[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
MOVING BEYOND THE FIRST FIVE YEARS: HOW THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION (TSA) WILL CONTINUE TO ENHANCE SECURITY FOR ALL MODES OF
TRANSPORTATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 15, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-105
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Lamar Smith, Texas
Norman D. Dicks, Washington Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Jane Harman, California Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Tom Davis, Virginia
Nita M. Lowey, New York Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia David G. Reichert, Washington
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
Islands Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Bob Etheridge, North Carolina David Davis, Tennessee
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Henry Cuellar, Texas Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania
Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Al Green, Texas
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas, Chairwoman
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Daniel E. Lungren, California
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Columbia Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado Officio)
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Erin Daste, Director & Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Coley O'Brien, Minority Senior Counsel
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection....... 5
The Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Witnesses
Mr. Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Ms. Cathleen Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Mr. Clark Kent Ervin, Director, Homeland Security Initiative,
Aspen Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
Mr. C. Stewart Verdery, Jr., Partner, Monument Policy Group, LLC:
Oral Statement................................................. 34
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
Appendix
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee..................... 59
Questions From Honorable Mike Rogers............................. 78
MOVING BEYOND THE FIRST FIVE YEARS: HOW THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION (TSA) WILL CONTINUE TO ENHANCE SECURITY FOR ALL MODES OF
TRANSPORTATION
----------
Tuesday, April 15, 2008
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, Clarke, Perlmutter,
Lungren, and Bilirakis.
Ms. Jackson Lee [presiding.] Good afternoon. The
subcommittee will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting
today to receive testimony on moving beyond the first 5 years,
how the Transportation Security Administration will continue to
enhance security for all modes of transportation. Importantly,
this testimony will discuss what the Transportation Security
Administration has accomplished in the first 5 years since the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security and what work
remains to be done to secure the Nation's transportation
system.
Let me first of all acknowledge the presence of the ranking
member, Mr. Lungren, of California, and Mr. Bilirakis of
Florida.
We are delighted that our Assistant Secretary Hawley is
here amongst the other witnesses. Let me thank them all.
Mr. Hawley, Ms. Berrick and Mr. Ervin, it is good to see
you again, and, Mr. Verdery, it is good to see you, as well.
I will attempt to yield myself 5 minutes and to speak
pithily in my opening remarks. Many of us are double-scheduled.
This is an extremely important hearing. I want to give time to
the witnesses and also time for the members, who may have to go
back to the floor.
As I said, good afternoon, and we thank you again for
coming to this hearing and participating, again, in the hearing
that speaks about the first 5 years of the Transportation
Security Administration. But, in light of where we are after 9/
11, to really focus on how we improve transportation in all
modes.
We have had some challenges. As we have discussed, the
needs for the air traffic marshals, if you will, the air
marshals, U.S. air marshals; as we have listened to the overall
challenges addressing the question of utilization of air
traffic controllers; as we continue to look for new technology
as it impacts the air cargo aspect; as we find that our flight
deck officers are facing maybe the possibility of accidental
utilization of guns in the cockpit. We know that there is much
to be done.
As we continue to work and to make better the work in
progress that is the transportation security screeners, we do
that by inviting Assistant Secretary Hawley to our respective
jurisdictions, as he did just recently in the city of Houston
at the Bush International Airport to look at--and as he has
done across the Nation--but to listen to and to look at ways of
enhancing the training and professional development of the TSA
screeners and to work on what is not a diminishing of security
but a consistency in security.
So, with a smile on my face, we certainly are not here,
Ranking Member Lungren, to tip off the terrorists, because with
all that we are trying to improve, I have said consistently
that this should give no comfort to any terrorist. The United
States is far better prepared and ready than it has ever been.
Certainly the tragedy, the horrific tragedy of 9/11, has caused
to be prepared. But we can always work to do better. For a
Nation, the necessity for funding and the necessity for
technology have to be utilized, along with oversight and hard
questions. We should not run away from hard questions.
As we welcome the witnesses today, I think we will be
speaking about many very important issues. We recognize the
significant milestone that is the Department of Homeland
Security's fifth year anniversary. This subcommittee will take
the opportunity to reflect on the work that TSA has done to
secure our Nation's aviation and surface transportation systems
and what work has to be done.
First, I would like to recognize, again, the work that the
TSA employees and the team have done.
Thank you, and thank you to Assistant Secretary Hawley for
your work.
However, in the business of security, there is always work
to be done for those of us charged with doing all we can to
protect the American public from those who wish to do us harm.
The work never ends, and we can never rest.
As such, we are here today to discuss not only what has
been accomplished in aviation and surface transportation
security, but what needs to be done. The TSA is responsible for
the security of highways, railroads, buses, mass transit
systems, ports and the 450 U.S. airports and employs
approximately 50,000 individuals who have the very important
mission of keeping the traveling public safe from terrorist
threats.
There are many aspects of securing transportation. First,
there must be an overarching plan and comprehensive strategy
under which all programs and policies must flow. Those programs
need to be administered efficiently in combination with
developments, in screening and detection, technology, to make
sure that threats are discovered.
We must have well-thought-out grant programs that quickly
get money to mass transit or transit systems and an appropriate
risk assessment so that continuing security investments can be
made that are tailored to particular transit systems to provide
the most comprehensive security networks, an all-important
component of security that I consider a paramount priority in
the continuing training of front-line workers. They are our
first line of defense against our enemies, and we owe it to
them to provide them with the best training, supportive work
environment and opportunities for professional development.
With respect to technology, we must cut out the red tape.
The longer we are engaged in red tape, the less secure America
becomes. If we must screen air cargo, then we must do it with
the latest technology. If it is available, we have to cut the
layers and layers of approval that now the DHS subjects
entrepreneurs and inventors of new technology that can actually
help us.
Do I want to build in fraud? Absolutely not. I want to
build in efficiency, expediency, detailed knowledge of the
technology and then approval, if it is a product or a
technology that works.
When this Congress passed into law the 9/11 bill, we
directed the Department to make improvements in the aviation
cargo screening, expanded the surface transportation security
grants, defined criteria for the handling of security-sensitive
materials on railroads and provided significant employee
training programs and protections.
I would like to think this committee has been part of the
solution. The subcommittee has worked very hard on including in
its oversight the improvement of transportation employees,
security employees. It is vitally important that the Department
continues to carry out the mandates created in the 9/11 bill.
These provisions were created in a bipartisan manner with
significant input from the Department and industry stakeholders
to close security gaps and fulfill the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission.
To be sure, the TSA has taken steps to secure the plane and
the passenger but has still left the system vulnerable to
attacks. In essence, I believe that our focus has
disproportionately been on protecting aircraft from past attack
scenarios, such as suicide hijackings, which we should never
forget, and IEDs carried out by airline passengers, and has not
given enough attention by other potential vulnerabilities.
I am encouraged by the progress that has been made within
the TSA, such as including refining the checkpoints, advances
made in behavior recognition.
Assistant Secretary Hawley, I will be asking you about a
success story we recently had in introducing technologies that
improve screening. However, there remains cause for concern, as
well. By TSA's own covert testing, TSA screeners are still
underperforming when it comes to detecting potential bombs and
bomb parts, calling into question whether TSOs are getting the
training they need to do the job that we need them to do and
that they desire to do.
Training, resources, we can't nickel-and-dime the security
of Americans. We must also not lose sight of the need for
robust surface transportation security programs. I wonder how
many of us have paid attention to the buses that travel upon
the roads and highways of this Nation, taking hardworking
Americans to work.
The intelligence tells us that transportation continues to
be the most significant security threat facing us today.
Aviation is still a premium for terrorists, but as attacks
around the world have shown us, rail and mass transit is also
an extremely attractive target for those who want to cause mass
casualties and panic, and buses, as I previously said.
When 11.3 million people are traveling by mass transit each
weekday, we cannot afford to lose sight of this vulnerability.
That is why this hearing is so vital. TSA is one of the most
high-profile components of the Department of Homeland Security.
It has a broad-based jurisdiction, and we are here to be a
partner in, again, as I said, protecting America against
threats and, as well, ensuring the safety and security of
Americans.
As the subcommittee with jurisdiction over transportation
security and infrastructure protection, we need to be in
constant communication with the TSA on how we can continue to
improve transportation security. So today, in the sense of
respect of the fifth anniversary of the department, let us
congratulate our successes, and let us thank our front-line
employees, but let us come together in our collective concern
and efforts and vigilance.
We have managed to avert a terrorist attack on our soil
since the tragic events of September 11. But even more
important than celebrating our efforts is thinking critically
and creatively and with foresight about the systemic steps that
we need to take to better secure our Nation's transportation
systems. As you are, we are here to be of assistance and to
make it happen.
I thank the witnesses for their testimony. With that, I
yield to the distinguished gentleman from California for his
opening statement.
[The statement of Chairwoman Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee
April 15, 2008
Good afternoon, I would like to thank everyone for their
participation in this afternoon's hearing entitled, ``Moving Beyond the
First Five Years: How the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Will Continue to Enhance Security for All Modes of Transportation.'' I
would also like to welcome our witnesses today who have come to talk
about this very important issue. As we recognize the significant
milestone that is the Department of Homeland Security 5-year
anniversary, this subcommittee will take this opportunity to reflect on
the work that the TSA has done to secure our Nation's aviation and
surface transportation systems, and what work has to be done.
First, I would like to recognize the hard work and dedication of
Assistant Secretary Hawley. Under Mr. Hawley, the TSA has made
significant strides in making aviation and surface transportation more
secure. This committee certainly congratulates him on his successes as
the Administrator of the TSA.
However, in the business of security, there is always work to be
done. For those of us charged with doing all we can to protect the
American public from those who wish to do us harm--the work never ends,
and we can never rest. As such, we are here today to discuss not only
what has been accomplished in aviation and surface transportation
security.
The TSA is responsible for the security of highways, railroads,
buses, mass transit systems, ports and the 450 U.S. airports, and
employs approximately 50,000 individuals who have the very important
mission of keeping the traveling public safe from terrorist threats.
There are many aspects to securing transportation. First, there
must be an overarching plan and comprehensive strategy under which all
programs and policies must flow. Those programs need to be administered
efficiently in combination with developments in screening and detection
technology to make sure that threats are discovered. We must have well-
thought-out grant programs that quickly gets money to transit systems
under an appropriate risk assessment so that continuing security
investments can be made that are tailored to particular transit systems
to provide the most comprehensive security network. An all-important
component of security that I consider a paramount priority is the
continuing training of frontline workers. They are our first line of
defense against our enemies, and we owe it to them to provide them with
the best training, supportive work environment, and opportunities for
professional development.
When this Congress passed into law the 9/11 bill, we directed the
Department to make improvements in aviation cargo screening, expanded
up the surface transportation security grants, defined criteria for the
handling of security sensitive materials on railroads, and provided
significant employee training programs and protections. It is vitally
important that the Department continues to carryout the mandates
created in the 9/11 bill. These provisions were created in a bi-
partisan matter, with significant input from the Department and
industry stakeholders, to close security gaps and fulfill the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
To be sure, the TSA has taken steps to secure the plane and the
passenger but has still left the system vulnerable to attacks. In
essence, I believe that our focus has disproportionately been on
protecting aircraft from past attack scenarios--such as suicide
hijackings and IEDs carried out by airline passengers--and has not
given enough attention to other potential vulnerabilities.
I am encouraged by the progress that has been made within the TSA,
such as including refining the checkpoints, the advancements made in
Behavior Recognition, and introducing technologies that improve
screening. However, there remains cause for concern as well. By TSA's
own covert testing, TSA screeners are still underperforming when it
comes to detecting potential bombs and bomb parts, calling into
question whether TSOs are getting the training they need to do the job
that we need them to do and that they desire to do.
We must also not lose sight of the need for a robust surface
transportation security program. The intelligence tells us that
transportation continues to be the most significant security threat
facing us today. Aviation is still a premium target for terrorists, but
as attacks around the world have shown us, rail and mass transit is
also an extremely attractive target for those who want to cause mass
casualties and panic. With 11.3 million people traveling by mass
transit each weekday, we cannot afford to lose sight of this
vulnerability. That is why this hearing is so vitally important. The
TSA is one of the most high profile components of the Department of
Homeland Security, and based on known threats, the most important.
As the subcommittee with jurisdiction over transportation security
and infrastructure protection, we need to be in constant communication
with the TSA on how we can continue to improve transportation security.
So today, in honor of the fifth anniversary of the Department, let us
congratulate our successes. Because of our collective efforts and
vigilance, we have managed to avert a terrorist attack on our soil
since the tragic events of September 11. But even more important than
celebrating our efforts is thinking critically, creatively and with
foresight about the systemic steps we need to take to better secure our
Nation's transportation systems and ensuring that we are committed and
dedicated to the implementation of these steps.
I thank the witnesses again and look forward to their testimony.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Jackson Lee.
Thank you for having this hearing.
The Transportation Security Administration is without a
doubt a critical partner in our Nation's domestic security
umbrella. Therefore, before we move beyond the first 5 years, I
believe it is important for us to reflect on what we have
learned during these formative years for TSA and for our
Homeland Security Department in general.
First and foremost, and you alluded to this a moment ago,
there have been no successful attacks against any U.S.
transportation mode since TSA was established. I don't think
that is by accident.
If anybody thinks that after 9/11 Al Qaeda put its feet up
on the table and decided that they were no longer going to try
and attack us, I think that person is living in a dream world.
There have been no successful attacks since--well, in 2002,
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and thus far in 2008. I don't
think that is by accident. I think it is because of the hard
work of many men and women around the world, including those
involved with TSA.
So, before we look forward, it seems to me we should
recognize and commend the outstanding work of all, including
TSA, in fulfilling their mission in securing our air, rail and
bus transportation systems. TSA has accomplished their mission,
yet we know there is much more to be done. There is no
perfection in this world, and we can always do better.
We have had hearings in which we have pointed out
shortcomings, as we have also acknowledged the successes within
the Department of Homeland Security, and I hope that will
continue.
But it seems to me we on our side over here could be doing
some things, too. We have not in the last year-and-a-half
provided a homeland security authorization bill. That is 2
consecutive years.
It seems to me, if we are serious about finding ways TSA
could enhance future transportation security, passing an
authorization bill, whether or not the Senate would move along
with it, would be an important first step. It would show
exactly we think TSA and the Department should be going. It
would show a commitment on a total bipartisan basis in our
effort to ensure that we continue with progress.
Another helpful change that we could make would be to
consolidate congressional jurisdiction of the Homeland Security
Department. I know how many times we have had TSA up here. I
know how many times we have had other people from the
Department of Homeland Security here.
It seems to me that TSA and the Department could focus on
its critical transportation security responsibilities in a
better way, instead of responding to and appearing before
countless congressional committees. I mean, that was the
promise of reorganization here in the Congress to go along with
the reorganization on the Executive branch.
I will say that my side of the aisle failed to do it, and I
was hoping that maybe we would see this in the last couple of
years, but it hasn't. That is not a partisan issue. That is a
congressional issue that continues.
But we ought to step up and say, if this is a priority, we
ought to have the courage to reorganize ourselves. Congress
should also stop the continuous departmental reorganizations. I
think this would stabilize the working environment and improve
productivity in the entire Department.
So, looking forward, TSA can enhance future security for
all modes of transportation by not abandoning the risk-based
security principles in pursuit of something which is elusive,
100 percent this, 100 percent that. One hundred percent
screening solutions at times may sound good, but they may not
in fact be the practical way that we deal with the problem.
Risk assessment allows TSA and the Department to
effectively target its financial and intelligence resources for
a greater security benefit. Without unlimited funding, and we
will never have that, we in the Congress have to do better. We
have to be smarter. We have to make sure that our Department is
smarter than the terrorists. We have to use our intelligence
and layered security measures to mitigate future risks.
As much as I would like to say it could be true, the fact
of the matter is risks cannot be eliminated entirely, and we
ought to level with the American public on that. It can be
managed and it can be practically dealt with and effectively
dealt with in all areas. But that is also true in a
transportation system as large as ours.
If we tried to promise something which is impossible,
bankruptcy will result and terrorists will win. I hope that we
can continue to use the risk-based approach, the layered
security approach, working in a cooperative effort between the
Congress and the Executive branch, pointing out the warts where
they exist, and I know occasionally you folks point out the
warts which exist over here, as well.
But we should be giving the American people confidence that
we are in this together, not for partisan purposes, but on a
bipartisan basis attempting to do the best for this country
under the best of circumstances that we can create. So I look
forward to the hearing today and to hear from our witnesses
this afternoon.
We have reviewed the prepared testimony. I might have to
skip out for a short time for another meeting I have, but I
will be back here for the round of questions and I know we will
probably be interrupted by votes on the floor, too. But I will
be back after that to make sure that we have a chance for the
questioning round.
So thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the ranking member and join him in
accepting the challenge. Obviously, as he admitted, when the
House was in different leadership it was quite difficult to try
to disturb this jurisdictional, if you will, roadblock that we
sometimes have.
I can assure you that myself and the Chairman of the full
committee are committed to ensuring a well-run Department of
Homeland Security with minimal amount of overlapping in
jurisdiction. We are willing to take up the challenge, and I
think as we listen to the witnesses, who may themselves wish to
comment on streamlining the jurisdictional oversight, we will
work together. We hope that you will have the votes on your
side of the aisle, and we will work to get the votes on our
side of the aisle, because it certainly is an important
question.
I would like to also note that you made an important point
about authorization, and of course we did pass an authorization
bill out of the House last year. We really will look forward to
tackling that again and working to ensure that it happens. But
we all are concerned about those issues, and we thank you for
your statement.
Let me as well now indicate that other members of the
subcommittee are reminded that under the committee rules
opening statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Hon. Brown-Waite follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ginny Brown-Waite
Thank you Chairwoman Jackson Lee and Ranking Member Lungren for
holding this hearing today.
While it is important for this committee to examine the role of the
Department of Homeland Security 5 years after the Department's
inception, I cannot overlook the committee's failure to draft and pass
an authorization bill. As many of my colleagues have pointed out,
passing an authorization bill is a primary responsibility of this
committee, and we must attend to this duty as quickly as possible.
Today, I look forward to hearing from Assistant Secretary Hawley
and our other witnesses as they shed light on the Transportation
Security Administration's greatest successes to date, and the looming
challenges they face in attempting to keep our transportation system
and critical infrastructure secure.
Specifically, I hope that Assistant Secretary Hawley can provide an
update on the status of Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) enrollment in the State of Florida. The well-intentioned TWIC
program must be implemented in a way that does not undo the good work
of States that took meaningful steps to protect their ports before TWIC
was developed.
This committee must also address how TSA plans to test airport
worker screening methods. As Congresswoman Lowey and I signaled with
the passage of our bill, H.R. 1413, to create a pilot program to screen
such workers, this is an issue TSA must confront as quickly as
possible. While there has been speculation that TSA may launch a
similar pilot program in the near future, I hope that the Assistant
Secretary can elaborate on his plan for approaching airport worker
screening.
Finally, I would like to thank the Assistant Secretary and TSA for
their dedication to keeping Americans, especially those of us who must
travel frequently, out of harm's way. Confronting terrorism and
protecting this Nation is often a thankless task, but your
accomplishments over the last 5 years have not gone unnoticed.
Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I welcome our panel of witnesses. Our
first witness, Assistant Secretary Kip Hawley, is very well
known to this committee. As the distinguished administrator of
the Transportation Security Administration, Kip Hawley has
exhibited his extensive transportation technology experience in
both the private and public sectors, his tenure as Assistant
Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security
Administration, since his swearing in in 2005.
Welcome.
Our second witness is Ms. Cathy Berrick, who is Director of
Homeland Security and Justice at the Government Accountability
Office. In this position, she oversees GAO's reviews of
aviation and surface transportation security matters, has
developed a broad knowledge of transportation security
practices and related Federal policies and Federal and private
sector roles and responsibilities.
Our third witness is Mr. Clark Kent Ervin, who has spent
some of his best years in Houston, Texas. Clark Kent Ervin
joined the Aspen Institute in January 2005 to explore the
creation of a homeland security initiative. Before joining the
institute, he served as the first inspector general of the
United States Department of Homeland Security from January 2003
to December 2004. Prior to his service at DHS, he served as the
inspector general of the United States Department of State from
August 2001 to January 2003. His service in the George W. Bush
administration is preceded by his service as the associate
director of policy in the White House Office of National
Service in the George H.W. Bush administration.
Welcome.
Our fourth and final witness is Mr. Stewart Verdery of
Monument Policy Group. From 2003 to 2005, he served as the
first assistant secretary for policy and planning at the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security. Following his unanimous
confirmation by the U.S. Senate, at DHS Border and
Transportation Security Directorate, he led efforts to develop
and implement policies related to immigration, visas, travel
facilitation, cargo security and international trade,
transportation security and law enforcement. Mr. Verdery
supervised policy development at agencies such as the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection and the Transportation Security
Administration. Mr. Verdery also serves as an adjunct fellow at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his
5 minute statement, beginning with Assistant Secretary Hawley.
STATEMENT OF KIP HAWLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Hawley. Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Hon.
Bilirakis, members of the subcommittee.
I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the
first 5 years at DHS for TSA and look ahead to the next 5
years. Two weeks ago today, Kevin Brown walked into the Orlando
Airport. A behavior detection manager in plainclothes saw Mr.
Brown and he saw a few things that caught his interest as a
trained behavior specialist.
Along with additional behavior detection officers, they
intercepted his checked baggage before they went to screening.
When they had searched his bags, they found everything you need
to build a bomb.
Brown didn't make it to the checkpoint and his bags never
left the lobby. He was intercepted and taken into custody by
the Orlando police, searched at curbside by the Orange County
bomb squad and turned over to the FBI. This is layered security
in action. It is an excellent example of TSA's partnership with
law enforcement and it is part of our new paradigm to recognize
and use the skill of our workforce to add layers of security to
go on offense.
How do we do that? There are three prongs to our approach
to upgrade security: people, technology and process. All of
those need to be improved, and all are moving forward as we
speak. We call it Checkpoint Evolution because we do not have
the game-changing technology that will at once take us back to
pre-9/11 convenience.
By upgrading what we do have, our significant people and
technology resources, coupled with process innovation, we can
get the security result we need with a lot less hassle to
passengers. Recently, TSA announced a prototype checkpoint that
will shortly be tested in Baltimore.
You will see there an integrated security checkpoint
bringing together people, technology and better process. You
will first notice a new look, but the most significant piece
involves our officers.
The checkpoint configuration and technology will support a
team approach that will be calmer and more conducive to smart
security. It all starts with our people. They are our biggest
investment, and if we motivate and prepare them to their best,
they will in fact improve TSA security.
Our TSOs are ready to use that experience and skill from
working with passengers every day to take security up a level.
This committee has been forward leaning, and the Chairwoman
mentioned in her opening statement their commitment to front-
line training. TSA is committed, as well.
We have begun a top-to-bottom retraining of our workforce.
I and every TSO working at a checkpoint will undergo this year
an extensive 12-hour retraining, bringing together the latest
thinking from intelligence, from explosive detection and in
human factors that can affect security.
This will give us the tools to go on offense. It is not
about completing a checklist. It is about stopping terror
plots.
On the technology front of Checkpoint Evolution, we will be
upgrading the technology you see at passenger checkpoints. For
quick, less-intrusive, highly effective screening of what is
carried on the person, whole-body imaging will be deployed,
this week, to JFK and LAX airports. We will begin operating
millimeter-wave technology at those airports.
In addition, we will be purchasing at least 30 more of the
machines for deployment at airports this year. I have
previously said that we are deploying 250 multi-view advanced
X-ray machines by midyear and today I am pleased to announce
our plan to purchase and deploy another 580 units, totaling
830, using fiscal year 2007 supplemental and fiscal year 2008
annual appropriations.
We have got 250 already bought. We are announcing today we
are going to add another 580. Multi-view advanced X-ray is a
powerful platform on which to build additional software
algorithms as new detection technologies become available,
including for liquids.
Six hundred of these machines, of the new A.T. machines,
are going to be deployed by year-end. TSA's strategy is to
start with intelligence, partner with law enforcement, industry
partners and the public and use security measures that are
flexible, widely deployable, mobile and layered to cover the
inevitable gaps that exist or develop in our complex open
transportation network.
We cannot afford to spend all our energy looking for listed
items while standing behind the magnetometer. We have to look
up from the checklist and be proactive, engaged in really
evaluating risk.
TSOs and all of us at TSA are focused not only on what we
already know, but also on being alert for clues of something
new, different and dangerous. That is the challenge of the next
5 years, to execute against known threats, but also to have the
courage and imagination to put measures in place now that will
disrupt whatever may come at us.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Hawley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kip Hawley
April 15, 2008
Good afternoon, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren, and
Members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to
discuss how transportation security has evolved and what the future
holds for transportation security.
The Department of Homeland Security has reached a significant
milestone in passing its fifth anniversary in March. Secretary Chertoff
has noted that it is time to assess how far the Department has come and
where it must go in the next 5 years. In that context, Secretary
Chertoff outlined the Department's priorities as: Identifying the
nature and scope of threats, assessing our vulnerabilities in relation
to these threats, preventing these threats from materializing, and
preparing responses to and recovery from disasters resulting from acts
of terrorism and nature. As the Secretary recently noted, before
September 11 we did not have an effective aviation security system to
protect the 2 million domestic air travelers who rely on commercial
aviation every single day. Today, the traveling public benefits from 20
layers of screening--from hardened cockpit doors; to Federal Air
Marshals; to 100 percent screening of passengers and their bags by the
dedicated men and women of the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA).
In conjunction with Secretary Chertoff, TSA is focused on risk-
based security using all of our resources--our people, our processes
and our technology--to get ahead of the terrorist threat. Namely: To
stop what is in progress; to disrupt and deter what is being planned;
and to address vulnerabilities that will strengthen our core. Two
recent items in the news remind us of the importance of these
challenges and of how TSA has successfully met them.
The first concerns the eight men currently standing trial in London
who are accused of a plot to conduct suicide bombings during the summer
of 2006 onboard passenger planes destined for North America. As details
of that plot emerge, the public is learning that deception and the use
of unconventional tactics are two of the staples employed by those who
desire to do us harm. The plot involved targeting flights bound for San
Francisco, New York, Washington, Chicago, Montreal, and Toronto with
home-made liquid explosives capable of being assembled and detonated
mid-flight. In opening statements, jurors were told that these
transatlantic flights, all leaving Heathrow Airport within 2\1/2\ hours
of one another, would be simultaneously blown up in midair with the
goal of killing on ``an almost unprecedented scale.'' Immediately after
the plot was foiled, TSA developed, with the help of the Science and
Technology Directorate, the current 3-1-1 liquids policy which, to
date, has proven to be an effective tool to manage the threat of liquid
explosives.
