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ONDCP REAUTHORIZATION: THE HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREAS PROGRAM AND CTAC

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

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ONDCP REAUTHORIZATION: THE HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREAS PROGRAM AND CTAC

TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark E. Souder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Souder, Cummings, Carter, Ruppersberger, Blackburn, Deal, Bell, and Ose.

Staff present: Christopher A. Donesa, staff director and chief counsel; Nicholas Coleman, professional staff member and counsel; John Stanton, congressional fellow; Nicole Garrett, clerk; Tony Haywood, minority counsel; and Earley Green, minority chief clerk.

Mr. SOUDER. Good morning. This is our third hearing on the reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy and its programs. Today we will focus on two programs that most directly impact State and local law enforcement against drug crimes: the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas [HIDTA] program, and the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center [CTAC].

Congress originally authorized the HIDTA program in 1988, and renewed it in 1993 and 1998. The program provides significant financial assistance to State and local law enforcement and facilitates strong cooperation among those agencies and with Federal law enforcement. That cooperation has led to many successes in our efforts to disrupt the market for illegal drugs. HIDTA has also been a politically popular program, as evidenced by its rapid expansion. The program started with five HIDTAs in areas that we would all agree are at the heart of the national drug trafficking networks. Over time, the program has steadily grown to where it now covers 28 separate areas and nearly 60 percent of the population.

While the program unquestionably is a key tool in our national drug control strategy, that rapid expansion clearly demonstrates that the subcommittee has many issues to consider to ensure that the program pursues its original goals, that it is accountable, and that it delivers results determined under rigorous performance measures. We must also carefully consider how to strike the appropriate balance to ensure that the program remains predominantly

focused on national goals while still ensuring that State and local agencies receive a fair return for their investments in the program. It is easy to make a case for the need to send Federal assistance to the hubs of national drug traffic to disrupt the market and keep drugs from every city in America. It is much harder to make the case to take taxpayer money from Indiana and send it to another State if it is used mainly for local projects or if it is not effective.

We will also consider today issues related to legislation that Ranking Member Cummings introduced last week to direct HIDTA funds to be made available to protect witnesses impacted in their neighborhoods by national drug traffic. The bill is fittingly named the "Dawson Family Community Protection Act." I believe that the unconscionable tragedy that befell the Dawson family in Baltimore well demonstrates the need for action in this area. As a cosponsor of his bill, I commend Mr. Cummings for his leadership and look forward to working closely with him on this issue. With limited dollars and great demands we will need to work with the Senate and the administration on the final amount, but I am committed to the principle that part of winning the battle against the drug lords is protecting citizens brave enough to stand up to their brutality.

Today's hearing will also review the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center, which was established in 1990 to oversee and coordinate the Federal Government's anti-drug research and development. CTAC oversees a number of research programs as well as the Technology Transfer Program, which provides drug detection and law enforcement technologies to Federal, State and local law enforcement. The program is so successful that there is a long waiting list for the available technology. I hope we can reaffirm our support for the key research programs, as well as to try to bolster the TTP program to make the equipment better available to our communities.

We have quite a mix of witnesses with us today, and we would especially like to welcome all the representatives of the State and local law enforcement community who are joining us here at this time. From the administration, on our first panel we will hear from Scott Burns, the Deputy Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy for State and Local Affairs. From the Drug Enforcement Administration, we will also hear from Mr. Roger Guevara, the Chief of Operations.

Our second panel will focus on HIDTA, and we will hear from Christy McCampbell, chief of the California Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement and Wayne Wiberg, commander of the Narcotics Investigation Section of the Chicago Police Department. From Maryland, Maryland State Police Superintendent Ed Norris, and Baltimore Police Department Organized Crime Bureau Chief Anthony Romano will testify.

On our third panel, we will focus on CTAC with Chief Ron Burns of Lakewood, Colorado Police Department, and Peter Modafferi, chief of Detectives for Rockland County, NY, District Attorney's Office.

Again, I thank you all for coming from so many places across the country to be here today. We very much look very much forward to your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]

Opening Statement
Chairman Mark Souder

"ONDCP Reauthorization: The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program and CTAC"

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
Committee on Government Reform

April 8, 2003

Good morning. This is our third hearing on reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy and its programs. Today we will focus on two programs that most directly impact state and local law enforcement against drug crimes – the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (or "HIDTA") program, and the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center, or "CTAC".

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On our third panel, we will focus on CTAC with Chief Ron Burns of the Lakewood, Colorado Police Department, and Peter Modafferi, Chief of Detectives for the Rockland County, New York, District Attorney's Office.

Again, thank you all for coming from so many places across the country to be here today. We very much look forward to your testimony.

Mr. SOUDER. I will now see if any of the other Members have an opening statement. Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Yes. Just very quick.

First, I would like to commend ONDCP for all the work that you do. Since 1998 I believe that your efforts to maintain a program of such importance to work with the local, State, and Federal law enforcement agency has done a lot to do with the issue of drugs. We know drugs is probably accountable for about 90 percent of all of our crime, especially violent crime, and the coordination and the teamwork is one of the main avenues and ways that we are going to at least put a dent into what is going on. So looking forward to your testimony. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Congressman Carter.

OK, I would like to take care of a few procedural matters. First, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing record, and that any answers to written questions provided by the witnesses also be included in the record.

Without objection, it is so ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents, and other materials referred to by Members and the witnesses may be included in the hearing record, and that all Members be permitted to revise and extend their remarks.

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Now, as our standard procedure, if Mr. Burns and Mr. Guevara will stand, is it our standard procedure to administer the oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you both for being here today and for your many years of work in these efforts, and we will start with Mr. Scott Burns, the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy for State and Local Affairs.

STATEMENTS OF SCOTT BURNS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STATE AND LOCAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY; AND ROGER GUEVARA, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. Thank you, Chairman Souder and Congressman Ruppersberger, Congressman Carter. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to talk about the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program [HIDTA], and the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center [CTAC], that are programs under the Office of National Drug Control Policy. I would like to commend you, Chairman Souder and your staff, and the subcommittee for the support that you have given us over the years in making the HIDTA program and the CTAC program successful arsenals in our efforts to make this problem of addiction and trafficking smaller.

As stated, the HIDTA program began in 1988 with the designation of five States. They were initially funded in 1990 and have grown over the subsequent 15 years to 28 HIDTAs in some 43 States. Membership includes some 35 Federal agencies, over 100 State agencies, in excess of 1,000 local law enforcement agencies participating.

I believe that the HIDTA program is one of the most effective law enforcement and counterdrug tools in the country, and I say

that because the HIDTA program is one of the, if not the only Federal program that does one, what one would think is simple, but very important thing, and that is bring together Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and law enforcement leaders in various areas of the country to collaborate, to work together, to share information, to use their intelligence support centers to make the problem of drug addiction and drug trafficking in this country smaller.

I also believe that under the leadership and direction of John Walters, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, over the past 12 months we have made great effort to make the HIDTA program better. We have initiated performance measurement standards; they have been written, they have been drafted, they have been disseminated to the 28 HIDTA directors, and we are in the initial process of implementation. We have also reorganized the Office of State and Local Affairs to provide greater oversight and greater attention to the HIDTAs, and we have also, as you well know, joined with the Department of Justice in launching the CPOT, or Consolidated Priority Organizational Targeting, program in an effort to go after the major drug trafficking organizations in this country and in the world.

I have the privilege, and I know that you have visited several of the HIDTAs, to work with some of the finest women and men in this country. I have found, under the direction of Kurt Schmidt, the National HIDTA Director, folks to be extremely dedicated from California to Connecticut, and every State in between, to getting up each day trying to help in this counterdrug effort.

I am also pleased to speak today on behalf of the Counternarcotics Technical Assessment Center [CTAC]. As you know, it is this country's chief R&D, or research and development, effort in trying to do two corps missions: one, to locate, to find, and to develop technologies that will help Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to do better to protect lives of law enforcement folks in the field and to allow them to do their missions better; and also through the neuroimaging program, which is a project, as you know, to bring together our best medical and scientific people in this country to study and to research addiction so that some day we will fully understand what it is and be able to treat it.

With that, I would respectfully request that my written statements be submitted into the record, and I look forward to any questions you may have. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Scott Burns follows:]

Testimony of Scott Burns
Deputy Director for State and Local Affairs
Office of National Drug Control Policy
Before the House Government Reform Committee
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
April 8, 2003

Chairman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of the Subcommittee: It is a pleasure for me to appear before your subcommittee today to discuss the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas-or HIDTA-Program and the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center-or CTAC-as you review the reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Under your leadership, the subcommittee has been extremely supportive of ONDCP and all of our programs which are designed to assist federal, state, and local agencies to work closely together in a national effort to reduce drug trafficking and drug use.

Responsibility for the day-to-day management of the HIDTA Program falls under the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director for State and Local Affairs. This program is an essential element of the President's National Drug Control Strategy and it enjoys the support of numerous federal, state and local law enforcement agencies across the nation. Today I intend to provide a brief overview of the HIDTA program; discuss current issues affecting HIDTA; provide you information on developments within the HIDTA Program; discuss the future of HIDTA, and answer any questions you might have on the full range of HIDTA activities. In addition to providing you with an overview of the HIDTA Program, I will also discuss the key elements of CTAC, another critical program engaged in the battle against illegal drugs.

Since the beginning of this Administration's stewardship of the HIDTA program, the Director of ONDCP, myself and other policymakers within the organization recognized that the focus of the HIDTA program had become diluted and that the tremendous growth of the program had resulted in a diminution of its effectiveness. It was obvious early on that HIDTA was not fully supporting initiatives that affected the highest levels of the drug trade, nor was there enough close coordination between HIDTA and the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program in supporting initiatives to disrupt and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations. The original purpose of HIDTA was to make a distinct difference in counterdrug efforts nationwide by reducing drug trafficking within a designated area.

Several changes were instituted under the guidance of Director Walters, including developing a closer working relationship with the OCDETF program, the implementation of the Consolidated Priority Organization Targeting (CPOT) program, the development of strong performance measures for the HIDTA program, and a re-organization of the Office of State and Local Affairs within ONDCP. These changes will ensure that the HIDTA program maintains a sharp focus on supporting initiatives aimed at disrupting the highest priority targets and also is well-managed, with day-to-day oversight by ONDCP, including continual assessment of performance. In order to ensure the HIDTA Program is targeted at the most critical areas of the U.S., ONDCP will also begin reviewing designations of existing HIDTAs based upon threat assessments submitted by the HIDTAs and supplemented by other relevant information.

HIDTA Overview

The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program was established by Congress through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, and was most recently reauthorized in 1998. The HIDTA Program provides federal assistance to enhance the counterdrug activities of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies in areas where major drug production, manufacturing, importation, transportation or distribution flourish to such a degree that they have harmful effects on other parts of the country. The purpose of the program is to provide much-needed funds and assistance to law enforcement entities within designated areas of the nation to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of counterdrug efforts. It is important to remember that HIDTA is not another Federal law enforcement agency, nor is it operational per se. Federal, State and local law enforcement initiatives are funded through HIDTA grants, which serve in the simplest terms as a facilitator of cooperation and as a force multiplier.

The original five HIDTAs were designated and funded in 1990, and were selected based on their critical role as "gateways" for drugs entering the United States and their impact on communities across the nation. Counties in the New York/New Jersey area, Miami area, Houston area, Los Angeles area and counties along the Southwest Border (Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico, West Texas and South Texas) were then eligible for federal assistance which enabled law enforcement agencies to closely collaborate on common counterdrug goals. The HIDTA Program was initially funded at $25 million for the original five HIDTAs, and received $86 million, or an average of more than $17 million each, in 1991; its first full year of operation.

During the intervening years, additional HIDTAs were designated by the Director of ONDCP, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, heads of national drug control agencies and appropriate governors. Baltimore/Washington and Puerto Rico/U.S. Virgin Islands were added in 1994; Atlanta, Chicago and Philadelphia/Camden in 1995; Rocky Mountain (Colorado, [Montana in 2002], Utah and Wyoming), Gulf Coast (Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi.), Lake County (Indiana), the Midwest (Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota) and Northwest (Washington state) in 1996; Southeast Michigan and Northern California in 1997; Appalachia (Kentucky, Tennessee and West Virginia), Central Florida, Milwaukee and North Texas (Oklahoma in 2002) in 1998; Central Valley (California), Hawaii, New England (Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Vermont), Ohio, and Oregon in 1999; and in 2001, counties in Nevada and North Florida were designated as HIDTAs. Today, there are 28 HIDTAs operating around the nation with an appropriation for FY 2003 of $224,878,725, or an average of $8 million. (Amount remaining after the 0.65% government-wide rescission).

As originally envisioned, a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area designation provided a coordination mechanism for federal, state, and local enforcement efforts, to include the creation and operation of multi-agency drug task forces and initiatives. Because HIDTA initiatives are designed and implemented by federal, state, and local agencies in response to a local assessment of an area's drug threat, the program provides enormous flexibility for individual HIDTAs to address the unique drug problems which plague communities across the nation. While HIDTA is

a federally-funded program, the direction and initiatives undertaken by each HIDTA are designed to address regional threats. One of the unique aspects of the HIDTA Program is the creation of law enforcement strategies at grass roots levels, using the combined talents of federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations.

The management of individual HIDTAs is carried out by an Executive Board comprised of an equal number of representatives from state/local and federal law enforcement agencies from within the HIDTA. Each Board hires an executive director who ensures Board directives and ONDCP policy/budget guidance are carried out. The Board is responsible for the development of strategies to combat drug trafficking within the HIDTA and for implementation of these strategies through law enforcement initiatives. It also ensures that resources are used appropriately and in compliance with program guidance and policies.

At the national level, the HIDTA Coordination Committee, comprised of representatives from ONDCP and the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, and Treasury, confers with ONDCP on issues relating to designation, grant awards and other policy issues relating to the HIDTA Program. This year, the Department of Homeland Security will join the Committee. There is also a great deal of input from HIDTA field personnel to the national HIDTA office on critical issues, including changing drug threats, resource issues and policy changes.

HIDTA initiatives are designed and implemented by the law enforcement entities participating in the HIDTAs, and all enforcement operations are carried out by federal, state, and local agencies. Generally, initiatives are carried out by law enforcement taskforces under the direction of individual Federal drug enforcement agencies, such as DEA, the FBI or the Border and Transportation Security Directorate of DHS, or by state and local law enforcement agencies. At the present time, there are approximately 500 separate HIDTA-funded initiatives (taskforces) operating nationwide, including 30 administrative initiatives. These taskforces work the full range of drug issues, such as investigations against major drug traffickers, local heroin enforcement cases, investigations of methamphetamine laboratories and international money laundering. With ONDCP's approval, each HIDTA sets its own enforcement priorities and the law enforcement participants in HIDTA-funded enforcement activities work in true partnerships towards agreed-upon, ONDCP-approved enforcement goals.

Another central element of the HIDTA Program is the Investigative Support Center (ISC). Currently 63 such separate, but electronically connected, intelligence initiatives are functioning throughout the HIDTA Program. The ISC, which is co-managed by a federal and a state/local law enforcement agency, creates a communications infrastructure that facilitates intelligence collection and information sharing among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. There are more ISCs than HIDTAs because the large geographic area of many HIDTAs requires there be multiple ISCs within a single HIDTA, as well as the need to decentralize intelligence assets so that ISCs can be located with key task forces. The personnel from multiple agencies stationed at ISCs also provide event and subject deconfliction services to the HIDTA task forces to ensure officer safety and avoid duplication of efforts. As central points of access and analysis of sensitive federal, state, and local law enforcement information, the ISCs provide secure sites and information systems for law enforcement agencies to share critical

information on trafficking organizations operating within the HIDTA. The HIDTA Program provides a fused, nationwide intelligence system with federal, state, and local law enforcement on-site information system access and analysis capabilities.

Current Issues and Program Developments

Several important issues are affecting the current direction and operations of the nation's 28 HIDTAs, including significant changes in the nature of drug trafficking in the U.S., as well as a highly competitive budget environment which demands high levels of performance from, and management of, government programs with closer collaboration among existing agencies. All of these issues have already resulted in changes to the HIDTA Program and will most certainly require further modifications to the program in the future.

Changing Nature of Drug Trafficking:

Since the creation of the HIDTA Program in 1988, the extent and nature of our nation's drug problem has changed considerably. The five original HIDTAs were "gateways" for the entry and trafficking of cocaine into the United States at a time when the cocaine industry was controlled by a handful of vertically-integrated organizations. In the intervening years, many changes in the drug trade have taken place and these changes have necessitated the creation of additional HIDTAs and the evolution of the entire HIDTA Program.

The rise in prominence of Mexico-based trafficking organizations during the 1990's focused enormous law enforcement attention on the southwest border region of the nation, from Texas to California. The proliferation of methamphetamine manufacturing laboratories, not only the "superlabs" controlled by Mexican poly-drug traffickers but also the smaller, environmentally-toxic laboratories located in many rural areas around the United States further challenged law enforcement during recent years. The importation and distribution of MDMA by a new breed of criminal organizations demanded new and innovative law enforcement strategies to address this emerging threat.

At this critical time, the strategic and security importance of the southwest border cannot be overstated. The Southwest Border HIDTA partnership mechanism that has been in place since 1994 has been a significant factor in coordinating a unified effort to provide law enforcement coverage of the vast border, and to harmonize various initiatives among five HIDTA partnerships that comprise the SWB HIDTA in the four border states. Drug traffickers do not respect national or state borders, and for them, the southwest border of the United States provides enormous opportunities to take advantage of the free flow of commerce and people between the United States and Mexico. It is extremely important that we maintain a single office that effectively pulls together the activities of the five Southwest Border HIDTA partnerships.

Currently, the vast majority of the drug traffickers responsible for the importation and distribution of cocaine, heroin, MDMA and most of the methamphetamine and marijuana available in this country operate from insulated overseas headquarters. Within the United States they are served by a vast network of transporters, distributors and money brokers who operate in the nation's cities, suburbs and rural areas. In HIDTA's fifteen year history, the Program has

been adapted to meet the realities of changing drug trafficking and drug use trends across the nation.

As was previously mentioned, the HIDTA program was not fully supporting government-wide efforts to target, disrupt and dismantle the highest-level drug trafficking organizations impacting our nation. Working with the Department of Justice, ONDCP committed HIDTA resources to regional initiatives aimed against priority target organizations represented in the Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list.

In Fiscal Year 2002, the Director of ONDCP provided $5.75 million in discretionary funds to HIDTAs through the CPOT program. In 2002, the Attorney General asked law enforcement organizations, including DEA and the FBI, to identify individuals and organizations posing the greatest threat to the United States. Twenty-two CPOT targets emerged as the U.S. Government's drug law enforcement priorities and a concerted, multi-agency effort is underway to disrupt and dismantle these organizations. Most of the leaders of these targeted organizations are headquartered overseas—in Mexico, Colombia, Europe, Southeast and Southwest Asia—and are integrally involved in the production and distribution of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine and MDMA.

Working with Justice's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program, including representatives from DEA, the FBI, the Border and Transportation Security Directorate of the DHS, IRS and numerous state and local law enforcement organizations around the nation, many HIDTA-funded task forces are focusing their efforts on the highest level drug targets operating within our borders. In most cases, high-level surrogates of the CPOT target organizations are the focus of multi-agency enforcement operations in HIDTA jurisdictions. Through concerted efforts, HIDTA-funded initiatives have been successful in seeing that their operations are disrupted and the organizations dismantled.

ONDCP intends to continue the CPOT program in Fiscal Year 2003, and will work with OCDETF to maximize the impact of HIDTA funding to support OCDETF/CPOT cases throughout the United States. OCDETF received a significant budget increase in FY 2003, which will result in the availability of additional resources for task forces and law enforcement initiatives to disrupt and dismantle major organizations.

The Need to Demonstrate Results and Effectively Manage Programs:

The President's Management Agenda specifically requires that Executive Branch agencies and programs, such as those carried out by HIDTA grantees, demonstrate results and do so with budgets that are tied to performance. In order to meet this important goal, it was necessary to enhance management of the HIDTA Program from ONDCP headquarters, while allowing individual HIDTAs to establish and implement initiatives that meet their local challenges.

Late last year, the Office of State and Local Affairs within ONDCP was reorganized, allowing us to enhance oversight of the Program. With a limited number of headquarters staff, we were able to re-align responsibilities among OSLA's personnel to maximize our management

effectiveness. This has resulted in a clearer understanding of local drug markets, a better articulation of HIDTA's specific goals and performance, and more focused support for individual HIDTAs.

In the area of performance management, the HIDTA Program has embarked on an ambitious effort to establish and meet particular performance goals that are tied to drug threats and activities to address these threats within individual HIDTAs.

The new performance management system will require each HIDTA to establish goals and report on their performance related to the following core issues: availability of drugs; the price and purity of drugs; percentage of priority Drug Trafficking Organizations disrupted or dismantled; drug-related crimes; drug-related deaths; drug-related emergency room admissions; percentage of cases closed; percentage of cases accepted for prosecution. These goals are central to the President's National Drug Control Strategy and relate directly to the mission of the HIDTA program.

The performance management system will be in place within the next several months, with each HIDTA office required to re-assess its threat, based on the CPOT list and regional threats affecting their areas and to demonstrate how the area meets each of the four statutory criteria for designation as a HIDTA. In June, the individual HIDTA budgets will be submitted, and will include specific performance measures. Between June and September, the HIDTA Program office will negotiate with each HIDTA on their submitted performance measures and data sources, and subsequent to the approval of the FY 2004 budget, each HIDTA will be provided funding levels associated with performance-related initiatives.

In this competitive budget environment, and in furtherance of the President's Management Agenda, it is critical for the HIDTA program to clearly articulate its goals, accomplishments and impact on the nation's drug problem. While there has been some significant progress made in reducing the levels of drug abuse in the United States, we are still facing serious threats by internationally-based drug trafficking organizations and by domestic manufacturers and distributors of drugs.

HIDTA plays an essential role in maximizing the impact of law enforcement at all levels, and significantly contributes to the overall goals of the President's strategy of reducing drug availability, and ultimately, drug use levels.

Future of the HIDTA Program:

The HIDTA Program will continue to be a crucial component of the nation's strategy to reduce the availability of illicit drugs, the related human destruction, and the crime and violence drug trafficking brings to our nation. ONDCP is determined to protect the program's integrity by limiting it to only those areas that truly meet the stringent criteria for HIDTA designation. Through implementation of the program's new performance management system, the HIDTA Program will demonstrate to stakeholders the significant impact HIDTAs have, through participating federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, on our nation's effort to substantially reduce drug use and related crime and violence. With the many important

priorities our nation faces, ONDCP is determined to ensure stakeholders that the HIDTA Program is being managed effectively, that the program remains a cornerstone in our nation's strategy to address the illicit drug issue, and that appropriated funds bring about positive, measurable, and notable outcomes.

Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center

Technology plays an important role in making progress toward our National Drug Control Strategy goals of achieving a 10 percent reduction in current use of illegal drugs in two years and a 25 percent reduction in current use of illegal drugs in five years. CTAC is comprised of two programs: Research and Development, and the Technology Transfer Program. Through CTAC sponsorship of advanced neuroimaging and genetics instrumentation, substance abuse researchers are revealing the processes in the brain that result in addiction and what can be done to reverse or mitigate these processes. New neuroimaging facilities dedicated to addiction research will be opened at the University of North Dakota, Brookhaven National Laboratory, and National Institute on Drug Abuse Intramural Research Program in Baltimore, Maryland. Research carried out at these facilities will provide for the development of better treatments to heal America's drug users, and will provide a better understanding of addiction to enhance prevention efforts.

To disrupt the market, the Border and Transportation Security Directorate of DHS is installing new capabilities and systems to interdict illicit drugs at our borders and on the high seas. Since September 11, 2001, this equipment has been used to search for chemical and biological agents and weapons of mass destruction. These searches have also led to dramatic increases in the seizure of drugs. CTAC looks forward to working closely with the Department of Homeland Security to continue developing advanced inspection technology that will further tighten border security.

The ability of our federal, state, and local agencies to communicate and share information is crucial to combating the drug trafficking organizations. A communications interoperability program developed in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration's Denver field office and the Denver metro regional drug task forces successfully demonstrated a capability to communicate effectively during joint operations with each agency using its own dissimilar and incompatible radios.

With the click of a mouse, this high tech digital switchboard allows the smooth interconnection of all participating radio systems — local, county, state and federal. While this system is not a substitute for 700 MHz or 800 MHz statewide modernizations that add geographic coverage, it does add function to existing coverage areas that is otherwise unavailable. That functionality - easy and smooth communications across all agency lines and radio platforms - is crucial to planned multi-agency operations and emergency response.

Our wireless communications interoperability system installed in the Denver area last year, custom-engineered by the U.S. Navy's top command and control laboratory, is in daily use and allows Denver metro city, county, state, FBI, DEA, and Border and Transportation Security Directorate of DHS radios to talk to one another as though they were all on the same system.

Since then, the Denver area wireless communications interoperability system has been installed throughout the entire state of Colorado. The wireless communications interoperability project throughout the state of Colorado is an excellent example of the success of the CTAC system engineering approach to system design.

Across America, the inability of most police, firefighters, and other public safety agencies in the same town, city, county or region to speak with each other on their radios is now the focus of national attention. This is not a new problem, but one of growing significance and consequence. The systems engineering approach to wireless communications interoperability in Colorado makes our design approach a cost effective, natural choice for a national rollout across the country.

One of CTAC's more successful programs, the Technology Transfer Program (TTP), relies on technical and operational performance testbed evaluations and outreach to industry to acquire additional items for law enforcement. The TTP process took several years of evolution to realize its full potential. Over the past five years, this program has brought advanced drug crime-fighting technology and associated training to over 20 percent of the state and local police departments and sheriffs' offices. The Technology Transfer Program makes available state-of-the-art, affordable, easily integrated and maintainable tools to enhance the capabilities of state and local law enforcement agencies for their counterdrug mission. It provides information technology and analytical tools; communications interoperability; tracking and surveillance; and drug detection devices. Hands-on training and maintenance support are provided to all recipients.

It is not a grants program - rather, the drug crime fighting technologies available from the program are limited to a catalog of items proven to be operationally effective by federal, state, and local law enforcement. The TTP maintains extensive records of state-by-state and jurisdiction statistics on every aspect of the program including the status of deliveries, departments receiving equipment, and training records. TTP performance management has received accolades in annual appropriations committee reports.

