[Senate Hearing 109-568]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-568
UNITED STATES ENTRY/EXIT TRACKING
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HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
JANUARY 25, 2006--WASHINGTON, DC
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
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__________
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri TOM HARKIN, Iowa
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
CONRAD BURNS, Montana HARRY REID, Nevada
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire PATTY MURRAY, Washington
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
J. Keith Kennedy, Staff Director
Terrence E. Sauvain, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Homeland Security
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
TED STEVENS, Alaska DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho PATTY MURRAY, Washington
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah HARRY REID, Nevada
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
Professional Staff
Rebecca Davies
Carol Cribbs
Shannon O'Keefe
Nancy Perkins
Mark Van de Water
Charles Kieffer (Minority)
Chip Walgren (Minority)
Scott Nance (Minority)
Drenan E. Dudley (Minority)
Administrative Support
Christa Crawford
C O N T E N T S
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Page
US VISIT's Continuing Efforts.................................... 8
Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology
Architecture and Systems Issues, Government Accountability
Office......................................................... 11
Status of Implementing GAO Recommendations....................... 12
Prepared Statement of Randolph C. Hite........................... 13
Results in Brief................................................. 14
Background....................................................... 15
Acquisition and Implementation Strategy.......................... 15
US VISIT is Being Implemented in Four Increments................. 16
US VISIT Capability is Operating at Ports of Entry............... 17
DHS has yet to Demonstrate that US VISIT as Defined is the Right
Solution....................................................... 18
Operational and Technological Context are Still Being Defined.... 18
Return on Investment has yet to be Determined.................... 19
Analysis of Program Impacts and Options is Being Performed....... 21
DHS is Still Establishing Needed Program Management Capabilities. 22
DHS has yet to Fully Establish Program Accountability Mechanisms. 25
US VISIT Strategic Plan.......................................... 27
Government-wide Interoperability................................. 27
Biometric Watchlist.............................................. 28
Exit Capability at Land Ports of Entry........................... 29
2006 Funding Level............................................... 30
2007 Funding Level............................................... 31
Exit Capability at Air and Seaports of Entry..................... 32
Statement of Senator Patty Murray................................ 32
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative............................. 33
Land Border Crossing Initiatives................................. 34
Land Border Crossing Requirements................................ 35
Land Border Crossing Challenges.................................. 35
Statement of Senator Ted Stevens................................. 36
Common set of Required Border Crossing Documentation............. 36
Harmonized Secure Border Documentation--Pass Card................ 37
Impact of Border Crossing Security on Alaskans................... 38
Southern Border Security Requirements............................ 40
Border Security Comparison--Washington State vs. Mexico.......... 40
Harmonization of Proprietary Database Systems.................... 41
Departmental Focus Needed to Guide US VISIT...................... 43
Revised Cost and Schedule Estimate Report of Real Time
Interoperability............................................... 43
Interoperability Funding......................................... 45
Congressional Funding Limitations................................ 46
Exit Strategy Limitations........................................ 46
Additional Committee Questions................................... 48
Questions Submitted to James A. Williams......................... 48
Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg........................ 48
Return on Investment............................................. 48
Air Exit Tracking................................................ 49
Land Entry/Exit Tracking Pilots.................................. 50
Information Technology Platform.................................. 51
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT)/Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)
Interoperability............................................... 52
Border Crossing Card/Laser Visa Readers.......................... 52
Office of Inspector General Report: US VISIT System Security
Management Needs Strengthening................................. 53
Limitations of US VISIT.......................................... 53
Question Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran....................... 54
US VISIT: Biometric Technology Model............................. 54
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby................. 54
Entry/Exit Border Technology..................................... 54
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd.................... 57
Fiscal Year 2006 Spend Plan...................................... 57
Ten Fingerprint.................................................. 57
DHS-FBI Interaction.............................................. 58
Immigration Statistics........................................... 58
Biometric Performance............................................ 59
Database Interoperability Milestones............................. 60
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy.................. 61
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Law Enforcement Support
Center......................................................... 61
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative............................. 61
Questions Submitted to Randolph C. Hite.......................... 62
Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg........................ 62
UNITED STATES ENTRY/EXIT TRACKING
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WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Homeland Security,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:01 a.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Judd Gregg (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Gregg, Stevens, Byrd, and Murray.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JUDD GREGG
Senator Gregg. We will begin the hearing of the Homeland
Security Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. I
appreciate Senator Byrd joining us today, as he always does,
and it is a pleasure to have our witnesses today.
US VISIT OVERVIEW
The purpose of this hearing is to review the status of the
US VISIT program. For those who are not up to speed on what US
VISIT is, basically the effort to try to protect this country
comes down to a lot of different parts, but the most
fundamental part is the capacity to gather intelligence about
the people who are threats. Knowing who is going to attack us
before they attack us, is absolutely critical to our capacity
to defend ourselves.
An essential element of that is that when we determine that
information, when we gain information as to who the threat is
or what the threat is, getting that information disseminated to
the people who are on the front lines for the purposes of
protecting us as a Nation and making sure that people who come
into our country come here to participate in our great Nation's
many benefits rather than to harm us is a critical effort; the
integration of the information with the front-line individual
who has the capacity to review the individuals coming into this
country.
US VISIT is essentially the backbone of this effort, in
that this is the computer structure, the software structure,
the concept structure, which will hopefully, when it works
fully, integrate all the different information vehicles which
we have out there. All the intelligence that we are gathering,
and all the background that we have, and make that information
from all the various agencies that are involved here--and we
are talking about a large number of major agencies--make that
information available on a real-time basis to the gatekeeper,
the Border Patrol agent, and the Customs and Border Protection
officer, so that they can evaluate an individual who is in
front of them, who is seeking entry into this country, and know
whether that individual means us harm.
It is a huge undertaking. Just getting these various
agencies integrated is a huge undertaking from a standpoint of
having their various systems communicate with each other. But
actually getting real-time information, that is hard
information, that is person-centered, is a true challenge.
I congratulate the Department for the strides it has made
in this area. Basically, we want to hear today about the
positive steps, but we are also really interested in is what we
still have to do. We know that there are still issues out
there, especially in the exit area, and we also know that there
are issues relative to integration, especially between the huge
database of fingerprints which the FBI has and the capacity of
that database to be accessed completely as versus selectively.
Additionally, there is the fundamental issue of the
communication between different agencies and whether it is
flowing effectively, and the issue of air entry and land entry
and the fact that we are making progress in air entry, but how
are we doing on land entry.
So there are a lot of issues still out there. This truly is
the backbone, US VISIT, the backbone of our capacity to
determine who is coming into the country and whether they are
going to cause us harm if they are coming in legally. It is a
critical piece of infrastructure that we want to stay on top of
as a Congress, and be sure we are aware of what the potential
is and where we can be helpful in supporting the Department as
it tries to get this system up and running.
So that is the purpose of this hearing. The fact that this
is the first hearing that this subcommittee has held in this
session reflects, I think, the high level of interest and
priority that we place on the success of US VISIT, because we
recognize that without this program working effectively we
simply are not going to be able to protect our borders.
Senator Byrd.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Is this microphone on?
We have made great progress in putting a man on the moon
and bringing him home again. Yet, thus far we have not
developed a good PA system in this country. We also have not
developed a system whereby we can know where men are
underground. We are not using the available technology, as we
should, so that we know where a coal miner is and be able to
communicate with him in the mine. It is a sad situation.
Forgive me for bringing that in.
Senator Gregg. No, that is understandable, Senator,
considering what you have been through and your State.
Senator Byrd. Let me say to the people who are viewing this
panel, you have just seen a demonstration of how a chairman
ought to open a meeting, how he ought to know what he is
talking about, and how he can convey and communicate his
thoughts to the audience. I congratulate him. I am very proud
of this chairman. I wish he were on my side of the aisle, but
he is not. But that aside, I have a tremendous respect for this
chairman.
Senator Gregg. Thank you.
Senator Byrd. I tell you, I have been around here 48 years
in this body and 6 years in the other body before I came here,
and 6 years in the State legislature, both houses, before that,
and I have not seen a chairman who is better than this one and
very few who are as good. I am proud of him. I do not care if
he is on the other side of the aisle. He is a friend of mine
and he is a colleague of mine. I am proud of him. I am proud to
say I am on his committee. If you have to have a Republican, I
have got one of the best here, one of the best.
Senator Gregg. That is very generous of you.
Senator Byrd. We do not draw a line between Republicans and
Democrats here, but I thought that ought to be said.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your support last spring of
my border security amendment. I was pleased that the Senate
acted in a bipartisan manner to begin providing the resources
we need to secure our borders. With your leadership, Mr.
Chairman--let me repeat that. With your leadership, Mr.
Chairman, we continued that effort in the fiscal year 2006
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, and I commend you, Mr.
Chairman, wholeheartedly for your effort last month to secure
an additional $1.1 billion for border security, and I challenge
the White House--let me say that again--I challenge--do you
hear me out there?--I challenge the House leadership and the
White House--hear me again--to embrace this effort.
By convening this hearing today, Mr. Chairman, you are
keeping the Senate focused on border security. The US VISIT
program is an integral part of our border security effort.
Given the fact that the Congress has invested over $1.3 billion
in this program, I congratulate our chairman for providing
appropriate oversight.
The US VISIT program is supposed to provide us with
accurate information about which individuals are legally
entering the country and about when they depart. I am pleased
that the Department, under Secretary Chertoff's leadership,
announced on July 13, 2005, its intention to move from using
two fingerprints when enrolling individuals into the US VISIT
system to capturing all ten finger and thumbprints. This is a
major step, a major step toward full interoperability with the
FBI fingerprint system.
Former subcommittee Chairman Cochran and I urged former
Secretary Ridge to take this step when we first met with him in
the Capitol almost 3 years ago. I am pleased that we are
finally moving forward.
BIOMETRICS
Now, Mr. Chairman, for years you and I have raised concerns
that the administration has not made a priority of integrating
our various biometric databases. If we are to ensure that we
only allow entry into this country of those who pose no threat,
we need to verify their identity and match their biometric
information, their fingerprints, against the FBI's existing
fingerprint database.
Over 2 years ago, this subcommittee began calling upon the
administration for real-time interoperability between the
Automated Biometric Identification System, IDENT, and the FBI's
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, IAFIS.
It appears that the message is finally being heard and that
some progress is being made toward this end. The subcommittee
wants to learn today when we will achieve this goal, and how
much it will cost?
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and I again
congratulate my chairman for conducting this hearing and for
addressing our border security needs in a bipartisan manner.
Senator Gregg. Thank you. Thank you, Senator, and thank you
for those very kind words, and the feelings are mutual.
Obviously, you have been an extraordinary leader in the Senate
for many, many years, a legend really.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, thank you.
Senator Gregg. I enjoy working with you immensely and the
points you made are the points that concern myself.
Senator Byrd. Thank you.
Senator Gregg. I would note that the FBI center I believe
is in West Virginia is it not, that has all these fingerprints?
Senator Byrd. Would you say that again, please?
Senator Gregg. I also note that the temperature in this
room is extraordinarily warm, so I may take my coat off, and if
people want to take their coats off, please do. Clearly this
committee is going to be needing LIHEAP money if we keep this
temperature up.
Senator Byrd. I am, I will take mine off.
Senator Gregg. A little warm in here.
We are joined today, fortunately, by the people who have
some answers for us and who have done a good job trying to get
this system up. That is the Director of the US VISIT program,
Jim Williams, and also the Director of Technology, Information
Architecture Systems at the Government Accountability Office,
Randy Hite. We appreciate your commitment to this effort. We
know it has been sincere and genuine and we would like to hear
your thoughts of where we are, where we are going, and what the
problems are and how we can help.
Mr. Williams.
STATEMENT OF JAMES A. WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES
VISITOR AND IMMIGRATION STATUS TECHNOLOGY
PROGRAM, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Williams. Good morning, Chairman Gregg, ranking member
Byrd, and other distinguished subcommittee members. Thank you
for the opportunity today to discuss with you the Department of
Homeland Security's US VISIT program. In addition to these
brief oral remarks, I have submitted a written statement, which
I hope you will include in the record.
Mr. Chairman, as Congress has mandated, our immigration and
border management system must simultaneously enhance the
security of our citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate
travel and trade, ensure the integrity of our immigration
system, and protect the privacy of our visitors. To accomplish
these goals, Mr. Chairman, you and your colleagues in Congress
have wisely recognized that we cannot continue to use 20th
century tools to address 21st century threats, challenges, and
opportunities. We owe the American people a wholesale
transformation of our immigration and border management system.
US VISIT represents the most prominent step we have taken
so far and it is succeeding because it combines the best of
technology, people, and business processes with the right
policies, infrastructure, and with a strong emphasis on
interagency and intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration
with the private sector.
In just 2 years of operation, US VISIT has met a series of
substantial milestones, giving us for the first time a
biometrically based system to reliably verify the identity of
those who enter or apply for entrance into the United States.
On January 5, 2004, we deployed US VISIT biometric entry
procedures at 115 airports and 14 seaports. On September 30,
2004, we expanded biometric entry procedures to include those
applying for admission under the Visa Waiver Program, VWP. In
October 2004, US VISIT supported the full deployment of the
State Department's BioVisa program, which records biometric and
biographic information at consulates around the world.
By December 29, 2004, 2 days ahead of schedule, we deployed
US VISIT biometric entry at our 50 busiest land ports along our
northern and southern borders. At 14 pilot locations, US VISIT
has collected biometrics from travelers departing the United
States. In early August 2005, we began testing radio frequency
identification technology, or RFID, at five ports along our
northern and southern land borders, and we deployed biometric
entry capabilities at 104 remaining land ports of entry before
the congressionally mandated deadline of December 31, 2005.
As a result of all this, US VISIT is providing powerful
capabilities that did not exist just 2 years ago. Since January
2004, we have processed more than 47 million visitors, which
makes US VISIT one of the largest scale biometric applications
in the world. Biometrics have enabled DHS to intercept at our
ports of entry more than a thousand people with criminal
histories, such as murderers, rapists, child predators, drug
traffickers, and immigration violators, and to deny visas
overseas to thousands more.
Just as importantly, biometrics are depriving potential
terrorists of the ability to use fraudulent identification
documents, which are among their most powerful tools, to gain
entry and threaten our country and our people.
We also place a high priority on being responsible stewards
of the information and technologies entrusted to us by applying
the principles of the Privacy Act to protect our visitors'
private information from misuse. Just last month, the 9/11
Commission's Public Discourse Project gave the US VISIT program
a grade of B, recognizing our achievements to date and
providing a reminder we have much work to do.
US VISIT FUTURE INITIATIVES: E-PASSPORTS, INTEROPERABILITY, TEN FINGER
SCANS
I would like to say just a few words about our work ahead.
With the State Department, we are working with VWP countries to
ensure they issue e-Passports to their citizens after October
of this year, and we are also currently testing e-Passport
readers with Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore as part of a
live test at San Francisco International Airport. Also, DHS and
US VISIT are making important strides to share information
across many agencies. We know that interoperability between
databases is an important priority for us, this committee, and
for you in particular, Mr. Chairman. DHS and the Departments of
Justice and State are working hard to achieve interoperability
between the FBI's IAFIS fingerprint system and DHS's IDENT
fingerprint system. We are making good progress on this effort,
thanks in large part to the efforts of FBI's Tom Bush and Jerry
Pender, as well as the State Department's Tony Edson.
We are also preparing a plan now to implement Secretary
Chertoff decision to enroll all U.S. visitors with ten finger
scans. This will enable us to identify visitors with even
greater accuracy than we do today, send fewer people to
secondary inspection, and allow border and visa-issuing
officers to focus more on those who might be greater risks.
Before I close, I would like to note that we appreciate the
advice and support that we have received from GAO's Randy Hite
and his team, who have provided important insights about the
development of the US VISIT program.
As Winston Churchill said to the British people after they
won their first major battle of World War II: ``We are at the
end of the beginning.'' We know that we have much work ahead to
deliver the 21st century system that the President, the
Congress, and the American people need to ensure our continued
national and economic security and protect our values.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I appreciate greatly the support of this committee and the
Congress that allowed for our achievements thus far, and we
look forward to continuing to work with you as we move ahead.
I would be glad to answer your questions. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of James A. Williams
Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and other distinguished
Members, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the
progress the Department of Homeland Security's United States Visitor
and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US VISIT) program has made
in securing our Nation's borders.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE US VISIT PROGRAM
It is the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS or Homeland
Security) vision to modernize and improve our immigration and border
management system through integration, collaboration, and cooperation
among all parts of the immigration and border management community--a
community that includes DHS organizations such as Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and the Department of State (DOS or State), among
many others. Moreover, it is imperative that these many organizations
work together as a single enterprise to accomplish a single mission--
coordinating roles, sharing information and technology, complementing
and reinforcing one another's business processes, and eliminating
redundancies.
DHS created the US VISIT program in July 2003 to meet statutory
requirements and, more broadly, to achieve the following program goals:
--To enhance the security of our citizens and visitors;
--To facilitate legitimate travel and trade;
--To ensure the integrity of our immigration system; and
--To protect the privacy of our visitors.
The US VISIT program is part of a continuum of security measures
that begins outside our Nation's physical borders. The program is a
critical component of DHS's strategies to prevent terrorist attacks on
the United States and facilitate the movement of legitimate travel and
trade. US VISIT represents a major achievement in creating an
integrated border screening system that enhances our Nation's security
and our efforts to reform our immigration and border management
systems. Through US VISIT, DHS is increasing our ability to manage the
information collected about foreign visitors during the pre-entry,
entry, status management, and departure processes, and allows us to
conduct better analysis of that information, and thereby strengthens
the integrity of our immigration system.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF US VISIT
DHS deployed US VISIT on time, within budget, and has met every
mandate established by Congress to date, as well as incorporating
biometrics (fingerscans and digital photographs) into US VISIT. The
addition of biometrics, coupled with the integration of databases, has
contributed to improved decision-making and information sharing across
the immigration and border management community. In each of the
incremental improvements that have been successfully deployed to date,
all of the four goals listed above have been met.
DHS met its first statutory requirement by integrating existing
arrival and departure biographic information on December 31, 2003.
Subsequently, DHS:
--deployed US VISIT biometric entry procedures at 115 airports and 14
seaports on January 5, 2004, for those individuals applying for
admission with nonimmigrant visas (Since that time, US VISIT
has been deployed to an additional seaport);
--expanded biometric entry procedures to include those individuals
applying for admission under the Visa Waiver Program on
September 30, 2004;
--supported the deployment of DOS's BioVisa Program, completed in
October 2004;
--deployed biometric entry to the 50 busiest land ports by December
29, 2004;
--collects biometrics on exit at 14 pilot locations for travelers
departing the United States;
--implemented radio frequency identification technology (RFID) at
five sites along the northern and southern land borders to
capture entry/exit information, trigger updated watchlist
checks, and provide the results of this information in a
cohesive form to the CBP officer at entry;
--deployed to all ports of entry the initial capability to compare
and authenticate travel documents issued by the United States
by October 26, 2005;
--deployed biometric entry capabilities to the remaining 104 land
border ports of entry before the Congressionally mandated
deadline of December 31, 2005; and
--will deploy reader technology that is capable of accommodating
biometrically enabled e-Passports from Visa Waiver Program
countries by October 26, 2006.
Enhancing Security and Improving Integrity of the Immigration System
The use of biometric and biographic data provides DOS consular
officers, CBP officers, and other immigration and border management
officials the information they need to authenticate travel documents;
verify identity; and identify criminals, immigration violators, and
other individuals who may pose threats to our security or public safety
before they can enter the United States. For the overwhelming majority
of foreign travelers who are welcome into our country, this same access
to data means they can be processed more quickly and more efficiently
while their privacy is protected.
Through US VISIT, DHS has processed approximately 47.6 million
travelers at our ports of entry from its inception through January 5,
2006. During this same period, the use of biometrics alone has allowed
DHS to intercept more than 1,011 known criminals and immigration law
violators--including individuals wanted for murder, rape, drug
trafficking, and pedophilia. Two examples:
--Several months ago, CBP officers at Los Angeles International
Airport encountered a Swiss national seeking admission as a
visa waiver applicant. A US VISIT fingerscan check by CBP
officers revealed that this person was wanted by INTERPOL for
suspected pedophilia.
--Prior to US VISIT, the traveler presented a fraudulent visa to
enter the United States more than 60 times using without
detection by standard biographic record checks. A routine US
VISIT check by CBP officers at John F. Kennedy International
Airport revealed his deception, and further CBP checks found
that he had two prior arrests for drug trafficking, a
subsequent failure to appear in court and visa fraud.
The use of biometric identifiers--specifically digital fingerscans
and photographs--has made travel safer and more secure by identifying
individuals attempting to claim other identities. The matching of
fingerprints through DOS's BioVisa Program, which is fully integrated
with US VISIT, against DHS's biometric watchlist has resulted in 15,200
hits on individuals applying to DOS for visas to come to the United
States, to date (January 2004 through January 5, 2006).
Additionally, US VISIT provides Immigration and Customs
Enforcement's (ICE) Compliance Enforcement Unit with a listing of
possible overstays on a weekly basis. This exchange of information has
led to the arrest by ICE of 122 individuals (January 2004 through
January 5, 2006) who have overstayed the terms of their admission.
Facilitating Travel and Trade
These accomplishments have been achieved without adversely
impacting inspection times for the millions of legitimate international
travelers who visit the United States every year. At some land border
ports of entry, automation of former paper processes through US VISIT
procedures have significantly reduced the time it takes for a visitor
to obtain a Form I-94 and be admitted into the country. For example, in
Laredo, Texas, the Form I-94 issuance process has been reduced from an
average of 8 to11 minutes to just 2 to 5 minutes, even though we have
added the collection of biometrics and additional security screening to
the process. The Port Director in Nogales, Arizona, James Tong, said
that US VISIT ``saved their bacon'' by being able to deal effectively
with the long lines at his port during the last holiday season thanks
to faster processing capabilities.
Protecting the Privacy of Our Visitors
From its beginning, US VISIT has applied the principles of the U.S.
Privacy Act to foreign nationals enrolled in the program. US VISIT has
acted to ensure institutional adherence to privacy regulations and best
practices including establishment of a Privacy Office that oversees
development of privacy principles and policy, mandatory privacy
training for program staff, and a set of checks and procedures to
ensure an avenue for redress by the public. The program has published,
and regularly updated, a Privacy Impact Assessment and Systems of
Record Notices. From more than 47.6 million transactions, the Privacy
Office has received approximately 131 requests for redress since the
program's beginning. DHS's former Chief Privacy Officer Nuala O'Connor
Kelly said of US VISIT, ``There's a program that's taking a lot of
information and they're dealing with it respectfully, accurately and
thoughtfully . . . I think they're a textbook study on how to get it
right.''
US VISIT'S CONTINUING EFFORTS
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
following the 9/11 Commission Report, has called for the completion of
a biometric entry and exit system as expeditiously as possible. US
VISIT has undertaken the following additional initiatives:
International Border Management and Cooperation
We are working with foreign governments and private sector entities
to establish strong and workable international standards for
interoperability. For example, DHS has worked closely with DOS and
countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) to ensure new
passports issued by VWP countries and our Department of State on or
after October 26, 2006, will be e-Passports that include an integrated
computer chip capable of storing biographic information from the data
page, a digital photograph, and future biometric information that can
be read by DHS readers.
Further, we are working in concert with Australia, New Zealand, and
Singapore to pilot test e-Passport readers. The test began January 15
and will run through the late spring. Australia's immigration minister
announced that his country would test a biometric border security
system at Sydney's airport. Japan is building a biometric entry system
which they have publicly stated will be modeled after US VISIT. The
European Commission published proposals in June 2005, to upgrade the
Schengen Information System to include biometric data as well as
information on individuals subject to European arrest warrants or
extradition, and individuals refused entry to the European Union.
Currently, the European Union is collecting fingerscans and digital
photographs in several pilot sites comparable to the BioVisa Program.
