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# INTERRUPTING NARCO-TERRORIST THREATS ON THE HIGH SEAS: DO WE HAVE ENOUGH WIND IN OUR SAILS?

## HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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# CONTENTS


| | Page |
|---|---|
| Hearing held on June 29, 2005 | 1 |
| Statement of: | |
| Utley, Ralph, Acting U.S. Interdiction Coordinator; Admiral Dennis Sirois, Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard; Admiral Jeffrey J. Hathaway, Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South; Charles E. Stallworth II, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and Thomas M. Harrigan, Chief of Enforcement Operations, Drug Enforcement Agency | 13 |
| Harrigan, Thomas M. | 43 |
| Hathaway, Admiral Jeffrey J. | 27 |
| Sirois, Admiral Dennis | 21 |
| Stallworth, Charles E., II, | 37 |
| Utley, Ralph | 13 |
| Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: | |
| Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State of Maryland, prepared statement of | 9 |
| Harrigan, Thomas M., Chief of Enforcement Operations, Drug Enforcement Agency, prepared statement of | 45 |
| Hathaway, Admiral Jeffrey J., Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South, prepared statement of | 29 |
| Sirois, Admiral Dennis, Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard, prepared statement of | 23 |
| Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana, prepared statement of | 5 |
| Stallworth, Charles E., II, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, prepared statement of | 39 |
| Utley, Ralph, Acting U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, prepared statement of | 17 |

# INTERRUPTING NARCO-TERRORIST THREATS ON THE HIGH SEAS: DO WE HAVE ENOUGH WIND IN OUR SAILS?

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**WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 2005**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY,
AND HUMAN RESOURCES,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark Souder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Souder, McHenry, Cummings, Brown-Waite, and Norton.

Staff present: Marc Wheat, staff director and chief counsel; David Thomasson and Pat DeQuattro, congresional fellows; Malia Holst, clerk; and Tony Haywood, minority counsel.

Mr. SOUDER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Good afternoon and thank you all for coming. Today we are going to examine how drugs make their way through the transit zone prior to arriving in Mexico for shipment into the United States.

Let me begin by conveying my intense displeasure and frustration with the manner in which USSOUTHCOM has worked with Congress and our subcommittee. Similar to the treatment Congress receives from USCENTCOM, Southern Command has avoided responding to congressional oversight of its counterdrug responsibilities. The subcommittee asked five simple questions for the record after a subcommittee visit to USSOUTHCOM's headquarters in January.

The answers to these simple questions were known by the Department of Homeland Security agencies months ago, yet USSOUTHCOM has not chosen to share these answers with Congress—perhaps the decision was to wait until 6 months after today's hearing before transmitting the answers to the subcommittee questions, perhaps we will never get the answers. This lack of cooperation, combined with the commitment to control rather than support Interagency counterdrug efforts leads me to question DOD's drug interdiction motivations.

That said, this hearing may serve to change the course of future drug funding to enable the execution of transit zone drug interdiction operations. But let me say that the big picture in the transit zone is disturbing. For the first time, our actionable intelligence exceeds our interdiction capabilities in the transit zone. In other

words, the Federal Government knows of specific boatloads of drugs heading north that we cannot intercept because of the lack of interception assets in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific.

The intelligence breakthrough is a recent development resulting from the very successful Operation Panama Express, an interagency intelligence-driven program managed by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security. Due to this impressive intelligence cuing, the Joint Interagency Task Force [JIATF], South now has improved insight into where, when, and how much cocaine will be smuggled through the transit zones. All of our Federal agencies need a special "well done" from Congress for record cocaine seizures in 2004. The hearing today is not meant to criticize, but rather look to improve on major successes in U.S. drug interdiction efforts.

Before I detail some more of these concerns, let me just add, I have been going through this testimony the last couple of days, part of our frustration, not just here with SOUTHCOM, with CENTCOM, and multiple other agencies, is we understand everybody's intense budget pressures and OMB has put tremendous pressures on every agency. Those of us, like myself, who supported efforts in Afghanistan, in Iraq understand that the military is stretched very thin.

But we represent the taxpayers. Appropriations come from this body and are dependent upon having accurate facts upon which to make those appropriations decisions; it is not an executive branch decision. We cannot make intelligence decisions without correct information. It may mean we just do not have enough money to do all this.

But that is what we are hired to do. And if we cannot get adequate information, we do not know how best to allocate anti-drug resources and what our tradeoffs are; how many are dying in this area. How can we do that if we do not have adequate data.

In most cases and in most agencies, bluntly put, we have not found the problem with the individual agencies. The question is what kind of systemic problem do we have right now sitting on information being released to Congress because many people perceive that releasing the information to us may lead to increased spending, or pressures for spending, or be used for partisan advantage. The fact is, I am a partisan for this administration and I cannot get the adequate data, not only in narcotics, but in agency after agency, and there is a building frustration that I have vented already this morning at the White House.

While the accomplishments of Panama Express should not go unnoticed, our asset shortfalls in the transit zone raise serious concerns about our ability to interdict known smuggling events. On May 10, 2005 this subcommittee held a hearing entitled, "2006 DOD Counternarcotics Budget: Does It Deliver the Necessary Support?" In the hearing, Marybeth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, testified that, "The Navy's problem with the P–3s, which affects not only the Department's counternarcotics assets, but the availability of maritime patrol aircraft worldwide, has been well documented and discussed."

Regrettably, the Navy failed to properly anticipate the inevitable fate of an old airframe employed primarily in a corrosive, salty air

environment. The Navy's P–3 replacement is not projected to begin service until 2012, with an uncertain date for employment in counterdrug activities in the transit zone.

Through the insistence of the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator and the JIATF-South commander, DHS has stepped up maritime patrol aircraft flight hours to backfill the loss of DOD assets. With DHS taking on a bigger role in transit zone interdiction operations, I would like to focus our discussion today on the following five topics that will affect future counterdrug operations in the transit zone.

First, while I support the increased transit zone flight hours flown by the Coast Guard and Homeland Security's Air and Marine Operations [AMO], I question whether the extra hours are sustainable and am interested in the costs for the increased operational tempo. According to JIATF-South figures, AMO flew a total of 578 hours in the transit zone in calendar year 2003. Now we are told that AMO has increased this figure to over 800 hours per month in 2005.

Similarly, the Coast Guard has also significantly increased their flight hours to meet the loss of Navy P–3 counterdrug flight hours. Like the Navy, both the Coast Guard and AMO fly old airframes that have finite lives. The increase of flying hours significantly impacts the agency's ability to operate in the future. Yet only the Coast Guard has an improved comprehensive modernization plan that addresses these future shortfalls.

Second, Section 124 of Title 10 states, "The Department of Defense shall serve as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States." The language for this law was framed in the National Defense Authorization Act of 1990–91. Federal law enforcement's ability to engage in counterdrug operations has significantly matured since 1989, when this legislation was passed.

Since then, DOD's responsibilities have changed, and Congress formed the Department of Homeland Security, combining the Federal law enforcement agencies that currently supply the bulk of the aviation and maritime assets deployed in the transit zone. Consequently, I believe that it is now time that the Department of Homeland Security should take on the primary responsibility for counterdrug detection and monitoring from the Department of Defense.

Third, the push to make the Joint Task Force North a Joint Interagency Task Force, another JIATF, will potentially place DOD as an overseer of domestic law enforcement interdiction programs. Lack of unity within the interagency has allowed DOD to take the lead in areas that have traditionally been accomplished by law enforcement agencies. Therefore, it is imperative that DHS and the Interagency should become more involved in the future JIATF process.

In order to have an effective joint interagency program, Federal law enforcement agencies must be willing to man JIATF South and any future JIATFs with employees capable of filling critical command and operations specialist positions. Conversely, the JIATFs must provide administrative and logistical incentives for Federal

law enforcement agencies to assign qualified employees to their locations.

Fourth, the transit zone, like the southwest border, lacks a strategic, comprehensive, layered, interagency plan that incorporates the operational demands of post-September 11th operations and the recent actionable intelligence improvements. Without a national interdiction plan, agency roles and responsibilities are not properly delineated resulting in a haphazard way of requesting national air and marine assets.

The U.S. interdiction coordinator laid the groundwork for this strategy by forming the Interdiction Planning and Asset Group. Unfortunately, the latest report for Interdiction Asset Requirements is out of date and does not truly reflect the current enhanced intelligence capabilities, nor does it take into account a post-September 11th environment.

Fifth, DHS air responsibilities, like airspace security, potentially take flight hours away from transit zone operations. Currently, it is unclear which DHS agency will be responsible for airspace security in the National Capitol Region and special security events. Both DHS candidates for the responsibilities are the major transit zone asset providers; namely, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Office of Air and Marine Operations. If the current air assets in the National Capitol Region were diverted to counterdrug operations in the transit zone, DEA and DHS could perform interagency interdiction operations in places like Guatemala, where increasing amounts of cocaine land from transit zone maritime and air smuggling ventures.

Today we have a panel of very experienced witnesses to help answer these and other questions posed by the subcommittee. We are pleased to welcome Mr. Ralph Utley, Acting U.S. Interdiction Coordinator at DHS; Admiral Dennis Sirois, we have met many times and I stumble over your name each time, U.S. Coast Guard's Assistant Commandant for Operations; Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway, Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South; Mr. Charles Stallworth, Customs and Border Protection's Acting Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine Operations; and Mr. Thomas Harrigan, Drug Enforcement Administration's Chief of Enforcement Operations.

We look forward to your testimony and insight into this important topic.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]

**Opening Statement**
**Chairman Mark Souder**

**"Interrupting Narco-terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails?"**

**Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy And Human Resources**
**Committee on Government Reform**

**June 29, 2005**

Good afternoon and thank you all for coming. Today we will examine how drugs are make their way through the Transit Zone prior to arriving in Mexico for shipment into the United States.

Let me begin by conveying my intense displeasure with the manner in which USSOUTHCOM has worked with Congress. Similar to the treatment Congress receives from USCENTCOM, Southern Command avoids responding to Congressional oversight of its counterdrug responsibilities. The Subcommittee asked five simple questions for the record after a Subcommittee visit to USSOUTHCOM's headquarters in January. The answers to these simple questions were known by DHS agencies months ago, yet USSOUTHCOM has chosen not to share these answers with Congress – perhaps the decision was to wait six months until after today's hearing before transmitting the answers to the Subcommittee questions, perhaps we'll never get the answers. This lack of cooperation, combined with a commitment to control rather than support Interagency counterdrug efforts leads me to question DoD's drug interdiction motivations.

That said, this hearing with may serve to change the course of future drug funding to enable the execution of transit zone drug interdiction operations. But let me say that the big picture in the transit zone is disturbing. For the first time, our actionable intelligence exceeds our interdiction capabilities in the transit zone. In other words, the Federal government knows of specific boatloads of drugs heading north that we cannot intercept because of lack of interception assets in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific. The intelligence breakthrough is a recent development resulting from the very successful Operation Panama Express, an interagency intelligence-driven program managed by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security. Due to this impressive intelligence cueing, Joint Inter Agency Task Force (JIATF) South now has improved insight into where, when and how much cocaine will be smuggled through the transit zones. All of our federal agencies need a special "well done" from Congress for the record cocaine seizures in 2004. The hearing today is not meant to criticize, but rather look to improve on major successes in U.S. drug interdiction efforts.

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Third, the push to make Joint Task Force North a Joint Interagency Task Force will potentially place DoD as an overseer of domestic law enforcement interdiction programs. Lack of unity within the Interagency has allowed DoD to take the lead in areas that have traditionally been accomplished by law enforcement agencies. Therefore it is imperative that DHS and the Interagency should become more involved in the future JIATF process. In order to have an effective joint interagency program, federal law enforcement agencies must be willing to man JIATF South and any future JIATFs with employees capable of filling critical command and operations specialist positions. Conversely, the JIATF's must provide administrative and

logistical incentives for federal law enforcement agencies to assign qualified employees to their locations.

Fourth, the transit zone, like the southwest border, lacks a strategic, comprehensive, layered, interagency plan that incorporates the operational demands of post 9/11 operations and the recent actionable intelligence improvements. Without a National Interdiction Plan, agency roles and responsibilities are not properly delineated resulting in a haphazard way of requesting national air and marine assets. The U.S. Interdiction Coordinator laid the groundwork for this strategy by the forming the Interdiction Planning and Asset Group. Unfortunately the latest report for Interdiction Asset Requirements is out of date and does not truly reflect the current enhanced intelligence capabilities, nor does it take into account a post 9/11 environment.

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Today we have a panel of very experienced witnesses to help answer these and other questions posed by the Subcommittee. We are pleased to welcome Mr. Ralph Utley, acting United States Interdiction Coordinator, Admiral Dennis Sirois, U.S. Coast Guard's Assistant Commandant for Operations, Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway, Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South, Mr. Charles Stallworth, Customs and Border Protection's acting Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine Operations, and Mr. Thomas Harrigan, Drug Enforcement Administration's Chief of Enforcement Operations. We look forward to your testimony and insight into this important topic.

Mr. SOUDER. As I mentioned earlier, I am going to turn the gavel over to our committee's vice chairman after the initial statements because I have a markup going on in another committee and several floor votes; I will be kind of in and out of this hearing. I will take all the statements with me to make sure I read it and will be doing plenty of followup. You always can be assured to hear from our office, probably more than you want many times.

Mr. Cummings, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. CUMMINGS. It will be very brief, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing to examine the efforts to interdict illicit drug shipments bound for the United States by way of maritime smuggling routes.

Southwest border States are primary points of entry for major illicit drug threats, such as Colombian and Peruvian cocaine, South American and Mexican heroin, Mexican methamphetamines, and Mexican and Colombian marijuana. Before drugs from South America reach the border, however, they must be transported to the United States through maritime transit zones, which encompass the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, the eastern Pacific Ocean.

The majority of drugs are transported by sea, by commercial means, including high speed, go-fast boats capable of carrying up to 2 tons of cocaine. The detection and apprehension of these vessels represents a difficult challenge for the Untied States and international interdiction agencies and requires the synergistic use of actionable intelligence, interagency communication, and assets and personnel capable of amounting an effective response.

The Department of Defense is the lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs through the transit zone into Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and across the U.S.' southwest border into the mainland United States. Based at the Naval Air Station in Key West, FL, Joint InterAgency Task Force South conducts counter illicit drug trafficking operations to detect, monitor, and handoff suspected illicit trafficking targets, promotes security, cooperation, and coordinates country team and partner nation initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit traffic.

In addition to DOD, the agencies that participate in the JIATF-South are the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigations. Cooperation and intelligence sharing among these agencies through JIATF-South and in other contexts is critical to U.S. efforts to stop illegal drugs before they reach our southern border and ports of entry through the country.

Today's hearing offers a very valuable opportunity to hear from key officials in agencies that play a vital role in U.S. interdiction efforts concerning their successes, remaining or emerging challenges, and the need for additional or upgraded resources.

With that said, I want to welcome all of our witnesses and thank all of them for their appearance here today. I look forward to the testimony. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings follows:]

**Representative Elijah E. Cummings, D-MD7**
**Ranking Minority Member**
**Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources**
**Committee on Government Reform**
**U.S. House of Representatives**
**109th Congress**

**Hearing on "Interrupting Narco-Terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails?"**

**June 29, 2005**

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for holding this important hearing to examine efforts to interdict illicit drug shipments bound for the United States by way of maritime smuggling routes.

The Southwest Border states are primary points of entry for major illicit drug threats such as Colombian and Peruvian cocaine, South American and Mexican heroin, Mexican methamphetamine, and Mexican and Colombian marijuana. Before drugs from South America reach the border, however, they must be transported to the United States through the maritime "transit zone," which encompasses the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific ocean.

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team and partner nation initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit traffic.

In addition to DoD, the agencies that participate in JIATF-South are the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Cooperation and intelligence sharing among these agencies through JIATF South and in other contexts is critical to U.S. efforts to stop illegal drugs before they reach our Southern border and ports of entry through the country.

Today's hearing offers a valuable opportunity to hear from key officials in agencies that play a vital role in U.S. interdiction efforts, concerning their successes, remaining or emerging challenges, and the need for additional or upgraded resources. With that said, I want to welcome all of our witnesses and thank them for their appearance before the Subcommittee today.

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's important hearing. I look forward to the testimony and yield back the balance of my time.

##

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. Mr. McHenry, do you have any opening comments?

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly appreciate you all being here today. I look forward to the panel discussion and your testimony.

I think it is important that we look at the resources we have. This is not a moment to necessarily rap you on the knuckles. It looks as if we have had increased intelligence-gathering operations and we actually have more intelligence to deal with, and so we have a better opportunity to catch drug traffickers in the process. We want to make sure that you have the resources and infrastructure in place so that we can actually catch those bad guys when we have the opportunities. And so I look forward to hearing your testimonies and your ideas in this regard.

I certainly appreciate your making the time to be here before us. I am sure, looking at you and looking at your backgrounds, you have done this a few times before and it certainly is as exciting as it always is. So thank you so much for being here and we hope to keep you awake for the remainder of the hearing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing record. That any answers provided by the witnesses also be included in the record. And without objection, it is so ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents, and other materials referred to by Members may be included in the hearing record, and that all Members be permitted to revise and extend their remarks. Without objection, it is so ordered.

As an oversight committee, it is our tradition to swear all the witnesses. So if you will each stand and raise your right hand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that each of the witnesses responded in the affirmative.

I am now going to turn the hearing over to our distinguished vice chairman, Mr. McHenry. I will be in and out depending on how the voting is going.

Mr. MCHENRY [presiding]. Mr. Utley, you may proceed.

## STATEMENTS OF RALPH UTLEY, ACTING U.S. INTERDICTION COORDINATOR; ADMIRAL DENNIS SIROIS, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD; ADMIRAL JEFFREY J. HATHAWAY, DIRECTOR, JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE SOUTH; CHARLES E. STALLWORTH II, ACTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION; AND THOMAS M. HARRIGAN, CHIEF OF ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

### STATEMENT OF RALPH UTLEY

Mr. UTLEY. Representative McHenry, Ranking Member Cummings, distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as the Acting U.S. Interdiction Coordi-

nator. I also serve as the Acting Director of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement in the Department of Homeland Security.

We have achieved record levels for transit zone cocaine interdiction, vessel seizures, and arrests in each of the past 2 calendar years. Specifically, in the transit zone, we have removed 210 metric tons of cocaine bound for the United States in 2003 and 248 metric tons in 2004. Cocaine seizures and removals in 2004 were approximately twice the seizures and removals of 1999. Those record levels of removals have occurred while our Nation is fighting two wars overseas and has taken on new duties to stop terrorists from entering the United States. The credit for these achievements goes to the entire counterdrug community who is working closer together and synergistically attacking the traffickers where they are most vulnerable. Let me discuss a few of the key factors that have improved interdiction.

First, the Department of Defense's leadership through Joint Interagency Task Force South has been key. In addition, the rest of the U.S. interdiction community has invested in this Task force which is producing great dividends. For more than 15 years the counterdrug community has worked to build this Task Force which has become a worldwide model for joint interagency and international cooperation. There have been many changes along the way, the most recent being the establishment of the Joint Operating Area. The Joint Operating Area has improved synergy, unity of command, and operational efficiency. Joint Interagency Task Force South now has total responsibility for the primary south to north drug trafficking threat vectors from South America. Establishing the Joint Operating Area makes sense, and I applaud those who made it happen.

We have long realized the value of actionable intelligence. For years, our ships and aircraft patrolled vast expanses of ocean, usually without the benefit of good intelligence. Today our forces often have real-time, actionable intelligence so that they may narrow their focus and improve their probability of detection. The intelligence community, working in close concert with the law enforcement investigators, has made remarkable strides toward understanding trafficking organizations, patterns, and activities.

In particular, Operation Panama Express, a combined OCDETF task force with representatives from the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense, has become a model of interagency partnering. Panama Express-led investigations are developing intelligence leads that support more interdictions. JIATF-South has become a full partner with founding members FBI, ICE, and DEA. At the same time, interdictions are leading to the successful prosecutions of both maritime transporters and higher level drug traffickers. Enhanced drug intelligence has allowed interdictions, investigations, and prosecutions to support each other like never before.

In years past, when we successfully detected a smuggling vessel, we often could not stop them or find the drugs. Today, front-line interdictors have better equipment and capability. The Coast Guard's armed helicopters and over-the-horizon boat programs have dramatically improved end-game results. The French and British helicopters are also now armed, and the U.S. Navy, in con-

junction with the Coast Guard, is working to arm their sea-based helicopters. We have also improved boarding tactics and equipment that increase the odds of finding drugs on fishing vessels.

We do not stop with a successful interdiction. In fact, interdiction directly supports new investigations and prosecutions. Under the leadership of the Justice Department, traffickers are being convicted with stiff sentences which in turn facilitates better intelligence and awareness as to how the traffickers are operating.

The support provided by our international partners is also critical to transit zone interdiction successes. JIATF South has full-time liaisons from 10 countries in the hemisphere and communicates and coordinates transit zone operations directly with host nations operations centers. Currently, France and the United Kingdom deploy and use their surveillance aircraft, armed helicopters, and surface ships in counterdrug missions. The British NIMROD, a highly capable four-engine, long-range maritime surveillance aircraft, has been especially effective in detecting and tracking drug smuggling vessels. Our Dutch allies continue to provide strong support in the Caribbean. The Canadian government is working with the U.S. Southern Command and Joint Interagency Task Force South to coordinate future Canadian P–3 aircraft deployments to the Caribbean.

This committed international and interagency effort is essential to transit zone operational success. International cooperation also has been critical in eliminating seams that traffickers once exploited. The United States now has 26 maritime bilateral agreements that have put the smuggler on the defensive. The smugglers now have less time to react to and avoid law enforcement, and we are able to board in time to find contraband and evidence to support prosecutions.

Maritime patrol aircraft [MPA], are key to transit zone interdiction operations. MPA are currently the only persistent wide-area surveillance platform that we can covertly detect, monitor, and track smugglers and support maritime end-game operations. In calendar year 2004, MPA participated in 73 percent of the cocaine removal events from noncommercial maritime conveyances in the transit zone. In the fourth quarter of last year, these figures rose to 91 percent.

Last year we suffered from a reduction in long-range MPA capability. Available MPA flying hours were significantly reduced due to unexpected wing corrosion in the U.S. Navy's P–3 fleet and the withdrawal of Netherlands P–3s from the Caribbean. Today the situation has improved. Customs and Border Protection P–3 hours have been funded to allow a 400 hour per month increase to transit zone operations; the Coast Guard has several initiatives in the President's fiscal year 2006 budget that will significantly increase C–130 hours in support of JIATF-South; and the U.S. Air Force has deployed E–3s to support the Air Bridge Denial program, freeing CBP aircraft for maritime patrol operations; DOD is supporting British NIMROD operations in Curacao; the U.S. Navy has improved the operational on-station time of their P–3s; and DOD is working to add Canadian Auroras to the effort. Looking forward, we need strong support from all of the force providers, and I am encouraged that they will deliver.

Let me conclude by saying that we must sustain the pace of these past 2 years and find ways to increase pressure on the traffickers. I have placed a priority on seeking alternatives that will further increase protection, monitoring, tracking, and interdiction capabilities in the transit zone. The USIC will continue to engage the entire interdiction community and find innovative and aggressive ways to improve our capabilities and operational effectiveness. We will support those strategies and operations that are working and keep the pressure on all fronts. We will continue to asses our efforts and report our progress to Congress.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Utley follows:]

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

**STATEMENT**

**OF**
**RALPH D. UTLEY (RADM, USCG Ret.)**
**ACTING UNITED STATES INTERDICTION COORDINATOR**

**BEFORE**

**HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES**

**"INTERRUPTING NARCO-TERRORIST THREATS ON THE HIGH SEAS: DO WE HAVE ENOUGH WIND IN OUR SAILS?"**

**Wednesday, June 29, 2005**
**2:00 pm**
**Washington D.C.**

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

## Introduction

Chairman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings, and distinguished Members of the Committee: I am honored to appear before you today as the Acting United States Interdiction Coordinator. I also serve as the Acting Director of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement for the Department of Homeland Security.

## Overview

We have achieved record levels for Transit Zone cocaine interdiction, vessel seizures, and arrests in each of the past two calendar years. Specifically, in the Transit Zone, we removed 210 metric tons of cocaine bound for the United States in 2003 and 248 metric tons in 2004. Cocaine seizures and removals in 2004 were approximately twice the seizures and removals of 1999. Those record levels of removals have occurred while our nation is fighting two wars overseas and has taken on new duties to stop terrorists from entering the United States. The credit for these achievements goes to the entire counterdrug community who is working closer together and synergistically attacking the traffickers where they are most vulnerable. Let me discuss a few of the key factors that have improved interdiction.

### Interagency Coordination

First, the Department of Defense's leadership through Joint Interagency Task Force South has been key. In addition, the rest of the U.S. interagency team has invested in this Task Force which is producing great dividends. For more than 15 years the counterdrug community has worked to build this Task Force which has become a worldwide model for joint, interagency, and international cooperation. There have been many changes along the way, the most recent being the establishment of the Joint Operating Area. The Joint Operating Area has improved synergy, unity of command, and operational efficiency. Joint Interagency Task Force South now has total responsibility for the primary south-to-north drug trafficking threat vectors from South America. Establishing the Joint Operating Area makes sense, and I applaud those who made it happen.

### Improved Intelligence

We have long recognized the value of actionable intelligence. For years, our ships and aircraft patrolled vast expanses of ocean, usually without the benefit of good intelligence. Today, our forces often have real-time, actionable intelligence, so they can narrow their focus and improve their probability of detection. The intelligence community, working in close concert with law enforcement investigators, has made remarkable strides towards understanding trafficking organizations, patterns, and activities. In particular, Operation Panama Express, a combined Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force – with representatives from the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense – has become a model for interagency partnering. Panama Express-led investigations are developing intelligence leads that support more interdictions. JIATF-South has become a full partner with founding members FBI, ICE, and DEA. At the same time, interdictions are leading to the successful prosecution of both maritime transporters and higher level drug traffickers. Enhanced drug intelligence has allowed interdictions, investigations, and prosecutions to support each other like never before.

**Better End-Game**

In years past, when we successfully detected a smuggling vessel, we often could not stop them or find the drugs. Today, front-line interdictors have better equipment and capability. The Coast Guard's armed helicopters and over-the-horizon boat programs have dramatically improved end-game results. The French and British helicopters are also now armed, and the U.S. Navy, in conjunction with the Coast Guard, is working to arm their sea-based helicopters. We have also improved boarding tactics and equipment that increases the odds of finding drugs on fishing vessels. We do not stop with a successful interdiction. In fact, interdictions directly support new investigations and prosecutions. Under the leadership of the Justice Department, traffickers are being convicted with stiff sentences which in turn facilitates better intelligence and awareness as to how the traffickers are operating.

**International Partnerships – A Team Effort**

The support provided by our international partners is also critical to Transit Zone interdiction successes. JIATF South has full-time liaisons from ten countries in the hemisphere and communicates and coordinates Transit Zone operations directly with host nations operations centers. Currently, France and the United Kingdom deploy and use their surveillance aircraft, armed helicopters, and surface ships in counterdrug missions. The British NIMROD, a highly capable four-engine, long-range maritime surveillance aircraft, has been especially effective in detecting and tracking drug smuggling vessels. Our Dutch allies continue to provide strong support in the Caribbean. The Canadian government is working with the United States Southern Command and Joint Interagency Task Force South to coordinate future Canadian P-3 aircraft deployments to the Caribbean. This committed international and interagency effort is essential to Transit Zone operational success. International cooperation also has been critical in eliminating seams that traffickers once exploited. The United States now has 26 maritime bilateral agreements that have put the smugglers on the defensive. The smugglers now have less time to react to and avoid law enforcement, and we are able to board in time to find contraband and evidence to support prosecutions.

**Maritime Patrol Aircraft**

Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) are key to Transit Zone interdiction operations. MPA are currently the only persistent wide-area surveillance platform that can covertly detect, monitor, and track smugglers and support maritime end-game operations. In Calendar Year 2004, MPA participated in 73% of the cocaine removal events from noncommercial maritime conveyances in the Transit Zone. In the fourth quarter of last year, these figures rose to 91%. Last year we suffered from a reduction in long-range MPA capacity. Available MPA flying hours were significantly reduced due to unexpected wing corrosion in the U.S. Navy's P-3 fleet and the withdrawal of Netherlands P-3s from the Caribbean. Today the situation has improved: Customs and Border Protection P-3 hours have been funded to allow a 400 hour per month increase to Transit Zone operations; the Coast Guard has several initiatives in the President's FY '06 budget that will significantly increase C-130 hours in support of JIATF-South; the U.S. Air Force has deployed E-3s to support the Air Bridge Denial program, freeing CBP aircraft for maritime patrol operations; DOD is supporting British NIMROD operations in Curacao; the U.S.

Navy has improved the operational on-station time of their P-3s; and DOD is working to add Canadian Auroras to the effort. Looking forward, we need strong support from all of the force providers, and I am encouraged that they will deliver.

**Conclusion**

Let me conclude by saying that we must sustain the pace of these past two years and find ways to increase pressure on the traffickers. I have placed a priority on seeking alternatives that will further increase detection, monitoring, tracking, and interdiction capabilities in the Transit Zone. The USIC will continue to engage the entire interdiction community and find innovative and aggressive ways to improve our capabilities and operational effectiveness. We will support those strategies and operations that are working and keep the pressure up on all fronts. We will continue to assess our efforts and report our progress to Congress.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering questions from you and your Committee.

Mr. MCHENRY. Gentlemen, just to let you all know, your full testimony will be entered into the records. Going forward, if we could try to stick with about a 5-minute time limit and you can summarize your testimony and hit the highlights.

Mr. Utley, my apologies for not giving you that guidance before. We certainly appreciate your testimony. I just want to make sure that the other gentlemen are aware of it as well so we can get to questions. Thanks so much.

Admiral Sirois.

**STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DENNIS SIROIS**

Admiral SIROIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members. It is an honor to represent the Coast Guard men and women before you here today. I do have a written statement that I would like to summarize very shortly.

The Coast Guard's counterdrug mission is the interdiction and seizure of illegal drugs in the transit zone. Although the Coast Guard seizes annually almost 54 percent of all cocaine seized by Federal agencies, this record could not have been attained without our interagency partners and international partners and the specific competencies each one of those agencies bring. Working closely with our interagency and international partners, we provide a continuous, coordinated, sustained law enforcement presence in the 6 million square mile transit zone and maritime approaches to the United States.

In fiscal year 2004, the Coast Guard and our partners seized or removed over 350,000 pounds of cocaine from the illegal drug trade, plus 108,000 pounds were lost to smugglers due to jettisoning. This includes the seizure of the fishing vessel LINA MARIA and its load of 33,000 pounds of cocaine, the Coast Guard's single event record to date. I would like to note that as of today the Coast Guard has seized 191,933 pounds of cocaine, again working with our great interagency partners.

STEEL WEB is the Coast guard long-range strategy to advance the national goal of attacking the economic basis of the drug trade and is an important part of the coordinated, comprehensive interagency effort supporting the National Drug Control Strategy supply reduction goal. This comprehensive approach to drug interdiction is summarized in three pillars: First, effective presence, which is a strong and agile presence informed by intelligence and law enforcement information; second, a regional engagement with the interagency and international law enforcement partner nations which has resulted in 26 bilateral agreements and a number of combined operations with these countries; and third, an end-game must exist. The phenomenal success of our HITRON helicopters in stopping the go-fast threat is key, but the smugglers are flexible and adaptive. To have an effective end-game, the Coast Guard must obtain and field the latest technologies, and develop new techniques to counter this ever changing threat.

What is troubling to the Coast Guard is the recent House Budget recommendation for the Coast Guard. Any reduction in Deepwater funding jeopardizes the Coast Guard's integrated recapitalization strategy by not providing adequate funding to recapitalize or modernize the Coast Guard's aging and obsolete cutters, aircraft, and

command and control, information, and surveillance and reconnaissance systems while sustaining legacy assets in the interim. At a minimum, the recommended funding levels will delay delivery of new assets. If held to the House recommended funding levels, operational capacity will go away faster than it can be replaced, and this resource problem will persist. If held to the $500 million funding level, the Coast Guard cannot complete necessary legacy asset sustainment which is necessary to reverse the downward trend in readiness and availability of our assets.

The Coast Guard appreciates your support over the years and we ask for your continued support as our funding is discussed. We are working our assets and our crews harder than ever, and the wear is beginning to show. The President addresses capacity and capability improvements for the Coast Guard in his budget request which includes maritime patrol hours for counterdrug operations, which I ask you to support. Deepwater, our plan for major asset recapitalization has never been more relevant, and I ask for your funding support for the President's request.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Sirois follows:]

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

**U. S. COAST GUARD**

**STATEMENT OF**

**REAR ADMIRAL R. DENNIS SIROIS**

**ON**

**INTERUPTING NARCO-TERRORIST THREATS ON THE HIGH SEAS**

**BEFORE THE**

**GOVERNMENT REFORM SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY & HUMAN RESOURCES**

**U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**JUNE 29, 2005**

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss Coast Guard counterdrug operations in the maritime transit zone.

The Coast Guard's counterdrug mission is the interdiction and seizure of illegal drugs in the transit zone. Although the Coast Guard seizes annually almost 54 percent of all cocaine seized by federal agencies, this record could not have been attained without our interagency partners and partner nations. Working closely with our interagency and international partners we provide a continuous, coordinated, sustained law enforcement presence in the six million square mile transit zone and maritime approaches to the United States. In fiscal year (FY) 2004, the Coast Guard seized or removed over 350,000 pounds of cocaine from the illegal drug trade, our most successful year to date (241,713 pounds seized plus 108,305 lost to smugglers due to jettisoning). This included the seizure of the fishing vessel LINA MARIA and its load of 33,109 pounds of cocaine, the Coast Guard's single event record.