Conclusion:

Both the HIDTA program and CTAC play an essential role in accomplishing ONDCP's mission of reducing drug use in America. They are key programs in the reauthorization of ONDCP.

Thank you for your support of both of these programs and ONDCP. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.

Mr. Guevara.

Mr. GUEVARA. Good morning, Chairman Souder and distinguished members of this subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss ONDCP and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program which was established by Congress over a decade ago. On behalf of Acting Administrator John B. Brown III and myself, I want to thank the subcommittee for their unwavering support on behalf of the men and women of DEA.

The HIDTA-funded program is a regional strategy providing Federal assistance in coordinating law enforcement efforts at the local, State, and Federal level. The program is designed to impact on the manufacturing, importation, and distribution networks. The HIDTA program complements our mission to destruct and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations. By leveraging the resources, manpower, and equipment of numerous law enforcement entities, we can, and have, achieved tremendous success.

I have benefited from seeing firsthand how a successful HIDTA-funded program operates. From 1997 to 1999, I was charged with oversight of the HIDTA Southern California Drug Task Force. In September 2000, I was promoted to Special Agent in Charge of the Caribbean Division in San Juan, Puerto Rico. With this promotion came the responsibility of serving as the vice-chair of the HIDTA executive board for the Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands HIDTA. Difficult decisions had to be made on which initiatives to undertake and how best to utilize our funds, but our cooperation and collaboration did breed success.

Federal resource constraints require that DEA continue to pursue the cooperative investigative efforts of other Federal, State, and local law enforcement officers. There are presently 18 DEA field divisions, plus the El Paso Intelligence Center [EPIC], that participates in the HIDTA-funded programs. This includes 48 DEA HIDTA groups supporting 90 initiatives and consisting of 527 task force officers. Over 300 DEA special agents work with HIDTA initiatives.

In support of national ONDCP objectives, each HIDTA is supposed to consist of an executive board comprised of an equal number of Federal, State, and local law enforcement leaders. DEA continues to urge that all HIDTA executive boards hold to the equal representation requirement mandated by the ONDCP in order to yield maximum effectiveness, and we pledge to undertake leadership positions whenever the opportunity arises.

Investigations begin for DEA, including our HIDTA-funded task forces, when discovering that larger scope of drug crime arrests merits the consolidation of resources. I would like to highlight three major programs the administration is emphasizing to make the greatest impact on America's drug enforcement efforts.

The first one is the Consolidated Priority Organization Targets [CPOTs], which is a single national list of major drug trafficking and money laundering organizations. There are 53 identified international command and control organizations representing the most significant drug organizations threatening the United States.

In fiscal year 2002, ONDCP allocated $5.7 million in discretionary funds in support of HIDTA-funded initiatives targeting

CPOTs. DEA fully supports this in keeping with HIDTA's mission to target the highest levels of drug trafficking groups.

DEA's Priority Drug Traffic Organization's [PDTO's], program is similar to CPOT, but more expansive since it also includes local and regional drug organizations significantly impacting the drug supply in DEA's 21 nationwide field divisions.

And, finally, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF], determines connections to related investigations nationwide in order to identify and dismantle drug trafficking organization. DEA's State and Local Task Force and HIDTA-funded groups are engaged as partners with the OCDETF program and enforce the effectiveness and success of the OCDETF program.

DEA currently has 30 HIDTA-funded initiatives that are PDTO investigations. Eighteen of those are also established as OCDETF investigations. Each designated HIDTA has at least one intelligence element, usually called an Investigative Support Center, which provide tactical investigative and strategic drug intelligence to HIDTA-supported task forces. HIDTA ISCs serve as hubs for the sharing of drug intelligence among Federal, State, and local law enforcement HIDTA-funded participating agencies. DEA's commitment to HIDTA shows in the assignment of nearly 10 percent of our analytical resources to the HIDTAs. But DEA can and should do more. DEA should provide a leadership role in all of the HIDTA ISCs.

HIDTA-funded initiatives should address the most significant drug threats. These initiatives must be evaluated regularly to ensure that they remain relevant. Oversight of HIDTA initiatives is crucial in order to keep within the national objectives of ONDCP.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, HIDTA is a concept and not an agency. Many participants believe HIDTA is a Federal grant for their own use. However, HIDTA is a funding mechanism designed to support Federal, State, and local drug investigative efforts. This point must be recognized by participating agencies in order to pursue a consolidated regional and national enforcement objective, as opposed to a fragmented one.

DEA believes the HIDTA program is a critical component in the administration's drug enforcement efforts. Maintaining the focus on the HIDTA mission and emphasizing the most significant targets will go a long way in not only achieving the disruption and dismantling of national and international organizations, but also in keeping drugs off our local streets. DEA stands ready to take on any challenge and continue to lead in America's fight to reduce drug trafficking and abuse.

In my written testimony which I have submitted is an overview of DEA's witness protection initiative. At this point I would be happy to answer any questions this subcommittee may have. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Guevara follows:]

Statement of Rogelio E. Guevara
Chief of Operations
Drug Enforcement Administration
Before the
House Government Reform Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
April 8, 2003

Executive Summary

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) continues to emphasize the need for cooperation and coordination with our state and local counterparts in the enforcement of federal drug laws. As such, DEA maintains a strong ongoing commitment to the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) addressing regional drug problems of concern.

DEA currently oversees and directly supervises 48 HIDTA-funded task forces located in DEA offices consisting of 527 Task Force Officers. Over 300 DEA Special Agents work within HIDTA initiatives to share and develop narcotics intelligence and pursue joint investigations. Many of these initiatives are initiated by DEA Program task forces.

DEA's commitment to the HIDTA program has resulted in significant HIDTA program successes in furtherance of the Department of Justice's Domestic Drug Enforcement Strategy. DEA will continue in our position as a leader in the HIDTA program by targeting, investigating, and dismantling the most notable drug trafficking organizations impacting the United States and by working with and utilizing resources of local and state agencies including:

- *Continued full participation within the HIDTA Program at all levels*
- *Continued interaction with HIDTA area regional, national and international initiatives targeting the most significant drug trafficking organizations*
- *Continued leadership roles in the HIDTA Investigative Support Centers*

Chairman Souder and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the Office of National Drug Control Policy's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program established by Congress over a decade ago, as well as DEA's Witness Protection Programs. My name is Roger Guevara, and I am the Chief of Operations for DEA. On behalf of Acting Administrator John B. Brown, III, and myself, I want to thank this subcommittee for its unwavering support of the men and women of DEA and its mission.

The HIDTA program is a national strategy providing Federal assistance in coordinating law enforcement efforts of local, state and Federal entities in areas where major drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution flourish to such a degree that they have harmful effects on other parts of the country. Linking all of these efforts enhances the investigative results, considering the limitations of personnel and funding that every law enforcement entity face.

Let me begin by addressing the HIDTA program. The DEA views the HIDTA program as an integral partner in our mission to disrupt and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations. By leveraging the resources, manpower and equipment of numerous law enforcement entities we can -- and have -- achieved tremendous success. We see the benefit at the local level, but it can go much further than that. The purpose of the program is to provide much-needed funds and assistance to law enforcement entities within designated areas of the nation to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of counterdrug efforts. We need to ensure that this focus remains.

Benefits of HIDTA Task Forces

I have benefited from seeing firsthand how a successful HIDTA-funded program operates. When Congress enacted legislation to create HIDTAs in 1990, one of the first five HIDTAs designated was Los Angeles. I was charged with oversight of the Southern California Drug Task Force, which was a HIDTA initiative, from 1997 to 1999. Still operating today, this task force continues to target and dismantle drug trafficking organizations responsible for violent crime, not only in Southern California, but in other parts of the United States as well.

In September 2000, I was promoted to Special Agent in Charge of the Caribbean Field Division in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Six years earlier, Congress had designated a HIDTA to cover Puerto Rico, as well as the U.S. Virgin Islands. With this promotion came the responsibility of serving as vice-chair of the HIDTA Executive Board. Difficult decisions had to be made on which initiatives to undertake and how best to put funds to use, but our cooperation and collaborations did breed success, including the dismantling or disruption of many trafficking and money laundering organizations.

The HIDTA Program

Criteria for Establishment

In designating a new HIDTA, by statute the Director of ONDCP consults with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, heads of national drug control agencies and the appropriate governors in considering the following criteria:

The extent to which –

- The area is a center of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution;
- State and local law enforcement agencies have committed resources to respond to the drug trafficking problem in the area, thereby indicating a determination to respond aggressively to the problem;
- Drug-related activities in the area are having a harmful impact in other areas of the country; and

- A significant increase in the allocation of Federal resources is necessary to respond adequately to drug-related activities in the area.

For HIDTA drug trafficking reduction efforts to remain viable, both present and future programs must take all of these criteria into consideration.

Leadership of HIDTA Executive Boards

In support of national ONDCP objectives, each HIDTA is required to consist of an Executive Board comprised of an equal number of federal and state/local law enforcement leaders. The HIDTA Executive Boards are chaired and vice-chaired by one state or local law enforcement official and one federal law enforcement official for one-year terms. ONDCP's policy further charges the Executive Boards with providing direction and oversight to ensure that HIDTA funds and resources are utilized in compliance with all program guidance and policies. The Executive Boards, in concert with the HIDTA Director, also are responsible for the development, implementation, and approval of the HIDTA strategy, initiatives, and budgets.

As with any entity of numerous participants, there are differing approaches to issues and initiatives. If the board is not weighted equally, there is the potential for initiatives from one group or another to be given disproportionate consideration. Even when the board achieves balance, stalemates or other issues may arise which can impact the effectiveness of the overall strategy under ONDCP's national objectives. DEA continues to urge that all HIDTA Executive Boards hold to the equal representation requirement mandated by ONDCP in order to yield maximum effectiveness. DEA pledges to undertake leadership positions whenever the opportunity arises.

HIDTA Investigative Support Centers

At the direction of ONDCP, each designated HIDTA has at least one intelligence element, usually called an Investigative Support Center (ISC). The HIDTA Program Guidance issued by ONDCP states that the mission of the HIDTA intelligence component is to provide accurate, detailed, and timely tactical investigative and strategic drug intelligence to HIDTA-supported task forces. This enables a more effective and efficient utilization of drug investigative resources. HIDTA ISCs serve as hubs for the sharing of drug intelligence among federal, state, and local law enforcement HIDTA-funded participating agencies

Every DEA field division has at least one HIDTA ISC in its area of responsibility and many have multiple HIDTA ISCs. The DEA field divisions participate in 30 of those 32 HIDTA ISCs. DEA has one Intelligence Supervisor assigned to 22 of the 32 ISCs and an additional 40 Intelligence Analysts assigned to HIDTA-funded task forces and ISCs. Further, DEA is represented on ONDCP's HIDTA intelligence committee which reviews and provides input on HIDTA Program Intelligence policy, technical/information sharing issues, and program direction.

The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) also plays a critical role in support of the HIDTA funded task forces and the HIDTA ISCs. In November 1999, EPIC created a HIDTA Coordination Unit. The Unit now consists of one Unit Chief (currently from the FBI), two DEA analysts, one Customs analyst, and two support personnel. The mission of the unit is to serve as a clearinghouse for the exchange of information, respond to requests from the HIDTAs for information on seizures and subjects, and prepare ad hoc and recurring publications in support of the HIDTA ISC's regional threat assessments.

While the primary purpose of the ISC is to provide the aforementioned types of drug intelligence, the program is designed to remain flexible to respond to the particular needs of an area. Maintaining focus on the disruption and dismantlement of drug trafficking organizations is critical for all participants. Although the exception and not the rule, there have been instances where participants in HIDTA areas are supportive only of their own initiatives. If their initiative is not active, some withhold their support, while continuing to receive HIDTA monies. This inhibits the ability of the HIDTA ISC to focus on priority joint initiatives.

DEA's commitment to HIDTA shows in the assignment of nearly ten percent of our analytical resources to HIDTAs. We are in the process of issuing further guidance to our Special Agents in Charge emphasizing the continued involvement of DEA in the ISCs. But DEA can and should do more. We believe DEA can provide a leadership role, not in just some, but in all of the HIDTA ISCs. The experience, training, and technical skills of DEA intelligence supervisors is unequaled in the arena of drug law enforcement intelligence and can be of even greater benefit to the ISCs and the excellent work that they are already doing.

The DEA-HIDTA Partnership and Enforcement Successes

There are 18 DEA Field Divisions, plus the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), that participate in a total of 90 HIDTA-funded initiatives. Federal resource constraints require that DEA continue to pursue, even more than in previous years, the cooperative investigative efforts of other federal state and local law enforcement officers. This enhanced cooperation is manifested through continued participation in HIDTA initiatives. The size of the DEA involvement in HIDTA initiatives has grown annually to include 48 HIDTA-funded Task Forces staffed by 305 DEA Special Agents and 527 other law enforcement officers.

The real benefits of such state, local, and federal cooperation are yielded through taking systematic steps to identify entire organizations to be disrupted or dismantled, rather than by placing all resources into immediate arrests. These joint investigations may take months and even years. They also can be very fruitful. The following operations represent thousands of hours of united investigation through HIDTA initiatives.

"Operation X-Isle"

In July 2001, the DEA Miami HIDTA Task Force initiated an international investigation that identified a worldwide 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA or Ecstasy)

distribution network operating in Colombia, Israel, the Netherlands and the United States. This case subsequently identified a priority target (later designated a Consolidated Priority Organization Target, or CPOT) as one of the financier's of the MDMA network. This DEA HIDTA-funded task force coordinated federal, state, local and international enforcement efforts in Europe, South and North America. Title III intercepts, undercover operations and search warrants resulted in the seizure of approximately 2 million MDMA pills and more than $2 million. Nine of the organizational leaders were arrested in Spain, Colombia, and the United States. The investigation also determined that Israeli organized crime elements were financing the smuggling operation and obtaining the MDMA from the sources of supply in Holland. In January 2003, as a result of the international scope of this investigation, the authorities in Switzerland froze additional accounts of the organization totaling $1.5 million. The investigation is active and continuing.

"Operation White Terror"

In September 2001, the FBI initiated the undercover investigation in Houston, Texas. The target was attempting to obtain $25 million worth of East-bloc military weapons for the AUC, a Colombian terrorist organization, in exchange for cocaine and U.S. Currency. In April 2002, DEA Houston HIDTA Major Drug Squad (MDS) 6 became involved in the investigation. The case resulted in an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (or OCDETF) investigation. To date the investigation has revealed that the original Priority Drug Trafficking Organization (or PDTO) target has been a long-time member of an international drug trafficking organization, responsible for the importation of more than 50 tons of cocaine directly into the United States, into our country through Mexico, and to Europe. The undercover operation resulted in the arrest of four defendants in connection with the weapons deal, three of which occurred in Costa Rica, subsequent to undercover meetings coordinated by HIDTA MDS 6.

Houston HIDTA MDS 6 has coordinated international investigative and enforcement efforts in Spain, Haiti, Colombia, Panama, Mexico and Costa Rica. In addition, the investigation has identified many current and historical international, federal, state and local investigations targeting members of the drug trafficking organization. HIDTA MDS 6 is coordinating accordingly with other law enforcement agencies to fully develop the drug conspiracy. This trafficking organization has been linked to two CPOT targets, Castano-Gil and Mejia-Munera. In November 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft announced the results of this initiative.

From Local to National Drug Strategies - the Benefits of the HIDTA Program

Our partnership with the HIDTA program serves a more strategic purpose as well. Local law enforcement officers make drug crime arrests. Investigations begin for DEA, including our HIDTA-funded task forces, when discovering the larger scope of these cases merits the consolidation of substantial federal, state and local resources. From these initiatives, we can be successful in targeting significant narcotics traffickers. I would like to highlight three major programs the Administration is emphasizing to make the greatest impact on America's drug enforcement efforts.

Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT)

In FY 2001, the Attorney General directed the Department of Justice to develop a single national list of major drug trafficking and money laundering organizations. In response, DEA, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and the former U.S. Customs Service (now part of the Department of Homeland Security), with input from the intelligence community and other member agencies of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, identified 53 international command and control organizations representing the most significant drug organizations threatening the United States. The Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list represents the first time federal agencies have worked together to develop a single target list. This list, which will be updated regularly, reflects the most significant international narcotic supply and related money laundering organizations, poly-drug traffickers, clandestine drug manufacturers and producers, and major drug transporters supplying the United States.

In FY 2002, the Office of the National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) allocated $5.75 million in discretionary funds in support of HIDTA-funded initiatives targeting CPOTs. The project supported the President's National Drug Control Strategy, ensuring that the HIDTA program focused on the most significant drug trafficking organizations. DEA fully supports this ONDCP initiative in keeping with HIDTA's original mission to target the highest levels of drug trafficking groups.

Priority Drug Trafficking Organization (PDTO) Program

DEA runs a parallel course with its priority targeting, through the utilization of its Priority Drug Trafficking Organization (PDTO) Program, by identifying and targeting significant drug trafficking organizations.

DEA's PDTO program is more expansive than CPOT, since it also includes local and regional drug organizations significantly impacting the drug supply in its 21 nationwide field divisions. PDTO investigations utilize intelligence derived from on-going PDTO and related investigations to identify major drug trafficking organizations. The focus includes each organization's distribution network, structure and members in order to target the highest level of the organization. The objective of each PDTO investigation is to dismantle or disrupt the identified organization, arrest the organization's leaders, distributors, importers, and facilitators, and seize and forfeit all assets associated with the organization. DEA management has directed that all PDTO investigations be coordinated with DEA Field Divisions, the Special Operations Division (SOD), DEA's Country Offices, and other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies (including HIDTAs), as appropriate.

DEA currently has 30 HIDTA-funded initiatives that are PDTO investigations. Eighteen of those also are established as Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force investigations.

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)

The greatest impact has been made when the full concentration of federal resources are brought to bear on these individuals and organizations through the efforts of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF). The OCDETF program functions through the investigative, intelligence, and support staffs of DEA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP), the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE), as well as the efforts of the U.S. Attorneys, the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, and state and local law enforcement agencies. The goal of each OCDETF investigation is to determine connections to related investigations nationwide in order to identify and dismantle the entire structure of the drug trafficking organization (DTO). OCDETF investigations emphasize disrupting the financial dealings and dismantling the financial infrastructure that supports the DTO. DEA's State and Local Task Force and HIDTA-funded groups are engaged as partners with the OCDETF program and enforce the effectiveness and success of the OCDETF program.

Keeping True to the Mission

HIDTA initiatives should address the highest possible priorities of the drug threat. DEA seeks to ensure that HIDTA strategies, budgets, and initiatives are developed and implemented in the most efficient manner possible to combat the regional, as well as national, drug threat.

Yearly initiatives must be evaluated properly to ensure that they remain relevant. Every DEA initiative, whether incorporated into a HIDTA-funded initiative or managed by itself, is inspected every year. In addition, DEA's Inspections Division scrutinizes HIDTA initiatives, in conjunction with regular field inspections, every three years. This oversight maintains the highest levels of quality control in keeping with the national objectives of DEA and ONDCP.

When initiatives are inspected, the impact on the HIDTA strategy is taken into account: Is information being shared with the ISCs? What interaction exists between other HIDTAs and non-HIDTA jurisdictions? What measurable outputs and outcomes are there?

In addition, ONDCP conducts its own reviews of HIDTA programs. These reviews can have tremendous benefits:

- Increase accountability of fiscal measures
- Aid in increasing cooperation among all participants of the program
- Improve the productivity of the Executive Boards by identifying problems, rather than encountering stalemates.

Since DEA receives copies of these reviews, we attempt to address specific problems relating to DEA as soon as possible. Still, there must be a better process that can provide for more timely and regular reviews.

DEA's Task Force Program

In addition to participation in the HIDTA program, DEA has long operated its own State and local task force operations. In an effort to combat the growth of drug trafficking nationwide, the DEA State and Local Task Force (SLTF) Program continues to emphasize the need for cooperation and coordination with our state and local counterparts in the enforcement of federal drug laws. These SLTFs address drug problems of concern in the geographic regions where they operate.

The DEA SLTF concept began in the early 1970's and was formally established in 1986. This program provides numerous advantages to both the DEA and participating agencies. DEA is able to share resources and expertise with state and local law enforcement, thereby increasing investigative results. The SLTF Program also allows state and local officers to be federally deputized, thus extending their jurisdiction. State and local participating agencies receive equitable shares of forfeited drug assets. DEA pays for overtime ($9,801 maximum per officer/per year) and related expenses for those officers participating in program funded task forces.

The SLTF Program is a significant asset to DEA and America's efforts to curb drug trafficking and abuse. State and local agencies that participate in this program are actually force multipliers, which add additional resources to DEA. These law enforcement agencies participating in the SLTF program are partners with DEA and exert a tremendous amount of influence on and oversight of the daily task force operations. In DEA offices that have over three task force elements, some of the individual groups have state and local supervisors who report to DEA Assistant Special Agents in Charge (ASAC). In larger DEA Field Divisions, some SLTFs have state and local executives in positions equal to DEA ASACs overseeing the multiple Task Forces. In this capacity, state and local executives have direct input on how the SLTFs operate.

What DEA does in our SLTF program is very similar to our involvement in the HIDTA program. DEA Program and HIDTA-funded task forces share and develop narcotics intelligence and pursue joint investigations. Statistically, DEA SLTFs account for approximately 40 percent of all DEA case initiations and seizures. It is important to emphasize that there are no real operational differences between the types of cases conducted by DEA Task Forces, including DEA HIDTA-funded Task Forces, and DEA's regular enforcement groups. The SLTF concept utilizes federal, state and local expertise in the development of investigations, which normally lead to federal investigations on par with other DEA enforcement elements. DEA has always had a long-standing commitment to state and local partners and routinely works cooperative cases. The SLTF Program allows DEA to formalize this commitment, and target drug trafficking organizations with joint intelligence for improved resource commitment and management.

Witness Protection Initiatives

I now would like to discuss DEA's Witness Security Program and the Victim and Witness Assistance Program. DEA recognizes the necessity of cooperating witnesses and citizens who provide information that assist in our investigations. These are important programs.

Witness Security Program

In support of DEA's domestic and international enforcement objectives, DEA utilizes the Department of Justice's Federal Witness Security Program to provide protection for confidential sources, witnesses and/or associates and family members if the need arises. As the members of the Subcommittee are well aware, drug trafficking organizations often utilize various methods of intimidation and violence in furtherance of their agenda. DEA has long maintained a strong commitment to ensuring the safety of individuals who provide assistance in dismantling these criminal drug organizations.

Once the decision to utilize the WSP is made, DEA coordinates closely with the United States Attorney's Offices where the prosecutions occur, the Department's Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO), Criminal Division, which is responsible for authorizing individuals into, and overseeing the WSP, and the United States Marshals Service, which administers the day-to-day operation of the WSP for those relocated in the community. In the cases requiring relocation of a witness, family members and/or associates, a risk assessment must be prepared to gauge whether the persons to be relocated pose a risk to the relocation community that outweighs the value of the witness's testimony. In relocation cases, either initially, or following a period of incarceration for some witnesses, DEA works with OEO to facilitate the initial administrative process and coordinates with the U.S. Marshals Service in producing the witnesses to be interviewed and evaluated by a Bureau of Prisons psychologist. This includes family members to be relocated. The process aims at determining the participants' suitability for the WSP and ensuring that the needs of the witness have been adequately addressed.

In addition, during the course of trial preparation, the United States Attorney's Office and DEA case agents frequently develop witnesses who have not previously been DEA confidential sources (CS) and therefore are not assigned CS numbers. The CS numbers must be supplied because of the potential for years of follow-up efforts for witnesses in the WSP. DEA documents all WSP participants as CSs for tracking purposes. All DEA documents use the true name of the witness, and only the U.S. Marshals Service has knowledge of assumed names provided for the purpose of security.

Victim and Witness Assistance Program

The first Federal victims' rights legislation was the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA). Congress amended and expanded upon the provisions of the 1982 Act in subsequent legislation, primarily the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, the Victims Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and the Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997.

In the VWPA, Congress made findings about the criminal justice system's treatment of crime victims. Congress recognized that, without the cooperation of victims and witnesses, the criminal justice system would cease to function. Yet, often those individuals were either ignored by the system or simply used as "tools" to identify and punish offenders. Congress found that all too often a victim suffers additional hardship as a result of contact with the system. The VWPA was enacted "to enhance and protect the necessary role of crime victims and witnesses in the criminal justice process; to ensure that the Federal Government does all that is possible within limits of available resources to assist victims and witnesses of crime without infringing on the constitutional rights of defendants; and, to provide a model for legislation for State and local governments."

As a result of victim rights legislation, the DEA Victim Witness Assistance Program (VWAP) was implemented and is responsible for providing mandated training to domestic and international offices, basic agent classes, and management. We work to ensure that victims encountered in DEA investigations are identified and referred to an appropriate social service component. We also make employees aware of available victim services. Information distributed to the public and to victims of crime is available in multiple languages. Identified victims include, but are not limited to, Confidential Sources who are threatened or physically harmed, children abused and/or neglected, domestic violence victims, law enforcement threatened or physically harmed, individuals testifying before grand juries or trials who are threatened, harmed, or need assistance. VWAP works together with federal, state and local victim agencies and organizations throughout the country.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, HIDTA is a concept and not an agency. One of the biggest misperceptions about HIDTA is the issue of ownership. Many participants believe HIDTA is a Federal grant for their own use. However, HIDTA is a funding mechanism designed to support federal, state and local drug investigative efforts. This point must be recognized by participating agencies in order to pursue a consolidated regional and national enforcement objective, as opposed to a fragmented one.

The DEA believes the HIDTA program is a critical component in the Administration's drug enforcement efforts. Maintaining the focus on the HIDTA mission and emphasizing the most significant targets will go a long way in not only achieving the disruption and dismantling of national and international organizations, but also in keeping drugs off of local streets. DEA stands ready to take on any challenge and lead in America's fight to reduce drug trafficking and abuse.

Finally, DEA recognizes the importance of witnesses and citizens providing us with information that assist in our investigations. We will do everything we can to ensure their safety. I would be happy to answer any questions the subcommittee might have.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank you both for your testimony, and as we continue to work on, as we start to actually prepare for the markup of the legislation, there are a number of things we are debating as regards HIDTAs.

