[Senate Hearing 109-305]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-305, Pt. 3
Senate Hearings
Before the Committee on Appropriations
_______________________________________________________________________
Department of
Homeland Security
Fiscal Year
2007
109th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION
H.R. 5441
PART 3
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES
Department of Homeland Security, 2007 (H.R. 5441)--Part 3
S. Hrg. 109-305, Pt. 3
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
on
H.R. 5441
AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 3
Department of Homeland Security
Nondepartmental Witnesses
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
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__________
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri TOM HARKIN, Iowa
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
CONRAD BURNS, Montana HARRY REID, Nevada
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire PATTY MURRAY, Washington
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
J. Keith Kennedy, Staff Director
Terrence E. Sauvain, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Department of Homeland Security
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
TED STEVENS, Alaska DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho PATTY MURRAY, Washington
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah HARRY REID, Nevada
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
Professional Staff
Rebecca Davies
Carol Cribbs
Shannon O'Keefe
Nancy Perkins
Mark Van de Water
Charles Kieffer (Minority)
Chip Walgren (Minority)
Scott Nance (Minority)
Drenan E. Dudley (Minority)
Administrative Support
Christa Thompson
C O N T E N T S
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Tuesday, February 28, 2006
Page
Department of Homeland Security.................................. 1
Nondepartmental Witnesses........................................ 435
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Judd Gregg (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Gregg, Allard, Byrd, Leahy, Mikulski,
Kohl, and Murray.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY
opening statement of senator judd gregg
Senator Gregg. We'll begin the hearing. I'm advised that
Senator Byrd is on his way but he asked that we proceed and I
appreciate Secretary Chertoff's participation in this hearing.
This is obviously the subcommittee which has jurisdiction over
the Department of Homeland Security, and the appropriations
responsibility that goes with that. There's a lot to talk
about; in fact, it's hard to know where to begin. But,
obviously, the topic of the moment, and it's a very serious
one, is the issue of ownership and management of American ports
by the UAE and a company owned by Dubai Ports World (DPW), and
the question of whether or not there's been adequate vetting of
the potential that ownership may have for enhancing the threat
to the ports.
The initial representation of course from the
administration was that it was adequately vetted. There is now
a number of different views of that. As I understand it, in the
initial vetting, the Department of Homeland Security raised
issues and then, in addition, the Coast Guard, which is part of
the Department, raised issues. The Coast Guard, issues went to
the question of whether or not there were concerns about gaps
in intelligence for DPW ownership and the fact that the Coast
Guard didn't feel it could adequately assess those gaps. The
language being in the report that the breadth of the
intelligence gaps also infer potential unknown threats against
large numbers of potential vulnerabilities and the intelligence
gaps include but are not limited to the following major themes;
operations it lists that; personnel, it list's that; and
foreign influence, it lists that.
So the Coast Guard appeared to have severe reservations,
now whether they were specific to the issue of the Dubai
ownership, DP World, or whether they were just generally
concerns is not clear. However, they were represented as fairly
significant.
Today, however, the Coast Guard has put out a statement
that says, and I'll quote it to give them fair representation,
``What is being quoted is an excerpt from a broader Coast Guard
intelligence analysis that was performed earlier on, as part of
its due diligence process. The excerpts made public earlier
today, when taken out of context do not reflect the full
classified analysis performed by the Coast Guard.'' That
analysis concludes: ``That DP World acquisition of PNO in and
of itself does not pose a significant threat to U.S. assets in
continental United States ports.'' Upon subsequent and further
review, the Coast Guard and the entire CFIUS panel believe that
this transaction, when taking into account strong security
assurances from DP World, does not compromise U.S. security.
Now that appears to be the position of the Coast Guard
today, which appears to be inconsistent with the excerpt, and
they're explaining that that is an excerpt, in part, of an
overall intelligence analysis. And it just, I think, leads to
further confusion. Because I think there's a genuine concern,
and its legitimate, that turning these ports over to an Arab/
operated owned-state sponsored entity is an issue which
deserves significant review, especially when the country in
question, although definitely friendly and supportive, has had
individuals from that country who have actually, according to
the 9/11 attack, been participants in the event and, therefore
clearly represent--those individuals clearly intended to do us
harm. And, thus, I think it's very appropriate that we pursue a
pause here and review further the security issues since there
is confusion, it appears to me, within even the Coast Guard's
position; and get an analysis which is unquestioned and factual
which we can have confidence in. I understand that sort of an
agreement has been reached with the leadership of the Senate,
Senator Warner specifically, and I would be interested when the
Secretary gives his opening statement, if he could address that
issue specifically, because it is one of major concern.
On a larger concern, or not a larger concern but a concern
I have of equal significance, is the entire budget that was
sent up here by the administration relative to Homeland
Security. Homeland Security, as we know, has gone through a
major restructuring and a period of assimilation as it has
tried to get up and running. And let me begin by congratulating
the Secretary, I'm not one of these folks who feels the
Secretary has not done a good job. I think the Secretary has
worked very hard to do a good job. And I believe that he has
set out a system and he has done it from a systematic approach,
and that's exactly the way we need to address the Department of
Homeland Security. But that doesn't mean the job is done, as
I'm sure the Secretary would be the first to acknowledge, and
there are very definite gaps in the Homeland Security
department, and the way it is delivering service and protecting
us.
The biggest gap I believe is the way it is viewed by this
administration, to be very honest. I believe it is used a
stepchild of national defense. I can't think of anything more
significant to national defense than protecting our border and
making sure that our Homeland is secure. And yet, time and time
again we see budgets being sent up here which dramatically
increase the core operation of the Defense Department
independent of what's happening in Iraq and Afghanistan, which
is getting money outside of the budget process. And yet the
Department of Homeland Security is being starved for funds in
crucial areas and this year is no different. What happened is
that there's a representation that the Department got an
increase in funding. But that increase in funding is tied
directly to getting a fee increase which the administration
knows is a non starter. The chairman of the authorizing
committee in the Senate, second ranking member of the
Appropriations Committee, former Chairman of Appropriations
Committee Ted Stevens has said it's a non starter and he proved
it last year. So when the administration sends up a budget
which assumes increase in operations on the border, which I
totally agree with the commitment in that, the desire to that.
In fact, last year, this committee unilaterally moved in that
direction after the initial presentation from the
administration was flat funding of border activity. This
committee unilaterally, with Senator Byrd's support and
leadership, changed the entire structure of the funding stream
and put in 1,500 new agents when we had finished, approximately
1,800 new beds for detention, and dramatically increased
funding for Border Patrol and border enhancement activities; I
thank the Secretary for his support of that. I suspect he would
have supported it earlier if he hadn't maybe been stonewalled
in the halls of the administration but the fact is, we had to
do it unilaterally up here and then we got the support from the
White House. But now, rather than continuing that effort
although it's stated that it's being continued because the
policies, as proposed, add another 1,500 agents and more beds,
all of which needs to be done. But the actual substance behind
those policies isn't there. There's no money behind those
policies. This is a situation of showing a proposal and then
hiding the funds. And so we end up with a budget that we've got
a $1.6 billion hole in. Last year, the chairman of the full
committee Senator Cochran in a very gracious act with the
ranking member obviously Senator Byrd, increased the allocation
of this committee by about $1.2 billion, I think, it was over
what it would have been, simply to try to fill that hole. Well
they don't have that flexibility this year. I asked,
aggressively asked, this administration in the supplemental
that they were going to send up for defense appropriations, did
they consider having in that supplemental $1.2 billion of
capital items to basically get the Coast Guard the planes they
need, get the border patrol the cars they need, get the
training facilities up to snuff in Artista, New Mexico so that
we would be able to do the physical capital expenditures that
are needed to have the border patrol be efficient and
effective, and have the Coast Guard be efficient and effective.
That seemed like a fundamental element of national defense to
me. Yet the administration has stonewalled us on that. They've
sent up a supplemental which doesn't have any money in it for
national defense on the borders, for Homeland Security, but has
a significant amount of dollars for Katrina, and a significant
amount of dollars for Iraq, both of which I'm sure are
necessary. But in the pecking order of national defense,
protecting our borders is right up there with both those
exercises.
And so this committee is being put in an extremely
difficult place by the White House's proposals on Homeland
Security. We're being asked to fund an expansion of the Border
Patrol which we are totally committed to and basically created,
authored, and drove as a policy, but being told that the funds
to do that are going to be illusory. It's a hollow budget and I
can't understand it because I've watched the press conferences
where the administration has said it's committed to border
security and domestic defense. And yet this budget isn't going
to get there. So that's a concern I have. On the operations
side we've got lots of issues, whether we'll have time to get
to them today, but let me just highlight a few. First, again
congratulations to you Mr. Secretary for approaching this in a
systematic way. That's the way it should be approached. But we
still have huge operational dysfunctionality in this
Department. It's not your fault, it's a function of the fact it
was thrown together quickly. The agencies within this
Department brought with them some systemic problems which
haven't been resolved and created some problems by being thrown
together that haven't been resolved. The most significant ones
are computer technology capability across the department, and
interfacing with other agencies, especially the US VISIT issue,
which I still have deep reservations about whether that we're
going to pull that off. But we've held hearings on it, so we
won't pursue that here. I appreciate the fact that the
Department is trying to stay on it, and stay aggressive on it.
I especially appreciate the independent views that you're using
to try to make sure it's done right.
But other issues are equally effecting performance. The
Katrina event was a horrific, embarrassing, and a terrible
event for the people down there and our country as a whole. And
the problem is not only the unintended consequences of the
event, but that the Department has had to refocus so much
energy on trying to straighten out the problems which were
shown by Katrina. I genuinely believe that for a period here we
moved away from national defenses as the primary goal of this
Department to solving the Katrina problems, which we have to
solve. But that's just showing that this functionality in the
face of a major catastrophe that's not driven by terrorists
doesn't maybe work that well.
Second, we've got this whole issue which has not been
resolved, of the relationship between Border and Customs and
ICE. Everywhere I go I hear this and I always ask the question
in a very vanilla way, how's it working? And the answer is um--
well; it's not bluntly spoken but it's clearly between the
lines, ``It's not working,'' from the people on the frontline.
It can't afford not to work. This is too big an issue. Then we
have the issue of just immigration policy itself, which is you
know obviously something you don't have full control over but
you have an impact on.
So these are things that concern me, I wish it were a more
pleasant story, because I have tremendous respect for you and
your team. I think you've brought good people on, but the story
is difficult right now to be kind. Hopefully you can shed some
light on it, and give us a little more optimism. I'll yield to
Senator Byrd for an opening statement, then we'll go to your
statement, then we'll to do questions.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. I share the chairman's concerns. I greatly
admire this Chairman he's totally dedicated to the task. He's
trying to make this function a success. He is chagrinned as he
makes very clear, and I totally agree with him. This Department
has been off and running for 3 years I believe. I don't know
how well it's running, but I don't know what to do about this.
Sometimes I feel like just throwing the books down and saying
to hell with it. That certainly would be the wrong attitude.
But we can't seem to get this thing going Mr. Secretary. You
seem to know a great deal about the problem and about what is
needed to fix it. And I have a feeling that you're highly
dedicated as well. But I simply cannot understand why with all
this money, all this effort, all this attention, and all this
dedication that we on this panel have given to this agency, why
it still is not functioning properly. Why it's not doing the
job. There's nothing secure about this thing. Talk about
Homeland Security, what's secure about.
So I thank our able chairman, Senator Gregg for calling
this hearing. Hardly a day goes by that Americans do not read
about the Department of Homeland Security in their own town
newspapers like the Beckley, West Virginia Register Herald, the
New Hampshire Union Leader, and every other major paper in the
land. This is an agency that impacts the lives of every
American. And the lives of every American are to a considerable
degree dependant upon this agency. I look forward to working
with you Mr. Chairman as we review not just the budget for the
agency, but also the policies and the operations for the
Department. And I welcome you here today Mr. Secretary.
Before discussing the President's budget it is important to
take a moment to thank the 182,000 employees in your
Department. They serve this Nation in the heat of the desert.
They serve this Nation in the cold of a northern winter. They
serve this Nation in the roughest seas and winds, at our ports,
our border stations, our airports. They are to be commended for
their efforts to preserve our freedoms, to make this truly a
Department of Homeland Security, and to secure our homeland.
IMPROVED BORDER SECURITY
I'm pleased to see that the budget includes significant
resources for improving security at our borders. Last spring,
Senator Craig and I offered, with Chairman Gregg's support, an
amendment to begin the process of hiring and training a
significant number of Border Patrol agents and immigration
investigators. Despite administration opposition--now did you
hear that?
Despite administration opposition, the funds were enacted
into law. With the chairman's leadership we continued that
effort in fiscal year 2006. Two months ago Chairman Gregg tried
to secure an additional $1.1 billion for this fiscal year to
provide our border security personnel with the tools they need.
The tools they need to do their jobs effectively, but he ran
into opposition from the other body.
HOMELAND SECURITY BUDGET AND ANOMALIES
Mr. Secretary, I urge you today to join in this cause and
urge the White House and the House leadership to embrace this
effort. Scream to the high heavens if they don't. Let the
people know where the fault lies. Let the people know really
who is for security. The administration continues to have a
huge credibility gap when it comes to homeland security.
There's a continuing drum beat that another terrorist attack is
likely. The President, in his State of the Union address said
to America ``The enemy has not lost the desire or the
capability to attack us.'' And yet a look at the
administration's budget reveals an odd, odd, odd complacency.
The administration's speech writers on the one hand and the
administration's policy writers seem to be living in
alternative realities. For example, in the White House disaster
response report released just a few days ago, the White House
calls for ``integrating and synchronizing the Nation's homeland
security plans across Federal, State and local governments''
yet what happens? The budget proposes to cut funding for
Emergency Management Performance Grants, which State and local
emergency managers depend on for their survival. The White
House report recommends improvements to communication's
equipment used in response to a catastrophe, but the budget
proposes to cut first responder grants by 25 percent. What's
wrong? What is wrong Mr. Secretary? Why the disconnect? Why the
disconnect? The White House report recommends improvements to
communication's equipment used in response to a catastrophe,
but the budget on the other hand--which is the White House's
product--proposes to cut first responder grants by 25 percent.
Why the disconnect? Hear me down there at the White House. Why
Mr. Bush? Why? In response to the administration's decision to
allow Dubai Ports World to operate terminals in six major U.S.
ports, the administration has asserted that they have a
robust--ha--a robust layered security system for our ports. And
yet the White House proposes for the second straight year, 1
year is not enough, for the second straight year, to eliminate
the port security grant program. Now why is that?
Of the $816 million that Congress has appropriated for port
security, only $46 million was requested by the President. Why
is that so Mr. Bush? Why is that so? Hear me. Let me say that
again. Of the $816 million that Congress has appropriated--that
Congress has appropriated--for port security, only $46 million
was requested by the President. There's nothing robust about
that. If that's robust then I'm an 810 pound giant. Take me on.
Yeah. There's nothing robust about that. Five months ago, the
Congress approved $173 million for port security grants, and
the Department has not even seen fit to announce how ports can
apply for the funds. Why is this? What's the matter Mr.
Secretary? Why don't we get off the ground. I do not understand
why this administration allows port security dollars to collect
dust at the Treasury in Washington. How really serious--how
serious is this administration about port security when it
decides to allow Dubai Ports World to control six major U.S.
ports and the President, Mr. Bush, and the Vice President, Mr.
Cheney, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security don't even know the decision was
made. What is happening? What's the matter with the right hand
that the left hand doesn't know what's going on? How serious is
the administration about port security when customs and borders
protection inspects only 5 percent of the 11 million containers
that come into the country each year. I believe I've been
reading that for 2 or 3 years, it doesn't seem to change. How
serious is the administration when the Coast Guard's Deepwater
budget for replacing its ships, planes and helicopters will not
even be completed until 2026. Man, I will have long since met
my maker by then and I hope you folks will carry on in my
stead. I don't know what good it will do you. The Coast Guard
will be the FEMA of 2010 if you do not invest in it now. What
about that? What's wrong? How serious is the administration
about helping victims of a disaster when it has made decisions
that have crippled FEMA? When the terrorists hit New York City
in 2001, FEMA was immediately on the scene and FEMA helped the
city to recover. Four years later when Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita hit the gulf coast, FEMA was no longer up to the task.
Within the bureaucracy of the Department of Homeland Security,
FEMA has lacked professional leadership, lacked attention, and
lacked resources. Bad management of the agency and its mission
has diminished the effectiveness of the qualified professionals
who serve in FEMA and who love their jobs. For example the
decision to separate the FEMA preparedness function from its
response and recovery function has proven to be a mistake. I
was against that, I said, I was against it. I was against it
then, I've been against it ever since. I'm against it now.
Separating the preparedness function from response and recovery
is like asking the marines to go into battle without first
training at Camp Lejeune. It's absolutely essential that our
emergency managers and first responders at every level of
government have the resources to train and exercise together
before a disaster. Whether it is a terrorist attack, or a
natural disaster.
I'm concerned that the Department of Homeland Security has
become the department of promises unfulfilled. The department
of promises unfulfilled. This must be rectified. Mr. Secretary
you have a tough job, I look forward to your testimony. Thank
you Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator Byrd. I want to echo
something that Senator Byrd said however. There's obviously a
lot of concern here. It's deep, it's significant, and it needs
to be raised. But we all greatly admire the people on the
frontline.
Senator Byrd. You bet.
Senator Gregg. And you've got a lot of them. And they do
very good work for us, and they put their lives at risk, and
they're willing to work in difficult situations and we
appreciate that very much. Hopefully nothing that's said here
would in anyway reflect on their professionalism and their
commitment which is superb.
Senator Byrd. No.
Senator Gregg. What we want to do is make them more capable
of doing their jobs well.
Senator Byrd. Heavens forbid.
Senator Gregg. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, we'd like to hear
from you.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CHERTOFF
Secretary Chertoff. Thank you Mr. Chairman, I appreciate
the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee before you
Mr. Chairman, and before Senator Byrd as ranking member. Of
course a lot has been raised in the opening statements, I
suspect I'll have the opportunity to answer some specific
questions about a lot of these as we go on, and I'm sure you'll
appreciate my saying that I do not intend to occupy a lot of
time in an opening statement addressing everything.
But I do want to talk about some of the major elements of
the budget. And I want to begin also by echoing the fact that
as you have both said what this Department does touches the
lives of every American. In fact, I venture to say, we probably
touch the lives of Americans in more individual and disparate
ways than does any other department in the Government. At the
same time we also have a tremendous workforce. We have 183,000
people, they serve everywhere from storm tossed seas, to very
hot desert landscapes. They do a superb job. We do owe them the
support that they're entitled to in order to carry out their
missions. Part of what I am trying to do, and I think part of
what my team is trying to do is to impose some discipline and
some systematic thinking to the missions. I don't think we want
to attack our budget problems by assigning money first and then
thinking about what to do with it afterwards. That has
sometimes been a course taken in Government. I think we want to
make sure we've thoroughly thought through what we need to do
and what the system and the mission is, and then apply the
money in a way that makes the mission occur.
I also understand that we have a challenge with respect to
the $1.6 billion amount that is allocated to be paid for by an
increase in passenger fees. I view the proposed increase as
being extremely modest. In fact it really evens out an anomaly
between those who leave from hub cities, and those who leave
from non hub cities. As I've said before, I think we're talking
about the price of a soda pop, and a newspaper at the airport.
I recognize from my experience last year this has engendered a
lot of push back, I'd still like to believe that we can get the
right thing done here. I also of course as always take back the
chairman and the ranking member's concerns about the need to
have capital investment back to the White House, and we will
continue to discuss how we can make sure we meet these needs.
Because I think we all agree at the end of the day we need to
be in the same place.
MAJOR INITIATIVES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Let me talk about some of the major initiatives in the
budget though, which does reflect a 6 percent increase in
funding if we get that fee that we should be getting over
fiscal year 2006, and also a 6 percent increase in growth
discretionary funds over the prior year. Let me begin by
talking about port security which is on everybody's mind. You
know this is an area where although there is a lot to do, a lot
has been done. And I think in fairness to the American people I
want to lay out a little bit what we actually have
accomplished, because we have made significant strides this
year as compared to previous years which I want to talk about.
PORT SECURITY ALLOCATIONS
One of the criticisms I often hear is that we spend
billions of dollars on aviation security and only a few hundred
million on port security. My response to the criticism is that
that is really comparing--not apples to oranges, but apples to
raisins. I think when you look at the total amount of money
we've spent on port security since 9/11 and you include the
2007 budget I had it calculated for this hearing. If our 2007
budget request is passed we will have spent nearly $10 billion,
with a B--$10 billion on port security and that's because when
I count port security I count not only the port security grants
which are obviously only a few hundred million. But I count the
hundreds of millions of dollars, and billions of dollars we've
invested in the Coast Guard port security program, as well as
the significant amounts we've invested in elements of customs
and border protection, science and technology, and our new
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which is investing millions
of dollars in research on radiation portal monitors.
So I think in fairness as we look back, and we consider all
of the money line itemed out for port security at these various
components it is actually a fair amount of money that has been
spent.
DHS' PORT SECURITY APPROACH
But I want to measure this not only in terms of money
spent, because what matters is not input, it's output. Let me
take a couple of minutes to talk about the way we approach port
security. Port security does not begin at home, it begins
overseas. It's kind of the opposite of charity. We begin by
having our Container Security Initiative which is designed to
put our resources in overseas ports of departure so we can
begin to screen cargo at the point of which is starts to enter
the supply chain, the maritime supply chain and not merely when
it starts to arrive in our American ports. We have a chart here
indicating where we have gone with the Container Security
Initiative. And what you will see--and a copy of this in my
prepared testimony for the Senators--you'll see that before 9/
11 we had no elements overseas as part of a container screening
initiative. In March 2002, we were at about 14 percent of the
cargo was coming through ports of embarkation that were part of
the initiative. This February we're up to about three-quarters,
and we are on track to get up to about 85 percent by the end of
fiscal year 2007. That's because most of the cargo that we are
concerned about comes through a comparatively small number of
ports, we have focused on the 42 ports which now are
responsible for three-quarters of the containers and these are
all now part of our Container Security Initiative.
What that means is we begin the process of screening well
before the cargo even gets to the overseas port. We then
inspect cargo overseas, before it actually gets on the ship, if
it is high risk cargo. And that really pushes our security
envelope way out. I'm not going to tell you the job is done,
one of the things I said, I think last year, and I've continued
to say earlier this year, is we need to extend our visibility
into the supply chain, even further back into the process so
that we see what is entering our maritime domain, really almost
at the point it leaves the factory overseas. And we also need
to have better security and tracking of containers once we've
got the containers stuffed and loaded onto ships. So we are
continuing to do work and research into pushing that out. But
it would be unfair for me not to observe how far we have come.
In that regard I'm actually planning to go to Hong Kong later
on in March to actually look at a system they have in place
there, which at least has established a concept of doing the
radiation screening and the x-ray screening for every container
before it gets loaded. I want to see how that works and see
whether that is a possibility for extending what we're doing.
But of course the supply chain security doesn't end at the
overseas port. We get the manifest of the cargo, the Coast
Guard examines the manifest, examines the crew list, examines
the history of the ship, even while the ship is underway to
come into American ports. When necessary the Coast Guard boards
ships in order to inspect cargo, or in order to examine crew
members who are listed on the cruise ship.
I should say that the Coast Guard actually inspects ports
overseas as part of our international initiatives on port
security. And if a port overseas does not have an adequate
security profile, we have the power and we have exercised the
power to suspend ships from that port coming into the United
States.
[The information follows:]
How Often has DHS (Coast Guard) Exercised the Power to Suspend Ships
From Entering Into the Port Coming Into the United States?
We have broken this data down into two separate categories, one for
deficiencies related to port state control and maritime security
compliance examinations; and one for failures to provide required
notice of arrival.
For deficiencies related to port state control and maritime
security compliance:
--In 2004, we expelled 15 vessels and denied entry to 2 vessels.
--In 2005, we expelled 5 vessels and denied entry to 2 vessels.
--Thus far in 2006, we've not expelled or denied entry to any vessel
for port state control or maritime security compliance.
--We only expel or deny entry to a vessel due to extremely
substandard conditions.
--The Coast Guard generally allows these vessels enter or re-enter
port when they have corrected the substandard conditions.
For failures to provide appropriate notice of arrival:
--In 2005, we denied entry to 147 vessels and expelled 15 vessels.
--Thus far in 2006, we denied entry to 11 vessels and expelled 7
vessels.
--The Coast Guard generally allows the vessels to enter or re-enter
port once the vessel makes proper notice of arrival and once
the appropriate 24 hour or 96 hour vetting period ends.
Senator Byrd. How often is that done?
Secretary Chertoff. I could give you the number; we have
done it on occasion. Usually what we do is if the shipping
company imposes its own security guards around the ship at a
port that has not met security requirements, we will allow the
ship in. In other words we will allow the shipping company to
do its own remediation with respect to guarding its own ship.
But I can think of one occasion in the last year where we got
to the point of decertifying a port, and for a short of period
of time, I think the port was decertified. I can get you the
details on the numbers. But this process is underway as we
speak with the Coast Guard going overseas inspecting ports
overseas.
Now let's continue to follow the supply chain. So we've
looked at--in many instances, three-quarters of the containers
we've done screening and necessary inspection before the cargo
has left. We've then looked at the crew, we've looked at the
ship, and Coast Guard has reviewed it while it's on route. When
it comes into the United States, if we have cargo that we have
screened, we've screened 100 percent, we're virtually at 100
percent of the cargo at this point using very complicated
analytical tools and using information we have about the
shipper, the cargo, the destination, and the method of payment.
If at the time it arrives we haven't inspected high risk cargo,
we then inspect it when it arrives. We put it through radiation
portal monitors and just to show you where we are with this,
these are large machines through which one can drive a truck
carrying a container and it will detect radio active emissions
from inside the container. We've gone again from February 2003,
where we had only a small number of radiation portal monitors
to a situation in which by the end of this year, we expect to
have about two-thirds of the container cargo going through our
seaports covered by radiation portal monitors. And we're on
track to get to 90 plus percent by the time we get to the next
fiscal year. And that's of course apart from hand held
radiation monitors and things of that sort. So that's a
significant amount of the containers coming through American
ports that are being checked through these radiation portal
monitors. In addition again if we have high risk containers
that haven't been inspected, we inspect them on the spot. So
it's only at the end of this very lengthy supply chain, with
multiple defenses none of them perfect, but in combination a
pretty effective series of defenses, only at the end of that
does the container finally enter the hands of the port terminal
operator which of course is the topic of conversation that
we've had over the last week involving Dubai ports.
So my point here is that the port terminal operator really
lies after the last line of defense and is not a critical
player in the line of defense. I should tell you the port
terminal operator plays no role in our selection of what cargo
to examine, in our screening process, in the Coast Guard's
examination of the ships that come in, in our decision of what
to put through the radiation portal monitors, or in our
decision about what containers to open up. The port terminal
operator has zero impact on that.
Let me briefly touch on the Coast Guard analysis which I
think you asked about Mr. Chairman, and then I will touch on
just a few other points before I conclude. As you correctly
point out, yesterday there was disclosed an unclassified
portion of a much larger classified study by the Coast Guard
early on in the process of reviewing this Dubai ports
acquisition. This process of review by the way began in I
believe October of last year, and concluded in January. So that
although the formal filing may have only been less than 30 days
before the conclusion of the process, the actual examination
and vetting process began actually months earlier when the
company first approached the CFIUS Committee.
The Coast Guard as part of its early review assessment
concluded that there were intelligence gaps. I should tell you
that I often see, by the way, intelligence analytic documents
that have that conclusion. By its nature I think an intelligent
and cautious analyst is always very careful to identify not
only what is known but what is unknown. And I think there was a
response to that. The response to that was, not only continuing
the process of checking with the other 12 departments involved
and their intelligence elements. But more important, putting
into place a significant number of assurances that would make
sure that as we go forward with this. Implementing this
transaction, Coast Guard and Customs would have an
unprecedented ability to look into what was being done at these
terminals, to insist upon the highest standard of security and
if necessary to enforce those standards. I would conclude my
comment on this by observing again, as you said Mr. Chairman,
even at that early stage the Coast Guard concluded that ``DP
World's acquisition of PNO in and of itself does not pose a
significant threat to U.S. assets in continental United States
ports.
ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR PREPAREDNESS AND FEMA
Let me briefly touch on a few other things before I
conclude Mr. Chairman. We have put additional money into
Preparedness and into FEMA, $50 million into a National
Preparedness Integration Program which, even as we speak, is in
the process of reviewing and validating and ultimately working
with States to improve the individual evacuation and emergency
plans all over the country. There are increases in targeted
capability grants. Although we do not support specifically
targeted port grants, we've actually put a couple of hundred
million dollars extra into the TIPP, the Targeted
Infrastructure Protection Program which includes port grants.
We've got a budget that allocates $10 million for chemical site
security. Increases in FEMA's core budget of 10 percent, $492
million including when we build on the amounts in the 2006
supplemental a total of 240 additional FTEs. As well as some
very specific steps we're taking for this hurricane season. As
you noted in border security we are proposing an increase in
1,500 agents, $100 million on border technology over $400
million to bring detention bed space up to 27,500 beds. And let
me say Mr. Chairman we are now for the first time building and
carefully tracking through metrics, exactly how we are
progressing and ending catch and release, and turning it into
catch and return for non-Mexicans we apprehend at the border.
This is a big accomplishment, we have some additional hurdles
to overcome and I'd be happy to address them if anybody asks
me. But we are, for the first time, in a position to see
exactly where we need to go, where we are, and we can identify
exactly what we need to do to cover the distance. And that's
part of this systematic thinking I'm thinking about. I've got a
lot of other elements to the budget. I'm sure you have a lot of
questions. I will ask that my statement--written statement be
accepted for the record, and I will be delighted to answer
questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Chertoff
Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and Members of the Committee: Before
beginning to outline our fiscal year 2007 budget request, I want to
thank you for the strong support you showed for the Department in the
two full budget cycles since it was fully established in March 2003.
This is my first full budget cycle and I am honored and pleased to
appear before the Committee to present President Bush's fiscal year
2007 budget for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
I would like to begin by assuring Members of this Committee and the
public of the Department's efforts to secure the Nation's seaports. The
Department continues to implement a multi-layered defense strategy to
keep our ports safe and secure. Utilizing the expertise of our
bureaus--particularly the United States Coast Guard and U.S. Customs
and Border Protection--the private sector, and state and local
authorities, we have made great strides since 9/11 to ensure that there
are protective measures in place from one end of a sea based journey to
the other. With the President's fiscal year 2007 Budget request, total
DHS funding for port security activities since fiscal year 2004 total
nearly $10 billion.
As the lead Federal agency for maritime security, the Coast Guard
routinely inspects and assesses the security of 3,200 regulated
facilities in more than 360 U.S. ports at least annually in accordance
with the Maritime Transportation and Security Act (MTSA) and the Ports
and Water ways Safety Act (PWSA). Every regulated U.S. port facility,
regardless of owner/operator, is required to establish and implement a
comprehensive Facility Security Plan (FSP) that specifically addresses
the vulnerabilities identified in the facility security assessment and
details measures and procedures for controlling access to the facility,
including screening, designating employees with key security
responsibilities, verifying credentials of port workers, inspecting
cargo for tampering, designating security responsibilities, quarterly
training, drills and annual exercises, and reporting of all breaches of
security or suspicious activity, among other security measures.
Working closely with local port authorities and law enforcement
agencies, the Coast Guard regularly reviews, approves, assesses and
inspects these plans and facilities to ensure compliance.
In accordance with MTSA, the Coast Guard has completed verification
of security plans for U.S. port and facilities and vessels operating in
U.S. waters. Specifically:
--Port Threat Assessments for all 55 militarily or economically
critical ports have been completed. The Coast Guard has
developed 44 Area Maritime Security Plans covering 361 ports,
the Great Lakes, the Inland and Western Rivers and the Outer
Continental Shelf region.
--The Coast Guard completed initial security plan verification exams
on all 6,200 U.S. flag inspected vessels on July 1, 2005.
--The Coast Guard has completed 2,400 verification examinations on
uninspected vessels regulated under the MTSA, and is on track
to complete all 4,800 by December 31, 2006.
--Reviewed and approved 3,200 facility security plans.
--Approved 60 offshore facility security plans.
In addition to the Coast Guard's broad authorities for ensuring the
security of U.S. port facilities and operations, the Coast Guard worked
through the International Maritime Organization to develop the
International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code. Through the
International Port
Security Program, the Coast Guard has partnered with other nations
worldwide to ensure compliance with ISPS. The Coast Guard has assessed
44 countries, which are responsible for 80 percent of the maritime
trade to the United States. Of those 44 countries, 37 have been found
to be in substantial compliance with the ISPS Code. The seven countries
that are not in substantial compliance have been or will soon be
notified to take corrective actions or risk being placed on a Port
Security Advisory and have Conditions of Entry imposed on vessels
arriving from their ports. The Coast Guard is on track to assess
approximately 36 countries per year.
The Coast Guard has also taken multiple steps to enhance our
awareness in the maritime domain. Publication of the 96-hour Notice of
Arrival regulation allows sufficient time to vet the crew, passengers,
cargo and vessel information of all vessels prior to their entering the
United States from foreign ports. The Coast Guard also has expansive
authority to exercise positive control over a vessel intending to enter
a port or place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Since
July 2004, the Coast Guard has boarded 16,000 foreign flag vessels for
security compliance with the ISPS Code and the MTSA. Out of those
16,000 boardings, the Coast Guard imposed 143 detentions, expulsions or
denials of entry. In addition, the Automatic Identification System
(AIS) has been fielded at 9 ports with Vessel Traffic Service systems
and allows the Coast Guard to identify and track vessels in the coastal
environment. Long range tracking, currently in development, will enable
the Coast Guard to identify and track vessels thousands of miles at
sea, well before they reach our coastal zones. Likewise, the Inland
River Vessel Movement Center provides critical information about the
movement of hazardous cargoes along our Nation's inland rivers.
The Coast Guard has increased its operational presence through a
number of other initiatives. For example, the Coast Guard has
established processes to identify, target, and have conducted 3,400
security boardings on High Interest Vessels. These boardings included
1,500 positive control vessel escorts to ensure these vessels cannot be
used as weapons of mass destruction. The Coast Guard has also
established 12 Maritime Safety and Security Teams and enforced hundreds
of fixed and moving security zones to protect Maritime Critical
Infrastructure and Key Assets (MCI/KA) and Naval Vessel Protection
Zones (NVPZ) to protect U.S. Navy and Maritime Administration vessels.
Further, the Coast Guard is developing a Risk-Based Decision Making
System, to be implemented this year, which will help prioritize High
Capacity Passenger Vessels (HCPV) escorts. Although initially developed
for high capacity ferries, its application is being expanded to enhance
current security measures for other HCPVs: ferries, cruise ships, and
excursion vessels carrying 500 or more passengers.
The Coast Guard is also working closely with various other agencies
to implement the National Strategy for Maritime Security, and its eight
supporting plans. Together, the plans provide the road map for the
integration of national efforts in supporting the four primary pillars
of maritime security: Awareness, Prevention, Protection, and Response
and Recovery. As DHS's executive agent for implementing and updating
plans related to Maritime Domain Awareness (Awareness), Global Maritime
Intelligence Integration (Prevention), Maritime Transportation System
Security (Protection), and Maritime Operational Threat Response
(Response/Recovery), the Coast Guard, in cooperation with other
stakeholders, is leading efforts to increase the coordination,
effectiveness and efficiency of existing government-wide initiatives.
In close coordination with the Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) mission is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons
from entering the United States by eliminating potential threats before
theyContainer Security Initiative arrive at our borders and ports. For
example, through a program administered by CBP, the Department has
implemented the 24-Hour Advanced Manifest Rule, requiring all sea
carriers, with the exception of bulk carriers and approved break bulk
cargo, to provide proper cargo descriptions and valid consignee
addresses 24 hours before cargo is loaded at the foreign port for
shipment to the United States. Failure to meet the 24 hour advanced
manifest rule results in a ``do not load'' message and other penalties.
This program gives the Department greater awareness of what is being
loaded onto ships bound for the United States and the advance
information enables DHS to evaluate the terrorist risk from sea
containers.
Similarly, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) initiatives bolster port
security. Through CSI, CBP works with host government Customs Services
to examine high-risk maritime containerized cargo at foreign seaports,
before they are loaded on board vessels destined for the United States.
In addition to the current 42 foreign ports participating in CSI, many
more ports are in the planning stages. By the end of 2006, we expect
that 50 ports, covering 82 percent of maritime containerized cargo
shipped to the United States, will participate in CSI. The table above
shows the Department's substantial progress in expanding the CSI
program since September 11, 2001.
Through C-TPAT, CBP has created a public-private and international
partnership with nearly 5,800 businesses (over 10,000 have applied),
including most of the largest U.S. importers. CTPAT, CBP and partner
companies are working together to improve baseline security standards
for supply chain and container security. CBP reviews the security
practices of not only the company shipping the goods, but also the
companies that provided them with any services.
At present, the C-TPAT program has completed validations on 27
percent (1,545 validations completed) of the certified membership, up
from 8 percent (403 validations completed) a year ago. Additionally,
validations are in progress on another 39 percent (2,262 in progress)
of certified members, and these validations will be completed
throughout 2006, bringing the total percentage of certified members to
65 percent by years' end. In 2007, the C-TPAT program validations will
continue. And we will have validated 100 percent by the end of CY 2007.
CBP also uses cutting-edge technology, including large-scale X-ray
and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices to screen cargo.
Presently, CBP operates over 680 radiation portal monitors at our
Nation's ports, including 181 radiation portal monitors at seaports.
CBP also utilizes over 170 large scale non-intrusive inspection devices
to examine cargo and has issued 12,400 hand-held radiation detection
devices. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget requests $157 million
to secure Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) Deployments at current and
next-generation detection equipment at our ports of entry through the
DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). Over 600 canine detection
teams, capable of identifying narcotics, bulk currency, human beings,
explosives, agricultural pests, and chemical weapons, are deployed at
our ports of entry. As reflected in the Radiation Portal Monitor
Deployment at Seaports table, 621 RPMs will be deployed to our Nation's
top seaports, which will allow us to screen approximately 98 percent of
inbound containers by December 2007.
CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) is also a critical component
of our layered port security efforts. The NTC provides tactical
targeting and analytical research support for CBP antiterrorism
efforts. Experts in passenger and cargo targeting at the NTC operate
around the clock using tools like the Automated Targeting System (ATS)
to identify tactical targets and support intra-departmental and inter-
agency anti-terrorist operations. The ATS serves as the premier tool
for performing transactional risk assessments and evaluating potential
national security risks posed by cargo and passengers arriving by sea,
air, truck, and rail. Using pre-arrival information and input from the
intelligence community, this rules-based system identifies high-risk
targets before they arrive in the United States. The Department's
Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) is supporting the introduction
of advanced intelligent algorithms to further improve these risk
assessment capabilities.
A key responsibility of the NTC is the support that it provides to
the field, including tactical targeting and research support for the
CSI personnel stationed at critical foreign ports throughout the world.
The NTC, combined with CSI, C-TPAT, the 24-hour rule, and ATS ensures
that all containers on-board vessels destined for the United States are
risk scored using all available information; and that all cargo
determined to be of high risk are examined. The NTC, working closely
with the Coast Guard, also vets and risk scores all cargo and cruise-
ship passengers and crew prior to arrival. This ensures that DHS has
full port security awareness for international maritime activity.
Further, DNDO's fiscal year 2007 budget request of nearly $536
million, a 70 percent increase from fiscal year 2006, includes $157
million which will allow for the acquisition and deployment of nearly
300 current and next-generation radiation detection systems at our
ports of entry. These systems will be deployed and operated by CBP. In
addition, DNDO's fiscal year 2007 budget also includes $30.3 million
for the development of enhanced cargo radiography screening systems for
our ports of entry. These enhanced screening efforts will compliment
the many information based programs, such as C-TPAT, the Department
already has in place for enhanced port security.
In addition to increased screening efforts at our own ports of
entry for radioactive and nuclear materials, the Department fully
endorses the concept of increased active and passive detection at
foreign ports of departure. The systems DNDO are acquiring and
developing can also be used by foreign ports with a CSI presence, as
well as the Department of Energy's Megaports program. We must continue
to stress the need for increased screening at foreign ports of
departure, while at the same time have a robust screening effort at our
own ports of entry.
In order for the Department to increase its visibility into the
security of our international supply chains, S&T is developing
technology solutions that can be applied across the supply chain. Part
of this effort is the development of a new class of security devices
that will monitor the integrity of intermodal shipping containers and
enable CBP Officers, CSI personnel and the NTC to gather information on
the status of a container to improve risk assessment and data
collection. When coupled with the broad supply chain security
architectural framework currently under development by S&T, the
Department will have the capability to bridge data and information
between container security devices, shippers, and the National
Targeting Center (NTC).
Finally, in addition to the work of the Coast Guard, CBP, S&T and
the DNDO, the Port Security Grant program has awarded over $700 million
to owners and operators of ports, terminals, U.S. inspected passenger
vessels and ferries, as well as port authorities and State and local
agencies to improve security for operators and passengers through
physical security enhancements. The mission of the Port Security Grant
program is to create a sustainable, risk-based effort for the
protection of ports from terrorism, especially explosives and non-
conventional threats that would cause major disruption to commerce and
significant loss of life.
The Preparedness Directorate will also announce the application
process for an additional $168 million in port security grants in the
coming weeks, bringing total funding to over $870 million since 9/11.
In addition, the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget bolsters funding
for infrastructure protection, including ports, through the $600
million Targeted Infrastructure Protection grant program. The fiscal
year 2007 request consolidates existing infrastructure grant programs
into a single program with a 55 percent increase in funding.
With all of the layered efforts already in place, and the ongoing
efforts that are supported in the 2007 budget request, port security
has substantially improved since 9/11, and since the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security.
OTHER KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS
I would like to now address some of our other major accomplishments
to date. As DHS approaches its third anniversary on March 1, 2006,
creating one national integrated strategy to fight the war on terror,
through awareness, prevention, protection, response, and recovery
remains the key focus of its vision and mission. Since its inception,
the Department has steadily progressed in its efforts to vigorously
protect America's homeland. Since 2001, the administration:
--Has increased annual spending on Government-wide non-defense
homeland security by 350 percent, more than tripling spending
devoted to homeland security;
--Created the Department of Homeland Security by merging 22 separate
agencies and programs into a cohesive department;
--Restructured the agencies that handle immigration and border
security issues. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has Port
of Entry officers and Border Patrol agents along the border.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) enforces immigration
laws and detains those aliens here illegally. U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) administers a wide variety of
immigration benefits and services within the United States;
--Established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to
improve aviation security and other modes of transportation
security nationwide. TSA hired a screener workforce and
deployed sufficient technology to electronically screen 100
percent of passenger and checked baggage;
--Created a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to detect,
identify, and track down the origins of nuclear and
radiological materials; and
--Provided the Department nearly $18 billion for State, local, and
tribal governments to enhance their preparedness for a range of
hazards, including $14 billion for terrorism and other
catastrophic events.
When I arrived at the Department in 2005, I initiated a Second
Stage Review (2SR) to assess whether DHS' policies, operations, and
organizational structure were properly aligned to maximize mission
performance. The implementation of 2SR instituted a fundamental reform
of policies and procedures critical to achieving the mission of the
Department. The Department also conquered many unique challenges,
making significant strides protecting vital infrastructure and assets;
preventing security breaches; ensuring safe travel and trade across our
borders; protecting privacy and civil liberties; and expanding critical
partnerships at every level.
In the last year, we have made great strides in the area of
prevention and preparedness. Our key accomplishments include:
Revamping the Port Security Grant Program--As part of the fiscal
year 2005 Office of Grants and Training (G&T) Port Security Grant
Program (PSGP), significant changes have been introduced to make the
program more risk based. Changes include limiting eligibility to the
Nation's most at-risk seaports and distributing funding based on risk,
needs and national priorities for port security. Additional rigor was
added to the evaluation process for applications and a communications
strategy was implemented to ensure consistent guidance was provided
throughout.
The program is being further refined in fiscal year 2006, and will
soon link distribution of funds to participation in a port-wide risk
management planning process. The intent of this process, which combines
the USCG's Maritime Security Risk Assessment Methodology (MSRAM) with
the Office of Grant's and Training's own Special Needs Jurisdiction
Toolkit, is to allow port areas to develop risk management strategies
that will assist them in identifying the most cost effective projects--
essentially allowing them to ``buy down'' the risk in their areas. This
program, known as the Maritime Assessment and Strategy Toolkit (MAST),
is an essential step in prioritizing risks and facilitating a port-wide
risk management planning process. Ultimately, MAST will serve to
further enhance the existing Area Maritime Security Plans and also
allow for ports to better integrate their security efforts into the
broader planning construct that forms the core of the Urban Areas
Security Initiative (UASI).
TSA Moves to a Risk-Based, Threat-Managed Security Approach.--
Employing TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams, piloting
behavioral pattern recognition analysis at 10 airports, and through a
Nation-wide modification of the prohibited items list, TSA has
increased its ability to identify and prevent terrorist threats to the
Nation and enhance aviation security.
Over $3 Billion Awarded to State and Local Governments.--DHS
awarded more than $3 billion in grants, training, and technical
assistance to State and local governments to support various
prevention, protection and response initiatives.
Standard First Responder Training Developed.--DHS established a
National Incident Management System (NIMS) standard curriculum to
ensure first responder training is widely available and consistent
among all training providers. More than 725,000 first responders
completed NIMS training nationwide.
Counterterrorism Training.--DHS provided counterterrorism training
to more than 1.2 million emergency response personnel from across the
country on a range of incident response issues, including incident
management, unified command, and public works protection/response, and
training on weapons of mass destruction.
Sharing Intelligence Information.--The Office of Intelligence and
Analysis provided State and local governments and the private sector
with more than 1,260 intelligence information products on threat
information and suggested protective measures.
Secret Service Operation Taps Network to Arrest 28 Globally.--U.S.
Secret Service conducted ``Operation Firewall,'' in which the Secret
Service became the first agency ever to execute a Title III wire tap on
an entire computer network. This global operation resulted in 28
arrests in eight States and six foreign countries. These suspects stole
nearly 1.7 million credit card numbers.
The hurricanes last fall stretched our Nation's resources and
forced us to reexamine our processes. We still however, saw our first
responders and relief personnel do remarkable things to assist our
fellow citizens.
Over 40,000 Rescued by U.S. Coast Guard and FEMA.--In the wake of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Coast Guard and FEMA rescued over
40,000 people in search and rescue operations. Coast Guard men and
women employed their Continuity of Operations Plans and demonstrated
deep commitment to the missions of search and rescue, protection of
natural resources, and restoration of a safe, efficient marine
transportation system.
More than 23,000 Victims Airlifted from New Orleans Airport.--More
than 700 transportation security officers and Federal air marshals
helped evacuate more than 23,000 victims at Louis Armstrong New Orleans
International Airport.
$5.7 Billion in Federal Aid Distributed.--FEMA distributed over
$5.7 billion in Federal aid to more than 1.4 million households to help
pay for housing assistance, food, clothing, home repair and other
essentials.
$12 Billion in Claims Distributed.--FEMA's National Flood Insurance
program paid over $12 billion in claims from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita,
and Wilma, with an estimated $10 billion in additional claims to be
paid over the next few months.
In the past year, we have also strengthened our borders and
interior enforcement of our immigration laws, expanded partnerships
with our neighbors, and increased our use of emerging technologies to
assist our efforts.
Secure Border Initiative Success.--In support of a comprehensive
strategy to control the border and enforce immigration laws, DHS
adopted a policy to replace the practice of catching and releasing
aliens with a ``Catch and Return'' policy. Expedited Removal (ER) has
been expanded along our entire land border as well as the number of
countries with nationals subject to ER. DHS adopted a goal to cut ER
detention time in half to speed alien removals, and the frequency of
deportation flights has increased. Litigation barriers preventing San
Diego fence completion have been removed. A process is also well
underway to seek and select a contract integrator to implement a
comprehensive border protection program plan using technology, staff,
and other assets.
Successful Counter Drug Operations.--Efforts by CBP, USCG and ICE
to secure the Nation's borders have yielded significant positive
results in stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.
In the most recently completed fiscal year, CBP reported seizing nearly
42,800 lbs of cocaine and more than 531,700 pounds of marijuana. In
addition, United States Coast Guard and CBP Air and Marine Operations'
counter drug operations exceeded results from previous years by
removing over 338,000 lbs of cocaine from the Caribbean Sea and Eastern
Pacific Ocean transit zones.
Arizona Border Control Initiative Bolstered Resources in Tucson
Corridor.--The second phase of this successful initiative included an
additional 534 Border Patrol agents permanently assigned to the Arizona
border, a 25 percent increase. These agents were supplemented by 200
agents and 23 aircraft temporarily assigned to the Tucson sector. The
initiative coupled with Operation ICE Storm, a human smuggling
initiative, resulted in more than 350 smugglers prosecuted in total,
millions in illicit profits seized and a significant decrease in
homicides according to local authorities.
Security and Prosperity Partnership Creates Common Security
Approach.--The United States, Canada and Mexico entered into this
trilateral partnership to establish common approaches to emergency
response, improving aviation, maritime, and border security, enhancing
intelligence sharing, and facilitating the legitimate flow of people
and cargo at our shared borders.
Immigration Processing Backlog Cut by 2.8 million.--USCIS reduced
the backlog of applications for immigration services and benefits from
3.8 million cases in January 2004 to fewer than one million in December
2005.
US VISIT Biometric Entry System Expanded.--US VISIT implemented the
biometric entry portion of the US VISIT system at 115 airports, 14
seaports and 154 land ports of entry. As of December 31, 2005, US VISIT
processed more than 44 million foreign visitors and detected 950
individuals with a criminal history or immigration violations.
Passport Requirements Strengthened.--As part of a multi-layered
approach to increasing the security of our citizens and visitors by
helping to ensure the integrity of their travel documents, DHS imposed
requirements establishing that all Visa Waiver Program travelers must
have a machine-readable passport to enter the United States. Visa
Waiver Program countries are now also required to produce new passports
with digital photographs.
Implemented Coast Guard Sectors.--The Coast Guard has reorganized
its field infrastructure by unifying previous Groups and Marine Safety
Offices into ``Sector'' commands. Within the new Sector construct, the
inclusion of Field Intelligence Support Teams to support port-level
commanders, as well as the establishment of Maritime Intelligence
Fusion Centers, serves to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness at all
levels of the chain of command. This restructuring unifies effort and
command, strengthens maritime border security, and improves information
sharing by providing a single point of Coast Guard service at the port
level. The largest Coast Guard reorganization in a decade, the
establishment of Sectors will be complete in 2006, significantly
improving maritime preparedness and response without requiring any
additional resources.
FISCAL YEAR 2007 BUDGET REQUEST
In accordance with the premise of 2SR and to build on the
Department's accomplishments, the fiscal year 2007 budget proposal for
the Department is driven by a mission and risk-based approach to
allocating the Department's resources, requesting $42.7 billion in
funding, an increase of 6 percent over fiscal year 2006. The
Department's fiscal year 2007 gross discretionary budget is $35.4
billion, also an increase of 6 percent over fiscal year 2006. Gross
discretionary funding includes appropriated budget authority and
discretionary fee collections such as funding for the Federal
Protective Service; aviation security passenger and carrier fees; and
premium collections. It does not include funding such as Coast Guard's
retirement pay accounts and fees paid for immigration benefits. The
Department's fiscal year 2007 net discretionary budget is $30.9
billion, an increase of 1 percent over fiscal year 2006.
Central to the Department's budget are five themes to ensure that
all resource allocations correspond with its integral mission and
vision. Key enhancements in the Budget for these five areas will allow
the Department to execute the initiatives of the administration and
effectively secure our Nation.
Increase Overall Preparedness, Particularly for Catastrophic Events
Either Natural or Manmade and Strengthen FEMA
Preparedness addresses the Department's full range of
responsibilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to acts of
terror or other disasters.
The Budget includes an increase of $294.6 million for the Targeted
Capability Grants, for a total of $1.4 billion. This builds upon the
$5.5 billion already in the grant pipeline to assist our States and
localities in increasing their preparedness and furthers the
Department's National Preparedness Goals. This funding includes an
$80.65 million increase for Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) to
provide a second layer of protection for urban areas based on risk. It
also includes a $213.9 million increase over comparable programs, for a
total of $600 million, for the Targeted Infrastructure Protection
Program (TIPP). This will provide States with maximum flexibility to
target resources to protect our Nation's ports, transit facilities,
chemical facilities, and other critical infrastructure.
The Budget also includes $50 million National Preparedness
Integration Program (NPIP) as a new initiative in the Preparedness
Directorate. NPIP will improve preparedness by executing Medical
Preparedness Coordination, Catastrophic Planning, Emergency
Communications Improvements, and Command and Control Alignment.
This budget enhances our ability to respond to and recover from
disasters. Indeed, last year's Gulf Coast hurricanes demonstrated the
need to strengthen FEMA's planning and response capabilities. While
funding was increased for these core activities in 2005 and 2006, the
fiscal year 2007 budget proposes a more significant investment to
further strengthen FEMA. FEMA's budget represents a 10 percent increase
over the 2006 fiscal year, including $44.7 million to strengthen
support functions. We will add resources to critical areas such as
procurement, information technology, and planning and amounts.
The Budget includes a $29 million increase and 92 FTE to support
FEMA's Strengthen Operational Capability initiative and reinforce its
essential support functions within its programs of Readiness,
Mitigation, Response, Recovery, and National Security, This program
increase will allow FEMA to fill critical positions, and upgrade
capital infrastructure and information technology support services.
A $5 million increase in the FEMA Procurement Staff supports the
Department's initiative to strengthen procurement capability across the
board. These additional 41 FTE will enhance FEMA's ability to
effectively deliver disaster response and recovery services by
efficiently and properly processing procurement requests during both
routine and extraordinary operating periods.
An additional 40 FTE and $10.7 million is requested for FEMA
financial and acquisition management. The funding requested will build
on the positions provided in the fiscal year 2006 supplemental
appropriation to operate the Gulf Region Acquisition Center to support
the billions of dollars in contracts necessary to meet the
unprecedented recovery needs of Hurricane Katrina and to bolster the
FEMA's financial management capabilities to meet the demands of current
and future catastrophic disasters.
An additional $5.3 million is requested for National Response Plan
(NRP) Support to help FEMA coordinate the response to all types and
magnitudes of threats or hazards. It will allow FEMA to support
shortened response times and provide more effective assistance during
incidents of national significance.
The fiscal year 2007 Budget seeks an increase of $100 million and
40 FTE for the pre-disaster mitigation grant program. This program is
designed to reduce the risk to populations, structures, and critical
infrastructure from natural disasters. These funds will provide for the
protection of: over 600 additional properties from flood damage through
acquisition, elevation, relocation, and/or flood proofing; 250
additional critical facilities from flood damage through drainage,
infrastructure, and utilities projects; 240 additional properties from
hurricane wind damage; 92 additional storm shelters to save lives from
tornadoes; and 154 additional critical public facilities against
seismic damage.
Finally, an additional $5 million is proposed for upgrade of the
Emergency Alert System (EAS). The EAS, which uses commercial radio and
television broadcast services to send Presidential messages, provides a
readily available and reliable means of emergency communications with
the American people when catastrophic events occur and other national
communications resources have been damaged or compromised. Building on
the supplemental funding provided in fiscal year 2006, this funding
will be used to improve system coverage, reliability, survivability,
and security by providing a two-way, national-level EAS satellite
backbone/path that will effectively link all Federal, State, and U.S.
Territory Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs).
The budget also proposes:
--A total of $62.4 million in funding for the Coast Guard's National
Capital Region Air Defense (NCRAD) program. This funding is
needed to provide an air intercept response to potential
threats in the National Capital Region airspace, helping to
protect Washington, DC, from airborne attack.
--A total of $17.7 million in funding to support the Radiological and
Nuclear Attribution and Forensics initiative. The request will
enable the Department to combine information on potential
capabilities of terrorist organizations to develop and deploy
threat agents with laboratory-based forensics techniques that
determine the source of any nuclear and radiological materials
or devices.
--An increase of $3 million for the Office of the Chief Medical
Officer to further strengthen cutting-edge science, technology,
and intelligence within the Department's policy-making process.
This request, more than doubling resources for this office,
will be used to develop policy driven initiatives to ensure
that the Nation and its critical infrastructures are medically
prepared for catastrophic events.
An increase of $10 million to establish an office to oversee
chemical site security. DHS will classify facilities into risk-based
tiers, establish security standards for each tier, and ensure strong
safeguards are in place to protect the public disclosure of any
sensitive information gathered by the office.
Strengthen Border Security and Interior Enforcement and Reform
Immigration Processes
Securing our Borders
One of the key elements in fulfilling the Department's mission is
securing the border, both land and maritime, from terrorist threats and
the flow of illegal migration and drugs. Under the Secure Border
Initiative (SBI) DHS will focus on controlling the border, building a
robust interior enforcement program, and establishing a Temporary
Worker Program. SBI, a performance-driven, department-wide enterprise
will make dramatic changes in the border security system. It will cover
every facet of how we sanction, manage, adjudicate, and remove persons
caught crossing the border; deter illegal migration overall; manage
immigration violators currently in the country; and interact with
States and localities at the front lines of immigration and drug
trafficking problems.
Funding dedicated to SBI efforts facilitates a complete program
encompassing many administrative, legal, and regulatory actions.
Substantial resource enhancements provided in 2005 and 2006 will pave
the way for an effective SBI program, and 2007 will be a turning point
towards meeting long-term border security objectives.
Among the key investments in the President's Budget for SBI is
$458.9 million to increase the Border Patrol Agent workforce by 1,500
agents, bringing the total of new agents added since 2005 to 3,000 and
the overall total number of agents to nearly 14,000. This increases the
size of our Border Patrol Agent workforce to 42 percent above the level
prior to the September 11 attacks.
To enhance our ability to protect the Nation's borders, the Budget
includes $100 million for border technology to improve electronic
surveillance and operational response. In 2006, DHS will solicit and
award a contract to complete the transition from the current, limited-
scope technology plan to one that addresses the Department's
comprehensive and integrated technological needs to secure our borders.
Funding requested in the 2007 President's Budget will provide
significant procurement investments needed to begin an aggressive
deployment plan.
To fund the continued construction of the San Diego Border
Infrastructure System (BIS), we are requesting $30 million. The project
includes multiple fences and patrol roads enabling quick enforcement
response and will give the United States full operational control of
the most urbanized corridor of our border with Mexico.
The Tactical Infrastructure Western Arizona (TIWAZ) is a critical
multi-year project that will deploy approximately 84 miles of vehicle
barriers and improve 150 miles of access and maintenance roads. The
Budget includes $51 million for the deployment of this tactical
infrastructure in Arizona which will enable the construction of 39
miles of permanent vehicle barriers.
To support the detention and removal of at least another 100,000
apprehended persons annually, the budget includes over $400 million for
an additional 6,700 detention beds and associated staffing and other
expenses. This would bring the total number of beds to 27,500 in 2007.
A key element of SBI is replacing a ``catch and release'' protocol for
captured aliens with a ``catch and return'' process, requiring a
substantial expansion of bed space. In addition, new bed space will be
used to return criminal aliens upon release from State and local
prisons, and address the problem of alien absconders defying orders of
removal.
The budget also includes $41.7 million for ICE worksite
enforcement, to add 206 agents and support staff for this effort. A
strong worksite enforcement program that continues to expand will send
a strong deterrence message to employers who knowingly hire illegal
workers; reduce economic incentive for illegal immigration; and help
restore the integrity of employment laws.
An additional $60 million is requested for ICE Fugitive Operations
apprehension teams, adding a total of 18 teams, to a planned level of
70 teams nationwide. In addition to shoring up our borders and
improving workplace oversight, the Department will continue to increase
efforts to catch the estimated 450,000 absconders around the country--a
level that is growing every year.
Outside of core SBI programs, the request level includes funding
for other vital border security programs to include:
--An increase of $62.9 million over fiscal year 2006 for total
funding of $399.5 million is requested for US VISIT, a critical
element in the screening and border security system towards
ensuring better border security in a post-September 11
environment. Included in the US VISIT initiative is $60 million
in new resources to improve connection of information between
DHS IDENT system and DOJ IAFIS fingerprint system.
--CSI & C-TPAT. The request continues to support the Container
Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which are critical in the
prevention and deterrence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
and other dangerous or illegal material importation. The Budget
requests $139 million for CSI to pre-screen inbound cargo at
over forty foreign ports and $55 million for C-TPAT to review
and improve the security of partner organizations throughout
the cargo supply-chain.
Reform and Modernization of Immigration Management
As Congress and the Administration collaborate to reform the
immigration system in addition to improving border security, it is
critical that the Department is ready to effectively manage any reform
and implement a sustainable immigration management system.
Among other things, the Budget includes resource initiatives for
worksite enforcement, fugitive operations, employment verification, and
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) business
transformation efforts.
The request includes $135 million for the operation and expansion
of the USCIS Systematic Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program
which provides immigration verification services to State Departments
of Motor Vehicles and other Federal and State agencies, and to expand
and enhance the current Basic Pilot program to be ready to support a
mandatory national electronic employment authorization verification
system. The current Basic Pilot program is a voluntary electronic
verification program enabling an employer to confirm the employment
eligibility of newly hired employees.
The President's Budget seeks a total of $112 million in fee and
discretionary resources within USCIS to accelerate comprehensive reform
and automation of existing business processes, including the
modernization of critically needed information technology and actions
to sustain improvements achieved in reducing the immigration processing
backlog.
Finally, as USCIS transforms its business processes, redesigns its
forms, and improves service delivery and value to its customers, the
agency will reform its fee structure to ensure the recovery of
operational costs in line with Federal fee guidelines. Currently,
application fees are not optimally aligned with the cost of each
application, and improvements must be made for the long term to more
effectively link regular and premium fees to specific service levels.
This effort becomes even more important as USCIS operations are
automated, forms are reduced and simplified, and USCIS prepares to take
on substantial new activities including a Temporary Worker Program. The
Department will continue to assess business model options for
implementation of the TWP as consideration of the proposal moves
forward in the Congress.
IMPROVE MARITIME SECURITY AND CREATE BETTER TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
SYSTEMS TO MOVE PEOPLE AND CARGO MORE SECURELY AND EFFICIENTLY
A core objective in establishing the Department was to strengthen
the overall security capability of the Nation's transit systems and
maritime security. Terrorist attacks on international transit and
national maritime systems have driven the Department to implement
rigorous security measures for the Nation's systems. The 2007
President's Budget request includes initiatives that continue to
support the objectives of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
which was enacted to strengthen the transportation system and ensure
the freedom of movement for people and commerce, by securing America's
transit system from terrorists, criminal threats and attack; and the
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, which was enacted
to secure U.S. ports and waterways from a terrorist attack.
A total of $4.7 billion is requested to support TSA's Aviation
Security efforts. Of this amount, $692 million will continue support
the deployment and maintenance of Explosive Detection and Electronic
Trace Detection Systems which provide a higher probability to detect a
wider range of explosives, and are critical to finding threats in
transportation venues and eliminating their destructiveness.
The President's 2007 Budget also proposes to replace the two-tiered
aviation passenger fee with a single, flat security fee of $5.00 for a
one-way trip with no change in the overall fee that may be charged on a
one-way ticket. This is consistent with the screening process whereby
you only pass through security once. The Budget also proposes to
collect $644 million in air carrier fees ($448 million for fiscal year
2007 plus $196 million owed from fiscal years 2005 and 2006). This is
based on a General Accountability Office (GAO) estimate of what is
reasonable.
The Budget also seeks resources for the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) to support next generation technology to secure our
transportation system. For example, a total of $30.3 million is
requested to fund the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography Systems
(CAARS) Development initiative. The DNDO will execute the program
developing advanced active-imaging radiography systems for cargo
inspection at the Nation's ports of entry. The CAARS program will
significantly improve throughput rates of imaging systems specifically
designed to identify concealed nuclear materials threats.
Funding of $157 million for the Radiation Portal Monitor
Acquisition initiative will secure next-generation passive detection
portals for deployment at official ports-of-entry to expose attempts to
import, assemble, or transport a nuclear explosive device, fissile
material, or radiological material concealed within cargo or
conveyances and intended for illicit use. Consistent with the global
nuclear detection architecture, the deployment strategy will be
mutually developed by the DNDO and CBP.
The Budget also seeks an increase of $12 million to support
staffing needed by CBP to support the deployment of weapons of mass
destruction systems deployed through DHS procurement programs. This
increase will fund 106 positions and ensure CBP will have dedicated
personal to resolve alarms from RPMs to conduct radiological
examinations at our Nation's busiest seaports.
For the U.S. Coast Guard, the President's fiscal year 2007 Budget
requests a total of $934.4 million for the Coast Guard's Integrated
Deepwater System (IDS), which is $10.7 million above the fiscal year
2006 funding level. The Deepwater funding will continue the IDS
acquisition of: the fourth national security Cutter (High Endurance
Cutter replacement); the first Fast Response Cutter (Patrol Boat
replacement); and additional Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). In
addition, it will establish a second MPA-equipped air station; complete
the re-engineering of the HH-65 helicopter, and significantly enhance
legacy fixed and rotary wing aircraft capabilities. IDS Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) upgrades to the USCG cutters, boats and aircraft
will enhance maritime domain awareness and are critical to the
achievement of an integrated, interoperable border and port security
system.
In addition to the C4ISR upgrades as part of IDS, $6.4 million is
requested to support a number of initiatives to enhance Maritime Domain
Awareness, including the necessary field infrastructure to expand
SIPRNET capability support, which will protect Coast Guard systems from
exploitation, and also provide prototype Sector Command Centers (SCC)
and Joint Harbor Operation Center (JHOC) operations support. $11.2
million is requested to continue implementation of Nationwide AIS to
significantly enhance the ability to identify, track and exchange
information with vessels. The fiscal year 2007 budget requests $10.6
million to build off prior years' efforts to improve MDA, including
operation and maintenance of the Maritime Awareness Global Network, as
well as the deployment of 80 Nationwide AIS receivers and transmitters.
Additionally, the $39.6 million requested for Rescue 21 will continue
deployment throughout the country, providing a State of the art
distress and response communications system.
Finally, the Department seeks a total of $4.8 million for the Coast
Guard's Maritime Security Response Teams (MSRT). Established to deter,
protect against and rapidly respond to threats of maritime terrorism,
the MSRT initiative expands upon the prototype Enhanced Maritime Safety
and Security Team that was established by re-allocating base resources
in fiscal year 2006. The unit will be capable of maintaining response
readiness in the event of domestic maritime terrorism incidents.
Enhance Information Sharing with our Partners
The ability to share information with State and local partners, the
private sector, law enforcement, and first responders is critical to
the Department's success, and promotes greater situational awareness.
DHS is prepared to enhance and maintain interoperability for
information sharing purposes to ensure a seamless capacity to share
information during national emergencies and to execute its daily
mission of detecting and preventing potential terrorist activity.
In support of this effort the Budget includes an increase of $45.7
million, 18.1 percent over fiscal year 2006 funding, for activities of
the Analysis and Operations Account to fund the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis (I&A) and the Directorate of Operations. I&A leads the
Department's intelligence and information gathering and sharing
capabilities by ensuring that information is collected from relevant
field operations and critical participants in the intelligence
community; analyzed with a mission-oriented focus; and disseminated to
the appropriate Federal, State, local, and private sector partners.
The Directorate of Operations distributes threat information
ensuring operational coordination Department wide; coordinates incident
management activities; uses all resources within the Department to
translate intelligence and policy into immediate action; and provides
oversight of the Homeland Security Operations Center, the Nation's
nerve center for information sharing and domestic incident management
on a 24/7/365 basis.
To support the Infrastructure Transformation Program (ITP), the
Budget proposes an increase of $36.3 million. This increase will
provide a highly reliable, secure, and survivable network
infrastructure and data center environment to improve information
sharing, more effectively securing the homeland while reducing
redundant investments. ITP will integrate the IT infrastructures of the
22 legacy components of the Department into ``One Infrastructure''
which includes the creation of one secure network; the establishment of
common and reliable email communication; the restructuring of helpdesks
and related services; the reduction in number and transformation of the
data centers; the standardization and modernization of the desktop
workstation and site services environment; and voice, video and
wireless infrastructure modernization.
The Budget also includes an increase of $9 million for Data Center
Development. The Department will continue the integration of its IT
infrastructure ``Dual Active/Active Data Centers'' that provide a
foundation for information sharing and agile responses to threats
against the homeland. The Data Center Development activity plays a
central role within the ITP, supporting the Department's strategic
planning priority of ``Stronger Information Sharing and Infrastructure
Protection.''
Strengthen the DHS Organization to Maximize Mission Performance
Sound financial management of the Nation's resources is critical to
maximizing mission performance for the Department. The President's
Budget aligns the Department's request according to a risk-based
allocation method, channeling the Nation's resources into the areas
that will most effectively accomplish the mission of the Department.
Successful mission performance is driven by developing human capital,
executing efficient procurement operations, and possessing state-of-
the-art information technology resources.
A key enhancement to the Budget includes an increase of $12.6
million to improve financial management department-wide. This includes
funding to improve DHS' internal controls over financial reporting, as
required by Public Law 108-330, the Department of Homeland Security
Financial Accountability Act; analyze opportunities for further
functional consolidation of segments of Departmental financial
management; support the Department's plan to achieve an unqualified
audit opinion with no material weaknesses; produce financial data that
is timely, reliable, and useful for decision-makers in their mission to
properly allocate resources to protect the Nation; and help protect
against waste, fraud, and abuse.
A total of $18 million is requested for the eMerge2 (electronically
Managing enterprise resources for government efficiency and
effectiveness) program. eMerge2 will continue to consolidate accounting
providers and systems in the Department by matching components
positioned to become service providers with those in need of new
systems. eMerge2 will invest in system enhancements, integrate systems,
and build tools to consolidate financial data, ensure accountability,
and provide timely, reliable information for decision making.
In addition, we propose an increase of $41.8 million for the Office
of the Chief Human Capital Officer to continue implementation of the
Human Resources System Initiative--MAXHR, a market and performance-
based compensation system that rewards employees for their
contributions to the mission of the Department, not longevity.
The Department has identified organizational performance
deficiencies in the current procurement process and will implement
comprehensive modifications to prevent fraud and misuse; and ensure
effective delivery of services and proper procurement and contracting
procedures. For this effort, we propose an increase of $27 million
throughout the Department to improve acquisition operations.
Finally, the Office of Policy requests an increase of $8.1 million
to provide funding to support DHS participation on the Committee on
Foreign Owned Investments in the United States under the Policy office;
expand duties of the International Affairs office; enhance capabilities
of the Homeland Security Advisory Committee (HSAC) to work with private
sector stakeholders; and increase efforts to oversee immigration and
border security related initiatives.
CONCLUSION
The fiscal year 2007 budget proposal reflects this administration's
ongoing commitment to protecting the homeland and the American people
while ensuring the Department has the resources we need to achieve our
critical mission. The budget builds upon past success and
accomplishments, reflects risk-based, outcome-driven priorities, and
supports the key imperatives under our Second Stage Review.
We will continue to work with Congress to ensure that our short and
long term priorities are adequately funded--including border security,
preparedness, strengthening FEMA, and enhancing chemical security. I
look forward to continuing our partnership with you to ensure funding
priorities are met so that we can continue to protect the homeland and
the American people.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I look
forward to answering your questions and to working with you on the
fiscal year 2007 budget and other issues.
REPORTED DHS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE DUBAI PORT DEAL
Senator Gregg. Thank you Mr. Secretary and obviously your
statement will be put in the record, and I appreciate the
background on the ports because it's a sophisticated system
you're trying to put in place. However just to clarify the
record here, there's been reports that when the initial review
of the Dubai situation came through that the dissenting agency
immediate approval was the Homeland Security Department. Then
there have also been reports as we have read, that the Coast
Guard had specific concerns which may have been applied
generally to other issues but in this area was particularly in
response to Dubai? Is that correct? Did the Homeland Security
Department initially object or raise opposition in any way to
the immediate approval, or the approval of this--
Secretary Chertoff. I think the way that gets reported
reflects a misunderstanding of the process. First of all the
Department of Homeland Security and all the departments
generally in this process, there's an ongoing discussion. It
doesn't--it's not like a formal vote to start the process. It's
more like a jury ballot; you know it takes a lot of votes. As I
think Assistant Secretary Baker has indicated previously DHS
raised certain concerns and the agreement by everybody was
those concerns ought to be addressed through assurances and
safeguards which the company agreed to. Those assurances and
safeguards satisfied us and everybody else on the committee
that any concerns that were on the table about the impact of
this on port security would be adequately--more than adequately
addressed. Because it gave us total visibility into who the
people were who were going to be over here; a total ability to
insist upon adherence to the highest security standards we
impose anywhere; and an ongoing ability for us to monitor
compliance. So I think with these elements in place and I don't
think there was any substantial disagreement about going
forward and getting these elements. But with these elements in
place, we were certainly satisfied that we had everything that
we needed, the Coast Guard was satisfied that there was nothing
more that they wanted to get in terms of assurances. As I say,
we did get the benefit not only of use of our own intelligence
component, but the community takes a position, and, of course,
each department has its own intelligence element. And the final
thing I would say is, this was not an unknown company to us.
Customs and Border Protection has worked with this company for
several years, including overseas and that obviously was a
significant comfort level in terms of our assessment of the
transaction.
Senator Gregg. That being said why is the administration's
position now that they're willing to delay further. It sounds
like you have all the information you think you need.
Secretary Chertoff. Well again, I want to make sure we're
accurate. It's been announced publicly, although I haven't seen
that the letter has come in yet, that the company has indicated
the intent to send a letter asking us to begin a 45 day
investigation. I don't know that that's ever happened before.
Whether it has or it hasn't, if we were to receive such a
letter and I haven't seen it yet, I anticipate we would honor
the company's wishes. I understand that there's clearly an
issue of being transparent, of assuring Congress and the public
that what we've done is a thorough vetting. It's not only that
we have to do the right thing; we have to be seen to have done
the right thing. So if the company wants us to pause and
undertake this review I see no reason why we wouldn't do that.
But I don't think that's in any sense a concession that somehow
we think we did something inadequately before.
Senator Gregg. I don't know how much time I have left, let
me turn to Senator Byrd, and I'll come back if there's time.
CLASSIFIED BRIEFING ON THE DUBAI PORT DEAL
Senator Byrd. For over a week Chairman Gregg's request and
my request, my staff's request for a classified briefing have
been rebuffed. The decision to allow Dubai Ports World to
operate terminals in six of our major ports was done without
consultation with the Congress. It was done without
consultation with the State and local governments near the
ports. It was done without notifying the Congress. Would you
commit to provide the subcommittee with a classified briefing
this week?
Secretary Chertoff. Yes.
Senator Byrd. Including providing the community
intelligence analysis that was used to make the decision?
Secretary Chertoff. Well whatever--I don't know the exact
elements of the briefing that we do, but as far as I'm
concerned we will--in the context of a classified briefing give
you whatever--the reason I hesitate is I don't own that
document. And I can't commit to provide a document that I don't
own. Certainly my Department will provide a briefing and
whatever classified documents, our Department documents can be
part of that briefing.
DHS REQUESTED TO GARNER ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
BORDER SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE
Senator Byrd. The budget that you are presenting today
finally gets the administration and your Department fully
behind the bipartisan congressional desire to secure our
borders. This effort started with the amendment that Senator
Craig and I offered through the Iraq war supplemental with the
support of our Chairman, Senator Gregg. Congress has taken the
lead in hiring more border patrol agents and immigration
enforcement officers and in providing more detention capacity.
I'm hopeful that this budget request is the first year of a
multi year effort at gaining true security of our borders.
To continue that effort, 2 months ago, Chairman Gregg
attempted to secure an additional $1.1 billion for border
security infrastructure. I supported his effort at that time,
to make sure that the agents and investigators that we're
hiring have the tools to do their jobs. I continue to support
him. I see no reason to wait another 7 months for the fiscal
year 2007 budget. Now will you commit to us today to reach out
to the White House and the House Republican leadership, to get
their support for Chairman Gregg's efforts?
Secretary Chertoff. Well I am always more than happy to
commit to taking back to my colleagues in the administration
and anywhere else advice from this committee about how we ought
to proceed. I mean we are strongly committed to a comprehensive
strategy at the border which includes not only additional
personnel, and we have 1,500 thanks to Congress' action last
year. We're in the process of getting them trained and
deployed, we have 1,500 in this budget we are working on a
comprehensive technology package through our secure border
initiative which would allow us to actually start acquisition
later this fiscal year of an integrated approach to using
technology as a tool at the border.
Senator Byrd. Does that mean that you will commit to reach
out to the White House and to the House Republican leadership
to get their support for Chairman Gregg's efforts?
Secretary Chertoff. It means I will be always happy to
reach out and discuss with great seriousness the--this
committee's effort to make sure we have adequate funding at the
border. I think it's consistent with this budget. I think it's
consistent with our strategy, and I look forward to working
with this committee in doing that.
Senator Byrd. So the answer is yes?
Secretary Chertoff. I've been about as clear as is in my
capability to be. I will certainly carry this committee's
message back and have a very serious discussion about what this
committee thinks is appropriate which I think is consistent
with what our views are.
Senator Byrd. So it's yes, maybe.
STRENGTHENING MARITIME SECURITY
Your budget embraces the bipartisan congressional effort
begun in the fiscal year 2005 emergency supplemental for
security at our land borders. The administration is promoting
what it is calling the Secure Borders Initiative. But the
initiative makes no mention of securing our wide open waterways
and coastlines from illegal migration. When you strengthen
security at the land borders those who wish to enter this
country illegally will pursue other entry points. The
administration's own national strategy for maritime security
States, that, and I quote, ``as security in our ports entry at
land border crossings, at airports continue to tighten,
criminals and terrorists will likely consider our relatively
undefended coastlines to be less risky alternatives for
unlawful entry into the United States.'' Unfortunately your
budget fails to address the future weakness. The Coast Guard's
Deepwater budget is flat as far as the eye can see. The Coast
Guard needs a 21 century fleet of ships and planes.
Unfortunately they have a fleet fit for the last century. The
Coast Guard's fleet of cutters is currently the 37th oldest of
world's 39 like size naval fleets. The Coast Guard Commandant
has testified that Coast Guard ships and planes are in a
declining readiness spiral. Under your Deepwater budget, the
acquisition of new planes, helicopters and ships won't be
completed until 2026. Twenty years from now, so the rest of you
will have to look after that. Given these concerns, how can it
be that you are satisfied with the Deepwater budget?
Secretary Chertoff. Well Senator, first let me say that we
fully agree, in fact, part of our operational planning in terms
of border security reflects an understanding that we're going
to get more pressure at our coastal borders as we tighten up on
our land borders.
Senator Byrd. Are you satisfied with the Deepwater budget?
Secretary Chertoff. I am. We've got almost $1 billion in
this year's budget. And a significant amount of money in Coast
Guard's budget directed at re-engineering assets so that we
take helicopters that may be old, but we really outfit them
with brand new engines and brand new avionics. I also want to
point out that the budget this year includes a 15, 1-5 percent
increase over last years levels for Coast Guard's supports,
waterways, and coastal security program. That's an additional
$274,000 million for this kind of coastal security.
Senator Byrd. I believe I've overrun my time.
Secretary Chertoff. So we are actually putting increased
money precisely into Coastal security area of Coast Guard.
PASSCARD TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Senator Byrd. I'll wait my turn.
Senator Gregg. Senator Allard.
Senator Leahy. Mr. Chairman? I wonder if Senator Allard
would be willing to let me go first. And I realize that
normally you'd go next, but I've just been told that I have to
Judiciary, and I wouldn't get a chance to question otherwise.
Senator Allard. I'd be glad to yield to the chairman from
Vermont, and I would assume that I would be called on next.
Senator Leahy. I thank my friend showing his usual courtesy
and Mr. Secretary, I mentioned this briefly when you came in. A
lot of people asked you about ports, we don't have ports in
Vermont we do border with a great and good friend of the United
States, Canada. And we're like many border States we're highly
skeptical about the development of the border crossing card.
The so called ``Passcard.'' I understand that you have some
legislation you've paged. But I would suggest that we--to be
looking for different legislation and you should be leading
that charge.
Aside from whether it's good policy or not, we've got an
economic and cultural train wreck on the horizon, these cards
are threatening all kinds of bottlenecks along the most
efficient, safest, and longest border in the world certainly,
the longest unguarded border. And I'm concerned about it. DHS
and the State Department are promoting two different
technological infrastructures for the card. DHS is promoting an
open UHF design, that's what we do to track freight pallets. If
it's open--if this open standard is adopted and is not secure,
it may actually reduce safety on the border, not only is it
less secure, it's completely different than what Custom and
Border Patrol is installing now to read information off of
chips with the new E-Passport. So it looks like they have to
have one set of technology for that, a separate technology for
less secure items, and they could be easily stolen. It's become
very, very confusing but it also ignores something else. The
northern border is not our southern border. Our situation with
Canada, our largest trading partner is much, much different
than it is with our southern border. It disregards our Canadian
friends and neighbors. I think it's counterproductive. I think
along in our State people have families on both sides of the
border. The difficulty is going to be in crossing, I think it's
going to create certainly in my State, it will create enormous
costs but I don't see where it does anything for our security.
So my question is, why are you supporting this ultra high
frequency standard, the same thing we do on commercially
tracking pallets on a truck? Why not support the standard that
is being used on E-Passports? It seems like everybody's going
off in different directions, it was probably a dumb idea in the
first place, but it just gets worse.
Secretary Chertoff. Well let me answer Senator by saying
first of all I don't think a decision's been made, in fact what
I've said, and I've talked to Secretary Rice about this, I
think we've both agreed and I think we've announced it, is that
we actually ought to migrate to a common standard. I would be
very surprised and dismayed----
Senator Leahy. Well you're sure not going in that direction
now, you're going in an entirely different one.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I mean if there are people who
think they're going in a different direction, maybe the final
decision hasn't been made. I'm pretty committed to going in a
single direction. Meaning, I want to have a chip, some kind of
an RFID chip that is compatible. Whether we do it in a
passport, or an border crossing card, or in some other kind of
card.
Senator Leahy. Well, but Canada is not moving on something
like this. I mean you're talking about doing this by January 1,
2008. Is that even realistic? If you don't have a common
technology now, I mean how realistic. Have you even asked for
money to get a common technology? I mean I can just see a
complete screw up on the border come January 1, 2008. Certainly
our closest friend in this hemisphere is going to be like what
happened? Are we pariahs?
Secretary Chertoff. Well first of all, you know we're
facing a legislative deadline, and I think we have an
obligation to make the deadline. We have money for----
Senator Leahy. But you haven't reached a common technology
yet, how are you going to do that?
Secretary Chertoff. We've actually been in discussion with
the State Department. And I think we announced a few weeks ago
that we actually do have--we are working toward a common
technology, so I will take back certainly your concern, if
people are sending you a different signal.
Senator Leahy. Well take back this concern too Mr.
Secretary, frankly as a life long Vermonter I live an hour's
drive from the Canadian border, as one who actually has
relatives in Canada, who understands the economics of dealing
with Canada, this is a cockamamie idea. I can show you dozens
of places where if a terrorist wanted to get through they could
get through with or without this. But I can show you where law
abiding people in the United States and Canada will be shut off
from visiting out of this country. It seems like almost doing
something for the sake of doing something, not really to
protect us.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I do need to push back on that a
little bit. Right now, what we use for identification crossing
the borders is not particularly as useful. I mean, we get all
kinds of documentation. We do ask for documentation, unless
were to waive all identification requirements, and just let
people come and go willy-nilly. It seems we owe the American
public at least the kind of identification document that is
biometric and that is secure. It doesn't have to be--
Senator Leahy. I've crossed that border without being asked
for identification.
Secretary Chertoff. But I have to tell you with respect
Senator, so did Ahmed Ressam, he crossed the border, but for
the--
Senator Leahy. And he got caught.
Secretary Chertoff. Well he did, but you know if it hadn't
been for an alert Customs and Border Protection person, he
would have blown up Los Angeles Airport, and then we would have
had a 9/11 Commission to talk about why we didn't have
identification cards.
Senator Leahy. Why not work on something with the
Canadians. You can't even come together with our own State
Department, can you get together with the Canadians?
Secretary Chertoff. Well we are more than happy--first of
all we are getting together with the State Department, we are
more than happy to work with the Canadians. Look, let me tell
you what our end State vision here is. Essentially a driver's
license type of card. With an RFID chip that works the way
proximity readers work all over office buildings in this city
that is inexpensive, that is compatible whether it's issued out
of Canada, or Mexico, or the United States. I believe we can do
this. We've got a prototype in the works, I completely endorse
the idea of a common technology and--or at least a compatible
technology and not going off in two separate directions. If
there are people in the Department who think they're going to
proceed in a different direction, I will certainly address
that. I think it's doable. I think we're legally obliged to it.
And I think it actually is a good thing to do.
Senator Leahy. Well thank you Mr. Chairman. And I thank
Senator Allard, and I will obviously submit some questions for
the record, and I hope they don't go into a deep dark hole. I
hope somebody well actually answer them. It would be nice I
mean. This is always unprecedented, but nice. Thank you.
PORT SECURITY
Senator Gregg. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for holding this important hearing. And likewise I'd like to
thank the Secretary for taking time to appear before the
committee. I'd also recognize that the Department of Homeland
Security, a new department was called to duty in important,
challenging and unprecedented ways last year. And I think I
want to recognize in a public way that there were a lot of
employees of the Department, you have over a 180,000 who did
their job, and they did it well, and I want to commend them for
that.
Now during the course of the year we learned that there are
some areas where the Department excels and we learned that
there are some areas where it needs improvement. That's why I
think this hearing is so very important, so we can pursue some
of those. I want to follow up a little bit on the port
question. I have some security concerns. Not so much in the
short term, but in the long term. You know that part of the
world, all those countries together, have not proven to be
sterling examples of how you recognize terrorists and how you
control them from getting into your operation. Are you
comfortable with how--there's going to be turnover in that
company, and are you comfortable with how new personnel may
come into that company, the kind of background checks and
everything that they may be required to do, and whether there
is going to be something that, over time, could assure the
American people that this may not convert over to where you
have a terrorist or two infiltrate the organization?
Secretary Chertoff. I am, Senator. And let me explain why
for a moment. The change that is being envisioned here, is the
change in the port terminal operator in the United States of
America. Obviously foreign ports are always operated by
foreigners, because they're in foreign countries. In terms of
the workforce, first of all we will know any change in
management, or any change in personnel. We'll have the
opportunity to check them against our watch lists, or even
require a more in depth background check. With respect to the
longshoreman force that actually is generally handled by a
hiring hall. Those are not regular employees of the port
terminal operator, they are hired everyday based on the way the
union, or if it's not a union, the non union halls send people.
So those aren't going to be regular employees of the company,
many of them are background checked according to the ports.
We're actually going to take some steps in the near future to
increase the level of background checking.
And finally, if there is a desire on the part of the
company, and this is not just this company, any overseas
company. If any overseas company wants to send people into the
United States to manage operations here, they've got to get a
visa. Which means we're going to check them, we're going to
determine that we're comfortable with them. We're going to run
them against our watch lists. We're going to do what we would
do anytime somebody wants to come and work in the country. So
contrary to some of the reporting, the company, no foreign
company has the ability on its own to decide they're going to
send somebody to the United States to work in a port without
our knowing about it and approving it as part of the visa
process.
FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS TO MINIMIZE SPENDING, WASTE AND FRAUD
Senator Allard. I'd like to move on, I think we've covered
that issue, perhaps enough. But we've provided, meaning the
Congress, has provide $87 billion, and dollars already
allocated in addition to that. The Department's requesting
additional $19.8 billion to meet what they described as
emergency needs. Anytime you have a large outflow of dollars
there's bound to be some waste. I'm interested in knowing what
kinds of mechanisms you put in place to try and keep the waste
down to a minimum, try to keep fraud down to a minimum, so that
we have some accountability, as we move forward in the
spending.
Secretary Chertoff. We have an oversight board in place a
Katrina Oversight board, in place to look in general at the
gulf and how we're spending money. From the very beginning of
this post Katrina effort, really the first week, we got the IG
involved right up front in terms of helping us try to design
programs that we thought would minimize the amount of fraud and
waste. We recognized that particularly in the initial weeks
when there was a real sense of emergency and crisis, we might
have to bend some of the normal rules, because people were
literally thrown out of their houses with barely the clothing
on their back. But we've got an oversight board in place now.
The IG, I think, has established a separate Assistant I.G.,
Inspector General, simply for the purpose of dealing with the
Katrina--
Senator Allard. And have they been submitting reports to
you on a regular basis?
Secretary Chertoff. They submit reports to the Inspector
General, and I will get from the Inspector General, reports
about what the status of this is. And of course Congress will
as well.
Senator Allard. So you've been getting those?
Secretary Chertoff. I don't know if I recall personally
seeing one, I know the Inspector General has been getting them,
and I've been getting oral reports, and reports about
particular problems that have been arising.
Senator Allard. Has he pointed out some flaws and perhaps
maybe some corrections that needed to be made?
Secretary Chertoff. The Inspector General has; some of the
flaws he's pointed out have been publicly revealed. We are
taking steps trying to correct those, frankly some of the steps
require us to address in advance of this hurricane season,
contracting so we get some of the things in place before we
actually get into the emergency situation. And you know, I
consider the Inspector General a part of our management team,
in a sense, that we take very seriously his suggestions. And in
particular the Deputy Director of FEMA who is responsible for
the gulf, is really tasked to work very closely with the
oversight board and the Inspector General for the gulf in terms
of making sure we are constantly monitoring these things.
Senator Allard. I know my time has expired, if I could
just--I want to follow up this. Who do we have on that
oversight board?
Secretary Chertoff. You know as I sit here I can't tell you
the names of the people, let me get you that list.
Senator Allard. Yeah, a list and backgrounds, if you would
please. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
[The information follows:]
Katrina Oversight Board
UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT: JANET HALE
Janet Hale was confirmed on March 6, 2003, as Under Secretary for
Management. Prior to her nomination and confirmation as Under
Secretary, Ms. Hale served as the Assistant Secretary for Budget,
Technology and Finance for the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), and as chief financial officer and chief information
officer.
Prior to HHS, she was the Associate Administrator for Finance for
the House of Representatives and the Associate Director for Economics
and Government at the Office of Management and Budget, responsible for
budget and policy development, regulatory reform, and financial
management for the departments of Treasury, Transportation, Commerce,
Justice, and 25 smaller agencies. Ms. Hale has also served as the
Assistant Secretary for Budget and Programs at the Department of
Transportation, Acting Assistant Secretary of Housing at the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, Vice President with the U.S.
Telephone Association, and Executive Vice President for the University
of Pennsylvania.
She graduated from Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, with a
Bachelor of Science in Education and received a Master in Public
Administration from the Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of
Government.
ACTING CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER: EUGENE H. SCHIED
Eugene H. Schied is the acting Chief Financial Officer of the
Department of Homeland Security. His permanent position is that of
Deputy CFO. Mr. Schied became the Department of Homeland Security's
first deputy chief financial officer in December 2004. In this
capacity, he supports the CFO in the day-to-day management of DHS'
budget, financial reporting, working capital fund, resource management
transformation, performance and planning, and investment review
operations. He is helping to lead the transformation of independent
legacy financial management operations and systems in DHS into a
cohesive corporate entity capable of achieving and sustaining the
highest financial management standards. Mr. Schied also served as DHS'
budget director from May 2003 until March 2004.
In between his positions at DHS, he was the budget director at the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which provides
budget and financial support to the Federal Judicial System.
Prior to joining DHS, Mr. Schied was the deputy chief financial
officer of the Department of Justice, where he served in the position
of deputy assistant attorney general/controller from March 2001 until
May 2003. He first joined the Department of Justice in 1992 as a
Presidential Management Intern, and held various positions of
increasing responsibility within the Department of Justice, including
holding the position of chief financial officer of the Drug Enforcement
Administration.
Mr. Schied holds a Master of Public Administration degree from the
Ohio State University School of Public Policy and Management and a
Bachelors of Arts in political science from the University of Iowa (Phi
Beta Kappa). Prior to moving to the Washington, DC area, Mr. Schied
worked for the City of Peoria, Illinois, City Manager's Office.
CHIEF PROCUREMENT OFFICER: ELAINE C. DUKE
Elaine C. Duke is the Chief Procurement Officer for the Department
of Homeland Security. She provides leadership over the department's
over $11 billion in contracts and $12 billion in financial assistance
programs. Ms. Duke was the department's Deputy Chief Procurement
Officer from October 2005 to December 2005, when she assumed duties as
the acting Chief Procurement Officer. In January 2006, Ms. Duke took
over the full responsibilities as the department's second procurement
chief. Before coming to the headquarters, she served for two years as
the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Transportation Security
Administration.
Ms. Duke spent the majority of her career in acquisition with the
U.S. Navy. She completed her final tour with the Navy at the Naval Sea
Systems Command in Washington, DC. She was Director, Office of Contract
Policy as well as the Deputy Director, Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical
Division in the Contracts Directorate. Prior to her tour with Naval Sea
Systems Command, Ms. Duke served on the staff of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Installations & Environment), working the base
closure and realignment program.
Ms. Duke also held various positions with the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command. She began her career as a contracting officer for
the U.S. Air Force. In addition to her work in the Department of
Defense, Ms. Duke served as the Deputy Director of Contracting and
Property Management for the Smithsonian Institution and Director of
Acquisition and Grant Services for the Federal Railroad Administration.
Ms. Duke has a Bachelor of Science degree in business management
and a Master's degree in business administration.
ACTING DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS: ROBERT F. SHEA
Mr. Shea was named Acting Director of Operations for FEMA in
support of Acting Director Robert David Paulison in February 2006. In
this position, Mr. Shea is responsible for implementing policies and
procedures on behalf of the FEMA Director and overseeing the day-to-day
response, recovery, mitigation and preparedness activities of FEMA,
part of the Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Shea's 29-year career in public service has touched on all
phases of FEMA's emergency management roles including preparedness,
response, recovery and mitigation along with all areas of functional
responsibility including operations, planning, logistics and
administration. Beginning as a FEMA Disaster Assistance Employee, Mr.
Shea has taken successively more challenging roles from program analyst
to branch chief in the former State and Local Programs and Support
Directorate, to division director and then deputy administrator and
finally acting Administrator of the Federal Insurance and Mitigation
Administration in FEMA.
In 2004 Mr. Shea was detailed to the Office of the Secretary,
Department of Homeland Security where he confronted the new challenges
of the post September 11 environment by supporting the issuance of the
National Response Plan, the initial formation of the Principal Federal
Official program, and the implementation Special Events Program. These
responsibilities brought him into contact with each of the 22
components of DHS.
Mr. Shea resides in Alexandria, VA where he and his wife, Mary
Hope, have raised four daughters, Sofia, Michele, Hope, and Victoria.
INSPECTOR GENERAL: RICHARD L. SKINNER
Mr. Skinner was confirmed as the Department of Homeland Security
Inspector General on July 28, 2005. Between December 9, 2004--July 27,
2005, he served as Acting Inspector General. He held the position of
Deputy Inspector General Department of Homeland Security (DHS) since
March 1, 2003, the date that the Office of Inspector General was
established.
Prior to his arrival at DHS, Mr. Skinner was with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), where he served as the Acting
Inspector General (October 2002--February 2003) and Deputy Inspector
General (1996--2002). From 1991 to 1996, Mr. Skinner served at FEMA OIG
as the Assistant Inspector General for Audits. In 1998, he received the
President's Meritorious Executive Rank Award for sustained superior
accomplishment in management of programs of the United States
Government and for noteworthy achievement of quality and efficiency in
the public service.
From 1988 to 1991, Mr. Skinner worked at the U.S. Department of
State (DOS) OIG. During his tenure at DOS OIG, Mr. Skinner served as a
senior inspector on more than a dozen foreign and domestic inspections
and in 1991, Mr. Skinner was appointed by the Inspector General to
serve as the ``de facto'' Inspector General for the Arms Controls and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA).
From 1972 to 1988, Mr. Skinner held a variety of audit management
positions with the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department
of Commerce (DOC). He began his Federal career in 1969 with the OIG of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Mr. Skinner holds a B.S. degree in Business Administration from
Fairmont State College and an MPA degree from George Washington
University.
DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL: JAMES L. TAYLOR
James L. Taylor was selected as Deputy Inspector General effective
October 16, 2005. He previously served as the Deputy Chief Financial
Officer (CFO) and Director for Financial Management at the Department
of Commerce. In this role, he also acted as Chair of the CFO Council
Policies and Practices Committee. Under his direction, the Department
of Commerce obtained the first of six clean financial statement audit
opinions and reduced material weaknesses from 11 to 0. Mr. Taylor led
the Department's successful effort to obtain a ``green'' rating on the
Financial Management Initiative of the President's Management Agenda.
Prior to his work at Commerce, Mr. Taylor held the position of
Deputy Chief Financial Officer at the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), where he was directly responsible for all financial
operations, with expenditures of over $4-10 billion annually.
Immediately prior to joining FEMA, Mr. Taylor served as Assistant
Administrator for the Federal Insurance Administration, a self-funded
activity charged with managing the National Flood Insurance Program,
where he was responsible for all financial, personnel, facilities,
strategic planning and other administrative operations and policy.
Mr. Taylor has been the recipient of numerous awards for
outstanding accomplishments, including the Presidential Rank Award for
Distinguished Executive in 2004; the Donald T. Scantlebury Memorial
Award for Excellence in Financial Management in 2005; the Gold Medal
for Outstanding Achievement in Financial Management in 2003; and the
Director's Award for Outstanding Achievement in 2000.
Mr. Taylor holds a bachelor's degree in Political Science/Economics
from Old Dominion University and an MPA in Finance from the University
of Delaware.
special inspector general: matthew (matt) a. jadacki, cpa, cgfm
Mr. Matthew ``Matt'' Jadacki is the Special Inspector General for
Gulf Coast Hurricane Recovery, under the Office of Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS/OIG). He joined DHS/OIG in
October 2005. The Gulf Coast Hurricane Recovery Office focuses on
preventing problems through a proactive program of internal control
reviews and contract audits to ensure disaster assistance funds are
being spent wisely
He is also responsible for coordinating the audit activities of
other Federal Inspectors General who have an oversight responsibility
for the funds transferred to their respective departments and agencies
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assist in the
disaster relief efforts.
Prior to joining DHS, Mr. Jadacki was the Chief Financial Officer/
Chief Administrative Officer (CFO/CAO) of the National Weather Service,
a component of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC). Before the National
Weather Service, Mr. Jadacki was the Acting CFO of FEMA, managing
eleven branches with over 200 employees and a $12 billion budget. Prior
to FEMA, he worked in the U.S. Department of State from 1987 to 1991 as
an Audit Manager and in DOC as an Operating Accountant/Auditor from
1981 to 1987.
Mr. Jadacki holds a B.S. in Business Management from the University
of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, and is both a Certified Public
Accountant and Certified Government Financial Manager. He holds
memberships in a number of societies, including the Association of
Government Accountants, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, and the Virginia Society of Certified Public Accountants.
PASS CARDS
Senator Gregg. Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I echo the
comments of the chairman and ranking member, we welcome you
here. You've got great people but, Mr. Secretary I'm not very
happy today. I joined Senator Leahy in his deep concern about
our borders. The confusion is incredible. He mentioned a 2008
deadline. It's 2007 for ferries. We have people who cross our
border on land, don't need a passport, get back on a ferry and
come back and they can't get back in the country because they
don't have a passport. We're told about these one day passes.
This is a whole topic of conversation. It isn't working. And
I'm going to be submitting some questions on that. I want to
talk about port security today.
PORT SECURITY FUNDING
You came before our committee last year, we gave you a
pass, you were new on board, but you've got tremendous
influence on this budget that we've been given. And I was
curious that your presentation on sea port and cargo security
was fairly long today, but in your testimony that you provide
us last week you didn't mention port and cargo security, and
that's been my concern about the administration since September
11. We hear rhetoric, we do not see any action. I've been
calling for a port and cargo security initiatives for almost 4
years now, and in a comprehensive plan.
There's 360 ports in our Nation today. I don't go to bed at
night thinking that we're secure in our port system despite the
rhetoric and the nice talk you gave about we look at things
overseas. I don't feel we're very secure. And I look at your
budget today where you're cutting back major programs, killing
major programs. Port security program, formula base grants to
States, training and exercise, port security grants, I mean I
look through this and I say where's the money? And I hear you
say you take the information back. Who are you taking it back
to? You're the Secretary, and it should be you standing in
front of all of us saying we have to do this. I just feel like
maybe the DP World has kind of brought this to Nation's
attention. But we have not done enough on port security.
Senator Collins has been fantastic, she and I have worked
together to produce a Green Lane Maritime Cargo Security Act,
that is a comprehensive cargo secure regime. We would like to
get your input back on that we've been working with everybody.
But it has been very hard to get this administration to put
their money behind their talk on Homeland Security. And I for
one, again, do not feel that this Nation is secure when it
comes to our ports, our cargo, and the millions of containers
that come in here everyday.
So my first question to you is when are we going to see a
comprehensive port security plan. Are you going to get behind
Senator Collins and I, are you going to ask for the resources
that we need? We hear the White House say don't worry about
this deal about UAE DP World because security is being done by
our Nation. Yet, I've had Secretary Ridge before you come
before our committee and others who say Federal Government has
done their part on port security, it's now up to the private
companies who run these ports. So I hear a really mixed
message.
Secretary Chertoff. And I think the answer is, I'd like to
try to unpack the different elements of this, because there are
several different elements. I certainly do not believe that the
Federal Government is finished with port security and something
which I said last summer, and I think I said it in January, is
one of our major initiatives has to be to push out the security
envelope in the supply chain.
Senator Murray. Right, and you outlined that in your
testimony and I know that you say the words. But are you going
to get behind the Green Lane Maritime Cargo Security Act that
Senator Collins and I have written and have worked hard to make
sure that we have a secure regime in place?
Secretary Chertoff. I don't know that I'm in a position
right now to take a definitive position on a particular act.
But what I can tell you is, we're committed, first of all, to
continuing what we're doing in the overseas, finishing the
overseas container security initiative, but beyond that, moving
further down the supply chain. Just a few weeks ago, I was in
conversations with the major shippers to talk about how we can
take advantage of the architecture to get better security as we
push further down, even to the point where things are initially
manufactured overseas and start their way up the supply chain.
Senator Murray. I've been hearing that rhetoric for years.
Secretary Chertoff. But I have to say, I mean that's why I
went through the exercise of putting the charts up. I don't
think it's fair to say we haven't made progress. I mean----
Senator Murray. Well I agree with you we have made some
progress, we have the radiation port monitors; we've got some
things in place. We are looking at some of the containers
overseas today. But we don't have the authority overseas today
to stop one of those containers from being loaded onto one of
our cargo container ships. We have a lot of work ahead,
wouldn't you agree with that?
Secretary Chertoff. I agree we have work ahead. And I agree
in particular we've got some----
Senator Murray. Well and I guess my--and I only have a few
seconds left. My concern is this budget doesn't reflect the
need to really focus on cargo and container security and that's
why the red flags on this whole issue. That's what really
concerns many of us. I am out of time. I want to have this
conversation with you; I would like to sit down with you. I
know Senator Collins would as well. We need to do more.
Secretary Chertoff. I would be happy to do that.
Senator Murray. And I would say this, I know my great
friend from Maryland is going to talk about the Coast Guard
budget too, but I'll you what, under this proposal 63 percent
of the Coast Guard budget is directed to Homeland Security.
