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POST–9/11 VISA REFORMS AND NEW TECHNOLOGY: ACHIEVING THE NECESSARY SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND TERRORISM

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

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POST–9/11 VISA REFORMS AND NEW TECHNOLOGY: ACHIEVING THE NECESSARY SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

Thursday, October 23, 2003

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS AND TERRORISM,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in Room SD–419, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John E. Sununu, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

Senator SUNUNU. Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing on post-9/11 visa reforms and new technology. We're trying to understand whether we're achieving necessary security improvements that everyone in America expects in today's changing environment.

The events of September 11th have made every American even more proud of our open and dynamic society. We welcome even more enthusiastically visitors to our shores to attend business, academic, or scientific meetings, visit friends, or study at the outstanding universities around the country. From the White Mountains of New Hampshire to the sparkling beaches of Florida, we recognize that those that travel here to enjoy the beauty of America, tourists, and other visitors make an enormous impact on our economy. We know that, as well as a great trading nation and a leader of development of new science and technology, our present and future prosperity, as well as our military and economic security, depend upon the swift movement of people, goods, and services all around the globe.

The attacks of 9/11, however, forced us to reassess our policies in a number of areas including the challenging task of ensuring that those who come to our country as guests or immigrants mean us no harm by a more rigorous scrutiny of travelers that want to visit our shores.

Since September 11th, Congress has worked closely with the executive branch to improve our ability to control our borders and prevent terrorists and criminals from entering our country. Congress passed two major pieces of legislation to address this need, the Patriot Act of 2001, and the Enhanced Border Security and

Visa Entry and Reform Act of 2002. In these bills, we have taken a wide range of steps, creating the new Department of Homeland Security, adding new requirements for strengthening the visa application and review process, and using new technology, such as biometrics in passports and visas, to protect our borders.

Today, we'll examine these post-September 11th visa issuance reforms and the new technology that supports them. We'll discuss these issues first with our distinguished witnesses from the Departments of State and Homeland Security, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In our second panel, we'll hear from several leading figures from the private sector to ascertain how the visa reforms affect them.

The Secretaries of State and Homeland Security recently recommitted themselves and their agencies to "work cooperatively to create and maintain an effective, efficient visa process that secures America's borders from external threats and ensures that our borders remain open to legitimate travel in the United States." They reaffirm that "such travel is important to our international, economic, and national values and interests."

This subcommittee understands the tremendous challenge that these and other agencies, including the FBI, undertake every day to keep terrorists and other criminals out while welcoming our friends. In fiscal year 2002, there were about 440 million border crossings into the United States at over 300 designated ports of entry. Of the more than 358 million borders crossers who entered through land ports, almost 50 million entered as pedestrians. The rest entered in more than 131 million vehicles, including cars, trucks, buses, and trains. Further, State Department processed about 8.4 million non-immigrant visa applications and issued 7 million U.S. passports. These numbers alone give stark indication to the scope and magnitude of the challenge that our witnesses today deal with every day.

Today, we'll focus on the procedures related to non-immigrant visas, including border crossing cards for Mexican citizens, as well as entry procedures for those using the Visa Waiver Program. The goal is to examine the visa-related reforms that this new government team, Departments of State and Homeland Security, working closely with the FBI, have made overseas and here in Washington. We're particularly interested in how new technology is being used to consolidate and expeditiously exchange information that agencies have on terrorism criminals who would threaten our security.

Among the questions we'll be asking, What steps are being taken to ensure that the visa and border control officers on the front lines are getting the information they need to ensure that evildoers cannot enter the country? Will, for example, the new Terrorist Screening Center, which is administered by the FBI, be able to meet the requirement to provide accurate and timely information on terrorists trying to gain admission through legal ports of entry in the United States? Looking to the future, a key question is, What new resources will be required to ensure that this new system operates the way it should? And what are the performance goals now set by agencies for timely decisions? I would add, whether or not those performance goals are meeting the expectations and the needs of

those in private industry or other areas of the economy that depend on the timely issuance of visas.

Such decisions are important to speed bona fide and legitimate visitors that are on their way and to enable us to work with others to apprehend terrorists. We seek the private sector's perspectives on the impact of reforms on these legitimate travelers, as well.

We'll hear from two panels of witnesses today. We will begin with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Visa Service, who will outline the new visa and border card application and adjudication process, from beginning to end. We will then hear from the Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for Policy, Border, and Transportation Security about the agency's new and vital role in this area. And finally we will have the acting assistant director for Records Management from the FBI to brief us on the FBI's important role in the new process.

Our second panel will consist of representatives from business and academia, that deal with travel and the access of foreign visitors that might have an impact on our economy, to provide us with their perspectives of the new process. I also hope that they'll share with us their insights of the impact the reforms will have on foreign friends and the perception of those foreigners on the United States.

I appreciate the time you've all taken from your very busy schedules to be with us this morning. I know Mr. Oberlin, representing the American Korean Chamber of Commerce, has come all the way from Seoul, and some other witnesses have traveled from as far as New Hampshire.

We will begin with our first panel. If there are no objections, I will enter all of your written statements into the record, ask each of you to summarize in five minutes your key observations. If you can do your best to keep to our timetable, that will allow the greatest possible amount of time for questions and interaction. And I do assure you any written testimony will be submitted for the record.

With that, let me welcome you and begin with Ms. Janice Jacobs, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services from the Department of State.

Welcome, and please feel free to provide us with a summary of your written testimony.

STATEMENT JANICE L. JACOBS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR VISA SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning.

I'm pleased to be here today to discuss the critical role that the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs plays in securing our nation's borders. Protecting the security of the United States from foreign threats has always been, and continues to be, the primary goal of the visa process. The Secretary has also articulated our policy of "Secure Borders/Open Doors," many times before the Congress and public. We are acutely conscious of the need for legitimate travelers, who constitute the overwhelming majority of our applicant pool, to receive swift, thorough, and clear adjudications of their visa applications so that they can plan their travel to the U.S. consonant with the goals of that travel.

It is an undeniable fact that in some parts of the world it now takes longer to receive a visa to travel to the U.S. than it did in the past. This is a direct consequence of the greater scrutiny to which certain visa applicants have been subjected in the wake of 9/11. At the same time, we continue to reform the visa process to make it more efficient and effective, but always within the context of security.

I'm proud to report to you today on some of the many improvements to the visa process since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, and I also would like to enter into the record a list of these accomplishments that we've undertaken since 9/11.

Senator SUNUNU. Without objection.

[See the appendix to this hearing, page 65, for the information referred to by Ms. Jacobs.]

Ms. JACOBS. Obviously, the best way to stop terrorists or criminals from receiving a legitimate U.S. visa is to identify those persons beforehand to our consular officers. The Consular Lookout and Support System's 15 million records on people ineligible to receive visas comes from U.S. government-wide sources and helps us do just that. Data are essential, but you obviously need to know how to use them in order to reliably distinguish the genuine threats from the legitimate visitors. Consular officers consequently apply their language and area skills to analyze an application and put relevant questions to the would-be visitor, when required.

We recently revised our regulations to limit the circumstances under which a post may waive the requirement to personally interview applicants so that this resource may be used with greater frequency. Requiring more personal interviews also allows our embassies and consulates to prepared for the introduction of biometric identifiers in the U.S. visa by October 26th, 2004, as required by law. In accordance with international standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organization, we have selected facial recognition and electronic fingerprint scanning as the most effective and least intrusive. We are currently collecting fingerprints at six posts, and will be collecting at all 211 visa issuing posts by the mandated deadline.

Since terrorist groups are agile organizations that are constantly recruiting members, we have designed a system of Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) requirements that require a consular officer abroad to refer selected visa cases identified by law enforcement and intelligence information for greater review by Washington-based agencies. Of the various SAO procedures, Visas Condor was created to focus on potential terrorism applicants. Review of Condor cases requires close cooperation with our partners in law enforcement and the intelligence community to ensure that all the best analysis is brought to bear on such cases before deciding whether to issue an applicant a visa. In no case do we issue a visa over the objection of law enforcement or the intelligence community.

We also have an SAO procedure to ensure that sensitive U.S. technology is not stolen or inappropriately shared with those who would use it to harm the U.S. or our allies. Known as the Visas Mantis, this procedure also requires close cooperation with other

agencies that are experts in law enforcement, counter-terrorism, and high technology. Once the analysis is complete, we review all information provided, and advise the consular officer as to whether or not there is any derogatory information on the applicant.

We have fortunately come a long way from the beginning of the Condor process, when, frankly, none of the agencies involved in the clearance process were able to handle the volume of cases. Since then, we have coordinated closely with the other agencies to improve the interagency process. We also shifted the clearance of Condor cases to our National Visa Center in New Hampshire in July of this year, created a special Mantis team in the visa office devoted exclusive to technology transfer cases, and are piloting a $1 million project this November to allow for seamless electronic transmission of visa data among foreign-service posts, the Department of State, and other Washington agencies.

The integrity of our own travel documents, both physical and procedural, is another lynchpin in the security of our country's borders. We are currently developing an intelligent passport with an imbedded chip that will use a facial-recognition standard consistent with the ICAO standard that is accepted internationally. The data initially written to the chip will be limited to the same biodata shown on the data page in the current version of the passport, along with a full digital image of the passport-bearer's portrait.

We have assembled an interagency working group to develop a project plan for implementing our program. Our objective is to begin piloting the passport in October 2004, with systemwide implementation by the end of 2005.

As I noted above, we will meet the congressionally mandated deadline of Section 303(b) of the Enhanced Border and Security Act to add biometrics to visas we issue to foreign nationals. Let me further add that to support this program, we will be expanding our data-share arrangements with the Department of Homeland Security. We will be providing DHS the electronic record of all issued visas, in real time, to include the visa recipient's photo and fingerprints. The fingerprint data will be checked against the DHS Lookout Database known as IDENT. We expect that DHS will use our visa data to speed up the identification, verification, and inspection of travelers arriving at U.S. ports of entry.

Finally, I would like to say a few words about our new partnership with the Department of Homeland Security. In this historic time of change, State and DHS have come together to establish procedures that will provide a sound basis for maintaining an effective, efficient visa process that secures America's borders from external threats while continuing to promote legitimate travel to the U.S. We worked long and hard together on a framework that gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the policy role contemplated by the Homeland Security Act, while maintaining the Secretary of State's clear chain of command over consular officers, and relying on the foreign policy and visa processing expertise of the Department of State and its consular officers.

I hope I have conveyed our deep commitment to enhancing the security of the visa process. I hope I have also conveyed our commitment to maintaining the openness of our society to foreign visitors from all aspects of life—students, family members, scholars,

business travelers, and tourists. All enrich our country and bring significant economic benefits to the United States. Secure Borders/ Open Doors remains our goal. Our challenge has been to integrate the security enhancing features of our new programs in both the visa and passport worlds in a manner that does not discourage legitimate travel to the U.S.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobs follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANICE L. JACOBS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the critical role that the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs plays in securing our nation's borders. Protecting the security of the United States from foreign threats has always been, and continues to be, the primary goal of the visa process. The Secretary has also articulated our policy of "Secure Borders/Open Doors" many times before the Congress and public. We are acutely conscious of the need for legitimate travelers—who constitute the overwhelming majority of our applicant pool—to receive swift, thorough, and clear adjudications of their visa applications so that they can plan their travel to the U.S. consonant with the goals of that travel. It is an undeniable fact that, in some parts of the world, it now takes longer to receive a visa to travel to the US than it did in the past. This is a direct consequence of the greater scrutiny to which certain visa applicants have been subjected in the wake of 9/11. At the same time, we continue to reform the visa process to make it more efficient and effective but always within the context of security. I am proud to report to you today on some of the many improvements to the visa process since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. (I would also like to enter into the record this list of improvements.)

Secretary Powell has described our consular officers abroad as America's first line of defense against terrorists and criminals who seek to enter the US to do harm to our citizens and foreign guests. Obviously the best way to stop terrorists or criminals from receiving a legitimate U.S. visa is to identify those persons beforehand reliably to our consular officers so they can spot them on visa lines and take appropriate action against them. Thanks to the USA PATRIOT ACT, which mandated interagency data-sharing, our Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) now contains more than 15 million records on people ineligible to receive visas, more than double the number available before 9/11. CLASS counts on the systematic contributions of many federal government agencies—but especially those of the law enforcement and intelligence communities—to provide up-to-date information on terrorist threats to the United States. In fact, the majority of information (61%) now in CLASS is derived from other agencies.

Data information is essential but you obviously need to know how to use it in order to reliably distinguish the genuine threats from the overwhelming majority of visa applicants who simply wish to visit our country for legitimate reasons. Consular officers employ the language skills and country knowledge acquired prior to arrival at post, along with new techniques now taught at the Foreign Service Institute that allow them to better recognize deception. Officer training and state-of-the-art consular systems come together in the visa interview where an officer can assess an applicant's bona fides, perform the mandatory namecheck and decide whether or not to issue a visa. While personal interviews may be costly in time and money, they are an essential part of the process to enable us to better assess the visa applicant. This is why we recently revised our regulations to limit the circumstances under which a post may waive the requirement to personally interview all visa applicants.

Requiring more personal interviews also allows our embassies and consulates to prepare for the next major reform, the introduction of biometric identifiers in the U.S. visa as required by Section 303 of the Enhanced Border and Security Act. By October 26, 2004, all U.S. visas must incorporate a biometric identifier. In accordance with international standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organization, we have selected facial recognition and electronic fingerprint scanning as the most effective and least intrusive. We are currently collecting fingerprints at six posts (San Salvador, Guatemala City, Frankfurt, Brussels, Ottawa and Montreal) in an efficient and respectful manner and will continue to expand our capability to all visa-issuing posts to meet the congressionally mandated deadline of October 26, 2004.

Since terrorist groups are agile organizations that are constantly recruiting members, we have designed a system of Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) requirements that require a consular officer abroad to refer selected visas cases, identified by law enforcement and intelligence information, for greater review by Washington based agencies. Of the various SAO procedures, "Visas Condor" was created to focus on potential terrorism applicants. Review of Condor cases requires close cooperation with our partners in law enforcement and the intelligence community to ensure that all the best analysis is brought to bear on such cases before deciding whether to issue the applicants a visa. In no case do we issue a visa over the objections of law enforcement or the intelligence community. In the last fiscal year, we processed approximately 212,000 SAO cases, which represent only 2.2 per cent of total visa workload.

We also have an SAO procedure to ensure that sensitive U.S. technology is not stolen or inappropriately shared with those who would use it to harm the US or our allies. Known as the "Visas Mantis," this procedure also requires close cooperation with other agencies that are experts in law enforcement, counter-terrorism, and high technology. Once the analysis is complete, we review the derogatory information provided in light of the provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act and other relevant law. We then advise the consular officer as to whether there is any derogatory information on the applicant.

We have nonetheless come a long way from the beginning of the "Condor" process and the very difficult period from the summer of 2002 when we first required a positive response from law enforcement prior to issuing any visa subject to this review. None of the federal agencies involved in the clearance process, including State, were technically equipped to handle the volume of data that began to come in to us when "Condor" began. To improve the overall process, we have made a number of technical changes in coordination with other agencies. In July of this year, we improved the efficiency of the clearance process by shifting clearance of "Condor" cases to our National Visa Center in New Hampshire. We also created a special Mantis team in the Visa Office devoted exclusively to technology transfer cases. We are also piloting a one million dollar project to allow for seamless electronic transmission of visa data among Foreign Service posts, the Department of State and other Washington agencies. The other agencies will no longer receive a telegram but a reliable data transmission through an inter-operable network that begins with the Consular Consolidated Database. Using the Consular Consolidated Database as an electronic linchpin will improve data integrity, accountability of responses in specific cases, and statistical reporting. We will pilot this project in November.

The integrity of our own travel documents, both physical and procedural, is another linchpin in the security of our country's borders. Although the Enhanced Border Security Act does not address the issue of biometrics in the U.S. passport, we believe it is desirable for the U.S. to commit to a comprehensive program to incorporate this new technology into the U.S. passport in light of the clear security and identity advantages that this new technology offers. We are currently developing an "intelligent passport" with an embedded chip that will use a facial recognition standard consistent with the ICAO standard that is accepted internationally. The data initially written to the chip will be limited to the same bio-data shown on the data page in the current version of the passport, along with a full digital image of the passport bearer's portrait. We have assembled an interagency working group to develop a project plan for implementing our program. Our objective is to begin piloting the passport in October 2004 with systemwide implementation by early 2006.

As I noted above, we will meet the congressionally mandated deadline of section 303(b) of the Enhanced Border and Security Act to add biometrics to visas we issue to foreign nationals. Let me further add that to support this program we will be expanding our datashare arrangements with DHS We will be providing DHS the electronic record of all issued visas in real-time to include the visa recipient's photo and fingerprints. The fingerprint data will be checked against the DHS lookout database known as DENT. We expect that DHS will use our visa data to speed up the identification verification and inspection of travelers arriving at US ports of entry.

Finally, I would like to say a few words about our new partnership with the Department of Homeland Security. In this historic time of change, State and DHS have come together to establish procedures that will provide a sound basis for maintaining an effective, efficient visa process that secures America's borders from external threats while continuing to promote legitimate travel to the U.S. We worked long and hard together on a framework that gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the policy role contemplated by the Homeland Security Act while maintaining the Secretary of State's clear chain of command over consular officers and relying

on the foreign policy and visa processing expertise of the Department of State and its consular officers.

I hope I have conveyed our deep commitment to enhancing the security of the visa process. I hope I have also conveyed our commitment to maintaining the openness of our society to foreign visitors from all aspects of life: students, family members, scholars, business travelers and tourists all enrich our country and bring significant economic benefits to the United States. "Secure Borders/Open Doors" remains our goal. Our challenge has been to integrate the security enhancing features of our new programs in both the visa and passport worlds in a manner that does not discourage legitimate travel to the U.S. I welcome your questions.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Ms. Jacobs.

Our second witness will be C. Stewart Verdery, Jr., who is the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Border, and Transportation Security at the Department of Homeland Security.

Welcome, Mr. Verdery.

STATEMENT OF HON. C. STEWART VERDERY, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. VERDERY. Good morning, Chairman Sununu and Chairman Lugar.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's new role in the visa issuance process and to describe how we intend to carry out our responsibilities now that the Memorandum of Understanding between DHS and the Department of State is in effect.

I'll speak as to how DHS will enhance security of the current visa issuance process, and highlight several DHS initiatives and statutory deadlines that will affect the entry and admission of foreign nationals to the United States.

Before delving into these topics, I'd like to mention how honored I am to return to the Senate for the first time in an official DHS capacity. I served Senators Warner, Hatch, and Nickles for over six years in this body, and have special appreciation for the legislative and oversight responsibilities that you and your colleagues exercise every day.

As Ms. Jacobs described, in developing and implementing the MOU, DHS has developed a collaborative and cooperative relationship with the Department of State. Our respective bosses, Asa Hutchinson and Maura Hardy, have established a very productive working relationship, and we're consulting on a variety of issues, including the visa clearance process and interview requirements for visa applicants. DHS and DOS also participate in several interagency working groups addressing issues such as the upcoming biometrics deadlines for documents, and the entry/exit system known as US-VISIT.

DHS intends to do a top-to-bottom review of the visa process to assess whether there are security weaknesses in the existing regulatory scheme or efficiencies to be gained without sacrificing security. This review is a high priority for the Department and will require collaboration with my colleagues at DOS, other executive branch departments, various stakeholders in the business community and private and public sectors, including the education establishment.

We're committed to ensuring that adequate resources and staff are devoted to implementation of the MOU and are working within

the President's fiscal year '05 budget request to assess the resource needs for this program, which will be handled, on an operational level, by the Office of International Enforcement within BTS. In the interim, OIE will fund operations from existing BTS budgets and leverage existing resources and personnel to staff our overseas operations.

We already have officers in Saudi Arabia reviewing all visa applications, as required by law. Our officers have full access to a variety of law enforcement databases and selected legacy-INS information.

The true value of DHS officers, in addition, lies in their wealth of law enforcement experience, especially related to border admissions and interior enforcement. By placing DHS officials at consular posts at the very beginning of the visa process, we're able to ensure that homeland security requirements are addressed immediately during visa adjudication.

The next phase for deployment currently envisions five regional hub sites that will cover approximately 23 countries. These sites will be selected based on a variety of factors, including visa volume, and security and threat assessments. Possible locations—and these are possible—include Pakistan, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Indonesia.

DHS has also launched a number of initiatives that will affect the visa process and admission to the United States. BTS is implementing the US-VISIT system, which will capture entry and exit information of certain visitors to the United States. Increment I of the system involves deployment of the entry/exit system at air and sea ports of entry by December 31st of this year, and collection of biometric and biographical information from visa holders. This information collected through the US VISIT program will enable DHS to check potential visitors against up-to-date watch lists and to restore integrity to our immigration laws for individuals who overstay or otherwise violate the terms of their visas.

DHS is also piloting border crossing card (BCC) readers at six ports of entry. DHS and DOS already incorporate biometrics into the BCCs, which are issued to Mexican nationals who qualify for B1 or B2 non-immigrant visitor status and cross the border frequently. DHS will be taking delivery of approximately 1,000 BCC readers starting next month. The BCC pilot tests have already helped DHS to identify a number of impostors and aliens attempting to enter the United States fraudulently.

There are also two congressionally mandated deadlines that will affect foreign travelers seeking admission under the Visa Waiver Program, or VWP. The first is the machine-readable passport, or MRP, deadline required by the Patriot Act. DOS granted a postponement of this October 1st, 2003, deadline to 21 countries currently participating in the VWP, and the Bureau of U.S. Customs and Border Protection within BTS has already issued field guidance to inspectors at the ports of entry, in terms of handling foreign nationals who are subject to the waiver. For those countries, this deadline now coincides with the October 26th, 2004, deadline for VWP countries to begin issuing passports enhanced by biometric information, which is required by the Border Security Act.

Finally, an effective and secure visa system also requires improved information-sharing and watch-list integration so the officers adjudicating or reviewing applications or screening travelers at U.S. ports of entry have all available tools and information needed to make sound decisions. DHS, in partnership with the State Department, the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Homeland Security Council, is participating in two important and soon-to-be-integrated initiatives, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, or TTIC, whose key responsibilities are the development and maintenance of an all-source database on known and suspected international terrorists, and the Terrorist Screening Center, the TSC, which will develop, integrate, and maintain a consolidated terrorist screening list of individuals known or suspected to be engaged in terrorist activities.

In conclusion, we recognize the importance of maintaining a visa process that allows legitimate travelers—whether for business, for education, or for family reasons—to continue to travel to the United States while ensuring that homeland security requirements receive the priority they deserve.

We look forward to working with our other DHS components, our law enforcement partners, the Department of State, the private sector, and the public sector to ensure that collectively we develop a visa system that provides the security that the American people expect and deserve.

Thank you for the invitation to testify today. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Verdery follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF C. STEWART VERDERY, JR.

Good afternoon, Chairman Sununu, Ranking Member Nelson and distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Homeland Security's new role in the visa process and describe how we intend to carry out our new responsibilities now that the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and State Department is in effect. I also will speak to how DHS will add value to the current visa process without duplication of effort. Finally, I would like to highlight several Homeland Security initiatives and statutorily mandated processes that affect entry procedures and admission of foreign nationals to the United States.

We recognize that DHS has a tremendous challenge ahead in terms of developing sound visa policy and adopting effective reforms to further enhance security in the current visa process. Our interests extend beyond the process by which non-immigrant or immigrant visas are issued at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts abroad. Our interests extend to the use, or exemption from use, of visas or other travel documents once issued and the admission of individuals to the United States generally. Any revision to existing visa policy or related procedures requires a thorough understanding of the mechanics of overseas and domestic operations and how they affect travel—from the initial application for a visa or travel document abroad, to the inspection process at the U.S. ports of entry, to admission to and departure of travelers from the United States.

Although the visa MOU has been in effect only a few weeks, DHS already has developed a cooperative partnership with State Department to begin examining various aspects of the visa process. Even prior to our formal assumption of responsibilities under the MOU, we worked with the State Department to tighten vulnerabilities in the visa process abroad. DHS and State Department consulted on a variety of issues, including criteria for visa clearances under Visas Condor and Mantis; streamlining of visa clearance procedures; and changes to interview waiver procedures for visa applicants. Today, DHS and State Department participate in ongoing interagency working groups including the US VISIT working group which, among other matters, addresses collection of biometric information from visa appli-

cants at consular posts abroad; the Data Management improvement Act (DMIA) Taskforce which is responsible for evaluating and making recommendations for implementation of the entry-exit system; and the Visa Security Program (VSP) Steering Committee which supports the Office of International Enforcement (OIE) and makes recommendations on significant issues affecting implementation of the MOU.

DHS intends to do a "top-to-bottom" review of the visa process and assess which aspects work well and which areas need improvement. We also will evaluate current regulations that affect the visa process to see if there are any security weaknesses in the existing regulatory scheme. This review is a high priority for the Department and requires extensive work with the State Department, other executive branch departments, and various stakeholders in the business community and public and private sector. Our ultimate goal is to adopt visa policies and procedures that emphasize security as well as efficiency. I am currently chairing a visa policy working group that will develop short and long-term policy initiatives related to DHS' visa responsibilities under the MOU. This working group will make recommendations to Secretary Ridge on how DHS should alter or improve visa policy.

We still are in the early stages of implementation of the visa MOU. The OIE, a distinct entity within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS), is responsible for overseeing management and implementation of the visa MOU and for assignment of DHS personnel to select consular posts. DHS has committed to ensuring that adequate resources and staff are devoted to implementation of the MOU and visa security program and is working, in the context of the President's FY' 05 budget request, to assess the financial requirements and appropriate budget needed to fund the program. In the interim, OIE will fund current operations from existing BTS budgets, and leverage existing resources and personnel to staff OIE and cover overseas operations at designated consular posts.

DHS officers are already in Saudi Arabia reviewing all visa applications prior to adjudication as mandated by the Homeland Security Act. Our officers in Riyadh and Jeddah also have provided valuable assistance, expert advice and training to consular officers on fraudulent documents, fingerprinting techniques and identity fraud. As part of the review process, DHS officers at home and abroad have full access to a variety of law enforcement databases, including the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS); Interagency Border Inspections System (IBIS); National Security Entry Exit System (NSEERS); Student Exchange and Visitor Information System (SEVIS); Biometric print fingerprint system (IDENT); and Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS). They also have access to selected legacy-INS automated adjudications data and certain commercial databases.

The real value of DHS officers lies in the wealth of their law enforcement and fraud experience and expertise, particularly from the perspective of border admissions and interior enforcement. By placing DHS officers at consular and diplomatic posts at the very beginning of the visa process, we are able to ensure that homeland security requirements are addressed immediately during visa adjudication and issuance—in essence, pushing the security perimeter of the United States outward to the point of first interaction with individuals seeking to enter the United States—at the time of their visa application.

DHS intends to deploy and assign personnel to select overseas posts in a phased approach. Phase I has already occurred with the DHS operation in Riyadh and Jeddah. Phase II will involve deployment to additional selected. Working with the Department of State, DHS will select the additional sites based on factors such as threat level or security risk, visa volume, and adequacy of physical facilities and communication capability. Possible next locations are: Pakistan, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Indonesia. Prior to final selection of additional locations, DHS and DOS assessment teams will travel to each site, and certain alternate locales, beginning at the end of this month and again in late November/early December. On return, the assessment teams will make formal recommendations to Secretary Ridge on which countries should be selected for Phase II deployment. We will update the committee once those sites have been determined.

DHS has launched a number of initiatives, some statutorily-mandated and some in conjunction with the State Department, that will affect the visa process and admission of foreign nationals on either Border Crossing Cards (BCCs) or non-immigrant visas. We are committed to ensuring that every initiative or decision that may affect visa issuance or travel and entry into the United States always involves careful consideration of the impact of national security requirements on the traveling public, U.S. industries and on agency resources. DHS's Office of Private Sector Liaison serves as a point of contact for affected parties to voice their concerns about any proposed DHS initiative, policy or action. The Office of International Affairs also coordinates information exchange with foreign governments and other nations friendly

to the United States on a variety of issues including matters related to the visa process. We recognize the need for open dialogue and communication with affected parties and for an effective outreach strategy and public information campaign that makes the traveling public aware of the many changes required by recent legislation and national security enhancements.

BTS is in the first phase of developing the US VISIT system. US VISIT is a new border security and enforcement program that will capture entry and exit information of certain visitors to the United States. The information collected will include biometrics such as fingerprints and a digital photograph that will validate identity and authenticate documents used for travel to the United States. The system will be capable of tracking the entry and exit of foreign visitors who require a visa or certain other travel documents to enter the U.S. US VISIT will make entry easier for legitimate travelers and more difficult for illegal entrants through the use of biometrically enabled documents.

Increment I of US VISIT involves deployment of the entry exit system at air and sea ports of entry by December 31, 2003. This first phase will allow DHS to identify entry and exit of foreign nationals who travel in and out of the United States by air and sea on a visa or other travel document to collect and verify biometrics for foreign nationals who travel on a visa at air and seaports; to check such travelers against watch lists using biographic and biometric data; and to monitor the duration of individual visits. The US VISIT program at air and sea ports of entry is further enhanced by the electronic passenger manifest procedures that require airlines to submit information on passengers prior to their arrival to, and departure from, the United States. DHS has pilot projects ongoing in Atlanta and at the Baltimore Washington International (BWI) airport. Increment II is tied to the October 26, 2004, deadline mandated by section 303(b)(1) of the Enhanced Border Security Act, which requires both DHS and DOS to issue machine-readable, tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry documents that incorporate biometric identifiers. By this date, DHS must be able to read and verify these new documents that are presented by foreign nationals seeking admission to the United States. Congress currently requires implementation of the integrated entry-exit system at the 50 highest volume land ports of entry by December 31, 2004 and the remaining land border ports by December 31, 2005.

The information collected through the US VISIT program will enable DHS to better enforce the immigration laws pertaining to individuals who overstay their visas or otherwise violates the terms of their admission to the United States. By using new biometric and other security-related technology, DHS will improve the integrity of the overall visa issuance and admission process. DHS and DOS already incorporate biometrics into Border Crossing Cards (BCCs), which are now issued only to Mexican nationals who qualify for B-1/B-2 non-immigrant visitor status and who cross the border frequently. The biometric BCC is functionally the equivalent of a B-1/B-2 visa for each entry that the alien makes, although there are specific time of visit and distance limitations on the alien's travel when he enters the United States. Applicants apply for BCCs with the State Department. During the application process, the State Department captures biometrics, the fingerprints and face, and these biometrics are then submitted to DHS. DHS checks the biometrics against various watch lists, enrolls the applicant in the BCC database and sends the outcome of the database check to the State Department for adjudication of the application. If the BCC application is approved that applicant may seek admission at any port of entry. In instances where applicants use a BCC in lieu of a separately issued B-1/B-2 non-immigrant visa, the applicant's admission is limited to a 72-hour period and a 25-mile radius of the port of entry, except for aliens entering through certain ports in Arizona who may travel up to 75 miles within that state.. BCCs presented at airports are scanned by readers at the primary inspection lane. As required by statute, inspectors match the biometrics (photo) on the BCC that is presented against the characteristics of the alien who bears the card prior to authorizing admission. At airports, the alien's information is verified against the information presented by the airlines prior to the applicant's arrival in the United States. If a BCC is presented at a land border, the card may or may not be scanned through a BCC reader, depending on whether the applicant arrives at the port of entry through a pedestrian, cargo, commercial or vehicle lane. All applicants, however, are subject to inspection and referred to secondary, if deemed necessary by the primary inspector, where a more through inspection may be accomplished.

DHS has piloted BCC readers at six ports of entry. Each port of entry was equipped with the BCC readers known as the Biometrics Verification System (BVS). These readers have the ability to biometrically verify those individuals applying for entry bearing BCC's on a limited basis. DHS is work to finalize the deployment schedule. DHS will take delivery of 1,000 BVS readers, with 200 BCC readers to

be delivered each month starting in November of this year. Preliminary results from the BCC pilot tests have helped DHS to identify a number of impostors and aliens attempting to enter the United States by fraudulently presenting a BCC. Ultimately, the information captured under the BCC system will be integrated into the US VISIT process.

Finally, there are two congressionally mandated deadlines that affect foreign travelers seeking admission under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP): the October 1, 2003, machine readable passport (MRP) deadline required by section 417 of the USA Patriot Act, and the October 26, 2004, biometric deadline required by section 303 of the Border Security Act. The October 1, 2003, MRP deadline is distinct from the October 26, 2004, deadline for biometrics in MRPs. Under section 303 of the Border Security Act, by October 26, 2004, VWP countries are required certify that they have a program to issue passports that contain biometrics as a condition of continued participation in the VWP. Also, on or after October 26, 2004, any alien seeking admission under the VWP must present an MRP that contains ICAO compliant biometrics, unless the passport was issued prior to that date.

On the October 1, 2003, MRP deadline, the State Department, in consultation with DHS, agreed to permit individual VWP countries to apply for a one-time waiver of the October 1, 2003 MRP deadline. Exercising his legislatively-authorized prerogative, the Secretary of State granted a waiver until October 26, 2004 to 21 countries currently participating in the VWP based on their having met certain requirements. Each country granted a waiver was required to make a formal request, via diplomatic note, acknowledging that the waiver would be a one-time opportunity and only valid until October 26, 2004, the date by which nationals of VWP countries must present a machine-readable passport. Countries also had to certify that they were making progress towards ensuring that machine-readable passports are available to their nationals and that they are taking appropriate steps to protect against the misuse of their non-machine readable passports. The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has already issued field guidance for inspectors at the ports of entry for handling foreign nationals who are subject to the waiver. CBP procedures require inspectors to notify travelers from VWP countries of this new requirement with handout material indicating that the non-MRP will no longer be accepted for travel to the United States after October 26, 2004. In addition, CBP inspectors are instructed to hand write "MRP notified" adjacent to the admission stamp in non-machine readable passports. On the October 26, 2004 MRP biometric deadline, DHS and the State Department are working along with our VWP partners to ensure understanding of the ICAO standards.

An effective and secure visa system requires more than adopting new technology or making enhancements to existing processes. It also requires improved information sharing and watch list integration so that officers adjudicating or reviewing visa applications abroad or screening travelers at the U.S. ports of entry have all available tools and information needed to make a sound decision.

Based upon direction from the White House, DHS, in partnership with the State Department, the Homeland Security Council, Department of Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency is participating in two important, and soon to be integrated initiatives, that improve interagency access to terrorist-related information during visa adjudication and admissibility determinations. The President announced his decision to create the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) during his State of the Union address and the Center began operations on May 1 of this year. One of TTIC's key responsibilities is the development and maintenance of an all-source database on known and suspected international terrorists. On September 16, 2003, President Bush signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 establishing the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). The TSC will develop, integrate, and maintain a consolidated terrorist screening list about individuals known or suspected to be engaged in terrorist activities. TSC will permit appropriate users access to terrorist identities information for use in a wide range of screening opportunities. The OIE is developing a visa vetting protocol that fully ensures that capabilities of both the TTIC and TSC are integrated into the visa vetting process.

DHS recognizes the importance of maintaining a visa process that allows legitimate travelers to continue to travel to the United States and we will continue to balance these interests while ensuring that homeland security requirements receive the priority they deserve in the visa process. We look forward to working with other DHS components, our law enforcement partners, and the Department of State to ensure that collectively, we develop a visa system that provides the security that the American people expect and deserve.

Thank you for the invitation to testify today and I look forward to any questions you might have.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Verdery.

Our third panelist is Mr. David Hardy, the acting director, acting assistant director, for Record Management at the FBI.

Thank you, Mr. Hardy, for being here, and welcome.

STATEMENT OF DAVID HARDY, ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. HARDY. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Sununu and Chairman Lugar, thank you for inviting the FBI to testify in this hearing in which you will be examining the FBI's role in the process of vetting foreign visa applicants to the United States.

My written testimony contains a detailed explanation of the name-check process, or the visa security review, as it's sometimes called, that occurs at the FBI. But, in short, the process identifies whether a name or a visa applicant is found in the FBI records, and then we determine if it is or it could be the individual whose name we're reviewing. Then we determine whether there is pertinent information on that individual. And finally we determine whether a Security Advisory Opinion should be given to State concerning that particular individual.

I want to emphasize to you that the FBI is sensitive to the impact that delays in visa processing may have on business, education, tourism, this country's foreign relations, and the worldwide perceptions of the United States. With these considerations in mind, the FBI is working diligently with the Department of State and other federal entities toward the common goal of improving the expediency and efficiency of the visa clearance process.

At the same time, the consequences of the FBI's mission on homeland security requires that our name-check process be primarily focused on accurate and thorough results. This means that there are instances when the FBI's review of a visa request must require as much time needed as to obtain an unequivocally correct result. In addition, this process has identified individuals who are of concern to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The FBI's goal is to have all Mantis and Condor vetting requests completed within 120 days. In my written testimony are two attachments, which show the current status of the Visas Condor Program and the Visas Mantis Program, and their status as of October 1st. I invite your attention to them so that I can explain the charts to you.

Attachment A, which is for Visas Condor, if you will look in the month of September, the FBI received 7,986 requests. By October 1st, the FBI had resolved all but 521 of these requests. In the month of August 2003, the FBI received 7,381 Visas Condor requests, and by October 1st we had resolved all but 257 of these requests.

If you can turn to Attachment B, which is for Visas Mantis. For Visas Mantis, the FBI received 1,029 requests in the month of September 2003, and by 1 October had resolved 832 of them. In the month of August, the FBI received 1,122 Visas Mantis requests, and by October 1st had resolved all but 116 of these requests.

The percentage of completion of these requests continue to rise over time. Ninety-seven percent of Visas Condor and 95 percent of Visas Mantis were resolved within 90 days. Visas Mantis are particularly difficult to resolve due to the predominance of the requests we receive from China and the commonality of Asian names.

A common question we receive, then, is, How long does it take to complete a visa request name check? And as shown in these graphs, for these two type of visa requests, 80 to 93 percent are completed in 30 days. For both type of visa requests, 97 to 98 percent of the requests are resolved within 120 days.

Most of the name-check requests that are over 30 days old are the result of the time required to retrieve and review field-office record information. Some delays occur at the analysts' desks. These are the counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, and other appropriate desks, but that is to be expected. The analysts that review these requests are the same ones that are assigned to support ongoing operations or to support the flow of intelligence to policymakers. While this adds to their significant responsibilities, they are the best professionals that the FBI has, and they're the appropriate individuals to make informed decisions of whether a request of a visa represents a threat to our homeland.

These efforts are not without substantial challenges. Prior to September 11th, the FBI name-check system processed approximately 2.5 million name checks. In fiscal year 2002, that number increased to 3.2 million. This is for all name checks, not just for visa name checks. And for fiscal year 2003, the number of requests reached 6.3 million. At earlier hearings, we had estimated 9.8 million requests, but the request of name checks decreased over the summer, although the number of visa requests have not decreased. Attachment C illustrates this explosive increase.

With the advent of new screening requirements in late 2001, specifically the Visas Condor Program, the FBI was overwhelmed by the increase of names to be checked. We did experience a backlog, and there were problems. Certain visa requests were lost between the Department of State and the FBI. We've all but eliminated that backlog and are working together with the Department of State to ensure that any old visa requests have been accounted for and processed. This has been accomplished through clarification of the FBI name-check database, software modifications, development of internal FBI tracking systems, and improvement in the coordination with the visa name-check processing, particularly with the Department of State.

This summer and fall, we closely monitored the student visa submissions for this school year, and believe that we were able to meet the seasonal demand, something that did not happen in summer 2002.

We are using the National Academy of Sciences' data to assist us in monitoring our response time and to conduct spot checks for both students and visiting scholars. Again, we have not seen any systematic problems associated with our review process.

We recognize that our current name-check process is not sufficiently robust for the volume of requests that we now receive, and that the current process of retrieving records and information from

our field offices is too cumbersome. The FBI is developing remedies for both of these concerns.

Again, the FBI recognizes the importance of accurate and timely name-check processing. And, Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize to you, this has the direct attention of the Director of the FBI.

The FBI appreciates the interest of the committee in this matter, and I am prepared to answer any questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hardy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID M. HARDY,

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for inviting the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to testify in this hearing, in which the committee is examining the FBI's role in the process of vetting foreign visa applicants to the United States. My name is David Hardy and I currently serve as Chief of the Record/Information Dissemination Section, the section within the FBI's Record Management Division responsible for the National Name Check Program. My goal today is inform you of the manner in which the FBI is an integral part of the cooperative effort of federal agencies to screen certain visa requests.

FBI NAME CHECK PROCESS

Certain visa applicants require substantial vetting prior to issuance of a visa. Two of these categories are Visas Condor, relevant to certain individuals who are from designated countries and who satisfy additional criteria which may make them worthy of additional scrutiny, and Visas Mantis, relevant to certain individuals who will have access during their visit to American special technologies.

Since June, 2002, the FBI has been able receive visa applications by automatic uploading of Department of State cables. Visa request information from the cable is parsed and placed in a server for transfer to the FBI's National Name Check Program (NNCP). Parsed information is run against the FBI Universal Indices (UNI). The searches seek all instances of the individual's name and approximate date of birth, whether a main file name or reference. By way of explanation, a main file name is that of an individual who is the subject of an FBI investigation, whereas a reference is someone whose name appears in an FBI investigation. References may be associates, witnesses, co-conspirators, or victims whose name has been indexed for later retrieval. The names are searched in a multitude of combinations, switching the order of first, last, middle names, as well as combinations with just the first and last, first and middle, and so on. It also searches different phonetic spelling variations of the names, especially important considering that many names in our indices have been transliterated from a language other than English.