And, Mr. Burns, I would like to start with the proliferation of HIDTAs that has occurred has resulted in a kind of different focus. In other words, every area, to some degree, is a drug trafficking area or it wouldn't have any drug usage; it is because somebody had to traffic in the narcotics. Historically we had DEA task forces or FBI task forces or local task forces to deal with that, but when the HIDTA was developed, they were supposed to be high intensity, which means higher intensity than other parts of the country drug trafficking areas. The initial ones, as I said in my opening statement, as you referred to, were pretty well universally agreed upon, Miami and Los Angeles, Southwest Border, and the large areas.

As this has proliferated, we have seen a wide variety of different types HIDTA focus, and this has also diluted the funds from going to those highest intensity areas. Do you believe that some of those areas should be removed from participation in the program? If we don't remove some from the program, do you believe that the budget should be allocated and a certain fixed portion should go to the highest intensity parts and less to the lower intensity? And if that isn't the case, there are certainly going to be additional HIDTAs because there are several HIDTAs right now that aren't as high as some areas that aren't excluded, so would you favor increasing the number of HIDTAs?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman. There is no doubt from 5 HIDTAs to 28 HIDTAs now in 43 States, the District of Columbia and Puerto, and covering approximately 13 percent of the counties in this country, that the original HIDTA concept in 1988 is not what it is in 2003. With that said, I must state that each HIDTA is different. Each HIDTA, as this program has evolved, has come to deal with specific issues in their area. Appalachia, certainly, as you know, is not New York and is not Los Angeles and is not the Midwest, each attacking the local impact and drug issues that they have in their jurisdiction, but also dealing with national manufacturing, transportation, distribution and financial crimes aspects of this business we call the drug trade. Certainly in 15 years the threat has moved. Certainly there are counties that no longer would meet the original designation as a HIDTA county, and certainly there must be some mechanism in place to rectify that.

With that said, level funding every year, and with a great deal of help from Congress with respect to where new or additional counties or HIDTAs ought to be stood up has had the effect, as you say, to dilute the pool, if you will, with which to attack the problem. I believe that the HIDTA program is most effective when professionals here in Washington and, more importantly, in the field assess the threat and then, with your support, drive resources to where we can do the best good.

Mr. SOUDER. You have, in your testimony, said you have tried to shift the focus of the HIDTA program to the National priority targets as well as the regional targets. Will HIDTAs be required to tailor all of their programs that direction, or do you see it as a mix?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. I see it as a mix. Currently our requirement is that 51 percent of all the funds for the HIDTA program must be allocated to rural areas or to attack the problem in rural America. The reality is today about 80 percent of all of the HIDTA funds are going to State and local jurisdictions in counterdrug functions.

The CPOT program is an attempt by Director Walters and myself and Kurt Schmidt and the Department of Justice, and with support from you, Mr. Chairman, and others to redirect the HIDTA focus toward the major targets, back in line with what the original intent of HIDTA was, and to try and make a difference on a National and international level.

Mr. SOUDER. This is probably going to be the most difficult challenge, and I am not sure we can politically get this done, but the way it is going is that every area of the United States, if it is to have a coordinated effort, that is a wonderful goal, and that certainly my home area, which does not have a HIDTA, even though it was raised initially in the process whether we would have one, is at this point a lot higher drug intensity trafficking area than many that are HIDTAs; and, therefore, the question is why doesn't my area and other Members of Congress, who don't have an area have a similar drug coordination effort? But the high intensity concept was to make sure that the places where most of the drugs were coming into the county would keep it from getting into the rural areas and other areas with pockets in myth and others that may be focused on differently. But I am not sure, politically, whether we can accomplish this, but it is definitely a different type of program and we have to, in the reauthorization, either acknowledge that it is a different program or figure out how we are going to do battle with the appropriators to make sure that the program follows through its authorized language.

And I thank you for your comments.

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. After September 11 there has been a lot of refocus of different Federal law enforcement agencies working more in the terrorism arena and with homeland security. How has that affected your agency as it relates to the programs we are talking about today, as far as resources going more into terrorism, homeland security? Has it affected manpower, resources?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. We have seen, Congressman, some pullback from clearly the Federal agencies that are involved, the FBI, which has been well documented, the Department of Defense, whom we have been working with closely to transition those programs that have been an assistance in the counterdrug program eradication, cargo inspections along the border, the schools that train thousands of State and local law enforcement in counterdrug efforts each year.

But the most disconcerting, I suppose, would be what is more in the rumor mill than we have actually seen, and that is that State and local law enforcement agencies are becoming more taxed. Budgets, as you know, are not going well across the country, and if chiefs and sheriffs have additional duties, counterterrorism or because of the budget, HIDTA is certainly the first area not that they want to, but that they are going to pull out of. That is our suspect.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I understand that. And with the locals and the refocus and all the different law enforcement agencies, have you seen resources leave your focus on actual drug versus looking more into the terrorism, from your perspective, from the Federal level?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. I have to tell you honestly that the day after, on September 12, and until today, John Walters has charged us with making it very clear to all Federal agencies that we are all Americans, we are here to help, whatever we can do to assist you we will, but we cannot dilute the counterdrug mission in light of terrorism, and that we will work together. So to date I would say I have not seen that.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. That is good. The other thing, first thing, drugs have no geographical boundaries, and I think the HIDTA concept is an excellent concept because you have local, State, Federal. A lot of times leads and sources or informants come from the local and then you develop like a strike force relationship. Now, there are always jealousies that exist. I know in the old days, when I was a narcotics prosecutor, we, as a local, did not have the money to pursue a high profile person, to have four or five cars tail some to put somebody in the witness protection program. I think what the Federal Government, through HIDTA, brought to the locals was not the resources and the teamwork concept. You always have issues of need to know, and the locals and State feel that the Federal agents are not telling them everything they know; probably more FBI than DEA, by the way. But where has that evolved? Do you see that changing or does that still exist? And if it does exist, what do you suggest we do to keep working through that problem?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. I have, likewise, spent a career as a local prosecutor.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Where were you?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. In southern Utah. Probably smaller than where you came from.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Oh, yeah. Baltimore.

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. That is pretty close.

I think one thing HIDTA has done over the years is establish better relationships. We have had the ability on a State and local level to work with the DEA, the U.S. attorneys, the relevant Federal agencies that are involved, and obtained the resources and the help to go after the higher priority targets; and, in fact, we have had many discussions in looking at CPOT, or the Consolidated Priority Organizational Targeting, program. While the target may be in Colombia or Mexico, we are certainly cognizant that the intelligence and the assistance may come from a local prosecutor in Baltimore or Duluth, and that is part of the beauty of the HIDTA program.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. In the high profile targets are resources used the most effectively wiretapping?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. Absolutely.

Mr RUPPERSBERGER. OK.

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. Yes. That is what we are doing.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. Well, I have had the pleasure to work with the capital area task force in Texas on many, many occasions, and it is a very, very effective group; brought a lot of cases to my court to try, and we disposed of a lot of those very effectively. I think it is a great concept, this proliferation of numerous expansions of offices that they have had. I am just curious because we are aware, particularly where I live is a gateway area from Mexico, I–35 supposedly is one of the highest drug traffic columns in America, and it runs right through my hometown. It is estimated every fifth car is possibly a drug trafficker. That is a kind of interesting estimate, I think, but, anyway, that is what they claim.

And so the five original idea areas of the country were clearly the areas where we had a high priority, and now there is some question as to whether resources are being drained from the high profile areas to other areas that have definite needs. And I think the task force idea works. Have you ever thought about switching from a task force to a strike force in some of the rural areas? Because I have seen our task force deal with specific problems and go in and attack a specific problem area as a strike force, which would temporarily take those resources from the high target areas, but then those resources could be re-made available for those high priority areas when they are needed; sort of a big picture allocation: strike a problem in middle America, and I think you can effectively deal with it, and then move back to the border and the areas where the high traffic unit is coming in and out. Has any of that concept been looked into?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. Interesting, Congressman, we have had those very discussions, and as Chairman Souder and his staff, and you know, Director Walters looks as the drug trade as a business. How do we hurt them; how do we become the anti-CEOs; what can we do to cripple or disable an entire trafficking organization or a part of it, the distribution, the transportation, the financial crimes aspect. And one of the tactics that we have looked at, and in some areas tried, is exactly what you are talking about, concentrate resources on a particular problem in a particular area and then see if we can disrupt the market.

Mr. CARTER. In our county they did that very thing on a small town, which you would think wouldn't be a source, but it seemed to be a congregating area for traffickers as they came out of Mexico. They, along with locals, have gone in and taken an area where you wouldn't allow your child to even drive through the area, and made it a place where you can hold a Sunday school picnic. They actually dozed down buildings along with local cooperation and did a beautiful job of cleaning up that area, and it was a strike by the capital area task force that did that, and very effective, and then they moved on to what they normally did with it.

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. Sure.

Mr. CARTER. And so that was the reason I thought about that.

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. Thank you.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Deal.

Mr. DEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, witnesses, for being here. Obviously sometimes our questions reflect where we live and what our districts are made up

of, and mine is one of those areas that is in north Georgia, which is a non-border State, yet from some of the actual arrests and convictions that have been obtained contain some of the hot spot areas for major distribution since I–75 goes through my district and I–85 also goes through my district.

So my first question is since we do have a HIDTA in Atlanta, but it is restricted, it is my understanding its content of restricted area is only Fulton County, city of Atlanta, and DeKalb County, and does not include any of the counties in my northern district, even though they have had some of the major drug busts, much more significant even than Atlanta itself, who, first of all, decides the jurisdictional area that is included within a HIDTA? Who makes the decision as to expand it or not?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. It is a long process, but the short answer is the ultimate decision is made by the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy after consulting with Members of Congress, you, the Governor from the respective State, and then having an intra-agency review; we would bring in experts from DEA and FBI and Treasury and others to look at it to see if it meets the statutory criteria.

But I guess the better answer to your question is, and it goes back to the chairman's initial statements, we are currently level funded at $206 million, and have been for some time, and the question is, then, how do we continue to expand. And you may have a serious problem in the northern part of Georgia, but we have to come up with a way of determining whether or not that is more of a problem than in Brownsville, TX, currently. And that is why we have looked at options of how we can reassess and look at the HIDTA program, and we hope that these performance measures that we are putting in place will do just that.

Mr. DEAL. Well, first of all, would you convey the request that they contact and discuss this issue with me, as a Member of Congress who has an issue and an interest in it?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. Most certainly.

Mr. DEAL. And I don't view it necessarily as putting one part of the country necessarily in competition with the other. I would like to say I would be willing to be in competition with the counties that make up the Atlanta division right now, as to whether or not they can justify all of the resources there, as opposed to some of the outlying areas on the suburban areas on the interstates, where much of the traffic is obviously still moving.

My second question is as an area that just as we have a problem with drug activity, we also have a problem with illegal immigrant activity, and since my son is the State prosecutor in my local area, we obviously know that there is a linkage of one with the other, and I would like to ask what is your working relationship with the INS as it relates to the illegal immigrant population being a source of bringing many of the drugs in from Mexico; and second, has that relationship changed or do you anticipate any changes as we move into the new Homeland Security Department? Would you comment on those areas, please?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. Certainly. I would answer that by saying along the border I think we have had an excellent relationship. I think that inside the continental United States we have not done

as well as we can. Under the new reorganization and under the Department of Homeland Security, we have made new efforts to try and coordinate better with them in the HIDTAs, and just within the last 6 months we have also made several trips to Mexico; we have met with State and local prosecutors on the other side of the border and discussed issues with respect to how we can help each other on these immigration issues and prosecution issues.

So we are doing good on the border; we could do better inside the United States.

Mr. DEAL. I am going to ask one last question, if my time is about to expire.

In that regard, my concern has been, of recent, that we have not seen the cooperation from Mexico with regard to such things as extradition. We all understand that capital felonies they are not going to extradite back, but most recently we understand that the Supreme Court of Mexico has now issued a ruling in which they have ruled that even those cases that would impose life imprisonment, since they now consider that to be cruel and unusual punishment, will not be extraditable back to the United States; and that is going to involve most of your major drug activities. I think that is in stark contrast to what Colombia's attitude has been, is that they welcome extradition of their major drug traffickers.

Have you seen any problems developing from that more restrictive extradition attitude from Mexico? And what impact will that have on your efforts to focus on major drug trafficking organizations?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. It is certainly an issue. I know that Director Walters has met with persons in the highest levels of the Mexican Government, I know that it is an issue that the Department of Justice deals with everyday, and I can only tell you that I think great strides have been made by Mexico within the last 12 months because of efforts by Mr. Walters and others to convince them that we can make the problem smaller by working together. And as a local prosecutor, my efforts have been to reach out to local prosecutors along the border. I have found that sometimes the problem isn't as big as countries, but as simple as getting to know people on the other side, and we have great hope that relationship is going to better our cooperative efforts and take down some of the major trafficking organizations. But clearly, Congressman, the extradition issue is a difficult one.

Mr. DEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Guevara, do you have anything to add on the Mexico relationship?

Mr. GUEVARA. No, sir. At my level, when I have met with counterparts, as recently as last week, I see an attitude that is predisposed to trying to cooperate with us more, and I think that there is a new era that will allow us to move forward and push ahead with that particular issue. In speaking to a prosecutor again just last week, I understand there is new legislation in Mexico that allows for the maximum penalty of 60 years, and in my semi-private discussions with him, he was of the opinion that if somebody was 50 years old and Mexican law allowed for punishment up to 60 year incarceration, that, in his eyes, constituted a life sentence. So

I say that just simply there is a new attitude, and I am optimistic that will lead us in this very, very difficult issue.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Bell.

Mr. BELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Burns, I apologize to both of you for not being here for your earlier testimony. And if you have already covered it, I also apologize.

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. It was really good.

Mr. BELL. It was all the talk throughout the Capitol that it was.

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. That is what I thought.

Mr. BELL. That is why I came.

But I represent part of the Houston region, and I wanted to talk to you. Some of the concern is focused on the splintering of the Southwest Border, HIDTA into the five different parts, and I am curious if you have plans for addressing some of the problems in regard to cooperation and communication, and how we get passed some of the turf war mentality.

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. Congressman, I have been the deputy director for 11 months. There are 28 HIDTAs, including one in Hawaii and Puerto Rico. I have been to the Southwest Border, I think, eight times. I have only been to about 14 of the HIDTAs. I have been there that many times to deal with the very issue that you raise. I am convinced that this country and the HIDTA program is best served by, one, cooperating HIDTA along the Southwest Border, from San Diego to south Texas. We have to deal with the border as one HIDTA, which it has always been, and in a cooperative spirit.

Last week we had the board members from, I think, four of the five partnerships, Arizona had some conflicts, we had all of the partnership directors here with the exception of Arizona, met with some of them later, and I believe we are well on our way to establishing standard operating procedure to meet the needs and the desires of the respective States, which is always a priority, and understand that in America it is time to work together, not splinter off, not my State, not my local issues, not my section of the border, but all together. And I hope to report to you within the next month that has happened and we are going to make it better.

Mr. BELL. Have you been able to develop some consensus during your trips for the formation of one?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. It has always been one. There has always been some idea that individual States want their own, and they believe that by being called their own HIDTA they may have more leverage for additional money. I think that, in meeting with the board members, there has become a consensus that they are more important to you and to the citizens of this country when they are combined as opposed to individual HIDTAs. They currently receive almost a quarter of the entire HIDTA budget. Individual States receive large amounts of moneys to combat the problem, and I think the reason that they receive so much attention is because they are the border.

Mr. BELL. Looking at just the Houston HIDTA, 15 State and local agencies and 10 Federal agencies that have to come together to formulate a strategy to attack drug trafficking, and I am just curious if you have seen some of the problems in that area regarding

communications and information sharing and strategic planning, and how what you would recommend as far as addressing some of those issues.

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. In Houston? Stan Purse, first, is one of the HIDTA directors in the country. The coordination in the Houston HIDTA, which I haven't been to because in many ways it is an example of what all HIDTAs should be, they have their finger on the pulse, they understand the threat, and they move their assets and direct their focus in cases toward the problem.

Mr. BELL. Thank you.

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. Thank you.

Mr. BELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. I would like to do a brief followup. This is far too complex a subject to do in a hearing, but I want to put on the record this comment and question.

If we have a Southwest Border HIDTA, which I agree with the concept, why wouldn't we have, then, regional concepts that are broad in other areas, such as north border, the northern border is longer, so maybe east-west? Why wouldn't everything north of the south border then also be a large zone of southwestern United States? Great Lakes region, all of Florida be together in one. In other words, a regionalization concept then with a local implementation, which might not be called a HIDTA, but we all agree that the functions of having the State and local involved have been invaluable in multiple ways. Nobody is questioning whether HIDTAs are effective, the question is how do we approach a national strategy to get the drug trafficking organizations? And if regionalization is good in one place, why wouldn't it be good in another?

And I would ask Mr. Guevara and then Mr. Burns to comment.

You were involved in southern California. Could you share some of your thoughts as how the DEA coordinates with this? Because the fact is we had DEA or FBI task forces in most regions already. What did the HIDTA add to that? And could you kind of weigh in on both the Southwest Border, the concept of regionalization, and then if we went to National, what that would do to the State and local cooperation?

Mr. GUEVARA. Yes, sir. The DEA would support consolidation of multiple efforts. DEA is of the view that if we bring our resources together and we stay focused, we can impact the traffic at the highest level and thereby reduce the overall flow of drugs, reducing the availability. So DEA would support a consolidation of border HIDTAs. And because these criminal organizations operate at will and are very fluid, we need to be able to respond accordingly, and toward that end DEA has recently been moving toward improving our ability to do just that. DEA has four border sacks that go from San Diego to Houston, and it has been one of my projects to improve our operations there, and that has included meetings as recently as the previous month and the month prior to that, in which I brought the four sacks together to improve that communication, and then I took it a step further by meeting with our Mexican colleagues in Mexico City to see what more we could do to improve that communication.

So I am of the view that it is imperative, wherever possible, that we have common goals and objectives, and that by working to-

gether and pooling our resources, we will hopefully, at the end of the day, be able to impact the traffic that will allow my parents in east Los Angeles to go to the grocery store.

And if you could repeat the second part of the question, please.

Mr. SOUDER. You were in the southwest or southern California border HIDTA yourself as a coordinator. How do you see, if we nationalize this more, it possibly negatively impacting the State and local cooperation?

Mr. GUEVARA. I think that there may be a reluctance on the part of local law enforcement if they were to see or think that this would take away from the local impact cases. And my answer to that point of view would be that it would actually allow us to improve our overall efforts impacting on local traffickers if we can identify a cell that is responsible for just putting out the narcotics on the street. Ultimately, they are getting it from somebody else, and the challenge needs to be that we connect those cells operating in the neighborhoods, connect it to the mid-level violators that will lead to the command and control operations that we can detect through Title 3 or wiretap operations. I don't see a conflict whatsoever. I think what it will do is facilitate the coordination that will allow us to do exactly those type of operations.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Burns, do you have any comments?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. It is an excellent question, and it is something that students of HIDTA, if there is such a thing, talk about. I guess my response would be that what we have tried to do is be threat-driven and not necessarily make it all fit nicely in geographic regions. To some extent, as you well know, there already is some regionalization. We have five States in the Rocky Mountain HIDTA, we have six States in the Midwest, we have six in New England. But those States came together because the threat was consistent one with another and they believed that in those areas they could best attack the problem.

But your idea is a good one, and it is one that I would like to discuss with you and your staff, because we are always trying to make this program better.

Mr. SOUDER. For most of those clusters, they were too small to get their own HIDTA to justify it to the director or the appropriations. In the Southwest Border HIDTA it is a different challenge because they are big enough to do it individually, and that is the tension. But I appreciate your comments.

Mr. Deal, do you have any other questions?

Mr. DEAL. I would just like to ask if there are any impediments to your functioning that we have any jurisdiction to deal with. I know that in the past, of course, there have always been jealousies among various departments. There have been in the past, of course, suspicions of not involving certain levels of departments. Many local jurisdictions, I think, were viewed as, well, don't share information with them, you are not sure where it is headed. I hope those days are over with. In fact, the jurisdictions at the local level that I have had involvement with I think are very willing to cooperate, I think they have the highest level of integrity of cooperation, and most of them are hungry for help from the outside because their resources are so limited.

But are there impediments such as Federal rules, regulations, laws, etc. that prohibit sharing of information, that prohibit your transfer of functions or personnel? Are there things along those lines that we need to be aware of that we ought to be trying to deal with?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. In many ways, Congressman, I think HIDTA is a victim of its own success. In the areas of the country where it works and is effective, everybody wants one, and I would say that, and I know Chairman Souder and his staff are well aware of this, it is a disincentive to the current HIDTAs where there is level funding in place. If they know the same money is going to come next year, no matter what, because of that requirement, we are not able, in ONDCP, I think, to do our job, and I think that would be helpful.

As I said, in the short time Director Walters has been here and that I have been here, we are all on the same page in one vein, and that is we need to stop, take a deep breath, find out where we are at with this program, get performance measures in place, and then determine how we can make it better.

Mr. DEAL. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ruppersberger?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. After the arrests are made, where do the cases go, the State court or Federal court, or do you determine where you can get the best result?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. It depends. Again, the beauty of HIDTA, I guess, is those issues are dealt with by the women and men who live in those areas and have firsthand knowledge of the problem. For example, along the Southwest Border we fund a number of State and local prosecutors because the cases, frankly, are overwhelming for U.S. attorneys to handle. And so it is dealt with by and between the States' attorneys and the U.S. attorneys in a particular region. Washington State right now, I am going there next week because there is an issue with BC Bud coming over the border in large amounts, and there is a State's attorney up there that some would say is swamped and he needs help; and there are county commissioners that say their jail is full, and, by the way, this kind of looks like a Federal issue.

So part of what HIDTA does is try and assist in working those issues out by and between the prosecutors as well as local law enforcement.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Would you say that it is more an issue of swamped or where you think you can get the best sentence time, so to speak?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. I have to answer that honestly.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. That is what I want you to do.

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. I wish we were to the point of where we could get the best sentence. I would say it is not that. I am sure it is that way in certain specific areas, but right now it is a matter of resources, it is a matter of putting bodies on cases and getting them charged.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Even with your high profile targets?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. Well, not with high profile targets. Those obviously would go to U.S. attorneys, and we would look at those as cases where the Federal system ought to be used always.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. One of the problems is that the northwest border is unusual because the primary markets are so far from the county where they are catching most of it, it is even way north of Seattle, and they are mostly headed toward California. So it has been a really unusual situation on the northwest.

Mr. Bell, do you have any further questions?

Mr. BELL. I have one other question on CTAC. The Technology Transfer Program is so popular that apparently we have a significant backlog in applications for next year's appropriations, and they will be spent as soon as these applications are approved. Do you think we should have an additional spending authorization? And if so, at what level?

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. As you state, the 2003 budget was spent in March, and there are over 1,000 applications already for 2004. Dr. Albert Brandenstein, who is here, would tell you that $65 million, I think it is $48 million for 2003, $65 million, and that is without the wireless communication aspect of it, would meet all of the needs of this important R&D program.

Mr. SOUDER. With that, we will have additional written submitted questions, and we will go to the second panel.

Thank you for coming this morning.

Mr. SCOTT BURNS. Thank you very much.

Mr. GUEVARA. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. If the second panel could come forward.

Mr. DEAL [assuming Chair]. We will welcome you to our hearing today, and it is my pleasure to be able to swear you in, but I would ask that you rise, please, take the oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. DEAL. Let the record show that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative to the oath. I told them I was accustomed to swearing in folks to a grand jury and to a witness stand, and that is almost the same, so we welcome you here.

Does any member of the panel have a special guest on the panel you would like to introduce?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I would just like to acknowledge Mr. Romano from the great city of Baltimore.

Mr. DEAL. All right, well, thank you.

The witnesses will each be recognized for opening statements, and we ask if you would, please, to try to summarize your statements and keep it within a 5-minute opening period.

And we are pleased to have Chief McCampbell. We will start with you and then just move down the line. Chief, we are pleased to have you with us.

STATEMENTS OF CHRISTY MCCAMPBELL, CHIEF, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; WAYNE WIBERG, COMMANDER, NARCOTICS AND GANG INVESTIGATION SECTION, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT; ANTHONY ROMANO, CHIEF, ORGANIZED CRIME DIVISION, BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT; AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEVE MOYER, CHIEF, HOMELAND DEFENSE/INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, MARYLAND STATE POLICE

Ms. MCCAMPBELL. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss what I see as the immense importance and the influence that the HIDTA programs have in our States. I speak representing my home State of California, but I hope that I can convey to you the benefits that are reflected on all the other States that participate in the HIDTAs.

I am the Chief of California's Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement and I oversee all statewide narcotic enforcement operations. I am also a past president of the California Narcotic Officers Association, which represents 7,000 members; NASDEA, which is the National Association of State Drug Enforcement Agencies; and, as well, I am an active member in the NNOAC, which is the National Coalition of Narcotic Officer Associations.

With an exploding population of over 34 million residents in California, it is the most populous State in the United States. We border Mexico; we face the most severe drug abuse epidemic ever known, and I attribute that to the ever-increasing legalization movement which many misguided individuals seem to be enthusiastically embracing in my State; and we are considered the source country for the manufacture of methamphetamine. With these many, many problems, we in California are fortunate enough to have been granted four HIDTAs in the State: one in Los Angeles, one in San Diego, one in San Francisco, one in Fresno. Or perhaps I should say that we are unfortunate enough to need that much help from ONDCP.

I am not an expert in the everyday administration of any of the HIDTAs, I leave that to the HIDTA directors, but I do participate in all four HIDTAs, have personnel assigned to each one. I have had the experience of being one of the framers of the San Francisco HIDTA and I chair their Initiatives Committee.

With this experience I have been able to observe firsthand the power and the coordination of efforts that the HIDTAs bring in the overall U.S. drug strategy. In observing the HIDTAs, I have noted five specific areas which I believe to be representative of the great success of this program.

First and foremost, of course, is the coordination of efforts. The designation of a HIDTA demands that the variety of agencies and personalities must come to the table and forge partnerships. Law enforcement has a tendency, as was mentioned before, to work separately and not always share. But HIDTA members must all work together, we share information and resources, and we establish those "pick up the phone" type relationships.