They need the money. They're doing a fantastic job out there. I
don't think any of that should be disregarded. But I look at
your budget and I see that the Coast Guard's budget on search
and rescue is cut $31 million, on natural resource protection
cut $56 million a total cut from traditional missions of $87
million. In my home State of Washington, we count on the Coast
Guard for search and rescue, fisheries protection, making sure
that they are watching our very, very complex coast line and
when all they hear is their only mission is Homeland Security
that doesn't make our country very strong when we see 63
percent of their budget now go to Homeland Security and they're
losing out on their critical missions, their life saving
missions that are important to State's like mine and other
coastal States.
Secretary Chertoff. I would welcome the opportunity to talk
to you about this. Let me just make a couple of observations.
This year our total amount of port security related funding in
the 2007 budget request will be over $3 billion, about $500
million more than was enacted for 2006. As far as the
percentage of Coast Guard that's considered Homeland Security
funding, I have to say, in some ways, I mean I always look at
all of it as Homeland Security funding. But one measure of how
Coast Guard has performed, and the fact that we haven't
compromised its other missions, is the magnificent performance
down in New Orleans last summer where we got more rescues than
in several of the previous years, 33,000 rescues and I think
that shows----
Senator Murray. The Coast Guard does a fantastic job.
Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. The capabilities are
there.
Senator Murray. But they are getting burned out. And that
is a deep concern to many of us in the coastal States. And just
so you know, much of the funds you're talking about in terms of
ports are legacy funds. You're not asking for new funding and
the Commandant of the Coast Guard said it was going to cost
$7.3 billion over 10 years for our ports just to comply with
the Maritime Transportation Security Act. The administration
has only asked for $46 million, a tiny part of that. I don't
see how we can continue to do this, and continue to put the
costs on the private companies that operate our ports and feel
secure.
Secretary Chertoff. If I can respond to that, I know that
everyone's out of time. I would simply say this: I mean the
private port owners actually do have to step up to the plate
and do some of the funding, I will tell you for example----
Senator Murray. But Mr. Secretary that's exactly what the
President said last week, was that we don't need to worry we
are in charge of security. Yet you just said that the private
companies need to step up and do it.
Secretary Chertoff. Well in terms of some of the funding
support for example. I don't see why----
Senator Murray. But if it is their funds, then they're in
charge of it.
Senator Gregg. Senator, we're going to have to move on.
Secretary Chertoff. Let me just give you a concrete
example. I think that we are clearly responsible for the
security. On the other hand, I don't think we should pay for
the fencing for a private company to build fencing and
lighting. I think we ought to make them pay for it. Now if they
don't pay for it, we ought to penalize them. There ought to be
a mandate, and we do mandate it. We mandate a lot of businesses
have to take certain kinds of precautions to protect
themselves. I think that's completely consistent with what the
President said, which is we have the responsibility for
security, we have to check it. But that doesn't mean we're
going to pay private companies to do what they ought to be
doing to protect their own assets.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Senator Gregg. Senator Mikulski.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, and
you're the right person to be chairing this committee. I recall
you were the first subcommittee on Appropriations along with
the help of Senator Byrd and Senator Stevens, to hold hearings
on terrorism. Well before 9/11 and your keen interest is very
much appreciated. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my
opening statement be in the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Barbara A. Mikulski
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I wanted to start off by saying that Mr.
Chairman you are the right person to be chairing this committee. I
recall that you were the first subcommittee chairman on the
appropriations committee along with the help of Senator Byrd and
Senator Stevens to hold hearings on terrorism. You held these hearings
well before the tragedy of September 11. Your keen interest in securing
our homeland and protecting this country from terrorism is very much
appreciated.
Good morning Secretary Chertoff. I want to thank you, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and all of the staff at DHS, as
well as all of our security agencies, who work so hard to keep this
country safe. It's good to be here with you today to discuss the
President's fiscal year 2007 budget request for the Department of
Homeland Security.
Last year at this time you had just been sworn in as the new
Secretary of DHS. This past year has certainly been a busy year for the
Department. It has been full of major challenges such as Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, and has been ridden with major failures. At the top
of that list was the failure of the Department and a failure of our
Nation's emergency response and preparedness to the hurricanes and the
people who were in desperate need of help.
The President's budget for next fiscal year claims to provide $35.7
billion to the Department of Homeland Security, which is a 6 percent
increase over last year. But if you take away the President's proposal
to double the airline security tax from $2.50 to $5, the budget is only
a 1 percent increase over last year's level. This concerns me.
I am pleased that there are small increases to two important grant
programs: the State Homeland Security Grant Program which has been
increased by $88.1 million and the Urban Area Security Initiative
Grants which has been increased by $82.5 million. These are important
programs and I am happy to see that both have been increased.
However, I am very concerned about the cuts to key first responder
grant programs. The SAFER Act or firefighter staffing grants have been
completely eliminated, the Emergency Management Performance Grants was
cut by nearly $12 million and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention
Grants have been totally eliminated.
But I want to address three issues specifically with you today
about the Department of Homeland Security fiscal year 2007 budget: The
P&O/UAE Deal and Port Security, immigration application backlogs for
military service members and fire grants.
First of all, the P&O/UAE Deal and Port Security Grants. I have
worked for many years on the Port of Baltimore, from dredging to port
security. So you can imagine my concern when I learned of a foreign
government-owned company taking over the Port's operations. I got
really angry when no one in the administration seemed to know about the
deal not the President, not the Secretaries of Treasury or Defense not
you.
After further inquiry, I learned that the deal was approved quickly
and secretly. The decision was made behind closed doors by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, an entity that
most Americans don't even know exists. The Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States has 12 members: the Secretaries of
State, Defense, Commerce and Homeland Security, the Attorney General,
the Secretary of Treasury, and six officials from the White House. The
six White House officials are: the Director of Office of Management and
Budget, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Chairman on the Council of
Economic Advisors, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy.
The decision to outsource our ports was made in only 30 days and I
am left with many questions about the decision. At what level did this
Committee meet? Did Secretary Rice, Secretary Rumsfeld, Attorney
General Gonzales and Secretary Snow sit around and decide this? Or was
it delegated to the coordinator of the coordinator? Was the FBI
consulted? What about the Director of National Intelligence?
This decision is about national security. The national security
threats facing our ports are real. I have said before that our ports
continue to be vulnerable to the infiltration of terrorists, the use of
commercial cargo containers to smuggle chemical or biological weapons
or even a dirty bomb, the intentional sinking of large commercial cargo
ships that could result in loss of life and block access to major
shipping channels, and the use of land around the port to stage attacks
on bridges, or our waterfront chemical and oil refineries.
Port operators play a vital role in insuring that these threats do
not become realities. The President tells us not to worry the Coast
Guard will continue to protect our ports. Yet, the Coast Guard is
already stretched too thin. They have increased responsibilities with
only slight increase in their budget. The Coast Guard is charged with
protecting 300 ports, more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals,
more than 1,000 harbor channels, all of which are spread along
thousands of miles of coastlines.
Our Coast Guard is one of the most efficient and effective of all
Federal agencies weren't we proud of them following Hurricane Katrina?
The Coast was there when we called on them. We need to ensure that we
are there for them and that the Coast Guard has the assets it needs to
been these challenges. The Coast Guard estimates that more than $5
million is needed for port security improvements. Yet, the President's
budget eliminates funding for the Port Security Grant Program a $175
million cut from last year. Our ports are essential to national
security and border security. I look forward to working with you to
ensure the security and viability of the Port of Baltimore for now and
in the future.
Now I want to turn to the issue of immigration application backlogs
for men and women serving in the U.S. military. This is an issue that
is close to my heart. Currently there are over 40,000 non-U.S. citizens
serving in the U.S. military today. Many of them want to be come U.S.
citizens but are caught up in red tape and paperwork and immigration
backlogs. Today there are about 3,000 applications pending at DHS for
service members applying for U.S. citizenship Spc. Kendell Frederick,
an Army reservist from Randallstown, Maryland got caught up in this
immigration backlog. His mother. Mrs. Michelle Murphy tried to help him
but she got the run around from immigration about what her son needed
to do to complete his citizenship application. He ended up being killed
in Iraq before he could become a U.S. citizen.
This should not have happened. Mr. Secretary, I want to ensure that
the men and women who have put themselves on the line, fighting for
this country are treated with the respect and professionalism they
deserve, including when they are applying to become U.S. citizens. DHS
should be working to ensure that resources are used to eliminate the
backlogs and improve the information these members receive.
It is crucial that service members and their families receive
accurate information when they call customer service at immigration and
that immigration forms reflect the current state of the law.
That has not always happened and this is why I introduced the
``Kendell Frederick Citizenship Assistance Act.'' This bill is meant to
improve the process for those men and women fighting for this country
to become U.S. citizens. I hope that you will join me and support this
important legislation.
Finally, I want to address another important issue fire grants. We
all know that when tragic events occur in our community, firefighters
are always the first on the scene. The Fire Grant Program offers double
value for American taxpayers firefighters get the training and
equipment they need to do their jobs safely whether they are responding
to a terrorist attack or a tornado.
FEMA and the National Fire protection Association found that an
estimated 57,000 firefighters lack personal protective clothing one-
third of firefighters per shift are not equipped with self-contained
breathing apparatus. The Fire Grant Program supports our firefighters
by giving them the equipment and training they desperately need. But
this is not about new fire trucks and protective gear. It's about
protecting the protectors and saving lives. So I look forward to
working with Members of the Committee in addressing this funding
shortfall.
Thank you Mr. Secretary and look forward to your testimony today.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Chairman and colleagues, I'm going to
focus on three issues. The Dubai ports, second the issue of
immigration where our military who have green cards and how
they're treated in a terrible backlog and number three, the
short sighted funding of our first responders.
DUBAI PORTS
On the reports, Baltimore is one of the six ports affected
in this Dubai deal, so we're pretty much on the edge of our
chair wondering what it means in terms of port security. Here
is my question Mr. Secretary, you're a member of the committee
that's--the CFIUS that's supposed to do this. Do you personally
attend the meetings or do you delegate that authority?
Secretary Chertoff. The general procedure, which was also,
by the way, the procedure that was followed when I was at the
Department of Justice, and as far as I know is the procedure in
every department is that the--I know the committee does a lot--
Senator Mikulski. Do you go or do you delegate?
Secretary Chertoff. Well I have to--you've got to give me
an opportunity to answer the question.
Senator Mikulski. Well, I've got 5 minutes.
Secretary Chertoff. I want to answer the question
accurately. The practice of all departments is, first of all,
there aren't a lot of meetings where everybody sits around.
There's a lot of telephone and email. An Assistant Secretary is
the level that generally conducts activities. If there is an
issue that is raised, it comes up to the Deputy and to the
Secretary. So I have on individual cases been involved
sometimes very deeply----
Senator Mikulski. Were you involved in the Dubai port?
Secretary Chertoff. I was not involved in the Dubai port
deal prior to its--the no objection, going from our department
to the committee.
Senator Mikulski. Were you aware of the Coast Guard yellow
flashing lights that they raised?
Secretary Chertoff. Well I've read the Coast Guard memo,
including the classified.
Senator Mikulski. When did you read it?
Secretary Chertoff. I read it about a week ago. And I will
tell you I must respectfully disagree with your
characterization. I don't see it as a flashing light. I have
seen countless intelligence reports, you've got to let me
finish. I've seen countless intelligence reports that quite
properly conclude by analyzing what is known, and then
indicating that there are things that are not known. The piece
of this report which was not widely reported yesterday, but was
finally declassified is the Coast Guard's conclusion in this
report. Which was an early report that DP World's acquisition
of PNO in and of itself does not pose a significant threat to
U.S. assets in U.S. ports.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Secretary, I read intelligence
reports too, I'm on the intelligence committee. Moving right
along here, are you now going to be personally involved in this
45 day----
Secretary Chertoff. I strongly suspect I will be.
Senator Mikulski. No, I didn't ask if you suspect, sir.
Secretary Chertoff. Of course I will be involved in it.
Senator Mikulski. Directly and hands on. Will there
actually be a meeting of this committee where you, Rumsfeld,
Secretary Snow, Attorney General Gonzales, in other words those
named will actually do this. Because it has enormous impact in
terms of security, public confidence, and also relationships
with people abroad.
Secretary Chertoff. Well I agree with you it's very
important. I will be personally involved. I'm not going to
speak for other Secretaries; you'll have to ask them what their
degree of involvement is going to be. I have actually been
personally involved in this since the last couple of weeks when
it became clear to me this was going to become a matter of some
controversy. I can't say that I looked at every scrap of paper,
but I certainly intend to be involved----
Senator Mikulski. What criteria will be used to determine
if there is a national security----
Secretary Chertoff. The same criteria I would use with any
company, any foreign company, or any foreign country. I would
judge the risk, I will look at the assurances that we have
obtained and the guarantees from the company and I will satisfy
myself that these put us in a position to eliminate any
material risk with respect to foreign ownership. And in doing
that I will certainly consult with the chief intelligence
officer in my department, the experts in Customs and Border
Protection and the experts at the Coast Guard.
Senator Mikulski. And will you be coordinating with Mr.
Negroponte, our Director of National Intelligence?
Secretary Chertoff. Yes. I will speak to him too.
Senator Mikulski. And we'll look forward to the classified
briefing. Is my time up?
Senator Gregg. No Senator, as I said we'll extend your
time. We wanted to make sure you got the questions in, so why
don't you go on to your next question there, and then Senator
Kohl's next.
MILITARY IMMIGRANT BACKLOG
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and
Colleagues, I don't know if you're aware but there are members
serving in our United States military who are not American
citizen's but possess green cards. They fight bravely, they
fight valiantly and they're doing a good job. I had a
constituent Kendal Frederick who actually was in the high
school ROTC before the military. Anyway he was jerked around by
immigration services, as was his mother, saying that his
fingerprints didn't count that he had given to the military to
become a citizen. Well the military took pity on him, and in
Baghdad arranged for him to go get his fingerprints after
Immigration told him he had to return to Baltimore. You with
me? From Baghdad, he would have loved to come back. He died on
his way to getting his fingerprints. So I've looked into this
situation, I've got legislation pending and now this goes to my
question, even though other things have been rebuffed.
Mr. Secretary there are 3,000 men and women fighting who
have green cards that have a back log with your Department.
What are you doing about the backlog?
Secretary Chertoff. We discussed this, and first of all I
completely agree with you that we ought to make a special
effort with respect to making sure our service personnel are
not held up with green cards. I wasn't aware the backlog was
3,000. I'm certainly prepared to tell you that we should move
heaven and earth to put these soldiers to the front of the line
and figure out a way to cut through the red tape. I've conveyed
that direction to Citizen and Immigration Services, I will
certainly be pleased----
Senator Mikulski. I really need you to insist upon it, and
look at it.
Secretary Chertoff. I agree. I'm onboard with that.
DHS ACTIVE DUTY FINGERPRINT VETTING POLICY
Senator Mikulski. Number two, the issue of fingerprints. In
other words when you join our military, you're fingerprinted
and you're vetted. We understand that there is now a bottleneck
with your agency accepting the vetting process and fingerprints
of DOD. What is your plan to correct that?
Secretary Chertoff. Well I have not heard that there was a
problem with it. If there is an issue with respect to the
quality of the prints, I mean that's, I guess, an issue we have
to address with DOD going forward. If the prints are of
sufficient quality and it's just a question of getting them
compatible with our databases, we ought to be able to sold
that, particularly because the numbers aren't that large.
Senator Mikulski. But nothing's happened.
Secretary Chertoff. As I say, I was not personally aware
there was a fingerprint backlog, but I will find out about it.
Senator Mikulski. It's not a fingerprint backlog; it is a
policy that is what's good enough for the Department Defense to
accept someone to serve our country is not good enough for you.
Secretary Chertoff. I mean that doesn't make any sense to
me, so I agree with you in principle, now as often is the case,
when I go back I get----
Senator Mikulski. You get a buzz and I'm tired of the buzz.
Secretary Chertoff. Well----
Senator Mikulski. We've been buzzed.
Secretary Chertoff. All I can tell you is, I believe you
are correct. We should be able to use DOD fingerprints. If
there is somehow a problem with the way the prints are taken,
we have to figure out how to correct that. And we'll get back
to you.
[The information follows:]
DHS' Active Duty Military Fingerprint Vetting Policy
CIS agrees with the Ombudsman's concept and intent to improve the
fingerprint process for military naturalization applicants, but CIS
does not concur with waiving the fingerprint-based criminal history
check at this time.
CIS recently initiated efforts with the U.S. Military and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to reengineer the fingerprint
process specifically for active duty military customers. Several
meetings and numerous discussions have occurred exploring the
possibility of waiving the CIS fingerprint requirement by relying on
background checks performed by the military at the time of enlistment
as well as post-enlistment background checks. Unfortunately, each of
the four branches of the military employ independent enlistment
processes and, even though a fingerprint check is conducted at the time
of enlistment, post-enlistment background checks are not routine.
Further, the military has confirmed that post-enlistment arrests and
charges are not necessarily known by the military. Therefore, because
no measures are in place with the military to ensure naturalization
ineligibility issues of criminality are identified, CIS cannot concur
with waiving the fingerprint requirement.
Though CIS does not concur with waiving the fingerprint check, CIS
does recognize of the importance of military service and the special
needs of military personnel. CIS, in conjunction with the military, FBI
and Office of Personnel Management (OPM), is developing a fingerprint
process that will eliminate the need for a soldier to appear anywhere
for another fingerprint appointment. Under this process, when an
application for naturalization is filed, the fingerprints previously
collected by the military at time of enlistment will be forwarded to
CIS and resubmitted to the FBI for an updated check. The details of the
process are as follows:
--At time of enlistment fingerprints are collected by the military
and forwarded to the FBI through the OPM
--The FBI performs a criminal history check, forwards results back to
OPM, and the FBI retains the fingerprints in a history file
--Upon receipt of a naturalization application submitted by an active
duty military member to the Nebraska Service Center (NSC), the
NSC will notify CIS staff at the FBI to request the
fingerprints from the FBI for resubmission
--Once retrieved by the FBI, the fingerprints are forwarded to the
NSC in hard-copy format
--NSC converts the fingerprints into an electronic format and
resubmits the prints to the FBI through CIS' electronic
fingerprint system. The fingerprint images are also
electronically stored at CIS
--Fingerprint transaction data and the FBI's search results are
posted in CIS' fingerprint system and viewable globally
The process improvement described above is only a first step. CIS
envisions additional enhancements as the Biometrics Storage System
(BSS) becomes available and the military considers possible changes at
the enlistment stage to automatically provide fingerprints to CIS.
Additionally, CIS is discussing with the military the concept of the
military establishing a background check infrastructure to certify
their personnel as having ``good moral character,'' along with other
less significant fingerprint process changes.
Senator Mikulski. This is the functional equivalent of
March 1. Could we look at this before April 1?
Secretary Chertoff. Yes.
Senator Gregg. I'm going to move on to Senator Kohl.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you.
Senator Gregg. And by the way Senator, I'm sure you're
going to be able to straighten this out, because you're on the
same wave length. But if you can't, I'm sure we can figure out
how to do something in the bill.
Senator Mikulski. I'd like to discuss this with you further
Mr. Chairman. And thank you, I hope I haven't run into your
time.
DUBAI PORT DEAL
Senator Gregg. Senator Kohl.
Senator Kohl. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, to
return to the issue that's been discussed once or twice here
today. This deal failed to pass the smell test with the
American people as you know, which is why we're here discussing
it today in such great detail. And as you know, top
administration officials, including the President, Secretary
Snow and yourself, were unaware of the deal until after it was
approved and announced. And so now, we're talking about a 45
day delay while it goes through a review process. But the
President has already said that the deal is a proper deal, and
I think you're more or less saying it today. So why would any
of us have great confidence in any chance that you're going to
come back in 45 days and say, guess what it's not a good deal.
It's not the right deal, you think many people really believe
that's going to happen?
Secretary Chertoff. First of all let me make it clear. I
don't care whether its 30 days, or 45 days, if new facts were
to come to light, obviously we would act on the new facts. And
you know no one has yet asked us to do a 45 day review. There's
been press accounts, but I haven't seen a letter yet. So I'm
not going to anticipate a letter that hasn't come yet. But
look, the bottom line is the facts speak for themselves. We're
going to give classified briefings, you had 12 or 14 agencies
looking at this, nobody--once we had the assurances in place
and they're very, very substantial assurances nobody raised an
objection to this deal going forward.
And let me spend just a moment talking about the
assurances, because I think maybe this is an item that escapes
public attention. The whole point of the assurances is, it
makes it clear that it's not like we're done with the process
of vetting the company. The assurances give us the authority
and obligation to continue vetting the company for the next
months and years. And it gives us an unprecedented ability to
do that. So it was always contemplated, once these assurances
were signed that we would have the Coast Guard and Customs and
Border Protection on a port by port basis, deeply engaged in
the process of reviewing what is going on in those terminal
operations, who the personnel are, what the security situation
is. So I basically reject the premise of the criticism that
somehow once we completed the review and allowed the
transaction to go forward, we somehow then are done. The
assurances were in fact designed to make sure we have a
continuing involvement in the process of security, just as we
do by virtue of the Coast Guard's inherent authority of
Captains of the Ports. This happens to be one of those few
areas where we have agencies that are so deeply involved on an
ongoing basis, that we have much greater ability to assure
security than in most sectors of the economy.
Senator Kohl. I appreciate that, and again what you're
saying leads me to conclude that in fact this deal is intended
to go forward by the administration. And I think you're making
that very clear right now with all the assurances and so on,
and the President has said that he would veto any attempt by
the Congress to override that decision. So I'll leave the
issue, but I think the impression has been made clear that you
all are intending to go forward with this, in a way which gets
by the furor that is immediately surrounding it, to a time when
it could be done--so you know, that's the impression I have,
you may disagree with that. But I'd like to leave it. I want to
ask you a question----
Secretary Chertoff. Well I'm sorry Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't
like to leave a hearing, a public hearing, and have my silence
be taken as acquiescence. If we were to be asked to undertake a
45 day review, we would do it honestly. At the end of the day
though, the facts are the facts. We will see what the facts
are. And that means the facts about what the intelligence is,
what our current security authorities are, what the security
posture is and what the company undertakes.
Senator Kohl. Okay.
Secretary Chertoff. So we'll deal with the facts as they
are.
Senator Kohl. In connection with that, I'd like to talk
about foreign ownership of ports, not ownership in fact but
ownership of the operation of the ports. Many people are
arguing that our ports should never have been turned over to
foreign governments in terms of operations. Legislation, as you
know, has already been introduced to ban any such deals. And
we're living in a post 9/11 world. Having been repeatedly
warned about the vulnerability in our ports I think that this
legislation deserves serious consideration. How do you feel
about the principle of having foreign owned companies, deeply
involved in the operation of our ports?
Secretary Chertoff. I think in evaluating this proposed
legislation Congress ought to consider the fact that obviously
many of our port terminals are operated by foreign countries
including for example China, which I think acquired a port in
the late 1990s. PNO itself is a foreign owned company. Almost
all of our shipping companies are foreign owned and obviously
if you're going to start to talk about foreign ownership you
need to talk about the shipping companies, and of course most
importantly the foreign ports which is where the cargo gets
loaded therefore where the greatest vulnerability exists. By
definition, foreign ports are foreign owned because they're in
foreign countries. So, I guess what I would say from a risk
management standpoint is, I always caution against the idea of
focusing very hard in a particular anecdotal issue that arises,
without stepping back and looking at the whole framework and
asking where the highest risk is.
To be honest I think the highest risk in our maritime
system is what happens overseas, because there's where cargo
gets loaded. And a lot of our emphasis has to be, without
suggesting domestic ports aren't important, a lot of what we've
got to do in terms of further work is extend our security
overseas. But I have to acknowledge that foreign ports will
always be operated by foreign companies because they're in
foreign countries. So we're going to have to live in a global
world, and I think we need to make sure as we do so, we're
fair, we have a level playing field, we don't treat, you know
countries that are friendly are treated in like fashion. We
should be able to distinguish between our friends and our foes.
I think it would be a very bad message if people in the Middle
East for example were to walk away with the feeling that even
when they're friendly we treat them dismissively. I think all
foreign companies raise concerns. I think we ought to treat
those concerns in a manner that's even handed, focuses on the
facts, and make sure that we treat our friends well and our
foes not so well.
Senator Kohl. Well you're right, and this legislation
that's been introduced is not directed against any part of the
world as you know, its legislation that says all of our port
security in this country should be handled by operations owned
in this country. So it's not in anyway an aspersion on the
Middle East.
NECESSITY OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP LONGEVITY AND POTENTIAL INEFFICIENCIES
DUE TO DHS' ENORMITY
One final question if I may take just a minute. DHS is an
enormously complicated operation as I'm sure you would attest.
In terms of it's budget, in terms of its mission, in terms of
it's number of personnel. I would ask you whether or not, if
it's going to be operated effectively, somebody needs to be in
a position of authority like yourself for a long, long, long
time. And pursuant to that, do you think that DHS is too big to
be operated effectively for example, with respect to FEMA and
what happened in Katrina, whether or not FEMA deserves to be an
independent agency; some of the things that FEMA controls
deserves to be broken away from DHS. How can DHS be as diligent
as it must be, and needs to be, if it's such a gargantuan
organization?
Secretary Chertoff. I've given that obviously a
considerable amount of thought in the year that I've been on
the job. And let me give you two answers, first of all I think
emphatically, there is value in having this as a single
organization. It doesn't mean it's easy to integrate. I mean
it's not easy to integrate and DOD took 40 years. But you know
in the end DOD produced a product, a combined joint services
approach to military operations which by all accounts is much
better than the way it operated when we had three separate
departments. If you look at what happened in Katrina, the best
results occurred when we operated in an integrated fashion,
using the whole department. When Admiral Allen came onboard he
really was committed to using all the assets of the department
as PFO and he did so, and he did so effectively.
When we stepped in as a department and we were able to
apply our resources at TSA to help manage evacuations, or Coast
Guard to do rescues. That was when the Department did best.
When the Department failed is when people decided to go it
alone. And I am strongly convinced if we were to set--if we
were to reverse course, separate FEMA out, we'd now create a
fissure or a fault line between two of the critical elements of
response. And it would make coordination that much more
difficult, it would make the ability to build FEMA into what it
deserves to be that much more difficult. I think that we were
on course to do the right thing with integrating. I will tell
you we didn't get there, we weren't there when I arrived, and I
think I was pretty honest in saying to people we needed to do a
lot more work. I said it in July, and I draw no comfort from
the fact that it was proven to be right in August. I think
though the original design makes a lot of sense. These are all
prevention, protection, and response, and all a spectrum of
things we have to use for all hazards whether they be natural,
whether they be terrorists. We will often not know when we
could have a outbreak of disease, we wouldn't know if it was a
terrorist attack, or a natural attack, you know anthrax, for
example, occurs in nature, but it also can be weaponized. So I
think that having an integrated approach that learns to use all
of the tools anytime we have a hazard or a challenge actually
makes a lot of sense.
I do though recognize you know, we're 3 years into this. It
took DOD 40 years to do Goldwater-Nichols, Senator Bennett says
it took 5 years to get the Department of Transportation right.
I'm committed to doing the job in less time, but I would be
less than honest if I didn't tell you that it's not going to be
done in a week, and I don't think anybody thought it was going
to be done in record time. So we've got a lot of work to do.
We've accomplished a lot. I'd be the first to tell you we've
got a lot of areas where we got to do a lot more work in. But I
think the course we have now is the right course.
Senator Kohl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
DHS' ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FEMA'S CAPABILITIES
Senator Gregg. Thank you Senator. And we want to let you
get to the work of which you have a lot to do, but I just want
to make a couple of comments and then ask a couple of specific
questions. On this concept of organization, I'm not so sure I
subscribe to your view. You know, I was here a little bit
before you got here in this fight; and in fact before 9/11 we
tried to address this issue and we ended up with a tug of war
between FEMA and what was then called National Domestic
Preparedness Office which was in the Justice Department as to
who would control first responders, and whether FEMA was the
right agency to deal with first responders in a terrorist
event. And FEMA came in and co-opted the NDPO and then you
split it off now, and moved it up to a Secretary level, and so
there's real issues here of management. And it seems to me that
it really gets to the capacity of an agency to handle an event.
That should be the way we should look at it. I think the White
House has done the right thing, and this Townsend report, I
don't know what the official title is, but just reading it I
haven't talked to her. But it seems to me that you've got to
grade the catastrophe. The event's level of impact and if you
have a flood in New Hampshire on a major river like we had,
FEMA does a great job and it should be the response agency. If
you have a middle level catastrophe but it's contained, such as
9/11, FEMA again may be the right agency to come in, in
coordination with a lot of other agencies. But when you get to
one of these catastrophic events, where you're essentially
wiping out--what happened was it wiped out a city and a region,
FEMA is not capable of handling it period. And nor probably is
the Department of Homeland Security, you just do not have that
capacity and you're probably going to have to use the
Department of Defense capability. And so I think there's got to
be some structure which grades the event before the integration
occurs as to who is in charge. And then gets those people on
the ground that should be in charge fast, which was the problem
in Katrina. We didn't have the right people there. If the
Department of Defense had charge of New Orleans, those people
wouldn't have been left at the Super Dome. They would have been
out of there because we would have had helicopters, and we
would have had what was needed.
And so I think the White House is on the right track, I
know you're very integrated in that process, but this idea that
FEMA should have responsibility for every major catastrophe in
this country is I think a huge mistake. I mean there are some
things they simply aren't going to be able to handle. Also
whether or not domestic God-driven strategies should be within
the organization called the Homeland Security Department. And
when you're time is 50, or 60, or 70 percent, and I suspect it
was at least that high during the peak of the Katrina event,
maybe 100 percent of your time is focused on a domestic
catastrophe because your agency is not functioning well in that
catastrophe, that's drawing off resources. It's drawing off
attention from what is the threat, which is the terrorists are
coming across the border with something that's going to harm
us, or they're here and they're going to harm us. And so I'm
just not sure that we shouldn't have some sort of quasi
independent effort here on the issue of domestic God driven
events. And I guess we shouldn't blame God for these events,
but events that have nothing to do with human input. So I don't
accept necessarily the thesis of your position yet, and I think
it needs to be looked at in a much more aggressive way, and I
respect and congratulate the leadership you and the White House
have given with this Townsend initiative.
TSA HIRING FREEZE
A couple of specific questions, TSA is under a hiring
freeze, it's been under a hiring freeze for 2 years, I
supported that freeze the first year, I've supported it the
second year, you can't continue it. It's clear they're having
huge attrition; they're using massive overhead dollars, I
think, to get through the day; there are morale issues, I
believe, that are developing that are very serious within that
agency. We're bringing online technology which should reduce
the need for personnel, but it's not there, it's not working
yet. In fact these puff machines I understand they take more
time wiping them down than they save time putting people
through them. This budget because of the way it's been
structured basically continues that freeze.
First question, can this agency continue to function
effectively and maintain the respect of the public if it is
under this type of a personnel freeze. Second, if we lose this
$1.6 billion that has been put in here as a ``here today, gone
tomorrow'' budget number, a plug, how does your Department
function?
Secretary Chertoff. With respect to the first question, I
think you know, ultimately over time we need to migrate to a
more efficient, more technologically driven system. But that's
not going to happen over night as you say Senator. One thing
that we are trying to do though is change our protocols to
begin to move to a more efficient use of screeners. One of the
things that Assistant Secretary Hawley has done for example,
he's started to retrain them not to focus on the nail and
scissors, but to focus on detonators and detonators pieces,
behavioral pattern recognition, this of that sort. Putting more
of our screening personnel into--and other security personnel
out into the area of the airport in general rather than having
them clustered at the area where we do the magnetometer.
So I think he is actually working very hard to find a way
to leverage the resources that we have to make them more
efficient.
TSA PASSENGER FEE INCREASE
I guess we come back to the fee, and look I have a very
simple position, I think it's the right thing to do. Let's put
aside whether I'm being a Don Quixote here, but if I didn't
think it was the right thing to do that would be a different
story. I think it's a fair price to ask passengers to pay, and
rather than----
Senator Gregg. Let me ask you to pause there. Even assuming
that's true. Under the budget that you sent up here, the fee
doesn't go to passengers. It goes to border security. So you're
asking the airline passengers to pick up this cost, now you can
argue that it's all the same pot, its fungible. But there's no
increase in TSA personnel even though the fee goes up.
Secretary Chertoff. Well there is, I mean I guess my answer
is, it is all the same pot, and it does fund research into new
technologies, deployment of replacement machines in order to
deal with other machines. I mean at the end of the day, if we
didn't--if we had a gap of $1.6 million, I have no doubt some
of the impact of that gap would be felt in TSA operations. And
you know at the end of the day, you have to say to the
industry, a world in which we had to plug a gap and it wound up
giving us longer lines at the airports and more inconvenient
airport situations; it would not be a happy situation for the
airlines. I mean maybe the answer is if we look--you know if we
don't--if we did have a gap to plug, maybe the answer is we
should look to plug the gap at least in part where the
beneficiaries who should be paying the money are located. So
that at least the cost is visited upon those who don't want to
pay the fees. I am hopeful that we can figure out a way to come
up with an appropriate fee. We retooled it this year; we came
up with a different approach, if someone has a better, fairer
way to do it, I'm open to hear about a better, fairer way to do
it. But at the end of the day this was Congress' original
vision, that this expense ought to be borne by those who
benefit from it, and I think we ought to insist on that.
Senator Gregg. Well under that logic there should be a
border crossing fee.
Secretary Chertoff. You know you could--I tell you for
example with respect to immigration services. We charge----
Senator Gregg. I'm not talking immigration, I'm talking
about the person who drives across the border from well there
aren't too many who drive across the border from New Hampshire,
but you know from Vermont to Canada or from Brownsville to----
Secretary Chertoff. I think Congress recognized when it
passed the original transportation security plan; that the
extraordinary expense of transportation security; keeping that
system safe was an extraordinary burden and should be borne at
least in part, because it's not entirely borne by the fee, but
it should be borne at least in part by the fee. Coast Guard
charges fees for certain kinds of activities. It's not unknown
for the----
Senator Gregg. Well should there be toll booths at the
borders so that you're actually tying the fee to border
security and not to airline security.
Secretary Chertoff. And I think there though, the benefit
you can argue about border security is distributed so widely
across the country that everybody benefits and everybody ought
to pay. Airline security and I think this was Congress'
position when the legislation was passed, you know people who
never got on an airplane don't really benefit. The benefit
really goes to the passengers. And therefore, while we
shouldn't require them to pay the entirety of it having them
bear a share doesn't seem unreasonable. You know some people
disagree obviously. I actually think though that there's a lot
of merit to that position, and we're talking about a
comparatively small increase. I mean if we were talking about a
huge amount of money, I think that would be different. But at
the end of the day, a net raise of $2.50 for you know, if you
have to wait at the airport for an hour you spend that in soft
drinks and newspapers. And now they charge you for the headsets
on the planes, that's $4, or $5. I mean it just--I have to say,
in the nature of things, it doesn't seem an unreasonable thing.
Senator Gregg. Thank you Senator Byrd do you have any
additional questions?
TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM
Senator Byrd. The President has submitted to Congress the
outline of his proposal for what he calls a Temporary Worker
Program. The proposal would legalize the status of millions of
illegal aliens to work in the United States. How many legal
aliens, individuals who cross the border illegally, or over
stayed their visas would be allowed to legalize their status
under the President's guest worker program?
Secretary Chertoff. Well this is, as you know Senator there
are a number of different proposals. The President has outlined
general principles. I don't think he submitted a specific
proposal yet. I think the estimates are, somewhere between 8
and 11 million illegal migrants in the country. Now some of
those are probably children who you know would be--if there
were a TWP a Temporary Worker Program they would be in the
country under the umbrella of their parents. But my, again
rough, really rough estimates are it could be around 7 million
workers who would ultimately have to be eligible under a
temporary worker program.
Senator Byrd. So that's amnesty isn't it?
Secretary Chertoff. It's not amnesty. I mean the President
has been very clear that this would be a program that would not
put people to the head of the line, or reward them for doing
something that they hadn't done. What it is, is a recognition
of an economic reality. There are millions of jobs now in this
country that are being performed by undocumented workers. I was
talking to a mayor whose name I will not mention, who estimated
that much of the home health system in the country is run with
the help of undocumented workers. The lettuce growers out west
complain without undocumented workers or workers coming in from
South America, all the lettuce would wilt. I think if you go
around and you look at grounds keeping, what people do on
lawns, you find an awful lot of undocumented workers. These
workers are here because American employers are paying them to
come here, or paying them to work here. And if we don't admit
that fact and the incredible economic demand and pull that that
is, we are not really addressing the problem honestly. I am
four square behind you increasing enforcement, more border
control, more satellites, more this, more that. But if you
expect that to do the job 100 percent, I think there's an
unfair demand being placed on our Border Patrol. I think in the
end, you have to address, and find some way to regularize and
bring into a legally regulated channel all of this economic
demand for temporary workers, so that we can really focus on
the people I think the country wants us to focus on most, which
are people who are coming in not to simply do work that nobody
else wants to do, but to commit crimes or to commit anti-social
acts or even to be terrorists.
Senator Byrd. Now why would such a program not encourage
other illegal aliens to break the law, in the hope of being
similarly rewarded with legalized status?
Secretary Chertoff. I think the answer is two reasons.
First of all, of course we could in fact make part of the law
requirement that this would only apply to people who could
demonstrate they had been in the country prior to the time that
the program was announced or the time it was passed. But second
because I think that much of the focus of this has to be on the
employers. It seems to me right now we're in a situation where
we're in a twilight zone.
Senator Byrd. You're what?
Secretary Chertoff. We're in a twilight zone. We basically
say to the employers don't hire illegal migrants, but we also
say we're not going to really check very hard. And I think
that's the worst of all worlds. What we ought to do is----
Senator Byrd. Why do we say that?
Secretary Chertoff. Well we do it, because we have not been
vigorous enough in enforcing worksite enforcement.
Senator Byrd. Why is that?
Secretary Chertoff. Well that's what we're in the process
of changing. One of the things the budget has ----
Senator Byrd. How long is it going to take to change it?
Secretary Chertoff. Let me try to lay out what our plan is.
We have the basic pilot which allows employers to verify the
status of their employees. The budget contains I think $135
million to expand that program. That would give us the
ability--for the first time--to say to employers, all
employers, not just a small group--now you have a tool that
will allow you to check the status of your employees. At the
same time we are taking steps now to increase our worksite
enforcement capability. The budget contemplates adding several
hundred new enforcement agents to enforce worksites. We've got
some legislative proposals up on the Hill that would give us
better tools in terms of worksite enforcement. We have to
consider increased penalties for worksite enforcement; it seems
to me you've got to do both of these things. You've either got
to give people a legal channel to check the status of their
employees; but then at the same time if you give them that
channel and you give them a temporary worker program, you have
to have a real sanction if they chose not to use the course
that the law has set out in front of them.
Senator Byrd. So you don't think that illegal aliens are
encouraged to break the law in the hope of being rewarded with
legalized status?
Secretary Chertoff. I think if we properly design a
temporary worker program it will recognize the reality that we
have, millions of undocumented workers in the country, but will
encourage people to come in using a documented and legal form
of temporary worker as opposed to an illegal form?
Senator Byrd. When are we going to do that?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, the President's budget has money
in here for the verification. There are a number of proposals
now for Temporary Worker Program; Chairman Specter I guess has
issued the chairman's mark on this. We are looking at the
various proposals, and I think it's our expectation and our
hope that we will see action on a Temporary Worker Program bill
this year.
Senator Byrd. What's he waiting on?
Secretary Chertoff. Well right now, we've just gotten the
chairman's mark, Chairman Specter has issued a mark. We've
got--we're analyzing that. It's just a matter--we've just had
it for a few days. We have the proposal by Senator McCain and
Senator Kennedy, we have a proposal by Senator Kyl and Senator
Cornyn, there's a lot of discussion about these issues. They
are complicated issues, but at least I think we are now
underway to tackling this very serious issue.
Senator Byrd. Once these illegal aliens have been
legalized, how do you ensure that they'll leave when their
temporary work visas expire?
Secretary Chertoff. Well one of the critical elements of
the process is temporary worker status. It would have to
involve a background check, would have to involve a biometric
identification card, so that we would be able to, for the first
time, have real ability to identify people in this country who
are temporary workers, and who are working on a temporary
basis. And then that would be the tool that we would use to
track people and make sure they're complying with the law. If
people's visas ran out, at that point, an employer who hired
that person to continue to work, after their visa had expired
would face a pretty serious sanction; and we could hold them to
a pretty serious obligation to check the status of their worker
to make sure they don't hire somebody who is here, having over
stayed their visa.
Senator Byrd. Is it impractical to detain and remove these
aliens now?
Secretary Chertoff. It would cost--I had it estimated, if
we this year were able to round up every single undocumented
worker, and if you accept the estimate of 8 to 11 million we
would have to build three times as many jail cells as currently
exist in the entire United States at some astronomical cost. We
would have to pay to have all these people removed. I don't
know that there are enough airplanes, commercial airplanes that
we could lease to put all of these millions of people on
airplanes and send them back.
Senator Byrd. So it's impractical then?
Secretary Chertoff. I would say it's virtually impossible.
Senator Byrd. And why is it any less impractical to assume
that they'll be detained and removed 6 years from now?
Secretary Chertoff. Because in 6 years if we devise this
program correctly, and we create a proper incentive structure
to have employers no longer employ people who are illegal,
because employers can find sufficient legal temporary workers
to do the jobs, economics will do the job for us. What will
happen is after the visa period, the demand for this kind of
illegal worker will be dried up, this will be satisfied by
legal workers and by temporary workers. And I think everybody
agrees that the principal reason people come to this country
illegally to work, is because they want to make money. If
there's no work for them, then the incentive is for them to go
back home.
And there are some further things we can do. I mean they
may accumulate benefits for example over 6 years, and we could
make the receipt of those benefits contingent upon their
returning back to their home countries. That would create a
financial incentive. I mean, I don't want to suggest this is
easy; we have wrestled with this question for 20 years. I
remember when I was U.S. Attorney in the early 1990s we were
talking about this.
The bottom line is, if we don't harness the economics of
the market place, if we don't build a set of incentive
structures, we will never solve this problem. I do not believe
there is a way, simply by using enforcement and border security
that we can ever address the issue of all these undocumented
workers.
Senator Byrd. Well, how do we ensure that our immigration
system is not overwhelmed by the millions of aliens who would
qualify for this program?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, part of what we are beginning to
do now is to plan the kind of information technology
architecture we would need to process people if we had a
temporary worker program. And if a temporary worker program
were passed, we'd have to deal with two sets of people. People
overseas who want to get in the program who would have to
presumably come to our consulates and register, and people in
this country. And I think one of the issues we are wrestling
with now, is what is the most efficient architecture to
register people, capture their fingerprints, run their
fingerprints against databases, interview them as we do with
visas, and then get them an inexpensive biometric card. I
suspect probably we would, you know the employers would have to
play a very significant role in the process because they are
the beneficiaries and so there might be fees involved. But I
don't want to get too far ahead of myself. You've identified
the complicated and important questions that have to be
addressed, and that we are currently addressing, and we are
currently planning in the event that we do get a Temporary
Worker Program that Congress passes. This is a very challenging
task. And immigration reform has been tried before. It was
tried in the mid 1980s, in many ways you know, you really have
to hesitate to take the challenge on. The problem is there's no
choice. If we don't address the challenge, we will continue to
be mired in what is an unacceptable situation in this country.
Senator Byrd. What have we learned from the implementation
of the 1986 amnesty?
Secretary Chertoff. Well I think we've learned amnesty is
not a good idea. And it's not a good idea to build a program
that is focused only on one element of the spectrum. In other
words, you've got to have serious border enforcement, serious
internal enforcement, and a serious Temporary Worker Program.
And only if all of these elements come into play can we expect
success.
CHEMICAL PLANT SECURITY LEGISLATION
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, it has been 4\1/2\ years since
the terrorists struck the homeland. While the administration
has been focusing a large portion of its resources on aviation
security and the border, chemical plants remain vulnerable. In
my State of West Virginia there are 73 chemical manufacturing
plants, and 100 chemical distribution plants. If there were an
attack on one or more of these facilities, the potential loss
of human life and damage to the local and the national economy
would be devastating. Despite the multitude of warnings that
the chemical sector is vulnerable to attack, the administration
has shown a great reluctance to make security at chemical
facilities a priority. I have pressed this issue with you, and
I have pressed it with former Secretary Ridge. Repeatedly I've
done this and to very little avail. I'm told that the private
sector is taking care of it.
Last year the Government Accountability Office concluded
that for 93 percent of the chemical industry it is uncertain
whether facilities are improving security at all. Only 1,100 of
the 15,000 chemical facilities identified by the Department of
Homeland Security are known to adhere to voluntary industry
security procedures. I was encouraged last summer when the DHS
Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, and
Information Security testified before Congress that a system to
enforce and audit security standards must be put in place for
the chemical sector. Unfortunately no action has been taken
since his testimony.
Your fiscal year 2007 budget proposes $10 million for a
chemical security office, which will evaluate the risk of
chemical facilities and establish security standards for them,
but this funding would not be available until fiscal year 2007,
which would further delay the effort to secure chemical
facilities. Why are you kicking this can down the road and not
pursuing enforceable standards for the chemical facilities now?
Secretary Chertoff. Well Senator, I'm pleased to say we
actually are. As Assistant Secretary Stephen said last year we
do believe that it is appropriate to have some mandatory
standards in the industry. I think we've dealt with a number of
Members of Congress, there's a proposed legislation that
Chairperson Collins and Senator Lieberman have proposed. We are
working with them on the legislation. I think we've sketched
out what principles we believe we need to have in chemical
plant security legislation, which is to have tiers of risk,
focused the most on the highest risk in chemical plants, and
require certain kinds of performance standards. Require audits,
and verification. We don't have the authority at this point, in
general, to do this. Although we do under the MTSC have
authority for chemical plants on waterways and rivers. We're
really looking to Congress to work with Congress in coming up
with an appropriate piece of legislation that would give us the
authority to do, for the chemical sector at large, the kind of
regulation that we think is appropriate. Now obviously the
devil is in the details, but we are supportive and working with
Congress now on some legislation that is working its way
through the process that would address this issue.
CHEMICAL SECTOR NATIONAL STRATEGY
Senator Byrd. Congress required you to complete a national
strategy for the chemical sector by February 10, 2006. That
strategy has not been submitted. Why? And can you tell the
committee when that strategy will be submitted to Congress?
Secretary Chertoff. I believe the strategy is in the final
stages of being reviewed, I think it went through several
rounds of comments from stakeholders in the private sector. I
believe that the comment period is now done, and I'm
anticipating this spring that we will have the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, and the specific chemical
sector plan published.
Senator Byrd. When?
Secretary Chertoff. This spring.
CHEMICAL PLANT SECURITY LEGISLATION
Senator Byrd. This spring. Yesterday, the Government
Accountability Office concluded that legislation is necessary
to give the Department the authority to require the chemical
industry to address plant security. It's been 3 years since the
Department of Homeland Security was created, why hasn't the
administration proposed legislation for Congress to consider?
Secretary Chertoff. Well we actually have in the last few
months sat down with a number of Members of Congress. We have
outlined the essential parameters of what we think legislation
should be. So we have submitted a proposal, not a--not a
detailed bill, but actually kind of a set of general principles
and we're actually----
Senator Byrd. What Members of Congress?
Secretary Chertoff. We sat down with--I sat down myself
with Chairperson Collins, and Senator Lieberman who are--I
think have got a bill that they've been working on, and the
Homeland Security Committee. I've dealt with a number of
Members of the House to get their views on a bill, so there is
actual legislation. Now I don't want to suggest that we support
the legislation in all respects. There are elements of this
Collins-Lieberman bill that we support, elements we don't
support. But we are engaged in the process with Congress as we
speak in trying to fashion what we think would be a good piece
of legislation.
Senator Byrd. How long is that process going to be?
Secretary Chertoff. I'm afraid that now you're asking me a
question that lies more in the area of Congress competence than
mine. I think it's before the committee, I don't know that
there's been a markup yet. But I may be wrong about that.
Senator Byrd. But the administration hasn't proposed
legislation for Congress to consider, has it?
Secretary Chertoff. We've laid out general guidelines, and
we've agreed to work with Chairperson Collins and Senator
Lieberman and their bill recognizing that there maybe some
areas of disagreement, as well as some areas of agreement.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Gregg. Well we thank you very much Mr. Secretary
for the time you've given us this morning. And again I know on
behalf of myself and Senator Byrd and other members, we want to
thank your staff, and people who work for your agency for their
dedication to this country. And we hope that the criticism that
you've heard today is taken as constructive, because it was
meant to be constructive. And our job is to give you the
resources you need and make it possible for you to do your job,
and the people who work for you do their job better; and we're
very committed to that. And this committee has not been on the
cheap side on resources, that we've been able to round up for
you and we intend to continue to go in that direction, but we
obviously have reservations about what was sent up relative to
the budget. Thank you.
Secretary Chertoff. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg
ENDING CATCH AND RELEASE
Question. Mr. Secretary, you have made a commitment to end catch
and release of detained illegal aliens. Drastically reducing catch and
release, even if not ending it completely, is an important commitment.
We need to understand the cost implications. Can you make good on this
commitment with the resources available to ICE for fiscal year 2006? If
not, what additional funds are required?
Answer. The Department has made ending ``catch and release'' on the
Southwest Border a priority and the Department has already made
significant progress in achieving this goal. The Department has:
--Increased efficiencies in the detention and removal system to allow
for faster turnover and greater utilization of detention
capacity;
--Expanded the use of expedited removal across the Southwest Border;
and
--Worked with foreign governments to ensure that they accept back
their citizens who have violated our immigration laws on a
timely basis.
The recently enacted supplemental provides sufficient funding for
an additional 4,000 detention beds in fiscal year 2006 as well as
associated removal and transportation costs. This additional funding
will allow DHS to detain nationals of El Salvador apprehended in the
Rio Grande Valley (RGV) Border Patrol Sector. Nationals of El Salvador
comprise one of the few populations still subject to ``catch and
release'' on the southwest border due to the 17 year old court
injunction. As a result of the supplemental, DHS plans to expand
detention capacity by approximately 3,000 beds in the Rio Grande Valley
with the remaining 1,000 beds distributed along the border in response
to apprehensions.
Question. Is this commitment only for the southwest border?
Answer. After implementing the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), the
department pledged to end the practice of ``catch and release'' along
the Southwest border, where 92 percent of the ``Other Than Mexican''
(OTM) apprehensions have taken place for the fiscal year to date.
Eventually, however, we hope to end this practice altogether. Key
elements of SBI that are aimed at ending ``catch and release'' include:
--Increasing the number of agents to patrol our borders, secure our
ports of entry and enforce our immigration laws; and
--Expanding and creating more efficient detention and removal
capabilities.
The detention and removal process is being re-engineered to create
an efficient system that will always have available detention capacity
by streamlining the process for removal and minimizing an alien's time
in detention. To date, we have achieved significant efficiencies in the
process through increased cooperation with foreign governments,
increasing detention capacity, and expanding expedited removal, as well
as streamlining our internal removal process. We will continue to focus
on these objectives and increase efficiencies as we work to achieve our
goal.
Question. When will this be implemented for the northern border and
along the coasts as the Department has committed to do?
Answer. DHS is committed to protecting all borders, including the
northern and coastal borders. On January 30, 2006 DHS took an important
step by authorizing the use of expedited removal on the northern and
coastal borders. This was preceded by Border Patrol personnel from
these sectors being trained in the use of Expedited Removal. Coastal
and northern border sectors are currently engaged in performing
expedited removals of aliens who meet the defined criteria for
placement in this removal process and where detention assets are
available.
Question. What is the plan to address the problems presented by
family detention and placing El Salvadorans in expedited removal?
Answer. In support of the Secretary's goal to end ``catch and
release'' of Other than Mexicans (OTMs) along the Southwest Border, ICE
DRO will begin detaining family units.
Holding families together within the same facility will maintain
family unity, allow family members the opportunity to make informed
decisions together, and reduce anxiety that may be caused by separating
family members for detention purposes. Families will remain united
throughout the immigration process, protecting parental rights and
allowing parents to maintain responsibility for their children.
The Department's implementation of expedited removal for
Salvadorans is substantially hindered by a 17 year old injunction in
Orantes v. Gonzalez. The United States asked the Court to lift or
modify its injunction more than 6 months ago. Discovery is still
continuing with respect to that motion so that no decision is
anticipated in the immediate future. This matter and other old
injunctions have led the Department to ask Congress to reform the
immigration injunction process so that the Department may obtain prompt
relief from old injunctions and will be protected from overbroad future
injunctions.
BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPLEMENTAL
Question. I believe that taking control of our borders is equally
important to fighting terrorism in Iraq. Wouldn't you agree Secretary
Chertoff that fighting the war on terror should start with protecting
the homeland?
Answer. Taking control of our borders is paramount to homeland
security. Since its inception, DHS has undertaken a host of steps to
enhance border security.
We began with a number of steps to increase border security at our
ports of entry. These included significant new initiatives to screen
individuals entering our country, including deployment of US VISIT and
revised terrorist watch list screening procedures. We have put in place
advance data requirements so that detailed information is transmitted
before a passenger arrives from overseas. We have also deployed a
number of new border security initiatives directed at cross-border
threats posed by the transportation of cargo. Amongst these were
innovative programs, including the Container Security Initiative (CSI)
and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).
We have also taken a number of steps to enhance border security
between the ports of entry. Most recently, DHS has developed the Secure
Border Initiative which is an integrated systems approach to
immigration enforcement. SBI focuses broadly on two major enforcement
themes, controlling the border and immigration enforcement within the
United States. Through SBInet, DHS is seeking an integrator to provide
a full range of solutions that will include integrating technologies,
infrastructure, response capabilities, people, and processes into a
comprehensive border protection system. DHS anticipates the award of
the integrator contract by September 2006. Securing our Nation's
borders remains one of the top priorities of DHS.
Question. In order for our country to take control of the border we
need not only to increase the personnel and technology available to
Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
but we need to invest in the infrastructure that will allow them to do
their jobs effectively. We need cars, planes, buildings, cameras and
other things.
Do you agree we need to invest in our enforcement infrastructure?
Answer. Yes. It is absolutely essential that we invest in and
maintain our enforcement infrastructure to ensure that our employees
not only have a safe and secure work environment, but also the tools to
allow them to perform their duties in the most effective manner
possible.
Our enforcement infrastructure acquisition and maintenance
processes must also be planned and managed in an integrated and
systematic fashion that ensures that mission performance is optimized
to the fullest extent by eliminating redundancy and incorporating
innovativeness and state-of-the-art technology--while also taking care
to ensure accountability and fiscal responsibility so that the American
public gets what they paid for.
To that end, a critical component of the Secure Border Initiative
is SBInet, which will serve to integrate multiple state-of-the-art
systems and security infrastructure into a single comprehensive border
security suite for the Department.
Question. We know that CBP needs to replace its air fleet, which
includes some airframes with an average age of 40 years, why haven't
you requested those dollars in the fiscal year 2007 budget request?
Answer. We have requested funding in this area. The Budget requests
$61 million in base Air and Marine procurement funding to be utilized
to purchase up to 30 new helicopters.
The fiscal year 2007 budget request was developed as CBP Air and
Marine was in transition and the requirements for air fleet
recapitalization were still evolving. Over the last few months, CBP has
been integrating the former aviation programs of the Offices of Air and
Marine Operations and Border Patrol under the newly established Office
of CBP Air and Marine. As part of this integration, CBP has been
working to develop a detailed plan to meet the threat to our borders
while maintaining our traditional missions. The plan reflects the newly
integrated aviation organization and includes requirements for the
acquisition of new aircraft, the retirement of obsolete assets, the
introduction of upgrades to aircraft, ground sensors, and
communications capabilities, the consolidation of maintenance and
training capabilities, the extension of the P-3 fleet service life, and
the realignment of air sites to most effectively support mission and
operational needs. The Department will keep the Committee apprised of
the plan's status.
US VISIT EXIT TRACKING CAPABILITY
Question. When does the Department expect to make a decision about
deploying biometric exit tracking at airports?
Answer. DHS is examining the results of the current exit pilots at
14 airports and seaports. DHS will then determine the best approach for
capturing exit data using biometrics and biographic information. We
continue to rely on our existing exit process, which is now enhanced by
implementation of the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) rule.
APIS collects electronic arrival and departure records from the
electronic manifest information sent to Customs and Border Protection
by carriers. The relevant portions of the arrival/departure records
transmitted through APIS are then recorded in Arrival/Departure
Information System (ADIS). ADIS then serves as a repository for entry,
exit, and status change information.
Question. When will a plan be submitted to the Committee to
implement that decision?
Answer. The Department is currently evaluating the results of these
pilots, as well as considering land-border exit screening options, and
will brief the committee at the conclusion of this review.
Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget requests a $60 million
increase for US VISIT. What specifically will be accomplished in fiscal
year 2007 with the increased funding requested for the program?
Answer. The $60 million increase for the US VISIT program will fund
the transition to 10-print and IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability. These
resources will be used to deploy 10 print readers to ports of entry,
improve IDENT technical capabilities, and improve interoperability with
IAFIS.
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
Question. What is the Department's role in preparing for and
responding to pandemic influenza?
Answer. Consistent with the DHS Strategic Plan, National Response
Plan, and the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan, DHS will
develop a plan to implement its roles and responsibilities under the
Pandemic Strategy. In addition to its incident management coordination
roles and responsibilities, DHS is responsible for ensuring integrity
of the Nation's infrastructure, domestic security, entry and exit
screening for influenza at the borders, facilitating coordination for
the overall response to a pandemic, and the provision of a common
operating picture for all departments and agencies of the Federal
Government
During a pandemic, DHS is the lead for overall domestic incident
management and will coordinate the Federal response. Specifically, the
Secretary, DHS:
--Retains responsibility for overall domestic incident management;
--Possesses the authority to declare an Incident of National
Significance and activate the Biological Incident Annex to the
National Response Plan (NRP);
--Coordinates non-medical Federal response actions for an Incident of
National Significance;
--As requested by HHS, directs the activation and deployment of
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) health/medical
personnel, equipment, and supplies, in a phased regional
approach, and coordinates the provision of hospital care and
outpatient services, veterinary services, and mortuary services
through NDMS;
--Coordinates with other Federal agencies to develop a public
communications plan through ESF #15--External Affairs and the
Public Affairs Annex to the NRP;
--Provides logistics support, as appropriate;
--Through ESF #1--Transportation identifies and arranges for use of
U.S. Coast Guard aircraft and other assets in providing urgent
airlift and other transportation support
--DHS components work with HHS to identify and isolate people and
cargo entering in the United States that may be contaminated;
and
--Develops plans and facilitates coordinated incident response
planning with the private sector at the strategic, operational
and tactical levels.
Question. A total of $47 million in emergency supplemental funding
was provided to DHS to plan and prepare for a pandemic event in the
fiscal year 2006 supplemental appropriations bill signed into law in
December of 2005. What is the status of the Department's plans for the
use of this funding?
Answer. Currently, staff and senior management have finished a
spending plan that programs the $47 million into various DHS components
where most immediate and critical needs have been identified. This
money will allow DHS to expand the Department's role in addressing the
avian flu issues. The funds will be allocated before the end of the
fiscal year 2006.
IMPROVING NATIONWIDE CATASTROPHIC PLANNING
Question. Mr. Secretary, in your speech on February 14, 2006, a
reference was made to some of the findings of the Nationwide Plan
Review Phase I--the effort to find out the status of catastrophic
planning across the country. I understand folks are hard at work,
digging into this information to understand it and make recommendations
to improve things. However, the report contains some very provocative
findings in terms of the level of confidence that many States and urban
areas have in the adequacy of their catastrophic plans. What
conclusions has the Department reached so far?
Answer. The February 10, 2006 Report to Congress was a compilation
of the first phase of the Nationwide Plan Review, which involved a
self-assessment of plans by States, territories and urban areas/major
cities using guidance and criteria provided by DHS. The Department has
not reached any conclusions as we are conducting the second phase
currently. The second phase involves visits by Peer Review Teams
comprised of former state and local emergency management and homeland
security officials to 131 States, territories, and urban areas to
jointly validate self-assessments, determine requirements for planning
assistance, collect best practices, and recommend corrective actions. A
Final Report, including recommendations will be provided to Congress by
June 2006. The purpose of the two-phase approach is to ensure DHS and
the participants can jointly review the Phase 1 written submission with
each participating entity's planning team, as well as provide immediate
feedback with specific recommendations and observations. The
combination of self-assessments and peer review will provide us with
the most accurate assessment of plan status.
FIRST RESPONDER GRANTS--RISK AND THREAT FACTORS
Question. Some people advocate all grants should be devoted to
terrorism prevention and preparedness; others that grants should be
used for all-hazards. Which do you advocate?
Answer. Fundamental to the mission of the Department is the
mitigation of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences that stem from
acts of terrorism and natural disasters. Taken as a whole, Departmental
assistance to States and localities supports the broad mission by
building capabilities that are applicable to either acts of terrorism
or natural disasters. Most states and localities have a hard-won
appreciation for their risks and vulnerabilities to various natural
disasters, and have already structured their response capabilities to
address these known risk. In contrast, catastrophic terrorism is more
recent threat that is not well understood, hard to predict, and for
which most states and localities are not adequately prepared. Further,
the Federal Government has a unique role in helping States and
localities prepare for a threat that has significant roots overseas.
That said, a number of DHS grant programs--including the Emergency
Management Performance Grant Program, Citizen Corps Program, and the
Metropolitan Medical Response System Program--are all-hazard in nature.
These programs are targeted to particular constituencies such as
emergency management, community preparedness, or public health and
medical communities but support preparedness activities across the full
range of natural and manmade hazards.
Several other programs--including the State Homeland Security
Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, and the Law Enforcement
Terrorism Prevention Program--focus on terrorism preparedness in
accordance with statutory intent. However, in fiscal year 2006, the
scope of allowable activities for several of these programs has been
expanded to include catastrophic events, provided that these activities
also build capabilities that relate to terrorism. This broadened scope
of program implementation activities recognizes and supports ongoing
preparedness initiatives addressing such issues as pandemic influenza
and the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita that are of critical
national importance, and recognizes the regional and national impacts
that such events can have.
Almost all of the capabilities included in the Target Capabilities
List and the overall framework of the National Preparedness Goal are
dual-use in nature, in that they can apply to both terrorism
preparedness as well as other hazards. Thus, even if a program is
technically focused on terrorism preparedness, the capabilities built
and sustained through those programs support a much broader range of
hazards than terrorism alone.
Question. How mature is the methodology being used to determine
where the risks and threats are today?
Answer. In fiscal year 2006, DHS has taken a major step forward in
its risk analysis, developing a robust model which evaluates both risks
to assets as well as risks to populations and geographic areas. By its
nature, this type of analysis will continually evolve and mature.
The DHS formula for determining eligible urban areas for its Urban
Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program has progressed from a simple
count of ``high'' and ``low'' criticality and numbers of threat reports
in fiscal year 2003 to a fully risk-based computation that is attack-
scenario based and uses infrastructure-specific vulnerability and
consequence estimates. At the same time, DHS has gone from considering
14 infrastructure types in the analysis in fiscal year 2003 to more
than 40 in fiscal year 2006; the fiscal year 2006 approach evaluates
risk to well over 100,000 specific infrastructures, and incorporates
strategic threat analysis from the Intelligence Community along with
law enforcement investigations, credible and less-credible threat
reports, and suspicious incident reporting received from local, State
and other Federal agencies.
The levels of complexity of the formula and data calculations have
increased markedly from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2006. For
example, in fiscal year 2003, three equations were used to formulate
the city prioritization; in fiscal year 2006, over 4,000 equations were
used. For fiscal year 2003, approximately 1,500 calculations were made,
in contrast to more than 3 billion calculations in fiscal year 2006.
Fiscal year 2005 UASI formulations were represented within a
spreadsheet of 42,000 cells. If the fiscal year 2006 UASI calculations
could be included in a spreadsheet, it would contain more than 20
million cells.
Question. How confident are you in a process which determined the
sixth largest U.S. city, San Diego, faces lessened risk?
Answer. The fiscal year 2006 risk formula consists of making two
complementary risk calculations: asset-based risk and geographically-
based risk.
--Asset-based risk utilizes threat values derived from the
Intelligence Community assessments of the intent and
capabilities of adversaries to accomplish a set of baseline
attack modes. These threats and attack types are mapped against
certain infrastructure types, such as bridges, dams, and power
plants.
--Geographically-based risk takes into account values that are based
on the inherent attributes of the geographic State or Urban
Area. This analysis considers factors such as terrorism-related
reporting and investigations, and population density. To arrive
at the total relative risk of terrorism, the geographically-
based risk score is weighted two times the asset risk score.
San Diego is on the list of eligible jurisdictions for full
participation in the fiscal year 2006 Urban Area Security Initiative
(UASI) grant program. In previous years, the risk score directly
converted to a dollar amount and allocation to the jurisdiction. This
is not the case for 2006 funding. Each of the 42 cities, including San
Diego has equal status in competing for the UASI grant funds. The
fiscal year 2006 Congressional Appropriations language instructed the
Secretary to award funds based on both risk and need. While San Diego's
relative risk values are lower in 2006 than they were in 2005, their
need has yet to be determined, and hence no decisions can yet be made
as to how much the city will receive. The Office of Grants and Training
will be making the funding determinations in May 2006.
Additionally, DHS anticipates that continued experience with the
annual risk analysis process will further improve the collective
understanding of the impacts of attacks on systems, improving the
ability of the process to recognize that, in some cases, a system
provides resilience, and in other instances the critical nodes within a
system provide the potential for significantly greater consequences.
DHS remains committed to continually improving its risk analysis
process, and looks forward to further refinement of the current
methodology.
STAFFING FOR ADEQUATE FIRE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE (SAFER) ACT GRANTS
Question. The National Fire Protection Association found
potentially two-thirds of the Nation's fire departments are
understaffed. What is DHS evaluating to determine that no funding
should be requested for SAFER Act grants?
Answer. The Department believes that preparedness is a shared
responsibility between the Federal Government and State and local
jurisdictions. Further, the dedication of Federal funds to a hiring
program such as the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response
(SAFER) program, is not the most effective use of limited homeland
security funds to enhance existing local preparedness capabilities. The
Department has requested significant funds over several years to
support public safety preparedness at the State and local levels of
government. Congress has appropriated and the Department has granted
billions of dollars to support training, exercising, and equipping
public safety personnel, including firefighters, across the Nation.
Homeland security funds should enhance existing local preparedness
capabilities rather than support a hiring program such as SAFER.
Ultimately, local governments have the responsibility to support
firefighter staffing levels commensurate with their local fire threat.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS (EMPG)
Question. If Katrina has shown us anything, it is the importance of
local preparedness and planning. The Emergency Management Performance
Grant program is important to State and local preparedness.
What justification is there in the face of the recent catastrophic
disasters to propose a reduction in funding available for EMPGs?
Answer. The fiscal year 2007 EMPG request is consistent with the
Administration's $170 million budget request in fiscal year 2006. The
Department continues to support the EMPG program, which helps States
and Urban Areas achieve target levels of capability to enhance the
effectiveness of their emergency management programs. The EMPG funding
request for fiscal year 2007 is sufficient for States to continue to
develop intra- and interstate emergency management systems that
encourage partnerships among government, business, volunteer, and
community organizations based on identified needs and priorities for
strengthening their emergency management and catastrophic planning
capabilities. In addition, programs such as the State Homeland Security
Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative--while focused primarily on
terrorism preparedness, also include catastrophic events, recognizing
that the capabilities built support a much broader range of hazards
than terrorism alone.
PORT SECURITY--AUTOMATED TARGETING SYSTEMS
Question. Today, our systems for capturing trade data used in
targeting incoming cargo is focused on the data available from the
manifest, i.e. cargo/shipping information versus the people who handle
the cargo. I understand that CBP has an initiative which started some
time ago to look at expanded data elements to more fully assess risks
of cargo, particularly seagoing cargo.
Is the feasibility and usefulness of capturing information on the
owners and operators of foreign and United States-based terminals being
looked at? Where are you with this effort?
Answer. CBP has been conducting an extensive evaluation of expanded
data elements that will enhance cargo targeting. In this analysis, we
have determined that the people who handle the cargo and particularly
those involved in the loading process are an important informational
element. The terminal operator has little to no control over the
security of the container and is therefore not deemed a useful data
element for cargo targeting. Data elements that we are looking at are
entities that initiate the movement and the physical handling of the
cargo.
CBP has conducted an extensive analysis and proposes that the
collection of a limited number of additional trade data elements at
manifest will effectively enhance cargo security and CBP's targeting
capabilities. New sources and types of data can be gathered during
other phases of supply chain operations and used to enhance and
strengthen the effectiveness of CBP screening and targeting efforts.
Data can be gathered during the purchase order process, staging and
shipment, and cargo transportation and includes such documents as
purchase orders, booking confirmations, bills of lading, terminal
receipts, status reports and proofs of delivery. By collecting more and
different information throughout the supply chain, greater visibility
and transparency can be achieved and true risk better understood within
the international supply chain.
CBP is working with its trade partners to find ways to obtain
better information, new information, and to find ways to get the
information we already have, but earlier in the supply chain so we can
interdict a known risk or intervene in connection with an unknown risk
at the earliest point possible. A supply chain security committee has
been set up within the Trade Support Network as a forum that works with
the trade community to identify and leverage advance information early
in the supply chain. This advance information will build upon existing
CBP security measures to add value to ongoing targeting initiatives in
order to secure our nations borders, as well as our efforts to
facilitate legitimate trade. The committee's goal is to identify,
discuss, document, and submit the trade communities' supply chain
security requirement recommendations for ACE--which in partnership with
CBP should result in an information requirements plan for the best data
set available to CBP.
Through partnering with the carriers, portals, importers, shippers
and terminal operators, CBP is gathering supply chain data, studying
what it means, discovering where it can be most effectively obtained in
the supply chain, who has it, how the pieces fit together and
determining how it can improve our targeting programs. All of this data
will assist us to zero in on suspect movements and perform any
necessary security inspections at the earliest point possible in the
supply chain. CBP has evaluated entry-level data time frames and
believes that submission of this data 24 hours prior to arrival may be
valuable as a final validation of carrier manifest data.
AVIATION SECURITY PASSENGER FEES
Question. If Congress does not accept the Administration's $1.3
billion proposal to increase passenger security fees, what specific
funding in the fiscal year 2007 budget request for programs or
activities do you propose for reduction or elimination to make up for
this difference?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
to seek Congressional support for the President's request to
restructure the air passenger fee as part of the TSA budget. TSA
believes that the adjustment addresses prior congressional concerns
with a fee based upon emplanements rather than one-way travel. We also
believe the restructured fee more equitably assigns the costs of
aviation security to the direct beneficiaries, the air travelers, as
envisioned in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA).
Aviation passengers currently pay an aviation security user fee of
$2.50 per emplanement, with a maximum of $5.00 per one-way trip. This
fee has not increased since it was originally imposed in early 2002,
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The President's budget proposal
aligns the collection of the fee with the point at which the screening
is done--upon entry into the aviation system. The proposed change in
the aviation security fee structure would establish a flat fee of $5.00
per one-way trip. This would have the effect of equalizing the amounts
paid by travelers between major cities and travelers who must take
connecting flights on a round-trip basis. Restructuring the fee would
also generate an additional $1.3 billion in revenue and bring the
percentage of aviation security expenses covered by passenger user fees
to approximately 72 percent. Currently, user fees cover only 42 percent
of the costs of aviation security.
OFFICE OF SCREENING COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS
Question. Where is the Department with regard to establishing the
Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO) office?
Answer. DHS is developing a plan to set up the SCO.
Question. Five and half months of this fiscal year have expired and
it is my understanding that not a single employee has been hired for
this office. In fact, there currently is no SCO office. Is that true?
Answer. DHS is committed to the SCO and is developing a plan to set
up the office and to develop coordinated screening policies.
Question. What is the Department's schedule to stand up this
office?
Answer. The department plans to have the office completely
operational and functioning by the end of fiscal year 2006.
Question. Given that the office will be operational for less than
half a year, I expect a significant proportion of the $4 million in
appropriated funds will not be spent this year. Is that a reasonable
expectation?
Answer. The $4 million is necessary for SCO operations in fiscal
year 2007.
Question. Given the lags in establishing SCO and the likelihood of
unspent funds for this office in fiscal year 2006, is the fiscal year
2007 budget request ($4 million) realistic or optimistic?
Answer. The fiscal year 2007 budget request of $4 million is
necessary for fiscal year 2007 operations.
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS INTEGRATION PROGRAM
Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget proposes a new preparedness
program called the National Preparedness Integration Program (NPIP).
Why is this new program needed?
Answer. Purpose of the NPIP:
The purpose of the National Preparedness Integration Program (NPIP)
is to improve the Nation's preparedness posture--a national safety and
security imperative. The NPIP does that by organizing, monitoring, and
enabling national preparedness activities--with key focus on high-
impact preparedness priorities.
The basic premise of the NPIP is that effective national
preparedness requires an integrated and synchronized approach among
Federal, State, local, tribal and private-sector partners to share
information and to plan, train, and exercise consistently. The current
Federal level approach to information sharing, planning, training and
exercising is inconsistent across departments and agencies, leading to
non-integrated preparedness.
As the preparedness enabling element of the Directorate for
Preparedness, the NPIP will integrate national preparedness system and
doctrine, and provide field-based preparedness coordination.
Additionally, NPIP will develop, foster and instill a national
preparedness culture--an imperative established by the White House and
the Congress, and an expectation of the American citizens.
The Scope of the NPIP:
The NPIP fuses together the core elements of Preparedness--
including strategic risk assessments, contingency planning, doctrine
development, and training and exercises--and allows for the
synchronization of these elements to create a functional organizational
alignment towards common preparedness activities across DHS
organizations.
In doing so, the NPIP will enhance strategic tools, including the
National Incident Management System, National Response Plan, National
Infrastructure Plan and the National Preparedness Goal. It will ensure
development of preparedness processes that foster harmonized day-to-day
routine interaction of disciplines, organizations, levels of government
and our citizens.
Because national preparedness is a top priority and DHS is
responsible for a proactive leadership role in encouraging national
preparedness, the NPIP will drive specific efforts to reach a robust
level of national preparedness. It will foster a ``culture of
preparedness,'' starting within DHS and extending to preparedness
partnerships beyond the Department.
The NPIP will play a major outreach role in leveraging and
encouraging existing efforts, and filling gaps among the connections
between programs, activities, and doctrine that are integral to
achieving robust national preparedness. To that extent, the NPIP will:
--Report directly to the Under Secretary for Preparedness;
--Focus on identifying and aggressively remedying national
preparedness gaps;
--Improve the Nation's ability to prepare, respond and mitigate
natural or other disasters;
--Examine national preparedness activities and programs and seek ways
to integrate and synchronize efforts;
--Provide a preparedness analysis capability and promote innovative
solutions with broad stakeholder input;
--Focus on addressing critical gaps in coordination among entities
responsible for preparedness;
--Promote proven preparedness practices, and leverage external
resources through strategic partnerships;
--Measure national preparedness using standardized metrics and
institutionalize preparedness improvements;
--Identify (and eliminate where possible) redundant preparedness
efforts/activities involving low return on investment; and
--Provide important incentives for organizations to coalesce and
leverage and supplement their efforts to enhance national
preparedness.
As laid out above, the NPIP will be responsive to emerging needs in
homeland security preparedness including lessons learned from real-
world incidents and exercises. As such, the NPIP will be an essential
resource for the Under Secretary for Preparedness to use to respond to
identified needs and capability gaps. Initial efforts will include
addressing shortcomings associated with the after action analysis of
the Hurricane Katrina response and the National Planning Scenarios: the
need to strengthen nationwide planning for catastrophic events;
synchronization of Federal and selected State and local plans by
region; incident command and control alignment; evacuation plans; all-
hazard planning for special need populations; and communication system
improvements. As the Under Secretary's vision continues to evolve and
further preparedness enhancements are identified, the NPIP will be
qualified accordingly.
Question. How will this new program be more effective in this
mission?
Answer. One of the fundamental concepts of the NPIP is that
homeland security preparedness is not just a Federal activity but is,
in fact, a national activity. The basic premise of the NPIP is that
effective national preparedness requires an integrated and synchronized
approach for Federal, State, local and private-sector partners to share
information and plan, train, and exercise as they work in unison to
prepare for disasters. Currently, preparedness efforts are largely
focused but separated at the Federal level, the State and local level,
or among the private sector, but not necessarily an integration of all
these levels.
This was exemplified in almost every aspect of the preparedness,
response, and recovery activities associated with Hurricane Katrina.
While many elements performed well within the parameters of their
understood mission areas, the system struggled because of disconnects
in the overall effort. These fractures among major organizations and
missions had not been adequately recognized and addressed prior to this
catastrophic event.
The NPIP will change that by:
Providing an integrated approach to Federal efforts to support
National Preparedness. Current preparedness efforts reside in different
parts of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--such as Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and
the Office of Grants and Training--as well as other parts of the
Federal Government. Building a truly national preparedness capability
will require substantial DHS coordination with other Federal
Departments. For example, the NPIP will ensure appropriate interface
with NORTHCOM and other Department of Defense (DOD) entities as to
ensure key participation in building a more secure homeland.
Accordingly, the NPIP will ensure DHS alignment with Health and Human
Services (HHS), Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), Department of Transportation (DOT), U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
The NPIP is intended to synchronize and integrate the preparedness
efforts of all parts of DHS and the Federal family. It will do so by:
--Providing a standardized approach to catastrophic planning.
--Developing integrated preparedness doctrine to share with partner
agencies.
--Enhancing coordination of national exercises and preparedness
training.
--Coordinating DHS medical planning with HHS, among other activities.
The NPIP will accomplish this through promoting proven preparedness
practices and leveraging external resources through strategic
partnerships, both within and outside of DHS, while avoiding redundant
efforts or activities involving low return on investment.
This will be a significant change from current practice where there
is no overarching entity focused on coordinating Federal preparedness.
For example, FEMA's preparedness function is heavily focused on
preparing for natural disasters and is not fully integrated with the
law enforcement or border control communities. Nor does FEMA's
preparedness effort run the gamut of necessary preparedness activities
to respond to a catastrophic incident, which include improving
communication systems.
Linking Federal efforts to locally-based preparedness efforts. A
vital part of the NPIP will be the placement of 11 Federal Preparedness
Coordinators (FPCs) across the country, with ten of the 11 FPCs being
collocated at the FEMA regional offices. FPCs will be locally-based
senior DHS officials responsible for coordinating a wide spectrum of
Federal, State, and local domestic incident planning and preparedness.
FPCs will provide DHS with an important and functional field presence
to collaborate and build partnerships with State and local government,
and private sector homeland security stakeholders within the FPC's
assigned geographic areas of responsibility and to ensure that these
stakeholders are working together and are thoroughly prepared.
Currently, such field level coordination is done on an ad hoc basis and
DHS does not have always have visibility into how high-risk areas are
prepared to deal with homeland security incidents.
In addition, the NPIP will be a means to provide the Nation's
leaders with the confidence that its local communities are prepared
should an incident happen. By integrating with the National
Preparedness Goal and by implementing a common set of preparedness
metrics, the NPIP will provide the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
White House, and others with an assessment of local-based preparedness
levels. Currently, that assessment does not exist. An initial
nationwide emergency plan review is underway, and the NPIP will be the
mechanism to strengthen nationwide planning for catastrophic events and
evacuation. The FPCs will be the implementing agents in the field
charged with synchronizing Federal, State and local plans by region to
include special need populations.
Promoting command-and-control alignment among all levels of
government involved in incident management and response. As Hurricane
Katrina indicated, successful incident management depends on effective
command and control alignment. The NPIP will promote such alignment by
ensuring that needed revisions to the National Response Plan (NRP) are
made, based on lessons learned from incidents and exercises--such as
TOPOFF 3--and stakeholder feedback.
In addition, the NPIP will integrate National Response Plan (NRP)
and National Incident Management System (NIMS) training and technical
assistance to improve the likelihood that the command and control
structure functions effectively and efficiently during incident
response. The Homeland Security Council's Hurricane Katrina report
noted the importance of a formal training program on the NIMS and NRP
for all personnel with incident management responsibilities. As part of
FEMA's implementation of NIMS, all FEMA full-time employees and
reservists were required to complete 4 independent study (IS) courses:
IS-100, Introduction to Incident Command System; IS-200, Basic Incident
Command System for Federal Disaster Workers; IS-700, National Incident
Management System: An Introduction; and IS-800, National Response Plan:
An Introduction. All new hires post-Katrina are also required to
complete this mandatory training. In preparation for the upcoming
hurricane 2006 season, FEMA will train a minimum of 1,500 ``disaster
generalists'' (Stafford Act Employees) by June 1, 2006. In addition to
the mandatory training above, these generalists will be required to
complete an additional 40 hours of classroom training on such topics as
disaster operations, safety and wellness, customer service, managing
change, disaster assistance procedures, and monitoring of debris
removal.
A final key aspect of command and control alignment is the ability
to communicate during an incident response. The NPIP will enhance that
ability through better system assessment and operational guidance
development.
The above are but a few of the examples of how the NPIP will be
more effective. Through its five major activities in fiscal year 2007--
catastrophic planning, command and control alignment, communication
system improvements, medical preparedness coordination, innovation and
best practices--and the implementation of the FPC concept, the NPIP
will significantly increase the integration of our Nation's
preparedness activities, including at the Federal level and between the
Federal Government and State, local and private sector officials. The
result of such integration will be seamless processes, established
preparedness doctrine, interconnected/interagency relationships, and
leveraged and synchronized resources during incident response.
Question. Is there an overlap with FEMA's efforts on response and
recovery?
Answer. No, the responsibility for response and recovery is charged
to FEMA, while the Preparedness Directorate is responsible for
preparedness. The fiscal year 2007 Budget Request for FEMA and
Preparedness' NPIP may appear to have some overlap; however, the
difference is in the scope and delineation of responsibilities.
NPIP addresses national integration and synchronization of Federal,
State, local, tribal and private preparedness activities to strengthen
regional abilities to respond and recover. Catastrophic events--
chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, and national disasters--
require preparedness to be scalable and adaptable to an event.
Preparedness establishes the doctrine and standards that allow national
preparedness and hence response and recovery to effectively work
together.
Taking into account the disaster cycle, Planning--Response--
Recovery--Mitigation, there are necessary relationships between
preparedness, response and recovery that would be strengthened by
greater collaboration. Each disaster brings lessons learned and hence
necessary adjustments that feed into preparedness; likewise, response
and recovery readiness is a function of preparedness efforts.
FEMA's mission is to lead the Nation's efforts to respond to,
recover from and mitigate disasters of all types. This includes
coordinating and ensuring the readiness of disaster response teams and
assets; sharing emergency management technical knowledge, training, and
assistance with State and local governments; deploying response teams,
commodities and supplies, and recovery assets, abilities, and funding;
and finally mitigating potential disasters through actions that will
prevent additional loss. FEMA's mission addresses the logistical and
technical aspects of response and recovery.
For, example FEMA's Response Division manages the Mobile Emergency
Response System (MERS), which among other things provides emergency
communication capabilities in a disaster event. In a catastrophic
event, such as Katrina, the region's communications infrastructure was
destroyed, and while the MERS performed as designed, the catastrophe
overwhelmed capabilities. The Federal Government, DOD, private
organizations, local governments, and commercial interests have
communication assets for emergency events; however, there needs to be
greater standardization of these assets. NPIP proposes to strengthen
national preparedness by cataloging emergency communication assets,
pre-coordinating their use, and developing communications plans for
catastrophic event scenarios. NPIP leads, coordinates, and synchronizes
Federal preparedness capabilities and assets, and in concert with other
partners addresses catastrophic scenarios that require the merging of
Federal, State, and local preparedness and response capabilities for
responses equal to the magnitude of a catastrophic event.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT
Question. Science & Technology is still working with the components
in deciding fiscal year 2006 funding levels for its research and
development portfolios. Please explain the process in which each DHS
components' mission research and development are being addressed and
adequately funded by Science & Technology.
Answer. The S&T Directorate has worked to identify and refine the
research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) requirements of
the Department's components over the last 3 years. For example, the S&T
Directorate worked closely with the Transportation Security Agency
regarding the direction of the research and development program at the
Transportation Security Laboratory. This has resulted in a more
customer-focused research and development program in the S&T
Directorate's Explosives Countermeasures Portfolio. The Science and
Technology Requirements Council (SRC) validates and prioritizes RDT&E
requirements with components. To further ensure that the S&T
Directorate is addressing our customers' highest priority needs, the
DHS Joint Requirements Council (JRC) is discussing the development of a
process to facilitate further refinement and prioritization of RDT&E
priorities by senior managers within each component.
Question. Were cuts made to one component's research and
development budget to pay for another component's?
Answer. Research and development funding requirements change year-
to-year. As such, in any given budget, S&T makes downwards or upwards
adjustments in order to fund the highest priority projects.
Question. I am concerned with the many changes in leadership at the
Department. The head of Science & Technology just announced his
resignation which will occur in March. How long will it be before a
permanent replacement will be named?
Answer. In June, the President announced his intention to nominate
Admiral Jay Cohen to be the Under Secretary for Science and Technology.
Admiral Cohen is currently a Retired Rear Admiral of the United States
Navy. He has served the United States Navy for over 35 years. He most
recently served as Chief of Naval Research at the Department of the
Navy.
Question. How will you ensure the new head of Science & Technology
will continue the priorities outlined for fiscal year 2006 and proposed
for fiscal year 2007?
Answer. The Department has established a transition office within
the S&T Directorate to work with present and incoming leadership. This
office will help to ensure follow-through on the science and technology
priorities identified to date.
DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE (DNDO)
Question. What expertise does DNDO have for developing, acquiring
and supporting a global architecture designed to detect the nuclear or
radiological material?
Answer. As an office staffed largely with representatives from
across the United States Government (USG) (including the Departments of
Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and State (DOS), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), as
well as DHS components such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the
Office of Grants and Training (G&T), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T)), the DNDO has been able, in a very short
time, to assemble a staff which draws from the inherent expertise of
each of these agencies. By combining the scientific expertise of DHS
S&T and DOE with the operational experience of CBP, USCG, and FBI (to
name a few) and the disciplined systems engineering, large-scale
acquisition, and logistics approaches of the DOD, the DNDO is well
suited for carrying out its mission of developing, acquiring, and
supporting the global nuclear detection architecture.
Question. Does DNDO have the necessary authorities to have this
global architecture implemented by other Federal agencies?
Answer. The DNDO has been given the mission of ``centralized
planning with decentralized execution.'' As such, the DNDO has been
given the responsibility, within the Federal Government, to develop the
global nuclear detection architecture. This will then be implemented
across multiple agencies, depending on prior missions and
jurisdictions. While the DNDO will not have oversight over the actions
of other agencies responsible for implementing their respective
portions of the global architecture, it will continue to advocate
beneficial programs to the Administration, as well as the Congress, and
to identify duplicative or ineffectual programs when necessary, with
proposed improvements.
RISKS AND THREATS
Question. I believe that you would agree that a biological or
nuclear event is among the highest catastrophic threats to our Nation's
security. What funds, by appropriations account, program, project, and
activity are devoted to preparing to prevent or respond to these in
fiscal year 2006 and in the fiscal year 2007 budget request.
Answer. There are many programs across the Federal Government
committed to preventing or responding to biological or nuclear attacks.
Specifically within the S&T Directorate and the DNDO, funds in fiscal
year 2006 and in the fiscal year 2007 budget request are as follows:
For the biological threat:
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year
2006 2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
S&T Research, Development, Acq. & Ops: 376.2 377.2
Biological Countermeasures.............
------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the nuclear threat:
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year
2006 2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
S&T Management and Administration....... 2.6 ..............
S&T Research, Development, Acq. & Ops... 333.7 ..............
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office... 314.8 ..............
Radiological and Nuclear 18.9 ..............
Countermeasures....................
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office....... ( \1\ ) 535.8
Management and Administration....... ( \1\ ) 30.5
Research, Development, and ( \1\ ) 327.3
Operations.........................
Systems Acquisition................. ( \1\ ) 178.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ n/a.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
AGRODEFENSE
Question. In fiscal year 2006, the Department of Homeland Security
provided $23 million for site selection and other pre-construction
activities for the National Bio and Agrodefense Facility. What is the
current progress of the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to
utilize this funding for site selection and pre-construction
activities?
Answer. The S&T Directorate initiated an Expression of Interest
(EOI) to explore potential sites for the National Bio and Agrodefense
Facility (NBAF). The EOI was issued on January 19, 2006 in the Federal
Register. Site criteria and requirements were developed by an
interagency technical working group (including DHS, the United States
Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Human Health and
Services) to evaluate sites that would best support research in high
consequence animal and zoonotic diseases in support of Homeland
Security Presidential Directives, HSPD-9 and HSPD-10. The results of
the EOI will be evaluated in an environmental impact statement (EIS) in
the fall of 2006, at which time the public will have the opportunity to
comment on the scope of the analysis. In addition, ORD plans to issue a
solicitation in March 2006 to procure architect-engineer services to
conduct conceptual design studies and initial cost estimates for the
NBAF. The conceptual design will be completed in 2007. Under the
present schedule construction could begin in 2009 and be operational by
the end of 2012.
Question. How much longer will the current aging Plum Island
Foreign Animal Disease facilities in New York State be able to sustain
the Department's agroterrorism and animal-based terrorism research
needs?
Answer. The Department is committed to operating the Plum Island
Animal Disease Center (PIADC) in a safe and secure manner until its
capability may be recapitalized through the National Bio and
Agrodefense Facility (NBAF), expected to be operational in 2012. The
Department will maintain the current facility to foster ongoing
scientific programs in accordance with the expanding missions of the
departments of Agriculture and Homeland Security.
Question. Does the Department anticipate constructing one facility
to carry out the Department's agroterrorism and animal-based terrorism
research and development research, or does the Department anticipate
utilizing multiple sites?
Answer. It is presently envisioned that the National Bio-
Agrodefense Facility (NBAF) will be a single facility (with necessary
support facilities) within an approximate 30-acre site.
DEEPWATER RECAPITALIZATION
Question. In fiscal year 2006, Congress provided $933.1 million for
the Coast Guard's Deepwater recapitalization program. The President's
fiscal year 2007 Budget Request proposes $934.4 million for the
Deepwater program. How important is full funding of the President's
Request to the continuation of this recapitalization program?
Answer. It is very important that full funding for the Deepwater
recapitalization program be provided. Any reduction will cause a delay
in the delivery of one or more assets or systems that the Coast Guard
needs to execute its post-9/11 mission responsibilities reduced funding
will result in reduced readiness. The Coast Guard requests funding each
year based on what is planned to be obligated in the year the funds are
appropriated. Full funding in accordance with the President's fiscal
year 2007 Budget Request allows the Coast Guard to continue its
recapitalization program in alignment with the Post 9/11 Revised
Deepwater Implementation Plan.
Question. What affect would a decrease in funding from the
President's Budget Request of $934.4 million have on the continuation
of this recapitalization program?
Answer. The following Deepwater projects are categories in the
fiscal year 2007 President's Budget request that require full funding
to ensure success of the Coast Guard recapitalization program. Key to
success is the synchronization of asset acquisitions to produce ``force
packages'' connected by a common network that enables a synergy of
operational performance from the totality of the system as depicted in
the enclosed graphic. If the planned synchronization is delayed due to
less than full funding in fiscal year 2007, then the planned
capabilities will be more costly to acquire in the future and the
operational performance improvements planned for that period are lost.
In simple terms, the Coast Guard recapitalization program schedule for
delivery of assets will be affected and the Coast Guard will not be
ready to accomplish their DHS assigned missions; please see the table
below.
Additionally, the graphic illustrates the synergistic linkages
between assets in the Deepwater system highlighting how reduced funding
in any one area reduces overall system performance outcomes.
In summary, the full success of the major AC&I projects is
dependent on the assets in these budget categories to be fully funded
as requested in the President's fiscal year 2007 budget.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget category Inadequate funding impacts
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AIR:
CASA MPA.............................. Would delay ``mission
ready'' status of
aircraft's 4 & 5, delays
delivery and missionization
of MPA #6; and further
delays two air stations
from receiving post 9/11
capabilities.
VUAV and MCH (HH-65C)................. Will delay delivery of
assets, limit major cutter
``force package''
capabilities, limiting
surveillance capability to
that achieved by legacy
surface assets.
HH-60 projects........................ Any project under funded or
out of sequence delays the
entire upgrade and
conversion sequence of the
HH-60; this medium range
helicopter is larger and
more capable than the CG HH-
65s.
AUF projects.......................... Delayed funding for Airborne
Use of Force upgrades means
that Homeland security
patrols will continue to be
conducted largely by
unarmed aircraft that lack
the capability to take
appropriate response on
``actionable
intelligence.''
C-130H Conversion projects............ The C-130H will continue to
operate with aging and
obsolete avionics and a
troublesome radar that has
provided degraded
reliability for several
years.
C-130J Fleet Introduction............. Will delay delivery of
asset(s) or prevent
``mission ready'' status--
that will continue the
shortage of maritime patrol
aircraft operating hours.
SURFACE:
NSC................................... Each day of delay means NSC
has an opportunity cost of
not surveilling 42,500
square nautical miles
compared to legacy 378;\1\
FRC................................... Delay/loss of enhanced
operational capabilities of
the patrol boat fleet
required by the post 9/11
requirements.
Mission Effectiveness Project for The legacy 210 foot and 270
Legacy 210 foot and 270 foot. foot cutters are the
youngest in the Coast Guard
fleet, but must be properly
maintained and upgraded to
provide on-going
operational service until
the replacement OPC is
delivered.
Cutter Small Boats (Long Range Small boats are part of the
Interceptor and Short Range Cutter ``force package''
Prosecutor). providing intercept and
boarding capability from
the parent cutter. Delayed
funding decreases ``force
package'' operating area.
C4ISR..................................... Will delay delivery of
assets--some components are
essential to asset
operation.
C4ISR is the key to being
AWARE in the maritime
region. Lacking awareness
increases our Nation's risk
for possible attacks from
terrorists and more
criminal activities.
Logistics................................. Unable to operate as
designed.
Readiness will be lower.
Suboptimal ``homeports'' due
to lack of shore
facilities--forcing use of
``Ports of Convenience.''
Systems Engineering & Integration......... Higher risk for lack of
synchronization of
Deepwater assets--will not
operate together.
These funds are required to
review all interoperability
connections which is a
labor intensive effort. If
these connections are not
properly developed and
tested, there will be a
higher probably of failure
during operational use.
Program Management........................ Unable to accomplish
inherently government work
necessary for success,
which includes the
oversight of the prime
contractor, the ability to
get other expert opinions
from sources outside the
government and/or prime
contractor, as well as
track those unique
responsibilities that
belong to the government
such as tracking program
progress and managing the
acquisition program
baseline.
Increased risk of failure
during operation and delay
in deploying due to
insufficient planning.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ All flight deck capable cutters will benefit from VUAV/MCH force
package surveillance capabilities.
Question. How will the Department and the Coast Guard address
Congress' frustration with the Coast Guard's poor responsiveness to
congressional direction?
Answer. Although the Coast Guard delivered several reports to the
Appropriations Committees late in fiscal year 2005, fiscal year 2006
has seen marked improvement. As a result of implementation of a series
of strategy meetings immediately following release of House, Senate,
and Conference Marks, report drafting and clearance times have
decreased. As of March 1, 2006, the Coast Guard has delivered all but
three of its fiscal year 2006 appropriations reports to Congress on or
before the due date, as demonstrated in the table below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date due to
Appropriations report Date delivered Congress
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Bi Annual) Port Security 2/14/2006......... Update of Oct 2005
Terrorism Exercises Results report
February 2006.
Coast Guard Housing Report \1\.. 2/13/2006......... 2/10/2006
Fisheries Enforcement (fiscal 2/9/2006.......... 2/10/2006
year 2006 Appropriations).
Patrol Boat Availability Report. 2/6/2006.......... 2/10/2006
Deepwater Implementation Plan 2/6/2006.......... 2/6/2006
Review.
MSST Policy Report.............. 2/6/2006.......... 2/6/2006
Operational Gap Analysis........ 2/6/2006.......... 2/6/2006
Fiscal year 2006 1st QTR 1/13/2006......... 1/15/2006
Acquisition Report \1\.
Fiscal year 2006 1st QTR 1/17/2006......... 1/15/2006
Abstract of Operations Report.
Occupational Safety and Health 1/4/2006.......... 12/18/2005
Risks Report \1\.
(Bi Annual) Port Security 10/28/2005........ 2/1/2006
Terrorism Exercises Results
October 2005.
Schedule of Port Security 10/24/2005........ 11/18/2005
Exercises.
Fiscal year 2005 4th QTR 10/13/2005........ 10/15/2005
Acquisition Report.
Fiscal year 2005 4th QTR 10/13/2005........ 10/15/2005
Abstract of Operations Report.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Delivered late.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANT (EMPG) PROGRAM
Question. After Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the need for strong
emergency management programs at the Federal, State, and local level,
emergency managers across the country anticipated an increase in the
President's Budget Request for the all-hazards Emergency Management
Performance Grant (EMPG) program. However, the President's Budget
Request proposed $170 million for the upcoming fiscal year, the same as
the previous year's request.
What role do you see for State and local emergency management
programs in national disaster preparedness?
Answer. The Department continues to fully support the EMPG program,
which helps States and Urban Areas achieve target levels of capability
to enhance the effectiveness of their emergency management programs.
The EMPG funding request for fiscal year 2007 is sufficient for States
to continue to develop intra- and interstate emergency management
systems that encourage partnerships among government, business,
volunteer, and community organizations based on identified needs and
priorities for strengthening their emergency management and
catastrophic planning capabilities. Further, homeland security is a
shared mission and thus a shared responsibility between the Federal
Government and our State and local partners. The Federal Government
should not be expected to bear all emergency planning costs. Instead,
the Department expects that States and localities will devote
significant funds to enhance their planing based on local conditions
and thereby help to improve the Nation's level of preparedness.
In addition, the Department's fiscal year 2007 budget request
expands the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) and the State
Homeland Security Program (SHSP), which will significantly enhance
State and local preparedness capabilities. In fiscal year 2007 the
Department has requested to expand the UASI program by $80.65 million.
The fiscal year 2007 UASI funding request will continue to help
establish a metropolitan area-wide approach to homeland security.
Allocating UASI funds based on risk and need will continue to reflect a
results-based planning process that supports achievement of minimum
baseline capability levels in our Nation's high threat urban areas. The
fiscal year 2007 budget request also includes an $83 million increase
in SHSP funding. These SHSP funds will continue to build capabilities
at the State and local levels through planning, equipment, training,
and exercise activities and to implement the goals and objectives
included in the Homelands Security Strategies.
Question. What role do you see for the EMPG program in the
Department of Homeland Security's national disaster planning for both
terrorism and natural disasters?
Answer. The National Preparedness Goal provides a common framework
for a systems-based approach to build, sustain, and improve national
preparedness for a broad range of threats and hazards, regardless of
origin. Achieving the National Preparedness Goal requires that the
emergency management discipline play a vital role in support of the
Goal, as well as the implementation of National Priorities and
achievement of the target levels of capability described in the TCL. As
the coordinator for disaster response operations, the emergency
management discipline is essential to the prevention, protection,
response, and recovery efforts necessary when disasters or other
incidents of national significance occur at the State and local level,
and when Federal assistance is needed.
Therefore, to sustain and enhance emergency management capabilities
in support of the Goal, the EMPG funds may assist States and urban
areas achieve the target levels of capability to sustain and enhance
the effectiveness of their emergency management program. As part of
this effort, the Administration has proposed to expand the scope of
EMPG activities to address homeland security planning. Further, the
program's current emphasis on funding staff costs limits our ability to
assess and measure results.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Arlen Specter
FEMA CONTRACT AWARDS
Question. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, there was concern about
the contracting processes used by FEMA to procure goods and services
and concern about the awarding of ``no-bid'' contracts. Are the
guidelines that direct contracting, especially during times of
emergency clear?
Answer. The guidelines contained in both the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) and the Homeland Security Acquisition Regulation
(HSAR) are clear as it relates to contracting during an emergency.
However, while the guidance is clear, it is spread among several parts
of the FAR. Therefore, to improve the responsiveness of the acquisition
community, the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council and the Defense
Acquisition Regulations Council are amending the FAR to provide a
consolidated reference to acquisition flexibilities that may be used
during emergency situations. Specifically, the information will be
consolidated into a previously reserved FAR part. This initiative,
however, makes no change to existing contracting policy.
Question. Is there anything Congress can do to make them clearer?
Answer. Additional legislation on this topic is unnecessary at this
time.
Question. What does FEMA need to do to improve disclosure of
contract awards?
Answer. FEMA is making every effort to operate with openness and
transparency with regard to contracts awarded to support the relief and
recovery efforts of Hurricane Katrina. In addition to complying with
the requirements of FAR 5.303, which requires notification to Congress
of contract awards exceeding $3 million, and FAR 4.6, which requires
the reporting of contracting data in to the Federal Procurement Data
System, DHS also posts, at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/
CPO-KatrinaContracts.pdf, all contract actions awarded by FEMA in
support of the relief and recovery effort. This list is updated weekly,
FEMA also posts, as required by FAR 4.6, the award of its contracting
actions into the Federal Procurement Data System. Recognizing the
importance of contract reporting, FEMA will provide implementing
guidance to all contracting personnel on the importance of timely
posting of contract awards.
Question. Does this budget proposal adequately fund those needs?
Answer. Yes. The President's Budget proposal adequately funds those
needs.
CARGO CONTAINER SECURITY
Question. In recent weeks, port security and cargo container
security in general have come to national attention. What statistics do
you have regarding the percent of all shipments entering the United
States that are inspected for compliance with United States and
international shipping regulations?
Answer. CBP targets incoming containerized cargo by automated
review of advance manifest and other information through its automated
targeting systems to assess the risk of incoming cargo shipments. CBP
examines all of the cargo that is identified as ``high-risk'' from this
initial targeting through either non-intrusive detection technology,
or, as needed, physical inspection.
CBP defines an examination as a physical inspection of a conveyance
and/or the imaging of a conveyance using large-scale Non-Intrusive
Inspection (NII) technology, for the presence of contraband. CPB
defines screening as a passive means of scanning a conveyance, baggage
or cargo. CBP screens conveyances, baggage, and cargoes with radiation
portal monitors and other radiation detection equipment for the
presence of radiological emissions.
From fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2005, the percentage of
total containers inspected has increased at a rate of 4.2 percent per
year. In fiscal year 2005, a total of 25,324,327 cargo conveyances
arrived in the United States from foreign sources and a total of
5,301,872 cargo conveyances were inspected.
In fiscal year 2005, approximately 21 percent of all cargo
conveyances (i.e., truck, rail and vessel) were examined for the
presence of contraband, and approximately 67 percent of arriving
containerized cargo was screened for radiation. Additionally, in fiscal
year 2005, CBP examined 569,308 or approximately 5 percent of all
arriving sea-borne containers.
Question. What sort of tools do inspection agents have to assist
them in screening containers in a timely, yet responsible manner?
Answer. Over the last several years, Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII)
technology has been the cornerstone of our layered enforcement
strategy. Technologies deployed to our Nation's air, sea, and land
border ports of entry include large-scale X-ray and Gamma-ray imaging
systems as well as a variety of portable and hand-held technologies to
include our recent focus on radiation detection technology. All CSI
ports are also required to have NII technology available to assist in
the inspection of identified high-risk containerized cargo bound for
the United States.
Large-scale systems include the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System
(VACIS), Mobile VACIS, Rail VACIS, Portal VACIS, Truck X-ray, Mobile
Truck X-ray, Mobile Sea Container System, Pallet Gamma-ray System and
Mobile GaRDs unit. Nuclear and radiological detection equipment
includes Personal Radiation Detectors, Radiation Portal Monitors and
Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices.
NII technologies are viewed as force multipliers that enable CBP to
examine or screen a larger portion of the stream of commercial traffic
while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade, cargo and passengers.