If there is a match with a name in a FBI record, it is designated as a "Hit," meaning that the system has stopped on a possible match with the name being checked, but now a human being must review the file or indices entry to further refine the names "Hit" on. If the search comes up with a name and birth date match, it is designated an "Ident" An "Ident" is usually easier to resolve.

Approximately 85% of name checks are electronically returned as having "No Record" within 72 hours. A "No Record" indicates that the FBI's Central Records System contains no identifiable information regarding this individual. By agreement with the Department of State, partially due to our concern about the time factors in approving most visa requests, a No Record equates to a No Objection to the issuance of a visa. The substantive investigative divisions in the FBI, (i.e., Counterterrorism Division (CTD), Counterintelligence Division (CD), Criminal Investigative Division (CU)) and the Cyber Division (CyD)) do not review visa requests where there is no record of the individual. Duplicate submissions (i.e., identically spelled names with identical dates of birth submitted within the last 120 days) are not checked and the duplicate findings are returned to the Department of State.

Because a name and birth date are not sufficient to positively correlate the file with an individual, additional review is required. A secondary manual name search usually identifies an additional 10% of the requests as having a "No Record", for a 95% overall "No Record" response rate. The remaining 5% are identified as possibly being the subject of an FBI record. The FBI record must now be retrieved and reviewed. If the records were electronically uploaded into the FBI Automated Case Support (ACS) electronic record-keeping system, it can be viewed quickly. If not, the relevant information must be retrieved from the existing paper record. Review of

this information will determine whether the information is identified with the subject of the request. If not, the request is closed as a "No Record."

The information in the file is reviewed for possible derogatory information. Less than 1% of the requests are identified with an individual with possible derogatory information. These requests are forwarded to the appropriate FBI investigative division for further analysis. If the investigative division determines there is no objection to the visa request, the request is returned to the name check dissemination desk for forwarding to the Department of State. If there is an FBI objection to the visa request, the investigative division will prepare a written Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) and forward it to the Department of State. In reviewing these visa requests, the FBI has identified individuals attempting to enter the United States who are of serious concern to the FBI.

I want to emphasize to you that the FBI is sensitive to the impact that delays in visa processing may have on business, education, tourism, this country's foreign relations, and worldwide perceptions of the United States. With these considerations in mind, the FBI is working diligently with the Department of State toward the common goal of improving the expediency and efficiency of the visa clearance process. At the same time, the consequences of the FBI's mission on homeland security requires that our name check process be primarily focused on an accurate and thorough result. This means that there are instances when the FBI's review of a visa request must require as much time as needed to obtain an unequivocally correct result.

PROCESSING TIMES

The FBI's goal is to have all Mantis and Condor vetting requests completed within 120 days. Attachment A illustrates the current status of Visas Condor names checks, and Attachment B illustrates the same for Visas Mantis name checks. This status was taken on October 1, 2003. For example, for Visas Condor, the FBI received 7,986 requests during the month of September 2003. By October 1, 2003, the FBI had resolved all but 521 of these requests, for a 93% resolution rate. (See Attachment A) In the month of August 2003, the FBI received 7,381 Visas Condor requests and by October 1, 2003, had resolved all but 257 of these requests for a 97% resolution rate. For Visas Mantis, the FBI received 1029 requests in the month of September 2003 and by October 1, 2003, had resolved 832, or 80% of them (See Attachment B). In the month of August 2003, the FBI received 1,122 Visas Mantis requests and by October 1, 2003, had resolved all but 116 of these requests for a 90% resolution rate. The percentages continue to rise over time, 97% of Visas Condor and 95% of Visas Mantis were resolved within 90 days. Visas Mantis are particularly difficult to resolve due to the predominance of requests from China and the commonality of Asian names.

A common question we receive is, How long does it take to complete a visa request name check? As shown on these graphs, 80 to 93% are completed in 30 days. For both types of visa requests, 97–98% of the requests are resolved in 120 days. Most name check requests that are over 30 days old are the result of the time required to retrieve and review field office record information. Some delay occurs at substantive analysts' desks, but this is to be expected. These analysts are assigned to the investigative divisions and are primarily assigned to the analysis of intelligence reports from around the world in order to support on-going investigations, or to support the flow of intelligence to policy makers. Despite these significant and voluminous responsibilities, these are the best professionals to review information in our records and to then make an informed decision on whether a requester of a visa represents a threat to our homeland, or is interested in illegally acquiring our targeted technology. Nevertheless, as I stated earlier, the FBI's resolves 98% of all types of visa requests within 120 days.

Resolved Visas Condor—2003

Attachment A

Month Received	Number of Requests Received	Number of Requests Resolved
October	6,436	6,417
November	8,355	8,337
December	6,488	6,460
January	5,374	5,342
February	4,492	4,473
March	6,648	6,620
April	5,836	5,811
May	5,059	5,021
June	7,384	7,266
July	9,307	8,996
August	7,381	7,124
September	7,986	7,465

Resolved Visas Mantis—2003

Attachment B

Month Received	Number of Requests Received	Number of Requests Resolved
October	875	875
November	1,283	1,282
December	1,119	1,113
January	1,354	1,347
February	1,035	1,023
March	2,011	1,986
April	985	970
May	1,240	1,217
June	2,589	2,564
July	1,737	1,652
August	1,122	1,006
September	1,029	832

Total Name Checks (1994–2003)

Attachment C

Fiscal Year	Number of Names Checked
FY 1994	1,792,874
FY 1995	2,091,426
FY 1996	2,939,521
FY 1997	2,850,769
FY 1998	2,148,993
FY 1999	2,957,525
FY 2000	2,449,981
FY 2001	2,771,241
FY 2002	3,288,018
FY 2003	6,309,346

PROCESS IMPROVEMENT

These efforts are not without substantial challenges. Prior to September 11, 2001, the FBI name check system processed approximately 2.5 million name check requests per year. In FY 2002, that number increased to 3.2 million. For FY 2003, the number of requests reached over 6.3 million requests. (At earlier Congressional hearings the FBI estimated that the number would reach 9.8 million requests. The rate of growth decreased over the summer months. It should also be noted that while over all name check submissions decreased over the summer, the number of visa request name checks showed no decrease.) Attachment C illustrates this explosive increase. With the advent of new visa screening requirements in late 2001, specifically the Visas Condor program, the FBI was overwhelmed by the increase in names to be checked. We did experience a backlog, some visa requests were lost between the Department of State and the FBI, and visas requested in the spring and summer of 2002 were delayed beyond the time period travelers had anticipated. We have all but eliminated the backlog, and are working together with the Department of State to ensure that any old visa requests have been accounted for and processed. This was accomplished through clarification of the FBI name check database, software modifications that allowed development of detailed metrics, the development of an internal FBI tracking system for SAO opinions, and improvement in the coordination of visa name check processing.

We closely monitored student visa submissions for this school year and believe that we were able to meet this seasonal demand. We are using National Academy of Sciences' data to assist us in monitoring our response time for both students and visiting scholars. Again, we have not seen any systematic problems associated with our review process. However, the FBI recognizes that the explosion in numbers of requests necessitates development of even more efficient processes in order to sustain the current pace of processing name check requests. The FBI is in the process of implementing a number of interim improvements to minimize manual submissions by all agencies and increase efficiency within the name check process. The FBI has developed high-level functional requirements for a new name check application compatible with the new FBI information systems in development. These new information systems, over time, will eliminate dependence on the retrieval of paper files. The development of this new name check application is now undergoing review within the FBI's Investment Management Process.

DECENTRALIZED RECORDKEEPING SYSTEM

I have touched upon our IT systems challenges, but now I want to discuss another factor in delays in the FBI responding to a visa name check. FBI files are currently stored at one of approximately 265 locations, including the FBI's Headquarters facility, several warehouses around the Washington Metropolitan area, in records centers either operated by the NARA or commercial concerns, four large Information Technology Center facilities on the east and west coast, at each of the 56 field of-

fices, many of the larger of our 400 resident agencies, and at legal attaché offices worldwide. Delays result from NNCP personnel identifying a file's location then requesting file information from a field office. Time delays mount as field office staffs search file rooms and then ship needed information or a prepared summary to FBI Headquarters. This process—repeated for many tasks, not only dilutes the FBI's responsiveness, but also limits information sharing—a critical success factor in working counterintelligence and counterterrorism cases.

One possible solution to these problems the FBI is exploring would be a central records repository where all of our closed paper files could be located, and our active files stored electronically. Our frequently requested closed files could be scanned and uploaded into our electronic record-keeping system, so that Agents and analysts world wide would have instant, electronic access to the information they need to do their jobs.

CONCLUSION

Again, the FBI recognizes the importance of accurate and timely name check processing. I want to emphasize to you, this issue has the full attention of Director Mueller. The FBI appreciates the interest of the committee in this matter. I am prepared to answer any questions the committee may have.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much, Mr. Hardy.

We're joined by Senator Nelson, as well as Chairman Lugar. And I will begin the questioning. I'll try to take less than five minutes so that I may turn to Senator Nelson for any opening comments and questions that he may want to get into.

Let me ask each of you to begin by commenting on information sharing. That seems to me to be a central issue here—the ease, the speed with which law enforcement, State, Homeland Security, and the FBI can share information and get access to information in order to evaluate requests for visas in a timely manner.

I'd like each of you to comment on what you see, currently, as the greatest obstacle to a good, strong, consistent information-sharing between agencies.

And why don't we begin with you, Mr. Verdery.

Mr. VERDERY. Well, Mr. Chairman, it's clear the problem that you identified is an important one. Whether you're talking about a Consular officer, a DHS officer overseas, or a Customs and Border Protection inspector at the border, not to mention a state and local officer who might have run into somebody, having access to the kind of information they need to do their job is obviously critical. I think this is the central thinking behind both the TTIC and the TSC that the Administration has unveiled over the last few months, the TTIC is running as we speak, and the TSC is coming online, I believe, late this year or in January, to try to come up with the integrated or consolidated sharing of information so that the people who have a need to know have the information they need to have. And so that's, obviously, been a problem over the years, that these two initiatives will link up together.

From our point of view, we will be both the supplier of information to these entities and a client, so we'll be receiving intelligence that will go in, to develop intelligence. We'll also be recipients, in terms of getting information from the TTIC and TSC and sharing it with the border inspectors, and our DHS overseas officers.

One thing I would just mention is, there has been a lot of progress in terms of making sure that the information that the State Department receives during the visa application process is available at the borders, at the ports of entry, for the inspectors so they can see, through the data-share program, information that

was received at the time of application to make sure that it's verified when the applicant shows up at the port of entry for admission to the United States.

Senator SUNUNU. Ms. Jacobs, what is the biggest obstacle to information sharing between agencies right now?

Ms. JACOBS. Well, I would just like to mention that I think the data-sharing has increased enormously after 9/11. We are making greater use of our consolidated database that has all information on visas that are issued or denied, sharing that information with inspectors at the ports of entry. We have doubled the number of lookouts in our Lookout system. We are finding new ways to share data with other agencies. Soon we will be sharing the fingerprint data that we collect overseas with the Department of Homeland Security with the inspectors at ports of entry.

I think that probably the two greatest obstacles that we all face, one would be the uneven pace of modernization of existing systems and systems architecture. And we all have new systems, I think, that we're trying to put in place. They don't necessarily talk to each other yet, and I think that's one thing that we really need to address.

The more that we can share information electronically, the more that we can do special clearances, or security advisory opinions, in particular, electronically, the faster the process will go. We are undertaking, at the State Department, to use our consolidated visa database to begin doing name checks electronically. We're going to pilot that program in November, and we hope to have it up and running by January of next year.

I think the other thing, the second greatest obstacle right now is perhaps the quality of the data that we share. I think we need to work a little bit on formats, the type of information, making sure that it is consistent, so that everyone is able to read the same things and understand what the Lookout data means.

Senator SUNUNU. Mr. Hardy, I'll give you a chance to answer that question in a moment, but, Ms. Jacobs, is there a plan in place, at State and certainly within your organization, to deal in some way with the system's modernization question?

Ms. JACOBS. Absolutely. We replace computer hardware every three to four years on our existing systems, and our systems are continually modified and updated to meet ne requirements. I think that the systems used by the Bureau of Consular Affairs are really state-of-the-art. As I mentioned, our consolidated database, which now has about 70 million visa records, 30 million of those have photos attached, we are finding new functionality for that system all the time. I talked about this new project to do electronic name checks. We're also using that data to share information with other agencies. The Bureau of Consular Affairs has just established a technology information management steering committee to undertake quarterly reviews of its projects. So I think we are, at State, doing everything we can to keep up to date.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.

Mr. Hardy?

Mr. HARDY. As Secretary Jacobs referred to, in the FBI record review, our name-check process, two existing systems were essentially modified and adapted to work together, and so that has not

been without the requirement for a great deal of coordination and loss of time as we try to adapt these two systems. The State Department is in the process of developing a new system, as is the FBI, and so many of the problems that we have currently will resolved as these new systems come online.

I will also state, though, that a significant amount of human cooperation and information sharing has overcome the lack of compatibility of these two systems, and it is through a great deal of hard work of people in both agencies that we're able to keep the robust information flow that is occurring.

As to other information issues, particularly concerning the investigative decision, I'll have to take that for the record, as it's out of my area of expertise.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.

Senator Nelson?

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this hearing.

This is an important subject, and in your next panel we have someone from Florida representing the tourism industry, to tell this subcommittee just how vital that industry is to our state and how much our Florida economy is so heavily dependent on the tourism industry. Close to 900,000 jobs in the state are related to tourism and all the ancillary businesses, such as the hotels, the restaurants, the theme parks, the airlines, the cruise ships. And so I'm looking forward to this panel, and it's of vital importance to our state.

Changes to the current policy toward the visa issuance are clearly needed, and we must ensure that we don't allow people who want to do us harm enter this country. At the same time, we've got to streamline the system. We clearly have to protect ourselves, but, in the process of protecting ourselves, we've got to enable the commerce to continue.

So we're now in a position to evaluate the failings and the shortcomings of the previous policy and to implement the changes needed to improve the systems. During these discussions, I'd like us to remember that we live in a global economy, and we simply can't close our doors to the foreign nations, nor can we create a system that is so burdensome that we discourage good, law-abiding nations to come here to visit, to work, to study, and otherwise contribute to our economy and to our country, as a whole.

We have had hearings, Mr. Chairman, of which—you and I both sit on the Commerce Committee—we've had hearings on the health of the nation's tourism industry, especially after September 11th.

Now, I have some concerns that some of these visa policies discussed could have a negative impact on the international tourism, and this is at the same time that we recognize that what we ought to be doing is reaching out to our foreign guests and having them coming to America. And so, last year, we appropriated $50 million to the Department of Commerce to create the U.S. Travel and Tourism Advisory Board. And it's a remnant of what we had 20 years ago, which was a little agency called the USTTA, the U.S.

Travel and Tourism Administration. And by leveraging just a few dollars in foreign advertising, it brought untold numbers of guests, which stimulated our economy here. Well, we are now reintroducing this idea after a two-decade hiatus, and I hope it's going to be one way that we can encourage more people to come and visit the U.S.

The ease of issuing non-immigrant visas is greatly important to sustaining tourism and other sectors of the economy. Fingerprinting services are a small, but a key, component to effective and efficient visa issuance. The ability of consulates to process fingerprints electronically is crucial in this age of rapid global movement.

In our Commerce Committee, we had a question of, in the aftermath of September 11th, what we found, that some of the hijackers had come here, they had taken flight lessons. My state happened to be a state where they had taken a lot of those. We have enacted legislation that—for foreign nationals taking flight lessons. And we want to encourage that activity; it's a legitimate business. So how do we protect ourselves? Well, we're requiring that they have fingerprints done, and done in an expeditious manner so that it won't hurt those flying schools' business. And, as I understand the process, fingerprinting is one of the final components of a background check, following the verification of names and other biographical information. And yet, in the past, we've seen it has taken up to three weeks to complete, and this is a very lengthy time for anybody that wants to come here, and it's also a lengthy for someone that is here in the United States, for clearance. And if the applicant is not cleared, for whatever reasons, that person clearly is—it's in our interest that we find out why they didn't get cleared.

So thank you for letting me make my opening statement, and what I'd like, then, is to ask of the panel to discuss and explain when can we expect electronic fingerprint collection to be widespread, and which countries will be among the first to have American consulates equipped with the technology? And take us through the scenario of what can a foreign national expect in the future when they go into an American embassy or consulate in their country to apply for a visa to come to the U.S.

Thank you.

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you for that question. I'm happy to answer it, because we have actually just started our fingerprint program at several of our posts overseas. As you know, we're required by law to include biometric identifiers with the visas that we issue by October 26th of 2004, and there are about six to eight posts right now where we are doing that. Doing that is working extremely well. In fact, I have here to show you basically what we're using. It is an electronic scanner, and all the applicants have to do is put down an index finger from each hand, very quickly. It takes about 30 seconds, and the fingerprint has been collected.

Senator NELSON. What are those six or eight posts? And when will that be installed?

Ms. JACOBS. Okay, we are already collecting at Frankfort, Brussels, Guatemala, San Salvador, Ottawa, Montreal, and I think we start Cairo in the next couple of days. And, as I said, we'll be worldwide by October of 2004.

The process itself is very quick, it's very easy. This data will eventually be shared with the inspectors at ports of entry, and we will also be checking a database that DHS maintains, called IDENT, so there will be a name check in addition to the name check that we do through out Lookout system.

Senator NELSON. Well, that sounds very encouraging. That sounds like October of '04 you're going to basically be able to fingerprint check everybody in a quick and efficient manner on any person applying for a visa to come to the U.S.

Ms. JACOBS. That's right. There is another process involved. We do have a lot of the NCIC, the FBI criminal data, in our Lookout system. If there is a hit on somebody who applies, where it looks like it's the same person, on those particular individuals we do have to take ten rolled fingerprints and send those back to the FBI to verify whether it's the same person. So that process does take a little bit longer than the electronic process that I was describing earlier.

Senator NELSON. How much longer?

Ms. JACOBS. I think we're doing those in about three weeks.

Senator NELSON. And what's the difference there? And what percent of all your visa applications will take that more lengthy process?

Ms. JACOBS. It's a very small percentage of the applicants. It just depends on whether there's a name that's either a direct hit or a close hit in the NCIC data. I think that eventually we may be able to do that electronically, as well. It's certainly something we're working towards.

We have an FBI agent who works up at our National Visa Center, in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, who actually is processing these, and he's very dedicated to turning these around quickly.

Senator NELSON. And when you say a "small percentage," what are we talking about?

Ms. JACOBS. I'll have to get back to you, I think, with the exact number, but of all of the applicants it's a very small number that actually—where we have to do the ten fingerprints.

[Ms. Jacobs' response to Senator Nelson's question follows:]

Ms. JACOBS. Of the 7,079,805 non-immigrant visa applications received worldwide during FY 2003, 24,364, or 0.34% were required to have their fingerprints taken as a result of a possible match in the NCIC FBI criminal database.

Senator NELSON. And that is just an estimate now. You're estimating that it's going to be a very small percentage.

Ms. JACOBS. Yes. Yes, sir. But I'm fairly certain it is a very small percentage.

Senator NELSON. But that's because they get back a direct hit.

Ms. JACOBS. Right.

Senator NELSON. Okay. Thank you.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Chairman Lugar, welcome to our subcommittee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Sununu. I thank you and Senator Nelson for a very important hearing.

My question comes really from the testimony of the next panel, and I cite specifically testimony of Jose Estorino, from Florida,

whom Senator Nelson has mentioned. He gives a summary, which is certainly balanced, that, by and large, these new rules and requirements make sense, from a homeland security perspective, and that TIA and the U.S. travel industry support efforts to enhance national security. But the many prospective international visitors, who experience wave after wave of new travel requirements, and so forth, paint a big picture that the United States is becoming a destination that's too difficult to enter, too expensive to visit, and simply not worth the effort. He cites Brazil, where a 45 percent fall-off in travel to the United States has been noted. He then details South Korea, and another witness gets into the South Korean problems, and estimates that maybe a sixth of the persons who would be coming to the United States, for various reasons, will not be coming.

In the Brazilian case, it's an interesting anecdotal discussion, because it's a big country. If Brazilians must travel long distances to do the paperwork, this could amount to $450 of expense per member—for a family of four, $1,800—and what was meant to be a vacation simply becomes "a bridge too far." Likewise, in South Korea, there are equally daunting problems.

Now, these dilemmas are well-known, I think, to everybody who's been discussing this issue. I started with the balance summary, that homeland security, as we have seen is extremely important. We've had a congressional inquiry going on in the Intelligence Committee, seemingly endlessly, as to why our government failed, intelligence-wise, in terms of our record-keeping, or whoever else was involved, that led to the death of many Americans on September 11th. So it's a serious business.

I'm just curious, from your standpoint, though, as persons representing three different departments, who does a broad overview of what this means to the country, as a whole? For instance, is it possible that the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, would meet in any informal or even formal way? Or is this at the level of the President? We try to assess what all this means to us, in terms of loss of national income, in terms of loss of international scholarship, and the perception of our country. My general summary of all the testimony today, but also anecdotally of a lot more, is that the cost of this program, in addition to the bureaucratic cost, the payment of the salaries and the expenses of doing all this—which are considerable—the cost in terms of our exports, the balance of payments, quite apart from the reputation America has, is very, very substantial.

I'm just curious: maybe this subcommittee is finally left to try to make these evaluations. Maybe the reason why we try to bring together two panels, those who are dealing with the real world and those who are dealing with the mechanisms of government, is to try to address this specific problem.

Do you have any view of who in our government, either executive or legislative, is supposed to take a more olympian view of what the general assets and liabilities of all of this are? If there are disasters, who mitigates them?

Ms. Jacobs, do you have an overall view of this situation?

Ms. JACOBS. Yes, sir, thank you. Actually, it's a very good question, because I think all of the agencies involved in border control

and border protection are trying to work on these measures in a way that does not discourage travel. I think we all recognize the billions of dollars that tourists introduce into the economy of this country, certainly students coming here—I think that's about a $12 billion industry—and I think we are all trying to work together.

I think that, to answer one of your questions, Secretary Powell, Secretary Ridge, and Attorney General Ashcroft do meet on a regular basis to talk about these issues, and sometimes they really get down in the weeds on some of it, too, about fingerprinting and all of the different things that we're doing. And those are very healthy discussions, because they are looking at the big picture, and they are trying to figure out, you know, are we doing these things in a smart way and to make sure that we're sharing information, sharing data, and, in the end, not discouraging legitimate travelers from coming to the U.S.

So I think, yes, I think there are people looking at this, there are people who certainly understand that their security, yes, has to be our top priority, but there are many other interests here at play, and people are watching those and taking an interest.

I'd give you an example, if I may, on how we're working on the U.S. Visit Program, which is the DHS's entry/exit system, will start early next year. All of the fingerprint data that we will be collecting will eventually be shared with the inspectors at ports of entry. We are already getting our systems more compatible so that we're able to share all kinds of information. I think perhaps that's one of the answers to this. If we can do this in a smart way, where we're using the most up-to-date technology so that we can check and keep out the people that we really need to keep out while letting in the legitimate travelers, I think that's the goal of the agencies represented here today.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that's encouraging, that there could be some, as you say, "smart technology."

Now, I mention this because this is a very controversial thing in our own country. Frequently we have constituents who say aged ladies are being stopped in our own security operations, and other people who are clearly not threats to American security. But yet, in a democratic principle, we say it doesn't matter who you are, how aged, how infirm, what your problem is, you've got to proceed in these ways. And those who are suggesting that there might be some smart technology that somehow leads us to greater discrimination of who might be a troublemaker leads then to lots of problems politically between various groups in our society, and we go back and forth.

No easy answers to this, but the net effect, most of our domestic airlines would say, has been a fall-off in patronage. Now, it may be the recession. And I note the New Hampshire University situation cites perhaps the decline in enrollment, or lack, that we haven't had much more, there comes from that, and so it may be. But there are a good number of people who would just testify airline travel internally, here, has become so daunting and discouraging, people have figured out other ways of simply doing it. Now, it may be more secure, but it may be dead by the time we're finished.

These are the issues that—and I'm grateful to your testimony that the Secretaries do visit specifically about these things, as you say, get into the weeds, in terms of the overall American posture and prosperity, as well as our reputation abroad, because I just think that's critically important.

And I would say, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that you would have subsequent hearings at various benchmark times to, sort of, see how it's all going. It may be, as the streamlining occurs, that tourism begins to peak up and we found that the worse didn't happen. And the problems that I find, say, with Purdue University, which you've found in New Hampshire, over 5,000 students, many coming from countries very controversial, on all of these lists, but extremely important, in terms of the technology sharing, our overall diplomacy with many, many countries, and I just see a tremendous loss occurring here.

Now, the delays mean, as anecdotes come in this testimony, that people delay courses of study. Eventually, they may get it done a year or two later, if they're not discouraged and go somewhere else, have a relationship with another country. And these are serious issues, even while we're trying to work through the nitty-gritty of security.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence of this additional editorial.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. I'm more than happy to indulge the committee Chairman.

In fact, I'd like to pursue that a little bit more. I think one of our witnesses mentioned the level of cooperation between counterparts at the State Department and Homeland Security, but with regard to the impact on travel or tourism or business or academia, is there a formal mechanism for consulting these other stakeholders when we're looking at changes in policy or procedures? And, second, is there a formal mechanism for discussing, with industry, potential new applications of existing private-sector technology to help solve some of these problems?

And I'd like each of you to address that, beginning with you, Mr. Verdery.

Mr. VERDERY. Well, in terms of official working groups to advise the Department, the one that you might be most familiar with is the Data Management Improvement Act Task Force, the DMIA, which Congress set up to advise then the Attorney General and now Department of Homeland Security on entry-exit issues. The DMIA has a number of important business stakeholders—airports, airlines, the travel industry, and the like—along with relevant government players—State and Commerce and the like—and they advise us on entry-exit, especially the US-VISIT program.

Senator SUNUNU. How often does that group get together?

Mr. VERDERY. I think officially it's quarterly, but we work with them quite a bit. Just in my short stint in the Department, I've met with them probably a half dozen times, and then we obviously meet with the individual members. The US-VISIT team and our office is working incredibly closely with the airports and the airlines on the US-VISIT program, because we understand how crucial they are to its success, both in terms of designing the systems at airports to allow for better check-in and check-out, and with the air-

lines in terms of making sure the passengers know what's in store for them. In fact, there's going to be a blizzard of press activity over the next few months to make sure the traveling public from foreign countries knows, when you show up at a port of entry, that you're going to slap these two fingerprints, have a quick picture taken during your interview process with the customs officer.

While I have the floor for just a second, I just wanted to echo what Ms. Jacobs said, in terms of the way these issues are handled at a principals level many times. The Attorney General, Secretary Ridge, and her department are very involved with US-VISIT and the other various biometrics deadlines. This is a top priority. He's given us very clear direction to facilitate travel.

And I truly believe that these systems are going to create efficiencies over time. The analogy that came into my head while you were talking, Chairman Lugar, is if you told somebody 20 years that you were going to scan everything at a supermarket, people would have said, "Wow, that's—you are going to wire that all up, and that's going to take forever." Well, now it obviously saves people time, it speeds people through.

And that's the idea, that the biometrics are going to make it easier for people to prove that there's no problem. If you don't show up on a watch list, there's no hit, you zoom on through, there's less discretionary problems, and it allows us to focus our energies, both at the visa issuance process and at the port of entry, on the very small number of people where we think there might be an issue.

So I do think that it's going to take a little growing pains, and we are working hand-in-glove with State, especially on US-VISIT and these other issues. But, in the medium-term, I'll call it, I am convinced this is going to be a boon to the travel industry, whether it's the students or business travel.

Senator SUNUNU. Ms. Jacobs, did you have anything you wanted to add to that?

Ms. JACOBS. Yes, sir. We are active members of the Tourism Policy Advisory Board that Senator Nelson mentioned. Within the State Department, we have a number of bureaus. Our Economic Bureau, EB, is always coming to us with concerns from the airlines. We have our regional bureaus, which also come to us with concerns about delays and the drop in travel that people have seen. So we are always aware of the issues.

In addition to that, we have a very active outreach program, with different business groups, academic, scientific groups who come to see us on a regular basis to both talk about, sort of, the overall picture, their concerns, and oftentimes they give us specific cases that they want us to look into where there might be delays. And so we do have a very active outreach and dialogue program with all of these different groups that have an interest in bringing legitimate travelers here.

Senator SUNUNU. Senator Lugar also mentioned cost. I mean, literally the cost of the application process, let alone the time and the effort that might be involved for applying for a visa.

Two specific cases. I believe the current price to apply for a nonimmigrant visa is a hundred dollars. And today there was a report that plans are in place to charge foreign students a hundred-dollar fee to pay for the new student tracking system.

Is this pricing structure a problem? Is it an issue? Does it act as a deterrent? Does it discourage visitors that we really should want to come to this country, should welcome to this country, from doing so?

Ms. Jacobs?

Ms. JACOBS. The $100 that we do charge non-immigrant visa applicants is a processing fee that is charged to most all of our applicants. Actually, our consular operations are funded by the fees that we collect from our visa applicants, from the non-immigrant applicants. And so it is based on a cost of study on the service that is provided.

Whether it's a deterrent or not, you know, you can argue, I think, both ways on that. Some people say that it is not; others say that once you get close to a hundred dollars, it suddenly becomes a factor in whether people want to apply for a visa.

Senator SUNUNU. Does it cover more—you know, when all is said and done and you look at your costs and what you collect in revenues, does it cover more than the cost of the processing and what's done with any overage? And is there reciprocal pricing by other countries?

Ms. JACOBS. It is not over the price of the services that we're providing. In fact, with all of the new requirements that we have undertaken after 9/11 and with the drop in demand going on at the same time, we were doing around 10 million, processing 10 million visas, in FY-01. We did about 6.9 million in FY-03. So there has been a drop in numbers, which means a drop in revenue, but our requirements are increasing. And so I think the answer is no, that the $100 is certainly—we're not overpricing the cost of visas.

With regard to your question about reciprocity, it really varies from country to country. Some countries that Americans enter with no fees, some countries do charge a fee, some less than a hundred. There are a few countries, including Brazil, Russia, some others, that charge a hundred dollars or more. What a lot of countries do is, will let people in free for a certain amount of time, but if you plan to stay over that time, say 90 days, then they will charge you a fee for that.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.

Senator Nelson?

Mr. VERDERY. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, could I speak a second to the SEVIS fee that you mentioned, if I could?

Senator SUNUNU. Yes, please.

Mr. VERDERY. Because I believe that regulation is going to be promulgated either today or tomorrow.

The basic thinking of this is to support the SEVIS student tracking system mandated by Congress to make sure that foreign students are enrolled in legitimate universities for a legitimate course of study. This program's actually been a great success this fall, in terms of getting people enrolled. The overwhelming majority of the people made it through with no problems. We had a instant response team set up to deal with problems from August 1st to September 15th, and I believe we cleared over 200,000 foreign students.

But, in terms of the fee, there was no mechanism to cover the cost of this. There's no appropriation to cover the bulk of this pro-

gram? And the decision came down to, do we want the taxpayers to cover this, or the beneficiaries of the program. And the decision was made to make the beneficiaries, the students, cover the fee, and the fee will not only cover the cost of the program, in terms of dealing with schools and the credentialing of schools, but also an enforcement mechanism, for the folks who we find that are not legitimate students. And we are finding impostors and others who were not enrolled. Several hundred, I believe, is what has been found this fall. And we have to have a capability to go find them and take appropriate action.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.

Senator Nelson?

Senator NELSON. Ms. Jacobs, you said your applications are down, so you have a revenue shortfall. Does that mean that you're thinking about raising the hundred-dollar fee?

Ms. JACOBS. At this particular point in time, we're still looking at it. We have just completed another cost-of-service study, and we have not made a final decision. I don't think, if it is raised, that it will be raised by much. But we're still looking at the information to see if we need to raise it. Our preference would be not to raise it if we don't have to. But, unfortunately, because we do depend on the machine-readable visa fees to fund our operations overseas, and we have the biometrics requirements and other things that we're doing after 9/11, we're going to have to find ways to fund that, those additional requirements.

Senator NELSON. Well, let me tell you that in 30 states, the tourism and travel industry is among the top three industries in those 30 states. And in a state like Florida, which has so many foreign guests come in its travel, if you've got a family of four or five that are coming for a vacation, four- or five-hundred dollars is a pretty big hit. And it starts to get into a question of, does it become a deterrent to those foreign guests coming and taking a vacation in America? So I would certainly urge you to consider that at the time that you are considering the raising of the fee, and I would hope that you don't raise the fee.

Mr. Verdery, when the terrorist screening—when will the Terrorist Screening Center be established?

Mr. VERDERY. I believe it will become operational around the first of the year. I'd have to get back to you on a specific date. That is really handled within our Department, within the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, rather than the BTS Directorate, where I work. We're more of a client of it. But I understand, first part of next year.

[Mr. Verdery's response to Senator Nelson's question follows:]

Mr. VERDERY. The Terrorist Screening Center will be established December 1, 2003.

Senator NELSON. We were told December the 1st.

Mr. VERDERY. That is probably more accurate.

Senator NELSON. When will the Consolidated Terrorist Screening List be established?

Mr. VERDERY. I assume it would be sometime after the TSC is set up. I think those plans are under development.

Senator NELSON. Okay. If you could get back to the committee—

Mr. VERDERY. I'd be happy to.

Senator NELSON. —we'd appreciate it.

[Mr. Verdery's response to Senator Nelson's question follows:]

Mr. VERDERY. The Consolidated Terrorist Screening List will be established December 1, 2003.

Senator NELSON. I want to pick up on the Chairman's comments about the testimony that will be coming with regard to tourism, and particularly coming from Brazil.

Foreign travel is clearly off, to a place like Orlando that is the number-one tourist destination in the world. And in the past, a lot of that travel has come from Brazil. It's estimated that we've lost nearly half of that travel business from Brazil.

So, Ms. Jacobs, comment to you—what you think we ought to do about this. What can we do to encourage and recoup some of that travel?

Ms. JACOBS. I think it's a difficult question, because sometimes it's hard to understand all of the different factors at play regarding the drop in travel to the U.S. I think that the new visa procedures and requirements may be a part of it. I think the economic situation of any given country, or perhaps even the worldwide economic situation, is a factor. I think that there may be perhaps more fear of travel in general after 9/11. So sometimes it's difficult to understand, you know, to really point your finger at any one particular thing that is causing people not to come here anymore.

Our hope, as far as visas goes, is to carry out these requirements that we have after 9/11 in a way that does not discourage travel to the states. We want to find, to use, the systems that we have, the technology that we have available to us, to do this in a fast way so that we are processing people quickly through.

I don't think there's any denying, though, that it is going to be an—for example, the fingerprint requirement that we have now will require people to travel to a consulate in order to collect those fingerprints. And so the procedures are going to be different after 9/11, and I'm not sure that we'll be able to go back to the way they were before September 11th. But we are doing everything that we possibly can to keep the process as efficient as possible.

Senator NELSON. In the old days, there were some countries that you didn't have to have a visa to travel from. Those days are gone forever now, are they not?

Ms. JACOBS. The Visa Waiver Program? The Visa Waiver Program still exists. There are 27 countries that participate. I think that the vast majority of people who enter the U.S., foreign visitors, come in under the Visa Waiver Program.

Senator NELSON. How are we going to protect our shores from the terrorists coming in under a visa waiver and not having to do the fingerprint?

Ms. JACOBS. The people from the visa waiver countries will—first of all, now they—by October of 2004, they'll have to have—all have to have machine-readable passports after that date. They will need the new biometric passport, which is a chip with their picture on it, biodata, which will allow the inspectors at the ports of entry to do facial recognition to confirm the identify of these travelers. In addition, we get information on these passengers before they actu-

ally arrive in the U.S., so that the inspectors at the ports of entry can run their names through the Lookout system, so that if anyone is in there, they can be stopped at the port of entry.

Mr. VERDERY. Senator Nelson, could I add to that? It's actually just something I'm working on, as Secretary Jacobs mentioned that a key part of the Visa Waiver Program is that we obtain the passenger name record information on incoming airline passengers before they get on the plane so that our Customs and Border Protection inspectors can run tracking of them and targeting to see if people have hits and the like. This will also be used with the CAPPS II program that TSA is developing to make sure that these folks are not a danger to the plane itself, in terms of hijacking.

I have actually been designated by the Secretary to handle our negotiations with the European Commission on this issue. They have privacy concerns about turning over and allowing us to have access to this type of data on their airline passengers of European origin, and we are negotiating with them as we speak to make sure that we continue to gain access to that information, because it really is the only information we receive for people in the Visa Waiver Program before they show up at a port of entry.

Senator NELSON. Would Richard Reed have been eligible under the visa waiver?

Mr. VERDERY. I'm trying to remember which country he—I believe he was.

Senator NELSON. He was a British citizen.

Mr. VERDERY. Yes. And that's the kind of information we would want to be able to run, a passenger's name like his through our watch list via the passenger name record information before he gets on the plane. Currently, under an agreement we have for Customs and Border Protection, that information is transmitted 15 minutes after wheels-up, so that they have access to it when they arrive. But for the CAPPS II program, we need to get the information beforehand so it can be reviewed before the passengers actually board the plane.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Lugar?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask—you may already have defined this before I came in, but what is the Condor and what is the Mantis program? What are the meanings of those terms, and who are we looking for?

Ms. JACOBS. Yes, sir. The Visas Condor was established in January 2002 to check for terrorists, a new requirement. And then the Visas Mantis is to check against transfer of sensitive technology. That particular check actually has existed for years. We just changed the name of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, how many visas have actually been denied under either of those two programs?

Ms. JACOBS. We have done about 125,000 Condor checks. To date, no one has been denied as a terrorist as a result of those checks. We've done about 12,500 Mantis checks, and I think the refusal rate is about .05 percent on those, and that's fairly consistent with what it's been over the years.

The CHAIRMAN. On those occasions, what sort of persons would be denied, or what would be causes for denial?

Ms. JACOBS. Under Visas Mantis, it would be someone whose program in the U.S. or course of study or purpose of travel somehow would involve sensitive technology that's controlled.

The CHAIRMAN. But, in the first instance, of the Condor, out of 125,000 applicants, not a single denial of those.

Ms. JACOBS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That's, you know, astonishing on the face of it, but there might have been some suspicion, I suppose, about at least one of the 125,000. How does it work? In other words, what sort of information is required in that particular program, as opposed to other visa programs?

Ms. JACOBS. Under that program, there are criteria that are established by various agencies back here in Washington, and when an applicant falls under the criteria, the case is referred back to Washington as a Security Advisory Opinion, and it's looked at by a variety of agencies—intelligence, law enforcement—and if they have any derogatory information, they get back to us. If we get a "no record" back, then we go ahead and say that the visa can be issued if the person is otherwise qualified.

The CHAIRMAN. Pragmatically, are you examining that from time to time to either add requirements or subtract them or tweak the thing so that it may be more effective and less inhibiting, in terms of people coming and going?

Ms. JACOBS. Yes, sir. In fact, we just revised the criteria and got those revised criteria out to the field a couple of months ago.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Well, I appreciate that technical information.

I just would comment that I think the work of this subcommittee on this issue, and your testimony today, is very, very important. We are trying to take a look at technical aspects of our security, but many of us, at least all three of us, in one form or another, are deeply worried about our economy. You know, in other fora, in other committees, we worry about jobless recovery or unemployment in the country or the fact that since 9/11 we've had a downer.

Many people have been discussing this in terms of so-called "frictional costs," the frictional costs being security measures that businesses are taking all over our country, or trips that were not taken, sales that were not made, tourism, that didn't occur. All the fallout of this continues. This is why I asked. You've been most responsive, as to the fact that at some level, the Secretary level, people who have a view of our entire economy and our well-being as American people—leaving aside the specific security problems that are posed to each of you—keep a sharp eye on this. We're busy trying to stimulate the economy through tax cuts and through regulatory changes and other things that we feel are very, very important. We pile one on top of another, and we are sometimes criticized for running up the federal deficit in our attempts to get something going.

Now, what we're discussing here today, of necessity, is an inhibitor on that growth, in my judgement, and it's a very substantial one. The question is, what is the balance? If our security requires warfare, we have been involved in that. We've been involved in all sorts of other operations, short of that, that are very expensive. That may be what we all have to face as Americans. If so, it's a fairly bleak prospect. This is why these hearings, it seems to me,

are extremely important in making certain that we think through everything we are doing, in terms of cost-effectiveness and, in a more Olympian view, in terms of American security.

I thank each one of you for the privilege of hearing you this morning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Chairman Lugar.

Ms. Jacobs, you might have provided this in your testimony—if so, I apologize—but what is the specific goal for turning around and making a decision on a visa from application to final approval?

Ms. JACOBS. Our goal for the cases that are referred back to Washington—and only about 2.2 percent of all of the visas that we process are actually referred back to Washington for some kind of clearance—our goal is to get those cases, once they come into Washington, through the process and an answer back to the field within 30 days.

Senator SUNUNU. And what is the current average duration?