The second concerns a successful catch by our Behavior Detection
Officers (BDOs) earlier this month at the Orlando International
airport. On Tuesday, April 1, a Jamaica-bound passenger, Kevin Brown,
aroused suspicion of TSA BDOs, who, working in conjunction with the
Orlando Police Department, the Orange County Bomb Squad, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, uncovered prohibited bomb-making
materials located in the passenger's checked bag. Their swift action
demonstrated that BDOs, trained to detect deceptive and suspicious
behavior, are contributing to airline security by detecting and
discovering dangerous people and dangerous items.
Facing a risk of unparalleled dimension, TSA has clarified its
mission by incorporating a risk-based and layered strategy into
security operations and programs. In evaluating our resources, we have
invested in promising technologies designed to more effectively aid us
in achieving our security mission. To engage our workforce, we have
relied upon the value of their input, provided provisions for their
safety, rewarded their work ethic through pay for performance
incentives, provided career progression opportunities, and invested in
their professional potential with increased training programs. In order
to leverage the value of our partners and stakeholders in the
transportation security community, we have developed and fostered
relationships with other government agencies, local law enforcement,
and the private sector. Finally, strong management of these assets has
enabled TSA to produce a spirit of evolution and a bold security
approach focusing on people, process, and technology.
Despite the challenges we have faced in implementing these ideals,
we have made significant progress, which I feel privileged to highlight
today.
EVOLUTION OF SECURITY AT THE CHECKPOINT
An effective security system must constantly be evolving. TSA is in
the process of a fundamental shift in strategy for the security
checkpoint which encompasses people, process, and technology. This is
the most significant change occurring in passenger screening since 9/11
and even since the checkpoint was first established in the 1970's. TSA
has taken a fresh look at our checkpoint operations to see how we can
improve security. We took what we know from the intelligence and
security communities, we listened to our employees, we learned from
passengers, we evaluated readily deployable technology, and have come
up with changes that we are piloting.
People.--The human element is critical to achieving a high standard
of security. TSA is overhauling the process at the checkpoint and
relying more on personal interaction to detect irregular behavior.
TSA's introduction of behavior detection and assuming the position of
travel document checker have proven to be valuable methods of
identifying people who are exhibiting unusual signs of stress, fear,
and/or deception at the checkpoint. Behavior detection draws a contrast
between average levels of travel stress and those intending to do harm.
Training all security officers to increase passenger interaction on a
one-on-one basis will achieve a calmer, quieter environment that will
result in heightened security.
Process.--The current checkpoint during a peak travel period is
often noisy and congested. Part of the noise comes from security
officers shouting instructions at travelers. A chaotic, noisy congested
checkpoint is a security nightmare because it can potentially conceal
the enemy. The prototype at Thurgood Marshall Baltimore-Washington
International Airport (BWI) gives screeners wireless whisper radio
headsets which will allow them to perform their duties in a more low-
key demeanor and communicate more effectively with others on their
team. Further, the prototype has light and sound elements designed to
have a calming effect.
Another simple yet effective program that improves the checkpoint
process is Self-Select Lanes currently running in Salt Lake City,
Orlando, Denver, Spokane, Boston, Orlando, Cincinnati, and Raleigh-
Durham, with more planned in the near future. Self-Select Lanes are
comprised of a series of lanes designated by signage that directs
passengers based on their travel needs and knowledge--Expert, for the
business traveler who flies several times a month; Casual, for
passengers that travel less frequently, but are familiar with the
security process; and Family/Special Assistance, for passengers
traveling with small children or strollers, elderly passengers, and
passengers who may need special assistance. These lanes give passengers
some control over the checkpoint process and have reduced the number of
alarms and prohibited items at the checkpoint.
Technology.--New technology does not currently exist to adequately
address the threat alone so TSA, working closely with the Science and
Technology Directorate, is investing in the development and deployment
of proven technology, including multi-view X-ray and whole body
imaging. These are the first significant additions to checkpoint
technology since walk-through metal detectors and standard X-ray
machines were introduced in the 1970's. Multi-view X-ray gives the
security officers a better look at what is in the carry-on and will
potentially speed up the process because fewer bag checks will be
required. The other advantage is the equipment can be upgraded as new
software algorithms are mastered.
TSA introduced millimeter wave in Phoenix, and we will roll out
this technology at LAX and JFK this month and BWI later this spring.
This technology can detect items concealed on the body, including
plastics, through a robotic image that will be viewed from a remote
location. TSA will be working to socialize this technology with the
American public. It is already in use in international transportation
venues, and will improve security while maintaining passenger privacy
by ensuring that images will not be saved or stored.
DEFINING OUR MISSION
Risk-Based, Layered Security
Checkpoint evolution is based upon a risk-based strategy that
requires us to envision the whole picture and implement selective and
unpredictable security measures. TSA is focusing beyond the physical
checkpoint--pushing our borders out and concentrating on persons with
hostile intent or those conducting surveillance even if they are not
carrying a prohibited item. By spreading our layers of security
throughout the airport environment and elsewhere, we have multiple
opportunities to detect terrorists and leverage the capabilities of our
workforce, our partners, and our technology.
Using this approach, we have significantly improved security at
airports by deploying our workforce in new locations and for new
functions. Our Travel Document Checker (TDC) program, which enhances
security by detecting individuals who attempt to board an aircraft with
fraudulent identification documents, has been implemented at all
federalized airports. We deployed 1,323 Behavior Detection Officers
(BDO) and trained them to identify potentially high-risk individuals
who exhibit behaviors indicating hostile intent at over 88 of our
busiest airports as part of the Screening Passengers by Observation
Technique (SPOT) program. In cooperation with Federal, State and local
law enforcement and aviation and surface transportation entities
nationwide, we have also deployed Visible Intermodal Protection and
Response (VIPR) teams, comprised of TSOs, BDOs, Transportation Security
Inspectors (TSIs), and Federal Air Marshals. VIPR teams enhance the
security of persons and critical infrastructure and prevent, prepare
for, protect against, and respond to acts of terrorism in all modes of
transportation at any location.
Enhanced Employee Screening.--In addition to the extensive scrutiny
that employees working in a sensitive airport environment must undergo
before being allowed unescorted access to the Security Identification
Display Areas (SIDA) or the sterile areas of our Nation's airports-
criminal history records checks and name-based checks against terrorist
watchlists, we have developed the Aviation Direct Access Screening
Program (ADASP), which conducts random and unpredictable screening of
individuals employed at airports who enter secured areas of airports
and their accessible property.
Screening of Air Cargo.--In carrying out the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act), Pub. L. 110-53
(2007), requirement of screening 100 percent of cargo transported on
passenger aircraft, TSA is stressing effective security management of
the air cargo supply chain. Collaborating with stakeholders--U.S.-based
shippers, freight forwarders, and passenger air carriers--TSA is
developing a program that will facilitate screening early in the supply
chain using currently approved screening methods and stringent facility
and personnel security standards. TSA will build upon our established
programs: air cargo security regulations, Security Directives, and
increased use of TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams and
TSIs for Cargo.
TSA's strategy will involve every component of the air cargo
shipping system from the entity originating the freight to the freight
consolidators/forwarders, airports, and finally to air carriers who
transport the cargo--and the people involved in the process that have
access to cargo at every point in the supply chain. This program is
designed to harmonize with the international community since a large
portion of air cargo moves on international flights.
TSA employs 300 Cargo TSIs who are exclusively dedicated to the
oversight of air cargo. An additional 150 air cargo TSIs will be added
by the end of fiscal year 2008. Inspectors conducted more than 30,000
compliance reviews in fiscal year 2006 and initiated more than 1,300
formal investigations based on suspected non-compliance with TSA. Along
with performing daily oversight of cargo operators, inspectors also
conduct covert testing of the air cargo system and participate in
``cargo strike'' surge activities at our Nation's largest cargo
airports.
General Aviation.--TSA is collaborating with the general aviation
(GA) community and our interagency partners to develop reasonable,
feasible, and effective security for GA operations while ensuring that
these measures support continued operations and increased growth of the
industry. TSA currently vets aircrew and passengers in certain high-
interest GA sectors, including flights flying into the ``Maryland-3''
airports (Potomac, Hyde, and College Park), GA flights flying into or
out of Reagan Washington National Airport, and certain categories of
private charter flights and general aviation aircraft. TSA is also
working with aircraft operators and Fixed Base Operators directly to
develop voluntary programs of verifying the identification of
passengers on board aircraft and maintaining facility security in and
around GA aircraft.
Internationally, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
recently issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that will
require GA operators to submit comprehensive manifest data about
passengers, crew, and flight information electronically to CBP, as part
of its Electronic Advance Passenger Information System (e-APIS), at
least 60 minutes before the aircraft departs for the United States.
Currently, we only receive very basic information from GA aircraft
coming into the United States, such as who is and is not a U.S.
citizen. Having this information an hour before departure will give CBP
officers more time to fully pre-screen travelers and crews and take
necessary actions to resolve threats.
Vetting
TSA's Office of Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing
(TTAC) consolidates the management of all vetting and credentialing
programs designed to identify known or suspected terrorist threats
seeking access to transportation systems, using terrorist-related
threat assessments. Since late 2003, TTAC has continually vetted flight
crews and other crewmembers on commercial and all-cargo flights flying
internationally into, out of, or over the United States or its
territorial airspace, representing about 50,000 crewmembers daily.
TTAC's mission has expanded to include vetting in other critical
sectors of transportation, including truck drivers applying for a
HAZMAT endorsement and persons or entities within the United States
engaging indirectly in air transportation of property on passenger
aircraft. Also, each and every foreign national applying for flight
training, leading to an additional skill, at any FAA-certified school
anywhere in the world is vetted before beginning that training. TSA is
seeking fee legislation to capture the costs related to these
applications ensuring a self-supporting sustainable fee-funded program.
Secure Flight.--To enhance the vetting of aviation passengers
against terrorist watch lists, TSA published a NPRM to implement the
Secure Flight program on August 23, 2007. As proposed, Secure Flight
will bring the process of comparing passenger names against the watch
list, now performed by aircraft operators, into the government and will
align domestic and international passenger pre-screening. This will
establish a more consistent and effective watch list matching process
and enhance our ability to stop terrorists before they get to the
passenger screening checkpoint. TSA is now evaluating the comments
received from the public and industry and preparing the Final Rule. We
have taken the time to build the Secure Flight program right. We have
built a program with the operational requirements necessary to enhance
aviation security while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of
the traveling public. The DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS
TRIP) is available for passengers who feel they have been improperly
delayed or prohibited from boarding an aircraft.
TSA has begun voluntary testing with airlines to validate the
Secure Flight watch list matching system, in which volunteer aircraft
operators provide data to TSA, while continuing to conduct watch list
checks for their flights. TSA will compare the results of its watch
list matching with these air carrier results to ensure the validity of
the Secure Flight system.
Transportation Worker Identify Card (TWIC).--The TWIC program
provides a tamper-resistant biometric credential to maritime workers
requiring unescorted access to secure areas of port facilities and
vessels regulated under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. 107-295. As of April 8, 2008, TSA has enrolled more than
213,000 port workers at approximately 90 fixed enrollment centers and
expects to complete national roll-out of 147 fixed enrollment centers
and enroll nearly 1 million workers during 2008.
In cooperation with the United States Coast Guard (USCG), we have
initiated pilot programs with partners in five distinct locations
across the country to test card readers in real world marine
environments. Current participants are the Port Authorities of Los
Angeles, Long Beach, Brownsville, and New York/New Jersey, and vessel
operations in Annapolis, Maryland and Vicksburg, Mississippi. We are
also working with DHS's Science and Technology Directorate and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to execute our
test plan that will evaluate the card-reader interface under a variety
of conditions and assess its impact on operations.
EFFICIENTLY ALIGNING OUR RESOURCES
People
TSA continues to seek efficiencies in our field operations. Through
the use of the Staffing Allocation Model (SAM), we are able to identify
operational and efficiency gains by better utilizing our TSOs. We have
improved our TSO scheduling to more accurately align with passenger
loads and air carrier schedules, increased the use of part-time
employees and expanded the use of ``split-shift'' employees to increase
staffing during high-volume periods. We have also installed computers
at or near screening checkpoints to allow a more efficient use of TSO
time for training and reduce their time away from checkpoints.
Technology
As a result of our close relationship with the Science and
Technology Directorate, working through the Capstone Integrated Product
Team (IPT) process, we are constantly seeking new technology solutions.
The events on 9/11 and the details of the London plot being made public
now teach us that we must anticipate threats that continue to grow in
sophistication and complexity. This effort includes leveraging the
skills of our TSOs with new technology designed to increase threat
detection and improve efficiencies in checkpoint throughput. We added
23 in-line Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) for checked baggage
screening at airports and are adding significant next generation
technologies. We are deploying liquids scanning devices at checkpoints
and are now using a hand-held liquids scanner for non-checkpoint
screening locations. We will begin deploying Advanced Technology (AT)
X-ray equipment for carry-on baggage, which provides TSOs with a better
capability to identify and detect threats through improved imagery and
analysis tools.
Other technology is being evaluated. We are pilot testing whole
body imagers to quickly and safely screen passengers for prohibited
items without the need for physical contact on a voluntary basis. We
are exploring Automated Carry-On Explosives Detection Systems (Auto-
EDS) for inspecting carry-on items, and we are testing new cast and
prosthesis scanners that will provide a safe, dignified, and non-
invasive way to identify potential threats and clear passengers wearing
casts, braces, and prosthetic devices. Finally, we are evaluating
several new products that will greatly increase the speed of handling
and screening checked baggage, particularly when integrated into an
airport's baggage handling system, while reducing the size of the
footprint of the baggage screening location.
The President's fiscal year 2009 budget request reflects TSA's plan
to strategically deploy additional technology that will improve
security for passengers, generate additional staffing efficiencies, and
improve the passenger's travel experience. The request anticipates an
additional $426 million annually in mandatory funds generated by a 4-
year $0.50 temporary surcharge on the passenger security fee with a
maximum increase of $1.00 per one-way trip. The temporary surcharge
would be deposited into the Aviation Security Capital Fund (ASCF) for
the specific purpose of purchasing, installing, and recapitalizing
inline EDS. This is being requested together with a proposal to allow
for more flexible funding of inline EDS, including the discretionary
use of letters of intent. This additional funding will allow TSA and
our airport partners to greatly accelerate the implementation of the
checked baggage screening investment plan.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Mitigation
Our TSOs undergo some of the world's most intensive IED training to
understand the nature of explosives and detect even the most cleverly
conceived devices. To learn to identify anomalies and enhance detection
of liquid explosives and other emerging threats, TSOs receive extensive
classroom, checkpoint, and computer-based IED recurrent training.
Practical exercises further enhance the ability to carefully scrutinize
the images which appear on the X-ray machines in order to recognize IED
components that are artfully concealed or disguised as innocuous items,
such as gels, shampoos, toothpaste, and shaving cream within bottles
and containers. The training is flexible and updated to respond to any
new potential threat against the Nation's transportation systems.
Additionally, TSA deploys special bomb simulation kits for recurrent
training purposes at all airport checkpoints. These kits are designed
to train TSOs to ``think like a terrorist,'' by creatively constructing
and concealing simulated explosive components and materials, and
attempting to get them through the checkpoints.
ENGAGING OUR WORKFORCE
The success of any operation depends on the quality of the people
involved. TSA has had a major focus on improving security by improving
the capabilities of its people. Better recruiting and hiring, better
training, better incentive systems, career progression opportunity,
more involvement in decisions effecting the workforce, and more
recognition of the critical role played by our people--these efforts
all have a positive effect on the security result TSA delivers.
Training.--We are in the process of rolling out a major training
package that ties together the latest intelligence analysis, more
advanced explosives detection skills, and ways to engage with
passengers in a way that gets calmer environment and better security
result.
Career Progression.--The Career Progression Program has been in
effect for a full year in fiscal year 2007. This program provides
widespread career growth and professional development opportunities for
high-performing TSOs. The plan allows TSOs to continue to advance in
their work based on their skills and performance; this will open up
more opportunities for TSOs to potentially qualify for security,
protection, or law enforcement jobs elsewhere within the Department of
Homeland Security.
Policies.--Recently, I met with the second generation National
Advisory Committee (NAC-2), which is a group comprised of all levels of
screening personnel selected by their peers. Together, we made
significant changes to the performance management system based on their
recommendations because we want our security professionals engaged in
their work and gaining knowledge through training as opposed to being
bogged down with assessment requirements. We want our supervisors and
managers on the floor, coaching and involved with the activity at the
checkpoint, not spending all of their time with program administration.
TSA leadership is serious about implementing human capital policies,
including pay, that reflect the critical importance of TSA people being
engaged and motivated for our vital job.
Safety.--Maintaining a healthy, able-bodied workforce is also
critical to TSA's mission. We have improved workplace safety through a
series of aggressive initiatives, including Optimization and Safety
Integrated Product Teams, involvement of the National Advisory Council
in planning aspects of the Safety program including the Safety Week
Campaign, the deployment of contract safety specialists to support TSA
field operations, and timely investigation of incidents to identify and
correct safety problems. We have automated the injury claim filing
process for injured TSOs to ensure that benefits are uninterrupted, and
our Nurse Case Manager Program is helping to return injured TSOs to
productive duty once they are medically capable. As a result, we
reduced the number of TSO Lost Time injuries and illnesses by 26.1
percent from 4,367 in fiscal year 2006 to 3,228 in fiscal year 2007--a
reduction to 7.19 injuries per 200,000 work hours.
DEVELOPING STRONG PARTNERSHIPS WITHIN ALL MODES
Surface Transportation Security
Strong partnerships have especially proven to be critical as we
expand our presence in modes of surface transportation security. TSA
continues to make progress in addressing major system wide security
risks in surface transportation and build information sharing networks.
We work closely with stakeholders in these industries, putting an
emphasis on sharing intelligence, capacity, and technology with that of
other law enforcement, intelligence or other agencies at every level of
government. We also continue to work closely with the Department of
Transportation (DOT), its various modal administrations, and the many
other surface transportation stakeholders to enhance security through
partnerships, proposed regulations, and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) with grant planning, evaluation and awards.
Freight Rail.--Secretary Chertoff established the priority goal of
achieving a 50 percent reduction in the objectively measured risk posed
by rail cars carrying toxic inhalation hazards (TIH) by the end of
2008. To achieve this goal, TSA has implemented a multi-layered
security strategy which includes regulatory development, cooperative
agreements, and comprehensive risk-based programs. To objectively
measure success in reducing the risk associated with TIH rail
transportation, TSA developed a program that will track and measure the
standstill time of TIH cars in high threat urban areas (HTUA)'s. Using
a detailed set of tracking data and comprehensive field inspections, to
date TSA has been able to document a 42.9 percent reduction in the
overall risk.
On December 21, 2006, TSA published a proposed rule (NPRM) to
strengthen the security of the Nation's freight rail systems in (HTUA).
The NPRM addressed shippers, carriers, and receivers of TIHs and other
security-sensitive materials by rail. Proposed requirements include
railcar location reporting within a specific time period and the
establishment of a secure chain of custody from shippers to railroads
and from railroads to receivers within HTUAs. TSA also proposed
requirements for designating rail security coordinators and suspicious
incident reporting by rail mass transit, passenger rail, and all
freight rail carriers. We intend to publish this final rule by the end
of the year.
Passenger Transit Programs and Grants.--As a strategic priority,
TSA focuses on elevating terrorism prevention and immediate response
capabilities in passenger transit systems through operational
deterrence, security training and exercises, and key infrastructure
protection.
A critical component of this effort is the Baseline Assessment for
Security Enhancement (BASE). TSA Transportation Security Inspectors
assess passenger transit systems in 17 areas foundational to an
effective security program. Applying the results of the 63
comprehensive security assessments completed to date, TSA has developed
and implemented programs and allocated resources for counterterrorism
training of frontline employees, dedicated anti-terrorism operational
packages, and transit system-focused terrorism prevention and response
exercises--each eligible for funding as priorities under the Transit
Security Grant Program.
The success of the BASE program reflects the close security
partnership developed with passenger transit systems. To facilitate
development of effective security strategies and programs, TSA
established the Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group.
Formed under the framework of the Government and Sector Coordinating
Councils, the Advisory Group brings together the expertise of 15
transit police chiefs and security directors from systems across the
Nation as a consultative forum with extensive experience to help align
security strategies and programs with operational realities.
Highway.--TSA is working on a number of strategies to close gaps in
security in various aspects of the highway sector-school buses, over-
the-road buses, commercial motor vehicles (CMV), HAZMAT motor carriers,
and highway infrastructure. Collaborating with industry and our
governmental partners, ongoing programs and initiatives include
training and development of standards and guidelines. TSA partners with
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to support these
efforts.
To facilitate information sharing, the Highway and Motor Carrier
Sector Government Coordinating Council (GCC) and Sector Coordinating
Council (SCC) meet on a regular basis. TSA has also developed a
Homeland Security Information Network Highway portal, a TSA Highway &
Motor Carrier (HMC) Web page, an internal TSA Highway and Motor monthly
newsletter for field personnel, and contributes security notes to
industry trade periodicals. The Highway and Motor Carrier Industry
Information and Analysis Center and Highway Watch programs are active
and continually processing reports from highway operators and sharing
information between industry and TSA.
To facilitate domain awareness, TSA conducts Corporate Security
Reviews (CSRs) with motor vehicle transportation organizations, as well
as organizations that maintain or operate key physical assets within
the highway transportation community with a current focus on the
transportation of HAZMAT by motor carriers. TSA is developing a pilot
project for testing the feasibility of tracking trucks carrying HAZMAT
by location and load type. The pilot includes the development of a set
of protocols capable of interfacing with existing truck tracking
systems, State and local government intelligence operations centers,
Federal law enforcement agencies, and first responders. The Integrated
Intermodal Information System-Domestic Feasibility Study focused on the
transportation of Extremely Hazardous Materials throughout the domestic
transportation system.
Pipeline.--TSA initiated a number of programs to assist pipeline
companies in their efforts to secure these vital systems. For example,
through the CSR Program, we have reviewed company adoption of the
pipeline security guidelines and developed a best security practices
document based on observations throughout the industry.
TSA partnered with our counterparts in Natural Resources Canada
(NRCan) to hold an International Pipeline Security Forum. This event
provided an opportunity for pipeline companies, industry associations,
and government representatives to exchange security information and
best practices. We continue to work with NRCan on cross-border pipeline
assessments in accordance with the Security and Prosperity Partnership
agreement.
9/11 Act Implementation
Finally, the recent 9/11 Act implemented important recommendations
from the
9/11 Commission and affirmed that Congress remains one of our strongest
partners. This legislation received overwhelming support from Members
of Congress and provided TSA with much needed tools to evolve
transportation security. In particular, we are pleased to now have the
authority to establish an administrative process for civil enforcement
of surface transportation regulations and orders, the flexibility to
develop a robust air cargo screening program that maintains the flow of
commerce, and the authority for VIPR teams to operate in all modes of
transportation. Overall, the act authorized 33 programs and 20
rulemaking actions for TSA, many of which were already initiated by
TSA. Fiscal year 2009 will be the first full year of TSA's expanded
inspector work force and K-9 team deployment, both strongly supported
in the 9/11 Act. TSA will utilize this legislation as another vehicle
to deliver the evolution of transportation security.
CONCLUSION
The needs of people must continue to drive the focus of
transportation security. The American people and the traveling public
require a transportation infrastructure that can be secured without the
expense of unreasonable burdens. The people in our workforce require
investments that will allow them to perform effectively and grow
professionally. The people within our homeland security partnerships
and network require cooperation, communication, and leadership. The
strength of these relationships has been fundamental to our progress
and must continue to remain a focal point as we more forward.
Madam Chairwoman, thank you again for this opportunity to highlight
the progress TSA has made since its creation and to provide a road map
for the evolution of transportation security. I look forward to our
continued work together and would be pleased to respond to your
questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I now recognize Ms. Berrick to summarize her statement for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN BERRICK, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Berrick. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Ranking Member
Bilirakis for inviting me here to discuss GAO's work assessing
TSA's progress in securing the transportation network and
needed focus moving forward.
Since its creation, we have reported that TSA has made
moderate progress in securing aviation and surface
transportation modes. In other words, we reported that TSA has
generally achieved between half and three-quarters of the
expectations set out for them by Congress, the administration
and DHS itself.
With respect to progress, we found that TSA has made
significant achievements in the following four key areas:
hiring, deploying, training and measuring the performance of
its aviation security workforce; developing, implementing and
testing procedures for screening passengers and baggage;
deploying systems to screen checked baggage for explosives; and
conducting risk assessments, partnering with stakeholders and
administering grant programs for surface transportation
systems.
For example, we reported that TSA has developed robust
training programs for TSOs, including enhanced explosives
detection training. TSA also issued strategies for securing
transportation modes and is pursuing a rulemaking to guide its
efforts in securing passenger and freight rail systems.
However, we found that other key areas need continued
attention, both in the short and long terms. First, it is
important that TSA move forward on initiatives to secure
airport perimeters and access to restricted airport areas.
Although TSA has completed technology pilots and issued
guidelines for biometric identification systems, it has not yet
determined how or when it will require the implementation of
these systems nationwide. In addition, TSA is making progress
in determining how to mitigate the risk posed by airport
workers through an ongoing pilot, among other efforts. However,
the agency has not yet made final decisions regarding how it
will address this vulnerability.
Second, with regard to checkpoint screening technologies,
DHS and TSA have researched, developed, tested and initiated
procurements of various technologies to detect explosives and
plan to deploy new, enhanced technologies this year. However,
to date, TSA has made limited progress in fielding emerging
technologies due to performance, maintenance and planning
issues.
Third, although TSA has made significant progress in
strengthening the development of Secure Flight, a government-
run program to match passenger information against a terrorist
watch list, some challenges remain, including the need for more
sound program cost and schedule estimates, better management of
program risks and test plans that reflect comprehensive systems
testing.
