

**'NOTICE' PROVISION IN THE
PIGFORD V. GLICKMAN CONSENT DECREE**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

NOVEMBER 18, 2004

Serial No. 117

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.house.gov/judiciary>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

97-230 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2005

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, *Chairman*

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois	JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina	HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas	RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California	JERROLD NADLER, New York
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia	ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio	MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee	ZOE LOFGREN, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah	SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama	MAXINE WATERS, California
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana	MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin	WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
RIC KELLER, Florida	ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania	TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona	ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana	ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia	LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
STEVE KING, Iowa	
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas	
TOM FEENEY, Florida	
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee	

PHILIP G. KIKO, *Chief of Staff-General Counsel*
PERRY H. APELBAUM, *Minority Chief Counsel*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, *Chairman*

STEVE KING, Iowa	JERROLD NADLER, New York
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee	JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama	ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana	MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania	ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
TOM FEENEY, Florida	
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia	

PAUL B. TAYLOR, *Chief Counsel*
E. STEWART JEFFRIES, *Counsel*
HILARY FUNK, *Counsel*
MINDY BARRY, *Full Committee Counsel*
DAVID LACHMANN, *Minority Professional Staff Member*

CONTENTS

NOVEMBER 18, 2004

OPENING STATEMENT

	Page
The Honorable Steve Chabot, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution	1
The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia	2
The Honorable Spencer Bachus, a Representative in Congress from the State of Alabama	4
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan	5

WITNESSES

Mr. J.L. Chestnut, Jr., Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway & Campbell, L.L.C., Class Counsel, <i>Pigford v. Glickman</i> Oral Testimony	8
Ms. Jeanne C. Finegan, APR, Consultant to Poorman-Douglas Corporation (Court-Appointed Facilitator, <i>Pigford v. Glickman</i>) for Communications and Public Relations, and formerly Vice-President and Director of Huntington Legal Advertising, a division of Poorman-Douglas Corporation Oral Testimony	9
Prepared Statement	11
Mr. Thomas Burrell, Farmer Oral Testimony	175
Prepared Statement	177
Ms. Bernice Atchison, Farmer Oral Testimony	205
Prepared Statement	207

APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Steve Chabot, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution	275
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia	276
Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan	277
Prepared Statement of Gary Grant, President, Black Farmers & Agriculturalists Association	279
Prepared Statement of Obie L. Beal	282
BFAA News Articles submitted by Chairman Chabot	288
Prepared Statement of Lawrence Lucas, U.S. Department of Agriculture Coalition of Minority Employees	295

**‘NOTICE’ PROVISION IN THE
PIGFORD V. GLICKMAN CONSENT DECREE**

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (Chair of the Subcommittee) Presiding.

Mr. CHABOT. The Committee will come to order. This is the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution. I am Steve Chabot, the Chairman of the Subcommittee. Good morning. Thank you all for being here for this very important meeting.

This is the second in a series of hearings the Constitution Subcommittee is holding on the 1999 settlement reached between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and a class of black farmers who have experienced discrimination by the USDA.

From the time this Subcommittee began examining this issue, we have had more reasons than not to believe that the Government has failed to do the right thing. I strongly believe, however, that with all of the information we are gathering in our oversight investigation, including through these hearings, we will have the understanding from which to develop a full and just solution.

I would like to thank our witnesses for coming. Your insights, expertise and institutional knowledge are critical to the Subcommittee in its efforts to find justice.

During the last hearing, my colleagues and I used our oversight authority to get a better understanding of the Consent Decree. However, as we continue to examine more closely certain aspects of the settlement and its administration, it has become increasingly apparent that certain due process protections fundamental to the Constitution may be lacking in this case.

Due process of law is the legal concept that the framers of our Constitution created to ensure that the Government respects all, not some or even most, of an individual's right to life, liberty, and property. The due process clause places limits on the Government's ability to deprive citizens of these rights, guaranteeing fundamental fairness to all individuals.

One of the most important safeguards that has evolved from this clause is the right to notice, notice of a judicial proceeding in which an individual's right to life, liberty, and property may be affected or eliminated altogether. The form of notice must be reasonably designed to ensure that those individuals will, in fact, be notified of

the proceedings. This fundamental right to notice applies to the 1999 *Pigford* Consent Decree and all those who had a viable claim of discrimination which impacted their lives, liberty, and property against the Department of Agriculture.

Tragically, recent statistics released on the Consent Decree suggest to this Subcommittee that this constitutional right was not safeguarded in the construction and administration of the Consent Decree. Although the notice campaign designed was deemed to be effective by the court in a fairness hearing held on April 14, 1999, the determination was made using advertising industry tools designed to measure the likely effectiveness of a campaign, not the actual effectiveness of a campaign. Reports indicate that approximately 66,000 potential class members submitted their claims late, most because they did not know that they were required to submit a claim sooner, thus losing their right to sue the USDA for past wrongs.

It is hard for many of us to accept that 66,000 farmers would consciously wait to file a claim that would impact their right to life, liberty, and property, knowing that they were required to do so earlier. Further investigation into the circumstances surrounding the late claims reveals that many farmers failed to get any notice whatsoever or failed to understand the contents of the notice if they did receive the notice. These facts lead this Subcommittee to conclude that the notice implemented in the *Pigford* case was either ineffective or defective as nearly two-thirds of the putative class failed to be effectively notified of the case requirements.

The hearing this morning will focus on the actual effectiveness of the notice campaign. As we learn more about this aspect of the Consent Decree, we will consider the appropriate remedy to protect the safeguards afforded by the Constitution and uphold Abraham Lincoln's vision that every black American who wants to farm has the tools available to do so.

I would like to close by putting a personal face on what Lincoln's vision means to people who have been impacted by the USDA's action. This promise is still valued today, as this quote explains, and I quote: "I have worked all my life being a servant to God and his people in Chilton County, Alabama. My forefathers were brought here to farm and the gift of loving the land has passed down for more than 10 decades. I am proud of the heritage in spite of the adversity," unquote. This is the sentiment of Bernice Atchison, one of the witnesses at today's hearing.

It is for Bernice and all of those who still have faith in the promises of this country that we are here today working toward finding a solution.

Thanks to all of the witnesses for taking the time to tell their story and thank you all for attending this hearing. Many of you have come from far away at considerable expense and circumstances, and we appreciate your being here.

And I would recognize the gentleman from Virginia, the Ranking Member, at least this morning, for the purpose of making an opening statement. Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Jerry Nadler of New York, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, asked me to express his regret that he is not

able to be here and asked me to serve as Ranking Member today instead. As you know, the Clinton Library is opening today, and we had scheduled this not knowing that. And frankly many of us didn't want to upset the scheduling of this meeting and try for another date since we wanted to keep this date. But several of the Members for that reason are not here.

Mr. Nadler strongly supports the efforts of this Subcommittee to examine the issues surrounding the *Pigford* settlement and is instrumental in helping to develop these hearings.

I would like to take the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to express my appreciation for the leadership that you have shown in seeking answers and solutions to the questions and problems that have come to light regarding the settlement, and for the time and attention you and your staff are devoting to pursuing these issues. And I express my appreciation for the open, bipartisan and productive manner in which you, Chairman Sensenbrenner, Agriculture Committee Chairman Goodlatte and your staffs have proceeded to work with us.

Full Committee Ranking Member Mr. Conyers, Mr. Watt, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Towns, Mr. Butterfield, Sanford Bishop, Artur Davis and their staffs have also been an integral part in the development of these hearings and the issues that we're exploring, as well as working closely with black farmers and their advocates.

This hearing is about the notice provision of the *Pigford* settlement. The information we have found reveals that some 96,000 claims were filed, but only 22,000 of these were or are slated to be considered on the merits. The primary reason for not considering the remaining claims on the merits is they were not submitted during the initial period set by the court for the filing of claims, which ended October 12, 1999, 6 months after the settlement was entered into. By that time, approximately 22,000 claims had been filed.

Upon realizing the claims were still pouring in beyond the initial deadline, the court set a deadline for accepting late claims. This was first set for January 30, 2000, but with claims still coming in, the court extended it to October 15, 2000. Some 66,000 additional claims were filed by the October 15 deadline and another 7,800 after that deadline. Of the 66,000, only 2,100, approximately 3 percent, were accepted for determination on their merits.

While the merits of all of the 2,100 late claims accepted have not been determined, some have; and according to the reports of the court-appointed Monitor of the settlement, a significant number of those considered were found to warrant payment under the settlement agreement.

A large part of the problem of the settlement appears to have been that no one realized that there was the potential for so many claims to be filed. Early estimates said the potential ranged from a few hundred to eventually a few thousand. It does not seem reasonable to believe that the court would twice extend the filing deadline for filing claims simply to tell virtually all of the late filers that they had filed too late. Nor does it appear reasonable to the court that anyone would have knowingly designed a claims procedure that would leave 75 percent of those who filed a claim without any way to get a determination on the merits.

It certainly does not seem reasonable to conclude that 75 percent of those who filed a claim knew before the deadline that they could but intentionally waited to file their claim late. With the vast majority of claims being filed after the deadline had passed, my inclination is to think that effective notice did not reach most claimants in a manner that allowed them to file their claims on a timely basis.

The court in trying to accommodate the situation gave the Arbitrator carte blanche authority to determine whether or not late claims should be let in due to extraordinary circumstances. Unfortunately, the Arbitrator established a process that resulted in virtually no one being able to show that they did not file due to extraordinary circumstances. Rather than applying the standard so narrowly as to leave 97 percent of the late filers out of the process, the Arbitrator might well have considered it to be an extraordinary circumstance that 75 percent of the claims filed in a class action settlement will not receive consideration on the merits.

There are, no doubt, a number of explanations and speculations for how we ended up with such a large percentage of the claims being filed beyond the court's initial filing deadline, and we will likely hear some of them today. Yet whatever the reasoning, I find it unacceptable that 75 percent of those who filed claims will not receive a determination on the merits of their claim. However we got here, we have a finite number of approximately 72,000 claims in which long-standing, atrocious misconduct by Federal Government officials is alleged; and I believe that these claims should receive a determination on their merits.

Not all of the claims will be found to be meritorious, but it would be a travesty of justice on top of a travesty of justice to prevent those claims that do have merit not to be resolved in favor of those claimants.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I would think—I want to thank you for scheduling the hearing. And I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses for any suggestions they may have, not to cast blame, but to ensure that justice is done to the victims of inexcusable Government action.

Mr. CHABOT. Do any Members of the panel wish to make opening statements. Mr. Bachus?

Mr. BACHUS. I thank the Chairman.

I want to go back to 1984. This same Subcommittee had a hearing in 1984, and I think it is important when we consider whether these people that did not file on time, whether or not we allow them to have their claims heard on the merits; and that is what this Subcommittee found back then, and that was 20 years ago.

It examined the very issues that led to the *Pigford* settlement, and what it found was that there was pervasive racial discrimination in the USDA's operations of its loan programs. Not only did the court find that much later, but as far back as 1984 this Subcommittee came to that conclusion. In addition, it found that there was an ineffective and often nonexistent civil rights complaint process within the USDA. Moreover, the hearing found that there was a complete and irreparable harm experienced by many black farmers by the illegal, racially discriminatory practices used by USDA.

I think that alone, the fact that this Congress took that testimony and came to those conclusions in 1984 makes it incumbent on us today to resolve any doubts in favor of these farmers who—and I think there is no real dispute about it today that they did receive—they were discriminated against, it was pervasive, and that in many cases, it is irreparable.

The fact that they will get \$50,000 is not really going to compensate them for their damages. Even if their claims are allowed to go forward, they are not going to recover. Their children are not going to recover. So I think it is incumbent on us. And if the court—and I attribute good motives to the people. I think there were good people involved in fashioning the notice process. I don't question that. But in hindsight—and we have all done things that we thought at the time were sufficient, but later on because of the results, we found that they were insufficient, that they didn't work. And the very fact that three out of four of the claimants that have now filed claims didn't file on time, I mean that alone ought to tell all of us—that ought to be sufficient for us to know that it was insufficient notice.

And the idea that the judge extends the notice but then denies all the claims and doesn't go to the merits, that is almost—you know, somebody lets you file late and then turns you down because you filed late, that is no—that is almost adding insult to injury. So I think it's incumbent on us to go forward with this, and I mean actually take some action that will—it won't compensate these farmers. We found that back in 1984.

Twenty years ago this Committee concluded no matter what we do, they are not going to be put back to where they were. And you can't uncrack eggs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHABOT. The very distinguished gentleman from Michigan, the Ranking Member of the full Judiciary Committee, Mr. Conyers, is recognized for making an opening statement.

Mr. CONYERS. Good morning, Chairman Chabot and Members of the Committee. And to the distinguished witnesses and all those who have taken their time to join us again in the Judiciary Committee, I am very proud to be with you again.

And I would like to just, first of all, begin by saying that I believe that former President Clinton, if he knew what made us decide to continue these hearings and keep those of us here who would have liked to have been in Little Rock today for the dedication going on there, but he might have said, I am glad you decided to stay and continue this hearing.

And so, Mr. Scott and I and others would have liked to have been there, but on balance, the historic significance of this referred to by the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Bachus, is so profound that we have to consider the issues just for a moment on a little bit larger note.

I would like to put my statement about the narrow issue that brings us here into the record. But let me point out that Chairman Steve Chabot and Mr. Scott, Mr. Nadler and Spencer Bachus have done something that I think should be recognized here. They have all made, from their particular points of analysis, incredibly signifi-

cant and similar statements in the direction of where we are and how we got to this point.

Chairman Chabot did not have to call this hearing. And as has been observed, had we not gone forward, it is very unlikely that there would have been any further action taken on this matter in the 108th Congress. And so it is in this spirit of mutual understanding that brings us here that I would like to make these observations over and above the process question of late filing of claims for just a minute here. And that is to say that the question of how African American agricultural leaders and their families and communities and as individuals have been treated historically is now coming to the first—well, not the first, but one of the most candid discussions that I have ever been witness to.

And I would like to take this time merely to describe—and I am open to meeting with my colleagues on the Committee, as well as the farmer leaders that are assembled here today about any refinements that are necessary. But it seems to me that we on the Committee, as Members of Congress, have to go to the Agriculture Committee of the House of Representatives to continue the much wider hearing on these historic issues. And I think with our Republican counterparts that we stand a fair chance of having that done.

I am prepared, of course, as Steve is, to go to the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee with whom we have had cordial working relations for two terms. Now we need to get all of this—there are so many peripheral issues that probably won't be gone into today; we need to get this on the record, the historical record of the Congress, and it should come from the Agriculture Committee.

The other item that we need to do is continue the examination of the plight of the black farmer in America, currently and historically, from the perspective of bringing in some of our think tanks and our institutions that deal in special, particular issues to begin to also complement what we expect will be the work of the Agriculture Committee in the 109th session. That would also include the Congressional Black Caucus input and many other organizations that work here in the capacity of think tanks that do these kinds of things, because we are now at the point, it seems to me, Spencer, that we can now begin to build an historical base unlike any that has been assembled before, and I think it will set the framework for the resolution of many of these long-standing problems and move us out of a very unfortunate past, which only our heirs to the future are in a position to correct. And I thank the Chairman for his consideration.

Mr. CHABOT. Do any other Members wish to make opening statements?

We will move to introduce the witnesses. Our first witness this morning will be J.L. Chestnut, Jr. Mr. Chestnut was born in Selma, Alabama in 1930. He graduated from the Howard University Law School in 1958.

In 1959, Mr. Chestnut opened his law office in Selma, becoming the first African American to ever open a law office in that town and one of only nine black lawyers practicing in the State of Alabama. In his capacity as NAACP lead counsel, he facilitated the implementation of the *Brown v. Board of Education* school desegregation decision in Alabama.

In 1963, he helped the first professional civil rights worker to visit Selma persuade local African Americans to attend the first mass meetings. That was the beginning of the Selma movement, which later led to the greater civil rights victory in the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965. When Martin Luther King set up shop in Selma in 1964, Mr. Chestnut represented Dr. King. Dr. King and Mr. Chestnut worked together to plan much of the historic Selma civil rights battle. He was lead counsel, at least lead class counsel in several class action cases, and is class counsel in the *Pigford* case.

After a distinguished career handling many civil rights cases, he is the senior partner in the largest black law firm in Alabama, which is the oldest predominantly African American law firm in the Nation. He also sits as a trustee on the board of the University of South Alabama, is a founder of both the Alabama Democratic Conference and the Alabama New South Coalition and is chairman of the board of deacons at the First Baptist Church.

Our second witness will be Jeanne Finegan, a representative of the Poorman-Douglas Corporation, which is the firm appointed by the court to serve as Facilitator in the *Pigford* settlement. Ms. Finegan is president of Capabiliti, L.L.C., and is a specialist in class action notification campaigns.

She has provided expert testimony regarding notification campaigns and conducted media audits of proposed notice programs for their adequacy. She has lectured, published, and has been cited on various aspects of legal noticing. Ms. Finegan has implemented many of the Nation's largest legal notice communication and advertising programs and has designed legal notices for a wide range of class actions.

Prior to establishing Capabiliti, Ms. Finegan co-founded Huntington Legal Advertising and spearheaded other companies. She has been a reporter, anchor, and public affairs director for several Oregon radio stations and worked for a television station. She is the author of many articles and is a speaker and panelist for public and private organizations.

And we welcome you here.

Our next witness is Thomas Burrell, a black farmer representative. Mr. Burrell was born May 7, 1949, in Covington, TN. Except for the time he has spent away at college, he has been a lifelong resident of Covington.

As an adult, Mr. Burrell farmed his own land. He is a veteran of the Vietnam war and is graduate of the school of business at the University of Michigan. He is also the father of three and has two grandchildren.

And we welcome you here.

Our final witness today is Ms. Bernice Atchison. Ms. Atchison was born in Chilton County on May 1, 1938. She married Alan C. Atchison on May 14, 1953, and they supported their family by farming as they raised eight children together until her husband died in 1992. She and her son continue to farm in Chilton County to this day.

And we welcome you here this morning, Ms. Atchison.

If we could have all the witnesses stand for a moment, we have a policy to swear in witnesses.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. CHABOT. I would like to familiarize you with our rules here relative to testifying. We have a lighting system. Each witness is given 5 minutes and the green light will be on for 4 of those minutes. A yellow light will come up that lets you know you have 1 minute to wrap up and the red light indicates that all 5 minutes have elapsed. We will give you a little flexibility on that, but we'll ask you to wrap up as close to the 5 minutes as possible because we are on relatively strict time limits around here, and we want to make sure everybody has an opportunity to ask questions and the hearing moves along.

So we again want to thank all the witnesses for coming here this morning. And, Mr. Chestnut, we will begin with you.

STATEMENT OF J.L. CHESTNUT, JR., CHESTNUT, SANDERS, SANDERS, PETTAWAY & CAMPBELL, L.L.C., CLASS COUNSEL, PIGFORD V. GLICKMAN¹

Mr. CHESTNUT. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and Committee Members, I thank you for the opportunity of appearing here.

My involvement in the *Pigford* litigation is really an extension of my life. *Pigford* did not rise out of a vacuum. It is one of many disgraces of what we were going through in Selma in 1958 when I opened a law office there as the first and only black person dedicated or dumb enough to do so.

Less than 70 blacks in the whole county were registered to vote, and each potential voter had to be vouched for by a white person. And there were black and white water fountains, black and white restrooms, graveyards. Not one black person in the whole State had served on a jury in 100 years. No blacks had jobs downtown anywhere in Alabama. And the all-white, all-male police department did whatever, whenever to whomever in black Alabama and nobody dared asked any questions. It is out of that that *Pigford* comes.

I was representing Congressman John Lewis when he was 20 years old in Selma and other places around Alabama when neither he nor I could know that we would live out the day. So it was natural that I would become a part of *Pigford*. And I had been in the front ranks of the black struggle, now for almost 50 years.

When I came into the litigation, the Government would not even discuss settlement in this doubtful case and it was doubtful. And the Government later changed its mind and said it would discuss possible settlement on a case-by-case basis. In the court's 65-page opinion, the judge quotes my argument against that assertion, saying it took us 15 years to get *Pigford* before a judge. They would always throw it out and dismiss it. And now if we do what the Government suggests, we will be here forever, case by case.

And I insisted that the court set a trial date, because in my judgment the Government would never seriously consider settlement unless there were a trial date. And the court set a trial date. And that's when a settlement in this case really became possible.

It was also at that point that I decided to educate, if you please, my class counsel, Phillip Fraas, about some black facts of life that he couldn't possibly know or understand. In fact, number one is

¹J.L. Chestnut did not submit a written prepared statement prior to the hearing.

that we face a cultural disconnect. I don't know of any other way to put it. Except for a core of dedicated and perennial-optimist black farmers, no one would believe—no black farmer would believe that a Government that for 150 years had ruined them would now help them. They would only believe that when there was something tangible and concrete what they could see or check. And by the time that happened, we would have serious problems because you can't keep a class action open in perpetuity. That is not the way the law is set up.

Early on I said to my co-counsel that is a serious problem that we will have to face. And in the end, when there is nobody else to blame, they will blame us. I know that because for 50 years I have been representing poor black folk, and I know what it is to be blamed when you can't get done what people are entitled to have done.

The second problem was that we could, in my considered opinion, succeed in winning all the money in the world and all the injunctive relief in the world, and as Congressman Bachus pointed out, we would not come close to producing justice that these poor black folk deserve. It just couldn't be done in the context of a lawsuit. At best, it's a piecemeal approach to piecemeal justice. And once again, somebody will have to be blamed in the end, and it will be us. And by "us," I mean the lawyers. I fully expected it and said it early on.

Mr. CHABOT. I am going to be blamed for letting you know that you are out of time, but we'll give you an additional 2 minutes if you could wrap it up in that time. And we are going to ask you questions and so you will be able to get into this.

Mr. CHESTNUT. Mr. Chairman, I believe if you sent your staff out tomorrow, within weeks they could find another 65,000 African-Americans who didn't file, but who now want into this lawsuit.

That is the cultural disconnect. That is a far deeper problem than legal notice.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much.

Ms. Finegan, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF JEANNE C. FINEGAN, APR, CONSULTANT TO POORMAN-DOUGLAS CORPORATION FOR COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS, AND FORMERLY VICE-PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF HUNTINGTON LEGAL ADVERTISING, A DIVISION OF POORMAN-DOUGLAS CORPORATION

Ms. FINEGAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. My name is Jeanne Finegan, and I am pleased to appear before you on behalf of Poorman-Douglas Corporation, the court-appointed Facilitator in the *Pigford* case.

Poorman and its division, Huntington Legal Advertising, participated in the development and implementation of the direct mail and the advertising components of the Consent Decree. I directed the advertising components and Nicole Hammond, my colleague, who is here today, was responsible for the direct mail component.

As set forth more fully in Exhibit 1 to my written statement, I have over 13 years of experience in the development of legal notice plans and class action and bankruptcy, and over 20 years of experience in the field of communication.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to address our involvement in the notice and claims administration process in *Pigford*. We know that some have raised questions about that notice program. But in order to place our work in context, I thought that it might be helpful for me to address some of those questions up front to you and to the Members of the Committee.

First, does the late—the number of late applicants show that the notice program was flawed or inadequate? We believe the answer is no.

One purpose of the notice program was to provide awareness of the complaint process. The *Pigford* notice did raise awareness. This is shown by the over 96,000 phone calls that Poorman received during the claims period from January to October 1999. This was one of the largest, sustained call volumes in a single case in the company's history. Some 53,000 requests were made for mail claim information.

These requests greatly exceeded all expectations. By the claims filing deadline, we had mailed nearly 50,000 claim forms and received back almost 18,000 completed forms.

As this Committee has heard from others, about 50 percent of the 67,000 individuals who applied to file a late claim were aware of the settlement in advance, but did not act in time. As this evidence confirms, a notice program may generate interest and awareness, but it cannot make someone file.

The decision to act or file a claim is influenced by many factors. The notice program is only part of that overall decision. So why did so many class members file late claims or seek to file late claims?

African American farmers have faced a long history of discrimination. Many class members may have believed that even with a legitimate claim, relief would not be forthcoming. This perception may have reduced, at least initially, the desire of many class members to act.

The media also tended to reaffirm this perception. If the farmer did not trust the settlement was genuine, this certainly would have affected their behavior. But as word spread that the settlement relief was being granted, class members became increasingly confident that filing a claim would not, in fact, be a waste of time. At this point, the deadline was upon them and many were unable to file in time.

The problem then is not that the class members' awareness was late, but class member activation was late. And I am not certain that any notification program, by itself, could have remedied that. However, this speculation begs the question, how did Poorman-Douglas develop the media strategy that was used?

We used well-accepted scientific industry methodology to develop our recommendations. We used data from reliable media research bureaus such as Mediamark Research and Nielsen to identify model class members by both their demography and their media consumption habits. From this information, we developed our recommendations for a media strategy.

The Consent Decree specified the following requirements: that a copy of the notice of class certification and the proposed class settlement was mailed to all then-known class members; a one-quarter-page newspaper ad was placed in over 27 general circulation

newspapers and over 115 local African American newspapers in an 18-State region. A full-page ad was placed in the 18-State regional edition of TV Guide and a half-page ad was placed in the national edition of Jet Magazine.

Mr. CHABOT. Your time has expired. We would appreciate it if you could wrap up.

Ms. FINEGAN. I would be happy, of course, to answer any questions that the Committee may have about any aspect of our work on the *Pigford* notice program as negotiated by the parties and approved by Judge Friedman. We believe that the plan did meet its goals.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Finegan follows:]

**House Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution
Testimony of Jeanne C. Finegan
November 18, 2004**

INTRODUCTION

My name is Jeanne C. Finegan. I am the President of Capabiliti, L.L.C., a communications consulting and public relations firm, which works in collaboration with Poorman-Douglas Corporation (hereinafter "P-D"), a company that specializes in the implementation and administration of Class Action and Bankruptcy media notification campaigns and claims administration services. Additionally, I am formerly the Vice President and Director of Huntington Legal Advertising (hereinafter "HLA"), a division of P-D, and was at the time when the Court approved the Consent Decree and notice program in Pigford v. Glickman Civ. Act. N. 97-1978 (PLF) (US. Dist. D.C.) (hereinafter "Pigford").

I have over 20 years of experience in the field of communications. I am a public relations professional accredited by the Universal Accreditation Board of the Public Relations Society of America. I have lectured and written extensively on the issue of notice. I have provided expert testimony regarding notification campaigns and conducted media audits of proposed notice programs for their adequacy under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) and similar state class action rules. My biography is included as Exhibit 1.

I have extensive experience in implementing legal notice programs in consumer, environmental, anti-trust, medical and product liability class actions, as well as various bankruptcy cases. I have served as a qualified legal notice expert in many of the most significant consumer class action lawsuits in the United States. Courts have recognized the merits of, and admitted expert testimony based upon my evaluation of the effectiveness of notice programs. I have implemented notice programs in hundreds of class action and bankruptcy cases, highlights of which are reflected in Exhibit 1.

Background

The Consent Decree in Pigford established the legal notice program which Poorman-Douglas, coordinated, through its division, Huntington Legal Advertising. A copy of the Consent Decree is attached hereto as Exhibit 2, which was preliminarily approved by the Court on January 5, 1999.¹ In this case, as in the notice programs P-D and HLA have implemented in other Class Action and similar settlements, the goal was to reach as many of the potential claimants as possible and notify them of their rights and the attendant responsibilities necessary to maintain those rights.

Legal Notice Administrators are often asked to do research and make recommendations on media selection for the target class. We were asked to do so in Pigford. While legal notice administrators may recommend a course of action, they do not make the ultimate decision on which notice program is to be implemented. After counsel for the parties conclude negotiations to determine the terms and timing of the settlement, and after the Court approves the settlement, the notice administrator develops the final notice program, consistent with the settlement and in consultation with the parties. Once the notice program is approved by the Court, the program is carried out as it was approved, absent unforeseen circumstances. Even in such cases, changes are undertaken only in consultation with the parties and with approval of the Court. The Pigford matter's legal notice program development and implementation followed this normal sequence of events, as detailed in Exhibit 3 and discussed further below.

In Pigford, P-D's class action case administration services included coordination of the direct mail notice process; formatting of the direct mail notice; coordination with the U.S. Postal Service; database management and preparation of affidavits for the Court regarding the services provided. HLA, under my direction, implemented the paid advertising, media and public relations components of the notice program as approved by the Court. My affidavit filed in the Pigford matter, dated February 19, 1999, is attached hereto as Exhibit 3 and details the

¹ The Consent Decree specified the following requirements for the class notice procedure:

- a. Mail a copy of the Notice of Class Certification and Proposed Class Settlement to all then-known class members.
- b. Arrange to have 44 commercials aired on the Black Entertainment Network and 18 similar commercials on Cable News Network, during a two week period.
- c. Arrange to have one-quarter page advertisements placed in 27 general circulation newspapers and 115 African-American newspapers in an 18-state region.
- d. Place a full page advertisement in the editions of TV Guide distributed in that 18 state region and a half page ad in the national edition of Jet Magazine.

implementation of the notice program as well as the estimated performance measures on the broadcast and print advertising components of that campaign.

INTRODUCTION TO DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL NOTICE PROGRAMS

Legal Framework

The legal requirements for an adequate class action notice campaign under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are well enumerated in the several district and appellate court opinions regarding this case. Copies of these opinions are attached hereto as **Exhibit 4**. Most significant to the issue of notice, the District Court concluded that

class members have received more than adequate notice and have had sufficient opportunity to be heard on the fairness of the proposed Consent Decree.... [T]he timing and breadth of notice of the class settlement was sufficient under Rule 23.²

The court went on to note that “[t]he parties also exerted extraordinary efforts to reach class members through a massive advertising campaign in general circulation and African American targeted publications and radio and television stations.”³

Additionally two U.S. Supreme Court decisions (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael 526 U.S. 137 (1999)) relating to the admissibility of scientific or other specialized knowledge are instructive in the approach and methodology that must be followed in the development of a scientifically based media program. To ensure the methodological reliability that underlies the development of a notification plan, as experts, we base our plan development recommendations on the use of: 1) advertising industry accepted methodology; and 2) techniques that can be tested by peers. As reflected in Exhibit 4, and discussed in more detail below, scientifically sound, effective and appropriate methodology was used to develop and implement the notice plan in Pigford.

Media Program Development & Analysis Methodology

Human behavioral science provides the scientific basis for the development of effective communications and, in this context, legal notification programs. In addition to the legal notice requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, like with any advertising campaign, two

² Exhibit 4, Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 101-102 (D.D.C. 2000).

³ Id. at 102. The court also noted that with the exception of one objection from United States Virgin Islands, “no one appears to believe that the scope of the notice provided was insufficient.” Id.

primary goals of a legal notice program are to 1) create awareness; and 2) solicit a response from the target audience.⁴ To act on the message delivered is a decision within the control of the class member and this decision is influenced by many factors.⁵ Legal Notice campaigns must take into consideration and address these realities and communication obstacles. Both the message and the selection of media should reflect these principles.

Class Member Definition

In any legal notice program, both the demographic and psychographic profiles of potential Class Members must be taken into account for it to be a targeted and efficient notice program. The Notice Program and its analysis in the Pigford case were based on nationally syndicated media research provided by Mediamark Research, Inc. (hereinafter "MRI"). MRI is the leading supplier of multimedia audience research (nationally syndicated data) in the United States.⁶ MRI bases its calculations for net audience reach on its proprietary. This type of data is widely used by companies as a basis of their media and marketing plans and the type of data upon which legal notice experts rely to define the target class and recommend the most effective combination of media vehicles to get legal notice to the target class.⁷

⁴ As outlined in EFFECTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS by Cutlip, Center & Brown (8th Ed. 1999), a widely used text in academic advertising and public relations programs across the United States, information campaigns succeed when:

- 1) They are programmed around the assumption that most of the publics to which they will be addressed will be either only mildly interested or not at all interested in what is communicated.
- 2) Middle-range goals which can be reasonably achieved as a consequence of exposure are set as specific objectives [setting realistic goals]. Frequently it is equally important either to set up or to utilize environmental support systems to help sheer information giving to become effective in influencing behavior.
- 3) If after middle-range objectives are set, careful consideration is given to delineating specific targets in terms of their demographic and psychographical attributes, their life-style, value and belief systems, and mass media habits. Here, it is important not only to determine the scope of prior indifference, but to uncover its roots as well.

Quoting seminal research by human behavioral scientist Harold Mendelsohn, "Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Succeed," Public Opinion Quarterly, 37 (Spring 1973) 412-23.

⁵ There are many barriers to successful message dissemination, some of which include indifference, skepticism and fatigue on the part of the target audience. Harper, "What Advertising Can and Cannot Do," presented to the Marketing Conference of the Conference Board, October 20, 1976, obtained from the American Association of Advertising Agencies.

⁶ As indicated on its website: "[a]s the leading U.S. supplier of multimedia audience research, MRI provides information to magazines, television, radio, Internet and other media, leading national advertisers and over 450 advertising agencies - including 90 of the top 100 in the United States. Mediamark's national syndicated data are widely used by these companies as the basis for the majority of the media and marketing plans that are written for advertised brands in the United States." <http://www.mediamark.com/>, last viewed on November 15, 2004.

⁷ MRI surveys adults 18 years of age and older for product and media usage habits. Annually, it surveys more than 25,000 consumers throughout the continental United States and provides data on a syndicated basis. The survey methodology uses a personal interview and self-administered questionnaire. A doublebase report (which is the type of report used in recommendations made for the Pigford media program) provides information on more than 50,000 consumers surveyed and is a more reliable base for smaller target audiences than a single year's report.

Components to a Legally Defensible Notice and Measurement of an Effective Notice Program

All recommendations on the paid advertising and media/public relations components of the legal notice program were developed using scientific methodology accepted within the advertising industry. This would include 1) identification and modeling of target class members by their demography and media consumption habits; and 2) recommendations on notice dissemination, based upon the media consumption habits of the target class members. Again, the goal is to achieve the most effective notice possible under the circumstances of the case and maximize the success of the information campaign. Recommendations made on this basis allow the parties and the Court to select the media or combination of media that would best achieve the program goals.

Within the context of a class action, it is ultimately the terms of the settlement (as agreed to by the parties and approved by the Court) that dictate the notice plan that is ultimately implemented. The notice administrator may make recommendations to the parties in advance of their seeking court approval, but the final plan, including the form and manner of notice, reflects the order of the Court.

The analysis in the Pigford case included modeling target groups demographically and psychographically, as noted above. However, as with all social sciences there is no one absolute formula for making these recommendations. The calculation of human behavior and media consumption is a not an exact science. Instead it is a combination of science and judgment based on experience. It should be noted that calculations are projections and hand-in-glove with projections are variations. This does not mean that one calculation is right and the other wrong. It simply means that there are variations based on the model one uses and the platform upon which the calculation is formulated.

Media Performance

An integrated media program provides the most effective legal notice campaign when it is comprised of various elements, including direct mail, newspaper, magazine and broadcast advertising, and public relations to disseminate the notice because this multimedia approach

helps to achieve higher audience reach and greater frequency of message.⁸ These media vehicles are recommended based upon the target class members' demographic and psychographical attributes, and mass media habits researched as discussed above.

One issue exists with regard to scientific measures of a program's success: not all components can be measured to the same degree that the paid advertising component is measured. Print and broadcast media performance (estimates on the reach and frequency) in Pigford were based on the data provided by Mediamark Research, Inc. and Nielsen Media Research. Other elements included in the Court-ordered notice program also contributed significantly to the reach and frequency, but cannot be as definitively measured, nor can they be combined with the media performance estimates.⁹

PIGFORD NOTIFICATION PROGRAM

Pursuant to the Consent Decree, the direct mail component of the notification program commenced on January 20, 1999, while the rest of the communication program commenced on January 18, 1999 and was substantially completed by January 30, 1999. Prior to the claims filing deadline, a total of 52,736 claims packages and 192,277 Schedules of Meetings were distributed (indicating the date and time of almost 200 informational meetings about the settlement scheduled around the United States during the notice period).

The media and public relations components were executed and performed as required by the Consent Decree and detailed in Exhibit 3 and as summarized below.

Pigford Notice Program Objectives

The purpose of the notice program designed and implemented in the Pigford case was to alert those African-American farmers who had been discriminated against by the Department of Agriculture, to advise them of their opportunity to participate in the lawsuit, and to inform them

⁸ Frequency is the average number of times the individuals (or homes) are exposed to an advertising schedule within a specific period of time. Independent studies conducted by Hubert Zielske, "Remembering and Forgetting of Advertising," Journal of Marketing 23 (March 1959) 239-43, and Leon Jakobovits, "Semantic Satiation and Cognitive Dynamics," American Psychological Association meeting paper, September 1966, concur that unless an individual is exposed often enough within a short enough interval, there is little point in reaching him/her at all. "The clustering of ad messages over a short period of time increases recollection." Surmaek, MEDIA PLANNING, A PRACTICAL GUIDE (3rd Ed. 1996).

⁹ The one exception to this statement is the contribution to the overall effectiveness of the campaign achieved by the print articles and television news stories which resulted from the media and public relations campaign. This can be analyzed at the conclusion of a campaign, and to the extent possible five and a half years later, has been reviewed.

of their rights and obligations under the terms of the Consent Decree, including important information regarding the Court approval of the Consent Decree.

Pigford Class Definition vs. Media Definition

As reflected in Exhibit 2, the class in Pigford was defined as: All African-American farmers who (1) farmed between January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1996; and (2) applied to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) during that time period for participation in a federal farm credit or benefit program and who believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race in USDA's response that that application; and (3) filed a discrimination complaint on or before July 1, 1997, regarding USDA's treatment of such farm credit or benefit application.¹⁰

Additionally the Court certified three subclasses, defined as:

Subclass I: African-American farmers, who have a file with Defendant, but did not receive a written determination from Defendant in response to their discrimination complaint;

Subclass II: African-American farmers, who have a file with Defendant, who received a written determination from Defendant in response to their discrimination complaint but who maintain that the written determination from Defendant was not reached in accordance with law; and

Subclass III: African-American farmers, who do not have a file with Defendant because their discrimination complaints were destroyed, lost or thrown away by Defendant.¹¹

The ability to define and model target class members by their demography and media consumption habits is limited by the definitions used and information gathered by advertising and public relations research firms like MRI. Thus the media definitions used to evaluate program reach and frequency do not always perfectly translate to a class definition. Therefore it is important to use a media definition that is as targeted as possible, while erring on the side of over inclusion to ensure that all potential class members are identified and measured in the defined media program.

For the Pigford case, the media definition provided by MRI that most closely resembled the class definition while ensuring inclusion of all potential class members, included all African-

¹⁰ Exhibit 2 at page 5.

¹¹ Id.

American farm operators, managers or others in farm-related industries.¹² The estimated size of the MRI defined class was 143,000 individuals. This data allowed HLA to recommend the media vehicles that had the highest reach and index of the target audience.¹³

Performance of Pigford Media Program

Exhibit 3 contains the details on the media program implemented pursuant to the terms of the Consent Decree in Pigford.¹⁴ Looking to the broadcast and print (or “paid”) media components alone (because of the measurability and combinability issues discussed above), on average, these two elements of the media program in the Consent Decree reached an estimated 87% of the MRI defined class (“media definition”) and that class had the opportunity to view the summary settlement notice approximately 2.4 times.¹⁵

The reach and frequency statistics discussed above and reflected in Exhibit 3 do not take into account the other opportunities, contemplated by the Consent Decree, that potential class members had to view the class notice. These additional opportunities were provided by direct mail, newspaper and magazine articles, editorials, radio and television news stories as a result of the media and public relations campaign and the informational meetings scheduled, all of which were a part of the Court ordered Pigford notice program.¹⁶ These components, although not fully quantifiable, contributed to its reach, message frequency and overall effectiveness.

¹² MRI’s Doublebase 1998 report was used for analysis of the media habits of the target class in Pigford. The Pigford Doublebase report is based on Wave 35, 36, 37 and 38 interviews. The period of MRI fieldwork (the personal interviews) was as follows:

Wave 35	March 1996 to July 1996
Wave 36	September 1996 to January 1997
Wave 37	March 1997 to August 1997
Wave 38	September 1997 to February 1998

¹³ The “index” is “[a] form of percentage that relates numbers (variables) to a base, with the base always representing 100” and the “index” shows the change in magnitude relative to the base. Sammanek, ADVERTISING MEDIA A TO Z (2003). For example, members in the Pigford target audience were 866% more likely than the general public (base population) to read Jet magazine per the MRI 1998 Doublebase report.

¹⁴ Class notice procedures are outlined in the Consent Decree on pages 7 and 8 (Exhibit 2).

¹⁵ Exhibit 3 at 6. In fact, the measurable reach and frequency from the paid media campaign is slightly higher since it was discovered after the date that Exhibit 3 was signed and filed that there were several additional television spots aired on selected stations, which were not anticipated in the original broadcast media program.

¹⁶ For example, there were almost 200 information meetings held around the country in the regions where there were the largest concentration of class members. Additionally, a recent survey of the media coverage of the Pigford Settlement during the notice period (or at least those that were available five and a half years later) generated as a result of the media/public relations campaign, shows that this additional media coverage, delivered significant additional opportunities for class members to view and receive relevant case information, increasing the reach and frequency of Pigford’s notice program. Alone, the segment regarding the case aired on CBS’s 60 Minutes on July 4, 1999 had 1,150,000 black adult viewers over the age of 25.

CONCLUSION

I would be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have about any aspect of our work on the Pigford notice program. As negotiated by the Parties and approved by Judge Friedman, that notice plan met its goals by advising potential claimants of their rights in a manner reasonably designed to give them an opportunity to assess what course of action, if any, they should follow. Like any notice plan, perhaps with more time and money, the court-approved plan may have achieved enhanced results. But that is pure speculation. What is fact is that the notice plan triggered a substantial response from potential claimants. For example, we fielded 96,000 telephone calls were fielded in response to the notice before the October 12th 1999 cut-off date. Based on that experience and generally-accepted measures, the Pigford notice program adopted by the Parties and Judge Friedman achieved its objectives.

LIST OF EXHIBITS

- I. **Biography for Jeanne C. Finegan**
- II. **Consent Decree signed by the Court Dated April 14, 1999**
- III. **Affidavit Dated February 19, 1999**
- IV. **Copies of Opinions on the Notice Program**

I. Biography for Jeanne C. Finegan

JEANNE C. FINEGAN, APR

BIOGRAPHY

Capabiliti L.L.C., President, Jeanne Finegan, APR has more than 20 years of communications and advertising experience. She is a nationally recognized specialist in class action notification campaigns. Finegan is accredited (APR) in Public Relations by the Universal Accreditation Board, a program administered by the Public Relations Society of America.

She has provided expert testimony regarding notification campaigns and conducted media audits of proposed notice programs for their adequacy under Fed R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) and similar state class action statutes.

She has lectured, published and has been cited extensively on various aspects of legal noticing, product recall and crisis communications and has served the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) as an expert to determine ways in which the Commission can increase the effectiveness of its product recall campaigns.

Finegan has implemented many of the nation's largest and most high profile legal notice communication and advertising programs. In the course of her class action experience, Courts have recognized the merits of, and admitted expert testimony, based on, her scientific evaluation of the effectiveness of notice plans. She has designed legal notices for a wide range of class actions and consumer matters that include product liability, construction defect, anti-trust, medical/pharmaceutical, human rights, civil rights, telecommunication, media, environment, securities, banking, insurance, mass tort, restructuring and product recall.

Her most recent work includes:

In re: John's Manville (Statutory Direct Action Settlement, Common Law Direct Action and Hawaii Settlement) Index No 82-11656 (BRL) United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York (2004). The nearly half-

billion dollar settlement constituted three separate notification programs, which targeted all persons, who had asbestos claims whether asserted or unasserted, against the Travelers Indemnity Company.

In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of a Clarifying Order Approving the Settlements, the Honorable Chief Judge Burton R. Lifland said:

"As demonstrated by Findings of Fact, the Statutory Direct Action Settlement notice program was reasonably calculated under all circumstances to apprise the affected individuals of the proceedings and actions taken involving their interests, Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.; 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), such program did apprise the overwhelming majority of potentially affected claimants and far exceeded the minimum notice required. The Court concludes that mailing direct notice via U.S. Mail to law firms and directly to potentially affected claimants, as well as undertaking an extensive print media and Internet campaign met and exceeded the requirements of due process. The Court's conclusion in this regard is buttressed by the results of over 26,000 phone calls, 20,000 requests for information 8,000 website visits and 4,000 users registered to download documents. The results simply speak for themselves."

In re: Wilson v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, Case No. D-101-CV 98-02814 (First Judicial District Court County of Santa Fe, State of New Mexico 2002.) This was a nationwide notification program that included all persons in the United States who owned, or had owned, a life or disability insurance policy with Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company and had paid additional charges when paying their premium on an installment basis. The class was estimated to exceed 1.6 million individuals. (www.insuranceclassclaims.com/).

In granting preliminary approval to the settlement agreement, the Honorable Art Encinias commented:

"The Notice Plan was the best practicable and reasonably calculated, under the circumstances of the action. ...[and] that the notice meets or exceeds all applicable requirements of law, including Rule 1-023(C)(2) and (3) and 1-023(E), NMR 2001, and the requirements of federal and/or state constitutional due process and any other applicable law."

In re: Deke, et al. v. Cardservice International, Case No. BC 271679 Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. (2004)

In the Final Order dated March 1, 2004, The Honorable Charles W. McCoy commented:

"The Class Notice satisfied the requirements of California Rules of Court 1856 and 1859 and due process and constituted the best notice practicable under the circumstances."

In re: Sager v. Inamed Corp. and McGhan Medical Breast Implant Litigation, Case No. 01043771, Superior Court of the State of California, County of Santa Barbara. (2004).

In the Final Judgment and Order, dated March 30, 2004, the Honorable Thomas P. Anderle stated:

"Notice provided was the best practicable under the circumstances."

In re: Florida Microsoft Antitrust Litigation Settlement. Index number 99-27340 CA 11, 11th Judicial District Court of Miami – Dade County, Florida. (2003)

In the Final Order Approving the Fairness of the Settlement, The Honorable Henry H. Harnage said:

"The Class Notice ... was the best notice practicable under the circumstances and fully satisfies the requirements of due process, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and any other applicable rules of the Court."

In re: Montana Microsoft Antitrust Litigation Settlement. No. DCV 2000 219, Montana First Judicial District Court – Lewis & Clark Co. (2003).

In re: South Dakota Microsoft Antitrust Litigation Settlement. Civ. No. 00-235, State of South Dakota County of Hughes in the Circuit Court Sixth Judicial Circuit.

In re: Kansas Microsoft Antitrust Litigation Settlement. Case No. 99C17089 Division No. 15 Consolidated Cases, District Court of Johnson County, Kansas Civil Court Department.

In the Final Order and Final Judgment, the Honorable Allen Slater stated:

"The Class Notice provided was the best notice practicable under the circumstances and fully complied in all respects with the requirements of due process and of the Kansas State. Annot. §60-22.3."

In re: North Carolina Microsoft Antitrust Litigation Settlement. No. 00-CvS-4073 (Wake) 00-CvS-1246 (Lincoln), State of North Carolina, Wake and

Lincoln Counties in the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, North Carolina Business Court.

In the multiple state cases, Plaintiffs generally allege that Microsoft unlawfully used anticompetitive means to maintain a monopoly in markets for certain software, and that as a result, it overcharged consumers who licensed its MS-DOS, Windows, Word, Excel and Office software. The multiple legal notice programs targeted both individual users and business users of this software. The scientifically designed notice programs took into consideration both media usage habits and demographic characteristics of the targeted class members.

In re: MCI Non-Subscriber RatePayers Litigation, MDL Docket No. 1275, (District Court for Southern District of Illinois 2001). The advertising and media notice program was designed with the understanding that the litigation affects all persons or entities who were customers of record for telephone lines presubscribed to MCI/World Com, and were charged the higher non-subscriber rates and surcharges for direct-dialed long distance calls placed on those lines. (www.rateclaims.com).

After a hearing to consider objections to the terms of the settlement, The Honorable David R. Herndon stated:

“As further authorized by the Court, [Huntington Legal Advertising] ... published the Court-approved summary form of notice in eight general-interest magazines distributed nationally; approximately 900 newspapers throughout the United States and a Puerto Rico newspaper. In addition, Huntington Legal Advertising caused the distribution of the Court-approved press release to over 2,500 news outlets throughout the United States... The manner in which notice was distributed was more than adequate...”

In re: Sparks v. AT&T Corporation, Case No. 96-LM-983 (In the Third Judicial Circuit, Madison County, Illinois.) The litigation concerned all persons in the United States who leased certain AT&T telephones during the 1980's. Finegan implemented a nationwide media program designed to target all persons who may have leased telephones during this time period, a class that included a large percentage of the entire population of the United States.

In granting final approval to the settlement, the Court commented:

“The Court further finds that the notice of the proposed settlement was sufficient and furnished Class Members with the information they needed to evaluate whether to participate in or opt out of the proposed settlement. The Court therefore concludes

that the notice of the proposed settlement met all requirements required by law, including all Constitutional requirements.”

In re: Pigford v. Glickman and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Case No. CA No. 97-19788 (PLF), (District Court for the District of Columbia 1999). This was the largest civil rights case to settle in the United States in over 40 years. The highly publicized, nation-wide paid media program was implemented to alert all present and past African-American farmers of the opportunity to recover monetary damages against the U.S. Department of Agriculture for alleged loan discrimination.

In his Opinion, the Honorable Paul L. Friedman commented on the notice program by saying:

“The parties also exerted extraordinary efforts to reach class members through a massive advertising campaign in general and African American targeted publications and television stations.”

Judge Friedman continued:

“The Court concludes that class members have received more than adequate notice and have had sufficient opportunity to be heard on the fairness of the proposed Consent Decree.”

In re: SmithKline Beecham Clinical Billing Litigation, Case No. CV. No. 97-L-1230 (Illinois Third Judicial District Madison County, 2001.) Finegan designed and developed a national media and Internet site notification program in connection with the settlement of a nationwide class action concerning billings for clinical laboratory testing services.

In re: MacGregor v. Schering-Plough Corp. Case No. EC248041 (Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles 2001). This nationwide notification was designed to reach all persons who had purchased or used an aerosol inhaler manufactured by Schering-Plough. Because no mailing list was available, notice was accomplished entirely through the media program.

In re: Swiss Banks Holocaust Victim Asset Litigation Case No. CV-96-4849, (Eastern District of New York 1999). Finegan managed the implementation of the Internet site. The site was developed in 21 native languages. It is a highly secure data gathering tool and information hub, central to the global outreach program of Holocaust survivors. (www.swissbankclaims.com).

In re: Louisiana-Pacific Inner-Seal Siding Litigation, Civil Action Nos. 879-JE, and 1453-JE U.S.D.C., (District of Oregon 1995 and 1999). Under the

terms of the Settlement, three separate Notice programs were to be implemented at three-year intervals over a period of six years. In the first Notice campaign, Finegan implemented the print advertising and Internet components of the Notice program. (www.ipsidingclaims.com/).

In approving the legal notice communication plan, the Honorable Robert E. Jones stated:

“The notice given to the members of the Class fully and accurately informed the Class members of all material elements of the settlement...[through] a broad and extensive multi-media notice campaign.”

In reference to the third-year Notice program for Louisiana-Pacific, Special Master Hon. Judge Richard Unis, commented:

“In approving the third year notification plan for the Louisiana-Pacific Inner-Seal™ Siding litigation, the court referred to the notice as ‘...well formulated to conform to the definition set by the Court as adequate and reasonable notice.’ Indeed, I believe the record should also reflect the Court’s appreciation to Ms. Finegan for all the work she’s done, ensuring that noticing was done correctly and professionally, while paying careful attention to overall costs.” Her understanding of various notice requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, helped to insure that the notice given in this case was consistent with the highest standards of compliance with Rule 23(d)(2).

In re: Thomas A. Foster and Linda E. Foster v. ABTco Siding Litigation, Case No. 95-151-M, (Circuit Court of Choctaw County, Alabama 2000). This litigation focused on past and present owners of structures sided with Abitibi-Price siding. The notice program that Finegan implemented was national in scope. (www.abitibiclaims.com/).

In the Order and Judgment Finally approving settlement, Judge J. Lee McPhearson said:

“The Court finds that the Notice Program conducted by the Parties provided individual notice to all known Class Members and all Class Members who could be identified through reasonable efforts and constitutes the best notice practicable under the circumstances of this Action. This finding is based on the overwhelming evidence of the adequacy of the notice program ...The media campaign involved broad national notice through television and print media, regional and local newspapers, and the Internet (see id. ¶¶9-11) The result: over 90

percent of Abitibi and ABTco owners are estimated to have been reached by the direct media and direct mail campaign.”

In re: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Litigation, Case No. A89-095-CV (HRH) (Consolidated) U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska (1997, 2002). Finegan implemented two media campaigns to notify native Alaskan residents, trade workers, fisherman, and others impacted by the oil spill of the litigation and their rights under the settlement terms.

In re: Georgia-Pacific Toxic Explosion Litigation Case No. 98 CVC05-3535, (Court of Common Pleas Franklin County, Ohio 2001). Finegan implemented a regional notice program that included network affiliate television, radio and newspaper. The notice was designed to alert adults living near a Georgia-Pacific plant of their rights under the terms of the class action settlement. (www.georgiapacificexplosionsettlement.com/).

In the Order and Judgement finally approving the settlement the Honorable Jennifer L. Bunner said:

“...Notice of the settlement to the Class was the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The Court finds that such effort exceeded even reasonable effort and that the Notice complies with the requirements of Civ. R. 23(C).

In re: Johns Manville Phenolic Foam Litigation Case No. CV 96-10069, (District Court for the District of Massachusetts 1999). The nationwide multi-media legal notice program was designed to reach all Persons who own any structure, including an industrial building, commercial building, school, condominium, apartment house, home, garage or other type of structure located in the United States or its territories, in which Johns Manville PFRI was installed, in whole or in part, on top of a metal roof deck. (www.pfirclaims.com/).

In re: James Hardie Roofing Litigation Case No. CV. No. 00-2-17945-65SEA (Superior Court of Washington in and for King County 2002). The nationwide legal notice program included advertising on television, in print and on the Internet. It was national in scope and designed to reach all persons who own any structure with JHBP roofing products. (www.hardieroofingclaims.com/).

In the Final Order and Judgement the Honorable Steven Scott stated:

“The notice program required by the Preliminary Order has been fully carried out.... [and was] extensive. The notice provided fully and accurately informed the Class Members of all material elements of the proposed Settlement and their opportunity to participate in or be excluded from it; was the best notice practicable under the circumstances; was valid, due and sufficient notice to all Class Members; and complied fully with Civ. R. 23, the United States Constitution, due process, and other applicable law.”

In re: First Alert Smoke Alarm Litigation, Case No. CV-98-C-1546-W (UWC), (District Court for the Northern District of Alabama Western Division 2000). Finegan implemented a nationwide legal notice and public information program. The public information program is scheduled to run over a two-year period to inform those with smoke alarms of the performance characteristics between photoelectric and ionization detection. The media program includes network and cable television, magazine and specialty trade publications. (www.brksmokealarmsettlement.com).

In the Findings and Order Preliminarily Certifying the Class, The Honorable C.W. Clemon wrote that the notice plan:

“...Constitutes due, adequate and sufficient notice to all Class Members; and meets or exceeds all applicable requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the United States Constitution (including the Due Process Clause), the Alabama State Constitution, the Rules of the Court, and any other applicable law.”

In re: American Cyanamid, Civil Action CV-97-0581-BH-M United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama 2001. The media program targeted those Farmers who had purchased crop protection chemicals manufactured by American Cyanamid.

In the Final Order and Judgment, the Honorable Charles R. Butler Jr. wrote:

“The Court finds that the form and method of notice used to notify the Temporary Settlement Class of the Settlement satisfied the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and due process, constituted the best notice practicable under the circumstances, and constituted due and sufficient notice to all potential members of the Temporary Class Settlement.”

In re: Bristow v Fleetwood Enterprises Litigation Case No Civ 00-0082-S-EJL (District Court for the District of Idaho 2001). Finegan implemented a legal notice campaign targeting present and former employees of Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., or its subsidiaries, who worked as hourly production workers at Fleetwood's housing, travel trailer, or motor home manufacturing plants. The comprehensive notice campaign included print, radio and television advertising.

In re: New Orleans Tank Car Leakage Fire Litigation, Case No 87-16374 Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, (2000). This case resulted in one of the largest settlements in US History. This campaign consisted of a media relations and paid advertising program to notify individuals of their rights under the terms of the settlement.

In re: Garria Spencer v. Shell Oil Company, Case No. CV 94-074, District Court, Harris County Texas, (1995). The nationwide notification program was designed to reach individuals who owned real property or structures in the United States which contained polybutylene plumbing with acetyl insert or metal insert fittings.

In re: Hurd Millwork Heat Mirror™ Litigation Case No. CV-772488, Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Santa Clara, (2000). This nationwide multi-media notice program was designed to reach class members with failed heat mirror seals on windows and doors, and alert them as to the actions that they needed to take to receive enhanced warranties or window and door replacement.

In re: Laborers District Counsel of Alabama Health and Welfare Fund v Clinical Laboratory Services, Inc. Case No. CV -97-C-629-W Northern District of Alabama, (2000). Finegan implemented a national media and Internet site notification program in connection with the settlement of a nationwide class action concerning alleged billing discrepancies for clinical laboratory testing services.

In re: StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation Case No. 01 C 1181, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division (2002). Finegan implemented a nationwide notification program designed to alert potential class members of the terms of the settlement.

In re: Albertson's Back Pay Litigation, Case No. 97-0159-S-BLW, U.S. District Court of Idaho (1997). Finegan implemented a secure Internet site, where claimants could seek case information confidentially. (www.albsuits.com).

In re: Georgia Pacific Hardboard Siding Recovering Program, Case No. CV-95-3330-RG, Circuit Court for the County of Mobile, State

of Alabama (1997). Finegan implemented a multi-media legal notice program, which was designed to reach class members with failed G-P siding and alert them of the pending matter. Notice was provided through advertisements which aired on national cable networks, magazines of nationwide distribution, local newspaper, press releases and trade magazines.

In re: Diet Drug Litigation, Finegan has worked on many state notification programs and worked as a consultant to the National Diet Drug Settlement Committee on notification issues.

In re: ABS II Pipes Litigation, Case No. 3126, Contra Costa Superior Court, State of California (1998 and 2001). The Court approved regional notification program designed to alert those individuals who owned structures with the pipe, that they were eligible to recover the cost of replacing the pipe. (www.abspipes.com).

In re: Avenue A Inc. Internet Privacy Litigation
District Court for the Western District of Washington Case No: C00-1964C

In re: Lorazepam and Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1290 (TFH) United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

In re: Provident Financial Corporation ERISA Litigation Case No C-01-5027 United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

In re: H & R Block, et al Tax Refund Litigation State of Maryland Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 97195023/CC4111

In re: American Premier Underwriters, Inc, U.S. Railroad Vest Corp.
Boone Circuit Court – Boone County, Indiana. Cause No: 06C01-9912

In re: Sprint Corporation Optical Fiber Litigation District Court of Leavenworth Co, Kansas Case No: 9907 CV 284

In re: Shelter Mutual Insurance Company Litigation District Court in and for Canadian Co. State of Oklahoma Case No. CJ-2002-263

In re: Conseco, Inc. Securities Litigation Southern District of Indiana Indianapolis Division Case No: IP-00-0585-C Y/S CA

In re: National Treasury Employees Union, et al United States Court of Federal Claims Case No: 02-128C

In re: City of Miami Parking Litigation Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami Dade County, Florida Case Nos: 99-21456 CA-10, 99-23765 – CA-10.

In re: Prime Co. Incorporated D/B/A/ Prime Co. Personal Communications, United States Court Eastern District of Texas Beaumont Division – Civil Action No. L 1:01CV658.

In re: Alsea Veneer v. State of Oregon A.A., Case No. 88C-11289-88C-11300.

Bankruptcy Experience --

Finegan has implemented literally hundreds of domestic and international bankruptcy notice programs. A sample case list includes the following:

In re: United Airlines, Case No. 02-B-48191 (Bnkr. N.D Illinois Eastern Division) Finegan worked with United and its restructuring attorneys to implement global legal notice programs. The notice was published in 11 countries and translated into 6 languages. Finegan worked closely with legal counsel and UAL's advertising team to select the appropriate media and to negotiate the most favorable advertising rates. (www.pd-ual.com/).

In re: Enron, Case No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) Finegan worked with Enron and its restructuring attorneys to publish various legal notices.

In re: Dow Corning, Case No. 95-20512 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.) Finegan originally designed the information website. This Internet site is a major information hub that has various forms in 15 languages. (<http://www.impiantclaims.com/>).

In re: Harnischfeger Industries, Case No. 99-2171 (RJW) Jointly Administered U.S. Bankr., District of Delaware. Finegan implemented 6 domestic and international notice programs for this case. The notice was translated into 14 different languages and published in 16 countries.

In re: Keene Corporation, Case No. 93B 46090 (SMB) U.S. Bankr. Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division. Finegan implemented multiple domestic bankruptcy notice programs including notice on the plan of reorganization directed to all creditors and all Class 4 asbestos-related claimants and counsel.

In re: Lamonts, Case No. 00-00045 U.S. Bankr. Western District of Washington. Finegan an implemented multiple bankruptcy notice programs.

In re: Monet Group Holdings, Case Nos. 00-1936 (MFW) U.S. Bankr. District of Delaware. Finegan implemented a bar date notice.

In re: Laclede Steel Company, Case No 98-53121-399 US Bankr. CT, Eastern District of MO, Eastern Division. Finegan implemented multiple bankruptcy notice programs.

In re: Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation, Case No. 91-804 Bankr., Southern District of New York; Finegan developed multiple nationwide legal notice notification programs for this case.

In re: U.S.H. Corporation of New York, et al., and (BRL) Bankr. Southern District of New York; she implemented a bar date advertising notification campaign.

In re: Best Products Co., Inc., Bankr. Case No. 96-35267-T, Eastern District of Virginia; she implemented a national legal notice program that included multiple advertising campaigns for notice of sale, bar date, disclosure and plan confirmation.

In re: Lodgian, Inc., et al – Southern District Court of New York Case No. 16345 (BRL) Factory Card Outlet – 99-685 (JCA), 99-686 (JCA) Health Services, Inc., et al – District Court of Delaware Case No. 00-389 (MFW).

In re: International Total Services, Inc., et al – Eastern District Court of New York, Case No: 01-21812, 01-21818, 01-21820, 01-21882, 01-21824, 01-21826, 01-21827 (CD) Under Case No: 01-21812.

In re: Decora Industries, Inc and Decora, Incorporated, District of Delaware Case No: 00-4459 and 00-4460 (JJF).

In re: Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., et al - District of Delaware Case No. 00 2692 (PJW).

In re: Telephone Warehouse, Inc., et al – District of Delaware Case No. 00-2105 through 00-2110 (MFW).

In re: United Companies Financial Corporation, et al. District of Delaware Case No. 99-450 (MFW) through 99-461 (MFW).

In re: Caldor, Inc, New York, The Caldor Corporation, Caldor, Inc. CT, et al. Southern District of New York Case No: 95-B44080 (JLG).

In re: Physicians Health Corporation, et al, District of Delaware Case No: 00-

4482 (MFW).

In re: GC Companies., et al. District of Delaware Case Nos:00-3897 through 00-3927 (MFW).

In re: Heilig-Meyers Company, et al. Eastern District of Virginia (Richmond Division) Case Nos: 00-34533 through 00-34538.

In re: Yes! Entertainment Corporation District of Delaware Case No: 99-373 (MFW).

In re: Wash Depot Holdings, Inc. et al District of Delaware Case No. 01-10571(SLR).

In re: Fine Host Corporation District of Delaware Case No. 99-20 (PJW).

In re: Lanxide Technology – District of Delaware Case No. 99C – 07-307 (SCD).

Background

Prior to establishing Capabiliti, Finegan co-founded Huntington Legal Advertising, a nationally recognized leader in legal notice communications. In 1997 Huntington Legal Advertising was purchased by Fleet Bank and Poorman-Douglas Corporation.

Prior to that, Finegan spearheaded Huntington Communications, (an Internet development company) and The Huntington Group, Inc., (a public relations firm). As a partner and consultant, she has worked on a wide variety of client marketing, research, advertising, public relations and Internet programs. During her tenure, client projects have included advertising (media planning and buying), shareholder meetings, direct mail, public relations (planning, financial communications) and community outreach programs. Her past client list includes large public and privately held companies: Code-A-Phone Corp., Thrifty-Payless Drug Stores, Hyster-Yale, The Portland Winter Hawks Hockey Team, U.S. National Bank, U.S. Trust Company, Morley Capital Management, Durametal Corporation and Bioject, Inc.

Prior to Huntington Advertising, Finegan worked as a consultant and public relations specialist for a West Coast-based Management and Public Relations Consulting firm.

Additionally, Finegan has experience in news and public affairs. Her professional background includes being a reporter, anchor and public affairs

director for KWJ/KJIB radio in Portland, Oregon, as well as reporter covering state government for KBZY radio in Salem, Oregon. Finegan worked as a television program/promotion manager for KPDX directing \$50 million in programming. Additionally, she was the program/promotion manager at KECH-22 television.

Finegan's multi-level communication background gives her a thorough, hands-on understanding of media, the communication process, and how it relates to creating effective and efficient legal notice campaigns.

Articles

Co-Author, "Approaches to Notice in State Court Class Actions," – For The Defense, Vol. 45, No. 11 -- November, 2003.

Citation – "Recall Effectiveness Research: A Review and Summary of the Literature on Consumer Motivation and Behavior" U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, CPSC-F-02-1391, p.10, Heiden Associates – July 2003.

Author, "The Web Offers Near, Real-Time Cost Efficient Notice," – American Bankruptcy Institute - ABI Journal, Vol. XXII, No. 5, -- 2003.

Author, "Determining Adequate Notice in Rule 23 Actions," – For The Defense, Vol. 44, No. 9 -- September, 2002.

Author, "Legal Notice, What You Need To Know and Why," - Monograph, July 2002.

Co-Author, "The Electronic Nature of Legal Noticing" - The American Bankruptcy Institute Journal -Vol. XXI, No. 3, April 2002.

Author, "Three Important Mantras for CEO's and Risk Managers in 2002" - International Risk Management Institute - imi.com/ January 2002.

Author, "100 Million People are Talking... Your Settlement Might be the Next Hot Topic" - Bureau of National Affairs Class Action Litigation Reporter - Vol. 2, No. 16 August 24, 2001.

Co-Author, "Used the Bat Signal Lately?" - The National Law Journal, Special Litigation Section - February 19, 2001.

Author, "How Much is Enough Notice" - Dispute Resolution Alert, Vol. 1, No. 6. March 2001.

Author, "Monitoring the Internet Buzz" – The Risk Report, Vol. XXIII, No. 5, Jan. 2001.

Author, "High-Profile Product Recalls Need More Than the Bat Signal" - International Risk Management Institute - imi.com/ July 2001.

Co-Author, "Do you know what 100 million people are buzzing about today? Risk and Insurance Management – March 2001.

Quoted Article: "Keep Up with Class Action" Kentucky Courier Journal – March 13, 2000.

Author, "The Great Debate - How Much is Enough Legal Notice?" American Bar Association – Class Actions and Derivatives Suits Newsletter, Winter edition 1999.

Speaker/Expert Panelist Presenter

U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission	Ms. Finegan participated as an Expert to the Consumer Product Safety Commission to discuss ways in which the CPSC could enhance and measure the recall process. As an expert panelist, Ms. Finegan discussed how the CPSC could better motivate consumers to take action on recalls and how companies could scientifically measure and defend their outreach efforts. Bethesda MD, September 2003.
Weil, Gotshal & Manges	CLE presentation "A Scientific Approach to Legal Notice Communication" New York, June 2003.
Sidley & Austin	CLE presentation "A Scientific Approach to Legal Notice Communication" Los Angeles, May 2003.
Kirkland & Ellis	Speaker to restructuring group addressing "The Best Practicable Methods to Give Notice in a Tort Bankruptcy." Chicago, April 2002.
American Bar Association –	How to Bullet-Proof Notice Programs and What Communication Barriers Present Due Process Concerns in Legal Notice. Presentation to the ABA Litigation Section Committee on Class Actions & Derivative Suits - Chicago, IL, August 6, 2001.
McCutchin, Doyle, Brown & Enerson	Speaker to litigation group in San Francisco and broadcast to four other McCutchin locations, addressing the definition of effective notice and barriers to communication that affects due process in legal notice. San Francisco - June 2001.
Marylhurst University -	Guest lecturer on public relations research methods. Portland - February 2001.
University of Oregon -	Guest speaker to MBA candidates on quantitative and qualitative research for marketing and communications programs. Portland - May 2001.
Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services (JAMS) -	Speaker on the definition of effective notice and barriers to communication that affects due process in legal notice. San Francisco and Los Angeles - June 2000.
International Risk Management Institute –	www.irmi.com/ Ongoing Expert Commentator on Litigation Communications.

American Bankruptcy Institute Journal (ABI) www.abi.org/ Contributing Editor – Beyond the Quill.

Memberships and Professional Credentials

APR, Accredited Public Relations by the Universal Board of Accreditation Public Relations Society of America.
Member of the Public Relations Society

II. Consent Decree signed by the Court Dated April 14, 1999

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, <i>et al.</i> ,)
Plaintiffs,)
v.)
DAN GLICKMAN, SECRETARY,)
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT)
OF AGRICULTURE,)
Defendant.)

Civil Action No.
97-1978 (PLF)

FILE
APR 14 1998
U.S. District Court
District of Columbia

CECIL BREWINGTON, <i>et al.</i> ,)
Plaintiffs,)
v.)
DANIEL R. GLICKMAN,)
Defendant.)

Civil Action No.
98-1693 (PLF)

CONSENT DECREE

WHEREAS the parties desire to resolve amicably all the claims raised in these suits, including the plaintiffs' claims under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, *et seq.*, and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 551, *et seq.*; and

WHEREAS the parties have agreed upon mutually satisfactory terms for the complete resolution of all the claims that have, or could have, been asserted by the plaintiffs in this litigation; and

WHEREAS, in light of the remedial purposes of this Consent Decree, the parties intend that it be liberally construed to

effectuate those purposes in a manner that is consistent with law;
and

WHEREAS the parties have entered into this Consent Decree for the purpose of ensuring that in their dealings with USDA, all class members receive full and fair treatment that is the same as the treatment accorded to similarly situated white persons;

NOW THEREFORE, the plaintiffs and the defendant, Dan Glickman, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"), hereby consent to the entry of this decree with the following terms:

1. Definitions

The following terms shall have the following meanings for purposes of this Consent Decree.

(a) The term "adjudicator" shall mean (i) the person or persons who is/are assigned by the facilitator to undertake the initial review of, and where appropriate make recommended decision on Track A claims under ¶ 9, below; and (ii) JAMS-Endispute, Inc., which shall make the final decision in all Track A claims and resolve issues of tolling under ¶ 6, below.

(b) The term "arbitrator" shall mean Michael K. Lewis of ADR Associates, and the other person or persons selected by Mr. Lewis who meet qualifications agreed upon by the parties and by Mr. Lewis and whom Mr. Lewis assigns to decide Track B claims under ¶ 10, below.

(c) The term "claimant" shall mean any person who submits a claim package for relief under the terms of this Consent Decree.

(d) The term "claim package" shall mean the materials sent to claimants who request them in connection with submitting a claim for relief under the provisions of this Consent Decree. The claim package will include (i) a claim sheet and election form and a Track A Adjudication claim affidavit, copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit A; and (ii) associated documentation and instructions.