Question. Secretary Chertoff mentioned in his statement for the
record that the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate is developing
technology solutions that can be applied across the supply chain. How
is S&T working with the private sector to procure technology?
Answer. In support of the Department's layered supply-chain-
security strategy, the S&T Directorate interacts with the private
sector in two main ways: (1) through an ongoing dialog with industry
and (2) through technology procurements.
Maintaining an ongoing dialogue with private industry helps the S&T
Directorate understand the present state of technology in the
marketplace, enabling sound investment decisions that reflect current
and future capabilities and meet operational and industry user
requirements. This dialogue takes place with technology providers,
supply chain consultants, the shipping industry (including carriers,
terminal operators, and port authorities) and international partners.
The S&T Directorate is currently procuring security solution
technologies from both large and small companies, including university
laboratories. Technology procurements result from several contracting
vehicles, which include solicitations under Broad Agency Announcements
(BAA) and our Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program. The
S&T Directorate presently has private-sector procurements underway for
the design and/or development of the following technologies:
--Advanced Container Security Device.--A system to detect intrusion
on any six sides of a container as well as to sense a human
presence and report alarms;
--Advanced Material Container.--A proof-of-concept container
constructed of composite materials that will incorporate
embedded security sensors and communications systems;
--Marine Asset Tag Tracking System.--A system to provide remote
communications capability for an ACSD or CSD to send an alarm
or status information;
--Secure Carton.--Alternative concepts to today's shipping cartons
that will enable monitoring to detect and report breaches at
the carton level; and
--Intelligent Anomaly Detection Tools for the Automated Commercial
Environment and Automated Targeting System.--Advanced
technologies to enable improved capabilities to predict suspect
or threat containers bound for the United States. This is in
support of the Customs and Border Protection Automated
Commercial Environment and Automated Targeting System (ACE/
ATS).
The S&T Directorate is also evaluating developmental Container
Security Devices (CSD) that can monitor container doors and report
alarms, which are currently being marketed by vendors. The S&T
Directorate is purchasing sample devices from qualified vendors to
conduct bench tests and vulnerability assessments to determine the
suitability of these devices to meet the Department's requirements.
With these technologies, the S&T Directorate is developing a Supply
Chain Security Architecture, a technology framework that ensures the
integration of non-regulated supply chain information and container
security device data to securely and efficiently transmit it to
governmental and private-sector stakeholders. In line with the
Department's emphasis on private sector involvement in supply chain
security, the S&T Directorate is currently working with two supply
chain industry experts to ensure supply chain interactions and
processes are accurately reflected. As this architecture defines the
standards and protocols for security and information exchange, the
Department can leverage private-sector supply chain information
management systems to enhance risk assessments, while providing for
business efficiencies to the commercial and shipping industry.
Additionally, the S&T Directorate is committed to ensuring
interagency coordination with other Federal stakeholders involved in
supply chain security and to leverage existing capabilities and lessons
learned.
Question. What specific types of technology is the Department
looking for?
Answer. The Department is seeking technologies and processes to
improve visibility and security across international supply chains. The
S&T Directorate is developing and evaluating many of these
technologies. They include security devices with the ability to monitor
the integrity of intermodal shipping containers in transit and
communicate status and alarm information about those containers to the
National Targeting Center (NTC). Critical to enabling these
capabilities are underlying technologies that can: operate in the harsh
intermodal shipping environment; provide close to 100-percent assurance
that sensors can detect authorized or unauthorized door openings and
closings, holes or false doors created on any side of a container; and
interface with other sensors currently under development to detect
human cargo, explosives, chemical, biological, or radiological
material, or breaches to the containers' contents at carton level. In
that containers transit unattended through the supply chain, these
container security sensors also require the ability to not be easily
compromised by either an insider attack or an outside adversary along
the supply chain.
The Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD), currently under
development in the S&T Directorate will utilize advanced sensors and
fusion systems to detect intrusion on any of the six sides of the
container and detect human cargo. The ACSD will be able to interface
with next generation advanced sensors currently under development
within the S&T Directorate that detect chemical or biological agents.
In addition, these systems require remote communications capabilities
to allow reach-back to the NTC to communicate alerts from any point
along the supply chain, as well as local communications systems for CBP
officers in the field. Other sensor suites which will be integrated
with the ACSD will include systems currently under development by the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to detect and report
radiological or nuclear agents.
As part of an effort to identify near term deployable security
systems for intermodal shipping containers, the S&T Directorate is
currently in the process of evaluating a variety of existing
developmental vendor Container Security Device (CSD) technologies that
claim to have the ability to monitor and report intrusion of the
container doors. Key to these evaluations is verification of claimed
system performance and reliable sensor performance. The end goal of
this survey is to accelerate a near term capability in advance of ACSD
development to monitor and report container door breaches to the NTC.
Other technologies under development and critical to container
security are communications systems that can transmit information from
containers intermodally and globally, while penetrating the high metal
environment of container stacks at ports and on ships or while in
transit on ship, rail and truck.
Beyond CSD and ACSD, the S&T Directorate is also evaluating a next
generation container constructed of advanced, light-weight materials
(versus steel) that will allow security sensors and communications
technologies to be built into the container's walls, doors and floors.
It is believed lighter weight containers will also increase business
efficiencies.
Lastly, the S&T Directorate is assisting DHS components in the
development of an architectural framework to enable integration of
supply chain data beyond that currently regulated by Customs and Border
Protection (CBP). This data combined with container integrity
information, when fused in a secure and efficient manner, will enhance
risk assessment benefiting security, while providing business
efficiencies to the commercial and shipping industry. Part of this
effort also involves the development of advanced intelligent algorithms
for use by CBP's targeting system to further improve anomaly detection
capabilities to improve assessment and targeting of high risk cargo.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT
BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION OFFICE
Question. Provide a list of accomplishments from the beginning of
fiscal year 2005 to date for the Business Transformation Office.
Answer.
Fiscal Year 2005
The BTO was responsible for several major projects during fiscal
year 2005, such as creating the functional integration Management
Directives, creating a comprehensive set of functional integration
milestones for each of the Management Lines of Business, establishing
functional integration support contracts, and tracking functional
integration priorities for the Management Directorate. The BTO reviewed
and tracked Management Directorate programs/initiatives for schedule
compliance based on identified milestones: eMerge, the Infrastructure
Transformation Program (ITP), MaxHR, HSPD-12 and IT Cost Avoidance. The
BTO also coordinated: On-boarding/Exit process, Senior Executive
Service process, Administrative Analysis project, and streamlining the
hiring process. Additional detail on the above projects is provided in
the paragraphs that follow.
In accordance with direction established in the Functional
Integration management Directives, the BTO instituted an annual
reporting process for establishing, measuring and reporting on
Component functional performance for business processes that are the
responsibility of the CXOs. The BTO also established a
process for evaluating and reporting on the performance of Component
CXOs and other Key Functional Officials to Component Heads.
Strategic Plan.--The BTO was responsible for the creation of a
multi-year Strategic Plan for the Management Directorate. The BTO began
constructing templates and defining content for Line of Business annual
reports and for business cases supporting functional integration
initiatives.
Management Directives.--The BTO was also responsible for creating
the Functional Integration Management Directives, which provided
direction on the leadership, integration, and management of the support
services through each Line of Business Chief (Chief Administrative
Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Information Officer, Chief
Human Capital Officer, Chief Procurement Officer and Chief Security
Officer).
Since its creation, DHS has achieved many of its objectives toward
integrating the management functions. From the many systems and
programs that DHS inherited, the Department has consolidated the
following:
--18 financial management centers down to 8 centers;
--27 bank card programs down to 3 programs;
--22 Human Resource Servicing offices down to 7 offices;
--8 payroll providers down to 1 payroll provider;
--22 Personal Property Management systems down to 3 systems;
--Acquisition Support for 22 agencies has been consolidated to 8
major procurement programs;
--1,100 Administrative Services agreements with other Federal
Departments to 39 agreements;
--52 percent of workforce through the Tri-Bureau initiative
(Organized shared services and resources needed to more
efficiently and jointly support our immigration, customs and
border protection activities (Customs and Border Protection/
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services/Immigration and
Customs Enforcement);
--Consolidated over 35,000 express package service contracts into 1
contract;
--129 commercial information content subscription services to 8
services; and
--Numerous copier maintenance and service contracts into 1 centrally
managed departmental contract.
In addition, the Department has published uniform DHS acquisition
regulations that apply across the enterprise and has established the
first Department-wide real property asset management plan which will
govern the consistent and efficient use and development of DHS land,
buildings and structures for mission accomplishment.
CXO Councils.--Each Line of Business Chief established a
Department-wide council to serve as a governance board which would
monitor and measure the performance of centers of excellence, shared
services providers, managed partner providers, and self-supporting
component providers for the various activities of their function.
Tri-Bureau Governance Board.--The Tri-Bureau Governance Board was
created in 2003 to oversee shared services and to serve as a decision
maker in regard to service consolidation across the Tri-Bureau
components.
MOUs/MOAs.--In fiscal year 2005, the BTO ensured that Memorandum's
of Agreement (MOA) and Memorandum's Understanding (MOU) between the
Department, DHS components and other government agencies were
established that would enable the Department to work more effectively
and efficiently with other Government entities. The BTO was responsible
for the execution of critical MOU's during the stand-up of the
Department of Homeland Security with DOJ, DOT, GSA, DOC, DOE, and
Treasury.
Fiscal Year 2006
In fiscal year 2006, the BTO completed the multi-year Strategic
Plan for the Management Directorate, the first in a series of six
Business Cases for implementing functional integration (Chief of
Administrative Services), and detailed annual reports for the
Management Directorate Lines of Business.
Functional Integration Milestones and Budget: The BTO continues to
build on the management integration work from fiscal year 2005 by
creating a comprehensive set of functional integration milestones for
each of the Management Directorate Lines of Business. The functional
integration milestones are critical deliverables and/or capabilities
with due dates that must be met by the Management Directorate Lines of
Business.
The BTO is developing a consolidated financial budget focused on
synchronizing the functional integration budgets of the Lines of
Business with their relevant components' budgets. This consolidated
functional integration budget will allow an accurate insight into where
money is being spent and how much is being spent in each of the Lines
of Business. This will enable the Department to set a baseline from
which we can begin to explore organizational transformation across the
Department and to develop an overall integration strategy for the
Management Directorate.
The BTO also continues to prioritize and track functional
integration priorities for the Management Directorate. The BTO will
continue to drive the integration of legacy support systems, maximizing
common platforms and leveraging the ``economies of scale'' that exist.
Another priority is to conduct a review of operations in the Management
Directorate on a macro level and look for additional opportunities to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Directorate.
Question. What are the pros and cons of combining this office with
the Immediate Office of the Under Secretary of Management?
Answer. There are benefits to having the Business Transformation
Office (BTO) as a separate staff element reporting to the Under
Secretary for Management. The BTO initiative requires specific skills
in planning, organizational development, program & management analysis,
project management and budget/finance which are different from those
required in the Immediate Office of the Under Secretary.
The BTO staff members generally have in-depth experience with the
business processes of one or more of the functional Lines of Business.
As a direct report to the Under Secretary, the BTO has access and
exposure to the full spectrum of initiatives across all management
functions (administrative services, enterprise architecture, financial
management, information technology, human capital management,
procurement, and security). Consequently, the BTO staff members are
appropriately qualified and in the proper position to identify
initiatives and interdependencies among the Lines of Business as the
Functional Integration efforts continue.
Combining the BTO with the immediate office of the Under Secretary
could be done as well, but there are few benefits to doing so. One
advantage would be that the staff members of the BTO could provide
program management skills and analysis for other more narrowly-defined
initiatives within the Management Directorate and among DHS components.
A disadvantage of this combination, however, would be that the long
term planning and functional integration roles of the BTO would most
likely be overcome by the day to day events that require immediate
attention within the Management Directorate and among the DHS
components.
EXECUTIVE SEDAN SERVICE
Question. Provide an analysis of the pros and cons of performing
the duties of the executive sedan service in house (i.e. leasing/
procuring the needed vehicles and hiring the needed drivers) as opposed
to contracting out for this service?
Answer. The following analysis shows pros, cons and not only cost,
but also organizational flexibility and administrative burdens as well
to provide executive sedan service for DHS executives and senior
officials.
Completely In-house
DHS EXECUTIVE SEDAN SERVICE--IN-HOUSE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Owned Vehicles (10 @ $23,000/vehicle--cost averaged over $46,000
5 years)...............................................
Maintenance............................................. 9,000
18 Drivers (12 hour shift--average 21 days/mo.)......... 1,720,232
3 Dispatchers........................................... 186,390
2 Driver Foremen........................................ 136,031
Supervisor.............................................. 118,346
---------------
Total............................................. 2,215,999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicles would be used over a 5 year period. Maintenance and
operational costs would be expected to increase over the life of the
vehicle. Disposal costs would be necessary at the end of the period.
Vehicles are DHS assets and are available for use in a COOP or
emergent situation.
Additional vehicle(s) necessary as ready back up in case of
accident or other failure, and for rotation during scheduled
maintenance.
Staff may be assigned to other transportation related duties as
need and workload dictate in unusual situations.
A significant addition to on-board FTE is required to assure
sufficient drivers and support for a 12 hour per day operation, while
also providing coverage for holidays, annual leave and sick leave.
This also adds some administrative burden to other administrative
functions such as human capital and finance.
Completely Contracted Out
DHS EXECUTIVE SEDAN SERVICE--FULLY CONTRACTED
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicles (9 vehicles @ $40,000--averaged over 5 years).. $72,000
Drivers................................................. 952,560
Dispatchers............................................. 219,135
---------------
Total............................................. 1,243,695
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contractor is responsible for assuring an adequate number of
cleared staff to provide the required support.
Contractor is also responsible for assuring an adequate number of
vehicles are available to meet the requirements of the contract.
Only pay for vehicles used, but with maintenance, replacement,
standby and mark up costs included. Costs would be higher if vehicles
are replaced on preferred 2-year cycle. Maintenance and down time would
be reduced and reliability increased.
Vehicles are assets owned by the contractor, and availability in a
COOP or emergent situations would not be expected.
Administrative burden is minimized as human capital support in
recruitment and processing as Federal employees is not required.
Contractor personnel may not be asked to perform tasks not
specifically covered by the scope of the contract.
Current Arrangement is a Hybrid
The Department currently contracts for vehicles (leases a
competitive procurement) and driving services separately in order to
take advantage of the lower costs and flexibilities that each has to
offer, while limiting overhead. The Department is paying $799 per month
($9,588 annually) per vehicle for a fully serviced lease which includes
maintenance and full insurance coverage. Cars are replaced every 2
years, which keeps reliability high and the leasing company can sell
the vehicle which keeps lease costs lower. If the contractor were to
acquire the vehicles, the Government would pay a higher price along
with a markup by the vendor. If a vehicle is out of service due to
other than routine maintenance, a loaner is often available,
eliminating the need to maintain another vehicle as a backup.
By contracting for the drivers and dispatchers, the contractor
bears responsibility for assuring that a sufficient number of cleared
personnel are available to provide the required level of service.
Contracting for the drivers and dispatchers also reduces administrative
burden on DHS.
--Although using contractor personnel, the vehicles remain DHS assets
and are available for use in a COOP or emergent situation.
--Administrative burden is less than the other options.
--No disposal costs
--Through use of an executive lease program, maintenance and
insurance are included and loaners are often available thus
minimizing the need for a backup vehicle.
MAXHR
Question. How many of the 29 new positions requested in the budget
for the MAXHR program could be negatively affected by a ruling against
the Department in it MAXHR court case?
Answer. Of the 29 new positions requested for the MAXHR program,
only six--those additional positions that would be used to support the
Homeland Security Labor Relations Board (HSLRB)--could potentially be
impacted by the court case.
Question. How much of $38.9 million increase to the ``Advisory and
Assistance Services'' component of the MaxHR program could be
negatively affected by a ruling against the Department in the MAXHR
court case?
Answer. With respect to the $71,749,000 requested in fiscal year
2007 for human resource management, the only funding that could be
foregone if the outcome of the court case is not in the Department's
favor would be the $7.450 million allocated for the Homeland Security
Labor Relations Board.
Question. In the event of a court ruling against the Department,
what are the Department's contingency plans with respect to the new
positions and support funding?
Answer. Regardless of the outcome of the litigation pending before
the Court of Appeals, the implementation of MAXHR will continue at DHS.
The process for implementation may be significantly more difficult,
however, if the outcome is not favorable to the Department. The
flexibilities in the legislation and the MAXHR regulations were
intended to allow the Department to construct a uniform, performance
based personnel system that would span the various components and
occupational categories across the Department. If those flexibilities
are not sustained by the court, the Department still intends to
implement a uniform personnel system but may have to invest
considerably more time and energy in negotiations and consultations
with the unions that represent employees in more than fifty bargaining
units across the organization. In addition, the Department may also
need to maintain multiple pay and performance management systems for a
longer time, pending the implementation of a single, unified MAXHR
system.
DHS HEADQUARTERS
Question. Will the $8.2 million requested in the fiscal year 2007
budget complete the build-out of the NAC? If so, when will the build-
out be finished?
Answer. The requested $8.2 million requested in the fiscal year
2007 budget will complete the build out of the NAC. We expect there may
be a need for some minimal funds in the out years to manage any minor
rearrangements and reconfigurations as missions changes require.
Question. When the build-out is complete, how much additional
capacity for growth (in terms of office space available) will the
Department have at the NAC?
Answer. After the NAC build-out is complete the NAC will be at full
capacity with approximately 300,000 usable square feet of space for
about 1,700 people, and there will be no additional office space
available.
PROCUREMENT REPORT
Question. As directed by the fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, provide a report on the number of procurement
officers for each Departmental component and include an assessment of
the adequacy of the number and training of these personnel.
Answer. The CPO continues to work with components and the DHS CFO
to budget for increased contracting staff. Based on fiscal year 2005
staffing levels, increases have been realized in both fiscal year 2006
(11 percent) and are projected fiscal year 2007 (47 percent) based on
the President's proposed budget. The CPO will work to continue this
trend until optimum staffing levels are attained. The following chart
shows the staffing numbers and the percentage of trained and certified
contracting officers.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of
Authorized FTE Authorized FTE President's Certified
Org Element Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Budget FTE Contracting
2005 2006 Fiscal Year Officers on
2007 Board
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP............................................. 92 119 179 79
OPO............................................. 127 127 227 79
TSA............................................. 67 105 165 74
ICE............................................. 81 64 96 32
USCG............................................ 336 339 339 89
FEMA............................................ 55 85 127 79
FLETC........................................... 31 36 36 100
USSS............................................ 25 25 25 96
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMPETITIVE SOURCING PERSONNEL
Question. How many of the 50 positions requested in the Office of
Procurement's fiscal year 2007 budget request are to be used for
competitive sourcing activities?
Answer. Currently one position will be added to competitive
sourcing. Once the Director of Acquisition Programs is on board we will
leverage the staffing of the OCPO programs to offset peaks and valleys
in work load requirements.
Question. How many positions in the Office of Procurement are
currently used for competitive sourcing activities?
Answer. Two positions.
CONTRACTING OUT REPORT
Question. The fiscal year 2004 Appropriation Omnibus (H.R. 2673)
Division F--Departments of Transportation and Treasury, and Independent
Agencies, Title VI Section 647(b), contained the following reporting
requirement: ``Not later than 120 days following the enactment of this
Act and not later than December 31 of each year thereafter, the head of
each executive agency shall submit to Congress a report on the
competitive sourcing activities on the list required under the Federal
Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-270; 31 U.S.C.
501 note) that were performed for such executive agency during the
previous fiscal year by Federal Government sources.''
The Committee has not yet received this year's report. Please
provide this information as well as any plans for public-private
competitions in fiscal year 2007.
Answer. The DHS fiscal year 2005 Section 647 report is being
prepared for submission to the Congress and posting on the DHS web
site.
Question. For fiscal year 2005 (actual), fiscal year 2006
(estimate), and fiscal year 2007 (request), how many positions in the
Department (broken down by agency) were competed and how much did the
competitions cost.
Answer. As noted in the Department of Homeland Security's Section
647 Report to Congress, DHS completed Competitive Sourcing (OMB
Circular A-76) competitions involving a total of 137 FTE in fiscal year
2005, at a one time cost of $787,000. All of these competitions were
retained in house.
For fiscal year 2006, DHS has completed competitions involving 150
FTE to date--all retained in-house--and is currently preparing for the
completion of additional competitions involving 235 FTE.
DHS is currently planning to announce in fiscal year 2006 several
competitions for completion in fiscal year 2007 involving 4,153 FTE.
Question. How many positions were subsequently contracted out as a
result of the competition?
Answer. No positions were contracted out in fiscal year 2005 and no
positions have been converted to contract performance as a result of
our fiscal year 2006 efforts to date.
DETAILEES TO THE WHITE HOUSE
Question. How many DHS employees (including the component agencies)
are currently detailed to the White House (including all Executive
Office of the President agencies)? Provide the committee a list
containing the originating agency; the office they are detailed to;
salary grade/step; length of detail (including beginning and end
dates); purpose of the detail; and indicate if the agency is
reimbursed.
Answer. Our most recent quarterly report shows 13 detailees to the
White House as of 12/31/05. See attached report entitled White House
Detailees.
FISCAL YEAR 2006 1ST QUARTER--DHS DETAILEES TO THE WHITE HOUSE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Detailed from
Reporting agency Detailed to which NON-DHS agency which NON-DHS Detailed from which Originating agency Grade/step or salary Detail start date Detail end date Purpose of detail Reimb. Y/N
agency DHS component
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USCG............................. WHITE HOUSE........................... .............. .................... USCG................ O-5................. Oct-2005............ Mar-2006............ Comprehensive N
Review Working
Group/Katrina
Lessons Learned
Team.
USCG/PHS......................... WHITE HOUSE........................... .............. DHS/USCG/PHS........ USCG/PHS............ MILITARY............ 6/13/2005........... 7/1/2008............ White House N
Physician
Assistant.
USCG............................. WHITE HOUSE/HSC....................... .............. DHS/USCG............ DHS/USCG............ MILITARY............ 6/14/2004........... 7/1/2006............ Director for Cargo N
and Port Security,
HSC.
USCG............................. WHITE HOUSE/HSC....................... .............. DHS/USCG............ DHS/USCG............ MILITARY............ 9/20/2004........... 11/1/2005........... Senior Director, N
Border and
Transportation
Security, HSC.
USCG............................. WHITE HOUSE/NSC....................... .............. DHS/USCG............ DHS/USCG............ MILITARY............ 5/28/2004........... 7/1/2006............ Duty Officer, White N
House Situation
Room.
USCG............................. WHITE HOUSE/NSC....................... .............. DHS/USCG............ DHS/USCG............ MILITARY............ 6/27/2005........... 7/1/2007............ Duty Officer, White N
House Situation
Room.
USCG............................. WHITE HOUSE/NSC....................... .............. DHS/US CG........... DHS/USCG............ MILITARY............ 11/17/2005.......... 7/1/2007............ Director for Drugs N
and Latin America,
NSC.
USCG............................. WHITE HOUSE/ONDCP..................... .............. DHS/USCG............ DHS/USCG............ MILITARY............ 7/15/2004........... 7/1/2006............ Office of Supply N
Reduction as the
Acting Staff
Director and the
Coast Guard
Liaison.
USCG............................. WHITE HOUSE/OVP....................... .............. DHS/USCG............ DHS/USCG............ MILITARY............ 5/17/2005........... 7/1/2007............ Military Aide to N
the VP.
USCG............................. WHITE HOUSE/OVP....................... .............. DHS/USCG............ DHS/USCG............ MILITARY............ 6/22/2005........... 7/1/2007............ Special Assistant N
to the VP.
USCG............................. WHITE HOUSE/OVP....................... .............. DHS/USCG............ DHS/USCG............ MILITARY............ 3/21/2005........... 7/1/2007............ Military Aide to N
the President.
USCG............................. WHITE HOUSE/WHCA...................... .............. DHS/USCG............ DHS/USCG............ MILITARY............ 5/5/2003............ 7/1/2006............ Chief of N
Engineering, WHCA.
USSS............................. WHITE HOUSE/WHO....................... .............. .................... USSS................ $94,260............. Jul-2005............ Jul-2006............ COOP Policy........ Y
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total White House Detailees 13.
DETAILEES TO THE DEPARTMENT
Question. How many employees of DHS component agencies are
currently detailed to the Department? Provide the committee a list
containing the originating agency; the office they are detailed to;
salary grade/step; length of detail (including beginning and end
dates); purpose of the detail; and indicate if this agency is
reimbursed.
Answer. Our most recent report (as of 12/31/05) shows 244 staff
detailed to DHS Headquarters offices. Slightly over half are detailed
to Operations. See attached report entitled QFR detailees.
FISCAL YEAR 2006 1ST QUARTER--DHS DETAILEES TO THE HEADQUARTERS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Detailed from which Detail start Reimb.
Reporting agency DHS component Originating agency Grade/step or salary date Detail end date Purpose of detail Y/N
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CRCL.......................... TSA................. TSA................. TSA Band H.......... 11/1/2005....... 2/28/2006...... Serve as Control Officer, Complaint Adjudication N
Program, CRCL.
DNDO.......................... S&T................. S&T................. $86,103 (1101)...... 04/15/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys N
Architect- ure.
DNDO.......................... S&T................. S&T................. $97,734 (IPA)....... 04/15/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Assessments. N
DNDO.......................... USCG................ USCG................ $65,000 (0-4)....... 12/05/05........ 06/04/06....... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Dev & N
Acq.
DNDO.......................... S&T................. S&T................. $200,000 (IPA)...... 04/15/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Director.... N
DNDO.......................... S&T................. S&T................. GS-13/1............. 04/18/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support. N
DNDO.......................... SLGCP............... SLGCP............... GS-15/1............. 10/03/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Dev & N
Acq.
DNDO.......................... USCG................ USCG................ $120,000 (O-6)...... 01/09/06........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Policy...... N
DNDO.......................... S&T................. S&T................. $151,156 (1101)..... 04/15/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Trans. R&D.. N
DNDO.......................... S&T................. S&T................. GS-15/2............. 03/01/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support. N
DNDO.......................... CBP................. CBP................. $122,000 (IPA)...... 06/09/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Engineer- N
ing.
DNDO.......................... SLGCP............... SLGCP............... GS-15/3............. 02/14/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Policy S&L.. N
DNDO.......................... CBP................. CBP................. GS-14/8............. 07/26/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Dev & N
Acq.
DNDO.......................... USCG................ USCG................ $95,000 (O-4)....... 12/05/05........ 06/04/06....... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support. N
DNDO.......................... SLGCP............... SLGCP............... GS-15/6............. 10/03/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Dev & N
Acq.
DNDO.......................... TSA................. TSA................. $128,000 (K Band)... 02/05/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Chief of N
Staff.
DNDO.......................... S&T................. S&T................. $173,186 (IPA)...... 06/04/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Assessments. N
DNDO.......................... S&T................. S&T................. GS-14/1............. 04/18/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support. N
DNDO.......................... CBP................. CBP................. GS-15/1............. 02/19/06........ 02/19/07....... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support. N
DNDO.......................... USCG................ USCG................ $95,000 (O-4)....... 01/09/06........ 01/09/08....... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Systems N
Engineering.
DNDO.......................... SLGCP............... SLGCP............... GS-12/1............. 08/15/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support. N
DNDO.......................... CBP................. CBP................. GS-14/5............. 07/31/05........ Indefinite..... Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support. N
I&A IA-H/AS................... OGC................. DHS/OGC............. GS 15............... 7/12/04......... Indefinite..... Support to I&A mission as attorney................ N
I&A IA-H/AS................... OGC................. OGC................. GS-15............... 12/15/03........ Indefinite..... Support to I&A mission as attorney................ N
I&A IA-C/CA................... ICE................. ICE................. GS-14............... 4/13/04......... Indefinite..... Support to I&A mission............................ N
I&A IA-C/CA................... TSA................. TSA................. GS-14............... 5/24/04......... Indefinite..... Support to I&A mission & TSA REP.................. N
I&A IA-D/TA................... USCG................ USCG................ LT.................. 1/24/05......... Indefinite..... Support to I&A mission & USCG Rep................. Y
I&A IA-D/TA................... USCG................ USCG................ .................... 8/10/05......... Indefinite..... Support to I&A mission & USCG Rep................. Y
I&A IA-D/TA................... CBP................. CBP................. GS-14............... 11/3/2003....... Indefinite..... Support to I&A mission & CBP Rep.................. N
I&A IA-H/IM................... CIA................. CIA................. SIS................. 10/20/05........ Indefinite..... DIRECTOR INFO MGT................................. Y
I&A IA-L P&I.................. NSA................. NSA................. GS-15............... ................ Indefinite..... Support to I&A mission & NSA rep.................. N
I&A IA-P/P&I.................. USCG................ USCG................ Lt. Cdr............. 11/28/05........ Indefinite..... USCG LIAISON TO ASIA.............................. N
L&IA.......................... CIS................. CIS................. 84,751.............. 1/1/2004........ Indefinite..... LEG AFFAIRS LIAISON TO IMMIGRATION................ N
L&IA.......................... TSA................. TSA................. 57,925.............. 7/11/2005....... 9/1/2005....... LEG AFFAIRS LIAISON TO TSA........................ N
L&IA.......................... COAST GUARD......... COAST GUARD......... MILITARY............ 6/23/2005....... Indefinite..... LEG AFFAIRS LIAISON TO COAST GUARD................ N
OGC........................... USCG................ USCG................ 82,937.............. 3/1/2005........ 3/1/2007....... Assist with international issues and with Team Y
Telecom/CFIUS legal issues.
OGC........................... USCG................ USCG................ 82,937.............. 3/1/2005........ 3/31/2006...... Provide legal advice concerning issues as they N
involve the USCG.
OGC........................... USCIS............... CIS................. 110,878............. 3/1/2005........ 12/31/2006..... Provide substantive immigration expertise to DHS N
OGC, focusing on issues relating to immigration
benefits and related USCIS issues.
OGC........................... ICE................. ICE................. 135,136............. 7/1/2005........ 12/31/2006..... Provide substantive immigration expertise to DHS N
OGC, focusing on issues relating to immigration
enforcement and related ICE issues.
OGC........................... HSLRB............... DHS................. 107,521............. 12/1/2005....... 12/31/2006..... Assist with implementation of MaxHR............... N
OGC........................... HSLRB............... DHS................. 107,521............. 12/1/2005....... 12/31/2006..... Assist with OGC's Katrina Task Force.............. N
OGC........................... UCSIS............... USCIS............... 118,272............. 12/1/2005....... 12/1/2006...... Assist with promulgation of regulations that N
impact on USCIS mission.
OPS Dir....................... ICE................. ICE................. GS-14............... Jul 2003........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. SIA................. GS-14............... Aug 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ IP-NICC............. Cont................ Oct 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... TSA................. TSA................. J................... May 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. S&T................. Cont................ May 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CBP................. CBP................. GS-12............... Dec 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CIS................. CIS................. GS-13............... Sep 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ IP-NICC............. GS-14............... Jan 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... TSA................. TSA................. H................... Apr 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... TSA................. TSA................. J................... Oct 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. S&T................. CDR................. Jul 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... FEMA................ FEMA................ GS-14............... May 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ RMD................. Cont................ Jan 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&L................. S&L................. Cont................ Dec 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CBP................. CBP................. GS-12............... Oct 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... USSS................ USSS................ GS-12............... Oct 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... DOI................. DOI................. GS-13............... Dec 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. S&T................. Cont................ Oct 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. DNDO................ Cont................ Nov 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... PAO................. PAO................. E-7................. Jan 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... USCG................ USCG................ Lt.................. May 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... ICE................. ICE................. GS-12............... Aug 2003........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ RMD................. Cont................ Jul 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. HSOMB............... Cont................ Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... TSA................. TSA................. GS-13............... Oct 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... USCG................ USCG................ O-3................. Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ SIA................. GS-13............... Jan 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. HSOMB............... Cont................ Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... DOI................. FPS /DOI............ GS-14............... Jan 2006........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ RMD................. Cont................ Jun 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... USCG................ USCG................ O-3................. Jun 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CIS................. CIS................. GS-13............... Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. SIA................. GS-14............... Dec 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CBP................. CBP................. GS-12............... May 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... USCG................ USCG................ E-6................. Oct 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. SIA................. GS-11............... Jan 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... FEMA................ FEMA................ GS-14............... Apr 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA.................. Cont................ Jan 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. S&T................. Cont................ Mar 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. S&T................. Cont................ Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. S&T................. Cont................ Dec 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA-R................ GS-14............... Jan 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&L................. S&L................. Cont................ Aug 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. SIA................. GS-13............... Oct 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... DHS Security........ Security............ Cont................ Apr 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... USCG................ SWO................. O-6................. Jun 2003........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... FEMA................ FEMA................ GS-14............... Jan 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&L................. S&L................. Cont................ May 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA-R................ GS-12............... Sep 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA.................. Cont................ Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA-R................ GS-13............... Jul 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ Fusion.............. Cont................ Oct 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... TSA................. FAM................. GS-12............... Oct 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ RMD................. Cont................ May 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CIS................. CIS................. GS-13............... Sep 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA-T................ Cont................ Jan 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA.................. Cont................ Feb 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. S&T................. Cont................ May 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA.................. GS-14............... Mar 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CBP................. CBP................. GS-12............... Jun 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ NBSG................ Cont................ Feb 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA-T................ Cont................ Jan 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... TSA................. TSA................. J................... Mar 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ IP-NICC............. Cont................ Sep 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CBP................. CBP................. GS-12............... May 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA.................. GS-11............... Oct 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... USCG................ USCG................ Lt.................. May 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... DHS Security........ Security............ Cont................ Sep 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CIS................. CIS................. GS-13............... Sep 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. SIA................. GS-13............... Nov 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... ICE................. ICE................. GS-14............... Jul 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ NBSG................ Cont................ Sep 2003........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CIS................. CIS................. GS-13............... Sep 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. S&T................. Cont................ Jan 2006........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA-T................ GS-11............... May 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... FEMA................ FEMA................ GS-14............... May 2003........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... ICE................. Future Ops.......... GS-15............... Mar 2003........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA.................. Cont................ Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA.................. Cont................ May 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ IP-NICC............. Cont................ Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. S&T................. Cont................ Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... DHS Security........ Internal Security... Cont................ Oct 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ IP-NICC............. Cont................ Jan 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... FEMA................ FEMA................ GS-11............... Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ IP-NICC............. GS-15............... Jan 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... ICE................. ICE................. GS-13............... Sep 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&L................. S&L................. Cont................ Nov 2003........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... DHS Security........ Security............ Cont................ Oct 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA-R................ Cont................ Oct 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... FPS................. FPS................. CMDR................ Nov 2003........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CIS................. CIS................. GS-12............... Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. SIA................. GS-15............... Aug 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA-T................ Cont................ Jan 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. SIA................. Cont................ Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... USCG................ USCG................ O-2................. Jan 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&L................. S&L................. Cont................ Jan 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. SIA................. GS-13............... Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... DHS PAO............. PAO................. GS-13............... Apr 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... DHS Security........ Security............ GS-14............... Jan 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA.................. Cont................ Jul 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... ICE................. ICE................. GS-14............... Sep 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... TSA................. TSA................. K................... Sep 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... FEMA................ FEMA................ GS-15............... Mar 2003........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. DNDO................ Cont................ Jan 2006........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CBP................. CBP................. GS-11............... Jan 2006........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ RMD................. Cont................ Jan 2006........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CBP................. CBP................. GS-12............... Jun 2003........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. HSOMB............... Cont................ Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... USCG................ USCG................ E-7................. Oct 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. S&T................. LCRD................ Jan 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. NBSG................ Cont................ Oct 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA-R................ Cont................ Aug 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA-T................ Cont................ Jan 2006........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. SIA................. GS-13............... May 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ RMD................. Cont................ Jan 2006........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CIS................. CIS................. GS-14............... Sep 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. S&T................. Cont................ Aug 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... USSS................ USSS................ GS-13............... Oct 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ PSA................. Cont................ Jul 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... IA.................. IA.................. GS-12............... Aug 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... CIS................. CIS................. GS-12............... Sep 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... USCG................ Executive Staff..... CDR................. Jun 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. NBSG................ Cont................ Dec 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... S&T................. S&T................. LCDR................ May 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir....................... Prep Dir............ RMD................. Cont................ Aug 2004........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Directorate............... Prep Dir............ RMD................. Cont................ Mar 2005........ Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
PREPAREDNESS.................. USCG................ USCG................ LT Commander........ 9/1/03.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. ICE................. NCSD................ GS-14............... 1/12/05......... 1/12/06........ Support law enforcement and Intelligence.......... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. INS................. INS................. SES................. 6/1/03.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... Y
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS 14/.............. 1/1/03.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS 13/.............. 12/1/02......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS 7/............... 1/1/04.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. FEMA................ FEMA................ GS-12............... 5/10/06......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ UND--Off............ 1/1/04.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. ICE................. ICE................. GS-1811-14.......... 11/1/03......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS 15/.............. 1/1/03.......... 1/1/04......... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. FEMA................ FEMA................ GS-14............... 9/13/05......... 5/6/06......... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. ICE................. ICE................. GS-14............... 12/1/03......... Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
PREPAREDNESS.................. S&T................. S&T Augmentee....... Detailed Contractor. 4/1/03.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS 15/.............. 11/1/03......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. EP&R................ EP&R................ GS-14............... 9/10/03......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS 13/.............. 5/1/03.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS 13/.............. 12/1/02......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USCG................ USCG................ LT.................. 4/1/05.......... 6/1/06......... Support to Preparedness mission................... Y
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS-14............... 7/1/04.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. CBP................. CBP................. GS-14............... 10/1/05......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS-15............... 8/2/05.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. CBP................. CBP................. GS-11............... 11/17/03........ Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ NCSD................ GS-14............... 1/4/05.......... Indefinite..... Support Law Enforcement and Intelligence.......... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. TSA................. TSA................. SES................. 9/1/05.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... Y
PREPAREDNESS.................. ICE................. ICE................. GS-0132-13.......... 1/1/04.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. ICE................. ICE................. GS-14............... 4/13/04......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. ICE................. ICE................. GS-1811-14.......... 1/1/03.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USCG................ USCG................ LT Commander........ 4/1/04.......... 6/1/06......... Support to Preparedness mission................... Y
PREPAREDNESS.................. ICE................. ICE................. SES................. 6/1/03.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS 13/.............. 12/1/02......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. FEMA................ FEMA................ SES................. 9/13/05......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. CBP................. CBP................. GS-13............... 11/3/03......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. TSA................. TSA................. J................... 3/1/03.......... Indefinite..... Provide real-time situational awareness and N
monitoring of the Homeland.
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS 6/............... 1/1/04.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. ICE................. ICE................. GS-0132-14.......... 3/1/03.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. FEMA................ FEMA................ GS-13............... 9/13/05......... 5/10/06........ Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. TSA................. TSA................. H................... 12/23/03........ Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. FEMA................ FEMA................ GS-13............... 3/1/03.......... Indefinite..... Assist State and Local officials during DHS stand N
up.
PREPAREDNESS.................. FEMA................ FEMA................ SES................. 10/1/05......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. TSA................. TSA................. H................... 10/1/03......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS-15............... 10/01/05........ Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. ICE................. ICE................. GS-14............... 4/1/04.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... Y
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS 15/.............. 12/1/03......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. ICE................. ICE................. GS-1801-14.......... 1/1/03.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. NGB................. NGB................. LTC................. 9/1/03.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS 13/.............. 1/1/04.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USCG................ USCG................ 12/3/03............. 9/4/04.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. USSS................ USSS................ GS 15/.............. 1/1/03.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. TSA................. TSA................. GS-14............... 9/1/04.......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... Y
PREPAREDNESS.................. TSA................. TSA................. I................... 10/1/03......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS.................. CBP................. CBP................. GS-14............... 11/3/03......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE...... USSS................ USSS................ GS-0301-15.......... 12/1/02......... Indefinite..... Support to Preparedness mission................... N
S&T........................... USCG................ DHS................. GS-14............... 01/09/04........ Indefinite..... Providing technical expertise to S&T.............. N
S&T........................... CBP................. DHS................. GS-14............... 09/12/05........ 9/13/2006...... Providing technical expertise to S&T.............. N
S&T........................... USCG................ DHS................. CDR................. 09/30/04........ 7/30/2007...... Providing technical expertise to S&T.............. N
USM/CIO....................... TSA................. .................... 149,200............. 4/3/2005........ 10/28/2005..... Support Solutions Engineering COE................. Y
USM/CIO....................... USCG................ .................... 130,155............. 4/4/2005........ 4/4/2006....... Providing support to the HSDN program office...... Y
USM/CIO....................... TSA................. .................... 141,844............. 7/13/2003....... Indefinite..... DHS/BTS Integration............................... N
USM/CIO....................... ICE................. .................... 100,152............. 12/1/2003....... 1/23/05 ended.. Program management and acquisition support........ N
USM/CIO....................... USCG................ .................... 102,885............. 4/4/2005........ 4/4/2006....... Providing support to the HSDN program office...... Y
USM/CIO....................... CIS................. .................... 89,736.............. 3/1/2003........ Indefinite..... Support DHS' Infrastructure Transformation Office. N
USM/CIO....................... TSA................. .................... 110,278............. 4/3/2005........ 10/28/2005 Information Technology............................ Y
ended.
USM/CIO....................... TSA................. .................... 145,482............. 10/27/2004...... Indefinite..... TSA representative to the Information N
Transformation Office.
USM/CIO....................... TSA................. .................... 138,093............. 4/3/2005........ 10/28/2005 Information Technology............................ Y
ended.
USM/CIO....................... TSA................. .................... 141,454............. 7/13/2003....... 10/19/2005 INFRASTRUCTURE program support.................... Y
ended.
USM/CIO....................... USCG................ .................... 156,886............. 5/1/2004........ Indefinite..... Support DHS' Infrastructure Transformation Office. Y
USM/CIO....................... CBP................. .................... 149,200............. 12/1/2004....... Indefinite..... CIO, Wireless Management Office................... N
USM/CIO....................... USCG................ .................... 120,139............. 5/16/2005....... 4/4/2006....... Providing support to the HSDN program office...... Y
USM/CIO....................... USCG................ .................... 130,155............. 4/4/2005........ 4/4/2006....... Providing support to the HSDN program office...... Y
USM/CIO....................... CBP................. .................... 52,468.............. 9/19/2005....... 2/19/2006...... Supporting the DHS Deputy CIO..................... N
USM/CIO....................... OSLGCP.............. .................... 97,206.............. 2/7/2005........ 9/30/2006...... Assistant Metadata Program Manager to help manage N
DHS Metadata Center of Excellence (MCOE) program.
USM/CIO....................... USCG................ .................... 130,155............. 4/4/05.......... 4/4/2006....... Providing support to the HSDN program office...... Y
USM/CIO....................... ICE................. .................... 100,152............. 12/1/2003....... Indefinite..... ACIO acquisition support.......................... N
USM-CAO....................... CBP................. CBP................. GS 15............... 9/12/2005....... 9/11/2006...... Specialization in Portfolio Management and N
coordination of cross-agency requirements..
USM-CHCO...................... CBP................. CBP................. GS 14/$100,152...... 4/28/2004....... Indefinite..... New MAX HR System--Communications Team............ N
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OFFICE OF SCREENING COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS
Question. In a brief the Committee received in December 2005, the
briefing materials stated that the Office of Policy was tasked with,
``Centralized policy development and coordination'' as well as,
``Ensuring consistency of policy and regulatory developments across
components.'' In light of this, what are the pros and cons of the
Office of Screening Coordination and Operations being a component
within the Office of Policy?
Answer. After conducting a Second Stage Review of the Department, I
announced and implemented organizational changes in order to enhance
the coordination of policy, operations, and intelligence across the DHS
spectrum. These changes resulted in the creation of a department-wide
Office of Policy, Office of Operations Coordination and Office of
Intelligence and Analysis. This new organizational structure became
effective in November 2005. These offices have been charged with
utilizing the tools of all of DHS's components to address the
Department's critical homeland security mission. Indeed, these new
offices interface on a daily basis with their counterparts in the DHS
component agencies. This coordinated effort has vastly improved the
Department's ability to develop strong regulatory and legislative
proposals.
The Office of Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO) will work
with each of these offices to improve security screening by creating
screening standards and polices for the Department of Homeland
Security, by providing a single redress office for travelers, and by
setting common standards for registered traveler programs. The
functions of the SCO include: (1) development of a unified business
vision and strategy for the coordinated screening of people; (2)
development of operational standards and coordination of policies; (3)
oversight of unified program management processes across the various
screening programs, and management of screening and credential
acquisitions; and (4) establishment of a portfolio of common screening
services that include unified standards concerning enrollments;
biometrics management; credentialing operations; and central redress
practices and policies.
The SCO will implement an effective and efficient screening
capability that integrates policies, business strategies and processes,
data and information systems, and technology to enhance security and
immigration, trade, travel, and credentialing experiences.
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
Question. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget for the Office of
Procurement Operations in the Working Capital Fund requests an increase
of 93 FTE. The Office of Procurement in the Under Secretary for
Management account requests an increase of 25 FTE. Given these large
increases in FTE for procurement contracting and policy, is a
sufficient number of lawyers with expertise in procurement law being
requested for the Office of General Counsel (an increase of four
attorneys is requested)?
Answer. The procurement law function within the OGC was originally
staffed to provide legal support to a small operational procurement
function serving the departmental offices (the Office of Procurement
Operations), a departmental grants activity, and the departmental
policy and executive function for the immediate offices Chief
Procurement Officer (ICPO). As of September 2004, the procurement law
function had three full-time procurement attorneys serving
approximately 60 staff at OPO and ICPO. With limited exceptions, the
contracts being written at the time by OPO were interagency agreements
(i.e., agreements to obtain goods and services from preexisting
contracts with other agencies or contracts to be let by those agencies)
and orders under blanket purchase arrangements under GSA schedule
contracts.
Currently, OGC has five procurement attorneys. Two of the
procurement attorneys have substantial collateral duties (one attorney
provides other general law guidance and counsel coordination activities
for US VISIT, and the other is providing legal advice on operational
security matters to the Chief Security Officers and his staff). This
staff is expected to provide: (i) solicitation and award reviews; (ii)
day-to-day advice on intermediate actions, such as vendor questions and
answers, discussion issues, competitive range determinations, and
source selection issues; (iii) legal advice on procurement policy for
the matters impacting the entire Department; (iv) oral and written
advocacy on protests and appeals before contract fora, such as the
Government Accountability Office, the Department of Transportation
Board of Contract Appeals, and other specialized fora at the Department
of Labor and Small Business Administration; and (v) litigation support
to the Department of Justice for procurement matters before the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims.
Currently, there are 87 staff assigned to OPO (from the 1102
series, an actual contract writing series). OPO has the authority and
intention to hire 40 additional staff members this fiscal year. ICPO
has approximately another 35 personnel on-board (from the 1102 series
and several administrative personnel from the 301 and 343 series). CPO
advises that in fiscal year 2007, under the President's budget
proposal, ICPO would increase staff by another 27 positions (1102), and
OPO would add another 108 personnel (1102). At the conclusion of fiscal
year 2007, OPO will have 228 staff on-board, and ICPO will have 62
staff on-board--for a total of 290 staff in CPO.
LOCAL CIS OMBUDSMAN
Question. The fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act
provided funding for an internal pilot program for local ombudsman
staffing, training, and coordination. Provide an update on the status
of this program.
Answer. The Local Ombudsman Pilot Program was completed on November
15, 2005. The program met all its goals, to establish personnel and
support requirements, determine liaison responsibilities and
limitations and create quality assurance standards and program
objectives.
The pilot program created a model of operations for Local Ombudsman
Offices or field offices. The pilot program ensures uniform operating
procedures and processes, and provides a consistent and standardized
model of operation. Personnel and support requirements were identified;
liaison responsibilities and limitations were determined; and quality
assurance standards and program objectives were scoped. The pilot
program also developed cost models to identify personnel, facilitation
and operating costs for Local Ombudsman Office's in various locations
across the country.
Question. Will additional local ombudsman programs be established
in fiscal year 2007? If so, when will they be stood up and in what
locations?
Answer. There are no current plans for the creation of any Local
Ombudsman's offices in fiscal year 2007.
Rather, the CIS Ombudsman is developing a ``Virtual Access
Ombudsman Office.'' This will make Ombudsman services accessible where
computer access is available. The President's fiscal year 2007 Budget
requests $5,927,000 for this office, including the annualization and
adjustment's to base, and provides funding for travel to enable
personal contact by representatives based in Washington, DC, visiting
various locations on a ``circuit-ride'' basis. This will enable the
Ombudsman to objectively identify areas to visit based on problems
presented by individuals and employers in dealing with USCIS. It will
provide an efficient method of providing government services which
incorporate new advancements in communication.
BRAC REPORT
Question. As directed by the fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, provide a report describing the impact of the
closure or realignment of any Department of Defense base resulting from
the Base Realignment and Closure law on Department of Homeland Security
facilities and activities.
Answer. BRAC properties offer DHS the opportunity to acquire assets
for current and future mission performance requirements that will
benefit operation effectiveness and efficiencies. The complex analysis
of the full extent and timing of operational and financial impacts,
including cost estimates from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2010, are
being completed. We anticipate submitting a full report by January
2007.
SENIOR LEADERSHIP TRAVEL INITIATIVE
Question. It is the Committee's understanding that the Secretary
and the Deputy Secretary do not travel by plane together. The fiscal
year 2007 budget indicates that only the Secretary's travel has been
designated as ``required use.'' Given this, why is the Deputy Secretary
requesting $500,000?
Answer. The use of a government aircraft is sometimes necessary and
the request for additional funding is based upon the cost per flight
hour of a government aircraft, which can cost up to $8,936 per flight
hour.
Question. Why couldn't the Deputy Secretary fly commercial aircraft
at a greatly reduced cost?
Answer. In most cases, the Deputy Secretary does fly commercial
aircraft in order to minimize the use of taxpayer dollars for travel.
Nonetheless, in some circumstances--such as during periods of higher
alert status, in order to accommodate travel to multiple or remote
locations in a short period of time, or when the traveling party is
large--it may be more cost effective or otherwise advisable for the
Deputy Secretary to fly on a government aircraft.
Question. Provide information on the travel done by the Secretary,
Deputy Secretary, and Chief of Staff for fiscal year 2004, fiscal year
2005, and fiscal year 2006 including the number of trips and the
charges per hour and per trip.
Answer. The information requested for specific travel costs is
listed below in the following charts. The rate per flight hour in the
chart below is the total rate per hour for the entire aircraft (i.e.
not prorated per passenger). The cost per flight hour therefore
includes the costs for all staff accompanying the Secretary. The Chief
of Staff is not included in the chart because the Chief of Staff does
not travel on government aircraft except when accompanying the
Secretary.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA USCG Mil Air
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rate per Rate per Rate per
Number of flight Number of flight Number of flight
trips hour \1\ trips hour trips hour
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2004
Secretary..................................... 6 $675 26 $6,192 9 $2,829-$7
,319
3 875 ......... ......... ......... .........
4 1,937 ......... ......... ......... .........
4 2,214 ......... ......... ......... .........
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Secretary........................ 17 ......... 26 ......... 9 .........
=================================================================
Deputy Secretary.............................. 2 875 ......... ......... ......... .........
2 2,214 ......... ......... ......... .........
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Dep. Sec......................... 4 ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
=================================================================
Fiscal Year 2005
Secretary..................................... 1 $790 26 $6,192 3 $2,829
12 875 14 8,936 3 8,495
1 1,937 ......... ......... ......... .........
2 2,214 ......... ......... ......... .........
1 2,590 ......... ......... ......... .........
3 2,829 ......... ......... ......... .........
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Secretary........................ 20 ......... 40 ......... 6
=================================================================
Deputy Secretary.............................. 1 875 1 6,192 ......... .........
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Dep. Sec......................... 1 ......... 1 ......... ......... .........
=================================================================
Fiscal Year 2006 (thru January 31, 2006)
Secretary..................................... 1 $2,590 6 $8,936 1 $4,332
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Secretary........................ 1 ......... 6 ......... 1 .........
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Deputy Secretary.............................. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Dep. Sec......................... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ FAA rates per flight hour do not include the 17 percent administrative fee charged on all flights.
OPERATIONS CENTERS
Question. You recently stated before the Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee that part of the problem in the
Hurricane Katrina response was lack of real time information being
shared among the Department's operations centers to ensure that all the
decision makers were informed on issues that needed action. You
indicated the problem was lack of integration of the operations centers
and cultural information hoarding which leads to stove piping.
There at least 19 Operations and Intelligence Centers at the
Department. Please list all DHS operations centers.
Answer. Below are the DHS Operations Centers for the DHS
Headquarters and the Component's Headquarters:
DHS Headquarters, Operations Directorate: Homeland Security
Operations Center (HSOC)
FEMA: National Response Coordination Center (NRCC)
U.S. Coast Guard: Coast Guard Command Center (CGCC)
U.S. Secret Service: USSS Headquarters Operations Center
Customs & Border Patrol (CBP): Situation Room (Sit Room)
Transportation Security Administration (TSA): Transportation
Security Operations Center (TSOC)
Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE): ICE Operations Center
(IOC)
The previous list of 19 submitted in response to other questions
included intelligence centers are below:
DHS HSOC & COMPONENT-LEVEL OPS AND INTEL CENTERS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Responsible agency Official name and acronym Street address
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Homeland Homeland Security Operations Center 3801 Nebraska Ave, NW, Washington, DC
Security (DHS): Headquarters/ (HSOC).
Operations Directorate. Note: Office of Intelligence & Analysis
(OI&A) (Watch & Warning Branch)
integrated into HSOC.
Federal Emergency Management National Response Coordination Center 500 C Street SW, Washington, DC
Agency (FEMA). (NRCC). 19844 Blueridge Mountain Rd, State
FEMA Operations Center (FOC)........... Route 601, Bluemont, VA 20132
United States Coast Guard Coast Guard Command Center (CGCC)...... 2100 2nd St SW, Washington, DC 20593
(USCG). National Response Center (NRC): Note: 2100 2nd St SW, Washington, DC 20593
Chair EPA; Co-chair USCG. 1461 North Road Street, Elizabeth City,
National Strike Force Coordination NC 27909
Center (NSFCC).
United States Secret Service USSS Headquarters Operations Center.... Classified
(USSS). Intelligence Division Duty Desk: IA 950 H Street NW, 9th Floor, Washington,
Duty Desk. DC 20223
Customs and Border Protection Situation Room--``Sit Room''........... 1300 Pennsylvania Ave N.W., Washington,
(CBP). National Targeting Center (NTC)........ DC 20229
Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) 12379 Sunrise Valley Drive, Reston, VA
National Communications Center (NCC)... 20191
Intel Watch............................ 1355 Customs Way, March AFRB, CA 92555
1900 Lakemont Ave, Orlando, FL 32803
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.,
Washington, DC 20229
Transportation Security Transportation Security Operations 13555 Eds Drive, Herndon, VA
Administration (TSA). Center (TSOC). 601 South 12th Street, Arlington,
Transportation Security Intelligence Virginia 22202
Services (TSIS).
Immigration and Customs ICE Operations Center (IOC)............ 425 I St. N.W., Washington, DC
Enforcement (ICE). Federal Air Marshalls (FAM) System FAMS Cabot Tech, 13555 EDS Drive,
Operation Control Division (SOCD). Herndon, VA 20171
Federal Protective Service (FPS) Southeast Federal Center, Bldg 74, Rm
National Capital Region. 1, 3rd & M St., SE, Washington, DC
ICE Intelligence Watch................. 20407
425 I St. N.W., Washington, DC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What is your plan to finally integrate the centers?
Answer. The plan is to integrate the DHS Operations Centers as
follows:
Short Term
DHS Operations Directorate acts as the Operations Advocate for DHS
and produces a cascading effect for a single operations function and
24/7 operations center within each component. The 2SR identified the
need for an integrated DHS/Department-level operations function and an
integrated DHS/Department-wide operations architecture/structure. In
particular, ``structure'' includes Department-wide organizing (and
resourcing) to provide operations functions at the Component level. The
newly formed DHS Operations Directorate provides ``one stop shopping''
and unity of effort for overall Department-level (strategic/national)
operations. The formation and implementation of the DHS Operations
Directorate will cascade the need/requirement for a consolidated
operations function within each DHS Component. The cascading effect is
similar to a ``forcing function'' that will ripple from the strategic
level through the operational and tactical level so that operations are
unified across the spectrum of threats and characterized by rapid
planning and execution.
As the operations advocate, the DHS Operations Directorate is
forcing a cultural change throughout DHS that focuses on critical
elements of ``command and staff actions'' including rapid and accurate
operational reporting, standardization, verification/quality control,
and real time situational awareness. The DHS Operations Directorate is
the senior (strategic/national level) operations entity and has staff
cognizance over operational matters within the strategic, operational
and tactical framework. Thus, the advocate ``looks out'' for and
promotes unified operations throughout DHS and with other partner
agencies. The advocacy includes helping Components develop an
operations function to promoting organizational and process changes to
supporting resource requirements. The DHS operations advocate keeps
critical operating issues in front of the senior DHS leaders.
The DHS Operations Directorate is providing integrated connectivity
and increased situational awareness through a Common Operating Network
and a Common Operating Picture. The common operating network is the
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). It is used for
operational reporting that will be fed into a Common Operating Database
(COD) that feeds the Common Operating Picture (COP). Using the HSIN and
the COP as two tools to coordinate or blend the DHS operation centers
(strategic, operational, tactical levels) into a functioning whole
(unity of effort). The COP will then be provided to the components for
their use and for updating. The integration of the DHS Operations
Centers via HSIN and the COP/COD provides information sharing and
situational awareness, both vertically and horizontally, for increased
unity of effort.
Long Term
When considering long term options, DHS is exploring solutions that
will lead to the consolidation as well as integration of its various
operations centers. Among the options being considered is the National
Operations Center. A National Operations Center facility would provide
the protections of subterranean, positive pressure CBRNE survivability
features common to modern Department of Defense Operations Centers
would ensure that mission critical collaboration and coordination
activities throughout all phases of national incident management
activities.
Question. Is there money in the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget
to get that done?
Answer. The 2007 President's budget request fully funds capability
milestones planned for HSIN and the Common Operating Picture necessary
to integrate operations across the department in the short-term.
I STAFF
Question. What is the status of the I staff?
Answer. The Operational Integration Staff (I-STAFF) no longer
exists. As part of the DHS reorganization following the Second Stage
Review, the Secretary incorporated I-STAFF functions into the
Operations and Preparedness Directorates.
Question. How many of the detailees to the I staff have returned to
their agencies and how many are detailed to the Operations Directorate?
Answer. There are no former I-Staff personnel detailed to the
Operations Directorate. All of the personnel previously detailed to the
I-Staff have either returned to their previous organizations or been
placed in permanent FTE positions elsewhere in the Department, with the
exception of 2 detailees who are transitioning into permanent positions
and 4 Coast Guard Officers who have been assigned on detail to the
Preparedness Directorate.
Question. Are detailees to the Operations Directorate reimbursed?
Answer. As a general rule, the Operations Directorate does not
reimburse parent organizations for the interagency support that is
provided to the Operations Directorate. However, Operations does have
reimbursable agreements with a few agencies to cover the cost of
support provided to the HSOC. Currently, agreements are in place with
the CIA, the National Geospatial Mapping Agency (NGA) and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
MORALE PROBLEMS AT DHS
Question. From August to December of 2004, the Office of Personnel
Management sent out surveys to 276,424 Federal employees at 30 cabinet
departments. The purpose of this survey was to allow managers to
measure, ``employees' perceptions of whether, and to what extent,
conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their
agencies.'' In June of 2005 the results of the survey were made public.
According to the survey, Department of Homeland Security employees
rated their Department the lowest in terms of performance and job
satisfaction. Of the 78 questions on the survey, the Department of
Homeland Security was in the bottom 10 percent of all departments and
agencies more than 96 percent of the time. In fact, the Department
ranked dead last on exactly half of the questions asked. Here are some
of the survey results:
Only 12 percent said they felt strongly that they were,
``encouraged to come up with new and better ways of doing thing.''
Only 4.6 percent strongly agree that, ``Employees are rewarded for
providing high quality products and services to customers.''
Only 3.3 percent strongly agreed with the following statement,
``Personnel decisions are based on merit.''
Mr. Secretary, that survey was taken before you came on board. This
past summer, you reorganized the Department. Then Hurricane Katrina
hit. Do you believe that morale and performance are improving at DHS?
Answer. The results of the Federal Human Capital (HC) Survey were
received shortly prior to my arrival at DHS. While the employees'
responses demonstrated a strong commitment to the DHS mission and how
their work efforts relate to our important tasks at hand, I was less
pleased with DHS' overall standing in the survey and responses to
specific areas such as establishment of a performance culture and trust
in top organizational leaders. Since receiving the survey results, I
have taken several actions to ensure that we maintain a focus on
improving the quality of work life for employees of the Department.
Upon receiving the survey results, I immediately took action to address
the findings, including correspondence to Departmental leaders and
establishment of an employee-led team to address the findings and
opportunities for improvement. Additionally, a ``culture and
communications'' team was charted under my Second Stage Review for the
express purpose of identifying opportunities to improving morale and
communications within DHS. The 2SR team identified a number of
findings, including an increased emphasis on leadership development,
creating a continuous learning environment, and establishing a
performance-based culture.
I believe that the action steps that are being undertaken as a
result of our response to the HC Survey as well as the 2SR team finding
are having, and will continue to have, a positive impact on the
organization. Our continued emphasis on implementing the Department's
new human resources system, MAXHR, will also have a tremendous impact
on our continued development of organizational leaders and movement
towards a more performance-based organization.
Question. What specific steps are you taking to improve morale at
the Department?
Answer. Today, the HC Survey response team within DHS, the I-team,
continues to work employee issues at a grass roots level, including
sponsoring employee focus groups to identify specific action plans for
improving DHS morale. A Chief Learning Officer position has been
established to increase our focus on training and development
opportunities, and MAXHR performance leadership training has been
initiated and completed for over 3,000 DHS managers to heighten their
skills and awareness of employee issues and creating a stronger
performance culture--with 9,000 more managers scheduled for training
this year. All SES members of the Department received specific training
in August of last year that included how to improve communications and
coaching skills within the workforce and how to create a better
alignment between organizational priorities and individual performance
expectations. Additionally, I have recently taken steps to improve
communications between senior leadership and all DHS employees, through
a Secretarial webcast, through which answers to frequently asked
employee questions were provided. I plan to continue this and other
efforts aimed at bettering communications with our leaders and our
workforce.
CIVIL RIGHTS
Question. How many civil rights complaints/investigations were
there in fiscal year 2004, fiscal year 2005, and fiscal year 2006 to
date (listed by agency)?
Answer. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)
categorizes ``Civil Rights Complaints'' in two ways: (1) external
complaints are allegations that employees or officials of the
Department have violated the civil rights or civil liberties of members
of the public, organizations, or non-DHS employees; and (2) for
internal complaints, the Secretary has delegated the authority to
direct processing of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints. The
response to this QFR is divided into these two categories.
External.--For external complaints, there are multiple entry points
into the Department. The Office for CRCL receives complaints from the
public and categorizes them by component. The Office retains these
complaints for investigation or refers them to the appropriate office
for investigation. In addition, we have provided separate information
for complaints filed directly with a component Civil Rights Office of
professional responsibility. Complaints filed with the DHS Office of
Inspector General are not included in these QFR responses.
DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
The number of complaints received by fiscal year and component in
the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties complaint management
system is as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPR/ IAIP/
Fiscal year Total CBP DHS \1\ FEMA PREP ICE TSA USCG USCIS USSS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004........................... 88 35 ....... 2 ...... 25 20 ...... 5 1
2005........................... 88 36 3 ...... 1 30 5 4 7 2
2006 (to date)................. 46 17 ....... 1 ...... 24 3 1 ...... ......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Indicates a multiple-component complaint.
Information for complaints filed directly with DHS component
offices is listed below:
Customs and Border Protection
Fiscal year 2004--218
Fiscal year 2005--255
Fiscal year 2006--111 (to date)
Federal Emergency Management Agency Office of Equal Rights
Fiscal year 2004--1
Fiscal year 2005--2
Fiscal year 2006--13 (to date)
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Fiscal year 2004--42
Fiscal year 2005--97
Fiscal year 2006--38 (to date)
Transportation Security Administration Office of Civil Rights
Fiscal year 2004--167
Fiscal year 2005--564
Fiscal year 2006--57 (to date)
Internal (EEO)
For internal complaints the aggrieved individual contacts a
component EEO Office, completes the informal process for discrimination
complaints and if the issue is not resolved to his or her satisfaction
may file a complaint with that component. Upon acceptance of the
complaint, the component EEO Office arranges for an impartial
investigation of the complaint. If the issue remains unresolved after
the investigation, the complainant has the right to a final agency
decision with a hearing conducted by an EEOC Administrative Judge or on
the record. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties issues
final agency decisions for the Department.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year CIS CBP FEMA FLETC HSHQ CE SA SCG SSS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004.................................... 90 208 34 9 ...... 271 594 34 14
2005.................................... 126 242 64 15 3 274 393 35 16
2006 (1st Qtr).......................... 24 77 18 4 3 45 63 5 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. On average, how long does it take to investigate and
resolve a claim?
Answer. The amount of time to investigate and resolve a claim
depends on various factors, which are listed below:
External
DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties:
--The average length of time for investigation and resolution of the
closed referred and retained complaints in the Office for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties complaint management system is 284
days.
Information for complaints filed directly with DHS component
offices is listed below:
Customs and Border Protection & Immigration and Customs
Enforcement:
--CBP and ICE use a joint database to track civil rights complaints;
the average is 6 months.
Federal Emergency Management Agency Office of Equal Rights:
--The average is 160 days.
Transportation Security Administration Office of Civil Rights:
--The average is 110 days out of an allotted 180 days.
Internal (EEO)
The numbers in the following chart refer to the average number of
days to investigate a complaint per component.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year IS CBP FEMA FLETC DHSHQ ICE TSA USCG USSS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004.................................... 267 211 270 329 ...... 227 314 168 181
2005.................................... 161 253 293 164 ...... 216 414 211 327
2006 (1st Qtr).......................... N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 391 143 N/A
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What is the current backlog?
Answer. The backlog is listed below:
External
DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
The Office defines ``backlog'' as complaints that have been open in
the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties complaint management
system for over 180 days. The current backlog is 57 complaints, of
which 30 are retained within the Office and 27 are referred to
components for investigation, out of total number of 223 complaints
received to date.
Information for complaints filed directly with DHS component
offices is listed below:
Customs and Border Protection & Immigration and Customs Enforcement
CBP and ICE use a joint database to track civil rights complaints.
From fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2006 YTD 761 Civil Rights
Complaints were received at the CBP/ICE Joint Intake Center (JIC). Of
the 761 complaints 621 have been completed and closed out. 140 Civil
Rights Complaints remain open and under investigation.
Federal Emergency Management Agency Office of Equal Rights
The current backlog is 15 pending investigation, 2 from fiscal year
2005 and 13 from fiscal year 2006. The increased activity as a result
of Hurricane Katrina created a backlog in processing fiscal year 2005
cases.
Transportation Security Administration Office of Civil Rights
The current backlog is 13 complaints from fiscal year 2005.
Internal (EEO)
For internal complaints ``backlog'' is defined as all open
complaints.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of CIS CBP FEMA FLETC HQ ICE TSA USCG USSS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 (1st Qtr).......................... 140 535 103 12 6 397 995 57 19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
US VISIT
IDENT-IAFIS
Question. I was very pleased that you announced last summer that
you planned to migrate the US VISIT program from the current two
fingerprint enrollment for visitors entering this country to ten
fingerprint enrollment. As you know, I have been pressing for this
since the Department was created. And I am also pleased that your
budget requests $60 million for achieving interoperability between the
FBI and Homeland Security biometric databases as part of this effort.
What is your estimated timeline for achieving a 10 fingerprint
process for US VISIT?
Answer. In order to realize the full benefits of collecting 10
fingerprints, US VISIT must undertake two initiatives: deploy
electronic readers capable of scanning 10 fingerprints accurately and
quickly; and develop interoperability between the FBI's Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) and DHS's Automated
Biometric Identity System (IDENT). US VISIT has already made progress
towards IDENT/IAFIS interoperability and is exploring 10-print readers
for deployment to multiple environments.
DHS, along with the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, as
well as the National Institute of Standards and Technology, hosted an
industry day to challenge the private sector to make a smaller, faster,
and more accurate 10-print capture device. We are working with industry
to help design new capture devices that meet DHS's basic operational
requirements at primary inspection. Advances in technology will allow
DHS and State to routinely collect 10 slap prints, without negatively
impacting the thousands of international visitors that pass though our
ports and visa issuing posts every day.
Question. What specific elements could be expedited in fiscal year
2006 if funding were available?
Answer. The Department has sufficient resources for IDENT/IAFIS
interoperability in fiscal year 2006.
EXIT
Question. Provide an update on funding estimates necessary to
implement exit and the status of the exit pilots.
Answer. The Department will submit to Congress plans on
implementation of exit screening once the review of the exit pilots is
complete.
VISA WAIVER PROGRAM (WVP)
Question. Please explain the DHS role in reviewing any new
expansion of VWP applications.
Answer. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with
the Secretary of State, may designate a country meeting the statutory
criteria for participation in the program. The DHS has established the
Office of International Enforcement to oversee the Department's role in
VWP; conduct the statutorily required reviews of currently
participating countries; and, working with Department of State,
evaluate whether any additional countries are eligible to participate
in the program.
Question. What are the criteria required for a country to become a
VWP participant?
Answer. The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) was established as a pilot
program in 1988. Under the program, nationals of designated countries
who are in possession of valid passports may visit the United States
for business or pleasure for 90 days or less without first obtaining a
nonimmigrant visa. Such visitors must sign a waiver of certain rights
and affirm, in writing, their admissibility and understanding of
program conditions prior to application for admission. A visitor under
the program may not extend his stay or change or adjust status with
minor exceptions (adjustment through an immediate relative petition or
an application for asylum).
The Visa Waiver Permanent Program (VWPP) Act of 2000 made the Visa
Waiver Pilot Program permanent. The statutory requirements for the VWP
are found at Section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
Currently, 27 countries participate: Andorra, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The last expansion took
place in 1999 with the addition of Singapore and Portugal. In fiscal
year 2004, according to the Office of Immigration Statistics,
approximately 15.9 million visitors (over 50 percent of all controlled
entries) entered the United States under the VWP. Most, but not all, EU
countries participate in the VWP.
The VWPP Act of 2000 and The Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act of 2002 modified Section 217 to impose new conditions
on VWP countries. Current statutory requirements are that the country:
--has reciprocal visa-free travel extended to citizens of the United
States for 90 days or less (tourism and business);
--has a low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate;
--has a low immigration violations rate (overstays, etc.);
--certifies that it reports to the United States on a timely basis
the theft of blank passports issued by that country;
--has a program to issue Machine Readable Passports (MRP) that are
tamper-resistant and incorporate biometric and document
authentication identifiers that comply with standards
established by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) by October 26, 2006; and
--through its designation does not compromise U.S. law enforcement
and security interests, including enforcement of U.S.
immigration laws and procedures for extraditions to the United
States.
The statute also requires that:
--a VWP traveler present an MRP;
--DHS have equipment to read these passports at ports of entry;
--Transportation carriers provide manifest data electronically; and
--Participating countries be evaluated against statutory criteria
every 2 years.
By policy issued in June and July 2005, DHS elaborated on the
statutory criteria by expanding the Lost and Stolen Passport(s) (LASP)
reporting requirement to include issued as well as blank passports and
clarified the biometric passport requirements. In addition, under the
new guidelines, participating countries must have a program in place to
issue MRPs which contain a digital photograph of the bearer embedded in
the biographical data page by 10/26/05 (Level I Certification) and a
``true'' biometric passport (``e-passport'') which includes an IC chip
containing the biographical information and photo by 10/26/06 (Level II
Certification). Level II Certification also requires that each VWP
country commit to certain LASP reporting standards. Currently, these
new LASP reporting standards are being finalized at DHS.
TEN PRINT CAPACITY OVERSEAS
Question. Please provide the specific time table for the Department
of State's plan to pilot a 10 print enrollment capacity at overseas
consulates?
Answer. The Department of State is the lead agency responsible for
deploying 10-print enrollment capabilities to overseas consulates.
Questions concerning this issue would be best answered by the
Department of State.
Question. At which locations are the pilots being considered?
Answer. The Department of State is the lead agency responsible for
deploying 10-print enrollment capabilities to overseas consulates.
Questions concerning this issue should be answered by State.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE
Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2002 mandates that the government develop and implement a plan to
require U.S. citizens and foreign nationals to present a passport--or
other appropriate secure identity and citizenship document--when
entering the United States. Starting by the end of this year, for
instance, a driver's license will not be sufficient proof of
identification for flying between Washington, DC and Montreal. This is
a major change in how we have treated travel relations with our
neighbors to the north and the south. Citizens on our border have not
been required to obtain passports in the past. This is a burden and a
major concern for many of our citizens, especially for the elderly and
those in rural areas.
On January 17, 2006, you and Secretary Rice announced a plan to
create and issue, by the end of 2006, new travel documents for
Canadian, Mexican, and United States citizens to ensure the secure, but
relatively unhindered, entry of these citizens into the other countries
without the need for costly United States passports. You have named it
the ``People, Access, Security, Service''--or PASS card. As I
understand it, this card may contain biometric data, such as a
fingerprint and a digital photograph of the card holder.
Given that cardholders will still have to fill out a form and
provide this personal data, how is the proposed PASS card fundamentally
different than a passport?
Answer. The recently proposed ``PASS System'' is an important
element of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI). Specific
questions concerning this issue should be directed to the Department of
State.
Question. What funds are included in the President's fiscal year
2007 budget request to facilitate this new program and where are they
located?
Answer. No funds are needed for this initiative in fiscal year
2007.
Question. How much will this new program cost the United States
government?
Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics
related to the production of travel documents, are in planning and are
predecisional.
Question. What will be the cost to American citizens of obtaining
these new documents and how will they go about applying for them?
Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including the specifics
related to the production of travel documents, are in planning and are
predecisional.
Question. Who will issue this document?
Answer. The Department of State and DHS have announced that State
will produce PASS system documents.
Question. How much will the card cost and who will have to pay for
this card?
Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics
related to the production of travel documents, are still in planning
and are predecisional.
Question. Will new card readers or scanners be required to read
these documents? How much will they cost?
Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics
related to the production of travel documents, are still in planning
and are predecisional.
Question. Are funds included in the budget request for machines to
read these cards at the ports of entry?
Answer. There are no funds needed at this time.
Question. What is your estimate of the total cost of this program?
Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics
related to the production of travel documents, are still in planning
and are predecisional.
Question. Where will these documents be produced?
Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics
related to the production of travel documents, are still in planning
and are predecisional.
Question. How will you ensure that these documents will be secure
and not subject to tampering and fraud?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security will work with the
Department of State to develop standards to ensure that any PASS travel
documents issued will contain anti-tampering and counterfeiting
features.
STRATEGIC BORDER INITIATIVE
Question. Explain the functions and expectations of the Southwest
border program to end catch and release.
Answer. Ending catch and release is a major objective of the Secure
Border Initiative (SBI)'s unified border control strategy, which
encompasses the interdiction of cross border violators at and between
official ports of entry. The Department has already made significant
progress in achieving this goal. Quick and efficient detention and
removal of apprehended aliens is crucial to border control.
Three major strategies in this effort are:
--Detect and respond to all cross-border crime;
--End ``catch and release'' of non-Mexican illegal aliens; and
--Deter cross-border violations.
A deterrence factor exists only when potential violators understand
that the chances that they will be apprehended and removed have
increased. This prevents a significant number of potential violators
from even attempting initial or repeat cross-border violations.
We have made great strides in our ability to detain non-Mexican
national aliens apprehended while illegally entering the United States
on our Southwest Border by employing three tools: increased capacity,
faster turnover (including increased use of expedited removal), and
increased deterrence. Indeed, we are now able to detain virtually all
non-Mexican aliens apprehended between ports of entry along the
Southwest border with the notable exceptions of El Salvadoran nationals
who cannot be placed into expedited removal due to an outstanding court
injunction, and aliens from countries that are slow to accept
repatriation of their nationals. With the money from the recent
supplemental, an additional 4,000 beds are available, which will allow
for the detention of El Salvadoran nationals.
In addition, until recently, family groups were routinely released,
but with the opening of a 500 bed family detention center in May, ICE
is able to detain all apprehended family units on the Southwest border.
Question. How many people are detained?
Answer. The funded bed level in fiscal year 2006 is 20,800. The
average daily population fluctuates, but the average nationwide from
October 2005 to February 1, 2006 was 20,501.
Question. How many people are ineligible for expedited removal?
What is being done with them?
Answer. Citizens of Cuba arriving at a United States port of entry
by aircraft are ineligible, by statute, for expedited removal. DHS
extended this exemption in 2005 to Cubans arriving at a land-border
port of entry. Also, as a result of an injunction entered by the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California 17 years ago in
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, the Department is prohibited from
applying expedited removal to Salvadorans.
The Administration has asked the Court to lift or modify its
injunction last fall. Discovery is still continuing in the court
proceedings and no decision is anticipated in the immediate future. The
Administration has also asked Congress to reform the immigration
injunction process so that the Administration may have additional
flexibility in the removal process.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, all nationalities are
amenable to expedited removal as prescribed by law, excluding the noted
exceptions. Aliens excepted from expedited removal is given a Notice to
Appear, which places them into removal proceedings, and a determination
is then made as to whether the alien should be paroled or subject to
continued detention, based on the likelihood the individual poses a
danger to the community and/or will appear for the removal hearing.
The recent supplemental will allow the Department to detain
additional aliens and will also allow the Department to detain El
Salvadoran nationals.
Question. What percent of detainees are refused return by their
home county and must be released in the United States?
Answer. Currently, the Department does not track the percentage of
detainees who are refused return by their home country.
The Detention and Removal Office (DRO), however, pursuant the
Supreme court's decision in Zadvydas v. Dabis, and 8 CFR 241.13,
generally issues release decisions once a determination is made that
removal is not likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future,
usually based on lack of a travel document. DRO issued 969 release
decisions pursuant to 8 CFR 241.13 in fiscal year 2005. That figure is
approximately 80 percent of the total cases referred to DRO and in
which DRO headquarters issued either a release or detain decision
pursuant to 8 CFR 241.13. These statistics do not address those non-
criminal aliens ICE does not apprehend or take into custody because the
country does not issue travel documents.
Question. Does the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)
have an increase in its budget request proportionally comparable to
support DHS' efforts under SBI?
Answer. The Department received the following response from the
Department of Justice: For 2007, the President has requested a program
increase of 120 positions (including 20 immigration judges, 10 Board of
Immigration Appeals staff attorneys, and related legal/clerical support
staff) and nearly $9 million.
Question. Please provide the caseload statistics for EOIR for
fiscal year 2003/04/05.
Answer. See below statistical tables provided by the EOIR.
Question. With the expansion of expedited removal across the SW
border, what is the average number of days an alien occupies a
detention bed? And what was the comparable average in August 2005?
Please provide this by nationality.
Answer. Because of their length, breakdown by nationality is
provided below. The lists are further divided by credible fear and non-
credible fear cases. Please note that both of these figures include
Canada and Mexico; countries whose citizens have an extremely short
length of stay due to proximity and minimal document requirements.
AVERAGE LENGTHS OF STAY (LOS) BY COUNTRY
[Expedited removals--credible fear claimed cases]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Country June 26, 2006 August 1, 2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALBANIA........................... 68.4 117.8
ALGERIA........................... ................. 262.0
BANGLADESH........................ 97.0 219.6
BOLIVIA........................... 52.7 39.8
BRAZIL............................ 52.3 49.4
BULGARIA.......................... 51.5 86.1
BURMA............................. 19.0 25.0
CAMEROON.......................... ................. 132.0
CHILE............................. ................. 42.0
CHINA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC........... 50.6 177.5
COLOMBIA.......................... 55.7 143.2
COSTA RICA........................ 65.5 35.2
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC................ 60.8 92.2
ECUADOR........................... 58.9 59.4
ERITREA........................... 29.0 222.5
ETHIOPIA.......................... 55.3 231.0
GUATEMALA......................... 43.7 54.5
GUYANA............................ ................. 196.0
HAITI............................. 54.6 112.1
HONDURAS.......................... 48.7 65.2
INDIA............................. 63.2 209.9
IRAN.............................. 19.0
LITHUANIA......................... ................. 63.0
MACEDONIA......................... ................. 171.0
MEXICO............................ 9.5 43.4
NEPAL............................. ................. 84.5
NICARAGUA......................... 70.2 109.5
NIGERIA........................... 73.0 .................
PAKISTAN.......................... 45.3 .................
PERU.............................. 50.0 69.2
POLAND............................ 30.0 46.1
PORTUGAL.......................... ................. 209.9
ROMANIA........................... 55.0 .................
RUSSIA............................ 19.0 .................
SERBIA............................ ................. 220.4
SLOVAKIA.......................... ................. 43.4
SOUTH KOREA....................... ................. 84.5
TURKEY............................ 44.3 .................
UKRAINE........................... 22.0 .................
URUGUAY........................... ................. 247.0
VENEZUELA......................... 94.3 183.5
YUGOSLAVIA........................ 45.9 221.5
Overall Average for Countries With 48.1 124.8
Credible Fear Claimed Expedited
Removals (Including Canada and
Mexico)..........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AVERAGE LENGTHS OF STAY (LOS) BY COUNTRY
[Expedited removals--no credible fear claimed cases]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
COUNTRY June 26, 2006 August 1, 2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALBANIA........................... 43.5 89.2
ARGENTINA......................... 30.1 35.3
BANGLADESH........................ 165 .................
BELIZE............................ 62.3 33.0
BOLIVIA........................... 34.9 60.6
BRAZIL............................ 25.9 27.2
BULGARIA.......................... 35.5 .................
CAMEROON.......................... 137.0 .................
CANADA............................ ................. .................
CHILE............................. 25.9 23.4
CHINA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC........... 23.7 106.1
COLOMBIA.......................... 29.2 55.4
COSTA RICA........................ 29.8 43.9
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC................ 39.6 55.5
ECUADOR........................... 27.7 38.2
ERITREA........................... 48.0 .................
FRANCE............................ ................. 22.0
GABON............................. ................. 27.4
GUATEMALA......................... 18.8 22.8
GUYANA............................ ................. .................
HAITI............................. 38.0 26.0
HONDURAS.......................... 15.3 27.7
INDIA............................. 78.7 .................
ISRAEL............................ 17.3 30.0
ITALY............................. 23.0 .................
JAMAICA........................... 26.6 .................
KOREA............................. 15.4 .................
LITHUANIA......................... 31.0 .................
MACEDONIA......................... 37.5 40.5
MEXICO............................ 1.5 8.4
NEPAL............................. ................. 48.0
NETHERLANDS....................... 27.0 .................
NICARAGUA......................... 29.3 59.9
NIGERIA........................... 73.0 .................
PAKISTAN.......................... 29.0 .................
PANAMA............................ 60.0 42.0
PARAGUAY.......................... 51.0 17.0
PERU.............................. 30.0 44.2
PHILIPPINES....................... ................. 63.0
POLAND............................ 31.0 27.0
ROMANIA........................... 44.0 .................
SENGAL............................ 103.0 .................
SLOVENIA.......................... ................. 152.0
SLOVAK REPUBLIC................... ................. 48.5
SLOVAKIA.......................... ................. .................
SOUTH KOREA....................... ................. 48.0
SPAIN............................. ................. 54.4
SRI LANKA......................... 37.0 .................
SWEDEN............................ ................. 77.0
TURKEY............................ 35.5 .................
UNITED KINGDOM.................... 2.0 40.0
URUGUAY........................... 36.4 43.4
VENEZUELA......................... 19.1 48.8
YUGOSLAVIA........................ 31.0 149.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Is ICE's workforce enforcement effort considered a part
of SBI?
Answer. Yes, ICE's worksite enforcement effort is a part of SBI. In
developing SBI, DHS is taking an integrated approach to the problem
including border security, interior enforcement, and the Temporary
Worker Program. For any of these pieces to work, each must be
coordinated. One principal objective of the interior enforcement piece
is ending the tolerance of illegal employment. Comprehensive employment
verification, improved recordkeeping, document and database checks, and
compliance audits are all important as the Administration develops an
comprehensive strategy. Passage of comprehensive immigration reform
will be critical to improve the tools available to the Department
increase our capacity to target egregious employers.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
CBP AND NCRC MISSION
Question. Since initiating the National Capitol Region air security
mission in 2003, CBP has performed this security mission via temporary
rotations of aircraft and personnel from the Southwest border and
elsewhere in the country--without receiving any additional funds to
perform this task.
What is the origin/inspiration for the proposed transfer of $5
million from the CBP base budget to the Coast Guard to perform the
National Capitol Region air defense mission?
Answer. The $5 million transfer represents the annual cost to
operate the National Capital Region Air and Marine Branch. This amount
is being proposed for transfer to the Coast Guard because in fiscal
year 2007 CBP will no longer be performing this function.
Question. How is this not an erosion of the CBP base budget?
Answer. The funding supported a function that CBP will not be
performing in fiscal year 2007. For this reason, it is not an erosion
of the base.
Question. What did CBP spend on this mission in fiscal year 2004
and fiscal year 2005 and what is the estimate for fiscal year 2006?
Answer. In fiscal year 2004, The National Capital Region (NCR)
costs of operations were $4,239,557. Salary costs were for eight
permanent FTE. In addition, an undetermined number of temporary duty
station personnel supported the NCR.
In fiscal year 2005, NCR costs of operations were $5,305,490.
Salary costs were for twelve permanent FTE. In addition, fourteen
temporary duty station personnel supported the NCR.
Estimated fiscal year 2006 costs of operations are $5,414,655.
These costs are only through August 1, 2006, when the transfer of the
mission to U.S. Coast Guard is expected to take place.
INSPECTIONS OF ARRIVING SAUDIS
Question. There have been reports that certain Saudi nationals were
not processed through US VISIT by CBP officers when they arrived at
Dulles International Airport. Is this true and, if so, why?
Answer. CBP is not aware of the specific incidents) this inquiry
references, and would be pleased to research further with additional
background information. However, certain classes of travelers are
exempt from US VISIT enrollment. These exempted classes include,
travelers applying for admission using an A, G, or NATO nonimmigrant
visa; Taiwan representatives of TECRO and dependents; children under
the age of 14 and persons over the age of 79. Additionally, the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security have the
authority to exempt individual travelers from US VISIT enrollment.
These individual exemptions sometimes include foreign government
officials and delegations who may not be traveling with diplomatic
visas.
Question. More generally, do supervisors have the ability to decide
who to enroll and/or process and who not to? What is a supervisors
``override'' authority?
Answer. Individual supervisors do not have the ability to decide
who is and is not enrolled and processed by US VISIT. The Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Homeland Security have the authority to
exempt individual travelers from US VISIT enrollment. This authority is
exercised at the headquarters level in advance of the arrival of the
passenger. These individual exemptions sometimes include foreign
government officials and delegations who may not be traveling with
diplomatic visas.
ENFORCEMENT OF CUSTOMS LAWS
Question. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security,
we have witnessed the steady erosion of the Transportation Security
Administration's legislated mandate to secure ``all modes of
transportation'', not just aviation. Now I am hearing more and more
stories from the field that the enforcement of Customs laws and
regulations are being routinely ignored by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement in favor of enforcing immigration laws. I take a back seat
to no one in my strong belief that all of our immigration laws should
and must be enforced. But this should not occur to the detriment of
enforcing Customs laws. Trade enforcement is critical to the well being
of our national economy.
What assurances can you provide me that a continued focus on
Customs enforcement is being accorded the proper level of support?
Answer. DHS is absolutely committed to ICE's concurrent customs and
immigration enforcement missions. ICE's Financial and Trade
Investigations Division oversees national enforcement of traditional
customs investigative arenas, including bulk cash smuggling, trade-
based money laundering, commercial trade fraud and intellectual
property rights (IPR) violations. Specifically, the Trade Transparency
Unit (TTU) and the Commercial Fraud and IPR Unit target predatory trade
practices that threaten U.S. economic stability, restrict U.S. industry
competitiveness in world markets, and place the public health and
safety of the American people at risk. The TTU, led by ICE, in
cooperation with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S.
Departments of State and Treasury, specifically analyzes domestic and
foreign import and export trade data for discrepancies or anomalies
that may indicate trade-based money laundering or other trade fraud
violations. The Commercial Fraud and IPR Unit targets traditional
customs violations, including IPR crimes, illegal textile
transshipment, illegal importation of counterfeit and restricted
pharmaceuticals, tobacco smuggling, circumvention of international
trade agreements, and importer and broker compliance.
In addition, the ICE Commercial Fraud and IPR Unit has implemented
special enforcement operations targeting identified areas of
vulnerability in the U.S. commercial trade system. These operations
include Fraud Investigation Strike Teams (FIST), which target fraud
within foreign trade zones and customs bonded warehouses, and Operation
Security Bond, which targets the illegal use of the in-bond system to
smuggle merchandise. During these operations, ICE's enforcement of
customs and immigration statutes has resulted in an increased discovery
of commercial fraud violations and the identification and removal of
illegal immigrants with unauthorized access to secure areas.
ICE's commitment to enforcing its concurrent customs and
immigration enforcement missions is unwavering.
CBP PRESENCE AT AIRPORTS
Question. On November 1, 2005, NTEU President Colleen M. Kelley
wrote to USA Today responding to an October 24 story the paper had
written about the increasingly long wait times for international
passengers arriving in the United States. She claimed that it is the
result of too few inspectors at the airports as well as because the
``One Face at the Border'' training has resulted in degradation in the
specialized types of training CBP officers need to effectively do their
jobs.
Are the wait lines the result of too few inspectors?
Answer. Wait times are contingent on available staffing, the number
of available primary booths, the number and type of arriving flights/
passengers (high risk flights/passengers vs. low risk), the number of
arrivals during peak hours, the degree of scrutiny required for each
passenger, and any heightened security measures.
Question. Has training been degraded?
Answer. Current CBP training is more comprehensive and structured
then in either former agency.
New CBP Officers receive 160 hours of Pre-Academy Orientation at
their assigned port of entry before they depart for the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center. They graduate after 72 classroom days of
training then return to the port prepared to fulfill a limited scope of
responsibility-primary inspection for what once was Immigration and
Customs purposes.
Upon return to their port they undergo a rigorous and regimented 2-
year training program filled with classroom, systems and on-the-job
training which begins the process of preparing them for the different
inspection environments to which they will be assigned, such as air
passenger processing, air cargo processing, land passenger processing,
sea cargo processing, etc. Neither the Customs Service nor the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had such a structured
program.
The current ``combined'' Academy training is shorter in length than
if CBP had merely put new CBP Officers into back-to-back courses of the
legacy training. In restructuring its training programs, CBP discovered
that it was able to condense the combined training in a rational way
due to the many overlapping areas and similarly taught courses between
the legacy immigration and customs training courses. For example, while
Customs Inspectors previously received introductory immigration
training in their basic course, and Immigration Inspectors received
some introduction in Customs law, they both received firearms,
defensive tactics, professionalism, Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO),
and interviewing skills training that applies in both environments. In
addition, CBP now only requires Spanish language training for the
Southwest border, Miami and Puerto Rico where those skills are needed.
Incumbent officers who were employed prior to the March 1, 2003
merger are required to participate in structured and specific cross
training courses for disciplines they have not previously received
training for prior to being assigned to a new task. As of December 31,
2005, CBP has identified, built and distributed more than 37 cross-
training modules ranging from a 6-hour CD-ROM awareness course on
Customs/Immigration fundamentals to an 8-day classroom session on
immigration law and procedures in processing passenger in primary. All
of these training programs include many of the required pre-requisites.
In addition to the new CBP Academy curriculum, CBP also worked with
USDA to develop a new unified entry-level training program for
Agriculture Specialists.
CBP INSPECTORS AT OUR PORTS
Question. Many valid concerns have been raised about the troubling
sale of control of a number of U.S. seaports to a foreign government-
owned entity. This sale is troubling on so many levels. The President
assures us that the ports are secure because the Coast Guard provides
security at the ports and Customs and Border Protection officers
examine the containers as they are being unloaded. But many outside
observers believe there are not enough CBP inspectors at the ports to
conduct robust screening and security activities. While there are
significant hiring increases in the budget request for Border Patrol
agents and immigration enforcement officers--increases I strongly
support--there are no apparent hiring increases for inspection
personnel at our ports.
If there are insufficient inspection personnel at our ports at this
point, and many of our ports are being controlled by foreign entities,
how can you assure us that this budget request makes our ports safer in
the absence of additional inspection staff?
Answer. In the fiscal year 2007 President's budget proposal, CBP is
requesting an additional 106 positions to enhance its ability to detect
illicit radiological materials concealed within shipments, conveyances
or containerized cargo entering the United States. The additional staff
will support the deployment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
detection systems deployed through Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's
WMD procurement program and ensure CBP will have dedicated personnel to
resolve alarms from Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) and to conduct
radiological examinations at our Nation's busiest seaports.
WMD detection systems are a critical part of CBP's layered process
that builds on redundant enforcement layers to detect and prevent
contraband, including illicit materials, from entering the United
States. CBP recognizes that no single strategy or risk assessment is
100 percent effective and accurate, so CBP focuses on layering multiple
initiatives together to accomplish its mission. CBP employs its layered
enforcement approach in safeguarding U.S. borders from threat by land,
air and sea.
Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology enable CBP to screen or
examine a larger portion of the stream of commercial traffic in less
time while facilitating legitimate trade. These tools provide CBP with
a significant capability to detect and interdict terrorist weapons at
our ports of entry.
CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE (CSI)
Question. Please explain the process by which an overseas port
becomes a member of CSI, including the security review and the
procedures to which the host government (and Customs officials) agree
to adhere.
Answer. A potential Container Security Initiative (CSI) port is
identified either by CBP or through a formal request from the foreign
government to the U.S. Embassy or directly to CBP. The decision on the
first 20 CSI ports was based on the total volume of direct container
traffic to the United States. Subsequent to the first 20 ports,
potential CSI ports are evaluated on several factors including
container volume to the United States, intelligence threat level,
strategic potential, port assessment status, government political will
and capacity building status.
Once a potential CSI port is identified, a preliminary study is
conducted of the number of containers arriving in the United States
from that port, the number of high-risk containers arriving in the
United States from that port, the potential of that port being used for
transshipment from a high-risk country, intelligence information
threats and perceived political will.
An assessment is then conducted at the potential CSI port. The
assessment teams consist of personnel from CBP, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Coast Guard Officers, and more
recently, Department of Energy Megaports Program Officers. The
assessment evaluates the overall port practices with the goal of
determining the vulnerabilities to their cargo processing systems, the
level of competence of the host government to conduct inspections, the
technical security at the port, the personnel security of the port, any
vulnerabilities in both the government agencies as well as private
companies working at the port, the amount of cooperation that the host
government is willing to provide CSI, the types and effectiveness of
radiation monitoring systems, the types and effectiveness of large
scale non-intrusive X-ray or Gamma-ray machines, and the laws
applicable to allow inspections of cargo.
Once a favorable assessment is completed, CBP and the host
government sign a Declaration of Principles (DOP). The DOP is a non-
binding arrangement between the two governments to implement CSI. The
DOP contains language that both Customs Administrations agree to:
--Intensify bilateral customs cooperation;
--Exchange information and work closely to help ensure the
identification, screening and sealing of high-risk containers
at the earliest possible opportunity;
--Station, on a basis of reciprocity and on a pilot basis U.S. CBP
officers; and
--Consult closely on the implementation of CSI at the port.
After the DOP is signed, CBP and the host Nation work together to
implement the CSI program by facilitating the physical build-out of
working areas and developing local CSI Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP). The local SOP describes in detail how the CSI process will work
as well as the container examination procedures.
After the CSI port becomes operational, an evaluation of the port
is conducted at 3-months, 6-months, and every 6 months thereafter. The
evaluations determine whether or not CBP and the host Nation are
complying with the SOP and formulate ways to improve the CSI operation.
DUBAI PORTS WORLD (DPW)
Question. The Port of Dubai has recently become the first port in
the Middle East to become a Container Security Initiative (CSI) port.
When did the initial port assessment for Dubai's participation in CSI
occur, who performed the assessment, and when was participation
finalized?
Answer. The initial port assessment at the Port of Dubai took place
September 23-25, 2004. Personnel from CBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), DHS Attache Offices in Abu Dhabi and Dubai and the
U.S. Coast Guard participated in the assessment. The Declaration of
Principles between CBP and Dubai Ports Customs and Free Zone
Corporation (Dubai Customs) was signed on December 12, 2004. The CSI
port of Dubai began operations on March 26, 2005.
Question. What role, if any, did the Department of Defense play in
the assessment and/or the determination that Dubai should become a
member of CSI?
Answer. The Department of Defense did not participate in the
assessment and/or the determination that Dubai should become a member
of CSI.
Question. Under CSI, the United States stations CBP officials at a
participating ports and, based on threat and analysis, inspects or
screens containers (determined to be potentially high risk and which
are headed directly for a U.S. port) prior to the loading of the
container on the ship. Our CBP personnel request host country Customs
officials to screen suspect containers and/or physically inspect them
for suspicious items, however, at best, U.S. CBP officials only observe
that process. Once a container arrives at a U.S. port, our inspectors
are able to screen and open containers. It has been asserted by CBP
officials that the port operators (including potentially DPW) do not
have access to or are not involved with the imaging or other inspection
of these containers overseas or in the United States.
What confidence do we have that CBP's methods of operation cannot
be compromised by a government-controlled port operating company with a
CSI port located in that country--i.e. when a potential bad actor has a
high degree of visibility into both ends of the supply chain?
Answer. CBP utilizes a multi-faceted layered defense, which employs
various enforcement activities at several points along the supply
chain. The system was designed to mitigate the possibility of
compromising the entire supply chain by breaching one component of it.
Since 9/11 CBP has initiated:
--The 24-hour rule which requires cargo information to be transmitted
to CBP 24 hours prior to laden at a foreign seaport;
--The CBP National Targeting Center, which was established to ensure
all shipments destined to the United States are reviewed
against the CBP Automated Targeting System;
--The CBP Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which
also was initiated as a force multiplier by employing the
import/export community to enhance security measures within
their respective business practices; and
--The CBP Container Security Initiative (CSI), which was developed to
augment the other CBP programs by allowing for enforcement
action to be taken at a point earlier in the supply chain and
creating an additional layer of scrutiny and enforcement within
the overall supply chain.
Cargo moving through the supply chain would also be subjected to
the security and enforcement programs of other U.S. agencies such as:
--U.S. Coast Guard 96 hour notice of arrival requirement;
--Port security enhancements as set forth by the International Ship
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code; and
--Department of Energy (DOE) Megaports program.
Many of the programs listed above, which are components of the U.S.
government's layered defense, are not accessible by port operators.
CBP performs the targeting and analysis of cargo shipments. The
Automated Targeting System is not shared or linked to the port
operators or foreign Customs administrations.
When members of a CSI team suspect that a container warrants
examination, a request is made to the host Customs Administration. If
there is agreement, the cargo is examined utilizing Non-Intrusive
Inspection (NII) equipment. If there is any anomaly then a subsequent
more intrusive examination is conducted. If the host Customs
Administration refuses to conduct the examination, then a decision is
made by the CSI team either to permit the loading of the container and
designate such container for an examination at the U.S. port of
arrival, or for CBP to issue a Do-not-Load (DNL) order to the cargo
carrier.
Any cargo that is examined at a CSI location is always subject to
the CBP enforcement protocols in the United States, as well as the
possibility of the cargo being re-examined. Port operators do not have
any control or insight into the cargo selection and examination process
at a CSI location and they do not have any insight into the selection
and examination/re-examination process at U.S. ports of entry.
The CBP programs, in conjunction with the multitude of other U.S.
government agency enforcement initiatives, put forth a layered/multi-
dimensional strategy to combat the attempts by any members of the
import/export community to compromise the supply chain.
SHIPPING CONTAINERS
Question. Please provide the most recent data on the total number
of shipping containers which enter the United States, the percentage of
those that are screened, those that are examined, and those that are
inspected. Also please provide your definitions of those terms.
Answer. CBP employs a layered process that builds on redundant
enforcement layers to detect and prevent contraband, including illicit
materials, from entering the United States. CBP recognizes that no
single strategy or risk assessment is 100 percent effective and
accurate, so CBP focuses on layering multiple initiatives together to
accomplish its mission. CBP employs its layered enforcement approach in
safeguarding U.S. borders from threat by land, air and sea.
Conveyances that are identified as high-risk undergo an
examination. In fiscal year 2005, 11,342,493 sea-borne containers
entered the United States from foreign locations. Approximately 5
percent, or 569,308 sea containers were examined. CBP defines an
examination as a physical inspection of a conveyance and/or the imaging
of a conveyance using large-scale Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII)
technology, for the presence of contraband.
CBP defines screening as a passive means of scanning a conveyance,
baggage or cargo. CBP screens conveyances, baggage, and cargoes with
radiation portal monitors and other radiation detection equipment for
the presence of radiological emissions. CBP currently screens 40
percent of all sea-borne containers for the presence of radiation.
NII technology enables us to screen or examine a larger portion of
the stream of commercial traffic in less time while facilitating
legitimate trade. These tools provide CBP with a significant capability
to detect and interdict terrorist weapons at our ports of entry.
INSPECTIONS AT AIR PORTS OF ENTRY
Question. There do not appear to be staffing increases in the
budget for the POEs. What impact does this have on primary and
secondary inspections at airports?
Answer. CBP's existing staff will manage the current and
anticipated increases in travel and trade by utilizing advanced
information components and international programs like the Container
Security Initiative (CSI) agreements to mitigate any delays in traveler
and cargo processing. Implementation of trusted traveler programs and
further development of the CBP Immigration Advisor Program at foreign
ports of debarkation would also minimize the impact of a static
staffing model. CBP utilizes state of the art information technology,
traveler information sharing efforts with the Department of State,
advance traveler screening via the Advance Passenger Information System
(APIS), and the National Targeting Center (NTC).
Question. Is there a requirement that port directors have been
given that they must meet in terms of inspecting inbound plane
passengers--such as 45 minutes?
Answer. CBP is not currently bound by a required processing time; a
previous legislative requirement to process all inbound international
passengers within 45-minutes of arrival was repealed by the Enhanced
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173).
CBP does, however, have a 30-minute processing time as a future goal.
Question. Does this budget address concerns enumerated in GAO
report 05-663?
Answer. CBP has addressed the concerns raised by GAO report 05-663
entitled ``International Air Passengers: Staffing Model for Airport
Inspections Personnel Can Be Improved.'' Through cross-training
initiatives, CBP has been adding officers at the passenger primary
lanes in our airports, processing all travelers, and making mission
related referrals to secondary inspection for people considered higher
risk. The fiscal year 2007 budget requests funds to improve the
Automated Targeting System, extend the Immigration Advisory Program,
leverage pre-departure passenger information, and strengthen
consolidated anti-terrorism secondary inspection. This will create an
effective force-multiplier, and serve to speed the processing of
legitimate travelers, thus lowering overall wait times.
OUTBOUND INSPECTIONS
Question. What is the status of meeting the outbound inspections
recommendations as listed in the June 2005 report--OIG-05-21?
Answer. CBP's Office of Field Operations is beginning its re-
evaluation of the Outbound program, which is responsible for enforcing
U.S. export laws and regulations and ensuring that weapons of mass
destruction do not fall into the hands of criminals or terrorists. The
goal is to align Outbound enforcement and processing with current
Inbound processes, to the extent possible, which will improve
uniformity and enhance border security programs.