Ms. JACOBS. I think we are doing the vast majority of our cases in 30 days or less. If the FBI puts a hold on a case, then they've asked us to give them 120 days to resolve the case, so some may take longer.

Senator SUNUNU. You don't track an average time, though, for them all that you can watch and monitor and determine whether it's increasing or decreasing?

Ms. JACOBS. We do. The office within the Visa office that processes the clearances actually goes through and checks on cases that are overdue, and we actually put those on a disk and give those to the FBI just to make sure that they've been checked.

Senator SUNUNU. So you would argue that you're meeting your goals at this point.

Ms. JACOBS. Yes, sir.

Senator SUNUNU. Are you going to change the goal, make it a little tougher? Set a new goal? Set a higher standard?

Ms. JACOBS. I would like to very much. When we have our new project in place using our consolidated database, I'm really hoping that we will be able to turn these around faster.

Senator SUNUNU. And I assume that Condor applications are part of the 2.2 percent that you say is referred back to Washington.

Ms. JACOBS. Yes, sir.

Senator SUNUNU. Do they comprise all of that 2.2 percent?

Ms. JACOBS. No. No, they—

Senator SUNUNU. What is the difference in criteria or evaluation, background checking, that goes on with regard to the Condor applicants that isn't done with other applicants that are referred back to Washington?

Ms. JACOBS. Okay. David, do you want to handle that one?

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, we look at each referral to us the same way. We do the same check, which is to review all FBI records to see whether or not there's information on that individual.

Senator SUNUNU. So is all of the 2.2 percent then goes through the same evaluation process, you're saying?

Mr. HARDY. If it's referred to us by the State Department, yes, that's correct.

Senator SUNUNU. How does the State Department decide which of the 2.2 percent gets referred to the FBI and which doesn't?

Ms. JACOBS. All of the cases that come in the—what we call SAO, Security Advisory Opinions, automatically go to the FBI, CIA, and other agencies around town. Some of the—it just depends on the type of check. The Visas Mantis, for example, we have an office within the State Department, the Nonproliferation Bureau, that actually looks at those cases, as well, and gives us advice as to whether they think there's a problem. So there are several players involved; it just depends on the type of check that's done.

Mr. VERDERY. Mr. Chairman, could I add something?

Senator SUNUNU. No, not just yet.

Mr. VERDERY. Oh, sure.

Senator SUNUNU. That didn't quite make sense to me. I must have missed something. Mr. Hardy said that anything that he receives goes through the same process, which I assume is the Condor and Mantis evaluations. And you suggested that all of the 2.2 percent go to FBI and CIA. So that would suggest that all of the 2.2 percent go through the Condor and Mantis process.

Ms. JACOBS. No, I'm sorry. That 2.2 percent includes a number of different checks. They all have animal names. There's a long list of them. Bears, Donkeys, Horses. I'm not quite sure how we—

Senator SUNUNU. So they're not all referred—

Ms. JACOBS. They're not—

Senator SUNUNU. —to the FBI.

Ms. JACOBS. All of those would be referred to the FBI.

Senator SUNUNU. Sorry. These two—I mean, these two statements do not square. If all of the 2.2 percent refer to the FBI, and the FBI treats them all the same way, then they all go through the same process.

So maybe, Mr. Hardy, maybe I misunderstood what you said. All of the referrals that you get, do they all go through the Condor and Mantis program? Do they all go through the same background evaluation program?

Mr. HARDY. Sir, I think the Condor and Mantis are subsets of the 2.2 percent that come through us. All programs, whether they're Donkeys, Eagles, Condors, Mantises, are reviewed the same way by the FBI. So the entire menagerie constitutes the 2.2 percent.

Senator SUNUNU. Okay. Maybe the problem here is using words like "reviewed the same way." Are you saying they all go through the exact same set of match identifiers and move through the same set of databases?

Mr. HARDY. That's correct, sir.

Senator SUNUNU. Why would you have a distinction, then? Why have the different categories if they're all going through the exact same databases? And, in some ways, that would be a good thing if we didn't have to make these distinctions, because we had a system that was quite seamless and quite efficient and could go through the same sets of matches. Perhaps you can submit the information or the clarification for the record.

And I'm sure that the problem is mine.

Just a couple of final questions, and I appreciate your patience.

Mr. Verdery, do the Homeland Security officers who review the visa applications in Saudi Arabia have access to information that our Consular officers do not?

Mr. VERDERY. They do.

Senator SUNUNU. And is that a vulnerability at other posts that don't have DHS officers?

Mr. VERDERY. Yes and no. The folks on the ground in Saudi Arabia and the people who will be deployed to the other posts that I mentioned during my opening statement will have access to certain DHS databases, law enforcement bases, that Consular officers do not. Now, this problem may be solved when the Terrorist Screen Center is up and running.

In terms of your questions about the places where DHS officers are not, which right now is everywhere except for Saudi Arabia, we do have a mechanism in place for questions to be referred back to Homeland Security here in Washington for review by the Office of International Enforcement. So there are people here that can provide this same type of expertise as the people on the ground overseas as we begin to roll out the deployment. Clearly, the deployment is going to take awhile, considering our resources, but we do have a mechanism in place for the officers overseas, both through the DOS or other DHS employees who aren't visa security officers, to reach back to Washington to gain the expertise that they need.

Senator SUNUNU. Did you give a date by which the five new hubs will be established?

Mr. VERDERY. I believe the goal is toward the end of this year. Like I mentioned, the locations have not been officially determined, and we're working to get assessment teams out to the field to review them, and then we'll have to go up to the Secretary for review.

Senator SUNUNU. But the effort has been funded?

Mr. VERDERY. The effort is being funded right now out of existing budgets, out of the other BTS components—the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. It's basically being taken out of hide for this year's budget cycle.

Senator SUNUNU. Ms. Jacobs, what's the impact of the new interview requirements on Consular staffing needs?

Ms. JACOBS. The impact has really not been that great at most of our posts, because most people were interviewing more applicants after 9/11. Many posts have always interviewed a large percentage of their applicants because of high fraud or other immigration pressures to come to the U.S. For the posts that have been heavily impacted, such as Seoul and some of the others, we are providing TDY assistance. We sent a Consular Management Assistant Team to that post to look at the situation, to come up with recommendations on use of windows, work flow, things that they can do to perhaps increase efficiencies. And we will continue to do that.

We are—as I said, though, most of the posts were already interviewing more people, so it really has not made that much of a difference. We have about 19 of our 211 posts, at this point, that have waiting periods of 30 days or more for an interview. All of the others are below that.

Senator SUNUNU. Mr. Verdery, I understand that there's technology out there where we can take the machine-readable visa and put it through a scanner that can then retrieve or access the photo that was attached to the application at the time that you made the visa request. Can your officials that are at ports of entry right now currently get access to that information?

Mr. VERDERY. They have access right now to the biographical information. The visas being issued with biometrics built in, as Ms. Jacobs mentioned, are in development now. And the photograph is not biometrically enhanced in the visa and is not available.

Senator SUNUNU. But the biographic information is the only thing that can be called up electronically right now.

Mr. VERDERY. That's right.

Senator SUNUNU. If there are no further questions—

Senator NELSON. And when will those photos be available?

Mr. VERDERY. I have to refer to Ms. Jacobs on the roll out—I think they are doing the fingerprints, and the pilots are ongoing.

Ms. JACOBS. That's correct. We actually do have photos available. We have about 70 million records in the database at this point, and about 31 million of those have photos attached. But when we share the fingerprint data, there will be photo information shared with that, as well.

Senator NELSON. And that will be, for all countries, by next October?

Ms. JACOBS. By October 26th, 2004. Yes, sir.

Senator NELSON. Okay.

Mr. Hardy, I'm going to follow the line of questioning of the Chairman. Do you do a different kind of investigation on each of these animal names, or is it all the same?

Mr. HARDY. Yes, sir. We essentially have the same process. The different categories are basically different criteria that are looked at. And within the FBI, a Mantis is more likely to be looked at by, say, the Russian desk or a China desk officer, as opposed to a Condor, which has to do with terrorism and would probably be looked at, in the end process, by someone from counter-terrorism.

Not only are there different criteria, there are different expediencies. For individuals who are traveling to this country with nonimmigrant visas, there is a requirement to turn them around quickly, there's considerable attention given to them in our mission profiles. So what we're trying to do is move them as quickly as possible, as opposed to some of the other ones—for example, an Eagle, which maybe a immigrant status or refugee status—that we didn't talk about here today, because they're not what primarily impacts international travel.

So we're able to break out the different categories of visa requests, and then we gauge our priorities as we work through the process based on the need to move them, or the importance of that particular program, Condor obviously being one of the most important programs that we have. So that's the distinction that occurs, but the overall generic process which occurs is the same for each of them.

Senator NELSON. With regard to the visa wavier program, Mr. Hardy, what is in process now—what is in place now that was not a year ago that would catch a Richard Reed?

Mr. HARDY. First, again, within my own particular area, on the Visa Waiver Program, we would not see one of those coming through the name-check program. However, as the FBI identifies individuals, they do provide them to the Lookout and CLASS systems, so that they assist in that identification, as has been earlier discussed by Secretary Jacobs.

Senator NELSON. Are you satisfied? Is your testimony to this committee that you're satisfied that the procedures are in place to catch a guy like that?

Mr. HARDY. Senator Nelson, I think as a record-management individual, I would have to defer that to our analysts and our substantive desk, which deal with the substance of the policies. So if I could take that for the record?

Mr. VERDERY. Sir, if I could just add that there are reviews ongoing of the countries within the Visa Waiver Program. I believe there have been six countries reviewed over the last year of so, and two of them have been found wanting in terms of the criteria for the program, in terms of the refusal rates for people from that country, our confidence in whether or not passports are stolen or lost, and a whole range of factors. And we are planning under the MOU that's now been signed, that that responsibility is primarily ours to review the Visa Waiver Program, and we are planning on doing so, to make sure that the countries that are in it are meeting their obligations.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Verdery, let me ask you—a little out of your bailiwick, but still important to our tourism industry, is lessening the hassles of travel and yet enabling still you to catch the bad guys. On what timetable do we have this kind of identification system on the passengers that you don't have a problem having to screen, and, therefore, they will have some kind of identification that allows them to streamline the process?

Mr. VERDERY. Well, if you're talking about the US-VISIT program, sir——

Senator NELSON. I'm talking about the domestic market.

Mr. VERDERY. The domestic market?

Senator NELSON. Yes.

Mr. VERDERY. Are you talking about U.S. citizens traveling?

Senator NELSON. Yes.

Mr. VERDERY. The CAPPS II program, is that what you're asking about?

Senator NELSON. I don't know the name of the program.

Mr. VERDERY. The CAPPS II is the program that TSA, Transportation Security Administration, is developing and is scheduled to become effective sometime next year. It has not begun testing yet. And this would replace the current CAPPS II program that the airlines run that determine who is referred to secondary screening. CAPPS II would attempt to make those decisions based more on identity verification, people that we have a reason to believe they are not who they say they are or their factors in their background bump up against something that raises concern and then they would be referred to secondary screening for flights.

The overwhelming majority of people would either go through with no screening, or, after the screening, you might run into the occasional so-called "red hit" that somebody's actually on a watch

list. But the point here is to improve the screening to lessen the number of people going to screening and to make it based on some more rational factors. And that should be up and running next year.

Senator NELSON. Okay, thank you.

Ms. Jacobs—and this will be my last question—earlier this year, the State Department promulgated a rule which would require a personal interview of most non-immigrant visa applicants. What are the costs and space implications for the staffing and embassy construction of this decision? And is the requirement of an interview creating the backlog or adding to the existing backlog of the visa applications?

Ms. JACOBS. Most of the posts have not been affected by the change of policy. In fact, most of the posts began interviewing more applicants after 9/11. Some of our posts have always interviewed a large portion of their applicants because of fraud or for other reasons. So the impact on the majority of our 210 posts has not been that great.

There have been a few posts, however, that were not interviewing a lot people, who are now, such as Seoul. And we are providing them extra help, extra people. We sent a special team there to take a look at the situation to see what recommendations they could make to improve efficiency—the use of the windows, things of that sort.

The space really has not been an issue. The collection of fingerprints that I talked about, we're actually doing this right at the interview window, so we haven't had to add anything new to the consular sections that would take away space. At some point in the future, if we were to go to more fingerprints, which we understand is a possibility because NIST, the scientists, have told us at some point our database may get so large that we need more than two fingerprints. If we have to go to a larger machine, then space will become an issue for a lot of our posts, and we are talking to our office of building operations and also to diplomatic security about needs if we need to enlarge or move offsite.

Senator NELSON. Well, all of you have a difficult job, and we appreciate the job you're doing, and it's one that we have to do well, for the protection of us, as well as for the enhancement of our economy.

Thank you.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Thank you to our panelists, who obviously have significant challenges in front of you. But I think we have a pretty good sense of where the immediate priorities are.

I do note that among the funds in the supplemental was $29 million to deal with the possibility of a shortfall for machine-readable visa—machine-readable passport fees. So I think it's fair to say that, at least on the appropriations side, people are cognizant of the needs to continue to provide the resources necessary to upgrade these technologies.

Thank you again, and we will submit additional questions for the record that we weren't able to get to this morning.

I thank you again, and welcome the next panel.

Our second panel will include Mr. William Oberlin, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in South Korea, Dr. John Aber, who is vice president for Research and Public Service at the University of New Hampshire, in Durham, New Hampshire, an institution I know very well, and Mr. Jose Estorino, who is the senior vice president of Marketing at the Orlando and Orange County Convention and Visitors Bureau, in Orlando, Florida.

Gentlemen, I very much appreciate you taking the time and traveling in order to be here today to provide testimony for the subcommittee. You've been very patient, but I do—I hope and I believe this was a case where the testimony of the previous panel was of particular interest to each of you, and I hope we were able to cover, with our questioning, some of the same questions that you might have asked of the previous panel.

At this time, it's a pleasure for me to allow you to summarize your written testimony. Your entire written testimony will be included in the formal subcommittee record. And we will begin with Mr. Oberlin.

Welcome.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM OBERLIN, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA

Mr. OBERLIN. Chairman Sununu, thank you very much.

We appreciate the opportunity to testify before you on the concerns of the new visa policy and its effects upon U.S. business in Korea. As president of the American Chamber of Commerce, I represent approximately 1,000 companies, approximately 2,500 members, and, in addition, I also work for the Boeing Company as the country executive for Korea.

Korea is a major trading partner, the 12th largest economy in the world, and it remains a strong security ally by sending noncombat troops to Iraq. They have just announced that they will send several thousand additional combat troops to support our efforts.

The world has felt significant changes since September 11th as America comes to grips with previously unimaginable threats. Our members strongly support all the security changes necessary to keep our country safe.

The U.S. Embassy in Korea is the largest visa-processing post in the world. Last May, Secretary Powell announced a new guideline that had the practical impact of doubling the number of personal interviews needed in Seoul, from 35 percent to 70 percent. The change in policy was announced during Korea's peak travel season, with only two week's notice to the industry. The backlogs in interviews immediately ballooned to more than 60 day's wait from the pre-policy turnaround times of two to five days.

We are extremely grateful to Consul General Bernie Alter and his team for their daily dedication to help American business in this new, difficult environment.

Coming at a time when many foreigners view America with increasing skepticism, the new visa policies will unfortunately spur a growth of anti-American sentiment in Korea. One such example was the recent action taken with virtually no advance warning to suspend the Transit Without Visa Program. This suspension came

at the beginning of August, when many Korean students were about to return home from their summer language programs in Canada. One American carrier told over 100 Korean students stranded in Canada they could not honor their reservations because the flight required an aircraft change in the U.S. Because there was a lack of appropriate notice and because the event took place during a peak travel season, there were no seats available on non-American carriers. These students and their families were severely inconvenienced and made to feel unwelcome by the United States.

We are concerned that a net increase of only 39 consular officers for fiscal year '03 and another 40 officers in fiscal '04 maybe not be enough to adequately handle the current and expected global demands without creating additional backlog. Last year, almost 700,000 Korean passport holders entered the United States, making Korea the fifth-largest source of inbound travel to the U.S. Unlike Koreans, citizens from the other four countries—the U.K., Japan, Germany, and France—do not need tourism visas to enter the U.S. In other words, Koreans form the largest single group of tourists who require visas to travel to the U.S. According to the U.S. Commercial Service, Korean tourists spent almost $21 billion in the U.S. over the last year. This revenue is at significant risk with our new visa policy.

Amway Korea annually takes its key distributors on incentive trips. Amway's '04 convention was scheduled to held in Las Vegas—or Los Angeles and was to include 8,000 Korean distributors. Historically, groups have been bulk-processed by an interview-waiver program internally managed by the consular section. Now all the applicants must individually apply for a personal interview via a telephone appointment system, which requires three to four minutes per application to register for an appointment. Waits for a interview range from between 30 to 70 days, depending upon the season. Because of the logistics of pushing 8,000 people through an individual appointment and interview process, Amway cancelled their L.A. venue and rescheduled for Japan. The aggregate lost revenue value of that single group alone was $18 million.

On May 19th, US VISIT, an entry-exit system to monitor the arrival and departure of international visitors, was announced, the plan to capture fingerprints and photographs for the millions of international visitors arriving at U.S. airports and the seaports beginning in January 1st, '04. This new security measure has not been well communicated to the travel industry, and certainly not to the traveling public in Korea. Again, a necessary policy clumsily implemented will do more to alienate our already strained relationships.

Also on the horizon is the law requiring all visa applicants to include biometric identifiers by October '04. Considering current space and staffing challenges, the expected waiting times to arrange appointments could be, some say, devastating, if not very, very challenging.

The reality in Korea is that due to increased security and a one-size-fits-all approach, we are losing business, tourists, and students, and, more importantly, we are losing friends and influence at a time when American can ill-afford the loss.

We believe that in addition to the war on terrorism, there is also a war raging for global influence, and this is also a war the U.S. cannot afford to lose. We may not see the results immediately, but in 20 to 30 years from now, when one looks back at this time and these challenges, we will be judged on how much foresight and how much creativity we used in resolving these difficult issues.

We respectfully urge the departments involved to begin aggressive information campaigns to explain the policy and to try and mitigate the negative repercussions. One creative approach might be to contract mobile biometric information collectors and, for an addition cost-recovery fee, take the service directly to the applicants. Allowing applicants to submit visa applications online, similar to Australia's visa policy, would shift the burden of the data entry to the applicants, which would save the U.S. Government time and money.

Let me conclude by iterating what I stated at the beginning. The American business community in Korea strongly supports the federal initiatives designed to protect America from terrorist attacks. We believe that protection of our national security must go hand in hand with protecting our economic security. Procedures and systems designed to deny terrorists must also work to facilitate the efficient entry of legitimate international business and leisure travelers. This is not an either/or proposition, but a matter of balance. We must achieve the twin goals of improving security and facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel.

Thank you very much. I look forward to trying to answer some of your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Oberlin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. OBERLIN

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on the concerns of the new visa policy and its effects on U.S. business in Korea. It is an honor to be invited here to contribute to this important dialogue on homeland security and visas. I came here today to share the views of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea. As president, I represent almost 1,000 companies doing business in Korea. These companies range in size—from very small 1-man companies to several thousand people working for America's largest and most prestigious companies. In addition to my position at AMCHAM, I also work for The Boeing Company as its Country President for Korea.

KOREA BACKGROUND

Korea is a major trade partner for the United States. As the 12th largest economy in the world, Korea has a GDP of $477 billion and per capita GDP of over $10,000, placing it in the middle rank of OECD countries and as the second largest in Northeast Asia after Japan. Korea is our 6th largest export market with Koreans buying more American products than those from China, France, Taiwan and Australia. Our two-way trade last year exceeded $58 billion. It is our largest market for agriculture and high tech products and is also becoming an increasingly important market for U.S. services, reaching $11.6 billion in 2001. These huge business opportunities have not gone unnoticed by our European and increasingly Asian competition, and they are aggressively focusing their business sights on Korea.

Korea also remains a strong security ally and was one of the first to join the U.S. led war on terrorism. They sent non-combat troops to Iraq and have just announced they will be sending several thousand combat troops to support our efforts in postwar Iraq. They also agreed to provide $200 million for the rebuilding of Iraq in addition to the $60 million already earmarked.

NEED FOR INCREASED SECURITY

The world has felt significant changes since September 11th as America comes to grips with previously unimaginable threats. Our members strongly support all the security changes necessary to keep our country safe. We understand that the movement of people and materials has changed forever and we are extremely grateful for all the dedicated efforts of so many to keep us out of harm's way while still expediting the legitimate flow of people and cargo.

We fully understand and accept the need for increased security in the visa process and I would like to take this opportunity to recognize the outstanding efforts our Consular Affairs people have made in their efforts to delicately balance the increased need for security with the ever-present necessity to facilitate legitimate travel. They are the real unsung heroes here.

U.S. EMBASSY: SEOUL

The U.S. Embassy in Korea has the distinction of being the largest visa processing post in the world. So any change in visa policy has a profound impact on our members and our businesses in Korea. Last May, when Secretary of State Cohn Powell announced a new guideline that had the practical impact of doubling the number of personal interviews needed in Seoul from 35% or 120,000 interviews to 70% or 240,000 interviews, both our exceptional staff in the State Department's Consular Affair's team and our own Embassy group immediately went to work to mitigate the potentially negative impact in Korea. Unfortunately, the Travel Agent Referral Program, which accounted for 28% of all visas issued by the post and the largest single channel of visas, was eliminated. Thanks in large part to the efforts of the Consul, however, the AMCHAM Visa Referral Program for our member companies, the Business Referral Program for large Korean companies meeting strict criteria and the University Referral Program were all extended through October 2004.

Literally overnight, the number of people requiring personal interviews doubled, with no additional staff or overtime money. In business, when demand doubles overnight for a product or service with no appreciable increase in resources, the result is usually long delays. The change in policy was announced during Korea's peak travel season with only 2 weeks notice to the industry. The backlogs for an interview immediately ballooned to more than 60 day waits from the pre-policy turnaround times of 2–5 days for a visa. Current interview appointment waits are now about 1 month, largely due to September/October being the country's lowest demand period for outbound travel. We are extremely grateful to Consul General Bernie Alter and his team for their daily dedication to help American business in this new difficult environment. While their efforts to minimize the damage on travel between Korea and the U.S. has been invaluable. We believe there are serious unintended consequences still facing the industry. Coming at a time when many foreigners view America with increasing skepticism, the new visa policies will unfortunately spur the growth of anti-American sentiment in Korea and the new policies, although necessary for our nation's safety and security, sometimes appear ill coordinated and poorly communicated.

NEED FOR TIMELY COMMUNICATION

One such example was the recent action taken by Homeland Security and the Department of State. With virtually no advance warning, they suspended 2 programs known as the Transit Without Visa (TWOV) and the International-to-International (ITI) programs. These program suspensions came in the beginning of August when many Korean students were about to return home from their summer language programs in Canada to begin their Korean school year. At least one American carrier told over 100 Korean students stranded in Canada the American flag carrier could not honor their reservations because their flight required an aircraft change in the U.S. before continuing onto Seoul. Because there was a lack of appropriate notice and because this event took place during a peak travel season, there were no seats available on non-American carriers. These students and their families were severely inconvenienced and made to feel unwelcome by the U.S.

While we understand and fully support the need for additional security, it sometimes seems that heavy-handed decisions like this have the unintended consequences of alienating our friends and allies even more. There is more anecdotal evidence of senior Korean business leaders beginning to question whether America truly wants their business.

One of our members is a Belgian citizen, who went to the U.S. on a business trip and had a harrowing experience. He was detained and ultimately not allowed to

enter the U.S. because his passport was not machine readable. Throughout this ordeal, he was not allowed to speak with anyone who could explain what was happening and as a result, ended up missing an extremely important business meeting. Additionally, his perception of the U.S. has been negatively affected by this experience.

A leading American IT company nearly lost a multi-million dollar deal because their client's software engineers and purchasing team's visa applications took almost 8 weeks to complete.

One of America's premier financial institutions expressed that their international clients are more and more suggesting meeting venues be moved to London or Frankf1rt because of U.S. visa difficulties.

CHALLENGES AHEAD

We recognize the need for our government to shift the priorities from concern on visa issuance about illegal-overstays to security. We also congratulate the efforts to better apprise consular officers of counter-terrorism issues, new programs to more fully vet visa applicants of particular concern and most importantly, the move to increase staffing for consular officers abroad. However, it does seem that a net increase of only 39 consular officers for fiscal year 2003 and another 40 officers in fiscal 2004 may not be enough to handle the current and expected demands without creating additional backlogs. Remember our Seoul example, virtually overnight we went from approximately 35% of the applicants needing personal interviews to 70%, with no appreciable increase in resources. Embassies like Seoul also face additional challenges of old physical structures and severe space limitations. The Embassy in Seoul currently has only 9 interview windows, so even with a significant increase in human capital resources, they would still be facing enormous physical space challenges.

KOREAN TOURISTS

In calendar year 2002, almost 700,000 Korean passport holders entered the U.S. making Korea the 5th largest source of inbound travel to the U.S. Unlike Koreans, citizens from the other 4 countries—the UK, Japan, Germany, and France do not need tourist visas to enter the U.S.; in other words, Koreans form the largest single group of tourists who require visas to travel to the U.S.

According to the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service, Korean tourists spent almost $21 billion in the U.S. during the previous year. We believe this revenue is at significant risk with our new visa policy. Our Visit U.S.A. Committee tells us that approximately 80% of the total airplane load leaving Korea is usually booked less than 3 weeks before the scheduled departure, which is one of the shorter lead times in the international travel industry. As a result, with competition from many attractive foreign tourist locations, the Korean market is extremely sensitive to the length of waiting period for visas appointments. Visa waits of more than a few days are no longer tolerated when visa free alternative destinations beckon. Airlines are watching their fall load numbers very closely and several of our members in the airline industry privately expressed deep concern about the falling demand for tourism to the U.S.

In Korea, travel agents tell us America is an increasingly difficult destination to sell. Koreans have visa exemptions and visa free agreements with over 100 countries, so they have many other competitive options available to them. Where other countries seem to be rolling out the red carpet and welcoming Korean travelers, the welcome mat for America is indeed looking very frayed. Many of our travel destination competitors are explicitly marketing themselves as an alternative to the arduous U.S. visa procedures.

I would like to share with you one example that illustrates the economic impact of this new policy change. Amway Korea annually takes its key distributors on incentive trips. Amway's 2004 convention was scheduled to be held in Los Angeles, California and was to include 8,000 Korean distributors. Historically, groups had been bulk processed via an interview waiver program internally managed by the Consular Section. Under the August 1, 2003 policy change, all applicants, including mega-groups, must individually apply for a personal interview via a telephone appointment system, which in itself requires 3–4 minutes per application just to register for an appointment. Waits for an interview then range between 30 to 70 days, depending on seasonality. Because of the logistics of pushing 8,000 people through an individual appointment and interview process, Amway cancelled their Los Angeles venue and rescheduled the convention for Miyazaki, Japan. The aggregate lost revenue value of this single group alone was $18 million. This scenario is now being repeated constantly as meeting, incentive and convention business rebooks to non-

U.S.A. destinations. We need your help to ensure that a system capable of processing these mega-groups is put in place so that America can get back into the consideration set.

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TOURISM

The U.S. economy relies on the billions and billions of dollars spent each year by tourists. The tourism industry makes up 6% of America's workforce but has suffered 25% of all jobs lost since September 11, 2001. Visitors for tourism and business were about 4.3 million visitors in fiscal year 2002, down from 5.7 million in fiscal year 2000. America needs safe, but open doors. The U.S. share of worldwide travel has been in a decade-long decline. With respect to Korea, up until 1995, growth of Korean visitors to the U.S. had tracked in tandem with Korea's total outbound growth. Since 1995, however, the U.S. has struggled to attain a 5% growth over a 7 year period, during a time when total Korean outbound travel has grown by 67%. With the latest interview policy changes, we expect the U.S. numbers will now turn negative as many would-be travelers choose other destinations. America has already dropped from its 30 year position as the 2nd largest tourist destination for Koreans to a 2003 ranking as number 4 behind Japan, China and Thailand. We expect further slippage going forward.

STUDENTS

American universities have been drawing on the talents of the best and brightest students of the world. Roughly half of all students now receiving Ph.D.'s in the sciences at U.S. schools are foreigners. However, this trend may not last for long.

These international students are important to the U.S., not just for the nearly $12 billion they infuse into the U.S. economy each year, but also for the knowledge they provide to bridge cultural gaps that is greatly improving the strategic position of the U.S. in the world. These students develop deep ties to our country, laying the foundation for productive relationships in the future. The U.S. Commercial Service estimates over 49,000 Korean students are studying in the U.S., contributing over $1.47 billion to our economy annually. We respectfully urge you to keep these important doors open.

CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON—PERCEPTION OF "FORTRESS AMERICA"

On May 19th of this year, the Department of Homeland Security announced new details regarding its U.S. VISIT (U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology) system, an entry-exit system to monitor the arrival and departure of international visitors. The plan is to capture fingerprints and photographs for the millions of international visitors arriving at U.S. airports and seaports beginning January 1, 2004. This new security measure has not been well communicated to the travel industry and certainly not to the traveling public in Korea. There is concern that when our friends and business associates arrive in the U.S. early next year to be fingerprinted and photographed, many will find the treatment, without advance warning to be unsophisticated and distasteful. Again, a necessary policy, clumsily implemented will do more to alienate our already strained friendships.

Also on the horizon is the law requiring all visa applications to include biometric identifiers by October 2004. While today there are more than 3 million Koreans with valid U.S. visas in their passports, this change in policy will likely require 100% of all visa holders as well as new applicants to come to the U.S. Embassy to be fingerprinted. Considering current space and staffing challenges, the expected waiting times to arrange appointments could be devastating. We again express our deep gratitude for the State Department's Consular Affairs' leadership in doing their best to provide additional resources in advance of this onerous requirement. Because this new policy has not been well communicated to the traveling public in Korea, when the Korean people realize everyone must be fingerprinted before submitting their visa application, there is concern that avoidable damage will again be done to our relationship.

ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL

The reality in Korea is that due to increased security and a "one size fits all approach," we are losing business, we are losing tourists, we are losing students and more importantly, we are losing friends and influence at a time when America can ill afford the loss. At a time when our policymakers are lamenting the global spread of antiAmericanism and pushing for better public diplomacy, the implementation of our new visa policies are making sacrifices we need not make. We believe that in addition to the war on terrorism, there is also a war raging for global influence and

this is also a war the U.S. cannot afford to lose. We may not see the results immediately but in 20 or 30 years from now when one looks back at this time and these challenges, we will be judged on how much foresight and creativity we used in resolving these difficult issues.

CREATIVE SOLUTIONS: USING TECHNOLOGY TO FACILITATE TRAVEL

We respectfully urge the Departments involved to begin aggressive information campaigns to explain the policy and to try and mitigate the negative repercussions. There also appears to be no recognition for the cultural impact of such decisions. Since Korea is one of the most technologically advanced economies in the world, one creative approach might be to contract mobile biometric information collectors and for an additional cost recovery fee, take the service directly to the applicants.

Allowing applicants to submit visa applications online, similar to Australia's visa policy, would shift the burden of the data entry to the applicants, which would save the U.S. government time and money. American industry is known for its creativity and innovation. Examples like FedEx's revolutionary package tracking system might be modified and used to expedite the visa process.

Since September 11, the U.S. government has introduced dramatic changes to strengthen the security of visa issuance. We must find ways to reduce delays that impede legitimate business and tourist travel, without incurring additional security risks. We must fully staff and fund these increased security programs to prevent damaging of our strong economic ties. Delays will end in Koreans choosing other destinations and worse, other business partners. If we want their continued business, we need to make them feel welcome and provide them the best service available. When additional security requirements are needed, we should do our utmost to provide timely information and communicate the changes as clearly and consistently as possible.

The new security realities in which we now live are here to stay. So we must find innovative, new ways to facilitate legitimate travel, while doing our best to carefully scrutinize those who would harm our nation.

Some people believe increasing the percentage of personal interviews will automatically improve the security of the U.S. One concern is that we seem to be moving towards a "one size fits all" approach. And in this particular case, one size definitely does NOT fit all. We support a risk-based approach that would carefully consider a country's links to terrorism, the mobility of its population and the government's commitment to support the U.S. on our war on terrorism.

We can unequivocally say that Korea would be at the low end of that security spectrum. There is no evidence of any Korean passport holder being involved in terrorism and there are no indigenous terrorist groups in Korea. The country is homogeneous, making it more difficult for terrorist cells to operate here. Korea is a strong security ally who was one of the first nations to answer the U.S. call for support in Afghanistan and again in Iraq with non-combat troops. And just last week the Korean government has agreed to send combat troops to join America in post-war Iraq. Clearly, both economically and more importantly, security-wise the South Korean people have proved to be our friends. We respectfully urge our leaders to recognize this friendship by making it easier for our Korean friends, customers, employees and relatives to travel to the U.S.

Let me conclude by reiterating what I stated at the beginning, the American business community in Korea strongly supports the federal initiatives designed to protect America from terrorist attacks. We believe that protection of our national security must go hand-in-hand with protecting our economic security. Procedures and systems designed to deny terrorists must also work to facilitate the efficient entry of legitimate international business and leisure travelers. This is not an "either/or" proposition, but a matter of balance. We must achieve the twin goals of improving security and facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel.

Thank you very much for your kind attention and I look forward to your questions.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Oberlin.

Dr. Aber, welcome.

STATEMENT OF JOHN ABER, VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH AND PUBLIC SERVICE, UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Dr. ABER. Good morning, Chairman Sununu and Senator Nelson.

Thank you for convening this hearing on a topic of central importance to the vitality of America's enterprise in science and tech-

nology. Events since 9/11 have reaffirmed the need to maintain an American edge in these fields while creating the political and administrative membrane that protects the nation's borders while continuing to encourage the free exchange of people and ideas across those borders remains a daunting challenge.

I think there's general agreement that the optimum management of our research enterprise requires free and open access by U.S. universities and laboratories to the pool of aspiring students and scholars who hold citizenships in other countries. This pool provides a significant part of the energy and talent that drives our technological advancement.

In presentations to a House committee last spring, Dr. Shirley Tilghman, president of Princeton University, noted that, in round numbers, a third of all Ph.D.s in science and engineering and 40 percent of all Ph.D. degrees in computer science are awarded to foreign-born students. Two thirds of these students stay in the country and contribute to our technological advances. Forty percent of the faculty in engineering departments across the country are foreign-born. Not only are the numbers important, but the quality of these people is also important. Dr. Tilghman notes that 20 percent of the members of the National Academy of Sciences are foreign-born, and more than a third of U.S. Nobel laureates, as well.

In addition, in her testimony, Dr. Tilghman noted that there had been changes post-9/11 that had impacted the free movement of students and scholars. Most of what she discussed related to the technology alert list, those fields which generate an immediate security check or further review by officers in security organizations. Both the expansion of the number of topics that are included in that last and the use of key words in interview processes to trigger these automatic further reviews were contributing, she felt, to the extension of the time involved in clearance. Also, the elimination of time limitations on decisions by State Department officials, relative to student visas, was also adding to the time required.

The impact of these changes on visa processing was reinforced in a statement by two national educational organizations, whose names are given in the printed testimony. Their statements stress the importance of interview waivers as a way of increasing the efficiency of the visa process and questioned, at the time of their letter, whether or not an increase that seemed to go from 20 percent of interviews of candidates to a 90 percent interview rate for candidates could be handled without increases in funding. And, Senator Nelson, I believe you asked questions on this to the previous panel.

Just to take the University of New Hampshire as an example, we continue to see about two to four cases each year of visa refusals, generally from students coming from China, Africa, and developing countries. Probably not surprisingly, our biggest difficulties are with students coming from Russia and China in high-technology areas. Many of these will automatically generate the Security Advisory Opinion process, which, again, was discussed in the previous panel.

There is an effort underway by educational organizations to try to put some numbers behind these. And, again, you were asking questions about what fraction of people go through the additional

process and what the time is involved in those additional processes. Three of these national organizations have posted a survey on the Web, and I've got the Web site, again, in the testimony. Their goal is to have good quantitative numbers from universities about how these changes have impacted their processing.

Last October, two of these organizations put up preliminary results suggesting that there had been substantial increases in processing time and that hundreds of students arrived late for their classes, resulting in unrecoverable costs to them, losses of tuition revenues to colleges, and decisions by students to go elsewhere. The University of Minnesota, for example, realized a 24 percent decrease in applicants from foreign students for their programs in the fall of 2003.

SEVIS has been described here as a technological method for speeding this process. Last spring, there were some technical difficulties with this mechanism. These seem to be largely cleared up, and SEVIS is, indeed, speeding the processing. And I think you heard some very up-to-date statistics, again, from the previous panel on this.

There have been additional costs, in terms of processing time. Ninety percent of our two-person team for processing these foreign student visas at the University of New Hampshire now goes into SEVIS-related issues. There will be also some additional costs for hardware and software, but these are things we bear gladly in order to be able to maintain the flow of these young and established scholars into our institution.

In terms of actual numbers, at the University of New Hampshire we have seen a leveling off of numbers of applicants for student visas through UNH. We would have probably expected to see an increase. There had been a continuing increase over the previous years. Although, again, it's difficult to say whether or not 9/11 alone has caused that leveling off, or the extent to which recession in the global economy has also contributed to that.

One area that's actually an exception, where we have seen a significant reduction in numbers of student applicants is in people coming for English-language instruction. These are shorter programs, and hindrances and walls created in that application process for the visas for those are more substantial for these shorter programs. Some institutions, we've seen a 20 percent decrease, some institutions have seen as much as a 50 percent decrease if that's one of their primary programs.

Student and scholar mobility is another area which is probably even a bigger process, and if we were going to focus on one that limits the ability of our foreign students to succeed, it would be the difficulty in reentering the country after they have achieved their visa status and then leave the country either to return home or go to scientific meetings. In particular, with Chinese students, those who have successfully come to the U.S. are becoming very reluctant to either return home or attend meetings because of the long delays they may encounter in returning to the U.S. This makes it difficult for them to maintain professional, personal, and family contacts, which are needed to persuade consular officers that they won't remain in the U.S. indefinitely, so it affects them in that way, as well.

In my search for information about this, it seemed that the problems being encountered, at UNH in particular, had more to do with employment visas than student visas. And I realize that's outside the scope of this particular hearing, but they do contribute, in general, to the idea of the perception of the U.S. in other countries. And I think it's interesting—and there was one mention of this in the previous panel—that there's really a very large industry around foreign visa students—a $12-billion-per-year industry—and that we are beginning, it seems, to lose market share to Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom in that arena, partly because of the perception, at least, that we've become a less welcoming institution.

There are a number of case studies in the report, and case studies, I think, are interesting because they put a human face on this, but I'll just conclude with one which kind of captures the problem. There was a nursing scholar in the U.S. on a J-visa, who went to Canada for lunch, and because of a mixup in her visa status and in the processing of that, she had to remain in Canada for four weeks. She was the head of her university's Healthy Asian American Program, and because of this delay, her institution had to rearrange and re-coordinate her program in a different way. So just one example of several.

But thank you for holding this hearing, and I hope this has been helpful.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Aber follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT TESTIMONY OF DR. JOHN ABER

Good Morning Chairman Sununu and members of the committee. Thank you for holding this hearing on a topic of central importance to the vitality of America's enterprise in science and technology. Events since September 11, 2001 have reaffirmed the need to maintain an American edge in science and technology. A good case can be made that the vigor of our science and technology community derives in large measure from what one of my German-born colleagues calls a "traditionally open and welcoming atmosphere for free discussions and large-scale international efforts" here in the U.S. Creating the political and administrative membrane that protects the nation's borders but continues to encourage the free exchange of ideas and people in support of a vigorous scientific community is a daunting challenge. This testimony will reinforce the importance of the international exchange of students and scholars to our research enterprise, and present information on the impact of changes in the student visa system since 9/11, using examples from both the University of New Hampshire and other major research institutions around the nation. I'll close with a statement on perceptions of the U.S. as result of changes in immigration processes, and a small set of case histories that put a human face on this important issue.

IMPORTANCE OF THE FREE MOVEMENT OF STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS

There is general agreement that the optimum management of our research enterprise requires free and open access by U.S. Universities and laboratories to the pool of aspiring students and scholars who hold citizenship in other countries. This pool provides a significant part of the energy and talent that drives our technological advancement. The importance of this source of talent has been emphasized by recent statements by the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security in support of visa policies that both protect our citizens and provide legitimate access, stating that "such travel is important to our international, economic and national values and interest."

In presentations to a house subcommittee on a related topic, Dr. Shirley Tilghman, President of Princeton University, and Dr. David Ward, President of the American Council on Education, summarized a number of important facts regarding

the impact of foreign-born scholars on the American research effort that are generally known, but bear repeating here. These include, in approximate numbers:

- One-third of all Ph.D.s in science and engineering, and two-fifths of those in Computer Science and Engineering, are awarded to foreign-born students;
- Two-thirds of foreign students who receive Ph.D.s here in science and engineering remain in the country and work here, and
- Two-fifths of faculty in engineering departments across the country are foreign-born.

In addition to quantity, the quality of work derived by our research enterprise through the efforts of non-native students and scholars is also evident. Foreign-born researchers make up:

- Nearly one-fifth of the members of the National Academy of Sciences, and
- More than one-third of U.S. Nobel laureates.