Requiring the agencies to co-locate and place as many resources under one roof is efficient and it builds those working relationships. Just recently, in my own Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, we

moved one of our local task forces under the umbrella of the HIDTA in the Richmond, CA area, combining our investigative efforts.

Second, enhanced communications and intelligence. Without the benefit of the HIDTAs, we would not have the communication levels that we now maintain for officer safety. The HIDTAs have tremendously enhanced communication abilities, and an integral part of HIDTA is the need to enhance and increase the free exchange of information and drug and criminal intelligence.

As a matter of fact, last year our Los Angeles clearinghouse, which is one of our information HIDTAs, began providing deconfliction services for not only the Los Angeles area, but for the northern California HIDTA, Central HIDTA, and the Nevada HIDTA. In the spirit of cooperation that is fostered by the HIDTA program, the northern California Narcotic Information Network [NIN], co-located with the Los Angeles Clearinghouse, and instead of everyone being territorial, all agreed to co-locate and work together in integrating our information. The intelligence component also of the HIDTAs has connectivity into the National RISS System, which combines local, State, and Federal narcotic intelligence sharing and has dramatically improved the communications.

Third, and I consider this very important regarding the HIDTAs, is regional responses. An essential component of HIDTA is the flexibility to focus on regional drug issues. Under the guidance of the board of directors, threat assessments are developed and then a strategy is built.

The Central Valley HIDTA is centered around Fresno in our State, an agricultural area that has a tremendous problem with meth labs and resulting toxic waste sites that are left behind. The environmental damage is horrendous, and I have personally seen drug-encrusted canisters, plastic ephedrine bottles visibly floating downstream in the Fresno area, or strewn about in the animal pastures in that area. The drug threat is enormous, and the Central Valley HIDTA almost exclusively focuses on the meth problem in our State. Other parts of the State do have different geographical problems and different drug problems, but the benefit of flexibility for the local board to decide what the threat is is essential to fighting our the drug problem.

We try to conduct OCDETF cases, but that is not always necessarily the case. So through the HIDTA flexibility, if necessary, we can still take a smaller case to the State's attorney. This type of flexibility is a key of success to the HIDTA program.

And I want to say, before I close, that enough emphasis cannot be placed on the importance of the HIDTA concept that allows strong local and State agency input into developing the regional enforcement strategies. HIDTA is the one Federal program that provides equal balance to all participants and maintains the identity of each region through our board of directors. To diminish that balance and exclude the State and the local input in favor of exclusive Federal control I think would dramatically dissipate participation and cooperation of many agencies.

Of course, it goes without saying the fiscal help that we get from HIDTA no doubt helps us, and we on the HIDTA boards, we watch that money very carefully, and it was just a week ago that one of

the HIDTA committees sat down together and we reviewed the initiatives and we redirected some of the funding from initiatives that had met their mission.

As you know, California is undergoing a severe budget crisis, and local and State narcotic enforcement units are being virtually eliminated. I have to say in Oregon I was told that just recently they are down to eight State narcotic agents in that State, Nevada has almost eliminated all of their State narcotic agents, and my own Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, we have been reduced by 100 personnel and I have had a cut of almost $10 million in my State BNE budget. It is very severe, and most of that money is being redirected toward homeland security.

The bottom line are the results that the HIDTAs produce: LA, we seized almost 40 tons of dangerous drugs in 2001; the Central Valley HIDTA, in 3 years, we seized over 1,400 lbs. of pseudoephedrine tablets; the northern California HIDTA, in 2 years we have made over 5,000 arrests; and the California Border Alliance Group, we have seized 8,000 lbs. of cocaine. These are the results that the HIDTAs produce for us.

In conclusion, this program allows enforcement to enhance narcotic enforcement activities, provide focus to regional problems, and facilitate cooperation. You would probably ask is it possible that we would continue on our narcotic efforts without a HIDTA. Yes, but it would be very painful, and I think it would hurt what we have built up with the HIDTAs.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. McCampbell follows:]

Remarks by

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Before The
House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources

Regarding

The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program
(HIDTA)

April 9, 2003

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the immense importance and influence that the HIDTA programs have provided to the states of this nation. I speak representing my home state of California, but I hope that I can convey the benefits that are reflected on all the other states that participate in the 28 HIDTAs across the country.

I am the Chief of California's Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (BNE) and oversee all statewide narcotic enforcement operations in California. I am also a past president of the California Narcotic Officers' Association that represents 7,000 law enforcement officers in the state. I represent California in NASDEA (National Association of State Drug Enforcement Agencies) and am an active member of NNOAC (National Narcotic Officers' Association Coalition).

With an exploding population of over 34 million residents, California is the most populous state in the U.S. We border with the state of Baja California, Mexico, which is considered one of the most vulnerable geographic areas of the U.S. in trafficking of illegal drugs. We face the most severe drug abuse epidemic ever known, which can be partially attributed to an ever-increasing legalization movement which many misguided individuals in our state seem to be enthusiastically embracing. And we are considered the source country for the manufacture of methamphetamine. With these many problems, we in California are fortunate to have been granted four HIDTAs in the state – one in Los Angeles, one in San Diego on the border of Mexico, one in Northern California, and one in Central California. Or perhaps I should say we are unfortunate enough to need that much help.

I do not purport to be an expert in the everyday administration of any of the HIDTAs – that is better left to the HIDTA Executive Directors. But I do participate in all four HIDTAs, have personnel assigned to each, and have had the personal experience of being one of the framers of the San Francisco Bay Area HIDTA and chair that Initiatives Committee.

With this experience I have been able to observe firsthand the overall power of the HIDTAs and the coordination of efforts they bring in the overall U.S. drug strategy to enhance America's drug control efforts among local, state and federal law enforcement. In observing the HIDTAs I have noted five specific areas which I believe to be representative of the great success the program offers to the states.

Coordination of Efforts

First and foremost, the designation of a HIDTA demands that the variety of agencies and individual personalities must come to the table, work together, and forge new partnerships. An acknowledged weakness of law enforcement entities has been the tendency to work separately and fail to sufficiently share information and resources. Where it was at one time generally acceptable to work independently, it is now detrimental. But HIDTA members must all work

together, share information and resources, and establish "pick up the phone" relationships. Expanding cooperative, multi-jurisdictional law enforcement efforts is critical to successful, modern-day law enforcement.

Requiring that agencies co-locate and place as many resources as possible under one roof is efficient and builds on the working relationships. Supporting this theory, within the last few weeks, BNE has moved a BNE-supervised task force into the HIDTA facility in Richmond, California, with the sole purpose of co-locating resources and combining investigative efforts with HIDTA.

Enhanced Communications and Intelligence

Without the benefit of the HIDTAs, we would not have the communication levels that we now maintain for officer safety. The HIDTAs have tremendously enhanced communication capabilities of law enforcement agencies working together. An integral part of HIDTA is the need to enhance and increase the free exchange of drug and criminal intelligence information among all agencies throughout the region.

For example, last year the Los Angeles County Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse (LA CRCIC) began providing deconfliction services for Los Angeles, Northern California, Central California, and the Nevada HIDTAs. In the spirit of cooperation that is fostered by the HIDTA Program, the Northern California NIN, based on a joint decision by the Executive Boards, co-located with the Los Angeles Clearinghouse. Instead of being territorial, all agreed to co-locate and work together in integrating information and enhancing officer safety. All the participating agencies have access to law enforcement data bases, intelligence analysts, and case support that they did not have prior to HIDTA. The HIDTAs have dramatically improved the collection, analysis, and dissemination of criminal intelligence communication by instituting a "systems network" of sharing. The intelligence component of the HIDTAs has connectivity into the National RISS System, which combines local, state and federal narcotic intelligence sharing.

Regional Responses

An essential component of HIDTA is the flexibility and ability for unique regional law enforcement problems to be addressed. Under the guidance of the Board of Directors, threat assessments are developed unique to each area, county or state. From there a strategy is built upon that assessment that focuses on the needs of the particular area.

The Central Valley HIDTA is centered around Fresno, an agricultural area that has a tremendous problem with methamphetamine labs and the resultant toxic waste sites that abound from residual waste products of methamphetamine manufacturing. The environmental damage is horrendous, with drug-encrusted canisters and plastic ephedrine bottles visibly floating

downstream or strewn about in grazing land and animal pastures. The drug threat is enormous, and the Central Valley HIDTA almost exclusively focuses on methamphetamine manufacturing. Other parts of the state have different geographical problems, but the benefit of flexibility of the local board to decide what threat is pertinent to their region is absolutely essential to fighting the drug problem in a particular area.

The HIDTA Task Forces also target the most significant individuals in their areas involved in drug trafficking, with the goal of developing OCDETF-level cases for prosecution. But if the target does not meet the high standards of OCDETF, there is still enough flexibility for a HIDTA to seek prosecution from the state's attorney instead. This type of flexibility is key to the success of the HIDTA Program.

Enough emphasis cannot be placed on the importance of the HIDTA concept that allows strong local and state agency input into developing the regional enforcement strategies. HIDTA is the one federal program that provides equal balance of all participants and maintains the identity of each region through a Board of Directors. To diminish this balance and exclude the state and local input in favor of exclusive federal control would dramatically dissipate participation and cooperation of many agencies in our future efforts of narcotic enforcement.

Fiscal Assistance

Without question, the HIDTAs provide that additional funding that allows regional areas to pay for an aggressive response to the national drug strategy to eliminate or reduce drug trafficking and its harmful consequences in critical regions of the United States.

Each initiative that is funded must provide a detailed budget and the requirements needed to achieve its expected outputs. The requests for funding must reflect realistic projections in support of each initiative's mission. As recently as one week ago, the San Francisco Area Initiatives and Financial Committees met to review current funding of initiatives, resulting in the elimination of several older initiatives that had met their mission. Funding sources were redirected to newer initiatives.

As you well know, California and many other states are undergoing a severe budget crisis. Local and state narcotic enforcement units are being virtually eliminated. The state of Oregon has been reduced to a total of eight state narcotic agents. Nevada has almost eliminated all state narcotic agents. My own BNE has been reduced by over 100 personnel and a budget cut of almost $10 million that has been redirected toward Homeland Security.

With these kinds of devastating cuts in narcotic enforcement efforts, the financial assistance provided by the HIDTAs is critical to continued efforts to eliminate the drug threat in this nation.

Bottom Line Results

The HIDTAs are extremely successful and prove their worth through the bottom line results. Results such as the following cannot be questioned as to the success of HIDTA:

The LA HIDTA seized almost 40 tons of dangerous drugs in 2001. They dismantled 74 percent of targeted major drug trafficking organizations.

The Central Valley HIDTA, in less than three years, has seized over 1,400 lbs. of pseudoephedrine tablets, 915 lbs. of methamphetamine, 282 lbs. of heroin, 240 lbs. of cocaine, and 15,000 marijuana plants.

The Northern California HIDTA in just two years made 5,048 arrests, seized 652 methamphetamine labs and 1,658,683 Ecstasy pills.

The California Border Alliance Group has seized over 461,285 lbs. of marijuana and 8,160 lbs. of cocaine on land borders.

With these kinds of results, there can be no doubt as to the benefits and the successes of the HIDTAs. If you look at these types of results and amplify them by the other HIDTAs in the U.S., the results point to significant impact on illegal drug trafficking across the United States.

Conclusion

The HIDTA program allows law enforcement to enhance enforcement activities, provide focus to regional problems, and facilitates cooperation among law enforcement agencies. Each HIDTA has developed a cohesive, comprehensive program combining locally focused initiatives to successfully carry out the national mission. Could narcotic enforcement across the nation carry on its mission without the assistance of HIDTA? It is possible, but it is certain that it would be a painful setback to meeting the mission of reducing and eliminating drug abuse and drug trafficking across the United States of America.

Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER [resuming Chair]. Mr. Wiberg.

Mr. WIBERG. Good morning. I want to thank you for affording me the opportunity to be here. My name is Wayne Wiberg. I am the commander of the Chicago Police Department Narcotic and Gang Investigation Section.

Chicago has a major problem threatening our communities and the people whom we are sworn to protect. There is a cycle of narcotic violence which has been persistent over several years. The violence in Chicago is directed by sophisticated gangs with long histories, as the Vice Lords and the Gangster Disciples, these gangs whose organizational structures can rival those of many Fortune 500 companies. The violence inflicted on our communities by the attempt to control the distribution of narcotics in our city is apparent in at least 50 percent of all homicides occurring within Chicago, and are attributed to the gangs involved in the narcotic trade. The main avenues of distribution are the open air drug market, which can net anywhere between $5,000 and $10,000 per day or a staggering $1.8 to $3.5 million per year at each location. As the gangs fight between each other and among themselves over the control of these open market locations, police officers' lives are at risk, in addition to the young men, women, and children who are losing their lives and their futures to violent death, lifelong addiction, and to long periods of incarceration.

We believe we have made a significant impact on these gangs. Our street corner conspiracy operations have been shown to effectively remove street corner gang markets in a surgical fashion, encompassing all entities in the market operation. Our conviction rates are high and sentences considerable. These operations have also shown to significantly improve the quality of life in the neighborhoods where we have been conducting them. But as important as these operations are, it is not enough. We are doing what we can to sever the "tentacles" of the drug distribution here in Chicago, but we need really to sever the "head," which is made up of the cartels that reach beyond local law enforcement and who supply various bulk narcotics for further distribution throughout this country.

Chicago has been identified as the premiere intermodal hub of narcotic distribution for the United States. An example can be found in one of the many large seizures made by the Narcotics Section of the Chicago Police Department in the year 2002. Officers from the Narcotic and Gang Investigation Section from the Chicago Police Department seized the largest amount of cocaine in department history: 2,000 kilos of cocaine were recovered from a warehouse in a suburb of Chicago. This seizure of cocaine had an estimated street value of approximately a quarter of a billion dollars. The Mexican cartel identified as bringing this shipment into the area stood to make an estimated $20 million in the wholesale distribution of these drugs, and the money was to be smuggled back into Mexico via the same false truck panels used to hide the bulk drugs.

There are many other examples supporting the fact that drug cartels are responsible for all the drugs that enter or pass through the Chicagoland area.

The ability of local law enforcement to attack international mechanisms that feed the narcotic violence in my city is not only limited by jurisdictional constraints, but by financial constraints as well. To be more effective in stemming the distribution of drugs, there has to be a greater participation between the Federal Government and local law enforcement in all investigative aspects of drug trafficking. A more concerted effort has to be applied to removing and eradicating the financial resources that generate drug distribution and the related violence. This can only be accomplished by a multi-agency effort. That is why the Chicago HIDTA is so valuable, it is the catalyst to accomplish this goal.

As with the era of prohibition, when the gangs rose to a level of sophistication that allowed their influence to reach beyond the resources of local law enforcement, there was a need for the Federal Government to help. The Chicago HIDTA is a conduit for that help. HIDTA has provided us with the resources and capabilities to identify the hierarchy of these drug organizations, and to move toward a more effective prosecution of drug conspiracy cases.

In closing, we in local law enforcement are challenged to try to make an impact on what really is an international network of drug delivery and distribution with limited resources. The Chicago HIDTA has been instrumental in helping to provide intelligence and link Federal resources to formulate comprehensive strategies and operations to be more effective by attacking not only the operatives at the street distribution level, but also impacting the upper and mid-level supply sources. We need continued support of these efforts to not only protect our police officers, but also to make our communities safer and to help to ensure a chance for a prosperous future for the next generation.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wiberg follows:]

Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Drug Policy and Human Resources

8 April 2003

Chicago is the third largest city in the United States, with a population of nearly three million people, with the Chicagoland area encompassing over eight million. Chicago is a national transportation, financial and industrial leader, as well as a city of great ethnic diversity. It is headquarters of 10% of Fortune 500 firms. Over 1,700 foreign-owned firms conduct business in Chicago.

But there is a major problem threatening our communities and the people in them who we are sworn to protect. There is a cycle of narcotic-driven violence which as been persistent over several years. The violence cycle is directed by sophisticated gangs with long histories, such as the Vice Lords and Gangster Disciples. These are gangs whose organizational structures can rival those of many Fortune 500 companies. The violence inflicted upon our communities by the attempt to control the distribution of narcotics in our city is apparent in at least 50% of all homicides occurring within Chicago, and are attributed to gangs involved in the narcotics trade. The main avenues of distribution are the open air drug market locations which can net anywhere between $5,000 and $10,000 per day or a staggering 1.8 to 3.5 million dollars per year at each location. As the gangs fight between each other and among themselves over the control of these open market locations, police officers lives are at risk, in addition to the young men, women and children who are losing their lives and their futures to violent death, lifelong addiction or long periods of incarceration.

- **Police officer Brian Strouse was murdered attempting to investigate drug activities of the Ambrose street gang in Chicago. He was gunned down by a member of this gang which was involved in a major PCP distribution operation.**

- **A young woman, while under the influence of PCP, drove her vehicle onto the sidewalk of Michigan Avenue, killing an infant, crippling the father and severely injuring the mother.**

These are just a couple of the examples of the tragic violence that occurs as a result of the plague of narcotics in our city.

We believe we have made significant impacts on these gangs. Our street corner conspiracy operations have been shown to effectively remove the street corner drug markets in a surgical fashion, encompassing all the entities involved in the market operation. Our conviction rates are high and sentences considerable. These operations have also shown to significantly improve the quality of life in the neighborhoods where they have been conducted. But as important as these operations are, it is not enough. We are doing what we can to sever the Atentacles@ of the drug distribution here in our city, but we need to really sever the Ahead@ which is made up of the cartels that reach beyond local law enforcement and who supply various bulk narcotics for further distribution throughout the United States. Chicago has been identified as the premiere intermodal hub of narcotic distribution for the United States. Some examples that support this can be found in the results of several operations.

In the year 2002, officers from the Narcotic and Gang Investigation Section of the Chicago Police Department seized the largest amount of Cocaine in department history: 2000 Kilos of Cocaine in a warehouse in a suburb. This seizure of Cocaine had an estimated street value of approximately a quarter of a billion dollars. The Mexican Cartel identified as bringing this shipment into the area stood to make an estimated twenty million dollars in the wholesale distribution of these drugs. The money was to be smuggled back into Mexico via the same false truck panels used to hide the bulk narcotics.

There are many other examples supporting the fact that drug cartels are responsible for all drugs that enter or pass through the Chicagoland area:

$ During the course of an Ecstasy investigation officers were made aware of a connection between Chicago area suppliers and an Israeli National. Information was developed that the Israeli National was trafficking large quantities of Ecstasy through the Las Vegas area and selling to traffickers from the Chicagoland area.

$ Another Ecstasy investigation resulted in the arrest of Polish Nationals selling five thousand tablets to undercover police officers.

$ Numerous heroin investigations identify Nigerian Nationals as the main suppliers directly related to open air drug market locations.

$ Numerous wire taps have identified various Cartels from Mexico, Columbia and Nigerian, as involved in narcotic distribution within the Chicagoland area.

$ In Summit, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago, a Columbian National was arrested after his heroin extraction lab exploded. It is the first seizure and arrest of this nature in the Chicagoland area.

- 3 -

$ Gang cells migrating from Chicago to other cities and to suburban and rural areas have increased the availability of drugs and, consequently, the associated violent criminal activity they are experiencing.

$ According to El Paso Intelligence Center, approximately 40% of the Cocaine and 11% of the Marijuana seized from commercial vehicles by State and Local officials from July 2000 through June 2001 were destined for Illinois. Similarly, 54% of the U.S. Currency seized from commercial vehicles originated from Illinois.

$ Cartel agents commit violent crimes within Chicago and then disappear, after fleeing the country, leaving a path of death and destruction behind.

The ability of local law enforcement to attack the international mechanism that feeds the narcotic violence in our cities is not only limited by jurisdictional constraints but by financial constraints as well. To be more effective in stemming the distribution of drugs, there has to be a greater participation between the Federal government and local law enforcement in all investigative aspects of drug trafficking. A more concerted effort has to be applied to removing and eradicating the financial resources that generate drug distribution and the related violence. This can only be accomplished by a multi agency effort. That is why the Chicago HIDTA is so valuable-it is the catalyst to accomplish this goal.

As with the era of prohibition, when the gangs rose to the level of sophistication that allowed their influence to reach beyond the resources of local law enforcement there was a need for the Federal government to help. The Chicago HIDTA is a conduit for that help. HIDTA has provided us with the resources and the capabilities to identify the hierarchy of these drug organizations and move toward a more effective prosecution of drug conspiracy cases.

As a prime example of what can be accomplished, through the invaluable assistance provided by HIDTA, as well as other law enforcement agencies: local, state and federal, a comprehensive investigation was conducted focusing on the distribution of PCP by the Ambrose street gang mentioned earlier. Through the combined efforts of participating agencies working through HIDTA, this entire organization was dismantled, from the street level dealers, their suppliers, the major distributors and the source of supply who created this drug in their clandestine labs. This criminal enterprise was primarily responsible for the distribution of this dangerous drug throughout the entire Midwestern region.

As a result of this joint investigation, over 50 persons have been arrested and convicted of Criminal Drug Conspiracy under State and Federal statutes, with some receiving life sentences. HIDTA efforts provided the link to dismantle this organization through resources, identification, analysis, and concentrated intelligence gathering. HIDTA was the hub to make this case extremely successful. As a result, over one million dollars in cash, numerous vehicles and weapons were seized from this one case.

HIDTA has also been responsible for providing our Detective Division with a Violent Crime Task Force Initiative which has been able to obtain information relative to drug related kidnaping and homicides. An example of the success of this effort occurred when a Columbian Cartel sought to have a drug debt recovered from a gang member who was trafficking on the west side of the City. Three corrupt jail guards were utilized as enforcers to recover this debt, which resulted in a homicide. Through the aid and assistance of HIDTA personnel, intelligence information was gathered which led to the successful arrest and prosecution of these individuals.

Another key element in which HIDTA has contributed to all law enforcement agencies within this State rests on Deconfliction Reports. Through HIDTA=s effort, information is now shared by agencies conducting separate investigations on identical targets. Prior to HIDTA, this never occurred. Perhaps, the most important aspect of this effort by HIDTA is evidenced by the fact that all major narcotic operations of participating agencies are deconflicted prior to the execution of enforcement action. This is key not only to officer safety issues, but also provides for a more effective and efficient allocation of resources.

The Chicago Package Interdiction Team developed as a result of HIDTA has been recognized as one of the Outstanding Interdiction Teams within the United States in the year 2002. This team seeks to disrupt illicit drug trafficking organizations that smuggle illicit drugs via packages into, out of and through the Chicago metropolitan area. Primarily a number of these packages originate from Asource@ states directly tied to Drug Cartels.

The Analytical teams from HIDTA provide tactical identification, analysis, mapping, intelligence information, and other useful tools that were previously not available to all law enforcement agencies. As a result of their efforts, we now have a cooperative effort on the part of all agencies involved in various investigations.

In summary, we in local law enforcement are challenged to try to make an impact on what is really an international network of drug delivery and distribution with limited

resources. The Chicago HIDTA has been instrumental in helping to provide intelligence and link federal resources to formulate comprehensive strategies and operations to be more effective by attacking not only the operatives at the street distribution level, but also impacting upper and mid-level supply sources. We need continued support of these efforts to not only protect our police officers, but also to make our communities safer and to help ensure a chance for a prosperous future for the next generation.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Mr. Romano.

Chief ROMANO. Members of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, good morning. I am pleased that Congressman Cummings extended the opportunity to the Baltimore Police Department to provide testimony today regarding the reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. I am Anthony Romano, chief of the Organized Crime Division of the Baltimore Police Department. I am extremely grateful for the partnership with HIDTA in Baltimore, and in my previous career with the New York HIDTA, where I served in the New York City Police Department for 18 years.

During those 18 years, I spent a period of time, in excess of 10 years, combating the war on drugs, especially in the late 1980's, the mid-1980's to late–1980's, when crack had completely overrun our city streets. I was a young narcotics detective assigned to the Narcotics Division, and we were tasked with the mission of taking back these streets. All of this was done with nothing more than a gun, a badge, and our arrest powers. We had no training other the basic training that was afforded to us by the New York City Police Department. There were no avenues available to rehabilitate those who were arrested. There were limitations on enforcement due to budgetary restraints.

A young police officer back in the 1980's, while guarding a witness in a drug trial, was assigned his post to watch the home of these witnesses, and that night, in doing his job, it cost him his life; he was executed by members of the gang that this witness was going to testify against.

I find myself now, after just retiring a year ago from the New York City Police Department, here in Baltimore, in a city that bears much resemblance to what I saw in the 1980's in New York, and as a specific case as it relates to a family here in Baltimore, namely, the Dawson family, another person who wanted to stand up against the fight on drugs, and this cost a mother, a father, and their father's children their lives.

There is just no room for this here. We need help beyond the help of just having additional manpower and being able to go out there and take these streets back. The people who are arrested need to be rehabilitated. Those involved in the fight need to have the training that is available.

Often, much too often, I have heard in my career in the New York City Police Department, and I hear grumblings as I begin my career here in Baltimore City, that there are budgetary restraints, and it is very difficult to run an operation 24 hours. Drug dealers don't shut down their operations; they begin in the morning, they work through the night, 7 days a week. Unfortunately, there aren't enough people for us to put out on the street to fight this war 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, so we find ourselves needing people to stay longer.

And what I have found in my career in New York, and I am starting to see here in Baltimore, and from my own personal experiences, no one does this work because they have to do this work. Drug work is a passion. I do this work and I have done it, and I

could have moved on to many different areas in the police departments, but I chose not to. I could have advanced up the ladder through promotion. I chose not to, I chose to stay where I was and fight the war on drugs.

Since 1994, the Baltimore/Washington HIDTA has performed at an extremely high level. It has assisted law enforcement agencies in coordinating an interagency response to significant threats or crises, such as the Washington-area sniper killings and the local response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. As a result, three law enforcement task forces operating in Maryland have been recognized by the ONDCP for their exemplary performance. These units include The Major Drug Traffickers Initiative, Drug Money Laundering Initiative, and Prince George's County Safe Streets Initiative.