DHS and US VISIT are also working closely with our Canadian and
Mexican neighbors, largely through the Security and Prosperity
Partnership, in bi-national working groups that are helping us create a
more consolidated, North American approach to enhancing security and
facilitating trade and travel.
International Registered Traveler
International Registered Traveler (IRT) initiatives cover a wide
variety of programs, including proposed programs such as a future
international trusted traveler program, and ongoing programs on North
American borders such as FAST, SENTRI, and NEXUS. For the past year, US
VISIT, in coordination with CBP and the Transportation and Security
Administration (TSA), has been working closely with representatives
from The Netherlands to develop and test an international registered
traveler program that would allow enrolled travelers to pass through
inspections more quickly.
Information Sharing Across Agencies
Efforts to support the sharing of alien biometric and biographic
information, and integrated alien information systems and processes
within the immigration and border management enterprise have already
reaped rewards such as the expansion of US VISIT databases to include
information from DOS, USCIS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
CBP, ICE, the Department of Defense (DOD), and INTERPOL.
DHS, and the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and DOS are working
collaboratively to achieve interoperability between the FBI's
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) and
DHS's Automated Biometric Identity System (IDENT).
Departure Confirmation
DHS is examining the results of the current exit pilots at 14
airports and seaports and DHS will determine the best approach for
capturing exit data using biometrics and biographic information. We
continue to rely on our existing exit process, which are being enhanced
now by the implementation of the Advanced Passenger Information System
rule.
10-Print Transition and Interoperability
US VISIT is not a single database or computer network, but rather
the bond that ties together several, previously independent databases
and watchlists. The benefit of using prior systems, as opposed to
starting anew, is that DHS has been able to make marked improvements
over a very short period of time.
DHS is progressing towards a seamlessly integrated system that will
allow users access to all relevant information in a timely manner to
make the right decisions on those individual visitors and immigrants
they encounter The next step is the interoperability of Homeland
Security's IDENT with the FBI's IAFIS.
Currently, DHS uses the IDENT two index fingerprint system to
collect and match fingerprints of international visitors entering
United States and of applicants for visas with the Department of State.
This process allows DHS and DOS to conduct watchlist checks and verify
that the person appearing before the CBP officer is the same person
previously encountered or granted a visa or other travel document.
IDENT/IAFIS interoperability will increase DHS and DOS's ability to
screen individuals, increase accuracy of matching, and provide greater
ability to match against latent prints. Integration will also benefit
the FBI and other law enforcement organizations by providing them with
increased access during the interim solution to information on high-
risk individuals to whom DOS refused a visa and those whom DHS has
expeditiously removed.
On July 13, 2005, the Secretary announced that in the future,
first-time visitors to the United States will be enrolled in the
program by submitting ten fingerprints. The Administration is
developing an implementation plan and associated cost estimates. The
plan will address interoperability as well as migration to ten
fingerscans. Moving to a 10-fingerscan standard will allow us to be
able to identify visitors with even greater accuracy. This will
translate into sending fewer people to secondary inspection, allowing
us to focus more time and attention on those who might be potential
risks to the country. It also allows us to match against additional
watchlist fingerprints including latent prints, and create a common
standard of fingerprint capture and use.
Although making both fingerprint databases interoperable may sound
simple, it presents a number of challenges. New systems and processes
must be developed, and new hardware must be installed at both database
storage sites. This must all be done in a manner that maintains the
high standards of efficiency, effectiveness, and privacy that we have
achieved with the current US VISIT system.
DHS and DOJ Joint Solutions
During joint meetings this past spring, staff from US VISIT and the
FBI Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division identified
three potential models for making IDENT and IAFIS interoperable. In May
2005, US VISIT and DOS leaders traveled to Clarksburg, WV to meet with
the leadership of the FBI'S CJIS Division. During that meeting, we
agreed to guiding principles for interoperability.
These efforts were given additional energy with Secretary
Chertoff's announcement that US VISIT will transition to biometrically
screening international visitors using a fingerprint standard of 10-
fingerscan capture at enrollment and two-flat finger verification for
each subsequent encounter.
An Interoperability Integrated Project Team (IPT) was established
in June with FBI'S CJIS Division and State Department's Bureau of
Consular Affairs. This team, with representation from the major
government stakeholders, will develop the roadmap to successful
interoperability. Additionally, USCIS and ICE are two very important
stakeholders and are participating actively when preparing for future
interoperability.
Our relationship with FBI's CJIS Division has been further
strengthened with the addition of US VISIT Deputy Director, Robert
Mocny, as the DHS representative to the FBI's CJIS Division Advisory
Policy Board (APB). This signifies a new and improved relationship with
FBI's CJIS Division, and participation will hasten progress towards
achieving full interoperability and optimize our work with States and
localities.
The IPT has agreed upon three phases to achieving interoperability:
(1) an interim data sharing model (data sharing solution); (2) initial
operating capability (IOC); and (3) full operating capability (FOC).
The interim solution will consist of a prototype (also known as the
interim data sharing model) that is a first step towards the new
interoperable environment between IDENT and IAFIS. The interim solution
will allow for two-way sharing of certain biometric information. FBI
will provide information on all wants and warrants. DHS will provide
information on expedited removals. State will provide Category 1 visa
refusals (e.g., generally one involving a permanent ground of
inadmissibility). DHS and FBI's CJIS Division will formally start the
first phase on February 1, 2006, and anticipate the interim solution to
be implemented over the following 6 to 8 months. This time period will
be used to design and build the prototype system.
During the next phase, the initial operating capability (IOC),
State and DHS will begin to collect 10 prints; DHS will convert the
current two-print DHS IDENT system to store and utilize 10-flat prints
in processing. DHS and FBI will establish an infrastructure for
exchanging information and search capabilities.
Finally, the full operating capability (FOC) will be achieved about
eighteen months after the completion of IOC. The FOC includes full
information sharing, subject to controlling laws and policy; high
performance searches of biometric data in both IDENT and IAFIS for
positive identification; increased matcher performance appropriate to
the increased volumes; and more comprehensive biographic/case data
sharing.
DHS, along with the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, as
well as the National Institute of Standards and Technology, hosted an
industry day to challenge the industry to make a smaller, faster, more
accurate 10-print capture device. We are working with industry to help
design new capture devices that meet DHS's basic operational
requirements at primary inspection. Advances in technology will allow
DHS and State to routinely collect 10 slap prints, without negatively
impacting the thousands of international visitors that pass though our
ports and visa issuing posts every day.
As with previous border security initiatives that involve using
biometrics, no one should underestimate the very real and significant
technological challenges, including the present realities that include:
--No capture device on the market today can take and process 10
prints in the same timeframe experienced for taking and
processing two prints.
--No capture device on the market today can capture 10 prints in less
than three slaps (four fingers left, four fingers right, two
thumbs), and most require four slaps (four fingers left, four
fingers right, left thumb, right thumb). None meet current
operational processing requirements for ports of entry,
embassies, or consulates.
--When more than one finger is scanned, segmentation of the fingers
into individual scans is necessary; this is one of the primary
factors that add processing time beyond that experienced today
when using single finger scans.
--Finally, the vendor community will need to manufacture sufficient
quantities of scanners to respond to this initiative.
IDENT/IAFIS interoperability will provide all users with more
information and greater accuracy. Collecting and storing ten-prints on
initial encounter (enrollment) will improve the accuracy of matches and
provide increased ability to match latent prints, DHS and DOS can then
use two prints to verify that the person appearing before them is the
same one encountered previously.
IDENT/IAFIS Workstation Deployment
DHS completed deployment of integrated IDENT/IAFIS workstations to
all remaining CBP ports of entry and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) sites by December 31, 2005.
The 2005 deployment focused on the remaining 66 ports of entry as
well as the 339 ICE locations.
These workstations allow DHS's users in the field to collect one
set of 10-rolled prints and simultaneously transmit them to both IDENT
and IAFIS for checks. This functionality is being deployed to improve
access to fingerprint and criminal history data for law enforcement
purposes.
The IDENT/IAFIS workstations are an important tool for Border
Patrol, secondary inspections, and interior enforcement. During these
encounters--where DHS already has identified that the individual may
not be admissible or may pose a threat--more time can be spent with the
individual so that DHS can obtain additional information from both of
these biometric watchlist systems that will help in the determination
of what actions may be most appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Since inception, US VISIT has met all of its goals. DHS and US
VISIT continue to work with the rest of the world to harmonize
international border processes and standards for data sharing.
At the same time, these improvements in screening have facilitated
legitimate trade and travel. We conducted (and continue to conduct)
extensive outreach and public education efforts to ensure that both
affected government staff and travelers understood the US VISIT process
and knew what to expect at the borders.
DHS continues to explore departure confirmation alternatives at our
air and seaports. US VISIT is looking at effective ways to utilize RFID
at the land ports. In the future, this information could be shared with
State and local law enforcement, as appropriate. Through US VISIT, we
are establishing an ``enrolled population''--a population that is
``known'' and for whom risk is assessed through recurrent biometric
screening. And from there, we can expand the security and facilitation
enhancements provided by DHS and US VISIT through the development of a
registered traveler program to facilitate the travel of known, low-risk
individuals.
In closing, I'd like to thank you for your support for the work
that has already been accomplished and your future assistance and
commitment to the work that lies ahead.
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Williams.
Mr. Hite we do appreciate GAO. You are sort of the fair
arbiter here, calling it how you see it, and we are interested
in what you see.
STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH C. HITE, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY ARCHITECTURE AND SYSTEMS ISSUES,
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Hite. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by
commending this subcommittee for its oversight of the US VISIT
program. Through legislative language, you have required annual
expenditure plans of the US VISIT program and through that you
have been able to provide valuable program direction and you
have established a real important accountability mechanism. So
I commend you for that.
Now, this legislative language has also required GAO to
review these annual expenditure plans. In this regard, we have
issued reports on each plan as well as other issues surrounding
the program and we have made over 25 recommendations aimed at
improving DHS's ability to manage the program, recommendations,
I would add, that DHS has stated have served to make the
program stronger.
My testimony today largely focuses on where DHS stands in
implementing our recommendations and to facilitate this
discussion what I will do is place the recommendations into the
three buckets. Bucket one contains those recommendations to
ensure that the program as it has been defined thus far by DHS
is the right thing to do, meaning that sufficient analysis has
been performed to demonstrate that each program increment is
being defined within the context of a larger homeland security
operational and technological vision, and that each increment
will produce mission results commensurate with expected costs.
Bucket two contains those recommendations to ensure that
the program is being done the right way, meaning that DHS is
employing the necessary mix of people, processes, and tools to
maximize the chances of delivering incrementally promised
capabilities and benefits on time and within budget.
Bucket three contains those recommendations to ensure that
the program is held accountable for results, meaning that
incremental commitments--and by that I mean cost, schedule,
capability, and benefit commitments--are defined and
performance against each is measured and disclosed.
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING GAO RECOMMENDATIONS
Now, before I summarize where the program stands in
implementing these buckets of recommendations, let me first
give credit where credit is due. Specifically, the US VISIT
program in concert with the State Department and others have
met some pretty demanding time frames for deploying and
operating an entry screening and identification capability at
hundreds of overseas facilities and U.S. ports of entry. This
capability is producing certain results, such as denying visas
to undeserving applicants, preventing entry to criminal aliens,
and arguably deterring terrorists from even attempting entry.
These are not trivial accomplishments, especially considering
that they have occurred during a period when DHS has
experienced some very well-publicized growing pains.
Having said this, however, I would also reiterate what you
mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks, and that is
what is operating today at the ports of entry still does not
include a comparable exit capability and much remains to be
done before DHS and FBI fingerprinting systems achieve real-
time interoperability.
In addition, many of our recommendations aimed at improving
US VISIT program management have not yet been fully
implemented. With respect to those recommendations aimed at
ensuring that US VISIT is the right thing, there's more to be
done. In particular, while the program office--and I emphasize,
the program office--has done this, they have established their
understanding of the strategic context in which US VISIT is to
operate by, for example, drafting a strategic plan showing how
US VISIT is aligned with the proposed immigration and border
management vision. The plan has not yet been--the plan has been
received at the departmental level, but has not been approved,
and it remains unclear how this program-level strategic plan
relates to broader DHS strategic initiatives, such as the
secure border initiative and the Department's enterprise
architecture.
As we have previously reported, implementing programs like
US VISIT without an explicit and stable corporate context
increases the likelihood that later the program will have to be
reworked. In addition, reliable return on investment analyses
have yet to be produced that show that program increments are
cost effective, and certain analyses done to date show that
program impacts and options going forward were limited.
With respect to recommendations aimed at ensuring that the
US VISIT program is done the right way, DHS has made mixed
progress. On the positive side, progress has been good in
establishing human capital capabilities, the people, which is
important in this particular program because achievements
achieved thus far are owed largely to the outstanding efforts
of the people on the program, both the contractor and with the
government.
But this kind of people dependency does not reasonably
assure future successes. To have such assurance, the program
needs to institutionalize certain management processes, such as
acquisition management, configuration management, risk
management, capacity management, and on and on, all of which we
have recommended. I would also add that these are not just
nice-to-have process capabilities; these are fundamental to
ensuring that large complex programs like US VISIT live up to
expectations.
Finally, on the issue of accountability more work remains
to be done there, too, to implement our recommendations. For
example, the expenditure plans that you have required through
legislation to date have not defined in meaningful and
measurable terms what incremental capabilities and benefits--
and I emphasize the incremental aspect of that--will be
delivered, when, and what costs; and these plans have not
adequately addressed what progress is actually being made
against incremental commitments.
Without measurable commitments and timely and accurate
reporting on the satisfaction of them, I would submit that
program accountability is lost.
PREPARED STATEMENT
In closing, let me say that our Nation's immigration and
border management challenges require that programs like US
VISIT be managed effectively and efficiently. Our
recommendations are aimed at making this happen. This concludes
my statement. I would be happy to answer any questions that you
have at this time.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Randolph C. Hite
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We appreciate the
opportunity to participate in the Subcommittee's hearing on US VISIT
(the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology),
a multibillion-dollar program of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) that is intended to achieve a daunting set of goals: to enhance
the security of our citizens and visitors and ensure the integrity of
the U.S. immigration system, and at the same time to facilitate
legitimate trade and travel and protect privacy. To achieve these
goals, US VISIT is to record the entry into and exit from the United
States of selected travelers, verify their identity, and determine
their compliance with the terms of their admission and stay.
Since fiscal year 2002, the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees have provided valuable oversight and direction to DHS on US
VISIT by legislatively directing it to submit annual expenditure plans
for committee approval. This legislation also directed us to review
these plans. Our reviews have produced four reports that, among other
things, described DHS progress against legislatively mandated
milestones and identified fundamental challenges that the department
faced in delivering promised program capabilities and benefits on time
and within cost.\1\ For example, we reported in September 2003 that the
program office did not have the human capital and acquisition process
discipline needed to effectively manage the program. In light of the
challenges that we identified, we concluded that the program carries an
appreciable level of risk, meaning that it must be managed effectively
if it is to be successful.
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\1\ GAO, Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve
Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning, GAO-03-563 (Washington, DC:
June 9, 2003); Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and
Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083
(Washington, DC: Sept. 19, 2003); Homeland Security: First Phase of
Visitor and Immigration Status Program Operating, but Improvements
Needed, GAO-04-586 (Washington, DC: May 11, 2004); and Homeland
Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on U.S.
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program, GAO-05-202
(Washington, DC: Feb. 23, 2005).
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Managing US VISIT effectively requires high levels of capability
and expertise. Fundamentally, it entails being able to respond
affirmatively to two basic questions. First, are we doing the right
thing? To be sure that a program is doing the right thing, it needs to
be justified by sufficient fact-based and verifiable analysis to show
that the program as defined will properly fit within the larger
homeland security operational and technological environments and that
it will produce mission value commensurate with expected costs and
risks. The second question is, are we doing it the right way? To be
done the right way, a program needs to be executed in a rigorous and
disciplined manner, which means that it needs to employ the necessary
mix of people, processes, and tools to reasonably ensure that promised
program capabilities and expected mission value are delivered on time
and within budget. Beyond these two questions, effective program
management also means that the program is held accountable for results,
which involves measuring and disclosing performance relative to
explicitly defined program goals, outcomes, and commitments.
Over the last 4 years, our reports have provided recommendations to
DHS to ensure that these questions are answered and used as the basis
for informed decision making about US VISIT. They have also provided
recommendations to promote DHS accountability for the program. These
recommendations have been aimed at helping the department to ensure
that this program fulfills expectations: in other words, that the
program is doing the right thing in the right way, and that it is
holding itself accountable for doing so. According to DHS, the
recommendations have made US VISIT a stronger program. Further, they
concur with the need to implement them with due speed and diligence.
My statement will describe the status of US VISIT and where the
department now stands in implementing these recommendations and thus in
addressing the challenges that it faces. It is based on our
aforementioned reports to the Appropriations Committees and our ongoing
work for the House Committee on Homeland Security. All work on which
this testimony is based was performed in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
To its credit, the US VISIT program has met a number of
legislatively mandated requirements. A pre-entry screening capability
is in place in visa issuance offices, and an entry identification
capability is available at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and in the
secondary inspection areas \2\ of 154 land ports of entry. This has
been accomplished despite the considerable departmental change
occurring around the program, and according to DHS, it has prevented
criminal aliens from entering the United States, besides probably
deterring other criminals and terrorists from attempting to enter
through these ports.
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\2\ Secondary inspection is used for more detailed inspections that
may include checking more databases, conducting more intensive
interviews, or both.
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Our recommendations over the last 4 years have been aimed at
helping DHS meet its US VISIT obligations by ensuring that it is doing
the right thing in the right way, and that the department holds itself
accountable for results. To address these recommendations, DHS has
taken a number of steps. To help ensure that is doing the right thing,
the department is in the process of clarifying the strategic context in
which US VISIT is to operate; it has analyzed the program's costs,
benefits, and risks; and it has begun analyzing program impacts and
options that will provide a basis for future program increments.
However, the program's fit within the department's operational and
technology context remains unclear, and DHS has yet to demonstrate that
early program increments are producing or will produce mission value
commensurate with expected costs and risks. In particular, the
department's return on investment analyses for exit solutions do not
demonstrate that investment options will be cost-effective.
On our recommendations aimed at ensuring that the program is
executed in the right way, DHS has made mixed progress. For example,
the department has made good progress in establishing the program's
human capital capabilities, which is important, because progress in
establishing program management process controls, such as test
management, has not been as good. For example, a test plan used in a
recent system acceptance test did not adequately trace between test
cases and the requirements to be verified by testing. As we have
previously reported, incomplete test plans reduce assurance that
systems will perform as intended once they are deployed. Our experience
in reviewing large, complex programs like US VISIT has shown that such
process management weaknesses typically result in programs falling
short of expectations.
With regard to our recommendations for establishing accountability
for program results by measuring and disclosing performance relative to
program goals, outcomes, requirements, and commitments, more also
remains to be done. For example, DHS has yet to define performance
standards that reflect limitations of the existing systems that make up
US VISIT. Also, its expenditure plans have not described progress
against commitments made in previous plans. Unless performance against
requirements and commitments is measured and disclosed, the ability to
manage and oversee the program will suffer.
BACKGROUND
US VISIT is a governmentwide program intended to enhance the
security of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel
and trade, ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and
protect the privacy of our visitors. The scope of the program includes
the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of hundreds of millions of
foreign national travelers who enter and leave the United States at
over 300 air, sea, and land ports of entry, as well as analytical
capabilities spanning this overall process.
To achieve its goals, US VISIT uses biometric information (digital
fingerscans and photographs) to verify identity and screen persons
against watch lists.\3\ In many cases, the US VISIT process begins
overseas, at U.S. consular offices, which collect biometric information
from applicants for visas, and check this information against a
database of known criminals and suspected terrorists. When a visitor
arrives at a port of entry, the biometric information is used to verify
that the visitor is the person who was issued the visa or other travel
documents. Ultimately, visitors are to confirm their departure by
having their visas or passports scanned and undergoing fingerscanning.
(Currently, at a few pilot sites, departing visitors are asked to
undergo these exit procedures.) The exit confirmation is added to the
visitor's travel records to demonstrate compliance with the terms of
admission to the United States.
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\3\ Biometric comparison is a means of identifying a person by
biological features unique to that individual.
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Other key US VISIT functions include:
--collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign
nationals who enter and exit the United States;
--identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated
the terms of their admission; (2) may be eligible to receive,
extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3) should be
apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials;
--detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity,
and determining traveler admissibility through the use of
biometrics; and
--facilitating information sharing and coordination within the
immigration and border management community.
In July 2003, DHS established a program office with responsibility
for managing the acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of
the US VISIT system and its associated supporting people (e.g., Customs
and Border Protection officers), processes (e.g., entry/exit policies
and procedures), and facilities (e.g., inspection booths and lanes).
As of October 2005, about $1.4 billion has been appropriated for
the program, and according to program officials, about $962 million has
been obligated to acquire, develop, deploy, operate, and maintain US
VISIT entry capabilities, and to test and evaluate exit capability
options.
ACQUISITION AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
DHS plans to deliver US VISIT capability in four increments, with
Increments 1 through 3 being interim, or temporary, solutions that
fulfill legislative mandates to deploy an entry/exit system, and
Increment 4 being the implementation of a long-term vision that is to
incorporate improved business processes, new technology, and
information sharing to create an integrated border management system
for the future. In Increments 1 through 3, the program is building
interfaces among existing (``legacy'') systems, enhancing the
capabilities of these systems, and deploying these capabilities to air,
sea, and land ports of entry. These first three increments are to be
largely acquired and implemented through existing system contracts and
task orders.
In May 2004, DHS awarded an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity
\4\ prime contract to Accenture and its partners. According to the
contract, the prime contractor will help support the integration and
consolidation of processes, functionality, and data, and it will
develop a strategy to build on the technology and capabilities already
available to produce the strategic solution, while also assisting the
program office in leveraging existing systems and contractors in
deploying the interim solutions.
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\4\ An indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract provides
for an indefinite quantity, within stated limits, of supplies or
services during a fixed period of time. The government schedules
deliveries or performance by placing orders with the contractor.
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US VISIT IS BEING IMPLEMENTED IN FOUR INCREMENTS
Increment 1 concentrates on establishing capabilities at air and
sea ports of entry. It is divided into two parts--1A and 1B.
--Increment 1A (air and sea entry) includes the electronic capture
and matching of biographic and biometric information (two
digital index fingerscans and a digital photograph) for
selected foreign nationals, including those from visa waiver
countries.\5\ Increment 1A was deployed on January 5, 2004,
through the modification of pre-existing systems.\6\ These
modifications accommodated the collection and maintenance of
additional data fields and established interfaces required to
share data among DHS systems in support of entry processing at
115 airports and 14 seaports.
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\5\ The Visa Waiver Program permits foreign nationals from
designated countries to apply for admission to the United States for a
maximum of 90 days as nonimmigrant visitors for business or pleasure.
\6\ Foreign nationals from visa waiver countries were included as
of September 30, 2004.
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--Increment 1B (air and sea exit) involves the testing of exit
devices to collect biometric exit data for select foreign
nationals. Three exit alternatives were pilot tested at 11 air
and sea ports of entry. These alternatives are as follows.
--Kiosk.--A self-service device (including a touch screen interface,
document scanner, finger scanner, digital camera, and receipt
printer) that captures a digital photograph and fingerprint and
prints out an encoded receipt.
--Mobile Device.--A hand-held device that is operated by a
workstation attendant and includes a document scanner, finger
scanner, digital camera, and receipt printer to capture a
digital photograph and fingerprint.
--Validator.--A hand-held device that is used to capture a digital
photograph and fingerprint, which are then matched to the
photograph and fingerprint captured via the kiosk and encoded
in the receipt.
Increment 2 focuses primarily on extending US VISIT to land ports
of entry. It is divided into three parts--2A, 2B, and 2C.