Dr. Ward also supplied important statistics on the positive impact of foreign students on the American economy, both directly while students, and eventually through their contributions to technological advancement in U.S. industries. He also makes the point that visiting students and scholars can be our best proponents of the American way of life abroad, and play an important role in increasing international understanding.

The testimonies of Dr. Ward and Dr. Tilghman, both eminent scholars and educators, are especially relevant in that they are both foreign-born.

National studies and our experience at the University of New Hampshire both show that this large representation of international students in technical degree programs does not result from preferential recruitment or retention. At the national level, the long-standing lack of interest in science curricula by U.S. students is a lamentable but undeniable fact of life, and is the subject of a number of initiatives by both governmental agencies and private foundations and institutes. At the University of New Hampshire we combine an enduring commitment to the kind of high-quality undergraduate educational experience generally associated with small liberal arts colleges, with focused support and achievement in selected areas of research excellence. One of our strongest areas is in Space Physics, particularly Sun-Earth interactions. Recruiting graduate students from the U.S. into this field is a tremendous challenge, even though the potential for a successful and stimulating professional career is very high. Without foreign-born students, many from Europe as well as other parts of the world, this important program would lack the energy and stimulation provided by young and developing scholars, and would be severely hampered.

IMPACTS OF CHANGES IN VISA PROCESSING SINCE 9/11

Operational and Fiscal

In her testimony to the House Science Committee, Dr. Tilghman noted changes that, from her perspective, had the greatest impact on visa processing. These included: (1) expansion of the Technology Alert List (TAL) to include the biological sciences and urban planning as Critical Fields of Study; (2) guidance to consular officers that restrictions on the export of controlled goods and technologies (the TAL) apply to nationals of all countries and not just to those who are from state sponsors of terrorism; (3) guidance that consular officers are not expected to be versed in all fields on the TAL, but should "listen for key words or phrases from the Critical Fields list" while interviewing applicants; and (4) elimination of time limitations on decisions by the State Department to suspend the processing of a student visa request. Each of these changes has increased the number of cases that are referred to the State Department and other federal agencies for additional screening and security approval, and the increased case load has resulted in prolonged processing time for nearly all student visa applications.

The impact of this change on visa processing time has been reinforced in a statement submitted to the Committee on Government Reform by the Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange and NAFSA: Association of International Educators. That statement stressed the importance of the waiver of personal interviews as an important mechanism for increasing the efficiency of visa application processing. These groups questioned the ability of the departments involved to handle a change from a 20% interview rate to a 90% interview rate without substantial increases in funding.

At UNH, although we continue to see occasional outright visa refusals (generally due to presumed immigrant intent on the part of F-1 students and exchange stu-

dents in J-1 status), we have seen no real increase over the level of recent years—about two to four cases each year, generally from China, Africa, and developing countries. More important adverse impacts derive from the increased time required to complete a successful application. Consular officers at U.S. embassies and consulates overseas now more than ever err on the side of caution in deciding whether to refer a case to Washington for a "security advisory opinion" based on a combination of the applicant's country of citizenship (or, occasionally, country of birth) and the degree of sensitivity of their field of endeavor here in the U.S.A. Russian and Chinese applicants working in fields where technology transfer is a major concern are especially likely to face delays because their cases are being referred to Washington. Although the Department of State tells us that eighty per cent of cases referred to Washington are cleared in thirty days or less, our anecdotal experience, and that of our colleagues at other institutions, does not appear to confirm this statistic.

It would be valuable to have data to underlie the perception that visa processing times have increased. The perception is surely there. Visits to the websites of major research universities across the country reveal a consistent set of statements regarding increased processing time and the requirement to begin the visa process early. MIT has instituted official policies that provide guidance on how to deal with foreign students who are delayed to the point that they cannot start a semester on time. The letter announcing those policies (released in February of this year) does suggest, however, that the number of cases involving substantial delays in student arrival time have been few.

There is an effort currently underway to determine whether processing times are increasing or decreasing. Three organizations representing the university community (NASULGC, NAFSA and AAU[1]) have posted a questionnaire on the web (www.nafsa.org/survey) to obtain information both about processing times and about numbers of current and past applications and enrollments by foreign students.

Two of these organizations (AAU and NAFSA) conducted a preliminary survey with results released in October 2002. Summary conclusions included that there had been a "substantial increase in the numbers of student visa delays and denial for fall 2002 when compared with fall 2001." Particular delays occurred with students from China, India and Muslim countries, with "hundreds" of students missing program start dates. The most common consequences of these delays were unrecoverable costs to students, loss of tuition revenue to colleges, and decisions by students to go elsewhere. One campus in particular, the University of Minnesota, reported a decline of 24% in international student applications for the fall of 2003.

The agencies involved have been bringing technology to bear in an effort to reduce processing time. SEVIS is a web-based system developed and operated by ICS to allow electronic submission and review of applications for student visas. Early difficulties with the technology reported by Dr. Tilghman last spring appear to have been solved, and SEVIS appears to be reducing processing times. Open questions remain about whether or not to charge a fee for this application method, and how this fee, if charged, should be collected. Otherwise, the system appears to be functional and helpful—a good use of technology to assure our own technological growth.

The system has impacted university international student offices by increasing upfront and operational costs associated with the local management of this system. Dr. Tilghman says that Princeton spent $38,000 for hardware and committed a full time person to implement SEVIS locally.

At UNH, implementation of SEVIS has required considerable amounts of time and effort to ensure that UNH is in compliance with new tracking requirements, especially relative to visiting students. Our part-time foreign student advisor and our full-time director devoted approximately 90 per cent of their time to SEVIS-related issues during the first half of this year—in addition to time spent during the many months leading up to initial implementation. This additional time commitment has resulted from the need to gather additional information from students, inform them of the requirements of the new program, and—because the stakes are so high for students who could fall out of legal status in case of error—double and triple checking the accuracy of all information and procedures. Time has also been spent working with national professional associations contributing information with the goal of influencing future regulations and processes.

Financial costs are yet to be determined. While we anticipate little need for additional hardware, we will undoubtedly need to purchase one of several software programs that can interface between SEVIS and our current data base system. This

[1] NASULGC = National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, NAFSA = NAFSA: Association of International Educators, and AAU = Association of American Universities.

could eventually cost $10,000 or more. Meanwhile, the need to confirm enrollments by hand rather than by "batching" data reported through SEVIS to the Department of Homeland Security is costing our office considerable staff time. Many smaller schools which are starting off from a less sophisticated level find the necessary investments of hardware, software, and staff training overwhelming.

Student Enrollment

In general, we have not seen a significant change in the numbers of foreign applicants to UNH degree programs. In the absence of the post-9/11 measures undertaken by government agencies, we could have expected a continued modest increase each year, but it is difficult to ascribe the lack of growth to specific factors. The general economic down-turn and other factors might be equally responsible. Likewise, we have not seen a significant increase in visa refusals or delays among our student cases. These trends mirror those reported to the House by Dr. Tilghman for a number of large private universities.

The one exception to this trend at UNH is a decrease of approximately twenty per cent in our English language programs, which tend to be of relatively short duration. Students coming to these programs are more likely to be discouraged by added costs and bureaucratic obstacles than are degree candidates. Many other institutions, especially those which offer English language instruction only, have seen their numbers cut in half. Because students coming initially to learn English tend to remain in the U.S. as degree candidates, decreased enrollments in other programs will likely follow with a lag time of one year.

Student and Scholar Mobility

Changes in immigration processes are also having an impact on the movement of students and scholars, affecting their intellectual progress and contributions to American research. One example involves Chinese students, who are both a large proportion of the total foreign student pool, and one which has traditionally faced higher visa refusal rates than those from most other countries. As a result of past practice and recent changes, Chinese students who are successful in getting to the U.S. are most often reluctant to risk a trip outside the U.S. during the course of their studies or research, for fear of being refused a reentry visa. They are therefore less likely to maintain the professional, personal, and family contacts which are needed to persuade consular officers that they won't remain in the U.S. indefinitely.

The number of countries for which individual interviews for visas are required is increasing, and now includes India, Russia, predominantly Muslim countries, and even Western European countries and Japan. As significant challenges in the visa process increase, more and more of our visitors are deciding not to go home to visit family, or to attend important international professional conferences, for fear of lengthy disruption of their studies and/or research.

International Perceptions

One of the charges from the committee regarding this testimony was to comment on "perceptions of our nation and our people abroad." Here we must rely on anecdote alone, as there are no valid indices of how our scientific colleagues view the U.S. as an environment for research. UNH has a significant presence in international research both in space physics and in the geosciences, and in other selected areas. A number of our most productive faculty spend a considerable part of their working life abroad. One of them has expressed to me a general concern about scientific collaborations, citing recent changes in practices as creating significant obstacles to international cooperation and creating the perception in the international research community that the U.S. is becoming more of a "closed shop." He suggests that this, combined with enormously constraining regulations about technology transfer has led to a rapid decline in collaboration opportunities. One specific example involved limitations on the selection of lead scientists for a NASA project that suggested to him an environment that "diminishes greatly the reach of U.S. scientific enterprises."

Visa challenges at the national level are now combined with additional complex requirements from other government agencies relating to drivers' licenses from state Departments of Motor Vehicles, social security numbers, and even tax information. Because of this, our international students and scholars are forced to divert increasing amounts time, attention, and emotional energy into issues of daily life and away from their studies and research. All of these factors in the long run seriously affect the efficiency with which they contribute to our collective progress. As they report back to their countrymen on these issues, the United States will may well continue to lose market share in the multi-billion-dollar international education business to Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom which have become increasingly competitive in attracting the best and brightest young minds worldwide.

As an example, a recent article by Janice Spaskey in the Chronicle of Higher Education reports on a Canadian program to speed visa processing for students wishing to study in Alberta, to increase that province's competitive advantage relative to Australia and the U.S. The provincial Minister of Learning developed this idea after a trip to Asia during which he became convinced that visa-related matters were important when students were deciding where to study. These potential foreign students were clearly seen as a resource worth competing for, and the current visa processing time of 3 to 9 months an important deterrent to success in that competition.

Case Histories

I'd like to give some of these general statements a human face by providing a few stories that underlie them. Anecdotes are dangerous because in a system as large as this there are bound to be occasional mistakes and individual delays for acceptable reasons. But these stories do exemplify how real people are being seriously impacted, and their important scholarly efforts delayed, by the current operation of the visa system. Identifying information has been removed from these case studies, but all are verifiable through direct communications. Personnel at NASULGC have been very helpful in drawing some of these stories together.

Case 1:

A Chinese graduate student in Physics from returned to China for family business in December, 2002. When he left for China, he did so with all of the appropriate documentation and maintained all immigration regulations while there. He initially interviewed for his return visa in early January, providing the follow-up information on his research area, which was requested by the visa officer. With no news on the visa after 6 weeks, the student visited to embassy to inquire about the status of his application. The student was informed that his application needed a security advisory opinion (SAO) from Washington and that he must wait. In the middle of February, a Congressional office inquired about the student's application with the State Department and learned that it was still under review. The approval for a return visa was finally granted in June and the student returned to campus almost immediately thereafter. The long delay had a number of negative consequences for the student and the university. The student was expected to graduate in August, 2003. Now, because of the delay, his graduation date has been pushed back by a year to August, 2004. A multi-million dollar federally-backed multiuniversity research project, of which he was a critical member, and the activities associated with it were delayed, including publications. The student was involved in another multi-million dollar federally-funded equipment simulation project, which was also delayed.

Case 2:

A third-year Chinese Biochemistry Ph.D. student visited her family during the holiday break in 2002. Upon attempting to renew her visa to return to the U.S. to continue her studies on January 3, 2003, she was told she would have to wait for the security clearance on her visa application. Her application was not cleared for the return visa until early August, 2003. She missed an entire semester.

Case 3:

A second-year graduate student from China in Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering visited China in September, 2002, with her academic advisor to participate in a conference and present a paper at a major Chinese university. Upon applying for her renewal visa to reenter the U.S to continue her studies, she has been delayed by the security check. She is still waiting for clearance and has to arrange make up courses in order to set the proper time for your Ph.D. qualifying exams.

Case 4:

A student from Turkey in the last semester of his Master's program in Economics was scheduled to begin his Ph.D. program Fall 2003. Although his student visa is valid until December 2003, he decided to apply for a new visa during the summer while visiting his family. His visa appointment was on July 24th; apparently there was a "hit" on the name check. His fingerprints have already been taken twice and as we understand it, the visa clearance process is still not resolved. He was forced to defer his Ph.D. program to Spring 2004 and the department had to reassign his assistantship at the last minute.

Case 5:

An undergraduate student from Canada who graduated last May applied for Optional Practical Training (OPT) in March 2003 for employment beginning 07/22/2003 and ending 07/21/2004 (F-1 students are allowed 12 months of employment in their

field of study). The OISS entered all the necessary information in SEVIS, as required. She received a job offer with a begin date of 06/01/2003. Unfortunately, "data fixes" in SEVIS can only be done through the SEVIS Help Desk but instead of changing the dates as the OISS requested, her OPT data was inadvertently canceled (apparently a miscommunication among Help Desk "counselors"). It took multiple phone calls to the Help Desk and the Vermont Service Center, with the help of Sen. Judd Gregg's office to finally resolve her case. Her OPT was finally approved on July 8. She was unable to leave the country while her case was pending for fear that she will not be able to return.

Case 6:

Due to an error in the SEVIS system, a J-visa nursing scholar could not reenter the United States for nearly four weeks after going to a border city in Canada for lunch. She is one of the coordinators of the university's Healthy Asian Americans Project. Due to her delay in returning to the U.S., alternate staffing had to be arranged to coordinate a major outreach program.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. Estorino, welcome.

STATEMENT OF JOSE ESTORINO, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF MARKETING, ORLANDO/ORANGE COUNTY CONVENTION AND VISITORS BUREAU, INC., ORLANDO, FLORIDA

Mr. ESTORINO. Thank you.

Chairman Sununu, Ranking Member Nelson, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on U.S. visa policy and related matters impacting international travel to the United States. It's a matter of serious and continuing concern for individual companies in the U.S. travel industry, as well as cities and states that depend on international travel for their economic livelihood.

The Orlando Convention and Visitors Bureau represents nearly 1500 private businesses that make up the tourism industry in the area. The travel industry is critical to the economic health of Orlando and the entire state of Florida. While domestic travel to Central Florida and the U.S. overall is much larger, international visitors typically stay longer and spend a great deal more than U.S. travelers. This is why the industry is so concerned about federal policies that are designed to protect the homeland, but may have the unintended consequence of deterring legitimate international travelers visiting Orlando and so many other destinations.

Today, I'm testifying on behalf of the Travel Industry Association of American, of which we are a long-time and active member. TIA is the national nonprofit organization representing all components of the $525 billion U.S. travel and tourism industry. TIA's mission is to represent the whole of the travel industry to promote and facilitate increased travel to and within the United States.

International business and leisure travel to the U.S. is a vital component of the national economy. In 2002, over 41 million international visitors generated 88 billion in expenditures, 12 billion in federal, state, and local revenue, and accounted for one million jobs nationwide. The continuing decline in international visitation over the past two years, though, has cost our economy $15.3 billion in expenditures.

The decline in travel is due to a variety of reasons, including fear of terrorism, a downturn in the global economy, and confusion over the new U.S. visa and border security procedures. While some of the causes are beyond the reach of any single government, actions by the U.S. Government can either enhance or harm our nation's

ability to attract more international visitors and create more economic opportunity for all states and cities.

There are a number of federal policy decisions that have been made in recent years or are currently being contemplated that have resulted in actual or perceived barriers that deter visitors from traveling to the United States. Rightly or wrongly, the international traveling public increasingly perceives the myriad of security rules is creating a fortress America. By and large, these rules and requirements make sense for a homeland security perspective. And TIA and the U.S. travel industry support efforts to enhance national security. But for many international visitors, wave after wave of new travel requirements paint a big picture that the United States is becoming a destination that is too difficult to enter, too expensive to visit, and simply not worth the effort.

In their opinion, the welcome mat has seemingly been pulled. Perception has become the new reality, and even in countries where there are relatively few barriers for travel to the United States, this negative perception has resulted in lost business for the United States.

I'd like to share with you comments and concerns from the field and other industry members that I have received in preparation for this hearing.

Since everyone in the family between the ages of 16 and 60 must come for a personal interview to a consulate or embassy, the cost to these individuals, in some cases, is 50 percent of what an actual trip to the U.S. would cost. This is the case in Brazil, a country the size of the United States, with only four places to conduct interviews.

Secondly, the rumored or perceived denial rate for these visas is reported to be 25 to 35 percent. And, in some cases, one family member is denied, while others are approved, basically preventing many from traveling.

Thirdly, due to the length of the process in acquiring a visa and the reality that people are planning trips shorter, and this creates additional barriers.

Fourth, the competition has taken advantage of our situation by heavily promoting other destination. And, in some cases, foreign carriers are adding greater flight frequency to their destinations.

Fifth, the tour operators and travel agents are selling these other destinations because of the visa barriers to the United States and have begun to develop new products to Europe and other destinations that don't have visa requirements.

And, sixth, the international media has reported on the visa barriers and is creating fear and dislike for travel to America. I was told that the consumer now perceives us as arrogant and elitist. This is damaging America's image.

Just last year, as Congressman Nelson mentioned, Congress appropriated 50 million to promote the U.S. internationally as the premier visitation destination in the world. The travel industry is grateful to Congress for recognizing the need to tell the world that we are not only open for business, but also eager to welcome international visitors to our cities and rural areas to experience our natural beauty, culture, and exciting attractions.

But even before government and industry have decided how best to invest this 50 million to attract increased numbers of international visitors, there is great concern, particularly overseas, that all of this new visa, passport, and entry procedures could potentially drown out efforts to invite the world to see America.

In conclusion, let me repeat that the U.S. travel industry strongly supports efforts by the Federal Government to protect our homeland. We realize these are challenging times for our government officials, who seek to prevent acts of terror while working to facilitate legitimate international travel and trade. We stand ready to work with Congress and the Administration on the creation of commonsense policies that prevent the entry of terrorists while truly facilitating the entry of tens of millions of legitimate business and leisure visitors who provide a great economic, social, and political benefit to our country.

Thank you very much, and I'll be glad to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Estorino follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSE ESTORINO

Chairman Sununu, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you on U.S. visa policy and related matters impacting international travel to the United States. This is a matter of serious and continuing concern for individual companies in the U.S. travel industry, as well as cities and states that depend on international travel for their economic livelihood.

I am Jose Estorino, Senior Vice President of Marketing for the Orlando/Orange County Convention and Visitors Bureau. I am responsible for all global marketing, domestic and international, and oversee seven international sales offices in Europe, Latin America and Japan. We represent nearly 1,500 private businesses that make up the tourism industry in our area. The travel industry is critical to the economic health of Orlando and the entire state of Florida. While domestic travel to central Florida and the U.S. overall is much larger, international visitors typically stay longer and spend a great deal more than U.S. travelers. This is why the industry is so concerned about federal policies that are designed to protect the homeland, but may have the unintended consequence of deterring legitimate international travelers from visiting Orlando and so many other destinations.

Today I am testifying on behalf of the Travel Industry Association of America (TIA), of which the Orlando/Orange County Convention and Visitors Bureau is a long-time and active member. TIA is the national, non-profit organization representing all components of the $525 billion U.S. travel and tourism industry. TIA's mission is to represent the whole of the travel industry to promote and facilitate increased travel to and within the United States. Its more than 2,000 member organizations represent every segment of the industry throughout the country.

The travel industry remains concerned about several federal policy decisions and programs that have created actual barriers to inbound international travel, or created a perception of barriers, that serve to discourage international visitors from traveling to the U.S. We continue to urge the federal government to work with us to find ways both to protect the homeland and ensure the economic vitality of the U.S. travel industry. This is not an "either or" proposition. This nation should and must have both.

OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL TO THE U.S.

International business and leisure travel to the U.S. is a vital component of our national economy. In 2002, over 41 million international visitors generated $88 billion in expenditures, $12 billion in federal, state and local tax revenue, and accounted for one million jobs nationwide. International travel and tourism to the U.S. is a service export, and in 2002, the U.S. had a positive balance of trade of $8 billion.

The continuing decline in international visitation over the past two years, though, has drastically reduced the flow of tax revenue to all levels of government and reduced our international balance of trade. Since 2000, the loss of international travel to the U.S. has cost our economy $15.3 billion in expenditures. Below is a review

of key international market performance since 2000, based on 2002 and 2001 arrivals figures:

Arrivals in U.S. (2000 Ranking)	Change in 2002 from 2001	Change in 2002 from 2000
Canada (1)	–4.0%	–11.1%
Mexico (2)	–0.5%	–4.8%
Total arrivals	–7.0%	–19.5%
U.K. (3)	–6.8%	–18.8%
Japan (4)	–11.2%	–28.3%
Germany (5)	–9.4%	–33.3%
Brazil (6)	–26.5%	–45.1%
Total Overseas	–12.4%	–26.4%

Note: Japan and the U.K. are in the Visa Waiver Program, which only requires a valid passport for entry. Travel from Brazil requires a valid passport and U.S. issued visa. Different rules apply to Canada.

Data Source: Dept. of Commerce, Ofc. of Travel and Tourism Industries.

The decline in travel is due to a variety of reasons, including fear of travel because of terrorism, a downturn in the global economy and confusion over new U.S. visa and border security procedures. While some of the causes are beyond the reach of any single government, actions by the U.S. government can either enhance or harm our nation's ability to attract increased international travel to the U.S. and create more jobs and economic opportunity for states and cities in every corner of our country.

FEDERAL POLICIES IMPACTING INBOUND INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL

There are a number of federal policy decisions that have been made in recent years, or are currently being contemplated, that either create actual barriers to travel for prospective international visitors, or lead to a perception of great difficulty for those intending to visit the U.S. for business or pleasure. Recent decisions on visa policy and new requirements for applicants, new rules concerning Visa Waiver traveler passports, and new entry-exit procedures taken as a whole have led to serious confusion and concern on the part of the international traveling public and those businesses that sell travel to the U.S.

INCREASED INTERVIEWS FOR VISA APPLICANTS

As security has become a paramount concern in visa processing, it now takes longer to process non-immigrant visa applications at numerous consulates. The State Department is taking more time to review applications and requiring more documentation. In addition to these changes, starting August 1, 2003, U.S. embassies and consulates have been required to personally interview virtually all non-immigrant visa applicants.

While the travel industry supports more vigorous screening of visa applicants, we were disappointed to learn these new requirements would not be accompanied by any increases in personnel or additional facilities in which to carry out this new mandate. In fact, the State Department fully admitted that increasing interview rates to approximately ninety percent would likely worsen delays in visa processing.

We appreciate the State Department's intentions to possibly shift resources to high-volume, visa-issuing posts abroad or add new consular positions to meet the dramatically expanded workload in some countries. That said, we argued this past summer, and still believe now, this policy should have been delayed until the State Department requested and received from Congress the requisite resources to avoid even greater delays in visa processing and issuance. Longer waits for visas will only cause international visitors to choose other destinations for travel where the actual or perceived barriers are less, and where they perceive their business is welcome.

VISA POLICIES AND COSTS DETER INTERNATIONAL VISITORS

New visa policies and related costs are having a detrimental impact on international travel to the U.S., and the following are real-world examples from the two largest non-Visa Waiver markets for travel to our country, Brazil and Korea.

Brazil is the largest market for travel to the U.S. from Latin America, and a major source of overseas visitors in Orlando, and Florida as a whole. Unfortunately, over the last two years Brazilian travel to the U.S. has declined by 45%. According to recent survey research by the U.S. Department of Commerce, the top concern for Brazilian tour producers wanting to send clients to the U.S. is the issue of travel barriers as a result of changes in U.S. visa policy.

For example, the visa interview rule has drastically increased the cost of visiting the U.S. for many Brazilians. Currently, there are only four locations in Brazil where an individual can go to apply in person for a U.S. visa. Brazil is almost as large as the continental U.S. This means many Brazilians will have to travel a significant distance to reach the U.S. Embassy or one of the consulates. For many visa applicants the trip will be long enough to warrant purchasing an airline ticket and possibly a hotel room. When you add these travel costs on to the $100 visa application fee, the total cost for obtaining a U.S. visa can be as much as $450 (U.S.) per person, or $1,800 for a family of four, in cases when all family members must appear in person.

Please bear in mind this is simply the cost for the trip within their own country to apply for a visa with the hope of reaching their ultimate destination—the United States. Further compounding the situation is the fact that one-third of Brazilian visa applicants are refused. Is it any wonder that while outbound travel from Brazil is growing in recent months, Brazilian travelers are choosing to travel to Europe where visas are not required?

As further evidence of the impact these visa policies are having on inbound travel from Brazil, we respectfully request that a letter from the Association of Brazilian Travel Producers (BRASTOA) on this matter be included in the official hearing record.

The Asian market has also been negatively affected. Last year, 638,000 Koreans traveled to the U.S. for business or leisure. In 2002, the U.S. embassy in Seoul issued 337,000 new visas, of which 273,800 were B–1 or B–2 visas for business and leisure travel. For 2002, only 27% of all B–1/B–2 visa applicants were interviewed in person.

If a 100% visa interview policy were implemented for the U.S. Embassy in Seoul with no additional resources, personnel and facilities limitations would restrict the embassy to issuing a maximum of 200,000 visas of all types per year. TIA estimates this would result in a loss of approximately 114,000 travelers (one of every six Korean visitors) and a loss of $205 million in expenditures for the South Korean travel market alone. Expand this to other travel markets, and it is easy to see how U.S. visa policies would cost industry and government hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of lost jobs.

In spring of 2003, prior to implementation of the new visa interview requirements, a South Korean would only have to wait two to five days before receiving a U.S. visa. At that time only about 35% of applicants were interviewed. The U.S. Embassy in Seoul moved to the new interview policy on July 18. Recent reports indicate Koreans must now wait eight weeks for an interview for B–1 or B–2 visas. This is unacceptable, and will undoubtedly cause many Korean travelers to choose other destinations for leisure trips.

VISA POLICIES RESULT IN CANCELED BUSINESS

According to reports from the Visit USA Committee in Korea, an 8,000-person group from Amway Korea was planning a 2004 conference in the U.S. As a result of increased delays in visa processing, they are now looking at alternative "visa-free" sites in Asia. The lost business from this one group is estimated to be over $15 million in travel expenditures.

Another example of business lost as a result of either actual barriers, or perceived barriers, involves New York City, which was one of three finalists for hosting the 2004 World Masters-Athletics Indoor Track & Field Championships. Although New York City out-scored Stuttgart and Stockholm in all host city judging categories, the World Association of Masters Athletes chose Germany over the U.S. specifically because it was believed that stringent U.S. visa policies would deter competitors and their families from coming to the meet. It was perceived that Germany would be more "open" to allowing athletes and their families to visit, even making special visa allowances for the athletes. The result of this decision is that New York City lost

anywhere from 4,000 to 8,000 international visitors (athletes, trainers, and family members) with an economic price tag of $5.75 to $11.5 million.

POSSIBLE INCREASE IN VISA APPLICATION FEE

In Congressional testimony this year, State Department officials have publicly mentioned the possibility of increasing the non-refundable fee it charges for non-immigrant visa applicants. The fee was raised in November of 2002 from $65 to $100 U.S. This fee is paid regardless of whether or not the visa application is approved. While we acknowledge that the State Department has fixed costs related to adjudication of visa applications, increasing the fee again would only serve to further discourage legitimate international travel to the U.S.

NEGATIVE PERCEPTION OF U.S. POLICIES

The international traveling public increasingly perceives that the myriad of new security rules is creating a "Fortress America." International travelers do not just consider the impact of individual rules, but view all rules and programs in total. They have noted the increase in visa fees, new visa interview requirements and growing visa denials. They are also aware of machine-readable passport deadlines, the future use of biometric identifiers in U.S. visas and Visa Waiver passports, collection and use of advance passenger information, or API, along with the soon to be implemented US VISIT (U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology), or entry-exit system, which is scheduled to begin at U.S. airports and seaports in 2004.

By and large, these new rules and requirements make sense from a homeland security perspective, and TIA and the U.S. travel industry support efforts to enhance national security. But for many prospective international visitors, wave after wave of new travel requirements paints a "big picture" that the United States is becoming a destination that is too difficult to enter, too expensive to visit and simply not worth the effort. In their opinion, the "welcome mat" has seemingly been pulled. Perception has become the new reality, and even in countries where there are relatively few barriers for travel to the U.S., this negative perception has resulted in lost business for the United States.

CONGRESS FUNDS INTERNATIONAL TOURISM PROMOTION

Just last year Congress appropriated $50 million to promote the U.S. internationally as the premier visitor destination in the world. This U.S. promotion campaign is being led by the U.S. Department of Commerce, with advice and counsel from the U.S. Travel and Tourism Promotion Advisory Board, which is composed of leaders in the U.S. travel industry. The travel industry is grateful to Congress for recognizing the need to tell the world that we are not only open for business, but also eager to welcome international visitors to our cities and rural areas to experience our natural beauty, culture and exciting attractions.

But even before government and industry have decided how best to invest this $50 million to attract increased numbers of international visitors, there is great concern that all of these new visa, passport and entry procedures could potentially drown out any efforts to invite the world to "See America." Our overseas business partners who sell travel to the U.S. are worried this investment in promotion will do little to increase inbound international travel because of widespread negative perceptions. We share their concerns, but sincerely hope this will not be the case. We are committed to working closely with the Department of Commerce to ensure this $50 million investment results in more international visitors, increased U.S. jobs and growing revenues for all levels of government.

CONCLUSION

TIA and the U.S. travel industry strongly support efforts by the federal government to protect our homeland from attack by those who would seek to harm our citizens, residents, and international guests. We stand ready to work with Congress and the Administration on the creation of policies that prevent the entry of terrorists while truly facilitating the entry of tens of millions of legitimate business and leisure visitors who provide a great economic, social and political benefit for this country.

We realize these are challenging times for government officials who seek to prevent acts of terror while working to facilitate legitimate international travel and trade. TIA and the entire travel industry, for example, applaud the Administration for its recent decision that extended the machine-readable passport deadline by one year for twenty-one Visa Waiver Program countries. This decision will help to pre-

vent the potential loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in lost business from key markets, and is viewed by travel industry leaders as a hopeful sign the federal government is increasingly aware of the "economic security" needs of the U.S. travel industry.

Again, we must have enhanced U.S. national security as well as growth in travel and tourism and the overall U.S. economy. Protecting America and providing jobs must remain priorities for Congress and the Administration. These goals are not mutually exclusive, and we can and must have both.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Estorino.

We'll begin the questioning with Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Estorino, welcome. I think you have underscored the case most articulately, what I was trying to get across in my questioning of the previous panel, that we've got to make it easier in the minds of the foreign guests to be able to come, and, at the same time, of course, protect our own borders.

Why don't you, for the record, tell about the travel business from Brazil and how it is so dramatically dropped?

Mr. ESTORINO. Travel has dropped significantly, about 45 percent, just recently. The issue that I'm hearing from the field is primarily the cost of acquiring a visa. You can imagine—I'll put it in a different perspective—imagine if American citizens had to get a visa to travel to the United Kingdom and we only had consulates in New York, Miami, and San Francisco. If every American had to go to one of these places in order to get a visa to travel to the U.K., how many people do you think would be traveling to the United Kingdom? I would suggest that it's not many.

So picture that case in Brazil. You have a situation where we're forcing a very large country—there are many other areas of population that do travel to the United States and are having to go to a selected number of cities.

I asked the question, because I wanted to know how many people outside of Sao Paulo, Brasilia, and Rio de Janeiro were traveling to the United States. The number that I received was approximately 45 to 50 percent of the travelers to the United States are coming from outside those major cities.

So it's a huge cost, as we all indicated earlier, when you have to pay a fee per applicant, as well as pay for travel arrangements, in the case of Brazil, in many cases, air travel, and then you have to spend the night, and then you have to get, you know, meals, et cetera, to then only find out that a third of these applicants are being denied. I believe it creates a huge barrier in interest and is really hurting the image of our country in welcoming these folks to the United States.

Senator NELSON. What about the other countries in South America?

Mr. ESTORINO. Well, there's a couple of countries that would have a similar scenario, that would have to travel long distances.

The issue of delays is the other question. All around the world, people are traveling—deciding to travel with a lot less lead time. So having to wait a long time for a visa does not incentivize people to want to come. Again, the denial rate is significant. So it just creates additional barriers. The media is not helping us in any way in these countries, obviously, presenting these stories and cases and so on.

So we have an image problem. We have to repair it through a public-relations effort, and we have to welcome our guests. And I'm not suggesting that we give each passenger a pina colada as they board the plane, but I am suggesting that we treat them, you know, respectfully. Most of these people are legitimate people that want to come to our country, and we should be welcoming them.

Senator NELSON. Of all of your inbound tourism traffic into the Orlando area, is Brazil the largest percentage of that?

Mr. ESTORINO. The United Kingdom represents our largest source of visitation, with over a million visitors. We saw that market decline last year. As an example, we saw our U.K. visitation drop approximately 17 percent, while we saw Brazilian visitation to Orlando drop 50 percent. So we've been hit across the board. Our Asian markets, although the number is much smaller, has also declined by 53 percent.

In total, Orlando was hit particularly hard, Senator, with an overall decline last year of 22 percent, compared to a U.S. overall decline of approximately 7 percent. So Orlando was hit particularly hard with international visitation.

Senator NELSON. And the Florida figures are not just Orlando. That's Miami, as well.

Mr. ESTORINO. Actually, sir, I was stating Orlando figures. Orlando had dropped over 22 percent, the state of Florida dropped nearly 16 percent, and the overall United States dropped, international passengers, was a drop of 7 percent. So Florida was hit harder than the nation, and Orlando was hit harder than both.

Senator NELSON. I, of course, bring up Miami because it, as well as Orlando, is one of the major international destination points, particularly with regard to commerce, a lot of banking, and so forth. It's interesting why we have our United States military Southern Command in Miami. It's because that is the point of greatest contact for all the governments of Central and South America. You think of the one point where they travel most frequently, interestingly, it's Miami.

With the United Kingdom being first—do you have that list? Go on down the list. Who's second into Orlando?

Mr. ESTORINO. Into Orlando, would be Germany. Then the South American nations, Brazil—I'm sorry, Canada would be second. It would be the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Brazil. And Mexico—I don't have exact numbers, but Mexico would be pretty high.

Senator NELSON. Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SUNUNU. Mr. Estorino, do you have any other suggestions, specific suggestions, for dealing with that reduction in travel? Like you mentioned the costs. Obviously, we could try to deal with the costs to the application process.

Mr. ESTORINO. I think, in the case of a country like Brazil, I've been told that organizations in Brazil, such as the Organization of Brazilian Travel Agents, BRAZTOA, the Association of Brazilian Tour Operators, is more than willing to work with the government, the U.S. Government, in facilitating anything that they could do to bring consulars to the other major cities to help facilitate visa processing. I'd say take them up on it somehow. We need to reduce the

process, we need to make it more economical for people to obtain a visa, and we need to do some outreaching to them.

Chairman Sununu, the other concern that I have is that if these barriers don't get resolved quickly, part of what may happen is American travel companies that are interested in generating visitation from these countries may abandon their marketing effort in these countries. There have been situations already; I'll give you an example: Walt Disney World has already closed their office in Brazil. While we, as the Orlando Convention and Visitors Bureau, have maintained our offices. That's a matter of prioritizing. But I can tell you it's very difficult to continue to dedicate resources to stimulate these markets when we know that there are some significant barriers that there's little we can do about.

Senator SUNUNU. Mr. Oberlin, does the embassy in Seoul have any sort of a mechanism for regular discussion with the business community or the academic community there on visa-related issues?

Mr. OBERLIN. Yes, as I mentioned in my comments, we applaud the efforts of the consular section, the leadership of Ambassador Hubbard. They have been working with the travel industry in Korea. They've been working with the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea and trying to find ways so that the problems can be lessened, to whatever degree possible.

A lot of what we think are some of the innovative ways in which we can go forward, that has been—that is through collaboration essentially with the experts, because there you have the experts right there on the ground.

Senator SUNUNU. Has the embassy been proactive in trying to communicate with the Korean people, generally, on these issues?

Mr. OBERLIN. I would say, yes, they have; but, unfortunately, I would also probably add that they're limited in resources in being able to do that. That's one of the things that we believe is critical. And I think one of my colleagues has already pointed it out, too. Communication. We know that we have to do—we know we have to do this. These policies are something that are necessary for our national security. However, at the same time, we have to make sure that our friends and potential visitors to the United States understand why we're doing what we're doing, because they have a different perception than what we have.

Senator SUNUNU. Do you have a specific goal in mind for a reasonable visa processing time?

Mr. OBERLIN. Well, we would like to take it back to where it was, and where it was—that was two to five days. We don't know whether that's possible in the near-term, but that should definitely be the objective. In other words, if you had to come up with a metric, the simplest metric would to take it before the implementation of the policy and try to achieve that in as short a period of time as possible.

Senator SUNUNU. And where is it now?

Mr. OBERLIN. Depending upon the season, it's between 30 to 60 to 70 days. I might comment—going back to your question about working with the embassy—we were very, very concerned initially, before the policy was implemented, that this was going to be far worse than what it is. I think everybody has pulled together quite

well to bring it down to the level that we see now. Unfortunately, for all the reasons that also have been discussed as far as how people make decisions on traveling, *et cetera,* it's still unacceptable./

Senator SUNUNU. Dr. Aber, on the student visa tracking system, do you believe that a centralized system would work more effectively or would be less costly, or should our goal be focused on making the current distributed system work even better?

Dr. ABER. I would think the distributed system has the advantage of having the people who are in contact with the students having access to the technology to do that processing. Certainly that leads to centralized review, as it should, but I would imagine that if there was a barrier between the people dealing with the students and a centralized data-entry system of some kind, it would probably increase the processing time rather than decrease it. There are certainly the costs of doing business this way, which are higher. But, again, as I said, at UNH, at least, you know, we're happy to do that, to the extent we can, in order to provide the best possible service and make it as easy as possible for these visitors to come.

Senator SUNUNU. Are you aware of any problems with tampering or unauthorized disclosure of information in the system?

Dr. ABER. I'm not. One thing that the people in our office said they do is go over and over this information several times, because they know once it's into an automated system, if it's inaccurate in any way, it might be very difficult to reclaim that information or restart the process. I haven't heard directly of any kind of tampering with the system. Although the concern is around if there is a charge for SEVIS, how that will be administered, and there was discussion of doing it with some kind of paper transaction which was thought to—would be thought to really increase the processing time. Given that this is centralized and electronic, there should be an electronic way of making the payment, as well.

Senator SUNUNU. When was the first time that you heard about a potential fee for SEVIS?

Dr. ABER. It was in that letter that was written by the American Association of Universities, which would have been in the spring of this year.

Senator SUNUNU. What has been your experience with any government officials or offices that you've had to contact with regard to the program?

Dr. ABER. I haven't heard any complaints along that line for UNH. We're, of course, a relatively small university. I have about 800 of these applicants in a year, and we have about four or so turned down per year, which I guess is about the national average.

So I didn't hear any egregious problems in our contact. Most of the problems that we encountered had to do with the reentry problems for students, and I've got some examples here, also reentry problems for people with immigrant statuses of one kind or another. And also, in terms of perceptions, the way that the visa status has been linked to things like driver's license renewals and tax information and things which tend to add, at the state level, to the number of headaches that our international visitors have to deal with, and add to this general notion that it may be easier to go somewhere else.

Senator SUNUNU. And you say you have submitted those case studies for the record, is that correct?

Dr. ABER. Yes.

Senator SUNUNU. Excellent.

Well, I thank all of our panelists very much for their testimony, for their willingness to stay and answer questions. And I offer you the opportunity to submit additional information for the record, if you would like.

And in order for Senators that weren't here today to submit questions, I ask unanimous consent that the record remain open for three more business days. It will be done so, without objection.

Thank you each again. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY JANICE L. JACOBS

CHANGES TO THE VISA APPLICATION PROCESS SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

The Department of State has made significant changes to the visa process and entry screening requirements since September 11, 2001, to provide better security in light of the revised threat assessment to our national security. The steps outlined below are some of our more important efforts to improve the security of U.S. borders, which also include our ongoing participation in interagency efforts to implement the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, the Homeland Security Act, and the National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS).

Improvements Made in Visa Processing

Application Processing

- Greatly increased the percentage of non-immigrant applicants interviewed worldwide and set a written standard on interviews to achieve consistency around the world. On August 1, 2003 new regulations were implemented which limit waiver of personal appearance for non-immigrant visa applicants to only a few categories of exceptions, such as diplomats, children, and the elderly.
- In coordination with the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, added more interagency security checks for counter—terrorism purposes for certain groups of visa applicants from certain countries.
- Provided access to the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) to DHS inspectors at ports of entry. The CCD provides detailed information on all visas issued, including photographs of noniminigrant visa applicants. (The CCD had earlier been made available to consular officers worldwide in May 2001.)
- Expanded intranet resources for consular adjudicators to assist them in reading and verifying entry/exit cachets in Arabic or Persian script.
- Concurred with the Department of Justice in the removal of Argentina (February 2002) and Uruguay (April 2003) from the Visa Waiver Program and imposition of limitations on Belgium's participation (May 2003).
- In March 2003, Centralized the flow of fiancée visa petitions from BCIS to the National Visa Center (NVC) in New Hampshire. NVC will compile FBI and security advisory checks before sending the files to overseas posts.
- Developed Internet site that allows applicants to complete NIV application online. Resultant application form includes a 2-D bar enabling quick scanning of data into the NIV system.