STEEL WEB is our long-range strategy to advance the national goal of attacking the economic basis of the drug trade and is an important part of a coordinated, comprehensive interagency effort supporting the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) supply reduction goal. This comprehensive approach to drug interdiction is summarized in three pillars.

First, there is a need for effective presence in the three major maritime smuggling vectors: Eastern Pacific, Eastern Caribbean and Western Caribbean. This is the most visible component of our strategy, maintaining a strong and agile maritime interdiction presence with vessels and maritime patrol aircraft. This agility is accomplished by combining tactical intelligence and law enforcement information with pre-positioning decisions made by Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S). This critical command, located in Key West, Florida, is staffed by a full spectrum of the interagency, as well as our international partners in the war on drug smuggling. JIATF-S is doing a great job of focusing limited resources on actionable intelligence, and more often than not, we are finding ourselves in the right place at the right time. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET) operating from U.S., British, and Dutch naval vessels have been particularly effective. These teams expand the reach of Coast Guard law enforcement authorities throughout the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific and in FY04 were responsible for the seizure of 64.3 MT of cocaine that totaled 58.6 percent of the amount of cocaine seized for that year.

Second, the Coast Guard's regional engagement with the interagency and international law enforcement partner nations has resulted in 26 bilateral agreements and a number of combined operations with these countries. This type of engagement, as outlined in our strategic planning, is crucial to our current effectiveness. It greatly reduces the time necessary to process a case involving suspect vessels from these nations, and promotes cooperation among these nations by engendering direct communications and operational protocols between national operations centers. The value of this engagement has been validated by our recent interdiction successes. The Coast Guard also supports international efforts to improve the capabilities of nations in source and transit zones to reduce production and trafficking within their territories and adjacent waters. Working closely with the State Department and Justice Department, the Coast Guard will continue to pave the way for the adoption of additional maritime counterdrug bilateral agreements with nation-partners in both the source and transit zones.

Third, an effective endgame must exist. The Airborne Use of Force (AUF) program employed by the Coast Guard has yielded impressive results. The phenomenal success of our HITRON helicopters in stopping the "go-fast" threat is key, but the smugglers remain flexible and adaptive. The Coast Guard has recently worked with the United Kingdom to develop AUF capabilities for the Royal Navy. The U.K. has already deployed this capability under JIATF-S tactical control twice this year. The Coast

Guard also is working with the U.S. Navy to explore their use of this AUF capability. The HITRON successes has also led to the Coast Guard beginning the process to arm all Coast Guard helicopters, which will ultimately lead to a more forceful presence in the transit zone. The Coast Guard continues to obtain and field the latest technologies, and develop new techniques to counter this ever changing threat. As an illustration of this, we are developing an initiative to deny "go-fasts" used in smuggling activities the critical use of offshore refueling vessels.

These three pillars are strengthened with effective interagency partnerships. The importance of this comprehensive interagency approach and cooperation cannot be overstated. An excellent example is the joint Justice Department and DHS Operation PANAMA EXPRESS investigation. Originally based on one event, it has expanded and become primarily responsible for the tremendous growth in actionable intelligence feeding JIATF-S. PANAMA EXPRESS participants include USCG, ICE, CBP, DEA and FBI, among others. The Coast Guard Investigative Service provides several Special Agents to PANAMA EXPRESS that serve as full members to the investigation. Their work fuels the intelligence cycle from which information derived from one seizure event provides information used during subsequent events, including persons, vessels, aircraft and locations.

Despite notable successes, of which there are many, there are areas of concern that warrant continued focus and attention. Most notably is the continuing readiness struggle of our Deepwater fleet. Our major cutters and aircraft are the centerpiece of our maritime transit zone presence. These assets are continuing to face severe maintenance and readiness challenges that, when combined with an increased post-9/11 operations tempo, impair the Coast Guard's ability to ensure effective presence and endgame. Maritime drug interdiction is about putting 'steel on target', in the form of cutters and aircraft capable of executing the mission. Increasingly, we're seeing that 'steel' begin to rust. Of 41 comparable naval fleets in the world, only Mexico and the Philippines have older than the Coast Guard. For that reason, the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) acquisition remains the Coast Guard's number one recapitalization priority. It is the centerpiece of the Coast Guard's future maritime security capacity and capability and is critical to ensuring our legacy assets remain mission capable as new assets come on line. Similarly, the overall Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities are vital to the Coast Guard's ability to operate seamlessly and fully integrated with our DOD and DHS partners. The IDS acquisition will not only replace the Coast Guard's current capacity, we have completed a comprehensive performance analysis and now delivered to the Congress a revised implementation plan that includes within the acquisition critical new capabilities. Increased cutter speed, stopping power, and equipping all Coast Guard helicopters with AUF capability are all part of this revised implementation plan. These capabilities, and others, are critical to dealing effectively with the entire spectrum of maritime threats, including within the maritime transit zone. As such, the Coast Guard asks for your support of the President's request of $966 million for IDS in FY 2006. Any reduction to the requested Deepwater funding jeopardizes the Coast Guard's integrated recapitalization strategy by not providing adequate funding to recapitalize/modernize the Coast Guard's aging and obsolete cutters, aircraft and C4ISR systems while sustaining legacy assets in the interim. Reduced funding levels, at the very minimum, would delay delivery of new assets that are integral to the continued success of drug interdiction efforts. For example, if held to the House recommended funding level of $500 million, operational capacity will diminish faster than it can be replaced, this resource problem will persist, and the Coast Guard will not have adequate resources to complete necessary legacy asset sustainment. The Coast Guard's Deepwater implementation strategy considers both aging assets and new assets to strike the right acquisition balance to satisfy operational requirements, which are reflected in the Revised Deepwater Implementation Plan. Without the requested funding, the acquisition and thus current and future Coast Guard readiness is put at substantial risk

This Revised Deepwater Implementation Plan projects the first legacy cutter decommissioning will occur in FY07, with decommissioning of future legacy assets as more new Deepwater cutters and aircraft become operational. The Coast Guard continuously monitors the cost effectiveness of operating aging fleets of cutters and aircraft, but the lack of an appropriate level of funding for Deepwater will have significantly negative operational ramifications

In addition to surface Deepwater assets, transit zone operations will also be affected by maritime patrol capability. For a near term addition to maritime patrol hours, the President's FY 2006 budget requests Coast Guard funding for 1,500 additional flight hours, which will help increase maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) flight hours. This is another reason that full funding of Deepwater is vital to U.S. counterdrug efforts in the transit zone. The Deepwater system integrator continues to develop the platform for future maritime patrol missions. The Medium Range Surveillance (MRS) aircraft will provide even greater capacity to increase maritime patrol flight hours. Additionally, High and Medium Altitude UAVs programs are under study and development to further provide maritime surveillance.

Deepwater's comprehensive system of systems will recapitalize our entire inventory of aging cutters and aircraft, as well as C4ISR systems at sea and ashore - all supported with integrated logistics. Deepwater will provide the means to extend our layered maritime defenses from our ports and coastlines many hundreds of miles to sea, increasing maritime domain awareness and maritime patrol in the Transit Zone. When Deepwater is fully implemented, our cutters and aircraft will no longer operate as independent platforms with only limited awareness of their surroundings in the maritime domain. Instead, they will have improved capabilities to receive information from a wide array of mission-capable platforms and sensors, enabling them to share a common operating picture as part of a network-centric force operating in unison with other cutters, boats, and both manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. In the aggregate, it is clear that the Coast Guard's Deepwater implementation is vital to the U.S. Government's interest in robust transit zone operations.

The Coast Guard appreciates your support over the years and we ask for your continued support as our funding is discussed. We are working our assets—and our crews—harder than ever, and the wear is beginning to show. The President addresses capacity and capability improvements for the Coast Guard in his budget request, which I ask you to support. Deepwater, our plan for major asset recapitalization has never been more relevant, and I ask for your support for the President's request.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Admiral.
Admiral Hathaway.

**STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JEFFREY J. HATHAWAY**

Admiral HATHAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cummings, good to see you both again. I am Rear Admiral Jeff Hathaway. I have the honor of presently serving as Director of JIATF-South, the Joint InterAgency Task Force South in Key West, FL. I am here representing U.S. Southern Command and, more importantly, the 450 men and women that comprise Joint Interagency Task Force South, which I will add, I truly have become a believer that it is the best of joint DOD interagency and international cooperation that I have seen and, quite frankly, a great example of good governance.

Chairman Souder mentioned that in 1991 DOD was given the lead for detection and monitoring in the transit zone. I would submit I believe that was a very good decision on the part of the Congress to cause that to happen. What it did was it brought core competencies from DOD into the counterdrug game. They are just as germane today as they were then. JIATF-South's heartbeat is driven by three core competencies that are DOD core competencies.

The first one is the ability to fuse vast amounts of all source intelligence. We have built the systems primarily on a DOD background, we have the analysts, most of them DOD but lots of them from our interagency partners, most of which are represented at the table with me. Most importantly, that backbone allows us to fuse, analyze, and push that intelligence out in a tactically actionable way so that it can be used.

No. 2 is, again a core competency of DOD, to exert command and control across vast distances. Our joint operating area is 42 million square miles. It is only DOD systems that have allowed us to fuse together DOD assets, U.S. interagency assets, and our international partners into one team and be able to talk with them realtime and to coordinate across those vast distances. Again, as germane today as it was many, many years ago.

And finally, again a core competency of DOD, is deliberate planning. We brought deliberate planning to the counterdrug game. We are able to synchronize operations in a way that the Department of Defense has been able to do for years and years. Again, we make that work for us on a daily basis.

We have put together in JIATF a standard operating procedure. Everyone leaves their own standard operating procedure at the door when they become part of the JIATF team. Everyone was part of building today's current operating procedure and it continues to renew itself on a daily basis. This weekend was a great example. We had intelligence from one of our allies, I cannot mention the country, we were able to use that information, fuse it with some of our technical reporting, and it cued us to a Sao Tomean vessel, a small West African country. Sao Tome finally refuted the claim of registry for that country.

But most importantly, we were able to take a Dutch frigate working for JIATF at the time with a U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachment on board, move them into an intercept position, hand the case over to the Coast Guard, board the vessel, with

the special intelligence we had, it allowed the Coast Guard to very quickly find the secret compartment on board, find 1.8 tons of drugs, seize the drugs, arrest the crew, and it all happened within our standard operating procedures.

Everyone knew exactly what was going to happen across the interagency, across DOD, with our international partners. It happens every day. Unity of command, a common vision, and unity of effort is what we strive for in JIATF.

Finally, I know this hearing is all about level of effort in the transit zone. I will be very honest with you, I look at this as a cup half full at this point. Last year, I will be very honest, we saw 331 go-fast cases, most of them in the Western Caribbean. Three years ago my predecessors could not have sat here and told you that we had the granularity of intelligence to know that we had that number of go-fast smuggling events. Mr. Cummings, you said each one of those carries about two tons. That is exactly right. The fact of the matter is, out of those 331, we only interdicted slightly less than 100. Out of those we interdicted, three out of four we were actually able to stop. Do we want to do better across this table? Absolutely. Do we have the resources today across the administration? I think we are working on them. So from a cup half full, we know where the enemy is, we know where we have to go to engage him, and all of us I know want to do that more robustly.

Let me just say that our counterdrug ship is sound, it is well-built, it has the right mix of crew, they are well-trained and motivated, and they are making the best use of the wind that they have in their sails today. But we are very confident that we could make even more effective use of greater winds, if they come. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Hathaway follows:]

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF

RADM JEFFREY HATHAWAY

DIRECTOR

JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE SOUTH

BEFORE THE 109TH CONGRESS

HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

29 JUNE 2005

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

**Introduction**

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before your subcommittee. Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South challenges drug traffickers in the air and on the high seas 24 hours a day, 7 days a week in defense of America's borders. We attack the shipment of illegal drugs and narco-traffickers themselves each and every time we have them in our sights. Our goal is to deny safe haven during any portion of their journey and we work hard in constant support of law enforcement to place the drug traffickers and their drugs in risk of interdiction. Through better intelligence, expanded law enforcement partnerships and the collective efforts of the counterdrug community, JIATF South has been able support ever increasing cocaine disruptions for the last six years with 2004 being a record all time high.

**Joint Interagency Task Force South is a National Task Force**

JIATF South was created to specifically address the south to north flow of drugs towards the United States from South America. Its roots go back to 1989 when the Department of Defense was congressionally directed as 'the lead agency' for the detection and monitoring (D&M) of drug trafficking events in support of law enforcement. Over the years additional, but appropriate, missions and functions were added to the command's responsibilities. It has taken 16 years to evolve to where we are today, an international, interagency organization that is specifically charged to D&M the flow of illicit trafficking, all executed under a single director.

There are significant strengths that make JIATF South as successful as it is today. Perhaps most noteworthy is that we are optimally designed and organized for success against drug trafficking. The National Interdiction Command and Control Plan created JIATF South as a 'national task force' and intentionally not as a department or agency task force. We are assigned to the Commander, USSOUTHCOM. The national task force concept aggressively creates mutually supporting efforts among its diverse personnel, agencies and countries. The JIATF organizational structure embodies the force-multiplier effect of a task force manned and led by personnel from the various agencies and countries with a counterdrug mission.

**The Threat**

The drug trafficking threats JIATF South and our country face is wide ranging. It includes the production and movement of drugs and often includes the movement of arms for terrorists - which are paid for by the profit from or the exchange for drugs.

**Terrorism and Drugs**

Within this hemisphere, we are particularly concerned with three terrorist organizations: the FARC, AUC and ELN. They all operate in Colombia, all are directly involved in the drug trade, and all are a direct threat to the democratic government of Colombia, neighboring nations and the strategic interests of the United States within the hemisphere. Just as importantly, we are concerned with the international terrorist organizations that are known to operate in Central and South America and the Caribbean. Some of these groups directly leverage drug trafficking, which may be cash, weapons, or drugs as a commodity to support terror activities.

**Drug Trafficking Organizations**

Drug trafficking organizations are usually a close-knit group, often involving family members and are exceptionally difficult to penetrate. They are well funded; the U.N. estimates the drug trade to be a $400 billion a year industry. With funds of this magnitude, they can afford to buy the latest technology and strong political influences within our theater. Finally, drug traffickers have at their disposal the use of various types of conveyances and modalities to smuggle drugs. The concealment of drugs is only limited by their imaginations. Drug trafficking is an asymmetrical threat that challenges our national security in a manner very similar to terrorism.

The tonnage of drugs being moved, especially cocaine, remains immense. While there is considerable interagency discussion on just how much cocaine is moved within any year, all agree that cocaine is still moved in quantities far in excess of what law enforcement forces can interdict. JIATF South examines the movement of drugs from a demand point of view. The premise of this approach is that the drug traffickers will collectively attempt to produce and ship enough drugs to account for drug losses (seizures plus disruptions), corruption, money laundering, security and enroute consumption to ensure enough cocaine reaches world market end users. Our estimate for calendar year 2005 of cocaine movement using this 'demand' methodology is that 570 metric tons will transit up the Eastern Pacific, Central America and Western Caribbean corridor (the biggest threat vector; accounts for about 86% of all cocaine movement to the U.S.); 100 metric tons will transit the Central and Eastern Caribbean corridor to the U.S. and approximately 350 metric tons will initially transit through the Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean to non-U.S. markets. In total, approximately 1000 metric tons of cocaine will potentially leave the landmass of South America in 2005.

In the Transit Zone, during calendar year 2004, 558 maritime smuggling events and 468 aerial cocaine movement events (numbers were extracted from the Interagency Counterdrug Data Base or CCDB) were documented. If all of these events were disrupted, it would have amounted to about 975 metric tons of cocaine. This amount far exceeds the primary flow that was actually disrupted--approximately 264.5 metric tons. Of this total, JIATF South directly supported the disruption of 217 metric tons (an all time record high for the organization) or put another way, JIATF South supported just over 82% of all documented primary flow cocaine disruptions.

**Mission**

There is no ambiguity in what we are charged to do. Our mission statement fully supports the D&M of illicit trafficking events. The major components of our mission:
- Detect & monitor illicit air and maritime targets;
- Conduct intelligence fusion (to include targeting narco-terrorists);
- Conduct multi-sensor correlation (radar inputs);
- Handoff the suspected drug trafficking target (air or maritime) to law enforcement agencies/ partner nation militaries;
- Promote security cooperation & regional initiatives and;
- Provide sensor surveillance support to the southern approaches to the United States,

In accomplishing our mission, I would like to first highlight the superb personnel that comprise JIATF South and then discuss the significant core competencies that reside within the command.

**Interagency and International Personnel**

The personnel structure of the JIATF South Team is unique and a major contributor to our successes. We are as much international as we are interagency in composition. We have representatives from the Air Forces of Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela; the Navies of Colombia, France, El Salvador, Mexico, and the United Kingdom; and a representative from the Brazilian Intelligence Agency. In the near future, we expect to add a liaison officer from the Spanish Guardia Civil and potentially a representative from Trinidad and Tobago. We have representatives from all Services of Department of Defense; Homeland Security provides U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection personnel; and DEA and FBI personnel represent the Justice Department contribution. Additionally, all the three letter intelligence codes from Washington, D.C. - NSA, DIA, CIA, NGA, and the NRO have operational personnel embedded in the JIATF South team. An invaluable component is the DoD civilians and contract personnel - all subject matter experts that provide the continuity and backbone for our efforts. This broad spectrum of skill sets comes together with one common objective: supporting our D&M mission. It is important to note that the interagency has personnel here not only in senior liaison officer positions, but also in positions that are fully integrated into the staff and empowered to make decisions to execute our D&M mission. To cite a few examples, the US Coast Guard provides the Director; our Deputy Director for Intelligence is from DEA and our Deputy Director for Operations is from Customs and Border Protection, our 24x7 watch floor is manned with DoD, USCG and CBP personnel.

**Intelligence**

Intelligence is the crown jewel of our national task force and it would not be immodest to say - for the entire counterdrug community. There is no other counterdrug intelligence organization anywhere that has the breadth, depth, singular focus and synergy found at JIATF South. All-source intelligence fusion and analysis drives our operations and scheme of maneuver. We have a great many sources of information but our most critical input comes from U.S. Law Enforcement. The information is fused with all-source intelligence, analyzed and sanitized as necessary, then aggressively disseminated to our tactical forces - U.S. and our allies.

It is of particular importance to note the extraordinary contribution the JIATF South Tactical Analysis Teams (TAT's). Located in many of the U.S. Embassies, the TAT personnel work closely with the Drug Enforcement Agents within the respective country to glean the tactically actionable information needed to cue the D&M forces. A TAT is modest in size, typically composed of two members. There are currently TAT's deployed to 16 countries. The U.S. Country Teams recognize extraordinary value of this resource and the demand for them is very high. We have approval to expand existing TAT support in three countries; to send a TAT to four new countries; and have pending requests from yet another seven country teams. Funding constraints will dictate how quickly additional TATs can be deployed. Additionally, JIATF South operates the Intelligence Analysis Center (IAC) in Mexico City, Mexico. Similar in function to the TAT's, it is more robust and addresses the international

air and maritime illicit targets entering Mexico. The TAT/IAC program is a model where a very modest investment of personnel pays big dividends for everyone.

Our intelligence is good and getting better by the day. The creative and innovative application of all our intelligence resources is absolutely cutting-edge. However, cueing us that a drug trafficking event is about to take place is not the same as having the fore-knowledge of when and where the drugs departed, what route the traffickers will take, the speed and direction they will travel or the final destination of the drugs. It is quite rare that we have this level of detail on a drug movement. It is worth noting that even the trafficking organizations can't ensure the departure, speed, direction, and delivery of their shipments. While we are at times able to ingeniously use technical intelligence to generally locate targets, the sizable area that we need to monitor still makes this a challenging task.

Herein lies the crux of the problem to be solved; the ability of the United States and its allies to D&M (find, sort, track, and handoff for interdiction) the initial movement of cocaine in the air (representing about 10% of the total volume) and on the high seas (representing about 90% of the total volume) in order to effectively disrupt the drug's transit. These estimations can be translated into expected drug trafficking events. Within the first six months of 2005, we expect 118 to 138 smuggling events by go-fast vessels, 59 to 75 fishing vessel events, and 24 to 31 aircraft flights. A go-fast boat is by far the hardest target to find and collectively they represent our greatest maritime threat. Only a modest fraction of their total movement is detected due to their small size and the paucity of surface surveillance capabilities.

**Command and Control**

The next core competency I would like to address is our ability to command and control our assigned and apportioned forces through a tremendously large Joint Operating Area of approximately 42 million square miles. We are nationally tasked to coordinate and de-conflict counterdrug operations. On any given day, we are controlling the U.S. and international contributions of 10 to 12 ships and 6 to 10 air sorties. This all takes place in our Joint Operations Center (JOC). The JOC has communications with all assets under our tactical control. Additionally, the JOC fuses multiple sources of radar, such as Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radar (ROTHR), U.S. and allied ground based radars (GBR) located in both the source and transit zones and radar data from U.S. and allied ships and aircraft to form a single, fully integrated air picture. This radar picture is then exported to a great number of customers within the United States military and law enforcement agencies and as appropriate, to our allies.

Conducting effective operations with forces this diverse requires a common set of standing operating procedures (SOP). One of the most powerful, but often unseen aspects of this command is that all of the contributing services, agencies and countries leave their respective asset employment doctrine at the door as they enter the building. Over the years, the interagency and international partners at JIATF South have established and continually refine a common set of mutually agreed tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure all forces are fully coordinated, integrated, synchronized and employed to the best possible effect.

The common operating picture, or COP, previously mentioned is also very important. We utilize real time location inputs from all of the U.S. assets and those from our allies in order to generate a complete picture of all friendly forces operating within our Joint Operating Area. The COP also highlights the current targets of interest being tracked. The COP is disseminated over various secure communication systems to U.S. military and law enforcement forces and as

appropriate, to our allied forces. It is with the COP that we ensure that all participants have a clear understanding of the current operational picture.

**Deliberate Planning**

The last core competency I would like to address is deliberate planning. JIATF South is nationally chartered to provide regional counterdrug planning support to the interagency and partner nations; we expend considerable effort meeting this important requirement. The breadth and depth of the counterdrug skill sets on our planning staff are found nowhere else. Our planning staff works directly with Ambassadors and our country teams downrange. Through the country teams, we integrate partner nations' counterdrug efforts with JIATF South. At any one time throughout the year, one or two bilateral or multilateral counterdrug operations is underway within JIATF South's JOA - which uniquely encompasses the entire SOUTHCOM AOR, as well as portions of the AORs of PACOM, and NORTHCOM. We host a semi-annual conference where all members from the counterdrug community within Central and South America, the Caribbean, Mexico and the United States meet at JIATF South to review the efforts, results and lessons learned from the previous six months; then discuss new initiatives and proposals and initiate planning, coordination and synchronization of counterdrug operations for the next six to nine months. As a result of this process, the entire counterdrug community has an opportunity to be heard and understood; their respective efforts orchestrated to best overall effect.

**Challenges in Capabilities**

The over-arching impediment to increasing our support to interdiction is the lack of D&M resources in the maritime arena, which represents about 90% of all drugs trafficking movement. The lack of persistent maritime surveillance is our number one problem for the near future. While we continue to improve intelligence, predictive analysis and tactical cuing, our limited maritime surveillance capabilities make it a challenge to locate cued targets once they are in the vast open ocean. The air portion of D&M effort is marginally better as we utilize ROTHR, mentioned earlier, to be able to conduct air surveillance over a substantial portion of our JOA at any one time. While we detect a major portion of all air traffic, we remain challenged to fully sort them all in order to identify drug flights. We lack sufficient ability to put 'eyes on' the suspect aircraft.

**Detection Shortfalls**

Overall, we see the glass as being half-full regarding the assets assigned or apportioned to the command. Notwithstanding the fiercely competing demands on scarce resources - which in turn impacts on the forces available for the conduct of counterdrug operations - DOD, the interagency and international community has made a tremendous effort to provide what we need. There is however, one area we noted earlier that deserves special attention, maritime surface surveillance.

JIATF South is challenged to adequately detect maritime vessels, especially the go-fast boats so commonly used. For example, in 2004, the interagency documented 331 go-fast events within the transit zone. Of the 331 documented events, 238 were not detected while in transit. That leaves 93 that were detected and of this number, 73 were successfully interdicted.

Regarding the 20 events detected but not successfully interdicted - no surface asset was available to conduct the interdiction. The bottom line: We detect just under 3 of 10 go-fast events; of those we do detect, almost 3 out of 4 are successfully interdicted, the traffickers are put in handcuffs and are destined to enter the U.S. (or an international) judicial system for prosecution.

**The importance of MPA**

Of all our asset shortages, maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), which currently provide long range surface maritime surveillance, is in critically short supply. MPA flying in support of ships significantly increases the probability of detection. To elaborate, we typically use a search box that is 75 x 150 nautical miles. A ship on patrol within this box has about a 9% chance of detecting a go-fast boat as the ship's radar does not 'see' over the immediate horizon. However, if the ship has a helicopter, it can extend the horizon from the ship and increases the probability of detection to approximately 20%. If we are able to provide a maritime patrol aircraft to help cue the ship and helicopter, the probability of detection increases to approximately 70%. The value of MPA and its contribution to our success rate can not be overstated. To assist the efficiency of the MPA aircraft, we will often use the U.S. Air Force E-3 Sentry (AWACS) or the Customs and Border Patrol P-3B AEW to help cue the MPA. Flying very high, these assets have the capability to surveil large areas of the ocean, and in turn, provide accurate suspected ship locations for the MPA to further investigate. The MPA flies from point to point and does not commit flying hours searching for surface targets. Without an asset cueing the MPA, the MPA is required to fly a search pattern then investigate each surface contact as it is found - a far less efficient use of its on-station air hours.

While ROTHR supports the aircraft detection effort 24x7, the capability to continuously surveil and detect surface maritime targets in a similar manner does not exist. Until a long term, all weather persistent surface surveillance solution is put in place, we will continue to rely heavily on long range maritime patrol aircraft, whose numbers are decreasing. Clearly, we must solve our detection shortfalls to ensure we can find maritime targets.

**Closing**

In spite of our challenges we continue to be successful for two primary reasons. First, is Unity of Command - the entire JIATF South team works with a common vision and a common purpose. The second is Unity of Effort. The tremendous caliber of people who dedicate their professional talents to safeguarding America's citizens by interdicting the drug traffickers far from our borders is simply extraordinary. This strategically important endeavor warrants our continued best efforts.




* Drugs lost in Jettisons, Scuttles & Crashes

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Admiral Hathaway.
Mr. Stallworth.

**STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. STALLWORTH II**

Mr. STALLWORTH. Good afternoon. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, it is my honor to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection interdiction efforts in the transit zone. My name is Charles Stallworth and I am the acting Assistant Commissioner for the CBP's Office of Air and Marine Operations. In the interest of time, I would like to summarize my prepared remarks which have been submitted for the record.

CBP is the Nation's unified border agency and as such is responsible for interdicting all people and conveyances that seek illegal entry. Our priority mission is preventing terrorists or terrorist weapons from entering our country, and includes our efforts to close our borders to illegal activity such as the smuggling of people and drugs. We do this while simultaneously enhancing the legal movement of people and trade. Our strategies reflect the operational reality that for the purpose of the border security the threats are converged and have converged.

AMO supports these homeland security and counterdrug efforts with more than 1,000 personnel who support and employ our fleet of advanced aircraft, marine vessels, and sensors. We tie this system of systems effort together at our Air and Marine Operations Center in Riverside, CA. Created by the 1994 National Interdiction Command and Control Plan, the NICCP, AMOC is a home to the Department of Homeland Security's common operational picture for air.

Our contribution in interdiction in the transit zone continues to increase. Since January 1, 2004, CBP is the single largest contributor of on-station flight hours in an effort that includes the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Air Force, and our international allies. From a contribution of 200 hours per month in recent years to a commitment of more than 600 hours per month, averaging over 700 hours per month this year, CBP's fleet of dedicated P–3 aircraft continue to score impressive interdictions against a maritime threat, made possible because of the outstanding cuing and intelligence support that we have heard about here earlier, most of it contributed by our interagency partners.

We support this effort with a capable but aging fleet of P–3 aircraft that is increasingly costly and difficult to maintain. We are rapidly approaching a decision point in the lives of these aircraft. Specifically, to maintain this level of effort in the transit zone, we will either have to significantly overhaul these planes or replace them altogether. In the interim, we are trying to make them as effective as possible by equipping them with sensors that will help boost the detection in maritime surface targets at greater ranges.

Throughout our 2003 departure from the U.S. Customs Service, our 2004 tenure as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and our move in 2005 in integration with CBP, the men and women of CBP's AMO have continued to deliver interdiction results against the drug trade and other threats to our borders. On behalf

of them and our Commissioner Robert C. Bonner, thank you for your support and interest in our mission.

I would be pleased to answer your questions when the time comes.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stallworth follows:]

**STATEMENT OF**

**MR. CHARLES E. STALLWORTH, II**

**ACTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER**
**OFFICE OF AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS**
**U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION**
**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

**BEFORE THE**

**HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES**

**REGARDING**

**INTERRUPTING NARCO-TERRORISTS ON THE HIGH SEAS: DO WE HAVE ENOUGH WIND IN OUR SAILS?**

**WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 2005**
**2:00 PM**
**ROOM 2247, RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING**

Chairman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings and distinguished members of this subcommittee, it is my honor to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) interdiction efforts in the "transit zone."

My name is Charles Stallworth and I am the acting assistant commissioner for the CBP's Office of Air and Marine Operations (AMO).

CBP, as the guardian of the Nation's borders, is America's frontline of defense. CBP safeguards the homeland—foremost, by protecting the American public against terrorists and the instruments of terror; while at the same time enforcing the laws of the United States and fostering the Nation's economic security through lawful travel and trade. These goals require the closing of our borders to illegal activity such as the smuggling of people and drugs while simultaneously enhancing the legal movement of people and trade. Our border security efforts reflect the operational reality that the threats to our borders have converged.

As legal points of entry into the U.S. continue to harden, the risk grows that potential terrorists will exploit known border security weaknesses between points of entry that are created and sustained by sophisticated organizations that smuggle people and drugs. While the illegal drug trade is a fundamental and major threat to the health and well being of the American people, taking the lives of more than 20,000 Americans each year, its networks, infrastructure and routes may also serve as turn key conduits for terrorist entry into or attacks against the U.S. By interdicting aviation and maritime smuggling conveyances destined for the U.S., CBP directly targets and combats the drug trade while simultaneously denying terrorists a possible means to enter or attack the U.S.

CBP's border security efforts occur at and between official points of entry. Additionally, CBP's air and marine operations are designed to extend our zone of security outward. This includes AMO's efforts in the source and transit zones to interdict smuggling conveyances, long before shipments of counter-narcotics, arms or aliens reach the physical borders.

AMO is the newest of CBP's three enforcement arms, having transferred from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in November 2004. AMO has approximately 1,000 personnel, 140 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and 73 high-speed marine vessels, including 4-engine P-3 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, CE-550 Citation Jet Interceptors, 40+ knot Midnight Express Interceptor vessels and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. AMO's air and marine crews are federal law enforcement agents who routinely perform interdiction, enforcement, airspace security, intelligence and investigative missions outside, inside and on the nation's borders.

AMO continues to provide aerial surveillance support to ICE and multiple other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, including the airborne aspect of controlled deliveries and covert tracking of suspect ground and air vehicles.

Through the unique Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC), located in Riverside,

California, CBP collects and analyzes approximately 200 civilian and military radar feeds from around the United States, Canada and its borders and fuses that data with law enforcement, intelligence and flight plan databases to produce a real-time common operating picture. AMOC has the capability to intake an additional 250 radar feeds at present. AMOC directly supports real-time interdictions of suspect aircraft on the nation's borders and beyond. Intelligence and research specialists there also routinely mine the existing databases for information that could indicate evidence of aviation smuggling activity. This independent research has led to numerous enforcement actions and investigations.

This capability is brought to bear against a substantial flow of drugs that comes to the United States from South America after passing through the Transit Zone – an area used by smugglers that is roughly twice the size of the continental U.S. It includes the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific Ocean.

Current estimates by the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force–South (JIATF-S) indicate that more than 400 metric tons of cocaine move through the transit zone for the North American market. In response, JIATF-S coordinates an international effort comprised of U.S. law enforcement, U.S. military and allied contributions. This collaborative effort includes vessels and aircraft that conduct detection, monitoring and interdiction missions.

By virtue of its unique aviation capabilities, CBP provides a very substantial amount of detection and monitoring capabilities that are prerequisites for successful interdiction. CBP's efforts in support of this international mission directly reflect CBP's extended border security strategy.

In response to requests from JIATF-S and the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, CBP's contribution jumped from 200 hours of monthly flight time in support of this mission, to at least 600 hours per month – or approximately 20 flight hours per day. In March and April 2005, CBP contributed more than 800 hours per month.

In addition to its substantial aircraft support, CBP has assigned some of its most experienced field leaders to JIATF-South on a temporary basis. This increased cross-pollination has prompted JIATF-S to request that CBP double the number of its senior personnel permanently assigned to that structure. John Stanton, a former fellow assigned to this subcommittee and one of our more experienced senior leaders, will soon be serving as the deputy director there and we are screening several others for permanent duty at JIATF-South as well.

In addition to our experienced people, CBP contributes important assets. The backbone of CBP's efforts in support of transit zone interdiction operations is our fleet of aging P-3 aircraft. We have 8 P-3s surveillance versions fitted with powerful airborne search radars and 8 other P-3s optimized for air-to-air interdiction in service today. These are very capable, long-range aircraft that are reaching the end of their service lives. In fact, they have already given one lifetime of service to the Navy. After being removed from long-term storage, they were overhauled and placed in the legacy U.S. Customs Service beginning in the 1980s. Consequently, these vintage aircraft are

expensive to maintain and our operational availability rates for these aircraft are less than what we would prefer. The average age of our P-3 surveillance aircraft is 38 years old. The average age of the interdiction P-3s, or "slicks" as we call them, is 40 years old.