Fourth, TSA made progress on a number of fronts in securing
air cargo and is pursuing a plan to meet the congressional
mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft.
However, TSA has placed less attention on cargo transported
into the United States from foreign locations and DHS and TSA
have made limited progress in deploying technologies to screen
cargo.
Finally, TSA will need to continue to define its regulatory
or other role with respect to all surface transportation modes
and more clearly define the mission and capabilities of its
inspections workforce. For example, it is unclear whether TSA's
surface inspectors will be able to support the increased
workload expected in implementing the requirements of the 9/11
Act and new security regulations.
In conducting our work, we have found that a variety of
cross-cutting issues have impacted DHS and its components'
efforts, including TSA. These include developing results-
oriented goals and measures to assess performance, integrating
a risk-based approach to guide investments and establishing
effective frameworks for coordinating with stakeholders.
TSA has placed attention on and continues to make progress
in addressing all of these issues. We are currently reviewing
TSA's efforts in many of these key areas and will continue to
report to the Congress and the public on the results of our
work.
This concludes my opening statement. I look forward to your
questions.
[The statement of Ms. Berrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick
April 15, 2008
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN AVIATION AND SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY CONTINUE TO PROGRESS, BUT MORE WORK REMAINS
GAO-08-651T
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to participate in today's hearing to discuss the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and challenges in securing our
Nation's transportation systems. The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) is charged with securing the transportation
network while ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. Other
DHS components, Federal agencies, State and local governments, and the
private sector also play a role in transportation security. In carrying
out its broader homeland security responsibilities, DHS faces the
challenge of determining how to allocate its finite resources within
the transportation system and across all sectors to address threats and
strengthen security. My testimony today focuses on: (1) The progress
TSA and other DHS components have made in securing the Nation's
aviation and surface transportation systems, and the challenges that
remain; and (2) crosscutting issues that have impeded TSA's efforts in
strengthening security. My comments are based on GAO reports and
testimonies issued from February 2004 to February 2008 and selected
updates to this work obtained in April 2008. In obtaining these
updates, we reviewed documents related to TSA security efforts and
interviewed TSA and transportation industry officials. In addition, we
included some of our preliminary findings from ongoing work regarding
the security of the Nation's aviation and surface transportation
systems. We conducted these performance audits in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
SUMMARY
TSA has undertaken a number of initiatives to strengthen the
security of the Nation's commercial aviation and surface transportation
systems. Specifically, TSA has hired and deployed a Federal work force
of over 50,000 passenger and checked baggage screeners, and installed
equipment at the Nation's more than 400 commercial airports to provide
the capability to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection
systems, as mandated by law.\1\ TSA has since turned its attention to,
among other things, strengthening passenger prescreening--in general,
the matching of passenger information against terrorist watch lists
prior to an aircraft's departure; more efficiently allocating,
deploying, and managing the transportation security officer (TSO)--
formerly known as screener--workforce; strengthening screening
procedures; researching and developing more effective and efficient
screening technologies; and strengthening procedures to ensure the
security of air cargo. TSA has also begun efforts to evaluate the
effectiveness of security-related technologies, such as biometric
identification systems, to secure access to restricted areas at
airports. DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has also taken
steps to strengthen passenger prescreening for passengers on
international flights operating to or from the United States, as well
as inspecting inbound air cargo upon its arrival in the United States.
DHS's Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate has also taken actions
to research and develop aviation security technologies. With regard to
surface transportation modes, TSA has developed a strategic approach
for securing these systems; established security standards for certain
transportation modes; and conducted threat, criticality, and
vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets,
particularly related to passenger and freight rail. TSA has also hired
and deployed compliance inspectors and conducted inspections of
passenger and freight rail systems. Finally, DHS has developed and
administered grant programs for various surface transportation modes.
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\1\ See GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on
Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-454
(Washington, DC: Aug. 17, 2007); GAO, Department of Homeland Security:
Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions,
GAO-07-1081T (Washington, DC: Sept. 6, 2007); and GAO, Department of
Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and
Management Functions, GAO-07-1240T (Washington, DC: Sept. 18, 2007).
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While these efforts have helped to strengthen the security of the
transportation network, DHS still faces a number of key challenges that
should be addressed to meet the goals and requirements set out for them
by Congress, the administration, and the Department itself. For
example, regarding commercial aviation, although TSA has made much
progress in developing Secure Flight--a government-run passenger
prescreening system--in February 2008, we reported that it can further
strengthen its efforts by developing more-sound cost and schedule
estimates, and strengthening security controls. In addition, while TSA
has taken actions to enhance perimeter security and restrict access to
secure areas at airports, it can further strengthen its efforts to
reduce the risks posed by airport employees. TSA has also not developed
a plan to guide and support individual airports and the commercial
airport system as a whole with respect to future technology
enhancements for perimeter security and access controls. Further, TSA
is only recently beginning to deploy new checkpoint technologies to
address key existing vulnerabilities, and has not yet developed and
implemented technologies needed to screen air cargo. With regard to
surface transportation security, while TSA has initiated efforts to
develop security standards for surface transportation modes, these
efforts have been limited to passenger and freight rail. Moreover,
although TSA has made progress in conducting compliance inspections of
some surface transportation systems, inspectors' roles and missions
have not been fully defined.
A variety of crosscutting issues have affected DHS's and, as they
relate to transportation security, TSA's efforts in implementing its
mission and management functions. These key issues include strategic
planning and results management, risk management, and stakeholder
coordination. For example, TSA has not always implemented effective
strategic planning efforts, fully developed performance measures, or
put into place structures to help ensure that it is managing for
results. In addition, DHS and its components can more fully adopt and
apply a risk-management approach in implementing its security mission
and core management functions,\2\ and more fully coordinate their
activities with key stakeholders. DHS and TSA have strengthened their
efforts in these areas, but more work remains.
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\2\ A risk management approach entails a continuous process of
managing risk through a series of actions, including setting strategic
goals and objectives, assessing risk, evaluating alternatives,
selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and monitoring
those initiatives.
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BACKGROUND
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted in
November 2001, created TSA and gave it responsibility for securing all
modes of transportation.\3\ TSA's aviation security mission includes
strengthening the security of airport perimeters and restricted airport
areas; hiring and training a screening work force; prescreening
passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screening passengers,
baggage, and cargo at the over 400 commercial airports nationwide,
among other responsibilities. While TSA has operational responsibility
for physically screening passengers and their baggage at most airports,
TSA exercises regulatory, or oversight, responsibility for the security
of airports and air cargo. Specifically, airports, air carriers, and
other entities are required to implement security measures in
accordance with TSA security requirements, against which TSA evaluates
their compliance efforts.
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\3\ Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
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TSA also oversees air carriers' efforts to prescreen passengers--in
general, the matching of passenger information against terrorist watch
lists prior to an aircraft's departure--and plans to take over
operational responsibility for this function with the implementation of
its Secure Flight program. CBP, which currently has responsibility for
prescreening airline passengers on international flights departing from
and bound for the United States, will continue to perform this function
until TSA assumes this function under Secure Flight. DHS's S&T is
responsible for researching and developing technologies to secure the
transportation sector.
TSA shares responsibility for securing surface transportation modes
with Federal, State, and local governments and the private sector.
TSA's security mission includes establishing security standards and
conducting assessments and inspections of surface transportation modes,
including passenger and freight rail; mass transit; highways and
commercial vehicles; and pipelines. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency's Grant Programs Directorate provides grant funding to surface
transportation operators and State and local governments, and in
conjunction with certain grants, the National Protection and Programs
Directorate conducts risk assessments of surface transportation
facilities. Within the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
have responsibilities for passenger rail safety and security. In
addition, public and private sector transportation operators are
responsible for implementing security measures for their systems.
DHS HAS MADE PROGRESS IN SECURING THE NATION'S AVIATION AND SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, BUT MORE WORK REMAINS
DHS, primarily through TSA, has undertaken numerous initiatives to
strengthen the security of the Nation's aviation and surface
transportation systems. In large part, these efforts have been guided
by legislative mandates designed to strengthen the security of
commercial aviation following the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks. These efforts have also been affected by events external to
the Department, including the alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to
blow up commercial aircraft bound from London to the United States, and
the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London train bombings. While progress has been
made in many areas with respect to securing the transportation network,
we found that the Department can strengthen its efforts in some key
areas outlined by Congress, the administration, and the Department
itself, as discussed below.
Aviation Security
Airport Perimeter Security and Access Controls. TSA has taken
action to strengthen the security of airport perimeters and access to
restricted airport areas. However, as we reported in June 2004, the
agency can further strengthen its efforts to evaluate the effectiveness
of security-related technologies and reduce the risks posed by airport
employees, among other things.\4\ In 2006, TSA completed the last
project in an access control pilot program that included 20 airports,
and which was designed to test and evaluate new and emerging
technologies in an airport setting. TSA is also conducting an airport
perimeter security pilot at six airports, to test technologies such as
vehicle inspection systems. However, TSA has not developed a plan to
guide and support individual airports and the commercial airport system
as a whole with respect to future technology enhancements for perimeter
security and access controls. Without such a plan, TSA could be limited
in assessing and improving the effectiveness of its efforts to provide
technical support for enhancing security. In addition, we reported in
September 2006 and October 2007 on the status of the development and
testing of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
program--DHS's effort to develop biometric access control systems to
verify the identity of individuals accessing secure transportation
areas.\5\ However, DHS has not yet determined how and when it will
implement a biometric identification system for access controls at
commercial airports. In June 2004, we reported that while background
checks were not required for all airport workers, TSA required most
airport workers who perform duties in selected areas to undergo a
fingerprint-based criminal history records check. TSA further required
airport operators to compare applicants' names against TSA's security
watch lists. In July 2004, consistent with our previous recommendation
to determine the need for additional security requirements to reduce
the risks posed by airport employees, TSA enhanced requirements for
background checks for employees working in restricted airport areas.
Also consistent with our recommendation, in 2007, TSA further expanded
the Security Threat Assessment--which determines, among other things,
whether an employee has any terrorist affiliations--to require airport
employees who receive an airport-issued identification badge to undergo
a review of citizenship status.\6\ Further, in March 2007, TSA
implemented a random employee screening initiative--the Aviation Direct
Access Screening Program--that uses TSOs to randomly screen airport
workers and their property for explosives and other threat items. TSA
has allocated about 900 full-time equivalent positions to the program
and has requested $36 million for fiscal year 2009 for an additional
750 full-time equivalent positions. As directed by Congress in 2008,
TSA plans to pilot test various employee screening methods at seven
selected airports, including conducting 100 percent employee screening
at three of these airports.\7\ TSA plans to begin pilot testing in May
and report on the results of its efforts--as directed--by September 1,
2008. Finally, consistent with our previous recommendation to develop
schedules and an analytical approach for completing vulnerability
assessments, TSA has developed criteria for prioritizing vulnerability
assessments at commercial airports. However, it has not compiled
national baseline data to fully assess security vulnerabilities across
airports. In 2004, TSA said an analysis of vulnerabilities on a
nationwide basis was essential since it would allow the agency to
assess the adequacy of security policies and help better direct limited
resources. GAO is currently reviewing TSA's efforts to enhance airport
perimeter and access control security and will report on our results
later this year.
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\4\ GAO, Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the
Security of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls, GAO-04-
728 (Washington, DC: June 2004).
\5\ GAO, Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges
Before Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
Program, GAO-06-982 (Washington, DC: September 2006) and Transportation
Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential Program, but Challenges Remain, GAO-
08-133T (Washington, DC: October 31, 2007).
\6\ TSA began conducting a name-based terrorist link analysis
against selected terrorism databases in 2002 for workers who performed
duties in selected airport areas.
\7\ The Explanatory Statement accompanying Division E of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-161, Div. E, 121
Stat. 1844, 2042 (2007), allocates $15,000,000 in appropriated funds
for TSA to pilot-test various forms of employee screening at seven
commercial airports. Among other things, TSA is to collect data on the
benefits, costs, and impacts of 100 percent airport employee screening
as well as of the alternative screening approaches, and brief the
committees on Appropriations on the progress and results of the pilot
projects no later than September 1, 2008.
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Aviation Security Workforce. TSA has made progress in deploying,
training, and assessing the performance of its Federal aviation
security work force. For example, TSA has hired and deployed a Federal
screening work force at over 400 commercial airports nationwide, and
developed standards for determining TSO staffing levels at airports.\8\
These standards form the basis of TSA's Staffing Allocation Model,
which the agency uses to determine TSO staffing levels at airports. In
response to our recommendation,\9\ in December 2007 TSA developed a
Staffing Allocation Model Rates and Assumptions Validation Plan that
identifies the process the agency plans to use to review and validate
the model's assumptions on a periodic basis. TSA also established
numerous programs to train and test the performance of its screening
work force. Among other efforts, TSA has provided enhanced explosives-
detection training, and recently reported developing a monthly
recurrent (ongoing) training plan for all TSOs. In addition, TSA has
trained and deployed Federal air marshals on high-risk flights;
established standards for training flight and cabin crews; and
established a Federal Flight Deck Officer program to select, train, and
allow authorized flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against
any terrorist or criminal acts. In April 2006, TSA implemented a
performance accountability and standards system to assess agency
personnel at all levels on various competencies, including training and
development, readiness for duty, management skills, and technical
proficiency. Finally, in April 2007, TSA redesigned its local covert
testing program conducted at individual airports. This new program,
known as the Aviation Screening Assessment Program or ASAP, is intended
to test the performance of the passenger and checked baggage screening
systems, to include the TSO work force. During our ongoing review of
TSA's covert testing program, we identified that TSA has implemented
risk-based national and local covert testing programs to identify
vulnerabilities in and measure the performance of selected aspects of
the aviation system. However, we found that TSA could strengthen its
program by developing a more systematic process for: (1) Recording the
causes of covert test failures; and, (2) evaluating the test results
and developing approaches for mitigating vulnerabilities identified in
the commercial aviation security system. We will report on the complete
results of this review later this year.
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\8\ TSA also oversees screening operations at airports utilizing
private screeners under TSA's Screening Partnership Program. See 49
U.S.C. 44920.
\9\ GAO, Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is
Useful for Allocating Staff Among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should
Be Systematically Reassessed, GAO-07-299 (Washington, DC: Feb. 28,
2007).
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Passenger Prescreening. Over the past several years, TSA has faced
a number of challenges in developing and implementing an advanced
prescreening system, known as Secure Flight,\10\ which will allow TSA
to assume responsibility from air carriers for comparing domestic
passenger information against the No Fly List and Selectee List.\11\ In
February 2008, we reported that TSA had made substantial progress in
instilling more discipline and rigor into Secure Flight's development
and implementation, including preparing key systems development
documentation and strengthening privacy protections.\12\ However,
challenges remain that may hinder the program's progress moving
forward. Specifically, TSA had not: (1) Developed program cost and
schedule estimates consistent with best practices; (2) fully
implemented its risk management plan; (3) planned for system end-to-end
testing in test plans; and (4) ensured that information-security
requirements are fully implemented. To address these challenges, we
made several recommendations to DHS and TSA to incorporate best
practices in Secure Flight's cost and schedule estimates and to fully
implement the program's risk-management, testing, and information-
security requirements. DHS and TSA officials generally agreed with
these recommendations. We are continuing to assess TSA's efforts in
developing and implementing Secure Flight--which, according to TSA's
planned schedule, will allow the agency to fully assume the watch list
matching function from air carriers in fiscal year 2010. TSA has also
taken steps to integrate the domestic watch-list matching function with
the international watch-list matching function currently operated by
CBP, consistent with our past recommendations. Specifically, TSA and
CBP have coordinated to develop a strategy called the One DHS Solution,
which is to align the two agencies' domestic and international watch-
list matching processes, information technology systems, and regulatory
procedures to provide a seamless interface between DHS and the airline
industry. TSA and CBP also agreed that TSA will take over the screening
of passengers against the watch list for international flights from
CBP, though CBP will continue to match passenger information to the
watch list in fulfillment of its border-related functions. Full
implementation of an integrated system is not planned to take place
until after Secure Flight acquires the watch-list matching function for
domestic flights.
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\10\ GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the
Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-
864T (Washington, DC: June 14, 2006) and GAO, Aviation Security:
Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions,
but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T (Washington, DC: Feb. 13, 2007).
\11\ Passengers identified as being on the No Fly List must be
denied boarding passes and must not be permitted to fly unless cleared
in accordance with TSA security requirements. Passengers on the
Selectee List are to be issued boarding passes, but they and their
baggage are to undergo additional security measures.
\12\ GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration
Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security
Programs, but More Work Remains, GAO-08-456T (Washington, DC: Feb. 28,
2008).
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Checkpoint Screening. TSA has taken steps to strengthen passenger
checkpoint screening procedures to enhance the detection of prohibited
items and strengthen security; however, TSA could improve its
evaluation and documentation of proposed procedures. In April 2007, we
reported that modifications to checkpoint screening standard operating
procedures (SOP) were proposed based on the professional judgment of
TSA senior-level officials and program-level staff, as well as threat
information and the results of covert testing.\13\ We also reported on
steps TSA had taken to address new and emerging threats, such as
establishing the Screening Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT)
program, which provides TSOs with a nonintrusive, behavior-based means
of identifying potentially high-risk individuals. For proposed
screening modifications deemed significant, such as SPOT, TSA
operationally tested these proposed modifications at selected airports
before determining whether they should be implemented nationwide.
However, we reported that TSA's data collection and analysis of
proposed SOP modifications could be improved, and recommended that TSA
develop sound evaluation methods, when possible, to assess whether
proposed screening changes would achieve their intended purpose. TSA
has since reported taking steps to work with subject-matter experts to
ensure that the agency's operational testing of proposed screening
modifications are well designed and executed, and produce results that
are scientifically valid and reliable. With regard to checkpoint
screening technologies, TSA and S&T have researched, developed, tested,
and initiated procurements of various technologies to address security
vulnerabilities that may be exploited; however, limited progress has
been made in fielding emerging technologies. For example, of the
various emerging checkpoint screening projects funded by TSA and
S&T,\14\ only the explosives trace portal and a bottled liquids
scanning device have been deployed for use in day-to-day operations.
However, due to performance and maintenance issues, TSA halted the
acquisition and deployment of the portals in June 2006. Also, in
February 2008, we testified that TSA lacked a strategic plan to guide
its efforts to acquire and deploy screening technologies, which could
limit its ability to deploy emerging technologies to airports deemed at
highest risk.\15\ According to TSA officials, the agency plans to
submit a strategic plan to Congress by June 2008. We have ongoing work
reviewing S&T and TSA checkpoint screening technologies efforts and
will report on our results later this year.
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\13\ GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer
Concerns Drive Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but
Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved,
GAO-07-634 (Washington, DC: Apr. 16, 2007).
\14\ Examples of projects currently in research and development
include the checkpoint explosives detection system and the whole body
imager. Projects that have undergone initiated procurements include the
cast and prosthesis scanner and the advanced technology systems.
\15\ GAO-07-448T.
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Checked Baggage Screening. TSA has made significant progress in
installing explosive detection systems to provide the capability to
screen checked baggage at the Nation's commercial airports, as mandated
by law. From November 2001 through June 2006, TSA procured and
installed about 1,600 Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and about 7,200
Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) machines to screen checked baggage for
explosives at over 400 commercial airports.\16\ In addition, based in
part on recommendations we made, TSA moved stand-alone EDS machines
that were located at airports that received new in-line EDS baggage
screening systems to 32 airports that did not previously have them from
May 2004 through December 2007. TSA also replaced ETD machines at 53
airports with 158 new EDS machines from March 2005 through December
2007. In response to mandates to field the equipment quickly and to
account for limitations in airport design that made it difficult to
quickly install in-line EDS systems, TSA generally placed baggage
screening equipment in a stand-alone mode--usually in airport lobbies--
to conduct the primary screening of checked baggage for explosives.\17\
Based, in part, on our recommendations, TSA later developed a plan to
integrate EDS and ETD machines in-line with airport baggage conveyor
systems. The installation of in-line systems can result in considerable
savings to TSA through the reduction of personnel needed to operate the
equipment, as well as increased security. In addition, according to TSA
estimates, the number of checked bags screened per hour can more than
double when EDS machines are placed in-line versus being placed in the
stand alone mode. Despite delays in the widespread deployment of in-
line systems due to the high upfront capital investment required, TSA
is pursuing the installation of these systems and is seeking creative
financing solutions to fund their deployment. In February 2008, TSA
submitted a legislative proposal to increase the Aviation Security
Capital Fund (ASCF) through a new surcharge on the passenger security
fee. According to TSA, this proposal, if adopted, would accelerate the
deployment of optimal checked baggage screening systems and address the
need to re-capitalize existing equipment deployed immediately after
September, 2001. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act reiterates a requirement that DHS submit a cost-sharing
study for the installation of in-line baggage screening systems, along
with a plan and schedule for implementing provisions of the study, and
requires TSA to establish a prioritization schedule for airport
improvement projects related to the installation of in-line or other
optimal baggage screening systems.\18\ As of April 3, 2008, TSA had not
completed the prioritization schedule, corresponding timeline, and
description of the funding allocation for these projects.
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\16\ Explosive detection systems (EDS) use specialized X-rays to
detect characteristics of explosives that may be contained in baggage
as it moves along a conveyor belt. Explosive trace detection (ETD)
works by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators
collect samples by rubbing swabs along the interior and exterior of an
object that TSOs determine to be suspicious, and place the swabs in the
ETD machine, which then chemically analyzes the swabs to identify any
traces of explosive materials.
\17\ See GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage
Screening Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, DC:
July 2006), GAO, Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and
Checked Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain, GAO-06-371T
(Washington, DC: April 4, 2006), and GAO-07-448T.
\18\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1603-04, 121 Stat. 266, 480-81
(2007).
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Air Cargo Security. TSA has taken steps to secure air cargo,
including initializing efforts to provide the capability to screen 100
percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by 2010, but its
efforts are not yet complete. In April 2007, we reported that TSA's Air
Cargo strategic plan contained a strategy for securing domestic air
cargo but did not include goals and objectives for addressing inbound
air cargo, or cargo transported into the United States from a foreign
country.\19\ We recommended that DHS develop a risk-based strategy for
securing inbound air cargo including defining TSA's and CBP's inbound
air cargo security responsibilities. CBP subsequently issued its
International Air Cargo Security strategic plan in June 2007, and TSA
plans to revise its Air Cargo strategic plan during the third quarter
of fiscal year 2008 to incorporate a strategy for addressing inbound
air cargo security, including how the agency will partner with CBP. We
also reported that TSA had not conducted vulnerability assessments to
identify the range of air cargo security weaknesses that could be
exploited by terrorists, and recommended that TSA develop a methodology
and schedule for completing these assessments.\20\ In response in part
to our recommendation, TSA implemented an Air Cargo Vulnerability
Assessment program in November 2006 and, as of April 2008, had
completed vulnerability assessments at five domestic airports. TSA
plans to complete assessments of all high-risk airports by 2009. In
addition, although TSA has established requirements for air carriers to
randomly screen air cargo, the agency had exempted some domestic and
inbound cargo from these requirements. While TSA has since revised its
screening exemptions for domestic air cargo, it has not done so for
inbound air cargo. TSA is also working with DHS S&T to develop and
pilot test a number of technologies to assess their applicability to
screening and securing air cargo.\21\ However, as of February 2008, TSA
had provided a completion date for only one of its five air cargo
technology pilot programs. According to TSA officials, the agency will
determine whether it will require the use of these technologies once it
has completed its assessments and analyzed the results. We also
reported in April 2007 that TSA did not systematically compile and
analyze information on air cargo security practices used abroad to
identify those that may strengthen the Department's overall air cargo
security program, and we recommended that it do so.\22\ TSA has since
begun development of a certified cargo screening program based in part
on its review of screening models used in two foreign countries that
rely on government-certified screeners to screen air cargo early in the
supply chain.\23\ According to TSA, the agency plans to deploy this
program to assist it in meeting the statutory requirement to screen 100
percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by August 2010
(and to screen 50 percent of such cargo by February 2009), as mandated
by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act.\24\ In
January 2008, TSA began phase one of the program's pilot tests, and as
of April 2008, had completed tests at six airports. TSA plans to
conduct tests at three additional airports by June 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound
Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660
(Washington, DC: Apr. 30, 2007).
\20\ GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen
Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, DC: Oct. 17, 2005)
and GAO-07-660.
\21\ TSA's air cargo pilot programs include an air cargo explosives
detection program; an EDS pilot program; an air cargo security seals
pilot; the testing of hardened unit-loading devices; and, the testing
of pulsed fast neutron analysis technology.
\22\ GAO-07-660.
\23\ According to TSA, the program will allow TSA-certified shipper
sand manufacturers to screen air cargo before it leaves the factory.
The screened cargo would then be secured with a tamper-resistant seal
and transported to the airport for shipment.
\24\ Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1602(a), 121 Stat. at 477-480 (2007)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. 44901(g)).
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Surface Transportation Security
Strategic Approach for Implementing Security Functions. In
September 2005, DHS completed the National Strategy for Transportation
Security. This strategy identified and evaluated transportation assets
in the United States that could be at risk of a terrorist attack and
addressed transportation sector security needs. Further, in May 2007,
DHS issued a strategic plan for securing the transportation sector and
supporting annexes for each of the surface transportation modes, and
reported taking actions to adopt the strategic approach outlined by the
plan. The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan describes the
security framework that is intended to enable sector stakeholders to
make effective and appropriate risk-based security and resource
allocation decisions within the transportation network. TSA has begun
to implement some of the security initiatives outlined in the sector-
specific plan and supporting modal plans. Additionally, the
Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act imposes a deadline of May 2008, for the Secretary
of DHS to develop and implement the National Strategy for Public
Transportation Security. Our work assessing DHS's efforts in
implementing its strategy for securing surface transportation modes is
being conducted as part of our ongoing reviews of mass transit,
passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicle, and highway
infrastructure security. We will report on the results of this work
later this year.
Threat, Criticality, and Vulnerability Assessments. TSA has taken
actions to assess risk by conducting threat, criticality, and
vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets,
particularly for mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail, but
its efforts related to commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure
are in the early stages. For example, TSA had conducted threat
assessments of all surface modes of transportation. TSA has also
conducted assessments of the vulnerabilities associated with some
surface transportation assets. For example, regarding freight rail, TSA
has conducted vulnerability assessments of rail corridors in eight High
Threat Urban Areas where toxic-inhalation-hazard shipments are
transported. With respect to commercial vehicles and highway
infrastructure, TSA's vulnerability assessment efforts are ongoing.