With the pending implementation of mandatory Automated Export
System (AES) filing, which will require electronic filing for all
export shipments that currently require a Shippers Export Declaration
(SED), more information will be available on export shipments. It will
be critical to leverage this electronic information to enhance the
secure screening and processing of outbound cargo, whereas current
capabilities for this purpose are limited. Not all export shipments are
currently filed through AES, which hampers CBP's Outbound targeting
efforts. The U.S. Census Bureau also has what is known as the ``Option
4'' filer program, which allows certain exporters to file export
information after the shipment has departed the United States.
Ultimately, CBP resources must be aligned in a manner that allows this
additional advance information to be used to screen and target high-
risk shipments and to conduct compliance inspections. As part of this
process, CBP must also implement a risk-based screening model for
export cargo, similar to what is already in place on the import side.
Currently, CBP outbound enforcement is accomplished with the
resources resident in the Anti-Terrorism Contraband Enforcement Teams
(A-TCET) at the ports of entry. These teams work as a single, united
enforcement team with a primary focus on targeting terrorists and
terrorist weapons. Their secondary focus is the interdiction of
narcotics, other contraband, alien smugglers/trafficking, fraudulent
documents and agricultural terrorism.
TUNNELS
Question. What is the policy regarding filling tunnels discovered
on the borders? Who is responsible for filling them and using what
funds?
Answer. While there is currently no policy regarding tunnel filling
or remediation, both CBP and ICE are currently drafting Tunnel
Principles/Policy (roles and responsibilities) when a sophisticated
tunnel (highly organized or sophisticated tunnel leading to a house or
warehouse) is discovered. The tunnel principles mainly emphasize joint
cooperation and coordination between CBP and ICE. The Border Patrol
Sector Chief and ICE Special-Agent-in-Charge will develop local
protocols based upon these principles.
There is no specific authority or funding indicating that any
particular group in the Federal Government has been designated the
responsibility to fill border tunnels. The cost of the remediation of
the tunnel in the San Diego, CA area is estimated to be approximately
$3 million (these costs include security, concrete, environmental
safety, labor etc). Generally speaking, most of the tunnels detected
have been rather small by comparison to the most recently discovered
tunnel in San Diego, CA. The tunnels have been filled by the Office of
Border Patrol (OBP) Facilities Department or the National Guard, using
general Salaries and Expenses appropriated funds.
Question. What activities are being taken by CBP, Science and
Technology, or other agencies to improve the technology for discovering
tunnels?
Answer. The S&T Directorate is working with the Office of Border
Patrol, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of
Defense (DOD) to find technology solutions for tunnel detection along
the Southern and Northern borders of the United States.
The S&T Directorate participated in the Tunnel Detection Technical
Support Working Group (TSWG) meeting held in January 2006 and the Joint
Task Force-6 Tunneling Conference held in June 2004. The S&T
Directorate is also engaged with NORTHCOM's Futures Group in relaying,
discussing, and leveraging potential technologies that satisfy DOD and
DHS's tunnel detection needs. The S&T Directorate's Border &
Transportation (B&T) Portfolio met with NORTHCOM officials in August
2005 to discuss specific opportunities to collaborate and leverage each
organization's expertise.
CBP is also coordinating with a number of sources that could
possibly provide technology that will meet CBP's detection needs. These
sources include the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA),
Sandia Laboratories, and the Border Research Technology Center. There
is currently no proven technology that can detect the types of tunnels
that have recently been encountered. Some promising research and
development is being done by Sandia Laboratories, but at this time, its
field utility is unknown.
cbp air and marine
Question. Please breakout the items you plan to procure in fiscal
year 20006/2007 and the funding source within AMO for each item (i.e.
Northern Border, WHDEA, etc.).
Answer.
Planned CBP Air and Marine Acquisitions for Fiscal Year 2006 and Fiscal
Year 2007--Dollars in Millions
Question. What is the status of establishment of all of the
Northern border airwings? Please provide the number of personnel on
board at each location, the number and types of equipment at each
location, the hours per day/week of operations at each location, and
specific milestones which must be met (and when they will be met) to
achieve full operating capacity at each location.
Answer. In fiscal year 2003, CBP Air and Marine (formerly Air and
Marine Operations) received congressional funding to open the first of
five planned Northern border air wing locations. The five planned
locations were strategically placed along the Northern border in areas
that provided for a 1-hour minimum response time to a border
penetration. The five planned locations are Plattsburgh, New York;
Detroit, Michigan; Grand Forks, North Dakota; Great Falls, Montana; and
Bellingham, Washington. Bellingham was the first to be opened on August
20, 2004, followed by Plattsburgh 18 days later on October 8, 2004.
Great Falls will open third in the summer of 2006. CBP will begin the
activation process for the new air sites in both Detroit and the Grand
Forks area of North Dakota in fiscal year 2007. The site survey for
Detroit has been completed and preliminary work to assess hangar,
maintenance, and support facility requirements is ongoing. Air assets
are being identified for transfer to the site and staffing plans are
being compiled. The fiscal year 2006 appropriation provided $2 million
for the North Dakota air site assessment, which is in progress and
should be completed in late May 2006. In addition, DHS is developing
funding options to ensure we meet the goal of establishing a presence
at both sites by the end of fiscal year 2007.
Current number of personnel on board, the number and types of
equipment, and the hours per day/week of operations at each location
are as follows in the table below.
In order to achieve full operating capacity, CBP's aviation
strategic modernization plan needs to be completed, reviewed and
approved by the Department and Congress. This plan includes fleet
modernization, recapitalization and fleet standardization by reducing
the number of aircraft types currently being operated and associated
technology, staffing and facility requirements. CBP is taking an
incremental approach to attain full operating staffing capacity at the
Northern Border Air branches.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Location Current FTE Current aircraft Current coverage hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Plattsburgh, NY................. 18 1--PC-12......... 0800-2400
2--AS350......... 5 days
1--C-206......... After hours callout as necessary
1--C-210.........
Detroit, MI..................... 1 1--OH6........... 0800-1600
5 days
After hours callout as necessary
Grand Forks, ND................. 3 1--AS350......... 0700-1500
1--C-206......... 7 days
1--C-182......... After hours callout as necessary
Great Falls, MT................. \1\ 34 2--C550.......... TBD
1--PC-12.........
2--UH60..........
Bellingham, WA.................. 19 1--C-550......... 0700-1700
1--PC-12......... 5 days
1--AS350......... After hours callout as necessary
1--MD600.........
1--C-206.........
1--C-182.........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The staffing and aircraft numbers indicated for Great Falls, which will be opening this summer, are
projected.
ADVANCED TRAINING CENTER
Question. In the December 28, 2005, response to my October 19,
2005, letter regarding the status of items identified in Conference
Report 109-241, I was told that the ``final spending plan, project
schedules, and projected training requirements'' would be provided to
the Committee ``by February 18, 2006''. It is now March 6, 2006 and we
have yet to receive the report. When can we expect to receive the
report?
Answer. The report receiving final revisions and will be
transmitted shortly.
Question. Also, please provide the level of funding provided in the
fiscal year 2007 request for operations and activities at the Advanced
Training Center.
Answer. CBP's base budget for fiscal year 2007 includes $9.5
million for ongoing operations and management at the Advanced Training
Center.
TUCSON SECTOR CHECKPOINTS
Question. The DHS Inspector General issued a report in January of
2006 that made a strong case for permanent Border Patrol checkpoints.
It said that, ``Permanent checkpoints permit safer, more efficient law
enforcement. It is not necessary to prohibit permanent checkpoints in
order to encourage the use of alternative tactics and mobile interior
operations.''
What are you doing to remove the House-backed bill language that
mandates the periodic movement of these checkpoints in the Tucson
sector?
Answer. CBP Congressional Affairs has conducted numerous briefings
to House Appropriations Committee Staff members on the use of efficient
checkpoints. Permanent checkpoints elsewhere on the Southwest Border,
located in strategic chokepoints in areas of egress from border areas,
have proven to be effective enforcement tools and thus make up an
important part of CBP's ``defense in depth'' strategy of controlling
the border. Permanent checkpoints are used effectively in every Sector
of the Southwest Border except Tucson Sector.
Question. How much does it cost to rotate these checkpoints?
Answer. The checkpoint located on Interstate 19 is the only
tactical checkpoint rotated every 7 days from one location to another.
The two locations currently have checkpoint equipment located at both
sites and only require personnel to rotate from one location to
another. In order to rotate checkpoints, it takes a minimum of 10
agents 2 hours in order to complete the checkpoint rotation, which
includes the breakdown of one site, and the setup of the other. It also
costs the duplication of checkpoint equipment to include port-a-johns,
trailers, signage, cones and lighting. These costs are not per
rotation, but are as a result of having to rotate. The duplicate
equipment costs about $65,000 plus an additional port-a-john contract
for $140 per month.
Question. What, if any, health-related problems have been
experienced by the men and women who are working in this difficult
(extreme heat, vehicle exhaust, lack of rest facilities) environment?
Answer. There have not been any health-related problems to
personnel working at the rotating Tucson sector checkpoints. All
medical and safety precautions are taken for the agents working at the
checkpoint. Shade, water, medical and communication are available to
the working agents or the checkpoint would not be allowed to open.
Question. What is the full construction cost of permanent
checkpoints in the Tucson sector?
Answer. The total cost for establishing three proposed checkpoints
in Tucson Sector was $45.78 million in December 2004. An updated
estimate would include increases associated with construction and
inflation factors.
--Highway 85--$12.79 million
--Highway 90--$15.31 million
--Interstate 19--$17.68 million
This is an estimated total that includes land acquisition, design,
construction costs, auxiliary cost, management services, and support
costs. National comprehensive traffic control guidelines are being
developed in response to the National Transportation Safety Board, and
may also impact the cost estimate. The guidelines are a collaborative
effort between CBP, Federal Highway Administration, and representatives
from the American Association of State Highway Transportation
Officials.
Question. To what extent do law breakers take advantage of the
temporary checkpoints by moving illegal aliens when CBP is closing the
temporary checkpoints?
Answer. Since Arizona is required to rotate checkpoints every 7
days, and Nogales only has two authorized sites, they rotate every
Saturday. Border Patrol's movements are predictable as dictated by the
appropriations language, and give the smugglers a clear advantage.
Law breakers do take advantage when CBP is closing the temporary
checkpoints by smuggling their illegal cargo (illegal aliens,
narcotics, etc.) further into the interior of the United States. When
the checkpoint is at the northern location, smugglers simply stage
their loads just south of it and once it is moved to the southern
location, they move their loads north. The moment a checkpoint is
closed, scouts notify smugglers immediately to transport their illegal
cargo further north into the United States. The smugglers are very in
tune to these rotations. Border Patrol deploys additional resources to
the interstate when possible, but the manpower required to move the
checkpoints limits this.
Smugglers also take advantage of Border Patrol movements by
exploiting the lack of flanking infrastructure, which would otherwise
be present at a permanent site. With no cameras and only limited
sensors to the flanks of the temporary sites, smugglers routinely walk
around the temporary checkpoints.
NORTHERN BORDER CARRYOVER FUNDS
Question. On what activities will you obligate the remaining $11
million in unobligated Northern Border prior year balances? When will
these funds be obligated?
Answer. We anticipate obligating $6 million on Radiation Portal
Monitors (RPM's) and Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD's) throughout
fiscal year 2006, $3.8 million for facilities repairs and alterations
by the end of fiscal year 2006, and $1.2 million to be obligated by
July 2006 for various mission support projects to support Anti-
Terrorism.
SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY SPECIALISTS
Question. What is the per person cost to hire, train, and make
proficient the specialists who verify participants' compliance as a
member of C-TPAT?
Answer. It is estimated that the per-person cost to hire, train,
and make proficient the specialists who verify participant's compliance
as a member of C-TPAT is $201,560. This includes $15,000 in training
costs, $83,000 in SCS Salary and compensation, $26,560 in benefits and
$77,000 for 1 full year of validation visits.
A newly hired Supply Chain Specialist (SCS) must undergo a 2-week
Basic SCS Training course. This course focuses on the core program
requirements of the C-TPAT program and is administered by CBP C-TPAT
program officers and managers, and experienced SCSs. Private sector
instructors who have first hand knowledge of supply chain principles,
logistics management, and related business practices provide additional
instruction.
In addition to the basic course, two 3-day training sessions are
held annually. One coincides with the Annual C-TPAT Training Seminar
and the other is a session held at one of the C-TPAT Field Offices.
These sessions allow the HQs C-TPAT Director and the Program
Management staff to communicate important program developments and
newly implemented procedures and technology.
While the Basic SCS course provides the students with formal and
effective classroom instruction to learn the scope of the duties of the
SCS position, accompanying experienced SCSs on a year's worth of
validation visits is critical to attaining the desired level of
proficiency of the SCS.
ARBITRATION DECISION ON THE FISCAL YEAR 2005 AWARDS
Question. What is the potential cost of the recent arbitrator
decision on the fiscal year 2005 awards process?
Answer. For fiscal year 2005, CBP implemented a unified awards
process in order to ensure that employees working side-by-side and
performing the same duties would have the same opportunities for awards
recognition. CBP inherited four different negotiated awards processes
when it was formed, two of them very similar to this unified process.
One union with a significantly different awards program agreed to the
unified process, but the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU)
sought to maintain its status quo using local joint awards committees
(JAC). It is the agency's position that we cannot treat our front line
officers differently while holding them to common standards of
performance.
This arbitrator decision affects only bargaining unit employees
represented by NTEU. The figures below are estimates based on how the
funding for awards under the old JAC process would have been
constructed.
--As of September 3, 2005, there were approximately 13,650 employees
in the NTEU bargaining unit, with combined salaries of $754.6
million.
--A unit's awards ``pool'' is typically calculated on the basis of 1
percent of the combined salaries of employees on-board in that
unit as of a particular date. For fiscal year 2005, the awards
pools were calculated in Pay Period 17, which ended on
September 3. The awards pool that would have been available to
award just NTEU employees for fiscal year 2005 would have been
$7.546 million.
--Organizational components typically reserve 15 to 25 percent of the
awards pool to fund special act awards throughout the year. The
balance of the pool is available to distribute as awards for
superior performance. It is estimated that $6.04 million would
have been available to pay awards to NTEU employees under the
JAC process.
--The arbitrator's decision requires the agency to recreate the local
JACs, collect nominations for shares, and reach consensus on
the number of shares to award, if any, to each nominee. If an
award calculated under this process is determined to be higher
than what an employee was actually awarded, additional payment
is to be made. The decision is silent on the action to be taken
if the JAC recommends a lower award or no award to an employee
who received one. Theoretically, then, the decision could
result in merely a redistribution of awards without additional
cost. In reality, however, the agency is unlikely to take
actions that will result in loss of an award already paid out.
--The award process used was designed to be fair and equitable to
employees of all bargaining units, and similar to the NTEU
process, provided employees the opportunity to nominate
themselves and/or co-workers for awards. Therefore, it is not
expected that re-running the 2005 awards under the NTEU process
would result in substantial increase in costs.
It is noted that CBP believes the arbitrator's decision is flawed,
and the agency is filing exceptions with the Federal Labor Relations
Authority.
Question. If CBP is required to correct the process and pay out the
rewards, from which account would these funds be drawn?
Answer. Any required payments would be made from CBP's Salaries and
Expenses account.
RESPONDING TO LETTERS FROM CONGRESS
Question. Is CBP looking for a contractor to help its employees
write letters to Congress? If so, why and isn't this more properly a
Department rather than a contractor function?
Answer. CBP does not employ contractors to write letters to
Congress. We have employed contractors to instruct writing skills to
our employees so that they are better able to author and edit memos,
letters, reports, and other documents.
BORDER PATROL DUTIES
Question. On February 15, 2006, the Washington Post ran an article
regarding the Vice President's accidental shooting of a friend while
hunting quail on a private ranch in Texas that stated, in part, ``and a
Federal Border Patrol agent, guarding the gate because Cheney was
there, knew nothing about the accident.'' The Vice President already is
protected by a significant Secret Service detail.
Given the relative paucity of Border Patrol agents posted along our
Southwest border, and the public's strong interest that our borders be
protected, why was an agent pulled off the border to perform a duty
that is routinely and more appropriately performed by the Secret
Service?
Answer. The U.S. Border Patrol's Rio Grande Valley Sector did
provide perimeter security during the Vice President's visit to the
ranch. The U.S. Secret Service requested assistance from the Rio Grande
Valley Sector due to the vastness of the ranch, the Border Patrol's 4-
wheel drive vehicle capabilities and the agent's knowledge and
familiarity with the area. The ranch is located within the sector's
Kingsville Station area of responsibility and is routinely patrolled by
Border Patrol agents. According to the sector, this request for
assistance was received well in advance of the visit and was supported
without sacrificing agent presence along the immediate border area or
at the sector's checkpoints.
VIRGIN ISLAND SUBSTATION
Question. What is the status of opening a Border Patrol substation
in the Virgin Islands?
Answer. The current threat assessments in the sector do not support
placing it as a priority enforcement area with the creation of a new
Border Patrol sector. Current assessments of the illegal immigrant flow
in the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) place it at 0.1 percent of that of
other focus areas, such as the Southwest land border, with an annual
illegal immigrant flow that exceeds 1 million. Therefore, DHS does not
support establishing a Border Patrol facility in the USVI at this time.
ICE CONTRACT WITH KELLOGG, BROWN AND ROOT
Question. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) recently
awarded Kellogg, Brown and Root, the engineering and construction
subsidiary of Halliburton, a contingency contract to support ICE
facilities in the event of an emergency. With a maximum total value of
$385 million over a 5-year term (consisting of a 1-year base period and
four 1-year options), the competitively awarded contract will be
executed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. KBR held the previous ICE
contract from 2000 through 2005. The contract calls for establishing
temporary detention and processing capabilities to augment existing ICE
Detention and Removal Operations facilities in the event of an
emergency influx of immigrants into the United States, or to support
the rapid development of new programs. The contingency support contract
provides for planning and, if required, initiation of specific
engineering, construction, and logistics associated with expanding
facilities as required.
Is it your intention to use this contract to construct the
additional detention bedspace and the 6,700 new beds called for in the
budget request?
Answer. The contingency contract provides ICE with an emergency
response mechanism to deploy support services and temporary shelters
within short response times for both emergency responders as well as
migrant populations. ICE has not utilized the KBR contingency support
contract to construct detention facilities in the past. ICE does not
anticipate the need to utilize the KBR contract for developing new
detention facilities associated with the increase of the 6,700 fiscal
year 2007 detention beds.
Question. Has KBR constructed existing detention bedspace under the
terms of this contract or of any previous contracts? Please provide us
with the details.
Answer. ICE has not exercised the current contingency support
contract to construct any existing detention facilities. Further, ICE
has not utilized any previous contingency support contracts awarded to
KBR for the purpose of constructing permanent detention facilities.
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT
Question. For worksite enforcement, please provide fiscal year 2005
case and workload statistics, both criminal and administrative.
Answer. There were a total of 412 worksite enforcement criminal
cases closed in fiscal year 2005. For fiscal year 2005, there were 176
arrests for criminal violations and 1,116 administrative apprehensions.
LENGTH OF STAY
Question. What is the average length of stay for a detained alien
in ICE's custody, including those in expedited removal?
Answer. The current average length of stay for all detained aliens,
including all case types and nationalities, is 33.7 days. Release from
custody includes all possible release types, to include bonds, order of
recognizance, order of supervision, removal, etc.
Source: DRO official statistics (as of May 31, 2006).
OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL LEGAL ADVISOR (OPLA)
Question. Please provide a break out of the attorneys in OPLA for
fiscal year 2003/2004/2005/2006, including position type and location,
the percentage of growth, how many are on board currently?
Answer. There are 3 SES positions within OPLA: Principal Legal
Advisor, Deputy Principal Legal Advisor and the Director of Field Legal
Operations. The remaining ICE attorneys are in the GS-905 series.
The following is a breakdown of the number of attorneys onboard:
--September 30, 2003: 614
--September 30, 2004: 608
--September 30, 2005: 571
--February 10, 2006: 599 (on board)
The decrease in the number of attorneys from September 2003 (614)
to February 2006 (599) was the result of several factors. OPLA lost
attorneys to CIS and CBP in the transition to DHS. Additionally,
because of an uncertain budget situation, ICE instituted a hiring
freeze and waiver process that precluded OPLA from effectively
replacing staff lost through attrition.
The attached charts show the number of attorneys by location.
Question. What is the expected average caseload reduction for
attorneys based on the requested resources for fiscal year 2007?
Answer. Each additional attorney assigned to perform immigration
court work handles at least 500 cases annually. With additional
attorney resources, there will be more time in which to respond to
motions, prepare cases, write briefs and respond to inquiries from
clients. If the ICE legal program receives the requested positions,
attorneys will be able to spend more time preparing the average case
for hearing before the Immigration Courts. This will have numerous
beneficial consequences:
ICE attorneys will have additional time to obtain and review the A-
files, prepare the cross-examination of the respondents, locate and
interview other witnesses, research complex legal issues, write pre-
trial briefs, and confer with opposing counsel.
The current attorney level results in the delay and/or termination
of court proceedings, provides more time for undocumented aliens to
amass equities in the United States, and results in additional
detention costs for the agency. Each 1-week continuance costs ICE $665
(i.e., $95 per day) in additional detention costs. In fiscal year 2004,
detainees remained in agency custody for an average of 39 days. The
Immigration Courts completed 84,975 detained cases that year, which
accounted for 34 percent of its total caseload. Furthermore, with an
increased attorney workforce, attorneys will have more time to enter
into stipulated deportation agreements with detainees, resulting in a
more effective use of detention beds. With an increased number of
attorneys, the program could make more effective use of detention and
removal resources.
BREACHED BOND
Question. Please explain the Breached Bond program, how many
detention beds it supported in fiscal years 2002-2005, how many beds
are estimated to be supported by it in fiscal year 2006 and budgeted
for in fiscal year 2007.
Answer. The Breached Bond/Detention Fund was authorized in Section
112 of the Department of Justice Appropriations Act of 1993 (Public Law
102-395). The Act amended Section 286 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, by establishing, in the General Fund of
the Treasury, a separate account to be called the Breached Bond/
Detention Fund. The first $8,000,000 in breached cash and surety bonds
collected goes to the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury. All
collections in excess of $8,000,000 posted under the INA, which are
recovered by the Department of Justice, are deposited as offsetting
collections into this fund. Amounts deposited into the fund, which
remain available until expended, can be used for expenses incurred in
the collection of breached bonds, bond management, litigation
activities to obtain compliance from surety companies found to be
delinquent in meeting their obligations to ICE, and for expenses
associated with the detention of criminal and illegal aliens.
In 1998, the Immigration Detention account receipts were merged
into this account. These receipts are derived from the penalty portion
of the receipts collected under Section 245(i) of the INA. Section
245(i) allows a person who qualifies for permanent residency, but is
ineligible to adjust status in the United States because of an
immigration status violation, to pay a $1,000 penalty to continue
processing in the United States. A portion of each application fee (not
to exceed $200.00) that the Attorney General determines is required to
process the application under the section and is remitted to the
Attorney General. Any remaining portions of such fees are deposited by
the Attorney General into the Breached Bond Detention Fund established
under 286(r).
Detention beds supported from fiscal years 2002-2005 are as
follows:
--Fiscal year 2002: 3,857
--Fiscal year 2003: 5,166
--Fiscal year 2004: 3,498
--Fiscal year 2005: 3,378
Estimated detention beds supported and budgeted for fiscal years
2006-2007 are as follows:
--Fiscal year 2006: 2,598
--Fiscal year 2007: 2,598
Question. Also, please explain the estimated impact on the program
of the anticipated increase in detentions resulting from the SBI.
Answer. While the number of aliens apprehended and detained will
rise, the Department has put into place practices that will allow the
program to turn over detention beds quicker, improve the processing of
aliens, and facilitate their removal from the United States.
DETENTIONS
Question. For fiscal years 2002-2005, how many illegal aliens did
you detain for one day or longer?
Answer. Illegal aliens detained for 1 day or longer during fiscal
years 2002-2005 are as follows:
--Fiscal year 2002: 181,236
--Fiscal year 2003: 209,629
--Fiscal year 2004: 215,417
--Fiscal year 2005: 217,270
Question. Of that total, how many were detained for less than 2
weeks, less than 1 month, and more than 1 month?
Answer. Illegal aliens detained for less than 2 weeks, less than 1
month, and more than 1 month are detailed below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Weeks 2 Wks--1 Mo. > 1 mo. Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2002................................ 93,728 33,869 53,639 181,236
Fiscal year 2003................................ 114,210 36,006 59,413 209,629
Fiscal year 2004................................ 115,613 34,637 65,167 215,417
Fiscal year 2005................................ 112,705 45,149 59,416 217,270
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER
Question. Please provide the number of State inquiries into the
LESC for fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, and any specific
workload statistics for LESC in support of fugitive operations.
Answer. In fiscal year 2003, the LESC responded to a total of
594,352 queries from Federal, State and local law enforcement officers,
of which 385,651 were queries from State and local law enforcement
officers. For fiscal year 2004, the LESC responded to a total of
667,453 queries, of which 458,711 were queries from State and local law
enforcement officers.
The LESC identified a combined total of 4,617 ICE fugitives through
NCIC in fiscal years 2003 (488), 2004 (1,854) and 2005 (2,275). ICE
immigration detainers were lodged in each instance by ICE Special
Agents assigned to the LESC, who then coordinated local action with ICE
field officers.
LESC agents are also able to identify alien fugitives based upon
information contained in incoming queries from the law enforcement
community. Wanted aliens identified by the LESC are not tracked by
individual category. However, in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, LESC
agents lodged a combined total of 27,886 detainers against criminal or
other wanted aliens, including fugitive aliens.
The LESC routinely provides fugitive leads to ICE field offices
based on information received from callers to the ICE tip-line. Tip-
line statistics are not available for individual categories of calls;
however, a substantial number of callers do provide information
concerning ICE fugitives.
Question. Describe the work load for LESC.
Answer. In fiscal years 2003, 2004 and 2005, the LESC responded to
a combined total of 1,938,307 electronic queries from Federal, State,
local and tribal law enforcement agencies in all 50 States, the
District of Columbia, two U.S. Territories and Canada. Electronic
queries to the LESC average in excess of 50,000 queries per month.
In fiscal years 2004 and 2005 the LESC received a combined total of
126,528 calls on the ICE tip line (98,857 of those calls were received
in fiscal year 2005 alone).
ICE Special Agents assigned to the LESC lodged a combined total of
27,886 ICE immigration detainers in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, or in
excess of 1,000 ICE immigration detainers each month.
The LESC received more than 107,036 telephone calls on its
dedicated law enforcement line in fiscal year 2005. Calls to the LESC's
law enforcement line average almost 9,000 per month. In fiscal year
2005, the LESC had more than 880,000 contacts with the law enforcement
community or the public concerning law enforcement matters associated
with ICE authorities and responsibilities.
In fiscal years 2003, 2004 and 2005, the LESC entered a combined
total of more than 90,000 new ICE records in the NCIC database--an
average of about 2,500 per month. However, new procedures recently
implemented at the LESC are expected to increase record entries to an
average of 5,700 per month.
In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the LESC was required to validate a
combined total of 212,420 NCIC records. In the first 3 months of fiscal
year 2006, the LESC validated an average of 12,000 records per month.
In fiscal year 2005, the LESC records staff completed more than 1.1
million file transactions. In the first 3 months of fiscal year 2006,
they averaged 92,000 record transactions per month, resulting in a
similar annual projection for fiscal year 2006.
INTENSIVE SUPERVISION PROGRAM EXPANSION
Question. On page 24 of the ICE congressional justification, it
states that the intensive supervision program is to be expanded to a
ninth and tenth city. To which cities are you expanding?
Answer. We are currently reviewing opportunities to expand ISAP
within the scope of current contracts. No determinations have been made
at this time.
GUANTANAMO FACILITY
Question. What is the status of the $5 million in fiscal year 2005
construction funds that were to be used at the Guantanamo facility?
Answer. $6 million was appropriated in fiscal year 2004 for the
facility, which provides housing for refugee applicants that are
awaiting determination of their claims.
Construction activities undertaken between fiscal years 2004 and
2006 are:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
20-Bed Segregation Unit................................. $1,787,000
East Compound 2.1 Acres Security Fencing and 1,566,658
Mobilization of Temporary Facilities...................
West Compound 2.9 Acres Security Systems and Perimeter 821,792
Fences.................................................
Building 624 Demolition and Asbestos Abatement.......... 529,200
Building 1567 64-Bed Renovation Project................. 147,153
---------------
Total............................................. 4,851,803
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
EXPLOSIVES TRACE PORTALS
Question. Please provide a purchase and deployment schedule for
Explosives Detection Trace Portals (ETPs). The schedule should include,
by airport, all ETPs purchased and deployed for fiscal year's 2005 and
2006, ETPs scheduled to be purchased and deployed based on the fiscal
year 2007 request, and ETPs scheduled for deployment in the future.
Answer. Below, in figure A, is the list of airports where
Explosives Trace Portals (ETP) were deployed with fiscal year 2005
funding.
ETP deployment using fiscal year 2006 funding will be installed in
two phases. Below, in figure B, is Phase I of the fiscal year 2006
deployment. The airport locations and number of units for all fiscal
year 2006 deployments are subject to change due to space constraints,
local airport construction, etc.
Phase II of the fiscal year 2006 deployment is in figure C. And,
the list of airports scheduled to receive the 92 ETPs requested in the
President's fiscal year 2007 budget is below in figure D. This list
accounts for 82 units; the remaining 10 units will be used to backfill
at airports in which ETPs have not been deployed due to local airport
construction. Airport locations and number of units are subject to
change due to space constraints, local airport construction, etc.
FIGURE A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airport Airport name No. of units
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BOS............................... Boston-Logan 1
International
Airport--MA.
BWI............................... Baltimore-Washington 1
International
Airport--MD.
CLT............................... Charlotte/Douglas 3
International
Airport--NC.
DCA............................... Ronald Reagan 2
Washington National
Airport--DC.
DFW............................... Dallas/Ft. Worth 4
International
Airport--TX.
DTW............................... Detroit Metro Wayne 3
County Airport--MI.
EWR............................... Newark International 2
Airport--NJ.
FLL............................... Ft. Lauderdale/ 2
Hollywood
International
Airport--FL.
GPT............................... Gulfport-Biloxi 1
International
Airport--MS.
IAD............................... Washington-Dulles 1
International
Airport--VA.
IND............................... Indianapolis 3
International
Airport--IN.
JAX............................... Jacksonville 2
International
Airport--FL.
JFK............................... JFK International 1
Airport--NY.
LAS............................... McCarran Las Vegas 4
International
Airport--NV.
LAX............................... Los Angeles 1
International
Airport--CA.
MIA............................... Miami International 7
Airport--FL.
PBI............................... West Palm Beach 1
International
Airport--FL.
PHX............................... Phoenix-Sky Harbor 1
International
Airport--AZ.
PIT............................... Pittsburgh 2
International
Airport--PA.
PVD............................... T. F. Green Airport-- 1
Providence, RI.
ROC............................... Greater Rochester 1
International
Airport--NY.
SAN............................... San Diego 1
International
Airport--CA.
SFO............................... San Francisco 7
International
Airport--CA.
SJU............................... Luis Munoz Marin 3
International
Airport--San Juan,
PR.
SMF............................... Sacramento 3
International
Airport--CA.
TPA............................... Tampa International 1
Airport--FL.
---------------
Total....................... .................... 59
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIGURE B
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airport Airport name No. of units
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABQ............................... Albuquerque 2
International
Sunport Airport--NM.
ALB............................... Albany International 1
Airport--NY.
ATL............................... Hartsfield Atlanta 3
International
Airport--GA.
BDL............................... Bradley 2
International
Airport--CT.
BOS............................... Boston Logan 8
International
Airport--MA.
BUF............................... Buffalo Niagara 2
International
Airport--NY.
BWI............................... Baltimore-Washington 8
International
Airport--MD.
CLE............................... Cleveland Hopkins 4
International
Airport--OH.
CMH............................... Port Columbus 3
International
Airport--OH.
CVG............................... Cincinnati/Northern 4
Kentucky
International
Airport--KY.
DEN............................... Denver International 6
Airport--CO.
DFW............................... Dallas/Fort Worth 8
International
Airport--TX.
EWR............................... Newark International 5
Airport--NY.
HNL............................... Honolulu 3
International
Airport--HI.
IAH............................... George Bush 2
Intercontinental
Airport Houston--TX.
JFK............................... John F. Kennedy 3
International
Airport--NY.
LAX............................... Los Angeles 8
International
Airport--CA.
LGA............................... LaGuardia Airport-- 2
NY.
MCI............................... Kansas City 4
International
Airport--MO.
MCO............................... Orlando 4
International
Airport--FL.
MDW............................... Chicago Midway 2
Airport--IL.
MSP............................... Minneapolis-St. Paul 7
International
Airport--MN.
OAK............................... Oakland 5
International
Airport--CA.
ORD............................... Chicago O'Hare 8
International
Airport--IL.
PBI............................... Palm Beach 1
International
Airport--FL.
PDX............................... Portland 4
International
Airport--OR.
PHL............................... Philadelphia 7
International
Airport--.
PHX............................... Phoenix Sky Harbor 4
International
Airport--AZ.
PVD............................... T. F. Green Airport-- 1
Providence, RI.
RDU............................... Raleigh-Durham 3
International
Airport--NC.
SEA............................... Seattle-Tacoma 6
International
Airport--WA.
SFO............................... San Francisco 1
International
Airport--CA.
SLC............................... Salt Lake City 5
International
Airport--UT.
STL............................... Lambert St Louis 5
International
Airport--MO.
TPA............................... Tampa International 6
Airport--FL.
---------------
Total....................... .................... 147
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIGURE C
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airport Airport name No. of units
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANC............................... Ted Stevens 3
Anchorage
International
Airport--AK.
ATL............................... Hartsfield Atlanta 6
International
Airport--GA.
AUS............................... Austin-Bergstrom 3
International--TX.
BHM............................... Birmingham 1
International
Airport--AL.
BNA............................... Nashville 2
International
Airport--TN.
BOI............................... Boise Air Terminal/ 2
Gowen Field--ID.
BUR............................... Bob Hope Airport-- 2
Burbank, CA.
COS............................... Colorado Springs 1
Municipal--CO.
DAL............................... Dallas Love Field-- 3
TX.
DAY............................... James M. Cox Dayton 1
International
Airport--OH.
DCA............................... Ronald Reagan 4
Washington National
Airport--DC.
DEN............................... Denver International 5
Airport--CO.
DTW............................... Detroit Metro Wayne 6
County Airport--MI.
ELP............................... El Paso 1
International
Airport--TS.
EWR............................... Newark International 4
Airport--NJ.
GEG............................... Spokane 2
International
Airport--WA.
GSO............................... Piedmont Triad 2
International
Airport--NC.
HOU............................... William P. Hobby 4
Airport--TX.
IAD............................... Washington-Dulles 4
International
Airport--VA.
JFK............................... John F. Kennedy 4
International
Airport--NY.
KOA............................... Kona International 2
Airport--AK.
LAS............................... McCarran 5
International
Airport--NV.
LAX............................... Los Angeles 4
International
Airport--CA.
LGA............................... LaGuardia Airport-- 4
NY.
LIT............................... Little Rock National 1
Airport--AR.
MCO............................... Orlando 4
International
Airport--FL.
MDW............................... Chicago Midway 2
Airport--IL.
MEM............................... Memphis 4
International
Airport--TN.
MHT............................... Manchester Airport-- 3
NH.
MIA............................... Miami International 3
Airport--FL.
MKE............................... General Mitchell 4
International
Airport--WI.
MSP............................... Minneapolis-St. Paul 3
International
Airport--MN.
MSY............................... New Orleans 4
International
Airport--LA.
OGG............................... Kahului Airport--HI. 2
OKC............................... Will Rogers World 2
Airport--OK.
OMA............................... Eppley Airfield--NE. 2
ONT............................... Ontario 2
International
Airport--CA.
ORD............................... Chicago O'Hare 4
International
Airport--IL.
ORF............................... Norfolk 3
International
Airport--VA.
RNO............................... Reno/Tahoe 2
International
Airport--NV.
RSW............................... Southwest Florida 3
International
Airport--FL.
SAN............................... San Diego 5
International
Airport, Lindbergh--
CA.
SAT............................... San Antonio 2
International
Airport--TX.
SDF............................... Louisville 2
International
Airport--KY.
SEA............................... Seattle-Tacoma 6
International
Airport--WA.
SJC............................... San Jose 6
International
Airport--CA.
SNA............................... John Wayne Airport-- 4
CA.
TUL............................... Tulsa International 1
Airport--OK.
TUS............................... Tucson International 2
Airport--AZ.
---------------
Total....................... .................... 151
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIGURE D
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airport Airport name No. of units
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABE............................... Lehigh Valley 1
International
Airport--PA.
ACY............................... Atlantic City 1
International
Airport--NJ.
AMA............................... Amarillo 1
International
Airport--TX.
AVL............................... Asheville Regional 1
Airport--NC.
BGR............................... Bangor International 2
Airport--ME.
BIL............................... Billings Logan 1
International
Airport--MT.
BTV............................... Burlington 2
International
Airport--VT.
BZN............................... Gallatin Field 1
Airport--MT.
CAE............................... Columbia 1
Metropolitan
Airport--SC.
CAK............................... Akron-Canton 1
Regional Airport--
OH.
CHA............................... Chattanooga 1
Metropolitan
Airport.
CHS............................... Charleston 2
International
Airport/AFB--SC.
CID............................... The Eastern Iowa 1
Airport--IA.
CRP............................... Corpus Christi 1
International
Airport--TX.
DAB............................... Daytona Beach 1
International
Airport--FL.
DSM............................... Des Moines 1
International
Airport--IA.
EUG............................... Eugene Airport/ 1
Mahlon Sweet Field.
EYW............................... Key West 1
International
Airport--FL.
FAI............................... Fairbanks 1
International
Airport--AK.
FAT............................... Fresno Yosemite 1
International
Airport--CA.
FNT............................... Bishop International 1
Airport--MI.
FSD............................... Joe Foss Field--SD.. 1
FWA............................... Ft. Wayne 1
International
Airport--Baer
Field--IN.
GRB............................... Austin Straubel 1
International
Airport--TX.
GRR............................... Gerald R. Ford 2
International
Airport--MI.
GSP............................... Greenville- 2
Spartanburg
Airport--SC.
HRL............................... Rio Grande Valley 1
International
Airport--TX.
HSV............................... Huntsville-Madison 1
County Airport--AL.
ICT............................... Wichita Mid- 1
Continent Airport--
KS.
ISP............................... Long Island 2
MacArthur Airport--
NY.
ITO............................... Hilo International 1
Airport--HI.
JAN............................... Jackson 2
International
Airport--MS.
JNU............................... Juneau International 1
Airport--AK.
LAN............................... Capital City 1
Airport--MI.
LBB............................... Lubbock 1
International
Airport--TX.
LEX............................... Blue Grass Airport-- 1
KY.
LGB............................... Long Beach Daugherty 2
Field Airport--CA.
LIH............................... Lihue Airport--HI... 1
MAF............................... Midland 1
International
Airport--TX.
MDT............................... Harrisburg 1
International
Airport--PA.
MFE............................... McAllen-Miller 1
International
Airport--TX.
MLB............................... Melbourne 1
International
Airport--FL.
MLI............................... Quad Cities 1
International
Airport--IL.
MOB............................... Mobile Regional 1
Airport--AL.
MSN............................... Dane County Regional 1
Airport--WI.
MSO............................... Missoula 1
International
Airport--MT.
MYR............................... Myrtle Beach 1
International
Airport--SC.
PHF............................... Newport News/ 1
Williamsburg
International
Airport--VA.
PIE............................... St Petersburg- 2
Clearwater Int'l
Airport--FL.
PNS............................... Pensacola Regional 1
Airport--FL.
PSP............................... Palm Springs 1
International
Airport--FL.
PWM............................... Portland 1
International
Jetport--ME.
RIC............................... Richmond 3
International
Airport--VA.
ROA............................... Roanoke Regional 1
Airport--VA.
ROC............................... Greater Rochester 2
International
Airport--NY.
SAV............................... Savannah 1
International
Airport--GA.
SBA............................... Santa Barbara 2
Municipal Airport--
CA.
SBN............................... South Bend Regional 2
Airport--IN.
SFB............................... Orlando Sanford 2
Airport--FL.
SGF............................... Springfield/Branson 2
Regional Airport--
MO.
SHV............................... Shreveport Regional 2
Airport--LA.
SRQ............................... Sarasota Bradenton 3
International
Airport--FL.
SYR............................... Syracuse-Hancock 1
International
Airport--NY.
---------------
Total....................... .................... 82
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Provide a similar schedule for other emerging technology
that will be used to screen passengers for explosives.
Answer. Below is the deployment plan for emerging technology in
fiscal year 2007. These deployments will enable the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) to screen all passengers designated for
additional screening and a random number of passengers selected to keep
the equipment in continuous use. TSA is currently developing a
strategic plan for our passenger screening program which will establish
our goals for screening passengers for explosives and provide a
deployment schedule by airport.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
# of
Technology units Location
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosives Trace Portals............ \1\ 92 1 per 3 checkpoint
lanes at Category X &
I airport
Automated Explosives Spot Sampler... 93 1 at each Category II
checkpoint
Automated Carry-On Bag Explosives 27 1 at each Category X
Detection Sy- stem. airport
Whole Body Imaging.................. 91 1 per 8 checkpoint
lanes at Category X &
I airports
Cast and Prosthetics Scanner........ 210 1 at each Category X
checkpoint
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This is the final phase of deployment to complete the 1 per 3 lanes
ratio.
Question. Provide a list of all certified ETP technology.
Answer. The following Explosives Trace Portals (ETPs) have been
reviewed by TSA, and are qualified for screening aviation passengers
for explosives:
--Smiths Detection Sentinel II; and
--GE IonTrack Entry Scan3.
Question. Provide a list of all ETP technology that is being
evaluated by DHS for certification.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
to work with the two current manufacturers of Explosives Trace Portals
(ETP) to further refine system performance and operational suitability.
At the present time, no other vendors have submitted an ETP for TSA
evaluation.
Question. How many airports have explosives detection ``puffer''
technology?
Answer. There are currently 94 Explosives Trace Portals installed
at 37 airports.
Question. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, what percent of airline
passengers were screened with this technology?
Answer. In fiscal year 2005 and early fiscal year 2006, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was in the early stages of
deployment of Explosives Trace Portals (ETP). Currently, there are 94
ETPs deployed at 37 airports. The ETPs are used to screen passengers
requiring additional screening and a random number of passengers to
keep the units in continuous use. The actual percentages of people
screened using this technology is considered Sensitive Security
Information and cannot be disclosed to the public. TSA would be happy
to provide the Committee with this information in the appropriate
forum.
CONTRACT OVERSIGHT
Question. How many contract officers are employed at TSA? How does
that level compare to industry and Federal Government standards?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration currently has 72
contract specialists and 32 of the specialists are contracting
officers.
The generally accepted benchmark for staffing for the procurement
function is ``cost to spend.'' This metric divides the total dollars
obligated by the direct manpower costs associated with the contracting
function. In fiscal year 2005, TSA's Office of Acquisition operated at
a 0.348 percent cost to spend. The Center for Advanced Purchasing
Studies (http://www.capsresearch.org) is recognized as the industry
expert organization regarding benchmarking for the acquisition
function. Their applicable standard for the acquisition function is 2.1
percent.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a
standard for the contracting function of 1.2 percent to 1.9 percent.
The DHS Chief Procurement Officer established a staffing goal of 1.2
percent in fiscal year 2006. TSA requested $7.5 million for an
additional 30 FTE and 61 positions in fiscal year 2007.
Question. How many additional contract employees will be hired
based on the fiscal year 2007 request?
Answer. Based on the fiscal year 2007 request, the Transportation
Security Administration expects to hire an additional 61 staff.
Question. What percentage of the TSA budget in fiscal year 2006 is
spent on contract oversight?
Answer. In fiscal year 2006, the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) total budget authority is $6.3 billion and TSA
is executing approximately $2 billion in contracts. The total budget
for acquisition, the office that performs contract oversight functions,
is $20.9 million (payroll, compensation and benefits, and operating
expenses), and this is approximately 0.3 percent of TSA's total budget
authority.
Question. Would the fiscal year 2007 request increase that
percentage? If so, by how much?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request increases
the acquisition budget by $7.5 million. The percentage of the
Transportation Security Administration's budget authority spent on
contract oversight increases to 0.45 percent.
Question. Of TSA's full budget authority in fiscal year's 2005 and
2006, what amount is spent on contracts?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) awarded
$2.1 billion on contracts in fiscal year 2005. In fiscal year 2006, TSA
expects to award approximately $2 billion on contracts.
Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 request is planned for
contracts?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration anticipates
executing approximately $2 billion of contracts from the total budget
authority in fiscal year 2007.
Question. Please explain TSA's Investment Review Board process.
Answer. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) acquisition
programs are categorized into four investment levels (1-4) based on
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) criteria, with Level I being the
most significant. Program levels determine the review forum for each
Key Decision Point approval. Level 1 and 2 investments have an
acquisition value over $50 million and are reviewed at both TSA and
DHS. The TSA Investment Review Process (IRP) is the initial review
point for Level 1 and 2 programs and the final review point for Level 3
and 4 programs. Level 1 and 2 programs, once approved at TSA, continue
to the DHS IRP.
The TSA IRP contains two components, the Business Management
Council (BMC) and Investment Review Board (IRB). Both components ensure
alignment of capital investments with DHS mission and goals, identify
program risks, and assess the program's current cost, schedule, and
performance status. The BMC is the initial review point for all TSA
programs before proceeding to the TSA IRB. The TSA IRB is the final
approval authority for Level 3 and 4 programs and assesses the
readiness of Level 1 and 2 programs before proceeding to DHS.
CUSTOMER SERVICE
Question. What are TSA's performance measures for customer service?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
measured its customer satisfaction using airport customer satisfaction
surveys. Below are the areas of customer satisfaction measured and the
results from the customer satisfaction surveys for fiscal year 2003-
fiscal year 2005.
Question. Are TSA's goals being met in those areas?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration is currently
evaluating the metrics that are being captured to ensure that we are
measuring elements that are meaningful and that will truly provide
information that will lead to process improvements. Simultaneously, we
will continue using the metrics in place and have set an overall
satisfaction goal of at least 81 percent for fiscal year 2006 and 82
percent for fiscal year 2007.
STAFFING
Question. Last year, TSA warned against a reduction in funding for
screeners on the basis that passenger wait times would be longer and
training costs would be higher. Based on the funding reduction for TSA
screeners in fiscal year 2006, have those concerns become reality?
Answer. Prior to November 2005, system wide average wait times were
stable, averaging just 3 minutes. Since then, average wait times have
increased, as evidenced by the table below.
While it is not surprising that wait times might rise over the
holiday months, the continued rise in wait times in February indicates
that even with the efficiency improvements from the December 22, 2005
Standard Operating Procedures changes, the wait times experienced by
passengers has increased.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Month Oct 2005 Nov 2005 Dec 2005 Jan 2006 Feb 2006 Mar 2006
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average Wait Time............................. 2.91 3.18 3.62 3.39 3.62 3.85
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Please provide a comparison of passenger wait times at
high peak periods in fiscal year 2006 to the same periods in previous
fiscal years.
Answer. A useful period comparison of peak period travel is the
winter holiday. Actual passenger traffic was down 3.5 percent this past
winter holiday period, while Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) staffing was down 10 percent due to the staffing reductions
required for fiscal year 2006. TSA staff were more productive, handling
7.3 percent more passengers per Transportation Security Officer than in
the previous year. However, passenger wait times during this past
winter holiday period increased 8.4 percent over the same period of
2004/2005.
Question. With a shrinking screener workforce, how will TSA pull
screeners off normal security lines and place them at dedicated
Registered Traveler lines without increasing wait times for normal
passengers?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
expect the implementation of the Registered Traveler program to
increase the required number of Transportation Security Officer (TSO)
Full Time Equivalents. TSA does not anticipate a need to move any TSOs
from normal security lines nor do we foresee increases in wait times
for passengers.
Question. Please provide a chart that displays airport management
staff by airport versus all other staff.
Answer. The requested information is provided in the table below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Law TSO:
Apt ID Airport name Cat State/U.S. enforce FSD & Air Screener TSO: TSO: bag TSO: TSO: pasgnr TSO: TSO: TSO: Airport
territory & reg. Staff cargo mangr administrative screening other maintenance screening training undefined total total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABE........................... Lehigh Valley Int'l Airport........ II............... PA......... 2 7 1 4 .............. 8 ...... ........... 35 7 ......... 50 64
ABI........................... Abilene Regional Airport........... III.............. TX......... 2 1 ...... 1 .............. 5 ...... ........... 9 1 ......... 15 20
ABQ........................... Albuquerque Int'l Sunport Airport.. I................ NM......... 6 12 1 4 8 52 ...... ........... 98 9 ......... 168 199
ABR........................... Aberdeen Airport................... IV............... SD......... ....... ...... ...... 1 .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 6 7
ABY........................... Southwest Georgia Regional Airport. IV............... GA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 4 1 ......... 9 9
ACK........................... Nantucket Memorial Airport......... III.............. MA......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 4 ........ ......... 6 7
ACT........................... Waco Regional Airport.............. III.............. TX......... ....... 1 ...... ........ 1 4 ...... ........... 9 2 ......... 15 17
ACV........................... Arcata-Eureka Airport.............. IV............... CA......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 9 ........ ......... 11 12
ACY........................... Atlantic City Int'l Airport........ II............... NJ......... 1 7 ...... 3 2 12 ...... ........... 28 2 ......... 44 57
ADQ........................... Kodiak State Airport............... III.............. AK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 7 ...... ........... 1 1 ......... 9 9
AEX........................... Alexandria Int'l Airport........... IV............... LA......... ....... ...... ...... 1 .............. 4 ...... ........... 11 2 ......... 17 18
AGS........................... Bush Field Airport................. III.............. GA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 10 ...... ........... 14 ........ ......... 24 24
AHN........................... Athens/Ben Epps Airport............ IV............... GA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 6 ........ ......... 7 7
AIA........................... Alliance Municipal Airport......... IV............... NE......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 1 ...... ........... 1 1 ......... 4 5
AKN........................... King Salmon Airport................ III.............. AK......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... ......... 1 ......... 4 5
ALB........................... Albany Int'l Airport............... I................ NY......... 2 9 1 4 5 42 ...... ........... 63 2 ......... 112 134
ALO........................... Waterloo Municipal Airport......... IV............... IA......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 4 5
ALS........................... Alamosa-San Luis Valley Arpt/ IV............... CO......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 4 4
Bergman Fld.
ALW........................... Walla Walla Regional Airport....... IV............... WA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 6 1 ......... 8 8
AMA........................... Amarillo Int'l Airport............. II............... TX......... ....... 1 ...... 2 1 20 ...... ........... 21 4 ......... 46 50
ANC........................... Ted Stevens Anchorage Int'l Airport I................ AK......... 9 13 3 6 8 65 ...... ........... 90 2 ......... 165 204
AOO........................... Altoona-Blair County Airport....... IV............... PA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 4 1 ......... 6 6
APF........................... Naples Municipal Airport........... IV............... FL......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 6 6
APN........................... Alpena County Regional Airport..... IV............... MI......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 4 4
ART........................... Watertown Int'l Airport............ IV............... NY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 6 ........ ......... 6 6
ASE........................... Aspen Pitkin County Sardy Field.... III.............. CO......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 5 6
ATL........................... Hartsfield Atlanta Int'l Airport... X................ GA......... 12 23 4 25 33 482 ...... 5 565 39 1 1,124 1,221
ATW........................... Outagamie County Airport........... II............... WI......... ....... 1 ...... 1 .............. 8 ...... ........... 20 2 ......... 30 32
ATY........................... Watertown Airport.................. IV............... SD......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 5 5
AUG........................... Augusta State Airport.............. IV............... ME......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 5 ........ ......... 5 5
AUS........................... Austin-Bergstrom Int'l Airport..... I................ TX......... 6 13 1 4 3 76 ...... ........... 119 6 ......... 204 230
AVL........................... Asheville Regional Airport......... II............... NC......... ....... 1 ...... 3 .............. 15 ...... ........... 15 9 ......... 39 43
AVP........................... Wilkes Barre/Scranton Int'l Airport III.............. PA......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 10 ...... ........... 13 5 ......... 27 28
AZO........................... Kalamazoo/Battle Creek Int'l III.............. MI......... ....... 1 ...... ........ 1 6 ...... ........... 16 3 ......... 25 27
Airport.
BDL........................... Bradley Int'l Airport.............. I................ CT......... 6 14 2 9 40 78 ...... 1 124 15 ......... 257 328
BED........................... Hanscom Field...................... III.............. MA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 4 (0) ......... 7 7
BET........................... Bethel Airport..................... III.............. AK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... 2 2
BFD........................... Bradford Regional Airport.......... IV............... PA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 7 7
BFF........................... W. Nebraska Reg'l A/P, W.B. Heilig IV............... NE......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 2 ...... ........... 1 2 ......... 6 7
Field.
BFL........................... Meadows Field, Bakersfield Airport. III.............. CA......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 15 ........ ......... 17 19
BGM........................... Binghamton Regional Airport........ III.............. NY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 17 ........ ......... 18 18
BGR........................... Bangor Int'l Airport............... II............... ME......... 1 7 ...... 3 2 11 ...... ........... 31 3 ......... 48 61
BHB........................... Hancock County Bar Harbor Airport.. IV............... ME......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 5 5
BHM........................... Birmingham Int'l Airport........... I................ AL......... 3 11 1 5 5 45 ...... ........... 49 14 ......... 111 136
BIL........................... Billings Logan Int'l Airport....... II............... MT......... 4 7 ...... 1 1 16 ...... ........... 29 3 ......... 50 63
BIS........................... Bismarck Municipal Airport......... III.............. ND......... 2 6 ...... 2 .............. 6 ...... ........... 10 1 ......... 18 28
BJI........................... Bemidji-City Airport............... IV............... MN......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 7 7
BKW........................... Raleigh County Memorial Airport.... III.............. WV......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 7 1 ......... 12 12
BKX........................... Brookings.......................... IV............... SD......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 3 3
BLF........................... Mercer County Airport.............. IV............... WV......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 6 6
BLI........................... Bellingham Int'l Airport........... III.............. WA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 8 ...... ........... 10 2 1 21 21
BMI........................... Bloomington-Normal Airport......... III.............. IL......... 1 4 ...... ........ .............. 9 ...... ........... 13 3 ......... 25 30
BNA........................... Nashville Int'l Airport............ I................ TN......... 8 14 ...... 6 5 96 ...... ........... 107 2 ......... 209 242
BOI........................... Boise Air Terminal/Gowen Field..... I................ ID......... 5 17 ...... 5 6 25 ...... ........... 59 4 ......... 95 128
BOS........................... Logan Int'l Airport................ X................ MA......... 13 18 4 18 69 177 ...... ........... 503 10 ......... 759 880
BPT........................... Southeast Texas Regional Airport... IV............... TX......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 8 2 ......... 13 14
BQK........................... Glynco Jetport..................... IV............... GA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 9 ........ ......... 9 9
BQN........................... Rafael Hernandez Airport........... III.............. PR......... 1 ...... ...... ........ .............. 6 ...... ........... 18 ........ ......... 24 25
BRD........................... Brainerd-Crow Wing Airport......... IV............... MN......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 5 5
BRL........................... SE Iowa Regional Airport Authority. IV............... IA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 3 3
BRO........................... Brownsville/South Padre Int'l III.............. TX......... ....... 1 ...... 1 .............. 7 ...... ........... 8 ........ ......... 16 18
Airport.
BTM........................... Bert Mooney Airport................ III.............. MT......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 6 1 ......... 9 10
BTR........................... Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport... II............... LA......... ....... 7 ...... 4 1 14 ...... ........... 27 2 ......... 45 57
BTV........................... Burlington Int'l Airport........... II............... VT......... 1 6 ...... 4 .............. 14 ...... ........... 56 1 ......... 71 82
BUF........................... Buffalo Niagara Int'l Airport...... II............... NY......... 4 10 2 4 .............. 57 ...... ........... 97 8 ......... 162 182
BUR........................... Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport.. I................ CA......... 3 11 1 4 2 25 ...... 1 103 6 ......... 138 160
BWI........................... Baltimore-Washington Int'l Airport. X................ MD......... 13 14 3 13 24 171 ...... ........... 434 10 ......... 639 706
BZN........................... Gallatin Field Airport............. II............... MT......... ....... 1 ...... 1 1 19 ...... ........... 26 1 ......... 48 51
CAE........................... Columbia Metropolitan Airport...... II............... SC......... 2 6 ...... 2 .............. 24 ...... ........... 32 ........ ......... 56 66
CAK........................... Akron-Canton Regional Airport...... II............... OH......... ....... 1 ...... 3 1 19 ...... ........... 30 4 ......... 54 58
CDC........................... Cedar City Municipal............... IV............... UT......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 4 ........ ......... 6 6
CDR........................... Chadron Municipal Airport.......... IV............... NE......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 1 ...... ........... 1 1 ......... 4 5
CDV........................... Merle K (MUDHOLE) Smith............ III.............. AK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 4 1 ......... 8 8
CEC........................... Crescent City Airport.............. IV............... CA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 6 ........ ......... 7 7
CEZ........................... Cortez Municipal Airport........... IV............... CO......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 5 5
CGI........................... Cape Girardeau Regional Airport.... IV............... MO......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 6 6
CHA........................... Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport... II............... TN......... ....... ...... ...... 2 .............. 9 ...... ........... 22 3 ......... 34 36
CHO........................... Charlottesville/Albemarle Airport.. III.............. VA......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 6 ...... ........... 10 1 ......... 17 18
CHS........................... Charleston Int'l Airport/AFB....... II............... SC......... 3 8 2 2 2 29 ...... ........... 46 ........ ......... 77 94
CIC........................... Chico Municipal Airport............ IV............... CA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 7 ........ ......... 7 7
CID........................... The Eastern Iowa Airport........... II............... IA......... 1 2 ...... 3 .............. 18 ...... ........... 34 ........ ......... 52 59
CIU........................... Chippewa County Int'l Airport...... IV............... MI......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 5 5
CKB........................... Benedum Airport.................... IV............... WV......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 5 3 ......... 12 13
CLE........................... Cleveland Hopkins Int'l Airport.... I................ OH......... 9 19 2 7 18 92 ...... ........... 185 15 ......... 311 365
CLL........................... Easterwood Airport................. IV............... TX......... ....... 1 ...... ........ 1 4 ...... ........... 7 2 ......... 13 15
CLT........................... Charlotte/Douglas Int'l Airport.... X................ NC......... 5 12 3 9 7 81 ...... ........... 170 19 ......... 277 313
CMH........................... Port Columbus Int'l Airport........ I................ OH......... 6 14 1 5 4 69 ...... ........... 107 9 ......... 190 221
CMI........................... University Of Illinois-Willard III.............. IL......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 5 ...... ........... 8 1 ......... 14 15
Airport.
CMX........................... Houghton County Memorial Airport... IV............... MI......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 5 5
CNY........................... Canyonlands Field Airport.......... IV............... UT......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 4 4
COD........................... Yellowstone Regional Airport....... IV............... WY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 5 1 ......... 8 8
COS........................... Colorado Springs Municipal......... I................ CO......... 3 12 ...... 3 .............. 44 ...... ........... 49 2 ......... 95 113
COU........................... Columbia Regional Airport.......... IV............... MO......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 5 5
CPR........................... Natrona Int'l Airport.............. IV............... WY......... 1 5 1 2 1 3 ...... ........... 6 2 ......... 11 21
CRP........................... Corpus Christi Int'l Airport....... II............... TX......... 2 7 1 2 .............. 16 ...... ........... 18 3 ......... 37 49
CRQ........................... McClellan-Palomar Airport.......... IV............... CA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 14 ........ ......... 14 14
CRW........................... Yeager Airport..................... II............... WV......... 3 5 1 1 5 9 ...... ........... 22 7 ......... 42 57
CSG........................... Columbus Metropolitan Airport...... III.............. GA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 7 ...... ........... 6 ........ ......... 13 13
CVG........................... Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky Int'l X................ KY......... 9 16 2 7 10 97 ...... ........... 168 4 ......... 279 323
Airport.
CWA........................... Central Wisconsin Regional Airport. III.............. WI......... ....... ...... ...... 1 .............. 6 ...... ........... 12 2 ......... 20 21
CYS........................... Cheyenne Airport................... IV............... WY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 6 6
DAB........................... Daytona Beach Int'l Airport........ II............... FL......... 4 8 ...... 3 .............. 8 ...... ........... 32 4 ......... 44 59
DAL........................... Dallas Love Field.................. I................ TX......... 7 13 1 6 23 54 ...... ........... 111 15 ......... 203 253
DAY........................... James M. Cox Dayton Int'l Airport.. I................ OH......... 3 10 2 3 .............. 41 ...... ........... 61 1 ......... 103 121
DBQ........................... Dubuque Regional Airport........... IV............... IA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 5 1 ......... 8 8
DCA........................... Reagan Washington National Airport. X................ VA......... 10 15 1 6 25 87 ...... ........... 244 3 ......... 359 416
DDC........................... Dodge City Regional Airport........ IV............... KS......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 4 4
DEC........................... Decatur Airport.................... IV............... IL......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 3 1 ......... 7 7
DEN........................... Denver Int'l Airport............... X................ CO......... 13 22 3 15 11 206 ...... ........... 464 33 ......... 714 778
DFW........................... Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport.... X................ TX......... 18 32 3 29 37 606 ...... ........... 650 9 ......... 1,302 1,421
DHN........................... Dothan-Houston County Airport...... III.............. AL......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 4 ...... ........... 7 1 ......... 13 14
DIK........................... Dickinson Municipal Airport........ IV............... ND......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 4 4
DLG........................... Dillingham Airport................. III.............. AK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 2 2 ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... 4 6
DLH........................... Duluth Int'l Airport............... III.............. MN......... 1 6 ...... 4 .............. 9 ...... ........... 11 3 ......... 23 34
DRO........................... Durango-La Plata County Airport.... III.............. CO......... 2 1 ...... 1 .............. 6 ...... ........... 6 1 ......... 14 18
DRT........................... Del Rio International Airport...... IV............... TX......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 5 5
DSM........................... Des Moines Int'l Airport........... II............... IA......... 4 7 1 3 1 24 ...... ........... 36 5 ......... 66 83
DTW........................... Detroit Metro Wayne County Airport. X................ MI......... 13 21 3 14 19 259 ...... ........... 454 11 ......... 743 812
DUJ........................... Dubois-Jefferson County Airport.... IV............... PA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 5 5
DVL........................... Devils Lake........................ IV............... ND......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 3 3
EAR........................... Kearney Municipal Airport.......... IV............... NE......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 6 6
EAT........................... Pangborn Memorial Airport.......... IV............... WA......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 4 1 ......... 7 9
EAU........................... Eau Claire......................... III.............. WI......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 6 ...... ........... 2 2 ......... 10 10
EGE........................... Eagle County Regional Airport...... III.............. CO......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 5 ...... ........... 3 1 ......... 9 10
EKO........................... Elko Regional Airport.............. III.............. NV......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 11 ........ ......... 13 14
ELD........................... El Dorado.......................... IV............... AR......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... 1 2 1 ......... 6 6
ELM........................... Elmira-Corning Regional Airport.... IV............... NY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 14 1 ......... 19 20
ELP........................... El Paso Int'l Airport.............. I................ TX......... 6 13 1 3 2 60 ...... ........... 62 10 ......... 134 159
ENA........................... Kenai Municipal Airport............ IV............... AK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 5 ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... 5 5
ENV........................... Wendover Municipal Airport......... III.............. UT......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 1 1
ERI........................... Erie Int'l Airport................. III.............. PA......... 1 3 ...... 3 .............. 15 ...... ........... 14 ........ ......... 29 36
ESC........................... Delta County Airport............... IV............... MI......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 1 ......... 6 6
EUG........................... Eugene Airport/Mahlon Sweet Field.. II............... OR......... 1 5 ...... 3 .............. 19 ...... ........... 20 1 ......... 40 49
EVV........................... Evansville Regional Airport........ III.............. IN......... 1 2 ...... 1 .............. 9 ...... ........... 18 2 ......... 29 33
EWN........................... Craven County Regional Airport..... IV............... NC......... 1 ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 9 ........ ......... 10 11
EWR........................... Newark Int'l Airport............... X................ NJ......... 17 13 2 22 55 414 ...... ........... 584 22 1 1,075 1,184
EYW........................... Key West Int'l Airport............. II............... FL......... ....... 1 ...... 1 .............. 4 ...... ........... 8 ........ ......... 13 15
FAI........................... Fairbanks Int'l Airport............ II............... AK......... 4 11 ...... 2 9 17 ...... ........... 23 6 ......... 55 82
FAR........................... Hector Int'l Airport............... III.............. ND......... ....... 4 ...... 2 .............. 9 ...... ........... 17 2 ......... 28 34
FAT........................... Fresno Yosemite Int'l Airport...... II............... CA......... 2 4 ...... 1 2 7 ...... ........... 42 3 ......... 54 63
FAY........................... Fayetteville Regional Airport...... III.............. NC......... ....... 1 ...... 1 .............. 8 ...... ........... 18 ........ ......... 25 27
FHU........................... Sierra Vista Municipal Airport..... IV............... AZ......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... 2 2
FKL........................... Venango Regional Airport........... IV............... PA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 4 ........ ......... 8 8
FLG........................... Flagstaff Pulliam Airport.......... IV............... AZ......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 10 ........ ......... 10 10
FLL........................... Ft Lauderdale-Hollywood Int'l Arpt. I................ FL......... 6 14 1 19 21 244 ...... 1 434 10 ......... 709 770
FLO........................... Florence Regional Airport.......... IV............... SC......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 6 ........ ......... 8 8
FMN........................... Four Corners Regional Airport...... IV............... CO......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 10 1 ......... 14 14
FNL........................... Fort Collins-Loveland Municipal.... III.............. CO......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 6 ........ ......... 6 6
FNT........................... Bishop Int'l Airport............... II............... MI......... ....... 1 ...... 2 .............. 21 ...... ........... 31 3 ......... 56 59
FOD........................... Fort Dodge......................... IV............... IA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 3 1 ......... 5 5
FSD........................... Joe Foss Field..................... II............... SD......... 4 4 ...... 2 .............. 16 ...... ........... 13 2 ......... 32 42
FSM........................... Fort Smith Municipal Airport....... III.............. AR......... ....... 1 ...... ........ 1 5 ...... ........... 9 2 ......... 16 18
FWA........................... Ft. Wayne Int'l Airport--Baer Field II............... IN......... ....... 2 ...... ........ 1 16 ...... ........... 22 4 ......... 43 46
GBD........................... Great Bend......................... IV............... KS......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 1 1 ......... 4 4
GCC........................... Gillette-Campbell County........... IV............... WY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... 2 2
GCK........................... Garden City Municipal Airport...... IV............... KS......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 5 5
GEG........................... Spokane Int'l Airport.............. I................ WA......... 5 12 1 4 4 25 ...... ........... 71 5 ......... 106 132
GFK........................... Grand Forks Mark Andrews Int'l Air- III.............. ND......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 10 1 ......... 16 17
port.
GGG........................... Gregg County Airport............... IV............... TX......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 4 1 ......... 7 7
GJT........................... Walker Field Airport............... III.............. CO......... 1 10 ...... 3 .............. 11 ...... ........... 14 2 ......... 28 42
GLH........................... Mid Delta Regional Airport......... IV............... MS......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 3 3
GNV........................... Gainesville Regional Airport....... III.............. FL......... ....... 1 ...... 1 .............. 6 ...... ........... 8 1 ......... 15 18
GPI........................... Glacier Park Int'l Airport......... III.............. MT......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 14 ...... ........... 15 ........ ......... 29 30
GPT........................... Gulfport-Biloxi Int'l Airport...... III.............. MS......... 2 5 ...... 2 1 15 ...... ........... 25 5 ......... 46 56
GRB........................... Austin Straubel Int'l Airport...... II............... WI......... 3 6 ...... 3 .............. 19 ...... ........... 22 3 ......... 43 55
GRI........................... Central Nebraska Regional Airport.. III.............. NE......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 2 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 4 5
GRK........................... Killeen-Fort Hood Regional Airport. IV............... TX......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 5 ...... ........... 22 2 ......... 29 30
GRO........................... Rota Int'l Airport................. I................ Mariana ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 1 ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... 2 2
Islands.
GRR........................... Gerald R. Ford Int'l Airport....... II............... MI......... 5 7 2 2 .............. 39 ...... 1 51 8 ......... 99 116
GSN........................... Saipan Int'l Airport............... II............... Mariana 1 7 ...... 1 1 27 ...... ........... 28 1 ......... 57 67
Islands.
GSO........................... Piedmont Triad Int'l Airport....... I................ NC......... 5 11 1 4 2 35 ...... ........... 75 12 ......... 124 146
GSP........................... Greenville-Spartanburg Airport..... II............... SC......... 2 7 ...... 2 .............. 31 ...... ........... 43 ........ ......... 74 85
GTF........................... Great Falls Int'l Airport.......... III.............. MT......... ....... 1 ...... ........ 1 6 ...... ........... 21 3 ......... 32 34
GTR........................... Golden Triangle Regional Airport... IV............... MS......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 5 ........ ......... 8 8
GUC........................... Gunnison County Airport............ III.............. CO......... 1 ...... ...... 1 .............. 2 ...... ........... 1 1 ......... 4 6
GUM........................... Antonio B. Won Pat Guam Int'l...... I................ GU......... 6 13 1 3 4 60 ...... ........... 56 10 ......... 131 158
HDN........................... Yampa Valley Regional Airport...... III.............. CO......... ....... ...... ...... 1 .............. 4 ...... ........... 4 1 ......... 9 10
HGR........................... Hagerstown Regional Airport........ IV............... MD......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 7 7
HIB........................... Chisolm-Hibbing Municipal.......... IV............... MN......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 2 2
HII........................... Lake Havasu City Municipal Airport. IV............... AZ......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 6 ........ ......... 6 6
HLN........................... Helena Regional Airport............ III.............. MT......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 5 ...... ........... 13 1 ......... 20 21
HNL........................... Honolulu Int'l Airport............. X................ HI......... 10 17 4 10 30 224 ...... 2 304 8 ......... 567 637
HOM........................... Homer Airport...................... IV............... AK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 5 ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... 5 5
HON........................... Huron.............................. IV............... SD......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 2 2
HOT........................... Hot Springs........................ IV............... AR......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 1 ...... ........... 2 2 ......... 5 6
HOU........................... William P. Hobby Airport........... I................ TX......... 5 12 1 7 9 67 ...... 1 132 ........ ......... 208 242
HPN........................... Westchester County Airport......... II............... NY......... ....... 1 ...... 3 .............. 11 ...... ........... 30 ........ ......... 41 45
HRL........................... Rio Grande Valley Int'l Airport.... II............... TX......... 2 7 ...... 2 1 13 ...... ........... 33 ........ ......... 47 59
HRO........................... Harrison........................... IV............... AR......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 1 ...... ........... 1 1 ......... 5 5
HSV........................... Huntsville-Madison Cnty Airport.... II............... AL......... 2 ...... 1 3 1 17 ...... ........... 29 4 ......... 52 59
HTS........................... Tri-State Airport.................. III.............. WV......... ....... ...... ...... 1 2 4 ...... ........... 11 2 ......... 19 21
HVN........................... Tweed-New Haven Airport............ IV............... CT......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 4 ........ ......... 8 9
HXD........................... Hilton Head Airport................ IV............... SC......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 5 ...... ........... 4 ........ ......... 9 9
HYA........................... Barnstable Municipal Airport....... III.............. MA......... ....... 2 ...... 1 .............. 3 ...... ........... 6 1 ......... 9 12
HYS........................... Hays Regional Airport.............. IV............... KS......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 3 1 ......... 6 6
IAD........................... Washington-Dulles Int'l Airport.... X................ VA......... 9 19 5 13 41 273 ...... 2 265 1 ......... 582 669
IAH........................... George Bush Intercontinental X................ TX......... 14 22 5 17 25 400 1 ........... 491 3 ......... 919 1,002
Airport.
ICT........................... Wichita Mid-Continent Airport...... II............... KS......... 4 10 1 4 .............. 30 ...... ........... 40 6 ......... 76 95
IDA........................... Idaho Falls Regional Airport....... III.............. ID......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 6 ...... ........... 11 1 ......... 19 19
IFP........................... Laughlin/Bullhead City Airport..... III.............. AZ......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 ......... ...... ........... 8 ........ ......... 9 10
IGM........................... Kingman Airport Authority, Inc..... IV............... AZ......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 4 ........ ......... 4 4
ILE........................... Killeen Municipal Airport.......... IV............... TX......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 1 1
ILM........................... Wilmington Int'l Airport........... III.............. NC......... 1 3 ...... 2 .............. 11 ...... ........... 17 2 ......... 30 36
IMT........................... Ford Airport....................... IV............... MI......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 6 6
IND........................... Indianapolis Int'l Airport......... I................ IN......... 9 13 3 7 14 68 ...... ........... 182 3 ......... 267 313
INL........................... Falls International Airport........ IV............... MN......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 5 5
IPL........................... Imperial County Airport............ IV............... CA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 4 ........ ......... 7 7
IPT........................... Williamsport Regional Airport...... IV............... PA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 6 1 ......... 8 8
IRK........................... Kirksville Regional Airport........ IV............... MO......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 3 3
ISN........................... Sloulin Field Int'l Airport........ IV............... ND......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 3 3
ISO........................... Kinston Regional Jetport........... III.............. NC......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 5 1 ......... 6 6
ISP........................... Long Island MacArthur Airport...... II............... NY......... 2 9 ...... 2 2 25 ...... ........... 58 2 ......... 88 103
ITH........................... Tompkins County Airport............ IV............... NY......... ....... ...... ...... 1 .............. ......... ...... ........... 15 ........ ......... 15 16
ITO........................... Hilo Int'l Airport................. II............... HI......... ....... 1 ...... 2 .............. 15 ...... ........... 30 1 ......... 47 50
IWD........................... Gogebic County Airport............. IV............... MI......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 3 3
IYK........................... Indian Wells Valley Airport IV............... CA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 4 ........ ......... 6 6
District.
JAC........................... Jackson Hole Airport............... III.............. WY......... ....... 1 ...... 1 .............. ......... ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... ....... 2
JAN........................... Jackson Int'l Airport.............. II............... MS......... 5 8 ...... 4 2 32 ...... ........... 50 ........ ......... 84 103
JAX........................... Jacksonville Int'l Airport......... I................ FL......... 5 11 2 7 7 20 ...... ........... 102 10 ......... 138 170
JBR........................... Jonesboro.......................... IV............... AR......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 1 ...... ........... 1 1 ......... 4 5
JFK........................... John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport...... X................ NY......... 27 15 ...... 25 56 570 ...... ........... 952 45 ......... 1,622 1,746
JHW........................... Chautauqua County Airport.......... IV............... NY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 7 7
JLN........................... Joplin Regional Airport............ IV............... MO......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 4 ........ ......... 5 5
JMS........................... Jamestown.......................... IV............... ND......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 3 4
JNU........................... Juneau Int'l Airport............... II............... AK......... 5 6 ...... 3 .............. 6 ...... ........... 32 ........ ......... 38 52
JST........................... Johnstown-Cambria County Airport... IV............... PA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 8 ...... ........... 8 ........ ......... 16 16
KOA........................... Kona Int'l Airport................. I................ HI......... 2 8 ...... 2 (0) 32 ...... ........... 52 ........ ......... 84 96
KTN........................... Ketchikan Int'l Airport............ III.............. AK......... ....... ...... ...... 1 .............. 8 ...... ........... 19 ........ ......... 27 28
LAN........................... Capital City Airport............... II............... MI......... 1 9 ...... 2 .............. 14 ...... ........... 24 3 ......... 41 53
LAR........................... Laramie Regional Airport........... IV............... WY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 3 3
LAS........................... McCarran Int'l Airport............. X................ NV......... 12 16 3 13 42 274 ...... 4 610 20 ......... 949 1,036
LAW........................... Lawton/Ft. Sill Regional Airport... IV............... OK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 7 ...... ........... 4 1 ......... 12 13
LAX........................... Los Angeles Int'l Airport.......... X................ CA......... 16 27 8 35 91 836 ...... ........... 985 20 ......... 1,931 2,108
LBB........................... Lubbock Int'l Airport.............. II............... TX......... 3 12 1 3 5 19 ...... ........... 26 4 ......... 54 78
LBE........................... Arnold Palmer Regional Airport..... IV............... PA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 7 1 ......... 10 10
LBF........................... North Platte Regional Airport...... III.............. NE......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 2 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 6 6
LBL........................... Liberal Municipal Airport.......... IV............... KS......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 4 4
LCH........................... Lake Charles Regional Airport...... IV............... LA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 6 ........ ......... 11 11
LEB........................... Lebanon Municipal Airport.......... IV............... NH......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 6 6
LEX........................... Blue Grass Airport................. II............... KY......... 2 3 ...... 2 .............. 6 ...... ........... 34 2 ......... 43 50
LFT........................... Lafayette Regional Airport......... III.............. LA......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 7 ...... ........... 15 2 ......... 24 25
LGA........................... LaGuardia Airport.................. X................ NY......... 7 13 2 10 35 227 ...... ........... 446 3 ......... 711 779
LGB........................... Long Beach Daugherty Field Airport. II............... CA......... ....... 2 ...... 4 2 34 ...... ........... 69 ........ ......... 105 113
LIH........................... Lihue Airport...................... I................ HI......... 1 9 ...... 2 1 28 ...... ........... 38 4 ......... 71 84
LIT........................... Little Rock National Airport....... I................ AR......... 6 10 1 5 .............. 36 ...... 1 46 14 ......... 97 119
LMT........................... Klamath Falls Airport.............. IV............... OR......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 5 1 ......... 7 7
LNK........................... Lincoln Municipal Airport.......... III.............. NE......... 2 3 ...... 2 (46) 31 ...... ........... 51 3 ......... 40 1
LNS........................... Lancaster Airport.................. IV............... PA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 3 3
LNY........................... Lanai Airport...................... III.............. HI......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 10 ........ ......... 14 14
LRD........................... Laredo Int'l Airport............... III.............. TX......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 10 2 ......... 16 16
LSE........................... La Crosse Municipal Airport........ III.............. WI......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 6 ...... ........... 9 2 ......... 18 18
LWB........................... Greenbrier Valley Airport.......... III.............. WV......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 3 1 ......... 5 5
LWS........................... Lewiston Nez-Perce County Reg'l Air- III.............. ID......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 6 ........ ......... 8 8
port.
LYH........................... Lynchburg Regional Arpt............ IV............... VA......... ....... ...... ...... 1 .............. 2 ...... ........... 10 2 ......... 14 15
MAF........................... Midland Int'l Airport.............. II............... TX......... ....... 1 ...... 2 2 12 ...... ........... 24 2 ......... 40 45
MBL........................... Manistee County Blacker Airport.... IV............... MI......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 2 2
MBS........................... Saginaw-MBS Int'l Airport.......... III.............. MI......... ....... ...... ...... 3 .............. 11 ...... ........... 18 2 ......... 31 34
MCI........................... Kansas City Int'l Airport.......... I................ MO......... 7 15 2 12 .............. ......... ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... ....... 36
MCK........................... McCook Municipal Airport........... IV............... NE......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 1 1 ......... 4 4
MCN........................... Middle Georgia Regional Airport.... III.............. GA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 6 6
MCO........................... Orlando Int'l Airport.............. X................ FL......... 8 15 2 20 (30) 353 ...... ........... 403 70 ......... 797 812
MCW........................... Mason City......................... IV............... IA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 3 1 ......... 5 5
MDT........................... Harrisburg Int'l Airport........... II............... PA......... 2 8 1 4 .............. 19 ...... ........... 34 6 ......... 58 73
MDW........................... Chicago Midway Airport............. I................ IL......... 6 16 1 8 15 127 ...... ........... 232 34 ......... 408 453
MEI........................... Meridian Regional Airport--Key IV............... MS......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 5 5
Field.
MEM........................... Memphis Int'l Airport.............. I................ TN......... 5 10 3 7 6 96 ...... 4 135 19 ......... 260 291
MFE........................... McAllen-Miller Int'l Airport....... II............... TX......... ....... 1 ...... 3 .............. 14 ...... ........... 24 3 ......... 41 45
MFR........................... Rogue Valley Int'l-Medford......... III.............. OR......... ....... 2 ...... 1 .............. 7 ...... ........... 12 2 ......... 21 24
MGM........................... Montgomery Reg'l Airport (Dannelly III.............. AL......... 2 8 ...... 2 .............. 5 ...... ........... 12 3 ......... 20 32
Field).
MGW........................... Morgantown Municipal Airport....... IV............... WV......... ....... ...... ...... 1 .............. 8 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 11 13
MHK........................... Manhattan Regional Airport......... IV............... KS......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 3 3
MHT........................... Manchester Airport................. I................ NH......... 1 18 1 6 11 36 ...... ........... 95 1 ......... 143 179
MIA........................... Miami Int'l Airport................ X................ FL......... 24 15 ...... 24 105 684 ...... ........... 722 ........ ......... 1,510 1,678
MKE........................... General Mitchell Int'l Airport..... I................ WI......... 5 12 2 4 3 66 ...... ........... 137 7 ......... 213 239
MKG........................... Muskegon County Int'l Airport...... IV............... MI......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 3 ...... ........... 5 3 ......... 11 12
MKK........................... Molokai Airport.................... III.............. HI......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 10 1 ......... 13 13
MKL........................... Mckellar-Sipes Regional Airport.... IV............... TN......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 5 5
MLB........................... Melbourne Int'l Airport............ II............... FL......... ....... 1 ...... 3 .............. 11 ...... ........... 23 ........ ......... 34 38
MLI........................... Metro Airport Authority of Rock II............... IL......... 4 9 1 2 .............. 19 ...... ........... 34 ........ ......... 53 69
Island.
MLU........................... Monroe Regional Airport............ III.............. LA......... 1 5 ...... 1 .............. 6 ...... ........... 10 4 ......... 20 28
MOB........................... Mobile Regional Airport............ II............... AL......... 3 9 ...... 3 1 16 ...... ........... 32 4 ......... 53 69
MOD........................... Modesto City County Airport H Sham IV............... CA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 5 ........ ......... 9 9
Field.
MOT........................... Minot Int'l Airport................ III.............. ND......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 7 1 ......... 12 13
MRY........................... Monterey Peninsula Airport......... III.............. CA......... ....... ...... ...... 1 .............. 5 ...... ........... 16 2 ......... 23 24
MSL........................... NW Alabama Reg'l Airport........... IV............... AL......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 5 5
MSN........................... Dane County Regional Airport....... II............... WI......... 2 8 ...... 3 .............. 26 ...... ........... 34 6 ......... 66 79
MSO........................... Missoula Int'l Airport............. II............... MT......... 3 5 ...... 1 1 15 ...... ........... 19 2 ......... 36 46
MSP........................... Minneapolis-St. Paul Int'l Arpt.... X................ MN......... 13 26 3 15 8 221 ...... 1 278 81 2 592 657
MSS........................... Massena Int'l Airport.............. IV............... NY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 5 ........ ......... 5 5
MSY........................... New Orleans Int'l Airport.......... I................ LA......... 8 13 2 7 22 60 ...... ........... 97 19 ......... 197 249
MTJ........................... Montrose County Airport............ III.............. CO......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 8 ...... ........... 5 1 ......... 15 15
MVY........................... Martha's Vineyard Airport.......... III.............. MA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 5 ........ ......... 6 7
MWA........................... Williamson County Airport.......... IV............... IL......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 1 ......... 5 5
MWH........................... Grant County Airport............... III.............. WA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 2 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 7 7
MYR........................... Myrtle Beach Int'l Airport......... II............... SC......... 2 6 ...... 3 2 36 ...... ........... 36 1 ......... 76 89
NSF........................... National Screener Force............ NSF.............. ........... ....... ...... ...... ........ 17 201 ...... ........... 292 44 ......... 554 571
OAJ........................... Albert J Ellis Airport............. IV............... NC......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 7 ........ ......... 11 11
OAK........................... Metropolitan Oakland Int'l Airport. I................ CA......... 7 14 ...... 7 17 119 ...... ........... 166 12 ......... 313 359
OGG........................... Kahului Airport.................... I................ HI......... 4 12 ...... 2 .............. 44 ...... ........... 72 9 ......... 125 143
OGS........................... Ogdensburg Int'l Airport........... IV............... NY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 6 ........ ......... 6 6
OKC........................... Will Rogers World Airport.......... I................ OK......... 4 13 ...... 5 1 44 ...... ........... 102 10 ......... 157 180
OMA........................... Eppley Airfield.................... I................ NE......... 5 12 1 5 .............. 48 ...... ........... 77 15 ......... 140 163
OME........................... Nome Airport....................... III.............. AK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... 1 1
ONT........................... Ontario Int'l Airport.............. I................ CA......... 6 13 2 6 .............. 95 ...... ........... 112 5 ......... 212 239
ORD........................... O'Hare Int'l Airport............... X................ IL......... 17 42 11 23 1 643 ...... 3 769 8 ......... 1,424 1,517
ORF........................... Norfolk Int'l Airport.............. I................ VA......... 4 11 ...... 5 1 59 ...... 3 91 6 ......... 159 180
OTH........................... North Bend Municipal Airport....... IV............... OR......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 2 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 6 7
OTZ........................... Kotzebue ``Ralph Widen Memorial'' III.............. AK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... 1 1
Airport.
OWB........................... Owensboro Davies County Airport.... IV............... KY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 4 4
OXR........................... Oxnard Airport..................... IV............... CA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 7 7
PAH........................... Barkley Regional Airport........... IV............... KY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 3 2 ......... 8 8
PBI........................... West Palm Beach Int'l Airport...... I................ FL......... 3 12 2 8 .............. 80 ...... 1 133 1 ......... 216 241
PDT........................... E. Oregon Regional Airport......... IV............... OR......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 7 1 ......... 11 11
PDX........................... Portland Int'l..................... I................ OR......... 9 15 2 6 19 168 ...... ........... 232 1 ......... 420 471
PFN........................... Panama City-Bay County Int'l III.............. FL......... ....... 1 ...... 1 .............. 4 ...... ........... 10 2 ......... 17 19
Airport.
PGA........................... Page Municipal Airport............. IV............... AZ......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 5 ........ ......... 5 5
PGV........................... Pitt-Greenville Airport............ IV............... NC......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 5 ...... ........... 5 1 ......... 11 11
PHF........................... Newport News/Williamsburg Int'l Air- II............... VA......... ....... 1 ...... 1 1 17 ...... 1 18 1 ......... 37 39
port.
PHL........................... Philadelphia Int'l Airport......... X................ PA......... 11 14 4 18 28 241 ...... 3 435 5 ......... 713 789
PHX........................... Phoenix Sky Harbor Int'l Airport... X................ AZ......... 17 30 2 19 35 301 ...... 3 462 13 ......... 814 918
PIA........................... Greater Peoria Airport............. III.............. IL......... ....... 2 ...... 2 .............. 13 ...... ........... 17 1 ......... 31 35
PIB........................... Hattiesburg-Laurel Regional Airport IV............... MS......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 4 4
PIE........................... St Petersburg-Clearwater Int'l II............... FL......... ....... ...... ...... 3 2 7 ...... ........... 27 3 ......... 40 44
Airport.
PIH........................... Pocatello Regional Airport......... III.............. ID......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 5 ...... ........... 6 1 ......... 13 14
PIR........................... Pierre Regional Airport............ IV............... SD......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 4 4
PIT........................... Pittsburgh Int'l Airport........... I................ PA......... 14 16 2 6 21 82 ...... 1 184 7 ......... 296 355
PKB........................... Wood County Airport................ IV............... WV......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 5 ...... ........... 5 1 ......... 11 11
PLB........................... Clinton County Airport............. IV............... NY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 2 ...... ........... 4 1 ......... 8 9
PLN........................... Pellston Regional Airport.......... IV............... MI......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 6 ...... ........... 5 1 ......... 13 13
PNC........................... Ponca City......................... IV............... OK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 5 ........ ......... 5 5
PNS........................... Pensacola Regional Airport......... II............... FL......... 4 8 ...... 2 2 29 ...... 1 36 5 ......... 72 88
PPG........................... Pago Pago-American Samoa........... III.............. AQ......... ....... 3 ...... 1 .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 3 ......... 7 11
PQI........................... Northern Maine Regional Airport.... IV............... ME......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 6 6
PRC........................... Prescott Municipal Airport......... IV............... AZ......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 8 ........ ......... 8 8
PSC........................... Tri-Cities Airport................. III.............. WA......... ....... 8 ...... 5 .............. 6 ...... ........... 27 3 ......... 36 49
PSG........................... Petersburg Airport................. III.............. AK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 6 ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... 6 6
PSM........................... Pease Int'l Airport................ III.............. NH......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 6 ........ ......... 6 6
PSP........................... Palm Springs Int'l Airport......... II............... CA......... ....... 7 ...... 2 3 21 ...... ........... 36 7 ......... 68 80
PUB........................... Pueblo Memorial Airport............ IV............... CO......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 1 1 ......... 3 4
PUW........................... Pullman/Moscow Regional Airport.... III.............. WA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 2 4 ...... ........... 4 1 ......... 10 12
PVC........................... Provincetown Airport............... IV............... MA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 1 ......... 6 6
PVD........................... T F Green State Airport............ I................ RI......... 4 14 1 6 11 79 ...... ........... 116 18 ......... 224 260
PWM........................... Portland Int'l Jetport............. II............... ME......... 4 8 1 3 .............. 30 ...... ........... 69 ........ ......... 99 115
RAP........................... Rapid City Regional Airport........ III.............. SD......... 2 5 ...... 2 .............. 11 ...... ........... 17 2 ......... 30 39
RDD........................... Redding Municipal Airport.......... IV............... CA......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 12 ........ ......... 12 13
RDM........................... Roberts Field...................... III.............. OR......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 7 ...... ........... 13 ........ ......... 20 21
RDU........................... Raleigh-Durham Int'l Airport....... I................ NC......... 6 13 2 9 10 91 ...... 1 154 2 3 260 300
RFD........................... Greater Rockford Airport........... III.............. IL......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 4 ...... ........... 10 2 ......... 17 18
RHI........................... Rhinelander/Oneida County Airport.. IV............... WI......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 3 1 ......... 8 8
RIC........................... Richmond Int'l Airport............. II............... VA......... 2 10 1 4 .............. 39 ...... ........... 46 5 ......... 90 107
RIW........................... Riverton Regional Airport.......... IV............... WY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 2 2 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 5 7
RKD........................... Knox County Regional Airport....... IV............... ME......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 5 5
RKS........................... Rock Springs-Sweetwater County..... IV............... WY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 4 5
RNO........................... Reno/Tahoe Int'l Airport........... I................ NV......... 4 14 ...... 5 1 54 ...... ........... 98 4 ......... 157 181
ROA........................... Roanoke Regional Airport........... II............... VA......... ....... 3 ...... 1 .............. 16 ...... ........... 16 ........ ......... 32 36
ROC........................... Greater Rochester Int'l Airport.... II............... NY......... 3 8 ...... 4 .............. ......... ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... ....... 15
RST........................... Rochester Int'l Airport............ III.............. MN......... ....... 1 ...... ........ 1 6 ...... ........... 10 1 ......... 17 19
RSW........................... Southwest Florida Int'l Airport.... I................ FL......... 3 13 ...... 7 3 41 ...... ........... 156 14 ......... 215 241
RUT........................... Rutland State Airport.............. IV............... VT......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 5 ........ ......... 5 5
SAF........................... Santa Fe Municipal Airport......... IV............... NM......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 4 ........ ......... 5 6
SAN........................... San Diego Int'l Airport, Lindbergh. I................ CA......... 6 18 1 15 20 168 ...... 5 280 40 ......... 512 572
SAT........................... San Antonio Int'l Airport.......... I................ TX......... 6 14 2 8 10 81 ...... ........... 115 8 ......... 214 254
SAV........................... Savannah Int'l Airport............. II............... GA......... 4 7 ...... 3 2 30 ...... ........... 40 ........ ......... 72 88
SAW........................... Sawyer Int'l Airport............... IV............... MI......... 1 1 ...... ........ .............. 6 ...... ........... 6 1 ......... 13 15
SBA........................... Santa Barbara Municipal Airport.... II............... CA......... 2 6 ...... 3 1 14 ...... ........... 22 4 ......... 40 51
SBN........................... South Bend Regional Airport........ II............... IN......... 2 5 ...... 2 2 13 ...... ........... 28 5 ......... 47 58
SBP........................... San Luis Obispo County Airport..... IV............... CA......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 6 ...... ........... 10 2 ......... 18 19
SBY........................... Salisbury/Wicomico County Reg'l Air- IV............... MD......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 11 ........ ......... 11 11
port.
SCC........................... Deadhorse Airport.................. III.............. AK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 4 4
SDF........................... Louisville Int'l Airport........... I................ KY......... 2 10 3 2 5 47 ...... ........... 67 8 ......... 128 150
SEA........................... Seattle-Tacoma Int'l Airport....... X................ WA......... 15 13 3 16 34 298 ...... 5 469 22 ......... 827 907
SFB........................... Orlando Sanford Airport............ III.............. FL......... ....... 1 ...... 4 .............. 20 ...... ........... 51 ........ ......... 72 77
SFO........................... San Francisco Int'l Airport........ X................ CA......... 9 11 5 13 .............. ......... ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... ....... 38
SGF........................... Springfield/Branson Regional III.............. MO......... 2 6 ...... 4 .............. 20 ...... ........... 26 4 ......... 49 61
Airport.
SGU........................... St. George Municipal Airport....... IV............... UT......... ....... ...... ...... 1 .............. 3 ...... ........... 6 ........ ......... 10 11
SHD........................... Shenandoah Valley Airport.......... IV............... VA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 3 3
SHR........................... Sheridan County Airport............ IV............... WY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 2 ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 5 6
SHV........................... Shreveport Regional Airport........ II............... LA......... 2 8 ...... 2 .............. 14 ...... ........... 28 5 ......... 48 60
SIT........................... Sitka ``Rocky Gutierrez'' Airport.. III.............. AK......... ....... ...... ...... 2 .............. 9 ...... ........... 8 1 ......... 19 21
SJC........................... San Jose Int'l Airport............. I................ CA......... 7 13 ...... 8 19 98 ...... 4 189 ........ ......... 311 358
SJT........................... San Angelo Regional Airport........ IV............... TX......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 4 ...... ........... 8 1 ......... 15 16
SJU........................... Luis Munoz Marin Int'l Airport..... X................ PR......... 6 14 3 15 9 166 ...... ........... 237 11 ......... 423 471
SLC........................... Salt Lake City Int'l............... I................ UT......... 9 16 2 12 15 205 ...... 7 240 5 ......... 473 527
SLK........................... Adirondack Regional Airport........ IV............... NY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 3 1 ......... 5 5
SLN........................... Salina Municipal Airport........... IV............... KS......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 4 4
SMF........................... Sacramento Int'l Airport........... I................ CA......... 8 15 1 8 25 103 ...... ........... 153 6 ......... 287 344
SMX........................... Santa Maria Public Airport......... IV............... CA......... ....... 1 ...... ........ 1 3 ...... ........... 4 1 ......... 9 11
SNA........................... John Wayne Airport................. I................ CA......... 6 14 1 7 19 68 ...... ........... 152 ........ ......... 239 285
SOW........................... Show Low Regional Airport.......... IV............... AZ......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 1 1
SPI........................... Capital Airport.................... III.............. IL......... 1 1 ...... 1 .............. 5 ...... ........... 9 1 ......... 15 18
SPS........................... Sheppard AFB/Wichita Falls III.............. TX......... ....... 1 ...... 1 1 9 ...... ........... 5 1 ......... 16 18
Municipal Airport.
SRQ........................... Sarasota Bradenton Int'l Airport... II............... FL......... 2 7 ...... 3 1 28 ...... ........... 39 1 ......... 70 83
STC........................... St. Cloud Regional Airport......... IV............... MN......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 4 2 ......... 9 9
STL........................... Lambert St Louis Int'l Airport..... X................ MO......... 10 16 2 13 8 120 ...... ........... 242 4 ......... 374 422
STT........................... Cyril E. King Int'l Airport........ II............... VI......... 2 9 ...... 3 1 35 ...... ........... 39 1 ......... 76 90
STX........................... Henry E. Rohlsen Airport........... III.............. VI......... ....... 3 ...... 1 1 12 ...... ........... 20 ........ ......... 33 38
SUN........................... Friedman Memorial Airport.......... III.............. ID......... ....... 1 ...... 1 .............. 4 ...... ........... 3 1 ......... 8 10
SUX........................... Sioux Gateway Airport.............. III.............. IA......... ....... ...... ...... 1 .............. 3 ...... ........... 6 3 ......... 12 14
SWF........................... Stewart Airport.................... III.............. NY......... ....... 1 ...... 2 .............. 9 ...... ........... 18 2 ......... 30 33
SYR........................... Syracuse-Hancock Int'l Airport..... II............... NY......... 4 13 1 6 2 53 ...... ........... 64 ........ ......... 118 144
TBN........................... Forney Army Airfield............... IV............... MO......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 5 5
TEX........................... Telluride Regional Airport......... IV............... CO......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 ........ ......... 5 5
TLH........................... Tallahassee Regional Airport....... II............... FL......... 4 8 ...... 2 .............. 14 ...... ........... 28 6 ......... 49 63
TOL........................... Toledo Express Airport............. II............... OH......... ....... 4 ...... 2 .............. 16 ...... ........... 25 4 ......... 46 52
TPA........................... Tampa Int'l Airport................ I................ FL......... 6 21 2 17 14 174 ...... 4 316 17 ......... 525 585
TRI........................... Tri-Cities Regional Airport........ III.............. TN......... ....... ...... ...... 1 .............. 8 ...... ........... 14 ........ ......... 22 23
TTN........................... Trenton-Mercer Airport............. IV............... NJ......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 5 5
TUL........................... Tulsa Int'l Airport................ I................ OK......... 3 10 1 5 1 44 ...... ........... 70 1 ......... 116 135
TUS........................... Tucson Int'l Airport............... I................ AZ......... 6 13 1 5 .............. 79 ...... ........... 72 2 ......... 154 179
TVC........................... Cherry Capital Airport............. III.............. MI......... 1 6 ...... 1 .............. 7 ...... ........... 16 3 ......... 26 34
TVF........................... Thief River Falls Regional Airport. IV............... MN......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 1 ........ ......... 3 3
TWF........................... Joslin Field, Magic Valley Regional IV............... ID......... ....... ...... ...... 2 .............. 3 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 7 9
Airport.
TXK........................... Texarkana Regional Airport......... III.............. TX......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 2 ...... ........... 4 ........ ......... 7 8
TYR........................... Tyler Pounds Field Airport......... IV............... TX......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 5 1 ......... 10 11
TYS........................... McGhee Tyson Airport............... II............... TN......... 1 6 ...... 4 .............. 22 ...... ........... 32 4 ......... 58 69
UIN........................... Quincy Regional Airport-Baldwin IV............... IL......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 3 1 ......... 6 6
Field.
UNV........................... University Park Airport............ III.............. PA......... ....... 1 ...... 1 .............. 5 ...... ........... 12 2 ......... 19 21
VCT........................... Victoria Regional Airport.......... IV............... TX......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 2 2 ......... 5 5
VDZ........................... Valdez Airport..................... IV............... AK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... 3 3
VEL........................... Vernal/Uintah County Airport....... IV............... UT......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 4 ........ ......... 4 4
VLD........................... Valdosta Municipal Airport......... IV............... GA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 6 ...... ........... 5 ........ ......... 11 11
VPS........................... Okaloosa County Air Terminal....... II............... FL......... ....... 1 ...... 2 1 9 ...... 1 27 3 ......... 40 44
WDG........................... Enid Woodring Municipal Airport.... IV............... OK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 2 ...... ........... 2 1 ......... 5 5
WRG........................... Wrangell Airport................... III.............. AK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... 3 ........ ......... 5 5
WRL........................... Worland Muni Airport............... IV............... WY......... ....... ...... ...... ........ 1 2 ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... 3 4
XNA........................... Northwest Arkansas Regional Airport II............... AR......... ....... 1 ...... 2 .............. 14 ...... ........... 27 3 ......... 44 47
YAK........................... Yakutat Airport.................... III.............. AK......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 3 ...... ........... ......... ........ ......... 3 3
YKM........................... Yakima Air Terminal-McAllister III.............. WA......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. 4 ...... ........... 16 2 ......... 22 22
Field.
YNG........................... Youngstown-Warren Regional Airport. III.............. OH......... ....... ...... ...... ........ .............. ......... ...... ........... 7 ........ ......... 7 7
YUM........................... Yuma Int'l Airport................. IV............... AZ......... ....... 1 ...... ........ .............. 1 ...... ........... 11 ........ ......... 12 13
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTALS.................. ................................... ................. ........... 807 1,757 174 1,062 1,357 14,890 1 74 23,279 1,393 9 41,004 46,162
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report shows the annualized FTE burn for PP02 ending February 4, 2006, rounded to the highest whole FTE.
Categories of TSO FTE burn are reported via timesheets and manual pay transactions. Manual pay transactions do not normally include labor distribution and are categorized as Other or Undefined.
TSO and other totals include prior pay period adjustments reported in PP02.
Reporting systems show HQ personnel located at airports by duty location, not airport code/name, so they are reported separately.
NO-FLY LIST
Question. At a recent Homeland Security Data Privacy and Integrity
Advisory Committee meeting, it was revealed that nearly 30,000 airline
passengers were mistakenly placed on the Federal ``terrorist'' watch
list. Why is the number so high?
Answer. At a meeting of the Department of Homeland Security Data
Privacy Advisory Committee on December 6, 2005, TSA testified that
``over 30,000 members of the traveling public have submitted the
Passenger Identity Verification Form and have received relief since the
TSA Office of Transportation Security Redress was created in November
2004.'' TSA did not say, nor did we imply, that these individuals were
``mistakenly placed'' on the Terrorist Watch List.
Through TSA's redress process, the overwhelming majority of these
persons were determined to have names that were the same as, or similar
to, individuals appropriately on the Terrorist Watch List. In these
circumstances, TSA provides the passenger with appropriate information
and notifies the airlines of the name match or similarity through
submission of a Cleared List. While this redress process does not
ensure that a passenger's travel will always be free of delays, it
helps to streamline the check-in process at airport ticket counters.
In accordance with the requirements of Homeland Security
Presidential Directive #6, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) consolidated its watch list operations within the Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC) and integrated the No-Fly List into the TSC
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), also called the Consolidated
Terrorist Watch List. TSA personnel assigned to the TSC conduct a
comprehensive review of nominations to the No-Fly List to ensure their
accuracy and completeness. Once these actions are complete, TSA
disseminates the List to air carriers.
By using a consolidated No-Fly List within the TSDB, TSA greatly
improved the coordination of intelligence and law enforcement
information supporting the program. Additionally, during the past year
the agencies that nominate subjects to the No-Fly List revalidated
their submissions and deleted or modified their records. These actions
have enhanced the quality of data.
TSA also has developed a comprehensive and user-friendly redress
process for persons who believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly
delayed, denied boarding, or flagged for additional screening at our
Nation's airports. Many individuals experience these problems due to
the similarity of their names to those of individuals who are
appropriately on the Terrorist Watch List. A passenger may initiate the
TSA redress process by submitting a completed Passenger Identity
Verification Form to the Office of Transportation Security Redress at
TSA headquarters. TSA will review the submission and reach a
determination of whether the redress process may aid in expediting a
passenger's airline check-in process, and inform the passenger
accordingly. The Passenger Identify Verification Form, as well as other
information about TSA's redress process has been posted on TSA's public
website. To access this information, go to http://www.tsa.gov, click on
``Travelers and Consumers'' at the top left of the page, choose ``TSA
Customer Service'' from the column on the left, and then click ``TSA
Watch Lists Clearance Procedures'' which is located about three-
quarters of the way down the page.
