Yes, ma'am. I have been at the lab for 6 years. Ms. Eshoo. Six years? Mr. Salgado. Three years, 3 months. Mr. Dickson. Twelve years. Ms. Eshoo. Twelve. Can anyone of you give me the short version of why Mr. Doran and Mr. Walp were fired? I have heard a lot of references so far today but there isn't anything that is clear about it. What was it that they had done that merited firing? Mr. Salgado. I accept the responsibility for that. Ms. Eshoo. I know you do, but what was the reason for it? Mr. Salgado. The reasons were primarily two fold. No. 1, they were in a probationary period when it was time for the institution to make---- Ms. Eshoo. I have people that serve on my staff that are in a probationary period but that is not the reason. You don't use that as a reason to fire someone. Mr. Salgado. I am just setting the background, if I might. The reasons were two fold essentially. First of all, through the period of time of the intense--from the July period to the November period of time there was incomplete, inaccurate information that was being provided to the University and the Laboratory needed upon which to base sound judgments affecting both personnel activities and natural security issues. Ms. Eshoo. All right. Let me ask this as a follow-up to that, Mr. Salgado. You talked about shirts, shoes, food, and furniture. Other than thinking about laminating Monopoly dollars, and firing the whistleblowers, what did each one of you accomplish on your watch for this culture that you oversaw? I mean, it seems to me that your testimony today reminds me of someone from the outside looking in rather than people that were in charge, even though it is after the fact because you are gone and there has been a reduction in your salary. How much is your salary now? Mr. Busboom. I was told last week. I was given a form saying it was $140,000. Ms. Eshoo. During your time did you oversee and route out of this culture that you refer to? Mr. Salgado. Well, first and foremost was---- Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Salgado, could you move forward and use the microphone? Mr. Salgado. Sorry, sir. I apologize. I was thinking. No. 1, I think that Dr. Browne and myself commenced a reorganization of the institution to put lines of authority and responsibility in place. Ms. Eshoo. Did it go past an organizational chart into actual effectiveness to route out the things that you have come here and referred to today? Obviously you had a knowledge of it because you are referring to it. Mr. Salgado. Yes. I believe those things were put into place a year ago and those are part of the transition. Ms. Eshoo. When you say put into place, what does that mean? Mr. Salgado. That means that---- Ms. Eshoo. On paper? Mr. Salgado. No. That the institution was reorganized. The roles and responsibilities and lines of authority were changed. There were movements of divisions in various activities. Ms. Eshoo. And what was the result of what you were just referring to, though? Mr. Salgado. Well---- Ms. Eshoo. How did the credit card--how could a credit card be used for the kinds of things that have obviously become more than public? And when you refer to reforms, what are you referring to? What are the specifics? Mr. Salgado. I am getting a little bit lost. On the credit card issues, once those issues were basically brought to the attention of the institution, several things occurred immediately. Ms. Eshoo. Don't refer to the institution. You are referring to the institution like it is a glob. There were people that were paid taxpayer money to run this place. Now, you have come here and you have outlined, as I said, shirts, shoes, food, furniture, laminated--you have made a reference to all of that. What did you do on your watch? In my view, not very much. Otherwise, we wouldn't be here. But I want to give you an opportunity to tell me. What did you root out? Mr. Salgado. When the purchase card activity surfaced, No. 1, I personally contacted, No. 1, the--on the purchase card activity I personally contacted the former IG to basically bring an external group in to help us basically look at the process procedures and to root out those activities that you have addressed. I notified the IG of the Department of Energy of a process---- Ms. Eshoo. I need to interrupt because I only have 10 minutes and I am a guest of the subcommittee. My observation so far is that you were very adept at knowing who to call outside the institution, as you refer to it. But there is a dereliction of duty here. You have more than made reference to what you knew to be wrong, except you didn't do anything about it. Now, maybe it is looking over your shoulder but I don't know what was rooted out. I think that the public light that shines on this is a very important one because it then is instructive in terms of what needs to be done. I appreciate the fact, Mr. Salgado, that you have come from a law enforcement background but this sounds like the Keystone Cops to me. Now, lab employees describe a culture of fear. Now that you are on your way out do you have any comments about that? Mr. Salgado. Well, if I may, first of all, I would address the fact that we did do things and we were proactive and aggressive. Ms. Eshoo. I don't know what they are, though, because you are not able to be specific. Mr. Salgado. Well, if I could submit it for the record then, I would ask that I be allowed to submit for the record those proactive things in the transformation of the institution, the reorganization, putting lines of authority and accountability in place, and bringing in people to basically help us---- Ms. Eshoo. I need you to answer my question, though, because you are on my time here. Mr. Salgado. Okay. I am sorry. I apologize. Is the question on my way out of a culture of fear? Ms. Eshoo. Been stated by employees. Mr. Salgado. I have heard that from the day I got there. Ms. Eshoo. Do you agree or disagree? Mr. Salgado. I agree that there is a perception of a culture of fear. Ms. Eshoo. No. Do you believe that is a truthful statement? And, if not, you can say you don't agree. Mr. Salgado. I believe that the people who have made that statement believe it to be true. Ms. Eshoo. You believe it to be true? Mr. Salgado. No. I believe that the people that made that statement, they believe it to be true, that there is a culture of fear. Ms. Eshoo. I would think that they believe it to be true, too. That is not what I am asking you. I am asking you if you find that statement to be correct. If you don't, say so. Mr. Salgado. I do not agree. Ms. Eshoo. Okay. That is enough. Mr. Busboom, do you have reflections about this statement? Mr. Busboom. Yes, ma'am. Certainly we moved forward in the OSI office to address these issues by, first, establishing the office, as Mr. Deutsch read in his opening statement. Second, we doubled the staff there within that 1 year and we added many hundreds of thousands of dollars in budget. I do believe we were on our way in terms of the security participation. . Ms. Eshoo. Was there ever anything--this is, I think, a question that is on many individual's minds. When you met with Mr. Doran and Mr. Walp, did you find anything in their work that was laudatory or did you just think that they didn't know what they were talking about? Was there anything that you said, ``Well, one out of 10 we agree with you and we are going to pursue this.'' Mr. Busboom. There were certainly positive things, yes. Ms. Eshoo. There were positive things. Did any of you ever follow up on them? Mr. Busboom. I followed up on the positive part, certainly. I wrote that report that said that Mr. Walp had done a good job in organizing the new office. Ms. Eshoo. Was there any dissension between the decisionmakers on the firing? Was there kind of a minority view, so to speak, or were you all in agreement with each other? Mr. Deutsch. I supported the decision, or did not oppose it. Ms. Eshoo. Mr. Salgado? Mr. Salgado. I supported it. Ms. Eshoo. You supported it. Mr. Busboom? Mr. Busboom. I supported it after--it is Busboom. Thank you. I supported it after the discussions that I had with by boss and his deputy and with chief legal counsel and Mr. Salgado. Ms. Eshoo. Mr. Salgado, you testified that the lab essentially can be improved. Now, obviously you are gone. Do you have some clarity around what the reforms should be? Any of you? Mr. Salgado. The answer is yes. I think the University of California needs to address its governance model, No. 1. And I think, No. 2, the fact of the matter is that the process, believe it or not, in the systems that are being put in place need to continue. The change of culture of an institution does not take place over night. That culture of that institution it will probably take 2 to 3 years moving on a forward path of aggressive change. Ms. Eshoo. I think if we keep observing culture and don't do something about it is why it doesn't change. That is my own take on it. With that, I see that my time has been used up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentlelady from California and advises you we will do a second round and I will begin that second round now. There is at tab 47, and if the staff would hand it to Mr. Salgado. Tab 47 is an e-mail written by Jo Ann Milum to James Holst at the University of California. It is dated December 11, 2002. This is 15 days after Walp and Doran were fired. Its subject line reads, ``Rationale for terminations.'' I am going to ask Mr. Salgado, can you tell us who Jo Ann Milum and James Holst are? Mr. Salgado. Jo Ann Milum---- Mr. Greenwood. Milum? Mr. Salgado. Milum. Mr. Greenwood. I am going to ask you to sit forward. Mr. Salgado. I am sorry, sir. Jo Ann Milum was my chief of staff previously and then took over as executive staff director for the Office of the Director. Mr. Greenwood. Which position was she on December 11? Mr. Salgado. She was the Executive Staff Director for the Office of the Director. In all candor, sir, she was also my Chief of Staff when I was at the Department of Energy so there is a long history there. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Mr. Holst? Mr. Salgado. Mr. Holst is the General Counsel, I believe is his title, for the University of California, Office of the President and is a direct line supervisor for Mr. Dickson. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. So why would she send this e-mail to Mr. Holst, do you think? Mr. Salgado. To be honest, sir, I don't know. I mean, I am assuming that it was requested by somebody. ``Per your request'' it says so I am assuming that Mr. Holst requested some information to be provided. That is my supposition. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Among the rationale for the termination of probationary employees Walp and Doran, there is an allegation that Walp and Doran failed to follow up on the Mustang case in a timely manner. Mr. Walp, however, first learned of the case on July 25, 2002 a week after the BUS division first learned of the case. The FBI took over the investigation on July 29, 2002. During a 4-day period before the FBI opened its investigation into the matter, how did Walp and Doran fail to follow up on the Mustang case? Mr. Salgado. I can't say in that context that they failed to follow up. There were other issues with the Mustang case that were of concern to us but on that particular issue. For the record, there was a meeting. The second time they met I directed Mr. Walp to go to Arizona to follow up on that case. The case was taken away from Mr. Walp and the FBI assumed investigation of the case and told us we were not to send anybody there to follow up on that part of the investigation. As to wording, I am not sure. There were other issues in the Mustang case but in that short period of time Mr. Walp agreed to go to Arizona. It was terminated by the FBI and they took over the case. Am I making myself clear? Mr. Greenwood. I am not sure that you are. If you had a case for 4 days--am I accurate when I say that Walp and Doran had responsibility for this case for 4 days? Mr. Salgado. I don't know the time, sir. I really don't. I am assuming but I don't know when the case came to them or anything. Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Busboom, can you shed light on that? Mr. Busboom. That sounds correct, sir. I think July 25 was the day it was reported. As far as July 29 being the date the FBI took over, I couldn't say from memory. Mr. Greenwood. The e-mail says that among the things that they did were foot dragging on the Mustang case. Now, I am not sure but how much foot dragging can you do in 4 days? Mr. Busboom. Me, sir? Mr. Greenwood. Yes, Mr. Busboom. Mr. Busboom. Again, I do not know if July 29 is the second date. I haven't seen this e-mail before so this is the first time I have read it. Mr. Greenwood. Do you think he dragged his foot on this? Do you think Walp and Doran dragged their feet, all four of them, in 4 days? Isn't it the case that your office was informed about this case in September of the year before? Mr. Busboom. Of the Mustang case? Mr. Greenwood. Yes. Mr. Busboom. No, sir. That is not correct. Mr. Greenwood. I am sorry. The Bussolini case. When did your office become aware of that matter? Mr. Busboom. The TA-33 case? Mr. Greenwood. Yes. Mr. Busboom. I became aware in July 2002. Subsequent to that---- Mr. Greenwood. When were your employees aware of it? Mr. Busboom. Subsequent to that I have seen memoranda, two memos, that talk to someone knowing about it as early as fall of 2001. Mr. Greenwood. When was action taken? Mr. Busboom. When was action taken, sir? Mr. Greenwood. Yes. Mr. Busboom. Again, according to the memoranda that we have on file, the person who knew about it in 2001 did call the FBI. Mr. Greenwood. When? Mr. Busboom. In September 2001. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. And did anything happen as a result of that? Mr. Busboom. I don't know, sir. Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Salgado, do you know the answer to that question? Mr. Dickson, do you know the answer to that question? Mr. Dickson. I don't believe anything happened. Mr. Greenwood. That employee is still there. Is that right? Mr. Salgado. My understanding that it is and that your are correct, sir, that as far as I know that there was a notification made to the FBI and that nothing happened after that internally. Mr. Greenwood. Here is what I am trying to reconcile. Okay? An employee of the Laboratory is aware that it appears that two other employees of the Laboratory are ordering tens of thousands of dollars of personal camping, hunting, sporting equipment and hoarding it in a bunker somewhere. How many months go by between the time that people at the lab become aware of this issue and something is ultimately done to propagate this case and to take some action on this case? How much time goes by? Mr. Salgado. As far as I know, it was until the FBI in July 2000. Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Salgado, would you sit forward, please? Mr. Salgado. As far as I know, it was not until Mr. McDonald went to the FBI personally in the year 2002. It was between September 2001 and July 2002 that any active investigative component---- Mr. Greenwood. Let us call that 10 months. Ten months go by in that case and nobody is fired for foot dragging. Four days go by in the Mustang case and we have got to get rid of these guys for dragging their feet and blowing the case. Can you understand how that looks to us? Can any reconcile--why should we not look at that and say we have got two extraordinarily different standards here. In one case we are acutely aware--people at the lab are acutely aware of what appears quite obviously to be thievery. Ten months go by before anything happens. In another case, Walp and Doran come into town and you give them the Mustang case and 4 days later you accuse them of dragging their feet, blowing it. How can you reconcile those two matters? Anybody? Mr. Busboom? Mr. Busboom. I wouldn't attempt to reconcile it for you, sir. I haven't seen this e-mail so I wasn't familiar with this logic here. I will say on the other case that I have been told after the fact that the FBI was immediately notified. My deputy told me that the information was---- Mr. Greenwood. Was a record made of that initial contact to the FBI? Is it possible to document it that, in fact, the FBI was, indeed, notified? Mr. Busboom. The only thing I have seen, sir, were memoranda written after the fact. Mr. Greenwood. Written after the fact. Mr. Busboom. That is correct, sir. Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Salgado, can you understand how we would--is that the standard procedure? If you contact the FBI about a matter as serious as that, is it standard procedure at the lab to not make any contemporaneous record of that contact? Mr. Busboom. I would have expected a contemporaneous record. I have not seen one. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Have you asked the individual why it was that he did not make--how he reconciles his statement after the fact that he notified the FBI in September with the fact that he made no record of that contact? Mr. Busboom. Yes, sir. We certainly did ask that question. Mr. Salgado asked us in October who knew what when and I personally was sent off by Mr. Salgado to get that answer. That is when the memoranda were written. One was written in October by Mr. Walp which outlined who, what, when. It referred to a second memorandum written by Mr. Sprouse in July of that year which had similar information. Mr. Sprouse's version of it was that it was, indeed, turned over to the FBI but they were extraordinarily busy with September 11 stuff because that is exactly when it was reported and nothing happened. Mr. Greenwood. I am just waiting for someone to explain to me how you can look at the 4 days of responsibility that Walp and Doran had on the Mustang case and say they dragged their feet and they blew the case. What did they specifically do wrong in those 4 days, Mr. Salgado? Mr. Salgado. I have never said that they blew the case, No. 1. No. 2, I don't know anything about dragging their feet in this arena. I may have seen e-mail before. I don't recollect it, to be honest with you. Mr. Greenwood. What did they do wrong in the Mustang case? Mr. Salgado. I think in the Mustang case there was a series of issues in the Mustang case that were difficult for us to deal with which was tied itself to misinformation, inaccurate information. Mr. Greenwood. Provided by Walp and Doran in 4 days? Mr. Salgado. In my opinion, provided by Walp and Doran in 4 days and the continuing period of time in which there were further engagement, No. 1. Mr. Greenwood. Be specific. What misinformation did they provide? Mr. Salgado. There was---- Mr. Greenwood. I am going to ask you to sit forward. I am going to have to tie your chair forward. Mr. Salgado. May if I move this, a little bit. There were a series of issues, sir, that dealt with it. There were things, and Mr. Dickson has probably a little bit more of the details, but there were issues about where the vehicle was to be delivered, who lived at the location, were the names the same or were they not the same, was there---- Mr. Greenwood. And this was all the information that was gathered during that 4 days? Mr. Salgado. I am not sure. As I indicated to you, sir, there were issues of inaccurate and incomplete information that was delivered both within the 4 days and beyond because there was a continuation of information. Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Dickson, can you shed any light on this? Mr. Dickson. I do not subscribe to the notion that there was foot dragging with respect to the Mustang case. That was not the complaint that I had made. Mr. Greenwood. My time is up but, Mr. Salgado, you just testified that the sender of this e-mail, Milum, is someone who have known for a very long time. Mr. Salgado. Yes. Mr. Greenwood. They have worked closely with you. Are you aware that she says they were foot dragging? Mr. Salgado. I am aware now. Mr. Greenwood. You were not aware until this moment? Mr. Salgado. Sir, I really don't remember looking at that e-mail. I may have but I don't remember that. I really don't. Mr. Greenwood. Would you concur that they dragged their feet? Mr. Salgado. On the Mustang case? No. There was not a foot dragging in the Mustang. There was a lot of issues surrounding that case but foot dragging is not how I would describe it. Mr. Greenwood. The gentleman from Washington is recognized. Mr. Walden. Oregon. Mr. Greenwood. Oregon. I am sorry. Mr. Walden. One of those northwest states. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Dickson, I want to have you refer to Tab 87 which is an e-mail from--the sender says [email protected]. It is addressed to you, Mr. Busboom, and to Mr. Tucker from Kenneth Schiffer. I want to read it for the record. I says, ``Subject: IG. FYI I was called this morning by Peter Schleck from the IG's office in the Forrestal. He made an appointment to meet with me on 12/17/02 to discuss my knowledge of the issues surrounding Walp and Doran. I proposed to limit my remarks to the documentation I have from 8/00 concerning meetings we held with the Bureau and LAPD regarding the issue of lost/theft of lab property. The thrust of my message would be to point out that as early as 8/00 the lab surfaced this problem to law enforcement and worked with them to address it. This was not something ``new'' which Walp and Doran discovered. I recollect also that I mentioned this meetings to Glenn when he was hired and provided him with a general background of the meetings we had had. I also recall saying this was not a simple matter and that there were sensitivities Glenn would have to consider when moving forward with it. I further explained my role in the matter. Let me know how this sits with you all. Ken.'' Mr. Dickson, I guess the question I have, it would appear from an outsider that maybe Mr. Schiffer is trying to get the story straight about what you and Mr. Busboom and Mr. Tucker should tell the IG. Doesn't this e-mail seem a little odd to you from a legal standpoint? Mr. Dickson. No, it actually does not, Congressman Walden. It is not uncommon for Mr. Schiffer in particular, and some others around the Laboratory, who are going off to become involved in some interview or something to just give me a heads up about what they are dong. I remember this e-mail. I never responded to it. I never talked to Mr. Schiffer about it. He is an experienced FBI agent and for some reason or the other from time to time if he is doing something, he will just let me know what it is I guess on the theory that if I hear about it, I will at least know what is going on. There is no effort on his part, as best I can remember, to ever clear anything that he is trying to do with me, or to ask for my input as to what he ought to say. Mr. Walden. Mr. Busboom, did you respond? Mr. Busboom. I don't recall if I responded but I certainly did get this e-mail. I have seen this. Yes, sir. Mr. Walden. What about the concept that the IG's interviews are confidential? Doesn't this raise an issue with that? Tell me how the IG process works. Maybe I don't understand. I thought it was supposed to be confidential. Mr. Dickson. Mystically. I am not aware and was never told by the IG that their process was confidential. I have looked at the IG orders and have not seen anything that suggested confidential. If it is confidential, I did not know about it and was not instructed that way when I was interviewed by the IG myself. Mr. Walden. Do you know, to the best of your knowledge, did Mr. Tucker respond to this e-mail? Mr. Dickson. No, I don't know. Mr. Busboom. I don't know, sir. Mr. Walden. You don't know? All right. Mr. Salgado, I want to go into the issue of the stolen items because you have taken offense to the concept of the ``greening of the valley'' or whatever. I have never been there. I don't have a clue but I watched the digital pictures they displayed here for us of the equipment the chairman referenced that was allegedly stolen equipment and all of that. As a taxpayer I get kind of upset about that. We have heard also reports of some $800,000 in hand tools being purchased from a sole source contractor, an individual. I don't know if that is still under investigation or not but it is a little difficult to understand. You state in your testimony that Los Alamos is not a den of thieves who are keeping the valley green. We know that the majority of lab employees are honest people. I fully believe that. That is generally the case in most organizations. But can you explain why our staff can go through procurement records and in a few hours find purchase after purchase of knives, camping gear, sleeping cots, top of the line Gore-Tex camping gear, auto equipment, and many other of what would appear to us to be obviously personal purchases that the Laboratory and the Federal Government have paid for. I have got a list here that the staff has provided me of card transactions for Boundary Waters tent. It is Tab 136 if that would be helpful. While you're looking that up, I want to give you a couple of examples that we received just last night. These purchases do not involve any of the people whose names have already been in the press. Tab 136 there are photos included for your viewing convenience. This is just for one vendor of camping supplies. Let us start with $1,435 Boundary Waters two-person tent. We can go on to the hunting knife sharpener, two bought in a month. There is my personal favorite, a pet heating pad for $119.99. Women's lined slippers, apparently necessary at the lab, as are GameView digital cameras which can sense game hundreds of yards away. This just goes on and on. These are pretty obvious ones. Did you find it, Mr. Salgado? Mr. Salgado. I have the chart. For clarification of my point, are the items that we are addressing at this Tab 136, are those items that are outside the scope of what I refer to as the TA-33 investigation? Mr. Walden. The answer, I am told, is yes. Mr. Salgado. I have no knowledge of these. I will say this. There were a lot of items that were purchased subsequent to the Sierra Grande fire. Many of these things, I believe, that the former IGs, Mr. Layton and Mr. Masten, also looked at to see whether or not--they raised issues, I know, for instance, about water coolers and things like that that were needed for environmental work. I know nothing about these. The first time I believe I have just seen this is right now. I have no indication, but I would assume that if it was done in 2002 this was part of the study that was undertaken by the former IGs but I don't know that. Mr. Walden. It actually says fiscal year 2001. Mr. Salgado. I am sorry, fiscal year 2001. The former IGs that we brought in, John Layton and Charles Masten, and the PricewaterHouse group, I believe, went back 48 months. I would think this should have been included in that review but I don't have personal know of it, sir. Mr. Dickson. Mr. Walden, may I? Mr. Walden. Certainly, Mr. Dickson. Mr. Dickson. If I may, in August of this year one of the responsibilities I was assigned was to work with the purchase card review team in its efforts to try to get to the bottom of the Mustang and other related vulnerabilities. As a part of that work, the PricewaterHouseCoopers team developed withering lists of items, like you're talking about, as a way of trying to test the system and see if there was glitch. I interceded because I learned not to jump to any conclusions about some of these more exotic sounding items in terms of their business purpose at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. You will find as you go through many--I don't know about these obviously but if you were to pull the string on these, there is a very good chance that you would find, although at this point they are seemingly ridiculous purchases, they turn out to have a very legitimate business purpose. PricewaterhouseCoopers did, in fact, work their way through page after page of these items. Mr. Walden. Let me interrupt you for a second. I am sorry. Who made the determination that they have legitimate purposes? The people who purchased them? Mr. Dickson. No. The PricewaterHouse did selected searches, identified seemingly inappropriate items, made phone calls, made visits, looked at items, and strangely found explanations for the great majority of those items. Mr. Walden. A great majority. Okay. Mr. Dickson. I think it is very appropriate to look at those and question them, but I don't think you're at the end of the process by just having looked. Mr. Walden. I understand that. Let me switch subjects for a minute. Prior to firing Mr. Walp and Doran, did you discuss with Mr. Salgado the possibility they could achieve whistleblower status and, if so, did Mr. Salgado say to you-- what did he say to you about that prospect? Did you discuss it with him? Mr. Dickson. Yes, I did. What we talked about was the notion that there was risk in any action that had to do with Mr. Walp and Doran. My position with respect to those two gentlemen was that we should assume for purposes of making the decision that they would be looked upon as whistleblowers and then decide whether or not the reason that the Laboratory was-- the decision that the Laboratory was making was based upon ground unrelated to their disclosure of information. Mr. Walden. What role did Dr. Browne play in the decision to fire Walp and Doran? Mr. Dickson. I would say that he relied upon other and was provided with information before the decision was made and incurred in it based upon the recommendation. Mr. Walden. Was he actively involved in considerations to fire Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran? Mr. Dickson. He was informed before the action took place. I would say that of all of the managers of the Laboratory who were involved, John was not the principal person. Mr. Walden. Why were there so many folks at the lab in management involved in this decision in your perspective? Mr. Dickson. Well, you know, there really aren't that many when you think about it. The S Division, Stan Busboom reports to Jim Holt. He is one of the people that was listed. Jim Holt then reports to Mr. Salgado who reports to Director Browne. I am the Laboratory counsel and provide legal services for the Laboratory. It is sort of really chain of command type issue. Mr. Walden. Is that the standard practice for probationary employee dismissals? Mr. Dickson. No. It can be. It depends on the circumstances. Mr. Walden. How often? Mr. Dickson. I am not involved in a great number of these decisions but in cases that have a propensity to be high profile, they can go all the way up to the top. The rationale-- the problem with this particular one, Congressman Walden, is that the purchase card review team in this activity were considered to be extremely important to the Laboratory. A lot of people were interested in and involved in that process. The fact that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were supposed to be supporting that team had the tendency to elevate their work perhaps to an abnormal level. Mr. Walden. Given that it was so high profile, or you indicate that was a concern, why was Mr. Busboom involved? Mr. Dickson. He is my manger. The division leader. Mr. Greenwood. The time, gentlemen, has expired. The gentlelady from California is recognized for 10 minutes. Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask the panelists today if there is anything that you know of, relative to all of the mismanagement that we are reviewing, and the abuse, and what I think is fraud as well, and I really think a dereliction of duty on the part of the top team at the lab. Does any of this in your assessment impinge on any national security issues? Mr. Busboom first. Mr. Busboom. I am not aware of any direct connection. I haven't seen any security incidents connected with the thefts. The only time I know that took place was the TA-33 had a concurrent security incident with the suspects involved in the case itself Ms. Eshoo. Is that resolved that you are referring to? Mr. Busboom. I don't know, ma'am, because I didn't conduct that inquiry. Ms. Eshoo. Whose responsibility is it to check it out? Mr. Busboom. That particular inquiry was conducted by Mr. Hawkins. Ms. Eshoo. Who is Mr. Hawkins? Mr. Busboom. He is the division leader of Nonproliferation and International Security who owns TA-33. Ms. Eshoo. Where is that now? Mr. Busboom. I don't know, ma'am. Ms. Eshoo. Does anyone follow up on any of these things? Can any of you inform the committee? Mr. Salgado. Yes. I would advise the committee that the security violations or infractions were addressed by line management and appropriate action was taken pursuant to those. Ms. Eshoo. When was that? Mr. Salgado. That was taken immediately following the October 24 meeting I had with the U.S. Attorney and the FBI. Ms. Eshoo. So that has been resolved? Mr. Salgado. Yes. And, in my opinion, there has been no jeopardy of national security in either of these activities. It was a high profile for the Laboratory and myself to be the balance of activity. Ms. Eshoo. I would appreciate that. I have in the previous hearing asked everyone that came to testify that same question because I think that obviously we have to keep our eye on the main ball, so to speak, not that today's testimony we are discussing today isn't important. I think in the last question that was asked by my colleague, the term ``abnormal level'' was used by you, Mr. Dickson. What do consider abnormal level? What did you mean by that? They raised their concerns to an abnormal level. Mr. Dickson. The intention to the dismissal of what we would call probationary employees had greater level of attention just because of who they were and what they were involved in at the time. I was asked the question is it normal for all of these terminations or dismissals of probationary employees to be at that level. He answered no. The next question was why was this one and that was the answer to that question. Ms. Eshoo. Have any of you ever participated in prior to Mr. Doran's and Mr. Walp's firings in anything like this before that we perhaps didn't know about that you can tell us about today? Is this the very first time on your watch that anyone that raised serious questions, were they caught in some probationary period? Were there others that were fired that we may not know about? Mr. Dickson. I think I may have created a misapprehension. What I meant when I used the word raised is that the decisionmaking process of Mr. Walp and Doran was at a higher level than perhaps might be typical. That is all I meant. It has nothing to do with the fact that they claimed to have raised issues. Ms. Eshoo. Well, the issues that they raised were clearly not appreciated. Otherwise, I don't think you would be here today. I mean, that, to me, is one of the more obvious things. It is like a 10,000 pound gorilla in the middle of the room. What I am very disappointed in today, I must say this, is that if I were to entitle or to characterize this panel, with all due respect to each one of you, is that this is the panel of denial. I think that goes to the heart of why the abuses that we are reviewing why we are even reviewing them. And refer to the place as the institution. We have a probationary period and people that maybe their style of communicating you found objectionable. As stewards of a public place and a public contract, I don't know what it would take to get your attention to the things that really mattered. You are saying the things that were charged on the credit card, where was it appropriate? Did anyone ever see that there was an attempt for a Mustang? Does that fit into something that is kind of regular order or regular business at your place? Mr. Salgado. Of course not. Ms. Eshoo. Whose attention did that come to before it was Mr. Walp or Mr. Doran? Let me ask you that. Mr. Busboom, do you know anything about it? Anyone ever bring it to your attention? Mr. Busboom. Specifically about the list there? Ms. Eshoo. The Mustang. Mr. Dickson. The Mustang came to the attention of the card holder who disputed the charge. The charge was reversed by the credit card company and there has been no loss to the Government. That is the answer. Ms. Eshoo. How about the person that tried to charge this? Did that say anything to you? I have to tell you, if someone on my staff tried to charge a Mustang on the Federal credit card I have, it would have raised a real flag. Now, maybe I am unusual. All right? Then again, maybe you are in the way you have run this place. Doesn't that just violate you? Mr. Salgado. Ma'am, if I may respond. Ms. Eshoo. Yes. Mr. Salgado. Absolutely Ms. Eshoo. Do. Mr. Salgado. Absolutely. First of all, it was raised basically by the BUS Division who brought it immediately to our attention. We immediately at that time put an internal review team to start looking at all the purchase card activity that we had looked at. We immediately also then decided that we needed to bring in an external review team in immediately to start looking at and questioning the process, procedures, and activities that were going on. That immediately raised a red flag to us. It wasn't brought to us by Walter Doran. It was brought to us by the BUS Division operations and we put the internal team in place and then an external team in place immediately. Ms. Eshoo. External, internal, but Walp and Doran didn't count into this. I have to tell you that I think that in an organization who is at the top counts. Why? Because by what they say, what they do to help create a transparent organization, an organization that understands that rules matter, that conduct matters, and that it starts from the top. You see? So I think you have failed, with all due respect, the good people that are part of this place. But that is not enough. That is not enough. In order to restore confidence both to the policymakers and to the American taxpayer, this place has to be hosed out. I don't think people should be rewarded by contracts. I stated this in the last hearing. I think that the University of California has to go tier by tier through the management however that is done. That is up to the University of California to do that. There has been a contract in place for decades. The University of California is a great university. I think that you have failed her by what you have done and what you have not done. I think if there is anything that has underscored that today, it is what I would call the denial panel. It is doing this. I raised two children and it is instructive to raise children. I remember going into a room and saying, ``Who spilled the milk on the rug?'' One would say, ``I wasn't even here.'' He was standing in the room. The other one would say, ``It is my brother.'' You see? This panel reminds me of that. I think there is serious denial on your part. I am sorry to say that but I think that it is absolutely the case. I also think that if I thought so last time around that the university has to go tier by tier in terms of the management team because this is not a management team. This is not a management team in my view. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me again to participate in the subcommittee's investigation in oversight. It is an important one. I believe that this can be fixed but I don't have confidence in terms of the people that are still left in charge. With that, I know that my time is up. The red light is blinking. Thank you. Mr. Greenwood. Thanks, gentlelady. I want to go back, Mr. Salgado, to the e-mail from Milum. Is it your testimony that you had nothing to do with the preparation of this e-mail? Mr. Salgado. I have no recollection of this e-mail. There were a lot of facts that went into it. Mr. Chairman, could you give me the number again? Mr. Greenwood. Yes. It is 47. Did she say to you, ``The University of California wants to know why you fired Walp and Doran and I have to respond to them,'' and ask you any questions as to why they were fired? Mr. Salgado. I have no recollection of the request coming in, No. 1, and so---- Mr. Greenwood. My question is did you have conversations with her about a request or about her communicating to the University of California about why Messrs. Walp and Doran were fired? Mr. Salgado. I don't have a recollection of that conversation specifically, but there were--I am not even sure of the date of this--December 11. Previous to that that she had been engaged in the conversations and helped draft the proposed letter of dismissal so there were conversations that took place. I really have no recollection of this. I don't know whether the request came to her. I guess it came to her specifically. I don't know. Mr. Greenwood. In there she says among the complaints against Walp and Doran was that they had ``no plan for bringing the review to closure.'' This is the Mustang case. Now, to this day LANL has failed to addressed Ms. Anaya's employment status at LANL. She has been on paid leave for over 6 months. The question is is there a plan for bringing this matter to a closure 6 months later? I mean, Walp and Doran were criticized for not bringing it to closure in 4 days. It is still not in closure. It is 6 months later. The woman who is suspect in this case, or at least people suspect that she is responsible for this conduct, is on paid leave. The question is is the pot calling the kettle black here? If these guys are criticized for not bringing this to closure in 4 days, and the Laboratory hasn't closed it for 6 months, should everyone involved in this case be dismissed in the same unceremonious way? Mr. Salgado. Obviously the answer to that question is no. I don't know where that case is. Mr. Greenwood. Do you, Mr. Busboom? Mr. Busboom. No, I don't, sir. Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Dickson? Mr. Dickson. I do, Mr. Chairman. The action on the Lillian Anaya matter was deferred for a number of months with the specific request first of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and, second, request of the DOE IG. Two weeks ago---- Mr. Greenwood. Was that request before or after the 4 days that Messrs. Doran and Walp had responsibility? Mr. Dickson. It was. Those were later. Mr. Greenwood. Afterward. Okay. Mr. Dickson. Those requests were, let us just say, relieved for lack of a better words, about 2 weeks ago. The discipline process has been invoked and it is expected that there will be a review board which is convened next week for the purpose of asking whatever division is to be made with respect to her employment status. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. The e-mail also says that, ``Walp lost or misplaced evidence in his custody. This rationale actually refers to two knives that were stolen from the S Division after they had been received by S Division employee James Mullens from Michael Alexander, the brother of one of the T-33 suspects. At the time that Mullens received items from Mr. Alexander he was serving as the LANL liaison with the FBI. In fact, at this point Mr. Busboom had removed Mr. Walp from his role as FBI liaison and instructed Mr. Walp to have no involvement in the TA-33 matter. Mr. Mullens was holding the Alexander items pursuant to the instructions of FBI Special Agent Camel.'' Mr. Busboom, do you really mean to hold Mr. Walp responsible for the theft of evidence from the investigation from which he had specifically been instructed to stay away? Mr. Busboom. Not as the FBI liaison but as the office leader, certainly. I expected all the property issues to be properly addressed. Mr. Greenwood. In fact, isn't it true that Mr. Walp took immediate action to determine who stole the knives from the evidence custodian and even offered to take a lie detector test regarding this matter. Mr. Busboom. I don't know about the lie detector test but my understanding was that the Inspector General was investigating. Mr. Greenwood. Did Mr. Walp take immediate action? Mr. Busboom. I don't know what immediate action he took. No, sir. Mr. Greenwood. Is it true that following the discovery of the theft of the knives that one of S divisions long-time employees, Bill Sprouse, went home sick for the afternoon and later refused to take a lie detector test regarding the theft of the knives? Mr. Busboom. I am not aware of that, sir. No. Mr. Greenwood. Anybody else aware of that? All right. Do you think that Mr. Walp is responsible for the theft of the knives? Mr. Busboom. No, sir. I think he is responsible for the safeguarding of the evidence. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. And did he--has evidence been safeguarded historically in a different way at the lab? Mr. Busboom. Oh, absolutely. You put in the chain of custody and you lock it up in the evidence locker or in a vault. Yes, sir. Absolutely. Mr. Greenwood. It was in a locked office in a secure building. Was it not? Mr. Busboom. It was in a locked office as far as I understand. Yes, sir. But it was not in the property locker and it was not in chain of custody. Mr. Greenwood. Let me ask this question. I would like you to describe, Mr. Salgado, the interaction with Messrs. Walp and Doran with regard to their firing. This letter was written. They were given the letter. Were they afforded the opportunity to defend themselves? Mr. Salgado. I was not part of that process so I can't answer the question. Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Busboom, do you know the answer to that question? Mr. Busboom. The answer is no. They asked for their resignations and then when they weren't forthcoming, they were terminated 2 weeks later. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Ms. Anaya has taken 6 months, is going before a board. Will she have the opportunity to present her side of the story? Mr. Dickson. Yes, she will. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Mr. Dickson. Ultimately. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Let us assume that hypothetically that the conclusion is that she did wrong and she is terminated here. Okay? Now, I would like you to compare the way that she is handled. She is allegedly a perpetrator of a crime. Messrs. Walp and Doran are people looking for perpetrators of crimes. They are given no opportunity whatsoever to defend themselves. They are told to leave, to resign. They don't resign and they are told that they are fired. I think they are given half an hour to get out. Now, Ms. Anaya, on the other hand, has been waiting 6 months. She is going to come before a board. Why would these two matters of dismissal of an employee be handled in such radically different fashions? Mr. Dickson. The answer is basically a creature of lab policy which is not dissimilar to Government policies all over the place. Congressman, it is normal for Government employers to have what are referred to as probationary period. These employees in these probationary periods are treated as employees at will and they do not have all the due process rights that long-service employees such as Mrs. Anaya had. The problem with Mrs. Anaya's termination all along has been the request and the demands of law enforcement agencies not to disturb the status quo while ultimate decisions are being made with respect to her employment. We would love to have taken action with respect to her entirely back in October. Mr. Greenwood. Let me ask this question. I am sure that--my guess is that Messrs. Doran and Walp were not the first probationary employees to be asked to resign or fired. Is that a fair statement? Mr. Dickson. I am sorry? I think I missed the---- Mr. Greenwood. My guess is that over the course of time other employees at LANL who have been on probationary status have been terminated. Mr. Dickson. That is right. Mr. Greenwood. My question is because they are on probationary status is it the policy of the Laboratory they don't get an opportunity to defend themselves? They can make allegations against probationary employees? Is that the way it works? Mr. Dickson. Well, what that really means is that there is no formal process by which they can complain over their termination. That is not to say that managers will turn a deaf hear if a probationary employee would---- Mr. Greenwood. My question is this. I asked why it was that Messrs. Walp and Doran were not afforded the opportunity to respond to the charges made against them and the causes given to them for why they were fired. The answer is because they were on probation. Mr. Dickson. Yes. Mr. Greenwood. So if that is the answer, then I would assume that is the way you treat all probationary employees. You make allegations about them, they are not afforded an opportunity to respond, and out they go. The allegations against them could be absolutely false but because they are on probationary status, they don't get to offer up their side of the story or defend themselves in any kind of a process. Is that the way it is? Mr. Dickson. That is correct. Mr. Greenwood. That sounds like a terrible policy. Mr. Dickson. Congressman Greenwood, that is in my experience the rule or the policy that exist in every governmental entity in the State of New Mexico and, as far as I know, throughout the country. There is a period of time during which employees come to an organization which they do not accrue the due process rights. We call it the new employee evaluation period. A lot of other places call it probation. That is the way the rule is and whether it is fair or not is open to question. Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Salgado, did you want to make a point? Mr. Salgado. I just want to make a point, Mr. Chairman, that this did not happen in somewhat of the stark vacuum we are talking about. It is my recollection that there were issues of performance that were raised in the early part of September and that those were basically--those issues were gone through the chain of command and that I believe Mr. Busboom or Mr. Tucker had ongoing discussions with Mr. Walp and Doran about their performance. There were these issues that did take place I know in the early part of September and October timeframe. I believe that is correct. Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Busboom, did you have a comment? Mr. Busboom. That is correct, yes. Mr. Greenwood. All right. Mr. Dickson, you want to make a comment? Mr. Dickson. I would like to address the notion of the aggressiveness with which these disciplinary actions have taken. Since the beginning of the Mustang case there have been a lot of attention focused on the Laboratory. The first thing that the Laboratory did in order to rectify the situation was to establish the purchase card review team. In my view that was an aggressive, open, thorough process by which we were going to specifically deal with some of these issues that have been raised by Congresswoman Eshoo. It was an expected outgrowth of that activity that we would discover other acts of misconduct if you are auditing you might find. Parallel to these ongoing events with the purchase card review team was the theft of TA-33. We have coordinated that investigation with the FBI very closely. As a matter of fact, you may recall from your review of the record that we were criticized for having threatened the FBI by saying we are going to move Mr. Bussolini and Mr. Alexander out and thereby disturb the FBI investigation. We needed to get those people out of TA-33. We needed to make sure that the security was preserved and that we didn't suffer any further loss. We gave the FBI a window of time and after a point said this is as far as we can go and took them out. They were dealt with within a matter of days. They are no longer employed by the Laboratory. The force of circumstances in order to accommodate the law enforcement needs, accommodate the security needs and accommodate just the operational needs, we have to make accommodations between the law enforcement and all of these people in order to do things. Some of these delays built into the system are caused by the collaboration among those various entrants. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. I want to thank all the panelists for your testimony, for being here with us voluntarily today. We are going to have to recess now because we have votes on the floor. I would also without objection include into the record Congressman Walden's introductory opening statement. With apologies to the second and third panels, this recess will have to continue until 4. We will return here at 4. [Whereupon, at 1:31 p.m. the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 4 p.m] Mr. Greenwood. We will reconvene and we will call forth Mr. Darling. Mr. Darling, if you would come and be seated. Mr. Bruce Darling is the Senior Vice President of University Affairs and Vice President for Laboratory Management, University of California. Welcome back. Mr. Darling. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Greenwood. We appreciate you being here and we are trying to accommodate your schedule so we will try not to delay you too much. As you recall from the last panel, this is an investigative hearing. We take testimony under oath. Do you have objection to giving your testimony under oath? Mr. Darling. I do not, sure. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Pursuant to the rules of the committee and the House, you are entitled to be represented by counsel. Do you wish to be represented by counsel? Mr. Darling. I do not. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Then if you would stand, raise your right hand. [Witness sworn.] Mr. Greenwood. You are under oath and recognized for your opening statement, sir. TESTIMONY OF BRUCE B. DARLING, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY AFFAIRS, INTERIM VICE PRESIDENT FOR LABORATORY MANAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Mr. Darling. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Deutsch, and members of the committee. First of all, I appreciate your willingness to accommodate me. My father died at the beginning of January, my uncle died at the end of January, and unfortunately my great uncle suffered a stroke Monday. We had to make a difficult decision of terminating life support and I would like to go home and visit him before he dies in the next day or two so I really appreciate your willingness to accommodate me. What I would like to do with your permission is to read my brief oral testimony and then perhaps respond to one or two questions that came up this morning for which I don't think you received a complete answer. Then I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have. Mr. Greenwood. Excellent. Thank you. Mr. Darling. What I would like to do today is to reemphasize to the committee and to the American people that the University of California is committed to reforming the business and management practices at Los Alamos National Laboratory; that senior University officials continue to investigate potential abuses at the Laboratory and to institute appropriate reforms. Our goal remains to raise our business practices to the level of our science and weapons programs and to restore public confidence in the Laboratory and the University. As you know, I was appointed Interim Vice President for Lab Management in addition to my other role at the university on January 8 of this year. At the first hearing on February 26 I provided you with a comprehensive list of options that the University has taken to address the business, procurement, and property problems at the lab. With your permission, what I would like to try to do today is to address several specific issues raised by the committee during the hearing on February 26, 2003. I would just note that on a number of these issues, I have consulted with Steven Doran in the last few days prior to coming here so that you know we are maintaining open communications as we go forward. I would also say that we intend to review each of the answers that we come up with in response to these questions that were raised by Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran and the committee with them and with you and will do so in complete candor. If you have additional information that leads us down another track, we will be happy to pursue that with the same level of diligence. We have continued to make additional management changes at Los Alamos. Most recently we reached settlement agreements with former Security Division Director Stanley Busboom and his Deputy Gene Tucker, as well as with the former Audits and Assessments Director Katherine Brittin. All three will be leaving the Laboratory in April, two retirements and one separation. In addition, our Deputy General Counsel is meeting, as we speak, with the U.S. Attorney in Albuquerque to obtain the additional information we need to make decisions about further management changes at the Laboratory and to better understand some of the circumstances that are still in question about the relationship between the U.S. Attorney and the FBI and Senior Laboratory managers. Another important issue is the current status of the individual who is alleged to have misused her purchase card to attempt to buy a Ford Mustang, Lillian P. Anaya. With the Department of Energy Inspector General's permission the Laboratory is now investigating possible disciplinary action. There was an interview with her on Friday, March 7, and although this requires due process, we expect the matter to be completed and the individual's employment status to be qualified in April. Additionally, I now have more information about Mary Francis Wood and Clarissa Rodriguez in response to Chairman Greenwood's questions during the last hearing. At my direction the Laboratory this week did send a letter to Ms. Wood's employer demanding repayment of the nearly $2,000 inappropriately charged on her purchase card at a casino and elsewhere. We have referred this matter and the Clarissa Rodriguez case, which involved a fraudulent travel voucher, to the Los Alamo District Attorney for possible law enforcement action and we wait his decision. There were a number of additional questions raised about the misuse of the Laboratory's procurement systems. Let me address a number of them: First, the allegation regarding excessive gasoline purchases seems to be explained by an improperly calibrated compressed natural gas pump meter. That meter has been corrected and is now dispensing the same amount of fuel as it shows on the meter. And, further, there was the fact that one of the vehicles that was receiving fuel was a fuel tanker that would take gasoline up to the Laboratory, distribute it then to emergency vehicles that were not supposed to leave the premises, generators and other onsite machinery. This might well explain why there was a high level of gasoline usage that did not correspond with the very low mileage on that tanker truck. Again, we are pursuing these issues and if there is additional information that comes to light, we will pursue that as well. Second, there has been no settlement to date with the Contract Associates matter. I think there was a statement made that the university and the lab had settled up for $50,000. However, the University's Audit Office has confirmed poor controls and record keeping both by the lab and the vendor, and that inadequate controls were built into the contract terms. The new controls are now in place and we have contracted with PricewaterhouseCoopers to conduct a comprehensive contract closeout audit of that contract so we know whether there are any disputed issues that need to be resolved and how to do so. Based on the findings, we will seek appropriate reimbursement from Contract Associates. I might add, we have encouraged competition from a number of other vendors so we are not relying solely on that company to make the purchase of the goods that were previously bought from that company. Finally, questions were raised about the ineffectiveness of the Laboratory's controls over its Local Vendor Agreements (LVAs) and Just-in-Time contracts (JITs). The external review team that was led by two former Federal Inspectors General and PricewaterhouseCoopers did begin a review in mid-January of those procurement practices and it is scheduled to issue its report in April. The University will act aggressively to implement any and all necessary reforms. In the meantime, I should let you know that we have reduced the number of LVAs from 35 to 27, set new restrictions on their use, reviewed each agreement to determine its continued value to the Laboratory, and we are developing additional controls to strengthen these agreements. On security matters, it was alleged that the security clearances of those involved in the thefts at the TA-33 facility had not yet been revoked. We have looked further into this matter and, as I testified before, the clearances were suspended by the Department of Energy at our request a full 6 weeks before they were officially terminated from the Laboratory on December 17, 2002. Finally, there was testimony 2 weeks ago about the current state of morale in the Office of Security Inquiries. While this has been a continuing concern of Interim Director Nanos, I should also note that the University independently dispatched its Director of Security to speak to the OSI staff both as a group and individually. He concluded that morale of the office is indeed poor, that the unit is understaffed and has a large backlog of work. We intend immediately to address these problems, both through reorganization and other steps Interim Director Nanos will take. A number of allegations were made regarding time card and work order fraud. While a 2001 audit does not suggest systemic problems, we intend to expand our 2002 audit procedures to more aggressively look for time and materials overstatements. Additionally, we have discussed this matter with Steven Doran to see if there are any other avenues that he thinks are available that we might pursue. In closing, I want to emphasize, as I did 2 weeks ago, that the University has not and will not let its focus on the important business and management issues that we are discussing today distract the Laboratory from fulfilling its mission to the Nation. We remain focused on ensuring that the Laboratory's scientific and weapons programs continue to meet their objectives. These objectives include ensuring the continued viability of the Nation's nuclear stockpile, monitoring nuclear proliferation around the globe, and helping prevent and prepare for nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks. The work being done at Los Alamos today is as important as at any time in the 60 years that the University has had the privilege and responsibility of managing the Laboratory. We remain honored to oversee this important work on behalf of the Nation. I would like to just conclude by thanking you again for this opportunity to address you. I would be pleased to answer your questions. If I may, I will just respond to some of the items that came up this morning. [The prepared statement of Bruce B. Darling follows:] Prepared Statement of Bruce B. Darling, Senior Vice-President, University Affairs, University of California Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Deutsch, and members of the Committee: I would like to take this opportunity to reemphasize to the Committee and to the American people that the University of California is committed to reforming the business and management practices at Los Alamos National Laboratory that are the focus of this hearing. I would also like briefly to address several specific issues raised the last time I appeared before you about which I now have additional information. Senior University officials continue to investigate potential abuses at the Laboratory and to institute appropriate reforms. As I said the last time I appeared before you, our goal is to raise our business practices to the level of our science and weapons programs-- which all of us agree the nation can be proud of--and in so doing, restore public confidence in the Laboratory and the University. With your permission, I will now address several specific issues raised during the Committee's hearing on February 26, 2003. On a number of these issues, I have consulted with Steven Doran for clarification and additional information. management changes We have continued to make additional management changes at Los Alamos. Most recently we reached settlement agreements with security division director Stanley Busboom and his deputy Gene Tucker. Both will be separated from the Laboratory. We have begun discussions with Katherine Brittin and we expect resolution of her status in the very near future. In addition, our Deputy General Counsel is meeting, as we speak, with the U.S. Attorney in Albuquerque to obtain the additional information we need to make decisions about further management changes. Another important issue is the current status of the individual who is alleged to have misused her purchase card to attempt to buy a Ford Mustang. For some time, the Laboratory refrained from pursuing a personnel action against this individual because of a pending investigation by the Department of Energy Inspector General. The Laboratory recently obtained the Inspector General's assurance that a Laboratory investigation could be conducted without interfering with the Inspector General's investigation. Since receiving the Inspector General's permission, the University has directed the Laboratory to investigate whether disciplinary action is appropriate. As you know, the Laboratory and the University must observe certain requirements of due process in conducting such an investigation. The Laboratory's human resources division is expected to complete its formal investigation by the end of this week. The result may be to convene a Case Review Board to evaluate the findings underway by the human resources division investigation, and to recommend disciplinary action against the individual in question. We expect this process to be completed--and the individual's employment status to be finally resolved--in April. Additionally, I now have more information about Mary Francis Wood and Clarissa Rodriguez in response to Chairman Greenwood's questions during the last hearing. Ms. Wood was a contract employee at the Laboratory who used her purchase card to make cash advances and other inappropriate purchases. The Laboratory terminated her employment on August 19, 2002, and the matter was later referred to the DOE Inspector General. At my direction, the Laboratory this week sent a letter to Ms. Wood's employer demanding repayment of the amounts inappropriately charged on her purchase card. The University has referred this matter to the local New Mexico District Attorney for possible law enforcement action. Clarissa Rodriguez was a Laboratory employee who cashed a fraudulent travel voucher. The Laboratory accepted Ms. Rodriguez's resignation on September 23, 2002, and she repaid the Laboratory on that date. The Rodriguez matter was referred to the DOE Inspector General shortly after the Laboratory learned about it. The University has referred this matter as well to the local District Attorney. To the best of our knowledge, the Inspector General's investigations into the Wood and Rodriguez matters are ongoing. procurement matters There were a number of additional questions raised about the misuse of the Laboratory's procurement systems. Let me address a number of them: First, it was asserted that purchase cards were used to purchase more fuel than fire trucks and other similar vehicles could hold. In looking into this matter, we were informed that some of the purchases involved compressed natural gas that was being dispensed from a gas pump with a miscalibrated meter. (The meter has been re-calibrated to properly record the amount of fuel that is dispensed.) The other purchases involved a dual-tank fuel truck that dispenses fuel to emergency response vehicles, emergency generators and other critical machinery at the Laboratory. This explains the unusually high amount of fuel that was used. In neither case does it appear that there was any fraud or abuse involved. A second issue was the allegation that Contract Associates ``overbilled'' the Lab for millions of dollars and yet the Lab is prepared to settle the case for only $50,000. For the record, there has not been a $50,000 settlement. However, the University's Audit Office has confirmed poor controls and record keeping both by the Lab and the vendor, and that inadequate controls were built into the contract terms. The new controls are now in place and we have contracted with PricewaterhouseCoopers to conduct a comprehensive contract closeout audit, which will be supervised by the UC Auditor. Based on the findings, we will seek appropriate reimbursement from Contract Associates. In addition, several other vendors are now providing the goods provided by Contract Associates so that there is competition in obtaining the goods. Finally, questions were raised about the ineffectiveness of the Laboratory's controls over its Local Vendor