--Increment 2A (air, sea, and land entry) includes the capability to
biometrically compare and authenticate valid machine-readable
visas and other travel and entry documents at all ports of
entry. Increment 2A was deployed on October 23, 2005, according
to program officials. It also includes the deployment by
October 26, 2006, of the capability to read biometrically
enabled passports from visa waiver countries.
--Increment 2B (land entry) redesigned the Increment 1 entry solution
and expanded it to the 50 busiest land ports of entry. The
process for issuing entry/exit forms \7\ was redesigned to
enable the electronic capture of biographic, biometric (unless
the traveler is exempt), and related travel documentation for
arriving travelers. This increment was deployed to the busiest
50 U.S. land border ports of entry on December 29, 2004. Before
Increment 2B, all information on the entry/exit forms was hand
written. The redesigned process provides for electronically
capturing the biographic data on the entry/exit form. In some
cases, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers enter the
data electronically and then print the completed form.
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\7\ Entry/exit forms (Form I-94, entry/exit form, and Form I-94W,
entry/exit for foreign nationals from visa waiver countries) are used
to record a foreign national's entry into the United States. Each form
has two parts--arrival and departure--and each part contains a unique
number for the purposes of recording and matching arrival and departure
records.
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--Increment 2C (land entry and exit) is to provide the capability to
automatically, passively, and remotely record the entry and
exit of covered individuals using radio frequency (RF)
technology tags at primary inspection and exit lanes.\8\ This
tag includes a unique ID number that is to be embedded in each
entry/exit form, thus associating a unique number with a US
VISIT record for the person holding that form. One of DHS's
goals in using this technology is to improve the ability to
collect entry and exit information. In August 2005, the program
office deployed the technology to three land ports of entry to
verify the feasibility of using passive RF technology to record
traveler entries and exits from the number embedded in the
entry/exit form. The results of this demonstration are to be
reported in February 2006.
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\8\ RF technology relies on proximity cards and card readers. RF
devices read the information contained on the card when the card is
passed near the device and can also be used to verify the identity of
the cardholder.
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Increment 3 extended Increment 2B (land entry) capabilities to 104
land ports of entry; this increment was essentially completed as of
December 19, 2005.\9\
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\9\ At one port of entry, these capabilities were deployed by
December 19, but were not fully operational until January 7, 2006,
because of a telephone company strike that prevented the installation
of a T-1 line.
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Increment 4 is the strategic US VISIT program capability, which
program officials stated will likely consist of a further series of
incremental releases or mission capability enhancements that will
support business outcomes. The program reports that it has worked with
its prime contractor and partners to develop this overall vision for
the immigration and border management enterprise.
All increments before Increment 4 depend on the interfacing and
integration of existing systems,\10\ including the following:
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\10\ In addition, Increment 2C (RF technology) will include the
creation of a new system, the Automated Identification Management
System.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--The Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) stores:
--noncitizen traveler arrival and departure data received from air
and sea carrier manifests,
--arrival data captured by CBP officers at air and sea ports of
entry,
--I-94 issuance data captured by CBP officers at Increment 2B land
ports of entry,
--departure information captured at US VISIT biometric departure
pilot (air and sea) locations,
--pedestrian arrival information and pedestrian and vehicle departure
information captured at Increment 2C port of entry locations,
and
--status update information provided by SEVIS and CLAIMS 3 (described
below).
ADIS provides record matching, query, and reporting functions.
--The passenger processing component of the Treasury Enforcement
Communications System (TECS) includes two systems: Advance
Passenger Information System (APIS), a system that captures
arrival and departure manifest information provided by air and
sea carriers, and the Interagency Border Inspection System, a
system that maintains lookout data and interfaces with other
agencies' databases. CBP officers use these data as part of the
admission process. The results of the admission decision are
recorded in TECS and ADIS.
--The Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) collects and
stores biometric data about foreign visitors.
--The Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and the
Computer Linked Application Information Management System
(CLAIMS 3) contain information on foreign students and foreign
nationals who request benefits, such as change of status or
extension of stay. Some of these systems, such as IDENT, are
managed by the program office, while some systems are managed
by other organizational entities within DHS. For example, TECS
is managed by CBP, SEVIS is managed by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, CLAIMS 3 is under United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services, and ADIS is jointly managed by CBP and US
VISIT.
US VISIT also interfaces with other, non-DHS systems for relevant
purposes, including watch list updates and checks to determine whether
a visa applicant has previously applied for a visa or currently has a
valid U.S. visa. In particular, US VISIT receives biographic and
biometric information from the Department of State's Consular
Consolidated Database as part of the visa application process, and
returns fingerscan information and watch list changes.
US VISIT CAPABILITY IS OPERATING AT PORTS OF ENTRY
Over the last 3 years, US VISIT program officials and supporting
contractor staff have worked to meet challenging legislative time
frames, as well as a DHS-imposed requirement to use biometric
identifiers. Under law, for example, DHS was to create an electronic
entry and exit system to screen and monitor the stay of foreign
nationals who enter and leave the United States and implement the
system at (1) air and sea ports of entry by December 31, 2003, (2) the
50 highest-volume land ports of entry by December 31, 2004, and (3) the
remaining ports of entry by December 31, 2005.\11\ It was also to
provide the means to collect arrival/departure data from biometrically
enabled and machine-readable travel documents at all ports of
entry.\12\
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\11\ 8 USC 1365a; 6 USC 251 (transferred Immigration and
Naturalization Service functions to DHS); 8 USC 1732(b).
\12\ 8 USC 1732(b); 6 USC 251.
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To the program office's credit, it has largely met its obligations
relative to an entry capability. For example, on January 5, 2004, it
deployed and began operating most aspects of its planned entry
capability at 115 airports and 14 seaports, and added the remaining
aspects in February 2005. During 2004, it also deployed and began
operating this entry capability in the secondary inspection areas of
the 50 highest volume land ports of entry. As of December 19, 2005, it
had deployed and begun operating its entry capability at all but 1 of
the remaining 104 land ports of entry.\13\ The program has also been
working to define feasible and cost-effective exit solutions, including
technology feasibility testing at 3 land ports of entry and operational
performance evaluations at 11 air and sea ports of entry.
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\13\ One port of entry was not fully operational until January 7,
2006, because of a telephone company strike that prevented the
installation of a T-1 line.
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Moreover, the development and deployment of this entry capability
has occurred during a period of considerable organizational change,
starting with the creation of DHS from 23 separate agencies in early
2003, followed by the establishment of a US VISIT program office
shortly thereafter--which was only about 5 months before it had to meet
its first legislative milestone. Compounding these program challenges
was the fact that the systems that were to be used in building and
deploying an entry capability were managed and operated by a number of
the separate agencies that had been merged to form the new department,
each of which was governed by different policies, procedures, and
standards.
As a result of the program's efforts to deploy and operate an entry
capability, DHS reports that it has been able to apprehend and prevent
the entry of hundreds of criminal aliens: as of March 2005, DHS
reported that more than 450 people with records of criminal or
immigration violations have been prevented from entering. For example,
its biometric screening prevented the reentry of a convicted felon,
previously deported, who was attempting to enter under an alias;
standard biographic record checks using only names and birth dates
would have likely cleared the individual.
Another potential consequence, although difficult to demonstrate,
is the deterrent effect of having an operational entry capability.
Although deterrence is not an expressly stated goal of the program,
officials have cited it as a potential byproduct of having a publicized
capability at the border to screen entry on the basis of identity
verification and matching against watch lists of known and suspected
terrorists. Accordingly, the deterrent potential of the knowledge that
unwanted entry may be thwarted and the perpetrators caught is arguably
a layer of security that should not be overlooked.
DHS HAS YET TO DEMONSTRATE THAT US VISIT AS DEFINED IS THE RIGHT
SOLUTION
A prerequisite for prudent investment in programs is having
reasonable assurance that a proposed course of action is the right
thing to do, meaning that it properly fits within the larger context of
an agency's strategic plans and related operational and technology
environments, and that the program will produce benefits in excess of
costs over its useful life. We have made recommendations to DHS aimed
at ensuring that this is in fact the case for US VISIT, and the
department has taken steps intended to address our recommendations.
These steps, however, have yet to produce sufficient analytical
information to demonstrate that US VISIT as defined is the right
solution. Without this knowledge, investment in the program cannot be
fully justified.
OPERATIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CONTEXT ARE STILL BEING DEFINED
Agency programs need to properly fit within a common strategic
context or frame of reference governing key aspects of program
operations--e.g., what functions are to be performed by whom, when and
where they are to be performed, what information is to be used to
perform them, and what rules and standards will govern the application
of technology to support them. Without a clear operational context for
US VISIT, the risk is increased that the program will not interoperate
with related programs and thus not cost-effectively meet mission needs.
In September 2003 we reported that DHS had not defined key aspects
of the larger homeland security environment in which US VISIT would
need to operate. For example, certain policy and standards decisions
had not been made, such as whether official travel documents would be
required for all persons who enter and exit the country--including
United States and Canadian citizens--and how many fingerprints would be
collected. Nonetheless, program officials were making assumptions and
decisions at that time that, if they turned out to be inconsistent with
subsequent policy or standards decisions, would require US VISIT
rework. To minimize the impact of these changes, we recommended that
DHS clarify the context in which US VISIT is to operate.
About 28 months later, defining this operational context remains a
work in progress. For example, the program's relationships and
dependencies with other closely allied initiatives and programs are
still unclear. According to the US VISIT Chief Strategist, an
immigration and border management strategic plan was drafted in March
2005 that shows how US VISIT is aligned with DHS's organizational
mission and that defines an overall vision for immigration and border
management. According to this official, the vision provides for an
immigration and border management enterprise that unifies multiple
internal departmental and other external stakeholders with common
objectives, strategies, processes, and infrastructures. As of December
2005, however, we were told that this strategic plan has not been
approved.
In addition, since the plan was drafted, DHS has reported that
other relevant initiatives have been undertaken. For example:
--The DHS Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America is to,
among other things, establish a common approach to securing the
countries of North America--the United States, Canada, and
Mexico--by, for example, implementing a border facilitation
strategy to build capacity and improve the legitimate flow of
people and cargo at our shared borders.
--The DHS Secure Border Initiative is to implement a comprehensive
approach to securing our borders and combating illegal
immigration.
According to the Chief Strategist, portions of the strategic plan
are being incorporated into these initiatives, but these initiatives
and their relationships with US VISIT are still being defined.
Similarly, the mission and operational environment of US VISIT are
related to those of another major DHS program--the Automated Commercial
Environment (ACE), which is a new trade processing system that is
planned to support the movement of legitimate imports and exports and
to strengthen border security. In addition, both US VISIT and ACE could
potentially use common IT infrastructures and services. As we reported
in February 2005, the program office recognized these similarities, but
managing the relationship between the two programs had not been a
priority matter. Accordingly, we recommended that DHS give priority to
understanding the relationships and dependencies between the US VISIT
and ACE programs.
Since our recommendation, the US VISIT and ACE managers have formed
an integrated project team to, among other things, ensure that the two
programs are programmatically and technically aligned. Program
officials stated that the team has met three times since April 2005 and
plans to meet on a quarterly basis going forward. The team has
discussed potential areas of focus and agreed to three areas: RF
technology, program control, and data governance. However, it does not
have an approved charter, and it has not developed explicit plans or
milestone dates for identifying the dependencies and relationships
between the two programs.
It is important that DHS define the operational context for US
VISIT, as well as its relationships and dependencies with closely
allied initiatives and such programs as ACE. The more time it takes to
settle these issues, the more likely that extensive and expensive
rework will be needed at a later date.
RETURN ON INVESTMENT HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED
Prudent investment also requires that an agency have reasonable
assurance that a proposed program will produce mission value
commensurate with expected costs and risks. Thus far, DHS has yet to
develop an adequate basis for knowing that this is the case for its
early US VISIT increments. Without this knowledge, it cannot adequately
ensure that these increments are justified.
Assessments of costs and benefits are extremely important, because
the decision to invest in any capability should be based on reliable
analyses of return on investment. According to OMB guidance, individual
increments of major systems are to be individually supported by
analyses of benefits, cost, and risk.\14\ In addition, OMB guidance on
the analysis needed to justify investments states that such analysis
should meet certain criteria to be considered reasonable.\15\ These
criteria include, among other things, comparing alternatives on the
basis of net present value and conducting uncertainty analyses of costs
and benefits. (DHS has also issued guidance on such economic analyses,
which is consistent with that of OMB.\16\ Without reliable analyses, an
organization cannot be reasonably assured that a proposed investment is
a prudent and justified use of resources.
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\14\ OMB, Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition and Management of
Capital Assets, Circular A-11, Part 7 (Washington, DC: June 21, 2005).
\15\ OMB, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefits-Cost Analysis
of Federal Programs Circular A-94 (Washington, DC: Oct. 29, 1992).
\16\ Department of Homeland Security, Capital Planning and
Investment Control: Cost-Benefit Analysis Workbook (Washington, DC: May
2003).
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In September 2003, we reported that the program had not assessed
the costs and benefits of Increment 1. Accordingly, we recommended that
DHS perform such assessments for future increments.\17\ In February
2005, we reported that although the program office had developed a
cost-benefit analysis for Increment 2B (which provides the capability
for electronic collection of traveler information at land ports of
entry),\18\ it had again not justified the investment, because its
treatment of both benefits and costs was unclear and insufficient.\19\
Further, we reported that the cost estimates on which the cost-benefit
analysis was based were of questionable reliability, because effective
cost-estimating practices were not followed. Accordingly, we
recommended that DHS follow certain specified practices for estimating
the costs of future increments.\20\
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\17\ GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and
Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083
(Washington, DC: 1Sept. 19, 2003).
\18\ GAO, Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many
Challenges Remain on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology Program, GAO-05-202 (Washington, DC: Feb. 23, 2005).
\19\ For example, the cost-benefit analysis identified two
categories of quantifiable benefits, but gave no quantitative or
monetary estimates for those benefits. Instead, the analysis addressed
two categories of benefits said to be nonquantifiable (strategic
alignment benefits, such as the improvement of national security and
the promotion of legitimate trade and travel, and operational
performance benefits, such as improvement of traveler identification
and validation of traveler documentation), but it did not explain why
those benefits could not be quantified.
\20\ Such cost-estimating practices are provided in a checklist for
determining the reliability of cost estimates that was developed by
Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute: A Manager's
Checklist for Validating Software and Schedule Estimates, CMU/SEI-95-
SR-004 (January 1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since our February 2005 report, the program has developed a cost-
benefit analysis for Increment 1B (which is to provide exit
capabilities at air and sea ports of entry). The latest version of this
analysis, dated June 23, 2005, identifies potential costs and benefits
for three exit solutions at air and sea ports of entry and provides a
general rationale for the viability of the three alternatives
described.\21\ This latest analysis meets some but not all the OMB
criteria for economic analyses. For example, it explains why the
investment was needed, and it shows that at least two alternatives to
the status quo were considered. However, it does not include, for
example, a complete uncertainty analysis for the three exit
alternatives evaluated. That is, it does not include a sensitivity
analysis for the three alternatives, which is a major part of an
uncertainly analysis.\22\ (A sensitivity analysis is a quantitative
assessment of the effect that a change in a given assumption--such as
unit labor cost--will have on net present value.) A complete analysis
of uncertainty is important because it provides decision makers with a
perspective on the potential variability of the cost and benefit
estimates should the facts, circumstances, and assumptions change.
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\21\ As described in the background section, these alternatives are
a mobile device, a kiosk, and a validator.
\22\ The other major component of an uncertainty analysis is a
Monte Carlo simulation. A Monte Carlo simulation allows all a model's
parameters to vary simultaneously according to their associated
probability distribution. The result is a set of estimated
probabilities of achieving alternative outcomes (costs, benefits, and/
or net benefits), given the uncertainty in the underlying parameters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the quality of a cost-benefit analysis is dependent on
the quality of the cost assessments on which it is based. However, the
cost estimate associated with the June 2005 cost-benefit analysis for
the three exit solutions (Increment 1B) did not meet key criteria for
reliable cost estimating. For example, it did not include a detailed
work breakdown structure. A work breakdown structure serves to organize
and define the work to be performed, so that associated costs can be
identified and estimated. Thus, it provides a reliable basis for
ensuring that the estimates include all relevant costs.
Program officials stated that they recognize the importance of
developing reliable cost estimates and have initiated actions to more
reliably estimate the costs of future increments. For example, the
program has chartered a cost analysis process action team, which is to
develop, document, and implement a cost analysis policy, process, and
plan for the program. Program officials also stated that they have
hired additional contracting staff with cost-estimating experience.
Strengthening the program's cost-estimating capability is extremely
important. The absence of reliable cost estimates impedes, among other
things, both the development of reliable economic justification for
program decisions and the effective measurement of performance.
ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM IMPACTS AND OPTIONS IS BEING PERFORMED
Program decisions and planning depend on adequate analyses and
assessments of program impacts and options. The department has begun to
develop such analyses, but some of these, such as its analyses of the
operational impact of Increment 2B and of the options for its exit
capability, do not yet provide an adequate basis for investment and
deployment decisions.
We reported in May 2004 that the program had not assessed its
workforce and facility needs for Increment 2B (which provides the
capability for electronic collection of traveler information at land
ports of entry). Because of this, we questioned the validity of the
program's assumptions and plans concerning workforce and facilities,
since the program lacked a basis for determining whether its
assumptions were correct and thus whether its plans were adequate.
Accordingly, we recommended that DHS assess the full impact of
Increment 2B on workforce levels and facilities at land ports of entry,
including performing appropriate modeling exercises.
Seven months later, the program office evaluated Increment 2B
operational performance, with the stated purpose of determining the
effectiveness of Increment 2B performance at the 50 busiest land ports
of entry. For this evaluation, the program office established a
baseline for comparing the average times to issue and process entry/
exit forms at 3 of these 50 ports of entry. The program office then
conducted two evaluations of the processing times at the three ports,
first after Increment 2B was deployed as a pilot, and next 3 months
later, after it was deployed to all 50 ports of entry. The evaluation
results showed that the average processing times decreased for all
three sites. Program officials concluded that these results supported
their workforce and facilities planning assumptions that no additional
staff was required to support deployment of Increment 2B and that
minimal modifications were required at the facilities.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Specifically, they said minimal modifications to interior
workspace were required to accommodate biometric capture devices and
printers and to install electrical circuits. These officials stated
that modifications to existing officer training and interior space were
the only changes needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the scope of the evaluations is not sufficient to satisfy
the evaluations' stated purpose or our recommendation for assessing the
full impact of 2B. For example, the selection of the three sites,
according to program officials, was based on a number of factors,
including whether the sites already had sufficient staff to support the
pilot. Selecting sites based on this factor could affect the results,
and it presupposes that not all ports of entry have the staff needed to
support 2B. In addition, evaluation conditions were not always held
constant: specifically, fewer workstations were used to process
travelers in establishing the baseline processing times at two of the
ports of entry than were used during the pilot evaluations.
Moreover, CBP officials from a land port of entry that was not an
evaluation site (San Ysidro) told us that US VISIT deployment has not
reduced but actually lengthened processing times. (San Ysidro processes
the highest volume of travelers of all land ports of entry.) Although
these officials did not provide specific data to support their
statement, their perception nevertheless raises questions about the
potential impact of Increment 2B on the 47 sites that were not
evaluated.
Similarly, in February 2005, we reported that US VISIT had not
adequately planned for evaluating the alternatives for Increment 1B
(which provides exit capabilities at air and sea ports of entry)
because the scope and timeline of its exit pilot evaluation were
compressed. Accordingly, we recommended that DHS reassess plans for
deploying an exit capability to ensure that the scope of the exit pilot
provides for adequate evaluation of alternative solutions.
Over the last 11 months, the program office has taken actions to
expand the scope and time frames of the pilot. For example, it
increased the number of ports of entry in the pilot from 5 to 11, and
it also extended the time frame by about 7 months. Further, according
to program officials, they were able to achieve the target sample sizes
necessary to have a 95 percent confidence level in their results.
Nevertheless, questions remain about whether the exit alternatives
have been adequately evaluated to permit selection of the best exit
solution for national deployment. For example, one of the criteria
against which the alternatives were evaluated was the rate of traveler
compliance with US VISIT exit policies (that is, foreign travelers
providing information as they exit the United States).\24\ However,
across the three alternatives, the average compliance with these
policies was only 24 percent, which raises questions as to their
effectiveness.\25\ The evaluation report cites several reasons for the
low compliance rate, including that compliance during the pilot was
voluntary. The report further concludes that national deployment of the
exit solution will not meet the desired compliance rate unless the exit
process incorporates an enforcement mechanism, such as not allowing
persons to reenter the United States if they do not comply with the
exit process. Although an enforcement mechanism might indeed improve
compliance, program officials stated that no formal evaluation has been
conducted of enforcement mechanisms or their possible effect on
compliance. The program director agreed that additional evaluation is
needed to assess the impact of implementing potential enforcement
mechanisms and plans to do such evaluation.
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\24\ The other two evaluation criteria were cost and conduciveness
to travel.
\25\ Compliance rates were 23 percent for the kiosk, 36 percent for
the mobile device, and 26 percent for the validator.
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DHS IS STILL ESTABLISHING NEEDED PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES
Establishing effective program management capabilities is important
to ensure that an organization is going about delivering a program in
the right way. Accordingly, we have made recommendations to establish
specific people and process management capabilities. While DHS is
making progress in implementing many of our recommendations in this
area, this progress has often been slow.
One area in which DHS has made good progress is in implementing our
recommendations to establish the human capital capabilities necessary
to manage US VISIT. In September 2003, we reported that the US VISIT
program had not fully staffed or adequately funded its program office
or defined specific roles and responsibilities for program office
staff. Our prior experience with major acquisitions like US VISIT shows
that to be successful, they need, among other things, to have adequate
resources, and program staff need to understand what they are to do,
how they relate to each other, and how they fit in their organization.
In addition, prior research and evaluations of organizations show that
effective human capital management can help agencies establish and
maintain the workforce they need to accomplish their missions.
Accordingly, we recommended that DHS ensure that human capital and
financial resources are provided to establish a fully functional and
effective program office, and that the department define program office
positions, roles, and responsibilities. We also recommended that DHS
develop and implement a human capital strategy for the program office
that provides for staffing positions with individuals who have the
appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities.
DHS has implemented our recommendation that it define program
office positions, roles, and responsibilities, and it has partially
completed our two other people-related recommendations. It has filled
most of its planned government positions and is on the way to filling
the rest, and it has filled all of its planned contractor positions.
However, the program completed a workforce analysis in February 2005
and requested additional positions based on the results. Securing these
necessary resources will be a continuing challenge.
In addition, as we reported in February 2005, the program office,
working with the Office of Personnel Management, developed a draft
human capital plan that employed widely accepted human capital planning
tools and principles (for example, it included an action plan that
identified activities, their proposed completion dates, and the office
responsible for the action). In addition, the program office had
completed some of the activities in the plan. Since then, the program
office has finalized the human capital plan, completed more activities,
and formulated plans to complete others (for example, according to the
program office, it has completed an analysis of its workforce to
determine diversity trends, retirement and attrition rates, and
mission-critical and leadership competency gaps, and it has plans to
complete an analysis of workforce data to maintain strategic focus on
preserving the skills, knowledge, and leadership abilities required for
the US VISIT program's success).
Program officials also said that the reason they have not completed
several activities in the plan is that these activities are related to
the department's new human capital initiative, MAXHR.\26\ Because this
initiative is to include the development of departmentwide
competencies, program officials told us that it could potentially
affect ongoing program activities related to competencies. As a result,
these officials said that they are coordinating these activities
closely with the department as it develops and implements this new
initiative, which is currently being reviewed by the DHS Deputy
Secretary.