Communities battling this intensive drug trade and the violence that accompanies it need to know that HIDTA dollars and expertise are available for them for strategic and effective responses to violence and substance abuse. In New York, and now in Baltimore, I know that we cannot do it alone. Please consider ONDCP and HIDTA favorably in your reauthorization deliberation. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Chief Romano follows:]

Testimony of Anthony Romano, Chief, Organized Crime Division
Baltimore Police Department
April 8, 2003

Members of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, good morning. I am pleased that Congressman Cummings extended the opportunity to the Baltimore Police Department to provide testimony today regarding the reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, (HIDTA). I am Anthony Romano, Chief of the Organized Crime Division of the Baltimore Police Department. I am extremely grateful for the partnership with HIDTA in Baltimore, and in my previous career with the New York HIDTA when I served with the New York City Police Department. HIDTA has the unique ability to bring law enforcement, criminal justice and treatment agencies together in a neutral forum that facilitates and promotes interagency cooperation and intelligence sharing

Since 1994, the Baltimore/Washington HIDTA has performed at an extremely high level. It has assisted law enforcement agencies in coordinating an interagency response to significant threats or crises, such as the Washington-area sniper killings and the local response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. It sponsors fourteen additional interagency law enforcement task forces operating throughout southern and central Maryland and the City of Baltimore; their missions include shutting down open-air drug markets; investigating and dismantling drug trafficking organizations and street gangs; money laundering investigations, addressing drug-related violent crime; and investigating firearms trafficking and violations related to the drug trade. As a result, three HIDTA law enforcement task forces operating in Maryland have been recognized by ONDCP for their exemplary performance (The Major Drug Traffickers Initiative, Drug Money Laundering Initiative and Prince George's County Safe Streets Initiative).

Other Baltimore/Washington HIDTA contributions are:

- Creation of the **Intelligence Center**, the only region-wide law enforcement intelligence center, which assists investigators in with case development services; supports complex investigations; researches new threats and emerging trends related to drug trafficking, drug-related crime and homeland security; and assists law enforcement agencies in developing their intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities

- Creation of the **Watch Center**, which provides tactical intelligence support such as case/subject deconfliction services; one-stop access to multiple Federal, state and local law enforcement information systems; and the only region-wide law enforcement event deconfliction system

- Sponsors of the **Baltimore Seaport Initiative**, the only interagency group dedicated to evaluating the Port of Baltimore's vulnerabilities to drug trafficking and terrorist threats

- Pioneering of the use of crime mapping as a tool for drug enforcement operations planning and evaluation in the HIDTA region

- Promotion of a highly successful crime-control drug treatment model that was adopted by the State of Maryland as a model for all drug treatment programs serving offenders in the criminal justice system

- Assisting seven Maryland jurisdictions in implementing programs based on the HIDTA's crime control treatment model; a recent evaluation demonstrates that these programs cut offenders' recidivism rates by nearly 60% for property offenses and 40% for violent crimes

- Supports law enforcement and community organizations in Baltimore and Montgomery County in providing effective substance abuse prevention program for at-risk youth

- Offers the W/B HIDTA-developed Case Explorer software (a case management system for law enforcement agencies that facilitates information sharing and intelligence analysis efforts) free of charge to law enforcement agencies

- Supports region-wide efforts to develop and implement enhanced technology (such as the CapWIN project) that enhances law enforcement and public safety operations

- Creates drug prevention programs focused on high-risk youth that have shown positive outcomes compared to control groups.

More importantly, the Washington-Baltimore HIDTA has proven to be responsive to Baltimore in its greatest times of need.

Darrell L. Brooks, a 21 year old, was angry that Angela Dawson had confronted drug dealers near her Baltimore row home and she regularly reported them to the police. To retaliate and put an end to Mrs. Dawson's crusade, Mr. Brooks kicked in the door of the Dawson's house at 2:00 am on Wednesday, October 16, 2002, poured gasoline and ignited a fire which killed Mrs. Dawson, 36, her husband, Carnell Dawson, Sr., 43, and their five children: eight year old twins, Keith and Kevin Dawson, Carnell Dawson Jr., 10; Juan Ortiz, 10; and LaWanda Ortiz, 14.

On the days that followed the Dawson tragedy, the Mayor challenged everyone in the City:

> *If there is anything that we have to vow because of this, it is that we only become stronger in our determination, and not to let the small number of bad people in this city run out the overwhelming number of those of us who truly care, like the Dawson family cared.*

ONDCP and HIDTA responded to the Mayor's call to action by providing the City with $2 million to be used towards intensive drug enforcement and prevention operations in the Oliver community where the Dawsons made their home.

Communities battling this intensive drug trade and the violence that accompanies it need to know that HIDTA dollars and expertise are available to them for strategic and effective responses to violence and substance abuse. In New York, and now in Baltimore, I know that we cannot do it alone. Please consider ONDCP and HIDTA favorably in your reauthorization deliberation. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you each for your testimony.

I am going to yield first to Ranking Member Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to just read over opening statement, make it a part of the record.

Mr. Chairman, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program is an important weapon in the Government's drug-fighting arsenal. By coordinating and synchronizing the regional anti-drug efforts of local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies, HIDTA programs around the country amplify the impact that participating agencies can make with limited resources.

I don't think that there is any question as to whether we should reauthorize this program. Absolutely we should, in my judgment. And I know, Mr. Chairman, that you agree. Like any program that undergoes rapid expansion, the HIDTA program has experienced growing pains. New and evolving drug use transit patterns of drug trafficking have fueled the growth of the HIDTA program from five regions in 1990 to more than 25 today.

One of the program's chief attributes is the capacity it provides to tailor a comprehensive interagency response to a highly specific regional drug threat. As we consider how to manage the growth of the HIDTA program into the future, we must be careful to preserve the advantage of flexibility that the program presently affords. The value of the HIDTA program is evident to me in the contribution that the Washington/Baltimore HIDTA has made since 1994 in helping agencies to fight the drug trafficking problem that severely affects my congressional district in Baltimore City, Baltimore County, and Howard County.

It is no secret that Baltimore City's local drug problem is among the Nation's worse. Sadly, the city I represent in Congress is home to some of the Nation's most violent drug trafficking organizations, and the impact of their activities on those who live among the dealers and their client is direct. Everyday I see the devastation that drug trafficking causes in the lives of drug abusers, their loved ones, and the entire neighborhoods crippled and terrorized by drug-related crimes against people and property.

As bad as conditions are in certain sections of Baltimore City, they would be much worse without the cooperation of coordination enabled by the Washington/Baltimore HIDTA. Through interagency task force and innovative and successful drug treatment component, a regional intelligence center and sophisticated crime mapping tools, the Washington/Baltimore HIDTA has dramatically enhanced the ability of law enforcement agencies to work together to dismantle major drug trafficking organizations and conduct investigations into large-scale drug money laundering operations.

The existence of the Washington/Baltimore HIDTA also enabled a multi-agency response to one of the most tragic events the city of Baltimore has ever seen: the arson and murder, as Mr. Romano has already talked about, of the Dawson family in retaliation for Angela Dawson's efforts to engage police to keep drug dealers away from her very doorstep. In the immediate wake of this tragedy, ONDCP Director Walters, to his credit, authorized the redirection of existing funds within the fiscal year 2002 Baltimore/Washington HIDTA budget to support a Baltimore targeting initiative that is helping to increase safety for residents of specific neighborhoods

that are subject to the ever-present threat of violence from drug distribution organizations and their affiliates.

And I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today, and coming, many of them, in such short notice.

Like the HIDTA program, the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center plays a critical role in our national drug control strategy and clearly deserves to be reauthorized. CTAC represents a tremendous resource for our Federal drug control agencies through its research and development programs and for local and State law enforcement through the Technology Transfer Program. As foreign and domestic criminals develop ever more sophisticated means of threatening harm to the American people, whether through the illegal drug trade or through terrorist activities, it becomes more and more essential to develop the technological means to detect and disrupt their activities. It is equally important that we enable those applications to be put to effective use by State and local law enforcement agencies. CTAC performs both these vital functions, and I strongly support the extension of its authorization.

A moment ago I mentioned the horrific crime that claimed the lives of Carnell and Angela Dawson and their five young children, age 9 to 14. In sections of Baltimore City and places like them, the drug trade has immediate and severe impact. Angela Dawson had the courage to stand up to drug dealers. The dealers responded with a brazen message to the entire community. We must ensure that the residents of communities like the Dawsons have the vigorous support of law enforcement to insulate them from the threat of violent retaliation for their partnership with the police.

I have often said, and I firmly believe, that the police cannot do their job effectively without the cooperation of the public. Witness relocation programs are not an adequate solution for individuals and families who are so deeply committed to reclaiming their communities as the Dawsons were. Moreover, communities can ill afford to lose such committed and courageous people.

The redirection of funds by Director Walters for the Baltimore targeting initiative was an appropriate and necessary initial Federal response to this very difficult problem of domestic narco-terrorism. The next step must be to ensure that this kind of effort can continue without eroding the support for other important HIDTA initiatives.

With that in mind, I have introduced legislation entitled the "Dawson Family Community Protection Act" that would make the funding of initiatives like the Baltimore targeting initiative a permanent priority within the Office of National Drug Control Policy. The bill would require the Director of ONDCP to devote a minimum of $1 million annually to HIDTA initiatives that aim to increase safety for and encourage voluntary cooperation with law enforcement, residents of neighborhoods that are severely affected by drug trafficking activity and related violence.

Mr. Chairman, I sincerely thank you for lending your support for H.R. 1599 as an original co-sponsor, and I look forward to working with you to see that the legislation is enacted either on its own or as part of the ONDCP reauthorization legislation the subcommittee will consider in the coming weeks.

In the meantime, I also want to thank all of the witnesses again for appearing before the subcommittee today, and I look forward to hearing the answers to the various questions put to you by our committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Mr. Ose, did you have a statement also?

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being late. I did want to get down here and make sure that I welcome Ms. McCampbell here to our committee. She is the chief of the California Department of Justice Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, and in that role she has worked closely with my staff and the communities that I represent across the State to improve our efforts to fight the use and abuse of dangerous drugs and narcotics.

Mr. Chairman, I want to add my compliments to those of the other Members here to your's and Mr. Cummings' continuing commitment to this effort. I have a statement I would like to enter into the record, but more than anything, I just want Christy McCampbell to know she is welcome here.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

I am going to start with a few direct questions on the HIDTA. And let me start as a followup to the last panel, if I can ask Ms. McCampbell, the California partnership based in San Diego is part of the overarching Southwest Border HIDTA. Do you agree with ONDCP belief that greater authority should be given to the Southwest Border HIDTA to manage the five regional? Have you been involved in this discussion at all? How would you ensure that the individual partnerships do not take actions that negatively impact other parts of the Southwest Border?

Ms. MCCAMPBELL. Well, I would have to say that I have not been directly involved in those types of discussions, but I know our CBAG, which is at San Diego and Imperial County, they do work collectively with the entire Southwest Border, and I do believe that we all need to be working together; that is the point of the HIDTAs. And we do work together at this time, so I am not sure to say it is really a separate entity is a fair thing. We have worked together; we share intelligence, we share information, and we share resources. So at this time we are part of the entire region.

Mr. SOUDER. We can have all nice general discussions, but sometimes it comes down to money, that part of the struggle that we have at the Federal level when we devise a program like this, and this is what we are trying to work through, is that each HIDTA sees its money coming in, they make their plans based on their money. What happens when there are shifts along the border in particular? Because when we are successful in one area, they will tend to move to another area. And the question is how do we make the decision to shift those different funding mechanisms?

The theory behind Southwest Border that this subcommittee clearly pushed for many years, particularly when Speaker Hastert was here, was that it needed to be somewhat fungible money that could move the intensity of the action where the gaps were. But then we ran into different problems in each State. It is one thing to talk theoretically about cooperation; it is another thing to say we

are doing these ongoing investigations, we don't want the money moved.

Any thoughts on that process of how to work through it? Because there is never enough money to tackle all the problems. The bottom line is nobody is saying that clearly there are parts of the Arizona border that are wide open right now; whereas, in the California border we have a little more, at least theoretically, control. That doesn't mean we have begun to eliminate the drug problem in California.

Ms. MCCAMPBELL. In the initiatives that I am familiar with within our State, we actually do some shifting of funds in the particular initiatives. We just did that recently. We felt that in the Bay Area, particularly, that we had met the mission of some of those original initiatives, so the board of directors took that upon themselves to say, OK, we have finished up with that initiative, let's redirect this to some new initiatives that are coming in. And I think the key to this is to allow that board of directors who knows the particular areas to have a lot of say into how those moneys are spent.

Now, that doesn't directly answer your question as to what do we do with that vacant part over there in Arizona at the border. I do agree that there has to be a shifting of funds; we don't stay on the same mission day in and day out forever. But I would like to emphasize that I think that those boards of directors, working in conjunction with ONDCP and with the HIDTA director, should have the authority to be able to perhaps in fact do shifting changing moneys.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Wiberg, we have a HIDTA in Chicago and a HIDTA in Lake County. I am from the northeast part of Indiana, where we tend to view Lake County as Lake County views itself, as almost an adjunct of Chicago. Why would those two HIDTAs be separate? In other words, part of what we are getting at the Southwest Border we need to look at in the Midwest as well, and that is drug dealers don't divide along State lines because they elect officials along State party lines; they work in geographic areas in distribution networks that aren't our political subdivisions.

I know political reasons why it is helpful in Indiana to have HIDTA. And I would ask a broader question. Not only Lake County, Chicago, but also why not a Great Lakes HIDTA or a West Great Lakes and an East Great Lakes, knowing Chicago and Detroit face slightly different things? But, in other words, why wouldn't you look at it as a hub, if we are saying this for the Southwest Border, and say how is it moving through the Great Lakes region?

Mr. WIBERG. To be very honest with you, it would be very difficult for me to try and evaluate what occurs in other areas outside of the city of Chicago.

Mr. SOUDER. OK, let us say Chicago and Lake County.

Mr. WIBERG. OK.

Mr. SOUDER. Because your guys are moving across the border. Most people who live there don't even know where the border is.

Mr. WIBERG. We have worked in conjunction with the Lake County HIDTA, and it was very effective because they brought to our table something that we were looking at with respect to an-

other street gang that was involved in the sale of PCP. And please understand, it is very difficult for me to make a judgment. I can tell you the HIDTA in Chicago is very effective; it works. I would like to see more of it, to be honest with you, for the surrounding Chicagoland area. We need more initiatives. How that would compare with Indiana, to be honest with you, Mr. Chairman, it would be very difficult for me to respond to that.

Mr. SOUDER. My assumption is that, for example, in my hometown the narcotics were mostly coming from Detroit, but we found gangs, kids who had moved in from Chicago. The logical connection in most cases are going to be out of the major metro areas moving through into the other areas, and this isn't hard for an outsider to see, and it is kind of exasperating to look at it from the outside and not see a willingness inside the organizations to see the networking pattern that comes with the narcotics coming from a long distance, moving to regional networks, down into subregional networks, down into smaller networks. And if we don't, as a country, focus on that, we are just going to continue to drown in the individual cases.

The HIDTAs certainly have improved that coordination, and what we are trying to get to is are there ways to further improve that or are HIDTAs starting to become, in a sense, another jurisdictional potential problem inside this system if they start coming in to the adjacency areas.

So you have had some cooperation with Lake County. Do you get into the Milwaukee zone at all?

Mr. WIBERG. Yes.

Mr. SOUDER. In other words, presumably narco chains are going to run up toward Milwaukee. Rockford?

Mr. WIBERG. Yes. Oh, definitely Rockford.

Mr. SOUDER. How do you interact with St. Louis?

Mr. WIBERG. From the time that I have been there, minimal. We really don't have that much involvement with St. Louis. A lot more closer to, you know, Milwaukee, Indiana, obviously. From the investigations that I have been involved in or know my group involved with, St. Louis has been minimal. But please understand, from a person who lives in Chicago and was a police officer for 37 years, I am glad the gangs are moving out of the city. You know, I apologize if they are coming your way, but I am glad they are moving that way. And I think that is one of the things that we need to be aware of, because when the gangs move, they bring everything with them; they bring the violence and they bring the drugs. And, again, I was stressing the fact that these drugs are not just limited to gangs, but they have that head behind them, which is the drug cartel.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. First thing, your comment kind of concerned me about the fact, and I am sure this is happening everywhere, the resources that are being taken away from the drug enforcement going into homeland security and terrorism. And there is no question we have to deal with both issues, but if you take one away from narcotics and transfer it, and I would like to know from maybe each one of you on the panel is that happening in all of your

jurisdictions, that the resources of manpower and moneys are going more into the terrorism and drawing away from your operations?

Ms. MCCAMPBELL. Yes, I can respond to that. It has been devastating to California. I try not to take it personally, as heading up narcotic enforcement, but, you know, in California the Governor and the attorney general created CADIC, which is an acronym for our intelligence system for homeland security for terrorism, and they created that out of nothing. They had no budget when September 11 occurred. There was no budget and so to create this bureau they took it out of narcotic enforcement. And they took it out of narcotic enforcement because who knows how to deal with things going on the streets but the narcotics officers? We had informants; we knew there were Middle Eastern connections to pseudoephedrine sales that we, as narcotic enforcement officers, had worked.

So 100 agents were taken out of Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement to create CADIC. We were promised eventually that would be refunded and made up, but then in the meantime we have energy crises and everything else, and so we have not received any allotments or funding back from our own State government.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Romano, how about you in Baltimore?

Chief ROMANO. Sir, as you know, we are in Charlie status. A lot of our moneys are going toward paying for overtime for officers and try to secure a city against terrorist attacks. Being new to this city and my initial impression of how serious the mayor and the police commissioner are to fighting this war on drugs, even though a lot of the moneys that I would normally be using to spend on training and for rehabilitation and for overtime as it relates to the war on drugs, there seems to be a huge commitment on the part of the mayor and, again, the police commissioner to go out there and do the job, and that is what we do. At some point I can only imagine that the strain on the budget is going to affect the work that we do.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. All the more reason why we need to encourage our President to give more money to first responders. I mean, it has to be done, because it is not only affecting what we are doing with our first responders, our police, our firefighters, and our health officers, but it is affecting your enforcement abilities. And after September 11 the terrorism issue will stay, we have to do that, but we can't take away from this drug situation. I think the statistics are clearly 90 percent of all crime is drug-related. That is about the national average. And we have to continue to focus on that.

My investigation, which is limited, on HIDTA, I think most of the jurisdictions like the fact that we have Federal, State, and local; love the fact that we get some resources from the Feds because they have more money than anybody; but some of the complaints that I hear that HIDTA, in certain areas, might be putting too much money into infrastructure and not enough into investigations, infrastructure being salary, rent, whatever that is. Do you see that in any of your jurisdictions?

And I want to start with you, Mr. Romano, since I am from Baltimore and you are from Baltimore.

Chief ROMANO. Sir, if you could just repeat the question.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Basically the question is the one complaint I hear about HIDTA is that there should be more money put into basic investigations than into infrastructure, infrastructure meaning salaries, rent, those type of things.

Chief ROMANO. HIDTA moneys that are utilized need to go beyond just certainly the infrastructure; we need to allocate moneys toward that. There is another huge component which has to be addressed, and that is in just dealing with witnesses and securing their safety and spending moneys to relocate them. In Baltimore City, approximately 25 percent of the cases are dropped because witnesses fail to appear, and this comes as a result of issues like the Dawson case, where a family who vowed to stand up and fight lost their lives in that fight.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I don't mean infrastructures in the communities. Really what I am trying to get to, because we are in reauthorization, do you feel that the Federal part of HIDTA needs to put more money into focusing on your target, on your investigations, you know, whatever the issues, or you don't see that that is an issue?

Chief ROMANO. No.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK.

Chief ROMANO. It has gotten more and more expensive to get this job done in purchasing equipment, in dealing with, as it pertains to Title 3, wiretapping, in dealing with companies that supply the services. Back in the early 1980's, when Title 3 on cellular phones were very rare, it seemed as though a lot of the companies were willing to help out law enforcement to the best of their ability. Now it has actually become business for them; we have become just another customer, and the amounts of money that are spent are exorbitant.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Deal.

Mr. DEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, let me thank all three of you for coming today, and to thank you personally for what you do to fight the problem of drugs and to ask that you express the appreciation of this committee and this Congress to your colleagues who do it on a daily basis. I think sometimes almost we are at a point in the history of our country where we take for granted that drugs are just an endemic part of everyday life, and I think we need to get much more serious about this so-called war on drugs, and I thank all of you and your departments for what you do in that regard.

I think all of us can hopefully agree that we need to reauthorize and hopefully to continue to enhance funding for all of these efforts, HIDTA and CTAC and every other effort that we have in that regard. I would like to ask you a little different question, though.

Ms. McCampbell, you are the only one of the panel whose State actually borders one of the two countries that border us. I would like to ask you have you made any overall general determination of the country of transport, the last country of transport through which the drugs are coming?

Mr. Wiberg, of course, you are closer to the Canadian border. Where are these drugs actually being transported through? I know

we have done a lot to try to deal with the country of origin, with Colombia and others, but what country are these drugs primarily coming through to get to our country?

Ms. MCCAMPBELL. Well, it depends on which drugs. We certainly know the issues, the pseudoephedrine dealing with methamphetamine in my State of California. We have found that a good portion of the pseudoephedrine is coming over the Canadian border down to California. Fortunately, we were able to create some laws that restricted sales and the ability to get pseudoephedrine in the State. Unfortunately, now they are not getting it in California, it is coming from Canada, and then being manufactured.

When you say the drugs themselves, we grow a lot of our own marijuana there, but there is marijuana being imported from Mexico as well. But, frankly, that is not our most serious problem. If you are going to prioritize, methamphetamine is our most serious problem, and that I would have to say Canadian border and the cookers, if you will, those manufacturing meth are coming across themselves, body-wise, from Mexico.

Mr. DEAL. Mr. Wiberg.

Mr. WIBERG. I think DEA probably can answer that question better than myself, but as an observer from the Chicago Police Department standpoint, Mexico has to take the lead with us. We don't really deal that much with the Canadian aspect of the pseudoephedrine coming through. Customs has made some excellent cases out of that. I know DEA has made some also. Most of it is the cocaine that comes into our city. And now we are graduating to white heroin, and that is Nigerian cartels now are becoming involved with that very strongly. How they are getting it in, a lot appears to be coming out of New York. That is what we see here in Chicago.

Mr. DEAL. Mr. Romano, how is it getting into New York? Where is it coming from?

Chief ROMANO. Well, you know, spending a lot of time in debriefing those who have been arrested, especially high level, when I retired, I retired out of a New York drug enforcement task force office, and I spent a lot of time there doing money laundering, you know, looking at the money leaving the country, back to the origin countries, and in doing that it was no different than tracking the drugs coming in. Basically, this is big business, and it is like being in a maze, you get to a wall and you find yourself having to look around for an alternate means to get through it, and these guys are no different.

Mr. DEAL. Where was the country of transport, at least, or where was the money going back to?

Chief ROMANO. The money was usually going back to South America, finding its way back there. But, again, the money aspect, there is a lot of big business here in the United States and a lot of people who are willing to assist these individuals in getting money out.

But as far as the drugs coming in, when we stopped up the ports of entry, the Mexican borders, when we beef that up and we go down to Miami and we beef up the borders and go into New York and Canada, we are attacking those individuals coming in from South America, from Mexico, so what they do is they have actually

found a way to go into Europe and come through Europe and work their way back into the United States, because we pay less attention to individuals coming in from Europe than we do those coming in from South America, because the mind-set is that drugs come in from South America, so we beef up on the borders and we pay no attention to a flight coming in from Spain. Spain is a huge, huge point of origin where the drugs actually go from South America into Spain, or somewhere in Europe, and find their way back into the United States.

Mr. DEAL. Can I ask one quick followup? And, Ms. McCampbell, I think it might be appropriate, since you are on the border State, are you seeing any more cooperation on the other side of the border, on the Mexican side, to assist us to try to stop it before it ever gets across the border, or is this all just what we are having to play defense on our side of the border? Are you seeing any more cooperation?

Ms. MCCAMPBELL. Well, we are definitely playing defense on our side, but I think we have definitely received more cooperation from Mexico with their attorney general there. He seems to be cooperating with us. We have intelligence that works with Mexico, I know DEA is working with Mexico, and I think there has been a definite improvement over the last few years than what it used to be.

Mr. DEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

We have been joined by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Moyer. If you will stand, we need to swear you in, and then get your testimony.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that the witness responded in the affirmative.

And, Mr. Bell, if I could go ahead and take summary of his testimony before we move to you for questioning.

Yes, Lieutenant Colonel Moyer?

Colonel MOYER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. It is my understanding that the State Police is here to support the reauthorization of issues as it relates to the HIDTA. The Maryland State Police has been actively a part of this, in cooperation with the Washington/Baltimore HIDTA since 1994. We have participated in showing that the development of the Office of National Drug Control Policy are utilized in the management of investigative initiatives and administrative responsibilities assigned in the Baltimore/Washington metropolitan area.

Most of the significant accomplishments has been the pioneering and the use of a crime mapping tool for drug enforcement and operations planning and evaluation in this region. It also offers a case explorer software, a case management system for law enforcement agencies to help facilitate information sharing and intelligence gathering on these types of operations.

Additionally, we have also worked with supporting enhancement of technology such as the CAPWIN project, which is a communications software piece which helps us have interactions with other law enforcement agencies in the region so we are not operating on different frequencies when we are involved in these types of drug operations.

Since Colonel Norris has been on board as of January 15, his priority has been to focus on homeland security, and over the last 18 months, in cooperation with the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Baltimore Police Department and Baltimore County Police Department, and other entities in the Baltimore/Washington metropolitan area, we are trying to foster a joint analysis center where we can take all information related to crime and/or terrorism-related type activities so that we can have all the information coming into one center so that it is shared with all Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the region.

With this, the Maryland State Police stands behind the HIDTA and the initiatives, and with the hopes in future cooperation along the lines of information sharing. The three major cases of recent that brings rise and shows the exposure of how well we do interact would be the Washington area sniper killings. HIDTA actually assisted us with the case management process on that.

I am the chief of the Homeland Security and Intelligence Bureau. The State Police was tasked with taking those thousands of leads, you know, whether it be Federal, State, or local, and putting that information together so that law enforcement could stay focused on making a successful conclusion to that case.

I think if you remember the tag number was actually obtained by the Baltimore Police Department on a non-enforcement type contact which linked the adult suspect in that case with the tag number, which resulted in the arrest being made in Maryland, and we have to give a lot of credit to HIDTA for bringing that software forward to be used in that case, which brought it to a successful conclusion.