(e) The term "class counsel" shall mean Alexander J. Pires, Jr. and Phillip L. Fraas, Lead Counsel for members of the class defined in § 2(a), *infra*. In addition, the following counsel and law firms have been acting, and will continue to act, as Of Counsel in this case: J.L. Chestnut, of Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway, P.C., Selma, AL.; T. Roe Frazer of Langston Frazer, Sweet & Freese, P.A., Jackson, MS.; Hubbard Saunders, IV, of The Terney Firm, Jackson, MS.; Othello Cross, of Cross, Kearney & McKissic, Pine Bluff, AR.; Gerard Lear of Speiser Krause, Arlington, VA.; and William J. Smith, Fresno, CA.

(f) The term "credit" shall mean the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment or to purchase property or services and defer payment therefor.

(g) The term "defendant's counsel" shall mean the United States Department of Justice.

(h) The term "discrimination complaint" shall mean a communication from a class member directly to USDA, or to a member of Congress, the White House, or a state, local or federal

official who forwarded the class member's communication to USDA, asserting that USDA had discriminated against the class member on the basis of race in connection with a federal farm credit transaction or benefit application.

(i) The term "facilitator" shall mean the Poorman-Douglas Corporation, which shall receive claims pursuant to this Consent Decree and assign claims to adjudicators and arbitrators for final resolution. The parties may, by agreement and without the Court's approval, assign to the facilitator such additional tasks related to the implementation of this Consent Decree as they deem appropriate.

(j) The term "preponderance of the evidence" shall mean such relevant evidence as is necessary to prove that something is more likely true than not true.

(k) The term "priority consideration" means that an application will be given first priority in processing, and with respect to the availability of funds for the type of loan at issue among all similar applications filed at the same time; provided, however, that all applications to be given priority consideration will be of equal status.

(l) The term "substantial evidence" shall mean such relevant evidence as appears in the record before the adjudicator that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion after taking into account other evidence in the record that fairly detracts from that conclusion. Substantial evidence is a lower standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence.

(m) The term "USDA" shall include the United States Department of Agriculture and all of its agencies, instrumentalities, agents, officers, and employees, including, but not limited to the state and county committees which administer USDA credit programs, and their staffs.

(n) The term "USDA listening session" shall mean one of the meetings of farmers and USDA's representatives conducted by USDA's Civil Rights Action Team between January 6, 1997 and January 24, 1997.

2. Class Definition

(a) Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) the Court hereby certifies a class defined as follows:

All African American farmers who (1) farmed, or attempted to farm, between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996; (2) applied to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) during that time period for participation in a federal farm credit or benefit program and who believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race in USDA's response to that application; and (3) filed a discrimination complaint on or before July 1, 1997, regarding USDA's treatment of such farm credit or benefit application.

(b) Any putative class member who does not wish to have his claims adjudicated through the procedure established by this Consent Decree may, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2), request to be excluded from the class. To be effective, the request must be in writing and filed with the facilitator within 120 days of the date on which this Consent Decree is entered.

3. Duties of Facilitator

(a) Poorman-Douglas Corporation shall serve as the facilitator and shall perform the following functions:

(i) publish the Notice of Class Settlement in the manner prescribed in ¶ 4, below;

(ii) mail claim packages to claimants who request them;

(iii) process completed claim packages as they are received;

(iv) determine, pursuant to the terms of this Consent Decree, which claimants satisfy the class definition as contained in ¶ 2(a);

(v) transmit to adjudicators claim packages submitted by claimants who contend that they are entitled to participate in the claims process due to equitable tolling of ECOA's statute of limitations under the particular circumstances of their claim;

(vi) transmit to the adjudicator the claims packages of class members with ECOA claims who elect to proceed under Track A;

(vii) transmit to the arbitrator the claims packages of class members with ECOA claims who elect to proceed under Track B;

(viii) transmit to the adjudicator the claims packages of class members who assert only non-credit benefit claims; and

(ix) maintain and operate a toll-free telephone number to provide information to interested persons about the procedure for filing claims under this Consent Decree.

(b) The facilitator's fees and expenses shall be paid by USDA.

4. Class Notice Procedure

(a) Within 10 days after the entry of the Order granting preliminary approval of this Consent Decree the facilitator shall mail a copy of the Notice of Class Certification and Proposed Class Settlement (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B) to all then-known members of the class.

(b) As soon as possible after entry of the Order granting preliminary approval of this Consent Decree the facilitator shall take the following steps:

(i) arrange to have 44 commercials announcing the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree and the time and place of the fairness hearing aired on the Black Entertainment Network, and 18 similar commercials on Cable News Network, during a two-week period;

(ii) arrange to have one-quarter page advertisements announcing the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree and the time and place of the fairness hearing placed in 27 general circulation newspapers, and 115 African-American newspapers, in an 18-state region during a two-week period; and

(iii) arrange to have a full page advertisement announcing the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree and the time and place of the fairness hearing placed in the editions of TV Guide that are distributed in an 18-state region, and a half page advertisement in the national edition of Jet Magazine.

(c) USDA shall use its best efforts to obtain the assistance of community based organizations, including those organizations that focus on African-American and/or agricultural issues, in

communicating to class members and potential class members the fact that the Court has preliminarily approved this Consent Decree and the time and place of the fairness hearing.

5. Class Membership Screening: Election by Claimant: Processing.

(a) The facilitator shall send claim packages to claimants who request them.

(b) To be eligible to obtain relief pursuant to this Consent Decree, a claimant must complete the claim sheet and return it and any supporting documentation to the facilitator. The claimant must also provide to the facilitator evidence, in the form described below, that he filed a discrimination complaint between January 1, 1981 and July 1, 1997:

(i) a copy of the discrimination complaint the claimant filed with USDA, or a copy of a USDA document referencing the discrimination complaint; or

(ii) a declaration executed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 by a person who is not a member of the claimant's family and which (1) states that the declarant has first-hand knowledge that the claimant filed a discrimination complaint with USDA; and (2) describes the manner in which the discrimination complaint was filed; or

(iii) a copy of correspondence from the claimant to a member of Congress, the White House, or a state, local, or federal official averring that the claimant has been discriminated against, except that, in the event that USDA does not possess a copy of the correspondence, the claimant also shall be required to

submit a declaration executed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 by the claimant stating that he sent the correspondence to the person to whom it was addressed; or

(iv) a declaration executed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 by a non-familial witness stating that the witness has first-hand knowledge that, while attending a USDA listening session, or other meeting with a USDA official or officials, the claimant was explicitly told by a USDA official that the official would investigate that specific claimant's oral complaint of discrimination.

(c) In order to be eligible for relief under §§ 9 or 10, below, a claimant must submit his completed claim package to the facilitator postmarked within 180 days of the date of entry of this Consent Decree, except that a claimant whose claim is otherwise timely shall have not less than 30 days to submit a declaration pursuant to subparagraph (b)(iii), above, after being directed to do so without regard to the 180-day period.

(d) At the time a claimant who asserts an ECOA claim submits his completed claim package, he must elect whether to proceed under Track A, ~~see~~ § 9, below, or Track B ~~see~~ § 10, below, except that claimants whose claims arise exclusively under non-credit benefit programs shall be required to proceed under Track A. A class member's election under this subparagraph shall be irrevocable and exclusive.

(e) Each completed claim package must be accompanied by a certification executed by an attorney stating that the attorney

has a good faith belief in the truth of the factual basis of the claim, and that the attorney has not and will not require the claimant to compensate the attorney for assisting him.

(f) Within 20 days of receiving a completed claim package the facilitator shall determine, pursuant to subparagraph (b), above, whether the claimant is a member of the class as defined by § 2(a). If a claimant is determined to be a class member, the facilitator shall assign the class member a consent decree case number, refer the claim package to an adjudicator or an arbitrator, as appropriate, and send a copy of the entire claim package to the class counsel and defendant's counsel along with a notice that includes the class member's name, address, telephone number, social security number, consent decree case number, and that identifies the track under which the class member is proceeding. If a claimant is found not to be a class member, the facilitator shall notify the claimant and the parties' counsel of that finding.

(g) A claimant who satisfies the definition of the class in § 2(a), above, but who fails to submit a completed claim package within 180 days of entry of this Consent Decree may petition the Court to permit him to nonetheless participate in the claims resolution procedures provided in §§ 9 & 10, below. The Court shall grant such a petition only where the claimant demonstrates that his failure to submit a timely claim was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.

6. Tolling of EEOA's Statute of Limitations.

(a) In addition to the class defined herein, a person who otherwise satisfies the criteria for membership in the class defined in § 2(a), above, but who did not file a discrimination complaint until after July 1, 1997, shall be entitled to relief under this Consent Decree by demonstrating, consistent with Irwin v. United States, 498 U.S. 89 (1990), that:

(i) he has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the applicable statute of limitations period;

(ii) he was induced or tricked by USDA's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline for the applicable statute of limitations period to pass; or

(iii) he was prevented by other extraordinary circumstances beyond his control from filing a complaint in a timely manner, provided that excusable neglect shall not qualify as extraordinary circumstances.

(b) Within 10 days of receiving a completed claim package from a person who did not file a discrimination claim until after July 1, 1997, the facilitator shall forward the claim to an adjudicator. The adjudicator shall then determine whether the claim is timely pursuant to subparagraphs (a)(i), (ii), or (iii), above. If the claim is found to be qualified under subparagraph (a), above, the adjudicator shall return the claim package to the facilitator, along with a written determination to that effect. The facilitator shall then process the claim pursuant to § 5(f), above, and the claimant shall be eligible for the relief provided

herein for class members. If the claim is found by the adjudicator to be untimely, the adjudicator shall return the claim package to the facilitator with a written determination to that effect. The facilitator shall promptly notify the claimant of the adjudicator's decision.

7. Interim Administrative Relief

Upon being advised by the facilitator that a claimant satisfies the class definition in § 2(a), above, or that a claimant has met the criteria for equitable tolling under § 6, above, USDA shall immediately cease all efforts to dispose of any foreclosed real property formerly owned by such person. USDA also will refrain from foreclosing on real property owned by the claimant or accelerating the claimant's loan account; however, USDA may take such action up to but not including foreclosure or acceleration that is necessary to protect its interests. USDA may resume its efforts to dispose of any such real property after a final decision in USDA's favor on the class member's claim pursuant to §§ 9 or 10, below.

8. Response by USDA to a Track A Referral Notice

In any Track A case USDA may, within 60 days after receipt of the materials and notice the facilitator is required, pursuant to § 5(f), above, to furnish to USDA with respect to persons who are determined to be class members, provide to the adjudicator assigned to the claim, and to class counsel, any information or materials that are relevant to the issues of liability and/or damages.

9. Track A -- Decision by Adjudicator

(a) In cases in which a class member asserts an ECOA violation and has elected to proceed under Track A:

(i) the adjudicator shall, within 30 days of receiving the material required to be submitted by the class member under ¶ 5, along with any material submitted by defendant pursuant to ¶ 8, above, determine on the basis of those materials whether the class member has demonstrated by substantial evidence that he was the victim of race discrimination. To satisfy this requirement, the class member must show that:

(A) he owned or leased, or attempted to own or lease, farm land;

(B) he applied for a specific credit transaction at a USDA county office during the period identified in ¶ 2(a), above;

(C) the loan was denied, provided late, approved for a lesser amount than requested, encumbered by restrictive conditions, or USDA failed to provide appropriate loan service, and such treatment was less favorable than that accorded specifically identified, similarly situated white farmers; and

(D) USDA's treatment of the loan application led to economic damage to the class member.

(ii) The adjudicator's decision shall be in a format to be agreed upon by the class counsel and defendant's counsel, and shall include a statement of the reasons upon which the decision is based.

(iii) In any case in which the adjudicator decides in a class member's favor, the following relief shall be provided to the class member:

(A) USDA shall discharge all of the class member's outstanding debt to USDA that was incurred under, or affected by, the program(s) that was/were the subject of the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the adjudicator. The discharge of such outstanding debt shall not adversely affect the claimant's eligibility for future participation in any USDA loan or loan servicing program;

(B) The class member shall receive a cash payment of \$50,000 that shall be paid from the fund described in 31 U.S.C. § 1304 ("the Judgment Fund");

(C) an additional payment equal to 25% of the sum of the payment made under subparagraph (B), above, and the principal amount of the debt forgiven under subparagraph (A), above, shall be made by electronic means directly from the Judgment Fund to the Internal Revenue Service as partial payment of the taxes owed by the class member on the amounts paid or forgiven pursuant to those provisions;

(D) The injunctive relief made available pursuant to ¶ 11, below; and

(E) The immediate termination of any foreclosure proceedings that USDA has initiated against any of the class member's real property in connection with the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the adjudicator; and the return of any

USDA inventory property that formerly was owned by the class member but which was foreclosed in connection with the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the adjudicator.

(iv) If the adjudicator determines that a class member's claim is not supported by substantial evidence, the class member shall receive no relief under this Consent Decree.

(v) The decision of the adjudicator shall be final, except as provided by ¶ 12(b)(iii), below. The parties hereby agree to forever waive their right to seek review in any court or before any tribunal of the decision of the adjudicator with respect to any claim that is, or could have been decided by the adjudicator.

(b) In cases in which a class member asserts only non-credit claims under a USDA benefit program:

(i) the adjudicator shall, within 30 days of receiving the material required to be submitted by the class member under ¶ 5, along with any material submitted by defendant pursuant to ¶ 8, above, determine on the basis of those materials whether the class member has demonstrated by substantial evidence that he was the victim of race discrimination. To satisfy this requirement, the class member must show that:

(A) he applied for a specific non-credit benefit program at a USDA county office during the period identified in ¶ 2(a), above; and

(B) his application was denied or approved for a lesser amount than requested, and that such treatment was different than the treatment received by specifically identified, similarly

situated white farmers who applied for the same non-credit benefit.

(ii) The adjudicator's decision shall be in a format to be agreed upon by the parties, and shall include a statement of the reasons upon which the decision is based.

(iii) In any case in which the adjudicator decides in a class member's favor, the following relief shall be provided to the class members:

(A) USDA shall pay to the class member the amount of the benefit wrongly denied, but only to the extent that funds that may lawfully be used for that purpose are then available; and

(B) The injunctive relief made available pursuant to §11(c)-(d), below.

(iv) If the adjudicator determines that a class member's claim is not supported by substantial evidence, the class member shall receive no relief under this Consent Decree.

(v) The decision of the adjudicator shall be final, except as provided by § 12(b)(iii), below. The parties hereby agree to forever waive their right to seek review in any court or before any tribunal of the decision of the adjudicator with respect to any claim that is, or could have been decided by the adjudicator.

(c) The adjudicator's fees and expenses shall be paid by USDA.

10. Track B - Arbitration

(a) Within 10 days of receiving the completed claim package of a class member who has elected to proceed under Track B, the

arbitrator shall notify the class member and defendant of the date on which an evidentiary hearing on the class member's claim will be held. The hearing shall be scheduled for a date that is not less than 120 days, nor more than 150 days, from the date on which the hearing notice is sent.

(b) At least 90 days prior to the hearing described in subparagraph (a), above, USDA and the class member shall file with the arbitrator and serve on each other a list of the witnesses they intend to call at the hearing along with a statement describing in detail the testimony that each witness is expected to provide, and a copy of all exhibits that each side intends to introduce at such hearing. The parties shall be required to produce for a deposition, and for cross examination at the arbitration hearing, any person they identify as a witness pursuant to subparagraph (a), above.

(c) Each side shall be entitled to depose any person listed as a witness by his opponent pursuant to subparagraph (b), above.

(d) Discovery shall be completed not later than 45 days before the date of the hearing described in subparagraph (a), above.

(e) Not less than 21 days prior to commencement of the hearing described in subparagraph (a), above, each side shall (i) notify the other of the names of those witnesses whom they intend to cross-examine at the hearing; and (ii) file with the arbitrator memoranda addressing the legal and factual issues presented by the class member's claim.

(f) The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence. All direct testimony shall be introduced in writing and shall be filed with the arbitrator and served on the opposing side at least 30 days in advance of the hearing. The hearing shall be limited in duration to eight hours, with each side to have up to four hours within which to cross examine his opponent's witnesses, and to present his legal arguments.

(g) The arbitrator shall issue a written decision 30-60 days after the date of the hearing. If the arbitrator determines that the class member has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the victim of racial discrimination and that he suffered damages therefrom, the class member shall be provided the following relief:

(i) actual damages as provided by ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a) to be paid from the Judgment Fund;

(ii) USDA shall discharge all of the class member's outstanding debt to the Farm Service Agency that was incurred under, or affected by, the program(s) that were the subject of the claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the arbitrator. The discharge of such outstanding debt shall not adversely affect the claimant's eligibility for future participation in any USDA loan or loan servicing program;

(iii) The injunctive relief made available pursuant to § 11, below; and

(iv) The immediate termination of any foreclosure proceedings that have been initiated against any of the class member's real property in connection with the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the arbitrator, and the return of any USDA inventory property that was formerly owned by the class member but which was foreclosed in connection with the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the arbitrator.

(h) If the arbitrator rules in the defendant's favor, the class member shall receive no relief under this Consent Decree.

(i) The decision of the arbitrator shall be final, except as provided by ¶ 12(b)(iii), below. The parties hereby agree to forever waive their right to seek review in any court or before any tribunal of the decision of the arbitrator with respect to any claim that is, or could have been decided, by the arbitrator.

(k). The arbitrator's fees and expenses shall be paid by USDA.

11. Class-Wide Injunctive Relief

(a) USDA will provide each class member who prevails under ¶¶ 9(a) or 10 with priority consideration, on a one-time basis, for the purchase, lease, or other acquisition of inventory property to the extent permitted by law. A class member must exercise his right to the relief provided in the preceding sentence in writing and within 5 years of the date this order.

(b) USDA will provide each class member who prevails under ¶¶ 9(a) or 10 with priority consideration for one direct farm ownership loan and one farm operating loan at any time up to five

years after the date of this Order. A class member must notify USDA in writing that he is exercising his right under this agreement to priority consideration in order to receive such consideration.

(c) Any application for a farm ownership or operating loan, or for inventory property submitted within five years of the date of this Consent Decree by any class member who prevails under ¶¶ 9 or 10, will be viewed in a light most favorable to the class member, and the amount and terms of any loan will be the most favorable permitted by law and USDA regulations. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be construed to affect in any way the eligibility criteria for participation in any USDA loan program, except that outstanding debt discharged pursuant to ¶¶ 9(a)(iii)(A) or 10(g)(ii), above, shall not adversely affect the claimant's eligibility for future participation in any USDA loan or loan servicing program.

(d) In conjunction with any application for a farm ownership or operating loan or for inventory property submitted by a class member who prevails under ¶¶ 9 or 10, above, USDA shall, at the request of such class member provide the class member with reasonable technical assistance and service, including the assistance of qualified USDA employees who are acceptable to the class member, in connection with the class member's preparation and submission of any such application.

12. Monitor

(a) From a list of three persons submitted to it jointly by the parties, or, if after good faith negotiations they cannot agree, two persons submitted by plaintiffs and two persons submitted by defendant, the Court shall appoint an independent Monitor who shall report directly to the Secretary of Agriculture. The Monitor shall remain in existence for a period of 5 years and shall not be removed except upon good cause. The Monitor's fees and expenses shall be paid by USDA.

(b) The Monitor shall:

(i) Make periodic written reports (not less than every six months) to the Court, the Secretary, class counsel, and defendant's counsel on the good faith implementation of this Consent Decree;

(ii) Attempt to resolve any problems that any class member may have with respect to any aspect of this Consent Decree;

(iii) Direct the facilitator, adjudicator, or arbitrator to reexamine a claim where the Monitor determines that a clear and manifest error has occurred in the screening, adjudication, or arbitration of the claim and has resulted or is likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice; and

(iv) Be available to class members and the public through a toll-free telephone number in order to facilitate the lodging of any consent decree complaints and to expedite their resolution.

(c) If the Monitor is unable within 30 days to resolve a problem brought to his attention pursuant to subparagraph (ii), above, he may file a report with the parties' counsel who may, in

turn, seek enforcement of this Consent Decree pursuant to ¶ 13, below.

13. Enforcement Procedures

Before seeking any order by the Court concerning the alleged violation of any provision of this Consent Decree, the parties must comply with the following procedures:

(a) The person seeking enforcement of a provision of this Consent Decree shall serve on his opponent a written notice that describes with particularity the term(s) of the Consent Decree that are alleged to have been violated, the specific errors or omissions upon which the alleged violation is based, and the corrective action sought. The person alleging the violation shall not inform the Court of his allegation at that time.

(b) The parties shall make their best efforts to resolve the matter in dispute without the Court's involvement. If requested to do so, the movant shall provide to his opponent any information and materials available to the movant that support the violation alleged in the notice.

(c) The person who served the notice of violation pursuant to subparagraph (a), above, may not move for enforcement of this Consent Decree until at least 45 days after the date on which he served the notice.

14. Attorney's Fees

(a) Class counsel (for themselves and all Of-Counsel) shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs under ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d), and to reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and

expenses under the APA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (as appropriate), that are generated in connection with the filing of this action and the implementation of this Consent Decree. Defendant reserves the right to challenge any and all aspects of class counsel's application for fees, costs, and/or expenses.

(b) Recognizing the fees, costs, and/or expenses already incurred, and given the anticipated fees, costs, and/or expenses to be incurred by class counsel in the implementation of this Consent Decree, defendant will make a one-time payment to class counsel of \$1,000,000 as a credit toward class counsel's application for attorney's fees, costs, and/or expenses. The payment shall be made to class counsel and of counsel (payable to Alexander J. Pires, Jr. and Phillip L. Fraas) within 20 days of the date on which this Consent Decree is entered by the Court. This one-time payment shall be credited against any ultimate award or negotiated settlement of fees, costs, and expenses, and to the extent any such ultimate award or settlement is less than this one-time payment, class counsel shall refund to defendant the entire amount by which this one-time payment exceeds the award or settlement amount.

(c) The provision of attorney's fees, costs, and/or expenses in this Consent Decree is by agreement of the parties and shall not be cited a precedent in any other case.

15. Parties' Respective Responsibilities

No party to this Consent Decree is responsible for the performance, actions, or obligations of any other party to this Consent Decree.

16. Fairness Hearing

(a) Upon the parties' execution of this Consent Decree, the parties shall transmit the Decree to the Court for preliminary approval; request that the Court schedule a fairness hearing on the Consent Decree; and request that the Court, upon issuance of an order granting preliminary approval of this Decree, issue an order setting aside the dates currently scheduled for trial and staying this litigation.

(b) Within 5 days of the execution of this Consent Decree by class counsel and defendant's counsel, the Notice of Class settlement provided for in ¶ 4, above, containing, *inter alia*, a notice of the fairness hearing on this Consent Decree shall be sent to all known, potential members of the class. The fairness hearing will be held at 10:00 AM on March 2, 1999, in Courtroom 20 of the E. Barrett Pettyman United States Courthouse at 3rd St. and Constitution Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. Any objections to the entry of this Consent Decree shall be filed not later than February 15, 1999.

17. Final Judgment

IF, after the fairness hearing, the Court approves this Consent Decree as fair, reasonable, and adequate, a Final Judgment, the entry of which shall be a condition precedent to any obligation of any party under this Consent Decree, shall be

entered dismissing with prejudice, pursuant to the terms of this Consent Decree and Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all claims in the litigation.

18. Releases

As provided by the ordinary standards governing the preclusive effects of consent decrees entered in class actions, all members of the class who do not opt out of this Consent Decree pursuant to ¶ 2(b), above, and their heirs, administrators, successors, or assigns (together, the "Releasors"), hereby release and forever discharge the defendant and his administrators or successors, and any department, agency, or establishment of the defendant, and any officers, employees, agents, or successors of any such department, agency, or establishment (together, the "Releasees") from -- and are hereby themselves forever barred and precluded from prosecuting -- any and all claims and/or causes of action which have been asserted in the Seventh Amended Complaint, or could have been asserted in that complaint at the time it was filed, on behalf of this class, by reason of, or with respect to, or in connection with, or which arise out of, any matters alleged in the complaint which the Releasors, or any of them, have against the Releasees, or any of them. It also is expressly understood that any class-wide claims of race-based discrimination in USDA's credit programs by members of the class defined in ¶ 2(a), above are barred unless the operative facts giving rise thereto did not occur prior to the entry of this Decree.

19. Defendant's Duty Consistent with Law and Regulations

Nothing contained in this Consent Decree or in the Final Judgment shall impose on the defendant any duty, obligation or requirement, the performance of which would be inconsistent with federal statutes or federal regulations in effect at the time of such performance.

20. No Admission of Liability

Neither this Consent Decree nor any order approving this Consent Decree is or shall be construed as an admission by the defendant of the truth of any allegation or the validity of any claim asserted in the complaint, or of the defendant's liability therefor, nor as a concession or an admission of any fault or omission of any act or failure to act, or of any statement, written document, or report heretofore issued, filed or made by the defendant, nor shall this Consent Decree nor any confidential papers related hereto and created for settlement purposes only, nor any of the terms of either, be offered or received as evidence of discrimination in any civil, criminal, or administrative action or proceeding, nor shall they be construed by anyone for any purpose whatsoever as an admission or presumption of any wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, nor as an admission by any party to this Consent Decree that the consideration to be given hereunder represents the relief which could be recovered after trial. However, nothing herein shall be construed to preclude the use of this Consent Decree in order to effectuate the consummation, enforcement, or modification of its terms.

21. No Effect if Default

Subject to the terms of ¶ 17, above, and following entry by the Court of Final Judgment, no default by any person or party to this Consent Decree in the performance of any of the covenants or obligations under this Consent Decree, or any judgment or order entered in connection therewith, shall affect the dismissal of the complaint, the preclusion of prosecution of actions, the discharge and release of the defendant, or the judgment entered approving these provisions. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be construed to affect the Court's jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree on a motion for contempt filed in accordance with ¶ 13.

22. Effect of Consent Decree if Not Approved

This Consent Decree shall not become binding if it fails to be approved by the Court or if for any reason it is rendered ineffective in any judicial proceeding before initially taking effect. Should it fail to become binding, this Consent Decree shall become null and void and shall have no further force and effect, except for the obligations of the parties under this paragraph. Further, in that event: this Consent Decree; all negotiations in connection herewith; all internal, private discussions among the Department of Justice and/or USDA conducted in furtherance of the settlement process to determine the advisability of approving this Consent Decree; and all statements made by the parties at, or submitted to the Court during, the fairness hearing shall be without prejudice to any person or party

to this Consent Decree, and shall not be deemed or construed to be an admission by any party to this Consent Decree of any fact, matter, or proposition.

23. Entire Terms of Agreement

The terms of this Consent Decree constitute the entire agreement of the parties, and no statement, remark, agreement, or understanding, oral or written, which is not contained herein, shall be recognized or enforced.

24. Authority of Class Counsel


Class counsel who are signatories hereto hereby represent, warrant, and guarantee that such counsel are duly authorized to execute this Consent Decree on behalf of the plaintiffs, the members of the plaintiff class, and all Of-Counsel for the plaintiffs.

25. Duty to Defend Decree

The parties to this Consent Decree shall employ their best efforts to defend this Consent Decree against any challenges to this Consent Decree, in any forum.


ALEXANDER J. PIRES, Jr.

Conlon, Frantz, Pheian, Pires
& Leavy
1818 N. St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 331-7050



PHILLIP L. PRAAS
Tuttle, Taylor & Heron
1025 Thomas Jefferson St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 342-1300

Of Counsel:
J.L. Chestnut
Othello Cross
T. Roe Frazer
Gerald R. Lear
Hubbard I Sanders, IV
Willie Smith

Consented to:

DAVID W. OGDEN
Acting Assistant Attorney
General

PHILIP D. BARTZ
Deputy Assistant Attorney
General

DENNIS G. LINDER
Civil Division



MICHAEL SITCOV
CAROLINE LEWIS WOLVERTON
DANIEL E. BENSING
CARLOTTA WELLS
Department of Justice
Civil Division
901 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 514-1944

SO ORDERED.


PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
United States District Judge

DATE: 4/14/99

III. Affidavit Dated February 19, 1999

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_____)	
TIMOTHY FIGFORD, <i>et al.</i> ,)	
Plaintiffs,)	
v.)	Civil Action N. 97-19788 (PLF)
DAN GLICKMAN, Secretary,)	
United States Department of Agriculture,)	
Defendant.)	
_____)	Declaration of Jeanne C. Finegan

I, Jeanne C. Finegan, attest:

1. My name is Jeanne C. Finegan. I am Director of Huntington Legal Advertising, an advertising and media-consulting firm in Beaverton, Oregon which specializes in the design and implementation of Class Action and Bankruptcy media notification campaigns.
2. This declaration is based upon my personal knowledge and upon information provided by associates or staff under my supervision. It is a post analysis of the communications plan. The information is of a type reasonably relied upon in the fields of advertising, media and communications.
3. I have over 15 years of experience in the field of communications, including 11 years as Director/President of Huntington Legal Advertising, one of the largest dedicated legal advertising agencies in the country. During my tenure at this firm, I have coordinated advertising notification programs for large-scale chapter 11 and class action cases including:

In re: Louisiana-Pacific Inner-Seal Siding Litigation, Civil Action Nos. 879-JE, and 1453JE U.S.D.C., District of Oregon, (1995). A multi-million dollar print advertising /Internet notification program designed to alert consumers about the settlement (<http://www.lpsidingclaims.com/>).

In re: Georgia Pacific Hardboard Siding Recovering Program, Case No. CV-95-3330-rg, Circuit Court for the County of Mobile, State of Alabama (1997). Both this and the Louisiana-Pacific notification program were designed to reach class members with the failed siding and alert them to the actions that they needed to take to recover damages. (<http://www.gpclaims.com/>).

In re: Garria Spencer v. Shell Oil Company, Case No. CV 94-074, District Court, Harris County Texas (1995) a \$2.4 million print advertising notification program designed to reach individuals who owned real property or structures in the United States which contained polybutylene plumbing with acetyl insert or metal insert fittings.

ABS II Pipes Litigation, Case No. 3126, Contra Costa Superior Court, State of California (1998). A regional notification designed to alert those who owned structures with the pipe, that they were eligible for recovery on the cost of replacing the pipe. (<http://www.abspipes.com/>)

In re: Alesa Veneer v. State of Oregon A.A., Case No 88C-11289-88C-11300, (1996). This statewide notification program included coupon response and 24-hour 800-information.

Some of my Bankruptcy legal notice experience includes:

In re: Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation, Case No. 91-804 Bankr., Southern District of New York; a \$1 million dollar bar date advertising notification program.

In re: U.S.H. Corporation of New York, et al., and (BRL) Bankr. Southern District of New York; a \$250,000 bar date advertising notification campaign.

In re: Best Products Co., Inc: Bankr. Case No. 96-35267-T, Eastern District Of Virginia; a national legal notice program that included multiple advertising campaigns for notice of sale, bar date, disclosure and plan confirmation.

In re: Dow Corning, Case No. 95-20512 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.); design and implementation of an Internet notification program. (<http://www.implantclaims.com/>)

4. I designed the legal notice program set forth herein, that was implemented by Huntington Legal Advertising and its parent company, Poorman-Douglas Corp.
5. Poorman-Douglas and Huntington Legal Advertising had responsibility for overall management and coordination of this program.
6. Poorman-Douglas (P-D) is a firm with more than 27 years of experience in claims processing. P-D's class action case administration services include coordination of all notice requirements; design of direct-mail notice; establishment of 800 phone line and fulfillment services; receipt and processing of opt-outs; coordination with the U.S. Postal Service; database management; and preparation of affidavits.

8. I understand that Pigford v. Glickman is on behalf of a nation-wide class that includes African American farmers from states including, but not limited to, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. The suit alleges that the Department of Agriculture ("USDA") willfully discriminated against these African American farmers when they applied for various farm programs, and that when they filed complaints of discrimination with the USDA, the USDA failed to properly investigate those complaints.

9. I understand that the class is defined as:

"All African-American farmers who (1) farmed between January 1, 1983, and February 21, 1997; and (2) applied, during that time period, for participation in a federal farm program with USDA, and as a direct result of a determination by USDA in response to said application, believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race, and subsequently filed a written discrimination complaint with USDA." Pigford v. Glickman, Order dated 10/09/98, Hon. Paul L. Friedman, U.S. District Court Judge.

10. I further understand the court certified three sub-classes pursuant to Rule 23(c) (4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: (1) "African-American farmers, who have a file with Defendant, but did not receive a written determination from Defendant in response to their discrimination complaint;" (2) "African-American farmers, who have a file with Defendant, who received a written determination from Defendant in response to their discrimination complaint but who maintain that the written determination from Defendant was not reached in accordance with law;" and (3) "African-American farmers, who do not have a file with Defendant because their discrimination complaints were destroyed, lost or thrown away by Defendant."

11. Based on the Poorman-Douglas/Huntington Advertising team's experience and research reasonably relied upon in the fields of advertising, media and communications, this program was designed to generate attention from those African-American farmers who have been discriminated against by the Department of Agriculture, and alert them to the opportunity to participate in the lawsuit. Details of the program are set forth in greater detail in subsequent paragraphs.

12. The focus of the notification program was to provide targeted national, regional and local notice through the use of paid media vehicles. The program took into account certain demographics of potential class members including ethnicity, occupation and geographical distribution of plaintiffs. The program also considered the psychographic characteristics of this class as defined by MediaMark Research¹. The psychographic analysis revealed the most appropriate media that reached the highest number of potential class members in the most cost-efficient manner.

¹ MediaMark Research, Inc. is a nationally syndicated source which surveys the demographics, product usage, and media exposure of all persons aged 18 and over in the United States.

13. The communication program outlined in this declaration commenced the week of January 18, 1999 and was substantially completed by January 30, 1999. Consistent with our experience, the format for legal notification consisted of three types:

- 1) comprehensive, long-form notice;
- 2) summary notice, containing essential elements of the long-form notice; and
- 3) short form notice, a display ad, the principal purpose being to call attention to the lawsuit.

14. The notice program set forth herein utilized cable television networks, magazines, and newspapers.

15. **Paid Advertising** - One two-week flight² of broadcast ads aired on CNN, and the Black Entertainment Network. Print ads appeared once in the national edition of *Jet Magazine* and regional editions of *TV Guide*; and once in general circulation newspapers and newspapers targeted at African-American readership. See Exhibit 1.

In order to create a highly targeted, cost-efficient proposal, the notification program was segmented into primary and secondary notification regions. The primary area of media focus was on the top seven states where the largest population of African-American Farmers resides, plus the three states, Alabama, Arkansas and Virginia, where approximately 190 named plaintiffs reside. Nationwide, a blanket of paid media coverage ensured additional notification. This blanket consisted of CNN and the Black Entertainment Network, *Jet* and regional editions of *TV Guide*. The primary region utilized the top three general circulation newspapers within each state. Additionally, 100³ African-American newspapers were added as a supplement in all 16 states. The secondary region encompasses all other states. Notification in the secondary region mirrors the primary region with the exception of utilizing only the highest general circulation newspaper in each state.

(a) **Print notification program** - Huntington Legal Advertising published a "short-form" notice (an "abbreviated notice with all the salient points of the case"). Attached to this affidavit (See Exhibit 2) is the short-form. The size of the notice varies depending on the format of the respective publication.

The short-form appeared as a display ad, and its principal purpose was to encourage potential class members to seek further information through an 800 number and mailing address. The information was sufficiently simple and comprehensive for class members to understand the pending litigation and their rights. It was sufficiently motivational to encourage potential class members to

² Flight - the period of time over which a campaign runs.

³ This number differs slightly from the originally planned 115 African-American newspapers. The discrepancy is due to certain advertising policies whereby a certain newspaper declines to run a legal notice of this nature, or the respective publications are no longer conducting business.

seek further, more detailed information from the above mentioned sources. See **Exhibit 3** for newspaper and magazine affidavits and tear sheet detail.

Short-form notices have been utilized in a number of well-publicized cases including Louisiana-Pacific Inner Seal Siding, DuPont Polybutelene Pipe, Avis Discrimination Litigation and many others. The value of short-form notices are twofold: the ads are easy to understand because they are written in lay-terms, and they are typically shorter than the full-notice, which makes them more cost-efficient.

Print ads appeared once in the national edition of Jet and regional editions of TV Guide. These publications were selected based on their reach⁴ and readership among this target group. Individually these publications are quite strong. Jet reaches 40.56 percent of this target group, with TV Guide reaching 48.25 percent.

In calculating the overall performance of each publication, performance formulas eliminate readership, listenership and viewership duplication. Therefore, it is not possible to simply add up the following percentages and calculate an average reach. Additionally these publications have high circulation and pass-along factors⁵. Combined, it is estimated that these magazines had the potential to reach some 5,123,414 households, and specifically some 86,000 African-American farm operators, managers or others in farm-related industries.

(b) Broadcast - We produced a 15-second and 30-second television advertisement, as a voice-over with a copy role. The ad was designed to attract the attention of potential class members. The use of 15- and 30-second spots helped to conserve budget, while increasing the frequency of the message. The commercial described the case and what actions potential claimants should undertake. The 800-number appeared at the bottom of the ad for the duration of the commercial; a copy of the approved script is included. (See **Exhibit 4**). A copy of the toll-free 800 telephone call inquiries as of February 17, 1999 is also included. (See **Exhibit 5**).

(c) Cable Television - A combination of 15-second and 30-second television commercials were targeted to air on CNN, and Black Entertainment Television. We purchased approximately 18 commercials on CNN. (26, :30's and 12, :15's) which aired in various dayparts⁶ such as early news and daytime, fringe and

⁴ Reach is the number or percent of a potential audience exposed to an advertisement, commercial, or special vehicle within a given period. Source: MediaMark Research 12/2/98.

⁵ Both newspapers and magazines have a "pass-along" factor. This represents the total number of readers in addition to the subscriber who review a given publication. Pass-along factors vary among publications. Media Mark research indicates that the pass-along for newspapers is 2.75, for Jet 9.98, Ebony is 6.94, TV Guide is 2.88.

⁶ A daypart is a time segment into which a broadcast day is divided - by audience composition and/or broadcast origination time, (e.g., for television: morning news/daytime/early fringe/early news/prime access/prime time/late news and late fringe. For radio: morning drive, mid-day, afternoon, afternoon drive, etc.)

primetime programming. VHS copies of the ads are included. (See Exhibit 6 – Box 1). We purchased 44 commercials on Black Entertainment. In total, one third of the total number of commercials will be 15-second commercials; two-thirds of the schedule will consist of 30-second commercials. Over two weeks we aired a total of 62 commercials across two cable networks. Some 50 percent of the schedule ran in prime time and 50 percent of the schedule ran in other, well-viewed, dayparts.

Program Evaluation and Analysis - A traditional way for advertisers to assess the potential outreach of paid advertising is through a "reach and frequency" analysis of plan performance. Calculations are based upon the number of ads, audited circulation figures of newspapers and magazines in which the advertisement appears, and the potential audience delivery of the broadcast or cable program purchased.

Analyses of plan performance is based on standard media evaluation tools and research provided by traditionally accepted media evaluation sources, such as MediaMark Research and AC Nielsen.

Program Analysis – On average this notice plan reached 87 percent of African-American farm operators, managers or others in farm-related industries, an average frequency⁷ of 2.4 times. The analysis is based on the psychographic tendencies of this target demographic group to watch or read various media. This notice plan reached a total of 8,635,050 newspaper households. The combined circulation for the selected magazines in this plan reached 5,123,414 households. The ad campaign resulted in 13,418 telephone calls, as of February 17, 1999.

For this campaign, newspaper achieved 23,746,387 adult gross impressions. Magazine created 9,227,767 adult gross impressions.

For this campaign, cable television reached nearly 18,495,000 television households nationwide. The purchased schedule on CNN created 11,449,000 adult gross impressions⁸, and Black Entertainment Television created 7,788,000 adult gross impressions.

access/prime time/late news and late fringe. For radio: morning drive, mid-day, afternoon, afternoon drive, etc.)

⁷ Average Frequency is the number of times the average household or person is exposed to an advertising schedule within a specific period of time. Independent studies conducted by Hubert Zielske, "Remembering and Forgetting of Advertising," - Journal of Marketing 23 (March 1959) 239-43, and Leon Jakobovits, "Semantic Satiation and Cognitive Dynamics," American Psychological Association meeting paper, September 1966, concur that unless an individual is exposed often enough within a short enough interval, there is little point in reaching him/her at all. The clustering of ad messages over a short period of time increases recollection. The optimum frequency of exposures for gaining attention and learning a message is about three.

⁸ Adult Gross Impressions are the number of those who might have had the opportunity to be exposed to a story that has appeared in the media. In print the term "impression or "opportunity to see" usually refers to the total audited

16 **Summary** - Based on my experience in designing and implementing legal notice programs in civil action suits, I believe that the notification campaign detailed in this declaration was strong resulting in some 15,132 telephone calls as of this date. I believe that the program resulted in broad-scale notification to potential class members of this case.

Dated: February 19, 1999


JEANNE C. FINEGAN

circulation of a publication. For example one article in a newspaper might be said to generate 1.5 million impressions or opportunities to see the story. Two articles would generate 3 million impressions, and so on.

Exhibit List

- Exhibit 1** Print detail
African-American Newspaper detail includes
Circulation
Date of publication
Location by state
General Circulation Newspaper detail includes
Circulation
Date of publication
Location by state
Magazine detail includes
Circulation in targeted states
Date of publication
Readership totals
- Exhibit 2** Short Form Display Ad
- Exhibit 3** Publication affidavits and tear sheets *(box 1)
- Exhibit 4** Broadcast scripts for 15- and 30-second commercials
- Exhibit 5** 800 Toll-Free Caller information
- Exhibit 6** VHS copy of ads *(box 1)
- Exhibit 7** Broadcast Schedules
CNN
Black Entertainment Television

Exhibit 1

African –American Newspapers

Huntington Legal Advertising
H
African American Newspaper Publication Report

STATE/PUBLICATION	AFFIDAVIT	TEARSHEET	RUN DATE	CIRCULATION
ALABAMA				
The Birmingham Times	X	X	1/21/99	21,500
Greene County Democrat	X	X	1/20/99	3,500
Mobile Beacon and Alabama Citizen	X	X	1/23/99 & 1/30/99	7,000
Speakin' Out News	X	X	1/20/99	21,000
The Tuskegee News	X	X	1/21/99	5,800
The Western Star	X	X	1/20/99	7,000
ARKANSAS				
Arkansas Tribune	X	X	1/21/99	5,000
CALIFORNIA				
The Black Voice News	X	X	1/21/99	7,500
California Advocate	X	X	1/29/99	25,000
LA Watts Times	X	X	1/21/99	25,500
Los Angeles Scoop	X	X	1/21/99	100,000
Los Angeles Sentinel	X	X	1/21/99	28,000
The Pasadena/San Gabriel Valley Journal	X	X	1/21/99	12,000
Sacramento Observer	X	X	WEEK OF 1/21	49,090
The San Diego Voice & Viewpoint	X	X	1/21/99	
San Francisco Bay View	X	X	1/20/99	
DELAWARE				
none	*	*	*	
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA				
Capital Spotlight Newspaper	X	X	1/21/99	50,000
News Dimensions	X	X	1/22/99	25,000
Washington Afro-American	X	X	1/23/99	40,000
The Washington Informer	X	X	1/21/99	27,000
Washington New Observer	X	X	1/23/99	20,000
Washington Sun	X	X	1/21/99	45,000
FLORIDA				
The Bulletin	X	X	1/22/99	18,525
Central Florida Advocate	X	X	1/22/99	30,000
Community Voice	X	X	1/21/99	12,000
Daytona Times	X	X	1/21/99	15,000
Florida Sentinel Bulletin	X	X	1/22/99	21,600
The Florida Star	X	X	1/21/99	10,000
Jacksonville Advocate	X	X	1/18/99	31,624
Jacksonville Free Press	X	X	1/21/99	38,000
New American Press	X	X	1/21/99	34,000
Northeast Florida Advocate	X	X	1/21/99	38,000
The Orlando Times	X	X	1/21/99	10,000
The Palm Beach Gazette	X	X	1/21/99	3,000
The Pensacola Voice	X	X	1/21/99	36,250

Huntington Legal Advertising
H
African American Newspaper Publication Report

The Pompano Ledger	X	X	1/21/99	22,000
Tallahassee Capital Outlook	X	X	WEEK OF 1/21	12,000
The Weekly Challenger	X	X	1/23/99	36,000
Westside Gazette	X	X	1/21/99	35,000
GEORGIA				
The Atlanta Bulletin	X	X	1/23/99	50,000
Atlanta Daily World	X	X	1/28 - 1/29	16,000
The Atlanta Inquirer	X	X	1/30/99	60,000
The Atlanta News Leader	Confirmed/Tearsheet Pending		1/19/99	10,000
Atlanta Voice	X	X	1/21/99	133,000
Augusta Focus	X	X	1/21/99	22,000
The Champion	X	X	1/21/99	17,000
The Columbus Times	X	X	WEEK OF 1/20	20,056
The Herald	X	X	1/20/99	8,500
The Macon Courier	X	X	1/20/99	17,100
The Metro Courier	X	X	1/20/99	23,660
Savannah Tribune/Fort Valley Herald	X	X	1/20/99	8,000
KENTUCKY				
Louisville Defender	X	X	1/21/99	2,833
LOUISIANA				
Alexandria News Weekly	Confirmed/Tearsheet Pending		1/21/99	13,750
Baton Rouge Weekly Press	X	X	1/21/99	7,500
The Drum	X	X	WEEK OF 1/20	4,000
The Louisiana Weekly	X	X	WEEK OF 1/18	9,060
Monroe Dispatch	X	X	1/21/99	12,500
Monroe Free Press	X	X	1/21/99	14,000
New Orleans Data News Weekly	X	X	1/16/99	20,000
Shreveport Sun	X	X	1/21/99	7,000
MARYLAND				
Baltimore Times	X	X	1/22/99	32,000
The Dundalk Eagle	X	X	1/21/99	26,000
The Prince George's Post	X	X	1/21/99	10,000
Baltimore Afro-American	X	X	WEEK OF 1/23	
Every Wednesday	X	X	1/27/99	40,000
MISSISSIPPI				
Jackson Advocate	X	X	1/21/99	26,000
Mississippi Memo Digest	X	X	1/20/99	3,000
NORTH CAROLINA				
Carolina Peacemaker	X	X	1/21/99	8,000
The Carolina Times	X	X	1/23/99	5,800
The Carolinian	X	X	1/21/99	17,700
Challenger	X	X	1/21/99	5,000
The Charlotte Post	X	X	1/21/99	10,743
The Fayetteville Press	X	X	1/25/99	7,000

**Huntington Legal Advertising
H
African American Newspaper Publication Report**

Frederic II County News	X	X	1/21/99	2,500
Wilmington Journal	X	X	1/21/99	8,600
Winston-Salem Chronicle	X	X	1/21/99	10,000
OKLAHOMA				
The Black Chronicle	X	X	1/21/99	28,803
The Oklahoma Eagle	X	X	1/21/99	15,000
SOUTH CAROLINA				
Black News	X	X	1/20/99	45,722
Carolina Panorama	X	X	1/22/99	16,000
Charleston Chronicle	X	X	1/20/99	6,000
The News	X	X	1/27/99	5,000
TENNESSEE				
Nashville Pride	X	X	1/22/99	35,000
Tri-State Defender	X	X	WEEK OF 1/23	25,600
TEXAS				
Dallas Post Tribune	X	X	1/21/99	18,500
The Dallas Weekly	X	X	1/26/99	20,300
Houston Defender	X	X	1/24/99	40,000
Houston Style	X	X	1/13 - 1/19	45,000
The Informer and Texas Freeman	X	X	1/22/99	30,000
San Antonio Informer	X	X	1/21/99	4,000
San Antonio Register	X	X	1/21/99	7,800
Snap News	X	X	1/23/99	10,000
Southwest Digest	X	X	1/21/99	27,000
The Villager	X	X	1/22/99	6,000
VIRGINIA				
The Metro Herald	Confirmed/Tearsheet Pending		1/22/99	35,000
New Journal & Guide	X		1/20/99	25,000
Richmond Free Press	X	X	1/21 - 1/23	25,000
The Richmond Voice	X	X	1/27/99	44,000
Roanoke Tribune	X	X	1/21/99	5,500
West Virginia Beacon Digest				
West Virginia Beacon Digest	X	X	1/20/99	35,000

TOTAL CIRCULATION 2,171,416

AFFIDAVITS AND TEAR SHEETS ARE ATTACHED

General Circulation Newspapers

**HUNTINGTON LEGAL ADVERTISING
General Circulation Newspapers**

State	Newspaper	Circulation	Pub. Date
Alabama	Birmingham News, Post-Herald	178,812	1/21/99
Arkansas	Arkansas Democrat Gazette	174,722	1/21/99
California	Los Angeles Times	1,095,007	1/21/99
Florida	The Miami Herald	367,029	1/21/99
Georgia	Atlanta Journal & Constitution	444,921	1/21/99
	Augusta Chronicle	74,671	1/21/99
	Macon Telegraph	70,644	1/21/99
Connecticut	Hartford Courant	216,292	1/21/99
Illinois	Chicago Tribune	672,999	1/21/99
Kansas	Wichita Eagle	93,441	1/21/99
Louisiana	New Orleans Times-Picayune	262,123	1/21/99
Mississippi	Clarion-Ledger	108,173	1/21/99
	Sun Herald	49,464	1/21/99
	NE Mississippi Journal	38,091	1/21/99
Missouri	St. Louis Post Dispatch	316,265	1/21/99
N. Carolina	Charlotte Observer	245,829	1/21/99
	Raleigh News & Observer	161,920	1/21/99
	Winston Salem Journal	90,523	1/21/99
S. Carolina	Columbia State	123,412	1/21/99
	Charleston Post & Courier	112,535	1/21/99
	Greenville News	98,950	1/21/99
Tennessee	Nashville Tennessean	195,974	1/21/99
	Memphis Commercial Appeal	171,442	1/21/99
	Knoxville News-Sentinel	117,948	1/21/99
Texas	Houston Chronicle	553,387	1/21/99
Virginia	Richmond Times Dispatch	210,160	1/21/99
TOTAL CIRCULATION		6,244,734	
TOTAL READERSHIP/GROSS IMPRESSIONS		17,173,018	

Magazines

Huntington Legal Advertising
H
 TV Guide Regional Circulation Detail

Publication	Geographical Distribution	Circulation	*Readership
TV Guide	Alabama		
	Northern	91,000	
	Southern	35,000	
	Gulf Coast	45,000	
	Arkansas		
	State Edition	33,000	
	California		
	California N	191,000	
	Fresno	35,000	
	Los Angeles	700,000	
	San Francisco	400,000	
	Santa Barbara	74,000	
	Bakersfield	32,000	
	San Diego	230,000	
	Washington		
	D.C./Baltimore/		
	Delaware/		
	Maryland Edition	415,000	
	Florida		
	Northern	37,000	
	Southern	141,000	
	Orlando	99,000	
	Tampa-Sarasota	127,000	
	Georgia		
	Atlanta	220,000	
	Georgia-Southern	33,000	
	Kentucky		
	State Edition	73,000	

Huntington Legal Advertising
H
 TV Guide Regional Circulation Detail

Louisiana	
State Edition	72,000
New Orleans	35,000

Mississippi	
Central Edition	22,000
Southern Edition	22,000

North Carolina	
Eastern	102,000
Charlotte	94,000

Oklahoma	
Tulsa	27,000
Oklahoma City	60,000

South Carolina	
State Edition	61,000

Tennessee	
Nashville	90,000
Knoxville/Chattanooga	38,000

Texas	
San Antonio	18,000
Shreveport/Texarkana	42,000
North Edition	43,000
South Edition	32,000
West	29,000
Dallas/Ft. Worth	100,000
Houston	98,000

Virginia	
Central	39,000
Eastern	88,000

West Virginia	
State Edition	77,000

Total Regional TV Guide Circulation	4,200,000
Total Regional Reader's for TV Guide	

12,096,000

Huntington Legal Advertising

H

TV Guide Regional Circulation Detail

**Readership or pass along factor: Magazines have multiple readers per copy. This is called a pass-along factor. TV Guide's pass-along is 2.75 per copy. This number is results in a readership total.*

Huntington Legal Advertising
H
 Jet Magazine Regional Circulation Detail and National
 Circulation/ Readership Totals

Publication	Geographical Distribution	Circulation	*Readership
Jet Magazine	Alabama State Edition	30,906	
	Arkansas	9,466	
	California	77,187	
	Delaware	4,499	
	District of Columbia	16,377	
	Florida	44,183	
	Georgia	58,918	
	Kentucky	9,486	
	Louisiana	25,508	
	Maryland	46,608	
	Mississippi	21,356	
	South Carolina	26,838	

Huntington Legal Advertising
H
 Jet Magazine Regional Circulation Detail and National
 Circulation/ Readership Totals

North Carolina	51,753
Oklahoma	8,326
Tennessee	27,755
Texas	57,045
Virginia	41,264
West Virginia	2,185

Total Jet Circulation for States of Focus	516,211	5,151,785
Total National Jet Circulation	923,414	9,215,671

**Readership or pass along factor: Magazines have multiple readers per copy. This is called a pass-along factor. Jet's pass-along is 9.98 per copy. This number is results in a readership total.*

****The National Edition of Jet was purchased for this notification program.**

Exhibit 2

ATTENTION

All past or present African American Farmers, your rights may be affected by a nationwide class action lawsuit. You may be entitled to compensation and damages.

You may be a potential class member if you farmed or attempted to farm between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996, and applied to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) for participation in a federal farm credit or benefit program and believe that you were discriminated against based on race. Settlement of the lawsuit has been preliminarily approved by the Court.

The Deadline to Opt-Out of the Class is 120 days from date of final approval of settlement.

The Deadline to file a claim is 180 days from date of final approval of settlement.

The Hearing before the Court for final approval is March 2, 1999.

If you wish to obtain more information about this case, obtain a claim package, or obtain a form to opt-out, call toll free:

1-800-646-2873

DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT OR CLERK'S OFFICE FOR INFORMATION

Exhibit 3

Exhibit 4

Farmers Litigation

:30 Second Cable Television Spot

:15 Second Cable Television Spot

1. Fade up copy roll over blue screen.

Split lower Screen
Super and hold

1-800-646-2873

If you are African American and farmed or attempted to farm between 1981 and 1996 the following announcement may apply to you.

If you applied to the U.S. Department of Agriculture for a farm credit or benefit programand believe that you were discriminated against based on race, you may be entitled to compensation and damages.

For more information please call toll free 1-800-646-2873.

**Farmers Litigation:
:15 Second Cable Television Spot**

1. Fade up copy roll over blue screen.
Super split screen and hold
1-800-646-2873
- If you are an African American and farmed between 1981 and 1996, your rights may be affected by a nationwide class action lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

For information call,
1-800-646-2873

2. Supers: fade out /fade copy roll

Exhibit 5

ACD-DN DAILY BLK FARMERS PERF RPT Page 1
Daily Report

Poorman-Doug las Date: 02/17/99 Time: 15:54:44

Days: 12/19/98 .. 02/16/99

ACD-DN	DAY	HRS AVAIL	TOTAL ACD CALLS	AVG ACD TALK TIME	TOTAL NOT READY TIME	AVG WAIT TIME	TOTAL OUT CALLS	ACD XFERD	NET OUT CLS	AVG BND DN TIME	TOTAL STAFF TIME	ANSR SRVS RATE
		HH:MM	MM:SS	HH:MM	MM:SS	HH:MM	MM:SS			SEC	HH:MM	
6671	01/05/99	0:02	2	0:05	0:10	0:29	2	0	2	40	0:13	100
	01/06/99	34:37	144	2:54	2:15	8:43	40	1	39	121	36:52	96
	01/07/99	57:45	509	2:47	7:22	2:12	30	1	29	77	65:07	93
	01/08/99	55:36	543	2:39	9:02	1:47	75	4	71	77	64:38	82
	01/11/99	54:49	669	2:41	6:26	1:03	90	4	86	66	61:15	70
	01/12/99	49:11	464	3:02	9:53	1:24	51	8	43	58	59:04	79
	01/13/99	53:36	401	3:31	7:18	1:49	65	7	58	83	60:54	86
	01/14/99	56:24	343	3:22	4:44	3:04	38	6	32	77	61:08	95
	01/15/99	54:09	282	3:20	5:30	4:06	75	2	73	60	59:38	91
	01/18/99	58:22	194	2:52	3:02	7:23	38	0	38	87	61:24	97
	01/19/99	63:30	436	3:27	8:17	2:31	77	3	74	61	71:47	88
	01/20/99	57:22	444	2:51	5:22	2:30	44	3	41	50	62:44	86
	01/21/99	48:04	540	2:30	5:12	1:49	57	13	44	86	53:15	97
	01/22/99	45:13	371	2:59	10:11	2:13	47	12	35	71	55:24	92
	01/25/99	63:22	842	2:43	8:23	0:33	46	7	39	71	71:45	69
	01/26/99	58:09	693	2:15	16:39	1:07	32	3	29	70	74:48	94
	01/27/99	46:03	561	2:34	8:09	1:02	32	2	30	55	54:12	93
	01/28/99	52:53	638	2:15	6:36	1:27	27	4	23	53	59:29	96
	01/29/99	45:39	510	2:32	10:40	1:06	28	2	26	86	56:19	94
	02/01/99	62:29	585	3:15	10:05	0:43	46	3	43	71	72:34	90
	02/02/99	54:23	388	3:05	9:58	1:23	41	4	37	107	64:20	91
	02/03/99	52:38	372	3:26	7:20	1:30	34	0	34	81	59:58	85
	02/04/99	55:32	389	3:09	4:49	1:53	25	1	24	85	60:21	92
	02/05/99	51:35	318	3:00	4:42	1:41	23	2	21	52	56:17	93
	02/07/99	0:00	0	0:00	0:01	0:00	0	0	0	0	0:01	0
	02/08/99	38:57	631	2:45	8:24	0:43	27	2	25	86	47:20	59
	02/09/99	34:50	402	2:56	6:05	1:45	19	1	18	57	40:55	83
	02/10/99	35:50	330	2:55	3:10	1:53	23	1	22	67	36:59	80
	02/11/99	39:40	290	2:36	2:27	3:31	14	0	14	90	42:07	95
	02/12/99	49:50	298	2:55	5:03	4:57	51	0	51	77	54:52	93
	02/13/99	24:00	0	0:00	0:00	*****	0	0	0	0	24:00	0
	02/14/99	24:00	0	0:00	0:00	*****	0	0	0	0	24:00	0
	02/15/99	62:41	418	2:52	5:43	4:49	20	1	19	116	68:24	87
	02/16/99	48:15	491	2:52	3:56	1:57	31	1	30	126	52:12	82

6671		1589:25	13418	2:51	206:52	2:11	1248	98	1150	76	1796:16	86

1589:25 13418 2:51 206:52 2:11 1248 98 1150 76 1796:16 86												

Exhibit 6

Exhibit 7

PRINT TO
 CK BILLING STATEMENT
 BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
 PHONE: MD 21277

REPRESENTATIVE
 LDC AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM
 ADDRESS: KLE
 CLASS ACTION NOTIFIC

INDEX NUMBER 16597801
DATE 1-31-99
PAGE
DATE CARD 76
BROADCAST MONTH JANUARY
STATION YES
CONTRACT END DATE 1-29-99
CONTRACT NUMBER 165978
CUSTOMER NUMBER 001142
AGENCY

REP HEADQUARTERS
 ONE RETLAZ
 WASHINGTON, DC 20001

LINE	PROGRAM	START DATE	END DATE	SPOTS	SPOT RATE	SPOT TYPE	SPOT LENGTH	SPOT TIME	SPOT DESCRIPTION	SPOT AMOUNT	REMARKS
10	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	114P	15	1:22	PR	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		
11	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	122P	15	1:22	PR	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		
12	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	357P	30	1:18	MC	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		
13	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	425P	30	1:20	ME	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		
14	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	427P	30	1:20	ME	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		
15	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	411P	30	1:20	TR	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		
16	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	347P	15	1:24	TU	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		
17	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	656P	30	1:20	WE	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		
18	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	633P	30	1:20	TH	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		
19	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	658P	15	1:18	MO	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		
20	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	658P	15	1:29	TR	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		
21	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	828P	30	1:20	TH	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		
22	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	818P	15	1:29	MO	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		
23	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	955P	30	1:20	WE	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		
24	ROTATING	01/17/99	01/23/99	1	943P	30	1:20	TH	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARM		

ACTUAL GROSS BILLING
AGENCY COMMISSION
NET GROSS AMOUNT

ACTUAL GROSS BILLING
AGENCY COMMISSION
NET GROSS AMOUNT

NET GROSS CONFIRMATION
 (Print the actual broadcast information when the broadcast
 from the program log and will be available, on request, for inspection by
 advertiser for at least 12 months.



P. O. BOX 79440
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
21279-0440

INVOICE
AGENCY BILLING ADDRESS

MAKE CHECKS TO
BLACK ENTERTAINMENT
P. O. BOX 79440
BALTIMORE, MD 21279

INVOICE NUMBER 16559801
DATE 1-31-99
RATE CARD 96
ISSUE/ISSUE MONTH JANUARY
SUBJECT STD YES
CONTRACT END DATE 1-29-99
CONTRACT NUMBER 165598
CUSTOMER NUMBER 001142

REPRESENTATIVE LOS AFRICAN AMERICAN FAR
ADVERTISER LOS AFRICAN AMERICAN FAR
CLASS ACTION NOTIFIC KLE
SALESPERSON NUMBER 5005

SCHEDULE	START DATE	END DATE	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	AD	TIME PERIOD	PLAN	RATE	NO. SPOTS	DAYS	DAY LENGTH	TIME	SPOTS/STAGE	SPOTS	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT	RECONCILIATION	DISCR
	1-18	1-24									12M-3M	CA	1	1	1-20	WE	30	248A	1	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARME			
	1-25	1-29									12M-3M	CA	1	1	1-24	TU	15	244A	1	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARME			
	1-23	1-23									8-9P	CA	1	1	1-23	SA	30	B3DP	1	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARME			
	1-24	1-24									9A-10A	CA	2	2	1-24	SU	30	921A	2	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARME			
	1-18	1-29									530-10P	CA	4	4	1-24	SU	30	939A	4	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARME			
	1-18	1-29									12M-3M	CA	1	1	1-24	TU	15	989P	1	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARME			
	1-18	1-29									12M-3M	CA	1	1	1-24	TH	15	937P	1	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARME			
	1-18	1-29									12M-3M	CA	1	1	1-28	TH	15	939P	1	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARME			
	1-18	1-29									12M-3M	CA	2	2	1-22	WE	15	904P	2	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARME			
	1-18	1-29									12M-3M	CA	2	2	1-22	WE	15	924P	2	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARME			
	1-18	1-29									12M-3M	CA	2	2	1-18	ME	15	1052P	2	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARME			
	1-18	1-29									12M-3M	CA	2	2	1-22	FR	15	1014P	2	AFRICAN AMERICAN FARME			

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

MONTHLY COST CONFIRMATION

We warrant that the actual broadcast information shown on this invoice was taken from the program log and will be available, on request, for inspection by advertiser or agency for at least 90 days.

ACTUAL GROSS BILLING
AGENCY COMMISSION
NET TOTAL
TOTAL RECONCILING DIME

REMITTANCE COPY



AGENCY BILLING ADDRESS

MAKE CNN / CABLE NEWS NETWORK
 PAYMENT P.O. BOX 830182
 ATLANTA, GA 31193

LOS ANGELES
 SALES
 AFRICAN AMERICAN
 4238

REPRESENTATIVE
 GUITRON, ERRI
 560

CNN
 ORDER TYPE 0
 INVOICE NO. 1382-153905
 SCHEDULE DATES 01/16/95-01/31/95
 AGENCY EST. NO. 2088002
 BROADCAST MONTH 02
 CONTRACT YEAR

SCHEDULE		ACTUAL BROADCAST		RECONCILIATION												
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
DAYS	LINE	RATE	SPOTS	DATES	DAY	TIME	LENGTH	SPOTS	PRODUCT/FILM NO.	RATE	REMARKS	DR.	DR.	DR.	DR.	DR.
-F	LINE# 11	1200P-100A	AK	1/20	W	1232A	15	AK	FARMERSLITTS							
		LARRY KING RPL		1/28	M	1232A	15	AK	FARMERSLITTS							
	LINE# 12	1000P-1100P	AL	1/25	M	1038P	30	AL	FARMERSLITTS							
		CNN & TIME TOP		1/18	M	916P	15	AJ	FARMERSLITTS							
-F	LINE# 10	900P-1000P	AJ	1/27	W	948P	15	AJ	FARMERSLITTS							
		LARRY KING LIVE		1/19	T				FARMERSLITTS							
	LINE# 18	CNN TODAY	-230P	1/29	F	216P	15	AR	FARMERSLITTS							
J	LINE# 16	200P-300P	AP	1/31	SU	221P	30	AP	FARMERSLITTS							
		WORLD REPORT		1/25	M	137A	30	AI	FARMERSLITTS							
	LINE# 13	100A-200A	AI								SPECIAL NEWS CD VERGE					
		CNN & TIME M 1A														

MONTHLY COST PER ORDER CONFIRMATION \$000000
 WARRANT THAT THE ACTUAL BROADCAST INFORMATION SHOWN ON THIS INVOICE WAS TAKEN FROM THE PROGRAM LOG, FEDERAL ID# -2431575

SUB-TOTALS
 TOTAL RECONCILING ITEMS

1984
 COLUMBINE JDS: HIAH

IV. Copies of Opinions on the Notice Program

TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, ET AL., APPELLEES v. ANN M. VENEMAN,
SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
APPELLANT

Nos. 02-5052 & 02-5053

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT

352 U.S. App. D.C. 214; 292 F.3d 918; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 12283; 53 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 275

May 1, 2002, Argued
June 21, 2002, Decided

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1] As Corrected August 8, 2002. Rehearing Denied August 26, 2002, Reported at: 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18009.

PRIOR HISTORY: Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. (No. 97cv01978). (No. 98ev01693).

DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

COUNSEL: Howard S. Scher, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice.

Jason A. Levine argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Anthony Herman and Alexander J. Pires, Jr.

JUDGES: Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and TATEL, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

OPINIONBY: TATEL.

OPINION:

[*919] TATEL, *Circuit Judge*: The question presented in this appeal concerns a district court's authority to interpret or modify a consent decree—here,

the settlement of a class action brought by over 20,000 African-American farmers charging the United States Department of Agriculture with racial discrimination in lending practices. Due to class counsel's failure—"bordering on legal malpractice," the district court called it—to meet critical consent decree deadlines, the district court interpreted the decree to allow extension of such deadlines "so long as justice requires." Although we find that the district court exceeded [**2] its interpretive authority under the decree, we hold that class counsel's conduct justifies modifying the decree under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). But because the order does not satisfy the "tailoring" requirement for a Rule 60(b)(5) modification, see *Ruffo v. inmates* [**920] of *the Suffolk County Jail*, 502 U.S. 367, 383, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992), we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Proceeding under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 1691-1691f, three African-American farmers filed this class action against the United States Department of Agriculture alleging racial discrimination in the administration of federally funded credit and benefit programs. The class ultimately included 22,000 similarly situated farmers from fifteen states. Shortly before the farmers filed suit, the Department released a report commissioned by then-Secretary Dan Glickman "to address [the agency's] longstanding civil rights problems," documented since the 1960s by numerous federal government "studies, reports, and task forces." CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION TEAM, USDA, CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF AGRICULTURE [**3] 2-3 (1997), available at http://www.usda.gov/news/civil/cr_next.htm. Examining the "painful history" of its dealings with African-American farmers, the Department concluded that local credit and loan agencies responsible for administering Department programs often discriminated against the farmers. *Id.* at 6. According to the Glickman report, Department officials had "effectively dismantled" the Office for Civil Rights Enforcement—the very office charged with addressing discrimination complaints. *Id.* at 47-48 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Often making matters worse," the "complaints processing system" was a "bureaucratic nightmare" that "processed [complaints] slowly, if at all," resulting in a huge "backlog," while at the same time the agency "proceeded with farm foreclosures—even where discrimination may have contributed to the farmers' plight." *Id.* at 22-25. "Minority farmers," the report concluded, "lost significant amounts of land and potential farm income as a result of discrimination by [USDA] programs." *Id.* at 30.

After Congress intervened to preserve the farmers' claims by tolling the Equal Credit Opportunity Act's two-year statute [**4] of limitations, see *Pigford v. Glickman*, 185 F.R.D. 82, 88-89 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f)), the parties entered into a consent decree. Designed to "ensure that in their dealings with USDA, all class members receive full and fair treatment that is the same as the treatment accorded to similarly situated white persons," the decree establishes procedures for resolving class members' individual claims. Consent Decree at 2. Specifically, the decree allows class members to choose between two claims procedures, known as Tracks A and B. In recognition of the fact that "most ... [class] members ... had little in the way of documentation or proof" of either discriminatory treatment or damages suffered, Track A awards \$ 50,000 to those farmers able to "meet only a minimal burden of proof." *Pigford*, 185 F.R.D. at 103. Track B—the mechanism at issue here—imposes no cap on damages, but requires farmers who choose this track, after limited discovery consisting "essentially [of] an exchange of lists of witnesses and exhibits and depositions of the opposing side's witnesses," to prove their claims by a preponderance of [**5] the evidence in one-day mini-trials before an arbitrator. *Id.* at 106. Set forth in paragraph 10 of the decree, Track B establishes strict time frames: the arbitrator sends a hearing notice within 10 days of receiving a Track B claim and holds a hearing no more than 150 days later; at least 90 days before the hearing, the Department and claimant file and serve on each other witness lists, summaries of direct testimony, and copies of all exhibits; discovery ends no later than 45 days before the hearing; and no fewer than 21 days before the hearing, both sides [**21] list witnesses they

intend to cross-examine and file summaries of all legal and factual issues. Consent Decree P 10(a)-(e). Track A and B decisions are final, except that the losing side may petition for review by a court-appointed monitor. *Id.* P P 9(a)(v), 9(b)(v), 10(i), 12(b)(iii).

Following notice to the class and a hearing, the district court approved the consent decree as "fair, adequate, and reasonable," pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. *Pigford*, 185 F.R.D. at 113. According to the district court, the decree represents an "historical first step toward righting the wrongs [**6] visited upon thousands of African-American farmers for decades by the [USDA]." *Pigford v. Glickman*, 127 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.D.C. 2001). Our opinion affirming the district court's approval of the decree noted its importance for both the farmers and the government: the "United States is likely to provide an estimated \$ 2 billion in debt relief and monetary payments in consideration for the dismissal of the class's complaint." *Pigford v. Glickman*, 340 U.S. App. D.C. 420, 206 F.3d 1212, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Ultimately, 21,546 claims were accepted for review—21,558 under Track A and 188 under Track B.

The decree provided for class counsel to receive an advance payment of \$ 1 million in fees to cover decree "implementation." Consent Decree P 14(b). The decree entitled counsel to seek additional fees under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d), for their work in connection with filing the action and implementing the decree. Consent Decree P 14(a). One year into the implementation process, the district court "took the extraordinary step of awarding a second advance"—this time for \$ 7 million. Order of the United [**7] States District Court for the District of Columbia at 2 (Mar. 8, 2001) (No. 97cv01978). The Department and class counsel eventually settled all fee claims for \$ 14.9 million. Attorneys and firms sharing the fees were: Alexander J. Pires, Jr., of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan, Pires & Leavy; Phillip L. Fraas, of Tuttle, Taylor & Heron; J.J. Chestnut, of Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway; T. Roe Frazer, of Langston, Frazer, Sweet & Freese; Hubbard Saunders IV, of The Terney Firm; Othello Cross, of Cross, Kearney & McKissic; Gerard Lear, of Speiser Krause; and William J. Smith.