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\26\ This initiative is to provide greater flexibility and
accountability in the way employees are paid, developed, evaluated,
afforded due process, and represented by labor organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS's progress in implementing our human capital recommendations
should help ensure that it has sufficient staff with the right skills
and abilities to successfully execute the program. Having such staff
has been and will be particularly important in light of the program's
more limited progress to date in establishing program management
process capabilities. DHS's progress in establishing effective
processes governing how program managers and staff are to perform their
respective roles and responsibilities has generally been slow. In our
experience, weak process management controls typically result in
programs falling short of expectations. From September 2003, we have
made numerous recommendations aimed at enabling the program to
strengthen its process controls in such areas as acquisition
management, test management, risk management,\27\ configuration
management,\28\ capacity management,\29\ security, privacy, and
independent verification and validation (IV&V).\30\ DHS has not yet
completed the implementation of any of our recommendations in these
areas, with one exception. It has ensured that the program office's
IV&V contractor was independent of the products and processes that it
was verifying and validating, as we recommended. In July 2005, the
program office issued a new contract for IV&V services after following
steps to ensure the contractor's independence (for example, IV&V
contract bidders were to be independent of the development and
integration contractors and are prohibited from soliciting, proposing,
or being awarded work for the program other than IV&V services). If
effectively implemented, these steps should adequately ensure that
verification and validation activities are performed in an objective
manner, and thus should provide valuable assistance to program managers
and decision makers.
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\27\ Risk management is a process for identifying potential
problems before they occur so that they can be mitigated to minimize
any adverse impact.
\28\ Configuration management is a process for establishing and
maintaining the integrity of the products throughout their life cycle.
\29\ Capacity management is intended to ensure that systems are
properly designed and configured for efficient performance and have
sufficient processing and storage capacity for current, future, and
unpredictable workload requirements.
\30\ The purpose of IV&V is to provide management with objective
insight into the program's processes and associated work products. Its
use is a recognized best practice for large and complex system
development and acquisition projects like US VISIT.
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In the other management areas, DHS has partially completed or has
only begun to address our recommendations, and more remains to be done.
For example, DHS has not completed the development and implementation
of key acquisition controls. We reported in September 2003 \31\ that
the program office had not defined key acquisition management controls
to support the acquisition of US VISIT, increasing the risk that the
program would not satisfy system requirements or meet benefit
expectations on time and within budget. Accordingly, we recommended
that DHS develop and implement a plan for satisfying key acquisition
management controls in accordance with best practices.\32\
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\31\ GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and
Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083
(Washington, DC: Sept. 19, 2003).
\32\ Specifically, we recommended that DHS follow guidance from
Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute (SEI),
which has developed the Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model
(SA-CMM). This model explicitly defines process management controls
that are recognized hallmarks of successful organizations and that, if
implemented effectively, can greatly increase the chances of
successfully acquiring software-intensive systems. The SA-CMM uses
maturity levels to assess process maturity. See Carnegie Mellon
Software Engineering Institute, Software Acquisition Capability
Maturity Model, version 1.03 (March 2002). Since we made our
recommendation, however, SEI has begun transitioning to an integrated
model and for its improvement program, the program office is using this
integrated model: SEI, Capability Maturity Model Integrated, Systems
Engineering Integrated Product and Process Development, Continuous
Representation, version 1.1 (March 2002).
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The program office has recently taken steps to lay the foundation
for establishing key acquisition management controls. For example, it
has developed a process improvement plan to define and implement these
controls that includes a governance structure for overseeing
improvement activities. In addition, the program office has recently
completed a self-assessment of its acquisition process maturity, and it
plans to use the assessment results to establish a baseline of its
acquisition process maturity as a benchmark for improvement. According
to program officials, the assessment included key process areas that
are generally consistent with the process areas cited in our
recommendation. The program has ranked these process areas and plans to
focus on those with highest priority. (Some of these high-priority
process areas are also areas in which we have made recommendations,
such as configuration management and risk management.)
The improvement plan is currently being updated to reflect the
results of the baseline assessment and to include a work breakdown
structure, process prioritization, and resource estimates. According to
a program official, the goal is to conduct a formal appraisal to assess
the capability level of some or all of the high-priority process areas
by October 2006.
These recent steps provide a foundation for progress, but fully and
effectively implementing key acquisition management controls takes
considerable time, and DHS is still in the early stages of the process.
Therefore, it is important that these improvement efforts stay on
track. Until these controls are effectively implemented, US VISIT will
be at risk of not delivering promised capabilities on time and within
budget.
Another management area of high importance to a complex program
like US VISIT is test management. The purpose of system testing is to
identify and correct system defects before the system is deployed. To
be effective, testing activities should be planned and implemented in a
structured and disciplined fashion. Among other things, this includes
developing effective test plans to guide the testing activities and
ensuring that test plans are developed and approved before test
execution.
In this area also, DHS's progress responding to our recommendation
has been limited. We reported in May 2004, and again in February 2005,
that system testing was not based on well-defined test plans, and thus
the quality of testing being performed was at risk. Because DHS test
plans were not sufficiently well-defined to be effective, we
recommended that before testing begins, DHS develop and approve test
plans that meet the criteria that relevant systems development guidance
prescribes for effective test plans: namely, that they (1) specify the
test environment; (2) describe each test to be performed, including
test controls, inputs, and expected outputs; (3) define the test
procedures to be followed in conducting the tests; and (4) provide
traceability between the test cases and the requirements to be verified
by the testing.
About 20 months later, the quality of the system test plans, and
thus system testing, is still a challenge. To the program's credit, the
test plans for the Proof of Concept for Increment 2C, dated June 28,
2005 (which introduces RF technology to automatically record the entry
and exit of covered individuals), satisfied part of our recommendation.
Specifically, the test plan for this increment was approved on June 30,
2005, before testing began (according to program officials, it began on
July 5, 2005). Further, the test plan described, for example, the
scope, complexity, and completeness of the test environment; it
described the tests to be performed, including a high-level description
of controls, inputs, and outputs; and it identified the test procedures
to be performed.
However, the test plan did not adequately trace between test cases
and the requirements to be verified by testing. For example, about 70
percent of the requirements that we analyzed did not have specific
references to test cases. Further, we identified traceability
inconsistencies, such as one requirement that was mapped to over 50
test cases, even though none of the 50 cases referenced the
requirement.
Time and resource constraints were identified as the reasons that
test plans have not been complete. Specifically, program officials
stated that milestones do not permit existing testing/quality personnel
the time required to adequately review testing documents.\33\ According
to these officials, even when the start of testing activities is
delayed because, for example, requirements definition or product
development takes longer than anticipated, testing milestones are not
extended.
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\33\ The Systems Assurance Manager stated that she has only two
staff, including herself, for ensuring testing quality of the US VISIT
composite system.
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Without complete test plans, the program does not have adequate
assurance that the system is being fully tested, and thus unnecessarily
assumes the risk of system defects not being detected and addressed
before the system is deployed. This means that the system may not
perform as intended when deployed, and defects will not be addressed
until late in the systems development cycle, when they are more
difficult and time-consuming to fix. This has in fact happened already:
postdeployment system interface problems surfaced for Increment 1, and
manual work-arounds had to be implemented after the system was
deployed.
Until process management weaknesses such as these are addressed,
the program will continue to be overly dependent on the exceptional
performance of individuals to produce results. Such dependence
increases the risk of the US VISIT program falling short of
expectations.
DHS HAS YET TO FULLY ESTABLISH PROGRAM ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
To better ensure that US VISIT and DHS meet expectations, we made
recommendations related to measuring and disclosing progress against
program commitments. Thus far, such performance and accountability
mechanisms have yet to be fully established. Measurements of the
operational performance of the system are necessary to ensure that the
system adequately supports mission operations, and measurements of
program progress and outcomes are important for demonstrating that the
program is on track and is producing results. Without such
measurements, program performance and accountability can suffer.
As we reported in September 2003, the operational performance of
initial system increments was largely dependent on the performance of
existing systems that were to be interfaced to create these increments.
For example, we said that the performance of an increment would be
constrained by the availability and downtime of the existing systems,
some of which had known problems in these areas. Accordingly, we
recommended that DHS define performance standards for each increment
that are measurable and that reflect the limitations imposed by this
reliance on existing systems. In February 2005, we reported that
several technical performance standards for increments 1 and 2B had
been defined, but that it was not clear that these standards reflected
the limitations imposed by the reliance on existing systems. Since
then, the program office has defined certain other technical
performance standards for the next increment (Increment 2C, Phase 1),
including standards for availability. Consistent with what we reported,
the functional requirements document states that these performance
standards are largely dependent upon those of the current systems, and
for system availability, it sets an aggregated availability standard
for Increment 2C components. However, the document does not contain
sufficient information for a determination of whether these performance
standards actually reflect the limitations imposed by reliance on
existing systems. Unless the program defines performance standards that
do this, it will be unable to identify and effectively address
performance shortfalls.
Similarly, as we observed in June 2003, to permit meaningful
program oversight, it is important that expenditure plans describe how
well DHS is progressing against the commitments made in prior
expenditure plans. The expenditure plan for fiscal year 2005 (the
fourth US VISIT expenditure plan) does not describe progress against
commitments made in the previous plans. For example, according to the
fiscal year 2004 plan, US VISIT was to analyze, field test, and begin
deploying alternative approaches for capturing biometrics during the
exit process. However, according to the fiscal year 2005 plan, US VISIT
was to expand its exit pilot sites during the summer and fall of 2004,
and it would not deploy the exit solution until fiscal year 2005. The
plan does not explain the reason for this change from its previous
commitment nor its potential impact. Nor does it describe the status of
the exit pilot testing or deployment, such as whether the program has
met its target schedule or whether the schedule has slipped.
Additionally, the fiscal year 2004 plan stated that $45 million in
fiscal year 2004 was to be used for exit activities. However, in the
fiscal year 2005 plan, the figure for exit activities was $73 million
in fiscal year 2004 funds. The plan does not highlight this difference
or address the reason for the change in amounts. Also, although the
fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan includes benefits stated in the
fiscal year 2004 plan, it does not describe progress in addressing
those benefits, even though in the earlier plan, US VISIT stated that
it was developing metrics for measuring the projected benefits,
including baselines by which progress could be assessed. The fiscal
year 2005 plan again states that performance measures are under
development.
Figure 1 provides our analysis of the commitments made in the
fiscal year 2003 and 2004 plans, compared with progress reported and
planned in February 2005.
Figure 1. Time Line Comparing Commitments Made in the US VISIT Fiscal
Year 2003 and 2004 Plans with Commitments and Reported Progress in the
Fiscal Year 2005 Plan
The deployment of an exit capability, an important aspect of the
program that was to result from the exit pilots shown in the figure,
further illustrates missed commitments that need to be reflected in the
next expenditure plan. In the fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan, the
program committed to deploying an exit capability to air and sea ports
of entry by September 30, 2005. Although US VISIT has completed its
evaluation of exit solutions at 11 pilot sites (9 airports and 2
seaports), no decision has yet been made on when an exit capability
will be deployed. According to program officials, deployment to further
sites would take at least 6 months from the time of the decision. This
means that the program office will not meet its commitment.
Another accountability mechanism that we recommended in May 2004 is
for the program to develop a plan, including explicit tasks and
milestones, for implementing all our open recommendations, and report
on progress, including reasons for delays, both to department
leadership (the DHS Secretary and Under Secretary) in periodic reports
and to the Congress in all future expenditure plans. The department has
taken action to address this recommendation, but the initial report
does not disclose enough information for a complete assessment of
progress. The program office did assign responsibility to specific
individuals for preparing the implementation plan, and it developed a
report identifying the person responsible for each recommendation and
summarizing progress. This report was provided for the first time to
the DHS Deputy Secretary on October 3, 2005, and the program office
plans to forward subsequent reports every 6 months. However, some of
the report's progress descriptions are inconsistent with our
assessment. For example, the report states that the impact of Increment
2B on workforce levels and facilities at land ports of entry has been
fully assessed. However, as mentioned earlier, evaluation conditions
were not always held constant--that is, fewer workstations were used to
process travelers in establishing the baseline processing times at two
of the ports of entry than were used during the pilot evaluations.
In addition, the report does not specifically describe progress
against most of our recommendations. For example, we recommended that
the program reassess plans for deploying an exit capability to ensure
that the scope of the exit pilot provides for adequate evaluation of
alternative solutions. With regard to the exit evaluation, the report
states that the program office has completed exit testing and has
forwarded the exit evaluation report to the Deputy Secretary for a
decision. However, it does not state whether the program office had
expanded the scope or time frames of the pilot.
In closing, I would emphasize that the program has met many of the
demanding requirements in law for deployment of an entry-exit system,
owing, in large part, to the hard work and dedication of the program
office and its contractors, as well as the close oversight and
direction of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.
Nevertheless, core capabilities, such as exit, have yet to be
established and implemented, and fundamental questions about the
program's fit within the larger homeland security context and its
return on investment remain unanswered. Moreover, the program is
overdue in establishing the means to effectively manage the delivery of
future capabilities. The longer the program proceeds without these, the
greater the risk that the program will not meet its commitments.
Measuring and disclosing the extent to which these commitments are
being met are also essential to holding the department accountable, and
thus are an integral aspect of effective program management. Our
recommendations provide a comprehensive framework for addressing each
of these important areas and thus ensuring that the program as defined
is the right solution, that delivery of this solution is being managed
in the right way, and that accountability for both is in place. We look
forward to continuing to work constructively with the program to better
ensure the program's success.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions that you or members of the committee may have at
this time.
US VISIT STRATEGIC PLAN
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Hite. Let us pick up where
you have sort of laid some groundwork issues here. Mr.
Williams, why has the Department not accepted your strategic
plan at the Department level? Do you know or can you speak to
that?
Mr. Williams. We have had discussions with the Department
about this and we are still working with them to essentially
vet our plan. In the meantime, we have been using this plan,
our strategic vision for an immigration and border management
enterprise, to guide our increments, so we are using it today
and we believe as we have had discussions with departmental
officials that we are in concert with their overall vision.
Senator Gregg. Do you expect them as part of their border
security initiative which Secretary Chertoff talked about 2
weeks ago, where he was taking the lead clearly from this
committee--I am just saying that as an aside--do you expect
them to pick up your plan and integrate it into that?
Mr. Williams. Well, as the Department is trying to prepare
a comprehensive plan for the borders, including things like the
Secure Border Initiative and US VISIT, we hope that we become a
part of that finalized vision. But again, we are working with
them with it. But we are using it today because as we have had
discussions we believe we are on the right track.
Senator Gregg. Well, I think that is what Mr. Hite said. He
said you have got a good plan, but it has not been accepted yet
at the higher level, therefore it is subject to change. We went
through this with the FBI and I chaired the subcommittee which
had jurisdiction over the FBI when they tried to do Trilogy the
first time, the second time, the third time. Each time it did
not work because the leadership had not gotten the strategic
plan together, and so the thing kept changing all the time. I
am concerned about that happening here.
So I guess we will just have to ask Mr. Chertoff, Secretary
Chertoff, where we are going with that.
GOVERNMENT-WIDE INTEROPERABILITY
You mentioned, Mr. Williams, that there are a series of
agencies which you integrate with on the biometric side and on
the intelligence side, I presume. How many different agencies
are there independent of HSA?
Mr. Williams. Independent of DHS?
Senator Gregg. DHS.
Mr. Williams. Well, first I would like to say that within
DHS we integrate across many different components of DHS,
including Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and even
doing work with TSA and others.
Beyond that, we work very closely with Department of State
and in our very first increment we integrated with Department
of State's CCD, or Consular Consolidated Database, and the
result of that meant that for the first time when the officers
actually scanned a passport or visa, say at Dulles Airport,
what popped up on their screen was the photo that the State
Department took when that person applied for a visa. We
continue to work on integration with the State Department.
With the FBI, we have an executive committee that myself,
Tom Bush of the FBI, and Tony Edson, State chair, where we are
working together on interoperability between IAFIS and IDENT,
and we are very proud of the collegial relationship and what we
have accomplished so far and we are developing plans for full
operational capability and flow interoperability of IAFIS and
IDENT. We also recently have had many discussions also with the
Department of Defense about what they are doing in the area of
biometrics, and those discussions actually took place, I
believe it was, last week, we went out to Clarksburg, West
Virginia, had a session hosted by the FBI, and had a great
discussion between the FBI, DOD, and US VISIT.
Senator Gregg. How about the new intelligence director?
Mr. Williams. Actually, we work very closely with Charlie
Allen, our Chief Intelligence Officer. In fact, I met with him
yesterday morning to brief him on what we are doing and how we
can make sure that as we receive information from other
agencies, biometric information, we can work together with his
intelligence analysts and make sure that he gets the
information he needs to do his job; because we are both
somebody who provides, and information that is provided to us,
we can run that information against our enrolled database.
Just to give you an example of how this can work, we had a
person last year who was an Iraqi capture who then escaped, but
DOD had taken his fingerprints. That person then went and left
Iraq after he escaped. Those prints came from DOD to the FBI to
us. That person applied for a visa at the State Department,
where it hit. So we are working across the immigration border
management spectrum with the intelligence, with the law
enforcement and the immigration border management agencies.
BIOMETRIC WATCHLIST
Senator Gregg. Does the information that they develop at
the Counterterrorism Center that's been set up--it used to be
called NCTC; I can never remember what the new name is--is that
information integrated, too?
Mr. Williams. Yes. As a person, or a biographic, or
biometric information is promoted to the National
Counterterrorism Center to become a known or suspected
terrorist, a KST, that biometric then is labeled as such by the
FBI and they provide us daily updates on those KSTs, that we
then load into our Lookout system.
Senator Gregg. So if you are a CBP officer or a border
person at a port of entry, air entry--I understand land is
still coming up--walk us through what happens?
Mr. Williams. Sure. When that plane leaves, that
information--name, date of birth, other information--is sent
electronically and that is checked against a biometric watch
list while that person is on the plane. So when that person
arrives at Dulles Airport and that passport or visa is first
swiped, if that biographic has been a hit against a terrorism
watch list, then biographically it would be a red flag as soon
as it pops up on the screen.
A person subject to US VISIT would be asked to put down
their digital finger scans, left, right index finger first--
later on, it will be ten prints--take a digital photo. After
the officer presses ``Send'' while they are still interviewing
the person, within about 6 to 10 seconds there is a response
back--is that a biometric hit against our watch list? In our
watch list we have--again, this is updated daily. We get known
or suspected terrorists, we get the FBI's wants and warrants of
foreign-born, unknown country of origin, child predators
foreign-born, and unknown country of origin. We also add in
fingerprints from DHS, deported felons, and recidivists, people
who keep trying to come across the border.
That makes up our biometric watch list. When that 6 to 10
seconds happens, that watch list is checked and the screen in
front of the officer is either blinking green, meaning it is
not a hit, or it is blinking red, it is a hit.
Senator Gregg. Now, if the person were to fly in to
Vancouver and get in a car and drive in to Spokane or
someplace--what is the crossing point?
Senator Murray. Blaine.
Senator Gregg. Blaine. I would love to visit it. I am sure
it is beautiful.
What is the status? You do not have the preliminary
information coming out of Vancouver on the flight when they
come into Vancouver, right?
Mr. Williams. No. But if the person is driving across the
land border coming into the United States at Blaine, if that
person is subject to US VISIT, which means they have a visa--
there are some restrictions, but generally--if they are coming
from anywhere in the world with a non-immigrant visa or they
are under the visa waiver program, they go into secondary
processing. They are not processed at primary.
At secondary processing they would be subject to the US
VISIT program. Now, the majority of people at land borders are
processed through primary and that includes U.S. citizens,
permanent residents, Canadian citizens, and Mexicans with
border crossing cards. Those people today are not included
under US VISIT.
EXIT CAPABILITY AT LAND PORTS OF ENTRY
Senator Gregg. There are a bunch of other questions I have.
I especially want to get into this exit issue because I do not
think there is much point in having this program unless we know
who is leaving as well as who is coming in. But I do want to
give my colleagues the opportunity to go.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Williams, in response to a question for
the record from a March 30, 2004, hearing, I asked ``What would
be the physical impact of the exit capability at our land
border ports of entry? Would there be a need for new
construction, procurement of land, building of additional
roads, and so forth?''
The response I was provided was that it depends on the
solution that was ultimately deployed. I was also told that
that decision would not be made until after the prime
integrator contract was awarded in mid-fiscal year 2004 and the
integrator offers a more comprehensive solution.
Well, now we are in the second quarter of fiscal year 2006.
Are we any closer to knowing what the need will be for
additional facilities construction, outbound lanes or staffing?
Mr. Williams. First of all, ranking member Byrd, I would
like to say that your message on interoperability between the
databases is message received. We are working very hard on
that. I will say that you have outlined some of our toughest
challenges today, such as going forward integration, further
integration of databases, but exit, in particular at land
borders, is probably one of our toughest challenges in terms of
coverage.
We looked at this several years ago in terms of if we
wanted to take all of the 700-plus lanes coming into the
country and mirror image replace those with the same
infrastructure, land acquisition, it would probably be over $3
billion. But more so than that, you have given us a mandate to
implement a biometric entry-exit system, but also do it in a
way that does not adversely impact legitimate trade and travel.
We have people leaving the United States today in cars,
buses, bicycles, and on foot, and generally they are people who
just drive out of the country, drive at say 40, and 50 miles an
hour in some places. What we are trying to do is look at,
instead of building a solution that says we mirror image entry,
where we stop everybody at a facility, an infrastructure,
before leaving, trying to look at a way to collect that
information about people leaving. We are only testing the
technology today.
One of the things we are testing at Blaine is could we use
RFID, toll booth-like technology, that would then collect the
information that the person left the country, without adversely
impacting legitimate travel and trade. So we are trying to deal
or come up with a solution that works within the constraints
that have been handed us. Exit is difficult both at land and
air and sea because we are different from other countries; we
have not built the infrastructure and put in place at either
airports, seaports, or at our land border, crossings that would
stop people and make them go through a passport control type
system like they do in many other countries. So we are trying
to deal with the constraint of trying to make sure we preserve
our economic prosperity, but at the same time meet the mandate
that you have given us to have an exit system.
2006 FUNDING LEVEL
Senator Byrd. Does the President's budget really meet the
needs?
Mr. Williams. The President's--does it meet the needs? The
President's budget for fiscal year 2006, he requested $390
million for our program. We wish we had received that. That is
what we thought we needed.
Senator Byrd. Would you say that again?
Mr. Williams. The President requested for US VISIT for
fiscal year 2006 $390 million and that is what we said we
needed and we wish we had received that amount. We received
less.
Senator Byrd. How much less?
Mr. Williams. I believe we are about $340 million right
now.
Let me tell you my concern there. Congress in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, following up
on the 9/11 Commission, gave us a mandate to accelerate the
biometric entry-exit system and I think we have made great
progress in meeting our commitments to Congress and we want to
continue to do so. As we deploy capabilities, we have to pay
for the operations and maintenance of that, and those
operations and maintenance as we deploy more capabilities
become a larger part of our annual budget, which then leaves
less money for new investments in additional capabilities or in
fact to accelerate the program.
Senator Byrd. Well, does the budget request reflect the
needs?
Mr. Williams. Yes, sir. The budget request for $390
million, we provided a justification for how we would spend
that money and what investments, what benefits, would come from
that.
Senator Byrd. So the President's budget request accurately
reflects your needs?
Mr. Williams. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. There is nothing in the 2006 request for the
exit capability.
Mr. Williams. We actually had in the 2006--in the 2005
request we had the additional money that we were going to use
to further deploy exit at air and seaports. For exit at land we
did have money in the 2006 request to continue the testing of
the RFID technology, a solution we think is promising for exit
at land borders.
2007 FUNDING LEVEL
Senator Byrd. What about the 2007 budget? Will it reflect
the needs? There is nothing in your 2006 request for the exit
capability. Are we clear on what the 2007 budget will provide?
Mr. Williams. Well, we have not submitted the--we have not
submitted the fiscal year 2007 budget. We are currently working
that with DHS.
Senator Byrd. So what do you think here? What can we do to
help here?
Mr. Williams. Well, I think it would help to have us be
given the money the President requested. Certainly we know you
want to continue to provide support to us in terms of the
money, the resources, and the direction that you have provided
that helps us get the job done. Your support is invaluable to
getting momentum across the Federal agencies to get this job
done. While we have great partnerships right now with many
agencies, it always helps to know that this is important to you
all, important in terms of giving us the support and the
resources we need to get the job done.