While old, these are good planes equipped with modern sensor equipment. The Department will soon decide whether to extend the lives of these planes with substantial overhauls or to replace them with new aircraft altogether.

It is also important to remember that when these aircraft entered the U.S. Customs Service, they were designed and fitted principally in response to a different threat than we face today. In the 1980s and 1990s, the bulk of the smuggling threat was airborne. In response, these Customs P-3s were fitted mainly to conduct aerial interdiction with air-to-air radars. Their impact was so successful that, over time, we have seen the vector change from the air to the water in the source and transit zones.

In fact, current trends indicate that only as much as 10 percent of transit zone smuggling takes to the air, according to our experienced aircrew who have watched these trends closely.

Because of the change in mode of operations, we are refocusing our P-3 fleet against maritime targets. And we have had some very significant successes. Acting upon inter-agency cueing, CBP AMO P-3s have just this year detected and identified for seizure multiple vessels carrying substantial cocaine loads. Let's just look at a snapshot of our activity last September. CBP AMO P-3s were part of the interagency effort that conducted the search and successfully located in the Eastern Pacific last September the following three suspect vessels; the *Lina Maria*, the *San Jose* and the *Cielo Azul*. After boarding by our U.S. Coast Guard partners, more than 32 tons of cocaine were seized.

As this example indicates, the majority of cocaine shipped today moves by fishing vessel or "go-fast boat." The small, high-speed go-fast vessels are often difficult to detect without advanced intelligence and sophisticated sensors. We continue to examine ways to leverage the capabilities of our P-3 fleet against this maritime smuggling threat. In particular, we are looking very closely at equipping them with a surface-search radar sensor that could provide geometric increases in effectiveness in the transit zone.

That increase in effectiveness is required because we have recently enjoyed a surge in high-quality actionable intelligence on illegal shipments. In past years, we had the assets, but not the intelligence. Today the situation has reversed. We have more intelligence on shipments today than we have assets to detect, monitor and interdict.

We have maintained this focus on our mission because of the enormous dedication and talent of our people in the field and headquarters.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared testimony. I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Mr. Stallworth.
Mr. Harrigan.

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS M. HARRIGAN**

Mr. HARRIGAN. Good afternoon, sir. Chairman McHenry, Ranking Member Cummings, on behalf of the Administrator of the DEA Karen Tandy, I wish to thank you for your continued support for the men and women of the Drug Enforcement Administration as well as the opportunity to testify today to discuss drug trafficking throughout the transit zones. As DEA's Chief of Enforcement Operations, I am acutely aware of the challenges we face in combating drug trafficking organizations throughout the region.

DEA's primary function as an investigative law enforcement agency is to identify and dismantle the world's most significant drug trafficking organizations. DEA's role in interdiction efforts is crucial since the intelligence gained from these operations often provides information needed to unveil the depth and magnitude of a drug trafficking organization's abilities and intentions. Law enforcement, intelligence, and interdiction agencies all play an integral role in disrupting the most sophisticated drug trafficking operations.

As you know, most of the major illegal drugs abused in the United States are produced in Latin America. While production levels have generally declined over the last few years, traffickers continue to use a variety of smuggling methods to move their product out of Latin America, including maritime and air conveyances. When focusing on those drugs destined for the United States, two general corridors stand out—Mexico/Central America and the Caribbean.

Historically, Colombian drug traffickers have utilized the Mexico-Central American corridor as well as the Caribbean corridor as a transshipment route to smuggle cocaine and heroin into the United States. Cocaine is smuggled into Mexico via maritime, land, and air conveyances, and over the years Colombian traffickers have exploited the Caribbean corridor for their smuggling purposes as the region provides them with increased flexibility and anonymity because of its vast geographic territory, numerous law enforcement jurisdictions, and fragmented investigative resources.

Through interagency collaboration, DEA has taken part in developing a multifaceted investigative strategy that is designed to combat the trafficking problem by employing a coordinated regional attack on the entire trafficking organization simultaneously, from the sources of supply in Colombia, to the transportation cells in the Caribbean corridor, to the distribution cells throughout the United States, and finally on to their financial operations. Perhaps no better operation exemplifies the level of the interagency cooperative effort evident in both corridors as the Panama Express. Panama Express represents a multi-agency Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF], investigation that began in the mid-1990's with personnel from DEA, ICE, JIATF, FBI, IRS, and the U.S. Coast Guard. JIATF-South, in particular, utilizes the information shared to better direct air and naval assets toward the goal of interdicting vessels smuggling cocaine through the transit zones.

The multi-agency El Paso Intelligence Center [EPIC], also participates in sharing information that increases the effectiveness of Panama Express. By passing real-time, actionable intelligence information on smuggling operations to JIATF-South, transit zone interdictions can be made more precise. As Assistant Administrator for Intelligence Anthony Placido testified to this committee on June 14, 2005, the cooperative efforts of EPIC, JTF-North, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Air and Maritime Operations Center, and JIATF-South contribute greatly to our interdiction effectiveness.

In conclusion, drug trafficking organizations today have the capacity to overwhelm the defenses of individual nations. These traffickers have adopted a global approach to their operations, consequently amassing billions of dollars in illicit profits, weakening national economies and democratic institutions, spreading violence and destruction, and producing some of the most powerful and corrupting organizations in the world.

The DEA recognizes that interagency cooperation and coordination is fundamental to increasing the efficiency of our operation in the transit zones. The DEA is committed to maintaining an effective relationship with its partners in domestic and international law enforcement, as well as its operational counterparts in other agencies. Having said this, we must and will continue to synchronize the resources and capabilities of operational enforcement agencies to collectively put forth the strongest effort to combat drug trafficking in the transit zones.

Chairman McHenry, Ranking Member Cummings, I thank you once again for the opportunity to testify and look forward to answering any questions you may have. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harrigan follows:]

**Statement of Thomas M. Harrigan**

**Chief of Enforcement Operations**

**Drug Enforcement Administration**

***Before the***

**House Government Reform**

**Subcommittee on Criminal Justice**

**Drug Policy, and Human Resources**

**"Interrupting Narco-Terrorist Threats on the High Seas:**

**Do We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails?"**

## Introduction

Chairman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings, distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of Administrator Karen P. Tandy, I wish thank you for your continued support of the men and women of DEA as well as for the opportunity to testify today to discuss drug trafficking in the transit zones.

DEA's primary function as an investigative law enforcement agency is to identify and dismantle the world's most sophisticated drug distribution organizations. In gathering intelligence from our investigations, DEA identifies actionable leads that can be passed to interdiction forces which result in seizures and arrests. These in turn generate tips and leads for investigators to further their current investigation or initiate new investigations.

DEA's role in interdiction efforts is crucial since the intelligence gained from these operations often provides the information needed to unveil the depth and magnitude of a drug trafficking organization's abilities and intentions. Law enforcement, intelligence, and interdiction agencies all have an integral role in this cycle of disruption of drug trafficker operations.

Drug trafficking has evolved into an international business that affects each and every one of us on a daily basis. Decisions made in source areas such as Bogota and Transit Zone areas such as Mexico, have a direct and immediate impact on our major cities in the United States, and increasingly in smaller rural areas of the United States.

## Threat Assessment:

Most of the major illegal drugs abused in the United States are produced in Latin America. Cocaine production begins in South America where net cultivation in the Andean Ridge countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru has remained fairly consistent over the past two years at roughly 166,000 hectares under cultivation. Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru collectively produced an estimated 640 metric tons of pure cocaine base in 2004,

roughly a 5 percent decline from production levels in 2003. Production levels have generally declined over the last few years due primarily to eradication efforts. Colombia, over the last several years, has become less dependent on Peruvian and Bolivian sources of supply for cocaine base. Colombia now produces at least 70 percent of the global cocaine HCl and as much as 90 percent of the cocaine HCl that reaches the United States. Traffickers use a variety of smuggling methods to move their product out of Latin America, including maritime and air conveyances. Currently, the majority of the cocaine is believed to be smuggled via maritime means. Colombia also produces heroin which is oftentimes smuggled on persons who travel via commercial air to transport the heroin. Drugs depart South America for locations worldwide. When one focuses however on those drugs destined for the United States, two very general corridors standout: Mexico/Central America and the Caribbean.

## MEXICO-CENTRAL AMERICAN CORRIDOR

**Situation Analysis:**

Historically, Colombian drug traffickers have utilized the Mexico-Central American corridor as a transshipment route to smuggle cocaine into the United States (U.S.). Cocaine is smuggled into Mexico via maritime, land, and air conveyances. Go-fast vessels and fishing vessels are the primary conveyances used to move cocaine into Mexico and Central America. Seizures in the transit zone often provide additional intelligence for enforcement activities and opportunities for United States prosecution. Arresting traffickers and enlisting their cooperation is a great source of information regarding the drug trafficking organizations' methods of operation.

**DEA Operations:**

*Operation Panama Express* – a multi-agency Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) investigation that began in the mid 1990s. Today there are personnel from DEA, ICE, JIATF, FBI, IRS, U.S. COAST GUARD, the U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Florida, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and the Sarasota, Hillsborough, and Pinellas County Sheriff's Offices dedicated to Operation Panama Express. Panama Express now operates from two offsite locations divided by investigative responsibility over the transit zones they cover. They also now operate as smaller fusion centers for the collection of actionable intelligence which is passed to the Joint Inter Agency Task Force South (JIATF-S) in Florida. JIATF-S utilizes the information to better direct air and naval assets towards the goal of interdicting vessels smuggling cocaine through the transit zones.

The multi-agency El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) also participates in sharing information that increases the effectiveness of Panama Express. By passing real-time, actionable intelligence information on smuggling operations to JIATF-S, transit zone interdictions can be made more precise. As Assistant Administrator for Intelligence Anthony Placido testified to this committee on June 14, 2005, the cooperative efforts

among EPIC, JTF-N, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) and JIATF-S contribute greatly to our interdiction effectiveness. These organizations recently met in Dallas, Texas to develop a common operating procedure that will ultimately improve our efforts in the transit zone.

Panama Express has had a measurable impact on the cocaine transportation industry, and law enforcement in general, outside of the statistical accomplishments of arrests and seizures and dismantlement of the cocaine organizations. Panama Express has had a significant impact on many factors related to task force operations, intelligence gathering, the deployment of naval and air assets dedicated to the interdiction of smuggling ventures, the development of technology used to target drug transportation and prosecution of cases resulting from JIATF-S interdictions.

The impact of Operation Panama Express is evident in the fact that not only have drug trafficking organizations (DTO) generally reduced the size of the cocaine loads they are smuggling by fishing vessel to an average of 3,000 kilograms, but also through Panama Express, more than 500 mariners have been arrested, significantly diminishing the supply of experienced mariners to operate the fishing vessels and go-fast boats used to smuggle cocaine. These factors resulting from the impact of Operation Panama Express have imposed significant hardships on the operating procedures of drug traffickers.

The following are arrest and seizure statistics for Panama Express, for FY 03, 04, and 05 thru 6/9/05 (seizure amounts include loads that are scuttled as well)

- FY 03 - arrests - 216; seizures - 63,000 kgs
- FY 04 - arrests - 261; seizures – 110,109 kgs
- FY 05 - arrests – 203; seizures - 76,920 kgs

- There have been approximately 190 interdictions credited to Operation Panama Express since its inception in 2000.

## CARIBBEAN CORRIDOR

**Situation Analysis:**

Currently, Latin American drug organizations, particularly major Colombian North Coast groups use the Caribbean corridor, especially the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, and the Bahamas as a transshipment point for cocaine and heroin destined for the United States and Europe. Key strategic countries utilized by these organizations as hubs are Curacao, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and St. Maarten.

Over the years, Colombian traffickers have exploited the Caribbean corridor, as the region provides them with increased flexibility and anonymity because of its vast geographic territory, numerous law enforcement jurisdictions, and fragmented investigative resources.

DEA has conducted several key multi-jurisdiction multi-national investigations that have had a significant effect on drug trafficking in the Caribbean region. Indicators of an interdiction impact include a reduction in the flow of drugs to certain areas and a shifting of transit routes through others. Overall, the strategic placement of interdiction assets in the Caribbean significantly enhances the effectiveness of DEA's efforts.

**DEA Operations:**

The DEA Special Operations Division (SOD) developed a Caribbean Initiative and began working with several countries in the Caribbean corridor to utilize evidence and intelligence derived to develop multi-national investigations. This multi-faceted investigative strategy is designed to combat the trafficking problem by employing a coordinated regional attack on the entire trafficking organization simultaneously – from the sources of supply in Colombia to the transportation cells in the Caribbean corridor, the distribution cells throughout the U.S., and the financial operations.

The following operations, in which several Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTS) were arrested, are examples of the success DEA has realized by utilizing the Caribbean Initiative to target priority drug trafficking organizations:

***Operation Double Talk*** – a multi-jurisdiction, multi-national OCDETF operation targeting Bahamian-based cocaine trafficking organization laundering money through financial institutions in New York and elsewhere. As a result of the New York operations, not only was a cocaine distribution cell (moving 500 kilogram shipments) disrupted but a heroin mill capable of distributing approximately 30-50 kilograms per month was seized and assets worth more than $5,000,000 are being forfeited by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York and DEA. This organization is responsible for transporting multi-hundred kilograms of cocaine via maritime methods from Jamaica to the United States via the Bahamas. These loads of cocaine were being transported into Miami, Florida from the Bahamas and then further trucked up to New York for distribution. To date, 31 arrests have been made, 235 kilograms of cocaine have been seized, 1,500 pounds of marijuana and $8,409,200 in US currency/assets have been seized. The Bahamas has continued their international cooperation with the United States, and is coordinating execution of additional arrests and search warrants in the Bahamas and Jamaica to coincide with Operation Busted Manatee.

***Operation Busted Manatee*** – a multi-jurisdictional, multi-national OCDETF operation initiated in August 2002. This operation targets significant Colombian sources of supply of cocaine, Colombian North Coast transportation coordinators, Caribbean trafficking cells, U.S./Canada based distribution cells, and money launderers from Colombia, Jamaica, the Bahamas, the United States, and Canada. These drug traffickers are responsible for transporting multi-ton quantities of cocaine from the North Coast of Colombia to Jamaica, the Bahamas, and South Florida for distribution to the U.S. and Canada. Operation Busted Manatee currently encompasses investigations in seven DEA offices (Miami, FL; Kingston, Jamaica; Cartagena, Colombia; Nassau, Bahamas; Panama; Ottawa, Canada; and

New York, NY) the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of New York, the U.S. Attorney for Southern District of Florida, the Criminal Division's Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, and six countries (Colombia, Canada, Panama, Jamaica, Bahamas, and the United Kingdom).

The well coordinated, multi-national effort between investigators from ***Operations Busted Manatee*** and ***Double Talk***, represents an impressive coalition that has compiled to date, 130 arrests, the seizure of 6,589 kilograms of cocaine, 2,665 pounds of marijuana, and $45,929,155.40 in U.S. currency/assets.

**CARIBBEAN INITIATIVE STATISTICS**

| SOD OPERATION | ARRESTS | COCAINE (KG) SEIZED | MARIJUANA (LB) SEIZED | U.S. CURRENCY/ ASSETS SEIZED |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Double Talk | 31 | 235 | 1,500 | $8,409,200 |
| Busted Manatee | 99 | 6,354 | 1,165 | $37,519.955.40 |
| **Total** | **130** | **6,589** | **2,665** | **$45,929,155.40** |

***Operation Firewall*** - The North Coast of Colombia is a major embarkation zone for go-fast vessels laden with multi-ton quantities of cocaine destined for United States via the Caribbean and Central American countries. It is estimated that several hundred go-fast boats leave the North Coast annually and each go-fast has the capability to transport between 1.5 and 2 metric tons of cocaine. To combat this situation, the Cartagena Resident Office (RO), Bogotá Country Office, in conjunction with the Cartagena Tactical Analysis Team and JIATF-S developed a maritime interdiction program on the Colombian north coast called Operation Firewall. Operation Firewall specifically integrates resources of foreign counterparts, such as the Colombian Navy/Coast Guard, Air Force, the Colombian National Police, Anti-narcotics North Zone Unit, SOUTHCOM, and DEA with support from U.S. Department of State/Narcotics Affairs Section. This program works in tandem with Panama Express and other maritime initiatives to target as well as maximize interdiction capabilities against Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs) as well as Colombian transportation organizations in the Caribbean.

The mission of this DEA-sponsored program is to specifically target go-fast boat activity and support investigative and intelligence efforts directed at transportation organizations related to DEA priority targets. Since the inception of Operation Firewall in July of 2003, and through June of 2005, the program has resulted in an approximate seizure of 21,923 kilograms of cocaine. Combined with Panama Express, the numbers are significantly enhanced with a total of 71,583 kilos of cocaine seized, 46 go-fast vessels seized and a total of 173 individuals arrested. While these combined figures provide an illustration of the successful and seamless relationship between Operation Firewall and Panama Express, they represent only a handful of the successful and collaborative counter-drug operations executed to interrupt the flow of narcotics through the transit zones.

**Conclusion:**

Chairman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings, distinguished members of the subcommittee, drug trafficking organizations today have the capacity to overwhelm the defenses of individual nations. These traffickers have adopted a global approach to their operations, consequently amassing billions of dollars of illicit profits, weakening national economies and democratic institutions, spreading violence and destruction, and producing some of the most powerful and corrupting organizations in the world. Therefore, it is incumbent on all nations to structure law enforcement operations which can dismantle these formidable sophisticated traffickers. The DEA recognizes that inter-agency cooperation and coordination is fundamental to increasing the efficiency of our operations in the transit zones. The DEA is committed to maintaining an effective relationship with its partners in domestic and international law enforcement, as well as its operational counterparts in other agencies. The United States must continue to synchronize the resources and capabilities of operational and enforcement agencies to collectively put forth the strongest effort to combat drug trafficking in the transit zones.

I thank you once again for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Mr. MCHENRY. I thank the panel for your opening statements. At this time, I would like to recognize Ranking Member Cummings for his series of questions.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to thank all of you for your efforts in what you do everyday to make our world a safer world.

I want to go to you, Admiral Hathaway, and something that you said that I just found very interesting. When you were talking about the resources needed and the fast boats, you said we are working on it. I am just wondering, explain exactly the process. In other words, we know about a certain number of fast boats, we cannot catch up with them.

Can you just elaborate a little bit on that, and then tell me what resources you would need to get to the level that you would like to. It sounds like there may be a level of frustration. I am trying to picture this fast boat going past me and I am not able to catch up with it. I am just wondering what is it that we need.

Admiral HATHAWAY. The greater intelligence that we have today, and much of that comes from the Panama Express operation that has been described to you by some of my colleagues, gives us better knowledge on departure times, departure locations of drug movements. Many of those are interdicted by host nations, primarily Colombian forces, and many, many are not.

We do not have precise data that allows us to track those vessels, these go-fast vessels that sometimes move at 30, 40 knots depending on weather conditions. What we need is to put eyes on them and we have to have surface assets to get in place to be able to effect an interdiction.

Not having perfect knowledge, you need some sort of maritime patrol aircraft to find the target, you need a surface asset and most ideally equipped with an armed helicopter to stop that asset so that it can be compelled to have law enforcement come on board and to find out if, in fact, they are committing an illegal act. Because of the great knowledge that we have, we know that there are many events that occur that we are not able to physically get either the aircraft or surface assets on scene. We have a terrific track record of being able to effect an end-game, get what we call in JIATF a disruption, either seize the drugs or cause the drugs to be jettisoned, they never get to a world market. That is great news. That is the cup half full. But we also know that the level of information and detail that we have today would allow us to do better.

What would it take, quite frankly, today is a greater level of aircraft support, maritime patrol aircraft, as we call it, persistent coverage in those areas. What we have to do today is I have to go at risk. In order to go after intelligence in one area, I have to vacate another area of the ocean, quite frankly, most often. We go where we have the best intelligence and I can make the best use of the assets that I have. I think working collaboratively we have come up with estimates of what it would take to be able to interdict certain percentages of drugs. We do not have a national goal in terms of what we should be doing in the transit zone; we try to do the best that we can with what we have. But we also have some very good estimates of what it would take to perform even better. What I do know is we can make much greater and effective use of the

assets that we have assigned to us today than we could have 5 or 6 years ago.

Mr. CUMMINGS. How many would you estimate that we are missing, the go-fast boats?

Admiral HATHAWAY. Well, sir, our estimates are, as I said in my opening statement, I used as an example the interagency documented 331 go-fast events in 2004 through our primary operating area. Most of those were transiting in the Western Caribbean but some were in the Eastern Pacific, some were in the Eastern Caribbean. Out of those, we actually were able to put eyes on about 93 of those, and three-quarters of those we were actually able to get an interdiction, which meant people were arrested, drugs were disrupted and were taken out of the system.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So we know pretty much that drugs are on those boats?

Admiral HATHAWAY. The intelligence we have is, yes, they were drug movements.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just one other question. Do you think that the administration's budget request is sufficient for you to accomplish what you want to accomplish? I wish the people in my neighborhood could understand the difficulty that you all have. Because a common question that I am asked in my neighborhood, which is only about an hour away from here in the inner-city of Baltimore, is that we don't have any boats, no planes. People have this feeling, because they do not know, they think that this is a very easy task to keep the drugs from coming in. I try to explain it to them as best I can that there are a lot of folks who are trying to get these drugs in. So what you are telling me then is that we have a whole slew of fast boats coming through at one time. That is a major, major problem; am I right? You just said you had to take resources from one place and take them over to the other. So I imagine that if they had some kind of coordinated effort, there would be a real big problem.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Well the effort that we have in coordinating what we have——

Mr. CUMMINGS. I am talking about if these drug smugglers had a coordinated effort.

Admiral HATHAWAY. What we do know about the transportation industry is there is a vague amount of coordination amongst a variety of those who transport drugs through our primary joint operating area. The fact of the matter, if you have 331 go-fast events, that is slightly less than one per day moving through our joint operating area. Trying to figure out whether it is leaving from Venezuela, the North coast of Colombia, the west coast of Colombia, or out of Panama is the trick. The intelligence we have allows us to do a much better job at that.

It is a vast, vast area and obviously we could do a better job. My job is to make the most effective operation out of what we have. And we are very proud of the effectiveness that we do have given the level of assets that we have. The administration's budget takes us another step down the road, quite frankly. Cooperation with our international partners, our traditional allies, we know that some of these drugs are coming over to Europe, has never been better. I think they are going to step up to the plate in even greater num-

bers, although they suffer from some of the same problems that U.S. military does in that the high usage rate of their assets is causing them in many cases to have to retire them earlier than they hoped for. That has been the case with the Navy P–3 aircraft, for example, which was a backbone for a long time for JIATF-South maritime patrol ops.

As it has been pointed out, the Coast Guard and CBP have been able to step up to the plate. DOD has been able to provide E–3s, our most sophisticated AWACS aircraft that I will be able to use in air bridge denial operations over Colombia and free up Customs and Border Protection P–3 domes to move into the maritime world. So we will be able to plus-up a very capable asset in the maritime world while the Air Force takes over the air bridge denial role for us, which is very good.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you.

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. If I may take my time now. Admiral Hathaway, I want to continue with Mr. Cummings line of thought here. You said 331 known go-fast events, that is known. Those are actually hard numbers that we are aware of of these events. Of those, 238 were not detected. Now can you describe the difference between known and not detected? We know that it is leaving Venezuela, we cannot detect that it has left Venezuela. Can you explain the measurement tool there?

Admiral HATHAWAY. The interagency group that documented those 331 cases have a level of reliability that they adhere to that a smuggling event occurred, each one of those 331, it is more than single source reporting. In many cases, we may not have even known the event was occurring until after the drugs arrived but sources told us that, in fact, the drugs arrived. So that is where we get the 331 number. It is intelligence.

Not detected means that we never saw those events as they occurred. We never had laid eyes on them in a detection and monitoring mode. I never had the opportunity to be able to——

Mr. MCHENRY. So you know they arrived, for instance, you know they arrived or you know they departed, the two events you know.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Correct.

Mr. MCHENRY. Maybe I am not directing this in the right way, but Mr. Cummings had this line of questioning to you and I thought it was interesting. Maybe Mr. Stallworth or if anyone else would like to chime in. So you know that it left, or you know that it arrived, and perhaps some you knew both that it left and that it arrived, and others you just knew one side or the other. All right. Now you said 93 detected. That means you saw it move; which is it left, it is in transit, it arrives. So 93 you saw in transit, detected. Of those 93, you caught 73. Pretty good when you actually see it move. OK.

First, let us commend you on actually having good intelligence. If it is 331, there had to be many more out there. Now that is another question. But it seems to me that if you are detecting 331 events yet you are only seeing in action 93 move, we have a real issue of actually seeing it move. I may be new around here, but it seems like a very basic concept that something is missing. Is it boats, is it airplanes, is it technology; what is the problem?

Mr. UTLEY. May I jump in on that because I own the data base. It is a CCDB, consolidated counterdrug data base. The point that Admiral Hathaway was making is that we have a pretty good idea that this event took place because we knew it left and we knew it arrived, but we might not know, I am going to reiterate what Admiral Hathaway said, that the event took place until after it took place. So there is another dimension and it is a time dimension in there, that had he known he may have been able to do something.

Mr. MCHENRY. This sounds like back to the future, time travel.

Mr. UTLEY. Well, not really. It is actually just a matter of a lot of times you do not know about an event until after it has taken place. I guess that is what I am trying to say.

Mr. MCHENRY. What I am asking for is this is an opportunity to say what are we missing. Admiral Sirois, I certainly appreciate your stepping forward and saying the Coast Guard may need some better equipment to compete with the go-fast. I certainly appreciate you stepping forward on that. Mr. Stallworth, you mentioned aircraft, we have to make a decision on are we going to keep repairing these aircraft or are we going to move forward with technology. I appreciate that instead of like being in la la land and not actually taking on the meat of the issue, the center part of this is the interdiction part, the actual catching those people in action. I certainly appreciate the time issue. But it seems to me that if know it left and you know it arrived, where is it in the middle? What can we do to catch the middle? Am I making any sense to you all? Everybody seems quiet.

Mr. STALLWORTH. Let me help you out a little bit here with the dynamics so you will understand a little bit better that it is not just a straight line, two points and it is a straight line between those. We have about 6 million square miles between us and the source. So we may know something is leaving Cartagena but you do not know necessarily what its destination is. So there is a little bit of time that you can use Colombian forces in their territorial waters to try and intercept that, find something that matches the description that you have. You may not have a direction, you may not know where it is going.

Let me give you a little bit of the life of a logistics move of drug trafficking. We get intelligence from people that may know about the time that it is leaving, the method that it is going, etc. Sometimes you do not know when but you know what the name is. But sometime between its departure and its arrival, that is where you have to do a detection, monitor it, find out if it is the right one, sort it out, and then put something on the surface down there. We do not have airplanes with grappling hooks to reach down there and just pull a fast boat out of the water, so we have to get someone down there. So sometimes we will observe something but none of the good guys are in a position to catch it or intercept it. So now you give information out to those people that may be at the port that it is likely going to, etc. And at the same time, Admiral Hathaway has international forces and our own domestic forces that are out there positioned as best they can be geographically, none of them sitting still, some do sit still, but most with an area of operations to try and cutoff a corridor.

So even if you knew, even with the 331, if you had time to do it, you are still going to have to sort through those. The numbers that he gave you, out of the 93 there were 73 that actually were real, it is just like being a policeman and there are speeders out there, here are 93 of them, how many are actually speeding. Well you can do that with an indicator. For us, you have to stop them, get inside, and then try and find it. These people are in business and their business is to get their product to market. It is very difficult for us, and that is why the cooperation is necessary throughout the interagency, both from the intelligence all the way through the investigation once you do catch someone, trying to feed the intelligence so that we can go back into the infrastructure and the organizations and the financial underpinnings of the drug trafficking.

Mr. MCHENRY. OK. Admiral Sirois.

Admiral SIROIS. Mr. Chairman, I know you are looking for a solution, and I can give you a short-term and a long-term. The 25 percent of the go-fast boats, and there is more than just go-fast, there are sailboats and merchant ships, fishing boats, but the 25 percent of the go-fast boats, if we had armed helicopters on every ship we could catch that 25 percent of the boats that we see go by. We have a plan that is in the budget to arm all Coast Guard helicopters so every ship will be deploying with an armed Coast Guard helicopter. So that will take care of that 25 percent. We hope to complete that over the next 3 to 4 years.

Also in the Deepwater plan, many of our legacy assets are being upgraded—better sensors, better communications suites, our new Deepwater cutters, for many, it is 2, 3 years before they come off the waves, but we can leverage better capabilities on our old cutters that will provide Admiral Hathaway with better assets in the fight down in the transit zone.

We have a large initiative, supported by the President, for maritime domain awareness, which is knowing what is going on out there, and it is an integrated network system of sensors, satellites, communications, unmanned aerial vehicles, all these things that will be networked in the system. When they come to full production that is when I think we are really going to show some successes in the transit zone.

Mr. HARRIGAN. Sir, if I may followup also just to sort of close the loop I believe on this. To give you a little background, we keep alluding to Operation Panama Express and that is based upon we have a cadre of sources of informants throughout the region, throughout the transit and the source zones. We obtain information from these sources of information. It may not be specific but we go with it. Again, just solely based on any information they may have, they feed back to Panama Express, we then feed it to JIATF, and obviously JIATF does the best they can with the available resources they have.

Mr. MCHENRY. I have gone significantly over my time. I guess that is the luxury of having the gavel at the moment. But I certainly appreciate you all going through this range of thought here. The idea of this hearing is to actually get ideas to help you do your jobs better. And I certainly appreciate your willingness to come forward and explain this process so we can look at ideas to actually

do what we are supposed to be doing, and that is to give you all the resources to achieve those goals. That is why we have these hearings on a regular occasion is to keep driving that process forward.

It seems to me that we need to make sure we have the resources and the technology in place so that we can actually do the job on the ground, in the water, and make this process easier for you. And if it is a question of resources, we would like to hear that. If it is a question of policy, we need to hear that too. That is the purpose of this committee.

Furthermore, we actually had a hearing back in January I believe, Admiral Hathaway, and I think Chairman Souder had some questions that he submitted and is still looking forward to receiving your response from that. We are now about 5 months or 6 months after that hearing, so we would like to hear from you on that.

At this time I will yield to Mr. Cummings for a second round of questions, and yield the Chair to my good friend, the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Brown-Waite.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Gentlemen, I want to reiterate that we do appreciate what you do. I want to just go on that subject of appreciation. Admiral Sirois, you just talked about bringing some new equipment to certain Coast Guard vessels; is that what you were saying?

Admiral SIROIS. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. What did you say? Say that again, please.

Admiral SIROIS. Our legacy fleet, our older cutters, we are putting new sensors on them, communications suites so that they are more effective in the job they are doing.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. And when we interdict, how dangerous is it? What do we usually find with regard to weapons?

Admiral SIROIS. Fortunately, very few weapons. We do find them from time to time. Most of the time we find that the crews will dispose of the weapons before our boarding team goes aboard. It is pretty imposing to have a large Navy ship or Coast Guard ship in close proximity to a 50 foot boat and that presence there dissuades them.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So going back to what you said, Mr. Stallworth, the whole thing of timing. I take it that the timing is very significant in that if you get the information—in other words, I am not trying to figure out who your informants are, but I imagine sometimes they can have some difficulty getting the word to you all in a timely fashion. Is that a reasonable assumption?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Sometimes. And I defer to the DEA on that.

Mr. HARRIGAN. Absolutely. Yes. That is an accurate assessment.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And that can be a real problem.

Mr. HARRIGAN. Absolutely.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So it could be some guy down at the docks somewhere and he sees something happening and then he has to go through 50 million changes, he has also got to protect his own safety and make sure he is safe and does not want to give away the fact that he is a source or he will not be a source very long. Is that reasonable?

Mr. HARRIGAN. Yes, sir. It sounds like you could give the Panama Express briefing, to be quite honest. You hit the nail right on the head.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So then you get the word. But the interesting thing is it sounds like most of the time this information is pretty reliable. Is that safe to say? In other words, reliable that there are drugs on the vessels.

Mr. HARRIGAN. Suffice it to say that the information that we receive is typically—again the cadre of sources that we have out there are fairly reliable, we have worked with them in the past, and they know exactly what to look for: the types of ship, the types of different maneuvers that they may employ, certain dock hands, that type of thing, sir. So this cadre of sources that we have are pretty well-versed in watching out for specific things.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. So I guess what I am trying to figure out is that let us say we see the go-fast boats and one of you all implied there are instances where we get there but maybe we do not have the necessary equipment at that moment. Was it you, Mr. Stallworth?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Yes. There are a number of dynamics as opposed to doing operations on land and a policeman pulling you over to the side of the road. It is called the end-game. For us, we can detect a suspect vessel, but if we do not have anyone on the surface in a position to actually stop them, go inside the vessel, and then inspect to see if there is a concealed compartment or if there are drugs there, we do not know. Sometimes we will se an open boat, a fast boat, but there is no one in the region on the surface that is going to be able to take them down. We just have to document the fact that it is there and where it is and give information and a heads-up to the local authorities of the areas that it may go to.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Would any kind of aerial operation help with that, like helicopters or——

Mr. STALLWORTH. Sure, if you had land-based helicopters that were on the islands, for instance, in the Caribbean. But you have a lot of water out there and the range of a helicopter and even the vessels that you put helicopters on have to be so close to that target vessel before the helicopter can take off because it has to have the ability to go out there, stop, if the vessel stops the helicopter has to stay there and monitor it until the ship or other surface assets get there. So there is a lot more to being successful with the end-game than just you see them, you know they have drugs, and now you got them. You actually have to catch them.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Were you going to say something, Admiral Sirois?

Admiral SIROIS. Just that the area that we operate in, the transit zone, it is like finding a needle in a haystack.