Several months after class counsel received their second fee advance and just two weeks prior to the deadline for filing petitions for monitor review for the "vast majority of claimants [in both tracks]," class counsel filed an emergency motion seeking an extension of time. Order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia at 2 (Nov. 8, 2000) (No. 97cv01978). Counsel revealed that they had filed only a small fraction of the total petitions requested by the farmers. Concerned that "counsel's failings ... not be

352 U.S. App. D.C. 214; 292 F.3d 918, *;
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 12283, **; 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 275

visited on their clients," *id.* at 3, and relying on "explicit assurances" by [**8] counsel as to the work load they could realistically shoulder into the future. *Pigford v. Veneman*, 141 F. Supp. 2d 60, 62 (D.D.C. 2001), the district court permitted counsel to file pro forma petitions by the original deadline and then to either file supporting materials or to withdraw the petitions at the rate of at least 400 petitions per month, *see Order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia* at 56 (Nov. 8, 2000) (No. 97cv01978).

A few months later, the district court observed "a very disturbing trend": class counsel had failed to meet their monthly quota "even once." *Pigford*, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 62. Worse still, counsel had "drastically cut its staff, bringing Class Counsel's ability to represent the [farmers] into serious question." *Id.* "Alarmed by Class Counsel's consistent failure" to meet decree timelines, the district [**22] court noted counsel's "remarkable admission that they never had a realistic expectation of meeting" agreed-upon or court-ordered deadlines for the monitor review process. *Order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia* at 23 (Apr. 27, 2001) (No. 97cv01978). The court [**9] described counsel's performance as "dismal"--"bordering on legal malpractice"--and "wondered" whether class counsel would have been in such a predicament had they not filed "three new sister class actions" against the Department. *Id.* at 2-3 & n.1, 5.

The district court eventually imposed a series of escalating daily fines on class counsel for untimely monitor review filings. *Pigford v. Veneman*, 143 F. Supp. 2d 28, 32 (D.D.C. 2001). Instead of simply submitting materials in support of their clients' petitions in a more timely fashion, however, counsel drastically increased the rate at which they *withdrew* petitions for monitor review--from 19% to 48%--"once again" leading the district court to "question Class Counsel's fidelity to their clients." *Pigford v. Veneman*, 148 F. Supp. 2d 31, 33 & n.1 (D.D.C. 2001).

Class counsel's failure to cope with their responsibilities extended to the Track B process. Consider the case of Earl Kitchen, a farmer from Arkansas who filed a Track B claim. Kitchen was initially represented by Jesse L. Kearney, a member of one of the firms sharing in the fee award, Cross, Kearney & McKissic. During the course of representing [**10] Kitchen, Kearney obtained extensions of several paragraph 10 deadlines either with consent or over the Department's objection. Around the time the Department agreed to pay class counsel \$ 14.9 million, Kearney missed the deadline (already extended by mutual consent) to submit written direct testimony. Kearney's failure could have drastic consequences, for absent submission of testimony, Kitchen's claim will "be

extinguished." Appellees' Br. at 12; *see also* Consent Decree P 10(g) (putting the burden of proof on the claimant).

In the meantime, the district court, deeply concerned about the decree's viability, asked the American Bar Association Committee on Pro Bono and Public Services to "assemble a team of *pro bono* lawyers to assist Class Counsel on an emergency basis." *Order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia* at 7 (Apr. 27, 2001) (No. 97cv01978). In response, lawyers from the Pro Bono Committee and the firms of Arnold & Porter and Crowell & Moring recruited some of Washington's largest law firms: Covington & Burling; Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood; Steptoe & Johnson; Swidler, Berlin, Shereff & Friedman; and Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering. The district [**11] court, recognizing the competing demands on class counsel arising out of their representation of multiple claimants in both tracks and at various stages of the claims resolution process, hoped that this added assistance would lift the "heavy burden of Track B litigation from the shoulders of Class Counsel," enabling them to "focus on the petition [for monitor review] process." *Pigford*, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 30 n.1.

Pro bono counsel took over the representation of Earl Kitchen and asked the Department to extend the time for filing written direct testimony. The Department refused. As a result and because class counsel had apparently missed deadlines in other Track B cases, pro bono counsel filed a "motion to endow," asking the district court "to interpret (and if necessary, to modify) the Consent Decree, so that Arbitrators have discretion to extend deadlines when strict compliance with the original scheduling framework would defeat the Decree's overarching remedial purposes." *Pls.' Mot. to Endow* at 1. [**23] Granting the motion, the district court found it "implicit" in the Decree's terms that arbitrators have such discretion. *Pigford v. Veneman*, 182 F. Supp. 2d 50, 53 (D.D.C. 2002); [**12]

The Department appeals. At its request, we entered a stay pending appeal.

II.

District courts possess two types of authority over consent decrees. First, they may interpret and enforce a decree to the extent authorized either by the decree or by the related order. *See Bd. of Trustees of Hotel & Rest. Employees Local 25 v. Madison Hotel, Inc.*, 321 U.S. App. D.C. 145, 97 F.3d 1479, 1484 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (observing that a district court retains enforcement jurisdiction over a settlement if litigants so provide in their stipulation of dismissal or the dismissal order incorporates the settlement terms). Second, they may modify a decree pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

352 U.S. App. D.C. 214; 292 F.3d 918, *;
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 12283, **; 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 275

Procedure 60(b)(5). See *Rujo*, 502 U.S. at 378-79 (holding that the Rule 60(b)(5) standard for modifying judgments applies to consent decrees). These two sources of authority reflect a consent decree's hybrid character, having qualities of both contracts and court orders. See *id.* at 378 (explaining that a consent decree "is contractual in nature" but also "an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree"). [**13]

The **farmers** based their "motion to endow" on both sources of authority. In granting the motion, the district court explained that it was exercising its "authority to enforce and to interpret an approved Consent Decree." *Pigford*, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 51. Although the court thus never addressed the question of its Rule 60(b)(5) authority, the **farmers** maintain that we may affirm the order on either ground. We consider each in turn.

Interpretation and Enforcement

Reasoning that the decree "explicitly allows for its construction in a liberal manner," and that paragraph 10 "delegates" the district court's authority over Track B claims to arbitrators, the district court found it "implicit in the terms of the Consent Decree" that arbitrators "have essentially the same authority over Track B hearings that a trial judge would have over a trial or related pre-trial proceedings," including "discretion to allow for revision of certain deadlines, even after the deadlines have passed, so long as justice requires the revisions and provided that the burden on the defendant is not so great as to outweigh the interest of the claimant in fully presenting his or her claim." *Id.* at 51-53. [**14] The Department argues that the consent decree gives the district court no such authority. According to the Department, the district court's only authority either to interpret or enforce the consent decree comes from paragraph 13, which "concerns ... alleged violations of any provision of the ... Decree," and directs "the person seeking enforcement of a provision of the ... Decree" to attempt to resolve any problems without court intervention and then to seek enforcement through contempt proceedings. Consent Decree P 13; see also *id.* P 21 (retaining the court's authority to enforce the decree through contempt proceedings). Since the **farmers** neither alleged a violation nor invoked the procedures for "seeking enforcement," the Department contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the "motion to endow." Defending the district court's order and relying on our statement in *Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n* that it is a "well-established principle that a trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce its consent decrees," 995 F.2d 280, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993), the **farmers** argue that the order was "properly grounded on jurisdiction 'ancillary' to that explicitly [**15] conferred [**24] by paragraph 13." Appellees' Br. at 21. Pursuant to this

"ancillary jurisdiction," the **farmers** contend, the district court properly "enforced" the decree's "overarching remedial purposes." *Id.* at 20. The **farmers** also argue that quite apart from paragraph 13, the district court had "inherent" authority to interpret the decree. *Id.* at 21.

We agree with the Department. In *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America*, the Supreme Court held that a district court lacked "ancillary jurisdiction" to enforce a consent decree because neither the decree nor the order dismissing the case expressly retained jurisdiction to do so. 511 U.S. 375, 380, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391, 114 S. Ct. 1673-81 (1994). Although *Kokkonen* differs from the situation here—the consent decree in this case does retain certain enforcement jurisdiction—the decision teaches that district courts enjoy no free-ranging "ancillary" jurisdiction to enforce consent decrees, but are instead constrained by the terms of the decree and related order. See 511 U.S. at 381 (explaining that if the dismissal order had retained jurisdiction or incorporated the settlement, then "a breach of the agreement would be a violation [**16] of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist"). Accordingly, an enforcement clause limited by its plain language, as is paragraph 13, to situations involving decree violations confers no ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the decree's "overarching ... purposes." Indeed, when the district court approved the decree, it observed that the parties added the enforcement provision because the original version "appeared to prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction in the event that the USDA did not comply with [its] terms." *Pigford*, 185 F.R.D. at 110, bolstering our view that the enforcement provision means what it says.

Beckett does not warrant a different result. Not only did the *Beckett* decree preserve the district court's "jurisdiction over [the] case to enforce the terms of [the] ... decree," 995 F.2d at 286, but the party seeking enforcement in *Beckett*—unlike the **farmers** here—alleged that the other party had violated the decree's terms, 995 F.2d at 281.

Equally unpersuasive is the **farmers'** argument that we need not worry about paragraph 13's limitations because the district [**17] court possesses "inherent" interpretive power over the decree "whether or not for explicit enforcement purposes." Appellees' Br. at 21. For one thing, we see no way the district court's interpretive authority can be unhinged from its enforcement authority. If the district court lacks paragraph 13 enforcement authority (because the **farmers** alleged no violation), then the **farmers** gain nothing from an interpretation that arbitrators may adjust paragraph 13 deadlines. Furthermore, none of the appellate cases cited by the **farmers** supports their assertion that "many cases

352 U.S. App. D.C. 214; 292 F.3d 918, *;
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 12283, **; 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 275

... have recognized the "inherent" jurisdiction of courts to interpret consent decrees," *id.*, apart from any enforcement power. Two of the cases involved decree modifications, not interpretations. See *Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc. v. Dayton*, 132 F.3d 1142, 1146 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1997); *Alberti v. Klevenhagen*, 46 F.3d 1347, 1365 (5th Cir. 1995). The third upheld, as a valid consent decree interpretation, a district court's imposition of interim deadlines not specified in the decree. See *Juan F. By and Through Lynch v. Weicker*, 37 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1997). The order in that [**18] case, however—unlike the one here—provided for court intervention "when plaintiffs showed the defendant was 'likely' to be in noncompliance"; the additional deadlines represented a permissible [**25] interpretation because they served to "ensure compliance." *Id.* at 879.

Our conclusion that the district court's interpretive and enforcement authority depends on the terms of the decree and related court order, rather than on some "ancillary" or "inherent" power, comports with a consent decree's contractual character. See *Rufo*, 502 U.S. at 378. In this case, for example, the **farmers** and the Department bargained over Track B's time frames. Track B's "abbreviated and unambiguous deadlines," the Department candidly tells us, serve its interests by "limiting the number of class members who ... opt for the Track B process and ... enhancing the government's ability to defend against [those] claims." Appellant's Br. at 24-25. The parties also bargained over paragraph 13, agreeing to limit district court enforcement authority to situations where the decree is violated. To now hold that the district court, through either some "ancillary" authority to enforce the [**19] decree absent a violation or "inherent" authority to interpret it, may permit extensions of Track B deadlines would not only deny the Department the benefit of its bargain, but would also discourage settlements. Who would sign a consent decree if district courts had free-ranging interpretive or enforcement authority untethered from the decree's negotiated terms?

Modification

The **farmers** argue that even if the district court lacked authority to interpret the decree to allow extension of Track B deadlines, we may still affirm the order as a proper modification pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). This rule permits courts, "upon such terms as are just," to "relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding ... [i]f it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." "[A] significant change in circumstances," the Supreme Court has held, may "warrant[] revision of [a] decree." *Rufo*, 502 U.S. at 383. Such changed circumstances include "unforeseen obstacles" that make a decree "unworkable." *Id.* at 384. Any modification

must be "suitably tailored to the changed circumstances." [**20] *Id.* at 383.

According to the **farmers**, two "significant changed ... circumstances" make the consent decree "unworkable." They first point to a "dramatic and unexpected expansion in class size"—from 2000 (the number originally estimated) to 22,000 (the final number). Appellees' Br. at 31. As the Department points out, however, at the time the district court approved the decree, the parties realized the class already had between "15,000 and 20,000" members. *Pigford*, 185 F.R.D. at 94. Although this may well suggest that the actual increase was not "significant" enough to justify modification, we decline to resolve that issue, for the district court did not rely on the larger class size as a basis for the order at issue here.

Class counsel's "inability to represent all Track B claimants adequately," *Pigford*, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 52, the **farmers** next argue, also provides a basis for a Rule 60(b)(5) modification. The Department concedes not only that counsel for "Kitchen and a number of other class members" committed "what appears to be malpractice," but also that this represents a "relevant new fact." Appellant's Br. at 28. Even so, the [**21] Department insists, the **farmers'** remedy is not to deny the Department the benefit of its bargained-for Track B deadlines, but rather to sue class counsel for malpractice. "Clients must be held accountable for the acts and omissions of their attorneys." *Id.* at 29 (quoting *Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs.*, [**26] 507 U.S. 380, 396-97, 123 L. Ed. 2d 74, 113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993)).

As a general matter, the Department is correct. In *Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.*, the case on which the Department primarily relies, the Supreme Court held that the failure of plaintiff's lawyer to attend a pretrial conference justified dismissing the case for want of prosecution. 370 U.S. 626, 633, 8 L. Ed. 2d 734, 82 S. Ct. 1386 (1962). Because plaintiff "voluntarily chose [his] attorney as his representative," the Court held, he could "[n]ot ... avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent." 370 U.S. at 633-34.

Neither *Link* nor any other case the Department cites, however, was a class action. In this case, except for the three named plaintiffs, not one of the thousands of class members "voluntarily chose" class counsel. Quite to the contrary, [**22] by certifying the class, the district court effectively appointed counsel for the **farmers**. Under Rule 23(a)(4), moreover, the district court, as a condition of class certification, had to find that class counsel would "adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4); see also *McCarthy v. Kleinienst*, 239 U.S. App. D.C. 247, 741

112d 1406, 1411 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that Rule 23's requirement of adequate representation encompasses "concerns about the competency of class counsel" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Exercising this responsibility, the district court found that "Mr. Alexander Pires and Mr. Phillip Fraas as lead counsel and Mr. J.I. Chestnut, Mr. Othello Cross, Mr. T. Roe Frazer, Mr. Hubbard T. Saunders, IV, Mr. Gerald Lear and Mr. James Myart, Jr., all serving as of counsel ... demonstrated that they will advocate vigorously for the interests of the class" and therefore "adequately will represent the interests of the class." *Pigford v. Glickman*, 182 F.R.D. 341, 350 (D.D.C. 1998).

In so distinguishing *Link*, we do not mean to suggest that the presumption of elicit accountability for attorney [**23] conduct has no applicability in class actions. Certainly a contrary rule would make class action settlements problematic. Moreover, the Rule 23(a)(4) finding of class counsel adequacy may partially substitute for the free choice found in conventional non-class litigation. Like most presumptions, however, this one is rebuttable. And in litigation involving a class-defined from the outset by its numerosity—where counsel is not in fact freely chosen by class members, it is logical that the presumption should be more easily overcome than if the clients had in fact freely chosen their attorneys.

At oral argument, the Department pointed out that even though the **farmers** may not have "freely selected" class counsel to pursue the underlying litigation, the decree permits them to choose other lawyers for Track A or B representation. Accordingly, the Department argues, holding the **farmers** accountable for their lawyers' dismal performance is perfectly appropriate. We disagree. Although the decree technically permits class members to retain other lawyers, we think the circumstances of this case, together with the terms of the decree itself, make such choices unlikely. For one thing, the decree [**24] prohibits lawyers from charging for their work in claims proceedings, see Consent Decree P 5(e), so lawyers desiring payment must seek fees pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d). Class counsel, however, received an advance fee award to provide such services. Class counsel also benefit from the district court's Rule 23 seal of approval. No wonder Earl Kitchen (the only claimant for whom the record contains relevant information) was represented by Jesse Kearney, a member of one of the firms that shared in the fee advance and ultimately the \$ 14.9 million settlement. [**27] Because Kitchen did not "voluntarily choose" Kearney in the usual sense, we see no basis for holding Kitchen responsible for Kearney's failure to file direct testimony on time.

Contrary to the Department's argument, we see nothing unfair about this result. Although we have no doubt that the Department expected Track B's tight deadlines to discourage claims—even to make them less winnable—the Department never counted on class counsel's virtual malpractice. Indeed, the decree itself assumes competent representation for the **farmers**. The decree's express purpose is [**25] to "ensure that in their dealings with USDA, all class members receive full and fair treatment." Consent Decree at 2, and its "main accomplishment was the *establishment of a process to adjudicate individual claims*." Opinion and Order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia at 8 (Mar. 8, 2001) (No. 97cv01978) (emphasis added). Unless the **farmers** have competent counsel, we cannot imagine how they could ever obtain "full and fair treatment" in a claims process where (as in Kitchen's case) missing a single deadline could be fatal.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that class counsel's failure to meet critical Track B deadlines amounts to an "unforeseen obstacle" that makes the decree "unworkable." *Ryfo*, 502 U.S. at 384. To hold otherwise would sanction the **farmers'** double betrayal: first by the Department, see CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 2-30, and then by their own lawyers.

Having said all this, however, we cannot affirm the challenged order as a proper Rule 60(b)(5) modification because of *Ryfo's* second requirement—that the modification be "suitably tailored to the changed circumstances." 502 U.S. at 391. [**26] Because the district court viewed its order as an interpretation, not a modification, it had no occasion to consider the tailoring requirement. In our view, the order, vesting arbitrators with generic authority to revise deadlines "so long as justice requires," *Pigford*, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 52-53, is far too broad. Although the order restores the **farmers** to the position in which they would have been but for counsel's dismal performance (it may even, as the Department argues, put them in a better position), the order potentially deprives the Department of all Track B deadlines. By contrast, a "suitably tailored" order would return *both* parties as nearly as possible to where they would have been absent counsel's failures. In Kitchen's case, a properly "tailored" remedy would, for example, reset the Track B clock at the point in the process where Kearney dropped the ball, establishing a new deadline for submitting direct testimony and leaving subsequent deadlines unchanged. Whatever tailoring method the district court ultimately adopts, see *United States v. Western Elec. Co.*, 310 U.S. App. D.C. 281, 46 F.3d 1198, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (recognizing a [**27] district court's "considerable discretion" in fashioning a Rule 60(b)(5) modification), it must preserve the essence

352 U.S. App. D.C. 214; 292 F.3d 918, *;
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 12283, **; 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 275

of the parties' bargain: for the **farmers**, an opportunity to have their individual claims pursued by competent counsel; and for the Department, the benefit of the consent decree's tight deadlines.

III.

We reverse the district court's order and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Rule

60(b)(5), and *Ruffo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail*, 502 U.S. 367, 377, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992). See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (authorizing federal appellate courts to "remand the cause and ... require [*928] such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances").

So ordered.

TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, ET AL., APPELLEES; LEONARD C. COOPER,
 APPELLANT v. DAN GLICKMAN, SECRETARY, THE UNITED STATES
 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, APPELLEE

No. 99-5222, Consolidated with No. 99-5223

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
 CIRCUIT

340 U.S. App. D.C. 420; 206 F.3d 1212; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5827

February 28, 2000, Argued
 March 31, 2000, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. (No. 97cv01978). (No. 98cv01693).

DISPOSITION: Affirmed the order of approval of the district court.

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

COUNSEL: David M. Schnorrenberg argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Richard I. Seymour, Teresa A. Ferrante, Stephon J. Bowens, Marcus Jimison, J. Michael Klise and Matthew C. Ilans. Julie Nepveu and Julie T. Gantz entered appearances.

Alexander J. Pires, Jr. argued the cause for appellees Freddie Jones, et al. With him on the brief was Phillip L. Iraas.

Robert M. Loebe, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee Dan Glickman, Secretary, The United States Department of Agriculture. With him on the brief were David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Marleigh Dover, Special Counsel, and Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney.

JUDGES: Before: SENTELLE, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

OPINIONBY: ROGERS

OPINION:

[*1213] ROGERS, *Circuit Judge*: Leonard C. Cooper appeals the district court's order approving a consent decree settling lawsuits brought by a class of approximately 20,000 African-American farmers, of which Mr. Cooper is a [**2] member, against the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"). n1 *See Pigford v. [**1214] Glickman*, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999). Under the decree, the United States is likely to provide an estimated \$ 2 billion in debt relief and monetary payments in consideration for the dismissal of the class' complaint alleging that USDA systematically discriminated against them on the basis of their race. *See id.* at 111. Making no claim that the farmers' individual claims cannot be fairly and justly resolved under the decree, Mr. Cooper contends instead that the benefits of the consent decree are illusory because USDA has reserved the right in paragraphs 19 and 21 to undo the decree by regulatory fiat, depriving the farmers of any judicial relief and, thus, the district court abused its discretion in approving the decree as fair, adequate, and reasonable under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As clarified by stipulations in the briefing and oral argument on appeal, no basis exists to conclude that USDA would promulgate such a regulation under laws in effect when the decree was approved by the district court. While paragraph 19 leaves the class [**3] exposed to potential congressional enactments nullifying or modifying the consent decree, the class would bear that risk in any event, at least so long as the decree remains executory. Additionally, Mr. Cooper's contention concerning the limitation of the district court's authority by paragraph 21 is inconsistent with the plain language of that provision. Accordingly, because Mr. Cooper's contentions are unpersuasive on their own

340 U.S. App. D.C. 420; 206 F.3d 1212, *;

2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5827, **

terms, and, in light of the benefits conferred on the class by the decree taken as a whole, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court, and we affirm.

n1 Mr. Cooper is the only member of the class to appeal although in noting his appeal he purported to file on behalf of himself individually and as a representative of a class of African-American farmers, sending copies to nine named persons. None of those persons is a named appellant, however. The class representatives, the named plaintiffs in the district court, and the Secretary of Agriculture are appellees.

L.

The [**4] consent decree settling the class action was the product of lengthy and, at times, contentious negotiations. The background is set forth in Judge Friedman's comprehensive opinion, *Pigford*, 185 F.R.D. at 89-92, familiarity with which is assumed, and we repeat only the details necessary for this opinion. n2

n2 The district court's opinion appears as an appendix to this opinion.

USDA indirectly administers programs that provide credit and other benefits to farmers. The USDA's credit and benefit programs are federally funded, but the decisions to approve or deny applications for credit or benefits are made at the county level by a committee of three to five members elected by local farmers and ranchers. In addition to acting on credit and benefit applications, the county committee appoints a county executive to assist farmers in completing their applications and to recommend to the county committee which applications should be approved. *Id.* at 86. USDA has promulgated a number of [**5] regulations governing how these officials are to administer the credit and benefit programs, but the evidence before the district court shows that USDA has exercised little oversight regarding how applications historically have been processed at the county level. *Id.* at 86-88. For years, African-American farmers, who have been significantly under represented on the county committees, *see id.* at 87, have complained that county officials have exercised their power in a racially discriminatory manner, resulting in delayed processing or denial of applications for credit and benefits by African-American farmers not experienced by white farmers who are similarly situated. *Id.* at 87-88. Such discriminatory treatment is prohibited by statute and by regulation. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1994); 7 C.F.R. § § 15.51, 15.52 (1999). In

December 1996, the Secretary of Agriculture appointed a Civil Rights Action Team to investigate allegations of racial discrimination in the administration of USDA credit and benefit programs, and, in February 1997, the USDA Inspector General reported that USDA had a backlog of discrimination [**6] complaints in need of immediate attention. [*1215] The President and the Secretary thereafter sought appropriations to carry out the recommendations to improve USDA's civil rights efforts. *Pigford*, 185 F.R.D. at 111.

On August 28, 1997, three African-American farmers filed suit on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated African-American farmers alleging racial discrimination in the administration of USDA programs and further harm from the allegedly surreptitious dismantling of USDA's Office of Civil Rights in 1983, which together were alleged to violate the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 *et seq.*; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, prohibiting discrimination in consumer credit. Following amendments to the complaint, the district court granted class certification in October 1998. *See Pigford*, 185 F.R.D. at 90. At that time, most of the farmers' ECOA claims were arguably barred by a two-year statute of limitations. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 1691c [**7] (f). Responding to petitions from class members, Congress enacted, and the President signed in November 1998, an amendment to retroactively extend the limitations period for persons who had filed administrative complaints between January 1, 1981, and July 1, 1997, for acts of discrimination occurring between January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1996. n3 A second class action, *Brevington v. Glickman*, Civ. No. 98-1693, filed in July 1998 and making similar allegations covering a different time period, was consolidated with *Pigford* for purposes of settlement, and a new class was certified. *See Pigford*, 185 F.R.D. at 90.

n3 *See* Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2297, notes); *see also* Statement By President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 4328, 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2108 (Nov. 2, 1998) ("This bill will also address the long-standing discrimination claims of many minority farmers by adopting my request to waive the statute of limitations on USDA discrimination complaints that date back to the early 1980s."), *reprinted in* 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 582.

[**8]

340 U.S. App. D.C. 420; 206 F.3d 1212, *;

2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5827, **

As the February 1999 trial date drew near, the parties' negotiations shifted from individual claims to a global settlement, *id.*, and with the assistance of a court-appointed mediator, the parties developed and agreed to a consent decree that contemplated a two-track dispute resolution mechanism to determine whether individual class members had been the victims of discrimination and, if so, the amount of monetary relief to which they were entitled. If a class member opts for resolution under Track A, "class members with little or no documentary evidence [will receive] a virtually automatic cash payment of \$ 50,000 and forgiveness of any debt owed to USDA," 185 F.R.D. at 95; whereas, class members opting for Track B resolution have the opportunity to prove their claims in a one-day mini-trial before an arbitrator and, if successful, the amount of monetary damages is not capped. *Id.* Class members dissatisfied with the opportunity for resolution of their claims under either Track A or Track B could opt out of the class within 120 days of entry of the consent decree, and file individual lawsuits. *Id.* The district court is to appoint a monitor from a list of names [**9] provided by the parties "to track and report on USDA's compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree." *Id.* at 109.

By law, the proposed consent decree could not take effect until the district court had approved it, *see* FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), and the district court's approval could not be granted until notice had been given to the class of the proposed settlement and a fairness hearing had been held to determine whether the "settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable and is not the product of collusion between the parties." *Piggford*, 185 F.R.D. at 98 (quoting *Thomas v. Albright*, 139 F.3d 227, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). The district court held a day-long hearing in which representatives of eight organizations and sixteen individuals, including Mr. Cooper, voiced their objections to the terms of the proposed consent decree. Many, including Mr. Cooper, [**1216] objected to the absence of certain forms of prospective structural relief, notwithstanding the fact that the complaint, as amended, did not seek such injunctive relief. 185 F.R.D. at 110. While USDA was likely to face billion-dollar monetary liability under the decree, no changes to the [**10] county committee system were mandated, and objectors feared that no improvements would be made to the way in which the farm credit and non-credit programs are administered. *See* Transcript of Fairness Hearing ("Tr."), Mar. 2, 1999 at Joint Appendix (JA) 388 (Mr. Bowers); 493 (Mr. Cooper). They also maintained that insufficient information had been exchanged during the discovery period leading up to the settlement. However, at the fairness hearing, neither Mr. Cooper nor his counsel voiced the objections raised now on appeal to paragraphs 19 and 21 of the decree. Instead the National Council of Community Based Organizations in Agriculture

("NCCBOA") argued to the district court that paragraph 19 "contemplates that a future statute or regulation may interfere with the relief that is provided by the decree." Tr. at JA 410. Without specifically mentioning paragraph 21, NCCBOA objected to that provision on the grounds that the class members "are remitted to contract law claims against the Government, but the contract here expressly provides that they can't have their claims reinstated and the Government has got a defense because of its new regulation to the relief that's provided by [**11] the Consent Decree." Tr. at JA 411.

Following the hearing, the district court suggested fourteen changes to the proposed consent decree, including modifying paragraph 19 to require USDA to use its best efforts to comply with laws prohibiting discrimination and modifying paragraph 21 to make clear that the district court retained jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree with its contempt power. The class and USDA rejected the first suggestion and adopted the second. The district court then allowed another round of written objections to be filed to the revised consent decree. n4 After considering all of the objections and the entire record, the district court approved the proposed consent decree as fair under Rule 23 and ordered that the decree be entered. Mr. Cooper noted an appeal from the order, but he did not seek a stay of proceedings under the consent decree pending appeal. n5

n4 Objections made directly by Mr. Cooper questioned whether class counsel truly represented the interests of the class members and suggested that the decree contain a provision rendering it void if either USDA or class counsel took steps to obstruct the district court's jurisdiction to enforce the proposed decree. Mr. Cooper's counsel, on behalf of Mr. Cooper, filed eight pages of objections, which also questioned the capacity of class counsel to represent the class, but made no mention of either paragraphs 19 nor 21 nor of the enforceability of the decree as a general matter. In addition, the North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers and Loss Prevention Project at North Carolina Central University Law School filed a set of objections jointly with three other organizations, including NCCBOA, which stressed, among other things, the view that in light of paragraphs 19 and 21, the district court's contempt power was inadequate to enforce the decree. [**12]

n5 Although the figures differ, USDA and class counsel represented in their respective

340 U.S. App. D.C. 420; 206 F.3d 1212, *;

2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5827, **

briefs that more than 20,000 persons have filed claims under the decree. See Appellee USDA's Br. at 15; Appellee Plaintiff Class' Br. at 12. At oral argument, class counsel represented that as of February 25, 2000, decisions in 9,573 Track A cases had been rendered of which 5,746 claims were granted and paid in an amount totaling \$ 359,125,000. Of the 3,827 Track A claims that were denied in whole or in part, one third have been appealed under the terms of the consent decree. In addition, approximately 146 class members have opted for resolution under Track B. Four cases have been completed, and eighty others are in discovery.

II.

The law is well settled that the decision to approve a consent decree is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See, e.g., *In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig.*, 148 F.3d 283, 299 (3d Cir. 1998). The district [*1217] court's role in reviewing the decree is to protect the interests of absent class members, and that is [**13] done primarily by evaluating the terms of the settlement in relation to the strength of their case. See *Thomas*, 139 F.3d at 231. The appellate court is not to substitute its views of fairness for those of the district court and the parties to the agreement, see *Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle*, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992), but is only to determine whether the district court's reasons for approving the decree evidence appreciation of the relevant facts and reasoned analysis of those facts in light of the purposes of Rule 23. See *Thomas*, 139 F.3d at 231; see also *Kickapoo Tribe v. Babbitt*, 310 U.S. App. D.C. 66, 43 F.3d 1491, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Mr. Cooper bears the burden on appeal of making a "clear showing" that an abuse of discretion has occurred. See *Moore v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers*, 246 U.S. App. D.C. 114, 762 F.2d 1093, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1985). He has not done so; on the contrary, the district court fulfilled the requirements of Rule 23 in exemplary fashion.

On appeal Mr. Cooper has abandoned the objections he raised in the district court regarding the lack of prospective structural relief and [**14] confines his challenge to the consent decree to paragraphs 19 and 21, which he contends give USDA, in effect, the right to unilaterally withdraw from the consent decree leaving class members with no judicial remedy. Mr. Cooper thus contends that the district court erred by failing to notify class members specifically of the terms of the two paragraphs and by approving the decree without requiring alteration or deletion of the two paragraphs. n6

n6 The paragraphs under attack provide:

19. Defendant's Duty Consistent With Law and Regulations

Nothing contained in this Consent Decree or in the Final Judgment shall impose on the defendant any duty, obligation or requirement, the performance of which would be inconsistent with federal statutes or federal regulations in effect at the time of such performance.

...

21. No Effect if Default

Subject to the terms of P 17, above, [conditioning the decree's obligations on a final judgment dismissing the complaint] and following entry by the Court of Final Judgment, no default by any person or party to this consent Decree in the performance of any of the covenants or obligations under this Consent Decree, or any judgment or order entered in connection therewith, shall affect the dismissal of the complaint, the preclusion of prosecution of actions, the discharge and release of the defendant, or the judgment entered approving these provisions. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be construed to affect the Court's jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree on a motion for contempt filed in accordance with P 13 [requiring parties to conciliate before filing contempt motion].

The last sentence of paragraph 21 was added after the fairness hearing.

[**15]

In his opening brief, Mr. Cooper contended that USDA can use paragraph 19 to renege on its agreement in the consent decree in one of three ways: (1) Congress could pass new legislation that USDA could interpret to preclude some or all of the relief provided by the decree; (2) USDA could promulgate new regulations to the same effect without new legislation; or (3) USDA could

340 U.S. App. D.C. 420; 206 F.3d 1212, *;

2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5827, **

interpret existing law to bar the relief provided in the decree without promulgating a rule. In subsequent briefing by appellees class counsel and USDA, and at oral argument, it has been clarified that there was no intent that paragraph 19 include the second and third possibilities; rather, USDA stipulates, and class counsel concurs, in their respective briefs that paragraph 19 "simply recognizes the legal reality that Congress makes the laws, and that it is the obligation of the government to perform prospectively in conformance with the then binding laws enacted by Congress." See Appellee USDA's Br. at 25; Appellee Plaintiff Class' Br. at 11.

With that clarification, USDA's promise to perform under the consent decree is not illusory because USDA has not reserved a unilateral right to withdraw, cf. *Gray v. American Express Co.*, 240 U.S. App. D.C. 10, 743 F.2d 10, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1984) [**16] (interpreting New York [*1218] law), rather it would take action by Congress to enable USDA to withdraw from the consent decree. Consequently, under elementary principles of contract law, USDA's promise to perform was backed by consideration at the time it was made and the parties have assigned to the plaintiff class the marginal risk that Congress might nullify the agreement in some respect by future legislation. Although the evidence before the district court establishes the basis for class members' mistrust of USDA and concern that the risk may be more than hypothetical, see *Pigford*, 185 F.R.D. at 110, the fact that Congress and the President acted quickly to remove a limitations bar to the plaintiffs' recovery indicates that as of October 1998 all three branches of the federal government had taken steps to aid in the final resolution of the **farmers'** claims on the merits. The district court noted the priority commitment of the President and the Secretary of Agriculture, spurred by the efforts of the **African-American farmers**, to obtain funding to carry out recommendations improving USDA's civil rights efforts, as well as Congress' "unprecedented action of tolling the statute [**17] of limitations." *Id.* at 111. And Mr. Cooper acknowledged through counsel on appeal that he has no evidence that this three-branch commitment has waned. The district court could therefore reasonably conclude when approving the decree that the risk of a radical about-face in current federal policy was remote.

More fundamentally, even in the absence of paragraph 19, the class would bear the risk of such hypothetical legislation, at least so long as the decree remains executory. See *Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co.*, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431-32, 15 L. Ed. 435 (1855); *BellSouth Corp. v. FCC*, 333 U.S. App. D.C. 253, 162 F.3d 678, 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also *Landgraf v. USI Film Products*, 511 U.S. 244, 273-274, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994);

Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992).ⁿ⁷ Thus, we need not pass upon Mr. Cooper's contentions concerning possible constitutional limitations on Congress' power to enact such legislation, see *Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.*, 514 U.S. 211, 131 L. Ed. 2d 328, 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995), [**18] nor address the ramifications of such legislation under the reasoning of *United States v. Winstar Corp.*, 518 U.S. 839, 135 L. Ed. 2d 964, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996), to conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by approving the proposed consent decree, as amended, which assigns a risk to the plaintiff class that it would have borne in any event.

ⁿ⁷ It is to be noted that the relief Mr. Cooper seeks, an order vacating the decree and remanding for trial, could require that plaintiffs' cases be tried over a number of years, see *Pigford*, 185 F.R.D. at 104, and thus could expose class members to this risk for a far longer period.

As to Mr. Cooper's contention that paragraph 21 deprives the **farmers** of the right to ask the district court to modify the decree or reinstate their lawsuit in the unlikely event that Congress passes legislation nullifying the decree, it too relies on a misplaced concern. Paragraph 21 provides that if the government *defaults* on its obligations [**19] under the decree, the plaintiff class can enforce the decree only by motion for civil contempt. Mr. Cooper reads this provision to also "strip[] the district court of its authority to reopen the final judgment" if Congress enacts legislation allowing for the decree to be nullified in whole or in part. However, the very basis for Mr. Cooper's contention concerning paragraph 19 is, and USDA agrees, that USDA would not be in default under the agreement if Congress passed new legislation nullifying, or directing the Secretary to nullify by regulation, the consent decree. Because that action would not qualify as a default, the provisions of paragraph 21 would not apply. Thus, Mr. Cooper's contention that the consent decree is unfair because the class would not be able to seek relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is mistaken. On its face, paragraph 21 does not foreclose that avenue of relief when USDA has not [**1219] defaulted, and thus were Congress to enact the hypothesized legislation, paragraph 21 would not bar the class from seeking modification of the decree, subject to its ability to "establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the [**20] decree and that the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance." *Rufo*, 502 U.S. at 393.

340 U.S. App. D.C. 420; 206 F.3d 1212, *;

2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5827, **

Moreover, not only do Mr. Cooper's contentions collapse under their own weight, but even were they to retain some persuasive force, the court must evaluate the district court's decision to approve the consent decree, with whatever shortcomings paragraphs 19 and 21 might present, in light of the agreement as a whole. *See Thomas*, 139 F.3d at 231. In that context, there is no doubt that the district court exercised its discretion well within the boundaries of the law. The serious concerns and objections to the proposed consent decree were carefully considered by the district court and balanced against the likely alternatives in a manner reflecting a considered and compassionate conclusion. *See, e.g., Pigford*, 185 F.R.D. at 101-04, 109-111. Neither Mr. Cooper nor, to our knowledge, any other class member contends at this point that the provisions of the consent decree providing monetary payments and loan forgiveness are unfair or unreasonable, and we have no occasion to consider whether these provisions are otherwise unfair [**21] or unreasonable. As a result, Mr. Cooper has failed to meet his burden to show that the enforcement provisions of the decree are so infirm as to render the entire agreement unfair or unreasonable. Furthermore, our reasons for finding Mr. Cooper's substantive contentions unpersuasive also lead us to reject his procedural contentions that the district court

did not address the objections to paragraphs 19 and 21 with sufficient specificity and that notice to the class was inadequate because it did not specifically describe paragraphs 19 and 21.

The ultimate question before the court is whether the district court abused its discretion by approving a consent decree, the principal provisions of which are an indisputably fair and reasonable resolution of the class complaint, containing one paragraph that assigns to the class a risk it would have borne in any event and another paragraph that limits the mode of enforcing the decree in the event of default. To ask the question is to answer it. Because it is clear that no abuse of discretion occurred we do not reach the government's alternative argument concerning whether it would be equitable for this court to vacate the decree in light of [**22] the number of claims that have been resolved in reliance on the decree.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of approval of the district court.

APPENDIX

[SEE APPENDIX IN ORIGINAL.]

(Pages 14 through 79 of slip opinion not available electronically)

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANN VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. CECIL BREWINGTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANN VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF), Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

215 F.R.D. 2; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6007

April 14, 2003, Filed

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reconsideration denied by Motion to strike denied by Pigford v. Veneman, 216 F.R.D. 1, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8786 (D.D.C., May 28, 2003)

PRIOR HISTORY: Pigford v. Veneman, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6972 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 10, 2003)

DISPOSITION: Defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs' response to defendant's response to plaintiffs' motion GRANTED.

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

COUNSEL: For Timothy C Pigford, PLAINTIFF (1:97-cv-1978): Jacob A Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, Washington, DC USA. Alexander John Pires, Jr, Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, Washington, DC USA. David A Branch, Washington, DC USA. Anthony Herman, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC USA. Richard Talbot Seymour, Loeff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, J.P., Washington, DC USA. J.L. Chestnut, Jr, Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright, Selma, AL USA.

For Lloyd Shafer, PLAINTIFF (1:97-cv-1978): Jacob A Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, Washington, DC USA. Alexander John Pires, Jr, Conlon, Franz, Phelan & Pires, Washington, DC USA. David A Branch, Washington, DC USA. Anthony Herman, Washington, DC USA. John Michael Clifford, Clifford, Lyons & Garde, Washington, DC USA. Mona Lyons, Clifford, Lyons & Garde, Washington, DC USA. Richard Talbot Seymour, Loeff,

Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, J.P., Washington, DC USA.

For George Hall, PLAINTIFF (1:97-cv-1978): Caroline Lewis Wolverton, Washington, DC USA. Jacob A Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, Washington, DC USA. Alexander John Pires, Jr, Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, Washington, DC USA. David A Branch, Washington, DC USA. Anthony Herman, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC USA. Richard Talbot Seymour, Loeff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, J.P., Washington, DC USA.

For Leonard Cooper, PLAINTIFF (1:97-cv-1978): Jacob A Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, Washington, DC USA. David A Branch, Washington, DC USA. Anthony Herman, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC USA. Marcus B Jimison, Nezu School of Law Land Loss Prevention Project, Durham, NC USA. Stephen J Bowens, Durham, NC USA.

For Abraham Carpenter, PLAINTIFF (1:97-cv-1978): Alexander John Pires, Jr, Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, Washington, DC USA. David A Branch, Washington, DC USA. Anthony Herman, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC USA. Phillip I. Traas, Washington, DC USA.

For Houston Blakeney, Reatha Blakeney, Leroy Robinson, Bobbie Newton, Pearlle Peterson, Naomi Knockett, Ilene Porter, James Davis, PETITIONERS (1:97-cv-1978): Stephen J Bowens, Durham, NC USA.

For Dan Glickman, FEDERAL DEFENDANT (1:97-cv-1978): Michael Siteov, US Department of Justice Civil

215 F.R.D. 2, *; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6007, **

Division, Washington, DC USA. Terry M Henry, US Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC USA. Susan Hall Lennon, US Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC USA. Daniel Edward Bensing, US Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC USA. Amanda Quester, Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Consumer Protection, Washington, DC USA. David Monro Souders, Weiner, Brodsky, Sidman & Kider, PC, Washington, DC USA.

For Ann M Veneman, FEDERAL DEFENDANT (1:97-cv-1978): Michael Siteov, US Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC USA. Terry M Henry, US Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC USA. Elizabeth Goitein, Washington, DC USA.

For Thomas Burrell, CLAIMANT (1:97-cv-1978): John Wesley Davis, Washington, DC USA. James W Myart, Jr, Law Offices of James W Myart, Jr, & Associates, San Antonio, TX USA. Evans M Folins, CLAIMANT (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Los Valores, CA USA.

For Sandy McKinnon, CLAIMANT (1:97-cv-1978): Stephen J Bowens, Durham, NC USA.

For Dan Glickman, FEDERAL DEFENDANT (1:97-cv-1978): Michael Siteov, US Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC USA. Terry M Henry, US Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC USA. Susan Hall Lennon, US Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC USA. Daniel Edward Bensing, US Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC USA. Amanda Quester, Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Consumer Protection, Washington, DC USA. David Monro Souders, Weiner, Brodsky, Sidman & Kider, PC, Washington, DC USA.

For Ann M Veneman, FEDERAL DEFENDANT (1:97-cv-1978): Michael Siteov, US Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC USA. Terry M Henry, US Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC USA. Elizabeth Goitein, Washington, DC USA.

For Thomas Burrell, CLAIMANT (1:97-cv-1978): John Wesley Davis, Washington, DC USA. James W Myart, Jr, Law Offices of James W Myart, Jr, & Associates, San Antonio, TX USA. Evans M Folins, CLAIMANT (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Los Valores, CA USA.

For Sandy McKinnon, CLAIMANT (1:97-cv-1978): Stephen J Bowens, Durham, NC USA. For Ben Hillsman, Jr, Zelma J Hillsman, CLAIMANTS (1:97-cv-1978): Gerard Robert Lear, Arlington, VA USA.

For George Barr Griffin, CLAIMANT (1:97-cv-1978): J L Chestnut, Jr, Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright, Selma, AL USA.

For Sarah Davis, MOVANT (1:197-cv-1978): Dennis Charles Sweet, Lanston, Grazer, Sweet & Freese, Jackson, MS USA.

For James Tanner, MOVANT (1:97-cv-1978): Ford C Ladd, Alexandria, VA USA. Evelyn M Coleman, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Hazlehurst, MS USA. Willie S Maymon, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Rolling Fork, MS USA. Colie Dixon, Sr, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Georgetown, MS USA. L D Maymon, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Hazlehurst, MS USA. Lois S Clark, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Wesson, MS USA. Curtis Dixon, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Jackson, MS USA. Linda Catching, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Hazlehurst, MS USA. Henry A Vaughn, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Hazlehurst, MS USA. Floria A Vaughn, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Hazlehurst, MS USA. Marilyn Stewart, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Jackson, MS USA.

For McArthur Nesbit, Eddie Slaughter, Leo Jackson, J B Black, Lucious Abrams, Jr, Griffin Todd, Sr, Gregory Erves, Cecil Brewington, Herbert I. Skinner, Jr, Obie I. Beal, Clifford Lovett, PLAINTIFFS (1:97-cv-1978): Jacob A Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, Washington, DC USA. Alexander John Pires, Jr, Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, Washington, DC USA. David A Branch, Washington, DC USA. Anthony Herman, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC USA. Richard Talbot Seymour, Lief, Cabraser, Helmman & Bernstein, LLP, Washington, DC USA.

For Antonio Santos, Clinton R Martin, MOVANTS (1:97-cv-1978): Gerard Robert Lear, Arlington, VA USA. Ezra McNair, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Crystal Springs, MS USA. Grover Miller, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Georgetown, MS USA. Geraldine Miller, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Georgetown, MS USA. Larry D Barnes, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Harrisville, MS USA. Edith Lomax-Barnes, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Crystal Springs, MS USA. Daryl Brent, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Pinola, MS USA. Curtis Dixon, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Jackson, MS USA. Harold B Dixon, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Hazlehurst, MS USA. Larry Garrett, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Georgetown, MS USA. Velma J Collins, MOVANT, (1:97-cv-1978), Pro se, Hazlehurst, MS USA.

215 F.R.D. 2, *; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6007, **

For Cecil Brewington, Jerry Cooper, Arthur Griffin, Charlie H Harris, William Lampley, Henry Simmons, Willis Frank Waceler, Paul Wiegard, Roy G Wood, Arthur Amos, Ransom Arnold, Clarence Polk, Hubert Brown, Carol Jean Brown, Willie Head, Jr, Andrew Jackson, Clem Jones, Aaron Mobley, Theodore FB Bates, Wilbert Walker, John M Decoudreaux, Roy H Adams, Larry Alexander, Herbert C Allen, Jr, James C Bacon, Stanley Bacon, W E Brandon, Joseph Brown, Leon B Brown, Willie J Burnes, Joseph Carthan, Michael V Chatman, Ronald Clarke, Albert J Cooper, Andrew L Cooper, Elijah Cole, Jr, Houston Coleman, Robert Coleman, Jimmy L Curry, Alfort Davis, Adell Davis, Sr, Harold L Davis, Onzie Glen, Marquis Grant, William Hamkin, Theis Hardy, George Henderson, Cary Holmes, Mark A Houston, Lee Andrew Howard, Ollie Hudson, Tobias Jenkins, Garrett Johnson, Sammy Johnson, Willie Johnson, Freddie Jones, Colonel, Willie F Lane, James Madlock, Andre Mathews, Kenzie McGinnis, Curtis Miller, Ted Miller, Jessie Moore, Rogers B Morris, Carl Perry, James W Piggs, Eddie Reed, James Sauder, Mattie Sanders, Willie E Sias, Oliver Short, Edward Smith, Vernon Smith, W C Spencer, Jr, McArthur Straughier, Johnnie Thomas, Harry P Thurmond, William Watkins, Bobby Wells, Michael A White, Carl Whittington, Cleotha Williams, Herbert Williams, John A Williams, Jr, Robert Williams, Susie I Croft, Raphael I. Williams, Sanders Williams, Freddie L Winters, Perry Woods, Willis Richardson, Grethel Richardson, Eric Richardson, Dionysia Richardson-Smith, Garon Trawick, Phillip R Barker, Cheney Coston, Percy Davis, Sheila W Harvey, Edison Lamont-Smith, Jr, Larry R Whitt, Lawrence L Brockenkridge, George C Robens, Jr, Enoch Edwards, Jr, Hezekiah Gibson, Walter Gore, Theodore Hough, Andrew B Johnson, Charlie, C/O Sandra Mack Kelly, Walter C/O Lucy Ibemere, David E Boyd, Tom Gray Ewell, Robert II Taylor, Jack Tyus, James Jenkins, Kirk A Beault, Aberra Bulbulla, Carl Christopher, Dennis Connell, Benjamin Jacobs-El, Vannico Hanney, Alphonso L James, Samuel Moore, Joan Nelson, Detroy A Peterson, Martin Reynolds, Wayne M Smith, Leona Watson, Curmeil Watson, Gail Chiang, James B Beverly, Jr, Macdo Hill, Mashelia Grandison-Kizzie, West Bones, Jr, Alice Davis, Alice Davis for Henry Davis (Deceased), Clinton F Johnson, Jr, PLAINTIFFS (1:98-cv-1693): Alexander John Pires, Jr, Coulton, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, Washington, DC USA, Phillip T. Iraaz, Washington, DC USA.

For Dan Glickman, FEDERAL DEFENDANT (1:98-cv-1693): Michael Siteov, US Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC USA.

For Ann Veneman, FEDERAL DEFENDANT (1:98-cv-1693): Elizabeth Goitein.

JUDGES: [**1] PAUL I. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge.

OPINIONBY: PAUL I. FRIEDMAN

OPINION:

[*3] MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Court has before it defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs' response to defendant's response to the motion to reopen all late claims due to mail delays, as well as plaintiffs' opposition to the motion to strike and defendant's reply. Upon consideration of the parties' arguments, Rule 11 and Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the challenged document itself, the Court will grant defendant's motion to strike.

In a recent filing pertaining to its motion to reopen all late claims due to mail delays, class counsel Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright made the following statement: "Throughout this litigation, Michael Siteov has persistently demonstrated the same racist attitude of U.S.D.A. workers who systematically destroyed the farms and lives of thousands of **farmers**, simply because they were black." Response to Defendant's Response to Motion to Reopen All Late Claims Due to Mail Delays at 1-2 ("Pl. Response Regarding Mail Delays"). In a subsequent filing, Chestnut, Sanders wrote: "We believe Mr. Siteov's dishonesty or wreckless [sic] [*2] disregard for the truth is inspired by his contempt for 'lawyers of color' who dare to challenge his unequal concern for black and white **farmers**." Response to Motion to Strike at 3. Despite the enormity of these accusations, Chestnut, Sanders has provided no factual basis or evidence in support of its charges. Nor has the firm explained how such accusations could be relevant to plaintiff's pending motion to reopen late claims. Instead, Chestnut, Sanders simply accused defendant's lead counsel, Michael Siteov -- an experienced and dedicated Department of Justice attorney and public servant of many years who has devoted nearly six years of his professional life to this important case -- of engaging in conduct of the most deplorable kind. The Court cannot abide this type of groundless accusation.

Almost from the beginning of this lawsuit, virtually every party and lawyer has endured sometimes harsh criticism -- from other parties to the case, from segments of the public and the media, and occasionally from this Court. The Court is well aware that attorneys both for plaintiffs and for the government have experienced frustration in their efforts throughout this difficult and

215 F.R.D. 2, *; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6007, **

often contentious [**3] matter. Despite the disputes between counsel over a variety of issues in implementing the procedures agreed to in the settlement, however, it has been apparent to the Court from the very beginning that every attorney of record -- no matter who the client -- consistently has honored the fundamental rights of the **African-American farmers** on whose behalf the case was brought. Although Mr. Siteov's role necessarily has been to protect and defend the [**4] interests of his client, the United States Department of Agriculture, the Court has no doubt that Mr. Siteov always has recognized and respected the basic rights of plaintiffs and their lawyers, without regard to their race. Indeed, the Court has expressed its respect and appreciation for Mr. Siteov's hard work and dedication repeatedly in open court, as early as March 2, 1999, at the Court's fairness hearing on the Consent Decree, and as recently as the December 11, 2002 status conference. See Transcript of Fairness Hearing, March 2, 1999 at 192-95; Transcript of Status Conference, December 11, 2002 at 41-43. Yet Chestnut, Sanders unfairly likens Mr. Siteov to those within the Department of Agriculture and on the state level who unlawfully [**4] discriminated against **African-American farmers** for many years before this case was settled. See Pl. Response Regarding Mail Delays at 1-2.

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that by presenting to the court any "pleading, written motion, or other paper," an attorney "is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," the pleading "is not being filed for an improper purpose, such as to harass . . . and [that] the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Here, not only did Chestnut, Sanders fail to offer any evidence of Mr. Siteov's alleged "racist attitude," but the Court can find nothing in the entire record of this case -- spanning many years, many hearings and many pages -- that would support such a charge. The Court has observed Mr. Siteov and listened to his arguments and representations in court on scores of occasions, has met with him and opposing counsel in Chambers a number of times, and has read thousands of pages that he has either written or whose preparation he has supervised. [**5] While his frustration level may have risen over the years (and his choice of language in certain recent filings has reflected that frustration), Mr. Siteov has appeared always to have acted professionally, honorably and ethically. There is no basis in fact and no evidentiary support for the charges that he has exhibited a racist attitude or that he has contempt for "lawyers of color." Such "abusive language toward opposing counsel has no place in documents filed with our courts; the filing of a document containing such language is one

form of harassment prohibited by Rule 11." Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1989).

In addition, Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may strike any matter that is "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Although a motion to strike generally is disfavored because it seeks an extreme remedy, a court has "liberal discretion" to strike such filings as it deems appropriate under Rule 12(f). Stanbury Law Firm v. IRS, 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000); see 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.37[1] at 12-93 to 12-94 (3d ed. 2002). The [**6] word "scandalous" in Rule 12(f) "generally refers to any allegation that unnecessarily reflects on the moral character of an individual or states anything in repulsive language that detracts from the dignity of the court." 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.37[3] at 12-97; see also In re TheMart.com Inc. Securities Litigation, 114 F. Supp. 2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ("scandalous" includes allegations that cast "a cruelly derogatory light on a party or other person"). Chestnut, Sanders' charges of racism are plainly scandalous within the meaning of the Rule, in that they "improperly cast[] a derogatory light" on a dedicated government attorney who has done his best to navigate the deep and murky waters of this litigation. 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1382 (2d ed. 1995). The accusations are indefensible and wholly inappropriate and have no place in filings in this court.

n1 Although Rule 12(f) applies by its terms only to "pleadings," courts occasionally have applied the Rule to filings other than those enumerated in Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 213 F.R.D. 33, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2813, No. 96-1285, 2003 WL 721477 (D.D.C. March 3, 2003) (considering Rule 12(f) motion to strike plaintiffs' response to defendant's historical accounting plan).

[**7]

Because the accusations of racism in the Chestnut, Sanders filings are unsupported by facts or evidence, constitute a form of harassment, [**8] and are scandalous, the Court will grant defendant's motion to strike Chestnut, Sanders' Response Regarding Mail Delays and *sua sponte* will strike Chestnut, Sanders' Response to the Motion to Strike, based both on Rule 11 and on Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.37[1] at 12-94; *McCortin v. United States Dept of*

215 F.R.D. 2, *; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6007, **

Labor, 630 F.2d 242, 244 (5th Cir. 1980), *cert. denied*, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).

Finally, counsel are reminded that Local Civil Rule 83.8(b)(6)(v) of the Rules of this Court requires all counsel to familiarize themselves with the D.C. Bar Voluntary Standards for Civility in Professional Conduct, which are included as Appendix D to those Rules. Among other things, the Standards provide that

we [attorneys] will treat all participants in the legal process, including counsel . . . in a civil, professional, and courteous manner, at all times and in all communications, whether oral or written. . . . Except within the bounds of fair argument [**8] in pleadings or in formal proceedings, we will abstain from disparaging personal remarks or acrimony toward such participants . . . We will not bring the profession into disrepute by making unfounded accusations of impropriety or making ad hominem attacks on counsel, and, absent good cause, we will not attribute bad motives or improper conduct to other counsel. . . . We will not degrade the intelligence, ethics, morals, integrity or personal behavior of others, unless such matters are legitimately at issue in the proceeding.

D.C. Bar Voluntary Standards for Civility in Professional Conduct PPI, 3, 5, 28. Despite these established principles, the communications among counsel and some of their court filings in this case have grown less civil, less respectful, and less professional, and the language

used by Chestnut, Sanders in its most recent filings is beyond the pale. Whatever the underlying issues in this lawsuit -- and despite the undeniably tragic history of discrimination against **African-American farmers** in this country -- counsel have an obligation to their clients, to this Court and to the legal profession not to engage in the type of conduct that is the subject of [**9] this Opinion and that has begun to pervade this case in recent months. When the lawyers involved in this litigation resort to **scurrilous** accusations and inflammatory remarks about opposing counsel, no one wins -- least of all the **African-American farmers** in whose name this case was brought.

For all of these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs' response to defendant's response to plaintiffs' motion to reopen all late claims due to mail delays [763] is GRANTED; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' response to defendant's response to plaintiffs' motion to reopen all late claims due to mail delays [776] is STRICKEN from the record in this case; it is

FURTHER ORDERED *sua sponte* that plaintiffs' Response to the Motion to Strike [772] is STRICKEN from the record in this case; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to strike these two documents from the records of this Court.

SO ORDERED.

PAUL I. FRIEDMAN

United States District Judge

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANN M. VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. CECIL BREWINGTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANN M. VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF), Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

217 F. Supp. 2d 95; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16955

September 11, 2002, Decided
September 11, 2002, Filed

DISPOSITION: [**1] Motion to vacate Consent Decree denied. Motion to remove lead Class Counsel denied.

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

COUNSEL: For TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, plaintiff (97-CV-1978): Jacob A. Stein, STEIN, MITCHELL & MEZINES, Alexander John Pires, Jr., CONLON, FRANTZ, PHELAN & PIRCS, Anthony Herman, COVINGTON & BURLING, Richard Talbot Seymour, LILFF, CABRASER, HELMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP, David A. Branch, Washington, DC.

For TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, plaintiff (97-CV-1978): J. L. Chestnut, Jr., CHESTNUT, SANDERS, SANDERS, PETTAWAY, CAMPBELL & ALBRIGHT, Selma, AL.

For CECIL BREWINGTON, plaintiff (98-CV-1693): Alexander John Pires, Jr., CONLON, FRANTZ, PHELAN & PIRCS, Phillip T. Fraas, Washington, DC.

For ANN M. VENEMAN, federal defendant (97-CV-1978): Michael Sirov, Terry M. Henry, Washington, DC. Elizabeth Goicin, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, DC.

For DAN GLICKMAN, federal defendant (98-CV-1693): Michael Sirov, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, DC.

For ANN VENEMAN, federal defendant (98-CV-1693): Elizabeth Goicin, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, DC.

JUDGES: PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge.

OPINIONBY: PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

OPINION: [**97]

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER [2]**

The Court has before it two motions filed by several pro se members of the plaintiff class: a motion to vacate the Consent Decree in this case or, in the alternative, to stay all proceedings pending order on said motion, and a motion to remove lead Class Counsel, both requesting an emergency hearing. n1 Because the Court finds that these motions concern common issues, the Court will address both motions together.

n1 Four movants are named in the text of both motions: Thomas Burrell, Eddie Slaughter, Fernando Burkette and William H. Miller. Gary Grant also joins the motion to remove Class Counsel. Despite the government's objections that not all of the above movants or other individuals who have signed the motions are members of the plaintiff class with standing to bring these motions, the Court finds that more than one of the above-named individuals are members of the class and thus do have standing. See Response and Opposition of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pircs

to motion to vacate Consent Decree or in the alternative, to stay all proceedings pending order on said motion and request for emergency hearing at F-2. Nor will the Court consider the representation of Class counsel that four of the five movants have no basis for complaint because they participated in the process to which they now object and prevailed on their claims. See *id.* The Court will move to the substance of the motions rather than address the issue of standing with respect to each movant.

[**3]

The Court finds no grounds to grant the extraordinary relief sought by movants. To the extent that these motions are based on the recent opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in this case, see *Pigford v. Veneman*, 292 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2002), [**8] movants have misread that opinion and the prior Orders of this Court cited therein.

1. MOTION TO VACATE THE CONSENT DECREE

With respect to the motion to vacate the Consent Decree, movants rely on the court of appeals' statement that the Decree is "unworkable." See Motion to Vacate Consent Decree at 2. In making that determination, however, the court of appeals necessarily was referring only to the tight deadline schedule of the Track B process -- since that was the matter before it -- although the judgment was influenced by the court's assessment of counsel's overall performance when faced with a workload well beyond what anyone could have imagined and counsel's failure to seek the assistance of this Court or other lawyers earlier. See *Pigford v. Veneman*, 292 F.3d at 926-27. The Consent Decree therefore was described as "unworkable" only with respect to the [**4] Track B process established by the Consent Decree and the relatively few Track B cases in which crucial deadlines were missed. See *id.* With respect to those cases, this Court may now fashion a narrow remedy that is "suitably tailored to the changed circumstances." *Id.* at 927 (citing *Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail*, 502 U.S. 367, 391, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992) (modification of consent decree permitted only where required by significant changes in law or fact and must be tailored to changed circumstances)). As the government notes, to vacate the Consent Decree would be "far too broad a remedy" to address the "unforeseen obstacles" that have arisen in some Track B cases. Government Opposition to motion to vacate Consent Decree at 4 (citing *Pigford v. Veneman*, 292 F.3d at 927). See also *Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail*, 502 U.S. at 384. Although Class Counsel have

encountered many difficulties in the implementation of this enormously complex settlement agreement, those difficulties do not warrant vacating the Consent Decree.

Indeed, to vacate the Consent Decree would nullify the settlement of this case, "the grand, [**5] historical first step toward righting the wrongs visited upon thousands of African-American farmers for decades by the United States Department of Agriculture," *Pigford v. Glickman*, 127 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.D.C. 2001), and would undo the substantial progress that has been made for so many African-American farmers in the long five years since this case was filed. To vacate the Consent Decree also would require that every dollar already paid out to African-American farmers, whether in cash awards or in the form of debt relief or tax relief, be returned to the government. See *id.* To date, nearly \$ 800 million of relief has gone to approximately 13,000 families of African-American farmers. n2 Requiring these families to pay back the considerable sums that they received would be an extreme, unwarranted remedy that would bring great hardship to thousands of members of the class.

n2 See Facilitator's Report of September 9, 2002 (available from Consent Decree Facilitator).

In urging the Court [**6] to vacate the Consent Decree, movants have made much of the court of appeals' reference to the "double betrayal" of African-American farmers: first, historically, by the Department of Agriculture and then -- at least as this Court reads the opinion -- by counsel in litigating the merits of certain individual claims under the Consent Decree. To the extent that some have read the "double betrayal" language more broadly, they are [**9] taking it out of context. As noted, the court of appeals' ruling pertained only to those Track B cases where crucial discovery and other deadlines have been missed, not to any events occurring before or even closely following entry of the Consent Decree. See *Pigford v. Veneman*, 292 F.3d at 927. The ruling did not relate at all to the over 20,000 Track A cases that were not the subject of the court of appeals' opinion. While the court of appeals criticized Class Counsel's failings regarding Track A, the ruling itself did not turn on those errors but only on the mishandling of Track B claims. Finally, the court of appeals' "double betrayal" language could not have related to any actions that may have been taken -- or not taken -- by the Department [**7] of Agriculture after the settlement, because any such actions necessarily would be beyond the scope of this case and its settlement. See *Pigford v. Glickman*, 185 F.R.D. 82, 92, 110-11 (D.D.C. 1999), *aff'd*, 340 U.S. App. D.C. 420, 206 F.3d 1212

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (class consisted only of African-American farmers discriminated against between January 1, 1983 and February 21, 1997, and consent decree did not provide mechanism to prevent future discrimination).

Similarly, the references by this Court and the court of appeals to conduct "bordering on malpractice," related only to counsel's failure "to meet critical consent decree deadlines." Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001 at 5, deadlines required to be met after the Consent Decree was approved. Class Counsel ably litigated the case throughout its early stages, and they negotiated and entered into a fair settlement for the class as a whole. Indeed, this Court has noted just how remarkable Class Counsel's performance was at those early stages in vigorously litigating this case to the brink of trial and negotiating a landmark settlement with the government. See *id.* at 45 ("Class Counsel have earned accolades [**8] of acclaim for their efforts in initiating this case, litigating it to the verge of trial, and then negotiating a truly historic settlement with the government."). To the extent that the Court has been justifiably critical of Class Counsel, its concerns have related only to counsel's handling of the implementation process after entry of the Consent Decree. See *id.*; *Pigford v. Veneman*, 143 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2001); *Pigford v. Veneman*, 148 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2001). Class Counsel's failings in handling certain matters after entry of the Consent Decree cannot provide a basis for vacating the Consent Decree.

II. MOTION TO REMOVE LEAD CLASS COUNSEL

Removal of Class Counsel at this stage would be an extreme action that should not be taken lightly. Removal of counsel would be appropriate only if the Court were to find that it was absolutely necessary to preserve the integrity of the adversary process, as, for example, where an attorney's conflict of interest undermines the Court's confidence in the vigor of the attorney's representation of his or her client, or where the attorney is in a position to use privileged information concerning the other [**9] side as a result of prior representation. See *Board of Education of the City of New York v. Nyquist*, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); see also *Koller ex rel. Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.*, 237 U.S. App. D.C. 333, 737 F.2d 1038, 1055-56 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 472 U.S. 424, 86 L. Ed. 2d 340, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985); *Ackerman v. National Property Analysts, Inc.*, 887 F. Supp. 510, 1993 WL 258679 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Here, movants have presented no evidence of a conflict of interest or the potential misuse of privileged information by Class Counsel. Furthermore, the Court sees nothing that would be gained by the removal of Class Counsel now since this case already has reached

the advanced stages of settlement implementation. See *In re Barnett*, 97 F.3d 181, 184 (7th Cir. 1996) [**100] (removal of class counsel improper where trial was almost concluded and nothing would be gained from expelling attorneys).

At the core of the criticisms voiced both by this Court and by the court of appeals was Class Counsel's repeated failure to meet deadlines for submission of claimant Petitions for Monitor Review, specifically the November 13, 2000 and May 15, 2001 deadlines. [**10] See Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001 at 1-3, 5-6; *Pigford v. Veneman*, 292 F.3d at 920. Class Counsel's failure in this respect was significant, as evinced by this Court's imposition of sanctions and its framing of issues for a possible future hearing on sanctions. In fact, the Court considered the performance of Class Counsel with respect to the Monitor review process "dismal," their disregard of deadlines "brazen," and their explanation for this performance with respect to the Monitor Petition process unacceptable and evasive. Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001 at 2-5.

Still, the practical impact of Class Counsel's failings was to threaten the government's enjoyment of the benefit of its bargain and to cost the government as much as an additional \$ 33 million, not to deprive claimants of the right to Monitor review. See Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001 at 6, n. 2. Ultimately, all the claimant Petitions subject to the November 13, 2000 deadline were either fully supported and deemed filed as of the original deadline or were withdrawn from the petition process as a result of substantive review by Class Counsel. n3 While [**11] the Court is aware of allegations that Class Counsel mishandled certain individual petitions, no such misconduct has been found by this Court or by the court of appeals, and movants' papers do not constitute a basis for making such a finding. As it has made clear in the past, the Court is fully prepared to impose sanctions on Class Counsel if the Court finds that Class Counsel "has shirked any of their responsibilities with respect to the filing of these materials and/ or withdrawals [of Petitions for Monitor Review]." Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001 at 6. n4 No evidence or argument presently before this Court, however, warrants Class Counsel's removal.

n3 To ensure that claimants were not injured by Class Counsel's failure, the Court expressly required that each Petition be supported by "fully researched, fully briefed, fully documented materials." Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001 at 6.

217 F. Supp. 2d 95, *; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16955, **

n4 See also Board of Education of the City of New York v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d at 1247 ("Since disqualification entails immediate disruption of the litigation, it is better to relegate any questions about [counsel's] conduct to other appropriate proceedings.")

[**12]

The efforts of Class Counsel have resulted in relief for thousands of African-American farmers. Although final decisions and awards have been made in thousands of individual claims, many claims remain to be finally determined and Class Counsel continues to make important contributions. None of the mistakes in the implementation process that have come to the attention

of this Court and been discussed by the court of appeals warrants the removal of Class Counsel in the midst of the Consent Decree implementation process. For all of these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion to vacate the Consent Decree [633] is DENIED, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to remove lead Class Counsel [634] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

United States District Judge

DATE: 9-11-02

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANN M. VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. CECIL BREWINGTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANN M. VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (P.F), Civil Action No. 98-1693 (P.F)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

144 F. Supp. 2d 16; 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5714

April 27, 2001, Decided
April 27, 2001, Filed

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Related proceeding at Wise v. Glickman, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5033 (D.D.C., Mar. 31, 2003)

COUNSEL: **[**1]** For TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, LLOYD SHAFER, GEORGE HALL, LEONARD COOPER, MCARTHUR NESBIT, plaintiffs (97-CV-1978): Jacob A. Slein, STEIN, MITCHELL & MEZINES, Washington, DC.

For TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, LLOYD SHAFER, GEORGE HALL, ABRAHAM CARPENTER, plaintiffs (97-CV-1978): Alexander John Pires, Jr., CONLON, KRANTZ, PHELAN & PIRES, Washington, DC.

For TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, LLOYD SHAFER, GEORGE HALL, plaintiffs (97-CV-1978): Richard Talbot Seymour, LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP, New York, NY.

For LLOYD SHAFER, plaintiff (97-CV-1978): John Michael Clifford, Mona Lyons, CLIFFORD, LYONS & GARDE, Washington, DC.

For GEORGE HALL, plaintiff (97-CV-1978): Caroline Lewis Wolverton, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, DC.

For LEONARD COOPER, plaintiff (97-CV-1978): Marcus B. Jimison, NCCU SCHOOL OF LAW, Land Loss Prevention Project, Stephen J. BOWENS, Durham, NC.

For ABRAHAM CARPENTER, plaintiff (97-CV-1978): Phillip L. Fraas, TUTTLE, TAYLOR & BERON, Washington, DC.

For MCARTHUR NESBIT, plaintiff (97-CV-1978): Alexander John Pires, Jr., [UNRECORDED WORDS].