TSA understands that the process is not perfect, and we will
continue to analyze the system and improve upon the work done thus far.
Question. What measures are being put in place to remedy this
problem?
Answer. In order to minimize the occurrence of incorrect matches,
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) consolidated its watch
list operations within the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and
integrated the No-Fly and Selectee Lists into the TSC Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB). TSA personnel assigned to the TSC conduct a
comprehensive review of nominations to the No-Fly and Selectee Lists to
ensure their accuracy and completeness. Once these actions are
complete, TSA disseminates the Lists to air carriers.
By using consolidated No-Fly and Selectee Lists within the TSDB,
TSA greatly improved the coordination of intelligence and law
enforcement information supporting the program. Additionally, during
the past year the agencies that nominate subjects to the No-Fly List
revalidated their submissions and deleted or modified their records.
These actions have enhanced the quality of data and removed persons
from the No-Fly List that should not have been on this list. The Secure
Flight program will continue to build on these enhancements and will
use a more sophisticated and consistent watch list matching system to
minimize the occurrence of incorrect matches.
Question. What is the process for redress?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office
of Transportation Security Redress is currently developing redress
procedures for addressing any situation where individuals believe they
have been incorrectly delayed or prevented from flying on an airplane
under the future Secure Flight program. TSA will maintain a record of
individuals who have been misidentified as individuals on a watch list,
which will contain identifying information necessary to authenticate
the identity of each individual, in order to avoid repeated delays and
minimize the occurrence of incorrect matches by the Secure Flight
program.
Currently, the air carriers conduct the watch list matching
function, and carriers handle the process differently from one another.
A primary advantage of the Secure Flight program is that the Federal
Government will conduct the watch list matching function, thus creating
a more consistent process that will tie into the redress mechanisms.
At the present time, passengers who experience delays in obtaining
a boarding pass because they have a name that is similar to a person on
the No-Fly or Selectee Lists may choose to participate in the TSA
Redress Program by submitting a TSA Passenger Identity Verification
(PIV) form, along with requested information, to TSA. The information
provided through the PIV form assists TSA in distinguishing passengers
from persons who are, in fact, on the watch lists. If TSA determines
that the passenger who submitted the PIV form is not the person on the
No-Fly or Selectee Lists, TSA will notify the passenger of that finding
and contact the appropriate parties, such as the airlines, to help
streamline the check-in process at the airports.
RECOVERIES
Question. Section 531 of the fiscal year 2006 Appropriations Act
provides specific authority for recoveries. Has TSA realized additional
recoveries and if so, has a spend plan been developed?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not
realized any recoveries in fiscal year 2006 to date, although it does
expect to realize modest recoveries in the fourth quarter.
Fiscal year 2006 recoveries are expected to be significantly
smaller than the over $100 million in recoveries reported in fiscal
year 2005. The large fiscal year 2005 recoveries resulted primarily
from the close-out of contracts awarded during the TSA start-up in
fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003.
PERIMETER SECURITY
Question. Has a competitive process for perimeter security pilots
been put in place? If so, how many pilots will TSA enter into with the
$5 million appropriated in fiscal year 2006? Please describe each
pilot.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
currently evaluating options to competitively award the $5 million for
perimeter security. Responsive projects may include perimeter sensors,
intelligent camera systems, biometric devices, technologies to detect
and track potential intruders, and communication capabilities to
provide appropriate alarm and response notification. TSA anticipates
award of the grants by the end of calendar year 2006.
EDS
Question. For EDS procurement, if funding were maintained at the
fiscal year 2006 level, how much would be needed for installation?
Answer. If funding for Explosives Detection System (EDS)
procurement were maintained at the fiscal year 2006 funding level, the
total funds required for installation would be $432,836,269. This
includes the mandatory aviation security capital fund of $250M, which
will primarily be used for LOIs.
Question. Provide a list of all certified EDS technology.
Answer. The following is a list of all Explosives Detection Systems
(EDS) certified for checked baggage screening:
--GE InVision CTX-1000
--GE InVision CTX-2500
--GE InVision CTX-5500
--GE InVision CTX-9000
--L-3 eXaminer 3000
--L-3 eXaminer 6000
--Reveal CT-80
--Analogic 6400
Question. Provide a list of all EDS technology that is being
evaluated by DHS for certification.
Answer. Several Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) are scheduled to
be tested for Transportation Security Administration certification.
This includes EDS models that have already been certified but are
undergoing adjustments to their hardware or software, requiring them to
be re-certified, similarly to new systems.
Re-certifications:
--Analogic AN 6400--Certification of Software: Standard threat mass
detection algorithm to improve detection performance.
--GE InVision CTX 5500--Certification of Hardware: standard x-ray
computer obsolescence.
--Reveal CT-80--Certification of CT-80: Modified Gantry speed (60 to
90 rpm) to increase system throughput and modified detection
algorithm to improve detection performance.
New Certifications:
--L3 eXaminer 3DX 6500
--Analogic XLB
--Analogic King Cobra
--GE InVision CTX 9800
--SureScan
Future:
--Long term research and development efforts for checked baggage
screening under the Manhattan II project may result in
prototype technologies for evaluation. These technologies
employ nanotechnology, tomosynthesis, terahertz based systems,
neutron based systems, and trace detection systems.
Question. Provide a LOI funding chart by airport (showing cost by
fiscal year, amount required for each year, amount funded by TSA, total
at 75/25 reimbursement cost share, total at 90/10 reimbursement cost
share, and total project cost).
Answer.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Govt Share--75 Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year 2004 Fiscal year 2005 Fiscal year 2006 Fiscal year 2007
75/25 LOI Total Cost percent reimbursement reimbursement reimbursement reimbursement reimbursement
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATL........................................................ $125,000,000.00 $93,750,000 ................. $15,000,000.00 $26,250,000.00 $26,250,000.00 $26,250,000.00
DEN........................................................ 95,000,000.00 71,250,000 $17,812,500 17,812,500.00 17,812,500.00 17,812,500.00 .................
DFW........................................................ 139,249,812.00 104,437,359 ................. 34,812,453.00 34,812,453.00 34,812,453.00 .................
LAS........................................................ 125,000,000.00 93,750,000 ................. 15,000,000.00 26,250,000.00 26,250,000.00 26,250,000.00
LAX........................................................ 341,956,000.00 256,467,000 ................. 55,000,000.00 67,155,666.67 67,155,666.67 67,155,666.67
SEA........................................................ 212,000,000.00 159,000,000 ................. 33,000,000.00 42,000,000.00 42,000,000.00 42,000,000.00
PHX........................................................ 122,000,000.00 91,500,000 ................. 13,000,000.00 26,166,666.67 26,166,666.67 26,166,666.67
BOS........................................................ 116,000,000.00 87,000,000 29,000,000 29,000,000.00 29,000,000.00 ................. .................
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................................................ 1,276,205,812.00 957,154,359.00 46,812,500.00 212,624,953.00 269,447,286.00 240,447,286.00 187,822,333.00
====================================================================================================================================
ATL........................................................ 125,000,000.00 112,500,000.00 ................. 15,000,000.00 26,250,000.00 26,250,000.00 45,000,000.00
DEN........................................................ 95,000,000.00 85,500,000.00 17,812,500 17,812,500.00 17,812,500.00 17,812,500.00 14,250,000.00
DFW........................................................ 139,249,812.00 125,324,830.80 ................. 34,812,453.00 34,812,453.00 34,812,453.00 20,887,471.80
LAS........................................................ 125,000,000.00 112,500,000.00 ................. 15,000,000.00 26,250,000.00 26,250,000.00 45,000,000.00
LAX........................................................ 341,956,000.00 307,760,400.00 ................. 55,000,000.00 67,155,666.67 67,155,666.67 118,449,066.67
SEA........................................................ 212,000,000.00 190,800,000.00 ................. 33,000,000.00 42,000,000.00 42,000,000.00 73,800,000.00
PHX........................................................ 122,000,000.00 109,800,000.00 ................. 13,000,000.00 26,166,666.67 26,166,666.67 44,466,666.67
BOS........................................................ 116,000,000.00 104,400,000.00 29,000,000 29,000,000.00 29,000,000.00 ................. 17,400,000.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................................................ 1,276,205,812.00 1,148,585,230.80 46,812,500.00 212,624,953.00 269,447,286.00 240,447,286.00 379,253,205.00
====================================================================================================================================
75/25 vs. 90/10 difference................................. ................. 191,430,871.80 ................. ................. ................. ................. -191,430,872.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PILOT PROGRAMS
Question. Provide a list and status of all TSA pilot programs
planned, ongoing, or completed including the cost of each pilot.
Answer. BEST Pilot.--During September and October of 2005, the Bus
Explosives Screening Technology (BEST) pilot was conducted by the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in partnership with
Greyhound and Peter Pan bus services. The goal of this first ever pilot
was to evaluate the use of screening technologies in a motorcoach
environment to screen passengers, checked baggage, and carry-on items
for explosives.
Status.--The pilot was completed.
Cost.--The total cost for the first BEST pilot was approximately
$407,000 in fiscal year 2005 funding.
HAZMAT Truck Security Pilot.--TSA awarded contracts to Science
Applications International Corporation and General Dynamics to design
and build a centralized prototype truck tracking center capability. The
pilot will also develop a set of protocols capable of interfacing with
existing truck tracking systems and with, as applicable, Federal, State
and local government intelligence operations centers, and Federal law
enforcement and first responder agencies.
Status.--The pilot is on-going. After the pilot phase is complete
(target date: May 2007), TSA will base decisions about the program's
future on the results.
Cost.--From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2006, Congress
appropriated $11.5 million for this pilot. Approximately $6 million has
been obligated to date.
Missouri Pilot.--Beginning April 2006, TSA will implement a pilot
project with the State of Missouri to conduct security plan evaluations
with the trucking industry. The purpose of this pilot is to monitor and
evaluate industry performance by leveraging Federal, State, and local
resources. The pilot will be based on the use of the Corporate Security
Review (CSR) program that TSA currently conducts with all 50 State
department of transportation agencies, motorcoach, and school bus
companies.
The CSR Missouri Pilot will allow TSA to train 44 Missouri State
troopers on security plan evaluation techniques; evaluate data
submitted to TSA for monitoring company and industry security planning
and implementation performance; conduct more than 300 evaluations by
September 2006; and evaluate and expand the pilot to States with large
concentrations of trucking companies. By utilizing existing safety data
from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), TSA will
apply a risk-based selection process to determine what carriers or
motor coach or school bus companies need greater scrutiny.
Status.--The pilot is ongoing.
Cost.--It is estimated that this pilot will cost approximately
$400,000.
Secure Automated Inspection Lanes (SAIL) Program, Phase III: SAIL I
& II assessed vehicle and passenger screening technology separately in
ferry pre-boarding environments. SAIL III will leverage lessons learned
to apply to a pilot operation in a large ferry operation that includes
both vehicle and passenger screening.
Status.--The pilot is in the planning stage.
Cost.--$225,000.
Maritime Passenger, Vehicle, and Baggage Screening Research and
Development Grant.--This pilot program will deploy screening equipment
into the maritime passenger domain that will be ultimately operated and
tested by the maritime transportation operators. In the pilot, TSA will
select screening equipment for various maritime passenger and vehicle
operations throughout the United States and work with operators to
develop screening procedures tailored to their existing operations.
Status.--The pilot is ongoing.
Cost.--$3.6 million.
Passenger Rail and Rail Transit Information Pilot.--The purpose of
this pilot program is to ensure that transit security information
gathering, synthesis, and sharing at the Federal Government level is
coordinated, effective, and timely. The pilot brings together Federal
partners to develop processes for information sharing and
communications protocols and to eliminate duplication and close
potential gaps. Objectives include enhancing domain awareness, ensuring
decision makers at all levels have a comprehensive and accurate picture
of the State of passenger rail and rail transit security, and
streamlining procedures in order to improve communication with
stakeholders during both normal operating periods and emergencies. The
initial phase of this information pilot is being tested in the National
Capital Region with the aim of extending the initiative nationwide and
across modes once the process is fully developed.
Status.--The pilot is ongoing.
Cost.--$330,000.
Integrated Intermodal Information System--Domestic.--The purpose of
this pilot is to continually spotlight suspicious activity in high
threat domestic supply chains and provide actionable, near-real time
advisories.
Status.--The pilot is ongoing.
Cost.--$600,000.
Southern Regional Radiological Pilot Program.--This pilot
operationally tests and evaluates new, innovative nuclear/radiological
detection security technologies (portable), and accompanying response
protocols and procedures.
Status.--The pilot is ongoing with completion expected by December
2007.
Cost.--$4 million.
Transportable Radiation Monitoring Systems.--This pilot's objective
is to develop and field test a concept of operations for deployment of
transportable radiation monitoring systems.
Status.--The pilot is ongoing with completion expected by December
2006.
Cost.--$2 million.
Southeast Transportation Corridor Radiological Detection Pilot.--
This pilot focuses on the deployment of transportable radiation
monitoring systems at selected weigh stations along a southeast
intermodal freight corridor.
Status.--The pilot is ongoing with completion expected in fiscal
year 2007.
Cost.--$1.2 million.
Hazardous Materials Carrier Training.-- This pilot will develop and
deploy training for HAZMAT shippers and carriers in how to conduct
vulnerability self-assessments.
Status.--The pilot is in the training development/planning stage
with completion expected by July 2007.
Cost.--$1.7 million.
Seals Pilot.--This pilot will evaluate the applicability and
effectiveness of tamper-evident seals in the air cargo environment.
Status.--The pilot is planned to start in July 2006.
Cost.--$500,000
Hazardous Materials Initiative.--TSA commissioned this initiative
to study the feasibility of equipping individual railroad tank cars
with real time tracking devices and constructing a national tracking
system. Phase I (market survey) and Phase II (equipment testing) are
complete. Phase III will develop a concept of operations for a national
tracking system.
Status.--Phase III is ongoing.
Cost.--Phases I and II were $175,000. Phase III is expected to cost
$109,341.
Multi-Modal Security Enhancement Teams (MMSET)--TSA seeks to
enhance the current network of security systems outside the aviation
mode by deploying teams that include Federal Air Marshals (FAMS) and
Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSI) to other
transportation sectors. These deployments will enhance the agency's
ability to leverage a variety of resources to quickly and effectively
raise the bar of security in any mode of transportation anywhere in the
country.
Status.--Six initial pilot deployments were completed in December
2005, and eight additional pilot deployments were completed as of June
2006. Planning for future deployments to other transportation venues is
ongoing.
Cost.--Incidental Travel and Pay, Compensation, and Benefits for
team member participants.
Field Skills Inventory Pilot.--The goal of the TSA Employee Skills
Inventory (SI) is to allow TSA to quickly identify workforce
capabilities that would benefit the agency's mission in many
situations, including:
--Task forces
--Details
--Emergency response situations
--Gap analysis
--Employee career development
--Succession Planning
Status.--The planned launch date is April 2006.
Cost.--None.
Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) Project Gandalf.--This pilot
addresses business processes at the FAMS Mission Operations Center
(MOC) for ``day of'' mission schedule changes. The Gandalf optimization
algorithm uses a rigorous set of business rules in selecting targeted
critical flights in a rapid and logical manner. This new mission
scheduling optimization tool-set will bring the FAMS core business
capabilities into the latest technology realm and will design from the
ground up a system that is tailored to specific FAMS requirements.
Status.--Initiated in January 2006, this is an ongoing program
which should be completed at the start of fiscal year 2007. After the
pilot phase is complete, TSA will base decisions about the program's
future on the results.
Cost.--$260,000 of Science and Technology funding has been expended
to date.
Reveal CT-80.--This pilot evaluated the operational effectiveness
and suitability of newly certified Explosives Detection System (EDS) at
various airports.
Status.--Pilot was completed.
Cost.--$4.7 million.
Explosives Trace Portals (ETPs).--This pilot evaluated the
effectiveness and suitability of ETPs for passenger screening for
explosives at various airport checkpoints.
Status.--Pilot was completed.
Cost.--$3.5 million.
Break Bulk Air Cargo Explosives Detection System (EDS).--This pilot
evaluates the effectiveness and suitability of EDS at various air cargo
facilities.
Status.--Pilot is ongoing.
Cost.--$19 million.20. Airport Access Control Pilot Program
(AACPP): This pilot evaluates the effectiveness of off-the-shelf access
control technology.
Status.--Pilot is ongoing with scheduled completion at the end of
CY 2006.
Cost.--$19.6 million.
Hardened Unit Load Device (HULD).--This pilot evaluates the
effectiveness and suitability of HULD for the transport of air cargo
and baggage on passenger aircraft.
Status.--Pilot is ongoing.
Cost.--$5 million.
Automated Carry-On Bag EDS.--TSA competitively selected two vendors
(Analogic and Reveal) to provide prototype checkpoint EDS systems.
Units will be deployed to the field to assess effectiveness and
suitability after they are certified and successfully complete
laboratory testing.
Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin
in fiscal year 2006.
Cost.--$2.5 million.
Cast and Prosthesis Scanner.--This pilot will test and evaluate the
effectiveness and operational suitability of cast and prosthesis
scanner technology at a hospital and then in the field after safety
testing is completed.
Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin
in fiscal year 2006.
Cost.--$440,000.
Passenger Hands and Personal Effects Scanning.--This pilot will
assess effectiveness and suitability of using ETD technology to screen
individuals for explosives.
Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin
in fiscal year 2006.
Cost.--$200,000.
Bottle Liquid Scanner.--This pilot will test and evaluate the
effectiveness and suitability of technologies to screen bottles for
flammable liquids.
Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin
in fiscal year 2006.
Cost.--$200,000.
Emerging Next Generation EDS.--This pilot will test and evaluate
emerging EDS, including King Cobra and SureScan.
Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin
in fiscal year 2006.
Cost.--$4 million.
Information Sharing Environment--This pilot will develop an agency-
wide approach, framework, and roadmap for information sharing among all
TSA stakeholders.
Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin
in fiscal year 2006.
Cost.--To be determined.
Unpredictable Screening Program (USP) Pilot.--This pilot is
designed to implement additional screening measures (e.g. sending
additional individuals through secondary screening) on a schedule which
would appear random to someone trying to predict TSA's screening
procedures. The ``unpredictability'' of these measures is intended to
complicate the ability to develop plans to circumvent screening
procedures.
Status.--Pilot is complete.
Cost.--No additional cost is associated with this pilot.
Baggage Handler Pilot.--The goal of this pilot is to help determine
the feasibility, benefits, costs, risks and other potential
consequences of using baggage handling personnel to support TSA
screening operations. This program is one of several initiatives being
undertaken to mitigate the higher than average Transportation Security
Officer (TSO) on-the-job injury rate.
The pilot program will be implemented as an Other Transaction
Authority (OTA) with an airport operator and/or carrier to determine
whether or not it is more economical to accomplish through the Federal
sector or to privatize the effort.
Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage. TSA expects to implement
the necessary agreements by summer 2006. Once launched, the pilot will
run 4 months.
Cost.--$2.64 million.
Glove Pilot.--This pilot is being designed to test gloves with
different thicknesses to determine if data validate the assumption that
using thicker (and more expensive) gloves is a cost effective way to
reduce the number of TSO hand and finger injuries and the workman's
compensation claims associated with those injuries. The pilot will be
conducted at several large airports with a history of such claims.
Status.--The pilot is currently in the planning and market research
phase.
Cost.--To be determined.
Question. For pilots that have been completed, have any been
transitioned into full scale programs? If so, please indicate those
programs.
Answer. Cockpit Access Security System (CASS) for Domestic Air
Carriers:
Prior to 9/11, domestic air crewmembers were routinely authorized
to ride in the flight deck jumpseat as an effective means of
transportation. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, all jumpseat
access by non-operational flight crewmembers was suspended. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) later issued directives
that allowed non-operational crewmembers to access the flight deck
jumpseat provided the air carriers develop a system to verify the
identity of crewmembers and their employment status.
CASS, an initiative proposed by member carriers of the Air
Transport Association (ATA), is a network of databases containing
employment and security information for individuals authorized to enter
the flight deck, as regulated by Federal Aviation Regulations. TSA
commenced a 6-month pilot program to test CASS on May 1, 2004.
Participation in the pilot program was limited to domestic flights of
ATA member air carriers, of which 17 currently participate. Because of
the initial success of the 6-month pilot, CASS was extended several
times at the request of the participating air carriers.
CASS operates by interlinking participating air carriers' employee
databases through a central router. When an employee of a participating
air carrier makes a request to occupy the flight deck jumpseat, an
inquiry is made through CASS, allowing the gate agent to immediately
access the requester's identification information and employment
status. As another layer of security, the captain of the flight
verifies the requester's FAA pilot and medical certificates before
giving final approval to board.
CASS is an important security initiative as it adds another layer
of security to protect the flight deck of air carrier aircraft and
provides a customer service benefit air carriers afford to their
pilots. First, the system adds a real-time vetting for individuals
seeking to access the flight deck. Second, it adds another qualified
individual to the flight deck who can assist the crew in an emergency.
Air Carriers provided very positive feedback of the pilot and
supported the permanent establishment of CASS. CASS was approved as a
permanent program effective September 23, 2005 and is now available to
all eligible domestic air carriers limited to domestic flights. The
Reveal CT-80 and Explosives Trace Portal (ETP) pilot programs were
deemed successful and the TSA has begun deployment of both types of
equipment at additional airports. Specifically, the TSA will deploy
over 70 Reveal CT-80 units and over 100 ETPs in fiscal year 2006.
Question. Does TSA plan to transition any of these pilots to full
scale programs? If so, please indicate those programs.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
requested fiscal year 2007 funding for emerging technology; however,
purchase of this equipment is dependant on the success of the
technology during the pilot programs. For other on-going pilots,
decisions will be made after the results of the pilots have been
evaluated.
Question. The fiscal year 2006 conference report requires TSA to
enter into a small number of pilots with airports to improve their
baggage screening process through creative financing options. Please
describe ongoing or planned pilots, the schedule associated with each
pilot, results to date, and next steps.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
currently exploring with industry partners the means to encourage
innovative financing to accelerate the deployment of optimal baggage
screening systems through a cost sharing study. This cost share study,
mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (Public Law 108-458), should be completed later this year and will
outline the options available. Once those options are determined, pilot
projects will be planned using these financing mechanisms.
REGISTERED TRAVELER
Question. For the Registered Traveler program, how will the fee the
individual traveler pays be determined? For instance, how are costs
such as capital improvements for space and TSA personnel to operate the
lanes factored in?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) expects
that the user fee will be market-driven with the price established by
private sector providers. The fee will reflect the providers' capital
investment, operating expenses, and financial incentives, as well as an
amount to be remitted to TSA to cover the Agency's direct costs in
facilitating the program. The TSA-portion of the fee will be
established through a notice published in the Federal Register in
accordance with Section 540 of the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2006 (Public Law 109-90).
The private sector providers will have the option of making capital
investment in approved screening equipment, additional screeners, and/
or space for separate Registered Traveler screening in accordance with
their business plan and in coordination with the airport operator and
TSA.
Question. What exactly will the Registered Traveler fee pay for?
Answer. The total RT participant fee will consist of two parts: the
TSA-set portion and the private sector portion. The private sector
portion of the fee will be set and collected by the enrollment
providers. TSA's activities under RT will be completely funded through
the fees set by TSA in the Federal Register notice, which is currently
under development. This fee will include components related to the
management of the program, the security threat assessment, technical
infrastructure required to operate the program, and vendor compliance
with the specified program standards.
Question. Aside from direct appropriations for the Registered
Traveler program in prior fiscal years, will TSA use other direct or
fee funded resources to operate this program?
Answer. For fiscal year 2007 budget forecasts, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) estimated $20 million in total fee
collections. TSA will revise its fee collection forecasts as soon as
more information about program design and private sector costs become
available.
Question. How many airlines will have to pay for construction of
new lanes dedicated for Registered Travelers?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
proposing a public/private partnership in which the government and
private vendors will team to provide both services and structure to the
RT program. The sponsoring entity (airport or airline) will be
responsible for all costs associated with adding new passenger
screening lanes. Requests for additional lanes will be subject to
airport and TSA approval based on the unique operational set-ups of the
individual airports and their checkpoints. TSA-approved checkpoint
equipment for new RT lanes will be authorized for purchase by the
service provider or sponsoring entity, depending on the physical
constraints of the respective location.
Question. While joining the Registered Traveler program is
voluntary, what assurances do participants have that data used to
verify their identity won't be compromised?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
currently considering which databases, both commercial and non-
commercial, will be included in the Registered Traveler (RT) Program's
watch list vetting process. Once a determination has been made, TSA
will be working with private sector entities to develop standards for
securing the data in order to protect the personally identifiable
information collected about applicants. The Privacy Impact Assessment
that will be published prior to the program launch will describe
privacy protections and data integrity safeguards for an ongoing RT
Program. In addition a Privacy Act System of Records Notice will
describe what data will be collected, how it will be used in the watch
list vetting process, how it will be stored and shared, and how it will
be transmitted to ensure its integrity and security.
SECURE FLIGHT
Question. On February 9, 2006, TSA shut down the Secure Flight
program and initiated a full scale audit of the program. How long will
this process take? Please provide a revised schedule for the Issuance
of a Regulation for Secure Flight.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
conducting a comprehensive audit in order to ensure that security,
privacy, and a unified Federal strategy are at the foundation of the
Secure Flight system and processes. While it should not take an undue
amount of time to finish, until that audit is completed and a path
forward for the program is decided upon, it would be premature to
speculate on the timeframe for Secure Flight milestones, including the
Secure Flight Regulation. TSA will be vigilant in keeping the Committee
apprised of all developments in relation to Secure Flight and looks
forward to working with Congress on this important program.
Question. When will TSA address all of the concerns raised by GAO?
Answer. Work on the Secure Flight Program is continuing. The
announced comprehensive audit will ensure that security, privacy, and a
unified Federal strategy are at the foundation of the Secure Flight
system and processes. Currently, the program is focusing on the areas
of concern raised by the Government Accountability Office regarding
program management, availability of technical documentation at the
appropriate level of detail, and the overall end-to-end business
process.
Certification of Secure Flight's compliance with the 10 mandates
will occur through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The
program is in the process of defining specific certification
requirements for review by the appropriate DHS entities. Secure Flight
certification will begin after initial results from operational testing
are available.
Question. Has TSA complied with all of the provisions related to
the Secure Flight program in the fiscal year 2006 DHS Appropriations
Act, including the prohibition on the use of commercial data?
Answer. Certification of Secure Flight's compliance with the 10
mandates will occur through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The program office is in the process of defining specific certification
requirements for review by the appropriate DHS entities. Secure Flight
certification will begin after initial results from operational testing
are available.
Question. What is the unobligated balance for Secure Flight?
Answer. The fiscal year 2006 appropriation, less the 1 percent
rescission, provided $56.1 million for the Secure Flight program, with
an additional $3.7 million in carryover funds. As of June 21, 2006, the
Transportation Security Administration has obligated approximately $18
million. Therefore, the unobligated balance is $41.8 million.
Question. Is the $40 million requested for fiscal year 2007 still
necessary in light of the ongoing audit of the program?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
currently rebaselining both the cost and the schedule to ensure that
TSA has addressed gaps found as part of the audit. TSA will share the
results of this rebaselinging with Congress once completed.
AIR CARGO
Question. What is the status of the 100 air cargo inspectors funded
in the fiscal year 2006 DHS Appropriations Act?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
developed an allocation plan for those additional resources, and the
hiring process is almost complete. The remaining two sections will be
made by mid-July 2006.
Question. What criteria must be met to become a ``known shipper''?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration has established
specific criteria that must be met before an air carrier or a freight
forwarder (also known as an indirect air carrier) can qualify a shipper
as ``known.'' Those criteria are contained in the carriers' standard
security programs, but they are Sensitive Security Information and may
not be publicly disclosed. In general, however, the air carrier or
freight forwarder must verify that certain business relationship
standards are met between the carrier and the shipper, and must also
verify the shipper's legitimacy.
Question. How often must a shipping company be recertified to be
maintained in the Known Shipper Database?
Answer. The requirements to qualify (and recertify) a shipper as
``known,'' as well as the specifics surrounding use of the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Known Shipper Database,
are contained in the indirect air carrier (IAC) and air carriers'
security programs, which are Sensitive Security Information and
therefore, may not be publicly disclosed. TSA Aviation Security
Inspectors routinely audit IAC and air carrier records to ensure
compliance with the known shipper requirements.
Question. How many ``Known Shippers'' are there?
Answer. Approximately 400,000 known shippers are currently
contained in the TSA Known Shipper Database. Currently, indirect air
carriers (IACs) and air carriers have the option of voluntarily
submitting their list of known shippers to the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) for inclusion in the TSA Known Shipper Database,
or they can maintain their own internal known shipper listing. TSA does
not maintain documentation on the number of shippers contained on the
internal known shipper lists of IACs, and air carriers that do not
currently participate in the TSA Known Shipper Database. However, TSA
estimates that this population of known shippers is approximately 1.5
million.
The Air Cargo Final Rule, issued May 17, 2006, made participation
in the TSA Known Shipper Database mandatory for all air carriers and
IACs. TSA will now have the ability to more accurately ascertain all
known shippers.
Question. Currently, how does TSA determine if air cargo is an
elevated-risk?
Answer. Currently, all cargo originating from a source other than
known shippers is considered elevated-risk cargo and is not permitted
to be transported on passenger aircraft.
Question. If cargo is identified as an elevated-risk, what security
procedures are taken?
Answer. Currently, cargo that originates from a source other than
known shippers is considered to be of elevated-risk and must not be
transported on passenger aircraft. Furthermore, cargo that originates
from known shippers is subject to random screening by the air carriers,
who must screen the percentage of cargo specified in their security
programs using Transportation Security Administration-approved
screening methods.
Question. TSA has been developing the Freight Assessment System for
sometime but no such system has been deployed. When will this system be
deployed?
Answer. The Freight Assessment System (FAS) is currently in its
Proof-of-Concept (POC) stage, which includes a data analysis and risk
assessment evaluation. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
is reviewing the results of the first iteration of the POC, which was
completed on January 27, 2006. The final iteration of the POC is
scheduled to be completed by June 30. Upon a successful completion of
the POC, TSA plans to move forward with an operational pilot that will
precede the development and implementation of the FAS. It is expected
that implementation of the FAS will begin in fiscal year 2007.
Question. What resources are included in the fiscal year 2007
request for this system?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request of $55
million for Air Cargo includes $5 million for the continued development
of the Freight Assessment System.
Question. How much will be needed to fully implement the Freight
Assessment System?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently
estimates the lifecycle cost for developing and deploying the Freight
Assessment System would be approximately $140 million. However, TSA
intends to conduct an alternatives analysis and to re-baseline the
program upon completion of the Proof-of-Concept to determine whether
the system can be brought to market faster and more economically.
Question. What synergies will there be, if any, with the CBP
National Targeting Center?
Answer. One of the guiding principles of the Freight Assessment
System (FAS) development is that industry should not have to provide
the same information to different Government agencies. Another guiding
principle is that the FAS should leverage, to the maximum extent
possible, other risk assessment systems and capabilities within the
Department of Homeland Security. Consequently, TSA partnered with U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in the design of the FAS to ensure
that it is fully harmonized with CBP's targeting methodology. Once the
FAS Proof-of-Concept is complete, we will re-engage with CBP to
determine how best to leverage CBP's targeting hardware and
infrastructure.
Question. What are the costs associated with the Freight Assessment
System in fiscal year 2007?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request of $55
million for Air Cargo includes $5 million for continued development of
the Freight Assessment System (FAS). A total of $5.8 million for FAS is
included in the fiscal year 2006 spend plan, which is scheduled to be
under contract before the end of fiscal year 2006 and will fund
continued development of this key program.
Question. Where will the work associated with the Freight
Assessment System be performed?
Answer. The Freight Assessment System is a complex system that will
require the participation of multiple vendors to develop, working from
multiple locations. Several alternative architectures are under
consideration, and TSA expects to select a deployment approach before
the end of the fiscal year.
Question. TSA indicated that initial feasibility studies for blast
resistant cabin and cargo liners were promising. Has TSA completed the
prototype for both passenger cabin and cargo hold liners?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
initiated a project to develop proof-of-concept cargo hold and
passenger cabin blast resistant liner designs and prototypes. This
project is now being administered by the Department of Homeland
Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T). The project is
currently in the preliminary stages of identifying candidate liner
design materials that are appropriate for use in liner construction
from both a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness
perspective, as well as a blast resistance perspective. Explosives
testing, as well as determination of FAA airworthiness compliance
(material flammability requirements) testing, is underway on candidate
composite material configurations that may be suitable for use in
protection of the aircraft.
Upon completion of the current material screening process and
finalization of material selection, expected in the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2006, engineering design concepts for cargo hold and
passenger cabin liners will be developed in the second quarter of
fiscal year 2007. Upon finalization of the liner design concepts,
prototypes will be fabricated and blast tested by DHS S&T within actual
aircraft structures. These tests, expected in the third quarter of
fiscal year 2007, will determine conformance to explosive mitigation
requirements and ability of the concepts to adequately protect the
aircraft.
Question. When would such a system be ready and what plans does TSA
have to retrofit existing aircraft with this new technology?
Answer. Explosive resistant liner design concepts could be ready as
early as the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007, assuming that the
liner design concepts developed and tested are deemed successful in
mitigating internal explosive effects without catastrophic structural
damage to the aircraft.
It is too early in the life cycle of these products to determine a
strategy for implementation. A cost/benefit analysis will be conducted
to determine if these products provide a good value and security
benefit. The Transportation Security Administration will base
subsequent retrofit decisions on the technical merit of the solution
and also consider issues such as cost variables to include
installation, maintenance, and additional weight impact. Any
implementation strategy will involve close coordination with the
Federal Aviation Administration, airframe manufacturers, and airlines
from both a technical and regulatory perspective.
Question. Why has the TSL not established certification standards
for air cargo screening equipment?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
established protocols for equipment used for screening cargo and
drafted a preliminary standard for cargo screening equipment similar to
the standard established for checked baggage screening technologies.
The draft standard distinguishes between break bulk and containerized
air cargo, and between perishable and non-perishable commodities. It
also stresses the importance of attaining a low false alarm rate. TSA
is working with the Science and Technology Directorate to further
develop the standards for air cargo screening technology solutions.
Question. What would be the cost of establishing and executing such
standards?
Answer. The development of the standards may require lab testing to
establish threat thresholds. These costs would become part of the
research and development funding in the Department of Homeland
Security's Science and Technology Directorate budget. The cost of
executing a standard for air cargo screening technologies would be
dependent upon the maturity of the systems presented for evaluation
once the standards are published.
Question. Why has the Department failed to finalize security
standards for air cargo as required in the Intelligence Reform Act?
Answer. TSA issued the Air Cargo Security Final Rule on May 17,
2006. The Rule introduces significant changes to current regulatory
requirements for four major sectors of the air cargo industry:
airports; passenger air carriers that transport cargo; all-cargo air
carriers; and indirect air carriers (also known as ``freight
forwarders'').
CANINE TEAMS
Question. As of November 2005, TSA had six certified TSA mass
transit canine teams. TSA anticipated that 30 teams would complete
training by May 2006. When will TSA fully deploy those teams to the 10
transit systems identified in November?
Answer. Twenty-nine teams are currently deployed with the remaining
team in training. Each of the 10 major mass transit systems identified
in the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) rail initiative
will initially receive three TSA certified canine teams along with
associated training and equipment, for a combined total of 30 new
canine teams. Each mass transit system will commit three handlers for
training at the TSA Explosives Detection Canine Handler Course in San
Antonio, TX. This training is provided at no cost to the mass transit/
rail system or law enforcement agency participating in the National
Explosives Detection Canine Team Program.
Question. Have any of the participating transit systems dropped out
of the program? If so, why?
Answer. All of the original systems that committed to entering the
program are still participating. After attending the course of
instruction at the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program
(NEDCTP) Training Academy, and working with the NEDCTP staff members in
the field, many of the participating systems have requested that
additional assets be deployed.
Question. Does TSA plan to expand this program to other transit
systems in fiscal year 2007?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
established an ambitious schedule to staff the currently planned 30
mass transit canine teams. Within the base of funds requested, TSA may
staff canine teams at additional mass transit locations based on
potential second year cost efficiencies. As TSA receives interest from
other mass transit systems, the agency will evaluate each request and
determine any new locations using risk-based criteria.
Question. How many canine teams are dedicated to air cargo?
Answer. Although explosives detection canine teams are not
dedicated exclusively to screening cargo, nearly 365 TSA-certified
explosives detection canine teams across the Nation's aviation domain
currently support cargo screening activities on a routine basis. The $7
million in additional funds will also assist the program with expanding
the number of TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams
throughout the Nation by the end of 2006, elevating the number of these
valuable multi-role canine teams from 365 to 420 in the aviation arena.
This approach will provide greater flexibility for these limited, yet
highly versatile, resources.
The mobility of these highly trained teams remains a critical
element in our unpredictable security response option. The fact that
TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams are not solely
dedicated to cargo screening activities allows these teams to meet on-
site threats at a moment's notice for multiple purposes anywhere in the
airport environment. As part of its efforts to increase canine cargo
screening activities, the NEDCTP has established a ``Cargo Training
Warehouse Lab'' at its training facility at Lackland AFB, in San
Antonio, TX. As a result of this initiative, every canine team that
leaves the NEDCTP training center is trained to screen cargo in an
effective manner.
SURGE CAPACITY
Question. If intelligence indicates that transit systems are being
targeted by terrorists, does TSA have the resources to deploy personnel
and technologies to assist transit authorities in a short period of
time?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
building, training, and testing teams to enhance its ability in this
regard. In a March 2006 exercise, TSA provided Amtrak with law
enforcement teams with surveillance detection capability, to
Philadelphia, New York, and Washington, DC. These teams, called Multi-
Modal Security Enhancement Teams (MMSETs) included Federal Air Marshals
(FAMS) and Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSI). These
resources possess a broad range of capabilities that allow TSA to help
protect against multiple threats and introduce elements of
unpredictability into security processes. TSA teams do not supersede
local security forces or their jurisdiction when deployed into public
transportation systems. Rather, the MMSETs supplement local
capabilities with the unique strengths and expertise TSA brings to the
transportation security mission.
TSA initiated several pilot deployments in public transportation
systems during the week of December 13-18, 2005. Additional pilot
deployments will occur throughout the current year. The objective is to
gain the necessary knowledge and experience in public transportation
modes and with specific public transportation systems to develop and
maintain an effective security enhancement capability. The MMSET
deployments expand the agency's capacity to leverage a variety of
resources in a flexible manner based on threat, so that we can quickly
and effectively raise the bar of security in any mode of transportation
anywhere in the country.
Prior to these pilots, TSA deployed resources on an ad hoc basis
during periods of heightened alert and National Special Security
Events. On July 7 and July 21, 2005, STSIs deployed jointly with
Federal Rail Administration Safety Inspectors to major Rail and Rail
Transit Operations Centers to monitor security postures and provide the
Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) with security
situational awareness in response to the London bombings. Inspectors
also deployed to support recovery efforts in the aftermath of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and to provide enhanced security for the
Presidential Inauguration and the Super Bowl. STSIs also deploy to
support investigations of transportation security incidents.
If passenger or cargo screening becomes necessary, TSA can deploy
members of the National Screening Force and Transportation Security
Officers (TSO) from select airports. The Office of Security Technology
would coordinate with the venue to make any facility modifications
necessary to deploy equipment. Additionally, TSA could deploy canine
resources quickly. In response to the terrorist bombings against rail
systems in Spain in March 2004, Secretary Tom Ridge announced that the
Department of Homeland Security would create a two-phased approach to
assist mass transit/commuter rail systems within the United States. The
first phase was the development of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) mass
transit canine program to assists State and local law enforcement
agencies and transit authorities. The purpose of the RDF is to provide
expanded capability to mass-transit systems within the United States by
assisting State, local, and transit authorities in the event of an
increased threat situation. The RDF is designed to reduce
vulnerabilities to mass transit/commuter rail systems by providing a
coordinated explosives detection canine capability, as well as a
deterrent effect against potential attacks.
Because of groundwork laid in that effort--preplanning and
acclimation within the mass transit/commuter rail environment--TSA was
able to rapidly deploy canine teams following the summer 2005 incidents
in London. TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams were
deployed across the country to support mass transit/commuter rail
systems that were in close proximity to their assigned airports within
hours of notification of the bombing events in London. TSA coordinated
activities with program agencies to deploy teams to conduct random
sweeps of platforms, conduct searches of unattended items, and provide
a physical deterrence, where possible. TSA has also expeditiously
provided explosives detection canine teams to Amtrak at its request on
several occasions, including during the Republican National Convention,
the Presidential Inauguration, and in New York during the fall 2005
security alert.
Along with the canine teams, at the request of Amtrak, TSA deployed
some of the technology field-tested in the Transit and Rail Inspection
Pilot (TRIP) for screening passengers and baggage in a rail environment
to the Republican National Convention in August 2004 and Presidential
Inauguration in January 2005.
Question. Does TSA have the authority to shift funding from other
TSA accounts to the Surface Transportation appropriation for short
periods of surge capacity without requesting a formal reprogramming?
Answer. The fiscal year 2006 Appropriations Bill (Public Law 109-
90), section 503(c), provides flexibility to TSA in terms of transfers
and reprogramming (i.e., ``not to exceed 5 percent of any appropriation
made available for the current year,'' without increasing an account
``by more than 10 percent by such transfers''), but such actions
constitute a permanent change in funding.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) may exercise other
options to develop and apply surge capability without the need to
transfer or reprogram funds. For example, under the Multi-Modal
Security Enhancement Team (MMSET) program, TSA may deploy resources to
provide surge capacity for enhancing security in public transportation
systems. The teams may consist of varying combinations of Federal Air
Marshals (FAMs), Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs),
Aviation Security Inspectors (ASIs), and explosives detection canine
teams. The teams provide both a visible deterrent and covert detection
capability. Use of TSA resources assigned in the geographical area of
the public transportation system ensures that costs remain minimal and
within available funding.
FEDERAL AGENCY HEAD SCREENING
Question. Do Federal agency heads receive special treatment at
airports? If so, why?
Answer. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) passenger and
property screening procedures do not provide for an automatic screening
exemption for heads of Federal agencies or commissions, nor are any
such exemptions being contemplated. However, like any individual under
armed protective escort by a Federal law enforcement officer (LEO) some
senior officials may not be required to proceed through a passenger
checkpoint upon presentation of proper identifying documents by the
armed Federal LEO escort (credential, badge, and Government-issued
photo ID). Under these circumstances, the identities of both the LEO
and the individual under protective escort must be verified by a TSA
representative. Screening checkpoint logbook entries must be made for
both the LEO and the individual being escorted.
OPERATION SAFE COMMERCE
Question. What is the status of the Operation Safe Commerce Pilots?
Answer. Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) is currently in its third
phase. In Phase II of OSC, 18 pilot projects focused on the
vulnerabilities of containers moving through the supply chains. They
concentrated on mitigating the identified vulnerabilities through the
deployment of technologies and business practices. OSC Phase III is
comprised of 4 pilot projects and a series of four testing phases that
address specific points of vulnerability in the supply chains.
Question. How are these results being incorporated into CSI, CTPAT,
Science and Technology Research, and other container security
operations?
Answer. Federal coordination and oversight of Operation Safe
Commerce (OSC) is an interagency effort. Members of the OSC Executive
Steering Committee (ESC) include representatives from the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), The Department of Transportation (DOT),
The United States Coast Guard (USCG), the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), the Department of State, and the Department of
Commerce. The Federal Partners provide valuable insight and guidance in
the management of OSC, and as such, G&T strives to provide full access
to the end results of the demonstrations as they become known. In
addition, Program Management staff from the DHS Office of Grants and
Training (G&T) has coordinated closely with S&T in the third phase of
OSC to ensure an alignment with S&T Directorate initiatives that are of
a similar nature.
CBP is an important partner because the lessons learned from OSC
help improve their Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). CSI establishes
coordination with host government customs services to examine high-risk
maritime containerized cargo at foreign seaports before they are loaded
on board vessels destined for the United States. C-TPAT is a public-
private and international partnership focused on improving baseline
security standards for supply chain and container security.
COAST GUARD
DEEPWATER
Question. The Coast Guard's fleet of cutters is currently the 37th
oldest of the world's 39 like-sized naval fleets. The Coast Guard
Commandant has testified that Coast Guard ships and planes are in a
``declining readiness spiral''. The Deepwater program won't be
completed until 2026. However, according to a recent DHS report on gaps
in Coast Guard operational capabilities, none of the Coast Guard's
cutters have met their readiness goal in the past 5 years. Coast Guard
patrol boats are operating at levels lower than they were in 1998, and
that gap will not be closed until 2012. Coast Guard maritime air
patrols are below1998 levels, and that gap will not be closed until
2014.
Has the Coast Guard considered accelerating Deepwater since the
program was re-baselined?
Answer. Although the Coast Guard fleet readiness continues to be
below acceptable levels, the Coast Guard has been able to meet or
exceed the majority of its mission performance targets, in part due to
the enhancements provided to legacy assets by the Deepwater program.
The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request makes a strong
statement regarding the criticality of funding the Deepwater program.
The program is now funded at approximately 40 percent more than the
$572 million funding level for fiscal year 2007, as compared to the
fiscal year 2002 planning factors. Full funding in fiscal year 2007
helps to restore readiness to a higher level, and allows the Coast
Guard to continue development of additional capabilities to be realized
as a result of enhancements such as:
--Accelerated HH-65 conversion to a Multi-Mission Cutter Helicopter,
--New National Security Cutter production to replace the legacy 378
foot High Endurance Cutters,
--Additional CASA Maritime Patrol Aircraft,
--Accelerated post 9/11 capabilities for HH-60 aircraft for airborne
use of force,
--A new Fast Response Cutter with enhanced post 9/11 capabilities
will be accelerated to replace the aging 110 foot patrol boat
fleet; and
--Legacy asset maintenance and sustainment, including the Medium
Endurance Cutter Mission Effectiveness Project.
The Deepwater post 9/11 Revised Implementation Plan, as approved by
the Administration, will recapitalize and modernize the Coast Guard
surface and aviation assets with robust maritime security and safety
capabilities that are critical to operational success across all Coast
Guard missions, now and in the future. Further acceleration of the
program is not being considered at this time.
Question. What would the cost be if the Coast Guard accelerated the
program to be completed in 10 years?
Answer. A preliminary estimate of $21 billion in funding would be
required to complete the Deepwater acquisition within the next 10
years.
Question. What would the cost be if the Coast Guard accelerated the
program to be completed in 15 years?
Answer. A preliminary estimate of $23 billion in funding would be
required to complete the Deepwater acquisition within the next 15
years.
Question. Would there be cost savings compared to the current 25
year plan?
Answer. Expediting the Deepwater program for completion over the
next 10 or 15 years would generate a cost avoidance of approximately $1
to $3 billion. However, annual appropriations of more than $2 billion
per year for several years would be required to complete the program in
a 10-year period, and more than $1.5 billion per year for several years
would be required to complete the program in a 15-year period.
DRUG INTERDICTION
Question. In November 2005, GAO reported that ``according to JIATF-
South, it cannot detect many of the known maritime cocaine movements
reported in the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean
because it cannot get ships or aircraft to the suspected movement in
time.'' The same report noted that Coast Guard and CBP officials were
concerned that they may not be able to sustain their level of assets in
light of budget constraints and other homeland security priorities. The
same officials noted that the long-term implications of likely declines
in transit zone assets have not been addressed.
Has the Coast Guard begun to address this problem? What solutions
are being pursued?
Answer. The Coast Guard's long-term plan to mitigate the decline in
the number of assets in the transit zone is the Deepwater Acquisition
Project. Deepwater is the Coast Guard's long-term asset
recapitalization and modernization project. As Deepwater assets come
into service, the Coast Guard will be able to address declines in
transit zone assets. In the short-term, the Coast Guard is managing
existing assets to best meet operational requirements across all of its
mission areas.
COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS RELOCATION
Question. The request indicates that the Coast Guard Headquarters
relocation will include other Federal tenants with similar security
requirements. Please provide a list of other Federal tenants that will
be relocating to the St. Elizabeths campus.
Answer. DHS is planning to relocate other functions to St.
Elizabeths West Campus in addition to the U.S. Coast Guard in order to
improve operational effectiveness and organizational efficiency. The
Department of Homeland Security is currently developing a Program of
Requirements (POR) to identify total real estate needs throughout the
National Capital Region (NCR).
Currently, DHS organizations are housed in 61 buildings throughout
the NCR. These dispersed locations constrain the coordination,
cooperation and synergy among components and headquarters. Once the POR
is completed, the Department of Homeland Security will be able to
identify the specific activities that will relocate to St. Elizabeths,
as well as the plan to house all remaining DHS functions throughout the
NCR.
Question. A prospectus for the design of the Coast Guard
Headquarters has been approved. What is the status of the prospectus
for construction of the Headquarters building?
Answer. The fiscal year 2007 construction prospectus was approved
by OMB and signed by GSA on February 14, 2006. It has been sent to
GSA's authorizing committees on the Hill--the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure and the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works. The prospectus has not yet been approved
by the House and Senate authorizing Committees. Attached is a copy of
the construction prospectus and fact sheet approved by OMB and signed
by GSA.
NATIONAL CAPITAL AIR DEFENSE MISSION
Question. When will the Coast Guard assume control of the National
Capital Region Air Defense Mission?
Answer. The Coast Guard plans to assume the NCRAD mission in late
fiscal year 2006. Our target start date is 01 September 2006. The exact
date is contingent upon the timing of Congressional approval of a DHS
request to transfer $4 million of fiscal year 2006 funds to USCG.
Approximately 5 months after the approval, the Coast Guard will be able
to assume the mission. The required 5 month lead time is due to the
long lead time required to order critical ground support equipment,
conduct personnel transfers and conduct aircrew training.
Question. The request includes $13 million (including transfer of
$5 million from CBP) for operational costs to operate the mission and
$49 million for the acquisition of 5 helicopters. If the $5 million
transfer from CBP is not approved, how will the Coast Guard absorb
costs?
Answer. If the $5 million in recurring funding is not transferred
from CBP, the Coast Guard would have to review its program budgets to
identify internal cost re-allocations that could be proposed to
Congress for reprogramming. A likely source of funds would be the base
counter-drug helicopter operations budgets.
Question. If the request is provided, when will the new HH-65Cs be
available for operation?
Answer. If funding is received, the Coast Guard plans to purchase 5
helicopter airframes in fiscal year 2007. These helicopters will
subsequently be outfitted at the Coast Guard's Aircraft Repair and
Supply Center (AR&SC) and be ready for operations by early fiscal year
2008.
Question. What assets will the Coast Guard use in the interim?
Answer. The Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the National
Capital Region Air Defense (NCRAD) mission will be supported by
existing fleet aircraft (HH-65C) typically used to support cutter
deployments/special missions until additional helicopters can be
purchased and outfitted.
The use of these cutter deployment/special mission helos will be
offset by exercising the last year option of our MH-68 armed helo
service contract, which will provide 8 armed helos & 1,000 additional
cutter days deployed at sea (DDAS) until the contract expires in Jan
2008. Originally the Coast Guard planed to replace the leased MH-68
helos with newly armed MH-65C helicopters in Jan 2007. Utilizing the
last year option of the MH-68 service contract will allow the Coast
Guard time to purchase and outfit additional HH-65 helicopters by the
time the MH-68 service contract expires in January 2008.
Question. Will additional acquisition costs be necessary in the
out-years? If so, how much?
Answer. The National Capital Region Air Defense mission will
require additional AC&I funds in the out-years.
In fiscal year 2007, the Coast Guard's AC&I budget requests $48.5
million for the acquisition of five helicopters, air intercept
equipment, ground support equipment, and facility upgrades at Coast
Guard Air Station Atlantic City.
In fiscal year 2008, as listed in the Capital Investment Plan, the
Coast Guard intends to request $18 million AC&I for the last two of the
seven helicopters needed to support the NCRAD mission.
Question. Is the Coast Guard considering fixed wing aircraft for
the NCRAD mission?
Answer. No.
POLAR ICEBREAKERS
Question. The National Academy of Sciences recently released
recommendations addressing the condition of the Coast Guard's polar
icebreaking fleet. What resources would be necessary to comply with the
report's recommendations?
Answer. The National Academy of Sciences report made the following
recommendations for the Nation's polar icebreaking fleet:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAS recommendation Potential cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States should reliably control N/A--the United States
at least 1 heavy icebreaker to break into currently controls 2
McMurdo station. vessels.
The United states should maintain N/A--the United States
dedicated, year-round icebreaker currently operates the
capability for the Arctic. Healy as an Arctic
icebreaking and research
vessel.
In the short term, the required Between $30 and $50 million
maintenance should be performed to make annually in fiscal year
at least one Polar class ship mission 2007 budget authority.
capable over the next 4 to 8 years.
Management of the U.S. icebreakers should N/A--Under the current USCG-
reside with the U.S. Coast Guard and it NSF Memorandum of
should have appropriate operational and Understanding, the costs to
maintenance budgets to fulfill U.S. Coast conduct the polar
Guard missions that require icebreaking. icebreaking programs are
fully paid for by the
National Science
Foundation.
In the short-term, NSF should revert to N/A--Under the current USCG-
being a user and should continue to NSF Memorandum of
negotiate financial agreements to pay for Understanding, NSF is the
icebreaker services when U.S. Coast Guard user of the icebreaking
ships are employed. vessels, while Coast Guard
operates them.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the report recommends that funds for operation and
maintenance of the Polar Icebreaking fleet be appropriated directly to
the Coast Guard. The fiscal year 2006 budget proposed, and Congress
subsequently appropriated, Polar Icebreaking funds to National Science
Foundation. The fiscal year 2007 budget does not propose any changes to
this funding approach.
PATROL BOATS
Question. To close the operational gap for 110 foot patrol boats
today, how many additional 110's would be necessary?
Answer. Assuming the following: All WPB 110s & 123s are able to
achieve readiness[?] targets, four 110s are out of service per year for
mid-life extensions, continued support of six 110s for Operation
Enduring Freedom and five U.S. Navy WPC-179s remain in service for the
Coast Guard, the Coast Guard would need three additional Deepwater-
capable patrol boats to fill the current operational gap.
Question. Has the Coast Guard considered buying new patrol boats to
bridge the operational gap until the Fast Response Cutter is built and
deployed? What would the cost be?
Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard has considered buying new patrol boats
to bridge the operational gap until the Fast Response Cutter is built
and deployed. There are several commercially available boats that would
be suitable, Deepwater-capable patrol boats. The Coast Guard has not
submitted to industry a Request for Information (RFI) that would allow
us to accurately determine the cost of a new patrol boat.
Question. Is there a manufacturing line available to build new 110
foot patrol boats for the Coast Guard fleet?
Answer. The Coast Guard is not aware of any production facility in
the United States that is currently building new 110 foot patrol boats.
Question. When will the Coast Guard relinquish the 179 foot patrol
boats currently being leased from the Navy?
Answer. The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Navy States that
the Coast Guard will retain custody and operational control of five
WPC-179s through fiscal year 2008. Additionally, this MOA States that
the Coast Guard may take ownership of the WPC-179s after 1 October 2008
if requested by the Vice Commandant and approved by the Vice CNO. Other
options available to the Coast Guard include requesting an extension to
the current MOA with the Navy or renegotiating a new agreement all
together.
Question. How will the Coast Guard make up for the operational
capability the 179 foot patrol boats currently provide?
Answer. The loss of the 179-foot patrol boats (WPCs) at the end of
fiscal year 2008 is accounted for in the Patrol Boat (WPB) Availability
Report provided to Congress. Our patrol boat report assumes the 6 110-
foot patrol boats deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom will return
home as we return the 179-foot patrol boats to the Navy, however, there
is no guarantee that this will occur.
The Coast Guard is currently exploring various alternatives should
attempts to extend or renegotiate the 179-foot patrol boat Memorandum
of Agreement with the Navy not be successful.
Question. Did the Operational Gap Analysis report take into account
the loss of the 179 foot patrol boats?
Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard did take into account the loss of the
179 foot patrol boats at the end of fiscal year 2008 (September 30).
The report assumes that the loss of the 179-foot patrol boats to the
Navy will correspond with an offsetting gain by the return of the 6
110-foot patrol boats currently deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom.
Question. For the 110 foot Service Life Extension program, how long
will each cutter being rehabbed be out of service?
Answer. Each Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP) will remove a 110-
ft patrol boat (WPB) from service for approximately 12 months.
Question. What is the maximum number of patrol boats that can be
rehabbed at one time without impacting Coast Guard operational
capabilities?
Answer. Each 110 foot patrol boat (WPB) that enters the Mission
Effectiveness Project (MEP) will be unavailable for operational use for
approximately 12 months. The optimal balance of acceptable operational
impact and timely MEP completion is four MEPs per year.
Question. Could the 110 foot Service Life Extension program be
accelerated if funding were available?
Answer. As indicated in the Coast Guard's Patrol Boat Availability
Report to Congress (dated 2/3/2006), the Coast Guard's current 110 foot
WPB Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP) plan strikes the best balance
between the needs of the Service's operational commanders and the
Deepwater spend plan.
The need to minimize the patrol boat operational hour gap is the
most significant determining factor. Each 110 foot WPB MEP requires 1
year of drydock availability. As noted in the report, each MEP will
have an impact on the patrol boat operational hour gap and the Coast
Guard's ability to perform its missions.
If Coast Guard efforts to mitigate the patrol boat hour gap
produced results beyond current expectations, the Coast Guard would
consider the costs/benefits of accelerating the 110 foot WPB MEP
production cycle.
Question. If funding were available, how long would it take to
procure and missionize new 110 foot patrol boats with operational
capabilities?
Answer. There are several commercially available boats that could
be suitable Deepwater-capable patrol boats. The Coast Guard is
investigating options and studying requirements, but has not submitted
to industry Requests for Information (RFI) that would allow us to
accurately determine the amount of time it would take to procure and
missionize new patrol boats with operational capabilities.
Question. Of the eight 110 foot patrol boats that have been
stretched to 123 feet, what was the original cost estimate compared to
the final cost?
Answer. The Original Contract Price (including Economic Price
Adjustment) for hulls 1 through 8 was $67.1 million (average $8.4
million per hull). The projected Final Price, less Request of Equitable
Adjustment (REA), is $80.3 million (average $10.04 million per hull).
Resolution of the REA submitted by ICGS and project close-out costs may
result in a figure slightly higher than the average $10.04 million per
hull cost.
Question. Last year, the Coast Guard asserted that new and improved
``condition measures'' would be established by the end of fiscal year
2005 that link cutter condition to mission capability. Please provide
these measures to the Committee.
Answer. The Coast Guard has developed condition measures that more
directly link cutter condition to mission capability. A clearer
relationship between engineering subsystems and mission performance
will enable a better return on maintenance investments and the best use
of limited maintenance resources.
Coast Guard naval engineers have developed two cutter condition
measures:
--``Percent of time fully mission capable'' (PTFMC) and
--``Average number of casualties per operational day'' (ANOCOP).
The PTFMC and ANOCOP measures will provide a direct link between
specific cutter engineering subsystems and mission degradation. These
metrics are expected to be completed by mid-calendar year 2006.
In fiscal years 2004-2005, a team was assembled to construct asset
condition matrices that incorporate engineering casualty reporting
(CASREP) data and performance data maintained in the Coast Guard's
Readiness Management System (RMS). The team identified and linked
thousands of shipboard engineering subsystems across every cutter class
and their direct impact/contribution to each Coast Guard mission. The
condition measures are currently being tested/validated for use in the
Coast Guard's Readiness Management System.
RESPONSE BOAT MEDIUM
Question. Please provide a deployment schedule (including
locations) for the Response Boat Medium program.
Answer. The Response Boat-Medium Project is currently in the middle
of source selection for the second procurement phase (production
contract). Contract award is planned for the forth quarter of fiscal
year 2006. The delivery location and schedule will be based on contract
award date, issuance of delivery orders, the contractor's integrated
master schedule, and operational testing and evaluation (OT&E). The
delivery locations identified by the Response Boat Siting Study are
included in the table below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unit City State Zip
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIRST DISTRICT:
STA EASTPORT..................... Eastport............... ME..................... 04631
STA JONESPORT.................... West Jonesport......... ME..................... 04649-9998
STA SOUTHWEST HBR................ Southwest Harbor....... ME..................... 04679-5000
STA ROCKLAND..................... Rockland............... ME..................... 04841-3498
STA BOOTHBAY HARBOR.............. Boothbay Harbor........ ME..................... 04538-0327
STA SOUTH PORTLAND............... South Portland......... ME..................... 04106-0007
STA PORTSMOUTH HBR............... New Castle............. NH..................... 03854-0600
STA MERRIMACK RIV................ Newburyport............ MA..................... 01950-2897
STA GLOUCESTER................... Gloucester............. MA..................... 01930-5004
STA BOSTON....................... Boston................. MA..................... 02109-1027
STA POINT ALLERTON............... Hull................... MA..................... 02045-1198
STA PROVINCETOWN................. Provincetown........... MA..................... 02657-9999
STA CAPE COD CANAL............... Sandwich............... MA..................... 2563
STA CHATHAM...................... Chatham................ MA..................... 02633-3499
STA WOODS HOLE................... Woods Hole............. MA..................... 02543
STA MENEMSHA..................... Chilmark............... MA..................... 02535-9707
STA BRANT POINT.................. Nantucket.............. MA..................... 02554-2293
STA CASTLE HILL.................. Newport................ RI..................... 02840-3798
STA POINT JUDITH................. Narragansett........... RI..................... 02882-6229
STA NEW LONDON................... New London............. CT..................... 06320-5593
STA NEW HAVEN.................... New Haven.............. CT..................... 06512-3698
STA EATONS NECK.................. Northport.............. NY..................... 11768-1094
STA MONTAUK...................... Montauk................ NY..................... 11954-9801
STA SHINNECOCK................... Hampton Bays........... NY..................... 11946-3233
STA FIRE ISLAND.................. Babylon................ NY..................... 11702-4600
STA JONES BEACH.................. Freeport............... NY..................... 11520-5001
STA NEW YORK..................... Staten Island.......... NY..................... 10305
STA SANDY HOOK................... Sandy Hook............. NJ..................... 07732-4999
STA BURLINGTON................... Burlington............. VT..................... 05401-5226
FIFTH DISTRICT:
STA WASHINGTON (DC).............. Washington............. DC..................... 20032-0702
STA MANASQUAN INLET.............. Point Pleasant Beach... NJ..................... 08742-2642
STA BARNEGAT LIGHT............... Barnegat Light......... NJ..................... 08006-9999
STA ATLANTIC CITY................ Altantic City.......... NJ..................... 08401-1986
STA CAPE MAY..................... Cape May............... NJ..................... 08204-5078
STA PHILADELPHIA................. Philadelphia........... PA..................... 19147-4395
STA OCEAN CITY................... Ocean City............. MD..................... 21842-4240
STA CHINCOTEAGUE................. Chincoteague........... VA..................... 23336-1809
STA WACHAPREAGUE................. Wachapreague........... VA..................... 23480-0370
STA CAPE CHARLES................. Cape Charles........... VA..................... 23310-0621
STA MILFORD HAVEN................ Hudgins................ VA..................... 23076-9700
STA PORTSMOUTH................... Portsmouth............. VA..................... 23703-2199
STA LITTLE CREEK................. Norfolk................ VA..................... 23520-5200
STA CRISFIELD.................... Chrisfield............. MD..................... 21817-1656
STA CURTIS BAY................... Baltimore.............. MD..................... 21226-1797
STA OXFORD....................... Oxford................. MD..................... 21654-1323
STA ANNAPOLIS.................... Annapolis.............. MD..................... 21403-5099
STA ST. INIGOES.................. Saint Inigoes.......... MD..................... 20684-0008
STA ELIZABETH CITY............... Elizabeth City......... NC..................... 27909
STA OREGON INLET................. Nags Head.............. NC..................... 27959-9731
STA HATTERAS INLET............... Hatteras............... NC..................... 28537-9999
STA HOBUCKEN..................... Hobucken............... NC..................... 28537-9999
STA FORT MACON................... Atlantic Beach......... NC..................... 28512
STA WRIGHTSVILLE BEACH........... Wrightsville Beach..... NC..................... 28480-2099
STA OAK ISLAND................... Oak Island............. NC..................... 28465
SEVENTH DISTRICT:
STA GEORGETOWN................... Georgetown............. SC..................... 29440-2412
STA CHARLESTON................... Charleston............. SC..................... 29401-1817
STA TYBEE........................ Tybee Island........... GA..................... 31328-1400
STA BRUNSWICK.................... Brunswick.............. GA..................... 31523-0577
STA MAYPORT...................... Atlantic Beach......... FL..................... 33139-5101
STA PONCE DE LEON INLET.......... New Smyrna Beach....... FL..................... 32169-2041
STA PORT CANAVERAL............... Cape Canaveral......... FL..................... 32920-4402
STA YANKEETOWN................... Yankeetown............. FL..................... 34498-0360
STA SAND KEY..................... Clearwater............. FL..................... 33767-2899
STA ST. PETERSBURG............... St. Petersburg......... FL..................... 33701-5099
STA CORTEZ....................... Cortez................. FL..................... 34215-9999
STA FT. MYERS BEACH.............. Fort Myers Beach....... FL..................... 33931-2221
STA FORT PIERCE.................. Fort Pierce............ FL..................... 34949-3039
STA LAKE WORTH INLET............. Riviera Beach.......... FL..................... 33404-2406
STA FORT LAUDERDALE.............. Dania.................. FL..................... 33004-3079
STA MIAMI BEACH.................. Miami Beach............ FL..................... 33139-5101
STA ISLAMORADA................... Islamorada............. FL..................... 33036-3317
STA MARATHON..................... Marathon............... FL..................... 33050-2199
STA KEY WEST..................... Key West............... FL..................... 33040-6695
EIGHTH DISTRICT:
STA PANAMA CITY.................. Panama City............ FL..................... 32407-5898
STA DESTIN....................... Destin................. FL..................... 32540-1289
STA PENSACOLA.................... Pensacola.............. FL..................... 32508-5231
STA DAUPHIN ISLAND............... Dauphin Island......... AL..................... 36528-4603
STA PASCAGOULA................... Pascaboula............. MS..................... 39568-1228
STA GULFPORT..................... Gulfport............... MS..................... 39502-1198
STA NEW ORLEANS.................. New Orleans............ LA..................... 70124
STA VENICE....................... Venice................. LA..................... 70091-9998
STA GRAND ISLE................... Grand Isle............. LA..................... 70358-0158
STA SABINE....................... Sabine................. TX..................... 77655-1108
STA GALVESTON.................... Galveston.............. TX..................... 77553-1912
STA FREEPORT..................... Freeport............... TX..................... 77541-8934
STA PORT O'CONNOR................ Port O'Connor.......... TX..................... 77982-0057
STA PORT ARANSAS................. Port Aransas........... TX..................... 78373
STA SOUTH PADRE ISLAND........... South Padre Island..... TX..................... 78597-6497
NINTH DISTRICT:
STA BUFFALO...................... Buffalo................ NY..................... 14203-3189
STA NIAGARA...................... Youngstown............. NY..................... 14174-9999
STA ROCHESTER.................... Rochester.............. NY..................... 14617-1098
STA OSWEGO....................... Oswego................. NY..................... 13126-1396
STA ALEXANDRIA BAY............... Wellesley Island....... NY..................... 13640-2112
STA ERIE......................... Erie................... PA..................... 16505-0130
STA FAIRPORT..................... Grand River............ OH..................... 44045-0038
STA CLEVELAND HBR................ Cleveland.............. OH..................... 44114-1092
STA LORAIN....................... Lorain................. OH..................... 44052
STA MARBLEHEAD................... Marblehead............. OH..................... 43440-5000
STA TOLEDO....................... Toledo................. OH..................... 43611-9999
STA BELLE ISLE................... Detroit................ MI..................... 48207-4376
STA ST. CLAIR SHORES............. St Clair Shores........ MI..................... 48080-1391
STA PORT HURON................... Port Huron............. MI..................... 48060-2998
STA TAWAS........................ East Tawas............. MI..................... 48730-9506
STA SAGINAW RIVER................ Essexville............. MI..................... 48732-9602
STA MARQUETTE.................... Marquette.............. MI..................... 49855-3864
STA SAULT STE. MARIE............. Sault Saint Marie...... MI..................... 49783-9501
STA ST. IGNACE................... Saint Ignace........... MI..................... 49781-1899
STA CHARLEVOIX................... Charlevoix............. MI..................... 49720-0258
STA STURGEON BAY................. Sturgeon Bay........... WI..................... 54235-1099
STA MANISTEE..................... Manistee............... MI..................... 49660-1315
STA MUSKEGON..................... Muskegon............... MI..................... 49441-1068
STA GRAND HAVEN.................. Grand Haven............ MI..................... 49417-1741
STA ST. JOSEPH................... Saint Joseph........... MI..................... 49085-1042
STA MICHIGAN CITY................ Sheboygan.............. WI..................... 53081-4649
STA CALUMET HARBOR............... Chicago................ IL..................... 60617-5197
STA KENOSHA...................... Kenosha................ WI..................... 53140-2998
STA MILWAUKEE.................... Milwaukee.............. WI..................... 53207-1997
STA TWO RIVERS................... Two Rivers............. WI..................... 54241-3095
STA PORTAGE...................... Dollar City............ MI..................... 49922-0350
STA BAYFIELD..................... Bayfield............... WI..................... 54814-0467
STA DULUTH....................... Duluth................. MN..................... 55802-2492
ELEVENTH DISTRICT:
STA SAN DIEGO.................... San Diego.............. CA..................... 92101-1079
STA LA/LONG BEACH................ San Pedro.............. CA..................... 90731-0208
STA CHANNEL ISLANDS HARBOR....... Oxnard................. CA..................... 93035-4397
STA MORRO BAY.................... Morro Bay.............. CA..................... 93442-1319
STA MONTEREY..................... Monterey............... CA..................... 93940-1497
STA SAN FRANCISCO................ San Francisco.......... CA..................... 94130-5013
STA VALLEJO...................... Vallejo................ CA..................... 94590-0644
STA GOLDEN GATE.................. Sausalito.............. CA..................... 94965-2289
STA BODEGA BAY................... Bodega Bay............. CA..................... 94923-0037
STA RIO VISTA.................... Rio Vista.............. CA..................... 94571-2099
STA LAKE TAHOE................... Tahoe City............. CA..................... 96145-0882
STA NOYO RIVER................... Fort Bragg............. CA..................... 95437
STA HUMBOLDT BAY................. Samoa.................. CA..................... 95564-9999
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT:
STA CHETCO RIVER................. Harbor................. OR..................... 97415-0328
STA COOS BAY..................... Charleston............. OR..................... 97420-0629
STA UMPQUA RIVER................. Winchester Bay......... OR..................... 97467
STA YAQUINA BAY.................. Newport................ OR..................... 97365-0076
STA TILLAMOOK BAY................ Garibaldi.............. OR..................... 97118-0167
STA CAPE DISAPPOINTMENT.......... Ilwaco................. WA..................... 98624-0460
STA GRAYS HARBOR................. Westport............... WA..................... 98595-0568
STA QUILLAYUTE RIVER............. La Push................ WA..................... 98350-0009
STA NEAH BAY..................... Neah Bay............... WA..................... 98357-0120
STA PORT ANGELES................. Port Angeles........... WA..................... 98362
STA BELLINGHAM................... Bellingham............. WA..................... 98225-2940
STA SEATTLE...................... Seattle................ WA..................... 98134-1192
STA PORTLAND..................... Portland............... OR..................... 97217
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OIL SPILLS
Question. There were over 3,800 oil spills caused by Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, with more than 8 million gallons spilled from
Hurricane Katrina alone. What implications do these spills have on the
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund?
Answer. The level of funds in the OSLTF as of January 2006 was $710
million.
To date, there have been no Hurricane Katrina or Rita expenses
charged to the Fund. All Katrina and Rita oil pollution response
activities thus far have been funded by either Stafford Act funding or
by a responsible party. The Coast Guard has received $178 million in
Stafford Act funds for coastal zone hazardous materials response, and
the EPA has received a similar amount for inland zone response. These
funds are expected to be sufficient through April 30, 2006. If response
requirements continue to be identified without additional Stafford Act
funding, it is possible that additional response costs will be incurred
by the OSLTF.
A bigger threat to the OSLTF is from claims. While none have been
received to date, third parties who have been economically damaged may
file claims for reimbursement, as well may Natural Resource Trustees
seek reimbursement from the Fund. Responsible Parties (RPs) who have
spent their own money in response to the spills may also try to claim
reimbursement for costs exceeding their limits of liability or for all
costs using an ``Act of God'' defense. These claims would have to be
evaluated on a case by case basis. If such claims meet the requirements
of OPA 90 they would represent legitimate claims against the fund. It
is unclear how much has been spent by the major refineries and other
facility owners in their response to these hurricane related spills.
The size and number of potential damages and Natural Resource
Damage (NRD) claims that could impact the fund is currently difficult
to estimate with any degree of certainty.
If impacts to the OSLTF from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita begin to
manifest themselves, the Coast Guard will notify DHS, OMB and Congress.
Since claims are only paid if there are funds available, we could delay
payment, or seek supplemental appropriations until the OSLTF is solvent
enough to make claims payments, all other forecast assumptions
remaining the same.
Question. Does the Coast Guard expect to have sufficient resources
in the Fund to address spills from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as well
as other claims?
Answer. The size and number of potential damages and natural
resource damages claims that could impact the OSLTF is currently
difficult to estimate with any degree of certainty.
If impacts to the OSLTF from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita begin to
manifest themselves, the Coast Guard will notify DHS, OMB and Congress.
Since claims are only paid if there are funds available, the Coast
Guard could delay payment or seek supplemental appropriations until the
OSLTF is solvent enough to make claims payments, all other forecast
assumptions remaining the same.
Question. Please provide a funding forecast chart through 2014.
Answer. The current OSLTF forecast, anticipating the resumption of
revenue (approximately $200 million per year), from the per barrel oil
tax in April, 2006 as approved in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 is
projected to remain healthy if pasat trends continue and there are no
significant Hurricane related impacts to the OSLTF (figure (a)).
It is impossible to estimate the claims that may materialze from
Hurricane Katrina damages, and whether the OSLTF will be statutorily-
required to pay such claims.
NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS
Question. Please provide a chart of costs the Coast Guard has
incurred in support of National Special Security Events (NSSEs). The
chart should display the cost associated with each NSSE in which Coast
Guard support was provided.
Answer. The Coast Guard has not participated in any NSSEs in fiscal
year 2006, and there are none scheduled with a maritime nexus for the
remainder of fiscal year 2006.
MTSA COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS
Question. In response to an fiscal year 2006 QFR, the Coast Guard
asserted that it planned to begin an evaluation of its facility
inspection efforts in June 2005, complete the field portion of the
evaluation in September of 2005, and produce a final evaluation in
December 2005. What conclusions were made in the final evaluation?
Answer. Coast Guard Headquarters and Area staffs developed and made
available an online survey to be completed by inspectors and direct
supervisory staff involved with Maritime Transportation Security Act
(MTSA) facility compliance examinations. The responses to questions
directly related to compliance inspections included:
A majority of responses (78.3 percent) indicated that unannounced
security spot checks on facilities are more effective in determining
compliance than full, scheduled annual examinations. As a result,
Captains of the Port (COTPs) are more actively performing unannounced
spot checks in addition to the scheduled annual examinations. A
security spot check form to aid COTPs in these type inspections was
created and made available to facility inspectors.
83.2 percent of the respondents indicated that existing enforcement
tools (tickets, civil penalties, etc.) are adequate to compel
compliance with MTSA regulations.
79.3 percent of the respondents indicated that the Coast Guard's
compliance guide (inspection checklist for annual examinations) is a
good resource for conducting and documenting MTSA examinations.
83.9 percent of the respondents indicated that standardized reports
accessible to unit personnel for tracking annual examinations, spot
checks, and deficiencies for all MTSA facilities would be useful. As a
result, Coast Guard Headquarters staff developed these standard
reports, which are now available to COTPs within the Readiness
Management System (RMS).
79.2 percent of the respondents indicated that the overall MTSA
facility compliance program (annual compliance examinations and random
spot checks) is effective.
Question. How many regulated facilities and vessels must maintain
compliance with MTSA regulations?
Answer. Vessels: Approximately 10,900 U.S. flag vessels comply with
MTSA and/or International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.
The number of foreign vessels that must comply with the regulations
issued under the authority of MTSA includes vessels that actually visit
the United States and meet one of the applicability criteria in the
MTSA Regulations.
--In 2004, 6,119 foreign vessels met that criterion.
--In 2005, approximately 8,100 foreign vessels met that criterion
Facilities: Approximately 3,200 facilities comply with the security
plan requirements of MTSA. The Coast Guard conducts annual compliance
examinations for all of these facilities to ensure continued compliance
with their approved security plans.
Question. How many random inspections does the Coast Guard make on
an annual basis?
Answer. The Coast Guard conducted 2,201 random compliance
examinations of vessels in 2005.
The Coast Guard conducted approximately 5,100 random security spot
checks of U.S. facilities in calendar year 2005.
Question. How much is included in the fiscal year 2007 budget for
compliance inspections?
Answer. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2007 Budget request does not
specifically identify funding for compliance inspections, however, the
Coast Guard's fiscal year 2007 Operating Expense base funding for
Marine Transportation Security Act (MTSA) implementation includes $69.4
million for vessel and facility security plan review, foreign port
assessments and Port State Control for foreign vessel security plans.
These activities largely (but not exclusively) support compliance
inspections support of MTSA.
WORKPLACE INJURIES
Question. The conference report accompanying fiscal year 2006 DHS
Appropriations Act included a requirement to report on technologies for
reducing occupational safety and health risks. That report included
useful information on ways to reduce risk through the use of modern
information tools. The report also lists deficiencies in these
programs. For example, the data systems lack documentation, which means
they can be lost and are hard to update; they are not integrated and
they are not connected to other systems, which means that there is
little to no opportunity for creating synergistic benefits.
Does the fiscal year 2007 budget include the resources to correct
these identified deficiencies? If not, what is the cost to address
these deficiencies?
Answer. The Department is engaged in numerous functional
integration initiatives to provide synergies among component agencies.
The Department's Information Technology (IT) Infrastructure
Transformation Program (ITP), led by the Office of the Chief
Information Officer, will integrate the IT infrastructures of the 22
legacy components into ``One Infrastructure.'' The ITP is intended to
eliminate duplicative and stove-piped infrastructures and provide
common capabilities and services for all components to leverage.
Investment in the ITP will benefit DHS component agencies by providing
economies of scale while promoting DHS integration and improving
information sharing and interoperability. The amount of IT investment
funding from components to support the ITP is still under deliberation
and any such proposal will be fully vetted with the Congress prior to
any actions being taken.
While the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2007 budget does not include
specific resources to address the deficiencies listed in the report for
all DHS components, it is important for DHS to work closely with the
Coast Guard to identify solutions for reducing risk by using
information tools that are being developed through DHS's ITP.
Integration and appropriate documentation of data systems, human
factors analysis systems and aviation safety systems (as discussed in
the referenced occupational health and safety report) will be critical
to any potential Department-wide initiatives to manage safety and
occupational health IT systems.
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
CAMPAIGN PROTECTION
Question. Please provide a historical chart showing the actual
costs for the campaign protection program. For each election since
1968, provide the number of candidates that received Secret Service
protection.
Answer.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Protection
Year protectees \1\ days Cost ($000)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004............................................................ 4 553 $65,347
2000............................................................ 7 673 49,233
1996............................................................ 6 508 26,816
1992............................................................ 7 663 35,809
1988............................................................ 12 1,399 37,629
1984............................................................ 11 1,152 28,547
1980............................................................ 12 1,669 25,001
1976............................................................ 19 2,448 16,274
1972............................................................ 16 1,273 6,374
1968............................................................ 16 1,222 2,981
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Includes spouses.
Question. The Secret Service already has a dedicated amount of
funding for National Security Special Events. Why does the Secret
Service need a dedicated appropriation for Presidential Campaigns?
Please describe the difficulties in executing the Candidate Protection
Program under current law and how a dedicated appropriation will
resolve those issues.
Answer. The Secret Service receives $2.5 million annually for
National Special Security Events (NSSE). The proposal is for a new no-
year appropriation that places NSSE funding and presidential campaign
funding in a no-year account that is separate from the Service's annual
funding. This proposal will allow for easier tracking of the funds, and
will take these funds out of the annual appropriation process used to
appropriate funding required to operate the Secret Service.
Currently, the Secret Service budgets for Presidential Campaigns
three out of every four fiscal years. Funding is required the year
before the start of the Campaign to purchase equipment and to train
personnel to work the campaign; funding is required during the campaign
year for candidate/nominee protection, the conventions, residence
security and other political events; the year following the main
campaign year funding is required for the last month of candidate/
nominee protection, post election security and the Inauguration.
Although the current method of budgeting does not pose a significant
problem, the Presidential Campaign is a predictable mandatory workload
increase that happens every 4 years, and because of the mandatory
nature of this major event the Department believes that a base should
be established to ensure that funding is available every 4 years for
this event. By providing a base amount of funding each year in a
separate account, only to be used for campaign activities, enough money
will be available at the start of each campaign and throughout the
campaign cycle. If the funding is not required, it will be non-recurred
from the base.
STAFFING
Question. What is the status of the 71 positions funded in fiscal
year 2006?
Answer. The Secret Service is actively recruiting to fill the 71
positions funded in our fiscal year 2006 budget. Of the 71 positions
funded, 51 positions are for special agents, 11 positions are for
physical security specialists, and 9 positions are for intelligence
research specialists. To date, (18 physical security specialist and 17
special agents) of the 71 positions have been filled. Announcements
advertising special agent, physical security specialist, and
intelligence research specialist positions have been posted, and are
being acted upon, with a number of applicants in the final stages of
the clearance process. Further, a Nation-wide recruiting initiative
begins in April which targets these and other positions. The Secret
Service will have identified and made job offers for the remaining
vacant positions by the end of the fiscal year.
Question. When will the 71 positions be on board?
Answer. The 71 positions should be filled by the end of fiscal year
2006. We project that all basic training should be completed, and the
new recruits fully operational, by the beginning of calendar year 2007.
Question. A February 2006 report entitled, Investigative and
Protective Workload Re-Balancing, States ``to effectively address and
achieve the balance recommended by the Committee between the
investigative and protective workloads, the Service would require the
additional staffing of 675 special agents, 114 uniformed officers, and
395 other mission critical support (MCS) personnel.'' The report states
that this could be achieved over a 5-year period.
What are the costs to carry out this plan?
Answer. As part of a continual strategic planning process, and in
an effort to address the efficiency, alignment and adequacy of its
human capital, the Secret Service has identified workforce strategies
and staffing requirements to keep pace with increasing work volumes,
both protective and investigative, and minimize the impact of excessive
overtime on our workforce.
Although the special agent and uniformed officer positions are
needed immediately to rebalance the field's workload and allow
sufficient resources to continue to support existing and new protective
operations, recruiting, background investigation, training, and
supervisory capacity, constraints limit the number of new applicants
the Secret Service can reasonably accommodate in a single year. The
Secret Service proposes a measured approach, addressing staffing
requirements over a 5-year period.
It would take an estimated $150,000,000 to cover first year costs
of hiring the 1,184 positions (675 special agents, 114 Uniformed
Division officers, and 395 professionals). This is based on current
salary and support costs levels. However, we would need to carry out
this hiring over a number of fiscal years, and this would add to the
total cost (outyear Federal pay raises, increased cost of health
benefits, non-pay inflation).
To cover the full outyear costs (annualizing the salary after the
first year, and covering the full-performance level salaries) would
require approximately another $95,000,000.
Question. What are the current monthly overtime levels for special
agents and uniformed division personnel?
Answer. For the last full fiscal year (fiscal year 2005), overtime
levels for average monthly overtime for special agents on protective
details was 75 hours and 67 hours for special agents assigned to field
offices. During this same time, uniformed officers averaged 33 hours of
overtime per month. (Source: Tonya Gray, ADM/MNO)
Question. How do those levels compare to other law enforcement
agencies within the Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. CBP response: During fiscal year 2005, CBP Border Patrol
Agents averaged 44 hours of overtime worked per month and the
Agriculture Officers averaged 21 hours of overtime per month.
We continue to work with other DHS components to obtain this
information.
Question. How do those levels compare with other law enforcement
agencies in the Department of Justice?
Answer. DOJ provided the following data for uniformed law
enforcement officers during fiscal year 2005: FBI law enforcement
officers averaged 36 overtime hours per month; the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) officers averaged less than 1
hour per month; and the U.S. Marshal Service officers averaged 24 hours
per month. The fiscal year 2005 monthly overtime for non-uniformed
agents was considerably less, with the FBI and ATF averaging less than
2 hours per month, while the U.S. Marshal Service agents averaged 6
hours per month.
Question. What ratio of staffing between investigations and
protection has the Secret Service concluded to be appropriate?
Answer. In order to ensure field office staffing for a balanced
workload between investigative work and protective work, the Secret
Service has identified an optimal mix between investigations and
protection workload at approximately 65 percent investigations to 35
percent protection. The Secret Service has established as an optimal
campaign year target, a 50-50 percent split of field special agent time
devoted to investigations and protection.
Question. What level of overtime for special agents and Uniformed
personnel has the Secret Service concluded to be appropriate?
Answer. In 1999, the Interagency Working Group (IAWG) on Special
Agent Retention and Workload Balancing was formed to address the
special agent staffing needs of the Secret Service, especially the
field (at that time, the field was devoting half of its time to
protection and half of its time to investigations). Also at issue was
the need to improve the quality of life of special agents. This group
determined that an effort should be made to reduce overtime levels to
those similar to fiscal year 1994, recommending that special agents
work no more than 20 hours of scheduled overtime per month (above the
standard 10-hour day that includes 2 hours of law enforcement
availability pay). Although this level of overtime was not necessarily
viewed as optimal, it was seen as an improvement over the average 73
hours of overtime worked per agent per month at that time.
In 2000, the Interagency Working Group on U.S. Secret Service
Uniformed Division Staffing Review was formed to make recommendations
designed to assist the Secret Service in improving retention and
enhancing worklife for its uniformed officers. This group made several
recommendations to address staffing levels and overtime issues.
Included was a recommendation that the Secret Service should attempt to
achieve a target level of 16 to 18 hours of overtime per officer per
month.
NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS
Question. What is the current unobligated balance in the National
Special Security Events Fund?
Answer. $4,934,000 is the balance currently in this fund, and
includes current year and carry-over funding.
Question. For each designated NSSE over the past 3 years, what were
the costs incurred by the Secret Service and the costs incurred by the
other Federal agencies that provided support for the event? For
instance, if CBP or the Coast Guard provided air support or manpower
for a particular NSSE, what were their associated costs?
Answer.
Question. Has the Secret Service reimbursed any other Federal
agency for costs incurred to support a NSSE?
Answer. The Secret Service budgets for known traditional protective
events such as a political convention and the Inauguration. If one of
these traditional events is designated an NSSE, the Secret Service
would have funding available to pay travel and overtime costs for
agents from other agencies and the military who are supporting the
Service's protective mission.
However, when events that are not traditional Secret Service events
are designated an NSSE, the Secret Service does not reimburse other
agencies.
Question. Why should the Secret Service have a dedicated fund to
pay for NSSE's when other Federal agencies that provide support for
these events do not?
Answer. In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive #62 named the
United States Secret Service as the lead agency for planning,
designing, and implementing security for events designated as National
Special Security Events (NSSEs). This Directive called for a funding
mechanism to be created to cover the costs of this new responsibility
within 120 days. No funding mechanism was created.
In the past the Service has proffered several options for
establishing funding mechanisms for providing the resources needed to
provide security for events designated as NSSEs. These options were
presented to various entities within the Department of the Treasury,
particularly the Under Secretary for Enforcement, as well as the Office
of Management and Budget. These options included permanent, indefinite
appropriations, to be controlled by various entities, with funding
available to all involved with providing security for these events. To
date, none of these options has been accepted, nor has an alternative
solution to the issue of funding these events been established.
Question. Would a DHS Fund to cover all component NSSE costs be a
better solution?
Answer. By statutory authority, the Secret Service coordinates,
plans and implements the security at National Special Security Events.
At these events the majority of the costs are incurred by the Secret
Service. Because many times the Secret Service does not know that an
NSSE is going to occur in time to budget for the event, funding needs
to be available to pay for the NSSE that occurs outside of the budget
cycle. The Department would support any method that assures that
funding is available to cover the expenses for providing security for
designated NSSEs.
TRAVEL
Question. Since 2-year funding authority was provided to the Secret
Service for protective travel, how much has the Secret Service carried
over on a year to year basis? Provide a chart showing the carryover
amount for each year since Congress granted the 2-year authority.
Answer. Protective travel funds carried forward:
--fiscal year 2001: $7,856,456
--fiscal year 2002: $10,017,610
--fiscal year 2003: $16,231,510
--fiscal year 2004: $5,853,395
--fiscal year 2005: $8,113,174
Question. Is $18 million still an appropriate ceiling for 2-year
travel funding?
Answer. Yes. The Secret Service spends approximately $100 million
per year on travel, with many employees traveling at any one time. This
leads to numerous outstanding travel vouchers at the end of a fiscal
year. Trying to estimate the amount of travel expenses not yet
vouchered at the end of the fiscal year is very difficult. Without this
2-year authority, use of limited travel dollars would be a lot less
efficient than it is. The $18,000,000 2-year authority works very well
for the Service.
ARMORED VEHICLES
Question. How many vehicles are there in the armored vehicle
program? Please describe a description of the fleet and the purpose
each vehicle serves.
Answer. This response is classified and will be provided to the
Committee under separate cover.
PROTECTION FUNDING
Question. According to the DHS End of Year Execution Report for
fiscal year 2005, the Secret Service exceeded obligational authority
for the Protection of Persons and Facilities program activity by
approximately $20 million. Why hasn't a reprogramming notification been
sent to Congress?
Answer. The official reprogramming notification was submitted and
has been subsequently approved by the Congress.
Question. What measures are being put in place to better account
for costs in this activity as they occur?
Answer. The Service will continue to review and report to the
Committee on Appropriations obligations by program, project, and
activity on a monthly basis. Using this information and any additional
information regarding what the future activity level will be, the
Service will make assessments regarding the need for a reprogramming
notification.
At the point where the Service becomes aware that a notification of
a proposed reprogramming of funding between programs, projects, and
activities is necessary, the Service will immediately notify the
Department. This will be followed, within two workdays, by submission
to the Department of a letter requesting a reprogramming of funds.
The Service will make every effort to ensure that all relevant
information regarding the costs being incurred, and likely to be
incurred, by program, project, and activity is gathered and analyzed.
By doing this, we will recognize the need for a formal reprogramming
notification at the earliest possible moment.
Question. Please provide a list of Federal agency heads other than
the Secretary of Homeland Security receiving Secret Service protection.
Pursuant to Section 522 of Public Law 109-90, has the Secret Service
entered into any agreement to perform protection for the head of a
Federal agency other than the Secretary of Homeland Security? Please
describe each agreement and the associated costs for each.
Answer. The Secret Service currently provides protection to the
Secretary of the Treasury on a reimbursable basis. A Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) has been provided to the Treasury Department from
the Department of Homeland Security defining all costs associated with
the Treasury Secretary's protection. The MOU estimates the
reimbursement to the Secret Service in the amount of $4.1 million.
Question. Please provide a list of all individuals receiving Secret
Service protection.
Answer. This response is classified and will be provided to the
Committee under separate cover.
PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL
Question. The fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act
was signed into law on October 18, 2006 and required that, in
accordance with the Department's implementation plan, the final
National Preparedness Goal shall be issued by December 31, 2005. As of
March 6, 2006 the final Goal has not been issued. Why has final
issuance been delayed?
Answer. The National Preparedness Goal is critical to addressing
many of the recommendations identified by the Administration and
Congress in the analysis of the responses to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita,
and Wilma. In addition, other significant recent initiatives, such as
the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza require us to ensure the
Goal is consistent and synchronized with these initiatives. The
Department is reviewing the Goal on an accelerated timeline in concert
with other specific recommendations regarding, for example, the
National Response Plan and National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The
Interim National Preparedness Goal was released on March 31, 2005. The
Department intends to release the final Goal within the next few
months.
Question. When will the final Goal be issued?
Answer. The Department intends to release the Goal within the next
few months.
Question. What is the impact to State and local governments?
Answer. State and local governments are already implementing the
Interim National Preparedness Goal. In fiscal year 2005, grant
recipients were required to align their homeland security strategies
with the National Priorities contained in the Interim Goal. States and
Urban Areas were also encouraged to adopt the capabilities-based
approach for planning, training and exercises. The release of the Final
Goal in the next several months will ensure these efforts reflect the
important lessons of Hurricane Katrina, Rita and Wilma.
HURRICANE PAM EXERCISE
Question. What lessons were learned from the 2004 Hurricane Pam
Exercise and how were those lessons incorporated into the fiscal year
2007 budget?
Answer. As an initial matter, the President has included $20
million in its fiscal year 2007 budget request to continue catastrophic
disaster planning activities. This will allow FEMA to continue to
review and enhance our operational capabilities as well as to provide
direct technical support to certain high risk areas for localized
catastrophic disaster planning.
In developing the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan,
``Hurricane Pam'', a series of planning workshops were conducted in
2004 and 2005. Planning topics considered to be the most urgent and
complex were discussed by State and Federal representatives in the
workshops such as hurricane pre-landfall issues, search and rescue,
temporary medical care, sheltering, temporary housing, school
restoration, and debris removal. Additional important topics included
access control and reentry, billeting of Federal response workers,
distribution of ice, water and power, donations management, external
affairs, hazardous materials, temporary housing, temporary medical
care, and dewatering of levee enclosed areas.
Catastrophic planning is an iterative process and will incorporate
products and results from the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic
Hurricane Planning effort, lessons learned from the 2005 and 2006
hurricane seasons, and results available from the New Madrid
catastrophic earthquake planning activities. More specifically,
activities planned include the following:
--Continuing the planning initiatives for the New Madrid Seismic Zone
and Southeast Florida and initiating catastrophic disaster
readiness for response and recovery for additional high-risk
communities;
--Continuing the development and implementation of initiatives that
support the critical areas of high-risk locality planning, mass
care, temporary housing, decontamination, and logistical
support. Specific proposals within each critical area will
support topics such as the following;
--Improving logistical support to include increased efficiency in
delivery of Federal resources;
--Ongoing evacuation and mass care services planning with high risk
localities as well as cities and States that are identified as
potential hosts for large numbers of evacuees;
--Training and exercises to evaluate/implement operational
requirements for conducting response and recovery activities in
contaminated areas;
--Developing and assessing innovative housing solutions;
--Implementing technology enhancements that support the expedited
application and delivery of needed assistance under the
Individual and Public Assistance programs; and
--Developing strategies to enhance the engagement and coordination of
private sector resources in response and recovery operations.
GRANT DRAWDOWN RATE
Question. By grant program, what is the award date, the obligation
rate and the drawdown rate for funds for each quarter in fiscal year
2005 and so far in fiscal year 2006?
Answer. The Department's principal source of homeland security
assistance to State, local and tribal governments is through the
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP). In fiscal year 2005, the HSGP
was comprised of the six programs--the State Homeland Security Program
(SHSP), the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), the
Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), the Emergency Management
Performance Grant (EMPG), the Metropolitan Medical Response System
(MMRS), and the Citizen Corps Program (CCP). In fiscal year 2006, the
HSGP was comprised of the same programs with the exception of the EMPG
program. In fiscal year 2006, the EMPG program exists as a separate
program.
During fiscal year 2005, the award dates for grants to the States
and territories under the HSGP varied depending on the time required to
review and finalize each individual grant award application. The first
of the fiscal year 2005 HSGP grant awards were made on February 14,
2005, with the last the fiscal year 2005 HSGP grant awards being made
on June 1, 2005. During fiscal year 2006, only the EMPG grant awards
have been awarded to date. Forty-seven fiscal year 2006 EMPG grant
awards were made on February 3, 2006 and the remaining 11 fiscal year
2006 EMPG grant awards were made on February 15, 2006. The fiscal year
2006 HSG program awards are still pending review and final award
decisions expected at the end of May, 2006, as stipulated by Congress.
The charts below contain information on total award amounts,
obligation amounts, obligation rates, drawdown amounts and drawdown
rates by quarter for both the HSGP and the EMPG for fiscal year 2005
and fiscal year 2006 (to date).
NATURAL DISASTERS
Question. When natural disasters strike the United States each
year, first responders go to the scene with the same equipment,
training and exercise that they receive for terrorism.
Has DHS considered including natural disasters as part of the risk
criteria for grant funding distribution?
Answer. The statutory intent of the State Homeland Security Program
(SHSP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) is focused on
enhancing capabilities to address Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE), agriculture, and cyber terrorism
incidents, therefore, natural disaster risk is not included. As many
States and localities remain ill-prepared for the unique detection,
prevention, and response aspects of terrorism, homeland security grant
programs should continue their focus on terrorism-related threats--
though many of these capabilities are of great value for natural
disaster response.
A number of other DHS grant programs--including the Emergency
Management Performance Grant Program, Citizen Corps Program, and the
Metropolitan Medical Response System Program--are more all-hazard in
nature. These programs are targeted to particular constituencies such
as emergency management, community preparedness, or public health and
medical communities but support preparedness activities across the full
range of natural and manmade hazards.
Question. What was the result, including any obstacles encountered?
Answer. Congress has rejected language that would encourage State
and local emergency managers to also address planning for homeland
security threats. This may serve to perpetuate a lack of coordination
between planning for natural disasters and terrorism-related events. In
addition, the program has encountered difficulty in defining clear
goals and objectives.
TRANSIENT POPULATIONS ACCOUNTING
Question. How, specifically, are transient populations accounted
for in grant programs where funds are distributed based on risk? If
this answer is classified, please provide it in that format.
Answer. The graphic below illustrates the risk methodology used in
the process to determine eligibility for the fiscal year 2006 Urban
Areas Security Initiative. In May 2005, DHS hosted a one-day
stakeholders meeting in Washington, DC to solicit input and feedback on
the fiscal year 2005 risk formula used to determine eligible urban
areas and associated funding allocations for the UASI Program. Several
of the recommendations from those stakeholders were incorporated into
the fiscal year 2006 formula, including data on transient populations
(e.g., tourists and commuters).
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS
Question. Emergency Management Performance Grants are proposed to
be cut by $13 million, 7 percent, in the fiscal year 2007 budget.
Secretary Chertoff recently commented to the Emergency Managers that
paying for State and local personnel expenses is not in the Federal
interest. EMPG has traditionally supported personnel expenses so that
local communities would have the manpower to plan and coordinate.
Additionally, a report to Congress by the Secretary, entitled The
Nationwide Plan Review, provides a status on catastrophic planning in
all States and in the Nation's largest urban areas. Overall, States and
large cities report they lack confidence in their own ability to manage
catastrophic events.. Federal seed money that is matched with State and
local dollars makes it possible to bring all the partners together
across all disciplines of responders and all layers of government. The
National Preparedness Integration Program proposed in the fiscal year
2007 budget claims to make more robust the Federal side of catastrophic
planning by using Federal Preparedness Coordinators to build and
maintain positive relationships with identified partners.
If local governments do not have the capacity to build an emergency
management program, isn't it a Federal responsibility to help them?
Answer. Fundamental to the mission of the Department of Homeland
Security is the mitigation of threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences that stem from acts of terrorism and natural disasters.
This mission however, is a shared responsibility and a shared
commitment of Federal, State, local and tribal governments. As a
partner in this effort, the Federal government is assisting State and
local jurisdictions to identify and build essential capabilities.
As part of its effort, the Department issued the Interim National
Preparedness Goal in March, 2005. The final Goal will be issued within
the next several months. The Goal provides a common framework to build,
sustain, and improve national preparedness for a broad range of threats
and hazards, regardless of origin. Achieving the National Preparedness
Goal requires that the emergency management discipline play a vital
role in support of the goal, as well as the implementation of the
levels of capability described in the Department's Target Capabilities
List. As the coordinator for disaster response operations, the
emergency management discipline is essential to the prevention,
protection, response, and recovery efforts necessary when disasters or
other incidents of national significance occur at the State and local
level, and when Federal assistance is needed.
The fiscal year 2007 Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG)
request is consistent with the Administration's $170 million budget
request in fiscal year 2006. The Department continues to support the
EMPG program's efforts to helps States achieve target levels of
capability to sustain and enhance the effectiveness of their emergency
management programs. The EMPG funding request for fiscal year 2007 is
sufficient for States to continue to develop intra- and interstate
emergency management systems that encourage partnerships among
government, business, volunteer, and community organizations based on
identified needs and priorities for strengthening their emergency
management and catastrophic planning capabilities.
Therefore, to sustain and enhance emergency management
capabilities, including those in support of the goal, the EMPG program,
in conjunction with the Department's other sources of homeland security
funding for State and local jurisdictions, is designed to assist these
jurisdictions achieve the target levels of capability to sustain and
enhance the effectiveness of their emergency management programs.
Question. It was stated in the fiscal year 2006 Senate Questions
for the Record, ``Further, the integration of EMPG into the Homeland
Security Grant Program umbrella results in synergies with other related
homeland security assistance programs. In addition, this integration
also has facilitated efforts by States/local jurisdictions to leverage
homeland security assistance to accomplish goals and objectives in
their homeland strategies.'' How specifically has this happened?
Answer. The Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) program
was separated from the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and
managed as a stand alone grant in fiscal year 2006 to expedite the
Nation's emergency management community. G&T continuously evaluates its
programs, including soliciting stakeholder feedback, to ensure that
programs support better support Federal, State, and local goals.
G&T is committed to ensuring that EMPG, HSGP, and other
preparedness programs are aligned with the National Preparedness Goal
and the National Priorities, which guide the goals and objectives in
State and urban area homeland security strategies. EMPG funding will
help align emergency management efforts with the Emergency Management
Accreditation Program (EMAP) Standard structure, the National Emergency
Management Baseline Capability Assessment Program (NEMB-CAP), the
National Response Plan (NRP), and the National Incident Management
System (NIMS).
CYBERSTORM
Question. What lessons were learned from CyberStorm?
Answer. The DHS cyber exercise team is currently compiling the
lessons learned for our Cyber Storm Exercise After Action Report (AAR),
but preliminary results indicate there was tremendous value gained by
all of the participants. Cyber Storm provided a non-attribution
controlled environment for our private sector, State, and international
government and interagency partners to examine cyber incident response;
information sharing mechanisms; procedures for establishing situational
awareness; public-private sector decision making; and communicating
appropriate information to the public during a cyber incident of
national significance. The exercise brought together the response
communities within the energy, information technology,
telecommunications, and transportation sectors, as well as the National
Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG) and Interagency Incident
Management Group (IIMG)--the interagency bodies responsible to respond
under the Cyber Annex to the National Response Plan (NRP).
While DHS, State governments, and many of the critical
infrastructure owner-operators have significant experience in physical
disaster and counter-terrorism incident response, never before have the
cyber implications for critical infrastructure, as well as the
collective cyber incident response community, been exercised
simultaneously at the strategic and operational levels. The first-ever
nature of the exercise scenario and player interaction provided a
significant opportunity to operationalize the Cyber Annex to the NRP,
raise awareness of the criticality of cyber preparedness at the senior
leadership level, foster significant cross-sector collaboration, and
identify areas that require future effort to ensure the Nation's
preparedness. Highlights from Cyber Storm include:
--The NCRCG and IIMG exercised their NRP responsibilities together
for the first time;
--State players worked multiple and challenging scenario events not
normally encountered and fostered new collaboration levels with
the Multi State-Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC),
US-CERT, and their own emergency management structures;
--Faced with the challenge of simultaneous events, private sector
players correlated incidents across sectors, with non-
traditional partners, while concurrently responding to a robust
incident pace;
--Sector ISACs stressed their operational capabilities beyond their
comfort zone, tested and validated prototype communication/
situational awareness tools, and worked cross-sector
coordination outside of the norm; and
--International coordination between government CERTs tested formal
and informal tools, thresholds, and protocols for crisis
communication/collaboration for the first time that will
provide the baseline and lessons learned for future
cooperation.