Agreements (LVAs) and Just- in-Time contracts (JITs). The University learned about these concerns from Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran several weeks prior to the last hearing. We took these concerns seriously and pursued them immediately, as we have with every other issue that has been raised by Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. In response, we asked the External Review Team chaired by two former federal Inspectors General, and aided by a dozen forensic accountants from PricewaterhouseCoopers to expand its review of the Laboratory's purchase card program to include a review of all Laboratory procurement, including LVA and JIT contracts to determine whether these agreements are vulnerable to abuse. The External Review Team began this project in mid-January; it is scheduled to complete its review and issue a report in April. When the External Review Team's review is completed and its report is issued, the University will act aggressively to implement any and all necessary reforms. In the meantime, we have reduced the number of LVAs from 35 to 27, set new restrictions on their use, reviewed each agreement to determine its continued value to the Laboratory, and we are developing additional controls to strengthen these agreements. security matters It was alleged that the security clearances of those involved in the thefts at the TA-33 facility had not yet been revoked. We have looked further into this matter and, as I testified before, the clearances were suspended by the Department of Energy on October 31, 2002--a full six weeks before the employees' official terminations on December 17, 2002. Finally, there was testimony two weeks ago about the current state of morale in the Office of Security Inquiries. While this has been a continuing concern of Interim Director Nanos, the University independently dispatched a representative to speak to the OSI staff both as a group and individually. He concluded that morale is indeed ``poor,'' that the unit is understaffed and has a large backlog of work, and that it remains divided between those who share Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran's concerns and those who reject the allegations made about inadequate reporting and poor accountability. We intend immediately to address these problems, both through reorganization and other steps Interim Director Nanos will take. time card and work order fraud A number of allegations were made regarding time card and work order fraud. While a 2001 audit does not suggest systemic problems, we intend to expand our 2002 audit procedures to more aggressively look for time and materials overstatements. Additionally, we have discussed this matter with Steven Doran, in his new capacity as the Director of Security for the Office of the President, to determine other avenues for possible investigation. In closing, I want to emphasize, as I did two weeks ago, that the University has not and will not let its focus on the important business and management issues that we are discussing today distract the Laboratory from fulfilling its mission to the nation. We remain focused on ensuring that the Laboratory's scientific and weapons programs continue to meet their objectives. These objectives include ensuring the continued viability of the nation's nuclear stockpile, monitoring nuclear proliferation around the globe, and helping prevent and prepare for nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks. The work being done at Los Alamos today is as important as at any time in the 60 years that the University has had the privilege and responsibility of managing the Laboratory. We remain honored to oversee this important work on behalf of the nation. Thank you again for this opportunity to address the Committee. I would be pleased to answer your questions. Mr. Greenwood. Why don't you just go right ahead and do that. Mr. Darling. Thank you. One of the questions that came up this morning was is any of the material that appeared in the 30-pound box of Laboratory documents that went to the Albuquerque Journal classified information. This was an area of concern to us and with the cooperation of both the attorney for the Albuquerque Journal and the publisher of the Albuquerque Journal we were able to have a national nuclear security administration classifying official go out, review the documents, and determine that there are no classified documents in that material and so we are all comforted to know that there was no breach of national security by the release of those documents to the newspaper. In addition, you asked about two key meetings. One was the meeting with the FBI and senior Laboratory management officials. Just to clarify, that was a meeting that took place on October 24, to the best of my recollection. It was a meeting between Mr. Salgado and Mr. Dickson from the Laboratory and the U.S. Attorney, and I believe some FBI agents. That remains a very important meeting because that is the meeting at which there continue to remain differences of opinion about what the U.S. Attorney and the FBI conveyed to the Laboratory officials about either their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with Mr. Walp's and Mr. Doran's performance. You also asked about the date of the meeting in which senior Laboratory officials met to determine the fate of Mr. Walp and Doran. To be clear, to the best of my knowledge, that was on November 18. There was some confusion about who was present at that meeting. I believe it was said that Mr. Busboom and Mr. Marquez were present. To the best of my knowledge they were not present. In previous meetings they told us that they were not members of that meeting in which Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran's fate were discussed. I believe the participants in that meeting were Mr. Salgado, Ms. Milum, Mr. Dickson, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Kruger. So I would be happy at this point, Mr. Chairman, to answer any other questions you might have. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Darling. The Chair recognizes himself for 10 minutes. On December 18, 2002, you interviewed several people including Mr. Salgado. At that time you took extensive notes. During your interviews you asked Mr. Salgado to explain why LANL fired Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. You previously testified that Mr. Salgado told you he was concerned that Walp and Doran would obtain whistleblower status following their anticipated meeting with the Department of Energy Inspector General. Reportedly he also told you that he suspected that they were the source of the anonymous 30-pound box of documents that were delivered to the Albuquerque Journal to which you just referred. Can you tell the subcommittee about your interview with Mr. Salgado and whether any of the other people you interviewed told you that they had discussed Walp and Doran's potential whistleblower status with Mr. Salgado prior to their firing. Mr. Darling. Yes, I would be pleased to. As I indicated at the last hearing, we interviewed 14 officials both at Los Alamos and at the university over a 2-day period, December 18 and 19. What emerged was a story with many consistencies and a few striking differences. Mr. Salgado was very candid with us. He told us that the meeting that I just described on November 18 had taken place. He described that Mr. Busboom, who was Mr. Walp's and Mr. Doran's immediate supervisor, was not present in the room. He indicated that there were two issues that were discussed that was related to their termination during their new employee evaluation period. One of those items was that the Inspector General had sent an official from Washington, DC to Los Alamos to interview employees at the lab. That Mr. Salgado had spoken to the DOE Inspector General. That the DOE Inspector General refused to tell him who the representative was going to interview at the lab and that he suspected that it was going to be Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. He did indicate to us, as he said today, that he thought there were a number of performance issues which contributed to the decision to terminate their employment. But he did go on to say that he was concerned that if Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were interviewed by the Inspector General, that would somehow confer, I think the term he used was technical whistle blower status on them and that it would make it more difficult for them to be terminated after that meeting. One of the reasons for making the decision to terminate them when they did was because of that forthcoming meeting. Second--I am sorry. I have forgotten your second point. Mr. Greenwood. So have I. Oh, the 30-pound box of documents. Yes. Did he raise that issue? Mr. Darling. Yes, he did. He indicated--no, I am sorry. There was a separate meeting on December 12 at which some of us met with Secretary Abraham, Deputy Secretary Costello and NNSA Administrator Brooks. It was in that meeting that he told the Secretary that he suspected, though I think the term he used was it is very likely that it was Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran who had provided the materials to the Albuquerque Journal and that he was certain that the box of documents had come from the Office of Security Inquiries. Mr. Abraham, the Secretary, I think captured all of our feelings at that meeting when he responded by saying, ``If you do not know that to be a fact, you should not be raising that issue. It undermines your case and it is not something that you should be saying.'' As I said, I think that echoed the sentiments of everyone else in the room at that time. Mr. Greenwood. The University of California terminated Mr. Busboom's association with the lab yesterday. Is that correct? Mr. Darling. Mr. Busboom will retire on April 2. I believe the agreement with Mr. Busboom was reached at the end of last week if I recall correctly. Mr. Greenwood. And why did the university want Mr. Busboom to retire? Mr. Darling. We had three options. One option was to terminate Mr. Busboom. A second option was to allow him to take the position that I described at the last hearing with a reduced salary. I think his salary currently is $190,000 and the law practice would have been to reduce it to, in this case, $140,000 commensurate with responsibilities of the new position that had been identified. The third was to reach a legal settlement. Given his prior performance as reflected in the performance evaluations that are in Laboratory files, our general counsel said that if we did terminate him, that he would have strong grounds for a wrongful termination suit. In these wrongful termination suits he would prevail and that the Laboratory would be responsible for paying many, many multiples of what it is that we have agreed to settle for. If you pursue the second option, which was to allow Mr. Busboom to be reassigned to an additional position--a new position at the lab at a lower salary, we would then be faced with paying that lower salary for an indefinite period of time. As you might imagine, as the years would roll on that would also amount to a very large amount of money. What we decided is in view of the recent events, the best thing that we could do for Mr. Busboom and for the Laboratory and for the American people would be to allow him to retire and to provide him with a fair settlement. Mr. Greenwood. And what was that? Mr. Darling. That fair settlement is a 12-month compensation equal to his current compensation of $190,000 per year, COBRA health insurance benefits for that same period of time, and his attorney's fees. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. You just explained to me how you could terminate the relationship or change the relationship with Mr. Busboom. My question is why? In other words, Mr. Busboom sat here and you were here and basically said he didn't do anything wrong. Your attorney said he advised you that if he had a strong wrongful termination case, that he could win. Under those circumstances why did the university want him to be gone? Mr. Darling. Well, we believe that the circumstances surrounding the termination of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were inappropriate. That we received discrepant views from Mr. Busboom and Mr. Tucker in our meeting with them on December 18 about why they were hired in the first place. What degree of authority they were to be given at the Laboratory for conducting their investigations. And I would just summarize it by saying that if we were told they were only to do inquiries and not investigations and that was an important distinction for the Security Division. On the plane home that night as we reviewed documents, what we found was that the job description, the job announcement, and the job advertisement all suggested that they were being hired to do investigations which I think conveys a different level of seriousness about the matter than just an inquiry. And that we did not believe that either the Laboratory Security Division or the senior management of the lab took appropriate steps to guide them, to try to reconcile the issues that came up that caused the conflict that you heard about today, and ultimately the decision to terminate them was an unwarranted decision and so we have made that decision for that reason. Mr. Greenwood. How about Mr. Salgado? Tell us about his separation. Mr. Darling. I was not directly involved with Mr. Salgado. Dr. McTague, who will appear on a later panel, was the Vice President for Lab Management at that time. When Dr. Browne informed President Atkinson, I believe, on December 23 that he intended to resign from the Laboratory, Dr. McTague spoke to Mr. Salgado. Mr. Salgado had not yet heard the news. My notes reflect the fact that Mr. Salgado told Dr. McTague that Mr. Salgado would step down as well. He was prepared to assume responsibility for what had happened. The understanding between them, I believe, was that Mr. Salgado would come to work in Dr. McTague's office for a period of 6 months or be compensated for a period of 6 months. There was somehow a breakdown in communication because Mr. Salgado says that he did not learn that he was separating from the Laboratory until January 2 when the university issued the press announcement. I can't explain that discrepancy but then the university began a series of negotiations with Mr. Salgado. Those negotiations concluded on January 31 without reaching agreement and the president decided on January 31 to terminate Mr. Salgado who is an at-will employee and, therefore, could be terminated whereas Mr. Salgado and others, that I am sure we will be talking about, were not at-will employees. Excuse me, Mr. Busboom. Thank you, Mr. Walden. Mr. Greenwood. You testified that Charles Lobello, one of the University of California's outside counsel, was scheduled to meet with the U.S. Attorney's Office in New Mexico today. What do you hope to learn from the U.S. Attorney in New Mexico and has the University of California had any other substantive discussions with the U.S. Attorney or the FBI regarding the LANL investigations of 2002? Mr. Darling. Yes. Both Mr. Lobello, former U.S. Attorney, and Mr. Lumburg, our Deputy General Counsel, are in Albuquerque today to meet with a number, I think four or five members of the U.S. Attorney's Office there. This is something that we sought to do beginning of December right after December 18 when we learned more details about the terminations of Mr. Walp and Doran, but this is the first occasion that it was possible to hold that meeting. We had no substantive discussions up until then. There have been a number of discussions trying to explain what our intentions our, trying to schedule the meetings, etc. This will be the first meeting. The purpose of the meeting is to try to find out, one, what were the relationships between the Laboratory and the U.S. Attorney and the FBI. Were they good. Were they not. Were there differences in the relationship between Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, on the one hand, and the senior Laboratory management on another. Is it possible that senior FBI officials were saying one thing to Mr. Dickson and Mr. Salgado and yet the agent involved in the case was saying something different to Mr. Walp and Doran that specifically relates to the question of whether Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were authorized or not authorized to provide information about cases being reviewed by the FBI to senior Laboratory management. Third, how might we keep that relationship strong and more productive in the future. Last, whatever information they might have about the cases that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were pursuing and how is it that they view the professionalism and the competence of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Darling. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Davis, for 10 minutes. Mr. Davis. Mr. Darling, before it becomes painfully obvious I will confess to you that I have stepped into the middle of this and I will do my best to try to handle this in a competent fashion. I am going to read you some questions that have been prepared by our staff and perhaps some of these points have been covered if I am not being sufficiently clear. I am sure you will help me. One of the points that was surprising to us this morning is Mr. Salgado stated that the cultural issues at Los Alamos including the lack of operational formality and management discipline caused many of the problems. But the evidence further suggest that neither Mr. Salgado nor Mr. Dickson really practiced operational formality or management discipline in their dealings with Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. Both of them moved outside their designated roles to try to run criminal investigations instead of leaving that job to the professionals the lab had hired. Mr. Salgado wanted to direct on a daily basis the Mustang investigation. Mr. Dickson wanted to be in charge of the TA-33 investigation and control all the communications with the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office. Is this the way you view the situation as well? Mr. Darling. One of the conclusions that I think came-- there were five people who met with me at the Laboratory to pursue these matters. I think it is fair to say that all of our view was that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were being held to more exacting standard of competence than Laboratory management was holding either other employees or holding itself. I will give you a couple of examples that were brought up this morning. You will recall that Mr. Dickson and Mr. Salgado said that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran provided inaccurate information about an address for Lillian P. Anaya. The confusion arose because there is another employee that I should add very clearly here was not involved in any of these matters but who has the name of Lillian M. Anaya. There was some initial confusion during that short period on which they were working on the Mustang case about whose address should be examined for the purposes of finding out where the Mustang had been delivered. We were told that was inaccurate information because they provided Lillian M. Anaya's address. Yet, that night on the plane flying home when we reviewed a Laboratory document that was being supported by the Laboratory administration, we found four separate addresses for Lillian P. and Lillian M. Anaya, none of which corresponded to the address that the Laboratory had told us was the correct address. Now, if there was that much confusion on the part of the Laboratory management and its advisors about the address, yet they did not hold themself to that same standard of accuracy, we did not understand why it was that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were being held to that standard of accuracy and why it was that that fact was a fact that was used for their termination. That is one example of the type of issues that we found very troubling that led us to pursue the matter with the degree that we have and finally to reinstate the employment of both of these individuals. There were other discrepancies like this. That wasn't the only one. Mr. Davis. One of the surprising points is that Mr. Walp and Doran were never allowed to attend meetings with Mr. Salgado and Mr. Dickson. Mr. Walp's counterpart at the FBI often attended, however. How was Mr. Walp supposed to understand the agreements made or have any input into them if he couldn't attend these meetings? Mr. Darling. Well, I think the Laboratory administration would say that Mr. Dickson was assigned the responsibility for liaison to the FBI and the U.S. Attorney so it was appropriate for that to take place. Like you, I come to the conclusion that the people who are working on issues need to be deeply involved. They are the ones who hold the facts and it is very important that those work as a team. I, again, do not believe that the Laboratory administration reflected that sense of a team involving the people who had the greatest responsibility in these matters and I think that was a misjudgment on their part. Mr. Davis. I believe it was Mr. Salgado who said he had only spoken to Mr. Walp a few times. Yet, he had a strong opinion that Mr. Walp was not competent. Does it surprise you that he never asked Mr. Walp about any of his complaints? Mr. Darling. That is one of the troubling issues. As I say, the October 24 meeting was a key meeting that was cited as a reason for terminating Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. Mr. Salgado told us that he came back from that meeting having heard from those officials that the lab had blown the Mustang case. Mr. Salgado came back from that meeting telling us that he believed that meant that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran had blown the Mustang case. Mr. Salgado came back from that meeting thinking that the U.S. Attorney and the FBI were saying that Mr. Salgado had blown the case by the aggressive nature in which he pursued it. Am I misusing names again? Mr. Walden. I think you meant either Mr. Dickson or Mr. Busboom came back. Mr. Darling. I meant Mr. Dickson came back. Mr. Dickson, who had accompanied Mr. Salgado had a different interpretation of the message. I am sorry for confusing names here today. Mr. Dickson believed it was Mr. Salgado who was being pointed to by the U.S. Attorney for blowing the case by pursuing it before the FBI was able to develop a case. Now, our question was why did they not speak to each other about that? Why did they not speak to Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran about that? Why did they not ask the U.S. Attorney and the FBI about that? Therefore, when you take the action to terminate someone and you do it on the ground that you are going to cite later, it seems to me you have a deep responsibility to inquire a little bit further than just wondering about what someone said. You have the responsibility to go back and be sure of what someone said. Mr. Davis. Just one more question. If you will bear with me, I am going to read you something that our counsel is attempting to write right now more abbreviated. There has been discussion about changing the 60-year-old culture at Los Alamos. Yesterday at a hearing in the California State Senate the university's treatment of whistleblowers was challenged. Mr. Nanos admitted that he had not been kind to whistleblowers. I want to refer you to a case we have begun to look into as an example of what can happen. With reference to Tab 132, this is a report from an administrative law judge concerning the termination of Jimmy Russell from S Division. Mr. Russell was a contract employee who had worked at S Division for 15 years. He was a self-assessment team leader, did audits and assessments of security programs. In 1999 he had a dispute over whether certain data should be identified as security infractions or security incidents. Shortly thereafter he was terminated and removed from the work place for threatening behavior. His group leader, Kevin Leifheight and Mr. Busboom were specifically cited as playing a crucial role in collecting and transmitting unfounded allegations of Mr. Russell's threatening behavior. The Judge further found the consensus for the immediate termination of Mr. Russell. It was reached by an emergency advisory panel at LANL, was substantially tainted by the selective and misleading information that it received from these UC managers. Mr. Russell won in court but lost his job. No disciplinary action was ever taken against either one of these gentlemen. One of the members of the emergency panel told us that Mr. Russell was not dangerous and that he simply went along with Mr. Busboom and Leifheight. We are going to look into this further and want you to promise that you will also look into the treatment of Mr. Russell and his accusers who were found in the wrong. Mr. Russell was unemployed for 2 years and lost an opportunity to become a lab employee because of these actions by Mr. Busboom, Mr. Leifheight. He is not the first Los Alamos contractor employee who has found himself in the street as the barrier of bad tidings. This is what you need to deal with if you are going to change the culture at the Laboratory. What can you do in this situation? Mr. Darling. Mr. Davis, let me just say that Admiral Nanos is the new interim director so he has only been on the job since January 6 so I don't think he has helped create that culture. I think he is one of the individuals who is involved in trying to change that. He has been very open. He has been holding meetings with all Laboratory employees receiving hundreds of e-mails from employees. I think there is a sincere belief on the part of the lab employees that he will help open up the communication for the reasons that you mentioned. With regard to Mr. Russell I first learned about the case in a question from Mr. Deutsch at the hearing on February 26. We have reviewed the decision by the representative of the Department of Energy. We have not talked to counsel that represented the Laboratory which is something we are seeking to do and we need to do. Unfortunately, it appears to be a case in which the personnel in the Office of Securities Inquiries failed to sufficiently analyze the underlying fact of the case. It appeared there was a failure to resolve issues short of an administrative hearing. It appeared that there was an underlying distrust reflected in what I briefly read in the decision from the Department of Energy official toward the Laboratory officials who were dealing with Mr. Russell so we need to understand a few more facts which we are trying to do in order to address your question. The first fact why the supervisors in the Office of Security Inquiries did not do an in depth analysis of the facts prior to termination. Second, why the deficiencies in the evidence and why was there no effort made to reconcile these differences before the termination. I think we have some of the same questions in this case that I alluded to in the case of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran and it is something we are pursuing right now. Mr. Davis. Once you conclude your analysis, what conceivably is the best thing you could do to compensate Mr. Russell and to send the appropriate message about how people will be treated henceforth in situations like that? Mr. Darling. That is a good question, Mr. Davis, but I think it would be premature of me to try to respond. We really don't know the full set of facts. We are pursing them seriously. Once we have them, I think as you have seen in many of our options, we are prepared to take action. We will not be reluctant to do so. I think it is important that we look at the facts first. Mr. Walden. Thank you, Mr. Davis. Mr. Darling, let me just read for the record here part of a statement from the decisionmaker in the case. It says, ``I find the UC based its decision to terminate his assignment [meaning Mr. Russell] on the alleged incident of threatening behavior by Mr. Russell which lacked any substantial factual basis and other incidents were grossly exaggerated. Moreover, I find that Mr. Russell's supervisor, his group leader, and his division director appeared to have played a crucial role in collecting and transmitting unfounded allegations of Mr. Russell's threatening behavior.'' It goes on from there. I am sure you have read. Mr. Darling. I have skimmed it. Mr. Walden. Who is his supervisor or who made the decision to terminate? Was that Mr. Busboom? Mr. Darling. Mr. Walden, you are taking me beyond a level of knowledge that I have. As I said, I have just learned about this. I have not read the full case so I am not able to answer that question. Mr. Walden. That goes back to July 2000, I think. It would be interesting to know. That is a pretty damning indictment, frankly, from an administrative law judge. Mr. Darling. It is a very troubling statement. Mr. Walden. I don't envy the task that you have agreed to walk into either, Mr. Darling. You have a lot on your plate. I have a question, though. Several of them. Maybe we can move through them. So Mr. Busboom is going to get paid $191,000 salary, his insurance for a year, and his attorney's fees? Mr. Darling. Yes. I believe the figure is $190,000 but I am not going to quibble. Mr. Walden. $190. Okay. Mr. Salgado is terminated without any compensation because he is an at-will employee. Mr. Darling. That is correct. Mr. Walden. What about Mr. Doran? What is his status right now in terms of settlement? Mr. Darling. I am glad you asked. You asked that question at the last hearing and I had to go off and attend to other duties. Mr. Doran is someone with whom we were negotiating since we reinstated him on January 17. He is now employed by the President's Office of the University of California as Director of Security for the Office of the President to do two things. One is to oversee the security guards that we have in the building. The second is to assist Senior Vice President Molinex who is responsible for business and financial matters and the university auditor who reports to Mr. Molinex and any special investigations that they deem appropriate at any of our 10 campuses or three national laboratories. Mr. Walden. So his status is settled? Mr. Darling. It was settled. I learned this morning from his attorney, Ms. Bonabe--we though we had an agreement in terms of the settlement. I learned from her this morning that there is one outstanding issue. I believe she is here, or at least was here. It is something we are trying to understand and resolve as quickly as possible in the same sense of openness and fairness in which we have pursued his rehiring in the first place. Mr. Walden. How much compensation is he seeking? Mr. Darling. Let me see if my memory will serve me well here. I believe his compensation is $105,000 per year. That is for working at the university. Mr. Walden. Right. In terms of a settlement? Mr. Darling. There is a settlement amount. I am sorry but I am just drawing a blank on the dollar amount. Mr. Walden. Perhaps we can get that at some point. Mr. Darling. If you will bear with me for a moment I have something here but I don't know if it has--no, I am sorry. I do not have those details. I would be happy to report back to you. Mr. Walden. I guess at least the fundamental question with these sorts of settlements, who actually ends up paying that? Mr. Darling. I am glad you asked that question. Mr. Walden. Does that get billed back to the Federal Government? Mr. Darling. No. With many of the costs that we have taken on whether it be hiring in PricewaterhouseCoopers, whether it is hiring Ernst & Young, all of these settlement agreements will be paid for by the university. We will not seek reimbursement from the Federal Government for them. Mr. Walden. Mr. Darling, I am told that recently LANL disclosed that an employee came forward to declare that for a number of years he had been selling LANL computer source codes and then using the proceeds to purchase new computers for his section routing the money through his personal bank account. Who is handling this matter? What is the status of the review? Have you determined whether any LANL funds or computers were converted to this employee or others for personal gain or benefit? Mr. Darling. Yes. I learned about this, I believe, about the time of the last hearing or shortly thereafter. There was an individual who was writing unclassified computer code. I just want to emphasize that so we don't get confused with any national security issues. Apparently we have an apparatus where one can take technology and license it to the private sector so that we get good ideas into the market place and that way, I think, do the American public a great service from inventions developed with Federal funds. He instead apparently chose to go around that process either out of frustration with it or for some other reason. I don't know. I don't want to attribute motives. He did, indeed, license that software code to a number of firms. We are looking into that. The university auditor is looking into that aggressively. One of the issues we had to deal with was whether to put him on investigatory leave while this was going on. The decision was made that since he was very cooperative there was no need to do that. We have learned that there are at least $100,000 involved. Perhaps more. He says he used it solely to make purchases at the Laboratory and that is one of the things we will be investigating along with, frankly, reviewing all of his bank records and any other financial transactions and see if that is true. Mr. Walden. I appreciate that, Mr. Darling. I guess the entrepreneurial spirit is alive and well at the lab. We have seen a number of different examples, this being among them. What are the safeguards? How do you know that somebody else isn't doing this that hasn't come forward or hasn't been caught? How do you keep track of that? Do you feel the system is adequate? Mr. Darling. Mr. Walden, I don't know the system at Los Alamos very well. The University of California has one of the most--let me just back up and say this comes about as a result of the Bayh Act in the early 1980's. The idea was to take ideas that at that point languished within the realm of the Federal Government, put them to work in the market place, and drive the creation of new companies, jobs for people, and much of what you have