For CECIL BREWINGTON, JERRY COOPER, ARTHUR GRIFFIN, CHARLIE HARRIS, WILLIAM LAMPLEY, HENRY SIMMONS, WILLIE FRANK WHEELER, PAUL WINGARD, ROY G. WOOD, ARTHUR AMOS, RANSOM ARNOLD, CLARENCE POLK, HUBERT BROWN, CAROL JEAN BROWN, WILLIE HEAD, JR., ANDREW JACKSON, CLEM JONES, AARON MOBLEY, TIFODORE F.B. BATES, WILBERT WALKER, JOHN M. DECODREFAUX, ROY H. ADAMS, LARRY ALEXANDER, HERBERT C. ALLEN, JR., JAMES C. BACON, STANLEY BACON, W. E. BRANDON, JOSEPH BROWN, LEON E. BROWN, WILLIE J. BURNES, JOSEPH CARTMAN, MICHAEL V. CHATMAN, RONALD CLARKE, ALBERT J. COOPER, ANDREW L. COOPER, ELIJAH COLE, JR., HOUSTON COLEMAN, ROBERT COLEMAN, JIMMY L. CURRY, ALFORD DAVIS, ADRIAN DAVIS, SR., HAROLD L. DAVIS, ONZIE GLEN, MARQUIS GRANT, WILLIAM HAMKIN, THETIS HARDY, GEORGE HENDERSON, CARY HOLMES, MARK A. HOUSTON, LEE ANDREW HOWARD, OLLIE HUDSON, TOBIAS JENKINS, GARRETT JOHNSON, SAMMY JOHNSON, WILLIE JOHNSON, FREDDIE JONES, COLONEL, WILLIE F. LANE, JAMES MADLOCK, ANDRE MATHEWS, KENZIE MCGINNIS, CURTIS MILLER, TED MILLER, JESSE

MOORE, ROGERS B. MORRIS, CARL PERRY, JAMES W. PIGGS, EDDIE REED, JAMES SANDER, MATTIE SANDERS, WILLIE E. SIAS, OLIVER SHORT, EDWARD SMITH, VERNON SMITH, W. C. SPENCER, JR., MCARTHUR STRAUGHTER, JOHNNIE THOMAS, HARRY P. THURMOND, WILLIAM WATKINS, BOBBY WELLS, MICHAEL A. WHITE, CARL WHITTINGTON, CLEOTHA WILLIAMS, HERBERT WILLIAMS, JOHN A. WILLIAMS, JR., ROBERT WILLIAMS, SUSIE I. CROFT, RAPIHAEL L. WILLIAMS, SANDERS WILLIAMS, FREDDIE I. WINTERS, PERRY WOODS, WILLIE RICHARDSON, GRETHEL RICHARDSON, ERIC RICHARDSON, DIONYSIA RICHARDSON-SMITH, GARON TRAWICK, PHILLIP R. BARKER, CHENAY COSTON, PERCY DAVIS, SHEILA W. HARVEY, EDISON LAMONT SMITH, JR., LARRY R. WHITE, LAWRENCE L. BRECKENRIDGE, GEORGE C. ROBERTS, JR., ENOCH EDWARDS, JR., HEZEKIAH GIBSON, WALTER GORE, THEODORE HOUGH, ANDREW B. JOHNSON, CHARLIE C/O SANDRA MACK KELLY, WALTER C/O LUCY IBEMERE, DAVID E. BOYD, TOM GARY EWELL, ROBERT H. TAYLOR, JACK TYUS, JAMES JENKINS, KIRK A. BENONI, ABERRA BULBULLA, CARL CHRISTOPHER, DENNIS CONNELL, BENJAMIN JACOBS-EL, VANNICO HANNFY, ALPHONSO I. JAMES, SAMUEL MOORE, JOAN NELSON, DELROY A. PETERSON, MARTIN REYNOLDS, WAYNE M. SMITH, LEONA WATSON, CURNEFALL WATSON, GAIL CHIANG, JAMES B. BEVERLY, JR., MACIO HILL, MASHELIA GRANDISON-KIZZIE, WEST BONES, JR., ALICE DAVIS, CLINTON F. JOHNSON, JR., AT-L PLAINTIFFS, plaintiffs (98-CV-1693): Phillip T. Fraas, TUTTLE TAYLOR & HIFRON, Alexander John Pires, Jr., CONLON, FRANTZ, PHELLAN & PIREs, Washington, DC.

For HOUSTON BLAKENEY, REATITA BLAKENEY, LEROY ROBINSON, BOBBI NEWTON, PEARLIE PETERSON, NAOMI KNOCKETT, HENTHIE PORTER, JAMES DAVIS, petitioners (97-CV-1978): Stephen J. Bowers, Durham, NC.

For DAN GLICKMAN, federal defendant (97-CV-1978): Daniel Edward Bensing, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Susan Hall Lennon, Amanda Quester, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, David Monro Souders, WEINER BRODSKY SIDMAN & KIDER, PC, Washington, DC.

For DAN GLICKMAN, ANN M. VENEMAN, federal defendants (97-CV-1978): Terry M. Henry, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, DC.

For DAN GLICKMAN, federal defendant (97-CV-1978, 98-CV-1693): Michael Sincov, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, DC.

For ANN M. VENEMAN, federal defendant (97-CV-1978): Michael Sincov, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, DC.

For BANKS LAW FIRM, Non Party (97-CV-1978): Wyndell Oliver Banks, Washington, DC.

RANDI ILYSE ROTH, Non Party (97-CV-1978), Pro se, St. Paul, MN.

EVANS M. FOJINS, claimant (97-CV-1978), Pro se, Los Valeros, CA.

For SARAH DAVIS, movant (97-CV-1978): Dennis Charles Sweet, LANSTON, FRAZER, SWEET & FREESE, Jackson, MS.

For JAMES TANNER, movant (97-CV-1978): Ford C Ladd, Alexandria, VA.

JUDGES: PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge.

OPINIONBY: PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

OPINION:

[*17] MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On April 19, 2001, the Court held a status conference because of its concern about Class Counsel's repeated failures to meet court-ordered deadlines relating to Petitions for Monitor Review. The history of the petition process and counsel's past failures in meeting petition deadlines is set out in previous Court orders and will not be repeated here. See Order of Reference P 8 (April 4, 2000) (establishing procedure); Stipulation and Order P 5 (July 14, 2000) (establishing deadlines); Order of Nov. 8, 2000 (discussing Class Counsel's failures and modifying deadlines); Order of April 6, 2001 (recounting Class Counsel's continued failures to meet deadlines).

In particular, the Court was alarmed by Class Counsel's consistent failure to meet a modified schedule for filing petition materials that was established the last time counsel sought emergency relief from the deadlines. As reports from the Monitor demonstrate, Class Counsel failed to meet the minimum quota of 400 filings per month in any of the past four months. See Monitor Report for Period Ending Dec. 15, 2000 (showing [**2] that Class Counsel filed materials or withdrawals with respect to 399 claimants); Monitor Report for Period

ending Jan. 15, 2001 (showing filings with respect to only 315 claimants); Monitor Report for Period ending Feb. 15, 2001 (showing filings with respect to only 282 claimants); Monitor Report for Period ending March 15, 2001 (showing filings with respect to only 180 claimants). At the April 19 status conference, the Monitor reported that there were still up to 2,064 petitions yet to be filed by Class Counsel before the May 15 deadline.

Class Counsel's performance with respect to the Petition for Monitor Review process has been dismal. Despite signing a stipulation with the government in which they agreed to file a sizable yet finite number of petitions by November 13, 2000, and despite promising not to seek an extension of that deadline, Class Counsel sought equitable relief from the Court mere days before the deadline expired. See Plaintiffs' Expedited Motion for a Hearing to Resolve Problems with Track A Petition for Monitor Review Process (Oct. 31, 2000). Agreeing with Class Counsel's entreaty to spare the class from the consequences of counsel's admitted failures, the [**3] Court permitted what amounted to a six-month extension of the deadline over the vehement objection of [**18] the government. As the Monitor's reports make clear, Class Counsel completely failed to take advantage of this extension, never meeting any of the monthly minimum requirements set by the Court.

At the April 19 status conference, Class Counsel made the remarkable admission that they never had a realistic expectation of meeting the November 13, 2000, deadline they had negotiated with the government, nor did they have any intention of meeting the modified May 15, 2001, deadline set by the Court. With respect to the initial deadline, Class Counsel conceded that they considered the November 13 deadline a "best estimate" of when they could complete more than 4000 Petitions for Monitor Review. With respect to the May 15 deadline, Class Counsel suggested that they never intended to meet the monthly quota of 400 petitions necessary to meet the deadline; instead they planned from the beginning to file between 350 and 400 petitions a month, then request an extension of time for the 500 or 600 petitions remaining when the deadline came. n1

n1 Class Counsel gave no real explanation for their inability or unwillingness to marshal their resources in a way that would ensure that all petitions would be filed in a timely manner. The Court is left to wonder whether Class Counsel would be in the position in which they now find themselves had they not filed and pursued three new sister class actions in this Court at the same time they were attempting to complete their

obligations in this case. See *Love v. Veneman*, Civil Action No. 00-2502 (JR); *Garcia v. Veneman*, Civil Action No. 00-2445 (LFO); *Keepseagle v. Veneman*, Civil Action No. 99-3119 (WFB). Considering the significant amount of work left to be done in this case, the Court will informally confer with the judges to whom the Love, Garcia and Keepseagle cases have been assigned to determine whether those cases should be indefinitely stayed until Class Counsel can prove that they are able to manage even one class action, let alone four.

[**4]

Equally remarkable, Class Counsel attempted to place blame for their lack of foresight and planning on everyone other than themselves. Counsel suggested that they were hindered by the Monitor's allegedly slow pace in deciding the first batch of Petitions for Monitor Review, by the government's alleged unwillingness to settle a dispute over attorneys' fees (with the alleged intent of sabotaging Class Counsel by depriving them of funds necessary to complete their obligations in this case), and even by the Court, who was purportedly just "wrong" when it decided against Class Counsel with respect to certain legal issues relating to their motion for attorneys' fees.

In an apparent attempt to further shift the blame from themselves to others, Class Counsel presented the Court with three options for resolving the instant deadline debacle: (1) the Court could grant Class Counsel another blanket extension of the deadlines so that they can file complete, thorough Petitions for Monitor Review; (2) the Court could allow counsel to file two-page informational petitions with the Monitor by the deadline, to be followed by complete petitions at some time in the future beyond the deadline; or (3) [**5] the Court could enforce the May 15 deadline and force the Monitor to accept what Class Counsel admits would be incomplete, inadequate petitions -- to the acknowledged detriment of their clients. These are not real options. Class Counsel in effect asks for an indefinite extension of time so that they can complete what should have been completed six months ago (the first or second option) or, in the alternative, dares the Court to enforce the deadline (the third option) and be the cause of Class Counsel filing petitions that are substandard and likely to be rejected by the Monitor.

Class Counsel have earned accolades and acclaim for their efforts in initiating [**19] this case, litigating it to the verge of trial, and then negotiating a truly historic settlement with the government. By negotiating the Consent Decree that settled this case, Class Counsel benefitted tens of thousands of African American

farmers claiming racial discrimination who otherwise would have remained mute and had no opportunity to obtain redress. Counsel's negligent handling of the final stages of this case, however, runs the risk of jeopardizing counsel's prior accomplishments. Class Counsel's miscalculations, left [**6] unremedied, could mean that literally thousands of **farmers** with possibly meritorious claims will be left without recourse due solely to counsel's myopia; counsel's conduct borders on legal malpractice. The brazenness with which Class Counsel have disregarded the deadlines first established in the Stipulation and Order they negotiated with the government and then modified by the Court's Order of November 8, 2000, appears to be the result of counsel's impression that no matter how poorly they perform their obligations, the Court would never let their failings adversely affect the class and would always come to the rescue.

Recognizing its obligation to ensure that the Consent Decree and subsequent orders are enforced in a manner commensurate with both the letter and the spirit of the parties' agreements and the Court's orders, the Court is still considering whether to exercise its equitable powers and grant an extension of time for the filing of Petitions for Monitor Review. Regardless of its decision, Class Counsel will be held accountable for their actions. If the Court ultimately decides to grant an extension beyond May 15, 2001, it will impose a progressive schedule of fines against [**7] Class Counsel for breaching their agreement with the government, memorialized in the Court's Stipulation and Order of July 14, 2000, and for deliberately violating the Court's Order of November 8, 2000. n2

n2 As part of the bargain struck between the parties and approved by the Court in the Order of July 14, 2000, Class Counsel agreed to meet the 120 day deadline in return for the government's agreement to admit more than 1,100 Track A claimants into the class who otherwise would have been excluded. Based on the current success rate of roughly 60% and a cash award of \$ 50,000 per claimant, this means that the agreement will cost the government *at least* \$ 33 million in damages alone -- not to mention the cost of providing debt relief for those same claimants, as well as the financial and personnel drain on the Departments of Agriculture and Justice. While the schedule of fees outlined below, if implemented, would not fully recompense the government for Class Counsel's flagrant breach of the agreement, it would provide at least a degree of compensation.

[**8]

Furthermore, the Court will not permit Class Counsel to file two-page "informational" petitions, as proposed by counsel at the status conference. Class Counsel is obligated to provide full, fair and adequate representation for all of their clients, not just those who were lucky enough to be at the top of counsel's list ten months ago when they first negotiated the deadlines. Counsel shall file fully researched, fully briefed, fully documented materials in support of all remaining Petitions for Monitor Review, or withdrawals of those petitions, where appropriate. If the Court determines at a later date that Counsel has shirked any of their responsibilities with respect to the filing of these materials and/or withdrawals, the Court will impose fines and sanctions beyond those outlined below.

Finally, it is clear to the Court that Class Counsel will be unable to meet their obligations, even with an extension of time, without the assistance of additional counsel. The Court is encouraged by Class Counsel's belated acknowledgment at the April 19 status conference that they would need to rely on outside counsel -- preferably [**20] *pro bono* counsel -- to assist with the filing of Petitions [**9] for Monitor Review after proper training. The Court also supports Class Counsel's attempts to find *pro bono* counsel to assist with the representation of Track B claimants. Such assistance would undoubtedly result in Class Counsel having more time to concentrate on Petitions for Monitor Review, something to this point they have not been able or willing to do.

To this end, Class Counsel, the Monitor and/or the Court have spoken with several individuals -- including Robert N. Weiner of Arnold & Porter, chair of the ABA Committee on Pro Bono and Public Services, Susan Hoffman of Crowell & Moring, and Steven B. Scudder, the ABA Committee's staff person -- who might be able to assemble a team of *pro bono* lawyers to assist Class Counsel on an emergency basis. The Court understands that Class Counsel have arranged a meeting on May 1, 2001, with Mr. Weiner, Ms. Hoffman, Mr. Scudder and representatives from District of Columbia law firms who might be willing to assist in dealing with the crisis. The Court is considering whether to ask the Monitor to attend this meeting, as well.

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that all deadlines set forth in the Court's Order [**10] of November 8, 2000, are suspended until further order of the Court; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that if the Court ultimately decides to grant an extension of time beyond May 15, 2001, it will impose a progressive schedule of fines

against Class Counsel. After all petitions on Class Counsel's Register of Petitions have been supplemented or withdrawn, Class Counsel will be fined for each day after May 15, 2001, that their obligation was not complete. Class Counsel will be fined \$ 1,000 for each day during the first month after the deadline that all supporting materials or withdrawals were not filed, they will be fined \$ 2,000 for each day during the second month after the deadline that all supporting materials or withdrawals were not filed, they will be fined \$ 3,000 for each day during the third month after the deadline that all that all supporting materials or withdrawals were not filed, and so on. Fines collected from Class Counsel will be placed in the Court Registry until such time as the Court rules on a proper motion for attorneys' fees or when the parties settle the current attorneys' fees dispute; at such time the Court will order that all funds in the Registry be paid to the government; [**11] and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that if after meeting on May 1, 2001, Class Counsel determine that an extension of

time beyond the May 15, 2001, deadline will be needed to complete the petition process in a professional manner, counsel shall file a motion seeking such an extension. The motion shall propose a realistic schedule for completing the petition process and shall provide the details of any plan to incorporate additional counsel (including an explanation of how such counsel would be trained and precisely how they would be utilized). If such a motion is necessary, it shall be filed and hand delivered to Chambers and government counsel by May 4, 2001, at 4:00 p.m.; a response from the government, if any, shall be filed and hand delivered to Chambers and Class Counsel by May 8, 2001, at 4:00 p.m.

SO ORDERED.

for PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
United States District Judge

DATE: April 27, 2001

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DAN GLICKMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. CECIL BREWINGTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DAN GLICKMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF), Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

127 F. Supp. 2d 35; 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140

January 3, 2001, Decided
January 4, 2001, Opinion Filed

DISPOSITION: [**1] Certain individual plaintiffs' motion to reconsider fairness of Consent Decree [248-1] DENIED.

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

COUNSEL: For TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, LLOYD SHAFER, GEORGE HALL, MCARTHUR NESBIT, EDDIE SLAUGHTER, LEO JACKSON, J. B. BLACK, LUCIOUS ABRAMS, JR., GRIFFIN LOOD, SR., GREGORY ERVES, CECIL BREWINGTON, HERBERT L. SKINNER, JR., OBIE L. BEAL, CLIFFORD LOVETT, plaintiffs: Jacob A. Stein, STEIN, MITCHELL & MEZINES, Alexander John Pires, Jr., CONTON, FRANTZ, PHELAN & PIRES, Richard Talbot Seymour, LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Washington, DC.

For LLOYD SHAFER, plaintiff: John Michael Clifford, Mona Lyons, CLIFFORD, LYONS & GARDE, Washington, DC.

For GEORGE HALL, plaintiff: Caroline Lewis Wolverton, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, DC.

For LEONARD COOPER, plaintiff: Jacob A. Stein, STEIN, MITCHELL & MEZINES, Washington, DC.

For LEONARD COOPER, plaintiff: Marcus B. Jimison, NCCU SCHOOL OF LAW, Land Loss Prevention Project, Stephen J. Bowens, Durham, NC.

For CECIL BREWINGTON, JERRY COOPER, ARTHUR GRIFFIN, CHARLIE HARRIS, WILLIAM LAMPLEY, HENRY SIMMONS, WILLIE FRANK WHEELER, PAUL WINGARD, ROY G. WOOD, ARTHUR AMOS, RANSOM ARNOLD, CLARENCE POLK, HUBERT BROWN, CAROL JEAN BROWN, WILLIE HEAD, JR., ANDREW JACKSON, CLM JONES, AARON MOBLEY, THEODORE F.B. BATES, WILBERT WALKER, JOHN M. DECOUDRELAUX, ROY H. ADAMS, LARRY ALEXANDER, HERBERT C. ALLEN, JR., JAMES C. BACON, STANLEY BACON, W. E. BRANDON, JOSEPH BROWN, LEON E. BROWN, WILLIE J. BURNES, JOSEPH CARTMAN, MICHAEL V. CHATMAN, RONALD CLARKE, ALBERT J. COOPER, ANDREW L. COOPER, ELLIJAH COLE, JR., HOUSTON COLEMAN, ROBERT COLEMAN, JIMMY L. CURRY, ALFORD DAVIS, ADELL DAVIS, SR., HAROLD L. DAVIS, ONZIE GLEN, MARQUIS GRANT, WILLIAM HAMKIN, THETIS HARDY, GEORGE HENDERSON, CARY HOLMES, MARK A. HOUSTON, LEE ANDREW HOWARD, OTTIE HUDSON, TOBIAS JENKINS, GARRETT JOHNSON, SAMMY JOHNSON, WILLIE JOHNSON, FREDDIE JONES, COLONEL, WILLIE E. LANE, JAMES MADLOCK, ANDRE MATTHEWS, KENZIE MCGINNIS, CURTIS MILLER, TED MILLER, JESSIE MOORE, ROGERS B. MORRIS, CARL PERRY, JAMES W. PIGGS, LUDIE REED, JAMES SANDER, MATTIE SANDERS, WILLIE E. STAS, OLIVER SHORT, EDWARD SMITH, VERNON SMITH, W. C. SPENCER, JR., MCARTHUR STRAUGHTER,

JOHNNIE THOMAS, HARRY P. THURMOND, WILLIAM WATKINS, BOBBY WELLS, MICHAEL A. WHITE, CARL WHITTINGTON, CLEOTIA WILLIAMS, HERBERT WILLIAMS, JOHN A. WILLIAMS, JR., ROBERT WILLIAMS, SUSIE I. CROFT, RAPHALL L. WILLIAMS, SANDERS WILLIAMS, FREDDIE L. WINTERS, PERRY WOODS, WILLIE RICHARDSON, GRETHER RICHARDSON, ERIC RICHARDSON, DIONYSIA RICHARDSON-SMITT, GARON TRAWICK, PHILLIP R. BARKER, CIENAY COSTON, PERCY DAVIS, SHEILA W. HARVEY, EDISON LAMONT SMITH, JR., LARRY R. WHITE, LAWRENCE L. BRECKENRIDGE, GEORGE C. ROBERTS, JR., ENOCH EDWARDS, JR., HEZEKIAH GIBSON, WALTER GORE, THEODORE HOUGH, ANDREW B. JOHNSON, CHARLIE C/O SANDRA MACK KELLY, WALTER C/O LUCY IBERERE, DAVID E. BOYD, TOM GARY EWELL, ROBERT H. TAYLOR, JACK TYUS, JAMES JENKINS, KIRK A. BENOIT, ABERRA BULBULLA, CARL CHRISTOPHER, DENNIS CONNELL, BENJAMIN JACOBS-EL, VANNICO HANNEY, ALPHONSO L. JAMES, SAMUEL MOORE, JOAN NELSON, DELROY A. PETERSON, MARTIN REYNOLDS, WAYNE M. SMITH, LEONA WATSON, CURNEALL WATSON, GAIL CHIANG, JAMES B. BEVERLY, JR., MACIO HILL, MASHFLIA GRANDISON-KIZZIE, WREST BONLS, JR., ALICE DAVIS, CLINTON F. JOHNSON, JR., ALL PLAINTIFFS, plaintiff (98-CV-1693): Phillip I. Fraas, TUTTLE, TAYLOR & HERON, Alexander John Pires, Jr., CONLON, KRANTZ, PHELLAN & PIRLS, Washington, DC.

For HOUSTON BLAKENEY, REATHA BLAKENEY, LEROY ROBINSON, BOBBI NEWTON, PEARLIE PETERSON, NAOMI KNOCKETT, ILENTHIE PORTER, JAMES DAVIS, petitioners: Stephen J. Bowens, Durham, NC.

For DAN GLICKMAN, federal defendant: Daniel Edward Bensing, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Terry M. Henry, Susan Hall Lennon, Amanda Quester, Michael Sitcov, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, David Monro Souders, WEINER BRODSKY SIDMAN & KIDER, PC, Washington, DC.

For DAN GLICKMAN, federal defendant (98-CV-1693): Michael Sitcov, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, DC.

For BANKS LAW FIRM, Non Party: Wyndell Oliver Banks, Washington, DC.

RANDI HLYSE ROTH, Non Party, Pro se, St. Paul, MN.

EVANS M. FOLINS, claimant, Pro se, Los Valeros, CA.

For SARAH DAVIS, movant: Dennis Charles Sweet, LANSTON, FRAZER, SWEET & FRESSE, Jackson, MS.

For ANTONIO SANTOS, CLINTON R. MARTIN, movants: Gerard Robert Lear, Arlington, VA.

JUDGES: PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge.

OPINIONBY: PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

OPINION: [*36]

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Court has before it the motion of certain individual plaintiffs to reconsider the fairness of the Consent Decree approved by this Court on April 14, 1999, defendant's opposition, Class Counsel's response, and movants' reply to defendant's and Class Counsel's arguments. The Court heard oral argument on the motion and permitted movants and the defendant to file supplemental memoranda. Upon consideration of the pre-and post-hearing memoranda and the arguments of counsel, the Court will deny the motion. [*37]

I. BACKGROUND

On January 5, 1999, the parties filed a proposed Consent Decree which, if approved by the Court, would settle this case and establish a process for adjudicating claims by individual **African American farmers** who claimed that the United States Department of Agriculture had discriminated against them on [**2] the basis of their race when, among other things, it denied their applications for credit and/or benefit programs. After granting preliminary approval of the settlement, the Court conducted an extensive fairness hearing on March 2, 1999. On April 14, 1999, the Court gave final approval to the Consent Decree, finding that it represented a fair, reasonable and adequate resolution of the class members' claims under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See *Pigford v. Glickman*, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999).

Shortly after the Court approved the Decree, seven individual putative class members appealed the Court's order approving the Consent Decree to the court of appeals, arguing that the Decree was unfair in certain respects and should be set aside. Appellants' arguments were considered and summarily rejected by the court of appeals. See *Pigford v. Glickman*, 340 U.S. App. D.C. 420, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000), *aff'g* *Pigford v. Glickman*, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999). While the

appeal was pending, the same seven appellants/movants filed the instant motion asking this Court to reconsider the fairness of the Consent Decree [**3] in light of "changed circumstances" which, they argue, justify vacating the Decree and scheduling this case for trial.

II. DISCUSSION

Movants have asked the Court to reconsider the fairness of the Consent Decree under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. n1 Rule 60(b)(5) permits a court to "relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding . . . [i]f it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Rule 60(b)(5), Fed. R. Civ. P.; see *Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail*, 502 U.S. 367, 378-83, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992) (applying Rule 60(b) to request for modification of consent decree); *United States v. Western Elec. Co.*, 310 U.S. App. D.C. 281, 46 F.3d 1198, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying *Rufo* analysis to request under Rule 60(b)(5) to modify consent decree).

n1 Movants also seek relief under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b)(6) permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Rule 60(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. The phrase "other reason," however, consistently has been interpreted by the courts to mean reasons *other than* those specified in subsections (1) through (5) of Rule 60(b). See *Baltia Airlines, Inc. v. Transaction Management, Inc.*, 321 U.S. App. D.C. 191, 98 F.3d 640, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing *Williamsburg Wax Museum, Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc.*, 258 U.S. App. D.C. 124, 810 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). By its plain terms, therefore, Rule 60(b)(6) does not apply in this case because movants have sought relief under one of the other provision of Rule 60(b). The Court therefore will focus only on whether it should reconsider its ruling under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules.

[**4]

A party seeking modification of a consent decree under Rule 60(b)(5) "must establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstances." *Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail*, 502 U.S. at 377; see *NLRB v. Harris Teeter Supermarkets*, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 32, 215 F.3d 32, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2000). To succeed on their motion in this case, movants must demonstrate that events or changed facts

(1) "make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous"; (2) make the decree "unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles"; or (3) make "enforcement [of the decree] detrimental to the public interest." *Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail*, 502 U.S. at 384; *NLRB v. Harris Teeter Supermarkets*, 215 F.3d [**38] at 35. Movants meet none of these three tests.

In their original motion for reconsideration, movants cited several examples of "changed circumstances" regarding the Track A claims process that allegedly constituted sufficient justifications for either setting aside the Consent Decree in its entirety or modifying it in unspecified ways. Many of [**5] the issues raised in the motion, however, were resolved or had become moot by the time the Court heard oral argument on the motion. n2 Accordingly, movants' supplemental hearing memorandum narrowed the alleged changed circumstances to only those still outstanding at the time of oral argument, and the Court therefore focuses only on those issues.

n2 For example, questions regarding the standard the Monitor should use to evaluate Petitions for Monitor Review and whether claimants are able to supplement the record when filing their Petitions were resolved by the Order of Reference, which appointed Randi Roth as the Monitor and clarified her duties and powers. See Order of Reference, Apr. 4, 2000, at P 8(e). In addition, uncertainty regarding the rules that apply to late-filed claims has been resolved by Court order, see Stipulation and Order, July 14, 2000, as has the issue of attorneys' fees for counsel other than Class Counsel and Of Counsel. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Aug. 28, 2000. Certain other arguments made by these same movants throughout this litigation were considered and rejected by the D.C. Circuit in *Pigford v. Glickman*, 340 U.S. App. D.C. 420, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000), *aff'g* *Pigford v. Glickman*, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999).

[**6]

The majority of the issues raised by movants are essentially complaints regarding the manner in which adjudicators have been deciding Track A claims. Movants believe that an unacceptably high rate of Track A claims are being denied; that too few farmers are receiving debt relief; that adjudicators are deciding claims in an arbitrary and capricious manner; that adjudicators have a tendency to resolve factual disputes against class members; and that adjudicators have in

certain cases accepted false and possibly perjurious information submitted by the government.

These arguments are not properly before the Court. Even if the Court were presented with evidence sufficient to support movants' claims -- and it has not been -- it would still decline to act on those claims at this time. As the Consent Decree and the Order of Reference make very clear, disputes regarding decisions by arbitrators should be brought to the attention of the Monitor through a Petition for Monitor Review. See Consent Decree PP 9(b)(v), 12(b)(iii); Order of Reference P 8. Such complaints regarding the outcome of individual Track A adjudications do not constitute changed circumstances within the meaning of Rule [**7] 60(b)(5). The parties settled this case on the premise that such complaints, at least as an initial matter, would be referred to the Monitor, not the Court.

Movants also suggest that Class Counsel's use of non-lawyers to assist class members fill out their claims packages and Class Counsel's alleged inability to provide comprehensive information regarding similarly-situated white farmers to Track A claimants constitute changed circumstances justifying substantial modification or vacation of the Consent Decree. Movants' arguments ignore the reality of this case and are without merit.

The size of the class, which the parties originally estimated would reach 2,000 farmers, quickly ballooned to more than 21,000 farmers. In light of this enormous and unforeseen expansion of the class, and considering the relative unwillingness of lawyers other than Class Counsel and Of Counsel to assist class members, it is difficult to fathom how movants can argue that Class Counsel's decision to use non-lawyer assistants constitutes changed circumstances and somehow harms the class. Faced with the need to assist a class more than 10 times larger than expected, Class Counsel made a wise decision: rather [**8] than tell potential class members that they [**9] could not participate in this case because there were not enough lawyers to assist each and every one of them with every aspect of the filing of their claims, Class Counsel chose to allow non-lawyers to assist some class members to assemble their claim packages, so long as an attorney ultimately reviewed and signed each claim before it was filed (as required by the Consent Decree). See Consent Decree P 5(e).

With respect to movants' argument that the Consent Decree should be vacated because Class Counsel has been unable to assist a sufficient number of claimants to identify a similarly-situated white farmer (which is critical to success in a Track A claim), the Court again finds that movants' assertion, even if true, does not make the Consent Decree unfair. At the hearing on this motion,

Class Counsel admitted that it has failed to identify as many similarly situated white farmers as it had anticipated (largely due to the increased class size), but noted that it expects to identify many more before filing Petitions for Monitor Review with respect to those Track A claims that were denied due to Class Counsel's admitted failures. Movants' [**9] suggestion that Class Counsel's shortcomings have so injured the chances of class members to ultimately prevail on their claims that the Consent Decree has become inherently unfair is without merit. In light of the fact that many Track A claims have not yet been decided and that the Monitor has yet to determine whether any of these allegedly injured claimants will get a "second chance" on reconsideration, this argument is premature.

The remainder of movants' arguments revolve around their apparent misunderstanding regarding the manner in which the Consent Decree has been implemented by Class Counsel and government counsel. Movants suggest that the two have colluded on several occasions to make decisions that adversely affect the class without first giving notice to and receiving the consent of the class. Movants cite two specific examples of such alleged "material modifications" that have been made to the Consent Decree without consent from the class: the alteration of the government's deadline for responding to Track A claims; and modification to the definition of "class member" that allegedly reduces the number of farmers who might obtain relief under the Consent Decree.

Movants [**10] first suggest that the parties' decision to enlarge the time within which the government has to respond to Track A claims violated class members' rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment and warrants setting aside the Consent Decree. In reality, however, the parties and the Court simply came to an agreement that a temporary extension of time for the government to respond in a relatively small number of cases was appropriate and necessary, particularly in light of the exponentially increased class size. The extension was not a material modification of the Consent Decree and has had only the most minor impact on claimants. In fact, the negative impact on the class would have been much more substantial if the parties had sought and the Court had required that the entire Track A claims process be halted for months while the parties notified and obtained the consent of the class on such a minor issue.

Movants also argue that the parties made a material modification to the Consent Decree that substantially harmed the class when they failed to consult all class members before deciding to consider farmers who attempted to apply, in addition to those who actually applied, as part of [**11] the class in this case (referred

to by the parties as the "constructive application" principle). Movants misunderstand the motivation behind and the impact of this decision. The constructive application principle, which was fully agreed to by the parties, actually expanded the scope of the class beyond the plain language of the Consent Decree and made more **farmers** eligible for relief. While the language of the Decree limits the class to "African [*40] American **farmers** who . . . applied to the United States Department of Agriculture . . . for participation in a federal farm credit or benefit program," Consent Decree P 2(a) (emphasis added), the constructive application principle extends possible relief in this case to those who *attempted to apply* as well, so long as certain requirements are met. Such an agreed-upon interpretation of the Consent Decree is not a change of circumstances that operates to the detriment of claimants; it is a reading that substantially broadens the scope of the class, is highly favorable to the claimants, and is completely in line with the parties' and the Court's expectation that the Consent Decree would be liberally construed to the benefit of **African [**12] American farmers**. See Consent Decree, Apr. 14, 1999, at 1-2 ("In light of the remedial purposes of this Consent Decree, the parties intend that it be liberally construed to effectuate those purposes in a manner that is consistent with the law.")

III. CONCLUSION

As Class Counsel, government counsel and movants' counsel all note in their briefs, the Consent Decree approved by the Court on April 14, 1999, is a grand, historical first step toward righting the wrongs visited upon thousands of **African American farmers** for

decades by the United States Department of Agriculture. In the 20 months since the settlement was approved, more than 11,000 **African American farmers** have filed successful claims for relief and have received monetary compensation and/or debt relief totaling more than \$ 500,000,000. This motion, brought on behalf of seven **farmers** out of the class of more than 21,000, seeks to obliterate this achievement and the possibility that thousands of additional **farmers** will receive additional millions of dollars by having the Court vacate the Consent Decree. Such an action would not only mean that the thousands of hours and hundreds of millions of dollars spent to this point [**13] administering the Decree would all be for naught, but also would mean that the thousands of **farmers** who have already prevailed on their claims would be forced to return their monetary awards to the government and would have to reassume the debt of which they just recently were relieved. Movants have failed to demonstrate that there are any changed circumstances that justify modifying or vacating the Consent Decree. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that certain individual plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the fairness of the Consent Decree [248-1] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

United States District Judge

DATE: 1/3/01

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DAN GLICKMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. CECIL BREWINGTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DAN GLICKMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (P.L.F), Civil Action No. 98-1693 (P.L.F)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

185 F.R.D. 82; 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5220

April 14, 1999, Decided

April 14, 1999, Filed

DISPOSITION: [**1] Consent Decree approved and entered.

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

COUNSEL: For Plaintiffs: Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Conlon Frantz Pheasant & Pires, Washington, DC.

For Plaintiffs: Philip L. Fraas, Washington, DC.

For Defendant: Michael Sirov, Philip Bartz, U.S. Dept. Of Justice, Washington, DC.

JUDGES: PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge.

OPINIONBY: PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

OPINION:

[*85] OPINION

Forty acres and a mule. As the Civil War drew to a close, the United States government created the Freedmen's Bureau to provide assistance to former slaves. The government promised to sell or lease to **farmers** parcels of unoccupied land and land that had been confiscated by the Union during the war, and it promised the loan of a federal government mule to plow that land. Some **African Americans** took advantage of these programs and either bought or leased parcels of land. During Reconstruction, however, President Andrew Johnson vetoed a bill to enlarge the powers and activities of the Freedmen's Bureau, and he reversed many of the

policies of the Bureau. Much of the promised land that had been leased to **African American farmers** was taken away and returned to Confederate loyalists. For most **African Americans**, the promise of forty [**2] acres and a mule was never kept. Despite the government's failure to live up to its promise, **African American farmers** persevered. By 1910, they had acquired approximately 16 million acres of farmland. By 1920, there were 925,000 **African American farms** in the United States.

On May 15, 1862, as Congress was debating the issue of providing land for freed former slaves, the United States Department of Agriculture was created. The statute creating the Department charged it with acquiring and preserving "all information concerning agriculture" and collecting "new and valuable seeds and plants; to test, by cultivation, the value of such of them as may require such tests; to propagate such as may be worthy of propagation, and to distribute them among agriculturists." An Act to establish a Department of Agriculture, ch. 71, 12 Stat. 387 (1862). In 1889, the Department of Agriculture achieved full cabinet department status. Today, it has an annual budget of \$ 67.5 billion and administers farm loans and guarantees worth \$ 2.8 billion.

As the Department of Agriculture has grown, the number of **African American farmers** has declined dramatically. Today, there are fewer than 18,000 **African American** [**3] farms in the United States, and **African American farmers** now own less than 3 million acres of land. The United States Department of Agriculture and the county commissioners to whom it has delegated so much power bear much of the responsibility for this dramatic decline. The Department

itself has recognized that there has always been a disconnect between what President Lincoln envisioned as "the people's department," serving all of the people, and the widespread belief that the Department is "the last plantation," a department "perceived as playing a key role in what some see as a conspiracy to force minority and disadvantaged **farmers** off their land through discriminatory loan practices." See Pls' Motion for Class Certification, Exh. B, Civil Rights at the United States Department of Agriculture: A Report by the Civil Rights Action Team (Feb. 1997) ("CRAI Report") at 2.

For decades, despite its promise that "no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program or activity of an applicant or recipient receiving Federal financial [**4] assistance from the Department of Agriculture," 7 C.F.R. § 15.1, the Department of Agriculture and the county commissioners discriminated against **African American farmers** when they denied, delayed or otherwise frustrated the applications of those **farmers** for farm loans and other credit and benefit programs. Further compounding the problem, in 1983 the Department of Agriculture disbanded its Office of Civil Rights and stopped responding to claims of discrimination. These events were the culmination of a string of broken promises that had been made to **African American farmers** for well over a century.

It is difficult to resist the impulse to try to undo all the broken promises and years of discrimination that have led to the precipitous decline in the number of **African American farmers** in the United States. The Court has before it a proposed settlement of a class action lawsuit that will not undo all that has been done. Despite that fact, however, the Court finds that the settlement is a fair resolution of the claims brought in this case [**6] and a good first step towards assuring that the kind of discrimination that has been visited on **African American farmers** since Reconstruction will [**5] not continue into the next century. The Court therefore will approve the settlement.

I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

The plaintiffs in this case allege (1) that the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") willfully discriminated against them and other similarly situated **African American farmers** on the basis of their race when it denied their applications for credit and/or benefit programs or delayed processing their applications, and (2) that when plaintiffs filed complaints of discrimination with the USDA, the USDA failed properly to investigate and resolve those complaints. See Seventh Amended Complaint at 4-5. Plaintiffs allege that defendant's

actions violated a number of statutes and the Constitution, but both sides agree that this case essentially is brought under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 ("ECOA"). See Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999, at 19. n1

n1 Most of the class members are complaining about racial discrimination in the USDA's credit programs. ECOA provides the statutory basis for claims of discrimination in credit transactions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691. A small number of class members, approximately 5% of the class, complain about the USDA's administration of its benefit programs, especially its disaster relief programs. See Seventh Amended Complaint at P 76. The benefit programs are not subject to ECOA, and the claims against the USDA for alleged acts of discrimination in these programs are brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. The differences between the two types of claims lead to slight variations in the burdens of proof and the relief provided.

[**6]

The Court certified this case as a class action on October 9, 1998, and preliminarily approved a Consent Decree on January 5, 1999. After a hearing held on March 2, 1999, the parties made some revisions to the proposed Consent Decree and filed a revised proposed Consent Decree with the Court on March 19, 1999. The Court now concludes that the revised proposed Consent Decree is fair, adequate and reasonable.

A. Factual Background

Farming is a hard way to make a living. Small **farmers** operate at the whim of conditions completely beyond their control; weather conditions from year to year and marketable prices of crops to a large extent determine whether an individual **farmer** will make a profit, barely break even or lose money. As a result, many **farmers** depend heavily on the credit and benefit programs of the United States Department of Agriculture to take them from one year to the next. n2 For instance, if an early freeze kills three-quarters of a **farmer's** crop one year, he may not have sufficient resources to buy seeds to plant in the following season. Or if a **farmer** needs to modernize his operations and buy a new grain harvester in order to make his operations profitable, he often [**7] cannot afford to buy the harvester without an extension of credit. Because of the seasonal nature of farming, it also is of utmost importance that credit and benefit applications be processed quickly or the **farmer** may lose all or most of his anticipated income for an

entire year. It does a **farmer** no good to receive a loan to buy seeds after the planting season has passed.

n2 The technical differences among USDA's various credit and non-credit programs are set forth in detail in a previous Opinion of this Court. See *Pigford v. Glickman*, 182 F.R.D. 341, 342-44 (D.D.C. 1998).

The USDA's credit and benefit programs are federally funded programs, but the decisions to approve or deny applications for credit or benefits are made locally at the county level. In virtually every farming community, local **farmers** and ranchers elect three to five member county committees. The county committee is responsible for approving or denying farm credit and benefit applications, as well as for appointing a county executive who [**8] is supposed to provide **farmers** with help in completing their credit and benefit applications. The county executive also makes recommendations to the county committee regarding which applications should be approved. The salaries of the county committee members and the county executives are paid from federal funds, but they are not considered federal [**7] government employees. Similarly, while federal money is used to fund the credit and benefit programs, the elected county officials, not federal officials, make the decision as to who gets the federal money and who does not.

The county committees do not represent the racial diversity of the communities they serve. In 1996, in the Southeast Region, the region in the United States with the most **African American farmers**, just barely over 1% of the county commissioners were **African American** (28 out of a total of 2469). See CRAT Report at 19. In the Southwest region, only 0.3% of the county commissioners were **African American**. In two of the remaining three regions, there was not a single **African American** county commissioner. Nationwide, only 37 county commissioners were **African American** out of a total of 8147 commissioners -- approximately [**9] 0.45%. *Id.*

Throughout the country, **African American farmers** complain that county commissioners have discriminated against them for decades, denying their applications, delaying the processing of their applications or approving them for insufficient amounts or with restrictive conditions. In several southeastern states, for instance, it took three times as long on average to process the application of an **African American farmer** as it did to process the application of a white **farmer**. CRAT Report at 21. Mr. Alvin E. Steppes is an **African American farmer** from Lee County, Arkansas. In 1986,

Mr. Steppes applied to the **Farmers Home Administration** ("FmHA") for an operating loan. Mr. Steppes fully complied with the application requirements, but his application was denied. As a result, Mr. Steppes had insufficient resources to plant crops, he could not buy fertilizer and crop treatment for the crops he did plant, and he ended up losing his farm. See Seventh Amended Complaint at P 14.

Mr. Calvin Brown from Brunswick County, Virginia applied in January 1984 for an operating loan for that planting season. When he inquired later that month about the status of his loan application, a FmHA [**10] county supervisor told him that the application was being processed. The next month, the same FmHA county supervisor told him that there was no record of his application ever having been filed and that Mr. Brown had to reapply. By the time Mr. Brown finally received his loan in May or June 1984, the planting season was over, and the loan was virtually useless to him. In addition, the funds were placed in a "supervised" bank account, which required him to obtain the signature of a county supervisor before withdrawing any funds, a requirement frequently required of **African American farmers** but not routinely imposed on white **farmers**. See Seventh Amended Complaint at P 11.

In 1994, the entire county of Greene County, Alabama where Mr. George Hall farmed was declared eligible for disaster payments on 1994 crop losses. Every single application for disaster payments was approved by the Greene County Committee except Mr. Hall's application for four of his crops. See Seventh Amended Complaint at P 5. Mr. James Beverly of Nottaway County, Virginia was a successful small **farmer** before going to FmHA. To build on his success, in 1981 he began working with his FmHA office to develop a farm [**11] plan to expand and modernize his swine herd operations. The plan called for loans to purchase breeding stock and equipment as well as farrowing houses that were necessary for the breeding operations. FmHA approved his loans to buy breeding stock and equipment, and he was told that the loan for farrowing houses would be approved. After he already had bought the livestock and the equipment, his application for a loan to build the farrowing houses was denied. The livestock and equipment were useless to him without the farrowing houses. Mr. Beverly ended up having to sell his property to settle his debt to the FmHA. See *id.* at P 12.

The denial of credit and benefits has had a devastating impact on **African American farmers**. According to the Census of Agriculture, the number of **African American farmers** has declined from 925,000 in 1920 to approximately 18,000 in 1992. CRAT Report at 14. The farms of many **African American farmers**

were foreclosed upon, and they were forced out of farming. Those who managed to stay in farming often were subject to humiliation and degradation at the hands of [**88] the county commissioners and were forced to stand by powerless, as white farmers received preferential [**12] treatment. As one of plaintiffs' lawyers, Mr. J.L. Chestnut, aptly put it, African American farmers "learned the hard way that though the rules and the law may be colorblind, people are not." Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999, at 173.

Any farmer who believed that his application to those programs was denied on the basis of his race or for other discriminatory reasons theoretically had open to him a process for filing a civil rights complaint either with the Secretary of Agriculture or with the Office of Civil Rights Enforcement and Adjudication ("OCRFA") at USDA. USDA regulations set forth a detailed process by which these complaints were supposed to be investigated and conciliated, and ultimately a farmer who was unhappy with the outcome was entitled to sue in federal court under LCOA. See *Pigford v. Glickman*, 182 F.R.D. 341, 342-44 (D.D.C. 1998). All the evidence developed by the USDA and presented to the Court indicates, however, that this system was functionally nonexistent for well over a decade. In 1983, OCRFA essentially was dismantled and complaints that were filed were never processed, investigated or forwarded to the appropriate agencies for conciliation. As a result, [**13] farmers who filed complaints of discrimination never received a response, or if they did receive a response it was a cursory denial of relief. In some cases, OCRFA staff simply threw discrimination complaints in the trash without ever responding to or investigating them. In other cases, even if there was a finding of discrimination, the farmer never received any relief.

In December of 1996, Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman appointed a Civil Rights Action Team ("CRAT") to "take a hard look at the issues and make strong recommendations for change." See CRAT Report at 3. In February of 1997, CRAT concluded that "minority farmers have lost significant amounts of land and potential farm income as a result of discrimination by FSA [Farm Services Agency] programs and the programs of its predecessor agencies, ASCS [Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service] and FmHA [Farmers Home Administration]. . . . The process for resolving complaints has failed. Minority and limited-resource customers believe USDA has not acted in good faith on the complaints. Appeals are too often delayed and for too long. Favorable decisions are too often reversed." Id. at 30-31.

Also [**14] in February of 1997, the Office of the Inspector General of the USDA issued a report to Secretary Glickman stating that the USDA had a backlog

of complaints of discrimination that had never been processed, investigated or resolved. See Pls' Motion for Class Certification, Exh. A (Evaluation Report for the Secretary on Civil Rights Issues). The Report found that immediate action was needed to clear the backlog of complaints, that the "program discrimination complaint process at [the Farm Services Agency] lacks integrity, direction, and accountability," id. at 6, and that "staffing problems, obsolete procedures, and little direction from management have resulted in a climate of disorder within the civil rights staff at FSA." Id. at 1.

The acknowledgment by the USDA that the discrimination complaints had never been processed, however, came too late for many African American farmers. ECOA has a two year statute of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f). If the underlying discrimination alleged by the farmer had taken place more than two years prior to the filing of an action in federal court, the government would raise a statute of limitations defense to bar the farmer's [**15] claims. For instance, some class members in this case had filed their complaints of discrimination with the USDA in 1983 for acts of discrimination that allegedly occurred in 1982 or 1983. If the farmer waited for the USDA to respond to his discrimination complaint and did not file an action in court until he discovered in 1997 that the USDA had stopped responding to discrimination complaints, the government would argue that any claim under ECOA was barred by the statute of limitations.

In 1998, Congress provided relief to plaintiffs with respect to the statute of limitations problem by passing legislation that tolls the statute of limitations for all those who filed [**89] discrimination complaints with the Department of Agriculture before July 1, 1997, and who allege discrimination at any time during the period beginning on January 1, 1981 and ending on or before December 31, 1996. See *Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999*, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2297, Notes).

B. Procedural Background

From the beginning, this case has been a contentious and hard fought battle on [**16] both sides. The original complaint in this action was filed on August 28, 1997, by three African American farmers representing a putative class of 641 African American farmers. At an initial status conference on October 30, 1997, plaintiffs requested that the case be referred to Magistrate Judge Alan Kay for the purpose of discussing settlement. The government opposed that request. The Court refused to require the government to engage in settlement negotiations if it was not prepared to do so in good faith

and with an open mind, but it made clear that the case would move quickly.

From plaintiffs' perspective, the most important pieces of evidence necessary to ensure speedy resolution of the case were the files of the individual **farmers** that were held by the government. The Court ordered both sides to comply with their obligations under Rule 26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by November 14, 1997, and it ordered the government to provide plaintiffs with any files in its possession on any **farmer** who was part of the putative class. See Order of November 4, 1997. The government complied with the Court's discovery ruling, and since then has continued to provide class [**17] counsel with the files of putative class members that it has. See Del's November 17, 1997, Report to the Court.

In the meantime, a number of motions to intervene were filed on behalf of putative class members represented by other attorneys. The two attorneys who originally had filed the Pigford action, Mr. Alexander Pires and Mr. Philip Fraas, stated in open court that any attorney was welcome to serve as of counsel in the case, on the condition that he or she would agree that (1) any compensation would be provided only under the attorneys' fees provisions of ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d), or other statutory fee-shifting provisions, and (2) he or she would neither collect any fees from individual **farmers** nor enter into a contingent fee arrangement by which the attorney would take a percentage of the **farmer's** settlement or award. Class counsel also represented that any putative class member on whose behalf a motion to intervene was filed would be added as a named plaintiff in an amended complaint.

The motions to intervene subsequently were withdrawn, and a number of lawyers entered appearances as of counsel for plaintiffs. The resulting team of lawyers in the case represents [**18] an extraordinary range of experience, specialties and geography: Mr. Pires and Mr. Fraas, both of Washington D.C., have represented **farmers** in cases against the Department of Agriculture for many years; Mr. J.L. Chestnut from Selma, Alabama, Mr. Othello Cross from Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and Mr. Dennis Sweet, from Jackson, Mississippi, all are experienced civil rights lawyers; Mr. T. Roe Frazer from Jackson, Mississippi, and Mr. Gerard Lear of Arlington, Virginia both are complex litigation and class action specialists. In addition, Mr. Hubbard Saunders, IV, an attorney from Jackson, Mississippi with nearly twenty-five years of experience, and Mr. Willie Smith from Fresno, California have worked on the case.

By mid-November of 1997, the government had rethought its original position with respect to mediation and agreed to explore the option of settlement. The

parties quickly agreed upon a mediator, Mr. Michael Lewis, but an agreement on the details of the mediation process required a number of status hearings and conference calls. Finally, in late December the parties agreed to stay the case for a period of six months during which time they would pursue mediation. The parties agreed [**19] to "commence" settlement discussions on a case-by-case basis but left open the possibility of discussing a global resolution of the case. See Order of December 24, 1997.

[*90] At a status conference just over two months later, however, there appeared to be a fundamental disagreement about the process of mediation; plaintiffs wanted to negotiate a settlement structure that would address the claims of all putative class members while the government continued to want to mediate claims on a case-by-case basis. Plaintiffs' counsel, in particular Mr. J.L. Chestnut, argued that the stay had to be lifted, legal issues briefed and decided, and a prompt and firm trial date set. If mediation continued on a case-by-case basis, Mr. Chestnut argued, "Well, Your Honor can look at my gray hair; I won't live that long. Many of my clients won't live that long. . . . Please, please give my people a trial date. It took us, Judge, 15 long miserable years to get here and now they want to go case by case. That will be another 15 years of injustice. The only way you can stop it, Your Honor, is a straightforward statement to the government: Settle it or try it." Transcript of Hearing of March 5, 1998, at 37-39. [**20]

The Court lifted the stay so that the parties could brief plaintiffs' motion for class certification and plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the statute of limitations. See Order of March 6, 1998. The Court also set a trial date of February 1, 1999. Id. Upon the representations of the parties that they wanted to continue trying to mediate the case with Mr. Lewis, the Court also extended the time for mediation. See Order of April 6, 1998.

In the meantime, plaintiffs had filed a second putative class action, *Brewington v. Glickman*, 185 F.R.D. 82, Civil Action No. 98-1693. The putative class in *Brewington* included those who had filed their discrimination complaints with the USDA after February 21, 1997, the cutoff date for the putative Pigford class, but before July 7, 1998, the filing date of *Brewington*. With the exception of the date of filing of discrimination complaints, the allegations of the *Brewington* complaint mirrored those of the Pigford complaint.

On October 9, 1998, the Court granted the motion for class certification in *Pigford*. The Court also ordered the parties jointly to file a draft notice to class members by October [**21] 30, 1998. At a status hearing on October 13, 1998, plaintiffs informed the Court that

Congress had passed a bill that would toll the statute of limitations for **African American farmers** who had filed complaints of discrimination with the USDA and that they would be withdrawing their motion for partial summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue as soon as the President signed the bill into law because that motion then would be unnecessary. On October 21, 1998, President Clinton signed into law the bill tolling the statute of limitations that had been enacted by Congress. See Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2297, Notes). The waiver of the statute of limitations provides that "a civil action to obtain relief with respect to the discrimination alleged in an eligible complaint, if commenced not later than 2 years after the enactment of this Act, shall not be barred by any statute of limitations." An "eligible complaint" is defined, in relevant part, as "a nonemployment related complaint that was filed with the Department of Agriculture [**22] before July 1, 1997 and alleges discrimination at any time during the period beginning on January 1, 1981 and ending December 31, 1996" in violation of ECOA or "in the administration of a commodity program or a disaster assistance program." See id.

Faced with a February 1, 1999, trial date, the parties continued their efforts at mediation with the help of Mr. Lewis. At some point after the March 5, 1998 status hearing, the focus of negotiations shifted from case-by-case analysis to structuring a global resolution of the claims of all class members. By December 1998, the parties had informed the Court that they were very close to agreeing upon a global settlement of plaintiffs' claims in both Pigford and Brewington. Finally, on January 5, 1999, the parties filed with the Court (1) a motion to consolidate the two cases, (2) a motion to alter the definition of the class certified in Pigford to include members of the Brewington action and to certify the class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (3) a motion [**91] for preliminary approval of a proposed Consent Decree, and (4) a notice to class members. The Court consolidated the two cases, preliminarily [**23] approved the Consent Decree, approved the notice to class members, notified class members of their right to file written objections by February 15, 1999, and scheduled a fairness hearing for March 2, 1999.

Within ten days after the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree, the facilitator mailed a copy of the Notice of Class Certification and Proposed Class Settlement to all then-known members of the class. n3 The facilitator also arranged a print notification program with one-quarter page advertisements in 26 general

circulation newspapers for January 21, 1999, and in 100 **African-American** newspapers between January 13, 1999 and January 27, 1999. See Def's Memorandum in Support of Consent Decree (Declaration of Jeanne C. Finegan). The facilitator also arranged to have a full page advertisement announcing the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree and the time and place of the fairness hearing placed in the editions of TV Guide that were distributed in an 18-state region, and a half page advertisement in the national edition of Jet Magazine. See id. In addition, the facilitator aired 44 commercials announcing the preliminary approval of the Consent Decree and the time [**24] and place of the fairness hearing on the Black Entertainment Network and aired 18 similar commercials on the Cable News Network over the course of a two-week period. The facilitator estimates that on average, the print and television notice campaign "reached 87 percent of **African-American** farm operators, managers or others in farm-related industries, an average frequency of 2.4 times." Id. at 6. As of February 19, 1999, the facilitator had received 15,132 telephone calls as a result of its notification campaign. Id. at 7.

n3 The "facilitator" is the Poorman-Douglas Corporation. See Consent Decree at P 1(i). Among other responsibilities, the facilitator is required to mail copies of the Notice of Class Certification and Proposed Class Settlement to all known class members within ten days of the Court's preliminary approval of the proposed Consent Decree and to undertake an advertising campaign notifying potential class members of the class certification and proposed class settlement. See id. at PP 3, 4.

[**25]

The USDA exerted efforts to obtain the assistance of community based organizations, including those organizations that focus on **African American** and/or agricultural issues, in communicating to class members and potential class members the fact that the Court had preliminarily approved the Consent Decree and the time and place of the fairness hearing. Def's Memorandum in Support of Consent Decree (Declaration of David H. Harris). USDA officials also were notified that, to the extent possible, they had an obligation to communicate to class members information about the Consent Decree and the fairness hearing. The Court posted a copy of the proposed Consent Decree and the Notice of Class Certification on the Internet Website of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Finally, class counsel held meetings in counties throughout the country, particularly in the South, to notify **farmers** of

the settlement, the process for filing a claim package and the time, place and purpose of the fairness hearing.

The Court timely received approximately eighteen written objections from organizations or individuals. See Order of February 25, 1999. The Court also received a number [**26] of letters after the February 15, 1999 deadline which it also has considered. With the exception of one objection filed after the hearing, see Order of March 11, 1999, the Court has considered all letters and filings received before and since the hearing that have expressed objections to or comments on the proposed Consent Decree. Class counsel and counsel for the government also filed memoranda in support of the proposed Consent Decree and supplemental responses to the objections raised.

The Court conducted a fairness hearing on March 2, 1999, which lasted an entire day. The Court allocated time for all objectors who previously had filed written objections to the Consent Decree and also allocated time at the end of the day for others who wished to express their views. See Order of February 25, 1999. The Court provided time for class counsel and counsel for the government [**92] to explain the proposed Consent Decree and to discuss their view of its fairness. The Court heard from representatives of eight organizations that had filed written objections, six individuals who had filed written objections and ten individuals who had not filed written objections. The Court also heard from [**27] class counsel, counsel for the government and the mediator.

After the hearing, the Court sent a letter to the parties summarizing some of the objections that had been raised at the hearing and suggesting changes to the proposed Consent Decree that might alleviate some of the concerns raised. The Court indicated that it would not issue a final ruling on the fairness of the proposed Consent Decree until March 19, 1999, in the event that the parties wanted to file a revised proposed Consent Decree addressing the concerns raised at the hearing and by the Court. By letter of March 19, 1999, the parties transmitted to the Court a revised proposed Consent Decree which includes those changes or clarifications that the parties believed they could make to the proposed Consent Decree without fundamentally altering the framework and basis for their agreement. The Court posted the revised Consent Decree to the Court's Internet Website and issued an order granting any objector leave to file any comments with respect to the revisions to the proposed Consent Decree by March 29, 1999. The revised proposed Consent Decree now is before the Court to determine whether it is fair, reasonable and adequate. [**28]

II. CLASS CERTIFICATION

The Court originally certified a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for purposes of determining liability. The class was defined as

All African-American farmers who (1) farmed between January 1, 1983, and February 21, 1997; and (2) applied, during that time period, for participation in a federal farm program with USDA, and as a direct result of a determination by USDA in response to said application, believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race, and filed a written discrimination complaint with USDA in that time period.

Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. at 352. Plaintiffs had asserted that the class could be certified under either Rule 23(b)(2) or Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the Court found that it was most appropriate for purposes of determining liability to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2), governing class actions seeking primarily injunctive or declaratory relief. At the time, the Court also noted that "if liability is found and the case reaches the remedy stage, the Court will have to determine the most appropriate mechanism for determining remedy. [**29] It is possible that at that point it would be appropriate to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). . . ." *Id.* at 351 (*citing Eubanks v. Billington*, 324 U.S. App. D.C. 41, 110 F.3d 87, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (in class action seeking both injunctive and monetary relief, court may adopt "hybrid" approach and certify (b)(2) class for former and (b)(3) class for latter)).

By Order of January 5, 1999, upon motion of the parties, the Court vacated the Order certifying the class and certified a new class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The newly certified class is defined as:

All African American farmers who (1) farmed, or attempted to farm, between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996; (2) applied to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) during that time period for participation in a federal farm credit or benefit program and who believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race in USDA's response to that application; and (3) filed a discrimination complaint on or before July 1, 1997, regarding USDA's treatment of such farm credit or benefit application.

Order of January 5, 1999.

There are three [**30] changes to the substantive definition of the class. The first change relates to the time frame within which a class member is required to have filed his or her discrimination complaint with the USDA. Under the original class definition, a class member was required to have filed his complaint with the USDA before February 21, 1997. The putative class in *Brewington* included [**93] those who had filed their complaints of discrimination with the USDA between February 21, 1997, the cutoff date in *Pigford*, and July 7, 1998, the date of filing of the *Brewington* action.

The definition of the class certified by Order of January 5, 1999, modifies the class definition so that the filing date is consistent with the recently-enacted legislation tolling the statute of limitations. See Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2297, Notes). The legislation specifies that in order to toll the statute of limitations, a farmer must have filed his complaint of discrimination with the USDA before July 1, 1997, and the new class definition includes the same [**31] cut-off date. The resulting class has a broader definition than the original *Pigford* class but a slightly narrower definition than the proposed class definition in *Brewington*. The members of the proposed *Brewington* class who are not a part of the newly certified class -- that is, those who filed discrimination complaints after July 1, 1997 -- are on a different legal footing because the statute of limitations has not been tolled for them and resolution of their claims therefore is not appropriate in this action.

The second change also involves timing issues. The original class definition specified that class members must have farmed between January 1, 1983, and February 21, 1997, and applied for a credit or benefit program during that same time period. The definition of the class certified by Order of January 5, 1999, requires class members to have farmed or attempted to farm between January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1996, and to have applied for a credit or benefit program during that time period. As with the changed discrimination complaint filing dates, this change in class definition is consistent with the recently-enacted legislation tolling the statute of limitations. [**32] See Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2297, Notes).

The third change relates to the way in which a class member's complaint of discrimination was transmitted to the USDA. Under the original class definition, a class

member must have filed a "written" complaint of discrimination with the USDA. The revised class definition provides that the class member must have "filed a discrimination complaint," and under the terms of the proposed Consent Decree, class members who have participated in "listening sessions" or have complained to members of Congress in certain case are deemed to have "filed" a discrimination complaint. See Consent Decree at P 1(h). None of the substantive changes to the class definition in any way affects the Court's analysis or conclusion that the case properly is certified as a class action. See *Pigford v. Glickman*, 182 F.R.D. at 344-45.

The primary difference between the class certified by the Court on October 9, 1998 and the class certified by the Court on January 5, 1999, is more procedural than substantive. [**33] The former was certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for purposes of determining whether the USDA is liable to class members and the latter was certified for all purposes pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). n4 Rule 23 provides that all class members in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action are entitled to notice and an opportunity to exclude themselves from -- or "opt out" of -- the class and pursue individual remedies. See Rule 23(c)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P. The Rule contains no explicit opt-out provision with respect to a class certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2), although a court [**94] may have discretion to permit class members to opt out of the class in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions. See *Fubanks v. Billington*, 110 F.3d at 92-95. The parties in this case agreed that it was more appropriate -- and fairer to members of the class -- to ask the Court to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3) for all purposes, particularly since the proposed settlement involves primarily monetary relief. See *id.* at 95. The decision to certify the class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) was made largely in order to allow class members to opt out of the class if they wanted to [**34] pursue their remedies individually either before the USDA or by separate court action.

n4 An action may appropriately be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole."

An action may appropriately be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the Court finds that "the questions of law or fact common to the members

of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."

The Court already has determined that a class exists and that the class meets the four criteria of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See *Pigford v. Glickman*, 182 F.R.D. at 346-50. Because [**35] the Court has certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it also must ensure that the separate and additional requirements of (b)(3) are satisfied before approving the proposed settlement. See *Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591, 622, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997) (court's fairness analysis for settlement purposes under Rule 23(e) cannot substitute for determination whether class is appropriately certified in the first place); *Thomas v. Albright*, 139 F.3d 227, 234 (D.C. Cir.) (requirements of predominance and superiority in subsection (b)(3) are additional to requirements of subsection (a) which apply to all class actions), *cert. denied*, 142 L. Ed. 2d 480, 119 S. Ct. 576 (1998).

Rule 23(b)(3) requires the Court to find (1) that questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and (2) that a class action is "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Rule 23(b)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. It is designed to cover cases in which a class action would promote "uniformity of decision as to persons similarly [**36] situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results." The Advisory Committee had dominantly in mind vindication of "the right of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all." *Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. at 615, 617 (quoting Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P., Adv. Comm. Notes). This is just such a case.

The ultimate settlement of this action envisions the creation of a mechanism on a class-wide basis that will then be utilized to resolve the individual claims of class members outside the traditional litigation process, most of them (Track A) in a rather formulaic way. Most members of the class lack documentation of the allegedly discriminatory transactions at issue. Without any documentation of those transactions, it would be difficult if not impossible for an individual farmer to prevail in a suit in federal court under a traditional preponderance of the evidence standard. The parties acknowledge, however, that it is not the fault of class members that they lack records. Since class members' lack of documentation is at least in part attributable to the

passage [**37] of time which has been exacerbated by the USDA's failure to timely process complaints of discrimination, there is a common issue of whether and how best to provide relief to class members who lack documentation, and that common issue "predominate[s] over any questions affecting only individual members." See Rule 23(b)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. This class action and its settlement as proposed in the Consent Decree provide a mechanism to address that common issue. See *Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. at 619 ("Settlement is relevant to a class certification").

In addition to the lack of documentation making individual adjudication of most claims so difficult, the sheer size of the class makes the prospect of individual adjudication of damages virtually unmanageable. For this or any other court to adjudicate the individual claims of the 15,000 to 20,000 African American farmers now estimated to be members of the class would take years or perhaps even a decade or more. Any "fair and efficient" resolution of the claims therefore necessitates the implementation of some sort of class-wide mechanism such as the creative [**95] and speedy Track A/Track B procedures proposed by the parties [**38] in the Consent Decree. The Court therefore finds that "a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." See Rule 23(b)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. The Court concludes that this action appropriately is certified for resolution pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The remaining question is whether the proposed Consent Decree is fair, adequate and reasonable under Rule 23(e).

III. PROVISIONS OF PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE

The proposed Consent Decree, as revised after the fairness hearing and jointly filed by the parties on March 19, 1999, is a negotiated settlement that resolves all of the claims raised by plaintiffs in the Seventh Amended Complaint. The purpose of the Consent Decree is to ensure that in the future all class members in their dealings with the USDA will "receive full and fair treatment" that is "the same as the treatment accorded to similarly situated white persons." Consent Decree at I-2. As with all settlements, it does not provide the plaintiffs and the class they represent with everything they sought in the complaint. Instead it is a negotiated settlement intended to achieve much [**39] of what was sought without the need for lengthy litigation and uncertain results. See *Stewart v. Rubin*, 948 F. Supp. 1077, 1087 (D.D.C. 1996) ("inherent in compromise is a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes"), *aff'd* 326 U.S. App. D.C. 337, 124 F.3d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1997). It is impossible to know precisely how much the overall settlement in this case will cost the government, in part because the exact size of the class has not been

determined and because the Consent Decree provides for debt relief that is dependent on the amount of debt that individual class members owe to the USDA, but plaintiffs estimate that the settlement is worth at least \$ 2.25 billion, the largest civil rights settlement in the history of this country. See Pls' Response to Post-Hearing Submissions at 7.

The Consent Decree accomplishes its purposes primarily through a two-track dispute resolution mechanism that provides those class members with little or no documentary evidence with a virtually automatic cash payment of \$ 50,000, and forgiveness of debt owed to the USDA (Track A), while those who believe they can prove their cases with documentary or other evidence by a preponderance of the evidence [**40] -- the traditional burden of proof in civil litigation -- have no cap on the amount they may recover (Track B). Those who like neither option provided by the Consent Decree may opt out of the class and pursue their individual remedies in court or administratively before the USDA. The essential terms of the proposed Consent Decree and settlement are summarized below.

Under the terms of the proposed Consent Decree, any class member has the right to opt out of the class and pursue his remedies either administratively before the USDA or in a separate court action. See Consent Decree at P 2(b). A class member who opts out of the class cannot collect any relief under the settlement, but he retains all of his legal rights to file his own action against the USDA. In other words, if a class member opts out of the class, nothing in this settlement affects him. Any class member who wishes to opt out of the class must file a written request with the facilitator within 120 days of the date on which the Consent Decree is entered. See id.

Those who choose to remain in the class have 180 days from the entry of the Consent Decree within which to file their claim packages with the facilitator. [**41] Consent Decree at P 5(c). n5 When a claimant submits his claim package, he must include evidence that he filed a discrimination claim with the USDA between January 1, 1981 and July 1, 1997. See id. at P 5(b). n6 In the absence of documentation [**96] that a complaint was filed with the USDA, a claimant may submit a declaration from "a person who is not a member of the claimant's family" stating that he or she has first-hand knowledge that the claimant filed the complaint. See id. n7 A claimant also must include a certification from an attorney stating that the attorney has a good faith belief in the truth of the factual basis of the claim and that the attorney will not require compensation from the claimant for his or her assistance. See id. at P 5(e). n8

n5 The Court may grant an extension of this 180 day period "where the claimant demonstrates that his failure to submit a timely claim was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control." Consent Decree at P 5(g).

n6 For a claimant who otherwise meets the class definition but who filed his complaint of discrimination after July 1, 1997, the claims package will be forwarded to JAMS-Endispute, Inc. JAMS-Endispute, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services Endispute, is a California-based corps of retired judges with offices throughout the country that provides alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. JAMS-Endispute will determine whether the claimant should be allowed to proceed as a class member despite his failure to timely file his discrimination complaint. See Consent Decree at PP 1(a)(ii), 6. [**42]

n7 For purposes of the proposed Consent Decree, a "discrimination complaint" means either a communication directly from the class member to the USDA or a communication from the claimant to a member of Congress, the White House, or a state, local, or federal official who forwarded the communication to the USDA asserting that the USDA had discriminated against the claimant on the basis of race in connection with a federal farm credit transaction or benefit application. Consent Decree at P 1(h).

n8 Class counsel is available to perform these services without charge to the claimant.

At the time that they submit their claim packages, claimants asserting discrimination in credit transactions also must choose between two options: adjudication of their claims under the Track A mechanism or arbitration of their claims under the Track B mechanism. Consent Decree at P 5(d). n9 The choice made between Track A and Track B has enormous significance. Under Track A, the class member has a fairly low burden of proof but his recovery is limited. Under Track B, there is a higher burden of proof but the recovery [**43] is unlimited. The claims facilitator, the Poorman-Douglas Corporation, has 20 days after the filing of a claims package within which to determine whether the claimant is a member of the class and, if he is, to forward the materials to counsel for the USDA and to the appropriate Track A or Track B decision-maker. Id. at P 5(f)

n9 Claimants asserting discrimination in non-credit benefit programs are only entitled to proceed under Track A. Consent Decree at P 5(d).

Under Track A, a claimant must submit "substantial evidence" demonstrating that he or she was the victim of race discrimination. See Consent Decree at PP 9(a)(i), 9(b)(i). Substantial evidence means something more than a "mere scintilla" of evidence but less than a preponderance. See *Burns v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs*, 309 U.S. App. D.C. 400, 41 F.3d 1555, 1562 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Put another way, substantial evidence is such "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support [the] conclusion," even when "a [*44] plausible alternative interpretation of the evidence would support a contrary view." *Secretary of Labor v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n*, 324 U.S. App. D.C. 154, 111 F.3d 913, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1997). n10

n10 The Consent Decree defines "substantial evidence" as "such relevant evidence as appears in the record before the adjudicator that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion after taking into account other evidence in the record that fairly detracts from that conclusion." Consent Decree at P 1(f).

A claimant asserting discrimination in a credit transaction can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence of four specific things: (1) that he owned or leased, or attempted to own or lease, farm land; (2) that he applied for a specific credit transaction at a USDA county office between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996; (3) that the loan was denied, provided late, approved for a lesser amount than requested, encumbered by restrictive conditions, or USDA failed to provide [*45] appropriate loan service, and such treatment was less favorable than that accorded specifically identified, similarly situated white farmers; and (4) that USDA's treatment of the loan application led to economic damage to the class member. See Consent Decree at P 9(a)(i). A claimant asserting discrimination only in a non-credit benefit program can satisfy his burden by presenting evidence (1) that he applied for a specific non-credit benefit program at a USDA county office between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996, and (2) that his application was denied or approved for a lesser amount than requested and that such treatment was less favorable [*97] than that accorded to specifically identified, similarly situated white farmers. See id. at P 9(b)(i).

The USDA has sixty days after it receives notice of a Track A referral to provide the adjudicator and class counsel with any information relevant to the issues of liability and damages. Consent Decree at P 8. After receiving any material from the USDA, the facilitator will either make a recommendation with respect to whether the claim should be approved or indicate its inability to make a recommendation. The entire packet of material, [*46] including the submissions by the claimant and the USDA and the recommendation of the facilitator, then is referred to a member of JAMS-Endispute, Inc., for a decision which is to be made within 30 days. See id. at P 9(a). That decision is final, except that the Monitor, whose responsibilities are discussed further below, shall direct the adjudicator to reexamine the claim if he determines that "a clear and manifest error has occurred" that is "likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." See id. at PP 9(a)(v), 9(b)(v), 12(b)(iii).