Namechecks

- By June, 2002, incorporated approximately eight million records from the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) into our Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) namecheck database. This more than doubled the records on file. (This was authorized by the USA Patriot Act.)
- Received into CLASS a threefold increase in namecheck records from the intelligence community (through TIPOFF, a clearinghouse for sensitive intelligence and watchlist entries).
- Started automated cross-checking of new derogatory information concerning terrorists or suspected terrorists (including TIPOFF entries) against records of previously issued visas in order to revoke existing valid visas in the hands of those who may be a threat.

- In May 2003, implemented the Alternate Processing Center (APC) for the CLASS namecheck system. Located in the Kentucky Consular Center, several hundred miles from Washington, DC, the APC provides additional namecheck production resources and load sharing capability with the primary computer complex in the Washington area. APC also improves CLASS survivability. Effective November 2002, discontinued the use of a CD-ROM based back-up namecheck system. No visa is now issued without a CLASS check which provides real-time lookout information.
- Implemented the Hispanic algorithm in all Western Hemisphere post; additional posts are gradually being phased in.
- Joined with DOJ and others in establishing a new Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) that will integrate watchlists, including TIPOFF. Visa applicants will be checked against TSC data.

Enhanced Data Collection

- Began worldwide deployment of biometric NIV software, with Brussels, our first pilot post, going live with fingerprint collection on September 22, 2003. All visa posts will have this capability by October 26, 2004.
- Included 25 additional data elements in the automated non-immigrant visa processing system beginning in September 2002. These fields are viewable worldwide through the Consular Consolidated Database. This data includes information on the U.S. sponsors and U.S. destination of the visa applicant.
- Created two new forms for nonimrnigrant visa applicants:the DS–157 (November 2001), required of all men aged 16 to 45 from every country in the world; and the DS–158 (July 2002), required of all applicants for student visas. The DS–157 is used to identify applicants who require a security advisory opinion from Washington agencies.
- In the spring of 2002, provided all posts with software and scanners to allow scanning of supporting evidence in serious refusals. This evidence is thus available in its electronic format to all consular operations and DHS border inspection offices. This is part of the effort to replace paper files with image-storage and retrieval and to improve the access to information by consular officers making adjudication decisions.
- In April 2002, began requiring photo-capture for refused noniinmigrant visa applicants.
- Revised photo standards for non-immigrant applicants to improve the quality of data for facial recognition and other purposes.
- Included several additional data elements in the automated immigrant visa processing system to support datasharing with the Social Security Administration.

Expanded Information Sharing

- Created a new staff office, VO/I, in the Visa Office in August 2002 to coordinate information management and liaison activities. We expect this office to continue to grow and to play a key role in interagency discussions.
- The Border Biometric Program office in the Visa Office has been reorganized as the Office of Border and International Programs to allow for expanded efforts at information sharing and coordination with like-minded nations and multilateral organizations.
- Piloted datashare with the Social Security Administration to facilitate enumeration of new immigrants.
- In the fall of 2001, began storing serious refusal files for posts at risk (or with space problems) at the Kentucky Consular Center (KCC). KCC has begun scanning old files, making these files available to all CCD users. This process will be expanded to include serious refusal files from all posts worldwide, thereby making them available to all posts worldwide and to domestic offices.
- Expanded distribution of electronic Intelligence Alerts on lost/stolen blank documents, making them available to federal, state, and local agencies and to foreign governments.
- Implemented technology support in the visa lookout system to support DHS's National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS).
- Successfully launched the Interim Student and Exchange Authentication System (ISEAS) (September 2002), which provided electronic verification of the acceptance of foreign students and exchange visitors who apply to enter the

United States on student ("F," "M") and exchange visitor ("J") visas. ISEAS was created to satisfy the mandates of Section 501(c) of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 and remained active until February 2003 when DHS's Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) was implemented.

- Worked with DHS on the implementation of the SEVIS student tracking system. All student visas are now verified and registered in SEVIS. Over one million records from SEVIS have been downloaded to CA's Consular Consolidated Database where the information is available for the electronic verification, adjudication, and reporting of student and exchange visitor visas.

Internal Controls

- Removed direct Foreign Service National access to detailed namecheck information in consular automated systems.
- Reviewed the visa referral system and reminded post/consular managers of the controls needed. The referral form was revised and its use was made mandatory worldwide. The form now requires written certification by the referring officer that the visa applicant is personally known to the referring officer and does not pose a threat to the United States.
- In July 2002, installed new management tools to monitor user accounts on consular automated systems.
- Mandated a special worldwide review of management controls in September 2002 and again in August 2003. This is now being made a required annual report from all consular sections.
- Implemented a system of Consular Management Assistance Teams to visit posts to review management controls and procedures. The first such visits were made in February 2003.
- Began the process of formalizing and disseminating Standard Operating Procedures for visa processing, including the creation of online processing manuals to better index operating instructions.
- Fraud Prevention Efforts
- In March 2002, pilot tested the new, tamper-resistant Lincoln non-immigrant visa foil with worldwide deployment completed in September 2003.
- Developed a more secure way of canceling machine-readable visas to deter malefactors from "washing" the cancellation stamp from the visa. The system was made available to posts in March of 2003.
- In April 2003, established a Vulnerability Assessment Unit (VAU) staffed by personnel from Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security. VAU personnel employ data-mining and other techniques to identify baseline trends and patterns and detect variations which could indicate possible malfeasance. The unit analyzes data anomalies and makes recommendations for action. The unit also participates in State Department training efforts to ensure consular employees are well informed about issues related to malfeasance.
- Provided information to the field on lessons learned from cases of consular malfeasance.
- In August 2003, established a fraud prevention unit at the National Visa Center in Portsmouth, New Hampshire (NVC). The unit focuses initially on data validation/fraud screening for employment—based cases using automated search tools. After experience has been gained at NVC, we will expand the program to the Kentucky Consular Center (KCC).
- Based on success with the Diversity Visa lottery (DV) program, anti-fraud efforts using Facial Recognition technology have been expanded on a test basis to thirteen NIV applicant pools, with a focus on countering both visa fraud and terrorism.
- Created an e-form for easy reporting of lost/stolen/missing visaed passports, with automatic forwarding to DHS.
- Continue to update our database of foreign lost and stolen passports. We currently have over 680,000 entries of blank and individually issued lost and stolen passports in the database.

Training

- In March 2002, initiated an Advanced Namechecking Techniques course at the Foreign Service Institute. Hundreds of consular officers have now received this training.

- Lengthened the Basic Consular Course, also known as ConGen, from 26 to 31 days. This change is the result of the added emphasis that we are giving to visa security, counter-terrorism awareness and interviewing techniques. Among the new modules is a two-day interviewing "minicourse" that will focus students on ways to identify lying/deception by applicants. The new curriculum also includes a half-day program on counter-terrorism at the CIA Headquarters in Langley. The new, longer ConGen training schedule began October 17, 2003.
- Increased training for Ambassadors, Deputy Chiefs of Mission and Principal Officers on their supervisory role in the visa function.
- Incorporated CIA module on terrorist travel patterns into the basic consular course, which was expanded in October 2003.

Security Improvements

- Proposed elimination of crew list visas and establishment of a requirement that seamen obtain individual visas. (Crew list visas do not allow for the same verification of identity and bona fides as do individual applications.) A proposed regulation was published for public comment in December 2002; the final rule in the final stages of interagency clearance.
- In February 2003, eliminated the waiver of visas for permanent residents of Canada and Bermuda.
- In March 2002, amended regulations to close a loophole and limit the ability of persons with expired visas to reenter the U.S. from contiguous territory (i.e. Mexico, Canada, the Caribbean). The change removed from the automatic revalidation provision those persons who apply for a new visa and are refused in Canada or Mexico and all nationals of countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism regardless of whether they apply for a visa.
- Supported implementation of the Aviation Security Bill.
- Reiterated standing guidance on interview requirements for applicants subject to security advisory opinion requirements.
- Started discussions with Mexico and Canada about greater cooperation on immigration, security, and visa issues.
- Approved an Entry-Exit Project Charter (now the "U.S. Visit" (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program), drafted jointly with INS, Customs, and DOT, which sets the parameters for an automated system to record the arrivals, departures, and stay activities of individuals coming to and leaving the U.S. Continue to work closely with DHS on development of U.S. Visit.

Future Improvements to the Visa Process and Timetables

The Department continues to implement requirements set forth in the USA PATRIOT Act, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, and the Homeland Security Act. Major initiatives not outlined above that are currently planned include:

Application Processing

- Initiate investigation of "rules based process" as a tool for visa screening.
- Implement an internet-based NIV application form that allows the applicant to fill in the form, which when printed contains a bar code readable at post for automatic input into our visa system.
- Revamp the visa processing sections of the Foreign Affairs Manuals, including a complete reexamination of all existing guidance to overseas posts. Existing standard operating procedures are being redrafted and reissued, and new standard operating procedures SOPs are being developed.
- Re-engineering the Interagency Visa clearance process to allow stronger accountability and quicker processing.

Namechecks

- Improve capacity of CLASS to handle additional information such as Interpol and deportation lookout information, the Hispanic algorithm, and lost and stolen passport data.
- Develop and implement an algorithm to improve performance on namechecking of Asian names. This algorithm will be piloted in FY 2004, with worldwide rollout projected for FY 2005.
- Continue to load data from the FBI, in a priority order.

- Upgrade the central namecheck processing facility to increase computer power and provide system scalability.

Enhanced Data Collection

- The Patriot Act requires that U.S. visas use biometric identifiers by October 26, 2004. The Department began phased implementation of biometric (fingerprint) collection in September 2003, with the first post "going live" on September 22, 2003. We anticipate that all posts will be collecting biometrics by October 2004.
- The Department will work with countries that are eligible for the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and with ICAO to meet the requirement that those countries incorporate biometric identifiers in their passports by October 2004, as required by the Patriot Act.
- Software improvements to help consular officers make all case notes online. This would support a legislative mandate to require electronic notes providing rationale for all visa refusals and for any subsequent issuance to a previously refused applicant.

Expanded Information Sharing

- Continue to expand datashare opportunities with federal agencies, maximizing the value of consular data to the USG while developing procedures to ensure proper use of this information.
- Make consular data available via the interagency OSIS (Open Sources Information System) network. Work with agencies concerned with Border Security (DHS, FBI, etc.) to develop an MOU that will allow this access.
- Continue working on a number of programs with Canada and Mexico as part of our U.S.-Canada Smart Border Action Plan (30 point plan) and U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership (22 point plan). As concerns the movement of people, we are working on agreements that would allow us to share Advance Passenger Information/Passenger Name Records for airline passengers entering the U.S., Canada, or Mexico. We are also working with both these countries (NEXUS with Canada and SENTRI with Mexico) to expand frequent travelers programs to allow faster crossings for bona fide travelers.

Training

- The Foreign Service Institute has lengthened the Basic Consular Course, also known as ConGen, from 26 to 31 days. This change is the result of the added emphasis that we are giving to visa security, counter-terrorism awareness and interviewing techniques. Among the new modules is a two-day interviewing "mini—course" that will focus students on ways to identify lying/deception by applicants. The new, longer ConGen training schedule began in October 2003.

Internal Controls

- Restrict further the access of Foreign Service National employees to namecheck information.
- Provide additional guidance to the field on supervisory officer review of visa issuances and refusals.
- Maintain a robust schedule of visits by consular management assistance teams to posts to review management controls and procedures.
- Provide written guidance to chiefs of mission and their deputies to assist them in their oversight of consular sections.

Fraud Prevention Programs

- Review facial recognition results from initial test deployment at visa posts to determine how it may benefit screening in the operational environment.
- Introduce new, tamper-resistant and machine readable immigrant visa foil. This new machine-readable immigrant visa process will include digitized photo and fingerprints.

Security Improvements

- Move to on-line electronic registration for the Diversity visa program. Registration for the DV–2005 "lottery" will be conducted exclusively through a dedicated web site. This will enable us to better identify duplicate entries, including, through extensive use of facial recognition technology, those submitted under fraudulent identities.
- Re-engineer the interagency visa clearance process with other agencies.

- Eliminate crew-list visas and require all seamen to obtain individual visas.

Additional Questions Submitted by the Committee for the Record

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO CONSULAR AFFAIRS DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JANICE JACOBS BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. In today's Hearing, it was mentioned that Brazil and Russia charge $100 for US citizens to apply for visas to their countries. Are these charges only for Americans? Please provide a list of the fifteen most expensive B1/B2-type visas for American citizens and note if these charges apply to other nationalities applying in those countries?

Answer. Yes, these charges are only for Americans. Brazil and Russia's visa fees are based on the principle of reciprocity.

Given the nature of many countries' visa regimes it is difficult to identify a list of the fifteen most expensive B1/B2-type visas charged American citizens. Some countries, for example, charge American citizens fees ranging from $30 to $500 depending on the length of the visa and how many entries the visa is valid for. The fees also vary greatly for countries that permit American citizens to enter visa free for up to 90 days, but require a B1/B2-type visa for more extended stays.

Of those countries that maintain a visa requirement for American citizens even for short-term visits, Brazil, Russia, Chile, Turkey, Nigeria, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus charge American citizens a minimum of $100 for a visa. Almost all of these countries base their visa fees on the principle of reciprocity. They generally charge American citizens more than nationals of other countries in order to match our $100 Machine Readable Visa fee.

Question. At today's hearing it was mentioned that of all the Visa Condor inquiries, not one resulted in refusal. Please provide for the Committee the number of cases of Visa Mantis, Eagle, Condor, Donkey, Bear, 212(f), Pegasus and Horse clearance cases and the number and percentage refused for the CY 2000–2002.

Answer. The Visa Office does not at present have an automated processing system that could produce overall statistics regarding the number of security advisory opinion (SAO) cases. The Visa Office uses an electronic filing system to receive and send responses to SAO cables. We were able to estimate the number of all SAO cables received in CY 2002. During that year, consular officers included multiple applicants in some cables. Consequently, the numbers below reflect the total number of cables, not the total number of applicants. The Visa Office is developing an improved electronic SAO system that will connect SAO requests with the Consolidated Consular Database which will allow us to obtain more accurate statistics on SAOs. The new system is scheduled for introduction in the field in early 2004.

Number of SAO Cables

Type	CY 2002
Bear	2,013
Condor	39,220
Donkey [includes 212(f)]	21,848
Eagle	24,728
Horse	43
Mantis	4,464
Pegasus	56

The Visa Office electronic filing system for SAOs also does not keep statistics on denials. Such statistics are available from a separate system, the automated nonimmigrant visa system in use overseas by consular officers.

The rate of denial is extremely low. The consular officer submits the case to Washington for a national security review only if the applicant is otherwise eligible. In other words, if a consular officer has cause to deny the visa for such reasons as

failure to establish entitlement to non-immigrant status, violation of immigration law during prior visits to the U.S., or prior criminal activity, the officer denies the visa and does not send the case to Washington.

The chart below lists the total number of refusals recorded by consular officers in the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) under the following sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act:

1. 212(a)(3)(A)(i) relating to espionage and sabotage;
2. 212(a)(3)(A)(ii) relating to any other unlawful activity;
3. 212(a)(3)(A)(iii) relating to opposition to, control or overthrow of the U.S. Government by force, violence or other unlawful means;
4. 212(a)(3)(B) relating to terrorism;
5. 212(a)(3)(C) relating to aliens whose entry into the U.S. would have potentially serious foreign policy consequences for the U.S.; and
6. 212(f) presidential relating to any class of aliens whose entry into the U.S. would be detrimental to the interests of the U.S. Currently there are 212(f) proclamations in effect for certain aliens from Angola, the Western Balkans, Burma, Cuba, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Visa Refusals: CY 2000

Section of INA	Refusals
212(a)(3)(A)(i)	12
212(a)(3)(A)(ii)	107
212(a)(3)(A)(iii)	1
212(a)(3)(B)	0
212(a)(3)(C)	1
212(f)	34

Visa Refusals: CY 2001

Section of INA	Refusals
212(a)(3)(A)(i)	23
212(a)(3)(A)(ii)	79
212(a)(3)(A)(iii)	0
212(a)(3)(B)	0
212(a)(3)(C)	0
212(f)	52

Visa Refusals: CY 2002

Section of INA	Refusals
212(a)(3)(A)(i)	42
212(a)(3)(A)(ii)	55
212(a)(3)(A)(iii)	0
212(a)(3)(B)	44
212(a)(3)(C)	0
212(f)	107

We have a quarterly reporting requirement to Congress on visa denials under 212(a)(3)(B), terrorism grounds. The visa applicants noted in the reports for CY 2000–2002 were, we believe, watchlisted and were reported to Washington by consular officers through the Visas Donkey process. They were not reported through

the Visas Condor process for which, as Deputy Assistant Secretary Jacobs stated in her testimony, there have been no denials on terrorism grounds to date.

Question. Please provide for the Committee the 19 posts mentioned at today's Hearing where the processing time of an NIV is in excess of 30 days. Please include the number of American and FSN staff working at each of those posts as well as the number of interview windows.

Answer. Fluctuations in wait times occur and cause changes on a weekly basis among posts that report workload statistics on the Consular Affairs database (CCD) meeting the 30 day or less wait time limit, and other posts that exceed 30 day limits. The 15 posts listed below reflect the number of posts that reported exceeding the 30 day wait time limit as of November 12, 2003. However, all overseas posts, including the 15 listed here, have standing instructions to prioritize student and medical or other emergency visa cases.

Post Wait Times in Excess of 30 Days

(as of November 12, 2003)

Post	Date	Average Appt. Wait Time (# Days)	Average Appt. Wait Time for Student, Exchange Visitors (# Days)	Number of NIV Officers at Post	Number of NIV FSNs at Post	Number of Interview Windows at Post
Abidjan	12 Nov	70	10	2	2	3
Accra	10 Nov	105	1	2.5	4	3
Addis Ababa	10 Nov	43	1	3	7	*
Caracas	10 Nov	73	10	6	11	8
Conakry	9 Nov	90	1	1	4	*
Osaka-Kobe	12 Nov	56	10	1	6	5
Lagos	28 Oct	140	1	8	23	*
Manila	9 Nov	95	3	12	68	*
Mexico City	10 Nov	40	3	19	43	15
Monterrey	31 Oct	77	28	12	22	10
Santo Domingo	4 Nov	92	1	6	14	6
San Salvador	10 Nov	32	1	6	8	6
Shanghai	2 Nov	35	1	4	14	*
Tegucigalpa	3 Nov	32	2	3	3	3
Ulaanbaatar	3 Nov	60	20	1	3	*

(*: Information not yet received by Department of State from respective post as of November 12, 2003)

Question. The current Budget in Brief (p. 21) estimates $676,245,000 from MRV fees and $850,000 from FBI fingerprint fees for FY 04. Please provide for the Committee the FY 03 estimates and actual intakes for these two funds. How much of the current Iraq Supplemental is needed to cover unanticipated MRV shortfalls for FY 03?

Answer. We estimated that net MRV collections would be $582 million in FY 2003. Actual net MRV collections totaled $536.778 million. Revenues collected from the fingerprint fee were estimated to be $1.2 million; actual FY 2003 collections totaled $2.704 million.

The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (Public Law 108–106) provides $109.5 million in the Diplomatic & Consular Programs appropriation to cover anticipated FY 2004 shortfalls. The FY 2003 MRV shortfall was covered through a combination of reductions in program spending and $46.0 million in supplemental appropriations provided in the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Act, 2003 (Public Law 108–11).

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO CONSULAR AFFAIRS DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JANICE JACOBS BY SENATOR JOHN E. SUNUNU

Question. Please provide a list of the Security Advisory Opinion request categories such as "Condor" with a brief description of the function of each category and the process by which they are reviewed in Washington. Include a flow chart. How many requests were sent to Washington in each category in FY±2002? In FY 2003 to date? How many resulted in recommendations to deny a visa?

Answer. There are six types of Security Advisory Opinions (SAO) for which the Department acts as an interagency clearinghouse: Visas Bear, Condor, Donkey, Eagle, Mantis and Merlin. Posts send SAO cables to the Department and clearing agencies.

1. *Bear:* For non-immigrant visa applicants for A, C-3 or G diplomatic visas. There are currently 33 countries that this requirement applies: These include Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma, Central African Republic, China, Croatia, Cuba, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Zimbabwe. These cases require interagency clearance.
2. *Condor:* For non-immigrant visa applicants from certain countries who fit special criteria and from countries that are designated state sponsors of terrorism. The list of countries and related list of criteria are classified. These cases are reviewed by the FBI.
3. *Donkey:* For applicants from any country for whom there is a hit in the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) or who are nationals of certain countries with special processing requirements. The latter is based on classified criteria. Requires interagency clearance.
4. *Eagle:* For certain immigrant and non-immigrant applicants from China, Cuba, Iran, Russia and Vietnam. These cases are reviewed by the FBI.
5. *Mantis:* For non-immigrant applicants from any country whose activities in the U.S. might involve the illegal transfer of sensitive technology. Requires an interagency clearance as well as input from the Department's Bureau of Non-Proliferation.
6. *Merlin:* For refugees from any country with a hit in the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), Cuban parolees under the Migration Accord, and following-to-join asylees. Requires interagency clearance.

All SAO telegrams are transmitted simultaneously by the consular officer overseas to all appropriate agencies in Washington. The Visa Office acts as the clearinghouse. It receives the incoming cable, records the responses of appropriate agencies, reviews derogatory information as needed, and transmits guidance to the consular officer in each case.

All SAO cases require FBI clearance and the FBI responds specifically to each case. Other clearing agencies respond when they have pertinent information. They have 15 working days (45 in the case of Merlins) to do so. Once the FBI has cleared and 15 days have passed, the Department informs the post that there is no objection to issuance of the visa.

If an agency has provided derogatory information on a specific case, the Visa Office will discuss with immigration experts in DOJ and DHS as appropriate as to whether the information is sufficient to warrant visa denial. No visa is issued if a clearing agency has filed an objection with the Visa Office until the appropriate derogatory information is reviewed in an interagency context.

Until March 21, 2003 consular officers included multiple applicants in some SAO cables. Thus, the numbers below reflect the total number of cables received, not the total number of applicants.

Number of Cables Submitted to the Department by Category

Type	FY 2002	FY 2003
Bear	1,774	2,616
Condor	17,177	85,288
Donkey	19,253	27,287
Eagle	16,625	45,616
Mantis	3,252	13,728
Merlin	0	7360

Denial Rate for SAOs

The Visa Office electronic filing system for SAOs does not keep statistics on denials. Such statistics are available through the automated visa system in use overseas by consular officers.

The rate of denial is extremely low. The consular officer submits visa cases to Washington for a national security review according to criteria pertinent to an SAO category only if the applicant is otherwise eligible. In other words, if a consular officer has cause to deny the visa for such reasons as failure to establish entitlement to non-immigrant status, violation of immigration law during prior visits to the U.S., or prior criminal activity, the officer denies the visa and does not send the case to Washington for an interagency review.

The chart below lists the total number of refusals recorded by posts in the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) under the following sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA):

1. 212(a)(3)(A)(i) relating to espionage and sabotage;
2. 212(a)(3)(A)(ii) relating to any other unlawful activity;
3. 212(a)(3)(A)(iii) relating to opposition to, control or overthrow of the U.S. Government by force, violence or other unlawful means;
4. 212(a)(3)(B) relating to terrorism;
5. 212(a)(3)(C) relating to aliens whose entry into the U.S. would have potentially serious foreign policy consequences for the U.S.;
6. 212(f) presidential proclamation relating to any class of aliens whose entry into the U.S. would be detrimental to the interests of the U.S. Currently there are 212(f) proclamations in effect for certain aliens from Angola, the Western Balkans, Burma, Cuba, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

The denial statistics under sections 212(a)(3) and 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for FY 2002–2003 are as follows:

Visa Refusal Statistics: FY 2002

Section of INA	Refusals
212(a)(3)(A)(i)	45
212(a)(3)(A)(ii)	63
212(a)(3)(A)(iii)	0
212(a)(3)(B)	47
212(a)(3)(C)	0
212(f)	93

Visa Refusal Statistics: FY 2003

Section of INA	Refusals
212(a)(3)(A)(i)	60
212(a)(3)(A)(ii)	43
212(a)(3)(A)(iii)	0
212(a)(3)(B)	98
212(a)(3)(C)	0
212(f)	1990

We have a quarterly reporting requirement to Congress on visa denials under 212(a)(3)(B), terrorism grounds. The visa applicants noted in the reports for CY 2000–2002 were, we believe, watchlisted and were reported to Washington by consular officers through the Visas Donkey process. They were not reported through the Visas Condor process.

Question. Private-sector witnesses in Panel 2 argued that the August 1 policy increasing non-immigrant visa interviews has increased the time an applicant must wait to be interviewed dramatically and has thus increased significantly the cost of a visa in time and money. Witnesses also said that the problem was compounded by high refusal rates. As a result, the U.S. tourism industry is said to be increasingly disadvantaged in its competition with other destinations, particularly those, such as the EU in the case of Brazilians, that require no visas for short visits.

Please provide a list of the wait-times at each visa-issuing post (the time a non-immigrant-visa applicant must wait between requesting an interview and being interviewed) for FY 2000, FY 2001, FY 2002 and August and September 2003, following the increase in required interviews.

Please also provide for all posts the number of applications by visa category (B1/B2, F–1, etc.) number of issuances and refusals, and the rates of refusal.

Answer. The Department of State began collecting statistical workload information on wait times for NIV appointments in July 2003. Therefore, of those months for which data was requested, the Department of State is only able to provide information for the months of August and September 2003. All overseas posts have standing instructions to prioritize student and medical or other emergency visa cases.