seen. The University of California is the largest licenser of technology of any university in the United States. I believe our revenues last year were around $80 million from licensing everything from technology, etc. We have a very good system. You are obliged as an employee when you go to work at the university, or one of our labs, to sign an agreement that you will turn over all of your patentable inventions to the University of California. We then have a process that provides an incentive back to the scientists so that they will receive personally some of the money in return. The department will receive the money and the university will receive some money in order to achieve that. We have a process that is reviewed, audited, and so forth in order to try to ensure the sanctity of that. Mr. Walden. Yes. I understand. I guess my question would be the process for somebody who wants to play by the process is pretty easy to follow. The question is what are the safeguards to make sure that somebody doesn't go around that. I assume you will be looking into that. Mr. Darling. Yes. Mr. Walden. Reportedly the FBI recently interviewed Janet Campbell, an architect formerly employed by UCSF regarding allegations that certain construction engineering contractors violated California law regarding bids for UC construction projects. Are you aware of any lawsuits or allegations of bid rigging, price bundling, or improper drafting of proprietary building specifications at recent UC construction projects at LANL or Sandia? Mr. Darling. I am not. I did learn from Mr. Molinex that there was a complaint. I don't know whether it was by this individual. We are looking into a complaint. I was not aware that it was at Los Alamos. Sandia is a separate Laboratory. I am not aware of anything to do with Sandia. Mr. Walden. Reportedly the plaintiff in one of these lawsuits against UC is scheduled to meet with the representatives of the UC Office of the President and has asked that Mr. Doran attend this meeting. Apparently UC has denied this request. Do you have any information on that? Mr. Darling. That is the first I have heard about this, Mr. Walden. I would be happy to inquire about it as soon as the hearing is over. Mr. Walden. Mr. Busboom was paid to retire. What about Tucker and Katherine Brittin? Mr. Darling. Mr. Tucker is a very similar circumstance to Mr. Busboom. He will also be retiring on April 2. The terms of the agreement are quite similar. One year of compensation at his compensation which I believe is $165,000 per annum, 1 year of COBRA insurance benefits, and, in this case, partial attorney's fees. Mr. Walden. And Katherine Brittin? Mr. Darling. Katherine Brittin will be departing from the Laboratory on April 17. We have provided, again, for the same reasons that I explained earlier, 1 year of salary, 18 months of COBRA benefits but no attorney's fees or other costs. Mr. Walden. All right. Mr. Darling. I realize that these are very large numbers. For many Americans these are salaries that they might never be able to aspire to in a lifetime. I don't want to minimize in any way the dollar amounts involved, but I do want to just to reiterate that when we looked at the alternatives, they would have indeed been much, much more expensive. Mr. Walden. There are a lot of people in my district who would love to come there and get fired or retire early. Mr. Darling. I understand that. Mr. Walden. It is outrageous. I understand, I guess, what you face. It seemed to me that given the issues that are involved in the lab and the people that have not been held responsible in any measure seem to be able to milk this system and walk out the door with an extraordinary settlement and---- Mr. Darling. Mr. Walden, your display is one that my colleagues that are here with me today have seen me express in recent weeks as I have pursued how it is that we might come to a different conclusion here. They will tell you that I pushed very hard for termination. It was only after repeated attempts on my part to find a way to do so that we ended up where we are today. Mr. Walden. Do you concur with the IG's comment that it was, I believe the term was, incomprehensible that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were fired? Mr. Darling. I do. In my oral testimony on February 26 I said that not only was it unwarranted, but that we did agree with the DOE Inspector General's term that we found it utterly incomprehensible. Mr. Walden. If everybody agrees that it is incomprehensible, why isn't the person who did the firing and signed the letter fired without compensation? Mr. Darling. Mr. Salgado was terminated without compensation. Mr. Walden. Mr. Busboom signed the letter. Didn't he? Mr. Darling. Yes, he did. I think, however, he testified today that he did not make the decision and that is one of the points of discrepancy that became evident on December 18. Mr. Busboom told us initially that he had made the decision to terminate them for a variety of performance reasons. Then as we progressed through the day and informed Mr. Busboom that there had been a meeting on November 18 at which their termination was discussed and ultimately settled, we asked Mr. Busboom whether he had been aware of that meeting. Mr. Busboom expressed great surprise. He had not only not participated in the meeting, he had not been aware that the meeting had taken place. He had not been aware that the chief of staff, the director and deputy director of the Laboratory, had offered the termination letter. He only knew that it came from his immediate supervisor, Mr. Holt. I think Mr. Busboom would acknowledge as he did today that he did not make the termination decision, that it was made by Mr. Salgado. I think I heard him say that earlier this morning. Mr. Walden. But it sounds like you just said that he told you initially that he made it based on a series of reports. Mr. Darling. I believe he thought he did. Then I think as we pursued our interviews with the 14 people and new information came out, I think we gave Mr. Busboom information that caused him to realize that he had not after all made the decision, that the decision had been made for him and the letter had been drafted for him. I would say what he did was he probably believed there were performance inadequacies that might have justified the termination and he edited very slightly the letter but the decision was made by Mr. Salgado as he said to us, and as he said to you. Mr. Walden. My time has expired but that is the most bizarre story I have ever heard in employment and I have been a private employer for 17 years. I don't understand how somebody thinks they are letting somebody go and then discovers they really didn't do it. Mr. Darling. It is another instance of troubling issues that left us not only perplexed but troubled and why it is that we pursued the issues well before we knew that your committee was even interested. This was a very troubling matter to the five of us as you might imagine. Mr. Walden. I can. Mr. Greenwood. My wife just got me to buy her new drapes and she convinced me it was my idea. Mr. Darling. I think the chairman had seen the movie ``My Big Fat Greek Wedding'' where one can see an example of that transaction taking place. Mr. Walden. And now for either a song or a poem, I hope. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey, is recognized for 10 minutes. Mr. Markey. I can actually go to ``My Big Fat Greek Wedding'' and I think I am going to go to that for my opening moment then. I will say that the problem with the University of California, Mr. Darling, is that they thought they could spray Windex on anything and it would make it okay like the father in ``My Big Fat Greek Wedding.'' It is important ultimately to have to deal with the issues. You just can't spray it away and hope that it is gone. The questions I have for you relate to the way the University of California treats whistleblowers. In the case of Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, their stories were all over the press. Congress weighed in. UC has, at least, partially remedied the situation. Not all whistleblowers at UC get much attention. Take, for example, Dee Kotla who worked for Livermore until 1997. She was fired after she testified that she had witnessed sexual harassment at the lab. The lab said she hadn't been retaliated against but rather was fired for ``improperly using her telephone and computer.'' It turned out she made a whopping $4.30 worth of personal calls. She sued and she won $1 million. The university appealed. She then asked for her legal fees, about $700,000 to be paid by UC, and she won that, too. The University of California continues to appeal. The University has run up at least $800,000 in legal fees fighting this case for 6 years, all over $4.30 worth of personal calls bringing the grand total to $2.5 million, all supposedly because of a $4.30 telephone call. In the meantime, Dee Kotla has to live each day of her life explaining why she was fired to perspective employers. Now, my question is, Mr. Darling, are you going to pay for all these legal fees or is the Federal Government going to pay for all the legal fees? Mr. Darling. I do not know the answer to that question, Mr. Markey, because I am not familiar with the case, but I assure you I will look into it. Mr. Markey. Well, again, you said earlier, ``We are going to pay for the legal fees'' in this one case that we were talking about. I wouldn't want anyone to get the misimpression that you are willing to assume all of these legal fees since the Federal Government ultimately reimburses you, the Department of Energy. Unfortunately, that creates a disincentive for you to settle since the Department of Energy will reimburse you for continuing on with this case indefinitely over a $4.30 phone call. I will get to my question momentarily, but before I do I want to name just a few other whistleblowers that the University of California has forced to fight for justice for years since they have not had the benefit of major press attention or a congressional hearing. Michele Doggett. I would like to say her name. She was fired by Livermore in 1999 after she disclosed waste, fraud, and mismanagement. Don Adrian who alleges that in 1997 Livermore conspired to steal a defense contract from his company after he reported waste, fraud, and mismanagement of funds that the lab was supposed to use as part of a cooperative research and development agreement. Janet Benson who has had a whistleblower case pending against Livermore since 1994. Charles Quinones, a security guard, fired by Livermore right after September 11 after he disclosed security and safety problems. And you have already been talking about Jimmy Russell, a former Los Alamos employee who was fired after making disclosures of security violations who had to fight for years with no income before he finally won. Is the University of California, Mr. Darling, committed to quickly resolving these and the other whistleblower cases? Mr. Darling. Mr. Markey, you bring these to my attention for the first time. I have only been in this position since January 8, as I mentioned before you came into the room. If you bring them to our attention, we will look into them with a degree of seriousness that we have shown thus far. Mr. Markey. The university often argues in court that it has State sovereign immunity and, therefore, can't be sued under Federal statutes even though these activities occurred at a Federal nuclear weapons lab. It then turns around and bills DOE and American taxpayers for its legal fees. How do you justify that? Mr. Darling. I am not an attorney and I am simply not in the position to have the information to comment in response to your question. Mr. Markey. Okay. Now, in each of these cases that I have just listed, is it your understanding that the Department of Energy will bear the legal cost or will the University of California will bear the legal costs? Mr. Darling. Since this is the first time I have heard of them, I am in no position to answer you either way. Mr. Markey. Again, I continue to believe that 95 percent of these costs are passed onto the Department of Energy, again creating a tremendous disincentive for you to ever settle since the Federal taxpayer will pick up the legal fees. As a result, you could continue harassing these poor people forever at Federal taxpayers' expense. I just think there is a point in time at which this just has to end. If you are willing to put these bills on the University of California, these incredible legal bills, that is one thing, but if you going to try to continue to put this on the Federal tab, believe me, okay, it is not going to last much longer because I think there is a bipartisan commitment here to end this practice of harassing these people indefinitely. Now, you said earlier that one of the individuals who fired the two Los Alamos whistleblowers just agreed to leave the lab for settlement of $190,000, health insurance, and all his legal fees. This is the guy who fired the whistleblowers. Have you ever offered a year's salary, health insurance, and legal fees to Mr. Walp or to the other whistleblowers who were wrongly fired? Mr. Darling. Mr. Markey, we had an extended discussion about this right before you walked into the room. I did say that the individual who terminated their employment was terminated himself with no compensation whatsoever. Second, we have rehired both Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran at their full former salaries. I think we have shown the seriousness of intent here to try to redress these improper activities. Mr. Markey. So Walp is a consultant and you have rehired him? Mr. Darling. We rehired both Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. Let me just back up and walk you through the sequence. We learned about their determination on November 25 midday. They had been terminated and escorted off the lab property that morning. We immediately began to pursue information because we did not feel that the reasons that were offered to us for their termination were appropriate. In late December after we learned that they had an attorney we started meeting with them. That meeting occurred on January 17. As I explained at the last hearing, once we had an opportunity to meet with them and hear their story, we immediately offered to rehire them and did so that very day. Coincidentally, that was the day a letter arrived from, I believe, this committee urging us to do that same thing. Your investigators had met with them beforehand and I think it was a display of our honesty and integrity that we came to the same conclusion that you did and decided to rehire them. They were rehired not only from that day forward, Mr. Markey, but we did pay their retroactive pay back to the date they were originally fired and we immediately entered into settlement discussions to try to compensate them financially for the fact that they had been terminated improperly in our judgment. In addition to that, we have with the exception of the one item I mentioned a moment ago to your colleagues reached agreement with Mr. Darling going forward to assume the new position at the university. With regard to Mr. Walp, Mr. Walp's attorney and our attorney are still in settlement discussions so I am not able to comment further on that. Mr. Markey. I guess what I would say is that if the guy who fired the whistleblowers gets $190,000, health insurance, and all his legal fees, somebody who gets fired should at least be offered the same deal. If it is not that as a minimum, then you have to question whether or not there is an uneven playing field still in existence at UC in terms of how you view these two groups of people, the perpetrator and the victim. Mr. Darling. You make an important point. What I did say is that while Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran are being compensated, the individual who fired them is receiving no compensation whatsoever. That is Mr. Salgado. Mr. Salgado was terminated without compensation. Mr. Markey. So the $190,000 is going to Busboom? Mr. Darling. Not to Mr. Salgado. Mr. Markey. Not to Mr. Salgado. But Busboom did sign the letter that canned these people. Mr. Darling. That is correct. This morning Mr. Busboom testified, and as I was describing the scenario to your colleagues before you walked in, that is not our judgment, nor is it the judgment of Mr. Busboom that it was Mr. Busboom who terminated them. Mr. Busboom was handed a letter that he signed. Mr. Salgado made the decision. Mr. Salgado has admitted to making that decision. Mr. Markey. So you consider him to be an innocent party here? Mr. Darling. I do not consider him to be an innocent party. What I did say is that we had three options. We had the option to terminate Mr. Busboom. We had the option to allow him under Laboratory policy to be reassigned to another position at the Laboratory at a lower salary. Or we had the opportunity or the option to settle the matter. Based on a review by general counsel of Mr. Busboom's previous employment and performance evaluations at the Laboratory, I was informed after extended discussions that if we had terminated him, he would have grounds for successful wrongful termination suit that would have cost the university many, many multiples of the $190,000 figure you just described. Second, if we had reassigned him at a lower salary, he would have had indefinite employment which would have kept him on the payroll at a very large dollar amount ultimately, or the option of settling as we did. I explained to Mr. Walden a moment ago, I realize these are very large dollar amounts and I in no way wish to minimize them. I do wish to say that was the lowest dollar amount that we felt we could conclude this matter--with which we could conclude this matter. Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from California, Mr. Radanovich, is recognized for 10 minutes. Mr. Radanovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief, Mr. Darling, with my questions. They are really surrounding the questions that I have on CREM devices. My first is regarding that incident and wanting to know whether there was any classified material that was missing or vulnerable. Was it classified material or was it declassified? What was the nature of the material? Mr. Darling. Let me back up and say that in, I believe, November or December 2002 Los Alamos did a complete and comprehensive inventory of all classified removable media. That is what CREM stands for, classified removable electronic media; disks, flash cards, etc. There were over 61,000 items. They found none to be missing. What I understand is there are a number of instances that came up prior to that. There was one hard drive carrier that had been bar coded improperly, was maintained in a properly secured and stored area where it was not accessible to anyone who did not have access to that area. But as I think Admiral Nanos indicated on January 15, the person who put that barcode on unfortunately did not check to see whether there was an electronic media with classified information in it. To this day we do not know whether there was such an item. It does not show up on the inventory. Every effort to try to determine whether it existed is negative so I cannot answer your question but we do not believe after checking to the best of our ability that there was any classified information missing. Mr. Radanovich. Has the system that you have set up since then, has it shown itself to be effective? Mr. Darling. We are changing the system. It is becoming much more robust for the very purposes that you allude to. We will be checking it thoroughly to make sure that it does. I would ask you to hold us accountable for doing that. Mr. Radanovich I am going to be quick because we have a vote going on, but has Los Alamos officials followed Department of Energy and NNSA procedures in self-assessing whether any of the classified material was missing or vulnerable and did the lab report the incidents to the DOE? Mr. Darling. My understanding, Mr. Radanovich, is that the Laboratory reported the items to DOE within the time period in accordance with DOE guidelines and that the lab is following DOE guidelines. Mr. Radanovich. Were any classified material mislabeled or destroyed during routine Laboratory efforts to discard old CREM devices? Mr. Darling. My understanding is that any classified material whether on a hard drive or on removable medium is put through an extensive and very carefully monitored process to first erase any information from the medium, second to sanitize it, and third to destroy it so that there is no possibility whatsoever after doing that that anyone can obtain the material that was originally stored on those devices. Mr. Radanovich. All right. Thank you very much. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, gentlemen. At the risk of causing our future witnesses to pull out their hair, let me mention that we have three votes on the floor. We will recess and we will return here at 5:30. We will then bring Mr. Hernandez and Mr. Marquez forward and we will try to speed up the process thereafter. We don't have anymore votes on the floor tonight so that should go more quickly. Mr. Darling, thank you again for your testimony. You are excused and the committee is in recess. Mr. Darling. Thank you, Mr. Greenwood, for accommodating my schedule. I appreciate it. [Whereupon, at 5:06 p.m. the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 5:43 p.m.] Mr. Greenwood. Okay. The committee will return to order again. I apologize to all of you gentlemen for the long day. Wisely, the staff has decided we are going to combine panels two and three so welcome to John Hernandez who is the former BUS-5 team leader at Los Alamos; Mr. Richard A. Marquez, Associate Director for Administration at the lab; Dr. John Browne, Senior Research Scientist and former Laboratory Director; Mr. John P. McTague, Professor of Materials, Materials Department, former Vice President of Laboratory Management, University of California; Mr. Ralph Erickson, Manager of Los Alamos National Laboratory Site Office at the NNSA. I should note that Mr. Marquez is accompanied by Mr. Stan Hettich, Director of Procurement at Los Alamos. Welcome. You gentlemen have heard me say that this is an investigative hearing and it is our custom to take testimony under oath. Does anyone object to testifying under oath? Witnesses. No. Mr. Greenwood. You are permitted pursuant to the rules of the House and this committee to be represented by counsel. Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel? Witnesses. No. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. If you would stand and raise your right hands. Okay. Please be seated. You are under oath. I suspect that we will start here with Mr. Hernandez. Mr. Hernandez, you don't have testimony? Is that correct? Mr. Hernandez. Not an opening statement, sir. Mr. Greenwood. Not an opening statement. Okay. Very well. Then Mr. Marquez. TESTIMONY OF JOHN HERNANDEZ, FORMER BUS-5 TEAM LEADER, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; RICHARD A. MARQUEZ, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR ADMINISTRATION, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; JOHN C. BROWNE, SENIOR RESEARCH SCIENTIST AND FORMER LABORATORY DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; JOHN P. McTAGUE, PROFESSOR OF MATERIALS, MATERIALS DEPARTMENT, FORMER VICE PRESIDENT FOR LABORATORY MANAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA; AND RALPH E. ERICKSON, MANAGER, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY SITE OFFICE, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, LOS ALAMOS Mr. Marquez. Mr. Chairman, my name is Rich Marquez and I am the Associate Laboratory Director for Administration, Los Alamos National Laboratory. Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony today regarding the Laboratory's procurement and property management issues. I have submitted a written statement and I would like that to be included as part of the record. Mr. Greenwood. It will be. Mr. Marquez. Thank you. Within 90 days of beginning my assignment in February 2002 I directed the development of a 3- year strategic plan to address what I considered to be weaknesses surrounding the procurement function. Simply stated, the Laboratory's procurement function had not kept pace with the robust science and technical side of the house. When we did develop a procurement excellence plan, in hindsight it is clear we prescribed a tune-up when an overall was probably required. The special inquiry of the DOE Office of the Inspector General found no evidence of coverup. However, there were concerns and allegations that the laboratory had obscured or even concealed issues regarding property and procurement vulnerabilities. I would like to address a number of these issues. First is the so-called Palmieri memo dated April 10, 2002. According to the IG the Laboratory issued and immediately rescinded a memorandum requiring corrective actions to address problems regarding the management of Government property. While this has raised some doubt about management's commitment to address control weaknesses, the fact is that the memo was reissued by me after full and formal coordination with the Laboratory senior executive team as well as with Mr. Palmieri and his subordinate staff. And, I might add, in my humble opinion, between fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2002 I think it contributed significantly to the reduction in the unlocated, lost, and stolen property. The next issue I would like to address is the Mesa contract. Sometime in mid to late July 2002 I became aware that the FBI had begun an investigation regarding alleged theft in connection with purchases made under the Mesa contract. Mesa contract is a blanket order agreement which was awarded on November 1, 2000. In 16 months the contract had grown from a simple $100,000 task order to $2.7 million. As I have indicated to the staff of this subcommittee and their field investigations, I cannot defend the manner in which this contract was administered. The contract has now expired but we have taken a number of important corrective steps including reassignment of Mr. Hernandez' team leader. To his credit his wrote a letter to his management acknowledging his responsibility and accountability and by his own admission his skills are more suited to major procurement staff work than to supervision and management. In addition, as Mr. Darling has now reported twice at this subcommittee, the Layton-PricewaterhouseCoopers team is now conducting an extensive review of the entire procurement function. Now I will address the various purchase card transactions that have come to the attention of this subcommittee. On July 25, 2002 I was advised about the attempt to purchase a Ford Mustang using a laboratory purchase card. At the same time I was told of $1 million of other purchases made by the same card holder over a 2-year period from a company called G&G Industrial Supply. I later earned that the card holder had virtually unlimited purchasing authority levels. Within a couple of weeks I also learned about casino advances made under a Laboratory purchase card issued to a secretary in the Procurement group. To compound the problem, I discovered that she was a subcontractor employee and as a member of the Procurement organization she could self-approve her purchases on the card. Shortly thereafter Mr. Salgado and I agreed to pursue a twofold strategy for dealing with the purchase issues. First, we appointed an internal committee to take a critical look at our current purchase card procedures and recommend immediate changes. As a result, within shortly over a month I issued revised purchase procedures on August 26, 2002. Second, we established an external review committee led by John Layton to do a thorough review of the Laboratory's purchase card program. This team and its work has been described to you in previous testimony by Mr. Darling. Now that we have the Layton report and the UC audit report, we will develop a formal corrective plan that meets the challenge given us by Chairman Greenwood when he visited the Laboratory. That is, we are committed to constructing a model purchase card program. We continue to aggressively pursue property management corrective actions as well including the beginning on February 3 or a wall-to-wall inventory and the formation of a cross- cutting team to take a hard look at the entire cradle-to-grave supply chain management process at the laboratory. We need to manage our property acquisition in a more integrated fashion. In conclusion, let me say that new processes and technology are only part of the solution. The real lesson learned from this experience is that people are our most effective internal control. It is precisely because we do not have a culture of thieves that there was not a great exploitation of the flaws in our processes and the breakdown of our business practices. The most recent Harvard Business Review has an article entitle, ``Predictable surprises and disasters you should have seen coming.'' The article makes the point that by actively encouraging people to speak up, executives can bring to the surface many problems that might otherwise go unmentioned. I think Interim Director Nanos recognizes this and has taken actions to create an open environment that celebrates the fact that people are now bringing issues forward. This is the point that DOE Inspector General Greg Freedman made in his testimony about changing the culture and acting on employee concern. Thank you for the opportunity to present testimony. [The prepared statement of Richard A. Marquez follows:] Prepared Statement of Richard Marquez, Associate Laboratory Director for Administration, Los Alamos National Laboratory My name is Richard Marquez, and I am the Associate Laboratory Director for Administration, Los Alamos National Laboratory, a position I have held since February of 2002. I am joined today by John Hernandez and Stan Hettich of the Laboratory's Business Operations Division, which reports to me. I thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony regarding the procurement and property management issues reported in this and other public forums. Virtually all of my career has been directly or indirectly related to the nuclear weapons complex and to federal resources management. Because of that, I keenly appreciate that the road to strong mission and program performance at a national laboratory leads through the effective and efficient buying of goods, services, construction, and equipment. Within 90 days of beginning my assignment, I directed the development of a three-year strategic plan to address what I considered to be weaknesses surrounding the procurement function at the Laboratory. I did this after reviewing the internal and external audit reports on file and after considering some key metrics on volume of procurement activity versus staffing. I was struck by the fact that from 1996 to 2002, the procurement volume had virtually doubled from $620 million to well over $1 billion. But I was concerned when I discovered that staffing over that same period had remained almost static. Moreover, attrition and leadership changes were continual. When I arrived at the Laboratory the third procurement director in a three-year time frame had only recently taken the helm. I also found very critical audit reports that were somewhat dated and that reputedly had been responded to with corrective actions by management. Of note, I also found ``Outstanding'' performance evaluation ratings under the contract for procurement as well as virtually all business management functions, including property management. In spite of what I regarded as somewhat conflicting indicators, it was my view then that the Laboratory's procurement function had not kept pace with the robust science and technical side of the house. That view, and my resolve to upgrade the procurement function, has only increased since that strategic plan was developed. What has changed is the understanding of the depth of the problems and the extent of commitment required to fix those problems--the diagnosis was for a tuneup and an overhaul is required. As Bruce Darling testified to this Subcommittee two weeks ago, the University of California has taken a very active and strong role in correcting the deficiencies that have been reportedly publicly. I am heartened by the commitment and resolve that the University has shown in tackling the many issues we face. Coupled with Pete Nanos's leadership, I believe that we can and will make changes and that we can sustain those changes over time. I am not surprised by the special inquiry of the DOE Office of Inspector General (OIG) in that it found no evidence of coverup regarding the problems at the Laboratory. However, I would like to address reported concerns and allegations that the Laboratory ``obscured'' or even concealed issues regarding property management or procurement vulnerabilities. property management In the January 28, 2003, DOE OIG report on their special inquiry of Los Alamos National Laboratory operations, the report concluded that the Laboratory took a number of actions that ``obscured'' serious property management and security problems. Palmieri Memo Rescinded and Reissued One area of OIG concern involved the finding that the Laboratory ``issued, then immediately rescinded without adequate explanation'' a memorandum requiring corrective actions to address problems regarding the management of Government property. In the opinion of the OIG, this raised doubts about management's ``commitment to address identified control weaknesses''. The memorandum has also been the subject of various news media reports. Let me list a quick chronology regarding that memorandum: The memorandum in question was issued by the former Laboratory Chief Financial Officer, Thomas Palmieri. Mr. Palmieri's memorandum was dated April 10, 2002, but not formally issued until April 18, when it was distributed via e-mail. The memorandum was retracted by Mr. Palmieri on April 19 as a result of direction I received from Joe Salgado, former Principal Deputy and Chief Operating Officer. He was sensitive to a wide-spread distribution of employees' names beyond those who had a need to know this information and, because of the importance of the subject, Mr. Salgado wanted a more formal ``top down'' discussion and dissemination of the memorandum from me to each of the other Associate Laboratory Directors. With respect