According to TSA, the agency performed 113 corporate security reviews
on highway transportation organizations through fiscal year 2007, such
as trucking companies, State Departments of Transportation, and
motorcoach companies.\25\ However, TSA does not have a plan or a
timeframe for conducting these reviews on a nationwide basis.
Furthermore, DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate's
Office of Infrastructure Protection conducts vulnerability assessments
of surface transportation assets to identify protective measures to
reduce or mitigate asset vulnerability. With regard to criticality
assessments, TSA reported in April 2008 that the agency had conducted
1,345 assessments of passenger rail stations.\26\ Additionally, the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act has several
provisions related to security assessments. For instance, the act
requires DHS to review existing security assessments for public
transportation systems as well as conduct additional assessments as
necessary to ensure that all high-risk public transportation agencies
have security assessments. Moreover, the act also requires DHS to
establish a Federal task force to complete a nationwide risk assessment
of a terrorist attack on rail carriers. We will continue to review
threat, vulnerability, and criticality assessments conducted by TSA
related to securing surface modes of transportation during our ongoing
work.\27\
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\25\ TSA conducts corporate security reviews in multiple modes of
transportation to establish baseline data against which to evaluate
minimum-security standards and identify coverage gaps in reviewed
systems.
\26\ According to TSA, the agency completed 945 criticality
assessments in fiscal year 2007 and 400 assessments in fiscal year
2008. TSA officials stated that some of these assessments may have been
conducted to update previously completed ones.
\27\ For more information, see GAO, Passenger Rail Security:
Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security
Efforts, GAO-07-225T (Washington, DC: Jan. 18, 2007).
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Issuance of Security Standards. TSA has taken actions to develop
and issue security standards for mass transit, passenger rail, and
freight rail transportation modes. However, TSA has not yet developed
or issued security standards for all surface transportation modes, such
as commercial vehicle and highway infrastructure, or determined whether
standards are necessary for these modes of transportation.
Specifically, TSA has developed and issued both mandatory rail security
directives and recommended voluntary best practices--known as Security
Action Items--for transit agencies and passenger rail operators to
implement as part of their security programs to enhance both security
and emergency-management preparedness. TSA also issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking in December 2006, which if finalized as proposed,
would include additional security requirements for passenger and
freight rail transportation operators.\28\ For example, the rule would
include additional security requirements designed to ensure that
freight railroads have protocols for the secure custody transfers of
toxic-inhalation-hazard rail cars in High Threat Urban Areas. DHS and
other Federal partners have also been collaborating with the American
Public Transportation Association (APTA) and public and private
security professionals to develop industry wide security standards for
mass transit systems. APTA officials reported that they expect several
of the voluntary standards to be released in mid-2008. Additionally,
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act requires
DHS to issue regulations establishing standards and guidelines for
developing and implementing vulnerability assessments and security
plans for high-risk railroad carriers and over-the-road bus
operators.\29\ The deadlines for the regulations are August 2008 and
February 2009, respectively. With respect to freight rail, TSA is
developing a notice of proposed rulemaking proposing that high-risk
rail carriers conduct vulnerability assessments and develop and
implement security plans. We will continue to assess TSA's efforts to
issue security standards for other surface transportation modes during
our ongoing reviews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ See 71 Fed. Reg. 76,852 (Dec. 21, 2006).
\29\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1512, 1531, 121 Stat. at 429-33,
454-57.
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Compliance Inspections. TSA has hired and deployed surface
transportation security inspectors who conduct compliance inspections
for both passenger and freight rail modes of transportation; however,
questions exist regarding how TSA will employ the inspectors to enforce
new regulations proposed in its December 2006 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and regulations to be developed in accordance with the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act.\30\ TSA
officials reported having 100 surface transportation inspectors during
fiscal year 2005 and, as of December 2007, were maintaining an
inspector work force of about the same number. The agency's budget
request for fiscal year 2009 includes $11.6 million to fund 100 surface
transportation security inspectors--which would maintain its current
staffing level. Inspectors' responsibilities include conducting on-site
inspections of key facilities for freight rail, passenger rail, and
transit systems; assessing transit systems' implementation of core
transit security fundamentals and comprehensive security action items;
conducting examinations of stakeholder operations, including compliance
with security directives; identifying security gaps; and developing
effective practices. To meet these compliance responsibilities, TSA
reported in December 2007 that it had conducted voluntary assessments
of 50 of the 100 largest transit agencies, including 34 passenger rail
and 16 bus-only agencies, and has plans to continue these assessments
with the next 50 largest transit agencies during fiscal year 2008. With
respect to freight rail, TSA reported visiting, during 2007, almost 300
railroad facilities including terminal and railroad yards to assess the
railroads' implementation of 17 DHS-recommended Security Action Items
associated with the transportation of toxic-inhalation-hazard
materials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1534, 121 Stat at 461-62.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA has raised concerns about the agency's ability to continue to
meet anticipated inspection responsibilities given the new regulations
proposed in its December 2006 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act. For example, the act mandates that high-risk over-the-road bus
operators, railroad carriers, and public transportation agencies
develop and implement security plans which must include, among other
requirements, procedures to be implemented in response to a terrorist
attack.\31\ The act further requires the Secretary of DHS to review
each plan within 6 months of receiving it. TSA officials stated that
they believe TSA inspectors will likely be tasked to conduct these
reviews. The act also requires that the Secretary of DHS develop and
issue interim final regulations by November 2007, for a public
transportation security training program.\32\ As of April 2008, these
interim regulations have not been issued. According to TSA officials,
TSA inspectors will likely be involved in ensuring compliance with
these regulations as well. To help address these additional
requirements, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act authorizes funds to be appropriated for TSA to employ additional
surface transportation inspectors, and requires that surface
transportation inspectors have relevant transportation experience and
appropriate security and inspection qualifications.\33\ However, it is
not clear how TSA will meet these new requirements since the agency has
not requested funding for additional surface transportation security
inspectors for fiscal year 2009. We will continue to assess TSA's
inspection efforts during our ongoing work.\34\
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\31\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1405, 1512, 1531, 121 Stat. at 402-
05, 429-33, 454-57.
\32\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1408, 121 Stat. at 409-11 (requiring
that the Secretary develop and issue final regulations for the training
program by August 2008).
\33\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1304, 121 Stat. at 393-94.
\34\ For more information, see GAO, Passenger Rail Security:
Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security
Efforts, GAO-06-181T (Washington, DC: Oct. 20, 2005).
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Grant Programs. DHS has developed and administered grant programs
for various surface transportation modes, although stakeholders have
raised concerns regarding the current grant process. For example, the
DHS Office of Grants and Training, now called the Grant Programs
Directorate, has used various programs to fund passenger rail security
since 2003. Through the Urban Areas Security Initiative grant program,
the Grant Programs Directorate has provided grants to urban areas to
help enhance their overall security and preparedness level to prevent,
respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. The Grant Programs
Directorate used fiscal year 2005, 2006, and 2007 appropriations to
build on the work under way through the Urban Areas Security Initiative
program, and create and administer new programs focused specifically on
transportation security, including the Transit Security Grant Program,
Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program, and the Freight Rail
Security Grant Program. However, some industry stakeholders have raised
concerns regarding DHS's current grant process, including the shifting
of funding priorities, the lack of program flexibility, and other
barriers to the provision of grant funding. For example, transit
agencies have reported that the lack of predictability in how TSA will
assess grant projects against funding priorities makes it difficult to
engage in long-term planning of security initiatives. Specifically,
transit agencies have reported receiving funding to begin projects--
such as retrofitting their transit fleet with security cameras or
installing digital video recording systems--but not being able to
finish these projects in subsequent years because TSA had changed its
funding priorities. The Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act codifies surface transportation grant programs and
imposes statutory requirements on the administration of the
programs.\35\ For example, the act lists authorized uses of these grant
funds and requires DHS to award the grants based on risk.\36\ It also
requires that DHS and DOT determine the most effective and efficient
way to distribute grant funds, authorizing DHS to transfer funds to DOT
for the purpose of disbursement.\37\ According to the TSA fiscal year
2009 budget justification, to ensure that the selected projects are
focused on increasing security, DHS grants are to be awarded based on
risk. We will continue assessing surface transportation related grant
programs as part of our ongoing work.\38\
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\35\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1406, 1513, 1532, 121 Stat. 405-08,
433-35, 457-60.
\36\ See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1406(b), (c)(2), 121 Stat. at
405-07.
\37\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1406(d), 1532(e), 121 Stat. at 407,
459.
\38\ For more information see GAO-06-181T.
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crosscutting issues have hindered dhs's efforts in implementing its
mission and management functions
Our work has identified homeland security challenges that cut
across DHS's mission and core management functions. These issues have
impeded the Department's progress since its inception and will continue
to confront DHS as it moves forward. These issues include: (1)
Establishing baseline performance goals and measures and engaging in
effective strategic planning efforts; (2) applying and strengthening a
risk-management approach for implementing missions and making resource
allocation decisions; and, (3) coordinating and partnering with
Federal, State, and local agencies, and the private sector. We have
made numerous recommendations to DHS and its components, including TSA,
to strengthen these efforts, and the Department has made progress in
implementing some of these recommendations.
DHS has not always implemented effective strategic planning efforts
and has not yet fully developed performance measures or put into place
structures to help ensure that the agency is managing for results. For
example, with regard to TSA's efforts to secure air cargo, we reported
in October 2005 and April 2007 that TSA completed an Air Cargo
Strategic Plan in November 2003 that outlined a threat-based risk-
management approach to securing the Nation's domestic air cargo system,
and that this plan identified strategic objectives and priority actions
for enhancing air cargo security based on risk, cost, and
deadlines.\39\ However, TSA had not developed a similar strategy for
addressing the security of inbound air cargo--cargo transported into
the United States from foreign countries--including how best to partner
with CBP and international air cargo stakeholders. In another example,
we reported in April 2007 that TSA had not yet developed outcome-based
performance measures for its foreign airport assessment and air carrier
inspection programs, such as the percentage of security deficiencies
that were addressed as a result of TSA's on-site assistance and
recommendations, to identify any aspects of these programs that may
need attention. We recommended that DHS direct TSA and CBP to develop a
risk-based strategy, including specific goals and objectives, for
securing air cargo;\40\ and develop outcome-based performance measures
for its foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection
programs.\41\ DHS generally concurred with GAO's recommendations with
regard to air cargo, and is taking steps to strengthen its efforts in
this area.
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\39\ GAO-07-660.
\40\ GAO-07-660.
\41\ GAO, Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air
Carrier Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These
Efforts Can Be Strengthened, GAO-07-729 (Washington, DC: May 11, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although DHS and TSA have made risk-based decisionmaking a
cornerstone of departmental and agency policy, DHS and TSA could
strengthen their application of risk management in implementing their
mission functions. Several DHS component agencies and TSA have worked
toward integrating risk-based decisionmaking into their security
efforts, but we reported that these efforts can be strengthened. For
example, TSA has incorporated certain risk-management principles into
securing air cargo, but has not completed assessments of air cargo
vulnerabilities or critical assets--two crucial elements of a risk-
based approach. TSA has also incorporated risk-based decisionmaking
when making modifications to airport checkpoint screening procedures,
to include modifying procedures based on intelligence information and
vulnerabilities identified through covert testing at airport
checkpoints. However, in April 2007, we reported that TSA's analyses
that supported screening procedural changes could be strengthened. For
example, TSA officials based their decision to revise the prohibited
items list to allow passengers to carry small scissors and tools onto
aircraft based on their review of threat information--which indicated
that these items do not pose a high risk to the aviation system--so
that TSOs could concentrate on higher threat items.\42\ However, TSA
officials did not conduct the analysis necessary to help them determine
whether this screening change would affect TSO's ability to focus on
higher-risk threats.\43\ As noted earlier in this statement, TSA is
taking steps to strengthen its efforts in both of these areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ GAO-07-634.
\43\ GAO-07-634.
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In addition to providing Federal leadership with respect to
homeland security, DHS also plays a large role in coordinating the
activities of key stakeholders, but has faced challenges in this
regard. Although improvements are being made, we have found that the
appropriate homeland security roles and responsibilities within and
between the levels of government, and with the private sector, are
evolving and need to be clarified. For example, we reported that
opportunities exist for TSA to work with foreign governments and
industry to identify best practices for securing passenger rail and air
cargo, and recommended that TSA systematically compile and analyze
information on practices used abroad to identify those that may
strengthen the Department's overall security efforts.\44\ With regard
to air cargo, TSA has subsequently reviewed the models used in two
foreign countries that rely on government-certified screeners to screen
air cargo to facilitate the design of the agency's proposed certified-
cargo screening program. Further, in September 2005, we reported that
TSA did not effectively involve private sector stakeholders in its
decisionmaking process for developing security standards for passenger
rail assets.\45\ We recommended that DHS develop security standards
that reflect industry best practices and can be measured, monitored,
and enforced by TSA rail inspectors and, if appropriate, rail asset
owners. DHS agreed with these recommendations. Regarding efforts to
respond to in-flight security threats, which, depending on the nature
of the threat, could involve more than 15 Federal agencies and agency
components, in July 2007 we also recommended that DHS and other
departments document and share their respective coordination and
communication strategies and response procedures, to which DHS
agreed.\46\ The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
includes provisions designed to improve coordination with stakeholders.
For example, the act requires DHS and DOT to develop an annex to the
Memorandum of Understanding between the two departments governing the
specific roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments in
addressing motor carrier transportation security matters, including the
processes the departments will follow to promote communications and
efficiency, and avoid duplication of effort.\47\ The act also requires
DHS, in consultation with DOT, to establish a program to provide
appropriate information that DHS has gathered or developed on the
performance, use, and testing of technologies that may be used to
enhance surface transportation security to surface transportation
entities.\48\ According to TSA, the agency has begun to provide transit
agencies with information on recommended available security
technologies through security roundtables for the top 50 transit
agencies; the posting of an authorized equipment list on the Homeland
Security Information Network Web site; and periodic briefings to other
Federal agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ See GAO-07-660 and GAO-05-851.
\45\ See GAO-05-851.
\46\ GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to
In-flight Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be
Strengthened, GAO-07-891R (Washington, DC: July 31, 2007).
\47\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1541, 121 Stat. at 469.
\48\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1305, 121 Stat. at 394-95.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The magnitude of DHS's and TSA's responsibilities in securing the
Nation's transportation system is significant, and we commend the
Department on the work it has done and is currently doing to secure
this network. Nevertheless, given the dominant role that TSA plays in
securing the homeland, it is critical that the agency continually
strive to strengthen its programs and initiatives to counter emerging
threats and improve security. In the almost 6\1/2\ years since its
creation, TSA has had to undertake its critical mission while also
establishing and forming a new agency. At the same time, a variety of
factors, including threats to and attacks on transportation systems
around the world, as well as new legislative requirements, have led the
agency to reassess its priorities and reallocate resources to address
key events, and to respond to emerging threats. Although TSA has made
considerable progress in addressing key aspects of commercial aviation
security, more work remains in some key areas, such as the deployment
of technologies to detect explosives at checkpoints and in air cargo.
Further, although TSA has more recently taken action in a number of
areas to help secure surface modes of transportation, its efforts are
still largely in the early stage, and the nature of its regulatory role
and relationship with transportation operators is still being defined.
As DHS and TSA move forward, it will be important for the Department to
address the challenges that have affected its operations thus far,
while continuing to adapt to new threats and needs, and well as
increase the effectiveness and efficiency of existing programs and
operations. We will continue to review DHS's and TSA's progress in
securing the transportation network, and will provide information to
Congress and the public on these efforts.
Madam Chairwoman this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may
have at this time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you for your testimony.
It is my pleasure now to recognize Mr. Ervin to summarize
his statement for 5 minutes.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF CLARK KENT ERVIN, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
INITIATIVE, ASPEN INSTITUTE
Mr. Ervin. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman and Mr.
Bilirakis. Thank you very much for inviting me to testify today
on this important topic. Let me start with the positives.
I think that Secretary Hawley is to be commended for the
more open and collaborative spirit he brings to the job. Under
his leadership, TSA has been more willing to listen to, respond
to and benefit from constructive criticism.
Operationally, I commend the move toward introducing more
randomness into the system so as to keep terrorists off guard
as much as possible. I think the behavior detection program is,
in theory, at least, very much to be applauded. A variant of it
has worked for many years, in fact, in Israel. It led just
recently, here in this country, in Orlando, as we have all
noticed and spoken about, to the detection of a passenger
carrying bomb parts.
As important as it is to spot guns, knives, bombs and other
potential weapons before they are used to deadly effect, it is
at least as important, if not more so, to try to identify
people whose behavior suggests that they might use such
weapons.
My concern is whether transportation security officers are
being trained long enough and comprehensively enough to truly
distinguish between people whose movements, mannerisms or
demeanor suggest deadly intent and people who merely look
different from the norm. What to a behavior detection officer
is behavior detection may to a given subject be racial or
ethnic profiling.
TSA is to be commended also for the initiative to redesign
the checkpoint to make it more aesthetically and
psychologically appealing, and, likewise, the effort to create
separate lines for experienced business travelers and harried
parents and others who need more time to go through the
checkpoint is commendable. But I remain troubled by several
things.
First of all, undercover government and media
investigations continue to the present day to show what they
have shown since 9/11: screeners far too often fail to spot
concealed guns, knives and bombs. TSA's response to such
results is always the same: screener performance is only one of
several, 19 layers, at airports. A concentrated effort to
defeat any one layer can succeed, certainly, but each layer is
linked such that the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts. Of course, screeners fail test nowadays. They are much
harder than they used to be, and they get harder all the time.
But to take these arguments in turn, the whole chain is
only as strong as its weakest link. As links go, the checkpoint
is the most important in terms of keeping weapons off
airplanes.
As a general rule, the one and only time that passengers
and their carry-on luggage are checked for guns, knives and
bombs is at the checkpoint. Of course we want the test to be as
hard as possible. It is not as if terrorists will make it easy
to spot their concealed weapons.
TSA seems to be saying implicitly and illogically the worse
we do on these tests, the better. The good news is that we have
heard today from Secretary Hawley that still more technology,
which is the ultimate key to this, will be deployed. I hope
that this effort will be accelerated and that additional moneys
will be provided to TSA to ensure and to further expedite the
deployment of these technologies.
My second concern relates to air cargo. It is good news
that TSA is now required by law to screen 100 percent of cargo
on passenger planes for explosives by 2010, so I was initially
heartened to read last week's ``USA Today'' story that TSA was
launching this effort this summer in major cities, suggesting
that the deadline will be met sooner, rather than later.
As I read further, though, I grew disheartened, as I
learned that, much like the C-TPAT program that CBP employs,
TSA will allow shippers of air cargo to volunteer to screen
their own cargo. There is no reason to believe that shippers in
any great numbers will be wiling to pay for the necessary
personnel and equipment.
Further, as to any shipper that would be willing to pay for
the necessary personnel and equipment and conduct its own self
screening, we simply cannot afford to outsource a critical
security function like this in the post-9/11 world. Businesses
are concerned about security, certainly, but understandably
their first concern is their bottom line. When the two
conflict, security loses out.
My third concern relates to air marshals. I was concerned
by the CNN story just last week that only about 1 percent of
the 28,000 commercial flights flown in an average day are
covered by air marshals, according to some half-dozen air
marshals and pilots interviewed by the network. If this is
true, this is particularly troubling, and that is especially
the case against the backdrop of the poor results on these
undercover tests that was just mentioned. I hope we will probe
that today during the course of the hearing.
Then, finally, I am concerned that while pilots and flight
attendants are screened, like passengers, every time they go
through checkpoints, other airport workers, some 900,000 of
them nationwide, are not. The background check process is not
sufficient, it seems to me, when we learned that on occasion
workers are caught with thefts and drug smuggling, other
crimes. If these background tests are not sufficient in that
circumstance, they are not sufficient to protect against
terrorism.
This summarizes my testimony, Madam Chairwoman, and I am
looking forward very much to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Ervin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Clark Kent Ervin
April 15, 2008
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members, for inviting me to
testify today on the topic, ``Moving Beyond the First Five Years: How
the Transportation Security Administration will Continue to Enhance
Security for all Modes of Transportation.''
Let me start with the positive. I think that Secretary Hawley is to
be commended for the more open and collaborative spirit he brings to
the job. Under his leadership, TSA has been more willing to listen to,
respond to, and benefit from constructive criticism. The new blog, for
example, provides an easy way for TSA leaders to communicate with and
hear from the public, and it provides a way for travelers to vent their
frustrations and to get things off their chest.
Operationally, I commend the move toward introducing more
randomness into the system, so as to keep terrorists off guard as much
as possible.
I think the Behavior Detection Program is, in theory at least, very
much to be applauded. It has worked, in fact, in Israel very
effectively for many years. And, it led just recently in Orlando to the
detection of a passenger carrying bomb parts. As important as it is to
spot guns, knives, bombs, and other potential weapons before they are
used to deadly effect (about which more later), it is at least as
important, if not more so, to try to identify people whose behavior
suggests that they might use such weapons.
My concern is whether Transportation Security Officers are being
trained long enough and comprehensively enough truly to distinguish
between people whose movements, mannerisms or demeanor suggest deadly
intent and people who merely look different from the norm. What to a
Behavior Detection Officer is ``behavior detection'' may, to a given
subject, be racial or ethnic profiling. I hope that the subcommittee
will probe into this issue today.
TSA is to be commended also for the initiative to redesign the
checkpoint to make it more aesthetically and psychologically appealing
through the use of music, lighting, and such. It is easy to make fun of
such moves, but anything that makes the traveling experience more
pleasant without sacrificing security is a very good thing, indeed.
Likewise, the effort to create separate lines for experienced business
travelers and harried parents struggling with children, luggage, and
toys (and other travelers who, for one reason or another, need more
time to navigate the checkpoint) is commendable. I travel in both
incarnations--sometimes alone, as a business traveler, and other times
with my wife and 2-year-old--and I would very much appreciate being in
a separate line with like travelers under each circumstance.
But, I remain troubled by several things. First, government and
media investigations continue to the present day to show what they have
shown since 9/11--screeners far too often fail to spot concealed guns,
knives, and bombs. This was the case in 2001, in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11, when the Department of Transportation's Inspector
General was responsible for conducting such tests. It was the case in
2003-2004 during my time as the Department of Homeland Inspector
General. It was the case in a followup DHS IG report in 2005 after I
left. In the spring of 2006, GAO reported that they were able to sneak
potential bomb components through checkpoints at 21 different airports
undetected. In October 2006, it was reported that screeners at Newark
International Airport, not incidentally one of the airports transited
by 9/11 hijackers, failed 20 out of 22 undercover tests. USA Today
reported a year later, last October, that screeners failed TSA's own
undercover tests 75 percent of the time at LAX, and 60 percent of the
time at Chicago O'Hare. And, just a couple of months ago, the DHS
Inspector General released its latest report on covert testing of
screeners. Only an unclassified summary was released, and it is
impossible to tell what the results were. But, I note that the IG made
six recommendations. It is certainly possible that the results showed
dramatic improvement in screener performance and the IG still found it
necessary to make six recommendations. Given the foregoing background,
I think it more likely that six recommendations were made because there
is still considerable room for improvement. In any event, I hope the
subcommittee has or promptly will obtain the classified version of the
report and learn for yourselves what the results are and how they stack
up against the foregoing ones.
TSA's response to such results is always the same. Screener
performance is only one of 19 security layers at airports. A
concentrated effort to defeat any one layer can succeed, certainly,
but, each layer is linked such that the whole is greater than the sum
of the parts.
And, of course, screeners fail tests nowadays. They are much harder
than they used to be, and they get harder all the time.
But, to take these arguments in turn, the whole chain is only as
strong as its weakest link. And, as links go, the checkpoint is the
most important, in terms of keeping weapons off airplanes. As a general
rule, the one and only time that passengers and their carry-on luggage
are checked for guns, knives, and bombs is at the checkpoint. At the
boarding gate, an agent or flight attendant merely checks whether each
passenger has a boarding pass that appears to be in order. So, if
weapons are missed at the checkpoint, chances are that they will make
it onto airplanes.
And, of course, we want the tests to be as hard as possible. It is
not as if terrorists will make it easy to spot their concealed weapons.
TSA seems to be saying, implicitly and illogically, the worse we do on
these tests the better.
The good news is that TSA grasps that, in addition to more and
better training, and consequences for screeners who consistently fail
such tests, the key to better screener performance are technologies
like backscatter and multi-view X-ray machines. The problem is that,
almost 7 years after 9/11, and 5 years after my office recommended such
technologies, they are still only in the pilot or testing phase. These
technologies, and others like them, should have been tested and piloted
long ago. By now, they should be widely deployed throughout the
country, ideally at every airport and checkpoint, and certainly at
every checkpoint at the highest risk airports in the country. That
takes money, of course, and that is something that DHS/TSA has been
short of since its inception, and, all too often, the dollars it has
been given have been poorly managed. I hope that the next
administration, Republican or Democrat, will make it a priority to get
TSA the resources it needs to move beyond the drawing board to the
field with these technologies that can make the difference between
terrorists' or DHS' winning the next time aviation is targeted for
attack.
Another problem is that, on occasion, covert tests have been
compromised by tipoffs to screeners that they are being tested. It is
unclear how widespread this is, but one time is one time too many. And,
of course, TSA management itself should never be involved in tipping
off screeners, as was suggested by the now infamous April 2006 email
that was the subject of a full committee hearing last November. I hope
that the Inspector General is investigating this matter and, if so, the
investigation concludes soon.