If the adjudicator finds in the claimant's favor and the claim involves discrimination in a credit transaction, the claimant will receive (1) a cash payment of \$ 50,000; (2) forgiveness of all debt owed to the USDA incurred under or affected by the program that formed the basis of the claim; (3) a tax payment directly to the IRS in the amount of 25% of the total debt forgiveness and cash payment; (4) immediate termination of any foreclosure proceedings that USDA initiated in connection with the loan(s) at issue in the claim; and (5) injunctive relief including one-time priority loan consideration and technical assistance. Consent Decree [*47] at PP 9(a)(iii); 11. If the adjudicator finds in the claimant's favor and the claim involves discrimination in a benefit program, the claimant will receive a cash payment in the amount of the benefit wrongly denied and injunctive relief including one-time priority loan consideration and technical assistance. Id. at P 9(b)(iii).

Track B arbitration is the option for those who have more extensive documentation of discrimination in a credit transaction. Under Track B, an arbitrator will hold a one day mini-trial and then decide whether the claimant has established discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Consent Decree at P 10. n11 Class counsel will represent any claimant who chooses Track B, or a claimant may be represented by counsel of his choice if he so desires. Track B is designed to balance the need for prompt resolution of the claim with the need to provide adequate discovery and a fair hearing. The entire Track B process will take a maximum of 240 days. During the first 180 days, there is a mechanism for limited discovery and depositions of witnesses. Following the one day mini-trial, the arbitrator will render a decision within 30 to 60 days. Id. at P 10(g). [*48]

n11 The arbitrator will either be Mr. Michael Lewis, the mediator, or will be a person selected by Mr. Lewis from a list of arbitrators pre-approved by class counsel and counsel for the government. See Consent Decree at P 1(b); Letter of March 19, 1999 from the Parties to the Court at P 1.

If the arbitrator finds that the claimant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the victim of racial discrimination and that he suffered damages from that discrimination, the claimant will be entitled to actual damages, the return of inventory property that was foreclosed and other injunctive relief, including a one-time priority loan consideration. Consent Decree at PP 10(g), 11. As with Track A claims, the decision of the arbitrator is final except that the Monitor shall direct the arbitrator to reexamine the claim if he determines that "a clear and manifest error has occurred" that is "likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." See id. at PP 10, 12(b)(iii).

The proposed [**49] Consent Decree also provides for an independent Monitor who will serve for a period of five years following the entry of the decree. The Monitor will be appointed by the Court from a list of names proposed by the parties and cannot be removed "except upon good cause." Consent Decree at P 12(a). The Monitor is responsible for making periodic written reports to the Court, the Secretary of Agriculture, counsel for the government and class counsel, reporting on the good faith implementation of the Consent Decree and efforts to resolve disputes [**98] that arise between the parties under the terms of the decree. Id. at P 12(b). n12 He or she will be available to class members and members of the public through a toll-free telephone number to facilitate the lodging of Consent Decree complaints and to expedite their resolution. Id. at P 12(b)(iv).

n12 The parties indicated in their letter of March 19, 1999, that one of the changes to the original Consent Decree would be that the Monitor would provide copies of his report to the Court. That change was not reflected in the revised Consent Decree that was filed by the parties on March 19, 1999, but the parties have since filed a corrected page 21 of the revised Consent Decree so that the Monitor in fact will be required to provide copies of the report to the Court. See Notice of Filing of April 9, 1999.

[**50]

The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree through contempt proceedings. Consent Decree at P 21. If one side believes that the other side has violated the terms of the Consent Decree, there is a mandatory procedure for attempting to resolve the problem with the assistance of the Monitor that the parties must follow before filing a contempt motion with the Court, but the Court remains available in the event that the terms of the decree are violated. Id. at P 13. Finally, the Consent Decree provides that class counsel shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under FCOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d), and under the Administrative Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), for the filing and litigation of this action and for implementation of the Consent Decree. Id. at P 14(a).

IV. FAIRNESS OF PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE.

Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, no class action may be dismissed, settled or compromised without the approval of the Court. Rule 23(e), Fed. R. Civ. P. Before giving its approval, the Court must provide adequate notice to all members of the class, id., conduct a "fairness hearing," and find, after notice and hearing, [**51] that the "settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable and is not the product of collusion between the parties." *Thomas v. Albright*, 139 F.3d at 231. In performing this task, the Court must protect the interests of those unnamed class members whose rights may be affected by the settlement of the action.

In this circuit there is "no obligatory test" that the Court must use to determine whether a settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. *Osher v. SCA Realty I, Inc.*, 945 F. Supp. 298, 303-04 (D.D.C. 1996). Instead the Court must consider the facts and circumstances of the case, ascertain what factors are most relevant in the circumstances and exercise its discretion in deciding whether approval of the proposed settlement is fair. n13 By far the most important factor is a comparison of the terms of the compromise or settlement with the likely recovery that plaintiffs would realize if the case went to trial. See *Thomas v. Albright*, 139 F.3d at 231 ("The court's primary task is to evaluate the terms of the settlement in relation to the strength of plaintiffs' case"); *Isby v. Bayh*, 75 F.3d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1996) ("the relative strength of plaintiffs' case on the merits [**52] as compared to what the defendants offer by way of settlement, is the most important consideration"); *Maywalt v. Parker and Parsley Petroleum Co.*, 67 F.3d 1072, 1079 (2nd Cir. 1995) ("the primary concern is with the substantive terms of the settlement: Basic to this is the need to compare the terms of the compromise with the likely rewards of litigation") (internal citations and quotations omitted). Having carefully considered all of

the objections that have been [*99] filed with the Court or expressed at the fairness hearing in relation to the strength of plaintiffs' case, the Court concludes that the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable and is not the product of collusion between the parties. n14

n13 The Third Circuit has adopted a nine-factor test for determining the fairness of a settlement of a class action, see *Girsh v. Jepson*, 521 F.2d 153 (3rd Cir. 1975), while the Tenth Circuit has adopted a four factor test, see *Gottlieb v. Wiles*, 11 F.3d 1004, 1014 (10th Cir. 1993), and the Eleventh Circuit has developed a six factor test. See *Bennett v. Behring Corp.*, 737 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1984). Other circuits, including ours, have not imposed such rigid sets of factors, instead recognizing that the relevant factors may vary depending on the factual circumstances. See *Thomas v. Tucson Elec. Power Co.*, 8 F.3d 1370, 1375-76 (9th Cir. 1993), *cert denied sub nom*, *Reilly v. Tucson Elec. Power Co.*, 512 U.S. 1220, 129 L. Ed. 2d 834, 114 S. Ct. 2707 (1994). To the extent that the factors enumerated by the other circuits are at all relevant to the determination of whether this Consent Decree is fair, adequate and reasonable, however, the Court has considered and addressed those factors in this Opinion. [**53]

n14 The Court has received written objections or comments from the following organizations: Black **Farmers** and Agriculturists Assoc.; Black **Farmers** of North Carolina; Central Piedmont Economic Assoc.; Concerned Black **Farmers** of Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi, Georgia and North Carolina; Coordinating Council of Black Farm Groups; Kansas Black **Farmers** Assoc.; Land Loss Prevention Project; Federation of Southern Cooperatives Land Assistance Fund; Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; NAACP; National Black **Farmers**; National Council of Community Based Organizations in Agriculture; National Family Farm Coalition; Oklahoma Black **Farmers** and Agriculturalists Assoc.; and United States Dept. of Agriculture Coalition of Minority Employees.

The Court has received written objections or comments from the following individuals (on behalf of themselves and/or on behalf of other class members): Theodore T.B. Bates; Robert R.

Binion; Abraham Carpenter, Jr.; Leonard C. Cooper; Harold M. Dunkelberger; George and Larry Ephron; Percy Gooch, Sr.; Estell Green, Jr.; Patricia Gibson Green; Brown J. Hawkins; Clarence Hardy; George and Patricia Hildebrandt; George Hobbs; Dave J. Miller; Jessie Nimmons; Timothy C. Pigford; Amelia Roland Washington; Roy L. Rolle, Jr.; Luis C. Sanders; Herbert L. Skimmer, Jr.; Gregory R. Swecker; V.J. Switzer; George M. Whitehead; Gladys R. Todd and Griffin Todd, Sr.; Andrew Williams; Jerome Williams; and Eddie and Dorothy Weiss.

All of the organizations and most of the individuals who had submitted written comments or objections spoke at the hearing on March 2, 1999. In addition, the following individuals spoke at the hearing: Mattie Mack; Kevin Pyle; Sherman Witchler; Eddie Slaughter; Ridgeley Mu'Min Muhammed; Willie Frank Smith; John Bender; Troy Scroggins; and Willie Head.

All of the objections and comments, whether received in the form of letters to the Court or as formal filings, have been filed as part of the official record of this case. To the extent possible, the Court has attempted to address all of the objections that have been raised. Whether or not specifically mentioned in this Opinion, the Court has carefully considered the objections and appreciates the extent to which the objectors have shared their thoughts and views.

[**54]

A. The Process of Settlement

Preliminarily, the Court considers those objections that address the fairness of the way in which the settlement negotiations were conducted, the amount of discovery completed at the time of settlement, the definition of the class, whether there is any evidence of collusion between class counsel and counsel for the government, and whether class members have had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard on the proposed settlement. See *Thomas v. Albright*, 139 F.3d at 231; *Durrett v. Housing Authority of City of Providence*, 896 F.2d 600, 604 (1st Cir. 1990); *Mars Steel v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank and Trust*, 834 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir. 1987); *Girsh v. Jepson*, 521 F.2d 153 (3rd Cir. 1975); *Osher v. SCA Realty I, Inc.*, 945 F. Supp. at 304.

1. Timing of Settlement and Extent of Discovery Completed

Some of the objectors maintain that settlement came too early and that class counsel undertook insufficient discovery in this case before settling it. A review of the history of the case, however, reveals that "there has been a literal mountain of discovery provided and reviewed." Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 170 (Comments [**55] of Mr. J.L. Chestnut). Less than three months after the case was filed, the Court ordered the USDA to open its files to plaintiffs within fifteen days. On the fifteenth day, the government provided plaintiffs with ten boxes of documents containing approximately 35,000 to 40,000 pages of records related to approximately 105 pending claims of race discrimination. See Def's November 17, 1997 Report to the Court, Declaration of Arnold Grundeman at P 4. Three days later, the government delivered an additional 20,000 pages related to another 30 pending cases of discrimination. See *id.* at P 5. At the time, the government represented that it was continuing to search for files, many of which had already been sent to a federal records repository. Since that time, the government has continued to provide plaintiffs with the files of class members.

The problem for plaintiffs has been that files simply do not exist for many class members. Providing additional time for discovery would not have solved that problem. As class counsel has pointed out, on the issue of liability of the USDA, the government's own [**100] documents and own admissions are the most damning evidence. See Transcript of [**56] Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 184 (Comments of Mr. Alexander Pires) ("I have an office full of admissions. I have tape recordings of Mr. Glickman. I have tape recordings of Government officials. I've interviewed everybody there is to interview. I have documents. I have the CRAT Report annotated. I have all the [Office of the Inspector General] Reports"). There really was no other discovery that could have made a difference. The same is true on the issue of damages. The government delivered to class counsel all of the files it had on individual class members. But without documentary evidence that does not exist, an individual farmer would be hard-pressed to provide evidence beyond his own testimony, and additional discovery from the government would not be helpful.

In addition, a relatively extensive amount of litigation had occurred by the time the parties agreed to a settlement. The issue of class certification had been extensively briefed by the parties and decided by the Court. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of the statute of limitations was fully briefed when the statute of limitations was tolled by legislative action. The government also had filed a motion [**57] for judgment on the pleadings and for partial summary judgment that was fully briefed. In sum, the discovery,

investigation and legal research conducted by class counsel before entering into settlement was thorough and supports the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement. See *Isby v. Bayh*, 75 F.3d at 1200.

2. Class Definition

The class is defined to include all **African American farmers** who (1) farmed, or attempted to farm, between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996; (2) applied to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) during that time period for participation in a federal farm credit or benefit program and who believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race in USDA's response to that application; and (3) filed a discrimination complaint on or before July 1, 1997, regarding USDA's treatment of such farm credit or benefit application. Some characterize this class definition as too narrow. They claim that the class should be broadened to include all **African American farmers** who claim to have faced discrimination in credit transactions or benefit programs with the USDA, regardless of whether they filed a complaint of discrimination with [**58] the USDA.

The legal issues for those who never have filed a discrimination complaint, however, are much more difficult than those facing the members of the class as currently defined. The statute of limitations issue still exists for those who never have filed complaints of discrimination because Congress tolled the statute of limitations only for those who filed discrimination complaints by July 1, 1997. Moreover, from the beginning, plaintiffs' complaint only sought relief for those who had filed discrimination complaints with the USDA. Accordingly, the Consent Decree in this case cannot provide relief for those who never purported to complain to the USDA in any way about the alleged discrimination. Cf. *United States v. Microsoft*, 312 U.S. App. D.C. 378, 56 F.3d 1448, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Some also have objected that the class as currently defined does not include all members of the putative Brewington class because under the current class definition, the farmer is required to have filed a complaint of discrimination prior to July 1, 1997, while the proposed class in Brewington would have included **African American farmers** who had filed their discrimination complaints [**59] prior to July 7, 1998. As previously discussed, see page 20 above, the statutory waiver of FCOA's two-year statute of limitations as recently enacted by Congress applies only to those farmers who filed complaints of discrimination by July 1, 1997. The claims of those who do not meet that deadline face separate and additional legal barriers not faced by the class as currently defined. Broadening the class would inject legal and factual issues into the case

that are not now present and would only serve to hinder a fair, reasonable and adequate settlement for the **African American farmers** who are a part of the class as currently defined. The Court therefore concludes that this class definition is appropriate.

[*101] The Consent Decree also requires each class member to provide proof that he filed a "discrimination complaint" with the USDA. The term "discrimination complaint" is defined broadly to include "a communication from a class member directly to USDA, or to a member of Congress, the White House, or a state, local or federal official who forwarded the class member's communication to USDA, asserting that USDA had discriminated against the class member on the basis of race in connection [**60] with a federal farm credit transaction or benefit application." Consent Decree at P1(h). In the absence of specified documents, a class member may submit an affidavit from a non-family member stating that he or she has personal knowledge that a discrimination complaint was filed and describing the way in which it was filed. See Consent Decree at P 5.

Some objectors maintain that it is unfair to require an affidavit from someone who is not a family member because, as Mr. Vernon Breckinridge put it, "getting loans from USDA is just like you go to a normal bank and get a loan. You don't normally go around and tell everybody in the neighborhood that you've gone to the bank to secure a loan." Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 101. While it may be that some will be precluded from obtaining relief because they cannot use affidavits from family members, the class membership determination is designed to be mechanistic so that it can be done quickly by the facilitator. If family members were permitted to submit affidavits, the facilitator would be required to make credibility determinations that inevitably would slow the process of determining class membership.

3. Asserted Collusion [**61]

The Court finds that there is absolutely no evidence of collusion between the class counsel and counsel for the government. See *Thomas v. Albright*, 139 F.3d at 231. From the outset, all settlement negotiations were conducted in the presence of the mediator, Mr. Michael Lewis, a neutral and detached mediator with twenty-five years of experience who has mediated many complex class action cases including employment and environmental cases. Mr. Lewis has stated quite emphatically that there was no collusion in this case: "If this case represented collusion or the negotiations in this case represented collusion I as a mediator never ever want to mediate a case in which the parties are at each others' throats. To term this negotiation intensive . . . understates the difficulty. This was an arduous

negotiation. It took a year. It was hard fought." Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 21-22.

Nor has the Court seen any evidence of collusion or other impropriety on the part of counsel on either side. From the day this case was filed, Mr. Alexander Pires has tenaciously asserted that his clients had a right to receive relief from the government. Even faced with difficult statute [**62] of limitations issues and a serious lack of documentation, he has never wavered from his fundamental position that the government had wronged generations of **African American farmers** and must provide compensation. Even when settlement negotiations were ongoing, both sides maintained their positions and continued to assert the interests of their respective clients in every filing and at every status conference. At the status hearing on March 20, 1998, for example, Mr. Chesnut pleaded for a trial date because he had no faith that the case would settle and he wanted to protect the interests of the class. Government counsel continued to file motions and protect the legal interests of the USDA. Certainly the Court can attest to the fact that the parties litigated vigorously all of the issues that were or logically could have been raised.

4. Notice, Opportunity to Be Heard and Reaction of the Class

When a class is certified and a settlement is proposed, the parties are required to provide class members with the "best notice practicable under the circumstances." Rule 23(c)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P.; see *Fisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156, 172-77, 40 L. Ed. 2d 732, 94 S. Ct. [**63] 2140 (1974). The Court concludes that class members have received more than adequate notice and have had sufficient opportunity to be heard on the fairness of the proposed Consent Decree. [*102] See *Durrett v. Housing Authority of City of Providence*, 896 F.2d at 604.

First, the timing and breadth of notice of the class settlement was sufficient under Rule 23. Notice was mailed to all known class members by January 15, 1999, nearly six weeks before the fairness hearing and a month before the deadline for comments, providing class members with ample time to submit their objections. See *Maywalt v. Parker and Parsley Petroleum Co.*, 67 F.3d at 1079; *Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co.*, 8 F.3d 1370, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1993), *cert denied sub nom. Reilly v. Tucson Elec. Power Co.*, 512 U.S. 1220, 129 L. Ed. 2d 834, 114 S. Ct. 2707 (1994), n15 The parties also exerted extraordinary efforts to reach class members through a massive advertising campaign in general circulation and **African American** targeted publications and radio and television stations. See pages 15-16 above.

n15 One objector maintains that notice was insufficient because the facilitator did not advertise in the United States Virgin Islands. With the exception of that one objection, no one appears to believe that the scope of the notice provided was insufficient.

[**64]

Second, the content of the notice was sufficient because it "fairly apprised the . . . members of the class of the terms of the proposed settlement and of the options that are open to them in connection with [the] proceedings." See *Maywalt v. Parker and Parsley Petroleum Co.*, 67 F.3d at 1079 (internal quotations omitted). The notice provided class members with information on the class, the purpose and timing of the fairness hearing, opt-out procedures and deadlines, and the deadline and process for filing claims packages. In addition, it provided telephone numbers for the facilitator and for class counsel to the extent that anyone had any questions.

Third, the Court gave objectors ample opportunity to present their objections to the Consent Decree. As noted above, the Court considered all of the written objections that were filed and provided objectors with an opportunity to present their objections orally at the fairness hearing. While the Court denied a request for an evidentiary hearing made by one group of objectors, see Order of March 11, 1999, the Court is not obligated to hold an evidentiary hearing, especially in view of the fact that it accepted and considered [**65] affidavits in place of testimony. See *Jones v. Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc.*, 741 F.2d 322, 325 (10th Cir. 1984); *Weinberger v. Kendrick*, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied *sub nom. Coyne v. Weinberger*, 464 U.S. 818, 78 L. Ed. 2d 89, 104 S. Ct. 77 (1983); cf. *United States v. Cannons Engineering Corp.*, 899 F.2d 79, 93-94 (1st Cir. 1990).

Finally, because the Court has received a number of objections, it is clear that class members do not unanimously support the settlement. It is significant, however, that there are relatively few objections to the settlement in comparison with the size of the class. See *Thomas v. Albright*, 139 F.3d at 232. This is a large class. As of March 26, 1999, 16,559 farmers had requested claims packages from the facilitator, and the facilitator already has received 1686 completed claim packages. By contrast, only 85 farmer class members have elected to opt out of the class. See Pls' Response to Post-Hearing Submissions of Objections at 67. Given the low rate of opt-outs and the relatively small percentage of class members objecting to the Consent Decree, the Court concludes that those objections do not warrant rejecting the [**66] Consent Decree. See *Thomas v. Albright*, 139 F.3d at 232 (settlement can be

fair even if "a significant portion of the class and some of the named plaintiffs object to it"). n16

n16 Certain of the original named plaintiffs, including both Mr. Timothy Pigford and Mr. Cecil Brewington, have objected to the terms of the settlement. The Court has carefully considered their objections but nonetheless concludes that the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. See *Thomas v. Albright*, 139 F.3d at 232 (fact that named class representatives object to proposed settlement does not preclude court from finding that settlement is fair).

B. Substantive Fairness: Likely Recovery at Trial Compared with Terms of Proposed Settlement

As our court of appeals has said, in considering a proposed class action settlement, [**103] the Court first must compare the likely recovery that plaintiffs would have realized if they had gone to trial with the terms of the settlement. See *Thomas v. Albright*, 139 F.3d at 231. The Court [**67] must look at the settlement as a whole and should not reject a settlement merely because individual class members claim that they would have received more at trial. The Court should scrutinize the terms of the settlement carefully, but the discretion of the Court to reject a settlement is restrained by the "principle of preference" that encourages settlements. See *Durrett v. Housing Authority of City of Providence*, 896 F.2d at 604; *Stewart v. Rubin*, 948 F. Supp. at 1086. The Court has received approximately sixty written submissions from forty-three groups or individuals objecting to or commenting on the fairness of the settlement. The Court also heard from numerous individuals and organizations at the fairness hearing on March 2, 1999. n17 Some of the objectors have argued persuasively that the settlement could have included broader relief, but that is not the test. See *Stewart v. Rubin*, 948 F. Supp. at 1087 ("the Court [should not] make the proponents of the agreement justify each term of settlement against a hypothetical measure of what concessions might have been gained"). The question is whether the structure of the settlement and the substantive relief including [**68] the amount of money provided are fair and reasonable when compared to the recovery that plaintiffs likely would have realized if the case went to trial. The Court concludes that they are.

n17 With one exception, see Order of March 11, 1999, the Court has considered all objections and comments that it received by April 2, 1999. Some of those who have submitted objections do

not appear to be members of the class and therefore lack standing to challenge the fairness of the Consent Decree, see *Mayfield v. Barr*, 300 U.S. App. D.C. 31, 985 F.2d 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1993), but the Court has considered their objections anyway.

The settlement provides a measure of certainty for most class members. The vast majority of class members probably will be entitled almost automatically to recovery under Track A, while Track B, which has no cap on the amount of damages available, provides those with stronger cases with the opportunity to realize greater recoveries. It is clear from the structure and terms of the settlement [**69] that class counsel were trying to strike a delicate balance between ensuring that as many class members as possible would receive compensation and ensuring that any compensation was adequate for the harm suffered. In striking this balance, class counsel were forced to recognize that most of the members of the class had little in the way of documentation or proof of their claims and likely would have recovered nothing if they were required to prove their cases by the traditional preponderance of the evidence standard. Track A was devised to provide a set amount of compensation for those class members who could meet only a minimal burden of proof, while Track B was not so limited. The Track A/Track B mechanism also ensures that this compensation is distributed as promptly as possible.

The Court is sympathetic to the reasons that various class members would have wanted class counsel to strike the balance differently in their negotiations. Nonetheless, the Court is not persuaded that striking a different balance would have been either achievable in the negotiating process or more favorable to all or even most members of the class. It certainly is not convinced that a better result would [**70] have been achieved by taking this case to trial where a substantial number of class members would have been unable to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence and thus would have recovered nothing. While each class member understandably wants the settlement to provide the greatest possible compensation to himself, the Court cannot conclude that the final balance struck by class counsel is anything but fair.

1. Likely Recovery If Case Had Proceeded to Trial

If the case had proceeded to trial, plaintiffs would have had in their possession strong evidence that the USDA discriminated against **African American farmers**. The reports of the Inspector General and the Civil Rights Action Team provide a persuasive indictment of the civil rights record of the USDA and the pervasive discrimination [**104] against **African**

American farmers. There does not appear to be much dispute that racial discrimination has occurred throughout the USDA and that the USDA and the county committees discriminated against **African American farmers** for decades in evaluating their applications for farm credit and benefits. In addition, when Congress took the unprecedented action of tolling the statute of limitations [**71] for ECOA, one of plaintiffs' major obstacles to establishing defendant's liability to the class was removed.

The problem is that even with that evidence, 80 to 90 percent of the class members lack any documentary evidence of the alleged discriminatory denial of credit or benefits to them. See Pls' Response to Written Objections at 11; Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 180 (Mr. Alexander Pires) ("What would happen . . . in this case if we went to trial? 90 percent of our clients do not have files. . . . 90 percent do not have files"). In order to recover damages under ECOA at a trial, a class member would have to be able to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a discriminatory denial of loans or terms of credit, the extent of the injury to him caused by the denial and the amount of damages he suffered. Absent any documentation, this would have been an impossible burden for the majority of class members. In addition, many class members lack any documentation to prove that they ever filed a complaint of discrimination with the USDA and therefore would have encountered great difficulty in even establishing their membership in the class. With no documentary evidence [**72] that they fall within the parameters of the class, it is not at all clear that those plaintiffs would have been able to recover anything.

Some objectors have suggested that the issue of damages could have been resolved by trying the claims of representative members of the class. See Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 46. As Mr. Alexander Pires explained, however, "I would never take the thousands of clients we have now and say bet your claim on those 12 or 13 cases that are your lead cases. Even though we helped pick them, I know what's in those 12 cases, and that's risky." *Id.* at 180. In fact, class counsel discovered during the process of negotiating the settlement that mediating the cases individually was risky. When the parties were in the initial stages of settlement negotiations, they agreed to mediate twelve individual test cases: six chosen by the government and six chosen by plaintiffs. The lack of documentation presented serious obstacles to the resolution of those cases. The parties worked for an entire month trying to settle eight of those twelve cases, and at the end of that month, not one case had been resolved. See Transcript of Hearing of March 5, [**73] 1998 at 32.

Moreover, bringing this case to trial likely would have been a very complex, long and costly proposition. Practically speaking, prevailing class members likely would not have obtained relief for many years. Trial on the issue of liability was scheduled to last the month of February 1999. Trial probably would have involved a number of experts, and the government probably would have raised a number of legal issues for the Court to resolve. Even if the Court devoted all of its resources and time to deciding the issue of liability, it is unlikely that a decision would have been issued before the summer of 1999. If the Court had found the USDA liable, it then would have had to resolve the issue of remedy for each farmer. A mechanism for establishing class or subclass membership and for resolving issues of individual damages for each farmer in the class or subclass would have been necessary. If the remedy phase were tried on an individual basis for each farmer -- as the government might have urged again as it has in the past, because of the acknowledged lack of documentation in so many cases -- the remedial process would have dragged on for years. If the remedy phase were not [**74] tried on an individual basis for each farmer, it is not inconceivable that a mechanism much like that negotiated in this settlement ultimately would be utilized. Even barring the inevitable appeal that the government would have taken in the event that plaintiffs prevailed, it is unlikely that any class member would have received any recovery for his injury for many years.

By contrast, the settlement negotiated by the parties provides for relatively prompt [*105] recovery. The claim of a claimant who chooses Track A will be resolved within 110 days of the date that the claim is filed. For those who choose Track B, the wait is a little longer because of discovery and trial, but the total time required is at most 240 days from the date that the claim is filed. Because neither side may appeal, the claimant will receive his compensation long before he would have if the case had gone to trial.

2. Overall Structure of Settlement: Track A and Track B

As currently structured, class members have three options: they have 120 days after the entry of the Consent Decree within which to notify the facilitator if they want to opt out of the class altogether, they may remain in the class and choose [**75] Track A or they may remain in the class and choose Track B. n18 Those who do not opt out have 180 days from the entry of the decree within which to file their claim packages and, for those who choose Track A, to submit their proof. Consent Decree at PP 5(c), 5(d).

n18 For those class members who allege only discrimination in a benefit transaction, Track B is not an option.

A number of class members complain that they lack sufficient information to select among these three options and that the settlement is structured to force class members to choose Track A. At meetings throughout the country, class counsel currently is making every effort to reach all class members, to explain the options and to sit down with individual class members to provide advice. See Pls' Response to Post-Hearing Submissions, Exh. C. The turnout for these meetings has been overwhelming and has far exceeded everyone's expectations: literally hundreds of farmers show up for each meeting. It has become clear that there are more class [**76] members than anyone had anticipated and some class members contend that although they show up at the meetings, class counsel does not have time to meet with them. Class counsel is in the midst of scheduling more meetings and providing more time for each meeting, and they have assured the Court that they will be able to meet with all class members prior to the deadline for filing claim packages.

Those who assert only discrimination in non-credit, benefit transactions, rather than discrimination in credit transactions, do not have the option of proceeding under Track B, see Consent Decree at P 5(d), and one objector complains that those who have faced discrimination in the USDA's benefit programs ought to be allowed to proceed under Track B. The problem is that programs that do not involve credit transactions are not subject to ECOA. The cause of action for those who allege discrimination in benefit programs arises solely under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, which does not provide for the same measure of damages as is provided under ECOA. For that reason, those who allege only that they have suffered discrimination in a benefit program are afforded a slightly [**77] different form of relief than the relief provided for those who suffered discrimination in a credit transaction with the USDA. In other words, the different statutory predicates for the two different kinds of claims restricted the solutions that counsel could negotiate in each context.

A class member who selects Track A must submit "substantial evidence" demonstrating that he was a victim of race discrimination in a credit or benefit transaction with the USDA. Consent Decree at PP 9(a), 9(b). Some have objected that the "substantial evidence" standard is too high a burden of proof. Part of that concern stems from a misunderstanding of the "substantial evidence" standard. While the phrase "substantial evidence" makes it sound as though the burden of proof is high, the substantial evidence standard

actually is one of the lowest possible burdens of proof known to the law. A "substantial evidence standard" is significantly easier for the claimant to meet than a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. A "preponderance of the evidence" standard means that the claimant has to show that it is more likely than not that discrimination happened, while under a "substantial evidence" standard, [**78] the claimant only has to provide a reasonable basis for the adjudicator to find that discrimination happened. [*106] See Consent Decree at P 1(f); see also page 28 above. The substantial evidence standard therefore should not be a bar to the claims of most class members.

In order for a claimant to prevail under Track A, he must present specified evidence, including evidence that he was treated less favorably than a "specifically identified, similarly situated" white farmer. See Consent Decree at PP 9(a)(i)(C), 9(b)(i)(B). Some objectors contend that it will be too difficult for some claimants to present evidence of a specific, similarly situated white farmer who received more favorable treatment, especially since there is no right to discovery under Track A. At this point, however, class counsel has amassed a significant amount of material regarding the treatment by the USDA of both African American farmers and white farmers, and claimants will be able to call upon that material in completing their claim packages. Class counsel should be able to provide most claimants with the evidence they need.

Under Track B, after limited discovery the claimant has a one day mini-trial before [**79] an arbitrator, and the claimant has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the USDA discriminated against him in a credit transaction. There are a number of objections to the Track B mechanism. First, the original Consent Decree defined Track B arbitrators as Michael Lewis and "any other person or person who he assigns to decide Track B claims." Some objectors contended that the definition of arbitrator was too vague and that those who were thinking about choosing Track B would have no way of knowing who the arbitrator might be. As Mr. James Morrison put it, "If Mr. Lewis chooses to have distinguished jurists, lawyers, former judges, I think he has that right as the four corners of the document gives him the authority. But if he wishes to choose Mickey Mouse, he could choose Mickey Mouse." See Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 75. The parties addressed this concern in the revised Consent Decree by defining arbitrators as either Michel Lewis or "other person or persons selected by Mr. Lewis who meet qualifications agreed upon by the parties and by Mr. Lewis and whom Mr. Lewis assigns to decide Track B claims. . . ." See Consent Decree at P [**80] 1(b). The parties have specified that Mr. Lewis

will "develop a single list of alternates which the parties would pre-approve and from which Mr. Lewis can select an arbitrator for any arbitration that he is unable to handle himself." See Letter of March 19, 1999 from Parties at P 1. While a claimant may not know the identity of the arbitrator at the time that the claimant chooses Track B, he will know who the potential candidates are and that they were not unilaterally selected by Mr. Lewis. In addition, class counsel can provide background information about the people on the list so the claimant will be able to make a more informed decision about whether he wants to select Track B.

Track B provides for limited discovery prior to the one day mini-trial. Discovery is limited essentially to an exchange of lists of witnesses and exhibits and depositions of the opposing side's witnesses. See Consent Decree at P 10(b)-(d). Some contend that discovery should be much broader. While it undoubtedly is true that the Track B mechanism anticipates less discovery than is ordinarily provided in the course of civil litigation, the Track B mechanism also resolves the claim much more quickly [**81] than an ordinary civil case would be resolved, in large part because of the shortened discovery period. Expanding the scope of discovery would take significantly more time, and class counsel in their judgment reasonably weighed the possible benefits of additional discovery, against the delays that would ensue and determined that this was an adequate amount of discovery. n19

n19 In fact, several objectors contend that the Track B mechanism, even with the shortened discovery period, takes too long to resolve claims. It is clear from the tensions between these two sets of objections that class counsel had to strike a delicate balance between resolving Track B claims expeditiously and obtaining the necessary discovery, and the balance finally struck appears eminently reasonable to the Court.

A hearing on a Track B claim lasts eight hours. Consent Decree at P 10(f). There is no live direct testimony. All direct testimony [*107] is submitted in writing. The eight hours at the hearing are comprised entirely of cross-examinations: [**82] each side is allotted four hours to cross-examine any witness of the opposing side. Several objectors contend that the claimant should be able to present live direct testimony, rather than presenting it only in written form. As with the Track B discovery issue, class counsel clearly was trying to balance the need for expedition with the need to ensure that the process produces just results. Again, the Court cannot conclude that the balance that counsel

ultimately struck renders the terms of the settlement unfair. n20

n20 The Court also notes that it is not unprecedented to conduct hearings in this way, even in trials in federal court. See Transcript at 51; Charles R. Richey, "Rule 16 Revised and Related Rules: Analysis of Recent Developments for the Benefit of Bench and Bar," 157 F.R.D. 69, 83-84 (1994).

-----Footnotes-----

In order to prevail on his claims, a Track B claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that "he was the victim of racial discrimination and that he suffered damages therefrom." See Consent [**83] Decree at P 10(g). One objection maintains that this standard is too high and that claimants will be unable to meet this standard. To the extent that a claimant is concerned that he lacks sufficient evidence to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard, the traditional standard in civil litigation in all states and federal courts in this country, Track A provides a safer option. A claimant who cannot meet the preponderance of the evidence standard is not barred from all relief; instead, he is required to choose Track A rather than choosing Track B. Another objector also contends that a Track B claimant should not be required to establish economic damage in order to prevail on a Track B claim, and that the claimant should be able to prevail even if he can only establish emotional injury. As class counsel has pointed out, however, the economic damage requirement stems from ECOA, which provides the cause of action for all Track B claimants.

Some objectors complain about the Track A/Track B structure because those claimants who select Track B and fail to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that they were the victims of race discrimination and that they suffered economic [**84] harm as a result will recover nothing under the settlement, see Consent Decree at P 10(h), rather than being permitted to proceed under Track A if they lose under Track B. The decision whether to proceed under Track A or under Track B therefore takes on a great deal of significance. If a claimant who has sufficient evidence to meet Track A requirements but insufficient evidence to prevail in Track B nonetheless chooses Track B, he will receive nothing.

As class counsel and counsel for the government have pointed out, however, there simply is no way that those who fail on a Track B claim could be permitted to proceed under Track A without entirely undermining the

settlement. The settlement is designed to resolve the claims of all class members as promptly as possible. Because of the absence of documentary proof in most cases, the vast majority of claimants will select Track A, and Track A is designed to be a mechanistic way to deal with claims very quickly. Track B, by contrast, involves a much lengthier, fact-specific inquiry, but it is anticipated that very few class members will opt for Track B. If there were a fallback mechanism to provide relief for claimants who failed in [**85] their Track B claims, every class member would choose Track B and the settlement structure would collapse under its own weight. See Letter of March 19, 1999 from the Parties to the Court at 4 (if a class member whose claim was denied under Track B nonetheless were permitted to recover under Track A, "virtually every class member who elects to seek relief under the Decree would choose to proceed under Track B. Not only would such a change increase exponentially the cost to the parties of implementing the Decree, it also would make it impossible for the parties or the arbitrator to come close to adhering to the deadlines for disposition of Track B claims imposed by P 10(a)-(c). Thus this change would make the Decree unworkable").

Finally, the decisions of the adjudicators on Track A claims and the decisions of the arbitrators on Track B claims are final; [**108] there is no right to appeal those decisions, except that the Monitor shall direct the arbitrator or adjudicator to reexamine the claim if he determines that a "clear and manifest error has occurred" that is "likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Consent Decree at PP 9(a)(v), 9(b)(v), 10(f), 12(b)(iii). Many [**86] objectors contend that the absence of appeal rights renders the settlement structure unfair and/or that it gives the arbitrators and adjudicators too much power. As Mr. Willie Head expressed it, "would you send your sons and daughters off to war with one bullet." Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 165. While the objection has force, class counsel made a strategic decision not to press for appeal rights because the government would have insisted that any appeal rights be a two-way street. See Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 179. Any appeal process inevitably would delay payments to those claimants who prevailed on their claims. Since it is anticipated that most class members will prevail under the structure of the settlement, the Court concludes that the forfeit of appeal rights was a reasonable compromise.

3. Track A Relief: The \$ 50,000 Objection

Any claimant who prevails on a Track A claim for discrimination in a credit transaction will receive: (1) a cash payment of \$ 50,000; (2) forgiveness of all debt owed to the USDA incurred under or affected by the program that formed the basis of the claim; (3) a tax

payment directly to the IRS in the amount of 25% [**87] of the total of the debt forgiveness and cash payment; (4) immediate termination of any foreclosure action that USDA initiated in connection with the loan(s) at issue in the claim; and (5) injunctive relief including one-time priority loan consideration and technical assistance. This relief package is the source of two objections.

Many objectors claim that a \$ 50,000 cash award is insufficient to compensate them for the losses they sustained as a result of the USDA's discrimination. As Mr. Willie Head expressed it, "imagine that your home has been taken, your land has been taken, your automobile has been taken, and then you can make a decision and see if \$ 50,000 will be enough for you." Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 165-66. Putting a monetary value on the damage done to someone who has experienced discrimination at the hands of the government obviously is no easy matter, and it is probable that no amount of money can fully compensate class members for past acts of discrimination. It is quite clear, as the objectors point out, that \$ 50,000 is not full compensation in most cases.

To the extent that a specific value can be put on such compensation, however, class counsel [**88] have thoroughly researched the issue and provided persuasive evidence that the amount is fair. n21 As class counsel points out, every claimant who prevails under Track A will receive not \$ 50,000 but at least \$ 62,500 (the sum of a \$ 50,000 cash payment plus \$ 12,500 in tax relief). And most who prevail under Track A will receive much more than that. The government estimates that the average African American farmer carries government debt of approximately \$ 100,000, and those debts will be forgiven under Track A; in addition, the settlement provides for a tax payment of 25% of the debt forgiveness. See Pls' Response to Post-Hearing Submissions, Exh. A (Declaration of Dr. Mervin J. Yetley) at P 5(e)-(d). The average cash value of relief for a claimant who prevails under [**109] Track A therefore totals \$ 187,500. Id. at P 6. Class members undoubtedly would have liked to have received a larger settlement. But \$ 187,500 is a significant amount of money, especially in view of the fact that a claimant who lacks the detailed records required in a normal civil action to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence need only establish his claim by substantial evidence in order to receive [**89] that compensation. The Court therefore concludes that class counsel had an adequate basis for agreeing to this amount and that it is fair and reasonable.

n21 To the extent that objectors are claiming that class counsel had no economic basis for

agreeing to settle the case for the amount they did, that argument is belied by the fact that class counsel consulted a number of economists. See Pls' Response to Post-Hearing Submissions. Moreover, while one objector submitted affidavits from other economists that contend that the value of class members' claims may have been worth more than \$ 50,000, those economists do not take into account the breadth of relief provided by the settlement. See id., Exh. A (Declaration of Dr. Mervin J. Yetley).

Class counsel also conducted an extensive study of the settlement of four previous civil rights actions in which plaintiffs alleged egregious violations of civil rights, including the case brought by Japanese Americans interned during World War II and the Tuskegee case involving the claims of African Americans injected with syphilis as part of government experiments. See Pls' Response to Post-Hearing Submissions at 2, n.2. Class counsel reasonably concluded that this settlement, which affords class members greater monetary relief than that afforded to individuals in those four cases, was fair and adequate.

[**90]

Some objectors also contend that the tax relief provided under Track A is insufficient because it may not cover all the federal taxes owed on the settlement and because it does not cover state taxes. Any effort to determine the exact amount of federal tax owed on a settlement, however, would have required scores of auditors and inevitably would have resulted in delays. The logistical problems presented by a provision covering state taxes would have been even more complicated, since every state has a different method of assessing income taxes and different tax rates. Again, class counsel in its judgment determined that a flat tax payment was in the best interests of the class and in assuring a prompt resolution of the claims, and the Court is unwilling to second-guess that judgment.

4. Other Objections to Individual Relief

The failure of both Track A and Track B to include certain measures of individual relief also has led to objections. First, some contend that the USDA should provide relief from loans owed to creditors other than the USDA. They argue that because the USDA discriminated in its credit programs, many African American farmers either had to obtain loans from private [**91] banks at very high interest rates or had to buy their equipment and supplies on credit from private companies at high interest rates. They therefore seek to

have all of those loans forgiven or at least to have loans that were guaranteed by the USDA forgiven. Class counsel clearly tried to negotiate for as much debt forgiveness as possible. But as Mr. J.L. Chestnut put it, "There is no likelihood the United States government is going to go around to . . . commercial banks paying off private loans of black **farmers**, whether it relates to discrimination or not. Nobody is going to be able to negotiate that with the United States government. How do I know that? Because I tried." Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 168.

Second, some have objected that the Consent Decree does not contain a provision to protect a class member's settlement award from his bankruptcy estate. The parties to this action cannot, however, determine whether the bankruptcy estate has a right to a claimant's settlement award. Those matters are controlled by operation of the bankruptcy laws and will turn on issues such as whether the claim is considered the property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Those [**92] matters properly are resolved in bankruptcy court between the parties to those actions and cannot be resolved by the parties to this action.

Third, a claimant who prevails under Track B is entitled to "any USDA inventory property that was formerly owned by the class member but which was foreclosed in connection with the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the arbitrator." See Consent Decree at P 10(g)(iv). With that one exception, however, the Consent Decree has no provision for returning land to prevailing claimants. A number of objectors have stated the need for more extensive land return provisions. Again, this was a matter that class counsel clearly tried to negotiate, and they obtained the best possible resolution they could.

Finally, one objector expressed concern that the credit records of many claimants have been damaged by the discrimination they experienced at the hands of the USDA and that it therefore will be difficult for those **farmers** to obtain credit from the USDA or others in the future. In response to that objection, the parties agreed to revise the Consent Decree to include a provision stating that "outstanding debt discharged pursuant to [Track [**93] A or Track B] shall not adversely affect the claimant's eligibility for future participation in any USDA loan or loan servicing program." See Consent Decree at P 11(c). In sum, while some class members clearly [**110] would have liked the terms of the settlement to be slightly different, the terms of the settlement are fair when compared with the likely recovery plaintiffs would have obtained at trial.

C. Monitoring and Enforcement Provisions

Some objectors contend that at the very least the enforcement and monitoring provisions of the Consent Decree must be strengthened. The Consent Decree provides for the appointment of a Monitor for a period of five years to track and report on the USDA's compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree. Under the original proposed Consent Decree, the Monitor was appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture, subject to class counsels' approval. A number of objections noted that the USDA did not have any incentive to appoint a strong and independent Monitor, and that the Monitor provision therefore needed to be changed. In response to those concerns, the parties revised the Monitor provision so that the Court now appoints the Monitor from a list of [**94] names submitted by the parties. See Consent Decree at 12(a). The Monitor is removable only for "good cause."

A number of objections also noted that the original proposed Consent Decree appeared to prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction in the event that the USDA did not comply with the terms of the decree. The law is clear that the Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Consent Decree. See *Spallone v. United States*, 493 U.S. 265, 276, 107 L. Ed. 2d 644, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1989); *Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n*, 301 U.S. App. D.C. 380, 995 F.2d 280, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (principle is well-established that trial court "retains jurisdiction to enforce consent decrees and settlement agreements"); *Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia*, 272 U.S. App. D.C. 235, 855 F.2d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (in action to enforce terms of consent decree, district court "unquestionably had power to hold the District of Columbia in civil contempt for violations of the consent decree"). The parties also have clarified that the Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Decree.

D. Absence of Provisions Preventing Future Discrimination

The stated [**95] purpose of the Consent Decree is to "ensure that in their dealings with the USDA, all class members receive full and fair treatment that is the same as the treatment accorded to similarly situated white persons." Consent Decree at 2. The Consent Decree does not, however, provide any forward-looking injunctive relief. It does not require the USDA to take any steps to ensure that county commissioners who have discriminated against class members in the past are no longer in the position of approving loans. Nor does it provide a mechanism to ensure that future discrimination complaints are timely investigated and resolved so that the USDA does not practice the same discrimination against **African American farmers** that led to the filing of this lawsuit. In fact, the Consent Decree stands absolutely mute on two critical points: the full

implementation of the recommendations of the Civil Rights Action Team and the integration and reform of the county committee system to make it more accountable and representative. The absence of any such provisions has led to strong, heart-felt objections. It also has caused the Court concern. After comparing the terms of the settlement as a whole with the [**96] recovery that plaintiffs likely would have received after trial, however, the Court cannot conclude that the absence of any such prospective injunctive relief renders the settlement as a whole unfair.

There are several legal responses to the objections about the lack of forward-looking injunctive relief. First, while plaintiffs sought both declaratory and monetary relief in the complaint, they never sought an injunction requiring the USDA to restructure or to fire people who may have engaged in discrimination. See Complaint at 40-42; Seventh Amended Complaint at 60-63. All of the objectors who seek to have the USDA restructured therefore are going beyond the scope of the complaint in this case. The role of the Court in approving or disapproving a settlement is limited to determining whether the settlement of the case before it is fair, adequate and reasonable. The Court cannot reject the Consent Decree merely because it [*111] does not provide relief for some other hypothetical case that plaintiffs could have but did not bring. Cf. *United States v. Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1459-60 (court cannot "reformulate the issues" or "redraft the complaint").

Second, nothing in the Consent Decree [**97] authorizes the USDA to engage in illegal conduct in the future, and the Consent Decree therefore should not be rejected for its failure to include such prospective injunctive relief. See *Isby v. Bayh*, 75 F.3d at 1197 ("we cannot approve a class action settlement which either initiates or authorizes the continuation of clearly illegal conduct . . . [but] we are mindful that . . . any illegality or unconstitutionality must appear as a legal certainty on the face of the agreement before a settlement can be rejected on this basis") (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Third, even if plaintiffs had prevailed on their ECOA claims at trial, it is not at all clear that the Court could have or would have granted the broad injunctive relief that the objectors now seek. The injunctive relief that the objectors seek, essentially an injunction requiring the USDA to change the way it processes credit applications, may be authorized where plaintiffs prove a constitutional violation, see *Hills v. Gantreaux*, 425 U.S. 284, 297, 47 L. Ed. 2d 792, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976), but plaintiffs in their Seventh Amended Complaint do not allege a constitutional violation and they have not undertaken [**98] to prove one. Moreover, while ECOA authorizes the Court to "grant such equitable and

declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce the requirements imposed under this subchapter." 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(c), in employing its broad equitable powers the Court must exercise "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." See *LaShawn A. v. Barry*, 330 U.S. App. D.C. 204, 144 F.3d 847, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting *Spallone v. United States*, 493 U.S. 265, 280, 107 L. Ed. 2d 644, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990)).

Those legal responses, however, provide little comfort to those who have experienced discrimination at the hands of the USDA and who legitimately fear that they will continue to face such discrimination in the future. The objections arise from a deep and overwhelming sense that the USDA and all of the structures it has put in place have been and continue to be fundamentally hostile to the African American farmer. As Mr. Leonard Cooper put it, "You cannot mediate . . . institutionalized racism" Transcript of Motions Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 142. Another class member expressed it more personally: "They have humiliated me and my family since [1989]. . . . And I was just [**99] wondering if there couldn't be something put in the provisions that would stop these FSA agents from humiliating and degrading [us] as they do. . . . my wife has almost had a nervous breakdown by dealing with our agent and he continues to do the same things that he has done in the past and I just wish there was some way for you to put something in that provision that would stop some of that stuff." Id. at 146.

Most fundamentally, these objections result from a well-founded and deep-seated mistrust of the USDA. A mistrust borne of a long history of racial discrimination. A mistrust that is well-deserved. As Mr. Chestnut put it, these objections reflect "fear which reaches all the way back to slavery. . . . That objection, you heard it from many today, it really asks you to retain jurisdiction over this case in perpetuity. Otherwise they say USDA will default, ignore the lawful mandates of this Court, and in time march home scot-free while blacks are left holding the empty bag again." Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 172. The Court cannot guarantee class members that they will never experience discrimination at the hands of the USDA again, and the Consent Decree does [**100] not purport to make such a guarantee. But the Consent Decree and the Court do provide certain assurances.

First, under the terms of this Consent Decree, the USDA is obligated to pay billions of dollars to African American farmers who have suffered discrimination. Those billions of dollars will serve as a reminder to the Department of Agriculture that its actions were unacceptable and should serve to deter it from engaging in the same conduct in the future.

Second, the USDA is not above the law. Like many of the objectors, the Court was surprised and disappointed by the government's [*112] response to the Court's modest proposal that the Consent Decree include a simple sentence that in the future the USDA shall exert "best efforts to ensure compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations prohibiting discrimination." Letter from the Court to Counsel, dated March 5, 1999; see Response Letter from the Parties to the Court, dated March 19, 1999. Whether or not the government explicitly states it in this Consent Decree, however, the Constitution and laws of the United States continue to forbid discrimination on the basis of race, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; 15 U.S.C. § 1691; [**101] 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, as do the regulations of the USDA. See 7 C.F.R. § § 15.1, 15.51. The actions of the USDA from now into the future will be scrutinized closely -- by class members, by their now organized and vocal allies, by Congress and by the Court. If the USDA or members of the county committees are operating on the misapprehension that they ever again can repeat the events that led to this lawsuit, those forces will disabuse them of any such notion.

Most importantly, the **farmers** who have been a part of this lawsuit have demonstrated their power to bring about fundamental change to the Department of Agriculture, albeit more slowly than some would have wanted. Each individual **farmer** may feel powerless, but as a group they have planted seeds that are changing the landscape of the USDA. As a group, they spurred Secretary Glickman in 1996 to look inward at the practices of the USDA and to examine **African American farmers'** allegations that the discrimination of the USDA was leading them to the point of financial ruin. As a group, they led Secretary Glickman to create the Civil Rights Action Team, a team that recommended sweeping changes to the USDA and to the county committee system. [**102] Indeed, in February 1997, the USDA Civil Rights Action Team itself recommended that the county committee system be revised by converting all county non-federal positions, including the county executive directors, to federal status, that the committee selection process be changed, that voting members of underrepresented groups be appointed to state and county committees, and that county committees be removed from any farm loan determinations. CRAT Report at 64-65.

As a group, the **farmers** mobilized a broad coalition within Congress to take the unprecedented action of tolling the statute of limitations. As a group, they brought Secretary Glickman to the negotiating table in this case and achieved the largest civil rights settlement in history. And as a group, they have made implementation of the recommendations of the CRAT Report a priority within

the USDA. See Statement of February 9, 1999, by Secretary Dan Glickman, Before the Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate ("I also want to emphasize the importance that the President and I have placed on USDA civil rights issues; this priority is reflected in [**103] the [FY 2000] budget. The President's budget provides the necessary funding to continue to carry out the recommendations of the Civil Rights Action Team (CRAT) as well as the recommendations of the National Commission on Small Farms which supports our civil rights agenda"). While the USDA landscape has remained resistant to change for many seasons, the labors of these **farmers** finally are beginning to bear fruit. This settlement represents one significant harvest. It is up to the Secretary of Agriculture and other responsible officials at the USDA to fulfill its promises, to ensure that this shameful period is never repeated and to bring the USDA into the twenty-first century.

V. CONCLUSION

Forty acres and a mule. The government broke that promise to **African American farmers**. Over one hundred years later, the USDA broke its promise to Mr. James Beverly. It promised him a loan to build farrowing houses so that he could breed hogs. Because he was **African American**, he never received that loan. He lost his farm because of the loan that never was. Nothing can completely undo the discrimination of the past or restore lost land or lost opportunities to Mr. Beverly or to all of the other [**104] **African American farmers** whose representatives came before this Court. Historical discrimination cannot be undone.

[*113] But the Consent Decree represents a significant first step. A first step that has been a long time coming, but a first step of immeasurable value. As Mr. Chesnut put it, "Who really knows the true value, if there is one, for returning a small army of poor black **farmers** to the business of farming by the year 2000 who otherwise would never make it back? I am not wise enough to put a dollar value on that and I don't think anybody on this planet is wise enough to reduce that to dollars and cents." Transcript of Hearing of March 2, 1999 at 171. The Consent Decree is a fair, adequate and reasonable settlement of the claims brought in this case. It therefore will be approved and entered.

SO ORDERED.

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

United States District Judge

DATE: 4/14/99

TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DAN GLICKMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

182 F.R.D. 341; 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16299; 41 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1310

**October 9, 1998, Decided
October 9, 1998, Filed**

DISPOSITION: **[**1]** Plaintiffs' motion for class certification **GRANTED**; class **CERTIFIED** for purposes of determining liability.

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

COUNSEL: For Plaintiffs: Alexander J. Pires, Jr., Conlon, Frantz, Pheelan & Pires, Washington, DC.

For Defendant: Susan Hall Lemmon/Terry Henry, U.S. Dept. Of Justice, Washington, DC.

JUDGES: PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge.

OPINIONBY: PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

OPINION:

[*342] **OPINION**

This case is before the Court on plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Upon consideration of plaintiffs' motion, the opposition filed by the government, plaintiffs' reply and the arguments presented by counsel at oral argument, the Court concludes that the class action vehicle is the most appropriate mechanism for resolving the issue of liability in this case. The Court therefore will certify a class for the purpose of determining liability.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, four hundred and one **African American farmers** from Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, **[*343]** Missouri, Mississippi,

North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia, allege (1) that the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") willfully discriminated against them when they applied for **[**2]** various farm programs, and (2) that when they filed complaints of discrimination with the USDA, the USDA failed properly to investigate those complaints. Fifth Amended Complaint at 53. n1

n1 Between the time the original complaint was filed and the time of oral argument on the motion for class certification, plaintiffs filed five separate motions for leave to file amended complaints. On May 22, 1998, the government indicated that it did not oppose the five motions for leave to amend, and on June 3, 1998, the Court granted plaintiffs' five motions for leave to file amended complaints. While the filing of the amended complaints had not been authorized at the time of argument on the motion for class certification, the issue since has been resolved and the Court therefore will treat the Fifth Amended Complaint as the relevant complaint for purposes of this Opinion.

On October 2, 1998, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a Sixth Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs have stated that the government does not oppose the motion.

[3]**

Plaintiffs challenge the USDA's administration of several different farm loan and subsidy programs and/or agencies. Until 1994, the USDA operated two separate

programs that provided, *inter alia*, price support loans, disaster payments, "farm ownership" loans and operating loans: the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service ("ASCS") and the Farmers Home Administration ("FmHA"). In 1994, the functions of the ASCS and the FmHA were consolidated into one newly-created entity, the Farm Service Agency ("FSA").

A farmer seeking a loan or subsidy from the FSA must submit an application to a county committee, comprised of producers from that county who are elected by other producers in that county. If the county committee approves the application, the farmer receives the subsidy or loan. If the application is denied, the farmer may appeal to a state committee and then to a federal review board. Under the ASCS and the FmHA, the procedure for applying for a loan or subsidy essentially was the same as the current FSA procedure, with several slight variations. If a farmer applied for an ASCS benefit, a County Executive Director was supposed to work with that farmer to help him complete [**4] his application, and the County Executive Director also was supposed to do an initial review of the application. If a farmer applied for a loan from FmHA, the review mechanisms available if the loan was denied differed slightly.

Under the FSA and previously under the ASCS and the FmHA, a farmer who believes that his application was denied on the basis of his race or for other discriminatory reasons has the option of filing a civil rights complaint either with the Secretary of the USDA or with the Office of Civil Rights Enforcement and Adjudication ("OCREA"). In the case of a farmer whose FmHA application was denied, the farmer also had the option of filing a complaint with the FmHA Equal Opportunity Office. A program discrimination complaint filed with USDA is supposed to be forwarded to OCREA, and after reviewing the complaint, OCREA is supposed to return it to the FSA for conciliation and/or preliminary investigation. The FSA then is required to forward the complaint to the Civil Rights and Small Business Utilization Staff ("CR&SBUS"), the division of FSA responsible for investigating complaints alleging discrimination within FSA's programs. CR&SBUS is required to forward the complaint [**5] to the State Civil Rights Coordinator who is supposed to attempt to conciliate the complaint and/or conduct a preliminary investigation and then report back to CR&SBUS. Ultimately, any conciliation agreement or investigatory findings are to be reported to OCREA for a final determination.

Plaintiffs allege a complete failure by the USDA to process discrimination complaints. Plaintiffs allege that in 1983, OCREA essentially was dismantled and that complaints that were filed were never processed,

investigated or forwarded to the appropriate agencies for conciliation. As a result, farmers who filed complaints of discrimination never received a response, or if they did receive a response, it was a cursory denial of relief. In some cases, plaintiffs allege that OCREA [**344] simply threw discrimination complaints in the trash without ever responding to or investigating them.

In response to the numerous complaints of minority farmers, Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman appointed a Civil Rights Action Team ("CRAT") to "take a hard look at the issues and make strong recommendations for change." See Pls' Motion for Class Certification, Exh. B (Report of the Civil Rights Action Team) at 3. In [**6] February of 1997, the CRAT issued a report which concluded that "minority farmers have lost significant amounts of land and potential farm income as a result of discrimination by FSA programs and the programs of its predecessor agencies, ASCS and FmHA. . . . The process for resolving complaints has failed. Minority and limited-resource customers believe USDA has not acted in good faith on the complaints. Appeals are too often delayed and for too long. Favorable decisions are too often reversed." Id. at 30-31.

Also in February of 1997, the Office of the Inspector General of the USDA issued a report to the Secretary of the USDA indicating that the USDA had a backlog of complaints of discrimination that had not been processed, investigated or resolved. See Pls' Motion for Class Certification, Exh. A (Evaluation Report for the Secretary on Civil Rights Issues). The Report found that immediate action was needed to clear the backlog of complaints, that the "program discrimination complaint process at [the Farm Services Agency] lacks integrity, direction, and accountability," id. at 6, and that "staffing problems, obsolete procedures, and little direction from management have [**7] resulted in a climate of disorder within the civil rights staff at FSA." Id. at 1.

The CRAT Report and the Report of the Inspector General clearly contributed to plaintiffs' decision to file this class action. Even before the reports were issued, however, minority farmers had alleged that the USDA discriminated on the basis of race in the administration of its farm programs. In late 1995, five farmers filed a lawsuit in this Court captioned Williams v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 95-1149 (now captioned Herrera v. Glickman). Williams originally was filed as a class action alleging that the USDA discriminated against minority farmers in the operation of its farm programs. The proposed Williams class was defined as

All African American or Hispanic American persons who, between 1981 and the present, have suffered from racial or national origin discrimination in the

application for or the servicing of loans or credit from the FmHA (now Farm Services Agency) of the USDA, which has caused them to sustain economic loss and/or mental anguish/emotion [sic] distress damages.

See *Williams v. Glickman*, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1683, Civil Action No. 95-1149, Memorandum Opinion of February [**8] 14, 1997 at 7. On February 14, 1997, Judge Thomas A. Flannery denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Judge Flannery essentially found that plaintiffs' proposed class definition was too amorphous and overly broad and that the claims of the named plaintiffs were not typical or representative of the claims of potential class members. Judge Flannery also found that even if plaintiffs could meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing class actions, plaintiffs had failed to establish any of the Rule 23(b) requirements. On April 15, 1997, Judge Flannery denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. n2

n2 Most of the original *Williams* plaintiffs settled their claims against the USDA. The two remaining plaintiffs, both of whom are Hispanic, had pending administrative complaints with the USDA, and the court therefore stayed the lawsuit pending an administrative determination by the USDA on the merits of the administrative complaints.

II. DISCUSSION

As a preliminary [**9] matter, the Court will address the government's contention that the issue of class certification proceued here has already been decided by Judge Flannery in *Williams*. While there are some facial similarities between plaintiffs' complaint in this case and the complaint in *Williams*, there also are significant differences. Most fundamentally, the gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint in this case is not just that they were subjected to discrimination when they applied for loans and subsidies but that when [**345] they filed complaints with the USDA regarding the alleged discrimination, the USDA failed properly to process and investigate those complaints. By contrast, the basis of plaintiffs' complaint in *Williams* was "the existence of a 'common thread of discrimination in the granting and servicing of loans by FmHA, which is a basic issue that affects all or a significant number of the putative class members.' . . . as well as the fact that they have all suffered the same 'injury' -- that is, denial of credit and loan servicing." See *Williams v. Glickman*, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1683, Civil Action No. 95-1149,

Memorandum Opinion of February 14, 1997 at 12. In *Williams*, Judge Flannery found that the class [**10] was insufficiently defined and that there was no commonality of claims because plaintiffs were "asking the Court to certify a class which would encompass every possible instance of discrimination in connection with the FmHA's making and servicing of loans." Id. at 15. By contrast, the legal and factual issues presented by plaintiffs in this case relate, in the first instance, to the USDA's processing of written complaints of discrimination (or lack thereof), and the class certification questions therefore differ significantly from those addressed in *Williams*.

In order to establish that they are entitled to certification of a class, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that a class exists, that all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been met and that the class falls within at least one of the three categories of Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., *Harman v. Duffey*, 305 U.S. App. D.C. 256, 19 F.3d 1459, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1994); *Franklin v. Barry*, 909 F. Supp. 21, 30 (D.D.C. 1995). The four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) require plaintiffs to demonstrate that (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of [**11] all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Rule 23(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. Plaintiffs claim that they meet all of the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and that a class can be certified pursuant to all three subdivisions of Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules, but they rely primarily on Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3).

Plaintiffs have proposed a number of class definitions with varying degrees of specificity. The original complaint and the four amended complaints that followed define the class rather generally. The parties appear to have briefed the class certification issue on the basis of the Fourth Amended Complaint, but plaintiffs' motion for class certification uses a slightly different definition from the one contained in the Fourth Amended Complaint. Subsequently, plaintiffs sought and were granted leave to file a Fifth Amended Complaint, which contains a third definition of the class. Finally, after oral argument on the issue of class certification, [**12] plaintiffs filed a revised proposed order which has yet another definition of the class. The final proposed class definition is the most specific and responds to many of the concerns raised by the government. The Court therefore will use that definition as the basis for its analysis. The revised proposed order defines the class as follows:

All **African-American farmers** who (1) farmed between January 1, 1983, and February 21, 1997; and (2) applied, during that time period, for participation in a federal farm program with USDA, and as a direct result of a determination by USDA in response to said application, believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race, and subsequently filed a written discrimination complaint with USDA.

Plaintiffs also have proposed three subclasses pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: (1) "**African-American farmers**, who have a file with Defendant, but did not receive a written determination from Defendant in response to their discrimination complaint;" (2) "**African-American farmers**, who have a file with Defendant, who received a written determination from Defendant in response to their discrimination complaint [**13] but said Defendant was not in accordance with the law;" and (3) "**African-American farmers**, who do not have a file with Defendant because their discrimination complaints were destroyed, lost or [**346] thrown away by Defendant." n3 Each subclass must independently meet the standards of Rule 23 class certification. Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 326 U.S. App. D.C. 17, 117 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

n3 The "file" referred to in the subclass definitions apparently is a file that is maintained by the USDA when a **farmer** submits an administrative discrimination complaint. The file presumably includes the complaint, the investigation and any resolution of the complaint.

A. Existence of Class

Although Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not specifically require plaintiffs to establish that a class exists, this is a common-sense requirement and courts routinely require it. See, e.g., Franklin v. Barry, 909 F. Supp. at 30; Lewis v. Nat'l Football League, 146 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.D.C. [**14] 1992). The requirement that a class be clearly defined is designed primarily to help the trial court manage the class. See Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d at 1471. It is not designed to be a particularly stringent test, but plaintiffs must at least be able to establish that "the general outlines of the membership of the class are determinable at the outset of the litigation." 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1760 at 118. In other words, the class must be

sufficiently definite "that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member." Id. at 121. The government contends that plaintiffs have failed to meet this basic requirement because, as in Williams, the definition of the class are so amorphous that it is impossible to determine who is or is not a member of the class.

The Court concludes that the parameters of the proposed class as defined by plaintiffs in this case are sufficiently clear to make the proposed class administratively manageable; by looking at the class definition, counsel and putative class members can easily ascertain whether they are members of the [**15] class. The class is limited in three ways. First, the class is limited to **African-American farmers** who were farming at some point during the time period between January 1, 1983 and February 21, 1997. Second, the class is limited to **farmers** who applied during that same time period for participation in federal farm programs with the USDA. Finally, the class is limited to **farmers** who filed written discrimination complaints with the USDA as a result of the USDA's response to their applications for participation in the farm programs. While plaintiffs' proposed class definition does not specify the time frame within which a **farmer** must have filed a written complaint with the USDA, plaintiffs made clear at oral argument that in order to be a member of the class, a **farmer** must have filed a written complaint of discrimination with the USDA in the time period between January 1, 1983 and February 21, 1997. The Court therefore will incorporate that time limitation into the proposed class definition.

The Court also finds that the proposed subclasses are sufficiently well-defined to make the subclasses administratively feasible and that the creation of subclasses will facilitate more focused discovery, [**16] a more orderly trial, and potentially a more refined approach to mediation and settlement. See Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 378 (2d Cir. 1997). Subclass 1 includes any member of the class who has a file with the USDA, but who never received a written response to his or her complaint of discrimination. The parameters of this subclass are clear, and it does not appear that there will be any difficulty identifying members of this subclass.

Subclass 2 includes any member of the class who has a file with the USDA, who received a written determination in response to his or her complaint of discrimination, but who claims that the determination by the USDA was not in accordance with law. n4 The [**347] government contends that trying to determine whether a **farmer** is a member of this subclass will require an individualized determination with respect to the merits of the individual's claim that his or her

complaint of discrimination was not adequately processed or investigated and thus undermines the utility of the class action vehicle. See *Hagen v. City of Winnemucca*, 108 F.R.D. 61, 63 (D.Nev. 1985) (proposed class definition of "all persons whose constitutional rights have been [**17] . . . are or may be violated by [city's unwritten prostitution policy]" . . . is insufficient, in that it would require the court to determine whether a person's constitutional rights had actually been violated in order to determine whether that person was a class member"); *Williams v. Glickman*, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1683, Civil Action No. 95-1149, Memorandum Opinion of Feb. 14, 1997 at 8-9.

n4 Plaintiffs' proposed definition for Subclass 2 defines it as all **African American farmers** who have a file with the USDA and "who received a written determination from Defendant in response to their discrimination complaint but said *Defendant* was not in accordance with the law." See Revised Proposed Order (emphasis added). It would appear to be more manageable to define the subclass in terms of whether the *determination* issued by the USDA was in accordance with law rather than whether the USDA was in accordance with the law, and the Court therefore will use that as the definition.

While Subclass 2 as defined by plaintiffs may require [**18] individualized determinations, a slight modification to the definition of the subclass will correct the problem. The subclass is framed primarily by two objective criteria and one subjective criterion. The two objective criteria are: (1) membership in the class, and (2) a determination from USDA with respect to the written complaint of discrimination. The third criterion for membership in the subclass is that the determination issued by the USDA "was not in accordance with the law." The problem with this criterion, as the government suggests, is that it either requires the Court to make an individualized finding with respect to whether each determination issued by the USDA was in accordance with law before the individual can be considered a member of the subclass or it requires the Court to assume that the USDA is liable and did not act in accordance with law when it made any determination with respect to a written complaint of discrimination. The problem is avoided simply by modifying the third criterion for membership in Subclass 2 to include those "who maintain that the written determination from Defendant was not reached in accordance with law." Redefining the third criterion in [**19] this way removes any need for the Court either to make an individualized merits inquiry

or to assume the liability of the USDA in order to determine whether a person belongs to the subclass.

Subclass 3 is comprised of any member of the class who does not have a file with the USDA because his or her complaint never was processed. Of all of the proposed subclasses, the members of this subclass probably will be most difficult to identify, since the USDA has not maintained a file on them. Nonetheless, this subclass is sufficiently well-defined to identify its members at least for the liability stage of the litigation. Membership in the subclass is limited to persons who are members of the class, and to be a class member a **farmer** must establish that he or she filed a written complaint of discrimination with the USDA between January 1, 1983 and February 21, 1997. Although as a practical matter persons without a file may have a more difficult time establishing their membership in the class than will the members of the other two subclasses for whom there is a paper trail within the USDA, the Court nevertheless finds that the parameters of the subclass, as limited by membership in the class, [**20] are sufficiently well-defined.

B. Rule 23(a) Prerequisites

1. Numerosity

The class and all three subclasses are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. See Rule 23(a)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. Plaintiffs estimate that there are approximately 2500 members of the class. The government disputes this number and contends that plaintiffs are only speculating about the exact number of class members. Gov'ts Opp. at 21. Mere conjecture, without more, is insufficient to establish numerosity, but plaintiffs do not have to provide an exact number of putative class members in order to satisfy the numerosity requirement. See, e.g., *Marciel v. Coronet Ins. Co.*, 880 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1989); *Franklin v. Barry*, 909 F. Supp. at 29. This is especially true where plaintiffs allege that it is the USDA's actions of destroying complaints that has led to plaintiffs' inability to provide a more precise number. The Court therefore concludes that the numbers provided by plaintiffs sufficiently establish numerosity.

[*348] Plaintiffs have provided the names of four hundred and one named plaintiffs who they claim fall within the class definition. That alone is sufficient to establish [**21] numerosity, especially where the class members are located in different states. See, e.g., *Markham v. White*, 171 F.R.D. 217, 221 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (class of 35 to 40 plaintiffs sufficient to satisfy numerosity where class members resided in different states). In addition, for all of the named plaintiffs, it is not mere conjecture to assume that there are more people who have not yet been identified who will emerge. The

sheer number of amended complaints filed in this case is a result of the fact that more plaintiffs keep coming forward. It simply is not manageable to require plaintiffs to keep filing amended complaints to add the names of more plaintiffs.

Since plaintiffs have sufficiently established numerosity with respect to the class as a whole, the subclasses also are sufficiently numerous. The only subclass about which there is any serious question with respect to the numerosity requirement is Subclass 2, and plaintiffs appear to acknowledge that there are fewer members of this subclass than the other two subclasses. See Transcript at 38, 40 ("the Government gave them a decision which there's a few of them"). While there may not be as many members of Subclass 2 as there [**22] are members of the other subclasses, there appear to be a sufficient number of members of this subclass and the issues presented by this subclass are sufficiently distinct to warrant making this a separate subclass.

2. Commonality

Plaintiffs also have established that there are questions of law and fact with respect to liability that are common to the class. See Rule 23(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P. Plaintiffs allege that the USDA failed properly to process each class member's complaint of discrimination. For purposes of determining liability, the same factual and legal issues arise: (1) Did the USDA have a legal obligation to process and investigate complaints of discrimination that it received? (2) If the USDA had such a duty, was there a systemic failure properly to process complaints in the specified time period? (3) If there was such a systemic failure, do plaintiffs have a private cause of action against the USDA? (4) Does the government have a legitimate statute of limitations defense to the claims asserted by plaintiffs? These shared issues are more than sufficient to meet the commonality prerequisite. See *Lightbourn v. County of El Paso*, 118 F.3d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 1997) [**23] ("The commonality test is met where there is at least one issue, the resolution of which will affect all or a significant number of the putative class members", *cert. denied*, 139 L. Ed. 2d 643, 118 S. Ct. 700 (1998)).