to his concern for a more formal distribution, on Sunday, April 28, I wrote an e-mail to the Laboratory's senior executive team in advance of an April 29 weekly senior executive meeting conducted by the Laboratory Director every Monday morning. The e-mail covered four topics, three of which were related to business and financial management, which I intended to discuss as agenda items for that meeting. The e- mail also included an advance copy of a memorandum that I formally distributed April 29. On April 29, I did, in fact, re-issue the memorandum to the Laboratory's senior executive team. It is significant to note that, on the morning of April 29, prior to the senior executive team meeting, I forwarded my April 28 e-mail to Mr. Palmieri, his deputy Dennis Roybal, his chief of staff, and the Laboratory's two principal property managers, Allen Wallace and John Tapia. It should also be noted that the formal distribution of the April 29 memorandum also included those same individuals as well as the 60 Laboratory property administrators and the 120 Laboratory business team leaders deployed across the Laboratory. OIG Interview of Mr. Palmieri I mention this because Mr. Palmieri, when interviewed on December 18, apparently forgot that the memorandum had been re-issued and advised the OIG otherwise. I do not agree with the DOE OIG's conclusion that we ``obscured'' serious property management problems but it would appear that we did obscure the very serious manner in which we followed up on property management issues. The April 29 Memorandum My April 29 memorandum was virtually the same as the Palmieri memorandum except that each Laboratory Associate Director was given the relevant unlocated, lost, and stolen property lists for each Division that reported to him. It included the guidance that all reasonable efforts be made to locate such property and provided that, after review of the circumstances for the loss, managers ``may deem that individuals should be held accountable or otherwise disciplined''. Attached to the memorandum were the same four reporting mechanisms intended by the Palmieri memorandum: missed assignment of property to accountability statements within 60 days as required by Laboratory policy; lost and stolen property per Division; inventory exceptions, by which we intended to report discrepancies between assignment of property and exceptions taken by the assigned custodian; and, trend reports. Of these four reports, the Property Management Group did issue the 60-day assignment report and the inventory exceptions report was produced in accordance with Appendix F requirements of the prime contract. The property group produced trend reports on request of management. The lost and stolen report was sent with my April 29 memorandum. Also, I received two corrective actions plans, one for a Division with unusually high levels of property unaccounted for and one for an Associate Director covering all of the Divisions reporting to him. The Year-End Results I think any fair assessment of the results of the re-issued memorandum and the Property Management Group's follow up actions would conclude that the memorandum was highly effective in raising the management level of attention to property management. At the time the memorandum was distributed, the cost of ``unlocated'' property in the inventory was $735 thousand and by September 30, 2002, that number was down to $484 thousand. With respect to lost or stolen property, we dropped from $533 thousand at the time of the memorandum to $206 thousand by September 30, 2002. Clarification of Reporting Lost and Stolen Property The DOE OIG special inquiry found a substantial degree of ``dysfunction'' with respect to roles and responsibilities regarding lost and stolen property. As indicated by Mr. Darling in his February 26 testimony, the Laboratory has clarified that lost and stolen property is to be reported to the Office of Audits and Assessments, which now directly reports to the University of California Office of the President. the mesa contract The next issue I would like to address is the Mesa Contract and the involvement by people in the Business Operations Division. That involvement was two fold. One, Business Operations Division administered the contract. And, two, personnel in Business Operations Division supported Security Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the criminal investigation of property purchased under that contract for personal use. Some time in mid-to-late July, 2002, Joe Salgado, then Principal Deputy and Chief Operating Officer of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, advised me that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had begun an investigation regarding alleged criminal improprieties in connection with purchases made under the Mesa Contract. Mr. Salgado did not share with me many details but advised me that my ``need to know'' was in order to make sure the FBI and our security organization had appropriate support from the Business Operations Division in terms of getting access to contractual records. Security Division and FBI investigation Shortly after this meeting, Stan Busboom, then Security Division Director for the Laboratory, called me and requested support from John Tapia, Deputy Group Leader for Property Management. Mr. Busboom advised me that John's expertise in property management would be useful to Glen Walp and Busboom as they worked with the FBI on the TA33 case. I agreed to that support and notified John Tapia that he was to provide any support required from the Security Division. To my knowledge, Mr. Tapia provided excellent support to Mr. Walp, Mr. Doran, Mr. Sprouse, Mr. Tucker, and even the FBI agent in charge. According to Mr. Tapia, his support included a description of the buying and property functions, copies of the Mesa Contract, credit card transactions, and Local Vendor Agreement records. Because Mr. Tapia required information from the procurement organization as well as his own property management group, Mr. Tapia would call me and ask me to advise procurement officials that he was authorized to request business records. I did that and, so far as was ever reported to me, the security investigation on the TA33 case was fully supported by the Business Operations Division and the staff in my directorate. Procurement Background I would like to make some observations about how the Mesa Equipment & Supply contract got to where it was and where the contract stands now. Before it had its own contract with the Laboratory, Mesa was a supplier to the Laboratory as a sub-tier contractor to a Just in Time vendor known as Frank's Supply. Their volume of sales under the Just in Time arrangement was reportedly on the average of $400 thousand per year. The Mesa Contract was awarded by the Laboratory as a small business contract on November 1, 2000, with a not-to-exceed ceiling of $100 thousand. On March 6, 2001, the contract was modified to increase the ceiling to $500 thousand. On January 23, 2002, the fourth and final change to the dollar ceiling increased the ceiling to $2.7 million. In sixteen months, the contract had grown from $100 thousand to $2.7 million. The contractual arrangement is referred to as a Blanket Order Agreement which, in simple terms, means that employees with purchase authorization across the Laboratory can make purchases under the contract. As I have indicated to the staff of this Subcommittee in their field investigations, I cannot defend the manner in which this contract was administered. I know that our procurement personnel questioned some individual purchases with at least one of the individuals who was terminated and is under FBI investigation. But we could have, and should have, done more. I was advised by Laboratory Counsel to leave the contract open pending the FBI field investigation. The contract term expired October 31, 2002. The FBI executed search warrants in this case on October 31, 2002. Follow up Actions What have we done since the FBI action? As the purchase card events unfolded and after my own review of the Mesa contract file, I directed the Business Operations Division to create a separate procurement review organization that would serve as a quality assurance office for Laboratory procurements. I wanted this office to serve as the agent of standardized policies, consistent terms and conditions, training requirements for staff, and, perhaps most importantly, institution of periodic desk-top audits of contract administration files and management of trend data. My experience as well as management literature tells me that just the fact that management is reviewing files and transactions eliminates a substantial percentage of internal control vulnerabilities. The University of California and the Laboratory are reviewing what can be done relative to eligibility of Mesa Supply & Equipment to do business at the Laboratory, including an evaluation of breach of contract and what debarment policies apply. Preliminary evaluation indicates that our policy is to utilize federal government debarment actions as the operative determinant for precluding contractors from doing business with the Laboratory. Given that, I will engage in further discussions with DOE and NNSA procurement officials on this matter. We have reassigned the Team Leader who had direct oversight of the administrator of that contract. John Hernandez was that Team Leader and he is here with me today. Similar to the Team Leader who had oversight of our purchase card program, Mr. Hernandez wrote a letter to his management acknowledging his accountability. By his own admission, Mr. Hernandez' skills are more suited to major procurement staff work than to supervision and management and his long career at the Laboratory reflects this. I plan to determine the amount that represents fraudulent transactions and, to the extent they are not within the scope of the Mesa contract, I plan to present a claim to that firm in that amount. For those items for which I cannot substantiate that they are out of scope, then we will go through a process of finding items of use by our facilities support contractor or by the Laboratory. After that, we would consider those items unallowable costs and so advise the NNSA Contracting Officer. Finally, as reported by Mr. Darling, the University of California has engaged the Layton/Price Waterhouse Coopers team to do an extended review of the entire procurement function, to include two years of data mining in connection with the various procurement mechanisms utilized by the Laboratory. Those include Blanket Purchase Orders, Just in Time contracting, and Local Vendor Agreements. The University of California and the Laboratory are committed to acting on any findings and recommendations resulting from that review, similar to the review of the purchase cards. the mustang case, g&g tools, and casino advances Now I will turn my attention to the various purchase card transactions that have come to the attention of this Subcommittee. The Ford Mustang case With regard to the attempt to purchase a Ford Mustang using a Laboratory purchase card, I was advised of that case on July 25, 2002, by Stan Hettich, Procurement Group Leader, and Dennis Roybal, Deputy Division Leader for the Business Operations Division. They informed me that the Purchase Card Administrator, Ms. Arleen Roybal, had received a call from Bank of America on July 18 that informed her of the attempted Mustang purchase as well as vehicle accessories. The attempted purchases occurred during a period from May 3 through May 23, 2002, using the Laboratory purchase card issued in the name of a Laboratory purchasing official. I was also told that the cardholder disputed the charges with Bank of America when the May purchase card statements were issued by the bank. G&G Tools At the same June 25 meeting, Mr. Hettich advised me of other purchases made by the same cardholder over a two-year time frame. These included over $1 million in tools for our Engineering, Sciences and Application Division. I was not particularly surprised by the volume of tool purchases given the scope of engineering effort by this Division. I was taken aback by the fact that tools were purchased under our purchase card program instead of our Just in Time Program, which is the appropriate mechanism for tool purchases. The Just in Time Program requires dye-marking of tools by vendors. The purchases were made under a limited exception granted by the procurement organization but the terms of the exception were not met. Moreover, I was surprised to find out that the cardholder had virtually unlimited purchasing authority levels. This particular cardholder had a single transaction limit of $50 thousand and her monthly limit was $900 thousand. I directed Mr. Hettich to notify both Audits and Assessments and Security Division. I followed up a few days later with Mr. Hettich and he advised me that he had, in fact, notified Mr. Walp and Gil Griego of the Audits and Assessments office. Also on July 25, 2002, I notified Mr. Salgado and advised him that I had directed Mr. Hettich to notify Audits and Assessments and Security Division. Mr. Salgado pointed out to me that the Department of Defense was undergoing critical reviews of their purchase card programs and he asked me for a briefing on the purchase card process and procedures. Mr. Vern Brown, Mr. Hettich and I briefed Mr. Salgado on July 29. The Casino Advances On or about August 9, Dennis Roybal, Deputy Division Director of the Business Operations Division, advised me of casino advances made under a Laboratory Purchase Card issued to Ms. Mary Frances Wood. Apparently this surfaced as a result of a desktop audit done by the Purchase Card Office on past transactions. Eleven cash withdrawals at three New Mexico casinos were made in the amount of $1,400 between March 19 and April 26, 2002. I was told that the purchase card office had directly notified Mr. Doran but, similar to the Mustang case, I asked Mr. Roybal to notify Audits and Assessment and Security Division and I notified Mr. Salgado. Ms. Wood was placed on administrative leave on August 19 and subsequently terminated. What particularly troubled me about this notification was that Ms. Wood was a contractor employee assigned to the Procurement Group Leader's Office. I was even more concerned that Mr. Stan Hettich, Procurement Group Leader, was listed as the approving official for Ms. Wood's purchases. I later discovered that Ms. Wood, as well as other personnel in the procurement organization, could ``self approve'' their purchases. Some time between the date (July 25, 2002) I was informed of the Mustang case, and August 26, 2002, I took two actions that are relevant to your inquiry here. One, I assigned John Tapia as the single point of contact for purposes of information flow to Security Division regarding property management, purchase cards, as well as the Mesa contract. Frankly, I was concerned about a possible conflict of interest in the procurement group given the fact Stan Hettich was shown as an approving official for Ms. Wood. I did not want to compromise any ongoing law enforcement investigations. I personally called the Purchase Card Administrator, Arleen Roybal, and advised her that she was to give full cooperation to Mr. Tapia and the Security Division. Two, I advised Mr. Salgado on the details I had regarding the Mesa Contract and the purchase card incidents. It was difficult at that time to know whether any of these were related incidents or how rampant the problem was. Mr. Salgado was equally concerned and he and I agreed to a two-fold strategy, which involved an immediate fix to the purchase card policies and procedures and an in-depth review of purchase card transactions to see how widespread the purchase card abuse problem was. Purchase Card Policies & Procedures First, we agreed to appoint an internal committee to take a critical look at our current purchase card procedures and recommend immediate changes that addressed problems such as the purchase card authorities and limits, lack of approving officials, and receipt of property ordered. That committee consisted of John Tapia, Laboratory Counsel Frank Dickson, and the former Contracts and Procurement Director of the NNSA's Albuquerque Operations Office, Mr. William Meyers, who serves as a consultant to me on special assignments. I chartered that committee and directed them to thoroughly study the most current Department of Defense OIG reviews and the recommendations from those studies. Based on those recommendations, and after feedback from Laboratory Division Directors, I issued revised Purchase Card Procedures on August 26, 2002. The Layton Committee Second, it was agreed that Joe Salgado would have a conversation with John McTague, the former University of California Vice President for Laboratory Management about the establishment of an external review committee to do a thorough review of the Laboratory's purchase card program. After Mr. Salgado and Mr. McTague discussed the idea, it was decided that McTague would direct the Laboratory to form such a team and direction was given accordingly. A team was put in place by the Laboratory which was led by former DOE Inspector General John Layton and supported by the University of California's audit firm of Price Waterhouse Coopers to do a thorough review of purchase card purchases over the past few years. On August 26, 2002, Mr. Salgado chartered that committee and the committee began its methodical review of some 170 thousand transactions and $120 million dollars worth of purchase card activity covering the period from October 1, 1998, through June 30, 2002, a forty-five month period. The Layton Committee issued a formal report of its findings on December 12, 2002, and, in addition to several findings and recommendations, referred $4.9 million in transactions to the Laboratory for further disposition, including several which they suggested for referral to the Office of Inspector General. The Laboratory's Management Response to the Layton Committee Report By memorandum dated December 9, former Laboratory Director John Browne formally tasked me to respond to the Layton Committee report. The memorandum was premised upon a November 20 draft report issued by the Layton Committee to Joe Salgado. My assignment was to reconcile all purchase card accounts that had not been reconciled, resolve all questionable purchase card transactions, and otherwise address the Layton report findings and recommendations. Shortly after that time, Joe Salgado requested that the University of California independently audit the Laboratory's management response to the Layton Committee report. In anticipation of that requirement, on December 4, I issued a Laboratory-wide data call for documentation required to validate purchases called into question. On December 6, I formed a Project Team, led by Jay Johnson, Acting Controller in Business Operations Division, to methodically address each and every questioned transaction and account. On December 13, I again made a Laboratory-wide request for documentation based on preliminary conversations with Patrick Reed as to the extent of documentation he required to satisfy his audit methodology. He wanted convincing documentation relative to software licensing purchases and items that the Layton Committee considered questionable. The Laboratory cooperation was overwhelmingly positive, the project team worked incredibly long hours under arduous conditions, and we concluded our project on January 31, 2003. Mr. Reed issued an interim audit report on February 10, 2003. His report concluded that we had provided adequate documentation or justification to support all but around $200 thousand in purchase card purchases. As reported by Mr. Darling, the University of California plans to reimburse the NNSA for those costs. Laboratory Purchase Card Program Corrective Actions Now that we have both the Layton report and the Reed report, we are developing an action plan that integrates the recommendations and implements corrective actions. In addition to the changes articulated in my August 26 announcement of purchase card changes, we have implemented many fixes already but I know we still have a ways to go before we have a program that is sustainable. We have made current all of our reconciliations, eliminating a significant backlog of reconciliations. We have re-formed the Purchase Card Program office, providing new interim leadership and staff to work off the corrective actions and develop robust administrative tools including monthly and quarterly audits. We have completed purchase card refresher training for all Laboratory card holders and approving officials. We have suspended cards for failure to meet the training requirements. We have dropped the number of purchase card holders from over a thousand to around 585. We have begun to design automated systems changes that will eliminate the need for manual reconciliation and to enhance internal controls features. We have collaborated with Livermore National Laboratory and Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory to establish standardized University of California purchase card policies. In addition, I have shared with NNSA Headquarters and the Los Alamos Site Office some Lessons Learned which might be of use to the rest of the Nuclear Weapons Complex M&O contractor sites. corrective actions Wall-to-Wall Inventory When John Browne tasked me to respond to the Layton Committee report on December 9, he also assigned me several actions related to property management. The key assignment required revised Laboratory procedures for: ensuring that controlled property is entered into the inventory at the time of receipt, regardless of how purchased; periodic reconciliation of property records with procurement records; ensuring that the Security Division, line managers, and property custodians take prompt action to find unlocated property; ensuring that spot and random property audits are completed; and addressing any other property management issues that I found warranted action. My evaluation of the property management issues surrounding this assignment made me realize that, as an institution, we were not prepared to implement ``fixes'' without a thorough understanding of the problem. In my opinion, it was a matter of ``first things, first'', and I thought it would be wise to scope the magnitude of the problem through a wall-to-wall inventory. I was not comfortable with the current use of accountability statements given the lack of public credibility in our property management controls. After a follow up meeting in December with John Browne and Joe Salgado, we concluded that the appropriate course of action was a wall- to-wall property inventory. I directed the Property Management Group to develop a wall-to-wall inventory project plan, which I subsequently approved, and on February 3, that wall-to-wall inventory was initiated. The methodology and the results will be validated by Price Waterhouse Coopers and the NNSA. As of today's date, we have inventoried over 70% of the 84,000 controlled property items in our inventory. We have accounted for over 70% of the cost of our controlled inventory, which is approximately $940 million. Cradle-to-Grave Supply Chain Integration Team We are also finding items in our Laboratory sweep that were not originally bar-coded. This underscores the importance of reviewing the cradle-to-grave process of supply chain management at the Laboratory. We need to formalize and integrate the steps that lead from ordering, to purchase, to receipt, to accounting, to entry into the inventory, to reporting as lost or stolen, and, where necessary, the need to institute individual accountability. In January, I chartered a team of Laboratory personnel to re- engineer the entire supply chain so that it is integrated and visible to the entire Laboratory. That team is led by Carol Smith, our very capable Warehouse Manager, and her team is expected to provide a report within the next few weeks. Drop Point Survey In my opinion, the single largest vulnerability of the Laboratory's property management system is the fact that, at our 43-square-mile Laboratory, it is not feasible to have a single warehouse as the sole location for delivery of property. As a part of the business and financial improvements that Bruce Darling discussed at the February 26 Subcommittee hearing, the Laboratory has also performed a survey of its 580 property delivery points which are referred to as ``drop points''. The Business Operations Division surveyed each of those points to assess the security, the volume, and the safety and housekeeping issues. I expect a report soon with their recommendations for improvement and tighter control but in the interim the number of drop points have been reduced to 440 and we have re-instituted clear accountability of control of these points by building and facility managers. Clarification of Reporting Lost and Stolen Property The DOE OIG special inquiry found a substantial degree of ``dysfunction'' with respect to roles and responsibilities regarding lost and stolen property. As indicated by Mr. Darling in his February 26 testimony, the Laboratory has clarified that lost and stolen property is to be reported to the Office of Audits and Assessments, which now directly reports to the University of California Office of the President. Management of Data The two external review teams that are reviewing property and procurement data have expressed concern regarding the Laboratory's ability to produce consistent and reliable data without significant manual manipulation of data. In essence, this was the root cause of the primary finding of the recent OIG review of our firearms inventory--we were unable to document the inventory of a dozen Glock handguns that were stuck in a property accounting backlog. In too many instances we have Laboratory business and financial personnel trying to ``muscle'' inadequate data systems on old information platforms. The Laboratory is embarked on an Enterprise Resource Project that will modernize our management of business and financial data. This will help us document the right kinds of data and provide managers timely access to quality data they need to make resource management decisions and better control assets and accountability for those assets. Sanctions and Accountability There have been legitimate concerns raised by this Subcommittee and others regarding individual accountability for Government property and the sanctions in place for violation of Laboratory procedures. I believe that our current disciplinary policies provide for such accountability but our practice in consistently enforcing sanctions needs improvement. Interim Director Nanos has a Laboratory-wide initiative in place to study all of our policies and he has indicated clear support for enforcing accountability in connection with our Federal stewardship responsibilities. conclusion Let me close by assuring you that the Laboratory is committed to correcting the many vulnerabilities in our business operations. I am highly encouraged by the resolve and commitment the University of California has shown in vigorously supporting positive change. I am proud of my association with the many thousands of honest and dedicated employees who have been working long hours, day after day, to regain the credibility of our neighbors, our customers, and the American taxpayers. We can fix processes and we can apply technology to the problem of internal controls, but we would fail again as a Laboratory if we don't heed the real lesson learned from this experience. People are our most effective internal control. It is precisely because we do not have a ``culture of thieves'' that there was not a greater exploitation of the flaws in our processes and the breakdown of our business practices. The most recent Harvard Business Review has an article entitled, Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming. It makes the point that organizational vulnerabilities are often the toughest to overcome but that, by actively encouraging people to speak up, executives can bring to the surface many problems that might otherwise go unmentioned. I think Interim Director Nanos recognizes this as a value and has taken actions that acknowledge this by creating an open environment that celebrates the fact that people are now bringing issues forward. This is the point that DOE Inspector General Greg Friedman made in his testimony about changing the culture and acting on employee concerns. Thank you for the opportunity to present testimony. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, sir. Dr. Browne. TESTIMONY OF JOHN C. BROWNE Mr. Browne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for this opportunity to make this statement. I, too, would like to submit my written statement for the record. I will try to be brief. You have covered a lot of the points already in earlier panels. Let me start by saying that there are no excuses for theft, waste, fraud, or abuse by anybody. That is a strong personal belief that I hold. I would like to put a few things in context if I may, Mr. Chairman. Los Alamos is a very large complex operation. We have on any given day 12,000 to 14,000 people on our site. Our site covers 43 square miles. That is about the size of the District of Columbia. We have a lot of buildings, over 2,000 buildings, hundreds of miles of road. That is not to make an excuse but it is to put in context the complexity of the large scale of operating this facility. We have a very important national security mission which I know you are aware of. I spent a lot of my time focused on this mission. I had the responsibility as Laboratory Director to annually certify the five weapons out of the seven types that are in the U.S. nuclear stockpile in a letter that I am required to send to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy. That is a very important responsibility and one that takes a lot of time throughout the year to address. The second part of our mission is to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Since September 11 we spend a lot of time dealing with threats of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons including the DNA analysis that occurred on the anthrax attacks that occurred here in Washington, New York, and Florida. However, having said that, even though I did focus on our mission, I felt that I was fully accountable for everything that happened at our laboratory. I don't want to make any excuses that because I depended on other people to look at operations because of the scope of things that somehow I am less accountable. I felt that I was fully accountable for all the actions of all the people on our site all the time. Let me just cover a few issues and then see if I can sum up. In terms of the TA-33 theft, I know Mr. McDonald testified a couple of weeks ago. When this was first brought to my attention that he approached the FBI, which was in late June of last year, and Mr. Salgado told me about this, I remember the discussion Mr. Salgado had and Mr. Salgado said to me, ``Mr. McDonald is a really stand-up guy. He was willing to come forward and really take a risk in a sense by saying that there were things going on at our Laboratory which were improper.'' I just wanted to make it clear that is the discussion we had at that time. Then in mid-July when I heard about the Mustang case from Mr. Marquez and Mr. Salgado, the question came up earlier this morning, ``Weren't you outraged?`` I was very outraged. I won't use the words that, in fact, I conveyed at the time to some of my managers. I was incredulous that anybody would even attempt to use a procurement card for this. The only good thing I would say is that the control system, in a sense, in this one case actually worked because the charges were blocked by the system. However, to me it pointed out we had other serious problems. As Mr. Marquez has just said, we immediately said, ``Let us go look and see if we have other problems.'' We had seen what had happened in the Department of Defense. We read the GAO reports and the first thing we said was, ``Let us take a quick look at what else is happening at Los Alamos.'' When we looked we didn't like what we saw. We immediately said, ``Let us go get this external team together that the former IG John Layton chaired.'' That is the situation that I saw. Let me just conclude since my time is up by saying that I don't believe I allowed any type of coverup to occur at our Laboratory. I certainly had no intention of ever preventing any information from getting out of our Laboratory to any investigatory body, the Department of Energy, the University of California, or certainly this committee. The DOE IG report did not find any evidence of any coverup by management. I wish that these events had not occurred at Los Alamos but they did. People who committed illegal acts or inappropriate acts should be held accountable for their actions. But I do not believe that Los Alamos is a culture of theft. I don't believe the facts support that. Instead, I would say that Los Alamos really is a culture of public service. That is, at least, the Los Alamos that I have been familiar with for the last 24 years. In my opinion, what we all need to do now, and Bruce Darling brought this up, is I think we need to make these corrections that the University of California and the Laboratory are putting in place. But we need to learn from these mistakes. What were the root causes of the mistakes, learn from them, make the changes, and move on. The reason I say that is I believe our mission is very, very critical to our country at this time. Maybe as important as it has ever been in our history. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of John C. Browne follows:] Prepared Statement of John C. Browne, Former Laboratory Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to present this statement regarding the procurement and property issues at Los Alamos National Laboratory. There are no excuses for theft, waste, fraud or abuse of government property, whatever the amount and whether by University of California or subcontractor employees. In many talks and written statements to the Laboratory over my 5 years as Director I have stated that integrity must be a key value of our institution. We must be good stewards of the taxpayers' money. LANL is a large, complex operation with a very important national security mission. On any given day there are 12-14,000 people on site. Our site covers 43 square miles--mesas, canyons connected by hundreds of miles of roads. There are over 2000 buildings, some of which require high physical and cyber security. To carry our programs we perform many hazardous operations--nuclear, high explosives, chemicals, X-ray machines, etc. Our FY03 budget is close to $2 billion--roughly one-half of which is spent on purchases. We have a critical national security mission. Our core mission is to ensure the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons. LANL has responsibility for certifying 5 of the 7 different nuclear weapon types in the U.S. stockpile. We take this responsibility very seriously and it received my highest attention during the past five years. Our other major mission area is to reduce threat of weapons of mass destruction to our homeland, our troops, and our allies. Since Sept. 11, 2001, we greatly increased our work on counter-terrorism--especially against weapons of mass destruction. For example, we designed and built nuclear detectors that have been deployed in Russian borders and ports; we assisted in the DNA analysis of the anthrax attacks in Washington, New York, and Florida and fielded biological detectors around the country, including at the Salt Lake City Olympics. As Lab Director I was accountable for all the activities of the laboratory and the actions of all the people on our site--good and bad--whether technical, administrative work or operations--a challenging job, but a rewarding job. procurement issues The possibility of theft at our TA33 site was raised by a contractor employee, Mr. McDonald, who testified here a few weeks ago. Mr. McDonald did the right thing by being persistent when his earlier attempts to report this illegal activity did not result in action. When I found out about the TA33 theft allegations in late June 2002, I asked Mr. Salgado, my principal deputy, to stay on top of this issue and keep DOE, UC, and me informed on a regular basis. We both felt that Mr. McDonald's actions were exemplary. A few weeks later, Mr. Salgado reported that an attempt to purchase a Mustang with a procurement card had been uncovered by our Business Services Division and by our bankcard service provider. This seemed incredulous to me, but in light of the recently reported procurement card abuses in the Department of Defense, we asked Mr. Marquez, my Associate Director for Administration, to conduct a quick scan of other LANL procurement card activities. This quick review turned up several apparent abuses. Based on this information, and after consulting with Dr. John McTague, UC Vice President for Laboratory Management, we decided to conduct an external review that was set up in August under the leadership of two former Inspectors General, John Layton and Charles Masten, and auditors from Pricewater-houseCoopers. The external review found that, while policies and procedures were in place at LANL, internal controls and oversight needed strengthening. We made significant changes in our procurement card practices in August 2002; more changes have been made recently. property inventory issues While LANL has received outstanding grades for its property inventory results since 1999, questions were raised in the press about missing equipment being an indicator of widespread theft at the Laboratory. There are over 70,000 property items at LANL, whose original value is about $1 billion. Our inventory system accounted for over 99.7% of these items in each of the last four years. Many items reported in the press, such as large magnets and specialized electronic equipment, were located at the Lab after searches were conducted. These items had been moved from their original site for new uses and the inventory system had not been corrected. There were over 400 computers reported missing in the last four years. We have over 33,000 computers at LANL used for R&D, as well as administrative matters. I agree with our critics that this scale of unaccounted computers is too high and steps have been taken to reduce the chances for theft of such computers. None of the 400 computers was used for classified information. There presently is a 100% wall-to-wall inventory being conducted at LANL. This should help resolve discrepancies and increase confidence in our inventory methodology which follows best industrial and government practice. other management changes LANL has been an organization in transition since the end of the Cold War. In response to changing requirements, improvements in safety and security were made in the mid- to late-1990s, including major changes following the hard drive incident that this committee investigated in 2000. All 61,000 classified removable electronic media were bar-coded two years ago and I directed several audits since that time. Our Nuclear Emergency team was re-organized, under new leadership and with improved procedures. Overall, reports by the DOE Office of Independent Assessments show a positive trend of improvements in safety and security over the past 5 years at LANL. To make further improvements in operations, UC and LANL brought in external companies two years ago to review our safety and security operations, project management, planning and budgeting systems, and nuclear operations. We began to implement the recommendations of these reviews last year. Based on my previous experience in information systems, I also brought in an Information Technology (IT) consulting company, Gartner Group, two years ago to recommend changes in our IT systems, which I believed to be insufficient to carry out our responsibilities. We began to implement IT system changes based on their recommendations last year; the IT system was contracted to IBM/Oracle for development. It is designed to provide managers administrative and operational information in a timely manner. My regret is that all the changes did not come fast enough to prevent these present problems. concluding remarks LANL does not have a culture of theft. I do not think that the facts and data support such a characterization. Yes, we have some people who committed some illegal acts. We have fired some employees, some are under administrative review by LANL, and some are still under FBI investigation. The vast majority of LANL people are dedicated to the service of this nation. I did not allow or support any cover-up. The DOE IG report did not find evidence of any cover-up by management. I believe that I kept the DOE and the UC informed of the information on these events as it became available to me. I formed internal and external reviews of the situation. I approved changes to LANL controls on procurement cards in August. When anonymous allegations of cover-up appeared in the press in November, I immediately asked Undersecretary Brooks to have the DOE IG investigate. I wish that these events had not occurred at Los Alamos--but they did. Our employees are human and humans make mistakes, and they should be held accountable for their actions. But I do not believe Los Alamos has a culture of theft--it is a culture of public service. The University of California has responded aggressively and is making the needed changes. In my opinion, we should learn from these mistakes and move on. LANL's mission has never been more important to our nation. Thank you for the opportunity to make these remarks. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you. Mr. McTague. TESTIMONY OF JOHN P. McTAGUE Mr. McTague. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, at the outset I want to say that I regret what transpired at Los Alamos. As the University of California Vice President for Laboratory Management when many of the events that are being investigated occurred, I am ultimately responsible for the mistakes and mismanagement by the Laboratory. In my written testimony I explain my involvement with the science policy and our national labs over the course of my varied career and my long-standing belief that the labs must be run in a manner that promotes and ensures excellence both from a scientific and a business perspective. When President Richard Atkinson appointed me Vice President for Laboratory Management, I assumed the post with this in mind. I took up my duties, determined to see the Laboratory implement Appendix O of the contract between the University and the Department of Energy, improve their cooperation and coordination with the Department, and prioritize proper project management and best business practices. In many ways I believe that the University and the Laboratory made progress toward achieving these goals during my time as vice president. When I stepped down from the position, for instance, the Laboratory's construction projects were on time and either at or below budget. Problems, however, clearly exist at Los Alamos. I first heard of the weaknesses being explored by this committee in August 2002 when Joe Salgado informed me that one Laboratory employee had attempted to purchase a Ford Mustang using her lab issued purchase card and that another employee had received cash advances at a local casino using her card. In that same call I was told that some Laboratory employees working in a high sensitive area were being investigated by the FBI for purchasing goods for their personal use through a Laboratory contract. As with Dr. Browne, I found these incidents outrageous. Among other actions, I immediately called for the creation of an outside review team to evaluate and critique the Laboratory's purchase card system. That is what became the Layton Committee which I directed the Laboratory to do in a letter of August 16. I also directed that the other University-managed labs, namely Livermore and Berkeley, review their purchase card systems for potential abuse. Similarly, the day I first learned of allegations that managers at Los Alamos might be conspiring to conceal property mismanagement and to stifle ongoing investigations, I drove to the Lab--I happened to be in Santa Fe that day--to look into the accusations first hand. These subsequent steps, however, cannot excuse what occurred already at Los Alamos. I regret that I did not detect these problems earlier. I spent much of my time as Vice President for Laboratory Management addressing what I knew were actual or potential weaknesses within the structure of the three laboratories. Regrettably, I missed some areas. I also want to touch briefly on what I know about the terminations of Glenn Walp and Steven Doran. Mr. Salgado told me in advance that he intended to recommend to Director Browne that Los Alamos terminate Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. That was in the week prior to the actual dismissal. Based on what I knew from Laboratory officials at the time, I thought that the lab had valid grounds for firing both men and told Mr. Salgado to do what he felt was right. However, in light of what I subsequently learned from this committee, from Secretary Abraham, and others, I now have serious reservations about the termination decision. In conclusion, I find the conduct at Los Alamos inexcusable and I am sorry that these events were not identified and corrected earlier in my tenure. Our national labs are extraordinary facilities and they must be managed with the utmost care and diligence. I do believe that the investigations by this committee, the Department of Energy, the University and others, will make Los Alamos and the University stronger improved institutions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of John P. McTague follows:] Prepared Statement of John P. McTague, Former Vice President for Laboratory Management, University of California Mr. Chairman, Mr. Deutsch, and members of the Committee: My name is John McTague, and from June 1, 2001, through January 6, 2003, I served as the Vice President for Laboratory Management for the University of California. I am grateful for the opportunity to appear today and address your concerns about the property procurement and management systems at Los Alamos National Laboratory. I greatly appreciate the diligence and dedication this Committee has shown in exposing problems at the Laboratory. Let me be clear: I was the University official directly responsible for overseeing Los Alamos National Laboratory when the events you are investigating occurred; they happened on my watch; I accept responsibility. Like you, and like the University, I consider the allegations of mismanagement and theft disturbing and inexcusable. professional background I come before you today having devoted much of my life to science and our national laboratories. In the academic, public, and private sectors, I have overseen, managed, and evaluated large-scale technology facilities, projects, and organizations requiring a high level of scientific and technical expertise. I believe that our national laboratories can and must realize scientific excellence while simultaneously achieving management accountability, cost effectiveness, and efficiency. After graduating from Georgetown University and receiving a PhD from Brown University, I began my career as a member of the technical staff at the North American Rockwell Science Center in California. I then joined the faculty of the University of California, Los Angeles as a professor of Chemistry and a member of the Institute of Geophysics and Planetary Physics. During my twelve years at UCLA, I also served as a consultant to the Physics Division at Los Alamos and received fellowships from NATO, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation. During the course of my academic career, I have authored or coauthored over eighty scientific publications. In 1982, I left UCLA to become chairman of the National Synchrotron Light Source Department at Brookhaven National Laboratory. When I arrived at the department, construction was underway on what was planned to be the most powerful x-ray ring in the world. The project, however, suffered from poor management, cost overruns, and schedule delays. By the time I left Brookhaven, the project was back on line. From 1983 to 1986, I served as Deputy Director of the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy, and in 1986, I was Acting Science Advisor to President Reagan. Following my service in the White House, I spent twelve years with the Ford Motor Company, serving first as Vice President for Research and then as Vice President for Technical Affairs. In both these positions, I came to appreciate even more the importance of managing scientific research while balancing cost, efficiency, and environmental concerns. While at Ford, I continued to play an active role in the nation's science policy and national laboratories. In 1990, the first President Bush appointed me to the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. From 1990 through 2000--under four different Secretaries of Energy and two different administrations--I served as a member of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, an organization that enjoys broad input into various energy-related matters, including weapons policy. During this same ten-year period, I served as the very first cochairman of the Department of Energy Laboratory Operations Board. This position, as you might imagine, gave me insight into both the strengths and weaknesses in the management of our national laboratories. During the mid-1990s, I also chaired the Board of Overseers for Fermi National Laboratory and was a charter member of the University of California's President's Council on the National Laboratories. appointment as vice president for laboratory management It was, I believe, because of my varied work experiences and longstanding interest in the management of our national laboratories that University of California President Richard Atkinson named me the University's first Vice President for Laboratory Management. In July 2000, as a cochairman of the Department of Energy Laboratory Operations Board, I learned of then Energy Secretary Bill Richardson's uncertainties about the University's oversight of Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. The Secretary's reservations came at a critical time; he was in the process of deciding whether to renew the University's contract to manage both laboratories. Consequently, I sent Secretary Richardson a letter describing the University's great strengths and weaknesses as a manager. I reminded the Secretary--as I remind all of you today-- that the two laboratories have for ``over a half century given this nation a vastly unmatched superiority in nuclear weapons and nonproliferation technology.'' ``There is,'' I told him and tell you, ``no remotely close second place contender, either among our allies or our potential adversaries.'' Part of the labs' dominance was--and is--directly attributable to the University of California's management. I explained that UC ``is exceptionally strong in two critical areas: personnel systems and technical quality control.'' Both factors, I emphasized to the Secretary and reemphasize today, ``are at the heart of the superiority we have sustained.'' Yet for the many positives in the University's management, I noted problems also existed. My criticisms of the University were direct and blunt. I informed the Secretary that ``unacceptable weaknesses in project and security management'' existed at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore. To remedy these shortcomings, I argued for the establishment of a ``single, unambiguous line of authority and accountability.'' I recommended that the University create ``a strong vice presidential position devoted full time'' to overseeing and working with the laboratories. The person holding this office, I told the Secretary, ``should have the resources and expertise to make the laboratories act as a system, to assess and assure the performance of the laboratory directors, as well as technical excellence of programs, major project management, personnel systems, safety, security, and business practices.'' Secretary Richardson subsequently renewed the University's contract, but he conditioned renewal on the University making specific improvements in its oversight system. One of these conditions--which are identified in Appendix O of the renewed contract--mandated that the University establish the office of Vice President for Laboratory Management. Sometime after sending my letter to Secretary Richardson, I received a call from President Atkinson, whom I had known for twenty years. He asked if I would consider interviewing for the new position. I had not sought the job; I was just beginning to enjoy my new retired life in Santa Barbara. Nonetheless, I told President Atkinson that I would interview for the post, but that he must understand that, if selected, I would only serve for a limited time. I intended, I told him, to stay in the position long enough to oversee the establishment of the office and regularization of the relationship with the Department of Energy, and the successful completion of the Appendix O requirements. On June 1, 2001, I became the first University of California Vice President for Laboratory Management. tenure as vice president I assumed my new responsibilities with several systemic goals in mind for both Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore. First, I was determined to see the University and the laboratories meet the milestones set forth in Appendix O. Second, and from a more programmatic perspective, I wanted the two labs to strike a healthy balance between competition and cooperation. The labs, I felt, must continuously push one another toward excellence. However, the competitive frenzy should not obscure the larger point: Both labs play a vital role in developing and maintaining our country's nuclear weapons arsenal. Therefore, where appropriate, I aimed to have the labs share their facilities, balance workloads, and work together toward creating unified definitions and safety standards. In essence, I hoped that the labs would operate as a system in carrying out their day-to- day activities. Third, I wanted the laboratories to make proper project management and best business practices an integral part of their operations. Budget and time constraints, I wanted the laboratories to understand, could not be ignored. These more overarching concerns were by no means my only priorities. The laboratories needed to take preventive measures against possible cyber attacks and physical assaults. Lab-specific issues also concerned me. For example, I was determined to prevent a recurrence of cost overruns and missed deadlines at the National Ignition Facility being constructed at Lawrence Livermore. On a less scientific level, both labs--but particularly Los Alamos--faced exploding healthcare costs that had to be reined in. Looking back, I believe the University and the laboratories made good strides toward achieving these goals during my nineteen-month tenure. On the security front, the University retained Aegis, a Washington, D.C. based consulting company, to review and critique the labs' security systems. I subsequently ordered the laboratories to implement Aegis's recommendations. I note that in the most recent simulation of a physical attack, Los Alamos performed extremely well. Improvements were also made in project management. When I stepped down, the major construction projects at the laboratories--including Lawrence Livermore's National Ignition Facility--were meeting the Department of Energy's milestones for cost and performance. Some construction projects were actually running ahead of schedule and below cost. Indeed, I was so pleased with progress being made by the laboratories and the University that in February 2002, I informed President Atkinson that I intended to resume my retirement by the end of the year. In October 2002, a month before I formally announced my resignation, the National Nuclear Security Administration completed a two-year review of Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore, during which the agency evaluated the laboratories for management accountability, safety and security, facilities safety, and project management. The two laboratories received the highest possible scores in all categories. Therefore, as I prepared to return to Santa Barbara, I believed that the University and the labs were well on their way toward fulfilling the Appendix O obligations and improving their management operations. recent problems at los alamos Sadly, as my tenure drew to a close, I suddenly learned of the deficiencies in Los Alamos's property management and procurement systems. I must confess, given the high marks received by the Lab's property audits in recent years, these discoveries came as a surprise. In hindsight, I should have devoted more time and energy to investigating the handling of property at Los Alamos. Purchase Card In early August 2002, Joe Salgado, then the Lab's Principal Deputy Director, telephoned and informed me that one laboratory employee had attempted to purchase a Ford Mustang using her lab-issued purchase card, and that another employee had used her card to obtain a cash advance at a local casino. Needless to say, I was appalled to hear of these incidents. More troubling, however, was Mr. Salgado's warning that the Lab's automatic reconciliation process had not detected the illicit transactions. I took immediate action after receiving Mr. Salgado's report. On August 16, 2002, I sent a letter to Director John Browne instructing him to establish the External Review Team to evaluate the Lab's purchase card system. The Review Team would be headed by two former inspectors generals and assisted by the accounting firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers. In addition, I instructed Mr. Salgado to give me weekly updates on the Lab's progress in resolving the purchase card issues. Finally, I ordered the other two national laboratories managed by the University, Lawrence Berkley and Lawrence Livermore, to investigate their purchase card systems and determine whether they suffered from problems similar to those afflicting Los Alamos. Fortunately, the reports I received indicated they did not. TA-33 In the same conversation that Mr. Salgado first informed me of the problems with the Lab's purchase card system, he also told me that some Los Alamos employees had purchased goods for their personal use using a Lab purchase order contract. Mr. Salgado explained that because the FBI was currently investigating the matter, he had limited information and the Lab's ability to undertake its own investigations was restricted. Mr. Salgado did say, however, that the suspected thieves worked in one of the Laboratory's sensitive areas. In later conversations with Mr. Salgado, I was told that officials in the Lab's Security and Safeguards Division were informed of the thefts in September 2001 and had notified the FBI, which did not take action for some time. Yet these same officials failed to report the matter to the Inspector General or senior managers at Los Alamos. As I told Mr. Salgado at the time, I believe the security officials made a mistake by not immediately passing the information up to their superiors or taking steps to notify the Inspector General. Mr. Salgado also subsequently told me that he and Frank Dickson, the Lab's Laboratory Counsel, felt that the FBI needed to conclude its investigation more rapidly. Allowing suspected thieves to continue working in a highly sensitive area of the Lab, he explained, posed an unacceptable security risk. Walp and Doran Terminations No discussion of the recent troubles engulfing Los Alamos could possibly be complete without mentioning Glenn Walp and Steven Doran. Like many of my University of California colleagues, I appreciate that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran did the nation, the Lab, and the University a service in publicizing their concerns over the Lab's property management system. I first heard the names Glenn Walp and Steven Doran on November 5, 2002, while meeting in Santa Fe, New Mexico, with project managers from Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Lawrence Berkley National Laboratories. While in Santa Fe, I was told of an article in the Energy Daily newspaper alleging that senior Los Alamos managers were concealing property mismanagement at the Lab and interfering with ongoing investigations. I found that assertion very troubling, and drove that same day to Los Alamos to look into the matter further. Once at the Lab, I met individually with Mr. Salgado and Jo Ann Milam. Later in the day, I held a much larger meeting involving Mr. Salgado, Frank Dickson, James Holt, Stanley Busboom, Gene Tucker, and Scott Gibbs. The general discussion of the meeting confirmed many of the details in the article. During this meeting, Mr. Dickson stated that he had previously lost confidence in Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran and that he did not trust either man. As best I could tell, all the other participants agreed with Mr. Dickson's assessment. The week before Thanksgiving, Mr. Salgado called to give me his weekly update on the purchase card system. During the conversation, he said that the Lab lacked confidence in Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, and he reported that the Lab had to act at once because both men were approaching the end of their probationary periods and about to go on vacation. Based on what Mr. Salgado said, I thought the probationary periods would expire while Mr. Doran and Mr. Walp were away from the Lab. Mr. Salgado pointed out that Mr. Walp had incorrectly accused an employee in the Lab's Human Resources Department of obstruction of justice, and other reasons offered as justifications for the terminations included Mr. Walp's refusal to cooperate with the External Review Team and the unreliability of reports submitted by Mr. Doran. After listening to Mr. Salgado, I asked whether he had spoken with Director John Browne about the terminations. He responded that the Director was out of town, but that he would consult him over the weekend. I then told Mr. Salgado to do what he felt was right. Based on the apparent unity of Laboratory managers, I did not doubt Mr. Salgado's actions or motivations when he notified me of his intention to recommend termination to Director Browne. Now, however, I have serious doubts about the actions. I subsequently learned, for instance, that neither Mr. Walp nor Mr. Doran were approaching the end of their probationary status. In fact, the probationary periods for both men ran into 2003, and both periods could have been extended by Laboratory managers. Secretary Abraham played an instrumental role in triggering my reassessment of the terminations. During the Secretary's December 12, 2002 visit to Santa Fe, Director Browne explained the Laboratory's reasoning for terminating Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. It was a case I had heard before, and a case, frankly, that I had accepted as plausible and defensible. Secretary Abraham offered a new, fresh perspective. As his probing questions demonstrated, an outsider objectively reviewing the situation might wonder if the terminations were warranted. The Secretary, as well as this Committee, helped shed new light onto the firings. concluding thoughts Our national laboratories are extraordinary institutions that provide an invaluable service to this country. They have no peer in the realm of scientific research and technical expertise. There is always room for improvement, however. I have devoted much of my life to bettering the project management of our national laboratories so as to ensure that their business practices match their scientific excellence. During my tenure as Vice President for Laboratory Management, I believe the University and Los Alamos made real and substantial progress toward improving management, oversight, and programmatic performance. Yet the failings at Los Alamos demonstrate that we must do much better. The events being investigated by this Committee are inexcusable. Theft and mismanagement of government property--regardless of size--cannot be tolerated. When I proposed creating the position of Vice President for Laboratory Management, I emphasized the importance of accountability. Ultimately, I was the University official in charge of overseeing Los Alamos, and I regret what occurred at the Lab. But I am also grateful to this Committee, to Secretary Abraham, to Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, and to the Inspector General for investigating, identifying, and publicizing the weaknesses at the Lab. I am convinced that the University and Los Alamos are becoming stronger and improved institutions because of these revelations. Thank you again for your efforts and for the opportunity to appear today. I would be happy to answer your questions. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, sir. Mr. Erickson. TESTIMONY OF RALPH E. ERICKSON Mr. Erickson. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. My name is Ralph Erickson. I am the current Manager of the National Nuclear Security Administration's Los Alamos Site Office. I was assigned to the Los Alamos Site Office in July 2002 as Director, reporting to the Manager of the Albuquerque Operation Office. During the middle of December 2002, as a part of National Nuclear Security Administration's restructuring, the Albuquerque Operation Office was disestablished and the Los Alamos Site Office began reporting directly to the National Nuclear Security Administration's Administrator Office in Washington, DC. At that time, I became the Manager of the Los Alamos Site Office. I am now responsible and accountable, to the Administrator, for the oversight and contract management for the contract with the University of California, related to the Los Alamos National Laboratory. My new responsibilities include functions that were previously the responsibility of the Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office, such as Business Management oversight and evaluation. Given the events of the past 8 months, which includes the Department of Energy's Office of Inspector General Special Inquiry, ongoing Federal Bureau of Investigation and other related activities, I have taken a number of actions to begin to address the findings and recommendation which have come from these events: I have directed that the Los Alamos National Laboratory take appropriate salary action for those individuals reassigned to lower-level positions. I have directed the Los Alamos National Laboratory to take five specific actions related to the recently issued Office of Inspector General report on fire arms inventory and report back to me in person on a monthly basis as to the status of the corrective actions taken by them. These corrective actions will be validated by the National Nuclear Security Administration. I have directed that Los Alamos National Laboratory establish an internal tracking system, to capture all findings, observations, lessons learned, and recommendations related to these and other assessment activities. This tracking system will include corrective actions, and a schedule for implementing the corrective actions. Los Alamos National Laboratory will identify a point of contact for each action. The National Nuclear Security Administration will review each action for adequacy and validate closure. I have taken actions to reengineer the Business Management Oversight Process, which is conducted by National Nuclear Security Personnel. Formerly, this process was focused on performance improvement (efficiency, and economy), and the process was functionally aligned. Assessments were conducted vertically within functional areas such as property, procurement, and finance. I have added steps to assure that transactions will be evaluated in a cradle-to-grave fashion horizontally across all functional areas. Thus, transactions involving the acquisition of personal property for example, will be assessed from inception to completion assuring that approved procedures are properly implemented across the Los Alamos National Laboratory business management activity. This methodology will insert an element of internal control review into the performance assessment process. Finally, as corrective actions are implemented, and validated for closure, I will also review each action and take appropriate actions, such as a contracting officers determination of allowable costs in order to assure that the Government's and the taxpayers funds are recovered as appropriate. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee. This concludes my statement; I would be pleased to answer any questions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ralph E. Erickson follows:] Prepared Statement of Ralph E. Erickson, Manager, Los Alamos Site Office, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy introduction Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: My name is Ralph Erickson, and I am the current Manager of the National Nuclear Security Administration's Los Alamos Site Office. I was assigned to the Los Alamos Site Office in July 2002 as Director, reporting to the Manager of the Albuquerque Operation Office. During the middle of December 2002, as a part of National Nuclear Security Administration's restructuring, the Albuquerque Operation Office was disestablished and the Los Alamos Site Office began reporting directly to the National Nuclear Security Administration's Administrator Office in Washington, D.C. At that time, I became the Manager of the Los Alamos Site Office. I am now responsible and accountable, to the Administrator, for the oversight and contract management for the contract with the University of California, related to the Los Alamos National Laboratory. My new responsibilities include functions that were previously the responsibility of the Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office, such as Business Management oversight and evaluation. Given the events of the past eight months, which includes the Department of Energy's Office of Inspector General Special Inquiry, ongoing Federal Bureau of Investigation and other related activities, I have taken a number of actions to begin to address the findings and recommendation which have come from these events: I have directed that the Los Alamos National Laboratory take appropriate salary action for those individuals reassigned to lower level positions. I have directed the Los Alamos National Laboratory to take five specific actions related to the recently issued Office of Inspector General report on fire arms inventory and report back to me in person on a monthly basis as to the status of the corrective actions taken by them. These corrective actions will be validated by the National Nuclear Security Administration. I have directed that Los Alamos National Laboratory establish an internal tracking system, to capture all findings, observations, lessons learned, and recommendations related to these and other assessment activities. This tracking system will include corrective actions, and a schedule for implementing the corrective actions. Los Alamos National Laboratory will identify a point of contact for each action. The National Nuclear Security Administration will review each action for adequacy and validate closure. I have taken actions to reengineer the Business Management Oversight Process, which is conducted by National Nuclear Security Personnel. Formerly, this process was focused on performance improvement (efficiency, and economy), and the process was functionally aligned. Assessments were conducted vertically within functional areas such as property, procurement, and finance. I have added steps to assure that transactions will be evaluated in a cradle to grave fashion horizontally across all functional areas. Thus, transactions involving the acquisition of personal property for example, will be assessed from inception to completion assuring that approved procedures are properly implemented across the Los Alamos National Laboratory business management activity. This methodology will insert an element of internal control review into the performance assessment process. Finally, as corrective actions are implemented, and validated for closure, I will also review each action and take appropriate actions, such as a contracting officers determination of allowable costs in order to assure that the Government's and the taxpayers funds are recovered as appropriate. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee. This concludes my statement; I would be pleased to answer any questions. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Erickson. The Chair recognizes himself for 10 minutes. Mr. Marquez, the committee obtained a report that was generated in last December. It was requested by BUS-5 team leader that shows items that were deemed sensitive that were not property tagged as they should be. Now, that report says there were over $600,000 in desktop computers untagged, $150,000 plus in pocket PCs, $188,000 in printers, $20,000 plus in scanners, $193,000 plus in work stations, $7,400 in network servers, $751,000 in lap tops. How can anyone sit here with a straight face and say that this property management system is not severely flawed given these numbers? Mr. Marquez. I am not familiar with the particular list. I do have a list that the University of California provided me. I suspect it is probably the same list. The list I have seen has roughly 500 individual transactions and it is roughly computers and computer peripheral equipment. As we speak, I have my staff inventorying that to try to track it back to serial numbers and purchases. So far, sir, with 65 percent of that complete, we have all of those showed up as bar coded and in the inventory. I would like to finish that and I would like to provide this committee with that report. Mr. Greenwood. All right. Which among you had direct responsibility for the purchase card program? Mr. Hettich. As the procurement manager I would say I had direct responsibility. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Reference was made, and I forget which one of you testified, to, I think, with regard to the Mustang case that the individual in charge had self-approved status. Mr. Hettich. Correct. Mr. Greenwood. Now, it seems to me so obvious that a system in which employees self-approve their expenses is obviously flawed. I can't imagine. That is not the way it works in the Congress. I can tell you that. I can tell you that if I buy a train ticket and put it on my Federal credit card, I better bring that stub in and I better give it to the woman who puts this report together and she sends it off to somebody else who matches it against the dates and so forth and approves. If I make a mistake anywhere in my reporting, I have got a problem. It seems so self-evident that any system that has self-approval is automatically flawed. How could you have a system like that? Mr. Hettich. I can give you the historic on it. It was actually set up that way in 1996 when the credit card system was first set up. Mr. Greenwood. What were they thinking then? Mr. Hettich. The logic at that time was if, in fact, you are giving a buyer a warrant to make a purchase under a PO system, then you don't--they effectively self-approve that. They release that contract action so in the case of a P-card it is an equal type of concept. I personally disagree with that idea. I agree with you. Mr. Greenwood. How long have you personally disagreed with that? Mr. Hettich. Well, I became the procurement manager in January of last year. Just so you have a context, I am the third procurement manager the Laboratory has had in 3 years and during a period where our growth in procurement actions was going up tremendously. The problem was, quite honestly, I have to admit and, again, you have others say this and I won't use that as an excuse, but I didn't realize that actually that is how the structure was at that time. When I found out, I was outraged. I mean, it just struck me---- Mr. Greenwood. You know, there was a lot in the news, I think somebody mentioned it today, about these kinds of problems in other departments, the Department of Defense. Mr. Hettich. That is correct. Mr. Greenwood. There were stories about somebody in the Department of Defense who paid for his girlfriend's breast enlargements or something using a credit card. There were all kinds of ridiculous abuses of the credit card system. Mr. Hettich. I had actually asked for a review of the credit card system in January when I first became the procurement manager and got a status from the then team leader over the small purchasing operation and the purchase card administrator on what is the status of our system. At that time that was not one of the issues that was raised unfortunately. Mr. Marquez. Mr. Chairman, let me just interject. We can look backward, and I agree, but it is not defensible. When we looked at it, and I had a small committee formed to look at this, the first place they looked, as Dr. Browne testified, was DOD OIG reports. They were rampant at the time. If you will notice in the August 26 revision of the procedures, which I issued, there is no continued self- approval. You have to have separate approvals. I mean, we all recognized at the time when we looked at it that it wasn't acceptable. I still believe it's not acceptable and we changed it. Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Let me stay with you, Mr. Marquez. Past procurement card audits dating back to 1998 identified the same systemic issues with the program time and time again. Checklist to ensure cards were closed out properly when employees leave the lab do not exist. Regular audits of programs not occurring. Property controlled items not properly accounted for. As I mentioned in my opening statement, I would like to know now what about your new procedural changes leads you to believe they will assist in solving the problems where none of the other audits and suggestions worked? Mr. Marquez. If you look at my written testimony, sir, you will see that when I started the job, I indicated in my written testimony that you had mixed signals. Yes, you had audit reports, but you also had corrective actions that were recorded that indicated that management had addressed the issues. You had ratings from the customer that were outstanding. There were mixed signals in this process. Notwithstanding that, your challenge is well taken. I believe that the answers are really pretty straight forward. First of all, I think you have to have sanctions. You have to have sanctions for the card holders and the review and approval officials that do not do their job. You have to have sanctions for people that abuse purchase cards. Our disciplinary procedures---- Mr. Greenwood. As my daughter would say, ``duh.'' Mr. Marquez. But my point is we have disciplinary procedures that cover that but our practices don't evidence that we rigidly enforce and follow up. That is a single difference. In January we suspended close to 200 cards for people who did not do the requisite training. We have not done that in the past. The scope of the cards. You know, we let this thing grow to where we had too many card holders. We have dropped it from something like 1,100 down to 585. We have got problems with our automated system. Every time we invent a system, we find ways to manually override it so that the internal control checks don't occur. We are going to fix that. And then, frankly, two other things that I think are just as important. We have, in my opinion, an over reliance on audits to do internal control's work. I think the answer is that the business organizations, whether they be the accounting people, the property people, the procurement, they have to do their own internal control desktop audits. They have to routinely check. As I indicated in my written testimony, experience and industry practice tells you that if management is paying attention, a lot of the internal control issues should go away. And, finally, and this is probably the most important, I really insist and maintain in my testimony, and I believe this with all of my heart, your best internal control is the very people who have the cards who observe others. If we create an environment of openness where they can bring forward issues, then that is another way to catch---- Mr. Greenwood. I certainly agree with that. It has been testified here that now there is this new spirit of rejoicing about bringing information forward. My question is did the opposite exist before? Was it your sense that prior to these changes that there was--that individuals who felt they were aware of wrongdoing going on by their coworkers were discouraged from bringing that forward? Mr. Marquez. I think you are going to find different views by different managers at the Laboratory. I will just share my own personal view. I believe that I have seen enough one-on-one conversations with people that they do believe that there would be retaliation if they brought forth issues. I have heard that on more than one occasion. Mr. Greenwood. What do you think led them to believe that? Can you think of cases where there has been retaliation? Mr. Marquez. I have had to review cases that claim retaliation in my capacity as the Associate Lab Director. Mr. Greenwood. Retaliation by whom? Mr. Marquez. By supervisors and managers. I have had people come to me and share who, in fact, have been past whistleblowers who to this day still claim that they are being retaliated against. Mr. Greenwood. And you have investigated those claims? Mr. Marquez. Yes, I have. Yes, sir. Mr. Greenwood. And have you found they have veracity? Mr. Marquez. I have found that in most cases a lot of these issues don't go away. People go through the process and they don't feel like justice was served at the end of that process. I am being candid with you. That's frankly my own assessment. Mr. Greenwood. You are under oath. You had better be candid. Mr. Marquez. But I have to tell you, those issues don't go away and I think, frankly, part of our problem is that we don't cultivate relationships. We don't have relationships amongst subordinates. We don't have vertical relationships. We don't have relationships even in the business community. We don't spend a lot of time on that and I think we need to spend more time on that. Mr. Greenwood. Mr. McTague, did you want to comment on that? Mr. McTague. Yes. With respect to the issue of whether there is hope that things will be better now with the new system, the University of California has a purchase card system, a single system at its 10 university campuses and the two other national laboratories that it manages. There have not been the systemic problems on the campuses or at the other laboratories with this new system which is now the one that has essentially been put into place at Los Alamos so hope springs eternal. Mr. Browne. Mr. Chairman, could I make a quick comment? Mr. Greenwood. Please. Mr. Browne. This whole subject really consumed a lot of my energy for a couple of years, this whole question of fear in the work place. The way I tried to address this was by a lot of employee focus groups. Going out in the laboratory and sitting down with employees without their supervisors there. I heard the same thing that Mr. Marquez just testified to. What I tried to do to address it was to give the employees more avenues to come forward, an ombuds office. I put in place at the time I became director something called Ask The Director where you could ask me anonymously or tell me what you thought was the problem and I would answer that publicly in our news bulletin. We had a series of these things. I think there is still some fundamental barriers in our institution that I have struggled with that have caused this fear to still exist and it goes back a long time. I know 10 years ago when I was in a different position at the Laboratory I dealt with the same fundamental problem and I talked to employees about what drives this fear in the work place. I think we have to just continue to do what Dr. Marquez says. The Lab Director has to stand up and say that it is okay. I have done that. I have done that on many occasions. I actually had a policy which I called my zero policy and that stood for zero people mistreatment at our Laboratory, zero safety incidents, zero security incidents. Ironically I got some pushback from our employees because technically they said you can never achieve zero. My answer to the employees was, ``What number is okay?'' In my opinion, there is no other number. You may not ever get there but the fact is that should be your goal as a leader of an institution. Mr. Greenwood. Thank you. The gentleman from Florida. Mr. Davis. Thank you. I have a series of questions that, if counsel is prepared, I would like to run through. Mr. Hettich, I want to start with you and the Mustang investigation. Why did you not report this to OSI as soon as you found out about it? Mr. Hettich. Sir, I have to disagree with the statement that was made that I did not. I got to Mr. Marquez as quickly as I could. After I talked to Mr. Marquez as the head of AD that we ultimately responded to, first of all, he asked me to make sure that I informed both AA-4, which was the Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Unit, and OSI. Historically, just so you have---- Mr. Davis. I am short on time and I know you will correct me if I am not putting this in the appropriate context. He did direct you to report this to OSI? Mr. Hettich. To both. Mr. Davis. And you did so? Mr. Hettich. Yes, sir. Mr. Davis. And how timely did you do so? Mr. Hettich. I called Mr. Walp the next day. We arranged-- -- Mr. Davis. Can you be specific on the date, if you can recall? Mr. Hettich. I would say--well, interestingly enough, I had found one of the call backs on it. The call back from Steve Doran was on the 25th but I had talked to Mr. Walp before that. There was also an allegation made that it was only because of John Topia which is not correct. Mr. Davis. Let me just understand this specific point. My information is the problem was discovered on the 18th. Does that message help you recall what date you would have talked to him? Mr. Hettich. It was discovered on the 18th. I was informed of it on the Wednesday of the week before the 25th. I talked to Mr. Marquez, called Mr. Walp on the Friday. Met with my people on the Tuesday for more information on it. Met with Mr. Doran actually, I think, the next day. Then with Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran on Thursday. Mr. Davis. Mr. Dickson's office knew about it in a couple of days. Did his office tell you to start your own investigation by calling the suspect employee and the suspect vendor? Mr. Hettich. No. Not me, but I am not sure if they had a conversation with either Mr. Holder, who is the team leader, or the purchase card administrator. Mr. Davis. Are you aware that Mr. Holder gave those instructions to the purchase card administrator and, if so, why did he do that? Mr. Hettich. I am not sure why he gave those instructions to the purchase card administrator. I think what he was trying to do was establish the facts so that he understood what was happening in this. As has been pointed out, she had immediately disputed it when the statement came out. Statements are like your own. They come out the month after. A May statement would have come out in June. Mr. Davis. Were you planning to have your people go out and get phone records and check on delivery methods? Were you planning to call the FBI yourself or were you going to let Bank America handle the problem since they had already reimbursed the vendor? Mr. Hettich. Actually, the first thing I wanted to do was talk to senior management as soon as I found out about it what they would like me to do with it. I would have automatically called AA-4 the same day that I found out about it but I wanted to make sure that Mr. Marquez was aware of it. I knew that OSI was taking a different role than they had historically taken on it. We discussed it and he said that he wanted to make sure that we were informing both avenues simultaneously and I did that. Mr. Davis. Mr. Marquez, do you agree with the description of the events? Mr. Marquez. I agree with the description relative to Mr. Hettich's and my conversation. I have really no knowledge of Mr. Holder's actions. Mr. Davis. In your capacity as the person in charge of all kinds of procurement, can you explain to us how the blanket purchase order like the Mesa agreement could have gotten out of hand without somebody monitoring it? Different people have told us this particular type of method was ripe for abuse. Mr. Marquez. As I have said to the staff members, there is really no excuse for the Mesa contract. The structure of it by its nature was more open than any blanket we had ever put together that I could find. It started out as a very small contract with a limited scope. It was expanded. While there was some review, the oversight was clearly not enough. Even though it had been in existence for quite a period of time by the time that I became the procurement manager, honestly the procurement manager in general should have known about it. I should have known about it. I can't defend that piece. I mean, I can't defend why that contract was structured as open as it was. Mr. Davis. I believe you may have said to Mr. Walp at some point that the system had become too customer oriented meaning the customer got what they wanted. Do you think that explains why the system was failing? Mr. Hettich. Actually, just so you understand, there was another aspect of what I told Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran. There were actually three things I said to explain the system differences. One was that in the mid-1990's there was a decision that the procurement and property personnel that were distributed, that were in the field, instead of reporting directly to the property management and procurement management, actually reported to a different BUS group. So the person that was overseeing their salary raises and everything else was not necessarily the procurement manager or the property manager. That was changed in February 2002. By the way, the other thing that I raised with them was the G&G Industries as the same time when they came over, at the same time I mentioned Mustang. Mr. Davis. In your opinion, do contract administrators have enough time to monitor the purchases to make sure they are legitimate? Mr. Hettich. No. Mr. Davis. So it's really a matter of personal accountability for each of the administrators. If the administrator is honest and does their job appropriate, everything will work out fine. If they don't, there are opportunities for misuse. Mr. Hettich. I think one of the things that Mr. Marquez said that is probably the most important is the level of oversight. Just to give you a comparison, for instance, at Lawrence Livermore the BUS organization has four people that look specifically at that. That is an independent organization. That is what Mr. Marquez has set up for us now also within our BUS organization. Mr. Davis. Mr. Hernandez, I would like to ask you to comment on the same point in terms of the oversight. Mr. Hernandez. I think the problem with this blanket, how it got out of hand, is due to, one, understaffing within procurement. The administrator of this contract is an honest person. She does a good job. Spends an abnormal amount of hours at work. We are overwhelmed with new requirements from requestors. Once you have a full plate of new requests you are being pushed to get these things out. Usually you have last minute requests. The administration and oversight of the contracts end up suffering. Mr. Davis. Mr. Marquez, what plans do you intend to undertake to deal with this problem that everyone seems to agree? Mr. Marquez. The staffing issue? Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. Mr. Marquez. Actually, we have done some things. Our organization in procurement is funded out of our G&A, general and administrative account. In fiscal year 2002 shortly after I got there I mentioned that we formed this procurement excellence plan. A tab of that, a section of that has to do with staffing. In between Stan Hettich and I and his team we laid out a 3- year plan. It is obvious now looking back it's not aggressive enough so with the help of the University of California we were going to go out actively and vigorously and recruit MBA level, whatever it takes to fix the staffing shortages. Mr. Davis. So this was a 3-year plan because you did not think it was an immediate problem but a problem with a long- term solution? Mr. Marquez. No. It was a 3-year plan because historically at the Laboratory what I saw in terms of procurement profile is that since 1996, as I mentioned in my written testimony, they had pretty static staffing and I felt like it was going to be an uphill battle to try to address the procurement and other administrative staffing areas so I put together a modest plan. Obviously it wasn't aggressive enough. We actually funded some positions both in 2002 and 2003 largely because of my intervention relative to the budget. Mr. Davis. I think my time is about up so let me close with this question. Dr. Browne, Mr. Salgado apparently has told us that people at the Los Alamos Lab treated the taxpayer's money as ``Monopoly money.'' He told us expensive furniture and food were bought as were thousands of dollars for shirts congratulating people. Do you agree with Mr. Salgado and what has been done or what will be done about this? Mr. Browne. I don't think I would have chosen the term Monopoly money. Mr. Davis. What term would you have chosen? Mr. Browne. I think it goes back to this question of formality of operations. What I mean by that is whenever you have resources to work a problem for the Government, you really need to have a system in place that allows you to plan your program, to budget what you are going to spend it on, telling your customer what you need to carry it out, and you need a good evaluation system that says how well you are doing it. It's more formality and project management and yet allowing enough flexibility for local managers to make some good judgment decision, not so rigid. What I think Mr. Salgado was saying was that the system, unfortunately, maybe had too much flexibility in the sense that some poor judgment by a few people in terms of how they use their resources that were at their disposal to carry out programs was maybe not with the best judgment that they could exhibit. For example, we have a program with the Department of Energy for morale funds. That is a program that is approved by the Department of Energy up to a certain limit. If someone chooses to try and go around that system to augment that fund, that is an unallowable cost. Mr. Erickson, I know, would tell me it is an unallowable cost and we would have to figure out another way to cover those expenses. Those were Joe Salgado's words. I never would have said Monopoly money. It conveys a little different context than I would which is more of this you have got to have rigorous formality when you are dealing with taxpayer's money. Mr. Marquez. Mr. Davis, may I comment? Mr. Davis. Please. Mr. Marquez. The Congressman from California this morning made a point about, ``What are you doing about it? You have got these cultural issues.'' I would like to tell you that we are doing something about it. I have formed a Business of Procedures Practices Council. PP3 we call it. What it is is a cross-section of the technical side of the house, all of the division leaders. As we make the corrective changes that we are proceeding with now, they sit on a steering committee and if they have objections, they needed to voice them then. If there are going to be programmatic impact, they need to let us know. What we do by this is get their buy-in each step of the way as we change and forge this new culture. To sit and say we have got this culture of accommodation, or whatever the term was that was used, I wanted to let you know we are doing something about addressing that cultural issue. Mr. Walden. All right. Where to start? I want to make a couple of comments. Dr. Browne, you triggered something that I think is important. I fully understand--well, I don't. Nobody understands what you have been through because it has probably been very difficult. You talked about size and scale of the operation. Even given that, you are still responsible. I appreciate that, you taking responsibility. It seems to me, though, that big organizations hire people and pay them pretty significant salaries to deal with the scope of the problems that may exist. I hear size and scale. We face it all across the Federal Government. I don't care how big or small your business is, you are going to have bad apples but, dog gone it, at some point. I appreciate your comments about Mr. McDonald being a stand-up guy. The great irony is, though, that he went with Bill Sprouse at OSI apparently. He told us he did at least once, if not more than that, to say there's a problem. He felt like he had been ignored. How ironic if, indeed, all of that is true. If Mr. Sprouse had actually done something about it, who knows what would have happened, how all of the lives would have been different. That's what troubles me is that my understanding is both the University system has basically hired back Mr. Walp and is working with Mr. Doran. Obviously we have heard today and before that there wasn't necessarily just cause to fire them, so that leads me to believe they didn't do anything wrong. They were the whistleblowers. They identified the problems. They were fired inappropriately and, in fact, the people who fired them have been dismissed with a nice severance parachute. Two weeks ago, I think it was, they sat here, Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran, and said the people they hired who were still there, the investigators or investigator, reported to them basically they are just as frustrated as ever, that nothing has changed. Now, I hear things are changing. We also hear, though, that certain LANL managers have suggested that the University of California's actions to rehire Walp and Doran are ``only so much window dressing'' and it is just a passing storm. Mr. Marquez, do you care to comment on that? That is the heart of the issue here. Is there real change or is this just wait it out until the storm passes? Mr. Marquez. I believe it's real change. I don't believe that---- Mr. Walden. You don't think it is window dressing? Mr. Marquez. No, sir. I believe that the University of California has demonstrated, at least to me, in the areas that I have to administer that they are sincere about the effort to make change. They are bringing resources to the table. They are bringing support on a daily basis. I have no doubt this is a sincere change. Mr. Walden. Okay. Mr. McTague and Mr. Marquez, are you familiar with the settlement/retirement agreements with Busboom, Tucker, and Brittin? Mr. McTague. That all occurred after my time. Mr. Marquez. That's a University of California action and I am not aware of it. Mr. Walden. So you don't know whether they included any indemnification? Mr. Marquez. I have no idea. Mr. Walden. Anybody know at the table? No one is in a position? Okay. Mr. McTague. Might I make a comment on your discussion earlier in the questions about that this time around are things really going to get fixed. From my perspective, retrospectively now, two things that are very important to making the system really work are, one, a very good audit line of authority. Ultimately the responsibility for running the Laboratory goes to the Regents of the University of California. The system that was in place for audit up until December, I guess, was that the local audit operation at Los Alamos in effect reported indirectly to the director and only very weakly up through the Office of the President to the Regents where there is an important audit office headed by Pat Reed. The connection now is that audit function reports directly to Mr. Reed so that it is independent of the system at the Laboratory. Mr. Walden. That's good. Mr. McTague. I think that is extremely important. The other important thing is the robustness of management systems. We have enough testimony that the management systems were not robust, antiquated, etc. Bringing in the Ernst & Young group to take a look at the total of the financial and other management systems at the Laboratory, I think, is an opportunity that would not have come about unless this committee had started the investigation. Mr. Walden. I appreciate that. Mr. Erickson, the NNSA fiscal year 2002 appraisal of the LANL rated the Lab's procurement and personal property management areas as ``excellent'' despite all the problems that had arisen at that time. Can you explain what that rating is based on and how it is that a system rated as excellent could allegedly allow two employees to walk off with lab property of over $150,000 Government purchased property? Mr. Erickson. The actual BMOR report, you may have heard it called that, Business Management Operations Report, was basically completed in about the August, early September timeframe by the portion of the Albuquerque Operations Office that at that time had responsibility for reviewing those business, procurement, and property activities. Based on the information that was available to them at that time, none, or very few, of the activities that had come to light as a result of the investigations in this hearing process were known. The FBI was investigating a number of issues, the Mustang case and others, as well as the TA-33 case. Those were under investigation. Given the fact that they were under investigation by the FBI, we weren't aware of all the details at that particular time and the people who did that report were not aware. That report was then issued at the very beginning of October of last year. The appraisal was put together in the latter part of October. At that point in time a few more of these details had come out. I made the decision to lower their rating by one grade and that is the rating that was made a part of the actual appraisal. Mr. Walden. Just one grade? Mr. Erickson. Again, because we didn't have the information. We did not have the data. This was prior to the firings of the two gentlemen. This was before we knew what was going to come out of the FBI investigation. Mr. Walden. You know, Mr. Erickson, it is probably frustrating for you to have me sit here and question all the work you are doing but I spent 5 years on a community bank board and served on the audit committee. We had the regulators in periodically. They were amazing at what they could find down to the gnat's eyelash practically. They were very rigorous. We welcomed it as a board because it kept our tails out of trouble. How do we get that into these systems? We had our own internal auditor. We had an external auditor. Then they would come in. Mr. Erickson. And that is one of the things that we are endeavoring to correct as we have moved beyond this. The metrics that were used by the BMOR people tended to be very vertical in