My second concern relates to air cargo. It is good news that TSA is
now required by law to screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger planes
for explosives by 2010. I was initially heartened to read last week's
USA Today story that TSA was launching the effort this summer in major
cities, suggesting that the deadline would be met sooner rather than
later. As I read further, I grew disheartened as I learned that, much
like Customs and Border Protection relies on shippers of oceangoing
freight to police themselves through the Customs Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism Program (C-TPAT), TSA will allow shippers of air
cargo to volunteer to screen their own cargo. There is no reason to
believe that shippers in any great numbers will be willing to pay for
the necessary personnel and equipment. Further, as to any shipper that
would be willing to pay for the necessary personnel and equipment and
conduct its own self screenings, we simply cannot afford to outsource a
critical security function like this in the post-9/11 world. Businesses
are concerned about security, certainly. But, understandably, their
first concern is their bottom line. When the two conflict, security
loses out. We should have learned the lesson the hard way on 9/11,
since airlines were in charge of screening passengers and baggage at
that time. The whole point of creating TSA was the recognition that,
left to its own devices, the private sector will put profit ahead of
security when the two conflict every time. One hundred percent of the
screening should be done by TSA personnel. And, if, TSA needs more
resources to accomplish this, TSA should forthwith be given those
additional resources.
My third concern relates to air marshals. I had been under the
impression that our problems with air marshals (the number of them,
their anonymity, etc.) were behind us. So, I was aghast to see the
recent CNN story to the effect that less than 1 percent of the 28,000
commercial flights flown on an average day are covered by air marshals,
according to more than a dozen air marshals and pilots interviewed by
the network. Of course, if true, this is even more troubling against
the backdrop of continued poor results on undercover tests of
screeners' ability to spot concealed weapons. If terrorists can smuggle
weapons on board aircraft, and there is no air marshal to defend the
plane and its passengers against attack, a given plane can be an open
target. We need to increase the budget for this vital program
sufficiently to enable TSA to cover 100 percent of at least the highest
risk flights, namely those into and out of the Nation's largest cities
and busiest airports, and as high a percentage of all other flights as
practicable. The air marshal force should be supplemented by trained
and deputized current and former law enforcement personnel from other
Federal, State, and local agencies, military personnel, and perhaps,
even, veterans. And, the Federal Flight Deck Officers Program, whereby
pilots are trained and authorized to carry a gun to protect the cockpit
should be expanded. At present, my understanding is that there's still
only one training facility, in a remote town in a remote state. And,
according to this just mentioned CNN report, pilots have to pay as much
as $3,000 of their own money for lodging and meals when they take the
course. And, Federal Flight Deck Officers do not get additional pay for
being willing to perform this additional, vital service. They should,
as a further incentive to encourage still more pilots (and other
authorized flight crew personnel) to sign up.
My fourth concern is that, while pilots and flight attendants are
screened, like passengers, every time they go through checkpoints,
other airport workers, some 900,000 of them nationwide, are not. There
have been numerous instances during recent years of airport personnel
being involved in thefts, drug smuggling, and other crimes. So, if
background checks are no panacea against the threat of crime, they are
likewise no panacea against the threat of terrorism. I hopeful that the
bill that Ms. Lowey of New York has introduced on this issue will
ultimately, and sooner rather than later, become law.
Finally, the title of this hearing refers to ``all modes of
transportation.'' TSA has devoted its resources, personnel, and
attention almost entirely to aviation related matters since its
creation in 2001. Now is past time for TSA to devote considerably more
resources, personnel, and attention to securing other modes of travel,
especially mass transit. Given that terrorists aim to maximize the
number of people killed and injured and damage to the U.S. economy, it
is curious that we have yet to see an attack on mass transit here in
the United States, especially since such attacks have happened since 9/
11 elsewhere in the world. Major cities like New York are taking
appropriate steps like increased armed police presence; a greater use
of bomb sniffing dogs and bomb detection technology; the wide
deployment of surveillance cameras; random bag searches, and public
awareness ``see something/say something'' campaigns. But, all these
measures are extraordinarily costly, and, given the deteriorating
economy, cities are increasingly strapped for funds. The Federal
Government has an obligation to help at least the highest risk cities
shoulder the burden of these costs, because these are the cities that
are likeliest to be targeted by terrorists and an attack on any one of
them would be an attack on the Nation as a whole.
Thank you very much, again, for the invitation to testify today,
and I look forward to your questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Mr. Verdery, if you would summarize your statement in 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF C. STEWART VERDERY, JR., PARTNER, MONUMENT POLICY
GROUP, LLC
Mr. Verdery. Madam Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Congressman
Bilirakis, thank you for having me back to the committee today.
It is nice to be back.
It is an interesting challenge, deploying policy,
technology and resources to secure transportation. Over the
past several years, TSA deserves great credit for making
strides in this arena.
I would ask the Congress to stick with what has worked--
risk management has worked--and not load on additional layers
on TSA that cannot be funded and cannot be properly
implemented. Some level of risk is inherent in transportation
systems, especially non-aviation systems, as we will talk about
later.
As you mentioned, I served as Assistant Secretary for
Policy the first 2 years of the Department. The 2 years I
oversaw TSA from a policy perspective were a tumultuous time,
as TSA moved from the Department of Transportation to DHS.
Unfortunately, it was a time when TSA's every misstep seemed to
show up on the late-night comics and led to congressional
oversight.
People had not yet grasped what it means to try to secure
aviation systems or transportation more broadly. What these
comics and critics missed was the success that was being built
and it was mentioned by both of you in your opening statements,
the fact that there has not been a successful incident in this
country, and that is largely because of the investments that
have been made.
Other agencies now have a public awareness of what a real
level of performance is. When a drug boat makes it past the
Coast Guard, when an illegal migrant makes it past CBP into the
country, when the IRS, on tax day, of all days, fails to find a
tax cheat, people say that is just what happens. We are not
going to be perfect. But, somehow, TSA is held to a standard,
and every time somebody sneaks a knife past security or every
time there is a breach in the sterile zone, it ends up on CNN.
We have to understand the risk in the system. I think the
American public would be very surprised to learn that in fiscal
year 2007, the last full year, the TSA's budget was 99.8
percent as large as the FBI's, and the FBI has a heck of a lot
broader portfolio than the TSA, everything from
counterterrorism to public corruption. But that is what happens
when you go and you hire 45,000 well-trained, well-compensated,
well-supported employees. You have gotten a good bang for the
buck.
But as you build out more and more mandates and add on more
and more equipment, there are trailing costs that may not be
worth the investment when there are so many other needs in the
Homeland Security arena.
People have to remember that each layer of the 20 layers
that have been mentioned are not meant to be perfect. The goal
of checking IDs is not to find the fake ID. The goal of the
liquids check is not to find the liquid. It is to identify
individuals who have a serious intent of doing harm to
passengers or to a transportation mechanism.
In my written testimony, I mention several successes of
Administrator Hawley over the last couple of years, and I
particularly want to mention the traveler redress program that
was launched last year with help of the DHS Screening and
Coordination Office. This has been a great success, and I
encourage people who have watch list problems to try to use it.
I had one individual that I work with said he had a watch
list problem and I will just read what he wrote me yesterday.
``I am a frequent traveler who regularly checked in online, at
home or at the airport kiosk. In preparation for a recent trip,
I tried to check in the night before and was told I had to see
an agent. I went to the desk and was told I had to check in
because I was on a security list. Apparently, there was someone
with my same name, even the middle initial.
``I went to the DHS Web site, read the TRIP process,
submitted the required forms and documents. Within 2 weeks, it
was resolved. I received a letter from DHS that reviewed my
case and fixed the issue. I thought the process was clear,
quick and responsive. I was impressed.''
So this is working well, but I ask the committee to go one
step further, take advantage of H.R. 4719, Congresswoman
Clarke's bill. Take it up, move it. It will codify the program
and expand it to non-transportation modes. It is an excellent
bill.
In my few minutes remaining, I want to take a couple of
programs where I think TSA has missed opportunities to work
with the private sector in ways that would be most productive.
First is the Registered Traveler program.
I know the committee had an oversight hearing on this
recently, but the basic program still--and I am a member of the
program--while you provide fingerprints as part of the
application process, they are not used. They are not run
against criminal databases. They are not run against terrorist
databases, the logic being, well, we are not changing the
checkpoint no matter what the background check says.
I think this is a missed opportunity. We have to look at
risk management, and the idea that we are going to make
somebody take off their shoes who is going through a full
background check, has volunteered every piece of information
that they will to the government and take up screener time to
check millions of would-be travelers and take off their shoes I
think is a poor use of resources that could be used for other
purposes.
Moreover, Customs and Border Protection, the sister agency
of TSA, promisingly announced yesterday that Global Entry,
International Registered Traveler program for arrivals in the
United States, these individuals will go through a full
interview, full criminal check, full background check,
fingerprint check. They ought to be cross-enrolled in the
domestic program and I understand talks are underway to make
that happen.
Again, that is moving people into a streamlined process and
allowing screeners to focus on individuals they haven't seen
before.
We need to move forward on the Travel Document Checker
program. It is part of the promising program that the
administrator announced. We are now checking IDs instead of
having it be handled by a rent-a-cop in an inconvenient, easy-
to-avoid fashion. But there is technology in the works in
driver's licenses with watermarks that can easily be read and
this will be able to find licenses that will be of increasing
value as REAL ID is finalized.
A true REAL ID-compliant license will be quite valuable if
it is stolen or forged, and we need to be able to detect those.
Madam Chairwoman, my 5 minutes is up. I hope during the
question-and-answer period, we will have a chance to talk about
Secure Flight, a program I worked on at DHS which remains in
the works, unfortunately. It is a difficult program, but a
priority and also how we can move forward in some of the other
modes of transportation.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Verdery follows:]
Prepared Statement of C. Stewart Verdery, Jr.
April 15, 2008
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to return to the House
Committee on Homeland Security to discuss the challenges that the
country faces in developing and deploying an effective mix of policy,
technology, and resources to secure our transportation systems. I am
currently a partner and founder of the consulting firm Monument Policy
Group, LLC and an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies.\1\
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\1\ As disclosed in filings with the House and U.S. Senate,
Monument Policy Group represents several clients with a variety of
interests related to transportation security. Also, CSIS does not take
policy positions. Thus, this testimony is submitted in my personal
capacity and not on behalf of any third party.
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Not only must these programs deter and detect those who would
commit acts of terrorism or crime, they must also facilitate the flow
of travelers and goods essential to our economic livelihood and social
fabric. Over the last several years, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has made great strides in striking this balance,
securing our transportation systems and using its significant but
ultimately limited resources to implement effective risk-management. I
would ask the Congress, and this committee in particular, to resist the
urge to hold TSA to the standard of perfection-instead, I hope that you
will understand that some level of risk is inherent in the security
arena, particularly if we want to balance security with the freedom of
movement of goods and people. Furthermore, I urge TSA and those who
fund and oversee the agency to rededicate themselves to working with
the private sector to find solutions that utilize private sector
expertise without requiring massive new Federal bureaucracies to secure
our transportation systems.
BACKGROUND
As you know, I served as Assistant Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security (BTS) Policy and Planning at DHS from 2003
through 2005. I was responsible for policy development within the BTS
Directorate, working closely with Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson and
Secretary Tom Ridge, in the areas of immigration and visas,
transportation security, law enforcement, and cargo security. These
policies largely were carried out in the field by BTS agencies such as
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), and TSA. BTS's functions have been subsumed and
enhanced under the new DHS structure, most notably the new DHS Office
of Policy.
I worked closely with TSA during my 2 years at DHS, serving as its
advocate within the administration and with the Congress, foreign
governments, and private sector stakeholders, and coordinating its
activities with other DHS entities such as CBP. This was a tumultuous
period of transition for TSA as it moved from the Department of
Transportation to DHS. During this time, nearly misstep seemingly
appeared on the front page of USA Today and any progress--or lack
thereof--in key areas was often caricatured by late night comedians and
critics in Congress and elsewhere. Unfortunately, this sort of
criticism did not take into account the broader fact that the Executive
branch deployed a new agency from scratch seemingly overnight.
Furthermore, these critics failed to note that TSA has succeeded in its
broad mission to deter transportation-based acts of terrorism in the
United States.
DISCUSSION
For most Federal agencies, the public has a general idea of an
acceptable level of performance. And it is generally not 100 percent
success. The public does not expect the Coast Guard to stop each
speedboat carrying drugs to our shores; the public does not expect
CBP's Border Patrol to catch every family of illegal migrants crossing
the border; nor, noting today is April 15, does the public expect the
IRS to recognize every tax cheat. Generally, it seems, we are as a
people familiar enough with these government entities to understand
that they will not succeed each and every time in their mission.
Unfortunately, TSA suffers from the expectation that all efforts must
reach 100 percent success or else they are a failure: hearings must be
held and someone must be held accountable.
Partially this is a result of TSA's own well intended effort to
create metrics for success. TSA's Web site prominently notes exactly
how many weapons were detected during the past week, the number of
security breaches resolved, and similar statistics. This mindset,
however, is also a function of the constant search for perfection in
each of TSA's security layers. TSA now describes some 20 layers of
security deployed to protect aviation, from government intelligence
activity to passengers trying to protect themselves and their fellow
citizens.
While serious observers of homeland security view and value each
layer for its multiplier effect on security, oftentimes the focus tends
to be on whether a single layer is being executed to perfection. For
example, the real goal of a travel document checker is not to find fake
ID's. The goal of TSA's liquids detection efforts is not to confiscate
expensive perfume from those who accidentally have more than three
ounces at the checkpoint. The goal of these and other layers is to
alert TSA to an individual whose intent is to kill or injure passengers
or use the plane itself as a weapon. That is the goal we should all be
holding TSA to, and that is the way performance should be measured.
However, far too few of us take that approach, and as a result TSA
has been stuck in a spiral of creating more and more programs,
consuming more and more of the Federal security budget. In fact, I
would argue that the TSA already consumes far too large a portion of
our scarce security resources. The average American would be shocked to
learn that in fiscal year 2007, according to the President's fiscal
year 2009 proposed budget, government spending for TSA ($6,028,000,000)
was 99.8 percent as large as that of the entire Federal Bureau of
Investigation ($6,040,000,000), with its massive responsibilities,
ranging from investigating acts of terrorism to combating public
corruption. Clearly, hiring more than 45,000 Federal employees and
supporting their activities with technology, equipment, training and
benefits is extraordinarily expensive. The committee should be very
wary of giving more mandates to TSA. These new mandates will not only
impose new costs, in terms of employing people, buying technology and
initiating training, but also in terms of maintaining that equipment,
retraining those people, and replacing that equipment when it becomes
obsolete. We should instead stop and think which security issues remain
unaddressed yet pose significant risks to the American public, and what
resources are necessary to close those gaps, even at the expense of
slightly higher but acceptable risks in other areas.
Interestingly, TSA's budget has remained relatively flat for
several years as an increasing percentage of the broader DHS budget has
been devoted to immigration enforcement. The proposed increases for
fiscal year 2009 are relatively small dollar programs aimed at fixing
holes in aviation vetting, rather than large new initiatives in
aviation or non-aviation transportation security.
At the same time, these slowing budget numbers may create an
increasing disconnect with TSA's growing list of authorized mandates.
For example, we have seen in the past year legislation to insist on 100
percent inspections of cargo carried on aircraft and ocean carriers
bound for the United States. Obviously, not all 100 percent mandates
are foolish: I was proud to help implement the US-VISIT biometric entry
program which now enrolls essentially 100 percent of foreign guests
arriving by air and sea.
But in general, 100 percent mandates should be viewed with great
skepticism because they essentially mean that no level of risk
management is acceptable. They fly in the face of efforts like TSA's
recently unveiled air cargo plan, which focuses on increased screening
by freight forwarders and via canine units. This may, in fact may
spread the pain of cargo screening enough to be effective as a
deterrent, and also be significantly more cost-effective.
Unfortunately, many people only believe 100 percent solutions are
acceptable, and therefore will force TSA to undertake some
sophisticated analysis and likely require a major increase in budget
authority, to push TSA beyond the 50 percent screening goal for fiscal
year 2009 to the elusive mark of 100 percent in 2010.
TSA PROGRESS
Assistant Secretary Hawley, his team at TSA and the broader DHS
department deserve great credit for stabilizing TSA's mission over the
past 3 years. They have restored public confidence in aviation security
and are using finite but limited resources to enhance the security of
other modes of transportation. I would like to highlight several
programs that I think are the hallmark of Assistant Secretary Hawley's
tenure at TSA:
SPOT.--Building on pilots begun in 2004, the use of specialized
training to alert transportation security officers to suspicious
behavior at or around the checkpoint is an effective security program
that provides a tremendous return on investment. Allowing TSO's to use
their eyes and ears as part of the Screening Passengers by Observation
Techniques (SPOT) program to detect threats amid the noise of the
checkpoint strikes me as the best possible use of screener time by
transitioning the TSA checkpoint into a law enforcement opportunity.
Checkpoint Evolution.--Shoehorning the TSA security checkpoint
process into the wide variety of airport configurations has been a
tremendous challenge for TSA, its airport and airline partners, and the
public at large. The recently unveiled ``checkpoint evolution'' or
``checkpoint of the future'' will take time to implement across the
spectrum of airport terminals, but represents enlightened thinking
about how to maximize passenger flow, minimize passenger stress, and
elevate the likelihood nefarious actors will be identified.
Passenger Redress.--Working with the DHS Office of Screening
Coordination, TSA launched the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP)
last year. While not flawless, TRIP has assisted tens of thousands of
individuals unlucky enough to have similar to those on terrorist watch
lists. In fact, I know first-hand of successes in this program, having
recently directed a colleague to use the TRIP program. Several weeks
later, he wrote me a note which said the following: ``I am a frequent
traveler who regularly checked in online at home or at the airport
kiosk. In preparation for a recent trip, I tried to check in the night
before and was told I had to see an agent. I went to the desk the next
morning and was told that I had to check in at the desk because I was
on a security list. Apparently there was someone with the same name,
including middle initial. I went to the DHS website and read the TRIP
process, submitted the required forms and documents and within 2 weeks
was able to check in online or at the kiosk again. I also received a
letter that DHS had reviewed my case and fixed the issue. I thought
that the process was clear, quick and responsive. I was impressed.''
To that end, I would encourage this committee to schedule a vote on
H.R. 4179, which will codify and improve TRIP, especially as redress
issues are encountered outside of TSA and CBP.
TSA AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
However, as with many glasses filled to the mid-point, the empty
half must be evaluated as well. Amidst all of the progress outlined
above, I am concerned that TSA has missed opportunities to utilize risk
management in key areas.
Registered Traveler.--TSA has made no secret of its position that
RT is not a priority program. In fact, Administrator Hawley and others
have argued that it is too risky to provide any changes in the
checkpoint process for RT enrollees without private sector development
of technology that is tested and meets some criteria for enhancing the
security process. I believe that there is a better approach. TSA can
and should use the RT framework to improve the checkpoint process for
travelers in ways that will set up risk management principles far
beyond the aviation space. For example:
Despite the fact that RT applicants provide fingerprints
during the application process, TSA does not actually compare
them to databases of known or suspected criminals or
terrorists. That is a missed opportunity, and I would encourage
this committee to push for this process to change. While such a
background check will not eliminate 100 percent of the risk
posed by a passenger, nor does the background check on
government employees access eliminate possible breaches of
classified material or inappropriate access to government
buildings. The question we must face is whether the risk of,
for instance, allowing a person who has passed a biographic and
fingerprint review to keep his shoes on through security is
significant enough to spend scarce screener resources X-raying
shoes of millions of people willing to place their full
identity before the government for review.
This week CBP launched the Global Entry international
registered traveler program for inbound U.S. citizens and legal
permanent residents able to pass a full background check. The
program will likely be opened to citizens of select foreign
nations who enter into information-sharing and reciprocity
agreements with the United States. Common sense would dictate
that Global Entry enrollees should automatically be approved
for the domestic RT program if they are willing to help pay for
the operation of the RT lanes. While discussions are underway
between CBP and TSA on this issue, they do not appear likely to
conclude before Global Entry begins enrollment next month. A
missed opportunity, for now, that should be fixed.
Integrating the RT card standards and looming REAL ID
driver's license requirement is essential. While I understand
discussions are underway to have TSA provide RT vendors more
specificity for their card architecture to meet REAL ID
mandates, they need to produce results before new document
requirements hit the checkpoint.
In addition to Global Entry members, TSA should consider
whether other low-risk populations--such as individuals with
security clearances or other Federal credentials, law
enforcement personnel, active duty military and certain
government employees--should be pre-approved for the RT
program, subject to their enrollment fee. This proposal has
long been called for by a range of groups supporting RT: it is
time for the government to step in and make this happen.
Travel Document Checker.--The TDC program is a solid achievement,
making the review of an identity document a real security layer as
opposed to an easy-to-defeat inconvenience. However, as TSA builds a
new checkpoint design, it would be remiss if it did not build into the
TDC program the ability to confirm whether a driver's license is
legitimate by reading imbedded watermarks now baked into most of these
documents. This capability will become more important once REAL ID is
fully in place and the value of a forged or altered driver's license
will skyrocket.
Secure Flight.--The Secure Flight program also represents a missed
opportunity to date to improve our transportation security. Almost 8
years after 9/11, and over 3 years since Secure Flight was scaled back
to a relatively simple watchlist review of passenger manifests, the
program appears to be far from implementation. Air carriers have
watched as CBP's need to collect pre-departure biographical
information, now known as the Automated Quick Query program, caught up
to and now appears to be likely to be implemented while Secure Flight
remains non-operational for domestic flights. It is reasonable for the
government to request that air carriers re-design their data collection
and transmission mechanisms one time for DHS needs, and it is
unfortunate that the two agencies in this space have not been able to
provide such a roadmap to date.
Black Diamond.--We have also seen considerable press about the new
``Black Diamond'' screening checkpoint self-selection program. As a
parent, I can understand the attractiveness of a screening line that
gives families and others slow to move through the checkpoint needed
time, and a more relaxed pace to do so. To date, however, I have not
seen any hard data on the actual effects of the program on throughput
at the checkpoint. We would be suspicious of a highway ``EZ-Pass''
program that asked drivers to pick their lane based on the 0-60 speed
of their vehicle leaving the booth, and the program simply appears too
new to evaluate effectively. In most locations, Black Diamond will be a
poor substitute for a true RT program that is designed to generate
additional throughput by having conducted a security review beforehand,
not just based on a traveler's perceived dexterity at the checkpoint.
Biometrics.--TSA also needs to place new emphasis on the power of
biometrics, especially when deployed in a mobile environment. The issue
of controlling access to sensitive parts of transportation systems
remains a difficult issue, especially in facilities never designed with
today's stringent access control regimes in mind. The rapid improvement
in mobile biometrics capabilities offers an increasingly cost-effective
way to verify identity with or without card architectures. I am
particularly interested in how TSA will learn from the access control
pilot underway at Denver International Airport and whether mobile
biometrics may play a role in the exit portion of the US-VISIT program.
General Aviation.--DHS is rightfully concerned that the relatively
unregulated nature of general aviation aircraft represents a weakness
in an otherwise impressive security array. GA flight activity
represents a growing market, including from overseas. Luckily, the
nature of the market has created opportunities for TSA and CBP to
piggy-back on reservation services to understand who is boarding
aircraft operating in the United States. TSA should move quickly on the
Secure Fixed Base Operator Program (SFBOP) pilots and seek funds to
expand the program quickly.
NON-AVIATION MODES OF TRANSPORTATION
Over the last 2 years, Congress has pushed for significant new
funding in other modes of transportation beyond aviation. This reaction
is perhaps understandable in light of vicious terrorist attacks on mass
transit and rail systems in Europe.
I would caution the committee against trying to compare modes and
especially against trying to replicate the TSA aviation model for
subway, rail, bus, or highway systems. By its very nature, aviation
lends itself to security processes due to its natural series of
chokepoints. Mass transit, on the other hand, is meant to be diffuse
and easy to access. Physical screening of passengers and luggage would
require a tremendously invasive deployment of equipment and personnel
in environments not designed for delays and chokepoints. Therefore, I
would encourage this committee to work with TSA on new ways to
effectively manage risk in non-aviation modes of transportation.
Additionally, I would encourage this committee to support TSA's use
of behavioral analysis via SPOT and VIPR teams. This is a valuable use
of TSA resources, and new ways to grow this effort would be worthwhile.
TSA should leverage the experience it has gained in these programs by
offering training to localities and transit authorities interested in
developing their own or similar capabilities.
DHS should also encourage the use of risk management in trusted
traveler programs in other transportation modes. The nature of mass
transit means government is seeing tremendous volumes of unknown
individuals. RT programs bring more information to the table for review
and should be adopted in environments beyond aviation.
Lastly, according to DHS figures, there is approximately $13
billion in unspent Federal assistance to State and local governments
for homeland security needs. Recognizing that much of that money has
already been spoken for in State-specific spending roadmaps and that
States and local governments utilize that assistance for a wide variety
of equipment and training needs, there still is room for
transportation-focused spending where it is truly needed.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the witnesses for their testimony
and I remind each member that he or she will have 5 minutes to
question the panel, and I now recognize myself for questions.
Certainly the witnesses have given us a broad perspective
of the success stories, but yet recognizing that our oversight
is crucial. I think that we should spend our time recognizing
the work that the vast numbers of employees of TSA have done
and never let any question that may come forward diminish that.
At the same time, we have precious little time to engage
with the administration and to ensure that our concerns are
sufficiently heard.
So let me start first with Assistant Secretary Hawley, and
tell me, how expanded, or how expansive, is the behavioral
assessment program? What kind of funding resources have you
invested in it? How many of your overall employees--and I think
Mr. Verdery said 45,000, and as he is looking, he is saying
give or take a few--really had the opportunity to have this
training?
Mr. Hawley. In terms of budget support we have gotten that,
and the President sent up a budget amendment in the fall for
fiscal year 2007 that has helped us, along with the 2008
appropriation, go from approximately 1,200 behavior detection
officers that we have now, and we expect to have about 2,000 by
the end of the year.
As you know, this is a separate category in terms of rank,
because one comes in as a TSO and then the behavior detection
officer is an opportunity for career progression. It is a
promotion and it is a full-time behavior detection capability.
So we have 2,000 out of the total workforce, or will have
2,000.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think you have just made a point, will
have 2,000, and that is out of 45,000. What would that
generally allow per airport, or major airport?
Mr. Hawley. Well, our goal is to cover all of the hours
that are open at the checkpoints and we will be able to get
through the large cat X, so to speak, and the cat ones, and I
am not sure how deep into all of the airports. However, we do
have roving patrols that move around from place to place.
I have to just correct one thing on a factual basis. On the
CNN report about air marshals covering 1 percent, that number
is absolutely wrong by an order of magnitude. It was a guess by
the folks there, and I just have to say that number is
completely false.