Senator Byrd. Well, you have appealed for us to meet the
President's request. Did he meet your request?
Mr. Williams. The President's budget reflected what we
thought we needed for fiscal year 2006.
Senator Byrd. Fully?
Mr. Williams. Well, we are trying to undertake this program
understanding it is a matter of national urgency----
Senator Byrd. The answer is no?
Mr. Williams. We are trying to take a measured approach to
do this. Giving us all the money at one time does not mean that
we can do all of this quickly. We have to be able to do this,
as Mr. Hite said, in a way that makes sure we can manage it
well. This is millions of dollars of taxpayers' money. We want
to make sure that we manage it well and deliver our commitments
that we have made to you. And too much money simply is money
that we would just sit there with it, because we want to make
sure that we get this right.
Senator Byrd. You did not answer my question. I have heard
that business about too much money so many times from this
administration. When I have sought to increase the amounts of
money, I get the ``too much money, we have too much money, we
have enough money already to do this and to do that and to do
this and to do that.''
EXIT CAPABILITY AT AIR AND SEAPORTS OF ENTRY
Well, let me ask you, Mr. Hite. In your testimony you noted
that the fiscal year 2005 US VISIT spend plan, which the
Congress approved almost a year ago, committed to deploying an
exit capability to air and seaports of entry by September 30,
2005. Yet your testimony further states: ``No decision has been
made about when an exit capability will be deployed. According
to program officials, deployment to further sites would take at
least 6 months from the time of the decision.''
In your evaluation of the airport and seaport environment,
is it better to deploy a limited, if not final, exit capability
or is it wiser to wait for what the US VISIT program office
determines is the ultimate solution? What is your answer?
Mr. Hite. It would be my position that they should wait to
have the credible analysis to make an informed decision about
what solution is going to best accomplish the end goal. What
they have pilot tested thus far at the land borders and at the
air and sea borders has demonstrated that those solutions are
not viable options. The air and sea, for example, there was a
very low compliance rate on the part of those exiting the
country, and certainly there is a tremendous amount of issues
with the land borders surrounding the use of RFID and what that
will actually tell you because it does not track an individual,
it tracks a document, and even then it does not necessarily--
depending on the number of documents, depending on the
placement of those documents in a vehicle or on an individual,
it does not necessarily read them all.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Byrd. Thank you.
Senator Gregg. We go back and forth here. Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. No.
Senator Gregg. Senator Murray.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY
Senator Murray. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and to you,
Senator Byrd, for holding this very important hearing today.
As Mr. Williams knows very well, my State poses some very
significant challenges for those of us who want to make sure
that we ensure security but do not impede the flow of
legitimate travel and commerce across our border, which is very
important in my State. We have one of the busiest border
stations in the entire country along our northern border. We
have an airport that serves as a gateway to Asia. We have
cruise terminals that served nearly a million passengers and we
have three international ferry terminals.
We also have the distinction, of course, of apprehending
Ahmad Rassam back in 1999, the first suspected al-Qaeda
terrorist. We were lucky at that time that an alert Border
Patrol agent noticed Rassam when he visited and arrived by
ferry from Canada.
So today US VISIT is making it easier for us to catch these
people who are attempting to enter our country. I know and my
citizens know that this is a very important program, it is
important to our safety, and our security, and our community.
So you should be very proud of your accomplishments so far.
That being said, I want to echo some of the comments that
have been made. We have to ensure that the biometric screening
is interoperable with the FBI as soon as possible, and you
addressed that. We all know that in order to have a fully
functioning system the exit portion of this program has to be
implemented as well. So I share those concerns.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE
Mr. Williams, while you are here I did want to ask you
about another issue that is of great concern to me and that is
the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, and specifically the
passport requirement for travel between the United States and
Canada. We are all aware Secretaries Chertoff and Rice
announced their intention to establish this new PASS card last
week to be used at land border crossings in lieu of the
passport, but that announcement really did not serve to answer
a lot of the looming questions and we have frankly been getting
a lot more since that announcement.
I know, Mr. Williams, this is not your program to
implement, but you are part of the interdepartmental working
group that is tasked with the implementation of that, and you
need to know that this is a major concern of my border
communities and it is really a growing concern within the
tourism and business communities on both sides of our border.
This program has the potential to severely impact communities
along the northern border by impeding legitimate cross-border
commerce and travel between the United States and Canada, which
is precisely what you have worked so hard to avoid with the US
VISIT.
There is already evidence that the passport requirement is
impacting our cross-border tourism simply because the rules and
implementation dates haven't been clear to our average
citizens. I think you know that our State has a very robust
tourism industry that has historically depended on fluid cross-
border travel. I would just like to take this opportunity to
encourage you as a member of that interdepartmental working
group to work closer with our local communities so we can
address their concerns. I would even suggest perhaps
establishing an official advisory group made up of some of our
elected, business and community leaders from that area.
I would really ask that you ensure that the Department
consider the adverse economic impact of new passport
regulations and allow adequate time for travelers to be
notified and require the additional documentation if that is
what is determined. And I would ask that you would consider
delaying the air and sea travel deadline and applying a uniform
date for implementing the new documentation requirements for
all travel, land, air, and sea, and would really appreciate
your attention to this because, as you can imagine, this is a
very, very concerning issue to a lot of our business leaders in
the State of Washington.
We all want the security. You have done a good job with US
VISIT. We want to make sure we do not do something that does
not increase security, but instead really harms our economy and
the tourism industry and the business industries that will be
impacted by that.
LAND BORDER CROSSING INITIATIVES
Mr. Williams. If you would like, I would be glad to comment
on some of the work we are doing there, trying to bring
together the requirements in law of the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative; as well as the Security and Prosperity
Partnership that was signed by President Bush, President Fox,
and then Prime Minister Martin last March; as well as the Rice-
Chertoff joint vision, looking at the challenges of the land
border.
One of the things, Senator, that I think would be helpful
is to stop what seems to be negative effects already when the
requirement is not until, for the land borders, until January
1, 2008. There are some misperceptions that a passport is
required now; and what ought to be clear is for the land
borders, it is January 1, 2008, and that the law says a
passport or other accepted travel document.
What Secretaries Rice and Chertoff announced is a PASS
card, People Access Security Service, a card that could be used
in lieu of a passport, especially for those frequent land
border crossers. What we are trying to do is, being very
sensitive to the economic impacts and we know that between
United States and Canada about $1.4 billion a day crosses that
border, is how do we enhance security and at the same time
facilitate legitimate travel and trade? If we can put a low-
cost wallet-size PASS card in the hands of those frequent
crossers, that then uses 21st century technology, that would
allow that information to be read ahead of time, put that
information on the screen, we can accomplish three objectives
that we do not do today at the land border.
Number one, we would get advance information about that
person, that would allow for a better security decision and
hopefully a faster processing.
Number two, we could actually record their entry, which we
don't do today for many people. We do not know, for example,
with a border crossing card--all those people are inspected and
their biometrics are taken at issuance, but generally when they
come into the country there is not a record today that they
entered. We know that often good people who enter, become bad
people. So we want to be able to preposition the information on
the officer's screen, have advance information, number one.
Number two, we want to record their entry.
Number three, what we are looking for in the future is
could we take that advance information and within a few seconds
check it against a watch list, so we give greater confidence to
the officer who has to interview that person or inspect that
person to say: All right, I already know who this person is, I
know they are not on a watch list. That should speed up the
processing of good people. It is just good risk management.
That is what we are trying to put in place, is a low-cost,
secure, 21st century card that would meet both the security and
economic needs of your community.
LAND BORDER CROSSING REQUIREMENTS
Senator Murray. Well, I appreciate that, but there are
different dates. Ferries, for example, is implemented 2007,
land 2008. So people in my State already assume that you have
to have a passport and they are saying, never mind, I am not
going, I do not have one; now, do I need that one or do I need
this PASS card, and do I have to buy that? The confusion alone.
So I would really encourage you to sit down with business
leaders there, who are feeling a tremendous impact from all of
the different dates, different cards, different ideas that have
come out.
Mr. Williams. We do believe that one of the keys to our
success where we are implementing change for human beings is
communication. We know you can never communicate enough, but we
try to do extensive outreach, particularly in your community,
where we are doing testing right now. But I think we need the
support of everybody, the Congress, the administration, even
the media, to correctly communicate what it is that the
requirements are--they are not until January 1, 2008--and what
we are trying to do.
Senator Murray. For the ferries it is 2007, and a lot of
the people, cross-border travel, go by ferry.
Mr. Williams. And they believe today that they have to have
a passport, and that is not the requirement today. So again, we
need to communicate what is the requirement. We had a lot of
these misperceptions about US VISIT before we started, people
saying we were going to shut down the borders, shut down the
economy. In fact, what we are trying to do is build out a 21st
century immigration and border management system that meets our
needs.
I look at some of your crossings and, frankly, when I look
at them I look at them as economic chokepoints, when you see
cars and trucks waiting to come to the United States to do
business, you see family. We want those people to come and we
ought to be able to use better technology and better business
processes to enhance our security and our economic prosperity.
LAND BORDER CROSSING CHALLENGES
Senator Murray. Well, are you concerned that adding
millions of daily passport checks is going to slow down
legitimate travel?
Mr. Williams. As I said, one of our mandates is to do no
harm, to not adversely impact the economy. That is why we test,
test, test to make sure we get it right. That is a concern
always to us, that we do not want to add even seconds to
people's time, because for many of our very busy land border
crossings we know through queuing theory that if you add a few
seconds to each person you are going to add hours to that last
person in line and then discourage them from coming.
Senator Murray. Mr. Chairman, in my State we have kids who
live in Point Roberts who have to travel into Canada every day
to come back down into school to go to school in Washington
State. If they get backed up in a long line, that is a huge
impact. Plus, we have thousands of trucks that travel across
our border with goods.
It is a real challenge in our State. But let me just go
back and make one really important point. Ferries is 2007, land
is 2008. So there is a legitimate business concern by our
ferries, many of them private businesses, that people will not
use ferries and we are going to jam up the lines even more on
the land crossings because of that. One date for everybody
would really make a huge difference and I would encourage you
to consider that.
Mr. Williams. I will take that message back, Senator.
Senator Murray. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gregg. Thank you.
Senator Stevens said he has something.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, I just want to join the
Senator from Washington, because we are already getting
complaints about the requirement for passports. I believe it is
coming from Canada now, anticipating what you might do. I
remember when we were a territory we had to have a birth
certificate to get back into the United States. We weren't
considered to be--although we were citizens, we weren't
considered to be acceptable to come through immigration without
birth certificates or a passport from Alaska.
We finally worked that out, and now we find that there is
just total uncertainty as to what is required. A student will
fly outside to--we call it outside; down to the south 48--to go
to school and drive back and find out they do not have the
documents to allow them, as they stand in line or their car has
been in line for an hour or two, they do not have the documents
to get through the border, on both sides, both the United
States and Canada.
COMMON SET OF REQUIRED BORDER CROSSING DOCUMENTATION
So I want to join the Senator from Washington to say I
think you have got to work it out with Canada. The same
documents ought to be acceptable on both sides of the border to
permanent residents. It is one thing for tourists who are
traveling from throughout the world that they should have a
passport to come in our country. That is acceptable. But those
of us who fly back and forth or drive back and forth, fly one
way and drive the other way, it is getting to be very
confusing.
I have had emergency calls: How do I get a passport
overnight? If we are going to have to have a requirement for
passports for land travel, the passport office is going to be
overwhelmed by Alaskans and people from the Northwest States
that travel back and forth to our State, as well as travel to
Canada as the Senator from Washington says. We have people in
our State also that have to go through Canada to get home and
Canadians that have to come through our country to get home. We
have cross-border situations the same as you do in terms of
Washington and the northern States.
But I urge you to get some common approach with Canada so
that documents acceptable on one side are going to be
acceptable on the other. It does seem to me that this
difference between the time frame of putting into effect of
land transportation has one requirement, but meanwhile there is
another requirement for air transportation and water
transportation--particularly the cruise ships. Our own ferries,
we have ferries, they stop in Canada, but they go on down to
Seattle, and they do that every day, and people are being
caught unawares that if they have gotten off in Canada they
have to have some different type of documentation when they
come into Seattle.
It is not right. I think special attention ought to be paid
to the people who live on the northern tier because it is
really going to cause a lot of problems this summer, I think,
from what we are hearing. I do not know about Washington, but I
am sure they must be flooded with the same requests for just
overnight help to get passports. It is not possible, as you
know, and that delays a lot of people. After they have made
plans for months, they suddenly find out there is one thing
they did not know and that was they had to have a passport
either coming or going through Canada.
So I think whatever you can do to help us eliminate this
anxiety right now over being treated differently--deep down
inside--people don't like me to say it too often, but we are
citizens of the United States that live in Alaska. But we have
special treatment now for Alaskans. We have different
requirements as we come back into the south 48 than you would
have otherwise if you went into Canada from Washington and came
back into Washington. I don't think that's fair.
So I hope that you can find some way to stabilize this and
get an international agreement on travel through Canada to
Alaska.
Mr. Williams. Well, again, Senator, the requirement is a
requirement in law that says passport or other accepted travel
document. As part of the Security and Prosperity Partnership,
we are working very closely with Canada. We have established a
working group. I have a counterpart with the Canada Border
Services Agency, Mr. Alons Alacaire, who we meet with
frequently, and in fact we have Canadian officials right now,
starting yesterday, today and tomorrow, that are meeting in
Crystal City on this particular topic.
So we are working closely with Canada, and our goal is just
as you stated. We want to be able to harmonize the technology
and the business processes so that if you have this card that
would facilitate your entry into the United States, you could
use that same card going back into Canada, so you could cross
from Blaine over to Canada and back and forth, whether United
States or Canadian citizen.
HARMONIZED SECURE BORDER DOCUMENTATION--PASS CARD
If we could harmonize on the same type of technology and
business processes, we can make it easier for those people who
want to cross. But again, the requirement is not for the land
borders that you must have a passport today. The requirement in
law in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
says for the land borders it is January 1, 2008, and it says an
other accepted travel document is acceptable. That is what
Secretary Rice and Secretary Chertoff announced, is this PASS
card we will be working on, to work with Department of State to
produce a low-cost, secure card that would make crossing the
border more secure and facilitate it, and then work with Canada
and Mexico to make sure that we can make something that works
across North America in a harmonized fashion.
IMPACT OF BORDER CROSSING SECURITY ON ALASKANS
Senator Stevens. Well, that is all right and good, but our
State is one-fifth the size of the United States. You do not
have an office in Alaska. And you say acceptable travel
documents. What is wrong with a birth certificate? It used to
be acceptable, but it is not acceptable now. So we are going to
have to find some way to get people from Holikachuk or Shizref
or Nome down to somewhere in Seattle to get a certificate, get
a card to enable them to travel down there.
I think you are not waking up to what it is that I am
telling you. The circumstances in rural Alaska are much
different from anywhere else. They cannot get those cards.
Mr. Williams. Well, again, we will work with the State
Department to make sure they can get the cards.
Talking about a birth certificate, what we are trying to do
is make this whole supply chain of identification documents
more secure. A customs and border protection officer would have
to be familiar with as many as 8,000 different birth
certificates and we are not sure that that is the right answer
for the future. We think we can produce a secure document that
would again facilitate their entry, and we would be glad to
local officials in your district, sir--in your State.
Senator Stevens. I hope you will and I hope you speak to
our governor and the state legislature, because they are very
much disturbed over what is happening. If you go from Hawaii to
the West Coast you do not have to go through a foreign country.
If you go from Alaska by land to the south 48, you have to
drive through Canada. If you go through on a ferry, you have to
go through Canada.
I do not think it is fair to say we would not have an
office in our State. But what is more, why can you not set it
up so you get it by mail and somehow or other not have to make
a personal appearance to get these cards?
Mr. Williams. The State Department, we are working closely
with them on how do we get these cards into the hands of people
who need them. They are considering all options and we are
discussing that with them, and we will certainly consider that.
Senator Stevens. Well, as a grandfather of three hockey
puck grandchildren, they fly down to the south 48 and they fly
back. Sometimes they drive back. Those people, they don't plan
in advance to get that card. Somehow or other, you've got to
find some way to recognize the problems so Alaskans can travel.
Mr. Williams. We also know that we have to look at what
Secretary Chertoff mentioned as the possibility of a one-day
pass to make it easier for people who are the person, just as
you said, who might fly down for one day, even on a whim. How
do we help that person, meet our needs and meet their needs?
They want to be able to go down on a flight like that, but we
also want to make sure we meet the requirements of the law that
they have something that provides for the security, because
every time we do not do something to provide for the security,
as we know, people who want to do us harm study our
vulnerabilities. We want to make sure we meet the economic
needs of our country to make sure people can travel with a one-
day thought, but also make sure we provide adequate security.
That is the mission that you have given us, is to accomplish
both of those.
So we are looking at not only a PASS card, but other things
that we would have to take care of the various populations and
how they travel.
Senator Stevens. Well, why do you not arrange for the
travel people to be able to issue temporary cards or something
like that, or your exit station as you drive? There is only one
road out of Alaska and that is the highway. Why could they not
issue some sort of a return pass so they can get back through,
not only from the south 48 driving through Canada to come back
into Alaska? This idea of having to go and get a special card
for those people, you are basically talking about the rest of
Americans. They do not even think about this the way we have
to. I think you have some up in New England have similar
problem.
Senator Gregg. We view Maine as a foreign country. Trying
to come through New Hampshire when they are getting to
Massachusetts, we basically require them to stop at our liquor
stores and buy liquor before they can get into Massachusetts.
Senator Stevens. Well, I am belaboring it, but we have a
tough problem and I think you should find some way to deal with
it by getting the people, our travelers, an ordinary contact,
the airlines or the ferry system or the exit station on the
Alaska Highway. Somehow or other, people ought to be able to
satisfy the requirements to get into the contiguous 48 States
and get back home without having to find some complicated
process of coming to their Senator to get a passport overnight.
Mr. Williams. We agree and we are considering those ideas
right now. We understand the need.
Senator Gregg. I think it is a valid point.
Senator Murray. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add to the
Senator from Alaska. As you can see, this is causing a
tremendous amount of concern out there. It is not just
something we can decide from here in Washington, DC. I would
really advise you to get an advisory committee made up from
business and elected leaders in both my State and Alaska, so
you can understand the real impacts.
This is a huge concern. I would just remind all of us that
the Vancouver Olympics are coming up very quickly and that is
why our businesses are so concerned. This kind of confusion
could really have an impact on those visiting.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gregg. I think the Senators have made an excellent
point, especially as it relates to the Alaskan situation.
SOUTHERN BORDER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
I am wondering, on the southern border they have a pass, a
border crossing card. Is my understanding correct that CBP has
decided not to integrate that into the database, that basically
that card does not get----
Mr. Williams. The border crossing card which is used by
Mexican citizens, it is issued--when people apply at Department
of State, it is issued to the 6.8 million Mexican citizens, who
use it about 100 million times a year. When that card is
issued, their biometrics are taken and checked against our
databases. When that person then comes in, there actually is a
machine-readable zone on that card, which is swiped most of
time at pedestrian.
At vehicle lanes, it is just not practical to take all of
the people's cards out of a car and say, let us pull them out
and use that card.
Senator Gregg. Yes, that is my point. That is not
integrated into US VISIT, is it?
Mr. Williams. Well, actually the biometrics that were taken
at the time of issuance are.
Senator Gregg. But if they do not use the card, so----
Mr. Williams. But if a person comes in, a border crossing
card person, and they are on foot coming in as a pedestrian, we
can check their biometrics today. If they are in a vehicle,
though, it is more problematic.
Senator Gregg. So that basically there has been a decision
made that the overwhelming number of people coming across those
borders you cannot really--even though you have got the cards
issued, the cards are not being used to track people who are
coming into the country if they are coming by car?
Mr. Williams. We do not generally record their entry today.
What we are hoping is as we look at this RFID technology, as
many of these border crossing cards were issued 10 years ago
are coming up for expiration, we are working with the State
Department to try and harmonize all of these cards around
technology and business processes, meaning if you could put
that RFID technology as part of the border crossing card then
at least when that car that maybe has four or five Mexican
citizens coming in under the limits of the border crossing card
program, we would be able to know who is coming in and record
their entry, which we do not do today.
BORDER SECURITY COMPARISON--WASHINGTON STATE VS. MEXICO
Senator Gregg. Well, I guess my point is Washington is
having a problem because we are going to require Canadians
coming in to have a card or a passport, and yet we have got a
card on the southern border and we are not using it and we are
allowing a lot of people to come across the border who are not
being----
Mr. Williams. Well, people are inspected when they present
their border crossing card.
Senator Gregg. It is done arbitrarily. I mean, they pick
out a car, they say, this car.
Mr. Williams. This [indicating] is the card. They come in
and the picture is looked at on the card and compared to the
picture of the person in front of them. They might also swipe
it and----
Senator Gregg. But not if they are in a car.
Mr. Williams. Not if they are in a car, generally no. We
would shut down the economies if we stopped everybody in a car
and said, we have got to check every one of these cards in
terms of swiping them and reading them.
Senator Gregg. That is exactly the concern they are having
in Washington State.
Mr. Williams. Yes. But again, if we can take these cards
when they are being reissued and incorporate technology in so
that when that person is coming, like when you approach a toll
booth, that you can read that information and then put it on
the screen, that allows you then to know who the person is by
putting the picture and the information on the screen and be
able to quickly take a look at the person.
But it also allows us to record their entry, which we are
not doing today. They are inspected, but there is no recording
of their entry.
Senator Gregg. Well, I understand that. But just, I guess
it is hard to conceive of how you would do this without
actually stopping the car. Let us use E-ZPass as an example. If
you are using some sort of E-ZPass system, you are assuming
that the person who put that E-ZPass in their window is the
same person who is on--who is getting it cleared. I mean, there
is no reason that person would not be different.
Mr. Williams. Well, even in our trusted traveler program on
the southern border with Mexico, the SENTRI program is like E-
ZPass. Those people, every one of them is stopped. There is
still a visual inspection of the person coming in.
HARMONIZATION OF PROPRIETARY DATABASE SYSTEMS
Senator Gregg. Well, it sounds like a technological
challenge. Which gets me to a more technical issue which I am
interested in, which I think has been raised by GAO, which is
the proprietary nature of these different systems is broken
out--different Departments have different proprietary systems.
How are you managing that? Both GAO and the OIG report had
serious concerns.
Mr. Williams. Well, again, I think we have achieved a lot
according to the Congressional mandates. Our first mandate of
Congress in the Data Management Improvement Act was to
integrate databases, which we did January 5, 2004. We know we
have a lot more work to do. What we want to be able to do is
what you have told us to do, is essentially to have real-time
information available to people, decision makers, across the
immigration border management spectrum, whether you are a State
Department visa-issuing officer, a CIS adjudication officer, an
ICE agent, a CBP officer. All of those people could encounter
the same people, and they need to know what happened in all
those previous encounters.
We do not do all of the kind of real-time access to
information that we need today. For example, if somebody is
turned away at a port of entry and then turns around and
applies to State for a new visa, State does not always know the
action that was taken at a port of entry. What we want to be
able to do is build a person-centric view of that person that
takes the information from all of these databases, that can
then aggregate the information and present it back to the
decision maker in real time.
Senator Gregg. Well, how far are you from doing that?
Mr. Williams. Well, I think we have made great strides in
doing that. But I think also we have a ways to go. Again, there
are many examples where we do not provide that kind of easy
access, real-time access to the information.
Senator Gregg. What's causing the inability to get there?
Is it that these proprietary systems are not integrated or can
not be integrated because they are different?
Mr. Williams. We believe we can do this. It is a function
of money, resources, and time. This is what we are shooting
for, is to continue to do this.
Senator Gregg. How do you avoid ending up getting locked
into one system that is not flexible enough to deal with
breakout technology that could significantly improve the
system?