The government contends that the factual and legal issues presented by each putative class member are distinct on two levels. First, the government contends that while some of the putative class members allege that they received no response from the USDA after they filed their discrimination complaints, other putative class members received findings of no discrimination from the USDA and still others received findings of discrimination. The government contends that the basis of the claims of each of these groups is distinct, and they therefore argue that the class action mechanism is

inappropriate. The claims of these three different groups do present slightly different issues, but the class action rule does not require commonality on every fact or every issue, *Franklin v. Barry*, 909 F. Supp. at 30, and the Court finds that there is sufficient similarity in the claims presented by class members that the differences that do exist are best addressed through the [**24] subclass mechanism rather than by abandoning the class mechanism altogether.

The government also argues that the "underlying question here is whether or not discrimination occurred in the credit and crop subsidy transactions that each class member is alleged to have participated in . . . [Putative class members] seek redress for the discrimination that occurred in any form or any variety of forms in the transactions that the class members participated in with their local offices." Transcript at 20-21. For instance, one class member may have filed a discrimination complaint with the USDA after the County Commission in Yazoo County, Mississippi delayed his FSA [**349] emergency disaster loan, while another class member may have filed a discrimination complaint with the USDA with respect to the denial of an emergency disaster payment in Greene County, Alabama, and a third class member may have filed a discrimination complaint with the USDA after he received a lower crop subsidy through the ASCS program than he thought he was entitled to receive. The government argues that because plaintiffs have failed to identify a particular practice or policy of discrimination in the USDA that is common [**25] to all class members, there is no commonality to their claims.

The government overlooks the central fact that the unifying pattern of discrimination at issue in this case is the USDA's failure properly to process complaints of discrimination, without regard to the program that triggered the discrimination complaint. Plaintiffs' primary complaint is a pattern of "systemic racial discrimination by the USDA based upon their fraudulent act in 1983 - the disbanding of the USDA civil rights enforcement office - and the fourteen years following that fraudulent act . . . Defendant's wrongful act in 1983 and continuing wrong from 1983 to 1997 created, for each Plaintiff, the circumstances that lead to each Plaintiff's claim." Plaintiffs' Reply at 6, 8. The damage caused by the USDA's alleged failure to properly process the discrimination complaints may vary according to whether a class member actually was subjected to discrimination in the process of applying for a USDA program and according to the program about which he or she complained. But for purposes of liability, class members uniformly present the issue of whether the USDA, for all intents and purposes, disbanded its civil rights [**26] office in 1983 and failed, in the fourteen

years that followed, properly to process written complaints of discrimination or to process them at all. n5

n5 The government contends that an allegation that class-wide racial discrimination has occurred is insufficient by itself to establish the right to proceed as a class action. See *General Telephone Co. v. Falcon*, 457 U.S. 147, 157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 740, 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982). Plaintiffs have alleged not just class-wide racial discrimination, but that the USDA for a period of fourteen years systematically failed to properly process written complaints of discrimination filed by African American farmers. It is the allegation of that discriminatory practice that defines this class and that entitles plaintiffs to class certification.

The claims of the members of Subclasses 1 and 3 present common issues of law and fact. The members of Subclass 2 present slightly different issues depending on whether the USDA denied them relief or granted them relief that they maintain [**27] was insufficient, but all of the members of that subclass share a common issue in addition to those shared by all class members: whether the fact that the USDA responded to their complaints precludes relief. The Court therefore finds that each subclass presents common issues of law and fact.

3. Typicality

Plaintiffs also have established that the claims of the class representatives are typical of those of the class. See Rule 23(a)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. The typicality prerequisite is "intended to assess whether the action can be efficiently maintained as a class and whether the named plaintiffs have incentives that align with those of the absent class members so as to assure that the absentees' interests will be fairly represented." *Baby Neal* for and by *Kanter v. Casey*, 43 F.3d 48, 57 (3d Cir. 1994). It is satisfied if each class member's claim arises from the same course of events that led to the claims of the representative parties and each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant's liability. *Id.* at 58; *Marisol A. v. Giuliani*, 126 F.3d at 376; *Johns v. Ruzet*, 141 F.R.D. 211, 216 (D.D.C. 1992). Plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint contains [**28] four hundred and one named plaintiffs. As discussed *supra* at 15-16, the claims of all class members arise from the USDA's alleged dismantling of its civil rights office and its subsequent failure to process discrimination complaints, the same event, practice and course of conduct that give rise to the claims of the four hundred and one representative plaintiffs.

The government contends that the claims of only three of the named plaintiffs are described in detail in the complaint and that the claims of Mr. Pigford in particular are not typical or representative of the claims of [**350] other putative class members because he previously has filed his claims in this Court, and his claims therefore may be barred on *res judicata* grounds. Since this is the second complaint filed by Mr. Pigford, the government indeed may be able to assert defenses to his claims that it could not assert against other members of the class. Moreover, upon review of the Fifth Amended Complaint, it appears that plaintiffs have not provided a detailed description of the claims of a representative of each subclass as defined in this Opinion. Because the Fifth Amended Complaint includes four hundred and one named [**29] plaintiffs who cover the spectrum of claims and interests that may be presented by the class, however, it is not too much to assume that this deficiency can be easily remedied. In order to provide greater precision and clarity as the legal and factual issues presented by each subclass are briefed and eventually tried or settled, plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint detailing the claims of at least four typical representatives of each subclass.

4. Adequacy of Representation

The final element of Rule 23(a) necessitates an inquiry into the adequacy of representation, including the quality of class counsel, any disparity of interest between class representatives and members of the class, communication between class counsel and the class and the overall context of the litigation. *Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia*, 117 F.3d at 575. The Court finds that class counsel and the representative class members adequately will represent the interests of the class.

First, Mr. Alexander Pires and Mr. Phillip Fraas as lead counsel and Mr. J.J. Chestnut, Mr. Othello Cross, Mr. T. Roe Frazer, Mr. Hubbard T. Saunders, IV, Mr. Gerald Lear and Mr. James Myart, Jr., all serving as of counsel, [**30] have demonstrated that they will advocate vigorously for the interests of the class. Class counsel represent a breadth of geographic coverage: they are associated with firms from Washington D.C.; Jackson, Mississippi; Selma, Alabama; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; and Arlington, Virginia. Moreover, there has been no suggestion that class counsel has not communicated with members of the class nor, given the large number of plaintiffs who have attended each hearing, could there be any such suggestion.

Second, the Court finds that there is no disparity of interest between the representative parties and members of the class as a whole. The fact that there are over four hundred named plaintiffs representing a breadth of situations and interests provides assurance that the

interests of all class members are fairly represented. To the extent that the lack of detail in the complaint with respect to particular named plaintiffs' factual situations presents a concern, that concern will be allayed when plaintiffs file a further amended complaint detailing the facts of four representatives of each subclass. See supra at 18.

Finally, the overall context of this litigation demonstrates the extent to which counsel in this case and the represented parties have worked together. At the time the original complaint was filed, only Mr. Pires and Mr. Fraas were involved. Shortly thereafter, a number of attorneys from other states moved to intervene on behalf of their clients. All of the motions to intervene now have been withdrawn, and the lawyers who filed the motions now are of counsel, working closely and in tandem with lead counsel. All (or most) have attended each hearing and, as appropriate, have participated actively. With the addition of these lawyers, it is clear that class counsel represent the spectrum of interests of the various class members.

C. Rule 23(b) Prerequisites

While plaintiffs believe they satisfy each of the subparts of Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court concludes that the class is most appropriately certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). See Rule 23(b)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P. ("the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate find injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole"). Civil rights actions frequently are certified under Rule 23(b)(2), and in fact the provision was added specifically to ensure that there was a mechanism for certifying classes in civil rights cases. See 7A *CITIZENS ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE* § 1776 at 495; *Eubanks v. Billington*, 324 U.S. App. D.C. 41, 110 F.3d 87, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

The government contends that plaintiffs primarily are seeking monetary rather than equitable relief and that the class therefore cannot properly be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). Plaintiffs certainly are seeking money damages. The mere fact that plaintiffs are seeking monetary relief in addition to injunctive and declaratory relief, however, does not preclude class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). "at least where the monetary relief does not predominate." *Eubanks v. Billington*, 110 F.3d at 92. Plaintiffs seek a variety of injunctive and declaratory remedies: they seek, *inter alia*, a declaratory judgment defining "the rights of plaintiffs and class members under defendant's farm programs including their right to equal credit, participation in farm programs,

and their right to full and timely enforcement of racial discrimination complaints," and an injunction reversing as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and contrary to law defendant's acts of denying class members credit and other benefits. See Fifth Amended Complaint at 90-94. While plaintiffs also seek monetary relief for the alleged acts of discrimination, the requested injunctive and declaratory relief, if granted, would have a significant impact on how the USDA processes its complaints and how it handles discrimination complaints currently proceeding through the administrative mechanism.

In addition, it is appropriate to certify this class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) because it is being certified only for purposes of determining liability. If liability is found and the case reaches the remedy stage, the Court will have to determine the most appropriate mechanism for determining remedy. It is possible that at that point it would be appropriate to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) (common questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting individual members and class action is superior method for adjudication of controversy). See *Eubanks v. Billington*, 110 F.3d at 96 (in class action seeking both injunctive and monetary relief, court may adopt a "hybrid" approach and certify (b)(2) class as to claims for injunctive or declaratory relief and certify (b)(3) class at monetary relief stage). For the purposes of determining liability, however, the Court will certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

D. Notice and Opt-Out Provisions

While Rule 23 does not specifically provide for notice and opt-out rights when a class is certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), the Court in its discretion may require plaintiffs to provide notice to all class members and may provide an opportunity for class members to opt out of the class. See Rule 23(d)(5), Fed. R. Civ. P.; *Thomas v. Albright*, 139 F.3d 227, 234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1998), *petition for cert. filed*, 67 U.S.L.W. 3156 (U.S. Aug. 24, 1998) (No. 98-326); *Eubanks v. Billington*, 110 F.3d at 96.

Plaintiffs in their proposed order suggest that the Court order that notice be given to all class members to inform them of the following: i) the conditions to be met for inclusion into the class; ii) the conditions resulting in the exclusion of certain individuals from the class; iii) the alternatives to joining the class; iv) the date, time and place of hearings to be held with regard to this matter; and v) the benefits and consequences derived from joining the class." Proposed Order at 3. Since the USDA has an administrative system to process complaints of discrimination that some class members may want to use, some form of notice and opt-outs

provisions may be appropriate in this case. The parties therefore shall jointly submit a draft notice.

An Order consistent with this Opinion shall be issued this same day.

SO ORDERED.

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

United States District Judge

DATE: 10/9/98

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the Opinion issued this same day, the Court finds that plaintiffs have established that they meet the prerequisites for class certification of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that plaintiffs have established that the [*352] class properly is certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for class certification is GRANTED; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that a class is CERTIFIED for purposes of determining liability; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that [**36] the class is defined as follows:

All **African-American farmers** who (1) farmed between January 1, 1983, and February 21, 1997; and (2) applied, during that time period, for participation in a federal farm program with USDA, and as a direct result of a determination by USDA in response to said application, believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race, and filed a written discrimination complaint with USDA in that time period.

it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the above class is divided into three subclasses, defined as follows:

Subclass I: **African-American farmers**, who have a file with Defendant, but did not receive a written determination from Defendant in response to their discrimination complaint;

Subclass II: **African-American farmers**, who have a file with Defendant, who received a written determination from Defendant in response to their discrimination complaint but who maintain that the written determination from Defendant was not reached in accordance with law; and

Subclass III: **African-American farmers**, who do not have a file with Defendant because their discrimination complaints were destroyed, lost or thrown away by Defendant.

[**37]

it is

FURTHER ORDERED that by October 23, 1998, plaintiffs shall file a further amended complaint detailing the claims of four typical representatives of each subclass; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall jointly file a draft notice to class members by October 30, 1998.

SO ORDERED.

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

United States District Judge

DATE: 10/9/98

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Burrell, you're recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS BURRELL, FARMER

Mr. BURRELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My name is Thomas Burrell. I'm the President of the Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association, Inc. I'm a past farmer and son of a lifelong farmer and a grandson of farmers as well.

To the Honorable Members of the United States House of Representatives, Chairman James Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member John Conyers and Constitution Subcommittee Chairman Steve Chabot, Honorable Bobby Scott, Ranking Member on the House Judiciary Committee Constitution Subcommittee, on behalf of the Black Farmers and Agriculturalist Association board of directors, State presidents, members of BFAA, the thousands of black farmers denied relief under the flawed *Pigford* Consent Decree, track A and track B, 70,000 black farmers designated as late filers, the thousands of potential class members and their heirs and the new black farmers class action lawsuit, we thank you for giving us this opportunity to be heard this date.

I would like to start my discussion relative to the invitation that I received, sir, and that was to talk about the notice provision of the Consent Decree; and in my opinion, by derivation, that would then lead us to paragraph 4 of the Consent Decree. And in paragraph 4, as Ms. Finegan made reference to, the Facilitator, it is our understanding as is expressed in this Consent Decree, was required to notify farmers.

And I am sure you would appreciate the fact that in the last Committee hearings, you heard comments from individuals. You have heard comments this morning. But one of the things that we have not, and I'm waiting to hear is not why so much black farmers or the mystery that people seem to ascribe to the fact that black farmers did not react. The mystery is simple. They simply were not notified.

One of the things that I think was missing as well is an understanding of the fact that black farmers are notified about opportunities basically the same way white farmers are notified. And that is if John Deere or Case International was going to sell a new tractor, Case is going to use the same advertisement to white farmers that they are going to use to black farmers. They call the magazines. They listen to the dealers in that area.

Black farmers purchase equipment the same way and buy their seeds the same way. Therefore, if you're going to notify them about any other opportunity, you do it the same way you notify white farmers. You notify them through their local newspapers. You talk to them through their local radio stations.

We are somewhat dismayed that in an attempt to notify black farmers in 18 States in the South, you use media who are not culturally and occupationally attuned to those farmers. When John Deere gets ready to sell a combine to a white farmer, they don't call the *Wall Street Journal* or *Newsweek*. Advertising is cultural and it is also, shall we say, occupational oriented.

Black farmers, here again, most of them do not have access to cable television, as was referenced in the notice. To those elderly

black farmers who do not read in the first place, advertising and notice in Jet Magazine or Ebony is not sufficient.

More importantly, in my close, sir, I would like to state we are prepared to answer not only why black farmers were not notified, but to give some reason why we think they were not. And if I might, the sad thing about it, USDA admitted and recognized that there were over a million black farmers in 1920. In 1982, they recognized that there were roughly 18,000. As my grandmother would say, you get rid of some in the wash and you get rid of the others in the rinse. In my opinion and the opinion of this organization, USDA has gotten ridden of 982,000 black farmers in the wash and this lawsuit is designed to get rid of the remaining 18,000 in the rinse.

This lawsuit, in my opinion, and the advertisement was never intended to notify black farmers. The advertisement was inadequate, it was arbitrary, and it really never had an issue of notifying black farmers. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burrell follows:]



THE TRAGEDY OF EXCLUSION

BLACK FARMERS

THEY WERE NOT NOTIFIED

THEY WERE DOUBLEY BETRAYED

ORAL AND WRITTEN TESTIMONY

OF

THOMAS BURRELL

PRESIDENT

**BLACK FARMERS AND AGRICULTURALISTS
ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED (TM)**

TO

**THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
CONSTITUTION SUBCOMMTTEE
HONORABLE STEVE CHABOT, CHAIRMAN
"NOTICE PROVISIONS OF PIGFORD V. VENEMAN"**

November 18, 2004

THE TRAGEDY OF EXCLUSION
BLACK FARMERS
THEY WERE NOT NOTIFIED
THEY WERE DOUBLY BETRAYED

ORAL AND WRITTEN TESTIMONY

OF

THOMAS BURRELL

PRESIDENT

BLACK FARMERS AND AGRICULTURALISTS ASSOCIATION,
INC. TM

TO

THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
CONSTITUTION SUBCOMMITTEE

“NOTICE PROVISIONS OF PIGFORD V. VENEMAN”

NOVEMBER 18, 2004

TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CHAIRMAN JAMES
SENSENBRENNER, RANKING MEMBER JOHN CONYERS, AND
CONSTITUTION SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN STEVE CHABOT,
HONORABLE BOBBY SCOTT, RANKING MEMBER AND THE HOUSE

JUDICIARY COMMITTEE AND CONSTITUTION SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS , ON BEHALF OF THE BFAA., INC. BOARD OF DIRECTORS, BFAA, INC. STATE PRESIDENTS, MEMBERS OF BFAA, INC, THE THOUSANDS OF BLACK FARMERS DENIED RELIEF UNDER THE FLAWED *PIGFORD* CONSENT DECREE, TRACTS A & B, THE 70,000 BLACK FARMERS DESIGNATED AS LATE FILERS, THE THOUSANDS OF POTENTIAL CLASS MEMBERS AND THEIR HEIRS IN THE NEW BLACK FARMERS CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT FILED LAST MONTH, BFAA, INC., ET AL V. VENEMAN, ET AL., WE, RESPECTFULLY, WANT TO THANK EACH AND EVERY ONE OF YOU FOR YOUR OBVIOUSLY SINCERE EFFORTS TO MAKE RIGHT THE WRONGS PERPETRATED BY THE USDA, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND OUR OWN CLASS COUNSEL, AL. PIRES, AGAINST BLACK FARMERS ACROSS THIS COUNTRY.

BEFORE GOING FORWARD, HOWEVER, WE WOULD BE REMISS IF WE DO NOT ADDRESS THE INTRODUCTORY STATEMENTS MADE BY THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN CHABOT AND OTHER COMMITTEE MEMBERS AT THE INITIATION OF THESE HEARINGS ON SEPTEMBER 28, 2004. MR. CHAIRMAN, YOUR COMMENTS WERE NOTHING SHORT OF MAGNIFICANT, SUBSTANTIVE AND SENSITIVE TO THE ISSUES FACING NOT ONLY BLACK FARMERS, BUT ALSO ALL AMERICANS, REGARDLESS OF RACE, COLOR, CREED, NATIONAL ORIGIN OR PREVIOUS CONDITION OF SERVITUDE, WHO DESERVE, WITHOUT DOUBT, THE PROMISES AND PROTECTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. MR. CHAIRMAN, WE HAVE NOT HEARD OR READ A MORE PROFOUND CIVIL RIGHTS STATEMENT SINCE THE MID-SIXTIES. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT BFAA, INC. HAS ADOPTED YOUR INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT AS

OUR THEME FOR JUSTICE! MR. SCOTT, SIR, WITHOUT YOUR COMMITMENT TO A SMALL GROUP OF BLACK FARMERS IN RICHMOND, VA. ALMOST A YEAR AGO TO THE DAY, THESE HEARINGS WOULD NOT HAVE MATERIALIZED. MR. SCOTT, YOU MADE YOUR INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT IN RICHMOND WHEN YOU SAID, "I INTEND TO CALL FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF PIGFORD BY THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE." AND HERE WE ARE, TODAY. THANK YOU, SIR.

THE OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OF ALL THE SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS IN THE SEPTEMBER 28TH HEARING SENT A RESOUNDING, VIBRATING MESSAGE ACROSS THIS COUNTRY, A STRONG MESSAGE HEARD BY THE USDA, THE DOJ, THE COURTS, CLASS COUNSEL, BLACK FARMERS AND ALL AMERICANS. THE MESSAGE IS – REGARDLESS OF PARTY – THE CONGRESS WILL NOT TOLERATE THIS CONTINUING INJUSTICE, OPPRESSION, DEPRIVATION AND DEGRADATION AGAINST BLACK FARMERS OR ANY OTHER SEGMENT OF THIS OUR FREE SOCIETY.

WHILE WE ARE KEENLY AWARE THAT THIS SUBCOMMITTEE IS EXPLORING THE FAILURES OF THE PIGFORD CONSENT DECREE AND MORE SPECIFICALLY, PARAGRAPH FOUR, THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF THE PIGFORD CONSENT DECREE, WE FEEL COMPELLED TO PRESENT TO YOU EVIDENCE THAT THE PROBLEM –THE BLACK FARMER / USDA SAGA - IS FAR MORE IN DEPTH AND PERVASIVE THAN THE USDA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND USDA ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS VERNON PARKER WOULD WANT YOU TO KNOW.

MY TESTIMONY, THEREFOR, IS DIVIDED IN TO TWO PARTS. PART ONE IS MY ORAL TESTIMONY AND PART TWO IS MY

WRITTEN TESTIMONY. THE WRITTEN TESTIMONY IS ATTACHED HERE, AND WE RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT THE WRITTEN TESTIMONY BE PLACED INTO THE RECORD.

ORAL TESTIMONY

A. THE DISTRICT OF CLOUMBIA APPEALLET COURT CAPTURED, MORE SUCCUNCTLY THAN ANYONE ELSE, THE PROBLEM WITH THE PIGFORD LAWSUIT WHEN IT SAID, BLACK FARMERS HAVE BEEN THE VICTIMS OF DOUBLE BETRAYAL – FIRST BY THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND THEN BY THEIR OWN LAWYERS. THIS STATEMENT CRYSTALIZES ALL THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE FACED IN THE LAST FORTY YEARS UP TO TODAY. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THIS BETRAYAL CAN BE TRACED THROUGH THE ENTIRE PIGFORD PROCESS. 1. THE DOJ, USDA AND CLASS COUNSEL NEGOTIATED A SETTLEMENT, THE CONSENT DECREE, IN A BACK ROOM IN WHICH THERE WAS NO BLACK FARMERS PRESENT. WE THINK THIS WAS BY DESIGN NOT BY ACCIDENT OR INNOCENT OVERSIGHT. WE WERE NOT INVITED TO OUR OWN DEMISE.

2. THE DOJ, USDA AND CLASS COUNSEL NEGLECTED TO GIVE DIRECT NOTICE TO BLACK FARMER CUSTOMERS, NAMES , ADDRESSES AND PHONE NUMBERS MAINTAINED BY THE FARM SERVICE AGENCY AND THE CENTRAL RECORDS OFFICE IN ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI.

3. THE NOTICE JOB WAS FARMED OUT TO A COMPANY THAT DID NOT KNOW OR COMPLETELY MISUNDERSTOOD THE COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE IN AMERICA'S BLACK COMMUNITIES, THE CHURCHES, BLACK REGIONAL AND LOCAL

NEWSPAPERS AND BLACK RADIO. MILLIONS OF DOLLARS WERE SPENT THAT RENDERED LITTLE RESULT AS EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT THERE WERE MORE THAN 70,000 LATE FILERS.

4. CLASS COUNSEL CONFUSED MANY BLACK FARMERS BY HAVING VERY YOUNG STUDENTS FILL OUT THE CLAIM FORMS AND BY MIS-INFORMING BLACK FARMERS THAT TRACT A WAS AUTOMATIC AND STATEMENTS LIKE, YOU WOULD BE A FOOL TO OPT BECAUSE GOING TRACT A IS LIKE TAKING CANDY FROM A BABY.

5. CLASS COUNSEL, EVEN AFTER THE POOR NOTICE, SET UP A ONE-ON-ONE CLAIM STRUCTURE THAT REQUIRED THE BLACK FARMER TO PROVIDE THE NAME OF A SIMILARLY WHITE FARMER.

6. THE DOJ AND CLASS COUNSEL WERE AWARE THAT THE OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS SPENT NEARLY \$600,000 ON GATHERING, ORGANIZING AND BATE STAMPING THOUSANDS OF BLACK FARMERS FILES. YET, THE DOJ NEVER REPORTED THE AVAILABILITY OF THESE FILES TO THE COURT, AND CLASS COUNSEL NEVER PICKED THE FILES UP EVEN AFTER BEING INFORMED AND NOTIFIED THAT THE FILES WERE READY TO BE RETRIEVED.

7. CLASS COUNSEL WAIVED DISCOVERY, DISMISSING EVIDENCE THAT PLAUSIBLY WOULD HAVE HELPED THE BLACK FARMERS, INDIVIDUALLY.

8. EVEN AFTER THOSE THAT WERE NOTIFIED, CLASS COUNSEL APPROVED THE CONSENT DECREE AGREEMENT WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO GET CONSENT OR A CONSENSUS FROM BLACK FARMERS.

9. CLASS COUNSEL IGNORED THE OBJECTIONS OF THOUSANDS OF BLACK FARMERS AT THE FAIRNESS HEARINGS.

10. AND NOW, CLASS COUNSEL IS FIGHTING HIS OWN CLIENTS, AND THE DOJ AND THE USDA ARE HELPING HIM BY OPPOSING EVERY LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE EFFORT TO MAKE RIGHT THE WRONGS THAT THEY ALL KNOW EXISTS.

IN CONCLUSION, WE SEEK THE HELP OF THIS CONSTITUTION SUBCOMMITTEE, IN ITS OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES, TO HELP WITH NEW LEGISLATION THAT WILL MAKE RIGHT THAT WHICH IS WRONG – TO GIVE BLACK FARMERS THE JUSTICE THEY DESERVE AND TO GIVE THE COURTS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO RE-OPEN THE PROCESS SO THAT THE NEW CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT, BFAA, INC, ET AL V. VENEMAN, ET AL. CAN REMEDEY THE FAILURES OF PIGFORD AND TO ALLOW THIS SAD CHAPTER IN OUR DEMOCRACY TO BE BURIED AS IT SHOULD BE.
THANK YOU.

-TOM BURRELL,
PRESIDENT, BFAA, INC.

THE END

WRITTEN TESTIMONY

BELOW

LETTER SENT TO AL PIRES



August 7, 2004

Mr. Alexander Pires, Co-Lead Class Counsel **By FAX , CMRRR & E-MAIL**
Mr. David Frantz, Named Partner
Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires
1818 North 18th Street, NW, Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036

Mr. Philip Frass, Co-Lead Class Counsel **By FAX, CMRRR & E-MAIL**
Hogan and Hartson
555 13th Street, NW
Washington, D.C.

Mr. J. L. Chestnut, Co-Lead Class Counsel **By FAX, CMRRR & E-MAIL**
Chestnut Sanders Sanders Pettaway Campbell and Albright
One Union Street
Selama, Alabama 36702-1290

Mr. Othello Cross
Cross, Kerney and McKissic
PO Box 6606
Pine Bluff, Arkansas 71611

By FAX, CMRRR & E-MAIL

REF: **PIGFORD V. VENEMAN, 97-1978 (PLF); BREWINGTON V. VENEMAN: 98-1693 (PLF): NOTICE OF TERMINATION; Demand for Statement of Attorneys' Fees Amount Paid and Reimbursed Costs with Breakdown by Law Firms**

Gentlemen:

This serves as official notice to you Class and Co-Class Counsel, that, on behalf of the entire, BFAA, Inc. membership, all Pigford prevailing and non-prevailing claimants and late filers denied participation in the lawsuit, approximately 100,000 class members, your services are hereby immediately terminated.

The reasons for the termination include but are not limited to the following:

- (1) Failure to conduct discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the best interest of the class members and to provide the evidence necessary to substantiate their claims when said information was available and discoverable.
- (2) Failure to provide adequate notice to putative class members resulting in approximately 70,000 such individuals being denied access to damages incurred as a result of the USDA's admitted discrimination
- (3) Failure to get consent and permission from named class plaintiffs, or any other class members, before entering into the Pigford Consent Decree, which was opposed by named plaintiffs and representatives of thousands of class members.
- (4) Failure to follow the demands of black farmers and named plaintiffs at the fairness hearing not to approve the Consent Decree.
- (5) Failure to seek forward looking injunctive relief in the Consent Decree as noted by Judge Paul Friedman.

- (6) Failure to provide judicial relief to stop the USDA from continued discrimination as noted by Judge Paul Friedman.
- (7) Entering into an agreement to defend the Consent Decree above the objections and to the detriment of all class members creating an irreversible conflict of interest
- (8) Being sanctioned with monetary penalties by the court for ineffective assistance of counsel and poor performance relating to missed deadlines, etc.
- (9) Being accused by the DC Appellate Court for virtual, near malpractice in the handling of black farmer claims and dual betrayal, with the USDA, of black farmers.
- (10) Entering, on information and belief, into a secret, "confidential settlement agreement," on payment of attorneys fees to you and other co-class counsels, with the Department of Justice attorneys hiding, ostensibly, the amount paid your law firms for representation of the class and not disclosing to your clients the exact amount paid and to whom. Your law firm has refused every single request for public disclosure or disclosures to your clients of how much you and other co-counsels were paid.
- (11) Filing a Motion to Strike the Motion to Modify the Consent Decree, Writ of Mandamus and Request for hearing in direct contravention of a request by nearly 4000 class members not to file and to withdraw the Motion to Strike.
- (12) Failing to file a Motion to Withdraw your opposition to the Motion to Modify after direct conversation between Mr. David Frantz and BFAA, Inc. President Tom Burrell in which Mr. Burrell demanded that you do on behalf of your clients, the class members. Your law firm outright refused the demand and indicated that BFAA members were not class members.
- (13) Ignoring your direct conflict of interest by taking a direct opposite and very public position of your clients' legal interest in violation of the Rules of Professional Ethics and the Disciplinary Rules for Lawyers, federal and state.
- (14) Making public statements to the media in direct conflict of what legal steps your clients have demanded you take in connection with all the recent pleadings filed by your clients in court, etc., etc, etc.
- (15) Failing to institute review and decision time limits on the monitor review process resulting in a two-year extension of the Monitor, to which you agreed with opposing counsel, and resulting in years of delay to prevailing

track B class members whose claims were appealed by either the government or the class members themselves. Said failure has been to the detriment to the prevailing class members in that the funds and injunctive awarded have been delayed to the extent of continuing financial, emotional and physical injury damages.

Your clients, hereby, demand that you prepare and present to them, by pleading to the court, **"NOTICE OF TOTAL AMOUNT OF AND BREAKDOWN OF ATTORNEYS FEES PAID PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL"** within ten (10) days of this letter.

Your clients demand that you file a pleading to the court, **"NOTICE OF TERMINATION BY CLIENTS"**, with a copy of this letter attached, within ten (10) days of this letter.

You are, hereby, noticed that a certified copy of this letter is being forwarded for disciplinary action, to the DC Bar Grievance Committee and to any state bar associations in which all counsel are licensed specifically as complaint of your and all other co-counsels' violations of the Rules of Professional Ethics,

Gentlemen, you have harmed thousands of black farmers by your poor and disgraceful performance, your possible violations of law, and your possible legal mal-practice. The damages are continuing and irreversible.

Finally, we suggest that you forward this letter to your legal malpractice insurance carrier.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas Burrell, President
BFAA, Inc.

C: Judge Paul L. Friedman,
United States District Judge for the District of Columbia
DC Bar Grievance Committee
James W. Myart, Jr., BFAA General Counsel

v.	§ § § § § § § §	98Cy01693 (PLF)
VENEMAN		

**-PETITION, DECLARATION AND RESOLUTION-
FORMAL COMPLAINT OF
ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT AND LEGAL MALPRACTICE
AGAINST AL PIRES, PHIL FRASS AND ALL OTHER CLASS CO-COUNSEL**

WHEREAS, *Pigford v. Veneman* has failed to protect the constitutional and statutory civil rights of over 80,000 Black Farmers;

WHEREAS, *Pigford v. Veneman* has been a dismal failure and failed, according to Judge Paul Friedman, to (1) provide for forward looking injunctive relief to prevent further discrimination as admitted by the USDA in the CRAT Report, (2) structure or restructure the racist county committee system;

WHEREAS, Al Pires' failure to provide for forward looking injunctive relief to prevent further discrimination against black farmers has resulted in the USDA's boldness in dismissing, without justification or legal basis, approximately 3000 black farmer administrative cases;

WHEREAS, the USDA Office of Inspector General, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Environmental Working Group have all released reports delineating continued, unabated discrimination by the USDA against black farmers;

WHEREAS the USDA Office of Inspector General, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Environmental Working Group have suggested collusive efforts by USDA and DOJ officials to undermine civil rights at the USDA, to obstruct justice and to undermine **"the historic civil rights settlement for black farmers"** under *Pigford*;

WHEREAS, the *Pigford* Consent Decree, the settlement of the case, was negotiated by Class Counsel Al Pires, Phil Frass¹ and other co-class counsel and

¹ THIS PETITION AND RESOLUTION APPLIES, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO THE CONLON, FRANZ, PHELAN AND PIRES LAW FIRM, PHIL FRASS AND DAVID FRANTZ, CO-

entered into above the written and verbal objections of named plaintiffs and other Black Farmers, putative members of the class as evidenced in the record of the proceedings;

WHEREAS, Class Counsel Al Pires has committed the following unethical and possible legal malpractice acts:

Failure to conduct discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the best interest of the class members and to provide the evidence necessary to substantiate their claims when said information was available and discoverable;

Failure to provide adequate notice to putative class members resulting in approximately 70,000 such individuals being denied access to damages incurred as a result of the USDA's admitted discrimination;

Failure to get consent and permission from named class plaintiffs, or any other class members, before entering into the **Pigford** Consent Decree, which was opposed by named plaintiffs and representatives of thousands of class members;

Failure to follow the demands of black farmers and named plaintiffs at the fairness hearing not to approve the Consent Decree;

Failure to seek forward-looking injunctive relief in the Consent Decree as noted by Judge Paul Friedman;

Failure to provide judicial relief to stop the USDA from continued discrimination as noted by Judge Paul Friedman;

Entering into an agreement to defend the Consent Decree above the objections and to the detriment of all class members creating an irreversible conflict of interest;

Being sanctioned with monetary penalties by the court for ineffective assistance of counsel and poor performance relating to missed deadlines, etc;

Being accused by the DC Appellate Court for virtual, near malpractice in the handling of black farmer claims and dual betrayal, with the USDA, of black farmers;

LEAD COUNSELS, AND ALL CO-CLASS COUNSEL WHO SIGNED THE PIGFORD CONSENT DECREE AND PARTICIPATED IN THE PIGFORD LAW SUIT TO ITS CONCLUSION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSENT DECREE.

Entering, on information and belief, into a secret, "confidential settlement agreement," on payment of attorneys fees to you and other co-class counsels, with the Department of Justice attorneys hiding, ostensibly, the amount paid your law firms for representation of the class and not disclosing to your clients the exact amount paid and to whom. Your law firm has refused every single request for public disclosure or disclosures to your clients of how much you and other co-counsels were paid;

Filing a Motion to Strike the Motion to Modify the Consent Decree, Writ of Mandamus and Request for hearing in direct contravention of a request by nearly 4000 class members not to file and to withdraw the Motion to Strike;

Failing to file a Motion to Withdraw your opposition to the Motion to Modify after direct conversation between Mr. David Franz and BFAA, Inc. President Tom Burrell in which Mr. Burrell demanded that you do on behalf of your clients, the class members. Your law firm outright refused the demand and indicated that BFAA members were not class members;

Ignoring your direct conflict of interest by taking a direct opposite and very public position of your clients' legal interest in violation of the Rules of Professional Ethics and the Disciplinary Rules for Lawyers, federal and state;

Making public statements to the media in direct conflict of what legal steps your clients have demanded you take in connection with all the recent pleadings filed by your clients in court, etc., etc., etc.;

Failing to institute review and decision time limits on the monitor review process resulting in a two-year extension of the Monitor, to which you agreed with opposing counsel, and resulting in years of delay to prevailing track B class members whose claims were appealed by either the government or the class members themselves. Said failure has been to the detriment to the prevailing class members in that the funds and injunctive awarded have been delayed to the extent of continuing financial, emotional and physical injury damages;

Ignoring his clients' demand that he prepare and present to them, by pleading to the court, "**NOTICE OF TOTAL AMOUNT OF AND BREAKDOWN OF ATTORNYES FEES PAID PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL**" within ten (10) days of this letter;

Ignoring his clients demand that he file a pleading to the court, "**NOTICE OF TERMINATION BY CLIENTS;**" and,

WHEREAS, Attorneys Charles Ogletree, Harvard School of Law, and Dennis Sweet, Sweet & Freeze, PC, attorneys involved in the negotiation of the Consent

Decree have indicated that they would not sign the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree subsequently approved by Judge Paul Friedman because it was not the final negotiated Consent Decree that was to be presented to the Court for approval. According to Mr. Ogletree and Mr. Sweet, the draft Consent Decree that they had agreed to included stringent time limits on the implementation process, injunctive relief to insure that the USDA could not discriminate against black post **Pigford** and other protections for the Black Farmer Class Members. Mr. Ogletree and Mr. Sweet have stated that, if asked by the Court, each would restate the serious allegations here;

WHEREAS, Al Pires has, in an effort to have our lawyer, James W. Myart, Jr., disbarred and silenced, filed malicious and untrue Texas Bar Association complaints against BFAA, INC. General Counsel James W. Myart, Jr.;

WHEREAS, Al Pires has filed a malicious, unconstitutional Motion to Enjoin James Myart and Tom Burrell from speaking publicly about his mishandling of the Pigford lawsuit;

WHEREAS, Al Pires has maliciously and callously accused BFAA, INC. of fraud, theft and misrepresentation;

WHEREAS, Al Pires has attempted to close down the bfaa.net website, the major vehicle for knowledge and information to Black Farmers;

WHEREAS, Al Pires made, under oath, contradictory statements to and possibly committed perjury during the House Judiciary Committee Constitution Subcommittee on September 28, 2004 dealing with the Implementation of the **Pigford** Consent Decree;

WHEREAS, Al Pires' conduct before the during the House Judiciary Committee Constitution Sub-committee on September 28, 2004 was rude, condescending and unbecoming of an officer of the Court; and

WHEREAS, Judge Paul Friedman, United States District Judge, has written a letter to Mr. Tom Burrell, President, BFAA, INC., indicating that BFAA, INC should file our written complaints against Al Pires and other class counsel with the DC Bar Grievance and Disciplinary Committees,

NOW THEREFOR BE IT RESOLVED that we, the undersigned, individually and collectively do, hereby and by copy hereof to the appropriate tribunals, file this petition, declaration and resolution as a formal complaint of misconduct by Al Pires and other class counsel as above-stated with the DC Bar Grievance and Disciplinary Committees and any other judicial tribunals provided for in the Local Rules of the United States District Court of Columbia, DC Circuit

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that we authorize and otherwise direct BFAA, INC.'S General Counsel James W. Myart, Jr. to file this file this petition, declaration and resolution in the proceedings of the Pigford matter in order to dispel any notion by the Court or anyone else that we, individually and collectively, do not support the pending Motions to Modify the Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and Emergency Hearing and to Disqualify Counsel;

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that we authorize and otherwise direct BFAA, INC.'S General Counsel James W. Myart, Jr. to file this file this petition, declaration and resolution in the proceedings of the Pigford matter in direct and express opposition to Al Pires' Motion to Enjoin James Myart and Tom Burrell, a motion we assert violates the FIRST AMENDMENT protection of free speech and makes scandalous allegations against James Myart, Tom Burrell, BFAA, INC. and all of us; and

BE IT FURTHER AND FINALLY RESOLVED that we pray the Honorable Judge Paul Friedman issue judgment in favor of the black farmers, to wit:

- (1) Modifying the Consent Decree to insure equity for all black farmers;
- (2) Issuing a Writ of Mandamus against the Ann Veneman, Secretary of Agriculture;
- (3) Referring, pursuant to the DC Local Rules, the matter of Class Counsel's misconduct and possible legal malpractice to the appropriate District of Columbia judicial and bar tribunals;
- (4) Denying the Motion to Enjoin James Myart and Tom Burrell;
- (5) Ordering the establishment of a litigation team to immediately take over the litigation of the entire matter; and
- (6) For other relief to which we may, through counsel, show ourselves entitled.

DECLARANTS, PETITIONERS AND RESOLVERS SAYETH FURTHER NOT

DATED: OCTOBER 9, 2004



CERTIFICATION

I, THOMAS BURRELL, DO HEREBY CERTIFY, UNDER THE PENALTIES OF PERJURY, THAT THE ABOVE PETITION, DECLARATION AND RESOLUTION, FORMAL COMPLAINT OF ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT AND LEGAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST AL PIRES, PHIL FRASS AND ALL OTHER CLASS CO-COUNSEL WAS ACCEPTED BY ACCLAMATION BY THE UNDERSIGNED INDIVIDUAL BLAK FARMERS AND PUTATIVE MEMBERS OF THE PIGFORD v. VENEMAN LAWSUIT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF THE HONORABLE PAUL L. FRIEDMAN IN THE CITY OF BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA on October 9, 2004.

/s/ _____
Thomas Burrell, President
Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association

SIGNATURES ATTACHED IN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

NEWS ARTICLE

Partly cloudy 51°
 5 Day Forecast

THE GREENWOOD
Commonwealth
 Greenwood, Mississippi

NEWS SEARCH
 Advanced search

News Classifieds Today's Print Ads Community Directory Marketplace My Zwire!

Monday, 15 November, 2004 | Home > News > News > Top Stories

Today's Print Ads

News
 Top Stories
 Local News
 Obituaries
 Police/Courts
 Community Calendar
 Weather
 Religion News
 State News
 National News
 Classified Displays

Sports
Opinion
Lifestyle
Classifieds
Links
Community

AT&T CallVantage
 Phone service for broadband

HOW MUCH WILL YOU SAVE
 WITH AT&T CALLVANTAGE SERVICE?
 AVERAGE OF 50% SAVINGS ON INTERNATIONAL CALLS

SELECT UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX DEGREE PROGRAM
 Criminal Justice MBA Business
 Information Technology Health Care Management

Top Stories

Attorney discusses 1999 consent decree and farmers' rights

By: Bob Darden, Staff Writer 11/14/2004

Email to a friend Voice your opinion Printer-friendly

Speaker says not enough black farmers, heirs were notified

Thi In F
 PA
 On Ca
 Clic
 bon
 fr
 Thi
 In F
 TDA

- ▶ **Our Newspaper**
- ▶ **Television**
- ▶ **Sports Wire**
- ▶ **Fun and Games**
- ▶ **Consumer Guide**
- ▶ **Personal Finance**
- ▶ **Lifestyles**

about settlement money

Black farmers and their families from across Mississippi came to the Leflore County Civic Center Saturday to learn about their rights and possible claims of discrimination at the hands of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

The meeting, sponsored by the Black Farmers and Agriculturists Inc. of Memphis, focused on the April 14, 1999 consent decree issued by Judge Paul Friedman in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Advertisement

Under the decree, known as the Pigford decree, black farmers and their heirs who could document discrimination by the Department of Agriculture were awarded settlements of \$50,000 each.

As a result of the decree, a total of 13,000 defendants were awarded monetary damages.

James Myart Jr., the general counsel for the association, said the court's initial settlement was not adequate. He faulted the consent decree for not notifying all black farmers and their heirs throughout the country.

"For black farmers and their heirs, justice is just around the corner," he said. "You all have heard a lot about this lawsuit, the Pigford lawsuit, which was supposed to pay black farmers real money. It has failed."

Myart said problems with the consent decree had little to do with the amount of money actually awarded.

"It's not about money. We've been broke for 300 years. What it is about is respect. What it is about is equality. What it is about is justice. Not just for us, but for everybody," he said.

The association, which has 10,000 members nationwide, has already filed an amended motion to modify the Pigford consent decree, essentially asking that the proceedings start over because the original decree was flawed, Myart said.

He said such a motion is difficult because Friedman would have to rewrite his previous opinion and most judges are eluctant to do that.

If the motion is denied, Myart said he will petition the U.S. Court of Appeals and, if necessary, the U.S. Supreme Court.

"I'm going to look Clarence Thomas right in the eye and tell him on this one, he's got to do the right thing," he said.

Help for black farmers is on the way in the form of a congressional hearing scheduled for Thursday in Washington, where Thomas Burrell, president of the association, will testify before the House Judiciary Committee.

Saturday's meeting was intended to bring farmers and their heirs up to speed and help the case for legal action, Burrell said.

Lack of timely notice from the government is just one problem with the present



consent decree, he said.

"We're not giving you advice. We're giving you information. A lot of people didn't get their money because they didn't know about it."

Congress appropriated about \$3 billion to settle the discrimination claims of black farmers, but most of that money has not been paid out, Burrell said.

"Black folks don't know the lawsuit exists. Probably every white farmer in this county knows about that lawsuit. Black folk don't know anything about it," he said.

Burrell said there were four categories of farmers and their families that are affected by the consent decree:

- Farmers and their heirs who received compensation.
- Farmers and their heirs who were denied compensation.
- "Late filers," which Burrell estimated at around 81,000.
- Those farmers and their heirs not involved in the original lawsuit.

In the decree, the lawsuit was limited to those farmers who were in business from January 1981 through December 1996. People who attempted to farm and their heirs also qualify.

Burrell said under the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution, all black farmers and their heirs, should have been notified of the settlement.

"We're not saying you'll get \$50,000. What we are saying is you ought to have had the chance," he said.

The association has been holding weekend meetings across the country. In January, they will tour Florida, Georgia, North Carolina and Louisiana, Burrell said.

He said the scrutiny the consent decree is receiving from Congress is very encouraging.

"The Constitution is on our side. The Congress is on our side. We think the judge, who is the guardian of the Constitution, is on our side. We're asking him to do what's right," he said.

©Greenwood Commonwealth 2004

[✉ Email to a friend](#) [✉ Voice your opinion](#) [🖨 Printer-friendly](#) [↑ Top](#)



Send us your community news, events, letters to the editor and other suggestions. Now, you can submit birth, wedding and engagement announcements online too!	
Copyright © 1995 - 2004 Zwirner Media, Inc. All Rights Reserved.	
News	Classifieds
Today's Print Ads	Community
Directory	Marketplace
My Zwire!	

OVERVIEW

I. GOVERNMENT MIS-CONDUCT IN BLACK FARMER SAGA APPLIED ACROSS THE BOARD

You should know that the Department of Justice attorneys, lead by Michael Sitcov, Chief, DOJ Federal Programs Branch, representing the Secretary, and the USDA OGC attorneys Nancy Bryson, appointed General Counsel, and J. Michael Kelly, career Deputy General Counsel, have, through their conduct, engaged in a hideous, collusive effort to deny all black farmers, not just those in the **Pigford** class, but also the Black Farmer administrative complainants utilizing, to their detriment, the intentionally ineffective and benign USDA Office of Civil Rights Complaint process as delineated in 7 CFR §§ 2.28, 15.52 et seq., black farmers who have individual lawsuits filed against the Secretary and the putative class members of the **BFAA, INC., et al v. VENEMAN, et al.** Black Farmers Class Action lawsuit which is the exact same lawsuit as **Pigford** except for the time limits, January 1, 1997 thru August 30, 2004, as opposed to the time limit cutoff in **Pigford**, December 31, 2004. Essentially the **BFAA, INC., et al v. VENEMAN, et al.**, and Black Farmer class action law suit picks up where **Pigford** left off. Secretary Ann Veneman, Assistant Secretary Vernon Parker and the Department of Justice and the USDA Office of General attorneys have employed the same conduct to all the non-**Pigford** complainants, USDA administrative complainants, individual Black Farmer Plaintiffs with individual cases pending in federal court, and potential members of the new **BFAA, INC., et al v. VENEMAN, et al.** class members as meticulously described in the [Environmental Working Group](#) report, **“OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE: USDA UNDERMINES HISTORIC CIVIL RIGHTS SETTLEMENT FOR BLACK FARMERS.”** (The same conduct applies to the employee discrimination complainants, literally thousands of

employees who, too, suffer from the intentionally ineffective and benign USDA Office of Civil Rights Complaint process.)

**II. DOJ ATTORNEYS ACCUSED OF OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE:
JUDGE EMMETT SULLIVAN REFERS MATTER TO DC BAR
GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE**

You are advised that the Native-American class action lawsuit, *Keepseagale, et al. v. Veneman*, 99Cv03199, before the Honorable Judge Emmett Sullivan is only one of such law suits precipitated by the Pigford Black Farmer Class Action Law Suit, the other having been filed by Hispanic and Women Americans. The same Class Counsel and DOJ Attorneys, supervised by Mr. Michael Sitcov, Chief, DOJ Federal Programs Branch and other DOJ subordinate lawyers are involved in all such cases. Because of unethical conduct, possible obstruction of Justice and tampering with witnesses, We filed a Motion for Sanctions, against Michael Sitcov. Judge Sullivan, angered by the conduct of Michael Sitcov referred the matter the subject of the Motion for Sanctions to the DC Bar Disciplinary and Grievance Committee.

In our opinion, the DOJ attorneys' conduct complained in the Motion for Sanctions is typical of the same conduct prevalent in the *Pigford, BFAA, inc.*, individual lawsuits, the USDA Office of Civil Rights administrative process and the Office of General Counsel attorneys' historical effort to destroy civil rights at the USDA. Further, the DOJ and OGC attorneys' conduct in *Keepseagale, et al. v. Veneman* is indicative and consistent with that exact conduct described in Environmental Working Group report, "**OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE: USDA UNDERMINES HISTORIC CIVIL RIGHTS SETTLEMENT FOR BLACK FARMERS.**"

**III. GOVERNMENT AND PIGFORD CLASS COUNSEL, TOGETHER,
OPPOSE MOTION TO MODIFY CONSENT DECREEE**

On behalf of thousands of denied **Pigford** Black Farmers, We filed a Motion to Modify the Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and Request for Expedited Ruling on. We subsequently filed an Amended Motion to Modify the Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and Request for Expedited Ruling.

The Department of Justice attorneys filed a Motion to Strike the Motion to Modify the Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and Request for Expedited Ruling.

Additionally, **Pigford** Class Counsel Al Pires filed, to the amazement of his clients and in direct opposition of his clients, a Motion to Strike the Motion and Amended Motion to Modify the Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and Request for Expedited Ruling. **Pigford** class members instructed Class Counsel Al Pires not to object to the Motion or the Amended to Modify the

Consent Decree, Request for Writ of Mandamus and Request for Expedited Ruling. (See FN 6a). Class Counsel Al Pires did not carry through his clients' written, expressed instruction. The **Pigford** class members terminated or attempted to terminate Class Counsel for his arrogant refusal to follow their written expressed instruction and demanded he present the termination letter to Judge Paul Friedman. The letter also demanded that Class Counsel Al Pires file a pleading with the Court detailing the amount of money he and all other co-counsel earned in the **Pigford** case. (See FN 6b) Class Counsel Al Pires refused to do so. (See FN 6c)

Again to the utter dismay of the **Pigford** black farmers, Class Counsel Al Pires then filed a Motion to Enjoin James W. Myart Jr. and **Pigford** complainant Tom Burrell from speaking publicly about his mishandling of the **Pigford** law suit, an arrogant attempt to deny the **Pigford** class members their FIRST AMENDMENT Constitutional rights. That matter is pending before the Court of Judge Paul Friedman.

The **Pigford** class members filed a Motion to Disqualify Class Counsel Al Pires. The Motion is pending before the Court.

Pigford class members were shocked at Class Counsel Al Pires' testimony and conduct before the committee. As a result of Class Counsel Al Pires' testimony and conduct before the committee, the **Pigford** Class Members filed a Motion to Stay all Proceedings in the Court until such time that a transcript of the September 28th Hearing could be presented to the Court to prove contradictions and possible untruths stated, under oath, by Al Pires and to show the court that Al Pires stated that he is not opposed to Modification of the Consent Decree, such testimony being in direct contradiction to his opposition pleadings filed by him in the **Pigford** case. That matter is pending ruling of Judge Paul Friedman as of this writing.

IV. USDA OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS OPERATES UNDER KNOWN CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Assistant Secretary Vernon Parker recently hired Ms Sahdna True, former Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Civil Rights, as the new Director of the Office of Civil Rights above, on information and belief, Ms. Arlean Leland's (Deputy General Counsel for Civil Rights) objection and legal advise that Ms. True had a legal conflict of interest in assuming the role as Director of OCR. The legal conflict of interest arises from the fact that as the Assistant Deputy General Counsel for Civil Rights, Ms. True, charged with defending Secretary Veneman and the Assistant Secretary Parker against every formal and informal discrimination complaint filed, is imputed with knowledge of every single such complaint. As Director of the Office of Civil Rights, Ms. True is now charged with the responsibility of issuing Final Agency Decisions on every complaint of which

she acquired knowledge as a supervising lawyer defending against same. That is an illegal conflict of interest prohibited by law and regulation.

Secretary Veneman and Assistant Secretary Veneman had express knowledge of this conflict of interest over a year ago when Assistant Secretary Parker placed Ms. True in an acting position of Director of the Office of Civil Rights. A Report by the EEOC, The Hayden Report, pointed the conflict out in its statutorily required review of the USDA Office of Civil Rights.

Further, We informed Secretary Veneman and Assistant Secretary Veneman of the obvious conflict of interest when over a year ago; We sent a letter of protest to them outlining in detail the conflict of interest. Unfortunately, my letter was ignored.

V. USDA DELAY IN INDIVIDUAL LAWSUITS

In spite of the major, wholesale criticisms of the USDA as seen in major publications throughout the United States, the USDA continues resisting fair-play and equity for black farmers. Over a year ago, several Black Farmers filed individual law suits against the USDA for continued civil rights violations. The USDA and their government attorneys have yet to even file answers to the law suits; and, in fact, they have employed every legal technicality to delay the judicial process and to avoid sitting down to at least discuss, in mediation, the cases, all such cases raising exactly the same issues as raised in **PIGFORD** and then some. A recent meeting with Assistant Secretary Vernon Parker and his government attorney reveals the exact same kind of bait and switch conduct as related in the Environmental Working Group report, **"OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE: USDA UNDERMINES HISTORIC CIVIL RIGHTS SETTLEMENT FOR BLACK FARMERS."**

VI. NEED FOR AND REQUEST TO EXPAND SCOPE OF HEARING AND CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION

Based on the breadth and depth of the issues relating to Black Farmers:

- A. the continued, unbridled actions of the Department of Justice and US Attorney lawyers representing the United States;
- B. the dubious actions of the Office of General Counsel attorneys Nancy Bryson in possibly interfering with the civil rights of Black Farmers in violation of 42 USC § 1985(3) and committing obstruction of justice with the intent to deny black farmers payment of compensatory damages pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act;

- C. the actions, contradictory testimony and possible perjury of Class Counsel Al Pires;
- D. the intentional non-functioning of the USDA Office of Civil Rights underlying the black farmers request to the Court for issuance of A Writ of Mandamus and the fact that Assistant Secretary Vernon Parker, on or about August 30, 2003, arbitrarily and capriciously dismissed, without legal authority or justification, approximately 3000 administrative complaints of discrimination filed by Black Farmers;
- E. the fact that Department of Justice attorneys Michael Sitcov were referred by federal Judge Emmett Sullivan to the DC Bar Grievance Committee for possibly obstructing justice and tampering with witnesses in the Native-American Class Action Lawsuit, a law suit exactly like, in law and facts, the **PIGFORD** except that the **Kepseegale** law suit involves Native-Americans suffering the same type of discrimination suffered by Black Farmers;
- F. the apparent efforts of the USDA and the DOJ to now delay the swift resolution of the **BFAA, INC., et al v. VENEMAN, et al.** Black Farmers Class Action Lawsuit; and
- G. the recent actions of Secretary Ann Veneman, Assistant Secretary Vernon Parker and US Attorneys representing them to deny individual plaintiffs, Robert and Laverne Williams, Estate of Howard Coats, Connie Grant and family, Dexter and Phyllis Davis, Michael Stovall, George and Phyllis Hilderbrandt, James Dismukes, George Hall, Rodney Bradshaw, or any other black farmer with a individual discrimination lawsuit against the United States any federal district court in the United States as well as any USDA employee. i.e. Ava Marshall of Virginia and M. Mobley of Washington, D.C., who has filed a law suit because of racial discrimination and the failure of the Office of Civil Rights to perform its administrative functions.

VI. CONCLUSION

This appears to be the only appropriate manner in which to conclude my testimony: My conclusion follows:

“Forty acres and a mule” The historical basis of the preceding phrase, the United States government's 19th century **promise** to the Freedmen, the former slaves and their heirs, has a 21st century life, a life laced with government-sanctioned deprivation of our country's cherished civil rights and liberties as delineated in the Bill of Rights (**Wet is well established that the US Constitution Bill of Rights constitute two types of individual protections - civil rights and civil liberties. Civil Rights are those rights that the government is obligated to protect between parties. Civil Liberties are those same exact rights but the government is prohibited from infringing upon. (Citation omitted) The USDA fails, intentionally and with malice, at both.**

The United States, as admitted by its Secretary of Agriculture, Ann Veneman, has systemically and relentlessly exercised despicable and repugnant discrimination against Black Farmers resulting in pain, suffering, distress, land

loss and death to Black Farmers that tried and, today, try to etch out a living on the land in their guaranteed pursuit of life, liberty, happiness and ownership of property. Even more, the United States government and its USDA officials at the very top rung have engaged and continue to engage in an institutional and insidious racism and conspiracy to interfere with the Black American Farmers' civil rights and liberties.

To this day, the *promise* remains elusive for all Black Americans, Black American Farmers and their heirs, merely because of their race, Black.

The racial hatred and animus perpetrated by the USDA, dubbed, "**The Last Plantation**," persist like a plague. USDA officials at the very top rung, through intention, deceit, passivity, inaction and benign neglect, have knowingly allowed and even encouraged top government administrators and lawyers as well as local federal Farm Service Agency officials across this land to trample on the civil rights of the Class Representatives and to make a mockery of our precepts of freedom. USDA officials at the very top rung, individually and jointly, knew or should have known that these blatant violations of law run rampant throughout every single agency in the mammoth USDA, "**The Last Plantation**." USDA officials at the very top rung have admitted their misdeeds and overt violations of law. Yet, they continue their terror against Black Farmers with an indescribable callous disregard, all in the face of judicial, legislative and public scrutiny.

This testimony and the several Black Farmer class action and individual lawsuits is made and have been brought to dispel the notion that the United States government and its USDA officials can further employ a repugnant racial animus in denying any American citizens, in this matter, Black Farmers and their heirs, the benefits of any federal program or activity on the basis of their race, **BLACK**, and to vindicate all the black farmers and their heirs' rights as guaranteed by the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

The Congress and the Courts must act sooner rather than later or black farmers will be an extinct species in this our land of opportunity where the pursuit of happiness equality and freedom for Black Americans, Black Farmers and the heirs of Black Farmers is a distant dream .

Thank you

/S/

Thomas Burrell

DECLARATION:

I declare under the penalties of perjury that the above and foregoing testimony and the facts stated therein or true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

204

DATE: November 16, 2004

/s/ _____

Thomas Burrell

Mr. CHABOT. Ms. Atchison, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF BERNICE ATCHISON, FARMER

Ms. ATCHISON. Mr. Chairman, fellow congressmen and this assembly, I stand before you in humbleness representing more than 700 of my fellow kinsmen in my county alone. I have here—been brought here today to speak on this notice.

As I was secretary for the Alabama Democratic Conference for more than 30 years in our county, I never imagined segregation would still be existing in this day at this time. The question that we are asking in Chilton County is, did Judge Friedman mean to leave this county out by not posting or notifying the black farmers and farm helpers?

While we help produce the products that was raised in this county and shipped to many other States to be sold, we had hoped to be treated fairly. We contacted the USDA of Chilton County and was told that they could not help us.

We immediately wrote certified letters to class counsel and to the Monitor stating that there were no affidavits and that there was no claim packages at the USDA, and they informed us they could not help us. The USDA of Chilton County did not have a copy of the Consent Decree, nor did they have a copy of the stipulation for us to view. It was not published in the county newspaper or it was not a notice sent out in our U.S. agriculture for the extension service here in Chilton County.

We were not notified by mail nor were we given a chance to apply even after we notified class counsel that there were no legal help for us in Chilton County. Many of us were sent denial letters and many were not answered or given a tracking number.

We have been—we have sent packages to inform you and ask that the error be corrected. These packages contain the proof that you needed to know. We know you have received those eight copies because they were sent certified mail. We have called time after time to no avail, beginning in April of 2000 until now, asking and pleading. Many of us are farm helpers, sharecroppers, and some have FMNP numbers as I do, yet you have denied me and many more.

I have lived on the same farm all of my life. I was born in this county in 1938. My mother and father worked hard to secure their own land for their children to inherit. You are now holding me accountable for a late claim affidavit when they were not sent to us as we requested in a timely manner. When we notified you that we had no claims, even your affidavits were not sent to any of our people until after August the 16th, which left only 20 working days, including a Labor Day weekend. Less than 20 days with no affidavit claims for our people or our families who all own farms and none have been notified of the process.

The problem was a USDA and class counsel problem. They defied the judge's order in Chilton County. They did not post. The judge plainly stated it: "t shall be posted or mailed." It was not.

And the USDA did not have a copy of the Decree, of the stipulation on hand for us to view. Without the proper information or instruction, we had no way of knowing what was needed to apply.

I am a farmer who owns 39 acres and a share in another 358 acres of inherited family land. We have proof that we notified both class counsel and the Monitor by certified mail at least in time to bring our problem to their attention.

When I received the response on August 16, 2000, dated August 10, 2000, we had less than 20 working days to respond and only one affidavit to represent all the peoples in our county. This was all that was sent to serve our county.

We have presented the facts to the class counsel and the Monitor and now to you, our fellow Congressmen. We believe these facts to be extraordinary circumstances beyond our control. We now ask and plead that you will rectify the error lest it become a miscarriage of justice.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Atchison follows:]

BERNICE ATCHISON
Testimony before the Constitution Subcommittee
Black Farmer Hearing
November 18, 2004

The question that we are asking in Chilton County is: Did Judge Freedman mean to leave this county out by not posting or notifying the Black Farmers and Farm Helpers?

While we worked to produce and help produce the products that are raised in this county and shipped to many other states to be sold, we had hoped to be treated fairly. We contacted the USDA of Chilton County and were told that they could not help us. We immediately wrote certified letters to class council and to the Monitor stating that there was no Affidavit and there was no claim package at the USDA and they informed us they could not help us. The USDA of Chilton County did not have a copy of the Consent Decree nor the stipulation for us to view. It was not published in County News Paper or the U.S. Agriculture for the extension service here in Chilton County. We were not notified by mail, nor were we given a chance to apply even after we notified Class Council there was no legal help in this county for us.

Many of us were sent denial letters and many were not answered or given a tracking number. We have sent packages to inform you and ask that the error be corrected. These Packages contain proof.

We know you have received them. Eight copies were sent by certified mail and 8 packages. We have called time after time to NO Avail beginning in April of 2000 until now asking, pleading that class council re-certify the error. Many of us own farms in Chilton County. Many are farm helpers, share croppers, and some have FMNP numbers as I do. Yet you have denied me and many more.

I have lived on the same farm all my life. I was born here in 1938. My Mother and Father worked hard to secure their own land for their own children to inherit. You are now holding me accountable for a late claim affidavit when you did not send them to us as we requested. When we notified you that we had no claims even your affidavit was not sent to any of our people until after August 16. That left only 20 working days with the Labor Day weekend in that. Less than 20 days with no affidavit claim for our people or our family who all own farms.

The problem was a USDA and Class Council problem. They defied the Judge order in Chilton County. They did not post, they did not notify by mail. The Judge said plainly: ("IT SHALL BE POSTED OR MAILED") It was not and the USDA did not have a copy of the decree or stipulation for us to view. Without that information or instructions we had no way of knowing what was needed to apply.

I am a farmer who own 39 ac. and 239 Grandfather 80 Grandmother 39 Aunt. We do have the said evidence to prove that we notified by certified mail at least 8 times to make you aware of our problem. When your response on August 10 came on August 16, 2000 we had less than 20 working days to respond and only one affidavit. That was all you sent.

To serve our county

Yours Truly,

Bernice Atchison

www.ewg.org OCT 29 2004

Bernice Atchison (W)
1072 Hwy 191
Orion, Ala 35085
205-688-2715
I Will Come

Dear Congressman

I am a 67 year old woman who file for the Black Farmer Relief we own our own property and we share in several other that you will find noted in these papers of mine and of my son Randall the last 15 years Randall has struggled try to keep our land and his grand father and great grand mother land in tact now he is told his application was receive after the date which proof show from Oct 15 2004 letter they are in error. Not only are they in error they Refuse to send Claim Pack or affidavit after they were requested. There are 10 Certified letters to prove it from my house alone, and there was other sent because I wrote them Note the Certification NO I have the Receipt This County Did not Post and I have proven it that is your extra Ordinary Circumstance USDA and Class Bannele Dajjed the Judge order and Discriminated Against Me and my family
Yours truly Bernice Atchison
Randall Atchison

<http://www.ewg.org/reports/blackfarmers/part1.php>

10/9/2004

October 15, 2004

Office of the Monitor
Claims Facilitator
RE: Letter Date Oct. 12, 2004

As you will note from the information and the receipt copy below we did ask for claim packages they were not sent that is the injustice. The extension was signed July 19 by Judge Freedman we received notice on August 16, 2000 less than 20 working days from Sept. 15, with a holiday Labor Day we returned the notice dated August 10 on the same day we received it August 16 2000 certified mail in it notifying you that there were no claim package nor affidavit in Chilton County. The consent decree nor the stipulation was posted at our USDA at any time.

We were told they could not help us. Proof attached of no posting. How could we get an on time application in when you withheld them? When Class Council failed to publish in our news or send notice by mail. We notified him of the problem and sent him proof asking that the error be corrected in this County to deny us would be an miscarriage of Justice. Proof attached.

Yours Truly

Randall J Atchison Claim Number: 135994
P.O. Box 423
Jemison, Alabama 35085
Farm located 1072 Highway 191 Jemison
FMNP 750

Certified Mail Receipt
7000 0600 0022 7305 8309
7001 1140 0003 0674 7526
7001 1140 0003 0674 7526
7004 1160 0004 4836 5948
7001 1140 0003 0675 0120
0300 1290 0000 9805 5268

*% Black James
% Scripp news
% EGE*

U.S. Postal Service CERTIFIED MAIL RECEIPT <i>(Domestic Mail Only - No Insurance Coverage Provided)</i>	
Postage	\$ 55
Certified Fee	140
Return Receipt Fee (Endorsement Required)	185
Restricted Delivery Fee (Endorsement Required)	
Total Postage & Fees	\$ 280
Recipient's Name (Please Print Clearly) <i>To be completed by mailer</i> Claims Facilitator P.O. Box 4390 Jemison AL 35085-4390	
Signature (Print Name) <i>To be completed by mailer</i> Randall J Atchison P.O. Box 4390 Jemison AL 35085-4390	

8786 4858 4100 0230 0002

U.S. Form 3822, February 2000 See Reverse for Instructions

Office of the Monitor
Pigford v. Veneman (D.D.C.)
Brevington v. Veneman (D.D.C.)

Post Office Box 64511
St. Paul, Minnesota 55164-0511
Phone (toll-free): 1-877-924-7483

October 12, 2004

SF 11
RANDALL ATCHISON
PO BOX 423
1072 HWY 191
JEMISON, AL 35085

Tracking # 135994

Dear Claimant:

Thank you for the correspondence you recently sent to the Office of the Monitor.

Our records indicate that you have filed or attempted to file a late claim for relief under the Consent Decree in the *Pigford v. Veneman* case. This is the case in which African-American farmers sued the United States Department of Agriculture alleging race discrimination. The only way to apply for relief is to file a written claim form and election sheet. The deadline for a timely filing of a claim under *Pigford* was October 12, 1999.

By court orders dated December 20, 1999, and July 14, 2000 the Court authorized the Arbitrator to make decisions about permission to file late claims. The deadline for requesting permission to file a late claim was September 15, 2000.

According to our records, you submitted your request for permission to file a late claim after September 15, 2000. Therefore, your claim cannot be accepted. Unfortunately, you will not receive any relief under the Consent Decree. The Office of the Monitor has no authority to take any action regarding this decision. If you have additional questions, please call the Claims Facilitator at 1-800-646-2873.

Sincerely,

Office of the Monitor

FMNP
750

The Chilton Co Committee
 has sent class counsels and the monitors these
 Certified letters beginning in April 2000
 up to now asking for the proof of no posting, we
 corrected and that claim package and affidavits
 be sent. We know that we have met the
 Extraordinary Circumstances that is required
 for this County these are the Certified Card return
 letter receipts Tracking Number

① 7004	1160	0004	4836	5948
② 7000	0600	0022	7306	2696
③ 7000	0520	0014	8584	9786
④ 0300	1290	0000	9805	8889
⑤ 7001	1140	0003	0674	7526
⑥ 7001	1140	0003	0674	9049
⑦ 0300	1290	0000	9805	5268
⑧ 7000	0600	0022	7305	8309
⑨ 7000	0520	0014	8584	9786
⑩ 7001	1140	0003	0675	0120

Committee - Tracking no
 Bernice Atchison 5887600
 Kendall J. Atchison Track 135994
 Morris Wilson #5604600

farm letter

FMNP 750
 Randell J Atchison
 Tracking No. 135994
 Affidavit 72267
 P.O Box 423
 Jemison, Alabama 35085
 Farm Location Hwy. 191

To The Monotor

The question that we are asking in Chilton County is Did Judge Freedman mean to leave this county out by not posting or notifying the Black Farmers and Farm helpers?

While we worked to Produce and help produce the products that is raised in this county and shipped to many other states to be sold.

We had hope to be treated Fairley. We contacted USDA of Chilton County and were told that they could not help us. We immediately wrote certified letters to class council and to the Monotor, telling that there were no Affidavit and there was no claim package at USDA and that they had in form us they could not help us. USDA Chilton County did not have a copy of the Conccent Decree nor the stipulation for us to view. It was not published in our County News Paper or the U.S. Agriculture for the extension service here in Chilton County. We were not notified by mail, we were not given a chance to apply even after we notified Class Councile there was no legal help in this County for us.

Many of us was sent denial letters and many were not answered or given a tracking number. We have sent packages after packages to inform you and ask that the error be corrected.

We know you receive them 8 copies were sent by certified mail 8 packages. We have called time after time to No Avail beginning in April 2000 until now asking,pleading that class councile recertify the error. Many of us own farms now here in Chilton County many are Farm Helpers, Share Croppers, some have FMNP No. as I do, yet you have denied me and many more. I have lived on the same farm all my life I was born here in 1957 my mother and father worked hard to secure their own land for their own children to inherit. You are now holding me accountable for a late Claim Affidavit When you did not send them to us as we requested. When we notified you that we had no claims even your affidavit was not sent to any of our people until after August 16 that left only 20 working days with the Labor Day weekend in that. Less than 20 days with no

farm letter

affidavit claim for our people our family who all own farms.

The problem was a USDA and class Council problem they Defyed the Judge order here in Chilton County they did not post. The Judge said it plainly IT SHALL BE POSTED. It was not and the USDA did not have a copy of the Decree or Stipulation for us to view. Without that information those instructions we had no way of knowing what was needed to apply. I am a farmer 39 ac and 239 Grandfather 80 Grandmother 39 Grandmother. We declare under purgery the Forgoing Statement are true and that we do have the said evident to prove that we notified by Certified Mail at least 8 times to make you aware of our problem. When you respond of Aug 10 came on Aug 16 2000 we had less than 20 working days to respond and only one affidavit that was all that you sent

Yours Truly



Black Farmers' Settlement

P.O. Box 4390
Portland, OR 97208-4390
1-800-646-2873

January 8, 2002

RANDALL ATCHISON
PO BOX 423
1072 HWY 191
JEMISON, AL 35085

TRACKING # 135994
AFFIDAVIT # 72267

Re: Pigford et al. v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
Brewington et al. v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

Dear Claimant:

The deadline for filing a claim in the Black Farmers Settlement against the U.S. Department of Agriculture, pursuant to Paragraph 5(c) of the Consent Decree, was October 12, 1999. On December 20, 1999, Judge Paul L. Friedman issued an Order giving me the responsibility for reviewing all late-filed claims. On July 14, 2000, Judge Friedman issued a second Order important to those who missed the October 12, 1999 deadline. One portion of that Order states, "~~All putative class members who are eligible under 5 (c) of the Consent Decree shall submit written requests for such relief to the Facilitator without a Claim, Sheet and Election Form postmarked not later than September 15, 2000. No extensions of that deadline will be granted for any reason.~~" Simply put, your petition for filing a late claim had to be postmarked by September 15, 2000.