No disrespect to Clark Kent Ervin who was quoting what he
heard on CNN, but just that number is not correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Now, would you venture to say that it is
sizably larger than that?
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will give Mr. Ervin a chance to respond.
Let me proceed and ask further on how much progress is
being made on the watch list, the Secure Flight. It is a
constant, if you will--raises continued concerns with the
traveling public and the airlines trying to balance the
necessity of security with competence, because it is a question
of competence. We can't seem to get an integrated and concise
list.
Mr. Hawley.
Mr. Hawley. As Mr. Verdery mentioned it, it has had a stop-
and-start history, but it really is back on track and I think
Ms. Berrick noted some steps yet to take. But we expect the
final rule to be out in the summer, and the development of the
program is going along and we are now doing benchmark testing,
actually operating the system with benchmark data.
So our expectation is that it will be ready to go, assuming
the rule is out, in the very beginning of 2009.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask Ms. Berrick, what is the
premier issue that TSA has to address if we are to move forward
in our security in the transportation system?
Ms. Berrick. I think there are probably three areas. One is
really that the airport perimeter security and access controls,
and there is really two aspects of this. One is the
implementation of a biometric identification system to control
access to restricted airport areas.
TSA has issued guidelines. They have done some pilot
efforts to get this off of the ground, but this program has not
been implemented nationwide.
Another area related to airport security is the screening
of airport employees, and TSA also has some efforts underway
through random screening. They also have a pilot effort
underway that was actually mandated by Congress to explore
different options for employee screening, but they haven't yet
made final decisions, so that is one area.
Another area is air cargo. As was mentioned, TSA is
mandated to begin 100 percent of screening of air cargo on
passenger aircraft by 2010. That is going to be a huge effort.
It is going to be a big change in how they do things right now.
They have got a plan to do that. GAO has been requested by
this committee and others to look at their strategy for doing
that and, as they roll this out, we will be looking at their
efforts, but that is going to be a challenge moving forward.
Then, finally, Secure Flight, as you just asked about. GAO
has been reviewing this program for the past 4 years and I have
to agree that Secure Flight has made significant progress the
past year-and-a-half. There is a lot more discipline and rigor
and the development of Secure Flight.
There are a few areas that we think TSA should still focus
on related to the program. One is cost and schedule estimates.
We don't think that TSA's estimates on the cost and the
schedule of Secure Flight were developed based on best
practices, and we had some recommendations to TSA to strengthen
that.
Another area is testing. The draft test plans that we have
seen identify testing, but not end-to-end testing. As you are
aware, Secure Flight is going to screen both domestic and
international passengers, so TSA will have to coordinate with
CBP in getting data to do matching.
Ms. Jackson Lee. How do you portend to improve the testing?
Ms. Berrick. We think that in the test plans it should
reflect the end-to-end system testing from start to stop. So
instead of doing individual tests at different locations within
TSA, within CBP, it needs to be end-to-end.
We highlighted this to TSA. TSA agreed that that is
important and said that they do plan on doing it. We just
haven't seen it in the testing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The air cargo, do you see a present and
future plan that TSA is now engaged in to lay out the road map
as to how they meet the requirements of the deadline that
Congress has set?
Ms. Berrick. Yes, they do have a strategy that they have
rolled out that is moving security further down the supply
chain where they will certify manufacturers and shippers,
maintain a chain of custody of cargo. That practice, in fact,
has been successful in some foreign countries that we have
highlighted in past reports.
We haven't independently assessed that. We have been asked
by this committee and others to do that, and we will be
reviewing that over the next year.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Ervin, I will hold my questions for
you, because I will now yield 5 minutes to the distinguished
gentlemen from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you so much
for holding this hearing, as well.
One of my concerns has to do with the security and safety
of our Nation's pipelines. There was an incident near my
congressional district several months ago in which a pipeline
carrying dangerous gas was breached, resulting in an evacuation
of the area.
This incident and the Federal response raised question
about the role of TSA in pipeline security and industry
compliance with the Federal safety and security guidance. I
have a couple of questions for Mr. Hawley.
Would you please explain to us how TSA assesses pipeline
security threats and monitors industry compliance with Federal
security standards and guidance. As well, how would you
characterize industry compliance with those standards?
Mr. Hawley. In the how do we keep them posted and how do we
develop threat information and share that, that is something
that we do on a daily basis and, as we identify threat
information anywhere in the world, we share it with the
industry. We do not, unlike some of the other areas that we
regulate, have a fleet of inspectors for pipelines.
So what we do is we work with best practices with industry
associations and industry companies that the pipeline is a
network and having security measures that keep the network
operating is the No. 1 priority. Then individual security plans
all along the way are things that we work with them on best
practices and then go out and do audits of whether or not they
are complying with them. In the audits that we have done, we
have found very good compliance and a willingness to change, as
need be.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, again for Mr. Hawley.
In your written testimony, you mention that the TSA has
reviewed company adoptions of pipeline security guidelines and
developed a best security practices document based on the
observations throughout the industry. Are these guidelines
voluntary and, if yes, does TSA have the authority to require
industry compliance with these guidelines and standards?
Mr. Hawley. They are voluntary and they are, from the point
of view of we have overall authority if there were to be a
particularly compelling need for public health and safety to
get at compliance.
However, it is an interesting area and, again, in terms of
authorization legislation coming out of this committee, I think
it could be clarified to some extent.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Do you agree with me that an act
of vandalism against a pipeline, such as the one in my
congressional district, carrying hazardous substances, can
threaten the public in the same manner in which a deliberate
act of terrorism against them? Do you believe the Federal
pipeline security guidance adequate to stop acts of vandalism
against pipelines like the incident, again, in my district, or
something worse, a deliberate act of terrorism?
Mr. Hawley. Vandalism is something that is pretty hard to
prevent, but we look at the networks, so first of all there are
controls within the network that would limit damage to one
area. Then, frankly, as individual punctures, perhaps, are
made, there are safeguards in place to limit the damage that
could be done there. There are prudent security measures that
go to the hardening and the physical security of it.
But given the length of the pipelines in this country,
preventing the vandalism opportunity is extremely, extremely
difficult.
Mr. Bilirakis. Are there clear roles and responsibility for
TSA and DOT regarding preparing for and responding to pipeline
safety and security incidents?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, we have an MOU between us and that is
written down and signed.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, how does TSA differentiate between a
security-related pipeline breach and a safety-related pipeline
incident?
Mr. Hawley. We have those issues across the board with DOT
and we have agreements that define them. But, essentially, it
is on a security threat, we have to share equally back and
forth because first you may not know. But it is principally at
the intel level at the kinds of regulatory things that we come
out with or recommended practices that we come out with that
would get at a security breach that may not be addressed by a
safety breach, in other words, willful intent versus an act of
God.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Madam Chairwoman, one more question.
The 9/11 bill included a requirement for TSA to visit the
top 100 most critical pipeline facilities in the United States,
six of which are in Florida. Does the fiscal year 2009 budget
request provide sufficient funding to develop and implement the
required strategy to review the security plans of pipeline
operators and actually carry out inspections to ensure their
adherence to existing Federal security guidance?
Mr. Hawley. I don't know, but I will have to get back to
you on that.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, thank you very much. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman's time has expired.
Let me acknowledge the presence of the distinguished
gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, and Mr. Perlmutter, the
distinguished gentleman from Colorado.
I now yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentlelady from
New York.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, Ranking
Member Lungren.
Over the past several years, as DHS and other security-
related agencies have implemented new procedures, one of the
biggest changes has been the combining of several watch lists
into a single database, I suppose in an effort to be efficient.
The use of that database was to screen the public.
In the years since this began, we have found that while it
is a great idea in concept, there have been problems putting it
into practice, as many innocent people have been mistakenly
swept up, most commonly while traveling.
Although the long-awaited Secure Flight program should help
reduce the number of misidentifications, it will not nearly
solve the problem by itself. It must be supported by an actual
redress program.
In February 2007, TSA, which scans more people against the
database than any other government entity, implemented the DHS
TRIP program, which has since been reclassified as the
Department's Office of Appeals and Redress, to provide such a
program that should allow passengers the opportunity to clear
their names and to avoid misidentification.
Assistant Secretary, would you give us sort of a sense of
where we are with that process, how accessible it is to the
public and what your assessment of its effectiveness has been
when you look at the mis-IDs in the data base?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, Secure Flight, I believe, will virtually
solve the problem in that there won't be misidentifications
because we will be getting the data, specifically date of birth
and the other data elements, that will allow us to resolve
whether or not that is the person.
So in terms of people who are misidentified, I think that
problem will virtually go away.
Secretary Chertoff has as one of his top personal
initiatives with TSA putting in place whatever we can do
immediately, given the problems that it causes for regular
travelers. And is a function of the airlines' reservation
systems, where some airlines have a very good way of matching
people. Others do not, so it really does depend on what is
going on in the airline reservation system.
So, working with the airlines and making some process
changes with how we handle it, we are working actually in
advance of Secure Flight to try to meaningfully address that
problem so people don't have to wait until Secure Flight.
Ms. Clarke. I mean, is this real time? We have a global
event coming up in the Olympics, where a lot of people with a
lot of different types of names are going to be moving around
the world, some coming through U.S. airports. Do you believe
that we are in a position by the time that the Olympics start,
to be able to screen people efficiently and effectively.
Mr. Hawley. I do. I think another part of this, the
Terrorist Screening Center, has announced, and we have
supported and helped with reducing the actual names on the
watch list, to scrub it and re-scrub it to have it be the
smallest possible, which obviously gets at the root cause.
I am highly confident that anybody who should be caught by
the filter is going to be caught by the filter. The consequence
of course is, as you note, with many configurations of names,
it is possible to misidentify people. So that is a challenge,
and I am not sure that that effort that I just described, to
get ready before Secure Flight, will be ready in fact for the
Olympics. But, clearly, we have a lot of plans across the U.S.
Government for the Olympics to make them successful.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Assistant Secretary.
Mr. Verdery, you represent the National Business Travelers
Association, which has extensive experience with the
transportation system. To what extent have they been impacted
by problems with the use of screening programs?
Mr. Verdery. I have seen increasing cases of
misidentification. Most of the times, it is just the fact that
people have the same names, common names, and that the TSA and
other screening agencies just don't have enough information to
differentiate the people on the spot.
We did a survey earlier this year and found that there was
a large number of people, of companies, that had had employees
in this situation. Many of them had used the DHS TRIP program.
Those that had used it found it successful, but not enough
people knew about it.
In addition to Secure Flight, which I support and hope will
move quickly, Customs and Border Protection sees lots of people
every day at land borders and air borders and people are
screened for other purposes, whether it is buying guns or other
purposes you can imagine coming down the pike for registered
traveler programs and registered other programs.
So that is why we have been very supportive of your bills,
to codify TRIP and expand it and provide it the resources. We
think a program of this magnitude deserves an authorization,
and so we have been happy to work with your office and hope
that the committee will move forward on it.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentlelady's time has expired.
It is now my pleasure to yield 5 minutes to the ranking
member, Mr. Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I was
glad that I could get back while we are still going on and
before we have a vote.
Let me ask the four of you, one of the controversial
programs that was started a number of years ago was the Federal
Flight Deck Officers Program, which allows officers, that is,
pilots and copilots, when properly trained, to carry weapons
onboard in the cockpit. Do any of you have any problems with
the continuation of that program?
Mr. Hawley. No, sir, I find it very effective security.
Ms. Berrick. GAO hasn't reviewed this program. DHS IG has.
They identified some positives and then also some areas for
improvement.
Mr. Ervin. I am supportive of the program, sir. If
anything, I think it should be expanded. My understanding is
that there is still only one training facility in New Mexico.
I think the number of training facilities should be
expanded. I think more pilots ought to be allowed to
participate in this program. Furthermore, my understanding is
that they have to pay their own lodging and food expenses, so
anything to increase the ranks, with proper training, of
course, is something that I would very much support.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Verdery.
Mr. Verdery. I support it, although I get worried with all
the tarmac delays of what kind of mood the pilots are in.
Mr. Lungren. I would ask all four of you, then, we are now
taking a retrospective of the first 5 years of TSA. We are
looking forward. What would be your one or two top priorities
going forward with TSA?
Mr. Hawley. To work with the Congress to have the
imagination and courage to step beyond the got-you mentality,
to go at proactive security and I think support our officers in
the training and their ability to act nimbly. I think that
would be No. 1.
Mr. Lungren. Ms. Berrick.
Ms. Berrick. A few. Implementing a biometric identification
system for airports nationwide to restrict access to restricted
areas within airports. Then also TSA making final decisions
about what to do in terms of screening airport employees--they
have a pilot right now--having made a final decision on how
they are going to address that vulnerability. Then, finally,
moving forward on their strategy for doing 100 percent
screening of air cargo, making sure that their plans are solid
and that they have controls in place to make sure that it is
working properly.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Ervin.
Mr. Ervin. I would largely agree with Ms. Berrick, sir. I
think it is absolutely critical, and I am pleased by what
Secretary Hawley said today about expanding the deployment of
technologies like multi-view X-ray technology and backscatter.
I would like ideally to see that deployed at every checkpoint,
at least at our major airports in the country as quickly as
possible. I would support further appropriations to TSA to
facilitate that. That is the only way, ultimately, that we can
increase these performances on these undercover tests.
Second, as Ms. Berrick said, air cargo, I think it is
essential that we move forward on 100 percent screening and
that all that screening be done by TSA personnel. Then, third
and finally, as she said, I am very concerned about the fact
that we are not routinely screening all airport workers other
than pilots and flight attendants.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Verdery.
Mr. Verdery. Three quick ones. One is making sure to align
your authorizing requirements with the appropriators. We are
getting a little bit out of whack with authorizing language
coming down that can't be funded or isn't being funded. That
leaves Mr. Hawley and his successors in the impossible position
of mandates that they just don't have money to go fulfill.
Second, your jurisdictional argument you made, I think I
have personally appeared before 22 of the subcommittees out of
the 86 that have some jurisdiction over DHS. It is
unconscionable, even the hearings that you see is just the tip
of the iceberg of oversight that just swallows up so much time
by the secretary on down. It has to be streamlined.
Third is use of biometrics, mobile biometric equipment,
especially, in a range of applications, whether it is access
controls, employee screening or the construction of an exit
program for US-VISIT.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Hawley, if I could switch gears a moment,
we talked a lot about aviation but surface transportation and
rail, there is a responsibility in your TSA to come up with
rules with respect to HAZMAT, and I know you share that with
DOT. I know DOT's rulemaking, I believe their work that they
have done is I think before OMB right now. I wonder, where is
TSA with respect to it? As I understand it, you focus on where
the highly HAZMAT cars are attended and where they are handed
off between railroads or between a railroad and a shipper, as
opposed to DOT's responsibility. Can you give us an update as
to where you are with rulemaking on that?
Mr. Hawley. I believe it is undergoing administration
clearance. We have a very--it is the same things we talked
about pipelines--a very close relationship with the Federal
Rail Administration, and we do in fact look at particularly the
HAZMAT cars, wherever they may be. Our particular focus is to
get them out of areas, standing still and, particularly,
unattended. So that is the center of our target area that we
want to keep them out of there.
But we have to be able to identify where they are if indeed
there is, particularly a terrorist threat, we need to know
where the cars that might be targets are. That is something
that we share with DOT.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, and thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank the ranking member.
The gentleman's time has expired. I yield 5 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks, Madam Chair.
Secretary Hawley, a couple months ago you and I attended a
conference out in Denver about the employee screening and I
think under the 9/11 bill there are seven airports that are
selected as models or pilots, thank you, for this employee
screening.
Can you tell us where we are on that?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, I believe they will start next month, in
May, including in Denver. We will have an answer for the
Congress by the end of the year.
Mr. Perlmutter. The chairwoman and I and a couple of others
visited Colorado last summer, where we were at the
Transportation Technology Center and, as part of that 9/11
bill, we also authorized Pueblo, Colorado, Transportation
Technology Center, to be one of the centers of learning for
transportation security.
Are you familiar with that at all? Do you know where we are
on that?
Mr. Hawley. I am familiar with the center. I am not exactly
sure what aspect of that we are driving at. I can certainly
check----
Mr. Perlmutter. The goal was to put together some training
facilities there that not only focused on safety, which was
more the transportation side of it, but also to develop some
security measures as, for instance, subways or trains that
might be subject to sabotage in some fashion or another. I know
that that is now part of our whole six or seven training
centers. What is it called, consortium? The national
consortium.
I can't spell, either. I guess I can spell national. I
can't spell consortium. I can. I really can.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We won't test you today.
Mr. Perlmutter. Would you check on that for us?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Perlmutter. Last question, or I guess I can have a
couple more, Congress has appropriated a significant amount of
funding to DHS and TSA for research, development, test and
evaluation and deployment of checkpoint screening technology
since 9/11, yet when I read your papers, I think that only two
new technologies have been deployed.
Is there anything in particular blocking the development of
the new technologies? Maybe other members of the panel have
some comments on this.
Mr. Hawley. I think if I got a couple extra on Mr.
Lungren's question about things for the future, I think the way
the capital markets deal with security technology is a massive
problem in that we get an appropriation from Congress to buy
certain things and there are companies that step forward and
say, yes, I have got those and we will take your money.
However, there is a vast scientific community in the world,
and certainly in the United States, who, if we could get them
engaged earlier in the process to present new ideas and new
technology to us, we would be able to move a whole lot faster.
So I think there is an acquisition-based mentality about
purchasing security equipment that does hold us back. Having
said that, I did say we are rolling out the A.T. now at an
additional 580 machines this year, 30 new millimeter wave, 200
new of the liquid bottle scanner. We will have by the end of
the year over 900 handheld new explosive detection devices.
So we are moving it out, but I think it could move faster.
Ms. Berrick. The GAO has reported on checkpoint
technologies and we have reported that the deployment of these
has been slow, I think slower than TSA anticipated. The
explosive trace portals were deployed. There were maintenance
and performance issues with those. The deployment was halted.
The liquid bottle scanners were also deployed.
Now, in the coming year, there is going to be a lot more
deployments. Some of those technologies have also been delayed
due to performance and maintenance issues. Some of the causes
we identified were coordination problems between DHS S&T. They
do have a memorandum of understanding that they have been
signed and I think coordination has improved.
Also, Congress mandated that TSA develop a strategic plan
for their strategy for deploying technologies. TSA hasn't yet
delivered that, although they can articulate, obviously, a
strategy for moving forward on checkpoint technologies. We are
going to be issuing a comprehensive report on how to improve
the process of fielding technologies in a couple of months.
Mr. Perlmutter. Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman. His time has
expired.
I have a few more questions. I yield myself 5 minutes. I
note the ranking member does.
But let me try to be very pointed with this line of
questioning and also rapid-fire. Some of the answers, I may ask
for you to put them in writing and I may also abbreviate your
answers, and I apologize for that.
As we indicated, we are grateful for the employees, and we
should not be questioned about our commitment to the duty of
the employees and the leadership because we are asking
questions that will further enhance the security of this
Nation.
So I am concerned, Assistant Secretary Hawley, about the
GAO's high-risk list that some of the aspects of your
Department are engaged in. My question is, just quickly, are
steps being taken to remove the TSA from high-risk areas,
according to GAO?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, a number of the recommendations made from
the GAO reports we agree and have taken action on. I think Ms.
Berrick mentioned air cargo, a study that they did in
recommending that we evaluate an international air cargo regime
and we have in fact done that, and in fact that is the
direction that we are headed.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But, in your tenure, do you believe that
you can answer all the questions that placed in these aspects
of your Department on the at-risk list? Is that something that
you are looking to achieve?
Mr. Hawley. We are addressing all the issues on the
programs we have. We cannot get them all solved in this
immediate time, because very many of the recommendations have
to do with building long-term, sustainable processes that take
time and actually taking the time to do it right. But I think
that is the way to go.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you please give me maybe your
resolutions and your status in writing--I would appreciate
that--to the committee?
I also would like to just hear a yes or no answer. There is
a transition, there are Presidential elections coming up. Is
TSA in particular looking at the transition and preparing a
road map so that there is no gap in leadership from the time of
transition from one administration to the next.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, can I give a short----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Short.
Mr. Hawley. The deputy administrator is a career official
who has been in the business 30 years, one of the founders of
TSA. Our senior leadership team has been meeting for over a
year without me to prepare for this and there are three
political appointees at TSA, so I view our preparations as
complete.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you provide that to this committee
in writing, as well? I think it is a very serious issue.
I believe that we should look at all aspects of information
askance, but I do believe that information in the media
provides an important opportunity for information that we
should have. As you well know, and you indicated, that we may
have not had all of the accurate facts regarding the CNN story
on the U.S. air marshals, the Federal Air Marshal Service, but
can we not at least admit or concede that there have been
discussions about morale and discussions about work conditions
that need to be improved?
My question to you is does any of that impact the security
of this Nation and, as the person who has oversight over that
service, the air marshals, what unique changes are being made
to ensure, one, that there is an expanded coverage of our
airlines, particularly when we see airlines getting larger and
larger, by merger, and that we improve the work conditions.
I would like Mr. Ervin, if he is in any sense aware, even
from the time he was at the Department of Homeland Security,
how we can fix some of the factors that are in the Air Marshal
Service.
Secretary Hawley.
Mr. Hawley. When I came into the job, one of my top
priorities was people of the Federal air marshals, that the
agency was stood up quickly. Dana Brown, who is the director,
has that as his top priority. He has been in the job 2 years
now and they have had extensive outreach, extensive changes. I
think if you were to visit widely with the Federal Air Marshal
Service, as I do, as you know. I do these town halls, and there
is definitely an uptick in opening and opening communication
and their mission importance is unbelievable and I think that
raises morale, as one of the most important tools the secretary
has across the board for counterterrorism.
So the VIPERs, some of these things are addressing issues
such as I don't want to be stuck in a plane my entire career.
Give me some additional things where I can use my brain and
keep fresh. We have done that and I think the results show it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I want to publicly say on the record
that I would like to have a meeting with a number of the front-
line air marshals that are actually flying. I hope that you
would give them the privilege of speaking clearly and openly. I
do think that is a concern.
They are law enforcement officers and they have attention
to order. We have not been able to get directly the actual
impressions of many of them, and I would hope maybe to invite
you and have them feel free to be able to express their
concerns, which deal with ours, which deal with transfers, time
off, but more importantly, all of that impacts the security of
this Nation.
Would you, Mr. Ervin, comment? You were enthusiastic about
the Flight Deck Officers Program, but I must raise the question
that there was an unfortunate accident that occurred by a gun
going off by one of the pilots, one of the major airlines.
There is some suggestion that the equipment is not appropriate.
Did you see any need for changes or oversight that we can do
better?
I happen to believe training, the right kind of equipment,
it may not be the best kind of equipment, and the training
process may be fractured or may be failing, and we can't afford
those kinds of accidents any time it is used. We hope it is not
used, but we certainly hope it is used both in need, but also
that it is used successfully, a weapon that a pilot may carry.
Can you speak to the air marshals, as well as the issue dealing
with the flight deck officers carrying guns?
Mr. Ervin. Certainly, Madam Chair. Thank you for the
opportunity to do that. Certainly, I deplore that accident, and
there is no question but that with regard to the Federal Flight
Deck Officers Program there has got to be adequate training.
That is why I mentioned there is still only one training
facility, as I understand it. That has got to be expanded.
Training has got to be----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you would suggest that one of our
investments should be another training facility.
Mr. Ervin. Absolutely. In theory, the program is a great
one and it can serve to supplement the air marshal program, so
to segue into that----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Should we also look at the equipment that
they use? It may not be well-suited for the flight deck.
Mr. Ervin. Absolutely. There is no question but that we
need to do that. I am simply saying that in theory the program
is a good one and it can amplify the air marshal workforce.
With regard to air marshals, I was very careful in my testimony
to say that this was a CNN report.
I hope Secretary Hawley is right that the overall coverage
is more than 1 percent, but obviously we can't talk about that
in any detail in open session. I just urge the subcommittee to
verify what Mr. Hawley has said. I hope he is right. I expect
that he is right, but to verify that by calling on either GAO
or the inspector general to do a classified investigation of
the matter.
We have to have 100 percent coverage of at least the
highest-risk flights into and out of our largest cities and as
much coverage as possible of the other flights in the country.
If we need to supplement the workforce with additional current
and retired law enforcement personnel, military personnel, we
ought to do that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you hold to the fact that morale,
work conditions, is certainly a key responsibility of this
committee in terms of oversight, but, more importantly, plays
very keenly into the security of our Nation in terms of how air
marshals either are staffed and/or what their conditions are,
what the level of their performance is at the time that they
are on the job? All these elements, I think, have to be
improved.
Mr. Ervin. Absolutely. Morale is a huge issue, not just
with regard to pilots and with regard to air marshals, but also
with regard to transportation security officers. Morale is a
security issue in the post-9/11 world.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I have one more question and it goes to
this continuing challenge that we have on the 100 percent
inspection of cargo. You know the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
wants or dictates to screen 50 percent of air cargo transported
on passenger aircraft within 18 months and 100 percent within 3
years.
Here is my dilemma, and this is to Assistant Secretary
Hawley, I understand that you have been aggressively moving a
program to screen all major airport activities. I understand
the program is relying heavily on the use of X-ray
technologies.
I think you know there has been significant concern by
passenger cargo carriers and their customers that the current
screening process, and to some degree the use of X-ray
technology has been ineffective, may cause some delays. I am
committed to 100 percent screening. Our ranking member has
indicated we may need to look at this and how we move it, but I
am committed to technology. I am interested in what
technologies TSA is considering.
What is the internal process used to test and certify such
technologies, given the rapidly approaching 2010 deadline for
100 percent cargo screening? What is TSA's timeline to
implement new cargo screening methods? Are you looking at the
vast array of technology?
For example, I had the opportunity to visit a major
passenger cargo carrier facility and I personally witnessed the
loading and unloading of cargo. But, during that visit, I saw
not only the carrier's current cargo screening process, I was
able to see new technology on the premises that were being
demonstrated by a small, minority-owned company, and you know
that this committee, the large committee, is focused on these
opportunities for looking for good technology, efficient and
effective.
I later discovered that it was the carrier that expressed
an interest in this new technology, not TSA, that the
technology has either been reviewed by TSA but certainly has
not been approved by TSA because of the layered and complex
approval process.