Mr. Williams. Well, what we always try to do is try to
follow open standards. In many of the systems that we put in
place, we try to follow international standards, because what
we are trying to do is we are trying to harmonize, frankly,
with the rest of the world. As everybody is in the same battle
against terrorism, how do we look at immigration, border
management, and biometric systems and build them in a way that
we can share?
We are doing the same thing as we meet with industry. We
communicate our needs. We do not want proprietary technology
because that locks us into something that is not flexible in
terms of costs and technology. We want something that is an
open standard, where we have competitive choices there.
I will say in terms of the person-centric view we are
trying to build out, to further integrate these databases, that
was part of the money that we requested in the fiscal year 2006
budget.
Senator Gregg. I want to get to that in a second.
Mr. Hite, how do you evaluate the answers that Mr. Williams
gave to the last two points?
Mr. Hite. I guess I would offer this. It is not normally
GAO's custom to defend the Executive Branch on something, but
they were given a very demanding----
Senator Gregg. Well, please do. We are interested in good
feedback and constructive criticism.
Mr. Hite. They were given a very demanding schedule in
terms of putting in place the entry-exit capability by certain
legislatively defined time frames. As a practical reality, the
only way that was going to be accomplished in meeting those
time frames was to leverage existing legacy technology,
independent systems that weren't developed to common standards
and had to be interfaced in order to accomplish what was
mandated to be done by a certain point in time.
As a natural consequence of that, what you have now is US
VISIT, a system of separate systems, systems that are managed
by separate organizational units. I think the criticism that we
made and that the IG made around certain aspects of how you
manage that system of systems, whether it be security or
whether it be configuration management, was recognizing the
fact that if you--by virtue of the fact that you had to build
from this set of legacy systems, you need to come up with some
way to centralize, give some type of centralized oversight to
how this collective set is managed from a configuration
standpoint and from a security standpoint.
And that was not being done. It was basically relying on
the fact that the individual systems are being managed and
therefore issues surrounding security or issues surrounding
configuration would take care of themselves.
So on the one hand I think they have dealt with and
effectively played the cards that they were dealt in this
particular situation. Now, strategically going forward they are
looking for ways to go beyond that and create a more
interoperable solution. But that is down the road. That is
years down the road. That is in fact what they have largely
brought on the prime contractor to help them do.
DEPARTMENTAL FOCUS NEEDED TO GUIDE US VISIT
Senator Gregg. Does Mr. Williams need more authority in
order to force integration of these systems?
Mr. Hite. I would not jump to him needing more authority at
this case. Maybe some authority to help him manage the interim
solutions now. But strategically, I think I go back to what I
said in my opening remarks, and I think you made the point too.
US VISIT is not an island. US VISIT fits within a larger
context within the Department of Homeland Security, and that
context needs to be defined and based on that definition. There
needs to be put in place an authority, a power, a
responsibility, an accountability structure, to make sure that
it can be accomplished.
Right now, in some respects I believe the program is--it is
sometimes the tail trying to wag the dog, because it is trying
to accomplish certain things through its program and what its
span of control and authority is, yet some of the things it is
trying to deal with are outside its control. So I think the
Department needs to step up and define this context, so that
programs like US VISIT and other programs out there like Secure
Flight and trusted traveler programs can be engineered in a way
that they work as one holistic interoperable set.
REVISED COST AND SCHEDULE ESTIMATE REPORT OF REAL TIME INTEROPERABILITY
Senator Gregg. I have a couple more questions. Senator
Byrd, did you have any additional thoughts, questions?
Senator Byrd. Just briefly. I'm very impressed by your
witnesses today, favorably so.
Mr. Williams, the conference report accompanying the fiscal
year 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act required the
submission, Mr. Williams, by November 20, 2005--it is my
birthday, November 20, 2005 of a revised cost and schedule
estimate for the achievement of real-time interoperability
between the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
System, IAFIS, and the Automated Biometric Identification
System, IDENT. We have yet to receive that report.
Your office has been charged with taking the lead on this
project. How much additional money will you need for true
IDENT-IAFIS interoperability, can you tell us?
Mr. Williams. I believe we did submit a report, but I am
not sure it included the out year estimates for what we think
we need. I will tell you it is a number somewhere, in terms of
between us and the FBI--we developed a joint estimate together
on what it would take to achieve full interoperability. It is
something you will see, I think, as part of the fiscal year
2007 budget submission, that next increment of money that we
need.
Frankly, I have to be careful what I say here because I do
not want to jump in front of the President's fiscal year 2007
budget. That is not something I should do. But we have outlined
what the cost estimates are. I believe you may already have
that information. I am not sure. But we do have a clear plan
and it is going to be something that is an amount of money that
is more than $100 million, just for example.
But it is something where we think the benefits--as Mr.
Hite said, we will outline all of the benefits we believe that
will be achieved. We are already starting to see the benefits
of that interoperability relationship that we have with the
FBI, and we do have a clear plan, based upon money and
resources, how to get there. The money that we will need you
will see in the fiscal year 2007 budget.
Senator Byrd. Are you saying that you will have enough
money in 2006?
Mr. Williams. We are currently looking at our 2006 budget
money to see whether we have enough money to do what we want to
do in 2006. What we have developed with the FBI is a three-part
plan. First of all, something we call an interim data-sharing
model. That is something where we would start with the FBI
sharing information with us, we would share information back
with them, for example, and we have already started doing this.
Previously, in our watch list we had wants and warrants of
foreign-born, unknown country of origin people. They are now
starting to share their wants and warrants of U.S. citizens, so
that is something they are sharing with us. Eventually, we will
start sharing with them things like visa refusals, so that we
have a bidirectional sharing of information.
That is an interim data-sharing model. We will then go into
initial operating capability of what we think will be the full
interoperability model. Initial operating capability, we hope
to start that some time in the fall. We are looking right now,
working with OMB to make sure we have the money to achieve
that.
Going beyond that, in the out years we would then be
shooting for a few years down the line for a few operational,
interoperational capability between IAFIS and IDENT. That money
we hope will be included in the fiscal year 2007 budget
request.
Senator Byrd. I may have missed something, but are you
saying you have enough money in 2006 or that you do not have
enough money?
Mr. Williams. Again, we are working with the Department and
OMB to make sure that we do, and that is an ongoing process
right now. As we define with the FBI what we want to do
initially--initially it is this interim data-sharing model--I
believe we have the money today for that, that we have
identified the money for that today. The money we need for
initial operating capability that we would begin some time
later in the fall of this year, we are currently working with
OMB and the Department to identify that money.
Senator Byrd. So we are already 4 months into the fiscal
year. I do not understand why you are waiting. We should have
received a plan months ago.
Mr. Williams. Again, I believe you did receive a response
from the Department, but it did not contain all of the
estimates because the Department did not want to provide
information in advance of the President's budget. But in terms
of--we are not waiting. We have a plan. Again, I talk to Tom
Bush regularly. We have our regular executive committee
meetings with him. I talked to him last night.
We are already beginning this interim data-sharing model,
where the FBI is already today transmitting additional
information to us, and we are going to start some time later
where we can give information back to them. We are not waiting.
We are trying to move out on this.
What we are trying to do is get some early successes, and
we think we are getting them already. In fact, for the
information they are giving us we have already had some
benefits just in the last few days, frankly.
Senator Byrd. This interoperability is critical, critical,
to the success of the US VISIT program. I hope that the
President's 2007 budget when it is submitted in 2 weeks will
include sufficient resources to move forward rapidly. What do
you think? Do you think my hopes will be----
Mr. Williams. I agree with your hope.
Senator Byrd. You are in an agreeable mood. I should have
been tougher on that question.
INTEROPERABILITY FUNDING
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gregg. I thank you, Senator. I think you have
highlighted a point that is very critical here, which we have
been highlighting as a subcommittee now for a long time, way
back, as you mentioned, to when Secretary Ridge took over the
Department. That is that this is a huge priority. We are glad
there is progress being made. I am actually sort of surprised
that there is progress being made, because the technology
hurdles here are very significant, especially as to getting all
ten fingerprints at the border entry point.
But we do feel that this is critical as a committee, and we
are committed to getting you the resources you need to do this.
We took a run at getting $1.1 billion additional capital into
the Department directed at border activity. In that number--and
it was in the--it was actually in the defense appropriations
bill and it would have been an emergency supplemental for the
Department--we did not have additional funding for this issue,
I do not believe.
But we are going to take another run at that, getting that
number, because that is capital improvement items and there
will be a supplemental before we will be doing the final bill.
So we will want to have that number, what you need to do this,
and be ready to move with that number.
The President's budget will be coming up on the 6th.
Hopefully, by then we will know the number, and if the right
number is not in the budget we will want to know from you what
the right number is, because, as the Senator has pointed out
and as we have pointed out on this committee for a number of
years, this system is not going to work unless we can access
that huge FBI database in my opinion. We would be leaving
millions of potential hits on the table if you do not get into
that database, and you can not get in there with two
fingerprints.
CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING LIMITATIONS
Second, there has been some discussion of what the proper
funding level is for this US VISIT effort. Really, there were
two things which limited our ability to fund this in our
opinion. The first was that we still do not see--and I think
Mr. Hite has made this point and you have made this point to
some degree, but not maybe in the same way I will. We do not
see an exit program that works and I am not inclined to just
put money into something unless we have got a demonstration of
something that works, that we can go to execution on.
Mr. Hite has pointed out that most of the demonstration
efforts in the area of the exit programs are not doing what has
to be done. You have pointed out that the capital costs of
doing a major exit mirror of the entrance would be huge, $3
billion, and maybe not even functional. So we have got to come
up with something that is more viable in this exit area.
The second thing that has limited the amount of money here
was when the White House sent up their budget to us on homeland
security they put in a plug number, $1.5 or $1.7 billion, which
was a fee increase on airlines to fund TSA, and then they
reallocated those monies throughout the agency. Everybody knew
that number was not real and that nobody was going to hit the
airlines, which were on the brink of disaster as it was, with
this type of a huge fee increase.
So we as a committee were stuck with a hole of $1.7
billion, which we then covered to a great extent. I think we
picked up--thanks to the largesse of the chairman and the
ranking member, we got an allocation that was significantly
higher than one might have expected, and we were able to pick
up a lot of that. But we were not able to pick up all of it. So
that adjustment came across the board.
I would hope--you do not have any role in this. But I would
hope we would not get another plug number in this budget that
is coming up, because it is not constructive to the effort of
making this Department--of addressing the needs of this
Department, as you might have noted in your own points.
EXIT STRATEGY LIMITATIONS
So I would like to just get your thoughts on exit strategy
because it is--you have made great progress on the entrance
side. There is still a long way to go, as you mentioned. Mr.
Hite certainly pointed out some of the things that need to be
done here from a strategic planning side. But if there is one
hole that clearly is not yet filled and which there does not
yet seem to be a concept as to how we are going to do it
effectively, it is the exit strategy. And if you do not know
who is leaving--knowing who is coming in is important, but
knowing who is leaving, if you are going to get a full picture
of where we stand as a country and who is here and who is not
here that might threaten us, it is important to know who is
leaving.
Mr. Williams. Let me summarize where we have been on exit
again. Talking about air and sea, we are currently conducting
these 14 pilots at 12 airports and 2 seaports.
Senator Gregg. If I could interject, I am sorry. But Mr.
Hite has basically said they are not working.
Mr. Williams. Well, that is what I wanted to comment on. We
evaluated these pilots based upon looking at compliance, cost,
convenience to the traveler. While we think the compliance
rates were low, we also have had recently something that caused
us to believe that, if implemented this way--and again, we are
looking at what is the right implementation strategy--that one
of the keys is enforcement, because where ICE took an
enforcement action in a particular place our compliance rate,
which was not great at that particular airport, all of a sudden
because ICE did something as part of an outbound operation, our
compliance rates in terms of the airlines wanting to help us
comply and getting passengers to comply so that we did not
disrupt their departure times, our compliance rates went up.
I think part of the problem with our compliance rates was
first of all, again we did not have the infrastructure that you
have on entry. Second, this was a new requirement and there
were people who believed, even though we told them it was
mandatory, they either did not believe it was mandatory or they
did not believe there would be any discipline or consequences
for failing to comply.
We just had a recent incident where ICE decided, and we
support that, to do an outbound operation because of another
reason. All of a sudden, in that particular place all the
airlines who did not want their departures interrupted by
people, by ICE, looking at who had not checked out, so then all
of a sudden the airlines said, well, let us work with you to
make sure people do check out so you do not disrupt our
departures. And our compliance rate shot up to around 90
percent, 90 percent meaning those people who should check out
of the country biometrically did check out of the country.
I think while we are looking at the results of these pilots
and then looking at other alternatives, because we want to make
sure we get this right--and again, dealing with a lack of
infrastructure, and we want to work with the airports and the
airlines and the cruise lines on getting this right. We do
think there has been value in what we have done in these
pilots. We have had over 400 hits.
Senator Gregg. I am sure it has some value.
Mr. Williams. Also, our matching rate for when we have an
entry biometric record to somebody leaving biometrically,
matching those two records is over 99 percent. When we have
been able to register that people have left, we have been able
to take those off the radar screen of ICE. In fact, we have
been working with ICE very collaboratively with some small but
great results, where we have been able to look at databases
such as--again, when an airplane leaves they have to provide us
a departure manifest that says who is on it--looking at our
biometric records of departure and saying to ICE: We can tell
you, take these people off your radar screen; they have left.
We have also been able to tell them with a degree of
confidence: We think these people are still here.
This is the first time, we believe, in our Nation's history
that we have been able to identify people who are overstays,
not through some other law enforcement or work site enforcement
or national security means, but just simply by looking at our
databases we have been able to say to ICE: We believe these
people are overstays. And ICE has then taken that information
and made nearly 100 arrests.
So we are looking at an exit system that will put integrity
in the immigration system. It's a difficult challenge, I agree.
But I think the pilots that we did, if you can implement
something like this nationwide with enforcement, where people
think there's consequences if they don't comply, it is going to
be of value to ensuring integrity in the immigration system. As
the President said, we want people to come. We want to know why
and we want to know, did they leave on time. That is the
integrity of the immigration system and that is what we are
shooting for.
Senator Gregg. Well, we appreciate that, and I think we
will probably ask GAO to give us an analysis of what we should
fund if we were to tool up something like that, what they feel
has worked there, too. But we do appreciate your conscientious
effort here. You have done--you have made a lot more progress
than I thought you would make, to be very honest, and you
deserve a pat on the back for it. Your people deserve
congratulations for all the effort and time they put into it
and to making what is really a critical element of our national
security work. So I thank you for that.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
There is, as has been pointed out, a long way to go. As you
say, it is the end of the beginning, or the beginning of the
next step, anyway, whatever the term was. We have got a long
way to go. You have started to build a foundation. We want to
support you in that. So get us the numbers you need for that
support, and to the extent GAO tells us that they make sense.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to James A. Williams
Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg
RETURN ON INVESTMENT
Question. US VISIT will be a multi-billion dollar investment in a
system that, while making significant strides in closing security gaps,
will not be able to close them all. The most significant question: what
is the return on investment for the American taxpayer?
Answer. The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology system (US VISIT) has made significant contributions since
its first functional deployment in January 2004 to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) strategic goals of: (1) detecting, deterring,
and mitigating threats to our homeland; and (2) serving the public
effectively by facilitating lawful trade, travel, and immigration.
Evidence of these contributions includes:
--Through January 2006, DHS has processed 49 million travelers
through its US VISIT biometric screening capabilities at ports
of entry, representing the largest application of biometric
screening capabilities in the world.
--US VISIT is providing capabilities to enable improved matching of
exit records to entry records, as demonstrated by results from
fiscal year 2005. During a pilot of biometric exit, 92 percent
of biometric exit records were matched to entry records,
compared to 82 percent for biographic matching. This 10 percent
increase equates to the ability to match an additional five
million individuals approximately per year.
--US VISIT screening of travelers at ports of entry have resulted in
nearly 3,500 biometric watch list hits, resulting in more than
1,000 adverse actions, including matches for individuals
convicted of serious crimes as well as individuals found to
have committed visa fraud and other immigration violations.
--hrough support to the Department of State (DOS) BioVisa program, US
VISIT supports a virtual border and detects persons of interest
before they ever reach our shores. Through January 2006, State
screened nearly 10.5 million visa application records through
US VISIT, resulting in almost 13,900 matches to derogatory
information.
--Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) apprehended 173 aliens
based on overstay records identified by US VISIT through
January 2006. These arrests mark a significant milestone. For
the first time in our Nation's history, nonimmigrant aliens who
overstay their authorized period of admission are being
identified by an automated system and this data is
electronically provided to enforcement authorities.
These statistics represent some of the contributions to date from
implementation of US VISIT in response to critical legislative
mandates.
The return on investment for the American taxpayer is the creation
of a virtual border with end-to-end information management on foreign
nationals traveling to the United States, covering their interactions
with Federal officials before they enter, when they enter, and when
they exit. Implementation of this border management technology will
also provide the necessary data to perform better analyses of our
immigration system, inform policy development, and support enforcement
efforts.
AIR EXIT TRACKING
Question. What are the results of the biometric exit pilots
executed in airports?
Answer. The exit pilot determined that all three exit alternatives
were able to capture and transmit biographic and biometric information.
All alternatives processed travelers quickly and efficiently and do not
unduly impede travel.
The exit pilot evaluation demonstrated that biometrics provide a
significant enhancement to the existing ability to match arrival and
departure records. US VISIT was able to successfully match biometric
exit records to a biometric entry record for 92 percent of all
travelers who complied with the exit process, as opposed to only an 82
percent successful matching rate of biographic-only records. This 10
percent increase would equate to, on a nationwide scale, the Government
matching an additional 5 million individuals approximately per year.
Compliance rates during the pilot were below 50 percent at the
majority of pilot locations, but may improve with enforcing the
requirement.
Biometric processing at exit provides an additional level of law
enforcement through the identification of persons who are attempting to
leave the United States with active wants and warrants.
Between January 5, 2004, and December 1, 2005, DHS had 322
biometric watch list hits on exit. While many of these matches did not
require DHS to stop the individual from leaving the country,
significant matches reviewed by the National Targeting Center (NTC) law
enforcement, and meeting documented criteria in standard operating
procedures, did merit response by DHS. Examples of significant records
responded to include, and are limited to, known or suspected
terrorists, active felony warrants, and active Interpol warrants. Of
these matches, five resulted in DHS taking adverse action.
Question. Is this a cost-effective means of tracking individuals as
they leave the United States?
Answer. As a part of the exit pilots, US VISIT is examining the
costs and benefits of this project.
Question. None of the pilots included setting up passport control
areas for departing passengers. Why?
Answer. During the initial development of possible solutions for
the collection of exit biometrics, various alternatives were
considered. US VISIT worked with Federal partners and stakeholders to
determine which of the alternatives could be implemented that would
also minimize the impact on the transportation companies and port
authorities.
A passport control system, in which gates are physically separated
from the rest of the terminal, was considered but rejected because it
would have required construction at every international departure
terminal and would have changed airline operations to only permit
international departures from certain gates.
Question. Is this something DHS should consider implementing?
Answer. No.
Question. Is requiring the airlines to collect the biometric data
and ensuring all passengers boarding aircraft have properly checked out
of US VISIT under consideration? How would this be done?
Answer. An integrated long-term solution could incorporate the
collection of the US VISIT exit biometrics and biographic information
into an existing function that a traveler is required to complete. This
could be completed at check-in, pre-boarding security screening, or
into the boarding gate procedures.
Question. When will the Department make a decision as to how exit
tracking will be implemented airports?
Answer. DHS is examining the results of the current exit pilots at
14 airports and seaports. DHS will determine the best approach for
capturing exit data using biometrics and biographic information. We
continue to rely on our existing exit process, which is now being
enhanced by implementation of the Advanced Passenger Information System
(APIS) rule.
Question. When will a plan to implement that decision be submitted
to this subcommittee?
Answer. The implementation of exit tracking will be included in
future expenditure plans.
LAND ENTRY/EXIT TRACKING PILOTS
Question. What exactly is being piloted at the land border? Is it
just the radio frequency identification tags (RFID)? Or has the reader
been integrated with the computer in the primary inspection booth? In
other words--are you testing only the tag or is the inspector getting
real time information from the tag?
Answer. US VISIT has established a pilot program at land border for
documenting exits and any subsequent reentries of nonimmigrant
travelers who have gone through the US VISIT process on entry. This
pilot is operating at five U.S. land border crossings utilizing radio
frequency identification (RFID) technology. Phase 1 of the test
embedded an RFID tag into the form (Form I-94/A) used by nonimmigrant
aliens and upgraded pedestrian primary workstations. The systems being
developed associate the RFID tag with data for the traveler, and pre-
position the information for display to the Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) Officer at the time of inspection. Also, Phase 1
records travelers in a vehicle on exit which are equiped with overhead
gantries (on which are hung RFID antenna) that are in place at all
pilot locations to record these travelers as they depart. Phase 1 was
implemented August 4, 2005.
Question. Is RFID a viable technology for this kind of tracking?
Answer. In 2004, an operational alternative analysis was conducted
and RFID met both operational and technical requirements. This study
examined remote sensing technologies such as facial recognition, iris
scanning, retinal scanning, global positioning systems, voice
recognition, as well as various types of RFID technologies. Criteria
used in the analysis included mission fit to operational requirements,
commercial availability, and impact on traveler privacy. RFID was
identified as the best fit to the requirements using technology
available today. Subsequently, an RFID feasibility study was performed
using three RFID industry leaders that led to a vendor recommendation
based on performance and deployment in a Proof of Concept.
US VISIT believes that RFID has the potential for use at exit, even
though the technology is still maturing. RFID is a rapidly advancing
technology. US VISIT will continue to work with industry to develop
RFID technology that meets the current and future needs of the
immigration and border security management community.
Question. How many different vendors are participating in the exit
pilots as of today?
Answer. The RFID Proof of Concept under way at selected land border
locations is using RFID products (readers, antennae, and tags) from
only one vendor.
Question. Is there a risk of getting tied into one proprietary
technology?
Answer. US VISIT has conducted early discussions with industry and
has stressed the importance of open standards and interoperability for
RFID technologies. An important activity in the next phase is to
evaluate and incorporate next generation RFID technologies into the
Proof of Concept to mitigate the risk associated with proprietary
products. Next generation RFID technologies are standards-based and
backward-compatible so that existing documents can continue to be used.
Question. Will RFID be able to replace the need to build vehicular
exit lanes along the Nation's land borders?
Answer. RFID is an emerging, evolving technology that private
industry is continuing to develop and enhance (i.e., industry is moving
toward an interoperable (versus proprietary) standard). We are testing
the possibility that RFID can be used as the primary technology for
recording the entry and exit of travelers in the land border
environment. Any solution cannot impede the free flow of legitimate
travelers and commerce on entry to, or exit from, the United States. In
order to meet that objective, RFID was the most promising solution.
Continuous improvement in the advances of RFID, business process
improvement, and increased traveler compliance will replace the need
for a costly public construction effort.
Question. Once an individual is enrolled in US VISIT and in
possession of the RFID-enabled I-94, how will you know if the readers
successfully captured a subsequent border crossing, without knowing
ahead of time when people plan to cross?
Answer. As a part of the US VISIT enrollment process, the
traveler's information is immediately available for subsequent use on
reentry. The tag is associated with that traveler's biographic and
biometric information on the back-end technical infrastructure. The
radio frequency (RF) readers are strategically placed to automatically
and remotely detect the presence of an RF-enabled I-94 from the head of
the vehicle and from the pedestrian lanes. When a tag is read, the tag
is immediately transmitted to the back-end systems for processing the
reentry (or exit, as the case may be) so that information can be
accessed and presented for the CBP Officer to use in the admission
decision.
Question. What is the level of confidence that the pilots will
produce meaningful information for evaluation?
Answer. DHS has already learned a great deal from the existing
pilots and the results will be used for the next phase of testing.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PLATFORM
Question. Is the current information technology platform (inherited
from legacy agencies) used by US VISIT adequate or likely to prove
inadequate?