Sep 15 2000

Your petition to file a late claim was postmarked after the September 15, 2000 deadline. Because your petition was postmarked later than September 15, 2000, I have no authority to approve your participation in the Pigford settlement. Under the terms of Judge Friedman's order, I must deny your request to participate in the settlement. My decision regarding the filing of your late claim may not be appealed to the Monitor or to the Court.

If we were to meet the deadline that settlement would be to post and be filing and that

Sincerely,

Michael K. Lewis
Arbitrator

FMNP
750

FMNP
750

Form F1661

72267

Willie Lee CAYEY
AFFIDAVIT 87434

September 7, 2004

To: Randi Ilyse Roth,

By Post 4/19/00 10:00 AM
4/19/00 10:00 AM 10/19/00

It is stated you are appointed to see that the decree functions properly. It has failed in everyway in Chilton County. We began notifying Class Counsel by Certified mail and calling the office in April 2000 that there was no claim package or affidavit in Chilton County. We notified and asked for more time. We have that proof of certified mail with six (6) copies. The Class Counsel and Monitor both knew of the problems we were having because we sent it to them. They denied Randall Atchison with a FMNP Number 750 with land of thirty-nine (39) acres 239-80-40 39, and 20 acres. He was sent an affidavit in September which I immediately returned. This was after the notice date not because we did not try. There was no consent decree and no stipulations any where for us to have as a guide. Yet court paid lawyers and monitors and question is ask, Did Judge Freedman mean for us to be left out? The order was defied by all he appointed and we have written letter after letter trying to rectify the error. We are poor disable people and in need. We can prove we own land and we can prove USDA did not post this information at any time. What more do you want from us? Class Counsel and the Monitor have received proof from us.

You sent out the stipulation signed on July 14, 2000, but the Judge signed it on July 19, 2000. We received the first copy on August 16, 2000 and immediately returned it the same day and applied to you for a claim package and affidavit. Since none were in Chilton County. Proof of this certified mail is receipt number 7000 05 20 0014 8584 9786. There were no affidavits sent before September 15, 2000 deadline which was twenty (20) working days away. How was we to get you an on time affidavit, How were we to know? You did not have it posted anywhere and we were unable to view a copy to know what was needed. *THE AFFIDAVIT WAS WITHHELD FROM OUR GROUPE MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO GET A ON TIME AFFIDAVIT INTO YOU*

yours Truly
Randale J. Atchison
135994
F MNP 750

4

5

Randall Atchison FMNP 750
P. O. Box 423
Farm on Hwy 191
Jemison, Alabama 35085

Proof of Notification

Certified Letters - 6 copies *6 different Letters*

Package from Chilton County

1 County Letter *from Mayes*

4 City Letters - Four

Probate Judge - 1

County Library - 1

No notice to Farmers by County Paper

No Consent Decree until after deadline

No Stipulation until September 16, 2000

No help from USDA but we asked

No help from class counsel but we called

No help from Monitor Michael K. Lewis but we notified him

There was no notice to any Black Farmers *in our group*

USDA Agriculture send flyers constantly, there was no notice in them
but ye my farm has been appointed the FMNP number 750.

Yours truly,

Randall Atchison
TRA No 135997
AF 72267

Tracking # 1309411
Affidavit # 72147

Pigford -et -al. v Veneman-Civil Action no 97 1978 plf
Brewington et -al. v Veneman Civil Action no 98 1693 plf

The Facilitator.
As A Farmer here in Chilton County we are being held accountable for the USDA mistake . They did not post it is plainely set out in the stipulation claims that show extraordinary circumstance beyond my controll is allowed this is what the JUDGE said.
paragraph (7) said copies of the stipulation and the order shall be posted in conspicouous public places in every USDA farm service agency and county offices no(2) or be mail by the facilitator to every pearson who requested a claim form (3) who did not sumitte a compleat claime to thefacilitator with in the pirod precribed

This stipulation, the original decree, nor the extension were posted at our USDA as order by JUDGE FRIEDMAN the usda farm office, court house, or usda extension office WE ask at each office the county farm service said they could not help us, the usda extension office had no knowledge of the suite at all.

MR Gray send out notices of enformation on programs farms session agriculture meeting farm marketing information several times each year. there has not ben any information on this matter. Even your letter to inform this state was not wrote until Feb 25 2000 and mail in march 2000 by then all days had expired for going to Selma ALA to see Lawyer Chestnut, which was 70 miles away we call him he was not taking any at that time. yet we are being held accountable for not filling a on time claim. there was no claims at our USDA office the secetary said she was not able to help us. we went to every office trying to get help the probate Judge did not know what to do You fail to post as judge order we had no information this is extraordinary circumstance

Judge FRIEDMAN Gave the order for you to post or notify by mail this was not done Iam a farmer have farmed all my life to deny us after we prove our aligation is also unjust we ask to participate

Yours Truly *Richard W. Fisher*

cc. Alexander Pines

*How are monitor
2 letters*

9

Tracking # 135093
Affidavit # 76610

ATTN: Mr. Michael K. Lewis

RE: Letter 2002

I am requesting that I be reviewed under the monitor review. I know that you have the authority to review from January 17, 2000 until January 18, 2005. I believe that we have proven extraordinary circumstances. We have submitted to you letters from the Mayors office, the Probate Office, and the Libraries showing that it was an error. It was not posted in any of the public facilities. None of these facilities received notice to post.

If we were to meet the dead line of Sept. 15, 2000, it was the responsibility of the facaltator to post or by mail from the Court House notify land owners. For less that \$6.00 every black Church could have been notified touching literally every black family. There are only 17 black Churches in this County. As you noted in the monitor review, there has been problems in the claim process. It would be a miscarriage of justice to leave us out. After we brought to your attention that USDA failed to post. We were not notified of the original suite. Nor the extention that was approved by the judge. We would like to have this error rectorfied. How can we be held accountable to know when the deadline was when you did not post. We believe that this is an extraordinary circumstances and we should be allowed to participate. We have stated that there was no lawyer in this error, therefore we are trying the best way we can to answer your petition.

Did Judge Freedman intend for Chilton County to be left out because USDA did not post. That would be injustice, we have submitted to you proof. I respectely sumitt our name for consideration
WE DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

SENCERELY,

Bernice Atchison 5887600
Morris Wilson 5604600
Randall Atchison 135994
COMMITTE

May 2002

List of NAME

~~8~~

JUNE 2002

JEMISON, ALABAMA 35085

RE: To your letter on May 9, 2002

Pigford et al v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
Brewington et al v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 98- 1693 (PLF)

Dear Mr. Michael K. Lewis,

We are asking for your reconsideration that we may participate in the settlement. We are enclosing the document necessary to prove to you the extraordinary circumstance that was beyond our control.

USDA did not post the information, in any city here in CHILTON COUNTY. Neither did they post it in the extension office. Therefore we are asking to join the settlement, based on these facts. We have read your petition in the Monitor Review. And we know that you were appointed from January 18, 2000 to January 17, 2005 (Page 7 paragraph 14). These are facts that we found.

The fact it was not posted, and we have sent copies with each petition to prove it. (Paragraph 5 of page 3) There is a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Paragraph 6 of page 3) We have gathered the necessary document to show the miscarriage of justice by the USDA of Chilton County. They fail to post the information in any town. (Paragraph 7) You already know the problem. This is a USDA problem of failing in their job as the Judge has ordered. It was not posted in our USDA office, or the county court house for us to view. Page 3 the class lawyer says describe the error or mistake, that makes it a miscarriage of justice.

(1) We are poor in need of these funds, and to be deprived of our share would be a miscarriage of justice

(2) We are African American.

(3) We have farmed all our lives. We all have.

(9 A) We notified Mr. Lewis in the beginning, there were no lawyers in our area, and that we were older people on S.S. and disabled. That is why we are trying to answer these petitions.

(Page 7) Yes we contacted USDA and was told they could not help us, the secretary stated that the case was being brought against them the USDA. We would have to do it on our own. We are asking to be permitted to participate in the suit. Because it was not our fault that it was not posted as the judge ordered. This was clearly a USDA problem. We have sent you the proof that it was not posted. They fail to post it as the judge ordered. They did not even post the extension. It would be unfair to hold us accountable for USDA failure, we are asking for justice as farmers.

Did Judge Freedom intend that this county be denied by not posting at any time. How was we to know what or when, if it is not posted to read, even the extension was not posted. That is why so many miss the deadline. It was a lack of information. Information that was due us by law, and could have been mailed to every black landowner.

We declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

859000

Tracking # 135093
Affidavit# 76610

ATTN: Mr. Michael K. Lewis

RE: Letter 2002 July 9

I am requesting that I be reviewed under the monitor review. I know that you have the authority to review from January 17, 2000 until January 18, 2005. I believe that we have proven extraordinary circumstances. We have submitted to you letters from the Mayors office, the Probate Office, and the Libraries showing that it was an error. It was not posted in any of the public facilities. None of these facilities received notice to post.

If we were to meet the dead line of Sept. 15, 2000, it was the responsibility of the facalitator to post or by mail from the Court House notify land owners. For less than \$6.00 every black Church could have been notified touching literally every black family. There are only 17 black Churches in this County. As you noted in the monotor review, there has been problems in the claim process. It would be a miscarriage of justice to leave us out. After we brought to your attention that USDA failed to post. We were not notified of the original suite nor the extention that was approved by the judge. We would like to have this error rectorfied. How can we be held accountable to know when the deadline was when you did not post.

JPK

10

10

We believe that this is an extraordinary circumstances and we should be allowed to participate.
We have stated that there are no lawyers in this area. therefore, we are trying the best that we
can to answer your petition.

WE DECLAIR UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE
AND CORRECT.

SINCERELY *Richard J. Atchison*
135 99 4

*The next few pages will show that you defied the
Judge below you did not Post in Chilton Co
any where and there were no Consent Decree
or Stipulation at our USDA office
we visited it and was told they could not help
us we call the number given and we wrote
& Certified letter asking for help and confirming
there were no claim package or affidavit
we went to even office in Chilton Co looking for
help we call and was given no information
we were told we would get information
over*

Randall J Atchison

Tracking No. 135994

Affidavit No. 72267

P.O. Box 423

Jemison, Alabama 35085

Farm on Highway 191 Jemison, Alabama
CHILTON COUNTY EVENT PACKAGE

*We own 39 ac Share 239- 80- 40- 20
that is Grandfather Grandmother Aunts that are
now Deceased*

The question that we are now asking in Chilton County is "Did Judge Feadman mean to leave this county out by not posting or notifying the Black Farmers and Farm helpers?" While we work to produce and help produce the produce that is raised in this county and shipped to many other states to be sold.

We had hoped to be treated fairly, we contacted USDA of Chilton County and were told that they could not help us. We immediately wrote certified letters to class counsel and to the monotor, telling that there were no affidavit and there was no claim package at USDA and that they had informed us they could not help. USDA Chilton did not have a copy of the Conccent Derece nor the stipulation for us to view. It was not published in our county news paper or the U.S. agriculture for the extension service here in Chilton County. We were not notified by mail, we were not given a chance to even after class councl knew their was no legal help in this county for us. Many of us was sent denial letters and many were not answered or given a track number. We have sent package after package to inform you and ask that the error be corrected. We know you received them, they were sent certified mail. We have called time after time to no avoid beginning in April of 2000 until now, asking class counsel to please recetify the error.

Many of us own farms now here in Chilton County, many are farm helpers some have FmNp no as I do yet you have denied me and many more, I have lived on the same farm all of my life and I was born in 1957. My mother and father worked hard to secere their own land for their own children to inherit. You are now holding me accountable for a late claim affidavit when you did not send them to us as we requested and when we notified you that we received them late you have still denied us, the problem was USD and class counsel. They defied the Judge order here in Chilton Co. by not obeying the stipulation. It plainly stated it shall be posted, we had no way of knowing what we needed to do without those instructions and a claim package or affidavit. We declare under purgey the for going statements are true and that we do have evidence to all of said charges.

Sincerely,
Randall J. Atkinson

FMNP
750

FMNP
750

(Proof) 137

City of Jemison

KENNETH RAY
MAYOR

P.O. BOX 609
JEMISON, ALABAMA 35085
TELEPHONE (205) 688-1492 OR (205) 688-1493
FAX (205) 688-1109

MARY ELLISON
CITY CLERK

November 5, 2001

Black Farmers' Settlement
P. O. Box 4390
Portland, OR 97208-4390

RE: Pigford et al. v. Veneman- Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
Brewington et al. v. Veneman - Civic Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

Dear Sir:

The City of Jemison did not receive a notice to post regarding the Black Farmers' Settlement, so therefore, it has not been posted for the public to review.

If you have any further questions, please call.

Sincerely,

Mary Ellison
Mary Ellison
City Clerk.

ICW/CLEER
Sara Atkinson

P. O. BOX 9
Maplesville, Alabama 36750
(334) 366-4211 or (334) 366-4212
Fax (334) 366-4210

Elizabeth Hayes
Aubrey Lofton
Drew Charles Mitchell
Kati Wallace

Nov 7, 2001

Black Farmer's Settlement
P.O. Box 4390
Portland, OR 97208-4390

RE: Pinford et al. V. Veneman-Civil Action No. 97-1978 (P.L.F.)
Brewington et al. V. Veneman-Civil Action No. 98-1961 (P.L.F.)

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

The Town of Maplesville, Town Hall or Mayor's Office did not receive a notice to post regarding the Black Farmers' Settlement, so therefore, it has not been posted for the public to review.

Sincerely,

W.C. Hayes, Jr
Mayor of Maplesville

Members:
 Chairman
 James Sharpe
 Alf Hanson
 Willie Ratt
 Clerk
 Signs - Adkins

Town of Thorsby
 P.O. Box 608
 Thorsby, Alabama 35171
 phone (205) 646-2520
 fax (205) 646-2414

Centennial 1901-2001

Tom Bentley
 Mayor

November 13, 2001
 Black Farmers' Settlement
 P.O. Box 4390
 Portland, OR 97208-4390

RE: Figford et al. v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 97-1978 (P.L.F)
 Brewington et al. v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 98-1693 (P.L.F)

Dear Sir:

The Town of Thorsby did not receive a notice to post regarding the Black Farmers' Settlement, so therefore, it has been posted for the public to review.

If you have any further question, please call.

Sincerely,
Jaclyn Porter
 Jaclyn Porter
 Assistant Clerk



City of Clanton

Post Office Box 4190 • Clanton, Alabama 36016 0540 • Telephone (205) 268-1051

1000, Joe Taylor, Mayor
Dorothy Wilson, City Clerk
John Halls Jackson, Jr., City Attorney

COUNCIL:
Ann Baker
James H. Dennis
Elliott Pittman
Mary Nell Smith
Robert R. Postenberg

November 9, 2001

P.O. Box 4190
Portland, OR 97208-4190

Re: Black Farmers Settlement

To Whom It May Concern

The City of Clanton did not receive a notice of any type of objection to have put up a City Hall for the Black Farmers Settlement

If you need anything further, please feel free to give me a call at 255-3051

Sincerely,

Brandi Patterson
Sec/Personnel Clerk

"A good place to visit - A better place to live"



OFFICE OF
PROBATE COURT
CHILTON COUNTY

CLANTON, ALABAMA 35045

November 5, 2001

ROBERT M. MARTIN
JUDGE OF PROBATE

SHIRLEY F. ROBINSON
CHIEF CLERK

Black Farmers' Settlement
P. O. BOX 4390
Portland, OR 97208-4390

RE: Pigford et al. v. Veneman-Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
Brewington et al. v. Veneman-Civic Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

The Chilton County Probate Office of Clanton, Alabama did not receive a notice to post regarding the Black Farmers' Settlement, so therefore, it has not been posted for the public to review.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Martin, Probate Judge



OFFICE OF
PROBATE COURT
CLANTON COUNTY
CLANTON, ALABAMA 35045

ROBERT H. MARTIN
JUDGE OF PROBATE

November 5, 2001

WHITLEY P. ROBERTSON
CLERK

Black Farmers' Settlement
P. O. BOX 4390
Portland, OR 97208-4390

RE: Figford et al. v. Veneman-Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
Brewington et al. v. Veneman-Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

The Clanton County Probate Office of Clanton, Alabama did not receive a notice to post regarding the Black Farmers' Settlement, so therefore, it has not been posted for the public to review.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Martin

Robert H. Martin, Probate Judge

Clanton/Clanton Public Library
100 First Avenue
Clanton, AL 35045
205-755-1768

Mary Jo Altemathy
Mary Jo Altemathy
Director

Library

Black Farmers' Settlement 8
 Claims Facilitator
 P.O. Box 4390
 Portland, OR 97208-4390
 1-800-646-2873

Handwritten notes:
 20
 12-13
 all days that are...

To: Black Farmers

Date: February 25, 1999

Re: Pigford, et al., v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 97-1078 (D.D.C.) (PLF)
 Brewington, et al., v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 98-1693 (D.D.C.) (PLF)

This is your claim package. A completed claim package (which includes your signature and a lawyer's signature) must be submitted to the Black Farmers' Settlement Claims Facilitator in order for you to be eligible to participate in the settlement.

In order to assist you in completing the claims package, lawyers from the eight law firms involved in this case will be holding meetings in the following cities on the dates listed below.

STATE, CITY	LOCATION	DATE	TIME
ALABAMA, Selma	IBPOEW -- Elks Building 4304 Water Ave. Selma, AL	Saturday, Jan 23	9 a.m. - 4 p.m.
MISSISSIPPI, Jackson	Tougaloo College Health & Wellness Center, Gym Tougaloo, MS	Tuesday, Feb 2	9 a.m. - 4 p.m.
ALABAMA, Selma	IBPOEW -- Elks Building 4304 Water Ave. Selma, AL	Saturday, Feb 6	9 a.m. - 4 p.m.
ALABAMA, Tuskegee	Tuskegee University Kellogg Conference Center Tuskegee, AL 36088	Friday, Feb 12	9 a.m. - 4 p.m.
GEORGIA, Albany	Albany Civic Center 100 West Oglethorpe Blvd Albany, GA	Saturday, Feb 13	10 a.m. - 4 p.m.
MISSISSIPPI, Jackson	Tougaloo College Health & Wellness Center, Gym Tougaloo, MS	Tuesday, Feb 16	9 a.m. - 4 p.m.
VIRGINIA, Richmond	Richmond Marriott Hotel 500 East Broad Street Richmond, VA	Tuesday, Feb 16	9 a.m. - 4 p.m.
ARKANSAS, Pine Bluff	Pine Bluff Convention Center One Convention Center Plaza Pine Bluff, AR	Wednesday, Feb 24	9 a.m. - 4 p.m.
CALIFORNIA, Fresno	Law Offices Of Ritchel & Smith 2350 W. Shaw Ave., #154 Fresno, CA	Saturday, Feb 27	9 a.m. - 4 p.m.
SOUTH CAROLINA, Orangeburg	Smith, Hamilton, Middleton Memorial Center Buckley Street South Carolina State University 300 College St., N.E. Orangeburg, SC	Thursday, March 4	9 a.m. - 4 p.m.

Handwritten notes:
 these days are
 already past
 when you would
 the letter
 how could we
 meet your meeting
 we could not go
 back when you
 said send it
 out to us until
 Aug 2000
 we got on 16 of
 Aug 2000
 we started you
 of this

Handwritten notes:
 I will do my best to get you the information you need before you start your lawsuit. Please write me at 746-357999

Friday, June 11, 2004

Bernice Atchison
1072 Hwy 191
Jemison, AL 35085

Law Offices
Conlon, Frantz, Phelan, & Pires, LLP
Suite 700
1818 N Street N.W.
Washington D.C. 20036

Att Alexander J. Pires Jr.
Phillip L. Frai's Class Counsel

We the people of Chilton County have waited for an answer from class counsel on the Pigford and Brewington case Black Farmers case.

We received your explanation of the Late claims sent to Bernice Atchison dated August 10, 2000. Many of us tried filing the late claims affidavit. Many were denied.

We understand, after receiving your letter of August 10, 2000 that the consent decree allows a person to participate. If he or she can show the claim was late due to Extraordinary Circumstances beyond his or her control. This was Judge Friedman's order.

After receiving this information, we got a committee together and we set out to prove to you that we met the extraordinary circumstances beyond our control. We sent to your office and Mr. Mikel K. Lewis's office, letters from the Four Mayors of this county, the probate Judge, and County Library, stating that they did not receive any copy from USDA to post for viewing.

Even though we went to USDA offices of this county, we were told that they could not help us, we were given this number to call; 1-800-646-2873, they did not have a copy for us to view. They did not have a copy of the extension, they did not have any application or any affidavit. As you can see this was not given to us until September 7, 2001. There is no counsel on the matter in Chilton County. I have sent written explanations with every claim and every request. We have proven to you as our class counsel, the extraordinary circumstances. We are asking that the error be corrected, Many of us still own farmland, Many of us worked on Farms as share croppers and care takers. It would be a miscarriage of Justice to deny what is due to us. We are willing to prove we have farms and that we own farms. Just tell us what we need to do. Now that I am better, I am willing to help the people of our county. I will go to the churches, there are only 17. I will put out fliers to help.

Our people need the money. We could bond a few people in each community and get the job done. Most people can name the farms they worked on and describe the location. Others can prove they own land by producing tax receipts. Just tell us what you need so we can receive our payment. We know we have met your conditions as stated in the review and the extension.

Yours Truly,

Bernice Atchison
Bernice Atchison

" We Still Own 39ac of my father's personal Land that was not in 1500 ac

Randall Atchison #2
DoB 11/23
Jermison also
Jern 1072 Hwy 191
Jermison, AL 35085
August 20, 2002
(205) 688-2715

Dear: Mr. Ted Hosp

I received an answer from Governor Seigerman, Dated July 23, 2002, in regard to a letter I wrote about a land dispute.

Mr Hosp this land has been in our family for more than a 100 years, since before 1883. Originally there was about 1500 acres but much of it has been lost through various means.

This case CV97-177R is a discrimination case against a black widow woman and is a dishonor to the law. Its ruling has broked state and federal law, following are some of the errors that I have found. I have tried all legal means to correct the ruling.

- (1) None feason that is admitted, the court does nothing.
- (2) Death of plaintiff who has no heirs, except a step daughter.
- (3) Money paid out of escrow account before case goes to court.
- (4) Sixteen heirs ask court to let the land stay in family and negotiated amongst ourselves for \$51,875.00 to be paid to heirs seeking relief.
- (5) Step daughter received \$9,687.30 in October before hearing in December and while the case was being contested.
- (6) Edward Delane received \$10,431.28, while his other twelve siblings received \$743.98 each. How did this happen? He declared Mr. Latham as is lawyer.
- (7) In open court the judge ask me if I had \$50,000.00 to pay for the land, I said "yes" . He ^{replied} you are not going to get it for \$50,000.00. Mr. Earskin Ford asked the judge why? she is an heir, ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~is~~. The judge said, "I am judge and you will pay \$80,000.00 plus taxes." I agreed to do that and asked for a copy of the order so I could get the money. On July 2, 2000, I reported to the court clerk that I had secured the loan and I asked how I should get it to the court, I asked if I should bring a certified check or have it electronically transferred, I was informed by the bank that it could be done in 24 hours. ~~Now He Did Not Tell US it gone up to \$110,000.00~~
- (8) On December 13, 2000 I proved to the court that I had bargained with the family for \$51,875.00. I showed the signatures of the family member agreeing to the amount.
- (9) This court never once notified any of the heirs of any of the court hearings, our addresses were available and most of us have cars and land, ~~we~~ we pay taxes. (we also vote)

Court to Plaintiff

LAW OFFICES
CONLON, FRANTZ, PHELAN & PIRES, LLP

DAVID J. FRANTZ*
BRIAN P. PHELAN*
MICHAEL J. CONLON*
ALEXANDER J. PIRES, JR.*
ANURAG VARMA

SUITE 700
1818 N STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

(202) 331-7050
FAX: (202) 331-9306
e-mail: firm@cfpllaw.com

RICHARD A. MEHLER
(1920-1987)

OF COUNSEL
F. JOSEPH BRINIG**
LAWRENCE BERNSTEIN

* ALSO ADMITTED IN VA
* ALSO ADMITTED IN MD

June 17, 2004

Ms. Bernice Atchison
1072 Hwy 191
Jemison, AL 35085

Re: The Black Farmers Case / Your Late Claim

Dear Ms. Atchison:


I received your letter dated June 11, 2004, in which you ask us to help you with your late claim.

You petitioned the Arbitrator to file a late claim. The Arbitrator denied your petition. You timely filed a request for reconsideration with the Arbitrator, and your request is now pending at the Office of the Arbitrator.

The Arbitrator decides all late claim petitions; we do not decide them.

You have done everything you can do. The Arbitrator will send a decision directly to you once he has reviewed your request for reconsideration.

Sincerely,


Alexander J. Pires, Jr.

170

Black Farmers' Settlement
P.O. Box 4390
Portland, OR 97208-4390
1-800-646-2873

JULY 19, 2001

CLAIM #
TRACKING # 00005887600
AFFIDAVIT # 01187

BERNICE ATCHISON
1072 HIGHWAY 191
JEMISON AL 35085

Re: Pigford et al v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
Brewington et al v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

Dear Claimant:

The deadline for filing a claim in the Black Farmers Settlement against the U.S. Department of Agriculture, pursuant to Paragraph 5(c) of the Consent Decree, was October 12, 1999. Paragraph 5(g) of the Consent Decree in this case provides that farmers who missed the October 12, 1999 deadline may petition the Court to permit the farmer to nonetheless participate in the claims resolution procedures set out in the decree.

The Consent Decree also establishes a high standard for the review of late claims in that the farmer must demonstrate that his failure to submit a timely claim was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control. On December 20, 1999, Judge Friedman delegated to me the review of all late-filed claims.

After a thorough review of your late claim affidavit and supporting documentation, I have concluded that you have not met the high standard contained in paragraph 5(g). Thus, your request to be permitted to participate in the settlement is denied. My decision is final and may not be appealed to the Monitor or to the Court.

Sincerely,



Michael K. Lewis
Arbitrator

Dewy

FMNP
750

2

Black Farmers' Settlement
P.O. Box 4390
Portland, OR 97208-4390
1-800-646-2873

OCTOBER 29, 2001

CLAIM #
TRACKING # 00005887600
AFFIDAVIT # 01187

*Ask for
Reconsideration*

BERNICE ATCHISON
1072 HIGHWAY 191
JEMISON AL 35085

RE: Pigford et al. v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
Brewinerton et al. v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

Dear Claimant,


As you know, you previously received a letter from me that denied your petition to file a late claim in the Black Farmers' Settlement. This letter is to inform you that there is a process for me to reconsider your application. Such a request must be sent in writing to the address above, postmarked within 60 days of the date of this letter. If you previously have requested reconsideration, you do not need to respond to this letter.

Before you make a request for reconsideration, I ask that you think about any circumstances that make stronger your argument that you should be permitted to participate in the settlement. As I said in my first letter to you, the standard established in the consent decree is that only circumstances beyond the control of the claimant should be considered. Only information or documents I do not already have will convince me to change my decision.

All written information must be accompanied by a cover letter signed by the potential claimant. The following sentence must be written above the claimant's signature: "I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT."

As you may be aware, there were thousands of people who petitioned to file late claims. Although you have received a decision from me, many others have not. Fairness dictates that before I review your petition for a second time, I must decide the petitions of those who have not heard from me once. In time, I will review your petition if you send me a request for reconsideration, but please be advised that it may be as much as a year before you hear from me again.

Sincerely,



Michael K. Lewis
Arbitrator

Office of the Monitor
Federal v. Veneman (D.D.C.)
Beckington v. Veneman (D.D.C.)

Post Office Box 64511
St. Paul, Minnesota 55164-0511
Phone (toll-free): 1-877-924-7483

June 29, 2004

BERNICE ATCHISON
1072 HIGHWAY 191
JEMISON, AL 35085

Tracking # 58876

Dear Claimant:

Thank you for the correspondence you recently sent to the Office of the Monitor. We received it on 6/18/2004.

We are in the process of preparing a more detailed response. You should receive a follow-up letter from us shortly.

Sincerely,

Office of the Monitor

Office of the Monitor
Pigford v. Veneman (D.D.C.)
Brewington v. Veneman (D.D.C.)

Post Office Box 64511
St. Paul, Minnesota 55164-0511
Phone (toll-free): 1-877-924-7483

5

June 29, 2004

Tracking # 58876

BERNICE ATCHISON
1072 HIGHWAY 191
JEMISON, AL 35085

Dear Claimant:

Thank you for the correspondence you recently sent to the Office of the Monitor.

Our records now indicate that you have filed a late claim affidavit for relief under the Consent Decree in the *Pigford v. Veneman* case. This is the case in which African-American farmers sued the United States Department of Agriculture alleging race discrimination. The only way to apply for relief is to file a written claim form and election sheet. The deadline for a timely filing of a claim under *Pigford* was October 12, 1999.

Your affidavit will be forwarded to Michael Lewis, the Arbitrator in this case. By court order dated December 20, 1999, the Court authorized the Arbitrator to make decisions with regard to late claims. Permission to file a late claim will be granted only if you demonstrate to the Arbitrator that your failure to submit a timely claim was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond your control.

The decision of the Arbitrator is final. If you would like an update on the status of your claim, or if you need further information, please call the Claims Facilitator at 1-800-646-2873.

Sincerely,

Office of the Monitor

*This claim
is being
processed*

C6

FMNP 750 - 6

September 7, 2004

To: Randi Ilyse Roth,

Black Farmers Class Action
97-1978 PLF & 98-1693 PLF

It is stated you are appointed to see that the decree functions properly. It has failed in everyway in Chilton County. We began notifying Class Counsel by Certified mail and calling the office in April 2000 that there was no claim package or affidavit in Chilton County. We notified and asked for more time. We have that proof of certified mail with six (6) copies. The Class Counsel and Monitor both knew of the problems we were having because we sent it to them. They denied Randall Atchison with a FMNP Number 750 with land of thirty-nine (39) acres 239-80-40 39, and 20 acres. He was sent an affidavit in September which I immediately returned. This was after the notice date not because we did not try. There was no consent decree and no stipulations any where for us to have as a guide. Yet court paid lawyers and monitors and question is ask, Did Judge Freedman mean for us to be left out? The order was defied by all he appointed and we have written letter after letter trying to rectify the error. We are poor disable people and in need. We can prove we own land and we can prove USDA did not post this information at any time. This meets your standards of extraordinary circumstances beyond our control. What more do you want from us? Class Counsel and the Monitor have received proof from us.

You sent out the stipulation signed on July 14, 2000, but the Judge signed it on July 19, 2000. We received the first copy on August 16, 2000 and immediately returned it the same day and applied to you for claim packages and affidavit. Since none were in Chilton County. Proof of this certified mail is receipt number 7000 05 20 0014 8584 9786. There were no affidavits sent before September 15, 2000 deadline which was twenty (20) working days away. How were we to get you an on time affidavit, How were we to know? You did not have it posted anywhere and we were unable to view a copy to know what was needed.

TRACK # 138994

72267

Certified Letter 7604 1160 0004 4836 5948

Request for Expedient Mail Aug 16 2000
Mid-Reg 700 0521 014 554 7784

DAVID J. FRANTZ
TRIAN D. PHELAN
MICHAEL J. CONLON
ALEXANDER J. PIRES, III
ANNY DE AN FASSETT
MELINDA YAMBA
MICHELLE A. PILGRIM
HOWARD WITTO
JAMES E. FISHER, II
LEANDRA OLLIE
SUNITHI JESATHI REESWARAN
MALCOLM M. GRICE
GREG J. KRISCHNER

LAW OFFICES
CONLON, FRANTZ, PHELAN & PIRES, LLP
SUITE 700
1818 N STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

(202) 331-7050
FAX: (202) 331-9306
e-mail: firm@cfpllaw.com
August 10, 2000

RICHARD A. MEYER
(1924-1987)
OF COUNSEL
F. JOSEPH BRING
LAWRENCE BERNSTEIN
ALSO ADMITTED IN VA
ALSO ADMITTED IN MD
NOT ADMITTED IN DC

BERNICE ATCHISON
1072 HIGHWAY 191
JEATSON

AL 35085

Mr. Phillip L. Friedman
Cristopher J. Pires

TRACKING #
58876-00

Dear Farmer:

Late Claim Deadline

1. Introduction

You are receiving this letter because you asked for a Claim Sheet and Election Form and did not complete it and return it on time in *Pigford v. Glickman* - the Black Farmers' Settlement against the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

On July 14, 2000, the Judge in this lawsuit, the Honorable Paul L. Friedman, issued an important Order. An Order from the Judge has the force of law. The Order is written in legal language. This letter will help explain its meaning to you. A copy of the Order is enclosed.

2. What is a "late claim"?

In order to be part of the Pigford settlement under Track A or Track B, each person must send to the Facilitator a six-page Claim Sheet and Election Form (or a "claim"). The settlement agreement (also known as the "Consent Decree") set a deadline October 12, 1999 for filing these claims. A late claim, therefore, is any claim postmarked after October 12, 1999.

3. Some late claims are allowed

The Consent Decree allows a person to participate in this case if he/she can show that the claim was late - that is, it was sent after October 12, 1999 - due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his/her control. Said another way, Judge Friedman has ordered that a late claim will be accepted if the Arbitrator in this case agrees that your claim was late due to extraordinary circumstances beyond your control.

Form E-400

*Proof of extraordinary
circumstances*



City of Jemison



KENNETH RAY
MAYOR

P.O. BOX 609
JEMISON, ALABAMA 35085
TELEPHONE (205) 688-4492 OR (205) 688-4493
FAX (205) 688-1109

MARY ELLISON
CITY CLERK

November 5, 2001

Black Farmers' Settlement
P. O. Box 4390
Portland, OR 97208-4390

RE: Pigford et al. V. Veneman- Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
Brewington et al. V. Veneman - Civic Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

Dear Sir:

The City of Jemison did not receive a notice to post regarding the Black Farmers' Settlement, so therefore, it has not been posted for the public to review.

If you have any further questions, please call.

Sincerely,

Mary Ellison
City Clerk.

James Chapman
Atty General
Office Staff
Clerk
State Admin

Thorsby, Alabama 35171
phone (205) 646 3570
fax (205) 646 9444

Continental 9001 9001

Clara Deaton
Mayor

November 13, 2001
Black Farmers' Settlement
P.O. Box 4390
Portland, OR 97208-4390

RE: Figford et al. v. Veneman- Civil Action No. 01-1978 (PLF)
Brewington et al. v. Veneman- Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

Dear Sir:

The Town of Thorsby did not receive a notice to post regarding the Black Farmers' Settlement, so therefore, it has been posted for the public to review.

If you have any further question, please call.

Sincerely,

Becky Foster
Becky Foster
Assistant Clerk

Thorsby, AL 35171

18

MAYOR
 TOWN CLERK
 S. Lee Alabius

Town of Maplesville
 P. O. Box 9
 Maplesville, Alabama 36750
 (334) 366-4211 or (334) 366-4212
 Fax (334) 366-4210

COUNCIL MEMBERS
 Mike Beckwith
 Elizabeth Hayes
 Aubrey Loftis
 Ray Charles McPhail
 Karl Wehrle

Nov. 7, 2001

Black Farmer's Settlement
 P.O. Box 4390
 Portland, OR 97208-4390

RE: Digford et al. v. Veneman-Civil Action No. 97-1978 (P.L.F)
 Drewington et al. v. Veneman-Civil Action No. 98-1963 (P.L.F)

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

The Town of Maplesville, Town Hall or Mayor's Office did not receive a notice to post regarding the Black Farmers' Settlement, so therefore, it has not been posted for the public to review.

Sincerely,

W.C. Hayes, Jr
 Mayor of Maplesville



OFFICE OF
PROBATE COURT
CHILTON COUNTY
CLANTON, ALABAMA 35045

ROBERT M. MARTIN
JUDGE OF PROBATE

November 5, 2001

SHIRLEY P. ROBINSON
CHIEF CLERK


Black Farmers' Settlement
P. O. BOX 4390
Portland, OR 97208-4390

RE: Pigford et al. V. Veneman-Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
Brewington et al. V. Veneman-Civic Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

The Chilton County Probate Office of Clanton, Alabama did not receive a notice to post regarding the Black Farmers' Settlement, so therefore, it has not been posted for the public to review.

Sincerely,



Robert M. Martin, Probate Judge

81/07/98 10:24 202 278 3888
 07/1/98-1999 17120
 USDA
 (AL AT PRA OFFICE) (AL AT PRA OFFICE) (AL AT PRA OFFICE)
 USDA PRA OFFICE
 202 700 5000 003/003 01/01/01

United States
 Department of
 Agriculture
 Farm and
 Foreign
 Agricultural
 Services
 Farm Service
 Agency
 1400 Independence
 Ave. SW
 Washington, DC
 20250-0544

TO: State Executive Directors
 FROM: Robert Springer
 Executive Director for State Operations
 SUBJECT: Litigation Settlement for Black Farmers

January 6, 1999

Since the media has released information regarding the settlement for the Black Farmers, State and County Offices have received many calls from producers and the media. To ensure everyone is providing the same information to producers and the media, refer all calls from:

- the media, to Laura Trivette, Deputy Press Secretary @ 202-720-4673
- Producers, to Black Farmers Litigation Hotline @ 1-800-646-2873 from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm EST

1800 646 2873
 1800 646 1289
 Received Sept 7 2000
 from Juscillo

Dan Erickson
 USDA
 Room 200A
 Administration Bldg
 Washington, DC
 20250
 202 720 3631
 Dan Erickson
 1150A
 Room 200A
 Administration Bldg
 Washington, DC
 20250

[Faint handwritten notes]

This one come from
 Juscillo sept 7 2000

202 7203631



OFFICE OF
PROBATE COURT
CHILTON COUNTY
CLANTON, ALABAMA 35045
November 5, 2001

BERT M. MARTIN
JUDGE OF PROBATE

SHIRLEY P. ROBINSON
CHIEF CLERK

Black Farmers' Settlement
P. O. BOX 4390
Portland, OR 97208-4390

Re: Figford et al. v. Veneman-Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
Brewington et al. v. Veneman-Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

The Chilton County Probate Office of Clanton, Alabama did not receive a notice of posting regarding the Black Farmers' Settlement, so therefore, it has not been posted for the public to review.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Martin, Probate Judge

Chilton/Clanton Public Library
100 First Avenue
Clanton, AL 35045
205-755-1768

Mary Jo Abernathy
Director

15

Bernice Atchison
1072 Hwy 191
Jemison, AL 35085

Law Offices
Conlon, Frantz, Phelan, & Pires, LLP
Suite 700
1818 N Street N.W.
Washington D.C. 20036

Att Alexander J. Pires Jr.
Phillip L. Fraiss Class Counsel

We the people of Chilton County have waited for an answer from class counsel on the Pigford and Brewington case Black Farmers case.

We received your explanation of the Late claims sent to Bernice Atchison dated August 10, 2000. Many of us tried filing the late claims affidavit. Many were denied.

We understand, after receiving your letter of August 10, 2000 that the consent decree allows a person to participate. If he or she can show the claim was late due to Extraordinary Circumstances beyond his or her control. This was Judge Friedman's order.

After receiving this information, we got a committee together and we set out to prove to you that we met the extraordinary circumstances beyond our control. We sent to your office and Mr. Mikel K. Lewis's office, letters from the Four Mayors of this county, the probate Judge, and County Library, stating that they did not receive any copy from USDA to post for viewing.

Even though we went to USDA offices of this county, we were told that they could not help us, we were given this number to call; 1-800-646-2873, they did not have a copy for us to view. They did not have a copy of the extension, they did not have any application or any affidavit. As you can see this was not given to us until September 7. There is no counsel on the matter in Chilton County. I have sent written explanations with every claim and every request. We have proven to you as our class counsel, the extraordinary circumstances. We are asking that the error be corrected, Many of us still own farmland, Many of us worked on Farms as share croppers and care takers. It would be a miscarriage of Justice to deny what is due to us. We are willing to prove we have farms and that we own farms. Just tell us what we need to do. Now that I am better, I am willing to help the people of our county. I will go to the churches, there are only 17. I will put out fliers to help.

Our people need the money. We could bond a few people in each community and get the job done. Most people can name the farms they worked on and describe the location. Others can prove they own land by producing tax receipts. Just tell us what you need so we can receive our payment. We know we have met your conditions as stated in the review and the extension.

Yours Truly,
Bernice Atchison

June 11 2004

*Received Answer July 14 2004
Date June 29 2004*

Tracking # 135093
Affidavit # 76610

ATTN: Mr. Michael K. Lewis

RE: Letter 2002

I am requesting that I be reviewed under the monitor review. I know that you have the authority to review from January 17, 2000 until January 18, 2005. I believe that we have prove3n extraordinary circumstances. We have submitted to you letters from the Mayors office, the Probate Office, and the Libraries showing that it was an error. It was not posted in any of the public facilities. None of these facilities received notice to post.

If we were to meet the dead line of Sept. 15, 2000, it was the responsibility of the facalitorator to post or by mail from the Court House notify land owners. For less that \$6.00 every black Church could have been notified touching literally every black family. There are only 17 black Churches in this County. As you noted in the nomotor review, there has been problems in the claim process. It would be a miscarriage of justice to leave us out. After we brought to your attention that USAD failed to post. We were not notified of the original suite. Nor the extention that was approved by the judge. We would like to have this error rectorfied. How can we be held accountable to know when the deadline was when you did not post. We believe that this is an extraordinary circumstances and we should be allowed to participate. We have stated that there was no lawyer in this error, therefore we are trying the best way we can to answer your petition.

Did Judge Freedman intend for Chilton County to be left out because USDA did not post. That would be injustice, we have submitted to you proof. I respectly sumitt our name for consideration
WE DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

SENCERELY,

Bernice Atchison 5887600
Morris Wilson 5604600
Randall Atchison 135994

COMMITTEE 205-688-2715

Pigford, et al. v. Glickman, et al.

Late Claim Affidavit

The Consent Decree in the *Pigford v. Glickman* case established the deadline for filing a claim as October 12, 1999. Any claim filed after October 12, 1999 is considered a late claim, the conditions for which are set out in § 5 (g) of the Consent Decree. Paragraph 5(g) provides that a farmer attempting to file a late claim must establish that circumstances beyond the farmer's control prevented him or her from filing a claim by the October 12, 1999 deadline. On July 14, 2000, Judge Friedman issued an order establishing September 15, 2000 as the final date by which a farmer can seek permission to file a late claim. The July 14, 2000 order also established that the decision of whether a farmer meets the standard specified in the Consent Decree would be made by the Arbitrator.

The Arbitrator will review all late claim petitions postmarked by September 15, 2000. The standard he will use is that contained in Paragraph 5 (g) of the Consent Decree - circumstances beyond the control of the farmer that prevented the farmer from filing a timely claim.

You do not have to use this form to file a petition for a late claim, but all late claim petitions must be in writing. It is important to include as much detailed information about the circumstances of the late filing as possible, because you have to convince the Arbitrator that circumstances or conditions beyond your control prevented you from filing a claim by October 12, 1999. If you have documents that help you explain why your claim is late, please include copies with your petition.

You will receive a letter from the Arbitrator telling you whether you have been given permission to file a claim or not. If the Arbitrator approves your petition, a claim form will be forwarded to you.

Bernia Atchison did not file a claim by the October 12, 1999 because of the following circumstances which were beyond my control (use additional paper if necessary): We could not obtain the claim package or the affidavit I mail the 1st got Aug 16 2000
We received 1 Late Claim affidavit
Aug 16 and return it same day by
Certified mail (order on July 14 2000
with hell then until late Aug
How could we get 700 people do there
we had less than 20 days with no application

Certified Mail # 7000 0520 0014 8584 9786

Bernice Atchison
Tracking No.5887600
Affidavit 01187

Pigford -et -al. v Veneman-Civil Action No.97 1978 plf. Brewington et -al. v Veneman Civil Action No. 98 1693 plf.

The Facilitator.

As a farmer here in Chilton County we are being held accountable for the USDA mistake. They did not post, it is plainly set out in the stipulation claims that shows extraordinary circumstance beyond my control is allowed this is what the Judge said. Paragraph (7) said copies of the stipulation and the order shall be posted in conspicuous public places. In every USDA farm service agency and County Offices. (2) or be mailed by the facilitator to every person who requested a claim. (3) Who did not submit a complete claim to the facilitator within the period perscribed. This stipulation the original decree nor the extension were posted at our USDA as orded by Judge Friedman the USDA farm office Cruthouse or USDA Extension Office had no notices we asked at each office the County Farm Service said they could not help USDA Extension Office had no knowledge of the suite at all. Mr. Gray sends out notices of information on programes, farms sessions, agriculture meeting, farm marketing information, several times each year. There has not been one notice on this matter even your letter to inform this state was not wrote until February 25,2000 and mailed in March 2000 by then all days had expired for going to Selma Al. to see Lawyer Chestnut which was 70 miles away. We called him he was not taking any more claims at that time stating he had gotten his quoter yet we are being held accountable for not filing on time. There was no claim at USDA Office in Chilton County. The secretary stated she was not able to help us. We went to every office trying to get help. The Probate Judge did not know what to do. You failed to post a notice with him. This is extraordinary circumstances Judge Friedman gave the order for you to post or notify by mail this was not done. I am a farmer has farmed all my life to deny us after we proved our aligation is unjust. We asked to participate Judge Fredman ordered on July 14,2000 was never published or posted in Chilton County. As the Facilitator you are appointed in this area we had no phone calls or letters from anyone that was appointed for this area. How can you hold us responsible for not getting a late claim in on time when you did not post or mail or give us notice.

Sincerely Bernice Atchison
Committeeman

(Use this over)

ARBITRATOR

19

Tracking 00006821700
 Affidavit 06242
 July 29 02

Pigford et al. v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)
 Brewington et al. v. Veneman - Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

Dear: Mr. Michael K. Lewis,

We are asking for your reconsideration that we may participate in the settlement. We are enclosing the document necessary to prove to you the extraordinary circumstance that was beyond our control.

USDA did not post the information, in any city here in C HILTON COUNTY. Neither did they post it in the extension office. Therefore we are asking to join the settlement, base on these facts. We have read your petition in the Montor Review. And we know that you were appointed from January 18, 2000 to January 17, 2005. (Page 7 paragraph 14). These are facts that we found.

The fact it was not posted, and we have sent copies with each petition to prove it. (Paragraph 5 of page 3) There is a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Paragraph 6 of page 3) We have gather the necessary document to show the miscarriage of justice by the USDA of Chilton County. They fail to post the information in any town. (Paragraph 7) You already know of the problem. This is a USDA problem of failing in there job as the Judge has ordered. It was not posted in our USDA office, or the county court house for us to view. Page 3 the class lawyer say describe the error or mistake, that makes it a miscarriage of justice.

(1) We are poor in need of these funds, and to be deprived of our share would be a miscarriage of justice.

(2) We are African American.

(3) We have farm all of our life. We all have.

(9 A) We notified Mr. Lewis in the beginning, there were no lawyers in our area, and that we were older peoples on S.S. and disable. That is why we are trying to answer these petition.

(Page 7) Yes we contact USDA and was told they could not help us, the secretary stated that the case was being brought against them the USDA. We would have to do it own our own. We are asking to be permitted to participate in the suit. Because it was not our fault that it was not posted as the judge order. This was clearly a USDA problem. We have sent you the proof that it was not posted. They fail to post it as the judge order. They did not even post the extension. It would be unfair to hold us accountable for USDA failure, we are asking for justice as farmers.

Did Judge Freedom intend that this county be denied by not posting at any time. How was we to know what or when, if it is not posted to read, even the extension was not posted. That is why so many miss the dead line. It was alack of information. Information that was due us by law, and could have been mail to every black land owner.

We declair under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

SIGN:

Bernice C. Atchison

SIGN:

FMNP 750
 Randell J Atchison
 Tracking No. 135994
 Affidavit 72267
 P.O Box 423
 Jemison, Alabama 35085
 Farm Location Hwy. 191

To The Monotor

The question that we are asking in Chilton County is Did Judge Freedman mean to leave this county out by not posting or notifying the Black Farmers and Farm helpers?

While we worked to Produce and help produce the products that is raised in this county and shipped to many other states to be sold.

We had hope to be treated Fairley. We contacted USDA of Chilton County and were told that they could not help us. We imediately wrote certified letters to class councele and to the Monotor, telling that there were no Affidavit and there was no claim package at USDA and that they had in form us they could not help us. USDA Chilton County did not have a copy of the Concent Decree nor the stipulation for us to view. It was not published in our County News Paper or the U.S. Agriculture for the extension service here in Chilton County . We were not notified by mail, we were not given a chance to apply even after we notified Class Councile there was no legal help in this County for us.

Many of us was sent denial letters and many were not answered or given a tracking number. We have sent packages after packages to inform you and ask that the error be corrected.

We know you receive them 8 copies were sent by certified mail 8 packages. We have called time after time to No Avail beginning in April 2000 until now asking,pleading that class councele recertify the error. Many of us own farms now here in Chilton County many are Farm Helpers, Share Croppers, some have FMNP No. as I do, yet you have denied me and many more. I have lived on the same farm all my life I was born here in 1957 my mother and father worked hard to secure their own land for their own children to inherit. You are now holding me accountable for a late Claim Affidavit When you did not send them to us as we requested. When we notified you that we had no claims even your affidavit was not sent to any of our people until after August 16 that left only 20 working days with the Labor Day weekend in that. Less than 20 days with no

farm letter

2-7

affidavit claim for our people our family who all own farms.

The problem was a USDA and class Council problem they Defyed the Judge order here in Chilton County they did not post. The Judge said it plainly IT SHALL BE POSTED. It was not and the USDA did not have a copy of the Decree or Stipulation for us to view. Without that information those instructions we had no way of knowing what was needed to apply. I am a farmer 39 ac and 239 Grandfather 80 Grandmother 39 Grandmother. We declare under purgery the Forgoing Statement are true and that we do have the said evident to prove that we notified by Certified Mail at least 8 times to make you aware of our problem. When you respond of Aug 10 came on Aug 16 2000 we had less than 20 working days to respond and only one affidavit that was all that you sent

Yours Truly

Randall J. Atcham
Randall J. Atcham
Morris Wilson Committee

Copy Sent to Class Counsel using
Copy Sent to Michael to Lewis

Randall

22

117,500
Tracking # 35 994
Affidavit 72267

Pigford -et -al. v Veneman-Civil Action no 97 1978 plf
Brewington et -al. v Veneman Civil Action no 98 1693 plf

The Facilitator.
 As A Farmer here in Chilton County we are being held accountable for the USDA mistake . They did not post it is plainly set out in the stipulation claims that show extraordinary circumstance beyond my controll is allowed this is what the JUDGE said.
 → paragraph (7) said copies of the stipulation and the order shall be posted in conspicuous public places in every USDA farm service agency and county offices no(2) or be mail by the facilitator to every pearson who requested a claim form (3) who did not submitte a compleat claime to thefacilitator with in the pirod precribed
 This stipulation, the original decree, nor the extension were posted at our USDA as order by JUDGE FRIEDMAN. the usda farm office, court house, or usda extension office. WE ask at each office the county farm service said they could not help us, the usda extension office had no knowledge of the suite at all.
 MR Gray send out notices of enformation on programs farms session agriculture meeting farm marketing information several times each year, there has not ben any information on this matter. Even your letter to inform this state was not wrote until Feb 25 2000 and mail in march 2000 by then all days had expired for going to Selma Ala. to see Lawyer Chestnut, which was 70 miles away we call him he was not taking any at that time, yet we are being held accountable for not filling a on time claim. there was no claims at our USDA office the secetary said she was not able to help us, we went to every office trying to get help the probate Judge did not know what to do You fail to post as judge order we had no information this is extraordinary circumstance
 Judge FRIEDMAN Gave the order for you to post or notify by mail this was not done I am a farmer have farmed all my life to deny us after we prove our aligation is also unjust we ask to participate

Yours Truly
- Michael J. Johnson

23

Randall J Atchison

Tracking No. 135994

Affidavit No. 72267

P.O. Box 423

Jemison, Alabama 35085

Farm on Highway 191 Jemison, Alabama
CHILTON COUNTY EVENT PACKAGE

The question that we are now asking in Chilton County is "Did Judge Feadman mean to leave this county out by not posting or notifying the Black Farmers and Farm helpers?" While we work to produce and help produce the produce that is raised in this county and shipped to many other states to be sold.

We had hoped to be treated fairly, we contacted USDA of Chilton County and were told that they could not help us. We immediately wrote certified letters to class counsel and to the monotor, telling that there were no affidavit and there was no claim package at USDA and that they had informed us they could not help. USDA Chilton did not have a copy of the Concent Deree nor the stipulation for us to view. It was not published in our county news paper or the U.S. agriculture for the extension service here in Chilton County. We were not notified by mail, we were not given a chance to even after class councele knew their was no legal help in this county for us. Many of us was sent denial letters and many were not answered or given a track number. We have sent package after package to inform you and ask that the error be corrected. We know you received them, they were sent certified mail. We have called time after time to no avail beginning in April of 2000 until now, asking class counsel to please recetify the error.

Many of us own farms now here in Chilton County, many are farm helpers some have FmNp no as I do yet you have denied me and many more, I have lived on the same farm all of my life and I was born in 1957. My mother and father worked hard to secere their own land for their own children to inherit. You are now holding me accountable for a late claim affidavit when you did not send them to us as we requested and when we notified you that we received them late you have still denied us the problem was USD and class counsel. They defied the Judge order here in Chilton Co. by not obeying the stipulation. It plainly stated it shall be posted, we had no way of knowing what we needed to do without these instructions and a claim package or affidavit. We declare under purgey the for going statements are true and that we do have evidence to all of said charges.

Sincerely,
Randall J. Akshum

We have proven to you the extra ordinary circumst
ance and the miscarage of justice
we have brought it to your attention we have sent to you the
Proof now we ask that you honor the stipulation as it was
taken and give us the justice that is due us,
those of us that can prove we own farm and still farm
despase to be payed, I own a farm and have a FmNp # 750
yet you have denied me I am still farming at this date.
Justice demand that you correct the error that made in Chilton County

**Feeder Pigs Association
Inspected Farms
(Supervisors-Mims & Simms)**

1965-1992

**Chilton County Feeder Pigs Programs
Black Farmers**

FARMS

Allen C. Atchison
Issac Campbell
Jim Powell
Wilson Bryant
J.W. Atchison
O.T. Nunn
L.C. Hudson

BOYS

Dekinyon & Adam
Gregory
Jimmie
Esburn
Marcus
David
James

RANDALL J. ATCHISON
 TRACKING 135994
 AFFIDAVIT 72269
 PD BIP 423
 JEMISON ALA 35885
 Farm on Hwy 91 Jemison

3 Fed Suit Copies Sent to Class Counsel
 and to Monitor
 Class Action Benefit per Court Order in

McRohan v Life & South
 BT-AL-CV 915 pt 3373E US District

Court for Northern District of Ala

USDA Sent us to Bank The Bank own
 Charge

Farms As Listed

- 1) Burbet Farm
Hwy 191 Jemison, AL.35085
Cattle-Hay-Horses
- 2)Jemison Milling Co.
Hwy 191 Jemison, AL. 35085
Feed-Fertilizer-Seeds
- 3) Hays Farms
Hwy 5 Jemison, AL. 35085
Corn-Beans-Okra
- 4) Charlie Childress Farm
Hwy 50 Jemison, AL. 35085
Vegetables-Fruit-Cotton-
Cattle-Hay-Chicken eggs
- 5) Bently Farms
Hwy. 31 Thorsby, AL. 35171
Peaches-Plums-Apples-
Potatoes
- 6) J.T. Porter Farms
Hwy.191 Jemison, AL.35085
Hay-Watermelon-Corn-Beans-
Cattle
- 7) Pat Lowrey Farm
Main Street Jemison,AL. 35085
Hay-Watermelon-Seeds-Feed-
Fertilizer
- 8) Luke Porter Farm
Jemison, AL. 35085
Peas-watermelon-Catfish-
Corn-Hay
- 9) Pete Land Farm
Hwy 50 Jemison,AL. 35085
Cotton-Corn
- 10) James Rasco Angus Farm (David Nunn)
631 Co. Rd. 208 Jemison, AL. 35085
Angus Cows-Hay
- 11) Charles Cup Farms (Joshlynn Allen)
Jemison AL. 35085
Peaches-Apples
- 12) Clyde Burnett Farm
Jemison, AL. 35085
Tomatoes-Peaches-Cotton-Corn
- 13) Norah Latham Farm
Hwy 22 Maplesville, AL. 36750
Chickenhouse-Cattle-Hay- Corn

14) Hoyte Freeman Farms
Hwy 191 Maplesville, AL. 36750
Cotton- Corn-Vegetables

15) Lathan Lenore
Hwy. 191 Maplesville AL. 36750
Cattle-Hay-Logging
Farm Lands

16) Fancy Farm/Fred Christian
Clanton, AL. 35045
Peaches

17) Otis Nunn Farm
658 Co. Rd. 205 Jemison, AL. 35085

List Of Farm Workers

1) Marcus Wilson
1197 Co. Rd. 87 Maplesville, AL. 36750

2) Melvin Bell
Co. Rd. 87 Box 1199 Maplesville, AL. 36750

3) Barbara Arnold
P.O. Box 313 Maplesville, AL. 36750

4) Allen D. Atchison
Rt. 1 Box 343 Jemison AL. 35085

5) Carl Eugene Binion
6435 Co. Rd. 53 Clanton, AL. 36045

6) Luvert Caver
6435 Co. Rd. 53 Clanton AL. 35045

7) Johnnie W. Underwood 5792900
3947 Reed St. Clanton, AL. 35045

8) Willie Lee Caver c/o Bernice Atchison 89229
P.O. Box 423 Jemison, AL. 35085

9) Adam Allen
Co. Rd. 402 Clanton, AL. 35045

10) Dekinyon Baldwin-Atchison Farm
Hwy 191 Box 970 Jemison, AL. 35085

11) Jimmie Nunn
658 Co. Rd. 205 Jemison Alabama 35085

12) Cecil Williams Williams Farm
Thorsby, Alabama 35171
Peaches, plums, Potatoes

5

28

Tracking # 135093
Affidavit# 76610

ATTN: Mr. Michael K. Lewis

RE: Letter 2002

I am requesting that I be reviewed under the monitor review. I know that you have the authority to review from January 17, 2000 until January 18, 2005. I believe that we have proven extraordinary circumstances. We have submitted to you letters from the Mayors office, the Probate Office, and the Libraries showing that it was an error. It was not posted in any of the public facilities. None of these facilities received notice to post.

If we were to meet the dead line of Sept. 15, 2000, it was the responsibility of the facalitatoer to post or by mail from the Court House notify land owners. For less than \$6.00 every black Church could have been notified touching literally every black family. There are only 17 black Churches in this County. As you noted in the monotor review, there has been problems in the claim process. It would be a miscarriage of justice to leave us out. After we brought to your attention that USDA failed to post. We were not notified of the original suite nor the extention that was approved by the judge. We would like to have this error rectorfied. How can we be held accountable to know when the deadline was when you did not post. We believe that this is an extraordinary circumstances and we should be allowed to participate. We have stated that there are no lawyers in this area, therefore, we are trying the best that we can to answer your petition.

WE DECLAIR UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

SINCERELY *BACK HICKS*

The Chilton Co Committee
 has sent Class Councils and the Monitors these
 Certified letters beginning in April 2000
 up to Now asking for the error of No posting be
 corrected and that Claim Pack ages and affidavits
 be sent. We know that we have met the
 extraordinary Circumstance that is required
 for this County these are the Certified Card return
 letter receipts tracking Number

①	7004	1160	0004	4836	5948
②	7000	0600	0022	7306	2696
③	7000	0520	0014	8584	9786
④	0300	1290	0000	9805	8889
⑤	7001	1140	0003	0674	7526
⑥	7001	1140	0003	0674	9049
⑦	0300	1290	0000	9805	5268
⑧	7000	0600	0022	7305	8309
⑨	7000	0520	0014	8584	9786
⑩	7001	1140	0003	0675	0120

Committee
 Bernice Atchison
 Randall Atchison
 Morris Wilson

Mr. CHABOT. I want to thank all the panel members here. The Members of the Committee have 5 minutes each to ask questions, and I recognize myself for 5 minutes.

Mr. Chestnut, I will begin with you. In your interview with the Selma Times Journal, you stated and I quote, "This is not about notice. The notice was as complete as any I have ever seen." If that was the case, how do you explain Ms. Atchison's situation, which you just heard her testify to? What would you have to say about that? What could have been done different? And what would your comments be relative to her situation?

Mr. CHESTNUT. I have been involved, Mr. Chairman, in probably more class actions than the average lawyer. And I don't know of any class action where the notice was more complete than in this case.

There are always some problems when you are dealing with large numbers over large territories. But I went around, Mr. Chairman, from county to county—Wilcox County was one of them; it's only about 50 miles from me—and held meetings encouraging farmers to become involved.

My little law firm, Mr. Chairman, borrowed \$2.5 million in order to help get the word out and help these farmers fill out the applications. And lo and behold, the Government eventually paid \$2 million back and would not pay the interest. I had to eat it.

I was out there scuffling with these problems. I was in her county not once, many times.

Now, no matter what kind of notice that you put out there, there are going to be people who will not get it. Michael Lewis reported in his supplemental, he went back and looked at the late filings and he found that of all of those 64—I think he looked at 64,000 instead of 65,000, only about 28,000 of these people said they did not have notice. Their reason for filing late were health reasons and things of that sort.

So you really only have a third of that 64,000 people. Of that, I don't know how many of those will turn out to be really black farmers.

Mr. CHABOT. Ms. Finegan, if notice needed to be tangible and concrete, Mr. Chestnut's words, why would you advertise on CNN and Jet Magazine rather than credible sources to the black farmers, like the churches, or as Mr. Burrell mentioned, local newspapers or local African American radio stations and things of that nature?

Ms. FINEGAN. As in the case with any class action, there are certain recommendations that are made to the parties, and this was no different. There were multiple recommendations made regarding notice. However, speaking to the point of local newspaper, we did, in fact, advertise as a one-quarter-page ad in local African American newspapers, 115 of them to be exact.

With respect to television, advertising is a science. It is a science of human behavior. There is a tremendous amount of art and judgment in it. To the extent that science is used, nationally syndicated media research such as Mediamark go directly to survey individuals for their media consumption habits. So this data is a projection based on actual consumption.

Based on Mediamark information, over 63 percent of the class had access to cable television and, in fact, had viewed some form of cable television in the previous 7 days.

Regarding the art—

Mr. CHABOT. Before you go on, I only have 5 minutes, so let me ask a follow-up question. What sort of local media did you use in either of the States of Kentucky or Ohio?

Ms. FINEGAN. Sir, I don't have the specific media information in front of me. I would be happy to supply you with that information. But more than likely, there was general circulation newspaper and local African-American newspapers.²

Mr. CHABOT. You mentioned 115 local newspapers, if you could provide that information to the Committee. My time has expired.

I recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Did I understand you to say that you believe that almost half the people that filed late had, in fact, gotten notice on time?

Ms. FINEGAN. I don't believe that I said that. I was citing a report from Mr. Lewis.

Mr. SCOTT. What portion of the late filers in your judgment—Mr. Chestnut suggested two-thirds, suggested that, had some kind of notice before the deadline. Do you know?

Ms. FINEGAN. I would have to defer to Mr. Lewis. He has probably had the ability to view that document specifically, and I have not.

Mr. SCOTT. You said the notice was designed by traditional scientific methodology to get the notice to people. Do you consider there is a difference between showing that somebody looked at the paper, or a paper was presented to them so they could see it, that kind of notice, and notice that they understood that they actually might have a case and what to do? Is there a difference?

Ms. FINEGAN. Of course, there is always a difference between a notice disseminated and a notice actually communicated.

Mr. SCOTT. Now, apparently, the notice got communicated after the deadline and 60,000-some people acted after the deadline. What did they know after the deadline that they didn't know before?

Ms. FINEGAN. That would be speculation, and I wouldn't care to go there.

Mr. SCOTT. Do you object to people having their claims decided on the merits?

Ms. FINEGAN. I am not a lawyer, sir.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chestnut, for a Member of Congress to listen to your resume, I just have to remark that without your courage back when it was dangerous to bring the kind of cases that you brought without—and I practiced law for a little while. People wouldn't be here but for your work, and I want to thank you for your lifetime of commitment.

Obviously, a lot of people in class action cases won't get the notice. I mean, I get notices all the time for class actions, and I just look at it, and figure I might get \$0.30, but it's going to cost me

²The material referred to can be found in the prepared statement of this witness on pages 78-89 of this hearing.

more to mail this thing in than to worry about it, and I don't do anything. At this point, I think a lot of people, after the deadline, figured out they might actually have a case worth applying.

Do you object to them getting their cases considered on the merits if we can figure out a way to do it?

Mr. CHESTNUT. No, I am for that 1,000 percent.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I don't have any more questions now.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much.

The gentleman yields back his time.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Jenkins, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chestnut, I'm sorry I missed your testimony, sir, but I take it from responses that you have given to questions that—was yours the only law firm involved? Were there other law firms involved?

Mr. CHESTNUT. I think there were eight law firms.

Mr. JENKINS. Eight law firms involved. But I take it that you have testified here that it is your belief that the notice was adequate?

Mr. CHESTNUT. I don't have—I don't have any reservations at all about the notice. I am a class action lawyer. I have dealt with notice for the last 20 years. I don't see anything significantly different.

Mr. JENKINS. And your firm and the other firms hired Ms. Finegan to help to see that the notice was disseminated?

Mr. CHESTNUT. My firm, plus the Government, who was paying, that's the big elephant in the room, and that is who said at one point, this is all we are going to pay for.

Mr. JENKINS. Yes. But Ms. Finegan, you believe the—have you done lots of these in your work?

Ms. FINEGAN. Yes, sir, I have.

Mr. JENKINS. Do you share the belief with Mr. Chestnut that this notice was adequate?

Ms. FINEGAN. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. JENKINS. All right. Mr. Burrell, I missed your testimony, and I'm sorry, sir, I understand you are a Tennessean.

Mr. BURRELL. Yes, sir, I am.

Mr. JENKINS. From the western part of the State?

Mr. BURRELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. JENKINS. I am from the eastern part of the State, and you know that we are closer to Washington, DC. In my hometown than we are to your part of the State. But we are coming there often now, because we have a son and daughter-in-law and three grandchildren near your home. It is in Covington, isn't it?

Mr. BURRELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Burrell, what was your testimony with respect to the adequacy of this notice?

Mr. BURRELL. My testimony, Congressman Jenkins, is that the notice was arbitrary. It was basically not an issue with USDA.

If you, sir, would read some of the testimony that was given to Judge Friedman at the fairness hearing, both the counsels for the farmers and the counsel for the Government made reference to the fact that the emphasis was put on paragraph 7, paragraph 10,

paragraph 9, paragraph 11, and paragraph 12 of the Consent Decree.

Our position is, then, whatever does or does not happen in paragraphs 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12 is a function of what happens in paragraph 4. Paragraph 4 is where class counsel and the Government did not put any emphasis on. And paragraph 4 specifically states—if you don't mind, it says—it says that they are going to do the right thing, the USDA has shown its best efforts, obtained the assistance of community-based organizations, including those organizations that focus on African-Americans and agricultural issues. What is technical about that? What is technical about calling a local radio station or the local news?

Sir, with all due respect, when USDA gets ready to foreclose on a farmer and take his land, they use the local newspaper. Why couldn't they use the local newspaper when it's time to pay him?

They are making these gestures about the pie-in-the-sky effort. You have got an organization 3,000 miles away from the average black farmer—and that's no disrespect to the people who live in the west—using an organization 2,000 and 3,000 miles away from farmers, and they are saying that they are advertising in the 18-State area. But the majority of the people they paid are heirs to the black farmers who live all over the country. So on its face, the advertisement was not adequate.

And I would—and in our analysis, 92 percent of the people who they paid live outside of those 18 States. If you are going to pay an heir that's moved to Detroit or moved to Washington or moved to L.A. Or moved to Houston, as is the result of the discrimination, why wouldn't you then advertise?

What has happened—in my closing, if you don't mind—is that people who were promised to be paid—they were advertised to the farmer but they paid the heir. But they did not advertise to the heir.

So you have this cross-connect where the regents are concentrating on paying a group, that they are only actually advertising to a group that they only paid 8 percent of the time.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you, my time has expired.

Mr. CHABOT. Is the gentleman from Michigan here?

Okay. The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Bachus, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you.

Mr. Chestnut—and I will ask Ms. Finegan this, too. You know, we had 140 years of discrimination. I mean, well, illegal discrimination, and we had 100 years before that. But this 180 days, that sort of bothers me. I mean, why all of a sudden, not to get in that much of a hurry, but that must have been a real hindrance to you, Ms. Finegan, to put together what may have been your largest notification charge you had ever been given, your company. As complex as it was, as Mr. Chestnut says, the black farmers, they have been short shifted. They have been scammed. They have been screwed, you know, for hundreds of years, so you have got to overcome that. They are going to be suspicious that somebody at the same organization that has discriminated against them, and for 40

years, suddenly, going to really give them something. I wouldn't fall for that.

So I will ask you, was the 180 days in the budget that you had?

Mr. Chestnut, actually, you said that you all had to borrow money, your firm. That indicates to me that you didn't have the financial resources to notify people? I mean, the Government may have said, the judge may have said this is what you are going to get.

So I would ask you, did you have a sufficient budget? Would you have liked more? Was 180 days, was that a problem?

Ms. FINEGAN. I will address the 180 days first, sir. The 180 days is shorter than some, and it's longer than others in class action.

Having said that, there are always constraints under which we have to work to provide notification programs.

Typically, we try to do the best we can with the budget constraints that we have been provided.

Mr. BACHUS. Right.

Ms. FINEGAN. So, in order to accommodate the widest scope program, we did try to run ads. We did run ads on cable network television.

Mr. BACHUS. What was your total network budget?

Ms. FINEGAN. The exact dollars I don't have in front of me. I believe that it was somewhere around \$385,000 just for the media.

Mr. BACHUS. Doesn't that just pretty much tell you that you—you know, I spent in my Congressional district, trying to get my message out, I spend \$1 million, and I am in an urban area where I can really load up.

Ms. FINEGAN. Again, sir, we were given a budget.

Mr. BACHUS. I can just tell you, \$380,000, that ought to tell everybody in this room. You weren't working on a—you didn't have a tenth of the money you needed.

And I know you are hired by the judge and the court, and it's hard, but, I mean—and the 180 days and \$385,000? This thing was designed to fail from day 1.

And I know, you know, that's what you had to work with.

Mr. Chestnut, you said you borrowed \$2 million.

Mr. CHESTNUT. \$2.5 million. But that had nothing to do with paying for the notice.

Mr. BACHUS. Well, you know, notice—I don't think notice—maybe notice is not the word we ought to use here. What you got to—what ought to be done here, the affidavits have to be delivered. Folks have to be educated in how to file claims.

Mr. CHESTNUT. That's what we borrowed the \$2.5 million for.

Mr. BACHUS. Yes, and how much money was budgeted to get the affidavits out, sit down with people and help them with these claims?

Mr. CHESTNUT. We hired lawyers all over the south.

Mr. BACHUS. Yes.

Mr. CHESTNUT. I was all over the south, all out to California. Not only spreading the word, but giving direct assistance to farmers.

Mr. BACHUS. But you had 180 days to do all of that?

Mr. CHESTNUT. That's right.

Mr. BACHUS. That's not enough time.

Mr. CHESTNUT. Well, this was the Government.

Mr. BACHUS. I am not criticizing your—

Mr. CHESTNUT. I understand.