Is TSA relying on carriers to source new technologies and
set standards for treating cargo? If so, what direction, if
any, is TSA giving the carriers? It seems TSA has placed the
responsibility squarely on the carriers. What efforts are you
making to move internally technology through the process, so
that if it is good, if it does work, it can be implemented and
be a partner with TSA to meet our goal of 2010 for 100 percent
screening?
Mr. Hawley.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, before giving the detailed answer, I think
both you and the ranking member talked about being part of the
solution and cooperatively working together, and I think air
cargo is a perfect example, where I remember contentious
hearings on this topic in the past. We worked very hard
together to arrive at a solution where now our conversations,
we agree on the goal. Now it is on the oversight of how we are
to implementing it, so I think that is a very positive thing.
As to the technology, last week, we put out to the airlines
the list of technologies that they can go ahead and buy now and
start screening with. We have worked with some of the cargo
intermediaries, 60 of them, I think, and we have got about $12
million, where we are going to help to use that as seed money
to get them to--it answers the question Mr. Ervin raised in his
testimony about getting the intermediaries to step up and start
screening.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We can see that X-ray is not always the
best technology for this.
Mr. Hawley. That is correct, and we are looking at ways.
The biggest problem is getting palletized freight, once it is
already built up into a pallet, to do effective screening of
that. If we could do that at palletized, it would open up more
opportunities at the airport, whereas today what we are trying
to do is get them while they are still in boxes screened before
they are put into pallets and then secure it before it gets to
checkpoint.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Does that mean the idea of this new
technology that I was able to visit, or to see, rather, and it
might be occurring in airports or cargo areas around the
Nation, is there a streamlined and expedited process that you
can then expedite the review and assessment of whether these
are credible new technologies and get them out there, working?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, this is probably the area I am most
personally involved with on the air cargo program is the
opening up of the accessible technologies to get at it. So it
is something very, very high priority for me.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I would like to direct these
individuals that are scattered across the Nation to a system
that really works. I would ask for, again, in writing for the
committee, what the process is for streamlining assessment of
technologies, what is the array of technologies that you are
using beyond X-ray and, I guess, your assessment of the ability
to reach our goal by 2010.
I think asking the question on December 31, 2009, is not
going to be helpful to whether or not we get 100 percent
screening. It is in the law now and it is certainly something
that we should try to establish. So I would ask for a full, if
you will, reporting on that and that assessment.
Let me indicate that the ranking member have additional
questions, and at this time I will yield to him.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much. First of all, just a
comment on the episode with the one flight deck officer. That
is one out of many.
Now, we have been briefed on how many there are and how
many flights and so forth, but we can't say that in public. All
I can say is that was one out of very many, and that is not a
bad record.
Mr. Hawley. I can say for that holster, which has been in
use for a little under 2 years, there have been over a million
flights with that holster without a problem. I think the
problem is not the holster.
Mr. Lungren. That is not bad, one out of a million. That is
kind of the record we set around here in Congress. We make one
mistake out of a million. We kind of like that.
Then, for the Federal air marshals, let us be honest, that
is a tough job from the standpoint of morale. You are flying on
airplanes and there is no trouble, you go on an another
airplane, there is no trouble. You go on another airplane,
there is no trouble.
I mean, any of us who have any family members who have ever
been in law enforcement know about law enforcement. I mean, you
can go through boring times and then you have some exciting
times. Then you go through some boring times. Thank God, in
most cases, our Federal air marshals get no exciting times.
So, I know, Mr. Hawley, you have tried to do some other
things which allowed them, perhaps, to take on some other
responsibilities on a rotating basis, and I know you have
gotten some criticism for that, as well. But I understand that
is an immediate challenge.
Let me ask you a question that was brought up by the
written testimony of Mr. Ervin, and the was talking about the
behavior detection program and concern that there is adequate
training such that we don't have a problem of either racial
profiling or ethnic profiling. The reason why I think it would
be good for you to make some observations on that is just this
weekend I was with some people who have nothing to do with law
enforcement, nothing to do with TSA, not in politics and they
were talking about that one incident, which they thought was
very positive. But they say, how do you make sure there isn't
that kind of profiling? I tried to explain it to them, but
maybe you could, for the record.
Mr. Hawley. I think it is a very legitimate question,
because it is one of the best pieces of security we have, and
we need to make sure that it withstands all of the tests so
that we can keep using it. We have a very disciplined program
at TSA for how we do it and measure it and track it.
However, I have asked for a full civil rights, civil
liberties review of the program, independent review, to lay
out, so that people will have some confidence in this question,
so that it is not just me answering the question that we have
disciplines in it, that we will have an outside look. I think
it is very important that the credibility of the program be
strong, because it is so much more effective than trying to
find little scraps of metal on an X-ray image 2 million times a
day.
So having that behavior-detection layer is a critical piece
of the total security package.
Mr. Lungren. Is it not true that the Israelis have used
that for years as an effective means of their screening
program, particularly at the airports?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, and ours is different in some respects
from theirs, and certainly law enforcement has used it over
many, many years in different forms. Our approach is that we
have it constrained very tightly and disciplined, so that we
are able to explain why this spot intervention was made and why
that one wasn't, so that it is clear it is not based on race or
any other thing.
Mr. Lungren. Now, I presume that you are--well, I hope you
are constantly updating it such that you are taking information
from the intelligence community and other episodes around the
world that would give you up-to-date information on kinds of
things people would be attempting to do, and therefore
behavioral responses to those duties, terrorist duties, that
they might be embarking on.
Mr. Hawley. We are indeed. There are two parts of it. One
is this training I mentioned in my opening statement, that we
are doing 12 hours' worth of training for everybody, and a
large part of that are things that we have learned on the
behavioral side and then how terrorists approach and try to do
distractions, et cetera.
The other is locking in the document checker with the
behavior detection, so that that is a way, because you are
going to be able to talk to the individual at the document
checker. So the behavior person will identify somebody they
want a little extra attention to and then the document checker
can check the documents and have a conversation, so locking all
that together.
Mr. Lungren. Well, that is why they took so much time with
me at Dulles Airport just 2 weeks ago.
Let me just ask all four of you, very quickly, are we doing
a good enough job--and I will start with Mr. Verdery and move
in reverse order. Are we doing a good enough job in leveraging
the private sector in this? In other words, are we doing a good
enough job of making sure that the private sector is part and
parcel of our effort?
We spend a lot of money on budget and everything else. Of
course, I keep thinking of registered travelers being one
possibility where the private sector works to complement what
the public sector is doing. I am not talking about the bells
and whistles, but I am talking about some additional
information and so forth that they might have. If we are not,
do you have any suggestions about how we could do a better job
of leveraging the private sector's participation in this
overall effort?
Mr. Verdery.
Mr. Verdery. Well, on the equipment procurement side, as
Mr. Hawley mentioned, it is a problem that the budgetary ways
of Congress of allocating money year to year doesn't match up
with kind of the buying equipment that is very expensive and
takes many years to recoup that investment, so that is a
problem on how things are purchased, especially in an era when
TSA's budget is essentially flat.
Over the last couple of years, more and more money, more
and more DHS money is being sucked up by CBP and ICE on
immigration enforcement. I won't argue about the relative
merits of it, but it is a fact.
I do think, with working on the private sector, we are
going to see two big things come together as what we are going
to do with Registered Traveler, and I spoke to that in my
statement. I am supportive of it and would like to see it
expand. Then what we are going to do on the exit program for
US-VISIT, which we understand the rule that is going to be
promulgated imminently. The question is are you going to ask
the airlines to do this? Are you going to allow Registered
Traveler providers to take care of this, or is TSA going to
take responsibility?
We know what the administration wants to do is to have the
airlines do it, but they are an unwilling recipient of the
football here, and so it is going to be a rulemaking, we will
have to fight it out. But those two issues are going to come
together at the checkpoint, where you have private sector
equities in play and it is going to require some tough
decisions as to who has the responsibility and who can do
things the most efficiently.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I just want to remind the witnesses, we
are going to have votes in 5 minutes, and if your answers could
be concise, thank you.
Mr. Ervin. I will be very brief. Mr. Lungren, it is really
difficult to give a short answer to that question. It is a very
big question. I would agree with what Mr. Verdery said about
Registered Traveler. I am a supporter of that program. It is a
very good example of a partnership between TSA and the private
sector.
As he said, I think that the contracting procedures are too
cumbersome, in that they ought to be streamlined so that
smaller businesses in particular can bring to the fore
technologies that they have developed. On the flip side of it,
though, I would stress that I don't think we should outsource
security to the private sector, and so that is why, as I
highlighted in my testimony, I have been concerned about this
notion that airlines should be allowed to police themselves
with regard to this 100 percent cargo requirement. I think that
is going in the wrong direction.
The whole point of creating TSA after 9/11 was the
recognition that, left to their own devices, airlines won't
police themselves.
Ms. Berrick. I think partnerships have significantly
improved since GAO started looking at aviation security 5 years
ago, both in aviation and surface modes of transportation. Some
quick examples on aviation: I think TSA is putting a lot more
focus on coordinating with international partners in other
countries. I think that is a great success story.
Also, passenger pre-screen, matching passenger information
against terrorist watch lists, TSA is doing a much better job
coordinating with air carriers. On the surface modes of
transportation, TSA has really reached out this past year-and-
a-half to work with stakeholders on surface modes of
transportation and work collaboratively with them, which wasn't
always the case prior to that.
One area to focus on, I think, related to partnerships is
in surface modes of transportation. I mentioned in my opening
statement that the 9/11 Act has a lot of requirements for TSA
to implement and also the transportation operators to implement
for security.
TSA has about 100 inspectors to do a lot of work. We have
heard from TSA and also from transportation operators that they
are concerned these inspectors are really going to be taxed. It
is going to be hard for them to implement all of these
requirements to check security programs, to check training
programs. So I think that is one area of focus that TSA should
focus on moving forward.
Mr. Hawley. In 280 days, I shall be returning to the
private sector, going back to California. I know from my
previous experience in the private sector, I would not even
consider doing business with the government, because it was
just too complicated, too slow, too many requirements. I think
that is a problem that the business community, the private
sector outside of the Beltway, be brought into the game a
little bit more in terms of thinking about the marketplace for
the public through the government. I think that is a very
important thing we need to do.
I would disagree with Mr. Ervin's comment in terms of I
think we have to work with our private sector partners. They
are part and parcel of security, and you don't want TSA
officers everywhere, but we need to have every airline
employee, every airport employee, mass transit--all private
sector, public sector, and even passengers, actively engaged in
the security process.
Whether or not it is natural, it has to be a part of the
security package of this country.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank all the witnesses.
Ranking Member, I was going to interrupt Secretary Hawley
and rule him out of order when he said that he would be
departing in 280 days. But we thank the witnesses. In
conclusion, let me just simply say, Mr. Hawley, I hope you will
go back. We appreciate the private sector involvement, but it
is my view that the cargo process needs technology approved by
TSA and utilized by TSA and to have the oversight that Mr.
Ervin has spoken about.
I also want to take note that I believe that we have made
great strides with the U.S. Federal air marshals, but there is
more work to be done. We appreciate an accident and one shot,
but we would like to think that we would want to ensure that
those kinds of accidents are diminished, because any suggestion
that we must not be worried leaves us vulnerable to what could
happen in flight.
So I would ask for your response to the committee's
questions on the oversight of this Flight Deck Officer Training
Program and the U.S. marshals program and, as well, I think one
of the issues Ms. Berrick has mentioned that is very important,
the perimeters of the airport and the IDing of the employees
coming on, working with the employees and unions.
Let me also say that this committee will have a field
hearing on the issue of mass transportation and so we are
concerned about those issues. We thank the ranking member and
the members who are here.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the
members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee
have additional questions for the witnesses.
We will ask you to respond expeditiously in writing to
those questions.
Hearing no further business, thanking the ranking member
and the committee members, the subcommittee stands now
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee for Kip Hawley, Assistant
Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, Department of
Homeland Security
GAO'S HIGH RISK LIST
Question 1. Please provide a written response to TSA's resolutions
and status on the steps being taken to remove the TSA from high-risk
areas, as outlined in the GAO report. In your response, please include
a thorough assessment on how the recommendations sighted in this report
will be incorporated into a plan of action toward ``building long-term,
sustainable processes'' as the Assistant Secretary had described.
Answer. Although the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
does not have any individual items on the Government Accountability
Office's (GAO) high-risk list, TSA is participating in the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to address Department-wide high-
risk items. TSA is an active participant in the newly formed DHS
Performance Improvement Council which will provide input into the DHS
Transformation and Integration Corrective Action Plan through the DHS/
GAO Performance Improvement Initiative.
Component contributions to this Initiative are still in the initial
stages and each component will meet with GAO to receive feedback on
current Government Performance Results Act performance measures and
milestones. Steps will be formulated to address performance improvement
processes and measures. TSA is scheduled to have its initial meeting
with GAO in mid-June and as a follow-up will develop or revise
processes and specific measures based on GAO recommendations.
TSA is committed to adhering to DHS/GAO guidance on submitting
timely reports on progress under this Initiative to building long-term
sustainable processes for the future.
CHECKPOINT TECHNOLOGIES
Question 2. Given the significant investments DHS and TSA have made
in research, development, and deployment in new screening technologies
to detect explosives and other threat items on passengers and their
carry-on items, how effectively are the new technologies working in the
airports? To what extent has the government's ability to detect liquid
explosives and other types of explosives at the checkpoint been
improved by deployment of the explosives trace portal and the hand-held
bottled liquid screeners?
Answer. The Explosives Trace Portal (ETP), while improving the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) capability to detect
certain explosive substances that may be carried by passengers, has not
been entirely successful in detecting the full range of explosive
threats of interest to TSA. TSA has worked closely with the ETP vendors
in order to improve detection sensitivity and product reliability;
however, TSA is not sufficiently satisfied with the results to commence
widespread deployment. In addition to the ETP, TSA has begun
operational testing of Whole Body Imagers (WBI) to detect a broad range
of explosives and other threat items on passengers. Utilizing
backscatter X-ray and millimeter wave technologies, the WBI pilots show
significant promise in detecting explosives and other non-metallic
threat items that may be concealed on passengers, while the enhanced
Walk Through Metal Detectors (WTMD) continue to provide weapons
detection of knives, guns, and other metal threats, as well as
improvised explosives device (IED) components (i.e. detonators &
wiring) that would be used in conjunction with the explosives to create
an IED. To detect liquid threats, prior to the deployment of hand-held
Bottle Liquid Scanners (BLS), TSA relied on screeners utilizing X-ray
images on the TRX systems to identify inconsistencies, such as
detonators and wiring protruding from bottles that were present in
passenger carry-on baggage. The BLS systems that have been deployed
enable screeners to screen ``3-1-1'' permitted liquid items and larger
exemptible liquids (i.e. medications and baby formula) to detect the
presence of one of the most readily available, liquid explosives
threats, even at very low levels of concentration. In addition, TSA is
currently beginning the replacement of aging TRX X-ray units with a new
generation of Advanced Technology (AT) X-rays. The ATs have
demonstrated a marked improvement in the detection of liquid explosives
and other threat items contained in carry-on items.
BEHAVIORAL DETECTION OFFICER
Question 3. How expansive the Behavioral Assessment Program? What
kind of funding resources have you invested in it? How many of your
overall employees have had the opportunity to participate in the
training? Additionally, what is the standard operating procedure for a
Behavior Detection Officer, once he or she identifies a suspect at an
airport? What paperwork is filed by the officer, who maintains those
records, and what office at TSA is tasked with managing the records and
identifying systemic problems that may surface?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) operates
the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) Program at
all CAT X and CAT I airports and a large number of CAT II airports
nationwide. The specific number of airports using this program and the
number of Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) deployed nationwide,
however, is Sensitive Security Information (SSI) and would need to be
provided in a secure setting.
The BDO Standard Operating Procedure document is also SSI in its
entirety, but generally speaking, the program includes the
identification of specific types of behavior that trigger specific
responses. Once someone manifests a cluster of these identified types
of behavior, he or she may be referred to secondary screening or a law
enforcement officer.
The SPOT Program was officially launched in fiscal year 2007.
Funding for fiscal year 2007 for Non-Personnel Costs & Benefits (non-
PC&B) was $1.5 million, and the program was funded $41.5 million for
PC&B. For fiscal year 2008, non-PC&B costs to date are $1.2 million and
end of year estimates are $3.2 million. For PC&B these costs are $30.2
million and $80.1 million, respectively.
BDO positions have been competitively offered at many airports
across the country. All TSA employees who qualify at those airports
have had the opportunity to apply for these positions, and those
selected for the program receive the requisite training. We are still
building this program and the number of employees trained in it changes
weekly. The end-of-year goal is to have well over 2,000 employees
trained, though the actual number is SSI and would have to be provided
in a secure setting.
In addition to the specific behavior detection training that the
BDOs receive under the SPOT Program, all Transportation Security
Officers (TSO) receive general behavioral awareness training through
the TSA On-line Learning Center program as do many Transportation
Security Inspectors (TSI). This general behavior awareness training,
though not directly associated with the SPOT Program, is intended to
enhance the overall capability of the workforce in this area of
security.
In reference to SPOT referrals, once a BDO identifies an individual
manifesting suspicious behavior, he or she institutes what is known as
``SPOT referral screening.'' This referral screening is non-invasive
and includes a bag search and engaging the passenger in casual
conversation in order to identify the origin of the passenger's
suspicious behavior. As a result of this process, there are two types
of reporting that can occur: (1) The completion of a SPOT Score Sheet
and (2) completion of an Incident Report (produced only in the event
that Law Enforcement Officer assistance is requested).
The SPOT Score Sheet is a document that the BDO completes following
each incident of SPOT referral screening. The BDO uses this document to
record and outline the specific behavior he or she identified that led
to the referral as well as the action taken as a result of the
subsequent referral screening (if any action was deemed necessary,
which does not occur in every case). No personally identifiable
information is included on the SPOT Score Sheet. This includes name,
physical characteristics, and ethnicity. A section on the SPOT Score
Sheet is checked off only if the passenger is assessed an initial point
if they qualify based on intel-driven specific age and gender
information. The only other passenger information included on the Score
Sheet is the flight data and the person's immigration status, if
applicable (illegal alien or self-deporting.) The Score Sheet also
includes a section for the BDO's professional analysis and comments on
the event, and a section for the resulting action taken (if any). This
score sheet is completed by the BDO at the end of the shift and is not
done in the presence of the passenger.
Information from the completed SPOT Score Sheets is entered into a
national database on a daily--but not less than weekly--basis, and the
paper copy is filed in a locked cabinet at the respective airport. The
SPOT Program Office at TSA Headquarters has full oversight of this
database. The airports also have the ability to monitor the score
sheets at their airports to maintain full visibility of their program.
The Incident Reports are provided to the appropriate chain of command
at each airport for appropriate processing/follow-up activity.
The SPOT Program is responsible for the overall management of the
SPOT database electronic records and for establishing an appropriate
record retention process. The record retention process includes the
establishment of a record disposition schedule for approval by the
National Archives and Records Administration to develop a formal policy
and procedures for SPOT paperwork. This process is currently in the
coordination and approval phase. The only physical paperwork produced
is appropriately maintained at the airport level.
While BDO Transportation Security Managers at each airport are
tasked with reviewing the referrals made at their airport for trends,
the SPOT Program Office also provides oversight on a national level
through its weekly review and analysis of the electronic data captured
in the national database, utilization of a standardization team, and
relationship management with the airports' SPOT points of contact. The
airport SPOT POC is the individual responsible for having local
oversight of the SPOT program at his or her respective airport. This
role may be filled by the Assistant Federal Security Director or
another TSA management representative at the airport.
SECURE FLIGHT--WATCH LISTS
Question 4a. What critical activities are included in the $82
million request for fiscal year 2009 funding for Secure Flight?
Answer.
FISCAL YEAR 2009 SECURE FLIGHT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed
Amount
Critical Spend Activities (in
Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Personnel Compensation & Benefits (PC&B) for Program Full $16
Time Equivalents (FTEs) and Facilities Costs................
Business Operations, Program Management Office (PMO), Privacy 12
and Implementation Support..................................
Iterative Secure Flight System Development and post- 15
production application support..............................
Operations and Maintenance of the Secure Flight System and 12
associated hardware/software................................
Secure Flight Resolution Service Center Operations........... 12
New IT hardware purchases and technology refresh............. 4
Airline Employee Vetting activities.......................... 5
DHS Router Costs............................................. 6
----------
TOTAL.................................................. 82
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 4b. When will the system be fully operational for domestic
watch list matching? For international watch list matching functions?
Do you believe your schedule is realistic, given the program's past
history?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration anticipates that
it will assume full watch list matching for all domestic aircraft
operators by July 2009 and for all international aircraft operators in
early 2010, pending congressional approval of recommended funding
levels and the publication of a final rule.
TSA believes this schedule is realistic. As TSA works aggressively
to implement the program, Secure Flight remains on track for
acceleration. In December 2007, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) delivered a Report to Congress on Secure Flight's implementation
plan, outlining a schedule for achieving key program milestones. Table
1 below highlights the program schedule.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Milestones Estimated Completion
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program planning complete after: Q1 FY07 Completed
Governance infrastructure
implemented, in accordance with industry
and government best practices;
Integrated Master Schedule
defined;
Life-Cycle Cost Estimates
completed; and
Privacy and security woven into
the program.
Benchmark Testing begins after: Q1 FY08 Completed
Interim Authority to Operate
(IATO) has been granted;
Secure Flight Exemption Rule is
effective.
System complete after (release 2): Q2 FY08
Design phase complete;
Development phase complete; and
System testing complete.
Parallel testing begins after: Q3 FY08
Implementation support provided
to aircraft operators;
Network interface engineering
complete; and
Operational testing with first
groups of domestic aircraft operators
conducted.
Service Center staffing, training, and Q3 FY08
operational testing begins..
DHS Certification complete................ Q4 FY08
Parallel testing complete; Secure Flight Q2 FY09
will begin full watch list matching
responsibility for domestic flights
after:
Operational testing with
subsequent groups of domestic aircraft
operators conducted.
Parallel testing with first group of Q2 FY09
aircraft operators complete. Domestic
cutovers begin and Secure Flight assumes
full watch list matching responsibility
for initial group of domestic aircraft
operators.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secure Flight is moving quickly toward full implementation. The
program is executing a comprehensive test approach, and TSA plans to
begin parallel testing with the first groups of domestic aircraft
operators in 2008, and to take over full responsibility for watch list
matching for both domestic and international aircraft operators in
fiscal year 2010, pending funding and the publication of the final
rule.
Secretary Chertoff has been clear that acceleration of the Secure
Flight program remains a priority and TSA remains committed to meeting
this key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Report and requirement
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Question 4c. What are TSA's key challenges in meeting Secure Flight
scheduled completion dates?
Answer. If Secure Flight does not receive approval for transfer of
$24 million in fiscal year 2008 and the President's request of $82
million in fiscal year 2009, the program will have to delay key work
scheduled for the current fiscal year and will not be able to continue
on an accelerated implementation timeline to assume full watch list
matching for all domestic aircraft operators by July 2009 and for all
foreign aircraft operators by early 2010. Further, the timely
publication and effective date of the Final Rule will ensure that TSA
is able to assume full watch list matching for all domestic aircraft
operators by July 2009 and by early 2010 for all foreign aircraft
operators.
Question 4d. What is the status of the Secure Flight rulemaking?
Answer. The Secure Flight Final Rule is still in the deliberative
process and should be promulgated in a timely manner.
100% CARGO SCREENING
Question 5a. In October 2005, GAO reported that TSA had taken a
number of actions intended to strengthen domestic air cargo security,
but factors existed that may have limited their effectiveness. In April
2007, GAO reported that DHS (TSA and CBP) have taken a number of
actions to secure air cargo entering the United States, but many of
these efforts are still in the early stages and could be strengthened.
Since GAO's reports were released, Congress enacted 9/11 Act, which
mandates 100 percent screening of air cargo transported on passenger
aircraft. Specifically, this act calls for a system to be developed and
implemented to provide a level of security commensurate with the level
of security for the screening of passenger checked baggage to screen
100 percent of air cargo on passenger aircraft within 3 years of the
date of enactment.
What is the status of TSA's efforts to meet the requirement set
forth in the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007 to screen 50 percent of air cargo transported on passenger
aircraft within 18 months of the enactment of the act and 100 percent
of air cargo within 3 years of its enactment?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is in the
process of developing and implementing the Certified Cargo Screening
Program (CCSP), a regulatory program that will enable industry to meet
the screening requirements contained in the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act).
At this time, air carriers perform the screening of all cargo to be
transported on passenger aircraft. However, due to the large volume of
such cargo (approximately 6,000 tons per day), air carriers alone will
not be able to screen cargo in the volume required to meet the 50
percent and 100 percent requirements of the 9/11 Act.
The CCSP is intended to enable the entire industry (original
manufacturers, shippers, and indirect air carriers) to perform
screening in order for cargo to arrive at the air carrier fully
screened and ready to load onto aircraft. CCSP participants will use
either physical search or non-intrusive screening methods such as X-ray
and explosive trace detection systems to screen cargo destined for
passenger aircraft.
To date, the TSA Air Cargo Division has briefed over 1,000
corporate representatives on the CCSP, and the response from industry
has been positive. Additionally, TSA is currently coordinating an
aggressive screening technology pilot program in support of the
Certified Cargo Screening Program at almost 60 Indirect Air Carrier
locations owned by 14 different companies. These locations are high-
volume cargo processing centers which build consolidated loads for air
carriers. None of the individual sites are operational to date, but TSA
anticipates that most will be operational prior to fall 2008.
TSA is also operating a similar pilot with approximately 80 shipper
locations in nine cities. However, these are all in preliminary
development but TSA plans to have the majority of these locations
validated, certified, and operational in fall 2008.
Question 5b. What is the status of TSA's report to Congress
assessing each exemption granted under 49 U.S.C. 44901(i)(1) for the
screening of cargo transported on passenger aircraft, required by the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?
Answer. In response to Section 1602 of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, on February 25,
2008, the Department of Homeland Security delivered a document entitled
Report to Congress on Air Cargo Subject to Alternate Screening to the
Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Committee on Homeland
Security, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, as well as the Government Accountability Office.
Question 5c. What progress has TSA made in implementing its
targeting system for elevated risk domestic air cargo transported on
passenger aircraft, referred to as Freight Assessment?