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Thank you all.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE [presiding]. The gentleman yields back his time.

I have a question for Admiral Hathaway. I understand that the chairman and staff came down to visit you and see the operation and posed some followup questions. Those questions were submitted—the visit was January 13th, and the questions were submitted January 28th.

Chairman Souder is much more patient than I would be. The questions were submitted in writing and then told that the questions would only be answered if they were under the chairman's signature. The bureaucracy in getting a Member of Congress' questions answered seems to me an offense. I find it offensive, I am sure the chairman found it offensive, and I would like to know why it takes 6 months to get some answers to some questions that a Member of Congress who Chairs this subcommittee asks.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Madam Chairman, I certainly apologize for the tardiness of the answers to those questions. I have seen the questions, they were worked on diligently in JIATF, they were very good questions, and I will take back to the administration the subcommittee's dismay that they have not received the appropriate answers.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Well, taking that back is real good, but the question is how many more 6 month periods are we going to have? I understand that the answers were actually submitted and then taken back this past Monday. Is that accurate?

Admiral HATHAWAY. I am not sure exactly where the answers to the questions are within the administration in terms of the clearing process.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Sir, I think the questions were directed to you.

Admiral HATHAWAY. The original questions were directed to myself as the Director of Joint Interagency Task Force South.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. So therefore you are the administration, sir.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Yes, ma'am. And as you know, at my level, when those questions are answered, they are ultimately transmitted to Congress but via my chain of command. And so I will find out where they are and certainly convey the dismay of the subcommittee. We will try to expedite getting those to you just as quickly as possible.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. I think perhaps even more interesting is why they were submitted and then withdrawn. I think an explanation needs to be given for that also. I believe in deadlines, sir.

Admiral HATHAWAY. As do I, Madam Chairman.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. I do not think a 6-month delay is acceptable. So how about within 3 weeks, because you already will have had the questions for almost 6 months. So how about 2 weeks? Could we have a commitment on that? I am sure those bureaucratic wheels can move a whole lot faster.

Admiral HATHAWAY. I will certainly take that back and try to expedite getting the answers to you. And if this subcommittee desires those within 2 weeks, I will make sure that everyone is aware of that. I can promise you that.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you, sir. I have a couple of questions for the representative from DEA. First, thank you all for being here. I apologize I was not here earlier. It is very frustrating when you serve on the Veterans Committee and they simultaneously are holding a hearing and you run from hearing to hearing.

I apologize, I did read part of the testimony though earlier in the day, but I apologize for not being here earlier. I want you to know that any other Members who are not here are facing the exact same situation of committee meetings being held simultaneously

and/or constituents, because this is the time to visit Washington, DC, constituents being in their office. So I apologize for not being here sooner.

Mr. Harrigan, I just have a question for you. Despite the good drug movement intelligence in the transit zone, we lack apparently similar knowledge in Mexico and Central America. So what agency has had the lead in developing logistic support bases that are located near the transit zones? And second, has DEA considered renewing operations in Guatemala?

Mr. HARRIGAN. It is probably very good timing, ma'am. The Chief of Operations Mike Braun, who I am sitting here in place of, is actually in Guatemala as we speak meeting with Ambassador Hamilton and the president of Guatemala over that issue. So hopefully we will have our bases covered down in Guatemala.

As far as the initial question, ma'am, you are correct. The problem when we see these go-fast boats and fishing vessels leave from the source countries, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, once they get into Mexico/Central America, to be quite honest with you, we are not quite sure what happens. It is literally once it goes into Mexico they break these loads down to considerably smaller loads and it is almost like an army of ants coming across the Southwest border. I believe CBP puts estimates of seizures average about 20 kilos per seizure along the Southwest border.

So we are in the process of developing, along with the other gentlemen here on the panel, DEA has a drug flow prevention strategy that we are turning into a plan. We are looking at targeting the vulnerabilities of these drug organizations and certain choke points where we will be able to identify them before they get to Mexico and Central America. It is certainly an issue.

We have several offices in Mexico, ma'am, our main office in Mexico City, and we are doing what we can with the resources we have down there. We have a good relationship with the Mexican police, with some of the vetted units, and we are doing the best we can to try and identify those areas where these huge loads are coming into both Mexico and Central America.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Let me ask you two other questions. First of all, were you with Customs before it was taken over by Homeland Security?

Mr. HARRIGAN. No, ma'am. No. DEA, Department of Justice, yes.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. OK. We have heard about the tremendous success of the Panama Express intelligence cuing. Our reliance on this kind of intelligence sources should not be our only avenues of information on the drug trade. What other exploitable sources on this kind of information do you have in the transit zone operations area?

Mr. HARRIGAN. Right now, ma'am, we rely almost exclusively on human intelligence. That is the bread and butter, to be quite honest with you. We have some great assets out there, whether they be technical in nature, but again, as Admiral Hathaway and Admiral Sirois alluded to earlier, we may have particular information they may be out in a particular zone, but it's like finding a needle in a haystack.

So without human intelligence, it is an uphill battle. So it is with that human intelligence that we can perhaps sort of close the area

a bit more for the JIATF and DOD assets to interdict those ships before they get to Mexico and Central America.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. So you are really relying a lot on the human intelligence?

Mr. HARRIGAN. Absolutely.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. On a scale of 1 to 10, how reliable is the information that you get?

Mr. HARRIGAN. It depends, obviously, on who it is coming from. But the success of Panama Express again is based on human intelligence and our sources in the area. So for the most part, if we get information, if it is gleaned through the Interagency folks, we take a hard look at it, as does every other agency sitting at this table, and we have a pretty good idea if there is a certain movement that is going to occur.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. One other question, and that is, does the DEA feel that the Joint Interagency Task Force South has optimized their airborne and maritime patrol efforts?

Mr. HARRIGAN. I would have to defer, ma'am, to Admiral Hathaway. But we have an outstanding relationship. We have agents and intelligence analysts as well as support personnel assigned to JIATF-South. They have every request that has come from DEA, any tasking, it has always been acted upon. Other than that, I would really have no comment to that particular question.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. So you are not at liberty to say whether you believe that they have optimized the airborne and maritime patrol?

Mr. HARRIGAN. I believe they have. I believe they have. From the information that we pass along to them, absolutely.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. OK. Is it true that about 90 percent of all drugs come into the U.S. through the Mexican border?

Mr. HARRIGAN. Those are the estimates, ma'am. Right now, the IACM, Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement, put the figures in 2003 at approximately 77 percent of the cocaine coming into the U.S. transited Mexico/Central America, and they had the remaining 23 percent going through the Caribbean. In 2004 there was tremendous movement, where estimates put it at 92 percent of the cocaine coming from South America would transit the Mexico/Central America corridor, while 8 percent would transit the Caribbean. OK. Now again, these are estimates that this IACM put together.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. When I first moved to Florida, I moved to a coastal area and kind of the local chatter was that there was a lot of drug smuggling going on through the fishing boats, small fishing boats. Tell me, has that changed? Has it gotten better? Has it gotten worse? This is along the west coast of Florida.

Mr. HARRIGAN. I will answer in part, ma'am, and then I will defer to perhaps Admiral Hathaway. Again, we have seen a decline over the last year or so of shipments going through the Caribbean. Again, they are simply estimates, nothing more, nothing less. We do see the vast majority of the drugs that are smuggled into the United States obviously come via maritime vessels, whether it be go-fast, whether it be containerized vessels, whether it be small fishing vessels. So based upon the IACM, we have seen a decline in the Caribbean.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you. Anybody else care to respond to that? Admiral Hathaway. Mr. Stallworth.

Mr. STALLWORTH. Yes, ma'am. To answer your question specifically about the west coast of Florida, it is difficult to say specifically. What I can say is regionally in South Florida, especially with the post-September 11th Department of Homeland Security's efforts down there in south Florida, where the Coast Guard, Air and Marine Operations, and the Border Patrol essentially produce one flying schedule so we deconflict all of our assets and we utilize them in probably the most effective and efficient way possible with the assets that we have, and with some of the operations down there, which included taking back the Miami River which was a Joint Interagency, investigative, etc., State and local, and Federal.

That operation has been I think very successful, and what happens is it has a tendency to impact the whole region. So when law enforcement and the Department got our act together down there and started acting in a cooperative manner, what we did has really had an impact on the total of south Florida, both maritime and air.

So I think the impact has been there. The focus on the Miami River project, and the focus in the other regions down there, the threat of mass migration from Cuba and other areas, has resulted in team work that has resulted in a much safer environment down there for south Florida. I think what you are seeing is just that.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you. Anyone else wish to comment? Yes?

Admiral SIROIS. The area along the coast we call the arrival zone, and that is the responsibility of CBP, Coast Guard, and many other State and local agencies. You mentioned the fishing fleet, certainly fishing fleet is suspect. I would have to ask my local folks in Florida what information they have, but any conveyance, and of course there are hundreds of thousands if not millions of boats in Florida, are opportunities.

The problem off the coast of Florida or any coastal area is those small boats carry small amounts of drugs. That is why it is most important that what JIATF-South does is get the large loads. As difficult as it is to get the large loads, it is much easier to do that than get the small loads in close to home.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you. Mr. Cummings, I believe you have some questions?

Mr. CUMMINGS. I will be very brief, Madam Chairlady. I just was wondering, to you Admiral Hathaway, is there a diversion of assets when the code levels go up? In other words, are we seeing a movement with regard to trying to deal with other priorities, particularly after September 11th and what have you? And if there are, does that call for a movement of your forces? And how does that affect what you do? Do you follow me? Maybe somebody else can answer that too.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Yes, sir. I will provide a comment and then I would turn to both my Coast Guard and my Customs and Border Protection colleagues. In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, there is no doubt that at JIATF-South both Coast Guard and what is now Customs and Border Protection assets were pulled back in fairly large numbers. Both of those organizations have matured greatly since that time.

As security levels go up in the United States, our assessment today as today's JIATF-South Commander, is that both the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection are able to handle both missions almost simultaneously. I no longer see a wholesale movement of assets from those two Interagency partners away from JIATF-South. We are able to maintain our level of operations while both these organizations flex in their homeland security duties. That is my assessment from the JIATF-South perspective. But I will ask both of them for theirs.

Admiral SIROIS. After September 11th the Coast Guard did draw back many of its major cutters in close to our ports and shores. Since that time, with the administration's budget and the support of Congress, we have added hundreds of new boats and patrol boats to our inventory. Those boats are doing things along our coastal ports that the major cutters were doing after September 11th. So now if the threat level is increased, we are pretty much able, as Admiral Hathaway mentioned, to do that mission without calling cutters back from his mission.

However, having said that, there are other things that we do that could cause us to pull back our cutters—mass migration from Cuba, mass migration from Haiti. All our cutters are multi-mission, so there are more things than the elevated Homeland Security threat alert level that could cause a disruption in the allocation of assets.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Anyone else? Mr. Stallworth.

Mr. STALLWORTH. Yes, sir. From the perspective of CBP, our counterterrorism mission is just as important as our counternarcotics, you almost cannot separate them. The Commissioner of Customs has a defense in depth strategy that includes the transit zone. So we would look at the facts and what the issue is because we know that the threat vector can come from the South just like it can from the North. So the decision is based on the threat and the situation as it is. There would not be just an immediate withdrawal of assets.

Mr. CUMMINGS. To Admiral Hathaway, I was just sitting here thinking about all you have been through today. I would imagine that if I were trying to put together one of those Southwest Airlines commercials, this would be the ideal time for you—you just want to get away. [Laughter.]

But I wanted to say, I hope you can understand the urgency. Believe me, I am not going to pile on; believe me. I understand Chairman Souder's concern about getting the information. I am assuming, based upon what you have said, that if it were up to you, and you do not have to answer this because I know you have a chain of command and all that kind of thing, that I guess we would have these answers.

But I am just asking you, as the Chairlady has said, and I agree with her, that we only have a limited amount of time to operate in this Congress and we do have a sense of urgency. Sometimes the public may not believe that, but we do. We have a limited amount of time to get some things done.

So I would hope that you would do the best you can. It is simply not good enough to say you will try. We kind of need answers. And

if there are problems, you need to let us know. We are human beings and we understand problems.

So I just could not leave this room without saying that to you because I want you to have a decent evening, and I really mean that. I have sat on the general committee for now 9½ years and I have seen people come before this committee and leave just simply devastated. I do not want you to leave feeling that way, and I am saying that very sincerely. You all do so much for us and you affect all of our neighborhoods and I know you do the best you can with what you have.

I know that when you are a military person there are certain things that you just do not say because there are chains of command and all that kind of thing. But I hope you will give it everything you have. I think the Chairlady asked for it in 2 weeks, if you could do that for us, please do that. And if for any reason that is in any way impossible, and I am sure it is not impossible, but if it is, please let us know. I hope that my statement helps you get through the evening. We thank you for your service, we really do. Thank you.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. And I thank Mr. Cummings for that question. One of the things that he said is I think he said he wants you to do the best you can with what you have. The reason why the chairman wanted those questions answered is to see what the shortfalls are, what additional equipment you need to better do your job to help interdict the drug trafficking to make our streets safer and our children safer. I do not think that there was any hidden agenda. It was not going to be a gotcha. It was how can we help you get better equipment, more equipment, whatever you need.

Sometimes in any administration their priorities are not always the priorities of the Members of Congress. Like Mr. Cummings and the other members of this committee, I go home every weekend, I see the broken-hearted parents whose kids are hooked on drugs. I have taught in college the caseworkers who work with those who are addicted to drugs. I know the heartache. I know the broken families.

So the chairman's intentions were to help you. As you know, the appropriations process is speeding along much quicker than ever before, and that was his goal, to help you get what you need, to make sure that what you got is a lot better to do your job better.

Before we end the meeting, I would like to hear from everybody here on the panel, and I want to thank you for being here today. Do any of the agencies represented here today support the idea of a maritime oiler to refuel interdiction assets in the Eastern Pacific? How about if we start down here with Mr. Utley.

Mr. UTLEY. I think it would be an excellent idea. It is having to do with the art of the impossible. Right now, the Navy does not have a spare oiler to donate to the Eastern Pacific, unfortunately, and it would be cost-prohibitive, it is somewhere around $25 million, to bring one out of mothballs.

I will let some of my colleagues obviously talk about this, they have more granularity than I do. Approach other countries in the region, it is almost like a bridge too far away, with the Colombian ones in pretty bad shape, the Peruvian is in pretty bad shape,

Chile is too far away. So, oh, yes, that would be really great. But it is the getting there that is very difficult.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you. Admiral Sirois.

Admiral SIROIS. Definitely. The number of days lost to cutters and Navy ships transiting back and forth to get fuel is troubling. I think last year one of our commanders estimated that in the Pacific we lost 100 patrol days because the ships were transiting back and forth.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you.

Admiral HATHAWAY. In U.S. Southern Command, we have been working with our partner nations, as Mr. Utley noted, Peru, Columbia. We have been aggressively pursuing options other than U.S. assets.

The frustration to me I can tell you, and this is the granularity of information we have today, that an on-scene day for one of our ships in the Eastern Pacific, whether it is Coast Guard, whether it is U.S. Navy, is worth about 100 kilograms of cocaine seized. When we lose that ship off-station, that is an opportunity lost. As Admiral Sirois simply said, by some estimates we lost about 100 ship days last year because we had to send cutters and U.S. Navy ships to shoreside refueling.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you. Mr. Stallworth.

Mr. STALLWORTH. Yes, ma'am. From the air and Marine operations perspective, we are the guys who go out there and detect them. We would like for somebody to be on the surface to do the end-game so that the time that we spend out there flying comes to fruition and we protect our neighborhoods. So I am in support of that.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you. Mr. Harrigan.

Mr. HARRIGAN. Well, ma'am, that is a bit out of the area of DEA's expertise. But for what it is worth, I fully concur with my panelists. [Laughter.]

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. You know, I am from New York and it is so good to hear a New York accent.

Mr. HARRIGAN. How did you guess?

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Because I am from New York.

I want to thank each and every one of you for being here. We appreciate your testimony and certainly look forward to having a copy of the response to the chairman. Like you, we are from the Government; we are here to help, we really are. I want to thank you all for being here.

This meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

13 July 2005

The Honorable Mark Souder
Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
Committee on Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
1227 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-3802

Dear Chairman Souder:

In response to your June 30, 2005 letter to Rear Admiral Hathaway of Joint Interagency Task Force South, attached are answers to the questions asked by your subcommittee after the visit to JIATF-S in January.

Pursuant to your request, by August 1, 2005, we will update these answers with the latest FY2005 data, and we will provide the answers to your new questions that were forwarded after the June 29, 2005 hearing.

Thank you for your support of the Department's counternarcotics efforts.

Sincerely,

Mary Beth Long
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics

## Subject: Follow-on Questions to the JIATF South Visit, 13 Jan 2005, by the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy & Human Resources

**Question 1. During the Subcommittee's visit to JIATF South, Admiral Hathaway stated that his actionable intelligence now exceeded his operational interdiction capability. Additionally, the DOD continues to face significant challenges with respect to resource allocation given the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not clear how the shortage of interdiction resources is being addressed by JIATF South and the respective supporting departments.**

**Question 1.a. Please provide a summary of operational assets dedicated to JIATF South detection and monitoring missions, by agency and asset type from FY2000 to present.**

Answer: Assets dedicated to D&M are only one part of the requirement for successful intelligence-based interdiction. The Department continues to provide significant Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets in both the transit and source zones. Most notably, the Department has recently returned two E-3 AWACS aircraft to the theater to increase ISR capability. Moreover, over the past 16 years the Department has developed a command and control capacity at JIATF South that is second to none. Moreover, DoD's significant investment in command, control, communication, and intelligence systems and the invaluable support from other Defense agencies cannot be duplicated by any other department.

The on-station days/hours of all the assets apportioned or assigned to JIATF South, from 1 October 2000 to 31 January 2005, by agency and type of asset[1] are as follows (source Consolidated Counterdrug Data Base (CCDB)):

**Maritime on-station days[2]:**

**US NAVY**

| | FFG | CG | DD | DDG | MCM | PC[3] | SSN | TAGOS | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 628 | 171 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 305 | 30 | 634 | 1,768 |
| FY2001 | 578 | 42 | 101 | 61 | 0 | 390 | 73 | 703 | 1,948 |
| FY2002 | 674 | 126 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 0 | 650 | 1,507 |
| FY2003 | 648 | 0 | 142 | 92 | 8 | 0 | 76 | 33 | 999 |
| FY2004 | 768 | 180 | 0 | 69 | 0 | 0 | 135 | 0 | 1,152 |
| FY2005 | 288 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 0 | 318 |

[1] A description of asset types is attached at the end of these Q&As.
[2] Note: The number of on-station days cited in the charts above is not indicative of the total days contributed by agency / asset. The response in question 2.a. below further elaborates the need to track on-station days / hours rather than tracking the total of days underway or hours flown.
[3] Patrol Craft (PCs) were transferred from the Navy to the Coast Guard following 9/11.

**US COAST GUARD**

| | WHEC | WMEC | WPB | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 141 | 622 | 0 | 763 |
| FY2001 | 119 | 569 | 14 | 702 |
| FY2002 | 198 | 730 | 0 | 928 |
| FY2003 | 110 | 632 | 0 | 742 |
| FY2004 | 623 | 994 | 56 | 1,673 |
| FY2005 | 214 | 217 | 0 | 431 |

**ALLIES**

| | FFG | AO | DD | DDG | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 190 | 192 | 0 | 138 | 520 |
| FY2001 | 280 | 148 | 0 | 34 | 462 |
| FY2002 | 504 | 214 | 0 | 0 | 718 |
| FY2003 | 531 | 187 | 15 | 9 | 742 |
| FY2004 | 515 | 112 | 0 | 8 | 635 |
| FY2005 | 204 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 204 |

**Aircraft on-station hours[4]:**

**CUSTOMS (CBP/ICE/BICE)**

| | C12 | C550 | P3A | P3B | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 36 | 246 | 763 | 1,014 | 2,058 |
| FY2001 | 0 | 1,125 | 399 | 1,763 | 3,287 |
| FY2002 | 60 | 590 | 911 | 1,456 | 3,018 |
| FY2003 | 410 | 151 | 852 | 1,448 | 2,861 |
| FY2004 | 719 | 0 | 1,860 | 2,794 | 5,373 |
| FY2005 | 0 | 0 | 533 | 1,258 | 1,791 |

**US ARMY**

| | ARL | ASP | B200 | C26 | EO5B | RC12 | SRS | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 910 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 399 | 1,309 |
| FY2001 | 1,231 | 381 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,125 | 2,737 |
| FY2002 | 1,360 | 0 | 6 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 1,651 | 3,029 |
| FY2003 | 1,812 | 0 | 133 | 51 | 0 | 365 | 659 | 3,021 |
| FY2004 | 1,134 | 0 | 814 | 388 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 2,343 |
| FY2005 | 98 | 0 | 98 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 196 |

[4] Note: The number of on-station hours cited in the charts above is not indicative of the total hours contributed by agency / asset. The response in question 2.a. below further elaborates the need to track on-station days / hours rather than tracking the total of days underway or hours flown.

**US NAVY**

| | E2C | EP3 | P3C/CDU | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 2,586 | 57 | 4,251 | 6,894 |
| FY2001 | 2,386 | 828 | 4,015 | 7,229 |
| FY2002 | 2,220 | 109 | 4,096 | 6,425 |
| FY2003 | 1,181 | 277 | 4,543 | 6,000 |
| FY2004 | 865 | 1,052 | 2,509 | 4,426 |
| FY2005 | 488 | 48 | 588 | 1,124 |

**US COAST GUARD**

| | HC130 | HU25 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 1,236 | 987 | 2,223 |
| FY2001 | 884 | 1,005 | 1,889 |
| FY2002 | 481 | 496 | 977 |
| FY2003 | 1,368 | 43 | 1,410 |
| FY2004 | 2,721 | 0 | 2,721 |
| FY2005 | 1,184 | 33 | 1,218 |

**US AIR FORCE**

| | C130 | E3 | EC130 | F16 | KC135 | U2 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 287 | 896 | 0 | 89 | 48 | 62 | 1,382 |
| FY2001 | 349 | 843 | 92 | 42 | 38 | 0 | 1,364 |
| FY2002 | 7 | 0 | 966 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 973 |
| FY2003 | 0 | 0 | 966 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 968 |
| FY2004 | 0 | 0 | 394 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 394 |
| FY2005 | 0 | 158 | 0 | 0 | 28 | 0 | 186 |

**ALLIES**

ALLIES

| | FRA ATL2 | FRA C206 | RSS | C26 | FRA C406 | FRA C408 | FRA F50 | FRA F60 | FRA FALCON | FRA HU25 | FRA HU50 | GBR NIMROD | NLD F27 | NLD P3 | P3C (CANADA) | FRA PIPER | FRA SENECA | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 96 | 250 | 608 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1006 |
| FY2001 | 0 | 25 | 596 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 364 | 0 | 972 | 0 | 37 | 5 | 1998 |
| FY2002 | 0 | 0 | 769 | 599 | 0 | 38 | 0 | 31 | 49 | 0 | 104 | 0 | 0 | 1791 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3380 |
| FY2003 | 46 | 0 | 602 | 862 | 0 | 132 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 124 | 0 | 0 | 1680 | 42 | 0 | 0 | 3511 |
| FY2004 | 18 | 0 | 806 | 743 | 0 | 221 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 665 | 0 | 0 | 1660 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4103 |
| FY2005 | 0 | 0 | 224 | 232 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 531 | 0 | 0 | 295 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1282 |

**Question 1. b. Please provide a summary of personnel dedicated to supporting JIATF South detection and monitoring missions, by agency and asset type from FY2000 to present (CPMD).**

Answer: The personnel dedicated to JIATF South, from 1 October 2000 to 31 January 2005, by agency are as follows (source: JIATF South records):

| | FY2000 | FY2001 | FY2002 | FY2003 | FY2004 | Present |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **DoD** | | | | | | |
| USA | 22 | 16 | 27 | 25 | 29 | 26 |
| USAF | 24 | 20 | 21 | 41 | 44 | 42 |
| USMC | 10 | 10 | 10 | 14 | 10 | 12 |
| USN | 25 | 26 | 31 | 81 | 84 | 74 |
| Civ (Army) | 95 | 102 | 115 | 124 | 126 | 118 |
| Civ (DIA) | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Civ (NGA) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| **SUBTOTAL** | **178** | **175** | **206** | **288** [5] | **296** | **277** |
| **INTER-AGENCY** | | | | | | |
| USCG | 21 | 20 | 21 | 23 | 24 | 25 |
| CBP | 7 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 5 |
| CIA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| DEA | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| DOS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| FBI | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| NSAP | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| TSR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| **SUBTOTAL** | **35** | **34** | **38** | **38** | **37** | **37** |
| **TOTAL** | **213** | **209** | **244** | **326** | **333** | **314** |
| AUTH | 235 | 233 | 270 | 355 | 366 | 368 |

[5]Note: this does not represent a real growth in personnel number for JIATF South, but rather reflects the merger of the Joint Southern Surveillance Reconnaissance Operations Center (JSSROC) into JIATF South. With this merger, JIATF South assumed all of the JSSROC mission set: multi-sensor aerial surveillance and fusion utilizing the Relocatable-Over-The-Horizon-Radar (ROTHR) and other ground based and aerial radar platforms for the Caribbean, Central and South America and the southern approaches to the United States. The merger included all JSSROC's equipment and personnel.

**Question 1. c. Please provide current contingency plans intended to fill the shortages in operational resources available to respond to actionable intelligence.**

Answer: JIATF-South does not have permanently assigned assets from DoD, Homeland Security (DHS), or partner nations. DoD allocates assets to Southern Command that are placed under the tactical control of JIATF-South; DHS allocates assets to JIATF-South based on availability and other mission demands. Despite the demands placed on all of these Departments for assets around the world and along our nation's borders, they have always provided JIATF-South with a force structure that continues to set records in detecting, monitoring and interdicting the flow of drugs. Our contingency plan was laid out in a recent document called the "Interdiction Planning and Asset Management Group", which was produced by an interagency working group. The group acknowledged that it is impractical to expect an unconstrained force structure for the drug-interdiction problem. We are instead implementing their recommended alternative strategy to generate a force-multiplying effect. Elements of this strategy include aggressive helicopter tactics against fast boats, technology, better intelligence, and enhancing partner nation capabilities.

**Question 2. The Subcommittee is concerned that we no longer possess the assets to take down known movements of large quantities of contraband entering the Eastern Pacific region from the country of Colombia.**

**Question 2. a. How many aviation and marine assets would be required in the Eastern Pacific to respond to the known intelligence derived from your Panama South operation?**

Answer: We are puzzled by the "no longer posses" language, and emphasize that the Command has had consecutive record-setting interdiction years. Additionally, these types of questions for remote regions like the East Pacific are somewhat complex to answer as the variables are based upon a number of factors, including on-station hours (aircraft), target availability and priorities, and days (ship) requirements. The amount of resources required to meet the on-station requirements are affected by several interrelated factors: the logistics hub from where the asset departs or returns, target location, and sensor capacity. As stated in the answer to the first question, planning for an unconstrained force package is not practical. We will continue to improve our intelligence and enhance partner nation capabilities. ~~To our advantage, traffickers suffer from similar issues as the East Pacific route is a long route for them to take as well; therefore, it places them at risk for interdiction for a longer period of time.~~ SOUTHCOM want to delete this sentence. SOUTHCOM says the opposite is true; the traffickers are headed that way because we aren't out that far. THJ

**Question 2. b. Do you currently have sufficient assets to meet the requirements you identify in the response to the previous questions?**

Answer: We work with the force providers to provide JIATF-South with a force package that allows us to stem the flow of drugs along the Pacific route. We intend to improve our force multipliers, to include better intelligence and increased partner nation capacity.

**Question 2. c. If you devoted sufficient assets to meet the requirements identified in questions 2(a) above what other JIATF South missions would be affected?**

Answer: We have two major smuggling routes to cover - the Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean. It does not make tactical sense to leave any vector open at the expense of another. Therefore, we allocate our resources in the various threat vectors based on intelligence, long-term plans, and short-term surge operations to maximize our efforts to stem the flow of drugs to the United States.

**Question 3. During the Subcommittee Staff's recent visit, the need to establish maritime refueling platforms in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean Sea to support detection, monitoring and interdiction forces was discussed, as well as the fact that the illicit traffickers have already established a network of logistics supply vessels (LSV s) to outmaneuver interdiction forces.**

**Question 3. a. Has such refueling support been requested, when, and of whom?**

Answer: (U) In an unconstrained environment, support from an oiler would be helpful. DoD and the USIC have looked into various options to acquire this capability, but in all cases, the trade-off in costs relative to other requirement were unacceptable or the assets were simply not available.

**Question 3. b. What was the response to those requests, and is maritime refueling support forthcoming, and if not why not?**

Answer: Five options were considered - USN AOE support, contracting MSC Oilers, reactivation of USNS Henry J. Kaiser, chartering a US flagged tanker, and a partner nation oiler. Only the use of a partner nation oiler was determined to be feasible; however, it was determined not to be cost effective relative to other mission requirements.

**Question 3. c. How many resource ship-days would best serve the Western Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific?**

Answer: The JIATF South Oiler requirements are 15 days per month in both the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.

**Question 3. d. Have the cooperating/partner nations been approached to assist with this resource request?**

Answer: Efforts have been underway to develop Oiler support capabilities with Colombia since 2000, Peru since May 2004, and Chile since May 2004. Currently, USSOUTHCOM, through its maritime component NAVSOVTH, is pursuing the development of Partner Nation at-sea refueling capabilities. Due to U.S. and Partner Nation funding constraints, progress is slow. For

example, Peru has volunteered the use of the Oiler LOBITO, but it has been plagued with maintenance issues and, although we have worked for years on this project, we have yet to conduct a proof of concept test, and no progress is expected in the next few years.

**Question 4. The Subcommittee was very impressed by the effectiveness of intelligence developed by Operation Panama Express South (PANEX South) and conveyed to JIATF South and DHS interdiction forces. PANEX appears to be a model for success, a joint effort that should be fully supported and enhanced by participating agencies.**

**Question 4. a. Please provide a summary of JIATF South funding provided to PANEX from FY2000 to present.**

Answer: The following resources were provided to PANEX (amounts in thousands of dollars):

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| FY00 | | No support documentation available |
| FY01 | $21.5 | Direct funding contribution to operations |
| FY02 | $189.6 | Direct funding contribution |
| | $212.0 | Permanent DOD Civilian Intel Analysts costs |
| | $43.9 | Temporary Duty Intel Analysts costs |
| | **$445.5** | **Total** |
| FY03 | $286.9 | Direct funding contribution |
| | $212.0 | Permanent DoD Civilian Intel Analysts |
| | $87.8 | Temporary Duty Intel Analysts |
| | **$586.7** | **Total** |
| FY04 | $290.2 | Direct funding contribution |
| | $212.0 | Permanent DOD Civilian Intel Analysts |
| | $87.8 | Temporary Duty Intel Analysts |
| | **$590.0** | **Total** |
| FY05 | $100.0 | Direct funding contribution |
| | $318.0 | Permanent DOD Civilian Intel Analysts |
| | $87.8 | Temporary Duty Intel Analysts |
| | **$611.8** | **Total thru 2/3/05** |

**Question 4. b. What plans does JIATF South have to enhance PANEX and further develop the partnership with the JIATF South Tactical Analysis Team (TAT) and Liaison (LNO) program?**

Answer: JIATF South will continue to support PANEX operations through direct funding, analyst support, and detection and monitoring operations that target PANEX-identified suspect vessels. In 2005, we will enhance PANEX by assigning two additional intelligence analysts, one

to PANEX North and one to PANEX South. This additional analysis capability will increase the amount of information that can be used to cooperatively identify smuggling targets, apprehend them in the transit zone, and deliver the smugglers into the custody of PANEX.

**Question 5. The Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) carries critical communication system repeaters and can deploy surface search sensors to detect in-coming go fast drug smuggling vessels. However, virtually all of the aerostats close to our sea border approaches have been decommissioned.**

**Question 5. a. Please explain why the decommissioning was justified in light of JIATF South's leading role for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime smuggling?**

Answer: The USG's interdiction strategy is to attack the flow of drug at the source - Colombia. Additionally, we have long believed that it is important to detect air and maritime smugglers as far forward into the threat area as possible. Based on threat vectors and that strategy, DoD developed the over-the-horizon radar system to replace many of the old Caribbean radar network. These radars gave us a deeper and wider look at the threat areas. Additionally, the bulk of the flow of drugs, historically and today, continues to pass through Mexico and enter the United States across our Southwest border. Drug smuggling through the U.S. gulf coast has always been deemed to be negligible. For these reasons, it made sense to close the aerostat sites along the Gulf coast and use those funds in a more cost effective manner to address the major drug flow vectors.

**Question 5. b. What has been the impact of the TARS decommissioning on JIATF South's Common Operating Picture (COP) for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime smuggling?**

Answer: The JIATF South common operating picture includes a feed from the FAA center in Miami, the air traffic control radars at Key West and Guantanamo Bay, three ground based radars in Puerto Rico, as well as the TARS sites at Cudjoe Key, FL and Lajas, Puerto Rico. Essentially, we have continuous surveillance coverage of all of South Florida, Cuba and the Caribbean out as far as the British Virgin Islands. As JIATF South is focused much deeper and far beyond the area covered by TARS, the impact on the COP is minimal.

**Question 5. c. What detections systems does JIATF South currently rely on to monitor illicit traffic or threats from any southern location, east of Texas?**

Answer: JIATF South is focused much deeper in the Caribbean. The area cited in the question is not continually covered by JIATF South. The Department of Homeland Security may be able to provide a more complete answer.