The interdependencies, gaps in response structure, and positive
cross-sector collaboration (between infrastructure sectors, Federal and
State, international and domestic) are all critical parts of Cyber
Storm lessons learned and will have enduring impact throughout each of
the player communities and in the collective.
Question. How have those lessons been incorporated into the fiscal
year 2007 budget?
Answer. Most of the lessons learned were process or procedurally
focused and DHS is moving rapidly to implement suggested improvements
and changes. For those specific instances where additional funding or
resources are required, we will prioritize these needs within the
budget allocation process for this year as well as out years--again
moving with all due expediency to meet critical needs for enhanced
cyber security.
Based on the lessons learned during Cyber Storm, National Cyber
Security Division (NCSD)/US-CERT is dividing the corrective actions
into two areas: funding required and no additional funding required.
NCSD is currently focusing on the items that can be rectified
quickly and without additional financial investment. These immediate
actions include, but are not limited to, procedures, policy and
practice development, and organizational changes. Since Cyber Storm,
US-CERT has already implemented organizational changes based on
exercise findings regarding resource limitations found in having
multiple facilities perform similar functions, i.e. incident handling.
Prior to Cyber Storm, NCSD had an existing project plan to test and
evaluate incident databases and event correlation tools for
implementation into US-CERT operations. These technology solutions are
expected to resolve certain exercise lessons learned and were already
designated as projects to be funded with fiscal year 2007 funds. The
tools being evaluated will greatly enhance US-CERT's ability to track
incidents, provide timely and calculated responses, and assist in
providing overall situational awareness.
Further, NCSD/US-CERT has additional government positions that will
be filled in the near term. These government additions will help to
guide the existing contractor staff and program tasks to completion.
FIRE GRANTS
Question. For FIRE grants, how many applications were received for
fiscal year 2005?
Answer. A total of 20,972 applications were received for the fiscal
year 2005 Assistance to Firefighter Grant funds.
Question. What was the total value of the fiscal year 2005
requests?
Answer. In fiscal year 2005 applications received under the fire
grant program reflected a request for $2,642,756,563 in Federal
dollars, though this does not reflect considerations of basic
eligibility or how such applications would have been scored in the peer
review process.
Question. How many applications were funded and at what dollar
value?
Answer. To date, under the fiscal year 2005 fire grant program,
5,731 of the applications received, totaling $586,377,025.00 in Federal
dollars have been funded. As of this date, $21 million in fiscal year
2005 funding remained available for award.
Question. Describe what first responder missions have been
accomplished (using measurable benchmarks) in fiscal year 2004 through
fiscal year 2005, that justifies the proposed $252 million (46 percent)
cut in fiscal year 2007.
Answer. Since the programs beginning in fiscal year 2001, the fire
grant program has provided nearly $2.5 billion to local fire
departments. The program has not developed any benchmarks that directly
measure the impact of the program at the local or national level.
SAFER
Question. For SAFER grants, how many applications were received for
fiscal year 2005?
Answer. The Department has received 2,985 applications under the
fiscal year 2005 SAFER grant program.
Question. What was the total value of the fiscal year 2005
requests?
Answer. Applications received under the fiscal year 2005 SAFER
program requested a total of $1,145,822,782 in Federal dollars, though
this does not reflect considerations of basic eligibility or how such
applications would have been scored. The non-Federal cost (local
contribution) share of the grant requests brings the total to
$2,889,274,945.
Question. How many applications were funded and at what dollar
value?
Answer. To date, the Department has funded 137 of the fiscal year
2005 SAFER applications received totaling $61,356,528.00 in Federal
dollars. Several decisions are still pending and it is anticipated that
the total amount of grants will be near the program's $65 million
appropriation.
INTEROPERABILITY GRANTS
Question. How will DHS coordinate with the Department of Commerce
on the interoperability grant program authorized in the fiscal year
2006 Budget reconciliation package?
Answer. In order to implement the interoperability grant program,
the Office of Grants and Training (G&T) within DHS and National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), located
within the Department of Commerce are discussing options to determine
the most efficient way to administer this grant program. One option
under consideration is to delegate administration of the program
through an Inter-Agency Agreement to G&T. This would leverage existing
capabilities of G&T for administering grant awards to State and local
units of government since 1998, and build on DHS initiatives to
strengthen interoperable communications.
Question. Will DHS recommend beginning the program in fiscal year
2007?
Answer. The specific timing of the program has not been determined
as the ``borrowing authority'' is based on projected auction receipts,
but initial implementation could begin in fiscal year 2007.
INTEROPERABILITY
Question. What progress has been made on Interoperability standards
since April 2005?
Answer. Since April 2005, the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) SAFECOM program, in partnership with the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Department of Justice's
National Institute of Justice (NIJ), have been working with industry
and the public safety community to accelerate the development of
Project 25 (P25) standards. Since that time, both the pace and scope of
standards development activities have increased dramatically. Basic
protocol standards that specify the functionality and capability of
these interfaces have now been completed and are being adopted.
The following list defines three of the standards and summarizes
progress as of March 2006:
--Inter-RF Subsystem Interface (ISSI).--The ISSI enables different
manufacturers' radio subsystems to interoperate and allows for
radios to roam from one system to another. Completion of the
ISSI is progressing rapidly with Telecommunications Industry
Association (TIA) balloting of a key ISSI protocol standard
achieved in January 2006 and completion of the standard
expected in March 2006. The public safety community can expect
ISSI products to be available in 2007.
--Fixed/Base Station Subsystem Interface (FSSI).--The FSSI enables
voice and control information to be transferred between a base
station and radio subsystem or dispatcher's console. A
completed FSSI standard was approved publication as a TIA
standard in January 2006. The public safety community can
expect FSSI products to be available in late 2006.
--Console Subsystem Interface (CSSI).--The CSSI connects a
dispatcher's console to the radio subsystem and allows voice
and control information to be transferred between the two.
Further development of the CSSI is dependent on completion of
the ISSI and FSSI protocol specification standards. The public
safety community can expect CSSI products to be available in
2007.
Question. What are the impediments to establishing such standards?
Answer. Time is the most significant impediment to the development
and establishment of interoperability standards. The National
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-113)
requires that Federal agencies and departments use technical standards
that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies.
The process for developing such voluntary consensus standards is quite
rigorous and lengthy.
OMB Circular No. A-119 defines the process by which the voluntary
consensus standards body reaches consensus. The process is designed to
allow for openness, balance of interest, due process, an appeals
process, and consensus, which is defined as ``general agreement, but
not necessarily unanimity, and includes a process for attempting to
resolve objections by interested parties, as long as all comments have
been fairly considered, each objector is advised of the disposition of
his or her objection(s) and the reasons why, and the consensus body
members are given an opportunity to change their votes after reviewing
the comments.'' While designed to ensure quality, this process takes
considerable time.
Question. Is there a measure to determine if local, State and
Federal entities are more interoperable than previously? If so, how is
this measured?
Answer. G&T and the SAFECOM program worked together to ensure that
a tactical-level emergency interoperable communications capacity is
developed and tested in 77 urban areas in the Nation. This initiative
builds on an effort led by SAFECOM and G&T in fiscal year 2004 called
RapidCom that focused on achieving tactical-level emergency
interoperable communications in ten major urban areas. The fiscal year
2005 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) requires each Urban Area
(77 Total) to develop a Tactical Communications Plan (TICP). For those
States and territories that do not have a designated urban area they
must designate a multi-jurisdictional metropolitan area or region as a
substitute. There are a total of 77 Urban Areas and multi-jurisdictions
metropolitan areas that are required to submit a TICP. The TICP must be
submitted by May 1, 2006 and these plans will undergo a review process
led by subject matter experts, Federal officials, and peers. Once the
review process has been completed each Urban Areas and multi-
jurisdiction metropolitan areas will then have to test their plan via
an exercise. At the conclusion of the exercise, an after action reports
(AAR) will be created to present clearly the issues the public safety
community must address to achieve meaningful communication
interoperability. This AAR is a review of the major issues identified
during the exercise and it will contain a list of recommendations to
improve regional communication and interoperability. Included in the
AAR, as an appendix, will be an improvement plan which will document
specific steps the region can take to improve their interoperability.
Through the TICP, exercise, and subsequent AAR process, the Department
can examine potential shortfalls, fill communication gaps, and improve
communication interoperability.
FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS COORDINATORS
Question. How many Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPC) are
currently on board? How long have they been on board?
Answer. The Federal Preparedness Coordinator is a new position and,
currently, there are no FPCs ``on board.''
Question. Where are they located and what are their
responsibilities?
Answer. The current plan calls for there to be 11 Federal
Preparedness Coordinators (FPCs). Ten of them will be based in FEMA
Regional office cities, and co-located with the FEMA regional offices.
The 11 FPC will be the Director of the Office of National Capital
Region Coordination, who will be dual-hatted as an FPC and continue to
be based in the Office of National Capital Region Coordination.
FPCs are responsible for coordinating a wide spectrum of Federal,
State, and local domestic incident planning, preparedness, and
relationship-building activities in advance of any specific threat or
incident. On a day-to-day basis, the FPC will undertake a range of
activities to ensure that all homeland security partners within the
FPC's assigned geographic areas of responsibility are prepared for an
Incident of National Significance. The area of responsibility for each
FPC will be the urban area where he or she is based, as well as other
high-risk and high-population urban areas in the vicinity. This means
that all Urban Area Security Initiative metropolitan areas in the
country will have an FPC responsible for coordinating preparedness
activities.
The FPC's specific responsibilities related to preparedness will be
to:
--Contingency Plan Review.--Coordinate with a preparedness assessment
work group for the review of urban area contingency and
continuity of operations plans--and lead any subsequent follow-
up action needed--per direction contained in HR 2360, to
``report on the status of catastrophic planning, including mass
evacuation planning in all 50 States and the 75 largest urban
areas.''
--Preparedness Review and Monitoring.--Assess the status of
preparedness in their areas of responsibility in accordance
with the National Preparedness Goal and guidance provided by
the Secretary and U/S for Preparedness.
--Exercise Coordination and Review.--Coordinate planning for, and
participate in, local, regional, and national-level homeland
security exercises and drills.
--Establish Local Relationships.--Build relationships with key
stakeholders (DHS operational elements, other Federal agencies,
State and local government officials, and the private sector).
--Situational Awareness.--Maintain situational awareness of available
resources and capabilities, existing operations, and possible
threats in the FPC's areas of responsibility.
--Public Communications.--Serve as a preparedness public
communications focal point for DHS in the assigned areas of
responsibility.
--Special Event Planning.--Coordinate local area Federal support for
designated Level I and Level II Homeland Security Special
Events occurring within the FPC areas of responsibility.
--Incident Response Planning.--Coordinate resource and operational
planning in preparation for incident response, in concert with
the FEMA Regional Director, and other Federal, State, local,
tribal and private sector partners.
Question. Are they co-located with other DHS or government
employees?
Answer. Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPCs) will be co-located
with FEMA regional offices. (Except for within the Office of National
Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC), where the Director of the NCRC
will be dual-hatted as an FPC.) In addition, each FPC will have a small
staff, including detailees from across DHS, who will also be based in
the FEMA Regional Offices. It is expected that FPCs will be integrated
with DOD liaisons who will also work out of FEMA regional offices.
Question. Do they coordinate or work with other DHS or government
employees? If so, how and what specific results have come from the
coordination?
Answer. DHS Directorate for Preparedness field staff will work
closely with the 11 Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPCs) and their
staffs, particularly the Office of Infrastructure Protection Protective
Security Advisors (PSAs) and the Office of Grants and Training (G&T)
Preparedness Liaison Officers. PSAs will have a ``dotted-line''
reporting relationship to the FPCs, while the G&T Preparedness Liaison
Officers will maintain their existing reporting relationships but
collaborate closely with the FPCs and their staff. This will allow FPCs
to be the lead Directorate for Preparedness staff in the field and be
the primary interface for preparedness issues with State, local, and
tribal governments as well as the private sector.
In addition, FPCs will work closely with FEMA Regional Directors to
ensure that, in the event of an incident, DHS would have a unified
response team in place based on pre-established relationships. The
importance of the relationship between the FPCs and FEMA Regional
Directors is demonstrated by the fact that FPCs will be co-located in
FEMA regional offices. The FPCs will work to leverage the efforts of
FEMA Regional staffs, trusted relationships, and individual points of
contact. FEMA Regional Directors are responsible for maintenance of
Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs) and Regional Interagency
Steering Committees (RISCs) under the NRP. These resources can provide
an abundance of information both during the planning and preparedness
stages which will be the primary focus of the FPCs, as well as during
incident response.
Absent a specific threat or incident, the FPC will help to
coordinate preparedness activities across DHS components and missions
within his or her areas of responsibility. It is important that the FPC
coordinate with and leverage key DHS field component entities: FEMA,
Preparedness Liaison Officers, Protective Security Advisors, ICE, CBP,
TSA, USCG, and USSS. The FPC plan recognizes the need to preserve
existing DHS component entity field relationships and agency statutory
roles. Therefore, existing component organizational structures,
reporting relationships, and chains of command will not be changed by
the introduction of FPCs.
Outside of DHS, efforts will be made to build relationships with
local Federal representatives with a focus on key NRP signatory
agencies. Many of these agencies will have a large role in the Joint
Field Office during an incident, and pre-existing relationships will
prove highly beneficial. More specifically, FPCs will initiate
relationships with two distinct entities within their areas of
responsibility--the members of the RISC and the Federal Executive Board
(FEB). Each of these bodies offers the FPC the perspective of key
officials who support Federal incident management efforts.
The FPC will also make a focused effort to build a strong
relationship with the local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Health and Human Services (HHS)
officials, the U.S. Attorney's Office, ATAC, Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF), and the Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Coordinating
Officer (DCO). The DCO will be a conduit to U.S. Northern Command's
(NORTHCOM) Joint Task Force (JTF) or JTF commander in the absence of an
established JTF.
The FPC will participate, as appropriate, in deliberations and
crisis planning with NORTHCOM staff elements leveraging the DCO
relationship where feasible. The FPC will, where appropriate,
coordinate with DOD, other Federal, State, tribal, local and private
sector stakeholders to ensure contingency plans are appropriately
aligned.
This interaction between the FPC and other locally-based DHS
components, as well as other Federal partner agencies, will enable the
FPC to leverage the capabilities of many important locally-based
Federal assets in support of developing integrated and synchronized
preparedness activities across the country.
Question. How will the proposed new initiative, the National
Preparedness Integration Program (NPIP), relate to the current FPCs?
Answer. Specifically the NPIP includes about $7.5 million for FPC
related activities at the local level. The mission of the NPIP is to
create, organize, enable and monitor initiatives to integrate and
synchronize national preparedness. The FPCs will play a key role in
achieving that mission given that National preparedness is only
possible when Federal, State, local and tribal governments, the private
sector and the American people are working collectively toward a shared
goal of enhanced preparedness.
Through the NPIP, FPCs will provide DHS with an important and
functional field presence to collaborate and build partnerships with
State and local government, and private sector homeland security
stakeholders within the FPC's assigned geographic areas of
responsibility and to ensure that these stakeholders are working
together and are thoroughly prepared. Currently, such field level
coordination is done on an ad hoc basis and DHS does not have always
have visibility into how high-risk areas are prepared to deal with
homeland security incidents.
FPCs will change that by providing vehicles for regular
coordination, strengthening the linkages between officials responsible
for responding to possible homeland security incidents. Our Nation
cannot afford for Federal, State and local government officials to have
to build working relationships and common approaches to incident
management amidst the fog of a major incident--such as Hurricane
Katrina or a pandemic influenza outbreak. Instead, these relationships
need to be built through frequent collaboration during steady State
activities, as well as through common, well-understood, and practiced
approaches to incident response prior to such an approach being needed.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
Question. How many times has technical assistance been requested
and for what purpose?
Answer. Beginning in fiscal year 2005 to present (October 1, 2004-
February 28, 2006), the Technical Assistance Division (TAD) of the
Preparedness Directorate's Office of Grants and Training (G&T) has
received 872 Technical Assistance (TA) Delivery Requests. Of these
requests, 857 TA services were delivered as follows:
--1 Arch Angel TA;
--104 Biannual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR) TA;
--8 Chemical Protective Clothing TA;
--15 Continuity of Operations Planning and Continuity of Government
(COOP/COG) TA;
--6 Critical Infrastructure Mitigation (CIM);
--6 Data Review Project Technical Assistance;
--249 Domestic Preparedness Equipment Technical Assistance Program
(DPETAP);
--2 Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) TA;
--2 Emergency Response Synchronization Matrix TA;
--9 Enhancing Grants Management Capacities for State Administrative
Agencies (SAAs) TA;
--3 Fusion Process Pilot Orientation TA;
--7 Initial Strategy Implementation Plan (ISIP) TA;
--209 Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program
(ICTAP);
--1 Mayoral Workshop;
--1 Prevention and Deterrence Surveillance Concepts TA;
--6 Prevention and Deterrence TA;
--54 Program and Capability Review (PCR) TA;
--14 Public Information Plan Development TA;
--4 Regional Response Planning TA;
--3 Regionalization Support TA;
--42 Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Orientation and TA;
--4 Terrorism Incident Annex (TIA) TA;
--51 Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP);
--53 Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) Port and Mass Transit TA
Program; and
--4 UASI Regional Planning TA.
Question. Have any applications for technical assistance been
refused? If so, why?
Answer. Of the requests received during this time (October 1, 2004-
February 28, 2006), the Technical Assistance Division (TAD) of the
Preparedness Directorate's Office of Grants and Training (G&T) has
referred a small number of requests to other entities better suited to
respond to the nature of the request, and has been unable to fulfill
fifteen requests for technical assistance.
Ten requests for DPETAP services have not been fulfilled in fiscal
year 2006 as G&T has directed a higher proportion of its funding to
grants. In addition, 5 requests for ICTAP service deliveries were not
fulfilled due to the fact that the requests were submitted from the
State level and the tactical program is funded to support only Urban
and metropolitan areas.
EXERCISES
Question. How many exercises has the Preparedness Directorate been
involved in? When, where and what was exercised? Who else participated
(i.e. local, State, Federal partners)?
Answer. The Preparedness Directorate has participated in 67 major
exercises since February 25, 2003. Table A: ``Preparedness Directorate
Exercises'' (below), is a listing of the 67 exercises by name, date of
exercise, location, topic of exercise, and scope of participation. In
addition to these major events, the Preparedness Directorate has
provided direct support to more than 200 State and local exercises over
the same period, including workshops, seminars, drills, tabletop
exercises, command post exercises, and full-scale exercises.
TABLE A.--PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE EXERCISES
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No Exercise name Date Location What was exercised? Who participated?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2006
67............................. Red, White, and Bloom...................... July 3, 2006............. Columbus, OH..... DHS-mandated exercise to validate State and local agencies;
the Tactical Interoperable Preparedness Directorate
Communications Plan of Columbus, evaluators
OH.
66............................. Regions I & II Hurricane Preparedness Exer- June 20-22, 2006......... New York, NY..... Coordination of critical response Federal, State, and local
cise. functions in anticipation of governments; non-governmental
2006 hurricane season. organizations and private sector
partners
65............................. Operation Wildcat.......................... June 20, 2006............ Wilmington, DE... DHS-mandated exercise to validate State and local agencies;
the Tactical Interoperable Preparedness Directorate
Communications Plan of evaluators
Wilmington, DE.
64............................. Dallas/Ft. Worth Exercise.................. June 20, 2006............ Arlington, TX.... DHS-mandated exercise to validate State and local agencies;
the Tactical Interoperable Preparedness Directorate
Communications Plan of Dallas, evaluators
TX and Ft. Worth TX.
63............................. College World Series Exercise.............. June 20, 2006............ Omaha, NE........ DHS-mandated exercise to validate State and local agencies;
the Tactical Interoperable Preparedness Directorate
Communications Plan of Omaha, NE. evaluators
62............................. Top Officials (TOPOFF) 4 Command Post June 19-23............... National Capital WMD search and render safe; Federal Interagency; State,
Exercise. Region. Continuity of Operations/ local, non-governmental
Continuity of Government; organization, and private sector
Catastrophic incident response. partners
61............................. Annual Airport Disaster Exercise........... June 8, 2006............. Nashville, TN.... DHS-mandated exercise to validate State and local agencies;
the Tactical Interoperable Preparedness Directorate
Communications Plan of evaluators
Nashville, TN.
60............................. South Carolina Hurricane Isabella Full- June 7, 2006............. Charleston/ DHS-mandated exercise to validate State and local agencies;
Scale Exercise. Dorchester/ the Tactical Interoperable Preparedness Directorate
Berkeley Communications Plan of evaluators
Counties, SC. Charleston, SC.
59............................. Region II Hurricane Preparedness Exercise June 4-5, 2006........... San Juan, PR..... Coordination of critical response Federal, State, and local
(PR, VI). functions in anticipation of governments; non-governmental
2006 hurricane season. organizations and private sector
partners
58............................. Regional IV Hurricane Preparedness Exercise May 31-June 1, 2006...... Atlanta, GA...... Coordination of critical response Federal, State, and local
functions in anticipation of governments; non-governmental
2006 hurricane season. organizations and private sector
partners
57............................. Operation Helping Hand..................... May 24, 2006............. Los Angeles DHS-mandated exercise to validate State and local agencies;
County, CA. the Tactical Interoperable Preparedness Directorate
Communications Plan of Los evaluators
Angeles and Long Beach, CA.
56............................. New Orleans/Baton Rouge Full-Scale Exercise May 23-25, 2006.......... Baton Rouge, LA.. Full-Scale Exercise to prepare Federal, State, and local
for hurricane season; DHS- agencies; Preparedness
mandated exercise to validate Directorate evaluators
the Tactical Interoperable
Communications Plans of New
Orleans, LA and Baton Rouge, LA.
55............................. Region VI Hurricane Preparedness Exercise.. May 17-18, 2006.......... New Orleans, LA.. Coordination of critical response Federal, State, and local
functions in anticipation of governments; non-governmental
2006 hurricane season. organizations and private sector
partners
54.............................
53............................. Region III Hurricane Preparedness Exercise. May 3, 2006.............. Philadelphia, PA. Coordination of critical response Federal, State, and local
functions in anticipation of governments; non-governmental
2006 hurricane season. organizations and private sector
partners
52............................. Gallant Fox IV Tabletop.................... March 6, 2006............ National Capital Pentagon Force Protection Federal, State and local agencies
Region. Exercise designed to practice
and test Federal, State, and
local response to an incident
involving the Pentagon and
surrounding region.
51............................. Blue Cascades.............................. March 1-2, 2006.......... U.S. Pacific Infrastructure interdependencies United States and Canadian
Northwest. in the Pacific Northwest region. Federal, State/Provincial, local
and private sector agencies
50............................. Thor's Hammer II--Spiral IV................ Feb. 21-24, 2006......... National Capital National Security Space Federal
Region. strategies to satisfy national/
interagency information needs
through timely delivery of
capabilities across a wide
spectrum of threat environments.
49............................. Mass Casualty Exercise..................... Feb. 9, 2006............. National Capital Designed to assess and identify Federal
Region. gaps in the U.S. Government's
(USG) ability to mount a
coordinated medical response to
a mass casualty event.
48............................. Cyberstorm 2006............................ Feb. 6-10, 2006.......... National Capital Homeland Security response and International, Federal, State,
Region recovery mechanisms related to a local, and Private Sector
(geographically cyber incident of national
dispersed significance.
effects).
47............................. Thor's Hammer II--Spiral III............... Jan. 23-27, 2006......... National Capital National Security Space Federal
Region. strategies to satisfy national/
interagency information needs
through timely delivery of
capabilities across a wide
spectrum of threat environment.
46............................. Catastrophic Assessment Task Force #1...... Dec. 10, 2005............ National Capital Assess USG policy and resources Federal
Region. as they relate to an influenza
pandemic.
45............................. Thor's Hammer II--Spiral II................ Dec. 5-9, 2005........... National Capital National Security Space Federal
Region. strategies to satisfy national/
interagency information needs
through timely delivery of
capabilities across a wide
spectrum of threat environments.
44............................. Avian Flu Public Affairs Exercise.......... Dec. 1, 2005............. National Capital Designed to assess public affairs- Federal
Region. specific departmental
preparedness, roles and
responsibilities, and inter-
departmental coordination
relative to Pandemic Avian
Influenza.
43............................. IIMG Pandemic Influenza.................... Nov. 29, 2005............ National Capital Interagency coordination issues Federal
Region. related to preparing for,
responding to, and recovering
from a pandemic influenza
outbreak.
42............................. DHS Avian Flu Exercise..................... Nov. 18, 2005............ National Capital Designed to assess departmental Federal
Region. preparedness, roles and
responsibilities, and inter-
departmental coordination
relative to Pandemic Avian
Influenza.
41............................. Determined Challenge....................... Nov. 7-30, 2005.......... National Capital Department and Agency (D/A) Federal
Region. Continuity of Operations (COOP)
preparedness.
40............................. Mercury 05................................. Oct. 17-21, 2005......... Australia........ Australian multi-jurisdictional Australian National and State/
prevention and response Territory agencies
capabilities; terrorism threats/
attacks.
Fiscal year 2005
39............................. Thor's Hammer II--Spiral II................ Sept. 12-16, 2005........ National Capital National Security Space Federal
Region. strategies to satisfy national/
interagency information needs
through timely delivery of
capabilities across a wide
spectrum of threat environments.
38.............................
37............................. Coalition Warrior Interoperability May 31-June 24, 2005..... National Capital U.S. combatant command and Federal
Deliverable 2005. Region. international community
investigation of command,
control, communications, and
computers (C4) solutions that
focus on relevant and timely
objectives for enhancing
coalition interoperability.
36............................. Senior Officials Exercise 05-4............. May 26, 2005............. National Capital Focused on continuity programs Federal
Region. against the backdrop of a
credible nuclear threat/incident.
35............................. Top Officials 3 (T3) Large Scale Game...... May 3-5, 2005............ National Capital Designed to explore strategies to International, Federal, State,
Region. positively address the medium- Tribal, and local governments
and long-term impacts and and private sector
recovery issues from an Incident
of National Significance.
34............................. T3 Full Scale Exercise..................... April 4-8, 2005.......... National Capital Prevention and response in the International, Federal, State,
Region. context of a chemical and Tribal, and local governments
biological attack on U.S. soil; and private sector
included cyber activity.
33............................. Senior Officials Exercise 05-3............. Mar. 10, 2005............ National Capital Critical homeland security policy Federal
Region. and operational issues in the
context of a chemical event.
32............................. Senior Officials Exercise 05-2............. Feb. 15, 2005............ National Capital Critical homeland security policy Federal
Region. and operational issues in the
context of a biological even.
31............................. Port of NY/NJ Economic Strategy Wargame.... Feb. 9-11, 2005.......... New York......... Designed to better define the Federal, State, local and private
primary issues of concern for sector
private industry when national
security issues arise within a
vital economic arena.
30............................. Chemical Security Exercise................. Feb. 1-2, 2005........... National Capital Vulnerabilities and threats to Private sector
Region. chemical infrastructures.
29............................. Silver Links Tabletop...................... Dec. 1, 2004............. Toronto, Canada.. Regional, cross-border United States and Canadian
infrastructure interdependencies Federal, State/Provincial,
and associated vulnerabilities local, and private Sector
in the Great Lakes/Northeast agencies
Region.
28............................. Senior Officials Exercise 05-01............ Nov. 10, 2004............ National Capital Critical homeland security policy Federal
Region. and operational issues generated
by a hypothetical terrorist
suicide bombing campaign in the
United States.
27............................. Corporate Emergency Exercise............... Nov. 4, 2004............. Baytown, TX...... Private Sector coordination with Private sector
DHS during a terrorism incident
at a chemical facility.
26............................. Silver Links Workshop...................... Nov. 4, 2004............. Quebec City, Regional, cross-border United States and Canadian
Quebec. infrastructure interdependencies Federal, State/Provincial,
and associated vulnerabilities local, and private Sector
in the Great Lakes/Northeast agencies
Region.
25............................. Purple Crescent II......................... Oct. 26-27, 2004......... New Orleans, LA.. Regional interdependency Federal, State, local and Private
shortfalls aimed at making the sector
New Orleans region disaster
resistant.
24............................. Multilateral Cybersecurity Conference...... Oct. 20-22, 2004......... Berlin, Germany.. Designed to discuss and highlight International (15 countries)
issues related to the formation
of a Global Watch and Warning
Network among national level
cyber security organizations.
Fiscal year 2004
23............................. National Capital Region Council of Sept. 27, 2004........... National Capital National Capital Region's Federal, State and local
Governments. Region. capability to respond to
multiple simulated weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) terrorist
attacks.
22............................. Senior Officials Exercise #4............... Aug. 19, 2004............ National Capital Impacts of a ``Redo'' threat Federal
Region. condition, anticipating and
minimizing unintended
consequences associated with
going tom ``Red,'' and
developing an Interagency
Incident Management Group (IIMG)
``playbook'' for elevating the
Homeland Security Advisory
System (HSAS) to ``Red.''.
21............................. Determined Promise 04...................... Aug. 4-5, 2004........... Richmond, VA..... Prevention and response in the Federal, State and local
context of air threats to
Alaska, Canada, and the
continental U.S., chemical
attacks in VA and CA, and a
radiological release in CA.
20............................. Cybersecurity Workshop..................... Aug. 4-5, 2004........... National Capital Courses of actions among Federal
Region. organizations involved in
responding to cyber attacks.
19.............................
18............................. Joint Warrior Interoperability Deliverable. June 14-25, 2004......... National Capitol Designed to give Federal D/As the Federal
Region. opportunity to view and assess
technologies that allow for
interagency information sharing.
17............................. Cascade Fury II............................ May 25-27, 2004.......... Alta, Wyoming.... Coordinated crisis management Federal and State
support to quickly restore the
transportation infrastructure in
the event of a major disaster or
emergency.
16............................. Forward Challenge 04....................... May 11-13, 2004.......... National Capital Federal COOP Plans in the context Federal
Region. of a failed terrorist attack in
the National Capital Region.
15............................. T3 CPX..................................... May 10-13, 2004.......... National Capital Designed to give key leadership Federal
Region. the opportunity to analyze
threats and direct prevention
counter measures, protect
economic security and critical
infrastructures, and develop
appropriate Courses of Action.
14............................. Eligible Receiver.......................... May 3-7, 2004............ National Capital Designed to exercise the Federal
Region. Interagency in homeland defense
and homeland security processes
in the context of a nuclear
threat.
13............................. California Spills of National Significance. Apr. 20-22, 2004......... California....... Initial National Response Plan Federal, State, local and Private
(NRP) and the National Incident sector
Management System. Other key
areas that were addressed:
economic, national security,
cross border, and political
issues.
12............................. Dark Portal................................ Feb. 24, 2004............ National Capital Designed to address the potential Federal
Region. impact of a combination of cyber
and physical attacks against
various critical infrastructures
with the intent to undermine
domestic and international
confidence in the U.S. banking
and finance sector.
11............................. Thor's Hammer Wargame...................... Feb. 23-27, 2004......... National Capital National Security Space--concept Federal
Region. of operations (CONOPS) and
investment strategy.
10............................. Unified Defense 04......................... Feb. 14-15, 2004......... National Capital DHS incident management roles and Federal
Region. responsibilities as defined in
Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-5 and validation of
the Initial NRP and National
Information Management System
(NIMS).
9.............................. Senior Officials Exercise #2............... Jan. 30, 2004............ National Capital Designed to review plans that Federal
Region. will guide a Federal response to
a catastrophic WMD event in a
U.S. City.
8.............................. Operation Heartland........................ Jan. 27-26, 2004......... National Capital Policy-level issues inherent to a Federal, State, local and Private
Region. terrorist attack on critical sector
transportation infrastructure
focusing on the entire spectrum
of security.
7.............................. Scarlet Cloud II........................... Dec. 19, 2003............ National Capital Management and response in the Federal
Region. context of a biological
terrorist incident including:
the application of Federal
authorities, movement
restrictions, issues in
implementing a mass prophylaxis
effort, and public risk
communication and fostering
critical continuing public
support.
6.............................. Scarlet Cloud.............................. Nov. 19, 2003............ National Capital Management and response in the Federal
Region. context of a biological
terrorist incident including:
the application of Federal
authorities, movement
restrictions, issues in
implementing a mass prophylaxis
effort, and public risk
communication and fostering
critical continuing public
support.
5.............................. Livewire................................... Oct. 27-31, 2004......... National Capital Existing communications and Federal, State, local and Private
Region. decision-making processes needed sector
to counter a well-planned, large-
scale cyber attack.
Fiscal year 2003
4.............................. Determined Promise 03...................... Aug. 18-28, 2003......... NV, CO, National Designed to train USNORTHCOM in Federal
Capital Re- homeland defense and Military
gion. Assistance to Civil Authorities
(MACA) missions.
3.............................. Top Officials 2............................ May 12-16, 2003.......... Seattle, WA, Response to a simulated release International, Federal, State and
Chicago, IL. of WMDs in two U.S. cities. local
2.............................. IAIP Tabletop Exercise..................... Mar. 11, 2003............ National Capital Coordination, integration, and Federal
Region. information sharing processes
and responsibilities.
1.............................. IAIP Watch Exercise........................ Feb. 25, 2003............ National Capital Coordination processes between Federal
Region. the organizations making up and
supporting the IAIP and to
validate the IW/IC Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP)
document.
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FIRE SERVICE NEEDS ASSESSMENT
Question. What is the current status of updating the national needs
assessment for the Fire Service?
Answer. The original needs assessment was published in December
2002. A second study was requested in the 2005 appropriations. This
study consists of 2 parts: the new national needs assessment and a
matching analysis of Assistance to Firefighter Grants to needs
identified in the 2002 study. The U.S. Fire Administration is
completing final revisions to the needs assessment.
DETECTION OF ANIMAL DISEASES
Question. What capacity do we have as a Nation to do animal disease
surveillance (especially in response to avian flu)? Is the capacity
robust?
Answer. The leads for these efforts are U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) and U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) and we defer
to those departments for details of their efforts. The Department of
Homeland Security assists these efforts in the development of
diagnostic tests for use in the USDA National Animal Health Laboratory
Network and strengthening the capacity (number of tests they can
perform and time required to perform them) in these laboratories. The
Department of Homeland Security also assists in the training of Foreign
Animal Disease Diagnosticians and Practitioners to recognize foreign
animal diseases introduced into the United States. With respect to
avian flu specifically, supplemental funds were requested for the
purpose of advanced development of rapid detection tests of animals for
advanced surveillance at borders and ports of entry. The Department of
Homeland Security also is the lead for the National Biosurveillance
Integration System (NBIS) intended to provide near-real-time
situational awareness of biological incidents, including animal
diseases. NBIS is currently in Phase II of its 3 phase development
plan. Planned NBIS surveillance data inputs will include data sources
from both USDA, HHS, and DOI.
Question. What system do we use and who is in charge of it? What is
DHS's role in monitoring the system?
Answer. We defer to U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U.S.
Department of Interior (DOI) for information regarding their systems.
The Department of Homeland Security-led National Biosurveillance
Integration System (NBIS) is currently in Phase II of its 3 phase
development plan and is monitored by DHS personnel 24/7. NBIS provides
near-real-time situational awareness to DHS through the National
Biosurveillance Group (NBSG) of Federal agency partners.
Question. Is the system connected to the public health system in
real time?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security National
Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) receives data inputs from
both animal health surveillance and public health systems and provides
near-real-time situational awareness to DHS and NBIS partners. NBIS
surveillance data inputs will include data sources from and U.S.
Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Interior, and Health and
Human Services/Centers for Disease Control.
Question. What animals are we testing (zoo, wildlife, livestock,
domesticated animals)? When? And where do the test results go?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security does not perform
testing of animals but refers testing to U.S. Department of
Agriculture's Animal Plant Health Inspection Service and the U.S.
Department of Interior.
Question. If there is a threat, how is the information communicated
to the local level?
Answer. If there is detection of animal diseases, whether it is in
the domestic animal population or in nature, the local surveillance and
health networks will be the first to know. Every State has a State
Health Director and a State Veterinarian. They work very closely
together. They practice and exercise their programs together, which
brings together a network of public and animal health professionals
from the local level. Regardless whether there is an incident such as
Mad Cow Disease, West Nile Fever, rabies, or bird flu, the public
health and animal health specialists at the ground level respond and
report to the State Health Department and State Veterinarian. The State
agencies then report any potential threat to the Centers for Disease
Control and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Protocols in place
ensure that DHS receives the information.
Question. What funds has DHS directed specifically toward the
detection of zoonotic threats in non-agricultural species?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has not directed funds
toward the detection of zoonotic threats in non-agricultural species.
Statutory responsibility for wildlife species resides with the U.S
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior.
Question. What type of coordination exists between Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services and
the Department of Agriculture to link veterinary diagnostic
laboratories to do surveillance of interest to agriculture as well as
public health?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is the lead for the
National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) intended to provide
near-real-time situational awareness of biological incidents, including
animal diseases. NBIS is currently in Phase II of its 3 phase
development plan. NBIS surveillance data inputs will include data
sources from and U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of
Interior, and Health and Human Services/Centers for Disease Control.
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND INFORMATION SECURITY
OWNERSHIP OF KEY ASSETS
Question. In a November 2005 report entitled Vulnerability
Assessments for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, DHS
identified 1,849 priority assets as part of the National Asset Data
Base? The report notes that 80 percent of the Nation's critical
infrastructure assets are owned by the private sector. How many of the
1,849 priority assets are owned, operated, or administered by a foreign
company, and how many of those foreign companies are controlled by a
foreign government?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is currently
working closely with the Department of Commerce to determine the
availability of data on critical infrastructure and key resources and
to determine ownership of these assets. The Department of Commerce has
the responsibility for compiling and maintaining the data that supports
the analysis of ownership issues. As yet, DHS is not in a position to
determine which priority assets are owned, operated, or administered by
a foreign company; or which of those foreign companies are controlled
by a foreign government. As the availability of data to DHS improves,
so will our understanding of this often complex and multi-faceted
issue.
STAFFING
Question. Under 2SR, how many of the 803 total FTE funded for IAIP
in fiscal year 2005 were transferred to IPIS?
Answer. The total number of IPIS FTE transferred under 2SR was 430.
Question. How many are currently on-board?
Answer. The number of IPIS FTE currently on board is 286.
Question. How many hiring selections remain?
Answer. Of the 159 remaining hiring selections, 21 FTE are waiting
for security clearances and 15 FTE were allocated to IPIS in fiscal
year 2006.
Question. What is the planned FTE level for IPIS in fiscal year
2007?
Answer. The planned FTE level for IPIS in fiscal year 2007 is 445.
This is the same level as fiscal year 2006 FTE.
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN
Question. When will the revised National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP) be completed?
Answer. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) consists
of the NIPP Base Plan and the 17 Sector-Specific Plans. The NIPP Base
Plan is complete and was formally released on June 30, 2006. Subsequent
updates and revisions to the Base Plan will be published, as necessary,
to reflect changing infrastructure protection needs and increasingly
refined best practices. As annexes of the NIPP Base Plan, the Sector-
Specific Plans will be completed 180 days after the issuance of the
NIPP Base Plan.
Question. The budget proposes an increase of $39 million for the
NIPP. The budget justification provides no information on this increase
or how it will be used. Provide a full justification on the genesis of
this funding, what it will be used for, and how it will strengthen the
security of the Nation's critical infrastructure.
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) request for
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) activities will support
the implementation of the NIPP Base Plan as well as the development,
management, and implementation of the Sector-Specific Plans (SSP). This
funding also will support NIPP programmatic operations and assist the
Sector-Specific Agencies in the NIPP-related outreach and engagement
activities across each of the Critical Infrastructures and Key
Resources (CI/KR) sectors.
The Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) intends to leverage
the NIPP framework to realize progress in several important areas.
First, the development of a stronger and steadfast partnership between
IP and the several Federal agencies assigned sector-specific
responsibilities. Cooordinated development of Sector Specific Plans and
other essential elements (such as vulnerability assessment tools and
methodologies) will provide the underpinnings of a successful,
efficient risk management program. Second, in partnership with other
Federal agencies, IP will develop and put into place an essential
element of risk management, i.e., consistent metrics. IP expects to
further define structural elements of the NIPP, in order to enable and
ideally expand participation in our overall risk management strategy,
especially to private sector owner-operators, State, local and tribal
governments, as well as to our Federal partners who are not designated
sector specific agencies. This approach will accelerate and improve
sector agency progress by facilitating the collection, normalization,
and prioritization of assets and protection programs based on
comparative risk across all 17 CI/KR sectors.
The NIPP provides the framework and sets the direction for
implementing a coordinated, national infrastructure protection effort
and is based upon a risk management framework that takes into account
threats, vulnerabilities and consequences when prioritizing CI/KR
protection activities. The comprehensive NIPP will be supported by SSPs
that will detail the application of the risk management framework and
performance metrics for each of the 17 specific sectors. IP will
support the implementation of protective programs using cross-sector
and sector-specific efforts to assure a balanced and effective approach
across all sectors and sub-sectors.
Sector-specific partnerships are vital elements of the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and are integral to its success.
IP intends to use the fiscal year 2007 funding to support the
development and implementation of sector partnerships and related
actions across the 17 CI/KR sectors with specific activities targeted
at the most critical sectors. The list of actions below is the initial
estimate of requirements. However, the proposed spend plan is designed
to be flexible so DHS can address higher priority needs as the Sector
Specific Plans required by the NIPP evolve over the coming months and
identify critical sector shortfalls.
--$1.0 Million.--Establishment and support for the State, Local, and
Tribal Government Coordinating Council (GCC) to serve as a
forum for State, local and tribal homeland security advisors to
participate in CI/KR protection efforts.
--$0.5 Million.--Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Council
(CIPAC) operations. Contractual support to manage and
coordinate council activities and to ensure compliance with
established policies.
--$2.5 Million.--Education and Outreach Support. Assist Sector
Specific Agencies (SSA) by developing and producing a Sector
Specific Plan training curriculum and by developing and
reviewing outreach and engagement plans and national CI/KR
protection awareness programs to assure a balanced approach
across all sectors.
--$1.0 Million.--Program Management Support. Assist SSA with required
reporting, development of response processes, identification of
resource requirements and assistance with the preparation of
budget support materials.
--$3.0 Million.--Sector Specific Agency (SSA) Responsibilities.
Perform sector-specific work supporting DHS SSA
responsibilities for the nuclear, emergency services, and
chemical sectors and identify protective program needs and the
protective programs that satisfy those needs.
--$15.0 Million.--Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset
Protection Program (RAMCAP). Develop specific RAMCAP modules
for the Water Treatment, Wastewater Treatment, Pharmaceutical
Manufacturing, Mass Transit Rail, Mass Transit Surface, Freight
Rail Yards, Bridges, Dams, Locks and Levees, and Pipelines
sectors and sub-sectors.
--$7.0 Million.--Targeted Comprehensive Reviews. Perform targeted
Comprehensive Reviews of the Transportation (Commuter and Mass
Transit Rail), Urban Commercial Zones (Metroplexes, e.g., Time
Square, Vegas Strip, etc.), and Dams sectors and sub-sectors.
--$9.0 Million.--IP NIPP Management Responsibilities. NIPP
management, administrative, coordination, and support
responsibilities including oversight activities associated with
coordination of the Sector Specific Agencies.
Question. Will the process to distribute this funding be
competitive?
Answer. This funding is devoted to the development and
implementation of sector-specific plans and the necessary tools and
techniques, including the application of a common risk management
strategy and performance metrics for each of the 17 sectors. All of the
planned procurements will be awarded using the normal contracting
process. If Sector Specific Agencies have shortfalls that are of
critical national interest and request assistance from DHS, we will use
a yet-to-be developed process to evaluate the need and assign the
relative priority for funding. When higher priority needs are
identified as sector specific plans evolve and critical sector specific
shortfalls surface, the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP)
intends to validate the needs and review potential funding
alternatives. IP recognizes the probability that as this process
unfolds, certain risks will be identified where the potential
consequence of attack and/or vulnerability of an asset is not
tolerable, even in the short term. Where such risks exist, IP will
partner with Federal agencies, owner-operators, and State and local
governments in order to identify and implement immediate risk-reduction
measures.
Question. What is a Sector Specific Partnership?
Answer. Sector partnerships between government and the private
sector are formed in all critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/
KR) sectors via the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).
This sector partnership model is used to promote and facilitate sector
and cross-sector planning, coordination, collaboration, and information
sharing for CI/KR protection involving all levels of government and
private sector owners and operators.
Question. What is a Sector Specific Agency?
Answer. Sector-Specific Agencies are specific Federal departments
and agencies identified under Homeland Security Presidential Directive
(HSPD)-7 with lead responsibility for the protection activities in
specified CI/KR sectors.
Question. The NIPP budget refers to education and training of
Federal, State, and local officials and private sector stakeholders.
Who are the stakeholders? Please be specific.
Answer. The NIPP security partners stakeholders include those
Federal, State, regional, territorial, local, or tribal government
entities; private sector owners and operators and representative
organizations; academic and professional entities; and certain not-for-
profit and private volunteer organizations that share in the
responsibility for protecting the Nation's critical infrastructure and
key resources (CI/KR). For example, in the Dams Sector, some of the
stakeholders include the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
Department of Interior/Bureau of Reclamation (DOI/BOR), United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Energy (DOE), United
States Army Corps of Engineering (USACE), Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), United States Coast
Guard (USCG), four State dam safety officials (CA, NJ, WA, OH), Xcel
Energy--MN, New York City Dept. of Environmental Protection--NY, New
York Power Authority, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E)--CA (Chair of SCC),
National Hydro Association (NHA), and the United States Society on Dams
(USSD) among many others. A similar diverse cross-section of
stakeholders exists for each of the 17 CI/KR sectors.
Question. How is this training different than what is provided
through the DHS Grants & Training Office?
Answer. The training referred to in the NIPP budget specifically
deals with understanding the risk management concepts that are central
to the implementation of the CI/KR protection activities outlined in
the NIPP.
Question. Why was the NIPP moved from Protective Actions to the
Critical Infrastructure Outreach and Partnership activity?
Answer. This transfer of funding from Protective Actions (PA) to
Critical Infrastructure Outreach and Partnership (CIOP) in fiscal year
2007 is congruent with the request for increased funding within CIOP in
order to consolidate NIPP and sector specific plan budget activities
within the Directorate for Preparedness, Office of Infrastructure
Protection (OIP). The OIP is responsible for 5 of the 17 Critical
Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) sectors: chemical, nuclear
reactors, materials, and waste, commercial facilities, dams, and
emergency services. In fiscal year 2006, PA is responsible for
development and initial implementation of the Sector Specific Plans
(SSPs) for chemical, nuclear, and commercial facilities. CIOP is
responsible for the development and initial implementation of the dams
and emergency services SSPs. CIOP also has responsibility for the
development of the NIPP and implementation management and measurement
for all 17 CI/KR sectors. The initial implementation of these plans
will be completed in fiscal year 2006, causing a shift in execution in
fiscal year 2007 from PA to CIOP to full implementation, sector
engagement, outreach, measurement, and education programs, more
consistent with the CIOP mission.
NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS
Question. The budget includes $5.413 million to support National
Security Special Events (NSSEs) and other events. As the Federal
coordinator of security at NSSEs, what involvement does the Secret
Service have in determining the use of this funding?
Answer. The ``Support to National Special Security Events (NSSEs)
and Other Events'' line, funds DHS planning and support to Special
Events as directed by the Secretary as well as Office of Infrastructure
Protection Continuity of Operations planning, exercise participation
and facilities support. Included in the roughly 1,800 ``special
events'' that DHS assesses, prioritizes and supports each year--based
on assessed risk--there are typically less than a dozen NSSEs . The
Directorate for Preparedness' Contingency Planning and Support Division
(CPSD) provides planning and resource support on an as-needed basis for
NSSEs as requested by and in coordination with the U.S. Secret Service
(which is the Department lead for NSSEs). This request ensures that IP
can provide appropriate support to the Secret Service. In addition,
CPSD identifies for the Secretary's approval and appointment USSS
nominees with appropriate skills and training to serve as the Principal
Federal Officials for NSSEs.
Question. What types of protective measures are deployed with this
funding?
Answer. DHS tailors the nature and level of support to each event
based in part on local capabilities. DHS support ranges from naming a
PFO or Federal Coordinator and providing appropriate planning and
threat support to deploying staff and their support equipment (e.g.,
communications).
Question. What happens to equipment deployed once the event is
over?
Answer. Deployed equipment is generally used by DHS personnel and
returns with them. DHS requires that DHS-loaned equipment deployed in
support of an event be returned to DHS following the event.
Question. For fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 (to date)
provide a breakdown of how this funding was expended, by NSSE.
Answer. In fiscal year 2006, the activity entitled Protect National
Security Special Events (NSSEs) and Other Events within the subprogram
Field Operations and Support, funds the research, analysis, and
planning to prioritize, rank and assess over 1,800 special events every
year. The funds are not used to support NSSEs directly, but provide
analytical and coordination functions in order to identify, coordinate,
protect, and monitor events of national significance. The significance
of these events requires special planning and coordination between
Federal and private stakeholders ensuring that the required protective
measures are implemented as necessary. The Office of Infrastructure
Protection (OIP) develops a comprehensive list of special events, and
the list includes a risk-based assessment and relative prioritization
of each event that Department of Homeland Security, Department of
Justice and other national, State and local authorities use to
determine security requirements, as well as, plan incident response and
management activities. After analyzing and prioritizing the special
events, OIP recommends and coordinates the assignment of a senior
Federal official for selected special events or NSSEs. When
appropriate, OIP then develops and publishes, in coordination with
national, State and local officials, an Integrated Federal Support
Plan, summarizing the responsibilities and plans of the various
stakeholders and authorities.
During fiscal year 2005, there were only two National Security
Special Events (NSSEs): the Presidential Inauguration (18 Jan 2005);
and the State of Union Address (2 Feb 2005). Office of Infrastructure
Protection (OIP) participation in both of these events was minimal. At
this time, our financial system does not provide expense information at
this level. If requested by the Secret Service, who has primary
responsibility for NSSEs, OIP would provide support in the following
ways:
--Provide personnel to participate in pre-event planning;
--Conduct Site Assistance Visit and Prepare Buffer Zone Protection
Plan;
--Provide radiation detectors to local law enforcement officials for
use during the event;
--Man a 24/7 operations center during events to collect and
disseminate intelligence information;
--Conduct training for local security personnel;
--Conduct exercises to prepare for events; and
--Provide Subject Matter Experts to event planners if requested.
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS
Question. The budget proposed to reduce funding for vulnerability
assessments by 42 percent, from $12.7 million to $7.382 million. Why is
such an important component of the IPIS portfolio reduced by 42
percent?
Answer. The Administration fully understands the Committee's
concern and fully agrees that vulnerability assessments are an
important component of the Infrastructure Protection and Information
Security portfolio. The funds requested for fiscal year 2007 are based
on the level of assessment activity that actually occurred in fiscal
year 2006 and takes into account the progress and efficiencies made to
date in performing site assessments. The requested funding level will
enable an ongoing program of thorough site assessments, yet, that level
does not necessarily result in a concurrent reduction in the number of
vulnerability assessments conducted during fiscal year 2007. The focus
of vulnerability assessments has shifted to the Buffer Zone Protection
Program (BZPP) in order to leverage the capability of State and local
authorities to perform their own vulnerability assessment. IP will
continue to provide guidance, technical assistance, and validation to
ensure consistency and accuracy.
The fiscal year 2007 budget expectation is based on a higher level
of expertise and training of State and local authorities, the Nation-
wide presence of Protective Security Advisors to reach out to critical
infrastructure stakeholders and perform some vulnerability assessment
data collection, and the benefits derived from increased efficiencies
due to better-defined processes in data collection and staff knowledge.
In addition, the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) is
placing a greater emphasis on the accelerated development and
deployment of assessment methodologies that are executable by owner-
operators and tailored to specific types of infrastructure. This
program, called RAMCAP, has now put into the field a number of
``modules'' that have proven highly effective at capturing critical
data regarding consequentiality and vulnerabilities in a manner that
supports normalization of results by IP.
As these several more innovative approaches to the assessment
mission begin to take effect, the need for IP to dispatched teams from
Washington into the field. to conduct individual assessments has
declined.
CHEMICAL SECURITY
Question. Your fiscal year 2007 budget proposes $10 million for a
Chemical Security Office, which will evaluate the risk of chemical
facilities and establish security standards for them, but this funding
would not be available until fiscal year 2007, further delaying the
effort to secure chemical facilities. Why are you kicking this can down
the road and not pursuing enforceable standards for the chemical
facilities now?
Answer. The Department is pursuing chemical security legislation in
Congress. Assistant Secretary Robert Stephan testified before both the
House and Senate about the need for comprehensive chemical security
legislation. Additionally, the Department's Office of Legislative
Affairs and technical experts from the Department have met with Members
from both the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate on this
important legislative initiative. The Department remains eager to
support Congress as they work to grant DHS the authority needed to
secure the chemical sector from terrorist attack.
Question. Why hasn't the Department played a lead role by
submitting legislation to the Congress?
Answer. The Department continues to work with the Congress on
chemical security legislation. The Department has outlined a number of
core principles to guide the development of a regulatory framework:
--Recognize that not all facilities present the same level of risk
and that the most scrutiny should focus on those that, if
attacked, could most endanger public health and cause economic
harm
--Develop enforceable, reasonable, clear, and equitable performance
standards
--Set performance standards based on the types and severity of
potential risks posed by terrorists and facilities should have
the flexibility to select among appropriate site-specific
security measures that will effectively address those threats
--Design any new authority to recognize the progress many responsible
companies have made since 9/11 and build on that progress
We hope the Congress will consider these principles as they work to
pass this important piece of legislation. Additionally, the Department
has not waited for legislation to assist in securing the Nation's
chemical sector.
--Prior to the formation of the Department of Homeland Security,
responsibility for the Nation's critical infrastructure was
scattered over various Federal agencies. Now one agency is
responsible for coordinating the U.S. Government's efforts to
protect critical infrastructure across all sectors, including
chemical facilities
--The Department works in close coordination with Federal, State, and
local governments as well as private sector partners to develop
and coordinate plans to protect our complex critical
infrastructure systems
This coordination has resulted in physical security enhancements in
and around chemical facilities, including strengthening law enforcement
coordination, improving access control, adding multiple buffer zones,
implementing surveillance and detection technologies, and improving
response and preparedness capabilities in the chemical, petrochemical,
and related sites of immediate concern to help protect our Nation, our
citizens and our way of life.
FEMA
MASS EVACUATION
Question. In February, Secretary Chertoff submitted a report to
Congress, as directed in the fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, entitled The Nationwide Plan Review, providing a
status on catastrophic planning in all States and in the Nation's
largest urban areas. Overall, States and large cities reported they
lack confidence in their own ability to manage catastrophic events with
their current plans. Not surprisingly, plans that have been updated
and/or exercised recently (within the last 2 years) are considered, by
the entity, more likely to be adequate.
The fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act also
included a provision that directs the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security to develop guidelines for State and local governments to
coordinate mass evacuation plans. Plans are to include, where
appropriate, the pre-positioning of items such as food, water,
medicine, and interoperable communications equipment that would be
required in a mass evacuation. Additionally, the legislation encourages
the Department to consider the need for such pre-positioned equipment
in allocating first responder funds. DHS is commended for taking the
provision to heart and including in the fiscal year 2006 grant guidance
that States should include their needs for mass evacuation planning in
their grant applications.
The nationwide report is a clear indication that we have a lot of
work still to do. In the State of West Virginia, the vulnerability in
this case is exposed when you consider those fleeing from an incident
in the National Capitol Region. West Virginia has a strong and capable
Governor who constantly works to be prepared to unexpectedly host
thousands and provide those passing through with food, water, and gas
for the capable, and medications and other assistance for those with
special needs.
What is DHS doing to be ready for mass evacuations?
Answer. While protecting its citizens is a responsibility of the
State and local elected/appointed officials and is codified in State/
local laws and statutes, DHS Preparedness grant programs can provide
support for the development of State and local emergency response
plans, which should provide for the evacuation of their citizens.
State/local emergency response plans should clearly lay out timing
parameters and roles and responsibilities associated with carrying out
evacuations, as well as account for special needs populations and
people who do not have their own means of transportation.
FEMA can assist in a mass evacuation, in part, by providing
reimbursement to local and State jurisdictions under the Public
Assistance Program, in cases of declared Federal emergencies.
Currently, under DHS leadership, a preliminary self-assessment has
been completed by State and local officials of catastrophic planning in
all 50 States, 6 territories, and our 75 largest urban areas under the
Nationwide Plan Review conducted by the Preparedness Directorate and
released on June 16, 2006. Currently underway is a second phase of this
review, which includes site visits by teams of former senior State and
local homeland security and emergency management officials to validate
emergency plans, identify deficiencies, and make specific
recommendations to improve catastrophic emergency planning, including
evacuation issues.
Prior to Katrina, FEMA, through its National Hurricane Program
(NHP), had undertaken hurricane evacuation studies in 22 States,
regional areas, and territories. Through these studies, NHP develops
the products and tools for State and locals to conduct evacuation
planning and operationally to conduct the actual evacuations. NHP
develops the technical information that is used by State and local
governments to develop an evacuation plan. This includes information
such as the evacuation clearance time, transportation analysis, hazard
analysis, and behavioral study. The evacuations and the planning
involved are a State and local responsibility using the tools and
products developed by the FEMA. The budget for the NHP is $2.91 million
per year, and approximately $2.9 million goes directly to the States
through grants.
DHS/FEMA is also partnering with the Department of Transportation
(DOT), whose primary role is to provide and coordinate transportation
assistance in the aftermath of a disaster. The National Response Plan
designates DOT as the lead support agency to DHS/FEMA for Emergency
Support Function 1/Transportation, and calls for DOT to: (1) process
and coordinate requests for Federal and civil transportation support;
(2) report damage to transportation infrastructure as a result of the
incident; (3) coordinate alternate transportation services; (4)
coordinate the restoration and recovery of transportation
infrastructure; (5) perform activities conducted under the direct
authority of DOT elements such as those related to air, maritime,
surface, rail, and pipelines; and (6) coordinate and support
prevention, preparedness, and mitigation among transportation
infrastructure stakeholders at the State and local levels.
Question. Has there been discussion of using the Stafford Act
Disaster Relief Fund to preposition water, fuel, food, and
communications equipment for mass evacuations? If not, why not?
Answer. FEMA appropriately uses the authorities of the Stafford Act
and the Disaster Relief Fund to pre-position water, food,
communications equipment, and other supplies and commodities to support
the needs of communities and individuals in disaster situations;
however, this material is not distributed for use until the President
declares an emergency or major disaster under the Stafford Act.
PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION
Question. Please provide a list of grant awards made through the
Pre-disaster Mitigation program?
Answer. The following chart list all Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM)
grants awarded (obligated) since the inception of the program in fiscal
year 2003.
PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Plans & projects Management costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2003 Pre-Disaster $89,662,430.94 $4,682,582.21
Mitigation Competitive Program
\1\..............................
Fiscal year 2003 Disaster 3,419,889.00 115,680.00
Resistant Universities Program
\2\..............................
Fiscal year 2003 Planning Set- 13,313,576.00 .................
aside \3\........................
Fiscal year 2005 Pre-Disaster 148,741,988.18 2,998,433.35
Mitigation Program \4\...........
-------------------------------------
Total....................... 255,137,884.12 7,796,695.56
=====================================
Grand Total Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Grant
Obligations................ 262,934,579.68
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fiscal year 2003 funds that were awarded in fiscal year 2004 and
fiscal year 2005.
\2\ Fiscal year 2003 funds that were awarded in fiscal year 2004 and
fiscal year 2005.
\3\ Fiscal year 2003 funds that were awarded in fiscal year 2003 and
fiscal year 2004.
\4\ Fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 funds that were awarded in
fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006.
FISCAL YEAR 2003 PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWARDED FED
SUBGRANT TITLE SHARE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PLANS AND PROJECTS RECIPIENT:
CT............................ Elevation of Homes $641,025.00
in the Cosey Beach
Area of East Haven.
CT............................ Home Elevation 64,575.00
Project in Milford,
Connecticut.
CT............................ Stratford Home 56,700.00
Elevation Project.
CT............................ Town of East Haven 75,206.25
Elevation Non-RLP
Home Elevation.
MA............................ Metro Boston Pre- 224,962.50
Disaster Mitigation
Plan.
MA............................ Town of Winthrop 145,503.00
Flood Mitigation
Project.
MA............................ Quincy, MA Housing 449,935.00
Elevation and
Retrofitting.
NH............................ Regional Planning 360,000.00
Hazard Mitigation.
VT............................ State of Vermont PDM- 450,000.00
C Mitigation
Planning.
VT............................ River Road 140,440.50
Mitigation Project.
NJ............................ Carneys Point Pre- 1,162,923.00
Disaster Flood
Mitigation Program.
NY............................ Nassau County Hazard 224,812.50
Mitigation Planning
Initiative.
PR............................ Municipality of Las 45,000.00
Piedras Mitigation
Plan.
PR............................ Municipality of 30,000.00
Humacao Pre-
Disaster Mitigation
Assistant Program.
PR............................ Multi-Hazard Local 60,000.00
Mitigation Plan
Municipality of
Cano- vanas.
PR............................ Municipality of 52,500.00
Salinas.
PR............................ Pre-Disaster 30,000.00
Mitigation Plan
Municipality of
Catano.
PR............................ Municipality of 39,000.00
Yabucoa PDM
Planning.
PR............................ Municipality of 52,500.00
Ceiba.
PR............................ Municipality of 45,000.00
Aibonito PDM
Planning.
PR............................ Multi-Hazard 56,250.00
Mitigation Plan
Municipality of
Barranquitas.
PR............................ Municipality of 48,750.00
Florida Mitigation
Plan.
PR............................ Municipality of 52,500.00
Patillas Planning
Application.
PR............................ Municipality of 45,000.00
Aquas Buenas
Mitigation Plan.
PR............................ Municipality of 56,250.00
Corozal.
PR............................ Municipality of 52,800.00
Coamo Local
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
PR............................ Municipality of 45,000.00
Maunabo Mitigation
Plan.
PR............................ Municipality of Toa 52,500.00
Baja Mitigation
Plan.
PR............................ Municipality of 73,500.00
Guynabo Mitigation
Plan.
PR............................ Municipality of San 75,000.00
Juan Multi Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
PR............................ Municipality of 60,000.00
Trujillo Alto
Mitigation Plan.
PR............................ Municipality of 45,000.00
Fajardo Mitigation
Plan.
PR............................ Municipality of 56,250.00
Loiza.
PR............................ Multi-Hazard 52,500.00
Mitigation Plan
City of Guayanilla.
PR............................ Municipality of 46,875.00
Comerio Mitigation
Plan.
PR............................ Preparation of 52,500.00
Mitigation Plan
Municipality of
Yauco.
PR............................ Multi-Hazard 22,500.00
Mitigation Plan
Juana Diaz
Municipality.
PR............................ Municipio de Vega 30,000.00
Alta.
PR............................ Municipality of 45,000.00
Orocovis Mitigation
Plan.
PR............................ Multi-Hazard 45,000.00
Mitigation Plan
Municipality of
Arroyo.
PR............................ Municipality of 52,500.00
Hatillo.
PR............................ Municipality of 56,250.00
Morovis Mitigation
Plan.
PR............................ Municipality of 41,250.00
Naranjito.
PR............................ Municipality of 36,750.00
Penuelas Mitigation
Plan.
PR............................ Municipality of San 53,499.00
German Mitigation
Plan.
PR............................ Multi-hazard 56,250.00
Mitigation Plan
Municipality of
Ciales.
PR............................ Municipality of 45,000.00
Lajas Mitigation
Plan.
PR............................ Multi-Hazard 45,000.00
Mitigation Plan
Municipality of
Anasco.
PR............................ Municipality of 56,250.00
Lares Mitigation
Plan Application.
PR............................ Municipality of 56,250.00
Maricao Mitigation
Plan.
PR............................ Municipio de Las 48,750.00
Marias.
PR............................ Multi-Hazard 30,000.00
Mitigation Plan
Municipality of
Rincon.
PR............................ Municipality of San 52,500.00
Sebastian.
PR............................ Municipality of 45,000.00
Villalba.
PR............................ Municipality of 52,500.00
Luquillo Mitigation
Plan.
MD............................ Prince George's 75,000.00
County Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
PA............................ Township of Abington 3,000,000.00
Flood Mitigation
Project.
WV............................ West Virginia Multi- 2,743,153.50
Jurisdiction
Mitigation Project.
AL............................ Valley Creek 2,946,569.85
Floodplain Property
Acquisition and
Demolition-
Birmingham, Alabama.
AL............................ Jefferson County, 226,641.75
Alabama Pre-
Disaster Mitigation
Acquisition Project.
AL............................ Village Creek 2,490,315.26
Property
Acquisition and
Demolition-City of
Birmingham.
FL............................ City of Plantation 14,775.00
Fire Station Number
1 Wind Retrofit.
FL............................ City of Plantation 87,784.50
Central Water
Treatment Plant
Shutter Retrofit.
FL............................ Sarasota County 53,639.00
Bishop Nevins
Academy, Dome F--
Hurri- cane.
FL............................ City of Plantation E 28,287.00
Water treatment
Plant.
FL............................ Broward County 728,512.00
Courthouse 201 SE
6th Street.
FL............................ City of Plantation 26,894.23
Fire Station #2.
FL............................ City of Plantation 25,358.00
Fire State # 3 Wind
Retrofit.
FL............................ City of Plantation 18,639.63
Fire Station #5
Retrofit.
FL............................ Sarasota County 84,585.00
Bishop Nevins
Academy, Dome A--
Hurricane Shelter
Retrofit.
FL............................ Sarasota County 61,587.00
Bishop Nevins
Academy, Dome E--
Hurri- cane.
FL............................ North Lauderdale-- 112,500.00
Wind Retrofit Bay
Doors at Fire
station #44.
FL............................ North Lauderdale-- 112,500.00
Wind Retrofit,
Municipal Complex.
FL............................ City of Miami--Fleet 564,968.00
Maintenance Garage
Retrofit Storm
Shutters and Door.
FL............................ Bishop Nevins 41,240.25
Academy Dome B Wind
Retrofit.
FL............................ Wellington Community 41,250.00
Center--Wind
Retrofit Project.
FL............................ Miami-Dade Co. 654,598.50
School Board
Jefferson Annex
Wind Retrofit.
FL............................ City of Plantation 22,224.00
Fire Department.
FL............................ University of Miami 1,912,929.75
Rosenstiel Medical
Research Building.
FL............................ University of Miami 429,975.00
Wind Retrofit of
Mailman Center for
Child Development.
FL............................ University of Miami 370,884.75
Professional Arts
Center Wind
Retrofit.
FL............................ Myers Telecomm. 171,093.75
Center Wind
Retrofit.
FL............................ City of Opa-locka-- 1,418,295.75
Localized Flood
Control.
FL............................ City of New Smyrna 137,625.00
Beach Drainage
Improvement Project.
FL............................ Elevate Dixie County 18,750.00
Equipment Shed.
FL............................ Volusia Elevation 4 52,612.50
Cunningham Drive.
FL............................ Broward County 2,433,750.00
Oakland Park NE 6th
Ave Drainage
Project.
FL............................ Broward County 2,625,075.00
Oakland Park
Kimberly Lake
Drainage Pro- ject.
GA............................ Augusta-Richmond 146,307.75
County, Hollywood
Subdivision
Acquisition
Demolition Project.
GA............................ State of Georgia 615,000.00
Multi-Hazard
Planning
Application #1.
GA............................ State of Georgia 746,250.00
Multi-Hazard
Planning
Application #2.
GA............................ State of Georgia 656,250.00
Multi-Hazard
Planning
Application #3.
GA............................ City of Thomasville 174,855.75
Passmore Street
Acquisition.
GA............................ Chatham County 674,475.00
Lamarville Woods
Subdivision
Acquisition
Demolition Project.
GA............................ City of Rome, 804,864.37
Brookwood Avenue
Housing Acquisition.
GA............................ City of Savannah 370,023.94
Acquisition and
Demolition Project.
GA............................ Columbia County-- 271,333.50
Ridge Crossing
Drainage
Improvements.
GA............................ City of Jesup and 1,099,698.00
Wayne County Law
Enforcement, EOC &
911 Complex Wind
Retrofit.
GA............................ Peachtree City-- 167,437.50
Tinsley Mill
Condominium
Drainage
Improvement.
GA............................ Bartow County Ember 313,537.50
Way-Penny Lane
Flood Mitigation
Pro- ject.
GA............................ Bacon County CR 343 140,779.86
Drainage
Improvement.
KY............................ Big Sandy Area 76,450.00
Development
District Pre-
Disaster Mitigation
Project.
KY............................ BRADD Regional 96,819.09
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
NC............................ Mecklenburg County 75,000.00
Multi-
Jurisdictional
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
NC............................ Kure Beach 2,713,218.00
Acquisition and
Demolition of a
condominium complex.
SC............................ North Charleston 24,446.58
District--Mitigatio
n Project-Hurricane
Doors.
SC............................ PDM Plan Monitoring 14,163.75
and Follow-Up
Activities.
SC............................ Litchfield Beach 18,750.00
Weir Replacement
Project.
TN............................ Rutherford Co. 165,022.50
Midland Fosterville
Rd. Mitigation
Project.
TN............................ Tennessee State 397,383.60
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
TN............................ Wilson County 154,656.75
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa Grand Traverse Band 64,800.00
and Chippewa Indians. Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Project.
IL............................ Kane County RepLoss 75,000.00
Area Mitigation
Plans.
IL............................ Kane County Critical 150,000.00
Facility Audits.
IL............................ Lake County 307,125.00
Elevations.
IL............................ Lake County 1,489,737.00
Acquisitions.
IN............................ City of Fort Wayne & 50,000.00
Adams County
Acquisition Project.
IN............................ State of Indiana 500,000.00
HAZUS-MH Planning
Grant.
Lac Vieux Desert Tribe........ LVD Tribal Pre- 18,813.00
disaster mitigation
plan.
OH............................ City of Fairfield, 2,578,844.99
Ohio Acquisition
Project.
St. Croix Chippewa of St. Croix Chippewa 71,295.00
Wisconsin. of WI Risk
Assessment & Pre-
Disaster Mitigation
Planning.
WI............................ Kewaunee County All 27,000.00
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
WI............................ Lac du Flambeau Band 36,000.00
of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians
PDM planning grant.
WI............................ Ho-Chunk Nation 55,130.00
Planning Grant.
WI............................ Calumet County All 22,500.00
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
WI............................ Florence County PDM 33,750.00
Planning Grant
Application.
WI............................ Deer Park (Village) 99,090.00
Acquisition Project.
WI............................ Portage County 590,739.00
Electric Utility
Protection.
WI............................ Pittmans Point and 103,950.00
Barber Lane
Mitigation Project.
WI............................ Kenosha County Fox 297,300.00
River Flood
Mitigation Program--
FINAL.
WI............................ City of Middleton 12,909.00
Clovernook
Subdivision
Waterway
Stabilization
Project.
AR............................ Fairview Safe Room 663,495.75
Project.
AR............................ Euper Lane 441,970.50
Elementary Safe
Room.
AR............................ Ballman Elementary 441,970.50
Safe Room.
AR............................ Trusty Elementary 441,970.50
Safe Room.
AR............................ Bonneville Safe Room 441,970.50
AR............................ Sutton Elementary 441,970.50
Safe Room.
AR............................ Beard Elementary 441,970.50
Safe Room.
AR............................ Albert Pike 441,970.50
Elementary Safe
Room.
AR............................ Spradling Elementary 441,970.50
Safe Room.
AR............................ AR. Planning........ 455,109.75
NM............................ County of Torrance 29,250.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
TX............................ Texas Multihazard 225,000.00
Mitigation Plan.
TX............................ City of Jersey 1,507,005.00
Village Home
Elevation Project 2.
TX............................ PDM-03-Z-02......... 2,595,429.48
TX............................ PDM-03-Z-01......... 2,969,373.75
TX............................ PDM-03-G-01......... 1,477,686.23
TX............................ Revised 200 Magnolia 94,725.00
Rd.
IA............................ Farley Pre-Disaster 1,131.00
Mitigation Plan.
IA............................ Mechanicsville Pre- 1,508.25
Disaster Mitigation
Plan.
IA............................ Clinton Pre-Disaster 6,031.50
Mitigation Plan.
IA............................ Clinton County Pre- 6,031.50
Disaster Mitigation
Plan.
IA............................ Preston Pre-Disaster 1,130.96
Mitigation Plan.
IA............................ Cedar County Pre- 6,031.50
Disaster Mitigation
Plan.
IA............................ Tipton Pre-Disaster 1,507.50
Mitigation Plan.
IA............................ West Branch Pre- 1,507.50
Disaster Mitigation
Plan.
IA............................ Epworth Pre-Disaster 1,130.96
Mitigation Plan.
IA............................ DeWitt Pre-Disaster 1,507.50
Mitigation Plan.
IA............................ Cascade Pre-Disaster 1,507.50
Mitigation Plan.
IA............................ City of Anthon Pre 4,500.00
Disaster Mitigation
Planning.
IA............................ Hornick Pre-Disaster 4,500.00
Mitigation Plan.
IA............................ Lawton Pre-Disaster 4,500.00
Mitigation Plan.
IA............................ Moville Pre-Disaster 4,500.00
Mitigation Plan.
IA............................ Sergeant Bluff Pre- 4,500.00
Disaster Mitigation
Plan.
IA............................ Sloan Pre-Disaster 4,500.00
Mitigation Plan.
IA............................ Woodbury County Pre- 4,500.00
Disaster Mitigation
Plan.
IA............................ Hazard Mitigation 5,250.00
Plan Update for the
City of Hudson.
IA............................ City of Glidden 2,625.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
IA............................ City of Rippey 1,875.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
IA............................ City of Lamont 5,250.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan Update.
IA............................ City of Perry PDM 3,750.00
Planning.
IA............................ City of Paton, Iowa-- 2,499.75
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
IA............................ Cedar Falls 450,000.00
Utilities Flood
Protection Project.
KS............................ City of Olathe 765,000.00
Effluent Pump
Station.
MO............................ Stockton Community 175,500.00
Center/Library Safe
Room.
MO............................ Pierce City Fire 119,700.00
Station Safe Room.
MO............................ Pierce City Pre- 31,500.00
Disaster Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
CO............................ City of Fort Collins 2,697,188.00
Spring Creek Basin
Mitigation projects.
MT............................ Petroleum County Un- 17,550.00
Interruptible Power
Supply.
UT............................ J. Willard Marriott 2,994,037.76
Library, University
of Utah, Seismic
Upgrade.
WY............................ Flood Control 1,593,514.87
Improvements of I-
180 & Morrie Ave.
Crow Creek
Crossings.
American Samoa................ Fagaalu Village, 665,673.00
American Samoa
Flood Hazard
Mitigation Project.
American Samoa................ Pago Pago village, 2,150,979.00
American Samoa
Flood Hazard
Mitigation Project.
AZ............................ Pima County Hazard 93,750.00
Mitigation Project.
AZ............................ Local Hazard 413,565.00
Mitigation Planning.
AZ............................ Pima County/Canada 3,000,000.00
del Oro Flood
Hazard Mitigation
Pro- ject.
CA............................ State of California 1,734,798.75
Hazard Mitigation
Planning Program.
CA............................ Sonoma County Pre- 224,085.35
Disaster
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan-
ning.
CA............................ San Diego County 603,761.25
Multi-
jurisdictional
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
CA............................ Ventura County 81,000.00
Regional
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
CA............................ ABAG San Francisco 450,000.00
Bay Area Pre-
Disaster Hazards
Mitigation Planning
Project.
CA............................ Cities of Huntington 101,251.71
Beach & Fountain
Valley Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
CA............................ Los Angeles County 97,500.00
Standard Multi-
Hazard Mitigation
Plan (DMA 2000 HMP).
CA............................ Sacramento County 77,344.73
All Hazards
Mitigation Plan.
CA............................ City of Redlands 115,828.21
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
CA............................ UC Berkeley, Loss 287,055.00
Estimation Model
and Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan
Development.
CA............................ California Fire 643,500.00
Alliance Community
Planning Project
for hundreds of
LHMP's.
CA............................ City of Rancho 22,837.50
Cucamonga Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
CA............................ Yuba County Hazard 1,132,500.00
Mitigation Plan.
CA............................ City of Los Angeles 400,000.00
Local Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
CA............................ City of Napa Borreo 654,700.35
Building Seismic
Retrofit Project.
CA............................ County of Sacramento 1,400,267.25
Flood Mitigation
Grant Program.
CA............................ Urban Wildland 244,087.50
Interface Network--
UWIN Redlands.
CA............................ Lake City-Humbug 114,369.01
Roadside Fuel break.
CA............................ Empire Mine Fuel 157,265.17
break Project.
Cortina Indian Rancheria...... Cortina Indian 83,475.00
Rancheria PDM
Planning--October
2003.
Hopland Band of Pomo Indians.. Hopland Tribe 32,600.00
Mitigation Plan.
Mooretown Rancheria........... Mooretown Rancheria 193,142.25
Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Project.
Northern Mariana Islands...... CNMI Fire Station 120,292.00
Roll-Up Doors
Retrofit.
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian 111,173.00
Umatilla Indian Reservation. Reservation Multi-
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
ID............................ Canyon, Ada, Elmore 103,162.00
Co. All Natural
Hazard Assessment
and Mitigation Plan.
OR............................ Oregon University 2,841,978.75
System: Earthquake
Building
Rehabilitation 2003.
OR............................ Oregon Mid/Southern 374,719.50
Willamette Valley
Multi-jurisdiction
Natural Hazards
Plan.
OR............................ Clackamas County 204,000.00
CCOM/EOC Seismic
Upgrade Project.
OR............................ Clackamas County Tri- 249,967.50
City Wastewater
Treatment Facility
Seismic Upgrade
Project.
OR............................ City of Oregon City 682,500.00
Mountain view
Reservoir Seismic
Retrofit.
OR............................ City of Canby/Canby 229,275.00
Telephone Central
Offices Seismic
Upgrade.
Shoshone-Bannock Tribe........ Fort Hall All 30,000.00
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
Skokomish Indian Tribe........ Skokomish Multi- 128,233.00
Hazard Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Plan
2004.
WA............................ Snohomish County 150,000.00
Natural Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
WA............................ Grays Harbor County 50,000.00
Comprehensive
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
WA............................ Pre-Disaster 37,500.00
Mitigation Plan.
WA............................ Thurston County 371,962.00
Salmon Creek Basin
Elevation Project.
---------------
Total Plans and Projects for .................... 89,662,430.94
Fiscal Year 2003 PDM
Competitive.
===============
MANAGEMENT COSTS:
CT............................ CT PDMC Management 83,750.63
Costs 10 percent.
MA............................ Commonwealth of 56,568.97
Massachusetts 2003
PDM-C Management
Costs Application.
NH............................ NH Management Cost.. 36,000.00
VT............................ State Management 56,703.24
Costs.
NJ............................ Grants Management 29,349.00
Costs.
AL............................ AEMA Management 867,450.00
Costs.
FL............................ State of Florida 500,631.75
Department of
Community Affairs,
Division of
Emergency
Management.
GA............................ Management of State 566,493.80
of Georgia PDM-C.
NC............................ NCDEM PDM Grant 216,843.00
fiscal year 2003
Management Cost.
TN............................ Tennessee Technical 70,640.00
Assistance and
Management Costs.
IL............................ IEMA management 63,000.00
costs.
OH............................ Ohio EMA TA/ 257,884.00
Management Cost.
WI............................ State PDM-C 132,609.00
Management Costs.
AR............................ Technical Assistance/ 283,916.15
Management Costs 2.
IA............................ State of Iowa 53,177.54
Management Costs
Application.
CO............................ State of Colorado TA/ 56,250.00
Management Costs.
UT............................ State of Utah PDM-C 50,000.04
Management Costs.
WY............................ State of Wyoming 23,902.73
PDMC-2003 Technical
Assistance.
American Samoa................ Territorial 281,665.00
Emergency
Management
Coordinating Office/
American Samoa.
AZ............................ AZ Division of 62,274.00
Emergency PDM
Management Grant.
CA............................ State of California 854,215.14
Technical
Assistance/
Management Cost
Application.
Cortina Indian Rancheria...... Cortina Indian 8,347.50
Rancheria
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan
Management Costs--
Final.
Northern Mariana Islands...... CNMI Management 12,029.20
Costs PDM-C 2003.
Confederated Tribes of the Unatilla Indian 5,558.22
Umatilla Indian Reservation. Reservation Multi-
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
ID............................ Idaho State 3,000.00
Management.
Skokomish Indian Tribe........ Sub grant Technical 12,823.30
Assistance
Application.
WA............................ Washington State 37,500.00
Technical
Assistance/
Management Costs.
---------------
Total Management Costs for .................... 4,682,582.21
Fiscal Year 2003 PDM
Competitive.
---------------
Total Obligated for Fiscal .................... 94,345,013.15
Year 2003 PDM Competitive.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FISCAL YEAR 2003 PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWARDED FEDERAL
SUB-APPLICANT SHARE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PLANS AND PROJECTS RECIPIENT:
CA.......................... San Jose State $99,957
University.
CA.......................... University of 67,100
California-
Berkeley.
CA.......................... University of 100,000
Southern
California.
CO.......................... University of 100,000
Colorado-Boulder.
FL.......................... University of Miami 226,500
FL.......................... Florida 100,000
Agricultural &
Mechanical
University (FAMU).
FL.......................... Florida 99,759
International
University (FIU).
GA.......................... University System 100,000
of Georgia.
KY.......................... University of 94,958
Louisville.
LA.......................... Tulane Power Plant. 18,113
LA.......................... Southern University 100,000
(LA).
LA.......................... University of New 99,750
Orleans.
MA.......................... Colleges of the 100,000
Fenway.
MA.......................... Mass. Institute of 99,750
Tech.
MO.......................... Metropolitan 100,000
Community College.
MS.......................... University of 75,000
Mississippi.
NC.......................... UNC-Wilmington..... 80,000
NC.......................... UNC-Wilmington..... 24,000
NC.......................... UNC-Wilmington..... 57,000
NC.......................... UNC-Wilmington..... 110,000
ND.......................... North Dakota State 100,000
University.
ND.......................... IT Sitting Bull 100,000
College.
NV.......................... University of 50,000
Nevada-Reno.
OH.......................... University of Akron 100,000
OK.......................... University of 75,000
Central Oklahoma.
OR.......................... University of 100,000
Oregon.
SC.......................... Horry-Georgetown 89,002
Tech.
TN.......................... University of 100,000
Memphis.
TX.......................... Texas State 75,000
Technical College.
TX.......................... Texas University- 97,500
Medical Center.
VA.......................... Radford University. 31,500
VA.......................... Virginia State 75,000
University.
VA.......................... Virginia Tech...... 75,000
WA.......................... University of 200,000
Washington-Seattle.
WA.......................... University of 300,000
Washington-Seattle.
------------------
Total Plans and Projects ................... 3,419,889
for Fiscal Year 2003
Disaster Resistant
Universities.
==================
MANAGEMENT COSTS:
MA.......................... Massachusetts 20,625
Emergency
Management Agency.
GA.......................... Georgia Emergency 10,000
Management Agency.
KY.......................... Kentucky State 3,749
Emergency
Management.
NC.......................... North Carolina 27,100
State Emergency
Management.
TN.......................... Tennessee State 10,000
Emergency
Management.
OK.......................... OK Emergency 7,500
Management.
CO.......................... CO Emergency 10,000
Management.
CA.......................... CA Emergency 26,706
Management.
------------------
Total Management Costs for ................... 115,680
Fiscal Year 2003 DRU.
------------------
Total Obligated for Fiscal ................... 3,535,569
Year 2003 Disaster
Resistant Universities.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FISCAL YEAR 2003 PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
REGION RECIPIENT AWARDED FEDERAL SHARE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1............................ CT.............. $248,375
1............................ ME.............. 248,375
1............................ MA.............. 248,375
1............................ NH.............. 248,375
1............................ RI.............. 248,375
1............................ VT.............. 248,375
2............................ NY.............. 248,375
2............................ NJ.............. 248,375
2............................ PR.............. 248,375
2............................ VI.............. 248,375
3............................ DE.............. 248,375
3............................ MD.............. 248,375
3............................ PA.............. 248,375
3............................ VA.............. 248,375
3............................ DC.............. 248,375
4............................ AL.............. 248,375
4............................ FL.............. 248,375
4............................ GA.............. 248,375
4............................ KY.............. 248,375
4............................ MS.............. 248,375
4............................ NC.............. 248,375
4............................ SC.............. 248,375
4............................ TN.............. 248,375
5............................ IL \1\.......... 225,820
5............................ IN.............. 248,375
5............................ MI.............. 248,375
5............................ MN.............. 248,375
5............................ OH.............. 248,375
5............................ WI.............. 248,375
6............................ LA.............. 248,375
6............................ NM.............. 248,375
6............................ OK.............. 248,375
6............................ AR.............. 248,375
6............................ TX.............. 248,375
7............................ IA.............. 248,375
7............................ MO.............. 248,375
7............................ NE \1\.......... 172,256
7............................ KS.............. 248,375
8............................ CO.............. 248,375
8............................ MT.............. 248,375
8............................ ND.............. 248,375
8............................ SD.............. 248,375
8............................ UT.............. 248,375
8............................ WY.............. 248,375
9............................ AZ.............. 248,375
9............................ CA.............. 248,375
9............................ NV.............. 248,375
9............................ HI.............. 248,375
9............................ American Samoa.. 248,375
9............................ Guam............ 248,375
10........................... WA.............. 248,375
10........................... OR.............. 248,375
10........................... ID.............. 248,375
10........................... AK.............. 248,375
------------------------
Total Obligated for ................ 13,313,576
Fiscal Year 2003
Planning.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Recipients did not request full award amount ($248,375).
FISCAL YEAR 2005 PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBGRANT TITLE AWARDED FED SHARE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PLANS AND PROJECTS RECIPIENT:
CT.......................... Central Naugatuck $101,050.00
Valley Council of
Governments Pre-
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
CT.......................... Capitol Region Pre- 322,500.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
CT.......................... NWCCOG-PDM2005..... 40,856.63
CT.......................... City of New Haven 22,500.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
MA.......................... Ell Pond Flood 1,745,700.00
Hazard Mitigation
Project.
MA.......................... Merrimack Valley 73,650.00
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
MA.......................... Pioneer Valley Pre- 224,962.50
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
MA.......................... Metro Boston North/ 206,868.75
West Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
MA.......................... Dukes County Pre- 30,000.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
MA.......................... City of Newburyport 23,700.00
All Hazard
Mitigation
Planning Project.
MA.......................... Central 112,500.00
Massachusetts
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
MA.......................... Pre-Disaster 11,249.99
Natural Hazard
Mitigation Plans
for Hawley and
Heath.
MA.......................... Nantucket All- 44,253.00
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
MA.......................... Massachusetts MH 111,100.00
Planning Grant on
behalf of
Northeastern
University.
ME.......................... Town of Canton Pre- 3,000,000.00
Disaster
Acquisition and
Demolition of
Floodplain
Properties.
NH.......................... City of Claremont, 112,500.00
NH Culvert
Project--Sugar
River Drive.
NH.......................... Regional Planning 400,200.00
Hazard Mitigation.
NH.......................... Fire Hazard 120,000.00
Mitigation
Enhancement Plan,
Statewide NH.
NH.......................... Water Resource 134,810.00
Planning for
Improved Emergency
Response for
Firefighting in NH.
VT.......................... VT Fluvial Erosion 337,497.62
Hazard Risk
Assessment.
VT.......................... Norwich University 41,346.11
Disaster Resistant
Planning.
NJ.......................... Hudson County Local 880,000.00
Mitigation
Strategy.
NJ.......................... Essex County Multi- 1,176,187.50
Jurisdictional
Mitigation
Strategy.
NY.......................... Town of Rockland NY 1,115,250.00
Property
Acquisition
Project.
NY.......................... Town of Rockland 122,663.62
Storm water
Management Culvert
Mitigation Project.
NY.......................... Village of Fairport 133,705.87
Blackwatch
Subdivision--Under
ground Electrical
Conversion.
NY.......................... Village of Port 22,500.00
Chester Multi-
Hazard Local
Mitigation Plan.
NY.......................... Town of 140,000.00
Southampton;
Prepare Town-wide
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
NY.......................... County of Albany, 75,000.00
New York
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
NY.......................... Town of Woodbury 50,625.00
N.Y. Multihazard
Mitigation Project.
NY.......................... Town of 24,000.00
Eastchester, N.Y.
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
NY.......................... Genesee County All 60,002.77
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
NY.......................... Orleans County 45,000.00
Multihazard
Multiple
Jurisdictional
Mitigation Project.
NY.......................... Pelham Village 25,012.50
Comprehensive
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
NY.......................... Rensselaer County 41,056.00
Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
NY.......................... Suffolk County All- 1,117,904.25
Hazard Multi-
jurisdictional Pre-
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
NY.......................... Briarcliff Manor's 45,562.50
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
NY.......................... Broome County Multi- 75,000.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
NY.......................... Town of Islip 93,750.00
Multihazard
Mitigation
Planning Project.
NYIT........................ Seneca Nation 108,750.00
Multihazard
Mitigation
Planning.
MD.......................... Prince George's 967,305.00
County Tor Bryan
Estates.
MD.......................... University of 178,425.00
Maryland College
Park Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
PA.......................... Lebanon County 43,930.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
PA.......................... County of Montour 48,000.00
Multi-
jurisdictional
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
PA.......................... Building Disaster 1,694,257.25
Resistant
Universities for
the PA State
System of Higher
Ed.
PA.......................... Snyder County 27,000.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan Project.
PA.......................... County of 45,416.64
Huntingdon
Multihazard Multi-
jurisdictional
Mitigation Plan.
PA.......................... Berks County Multi- 90,000.00
jurisdictional
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
PA.......................... Blair County Hazard 27,855.68
Mitigation Plan.
PA.......................... Armstrong County 105,000.00
Multi-
Jurisdictional
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
PA.......................... Clarion County 38,465.00
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
VA.......................... George Mason 112,500.00
University All-
Hazards Mitigation
Planning.
VA.......................... Expanding and 205,185.00
Revising
Chesapeake's
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
FL.......................... University of Miami 350,174.99
RSMAS Marine
Campus Hurricane
Retrofit.
FL.......................... Jackson Health 125,642.96
System--Ambulatory
Care Center--East.
FL.......................... Jackson Health 411,945.48
System--Ambulatory
Care Center--West.
FL.......................... Jackson Health 394,664.40
System--West Wing.
FL.......................... Jackson Health 168,168.55
System--Central
Wing.
FL.......................... Jackson Health 310,641.58
System--South Wing.
FL.......................... University of Miami 2,214,674.99
School of Medicine
Hurricane Retrofit
(Multiple).
FL.......................... Jackson Health 82,150.68
System--North Wing.
FL.......................... Jackson Health 1,404,397.15
System--East Tower.
FL.......................... Jackson Health 670,029.33
System--Mental
Health (Highland
Pa- vilion).
FL.......................... Jackson Health 413,526.79
System--Rehabilita
tion Building.
FL.......................... Jackson Health 296,373.67
System--Rehabilita
tion Annex.
FL.......................... Jackson Health 295,326.82
System--Institute
Building.
FL.......................... Roof Reinforcement/ 119,250.00
Cutler Ridge
District Station.
FL.......................... City of North Miami 37,500.00
Police Facility
Window Replacement
Project.
FL.......................... Miami Children's 395,687.21
Hospital Pre-
Disaster Wind
Mitigation Project.
FL.......................... Miami Children's 55,933.00
Hospital
Satellite, Pre-
Disaster Wind
Mitigation Project.
FL.......................... Eckerd College 117,750.00
Mitigation Plan/
Risk Assessment.
GA.......................... DeKalb County--JAX 2,827,165.50
SQUARE ACQ1.
GA.......................... DeKalb County-- 2,625,750.00
15ACQ.
GA.......................... DeKalb County--JAX 942,388.50
SQUARE ACQ2.
GA.......................... City of Warner 96,622.00
Robins Acquisition
Project.
GA.......................... City of Savannah 741,384.47
Acquisition
Demolition 2005
Project.
GA.......................... City of Atlanta 1,076,772.75
Acquisition--Fisca
l Year 2005--PDM.
GA.......................... City of Atlanta 1,634,372.66
Elevation--Fiscal
Year 2005--PDM.
GA.......................... State of Georgia 301,875.00
Multi-Hazard
Planning
Application.
NC.......................... Acquisition & 337,881.00
Demolition in
Myers Park Manor--
Charlotte, NC.
NC.......................... Acquisition & 2,113,660.50
Demolition along
Cullman Ave.--
Charlotte, NC.
NC.......................... UNCW Mitigation 13,500.00
Plan.
NC.......................... North Carolina DEM 319,794.00
Grant to Update
State 322 Plan.
NC.......................... UNC-CH 2005 PDM 339,087.80
planning app 2.
SC.......................... Low country COG 8,781.00
Inclusion of all
Communities into
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
TN.......................... Rutherford County 1,116,112.50
Greenwood
Acquisition
Project 2005.
TN.......................... Rutherford County 583,912.50
Twin Oaks
Acquisition
Project 2005.
TN.......................... Metro Nashville 1,971,765.00
2005 Home Buyout.
TN.......................... Giles County Hazard 30,000.00
Mitigation Plan.
TN.......................... University of 56,250.00
Tennessee
Multihazard
Mitigation
Planning Project.
IL.......................... DuPage County, 75,000.00
Illinois Natural
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
IN.......................... Town of Dyer Multi- 30,000.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
IN.......................... City of Hammond 37,500.00
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
IN.......................... Hancock County 30,000.00
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
IN.......................... DeKalb County Multi- 30,000.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
IN.......................... Noble County Multi- 30,000.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
IN.......................... Steuben County 30,000.00
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
IN.......................... Indiana's Boundary 1,821,750.00
River Mitigation
Planning
Initiative.
MI.......................... Robinson Township 2,428,156.50
PDM Property
Acquisition
Project 1.
MI.......................... Robinson Township 2,654,815.50
PDM Acquisition 2.
MI.......................... Michigan 56,250.00
Technological
University
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
MN.......................... McLeod County All 24,750.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
MN.......................... Douglas County All 24,750.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
MN.......................... Grant County All 24,750.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
MN.......................... Wabasha County All 23,273.22
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
WI.......................... City of Darlington 187,500.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Project.
WI.......................... Marinette County 37,500.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
WI.......................... Waupaca County 33,918.00
Mitigation
Planning.
WI.......................... Brown County All- 74,994.00
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
WI.......................... Manitowoc County 71,349.00
All-Hazards
Mitigation Plan.
WI.......................... Waushara County All- 35,250.00
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
WI.......................... Lafayette County 15,874.50
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
WI.......................... Sheboygan County 39,750.00
All-Hazards
Mitigation Plan.
WI.......................... Jackson County 45,000.00
Wisconsin
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
WI.......................... Dunn County Natural 30,000.00
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
WI.......................... Forest County All 22,500.00
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
WI.......................... Langlade County All 22,500.00
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
WI.......................... La Crosse County 60,000.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
WI.......................... Buffalo County 45,000.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
WI.......................... Wisconsin Emergency 141,818.00
Management
Planning
Application.
WI.......................... Iron County 40,152.00
Wisconsin Pre-
Disaster
Mitigation Plan
Development.
WI.......................... Jefferson County 45,000.00
Multi-Hazards
Mitigation Plan.
WI.......................... Ozaukee County 37,500.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
AR.......................... Fort Smith School 531,329.97
District Safe Room
at Carnall Elem-
entary.
AR.......................... Fort Smith School 531,329.97
District Morrison
Elementary Safe
Room.
AR.......................... Van Buren School 1,129,368.75
District High
School Safe Room.
AR.......................... Mansfield School 412,077.00
District High
School Safe Room.
AR.......................... Alma School 1,056,555.58
District Safe Room
Application.
AR.......................... Mansfield School 412,077.00
District Middle
School Safe Room.
AR.......................... Fort Smith School 531,329.97
District Cavanaugh
Elementary Safe
Room.
AR.......................... Johnson County 30,000.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
AR.......................... Pope County Hazard 30,000.00
Mitigation Plan.
OK.......................... Caddo Kiowa 440,999.90
Technology Center,
Fort Cobb,
Oklahoma, Safe
Room Construction.
OK.......................... City of Dewey Multi- 13,500.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
OK.......................... City of Stillwater 60,000.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
OK.......................... Tulsa County Multi- 60,000.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
OK.......................... City of Guymon 15,000.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
OK.......................... City of Sand 39,999.50
Springs Multi-
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
OK.......................... City of Ada Multi- 30,000.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
OK.......................... City of Okmulgee 30,000.00
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
OK.......................... City of Holdenville 15,000.00
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
OK.......................... McLoud School 19,999.99
Natural Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
OK.......................... City of Muskogee 75,000.00
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
OK.......................... City of Tahlequah 21,000.00
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
TX.......................... City of Nacogdoches 226,831.56
Property
Acquisition
Project.
TX.......................... Travis County 386,486.04
Acquisition/
Demolition--12
Homes in Timber
Creek.
TX.......................... Pilot List 2,666,167.06
Application #1.
TX.......................... Pilot List 2,455,071.76
Application #2.
TX.......................... Pilot List 2,645,354.48
Application #3.
TX.......................... Pilot List 2,120,046.52
Application #4
Pasadena.
TX.......................... Acquisition and 1,855,157.53
Demolition 1.
TX.......................... Acquisition and 2,215,919.64
Demolition 2.
TX.......................... Acquisition and 2,542,723.31
Demolition 3.
TX.......................... Acquisition and 2,657,445.36
Demolition 4.
TX.......................... City of Laredo 73,230.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Project.
TX.......................... City of Southlake 30,000.00
HAZMAP.
TX.......................... City of Arlington 166,545.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Action
Plan.
IA.......................... City of Forest City 43,200.00
Flood Mitigation
Project.
IA.......................... City of Hampton 45,936.21
Project to Protect
Critical
Facilities From
Flooding.
IA.......................... Council Bluffs- 362,396.25
Valley View Drive
Acquisition.
IA.......................... City of Davenport 10,710.00
PDM Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Kossuth County Pre- 6,375.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Pre-Disaster 11,999.96
Mitigation
Planning--Mills
County, Malvern,
and Hastings, Iowa.
IA.......................... Iowa 322 Update.... 163,200.00
IA.......................... Pre-Disaster 30,148.00
Mitigation
Planning--Seven
Pottawattamie
County Cities.
IA.......................... City of Tripoli 5,250.00
Local Hazard
Mitigation Plan
Application.
IA.......................... City of Clear Lake 6,375.00
Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... City of Britt Pre- 6,375.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... City of Northwood 6,375.00
Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... City of Lenox 2,250.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Wapello County 31,997.35
Multi-Jurisdiction
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Springbrook Pre- 2,835.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Union County 8,999.40
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Charlotte Pre- 3,645.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Ringgold County 10,000.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... City of Shellsburg, 3,000.00
Iowa, Pre Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Lost Nation Pre- 3,645.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Low Moor Pre- 3,645.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Peosta Pre-Disaster 3,645.00
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Sageville Pre- 3,645.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Delhi Pre-Disaster 3,645.00
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... LaMotte Pre- 3,645.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... City of Stuart Pre- 3,375.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Ames All-Hazards 58,406.65
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... City of Norway, 3,000.00
Iowa, Pre Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Davis County Multi- 19,989.90
Jurisdiction Multi-
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
IA.......................... City of Mason City 7,500.00
Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Clayton County, 6,375.00
Iowa, Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Plan
Update.
IA.......................... City of Oxford 1,500.00
Junction
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... City of Luzerne, 3,000.00
Iowa, Pre Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Story County, Iowa, 33,777.97
Multi-
Jurisdictional
Multihazard
Mitigation Plans.
IA.......................... Welton Pre-Disaster 2,835.00
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Delmar Pre-Disaster 3,645.00
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... City of Ayrshire 3,750.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... City of Kimballton 2,625.00
Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... City of Vail Pre- 2,000.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Sherrill Pre- 2,835.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Akron Pre-Disaster 3,150.00
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Plymouth County Pre- 4,500.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... City of Merrill Pre- 4,500.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Graf Pre-Disaster 2,835.00
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Lee County Pre- 34,687.00
Disaster
Mitigation
Planning Project.
IA.......................... Louisa County Pre- 34,686.00
Disaster
Mitigation
Planning Project.
IA.......................... City of Ruthven 3,750.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... Polk County Multi- 150,579.53
jurisdictional
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... City of Truesdale 3,750.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... City of Lakeside 3,750.00
Multihazard
Mitigation
Planning Grant.
IA.......................... City of Sheldon 6,000.00
Multi-hazard Pre-
Disaster Plan.
IA.......................... City of Westfield 3,150.00
Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
IA.......................... City of Madrid, 6,000.00
Flood Mitigation
Project.
KS.......................... Sedgwick County 237,000.00
Public Safety
Center.
KS.......................... Ottawa County, Ks. 4,248.75
Mitigation Plan.
MO.......................... Pierce City School- 973,017.36
Shelter.
MO.......................... City of Brentwood 592,500.00
Property Buyout
Mitigation.
MO.......................... City of 1,713,319.00
Independence Power
& Light PDM 2005-
2008.
MO.......................... Willow Springs R-4 656,580.00
High School and
Middle School
Tornado Shelter.
MO.......................... City of Butler 31,500.00
Mobile Home Park
Shelter.
MO.......................... West Plains R-VII 2,050,324.54
School District
Tornado Shelter.
MO.......................... City of Houston, 145,612.50
Missouri Flood
Loss Prevention
Buyout Project.
MO.......................... Smith Hatchery Road 48,750.00
Bank Stabilization
Project.
MO.......................... Blue River 1,273,630.50
Community Safe
Room.
MO.......................... Sullivan County 336,942.00
Missouri Bridge
Mitigation Project.
MO.......................... Clay County/ 120,727.00
Paradise Pointe
Marina Tornado
Shelter.
MO.......................... Seymour Special 140,335.12
Road District
Skyline Bridge.
MO.......................... Clay County/Camp 120,727.00
Branch Marina
Shelter.
MO.......................... Longview CC 2,553,285.50
Community Safe
Room.
MO.......................... Maple Woods 2,398,602.75
Community Safe
Room.
MO.......................... Penn Valley 3,000,000.00
Community Safe
Room.
MO.......................... BTC Community Safe 993,852.75
Room.
MO.......................... University of 79,317.41
Missouri--Rolla
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
MO.......................... Kansas City Metro 88,702.50
Area Storm Shelter
Plan.
NE.......................... Village of Elmwood 1,687.50
All-Hazards
Mitigation Plan.
NE.......................... Village of South 2,250.00
Bend All-Hazards
Mitigation Plan.
NE.......................... Hall County All- 68,389.96
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
CO.......................... North Cheyenne 71,754.26
Canyon Fuels
Mitigation Project.
CO.......................... Regional Detention 3,000,000.00
Pond at Police
Station 2 (38th &
Holly).
CO.......................... City of Colorado 217,632.00
Springs Landslide
Damaged Homes
Acquisition and
Removal-2 Homes.
CO.......................... Grand County Pre 22,721.25
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
CO.......................... Montrose County 70,875.00
Mitigation Plan.
CO.......................... Jefferson County, 225,000.00
Colorado.