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Abu Dhabi	5-Aug-03	.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Abu Dhabi	12-Aug-03	.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 Days
Abu Dhabi	19-Aug-03	.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 Days
Abu Dhabi	25-Aug-03	.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 Days
Abu Dhabi	1-Sep-03	.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 Days
Abu Dhabi	9-Sep-03	1.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Abu Dhabi	14-Sep-03	.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 Days
Abu Dhabi	15-Sep-03	1.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Abu Dhabi	22-Sep-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Abidjan	1-Aug-03	120.00 Days	.00 days	Unavailable
Abidjan	18-Aug-03	120.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Abidjan	26-Aug-03	120.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Abidjan	16-Sep-03	120.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Abidjan	29-Sep-03	120.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Accra	7-Aug-03	128.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Accra	13-Aug-03	126.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Accra	18-Aug-03	126.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Accra	26-Aug-03	125.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Accra	8-Sep-03	130.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Accra	22-Sep-03	127.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Auckland	6-Aug-03	.00 days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Auckland	16-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Auckland	30-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Adana	4-Aug-03	.00 Days	.00 Days	.00 days
Adana	11-Aug-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Adana	18-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Addis Ababa	1-Aug-03	89.00 Days	.00 days	Unavailable
Addis Ababa	27-Aug-03	78.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Addis Ababa	2-Sep-03	70.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Addis Ababa	9-Sep-03	69.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Addis Ababa	25-Sep-03	63.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Addis Ababa	30-Sep-03	63.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Ashgabat	4-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Ashgabat	18-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Algiers	4-Aug-03	1.00 Days	14.00 Days	1.00 Days
Algiers	11-Aug-03	1.00 Days	14.00 Days	1.00 Days
Algiers	25-Aug-03	1.00 Days	10.00 Days	1.00 Days
Algiers	1-Sep-03	1.00 Days	10.00 Days	1.00 Days
Amsterdam	30-Aug-03	15.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Ankara	4-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	3.00 Days
Ankara	11-Aug-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Ankara	18-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Ankara	25-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Ankara	2-Sep-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	3.00 Days
Ankara	8-Sep-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Ankara	15-Sep-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Ankara	22-Sep-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Antananarivo	1-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	Unavailable
Antananarivo	2-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Antananarivo	29-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Asmara	1-Aug-03	5.00 Days	.00 days	Unavailable
Asuncion	4-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Asuncion	12-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Asuncion	18-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Asuncion	25-Aug-03	.00 Days	.00 days	.00 Days
Asuncion	4-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Asuncion	22-Sep-03	.00 Days	.00 days	.00 Days
Almaty	4-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Almaty	11-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Almaty	18-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Almaty	25-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Almaty	2-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Almaty	8-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Almaty	15-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Almaty	22-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Almaty	30-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Athens	4-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Athens	11-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Athens	21-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Athens	25-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Athens	2-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Athens	8-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Athens	15-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Athens	22-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Athens	29-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Bamako	5-Aug-03	9.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Bamako	11-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Bamako	18-Aug-03	11.00 Days	.00 days	11.00 Days
Bamako	25-Aug-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Bamako	8-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Bamako	15-Sep-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	8.00 Days
Bamako	30-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Banjul	1-Aug-03	21.00 Days	.00 days	Unavailable
Banjul	13-Aug-03	21.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Bucharest	-Aug-03	9.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Bucharest	4-Aug-03	9.00 Days	.00 Days	7.00 Days
Bucharest	11-Aug-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Bucharest	18-Aug-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Bucharest	25-Aug-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Bucharest	2-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Bucharest	8-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Bucharest	16-Sep-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	10.00 Days
Bucharest	23-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Bucharest	30-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Budapest	4-Aug-03	30.00 Days	.00 days	22.00 Days
Budapest	18-Aug-03	30.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Budapest	25-Aug-03	25.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Budapest	2-Sep-03	22.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Budapest	8-Sep-03	16.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Budapest	15-Sep-03	16.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Budapest	22-Sep-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Budapest	29-Sep-03	9.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Beijing	11-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Beijing	18-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Beijing	26-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Beijing	3-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Beijing	9-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Beijing	14-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Beijing	22-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Bern	20-Aug-03	60.00 Days	.00 days	60.00 Days
Bern	30-Sep-03	60.00 Days	.00 days	60.00 Days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Bridgetown	6-Aug-03	15.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Bridgetown	11-Aug-03	11.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Bridgetown	18-Aug-03	15.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Bridgetown	25-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Bridgetown	2-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Bridgetown	8-Sep-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Bridgetown	12-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Bridgetown	22-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Bogota	4-Aug-03	127.00 Days	5.00 Days	4.00 Days
Bogota	11-Aug-03	121.00 Days	5.00 Days	1.00 Days
Bogota	18-Aug-03	121.00 Days	5.00 Days	1.00 Days
Bogota	26-Aug-03	114.00 Days	5.00 Days	1.00 Days
Bogota	2-Sep-03	126.00 Days	5.00 Days	1.00 Days
Bogota	9-Sep-03	121.00 Days	5.00 Days	1.00 Days
Bogota	15-Sep-03	120.00 Days	8.00 Days	1.00 Days
Bogota	22-Sep-03	120.00 Days	6.00 Days	1.00 Days
Bishkek	4-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Bishkek	13-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Bishkek	18-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Bishkek	28-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Bishkek	18-Sep-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Bishkek	23-Sep-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Bishkek	29-Sep-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Baku	25-Aug-03	.00 days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Baku	29-Sep-03	.00 days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Belfast	22-Sep-03	5.00 Days	1.00 Days	5.00 Days
Belfast	29-Sep-03	5.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Belgrade	4-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Belgrade	11-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Belgrade	16-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Belgrade	26-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Belgrade	3-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Belgrade	9-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 Days	.00 days
Belgrade	15-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 Days	.00 days
Belgrade	23-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 Days	.00 days
Belgrade	29-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 Days	.00 days
Mumbai (Bombay)	3-Aug-03	9.00 Days	1.00 Days	3.00 Days
Mumbai (Bombay)	10-Aug-03	11.00 Days	1.00 Days	3.00 Days
Mumbai (Bombay)	17-Aug-03	9.00 Days	1.00 Days	3.00 Days
Mumbai (Bombay)	24-Aug-03	9.00 Days	1.00 Days	3.00 Days
Mumbai (Bombay)	31-Aug-03	5.00 Days	1.00 Days	3.00 Days
Mumbai (Bombay)	8-Sep-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Mumbai (Bombay)	14-Sep-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Mumbai (Bombay)	21-Sep-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Mumbai (Bombay)	28-Sep-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Bangkok	11-Aug-03	11.00 Days	.00 days	11.00 Days
Bangkok	18-Aug-03	9.00 Days	.00 days	9.00 Days
Bangkok	24-Aug-03	9.00 Days	.00 days	9.00 Days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Bangkok	1-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Bangkok	7-Sep-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	8.00 Days
Bangkok	14-Sep-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	8.00 Days
Bangkok	21-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Bangkok	28-Sep-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Buenos Aires	4-Aug-03	8.00 Days	3.00 Days	2.00 Days
Buenos Aires	4-Aug-03	8.00 Days	3.00 Days	.00 days
Buenos Aires	12-Aug-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Buenos Aires	21-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Buenos Aires	8-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Buenos Aires	15-Sep-03	11.00 Days	.00 days	11.00 Days
Buenos Aires	22-Sep-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	8.00 Days
Buenos Aires	29-Sep-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	8.00 Days
Brasilia	4-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Brasilia	5-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Brasilia	25-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Berlin	4-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Berlin	14-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Berlin	18-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Berlin	25-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Berlin	2-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Berlin	8-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Berlin	15-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Berlin	22-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Berlin	30-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Brussels	1-Aug-03	3.00 Days	2.00 Days	Unavailable
Brussels	7-Aug-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Brussels	21-Aug-03	1.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Brussels	29-Aug-03	1.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Brussels	18-Sep-03	3.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Brussels	23-Sep-03	3.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Beirut	4-Aug-03	21.00 Days	28.00 Days	3.00 Days
Beirut	11-Aug-03	28.00 Days	28.00 Days	3.00 Days
Beirut	2-Sep-03	28.00 Days	28.00 Days	3.00 Days
Beirut	17-Sep-03	28.00 Days	28.00 Days	3.00 Days
Bandar Seri Begawan	11-Aug-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Bratislava	1-Aug-03	15.00 Days	.00 days	Unavailable
Bratislava	4-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Bratislava	12-Aug-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	8.00 Days
Bratislava	15-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Bratislava	18-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Bratislava	19-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Bratislava	25-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Bratislava	3-Sep-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Bratislava	8-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Bratislava	12-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Bratislava	23-Sep-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Bratislava	29-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Bujumbura	15-Sep-03	.00 days	1.00 Days	4.00 Days
Ciudad Juarez Tpf	4-Aug-03	8.00 Days	30.00 Days	Unavailable
Ciudad Juarez Tpf	11-Aug-03	4.00 Days	30.00 Days	Unavailable
Ciudad Juarez Tpf	18-Aug-03	4.00 Days	30.00 Days	Unavailable
Ciudad Juarez Tpf	25-Aug-03	4.00 Days	30.00 Days	Unavailable
Ciudad Juarez Tpf	2-Sep-03	32.00 Days	30.00 Days	Unavailable
Chengdu	4-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Chengdu	11-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Chengdu	17-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Chengdu	27-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Chengdu	3-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Chengdu	7-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Chengdu	15-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Chengdu	22-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Chiang Mai	3-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Chiang Mai	1-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Chisinau	4-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Calcutta	3-Aug-03	13.00 Days	.00 days	13.00 Days
Calcutta	11-Aug-03	9.00 Days	.00 days	9.00 Days
Calcutta	19-Aug-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	9.00 Days
Calcutta	25-Aug-03	6.00 Days	.00 days	6.00 Days
Calcutta	1-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Calcutta	7-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Calcutta	15-Sep-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Calcutta	21-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Calcutta	28-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Calgary	1-Aug-03	15.00 Days	.00 days	Unavailable
Calgary	11-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Calgary	18-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Calgary	25-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Calgary	2-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Calgary	17-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Calgary	29-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Colombo	10-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Colombo	17-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	10.00 Days
Canberra	4-Aug-03	.00 Days	.00 Days	.00 Days
Canberra	11-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 Days
Canberra	18-Aug-03	.00 Days	.00 days	.00 Days
Canberra	25-Aug-03	.00 Days	.00 days	.00 Days
Canberra	3-Sep-03	.00 Days	.00 days	.00 Days
Canberra	8-Sep-03	.00 Days	.00 days	.00 Days
Canberra	22-Sep-03	.00 Days	.00 days	.00 Days
Canberra	28-Sep-03	.00 Days	.00 days	.00 Days
Cotonou	6-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Copenhagen	4-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Copenhagen	12-Aug-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Copenhagen	18-Aug-03	1.00 Days	2.00 Days	1.00 Days
Copenhagen	25-Aug-03	1.00 Days	2.00 Days	1.00 Days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Copenhagen	3-Sep-03	1.00 Days	2.00 Days	1.00 Days
Copenhagen	8-Sep-03	1.00 Days	2.00 Days	1.00 Days
Copenhagen	15-Sep-03	1.00 Days	2.00 Days	1.00 Days
Copenhagen	22-Sep-03	1.00 Days	2.00 Days	1.00 Days
Copenhagen	29-Sep-03	1.00 Days	2.00 Days	1.00 Days
Cape Town	6-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Cape Town	12-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Cape Town	19-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Cape Town	25-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Cape Town	2-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Cape Town	22-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Cairo	3-Aug-03	45.00 Days	50.00 Days	15.00 Days
Cairo	10-Aug-03	39.00 Days	50.00 Days	15.00 Days
Cairo	17-Aug-03	45.00 Days	60.00 Days	20.00 Days
Cairo	24-Aug-03	47.00 Days	60.00 Days	20.00 Days
Cairo	1-Sep-03	44.00 Days	60.00 Days	20.00 Days
Cairo	7-Sep-03	45.00 Days	60.00 Days	20.00 Days
Cairo	14-Sep-03	35.00 Days	60.00 Days	20.00 Days
Cairo	21-Sep-03	17.00 Days	60.00 Days	17.00 Days
Cairo	28-Sep-03	24.00 Days	60.00 Days	24.00 Days
Caracas	5-Aug-03	51.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Caracas	11-Aug-03	53.00 Days	.00 days	53.00 Days
Caracas	18-Aug-03	53.00 Days	.00 days	53.00 Days
Caracas	26-Aug-03	58.00 Days	.00 days	58.00 Days
Caracas	2-Sep-03	24.00 Days	.00 days	24.00 Days
Caracas	8-Sep-03	65.00 Days	.00 days	65.00 Days
Caracas	16-Sep-03	52.00 Days	.00 days	52.00 Days
Caracas	23-Sep-03	63.00 Days	.00 days	63.00 Days
Caracas	29-Sep-03	57.00 Days	.00 days	57.00 Days
Conakry	10-Aug-03	60.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Conakry	17-Aug-03	60.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Conakry	25-Aug-03	60.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Conakry	31-Aug-03	60.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Conakry	7-Sep-03	60.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Conakry	14-Sep-03	60.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Conakry	21-Sep-03	60.00 Days	2.00 Days	1.00 Days
Conakry	28-Sep-03	80.00 Days	2.00 Days	1.00 Days
Casablanca	4-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Casablanca	13-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Casablanca	25-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Casablanca	2-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Casablanca	8-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Casablanca	16-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Casablanca	22-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Casablanca	29-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Dublin	6-Aug-03	13.00 Days	.00 days	13.00 Days
Dublin	18-Aug-03	11.00 Days	.00 days	11.00 Days
Dublin	15-Sep-03	9.00 Days	.00 days	9.00 Days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Dublin	22-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Dublin	29-Sep-03	4.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Dhaka	4-Aug-03	30.00 Days	1.00 Days	14.00 Days
Dakar	26-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	10.00 Days
Dakar	1-Sep-03	15.00 Days	.00 days	15.00 Days
Dakar	15-Sep-03	15.00 Days	.00 days	15.00 Days
Dakar	22-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
Dakar	29-Sep-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Damascus	4-Aug-03	1.00 Days	26.00 Days	1.00 Days
Damascus	11-Aug-03	1.00 Days	26.00 Days	1.00 Days
Damascus	18-Aug-03	4.00 Days	27.00 Days	4.00 Days
Damascus	25-Aug-03	5.00 Days	26.00 Days	5.00 Days
Damascus	1-Sep-03	9.00 Days	27.00 Days	9.00 Days
Damascus	7-Sep-03	6.00 Days	28.00 Days	6.00 Days
Damascus	15-Sep-03	6.00 Days	27.00 Days	6.00 Days
Damascus	22-Sep-03	5.00 Days	28.00 Days	5.00 Days
Damascus	29-Sep-03	5.00 Days	28.00 Days	5.00 Days
Dubai	5-Aug-03	.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 Days
Dubai	12-Aug-03	.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 Days
Dubai	19-Aug-03	.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 Days
Dubai	1-Sep-03	.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 Days
Dubai	14-Sep-03	.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 Days
Frankfurt	11-Aug-03	35.00 Days	21.00 Days	.00 Days
Frankfurt	18-Aug-03	30.00 Days	10.00 Days	.00 Days
Frankfurt	15-Sep-03	19.00 Days	3.00 Days	.00 Days
Frankfurt	22-Sep-03	17.00 Days	3.00 Days	.00 Days
Frankfurt	29-Sep-03	17.00 Days	3.00 Days	.00 Days
Gaborone	1-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	Unavailable
Gaborone	5-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Gaborone	11-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Gaborone	18-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Gaborone	25-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Gaborone	2-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Guadalajara	5-Aug-03	9.00 Days	25.00 Days	2.00 Days
Guadalajara	11-Aug-03	4.00 Days	25.00 Days	3.00 Days
Guadalajara	18-Aug-03	7.00 Days	25.00 Days	2.00 Days
Guadalajara	26-Aug-03	8.00 Days	22.00 Days	1.00 Days
Guadalajara	2-Sep-03	6.00 Days	22.00 Days	1.00 Days
Guadalajara	8-Sep-03	3.00 Days	22.00 Days	1.00 Days
Guadalajara	15-Sep-03	2.00 Days	18.00 Days	1.00 Days
Guadalajara	22-Sep-03	1.00 Days	18.00 Days	1.00 Days
Guadalajara	29-Sep-03	1.00 Days	18.00 Days	1.00 Days
Georgetown	4-Aug-03	37.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
Georgetown	2-Sep-03	35.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
Guatemala City	4-Aug-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Guatemala City	11-Aug-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Guatemala City	18-Aug-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Guatemala City	25-Aug-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Guatemala City	2-Sep-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Guatemala City	8-Sep-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Guatemala City	16-Sep-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Guatemala City	22-Sep-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Guatemala City	29-Sep-03	4.00 Days	2.00 Days	4.00 Days
Guangzhou	3-Aug-03	11.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Guangzhou	3-Aug-03	11.00 Days	1.00 Days	11.00 Days
Guangzhou	11-Aug-03	14.00 Days	1.00 Days	14.00 Days
Guangzhou	20-Aug-03	14.00 Days	1.00 Days	14.00 Days
Guangzhou	24-Aug-03	14.00 Days	1.00 Days	14.00 Days
Guangzhou	1-Sep-03	10.00 Days	1.00 Days	10.00 Days
Guangzhou	7-Sep-03	10.00 Days	1.00 Days	10.00 Days
Guangzhou	12-Sep-03	14.00 Days	1.00 Days	14.00 Days
Guangzhou	29-Sep-03	14.00 Days	1.00 Days	14.00 Days
Guayaquil	4-Aug-03	20.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Guayaquil	11-Aug-03	18.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Guayaquil	20-Aug-03	22.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Guayaquil	25-Aug-03	22.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Guayaquil	2-Sep-03	16.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Guayaquil	8-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Guayaquil	15-Sep-03	11.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Guayaquil	23-Sep-03	11.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Guayaquil	29-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Havana	5-Aug-03	.00 days	90.00 Days	.00 days
Havana	18-Aug-03	.00 days	90.00 Days	.00 days
Havana	25-Aug-03	.00 days	80.00 Days	.00 days
Havana	2-Sep-03	.00 days	80.00 Days	.00 days
Havana	9-Sep-03	.00 days	80.00 Days	.00 days
Havana	30-Sep-03	.00 days	75.00 Days	.00 days
Ho Chi Minh City	5-Aug-03	10.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Ho Chi Minh City	10-Aug-03	9.00 Days	1.00 Days	9.00 Days
Ho Chi Minh City	18-Aug-03	8.00 Days	1.00 Days	8.00 Days
Ho Chi Minh City	2-Sep-03	6.00 Days	1.00 Days	6.00 Days
Ho Chi Minh City	7-Sep-03	5.00 Days	1.00 Days	5.00 Days
Hermosillo	4-Aug-03	15.00 Days	35.00 Days	.00 days
Hermosillo	11-Aug-03	13.00 Days	35.00 Days	.00 days
Hermosillo	18-Aug-03	15.00 Days	35.00 Days	.00 days
Hermosillo	2-Sep-03	19.00 Days	35.00 Days	.00 days
Hermosillo	6-Sep-03	17.00 Days	35.00 Days	.00 days
Hermosillo	13-Sep-03	17.00 Days	35.00 Days	.00 days
Hermosillo	23-Sep-03	16.00 Days	35.00 Days	.00 days
Hermosillo	29-Sep-03	18.00 Days	35.00 Days	.00 days
Halifax	5-Aug-03	5.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Halifax	13-Aug-03	5.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Halifax	18-Aug-03	5.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Halifax	26-Aug-03	5.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Halifax	3-Sep-03	5.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Halifax	8-Sep-03	5.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Halifax	22-Sep-03	5.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Halifax	30-Sep-03	5.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Helsinki	11-Aug-03	10.00 Days	2.00 Days	5.00 Days
Helsinki	21-Aug-03	10.00 Days	2.00 Days	5.00 Days
Helsinki	10-Sep-03	10.00 Days	2.00 Days	5.00 Days
Hong Kong	4-Aug-03	17.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Hong Kong	10-Aug-03	17.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Hong Kong	18-Aug-03	16.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Hong Kong	25-Aug-03	13.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Hong Kong	1-Sep-03	13.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Hong Kong	8-Sep-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Hong Kong	14-Sep-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Hong Kong	21-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Hong Kong	29-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Harare	27-Aug-03	4.00 Days	.00 days	4.00 Days
Islamabad	25-Aug-03	59.00 Days	4.00 Days	.00 days
Istanbul	4-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	3.00 Days
Istanbul	4-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Istanbul	11-Aug-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Istanbul	18-Aug-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Istanbul	25-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Istanbul	2-Sep-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	3.00 Days
Istanbul	8-Sep-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Istanbul	18-Sep-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Istanbul	22-Sep-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Istanbul	29-Sep-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Jakarta	10-Sep-03	42.00 Days	7.00 Days	1.00 Days
Jeddah	7-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Jerusalem	7-Aug-03	10.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Jerusalem	11-Aug-03	10.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Jerusalem	18-Aug-03	10.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Jerusalem	25-Aug-03	10.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Jerusalem	3-Sep-03	9.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Jerusalem	23-Sep-03	7.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Osaka/Kobe	3-Aug-03	10.00 Days	10.00 Days	10.00 Days
Osaka/Kobe	11-Aug-03	10.00 Days	10.00 Days	10.00 Days
Kathmandu	4-Aug-03	12.00 Days	.00 days	12.00 Days
Kathmandu	11-Aug-03	9.00 Days	.00 days	9.00 Days
Kathmandu	18-Aug-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Kathmandu	25-Aug-03	4.00 Days	.00 days	4.00 Days
Kathmandu	2-Sep-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Kathmandu	8-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Kathmandu	15-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Kathmandu	22-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Kathmandu	29-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Kiev	5-Aug-03	32.00 Days	.00 days	10.00 Days
Kiev	12-Aug-03	28.00 Days	.00 days	10.00 Days
Kiev	20-Aug-03	28.00 Days	.00 days	10.00 Days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Kiev	27-Aug-03	25.00 Days	.00 days	10.00 Days
Kiev	9-Sep-03	21.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
Kiev	15-Sep-03	21.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
Kinshasa	4-Aug-03	14.00 Days	1.00 Days	14.00 Days
Kinshasa	11-Aug-03	14.00 Days	1.00 Days	14.00 Days
Kinshasa	19-Aug-03	14.00 Days	1.00 Days	14.00 Days
Kinshasa	25-Aug-03	14.00 Days	1.00 Days	14.00 Days
Kinshasa	8-Sep-03	10.00 Days	1.00 Days	10.00 Days
Kinshasa	15-Sep-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	5.00 Days
Kinshasa	29-Sep-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	5.00 Days
Kuala Lumpur	4-Aug-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Kuala Lumpur	11-Aug-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Kuala Lumpur	18-Aug-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Kuala Lumpur	25-Aug-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Kuala Lumpur	1-Sep-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Kuala Lumpur	8-Sep-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Kuala Lumpur	15-Sep-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Kingston	5-Aug-03	2.00 Days	3.00 Days	.00 days
Kingston	5-Aug-03	2.00 Days	3.00 Days	2.00 Days
Kingston	12-Aug-03	2.00 Days	3.00 Days	2.00 Days
Kingston	19-Aug-03	2.00 Days	3.00 Days	2.00 Days
Kingston	25-Aug-03	2.00 Days	3.00 Days	2.00 Days
Kingston	4-Sep-03	2.00 Days	3.00 Days	2.00 Days
Kolonia	3-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Kolonia	31-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Koror	1-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Krakow	6-Aug-03	16.00 Days	10.00 Days	16.00 Days
Krakow	29-Aug-03	7.00 Days	10.00 Days	7.00 Days
Krakow	11-Sep-03	4.00 Days	10.00 Days	4.00 Days
Krakow	19-Sep-03	2.00 Days	10.00 Days	2.00 Days
Krakow	22-Sep-03	2.00 Days	10.00 Days	2.00 Days
Krakow	25-Sep-03	5.00 Days	10.00 Days	5.00 Days
Krakow	30-Sep-03	2.00 Days	10.00 Days	2.00 Days
Kuwait	1-Aug-03	21.00 Days	.00 days	Unavailable
Kuwait	12-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Kuwait	18-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Kuwait	29-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Lagos	25-Aug-03	90.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Lagos	15-Sep-03	65.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Lagos	23-Sep-03	77.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Lagos	30-Sep-03	78.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Libreville	2-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Lilongwe	5-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Lilongwe	1-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Lima	11-Aug-03	25.00 Days	.00 days	10.00 Days
Lima	18-Aug-03	25.00 Days	.00 days	10.00 Days
Lima	26-Aug-03	22.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Lima	9-Sep-03	17.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Lima	15-Sep-03	15.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Lima	23-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Lima	29-Sep-03	15.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
London	12-Aug-03	42.00 Days	5.00 Days	8.00 Days
London	26-Aug-03	32.00 Days	5.00 Days	8.00 Days
London	12-Sep-03	22.00 Days	5.00 Days	22.00 Days
London	22-Sep-03	19.00 Days	7.00 Days	19.00 Days
La Paz	4-Aug-03	30.00 Days	3.00 Days	7.00 Days
La Paz	11-Aug-03	30.00 Days	3.00 Days	7.00 Days
La Paz	18-Aug-03	30.00 Days	3.00 Days	7.00 Days
La Paz	25-Aug-03	21.00 Days	3.00 Days	5.00 Days
La Paz	2-Sep-03	17.00 Days	3.00 Days	5.00 Days
La Paz	8-Sep-03	16.00 Days	3.00 Days	5.00 Days
La Paz	15-Sep-03	17.00 Days	3.00 Days	5.00 Days
La Paz	22-Sep-03	14.00 Days	3.00 Days	5.00 Days
La Paz	29-Sep-03	11.00 Days	3.00 Days	5.00 Days
Lisbon	4-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Lisbon	11-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Lisbon	18-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Lisbon	25-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Lisbon	2-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Lisbon	17-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Lisbon	22-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Lisbon	29-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Luanda	1-Aug-03	3.00 Days	2.00 Days	Unavailable
Luanda	2-Sep-03	4.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Lusaka	14-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Luxembourg	1-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	Unavailable
Luxembourg	2-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Maseru	4-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Maseru	2-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Madrid	4-Aug-03	58.00 Days	1.00 Days	22.00 Days
Madrid	11-Aug-03	15.00 Days	1.00 Days	15.00 Days
Madrid	19-Aug-03	15.00 Days	1.00 Days	10.00 Days
Madrid	25-Aug-03	22.00 Days	1.00 Days	18.00 Days
Madrid	2-Sep-03	10.00 Days	1.00 Days	10.00 Days
Madrid	15-Sep-03	19.00 Days	1.00 Days	14.00 Days
Chennai (Madras)	6-Aug-03	34.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Chennai (Madras)	6-Aug-03	34.00 Days	1.00 Days	23.00 Days
Chennai (Madras)	11-Aug-03	30.00 Days	1.00 Days	25.00 Days
Chennai (Madras)	27-Aug-03	23.00 Days	1.00 Days	16.00 Days
Chennai (Madras)	10-Sep-03	14.00 Days	1.00 Days	10.00 Days
Mexico City	4-Aug-03	46.00 Days	30.00 Days	2.00 Days
Mexico City	11-Aug-03	48.00 Days	30.00 Days	2.00 Days
Mexico City	18-Aug-03	46.00 Days	30.00 Days	2.00 Days
Mexico City	25-Aug-03	46.00 Days	30.00 Days	2.00 Days
Mexico City	2-Sep-03	49.00 Days	30.00 Days	5.00 Days
Mexico City	8-Sep-03	48.00 Days	30.00 Days	2.00 Days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Mexico City	15-Sep-03	47.00 Days	30.00 Days	2.00 Days
Mexico City	22-Sep-03	45.00 Days	30.00 Days	1.00 Days
Mexico City	29-Sep-03	39.00 Days	30.00 Days	1.00 Days
Melbourne	4-Aug-03	4.00 Days	2.00 Days	1.00 Days
Melbourne	11-Aug-03	8.00 Days	2.00 Days	3.00 Days
Melbourne	18-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	3.00 Days
Melbourne	25-Aug-03	8.00 Days	2.00 Days	3.00 Days
Melbourne	3-Sep-03	8.00 Days	2.00 Days	3.00 Days
Melbourne	8-Sep-03	5.00 Days	1.00 Days	3.00 Days
Melbourne	22-Sep-03	5.00 Days	1.00 Days	4.00 Days
Melbourne	28-Sep-03	5.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Milan	4-Aug-03	19.00 Days	.00 days	8.00 Days
Managua	4-Aug-03	5.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Managua	11-Aug-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Managua	2-Sep-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	8.00 Days
Managua	9-Sep-03	9.00 Days	.00 days	9.00 Days
Managua	17-Sep-03	9.00 Days	.00 days	9.00 Days
Managua	23-Sep-03	9.00 Days	.00 days	9.00 Days
Managua	30-Sep-03	9.00 Days	.00 days	9.00 Days
Manila	4-Aug-03	67.00 Days	4.00 Days	11.00 Days
Manila	19-Aug-03	80.00 Days	3.00 Days	2.00 Days
Manila	25-Aug-03	74.00 Days	3.00 Days	1.00 Days
Manila	2-Sep-03	72.00 Days	3.00 Days	2.00 Days
Manila	8-Sep-03	73.00 Days	4.00 Days	2.00 Days
Manila	15-Sep-03	70.00 Days	4.00 Days	.00 Days
Manila	22-Sep-03	73.00 Days	4.00 Days	.00 Days
Manila	28-Sep-03	88.00 Days	4.00 Days	.00 Days
Moscow	13-Aug-03	13.00 Days	3.00 Days	7.00 Days
Moscow	19-Aug-03	8.00 Days	2.00 Days	7.00 Days
Moscow	25-Aug-03	4.00 Days	2.00 Days	4.00 Days
Moscow	3-Sep-03	6.00 Days	2.00 Days	4.00 Days
Moscow	16-Sep-03	6.00 Days	2.00 Days	4.00 Days
Moscow	24-Sep-03	6.00 Days	2.00 Days	4.00 Days
Moscow	29-Sep-03	5.00 Days	2.00 Days	4.00 Days
Minsk	1-Aug-03	23.00 Days	.00 days	Unavailable
Minsk	3-Sep-03	13.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
Muscat	2-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Montreal	4-Aug-03	31.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Montreal	11-Aug-03	38.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Montreal	18-Aug-03	37.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Montreal	27-Aug-03	37.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Montreal	2-Sep-03	36.00 Days	.00 days	36.00 Days
Montreal	11-Sep-03	24.00 Days	.00 days	24.00 Days
Montreal	17-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Montreal	23-Sep-03	35.00 Days	.00 days	35.00 Days
Monterrey	4-Aug-03	59.00 Days	28.00 Days	.00 days
Monterrey	3-Sep-03	55.00 Days	28.00 Days	.00 days
Monterrey	30-Sep-03	55.00 Days	28.00 Days	.00 days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Montevideo	19-Aug-03	3.00 Days	2.00 Days	3.00 Days
Montevideo	22-Sep-03	1.00 Days	2.00 Days	1.00 Days
Nicosia	4-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Nicosia	11-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Nicosia	18-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Nicosia	25-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Nicosia	2-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Nicosia	8-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Nicosia	15-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Nicosia	22-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Nicosia	29-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Nogales	25-Aug-03	3.00 Days	25.00 Days	.00 days
Nogales	27-Aug-03	1.00 Days	35.00 Days	.00 days
Nogales	2-Sep-03	2.00 Days	35.00 Days	.00 days
Nogales	8-Sep-03	1.00 Days	35.00 Days	.00 days
Nogales	15-Sep-03	4.00 Days	28.00 Days	.00 days
Nogales	19-Sep-03	2.00 Days	28.00 Days	.00 days
Nogales	26-Sep-03	1.00 Days	35.00 Days	.00 days
Naha	10-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Naha	25-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Naha	7-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Naha	18-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Naha	28-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Naples	4-Aug-03	4.00 Days	.00 days	4.00 Days
Naples	12-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Naples	18-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Naples	25-Aug-03	4.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Naples	3-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Naples	16-Sep-03	9.00 Days	.00 days	9.00 Days
Naples	23-Sep-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	8.00 Days
Naples	29-Sep-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	10.00 Days
Nassau	9-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Nouakchott	13-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
New Delhi	4-Aug-03	29.00 Days	3.00 Days	.00 days
New Delhi	11-Aug-03	28.00 Days	3.00 Days	.00 days
New Delhi	18-Aug-03	22.00 Days	3.00 Days	10.00 Days
New Delhi	25-Aug-03	17.00 Days	3.00 Days	10.00 Days
New Delhi	2-Sep-03	15.00 Days	3.00 Days	7.00 Days
New Delhi	10-Sep-03	10.00 Days	3.00 Days	10.00 Days
New Delhi	24-Sep-03	.00 days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Oslo	4-Aug-03	1.00 Days	5.00 Days	1.00 Days
Oslo	13-Aug-03	5.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Oslo	19-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Oslo	25-Aug-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Oslo	8-Sep-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Oslo	15-Sep-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Oslo	22-Sep-03	3.00 Days	2.00 Days	1.00 Days
Ottawa	4-Aug-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Ottawa	11-Aug-03	9.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Ottawa	18-Aug-03	12.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Ottawa	25-Aug-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Ottawa	2-Sep-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Ottawa	8-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Ottawa	14-Sep-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Ottawa	22-Sep-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Phnom Penh	7-Sep-03	38.00 Days	1.00 Days	38.00 Days
Phnom Penh	29-Sep-03	30.00 Days	1.00 Days	30.00 Days
Panama City	6-Aug-03	21.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Panama City	11-Aug-03	21.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Panama City	25-Aug-03	21.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Panama City	11-Sep-03	21.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Panama City	22-Sep-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Prague	4-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Prague	11-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Prague	18-Aug-03	9.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Prague	26-Aug-03	8.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Prague	5-Sep-03	9.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Prague	9-Sep-03	9.00 Days	1.00 Days	9.00 Days
Prague	15-Sep-03	9.00 Days	1.00 Days	9.00 Days
Prague	30-Sep-03	8.00 Days	1.00 Days	8.00 Days
Paris	11-Aug-03	23.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Paris	18-Aug-03	23.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Paris	21-Aug-03	26.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Paris	2-Sep-03	22.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Paris	10-Sep-03	21.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Paris	12-Sep-03	20.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Paris	15-Sep-03	17.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Paris	23-Sep-03	15.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Perth	4-Aug-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Perth	11-Aug-03	.00 days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Perth	18-Aug-03	.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Perth	25-Aug-03	.00 Days	.00 days	.00 Days
Perth	3-Sep-03	.00 Days	.00 days	.00 Days
Perth	8-Sep-03	.00 Days	.00 days	.00 Days
Perth	22-Sep-03	.00 Days	.00 days	.00 Days
Perth	28-Sep-03	.00 Days	.00 days	.00 Days
Port Moresby	1-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Port Moresby	30-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Port Au Prince	29-Aug-03	15.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Port Of Spain	4-Aug-03	21.00 Days	3.00 Days	.00 days
Port Of Spain	11-Aug-03	21.00 Days	3.00 Days	.00 days
Port Of Spain	19-Aug-03	21.00 Days	3.00 Days	.00 days
Port Of Spain	25-Aug-03	21.00 Days	3.00 Days	.00 days
Port Of Spain	10-Sep-03	14.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Port Of Spain	25-Sep-03	6.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Quebec	8-Sep-03	6.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Quito	4-Aug-03	17.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Quito	12-Aug-03	13.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Quito	18-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Quito	26-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Quito	8-Sep-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Quito	15-Sep-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Quito	22-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Quito	29-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Recife	3-Aug-03	27.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Recife	2-Sep-03	5.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Rio De Janeiro	11-Aug-03	2.00 Days	5.00 Days	2.00 Days
Rio De Janeiro	27-Aug-03	5.00 Days	5.00 Days	5.00 Days
Rio De Janeiro	22-Sep-03	7.00 Days	5.00 Days	7.00 Days
Riga	13-Aug-03	5.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
Riga	18-Aug-03	5.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
Riga	25-Sep-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Reykjavik	10-Sep-03	.00 days	3.00 Days	.00 days
Rome	4-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Rome	11-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	4.00 Days
Rome	20-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	4.00 Days
Rome	26-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	4.00 Days
Rome	2-Sep-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	4.00 Days
Rome	15-Sep-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	4.00 Days
Rome	23-Sep-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	4.00 Days
Rome	30-Sep-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	4.00 Days
Rangoon	4-Aug-03	30.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Rangoon	10-Aug-03	30.00 Days	.00 days	20.00 Days
Rangoon	18-Aug-03	30.00 Days	.00 days	20.00 Days
Rangoon	26-Aug-03	30.00 Days	.00 days	25.00 Days
Rangoon	2-Sep-03	30.00 Days	.00 days	25.00 Days
Rangoon	7-Sep-03	30.00 Days	.00 days	25.00 Days
Rangoon	14-Sep-03	30.00 Days	.00 days	25.00 Days
Santo Domingo	4-Aug-03	87.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Santo Domingo	12-Aug-03	87.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Santo Domingo	18-Aug-03	88.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Santo Domingo	25-Aug-03	87.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Santo Domingo	8-Sep-03	87.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Santo Domingo	15-Sep-03	86.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Santo Domingo	22-Sep-03	86.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Seoul	28-Aug-03	20.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Seoul	9-Sep-03	35.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Seoul	21-Sep-03	14.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Seoul	29-Sep-03	31.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Singapore	4-Aug-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Singapore	11-Aug-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Singapore	18-Aug-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Singapore	25-Aug-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Singapore	2-Sep-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Singapore	7-Sep-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Singapore	15-Sep-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Singapore	21-Sep-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Singapore	30-Sep-03	2.00 Days	2.00 Days	2.00 Days
Shanghai	3-Aug-03	38.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Shanghai	3-Aug-03	38.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Shanghai	11-Aug-03	42.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Shanghai	17-Aug-03	18.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Shanghai	27-Aug-03	15.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Shanghai	9-Sep-03	35.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Shanghai	14-Sep-03	35.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Shanghai	22-Sep-03	43.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Skopje	4-Aug-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Skopje	18-Aug-03	4.00 Days	.00 days	4.00 Days
Skopje	25-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Skopje	2-Sep-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Skopje	9-Sep-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Skopje	15-Sep-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Skopje	22-Sep-03	4.00 Days	.00 days	4.00 Days
Skopje	29-Sep-03	4.00 Days	.00 days	4.00 Days
San Jose	4-Aug-03	17.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
San Jose	11-Aug-03	19.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
San Jose	18-Aug-03	18.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
San Jose	25-Aug-03	20.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
San Jose	2-Sep-03	19.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
San Jose	8-Sep-03	19.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
San Jose	15-Sep-03	18.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
San Jose	22-Sep-03	17.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
San Jose	29-Sep-03	17.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
San Salvador	12-Aug-03	15.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
San Salvador	18-Aug-03	17.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
San Salvador	25-Aug-03	17.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
San Salvador	8-Sep-03	10.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
San Salvador	16-Sep-03	10.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
San Salvador	22-Sep-03	8.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
San Salvador	29-Sep-03	8.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Santiago	4-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Santiago	11-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Santiago	18-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Santiago	25-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Santiago	2-Sep-03	8.00 Days	1.00 Days	8.00 Days
Santiago	9-Sep-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Santiago	15-Sep-03	6.00 Days	1.00 Days	6.00 Days
Santiago	22-Sep-03	6.00 Days	1.00 Days	6.00 Days
Santiago	29-Sep-03	4.00 Days	1.00 Days	4.00 Days
Shenyang	11-Aug-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	8.00 Days
Shenyang	17-Aug-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Shenyang	2-Sep-03	12.00 Days	.00 days	12.00 Days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Shenyang	7-Sep-03	28.00 Days	.00 days	28.00 Days
Shenyang	15-Sep-03	30.00 Days	.00 days	30.00 Days
Shenyang	29-Sep-03	32.00 Days	.00 days	32.00 Days
Sofia	11-Aug-03	44.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
Sofia	8-Sep-03	36.00 Days	.00 days	5.00 Days
Sofia	29-Sep-03	25.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Sao Paulo	4-Aug-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Sao Paulo	4-Aug-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Sao Paulo	4-Aug-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Sao Paulo	11-Aug-03	4.00 Days	1.00 Days	4.00 Days
Sao Paulo	18-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Sao Paulo	25-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Sao Paulo	2-Sep-03	4.00 Days	1.00 Days	4.00 Days
Sao Paulo	8-Sep-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Sao Paulo	15-Sep-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	3.00 Days
Sao Paulo	22-Sep-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
Sao Paulo	29-Sep-03	2.00 Days	1.00 Days	2.00 Days
St Petersburg	25-Aug-03	18.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
St Petersburg	15-Sep-03	15.00 Days	2.00 Days	4.00 Days
St Petersburg	23-Sep-03	17.00 Days	2.00 Days	4.00 Days
St Petersburg	30-Sep-03	15.00 Days	2.00 Days	4.00 Days
Surabaya	3-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Surabaya	10-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Surabaya	20-Aug-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Surabaya	24-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Surabaya	26-Aug-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Surabaya	2-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Surabaya	7-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Surabaya	14-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Surabaya	22-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Surabaya	28-Sep-03	1.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Stockholm	4-Aug-03	28.00 Days	1.00 Days	25.00 Days
Stockholm	29-Aug-03	21.00 Days	1.00 Days	5.00 Days
Stockholm	11-Sep-03	21.00 Days	1.00 Days	5.00 Days
Stockholm	16-Sep-03	21.00 Days	1.00 Days	5.00 Days
Suva	2-Sep-03	5.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Sydney	4-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Sydney	11-Aug-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Sydney	18-Aug-03	4.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Sydney	25-Aug-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Sydney	3-Sep-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Sydney	8-Sep-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Sydney	22-Sep-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	1.00 Days
Sydney	28-Sep-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Taipei	3-Aug-03	9.00 Days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Taipei	10-Aug-03	8.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Taipei	17-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Taipei	24-Aug-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	.00 days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Tallinn	5-Aug-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Tallinn	12-Aug-03	3.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Tallinn	2-Sep-03	2.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Tbilisi	15-Aug-03	30.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Tbilisi	19-Aug-03	24.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Tbilisi	22-Sep-03	21.00 Days	.00 days	.00 days
Tegucigalpa	4-Aug-03	29.00 Days	5.00 Days	3.50 Days
Tegucigalpa	11-Aug-03	24.00 Days	4.00 Days	3.50 Days
Tegucigalpa	18-Aug-03	28.00 Days	5.00 Days	3.50 Days
Tegucigalpa	25-Aug-03	25.00 Days	5.00 Days	3.50 Days
Tegucigalpa	2-Sep-03	34.00 Days	5.00 Days	3.50 Days
Tegucigalpa	8-Sep-03	20.00 Days	4.00 Days	2.00 Days
Tegucigalpa	16-Sep-03	25.00 Days	4.00 Days	2.00 Days
Tegucigalpa	23-Sep-03	22.00 Days	5.00 Days	2.00 Days
Tegucigalpa	29-Sep-03	25.00 Days	5.00 Days	2.00 Days
Tijuana	4-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Tijuana	4-Aug-03	15.00 Days	30.00 Days	15.00 Days
Tijuana	11-Aug-03	16.00 Days	30.00 Days	16.00 Days
Tijuana	2-Sep-03	6.00 Days	30.00 Days	6.00 Days
Tijuana	8-Sep-03	5.00 Days	30.00 Days	5.00 Days
Tijuana	29-Sep-03	2.00 Days	30.00 Days	2.00 Days
Tijuana Tpf	5-Aug-03	21.00 Days	30.00 Days	.00 days
Tijuana Tpf	19-Aug-03	15.00 Days	30.00 Days	.00 days
Tijuana Tpf	22-Aug-03	15.00 Days	30.00 Days	.00 days
Tijuana Tpf	3-Sep-03	12.00 Days	30.00 Days	.00 days
Tijuana Tpf	8-Sep-03	14.00 Days	30.00 Days	.00 days
Tijuana Tpf	22-Sep-03	8.00 Days	30.00 Days	.00 days
Tokyo	3-Aug-03	10.00 Days	14.00 Days	7.00 Days
Tokyo	5-Sep-03	7.00 Days	14.00 Days	7.00 Days
Tel Aviv	4-Aug-03	14.00 Days	2.00 Days	7.00 Days
Tel Aviv	4-Aug-03	14.00 Days	2.00 Days	7.00 Days
Tunis	18-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Tunis	28-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Tunis	2-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Tunis	8-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Ulaanbaatar	4-Aug-03	43.00 Days	2.00 Days	30.00 Days
Ulaanbaatar	27-Aug-03	46.00 Days	2.00 Days	30.00 Days
Ulaanbaatar	8-Sep-03	46.00 Days	2.00 Days	21.00 Days
Vancouver	22-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Vancouver	29-Sep-03	15.00 Days	.00 days	15.00 Days
Vilnius	4-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Vilnius	11-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Vilnius	19-Aug-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	14.00 Days
Vilnius	25-Aug-03	10.00 Days	.00 days	10.00 Days
Vilnius	3-Sep-03	13.00 Days	.00 days	13.00 Days
Vilnius	8-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Vilnius	15-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Vilnius	22-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days

Historical Wait Times for NIV Appointments Reported by U.S. Overseas Post—Continued

(for August & September 2003 only)

Post	Entry Date	Average Appointment Wait Time	Average Processing Time	Average Appointment Wait Time Student, Exchange Visitors Only
Vilnius	29-Sep-03	7.00 Days	.00 days	7.00 Days
Valletta	1-Aug-03	.00 days	2.00 Days	Unavailable
Valletta	4-Sep-03	.00 days	2.00 Days	.00 days
Vienna	5-Aug-03	.00 days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Vienna	20-Aug-03	.00 days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Vienna	25-Aug-03	.00 days	1.00 Days	.00 days
Warsaw	5-Aug-03	26.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Warsaw	11-Aug-03	20.00 Days	.00 days	2.00 Days
Warsaw	18-Aug-03	20.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Warsaw	25-Aug-03	17.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Warsaw	2-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Warsaw	8-Sep-03	14.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Warsaw	15-Sep-03	8.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Warsaw	22-Sep-03	6.00 Days	.00 days	3.00 Days
Yerevan	4-Aug-03	10.00 Days	1.00 Days	10.00 Days
Yerevan	11-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Yerevan	18-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Yerevan	25-Aug-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Yerevan	2-Sep-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Yerevan	8-Sep-03	7.00 Days	1.00 Days	7.00 Days
Yerevan	15-Sep-03	3.00 Days	1.00 Days	3.00 Days
Yerevan	22-Sep-03	1.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Yerevan	29-Sep-03	1.00 Days	1.00 Days	1.00 Days
Zagreb	4-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Zagreb	11-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Zagreb	18-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Zagreb	25-Aug-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Zagreb	2-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Zagreb	8-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Zagreb	15-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days
Zagreb	22-Sep-03	.00 days	.00 days	.00 days

(Note: Statistics designated as ''00 days'' reflect ''same day processing'')

FY 2003 Worldwide NIV Workload

(by Visa Category)

Category	Issuances	Refusals	Overcome/ Waivers	Adj. Refusal Rate
A	183,504	5,159	3,461	1.99%
B1	61,195	19,628	8,437	15.46%
B1/B2	2,223,166	1,507,689	317,703	34.86%
B1/B2/BCC	836,378	375,010	27,470	29.36%
B2	271,990	156,007	34,710	30.84%
C	40,839	4,524	1,465	6.97%
C1/D	210,648	24,074	15,563	3.88%
D	16,120	1,976	1,314	3.94%

FY 2003 Worldwide NIV Workload—Continued

(by Visa Category)

Category	Issuances	Refusals	Overcome/ Waivers	Adj. Refusal Rate
DCREW	4,631	1	0	0.02%
E	32,096	6,934	5,138	5.30%
F	235,579	129,269	51,149	24.90%
G	31,103	3,082	2,162	2.87%
H	286,930	66,924	41,919	8.02%
I	12,329	1,467	777	5.30%
J	283,660	55,170	32,170	7.50%
K	44,633	17,951	10,091	14.97%
L	110,816	19,454	15,207	3.69%
M	4,301	1,769	1,155	12.49%
N	18	0	0	0.00%
NAFTA	1,219	158	122	2.87%
NATO	5,702	100	70	0.52%
O	10,150	1,406	1,004	3.81%
P	34,358	6,894	3,106	9.93%
Q	1,970	417	194	10.17%
R	11,798	6,062	2,680	22.28%
T	58	15	9	9.38%
V	43,203	11,365	6,958	9.26%
Total	4,898,394	2,422,505	584,034	27.29%

Question. According to private-sector witnesses, the significant costs for applicants' travel to visa interviews, particularly in large countries like Brazil, is already having an adverse impact on U.S. interests, including business, tourism, scientific, technological and public diplomacy interests. Is the Department considering new programs such as opening permanent or temporary visa-interview offices in more locations to enable applicants to be interviewed closer to home?

Answer. The Department of State is not considering opening more consular facilities at this time. Our priority is to focus first on strengthening the skills of existing personnel through better training, adding more consular officers to existing overseas posts, upgrading existing overseas facilities, and meeting biometric requirements for travel documents set forth by Congress. Once these challenges are met, we will be in a position to evaluate further the possible need for additional facilities.

Let me note that consular facilities are extremely costly given the need to have permanent funding strategies to maintain security, communications, personnel, and resources to support consular activities and related internal controls. Such facilities cannot be adequately maintained based on the MRV fee alone as a funding strategy. Decisions as to whether to open additional offices overseas must also take into account foreign policy issues.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO DHS ASSISTANT SECRETARY C. STEWART VERDERY, JR. AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JANICE JACOBS BY SENATOR JOHN E. SUNUNU

Question. In its report of July 15 (GA)–03–1013T), the General Accounting Office (GAO) found "that the Departments of State, Homeland Security and Justice could more effectively manage the visa process if they had clear and comprehensive policies and procedures and increased agency coordination and information sharing."

GAO said that "State and Justice disagreed on the evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism grounds."

Further, the visa revocation process was not being used aggressively to alert homeland security and law enforcement agencies that individuals who are security risks might have entered the country before their visas were revoked. "The process

broke down when information on revocations was not being shared between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement officials."

GAO concluded that these "weaknesses diminish the effectiveness of the visa process in keeping potential terrorists out of the United States."

What steps have the Department of State, Homeland Security, and Justice taken to remedy these deficiencies?

Specifically, what is now the guidance to consular and DHS officers on the evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism grounds?

Response from Janice L. Jacobs (DOS)

Answer. The Patriot Act of October 26, 2001 made changes to the language of Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which describes the grounds of visa ineligibility for terrorism. The Act had the effect of broadening and strengthening the provisions of Section 212(a)(3)(B). The Department of State communicated the new provisions to all consular officers shortly after enactment of the Act. The Department has also established a special segment of the training program that consular officers receive before they go abroad to help them identify potential terrorists who may apply for visas. As a procedural matter, all consular officers must consult the Visa Office when they have reason to think that a case may involve terrorism. The Visa Office provides guidance to the consular officer in each specific case that reflects the consensus of appropriate agencies once such agencies have reviewed the derogatory evidence that exists relevant to that case. We have no outstanding cases for which there is a difference of opinion with DHS concerning the relevance of case specific information and the terrorism grounds of ineligibility of the INA. The Department of State does not authorize the issuance of any visa over the objections of either DHS or the FBI.

Response from C. Stewart Verdery, Jr. (DHS)

Answer. Prior to January 2003, legacy agencies and then DHS did experience problems with receiving notice of visa revocations from the Department of State (DOS), in part due to a miscommunication about which codes should be accepted as revocation codes and to an incorrect interface between IBIS and CLASS. These problems have been corrected and since the June 2003 report, DOS has worked with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to put procedures into place that strengthen the visa revocation process. Both CBP and DOS agree that the optimal solution for ensuring revoked visa information is transmitted timely is the automated interface that links the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) with the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) and the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS). CBP and DOS have established a single code for posting of visa revocations into TECS/IBIS. In addition, ICE has requested and received immediate notification from DOS of all visa revocations, including revocations based on national security grounds.

Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides guidance, and some specific definitions, to consular and DHS officers on the evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism grounds and specifically renders an alien ineligible to receive a visa when:

> The alien has engaged in terrorist activity;
>
> A consular or DHS officer knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe, the alien is engaged in or is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity as defined in part (iv) of that section;
>
> The alien has, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily harm, incited terrorist activity;
>
> The alien is a representative of a foreign terrorist organization as designated by the Secretary of State, or of a political, social or other similar group whose public endorsement of acts of terrorist activity the Secretary of State has determined undermines United States efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activity;
>
> The alien is a member of a foreign terrorist organization, as designated by the Secretary of State or which the alien knows or should have known is a terrorist organization (an alien who is an officer, official, representative or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization is considered to be engaged in terrorist activity);
>
> The alien has used the alien's position of prominence within any country to endorse or espouse terrorist activity, or to persuade others to support terrorist activity, or to persuade others to support terrorist activity or a ter-

rorist organization, in a way that the Secretary of State determines United States efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities; orThe alien is the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible under this section, if the activity causing the alien to be inadmissible occurred within the last 5 years (exceptions to this clause are specified).

If a consular post believes that an individual may be ineligible for a visa based on terrorism grounds outstanding instructions require that the application be forwarded to DOS's bureau of consular affairs for decision. The decision to deny a visa based on terrorism grounds cannot be made by an individual officer at a consular post.

Question. What is the process the Department of State now uses to notify Homeland Security and law enforcement agencies that a visa has been revoked? Does the Department of Homeland Security then check entry records to see if the individual is in the United States? What steps are then taken to apprehend the individual?

Response from Janice L. Jacobs (DOS)

Answer. The Department of State notifies the Department of Homeland Security of revoked visas in three ways. A copy of the signed Certificate of Revocation is faxed to the Intelligence Division of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP is also a recipient of outgoing cables sent by the Department to overseas Posts, which inform Posts of revocations and instruct them to take appropriate action. Third, the Department enters hits in its CLASS lookout system under the code "VRVK" (Visa Revoked). These hits are shared electronically, on a real-time basis, with the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS), which is used by CBP inspectors at ports-of-entry and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents in their capacity as the law enforcement arm of the Department of Homeland Security.

The additional questions concerning internal procedures of DHS fall within the competence of DHS to respond.

Response from C. Stewart Verdery, Jr. (DHS)

Answer. CBP and DOS have established a single code for posting of visa revocations into TECS/IBIS. This code is used to flag cases in the lookout databases, thereby notifying inspectors at the port-of-entry that an alien seeking admission has had his or her visa revoked. The revocation code and the current language on the visa revocation certificate are adequate for the CBP to take action to prevent the holder of a revoke visa from entering the United States.

ICE also now receives immediate notification from DOS of all visa revocations, including revocations based on national security grounds. As a result, ICE is kept up-to-date on all visa revocations on terrorism grounds. When ICE is notified of a visa revocation the Intelligence Unit conducts records checks, obtains all derogatory information relating to the subject of the visa revocation, and forwards it to the appropriate ICE Investigations Division for a full field investigation. ICE, upon receipt of notification of a visa revocation, always queries ICE databases to determine if any of the individuals who have had their visas revoked have entered the U.S. and still have not departed. Upon confirmation that individuals who have had their visas revoked for national security grounds have entered the U.S. and not departed, ICE Office of Investigations in coordination with the FBI will make every attempt to locate the individual and investigate all possible avenues to remove the individual from the U.S. thereby minimizing the threat they may pose to the homeland. ICE also investigates all immigration violations that would make the person subject to removal proceedings (violations such as unauthorized employment, failure to depart the United States as required, etc.). ICE conducts a full field investigation of any foreign national that is believed to be in the United States and whose visa was revoked on national security grounds.

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO DHS ASSISTANT SECRETARY C. STEWART VERDERY, JR. AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JANICE JACOBS BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Question. There doesn't seem to be anyway for a person applying for a non-immigrant visa to know when she can expect to have her application either approved or denied. In addition, there are reports that some people are required to wait months for a decision on their application. This uncertainty coupled with the sometimes unreasonably lengthy wait times can create a great deal of hardship for travelers trying to come to the US to the extent that many may choose not to come at all.

How long does it currently take to process non-immigrant visa applications at consulates or embassies? How long should the process take? Do the wait times for processing applications vary significantly from country to country? If so, what are the reasons for the discrepancies? And when can we expect those discrepancies to be eliminated? Are, and if so, how are applicants notified when their visa applications require more thorough background checks? Will the automation of biometric data significantly reduce the wait time for applicants? If so, by how much? Does the State Department and Department of Homeland Security have a timeframe under which they intend to improve the process to address all these concerns?

Response from Janice L. Jacobs (DOS)

Answer. The overwhelming majority of all non-immigrant visa applicants receive a definitive decision from the consular officer regarding the merits of their case upon conclusion of the visa interview. Only 2%–2.5% of all non-immigrant visa cases worldwide on average are submitted by consular officers to Washington for interagency screening.