# US GOVERNMENT ISR/D&M ASSETS

**Maritime Assets**

| | |
|---|---|
| FFG | Guided Missile Frigate (USN) |
| CG | Guided Missile Cruiser (USN) |
| DD | Destroyer (USN) |
| DDG | Guided Missile Destroyer (USN) |
| MCM | Mine Countermeasure Ship (USN) |
| PC | Patrol Craft (USN) |
| SSN | Attack Submarine (USN) |
| TAGOS | Oceanographic Survey Ship (USN) |
| WHEC | High Endurance Cutter (USCG) |
| WMEC | Medium Endurance Cutter (USCG) |
| WPB | Patrol Craft (USGC) |
| AO | Oiler |

**Aircraft assets**

| | |
|---|---|
| C12 | USCS Surveillance/Reconnaissance (Beech 1900D) |
| C550 | USCS Surveillance/Reconnaissance (Cessna Citation II) |
| P3A/P3B | USCS Maritime Patrol Aircraft (Lockheed Martin Orion) |
| ARL | RC-7 Airborne Reconnaissance Low (De Haviland) |
| B200 | Surveillance/Reconnaissance (Raytheon King Air) |
| RC12 | Surveillance/Reconnaissance (Beech Super King Air) |
| SRS | Surveillance/Reconnaissance (Contracted Aircraft) |
| E2C | USN Airborne Early Warning and Control (Northrop Grumman Hawkeye) |
| EP3 | USN Electronic Surveillance/Reconnaissance (Lockheed Martin Orion) |
| P3C | USN Maritime Patrol Aircraft (Lockheed Martin Orion) |
| P3CDU | USN Maritime Patrol Aircraft (Counterdrug Upgrade) (Lockheed Martin Orion) |
| HC130 | USCG Surveillance/Reconnaissance (Lockheed Martin Hercules) |
| HU25 | USCG Surveillance/Reconnaissance (Dassault-Breguet Guardian) |
| C130 | USAF/ANG Surveillance/Reconnaissance (Lockheed Martin Hercules) |
| C550 | USAF/ANG Surveillance/Reconnaissance (Cessna Citation II) |
| E3 | USAF Airborne Early Warning and Control (Boeing Sentry) |
| EC130 | USAF/ANG Surveillance/Reconnaissance (Senior Scout) (Lockheed Martin Hercules) |
| F16 | USAF/ANG Multi-role Fighter (Lockheed Martin Fighting Falcon) |
| KC135 | USAF/ANG Aerial Refueling (Boeing Stratotanker) |
| U2 | USAF Surveillance/Reconnaissance |

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

AUG 0 1 2005

The Honorable Mark Souder
Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
Committee on Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
1227 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-3802

Dear Chairman Souder:

In response to your June 30, 2005 letter to Rear Admiral Hathaway of Joint Interagency Task Force South, attached are answers to the questions asked by your subcommittee after the visit to JIATF-S in January, as well as your hearing in June.

Pursuant to your request, we have updated the answers to your original five questions asked in January with the latest FY2005 data.

Thank you for your support of the Department's counternarcotics efforts.

Sincerely,

Robert J. Newberry
Principal Director for Counternarcotics

Committee On Government Reform
Subcommittee On Criminal Justice, Drug Policy And Human Resources
Follow-up questions for the record for
Admiral Jeffrey J. Hathaway, Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South
Dated August 1, 2005.

**Question 1. (U) "During the Subcommittee's visit to JIATF South, Admiral Hathaway stated that his actionable intelligence now exceeded his operational interdiction capability. Additionally, the DOD continues to face significant challenges with respect to resource allocation given the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not clear how the shortage of interdiction resources is being addressed by JIATF South and the respective supporting departments."**

**Question 1. a. (U) "Please provide a summary of operational assets dedicated to JIATF South detection and monitoring missions, by agency and asset type from FY2000 to present."**

Answer: (U) Assets dedicated to D&M are only one part of the requirement for successful interdiction. The Department continues to provide significant Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets in both the transit and source zones. Most notably, the Department has recently returned two E-3 AWACS aircraft to the theater to increase D&M capability. Moreover, over the past 16 years the Department has developed a command and control capacity at JIATF South that is second to none. DoD's significant investment in command, control, communication, and intelligence systems and the invaluable support from other Defense agencies cannot be duplicated by any other department.

The on-station days/hours of all the assets apportioned or assigned to JIATF South, from 1 October 2000 to 31 January 2005, by agency and type of asset are as follows (source Consolidated Counterdrug Data Base (CCDB)):

**Maritime on-station days[1]:**

**US NAVY**

| | FFG | CG | DD | DDG | MCM | PC | SSN | TAGOS | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 632 | 171 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 305 | 30 | 634 | 1,772 |
| FY2001 | 578 | 42 | 101 | 61 | 0 | 390 | 73 | 703 | 1,948 |
| FY2002 | 674 | 126 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 0 | 650 | 1,507 |
| FY2003 | 647 | 0 | 141 | 91 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 920 |
| FY2004 | 768 | 180 | 0 | 69 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,017 |
| FY2005 | 288 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 288 |

**US COAST GUARD**

| | WHEC | WMEC | WPB | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 141 | 622 | 0 | 763 |
| FY2001 | 119 | 569 | 14 | 702 |
| FY2002 | 198 | 730 | 0 | 928 |
| FY2003 | 110 | 632 | 0 | 742 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2004 | 623 | 994 | 56 | 1673 |
| FY2005 | 214 | 217 | 0 | 431 |

**ALLIES**

| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **FY2000** | 0 | 0 | 21 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 96 | 250 | 608 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **1006** |
| **FY2001** | 0 | 25 | 596 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 364 | 0 | 972 | 0 | 37 | 5 | **1998** |
| **FY2002** | 0 | 0 | 769 | 599 | 0 | 38 | 31 | 49 | 0 | 104 | 0 | 1791 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **3380** |
| **FY2003** | 46 | 0 | 602 | 862 | 0 | 132 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 124 | 0 | 1680 | 42 | 0 | 0 | **3511** |
| **FY2004** | 18 | 0 | 806 | 743 | 0 | 221 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 655 | 0 | 1660 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **4103** |

**A=FRA ATL2/B=FRA C206/C=RSS C26/D=FRA C406/E=FRA C408/F=FRA F50/G=FRA FALCON H=FRA HU25/I=FRA HU50/J=GBR NIMROD/K=NLD F27/L=NLD P3/M=P3C (CANADA) N=FRA PIPER/O=FRA SENECA**

[1] Note: The number of on-station days cited in the charts above is not indicative of the total days contributed by agency / asset. The response in question 2.a. below further elaborates the need to track on-station days / hours rather than tracking the total of days underway or hours flown.

**Aircraft on-station hours[2]:**

**CUSTOMS (CBP/ICE/BICE)**

| | C12 | C26 | C550 | P3A | P3B | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 35.7 | 0.0 | 246.3 | 762.7 | 1,013.7 | 2,058.4 |
| FY2001 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,124.7 | 399.0 | 1,763.4 | 3,287.0 |
| FY2002 | 60.4 | 0.0 | 589.9 | 911.1 | 1,456.4 | 3,017.7 |
| FY2003 | 346.4 | 0.0 | 150.8 | 695.4 | 878.2 | 2,070.8 |
| FY2004 | 719.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,843.4 | 2,735.5 | 5,298.2 |
| FY2005 | 0.0 | 3.1 | 0.0 | 532.7 | 1,257.9 | 1,793.7 |

**US ARMY**

| | ARL | ASP | B200 | C26 | EO5B | P3B | RC12 | SRS | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 910.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 399.3 | 1,309.5 |
| FY2001 | 1231.5 | 380.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,125.0 | 2,737.2 |
| FY2002 | 1359.6 | 0.0 | 6.4 | 11.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1,651.0 | 3,028.7 |
| FY2003 | 1812.0 | 0.0 | 133.5 | 51.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 365.4 | 658.5 | 3,020.5 |
| FY2004 | 1134.3 | 0.0 | 814 | 387.7 | 7.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2,343.1 |
| FY2005 | 98.4 | 0.0 | 164 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 262.4 |

**US NAVY**

| | E2C | EP3 | P3C | P3CDU | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 2,586.3 | 57.0 | 2,880.5 | 1,370.3 | 6,894.1 |
| FY2001 | 2,385.9 | 828.1 | 3,126.0 | 889.0 | 7,229.0 |
| FY2002 | 2,220.4 | 108.8 | 1,932.8 | 2,163.6 | 6,425.5 |
| FY2003 | 1,180.6 | 276.7 | 2,561.3 | 1,981.2 | 5,999.8 |
| FY2004 | 865.2 | 1,052.3 | 1,473.8 | 1,043.9 | 4,435.1 |
| FY2005 | 488.2 | 48.0 | 339.2 | 307.3 | 1,182.7 |

**US COAST GUARD**

| | HC130 | HU25 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 1,236.3 | 987 | 2,223.3 |
| FY2001 | 884.5 | 1,004.9 | 1,889.4 |
| FY2002 | 480.8 | 496.3 | 977.1 |
| FY2003 | 1,367.6 | 42.6 | 1,410.2 |
| FY2004 | 2,721.1 | 0.0 | 2,721.1 |
| FY2005 | 1,184.3 | 33.4 | 1,217.7 |

**US AIR FORCE**

| | C130 | C550 | E3 | EC130 | F16 | KC135 | U2 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 286.7 | 0.0 | 895.5 | 0.0 | 89.3 | 48.0 | 61.7 | 1,381.2 |
| FY2001 | 348.8 | 0.0 | 842.6 | 91.9 | 42.5 | 38.3 | 0.0 | 1,364.1 |
| FY2002 | 7.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 966.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 973.2 |
| FY2003 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 965.9 | 0.0 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 968.3 |
| FY2004 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 393.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 393.7 |
| FY2005 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 157.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 28.1 | 0.0 | 185.7 |

**ALLIES**

| | FRA ATL2 | FRA C206 | RSS C26 | FRA C406 | FRA C408 | FRA F50 | FRA Falcon | FRA HU25 | FRA HU50 | UK Nimrod | NL P27 | NL P3 | CAN P3C | FRA PIPER | FRA SENECA | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 21.1 | 0.0 | 20.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.4 | 95.6 | 249.6 | 608.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1006.3 |
| FY2001 | 0.0 | 25 | 595.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 363.9 | 0.0 | 971.9 | 0.0 | 37.0 | 4.8 | 1998.2 |
| FY2002 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 768.8 | 599.4 | 0.0 | 37.6 | 30.5 | 48.8 | 0.0 | 103.8 | 0.0 | 1790.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3379.6 |
| FY2003 | 45.7 | 0.0 | 601.5 | 861.7 | 0.0 | 132.1 | 0.0 | 23.9 | 0.0 | 123.6 | 0.0 | 1680.1 | 41.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3510.5 |
| FY2004 | 18.0 | 0.0 | 218.9 | 201.1 | 0.0 | 81.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 303.5 | 0.0 | 44.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1267.7 |

[2] Note: The number of on-station hours cited in the charts above is not indicative of the total hours contributed by agency / asset. The response in question 2.a. below further elaborates the need to track on-station days / hours rather than tracking the total of days underway or hours flown.

Question 1. b. Please provide a summary of personnel dedicated to supporting JIATF South detection and monitoring missions, by agency and asset type from FY2000 to present (CPMD).

Answer: The personnel dedicated to JIATF South, from 1 October 2000 to 31 January 2005, by agency are as follows (source: JIATF South records):

| | FY2000 | FY2001 | FY2002 | FY2003 | FY2004 | Present |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **DoD** | | | | | | |
| USA | 22 | 16 | 27 | 25 | 29 | 26 |
| USAF | 24 | 20 | 21 | 41 | 44 | 42 |
| USMC | 10 | 10 | 10 | 14 | 10 | 12 |
| USN | 25 | 26 | 31 | 81 | 84 | 74 |
| Civ (Army) | 95 | 102 | 115 | 124 | 126 | 118 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Civ (DIA) | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Civ (NGA) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| **Subtotal** | **178** | **175** | **206** | **288** [3] | **296** | **277** |
| | | | | | | |
| **Interagency** | | | | | | |
| USCG | 21 | 20 | 21 | 23 | 24 | 25 |
| CBP | 7 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 5 |
| CIA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| DEA | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| DOS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| FBI | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| NSAP | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| TSR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| **Subtotal** | **35** | **34** | **38** | **38** | **37** | **37** |
| | | | | | | |
| Total | 213 | 209 | 244 | 326[3] | 333 | 314 |
| | | | | | | |
| Authorized | 235 | 233 | 270 | 355 | 366 | 368 |

[3] Note: this does not represent a real growth in personnel number for JIATF South, but rather it reflects the merger of the Joint Southern Surveillance Reconnaissance Operations Center (JSSROC) into JIATF South. With this merger, JIATF South assumed all of the JSSROC mission set: multi-sensor aerial surveillance and fusion utilizing the Relocatable-Over-The-Horizon-Radar (ROTHR) and other ground based and aerial radar platforms for the Caribbean, Central and South America and the southern approaches to the United States. The merger included all JSSROC's mission, equipment and personnel.

**Question 1. c. (U) Please provide current contingency plans intended to fill the shortages in operational resources available to respond to actionable intelligence.**

Answer: (U) JIATF-South does not have permanently assigned assets from DoD, Homeland Security (DHS), or partner nations. DoD allocates assets to Southern Command that are placed under the tactical control of JIATF-South; DHS and allies allocate assets to JIATF-South based on availability and other mission demands. Despite the demands placed on all of the U.S. Departments for assets around the world and along our nation's borders, they have always provided JIATF-South with a force structure that continues to set records in detecting, monitoring and interdicting the flow of drugs. Our contingency plan was laid out in a recent document called the "Interdiction Planning and Asset Management Group", which was produced by an interagency working group. The group acknowledged that it is impractical to expect an unconstrained force structure for the drug-interdiction problem. We are instead implementing their recommended alternative strategy to generate a force-multiplying effect. Elements of this strategy include aggressive helicopter tactics against fast boats, technology, better intelligence, and enhancing partner nation capabilities.

**Question 2. (U) "The Subcommittee is concerned that we no longer possesses the assets to take down known movements of large quantities of contraband entering the Eastern Pacific region from the country of Colombia."**

**Question 2. a. (U) " How many aviation and marine assets would be required in the Eastern Pacific to respond to the known intelligence derived from your Panama South operation?"**

Answer: We are puzzled by the "no longer posses" language as the Command has had consecutive record-setting interdiction years. Additionally, these types of questions for remote regions like the East Pacific are somewhat complex to answer as the variables are based upon on-station hours (aircraft), target availability and priorities, and days (ship) requirements. The amount of resources required to meet the on-station requirements are affected by several interrelated factors: the logistics hub from where the asset departs or returns, target location, and sensor capacity. As stated in the answer to the question 1.c., planning for an unconstrained force package is not practical. We will continue to improve our intelligence and enhance partner nation capabilities.

**Question 2. b. (U) "Do you currently have sufficient assets to meet the requirements you identify in the response to the previous questions?"**

Answer: We work with the force providers to provide JIATF-South with a force package that allows us to address the flow of drugs along the Pacific route. We intend to improve our force multipliers, to include better intelligence and increased partner nation capacity.

**Question 2. c. (U) "If you devoted sufficient assets to meet the requirements identified in questions 2. a. above what other JIATF South missions would be affected?"**

Answer: (U) We have two major smuggling routes to cover - the Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean. It does not make tactical sense to leave any vector open at the expense of another. Therefore, we allocate our resources in the various threat vectors based on intelligence, long-term plans, and short-term surge operations to maximize our efforts to stem the flow of drugs to the United States.

**Question 3. (U) "During the Subcommittee Staff's recent visit, the need to establish maritime refueling platforms in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean Sea to support detection, monitoring and interdiction forces was discussed, as well as the fact that the illicit traffickers have already established a network of logistics supply vessels (LSVs) to outmaneuver interdiction forces."**

**Question 3. a. (U) "Has such refueling support been requested, when, and of whom?"**

Answer: (U) In an unconstrained environment, support from an oiler would be very useful. DoD and the USIC have looked into various options to acquire this capability, but in all cases, the trade-off in costs relative to other requirement were unacceptable or the assets were simply not available.

**Question 3. b. (U) What was the response to those requests, and is maritime refueling support forthcoming, and if not why not?**

Answer: (U) Five options were considered - USN AOE support, contracting MSC Oilers, reactivation of USNS Henry J. Kaiser, chartering a US flagged tanker, and a partner nation oiler. Only the use of a partner nation oiler was determined to be feasible; however, it was determined not to be cost effective relative to other mission requirements. However, we continue to work with Partner Nations, specifically Colombia, Peru, and Chile to review options and potential support.

**Question 3. c. (U) How many resource ship-days would best serve the Western Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific?**

Answer: (U) The JIATF South Oiler requirements are 15 days per month in both the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.

**Question 3. d. (U) Have the cooperating / partner nations been approached to assist with this resource request?**

Answer: (U) Efforts have been underway to develop Oiler support capabilities with Colombia since 2000, Peru since May 2004, and Chile since May 2004. Currently, USSOUTHCOM, through its maritime component NAVSOUTH, is pursuing the development of Partner Nation at-sea refueling capabilities. Due to U.S. and Partner Nation funding constraints, progress is slow. For example, Peru has volunteered the use of the Oiler LOBITO, but it has been plagued with maintenance issues and, although we have worked for years on this project, we have yet to conduct a proof of concept test, and no progress is expected in the next few years.

**Question 4. (U) The Subcommittee was very impressed by the effectiveness of intelligence developed by Operation Panama Express South (PANEX South) and conveyed to JIATF South and DHS interdiction forces. PANEX appears to be a model for success, a joint effort that should be fully supported and enhanced by participating agencies.**

**Question 4. a. (U) Please provide a summary of JIATF South funding provided to PANEX from FY2000 to present.**

Answer: (U) The following resources were provided to PANEX (amounts in thousands of dollars):

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| FY00 - | No support documentation | |
| FY01 - | $21.5 | Direct funding contribution to operations |
| FY02 - | $189.6 | Direct funding contribution |
| | $212 | Permanent DOD Civilian Intel Analysts costs |
| | $43.9 | Temporary Duty Intel Analysts costs |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | **$445.5** | **Total** |
| FY03 | $286.9 | Direct funding contribution |
| | $212 | Permanent DOD Civilian Intel Analysts |
| | $87.8 | Temporary Duty Intel Analysts |
| | **$586.7** | **Total** |
| FY04 | $290.2 | Direct funding contribution |
| | $212 | Permanent DOD Civilian Intel Analysts |
| | $87.8 | Temporary Duty Intel Analysts |
| | **$590.0** | **Total** |
| FY05 | $100 | Direct funding contribution |
| | $318 | Permanent DOD Civilian Intel Analysts |
| | $87.8 | Temporary Duty Intel Analysts |
| | **$611.8** | **Total thru 2/3/05** |

**Question 4. b. (U) What plans does JIATF South have to enhance PANEX and further develop the partnership with the JIATF South Tactical Analysis Team (TAT) and Liaison (LNO) program?**

Answer: (U) JIATF South will continue to support PANEX operations through direct funding, analyst support, and detection and monitoring operations that target PANEX-identified suspect vessels. In 2005, we will enhance PANEX by assigning two additional intelligence analysts, one to PANEX North and one to PANEX South. This additional analysis capability will increase the amount of information that can be used to cooperatively identify smuggling targets, apprehend them in the transit zone, and deliver the smugglers into the custody of PANEX.

**Question 5. (U) The Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) carries critical communication system repeaters and can deploy surface search sensors to detect in-coming go fast drug smuggling vessels. However, virtually all of the aerostats close to our sea border approaches have been decommissioned.**

**Question 5. a. (U) Please explain why the decommissioning was justified in light of JIATF South's leading role for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime smuggling?**

Answer: (U) The USG's interdiction strategy is to attack the flow of drug at the source - Colombia. Additionally, we have long believed that it is important to detect air and maritime smugglers as far forward into the threat area as possible. Based on threat vectors and that strategy, DoD developed the over-the-horizon radar system to replace many of the old Caribbean radar network. These radars gave us a deeper and wider look at the threat areas. Additionally, the bulk of the flow of drugs, historically and today, continues to pass through Mexico and enter the United States across our Southwest border. Drug smuggling through the U.S. gulf coast has always been deemed to be negligible. For these reasons, it made sense to close the aerostat sites along the Gulf coast and use those funds in a more cost effective manner to address the major drug flow vectors.

**Question 5. b. (U) What has been the impact of the TARS decommissioning on JIATF South's Common Operating Picture (COP) for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime smuggling?**

Answer: (U) The JIATF South common operating picture includes a feed from the FAA center in Miami, the air traffic control radars at Key West and Guantanamo Bay, three ground based radars in Puerto Rico as well as the TARS sites at Cudjoe Key, FL and Lajas, Puerto Rico. Essentially, we have continuous surveillance coverage of all of South Florida, Cuba and the Caribbean out as far as the British Virgin Islands. As JIATF South is focused much deeper and far beyond the area covered by TARS, the impact on the COP is minimal.

**Question 5. c. (U) What detections systems does JIATF South currently rely on to monitor illicit traffic or threats from any southern location, east of Texas?**

Answer: (U) JIATF South is focused much deeper in the Caribbean. The area cited in the question is not continually covered by JIATF South. The Department of Homeland Security may be able to provide a more complete answer.

**Question 6. (U) "In the US Interdiction Coordinator and Coast Guard opening statements both that the Coast Guard is currently working with the U.S. Navy to arm their helicopters to supplement the highly successful HITRON program. We view this as an effective force multiplier in the transit zone."**

**Question 6.a. (U) "When will this new Navy capability be employed?"**

Answer: (U) The Navy has been working to develop this capability for some time, and is currently completing the necessary airframe modifications for the gun mounts and protective requirements. The Navy hopes to have HITRON capability operational within 6 months.

**Question 7. (U) "The House and the Senate have supported the purchase of surface search radar for Customs and Border Protection's Office of Air and Marine Operations aging fleet of P-3 aircraft."**

**Question 7.a. (U) Question: "Will this new radar system significantly improve efforts in the transit zone?"**

Answer: (U) JIATF South supported the testing of this radar against go-fast boats; our highest maritime threat. The SEAVIEW Radar, installed on CBP P-3A's, was hands-down, the highest performing off the shelf radar in detecting go-fast boats.

**Question 7.b. (U) "Should it be utilized by all aircraft performing the marine patrol aircraft mission?"**

Answer: (U) The U.S. Navy's P-3s utilize radars that perform effectively against a wide array of requirements. The Department would need to study the cost effectiveness of such a measure.

**Question 8. (U) "Despite good drug movement intelligence in the transit zone, we lack similar knowledge in Mexico and Central America."**

**Question 8.a. (U) "What agency has the lead in developing logistical support bases that are located near the transit zones?"**

Answer: (U) In response to JIATF South D&M requirements, each agency providing D&M support is responsible for their respective logistics, to include basing. DOD has by far the most robust logistical infrastructure within the JIATF South JOA. Interagency and international D&M forces leverage DOD's considerable logistical contributions by basing their resources out of a Cooperative Security Location (CSL). Currently there are three CSL's, Curacao, Netherlands Antilles; Comalapa, El Salvador; and Manta, Ecuador and all have had significant U.S. government investment in time, money, resources and international agreement. CSL's are the first and primary choice for all interagency and allied logistical support. JIATF South's tactical requirements may at times place the D&M forces at some distance from the CSL's creating the situation where alternate logistic support makes sense. On these occasions, usually planned well in advance, the supporting agency, along with JIATF South, seeks other short-term logistical locations in order to best support the D&M effort. Bottom line: All D&M asset basing is under the overview of JIATF South requirements to ensure the D&M forces can be coordinated, integrated and synchronized to the highest degree possible. Tactical flexibility and agility is a significant consideration when scheduling and employing D&M resources from the CSL's or on occasion, other short-term logistical support areas.

**Question 8.b. (U) "Has your office considered renewed operations in Guatemala?"**

Answer: (U) JIATF South has had and continues to have a very aggressive operational tempo with Guatemala. It is accurate to say that the high level of our planning support and execution of CD operations within Guatemala and the immediate region taxes / utilizes their capabilities to the limit. To recap the last 12 months:

- 13 to 21 July 2004 – Conducted the first cross-border CD operation between Guatemala and Belize. US JTF-Helicopters (stationed in Soto Cano, Honduras) deployed to Belize and Guatemala to move law enforcement forces in reaction to suspected drug trafficking events.
- 8 to 14 September 2004 – Conducted a joint U.S. and Guatemalan maritime operation in EPAC
- 21 to 22 October 2004 – Conducted a joint U.S. and Guatemalan CD planning conference for the eradication operation the following month.
- 18 to 23 November 2004 – Conducted Central Skies poppy eradication operation with U.S. JTF-B helicopters moving law enforcement personnel.
- 30 November to 3 December 2004 – Guatemala participated in the JIATF South Central American Air Corridor Interdiction Conference to address sorting legitimate from suspected illegitimate drug flights flying within Central America.
- 13 to 19 December 2004 – Conducted a joint U.S. and Guatemalan maritime operation in EPAC

- 6 to 7 January 2005 – Conducted Central Skies planning conference in Guatemala (JTF-B deployments to Guatemala).
- 3 to 11 February 2005 – Conducted cross border CD operation between Guatemala and Belize.
- 5 to 8 April 2005 – Conducted joint tactical response team (TRT) training with the Guatemalan law enforcement forces.
- 24 to 25 May 2005 – Conducted a CD planning conference for EPAC U.S. Guatemalan maritime operation

1 to 5 June 2005 – Deployed JTF-B helicopters to Guatemala to support the reconnaissance of illicit airfields. This data will be used to cue the Guatemalan TRT forces.

To keep the answer unclassified, we eliminated the dates for planned near-term events with Guatemala. The following actions will take place with the next 6 weeks within Guatemala:

- Conduct multilateral U.S. El Salvador and Guatemalan EPAC CD maritime operation.
- The Guatemalan Chief of Staff will visit JIATF South.
- Complete Planning to conduct a CD cross border operation between Guatemala and Belize.
- Continue planning for the conduct a multilateral CD operation with Guatemalan, Belizean, Honduran and U.S. forces.

**Question 8.c. (U) "Do you support DHS establishing operations in Central America or other locations within the transit zone boundaries?"**

Answer: (U) The Department of Defense, along with DHS and other agencies, have specifically chartered JIATF South to represent them as the national joint interagency task force in order to centralize the coordination, integration, and synchronization of all CNT D&M operations within its assigned joint operating area. There is no other organization in the United States that has these responsibilities or capabilities. Due to DoD's support, JIATF-S has an extraordinary level of intelligence fusion, command and control or deliberate planning skills to specifically address CD operations. Bottom line: Creating additional operational CD centers are enormous leaps backwards - the power of JIATF South is the interagency's centralization of critical functions and skills in order to achieve:

- Unity of Command
- Unity of Effort
- Common Vision; Common Mission; Common Purpose

**Question 9. (U) "Shortages in aviation assets in the transit zone and the need for fiscal responsibility in the aviation modernization programs raise the following questions."**

**Question 9.a. (U) "What aviation detection and monitoring asset has provided you the greatest return per flight hour?"**

Answer: (U) Fixed-wing air asset performance is not simple to measure. Operating alone, MPA & AEW aircraft are rarely tied directly to disruptions, but they do make considerable contributions to both intelligence and to D&M. Thus, these flights are a subset or perhaps better said, subsystem of the larger D&M effort.

There are 4 primary roles for these assets:

-- 1) D&M of suspect air tracks.

-- 2) Intelligence gathering. The aircraft is flown to find a specific target; to identify an unknown entity; or simply to look in an area that hasn't been searched lately with the intent to stimulate drug trafficking communications systems as they report these aircraft to their base stations. When locating specific targets, these could either be motherships, logistics support vessels or security vessels.

-- 3) Maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) flown in support of a ship with the goal of detecting a suspected surface event.

-- 4) Monitoring of a maritime event.

As a mission is flown, one or all of the prmiary roles are covered, with several roles occurring at the same time. Aircraft like the USAF E3 or CBP P-3B (domes) can surveil tremendously large areas at a time, but can not sort the target. The USN P-3 or CBP P-3A can sort a target, but can not surveil large areas at one time. Due to the level of resources available, it is difficult getting wide area surface surveillance coupled with aircraft that can sort the targets found by the domes. If a dome is not available, the USN P-3 or CBP P-3A must self cue - greatly cutting down the area it can surveil.

It is not possible to simply take the amount of cocaine disrupted in an area, over a period of time and divide it by the on-station hours of each asset type to categorize or assess its performance. For the first part of this year, EPAC C-130's had a very low detect rate but they were the workhorse as they found the majority of the scarce LSV's which indirectly led to significant tonnage of disrupted cocaine shipments via go-fast boats. We do not have the manpower to conduct detailed "hot washes" for every mission or event to pick out and document every asset's contribution. Instead, we rely on overall capabilities to assess the potential value of an asset.

A consideration that also impacts the question; our best, most capable assets may at times be constrained by partner nation politics or provider constraints (usually based on force protection). For example, a CBP aircraft may be able to deploy to or within an area where USCG C-130 or USN P-3 may not, thus skewing each of the aircraft's value or potential contribution.

Anecdotally, the most valuable aviation asset is a HITRON capable helicopter. While they yield tangible, measurable results, they are considered end-game assets and are considered part of, or perhaps better said, an extension of a ship's weapon system. Please see amplying information in the answer to question 6.a.

**Question 9.b. (U) "What marine patrol aircraft has provided the greatest return per flight hour?"**

Answer: (U) Please see the answer to 9.a. above. Questions 9.a. and 9.b. from JIATF South's point of view are the same.

**Question 10: (U) "Given the increasing demands on DoD, and its diminishing support of counterdrug operations, would it make sense to transfer leadership for drug interdiction**

**(including detection and monitoring) to law enforcement agencies, particularly those at the Department of Homeland Security?**

Answer: (U) The Department has not diminished its support of counterdrug operations around the world. Moreover, the question of who serves as the lead D&M agency is more than a question of which agency is currently providing the highest amount of assets. Over the past 16 years the Department has developed a command and control capacity at JIATF South that is second to none. The Department's investment in command, control, communication, and intelligence systems and the invaluable support from other Defense agencies cannot be duplicated by any other department. A fully integrated operational, intelligence and communications architecture, the ability to train and create the ability to command and control both interagency and international air and maritime forces over 42 million square miles and the discipline in deliberate planning are all uniquely DoD skills and core functions - and are absolutely fundamental to the success of JIATF-S. The law enforcement community simply does not have the skill sets or the resources.

**Question 10.a. (U) What long term role (5+ years) will DoD play in the transit zone, specifically in terms of interdiction assets, personnel, logistical systems and support?**

Answer: (U) The Department will continue to provide the leadership, capabilities, and resources that it has provided since being assigned the mission in 1989.

**Question 11. (U) "Refueling capabilities for maritime assets on interdiction missions in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific are critical to the mission success."**

**Question 11.a. (U) "Has "oiler" support been requested by USIC, JIATF South, or Coast Guard for counterdrug missions in the Eastern Pacific?"**

Answer: (U) While we cannot answer for USIC or the Coast Guard, JIATF South has requested oiler support.

**Question 11.b. (U) Is the "oiler" support forthcoming, and if not, why not?"**

Answer: (U) In an unconstrained environment, support from an oiler would be helpful. DoD and the USIC have looked into various options to acquire this capability, but in all cases, the trade-off in costs relative to other requirement were unacceptable or the assets were simply not available. Five options were considered - USN AOE support, contracting MSC Oilers, reactivation of USNS Henry J. Kaiser, chartering a US flagged tanker, and a partner nation oiler. Only the use of a partner nation oiler was determined to be feasible; however, it was determined not to be cost effective relative to other mission requirements. However, we continue to work with Partner Nations, specifically Colombia, Peru and Chile to review options and potential support.

**Question 11.c. (U) How many resource ship-days would best serve the Western Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific?**

Answer: (U) The JIATF South Oiler requirements:
- Caribbean - 15 days /mo = .5 presence/mo. (often met by UK Oiler)
- East PAC - 15 days/mo = .5 presence/mo.

**Question 11.d. (U) "Please provide a copy of the JIATF South oiler feasibility study."**

Answer: (U) JIATF South's feasibility point papers on Oiler's are attached.

**Question 11.e. (U) "Has your office explored commercial vendor possibilities to provide oiler support? If not, why not?"**

Answer: (U) Yes. Please see answer to question 11.b.

**Question 12. (U) "Twelfth Air Force has built a Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC) at Davis Monthan AFB to write the Air Tasking Order for Joint Interagency Task Force South that defines all of the air assets available for transit zone utilization."**

**Question 12.a. (U) "Why did 12th Air Force take away Joint Interagency Task Force South's ability to deploy their aviation resources to meet the current counterdrug threat?"**

Answer: (U) The 12th Air Force did not take away Joint Interagency Task Force South's ability to deploy their D&M aviation resources to meet the current counterdrug threat.

**Question 12.b. (U) "Both Joint Interagency Task Force South commander and the 12th Air Force Commander report to the USSOUTHCOM commander. Why did the USSOUTHCOM commander approve an air tasking responsibility away from his operational commander at Joint Interagency Task Force South?"**

Answer: (U) Commander, USSOUTHCOM did not take any CD D&M air tasking responsibility away from Joint Interagency Task Force South.

**Question 13. (U) "Border Patrol, Air and Maritime Operations, and the Coast Guard have all begun to test and evaluate unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), to patrol the borders and our coastal waters. It appears, however, that each of the three agencies is pursuing separate UAV programs. In last year's July 22 hearing entitled, "Drugs and Security in a Post 9/11 World: Coordinating the Counternarcotics Mission at the Department of Homeland Security" the Subcommittee was told that this was being coordinated through the Aviation Management Council."**

**Question 13.a. (U) "When do you expect a decision on the deployment of a UAV capability in the transit zone?"**

Answer: (U) Respectfully, this question should be addressed to the Department of Homeland Security for answer.