And that would be the summary of State Police testimony.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. We will put your whole statement in the record.

Mr. Bell.

Mr. BELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to go back to something that was said about the diversion of funds to homeland security and away from the war on drugs in the various States.

And I believe, Chief McCampbell, you commented on that. Certainly it was the desire of many of us that after September 11 that we move away from the protect the turf mentality that seemed to exist throughout law enforcement, regardless of what area we were talking about, and based on what we are told these days, that has happened in regard to terrorism.

I am curious as to whether you all believe there is any way to expand that concept and start building alliances between those who are engaged in the war on drugs with those who are engaged in homeland security. And where I am going with this, looking at like port security. It seems to make perfect sense. And I represent the Houston region. One of the major entry points for drugs is obviously the Port of Houston. There seems to be a natural crossover there and a natural overlap there where folks could work together.

And I am just curious, Chief McCampbell, could you comment on that?

Ms. MCCAMPBELL. Yes. That is a very good point, and, actually we are starting to do that in our intelligence system, No. 1, our

RISS, our Regional Information Sharing network, which the HIDTAs, they connect into, and that is how we all share our intelligence and put our information in on our drug cases. But now we are putting some security information in there, and our war room in the Los Angeles Clearinghouse is working on deconfliction of our agents going out and looking at terrorism, possible suspects of terrorism. So we are doing that and we are doing it through the HIDTAs.

Our ports of entry, I certainly have them in San Francisco, that is one of our main initiatives. And we have agents at the ports of entry and at the airport, and we are combining our efforts with our own Statewide internal homeland security units.

Mr. BELL. Commander Wiberg, do you have any thoughts on that?

Mr. WIBERG. I think we are in the embryonic stages of it, to be honest with you. A lot of my people from narcotics graduate into the intelligence and are mostly working on the terrorists. Unfortunately, from my standpoint, I am not getting anything back, and obviously the experienced police officers that have that narcotics background fall right into the training for the work of the terrorists. I think we need more of it.

I want to say after we recovered that 2,000 kilos, it made it very apparent to me that if someone can smuggle that much quantity of drugs in the country, what else can they bring in?

Mr. BELL. Sure.

Mr. WIBERG. And if we don't have a closer association with those people that are responsible for keeping an eye on those individuals, then we are banging our heads against the wall, we are losing it again; and I don't think we should. I think it is very important that we have this multi-agency exchange of information, be it on terrorists, be it on drug traffickers.

Mr. BELL. In looking at the HIDTA program overall, since we are talking about reauthorization, and you are not going to hurt any of our feelings if you have criticisms of the program, are there problems that need to be addressed going forward from this point?

Lieutenant Colonel, we can start with you.

Colonel MOYER. Yes, sir. The amount of success and cooperation we have had with HIDTA in the Baltimore/Washington area is phenomenal. As I mentioned, and I can go back to the statements that were just made, trying to put this joint analysis center together, we will be taking crime information as well as the information related to terrorism; and whether it is Federal, State, or a local law enforcement agency, and even the military branches want to participate with us, we want to get all the information into one center so that we can get the information back out to all of law enforcement.

You know, what was mentioned was, you know, a lot of the people with the drug experience is from the law enforcement arena and others, you know, are going into the terrorism identification type work. But we feel it is a benefit to bring everything together because, you know, cases that we feel will lead you into a terrorist type investigation, are those people out there with false identities or doing some money laundering, which all can tie back into several of the drug operations.

So we would support that in enhancing and broadening it so it can work together with both, because we feel there is a lot of overlap that will show once we put all the data bases together.

Mr. BELL. Anyone else want to comment on changes or problems that they would like to see addressed?

Mr. WIBERG. From the Chicago standpoint, I would like to see more initiatives, is one. I don't feel we have enough. And that may be because of resources.

Mr. SOUDER. Could you explain what you mean by initiatives?

Mr. WIBERG. More initiatives relative to working the cases involving the drug cartels and their correlation with respect to the open air drug markets that we have so many of. In every situation that we are involved in, be it a wiretap or an investigation, it is either popping up to a Nigerian cartel or a Mexican or Colombian cartel, and it is all the way from the individual who is buying a $10 bag of dope all the way up, and it goes that far; and the violence that occurs as a result of that.

These street corners now are tremendous amounts of real estate, and they bear a lot of money, and people are willing to do whatever is necessary to protect them, defend them, and ensure that no one takes them from them. Consequently, we need more initiatives along the lines of doing more street conspiracy cases with HIDTA involvement. We have HIDTA involvement now; we would like to have more.

Like anywhere else, we are all suffering from manpower constraints; Chicago Police Department Narcotics Section is no different. And I think with respect to that, I think by having the initiatives we can make it more conducive to bring more police officers in for more training, whatever.

One of the things that has not hit Chicago as of yet, and I have my fingers crossed, but I am not very optimistic, is the methamphetamine. We have had three within the last year, which we consider ourselves very fortunate, but it is very apparent from surrounding suburbs that it is very close, and it is getting closer everyday. And I think that is something that we need to really address from a Federal standpoint, along with the HIDTA, to be honest with you.

The second thing that I think is even more important is that because the financial gains that are being made by these drug operations, we need more involvement from the Federal Government relative to financial, to the financial end of going after these individuals. As the mayor of the city said, you know, you can go in any neighborhood and they will be glad to tell you who the drug dealers are, and most of the Chicago policemen could tell you that too. It is just, you know, when they are driving around in their fancy cars, living in their homes that are extravagant, you know, who is going after them? And realistically, right now, nobody. Nobody. And that is the reality in Chicago, nobody is going after the financial end of these individuals. And if it is being done, it is being done on a very small basis, and that is not acceptable when you have a street corner that can generate the kind of money that they are generating.

Mr. BELL. Chief McCampbell.

Ms. MCCAMPBELL. There has been, if you will, in the rumor mill, or talk of consolidating the HIDTAs and putting them under the

umbrella of, say, the OCDETFs or some other Federal being, and I would like to emphasize, and I did mention it in my testimony, but I would like to emphasize the importance of keeping the balance of having Federal, State, and local participation and acting as the board of directors, because it is my belief that if we went under just the OCDETFs or under just the straight Federal guidelines, if you will, that we would lose participation, and I think like a local sheriff would go why do I need to put my agents in another Federal program? And I think the structure of the HIDTAs, where you allow the sheriffs and the chiefs and the State and locals to be on the board, I think that is an important presence, and I think it is an excellent part of the HIDTAs and one that I hope does not go away.

Mr. BELL. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I want to thank Chief Romano and the Lieutenant Colonel Moyer for being here.

Let me just ask you all a few questions. Chief Romano, you talked about this whole issue of 25 percent of the cases being dropped because of witness problems and, more specifically, I guess, witnesses being threatened. I live in the inner city of Baltimore and I talk to lks all the time, and people are scared to death. I believe that you can see crimes committed in my neighborhood and nobody would tell, and I don't think the Dawson case helped. Matter of fact, I think it hurt tremendously.

I am just wondering how do you deal with that kind of issue, I mean, that is, of threatened witnesses? Because I think if we are not careful in this country, we will find ourselves in a situation like they find themselves in Colombia, where you just don't get the cooperation and the drug dealers take over.

Chief ROMANO. Well, this problem goes beyond simply having someone pick up the phone and make a call and having the police respond and making an arrest. We, as a police department, have to forge a tremendous relationship with the community.

In dealing with the prosecution and the cases, we have to make the best cases that we can make so that the community sees an individual taken off the street, brought to justice, and then incarcerated, because too often what they are seeing is that an individual, they will pick up a phone and call in about, will be back out on the street a week, a month, a year later. There is no sense of feeling that you e safe when a person that you are directly responsible for putting away is back out there an hour, a day later.

So certainly us, as a police department, we need to make the best cases that we can make. We have to go out there and speak with the community and let them know that there are avenues available to them so that they can be safe. Take a family and relocate them, almost like witness protection. Let us do this, but, again, to do things like this we need moneys.

But our relationship with the community is probably the most important part of this whole process, and just trust, trusting the police, because as much as they don't like the drug dealers, there are a lot of other issues that they have to deal with, and in the

process we will find a way to forge a relationship with them and allow them to feel as though there is safety if they come forward.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Lieutenant Colonel, did you want to join in?

Colonel MOYER. The comment that I can make is I think you were well aware that I was on loan with the Department of Juvenile Justice for the last 3 years, helping them get through their issues there in Maryland, and still what we run into is what was just mentioned; it is the ability to keep, as far as juveniles go, keep those youths off of the streets for reasons of the problems that they are creating in their neighborhoods when they go back home. But there is also that issue of offering some type of protection when they are involved or when they become a target or their family becomes a target because of their involvement in the drug trade in Baltimore.

I think what was mentioned was through Steve Hess and the U.S. Attorney's Office there are victim assistance and witness assistance type programs, but, again, it is a funding issue and being able to have the capacity to do that for certain cases which may not be prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney's Office and rests locally with the State's attorney's office.

I know in having personally talked to some of the youth that were detained at Cheltenham and at the Hickey School, there were times when they would act up intentionally just to stay there on the grounds of those two schools so they would not return to the street and be confronted with people that they may owe some money to from a drug transaction.

But, again, it boils down to having the right amount of funding available to offer that type of protection for the cases, which are not the huge case that is going before the U.S. Attorney's Office.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I see my time has run out, but I want to thank all of you for what you do everyday. This drug problem is a very, very serious problem, and sometimes I don't think that a lot of people understand how devastating and how far-ranging it is and the many families that it affects; and you all put your lives on the line everyday and your welfare on the line everyday to make a difference, and we really appreciate what you all do, and we want to make sure that we do everything in our power to help you do what you have to do. And this subcommittee has been very, very supportive of law enforcement and at the same time been very supportive of trying to bring treatment to our communities so that we can have that dual approach, addressing the law enforcement portion but also dealing with the treatment and prevention so that you don't have as much of a problem to deal with.

And so we thank you all for being here. We really appreciate it.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. We will have additional written questions, but I wanted to pursue just a couple of things here yet at the end of this panel.

We made a tactical decision, in putting this panel together, not to have HIDTA directors themselves, who would have a direct vested interest, but to have representatives of a number of different narcotics agencies to tell you your reactions of the HIDTAs. We have been meeting with HIDTA directors all over the country, getting all sorts of information in, and it is a little like Garrison

Keeler and Lake Wobegone, all the men are good looking, all the women are strong, and all the kids are above average.

And the problem we get is everybody is above average; we don't get any problems identifying. But a couple have jumped out here, and I particularly wanted to ask Mr. Wiberg a couple of questions.

I don't think you want to give the impression, nor do you mean to give the impression, that in Chicago it is worse than everybody else, but you may have given us a window that we do not often get to see, when you said that there aren't investigations occurring. I want to zoom in a little bit on what you meant about the drug markets and the Colombians and the Mexicans and so on, because we are paying, in Chicago, for example, we have huge agencies that are dealing with trying to traffic back and trace that back to Colombia and Mexico. Yet you are saying they aren't being pursued, and you are the commander of the Narcotics Division of the Chicago Police Department.

What precisely are you saying? Are you saying there is not the efforts; it has been cut back?

Mr. WIBERG. Please understand, Mr. Chairman, we are pursuing and Federal agencies are pursuing the drug dealers. What is not being pursued is the financial end at all. At all. It is not being pursued from the individuals that are the gang leaders, gang structure of selling drugs.

Mr. SOUDER. Not going after their assets under asset forfeiture law? Is that a U.S. attorney's problem?

Mr. WIBERG. To be honest with you, we don't see IRS involved in anything. These individuals have been conducting business for a number of years, and I don't think they are paying taxes, and IRS, we have given them information and it just falls on deaf ears, to be honest with you. There is no involvement on their part.

Mr. SOUDER. Have there been cases made by the police department working with ATF, with DEA, with FBI, where the U.S. attorney has gone after the money?

Mr. WIBERG. Yes.

Mr. SOUDER. And then it is not being followed through is what you are saying.

Mr. WIBERG. Definitely not. There is no follow-through on the part of IRS.

Mr. SOUDER. Are you part of and does the HIDTA in Chicago have subgroups like was alluded to in Mr. Romano's testimony, and which we have seen in other areas, where you have multiple different task forces taking care of different problems?

Mr. WIBERG. Yes.

Mr. SOUDER. Is this one of them? Why wouldn't this be one?

Mr. WIBERG. Well, let me say this. They have been invited to the table; they just haven't shown up yet.

Mr. SOUDER. IRS?

Mr. WIBERG. IRS.

Mr. SOUDER. But that is the only agency?

Mr. WIBERG. And we have presented to IRS.

Mr. SOUDER. Have you gone to Treasury as opposed to IRS? Because Treasury is the prosecuting.

Mr. WIBERG. I understand, sir. The mayor gave to whomever 10 names of people that we had worked, that we know had tremendous amount of assets, and where that is at, I don't know.

Mr. SOUDER. OK. I appreciate your frankness, because that is what we are trying to figure out.

Mr. WIBERG. But please don't misunderstand. We have a tremendous effort on the part of working the cartels for enforcement by everyone, everyone involved. The problem rests with the financial end, like I said; it is not being done.

Mr. SOUDER. The other question I wanted to ask, which now that I am over 50 my mind occasionally drifts. I was reading something else there.

Let me see if it comes back to me in a second. Well, I lost it.

Does anyone else on the panel have any additional questions?

Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The prior panel, I think it was Mr. Burns that testified, and I asked him the question about resources being taken away from Federal law enforcement because of the terrorism issue, and all three members of the panel here said that clearly is an issue.

Now, from your perspective, from more the local, State level, do you see that resources are also being drawn away from the Federal law enforcement agencies as a result of what is happening with the terrorism issue? Because we are trying to do reauthorization, and we want to focus on what is right, and we know that we need the resources and we know that we have to deal with the issue of terrorism and we have to deal with the issue of drugs, narcotics. Now, you know, if we need more resources, more probably in the terrorism so that you won't lose resources, do you see that also on a Federal level too?

Mr. SOUDER. That is my question as well. Let me try another angle, if I may.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You gave me the ESP.

Mr. SOUDER. Yes.

This is a touchy subject, and I am the new homeland security, and I am particular on the border committee, and we inserted, with my initiation and the Speaker pushing it, a narcotics connection inside the new Department of Homeland Security. But this is indisputable, a couple of the facts. FBI has been asked to concentrate on homeland security, not narcotics, and they are pulling officers off the case. Customs and Border Patrol are trying to sort through what their responsibilities are, given the fact they are now under homeland security and that is their No. 1 priority.

Presumably, if they are following orders at the local level, you have seen a reduction in Federal cooperation in drug enforcement in those agencies. Is that true?

Colonel MOYER. I think what we are seeing in Maryland is that we are in a transition, you know, right now, and having a meeting with Gary Bald, who is the special agent in charge at the Baltimore office, we know that they are redirecting some resources, but I don't think we felt the overall impact of what the Bureau's involvement will be there in the Baltimore area.

And I can hand it off to my colleagues from there.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Also you are DEA also.

Colonel MOYER. And DEA, correct.

Chief ROMANO. Based on what I have seen so far, it seems as though our representation in the task forces and the assistance that we are getting from the task forces has been fine. I basically arrived here in Baltimore yesterday, but have been here several weeks ago, over the past couple weeks to start looking at what needs to be addressed here; and the areas as they pertain to our Federal task forces, whether they be Customs task forces, DEA task forces, FBI task forces, there seems to be a very good working relationship with them.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. My questions is not the working relationship. Are resources being taken away, manpower, and moved over to the terrorist issue? And if it is the case, I mean, we want to know about it so we can try to raise an issue. My issue, which I stated before, is that we need to encourage the President to give more resources to first responders so that the resources do not have to be taken away from your goal and mission, which is to fight drugs and arrest people with drugs. And that is what I am looking for in my question.

If you haven't been here that long, you probably don't know yet, because you don't know what was there and what is not going to be there, so probably a month from now you will be able to answer the question a lot better.

Chief ROMANO. That is correct, sir.

Ms. McCampbell. We have definitely seen, in particular, our military, our National Guard has been taken off almost all of our drug cases. They were very dominant in helping us with our weed and seed programs with our marijuana eradication. They were actually out there whacking weeds with us up in the mountains, and they have all been taken off that.

Now, I understand military, it is a whole separate thing, but this is our State, our National Guard, which has always been very helpful in drug eradication in our State. That is one.

The second part of that is FBI. They were very helpful, we worked very closely with them on drug cases until September 11, and they were part of our task forces, and almost all of them have been taken out of the drug business and their resources are all going to, you know, homeland security type of issues.

DEA I personally have not seen that their mission has been decreased in working drugs from a State perspective.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. So as a result of that, is that impacting on your abilities to do the job that you need to do?

Ms. MCCAMPBELL. Yes.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK.

Mr. SOUDER. She didn't mention Customs and Border Patrol.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What?

Mr. SOUDER. She didn't mention Customs and Border Patrol. Have they had a reduction in the amount working on narcotics as opposed to terrorism?

Ms. MCCAMPBELL. Yes, they have. We certainly had much Border Patrol participation down at the border. Actually, to some extent they were very helpful, because when they were looking for terrorists, as opposed to drugs, we were getting bad people and drugs that were at the border. But really their mission, I think, has been

much more toward homeland security now than it has looking for drugs at the borders.

And as far as Customs, they certainly participate in our task forces, but they have been kind of in limbo right now because some of them, at least on the street level, don't exactly know who or where they are working because of the combining of them into homeland security. I think they are struggling with identity right now.

Mr. WIBERG. If I may, I think it is the situation, at least in Chicago, that everybody is doing more with less. The relationships we have had with DEA go back as far as I can remember. We have good relationships with all the agencies, but we are all doing more with less. September 11 has affected every agency within the Chicagoland area. Customs is drifting. A lot of times we are being involved now with assisting Customs with cases that they have, taking some of my officers and assisting them in cases they have, which do not directly have anything to do with the narcotics end of it, but maybe homeland security.

But all the agencies that I deal with, all the Federal agencies are doing more with less, and we are trying to combine, and I think, you know, it is becoming very apparent that we become more effective when we are all together because there isn't a lot of us independently, to be honest with you.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. No further questions.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I think basically what Chairman Souder and Mr. Ruppersberger are aiming at is that we have always been concerned about balance, having a balance. I have often said that while we are fighting terrorists and fighting outside forces, we have to be carful that we don't erode from the inside or implode. And I just wanted to figure out, I mean, do you all see the problem as such, just to put the final question on what they have been saying, are there things that you would like for us to do as a Congress to help you? Do you think the problem is that bad or do you feel confident that it is just a temporary situation?

For example, the National Guard helping you out, is that something that you feel is very important right now, or do you feel that, you know, you can kind of go without it? And if you can go without it, what impact does it have?

You know, those are the kind of things that we have to have a pretty good understanding of because we are all of us, one thing that Democrats and Republicans agree on, we don't agree on a whole, whole lot, but we do agree that the people's taxes should be spent effectively and efficiently. And so, you know, we are just wondering what would you have us do, if anything?

Ms. MCCAMPBELL. I would like to respond to that. I think what I am very concerned about, being in the narcotic business, is that with the creation of homeland security and the surrounding issues of that, that we in narcotic enforcement are going to get lost. It certainly has put narcotic enforcement to the back burner in my State, that is for sure, and I would certainly ask you for continued support, continued funding. I need the help of the National Guard, and they are virtually closing down on their drug interdiction business that they had been in. I need that help from them. I need the FBI to help on our local task forces and our local areas. And certainly

I can't work without DEA. I mean, they are as important as anybody can be in our State.

And so I don't know exactly what the answer is, I suppose it is always funding, but if there is some way that we can make sure that narcotic enforcement doesn't fall to the background under the shadow of homeland security, we need to do that.

Mr. CUMMINGS. When the homeland security legislation came through, Chairman Souder and I were very concerned about narcotics efforts, law enforcement efforts not getting the kind of attention that we thought it should continue to get, and we had put in an amendment to make sure that there was a person in Homeland Security to address the issue of drugs in this country. We didn't get the level that we wanted, but we did make sure that we got somebody in there to keep their eye on the drug problems here, because we were so afraid that some of the things that you are talking about right now would happen, and we need to kind of figure out how we get to the powers that be to begin to look at some of these issues.

Ms. MCCAMPBELL. Just in response to that, I believe the appointment is Mr. Mackin. And I had an opportunity to meet with him very briefly at the National Coalition of Narcotic Officer Association's meeting last week, which, by the way, Chairman Souder was awarded a very prestigious award of being in the House of Representatives, the most honored person in the House of Representatives. But I did have a chance to meet with Mr. Mackin last week, and he actually has contacted me and is going to be coming out to California to discuss these exact issues. So I was quite pleased to hear that.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So now you know who was responsible for Mr. Mackin even having a position to get. It is nice to take credit for something up here for a change.

Congratulations, Mr. Chairman, by the way.

Anybody else want to respond to that?

Colonel MOYER. The only thing that I would like to add to that is that I think, like I said, we have a great working relationship with our partners. You know, the FBI has admitted that they will be backing away. I think we need to see who will be picking up that extra load. But you have already mentioned, I think, with the focus on enforcement, as well as treatment, needs to be paramount, and especially in the Baltimore area, treatment. I would echo what you have already said, that if there is dollars that can come toward Maryland in that effort, that would be great.

But as far as enforcement goes, a lot of the enhancements that have come through HIDTA have been from a technology point of view. The ability to have deconfliction so you don't have officers from different agencies or different task forces overlapping is very important, but, additionally, the surveillance equipment ability, to be able to watch particular hot spot areas or drug corners and marketing type areas where you don't have to put the human resource there undercover on the street, where you can monitor the activity from a distance, would be a huge enhancement for all of us.

Mr. WIBERG. Might I also interject more funding for hiring more agents and more police officers. Those are the first responders, and we are running out of them.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you all very much.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank you for your testimony. As Mr. Cummings said, it was one of only two changes in the original markup of the bill. We are very concerned about the long-term trends. I do believe the border security will be a benefit; in other words, as we tighten that up, we will catch them at the borders more.

We are concerned in obviously having Asa Hutchinson and Mr. Bonner from Customs there, they were former DEA guys, but I think there will be a narrowing in of DEA being the primary Federal, and that means they can't take a reduction; and that hopefully less is more will work, because we are in a very difficult situation as advocates of the anti-narcotics effort. Either we have to argue that we haven't been efficient in the past or that when we reduce resources going to narcotics, we are going to have a rise in narcotics; and we don't like either one of those points.

But we are now at that position in the U.S. Congress is the less is more will work to a point, but we have to show the specifics or we are going to look at longer term questions as we see resources diverted, as they certainly are and we are hearing on a regular basis.

But thank you each for your work. Thank you for your testimony, and appreciate your coming in today. If you have any further additions you want to add to the record, send them to us.

Mr. SOUDER. If the third panel will now come forward. Mr. Ron Burns, the chief of the Lakewood, CO Police Department; Mr. Peter Modafferi, chief of detectives, Rockland County, NY District Attorney's Office.

The third panel is one of the less glamorous, in Washington terms, issues in the supply of equipment in the OCDETF program, but it is one of the most important things at the local level.

If both of you will remain standing, I will give you your oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that both witnesses responded in the affirmative.

Thank you for your patience. This has been a long hearing, but it will be most likely the only hearing, particularly on the subject that you are about to address, and one of the most important programs in the Nation regarding local law enforcement. So thank you for taking the time to come to Washington and be willing to testify.

Chief Burns.

STATEMENT OF RON BURNS, CHIEF, LAKEWOOD, CO POLICE DEPARTMENT; AND PETER MODAFFERI, CHIEF OF DETECTIVES, ROCKLAND COUNTY, NY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

Chief RON BURNS. Chairman Souder and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I would like to thank the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources for the opportunity to testify regarding the effectiveness of the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center [CTAC]. The role of CTAC in the research and development of technological measures for Federal and local law enforcement agencies has benefited the efforts of the Lakewood Police Department and the Federal and local agencies in the Denver area.

The city of Lakewood is located in the metropolitan Denver area. There are 43 local, county, and State law enforcement agencies, in addition to several Federal law enforcement agencies in that area. Drug trafficking, crime, and exceptional incidents have no jurisdictional boundaries. Collaboration and multi-jurisdictional efforts are essential to combating illicit drug trafficking and crime. Our law enforcement agencies operate typically with incompatible radio communications systems. During multi-jurisdictional efforts we cannot communicate with each other. Our department has experienced these difficulties on many occasions, including the Columbine incident.

In September 2000, the Lakewood Police Department hosted an evaluation of various technologies that link the communication signals from one radio, and it is typically from a diverse system, directly into all other radios selected for interoperability. The evaluation was successful and the system, the ACU–1000, was selected and made operational in 2001. The cost of the system, and this was for the equipment, was $194,971 and was entirely funded through the ONDCP, CTAC, and the Navy's SPAWAR Systems Center in San Diego. Installation was very smooth and the cooperation with coordinating Federal agencies was excellent.

Today the system is operational on a 24 hour, 7 day a week basis and hosts 15 local, State, and Federal agencies. The Lakewood Police Department's Technical Operations Unit provides ongoing maintenance and support. During 2002 the system was used on the average of once a day, or almost 38 times a month, for inter-jurisdictional operations. Very frequently, DEA, U.S. Customs, the FBI, and local law enforcement use the system in drug investigations. Their surveillance includes the use of aircraft linked with the ACU–1000 to follow suspected drug dealers. The system was also used in a bomb threat at the Denver Federal Center, and in the summer of 2002 to coordinate emergency response to front line firefighters during the worst forest fire in Colorado history. This technology has not only solved a communications problem, but also enhanced the overall cooperation among participating agencies.

Cooperation among local, State, and Federal agencies is critical in the investigation of illegal drug operations, crime reduction, and large-scale events, and now with the threat of terrorists' activities. The ability of public safety agencies to communicate is absolutely essential. The ACU–1000 radio interoperability successfully solves this communications issue by linking radio systems from various and diverse systems or signals. Hopefully, this system will be expanded to include entire metro areas and to link with other areas of interoperability systems across the country, building a national network.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a success story of the cooperation between Federal agencies and local law enforcement. This project is a resounding success and could not have been accomplished without the House Committee on Government Reform, and the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, and CTAC. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Chief Ron Burns follows:]

Statement of

Chief Ron Burns
City of Lakewood Police Department Colorado

Before the

House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy
And Human Resources

April 8, 2003

Chairman Souder, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I would like to thank the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources for the opportunity to testify regarding the effectiveness of the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC). The role of CTAC in the research and development of technological measures for federal and local law enforcement agencies has benefited the efforts of the Lakewood Police Department and the federal and local agencies in the Denver area.