Answer. Deployment of the US VISIT system required the beginning of
the integration of existing systems immediately.
In order to deploy US VISIT quickly, DHS and its enterprise
partners--the Department of Justice (DOJ) and DOS--used (and have been
successful) in trying to integrate disparate systems and networks to
give users access to mission-critical information systems. However, the
systems and their infrastructure platforms can be greatly improved.
There are modernization efforts in various stages throughout DHS, as
well as within critical partner agencies such as DOJ (including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)), that will decrease the risk to
scalability and functionality that some older systems and platforms
present. US VISIT continues to examine DHS systems. For example, as
part of the plans and analysis for transitioning to 10-print biometrics
and full interoperability with DOJ/FBI Criminal Justice Information
Services (CJIS)-Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(IAFIS), US VISIT will modernize the Automated Biometric Identity
System (IDENT) platform.
Question. One of the challenges facing US VISIT is that many of the
information technology systems that are integral to this effort are
owned and operated by other components and departments. How is this
being managed?
Answer. DHS has established a Federal Advisory Board that includes
senior representatives from a wide range of stakeholders. US VISIT is a
member of the DHS Joint Requirements Council. The US VISIT Chief
Information Officer (CIO) is a member of the DHS CIO Council, and the
DHS CIO has established a subgroup of CIOs as a Screening Portfolio (US
VISIT, CBP, ICE, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)) for those organizations
that are primarily the owners and operators of systems and
infrastructure that comprise critical pieces of US VISIT.
Question. One of the challenges facing US VISIT is that many of the
information technology systems that are integral to this effort are
owned and operated by other components and departments. What mechanisms
are in place to make sure that development decisions are getting made
in a timely manner and that the decisions are in fact carried out?
Answer. In addition to the answer provided previously, US VISIT has
established Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) to manage each project.
These teams oversee the project and then allocate resources to
components via interagency agreements and basic service level
agreements to make the necessary enhancements and improvements. The US
VISIT IPT manager ensures that all components agree and obtain
clearance on formal business requirements, which then dictate the
progression of the project through its lifecycle and the key decision
points that are required to keep the project on budget and within
schedule and scope. Issues that would affect the project or projects
are elevated.
Question. What has been accomplished with the $21 million of fiscal
year 2005 funds spent on developing the long-term strategy for US
VISIT, including modernizing systems and capabilities and integrating
databases?
Answer. In fiscal year 2005, US VISIT allocated $21 million for
Increment 4, the modernization and expansion of systems and
capabilities. Of those funds, $13 million was allocated to the
modernization of systems and capabilities and $8 million was allocated
to facilities delivery support. Of the funding for modernizing systems,
approximately $4 million was used for strategic planning and
blueprinting. The funds for facilities delivery support have been
obligated for environmental studies and analysis, systems and
performance modeling, Geographical Information System development and
sustainment, and facilities planning to support operations for air,
sea, and land ports.
automated biometric identification system (ident)/integrated automated
FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IAFIS) INTEROPERABILITY
Question. There are legislative proposals that would set a deadline
of October 26, 2006, for DHS to complete the conversion of US VISIT
from a 2-fingerprint standard to a 10-fingerprint standard. Can the
conversion to 10-fingerprints be completed by October of 2006? If not
then, what is a realistic timeframe?
Answer. US VISIT does not require additional statutory authority to
move from a 2- to a 10-fingerprint standard. The conversion to 10
fingerprints cannot be completed by October 26, 2006, regardless of
funding levels.
US VISIT must undertake two initiatives: deploy electronic readers
capable of scanning 10 fingerprints accurately and quickly; and develop
interoperability between the FBI's IAFIS and DHS's IDENT. US VISIT has
already made progress towards IDENT/IAFIS interoperability and is
exploring 10-print readers for deployment to multiple environments.
DHS, along with the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, as
well as the National Institute of Standards and Technology, hosted an
industry day to challenge the private sector to make a smaller, faster,
and more accurate 10-print capture device. We are working with industry
to help design new capture devices that meet DHS's basic operational
requirements at primary inspection. Advances in technology will allow
DHS and State to routinely collect 10 slap prints, without negatively
impacting the thousands of international visitors that pass though our
ports and visa issuing posts every day.
The joint DHS/DOJ/DOS Integrated Project Team has agreed upon three
phases to achieving interoperability: (1) an interim data sharing model
(data sharing solution); (2) initial operating capability (IOC); and
(3) full operating capability (FOC).
The interim solution will consist of a prototype (also known as the
interim data sharing model) that is a first step toward achieving the
new interoperable environment between IDENT and IAFIS. The interim
solution will allow for two-way sharing of certain biometric
information. FBI will provide information on all wants and warrants.
DHS will provide information on expedited removals. DOS will provide
Category 1 visa refusals (e.g., generally one involving a permanent
ground of inadmissibility). DHS and FBI's CJIS Division formally
started the first phase on February 1, 2006. This time period will be
used to design and build the prototype system. These improvements will
be completed by the end of fiscal year 2006.
During the next phase--the initial operating capability (IOC)--DOS
and DHS will begin to collect 10-prints and DHS will convert the
current two-print DHS IDENT system to store and utilize 10-flat prints
in processing. DHS and FBI will establish an infrastructure for
exchanging information and search capabilities.
Finally, the full operating capability (FOC) includes full
information sharing, subject to controlling laws and policy; high
performance searches of biometric data in both IDENT and IAFIS for
positive identification; increased matcher performance appropriate to
the increased volumes; and more comprehensive biographic/case data
sharing.
BORDER CROSSING CARD/LASER VISA READERS
Question. Funds were appropriated to purchase readers for the
border crossing cards in use along the southwest border. These machines
were purchased and installed during fiscal year 2004; however the
decision was made to not integrate the readers with the Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) computer systems. So while an individuals card
is read during the interaction with the inspector, no record is being
kept of the number of times that individual crossed our borders, even
though that capability exists.
Given the technological challenges in pursuing RFID technology for
tracking of entries and exits at land ports-of-entry will integration
of the BCC readers with the CBP computer system be re-considered?
Answer. US VISIT, in partnership with CBP, embarked on a further
upgrade of card-reading software during fiscal year 2005. This upgrade
was completed in October 2005 and allows CBP Officers quicker access to
biographic and biometric information in the primary inspections
environment for persons holding U.S.-issued travel documents and cards.
The new software is fully integrated and thus offers the officer the
option of viewing the alien's crossing history.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT: US VISIT SYSTEM SECURITY MANAGEMENT
NEEDS STRENGTHENING
Question. On January 24, 2006 the DHS Office of Inspector General
released a report entitled ``US VISIT System Security Management Needs
Strengthening''. What steps do you plan to take to remediate these
issues?
Answer. Our remediation steps are outlined in our formal response
to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Report and included in the
end of that report.
Question. The report included findings that US VISIT was not in
compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act, and
further that there was a lack of communication and coordination
regarding the security of existing US VISIT systems between the program
office, the CBP programs and Chief Information Officer, and the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement programs and Chief Information
Officer. How do you plan to remedy these situations?
Answer. The OIG report concluded, ``Overall, information security
controls, including physical access controls, have been implemented and
provide an effective level of security on the systems, which comprise
the backbone of US VISIT.'' The specific FISMA deficiencies mentioned
in the report directly relate to documentation issues with memoranda of
understanding and Interconnection Security Agreements (ISAs). At the
time the report was written, DHS policy did not require an ISA for
internal DHS connections (i.e. US VISIT to CBP). Since the publishing
of the report, the DHS Information Technology (IT) Security policy was
updated to require ISAs for ALL interconnections, both internal and
external. US VISIT plans on fully complying with the OIG recommendation
(as noted in our formal response included at the end of the report) and
the DHS policy requirement.
US VISIT formally disagreed with the finding that there was a lack
of communication and coordination and included this information in its
response to the OIG report, US VISIT program functions are implemented
via systems, owned and operated by CBP and ICE, that are modified or
enhanced according to functional and security requirements developed by
US VISIT. Technical solutions meeting these requirements are often
developed in concert, or at a minimum in consultation with, the other
organizations. Furthermore, US VISIT is directly involved in oversight
of system assurance testing and has established a life-cycle process
that coordinates the involvement of CBP and ICE. In addition, we have
initiated regular security team meetings, attended by the security
principals from each organization that meet to discuss a wide range of
security issues. These meetings are essentially conducted worker-to-
worker' and may not always have high visibility, but they nonetheless
directly and positively impact the security posture of the systems
comprising US VISIT.
LIMITATIONS OF US VISIT
Question. After full deployment of US VISIT, gaps will continue.
Individuals will continue to enter both legally and illegally--by
walking across the land border between ports, using a private boat on
lakes or in the ocean, or by using private planes. How will the
Department ensure gaps between ports of entry are not exploited?
Answer. DHS and CBP is aggressively pursuing the full
implementation of the National Border Patrol Strategy for the
deployment of all required resources to achieve operational control
between the ports of entry, as well as the necessary detention and
removal resources.
A major supporting component of the strategy is the Department's
Secure Border Initiative (SBI) to coordinate the deployment of all DHS
resources for bringing operational control to both the Northern and
Southern borders.
The SBI includes the following:
--More officers to patrol our borders, secure our ports of entry and
enforce immigration laws;
--Expanded detention and removal capabilities to eliminate the
``catch and release'' process;
--A comprehensive and systemic upgrading of the technology used in
controlling the border, including manned and unmanned aerial
assets, and next-generation detection technology;
--Increased investment in infrastructure improvements at the border--
providing additional physical security to sharply reduce
illegal border crossings; and
--Increased interior enforcement of our immigration laws--including
more robust worksite enforcement.
The mix of resources provided by the SBI will substantially
address, when fully deployed, the gaps on the land, water, and air to
prevent the illegal entry into the United States of persons and
contraband at and between the ports of entry.
Question. How will the entry and exit of private boats and planes
be tracked?
Answer. The locations that process private boats and aircraft have
generally not been designated in the Federal Register as US VISIT
equipped locations, and therefore, US VISIT equipment has not been
installed in these locations. The number of travelers subject to US
VISIT requirements arriving at these locations is generally low.
CBP does have other mechanisms in place to perform biographic
queries of travelers and biometric queries if deemed necessary. All
persons arriving via private boat and air must report their arrival to
CBP. CBP enters all arrival data and traveler biographical information
into the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) and issues
an I-94 (which is also entered into TECS) if applicable. When the
person issued the I-94 departs the United States, he must surrender the
I-94 to CBP. CBP also has the authority and ability to perform
fingerprint queries on any traveler where biometric equipment is
available. Biometric equipment may not be available at smaller
locations, however, and in situations where this is the case, CBP would
transport the traveler a short distance to an equipped location.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
US VISIT: BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY MODEL
Question. Mr. Williams, according to your written testimony, US
VISIT has been deployed on time, within budget, and has met every
mandate established by Congress to date. Also according to your
testimony, US VISIT has processed approximately 47.6 million travelers
at our points of entry, while intercepting over 1,000 known criminals
and immigration law violators and receiving only 131 complaints
regarding privacy issues.
Do you think this model of implementation and management of
biometric technology could be successfully deployed for other law
enforcement uses in other Federal Government agencies?
Answer. US VISIT already supports the sharing of biometrics and
biographic data with DOS consular officers, CBP Officers, and USCIS
Officers so they may have the information they need to authenticate
travel documents, verify identity, adjudicate immigration benefits, and
identify criminals, immigration violators, and other threats to our
security. Additionally, ICE is using information from US VISIT to
identify overstays and to strengthen immigration enforcement.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
ENTRY/EXIT BORDER TECHNOLOGY
Question. How long before border technology is in place to securely
process entry and exit at all points in the United States?
Answer. The initial phases of US VISIT have successfully
implemented new screening capabilities that include biometric entry
procedures now operating at 311 land, air, and sea ports of entry, as
well as linking key interagency databases. US VISIT is piloting exit
procedures in 14 air and seaports, and is exploring the use of RFID for
exit at the land ports.
Still, significant challenges remain before all the necessary
technology and systems are in place to securely process entry and exit
at all ports.
Question. Is it really feasible to monitor every point of entry in
the United States to accurately track entry and exit?
Answer. The long-term strategy of US VISIT is to deploy end-to-end
processes and manage information on foreign nationals traveling to the
United States by integrating their interactions with government
officials before they enter the United States, when they enter, and
when they exit. Furthermore, linkage of key intelligence data and
global coordination with our partners in the international open
community has provided an increased level of security.
The initial phases of US VISIT have successfully implemented new
capabilities that include biometric entry procedures now operating at
all 311 land, air, and sea ports of entry. US VISIT continues to
develop exit capabilities and further integrate databases within the
immigration and border security community.
Question. What will be the total cost of such a project?
Answer. The Department is devoping a long-term deployment schedule
for a comprehensive, biometrically based entry-exit system. Many
elements still need to be researched and tested before accurate cost
estimates can be made.
Question. Does the Department of Homeland security have a strategic
forward looking plan to institute and proficiently carry out such a
program?
Answer. Since US VISIT has implemented its initial increments, US
VISIT will now focus on improving business processes, developing and
testing new technology, and improving information sharing to create an
integrated border management system for the future.
Question. What are the assumed error rates of a entry and exit
tracking program?
Answer. DHS does not assume error rates since exit is not deployed
at all ports. However, DHS does have ``unmatched'' data on exit, which
incorporates both biometric and biographic entry-exit matching
strategies, and is dependent on the following factors: (1) The ability
of the system to accurately match the arrival records that are captured
to the corresponding departure records that are captured. This matching
capability is constrained by the limitations of the matching
technologies and by the accuracy and completeness of the data elements
captured at entry and at exit. (2) The completeness (percentage of the
population) for whom entry and exit records are captured at all points
where persons can legally enter and depart the country. Surreptitious
entries and exits (e.g., between ports of entry) are outside the scope
of such a system. (3) The degree of certainty that records captured at
departure indicate those individuals actually departed the county.
Based on available information, we assume that fingerprints of
sufficient quality to perform biometric matching cannot be captured for
approximately 2 percent of the population. Of the remainder, studies
performed by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
indicate that for one-to-many searches, US VISIT biometric matches have
a 97 percent accuracy rate, and for one-to-one searches a 99 percent
accuracy rate. No corresponding statistical or scientific baseline has
been established for biographic matching since the ability to
accurately perform text-based record matching is dependent upon the
accuracy and completeness of the specific data elements collected and
the matching algorithms employed.
Question. How many people slip through the system?
Answer. US VISIT analyzes exit records to determine if stays were
legally extended, if there were approved changes in status, or if
information in other systems may have impacted matching an entry to an
exit. US VISIT then provides ICE's Compliance Enforcement Unit (CEU)
with a listing of possible overstays on a weekly basis. This exchange
of information has led to the arrest by ICE of 122 individuals (January
2004 through January 5, 2006) who have overstayed the terms of their
admission.
Question. Another major problem with our immigration system is visa
overstays, what is Homeland Security doing to rectify this abuse?
Answer. The Department is concerned about the number of visa
overstays. Any one of ICE's roughly 6,000 criminal investigators can
and does make arrests for visa violations on a daily basis. In fiscal
year 2005, there were thousands of such arrests by ICE field agents.
To further address the problem of visa overstays, ICE established
the CEU in June 2003 to specifically target visa violators who pose an
elevated national security or public safety threat. It is important to
note there was no mechanism in place before the September 11, 2001,
attacks to identify and prioritize visa violators according to risk.
The CEU utilizes DHS nonimmigrant registration and tracking systems,
such as the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS),
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) and US VISIT
to identify and refer visa overstay and student status violators for
field investigation.
In its relatively short existence, CEU-generated investigations
have led to the arrest of nearly 1,800 high-risk visa violators
nationwide through January 2006, including suspected national security
threats, murderers, rapists, and other criminals. From fiscal year 2004
to 2005, the number of CEU-generated arrests increased by roughly 180
percent, as the unit established a foundation and began expanding
operations with additional personnel and data systems. At the current
time, there are 237 Compliance Enforcement personnel at ICE
headquarters and in the field.
Question. Do you know how many temporary visa holders never return
to their home country?
Answer. Since the United States does not have immigration exit
control deployed to every land, air and sea port of entry, it is
difficult to estimate this number. However, as US VISIT, ICE, and CBP
move forward with plans for implementing biometric exit control at air
and sea and exit at the land borders, estimating this number may become
easier.
The DHS Office Immigration Statistics issued a report in 2003 that
used data from the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS). As DHS noted
in a previously submitted question for the record from the March 2,
2005, fiscal year 2006 Senate Budget Hearing, this report found a total
of 23.6 million nonimmigrant departures were recorded by NIIS during
2003. Of those, 22.1 million or 94 percent were matched to an arrival
and showed valid arrival and departure dates. Note that this was a one
time report by the Office of Immigration Statistics and has not been
updated or revised. Biometric exit control will provide a confirmed
record that accurately ties an entry and an exit to a particular alien.
This cannot be done with the NIIS system derived information.
Question. What are the ramifications and penalties for overstaying
a visa?
Answer. Penalties for overstaying a nonimmigrant visa are set forth
by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended. An overstay
violation can result in arrest and removal, denial of future visas, and
may lead to a finding of inadmissibility on subsequent applications for
entry to the United States.
If removed for a visa overstay violation, the alien is barred from
re-entering the United States for a minimum period of 5 years from the
date of removal. Should such an alien re-enter the United States
illegally, the alien is subject to prosecution for illegal re-entry and
may face fines and/or imprisonment. Additionally, the alien will be
subject to reinstatement of the previous order of removal and will not
have the right to a hearing before an immigration judge prior to
removal.
For nonimmigrants who are admitted to the United States under the
Visa Waiver Program and subsequently overstay their authorized periods
of admission, there is no provision for a hearing before an immigration
judge and the alien is removed under an administrative process. He may
not re-enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program.
Question. The border with Mexico and the numerous illegal crossings
that take place each day are a big concern to the citizens of Alabama.
Not only the crossing of Mexican citizens, but the crossing of non-
Mexicans and possibly persons from Nations with known terrorist
connections.
How much does a system like US VISIT impact the border with Mexico?
Answer. US VISIT assists security along the border with Mexico by
providing information to CBP Officers and DOS consular officials on
whether an individual seeking entry through a port had been previously
apprehended illegally crossing the border or if that individual has a
criminal history in the United States.
In addition to increasing security, US VISIT is having a positive
impact at the land borders by facilitating legitimate travel. At some
land border ports of entry, automation of former paper processes
through US VISIT procedures have significantly reduced the time it
takes for a visitor to obtain a Form I-94 and be admitted into the
country. For example, in Laredo, Texas, the Form I-94 issuance process
has been reduced from an average of 8 to 11 minutes to just 2 to 5
minutes, even though we have added the collection of biometrics and
additional security screening to the process.
Question. Are we just making it more difficult for persons who are
trying to visit the United States legally while ignoring the illegal
immigrant traffic?
Answer. No. US VISIT's accomplishments have been achieved without
adversely impacting inspection times for the millions of legitimate
international travelers who visit the United States every year. US
VISIT, in partnership with CBP's Office of Information Technology,
developed US-ARRIVAL. US-ARRIVAL is the system that automated the I-94
issuance process at ports of entry. For example, in Laredo, Texas, the
Form I-94 issuance process has been reduced from an average of 8 to 11
minutes to just 2 to 5 minutes, even though we have added the
collection of biometrics and additional security screening to the
process.
The capability offered by biometric identification means that those
who are welcome in the United States can be processed more quickly and
more efficiently. US VISIT and the BioVisa Program represent milestones
in the Nation's efforts to modernize and reform the U.S. immigration
and border management system.
The implementation of joint IDENT/IAFIS workstations in Border
Patrol stations and in secondary inspection at the point of entry has
increased the level of screening that Border Patrol agents and
inspectors can do. In 2004, Border Patrol made 1.1 million
apprehensions of individuals crossing the land border between the ports
of entry. As Border Patrol processed these individuals, their
fingerprints were collected and checked against IDENT to see if there
are any existing records on them.
Question. How much does the biometric database used within US VISIT
come into play when persons who are trying to cross the United States/
Mexican border are processed?
Answer. US VISIT biometric entry procedures have been operational
in the secondary inspection areas of the 50 busiest land border ports
since December 29, 2004. The remaining land border ports were
operational by December 31, 2005. US VISIT applies to all visitors who
apply for entry with a nonimmigrant visa, including those using a
Border Crossing Card (BCC) to travel beyond the border zone or for more
than 30 days, or under the Visa Waiver Program. As part of the US VISIT
process, CBP Officers collect digital, inkless finger scans and take a
digital photo of the visitor.
In addition, the IDENT/IAFIS workstations are an important tool for
Border Patrol, secondary inspections, and interior enforcement. DHS
completed deployment of integrated IDENT/IAFIS workstations to all
remaining CBP ports of entry (for secondary inspection), ICE sites, and
Border Patrol stations by December 31, 2005. The 2005 deployment
focused on the remaining 66 ports of entry as well as the 339 ICE
locations.
These workstations allow DHS's users in the field to collect one
set of 10-rolled prints and simultaneously transmit them to both IDENT
and IAFIS for checks. The joint workstations allow Border Patrol to
view US VISIT records and also allow CBP and ICE to view Border
Patrol's processing records through US VISIT.
Question. Do we have the same processes in place to identify wrong
doers and track them if they are caught in the future?
Answer. Once a person ``hits'' against US VISIT (IDENT), that
record is maintained in the system. This allows DHS to flag particular
persons if their records denote that they have committed an act that
bars them from future admissions or from receiving immigration
benefits.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
FISCAL YEAR 2006 SPEND PLAN
Question. During the hearing, you noted your disappointment that
the Congress did not fully fund the President's fiscal year 2006
request for US VISIT. However, we are 4 months into the fiscal year and
we have yet to receive the required spend plan demonstrating how you
intend to use the funds you were provided. What is the reason for the
delay?
Answer. The expenditure plan is currently under review. US VISIT
will submit the expenditure plan as soon as possible after the required
review process is complete.
Question. When can we expect to receive the spend plan?
Answer. US VISIT will submit the expenditure plan as soon as
possible after the required review process is complete.
TEN FINGERPRINT
Question. I was pleased that Secretary Chertoff announced this past
summer that he plans to migrate the US VISIT program from the current
two fingerprint enrollment for visitors to this country to a ten
fingerprint enrollment. I have been pressing for this since the
Department was created. What is your estimated timeline for achieving a
10 fingerprint process for US VISIT?
Answer. In order to realize the full benefit of collecting 10
fingerprints, US VISIT must undertake two initiatives: deploy
electronic readers capable of scanning 10 fingerprints accurately and
quickly; and develop interoperability between the FBI's IAFIS and DHS's
IDENT. US VISIT has already made progress toward IDENT/IAFIS
interoperability and is exploring 10-print readers for deployment to
primary inspection.
DHS, along with the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, as
well as the NIST, hosted an industry day to challenge the private
sector to make a smaller, faster, and more accurate 10-print capture
device. We are working with industry to help design new capture devices
that meet DHS's basic operational requirements at primary inspection.
Advances in technology will allow DHS and State to routinely collect 10
slap prints, without negatively impacting the thousands of
international visitors that pass though our ports and visa issuing
posts every day.
The joint DHS/DOJ/DOS Integrated Project Team has agreed upon three
phases to achieving interoperability: (1) an interim data sharing model
(data sharing solution); (2) initial operating capability (IOC); and
(3) full operating capability (FOC).
The interim solution will consist of a prototype (also known as the
interim data sharing model) that is a first step toward achieving the
new interoperable environment between IDENT and IAFIS. The interim
solution will allow for two-way sharing of certain biometric
information. FBI will provide information on all wants and warrants.
DHS will provide information on expedited removals. DOS will provide
Category 1 visa refusals (e.g., generally one involving a permanent
ground of inadmissibility). DHS and FBI's CJIS Division formally
started the first phase on February 1, 2006, and it will be completed
by the end of fiscal year 2006.