**Question 14. (U) "Customs and Border Protection (CBP) currently has Federal Aviation Administration traffic information fed into the operating systems at the Air and Maritime Operations Center (AMOC) in Riverside, CA. By sorting these air tracks they can identify potential air threats and smuggling operations within the continental United States."**

**Question 14.a. (U) "Do the Joint Interagency Task Force South and DHS have a plan to leverage the existing capabilities within DHS to develop a Common Operational Picture (COP) for the transit and arrival zones?"**

Answer: (U) Within its' assigned JOA, the interagency has made JIATF South responsible for the D&M of all illicit air and maritime movement as well as command and control of all assigned and apportioned D&M assets. All of this information is included within the command's COP. JIATF South has been sending its COP to CBP and a wide variety of other agencies for many years. DHS integrates the JIATF South inputs into its COP. In turn, the AMOC supports the sorting of air targets within its AOR and transmits the data to JIATF South.

**Question 14.b. (U) "Has the office of the US Interdiction Coordinator sent a representative(s) to the Customs and Border Protection's Air and Marine Operations Center to utilize the law enforcement and air sorting capabilities of that Facility?"**

Answer: (U) Respectfully, this question should be addressed to the US Interdiction Coordinator for answer.

**Question 15. (U) "Border Patrol, Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection's Office of Air and Marine Operations have aging air and surface assets."**

**Question 15. a. (U) "What is the Administration's timetable to replace and modernize these assets?"**

Answer: (U) Respectfully, this question should be addressed to those respective agencies for answer.

**Question 15.b. (U) "Will the replacement plans assure that there is no disruption or reduction in current capabilities?"**

Answer: (U) Respectfully, this question should be addressed to those respective agencies for answer.

**Questions 16 through 20 are being answered de novo as of 29 June 2005, updating the original responses:**

**Question 16. (U) "During the Subcommittee's visit to JIATF South, Admiral Hathaway stated that his actionable intelligence now exceeded his operational interdiction capability. Additionally, the Department of Defense continues to face significant challenges with respect to resource allocation given the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not clear**

**how the shortage of interdiction resources is being addressed by JIATF South and the respective supporting departments."**

**Question 16.a. (U) "Please provide a summary of operational assets dedicated to JIATF South detection and monitoring missions, by agency and asset type, from FY 2000 to present."**

Answer: (U) Assets dedicated to D&M are only one part of the requirement for successful intelligence-based interdiction. The Department continues to provide significant Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets in both the transit and source zones. Most notably, the Department has recently returned two E-3 AWACS aircraft to the theater, primarily for ABD support. Moreover, over the past 16 years the Department has developed a command and control capacity at JIATF South that is second to none. Moreover, DoD's significant investment in command, control, communication, and intelligence systems and the invaluable support from other Defense agencies cannot be duplicated by any other department.

The on-station days / hours of all the assets apportioned or assigned to JIATF South, from 1 October 2000 to 29 June 2005, by agency and type of asset are as follows (source Consolidated Counterdrug Data Base (CCDB) and JIATF South records))

**Maritime on-station days[4]:**

**US NAVY**

| | FFG | CG | DD | DDG | MCM | PC | SSN | TAGOS | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 628 | 171 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 305 | 30 | 634 | 1,768 |
| FY2001 | 578 | 42 | 101 | 61 | 0 | 390 | 73 | 703 | 1,948 |
| FY2002 | 674 | 126 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 0 | 650 | 1,507 |
| FY2003 | 648 | 0 | 142 | 92 | 8 | 0 | 76 | 33 | 999 |
| FY2004 | 768 | 180 | 0 | 69 | 0 | 0 | 135 | 0 | 1,152 |
| FY2005 | 625 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 0 | 700 |

**US COAST GUARD**

| | WHEC | WMEC | WPB | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 141 | 622 | 0 | 763 |
| FY2001 | 119 | 569 | 14 | 702 |
| FY2002 | 198 | 730 | 0 | 928 |
| FY2003 | 110 | 632 | 0 | 742 |
| FY2004 | 623 | 994 | 56 | 1,673 |
| FY2005 | 527 | 716 | 8 | 1,251 |

**ALLIES**

| | FFG | AO | DD | DDG | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 190 | 192 | 0 | 138 | 520 |
| FY2001 | 280 | 148 | 0 | 34 | 462 |
| FY2002 | 504 | 214 | 0 | 0 | 718 |
| FY2003 | 531 | 187 | 15 | 9 | 742 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2004 | 515 | 112 | 0 | 8 | 635 |
| FY2005 | 510 | 70 | 0 | 0 | 580 |

[4] Note: The number of on-station days cited in the charts above is not indicative of the total days contributed by agency / asset. The response in question 17.a. below further elaborates the need to track on-station days / hours rather than tracking the total of days underway or hours flown.

**Aircraft on-station hours [5]**

**CUSTOMS (CBP/ICE/BICE)**

| | C12 | C550 | P3A | P3B | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 36 | 246 | 763 | 1,014 | 2,058 |
| FY2001 | 0 | 1,125 | 399 | 1,763 | 3,287 |
| FY2002 | 60 | 590 | 911 | 1,456 | 3,018 |
| FY2003 | 410 | 151 | 852 | 1,448 | 2,861 |
| FY2004 | 719 | 0 | 1,860 | 2,794 | 5,373 |
| FY2005 | 0 | 0 | 1,644 | 2,313 | 3,957 |

**US ARMY**

| | ARL | ASP | B200 | C26 | EO5B | RC12 | SRS | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 910 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 399 | 1,309 |
| FY2001 | 1,231 | 381 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,125 | 2,737 |
| FY2002 | 1,360 | 0 | 6 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 1,651 | 3,029 |
| FY2003 | 1,812 | 0 | 133 | 51 | 0 | 365 | 659 | 3,021 |
| FY2004 | 1,134 | 0 | 814 | 388 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 2,343 |
| FY2005 | 98 | 0 | 164 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 262 |

**US NAVY**

| | E2C | EP3 | P3C/CDU | S3 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 2,586 | 57 | 4,251 | 0 | 6,894 |
| FY2001 | 2,386 | 828 | 4,015 | 0 | 7,229 |
| FY2002 | 2,220 | 109 | 4,096 | 0 | 6,425 |
| FY2003 | 1,181 | 277 | 4,543 | 0 | 6,000 |
| FY2004 | 865 | 1,052 | 2,509 | 0 | 4,426 |
| FY2005 | 835 | 48 | 1,181 | 133 | 2,197 |

**US COAST GUARD**

| | HC130 | HU25 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 1,236 | 987 | 2,223 |
| FY2001 | 884 | 1,005 | 1,889 |
| FY2002 | 481 | 496 | 977 |
| FY2003 | 1,368 | 43 | 1,410 |
| FY2004 | 2,721 | 0 | 2,721 |
| FY2005 | 2,213 | 95 | 2,308 |

**US AIR FORCE**

| | C130 | E3 | EC130 | F16 | KC135 | U2 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 287 | 896 | 0 | 89 | 48 | 62 | 1,382 |
| FY2001 | 349 | 843 | 92 | 42 | 38 | 0 | 1,364 |
| FY2002 | 7 | 0 | 966 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 973 |
| FY2003 | 0 | 0 | 966 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 968 |
| FY2004 | 0 | 0 | 394 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 394 |
| FY2005 | 0 | 418 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 418 |

**ALLIES**

| ALLIES | FRA ATL2 | FRA C206 | RSS C26 | FRA C406 | FRA C408 | FRA F50 | FRA F60 | FRA FALCON | FRA HU25 | FRA HU50 | GBR NIMROD | NLD F27 | NLD P3 | P3C (CANADA) | FRA PIPER | FRA SENECA | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2000 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 96 | 250 | 608 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1006 |
| FY2001 | 0 | 25 | 596 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 364 | 0 | 972 | 0 | 37 | 5 | 1998 |
| FY2002 | 0 | 0 | 769 | 599 | 0 | 38 | 0 | 31 | 49 | 0 | 104 | 0 | 1791 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3380 |
| FY2003 | 46 | 0 | 602 | 862 | 0 | 132 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 124 | 0 | 1880 | 42 | 0 | 0 | 3511 |
| FY2004 | 18 | 0 | 806 | 743 | 0 | 221 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 655 | 0 | 1660 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4103 |
| FY2005 | 82 | 0 | 577 | 434 | 0 | 51 | 369 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 636 | 0 | 295 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2444 |

[5] Note: The number of on-station hours cited in the charts above is not indicative of the total hours contributed by agency / asset. The response in question 17.a. below further elaborates the need to track on-station days / hours rather than tracking the total of days underway or hours flown.

**Question 16. b. (U) "Please provide a summary of personnel dedicated to supporting JIATF South detection and monitoring missions, by agency, from FY 2000 to present."**

Answer: (U) The personnel dedicated to JIATF South, from 1 October 2000 to 29 June 2005, by agency are as follows (source: JIATF South records):

| FY2000 | FY2001 | FY2002 | FY2003 | FY2004 | Present | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **DoD** | | | | | | |
| USA | 22 | 16 | 27 | 25 | 29 | 28 |
| USAF | 24 | 20 | 21 | 41 | 44 | 44 |
| USMC | 10 | 10 | 10 | 14 | 10 | 12 |
| USN | 25 | 26 | 31 | 81 | 84 | 71 |
| Civ (Army) | 95 | 102 | 115 | 124 | 126 | 131 |
| Civ (DIA) | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Civ (NGA) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| **SUBTOTAL** | **178** | **175** | **206** | **288** [10] | **296** | **291** |
| | | | | | | |
| **INTER-AGENCY** | | | | | | |
| USCG | 21 | 20 | 21 | 23 | 24 | 21 |
| CBP | 7 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 4 |
| CIA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| DEA | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DOS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| FBI | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| NSAP | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| TSR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| **SUBTOTAL** | **35** | **34** | **38** | **38** | **37** | **30** |
| **TOTAL** | **213** | **209** | **244** | **326** | **333** | **321** |

AUTH 235 233 270 355 366

[6] Note: this does not represent a real growth in personnel number for JIATF South, but rather it reflects the merger of the Joint Southern Surveillance Reconnaissance Operations Center (JSSROC) into JIATF South. With this merger, JIATF South assumed all of the JSSROC mission set: multi-sensor aerial surveillance and fusion utilizing the Relocatable-Over-The-Horizon-Radar (ROTHR) and other ground based and aerial radar platforms for the Caribbean, Central and South America and the southern approaches to the United States. The merger included all JSSROC's mission, equipment and personnel.

**Question 16.c. (U) "Please provide current contingency plans intended to fill shortages in operational resources available to respond to actionable intelligence."**

Answer: (U) JIATF-South does not have permanently assigned assets from DoD, Homeland Security (DHS), or partner nations. DoD allocates assets to Southern Command that are placed under the tactical control of JIATF-South; DHS and allies allocate assets to JIATF-South based on availability and other mission demands. Despite the demands placed on all of the U.S. Departments for assets around the world and along our nation's borders, they have always provided JIATF-South with a force structure that continues to set records in detecting, monitoring and interdicting the flow of drugs. Our contingency plan was laid out in a recent document called the "Interdiction Planning and Asset Management Group", which was produced by an interagency working group. The group acknowledged that it is impractical to expect an unconstrained force structure for the drug-interdiction problem. We are instead implementing their recommended alternative strategy to generate a force-multiplying effect. Elements of this strategy include aggressive helicopter tactics against fast boats, technology, better intelligence, and enhancing partner nation capabilities.

**Question 17. (U) "The Subcommittee is concerned that we no longer possess the assets to take down known movements of large quantities of contraband entering the Eastern Pacific region from the country of Colombia."**

**Question 17.a. (U) "How many aviation and marine assets would be required in the Eastern Pacific to respond to the known intelligence derived from your Panama Express South operations?"**

Answer: (U) We are puzzled by the "no longer poses" language, and emphasize that the Command has had consecutive record setting interdiction years. Additionally, these types of questions for remote regions like the East Pacific are somewhat complex to answer as the

variables are based upon on-station hours (aircraft), target availability and priorities, and days (ship) requirements. The amount of resources required to meet the on-station requirements are affected by several interrelated factors: the logistics hub from where the asset departs or returns, target location, and sensor capacity. As stated in the answer to the question 1.c., planning for an unconstrained force package is not practical. We will continue to improve our intelligence and enhance partner nation capabilities.

**Question 17. b. (U) "Do you currently have sufficient assets to meet the requirements you identify in the response to the previous questions?"**

Answer: We work with the force providers to provide JIATF-South with a force package that allows us to address the flow of drugs along the Pacific route. We intend to improve our force multipliers, to include better intelligence and increased partner nation capacity.

**Question 17. c. (U) "If you devoted sufficient assets to meet the requirements identified in questions 17. a. above what other JIATF South missions would be affected?"**

Answer: (U) We have two major smuggling routes to cover - the Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean. It does not make tactical sense to leave any vector open at the expense of another. Therefore, we allocate our resources in the various threat vectors based on intelligence, long-term plans, and short-term surge operations to maximize our efforts to stem the flow of drugs to the United States.

**Question 18. (U) "During the Subcommittee Staff's recent visit, the need to establish maritime refueling platforms in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean Sea to support detection, monitoring and interdiction forces was discussed, as well as the fact that the illicit traffickers have already established a network of logistics supply vessels (LSVs) to outmaneuver interdiction forces."**

**Question 18.a. (U) "Has such refueling support been requested, when, and of whom?"**

Answer: (U) In an unconstrained environment, support from an oiler would be very useful. DoD and the USIC have looked into various options to acquire this capability, but in all cases, the trade-off in costs relative to other requirement were unacceptable or the assets were simply not available.

**Question 18.b. (U) "What was the response to those request, and is maritime refueling support forthcoming, and if not why not?"**

Answer: (U) Five options were considered - USN AOE support, contracting MSC Oilers, reactivation of USNS Henry J. Kaiser, chartering a US flagged tanker, and a partner nation oiler. Only the use of a partner nation oiler was determined to be cost feasible; however, it was determined not to be cost effective relative to other mission requirements. However, we continue to work with Partner Nations, specifically Colombia, Peru and Chile to review options and potential support.

**Question 18.c. "How many resource ship-days would best serve the Western Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific?"**

Answer: (U) The JIATF South Oiler requirements are 15 days per month in both the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.

**Question 18.d. (U) "Have cooperating /partner nations been approached to assist with this resource request?"**

Answer: (U) Efforts have been underway to develop Oiler support capabilities with Colombia since 2000, Peru since May 2004, and Chile since May 2004. Currently, USSOUTHCOM, through its maritime component NAVSOUTH, is pursuing the development of Partner Nation at-sea refueling capabilities. Due to U.S. and Partner Nation funding constraints, progress is slow. From example, Peru has volunteered the use of the Oiler LOBITO, but it has been plagued with maintenance issues and, although we have worked for years on this project, we have yet to conduct a proof of concept test, and no progress is expected in the next few years.

**Question 19. (U) "The Subcommittee was very impressed by the effectiveness of intelligence developed by Operation Panama Express South (PANEX) and conveyed to JIATF South and DHS interdiction forces. PANEX appears to be a model for success, a joint effort that should be fully supported and enhanced by all participating agencies."**

**Question 19.a. (U) "Please provide a summary of JIATF South funding provided to PANEX, from FY 2000 to present."**

Answer: (U) The following resources were provided to PANEX from FY 2000 to 29 June 2005 - amounts in thousands of dollars:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| FY00 - | No support documentation | |
| FY01 - | $21.5 | Direct funding contribution to operations |
| FY02 - | $189.6 | Direct funding contribution |
| | $212 | Permanent DOD Civilian Intel Analysts costs |
| | $43.9 | Temporary Duty Intel Analysts costs |
| | **$445.5** | **Total** |
| FY03 | $286.9 | Direct funding contribution |
| | $212 | Permanent DOD Civilian Intel Analysts |
| | $87.8 | Temporary Duty Intel Analysts |
| | **$586.7** | **Total** |
| FY04 | $290.2 | Direct funding contribution |
| | $212 | Permanent DOD Civilian Intel Analysts |
| | $87.8 | Temporary Duty Intel Analysts |
| | **$590** | **Total** |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| FY05 | $306.5 | Direct funding contribution |
| | $318 | Permanent DOD Civilian Intel Analysts |
| | $87.8 | Temporary Duty Intel Analysts |
| | **$712.3** | **Total thru 6/29/05** |

**Question 19.b. (U) "What plans does JIATF South have to enhance PANEX and further develop the partnership with the JIATF-South Tactical Analysis Team (TAT) and Liaison (LNO) program?"**

Answer: (U) JIATF South will continue to support PANEX operations through direct funding, analyst support, and detection and monitoring operations that target PANEX-identified suspect vessels. In 2005, we will enhance PANEX by assigning two additional intelligence analysts, one to PANEX North and one to PANEX South. This additional analysis capability will increase the amount of information that can be used to cooperatively identify smuggling targets, apprehend them in the transit zone, and deliver the smugglers into the custody of PANEX.

**Question 20. (U) "The Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) carries critical communication system repeaters and can deploy surface search sensors to detect in-coming go fast drug smuggling vessels. However, virtually all of the aerostats close to our sea border approaches have been decommissioned."**

**Question 20.a. (U) Please explain why the decommissioning was justified in light of JIATF South's leading role for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime smuggling?**

Answer: (U) The USG's interdiction strategy is to attack the flow of drug at the source - Colombia. Additionally, we have long believed that it is important to detect air and maritime smugglers as far forward into the threat area as possible. Based on threat vectors and that strategy, DoD developed the over-the-horizon radar system to replace many of the old Caribbean radar network. These radars gave us a deeper and wider look at the threat areas. Additionally, the bulk of the flow of drugs, historically and today, continues to pass through Mexico and enter the United States across our Southwest border. Drug smuggling through the U.S. gulf coast has always been deemed to be negligible. For these reasons, it made sense to close the aerostat sites along the Gulf coast and use those funds in a more cost effective manner to address the major drug flow vectors.

**Question 20.b (U) What has been the impact of the TARS decommissioning on JIATF South's Common Operating Picture (COP) for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime smuggling?**

Answer: (U) The JIATF South common operating picture includes a feed from the FAA center in Miami, the air traffic control radars at Key West and Guantanamo Bay, three ground based radars in Puerto Rico as well as the TARS sites at Cudjoe Key, FL and Lajas, Puerto Rico. Essentially, we have continuous surveillance coverage of all of South Florida, Cuba and the

Caribbean out as far as the British Virgin Islands. As JIATF South is focused much deeper and far beyond the area covered by TARS, the impact on the COP is minimal.

**Question 20c. (U) What detections systems does JIATF South currently rely on to monitor illicit traffic or threats from any southern location, east of Texas?**

Answer: (U) JIATF South is focused much deeper in the Caribbean. The area cited in the question is not continually covered by JIATF South. The Department of Homeland Security may be able to provide a more complete answer.

# Eastern Pacific MSC Oiler

**Purpose.** Present initial research in response to RADM Sirois query regarding the deployment of an MSC Oiler in the Eastern Pacific (EPAC)

**Discussion.** An Oiler deployed in the EPAC in support of TG 4.1 units would provide several major benefits:

- Ship on-station time is projected to increase between 16 and 22% as a result of an at-sea refueling capability. Currently, TG 4.1 units operating in EPAC return to port on average every 12 days to refuel.
- Enhanced OPSEC as a result of a reduced number of port calls
- Increased flexibility of operations due to fuels availability without the constraints of required lead time for diplomatic clearances.
- Additional law enforcement assets against LSV-type motherships
- Capability to conduct extended pursuit operations without having to 'break off' due to remaining fuel concerns

**Options.** Military Sealift Command (MSC) can provide two types of ships which already are, or could be, outfitted to deliver fuel in the EPAC.

- Kaiser Class fleet Oiler:
  - $11M to $20M per year
  - Length: 677 feet
  - Speed: 20 kts
  - Cargo capacity: 7.5M gl MGO and JP-5
  - The $11M price range is achieved through minimum Oiler manning and an arrangement with CDRPACFLT in which they continue to pay reduced operating costs. The more manning and fuel stations, the more money. Price includes fuel.

- Offshore supply vessel/small tanker:
  - Estimated cost: $ 5.5M to $7M per year. Firm cost information HQ MSC should be available mid Jan. 03.
  - Length: 200-300 feet
  - Speed: approx. 15 kts.
  - Cargo capacity: 300-600K gl MGO and JP-5

**Availability**

- The Henry J. Kaiser (T-AO 187), the initial vessel of the Kaiser Class Fleet Oiler, has recently undergone an overhaul, and can be ready for sea in less than 30 days.
- An offshore supply vessel would require seven to ten months of design and alterations to install alongside refueling capability as well as the ability to carry and deliver JP-5. Costs, currently being researched by HQ MSC, would be in addition to above mentioned operating costs.

**Summary**

- Although an Oiler in the EPAC would significantly enhance the effectiveness of JIATF East maritime CD operations, we have not found any funded MSC Oiler ship days.
- Potential MSC Oiler funding could be pursued through DASD/CN. However, given the budget decrements we are experiencing, JIATF East would need to offer an appropriate portion of another program budget to offset the costs of a MSC Oiler.
- JIATF East could discuss the retention of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary BLACK ROVER in the EPAC beyond its current deployment schedule or future deployments into the EPAC.
- Director, J4, will solicit guidance from CTF 4.1 on how to proceed.

Prepared: Jan 2003

# Utilizing Peru, Colombia and/or Chile Replenishment Ships to Refuel U.S. Interdiction Assets

**(U) Purpose**: To provide updated information on the status and feasibility of utilizing Peruvian, Colombian and/or Chilean Navy replenishment ships to refuel JIATF-S assigned U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships.

**(U) Background:** The current and projected operational commitments for U.S. Navy and Military Sealift Command (MSC) fleet oiler assets preclude the provision of sustained support to vessels conducting CD operations in the JIATF-SOUTH Joint Operating Area (JOA). Peru, Colombia and Chile have indicated willingness and/or offered to provide replenishment support to JIATF-SOUTH assigned ships with varying levels of commitment, capability and financial support.

**(U) Peru.** The Peruvian Navy supports use of its oiler, BAP LOBITOS (ATP-153), in the EPAC if the U.S. will fund operating expenses. COMUSNAVSO recently completed a favorable assessment of the ship and has made funds available for a proof of concept deployment tentatively scheduled for late-May 04. Tentative support schedule is 45 days per quarter in support of CNT operations. The ship is equipped with fuel riggings and couplings compatible with US surface vessels and has been used during UNITAS exercises.

**(U) BAP LOBITOS Specifications:**
- Built by Bath Iron Works in 1975
- Was ex-SEALIFT CARIBBEAN (T-AOT 174)
- 13.9m draft, 178.9m LOA, 25.6m beam
- 13-knot max speed
- 185,000-barrel (7.77M gallons) cargo capacity: 7.72M gallons DFM, 50K gallons JP-5

**(U) Operating costs:**
- $7,167.85 per day [$6,335.50/day in DFM, $373.50/day in lube oil, and $458.85 in rations]
- $2,616,265.25 per year

**(U) Additional Considerations:**
- Peruvian Navy needs to reconfigure one of the cargo tanks (50k gallons) to accommodate JP-5. They will need to plumb a JP-5 specific piping for RAS as well as internal recirculation of JP-5 with the cargo tank.
- Peru Navy stated BAP LOBITOS does not have a helicopter deck, but has sufficient area to conduct vertical replenishment (VERTREP).
- Peru Navy stated that they are willing to carry parts for transfer to USN ships.
- BAP LOBITOS has dry food storage capability, but no frozen food storage capability.

**(U) Colombia.** The Colombian Navy supports use of it's two Naval Auxiliaries, ARC BUENAVENTURA and ARC CARTAGENA DE INDIAS, both of which are currently undergoing extensive overhauls. Colombia has dedicated 8.2M USD and the US has contributed 550K USD towards conversion of these ships. Additional U.S. operational funding requirements are TBD. Tentative support schedule is 4-5 days per month in support of CNT operations in the EPAC and WCARIB. The ships will also extend time on station for Colombian Naval assets conducting combined operations with U.S. forces.

# Utilizing Peru, Colombia and/or Chile Replenishment Ships to Refuel U.S. Interdiction Assets

**(U) ARC BUENAVENTURA Specifications:**

- Built by Bremer Vulcan in 1968
- Was ex-NIENBURG (A 1416)
- 4.2m draft, 104m LOA, 13.2m beam
- 16-knot max speed
- 200,000 gal cargo capacity: 175K gal DFM, 25K gallons JP-5

**(U) Operating costs:**

- TBD

**(U) Additional Considerations:**

- Fuel Exchange Agreement needs to be negotiated.
- COMUSNAVSO has expressed concerns regarding the ships' operational capabilities (low liquid load capacity, slow pumping rate, un-tensioned rigging, short span of cables/hoses). Configuration is below USN technical standards but acceptable per NAVSEASYSCOM.
- ARC BUENAVENTURA conversion is 60% (est.) complete. It still requires tank conversion, station/pumping/transfer system and equipment installation, and testing. Projected to be ready-for-sea in AUG/SEP 04. Ship will be able to provide full set of underway replenishment (UNREP) and VERTREP services (except transfer of ammunition).
- ARC CARTAGENA DE INDIAS projected to be ready-for-sea AUG 05.

**(U) Chile.** The Chilean Navy has expressed interest in additional cooperation and support for U.S. maritime CNT efforts, including at sea replenishment of U.S. forces. Chile has one Replenishment ship, ARAUCANO (AO 53), which regularly supports U.S. assets participating in UNITAS. Scope of support, funding and availability requirements is TBD. JIATF-SOUTH planners will discuss replenishment options in Chile 10-15 May 04. JIATF-SOUTH will conduct a combined CNT operation with Chilean maritime forces in late Jun 04.

**(U) ARAUCANO Specifications:**

- Built by Burmeister & Wain in 1967
- 8.8m draft, 151.7m LOA, 22.8m beam
- 17-knot max speed
- 5.58M gal cargo fuel capacity

**(U) Recommendation**: In terms of capacity, capability and duration, utilizing Peru's BAP LOBITOS is the most feasible option to date. Pending a successful proof of concept, the BAP LOBITOS could substantially improve U.S. Assets on station time (by 40% if the 45 day per quarter deployment rate is sustained) at a reasonable cost. While Colombia's replenishment ships are considerably less capable, they can provide limited support to U.S. assets while simultaneously extending on station time for Colombian ships direct support. Continued evaluation and support of this option is warranted. Discussions regarding Chilean replenishment support options and requirements are ongoing. Anticipate outline and recommendations following the Jun 04 combined operation.

Prepared: 07 MAY 04

# Refueling at Sea Support for CNT Operations Surface Assets in East Pacific

**Purpose**: To provide updated information regarding ongoing efforts to obtain oiler support for JIATF SOUTH CNT operations in EPAC.

**Background:** Since before 1999, JIATF SOUTH has been working to obtain oiler support for EPAC operations. The current and projected operational commitments for U.S. Navy and Military Sealift Command (MSC) fleet oiler assets preclude the provision of sustained support to vessels conducting CD operations in the JIATF-SOUTH Joint Operating Area (JOA). Other alternatives ranging from commercially contracting oiler support to reactivating a decommissioned oiler were considered and deemed cost prohibitive. The remaining option, obtaining Partner Nation oiler support, is currently being pursued and is under the purview of NAVSOUTH per direction from SOUTHCOM.

**Discussion:** Partner Nations considered were Colombia, Chile and Peru. Oiler support from Colombia is no longer being considered due to capability limitations and ORM considerations. Chilean oiler support continues to be discussed periodically. Oiler support from Peru is the most viable option. However, mechanical problems and resource constraints have delayed the Peruvian oiler's proof of concept deployment pending completion of repairs.(Basically, the cost of repairs exceeded available US fiscal resources and Peruvians reps would re-engage SOUTHCOM once repairs are completed.) As of May '05 Peruvians reps have re-engaged NAVSOUTH and SOUTHCOM about providing oiler support. Per SOUTHCOM assist tasker SCSJS-31032 from May '05, three basic actions are required to continue the process of getting oiler support from Peru:

1. Draft and sign MOA with Peru (Per the assist tasker from SOUTHCOM, JIATFS provided a draft MOA to NAVSOUTH and SOUTHCOM on 12 May 05)

2. Address need for site survey in Peru during 11-14 May timeframe (NAVSOUTH met with Peruvian reps in Mayport and determined additional site surveys not required.)

3. Determine feasibility of conducting a proof of concept fourth quarter FY 05 or first quarter FY 06. (Work in progress-NAVSOUTH working way ahead with Peruvian reps. SOUTHCOM working to find funding for the proof of concept)

**Additional consideration:** Per discussions with the UK scheduler, the annual presence of UK frigates and oilers in the CARIB will decrease starting in 2006. During the periods when UK frigates are not in the CARIB, the UK oiler will be under JIATFS TACON and available for movement to EPAC to support operations. The movement of the UK oiler to EPAC would be coordinated through the UK LNO at JIATFS.

**Impact:** Currently in EPAC, narco traffickers are using routes that take them further South and West of the Galapagos. JIATFS surface assets require 2-3 days transit (one way) after refueling in Manta, EC or 3-4 days transit (one way) after refueling in CENTAM to reach the narco traffickers. With at sea endurance of

# Refueling at Sea Support for CNT Operations Surface Assets in East Pacific

JIATFS surface assets typically averaging between 10-12 days, 30% -60% of that time is spent in transit to/from port. (Manta, EC – 30%-50% of endurance spent in transit; CENTAM -50%-60% of endurance spent in transit). Oiler support in EPAC would double surface asset at sea endurance (20-24 days). This is based on the fact that the need for brief stops for fuel (BSF), scheduled 10-12 days between required port visits, would be eliminated as ships could stay on station and refuel at sea.

**Recommendation**: None. This paper is provided to present the latest information regarding efforts to obtain oiler support for JIATFS CNT operations in EPAC.

Prepared: 26 May 05

**STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD**

**EDUARDO BHATIA**
**EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR**
**PUERTO RICO FEDERAL AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION**

**COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO**

**HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES**

**HEARING ON**

**"INTERRUPTING NARCO-TERRORIST THREATS ON THE HIGH SEAS: DO WE HAVE ENOUGH WIND IN OUR SAILS?"**

**JUNE 29, 2005**

Chairman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings, I greatly appreciate you convening this important hearing before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources entitled "Interrupting Narco-terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails?". My name is Eduardo Bhatia, and I am the Executive Director of the Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration, which represents the Commonwealth government in Washington, D.C. This is a particularly important issue for Puerto Rico and our nation at this time. I appreciate your willingness for me to provide these comments before your Subcommittee that I hope will allow for a greater understanding of the maritime narco-terrorist threat that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico faces, how local and federal agencies are responding to these threats, and what steps may be taken to improve the deterrence, interdiction and other efforts to respond to these threats.

There is no doubt that narco-trafficking is a major problem affecting Puerto Rico. To a great extent, Puerto Rico lays both in the transit zone for narco-trafficking, and is seen as a final destination as well. Of concern is our particular focus on the matter before the subcommittee – the threat and capability of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to exploit the 363 miles of coastline of Puerto Rico to smuggle large quantities of cocaine and other narcotics into the Island, and to transship it elsewhere from Puerto Rico. Located only 380 miles from the South American coast, narcotics like cocaine are easily transported through the Gulf or Mexico or Caribbean Sea by go-fast boats or air drops into the eastern Caribbean islands or Hispaniola. Puerto Rico is an attractive transshipment point, as once in Puerto Rico, there are no further inspections by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) or other barriers that preclude narcotics or contraband from being smuggled elsewhere in the U.S. As a federal official once noted to me, "once you get something in Puerto Rico, you may as well be in Iowa – there is nothing to stop you from moving it elsewhere in the nation."

From eastern Caribbean islands such as the Virgin Islands and St. Maarten, narcotics are then carried by go-fast boats to the islands of Vieques and Culebra or to the eastern or southern mainland of Puerto Rico, or via go-fast boats or, often with illegal immigrants, shipped in *yolas* from Haiti and more commonly, from the Dominican Republic. Other maritime means for

narcotics entering Puerto Rico include private yachts and fishing boats, in addition to container ships arriving primarily from Central and South America. For instance, in February 2004, CBP officers in San Juan inspected a vessel arriving from Venezuela, which had made a port call in the Dominican Republic, in which they found 1,705 pounds of cocaine valued at over $55 million, while in February 2005, federal authorities seized more than 2,000 pounds of cocaine and 2 ounces of heroin on a Honduran-flagged ship in nearby waters, which was escorted, searched and detained in San Juan.

Through coordination with local members of DTOs or other criminal entities, narcotics are often retrieved onshore or near-shore at night, and then stored in Puerto Rico until the narcotics can be transshipped elsewhere within the United States – most commonly the northeastern corridor of New York City, New Jersey, and Boston, among other locations. In fact, analysts estimate that 80 percent of the cocaine that enters Puerto Rico is transshipped to other locations, with only about 20 percent being consumed locally. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimates that 25 percent or more of the total amount of cocaine entering the United States comes from the Caribbean corridor, and the flow through Puerto Rico contributes greatly to this percentage. According to the 2003 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Caribbean Cocaine Threat, the estimated flow of cocaine directly through Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands was 11 metric tons, while estimates of cocaine flow through Hispaniola were 44 metric tons, and 27 metric tons through the eastern Caribbean and Lesser Antilles. According to the ONDCP assessment, since most of the cocaine passing through Hispaniola and the Lesser Antilles is transshipped through Puerto Rico, the total flow through the Island to the continental U.S. is estimated to be 82 tons, or fifteen percent of the total flow into the U.S. (though more cocaine passes through the Caribbean bound for Europe, these numbers do not represent that additional amount).

While I note the estimates and intelligence that is available pertaining to narcotics, these transit corridors could presumably be used not just for access to the American illegal drug market, but with potential collaboration between narco-traffickers and terrorist organizations, rather heinous people or dangerous cargo or weapons could be smuggled in as well.