Interagency screening currently takes less than 30 days to process for most cases. Whenever the consular officer has reason to submit a case to Washington for interagency screening, the consular officer normally advises the visa applicant that additional administrative processing is required.

In other instances, the complexity of a respective applicant's case may require the applicant to return with additional supporting evidence, or the consular officer may wish to take investigative measures to determine the veracity of the applicant's statements. Such issues generally add a few days to visa processing.

Wait time processing of applications does vary from country to country based on availability of staffing and local political, economic, or social conditions. For example, most student visa applications are submitted during the summer due to the U.S. academic calendar. Staffing gaps often occur to some degree during the summer because most Foreign Service change of assignments occur during this period. In only 15 U.S. posts overseas have appointment wait times in excess of 30 days for NIV applicants as of November 12, 2003.

We do not expect that these discrepancies will be eliminated altogether because variances that arise are post-specific. However, the majority of US posts do currently have a wait time under 30 days.

The automation of biometric data is not expected to significantly reduce the wait time for applicants. The use of biometric data will help establish identity but consular officers will still need to perform their adjudication responsibility, i.e. determine whether the applicant intends to visit the US for legitimate purposes as specified in immigration law.

In order to improve the visa issuance process and address all the above concerns, the Department of State intends to create 80 additional MRV-funded consular officer positions in FY 04 in order to assist with the additional workload demand. These positions will be designated for posts worldwide with significant workload increases in order to improve the efficiency of the visa process while not compromising the need to meet security requirements.

Response from C. Stewart Verdery, Jr. (DHS)

Answer. DHS' ultimate goal is to adopt visa policies and procedures that will emphasize security as well as efficiency. DHS, working in cooperation with DOS and other agencies, is exploring ways to improve or modify the visa process in order to support this goal. While DHS has not set a particular timeframe for action, the visa process and DHS's new role in that process, is a priority for the Department. DHS is also well aware of the significance of visa policy to other government entities as well as the private sector and will keep their concerns in mind when evaluating the visa process. Currently, DHS has a visa policy working group that is developing short and long-term policy initiatives related to DHS' responsibilities under the section 428 visa MOU. This working group will make recommendations to Secretary Ridge on how DHS should alter or improve visa policy to increase security as well as efficiency in visa processing. We will gladly update the committee on these initiatives as the Department moves forward on these issues.

In the meantime, DHS made a policy decision to suspend the NSEERS 30-day and annual interviews in December 2003 to better utilize immigration enforcement resources. DHS has also decided that Border Crossing Card holders will not be subject to US-VISIT, initially, to prevent additional wait times at land ports of entry primary inspection lanes while the US-VISIT office determines the best manner to implement US-VISIT at the land borders. DHS, along with DOS and other relevant agencies, is currently finalizing its plan to review the Visa Waiver Program countries, which is required every two years under the Enhanced Border Security and

Visa Entry Reform Act. Also, DHS is currently examining the Visa Condor and Mantis programs with the goal of streamlining the visa process and reducing the application period.

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO DHS ASSISTANT SECRETARY C. STEWART VERDERY, JR. AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JANICE JACOBS BY SENATOR GEORGE ALLEN

Question. There are reports that some of our major international gateway airports are facing substantial delays in processing in-bound passengers. At Dulles, for example, wait times have increased for arriving international passengers.

Recognizing that the government has legitimate security concerns in processing passengers, I would like to know what can be done to speed things up. Is it a question of manpower and other resources?

Response from C. Stewart Verdery, Jr. (DHS)

Answer. Arriving international passengers are not experiencing substantial delays in CBP processing. Since developing a strategic plan to monitor and measure average wait times at the top 20 airports (83% of all arriving passengers), average wait times nationwide have decreased from 59 minutes to 34 minutes. At Dulles, the average wait time decreased from 70 minutes as of an August 2003 baseline to 45 minutes as measured in a recent 7-day period (12/28/03 through 1/3/04).

Since implementation of US-VISIT, average wait times nationwide and at Dulles have remained relatively stable. Nationwide wait times decreased slightly from 36 minutes to 34 minutes; at Dulles, the average wait time is now 45 minutes, relatively unchanged from 43 minutes as measured in the last full week prior to US-VISIT.

CBP continues to monitor and measure airport primary wait times at the top 20 airports on a daily basis. Field Offices with airport location(s) exceeding the wait time threshold of 60 minutes are required to provide an explanation and corrective action plan to Headquarters.

Question. Recent changes in the transit-without-visa rules and the international-to-international transfer rules are likely to compound the problem for major gateway airports. As you can appreciate, these programs will continue to have a significant adverse affect on concessionaires and others connected with our international gateway airports. What, if anything, is being done to address the potential negative impact of these rules?

Response from C. Stewart Verdery, Jr. (DHS)

Answer. DHS and CBP have been working on revising a security-enhanced transit program since August 7, 2003, when the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs published regulations suspending the TWOV and ITI transit programs based on credible intelligence concerning a specific threat of exploitation of the TWOV program by terrorist organizations.

In August and September 2003, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)conducted field visits and held meetings with airline industry and theDepartments of Homeland Security (DHS), State (DOS), and Transportation(DOT) on the possible reinstatement (or revision) of a security-enhanced transit program. On September 22, 2003, the public comment period concerning the suspension of the TWOV and ITI programs expired. CBP reviewed the 17 comments submitted by the air and sea industry in response to the regulation published in the Federal Register on August 7, 2003. These comments, along with concerns raised during CBP field visits and meetings held with the industry, contributed to the formulation of a proposed plan to reinstate a transit without visa program. In mid-January 2004,special transit procedures were initiated at Miami International Airport for certain groups of international passengers, including passengers holding Visa Waiver Program (VWP) country passports, passengers in possession of a visa to enter the U.S., and Canadian citizens. Presently, special transit procedures have taken place at several U.S. ports of entry including Los Angeles, Orlando, and San Juan. Meetings with the DOS and the Department of Commerce (DOC) concerning a revised transit plan were held in January 2004.

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO DHS ASSISTANT SECRETARY C. STEWART VERDERY, JR. AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JANICE JACOBS BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. How realistic is the October 24 [sic], 2004 requirement for biometric data to be encrypted in the passports of current Visa Waiver Program Countries?

Which countries have already requested waivers for this provision, which have told us that they will be able to meet this requirement? When will U.S. Passports have such biometric features? What biometric feature(s) will be encrypted in our passports?

Response from Janice L. Jacobs (DOS)

Answer. Most countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) will be unable to comply with section 303(c) of the Enhanced Border Security Act.

Of the 27 countries currently participating in the VWP program, only five (Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands and New Zealand) have indicated that they may be able to include biometrics per the ICAO standard by the mandated deadline. Budgetary difficulties may delay their plans.

Most governments cited as the main reason for being unable to comply with the October 26, 2004 deadline the fact that the ICAO did not establish a biometric standard (facial recognition technology) until May 2003. Most governments say there is insufficient time before October 26, 2004 to identify and contract for new technology that would bring a new passport with biometrics into production. All have said they will be able to comply with the ICAO standard at some point, possibly in late 2005/early 2006, but not prior to the October 2004 deadline stipulated in US law.

No waiver of the biometric requirement stipulated in section 303(c) concerning the passports of VWP countries exists in U.S. law.

The Department of State (DOS) plans to implement a new version of the United States passport that will meet the ICAO standard for the use of biometrics. The new U.S. passport will contain an embedded Integrated Circuit (IC) contactless chip. The chip will be used to store the information currently displayed on the passport (i.e. name, date and place of birth, date of issuance, etc.) along with a full digital image of the portrait of the passport bearer. The new technology will enhance the security of the passport and will facilitate the movement of travelers at ports of entry. The new passport initially will be issued on a limited scale by October 2004. All newly issued full-validity United States passports will have embedded chips by the end of calendar 2005.

Response from C. Stewart Verdery, Jr. (DHS)

Answer. While most VWP program countries will be able to certify that they have a program in place to issue biometric passports by the October deadline, very few, if any, VWP countries will actually be able to begin issuing biometric passports by that date. The result is that millions of visitors from VWP countries who are issued non-ICAO compliant passports after October 26, 2004, will be required to obtain visas prior to traveling to the United States. The issue is not lack of will or commitment to achieving the standard by these countries, but rather challenging scientific and technical issues.

According to the Department of State, most of the Visa Waiver Program governments have indicated that they will be able to comply with the ICAO standard (facial recognition) in late 2005 to early 2006. Secretaries Ridge and Powell have testified before the House Judiciary Committee, requesting an extension of the deadline. In addition, Senator Chambliss has introduced a bill to extend the deadline.

There are two congressionally mandated deadlines that affect foreign travelers seeking admission under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP):

- October 1, 2003—machine readable passport (MRP) deadline required by section 417 of the USA Patriot Act
- October 26, 2004—biometric deadline required by section 303 of the Border Security Act.

Section 417 of the USA Patriot Act requires any alien seeking admission to the United States under the VWP, on or after October 1, 2003, to possess a machine-readable passport unless the Secretary of State waives the requirement. The October 1, 2003, MRP deadline is distinct from the October 26, 2004, deadline for biometrics in MRPs. Under section 303 of the Border Security Act, by October 26, 2004, VWP countries are required to certify that they have a program to issue passports that contain biometrics as a condition of continued participation in the VWP. Also, on or after October 26, 2004, any alien seeking admission under the VWP must present an MRP that contains ICAO compliant biometrics, unless the passport was issued prior to that date.

Unlike the October 1, 2003 MRP, the October 26, 2004 biometrics deadline does not have a waiver provision.

On the October 1, 2003, MRP deadline, DOS, in consultation with DHS, agreed to permit individual VWP countries to apply for a one-time waiver of the October

1, 2003 MRP deadline. Exercising his legislatively-authorized prerogative, the Secretary of State granted a waiver until October 26, 2004 to 21 countries currently participating in the VWP based on their having met certain requirements. Those countries are: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Each country granted a waiver was required to make a formal request, via diplomatic note, acknowledging that the waiver would be a one-time opportunity and only valid until October 26, 2004, the date by which nationals of VWP countries must present a machine-readable passport. Countries also had to certify that they were making progress towards ensuring that machine-readable passports are available to their nationals and that they are taking appropriate steps to protect against the misuse of their non-machine readable passports. The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has already issued field guidance for inspectors at the ports of entry for handling foreign nationals who are affected by the waiver. CBP procedures require inspectors to notify travelers from VWP countries of this new requirement with handout material indicating that the non-MRP will no longer be accepted for travel to the United States after October 26, 2004. In addition, CBP inspectors are instructed to handwrite ″MRP notified″ adjacent to the admission stamp in non-machine readable passports.

Regarding the October 26, 2004 MRP biometric deadline, most VWP program countries will be able to certify that they have a program in place to issue biometric passports by the October deadline, but very few, if any, VWP countries will actually be able to begin issuing biometric passports by that date. The result is that millions of visitors from VWP countries who are issued non-ICAO compliant passports after October 26, 2004, will be required to obtain visas prior to traveling to the United States. The issue is not lack of will or commitment to achieving the standard by these countries, but rather challenging scientific and technical issues. According to the Department of State, most of the Visa Waiver Program governments have indicated that they will be able to comply with the ICAO standard (facial recognition) in late 2005 to early 2006. Secretaries Ridge and Powell have testified before the House Judiciary Committee, requesting an extension of the deadline. In addition, Senator Chambliss has introduced a bill to extend the deadline.

Question. Given the testimony of the second panel at today's Hearing regarding the situation confronting foreign students, and the remarks by the first panel on the need to collect SEVIS, what are the current plans to collect the $100 SEVIS processing fee?

Response from C. Stewart Verdery, Jr. (DHS)

Answer. On October 27, 2003, DHS published a regulation in the Federal Register that will require every foreign student who registers in the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) to pay a one-time fee of $100. The SEVIS fee is mandated by Section 641 of P.L. 104–208 IIRIRA, published 30 September 1996. To date, the SEVIS program has been unfunded. In the FY 2002 supplemental (P.L. 107–206 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response To Terrorist Attacks on the United States), legacy INS received $36.8 million in appropriated counter-terrorism funds to expedite the development of SEVIS However, while the funding covered the program development, it did not include funds for enforcement or maintenance of the program. The $100 fee is estimated to generate over forty million dollars that will be used for program operations, system maintenance, personnel to work with the schools, and for compliance efforts. This fee also will allow DHS to continue to closely monitor students coming into the United States while ensuring that this close scrutiny is not burdensome on the students or the educational communities that they seek to join.

The proposed rule, currently in its comment period, states that the $100 SEVIS student fee will be collected in two ways:

1. The student or exchange visitor (hereafter, student), or a family member or other third party including schools or exchange visitor programs if they so desire, may complete the Form I–901 online and submit the $100 in an online credit card transaction. Once the transaction processes (usually less than one minute), the payor will be able to print out a receipt. A receipt will be mailed, or sent via courier for an additional cost, to the student within three days of the fee payment being processed; or

2. The student may obtain a hardcopy I–901 form or complete the internet I–901 form and send it in with a check, money order, or foreign draft drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. dollars. The fee receipt will be printed and

mailed, or sent via courier for an additional cost, to the student within three days of the fee payment being processed.

In either case, the Department of State consular officers will be able to check electronically to confirm that the fee was paid in cases where the receipt does not arrive or subsequently is lost.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO DHS ASSISTANT SECRETARY C. STEWART VERDERY, JR. BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. What is the level of DHS funding for equipment needed to handle the information now being sent over by the State Department? What are the levels budgeted for FY 2004? Please provide the committee with an example of the age and types of computers and bandwidth that you are using at border points of entry and describe your replacement/upgrade cycle.

Answer. The costs to establish and maintain section 428 responsibilities are being funded by the components within the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has a variety of computers at the ports of entry that are primarily Dell Pentium 3 or Pentium 4 workstations. Typically, workstations are replaced every three to four years, contingent upon the availability of funding. The land border primary workstation is a ruggedized laptop PC with a special keyboard layout and glare resistant screen that is four years old and will be replaced when the US-VISIT Project incorporates new functionality into the vehicle primary booths. The CBP network uses frame relay protocol with T1 circuits to each Port of Entry.

Question. As the committee currently understands the situation, visa application information, including the applicant's photo, captured by the Department of State is available to DHS officials at ports of entry, but that DHS is only able to access the data in "secondary," that is, not during the initial interview. The committee understands that DHS is in the process of upgrading its systems to remedy this.

Is the above scenario correct? If so, what upgrade mechanisms are required—new software and/or hardware? Please provide the per-unit cost of the upgrade and the total cost. Has this cost been requested in the FY 2004 appropriations, if not will it be funded from within existing DHS resources or will this have to wait until FY 2005?

Answer. Visa information is already available at primary (initial interview) locations. As part of the US-VISIT Increment 1 implementation at 115 airports and 14 seaports on January 5, 2004, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented the display of non-immigrant visa (NIV) data at all primary inspection locations in these ports. In response to the CBP Officer "swiping" a visa through the integrated document reader at primary, a query is made against the central IBIS (Interagency Border Inspection System) database, which includes NIV data supplied by the State Department. Available NIV data matching the query is displayed to the CBP Officer, including the digital visa photo. This allows the CBP Officer to perform an immediate match between the traveler, the traveler's document, and the data/photo supplied by the State Department. This match supplements the fingerprint matching process also implemented as part of US-VISIT. CBP currently has NIV data dating back to July 2001. The State Department has provided additional NIV data going back to the beginning of 2000 and this data is currently being loaded for access by the CBP Officers at primary. Plans for implementing the US-VISIT capability, including NIV data, at land-border ports is still under discussion at the US-VISIT Program Management Office.

The NIV data and process for continuous updates were already available in IBIS prior to the US-VISIT implementation. Integration of this data into the US-VISIT process at primary was funded as part of the US-VISIT FY03 funding. No additional funding is required to complete the loading of the older NIV data.

Question. In order to have a better understanding of the workload at our borders, please provide for the committee a staffing pattern of Custom and Border Protection Officers/INS Legacy Officers, by fiscal year from FY 1999 to FY 2003, by port of entry. Please indentify any officers that are contractors. For each post, for each year, please provide the number of visitors processed.

Answer. Please find attached on-board staffing data, which we are able to provide as a total for the Legacy United States Customs Service (USCS) and the Legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for FY 1999 and for Legacy USCS, Legacy INS, and the Legacy Agricultural Quarantine Inspectional Service for FY 2000

(attachment 1). We are also able to provide Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on-board staffing data by port of entry for FY 2003 (Attachment 2). Also, please find attached the workload figures at ports of entry for FY 1999–FY 2003 (Attachment 3).

Attachment #1.—Customs and Border Protection, Office of Field Operations (as of the end of FY 2003)

Inspectional Staff for All Locations

	FY 2001 (9/22/01)	FY 2002 (9/21/02)	FY 2003 (10/04/03)
Legacy Customs	8,184	9,008	10,538
Legacy Immigration	4,717	5,422	6,741
Legacy Agriculture	[1]0	[1]0	1,485
Totals	12,901	14,430	18,764

[1] Historical totals are unavailable.

Attachment #2.—FY 2003 Customs and Border Protection: Report of Inspectors; Sorted by Field Office, Port of Entry, and Legacy Agency

[As of End of FY 2003]

Field Office & Port of Entry	State	Field Office Authorized	Legacy INS On Board	Legacy Customs On Board	Legacy AGI On Board	Total On Board	Total Vacancies
Atlanta (1317)							
Atlanta	GA	—	98	99	38	235	—
Brunswick	GA	—	—	2	1	3	—
Savannah	GA	—	4	41	8	53	—
Bullock	NC	—	1	—	1	—	—
Charlotte	NC	—	11	16	4	31	—
Fayetteville	NC	—	—	1	1	—	—
Greensboro	NC	—	2	—	2	—	—
Morehead City	NC	—	2	1	3	—	—
Raleigh–Durham	NC	—	3	8	4	15	—
Wilmington	NC	—	2	10	3	15	—
Winston Salem	NC	—	1	—	1	—	—
Bethune	SC	—	1	—	1	—	—
Charleston	SC	—	6	70	9	85	—
Columbia	SC	—	1	—	1	—	—
Greenleyville	SC	—	1	—	1	—	—
Greenville	SC	—	4	1	5	—	—
Myrtle Beach	SC	—	1	—	1	—	—
Dublin	VA	—	1	—	1	—	—
Newport News	VA	—	3	—	3	—	—
Norfolk	VA	—	47	6	53	—	—
Richmond	VA	—	5	—	5	—	—
Charleston	WV	—	1	—	1	—	—
Subtotal: Atlanta	—	495	124	317	76	517	-22
Baltimore (1313)							
Dover AFB	DE	—	3	3	2	8	—
New Castle	DE	—	—	3	—	3	—

Attachment #2.—FY 2003 Customs and Border Protection: Report of Inspectors; Sorted by Field Office, Port of Entry, and Legacy Agency—Continued

[As of End of FY 2003]

Field Office & Port of Entry	State	Field Office Authorized	Legacy INS On Board	Legacy Customs On Board	Legacy AGI On Board	Total On Board	Total Vacancies
Wilmington	DE	—	—	5	1	6	—
Baltimore	MD	—	21	75	10	106	—
Atlantic City	NJ	—	—	1	—	1	—
Trenton	NJ	—	—	1	—	1	—
Avoca	PA	—	—	1	—	1	—
Erie	PA	—	1	—	—	1	—
Harrisburg	PA	—	—	3	—	3	—
Philadelphia	PA	—	62	109	17	188	—
Pittsburgh	PA	—	11	12	2	25	—
Alexandria	VA	—	—	2	—	2	—
District Office:							
Wash., DC	VA	—	1	—	—	1	—
Dulles	VA	—	96	86	18	200	—
Norfolk	VA	—	6	—	—	6	—
Subtotal: Baltimore		541	201	301	50	552	-11
Boston (1304)							
Bridgeport	CT	—	—	3	—	3	—
Hartford	CT	—	5	7	—	12	—
New Haven	CT	—	—	3	—	3	—
Wallingford	CT	—	—	—	1	1	—
Windsor Locks	CT	—	—	—	1	1	—
Boston	MA	—	65	118	20	203	—
Gloucester	MA	—	—	1	—	1	—
New Bedford	MA	—	—	2	—	2	—
Springfield	MA	—	—	2	—	2	—
Worcester	MA	—	—	2	—	2	—
Bangor	ME	—	4	6	—	10	—
Belfast	ME	—	—	1	—	1	—
Bridgewater	ME	—	6	3	—	9	—
Calais	ME	—	25	41	—	66	—
Coburn Gore	ME	—	4	3	—	7	—
Eastport	ME	—	—	2	—	2	—
Forest City	ME	—	—	1	—	1	—
Fort Fairfield	ME	—	8	8	—	16	—
Fort Kent	ME	—	8	10	—	18	—
Houlton	ME	—	16	45	4	65	—
Jackman	ME	—	10	22	—	32	—
Limestone	ME	—	7	—	—	7	—
Lubec	ME	—	5	4	—	9	—
Madawaska	ME	—	13	8	—	21	—
Orient	ME	—	—	1	—	1	—
Van Buren	ME	—	11	9	—	20	—
Vanceboro	ME	—	6	5	—	11	—
Portland	ME	—	4	4	1	9	—
Manchester	NH	—	—	1	—	1	—
Pittsburg	NH	—	4	—	—	4	—
Portsmouth	NH	—	—	2	—	2	—
Providence	RI	—	4	5	—	9	—

Attachment #2.—FY 2003 Customs and Border Protection: Report of Inspectors; Sorted by Field Office, Port of Entry, and Legacy Agency—Continued

[As of End of FY 2003]

Field Office & Port of Entry	State	Field Office Authorized	Legacy INS On Board	Legacy Customs On Board	Legacy AGI On Board	Total On Board	Total Vacancies
Warwick	RI	—	—	—	1	1	—
Alburg	VT	—	5	—	—	5	—
Beebe Plains	VT	—	4	—	—	4	—
Beecher Falls	VT	—	7	10	—	17	—
Burlington	VT	—	—	4	—	4	—
Derby Line	VT	—	25	48	1	74	—
Highgate Springs	VT	—	22	53	3	78	—
North Troy	VT	—	6	1	—	7	—
Norton	VT	—	11	16	—	27	—
Richford	VT	—	19	21	—	40	—
St Albans	VT	—	1	2	—	3	—
Subtotal: Boston	814	305	474	32	811	3	—
Buffalo (1309)							
Albany	NY	—	1	6	1	8	—
Alexandria Bay	NY	—	—	51	1	52	—
Champlain	NY	—	57	130	—	187	—
District Office: Buffalo	NY	—	2	285	8	295	—
Johnson City	NY	—	—	1	—	1	—
Massena	NY	—	19	30	—	49	—
New York	NY	—	—	1	—	1	—
Niagara Falls	NY	—	93	—	—	93	—
Ogdensburg	NY	—	13	23	—	36	—
Peace Bridge	NY	—	56	—	—	56	—
Rochester	NY	—	—	6	—	6	—
Rouses Point	NY	—	—	—	1	1	—
Syracuse	NY	—	—	3	—	3	—
Thousand Islands	NY	—	28	—	—	28	—
Trout River	NY	—	14	34	—	48	—
Subtotal: Buffalo		808	283	570	11	864	-56
Chicago (1339)							
Des Moines	IA	—	1	1	—	2	—
Chicago	IL	—	162	185	51	398	—
Decatur	IL	—	—	1	—	1	—
Des Plains	IL	—	—	—	1	1	—
Milan	IL	—	—	1	—	1	—
Peoria	IL	—	—	1	—	1	—
Rockford	IL	—	—	1	—	1	—
Rosemont	IL	—	—	—	4	4	—
Waukegan	IL	—	—	2	—	2	—
Wheeling	IL	—	—	1	—	1	—
Evansville	IN	—	—	1	—	1	—
Fort Wayne	IN	—	—	2	—	2	—

Attachment #2.—FY 2003 Customs and Border Protection: Report of Inspectors; Sorted by Field Office, Port of Entry, and Legacy Agency—Continued

[As of End of FY 2003]

Field Office & Port of Entry	State	Field Office Authorized	Legacy INS On Board	Legacy Customs On Board	Legacy AGI On Board	Total On Board	Total Vacancies
Indianapolis	IN	—	2	14	2	18	—
Wichita	KS	—	—	2	—	2	—
Erlanger	KY	—	—	—	6	6	—
Hebron	KY	—	—	32	—	32	—
Lexington	KY	—	—	1	—	1	—
Louisville	KY	—	—	19	—	19	—
Lowmansville	KY	—	—	1	—	1	—
Duluth	MN	—	2	—	1	3	—
Minneapolis/ St. Paul	MN	—	37	29	7	73	—
Rochester	MN	—	—	1	—	1	—
Chesterfield	MO	—	—	1	—	1	—
Gladstone	MO	—	—	—	1	1	—
Kansas City	MO	—	—	5	—	5	—
North Kansas City	MO	—	—	1	—	1	—
Springfield	MO	—	—	1	—	1	—
St. Ann	MO	—	—	—	4	4	—
St. Louis	MO	—	12	—	—	12	—
Woodson Terr.	MO	—	—	11	—	11	—
Akron	OH	—	—	2	—	2	—
Ashtabula	OH	—	—	1	—	1	—
Cincinnati	OH	—	13	—	—	13	—
Cleveland	OH	—	8	1	—	9	—
Columbus	OH	—	1	5	—	6	—
Dayton	OH	—	—	9	—	9	—
Hebron	OH	—	—	1	—	1	—
Middleburg Heights	OH	—	—	15	1	16	—
OIC/Cincinnati	OH	—	2	—	—	2	—
Sandusky	OH	—	2	2	—	4	—
Swanton	OH	—	—	2	—	2	—
Toledo	OH	—	2	2	—	4	—
Vandalia	OH	—	—	1	—	1	—
West Chester	OH	—	—	—	1	1	—
Wilmington	OH	—	—	4	—	4	—
Erie	PA	—	—	2	—	2	—
Sioux Falls	SD	—	—	1	—	1	—
Milwaukee	WI	—	2	9	—	11	—
Racine	WI	—	—	1	—	1	—
Subtotal: Chicago		709	246	372	79	697	12
Detroit (1338)							
District Office: Detroit	MI	—	2	—	—	2	—
Algonac Ferry	MI	—	3	—	—	3	—
Battle Creek	MI	—	—	2	—	2	—
Bay City	MI	—	—	1	—	1	—
Cascade	MI	—	—	3	—	3	—

Attachment #2.—FY 2003 Customs and Border Protection: Report of Inspectors; Sorted by Field Office, Port of Entry, and Legacy Agency—Continued

[As of End of FY 2003]

Field Office & Port of Entry	State	Field Office Authorized	Legacy INS On Board	Legacy Customs On Board	Legacy AGI On Board	Total On Board	Total Vacancies
Detroit	MI	—	—	—	5	5	—
Detroit Int'l Bridge	MI	—	58	—	—	58	—
Detroit Tunnel	MI	—	48	—	—	48	—
Detroit, Metro Airport	MI	—	91	287	—	378	—
Marine City Ferry	MI	—	2	—	—	2	—
Marine Unit	MI	—	8	—	—	8	—
Pontiac	MI	—	—	3	—	3	—
Port Huron	MI	—	52	107	5	164	—
Romulus	MI	—	—	69	13	82	—
Saginaw	MI	—	—	1	—	1	—
Sault Ste. Marie	MI	—	27	35	1	63	—
Ypsilanti	MI	—	—	1	—	1	—
Subtotal: Detroit		816	291	509	24	824	-8
El Paso (1324)							
Columbus	NM	—	15	35	1	51	—
Santa Teresa	NM	—	8	40	—	48	—
Albuquerque	NM	—	—	4	—	4	—
Antelope Wells	NM	—	—	2	—	2	—
Conchiti	NM	—	—	1	—	1	—
District Office: El Paso	TX	—	2	—	—	2	—
El Paso	TX	—	271	457	26	754	—
Fabens	TX	—	22	35	1	58	—
Fort Hancock	TX	—	6	3	—	9	—
Harlingen	TX	1	—	—	1	—	
Presidio	TX	—	12	34	1	47	—
Progresso	TX	—	—	1	—	1	—
Subtotal: El Paso		957	337	612	29	978	-21
Houston (1353)							
Oklahoma City	OK	—	—	2	—	2	—
Tulsa	OK	—	—	2	—	2	—
Corpus Christi	TX	—	4	5	2	11	—
Dallas	TX	—	86	106	35	227	—
Galveston	TX	—	5	—	2	7	—
Houston	TX	—	83	226	52	361	—
Houston Seaport	TX	—	10	—	—	10	—
Port Arthur	TX	—	1	3	2	6	—
Amarillo	TX	—	—	1	—	1	—
Freeport	TX	—	—	1	—	1	—
Lubbock	TX	—	—	1	—	1	—

Attachment #2.—FY 2003 Customs and Border Protection: Report of Inspectors; Sorted by Field Office, Port of Entry, and Legacy Agency—Continued

[As of End of FY 2003]

Field Office & Port of Entry	State	Field Office Authorized	Legacy INS On Board	Legacy Customs On Board	Legacy AGI On Board	Total On Board	Total Vacancies
Subtotal: Houston		617	189	347	93	629	-12
Laredo (1323)							
Austin	TX	—	1	5	2	8	—
Brownsville	TX	—	122	227	29	378	—
Del Rio	TX	—	43	61	2	106	—
District Office: San Antonio	TX	—	1	—	—	1	—
Eagle Pass	TX	—	81	105	11	197	—
Hidalgo	TX	—	97	138	—	235	—
Laredo	TX	—	153	381	25	559	—
Pantex	TX	—	—	1	—	1	—
Pharr	TX	—	—	64	22	86	—
Progresso	TX	—	39	36	1	76	—
Rio Grande City	TX	—	—	25	—	25	—
Roma	TX	—	44	54	4	102	—
San Antonio	TX	—	15	15	4	34	—
Subtotal: Laredo		1824	596	1112	100	1808	16
Long Beach (1327)							
Hawthorne	CA	—	—	—	94	94	—
LA Deferred Inspection	CA	—	3	—	—	3	—
Ontario	CA	—	—	—	2	2	—
Palm Springs	CA	—	—	1	—	1	—
Port Hueneme	CA	—	—	1	2	3	—
Terminal Island	CA	—	—	76	—	76	—
Ventura County Suboffice	CA	—	1	—	—	1	—
Victorville	CA	—	—	1	—	1	—
Long Beach Marine	CA	—	15	205	34	254	—
Los Angeles Airport	CA	—	361	349	6	716	—
Las Vegas	NV	—	15	7	2	24	—
Subtotal: Long Beach		1199	395	640	140	1175	24
Miami (1352)							
District Office: Miami	FL	—	2	719	196	917	—
Ft Ldl/Prt Evrglds	FL	—	40	127	18	185	—
Key West	FL	—	6	6	1	13	—

Attachment #2.—FY 2003 Customs and Border Protection: Report of Inspectors; Sorted by Field Office, Port of Entry, and Legacy Agency—Continued

[As of End of FY 2003]

Field Office & Port of Entry	State	Field Office Authorized	Legacy INS On Board	Legacy Customs On Board	Legacy AGI On Board	Total On Board	Total Vacancies
Miami Airport	FL	—	332	—	—	332	—
Miami Marine Unit	FL	—	59	—	—	59	—
West Palm Beach	FL	—	7	27	4	38	—
Ft. Pierce	FL	—	—	3	1	4	—
Subtotal: Miami		1527	446	882	220	1548	-21
New Orleans (1320)							
Little Rock	AK	—	—	2	—	2	—
Mobile	AL	—	2	14	5	21	—
Alabaster	AL	—	—	—	1	1	—
Birmingham	AL	—	—	1	—	1	—
Huntsville	AL	—	—	4	3	7	—
Baton Rouge	LA	—	3	2	—	5	—
Lake Charles	LA	—	3	3	—	6	—
New Orleans	LA	—	28	55	20	103	—
Gramercy	LA	—	—	2	—	2	—
Morgan City	LA	—	—	5	—	5	—
Shreveport	LA	—	—	3	—	3	—
Gulfport	MS	—	3	19	4	26	—
Pascagoula	MS	—	—	2	—	2	—
Vicksburg	MS	—	—	3	—	3	—
Memphis	TN	—	5	42	7	54	—
Nashville	TN	—	2	4	—	6	—
Blountville	TN	—	—	1	—	1	—
Chattanooga	TN	—	—	2	—	2	—
Knoxville	TN	—	—	3	—	3	—
Subtotal: New Orleans		260	46	167	40	253	7
New York (1310)							
Cherry Hill	NJ	—	4	—	—	4	—
Newark	NJ	—	186	164	27	377	—
Elizabeth	NJ	—	278	37	315	—	—
Secaucus	NJ	—	—	1	1	2	—
New York	NY	—	488	10	121	619	—
Newburgh	NY	—	—	—	2	2	—
Queens	NY	—	—	620	—	620	—
Subtotal: New York		1932	678	1073	188	1939	-7
Portland (1329)							
Alcan	AK	—	7	—	—	7	—
Anchorage	AK	—	16	38	7	61	—

Attachment #2.—FY 2003 Customs and Border Protection: Report of Inspectors; Sorted by Field Office, Port of Entry, and Legacy Agency—Continued

[As of End of FY 2003]

Field Office & Port of Entry	State	Field Office Authorized	Legacy INS On Board	Legacy Customs On Board	Legacy AGI On Board	Total On Board	Total Vacancies
Border	AK	—	—	3	—	3	—
Dalton's Cache	AK	—	4	—	—	4	—
Dutch Harbor	AK	—	1	—	—	1	—
Eagle	AK	—	—	1	—	1	—
Fairbanks	AK	—	1	1	—	2	—
Haines	AK	—	—	7	—	7	—
Juneau	AK	—	1	1	—	2	—
Ketchikan	AK	—	6	3	—	9	—
Nome	AK	—	0	—	—	0	—
Sitka	AK	—	—	1	—	1	—
Skagway	AK	—	6	7	—	13	—
Wrangell	AK	—	—	1	—	1	—
Aurora	CO	—	—	—	2	2	—
Broomfield	CO	—	—	1	—	1	—
Colorado Springs	CO	—	—	1	—	1	—
Denver	CO	—	16	20	—	36	—
Englewood	CO	—	—	1	—	1	—
Fort Collins	CO	—	—	—	2	2	—
Boise	ID	—	—	1	—	1	—
Astoria	OR	—	2	1	—	3	—
Coos Bay	OR	—	—	1	—	1	—
Portland	OR	—	17	24	6	47	—
Longview	WA	—	1	1	—	2	—
Subtotal: Portland		223	78	114	17	209	14
Preclearance (1354)							
Freeport	BAH	—	7	10	—	17	—
Nassau	BAH	—	19	17	—	36	—
Hamilton	BER	—	10	8	—	18	—
Calgary	CAN	—	25	11	—	36	—
Edmonton	CAN	—	9	7	—	16	—
Montreal	CAN	—	40	19	1	60	—
Ottawa	CAN	—	13	7	—	20	—
Toronto	CAN	—	119	49	1	169	—
Vancouver	CAN	—	59	21	1	81	—
Victoria	CAN	—	8	—	0	8	—
Winnipeg	CAN	—	6	7	—	13	—
Dublin	IRE	—	2	—	—	2	—
Shannon	IRE	—	4	—	—	4	—
Aruba	NA	—	3	11	1	15	—
Subtotal: Preclearance		628	324	167	4	495	133
San Diego (1325)							
Andrade	CA	—	12	22	—	34	—
Calexico	CA	—	166	204	16	386	—

Attachment #2.—FY 2003 Customs and Border Protection: Report of Inspectors; Sorted by Field Office, Port of Entry, and Legacy Agency—Continued

[As of End of FY 2003]

Field Office & Port of Entry	State	Field Office Authorized	Legacy INS On Board	Legacy Customs On Board	Legacy AGI On Board	Total On Board	Total Vacancies
Calexico East	CA	—	1	—	—	1	—
Otay Mesa	CA	—	29	94	—	123	—
San Ysidro/San Diego	CA	—	406	365	39	810	—
Tecate	CA	—	—	39	—	39	—
Bonnyville	CA	—	—	1	—	1	—
San Jose	CA	—	—	1	—	1	—
District Office: San Diego	CA	—	2	—	—	2	—
Subtotal: San Diego		1528	616	726	55	1397	131
San Francisco (1328)							
Sacramento Suboffice	CA	—	2	5	1	8	—
San Francisco	CA	—	222	241	50	513	—
San Jose Suboffice	CA	—	—	4	4	8	—
Fresno	CA	—	—	1	—	1	—
Oakland	CA	—	—	5	11	16	—
Agana	GUA	—	66	—	—	66	—
Honolulu	HI	—	164	109	53	326	—
Hilo	HI	—	—	1	—	1	—
Kahului	HI	—	—	1	—	1	—
Kailua Kona	HI	—	5	4	2	11	—
Reno	NV	—	1	2	—	3	—
Salt Lake City	UT	—	2	3	—	5	—
Subtotal: San Francisco		1013	462	376	121	959	54
San Juan (1349)							
Mayaguez	PR	—	8	12	3	23	—
Ponce	PR	—	3	7	4	14	—
Roosevelt Roads	PR	—	2	—	—	2	—
San Juan	PR	—	115	155	57	327	—
Arecibo	PR	—	—	1	—	1	—
Coloso	PR	—	—	1	—	1	—
Culebra	PR	—	—	1	—	1	—
Fajardo	PR	—	—	5	—	5	—
Penuelas	PR	—	—	—	1	1	—
Rio Piedras	PR	—	—	1	—	1	—
Salinas	PR	—	—	2	—	2	—
Vieques	PR	—	—	1	—	1	—
Charlotte Amalie	VI	—	36	9	—	45	—
Christiansted	VI	—	12	6	—	18	—
Cruz Bay	VI	—	3	2	—	5	—
St. John Is	VI	—	—	2	—	2	—

Attachment #2.—FY 2003 Customs and Border Protection: Report of Inspectors; Sorted by Field Office, Port of Entry, and Legacy Agency—Continued

[As of End of FY 2003]

Field Office & Port of Entry	State	Field Office Authorized	Legacy INS On Board	Legacy Customs On Board	Legacy AGI On Board	Total On Board	Total Vacancies
St. Croix	VI	—	—	10	5	15	—
St. Thomas	VI	—	—	18	7	25	—
Subtotal: San Juan		492	179	233	77	489	3
Seattle (1330)							
Eastport	ID	—	11	20	—	31	—
Porthill	ID	—	10	7	—	17	—
Baudette	MN	—	6	11	—	17	—
Crane Lake	MN	—	—	1	—	1	—
District Office: St. Paul	MN	—	3	—	—	3	—
Duluth	MN	—	—	3	1	4	—
Grand Portage	MN	—	7	18	—	25	—
Intl. Falls	MN	—	22	43	1	66	—
Lancaster	MN	—	4	4	—	8	—
Noyes	MN	—	2	—	—	2	—
OIC–Suboffice SPO	MN	—	1	—	—	1	—
Pinecreek	MN	—	4	—	—	4	—
Roseau	MN	—	3	11	—	14	—
Warroad	MN	—	7	14	—	21	—
Babb	MT	—	—	9	—	9	—
Butte	MT	—	—	1	—	1	—
Cut Bank	MT	—	—	1	—	1	—
Del Bonita	MT	—	4	—	—	4	—
District Office: Helena	MT	—	4	—	—	4	—
Eureka	MT	—	—	12	—	12	—
Great Falls	MT	—	—	3	—	3	—
Havre	MT	—	—	1	—	1	—
Kalispell	MT	—	—	1	—	1	—
Morgan	MT	—	5	—	—	5	—
Opheim	MT	—	5	—	—	5	—
Piegan	MT	—	8	—	—	8	—
Raymond	MT	—	12	17	—	29	—
Roosville	MT	—	10	—	—	10	—
Scobey	MT	—	4	1	—	5	—
Sweetgrass	MT	—	17	46	3	66	—
Turner	MT	—	4	1	—	5	—
Whitetail	MT	—	1	1	—	2	—
Whitlash	MT	—	0	—	—	0	—
Wild Horse	MT	—	5	—	—	5	—
Willow Creek	MT	—	4	—	—	4	—
Ambrose	ND	—	2	—	—	2	—
Antler	ND	—	3	1	—	4	—
Carbury	ND	—	5	1	—	6	—
Dunseith	ND	—	6	20	—	26	—
Fargo	ND	—	—	1	—	1	—
Fortuna	ND	—	—	1	—	1	—

Attachment #2.—FY 2003 Customs and Border Protection: Report of Inspectors; Sorted by Field Office, Port of Entry, and Legacy Agency—Continued

[As of End of FY 2003]