CO.......................... Colorado PDM-C 80,000.00
Planning Grant
Fiscal Year 2005.
MT.......................... Remaining and 208,500.00
Unfunded Montana
Communities
Planning Grant
Application.
MT.......................... Montana University 255,016.60
System Multi-
Hazard Planning.
ND.......................... North Dakota 345 kV 1,511,250.00
Transmission
Structure
Replacement.
ND.......................... City of Fargo Drain 987,000.00
10 Flood
Mitigation.
SD.......................... Marshall County Pre- 7,012.50
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
SD.......................... Kingsbury County 7,012.50
Pre Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
SD.......................... Clark County 7,012.50
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
SD.......................... Grant County 9,000.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
SD.......................... Miner County 7,012.50
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
SD.......................... Charles Mix County 4,968.75
Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
SD.......................... Spink County Multi- 5,250.00
hazard Mitigation
Plan.
SD.......................... McPherson County 7,012.50
Pre Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
SD.......................... Faulk County Pre 7,012.50
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
SD.......................... Day County Pre 9,000.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
SD.......................... Roberts County Pre 9,000.00
Disaster
Mitigation Plan.
SD.......................... Perkins County 4,500.00
Multi-hazard,
Multi-
jurisdictional Pre-
disaster
Mitigation Plan.
UT.......................... City of Orem Fire 75,000.00
Station 1 Seismic
Retrofit--300 East
1000 South, Orem,
UT.
UT.......................... City of Orem Fire 75,000.00
Station 2 Seismic
Retrofit--911
North Main St.
Orem, UT.
UT.......................... Layton City Fire 268,608.75
Station
Reconstruction &
Retrofit.
UT.......................... JVWTP Structural 1,791,750.00
Seismic Retrofit.
UT.......................... Utah Enhanced PDM 131,187.50
Plan Grant
Application.
UT.......................... University of Utah 537,340.77
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
WY.......................... City of Cheyenne 2,764,684.31
Dry Creek Sheridan
Reach Flood
Control Project.
WY.......................... Campbell County, 18,750.00
City of Gillette,
Town of Wright
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
WY.......................... Pre-disaster 15,000.00
Mitigation Plan
for Lincoln Co.,
WY.
WY.......................... Sublette County 6,000.00
Multihazard
Mitigation Project.
WY.......................... Northwest College 19,875.00
Mitigation Plan.
WY.......................... Update and 21,420.00
Expansion of
Wyoming Multi-
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
AZ.......................... State of Arizona 56,250.00
Mitigation Plan
Input into AzHMPS.
AZ.......................... Hazard Mitigation 231,000.00
Planning for
Tribal Governments.
CA.......................... Pasadena City Hall 3,000,000.00
Seismic Upgrade &
Rehabilitation
Project.
CA.......................... City of Huntington 3,000,000.00
Beach Ca. Civic
Center Seismic Ret-
rofit.
CA.......................... SF Bay Area Rapid 2,999,999.98
Transit District
Mitigation Project.
CA.......................... University of 3,000,000.00
California San
Francisco Medical
Center Seismic Saw-
Cut Project.
CA.......................... Joseph P. Bort 2,976,000.00
Metro Center
Seismic Retrofit
Mitigation Project
(Oakland, CA).
CA.......................... City of Santa Clara 1,268,801.99
at Grade Water
Tanks Seismic
Retrofit
Mitigation Project.
CA.......................... Cucamonga Valley 48,436.64
Water District,
Reservoir Site 1B,
Seismic Mitigation
Project.
CA.......................... Western Municipal 116,895.00
Water District
Seismic
Mitigation--New
Lurin Reservoir.
CA.......................... Western Municipal 119,092.50
Water District
Seismic
Mitigation--La
Sierra Reservoir.
CA.......................... Victor Valley Water 201,000.00
District Seismic
Mitigation--Zone
#2.
CA.......................... Western Municipal 116,895.00
Water District
Seismic
Mitigation--Markha
m Reservoir.
CA.......................... Western Municipal 116,895.00
Water District
Seismic
Mitigation--Jim
Jack Reservoir.
CA.......................... Western Municipal 116,895.00
Water District
Seismic
Mitigation--Roosev
elt Reservoir.
CA.......................... Cal State 862,425.00
University San
Bernardino
Physical Sciences
Seismic Mitigation
Project.
CA.......................... Hall of Justice 2,067,577.50
West Courthouse
Seismic Hazard
Miti- gation.
CA.......................... Los Gatos 1,008,350.25
Courthouse Seismic
Hazard Mitigation.
CA.......................... Palo Alto 236,514.00
Courthouse Seismic
Hazard Mitigation.
CA.......................... Cal State San 850,570.75
Bernardino
Biological
Sciences Seismic
Mitigation Project.
CA.......................... Cal Poly Pomona 2,166,354.00
Science 3 Seismic
Mitigation Project.
CA.......................... Cucamonga Valley 109,496.98
Water District,
Reservoir Site 1C,
Seismic Mitigation
Project.
CA.......................... Cucamonga Valley 35,973.82
Water District,
Reservoir Site 4B,
Seismic Mitigation
Project.
CA.......................... Cucamonga Valley 26,841.52
Water District,
Reservoir Site 5B,
Seismic Mitigation
Project.
CA.......................... Cucamonga Valley 31,407.67
Water District,
Reservoir Site 6C,
Seismic Mitigation
Project.
CA.......................... Victor Valley Water 137,250.00
District Seismic
Mitigation--Zone
#3.
CA.......................... County of Butte 122,155.98
Multi-
Jurisdictional
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
CA.......................... Arroyo Grande, 51,281.25
Grover Beach, and
Lucia Mar Unified
School District
PDM.
CA.......................... City of Palmdale 98,325.00
Local Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
CA.......................... Fresno County Local 230,951.34
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
CA.......................... Amador County Multi- 43,875.00
jurisdictional
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
CA.......................... City of San Marcos 124,500.00
Wildland Urban
Interface Hazard
and Risk
Assessment.
CA.......................... City of La Canada 45,000.00
Flintridge
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
CA.......................... City of Pismo Beach 48,750.00
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
CA.......................... Humboldt County 117,000.00
Multi-Agency Multi-
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
CA.......................... Mendocino Emergency 142,124.42
Services
Multihazard
Mitigation Project.
CA.......................... CA MHMP Enhancement 624,325.00
for Alluvial Fan
Flood Hazards.
CA.......................... City of Tustin-- 56,250.00
Local Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
CA.......................... City of Yuba City 30,000.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
CA.......................... La Habra Local 56,250.00
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
CA.......................... City of Mill Valley 26,600.29
Hazard Mitigation
Planning Grant.
CA.......................... City of Novato 39,758.25
Multi Hazard
Mitigation
Planning Project.
CA.......................... City of Larkspur 37,499.76
Hazard Mitigation
Planning Grant.
CA.......................... Clovis Unified 58,974.00
School District
Multi-hazard
Mitigation Plan
Development.
CA.......................... Santa Barbara 61,425.00
School Districts
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
CA.......................... Imperial County 101,368.50
Multi-
Jurisdictional
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
CA.......................... Eastern Municipal 56,250.00
Water District
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
CAIT........................ Picayune Rancheria 51,480.00
Mitigation
Planning.
CAIT........................ PDM-C.............. 112,800.03
CAIT........................ Blue Lake Rancheria 55,338.75
Mitigation Plan.
CAIT........................ Pauma-Yuima Band of 46,170.00
Mission Indians
HMP.
CAIT........................ Santa Ynez Tribal 60,657.00
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
CAIT........................ Pala Band of 76,500.00
Mission Indians
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
HI.......................... County of Kauai-- 135,000.00
Dev of New Wind
Design Code
Provisions and
Risk Assess Plan.
HI.......................... University of 261,821.00
Hawaii System
Multihazard
Mitigation Pro-
ject.
NV.......................... State of Nevada 60,063.50
HAZUS-MH Planning
Grant.
NVIT........................ Pyramid Lake Paiute 19,500.00
Tribe Pre-disaster
Mitigation
Planning Project.
AK.......................... Hooper Bay and 14,040.00
Paimiut All
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
AK.......................... Dillingham Hazard 7,515.30
Mitigation Plan.
AK.......................... Kodiak Island 41,723.25
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
AK.......................... Lake & Peninsula 19,416.75
Borough Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
ID.......................... Caribou County 22,500.00
Public Safety All
Hazard Mitigation
Plan- ning.
ID.......................... Twin Falls County 41,250.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
ID.......................... Gooding County 41,250.00
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
ID.......................... Cassia County All 41,250.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
ID.......................... North East Idaho 337,530.00
Regional
Multihazard
Mitigation Plan.
ID.......................... Idaho State Hazard 201,503.84
Mitigation Plan
2008.
ID.......................... Lincoln County 41,250.00
Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
ID.......................... Camas County Multi- 41,250.00
Hazard Mitigation
Plan.
IDIT........................ Duck Valley Indian 35,025.00
Reservation All
Hazard Plan.
OR.......................... Clackamas River 1,570,836.00
Water System
Seismic and Ice
Storm Retrofit
Project.
OR.......................... Douglas County/ 731,512.50
Roseburg Public
Schools Seismic
Mitigation Project.
OR.......................... City of Beaverton 1,015,087.50
City Hall Seismic
Upgrade.
OR.......................... Scappoose Fire 162,750.00
Station Seismic
Upgrade.
OR.......................... City of Lake Oswego 187,500.00
Seismic Upgrade
Grant Application.
OR.......................... Columbia River Fire 281,400.00
& Rescue Fire
Stations Seismic
Ret- rofit.
OR.......................... University 1,977,996.00
Demonstration
Projects: OSU and
WOU.
OR.......................... Mid-Columbia & 932,237.25
Southeast Oregon
Multi-Jurisdiction
Mitigation Plan
Development.
ORIT........................ Burns Paiute Tribe-- 42,267.50
Multihazard
Mitigation Project.
WA.......................... S. Lake Union 534,921.75
Armory Seismic
Upgrade.
WA.......................... Frances Anderson 782,190.00
Center.
WA.......................... School Seismic 3,000,000.00
Retrofits.
WA.......................... Cedar River/Rainbow 1,212,127.50
Bend Acquisition.
WA.......................... City of Westport, 30,000.00
Washington Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
WA.......................... Whitman County 111,728.46
Multi-
Jurisdictional
Natural Hazards
Mitigation Plan.
WA.......................... Washington State 377,619.00
University
Statewide Hazard
Mitigation
Planning Project.
WA.......................... Washington State 493,125.12
Region 5 (Pierce
County) Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
WA.......................... Grant County Multi- 40,458.91
jurisdictional
Hazard Mitigation
Planning Sub grant.
WAIT001..................... Pre-Disaster 111,685.80
Mitigation Update
Project.
WAIT004..................... Tulalip Reservation 17,200.00
State-level Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
WAIT005..................... Sauk-Suiattle 16,959.96
Indian Tribe All
Hazards Mitigation
Plan.
------------------
Total Plans & Projects for ................... 148,741,988.18
Fiscal Year 2005 PDM.
==================
MANAGEMENT COSTS RECIPIENT:
CT.......................... CT 2005 PDM 48,691.16
Management Costs.
MA.......................... Commonwealth of 448,408.00
Massachusetts 2005
PDM-C Management
Costs Application.
ME.......................... Maine Management 196,816.50
Costs PDM-C 2005.
NH.......................... New Hampshire State 86,962.50
2005 Management.
GA.......................... GA State Management 777,179.00
Costs.
NC.......................... NC State Management 312,392.39
Costs.
SC.......................... SC State Management 211,800.00
Costs.
TN.......................... Tennessee 2005 PDM 75,000.00
Technical
Assistance.
MI.......................... State of Michigan 185,309.50
2005 PDM
Management Costs.
WI.......................... State PDM-C 112,740.00
Management Costs.
IA.......................... State of Iowa 2005 118,888.92
Management Costs.
ND.......................... State of North 249,825.00
Dakota Technical
Assistance Grant.
SD.......................... State of South 8,379.75
Dakota-Office of
Emergency
Management.
UT.......................... State Management 137,064.68
Cost for fiscal
year 2005.
WY.......................... Wyoming Office of 23,715.00
Homeland Security
fiscal year 2005
PDM--C Management.
ORIT........................ Burns Paiute Tribe-- 3,566.25
Management
Oversight.
WAIT005..................... Hazard Management 1,694.70
Plan.
------------------
Total Management Costs for ................... 2,998,433.35
Fiscal Year 2005 PDM.
------------------
Total Obligated for Fiscal ................... 151,740,421.53
Year 2005 PDM.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. How have these projects proven themselves when disaster
strikes?
Answer. The Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program provides funds to
States, territories, Federally-recognized Indian tribal governments,
and communities for hazard mitigation planning and the implementation
of mitigation projects prior to a disaster event. The PDM program is
designed to reduce the risk to populations, structures, and critical
infrastructure from natural disasters.
These funds provide for the protection of lives and properties from
flood damage through acquisition, elevation, relocation, and/or flood
proofing; protection to critical facilities from flood damage through
drainage, infrastructure, and utilities projects; protection of
properties from hurricane wind damage; saving lives through the
construction of tornado storm shelters; protection to public facilities
against seismic damage; and providing the framework for communities to
analyze risk and better plan to protect their communities from
disasters.
The findings of the Multihazard Mitigation Council demonstrate that
on average, a dollar spent by FEMA on hazard mitigation (actions to
reduce disaster losses) grants provide the Nation about $4 in future
benefits. To date, PDM has provided $272.5 million to fund 709 hazard
mitigation plans and projects. Once PDM grants are implemented at the
local level, it generally takes several years to complete the hazard
mitigation activity. Since grant awards began in 2004, not enough time
has passed to evaluate actual PDM project performance. Below are
examples of activities that are ongoing with PDM funds across the
county.
Darlington, Wisconsin--All-Hazard Mitigation Plan and Acquisition
Project
Darlington began its success in PDM with a planning sub-grant in
2002 which resulted in the City's All-Hazard Mitigation Plan. With a
long history of damaging floods, the City is taking action to reduce
the number of repetitively flooded properties.
One of the latest projects funded through the PDM program is the
purchase and removal of a light industrial building located in the
floodway. Having flooded four times in the past 60 years, the building
has sustained structural and content damage as well as business
interruption losses. The building will be demolished and the site will
become part of the Pecatonica Riverside Park, which is heavily used by
the general public.
As of January 2006, 19 commercial buildings were flood proofed and
another 14 were purchased and removed from the floodplain, through PDM
and FEMA's other grant programs--the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
(HMGP) and Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) program.
Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami, Florida--Wind Mitigation
A total of 32 hurricanes have struck Southern Florida in the past
100 years. Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami is one of the Nation's
busiest hospitals, serving a population of 2.3 million. It is also the
major teaching facility for the University of Miami School of Medicine.
Jackson Memorial plans to harden its buildings against windstorms using
a ``see thru'' shutter system for doors and windows that are engineered
and installed to comply with local building codes.
Other structures in Miami Dade County that have been similarly
retrofitted have suffered only superficial damage, such as chipped
paint, during high-wind events, including Hurricanes Katrina and Wilma.
City of Birmingham, Alabama--Acquisition Project
The City of Birmingham has an aggressive goal to remove properties
that are subject to repeated flooding. Both the City of Birmingham and
the State of Alabama, with support from FEMA's Region IV Office, have
successfully used the PDM grant program to further this goal. In 2003,
Birmingham received a PDM grant of $2,490,315 to purchase 65 flood
vulnerable properties. The grant monies helped to relocate 55 families
and turn a hazardous area into recreational parkland in perpetuity.
Bay Area Rapid Transit District, California--Earthquake Mitigation
Project
In the highly seismic area of San Francisco, the Bay Area Rapid
Transit (BART) system, which carries over 310,000 commuters by fixed
rail and bus each workday, found its critical Train Operations Center
to be at significant risk of collapse and liable to fall in on the
underground portion of the building in the event of an earthquake.
BART is using its PDM grant to raze the above-ground portion of the
building and move the entire operation underground. This will reduce
the potential for damage, increase the safety of BART employees, and
help to maintain normal transportation routes for the Bay area
following an earthquake.
FEMA FUNDING LAPSE
Question. Are there plans to use the section 504 authority to
expedite hiring in fiscal year 2006? If not, why not?
Answer. FEMA plans to submit Congressional notification to use 50
percent of the unobligated balances remaining at the end of fiscal year
2005, as permitted by Section 504 of the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriation Act of 2005. These funds will be used to meet
priority resource needs including personnel expenses deferred due to
the response and recovery requirements for Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.
Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes a new
initiative that creates a new bureaucracy in the Preparedness
Directorate to do the same thing that FEMA used to do. The National
Preparedness Integration Program (NPIP) is proposed to fund improved
catastrophic planning; enhanced emergency communications systems; the
aligning of preparedness planning for Federal, State, and local command
and control processes; harmonized medical coordination; and development
of innovative ideas and methods for preparedness. This action appears
to widen the chasm between preparedness and recovery by stove-piping
FEMA and the Preparedness Directorate.
What is the overall strategy to ensure that meaningful and
effective planning efforts are coordinated among levels of government
and within the Department, that those in command and control know each
other prior to an incident, and that first responders have trained and
exercised together, before they respond to the next disaster--no matter
what the hazard?
Answer. Results of the Department's Second Stage Review (2SR)
separated the former Office of Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection (IAIP) into the new Office of Intelligence and Analysis
(I&A) and the Directorate for Preparedness. As acknowledged by the
Conferees to the fiscal year 2006 DHS Appropriation in the Conference
Report, the new Directorate for Preparedness will assess and prioritize
policies and operations to enhance preparedness for a natural disaster
or terrorist attack. The conferees directed the Directorate to work
with the Director of FEMA to continue an all-hazard approach for
preparation, response, and recovery to any type of disaster, and this
concerted approach is under way.
The overall strategy to ensure that meaningful and effective
planning efforts are coordinated among levels of government and within
the Department is summarized in the report, The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. The report recommends that DHS
should establish an interagency team of senior planners with
appropriate emergency management experience to conduct a comprehensive,
90-day review of the NRP and NIMS. As part of this review, all agencies
will be required to develop integrated operational plans, procedures
and capabilities for their support to the base NRP and all ESFs and
Support Annexes.
In addition, the Lessons Learned Report recommends that DHS
integrate and synchronize its preparedness functions by fully
implementing 2SR.
To ensure that those in command and control know each other prior
to an incident, and that first responders have trained and exercised
together before they respond to the next disaster, the NPIP will
install Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPCs). FPCs will execute
NPIP related activities at the local level. The mission of the NPIP is
to create, organize, enable and monitor initiatives to integrate and
synchronize national preparedness. The FPCs will play a key role in
achieving that mission given that National preparedness is only
possible when Federal, State, local and tribal governments, the private
sector and the American people are working collectively toward a shared
goal of enhanced preparedness.
Through the NPIP, FPCs will provide DHS with an important and
functional field presence to collaborate and build partnerships with
State and local government, and private sector homeland security
stakeholders within the FPC's assigned geographic areas of
responsibility and to ensure that these stakeholders are working
together and are thoroughly prepared. Currently, such field level
coordination is done on an ad hoc basis and DHS does not have always
have visibility into how high-risk areas are prepared to deal with
homeland security incidents.
FPCs will change that by providing vehicles for regular
coordination, strengthening the linkages between officials responsible
for responding to possible homeland security incidents. Our Nation
cannot afford for Federal, State and local government officials to have
to build working relationships and common approaches to incident
management amidst the fog of a major incident--such as Hurricane
Katrina or a pandemic influenza outbreak. Instead, these relationships
need to be built through frequent collaboration during steady State
activities, as well as through common, well-understood, and practiced
approaches to incident response prior to such an approach being needed.
Question. How does this budget reflect that strategy in a way that
funds will not lapse, the right people are working together, and
Americans are made safer?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 Budget Request funds the
strategy outlined above by directing spending through the NPIP to our
most urgent preparedness integration priorities. The NPIP will serve as
the Department's lead in coordinating, implementing, and monitoring
initiatives to integrate and synchronize national preparedness efforts
at the Federal level, the State and local levels, and throughout the
private sector.
RETOOLING OF FEMA
Question. On February 13, 2006, Secretary Chertoff announced a
retooling of FEMA. What resources are needed to accomplish each
outlined goal and where will the funds come from?
Answer. The first steps in FEMA retooling are being applied to the
current focus in FEMA's preparations for the upcoming hurricane season
through improvements to our response and recovery functions, such as
victim assistance, logistics, and communications.
Retooling initiatives in place or underway for the 2006 hurricane
season include:
--Implementation of Phase I of the Total Asset Visibility commodities
tracking program in Regions IV (AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN)
and VI (AR, LA, OK, NM, TX).
--Pre-positioning of emergency supplies through inter-agency
agreements with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and private
partners.
--Increased customer service capability through increased victim
registration capacity.
--Public Assistance and Individual Assistance Techncial Assistance
Contract improvements.
--Implementation of improved internal controls and anti-fraud
protections (ChoicePoint).
--Expanded housing inspection capacity.
--IT and facility improvements at both the Regions and Headquarters
for improved situational awareness.
--Implementation of a program to allow contractors to register on-
line to provide an immediately accessible, nationwide list of
resources for debris removal.
--Pre-designated mission assignments with other Federal entities to
facilitate immediate response requirements.
--Improved emergency communications capabilities including upgraded
and expanded Land Mobile Radios and High Frequency (HF)
equipment integration; and
--Implemented aggressive hiring initiatives to fill critical
vacancies.
The majority of funding for FEMA retooling and 2006 hurricane
season preparations is sourced from the Disaster Relief Fund. FEMA is
still in the process of refining these initiatives and identifying the
specific short and long-term costs.
LESSONS LEARNED
Question. In February 2006, the White House released a report, The
Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, with 125
recommendations. What resources are need to accomplish each outlined
goal and where will the funds come from?
Answer. The Department is currently engaged in comprehensive
efforts to identify lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina
response, both on its own and through an interagency working group.
Many of these lessons have already led to recommendations upon which
the Department is moving forward and implementing changes using
currently available resources and authority. Because of the timing of
the report, recommendations considered for implementation are not
specifically addressed in the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget. The
Department is identifying available resources within the fiscal year
2006 budget and considering options for fiscal year 2007 as review and
implementation work moves forward. We look forward to working with this
committee on any budgetary resource changes that may be needed in the
future.
Question. What legislative changes are needed to implement the
recommendations?
Answer. The Department is currently engaged in comprehensive
efforts to identify lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina
response, both on its own and through an interagency working group.
Many of these lessons have already led to recommendations upon which
the Department is moving forward and implementing changes. As this work
continues, the need for legislative changes to existing authorities may
emerge. We look forward to working with this committee on any
legislative changes which may be needed.
FEMA STAFFING
Question. How many FTEs, by Budget Activity (breaking out
Preparedness (Readiness), Mitigation Response and Recovery also), is
FEMA authorized to hire in fiscal year 2004, 2005 and 2006?
Answer.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal
Activity year 2004 year 2004 year 2005 year 2005 year 2006
authorized actual authorized actual enacted
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Readiness, Mitigation, Response, & Recovery:
Readiness.......................................... 377 295 377 271 176
Mitigation......................................... 105 92 105 90 95
Response........................................... 368 366 388 355 379
Recovery........................................... 194 163 194 165 172
--------------------------------------------------------
Total, RMRR...................................... 1,044 916 1,064 881 822
========================================================
Administrative & Regional Operations \1\............... 971 820 884 825 1,032
Public Health Programs................................. 91 83 40 88 40
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program \2\........ 90 77 90 78 .........
National Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund.................. 55 ......... 55 ......... 15
Disaster Relief........................................ 2,290 3,330 2,290 5,458 3,493
Cerro Grande Fire Claims............................... 12 10 5 2 .........
Flood Map Modernization Fund........................... 33 ......... 33 13 33
National Flood Insurance Fund.......................... 271 238 271 241 270
Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program Account........ 2 3 3 3 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Includes the Office of the Under Secretary.
\2\ REP was transferred to the Preparedness Directorate in fiscal year2006.
Question. How many were or are on board?
Answer. The chart below reflects the positions on board.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Fiscal year Fiscal year 2006 on board
Activity 2006 positions 2006 est. FTE as of February
18, 2006
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Readiness, Mitigation, Response, & Recovery:
Readiness................................................... 200 176 161
Mitigation.................................................. 104 95 87
Response.................................................... 427 379 330
Recovery.................................................... 181 172 156
-----------------------------------------------
Total, RMRR............................................... 912 822 734
===============================================
Administrative & Regional Operations............................ 1,072 1,032 749
National Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund........................... 55 15 ..............
Flood Map Modernization Fund.................................... 33 33 25
National Flood Insurance Fund................................... 270 270 237
Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program Account................. 3 3 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Excludes Disaster Relief Fund and Public Health Programs.
Question. How many vacancies will be filled by funds provided
through supplemental appropriations bills enacted after August 2005?
Answer. The supplemental appropriation (Public Law 109-148)
included 80 full time permanent positions and funding for the staffing
of the Gulf Region Acquisition Center and Office of the Chief Financial
Officer. The fiscal year 2007 request includes funding to support these
positions on a permanent basis. FEMA plans to fill all of the
positions.
FEMA FUNDING LAPSE
Question. In fiscal year 2005, FEMA lapsed $11 million, 6 percent,
of the funds in the Preparedness, Mitigation, Response and Recovery
account. What specifically were these funds to be used for and what did
not happen at FEMA because the funds were returned to the Treasury?
Answer. Because of FEMA's focus on responding to hurricanes
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, funding planned for Federal Incident Response
Support Teams (FIRSTs), medical surge efforts, and filling vacant
positions lapsed.
HURRICANE KATRINA CONTRACTS
Question. In response to Hurricane Katrina, how many FEMA contracts
were made?
Answer. FEMA awarded 3,479 contract actions.
Question. How many were sole sourced?
Answer. There were 227 new contracts that were sole source awards.
Question. Identify the cruise ships contracts. How many contracts
were made?
Answer. The Military Sealift Command awarded a total of four
contracts for cruise ships to support Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.
One contract was awarded to Scotia Prince Lines for the vessel SCOTIA
PRINCE. Carnival Cruise Lines was awarded three contracts for the
HOLIDAY, ECSTASY and SENSATION. The respective contract numbers as
follows:
N00033-05-C-5610--Scotia Prince
N00033-05-C-5611--Carnival Sensation
N00033-05-C-5612--Carnival Ecstasy
N00033-05-C-5613--Carnival Holiday
Question. How many were sole sourced?
Answer. None. The contracts were competitively procured.
Question. How were the contracts solicited?
Answer. The Military Sealift Command released a Request for
Proposals through its standard, web-based competitive solicitation
process.
Question. What was the cost per bed occupied?
Answer. The average daily per-person-cost (or bed occupied) was
$307.18, calculated by dividing the contract total obligated amount by
the total passenger counts for the three Carnival ships.
Daily costs were calculated by dividing the contract total
obligated amount by the number of days, then dividing that figure by
the number of passengers, as described below.
Contract Amounts (Total obligated, including reimbursable cost
limits):
--Ecstasy--$82,713,000
--Holiday--$62,153,000
--Sensation--$91,133,000
(A) Contracts' total obligated amount $235,999,000.
Passenger Days (Total passenger count for the period of occupancy):
--Ecstasy--329,204
--Holiday--135,464
--Sensation--303,603
(B) Total passenger days 768,271
A divided by B=$307.18 per passenger daily cost.
MAP MODERNIZATION
Question. Through the Map Modernization Program how many maps have
been updated?
Answer. As of the end of fiscal year 2005 for the Flood Map
Modernization Program, FEMA estimates that:
--Digital flood map products were available for 39 percent of the
Nation's population.
--11 percent of the stream miles mapped was based on new, updated, or
validated engineering analysis, covering 4 percent of the
population.
--Digital flood map products covered 15 percent of the land area of
the continental United States.
Question. How many are left to update?
Answer. Between the end of fiscal year 2005 and the end of fiscal
year 2010, the following actions are planned:
--Digital flood map products will be available for an additional 53
percent of the Nation's population. Map Modernization will
provide updated maps for 92 percent of the population by 2010.
--30 percent of the stream miles mapped will be based on new,
updated, or validated engineering analysis, affecting 40
percent of the Nation's population.
--Digital flood map products will cover an additional 50 percent of
the land area of the continental United States. Map
Modernization will cover 65 percent of the land area of the
continental United States by 2010.
Question. Of the updated maps, how many used new scientific data
and what type of data (i.e. topographic, etc.), not just technology,
was used in the update process?
Answer. Thirty percent of the stream miles mapped will be based on
new, updated, or validated engineering/scientific analysis, affecting
40 percent of the Nation's population. For these updates, FEMA is using
new or updated scientific data such as topographic data, base maps,
stream gage data, rainfall data, engineering analyses, and land
surveys. In addition, FEMA has used Geographic Information Systems
(GIS) to compile the updated maps and is making these maps available
through a web-based mapping information platform.
Question. In fiscal year 2006, questions for the record, it was
stated that FEMA is ``on track to complete the project by 2010, should
the funding requested through 2008 be provided.'' Does this remain
true?
Answer. FEMA is still on track to complete the project by 2010,
should the funding requested through 2008 be provided.
Question. What is the projected cost through 2008?
Answer. FEMA estimates that it will need approximately $200 million
in appropriated funds in both fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 for
the Flood Map Modernization Program.
EXERCISES
Question. How many exercises has FEMA been involved in? When, where
and what was exercised? Who else participated (i.e. local, State,
Federal partners)?
Answer. Since May 2003, FEMA has been involved in the following
exercises:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capabilities
Exercise Name Dates Location exercised FEMA participants Other participants
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOPOFF 2.......................... May 12-16, 2003........... Multiple locations... Response capabilities National Response Department of
and command, Coordination Center Homeland Security
control, and (NRCC) at FEMA (DHS)/Office for
coordination at top Headquarters; FEMA Domestic
officials level. Regions V and X. Preparedness (ODP)
(Sponsors)
Determined Promise 2003........... September 2003............ Las Vegas, NV........ Response capabilities National Response Department of
and coordination Coordination Center Defense (DOD)/
with DOD. (NRCC) at FEMA. Northern Command
Headquarters; FEMA
Region IX; FEMA
Response Division,
Operations Branch,
Planning Section.
Crisis Management Exercise........ 2003...................... ..................... Response capabilities FEMA Headquarters... North Atlantic
and coordination Treaty Organization
with DOD. (NATO)/Department
of Defense (DOD)
Unified Defense................... February 2004............. ..................... Response capabilities National Response Department of
and coordination Coordination Center Defense (DOD)/
with DOD. (NRCC) at FEMA Northern Command
Headquarters; FEMA (Sponsors)
Region VI; Response
Division,
Operations Branch,
Planning Section.
CWID.............................. 2004...................... ..................... Response capabilities FEMA Headquarters... Department of
and coordination Defense (DOD)
with DOD.
Crisis Management Exercise........ 2004...................... ..................... Response capabilities FEMA Headquarters... North Atlantic
and coordination Treaty Organization
with DOD. (NATO)/Department
of Defense (DOD)
Determined Promised 2004.......... 2004...................... Richmond, VA......... Response capabilities FEMA Region III..... Department of
and coordination Defense (DOD)/
with DOD. Northern Command
(Sponsors)
Forward Challenge................. 2004...................... ..................... Response capabilities FEMA Headquarters; Department of
and coordination FEMA Office of Defense (DOD)
with DOD. National Security
Coordination.
Livewire.......................... 2004...................... ..................... ..................... FEMA HQ and FEMA ....................
Region I.
TOPOFF 3 CPX...................... 2004...................... ..................... ..................... FEMA Headquarters... Department of
Homeland Security
(DHS)/Office for
Domestic
Preparedness (ODP)
(Sponsors)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant March 9-10, 2005.......... Brattleboro, VT...... Six person team to Mobile Emergency ....................
Drill. support NPP drill. Response Support
(MERS) Detachments.
Defense Interoperability March 11-28, 2005......... ..................... Response capabilities Mobile Emergency Defense Information
Communications Exercise (DICE) and coordination Response Support Systems Agency
2005. with DOD. (MERS) Detachments. (DISA)/Joint
Interoperability
Test Command (JITC)
TOPOFF 3.......................... April 4-10, 2005.......... Multiple locations... Response capabilities National Response Department of
and command, Coordination Center Homeland Security
control, and (NRCC) at FEMA (DHS)/Office for
coordination at top Headquarters; FEMA Domestic
officials level. Regions I and II. Preparedness (ODP)
(Sponsors)
Chemical Stockpile Emergency May 8-12, 2005............ ..................... Response capabilities Mobile Emergency ....................
Preparedness Program (CSEPP). Response Support
(MERS) Detachments.
Radiological Emergency May 23-27, 2005........... Brattleboro, VT...... Response capabilities Mobile Emergency
Preparedness Exercise. Response Support
(MERS) Detachments.
Grecian Firebolt 2005............. June 1-24, 2005........... ..................... Joint Secure Mobile Emergency Department of
Communications Response Support Defense (DOD)/ASC
Exercise. (MERS) Detachments.
Pinnacle Exercise................. June 20-25, 2005.......... ..................... National level Mobile Emergency Department of
response Response Support Homeland Security
capabilities (MERS) Detachments; (DHS)
demonstration. FEMA's Office of
National Security
Coordination.
Northern Edge/Alaska Shield....... August 15-19, 2005........ ..................... Response capabilities FEMA Region X; Northern Command
Mobile Emergency (Sponsor), Alaska
Response Support Command
(MERS) Detachments.
Dingo King 2005................... August 20-24, 2006........ Kings Bay, GA........ National Nuclear FEMA Region IV; Department of
Weapon Accident Mobile Emergency Defense (DOD)/
Exercise- Response Response Support Defense Threat
capabilities and (MERS) Detachments. Reduction Agency
coordination with (DTRA) (Sponsors)
DOD.
Joint User Interoperability August 1-30, 2005......... ..................... Interoperable Mobile Emergency United States Joint
Communications Exercise (JUICE) communications. Response Support Forces Command
2005. (MERS) Detachments. (USJFCOM)
Ardent Sentry 2005................ September 2005............ ..................... Response capabilities National Response ....................
and coordination Coordination Center
with DOD. (NRCC) at FEMA
Headquarters;
Response Division,
Operations Branch,
Planning Section.
Crisis Management Exercise........ 2005...................... ..................... Response capabilities FEMA Headquarters... North Atlantic
and coordination Treaty Organization
with DOD. (NATO)/Department
of Defense (DOD)
Defense Interoperability February 20-March 3, 2006. ..................... Defense MERS--Denton Defense Information
Communications Exercise (DICE) interoperability Detachment. Systems Agency
2006. exercise/testing. (DISA)/Joint
Interoperability
Test Command (JITC)
(Sponsors)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PERSONNEL
Question. How many permanent and temporary personnel left FEMA
during fiscal year 2005 and how many were replaced?
Answer. During fiscal year 2005, there were 5,715 employee
separations from FEMA and 6,051 employee accessions, for a turnover
rate of 20.32 percent.
Question. How many have left in fiscal year 2006?
Answer. During fiscal year 2006, as of February 4, 2006, there have
been 644 employee separations from FEMA and 4,822 employee accessions--
for a turnover rate of 2.29 percent.
Question. How many trained temporary personnel were/are available
to FEMA in fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2006?
Answer:
Fiscal year 2001--2,521
Fiscal year 2002--2,865
Fiscal year 2003--3,289
Fiscal year 2004--3,330
Fiscal year 2005--5,458
Fiscal year 2006--11,790
All of FEMA's temporary Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs)
receive training. Because DAEs are permitted to list themselves as not
available for deployment, the number of DAEs available at any given
time will vary. The numbers provided for prior years reflect total DAEs
deployed for various disasters during the fiscal year. Fiscal year 2006
numbers reflect those currently on board as of 5/13/06.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES
BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION PROGRAM
Question. What is the estimated total cost of the business
transformation program?
Answer. In fiscal year 2007, USCIS plans to spend $112 million ($47
million as requested in the President's fiscal year 2007 budget and $65
million from mandatory). As part of planning efforts in fiscal year
2006, USCIS is completing the business transformation strategy which
will inform activities beyond 2007.
CIS INITIATIVES
Question. Please provide a basic description of the SAVE and EEV
programs including: (a) which one employers currently check to
determine status of their employees; (b) when the SAVE program started;
(c) what prohibitions have been placed on the program; (d) and what
portion of the costs are covered by fees paid by whom.
Answer. The SAVE Program.--The Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 (IRCA), required the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service (now U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)), to
establish a system for verifying the immigration status of non-citizen
applicants for, and recipients of, certain types of Federally funded
benefits, and to make the system available to Federal, State, and local
benefit issuing agencies and institutions that administer such
benefits. The Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE)
Program was established in September 1987, and is the USCIS office
responsible for administering DHS programs involving customer access to
immigration status information contained in the SAVE Verification
Information System (VIS). The VIS database consists of information
drawn from the Central Index System (CIS) and the TECS/IBIS system, and
contains over 120 million records. There are currently 197 agencies
with over 190,000 Federal, State, and local government users
participating in SAVE. In fiscal year 2005 SAVE responded to more than
10.5 million immigration status verification queries from these users.
SAVE customers access status information via the web, a personal
computer with modem, 3,270 terminals, or batch method. The SAVE
Federal, State, and local government users pay a per query cost for
using the SAVE system. These query costs are paid directly to Computer
Sciences Corporation, the contractor which operates and maintains the
VIS database for the SAVE Program.
The Basic Pilot (Employment Eligibility Verification).--In 1996,
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA), provided for the implementation of the Basic Pilot program
for a 4-year period. Congress twice extended authorization for the
Basic Pilot to its current authorization deadline of November 2008. The
USCIS SAVE Program and the Social Security Administration (SSA) jointly
conduct the Basic Pilot Program. The program involves verification
checks of the SSA and DHS databases, using an automated system to
verify the employment authorization of newly hired employees.
The Basic Pilot was implemented in November 1997. By statute, the
Basic Pilot is a voluntary program, and free to employers who
volunteer. The Basic Pilot was originally available to employers in the
States of California, Florida, Illinois, Nebraska, New York and Texas;
however, in December 2004, the pilot was expanded to employers in all
50 States and the District of Columbia. There are currently more than
5,500 employers enrolled in the Basic Pilot representing more than
23,500 employer sites. Basic Pilot performed more than 980,000 queries
in fiscal year 2005.
By statute, the Basic Pilot cannot be used to pre-screen job
applicants; to re-verify employment authorization; or to verify
employment authorization for those employees who were hired prior to
the company joining the Basic Pilot Program. Presently, the Basic Pilot
is available through a Web-Based access method. The USCIS is currently
paying for the Basic Pilot query costs from general immigration benefit
application fees.
Question. Also describe the role that the Social Security
Administration plays in these processes.
Answer. The Social Security Administration (SSA) is a SAVE agency
user. SSA uses the SAVE system to verify the immigration status of non-
citizens and naturalized citizens applying for Supplemental Security
Income benefits and non-citizens applying for Social Security Numbers.
Additionally, the SSA is jointly conducting the Basic Pilot program
with USCIS. All Basic Pilot queries, whether the employee claims to be
a citizen, national, or non-citizen, first go to the SSA database for
verification. When the information cannot be verified through the
automated system, the employee must contact an SSA field office to
correct any discrepancies in the SSA record in order to confirm their
employment authorization. All non-citizen queries also go to USCIS for
verification of work authorization status.
Question. What is the timeline for implementing SAVE and EEV?
Answer. The SAVE Program has been in existence since September
1987. The Basic Pilot Program was implemented in November 1997.
Language mandating an Employment Eligibility Verification (EEV) Program
is included in several pending pieces of legislation. Should
legislation be passed mandating an EEV program, USCIS has estimated
that it will take 12 to 18 months, from the time that USCIS receives
funding through appropriations, to fully implement the program. The
President's fiscal year 2007 budget requests $111 million to improve
and expand Basic Pilot in anticipation of a mandatory, national
program. This funding will cover start up infrastructure improvements
including increases in personnel, increased operating efficiency
through automation of features and a reengineered process, and the
increasing accuracy of DHS databases and data on individuals used in
the verification process. These operating efficiencies are intended to
reduce the reliance on manual verification and the need for personnel
for this function.
Question. What part of the EEV request is not tied to pending
legislation?
Answer. A total of $111 million in the President's fiscal year 2007
budget request is in anticipation of legislation requiring a national
mandatory employment eligibility verification program. In addition to
the $111 million, the President's budget also requests $20.5 million to
support the existing base operations of the Basic Pilot and SAVE
programs, and $4 million to support expansion of SAVE to meet the
requirements of the REAL ID Act. Therefore, a total of $24.5 million
out of a combined total of $135.5 million relating to immigration
verification activities is not tied to pending legislation.
CIS PERSONNEL
Question. How many status verifiers are there and where are they
located?
Answer. There are currently 159 Immigration Status Verifier
positions. The charts below show where these positions are located.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUTHORIZED
OFFICE POSITIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADQUARTERS:
National Records Center (Contact Reps).............. 24
FCO POSITIONS:
Immigration Status Verifiers........................ 135
---------------
Total............................................. 159
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BREAKDOWN OF POSITIONS BY LOCATION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office Authorized
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADQUARTERS:
Headquarters........................................ 15
National Records Center............................. 9
EASTERN REGION DISTRICT OFFICE:
Atlanta............................................. 2
Baltimore........................................... 3
Boston.............................................. 2
Buffalo............................................. 3
Cleveland........................................... 1
Detroit............................................. 1
Miami............................................... 8
Newark.............................................. 4
New Orleans......................................... 2
New York............................................ 8
Philadelphia........................................ 2
Portland, Maine..................................... 1
San Juan............................................ 3
Washington.......................................... 3
SUBOFFICE:
Albany.............................................. 1
Charlotte, NC....................................... 1
Charlotte Amalie, VI................................ 1
Hartford............................................ 2
Norfolk............................................. 1
Pittsburgh.......................................... 2
Providence.......................................... 1
St. Albans.......................................... 1
Vermont Service Center.............................. 1
CENTRAL REGION DISTRICT OFFICE:
Chicago............................................. 2
Dallas.............................................. 4
Denver.............................................. 2
El Paso............................................. 2
Harlingen........................................... 2
Houston............................................. 2
Kansas City......................................... 1
Omaha............................................... 1
San Antonio......................................... 2
St. Paul............................................ 1
SUBOFFICE:
Salt Lake City...................................... 1
St. Louis........................................... 1
WESTERN REGION DISTRICT OFFICE:
Anchorage........................................... 1
Honolulu............................................ 2
Los Angeles (Perm).................................. 24
Los Angeles (Term).................................. 17
Phoenix............................................. 1
Portland, Oregon.................................... 1
San Diego........................................... 3
San Francisco....................................... 6
Seattle............................................. 2
SUBOFFICE:
Guam................................................ 1
Las Vegas........................................... 1
Reno................................................ 1
---------------
TOTAL............................................. 159
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USER FEE REFORM PROPOSAL
Question. Please provide details on the comprehensive immigration
enforcement user fee reform rulemaking.
Answer. Details of the Department's plans for this reform
rulemaking are still under review.
TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS
Question. What is the status of the proposed legislation?
Answer. To date, the legislation has not been enacted by Congress.
Question. If legislation is not enacted, what is the impact on the
fiscal year 2007 budget?
Answer. Fee revenues would be $20 million less than projected in
the budget. Other immigration benefit applications would continue to
subsidize the processing of temporary protected status applications due
to the statutory fee cap.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
RAIL PILOTS
Question. In fiscal year 2005, $10 million was funded to develop
and conduct simulated real-world exercises to validate a training
program for the use of commercially-available equipment against suicide
bombers in commuter and passenger rail environments. How has the public
responded to this program?
Answer. As part of the rail security pilot program at the Port
Authority Trans-Hudson Rail Station at Exchange Place, screening of
passengers occurred in two phases at the turnstile check-point: (1)
Screening of the passenger and (2) Screening of baggage. Passengers
proceeded through metal detectors, X-ray systems, physical search, and
trace detection techniques--all of which were adapted to address a
potential attack by a suicide bomber or via an improvised explosive
device (IED) that has been left behind.
Upon completion of this rail security screening, passengers were
asked to voluntarily respond to the Rail Security Pilot Passenger
Survey, a seven-item, self-report questionnaire concerning the
passenger's screening experience and opinions regarding the screening.
Results of the survey indicated that many passengers felt that they
were not adequately informed that the screening process was voluntary
or that they had the right to refuse the screen and board their train
at another station. However, the results also indicated that:
--The majority of passengers did not feel uneasy about going through
the screening process;
--Passengers felt the screeners were extremely professional,
courteous, and respectful;
--The screening process, on average, did not require too much time;
--Passengers were moderately in favor of future additional security
testing of explosive detection technologies in rail stations;
and that
--Passengers strongly agreed that improving rail security is worth
the additional time needed to go through the screening process.
Overall survey results suggest that rail passengers had a favorable
security screening experience and support efforts to improve rail
screening.
Question. Is there any funding included in the fiscal year 2007
budget to expand this program to other transit systems?
Answer. No funding is included in the fiscal year 2007 budget to
expand this program to other transit systems.
Question. Does S&T plan to expand this program to the bus
environment?
Answer. The S&T Directorate plans to expand this screening concept
to a bus terminal. Passengers will be screened in two phases at a
check-point: (1) screening of the passenger and (2) screening of
baggage. Passengers will proceed through an array of technologies such
as walk-through metal detectors, X-ray systems, physical search and
trace detection techniques--all of which will be adapted to address the
suicide or leave-behind Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threats.
MANPADS
Question. $340 million has been appropriated to date for the
development of countermeasures to protect commercial aircraft from the
threat of Man Portable Air Defense Systems. The fiscal year 2007 budget
indicates that findings will be presented to the Administration and
Congress to aid them in making an informed decision to address
protection of commercial airlines from the threat of MANPADS. When will
that report be submitted to Congress?
Answer. Congress has appropriated $231.9 million through fiscal
year 2006 to the S&T Directorate's Counter-MANPADS program to develop
and demonstrate the migration of existing Counter-MANPADS technologies
to the commercial airline industry. The Counter-MANPADS Phase II report
has been prepared and is in the inter-agency review process. It will be
provided to Congress as soon as the process is complete.
Question. What process will the Administration follow in
determining whether such technological countermeasures should be
purchased and deployed on commercial aircraft?
Answer. The S&T Directorate will provide to Congress this spring a
Counter-MANPADS Phase II report containing cost and performance
information that can be used as part of the decision-making process.
The report will also provide information to assist with deciding the
next steps in applying this technology to protect commercial airlines.
Specific information that will be provided in the report includes the
technical results of the Counter-MANPADS system demonstration, data and
analysis on the installation of the systems on commercial aircraft, and
current estimates for the cost of installing as well as maintain and
support the systems in a commercial aviation environment.
CHEMICAL DETECTION
Question. In testimony last year before the Subcommittee, former
Assistant Secretary Parney Albright stated that S&T was working very
closely with the Office of Domestic Preparedness on guidance that will
allow grants to be used by transit authorities to deploy a chemical
detection system, better known as PROTECT. While some transit
authorities have purchased individual detectors, only three have
deployed the PROTECT system. Assistant Secretary Albright stated ``that
there are something like 30 metro systems around the country--that
would then basically take the system and install it. It is really
inexpensive.''
Why have only 3 systems installed such a system?
Answer. The decision to install the Program for Response Options
and Technology Enhancement for Chemical Terrorism (PROTECT) system is
at the discretion of each transit system. Following the system's
successful demonstration in Washington, DC, New York City and Boston,
the PROTECT system became available for installation in other transit
systems. Procurement and installation of PROTECT systems can be funded
by the Transit Security Grants Program administered by the DHS Office
of Grants and Training (G&T). The Transit Security Grant Program
includes funds for rail transit security, targeted to specific urban
areas for the prevention and detection of explosive devices and
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents. Acquisition of
the PROTECT system is permissible under this program. The S&T
Directorate is assisting G&T with technical data package development
and is prepared to offer technical assistance in the deployment of the
system through this program.
Question. What is the cost to purchase and operate PROTECT?
Answer. The average cost to equip a single transit station with the
Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancement for Chemical
Terrorism (PROTECT) system varies between $250,000 to $1 million to
install, dependent upon the complexity of the station. Annual
maintenance costs average approximately $50,000 per station.
Question. If S&T operates the Bio-Watch system for bio-threats, why
shouldn't S&T operate the PROTECT system for chemical threats?
Answer. The Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancement
for Chemical Terrorism (PROTECT) system is designed for chemical
attacks within facilities or in localized areas, whereas BioWatch is a
monitoring system for wide-area biological attacks. PROTECT is also
designed for specific stakeholders such as transit facilities, and the
response to an emergency has to be immediate to effectively mitigate
the event and save lives. PROTECT is integrated with the local
emergency operations centers (EOC) in the region and designed so that
it would fit into and utilize existing infrastructure such as camera,
information technology, and communication systems. Because PROTECT is
integrated with existing infrastructure, the operating costs remain
relativity low and are mainly associated with sensor maintenance. The
sensors, once installed, require an adjustment period which can be
lengthy to address local chemical interferences from various sources
(exhausts, cleaning solutions, nearby businesses, etc.). These are best
addressed locally. Therefore, PROTECT can be effectively owned and
operated directly by the individual stakeholder.
Since PROTECT is currently allowed through the Transit Security
Grant Program, individual transit systems voluntarily make the decision
to install the system such as Baltimore. Baltimore is in the process of
installing their own system using a combination of grants and operating
funds. Many other transit systems have shown an interest in PROTECT.
The S&T Directorate has successfully installed systems in three
transit systems and does have experience through the BioWatch program
in deploying a monitoring and response system nationally. PROTECT,
however, differs from BioWatch in the response actions which need to be
locally controlled to ensure an effective and timely response. Thus,
any Federally funded program to ensure broad installation of PROTECT
would be best served by requiring that stakeholders commit to incurring
and maintaining operating and maintenance costs once the installation
and transition period is complete.
TUNNEL DETECTION
Question. What is S&T currently doing to develop technology and
other deterrents to border tunnels?
Answer. The S&T Directorate is developing border protection pattern
discovery and prediction technologies that will provide a new
capability to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This
capability will enable the rapid fusion of disparate information
sources to discover geo-spatial, behavioral, and temporal patterns and
indicators that will provide ICE field agents with local scene
awareness and actionable intelligence. This technology will be
developed within ICE's Office of Intelligence to facilitate the
derivation of patterns and indicators that address operational missions
such as: (1) crossing routes and staging areas for cross border
smuggling, (2) crossing patterns by group that will help identify the
number of organized groups involved and their respective signatures,
(3) crossing patterns by tactic that will help identify distinctive
signatures for specific tactics, such as drug and human smuggling, (4)
the identification of links and patterns between illegal border
crossing and criminal activity within the United States, and (5) tunnel
activity indicators to help discover the likely next tunneling start
and end points.
In addition, the S&T Directorate is working with the Office of
Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department
of Defense (DOD) to find technology solutions for tunnel detection
along the Southern and Northern borders of the United States.
The S&T Directorate participated in the Tunnel Detection Technical
Support Working Group (TSWG) meeting held in January 2006 and the Joint
Task Force-6 Tunneling Conference held in June 2004. The S&T
Directorate is also engaged with NORTHCOM's Futures Group in relaying,
discussing, and leveraging potential technologies that satisfy DOD and
DHS's tunnel detection needs. The S&T Directorate's Border &
Transportation (B&T) Portfolio met with NORTHCOM officials in August
2005 to discuss specific opportunities to collaborate and leverage each
organization's expertise.
CBP is also coordinating with a number of sources that could
possibly provide technology that will meet CBP's detection needs. These
sources include the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA),
Sandia Laboratories, and the Border Research Technology Center. There
is currently no proven technology that can detect the types of tunnels
that have recently been encountered. Some promising research and
development is being done by Sandia Laboratories, but at this time, its
field utility is unknown.
Question. What level of funding has been contributed to this effort
to date and what, if any, funding is included in the fiscal year 2007
request?
Answer. Funding for border protection pattern discovery and
prediction was $700,000 in fiscal year 2005 and $1.2 million in fiscal
year 2006. No funds are directly associated with detection of border
tunnels in the fiscal year 2007 budget request.
AIR CARGO SECURITY
Question. The Transportation Security Laboratory awarded nine
contracts to develop new technologies that would provide enhanced
security for containerized air cargo inspection and U.S. mail
inspection transported on passenger aircraft.
Please provide a notional schedule from testing of these systems to
deployment, including costs for each step of the process.
Answer. In September 2004, the Transportation Security Agency
commenced a long-term research and development Air Cargo Inspection
Project for development of new technologies in screening containerized
and mail cargo. In fiscal year 2006, laboratory test and evaluations
for eight technologies are planned. Pending availability of funding and
satisfactory program progress, this will be followed by a 3-year effort
(fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2010) for the system development phase
and testing of technologies that have passed the laboratory test and
evaluation. Based on the number of technologies that show potential for
screening containerized and mail cargo during the system development
phase, the operational test and evaluation phase will commence in
fiscal year 2011.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated
Development phase duration Projected cost Funding year
(months) (millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase 1--Preliminary Design/Detailed Design..................... 24 $24.0 2005
Proof of Concept Testing.................................... 12 2.4 2006
Phase 2--System Development:
Sub Phase I................................................. 8 12.0 2007
Sub Phase II................................................ 8 12.0 2008
Sub Phase III............................................... 8 12.0 2009
Phase 4--System Test............................................ 8 4.0 2010
Phase 5--Pilot Site............................................. 4 8.0 2011
-----------------------------------------------
Total..................................................... 72 74.4 ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NEXT GENERATION EDS
Question. How much is budgeted for Manhattan II in fiscal year
2007?
Answer. Funding for Phase II (systems development) of the Manhattan
II project for fiscal year 2007 has been tentatively identified in the
amount of $14.2 million. This is based on three contracts to be awarded
for screening system development and the development of a system
architecture to support the screening solutions.
Question. Based on information provided by the Transportation
Security Lab (TSL), deployable systems will be available starting in
fiscal year 2010. However, the Subcommittee has learned that a
comprehensive audit of the program is underway. What budget and
deployment schedule implications does this have on the program?
Answer. There is a cost-sharing study being conducted by the
Transportation Security Agency (TSA) in response to direction received
from Congress in fiscal year 2005. A preliminary draft of the results
from this study is being prepared. Based on the final results of this
study, the strategic plan developed by TSA in fiscal year 2005 may
change, which will have an impact on future budget and deployment
requirements.
Question. Has there been discussion of charging industry for
certification of EDS by the TSL?
Answer. In the mid-90's, when the Transportation Security
Laboratory (TSL) was part of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
a reimbursable agreement was established charging industry a maximum of
$50,000 for explosives detection system (EDS) certification testing.
Unfortunately, this process was never re-established as the TSL was
transferred from the FAA to the Department of Transportation and
finally to the Department of Homeland Security (first within the
Transportation Security Administration and then to the S&T
Directorate). TSL is pursuing reincorporation of this process.
Question. What is spent on the certification process?
Answer. In order to accurately determine a fair and reasonable
charge for the industry, the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL),
in cooperation with the S&T Directorate, is currently assessing the
costs associated with the use of laboratory time, laboratory materials,
government and contractor labor used in the execution of explosive
detection systems (EDS) certification testing. The certification
process for EDS consists of five primary components: certification-
readiness testing (CRT); pre-certification testing; certification
testing; post-certification testing; and post-test data analysis and
reporting. For any given system submitted to the TSL for EDS
certification, the duration and cost of each of these elements varies,
depending on the maturity, capability and throughput of the system
under evaluation. The time that a given system is under evaluation also
varies, but typically can range anywhere from as short as 6 weeks to as
long as 6 months. Given these and other factors, at present we estimate
an industry maximum for EDS certification would be established at
approximately $250,000.
BORDERSAFE
Question. What technologies have been certified and deployed
through the BorderSafe program?
Answer. Three main areas of technology have been deployed through
the BorderSafe program. They include tools and technologies that
support data merging and visualization; handheld, wireless access to
regional and national law enforcement databases; and regional law
enforcement information sharing. Specific examples are highlighted
below.
--A spatial temporal visualization (STV) and criminal activity
network (CAN) toolset designed by the University of Arizona's
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory was deployed to the Tucson
Police Department (TPD). The STV tool enables TPD crime
analysts to plot suspicious or criminal incidents near critical
infrastructure and explore distribution of those incidents by
time period. The CAN tool integrates Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) License Plate Reader data with a local TPD
criminal record data set to reveal links among subjects who
routinely crossed the border and are known offenders in the
Tucson region.
--Impact for customers:
--BorderSafe merged Federal and local law enforcement data sets for
analysis and visualization. As a result, 35 vehicles with a
history of crossing the border and known links to criminal
activity in Tucson were referred to CBP for alert status.
--BorderSafe's visualization tools identified a number of high-
frequency border crossing vehicles with Mexican license
plates and known associations to local Tucson crime
networks.
--A wireless data access application (known as Global Query) was
developed and deployed to the San Diego Automated Regional
Justice Information System (ARJIS)--a California Joint Powers
Agency that includes over 70 law enforcement organizations in
the counties of San Diego and Imperial. The wireless Global
Query application enables field officers to use a handheld
device to concurrently query a number of commonly used regional
and national law enforcement databases, including: San Diego
local records management and officer notification systems
(local booking photos, county warrants); the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) (wanted persons, temporary
restraining orders, and deported felon alerts); and the
California Department of Motor Vehicles (registration, drivers
license, and stolen vehicle information). The wireless Global
Query application is currently used by more than 150 Federal,
State and local law enforcement officers from 15 different
agencies and taskforces in Southern California.
--Impact for customers:
--Hits on the deported felon watch list by BorderSafe program
participants using the wireless Global Query application
have led to over 200 identifications and arrests in the San
Diego region.
--An FBI agent registered a ``suspected terrorist'' hit using the
wireless Global Query application.
--The 20,000th fugitive for the San Diego U.S. Marshal's Violent
Crimes Task Force was arrested after a record check was run
through BorderSafe's wireless Global Query application.
--DHS Border Patrol agents using the wireless Global Query
application arrested 10 Brazilian subjects for being
illegally smuggled into the United States. The driver of
the vehicle was charged with felony alien smuggling.
--Hundreds of suspect and fugitive identifications have been made
in the field by local law enforcement and Federal task
force members running records checks and retrieving digital
photographs via BorderSafe's wireless Global Query
application.
--A commercial law enforcement information and knowledge management
system was deployed to San Diego ARJIS to consolidate records
management data from 18 Southern California jurisdictions. Data
query access to the system was made available to the entire
ARJIS user community (over 70 law enforcement organizations),
and a data sharing protocol and virtual private network (VPN)
was implemented to allow information sharing between ARJIS and
the Tucson Police Department. VPNs were also implemented in
Southern Arizona to support information sharing between the
Tucson Police Department regional node and law enforcement
agencies in Mohave County, Kingman, Bullhead City, and Lake
Havasu City.
--Impact for customers:
--One day after implementation of the BorderSafe network connection
between San Diego and Tucson, a TPD analyst with only the
name of a suspected Tucson crime ring leader obtained the
suspect's driver's license and mug shot photos from ARJIS.
His photos were shown to an informant who positively
identified the suspect, leading to his apprehension and
arrest.
--Through BorderSafe's systems integration and network deployment
initiatives, a TPD Sergeant found information and photos in
ARJIS relevant to gang related criminals and their
associates in the Tucson region. This information was used
to enhance ongoing TPD investigations by positively
identifying gang suspects and broadening the scope of
surveillance of their known associates.
Question. The budget indicates that the Southwest regional test bed
will include two additional local jurisdictions along the border in
fiscal year 2007. Where?
Answer. During fiscal year 2007, the BorderSafe program's southwest
regional test bed will expand to include two additional jurisdictions
located in New Mexico and Texas.
TRANSIT SECURITY PROJECT
Question. Through the Transit Security Project (TSP), S&T assists
transit agencies in developing tactical countermeasures to reduce risk
to transit systems from various terrorist threats. What actionable
measures have been taken by transit systems as a result of the TSP?
Answer. Since the Program for Response Options and Technology
Enhancement for Chemical Terrorism (PROTECT) system is currently
allowed through the Transit Security Grants Program, administered by
the DHS Office of Grants and Training (G&T), individual transit systems
voluntarily make the decision to install the system. Baltimore is in
the process of installing their own system using a combination of grant
and operating funds. Many other transit systems have shown an interest
in PROTECT. Following the system's successful demonstration in
Washington, DC, New York City and Boston, the PROTECT system became
available for installation in other transit systems via the grant
program.
Question. Is S&T working with the Grants & Training Office to make
clear that these countermeasures are allowable under the current
transit security grant guidance?
Answer. The S&T Directorate is working directly with the Transit
Security Grants Program administered by the DHS Office of Grants and
Training (G&T). The S&T Directorate also assists G&T with technical
data by serving as the point-of-contact for questions and is prepared
to offer technical assistance in the deployment of transit security
systems through this program.
COAST GUARD R&D
Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget reduces the amount of funding
in the Coast Guard's budget for R&D. How much in the fiscal year 2007
budget for S&T is dedicated to R&D for Coast Guard activities? Please
specify each program and in which portfolio the work is being
performed.
Answer. The S&T Directorate is dedicating $2.8 million in fiscal
year 2007 for research and development for Coast Guard activities.
Approximately half of the budget in the Coast Guard Portfolio will be
directed towards efforts in the Boarding Program, which focuses on
providing and improving capabilities for boarding officers. The balance
of the effort will be devoted to advancing and adapting technologies in
the Compel Compliance Program, which concentrates on stopping or
controlling threatening vessels and people in the maritime domain.
R&D FUNDING
Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is
dedicated to port security R&D? Please specify each program and in
which portfolio the work is being performed.
Answer. The Border and Transportation Portfolios' cargo security
program supports port security. The fiscal year 2007 budget request for
this program is $16 million.
Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is
dedicated to air cargo R&D? Please specify each program and in which
portfolio the work is being performed.
Answer. For fiscal year 2007, $12 million was requested to continue
the system development and test phase of the Aviation Cargo Security
Pilot, which is evaluating promising commercial off-the-shelf aviation
screening technologies. This work is being conducted through the
Explosives Portfolio and is coordinated with the Transportation
Security Administration.
In addition, the fiscal year 2007 budget request for the
continuation of the Air Cargo Pilots initiated in fiscal year 2006
included $5 million and an additional $5 million for mid- and long-term
R&D to support the development and identification of technologies for
screening air cargo. The screening of air cargo will be based on a
multi-layered approach due to the various types of cargo commodities,
packaging types and transportation devices (break bulk, container,
palletized, skids) that are part of the air cargo supply chain. One
technology cannot meet all air cargo screening requirements and
therefore and multi-effort R&D program must be maintained to develop
and test technologies that meet government screening requirements as
well as minimizing the economic impact on the air cargo supply chain.
Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is
dedicated to container security R&D? Please specify each program and in
which portfolio the work is being performed.
Answer. The R&D Cargo Security fiscal year 2007 budget is $16
million. This program is conducted through the Border and
Transportation Portfolio. The $16 million funds S&T Cargo Security
Programs which include the Advanced Container Security Device and
Container Security Device (CSD), the Marine Asset Tag and Tracking
System, Security Carton, Advanced Material Container, Advanced
Screening and Targeting and Supply Chain Security Architecture
Programs.
R&D FUNDING
Question. What lessons have been learned, if any, from the
Operation Safe Commerce program?
Answer. The last phase of Operation Safe Commerce (OSC), Phase II,
provided insight into container security. During that phase,
vulnerability assessments were conducted by the 18 pilot projects
across the supply chains. These assessments included detailed
examinations of customary operating procedures and infrastructure. They
revealed that container security is composed of degrees of security and
relied equally on technology and best practices. The pilot projects
showed that security could be improved through a combination of
improved business practices and enhanced technology. Best practices
which were people driven often varied and were largely dependent upon
outside factors such as local conditions, infrastructure, and
traditions.
Lessons Learned:
--There are 13 standard security control points that provide the
foundation to assess and model container threat scenarios,
vulnerabilities and security counter measures.
--Supplier
--Factory
--Empty Container Storage/Dray
--Drayage of Cargo to Consolidator (if stuffing is not at factory)
--Container Stuffing/Sealing (Consolidation)
--Container Storage (Foreign)
--Drayage to terminal (from factory to consolidator)
--Foreign Terminal
--Ocean Commerce
--U.S. Terminal
--Inland Drayage or Rail Transport (U.S.)
--Deconsolidation (U.S.)
--Business processes/information transmission
--Technologies tested in Phase II did not adequately protect against
a motivated adversary. Commercial technology was successfully
used and integrated with business processes. However, even
though many of the technologies demonstrated in the OSC pilots
provided enhanced security, there were significant deficiencies
noted in total detection. Most door seals were readily
defeated; cargo in other containers interfered with sensor
detectors; and biological and chemical detectors proved
unreliable. Fixed reader technology faced many challenges. The
dynamics of the supply chain forced many projects to change
their routes; there were labor resistance, and the proprietary
operation of the technology. Technology alone is not sufficient
to protect the Nation's cargo against the introduction of
contraband or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
--There are no incentives to motivate commercial stakeholders to
invest in container security measures. Container commerce is
extremely cost sensitive and investment in discretionary
security measures could place a stakeholder in a disadvantage
commercially.
--Basic security information is not available to the supply chain
stakeholders. There is no facilitation of information sharing
concerning supply chain security regarding relevant threats,
vulnerabilities and security requirements between private
industry and government. When anomalies were discovered there
were no protocols in place to respond and investigate.
Reporting protocols and guidance were developed within the OSC
project by US CBP and the OSC Federal partners.
The formation of supply chain partnerships can enhance container
security. Container commerce is global and involves many stakeholders
including the United States Government, foreign governments and
commercial stakeholders.
Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is
dedicated to transit security R&D? Please specify each program and in
which portfolio the work is being performed.
Answer. Within the fiscal year 2007 budget request, $183.73 million
is included for research and development that can support transit
security technologies. This work is being conducted across all S&T
Directorate Portfolios, and much of this effort supports other Homeland
Security mission requirements as well as transportation security.
TRANSIT SECURITY R&D PROJECTS AND FUNDING
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Portfolio Project name 2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Border and Transportation......... Automated Pattern 0
Discovery.
Critical Infrastructure Protection Automated Scene 2.1
Understanding/
Insider Threat
Countermeasures.
Standards......................... Blast Resistant 0.32
Trash Receptacles.
Threat Awareness.................. Biometrics and 2.6
Deception Detection.
Biological Countermeasures........ BioWatch............ 94.0
Critical Infrastructure Protection CIP Decision Support 5.8
System.
Critical Infrastructure Protection Control Systems 0.5
Security.
Counter-MANPADS................... Counter-MANPADS 4.9
Program.
Rapid Prototyping................. Emerging Civil 7.4
Aviation Defense
Technologies and
Commercial Aircraft
Protection Program.
Critical Infrastructure Protection Focused Sector 3.0
Studies.
Critical Infrastructure Protection National CIP R&D 0.9
Plan.
Border and Transportation......... Rail Security: ..............
Chlorine Mitigation.
Emergent and Prototypical Transit Security 1.0
Technology. Project.
Explosives........................ Aviation Security... 52.98
Explosives........................ Suicide Bombers/ 8.23
Leave-Behind IEDs.
---------------
TOTAL....................... .................... 183.73
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Automated Pattern Discovery (Border and Transportation).--Fusion of
disparate data sources that maps threats across basic geographic,
infrastructure, demographic, behavior, and time data. Impact: Provides
decision makers the ability to rapidly assess a situation,
automatically derive locations of high risk and vulnerability,
prioritize asset allocation, and to assess their effectiveness over
time.
Automated Scene Understanding/Insider Threat Countermeasures
(Critical Infrastructure Protection).--Visual interpretation tools that
will be able to detect packages left-behind in rail cars. Impact:
Enhanced monitoring and forensic video technologies for protection of
mass transportation.
Blast Resistant Trash Receptacles (Standards).--Will provide
performance standards and test methods for blast resistant trash
receptacles, allowing users to make informed purchase decisions.
Impact: Initiated for transit systems, this project coordinated with
the System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER)
Program will build industry and law enforcement consensus about
performance standards and test methods for these receptacles. We are
coordinating with the DHS Office of Grants and Training for these
standards.
Biometrics and Deception Detection (Threat Awareness).--Robust
multi-mode Biometric recognition systems for signature acquisition at a
distance to increase recognition accuracy and efficiency for
identification and deception detection. Impact: These systems provide
an interviewing aid for intelligence & law enforcement and real-time
screening at air, land, and sea portals with little or no negative
impact on screening throughput.
BioWatch (Biological Countermeasures).--Early warning system
designed to detect the intentional release of select aerosolized
biological agents; network informs Federal, State, and local emergency
management authorities about the extent of the release and assists in
the rapid response to a biological terrorist act. Impact: Provides
protection to several highly trafficked rail systems to provide early
detection of a biological terrorism attack. Through the expansion of
the BioWatch system to high-threat U.S. cities, air, rail, and other
transportation systems will be equipped with detection capability at
the discretion of the local decision makers.
CIP Decision Support System (Critical Infrastructure Protection).--
A suite of computer models that analyze and quantify the consequences
to and interdependencies of the 17 infrastructure sectors (including
transportation). Impact: Awareness of interdependencies, and cascading
effects on the transportation sector.
Control Systems Security (Critical Infrastructure Protection).--
Developing security measures and protocols for Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
Impact.--Security for these systems which are vital in rail and
waterway transportation.
Counter-MANPADS Program (Counter-MANPADS).--Protect commercial
aircraft from shoulder-launched missiles (Man Portable Air Defense
Systems). Impact: Migration of existing Counter-MANPADS technologies to
the commercial airline industry seeks to protect commercial aircraft
while ensuring that resulting countermeasures systems have minimal
impact on air carrier and airport operations, maintenance, and support
activities.
Emerging Civil Aviation Defense Technologies (Rapid Prototyping)
and Commercial Aircraft Protection Program (Border and
Transportation).--Studies aircraft susceptibility/vulnerability
reduction, and countermeasures related to sabotage.
Impact.--Will study pilot vision protection, aircraft structural
hardening, reduction in vulnerabilities, thrust-only control/propulsion
controlled aircraft, CBRE threats, and effects of hazardous items that
elude screening.
Focused Sector Studies (Critical Infrastructure Protection).--
Identify measures to mitigate the effects of an attack or other hazard
to critical infrastructure. Waterway transport, locks and dams, is
under consideration for a study. Impact: Awareness of vulnerabilities,
consequences of attacks on modes of transportation.
National CIP R&D Plan (Critical Infrastructure Protection).--
Coordination vehicle for all Federal research and development in
protection of critical infrastructure sectors, including
transportation. Impact: Improved coordination and awareness of Federal
R&D in transportation security.
Rail Security: Chlorine Mitigation (Border and Transportation).--A
Chlorine Rail Hazard effort to study methods and technologies to
mitigate the likelihood of an incident and the effects if an incident
occurs. Impact: Will reduce the risk and effects of an accidental or
intentional incident involving an extremely hazardous substance such as
chlorine.
Transit Security Project (Emergent and Prototypical Technology).--
Characterize the threat of conventional explosives on critical
structural elements of transit systems (subways); and assist transit
agencies to analyze feasible countermeasures to reduce risk to
structures from conventional explosives threat. Impact: HS support of
the Transit Security project primarily includes (1) specific R&D
activities for the prevention of and response to a WMD event, and (2)
approaches to review and evaluate, as well as customize and extend, S&T
Directorate technologies for the transit industry based on the unique
characteristics of the transit environment.
Aviation Security.--Complete the air cargo pilot to evaluate
available technologies to screen break-bulk air cargo. Evaluate and
ready for qualification, the prototype automated carry-on baggage
explosives detection system. Improve and evaluate current passenger
explosives detection systems. Continue the development of advanced
systems to screen people for both explosives and weapons. And as
improved systems become available, evaluate for certification or
qualification checked baggage EDS, checkpoint screening, and cargo
screening systems.
Suicide Bombers/Leave-Behind IEDs.--Pilot available and prototype
explosives detection and mitigation countermeasures in operational
environments to protect critical infrastructure. Develop prototypes of
advanced systems to screen people for suicide bombs.
Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is
dedicated to border security R&D? Please specify each program and in
which portfolio the work is being performed.
Answer. Within the Conventional Missions (Border and Transportation
Portfolio), the R&D Border Security fiscal year 2007 budget request is
$36 million. The breakout is: $20 million for Border Watch (includes
support to Secure Border Initiative, CBP UAV sensors evaluation) ; and
$16 million for Cargo Security.
Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is
dedicated to interoperability R&D outside of the SAFECOM program?
Please specify each program and in which portfolio the work is being
performed.
Answer. Interoperability research and development (R&D) within the
S&T Directorate is conducted through the Office for Interoperability
and Compatibility (OIC). The fiscal year 2007 budget request of $29.74
million for interoperability related R&D includes $25.39 million for
SAFECOM and $4.34 million for program areas outside of SAFECOM. The
chart below specifies the breakout of interoperability related R&D
programs. It should be noted that these estimates are subject to change
depending upon the final appropriation amount.
OFFICE FOR INTEROPERABILITY AND COMPATIBILITY
[Millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Program areas 2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Communications (SAFECOM) \1\............................ 25.4
Equipment............................................... 3.1
Training................................................ .4
Other................................................... .8
---------------
Total............................................. 29.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ All of the Communications budget supports SAFECOM.
DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE (DNDO)
Question. What percentage of the DNDO budget is directed to each of
the three layers identified--exterior, border, and interior?
Answer. A majority of the programs included in the DNDO budget
request have applications across several, if not all, of the three
architecture layers. For instance, technologies developed with funds
requested for both systems development and transformational research
and development (a total of $209 million) could have applications in
operations within the United States, at the U.S. border, and overseas.
Equally, these technology programs will feed potential acquisition
programs beyond those executed by the DNDO and are not represented in
the DNDO budget request. The systems engineering and test and
evaluation efforts that support these technology development programs
also have application across several, if not all, of the three
architecture layers.
With that being said, the request for Systems Acquisition, which
results in detection systems being deployed to specific geographic
locations, can be clearly allocated to each of the layers. Of the $178
million requested for Systems Acquisition, $157 million will support
the deployment of technologies to the Nation's borders (primarily at
ports of entry), while an additional $21 million will provide a
detection ``surge'' capacity for the Nation's interior. No funds
requested through the Systems Acquisition PPA will fund deployment of
technologies exterior to the United States.
Question. Since most of the ``exterior'' layer encompasses
primarily detection and interdiction efforts by other agencies like the
Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, what authority will DNDO
have over those agencies in the development and deployment of the
global architecture?
Answer. The DNDO has been given the mission of ``centralized
planning with decentralized execution.'' While the DNDO will not have
oversight over other agencies responsible for implementing portions of
the global architecture, it will continue to advocate beneficial
programs to the Administration, as well as the Congress, and identify
duplicative or ineffectual programs when necessary, with proposed
improvements.
Question. Why does the budget propose to combine both the
acquisition budget and the longer-term R&D budget together in the same
appropriation account?
Answer. At a macroscopic level, all activities of the DNDO are
aligned to a single, fairly specific goal--the prevention of nuclear
and radiological terrorism. As such, the Department chose to combine
all clearly identifiable requests for this purpose into a single
appropriation for the DNDO. At the same time, the Department did decide
to segregate acquisition funds into a separate PPA to provide clarity
regarding investments in long-term research and development and
procurement activity.
The decision to combine these activities into a single
appropriation is supported by the reality that technology development
and acquisition programs move across a gradual transition from the
systems development phase to the acquisition phase, with the joint
goal, from a performance-based standpoint, of fielding capable systems
to counter the given threat. It is this intrinsic integration that led
the Department to combine these activities into a single appropriation.
Question. Would DNDO be better served if long-term research and
development was separated from the acquisition of technology and
systems that are available today?
Answer. The Department believes that the appropriations structure
included in the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget adequately allows
the DNDO to complete its mandated mission, while at the same time
providing the necessary visibility into the use of appropriated funds.
Question. The Government Accountability Office has expressed
concerns about the reliability of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portals
(ASP) technology. The budget proposes $20 million to expand crystal
manufacturing capacity to meet ASP requirements for gamma detectors in
fiscal year 2007-10. In fiscal year 2006 $12 million is proposed to be
spent on this capacity development. According to the DNDO budget, a
limited number of ASP portals will not be piloted in the field until
fiscal year 2007.
Given GAO's concerns about the ASP technology, why is so much
funding going towards expanding the capacity of an unproven technology?
Answer. First, it should be noted that the total investment planned
for the Sodium Iodide Manufacturing Program is $32 million, concluding
in fiscal year 2007. The decision to begin to invest in this expansion
of domestic production capacity is supported by initial results from
DNDO testing of ASP systems, which validated spectroscopic capabilities
when compared with polyvinyl toluene, or PVT-based systems and
demonstrated, in some cases, a four times improvement in performance
against threat-like objects and a 60 percent reduction in alarms
generated by naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM).
Additionally, in light of DNDO projection to expand the rate of
acquisition of ASP systems in the coming year, DNDO requirements will
exceed current crystal production capacity by as early as fiscal year
2007.
Given the proven performance of ASP systems during DNDO
qualification testing in late fiscal year 2005 and the long timescales
involved in this type of capitalization program, the DNDO believes it
prudent begin this investment immediately. By doing this, the
industrial base will be prepared to meet expanding DNDO needs in fiscal
year 2007 and beyond.
Question. What is the total investment DNDO plans to make to expand
the capacity?
Answer. The total investment planned for the Sodium Iodide
Manufacturing Program is $32 million, of which $12 million will be
provided in fiscal year 2006 and $20 million will be provided in fiscal
year 2007.
Question. The cost of the ASP Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) is
roughly three times the cost of PVT-RPMs. Based on the initial testing
of the ASP technology, has DNDO performed a cost-benefit analysis
comparing the two technologies?
Answer. Though initial procurement costs of ASP RPMs are likely to
be higher than those of PVT-based RPMS, the total life-cycle and
operations costs for ASP systems are likely to be approximately equal
to those of PVT-based systems. The primary reason for this is the
greatly reduced secondary inspection rate associated with ASP systems,
which will result in the need for less CBP officers (and RPMs) to be
dedicated to labor-intensive secondary inspections, and an accompanying
improvement in the overall flow of goods and people.
The DNDO and CBP are currently conducting a joint analysis to
determine the most cost-effective means of deploying ASP systems to the
Nation's POEs. This analysis will take into account performance
information gathered through DNDO testing and current cost estimates,
as well as operational metrics such as throughput rates, NORM rates,
and personally-owned vehicle (POV) rates at individual ports. The
analysis will lead to a strategy that deploys ASP systems only to
locations where the benefits of these systems (when compared to
current-generation technologies) is required to maintain screening
operations at acceptable detection thresholds without impeding the flow
of people and goods. Overall, this deployment strategy will provide the
optimum mix of current and next-generation systems while maintaining a
fiscally responsible approach to the program.
Question. In light of the threefold increase to acquire ASP-RPMs,
what benefits will they provide over RPMs currently deployed?
Answer. Beyond the reductions in secondary costs outlined in the
previous response, ASP systems address a substantial capabilities gap
in the currently deployed architecture by increasing the probability of
detecting smuggled nuclear and radiological materials, while decreasing
the probability of falsely alarming on NORM or innocent radioactive
materials (such as granite tiles, ceramics, and kitty litter) or
incorrectly dismissing nuclear material. ASP systems use their ability
to identify the source of detected radiation through spectroscopic
isotopic identification to accomplish this.
With current-generation systems, which only indicate the presence
of radiation but provide no information as to its identity, operational
requirements often require a `sensitivity threshold' to be set to
alleviate the need for labor-intensive and time-consuming secondary
inspections. ASP systems do not implement this type of threshold.
Rather, ASP portals systems automatically detect all sources of
radiation--and use the identification capability to sort the threat
material from the innocent sources of radiation. The use of
spectroscopic identification will dramatically reduce false positives--
and allow for considerably improved throughput at high-volume ports,
while simultaneously improving our security.
Question. According to the DNDO budget, qualification tests for a
rail portal monitor system will occur in May of 2007. When does DNDO
anticipate a full rate production decision?
Answer. Contingent upon ASP contract award in the summer of fiscal
year 2006, the DNDO is currently anticipating systems qualification
testing for rail variants of the ASP system by May 2007. Given this
timeline, the DNDO anticipates a full rate production decision for the
rail variant by the summer of fiscal year 2007.
Question. Does DNDO plan to pursue similar systems to screen air
cargo? If so, is this work being coordinated with the Transportation
Security Laboratory?
Answer. If operational requirements to screen air cargo emerge
(beyond what is currently being done at international mail facilities
and planned at international airports), and these requirements
necessitate additional capabilities provided by ASP systems when
compared to current-generation technologies, the DNDO would pursue ASP
variants for this mission. If this occurs, the DNDO would fully
coordinate with TSL (as well as TSA, S&T, and CBP) to incorporate ASP
systems, as appropriate, into other technology solutions currently
under development.
Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget proposes a $7 million
increase for red teaming. Within that budget request, what specific
exercises to identify vulnerabilities in Federal, State, and local
operations are planned?
Answer. The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes funding for
both the Preparedness Directorate's National Exercise Program and for
DNDO activities. The DNDO intends to conduct red teaming exercises
across the entire global nuclear detection architecture, to include
both operational assets such as RPMs at the Nation's borders and
support assets such as technical reachback and the Nuclear Assessment
Program. The exact exercises to be conducted in fiscal year 2007 have
yet to be identified. The DNDO anticipates standing up a red teaming
``cell'' by April 2006. This cell will develop adversary playbooks
(without prior knowledge of DNDO capabilities) that can be used to
evaluate all portions of the deployed and operated architecture. As
part of this effort, the DNDO red team will participate in the Top
Officials 4 Exercise (TOPOFF 4) in November 2007. Beyond these red
teaming activities, the budget request will also fund a series of net
assessment activities, including an analysis of open source
information.
Question. Will any of the funding be used for red teams to
penetrate border entry points?
Answer. While the exact nature of the exercises to be conducted in
fiscal year 2007 is still under development, the DNDO intends to
conduct red teaming exercises against multiple components of the global
detection architecture, including border entry points. In addition,
aspects of the TOPOFF 4 exercises, in which the DNDO will participate,
will likely involve the evaluation of border entry point operations and
their overall effectiveness.
Question. The budget request includes $21 million for the ``SURGE''
program. What equipment and systems will be purchased with the funding?
Answer. The DNDO is currently conducting a requirements analysis
for the ``Surge'' program, with a targeted completion date of April
2006. Following this analysis, the DNDO will identify standardized
equipment that would be acquired, with a goal of initiating procurement
in early October 2006. The DNDO anticipates that equipment will
primarily consist of a mix of vehicle-based and human portable
detection systems.
Question. What type of capacity to rapidly respond will this
funding provide?
Answer. The ``Surge'' program is still in the planning and
requirements analysis phase, and final determinations for overall
capacity have yet to be made. Initial planning estimates focus on
providing the appropriate amount of detection systems to equip
approximately 250 operators with vehicle-based mobile systems and
human-portable (backpack and handheld) systems. The requested funding
will also allow the DNDO to pre-train a number of operators that can
then be leveraged to train additional operators rapidly in the event of
a heightened alert. The DNDO is still in the process of exploring
several operational concepts for the fielding of equipment, including
Federal/State/local hybrids and concepts for full State and local
operations using Federally-loaned equipment.
Question. Where will these systems be stored?
Answer. The ``Surge'' program is still in the planning and
requirements analysis phase, but initial DNDO plans focus on pre-
positioning assets with DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)
teams, so as to leverage existing USG infrastructure. If this option
ultimately proves to not be viable, additional options that might be
available for consideration include DOE National Laboratories, DOD
storage and logistics facilities, and FEMA storage locations.
Question. What measures are being taken to coordinate with Federal,
State, and local governments to prepare for scenarios where rapid
deployment of these systems would be necessary?
Answer. The DNDO will begin engaging with select State and local
agencies to develop a range of scaleable deployment strategies based on
various potential threat scenarios in late fiscal year 2006. Based on
these interactions, the DNDO plans to conduct the first full-scale
``Surge'' training program by December 2006, with the first systems
validation test occurring in January 2007. The DNDO will then expand
this training to additional State and local operators in preparation
for TOPOFF 4 in November 2007.
Question. The budget request includes $13.5 million for Systems
Architecture development. Based on the fact that other Federal
Departments such as Energy, State, and Defense are all part of the
global nuclear detection and interdiction structure, are those agencies
contributing funding towards the development of the global
architecture?
Answer. While multiple agencies across the Federal Government are
part of the global nuclear detection architecture, the responsibility
for developing and documenting the architecture resides with the DNDO.
Other agencies, however, play an important role in the development of
the nuclear detection architecture. The Departments of Energy and
Defense, as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, CBP, and the
U.S. Coast Guard have each detailed staff members to the DNDO Office of
Systems Engineering and Architecture to ensure that input and concerns
of each agency are represented in architecture development and
recommendations. However, because the DNDO is the lead agency
responsible for the design of the global nuclear detection
architecture, all funds for its development are included in the DNDO
budget request.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
BORDER CROSSING CARD--THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE (WHTI)
IMPLEMENTATION
Question. Open Ultra High Frequency (UHF) was designed to track
pallets--it is not a secure technology. Why then is the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) supporting an open UHF standard for the border
crossing card?
Answer. DHS is working with the Department of State to evaluate the
type of reader technology that will most cost-effectively keep border
traffic moving at acceptable response times while also protecting
privacy and enabling future functionality (e.g., potentially
documenting land border exit from the United States). Existing, proven
CBP land border trusted traveler programs (NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST), as
well as US VISIT's I-94 card pilot, currently use a UHF standard in
primary lanes. Abandoning the current technology for a different one
would require a change in standards at land border primary lanes for
these existing programs. Moreover, even a proximity detection standard
for a PASS card would likely differ from the ePassport technology that
the Department of State is currently planning to implement. The
ePassport requires Basic Access Control (BAC) and can only be accessed
through a two-step process initiated by first running the document
across a Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) reader, which effectively unlocks
it, and then running it across a platen to read it. Utilizing BAC could
thus be expected to increase response times, with corresponding
implications for land border thru-put.
We are also considering whether documents containing personal data,
such as the e-Passport, merit different levels of protection vice
documents that contain no personal data but merely serve as a pointer
to information in a database. To further address privacy concerns, DHS
and the State Department are exploring other mitigation strategies such
as a storage pouch to shield a card when it is not in use.
Question. Why will DHS not support the ISO 14443 standard that is
being used on ePassports?
Answer. DHS is working with the Department of State to evaluate the
type of reader technology that will most cost-effectively keep border
traffic moving at acceptable response times while also protecting
privacy and enabling future functionality (e.g., potentially
documenting land border exit from the United States). Existing, proven
CBP land border trusted traveler programs (NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST), as
well as US VISIT's I-94 card pilot, currently use a UHF standard in
primary lanes. Abandoning the current technology for a different one
would require a change in standards at land border primary lanes for
these existing programs. Moreover, even a proximity detection standard
for a PASS card would likely differ from the ePassport technology that
the Department of State is currently planning to implement. The
ePassport requires Basic Access Control (BAC) and can only be accessed
through a two-step process initiated by first running the document
across a Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) reader, which effectively unlocks
it, and then running it across a platen to read it. Utilizing BAC could
thus be expected to increase response times, with corresponding
implications for land border thru-put.
We are also considering whether documents containing personal data,
such as the e-Passport, merit different levels of protection vice
documents that contain no personal data but merely serve as a pointer
to information in a database. To further address privacy concerns, DHS
and the State Department are exploring other mitigation strategies such
as a storage pouch to shield a card when it is not in use.
Question. DHS will have to install readers for the ePassport that
is based on the secure ISO 14443 technology, which is not compatible
with open UHF technology. How much more will an entirely second set of
readers and interface cost if DHS selects an open UHF standard for the
PASS card?
Answer. DHS is working with the Department of State to evaluate the
type of reader technology that will most cost-effectively keep border
traffic moving at acceptable response times while also protecting
privacy and enabling future functionality (e.g., potentially
documenting land border exit from the United States). Existing, proven
CBP land border trusted traveler programs (NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST), as
well as US VISIT's I-94 card pilot, currently use a UHF standard in
primary lanes. Abandoning the current technology for a different one
would require a change in standards at land border primary lanes for
these existing programs. Moreover, even a proximity detection standard
for a PASS card would likely differ from the ePassport technology that
the Department of State is currently planning to implement. The
ePassport requires Basic Access Control (BAC) and can only be accessed
through a two-step process initiated by first running the document
across a Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) reader, which effectively unlocks
it, and then running it across a platen to read it. Utilizing BAC could
thus be expected to increase response times, with corresponding
implications for land border thru-put.
We are also considering whether documents containing personal data,
such as the e-Passport, merit different levels of protection vice
documents that contain no personal data but merely serve as a pointer
to information in a database. To further address privacy concerns, DHS
and the State Department are exploring other mitigation strategies such
as a storage pouch to shield a card when it is not in use.
Question. When will a final decision be made on the PASS card
technology?
Answer. This is still being discussed between DHS and DOS, but the
goal is to begin issuing the new passport cards by the spring of 2007.
Question. I have several questions about how DHS plans to fund the
implementation of the border crossing card, which are as follows:
How much money in fiscal year 2007 has DHS requested for border
crossing card implementation?
Answer. The budget doesn't request specific funding for issuing the
new passport cards.
Question. I have noted several areas that will require significant
resources, including information technology; hardware, including the
PASS Card readers at borders; road work and other infrastructural
improvements; and training for DHS, CBP and other staff who will try to
make this program work efficiently on the border.
Please tell me your plans and budget requests in the specific areas
of information technology; hardware, such as the card readers;
infrastructure; and training, as related to WHTI.
Answer. Up-front funding needs associated with PASS Card
infrastructure are currently being assessed and were not included in
the fiscal year 2007 budget.
Question. How does DHS propose to implement WHTI and have it
operational by January 1, 2008?
Answer. We are working with the Department of State to get a Notice
of Proposed Rule Making published and to develop the best strategies to
implement the technology piece of WHTI, taking into account privacy
issues as well as comments from the public from the Advance Notice of
Proposed Rule Making.
Question. Is that deadline realistic?
Answer. DHS believes that it will be able to implement required
elements by January 1, 2008. DHS is working with Department of State to
get the Notice of Proposed Rule Making published and to develop the
best strategies to implement the technology piece of WHTI, taking into
account privacy issues as well as comments from the public from the
Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making.
Question. If that deadline is unrealistic, then should Congress
consider modifying it?
Answer. DHS believes that WHTI is an important border security
initiative that will standardize and secure travel document
requirements and believes that it will be able to implement required
elements by January 1, 2008.
Question. I would like to work with you to ensure that WHTI is
implemented in a manner that considers security, commerce and community
ties.
In your opinion, does agency discretion allow for implementation in
phases, such that the government can assess what works and what does
not?
Answer. DHS and the State Department have proposed to implement
WHTI in two phases, first for the air and sea environment, and second
for the land border environment. Both agencies believe that this will
allow for an orderly implementation, since more travelers in the air
and sea environments currently possess travel documents and due to the
complexities of the land border environment, where additional
technology must be part of the solution. The regulatory rule making
process requires the government to evaluate and consider comments from
the public, giving us the opportunity to review potential solutions to
help implement WHTI. DHS is also evaluating existing programs and
pilots for potential solutions.
Question. In your opinion, does agency discretion allow you to test
pilot programs before implementing the WHTI?
Answer. Yes. We expect to build upon existing pilots and programs
such as FAST (Free and Secure Trade) and NEXUS, which are currently
operational at many CBP facilities.
NORTHERN BORDER AND BORDER PATROL AGENTS
Question. I have fought hard since September 11, 2001, to increase
the number of border patrol agents on the Northern Border and was glad
to see a request for approximately 1,500 new agents in the President's
budget. It was unclear to me, however, whether the request includes any
new agents for the Northern Border.
Of the roughly 1,500 new positions, how many are designated for the
Northern Border?
Answer. The 1,500 new Border Patrol Agents requested in fiscal year
2007 will be deployed initially to the Southwest Border where there is
the largest concentration of apprehensions and gaps in terms of our
ability to secure the border. While the focus of the new hires is the
Southwest Border, consideration is given to relocate experienced agents
to the Northern Border based on current deployment levels and threat
assessments. It is anticipated that up to 10 percent of the new hire
amount could be considered for relocation to the Northern Border,
again, depending on deployment levels, technology, organizational
capacity and threat assessment at the time the deployments are being
considered.
LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER
Question. I was pleased to see that the President's budget request
included an additional $4 million for operations at the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC). The
LESC responds to over 600,000 annual inquiries on criminal illegal
aliens from local, State and Federal law enforcement agencies
throughout the country 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The workload at
the LESC is growing significantly as DHS and ICE are tasking the center
with additional duties to assist even more local, State and Federal law
enforcement authorities.
Please provide to me the details for what these additional funds
will be used at the LESC.
Answer. The funding will support the hiring of 66 additional
employees at the LESC.
Question. Due to the ICE hiring freezes over the past several
years, I would imagine that the staffing levels at the LESC have fallen
below authorized levels of FTEs. Will some of the additional funds be
used to hire additional full time employees at the Center?
Answer. Yes. The funding will support the hiring of 66 additional
employees at the LESC.
DERBY LINE
Question. While reviewing the General Services Administration (GSA)
budget submission for the coming year, I noticed that no money is
included in the President's proposal for the Derby Line port expansion
project. In fact, there are seven Southern Border stations on the list
and not one from the Northern Border. While GSA submits the formal
request for projects, I understand that DHS compiles and prioritizes
the list.
Senator Jeffords and I worked very hard last year to secure the
money needed by the State of Vermont to upgrade its road network
leading up to the Derby Line port. We fought hard to ensure Federal
funds were available to address what was otherwise an unfunded mandate,
so I therefore have several questions about this situation.
Is DHS committed to completing the Derby Line project? If so, is
there enough money available currently to continue the port expansion?
Answer. DHS is committed to the Land Ports of Entry Modernization
Program. Derby Line was a priority project, which we forwarded in our
fiscal year 2005 request to the General Services Administration (GSA).
GSA has completed the Feasibility Study and Design. Unfortunately, GSA
must weigh their entire project for all Federal agencies and Derby Line
was not submitted in their fiscal year 2007 budget. DHS has notified
GSA that Derby Line will be its highest priority project in its fiscal
year 2008 submission to GSA.
Question. What is your timetable for upgrading the facilities at
border stations across Vermont--especially those for which funding was
reprogrammed last year?
Answer. The DHS and CBP Capital Investment Program (CIP) is
undergoing continuous modifications as Strategic Resource Assessments
(SRAs) are completed. We have just recently completed site surveys for
all land ports of entry located in the New England States. The SRAs
will assess the current facility conditions and use updated land ports
of entry (LPOE) standards to determine the facility's operational
requirements. We will then extend our models out 30 years and see what
our total requirements should be in the future. The SRA will help guide
us in establishing our priorities based on data collected and
conditions of the land ports of entry (LPOEs) and rank them
accordingly.
Currently, our Capital Improvement Plan has proposed the following:
Derby Line, VT, as top priority for fiscal year 2008; Richford, VT, in
fiscal year 2009; Beebe Plains, and Richford (Pinnacle Road), VT, in
fiscal year 2010; Norton, VT, in 2011 and Highgate Sprints, VT, in
2012. The CIP is updated annually based on the results of the SRA. We
will be updating the CIP in the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2006 for the
fiscal year 2008 program and initiate the formulation of the fiscal
year 2009 program with the General Services Administration.
Question. What commitment can we expect from DHS make to upgrade
the Northern Border when it has not requested any funding for
construction projects?
Answer. DHS has recently completed design standards for small ports
of entry. The completion of the design standards will allow DHS and the
General Services Administration to compress the project delivery
schedule, and will allow DHS to seek funding for the replacement of
more than 102 small ports along our northern border over the next 15
years.
Question. Will you keep me informed on the progress of border
upgrades in Vermont?
Answer. DHS, in concert with General Services Administration (GSA),
will provide program updates at critical points along the program
planning and construction delivery process.
I-91 CHECKPOINT
Question. As you may recall, DHS established a temporary checkpoint
on Interstate 91 in Hartford, Vermont, from December 2003 to May 2005.
While we occasionally heard about CBP making a drug-bust or identifying
an expired visa there, it seemed to me that the checkpoint did far more
to harass law-abiding Vermonters than to protect their security. I was
not the only person who felt this way. In fact, former Republican
Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, criticized the Hartford checkpoint
as an unnecessary government intrusion.
Last May, DHS announced that the temporary checkpoint would be
dismantled and the Border Patrol agents there redeployed to the
Southern Border. You can imagine my surprise, then, when I recently
learned that DHS has quietly begun conducting a feasibility study to
see whether it should build a permanent checkpoint on I-91. I
understand that the study was initiated about a month ago and should be
complete in 6 months.
What about the situation on the Southern Border has changed so much
that shifting 25-30 Border Patrol agents to a checkpoint 92 miles from
the border with Canada makes any sense?
Answer. Border Patrol tactical traffic checkpoints, such as the one
located on Interstate 91, are a critical component of CBP's multi-
layered border security strategy. This strategy was developed to
maximize resources and increase the certainty of arrest of anyone
attempting to illegally enter the United States. The Border Patrol
traffic checkpoint on Interstate 91 is operated intermittently as a
strategic component, meaning that there may be extended periods of time
that the checkpoint is not operational. Available resources and
intelligence dictate when the tactical traffic checkpoint on Interstate
91 will be operational. When the Interstate 91 Traffic Checkpoint was
``dismantled,'' it was in fact temporarily not operational. Since the
tactical Border Patrol checkpoint was instituted on Interstate 91 in
December of 2003, apprehensions have included 688 illegal alien
apprehensions, 27 illegal aliens from special interest countries, and
154 pounds of marijuana valued at $693,000. These apprehensions include
numerous criminal aliens with convictions and outstanding warrants for
rape of a child, arson, fraud, assault & battery, domestic assault,
burglary, fraudulent documents, re-entry after deportation and
multitude of others with serious immigration or criminal records.
Furthermore, when the national threat level was raised post September
11, 2001 the Interstate 91 checkpoint was operational 24 hours a day 7
days a week. Staffing to facilitate this operation required that
detailed agents be brought into Swanton Sector to augment the normal
cadre of agents. Once the threat level was lowered the detailed staff
were returned to their normally assigned Sectors and the responsibility
of manning the Interstate 91 traffic checkpoint was returned to Swanton
Sector. There have never been plans to cease Border Patrol tactical
checkpoints on Interstate 91 nor were there any plans to permanently
reassign Northern Border agents to the Southern Border during 2005.
Since the national threat level was lowered the agents that operate the
Interstate 91 traffic checkpoint are permanently assigned to the
Newport Border Patrol Station in Swanton Sector. These agents are
assigned routine Border Patrol duties when they are not assigned to the
checkpoint.
Question. How do you intend to pay for the construction and
redeployment?
Answer. If permission to build permanent checkpoints were granted,
the construction would be identified and submitted as an unfunded
requirement. The local Sector Chief would address the redeployment of
personnel as needed.
Question. Will you keep me informed on the progress of your study
and decision-making?
Answer. The Interstate 91 Border Patrol traffic checkpoint
feasibility and environmental impact study was funded and initiated on
January 13, 2006. It is estimated that the study will be completed in
Spring 2006. The results of the study and any decisions on project
advancement will be shared with your office through CBP's Office of
Congressional Affairs.
HURRICANE KATRINA
Question. It is difficult to locate hard numbers about the numbers
of dead or missing resulting from Hurricane Katrina. The press has
reported that 1,300 persons are dead and that approximately 3,200
individuals are still listed as ``missing'' or ``whereabouts unknown.''
Almost 6 months after the hurricane hit, these numbers are
staggering. It may be that more people were killed in the hurricane
than were killed in the terrorist attacks of September 11.
Why are so many names still listed as missing? What is the
government doing to locate them?
Answer. As and initial matter, it must be noted that the States
have the sovereign responsibility for declaring deaths and
investigating reports of missing individuals. The State medical
examiner, in particular, is usually responsible for declaring deaths
and all numbers come from the States.
DHS supportes the effort to collect data on missing people through
the Find Family National Call Center (FFNCC), the national collection
point for information on missing family members or those who may have
perished in Hurricanes Katrina or Rita from the State of Louisiana. The
center seeks to reunite families and to help locate and recover the
remains of loved ones. The FFNCC is a joint effort between the State of
Louisiana, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services.
Callers to the FFNCC are asked to provide any available information
about their missing loved ones, including:
--A physical description;
--Doctors' and dentists' names;
--A medical history, including any dental work or joint replacements;
and
--Unique characteristics like tattoos, scars and birthmarks.
In, addition, Family members may be asked to release dental
records, as they are particularly useful in identifying the deceased.
The health professionals, staff and volunteers at the FFNCC are trained
to provide sensitive, confidential assistance. All information gathered
by the FFNCC is held in the strictest confidence and used only for the
purpose of identifying and reuniting family members.
The Center also coordinates with other organizations including, the
Salvation Army, Louisiana Nursing Home Association and the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children.
In addition, FEMA has opened a Victim Identification Center (VIC)
in Carville, LA. The VIS is on a 32-acre site that is designed to
process, identify and store human remains found following the
hurricanes. The center replaces a temporary facility that had been
operating in St. Gabriel for almost 3 months.
The VIC began the processing of human remains on November 29. The
facility works with the FFNCC to help identify the remains of
individuals who perished as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Forensic data obtained at the VIC is cross referenced against data
collected from calls to the FFNCC. This includes fingerprints, X-rays
and dental records to identify victims.
DNA analysis may also be used to identify victims when all other
means have been exhausted. Once a body's identification is confirmed,
the parish coroner must sign the death certificate. The State medical
examiner will then authorize the release of the body to the funeral
home of the next of kin's choice.
FEMA has also supported the American Red Cross's Family Links
Registry program which provides evacuees with family reunification
support. FEMA promoted this effort and other similar family linkage
efforts by including web linkages on the FEMA Katrina webpage and in
press releases appropriate.
In addition, FEMA has worked with the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children (NCMEC) since last October. FEMA facilitated the
sharing of information in its disaster assistance database with NCMEC
to enable contact between separated family members.
As of June 1, 2006 the FFNCC lists 210 persons still missing or
unidentified.
AVIAN BIRD FLU
Question. Two years ago, we had a shortage of winter flu vaccine.
We never received satisfactory answers from the Bush Administration
about why it had not planned and prepared better.
If it cannot prepare for the seasonal flu, which is an annual
occurrence, what does that tell us about the government's ability to
prepare for large scale pandemics or biological terrorist attacks?
Answer. The shortage of influenza vaccine experienced 2 years ago
occurred when a manufacturer encountered production problems and could
not fulfill its orders for vaccine. The Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) and Prevention, within the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), provided leadership in working with the provider
community and State and local Health Departments to target early stocks
of vaccine to high-risk groups most vulnerable to influenza. HHS/CDC
also acquired more vaccine on international markets to bring our
vaccine supply levels near to the previous year's totals.
This incident highlighted a need to create a robust vaccine
manufacturing capacity within this country, which was one of the
keystones of the President's $7.1 billion pandemic flu Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations request to Congress. In fiscal year 2006
Congress provided $3.8 billion for the President's plan and a portion
of these funds will be used to stimulate U.S. vaccine manufacturing
capacity.
The future benefits of the investment include having contractual
arrangements with these companies to manufacture enough pandemic
influenza vaccine whenever a pandemic emerges; having a healthy
influenza vaccine manufacturing industry in the United States, capable
of making enough annual influenza vaccine for every person in the
United States which is the current recommendation of public health
experts; U.S. vaccine manufacturers would be able to sell influenza
vaccines abroad (a good business proposition and international public
health situation); and some cell-based vaccine manufacturers may also
be able to use their new technologies for production of needed
childhood vaccines.
Question. Now, we see the bird flu migrating westward. What
assurance can you give to the American people that the United States
will be prepared should this deadly virus reach our shores?