The City of Lakewood is located in the metropolitan Denver area. There are forty-three local, county, and state police agencies in the area, in addition to several federal law enforcement agencies. Drug trafficking, crime and exceptional events have no jurisdictional boundaries. Collaboration and multi-jurisdictional efforts are essential to combating illicit drug trafficking and crime. Many of our law enforcement agencies operate with incompatible radio communications systems. During multi-jurisdictional efforts we cannot communicate with each other. Our department has experienced these difficulties on many occasions, including the Columbine incident.

In September 2000, the Lakewood Police Department hosted an evaluation of various technologies that link the communication signals from one radio (from various and diverse radio vendors) directly into all other radios selected for interoperability. The evaluation was successful and the system (ACU-1000) was selected and made

operational in 2001. The cost of the system was $194,971 and was funded entirely through the White House Office on National Drug Policy, CTAC and the Navy's SPAWAR (Space Warfare) Systems Center in San Diego. Installation was very smooth and the cooperation with coordinating federal agencies was excellent.

Today the system is operational twenty-four hours/seven days a week, and hosts fifteen local, state and federal agencies. The Lakewood Police Department's Technical Operations Unit provides maintenance and ongoing support. During 2002 the system was used on the average once a day (37.8 times per month) for inter-jurisdictional operations. Very frequently, DEA, US Customs, the FBI, and local law enforcement use the system in drug investigations. Their surveillance includes the use of aircraft linked with the ACU-1000 to follow suspected drug smugglers. The system was also used in a bomb threat at the Denver Federal Center, and in the summer of 2002 to coordinate emergency response to the front line firefighters during the worst forest fire in Colorado history. This technology has not only solved a communications problem, but also enhanced the overall cooperation among participating agencies.

Cooperation among local, state and federal agencies is critical in the investigation of illegal drug operations, crime reduction, large-scale events, and now the threat of terrorists' activities. The ability of public safety agencies to communicate is absolutely essential. The ACU-1000 radio interoperability successfully solves this communications issue by linking radio signals from various and diverse systems. Hopefully, this system will be expanded to include entire metro areas and a link to other interoperable systems across the country, building a national network.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a success story of the cooperation between federal agencies and local law enforcement. This project is a resounding success and could not have been accomplished without the House Committee on Government Reform, the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, and CTAC.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much. It is good to hear a success story.

Mr. Modafferi.

Mr. MODAFFERI. Good afternoon, Chairman Souder. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you this morning in support of the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center.

My name is Peter A. Modafferi, and I am the chief of detectives of the Rockland County, NY District Attorney's Office. I also chair the Police Investigative Operations Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and I sit on a number of boards, working groups, and committees concerned with issues related to criminal investigations. Those positions include, among others, serving as a Technical Expert for CTAC's Technology Transfer Program and serving as a member of the FBI's Law Enforcement Executive Forum, two projects which are concerned with how technology affects law enforcement's ability to conduct criminal investigations.

In the Rockland County District Attorney's Office I am responsible for the supervision of criminal investigations in Rockland County, including those conducted by the Rockland County Narcotics Task Force. The Task Force is an investigative unit under the District Attorney which is comprised of investigators and support staff from eight different agencies. It is under the operational command of a director, Captain Joseph Tripodo of the New York State Police, and the assistant director, William Manti, a Supervisory Investigator with the District Attorney's Office.

I offer this explanation of our Drug Task Force to emphasize the need for and the successes garnered from interagency cooperation. Cooperation is essential at all levels of government, and it is the foundation on which the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center is built.

There are two parts of the CTAC program that Rockland County and law enforcement nationwide have benefited from: the Technology Transfer Program and the Research and Development Program.

The Technology Transfer Program provides State and local law enforcement agencies with technologies without encumbering the budgets of the applying departments. Through that program, Rockland County has been able to maintain its ability to conduct court-authorized or electronic surveillance while investigating mid to upper-level drug trafficking organizations.

As you are aware, the technology in the communications industry has changed dramatically over the past decade. Those changes have severely limited the ability of law enforcement agencies to conduct investigations utilizing electronic surveillance.

The Technology Transfer Program has supplied Rockland County with equipment which is critical to our mission. One such piece of equipment is a digital wiretap system, Voice Box 3. This allows us to conduct electronic surveillance in accordance with changes brought about by the Communications Act to Assist Law Enforcement. In addition to supplying these systems, CTAC maintains contact with the agencies that receive equipment, and through training and consultation address the needs and issues that arise. Our

experiences with the support we receive from CTAC has been outstanding.

In addition to TTP, Rockland County has been involved in research and development projects through CTAC. While these projects are manpower-intensive for Rockland County, the county and other agencies benefit greatly when projects that are developed become products made available to law enforcement through TTP.

CTAC makes it possible for agencies like Rockland County Narcotics Task Force to do its job effectively. This was dramatically proven when, during investigation which culminated in June 2002, the Rockland County Narcotics Task Force found a gaping hole in our border security. While in the course of intercepting conversations pertaining to smuggling of cocaine through Kennedy Airport, we were shocked to hear the drug traffickers we were targeting discuss a highly successful and lucrative alien smuggling operation. We immediately notified DEA, Customs, and INS, all of whom joined our investigation.

In addition to the 51 drug-related arrests prosecuted by the District Attorney's Office, the U.S. Attorney's Office of the Eastern District of New York prosecuted seven individuals for passport fraud and alien smuggling. The Rockland County Narcotics Task Force, utilizing equipment made available to us through CTAC, found and helped address a serious weakness in the security of our Nation.

Local law enforcement is faced with technological change everyday. We need the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center to continue to be effective.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has done an outstanding job of implementing the Communications Act to Assist Law Enforcement. There are, however, obstacles yet to be addressed. CTAC helps us address these needs. In my opinion, the communication industry views law enforcement as a profit center; they charge exorbitant fees to make connections necessary to conduct court-ordered electronic surveillance.

Law enforcement agencies will continue to work with CTAC to seek technical solutions to limit the impact of this problem; however, these exorbitant phone company charges may soon eliminate our ability to conduct electronic surveillance. This would be devastating to the safety and security of our Nation.

I would like to thank Dr. Brandenstein, who is seated to my left, for his leadership in this wonderful program, and I would like to thank you for this opportunity to speak before you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Modafferi follows:]

Statement Of
Peter A. Modafferi
Before the Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
April 8, 2003

Topic: Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center
Office of National Drug Control Policy

Introduction

Good Morning Chairman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you this morning in support of the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center.

My name is Peter A. Modafferi and I am the Chief of Detectives of the Rockland County, New York District Attorney's Office. I also chair the Police Investigative Operations Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and I sit on a number of boards and committees concerned with issues related to criminal investigations. Those positions include, among others, serving as a Technical Expert for CTAC's Technology Transfer Program and serving as a member of the FBI's Law Enforcement Executive Forum.

In the Rockland County District Attorney's Office I am responsible for the supervision of criminal investigations including those conducted by the Rockland County Narcotics Task Force. The Task Force is an investigative unit under the Office of the District Attorney, which is comprised of investigators and support staff from eight different police agencies. It is under the operational command of a Director, Captain Joseph Tripodo of the New York State Police. The Assistant Director is William Manti, a Supervisory Investigator of the District Attorney's Office.

I offer this explanation of our Drug Task Force to emphasize the need for and the successes garnered from inter agency cooperation. Cooperation is essential at all levels of government and it is the foundation on which the **Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center** is built.

Discussion

There are two parts of the CTAC program that Rockland County and law enforcement nationwide have benefited from: (1) the Technology Transfer Program, and (2) the Research and Development (R&D) Program.

The Technology Transfer Program (TTP) provides state and local law enforcement agencies with cutting-edge, easily integrated and maintained drug crime fighting technologies without encumbering the budgets of the applying departments. TTP has supplied Rockland County with equipment that is critical to our mission. One such piece of equipment is a digital wire tap system, Voice Box III. CTAC maintains contact with the agencies that receive equipment through training and consultation. This approach is instrumental in addressing needs and issues as they arise. Our experiences with the CTAC support we received have been outstanding.

In addition to TTP, Rockland County has been involved in Research and Development Projects through CTAC. While these projects are manpower intensive for the county, Rockland County and other agencies have benefited greatly from projects that are developed in the R&D program and then shared through TTP.

Counter-Terror and Counterdrug Capabilities from the Technology Transfer Program

In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11/01, America was faced with the often-ignored fact that our country does not have a national police force. But it does have more than 18 thousand town, city, county and state law enforcement agencies whose hundreds of thousands of officers are eager to help in the defense of our homeland. In short order, the FBI sent out an appeal to those departments for help to prevent a second wave of terrorist attacks. Today, more than 4 thousand local agencies in all 50 states have advanced technology which can help them support the surveillance and intelligence gathering work they are doing to support the FBI and defend their own jurisdictions against terrorism. They have night vision, hidden compartment detectors, digital wiretap systems, satellite-based trackers, radio interoperability systems and a host of other gear because they received it over the past 5 years to fight drug crime from CTAC's Technology Transfer Program. The systems have already figured in detecting an alien smuggling operation in New York City.

Organization and Program Background

CTAC, the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center is a small science organization inside the U.S. Government with wide responsibilities. In 1990, Congress created CTAC within the Office of National Drug Control Policy to coordinate the research and development (R&D) of all federal agencies experimenting with advanced technology to fight drug crime, and to use its own budget to initiate and fund R&D in prevention, treatment and law enforcement science. By the mid-1990's, local law enforcement was finding it more difficult to penetrate drug crime organizations. Drug distribution gangs were increasingly based on familial and village associations, making the use of undercover officers almost impossible and similarly reducing the effectiveness of other, standard methods of conspiracy investigation. It became apparent that there was a large, unmet need for advanced technological help for many of our country's more than 18,000 local and state law enforcement agencies if they are to effectively fight drug crime.

Program Development

In 1996, CTAC began a learning process, conducting state and local workshops across America, listening to the technology needs of city, county and state narcotics enforcement units and the politics of budgeting local police agencies. What emerged were three understandings that would drive new policy: (1) The technology requirements for effective drug enforcement at the local level are essentially the same as at the federal level with the main difference being a matter of scale, the relative size of the problem. A 4-man town police department might not be able to use a digital wiretap system but a singe night vision device could help turn the tables on street drug dealers operating with impunity on dark streets. (2) Budget priorities at local and state law enforcement agencies largely exclude the purchase of advanced technology to fight drug crime

even though the technologies are much needed. Even though high tech is a proven force-multiplier for fighting drug crime, local cops won't get their hands on it unless it comes from outside their own budget. (3) Previous federal attempts to provide technologies often resulted in systems being delivered but never used because no mandatory training or reporting was required. Since the local law enforcement agencies didn't have dollars for training, nobody knew how to use the equipment, which, as a result, was often never integrated into the department's regular operations.

Congress Acts

In 1998, Congress ordered CTAC to apply its understanding of the requirements of local and state law enforcement and create a Technology Transfer Program to provide advanced tactical systems and devices and the training required to use them, to narcotics units whose needs met the criteria set by CTAC. Since CTAC is not configured as a program management agency, it selected the Counterdrug Office of the US Army's Electronic Proving Ground (EPG) at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, to administer the Technology Transfer Program to support America's more than 18,000 municipal, county and state enforcement agencies.

Within months, and at remarkably low administrative cost, the Technology Transfer Program was up and running, conducting workshops around the nation to educate local and state law enforcement about the new program and helping the departments to apply for a list of fully tested technologies at the end of each workshop. Then, the website www.epgctac.com was created permitting law enforcement agencies to apply online.

Technology Transfer Program Status

Today, the program is an enormous success with a budget-induced backlog of thousands of applications. The program offers technologies that sharply increase police effectiveness and officer safety. Most were originally developed under the sponsorship of CTAC, FBI, DEA, Customs, and DOD. Many of the systems and devices CTAC transfers to state and local agencies—such as night vision and wireless interoperability—are also applicable to counter-terrorism missions of homeland security.

In addition to its response to constant feedback from Law Enforcement Agencies, a group of senior local and state law enforcement executives was recruited to serve as regional liaisons between the TTP program office and departments applying for the technologies. The Regional Experts, of which I am one, are law enforcement officials who assist in developing the catalog of items and, with technical consultants, conduct periodic follow-up to assure proper employment of the technologies, and assess the effectiveness of the technology and the potential need for additional training or equipment modifications.

Cop Friendly

State and local law enforcement agencies are often surprised at how easy it is for a qualified department to get high tech help from this program and how smoothly CTAC's turnkey method

works: Apply, Train, Receive. Everything is included, even site-specific engineering and installation of Wireless Interoperability Systems.

CTAC's Technology Transfer Program is NOT a grant program. There is NO transfer of money. Instead, state and local law enforcement agencies decide what they need and apply for the available systems and devices that meet those requirements. Applications are reviewed thoroughly but quickly and, as long as funds are available, technologies are purchased and scheduled for delivery and training. The Program's goal is to get the technologies deployed rapidly to help state and local authorities do the most damage possible to terrorists and drug criminals and to increase officer safety. Mandatory, scheduled training, which includes paid travel and partial per diem, precedes the delivery of any of the systems and devices, and there are follow-up evaluations at 90, 180, and 270 days.

The Rockland County Case: OPERATION BRICKYARD

CTAC's Technology Transfer Program gave the Rockland County NY Narcotics Task Force a user-friendly, digital wiretap system and a tracking system just like the ones used by the DEA and FBI. We needed the systems if we were going to crack the very tightly knit cocaine distribution ring run in the town of Haverstraw. Because the technology is so effective, monitoring multiple court-ordered wiretaps—usually exhausting and very manpower intensive—was simple and required only a few people. We shocked to hear these cocaine traffickers conspire to smuggle illegal aliens past security at JFK airport and into our country. Realizing that national security was being systematically breached, we immediately notified DEA, Customs and INS; all of whom joined our investigation.

On June 20th of last year, federal agents joined more than a hundred heavily armed officers from the 8 agencies that make up our Narcotics Task Force. Quietly, they hit locations all over our county and at several addresses in New York City. By the end of the day, we had rolled up the entire drug gang, but also the key players in the alien smuggling ring at JFK airport, which included a worker for a food supplier to a major airline who had security keys to the building. In addition to the 51 drug-related arrests prosecuted in Rockland County, the United States Attorney's Office of the Eastern District of New York prosecuted seven individuals for Passport Fraud and Alien Smuggling.

None of that could have happened without the powerful technologies and mandatory training we received from CTAC's Technology Transfer Program.

CTAC began its program by listening to local cops across America and then created a complete program that pays for original research and development and equips local law enforcement with knowledge as well as the right kind of hardware and software. As a result, today, when America most needs its local police to be prepared for a wide variety of investigative challenges, more than four thousand of our country's 18,000 local law enforcement agencies are technologically a lot more capable. Thanks to CTAC.

Challenges Ahead

As you are aware, the technology of the Communications industry has changed dramatically over the past decade. Those changes have severely limited the ability of law enforcement agencies to conduct investigations utilizing electronic surveillance.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has done an outstanding job of implementing the Communications Act to Assist Law Enforcement (CALEA). As a member of the Law Enforcement Executive Forum conducted by the FBI, I meet periodically with other Law Enforcement Executives to discuss the implementation of the CALEA. Through these meetings I see the challenges to law enforcement that have arisen through the implementation of CALEA and I have found that CTAC attempts to address each obstacle through research and development and by working hand in hand with vendors and law enforcement agencies.

In my opinion, the Communications Industry views Law Enforcement as a "profit center". They charge exorbitant fees to make the connections necessary to conduct court ordered electronic surveillance. Law Enforcement Agencies will work with CTAC to seek technological solutions to limit the impact of this problem, however, the exorbitant phone company charges may soon eliminate our ability to conduct electronic surveillance. That would be devastating to the safety and security of our nation.

Conclusion

CTAC is a successful, up and running federal, technology deployment program that effectively addresses the needs of state and local law enforcement and it does it well. CTAC offers a cost effective, low overhead, turnkey operation and a highly motivated management team that makes it possible for agencies like the Rockland County Narcotics Task Force to do its job effectively.

Local law enforcement is faced with new technological challenges everyday. To successfully address those developments we, at the local level, need the **Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center.**

Thank you for this opportunity to speak before you.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you both for your concise testimony. We will insert the entire statement in the record. It is important that we build on the hearing record on reauthorization, the importance of this program, and it is important to local law enforcement.

Could you each tell us how you and your agencies first learned about the Technology Transfer Program?

Chief RON BURNS. I have been with two other agencies, actually three other agencies other than Lakewood, CO, and we heard about the Technology Transfer Program primarily through our involvement with HIDTA, our involvement with DEA, and then through local and federally based task forces.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you get the impression in Colorado that it has kind of been a rolling process, that as more people get access to the technology, people ask them where they heard about it and then it is connected, or do you think it is more top-down?

Chief RON BURNS. No, I think that is the case. You know, technology is continually developing, and as new items come into use, as new technologies are discovered, you know, one agency will get them and then the word will spread.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Modafferi, could you tell us how you and your agency first learned, and then how you think others learn in the primary way? Because the difference is that had it come top-down and every department known about it, we would know kind of the finite about a demand. But if it has been kind of a trickle in, it means the demand is going to build as more people hear about it from other local departments and subdepartments.

Mr. MODAFFERI. That is an interesting question. We are very pleased with what we have received from CTAC, and we hope we continue to receive as much as it spreads out with our success.

We first heard of CTAC through a former chief investigator with the New York State Organized Crime Task Force who became an employee of CTAC. He got us involved; we have had tremendous successes, and our success has been noted by the media in the New York metropolitan area and I think has gotten people to call us and ask how you did that, where did you get that equipment from, and we have promoted CTAC.

The other way that I am promoting CTAC nationwide is through the Police Investigative Operations Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Dr. Brandenstein has appeared before the Committee and explained the program; he has stood before it and been grilled on questions, and he has been very favorably received. So people leave the different IACP functions and conferences with a better knowledge of CTAC, and I am sure that played a role in the growing demand for it.

Mr. SOUDER. What is interesting is when he came to Fort Wayne and the areas north of Fort Wayne, a fair number of people were exposed to it for the first time. Some had heard that other departments had it, and many of the departments already had applied or had gone off on their own because they had heard earlier. It is a combination, but my feeling is that it is a building demand.

Is there anything in the process that you believe could either be streamlined or improved, as we look at reauthorization, as far as from the local law enforcement standpoint as far as clarity, what it takes to go through, the amount of paperwork, clarity, or even

other types of technology that clearly would help in the anti-narcotics effort?

Chief RON BURNS. Well, actually, I asked that question of the technicians and the operational people who really were at the grassroots level developing this system, you know, were there any problems whatsoever. There were none. I mean, it was very, very smooth. The development, the testing of the equipment, the installation all went very, very smooth; I couldn't have asked for any more cooperation.

Mr. MODAFFERI. From my experience, it has been an outstanding relationship. I also sit as a technical expert, regional expert for CTAC, and I review the applications that come in from the northeast, and as word spreads of CTAC, the numbers increase, the volume of the applications, and I do find that certain departments are asking for equipment that they couldn't possibly utilize; an eight-man police department in the State of Maine will ask for a wiretap system that costs a tremendous amount of money, but they wouldn't have the personnel to conduct a wiretap.

So it is something that I have spoken to Dr. Brandenstein about and it is something that we are addressing. I think when we talk about the CTAC program, we have to make people understand where they fit into it, as opposed to they can just get all this equipment that would be great to have; but logic has to enter into this someplace, and how do you logically put that equipment to best use.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Is the research and development duplicative of the National Institute of Drug Abuse, what they do? I mean, is it the same kind of thing?

Mr. MODAFFERI. Not at all. The research and development program that we are involved in with CTAC is specifically related to conducting drug investigations to a degree that it is very specific projects that we work on, very specific equipment that couldn't be used anyplace else in the criminal justice arena but narcotics investigations. It is region-specific, it is case-specific, and hopefully it is stuff that can be used in other areas, but in other areas by people with similar needs.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You know, they say that as we develop our technology, the folks who want to skirt the technology are constantly coming up with new things to get around it. I mean, do we have that; is that a major problem?

Chief RON BURNS. Well, I would say technology is continually evolving, and, first of all, we have to adjust our enforcement and our efforts to be flexible enough to respond to that, but then the development of our technology I think continually has to be evolving. And as something is developed, something else may be developed to counteract that. So I guess the answer to that question is yes, it is continually changing but, yes, we have to continually respond to that change technologically.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Did you have something? I am sorry.

Mr. MODAFFERI. I am sorry, sir. In preparing my statement for today, I was going to go into more detail about what we have actually accomplished through CTAC, but we don't put that out in our

press releases. I would be hesitant to speak about it anywhere because we have made some tremendous, tremendous technological advances that we don't want the bad guys to know. If they knew we knew, they would change their approach, and at this point I think we are doing some things that they just don't know we can do.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, I will tell you I agree with you. I think, you know, I don't want them to know what you know either. And that is the very reason why I asked that question, because I know that when you have the amounts of money that are involved here, they can certainly get folks or find people who are probably almost, if not just, as sharp, as the people who do what you do. And so I was just wondering about that.

When I see how far technology has come just in the last few years, I mean it has been astounding. When I think that I can hold one of these little things and be able to send messages all around the world from just sitting right here, it is just astounding to me.

So I just was wondering, you know, exactly how you go about making sure that you keep up with what they may be trying to do to counter what you do. And so apparently you feel like you have been very effective, and I assume you would, like everybody else, love to see more money in the program. Is that right?

Chief RON BURNS. Absolutely. And, you know, I think we have made tremendous strides with technology. I mean, in my days working narcotics on the street, you know, I had a body bug system that hardly even worked at all, and the technology today is just tremendous, and I would like to see more support.

You know, in terms of this radio interoperability system, it has been so helpful in regional investigations and drug investigations, or counterterrorism investigations, and that is something that probably wouldn't have been thought of or we were able to do. We could not have accomplished this, you know, 5 years ago as easily, so it is just incredible the support that we have had.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you all.

Mr. SOUDER. Could you describe to me, Mr. Modafferi probably would know most here, the process of when new technologies are added? Is it a combination of something becomes available at the national level that can be offered and requests that are coming up from the local communities?

Mr. MODAFFERI. With CTAC, we have sources meetings periodically throughout the year in which we, in working with the SPAWAR people and the Fort Huachuca, who does the technical assistance for CTAC, we develop what we think should be in the program and we ask vendors what they think they have to offer the program, and we come out of these with new products that we put into the booklet that makes it available to local law enforcement.

Mr. SOUDER. One other question regarding the, in general, on this program as to how it works. You mentioned an example of Maine possibly wanting a system that they didn't have the ability to utilize. And I believe I know the answer to the question, but I want to have it in the record and understand how you measure that and are there requirements if you get this equipment you have to take X amount of training, you have to have somebody to staff it?

Mr. MODAFFERI. Yes, before any training is given out by CTAC, they have the mandatory training sessions around the country. But before it reaches that point, it goes through a series of evaluations by different CTAC staff people, up to and including myself, looking at the northeast region, and very often I will look at an application and I will say, you know, this really isn't appropriate, and I will call that police chief and talk to them about what else is available in the program that he might be able to get a better bang for our buck with, ours being the public's, it is taxpayer money.

But once it is given out, it is seriously monitored, and if they can't pass muster on the training, it is not given.

Mr. SOUDER. And, Mr. Burns, when you received your equipment and have looked at other departments in your region, as well as your own, did you see that as also a request to you about whether you will adequately staff or have maintenance abilities, those type of things?

Chief RON BURNS. Well, our staff was trained in the operation of the equipment and then effectively took over the ongoing maintenance with the help of CTAC. So we conduct our own maintenance and system upgrades and ongoing maintenance currently with our own staff, and they were trained through CTAC.

Mr. SOUDER. Do either of you have any additional things you would like to add about the strengths or weaknesses of the program? You will probably be the only witnesses to this committee and the full committee as far as what things we might want to do in the reauthorization, do you have any suggestions?

Chief RON BURNS. I would just suggest, in my perspective, from a local law enforcement agency in a metropolitan area, and that would be to continue pushing the envelope looking for new technologies, and continually offering these products to local law enforcement agencies or metropolitan task forces in terms of drug interdiction and terrorism. I think this has just been a tremendous success for us, and I don't know how we could actually operate it without it effectively.

Mr. MODAFFERI. I would like to make a point; I made it in my oral statement and my written statement. We are generalists at our level, at local law enforcement; we handle not only narcotics, but we handle everything from organized crime to terrorism. And it is important that the committee realize that at our level the equipment that is being used is used not only in drug fighting, but also in terrorism. I mentioned our case with Kennedy Airport.

And there are different things that are available through CTAC, night vision equipment, hidden compartment detectors, digital wiretap systems, satellite-based trackers, radio interoperability systems. All of those are vitally important not only to the drug arena, but also to terrorism, and I think when you get to our level, the very local level of law enforcement, CTAC has to continue acting the way it is acting in supporting local law enforcement because we do share our equipment and we do make it available.

The other thing that I mentioned in my statement is not a CTAC-related issue, but it is one very dear to my heart, and it is about the communications industry acting like we are profit centers; and I wish at someplace in Congress they would address that issue, because we may have the equipment, but with what we are

being charged by the phone companies, we may be soon unable to use it.

Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. You mean rates, basically?

Mr. MODAFFERI. Yes, the things they charge us to hook up.

Mr. SOUDER. I would like to pursue two other things here. We are getting ready to vote. I know you have both come a long way, but you heard the earlier discussions that we had on HIDTAs. Presumably both of you have seen and had interactions in that. Do either of you have anything you would like to add on the record as far as the HIDTA debates?

Chief RON BURNS. In our area, we operate a task force, a drug task force that is made up of several city agencies, county agencies, and HIDTA has been very supportive of that effort, helps fund that effort. And, in addition, from that task force we assign an officer to the local DEA office, so we work very closely with DEA. And it seems to tie the Federal enforcement with our local enforcement very nicely, and, again, HIDTA has been very cooperative and very supportive in funding our task force, our local task force.