Mr. BACHUS. I am just saying, it's obvious to me that you aren't under this—for whatever—and I think—Ms. Finegan, you said it greatly exceeded your expectations, you know, all the claims and all.

So, I mean, that had to—I mean, that—"owe me"—isn't that what you—you used that phrase?

Ms. FINEGAN. Yes, sir. It did greatly exceed the expectations of the parties.

Mr. BACHUS. Yes, so—

Mr. CHESTNUT. But I think the record ought to reflect that this was an adversary proceeding. The Government was not in bed with us. The Government has never been in bed with J.L.—

Mr. BACHUS. I understand that. What we as the Congress have got to look and see whether the Government was reasonable in what they did. I am not criticizing what you did.

Mr. CHESTNUT. No.

Mr. BACHUS. All I am saying is—and the Government gave you 180 days and \$385,000 to notify people. It's apparent to everybody up here, that's not enough time, not enough money.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms. Hart, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. HART. Hope that buzzer is not for me.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Following up, actually, a little bit on Mr. Bachus' questions. Stop it.

Mr. CHABOT. Those bells are just to annoy people, basically. That means the House is going out of session on floor. But there are no votes until, we believe, 8 this evening, because of President Clinton's library opening.

Ms. HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up with Mr. Chestnut a little bit more.

I believe you said at one point that two-thirds of the people who made late claims didn't claim that they didn't receive notice. Am I stating that correctly?

Mr. CHESTNUT. I said that the Facilitator, Mr. Michael Lewis, went back after he testified before this Committee and examined the 64,000 of the 65,000 people, and he filed, I think, a supplemental, with this Committee, in which he said only a third—about 28,000 of those persons, said they didn't have notice or were not aware. They filed, for health reasons and other reasons.

Could I just, for 1 minute—Mr. Bachus, it wasn't 180 days. These people had from October 12th to file these claims from the date of the Consent Decree, and some of them began in January 1999, right after it was—there was a preliminary report. So that was 9 months out there that people had a window to file claims. I just want to put that in the record.

Ms. HART. Okay, that's all right. Thanks. I appreciate that clarification.

I am still stuck on this notice thing. And, you know, if you are trying to get a hold of a certain group of people, then the best way

to do that is to inquire what they used to get their information. And so I would like to jump over to Mr. Burrell and Ms. Atchison.

Just, if you could for me, what would you suggest media—what type of media should have been used to provide this kind of notice that was not?

And I will start with Mr. Burrell.

Mr. BURRELL. Well, thank you, Congresswoman Hart.

The organization that I am with, with the Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association, we have been, with the assistance of our attorney, notifying farmers about the lawsuits as well. It's interesting to note also that Mr. Pires in his statements talked about—and as Mr. Chestnut corroborates—how they travel from State to State. You would read in some testimony where they maintained it was 5 and 6 and 8 and 10 of them in a room.

Our question is—and Mr. Pires went on to say that he went to Alabama 42 times. Alabama, I think, has the largest number of claimants—and rightly so—in this lawsuit. That tells us then, that on average, 100 people heard them when they were visiting.

When we had a meeting in Alabama—we had a meeting in Montgomery—3,000 folks showed up at one meeting. But the difference between the 3,000 that came up to our meeting and, we believe, the 100 that came to his is we spent thousands of dollars buying local radio advertisement. We subscribed to black—Adonis black radio that deals specifically with that area, and we believe that's why the people came out.

Ms. HART. And that was—that same avenue of notification.

Mr. BURRELL. That same avenue, because virtually every black radio station that we called maintained that they themselves did not even know about the lawsuit.

Ms. HART. Thank you.

Ms. Atchison, could you enlighten us a little bit about your neighbors, and what kind of newspapers that you would read? And if there was any notice given in this?

Mr. BURRELL. We don't have black newspapers in Chilton County, period.

Ms. HART. Is there a local newspaper in Chilton County?

Ms. ATCHISON. We have a local newspaper in Chilton County, but it is not a black newspaper.

Ms. HART. But do people read it?

Ms. ATCHISON. Well, we are in a real rural area. You will find some people that do read it. You will find some people where it is not prevalent.

Ms. HART. Okay.

Ms. ATCHISON. But what I did to prove to Mr. Lewis, I sent him letters from all four mayors of Chilton County, who all stated—and if you pick up one of these here.

Ms. HART. Yes.

Ms. ATCHISON. You will find that each one of them stated that they did not receive any notice whatsoever to post.

Ms. HART. So there was no local government contact posted in the community bulletin board?

Ms. ATCHISON. No.

Ms. HART. Nothing like that.

Ms. ATCHISON. Wasn't posted at our county courthouse; wasn't posted at the local library. I wrote Mr. Lewis and also sent class counsel a letter, on January 9th of 2000, stating, "If we were to meet the deadline of September 15, 2000, it was the responsibility of the Facilitator to post all mail from the court house."

Notification, notifying the landowners, for less than \$6, every black church could have been notified, touching literally every black family. There were only 17 black churches in Chilton County. As you noted in the Monitor Review, there has been problems in the claim process. It would be a miscarriage of justice to leave us out after we have brought it to your attention. USDA has failed to post. We didn't even have a Consent Decree to look at to know what we needed to do. We just—just kind of sent something in.

Ms. HART. I am out of time. Thank you for that.

Mr. CHABOT. Would the gentlelady like an additional minute?

Ms. HART. I would.

Mr. CHABOT. All right. The gentlelady is recognized for an additional minute.

Ms. HART. Thanks, I just want to give Ms. Atchison an opportunity to finish because one of the things that concerns me, you know, we talk about constructive notice. That is basically that people should have known, that there is a constructive notice that should have been given for people to find this out. Do you believe that whatever advertising was done, that people in your community should have been able to figure this out? Just a yes or no.

Ms. ATCHISON. No.

Ms. HART. Thank you very much. That's good.

I yield back.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman from Alabama is recognized.

Mr. BACHUS. Only because—I will say this, Mr. Chestnut. Mr. Chestnut, I would never question anything that you have ever done. I am aware that you have righted injustices for years under great threat of physical harm.

I will say this, I am confused on this 180-day thing. Because it did say that October 12, 1999, which was 6 months following the entering of the Consent Decree, 180 days. Now, the judge did extend this over a year. But now bear in mind, he only extended it for two reasons, hospitalization and natural disasters. I mean, he actually said lack of notice is not an acceptable reason.

Ms. ATCHISON. That's right.

Mr. CHESTNUT. Mr. Bachus, you are—

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chestnut, could you turn on the mike?

Mr. CHESTNUT. You are speaking to the choir. I argued.

Mr. BACHUS. Okay.

Mr. CHESTNUT. I argued to the court that we ought to have more time.

Mr. BACHUS. Okay.

Mr. CHESTNUT. I argued to the court that the Monitor ought not to be somebody in Minnesota. I also argued to the court, Mr. Bachus, that the Monitor ought not to be white and sent two black women around there, and the judge said no.

Mr. BACHUS. Okay. But I just want to clarify, you know, the 180 days is really what we are talking about here. Because after that,

it was natural disasters and hospitalizations. You know, that's not really an extension in my mind.

Mr. CHESTNUT. Some people started filing claims right after the Consent Decree was preliminarily approved. That was in January. That's 9 months.

Mr. BACHUS. I agree. Some of them had lawyers. I am just saying that we are talking about all of them.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, it's rare where we get a situation where we basically agree with all of our witnesses, and I think that's where we are today. Sometimes, we just make things a little more complicated than they need to be.

But I don't really see that this is a case of placing blame on anybody. It may very well be that when everything shifts out, this notice was legally proper. But the notice should always be to help stop abuse of process. But it shouldn't be part of encouraging abuse of process.

And, let me say, I start out with two prejudices, or maybe one big one. Both my grandfathers were farmers, and neither one of them made it, for a long period of time. One had to become a carpenter. One of them went as a bridge tender. And I don't care whether you are a black farmer or white farmer in America; we put our farmers up against the ropes. And I am really concerned there will come a time where we are as dependent on foreign food as we are on foreign oil in America.

Let me just say one other thing about both my grandfathers. One of them only went to the third grade, and I don't care, he wouldn't have read the Wall Street Journal. He wouldn't have read The New York Times. But he wouldn't have read the local newspaper, but I would never have raised that issue to him that he wouldn't do that, because what he did is he got up in the morning, and he worked from the time the sun came up, and he worked until the sun went down, just to keep things going.

And my suspicion is we have got farmers out there that are the same way. Wouldn't have the magazine we put it in.

Mr. Burrell, in fairness, my grandfathers wouldn't have read the trade magazines, but what they would have read, the advertisements that came out in the catalogs, but they just didn't have time to do it.

And one of my concerns is this. I think most of us up here, we don't want a single farmer up here who doesn't have a meritorious claim to recover anything. But at the same time, we don't want any farmers in here who have meritorious claims not to recover.

And so my question might be oversimplified, but I don't think our issue is whether we should help these farmers. The question I pose to all four of you is, given the situation where we are now, what can we do now to help these farmers?

Mr. CHESTNUT. I think, one, the *res judicata* of the United States could say, let all 65,000 in, and the Justice Department would ask class counsel to agree to that, and we surely would agree, and that would end the problem right there.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chestnut, in all due respect, that's above my pay grade. But what can we do on this Committee and in Congress to help these farmers?

Mr. CHESTNUT. I think Congress can fashion a law that deals with this problem. But I think it has to be very careful. Number one, the Consent Decree is now a contract, a binding contract between the parties and approved by the court. If you fashion legislation to undo that, you could raise all kinds of constitutional problems.

There is also the question of *res judicata* out there that has to be dealt with. But I think that you could create a new cause of action independent of—and pay for it—that would cover these people, and if you did that, I think you would solve the problem.

I don't think the problem could be solved in any other way. I could be wrong, but I don't think so. But I am also very apprehensive about, once again, falsely raising the expectations of poor black farmers who have suffered enough. They need to understand that there is a big difference between what is a legislative problem and what is a legal problem; what can and what cannot be done in the courts. And the Congress and the White House are the only two bodies that can resolve this problem in my opinion. I don't think it's going to be resolved in the courts.

Mr. FORBES. And I want to get to Mr. Burrell.

But Mr. Chestnut, we would appreciate your further input on that with thoughts of solutions, if you could.

And Mr. Burrell?

Mr. BURRELL. Ladies and gentlemen of this Committee, the issue for all farmers in general, and black farmers in particular, with no disrespect, is not about legislation. Because if they had gotten—it's about discrimination.

If they were not discriminated against by USDA, if they had received their loans—so any other remedy that is short of freeing them up from the gravitational pull of discrimination at USDA, we will be right back here again.

One of the things in this Consent Decree that disturbed even the judge is that USDA admitted that it would pay the settlement, but it did not say that it will stop discriminating against black farmers.

So whatever else we do. If the farmer is left with going right back to the scene of the crime the morning after, USDA right now has it in its power to undo because the fact that discrimination is being allowed to exist at that agency.

And we just believe that this—first of all, this law sought should be reopened. But more importantly, we have bona fide borrowers, bona fide borrowers, who are being foreclosed on right now. We need some immediate resolution to at least get the Government to do what they did when they admitted to discrimination, and that is to get a moratorium on the foreclosure, stop the bleeding, at least in the short term.

Mr. FORBES. Okay.

Mr. CHABOT. Okay, thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.

That concludes the questioning of the panel.

I want to thank the witnesses for being here this morning. I think they have very much helped this Committee in dealing with this very significant matter.

I would also let the members of the panel here know that we may be submitting some questions in writing, additional things that may have been brought up here. Maybe we didn't have time to go into some things, so we will perhaps be sending some additional questions to you.

I would also like to let everyone know that we are anticipating possibly having a field hearing, a hearing like this but outside of Washington, possibly in Ohio, possibly in Cincinnati, sometime—coincidentally, that happens to be my district. But it would probably be in late January. And we have, I think, a pretty good communication system going on here as far as getting information and people knowing when we are going to have these hearings. So we will—yes, we have good notice about getting that out. We probably won't be hiring your firm, Ms. Finegan, to get this notice out.

But nonetheless, we will make sure that everyone knows about that hearing, and we will welcome anybody that would like to attend to do that.

And if there's no further business to come before the Committee, we, again, thank the members for their testimony here this morning, and we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEVE CHABOT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION

Good morning. Thank you all for being here for this very important hearing. This is the second in a series of hearings the Constitution Subcommittee is holding on the 1999 settlement reached between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and a class of Black farmers who have experienced discrimination by the USDA.

From the time this Subcommittee began examining this issue, we have had more reasons than not to believe that the government has failed to “do the right thing.”

I strongly believe, however, that with all of the information we are gathering in our oversight investigation, including through these hearings, we will have the understanding from which to develop a full and just solution.

I would like to thank our witnesses for coming. Your insights, expertise, and institutional knowledge are critical to this Subcommittee in its efforts to find justice.

During the last hearing, my colleagues and I used our oversight authority to gain a better understanding generally of the Consent Decree.

However, as we continue to examine more closely certain aspects of the settlement and its administration, it has become increasingly apparent that certain Due Process protections, fundamental to the Constitution, are lacking in this case.

Due Process of the law is the legal concept that the Framers of our Constitution created to ensure that the government respects all—not some, or even most—of an individual’s right to life, liberty, and property.

The Due Process Clause places limits on the government’s ability to deprive citizens of these rights—guaranteeing fundamental fairness to all individuals. One of the most important safeguards that has evolved from this Clause is the right to notice—notice of a judicial proceeding in which an individual’s right to life, liberty and property may be affected or eliminated altogether. The form of notice must be reasonably designed to ensure that those individuals will, in fact, be notified of the proceedings.

This fundamental right to notice applies to the 1999 Pigford Consent Decree and all those who had a viable claim of discrimination, which impacted their lives, liberty and property, against the Department of Agriculture.

Tragically, recent statistics released on the Consent Decree suggest to this Subcommittee that this Constitutional right was not safeguarded in the construction and administration of the Consent Decree.

Although the notice campaign design was deemed to be effective by the court in a fairness hearing held on April 14, 1999, the determination was made using advertising industry tools designed to measure the likely effectiveness of a campaign, not the actual effectiveness of a campaign.

Reports indicate that approximately 66,000 potential class members submitted their claim late—most because they did not know that they were required to submit a claim sooner—losing their right to sue the USDA for past wrongs.

It is hard for many of us to accept that 66,000 farmers would consciously wait to have file a claim that would impact their right to life, liberty, and property—knowing that they were required to do so earlier.

Further investigation into the circumstances surrounding the late claims reveals that many farmers failed to get any notice whatsoever—or failed to understand the contents of the notice if they did. These facts lead this Subcommittee to conclude that the notice implemented in the Pigford case was either ineffective or defective—given the nearly two-thirds of the putative class failed to be effectively notified of the case requirements.

The hearing this morning will focus on the actual effectiveness of the notice campaign. As we learn more about this aspect of the Consent Decree, we will consider the appropriate remedy in order to protect the safeguards afforded by the Constitution and uphold Lincoln's vision that every Black American who wants to farm was the tools available to do so.

I would like to close by putting a personal face on what Lincoln's vision means to people who have been impacted by the USDA's actions. This promise is still valued today, as this quote explains: "I have worked all my life being a servant to God and his people in Chilton County, Alabama. . . . My forefathers were brought here to farm and the gift of loving the land has passed down for more than 10 decades. I am proud of the heritage in spite of the adversity." This is the sentiment of Bernice Atchison, one of the witnesses at today's hearing. It is for Bernice and all of those who still have faith in the promises of this country that we are here today working toward finding a solution.

Again, thanks to all of the witnesses for taking the time to tell their story today.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT C. SCOTT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Jerrold Nadler of N.Y., the Ranking Member for this Subcommittee, asked me to express his regret that he was not able to be here and to serve as Ranking Member today, in his stead. Although he is not able to be with us today, he strongly supports the efforts of this Subcommittee to examine the issues surrounding the *Pigford* Settlement and was instrumental in helping to develop these hearings.

I would also like to take this opportunity to note my appreciation for the leadership you have shown, Mr. Chairman, in seeking answers and solutions to the questions and problems that have come to light regarding the *Pigford* settlement, and for the time and attention you and your staff are devoting to pursuing these issues. And I, again, express my appreciation for the open, bi-partisan and productive manner in which you, Chairman Sensenbrenner, Agriculture Committee Chairman Goodlatte and your staffs have proceeded to work with us. Full Committee Ranking Member John Conyers, Rep. Watt, Rep. Bennie Thompson, Rep. Towns, Rep. Butterfield, Rep. Sanford Bishop, Rep. Baca and Rep. Autur Davis, and their staffs, have been an integral part of developing these hearings and the issues we are exploring as well, working closely with Black farmers and their advocates.

This hearing is about the notice provisions for the *Pigford* Settlement. The information we have found reveals that some 96,000 claims were filed, but only about 22,000 of these claims were, or are slated to be, considered on the merits. The primary reason given for not considering the remaining claims on their merits is that they were not submitted during the initial period set by the court for the filing of claims, which ended October 12, 1999, 6 months after the settlement was entered into. By this time, approximately 22,000 claims had been filed. Upon realizing that claims were still pouring in beyond the initial deadline, the court set a deadline for accepting late claims. It was first set for January 30, 2000, but with claims still coming in, the court extended it to October 15, 2000. Some 66,000 additional claims were filed by the October 15, 2000 deadline, and another 7,800 after the deadline. Of the 66,000, only 2,100, approximately 3%, were accepted for a determination on their merits. While the merits of all of the 2,100 late claims accepted have not been determined, some have and, according to reports from the court appointed Monitor of the settlement, a significant number of those considered were found to warrant payment under the settlement agreement.

A large part of the problem in the settlement appears to have been that no one realized that there was the potential for so many claims to be filed. Early estimates of the potential ranged from a few hundred to, eventually, a few thousand. It does not seem reasonable to believe that the court would twice extend the period for filing claims simply to tell virtually all of the late filers—97% of them—that they had filed too late. Nor does it appear reasonable to believe that the court, or anyone, would have knowingly designed a claims procedure that would leave 75% of those who filed a claim without a way to get a determination on the merits. And it certainly does not seem reasonable to conclude that 75% of those who filed a claim knew before the deadline that they could, but intentionally waited to file their claim late. With the vast majority of claims being filed after the deadline had passed, my inclination is to think that effective notice did not reach most claimants in a manner that allowed them to file their claims on a timely basis.

The court, in trying to accommodate this situation, gave the Arbitrator carte blanc authority to determine whether late filed claims should be let in due to "extraor-

dinary circumstances.” Unfortunately, the Arbitrator established a process that resulted in virtually no one being able to show that they did not file on time due to extraordinary circumstances. Rather than applying this standard so narrowly as to leave 97% of the late claims out of the process, the Arbitrator might well have considered it to be an “extraordinary circumstance” that 75% of the claims filed in a class action settlement will not receive consideration on the merits.

There are, no doubt, a number of explanations and speculations for how we ended up with such a large percentage of the claims being filed beyond the court’s initial filing deadline, and we will likely hear some of them today. Yet, whatever the reasoning, I find it unacceptable that 75% of those who filed claims will not receive a determination on the merits of their claim. However we got here, we have a finite number of approximately 72,000 claims in which long-standing, atrocious misconduct by the federal government is alleged, and I believe these claims should receive a determination on their merits. Not all of the claims will be found meritorious, but it would be a travesty of justice on top of a travesty of justice to prevent those claims that do have merit to be resolved in favor of the claimants.

So, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for scheduling this hearing. I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses for any suggestions they may have, not to cast blame, but to insure that justice is done for the victims of inexcusable government action. Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN CONYERS, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

On April 14, 1999, I stood in victory with Black farmers across this country. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) had agreed to a \$1 billion settlement in the *Pigford v. Glickman* case. Each black farmer was to receive at least \$50,000 to settle claims that they were denied government loans because of their race.

I was disturbed to learn that USDA has denied payments to almost 90% of black farmers. Of the 94,000 growers who sought restitution for discrimination, 81,000 were turned away. The most glaring denial of compensation is the settlement-funded arbitrator’s rejection of 64,000 farmers who came forward with claims during the late claims process established by the court. Since the Court in approving the settlement described the claims as almost “automatic,” we need to understand what has gone wrong and whether we have a continuing role.

At our last hearing, we started to unravel the procedural aspects of the consent decree that led to the denial of more than 64,000 claims. What became clear was that “notice issues” formed the threshold challenge for the claimants. Given the continuing nature of complaints against the USDA, this hearing is extremely well timed and I thank the Chairman for his spirit of cooperation in helping to shed light on these issues.

Before the parties move forward with additional litigation, it is incumbent on Congress to ensure that the goals of the *Pigford* settlement have been met by the USDA. Unlike most litigation, where Congress watches from the outside, we have taken a more active role here by extending the Statute of litigation and allowing claims to move forward.

The primary issue for this hearing is why did these 64,000 individuals, plus another 7800 who filed a claim after the 2nd deadline, chose to file a claim, but only after the deadline(s) had passed?

Clearly, this raises the question of whether they received effective notice of the right or opportunity to file a claim within the time frame(s). Many farmers and their advocates contend that the notice campaign developed by the Poorman Douglas Corporation for the *Pigford* settlement was not adequately tailored to reach black family farmers.

The most remarkable exclusion from the notice campaign was the lack of a direct mailing to these farmers. Although USDA conducts regular mailings to all farmers who receive loan or subsidy assistance, and has records of applications for these programs, notice of the settlement was not provided in regular USDA direct mail communications or in a mailing specifically aimed at putative class members.

Most class action notice campaigns include a direct mailing component as a way to reach the broadest audience of potential class members. This is vital, of course, because if putative class members do not learn of the settlement in time to opt-out, they lose the right to pursue their claims in court if they do not agree with the terms of the consent decree. I trust that both class counsel and the representative from Poorman Douglas will address this issue, which may form the basis for additional inquiry.

There are other obvious questions: the only television broadcasts of the notice were on cable TV channels: Black Entertainment Television and Cable News Network. Paid cable television may not be available in many rural areas, and is generally considered costly for the average citizen. This is especially true for family farmers who must extend every resource to maintain the farm. Overall, despite the findings of the Court, the volume of late filings raises serious issue about whether the notice campaign was well crafted to reach potential claimants.

The groundbreaking victory for civil rights at USDA has proved to be short lived. Black farmers face major obstacles in obtaining settlement payments in *Pigford* and continuing allegations of discrimination by the USDA have spawned additional litigation. Ultimately, the process seems to have failed the claimants.

In 1910 Black farmers owned about 16 million acres of land. Today, Black farmers own fewer than 2 million acres. In 1920 there were nearly 1 million Black farmers, but fewer than 30,000 exist today. Unless we can reverse this trend by upholding the principles of equality and fairness, black farmers—who once served at the backbone of our agricultural industry—may soon be nonexistent.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARY GRANT, PRESIDENT, BLACK FARMERS &
AGRICULTURALISTS ASSOCIATION

To: Chairman Steve Chabot
Committee on the Judiciary
The Subcommittee on the Constitution
U.S. House of Representatives
362 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Re: The Notice Provision in the Pigford Settlement

Hearing on November 18, 2003
Room 2141
Rayburn Office Building
Washington, DC
10:00am

From: Gary R. Grant, President
Black Farmers & Agriculturalists Association
PO Box 61
Tillery, North Carolina
(252) 826-2800
bfaausnow@aol.com or tillcry@aol.com

In light of recent revelations that have been brought out by the Environmental Working Group, and taking into account the fact that Judge Paul Freidman, in the Pigford vs. Veneman (Glickman) case, has fined Attorney Al Pires, the Black farmers' lawyer, for mishandling the Pigford Consent Decree, we are asking Congress to step in and provide overdue relief to the Black farmers ill served by this Pigford Consent Decree.

With the same oppressive and immoral governmental consensus as that of the 1854 Dred Scott Decision and the 1930's Scottboro Boys case, Black farmers have been exploited and penalized by historical and institutional racist policies perpetuated by ruthless local and federal employees. How much more impossible could it be for a small band of mostly aging Black American farmers to resist the legal powers and unending racist strategies of the USDA complex and the Department of Justice?

On behalf of the members of this organization and myself, our specific concerns are:

The Black Farmers

Many of the legitimate Black farmers who applied in the Pigford Consent Decree have not been paid. This process has taken farmers and or their decedents well over five years to maneuver through the cumbersome and unfair process of the Consent Decree to receive, at minimum, the \$50,000. Many of those who were successful still are not able to receive debt relief.

Black farmers who are labeled as owing the USDA money are disproportionately more likely to have their claims of discrimination denied by the arbitrator and adjudicator, and this practice appears to be a concerted effort to prevent the "actual or real farmers" from

remaining in agriculture. Furthermore, for those farmers prevailing in the class, the government is not paying the \$12,500 in taxes to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in a timely manner, thus causing many farmers to receive threatening notices from the IRS that "payments are due immediately or enforcement actions will commence." Needless to say, these actions add to the stress and frustrations that Black farmers are already suffering from the actions of the USDA.

Denied Debt Relief

The Black farmers, who have not received debt relief, are again besieged by their properties being at risk to foreclosure by the USDA. Many of them are facing certain bankruptcy and loss of livelihood as well as land. National and local agents have proceeded with a vengeance against those who were denied in *Pigford*.

Timely Filings by farmers

There were legitimate reasons why many Black farmers and their heirs were not able to get their applications in on time. The primary reason for the failure is due to both the USDA and the Attorney Al Pires failings to use a fair and impartial notification method. These applicants, especially the farmers, should have their applications accepted in the *Pigford* lawsuit.

Black farmers objected on March 4, 1999 at the "Fairness Hearing" and have continued their objection to the use of submitting the name of a "similarly situated white farmer" in order for a determination to be made in their claim. In order for this to be a successful tool, the Black farmer must have access to a white farmer's file at USDA "through discovery," which were not available for the Black farmer to review to determine if a "similarly situated white" farmer had received loans while the Black farmer did not. This is like asking a woman in a suit who developed breast cancer from implants to match her legal claim with a neighbor who died from taking the deadly Vioxx.

Reproving discrimination

We object to the unusual requirement in the *Pigford* Consent Decree that as a part of a class action lawsuit, Black farmers must re-prove discrimination on an individual basis. The individual in a class is a "class member" and should be treated as such. This standard was set in the case of both the Japanese Americans and with victims of the Jewish Holocaust.

We further object to the Black farmers having to re-prove discrimination because the grounds for discrimination as a class was set out in the Civil Rights Action Team's February, 1997 CRAT report, which the court had access to.

Failure of USDA to live up to the agreement

We are further disappointed that even the Black farmers who did prevail in the *Pigford* case have not been given preferential treatment in USDA loan programs since 1999. My office continues to receive calls regarding farmers trying to get loans and being denied for the same reasons prior to the *Pigford* action. This action continues because no local or federal USDA employees have been reprimanded, penalized, nor terminated for their

previous grievous acts of racism and discrimination.

We are overwhelmed by the actions of the USDA and DOJ to use any tactic to not pay Black farmers what is legally due them, as well as seeking means not to relieve the farmers' USDA debt.

We feel that the final major tactic of the USDA's lawyers and this consent decree is to use tax payer money to prolong the struggle for justice for Black farmers until the farmers die off, especially since statistics show that in 1997 over 25% of Black farmers were over 70 years of age.

Political Atmosphere

In the present atmosphere of political enmity, Black and poor people in general seem to still be considered a sub-system of the American society. Before the prevailing political party takes office in January 2005, somebody in the American government should have the political will and the moral courage to end this interminable nightmare for Black farmers and their families.

And finally, as the duly elected president of the National Black Farmers & Agriculturalists Association (BFAA), the real membership of BFAA and I are very much disturbed and offended that this Congressional Committee denies me the right to appear personally, while allowing Thomas Burrell to address the committee as president of an organization that has not elected him, according to the by-laws of the organization he pretends to represent.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF OBIE L. BEAL

**WRITEN TESTIMONY FOR THE CONGRESIONAL JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
ON THE CONSTITUTION – RE: PIGFORD V. GLICKMAN- HEARING DATE
NOVEMBER 18, 2004**

NOV. 16, 2004

**TO : U.S. CONGRESS
CON. JUG. COMM.**

**FROM : OBIE L. BEAL
P.O. BOX 435
MONTEZUMA, GEORGIA 31063**

**PH. (478) 472 - 2670
Fax (478) 472 - 9388**

DEAR CONGRESS,

**AFTER BEING ASKED BY SEVERAL FARMERS TO
READ AND EXPLAIN TO THEM LETTERS THEY RECEIVED FROM
MANAGERS OF THE BLACK-FARMERS CLASS -ACTION LAW SUITE.**

**IT WAS CLEAR TO US THAT THE CONSENT- DECREE WAS POSSIBLLY
ABUSED BY SOME OF THE APPOINTED MANAGERS.**

**AFTER OUR FEDERAL ELECTED OFFICALS WORKED HARD TO HELP
PROVIDE A REMEDY FOR THE ACTUAL-FARMERS, THEIR WORK HAS
BEEN ALMOST FRUIT-LESS FOR THE ACTUAL-FARMER, BECAUSE**

**IT APPEARS, THE MANAGERS COMMITED UNLAWFUL ACTS, WHILE
BEEN TRUSTED BY CONGRESS TO RIGHTLY: 1. CONSTRUCT 2. GET
APPROVED 3. ENFORCE, THE CONSENT DECREE (COURT ORDERED).**

**BELEAVE IT OR NOT, IF THIS MATTER IS NOT FULLY INVESTIGATED BY
CONGRESS, IT WILL LEAVE IN PLACE A UNAUTHORIZE MALIGNANT
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (CANCER). WE ALL KNOW THAT A CANCER
WILL SPREAD.**

**IF THIS MATTER IS TRUE AND NOT NIPPED IN THE BUD IT WILL SPREAD
THROUGHOUT OUR FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT. ONLY
CONGRESS CAN RESOVE THIS MATTER.**

**I AM ONE OF THE VICTIMS OF THIS UNLAWFUL ADMINISTRATIVE -
PRACTICE AND CAN EXPLAINE IT TO CONGRESS, IF ALLOWED.**

**I, ON BEHALF OF ALL ACTUAL-FARMERS IN THE BLACK FARMERS
LAW-SUIT WHO ARE VICTIMS OF THIS UNLAWFUL, MALIGNANT
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, AND ALL U.S.A. - CITIZANS, REQUEST A
COMPLETE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION INTO THIS MATTER.**

SINCERELY

OBIE L. BEAL

1. FARMERS : All African American Farmers who (1) farmed, or attempted to farm, between January, 1981 and December 31, 1996; (2) applied to the United States Department of Agriculture (U.S.D.A.) during that time period for participation in a federal farm credit or benefit program and who believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race in USDA's response to that application; and (3) filed a discrimination complaint on or before July 1, 1997, regarding U.S.D.A. treatment of such farm credit or benefit application. (See consent-decree, class definition, pg. 5, No.2 (a).

2. CLAIMANT : The term "Claimant" shall mean any person who submits a claim package for relief under the terms of this Consent Decree. (See consent-decree, pg. No.2, definitions 1 (c).

MANAGERS : (1) usda lawyers (2) farmers lawyers (3) judges (4) **ADR.**

(5) JAMS-Endispute, Inc., (6) adjudicator, and others.

In the Consent Decree, Farmers and Claimant are two different groups of people: (1) FARMER : The number of Farmers / names is limited to those in USDA records / files, except a few. (2) CLAIMANT : The Claimant is any person, (Claimant is a Loophole. What would pay the MANGERS the most money, a handful of Farmers or many Claimants?)

CLAIMANT definition (no 2. above) is one of many disastrous flaws / loopholes in the Consent Decree. This word open the door for anyone to apply for relief.

THE MORE THE BETTER: It appears, the way U.S.D.A. attorney and the Farmers attorney defined and used the word "Claimant" made it possible for any person, along with the Farmers to file a claim. This was a great way to get 90,000 claims quick (see EWR report). It appears someone wanted more than enough claims to file their timecard.

CATCH ME IF YOU CAN : It appears, the Lawyers wanted lots of Claimants quick, So they could process the Claimants claims quick and get paid quickly. (Where were the supervisors of the lawyers?)

The Consent Decree Managers aware or unaware, allowed the Consent - Decree to be carried out while the Farmers loudly cried out to them for help. The Farmers was illegally forced to be a sacrifice for Managers who carried out unlawful act (s).

The way the word Claimant was defined and used by the Lawyers, would allow for any person along with the Farmers to file a claim in this law-suite, and this would quickly lead to approximate 90,000 claims (see EWG report). Was this by design? Let us try to see.

A. Claimants applied	90,000 x \$ 65,500.00 =	\$ 5,850,000,000.00
B. Claimants accepted	22,000 x \$ 65,500.00 =	\$ 1,430,000,000.00
C. Claimants paid	13,411 x \$ 65,000.00 =	\$ 871,715,000.00
D. Farmers applied	15,000 x \$ 65,000.00 =	\$ 975,000,000.00
D. Farmers applied	10,000 x \$ 65,000.00 =	\$ 650,000,000.00
E. Farmers paid	_____ =	\$ unknown
F. All lawyers fee	_____ =	\$ unknown
G. Adjudicator fee	_____ =	\$ unknown
H. Arbitrator fee	_____ =	\$ unknown
J. Facilitator fee	_____ =	\$ unknown
K. Jams Inc. fee	_____ =	\$ unknown

Did U.S.D.A. make known to there own lawyer the number of Farmers in U.S.D.A. files?

Using U.S.D.A. files in the early stage of negotiating the consent decree, would have allowed U.S.D.A. attorney to hold the plaintiff lawyers to those Farmers / names in U.S.D.A. files, except a few. (see example "D" above. The figures above are approximate).

It appears, the Managers did not request how many farmers was in the U.S.D.A record / file, also it appear the Managers knew the more Claimants you have the more money the government could be charged (Loophole in the Consent Decree, nobody will catch it before the Managers get paid).

Not using U.S.D.A. files, allowed U.S.D.A. lawyers and the plaintiff lawyers to come up with a Consent-Decree that would backfire on the lawyers in several areas when the Consent Decree was carried out.

The Farmers now see the Managers / lawyers negotiated a Consent Decree that would allow Claimants to enter into the lawsuit that was suppose to be designed for Farmers only. (Was the U.S.D.A. lawyer asleep)?

Did the Managers have a hidden plan? Only a Congressional Investigation will reveal the truth. One thing for sure someone do not want to share with the public detail information about how much money has been paid out to 1. All Lawyers 2. Facilitators 3. Adjudicators 4. Arbitrators 5. Monitors 6. Jams Inc., and when they got the money (date). Also, it appears someone is protecting some of the Managers of the Consent Decree. (We can hold them (Farmers) off until the Statute Of Limitations runs out).

The Consent Decree had specific dead-lines for the Farmers and Managers to meet, but the way the dead-lines was wrongly enforced by some of the Managers, allowed it to favored the Managers. Let me explain : If a Farmer missed a deadline (date) he was out of the law-suite, but if a Manager missed a deadlines he would be allowed extensions.

SOLUTION: 1. Using the Consent Decree Class Definition for Farmers, obtain all African American Farmers file /names from U.S.D.A. and pay them. (If u.s.d.a. will give you the farmers files)

The above solution is so simple only a few lawyers in this country would not have figured it out, but someone chose a very BAD-SOLUTION allowing Claimants to file claims. It appears the more Claimants the better.

Early in the process, the Farmers attorneys and U.S.D.A. attorneys should have gone to U.S.D.A., and obtained the name of all African American Farmers (15,000 approximate) and paid them, then allow one year for the rest of the Farmers to come and sign up to be paid.

When the Claimants (any person who submit a claim package) submitted claims by ten's of thousands, it did not take long for the Farmers - Claims to get lost among the Claimants-Claims (paper work). See example below.

EXAMPLE : 15,000 Farmers ----- in U.S.D.A approximate
75,000 Claimants ---- see EWG report
90,000 claims

It also appears someone was interested in filing lots of claims (get paid) on many Claimants instead of filing a few claims (get paid) on a few Farmers.

Mean while, back on the farm, the Farmers are watching the mailbox, and it do not take long to hear of the good-news concerning Claimants getting paid \$ 50,000.00. With the good-news spreading the nation, farmer Joe would ask farmer Bo, have he been paid. It did not take long for all Farmers to see, Claimants were getting paid, but not the Farmers.

By December 2002, the Farmers knew they had been given bad seeds (Managers) because the Managers were wrongly producing in the Name Of Justice, and to make matters worse, the Managers were giving the Farmers the run-around when they complained.

The Farmers in this law-suit request Congress to take all necessary action to solve this problem (see SOLUTION above) and other problem.

After Congress set in motion an act, that was to help correct the wrong that was committed by U.S.D.A. against African American Farmers. No sooner than Congress authorized other Managers to rightly carry out the best solution for the problem, all hell brook loose. Let me explain : Congress trusted Managers to do what was right toward the Farmers. But the Managers abused Congress Trust by :

1. Drafting a Consent Decree that would disqualify most of the FARMERS.
2. The Managers designed and defined into the Consent Decree loophole (s), the word **CLAIMANT**.
3. The Managers made up rules as they went.

Why would the Managers do this?

When you go back over the paper-trail you will see the Managers was trusted with who get paid, including themselves. The Managers knew there was **no one** directly watching them, that would keep them on track. So the Managers used LEGAL-DOCUMENTS for illegal gains.

The Managers Designed the Consent Decree in a way, that Farmers who qualified for relief, would easily be declared disqualified. Also, the Managers defined the word “Claimant,” so any persons could apply for relief, and easily qualify for relief.

The U.S.D.A. Lawyer should have caught this and nipped it in the bud, because U.S.D.A. have all the Farmers names (approximate) in U.S.D.A. files. Was U.S.D.A. Lawyer asleep?

When the Farmers realized they had been wined & dined by their Lawyers to set them up for a fall, the Ambiguous Consent-Decree was being carried out.

The Farmers would not have known there was something wrong, until they noticed, there were so many Claimants / non-farmers being paid.

The Managers wrote into the Consent-Decree the word “CLAIMANT.” This word would allow anyone along with Farmers to to apply for relief.

SOLUTION : Using the Consent Decree Class-Definition for Farmers, obtain all African American Farmers file / names from U.S.D.A. and pay them. (If U.S.D.A. will give them to you).

BFAA NEWS ARTICLES SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN CHABOT

Copyright 2004 The Tulsa World
 Tulsa World (Oklahoma)
 May 9, 2004 Sunday Final Home Edition
 SECTION: NEWS; Tulsa; Pg. A23

Black farmers want case reopened

NICOLE NASCENZI World Staff Writer

Several hundred people attended an informational meeting Saturday at the Greenwood Cultural Center to learn about an organization's attempt to reopen a case in which the government was accused of discriminating against black farmers.

More than 20,000 black farmers filed a class-action lawsuit in 1997, alleging racial discrimination in farm lending practices by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. As part of the settlement, the government has paid more than \$641 million in claims, according to the USDA.

Leaders of the Tennessee-based Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association Inc. believe the settlement is flawed and filed a motion to reopen the case April 14 in the U.S. District Court in Washington.

"I believe this motion will go to the Supreme Court," said James W. Myart Jr., an attorney for the group.

Myart said if the motion is denied he will begin a new class-action lawsuit.

The case should be reopened because the government violated the due-process rights of black farmers and their descendants by not notifying them of the first lawsuit, said Jay Dyson, the group's communications director.

Black farmers have not been treated fairly by the USDA and have been denied resources because of their race, Dyson said. This discrimination has forced many farmers to sell their land.

In 1910, blacks owned nearly 16 million acres of farmland and today blacks own less than 2 million acres, he said.

"This is the most important movement black folks can be involved in," said Thomas Burrell, Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association president.

Some Oklahomans received false petitions soliciting money for the lawsuit, Dyson said.

According to a report by the Better Business Bureau of the Mid-South in Memphis, the bureau has received complaints about an organization called the Black Farmers Agriculturalist Association "soliciting \$100 from consumers and attempting to gain signatures for a petition."

Dyson said his group has heard about the bogus petitions but is not responsible for the false questionnaires.

People interested in taking part in the Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association's actions can join the nonprofit organization for a \$100 membership fee, he said.

Joining the organization and completing its questionnaire does not make them part of the class action. Dyson said it is too early in the legal process to join the suit.

Kenneth DeJar, a local black farmer, said he attended Saturday's meeting to learn about the organization and its plans.

"This is something that is needed in the community," DeJar said.

www.usda.gov/da/consent.htm Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association: www.bfaa.net

Tulsa World (Oklahoma)
 March 18, 2004 Thursday Final Home Edition
 SECTION: ACTION LINE, NEWS; Pg. A2

Beware 'Black Farmers Agriculturalist' scam

PHIL MULKINS World Action Line Editor

What do you know about the "Black Farmers Agriculturalist Association," its petition and its request for \$100 dues to join a suit to collect slave reparations? -- M.T., Tulsa.

The Better Business Bureau has received many phone calls recently on the "Black Farmers Agriculturalist Association" in Covington, Tenn. It has been targeting this area with a questionnaire, an application and asking for \$100. The Bureau urges extreme caution with this "application" as the organization is a mystery to the Bureau.

A report from the Better Business Bureau of the Mid-South, Memphis, says the Association operates out of a post office box in Covington, Tenn. Bureau records show it is "soliciting \$100 from consumers and attempting to gain signatures for a petition."

The bureau has requested basic information about the organization on two occasions, but the organization has declined to provide any information. As of Jan. 28, two phone numbers for the company play recordings stating its voice mailbox is full; so neither the Bureau nor Action Line has been unable to contact the company by phone.

Tulsa Bureau President and Chief Executive Officer Rick Brinkley said "Bureaus around the country are reporting large numbers of inquiries on this organization. However, the company will not respond to information requests. We have received copies of the its materials and questionnaire asking if people feel they have ever been discriminated against."

While many might respond "yes" to such questions, the material makes it clear the organization will "only send the responses of dues-paying members to its attorney" -- apparently for inclusion in "Pigford v. Veneman (formerly known as Pigford v. Glickman), a class action lawsuit brought by African American farmers who alleged the USDA discriminated against them, based on race, in its farm credit and non-credit benefit programs. April 14, 1999, the court approved a consent decree -- ending the case."

The material Brinkley obtained says the association "is working on behalf of black citizens of the United States to get a previous lawsuit reopened against the USDA. The USDA has over \$11 billion of our forefathers' money waiting to be shared to all black citizens of the United States. But it's locked away. Two years ago people misinformed the public and said only black farmers were eligible to apply for the money but that was not the case. Unfortunately, for the general black public, we did not know the exact truth and time to file, and the deadline to mail in the application was upon us. Only now are we given the truth about the lawsuit which requires the petition to reopen. That's where the association comes in -- to finish giving out to the black citizens their '40 acres and a mule' - - reparation money due to our forefathers who is now dead and gone, for their sweat and labor." The Portland Office for the Black Farmers Settlement said the deadline for class inclusion was Oct. 12, 1999. The USDA Web site -- www.usda.gov/da/status.htm -- offers a case summary and figures on the \$650 million payout.

Submit Action Line questions to 699-8888 or by e-mail at phil.mulkins@tulsaworld.com. Action Line pursues consumer complaints submitted with photocopies of documentation to Tulsa World Action Line, P.O. Box 1770, Tulsa, OK 74102-1770.

Black farmers seek justice

By: Nikki Davis Maute
 Hattiesburg American
 July 26, 2004

Black farmers and their supporters were vocal Saturday in their demand that the federal government stop foreclosing on African American farmers and release the \$2.5 billion they say belongs to them.

Nearly 2,000 people - from as far away as Texas - roared their approval at the Lake Terrace Convention Center in Hattiesburg as they agreed to endorse a declaration by the Black Farmers and Agriculturists Association Inc., to challenge what they say is a government conspiracy to deny them money from a civil rights lawsuit settlement.

The Hattiesburg turnout - one of many similar gatherings in Mississippi and other states - surprised organizers who had set up for about 1,000 people. "This is the best we've had, but we are in Mississippi where the potential for black farmers who were denied their rights is the greatest," said Thomas Burrell, president of the black farmers organization.

In 1999, the U.S. Agriculture Department set aside the money to settle a class action lawsuit filed by black farmers who had been shut out of federal farm programs. The general payout was \$50,000 to farmers or heirs who qualified. The idea of receiving a \$50,000 settlement for participants brought smiles to many faces.

"That's the amount of money that the government paid to 13,000 folks," Burrell said. "But they still have \$2.3 billion of our money and let me assure you the U.S. Agriculture Department will give our money to boll weevil protection or tobacco farmers if we don't fight them."

To file a claim, farmers or their heirs had to prove they had been denied a loan between 1981 and 1996. They had until Oct. 12, 1999 to apply. The black farmer's group also wants the settlement set aside and the deadline extended.

"The real problem today is most black folks did not file by Oct. 12," Burrell said, "and we are saying we did not know because they did not tell us and they were supposed to." Burrell asked for a show of hands for anyone who received \$50,000. One farmer raised his hand. "If you got the \$50,000 did you get all you are entitled to?" Burrell asked. "Did you know that you are entitled to apply for another \$1.54 million to buy land and seeds and equipment to farm again?"

After the meeting, the farmer who had applied and been paid declined to comment.

Burrell rallied support for the lawsuit by taking USDA Secretary Ann Veneman to task. "Miss Ann is sitting on our money," he said. "Are we going to let Miss Ann get away with this?" The crowd was unanimous and loud in their criticism of Veneman. "Some people in this room are not farmers," Burrell said. "This has nothing to do with it. It all deals with people who tried to borrow money from the USDA and their heirs."

While the meeting was free and open to the public, Burrell invited the participants to join the black farmers group. The fee is \$100. "We've got to have the money to fight this," Burrell said. "We are taking this fight to all of America. It's our money."

Burrell urged blacks all over the U.S. to ask their congressmen and senators to investigate what he said was the failure of the USDA to carry out the terms of the lawsuit that settled the class action lawsuit in which the federal agency discriminated against black farmers.

Deloris Otis of Galveston, Texas, said she was ready to challenge the government. Growing up on a Texas farm, Otis said she was unaware that the lawsuit was settled and she could have been entitled to the money. "Oh yes, we will join this group," Otis said.

Burrell also cited a report by the Environmental Working Group and the National Black Farmers Association that accuses the Bush administration of spending millions of dollars to "willfully obstruct justice" by denying the claims of black farmers."

Collins farmer John E. Rankins said he's glad that someone is finally talking about the money black farmers are due. "I did not know I could file," Rankins said. He said his father was a farmer. "They ought to just go ahead and pay," his wife, Daisy said.

November 9, 2004
 Defendant A No-Show In Slavery Scam Trial

By Andy Wise

OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI -- A Georgia man fails to show up for the second week of his trial on charges he bilked African-Americans in a bogus slavery reparations scheme.

Morris James of Montezuma, Georgia, faxed a letter to U.S. District Court Judge Michael Mills of the Northern District of Mississippi over the weekend, saying he is in a Georgia hospital undergoing tests for an unknown medical condition.

"Judge Mills informed the jury that the case would be recessed until Thursday for what the judge described as a medical necessity," says John Hailman, Criminal Division Chief for the U.S. Attorney's Office in Oxford.

James and his company, National Resource Information Center Inc., face 26 counts of fraud. A June 2003 indictment says James, his associates and a bank of telemarketers targeted predominantly black churches and neighborhoods in North Mississippi "to solicit and receive fees for providing, preparing, and processing applications for government compensation from a Black Farmers' Lawsuit and a Black Heritage Tax Credit."

Federal prosecutors say the tax credit does not exist, and the Black Farmers' Lawsuit was settled by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1999. "Claiming tax refunds or credits for slavery reparations is illegal," says Eileen O'Connor, Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice's Tax Division in Washington, D.C. "The Justice Department is taking vigorous action to stop the promotion of schemes that undermine the federal tax system and leave honest taxpayers footing the bill."

"I don't know if I should answer any questions right now," James said at his jury selection November 1. U.S. District Court Judge Duross Fitzpatrick for the Middle District of Georgia signed a preliminary injunction against James in 2003. The injunction bans James from distributing letters that promote false claims of tax credits for slavery reparations. It also forces James to stop distributing information about the offers and to turn over his client lists.

In 2001, the On Your Side Investigators first received complaints about Ella Thomas of Fayette County, Tennessee. The complaints alleged she had been visiting predominantly black churches, disseminating letters addressed to "Black Americans." The letters encouraged them to send \$50 and a completed 1040A federal tax identification form to James' company in Montezuma. In exchange, they would receive \$43,000 in tax credits or cash as restitution for the wrongs of slavery.

A Whitehaven woman who asked not to be identified fell for the scam. She said she personally handed Thomas eight money orders at a total of \$200 to collect slavery reparations for every member of her family. "(Thomas) told us they would be sent to Georgia, and that we would receive money in four to six weeks," said the woman. The money never came. Then the calls started coming -- 50 a week to the Mid-South Better Business Bureau complaining about Thomas, James and the slavery scam. The bureau's agents discovered there never was a tax settlement or credit for slavery reparations.

"It had just enough of an air of legitimacy to suck people in, and yet it was completely bogus," says Randy Hutchinson, President of the Mid-South BBB.

Three years ago, we found Thomas at her home in Moscow, Tennessee. We asked her how many people actually received their \$43,000. "Well, lots of folks," said Thomas. "I don't even want to tell you." When we accused her of being James' agent and collecting money for his scam, Thomas said, "Look, I only tell (potential investors about the opportunity). If they want to mail them, they mail them."

Federal investigators say James, through agents like Thomas, may have duped more than 6,000 African-Americans into "investing" in the slavery reparations scam. It is not clear how many may have fallen victim in the Mid-South, although "3 On Your Side" received complaints about the same scam in Batesville, Mississippi, Tipton County, Tennessee and Northeast Shelby County.

Clyde Crawford of Arlington, Tennessee, gave hundreds of dollars in money orders to James through Thomas for a chance at getting his slavery reparations. It never occurred to him it could be a scam.

"I guess it was a little bit of over-reaction on my behalf," says Crawford.

Tom Burrell, supporter of James and President of the Black Farmers' Association, says it's not a scam, and the black farmers' lawsuit is still alive. He says the African-Americans who paid James were buying "memberships" to secure a spot in any future pay-out from the suit.

"Individuals who paid memberships paid memberships for their interest to be represented in this lawsuit," Burrell says. "There was never any guarantee (of compensation)."

Thomas has not been charged in connection with James. James must show up for court Thursday, or he could be declared a fugitive.

The Watch Box
Alabama Watch's Consumer Column
Published Periodically
June 2004

THERE'S MORE TO THE BLACK FARMERS' LAWSUIT THAN MEETS THE EYE

On Saturday, June 12, thousands of people flooded the Montgomery, Alabama Civic Center for a "seminar" on the Black Farmers' Lawsuit organized by the Black Farmers & Agriculturalists Association out of Tennessee, Arkansas and Delaware. Alabama Watch had tried in vain to contact this association over the years because we knew that out in the rural counties somebody was "signing up" people for the Black Farmers Lawsuit to the tune of \$10 to \$150 and asking for folks' social security numbers. Thomas Burrell, President of the BFAAA never returned our calls, but when he came to Montgomery we got the chance to talk with him. Burrell told me his organization is a membership political organization, not a 501 (c)(3) and that membership is \$100 a year.

I asked President Burrell how he financed renting the Montgomery Civic Center and the huge advertisement in the Montgomery Advertiser and he told me the event was fully funded by his members. Burrell brought about 50 people with him from surrounding states. This event costs a lot of money.

Burrell would neither confirm nor deny that his organization was involved in the rural scheme to sign folks up for a lawsuit or for a potential reopening of the lawsuit. He denied that his organization charges people money, and indeed, I saw no money changing hands at the Civic Center in Montgomery. Burrell explained that what his organization is trying to do is reopen the case with a motion called a *writ mandamus* (a writ issued to compel a lower court or a government officer to perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly). He went on to say that the lawyers in the case were grossly incompetent, that claims have not been paid, and that the basis of this writ is ineffective counsel. Burrell claims only 13,000 black farmers have been paid from the settlement. Attorneys dispute that number.

I spoke with J.L. Chestnutt, one of the attorneys in the original suit, and he said there is a "slim to none" chance that the court will reopen the case. He said claims are still being paid, but the claimants must prove they qualify for the settlement. Chestnutt and Sanders publicized the Black Farmers Lawsuit widely urging people to sign up before the deadline. The firm has also gone public asking people not to give anyone any money nor their social security number in the seemingly endless rounds of "lawsuit sign-ups" that continue to be held in Alabama's rural counties.

Digging for the Truth

We believe that it is disingenuous, at best, for the BFAAA to advertise that black farmers and /or their survivors ought to sign up to reopen this lawsuit when the reopening of the suit is a question of law. It is cruel to get people's hopes up for what may be nothing, and it is worse to take money for the sign-ups, if the BFAAA is behind that effort. This writ is a question of law, and the responsible thing to do would have been to sign people up after the suit is successfully reopened.

We believe that the Attorney General's office has a responsibility to investigate this whole matter and take a public position on what is going on. We think the press should dig a little deeper before reporting on this case. People traveled hours, from all over Alabama, to get to this "seminar",

Clearly, African American farmers have suffered discrimination and land loss in Alabama. That's the whole point of the lawsuit. There was wide and adequate publicity by the law firms involved to seek out people who should sign up for the settlement, and time limits were clear.

However, people are not clear on how to qualify for the settlement. It is the lack of clarity that allows rumors to run rampant and sets the stage for further exploitation of Black rural people. We stand by our original advice NOT to give anybody any money or your social security number. Again, we call on the press and the Attorney General to dig deeper, and to publicize advice for rural black Americans who have already been exploited and cheated.

Understanding the Case:

In 1997, a number of African American farmers filed a class action on claims of racial discrimination in farm lending and benefit programs. The case name is Pigford v. Veneman. The class of people in the lawsuit had to have:

- ? Farmed, or attempted to farm between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996;
- ? Applied to USDA during that time for a loan, or participation in a federal farm credit or benefit program;
- ? Believed they were discriminated against on the basis of race in USDA's response to their application and
- ? Filed a discrimination complaint between January 1, 1981 and July 1, 1997 regarding USDA's treatment of their application for help.

The farmers who filed the case and USDA came to an agreement and entered into a 5-year Consent Decree. Potential claimants who had not previously filed claims were given until September 15, 2000 to file affidavits indicating why their filing was late. An Arbitrator, Michael Lewis, was assigned to make the decision on those claims. A total of 61,844 late claim affidavits were filed. To date, 56,388 have been rejected and 1,050 have been approved.

The approved claimants can choose one of two tracks for processing their claims, Track A or Track B.

What Black Farmers Got:

Under Track A the farmers got a blanket payment of \$50,000 plus loan forgiveness and some offset of tax liability, or \$3,000, depending on the circumstances. Track B has a higher standard of proof and those cases will get individual amounts.

Both tracks will get priority consideration on a one-time basis to buy, lease or otherwise acquire property in USDA's inventory, for priority consideration for loans and technical assistance.

Applications for these services must be made by April 14, 2005 by people who have been deemed part of the class.

Alabama Watch is a nonprofit nonpartisan statewide consumer group representing the interests of Alabama families and small businesses. The website is www.alabamawatch.org, and you may reach Alabama Watch by calling 1-800-449-7515 or by e-mail at info@alabamawatch.org.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE C. LUCAS

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Coalition of Minority Employees, "The Coalition" is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-racial organization with 55 presidents in 34 states. The Coalition is committed to changing the discriminatory culture at USDA and holding proven discriminatory officials and others accountable for reprisal against employees and farmers. The Coalition has informed USDA leadership on numerous occasions regarding the Department's historical and lingering problems; resulting in demoralized employees, injured customers and the wasting of millions of taxpayer dollars on the Department's dysfunctional civil rights process.

Currently, there have been thirty or more Class Action (employee) lawsuits that have been filed and a backlog of thousands of employee and farmer complaints requiring processing generated by discriminatory officials whose wrong doings go ignored. The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Office of Federal Operations, in a report dated February 26, 2003, confirmed "The Coalition's" allegations regarding the longstanding systemic problems in civil rights administration and processing. Despite the failures and shortcomings cited in the EEOC report, the Department is still in a state of denial, attempts to gloss over its systemic problems and fails to implement legal settlements regardless of the merits of these cases.

The purpose of my testimony is to inform, apprise and sensitize members of this Committee and the American taxpayers of the terrible wrongs inflicted by USDA on this Nation's Black farmers and its employees.

Officials responsible for protecting the rights of Black farmers have failed, by concocting a scheme to block settlements and obstruct justice . . . as reported by Black farmers and the recent report written by the Environment Working Group (EWG). Those responsible for this mess are said to include the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Attorneys for the Black farmers. Poorman Douglass, court ordered contractor, with a budget of only \$385,000, was responsible for the administration of an inadequate notice process, that resulted in their failure to deliver timely information to Black farmers.

"The . . . settlement is a complete failure," said Marianne Calendar, a lawyer for the Environmental Working Group (EWG.) "In part, it was the plaintiffs' lawyers who failed them. They took advantage of every aspect of the court's rules and the settlement's shortcomings to avoid responsibility. Black farmers failed to benefit from a consent decree that was supposed to remedy years of a "sophisticated, race-based system of intentional discrimination" that encouraged government officials to discriminate against them, by obstructing and denying the efforts of Black farmers to obtain loans and other programmatic assistance.

At the last hearing of the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Tuesday, September 28, 2004, lawmakers said the 1999 class action settlement did not help most of the farmers in the class. About 65,000 black farmers were excluded because they did not file claims in time, said subcommittee chairman Steve Chabot, R-Ohio. "We cannot in good conscience allow a settlement that leaves out more potential claimants than it allows in to go unexamined or remain unresolved," Chabot said.

The Pigford Consent Decree, signed by Judge Paul Friedman in April of 1998, is the written settlement agreement in the federal court case, *Pigford et al v. Ann Veneman*, Secretary of Agriculture; was settled in 1999 between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Black farmers who sued the agency over race discrimination in loan practices and loss of millions of acres of land. Black farmers have complained since the settlement was entered into that the process was flawed. The Agriculture Department acknowledged a past history of discrimination and agreed to a two-tiered process of resolving claims. For both, claimants needed to prove that a similarly situated white farmer was treated better than they. Many had trouble acquiring evidence from USDA or local officials to establish unfair treatment. It appears that the wrong choices continue to be made by USDA officials, compounding the injustices emanating from USDA's failure to comply with the Consent Decree.

The settlement contained two options, Track A and Track B, Track A was a more simplified process. Ninety-Nine percent (99%) of the claimants opted for track A. This Track included a \$50,000 settlement, plus \$12,500 for taxes, forgiveness of previous federal loans and class wide injunctive relief. Track B was more difficult because the burden of proof was higher than in Track A. By opting for Track B, one could receive actual damages, but again, the burden of proof had to be "beyond shadow of doubt". The class action lawsuit should have paid more than 30, 000 eligible farmers several billion dollars and provided them forgiveness on loan debts for the USDA's discrimination.

To date, the lawsuit has compensated only 13,000 Black farmers \$50,000 each, leaving tens of thousands uncompensated and denying them at least 3 billion dollars or more as well as the land stolen from them by the government. Over twenty-two thousand one hundred fifty nine (22,159) "Track A" applications were accepted in the lawsuit. On March 15, 2004, only 61% of the claims were ruled in favor of the claimants and 39% were denied. Although some denials were reversed, no one else has gotten paid in 2 years. The funds money dispersed is about \$818,450,387, below the \$2.4 billion claimed by the government. It's true that some people did get paid in the lawsuit. However, many more farmers would have been paid had as required by the Consent Decree, had they been notified by USDA. On April 14, 2004, the statute of limitations ran out and more than 65,000 potential claimants were shut out of the process, denying Black farmers an opportunity to prove their claims.

The Coalition is grateful to the Environmental Working Group (EWG) and John Boyd, Jr., President, The National Black Farmers' Association (NBFA) for the dramatic report entitled, "A Century of USDA's Institutionalized Racism Subjects African American Farmers to Dramatic Land Loss," from which much of the data for this document was obtained. USDA has a long and checkered past when it comes to spending the American taxpayers dollars on lawyers and attorneys to protect themselves against the wrongdoings, discriminatory activities, retaliation and abuses against Black, minority farmers and employees.

The USDA Office of General Counsel (OGC) has a long track record of using government funds to pay big expensive outside attorneys to protect them from customers and employees making claims against the Department. The reason for this waste is that USDA OGC attorneys lack the credentials, expertise and authority required to do it themselves. In addition, they frequently abuse the system and fail to apply laws appropriately. Many of them hide behind the government's dysfunctional abusive arcane civil rights process and successfully break the laws at the expense of the American taxpayer.

Based on historical data and widespread reports, papers filed in court and recent Hearing "Status of the Implementation of the Pigford v. Glickman Settlement," held on Tuesday, September 28, 2004, U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Black farmers are still suffering at the hands of a failed process which was supposedly designed to protect them . . . not abuse them. This Congress of the United States owes it to the American taxpayer and Black farmers to get to the bottom of this dysfunctional process inside and outside USDA to right this egregious wrong intentionally perpetrated upon Black farmers by those with their own personal agendas . . . racism, sexism, reprisal, intimidation and other abuses.

The Department of Agriculture has denied payments to approximately 90 percent of Black farmers, who sought compensation for discrimination under a landmark court settlement the agency reached with African American growers five years ago, according to a report released in July 2004, by the Washington-based Environmental Working Group (EWG). A two-year investigation found that USDA officials contracted with Justice Department lawyers who ran up a bill for 55,712 staff hours reviewing the claims . . . again wasting taxpayer money. to aggressively fight the farmers' claims after the settlement of the \$3 billion class-action lawsuit. The Report states that of the 94,000 growers who sought restitution in a process set up by the court, 81,000 were turned away. The report, funded by the Ford Foundation, said the USDA's actions "willfully obstructed justice" and "deliberately undermined" the spirit of the settlement. Employees suffer from the same abuses and reprisals.

It has been proven that individuals including our own government have engaged in a hideous, collusive effort to deny Black farmers not just those in the Pigford class, but also the Black Farmers engaged in the administrative complaints process post Pigford efforts to derail the justice they deserve.

Dan Glickman, Former, Secretary of Agriculture, Under the Clinton Administration, tried to fix the civil rights mess at USDA and briefed incoming Secretary, Ann Veneman on the issues and the pitfalls of trying to change USDA historic racist culture. Mr. Glickman's advice seemingly fell on deaf ears and the power stayed in the hands of discriminating officials who continue to cover up for each other and distort the facts. This generated many additional cases and resulted in new class actions, fueling a culture of non-compliance with laws, settlements and Congressional mandates. This continues to this very day. Secretary Glickman the creator of the Office of General Counsel, Civil Rights Division, for the purpose of solving the problem . . . instead they are part of the problem.

We must continue to expose those responsible for the injustices against farmers, at the hands of USDA . . . the Justice Department, Court Ordered Monitors, Arbitrators and even their own Attorney. Hopefully, these Hearings will help eliminate the institutionalized abuses partly due to poor USDA leadership and little to *no accountability*. Lawmakers and others now recognize that the 1999 class action settle-

ment did not help most of the farmers in the Class. About 65,000 Black farmers were excluded because they didn't file claims in time due to a mostly flawed and inadequate notification process. We are "sick and tired of being sick and tired."

American taxpayer dollars are being used to fund abuses against Black and minority farmers as well as USDA employees. Hopefully, these Hearings will continue to surface this travesty of justice . . . masterfully designed and perpetrated by those seeking to thwart legal process. Upon corroboration of these allegations, I request that Congress pass legislation (attached) to assure that the approximately 64,000 Black farmers who did not benefit from the Pigford vs. Veneman Lawsuit receive a just and fair hearing, on the merits of their cases.

The racial hatred and animus perpetrated by the USDA, dubbed, "*The Last Plantation*," persists like a plague. USDA officials at the very top rung, through intention, deceit, passivity, inaction and neglect, have knowingly allowed and even encouraged top government administrators and lawyers as well as local federal Farm Service Agency officials across this land to trample on the civil rights of the Black farmers and to make a mockery of our precepts of freedom and justice.

In closing, this is not a Republican problem or Democrat problem, but an American problem and America will have to deal with it." The Agriculture Department has steadfastly contended the agency's record on civil rights laws has been exemplary. It cited numerous initiatives it has undertaken to give Black farmers a greater voice in the agencies organizational structure and its efforts to funnel more business to minority farmers . . . at the same time causing their decline. These actions undermine the intent of our constitution . . . freedom of speech and the James S. Sensenbrenner, "No Fear Bill," H.R. 169.

Too much has been lost and too much is at stake for Black farmers to just accept that the solution in 1999 has failed more people than it has helped. USDA the "People's Agency" established in 1862 under President Abraham Lincoln, has sabotaged its reputation and credibility by creating conditions that make farm ownership impossible and a providing an unhealthy work environment for employees. I recommend for the above stated reasons that the Office of Civil Rights be put in "Receivership" until such time that the Congress and the Bush Administrations can be guaranteed that this deplorable mess and dysfunctional system will be repaired once and for all and stop being a burden to American taxpayers.

DRAFT # 4c

S. _____

H.R. _____

To amend an Act dated October 21, 1998, suspending the Statute of Limitations regarding claims filed by African-American farmers against the United States Department of Agriculture.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress Assembled,

Short Title

Section 1. This Act may be cited as "The Justice for Black Farmers Act of 2005".

Statute of Limitations Waiver Reform

Section 2. Section 741 of Division A of section 101(a) of Public Law 105-277 (112 Stat. 2681-30), October 21, 1998 , "October Act") is amended by:

(a) striking out "not later than 2 years after the enactment of this Act" in subsection "(a)" , and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "not later than June 30, 2005", and

(b) adding at the end, the following:

"(h) All African American farmers who:

(1) farmed, or attempted to farm, between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996;

(2) applied to USDA during that time period for participation in a federal farm credit or benefit program and who believed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race in USDA's response to that application; and

(3) filed a discrimination complaint on or before July 1, 1997, regarding USDA's treatment of such farm credit or benefit application,

are deemed to have an eligible complaint and may submit a claim for relief under the 1999 Consent Decree in *Pigford v. Veneman* ("Consent Decree"), notwithstanding any other law, regulation, ruling, or decree .

"(i) The District Court for the District of Columbia, having jurisdiction over the consent decree, shall appoint the following:

(1) Special Masters to hear all claims under such Consent Decree, who shall have authority to rule on all matters procedural or substantive which may come before such Special Master from either Party;

(2) Special Prosecutors to represent the Federal government but no such Special Prosecutor shall have been an employee of the Department of Agriculture or the Department of Justice at any time after January 20, 2001.

“(j) Claimants may be represented by attorneys of their choice in these proceedings. The Court may award attorneys’ fees and expenses (including expert witness’ fees) as provided by the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 1988.

“(k) Proceedings.

(1) Proceedings before such Special Masters under the Consent Decree shall follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (including the right to discovery), *except that*, the District Court for the District of Columbia may modify such rules as they apply to proceedings under the Consent Decree in the interest of justice.

(2)(A) Such Special Masters, following a hearing as provided in the Consent Decree, shall rule for the Plaintiff, in “Track A” (as defined by the Consent Decree) if he or she determines that a scintilla of evidence exists that discrimination occurred and, in “Track B” (as defined by the Consent Decree) if he or she determines that a preponderance of the evidence supports the plaintiff’s complaint that discrimination occurred.

(B) Upon a finding for the plaintiff, the Special Master shall award, in Track A, cash damages of \$50,000, and such non-cash relief as such Special Master shall deem appropriate and, in Track B, actual and punitive damages, and such non-cash relief as such Special Master shall deem appropriate.

(C) In all cases, because of the admissions by the Department of Agriculture of its discriminatory activity, the Special Master shall presume as a matter of law that white farmers were treated more favorably than each plaintiff, *except that* the Special Prosecutor may rebut such a presumption with a showing that the preponderance of the evidence shows equal treatment between similarly-situated white farmers and a plaintiff.

(D) Any ruling, order, decree, or motion by the Special Master may be appealed to the District Court for the District of Columbia having jurisdiction over the Consent Decree.

“(l) Departmental Requirements.

(1) The United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") shall affirmatively take such actions as necessary to ensure compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations prohibiting discrimination.

(2) USDA shall report annually to the Congress (*i.e.* the House and Senate Committees having jurisdiction over Agriculture, the Judiciary, and Appropriations) on these actions and shall include in such report the information required on Departmental beneficiaries served as required by section 10708 of the 2002 Farm Bill, 7 U.S.C. 2229a, and section 808a of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3608a.

United States Department of Agriculture Program Reform for Black Farmers

Section 3. Office of Black Farmers' Affairs.

(a) There is hereby established within the Office of the Secretary in the Department of Agriculture an Office of Black Farmers' Affairs.

(b) The Office shall be administered by an Assistant Secretary appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the United States Senate.

(c) This Office shall include the following duties:

1. To represent the Department and the Secretary in its relations with Black farmers.
2. To monitor -
 - A. All activity resulting from the *Pigford v. Veneman* litigation, including actions under the consent decree, as well as decisions and other actions taken by the Special Monitor.
 - B. Any negotiations, litigation, or other proceedings resulting from the rights and privileges granted under Section 2 of this Act.
3. To make all decisions on applications received from African farmers and rural residents for loans, grants and other financial assistance from any program administered by the Farm Service Agency, Rural Housing Service, Rural Business and Cooperative Service, the Rural Utility Service, Natural Resources Conservation Service, or any Offices administratively located within the Mission Areas of Farm and Foreign Agriculture Services, Rural Development, or Natural Resources and Environment that provide loans, grants, or other financial assistance.
4. To perform all efforts of outreach to Black farmers. All activities heretofore performed by the Office of Outreach, the Office of Small and

Disadvantaged Business Utilization, and the 2501 Program are redirected and the Director or Administrator of each such Office or program shall report to the Assistant Secretary established by this Act.

5. To assure, in regard to Farm Programs, that assistance shall be provided to Black farmers on matters including, but not be limited to, the following:
 - A. Education and training for farm ownership, financial and farm management, market development, and sales;
 - A. Increasing farmland ownership, especially for young and female farmers; to levels present in 1981;
 - A. Increasing loan levels to not less than \$10,000,000 per year for 10 years;
 - A. Technical assistance for conservation and land management;
 - A. Increasing grants to black farmer community-based organizations to assist in outreach to black farmers.
6. To prepare annual reports to the President and the Congress (specifically the Committees of the House and Senate having jurisdiction over Agriculture, Appropriations, and the Judiciary) on the state of Minority farming and rural life in the United States.

(d) (i) The sum of not less than \$1.5 billion is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005 and for each year for ten years thereafter.

(ii) Such sums shall be funded from appropriations for the agencies, offices, or programs administered by the Mission Areas of Farm and Foreign Agriculture Services, Rural Development, or Natural Resources and Environment that provide loans, grants, or other financial assistance.

(iii) At the end of ten years following the enactment of this Act, the Office of Black Farmers' Affairs shall cease to exist, and all duties shall be returned to each agency from which they emanated, or to the Office of the Secretary. The Assistant Secretary shall prepare a final report on the activities of the Office of Black Farmers' Affairs and on the state of Black farming and rural life in the United States for the President and the Congress (as specified in Section 3(c)(4)).

Section 4. Moratorium on black farm foreclosures. From the date of enactment of this Act, there is hereby instituted a 10-year moratorium on all black farm foreclosures by the United States Department of Agriculture or its agents.

Section 5. First right of refusal to purchase foreclosed farms.

(a) All Black farmers shall be given the first right of refusal to purchase farms foreclosures in the mid-atlantic and southern states that are acquired or held by the Department of Agriculture or its agents.

(b) Loans shall be made available to such farmers from the Commodity Credit Corporation for purposes of financing the acquisition of farms in Section 5(a).

Section 6. Definition. For the purposes of this Act the term "Black farmer" is defined as any natural person who farms and who is Black or African-American.