Field Office & Port of Entry	State	Field Office Authorized	Legacy INS On Board	Legacy Customs On Board	Legacy AGI On Board	Total On Board	Total Vacancies
Hannah	ND	—	4	1	—	5	—
Hansboro	ND	—	5	1	—	6	—
Maida	ND	—	4	1	—	5	—
Neche	ND	—	5	5	—	10	—
Noonan	ND	—	5	1	—	6	—
Northgate	ND	—	4	1	—	5	—
Pembina	ND	—	23	71	1	95	—
Portal	ND	—	10	39	—	49	—
Sarles	ND	—	1	1	—	2	—
Sherwood	ND	—	3	1	—	4	—
St. John	ND	—	4	1	—	5	—
Walhalla	ND	—	5	1	—	6	—
Westhope	ND	—	3	1	—	4	—
Anacortes	WA	—	—	5	—	5	—
Bellingham	WA	—	3	5	—	8	—
Blaine	WA	—	—	149	22	171	—
Boundary	WA	—	4	—	—	4	—
Danville	WA	—	4	4	—	8	—
District Office:							
Seattle	WA	2	—	—	2	—	
Ferry	WA	—	1	—	2	3	—
Friday Harbor	WA	—	1	3	—	4	—
Frontier	WA	—	11	—	—	11	—
Laurier	WA	—	5	3	—	8	—
Lynden	WA	—	15	19	—	34	—
Metaline Falls	WA	—	3	4	—	7	—
Moses Lake	WA	—	—	1	—	1	—
Northport	WA	—	—	6	—	6	—
Oroville	WA	—	19	22	1	42	—
Pacific Highway	WA	—	36	—	—	36	—
Peace Arch	WA	—	44	—	—	44	—
Point Roberts	WA	—	12	2	—	14	—
Port Angeles	WA	—	1	4	—	5	—
Port Townsend	WA	—	—	1	—	1	—
Seattle/Seaport	WA	—	7	—	24	31	—
Seattle/Tacoma Airport	WA	—	37	122	—	159	—
Spokane	WA	—	0	3	—	3	—
Sumas	WA	—	20	50	—	70	—
Tacoma	WA	—	4	24	—	28	—
Subtotal: Seattle		1402	484	802	55	1341	61
Tampa (1318)							
Cape Canaveral	FL	—	16	15	3	34	—
Daytona Beach	FL	—	—	1	—	1	—
Fernandina Beach	FL	—	—	1	—	1	—
Fort Myers	FL	—	4	4	1	9	—
Jacksonville	FL	—	4	41	2	47	—
Melbourne	FL	—	—	1	—	1	—

Attachment #2.—FY 2003 Customs and Border Protection: Report of Inspectors; Sorted by Field Office, Port of Entry, and Legacy Agency—Continued

[As of End of FY 2003]

Field Office & Port of Entry	State	Field Office Authorized	Legacy INS On Board	Legacy Customs On Board	Legacy AGI On Board	Total On Board	Total Vacancies
Ocala	FL	—	—	1	—	1	—
Orlando	FL	—	60	42	20	122	—
Panama City	FL	—	0	1	1	2	—
Pensacola	FL	—	—	1	—	1	—
Sanford	FL	—	21	7	2	30	—
Sarasota	FL	—	—	1	—	1	—
St. Petersburg	FL	—	—	2	—	2	—
Tampa	FL	—	29	36	4	69	—
Subtotal: Tampa		321	134	154	33	321	0
Tucson (1326)							
Douglas	AZ	—	42	72	2	116	—
Lukeville	AZ	—	15	14	—	29	—
Naco	AZ	—	16	20	—	36	—
Nogales	AZ	—	107	214	25	346	—
Phoenix	AZ	—	22	18	7	47	—
San Luis	AZ	—	63	91	5	159	—
Sasabe	AZ	—	4	11	—	15	—
Tucson	AZ	—	4	9	2	15	—
Subtotal: Tucson		790	273	449	41	763	27
Regional Offices		42	14	—	—	14	28
Training Academy		—	0	—	—	0	0
Headquarters		224	40	141	—	181	43
Grand Total		19,162	6,741	10,538	1,485	18,764	398

Attachment #3.—Workload Figures at Ports of Entry for FY 1999 to FY 2003

Total Passengers and Pedestrians

Location	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
National Totals	479,904,115	493,251,056	471,666,097	415,193,122	412,948,956
North Atlantic CMC—Boston	15,271,379	15,270,045	14,465,950	12,401,346	12,516,430
Port of Portland, ME	97,218	139,873	132,078	161,212	134,104
Port of Jackman, ME	586,910	678,539	747,119	560,263	493,264
Port of Bangor, ME	31,973	31,853	25,597	37,448	41,595
Port of Bath, ME					
Port of Bar Harbor, ME				55,582	119,738
Port of Rockland, ME					
Port of Portsmouth, NH	5,196	7,891	6,918	5,949	7,439
Port of Belfast, ME	127,940	115,050	125,524	43,021	2,559
Manchester User Fee Airport, NH	248	730	1,018	730	932
Port of Houlton, ME	1,092,072	1,023,928	888,357	941,339	832,134
Port of Van Buren, ME	617,359	571,418	572,290	528,447	533,809
Port of Madawaska, ME	1,529,163	1,502,028	1,298,667	1,188,158	1,228,153
Port of Fort Kent, ME	699,485	678,094	589,589	527,264	523,523
Port of Fort Fairfield, ME	523,009	465,910	422,582	383,078	387,229
Port of Limestone, ME	116,414	110,897	118,556	137,468	125,820
Port of Bridgewater, ME	265,817	192,800	167,144	146,895	144,372
Port of Calais, ME	3,366,209	3,400,087	3,161,446	2,083,870	2,549,868
Port of Eastport, ME	560,199	574,989	532,641	454,162	447,857
Port of Vanceboro, ME	95,105	147,447	144,681	122,837	133,913
Port of Jonesport, ME					
Port of St. Albans, VT			14,933		12,182
Port of Highgate Springs/Alburg, VT	1,168,806	1,220,791	1,247,205	1,203,572	1,213,613
Port of Richford, VT	297,673	295,728	278,518	257,333	222,485

Attachment #3.—Workload Figures at Ports of Entry for FY 1999 to FY 2003—Continued

Total Passengers and Pedestrians

Location	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
Port of Burlington, VT	5,256	6,220	5,335	5,105	4,636
Port of Derby Line, VT	1,863,366	1,759,129	1,723,816	1,536,398	1,452,441
Port of Norton, VT	197,345	234,863	183,244	180,068	177,428
Port of Beecher Falls, VT	228,779	214,382	191,006	209,775	156,871
Lebanon User Fee Airport, NH	465	26	21		
Port of North Troy, VT					
Port of Boston, MA	47,685	73,299	86,794	74,541	56,223
Logan Airport, MA	1,722,012	1,794,628	1,773,563	1,527,044	1,527,520
Port of Springfield, MA	220	161	17	51	
Port of Worcester, MA	250	232	397	293	158
Port of Gloucester, MA	1,716	2,109	1,991	2,626	2,176
Port of New Bedford, MA	2,549	2,967	3,591	3,602	2,833
Port of Plymouth, MA	144	750	270	195	350
Port of Fall River, MA	66	163	37	93	252
Port of Salem, MA	303	125	220		
Port of Lawrence, MA	62	136	97	100	191
Port of Provincetown, MA					
Port of Hartford, CT	16,032	17,678	12,056	14,664	12,855
Port of Bridgeport, CT	340	316	296	162	214
Port of New Haven, CT	369	336	588	417	419
Port of New London, CT	1,067	411	957	350	236
Port of Providence, RI	1,498	1,267	3,898	6,215	8,580
Port of Newport, RI	1,044	2,794	2,893	1,019	781
EAST GREAT LAKES CMC—Buffalo	30,515,499	30,939,591	30,094,389	29,777,568	26,688,585
Port of Buffalo, NY	20,168,171	20,141,564	20,683,033	19,838,233	17,154,961

Port of Rochester, NY	5,048	5,677	4,833	2,144	3,091
TNT Skypak, Buffalo, NY					
Port of Oswego, NY	2,444	2,460	2,547	1,923	1,719
Port of Syracuse, NY	5,791	4,071	3,762	3,326	2,782
Port of Utica, NY					
Binghampton User Fee Airport, Syracuse, NY		806	738	485	462
Port of Champlain-Rouses Point, NY	3,564,928	3,700,556	3,558,376	4,423,403	4,262,769
Port of Trout River, Champlain, NY	475,756	593,841	396,940	377,130	383,914
Port of Albany, NY	2,631	2,246	2,415	2,780	2,352
Port of Ogdensburg, NY	723,988	795,573	560,626	639,028	618,945
Port of Massena, NY	3,290,566	3,301,420	2,614,673	2,387,370	2,388,014
Port of Alexandria Bay, NY	2,275,725	2,391,377	2,266,446	2,101,746	1,869,576
MID-ATLANTIC CMC—Baltimore	3,433,843	3,682,557	3,987,844	3,742,790	4,029,533
Port of Philadelphia, PA	17,174	18,138	13,164	14,155	20,378
Philadelphia International Airport, PA	917,996	968,252	1,138,238	1,141,374	1,309,689
Port of Chester, PA/Wilmington, DE	1,366	1,183	1,460	1,932	1,228
Port of Chester, PA					
Atlantic City User Fee Airport, NJ	1,060	1,359	769	332	332
UPS Courier Philadelphia, PA	1,604	1,742	3,361	3,825	3,337
Allentown, PA	1,180	758	960	2,520	2,318
Port of Pittsburgh, PA	254,402	231,631	270,551	229,345	155,038
Trenton/Mercer User Fee Airport, NJ		425	1,260	1,403	1,274
Port of Harrisburg, PA	3,528	2,524	2,987	1,511	1,273
Port of Wilkes Barre/Scranton, PA	612	752	662	757	341
Port of Baltimore, MD	1,474	331	6,420	201	127,620
Port of Annapolis, MD					
BWI Airport, Baltimore, MD	306,279	314,732	382,702	335,593	356,446
Port of Alexandria, VA	4,657	1,825	1,437	119	
Port of Washington, DC	1,922,511	2,138,388	2,163,873	2,009,723	2,050,259
NEW YORK CMC—New York	14,252,757	15,143,391	14,017,278	11,561,856	12,346,258

Attachment #3.—Workload Figures at Ports of Entry for FY 1999 to FY 2003—Continued

Total Passengers and Pedestrians

Location	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
Port of JFK Airport, NY	9,898,560	10,327,062	9,577,663	7,867,512	8,277,995
Federal Express Corp (JFK), NY					
NYACC. JFK Int'l Airport, NY					
DHL Airways, JFK Int'l Airport, NY					
Emery Worldwide, JFK Int'l Airport, NY					
Air France (Mach Plus), JFK Int'l Airpot, NY					
Dworkin/Cosell Courier, JFK Int'l Airport, NY					
Swiss Air, JFK Int'l Airport, NY					
Alitalia (Aliexpress), JFK Int'l Airport, NY					
TNT Skypak, JFK Int'l Airport, NY					
Port of New York, NY	247,015	320,047	240,039	277,500	425,918
Port of New York-Newark, Elizabeth, NJ	4,103,574	4,492,593	4,196,245	3,413,763	3,639,419
Port of Perth Amboy, NJ	1,346	964	724	101	112
UPS (Newark), Elizabeth, NJ					
Morristown Airport, Elizabeth, NJ	2,262	2,725	2,607	2,980	2,814
Federal Express ECCF, Elizabeth, NJ					
SOUTH ATLANTIC CMC—Atlanta	3,066,117	3,515,550	3,551,972	3,301,175	3,444,857
Port of Norfolk, VA	46,149	51,641	48,605	66,975	7,228
Port of Newport News, VA	12,704	7,812	3,992	5,692	779
Port of Richmond/Petersburg, VA	5,914	5,466	4,412	3,899	4,309
Port of Charleston, WV	718	724	672	755	1,158
Port of Front Royal, VA					
New River Valley User Fee Airport, Dublin, VA		81	73	82	533
Port of Charlotte, NC	277,061	380,859	431,613	307,137	485,594
Port of Wilmington, NC	7,879	9,242	9,682	10,372	9,830

Port of Beaufort-Morehead, NC	14,549	18,994	8,561	16,099	18,842
Port of Durham, NC	70,604	70,610	65,259	65,596	76,286
Port of Winston Salem, NC	1,083	939	989	3,187	1,215
Port of Charleston, SC	6,752	15,712	25,695	23,103	21,579
Port of Greenville/Spartanburg, SC	1,901	2,771	1,518	2,814	3,033
Port of Georgetown, SC	79	23	44	266	234
Port of Columbia, SC	1,647	1,187	500	492	697
Port of Savannah, GA	2,890	5,001	4,028	2,118	4,957
Port of Brunswick, GA	3,088	1,933	1,006	1,015	540
Port of Atlanta, GA	2,612,712	2,941,488	2,944,991	2,790,937	2,807,944
NORTH FLORIDA CMC—Tampa	3,151,528	3,613,679	3,318,158	3,019,563	3,120,682
Port of Tampa, FL	360,837	343,823	394,920	386,517	494,455
Port of St. Petersburg, FL	118,344	78,509	72,002	16,810	11,580
Port of Manatee, FL	26,063	46,781	48,345	51,210	40,518
Port of Ft. Myers, FL	24,690	62,726	61,053	22,576	33,223
SW. Florida Regional Airport, Ft. Myers, FL	40,550	736	876	1,109	1,108
Sarasota Bradeton Airport, Sarasota, FL	2,951	22	4,686	57	139
Port of Orlando, FL	1,077,155	1,134,713	957,781	660,123	665,585
Port of Port Canaveral, FL	974,764	1,439,073	1,249,400	1,341,212	1,383,326
Sanford Regional Airport, FL	457				2
Daytona Beach Regional Airport, FL	10,966	11,264	8,089	8,449	8,903
Melbourne Regional Airport, FL	221	1,310	1,680	3,781	4,723
Sanford-Orlando Int'l Airport, Sanford, FL	458,156	442,508	465,096	467,778	418,835
Port of Jacksonville, FL	44,213	41,897	44,044	48,941	50,364
Port of Fernandina, FL	6,529	5,376	5,538	5,188	3,513
Port of Panama City, FL	4,047	3,518	3,156	2,674	2,671
Port of Pensacola, FL	1,566	1,318	1,370	3,056	1,462
Ocala Regional Airport, FL	8	66	86	82	275
SOUTH FLORIDA CMC—Miami	14,777,974	12,974,382	13,563,043	13,019,133	14,220,879
Miami Airport, FL	8,369,505	8,314,194	8,079,088	7,266,908	7,371,891

Attachment #3.—Workload Figures at Ports of Entry for FY 1999 to FY 2003—Continued

Total Passengers and Pedestrians

Location	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
Port of Fort Pierce, FL	17,675	17,434	15,550	15,943	16,073
International Courier Association, Miami, FL					
DHL Worldwide Express, Miami, FL					
MIA/CFS Exp Consig Facil, Miami, FL					
UPS Miami International Airport, Miami, FL					
Port of Miami, FL	1,585,472	1,608,171	2,332,493	2,285,511	2,581,304
Port of Port Everglades, FL	1,878,378	1,892,019	1,662,927	1,783,454	2,139,684
Port of West Palm Beach, FL	94,732	114,715	93,411	93,244	107,274
Port of Key West, FL	973,097	958,150	885,081	1,207,716	1,591,785
Miami Seaport Alternate, Miami, FL					
Ft. Lauderdale Intl. Airport, FL		69,699	494,493	366,357	412,868
CARIBBEAN CMC—San Juan	3,219,189	3,500,223	3,817,388	3,888,511	5,081,159
Port of Aguadilla, PR	5,003	7,196	5,600	3,843	5,061
Port of Fajardo, PR	50,806	47,804	43,678	33,594	35,929
Port of Mayaguez, PR	23,569	27,575	47,541	74,481	54,863
Port of Ponce, PR	1,889	1,712	3,504	6,553	10,467
Port of San Juan, PR	629,602	699,021	956,993	1,355,000	1,604,471
International Airport, Old San Juan, PR	1,264,001	1,409,354	1,371,418	1,182,893	1,195,174
Guanica, PR					
Port of Charlotte Amalie, VI	317,548	243,938	181,365	138,079	1,150,666
Port of Cruz Bay, VI	146,683	138,031	134,914	148,580	194,790
Port of Christiansted, VI	128,178	230,167	363,963	244,285	108,792
Pre-Clearance, St. Croix , VI	186,421	187,726	185,282	176,956	161,831
Pre-Clearance, St. Thomas , VI	465,489	507,699	523,130	524,247	559,115

GULF CMC—New Orleans	394,929	423,691	390,418	453,287	607,289
Port of Morgan City, LA	22,517	19,776	16,250	15,921	12,499
Port of New Orleans, LA	166,123	224,778	210,168	239,382	337,837
Port of Little Rock, AK	109	133	177	271	231
Port of Baton Rouge, LA	10,453	3,226	210	166	183
Port of Memphis, TN	115,040	118,745	116,930	150,176	182,671
Port of Nashville, TN	2,6632	24,165	18,992	9,569	8,978
Port of Chattanooga, TN	298	319	228	446	237
Port of Gramercy, LA	310	351	316	183	142
Port of Vicksburg, MS	278	239	185	368	317
Port of Knoxville, TN	532	382	273	414	369
Port of Lake Charles, LA	21,114	2,583	2,027	937	1,971
Port of Shreveport/Bosier City, LA	3,997	3,886	801	941	1,064
Port of Jackson Airport, MS	96	130	153	113	88
Tri-City Airport, Blountville, TN	212	263	454	722	781
FEDEX Courier, Memphis, TN	10,723	12,464	12,561	9,985	10,184
Arkansas Aeroplex User Fee Airport, AR					
Port of Mobile, AL	2,911	1,384	2,285	15,342	2,028
Port of Gulfport, MS	3,159	901	802	1,076	41,296
Port of Pascagoula, MS	2,565	2,344	2,432	1,835	1,062
Port of Birmingham, AL	5,242	4,980	2,738	2,771	2,347
Port of Huntsville, AL	2,618	2,642	2,436	2,669	3,004
MID-AMERICA CMC—Chicago	15,339,328	6,441,804	6,333,382	5,451,645	5,607,942
Port of Chicago, IL	4,124,875	4,557,948	4,573,343	3,799,223	3,917,296
Port of Peoria, IL	994	658	613	682	852
Port of Omaha, NE	662	1,070	1,158	2,213	1,808
Ohare International Airport, Chicago, IL					
Port of Des Moines, IA	482	635	728	1,316	1,075
Port of Davenport/Rock Island/Moline, IL	34	83	250	181	217
Waukegan Regional Airport, Chicago, IL	502	736	935	801	925
Greater Rockford Airport, Rockford, IL	416	291			

Attachment #3.—Workload Figures at Ports of Entry for FY 1999 to FY 2003—Continued

Total Passengers and Pedestrians

Location	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
Pal-Waukee Airport, Wheeling, IL	511	1,734	1,549	1,702	1,802
Nippon Courier Hub, Chicago, IL					
Rockford Airport, IL	414	292	412	587	633
Midway Int'l Airport, Chicago, IL			1,743	95,207	123,994
Dupage User Fee Airport, West Chicago, IL	111	821	805	1,036	747
Decatur User Fee Airport, IL		150	287	274	223
Port of Cleveland, OH	69,832	100,706	101,043	65,878	88,602
Port of Ashtabula/Conneaut, OH			13,160	11,882	9,709
Port of Erie, PA	3,986	3,902	3,594	3,633	3,379
Port of Owensboro, KY/Evansville, IN					
Port of Akron, OH	1,193	1,106	1,156	1,093	1,026
Port of Cincinnati, Lawrenceburg, IN	449,090	412,297	298,369	326,247	322,691
DHL Courier, Cincinnati, OH	1,640	2,730	3,523	3,930	3,921
Port of Columbus, OH	11,296	11,798	12,259	11,112	11,939
Rickenbacker Airport, Columbus, OH		141	30	157	177
Port of Dayton, OH	3,856	3,101	1,854	2,200	1,206
Airborne Air Park, Wilmington, OH	1,955	1,690	1,552		
Emery Courier, Dayton, OH	6,830	7,403	6,544	3,962	3,659
Port of Indianapolis, IN	47,310	47,597	51,473	50,358	45,587
Port of For Wayne Airport, IN	1,750	1,651	1,424	1,009	888
Port of Louisville, KY	1,178	2,170	1,316	884	1,097
Blue Grass Airport, Lexington, KY	33	472	511	635	698
UPS Courier, Louisville, KY	3,112	2,825	3,316	3,119	3,331
Port of Toledo/Sandusky, OH	14,659	35,989	29,095	31,267	25,939
Port of Sandusky, OH	789				
Burlington Air Express, Toledo, OH	2,426				

Burlington Air Express Hub, Toledo, OH		3,550	3,947	3,197	2,351
Federal Express Hub, Indianapolis, IN	775	915	1,492	779	873
Airborne Courier Hub, Wilmington, OH				1,597	1,606
Port of Milwaukee, WI	48,799	48,107	54,699	57,139	63,500
Port of Marinette, WI	610	575	600	820	658
Port of Green Bay, WI	2,285	2,109	2,083	2,500	1,880
Port of Manitowoc, WI				11	
Port of Sheboygan, WI					
Port of Racine, WI	264	451	550	444	362
Port of Minneapolis, MN	829,395	890,950	863,737	739,976	757,732
Rochester User Fee Airport, MN	374	908	737	939	924
Port of Sioux Falls, SD	2,242	2,287	1,887	2,267	1,183
Port of St. Louis, MO	238,187	263,622	264,728	202,851	183,716
Port of Springfield, MO	245	163	258	355	364
Port of Wichita, KA	1,343	2,878	4,223	2,660	1,125
Port of Kansas City, MO	33,986	25,293	22,057	15,121	18,002
Port of Spirit of St. Louis, MO			309	293	215
WEST GREAT LAKES CMC—Detroit	33,389,092	38,382,135	31,993,695	23,676,485	22,651,093
Port of Detroit, MI	22,685,595	25,657,300	23,066,299	16,074,309	14,355,872
Oakland/Pontiac Airport, Detroit, MI	3,502	3,454	3,141	3,055	9,735
Willow Run Airport, Ypsilanti, MI		597	778	963	,4367
Detroit Metropolitan Airport					1,022,321
Port of Sault Sainte Marie, MI	3,920,555	4,435,217	2,606,768	2,060,759	2,024,761
Port of Escanaba, MI					
Port of Mackinac Isle, MI					
Port of Grand Rapids, MI	7,177	8,547	5,948	5,695	5,992
Port of Battle Creek, MI	1,649	1,498	1,905	1,865	1,681
Port of Saginaw/Bay City/Flint, MI	3,999	4,279	4,340	3,974	3,888
Port of Muskegon, MI					
Port of Port Huron, MI	6,766,586	8,271,243	6,304,516	5,525,865	5,222,476

Attachment #3.—Workload Figures at Ports of Entry for FY 1999 to FY 2003—Continued

Total Passengers and Pedestrians

Location	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
Port of Algonac, MI					
EAST TEXAS CMC—Houston	4,513,256	4,977,497	5,203,799	4,838,113	4,871,889
Port of Houston, TX	77,205	97,868	161,626	231,533	104,521
Houston Intercontinental Airport, TX	2,378,482	2,656,873	2,774,955	2,691,220	2,707,030
Port of Galveston, TX	2,835	1,252	256	274	111,597
Port of Texas City, TX					
Port of Freeport, TX	287	488	463	509	766
Port of Port Arthur, TX	49	40	271	41,757	35,492
Port of Beaumont, TX					
Port of Port Lavaca, TX	320	50	80	1,168	2,974
Port of Corpus Christi, TX	1,818	584	2,184	5,519	11,970
Port of Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX	2,049,669	2,215,224	2,258,993	1,861,923	1,893,137
Midland Airport, TX	613	372	387	349	453
Addison Airport, Dallas, TX	577	2,219	1,519	1,692	1,681
Fort Worth Alliance Airport, TX	54	425	462	440	445
Port of Amarillo, TX	10	64	94	97	96
Port of Lubbock, TX	75	24	40	82	59
Port of Oklahoma City, OK	268	964	1,250	889	874
Port of Tulsa, OK	820	1,050	1,219	661	794
SOUTH TEXAS CMC—Laredo	107,074,542	105,021,530	96,205,915	87,113,236	84,395,797
Port of Laredo, TX	25,584,455	25,223,807	25,996,152	22,175,729	22,096,828
Port of Del Rio, TX	6,185,883	6,300,780	4,750,624	4,883,922	4,729,946
Port of Eagle Pass, TX	8,028,121	9,608,956	9,593,065	9,806,065	9,248,047
Port of Roma, TX	5,157,288	5,296,982	4,479,956	3,826,185	3,435,146

Port of Rio Grande City, TX	2,587,394	2,558,389	2,275,470	2,700,494	2,657,861
Port of Hidalgo, TX	32,362,499	28,282,474	22,687,793	20,232,325	19,354,891
Port of Progreso, TX	4,574,584	4,553,650	4,487,126	4,339,723	4,034,632
Port of Brownsville, TX	22,446,293	23,035,546	21,776,588	19,014,143	18,720,158
Port of San Antonio,TX	133,689	144,710	141,087	119,868	100,411
Port of Austin, TX	14,336	16,236	18,054	14,782	17,877
WEST TEXAS/NEW MEXICO CMC—El Paso	57,460,944	61,194,899	56,694,883	42,141,131	41,612,624
Port of El Paso, TX	52,118,723	55,255,832	51,295,486	36,443,526	36,513,928
Port of Presidio, TX	2,016,187	2,007,443	1,867,851	1,818,696	1,719,429
Port of Fabens, TX	2,135,911	2,097,280	1,989,080	1,847,469	1,439,989
Port of Columbus, NM	1,016,923	1,624,295	1,203,051	1,154,676	1,231,911
Port of Albuquerque, NM	1,162	1,044	1,844	1,259	253
Port of Santa Teresa, NM	156,760	208,549	337,117	875,156	706,797
Port of Santa Teresa Airport	15,278	456	454	349	317
ARIZONA CMC—Tucson	34,520,599	35,952,803	34,205,867	37,193,881	35,145,484
Port of Douglas, AZ	6,558,323	6,880,304	5,800,521	8,754,639	6,254,480
Port of Lukeville, AZ	1,472,346	1,257,372	1,431,679	1,386,963	1,318,329
Port of Naco, AZ	908,154	978,901	964,705	930,849	1,518,848
Port of Nogales, AZ	15,174,299	17,074,824	15,363,834	14,687,826	15,684,719
Port of Phoenix, AZ	397,777	458,729	506,587	495,109	559,927
Port of Sasabe, AZ	97,857	95,646	96,592	111,524	115,873
Port of San Luis, AZ	9,873,359	9,171,062	10,011,133	10,799,854	9,667,260
Port of Tucson, AZ	38,484	35,452	29,786	26,125	24,142
Scottsdale User Free Airport, AZ		513	1,030	992	1,152
Williams Gateway User Fee Airport, Mesa, AZ					754
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA CMC—San Diego	95,780,599	95,492,433	98,946,655	85,732,767	90,509,926
Port of San Ysidro, CA	41,413,098	39,569,663	47,936,872	42,265,083	47,405,596
Port of Otay Mesa , CA	11,357,380	12,780,553	11,069,117	11,364,297	12,852,960
Port of San Diego, CA	278,306	298,798	338,745	377,677	393,538

Attachment #3.—Workload Figures at Ports of Entry for FY 1999 to FY 2003—Continued

Total Passengers and Pedestrians

Location	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
Port of Tecate, CA	3,465,212	3,650,752	2,887,611	2,779,776	3,116,574
Port of Calexico, CA	29,434,800	28,276,782	25,074,265	18,735,914	16,926,701
Port of Andrade, CA	3,397,050	3,580,525	3,358,839	3,137,651	3,175,678
Port of Calexico East, CA	6,434,753	7,335,360	8,281,206	7,072,369	6,638,879
SOUTH PACIFIC CMC—Los Angeles	8,782,667	9,820,664	9,635,201	8,213,662	8,497,539
Port of Los Angeles, CA	941,228	1,111,185	931,168	810,012	1,000,055
Port of Long Beach, CA	599				
Port of Port Hueneme, San Pedro, CA	7,129	7,667	7,038	10,669	7,926
Port of Port San Luis Obispo, CA					
Port of Segundo, CA					
Port of LAX, Los Angeles, CA	7,580,488	8,405,521	8,368,864	7,126,242	7,136,984
Port of Ontario Int'l Airport, Los Angeles, CA	198	377	10,288	19,336	53,796
Port of Las Vegas, NV	252,409	294,713	316,633	246,089	297,436
DHL (LAX), Los Angeles, CA					
Gateway Freight Ser. Inc, Los Angeles, CA					
International Bonded Courier, Los Angeles, CA					
Virgin Atlantic Cargo, Los Angeles, CA					
UPS Ontario, Los Angeles, CA	281	394	284	275	265
Port of Palm Springs, Los Angeles, CA	335	757	871	953	1,015
TNT Express, LAX, Los Angeles, CA					
Southern Calif. Logistics Airport, Victorville, CA		50	55	86	59
San Bernadino User Fee Airport, CA					3
MID-PACIFIC CMC—San Francisco	6,597,151	7,014,660	6,931,112	5,995,546	5,852,760
San Francisco International Airport, CA	3,307,795	3,699,556	3,808,868	3,324,888	3,111,401

Port of San Francisco, CA	37,387	27,999	34,622	44,793	49,886
Port of Reno, NV	649	3,062	2,310	885	858
Port of Fresno, CA	19	188	69	10	
Port of Eureka, CA	1,086	719	526	662	488
Port of Salt Lake City, UT	23,675	21,314	30,256	31,311	35,835
Port of Monterey, CA					
Port of Oakland, CA	85,963	74,083	55,238	104,058	195,870
Port of San Jose, CA	159,965	163,646	216,722	147,003	144,339
DHL Worldwide Express, San Francisco, CA					
Aircargo Handling Service, San Francisco, CA					
TNT Skypak, San Francisco, CA					
FEDEX Courier Hub Facility, Oakland, CA					
IBC Pacific, Burlingame, CA					
Sacramento, CA	50	55	135	57	122
Port of Honolulu, HI	90,412	124,643	89,303	79,241	184,200
Port of Hilo, HI	64,307	40,254	243	1,112	1,619
Port of Kahului, HI	6,856	1,288	1,984	4,281	1,084
Port of Nawiliwili-Port Allen, HI	37,674	62,791	13		25
Honolulu International Airport, HI	2,688,519	2,710,113	2,603,268	2,190,256	2,058,144
Port of Kailua-Kona, HI	92,274	84,949	87,555	66,989	68,889
NORTHWEST GREAT PLAINS CMC—Seattle	26,959,252	26,049,912	24,478,093	21,274,248	19,177,687
Port of Seattle, WA		214,561	279,289	301,588	321,697
Airport Inspection Branch (SEATAC), Seattle, WA		922,184	923,884	855,454	877,324
Port of Spokane, WA		8,858	8,899	5,286	2,520
Yakima Airport, WA		1			
Grant County User Fee Airport, Moses Lake, WA		260	608	176	81
Port of Kenmore Air Harbor, Seattle, WA					
UPS, Seattle, WA					
Port of Avion Brokers, Seattle, WA,					
DHL Worldwide Express, Seattle, WA					
Port of Tacoma, WA		22,070	20,151	20,059	19,073

Attachment #3.—Workload Figures at Ports of Entry for FY 1999 to FY 2003—Continued

Total Passengers and Pedestrians

Location	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
Port of Aberdeen, WA		30	14	1	359
Port of Everett, WA		7,176	5,875	1,776	1,499
Port of Port Angeles, WA		313,335	307,917	285,957	263,627
Port of Port Townsend, WA		1,018	784	712	1,035
Port of Olympia, WA		253	516	352	446
Neah Bay, WA					
Airborne Express SEATAC, Seattle, WA					
UPS Courier HUB, Seattle, WA					
Port of Blaine, WA	9,504,549	9,319,177	8,751,886	5,495,810	5,370,526
Port of Oroville, WA	607,283	592,659	576,971	574,944	568,099
Port of Boundary, WA	78,256	71,904	90,484	73,811	88,149
Port of Danville, WA	128,570	137,339	134,053	106,737	96,899
Port of Ferry, WA	30,317	26,415	29,054	27,585	25,165
Port of Frontier, WA	126,899	110,610	110,390	103,907	92,423
Port of Laurier, WA	125,901	122,729	123,816	97,881	99,265
Port of Metaline Falls, WA	81,639	80,600	81,602	73,269	63,742
Port of Nighthawk, WA	16,348	15,987	12,641	12,305	10,222
Port of Sumas, WA		2,286,081	2,264,737	1,916,030	1,787,237
Port of Bellingham, WA		15,861	12,525	52,093	52,370
Port of Anacortes, WA		115,075	119,505	121,972	101,128
Port of Friday Harbor, WA		48,575	42,453	37,827	34,177
Port of Point Roberts, WA		1,697,067	1,645,188	1,320,372	1,471,157
Port of Lynden, WA		1,479,860	1,394,663	1,312,636	1,270,411
Port of Great Falls, MT		43,247	32,895	3,247	2,893
Port of Butte, MT		312	334	185	146
Port of Eastport, ID		349,233	299,234	271,516	247,922

Port of Piegan, MT	448,210	412,076	401,444	379,087
Port of Porthill, ID	256,379	288,803	226,218	208,078
Port of Roosville, MT	322,829	242,476	277,670	248,084
Port of Missoula City Airport, MT				
Port of Kalispell, MT	981	1,014	643	1,485
Port of Raymond, MT	99,612	92,461	87,082	77,503
Port of Scobey, MT	14,696	15,420	13,858	13,524
Port of Whitetail, MT	12,391	11,521	10,925	8,037
Port of Opheim, MT	13,685	14,235	12,161	9,099
Port of Sweetgrass, MT	939,250	766,593	1,924,416	175,604
Port of Turner, MT	15,932	13,126	11,606	11,016
Port of Morgan, MT	16,627	17,295	12,676	10,481
Port of Whitlash, MT	2,953	2,759	2,759	2,286
Port of Del Bonita, MT	66,759	40,906	45,785	43,034
Port of Wildhorse, MT		20,571	43,512	45,254
Port of International Falls/Ranier, MN	1,454,414	1,389,293	1,239,368	1,331,169
Port of Baudette, MN	521,770	464,019	483,224	451,948
Port of Warroad, MN	447,124	435,308	397,972	388,621
Port of Grand Portage, MN	775,062	518,607	532,186	526,467
Port of Pembina, ND	1,123,526	1,020,220	1,020,743	986,051
Port of Noyes, ND	143,135	159,374	71,355	51,849
Port of Duluth, MN	32,240	15,813	12,765	12,558
Port of Ashland, WI				
Port of Superior, WI				
Grand Forks Airport, ND	713	769	2,137	1,787
Port of Portal, ND	375,932	328,358	341,890	318,441
Port of St. John, ND	76,315	75,308	68,878	65,835
Port of Northgate, ND	44,301	42,832	33,472	31,635
Port of Ambrose, ND	13,034	8,855	5,099	4,509
Port of Antler, ND	30,148	27,953	26,544	24,171
Port of Sherwood, ND	31,341	24,882	23,765	21,984
Port of Hansboro, ND	32,223	28,574	23,615	23,020

Attachment #3.—Workload Figures at Ports of Entry for FY 1999 to FY 2003—Continued

Total Passengers and Pedestrians

Location	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
Port of Fortuna, ND		31,327	26,932	28,288	26,056
Port of Westhope, ND		29,595	34,023	44,819	28,611
Port of Noonan, ND		64,550	60,155	58,909	59,511
Port of Carbury, ND		33,934	34,090	27,730	29,340
Port of Dunseith, ND		202,927	200,413	176,168	203,804
Port of Roseau, MN		109,821	107,068	89,295	96,479
Port of Neche, ND		110,577	100,327	111,966	114,399
Port of Walhalla, ND		63,681	64,708	73,052	74,642
Port of Hannah, ND		14,153	19,574	17,618	14,221
Port of Sarles, ND		14,478	19,058	20,997	22,591
Port of Maida, ND		41,384	41,579	41,985	39,976
Port of Pinecreek, MN		16,735	17,466	18,804	12,547
Hector User Fee Airport, Fargo, ND		2,691	2,911	3,486	2,276
Lancaster, MN				133,875	111,025
NORTH PACIFIC CMC—Portland	1,403,461	1,519,036	1,128,649	1,145,094	1,280,083
Port of Portland, OR	250,994	169,741	80,656	8,109	52,325
Portland International Airport, OR	2,394				
Port of Longview, WA	167	238	194	186	202
Port of Boise, ID	1,132	1,104	1,070	1,536	1,193
Port of Astoria, OR	162	175	71	125	128
Port of Coos Bay, OR	1,255	1,249	1,098	727	1,045
Port of Newport, OR	69	235	229	357	220
Rogue Valley-Medford, Medford/Jackson, OR	53	73	247	210	92
Port of Vancouver, WA					
Port of Kalama, WA					

Kingsley Field User Fee Airport, Klamath Falls, OR					
Port of Anchorage, AK	235,774	287,744	125,817	141,483	117,123
Port of Juneau, AK	14,889	153,106	12,680	2,660	1,11,314
Port of Ketchikan, AK	151,928	130,229	138,082	213,957	155,031
Port of Skagway, AK	254,612	268,931	248,098	247,139	269,741
Port of Alcan, AK	162,583	154,141	142,191	148,332	134,439
Port of Wrangell, AK	5,610	1,342	1,120	1,537	1,725
Port of Valdez, AK	436	476	125	189	15,588
Port of Dalton Cache, AK	40,484	47,743	49,014	47,839	45,314
Port of Fairbanks, AK	7,866	7,312	8,145	10,698	10,241
Saint Paul Airport, Anchorage, AK	41	5	32		
Port of Sitka, AK	447	411	337	1,760	595
FEDEX Courier Hub Facility, Anchorage, AK	6,146	6,141	6,194	5,943	5,911
UPS Courier Hub Facility, Anchorage, AK	3,936	4,499	5,306	5,076	5,508
Port of Denver, CO	261,751	282,112	306,910	304,941	350,054
Natrona County Int'l Airport, Casper, WY	494	585	351	741	795
Jefferson Country Airport, Broomfield, CO	238	402	218	732	585
Arapahoe County Airport, Englewood, CO		1,042	464	817	914
PRECLEARANCE OPERATIONS CMC		12,320,530	12,702,346	11,252,036	11,271,449
Kindley Field, Bermuda		323,088	380,785	346,412	340,635
Freeport, Bahamas		318,027	372,059	349,068	355,123
Nassau, Bahamas		1,278,464	1,258,091	1,100,619	1,136,901
Aruba, Miami, FL		251,963	541,086	494,778	507,254
Vancouver, Canada Preclearance		2,068,395	2,064,671	1,904,495	2,083,875
Edmonton, Canada Preclearance		245,814	267,601	200,431	238,610
Montreal, Canada Preclearance		1,532,035	1,482,292	1,339,176	1,373,199
Winnepeg, Canada Preclearance		209,572	206,282	163,824	185,978
Toronto, Canada Preclearance		4,854,284	4,901,616	4,194,927	3,850,854
Calgary, Canada Preclearance		838,664	848,037	827,657	864,522
Ottawa, Canada Preclearance		400,224	379,826	330,649	334,498

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO DHS ASSISTANT SECRETARY C. STEWART VERDERY, JR. BY SENATOR JOHN E. SUNUNU

Question. With 80% of the U.S. border crossings through land ports of entry, security of the entry process at these ports is critical. What steps is the Department of Homeland Security taking to do security name checks and Congressionally mandated document verification for those seeking entry without passports because they claim Canadian or U.S. citizenship or resident status and are thus exempt from passport requirements?

Answer. The great majority of persons arriving at land border ports are residents of the border areas who cross frequently and who are familiar with requirements concerning their entry into the United States. Consequently, at land border ports-of-entry, a screening procedure has been established to rapidly inspect applicants for admission, passing those found readily admissible and referring for further action those requiring more detailed examination. Without an efficient primary inspection, it would be impossible to process the great volume of applicants at large land border ports or utilize manpower effectively at the smaller ports. The effectiveness of inspections at such ports is entirely dependent on the effectiveness of the primary inspector. Despite the limited time devoted to each inspection, primary officers at land borders intercept a high volume of fraudulent documents and false claims to U.S. citizenship. CBP inspectional procedures differ between the northern and southern borders, reflecting differences in regulations governing entry documentation. While the actual procedures may differ, the inspection process itself does not—each application for admission is carefully reviewed by a CBP officer who must be fully satisfied that the person making application is entitled to enter the United States.

In determining which oral claims to accept, a CBP officer may rely on the confidence of the applicant's demeanor and language ability. Veteran officers develop questioning and recognition skills. Each adult applying for admission is questioned as to citizenship. An officer may require documentary proof of citizenship at any time.

In order to properly screen arriving persons and vehicles entering at Canadian or Mexican border ports-of-entry, a license plate number is entered into the IBIS computer on the primary line. Automatic license plate readers (LPRs) have been installed at the majority of the land border crossings. These LPRs are designed to automatically capture and transmit license plate data from vehicles processed at the land border to TECS.

It is current CBP policy for all officers on the land border to perform a 100% query of the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) on all arriving private and commercial vehicle license plates including buses, tractor-trailers and taxi cabs. IBIS checks are performed for all adults applying for admission at land border pedestrian primary stations, where local managers deem appropriate. IBIS checks are mandatory for all applicants for admission, who are referred to secondary inspection. Discretion must be exercised consistent with existing threat levels when less than 100% IBIS checks are to be performed. Local CBP management officials should coordinate to determine how to best inspect frequent border crossers and conduct IBIS checks.

CBP is constantly reviewing its procedures and operations to address national security issues. CBP provides the most up to date information to our line officers and develops additional training materials so that they are fully prepared to meet the challenge that they face daily.

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