So I guess I am not talking about just one singular agency, but a multitude of agencies working a larger geographic area, and it has worked out very well.

Mr. MODAFFERI. I am in the New York metropolitan area, and we are very involved with the New York HIDTA. The New York HIDTA, over the years, has been tremendously successful, and especially since September 11. We have, in Rockland County, in Westchester County, we have set up our own regional intelligence centers that are separate and distinct from the main HIDTA center in downtown Manhattan. The New York State Police are now setting up a regional intelligence center in Upstate New York. And without New York HIDTA, we wouldn't be able to have the investigative support that we have in the New York metropolitan area and throughout New York State, so it has been a tremendous success.

And I have heard about the changes that are being considered, but I would hope that, especially in an area like New York, it would remain pretty much the way it is going.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, they have called a vote. I guarantee this will be my last question.

In particular, Mr. Modafferi, I wanted you to see if you have any thoughts on this. It is somewhat related to the topic at hand today, but they have done such a good job at ONDCP in implementing this program that one of the questions are is in the Department of Homeland Security should we have a similar type of an outreach? You have raised the question of multi-use of the equipment; in other words, I don't want to see this program changed because it enables us to particularly have things that are of particular use in narcotics, and to somewhat not lose focus by blending and having Homeland Security squash the narcotics effort in this area as well because it is like a 1,000 pound gorilla versus a 100 pound gorilla in terms of Washington spending right now.

On the other hand, were we to set up some kind of a program, clearly a lot of the equipment would be similar, because, just like you said, you clearly, in the smuggling ring, I thought you had a

great comment in your testimony about with just family connections it is very hard to use undercover agents, and you need the technology. That would be true of terrorism and homeland security type systems as well.

And I just wondered if you had any thoughts of if we set up a similar type system for local responders, how we would deal with the overlaps.

Mr. MODAFFERI. First off, I don't think you should set up something similar. That is my opinion. I think you should just go with what works.

Mr. SOUDER. Let me tell you what is somewhat behind it. I and others are seeing potentially, and this is heresy in some corners, a potential humongous pork barrel project here in homeland security, where everybody is coming to us for all kinds of stuff, and we are going to repeat what you said about Maine 1,000 times over. People are going to get equipment that they don't know how to use, they haven't gone through training, and unless we have some kind of an orderly method to distribute the responder equipment, we are going to drown in dollars that are ineffectively used, then the criticism is going to come back you wasted all this money in homeland security, you diverted anti-drug resources, other crime resources into homeland security, and you didn't know your head from a hole in the ground.

That is what is kind of behind how do we control the technology, much like what you have done such a good job of in narcotics.

Mr. MODAFFERI. Well, I think Chief Burns would agree with me, that the panel before us was comprised of major cities and large States. We are from the local level and we do work together and we are very generalists. I think the CTAC program has been very effective. I don't know how you are going to work this out, because the equipment has to get out there, but you should at least replicate CTAC's approach.

But you have to realize that when you are supplying equipment to the local level, it is incumbent upon us to work together. Our drug task force is co-located in the same building as our intelligence unit. If the drug people arrest somebody who knows something about terrorism or murders or something, they tell the intelligence unit and it gets out. So when you do replicate this thing, you really have to have regional experts that are considering that an eight-man police department really doesn't need that, or the 40,000-man New York City Police Department needs 12 of these. You know, it basically comes down to local level to common sense, and I don't think that a big bureaucratic shuffle in Washington can address it as effectively as CTAC has.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.

Do you have anything to add, Mr. Burns, to that?

Chief RON BURNS. I was just going to say why reinvent the wheel when there is a mechanism already in place. Very effective.

Mr. SOUDER. A smile came to my face, it is because the scale of the way we do things in Washington, and as a practical matter, we would certainly try to replicate the process, but you have to be very careful you are not swallowed up by a huge department that is big right now.

But I definitely agree if a process is working, that is the process we ought to look at replicating, how you get this local community input into making that kind of decision, particularly as it gets to smaller counties, because unlike a statement was made in homeland security and everybody seems to be uniting, we are watching the counties and the cities fight over every dollar right now, and we are actually seeing more turf battles right now in homeland security than we are seeing in narcotics, and it is really scary because the money is so huge; it is much like the way government works. If we say narcotics is the big issue, everybody repositions their departments around narcotics; if we say it is missing children, we reposition around missing children; if it is homeland security, we reposition all the grant requests around that.

And we really need to both watch to make sure that your efforts in the drug enforcement areas are still there and, at the same time, that we are as efficient in these new departments.

So thank you very much for your testimony. Thanks for coming a long distance for the hearing today.

And with that, the subcommittee hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

Questions for the Record
"ONDCP Reauthorization hearing: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) and Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC)", Mr. Scott Burns testifying House Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources.
April 8, 2003

Questions from Chairman Souder

HIDTA Issues

1. Question

Some officials have expressed concern that an exclusive emphasis on Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOT) in determining funding and activities for the HIDTAs will discourage state and local agency participation. How do you respond to this criticism?

Answer:

We are aware of this concern. Currently, approximately 80% of all HIDTA funds are allocated to state and local agencies to address regional concerns. The Consolidated Priority Targeting (CPOT) has been integrated within the national HIDTA priority targeting project to focus resources on the most dangerous drug trafficking organizations that impact our Nation. This is a very important project as it brings HIDTA's significant Federal, State, local and intelligence resources to bear in the investigation of these organizations. The project provides funds to HIDTA initiatives that are primarily conducting investigations *of organizations that are linked to the CPOT targets.* Because the initiatives that receive CPOT funds are required to maintain a collocated mix of Federal, State and local officers and will continue to conduct regional investigations, we do not think that state and local participation will be significantly impacted.

2. Question

What do you believe is the ideal relationship between HIDTA and OCDETF? What Should HIDTA be doing that OCDETF does not do, and vice versa? In other words, what should be the primary difference between these two programs?

Answer:

Both the HIDTA program and OCDETF are being refocused to pursue the highest value targets in their respective areas. Having said that, there are differences of approach. As you are aware, HIDTA funds initiatives (bringing together State, local and Federal agencies to attack a specific problem in a specific area that results in many cases being filed in a particular HIDTA area) and intelligence architecture and infrastructure; OCDETF funds cases (Federal resources are dedicated to a specific case and a specific target on a case by case basis). While the programs are similar in mission (identify and remove those committing narcotics offenses),

HIDTA simply provides the infrastructure for law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to come together and continuously work numerous cases--usually resulting in hundreds of arrests and convictions as a result of the Initiative--and OCDETF targets a specific person or specific organization—usually resulting in the prosecution of a specific target.

3. Question:

The number of HIDTAs, and the number of counties included in HIDTAs, have increased significantly since the program's inception. At present, many areas that cannot seriously be called "high intensity drug trafficking areas" are now included within designated HIDTAs.

a) Are there areas that should be removed from participation in the program?

Answer:

The drug threat in the United States is in constant flux. If the threat situation in a designated area changes and the area no longer meets statutory criteria, the area should be removed from the program. However, due to restrictions in annual appropriations language, this has not been possible.

b) Should the majority of the program's budget be dedicated to the most significant HIDTAs, with the rest divided among lower intensity areas?

Answer:

Yes. The HIDTA program should drive the majority of the money to where the greatest threat exists. For example, Nevada receives $1.4 million, the Southwest Border receives $49 million. In the initial allocation of FY 2003 funds, over 23% of the dollars went to the Southwest Border.

c) Do you believe that the 4 criteria defined by Congress for designating a HIDTA need to be revisited? Are they too vague to ensure that only the most significant drug trafficking areas are included in the program?

Answer:

The criteria are appropriate.

4. Question:

In your testimony, you stated that ONDCP plans to use its new PMEs to determine the size of each HIDTA's budget, by rewarding the high-performing HIDTAs. What new statutory tools do you need to ensure this is possible - since in recent appropriations bills Congress has locked in each HIDTA's budget at the previous year's level?

Answer:

Level funding promotes mediocrity, and the requirement of level funding should be revised. The Director of ONDCP has sufficient statutory authorization to implement this system. Therefore no additional statutory authority is being sought. Counties (or even an entire HIDTA) should be removed from the HIDTA program if the threat no longer meets the criteria. Likewise, the funding of a HIDTA should be subject to review and modification if it is failing to perform. PMEs should be one of the factors used to decide the size of a HIDTA's budget. However, annual appropriations language restrictions, if continued, would make implementation difficult.

5. Question:

What plans does ONDCP have to improve coordination and communication between all of the HIDTAs throughout the country? Do you believe a regional strategy would be effective for HIDTA?

Answer:

All HIDTAs are now connected via the Regional Information Sharing System Program's "RISS.net" network. The next step in this process is to connect all task forces and initiatives within each HIDTA. This nationwide intelligence system will promote the sharing of law enforcement information nationally, among Federal, State and local LEAs. This system will greatly enhance regional and national collaboration among LEAs.

We are also in the planning stages of expanding Operation COBIJA (a successful Southwest Border oriented interdiction and information sharing operation) to a national level. The HIDTA Program currently uses regional strategies to target threats and focus resources. Each HIDTA prepares and submits an annual strategy. Greater sharing of these strategies and focus should create more synergy within the National HIDTA program.

CTAC Issues

6. Question:

The Technology Transfer Program (TTP) is so popular that there apparently is such a significant backlog in applications that next year's appropriations will be spent as soon as they are approved. Would additional spending authorization be beneficial, and if so at what level?

Answer:

Currently CTAC has 1,915 requests for equipment that it is unable to meet. At the end of FY 2003 it is likely that number will be even greater. The technology needs of State and local law enforcement are substantial and have been exacerbated by recent budget difficulties and increased requirements for Homeland Security. However, it would be unrealistic to look to ONDCP's technology transfer program in a futile effort to make a significant dent in that need. The program was never intended to provide every local LEA with identical technology.

Rather than authorizing additional funding that would not significantly affect that aggregate unmet technology need, we should instead improve how we use the funds we currently receive. For example, we could prioritize requests so that we provide technology to places where it can make the biggest impact. We could also consider giving priority to requests from law enforcement agencies according to their financial need, a combination of the size of the agency budget and the ability of the jurisdiction to provide more support. We could increase the targeting of federal drug control funds by giving priority to LEAs that are part of HIDTAs or are engaged in investigations related to the major drug trafficking organizations. We could also require recipients to pay for some or all of the acquisition cost for the hardware and continue to provide the training free of charge.

In conjunction with OMB, we are presently conducting an in-depth review of the CTAC program. The approaches mentioned above will be among those discussed. We welcome your suggestions for improving the operation of the TTP.

7. Question:

With respect to the Technology Transfer Program (TTP), does ONDCP keep track of what impact transferred technology is having for each recipient? How does ONDCP measure how effective the TTP program is? How does it determine whether the technology has been put to good use?

Answer:

Recipient agencies submit written evaluations of the effectiveness of the equipment and the program at 90-, 180-, and 270-day intervals after equipment receipt. The evaluations include data on the impact of the technology on their daily operations. Evaluation forms request specific objective and quantifiable data regarding results achieved with use of TTP equipment, including data as to the number of cases in which the equipment was employed and details of specific operational experience with the technology. For example during FY2002, recipient agencies reported more than 1,700 arrests, 1,141 indictments and 727 convictions attributable to the assistance of TTP equipment. In addition, recipients provide subjective comments as to the

utility of TTP technologies. These subjective comments provide a vital feedback loop for insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the TTP.

The TTP enjoys support from active-duty, nationally recognized, senior police chiefs and sheriffs who serve as regional law enforcement experts for each of 10 TTP regions across the country. Each TTP regional expert provides a subjective judgement as to whether the technologies requested will improve the operational capabilities of the requesting department or organization, the organization has the requisite infrastructure to integrate the technology into its daily operations, and whether the equipment is too complex for the organization.

TTP evaluations submitted to date indicate that the technologies offered are readily integrated into the operations of state and local agencies. Recipient agencies confirm that TTP equipment improves counterdrug operations. In general, following receipt of TTP equipment, agencies report an increase in drug-related arrests and seizures and a dramatic improvement in officer safety.

Questions from Congresswoman Blackburn

1. **Question:**

What is the total budget of the HIDTA program, and the budget of each individual HIDTA?

Answer:

See attached spreadsheet.

2. **Question:**

What percent of the HIDTA program budget is spent on administrative costs?

Answer:

The FY 2003 costs for administration are 11 percent; this is a reduction of 1 percentage point from FY 2002.

3. **Question:**

What percent of the HIDTA program budget is spent on actual operations?

Answer:

A total of 89 percent of the HIDTA budget supports operations.

4. **Question:**

What are the outcomes and benchmarks for the programs funded by HIDTA?

Answer:

A new Performance Management System for the HIDTA Program will be implemented in 2003. Using this system, each of the HIDTAs' impact on their respective threats will be measured, ultimately determining the impact the HIDTA is having on its region. The new system will provide both regional and national program managers with the information required to focus the HIDTA Program more effectively in support the National Drug Control Strategy.

The Program at large focuses Federal resources on those areas of the US that experience the most critical illicit drug trafficking problems and associated crime and violence. In doing so, it provides Federal, State and local law enforcement with funding and a framework with which to work together, sharing information, resources and eliminating

duplication, thus operating more effectively to impact local/regional and national counterdrug issues.

5. Question:

How does ONDCP rank HIDTA-funded programs in terms of priority and importance?

Answer:

Baseline funding in the HIDTA Program has and continues to be regulated by annual appropriations language. Level-funding regulations tend to become a disincentive to performance.

Discretionary HIDTA funding, however, has been largely focused, through the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Consolidated Priority Organizational Target (CPOT) Project, on HIDTA initiatives targeting high-value investigations having linkages to the drug trafficking organizations identified by DOJ as being most notorious and having the largest market share of the illicit drug market.

6. Question:

What measurable data do you use to establish that ranking system?

Answer:

The new Performance Management System for the HIDTA Program will use data that measures the impact of the HIDTAs on their regional threats. Primarily the following areas will be measured:

- Reductions in drug-related crime and violence
- Reduced drug availability

ONDCP will work with the HIDTAs to identify data sources to assist in their measurements of the areas listed above.

FISCAL YEAR 2003
HIDTA ALLOCATION

HIDTA	FY 2002 ALLOCATION	FY 2003 ALLOCATION
Appalachia	$6,022,000	$6,022,000
Atlanta	$3,847,044	$3,847,044
Central Florida	$2,522,000	$2,522,000
Central Valley California	$2,500,000	$2,500,000
Chicago	$5,404,726	$5,404,726
Gulf Coast	$6,650,500	$6,650,500
Hawaii	$2,500,000	$2,500,000
Houston	$9,627,780	$9,627,780
Lake County	$3,022,000	$3,022,000
Los Angeles	$14,057,115	$14,057,115
Midwest	$12,516,550	$12,516,550
Milwaukee	$4,650,500	$4,650,500
Nevada	$1,400,000	$1,400,000
New England	$2,847,636	$2,847,636
New York/New Jersey	$11,624,441	$11,624,441
North Florida	$1,400,000	$1,400,000
North Texas	$2,572,000	$2,572,000
Northern California	$2,697,000	$2,697,000
Northwest	$4,022,000	$4,022,000
Ohio	$2,500,000	$2,500,000
Oregon	$2,500,000	$2,500,000
Philadelphia/Camden	$3,908,343	$3,908,343
Puerto Rico/U.S. Virgin Islands	$9,084,494	$9,084,494
Rocky Mountain	$8,689,625	$8,689,625
Southeast Michigan	$3,000,000	$3,000,000
South Florida	$12,200,854	$12,200,854
Southwest Border	$46,957,447	$46,957,447
Washington/Baltimore	$12,550,500	$12,550,500
National HIDTA Assistance Center*	$2,975,105	$2,975,105
Auditing Services	$2,041,000	$2,086,350
Discretionary Funds	$20,000,340	$18,542,715
TOTAL	$226,291,000	$224,878,725

*Funded through the South Florida HIDTA

03/15/2003

Statement for the Record
Mitchell S. Daniels
Director, Office of Management and Budget
U.S. House Government Reform Committee
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources

The Office of Management and Budget's Review of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program

It is my pleasure to submit the Office of Management and Budget's statement describing our review of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program. This Statement first places the HIDTA review in the broader context of our Government-wide assessment of Federal programs and then summarizes the results of our HIDTA review.

Budget and Performance Integration

OMB's review of the HIDTA program was conducted to further the Budget and Performance Integration initiative of the President's Management Agenda, which is intended to reform how government is managed and to improve the performance the federal programs. The agenda includes five government-wide initiatives and nine program-specific initiatives. The five government-wide initiatives represent longstanding management challenges for the federal government. The Budget and Performance Integration initiative enhances the quality of information on program results so that government can make better decisions about its allocation of resources.

The Administration's efforts to link budget and performance began last year with the formulation of FY 2003 budget. This year that link was formalized. A new instrument for assessing government programs in an objective and transparent manner, called the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), was used to evaluate a program's overall effectiveness by reviewing its: purpose and design; strategic planning; management; and results and accountability.

What Is the PART?

The PART is an accountability tool that attempts to determine the strengths, weaknesses and results of individual federal programs. Its overall purpose is to lay the groundwork for evidence-based funding decisions. It places the burden of proving effectiveness squarely on the shoulders of Federal program managers.[1]

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[1] More detailed information regarding guidance, content and results of PART reviews, is contained in the Performance and Management Assessments Volume of the Budget, and is available on the OMB website at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ombudget/fy2004/.

The Administration reviewed 234 diverse federal programs, representing about 20 percent of all federal funding. The 234 programs were selected to provide a representative sample of government programs and to use as a test the flexibility of the PART. The programs chosen varied by type (such as regulatory, grants, or direct assistance), as well as size. To test how well the PART would confirm expectations, some programs generally considered effective (such as the National Weather Service) were included, as well as some widely criticized as less effective, (such as compliance with the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)). Finally, several items of great interest to the President or the Congress were selected, such as programs scheduled for reauthorization this year.

This assessment process confirmed many longstanding suspicions. Federal programs have inadequate measures to judge their performance. More than one-half of the programs analyzed received a rating of Results Not Demonstrated because of the lack of performance measures and/or performance data. The vast majority of programs have measures that emphasize inputs (such as the number of brochures printed) rather than outcomes or results. The distribution of PART assessments is shown below.



The Program Assessment Rating Tool is not perfect. We have identified a number of shortcomings that will need to be addressed. For example, we need to improve the definition of "adequate" performance measures and to increase the consistency of staff interpretations of agency answers. The application of the PART also highlighted some performance measurement challenges common to law enforcement. In particular, we need better outcome measures for these programs, including the HIDTA program, and we have not solved the problem of recognizing the real but elusive deterrent effect of law enforcement. Nonetheless, the PART is an important next step in changing the way federal managers think about their responsibilities. With further improvement and use, it will provide incentives for federal managers to make their programs more effective. It will provide meaningful evidence to the Congress and other decision-makers to help inform funding decisions, and identify flaws in underlying statutes that undermine effectiveness.

The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program

The statute establishing the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program authorizes federal assistance to areas of the United States that meet four criteria:

1. the area is a center of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution;
2. State and local law enforcement agencies have committed resources to respond to the drug trafficking problem in the area, thereby indicating a determination to respond aggressively to the problem;
3. drug-related activities in the area are having a harmful impact in other areas of the country; and
4. a significant increase in allocation of Federal resources is necessary to respond - adequately to drug-related activities in the area.

The five original HIDTAs, designated in 1990, included the main points of entry for illegal drugs into the United States. Subsequently, HIDTA designations have proliferated. Since 1995, twenty-three additional HIDTAs have been designated, an average of almost three a year. Moreover, many existing HIDTAs have been expanded since initial designation. Today, there are 28 HIDTAs located in 43 States and approximately 330 Congressional Districts. The Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates that HIDTAs include more than 13 percent of all counties in the United States and more than 60 percent of the U.S. population. While it is undeniable that there is some level of drug problem in all areas designated as HIDTAs, it seems a dubious proposition that all are centers of illegal drug activity that have harmful effects on other parts of the country.

The tremendous growth of the HIDTA programs has meant that scarce HIDTA funds are diverted from real centers of illegal drug trafficking that significantly affect other parts of the country to other areas that have less strategic importance for our efforts to reduce drug trafficking. For example, the initial five HIDTAs were initially funded at an average of more than $16 million each in 1993. Today, the 28 HIDTAs receive an average of $8 million each.

OMB's Review of the HIDTA Program

OMB's review was conducted in close collaboration with staff from the Office of National Drug Control Policy. The process of completing the evaluation revealed differences of opinion. Nonetheless, it generated constructive dialogue about the program's strengths and weaknesses, as well as the importance of demonstrating program results. In the end, the assessment was a consensus document of the two Offices.

The assessment concluded that the HIDTA program, like about one-half of the 234 programs reviewed, had not demonstrated results and that new performance measures were needed. The specific findings included:

The HIDTA program has not established satisfactory long-term performance goals or annual goals. Variants of three goals had been put forward by ONDCP since the mid-1990s. However, one was a composite of several process goals (e.g., "establishing sound fiscal/programmatic management"), a second ("disruption of drug trafficking organizations") had been discarded by ONDCP as not useful as defined, and data reflecting progress toward the third goal ("reduction in drug-related crime") had not been systematically collected and analyzed. This weakness has been noted by the Congress, most recently in the following language from the Managers' Statement for the FY 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act: "The conferees remained concerned by ONDCP's lack of progress in developing performance measures of effectiveness (PMEs) for the HIDTA program."

The HIDTA program had not been subjected to an independent comprehensive evaluation of its performance. Although the HIDTA National Office annually reviews Budget and planning documents submitted by each HIDTA and undertakes in-depth on-site reviews of individual HIDTAs annually, there has not been a systematic evaluation of the program's performance. Such evaluations are necessary to ensure program planning is informed by non-biased evaluations of a sufficient scope to inform program improvements and influence program planning.

The HIDTA program appears to have lost focus. The magnitude of the program's expansion, particularly absent an independent comprehensive evaluation, shows a disregard for the clear intent of the statute, i.e., to focus on the areas of the Nation where major drug production, manufacturing, importation, transportation or distribution flourish to such a degree that they have harmful effects on other parts of the country. This expansion during the 1990s was driven by two factors: (1) ONDCP did not ensure that each of the four criteria for designation as a HIDTA was met; and (2) Congressional requests and requirements, through the appropriations process, for designations of HIDTAs in their States and Districts and for earmarked funding for existing HIDTAs.

In response to these findings, the review recommended:

- implementation of a performance measurement system that includes solid program outcome goals;
- development of a process to ensure funding for individual HIDTAs reflects the performance of that HIDTA; and
- seeking no funding increases for the program until the first recommendations are implemented and the resulting data can be evaluated.

Current Status

As a first step to refocusing the HIDTA program, ONDCP is rewarding HIDTAs that develop initiatives aimed at higher-level, higher impact targets. ONDCP is undertaking a

pilot project that provides additional funds to HIDTAs that pursue high level drug trafficking organizations identified on the Department of Justice's Consolidated Priority Organizational Target (CPOT) list.

In addition, ONDCP has begun implementing a Performance Management System that will hold HIDTAs accountable for performance against their self-described drug threats. This new System, combined with expanded program oversight by ONDCP, is intended to ensure that HIDTA resources are being used effectively, but will also enable ONDCP to meet the Congressional requirement for reallocating funding among existing HIDTAs based on performance.

Ultimately, however, more significant measures are needed. To ensure the HIDTA program is targeted to the most critical areas of the United States, ONDCP will also begin reviewing designations of existing HIDTAs based on threat assessments submitted by the HIDTAs and supplemented by other relevant information.

TESTIMONY SUBMITTED BY
THE REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEMS (RISS) PROGRAM

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY
AND HUMAN RESOURCES
OF THE
GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE

SUBMITTED BY
GERARD P. LYNCH, ESQ., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
MIDDLE ATLANTIC-GREAT LAKES ORGANIZED CRIME
LAW ENFORCEMENT NETWORK
ON BEHALF OF
THE REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEMS (RISS) PROGRAM

The Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Program recognizes the HIDTA Program, which is authorized by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, as a crucial national law enforcement resource through its provision of federal funds to help reduce drug trafficking as well as its deployment and support of specific initiatives to reduce or eliminate illegal drugs. Many of the hundreds of participating law enforcement agencies of the HIDTA Program are also members of their respective regional RISS Intelligence Center.

During 2000, RISS entered into a formal partnership with the HIDTA Program to connect the HIDTA Intelligence (Investigative Support) Centers to riss.net (the RISS secure intranet). The RISS Intelligence Centers collectively provide secure information sharing and communication network services to their local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement member agencies through the operation of the secure Web-based nationwide network known as riss.net. RISS users logon riss.net to use secure e-mail and retrieve timely computerized intelligence information from RISS databases, RISS investigative leads bulletin board, other online RISS resources, and other agency databases/systems connected to riss.net.

RISS electronically links other systems to riss.net as nodes to integrate and expand secure information sharing capabilities nationwide, such as the Southwest Border States Anti-Drug Information System (SWBSADIS), RISS/LEO, and other federal and state agency intelligence systems. RISS provides this node connectivity to the HIDTAs for access to riss.net as their secure information technology communications backbone between the various HIDTA Intelligence Centers. The HIDTAs call this electronic connectivity capability hidta.net. However, hidta.net is in fact riss.net operated by RISS. All HIDTA secure electronic messages among their users and between the HIDTA Intelligence Centers travel on the RISS network. HIDTA prefers to use the term hidta.net so their users will know the messages are coming from other HIDTA personnel. RISS

officials agreed to the "hidta.net branding" of their messages traversing the RISS network.

Connecting the HIDTAs and other agency systems to riss.net avoids duplication of effort and costs associated with implementing and maintaining the necessary secure intranet technology infrastructure that otherwise would be required by each system individually.

RISS and HIDTA have an excellent partnership that benefits law enforcement member agencies across the country in sharing information on drug trafficking and other initiatives. Currently, 15 HIDTA Intelligence Centers are connected to riss.net as nodes with two additional HIDTA centers pending connection. The HIDTAs anticipate connecting all HIDTA Intelligence Centers to riss.net as funding permits.

We are grateful for the opportunity to provide the committee with this testimony and appreciate the support this committee has continuously provided to the RISS Program.

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