During the next phase--the initial operating capability (IOC)--DOS
and DHS will begin to collect 10-prints; and DHS will convert the
current two-print DHS IDENT system to store and utilize 10-flat prints
in processing. DHS and FBI will establish an infrastructure for
exchanging information and search capabilities.
Finally, the full operating capability (FOC) includes full
information sharing, subject to controlling laws and policy; high
performance searches of biometric data in both IDENT and IAFIS for
positive identification; increased matcher performance appropriate to
the increased volumes; and more comprehensive biographic/case data
sharing.
Question. What are the estimated costs to achieve this capability?
Answer. The fiscal year 2007 Budget includes $60 million for IDENT/
IAFIS interoperability and 10-print deployment.
Question. Do you have the necessary resources this year to
implement your plan?
Answer. Yes. The fiscal year 2007 Budget includes $60 million for
the 10-print and IDENT/IAFIS interoperability projects.
DHS-FBI INTERACTION
Question. In a June 1, 2005 letter I received from Attorney General
Gonzalez, he stated that ``DHS will migrate to the uniform biometric
standard of 10 flat prints for enrollment and background checks. In
addition, the FBI changed its business process to provide fingerprints
of Known or Suspected Terrorists to the DHS daily.'' And on July 13,
2005, Secretary Chertoff announced his decision to enroll visitors
using ten prints. I am pleased to see that after more than 2 years of
urging, this level of cooperation is finally bearing results.
The FBI is upgrading its IAFIS system. What impact, does the FBI
system upgrade have on US VISIT?
Answer. IDENT/IAFIS interoperability will increase DHS and DOS's
ability to screen individuals, increase the accuracy of matching, and
provide greater ability to match against latent prints. Integration
will also benefit the FBI and other law enforcement organizations by
providing them with increased access during the interim solution to
information on high-risk individuals to whom DOS refused a visa and
those whom DHS has expeditiously removed.
The first phase of interoperability--the interim solution--will
consist of a prototype (also known as the interim data sharing model)
that is a first step toward achieving the new interoperable environment
between IDENT and IAFIS. The interim solution will allow for two-way
sharing of certain biometric information. FBI will provide information
on all wants and warrants. DHS will provide information on expedited
removals. DOS will provide Category 1 visa refusals (e.g., generally
one involving a permanent ground of inadmissibility). This will be
completed in fiscal year 2006.
During the next phase, the initial operating capability (IOC), DOS
and DHS will begin to collect 10-prints; and DHS will convert the
current two-print DHS IDENT system to store and utilize 10-flat prints
in processing. DHS and FBI will establish an infrastructure for
exchanging information and search capabilities.
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS
Question. One of the benefits of the US VISIT program, once it is
fully operational, will be the ability to determine whether individuals
who have been allowed entry into the United States have overstayed
their visas. This would be a major step forward toward gaining control
of our immigration system and management of our borders. However, some
skeptics of the US VISIT program have complained that the Department
has deliberately slowed development and implementation of the ``exit''
component of US VISIT because you do not want to know the true volume
of visa overstays in part because the Department lacks the resources to
round up the large number of visa violators. What is your reaction to
these comments?
Answer. There is a substantial effort ongoing in DHS to determine
the true volume of visa overstays led by ICE's CEU. This unit provides
a listing of possible overstays on a weekly basis that has led to the
arrest by ICE of 122 individuals (January 2004 through January 5,
2006). DHS wants an accurate count of visa overstays and exit will help
improve the current information available.
Question. Do you believe that your office is collecting as much
information on visa overstays as it can at this point?
Answer. Yes. Through the use of CBP Form I-94, passenger manifests
transmitted through APIS, and data from our exit pilots, US VISIT is
collecting as much information on visa overstays as current system
capabilities allow.
US VISIT provides ICE's CEU with a listing of possible overstays on
a weekly basis. This exchange of information has led to the arrest by
ICE of 122 individuals (January 2004 through January 5, 2006) who have
overstayed the terms of their admission.
BIOMETRIC PERFORMANCE
Question. I know that biometric identification technology is the
backbone of the US VISIT system and that, in fact, US VISIT represents
the largest-scale application of biometrics in the world. Now that US
VISIT has been in operation for nearly 2 years, can you tell us just
how well biometrics have performed, and what other technologies are you
contemplating using as part of the program?
Answer. US VISIT has fulfilled the legislative mandate for
completing the deployment of biometric entry capabilities at all ports
and visa-issuing posts of the United States. This program verifies each
visitor's identity and compares the visitor's biometric and
biographical information with watch lists of terrorists, criminals, and
immigration violators. Achievements for the biometric program include:
--Deployment on December 29, 2004, of initial operational biographic
and biometric entry functionality in the secondary inspection
areas, providing enhanced biographic and biometric identity
verification, and enhanced lookouts, and watch list checks.
--Implementation of functionality at all ports of entry on October
26, 2005, for producing U.S.-issued passports with an
integrated circuit ship capable of storing biographic
information from the data page of a passport, a digitized
photograph, and any other biometric information required in
travel documents.
--Deployment of biometric entry capabilities at the top 50 land
border ports, and the remaining 104 land border ports of entry
in December 2005.
In addition, the introduction of biometrics to the visa issuance
process (BioVisas) at DOS consular posts worldwide, and upon admission
at the air and sea ports of entry (and upon exit at selected ports),
has produced results.
Preentry.--During fiscal year 2005, 5,813,789 finger scans and
photographs were collected and checked against biometric watch list
records during the visa application process at consular posts overseas.
These checks resulted in 8,278 matches to derogatory information. DOS
uses any derogatory information from watch list matches, or ``hits,''
as one source of data, together with its review of information provided
on the visa application and information gained during the visa
interview, to make an informed decision whether to grant or deny a
visa.
The biometrics and visa data collected by DOS during the visa
application process are also transmitted to DHS systems for
verification of identity when an individual granted a visa applies for
admission at a U.S. port of entry. This has significantly improved the
Department's ability to detect visa fraud for those issued a visa under
the biometric visa program, preventing imposters from entering the
United States using a visa that was issued to someone else.
Entry.--During fiscal year 2005, 30,200,086 travelers went through
the US VISIT biometric process at the ports of entry. This process
resulted in 4,153 matches against biometric watch list records and 583
adverse actions. Examples of some of the more significant matches were
for individuals convicted of murder, rape, child molestation; drug
trafficking, manslaughter, visa fraud, and immigration violations.
Significantly, these enhanced processes--taking digital finger scans--
account for only 10-15 seconds, on average, of the primary inspection
process.
US VISIT is also able to identify frequent travelers with no
criminal history or other adverse record. By associating biometric
identities to travel documents, US VISIT was able to successfully
identify 9,436,290 travelers during the primary inspection process as
repeat travelers, verifying their identity as individuals who were
previously admitted to the United States presenting the same travel
documents.
All of this had to be accomplished without negatively impacting
wait times at primary inspection. Implementing 10-prints will only
enhance the Department's ability to prevent false positive matches
(identification mistakes), check travelers against latent fingerprints,
and deny entry to criminals and terrorists.
US VISIT is exploring new technology to improve security and
traveler facilitation at our ports of entry. We are working with
Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore to pilot test e-Passport readers.
The test began January 15, 2006, and will run through late spring of
this year. US VISIT is also testing the use of RFID technology to track
entry and exit at select land ports.
As a result, border management personnel will have extensive and
additional information available to support the pre-entry, entry,
status management, exit, and analysis processes.
DATABASE INTEROPERABILITY MILESTONES
Question. The 9/11 Commission and various legislation enacted since
9/11 have all called for greater interoperability between the many
databases various Federal agencies use to identify people on our
criminal watch lists or visa overstay lists. US VISIT is well underway
with its effort to create interoperability between its Automated
Biometric Identification System (or IDENT) and the FBI's Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (or IAFIS). What can you
tell us about the milestones that process has reached so far, and what
do you see ahead?
Answer. The joint DHS/DOJ/DOS Integrated Project Team has agreed
upon three phases to achieving interoperability: (1) an interim data
sharing model (data sharing solution); (2) initial operating capability
(IOC); and (3) full operating capability (FOC).
The interim solution will consist of a prototype (also known as the
interim data sharing model) that is a first step toward achieving the
new interoperable environment between IDENT and IAFIS. The interim
solution will allow for two-way sharing of certain biometric
information. FBI will provide information on all wants and warrants.
DHS will provide information on expedited removals. DOS will provide
Category 1 visa refusals (e.g., generally one involving a permanent
ground of inadmissibility). DHS and FBI's CJIS Division formally
started the first phase on February 1, 2006, and will be completed by
the end of fiscal year 2006.
During the next phase--the IOC--DOS and DHS will begin to collect
10-prints and DHS will convert the current two-print DHS IDENT system
to store and utilize 10-flat prints in processing. DHS and FBI will
establish an infrastructure for exchanging information and search
capabilities.
Finally, the FOC includes full information sharing, subject to
controlling laws and policy; high performance searches of biometric
data in both IDENT and IAFIS for positive identification; increased
matcher performance appropriate to the increased volumes; and more
comprehensive biographic/case data sharing. e-Passports
Question. US VISIT has worked side-by-side with the State
Department to develop what's known as the e-Passport both for visitors
traveling here under the Visa Waiver Program and for our own citizens.
What is the status of e-Passport development, and how will this affect
travel to and from the United States?
Answer. A U.S. Electronic Passport (e-Passport) is a passport with
information from the passport's data page stored on an integrated
circuit chip embedded within the passport book. Standards for the
manufacture of e-Passports are set by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). E-Passports are a significant step forward in
security as they can eliminate numerous types of passport fraud.
Many countries, including the United States, are developing e-
Passports for issuance and use during 2006. Last summer, Secretary
Chertoff announced that as of October 26, 2006, DHS policy would
require that travelers from all Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries
possess an e-Passport to be considered for admission if that passport
was issued on or after that date. DHS will be deploying e-Passports
readers to U.S. ports of entry by October 26. Accordingly, VWP
countries are expected to be in full e-Passport production by October
2006.
DHS is working with VWP countries by offering its readers for
testing purposes so that they can correct any errors prior to beginning
full e-Passport production. The U.S. readers are ICAO-compliant, so
countries can be assured that their passports meet international
standards. To date, the United States has ``certified'' six VWP
countries and expects many more e-Passport exemplars to arrive in the
coming months from remaining countries.
Question. What impact will it have on U.S. citizens?
Answer. The e-Passport is being proposed by DOS. State has
announced that the proposed e-Passport is the same as a traditional
passport with the addition of a small integrated circuit (``chip'')
embedded in the back cover. The chip will store the same data visually
displayed on the data page of the passport, a biometric identifier in
the form of a digital image of the passport photograph (which will
facilitate the use of face recognition technology at ports of entry),
the unique chip identification number and a digital signature to
protect the stored data from alteration. At ports of entry, U.S.
citizens would present their e-Passports just as they present their
current passport. CBP Officers would use the special features of the e-
Passport to confirm the identity of the person presenting the passport.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER
Question. The ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) has a
voluminous database on criminal illegal aliens as well as absconders.
The Center is on-line 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, responding to
inquires from local and state law enforcement in all 50 states. Last
year, the LESC issued detainers on over 16,000 individuals.
The LESC would seem to have a vast amount of information that
should be incorporated into the US VISIT program. Has the LESC database
been incorporated into US VISIT?
Answer. The LESC is an analytical center that has access to the
many immigration-related databases. The employees of the LESC are
highly skilled in their ability to research these databases to
determine persons of interest. As a person is determined to be of
interest, this information is shared with the Federal screening systems
including US VISIT.
Question. What cooperation and coordination, if any, has there been
between the US VISIT database and the criminal alien databases that are
located at the Law Enforcement Support Center?
Answer. The LESC is responsible for the immigration violator's file
that resides in National Crime Information Center (NCIC). When an
individual is placed in the immigration violator file and also has
fingerprints on file, they are also placed on the US VISIT watch list.
If positive identification is made through one of the US VISIT
processes--preentry, entry, status management, or exit--a decision
maker would have available the information provided by the LESC.
Question. If there has been coordination between these two
programs, what role will the LESC play in supporting US VISIT in the
future?
Answer. US VISIT will continue to work closely with LESC and all
agencies on improved integration and sharing of information.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE
Question. Last week, Secretary Chertoff spoke about a new ``People
Access Security Service,'' or ``PASS System Card,'' which is designed
to serve as a passport equivalent for U.S. citizens who frequently
cross into Canada or Mexico. This PASS Card will comply with the
requirements of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, a law that
requires individuals to show a passport or its equivalent at land
border crossings beginning January 1, 2008.
I have expressed serious concerns about the impact of the WHTI in
Northern Border States, including Vermont, particularly with regard to
tourism, trade, and cross-border community ties.
Currently, most Canadian citizens are not required to participate
in the US VISIT screening program when they enter the United States.
Will the implementation of the WHTI result in any modification of this
policy?
Answer. DHS is aggressively working with DOS and the governments of
Canada and Mexico to ensure that the implementation of the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) does not slow cross-border travel
and trade.
Question. Administration officials from the Departments of State
and Homeland Security frequently mention consultation with the Canadian
government with regard to the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.
Please provide greater detail about current discussions with the
Canadian Government. Is the Canadian Government developing a passport
alternative that will meet the land border crossing requirements of the
WHTI?
Answer. Through the Security and Prosperity Partnership, government
representatives from the United States and Canada have been meeting and
working together to discuss both short and long-range issues that
affect both our countries. We have established working groups to
promote further collaboration in certain areas, including developing
recommendations for lower-cost, secure proof of status and nationality
documents that would facilitate cross-border travel.
Question. If so, when does Canada expect to make such documents
available to Canadian citizens who wish to travel to the United States?
Answer. We have established working groups to promote further
collaboration in certain areas, including developing recommendations
for lower-cost, secure proof of status and nationality documents that
would facilitate cross-border travel.
______
Questions Submitted to Randolph C. Hite
Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg
Question. What aspects of US VISIT has the department not
addressed?
Answer. Congress has required that DHS develop and implement an
electronic entry and exit system at all ports of entry (POE).\1\
Specifically, DHS was to implement an entry and exit capability to air
and sea ports of entry by December 31, 2003; to the 50 busiest land
POEs by December 31, 2004; and to all remaining POEs by December 31,
2005. As of December 2005, DHS has deployed an entry capability to all
POEs, consistent with legislative requirements, but most notably, it
has not implemented an electronic exit capability at all air, sea, and
land POEs.
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\1\ Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management
Improvement Act of 2000, Public Law 106-215 (June 15, 2000); Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Public
Law 107-56 (Oct. 26, 2001); and Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry
Reform Act of 2002, Public Law 107-173 (May 14, 2002).
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In its fiscal year 2005 US VISIT expenditure plan, DHS committed to
deploying an electronic exit capability to air and sea POEs by
September 30, 2005. However, as of January 2006, DHS's implementation
of this capability has been limited to pilot testing at 11 air and sea
POEs, and the department has not yet decided how or when to deploy it
further. According to program officials, such implementation would take
at least 6 months from the time of a decision.
As of January 2006, the department is evaluating the feasibility of
an electronic exit capability at land POEs. Specifically, in August
2005, DHS deployed technology to three land POEs to verify the
feasibility of using passive radio frequency tags at the primary
inspection and exit lanes.\2\ This tag includes a unique ID number that
is to be embedded in each entry/exit form, thus associating a unique US
VISIT number with a form issued to a person when entering the country.
According to the program official responsible for Increment 2C, the
results of this demonstration have been evaluated. However, we have not
yet received a copy of the evaluation.
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\2\ Radio frequency technology relies on proximity cards and card
readers. Radio frequency devices read the information contained on the
card when the card is passed near the device and can also be used to
verify the identity of the cardholder.
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Question. In GAO's review of the fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan,
there were specific concerns raised about the cost-benefit analysis
developed for US VISIT. How could the cost-benefit analysis be
improved?
Answer. According to OMB guidance, individual increments of major
systems are to be individually supported by analyses of benefits, cost,
and risk.\3\ In addition, OMB guidance on the analysis needed to
justify investments states that such analysis should meet certain
criteria to be considered reasonable.\4\ These criteria include, among
other things, comparing alternatives on the basis of net present value
and conducting uncertainty analyses of costs and benefits. We
previously reported that US VISIT had not assessed the costs and
benefits of its program increments. Accordingly, we recommended that
DHS determine whether proposed US VISIT increments will produce mission
value commensurate with costs and risks.
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\3\ OMB, Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition and Management of Capital
Assets, Circular A-11, Part 7 (Washington, DC: June 21, 2005).
\4\ OMB, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefits-Cost Analysis
of Federal Programs, Circular A-94 (Washington, DC: Oct. 29, 1992).
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In February 2005, we reported that the program office had not
justified its investment in Increment 2B (which provides the entry
capability for electronic collection of traveler information at land
POEs), because its treatment of both benefits and costs was unclear and
insufficient.\5\ Since our February 2005 report, the program has
developed a cost-benefit analysis for Increment 1B (which is to provide
exit capabilities at air and sea ports of entry). Similar to the
Increment 2B cost-benefit analysis, this latest analysis, dated June
23, 2005, meets only some of OMB's criteria for economic analyses. For
example, it explains why the investment was needed, and it shows that
at least two alternatives to the status quo were considered. However,
the analysis does not include a complete uncertainty analysis for the
three exit alternatives evaluated, which is important to providing
decision makers with a perspective on the potential variability of the
cost and benefit estimates should the facts, circumstances, and
assumptions change.
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\5\ For example, the cost-benefit analysis identified two
categories of quantifiable benefits, but gave no quantitative or
monetary estimates for those benefits. Instead, the analysis addressed
two categories of benefits said to be nonquantifiable: strategic
alignment benefits (such as the improvement of national security and
the promotion of legitimate trade and travel) and operational
performance benefits (such as improvement of traveler identification
and validation of traveler documentation). However, it did not explain
why those benefits could not be quantified.
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To improve its cost-benefit analyses, it is important that the
program office adhere to relevant guidance. If this is not done, the
reliability of the analyses is diminished, and an adequate basis for
making prudent investment decisions does not exist.
Another area in which US VISIT cost-benefit analyses can be
improved is the quality of the cost assessments on which they are
based. As we previously reported, the cost estimate associated with the
June 2005 cost-benefit analysis, for example, did not meet key criteria
for reliable cost estimating. In particular, it did not include a
detailed work breakdown structure, which serves to organize and define
the work to be performed, so that associated costs can be identified
and estimated.
Program officials report that they have initiated actions to more
reliably estimate the costs of future increments. For example, the
program has chartered a cost analysis process action team, which is to
develop, document, and implement a cost analysis policy, process, and
plan for the program. Program officials also stated that they have
hired additional contracting staff with cost-estimating experience.
Strengthening the program's cost-estimating capability is extremely
important. The absence of reliable cost estimates impedes, among other
things, both the development of reliable economic justification for
program decisions and the effective measurement of performance.
Question. Have you seen an improvement in metrics being used by US
VISIT to determine the benefits?
Answer. Measurements of program progress and outcomes are important
for demonstrating that the program is on track and is producing
results. Without such measurements, program performance and
accountability can suffer. To better ensure that US VISIT meets its
expectations, we made a recommendation to DHS to fully disclose, among
other things, the benefits to be delivered with US VISIT. However,
based on our reviews of US VISIT expenditure plans, US VISIT has made
limited progress in defining and measuring program benefits.
In the US VISIT fiscal year 2004 expenditure plan, US VISIT
identified seven benefits for the program: two examples are (1)
preventing the entry of high-threat or inadmissible foreign nationals
through better and/or advanced access to data before their arrival and
(2) improving enforcement of immigration laws through enhanced data
accuracy and completeness. The plan also identified metrics for three
of the seven benefits, including the two examples above, and stated
that the program was developing metrics for measuring the projected
benefits, including baselines against which progress can be assessed.
However, the fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan did not include any
information on these metrics or on progress made on achieving benefits.
Further, the plan stated that performance measures were still under
development.
In the absence of defined metrics, the fiscal year 2005 expenditure
plan identified examples of how US VISIT is addressing its four stated
goals. However, the examples largely described US VISIT functions
rather than measures of goal achievement. For example, in support of
the stated goal of ensuring the integrity of our immigration system,
the plan stated that through US VISIT, officers at primary inspection
can instantly search databases of known criminals and known and
suspected terrorists. It did not, for example, explain how promised
immigration system integrity improvements would be measured.
Question. What progress have you seen in the development of
performance measures?
Answer. To ensure that a system adequately supports mission
operations, it is important to establish measurements of the system's
operational performance. Thus far, the US VISIT program has made
limited progress establishing such measurements. For example, we
reported in September 2003 that the operational performance of the
initial US VISIT system increments was largely dependent on the
performance of existing systems that were to be interfaced to create
these increments. In particular, we said that the performance of an
increment would be constrained by the availability and downtime of the
existing systems, some of which had known problems in these areas.
Accordingly, we recommended that DHS define performance standards for
each increment that are measurable and that reflect the limitations
imposed by this reliance on existing systems.
In February 2005, we reported that several technical performance
standards for increments 1 and 2B had been defined, but that it was not
clear that these standards reflected the limitations imposed by the
reliance on existing systems. Since then, the program office has
defined certain other technical performance standards for the next
increment (Increment 2C, Phase 1), including standards for
availability. Consistent with what we reported, the functional
requirements document states that these performance standards are
largely dependent upon those of the current systems. For system
availability, this document sets an aggregated availability standard
for Increment 2C components. However, it does not contain sufficient
information for us to determine whether these performance standards
actually reflect the limitations imposed by reliance on existing
systems.
To further develop performance standards, the program office has
prepared a Performance Engineering Plan, dated March 31, 2005, that
links US VISIT performance engineering activities to its System
Development Life Cycle. The plan (1) provides a framework to be used to
align the program's business, application, and infrastructure
performance goals and measures; (2) describes an approach to translate
business goals into operational measures, and then to quantitative
metrics; and (3) identifies system performance measurement areas
(effectiveness, efficiency, reliability, and availability). According
to program officials, they intend to establish a group to develop
action plans for implementing the engineering plan, but they did not
have a time frame for developing these plans.
Question. One of GAO's prior recommendations was for US VISIT to
develop a risk management plan, and to report all high risks and their
status to an executive body. Earlier this year, the risk management
plan had been partially implemented. Have you seen evidence that US
VISIT is managing its risks well?
Answer. Risk management is a continuous, forward-looking process
that is intended either to prevent possible problems from occurring or
to minimize their impact if they occur by proactively identifying
risks, implementing risk mitigation strategies, and measuring and
disclosing progress in doing so. A related key to successfully managing
risks is to develop a plan and process for identifying, analyzing,
mitigating, and monitoring risks. Accordingly, we recommended in
September 2003 that US VISIT develop and implement a risk management
plan.
Since then, US VISIT has taken several actions to implement this
recommendation and to strengthen risk management. For example, the
program office has
--developed and has begun implementing a risk management plan that
includes, among other things, a process for identifying,
analyzing, handling, and monitoring risk;
--defined a governance structure to oversee and manage the process;
--established a risk database that includes, among other things, a
description of the risk, its priority (e.g., high, medium, or
low), and its mitigation strategy; and
--developed risk management training and provided this training to
program personnel beginning in November 2005.
Notwithstanding these steps, US VISIT has not yet fully implemented
its risk management plan and process. As part of an assessment of its
process maturity, the US VISIT program office found that the risk
management process detailed in its plan was not being consistently
applied across the program. In response, program officials stated that
they have developed risk management training and began conducting
training sessions in November 2005.
In responding to these questions, we relied on past work related to
our reviews of US VISIT's program management. We conducted this past
work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Mr. Williams. Mr. Chairman, if I may say, and to Ranking
Member Byrd, I really appreciate the pat on the back. I work
with, frankly, an incredible team of dedicated Government
officials and contract officials, people who just work around
the clock to make this work. Some of the people are here with
me today and it is my honor to work with them. I will convey
your words back to the team. So I appreciate that.
Senator Gregg. Thank you, and thank you for your time
today.
The hearing is recessed.
[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., Wednesday January 25, the
hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]