As you can imagine, this system has far ranging impacts on Puerto Rico. Though I recognize that this is not the focus of this hearing, it is important to note that the maritime narco-threat that Puerto Rico faces causes locally an extraordinarily high significance of violent crime, particularly murder. Coupled with an unemployment rate double that of the rest of the United States, local involvement with criminal gangs and other DTOs is all too common, and causes immeasurable impacts to our economy, education system, and quality of life. In a certain sense, the impacts from narco-trafficking bring a certain level of terrorism to Puerto Rico's communities.

Nonetheless, I want to assure you that the government and law enforcement agencies of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are dedicated to combating this threat and that they are working closely with their federal counterparts. As Puerto Rico's Resident Commissioner in Congress from 2001 - 2005, Governor Aníbal Acevedo-Vilá worked closely with federal law enforcement agencies to bring more resources to address narcotics and related crime, such as working with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to create a Mobile Enforcement Team in Puerto Rico, which has since proven effective. Fighting crime and combating the narco-trade are priorities for the Governor, and will continue to be. The Superintendent of the Puerto Rico Police Department, Pedro Toledo, is a former FBI Special Agent, which greatly facilitates cooperation between Commonwealth and federal authorities. The existence of the Puerto Rico/Virgin Islands High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) also enables strong federal-local collaboration, planning, information sharing and coordinated efforts to address drug trafficking both in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, as well as in the surrounding waters. JIATF-South plays a similarly important, though a broader, and more strategic role.

The primary Commonwealth law enforcement agency dedicated to maritime law enforcement, including but not limited to narcotics, is the Rapid Response Task Force, or FURA by its Spanish acronym. FURA does have a terrestrial component, though that is out of the scope of this hearing. One of the agency's primary goals is the detection and interdiction of questionable vessels in the waters of Puerto Rico with the intent of deterring and catching those who attempt to smuggle drugs into Puerto Rico, and is in fact the lead agency in the 2004-2005 PR/VI HIDTA Air and Marine Interdiction Initiative. FURA has a fleet of boats, helicopters and

planes and a dedicated and professional force of 759 officers and agents and 24 civilians. Of those officers and agents, 354, or over 46 percent, are assigned to the eleven Maritime Divisions, based along the coast of the Island. Just this week a new station was inaugurated by Governor Acevedo-Vilá in the eastern Municipality of Humacao, which will greatly aid in the capability to interdict maritime threats along the southeastern shore and the islands of Vieques and Culebra.

FURA has been successful in its efforts to detect and interdict drug shipments. The agency conducted 5,761 maritime patrols in 2004, totaling 29,170 hours of patrol time. These patrol operations led to 9,049 interventions of vessels. One metric of FURA's effectiveness is the amount of cocaine captured annually, which is rather significant, if only from an absolute and not a relative perspective:

| Year | Amount of Cocaine Seized by FURA |
|---|---|
| 2000 | 3697 kilograms |
| 2001 | 5203 kilos |
| 2002 | 1349 kilos |
| 2003 | 3959 kilos |
| 2004 | 2309 kilos |

In addition, FURA seized 10,930 pounds of marijuana in 2003, and 649.8 pounds in 2004, and 28 kilos of heroin in 2003. As you can see, the actions of FURA, and all of the Puerto Rico Police, exemplify the strong and dedicated effort of the Commonwealth to curtail drug smuggling into and around our Island. Though locally funded, FURA has benefited from certain federal resources. For instance, Byrne Justice Assistance Grants (JAG) funded the training and certification of 31 FURA officers in emergency and instrument flight procedures in 2003, and FURA received a total of $2.3 million from the HIDTA program for maintenance of the boat and plane fleet, allowing for safer and increased operational tempo of the maritime patrols. In addition to FURA and the Puerto Rico Police, the Puerto Rico National Guard has also contributed to combating the maritime threat by assisting with inspections of cargo ships and other vessels, supporting aerial detection efforts, and providing myriad support functions through the HIDTA collaborative.

Thankfully, Puerto Rico partners closely with federal law enforcement and homeland security officials in addressing this narco-trafficking threat. Coordinated through the PR/VI HIDTA, FURA and the Puerto Rico Police operate alongside the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol, Air and Marine Operations, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and others.

From a perspective on the maritime threat, the Coast Guard deals with much of the maritime traffic in and around Puerto Rico, and is the lead federal authority for maritime issues on the high-seas beyond Puerto Rico and U.S. coastal waters. Operating out of San Juan Harbor, Coast Guard Sector San Juan operates a fleet of 6 110-foot (WPB) *Island Class* Patrol Boats, in addition to numerous smaller vessels, which patrol the waters around Puerto Rico and throughout the Caribbean. In addition, the Coast Guard maintains an air detachment, Air Station Borinquen, which is located in the northwest municipality of Aguadilla on the former Ramey Air Force Base. Combining air assets, such as HU-25 Falcon Jet surveillance aircraft, and the vessel fleet the Coast Guard provide leadership in maritime surveillance, detection and interdiction activities that greatly contribute to the law enforcement activities and defensive posture in the waters around Puerto Rico. The San Juan Sector Coast Guard has proven successful in these endeavors, reporting seizures of 21 kilograms of heroin in FY 2004, and 38 kilos to date in FY05; 14,994 kilos of cocaine in FY04, and 5,499 kilos to date in FY05; and 38,354 pounds – over 19 tons of marijuana/hashish in FY04, and 9,079 pounds to date in FY05. These seizures were yielded by the following interdiction events: FY04, 44 events for cocaine, 18 for marijuana, and 4 for heroin; and to date in FY05, 20 events for cocaine, 13 for marijuana, and 5 events for heroin seizures. These are significant quantities of narcotics that, through the efforts of the Coast Guard, have been captured and did not make it into our communities. The Coast Guard has a broad range of responsibilities, and as with narcotics interdiction, performs a supreme job that the people of Puerto Rico greatly appreciate.

Other Homeland Security agencies are closely involved in the maritime counter-narcotics effort around Puerto Rico and in the Caribbean. Working closely with the Coast Guard, CBP officers regularly interdict questionable vessels from the Dominican Republic and elsewhere, often detaining illegal immigrants and occasionally contraband. The Air and Marine Operations

(AMO) component based out of Puerto Rico, which was recently transferred from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement branch, conducts critically important detection and interdiction flights in the Caribbean. Using a variety of air and marine assets, AMO provides critical awareness of suspicious planes and boats in the region, which in turn supports the interdiction efforts conducted by AMO, the Coast Guard, or Puerto Rican forces. The AMO has plans to construct a new facility on the former Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, which will increase the capability of AMO to conduct detection and interdiction missions in the increasingly used eastern Caribbean corridor.

One final federal asset of importance to the counter-narcotics effort in Puerto Rico is the tethered aerostat radar system (TARS) located in the southwest Puerto Rico town of Lajas. The Lajas TARS provides real-time awareness of airborne tracks in the Caribbean, out to a radius of 300 miles when fully deployed. The Lajas TARS has succeeded in deterring many suspicious tracks from flying towards Puerto Rico, and preventing airborne drug shipments from being dropped near or in Puerto Rico. The TARS costs about $3 million per year to operate, and in comparison with other detection means, is highly cost effective. According to federal data, aerostats were responsible for the vast majority of all detections of suspect air targets nationwide in 2002, at an exponentially lower cost than P-3s, C-550 or other airborne sensor platforms. Though the U.S. Air Force removed the Lajas TARS from service for a short period in early 2004, pressure from Puerto Rico and the value of the TARS to other federal agencies led the Defense Department to return the aerostat to service.

As you can see, while Puerto Rico faces a broad array of threats from narco-traffickers and potentially narco-terrorists who use the high seas to conduct their illegal activities, coordination and cooperation between Commonwealth and federal entities has been successful in interdicting, deterring, detaining and prosecuting that activity. Despite these concerted efforts, DTOs continue to have success in smuggling cocaine, other narcotics, and potentially other contraband to, and through the Island. In order to maintain the capability of Puerto Rico and the federal government in responding to these threats, Congress should consider the following recommendations:

- To enable critical interagency cooperation, HIDTA should continue to be funded at a high level, and should remain under the control of the ONDCP;
- Federal assistance to local law enforcement agencies, such as the Byrne JAG program, should remain funded at a high-level;
- As has been requested by Resident Commissioner Luis Fortuño, support the Coast Guard in devoting greater numbers of its vessels and air assets, such as MH-68A Stingray Interdiction Helicopter (HITRON), to assignment to Coast Guard Sector San Juan;
- A Border Patrol office should be established in the U.S. Virgin Islands with new manpower/personnel and resources, enabling the Border Patrol in Puerto Rico to more greatly focus on smuggling and illegal immigration threats to the Commonwealth;
- Fully fund the AMO's construction of a new facility, including helipad, boat docks and refurbished hangers, at the former Naval Station Roosevelt Roads;
- Provide funding for the Maritime Patrol Aircraft that AMO is procuring, which will increase the agency's ability to detect maritime tracks from the air; and
- The Lajas TARS should be retrofitted to include maritime radar, which would cost less than $250,000 to install and only accrue $30,000 in additional annual operations costs, while providing AMO, FURA, Coast Guard and others with extremely heightened maritime awareness up to 300 miles out from Puerto Rico.

These recommendations, if followed, will provide the important resources and information for federal and Commonwealth law enforcement agencies to continue their dedicated response to the narco-terrorist threat originating from the high seas. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is dedicated to combating the threat of drugs on our streets and communities, and realizes that preventing narcotics from entering our Island is the first step that can be locally taken towards supply reduction. In creating and maintaining an important defense against narco-smuggling into Puerto Rico, Commonwealth and federal authorities will be all the more prepared and capable of deterring and interdicting any worse threats that exist, or may arise.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I thank you for this opportunity to provide a Puerto Rico perspective on this extremely important issue, and I hope that we, the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, can work with you, as we have with our federal law enforcement counterparts, to ensure the greatest possible capability of protecting our nation from the threats of narco-terrorism.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20229

U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

AUG 11 2005

The Honorable Mark E. Souder
Chairman
Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy and Human Resources
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of June 30, 2005, regarding the June 29, 2005, hearing "Interrupting Narco-terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails?" In your letter, you raised several questions regarding the role of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP has recently completed its review at this matter. Please allow me to answer those questions in the enclosed responses.

I appreciate your interest in Customs and Border Protection. If we may offer further assistance, please contact me at (202) 344-1760.

Sincerely,

Thaddeus M. Bingel
Assistant Commissioner
Office of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
HEARING BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES
JUNE 29, 2005

QUESTION 1. During a January 2005 Subcommittee staff visit to Joint Interagency Task Force- South, Admiral Hathaway stated that he now has more actionable intelligence available than he has interdiction assets capable of responding to the potential smuggling events.

a. Does your office have strategic plans to address future resource allocations and backfill these asset shortages?

ANSWER: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and CBP Air currently are working with Joint Interagency Task Force- South (JIATF-S) to quantify the number of missed opportunities and identify the resources needed to successfully detect and pursue potential smugglers.

b. Does your office have sufficient assets to meet the transit zone requirements?

ANSWER: As coordinated by the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, CBP committed to provide 600 flight hours per month to support interdiction operations in the source and transit zones. Through CBP Air, the agency routinely meets those requirements with its current aircraft inventory and budget. Any increase in CBP's portion of the transit zone support would require a reevaluation of Air and Marine Operations (AMO) assets and deployment priorities.

c. If you devoted sufficient assets to meet the transit zone requirements, what other Homeland Security mission (port, border, and airspace security) would be affected?

ANSWER: The transit zone requirements for CBP Air would have to be articulated if they exceed the current 600 hours per month support that CBP Air provides. The current commitment to JIATF-S represents 60 percent of the total flight hours flown by CPB Air's P-3s. CBP Air meets this current obligation to support JIATF-S in the source and transit zones with its current aircraft inventory and budget. Given the current resources, an increase in the requirements for P-3 support in the Caribbean or Eastern Pacific would impact missions along the border or in the protection of critical infrastructure.

QUESTION 2. The House and Senate have supported the purchase of surface search radar for the Customs and Borders Protection's Office of Air and Marine Operation aging fleet of P-3 aircraft.

a. Will this new radar system significantly improve efforts in the transit zone?

ANSWER: The inclusion of modern surface search radar onboard the CBP Air fleet of P-3s will provide a significant increase to the effectiveness of the P-3 in the maritime surveillance of the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.

b. Should the palletized surface search radar be utilized in all your P-3 Slick marine patrol aircraft?

ANSWER: The concept behind the palletized surface search radar system is the ability to configure the P-3 with the appropriate sensors for the broad variety of missions. Additional palletized sensor systems that will support overland missions are under consideration. The end goal is to have the appropriate mix of palletized systems on hand in order to configure the aircraft appropriately for all their homeland security missions.

QUESTION 3. Border Patrol, Air and Marine Operations and the Coast Guard have all begun to test and evaluate unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), to patrol the borders and out coastal water. It appears, however, that each of the three agencies is pursuing separate UAV programs. In last year's July 22 hearing entitled, "Drugs and Security in a Post 9/11 World: Coordinating the Counternarcotics Mission at the Department of Homeland Security" the Subcommittee was told that this was being coordinated through the Aviation Management Council.

a. Have you given consideration to recommending an end to the divisions within CBP of the testing and evaluation programs for CBP UAV's?

ANSWER: CBP Air will provide a single UAV program to meet a spectrum of CBP mission needs.

b. When do you expect a decision on the deployment of a CBP UAV Program?

ANSWER: CBP has set a goal for fielding its first UAV system in Fiscal Year 2005. CBP issued a Request for Information in March 2005 and, as a result of the information gained from this effort, the agency issued a subsequent Request For Proposal for a UAV system in June 2005. The current UAV timeline estimates a contract award in August 2005 and deployment of the UAV to the Southwest Border in September 2005.

QUESTION 4. Border Patrol, Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protections Office of Air and Marine Operations have aging air and surface assets.

a. What is your agency's timetable to replace and modernize these assets?

ANSWER: CBP Air developed a draft modernization and recapitalization plan that could accomplish the majority of it goals within the first 5 years after implementation. At the completion of the transition effort aimed at merging the

air programs of AMO and Office of Border Patrol (OBP), the CBP Air plan along with OBP's modernization plan will be reviewed and revised as necessary to reflect the new CBP Air organization.

b. Will the replacement plans assure that there is no disruption or reductions in current capabilities?

ANSWER: An underlying tenant of the draft CBP Air modernization plan is that the plan would not adversely impact current operations. This will be accomplished by ensuring legacy assets are kept at full operational readiness, while new assets with enhanced multi-role capabilities are brought into service.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

The Honorable Mark Souder
Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
Committee on Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
B-377 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-3802

Dear Chairman Souder:

In response to your July 29, 2005 letters to U.S. Southern Command, Northern Command, Central Command and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, attached are answers to the questions asked following the subcommittee hearing, "2006 DOD Counternarcotics Budget: Does it Deliver the Necessary Support?"

Pursuant to your request, we have coordinated with the Commands, to provide you the comprehensive answers to these questions.

Thank you for your support of the Department's Counternarcotics efforts

Sincerely,

Robert J. Newberry
Principal Director for Counternarcotics

Committee On Government Reform
Subcommittee On Criminal Justice, Drug Policy And Human Resources
Follow-up questions for the record for
Captain Edmund Turner (U.S. Southern Command), Colonel John D. Nelson, (U.S. Northern Command), Captain Jim Stahlman (U.S. Central Command), and Mary Beth Long (Office of Secretary of Defense)

Dated July 29, 2005.

*(SOUTHCOM #1/NORTHCOM #1/OSD #1)*

**Question 1. The Department of Defense was designated as the single lead agency for detection and monitoring in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1989. The Tethered Aerostat Radar System is an example of a detection system now run by the Department. This system was originally authorized in the 1986 Omnibus Drug Act, and was envisioned as a 14-unit picket line protecting the southern approaches of the U.S. from low flying aircraft. Unfortunately, the system was only implemented to a maximum of 12 balloons and has been allowed to wither 7 presently, leaving key southern approaches to the U.S. unprotected. General Eberhart, former Commander of U.S. Northern Command, suggested either grounding the TARS balloons, except for the Florida Keys aerostat suggesting it only benefits from a single balloon located in the Florida keys.**

**Question 1a. Can you explain how this degradation was justified in light of DoD's lead agency role for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime smuggling?**

Answer: To support the Counternarcotics interdiction strategy, DoD continues to commit maritime and aerial assets to the Detection and Monitoring mission subject to global commitments. Although specific air and maritime assets resourcing is greatly important to the D&M strategy, effective mission accomplishment is dependant on the integration of a number of supporting elements. DoD executes its statutory role to serve as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for Detection and Monitoring by aggressively providing command and control; aircraft and ships to support D&M, Air Bridge Denial and Intelligence and Reconnaissance; collaboration, communication information sharing architecture; planning assistance; training and equipping for partner nation military and law enforcement units; counternarcotic asset basing through Cooperative Security Locations; and, logistic, transportation and manpower support.

Based on the interdiction strategy and the current threat vectors, DoD employs the Re-locatable Over-the Horizon Radar System (ROTHR) in place of the aging Caribbean radar network, primarily comprised of the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS). ROTHR provides a much broader and deeper look into the primary threat areas. The predominance of TARS coverage that has been diminished is along the Gulf Coast where drug flow into the U.S. has been historically negligible. It should be noted that the TARS was designed to detect aerial targets and has very limited capability to detect small

surface targets. The primary means of conveyance in the Transit Zone (East Pacific and Caribbean) continues to be non-commercial maritime small craft (go-fasts).

**Question 1b. What has been the impact of the TARS decommissioning of JIATF-South's Common Operating picture for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime smuggling?**

Answer: The impact on the Common Operational Picture (COP) is minimal. JIATF-South continues to fuse numerous, all-source feeds into the COP, including the FAA center in Miami, the air traffic control radars at Key West and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, three ground based radars in Puerto Rico, and the two existing TARS sites at Cudjoe Key, Florida and Lajas, Puerto Rico. Essentially this results in continuous surveillance coverage of all south Florida, Cuba, the Caribbean as far east as the British Virgin Islands and south into the Andean Ridge countries. JIATF-South is primarily focused south beyond the area covered by TARS.

**Question 1c. What detection systems does JIATF-S currently rely on to monitor illicit traffic or threats from any southern location, east of Texas?**

Answer: JIATF-South utilizes the full spectrum of Detection and Monitoring assets and is focused much deeper in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. As a result, suspected smuggling targets are typically detected before they enter the Gulf of Mexico. The area adjacent to Texas is not continually covered by JIATF-South. The Department of Homeland Security and US Northern Command may be able to provide specific information in monitoring systems in US territorial waters.

**Question 1d. What detection systems does JIATF-S currently rely on to monitor illicit traffic or threats along the Southwest border?**

Answer: JIATF-S has no operational responsibility for the Southwest border.

*(SOUTHCOM #2/OSD #2)*

**Question 2. JIATF-S reports that in order to operate 2 E-3 AWACS aircraft and their required tanker the Air Force deploys 97 personnel. They also require over 100 ground support personnel to maintain and guard the aircraft. DHS P-3 domes, by contrast, have 8-10 men crews and no more than 3 maintenance personnel totaling no more than 25 people for 2 aircraft. Additionally, the cost per flight hour for the P-3 Dome is approximately one half that of the E-3 AWACS.**

**Question 2a. Would it not make a lot more economic sense to empower DHS to fulfill the counterdrug responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere?**

Answer: No single agency has the resources required to accomplish the entire counterdrug mission in the Western Hemisphere. Both DoD and DHS provide Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft to meet all counterdrug requirements, ranging from Air Bridge Denial (ABD) to air and maritime surveillance. The aircraft of each department have differing capabilities and support requirements. DoD facilities (Cooperative Security Locations - CSLs) and the "100 ground support personnel", who operate the CSL, provide bed down support for all aircraft conducting counternarcotics missions, including DHS assets. This includes logistical and lodging support, communication architecture, intelligence collaboration, force protection and security. Currently, DoD possesses the best capability to operationally integrate all assets in its Command and Control network and is best postured to continue as the lead agency. Our significant investment in command, control, communication, and intelligence systems and the invaluable support from other Defense agencies cannot be duplicated by any other department.

*(SOUTHCOM #3/OSD #3)*

**Question 3. The National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) is an interagency effort, organized under ONDCP, to coordinate the efforts of federal agencies involved in stopping drug smuggling through the transit zone. It is agreed to by ONDCP, the Defense Department, the Justice Department, and agencies now under the Dept. of Homeland Security. The last NICCP was issued in 1999. Since then, the attacks of September 11, 2001 have led to major changes in the interdiction agencies. The Defense Dept. has reduced its commitment to counterdrug operations as a result of the War on Terror, while Customs and the Coast Guard have been transferred to DHS -- whose main mission is also preventing terrorism. A new NICCP, designed to take into account these vast changes, would seem to be long overdue.**

**Question 3a. What is the status of a new NICCP?**

Answer: Let me first point out that the Department has not reduced its commitment to counternarcotics operations, and remains committed to the mission and its responsibilities. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict signed the NICCP on behalf of the Department on 2 August 2005. U.S. Southern Command had the opportunity to review and comment on the new NICCP before it was signed. For a current progress report, the Committee should direct this question to the United States Interdiction Coordinator, who has primary responsibility for the NICCP.

**Question 3b. What steps is ONDCP taking to ensure that the new NICCP is sufficiently comprehensive, and will be issued soon?**

Answer: From the Department's perspective, ONDCP actively participated in drafting and coordinating the NICCP. The USIC, drafter of the NICCP, takes direction from the Director, ONDCP, For a more comprehensive answer, the Committee should direct this question to the Director, ONDCP.

*(NORTHCOM #2)*
**Question 4. In the Subcommittee's Congressional Delegation to JTF-North in March, we learned that JTF-North has future plans on becoming a Joint Interagency Task Force.**

**Question 4a. Do you feel that DoD should be the lead agency to provide command and control support to counterdrug law enforcement efforts or can the Interagency provide the necessary skills and assets to manage a national common operating picture that depicts all counterdrug efforts in the U.S.?**

Answer: The DoD currently has the necessary authority in section 1004(b)8 of P.L. 101-510, as amended to provide command, control, communications, and computer network support to law enforcement to facilitate counterdrug activities. It would not be appropriate and it is not necessary to designate DoD as a lead agency for law enforcement efforts in the U.S.

JTF-North has transitioned from JTF-6, which was solely focused on counternarcotics missions in support to civil law enforcement agencies, to a command that supports these agencies in countering the broader transnational threats of narcoterrorism and high-interest alien smuggling. It is premature to discuss any future evolution of JTF-N as a partner in a JIATF.

**Question 4b. If you were to be upgraded to a JIATF what agency would command it?**

Answer: The question is too hypothetical in nature to answer.

*(CENTCOM #1/OSD #4)*
**Question 5. The Subcommittee believes that destruction of the stockpiled opium and heroin should be DoD's primary response to this immediate threat. The reluctance to target known warehoused opium products will encourage even more heroin production, threatening to increase heroin addiction in Europe and the U.S., and**

**providing increased funding for the terrorists who are engaging our troops currently in Afghanistan.**

**Question 5a. Has USCENTCOM begun to target known counternarcotics targets?**

Answer: As in other theaters, USCENTCOM continues to support U.S. and Coalition counternarcotics security forces as they target known narcotics targets. If our troops come across drugs or drug producing equipment during the conduct of military operations, they are authorized to take action against these targets and report all drug related discoveries.

**Question 5b. Would the risks for DoD personnel in Afghanistan be unacceptable if they were to begin to engage in stockpiled sources of drugs?**

Answer: Risk assessments are factually and temporally conditional; as such this question is too hypothetical to answer fully. U.S. Commanders in Afghanistan continually assess risks when planning and conducting operations.

*(CENTCOM #2/OSD #5)*
**Question 6. The Subcommittee supports the Department of State's efforts to have the Afghanistan regime allow both aerial and ground poppy eradication.**

**Question 6a. What role will USCENTCOM forces play in counternarcotics aerial and ground eradication efforts?**

Answer: USCENTCOM will support other agency's efforts as they carry out the Embassy's counternarcotics strategy. DoD will have no direct role in eradication efforts.

**Question 6b. Will USCENTCOM increase the mobility and force protection provided eradication teams?**

Answer: There are no plans at this time for USCENTCOM to provide military forces for mobility and force protection for eradication teams. USCENTCOM will provide in extremis support, as necessary.

**Question 6c. Has USCENTCOM received requests for mobility or force protection from UK and other counternarcotics forces?**

Answer: USCENTCOM has received and supported requests for transportation from DEA agents in Afghanistan. Law enforcement entities provide for their own immediate defense, but USCENTCOM does provide in extremis defensive support as necessary.

**Question 6d. Is USCENTCOM providing logistical support to Department of State INL sponsored eradication? If so, what type of support?**

Answer: USCENTCOM provides transportation support and shares intelligence.

**Question 6e. Is USCENTCOM aware of any FBI, DEA or USAID involvement in eradication efforts? If so, has USCENTCOM supported any of these agencies?**

Answer: USCENTCOM is not aware of any FBI or DEA involvement in eradication. USAID is reportedly conducting some alternative livelihood programs in conjunction with eradication.

*(CENTCOM #3/OSD #6)*
**Question 7. Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan CFC-A developed the Integrated Border Management and Customs Control (IBMCC) concept to secure border crossing sites. The IBMCC concept includes Afghan National Police, Afghan Border Patrol, Afghan National Army, Afghan Customs and Counternarcotics Police (NCPA).**

**Question 7a. What is the current status of the IBMCC sites?**

Answer: CFC-A is currently testing the concept at the ISLAM Qala border crossing point. Planning is on-going to construct additional facilities at Shir Ghan and Spin Boldak border crossing points. Other nations are developing additional border crossing points.

**Question 7b. Are there any performance measures to date that would indicate program success?**

Answer: We are formulating performance measures to validate the concept.

**Question 7c. What metric will be used to determine if funding, construction and manning these border sites is actually hindering the flow of narcotics?**

Answer: The metrics have yet to be determined.

*(CENTCOM #4/OSD #7)*
**Question 8. Your Afghanistan counternarcotics objectives state that you aim to improve border security by providing infrastructure for National and Highway Police, improve border crossing points, and provide communications for Border Police. Your second objective calls for an improvement in intelligence sharing with law enforcement by creating an intelligence fusion centers in Combined Forces**

**Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) and in the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Your third objective calls for interdiction support through the improved mobility of the Afghan interdiction force and through the issuance of equipment for the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police.**

**Question 8a. How much heroin do you estimate that you have destroyed under this plan?**

Answer: The British Government and DEA work directly with Afghan counter narcotics security forces. For an accurate answer, the Committee should direct this question to the British Government or DEA, but USCENTCOM believes that over 1 metric ton of heroin and over 120 metric tons of opium/ opiates have been interdicted in Afghanistan.

**Question 8b. Do U.S. forces in Afghanistan have the authority to lead an operation to destroy know caches of stockpiled drugs? If not, why not?**

Answer: It depends on the situation. The Department believes the best approach is to develop the capacity of Afghan's security forces and judicial systems to address the drug problem in their country as a law enforcement operation. We are executing that approach.

*(CENTCOM #5/OSD #8)*
**Question 9. The efforts of the State and Defense Departments are integral to disrupting the market. However, if we focus on interdiction and not on the endgame that seizes the narcotics and prosecutes the violators, you gain only a load of dope and risk not getting to the source of the problem.**

**Question 9a. How are suspected smugglers ultimately handed off to host nation law enforcement agencies in transshipment areas?**

Answer: Your question highlights a problem. We turn over individuals to law enforcement, but the Afghan system for dealing with suspects is undeveloped. The Department of Defense agrees that more needs to be done to impose consequences for drug traffickers. The Department of Defense is working closely with the Department of State to establish the first Counternarcotics Judicial Center, which should be operating before the end of this year. Construction has already begun. The Center includes space for investigative and judicial personnel, as well as holding temporary holding spaces for suspects and convicted criminals.

**Question 9b. What extradition treaties exist with the countries surrounding Afghanistan?**

Answer: For an accurate and complete answer, the Committee should address this question to the Departments of Justice and State.

*(CENTCOM #6/OSD #9)*
**Question 10. What is the Department of Defense guidance to the troops deployed to Afghanistan, with respect to discovering poppy fields, labs, warehouses, and drug shipment convoys?**

Answer: USCENTCOM distributed reporting guidance and procedures to deployed troops for drug discoveries, but specific guidance is classified.

*(CENTCOM #7/OSD #10)*
**Question 11. British Government officials in the region have told my staff that attacking static targets like opium warehouses or processing plants would have an enormous impact on disrupting the drug trade in and around Afghanistan. How many warehouses, laboratories, and other stationary drug targets been destroyed to date?**

Answer: As of 28 July, various reporting indicates that over 150 drug laboratories have been interdicted in Afghanistan. The British Government and the DEA work directly with the Afghan counternarcotics security forces. For an accurate answer, the Committee should direct this question to the British Government or the DEA.

**UNITED STATES INTERDICTION COORDINATOR**
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
245 Murray Lane, SW, Mail Stop 9100
Washington D.C. 20528-9100

September 19, 2005

The Honorable Mark Souder
Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy and Human Resources
House Committee on Government Reform
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Souder:

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the questions for the record from the June 29, 2005 hearing on "Interrupting Narco-Terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails?" Attached are my written responses to those questions.

I look forward to working with you on future interdiction issues. If I may be of further assistance, please contact me at (202) 205-9481.

Sincerely,

RADM Ralph D. Utley, USCG (Ret.)
Acting United States Interdiction Coordinator

Questions for the Record from Chairman Mark E. Souder
Subcommittee Hearing held on June 29, 2005
"Interrupting Narco-Terrorist Threats on the High Seas?"

1. During a January 2005 Subcommittee staff visit to Joint Interagency Task Force-South, Admiral Hathaway stated that he now has more actionable intelligence available than he has interdiction assets capable of responding to the potential smuggling events.

    a. Is there a gap in interdiction resources in the transit zone?

ANSWER: There is not. The interdiction assets provided by the U.S. Coast Guard, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, and the Department of Defense in aggregate are at levels consistent with previous years. What has happened is that our intelligence has improved and has contributed significantly to an increase in seizures in the last two years. There is actionable intelligence that cannot be pursued due to a lack of air and marine interdiction assets, but this is not the same thing as saying that there is a gap in our capability. There have been cases where there is more actionable intelligence than the number of assets available to respond to potential smuggling events, particularly when several suspected smuggling events occur simultaneously in both regions. JIATF South has indicated that it is in the process of tracking these "missed interdiction opportunities" to determine their specific extent.

    b. Does the office of the US Interdiction Coordinator, Joint Interagency Task Force South, and Homeland Security have strategic plans to address future resource allocations and backfill these asset shortages?

ANSWER: The USIC has issued Interdiction Planning Guidance (IPG) to the interagency counterdrug community. The IPG provides guidance and priorities for future interdiction efforts and each organization then develops specific strategies and resource requirements needed to accomplish those efforts. To assist the interagency in determining asset requirements, the USIC formed the Interdiction Planning and Asset Management Group (IPAMG) – an interagency group that used a rigorous analytical process to develop Transit Zone interdiction resource requirements for the 2004 – 2008 timeframe. These were predecisional recommendations for various force levels needed to meet specific Transit Zone cocaine removal and seizure goals. Through regular meetings and conferences, the USIC continues to collaborate with interagency partners on appropriate strategies, operational plans and resource allocation levels needed to support the National Drug Control Strategy.

    c. How many aviation and marine assets would be required in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean to respond to the known actionable intelligence held at Joint Interagency Task Force South?

ANSWER: JIATF South recently completed a classified study on Transit and Source Zone asset requirements. JIATF South would be in a better position to respond to this question.

    d. Does the United States have sufficient assets to meet the transit zone requirements?

ANSWER: While the United States has sufficient operational air and maritime assets in its inventory, those assets cannot all be brought to bear in the Transit Zone. However, no resource provider has "Transit Zone drug interdiction" as its sole mission, and each organization must prioritize its asset utilization to support its primary and collateral missions. The finite number of available assets limits the ability of contributing organizations to support the entire spectrum of required missions. The USIC has engaged with the entire counterdrug community to ensure that Transit Zone assets and operations are synchronized and optimized as much as possible.

e. If you devoted sufficient assets to meet the transit zone requirements, what other Homeland Security missions (port, border, & airspace security) would be affected?

ANSWER: Sufficient air and marine assets are currently being dedicated to meet known Transit Zone requirements. To answer your question a different way, every organization involved in drug interdiction is also responsible for supporting other collateral missions. It is doubtful that any organization could support major increases in requirements for transit zone interdiction without significantly impacting other Homeland Security (port, border and airspace security) missions.

2. In the US Interdiction Coordinator and Coast Guard opening statements both mention that the Coast Guard is currently working with the U.S. Navy to arm their helicopters to supplement the highly successful HITRON program. We view this as an effective force multiplier in the transit zone.

   a. When will this new Navy capability be employed?

ANSWER: The Department of the Navy staff has advised the USIC that it estimates that an Airborne Use of Force (AUF) capability will be operational from U.S. Navy helicopters in 2006. The Navy recently released their AUF CONOPS.

3. The House and the Senate have supported the purchase of surface search radar for Customs and Border Protection's Office of Air and Marine Operations aging fleet of P-3 aircraft.

   a. Will this new radar system significantly improve efforts in the transit zone?

ANSWER: Yes. A state-of-the-art sea surface search radar system would improve the ability of CBP P-3 aircraft to detect suspect drug smuggling vessels in the Caribbean Eastern Pacific regions.

   b. Should it be utilized by all aircraft performing the marine patrol aircraft mission?

ANSWER: If all MPA were equipped with a state-of-the-art surface search radar system, this would enhance their maritime detection and intelligence gathering capabilities and would increase the tactical commander's ability to interdict drug smuggling vessels.