Answer. The U.S. Government is prepared to provide a scalable,
tailored Federal response that capitalizes on the lessons learned from
the recent SARS events in Asia and Canada. Individual Departments are
preparing Pandemic Influenza-specific plans to implement their roles
and responsibilities under the Pandemic Strategy. The Department of
Homeland Security is the lead for overall domestic incident management
and will coordinate the Federal response; HHS is responsible for the
U.S. medical response; USDA is the lead for a domestic veterinary
response; and DOS coordinates with international partners.
The Federal Government intends to utilize a regional command,
control, and coordination structure to coordinate Federal response
activities. Joint Field Offices will be pre-identified and will be
activated based on the outbreak trends and requests for assistance. The
Secretary of Homeland Security is prepared to pre-designate and deploy
a Principal Federal Official as required. Timely, factual, and
consistent public messaging will be coordinated across the USG through
the use of a National Joint Information Center (JIC) located at DHS and
a local JIC in the vicinity of the outbreak. Communications will be
maintained 24/7 with State, local, tribal, private sector, and
international entities through established coordinating mechanisms.
Question. By when will the government be fully prepared?
Answer. Preparedness for a pandemic requires the establishment of
infrastructure and capacity, a process that can take years. The
Strategy affirms that the Federal Government will use all instruments
of national power to address the pandemic threat. The HSC
Implementation Plan outlines three hundred and twenty-five specific
tasks that must be completed. Each task has a lead agency and
coordination agencies identified, with the majority of items having a
timeline for implementation which range from 3 to 36 months. For a
small number of the items, no timeline has been identified.
Question. The H5N1 avian flu virus strain was initially identified
in Southeast Asia, but has rapidly spread across the rest of Asia, into
Africa, and outbreaks in birds have now been found in seven European
nations. The United Kingdom has also positively identified the virus in
quarantined birds coming from Southeast Asia. It may only be a matter
of time until it reaches our shores, which leaves many of us concerned
that the United States is not doing nearly enough to assist with
surveillance and prevention of and preparation for this deadly virus
abroad and at home.
The fiscal year 2006 Defense Appropriations Act reserved for
international avian flu efforts $3.8 billion, of which $47.3 million
was designated for the Homeland Security Department for necessary
expenses to train, plan and prepare for a potential outbreak of highly
pathogenic influenza. However, the fiscal year 2006 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations request that the Administration recently
submitted to Congress included no request to continue our national
efforts to combat the avian flu and prepare for a possible avian flu
epidemic.
I was surprised to see no request for such funding, given that we
had heard rumors that the Administration planned to ask Congress to
devote an additional $2.3 billion this year for prepare for a bird flu
epidemic.
Secretary Chertoff, does the Administration plan to submit to
Congress a request later this year to continue our national efforts to
help in global efforts to combat the avian flu, as well as prepare for
a possible avian flu epidemic here at home?
Answer. The Department has five active working groups that are
defining additional actions and requirements based on emerging data and
information. Our first priority is to ensure that the $47 million
already provided achieve the objectives laid out by the Administration,
and we will also leverage other DHS programs in support of these
efforts.
Question. If so, please describe the request that you anticipate
submitting as a supplemental related to detection and prevention of
avian flu.
Answer. At this point, the Department does not envision requesting
a supplemental in 2007. However, any budgetary needs for fiscal year
2007 and beyond will be determined and, if necessary, requested by the
Administration through its normal processes to address all relevant
agencies' needs.
Question. What resources and strategies will be deployed by the
Department to help States and local officials cope with the possibility
of an outbreak?
Answer. Recognizing that the Federal Government will be equally
degraded during an actual pandemic event and will be limited in its
ability to provide on-the-ground medical resources, DHS and other
agencies are assisting State and local officials with preparedness
activities. DHS has developed a planning guide geared to businesses
which will very shortly be available on the United States Government
Pandemic Flu website (www.pandemicflu.gov). The Department, in close
coordination with the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and
Human Services, and Treasury, continues to develop initial plans and
pilot projects to address State, local, and private sector preparedness
for this possible event. Full-scale deployment of comprehensive
training and exercise programs will increase public and private sector
readiness and overall preparedness across the entire Nation. These
programs will also assist with development and validation of State,
local, and private Sector mitigation strategies to ensure efficient and
effective use of all available public and private sector resources to
minimize national economic impacts and associated national security
implications.
The Federal response structure is designed to be scalable and
tailored to the outbreak; therefore, its command, control, and
coordination structure can expand as required. This structure is based
on concepts outlined in the National Incident Management System (NIMS)
and further defined in the National Response Plan (NRP). The Department
is working to ensure that appropriate DHS leaders are in place to
assist in the coordination of a Federal response during a pandemic. We
have pre-identified five locations across the Nation where Joint Field
Offices could be established should the situation warrant, and will
pre-designate a national pandemic coordinator. As in any disaster,
these Joint Field Offices will be the primary conduits through which
States and local governments request support from the Federal
Government.
Question. By all accounts, the current capacity to develop an avian
flu vaccine is inadequate. Even if a vaccine is developed, it will take
time to produce the millions of doses needed to protect our citizens.
Some health officials have urged the need for other countermeasures
such as medications that would fight an infection or increased usage of
personal protective equipment.
What steps is the Administration taking to not only increase
vaccine manufacturing capacity, but to research and stockpile other
countermeasures?
Answer. A portion of the funds Congress provided in the Emergency
Supplemental pandemic appropriation will be used to stimulate a robust
U.S. vaccine manufacturing capacity.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has plans to
purchase or subsidize the purchase of 81 million treatment courses of
antivirals over a 2 year period, much of which will be stored in the
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). The fiscal year 2006 HHS budget
allows HHS to purchase 20 million treatment courses of antivirals for
subsequent distribution States and localities and to subsidize the
purchase of 31 million treatment courses by them (HHS will provide a 25
percent subsidy; $170 million has been designated for this).
To further encourage the development of new medical countermeasures
against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents
and to speed their delivery and use should there be an attack,
President Bush, in his 2003 State of the Union address proposed and
Congress subsequently enacted Project BioShield. Project BioShield
provides the Department of Health and Human Services with several new
authorities to speed the research, development, acquisition, and
availability of medical countermeasures to defend against CBRN threats.
In exercising the procurement authorities under Project BioShield, HHS
has launched acquisition programs to address each of the four threat
agents deemed to be Material Threats to the U.S. population by the
Department of Homeland Security [Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), smallpox
virus, Botulinum toxins, and radiological/nuclear agents]. For example,
HHS has used Project BioShield to award two contracts for vaccines
against anthrax and one contract for a liquid formulation of a drug to
protect children from radioactive iodine exposure following nuclear
events. These countermeasures are being added to the SNS that currently
includes vaccines, antibiotics to counter infections caused by anthrax,
plague, and tularemia, antitoxins, chemical antidotes and radiation
emergency medical countermeasures. However, we recognize that more can
and must be done to aggressively and efficiently implement Project
BioShield.
Finally, with regard to Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), that
could be used to handle a pandemic, the current SNS inventory contains
1,006,830 N95 respirators and 1 million pairs of gloves.
As part of the Emergency Supplemental allocation for pandemic
influenza, funds have been targeted to acquire supplies and equipment
to enhance preparedness for a response to a Pandemic Influenza event,
including personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare providers
such as N95 respirators, surgical masks, gloves, and face shields, as
well as syringes and needles. Decisions on what items to procure are
being made by subject matter experts in HHS.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). The initial target of
providing for 25 million people has been staged over a 2 year cycle.
Based on the assumption of 4 masks and 4 pairs of gloves per
individual, acquisitions in fiscal year 2006 will provide PPE for in
excess of 20 million people. The balance of the targeted coverage (5
million people) will be acquired in the following year.
Low Waste Syringes and Needles. Initial procurement includes low
waste syringes and needles to support the administration of the
proposed 20 million H5N1 vaccines doses.
Question. When Hurricane Katrina hit, and in the days and weeks
after, many Federal officials took a ``blame the locals'' approach for
what went wrong with disaster response. Last week, Department of Health
and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt told both the National
Governors' Association and the Maryland Pandemic Influenza Summit not
to count on Federal agencies to save them should a flu pandemic strike.
Specifically, Secretary Leavitt said, ``Any community that fails to
prepare with the expectation that the Federal Government will come to
the rescue will be tragically wrong.''
I am concerned that, rather than preparing adequately for the bird
flu, Federal officials are lowering expectations and hinting that a
lack of preparedness will be the fault of State and local authorities.
However, like with Katrina, we have been warned well in advance of the
potential for disaster.
Secretary Chertoff, is the Administration advocating an ``every
State for itself'' approach? Where is the Administration's leadership
on this issue?
Answer. If a pandemic should strike this country, every sector of
society could fall victim. It would affect infrastructure from our
ability to keep grocery store shelves stocked, to keeping the lights on
and communications systems working. It would affect local and State
government workers as well as Federal Government workers. Many of the
same people we would depend on for help and services in time of an
emergency will be affected by whatever disease strikes us.
When Secretary Leavitt told both the National Governors'
Association and the Maryland Pandemic Influenza Summit not to count on
Federal agencies to save them should a flu pandemic strike, he was
giving State leadership a simple and honest message. The message needs
to be heard by all local and State officials who have any
responsibility for local or State emergency response. Additional
questions regarding the context of Secretary Leavitt's message should
be directed to HHS.
ALL-STATE MINIMUM
Question. I am disappointed that once again President Bush's
proposed budget for fiscal year 2007 reduces from 0.75 percent to 0.25
percent the all-state minimum formula, which I authored. This is a base
amount used for the distribution of funding under the State Homeland
Security Grant Program and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention
Program. This formula assures that each State receives a minimum of
0.75 percent of those grants to help support their first responders'
basic preparedness needs.
Not only would this change result in the loss of millions in
homeland security funding for the fire, police and rescue departments
in small- and many medium-sized States, but also deal a crippling blow
to their efforts to build and sustain their terrorism preparedness.
Mr. Secretary, does this Administration want to shortchange rural
States and roll back the hard-won progress we have begun to make in
homeland security by slashing the protections provided to us by the
all-State minimum?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 request for the State
Homeland Security Program proposes a 0.25 percent minimum allocation
for all States, territories, and the District of Columbia to ensure
funding to address basic preparedness needs with the balance of the
funding to be allocated based on risk and need. Since the threats
confronting the Nation respect neither jurisdictional nor geographic
boundaries, limited resources must be allocated and applied in an
effective and efficient manner to achieve the greatest return on our
national investment in homeland security by addressing the greatest
risks and needs.
The 9/11 Commission has recommended that ``Federal homeland
security assistance should not remain a program for general revenue
sharing. It should supplement State and local resources based on the
risks and vulnerabilities that merit additional support.''
All States, whether small, medium, or large, have been provided
over $14 billion in DHS preparedness funding since the attacks of 9/11
to build and sustain preparedness capabilities. A 0.25 percent minimum
allocation would be coupled with any additional funding based on risk
and need. That allocation process would address the risks and needs of
both large and small States, and would not be calculated soley based on
population.
Question. Would you agree that homeland security is a national
responsibility shared by all States, regardless of size?
Answer. Yes, homeland security is a national responsibility shared
by all levels of government. The National Preparedness Goal is truly
national in scope, communicating a vision that engages Federal, State,
local, and tribal entities, their private and non-governmental
partners, and the general public to achieve and sustain risk-based
target levels of capability to prevent, protect against, respond to,
and recover from major events in order to minimize the impact on lives,
property, and the economy. The Expanded Regional Collaboration National
Priority included in the Goal highlights the need for embracing
partnership across multiple jurisdictions, regions, and States in
building capabilities cooperatively. Successful regional collaboration
allows for a multi-jurisdictional and multidisciplinary approach to
building capabilities for all four homeland security mission areas,
spreading costs, and sharing risk across geographic areas.
Question. Do you agree that each State has basic terrorism
preparedness needs and, therefore, a minimum amount of domestic
terrorism preparedness funds is appropriate for each State?
Answer. While there is no consistent defintion of ``basic terrorism
preparedness needs'' a minimum allocation of domestic terrorism
preparedness funds for each State is appropriate.
The 0.25 percent minimum allocation proposed in the President's
fiscal year 2007 request will provide States, territories, and the
District of Columbia with funding continuity. However, since the
threats confronting the Nation respect neither jurisdictional nor
geographic boundaries, limited resources must be allocated and applied
in an effective and efficient manner to achieve the greatest return on
our national investment in homeland security by addressing the greatest
risks and needs.
Question. Mr. Secretary, would you agree that the mission of the
Department of Homeland Security extends beyond terrorism threats, and
that States must prepare for and have the ability to respond to all
types of homeland security threats, such as natural disasters and other
emergencies?
Answer. The mission of the Department of Homeland Security includes
safeguarding the Nation from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or
other emergencies and leading national response and recovery efforts to
acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies. The
National Preparedness Goal, which outlines preparedness priorities for
Federal, State, local governments, private sector, and the general
public, is all-hazard in nature and is predicated on the importance of
capabilities-based planning as a means to enhance our preparedness.
Capabilities-based planning is not focused on a particular scenario or
threat, but rather pushes us as a Nation to plan under uncertainty to
provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards
while working within an economic framework that necessitates
prioritization and choice.
Question. If you do not support applying the 0.75 percent minimum
to the State Formula Grants Program, what compromise between 0.75
percent and 0.25 percent for the distribution of funds would you
support?
Answer. As indicated in the President's fiscal year 2007 budget
request, the Administration supports the .25 percent minimum, which
will allow over 85 percent of the State Homeland Security Grant Program
to be awarded based on risk, need, and potential effectivness.
STATE AND LOCAL FIRST RESPONDERS
Question. President Bush often says that he wants to ensure that
our State and local first responders receive the resources necessary to
do the job the American public expects them to do. I find that hard to
believe, though, when I read that he proposes nearly $400 million in
overall cuts to funds for State Homeland Security Grant Program,
Emergency Management Performance Grants and other programs administered
by the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness that directly benefit police, fire and medical rescue
units. Furthermore, the President's budget eliminates funding for the
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention program. The Administration
justifies these cuts by stating it does not believe those funds are
``targeted'' to homeland security capabilities.
I believe, however, that the current Administration has failed to
make first responders a high enough priority by consistently
underfunding homeland security efforts of every State.
The Hart-Rudman Terrorism Task Force Report argued that our Nation
will fall approximately $98.4 billion short of meeting critical
emergency responder needs through this decade's end if current funding
levels are maintained. Clearly, the domestic preparedness funds
available are still not enough to protect from, prepare for and respond
to future domestic terrorist attacks anywhere on American soil.
Would you agree, Mr. Secretary, that to be truly protected from,
prepared for and able to respond to terrorist attacks we must look to
increase the funds to our Nation's State and local first responders,
rather than decrease them, as proposed by the President?
Answer. The fiscal year 2007 budget request is a strong commitment
to the Nation's first responders. As always, the Department believes
that homeland security is a shared mission and thus a shared
responsibility between the Federal Government and our State and local
partners. The Federal Government should not be expected to bear all
homeland security costs. Instead, the Department expects and
anticipates that States and localities will devote significant funds to
enhance their security and thereby help to improve the Nation's level
of preparedness.
ADMINISTRATION PLANS FOR DUBAI PORTS WORLD TO TAKE CONTROL OF
SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS AT SIX U.S. PORTS
Question. I have several questions about the Administration's
controversial decision to approve the takeover by Dubai Ports World
(DPW) of significant operations at six U.S. ports.
I was pleased by the Administration's recent decision to accept
DPW's request that the U.S. government conduct a proper full 45-day
security review, a review that the President previously said was
unnecessary. This review may reassure a concerned public that DPW's
management of port operations in the United States will not affect our
Nation's safety. However, this development does not excuse the
Administration from its earlier decision to ignore a mandate in the law
for a thorough review process. Yet again, on an issue of national
security, the Administration chose to go it alone, operated in secret
on a national security issue, and then said to the American people,
``just trust us.'' Like with the domestic spying program and prior
assertions on interrogation policy, this Administration operates as if
it is above the law.
Mr. Secretary, you are a member of the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which expedited what review
was conducted. That leads me to ask for the following information from
you:
What role did you play in the CFIUS review of the proposed
transaction?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security was represented in the
CFIUS review of the DPW case by Assistant Secretary Stewart Baker, who
coordinated across the Department with the relevant intelligence,
operational, and legal components.
Question. Please describe the role the Department of Homeland
Security in the negotiation and review of the deal.
Answer. In these cases, DHS considers whether the acquisition may
affect national security broadly construed, focusing in particular on
the acquisition's potential impact on critical infrastructure and other
homeland security factors, as well as traditional measures of national
security. In the CFIUS process DHS determines: (1) whether DHS already
has sufficient legal or regulatory authority to address any threat to
homeland security that might be raised by the transaction; (2) whether
DHS has homeland security concerns about the parties to the
transaction; and (3) whether the homeland security concerns can be
resolved with binding assurances from the parties to the transaction.
In this particular case, DHS and other CFIUS member agencies
requested and received intelligence assessments about DPW and received
briefings from the company. Further, as a matter of prudence, DHS
sought and received binding assurances that, among other things, (i)
P&O, the subject of the acquisition, would continue to participate at
not less than the current level in certain port security programs and
best practices, and (ii) P&O would provide any records upon DHS's
request.
With these assurances, DHS believed that there was no basis for
contesting the transaction.
As you know, DPW has agreed to sell the U.S. component of P&O to an
unrelated U.S. buyer and to ensure that it is managed independently of
DPW until that time.
Question. Did you or anyone else on behalf of the Department of
Homeland Security raise any national security concerns about this
transaction?
Answer. DHS did not have specific concerns about this transaction.
In reviewing DPW's proposed acquisition of P&O, DHS concurred with the
intelligence community and the other CFIUS agencies reviewing the
transaction that DPW's acquisition presented no current threat to U.S.
national security. Nevertheless, given DHS's responsibility for
critical infrastructure protection and port and maritime security, DHS
wanted to ensure, to the extent possible, that DPW would not present a
future risk to national security by taking adverse action sometime in
the future and therefore obtained certain written assurances from DPW,
including: (i) that DPW would participate in certain port security
programs that are voluntary for other companies but would become
mandatory for DPW because of its written assurances; and (ii) that DPW
would provide, upon request, any records maintained regarding DPW's
operations in the United States.
Question. What security precautions, if any, were requested?
Answer. As indicated above, DHS decided that it would be prudent to
obtain certain security assurances from DPW. DPW committed to
participate in various U.S. cargo inspection and security programs that
are only voluntary today. These programs include DHS's Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (``C-TPAT'') and Container Security
Initiative (``CSI''), and the related Department of Energy Megaports
program. These programs protect U.S. ports by screening cargo before it
approaches U.S. shores.
DPW also agreed to assist U.S. law enforcement agencies (Federal,
State, and Local) and to disclose any information concerning the
operation of the company's U.S. facilities, equipment, or services and
to provide any relevant records that may exist of foreign efforts to
control operations in any of its U.S. facilities.
DPW further agreed to maintain P&O's existing security policies and
procedures at the U.S. facilities--including security personnel--and
provide written notice to DHS if those policies or procedures change so
that DHS can address any concerns.
Finally, DPW also agreed to operate any facilities they would own
or control in the United States as a result of the acquisition with the
current U.S. management structure, to the extent possible.
Question. In an undated document released yesterday, the Coast
Guard expressed concerns about intelligence gaps concerning foreign
ownership of port assets. Were you aware of these concerns? Did you act
upon them?
Answer. The referenced concerns must be placed in context. The U.S.
Coast Guard resolved its intelligence concerns in the context of the
original CFIUS review. Further, DHS considered the intelligence
community reporting on this case and no unresolved concerns were
raised.
Question. Why did the Administration decide to not adhere to the
45-day review process established by the Byrd Amendment?
Answer. The Department of the Treasury, as Chair of the CFIUS, is
better positioned to respond to questions regarding CFIUS's
interpretation of the Byrd Amendment.
Question. What led to the January 6, 2006, letter of assurances to
the Department of Homeland Security in connection with this
transaction?
Answer. In reviewing DPW's proposed acquisition of P&O, DHS
concurred with the intelligence community and the other CFIUS agencies
reviewing the transaction that DPW's acquisition presented no current
threat to U.S. national security. Nevertheless, given DHS's
responsibility for critical infrastructure protection and port and
maritime security, DHS wanted to ensure, to the extent possible, that
DPW would not present a future risk to national security by taking
adverse action sometime in the future.
Question. Is the January 6, 2006, letter intended to be a binding
contractual obligation? If so, how would it be enforced and by whom?
Answer. The January 6, 2006 assurances letter from DPW to DHS
constituted a legally binding agreement. If DPW were to have breached
the agreement, DHS had full authority to conduct detailed inspections
of all containers or other cargo handled by the operator and authority
over the terminal itself so that DHS could protect national security.
Both the terms of the assurances letter and the CFIUS regulations
provide CFIUS with authority to reopen its review of a transaction
where the parties have made a material misrepresentation or omitted
material facts.
DHS would have had recourse to all available remedies under
contract law. For example, the Government could have asked a court to
order DPW to perform any provision that the Government believed DPW had
breached, or to pay damages for costs that resulted from such breach.
Question. What subject matter and personal jurisdiction would our
courts have over the Dubai principals?
Answer. As noted in our response to QFR 3683, above, U.S. courts
would have had subject matter and personal jurisdiction over any of the
terms of the assurances letter entered into between DP World and DHS.
In addition, DHS would have had other available remedies that would not
have required resort to a court, including the full authority to
conduct detailed inspections of all containers or other cargo handled
by the operator and authority over the terminal itself so that DHS
could protect national security.
Question. What would remedies be available to the United States if
the contractual obligations were not fulfilled?
Answer. As stated above, DHS would have had recourse to all
available remedies under contract law. In addition, DHS could have
reinstituted CFIUS proceedings and potentially ordered the transaction
to be unwound.
Question. Was legal analysis conducted to ascertain whether the
special assurances offered in the January 6 letter could be enforced?
Please provide any such analysis and related documents.
Answer. While not obtained in every case, it is not unusual for one
or more CFIUS agencies to obtain an assurances letter from a party in
CFIUS. These letters are contractual arrangements between the parties,
and terms are enforceable like other contracts.
DHS's Office of General Counsel reviewed the terms of the January
6, 2006 assurances letter but did not issue a specific, written opinion
relating to the ability of DHS to enforce any or all of the contract
terms.
Question. Who is the ``responsible corporate officer'' who will
serve as a point of contact for DHS in each U.S. facility owned or
controlled by Dubai Ports World, Ports, Customs and Free Zone
Corporation, and Thunder FZE?
Answer. Dubai Ports World announced in February 2006 that it would
sell the P&O facilities in the United States to an American company.
Until that point, the P&O security officer continues to serve as the
point of contact at the formerly P&O U.S. facilities.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Senator Gregg. The subcommittee will stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., Tuesday, February 28, the
hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007
----------
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES
[The following testimonies were received by the
Subcommittee on Homeland Security for inclusion in the record.
The submitted materials relate to the fiscal year 2007 budget
request for programs within the subcommittee's jurisdiction.]
Prepared Statement of the American Psychological Association
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, the American
Psychological Association (APA) represents 150,000 members and
affiliates, and works to advance psychology as a science, a profession,
and a means of promoting health and human welfare. Psychologists are
involved in a broad spectrum of programs within the jurisdiction of
this Subcommittee. For example, psychologists manage the Social and
Behavioral Research Program within the Threat Awareness Portfolio of
the DHS Science and Technology Directorate. Psychologists also provide
expertise as members of the Homeland Security Science and Technology
Advisory Committee and the Academe and Policy Research Senior Advisory
Committee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council. Psychologists
serve as Principle Investigators directing the activities of two of the
five University-Based Centers of Excellence and student psychologists
are becoming the next generation of Homeland Security experts training
under the DHS Scholars and Fellows program.
Overall, APA has been pleased to see the increasing emphasis DHS is
placing on behavioral and psychological science within the department.
However APA is also concerned about how pending DHS reorganization and
proposed budget cuts might undermine long range planning for
psychological and behavioral research programs within the department.
Finally, DHS must remain ever-mindful that behavioral research
necessarily involves systematically collected and analyzed empirical
data that cannot be replaced by the well-intentioned but perhaps ill-
informed speculation of experts or contractors who lack training in the
behavioral sciences.
The Threat Awareness Portfolio was cut 35 percent from fiscal year
2005 to fiscal year 2006. The fiscal year 2007 budget calls for an
additional 6.4 percent cut over fiscal year 2006. APA recommends that
Congress restore the proposed 6.4 percent cut and fund the Threat
Awareness Portfolio at or above the $43 million fiscal year 2006
appropriation.
The Threat Awareness Portfolio (TAP) in the Science and Technology
(S&T) Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsors
research to inform, develop, and test tools and methodologies to assess
terrorist threats, understand terrorism, and improve national security.
There are three broad program areas within TAP, one of which is the
Social and Behavioral Research (SBR) Program. The SBR Program sponsors
social science and behavioral research to support the missions of DHS
and the broader law enforcement and intelligence communities, as well
as promote the safety and security of the American public.
SBR Program Description, Strategic Goals, and Areas of Research
The SBR Program was developed with four strategic aims. The program
leverages the theories, data, and methods of the social and behavioral
sciences to improve the detection, analysis, and understanding of the
threats posed by individuals, groups, and radical movements; it
supports the assessment of the psychosocial impacts of catastrophic
events and the validation of public communications and education
programs to increase the American public's all hazards preparedness and
response capabilities; it facilitates information exchange across the
Federal Government to enhance the knowledge and coordination of
Federally sponsored social and behavioral science research related to
national security and preparedness; and it develops mechanisms to
provide senior policymakers with social and behavioral science theories
and data that can inform their decisions. To achieve these aims, the
SBR Program supports numerous coordinated activities that incorporate
social and behavioral science into coherent, integrated techniques and
methodologies. These activities fall within four broad research and
development areas that support each of the strategic goals of the SBR
Program.
First, the program's activities inform the ability of operational
end users (including personnel involved with border and transportation
security, customs enforcement, and intelligence analysis), to detect
threats and conduct accurate risk assessments. With continued support,
these efforts will produce two main products--models of behavioral and
linguistic cues that indicate whether an individual is likely engaged
in deception or is intent on doing harm; and an integrative model of
the ideological, organizational, and contextual factors associated with
a group or radical movement's likelihood of engaging in violence.
Second, the program supports coordinating research in public
education and communication aimed at increasing the American
population's ability to prepare for and respond to natural and man-made
catastrophic events and developing quantitative assessments of
psychosocial vulnerabilities. With continued support, these efforts
will test and evaluate the effects of various theoretically sound
messaging and education programs on public all-hazards preparedness and
response, as well as develop an index to measure the psychosocial
impact of catastrophic events.
Third, the program sponsors activities to improve the coordination
of social and behavioral science research related to national security
and preparedness by supporting various methods of information sharing
across the Federal Government. With continued support, these efforts
will produce integrated symposia and workshops attended by relevant
Federal partners and a participatory web-based system for sharing
information on Federally funded social and behavioral science research
related to national security and preparedness.
Fourth, the program assembles leading thinkers on the social and
behavioral aspects of terrorism and national security to participate in
study sessions and web-based dialogue focused on topics of relevance to
the SBR Program and DHS as a whole. With continued support, this group
will produce white papers and briefings on a range of topics (see
appended description of DHS Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership
Program).
IMPROVING RISK ASSESSMENT BY INCREASING THE AWARENESS OF THREATS
To protect the nation effectively, it is essential to improve our
ability to assess the potential threats posed by individuals as well as
the larger terrorist groups and movements to which they may belong. In
fiscal year 2007, the SBR Program's activities will continue to build
upon work completed in fiscal year 2006 to improve our ability to model
whether an individual is intent on doing harm or engaged in deception,
as well as improve our ability to model the likelihood that a group
will engage in violent activity. Additional work will be sponsored to
compare how models based on open source material differ from models
developed on classified data.
Improving Awareness of Individual Threats--Project Hostile Intent
An ongoing program, Project Hostile Intent aims to detect and model
the behavioral cues that indicate an individual's intent to do harm
and/or deceive The cues examined in Project Hostile Intent are those
that can be assessed remotely and in real time, and the procedures and
technologies required to collect these cues are non-invasive and
amenable to integration into busy operational contexts. In addition to
detecting these cues, this project examines whether this process can be
automated through the use of sensors and detection algorithms and,
subsequently, integrated with other technologies aimed at identifying
individuals who pose threats to the homeland, e.g., biometric tools and
databases. The targeted customers of this research are Customs and
Border Patrol and Transportation Security Administration personnel.
Improving Awareness of Group Threats
Another SBR Program research priority is improving our ability to
determine the intentions of various domestic and foreign groups who may
pose a threat to the U.S. homeland or U.S. interests abroad. The
central activity in this area is the Motivation and Intent (M&I)
Project, aimed at developing models to inform analysts' assessments
regarding whether a group intends to engage in violent activity to
further its goals. In future years, work in this area will be further
expanded to incorporate the modeling of radical movements and the
violent activity associated with such movements. In addition, several
projects will be sponsored to augment the M&I effort by providing
additional data or addressing gaps in the current social and behavioral
science research. The tools, methodologies, and knowledge developed
through this research program will improve the efficiency and accuracy
of intelligence analysis by identifying key social and behavioral
science variables to consider when assessing the likelihood that a
group may intend to act violently.
The Motivation and Intent (M&I) Project
In fiscal year 2005, the SBR Program initiated funding of the M&I
Project. This activity draws on social science data and theories to
develop analytic models aimed at determining the ideological,
organizational, and contextual factors associated with a group's
likelihood of engaging in violence. The goal of this on-going effort is
to develop an integrated framework that enables analysts to examine the
impact of various social and behavioral science variables on a group's
intent to engage in violence. The project will model the factors
associated with violent activity carried out by both domestic and
foreign groups. APA believes that this work could be augmented by
research to understand how terrorist organizations reason with respect
to target selection (i.e., does target selection depend on
circumstances such as differential vulnerability of targets, as opposed
to other considerations). Further, it would be helpful to understand
how specific tactics are adopted and the considerations that enter into
tactic selection.
Update and Maintenance of the Global Terrorism Database
The SBR Program has supported the updating of a coded and
computerized database comprised of more than 69,000 terrorist incidents
recorded worldwide from 1970-1997 as well as the initial coding and
inclusion of incidents that have occurred from 1998 to the present.
While this worthwhile activity will continue to be supported in fiscal
year 2006 and beyond, APA believes a complementary database of
government responses to terrorism would also be helpful as terrorists
appear to adapt and counter-adapt based on responses to their actions.
Quantitative Analysis of Terrorist Perspectives and
Behaviors
The SBR Program also will sponsor activity to incorporate
perspective analysis into the M&I Project. This project will involve an
analysis of the perspectives of multi-level (individual, group, and
subculture) actors in a country or region in which various terrorist
groups of interest operate. An underlying conceptual framework will be
created informed by social and behavioral scientists and other subject
matter experts who are familiar with the region, politics, and actors
of interest. The framework will extract patterns in actors' foci and
attitudes from various sources of data (e.g., media statements and
materials from actors' websites). This activity will add a unique
capability as it will allow an analyst to make more informed decisions
regarding agents' intentions based on the perspectives of multiple
actors in a region of interest.
In addition, a team of social and behavioral scientists will
quantify the perspectives of these actors and conduct statistical
analyses relating these perspectives to various types of activities
(for example, engaging in violence, condoning violence, participation
in the political process, etc.). This effort will allow for the testing
of social and behavioral science theories drawing on the unique source
of data provided by the perspective analyses of various actors. It will
also allow for a scientifically rigorous analysis of trends in actors'
attitudes and behaviors based on an analysis of actors' perspectives
and detailed chronologies of their behaviors. The findings from this
project will inform the M&I Program's modeling efforts and allow for
the refinement of the conceptual framework that forms the basis for the
perspective analysis.
Systematic Comparison of Open and Classified Data Sources
The SBR Program will sponsor work that conducts a detailed
comparative analysis of open source data and classified data,
specifically focused on the information used to identify the motives
and intents of actors of interest. This activity will identify the
relative strengths of these two types of data and explore what types of
information they provide to help an analyst determine the intentions of
individuals and groups. The research in this area will provide detailed
comparative information on open source and classified data that will
better inform decisions regarding whether and/or when to rely on open
source data, and the applicability of academic research to intelligence
analyses.
Improving Risk Assessment and Risk Communication
Research in the social and behavioral sciences can examine how best
to help the American population prepare for and respond to natural and
man-made catastrophic events, thereby reducing one component of
national vulnerability. Public communication and education strategies
for natural and man-made catastrophic events are key components of
DHS's overall preparedness and response missions, and sponsoring
research on the efficacy of these communications is a stated priority
of the SBR Program.
However, current risk communications strategies should be informed
by decades of existing research which have produced consistent findings
regardless of the category of risk under study. Such research shows
that people want the truth, even if it is worrisome and as such, candor
in risk communication is critical. People can absorb only a limited
amount of new information at a time and as a result risk communications
must prioritize and organize critical facts according to the way the
target audience naturally thinks. Further, people have an inherent
difficulty in understanding certain kinds of information (e.g. that
repeated exposure to small risks increases their overall risk) so risk
communications must accommodate the known strengths and weaknesses of
the target audiences thought processes. Additionally, emotions can
cloud people's judgment in predictable ways that interferes with
decision making so those charged with communicating risks must do so
respectfully in order to facilitate reasoned decision making. Even the
most experienced communicators cannot accurately predict how messages
will be interpreted on novel topics or with unfamiliar audiences. Thus
messages must be systematically evaluated for both intended and
unintended reactions before they are disseminated. In emergency
planning exercises, people exaggerate their ability to predict others
behavior, as a result social and behavioral scientists need to be
included in such planning teams to ensure that plans are based upon
science rather than intuition. Finally, people generally make sensible
and effective decisions if communicators deliver relevant, timely and
accurate information.
Improving Federal Information Sharing and Collaborative Research
Efforts
A priority of the SBR Program is the development of effective
methods for information sharing among Federal agencies tasked with
addressing various aspects of national security and preparedness. Not
only will such information sharing increase the effectiveness and the
ability of the government to protect U.S. interests at home and abroad,
it will also increase collaborative research efforts and reduce
unnecessary duplication. The initial effort will consist of workshops
focused on issues related to national security and will later expand to
the provision of web-based dialogue and interaction to facilitate
information exchange.
Providing Policymakers Social and Behavioral Science Information--The
Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership
The Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership (Partnership)
Program assembles leading thinkers on the social and behavioral aspects
of terrorism and national security to participate in study sessions and
web-based dialogue focused on topics of relevance to the SBR Program,
DHS, and the nation as a whole. It was created to describe the
significant roles that social, cultural, economic, and psychological
factors play in the threats we face and our counter-threat activities
and provide a mechanism for communicating social and behavioral
research findings to policymakers. In fiscal year 2006, at the request
of the DHS Policy Directorate, the Partnership will examine the impact
of U.S. policies on radicalization in the United States. It will also
hold study sessions on topics related to (1) assessing the intent of
terrorist groups and (2) determining the long-term impacts of a
terrorist attack with improvised nuclear device.
APA recognizes that recent events such as hurricane Katrina, as
well as forecast events such as a pandemic flu outbreak, have forced a
realignment of the Department's strategic goals to prioritize the
strengthening of public resilience in responding to the diverse threats
facing us. That will mean evaluating Departmental investments in terms
of their contribution to, among other things, strengthening
communities, securing trust in government, providing multi-threat
response capabilities and enhancing economic and institutional
recovery.
Accomplishing these tasks will require attention to social and
behavioral variables in three contexts:
Predicting the public's response to various threats (e.g., to what
extent will people understand warnings, trust authorities,
support one another in the face of threats, rebound from
trauma).
Understanding the limits to analyses and plans, so that citizens and
officials have realistic expectations of the confidence to
place in them.
Communicating about threats, so that people receive the specific
information that they need for effective action, in a credible,
comprehensible form.
These issues are relevant to preparation, response, and recovery
for all threats. While the Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership
has begun to address these issues, APA believes the Department would
benefit from an in-house Center for Translational Social and Behavioral
Science Research tasked with ensuring that our homeland security plans
are grounded in the best available science.
Although the center should be located in the Science and Technology
Directorate, it should provide services to the entire Department. For
example, it would be a resource for creating scientifically sound,
behaviorally realistic communications, usability standards, risk
analyses, and emergency plans. It would also identify fundamental
issues, to be studied by the University Centers of Excellence and
others.
The Center proposed is similar to the Office of Behavioral and
Social Sciences Research at the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
which celebrates a 10 year anniversary this year and leverages a modest
budget to coordinate interdisciplinary and translational behavioral and
social science research across the twenty-seven Institutes and Centers
of NIH. This initiative would address a significant gap in the
Department's science and technology resources, while providing an
essential input to implementing the Department's commitment to risk-
based decision making.
UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS--DHS SCHOLARS AND FELLOWS PROGRAM.
APA has been very pleased to see how well behavioral and social
scientists are represented in the DHS Scholars and Fellows awards.
However, we are concerned that cuts to the fiscal year 2006 budget and
proposed cuts to the fiscal year 2007 budget will serve to disrupt a
critical career pipeline for the next generation of Homeland Security
scientists. If the proposed fiscal year 2007 budget is enacted, DHS
will cut Scholars and Fellows support by one third. Especially this
year, as the Administration and Congress focus on the American
Competitiveness Initiative, we strongly recommend that the subcommittee
restore full funding of the DHS Scholars and Fellows program.
University Programs were cut 11 percent from fiscal year 2005 to
fiscal year 2006. The fiscal year 2007 budget calls for an additional
16 percent cut over fiscal year 2006. APA recommends that Congress
restore the proposed 16 percent cut and fund the University Programs at
or above the $62 million fiscal year 2006 appropriation.
department of homeland security report language for fiscal year 2007
Proposed by the American Psychological Association
Science and Technology Directorate
The Committee understands that terrorists are people and terrorism
is behavior, therefore understanding the importance of the behavioral,
psychological and social sciences to countering terrorism and homeland
security is paramount. The Committee applauds DHS strong support of a
full range of behavioral and social science research.
The Committee recommends DHS implement a Center for Translational
Social and Behavioral Science Research tasked with ensuring that our
homeland security plans are grounded in the best available science. The
Committee believes such a center should be a resource for creating
scientifically sound, behaviorally realistic communications, usability
standards, risk analyses, and emergency plans and should also identify
fundamental issues to be studied by the University Centers of
Excellence and others.
The Committee appreciates that the psychological consequences of a
manmade and natural disasters are likely to be widespread and long
lasting and that events like hurricanes Katrina and Rita are known to
have caused stress and anxiety in Americans of all ages, ethnicities,
and disparate geographical locations. Mental health practitioners must
be trained to deal with the particular aftermath that such events
impose. The Committee encourages DHS to ensure that mental health
research, particularly longitudinal research, is focused on how to
respond, mitigate and inoculate the populace as effectively as
possible.
The Committee also recognizes, however, that the social and
behavioral sciences have a much larger role to play than the single
domain of mental health. The technological devices and infrastructure
that are created in support of counter-terrorism and homeland security
efforts will be only as effective as the humans who interact with them.
Because many instances of protection against devastating loss since 9/
11 involved human alertness to unusual behavior, the Committee
recognizes that a significant portion of the most effective defense
against domestic attack will be human agents. In addition, the
Committee acknowledges that as we devise innovative technological
systems to thwart terrorists, the most dangerous terrorist will be one
who knows how to modify his or her behavior so as to circumvent these
systems. Therefore, the Committee believes that effective counter-
terrorism technologies must be developed in concert with the social and
behavioral sciences.
The Committee encourages DHS to pursue research on the assessment
of the human dimensions (social, cultural, and behavioral) in which
networks exist, such as first-response teams, emergency management
teams, communication systems, intelligence networks, terrorist groups,
and U.S. government (Federal, State, and local) departments and
agencies. Systems analysis and systems engineering are powerful tools
for understanding how these networks function. However, the Committee
recognizes that these tools will be useful only to the extent those
human behavioral variables are appropriately described and incorporated
into the analyses.
The Committee is concerned about the utility of the Homeland
Security Advisory System and encourages DHS to include an on-going
evaluation of its effectiveness. The Committee encourages DHS to
support research on risk assessment and the communication of risk in
order to understand the framework in which the communicator operates as
well as the knowledge base and competence of the audience. The
Committee recognizes that an effective and meaningful alert system
involves knowing how to articulate the goals of the communication
including whether to inform only, or to inform and change behavior.
The Committee encourages further development of animal models for
the assessment of chemical, radiological and biological agents that
might be used as weapons of attack and the pharmacological
countermeasures required to neutralize or reverse their effects. The
Committee recognizes that animal models are useful not only as
indicators of the apparent physiological responses to such agents, but
careful measurement of their behavior (motivation, learning,
aggression) can serve as more sensitive indices of both long- and
short-term effects of such weapons. Further, the Committee recognizes
animals also are potential targets of attack in the agricultural
sector, so that longitudinal data on animal behavior can serve as
valuable baseline data against which to detect attacks by biological
agents that may be either slow- or fast-acting.
The Committee recognizes that understanding how humans process
information is critical to developing new technologies for information
gathering and intelligence analysis. The Committee encourages
additional research to ensure that such technologies optimally
accommodate the human user. Further, the Committee encourages DHS to
support research that applies basic learning algorithms to data-mining
systems. Such systems can then become language-independent and analyze
text for meaning rather than simply the identification of keywords.
The Committee recognizes the value of robotics in performing
dangerous work and in substituting for human surveillance. The
Committee encourages DHS to support research on human-machine
interaction to optimize the functions of both the human and machine in
this partnership. The Committee recognizes that it is imperative to
understand how best to design robotic systems to interact effectively
with their human controllers and partners. The Committee believes that
human behavior cannot be perceived as a weak link in this interaction
because human cognitive, perceptual and motivational capacities are a
given and the machine system must be built to complement the human
user.
The Committee recognizes the profound effect that terrorism can
have on social systems and encourages DHS to support research on how
attitudes and beliefs about terrorism affect consumer confidence,
population mobility, decisions about child-care, job behaviors, and
attitudes towards immigrants, religion, political institutions and
leaders. The Committee encourages further research on understanding the
short- and long-term effects of stereotyping and marginalization of
groups as well as research on hate-crimes and the emergence and
maintenance of fundamentalist, extremist, and anti-government groups
within the United States and outside the United States.
The Committee recognizes the potential for massive disruption by
those who would distribute erroneous or system-destructive information
into the Internet, the telecommunications infrastructure, embedded/
real-time computing systems, and dedicated computing devices. The
Committee recommends DHS support research to analyze the behavior,
motivations and social contexts of known instances of successful
``hacking''. The Committee encourages DHS to research effective
safeguards that our consistent with the behaviors of the humans that
use these systems.
The Committee recognizes that emergency management, evacuation, and
the design of egress systems are operable only to the extent that we
know how humans behave in emergency situations. The Committee
encourages research on human behavior under duress and encourages
research on designing emergency systems and infrastructure (operation
and communication systems, buildings, roads and tunnels, stadiums) that
facilitate the most effective behavior in emergency situations.
The Committee recognizes there is a need to put as much attention
into government responses to terrorism as into terrorist acts
themselves. There are a number of data bases recording particulars of
terrorist attacks, but none so far that record government responses
(legal, military, political, policing; strategy and tactics) on the
same time line as the terrorist attacks. The committee believes this
information is critical to track because terrorists appear to adapt and
counter-adapt based on responses to their actions.
The Committee recommends that DHS also encourage research to
understand how terrorist organizations reason with respect to target
selection (i.e., does target selection depend on circumstances such as
differential vulnerability of targets, as opposed to other
considerations). Further, it would be helpful to understand how
specific tactics are adopted and the considerations that enter into
tactic selection.
The Committee realizes there is a need to understand how groups
move from radical protest or social movement to terrorism and to
examine the trajectories by which individuals move to terrorism.
Whether an individual joins a protest group or social movement which
escalates to the level of terrorism or joins an existing terrorist
group, the background and experience and psychology of individuals
recruited to terrorism in these two ways may be quite different. Moving
to terrorism as a member of a continuing group is more like a slippery
slope, whereas moving to terrorism by joining an existing terrorist
group is more like making a decision.
The Committee urges DHS to developing data bases of terrorist
rhetoric for important terrorist groups over time. If terrorists there
are rhetorical differences between protest groups that do and do not go
on to commit terrorist acts such differences might be useful for
directing countermeasure resources. When the rhetoric is not in
English, English speaking researchers need the rhetoric translated so
that they can apply text analysis tools in seeking rhetorical
predictors.
The Committee appreciates the DHS focus on jihadist terrorism but
recognizes that it also needs to prepare for a resurgence of domestic
terrorism. Neo-Nazi, constitutionalist, and white militia violence
emerged after the Soviet threat disintegrated; similarly it can be
expected that these groups and their violence will reemerge as the
threat from Al Qaeda fades. There is a danger in focusing only on
jihadist terrorism. The Committee suggest that National surveys with
unobtrusive questions (what percent of world's population is white?)
could begin to track the popularity of ideas associated with the idea
that the U.S. Federal Government is the enemy.
The Committee notes that thus far, Islamic communities in Europe
have been more involved in jihadist violence than Islamic communities
in the United States. The Committee urges DHS to continue to research
the determinants of support for violence among diasporas and develop
theories of diaspora experience in relation to home country politics
and especially support for violence in relation to home country
politics.
The Committee understands that Al Qaeda is less an organization
than a brand name or sympathy group with many local franchises now. The
anarchist movement of the late 1800s and early 1900s had a similar
quality, and due to the international nature of the anarchist threat
governments leaders reached unprecedented cooperative agreements in
trying to suppress the anarchists. The Committee recommends that DHS
conduct a review of research on anarchist terrorism at the beginning of
the 20th century in an effort to apply lessons learned for suppressing
Al Qaeda.
The Committee urges DHS to continue research on the psychology of
negative intergroup emotions. Most analyses of terrorism and terrorist
motives makes reference to fear, hate, anger or humiliation but the
Committee understands there is very little empirical research on hate
and humiliation. Further while there is research on anger and hate it
appears to focus on the interpersonal level which may be very different
than anger and hate at the intergroup level. The Committee recognizes
that episodes like Abu Ghraib highlight the problem in understanding
intergroup emotions which are twofold: understanding the relation
between interpersonal and intergroup emotions, and understanding in
particular intergroup emotions of hate, humiliation, and shame.
The Committee recommends that DHS continue to review criminology
literature and research related to gangs, especially youth and prison
gangs, to better understand how different types of terrorist groups on
the basis of recruiting, decision making, and desistence. The Committee
believes that through research comparing terrorist groups that do and
do not split, DHS might learn how to encourage internal conflict and
splitting within terrorist organizations. Further, the Committee notes
that there are cases, such as the Armenian Secret Army for Liberation
of Armenia, and Egyptian Group after Luxor, in which terrorist activity
drops quickly from high to low levels. As the dynamics of endings are
not necessarily the reverse of the dynamics of beginnings, the
Committee believes it should be useful to study such cases to learn how
to encourage desistence.
The Committee notes that terrorists are sometimes but not always
seen as representing the group or cause they claim to be fighting for.
Psychological research has emphasized attributions to individual actors
with little attention to attributions to groups, and the attributions
of interest are moral responsibility more than the usual psychological
focus on perceived ``causes'' of behavior as trait-based or situation-
based. The Committee encourages DHS to conduct additional research on
attribution theory to better understand how actions of a few are
sometimes but not always attributed to the group the individuals come
from.
The Committee urges DHS to continue to study why some groups move
from local to international terrorism. Most terrorism begins in
response to local issues, and relatively few groups escalate to
international attacks. The Committee believes we need to understand
when and how this kind of escalation occurs. The Committee notes that
most data bases focus on international terrorist attacks and may
discount data about earlier local attacks by the same groups. The
Committee believes that by studying local terrorist groups whose
actions remained local DHS would have a basis for comparison with local
groups that transitioned to international attacks.
______
Prepared Statement of the American Public Transportation Association
APTA is a nonprofit international association of over 1,600 public
and private member organizations including transit systems and commuter
rail operators; planning, design, construction and finance firms;
product and service providers; academic institutions; transit
associations and State departments of transportation. APTA members
serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient and economical
transit services and products. Over 90 percent of persons using public
transportation in the United States and Canada are served by APTA
members.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to submit written
testimony on the security and safety of public transportation systems.
We appreciate your interest in transportation security, and we look
forward to working with you as you develop the fiscal year 2007
appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security.
ABOUT APTA
The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a
nonprofit international association of more than 1,600 public and
private member organizations including transit systems and commuter
rail operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms;
product and service providers; academic institutions; transit
associations and State departments of transportation. APTA members
serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical
transit services and products. More than 90 percent of the people using
public transportation in the United States and Canada are served by
APTA member systems.
OVERVIEW
Mr. Chairman, public transportation is one of our Nation's critical
infrastructures. We cannot overemphasize the critical importance of our
industry to the economic quality of life of this country. Over 9.6
billion transit trips are taken annually on all modes of transit
service. People use public transportation vehicles over 32 million
times each weekday. This is more than 16 times the number of daily
travelers on the Nation's airlines.
Safety and security are the top priority of the public
transportation industry. Transit systems took many steps to improve
security prior to 9/11 and have significantly increased efforts since
then. Since September 11, 2001, public transit agencies in the United
States have spent over $2 billion on security and emergency
preparedness programs and technology from their own budgets with only
minimal Federal funding. Last year's events in London and the previous
year's events in Madrid further highlight the need to strengthen
security on public transit systems and to do so without delay. We do
not need another wakeup call like the terrorists attacks on rail
systems in London and Madrid.
We urge Congress to act decisively on this issue. In light of the
documented needs, we respectfully urge Congress to provide at least
$560 million in the fiscal year 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations
bill for transit security grants to assist transit systems to continue
to address the $6 billion in identified transit security investment
needs. Funding at this level annually would allow for dramatic
improvement in security for the Nation's transit users over a 10 year
period. Federal funding for additional security needs should provide
for both hard and soft costs as described below and will be in addition
to investments as transit systems continue to provide from their own
resources. We also respectfully urge Congress to provide $500,000 to
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) so that DHS can in turn
provide that amount in grant funding to the APTA security standards
program which includes participation with our Federal partners to
assist with the development of transit security standards. In addition,
we respectfully urge Congress to provide $600,000 to maintain the
Public Transit Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC).
BACKGROUND
In 2004 APTA surveyed its U.S. transit system members to determine
what actions they needed to take to improve security for their
customers, employees and facilities. In response to the survey, transit
agencies around the country have identified in excess of $6 billion in
transit security investment needs. State and local governments and
transit agencies are doing what they can to improve security, but it is
important that the Federal Government be a full partner in the effort
to ensure the security of the Nation's transit users.
In fiscal year 2003, transit security was allocated $65 million in
Federal funds from DHS for 20 transit systems. In fiscal year 2004, $50
million was allocated from DHS for 30 transit systems. For the first
time in fiscal year 2005, Congress specifically appropriated $150
million for transit, passenger and freight rail security. Out of the
$150 million, transit is to receive approximately $130 million--almost
$108 million for rail transit and more than $22 million for bus. Also,
passenger ferries are slated to receive an additional $5 million for
security from a separate account. In fiscal year 2006, Congress
appropriated $150 million for transit, passenger and freight rail
security. DHS is currently deciding how to allocate this funding among
the modes of transportation. We are very appreciative of this effort.
However, in the face of significant needs, more needs to be done.
Transit authorities have significant and specific transit security
needs. Based on APTA's 2003 Infrastructure Database survey, over 2,000
rail stations do not have security cameras. According to our 2005
Transit Vehicle Database, 53,000 buses, over 5,000 commuter rail cars,
and over 10,000 heavy rail cars do not have security cameras. Fewer
than one-half of all buses have automatic vehicle locator systems
(AVLs) that allow dispatchers to know the location of the bus when an
emergency occurs. Nearly 75 percent of demand response vehicles lack
these AVLs. Furthermore, no transit system has a permanent biological
detection system. In addition, only two transit authorities have a
permanent chemical detection system. A partnership with the Federal
Government could help to better address many of these specific needs.
We are disappointed that the Administration proposed only $600
million for a Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program in the fiscal
year 2007 DHS budget proposal, which would fund infrastructure security
grants for transit, seaports, railways and other facilities. We are
also disappointed that the Administration did not include a specific
line item funding amount for transit security. We look forward to
working with the Administration and Congress in securing adequate
transit security funding that begins to address unmet transit security
needs throughout the country.
We further request that the existing process for distributing DHS
Federal grant funding be modified so that funds are distributed
directly to transit authorities, rather than to State Administrating
Agencies (SAA) on a regional basis. We believe direct funding to the
transit authorities would be more efficient and productive. The
Administration's process and conditions that have been put into effect
have created significant barriers and time delays in getting the actual
funds into the hands of transit agencies.
As I noted in previous testimony, APTA is a Standards Development
Organization (SDO) for the public transportation industry. We are now
applying our growing expertise in standards development to transit
industry safety and security, best practices, guidelines and standards
as well. We have already begun to initiate our efforts for security
standards development and we have engaged our Federal partners from
both the DHS and Department of Transportation in this process. Through
these initial meetings, I am pleased to advise that our Federal
partners have agreed to support these efforts. We look forward to
working with the Administration and Congress in support of this
initiative. We respectfully urge Congress to provide $500,000 to the
DHS so that it can in turn provide that amount in grant funding to the
APTA security standards program which includes participation of our
Federal partners to assist with the development of such standards and
practices consistent with what we have already seen through the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA). Our efforts in standards development for
commuter rail, rail transit and bus transit operations have been
significant and our status as a SDO is acknowledged by both the FTA and
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). The FTA and the
Transportation Research Board have supported our standards initiatives
through the provision of grants.
We also would like to work with Congress and the Department of
Homeland Security's Directorate of Science and Technology to take a
leadership role in advancing research and technology development to
enhance security and emergency preparedness for public transportation.
INFORMATION SHARING
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, public transit
systems across the country have worked very hard to strengthen their
security plans and procedures and have been very active in training
personnel and conducting drills to test their capacity to respond to
emergencies. As well, to the extent possible within their respective
budgets, transit systems have been incrementally hardening their
services through the introduction of additional technologies such as
surveillance equipment, access control and intrusion detection systems.
While the transit systems have been diligent, they have been unable to
fully implement programs without more assistance from the Federal
Government.
A vital component of ensuring public transit's ability to prepare
and respond to critical events is the timely receipt of security
intelligence in the form of threats, warnings, advisories and access to
informational resources. Accordingly, in 2003, the American Public
Transportation Association, supported by Presidential Decision
Directive #63, established an ISAC for public transit systems
throughout the United States. A funding grant in the amount of $1.2
million was provided to APTA by the Federal Transit Administration to
establish a very successful Public Transit ISAC that operated 24 hours
a day, 7 days a week, and gathered information from various sources,
including DHS, and then passed information on to transit systems
following a careful analysis of that information. However, given that
the Federal Transit Administration was subsequently unable to access
security funds, and given the decision of DHS to not fund ISAC
operations, APTA then had to look for an alternate method of providing
security intelligence through DHS's newly created Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN). APTA continues to work with DHS staff to
create a useful HSIN application for the transit industry. It is clear,
however, that while the HSIN may become an effective resource, it does
not match the 24/7 two-way communication functions provided through the
Public Transit ISAC. However, we believe that consistent, on-going and
reliable funds from Congress should be provided for the Public Transit
ISAC that has been proven an effective delivery mechanism for security
intelligence. Therefore, we respectfully urge Congress to provide
$600,000 to maintain the Public Transit ISAC.
In addition, APTA's membership includes many major international
public transportation systems, including the London Underground, Madrid
Metro, and the Moscow Metro. APTA also has a strong partnership with
the European-based transportation association, the International Union
of Public Transport. Through these relationships, APTA has participated
in a number of special forums in Europe and Asia to give United States
transit agencies the benefit of their experiences and to help address
transit security both here and abroad.
COST OF HEIGHTENED SECURITY
Following the attacks on London, APTA was asked to assist the TSA
in conducting a teleconference between the TSA and transit officials to
discuss transit impacts pertaining to both increasing and decreasing
the DHS threat levels. There is no question that increased threat
levels have a dramatic impact on budget expenditures of transit systems
and extended periods pose significant impacts on personnel costs. These
costs totaled $900,000 per day for U.S. public transit systems or an
estimated $33.3 million from July 7 to August 12, 2005 during the
heightened state of ``orange'' for public transportation. This amount
does not include costs associated with additional efforts by New York,
New Jersey and other systems to conduct random searches.
Many transit systems are also implementing other major programs to
upgrade security. For example, New York's Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (NY-MTA) is taking broad and sweeping steps to help ensure
the safety and security of its transportation systems in what are among
the most extensive security measures taken by a public transportation
system to date. NY-MTA will add 1,000 surveillance cameras and 3,000
motion sensors to its network of subways and commuter rail facilities
as part of a $212 million security upgrade announced late last year
with the Lockheed Martin Corporation. In fact, NY-MTA plans to spend
over $1.1 billion between now and 2009 on transit security.
SECURITY INVESTMENT NEEDS
Mr. Chairman, since the awful events of 9/11, the transit industry
has invested some $2 billion of its own funds for enhanced security
measures, building on the industry's already considerable efforts. At
the same time, our industry undertook a comprehensive review to
determine how we could build upon our existing industry security
practices. This included a range of activities, which include research,
best practices, education, information sharing in the industry, and
surveys. As a result of these efforts we have a better understanding of
how to create a more secure environment for our riders and the most
critical security investment needs.
Our latest survey of public transportation security identified
enhancements of at least $5.2 billion in additional capital funding to
maintain, modernize, and expand transit system security functions to
meet increased security demands. Over $800 million in increased costs
for security personnel, training, technical support, and research and
development have been identified, bringing total additional transit
security funding needs to more than $6 billion.
Responding transit agencies were asked to prioritize the uses for
which they required additional Federal investment for security
improvements. Priority examples of operational improvements include:
--Funding current and additional transit agency and local law
enforcement personnel
--Funding for over-time costs and extra security personnel during
heightened alert levels
--Training for security personnel
--Joint transit/law enforcement training
--Security planning activities
--Security training for other transit personnel
Priority examples of security capital investment improvements
include:
--Radio communications systems
--Security cameras on-board transit vehicles and in transit stations
--Controlling access to transit facilities and secure areas
--Automated vehicle locator systems
--Security fencing around facilities
Transit agencies with large rail operations also reported a
priority need for Federal capital funding for intrusion detection
devices.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Homeland Security issued directives
for the transit industry in May 2004 which would require that transit
authorities beef up security and to take a series of precautions which
would set the stage for more extensive measures without any Federal
funding assistance. Transit systems have already carried out many of
the measures that Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
calling for, such as drafting security plans, removing trash bins and
setting up procedures to deal with suspicious packages. The cost of
these measures and further diligence taken during times of heightened
alert is of particular concern to us. We look forward to working with
you in addressing these issues.
As you know, in the fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security
Appropriations bill (Public law 109-90), TSA can hire rail inspectors
using an $8 million appropriation. We have concerns about this
provision. We believe that funding for the inspectors would be better
spent on things that would support the industry such as surveillance
cameras, emergency communication and other systems rather than
highlighting security issues without providing the necessary resources
to address them. We look forward to working with you in addressing our
concerns.
ONGOING TRANSIT SECURITY PROGRAMS
Mr. Chairman, while transit agencies have moved to a heightened
level of security alertness, the leadership of APTA has been actively
working with its strategic partners to develop a practical plan to
address our industry's security and emergency preparedness needs. In
light of our new realities for security, the APTA Executive Committee
has established a Security Affairs Steering Committee. This committee
addresses our security strategic issues and directions for our
initiatives. This committee will also serve as the mass transit sector
coordination council that will interface with DHS and other Federal
agencies forming the government coordinating council.
In partnerships with the Transportation Research Board, APTA
supported two TCRP Panels that identified and initiated specific
projects developed to address Preparedness/Detection/Response to
Incidents and Prevention and Mitigation.
In addition to the TCRP funded efforts, APTA has been instrumental
in the development of numerous security and emergency preparedness
tools and resources. Many of these resources were developed in close
partnership with the FTA and we are presently focused on continuing
that same level of partnership with various entities within DHS. Also,
APTA has reached out to other organizations and international
transportation associations to formally engage in sharing information
on our respective security programs and to continue efforts that raise
the bar for safety and security effectiveness.
APTA has long-established safety audit programs for commuter rail,
bus, and rail transit operations. Within the scope of these programs
are specific elements pertaining to Emergency Response Planning and
Training as well as Security Planning. In keeping with our industry's
increased emphasis on these areas, the APTA Safety Management Audit
Programs have been modified to place added attention to these critical
elements.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation's heightened security needs
post 9/11, we believe that increased Federal investment in public
transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical. The public
transportation industry has made great strides in transit security
improvements since 9/11 but much more needs to be done. Therefore, we
respectfully urge Congress to provide at least $560 million in the
fiscal year 2007 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill
for transit security grants to assist transit systems to continue to
address the $6 billion in identified transit security investment needs.
Funding at this level annually would also allow for dramatic
improvement in security for the Nation's transit users over a 10 year
period. We also respectfully urge Congress to provide $500,000 to the
Department of Homeland Security so that DHS can in turn provide that
amount in grant funding to the APTA security standards program which
includes participation of our Federal partners to assist with the
development of transit security standards and practices consistent with
what we have already seen through the FTA. In addition, we respectfully
urge Congress to provide $600,000 to maintain the Public Transit ISAC.
We have also found that investment in public transit security
programs, resources and infrastructures provides a direct benefit in
preparation and response to natural disasters as well. We look forward
to building on our cooperative working relationship with the Department
of Homeland Security and Congress to begin to address these needs. We
again thank you and the Committee for allowing us to submit testimony
on these critical issues and look forward to working with you on safety
and security issues.
______
Prepared Statement of the International Association for Emergency
Managers
Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for allowing me this opportunity to provide
testimony on the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security.
I am Michael D. Selves. I am currently the Emergency Management and
Homeland Security Director for Johnson County, Kansas. Johnson County
constitutes the Southwest suburbs of the Kansas City Metropolitan Area
and, with a population of approximately a half million, is the most
populous county in Kansas. I currently serve as the First Vice
President of the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM)
and am providing this testimony on their behalf. I am also a Certified
Emergency Manager (CEM), and have served IAEM over the past 5 years as
chair of the Government Affairs Committee. For the past 11 years I have
been an active participant in the National Association of Counties,
chairing their Subcommittee on Emergency Management, as a charter
member of their Homeland Security Task Force as well as serving 2 years
on their Board of Directors. I was appointed by Department of Homeland
Security Secretary Ridge to his task force on State and local Homeland
Security funding.
The International Association of Emergency Managers has over 2,700
members including emergency management professionals at the State and
local government levels, the military, private business and the
nonprofit sector in the United States and in other countries. Most of
our members are city and county emergency managers who perform the
crucial function of coordinating and integrating the efforts at the
local level to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and
recover from all types of disasters including terrorist attacks. Our
members include emergency managers from large urban areas as well as
rural counties.
Hurricane Katrina has unequivocally demonstrated the need for
strong emergency management programs at the Federal State and local
levels. As emergency management professionals, we know the only way
plans, preparations and equipment can be brought to bear in a disaster
is through the planning efforts--of people . . . people whose job it is
to bring all elements of a community together to make the plans work
and who will be there when the time comes to implement those plans. For
this reason, we are limiting our statement to one single critical
issue: We respectfully request your assistance in increasing the
funding for the Emergency Management Program Grant (EMPG).
Emergency Management Performance Grant
--Request the $13,100,000 funding cut be rejected and the amount
increased to $256 million to begin addressing the shortfall.
--Request that EMPG funding be maintained in a separate account as in
the fiscal year 2006 Congressional action and not combined with
other grant programs.
Increase funding for EMPG.--Appropriations Committee report
language referred to the program as ``the backbone of the Nation's
emergency management system.'' In order to maintain this system and
build the capacity required to meet the greatly increasing demands,
additional investment is needed.
However, the President's Budget request for fiscal year 2007
proposes to reduce the funding from the $183,100,000 appropriated in
fiscal year 2006 to $170,000,000. According to a biennial study
conducted by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) in
2004 there is a shortfall of $260 million. We respectfully request that
EMPG be increased $86 million over the fiscal year 2007 request for a
total of $256,000,000 to begin addressing this shortfall.
Maintain EMPG as a separate account.--We also urge you to continue
to maintain EMPG as a separate account. The President's budget includes
this program in the ``State and Local'' account with a number of other
grant programs. EMPG is different from the other programs in this
account. EMPG has existed for over 50 years and supports all hazards
emergency management, including terrorism. In addition, it is a
performance based continuing program with deliverables and requirements
that must be met in order to receive funding the next year.
EMPG is critically important.--We believe it is the single most
effective use of Federal funds in providing emergency management
capacity to State and local governments. No other source of homeland
security funding is based on a consensus building process determining
outcomes and specific deliverables backstopped by a quarterly
accountability process. In fact, we feel this program would more
accurately be described by the name Emergency Management Assistance
(EMA) because of the unique requirements for deliverables and
accountability it imposes--unique among all other homeland security
sources of financial assistance.
In addition, this unique program has never experienced ``backlogs''
of unspent funds because it is built on the experience and refinement
of over 5 decades of proven effectiveness and efficiency. EMPG
assistance requires a 50 percent State or local match, thus creating
the much-needed ``buy-in'' not present in many other grant programs.
Actually, the ``buy-in'' in this program is significantly greater due
to the fact that currently many local jurisdictions are receiving 20
percent or less. In addition many local jurisdictions receive no
funding at all because of shortage of funds.
Examples of the critical benefits of EMPG are the following:
--This program provides funding for the emergency managers who
perform the role of the ``honest broker'' at the State and
local level and who establish the emergency management
framework for preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation.
--EMPG funding provides the people who are legally responsible for
creating a ``culture of preparedness'' at the State and local
level.
--EMPG funding also provides many of the personnel who can be
deployed across State lines to assist other States in case of
disaster through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC). During the 2005 response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
65, 919 civilian and military personnel and equipment assets
were deployed from 48 States, the District of Columbia, the
Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Over 2100 missions were
performed.
--EMPG funding has assumed a greater importance in light of recent
catastrophic events and the responses to those events. For
example, the President and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) have tasked State and local government emergency managers
with the responsibility to review their Emergency Operations
Plans regarding the issue of evacuation.
--EMPG supports the people who have had the added responsibility of
administering homeland security funding programs and additional
planning efforts since 2001. While we agree the National Plan
Review is a vitally important project, floods, tornadoes and
other disasters simply haven't stopped happening.
Without more funding and people we can't reach the level of
preparedness our Nation deserves and our citizens demand.
The recent White House report on the response to the Hurricane
Katrina contains 125 recommendations. A significant number of these
recommendations are ``top-down'' initiatives which require the
collaboration and coordination efforts of State and local emergency
managers in order to be fully implemented. We also know that genuine
solutions to broad based issues like emergency management can only
succeed if they recognize the primary importance of State and local
governments.
One way to sum things up is to acknowledge that beautiful plans
written without the input and agreement of key stakeholders on roles
and responsibilities will gather dust on shelves. A plan that works and
has broad based buy in may be ugly and patched, but it lives, breathes
and works, just like the people who implement it in a disaster.
EMPG provides people who build partnerships.--The single most
critically important thing EMPG funding provides is emergency
management personnel at the State and local level. People are the most
important investment this program makes because without them nothing
else works. Emergency Management is a people process. I would like to
point to my own jurisdiction--Johnson County, Kansas--as an example.
Even before Katrina, we were engaged in the process of evaluating
and revising our local emergency operations plan. I can tell you that
this plan truly has broad buy in and acceptance within our
jurisdiction. This happened because 16 subcommittees involving more
than 120 people for 8 months of effort developed the 16 annexes of our
plan. Because of the extensively and intensively people-based approach
of this process, all of our officials--from our elected local
leadership and senior management to front-line first responders--know
and accept their roles and responsibilities. This would not have
happened without EMPG funding providing the personnel in my office to
facilitate this process. And the end result is very important. If we
shake hands before the disaster, we won't have to point fingers
afterwards.
Emergency Management personnel at the State and local level have
long involved private enterprise and faith-based groups in their
inclusive, all-hazards planning process. For example, many of the State
and local governments that hosted Katrina survivors fully integrated
private and faith based organizations in their reception planning.
These organizations' contributions ranged from providing critically
needed supplies to serving as counselors and community emissaries for
potential new residents of our communities.
In conclusion, we believe this program must be maintained and
sustained at a level which ensures that we continue to have a strong,
truly national, system of emergency management in America. I sincerely
thank you for this opportunity to express our deep concerns.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Border Patrol Council
The National Border Patrol Council thanks the Subcommittee for the
opportunity to present the views and concerns of the 10,500 front-line
Border Patrol employees that it represents regarding the resources
necessary to provide effective homeland security now and in the future.
Initially, it is important to recognize that there are numerous aspects
of homeland security, and each of them must receive adequate funding
and support in order for the overall program to function properly.
Deficiencies in any part(s) of the system will weaken the entire
structure, enabling terrorists and other criminals to exploit these
vulnerabilities. Thus, it is imperative that all of these matters are
addressed concurrently. Beyond the obvious need to substantially
increase the number of personnel in all of the Department of Homeland
Security's programs, there is an equally pressing need to enhance the
infrastructure that supports these programs.
It is beyond dispute that our borders are out of control. Millions
of people cross them illegally every year, and only a small percentage
are apprehended. While most of these people are merely seeking to
improve their economic lot in life, a small but significant percentage
of them are criminals who take advantage of our open borders, and a few
terrorists undoubtedly do the same. In order to restore a semblance of
order to this chaotic situation, the root cause of illegal immigration
needs to be addressed by turning off the employment magnet that lures
impoverished people to our country. This will require a significant
revision in the existing statutes so that employers are able to easily
determine who has a right to work in this country and are discouraged
from ignoring or disobeying the law through the certain imposition of
tough penalties. A single, counterfeit-proof document must serve as the
foundation of this approach. In order enforce this new law, substantial
additional resources will need to be allocated. At a minimum, 10,000
criminal investigators should be added for this purpose.
Even though the adoption of the foregoing measures would eliminate
most illegal border crossings by people seeking employment, it would do
nothing to diminish the flow of criminals and contraband. Stopping this
illicit activity will require a sophisticated network of detection
devices coupled with substantial increases in Border Patrol agents to
respond to such intrusions and apprehend the violators. The additional
1,500 agents requested by the Administration for the upcoming fiscal
year is entirely inadequate for this purpose, and should be increased
to 2,500. Thereafter, the size of the Border Patrol should be increased
by at least the same amount every year until a total of at least 25,000
agents are deployed.
The number of inspections personnel at the Ports of Entry also
needs to be increased significantly to allow for a more thorough
inspection process without disrupting the flow of legitimate traffic.
This will require an expansion of the existing facilities in some
locations, and the building of additional facilities in areas where
that is impractical. Moreover, the failed ``One Face at the Border''
initiative needs to be discarded in favor of a system that fosters
specialization in each of the complex areas of immigration, customs,
and agriculture laws.
The number of detention beds and personnel to guard detainees also
need to be augmented significantly. The promise of ``catch and return''
is meaningless unless it can be backed up by sufficient resources.
In order to adequately patrol the thousands of miles of coastal
areas and other waterways along the boundaries of the United States,
the Coast Guard also needs substantial increases in personnel.
The number of Federal Air Marshals has been allowed to dwindle to
dangerously low levels. A significant increase in the ranks of these
employees is also critical to efforts to bolster homeland security.
It is important that the occupations supporting the foregoing
programs also be increased commensurately. Far too often, these
important resources are neglected when the primary occupations are
augmented, resulting in needless inefficiencies.
The addition of significant numbers of new employees will present
many challenges. First and foremost, it will be necessary to make these
occupations more attractive in order to recruit and retain sufficient
numbers of highly-qualified personnel. Law enforcement agencies
throughout the country are currently experiencing difficulties meeting
their recruitment goals, and many of them are finding it necessary to
increase salaries and benefits to remain competitive.\1\ The Border
Patrol just raised its entry level age from 37 to 40, reflecting the
difficulties it is facing in attracting a sufficient number of
qualified recruits. In many areas of the country, the pay and benefits
of Federal law enforcement agents already lag behind that of their
State and local law counterparts. In order to become more competitive
in this job market, the Federal Government needs to upgrade its pay and
benefits, and take other steps to ensure that these jobs are deemed
desirable.
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\1\ ``Police Finding It Hard to Fill Jobs; Forces Use Perks And
Alter Standards,'' The Washington Post, March 27, 2006, page A-1.
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The pay of many of the Department of Homeland Security's
occupations needs to be raised substantially. This includes, but is not
limited to, Border Patrol Agents, Customs and Border Protection
Officers, Immigration Enforcement Agents, and Law Enforcement
Communications Assistants. Moreover, the demoralizing practice of
requiring many of the Department's law enforcement employees to work
long hours of overtime without any compensation needs to be remedied by
placing all employees under the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Also, all of the Department's law enforcement officers need to be
afforded law enforcement retirement coverage.
The pay-for-performance plan that is being implemented throughout
DHS must be discarded in favor of a fair and predictable pay system.
The pay of dedicated employees should not be left to the whim and mercy
of arbitrary and capricious supervisors, many of whom are ordered to
withhold pay increases in order to offset budgetary shortfalls in other
areas.
Additionally, the labor-management relations provisions of the
Homeland Security Act must be repealed. These draconian measures serve
no legitimate purpose, and will in fact deter employees from exposing
fraud, waste or corruption. Because they institutionalize the unfair
treatment of employees, they will also discourage the best and the
brightest from serving in the Department.
Although all Federal agencies have the authority to pay generous
recruitment and relocation bonuses and retention allowances, the
Department of Homeland Security rarely exercises it because little or
no money is budgeted for that purpose. This unwise practice needs to be
remedied. Similarly, the Department needs additional money for the
purpose of funding personnel relocations. Themovement of personnel from
one location to another is essential to the success of the
organization.
Counter-productive enforcement schemes such as the Border Patrol's
``strategy of deterrence'' need to be abandoned in favor of effective
strategies. The notion that criminals and terrorists will be dissuaded
from crossing the borders illegally because Border Patrol agents are
positioned at quarter-mile fixed intervals along the border is absurd.
Surveillance technology can be a useful enforcement tool,
especially in detecting violators who are attempting to illegally cross
our borders. The temptation to rely upon such devices to replace
trained law enforcement officers needs to be resisted, however. Even
the most sophisticated of these devices is incapable of apprehending a
single violator. At best, most of these devices are only capable of
providing snapshot views of intrusions, and their utility is thus quite
limited. The high cost of complex devices such as unmanned aerial
vehicles renders them less cost-effective than manned aircraft such as
helicopters.
The Department needs to provide all of its officers with instant
access to databases that allow them to quickly determine if a person is
wanted for the commission of a crime or suspicion of terrorist
activities. Disturbingly, almost none of the Department's vehicles have
portable computers.
Many of the Border Patrol's vehicles are long overdue for
replacement. It is senseless to spend large amounts of money repairing
vehicles that continually break down because of their age and the wear
and tear of law enforcement use.
Numerous DHS employees are wearing body armor that is not suited
for the types of dangers that they face and the environment in which
they operate. Moreover, the weapons issued to these employees are no
match for those utilized by the criminals that they face.
The communications system utilized by many of the Department's
employees is antiquated and inadequate. There are numerous areas where
employees routinely operate without the ability to communicate with
each other because the radio network does not provide coverage. This
hazardous situation needs to be remedied.
Many employees do not have hand-held global positioning system
devices to assist them in navigating around the vast areas that they
are responsible for patrolling. Moreover, the supply of night vision
equipment is inadequate, and much of it is outdated.
Hiring large numbers of employees will require an expansion of the
existing training facilities. The small size and deplorable condition
of the Border Patrol's facilities in Artesia, New Mexico are cause for
particular concern. The infrastructure of that community cannot support
an operation of the magnitude needed to properly train several thousand
agents every year, and serious consideration needs to be given to
finding a new location that is more suited to this purpose.
As significant numbers of additional personnel are added to all
parts of the country, it is important to plan ahead and ensure that the
facilities in those locations are large enough to ensure that the
operations run efficiently.
Although most of the infrastructure needs identified herein can
easily be met through proper planning, the chronic deficiencies in
these areas demand an approach that incorporates them into the hiring
process. A funding formula that factors all of these needs into the
cost of a full career must be developed, adjusted from time to time,
and followed.
While the expense of providing effective homeland security may seem
steep at first glance, it pales in comparison to the cost of failing to
do so. The investment in the infrastructure of America's homeland
security must begin now. Further delays will leave our Nation
needlessly vulnerable to further attacks by those who want to destroy
us.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Emergency Management Association
Introduction
Thank you Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished
members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity to provide you
with a statement for the record on the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) fiscal year 2007 budget. I am Bruce Baughman, the President of
the National Emergency Management Association and Director of the
Alabama Emergency Management Agency. In my statement, I am representing
the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), whose members are
the State emergency management directors in the States, the U.S.
territories, and the District of Columbia. NEMA's members are
responsible to their governors for emergency preparedness, homeland
security, mitigation, response, and recovery activities for natural,
man-made, and terrorist caused disasters.
As you consider the budget for fiscal year 2007, emergency
management in our country has received greater attention as a result of
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Though, funding has not followed
from the Federal Government to assist in meeting the needs for all-
hazards emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation
activities. Over the past year, our Nation's emergency management
system has been tested by the extensive natural disasters that we have
faced. In all, there were 48 major disaster declarations, 68 emergency
declarations, and 39 fire management assistance declarations. Every
single State was impacted by one of these declarations, including the
District of Columbia, and all but two of the U.S. territories. 48
States were impacted enough by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to warrant
declarations for Federal assistance, whether the States were disaster
areas or the States took in significant numbers of evacuees. States
have been mandated to complete comprehensive reviews of evacuation
plans and other emergency plans with no Federal support. At the same
time, emergency management continues to prepare for the threat of
terrorism with new requirements coming from the Federal Government such
as updating State plans to reflect the National Response Plan (NRP),
training emergency responders on the new National Incident Management
System (NIMS), and implementing the National Preparedness Goal mandated
by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD 8) on National
Preparedness with no additional Federal financial assistance to meet
Federal mandates. The multi-hazards emergency management system
continues to be the means to practice and exercise for devastating acts
of terrorism, while at the same time preparing the Nation for
hurricanes, tornadoes, hazardous materials spills, and floods. We
respectfully ask for your Committee to consider the role of emergency
management as you address the fiscal year 2007 appropriations and ask
for your serious consideration for Federal support for the Emergency
Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG) to build State and local
emergency management capacity.
The Department of Homeland Security budget provides critical
support to State and local emergency management programs through actual
dollars, grants, and program support. This year, NEMA would like to
address three critical issues regarding the proposed Federal budget for
Department of Homeland Security:
--Extreme concern for proposed cuts to the Emergency Management
Performance Grant (EMPG) program while requirements increase
for State and local governments;
--The need for Federal support for the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC); and
--Concerns related to the status of reorganizations at the Department
of Homeland Security.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING
EMPG is the only program for All-Hazards Preparedness/Readiness
Natural disasters are certain and often anticipated. Every State
must be able to plan for disasters as well as build and sustain the
capability to respond. EMPG is the only source of funding to assist
State and local governments with planning and preparedness/readiness
activities associated with natural disasters. At a time when our
country is recovering from one of the largest natural disasters and
making strides to improve the Nation's emergency preparedness/
readiness, we cannot afford to have this vital program be cut by $13.1
million. EMPG is the backbone of the Nation's all-hazards emergency
management system as the only source of direct Federal funding to State
and local governments for emergency management capacity building. EMPG
is used for personnel, planning, training, and exercises at both the
State and local levels. EMPG is primarily used to assist States in
maintaining personnel for State and local emergency management
programs, and consequently the Nation's emergency response system. EMPG
is being used to help States create and update plans for receiving and
distribution plans for commodities and ice after a disaster, debris
removal plans, and plans for receiving or evacuating people.
The State and local government partnership with the Federal
Government to ensure preparedness dates back to the civil defense era,
yet increased responsibilities over the last decade have fallen on
State and local governments. With the recent expanded focus on
terrorism and the increased demands of the Federal Government to assist
in implementation of Federal initiatives like the NRP, the NIMS, and
HSPD8, EMPG becomes more important as a means to ensure State and local
involvement and compliance with new systems.
NEMA completed a Quick Response Survey in March 2006 to assess the
impacts of the proposed cut to the EMPG program. Of the 42 States
responding, 90 percent of the States will have to cut staff ranging
from one person to more than 50 positions. If the cut is included in
the budget: 20 States will have to cut between 1-10 positions; 10
States will have to cut between 11-30 positions; 4 will have to cut
between 31-50 positions; and 4 will have to cut more than 50 positions.
In the same Quick Response Survey, 83 percent of responding States
report that the majority of EMPG funds go to local grants, so the
impact of the cut would be greatest on local governments.
State and Local Match
EMPG is the only program in the Preparedness Account within the
Department of Homeland Security that requires a match at the State and
local level. The match is evidence of the critical partnership of State
and local governments to address the urgent national security need for
emergency planning for all disasters regardless of the cause. EMPG
requires a match of 50 percent from the State or local governments.
According to the NEMA 2004 Biennial Report, budgets for State emergency
management agencies nationally were reduced by an average of 23 percent
in fiscal year 2004, yet at the same time States were continuing to
over match the Federal Government's commitment to national security
protection through EMPG by $96 million in fiscal year 2004, which is a
80 percent State and 20 percent Federal contribution.
EMPG Helps Ensure Personnel for Mutual Aid
During last year's hurricane season, the interdependencies of the
Nation's emergency management system were demonstrated and one of the
success stories was the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).
EMAC enabled 48 States, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands,
and Puerto Rico to provide assistance in the form of more than 2,100
missions of human, military and equipment assets and over 65,000
civilian and military personnel and equipment assets to support the
impacted States. The estimated costs of these missions may exceed $829
million and the missions and requests for aid are continuing. Of the
personnel providing assistance through EMAC, 46,448 were National Guard
personnel and 19,431 were civilians. Many of the civilians sent to
provide assistance were supported by the EMPG program. The nature of
the Nation's mutual aid system vividly shows the need for all States to
have appropriate capabilities for all disasters and EMPG allows States
and local governments to build this capability both for their own use
and to share in through EMAC. Additional resources are needed to build
emergency response capabilities on a national basis and to ensure the
system can handle the demands of natural disasters including
catastrophic events and other emergencies no matter where they occur.
Appropriate Support Needed to Strengthen Program
While EMPG received modest increases in 2003 and 2004 after 10
years of straight-lined funding, the program still needs significant
investment to accomplish its goals. The final fiscal year 2006 DHS
conference report provided an additional $5 million for the program,
but after the across the board cut, the program was left with $183.1
million. We appreciate all of the efforts of members of Congress and
the Administration to allow for these increases. The current cut comes
at a time when emergency management needs to address shortfalls and new
threats. EMPG needs adequate and predictable resources in order to
sustain the increased demand for preparedness/readiness. Continued
funding increases are necessary to make up for a decade of degradation
of funding and increased State and local commitments because funding
has not kept pace with inflation or with increasing demand. The
increased flexibility of EMPG is offset by funding shortfalls estimated
in the NEMA Biennial Report in 2004 to be over $264 million for all 50
States. The current shortfall is $260, because of a $3.1 million
increase in fiscal year 2006.
The President's budget proposal will have a devastating impact on
the Nation's emergency management system at the same time that
responsibilities are increasing for new and emerging hazards. The
proposal decreases funding for the EMPG program by $10 million. These
cuts mean that emergency management would be saddled with increased
mandates, while coping with decreases to an already modest budget. In
budget consideration for fiscal year 2003, 2004, and 2006, Congress
affirmed the importance of EMPG in appropriations bills in language
addressing the significance of the program and increased the levels of
funding for the program twice. Prior to these modest increases, the
program had been straight lined for over a decade and even with these
increases the program's growth rate has not kept pace with inflation
over the last 15 years. Additionally, Congress affirmed the intent of
the program as all-hazards and dedicated to supporting personnel during
consideration of the fiscal year 2006 budget. NEMA is appreciative of
Congress' recognition of the EMPG program, but this year we
respectfully ask that Congress aggressively address the programs
shortfalls with an additional $87 million in funding for EMPG for
fiscal year 2007, for a total of $270 million.
Clearly, Congress wants to understand what is being built with
these investments, especially in tight fiscal conditions. The 2006
Quick Response Survey found that if States were to each receive an
additional $1 million in EMPG funding for fiscal year 2007, States
would use the following percentages for the following activities: 88
percent of States responding would update plans including evacuation,
sheltering, emergency operations, catastrophic disasters and others; 83
percent would provide more training opportunities for State and local
emergency preparedness and response; 88 percent would provide more
preparedness grants to local jurisdictions; 69 percent would conduct
more State and local exercises; and 61 percent would use funding for
State and local NIMS compliance.
EMPG's modest Federal increases in helped the program grow, but
shortfalls continue to force an unequal burden on State and local
governments. States are continuing to increase their out of pocket
costs in order to ensure there is adequate funding for local programs.
The shortfall means that many communities that would like to implement
a full-time, professional emergency management capability cannot do so
because of shortfalls in Federal funding. Further, EMPG is primarily
used as a pass-through program for local governments, so the shortfall
affects our smallest localities that are often those most in need of
emergency preparedness planning. Currently, States and local
governments are over matching the Federal Government's commitment to
national security protection through EMPG by $96 million according to
the 2004 NEMA Biennial Report.
Accountability Measures
Many States have various accountability measures in place to track
the use of EMPG funding and NEMA supports the development of a national
system that quantifies the uses of the funding. In fact, NEMA through
the National Homeland Security Consortium is working closely with the
new Preparedness Directorate at DHS to work collaboratively on
performance metrics for HSPD-8 and performance metrics for the Response
Capabilities in the TCL. The DHS effort will help to develop a national
picture of EMPG metrics as well. At the same time, States already have
measures in place at the State level to track the use of EMPG funding
in their States. Some of the measures in place reported in the 2006
Quick Response Survey include: 95 percent of responding States have
reporting requirements; 76 percent of States responding require the
development of State-wide goals that must be met with the funds; 61
percent of the States responding call for local governments to
demonstrate performance against goals that are written by local
jurisdictions; 42 percent of responding States implement corrective
action plans if goals are not met with funding; and 45 percent of
States tie program funding to meeting the standards in place with the
voluntary Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) for State
and local emergency management agencies.
EMPG as a Separate Account
The President's Budget proposal for fiscal year 2007 suggests
combining the EMPG account with the Citizen Corp account to form a
formula-based grant account. NEMA strongly disagrees with this
approach, as EMPG must be maintained as a separate line item account as
Congress has affirmed since fiscal year 2003. Congress agreed at that
time that the program account needed to be visible and easy to find in
the budget because of the importance of the program. The separate
account is critical because the program is the only all-hazards grant
program being administered through the Grants and Training Office to
emergency management agencies. Further, the separate account allows for
EMPG to be tracked and has raised visibility on the importance of the
program among members of Congress. Additionally, we suggest that
Congress maintain the method of distribution for EMPG, similar to the
language in the fiscal year 2006 appropriations, however continuing to
allocate the funding through the State Administrative Agencies (SAAs)
continues to cause delays in some States. NEMA supports language that
would expressedly restore the grants allocation to State emergency
management agencies, to facilitate the process of getting funding to
emergency management agencies at the State and local level faster.
All-Hazards Approach
The Federal Government must continue the commitment to ensuring
national security though all-hazard preparedness. Without adequate
numbers of State and local personnel to operate the all-hazards
emergency management system, the infrastructure used to prevent,
prepare for, respond to, and recover from all disasters will collapse.
Unfortunately, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita illustrated the need for
adequate emergency management needs from the ground up. Instead of
making significant investments towards terrorism preparedness, we must
maintain an all-hazards approach and shore up the foundation of our
response system for all disasters regardless of cause--EMPG. We
strongly ask for Congress to ensure predictable and adequate funding
levels for the EMPG in fiscal year 2007.
BUIDING OUR NATION'S MUTUAL AID SYSTEM THROUGH EMAC
The response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita resulted in the largest
deployment of interstate mutual aid in the Nation's history through the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). As mentioned
previously, EMAC deployed personnel comprised of multiple disciplines
from all member States to respond to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Florida, and Texas. EMAC Operations in Louisiana are still underway.
The process enabled National Guard, search and rescue teams, incident
management teams, emergency operations center support, building
inspectors, and law enforcement personnel to immediately assist the
requesting States in need of support. The National Guard even chose to
continue under EMAC when deployed under Title 32 because of the
organization, liability protections, accountability, and tracking
abilities EMAC provides.
EMAC was created after Hurricane Andrew by then-Florida Governor
Lawton Chiles. The system was developed through the members States of
the Southern Governors' Association to establish mechanisms to enable
mutual aid among member sates in emergency situations. The Southern
Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact (SREMAC) was signed by
participating Governors in 1993. Following recognition of SREMACs
nationwide applicability by the National Governors' Association and
FEMA, Congress enacted EMAC in 1996 (Public Law 104-321). Currently 49
States, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of
Columbia are members of EMAC. Hawaii is currently considering
legislation to become a party to the compact during their current
legislative session. EMAC requires member States to have an
implementation plan and to follow procedures outlined in the EMAC
Operations Manual. EMAC takes care of issues such as reimbursement,
liability protections, and workers' compensation issues.
Prior to the historic 2005 deployments, EMAC's largest previous
deployment was during the 2004 Hurricane season in Florida, Alabama,
and West Virginia, which enabled 38 States to provide assistance in the
form of more than $15 million in human, military, and equipment assets
and over 800 personnel to support the impacted States for over 85 days
of continuous response operations. NEMA utilized the grant funds to
work with an independent consulting company to complete a 2004 After
Action Report, that identified areas for continuous improvement for the
EMAC systems and EMAC has worked to draft a strategic plan to implement
the lessons learned into practice. NEMA is currently working to
complete an After-Action Report on the 2005 season, with a meeting of
stakeholders, assisting States, requesting States, and others later
this month. The report is expected to be complete by September 2006 and
the strategic plan will be amended to reflect new lessons learned. The
support of EMAC is critical to helping offset the costs of disasters
and maintaining the need for a massive Federal workforce for response
to catastrophic disasters. The beauty of EMAC is that it provides
assistance to those in need, but allows others to assist and learn from
disasters in other States.
In order to meet the ever-growing need for and reliance on
interstate mutual aid, EMAC is seeking $4 Million over 3 years to
continue to build EMAC capabilities. This funding will allow EMAC to
focus on the implementation of lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita such as Training and Education, Resource Typing and
Credentialing, and Information and Resource Management. Since EMAC's
inception in 1993, EMAC was funded by member States until 2003. In
2003, FEMA funded EMAC with a 3 year grant of $2 Million. This funding
expires in November 2006. This funding has been used for administrative
support of EMAC, development of the EMAC Operations system whereby all
resources deployed under the Compact are tracked from when it is
requested until reimbursement is paid, and the 2004 and 2005 after
action reports.
SECOND STAGE REVIEW AND FEMA
As the Congress looks at the lessons learned and recommendations
for reform included in reports following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
we ask that NEMA's members be consulted regarding further changes to
the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA. Most importantly,
consideration needs to also be given to the connectivity between FEMA
and the Preparedness Directorate within DHS, since all FEMA's
preparedness functions were moved out into this new Directorate. When
the Second Stage Review proposal was announced, NEMA articulated grave
concern in a July 27, 2005 letter to the Department of Homeland
Security regarding the Second Stage Review (2SR) creating a
Preparedness Directorate that would be primarily focused on terrorism.
The letter to Congress highlighted the lack of the Department's focus
on natural-hazards preparedness and the inability to connect response
and recovery operations to preparedness functions, as any unnecessary
separation of these functions could result in a disjointed response and
adversely impact the effectiveness of Departmental operations.
Nevertheless, we understand that the 2SR is moving ahead and look
forward to finding ways to connect the new Preparedness Directorate
with FEMA. We fear that if those interrelationships are not made the
result could mean that many State and local governments will be meeting
FEMA for the first time when as disaster occurs in their State because
of the separation of functions. We hope to work with Congress to ensure
linkages of preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation functions
in the all-hazards approach to emergency management.
NEMA also calls on Congress to consider the needs of the FEMA in
this year's budget process, to restore the agencies ability to respond
to all disasters. Our Nation is same point as the Nation was after
Hurricane Andrew in 1992, questioning organizational structures,
leadership, the roles of Federal, State, and local government, funding
for FEMA and emergency management and even citizen preparedness. No
Federal agency is more qualified structurally and statutorily than FEMA
to help our Nation respond to and recover from disasters. FEMA has the
direct relationships with State and local governments because of the
grant programs and the disaster relief programs authorized through the
Stafford Act. FEMA is the only Federal agency authorized under the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Relief Act (42 U.S.C.
5121 et seq.) to carry out duties on behalf of the President. The 1978
Reorganization Plan 3, which created FEMA, also gives FEMA the
responsibility for all of the functions of emergency preparedness and
response. The plan States:
``This reorganization rests on several fundamental principles.
First, Federal authorities to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to
major civil emergencies should be supervised by one official
responsible to the President and given attention by other officials at
the highest levels. The new agency would be in this position.''
FEMA is and should be the agency of choice to coordinate the
functions of the Federal Government in response to disasters,
regardless of their cause.
FEMA has the ability to tap into the emergency responder community
to build relationships through training and exercises. FEMA also has
the skills to work cooperatively with State and local elected and
appointed officials to work towards comprehensive recovery. FEMA has
the coordinating function in the Federal Government and should have the
ability to tap all the resources at the Federal level to respond to a
disaster. However, all these areas need to be strengthened with an all-
hazards focus to ensure that Federal, State, and local governments are
building relationships before a disaster and understand how to work
together cohesively. FEMA also needs financial support to maintain and
build their capacity.
The time to stop the cycle of degradation of emergency management
functions by reorganization after reorganization is now and we must
systematically improve our Nation's emergency response system through
verified lessons learned and not reactionary decisions. We hope that
Congress will partner with NEMA as they move forward to consider
changes to DHS organizational functions and the role of FEMA.
CONCLUSION
The last year has proved our Nation's continuous vulnerability
against all-hazards of many sizes. We will be faced with recovery on
the Gulf Coast for many years to come and we cannot ignore the
predictions for the coming Hurricane season. We must continue to build
national preparedness efforts with a multi-hazard approach. In this
year's appropriations process Congress will make critical decisions
that shape the future of emergency management in this country. As you
begin your consideration, we ask you to recognize the importance of
adequately funding the EMPG program in building capacity through people
at the State and local level for all disasters. I thank you for the
opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA and appreciate your
partnership.
LIST OF WITNESSES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PREPARED STATEMENTS
----------
Page
American:
Psychological Association, Prepared Statement of............. 259
Public Transportation Association, Prepared Statement of..... 266
Byrd, Senator Robert C., U.S. Senator From West Virginia:
Questions Submitted by....................................... 73
Statement of................................................. 5
Chertoff, Michael, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security.... 1
Prepared Statement of........................................ 12
Statement of................................................. 8
Cochran, Senator Thad, U.S. Senator From Mississippi, Questions
Submitted by................................................... 66
Gregg, Senator Judd, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire:
Opening Statement of......................................... 1
Questions Submitted by....................................... 55
International Association for Emergency Managers, Prepared
Statement of................................................... 270
Mikulski, Senator Barbara A., U.S. Senator From Maryland,
Prepared Statement of.......................................... 37
National:
Border Patrol Council, Prepared Statement of................. 272
Emergency Management Association, Prepared Statement of...... 274
Specter, Senator Arlen, U.S. Senator From Pennsylvania, Questions
Submitted by................................................... 71
SUBJECT INDEX
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Page
Additional:
Committee Questions.......................................... 55
Funds for Preparedness and FEMA.............................. 12
Administration Plans for Dubai Ports World to Take Control of
Significant Operations at Six U.S. Ports....................... 255
Advanced Training Center......................................... 117
Agrodefense...................................................... 66
Air Cargo........................................................ 152
Security..................................................... 235
All-State Minimum................................................ 253
Arbitration Decision on the Fiscal Year 2005 Awards.............. 119
Armored Vehicles................................................. 179
Avian Bird Flu................................................... 250
Aviation Security Passenger Fees................................. 61
BRAC Report...................................................... 93
Border:
Crossing Card--the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
(WHTI) Implementation...................................... 245
Infrastructure Supplemental.................................. 56
Patrol Duties................................................ 120
Bordersafe....................................................... 236
Breached Bond.................................................... 121
Business Transformation:
Office....................................................... 73
Program...................................................... 230
Campaign Protection.............................................. 176
Canine Teams..................................................... 154
Cargo Container Security......................................... 71
Chemical:
Detection.................................................... 234
Plant Security Legislation...................................53, 54
Sector National Strategy..................................... 54
Security..................................................... 205
Citizenship and Immigration Services............................. 230
Initiatives.................................................. 230
Personnel.................................................... 231
Civil Rights..................................................... 99
Classified Briefing on the Dubai Port Deal....................... 25
Coast Guard...................................................... 157
Headquarters Relocation...................................... 158
R&D.......................................................... 238
Competitive Sourcing Personnel................................... 78
Container Security Initiative (CSI).............................. 111
Contract Oversight............................................... 128
Contracting out Report........................................... 78
Customer Service................................................. 128
Customs and Border Protection.................................... 108
Air and Marine............................................... 115
And NCRC Mission............................................. 108
Inspectors at our Ports...................................... 111
Presence at Airports......................................... 110
Cyberstorm....................................................... 184
Deepwater........................................................ 157
Recapitalization............................................. 67
Departmental Management.......................................... 73
Derby Line....................................................... 247
Detailees to the:
Department................................................... 80
White House.................................................. 78
Detentions....................................................... 122
Of Animal Diseases........................................... 200
DHS:
Active Duty:
Fingerprint Vetting Policy............................... 41
Military Fingerprint Vetting Policy...................... 42
Headquarters................................................. 77
Organizational Structure and FEMA's Capabilities............. 46
Port Security Approach....................................... 9
Requested to Garner Administrative Support of the
Congressional Border Security Infrastructure Initiative.... 25
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)........................65, 242
Drug Interdiction................................................ 158
Dubai Ports...................................................... 39
Deal......................................................... 43
World (DPW).................................................. 112
EDS.............................................................. 144
Emergency Management Performance Grants.........................60, 183
Program...................................................... 70
Ending Catch and Release......................................... 55
Enforcement of Customs Laws...................................... 109
Executive Sedan Service.......................................... 75
Exercises......................................................190, 227
Exit............................................................. 101
Explosives Trace Portals......................................... 123
Federal:
Agency Head Screening........................................ 156
Preparedness Coordinators.................................... 187
FEMA............................................................. 206
Contract Awards.............................................. 71
Funding Lapse..............................................223, 226
Staffing..................................................... 225
Fire:
Grants....................................................... 185
Service Needs Assessment..................................... 200
First Responder Grants--Risk and Threat Factors.................. 58
Fiscal:
Accountability Mechanisms to Minimize Spending, Waste and
Fraud...................................................... 30
Year 2007 Budget Request..................................... 18
Grant Drawdown Rate.............................................. 181
Guantanamo Facility.............................................. 123
Homeland Security Budget and Anomalies........................... 6
How Often has DHS (Coast Guard) Exercised the Power to Suspend
Ships From Entering Into the Port Coming Into the United
States?........................................................ 10
Hurricane:
Contracts.................................................... 226
Katrina...................................................... 249
Pam Exercise................................................. 180
I Staff.......................................................... 97
IDENT-IAFIS...................................................... 101
Ice Contract With Kellogg, Brown and Root........................ 120
Improve Maritime Security and Create Better Transportation
Security Systems to Move People and Cargo More Securely and
Efficiently.................................................... 21
Improved Border Security......................................... 5
Improving Nationwide Catastrophic Planning....................... 58
Infrastructure Protection and Information Security............... 201
Inspections:
At Air Ports of Entry........................................ 113
Of Arriving Saudis........................................... 109
Intensive Supervision Program Expansion.......................... 123
Interoperability................................................. 186
Grants....................................................... 186
I-91 Checkpoint.................................................. 248
Katrina Oversight Board.......................................... 31
Law Enforcement Support Center.................................122, 247
Length of Stay................................................... 121
Lessons Learned.................................................. 224
Local CIS Ombudsman.............................................. 93
MAXHR............................................................ 77
Major Initiatives and Accomplishments............................ 8
MANPADS.......................................................... 233
Map Modernization................................................ 226
Mass Evacuation.................................................. 206
Military Immigrant Backlog....................................... 40
Morale Problems at DHS........................................... 98
MTSA Compliance Inspections...................................... 175
National:
Capital Air Defense Mission.................................. 167
Disasters.................................................... 182
Infrastructure Protection Plan............................... 201
Preparedness:
Goal..................................................... 180
Integration Program...................................... 62
Special Security Events...............................175, 178, 203
Necessity of Senior Leadership Longevity and Potential
Inefficiencies Due to DHS Enormity............................. 45
Next Generation EDS.............................................. 236
No-Fly List...................................................... 143
Northern Border:
And Border Patrol Agents..................................... 247
Carryover Funds.............................................. 118
Office of:
General Counsel.............................................. 92
Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA)............................... 121
Screening Coordination and Operations........................61, 92
Oil Spills....................................................... 172
Operation:
Centers...................................................... 94
Safe Commerce................................................ 157
Other Key Accomplishments........................................ 16
Outbound Inspections............................................. 114
Ownership of Key Assets.......................................... 201
Pandemic Influenza............................................... 57
Pass Cards....................................................... 34
Technological Infrastructure................................. 27
Patrol Boats..................................................... 168
Perimeter Security............................................... 144
Personnel........................................................ 230
Pilot Programs................................................... 147
Polar Icebreakers................................................ 168
Port Security.................................................... 29
Allocations.................................................. 9
Automated Targeting Systems.................................. 60
Funding...................................................... 34
Pre-Disaster Mitigation.......................................... 207
Preparedness Directorate......................................... 180
Procurement Report............................................... 77
Protection Funding............................................... 179
R&D Funding....................................................238, 239
Rail Pilots...................................................... 233
Recoveries....................................................... 144
Registered Traveler.............................................. 151
Reported DHS Reservations About the Dubai Port Deal.............. 24
Responding to Letters From Congress.............................. 120
Response Boat Medium............................................. 170
Retooling of FEMA................................................ 224
Risks and Threats................................................ 66
Safer............................................................ 185
Science and Technology........................................... 233
Management................................................... 65
Secure Flight.................................................... 151
Senior Leadership Travel Initiative.............................. 93
Shipping Containers.............................................. 113
Staffing..................................................129, 177, 201
For Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) Act Grants.. 60
State and Local First Responders................................. 254
Strategic Border Initiative...................................... 103
Strengthening Maritime Security.................................. 26
Supply Chain Security Specialists................................ 118
Surge Capacity................................................... 155
Technical Assistance............................................. 189
Temporary:
Protected Status............................................. 233
Worker Program............................................... 49
Ten Print Capacity Overseas...................................... 102
Transient Populations Accounting................................. 182
Transit Security Project......................................... 238
Transportation Security Administration........................... 123
Hiring Freeze................................................ 47
Passenger Fee Increase....................................... 48
Travel........................................................... 179
Tucson Sector Checkpoints........................................ 117
Tunnel Detection................................................. 235
Tunnels.......................................................... 114
United States Secret Service..................................... 176
User Fee Reform Proposal......................................... 232
US VISIT......................................................... 101
Exit Tracking Capability..................................... 57
Virgin Island Substation......................................... 120
Visa Waiver Program (WVP)........................................ 101
Vulnerability Assessments........................................ 204
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative............................. 102
Workplace Injuries............................................... 176
Worksite Enforcement............................................. 121
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