an organization. They didn't take a transactional look at how things really crossed the line between procurement and property and things like that. This year based on what we found and what we learned we are changing that process. Mr. Walden. Are you changing auditors? Mr. Erickson. We're not changing auditors because we rely on two things. One, the Federal employees whom we used before. We also use the IG on an annual basis to look at our books. Mr. Walden. You don't use an outside Government auditor? Mr. Erickson. It's all within house, if you will. The internal is our own organization, the NNSA. We also rely on the IG as, if you will, the external organization. We don't go to Arthur Anderson. Mr. Walden. Nobody does that anymore, Mr. Erickson. In part as a result of this committee, I might add. Mr. Erickson. I recognize that. Mr. Walden. We are trying to avoid all those issues. When did you find out about the Bussolini-Alexander case? Mr. Erickson. I was informed of that toward the latter part of August. I had heard about the Mustang and the P-card, as it is sometimes is called, issue. Mr. Walden. Who told you about it, Bussolini-Alexander? Mr. Erickson. That was Joe Salgado. Mr. Walden. And what was your response? Mr. Erickson. I was astounded, amazed, disappointed, and very upset. Mr. Walden. Did you notify anybody at NNA or DOE about the problem? Mr. Erickson. Yes. I immediately notified at that time my immediate boss which was John Arthur who was the manager at Albuquerque and also---- Mr. Walden. No relation to Arthur Anderson? Mr. Erickson. No relation, sir. Then also the administrator's office, Linton Brooks' office, within headquarters. Mr. Walden. So that is the action you took and then out of your hands from there? Mr. Erickson. In a sense out of my hands because those are ongoing investigations by the FBI. We stand away from that and let the FBI do their job until they are complete. Mr. Walden. I just want to close my part and turn it over to my colleague here. The fact is it still troubles me that Walp and Doran were here 2 weeks ago reporting to us that in their opinion and what they are hearing the same problems are still going on. I just leave you with that. Whether it is accurate or not I don't know. I hope you take that to heart. Mr. Deutsch. Mr. Deutsch. Thank you. Mr. Marquez, I am going to refer to an e-mail dated January 23, 2002, from Robert Holder to Dennis Roybal. If you want to take a look at it, it is at Tab 107 in the book. Who are Mr. Roybal and Mr. Holder? Mr. Marquez. I can't find the tab but Mr. Roybal was--what was the date? Mr. Deutsch. January 23, 2002. Mr. Marquez. Until recently Mr. Roybal was the Deputy Division Director in the Business Operation Division. Mr. Holder until recently was a team leader for the accelerated purchasing team in the procurement group of the Business Operations Division. Mr. Deutsch. Their titles now are? Mr. Marquez. Mr. Roybal is a special assistant to my office and Mr. Holder, I believe, has been reassigned as a senior procurement staff in the procurement group. Mr. Deutsch. Do they both work for you? Mr. Marquez. They both report to me but they work in the Business Operations Division. Mr. Roybal reports directly to me now. Mr. Deutsch. There is a concern about an IG order, the purchase case program. Is that correct? Mr. Marquez. I am sorry? Mr. Deutsch. There is a concern, or is there a concern about an IG order of--in the e-mail itself it talks about that, concern about the IG order of the purchase case program. I have it right here. Mr. Marquez. ``DOE IG just announced they are going to initiate a DOE wide audit of contractor purchase card use.'' I think this e-mail is a forwarded e-mail that originated within NNSA. I think what they are doing is he is forwarding an e-mail to give notice that they are doing a--DOE apparently is going to do a purchase wide---- Mr. Deutsch. In this e-mail Mr. Holder tells Mr. Roybal that the purchase card system allows the purchase of attractive items and cannot demonstrate that they are being properly controlled. Could you tell us what attractive property is? Mr. Marquez. Sensitive or attractive, if that is what he is referring to, is a property control term which means items that are under $5,000 which is the normal tracking threshold but would be sensitive or attractive in the sense that someone might be inclined to steal it, walk off with it. Those would be things like, for example, an lap top, cameras, phones, things of that nature. Mr. Deutsch. And why aren't they being controlled? Mr. Marquez. They are being controlled. I am not sure what this e-mail is all about. I would have to go through and read it. The purchase card regulations that I changed in August would exclude purchases of this nature. It would prohibit these kinds of purchases. That was one of the key changes in that set of requirements that I issued in August. Mr. Deutsch. Right. I mean, the words from the e-mail, ``The reviews are not current and have likely never been current.'' Mr. Marquez. Well, this is Mr. Holder's view of the world, but I can tell you that as of the end of February when we closed our P-card accounts, we dropped our reconciliations and our P-card accounts to a point where we are now within $8,000 on reconciliation so I am not really familiar---- Mr. Deutsch. Is that February of this year? Mr. Marquez. Yes. February of this year. Yes, sir. Mr. Deutsch. So this memo is of January of last year. Mr. Marquez. January 2002. Keep in mind that (a) this was before my time so you are catching me with an e-mail that I have not seen, but (b) in August 2002 we instituted lab wide purchase card changes. Mr. Deutsch. Right. I guess the question is what happened between January and August? Why did it take 8 months to do that? Mr. Marquez. Well, first of all, to be really honest with you, I wasn't aware that we were buying controlled property with our P-card process. I wasn't aware of that until I found out after we had our purchase incidents in the summer. Obviously I didn't agree with that policy and I changed it. Mr. Deutsch. We were provided this week with a list of all the computers bought on the purchase card system. In January Mr. Holder recommended not allowing this type of purchase. January 2002 he noted that Sandia didn't allow it nor did any other private companies. Mr. Marquez. Most companies don't allow it, sir. Most Government institutions don't allow it. Mr. Deutsch. Right. I guess my question again is this is January when he was saying this. Why did it take until August to change the system? Mr. Marquez. Well, I came on board February 4 and was not aware of this issue until the summer of 2002. When I became aware of it, within a month we instituted a change procedure. Mr. Deutsch. Why would you not be aware of it? Mr. Marquez. Because we do $1.3 billion of acquisitions every year. It is not that it is insignificant but through the chain of command you have to understand that Business Operations Division is one or eight or nine divisions that I manage on a daily basis. Some of these issues get to my attention and when they do, I try to take care of them. Mr. Deutsch. All right. It's a control issue. Obviously I don't want you to sign off on every purchase. Let me just follow up. On July 29 Vernon Brown did another purchase card assessment. This is after the Mustang case. It's Tab 138 if you want to take a look at it, page 8. He said, ``There is no mechanism to ensure that property rules are adhered to and it is very easy to bypass or simply ignore the rules.'' Mr. Marquez. Actually, this copy is a copy, I think, I provided. This is my handwriting. These are my notes. What this was is this was the briefing that I asked Vern Brown to give to Joseph Salgado and I in Joe Salgado's office on July 29 because both of us became concerned. On July 25 we became notified of the P-card incident, I believe, with the Mustang case. That was the first one. By the following Monday--I think we were notified on a Thursday. By the following Monday Vern Brown had worked all weekend and put together a very comprehensive report for us by way of this briefing so that we could understand the magnitude and scope of the problem. Mr. Deutsch. Okay. Did the Inspector General miss all the problems with the purchase card programs that have been uncovered since? Did he miss the suspicious purchases of sporting goods, global positioning systems, digital cameras, binoculars, slippers, bicycle helmets, and the clothes that we uncovered? Mr. Marquez. When you say Inspector General, are you talking about the former Inspector General John Layton? Mr. Deutsch. No, the Inspector General who investigated this at the time. Mr. Marquez. Actually, what they did in July--a lot of these--this was like the confluence of great rivers. The IG had, in fact, launched their review and that came together with amazing coincidence at the same time that we discovered the Mustang case. The IG did more of a--as I recall, they actually pulled up 90 cases on a random basis and they asked us to give them all the information that we possibly could. We did that. I believe out of that review that the IG did independently, some of those cases were referred to the Inspector General. I have to tell you then that in August, August 26, I believe, John Layton's team began their exhaustive review and they covered a 45-month period going backwards from June 30, I believe, of 2002. That would have been clear back to 1998. They looked through every single purchase card transaction. You have to be careful. Some of these items, for example, the TA-33, were purchased under a blanket purchase agreement, the Mesa contract. John Layton's team did not look at that and neither did the Inspector General. Mr. Deutsch. We have gone through this but can you just quickly explain the local vendor agreements and how they work? Mr. Marquez. I may have to rely on Mr. Hettich but I can tell you what I do know. At one time we had 35 local vendor agreements. These are vendors in the Northern New Mexico community. The idea is to provide commodities below a certain dollar amount supposedly on an exigent basis. How it operates is that by your badge, which the Laboratory issues you, you walk into a vendor and you can order supplies. In simple terms, that is the local vendor agreement process. As Bruce Darling indicated, we have looked at that and we believe that has got vulnerabilities and we are in the process of trying to increase the internal controls on that program. Mr. Deutsch. We found knives, cameras, binoculars, Nike shoes, and a variety of other questionable purchases on local vendor spreadsheets. Has an audit ever been done? Mr. Marquez. I can't tell you if an audit has been done on local vendor agreements. I can tell you that I, too, have found invoices on the local vendor, particularly the Nike shoes. That is a fairly recent case. I looked at that. That is KSL subcontractor, two individuals that drive taxis for them. They tried to characterize those as safety shoes. That is not within the normal bound of the Frank's Supply vendor list. We have actually challenged that and either KSL will reimburse us or we will go back to Frank's Supply and get reimbursement from them. Mr. Deutsch. Right. And can you provide a direct answer whether or not it has been audited or not? Mr. Marquez. I am sorry? Mr. Deutsch. Can you supply us with the information if an audit has been done. Mr. Marquez. I will find that out for you, sir. Mr. Deutsch. You are also promising us that PricewaterhouseCoopers is going to do an extended review of data mining for a 2-year period. We have not been particularly impressed by their work at this point. One can data mine for suspicious vendors of purchase names. It has some value but you need to get out into the field and see if the equipment is really there at this point. There are many items that Mr. Bussolini and Alexander converted to personal use that are not obvious on their face. Are you planning at this point to actually do field level investigations to deal with this? Mr. Marquez. Yes, sir. With respect to the particular slides that I got to see at the last testimony, I had a team spend this last weekend inventorying those bunkers at TA-33 and I believe that within the week I'll know the contents of those bunkers and I'll have some cost estimate of the items that were acquired. Mr. Deutsch. And my final question. You have said that you have only accounted for 70 percent of your controlled inventory. Is the claim that you accounted for 99.5 percent? Mr. Marquez. By DOE performance measure under our prime contract, in our controlled inventory we accounted for the past several years at above 99.5 which is the outstanding level. The 70 percent number I am not familiar with. Mr. Deutsch. Apparently that is in your testimony. Mr. Marquez. Well, I mean, you have to give me--in what context? Mr. Deutsch. In the wall-to-wall inventory. Mr. Marquez. Oh, the wall-to-wall inventory. That was started February 3 and as of Friday when I left the office, we had hit 70 percent of the items that are in our inventory. Mr. Deutsch. So it is an ongoing inventory. Mr. Marquez. It is ongoing. It is not scheduled to be completed until September 30. I am happy to report that we are well ahead of the progress chart on that. Mr. Deutsch. Thank you. Mr. Walden. We are going to do one more round and I think cut it to 5 minutes if that is all right with you. Mr. Marquez, I want to go back to one point because I think I heard you say that the external team audit looked at every P- card purchase. My understanding is that it was actually mine data using key word. It wasn't absolutely every purchase. Do you know that to be different? Mr. Marquez. You know, I probably shouldn't venture into it. I am not an auditor. The methodology they use I really can't get into the details of that. The scope was clearly 45 months of transactions, 170,000 transactions and roughly $120 million. Mr. Walden. Right. We were just trying to clarify. Mr. Marquez. They did do data mining. They did it based on our automated system. It has data fields that indicate what type of commodity was purchased. A lot of times the signal in that data field that you enter in our automated system would really leave open to question who in God's name would buy those kinds of things. Our team that I formed, I believe on December 6, worked through January 31 and our challenge was to take the list that PricewaterhouseCoopers left us and walk through each of those and justify them in advance of a UC audit report. Mr. Walden. Another question for you. One of the issues that came up were how the P-card accounts have not been reconciled. I think there was a major effort to get them all reconciled, some $3.8 million worth prior to June 30 or something. Mr. Marquez. That is correct, sir. Mr. Walden. I have a printout here from July 2002 through November 2002. It is fiscal year 2003. This shows data that has not been reconciled to the tune of $677,200.47. Mr. Marquez. At that time that was correct. Our plan was always to catch up because we were woefully behind. The same resources that I had to use to catch up and then we went and started with fiscal year 2003. I am happy to report that as of the end of February we are caught up and the discrepancy was at around $8,000 which is a significant improvement. It used to be in the $300,000 to $400,000 area. Mr. Walden. That's good to know. Dr. Browne, on December 16, 2002 you were still Director at the Lab? Mr. Browne. That is correct. Mr. Walden. You sent an e-mail to all LANL employees declaring that Walp and Doran were ``simply wrong'' and there were reports of widespread theft, coverup, and interference with law enforcement authorities at LANL. It is Tab 33 if you need to---- Mr. Browne. I remember the e-mail. Mr. Walden. Do you still hold to that opinion? Mr. Browne. The thing I was trying to convey to our employees was that I did not believe that there was this culture of theft that Mr. Walp and Mr. Doran were reporting in the press. I had not gone to the press and I felt that somehow I had to convey to our employees that I did not share this view that we had a work force full of thieves. That is what the intent of the e-mail was. Mr. Walden. Do you think--I guess I am trying to sort out here. I hear about Mustang. I hear about Mesa. I think it was Mr. Walp or maybe it was Mr. Doran who talked about a case that is out there of $800,000 purchase of hand tools from a single source. Is all that stuff legitimate? Mr. Browne. I think Mr. Marquez can answer the hand tools. My understanding was that was also reconciled. Is that correct? Mr. Marquez. Yes. There were issues and I am not going to say they were all hand tools. They were different types of tools for machining purposes. We have a large engineering and sciences application division. Mr. Walden. This guy went to--my understanding is---- Mr. Marquez. G&G Industry in Rio Rancho, New Mexico. It was basically a storefront operation. Mr. Walden. Part of what we were told is he would go to K- Mart and buy the tools. Mr. Marquez. It turns out he was somewhat of a pass through but I will tell you that the auditors that looked at this found that his prices were competitive with what we would have normally bought under the Just In Time program. That wasn't my concern. My concern was they should never have been bought under purchase cards in the first place. That was actually in place as a procedure and policy at the time and they were done under a so-called exception. If you pull the string on the exception, most of the requirements of the exception--I think people read the first sentence which says, ``You have an exception under the following conditions.'' They stopped before the word ``under'' and they characterized that as a blanket exception. They went off and purchased tools for a couple of years. Mr. Walden. You have changed that so that cannot ever happen--well, that should never happen again. You have done that through some sort of independent cross-approval? Mr. Marquez. Actually, we changed the purchase card requirements. You cannot buy those. We made it very clear. Mr. Walden. Are there limits on how much--if I had a P-card at Los Alamos, is there a dollar limit amount on my P-card? Mr. Marquez. Yes, now there is. $2,500 per transaction. I think it is $25,000 a month. Mr. Walden. How do you prevent them from exceeding that? Mr. Hettich. The thing you have to do is what you keep on saying and what we are saying also, and that is the only way you do it is to audit it correctly, honestly. I mean, you have to have an independent assessment taking place on a regular basis. If you find that somebody violates the instructions, the regulations that are out there, then you take appropriate remedial action against the person. Mr. Walden. Is it not better to go to a purchase order system where somebody up the chain sings off on it? Mr. Hettich. The difference between the two methodologies and the reason that the Federal Government quite honestly pushed people toward P-cards is the difference in the cost of the two methodologies. If you really look at the cost of doing a P-card transaction against doing a PO transaction, there is a significant cost difference. The question is is the risk factor---- Mr. Walden. Fraud, waste, abuse. Mr. Hettich. That's right. So that is one of the decision pieces. In the case of Livermore what they did was establish four independent auditors to keep up with this and go out to the desk tops, as you point out, do different things like that. Put an insurance to their own management that the risk factor was prudent. Mr. Walden. What an internal auditor would do. Do the random checks. Mr. Hettich. Correct. Mr. Walden. Is that in place now at Los Alamos? Mr. Hettich. Yes. Mr. Walden. I have way overshot my 5 minutes. You don't have any other questions? Mr. Chairman, do you? If not, the chairman asks unanimous consent to enter the binder into the record. Without objection that is so ordered. Opening statements are already approved for entry into the record with unanimous consent. Gentlemen, thank you for your patience today, your forthright comments. We very much appreciate you testifying before the committee. With that, we stand adjourned. [Whereupon, at 7:02 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned.] [Additional material submitted for the record follows:] April 10, 2003 The Honorable Jim Greenwood Chairman Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives 2125 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. Chairman: At the Subcommittee's hearing on March 12, 2003, I committed to provide information on my actions and accomplishments to change the historical culture at Los Alamos National Laboratory by reducing an entrenched ``management by accommodation'' and achieving a heightened sense of fiduciary responsibility to the American taxpayer. This letter fulfills that commitment, and I request that it be included in the official record of the Subcommittee's hearings on Property and Procurement Mismanagement at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The efforts Director Browne and I made to drive change and address management problems at the Laboratory were noted by NNSA in its FY 02 Appraisal, dated December 13, 2002: ``NNSA is encouraged by the aggressive leadership demonstrated by the Laboratory Director and Deputy Director--NNSA recognizes the outstanding effort on the part of Laboratory senior management to organize, drive improvement, and accelerate change in overall Laboratory culture. NNSA recognizes as well that LANL faces challenges such as the alarming trend in Price Anderson Amendment Act violations and the current investigations into irregularities in its purchasing activities. Nonetheless, NNSA is encouraged that LANL senior management has moved swiftly and demonstrated an understanding of the urgency and need for outside assistance as a mechanism to add credibility to the investigation process.'' The following actions and accomplishments are a representative, not exhaustive, sample of my actions and accomplishments, and they are consistent with NNSA's evaluation as noted above. The list begins in the fall of 1999 when I joined the Laboratory: Based on findings by the Office of Audits and Assessments (AA), I directed that reconciliations of bank accounts be brought current and that monthly reconciliation of bank accounts be completed thereafter. AA reports for several consecutive years, all of which had been filed with the University's Office of the President (UCOP), noted failure by the BUS Division to complete monthly reconciliations for three accounts--payroll, accounts payable, and travel--for fiscal years 1995 thru 1999. Total activity in the subject accounts over 5 fiscal years was over $7 billion. I provided periodic progress reports to UCOP (Van Ness and Kennedy) and the Regents (Leach) until the reconciliations were completed in August, 2000. Upon joining the Laboratory, I directed that each division and office that reported to me (BUS, HR, Audits and Assessments, Industrial Business Development, and others) complete a Vulnerability Analysis within 60 days. The effort resulted in over 200 findings, of which 134 were in the BUS Division. I required that Divisions implement specific corrective action plans for addressing identified vulnerabilities, and I tracked progress in weekly meetings with Division leaders. All Divisions except BUS had completed corrective action plans at the end of one year. In 1999 I directed a comprehensive review of the Laboratory's procurement program and procedures, using Laboratory employees and external procurement experts. UCOP directly participated in the review. I was led to believe that the review team's commitment to consensus may have led to a document written, in part, to accommodate the UC representative's preference for a ``softer'' report than some of the LANL representatives would otherwise have produced. I implemented a number of reforms and improvements as a result of the team's report. Directed the reorganization of the BUS Division and the addition of two Deputy Division Leaders to strengthen overall division management. Implemented a corrective action plan to eliminate over a period of about 6 months a multi-year backlog of about 900 contract closeouts. Reviewed progress weekly with Division management. Elevated the Small Business Procurement Office to report directly to the BUS Division leader to strengthen management of small business contracts and procurement actions. Established a small business point of contact in the Laboratory Ombudsman Office to assure that any small business perceptions of favoritism, procurement irregularities, or inadequate contract administration could be reported without fear of reprisal. I took this action in response to indications from the small business community that the Laboratory was not viewed as a good business partner by some vendors. Streamlined the process to assure prompt payments to vendors, subject to appropriate checking and approval by Laboratory users of vendor-supplied equipment, materials and services. Engaged The Gartner Group to advise the Laboratory on its business information management and related information technology activities. Implemented The Gartner Group's recommendations, thus avoiding significant expenses that would have resulted in inadequate systems. Cancelled the Laboratory's PeopleSoft project on the basis of cost/benefit analysis and ill-conceived scope; avoided planned project expenses. Initiated an Enterprise Resource Planning project (ERP) to modernize and streamline the Laboratory's business information management function and to adopt best business practices embedded in related commercial software. This is a multi-year project that is continuing and has been identified by the Interim Director as one of the Laboratory's highest priorities. Continued implementation of the ``Sunflower'' system, used by UC at Lawrence Livermore and Berkeley Labs and by other contractors in the DOE system to support property management. Continued implementation of the ``TIPS'' system to support the procurement function. Established a Laboratory-wide system for IT (Information Technology) governance to provide a central authority and Lab- wide coordinating point for policy and procedures and to assure that investments in IT were cost effective and reviewed by the Laboratory Senior Executive Team prior to commitments. Initiated three studies of the Laboratory's computer inventory: A review of the number of personal computers reported as being used at the homes of employees; a number of computers were returned to Laboratory property as a result of this study; An analysis of the number and costs of computer purchases over recent fiscal years; the analysis was intended to guide future decision-making regarding methods and standards for computer purchases; A review of classified computers, as mentioned in my written testimony, to assure that none of the computers reported as lost or stolen contained classified information and to assure that all classified computers could be located. Required sound business case analysis for a number of ongoing Laboratory investment and acquisition activities, resulting in: Cancellation of the Laboratory's agreement with a local developer to guarantee rentals of new luxury townhouses and high quality apartments for use as student housing. Laboratory staff had entered into the agreement without having done a sound business case analysis and without having provided full information to the Laboratory Director. Personal assumption of oversight for completion and occupancy of the Laboratory's space at the Los Alamos Research Park to assure compliance with NNSA's conditions of approval and cost beneficial project management. Required weekly status reports. Like student housing, commitments to the Research Park had been made by Laboratory staff without adherence to NNSA requirements, without adequate financial and legal analysis, and without full information to and approval by the Director. Established a Blue Ribbon Task Force and related Technical Panels to provide external management and technical expertise to the Laboratory's pit production and manufacturing program. Laboratory and NNSA program managers have acknowledged that the Task Force and technical panels have been instrumental in putting the Laboratory in a position to meet the NNSA- determined schedules for this high priority national security program. The Interim Laboratory Director recently converted the Task Force to a comprehensive Program Management Review Committee. Strengthened procurement support and service to high priority NNSA and DOE projects, including pit manufacturing, Spallation Neutron Source (SNS--a multi-laboratory project led by Oak Ridge), and the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) through which the Laboratory has developed its ``Q'' machine. Achieved 10% reduction in overhead ratio from FY 00 to FY 02 as a result of having instituted a ``bottoms up'' approach to the annual indirect budget planning process. Oversaw implementation of legislatively mandated travel regulations for contractors that resulted in reductions in allowable expenses for official travel; personally reviewed travel expense claims of all Associate Directors. Established an internal Advisory Committee on Administrative Policies and Practices to assure input and buy-in from all Directorates in the Laboratory for adoption and implementation of new or modified procedures and practices aimed at making the Laboratory's business systems more accountable. Established mandatory management training for all Group Leaders to strengthen management capabilities in the Laboratory. Required each member of the Senior Executive Team (SET) to lead off one of the sessions by clearly articulating SET expectations. The process to design and implement the training took over one year, due in part to resistance by Division and Group Leaders, as well as the Human Resources Division, to ``mandatory'' requirements. With Director Browne, designed and implemented a significant reorganization of the weapons program to strengthen line management accountability. NNSA noted in its FY 02 appraisal, ``The reorganization represents a paradigm shift in that line management now owns programs and is central to, accountable and responsible for program success. Planning is now the basis for program execution.'' Realigned the Laboratory's internal budget planning process to assure that the Director's strategic vision drove program planning and to strengthen the Director's ``ownership'' of the budget. Authorized total outsourcing of the Laboratory's supplement secretarial pool and established procedures to assure the pool was used as an avenue to Laboratory employment for local residents. Requested NNSA approval and subsequently implemented ``hot skills'' pay to assure that the Laboratory would continue to be competitive in terms of recruiting and retention of staff in specific, critically important scientific and technical areas. Implemented salary surveys by external experts in compensation equity to assure equitable pay for ethnic and racial minorities and women. These surveys and related appropriate pay adjustments enabled the Laboratory to avoid litigation, particularly regarding the issue of pay for Asians and Pacific Islanders that arose in the aftermath of the Wen Ho Lee case. Salary surveys were completed for API and Hispanic minorities prior to my leaving the Laboratory; a third survey covering women employees was in planning at the time of my departure. Implemented a realignment of facilities management to consolidate approximately 15 separate facility management units and thereby improve accountability and cost effectiveness in facility management operations. With Director Browne, established an internal Strategic Security Working Group to review long-term security planning and operations in the aftermath of 9/11. Assumed personal oversight of Laboratory activities to satisfy requirements of Appendix O to the University's contract for Los Alamos operations, including: Completion of Authorization Basis (AB) documents for 5 critical facilities and for the packaging and transportation function. As a result of this effort, NNSA noted ``. . . LANL's increased emphasis and effort to support safety authorization basis preparation (It appears that LANL may be the only NNSA site that is 10 CFR 830 compliant by the April 2003 due date).'' Completion of inventory and gap analysis related to maintenance of critical skills to support mission requirements. Implemented procedures to assure that the Laboratory was in full compliance with 10CFR requirements for quality certification of vendors of certain types of equipment, services and materials. Established a pilot effort to implement a Programming Planning Budgeting and Evaluation System (PPBES) aligned with NNSA's legislatively mandated PPBES system. Initiated review of meal expenses in all Divisions and Directorates and subsequently established more rigorous standards for Laboratory purchase of meals in connection with meetings. Standards were later converted to ``guidance'' to accommodate objections from some Divisions. Required Division or Group Leader certification of working meal expenses and justification/approval of exceptions to standards. Based on AA findings during an audit of the former Site Support Services contract, withheld current fee payments and recovered fee previously paid. Required recompetition of the site support services contract and acted as Source Selection Official to select a new contractor with emphasis on cost effectiveness and partnering with the Laboratory to improve operational performance. In addition to the above, I met weekly--and sometimes more frequently--to track progress and monitor performance of all of my direct reports on issues ranging from resource management to safety performance to delivery on program commitments. In all of these sessions, I consistently emphasized fiduciary responsibility, formality of operations, and disciplined management. Almost without exception and not surprisingly, I found the Laboratory's staff and managers willing and eager to respond and to meet expectations. Nonetheless, an ingrained culture that had historically under-valued effective management, meant that change came more slowly than I would have preferred. I appreciate the opportunity to supplement my testimony before the subcommittee. Sincerely yours, Joseph F. 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