4. Despite good drug movement intelligence in the transit zone, we lack similar knowledge in Mexico and Central America.

a. What agency has the lead in developing logistical support bases that are located near the transit zones?

ANSWER: There are several agencies that perform this function. DoD has established and continues to maintain Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in Curacao, The Netherlands Antilles; Manta, Ecuador; and Comalapa, El Salvador to support Transit Zone counterdrug operations.

b. Has your office considered renewed operations in Guatemala?

ANSWER: The USIC has reviewed the situation in Guatemala and supports interdiction and enforcement operations conducted in Guatemala, in conjunction with the host nation, provided those operations do not disrupt or degrade ongoing operations in higher priority regions of the Transit Zone, e.g. the Eastern Pacific.

c. Do you support DHS establishing operations in Central America or other locations within the transit zone boundaries?

ANSWER: In addition to supporting the day-to-day operations involving ICE and USCG in Central America and the Caribbean, USIC supports JIATF South, guided by the best available intelligence, as being the appropriate authority for determining how best to employ DHS assets in additional Transit Zone operations.

5. Shortages in aviation assets in the transit zone and the need for fiscal responsibility in the aviation modernization programs raise the following questions.

a. What aviation detection and monitoring asset has provided you the greatest return per flight hour?

ANSWER: The USIC does not measure or track aviation platform performance in terms of "greatest return per flight hour". In terms of overall detection and monitoring performance, the CBP P-3A "Slick" and P-3B "Dome", have consistently proven valuable when employed together in a "Double Eagle" package. This provides the tactical commander with a simultaneous long-range detection and short-range intercept/tracking capability. For example, the P-3B uses its long-range surveillance radar to detect a suspect target, while the P-3A uses its short-range radar and optical sensors to intercept, identify and covertly track that suspect target. By employing these sensors together, the tactical commander has a better probability of detecting, monitoring and achieving endgames against suspect targets.

b. What marine patrol aircraft has provided the greatest return per flight hour?

ANSWER: Of all available long-range Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) platforms, the United Kingdom's Royal Navy NIMROD aircraft has achieved impressive results, primarily due to the close proximity of its operating base (Curacao, The Netherlands Antilles) to Central Caribbean "Go-Fast" drug smuggling corridors and its superior surface search radar. The NIMROD,

however, is only available for brief periods and budgetary reductions within the RAF may reduce its ability to support JIATF South operations in the Caribbean.

c. Given the increasing demands on DoD, and its diminishing support of counterdrug operations, would it make sense to transfer leadership for drug interdiction (including detection and monitoring) to law enforcement agencies, particularly those at the Department of Homeland Security?

ANSWER: No. The overall leadership for drug interdiction is already with law enforcement. DoD should retain its role as the lead Federal agency that supports law enforcement with the detection and monitoring of air and maritime targets of interest. DoD reduced USN P-3 support to counterdrug MPA operations as part of a worldwide P-3 cutback - triggered by unexpected levels of P-3 airframe fatigue and corrosion. Despite this reduction (which involved a single platform), DoD continues to provide robust support to counterdrug operations in the Transit and Source Zones. This includes providing critical base support at three Forward Operating Locations (FOLs); maintaining Tethered Aerostat Radar (TARS), Relocateable Over-The-Horizon Radar (ROTHR), Counternarcotics Command Management (CNCMS) and Cooperating Nation Information Exchange (CNIES) Systems; and deploying ships, helicopters, and surveillance, air refueling, and logistical support aircraft to the Caribbean, Central America and South America. Over the past 16 years, DoD has also developed a robust command and control capacity at JIATF South and provides support for the majority of JIATF South's Full Time Equivalent (FTE) civilian and contractor support positions. DoD's long-term investment in Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence (C3I) systems cannot be duplicated by any other Federal agency. DHS personnel are already assigned as part of the JIATF South staff and several senior DHS representatives hold key JIATF South leadership positions (Director, Deputy Director, and Deputy Director for Operations).

d. What long term role (5+ years) will DoD play in the transit zone, specifically in terms of interdiction assets, personnel, logistical systems and support?

ANSWER: DoD intends to continue to provide the same crucial support in the future as they provide today.

6. Refueling capabilities for maritime assets on interdiction missions in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific are critical to the mission success.

a. Has "oiler" support been requested by USIC, JIATF South or Coast Guard for counterdrug missions in the Eastern Pacific?

ANSWER: No specific formal request has been made for oiler support, because no feasible and cost-effective oiler option has been identified.

b. Is "oiler" support forthcoming, and if not, why not?

ANSWER: No. The USIC understands that there is no available United States Navy oiler to support this requirement. Allied oiler support is also not readily available. United Kingdom oiler

support is limited to Caribbean operations. Colombian oiler support is no longer being considered due to limited offload capabilities and range, as well as extensive maintenance/refurbishment requirements. Peruvian oiler support has been delayed due to mechanical problems which have delayed the Peruvian Navy oiler's proof-of-concept deployment, pending completion of repairs. Chilean oiler support is being examined and appears to be an unrealistic option, due to the long transit distances between Chilean ports and EASTPAC refueling areas.

c. How many ship-days would be required to service the Eastern Pacific and the Western Caribbean?

ANSWER: It is estimated that the continuous presence of an oiler in EASTPAC could increase operational ship days by over 20 percent.

d. What capabilities will you receive for the $25 million you quoted in the hearing?

ANSWER: A deployed oiler in EASTPAC would expand tactical capabilities and flexibility. Coast Guard cutters and Navy ships historically spend 30-50% of their available EASTPAC operational time transiting to and refueling at coastal facilities. A deployed oiler (refueling ship) would reduce this "in port" refueling requirement and improve interdiction opportunities against drug smuggling vessels – especially those that operate hundreds of miles away from land (some west of the Galapagos Islands).

e. Please provide a copy of the JIATF South oiler feasibility study.

ANSWER: The USIC does not have a copy of this document. It should be requested from JIATF South.

f. Has your office explored commercial vendor possibilities to provide oiler support? If not, why not?

ANSWER: Yes. This option appears cost prohibitive. The estimated cost to reactivate and lease a Military Sealift Command Oiler for one year or to lease an operational U.S.-Flagged Oiler for one year is $25M.

7. Twelfth Air Force has built a Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC) at Davis Monthan AFB to write the Air Tasking Order for Joint Interagency Task Force South that defines all of the air assets available for transit zone utilization.

a. Why did 12th Air Force take away Joint Interagency Task Force-South's ability to deploy their aviation resources to meet the current counterdrug threat?

ANSWER: 12th Air Force did not take away JIATF South's ability to deploy its aviation resources to meet the current threat. JIATF South provides 12th Air Force its daily input for the tasking all counterdrug assets. The development of an Air Tasking Order (ATO) by 12th Air

Force has not taken away the ability of the JIATF South Director to deploy and employ aviation resources that are under JIATF South's tactical control.

b. Both the Joint Interagency Task Force South commander and the 12th Air Force Commander report to the USSOUTHCOM commander. Why did the USSOUTHCOM commander approve an air tasking responsibility away from his operational commander at Joint Interagency Task Force South?

ANSWER: This question should be directed to the Department of Defense.

8. Border Patrol, Air and Marine Operations, and the Coast Guard have all begun to test and evaluate unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), to patrol the borders and our coastal waters. It appears, however, that each of the three agencies is pursuing separate UA V programs. In last year's July 22 hearing entitled, "Drugs and Security in a Post 9/11 World: Coordinating the Counternarcotics Mission at the Department of Homeland Security" the Subcommittee was told that this was being coordinated through the Aviation Management Council.

   a. Have you given further consideration to end the divisions within DHS and demand coordination of the testing and evaluation programs for DHS UAV's?

ANSWER: All of the Department's UAV activities, including Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) are already fully coordinated with the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection (including Border Patrol and Air and Marine Operations), and the United States Coast Guard. These organizations also have representatives on the Department's UAV Working Group, UAV Executive Steering Group and Aviation Management Council. This coordination and these venues ensure synergy and synchronization of efforts to test and evaluate UAVs as detection and monitoring platforms along the United States land and sea borders.

   b. When do you expect a decision on the deployment of a DHS UAV program?

ANSWER: The Secretary of Homeland Security has directed that the Department's UAV Initial Operational Capability (IOC) be established along the U.S southern border by the end of this year. Customs and Border Protection, the designated lead component for this effort, has issued a competitive Request For Proposal (RFP) to procure and begin operating DHS's first UAV system by this deadline.

9. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) currently has Federal Aviation Administration traffic information fed into the operating systems at the Air and Maritime Operations Center (AMOC) in Riverside, CA. By sorting these air tracks they can identify potential air threats and smuggling operations within the continental United States.

   a. Do the Joint Interagency Task Force South and DHS have a plan to leverage the existing capabilities within DHS to develop a Common Operational Picture (COP) for the transit and arrival zones?

ANSWER: The USIC continues to collaborate with the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to identify options to share a Common Operating Picture (COP). The President's Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request includes $12.9M to enhance the Department of Homeland Security Operations Center's capabilities. This includes searching for, requesting, and receiving large amounts of information from all relevant sources, as well as fusing and sharing an integrated COP with all stakeholders.

b. Has the office of the US Interdiction Coordinator sent a representative(s) to the Customs and Border Protection's Air and Marine Operations Center to utilize the law enforcement and air sorting capabilities of that facility?

ANSWER: Yes. The USIC has sent several representatives to the Customs and Border Protection's Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) for staff orientation visits. In addition, the previous AMOC Director is now detailed to the USIC staff as the Deputy Executive Director. The USIC has no requirement to utilize any law enforcement or air sorting capabilities from the AMOC on a real-time basis. Such capability is currently being utilized by JIATF South.

10. The National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) is an interagency agreement, designed to optimize the nation's interdiction efforts. The last NICCP was signed in March 1999.

a. What is the status of a new NICCP?

ANSWER: The NICCP is final and has been signed by the Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy.

b. What steps is the US Interdiction Coordinator taking to ensure that the new NICCP is sufficiently comprehensive, and will be issued soon?

ANSWER: I have given the updated NICCP my personal attention and feel that it is sufficiently comprehensive and will address the command and control relationships, as well as provide a mechanism to review the adequacy of support to the National Task Forces. Issuing the NICCP is my top priority.

11. The General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) is an interagency effort to establish "an all-encompassing national counterdrug intelligence architecture." The last GCIP was issued, under the leadership of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, in 2000 with a status update on the 2000 report in 2002.

a. What steps are being taken to review the old GCIP, and to issue a new one to address the new organizational changes brought on by DHS?

ANSWER: We are nearing completion of many of the goals and milestones established by the GCIP. Accordingly, funding for the Counterdrug Executive Secretariat (CDX) will end October 1, 2005. Remaining CDX projects will be turned over to the lead agency for sponsorship,

program management, and funding. The Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group met in June 2005 in which a subgroup was formed led by the CIA Crime and Narcotics Center to establish a way ahead to consider follow-on interagency structure and process for information sharing and intelligence coordination within the law enforcement and Intelligence Communities.

12. Border Patrol, Coast Guard, and Customs and Border Protection's Office of Air and Marine Operations have aging air and surface assets.

    a. What is the Administration's timetable to replace and modernize these assets?

ANSWER: The President's Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request includes the following specific air and surface asset replacement/modernization initiatives: $20.0M to provide the United States Border Patrol with 12 helicopters (these 12 helicopters will replace 12 of the 58 Vietnam vintage helicopters currently in service); $966.0M to fund the replacement and modernization of United States Coast Guard's major cutters, offshore patrol boats, fixed wing aircraft, and multi-mission helicopters. This includes the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) acquisition of the National Security Cutter (WHEC replacement) by funding production of the third cutter of this class, complete the design of the Offshore Patrol Cutter (WMEC replacement), promote completion of the Multi-Mission Cutter Helicopter (re-engineered and electronically upgraded HH-65 helicopter), and significantly enhance legacy fixed and rotary aircraft capabilities through avionics and radar systems recapitalization. The timeline for completing these initiatives depends on Congress making available the requested levels of funding. The Department's Office of Air and Marine Operations is also researching options for modernizing its current P-3 fleet and has issued a Request for Information (RFI) to determine the best course of action (i.e., to either extend the service life of the P-3 fleet or procure a replacement aircraft). AMO has already received multiple responses and is currently studying them for best and most cost effective course of action. The decision will be part of the ongoing transition process that will integrate Border Patrol (BP) and Air and Marine Operations (AMO) into a single entity. As an interim fix for MPA, AMO is planning on purchasing the SeaVue maritime radar for its eight P-3A Slick aircraft. AMO will continue to maintain long-range MPA capabilities similar to P-3 but with enhanced sensor systems. This will be a part of the ongoing RFI process.

    b. Will the replacement plans assure that there will there is no disruption or reduction in current capabilities?

ANSWER: Recapitalization of aging air and surface assets will take place so as to preserve operational effectiveness and minimize disruption in support of all aspects of the Department's mission.

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**FUTURE RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS**

**QUESTION:**
Does the Coast Guard have strategic plans to address future resource allocations and backfill these asset shortages?

**ANSWER:**
The Coast Guard has a drug interdiction strategic plan (Steel Web) as well as a modernization plan (Deepwater). The Integrated Deepwater System is the Coast Guard's long term asset recapitalization and acquisitions plan, which is designed to enhance existing assets and produce new aircraft, ships and C4ISR to meet the Coast Guard's operational requirements. The Coast Guard recently presented a revised Deepwater Implementation Plan with its fiscal year 2006 budget request. Full funding of the Coast Guard's Deepwater plan will ensure adequate resources for transit zone operations.

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**AVIATION AND MARINE ASSETS IN EASTERN PACIFIC AND CARIBBEAN**

**QUESTION:**
How many aviation and marine assets would be required in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean to respond to the known actionable intelligence held at Joint Interagency Task Force South?

**ANSWER:**
The Coast Guard does not a have an analysis of missed opportunities due to a lack of assets to respond to actionable intelligence for all aviation and marine assets (Coast Guard, Navy and interagency). Joint Interagency Task Force South may be able to provide this analysis. The Coast Guard has projected the allocation of 102,600 cutter hours, and 14,000 aircraft hours for counter drug operations in fiscal year 2006.

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**TRANSIT ZONE REQUIREMENTS**

**QUESTION:**
Does your agency have sufficient assets to meet the transit zone requirements?

**ANSWER:**
The Coast Guard does not have "transit zone requirements." Coast Guard ship and aircraft assets are budgeted for a number of hours that facilitates the appropriate balance between operational and maintenance needs. These programmed operational hours are apportioned to all of the appropriate mission areas, allowing the Coast Guard to dedicate the maximum resource hours to all mission areas to achieve performance goals in each of those missions. Every year the Coast Guard publishes Mission Planning Guidance to assist the Coast Guard Area Commanders in making resource apportionment and allocation decisions in a manner that helps the Coast Guard achieve its program performance goal targets in support of national goals. In the case of the counter drug mission, the Coast Guard dedicates the majority of available cutter and aircraft hours to the drug interdiction mission.

The transit zone is an area of six million square miles. Given the age and condition of existing Coast Guard Deepwater assets, it will become increasingly problematic to maintain the current level of deployments as cutter and aircraft days are lost due to unscheduled maintenance. The Coast Guard projects the allocation of 102,600 cutter hours and 14,000 aircraft hours for counter drug operations in fiscal year 2006.

The President's fiscal year 2006 budget request will increase the number of Maritime Patrol Aircraft flight hours, thereby allowing greater coverage for known departures, and creating greater awareness in the transit zone and hand off to end game assets.

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**OTHER HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS**

**QUESTION:**
If you devoted sufficient assets to meet the transit zone requirements, what other Homeland Security missions (port, border, & airspace security) would be affected?

**ANSWER:**
The Coast Guard does not have "transit zone requirements." All Coast Guard assets and all mission areas are considered in the development of Mission Planning Guidance for each fiscal year. The mission planning guidance is developed to assist the Coast Guard Area Commanders in making resource apportionment and allocation decisions in a manner that helps the Coast Guard achieve its program performance goal targets in support of national goals.

Achieving performance goal targets, given the finite resources of the Coast Guard, requires detailed planning and regular monitoring and adjustment, as necessary. Additionally, operations are planned within operational tempo and personnel tempo limits, and conducted at a sustainable level, to ensure maximum operational readiness.

As a multi-mission agency, the Coast Guard invests significant effort to achieve performance targets in all mission areas. For example, doubling cutter and aircraft hours in the transit zone would reduce by 50% resource contributions to the Living Marine Resources, Migrant Interdiction and Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security missions, resulting in failure to meet the performance goal targets in those three homeland and non-homeland security mission areas.

**OILER SUPPORT IN THE EASTERN PACIFIC**

**QUESTION:**
Has "oiler" support been requested by USIC, JIATF South, or Coast Guard for counterdrug missions in the Eastern Pacific?

**ANSWER:**

Yes. The Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South (JIATF-S) asked the U. S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) in March 2003 for oiler support for the Eastern Pacific region (EASTPAC). USIC in turn asked the U.S. Navy for oiler support for the EASTPAC. In response to USIC's request, the U.S. Navy proposed host nation oiler support. To date nothing has come of host nation initiatives in either Colombia or Peru.

**FORTHCOMING OILER SUPPORT**

**QUESTION:**
Is "oiler" support forthcoming, and if not, why not?

**ANSWER:**

The Coast Guard is not aware of forthcoming oiler support. As described above, the Navy has recommended that JIATF-S pursue oiler support from host countries like Colombia and Peru. To date, there has been no response from the host countries to requests for oiler support.

**SHIP-DAYS TO SERVICE EASTERN PACIFIC AND WESTERN CARIBBEAN**

**QUESTION:**
How many ship-days would be required to service the Eastern Pacific and the Western Caribbean?

**ANSWER:**
The Coast Guard has not done an analysis of the required number of days of oiler support to service the Eastern Pacific and the Western Caribbean. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) conducted an Oiler Feasibility Study, which is classified. More information may be available from JIATF-S.

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**PATROL-DAYS SAVED BY OILER SUPPORT**

**QUESTION:**
How many patrol-days would be saved if an oiler supported Coast Guard cutters during interdiction operations in the transit zone?

**ANSWER:**
The potential for saving patrol-days exists only in the Eastern Pacific (EASTPAC) due to distances involved. Conservatively, assume one day transit to and from, and one day to refuel for each brief stop for fuel (BSF). This equates to a minimum of three days per Brief Stop for Fuel (BSF), where the cutters are out of position. Cutters typically take two to three BSFs per patrol.

A conservative Coast Guard estimate would add approximately 30 patrol days with an EASTPAC oiler by eliminating at least one BSF per patrol. Some BSFs will still be necessary due to the expansive size of the EASTPAC area of responsibility (AOR), which is approximately three times the size of the United States.

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**COMMERCIAL VENDORS FOR OILER SUPPORT**

**QUESTION:**
Is your office aware of commercial vendors that could provide oiler support?

**ANSWER:**
The Coast Guard is not aware of any commercial vendors that would be capable and competent in providing oiler support to U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships in the Eastern Pacific. However, Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) conducted an Oiler Feasibility Study, which is classified. More information may be available from JIATF-S.

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**DEPLOYMENT OF A UAV CAPABILITY IN THE TRANSIT ZONE**

**QUESTION:**
When do you expect a decision on the deployment of a UAV capability in the transit zone?

**ANSWER:**
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV's) remain a developmental technology and include both Medium and High Altitude versions. The Coast Guard Deepwater program is not scheduled to deploy medium/high altitude UAVs until the 2016 timeframe. Shipboard short-range vertical takeoff and landing tactical UAVs are scheduled to be delivered in the 2008-2009 timeframe to coincide with the delivery of the Coast Guard's new Deepwater major cutters. The Coast Guard continues to seek funding support for a proof of concept operation in the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force - South (JIATF-S) transit zone to evaluate the effectiveness of UAV's for counter drug detection, surveillance, identification and classification missions in the transit zone in the near-term.

USCG Responses to QFRs from the 29 June interrupting Narco-Terrorist Threats on the High Seas before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy & Human Resources

**ADMINISTRATION'S TIMETABLE TO REPLACE AND MODERNIZE ASSETS**

**QUESTION:**
What is the Administration's timetable to replace and modernize these assets?

**ANSWER:**
The Administration's timetable to replace and modernize these assets for the Deepwater plan is attached. The actual out-year delivery schedule is predicated on funding availability & DHS/USCG priorities. Future USCG budget submissions may include additional sustainment, enhancement, and conversion projects within the AC&I account. This account is subject to yearly availability of appropriations. The USCG will continue to attempt to extend the life of its aviation and surface assets, when possible, using these critical funds.




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| Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered |
| 12 | 378' 0 NSC | 27 | HC130 0 HC130J | 12 | 378' 1 NSC | 27 | HC130 0 HC130J | 12 | 378' 2 NSC | 27 | HC130 6 HC130J | 12 | 378' 3 NSC | 20 | HC130 6 HC130J | 11 | 378' 4 NSC | 16 | HC130 6 HC130J |
| 1 | 282' 0 OPC | 42 | HH60J 0 MPA | 1 | 282' 0 OPC | 42 | HH60J 0 MPA | 1 | 282' 0 OPC | 42 | HH60J 3 MPA | 1 | 282' 0 OPC | 42 | HH60J 3 MPA | 1 | 282' 1 OPC | 42 | HH60J 3 MPA |
| 13 | 270' 0 FRC | 95 | HH65 0 MRR | 13 | 270' 1 FRC | 95 | HH65 0 MRR | 13 | 270' 1 FRC | 95 | HH65 0 MRR | 13 | 270' 3 FRC | 85 | HH65 0 MRR | 13 | 270' 5 FRC | 95 | HH65 0 MRR |
| 1 | 230' 0 123' | 20 | HU25 0 MCH | 1 | 230' 0 123' | 20 | HU25 0 MCH | 0 | 230' 0 123' | 20 | HU25 0 MCH | 0 | 230' 0 123' | 17 | HU25 0 MCH | 0 | 230' 0 123' | 17 | HU25 0 MCH |
| 1 | 213' 0 LRI | | 0 VUAV | 1 | 213' 1 LRI | | 3 VUAV | 1 | 213' 2 LRI | | 3 VUAV | 0 | 213' 3 LRI | | 6 VUAV | 0 | 213' 5 LRI | | 9 VUAV |
| 14 | 210' 0 SRP | | 0 HAEUAV | 14 | 210' 10 SRP | | 0 HAEUAV | 14 | 210' 11 SRP | | 0 HAEUAV | 14 | 210' 14 SRP | | 0 HAEUAV | 14 | 210' 18 SRP | | 0 HAEUAV |
| 41 | 110' | | 0 HC130H | 41 | 110' | | 0 HC130H | 40 | 110' | | 0 HC130H | 40 | 110' | | 0 HC130H | 38 | 110' | | 0 HC130H |

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


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| 10 | 378' | 4 NSC | 16 | HC130 | 6 HC130J | 8 | 378' | 4 NSC | 12 | HC130 | 8 HC130J | 7 | 378' | 4 NSC | 8 | HC130 | 6 HC130J | 5 | 378' | 5 NSC | 4 | HC130 | 9 HC130J | 3 | 378' | 6 NSC | 0 | HC130 | 6 HC130J |
| 1 | 282' | 2 OPC | 42 | HH60J | 7 MPA | 1 | 282' | 3 OPC | 36 | HH60J | 11 MPA | 1 | 282' | 4 OPC | 27 | HH60J | 15 MPA | 1 | 282' | 5 OPC | 18 | HH60J | 20 MPA | 1 | 282' | 6 OPC | 8 | HH60J | 25 MPA |
| 13 | 270' | 7 FRC | 95 | HH65 | 0 MRR | 13 | 270' | 10 FRC | 76 | HH65 | 6 MRR | 13 | 270' | 14 FRC | 57 | HH65 | 15 MRR | 13 | 270' | 18 FRC | 38 | HH65 | 24 MRR | 13 | 270' | 22 FRC | 19 | HH65 | 33 MRR |
| 0 | 230' | 8 123' | 17 | HU25 | 0 MCH | 0 | 230' | 8 123' | 19 | HU25 | 19 MCH | 0 | 230' | 8 123' | 8 | HU25 | 38 MCH | 0 | 230' | 8 123' | 0 | HU25 | 57 MCH | 0 | 230' | 8 123' | 0 | HU25 | 76 MCH |
| 0 | 213' | 6 LRI | | | 12 VUAV | 0 | 213' | 7 LRI | | | 15 VUAV | 0 | 213' | 8 LRI | | | 17 VUAV | 0 | 213' | 10 LRI | | | 19 VUAV | 0 | 213' | 12 LRI | | | 21 VUAV |
| 13 | 210' | 21 SRP | | | 0 HAEUAV | 11 | 210' | 25 SRP | | | 0 HAEUAV | 9 | 210' | 30 SRP | | | 0 HAEUAV | 7 | 210' | 36 SRP | | | 0 HAEUAV | 5 | 210' | 42 SRP | | | 0 HAEUAV |
| 36 | 110' | | | | 0 HC130H | 34 | 110' | | | | 4 HC130H | 30 | 110' | | | | 8 HC130H | 26 | 110' | | | | 12 HC130H | 22 | 110' | | | | 16 HC130H |

USCG Responses to QFRs from the 29 June interrupting Narco-Terrorist Threats on the High Seas before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy & Human Resources




| 2016 | | | | 2017 | | | | 2018 | | | | 2019 | | | | 2020 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Surface | | Aviation | | Surface | | Aviation | | Surface | | Aviation | | Surface | | Aviation | | Surface | | Aviation | |
| Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered |
| 1 | 378' | 7 NSC | 0 HC130 | 6 HC130J | 0 | 378' | 8 NSC | 0 HC130 | 6 HC130J | 0 | 378' | 8 NSC | 0 HC130 | 6 HC130J | 0 | 378' | 8 NSC | 0 HC130 | 6 HC130J |
| 1 | 282' | 7 OPC | 0 HH60 | 36 MPA | 0 | 282' | 8 OPC | 0 HH60 | 36 MPA | 0 | 282' | 9 OPC | 0 HH60 | 36 MPA | 0 | 282' | 10 OPC | 0 HH60 | 36 MPA |
| 13 | 270' | 25 FRC | 0 HH65 | 42 MRR | 13 | 270' | 28 FRC | 0 HH65 | 42 MRR | 13 | 270' | 31 FRC | 0 HH65 | 42 MRR | 13 | 270' | 34 FRC | 0 HH65 | 42 MRR |
| 0 | 230' | 8 123' | 0 HU25 | 95 MCH | 0 | 230' | 8 123' | 0 HU25 | 95 MCH | 0 | 230' | 8 123' | 0 HU25 | 95 MCH | 0 | 230' | 8 123' | 0 HU25 | 95 MCH |
| 0 | 213' | 14 LRI | | 24 VUAV | 0 | 213' | 16 LRI | | 27 VUAV | 0 | 213' | 17 LRI | | 30 VUAV | 0 | 213' | 18 LRI | | 33 VUAV |
| 5 | 210' | 47 SRP | | 4 HAEUAV | 4 | 210' | 52 SRP | | 4 HAEUAV | 3 | 210' | 56 SRP | | 4 HAEUAV | 1 | 210' | 60 SRP | | 4 HAEUAV |
| 18 | 110' | | | 18 HC130H | 14 | 110' | | | 16 HC130H | 11 | 110' | | | 16 HC130H | 8 | 110' | | | 16 HC130H |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 5 | 110' | | 18 HC130H |

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


| 2021 | | | | 2022 | | | | 2023 | | | | 2024 | | | | 2025 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Surface | | Aviation | | Surface | | Aviation | | Surface | | Aviation | | Surface | | Aviation | | Surface | | Aviation | |
| Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered | Legacy | Delivered |
| 0 | 378' 8 NSC | 0 HC130 | 6 HC130J | 0 | 378' 8 NSC | 0 HC130 | 6 HC130J | 0 | 378' 8 NSC | 0 HC130 | 6 HC130J | 0 | 378' 8 NSC | 0 HC130 | 6 HC130J | 0 | 378' 8 NSC | 0 HC130 | 6 HC130J |
| 0 | 282' 13 OPC | 0 HH60 | 36 MPA | 0 | 282' 15 OPC | 0 HH60 | 36 MPA | 0 | 282' 17 OPC | 0 HH60 | 36 MPA | 0 | 282' 19 OPC | 0 HH60 | 36 MPA | 0 | 282' 21 OPC | 0 HH60 | 36 MPA |
| 10 | 270' 40 FRC | 0 HH65 | 42 MRR | 8 | 270' 45 FRC | 0 HH65 | 42 MRR | 6 | 270' 46 FRC | 0 HH65 | 42 MRR | 4 | 270' 48 FRC | 0 HH65 | 42 MRR | 2 | 270' 52 FRC | 0 HH65 | 42 MRR |
| 0 | 230' 8 123' | 0 HU25 | 95 MCH | 0 | 230' 8 123' | 0 HU25 | 95 MCH | 0 | 230' 8 123' | 0 HU25 | 95 MCH | 0 | 230' 8 123' | 0 HU25 | 95 MCH | 0 | 230' 8 123' | 0 HU25 | 95 MCH |
| 0 | 213' 21 LRI | | 41 VUAV | 0 | 213' 23 LRI | | 45 VUAV | 0 | 213' 25 LRI | | 45 VUAV | 0 | 213' 27 LRI | | 45 VUAV | 0 | 213' 29 LRI | | 45 VUAV |
| 0 | 210' 69 SRP | | 4 HAEUAV | 0 | 210' 74 SRP | | 4 HAEUAV | 0 | 210' 79 SRP | | 4 HAEUAV | 0 | 210' 84 SRP | | 4 HAEUAV | 0 | 210' 87 SRP | | 4 HAEUAV |
| 0 | 110' | | 16 HC130H | 0 | 110' | | 16 HC130H | 0 | 110' | | 16 HC130H | 0 | 110' | | 16 HC130H | 0 | 110' | | 16 HC130H |

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Notes:

1. Notional plan: actual out-year delivery schedule predicated on funding availability & DHS/USCG priorities
2. Bridging Strategies: Along with the Legacy assets noted here, the Coast Guard is currently operating 8 MH-68 HITRON helicopters and 5 PC-179 patrol boats.
3. This document shows the delivery timeline. The delivery timeline lags behind the funding timeline shown in the Capital Investment Plan based on design/construction schedules of the individual assets.
4. Future USCG budget submissions may include additional sustainment, enhancement, and conversion projects within the AC&I account. This account is subject to yearly availability of appropriations. USCG will continue to attempt to extend the life of its aviation and surface assets, when possible, using these critical funds.

10 July 2006

| 2026 | | | | | | | | 2027 | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Surface | | | | Aviation | | | | Surface | | | | Aviation | | | |
| Legacy | | Delivered | | Legacy | | Delivered | | Legacy | | Delivered | | Legacy | | Delivered | |
| 0 | 378' | 8 | NSC | 0 | HC130 | 6 | HC130J | 0 | 378' | 8 | NSC | 0 | HC130 | 6 | HC130J |
| 0 | 282' | 23 | OPC | 0 | HH60 | 36 | MPA | 0 | 282' | 25 | OPC | 0 | HH60 | 36 | MPA |
| 0 | 270' | 55 | FRC | 0 | HH65 | 42 | MRR | 0 | 270' | 58 | FRC | 0 | HH65 | 42 | MRR |
| 0 | 230' | 3 | 123' | 0 | HU25 | 95 | MCH | 0 | 230' | 0 | 123' | 0 | HU25 | 95 | MCH |
| 0 | 213' | 31 | LRI | | | 45 | VUAV | 0 | 213' | 33 | LRI | | | 45 | VUAV |
| 0 | 210' | 89 | SRP | | | 4 | HAEUAV | 0 | 210' | 91 | SRP | | | 4 | HAEUAV |
| 0 | 110' | | | | | 16 | HC130H | 0 | 110' | | | | | 16 | HC130H |

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**ASSET REPLACEMENT PLANS**

**QUESTION:**
Will the replacement plans assure that there will there is no disruption or reduction in current capabilities?

**ANSWER:**
The primary challenges to the Deepwater acquisition are to field new capabilities and to retire legacy assets that are beyond their service lives as soon as possible while remaining within the Coast Guard's current operating expenses. The Revised Deepwater Implementation Plan was developed to minimize any disruption or reduction in current capabilities while adhering to those principles. As Coast Guard assets are phased out, they are being replaced by more capable assets. This will allow the Coast Guard to close current capability gaps by (1) enhancing the performance of selected Deepwater assets through added capabilities and conversions, including C4ISR systems; (2) adjusting the implementation schedule and mix of individual assets over the life of the program; (3) providing necessary balance over the life of the program based on the Department of Homeland Security's strategic goals, and emerging mission requirements.

**FORMER CG HISTORIC FACILITIES**

**QUESTION:**
Coast Guard officials have repeatedly discussed a pending legal decision that would allow the Coast Guard to fund maintenance and improvement projects at former Coast Guard historic facilities which are now leased to non-profit agencies. What is the Coast Guard decision regarding this issue?

**ANSWER:**
The Coast Guard does not fund maintenance and improvement projects at former Coast Guard historic facilities. Appropriated funds can only be expended for the objects for which the appropriations were made, in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a). Since former historic facilities are no longer owned by the Federal Government, the Coast Guard cannot expend appropriated funds for any improvements to them. The Coast Guard is not awaiting a legal decision on this issue.

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**TIME FRAME FOR CG DECISION**

**QUESTION:**
Coast Guard officials have repeatedly discussed a pending legal decision that would allow the Coast Guard to fund maintenance and improvement projects at former Coast Guard historic facilities which are now leased to non-profit agencies. Why has it taken the Coast Guard so long to reach this decision?

**ANSWER:**
The Coast Guard does not have the legal authority to fund maintenance and improvement projects at former Coast Guard historic facilities for which the Coast Guard no longer has any operational or other mission-related need. In accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a), appropriated funds can only be expended for the objects for which appropriations are made. The Coast Guard is not awaiting a legal decision regarding the funding of maintenance and improvement projects at former Coast Guard historic facilities.

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