Answer. The Freight Assessment System has completed its pre-system
pilot test and has received authority to operate from the
Transportation Security Administration Information Technology office.
The system will be deployed to industry in conjunction with the
Certified Cargo Screening Program.
Question 5d. What progress has TSA made in coordinating with the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to enhance the security of air
cargo transported into the United States?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
currently collaborating with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) on a key component of its risk-based approach for securing
inbound air cargo. As part of this approach, TSA has engaged CBP to
leverage its Automated Targeting System (ATS) and in a joint CBP/TSA
international inbound air cargo targeting pilot. The pilot will
evaluate the use of existing ATS trade data and its automated risk
assessment program to identify elevated-risk air cargo.
CBP has given TSA an initial briefing on the capabilities of ATS,
and TSA has likewise briefed CBP on its authority and policy vehicles
in the international environment. In addition, TSA has provided to CBP
its risk assessment of inbound cargo on passenger planes. Included in
this assessment is an analysis of threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences. Going forward, the agencies will collaborate on how to
implement changes that address these potential risks via ATS.
As such changes are successfully tested, the goal for both TSA and
CBP will be to jointly consider how such integrated risk-assessment
efforts could be accomplished prior to departure of an aircraft from an
international last point of departure.
Question 5e. What is the status of TSA's efforts to develop and
implement technology to inspect air cargo?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office
of Security Technology is supporting air cargo security goals and
objectives by testing, evaluating, and qualifying technology to detect
explosives and stowaways as well as ensure the integrity of the air
cargo supply chain. TSA plans to both optimize currently available
technologies and provide cargo specific screening procedures coupled
with protocols to support these technologies in the operational
environment.
The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate is about to conclude the congressionally
directed Air Cargo Explosives Detection Pilot Program and provide the
report on the results of that effort later this year. TSA will be
conducting an operational test at some airports, domestic and
international, to develop requirements, specifications, and testing
protocols to qualify carbon dioxide (CO2) monitors. The
CO2 monitor is expected to be qualified in fiscal year 2009.
Heartbeat Monitors are susceptible to environmental factors at the
airports that will be addressed in future research efforts before they
are qualified by TSA for use by the cargo freighters. TSA has deployed
certified checked baggage screening technologies into actual air cargo
screening operations, at about twelve different sites, to determine all
the integration, training, and operational issues. TSA has also
initiated pilot tests to study ways to integrate counter-to-counter air
cargo into the existing airport checked baggage screening
infrastructure using Explosives Detection System (EDS) and Explosive
Trace Detection (ETD) screening equipment.
The technologies showing promise in the near-term are existing or
slightly modified explosives detection screening technologies such as
EDS, Cargo Optimized EDS, ETD, and dual energy, multi-view Advanced
Technology X-ray (AT-X-ray) technologies, and some CO2
monitors for detecting stowaways.
TSA will have screening technologies qualified to core air cargo
screening requirements by January-March 2009. To get on the qualified
products list (QPL) means: (a) That the technology has successfully
completed commodity based integration test and evaluation (IT&E)
qualification testing; (b) that the technology has successfully
completed the subsequent operational test to ensure the product is
operationally suitable and effective in an operational environment; (c)
that the air cargo screening procedures and alarm resolution protocols
for the technology have been developed and incorporated into Standing
Operating Procedures for Transportation Security Officers and
incorporated into TSA Security Directives and Aircraft Operators and
Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Programs; and (d) that the
screener training curriculum and course materials have been developed
and validated.
Candidate Air Cargo Screening Technologies for Use by Indirect Air
Carriers in Screening Break Bulk Cargo
Explosives Detection Systems (EDS)
GE CTX 2500
GE CTX 5500
GE CTX 9000/9400
L3 6000/6600
Reveal CT-80/80DR
Explosives Trace Detectors (ETD)
GE Itemiser 2
Smiths Ionscan 400B
Smiths Ionscan 500DT
Smiths Sabre 4000 (Particle Mode Only)
Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray
AT X-ray/Small
L3 ACX 6.4
Rapiscan 620DV
Smiths 6040 aTiX
Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray/Medium
L3 MVT HR
L3 VIS HR
Rapiscan MVXR5000
Smiths 10080 EDtS
Smiths 10080 EDtS++
1. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is in the
process of evaluating and testing the technologies on this list
for screening air cargo. Future testing may result in
modifications to this list.
2. ETDs must be present for use in either alarm resolution (EDS) or
for use IN CONJUNCTION with AT X-Ray (directed search).
3. ETDs can be used as primary detection technology.
4. Protocols for use in screening air cargo with these technologies
are being finalized and will be provided later.
5. Not all technologies are appropriate for all commodities.
6. The TSA would encourage Indirect Air Carriers to propose
screening processes and procedures based on their unique
operational needs.
Candidate Air Cargo Screening Technologies for Use by Air Carriers in
Screening Break Bulk Cargo
Explosive Detection System (EDS)
GE CTX 2500
GE CTX 5500
GE CTX 9000/9400
L3 6000/6600
Reveal CT-80/80DR
Explosive Trace Detectors (ETD)
GE Itemiser 2
Smiths Ionscan 400B
Smiths Ionscan 500DT
Smiths Sabre 4000 (Particle Mode Only)
Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray
AT X-ray/Small
L3 ACX 6.4
Rapiscan 620DV
Smiths 6040 aTiX
Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray/Medium
L3 MVT HR
L3 VIS HR
Rapiscan MVXR5000
Smiths 10080 EDtS
Smiths 10080 EDtS++
1. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is in the
process of evaluating and testing the technologies on this list
for screening air cargo. Future testing may result in
modifications to this list.
2. ETDs must be present for use in either alarm resolution (EDS) or
for use IN CONJUNCTION with AT X-Ray (directed search).
3. ETDs can be used as primary detection technology.
4. Protocols for use in screening air cargo with these technologies
are being finalized and will be provided later.
5. Not all technologies are appropriate for all commodities.
TRANSITION
Question 6. Please provide a written response as to how TSA is
preparing a transition blueprint in the upcoming months. Do you have a
Senior Leadership Team in place to assist with this transition
blueprint? If so, who is a member of the Senior Leadership Team? In
your response, please carefully and with as much detail as possible
include TSA's plan of action to provide incoming leadership team with
identified best practices and lessons learned; standard communication
forums/mechanism through which incoming leadership can discuss ongoing
policy transition issues throughout their first year in office; and
reports outlining lessons learned within critical components at TSA and
program success and failures within specific offices, as well as
objective recommendations on how the incoming leadership should move
forward.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is closely
working under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and the Office of the Under Secretary for Management (USM) to ensure a
smooth transition process. The Under Secretary for Management Paul
Schneider and Deputy Under Secretary for Management Elaine Duke provide
the overall leadership for the Department's, and TSA's, transition
efforts. In June, RADM John Acton of the United States Coast Guard
(USCG) will be detailed to USM to serve as DHS Transition Director
where he will lead the USM core team that is currently in place. TSA
has designated a senior career executive as its Senior Transition
Officer to support the Department's transition team. He is assisted by
a career Deputy Transition Officer and each office within TSA has a
designated Point of Contact to ensure that complete and timely
information is provided to incoming appointees of the new
administration.
TSA also has a longstanding Senior Leadership Team (SLT) comprised
of the Deputy Administrator, all Assistant Deputy Administrators, and
other office heads. The SLT was created in 2005 and is a forum for the
career leadership of the agency to make key policy decisions and
recommendations to the Assistant Secretary. The SLT meets weekly. We
anticipate that the SLT will continue its critical role during the
transition. TSA's SLT will be able to provide the new political
leadership of the next administration with professional advice on the
programs they administer.
TSA is well placed to respond to the demands to ensure that its
core functions of providing security throughout the transportation
networks continues during and beyond the transition period. TSA's
Deputy Administrator is a career civil servant as are all of the
Assistant Administrators with the exception of Legislative Affairs and
Strategic Communications and Public Affairs, and in each instance we
have career professionals to lead those offices during the transition.
Furthermore, TSA has been diligently working on succession planning to
make certain that as some of our senior leaders either retire or move
to other positions, there is a deep bench in place to continue the
agency's mission. In fact for the past 2 years a major focus of the SLT
has been on leadership and management development programs for the next
generation of TSA leaders to head a rapidly maturing agency that is
still less than 7 years old.
GRANT FUNDING
Question 7a. Please describe the procedures and differences that
are used in determining grant funding decisions for Tier 1 and Tier 2
transit agencies.
Answer. Projects that have the highest efficacy in reducing our
Nation's transit risk are funded with transit security grants. All
projects for fiscal year 2008 were scored using a formula as described
in the grant guidance. The formula is a function of risk, project
effectiveness, quality, and regional collaboration. All transit
agencies had the opportunity to be provided their agency specific risk
score. The project effectiveness values were laid out clearly in the
grant guidance and were based on the type of project proposed in the
application. The methodology and the formula were explained in detail
during the stakeholder conferences. Transit agencies also had
opportunities to ask questions either via email or during the weekly
conference calls.
There were differences in the procedures for how Tier 1 and Tier 2
were scored for ``quality'' and ``regional collaboration.'' For Tier 2,
the quality and regional collaboration factors were scored by the
National Review Panel composed of subject matter experts. Since the
process for Tier 2 is competitive, applications were evaluated solely
on the information submitted with the application. For Tier 1, the
projects are awarded the maximum quality score since they are arrived
at through a collaborative process at the Regional Transit Security
Working Groups, working with the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) to ensure high quality projects.
Tier 1 and Tier 2 scores were then ranked separately. The
recommended funding for Tier 2 was under the target allocation, so all
projects recommended for funding were funded. For Tier 1, a minimum
score threshold was determined based on the national slate of projects
submitted, and funded projects generally exceeded that score. In Tier
1, due to excess funds in Tier 2 and the Freight Rail Security Grant
Program, several regions received more than their target allocation
announced on February 1, 2008, with the release of the grant guidance.
These funds were allocated to regional projects that were ``next in
line'' and able to be fully funded on the project lists submitted by
regions.
Question 7b. What are some of the barriers that TSA is experiencing
to releasing grant funding in a timely manner?
Answer. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is
responsible for administering the transportation security grants for
intercity bus, AMTRAK, freight rail, transit, and trucking. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has the programmatic lead
for these grant programs. TSA is responsible for coordinating and
leading the development of recommended funding for all submitted
investments. TSA does not release grant funding for any of the
transportation security grant programs. FEMA is responsible for
releasing grant funds based on those recommended funding levels. There
are several factors that in the past have caused delays in the release
of funding from FEMA including lack of detailed budget submissions by
agencies, and environmental historical preservation reviews. In an
effort to mitigate such delays this year, TSA engaged in extensive
outreach activities that included nationwide workshops, weekly
teleconferences with both Tier I and II security partners, and regular,
recurring meetings with Tier I groups in such cities as Philadelphia,
San Francisco, New York, and Los Angeles. As TSA's partner and a full
participant in all outreach activities, FEMA provided prospective
grantees with detailed information regarding requirements for budget
submissions and environmental historical preservation reviews.
Question 7c. Please discuss how TSA determines the grant funding
priorities for the transit security grant program and discuss whether
these priorities are risk-based.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) developed
six risk-based Transit Security Fundamentals (TSFs) for implementation
by transit agencies as a means of enhancing the security posture of
individual agencies and establishing a security baseline throughout the
transit mode. The TSFs consist of protection of high-risk/high
consequence underwater and underground rail assets; protection of other
high-risk/high consequence assets and systems that have been identified
through system-wide risk assessments; use of visible, unpredictable
deterrence; targeted counter-terrorism training for key front-line
staff; emergency preparedness drills and exercises; and public
awareness and preparedness campaigns. Each of these fundamentals
supports the achievement of the National Preparedness Goal, as well as
other national and regional strategies to mitigate risk. The TSFs,
developed in coordination with transit security partners, have been the
basis of project priorities under the Transit Security Grant Program.
TSA security assessments focus particular attention on posture in the
TSFs and the overall assessment results advance the development of risk
mitigation priorities, security enhancement programs, and resource
allocations.
In partnership with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and
the mass transit and passenger rail community, TSA developed and
implemented the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE)
program. The BASE program aims to expand TSA's awareness and
understanding of the current security posture in the passenger rail and
mass transit mode, enable more effective targeting of security programs
and technical assistance to elevate security, and facilitate sharing of
best security practices. TSA's Transportation Security Inspectors
(TSIs) complete these comprehensive assessments by thoroughly reviewing
and rating mass transit and passenger rail agencies in 17 Security and
Emergency Management Action Items. Updated in 2006 in a collaborative
effort by TSA and FTA in coordination with representatives of the mass
transit and passenger rail community, the Action Items encompass
security and emergency management plans, security program
accountability, terrorism prevention and response training and
exercises, public awareness campaigns, physical security, personnel
security, information security, procedures to elevate security measures
as the threat level increases, internal security audits, and
operational security measures. As of May 15, 2008, TSA had completed 64
BASE assessments of mass transit and passenger rail agencies. The
detailed reports TSIs produce of results of BASE assessments provide
the data for analysis of areas and trends requiring improvement, both
in individual mass transit and passenger rail agencies and nationally
based on a consolidation of results.
As one example, well-trained employees are a force multiplier for
security efforts implemented by mass transit and passenger rail
agencies. When the BASE results demonstrated the need for significant
improvement in continuing security training of employees, TSA developed
and published the Mass Transit Security Training Program in February
2007. Produced in coordination with the Department of Homeland
Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA), FTA, the
Sector Coordinating Council, and the Transit Security and Policing Peer
Advisory Group, this program provides detailed guidelines on
implementing an effective security training program, citing the subject
areas in which particular categories of employees should receive
training. Identified course options include programs funded by FTA/TSA
(transit specific terrorism prevention and response) and FEMA (general
terrorism prevention and response). Supported by the Transit Security
Grant Program, this initiative expanded significantly the volume and
quality of training for transit employees.
TSO WORKFORCE STAFFING
Question 8a. A few weeks ago TSA announced changes to the pay for
performance system, known as PASS, for your transportation security
officer (TSO) workforce. While some of the changes are welcomed by the
workforce there are a number of questions, particularly on training and
testing for TSOs. As part of the PASS changes there will be reduction
in required training in 2009.
How do you expect to refine and reduce the training requirements
for 2009, and still ensure that TSOs are properly prepared for the
duties of the job?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's Office of
Human Capital and the Office of Security Operations (OSO) have been
working with the National Advisory Council (NAC) Training and
Performance Accountability and Standards System (PASS) subcommittees,
to review the mandatory training plan. The amount of training being
considered for reduction will solely reflect those items not directly
related to core security screening functions and federally mandated
courses. Non-essential training will still be available as elective
courses. The NAC subcommittee will submit recommendations for
consideration in June 2008.
Question 8b. Will TSA increase its TSO workforce so that employees
can have time to properly train?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Office of
Operational Performance/Workforce Utilization stated that funding for
Full-Time Equivalency (FTE) positions increased from 651 to 1,473 for
the fiscal year 2008 Staffing Allocation Model. TSA has changed its
weekly training requirement to a quarterly requirement. This factor
alone has allowed the Transportation Security Officer workforce time to
complete training requirements and complete the daily security mission.
Additionally, Federal Security Directors are scheduling training hours
into the daily duty schedules.
Question 8c. What is the percentage of workplace injury cases for
the TSO workforce? How does this compare to the average across the
Federal Government?
Answer. The Total Case Rate (TCR) is the rate of injury per 100
employees. The TCR for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce is 10.96. The Federal
Government does not provide a TCR for specific workforces, such as the
TSO, however, the Federal Government overall TCR is 4.26. In
comparison, all TSA workplace injury cases resulted in a TCR of 9.99.
Although TSA's TCR is higher than the Federal Government's overall TCR,
it is important to note that for fiscal year 2008 the TSO TCR has been
reduced by 21.71 percent over the same period in fiscal year 2007.
Question 8d. How is TSA working to ensure that your employees are
aware of preventative measures for injuries and if injured, can take
the time the need to heal properly before returning to work?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
implemented cross-functional teams that facilitate and expedite
programs or projects designed to improve checked baggage and checkpoint
screening efficiency by reviewing airport/office space ergonomics, work
environments, and health/safety risks. Additionally, the TSA
Optimization and Safety section secures funding and support for
activities such as workspace configuration and redesign and equipment
purchase. Each of these initiatives is aimed at reducing TSA losses
associated with Transportation Security Officer on-the-job injury
claims.
The TSA Occupational Safety, Health, and Environment program has
placed Occupational Safety and Health specialists at the TSA Mission
Support Centers that are responsible for working with each airport to
ensure that there is a viable and effective occupational safety and
health program in place which includes outreach and communication to
TSA employees. These specialists also conduct formal safety inspections
of each airport and ensure that incidents are investigated promptly,
and that any corrective actions are implemented.
Further, TSA's Office of Human Capital has implemented a national
nurse case management program to provide focus and direction for early
medical intervention for injured employees. When an employee is
injured, a contracted nurse contacts the employee within 24 hours of
the injury to provide support and assistance. Through on-going
contacts, the nurse monitors the employee's medical condition to ensure
quality medical care to facilitate their medical progress and return to
duty when medically feasible. The nurse case managers ensure that the
medical documentation received from the treating physician is clear and
complete, so that limited duty assignments are appropriate and
consistent with the employee's medical restrictions.
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR TSOS
Question 9a. Our transportation security officers are the frontline
at our Nation's airports and these employees do not enjoy the same
rights and protections as other Federal employees, including
whistleblower protections. TSA took steps to remedy this in late
February by signing a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between TSA and the
Merit System Protection Board (MSPB). As I understand it, based on the
MOA, MSPB will now be able to hear whistleblower cases from TSA
employees.
Have the cost details of this agreement been reconciled between TSA
and MSPB. If not, when can we expect them to be?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) have agreed to the terms of TSA
reimbursement for MSPB's direct costs incurred to adjudicate
transportation security screeners' whistleblower retaliation appeals.
The agencies are in the process of finalizing an Interagency Agreement
addressing this issue.
Question 9b. The MOA outlines that either party upon 30 days of
written notice to the other party may terminate the MOA--is there a
contingency plan in place should this happen?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) anticipate that the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) will be continued and will not be terminated by either
party. In the event that termination becomes foreseeable, TSA and MSPB
will work together to ensure that transportation security officers'
whistleblower retaliation appeals receive timely, fair resolution.
Question 9c. What are the biggest challenges to staffing up TSA--is
it finding qualified candidates necessary for the vacant positions? Is
it competitiveness pay issues in some localities? How can these
challenges be best addressed?
Answer. The challenges the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) faces today for staffing Transportation Security Officer (TSO)
positions nationwide vary from airport to airport. For several airports
the starting pay scale is not competitive for their labor market, such
as competing with the oil industry in Wyoming, the hotel industry in
tourist locations such as the Hawaiian Islands, and the fishing
industry in remote Alaska locations. In other locations, the challenge
is competition with other Federal employers in the same region. Higher
attrition rates are experienced in these positions because many of the
available work schedules are for part-time or split-shift positions,
and many employees transfer to other Federal agencies after passing the
probationary period. Additionally, the hiring process itself can be
lengthy and candidates applying for part-time positions have accepted
other jobs prior to our offer being made.
To address these current challenges, TSA offers incentive pay for
hard-to-fill areas to be competitive with starting pay scales. To
attract long-term employees and reduce attrition, TSA continues to
provide more extensive information to prospective candidates depicting
a realistic job preview so that future employees understand the job
they are accepting and the career path available within TSA. TSA is
also offering incentives to current employees who recruit future
employees with the hope that these future employees will understand the
job and career path and be looking for long-term employment. Increased
benefits are available for part-time employees, which not only draws
candidates into applying but gives them incentive to stay. TSA is
continually looking at the hiring process to decrease the time to hire
and ensure candidates understand where they are in this multi-step
process.
Question 9d. A challenge across the Department is keeping qualified
and committed individuals on staff. Can you please provide to us the
attrition rates for TSOs and if exit interviews have been conducted,
what have been the top three reasons for employee departures?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) utilizes
the National Exit Survey to collect information regarding reasons for
leaving from those employees who voluntarily depart TSA. Completion of
the survey is voluntary. The National Exit Survey was revised in July
2007 to provide departing employees with the ability to rank the top
three reasons for leaving TSA. From July 2007 to March 2008, the top
three reasons why employees leave TSA are as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response
Reasons for Leaving Rate in
Percent *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pay.......................................................... 54
Career Advancement........................................... 53
Personal Reasons............................................. 50
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Percentages will not equal 100 percent because participants may have
selected more than one ``most important'' reason for leaving.
The response rate for Transportation Security Officers (TSO)
employees who completed the National Exit Survey during this time
period is 16 percent. The national average response rate for employees
completing an exit survey is 20 percent.
Transportation Security Officer (TSO) attrition statistics are in
the table below.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OFFICER (TSO) ATTRITION SUMMARY AS OF 05/10/08 (PAY PERIOD 0809)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data as of 5/24/2008 (PP 0810) *--FY08 YTD Includes Attrition Through 3/1/
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 2008 (Percent)
--------------------------------------------
TSO Attrition Type FY08
FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 YTD *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full-Time (all paybands/reasons)................................... 18.9 18.9 16.5 14.4 14.3
Part-Time (all paybands/reasons)................................... 72.4 55.9 45.8 44.6 42.5
--------------------------------------------
TOTAL (all paybands/reasons)................................. 24.2 23.7 20.9 21.2 21.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INSPECTION PROGRAM
Question 10a. Since 2005, TSA has deployed Surface Transportation
Security Inspectors at field offices across the country to identify and
reduce vulnerabilities and gaps in passenger and freight rail and to
enforce existing security requirements.
In fiscal year 2007, was TSA's Surface Transportation Security
Inspection Program sufficiently staffed to fulfill all of its
responsibilities? If not, please explain?
Answer. In fiscal year 2007, the Surface Transportation Security
Inspection Program (STSIP) was sufficiently staffed with 100 Full-Time
Equivalent (FTE) to achieve agency performance goals related to
Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) reviews in mass
transit, Security Action Item (SAI) reviews in freight rail (Toxic
Inhalation Hazard risk reduction), and Station Profile development in
passenger and mass transit rail. Additionally, during this time the
STSIP was able to sufficiently support numerous Visual Intermodal
Protection and Response (VIPR) operations nationwide, conduct extensive
security partner outreach, and provide ongoing incident response to
enhance information sharing capabilities in the surface modes. The
STSIP was authorized to hire an additional 75 FTE in a supplemental
appropriation in fiscal year 2008 to facilitate enhancement of and help
offset the resource requirements of the VIPR program, for a total of
175 FTE. This staffing level was sufficient for fiscal year 2008 as
well.
Question 10b. The Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement
(BASE) is TSA's primary tool for assessing mass transit agencies. Has
TSA conducted any assessments of the BASE's effectiveness in
identifying and reducing vulnerability gaps? If yes, what were the
results?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
continuously assesses the effectiveness of the Baseline Assessment for
Security Enhancement (BASE) program in identifying and reducing
security vulnerabilities. This approach is reflected in the development
of the program, its implementation, the application of assessment
results, and quality control efforts.
The BASE program, which commenced fully in November 2006, assesses
the security posture of mass transit and passenger rail agencies in the
Security and Emergency Management Action Items. Developed in a joint
effort of TSA, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the
Department of Transportation (DOT), and mass transit and passenger rail
operating and security officials engaged through the Mass Transit
Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) and Transit Policing and Security
Peer Advisory Group (PAG), the Action Items cover a range of areas that
are foundational to an effective security program. Components include
security program management and accountability, security and emergency
response training, drills and exercises, public awareness, protective
measures for Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) threat levels,
physical security, personnel security, and information sharing and
security. Particular emphasis is placed on posture in the six Transit
Security Fundamentals (protection of underground/underwater
infrastructure; protection of other high consequence systems and
assets; random, unpredictable deterrence; training; exercises; and
public awareness).
TSA's Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs) conduct
the BASE assessments in partnership with the mass transit and passenger
rail agencies' security chiefs and directors. To date, 64 BASE
assessments have been completed in total, covering 47 of the largest 50
agencies, 2 second assessments on top 50 agencies, 9 ranked in the 51-
100 range in size, and 6 smaller agencies. The results of the
assessments inform development of risk mitigation priorities, security
enhancement programs, and resource allocations, notably transit
security grants. Three representative examples illustrate these points.
Well-trained employees are a force multiplier for security
efforts implemented by mass transit and passenger rail
agencies. When the BASE results demonstrated the need for
significant improvement in continuing security training of
employees and provided insights on the cause of this situation,
TSA acted expeditiously to develop and implement solutions. In
February 2007, TSA published the Mass Transit Security Training
Program and revamped the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP)
to expand the scope and quality of security training of mass
transit and passenger rail employees. Produced in coordination
with the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency
Management Agency (DHS/FEMA), the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA), the SCC, and the PAG, this program
provides detailed guidelines on implementing an effective
security training program, citing the subject areas in which
particular categories of employees should receive training.
Identified course options include programs funded by FTA/TSA
(transit specific terrorism prevention and response) and FEMA
(general terrorism prevention and response). Acting on the
indications that restrictions on appropriate uses of TSGP funds
inhibited investment in training, TSA and FEMA, assisted with
coordination by the SCC and PAG, adjusted the TSGP guidance to
permit use of grant funds to cover backfill and overtime costs
incurred to maintain operations when employees leave their
normal duties to attend training courses. Additionally, a
streamlined application and review process eased preparation of
training project proposals for eligible mass transit and
passenger rail agencies and expedited delivery of funding. As
an example of this effort's effectiveness, the proportion of
grant awards for security training among eligible mass transit
and passenger rail agencies in Tier 2 under the TSGP rose from
3 percent of the total funding allocation in fiscal year 2006
to 68 percent in fiscal year 2007.
As a strategic priority, TSA emphasizes the expansion of
random, unpredictable security activities to enhance
deterrence. The BASE results indicated the need for greater
effort to assist mass transit and passenger rail agencies in
higher risk areas to implement these types of measures. Through
the operational package option for eligible Tier 1 mass transit
and passenger rail agencies under the TSGP, during fiscal year
2007 DHS commenced funding of projects to assemble, train, and
equip dedicated anti-terrorism teams to operate in a mass
transit and passenger rail systems. The specialized expertise
these teams develop enhances security through implementation of
operational activities focused on terrorism prevention and by
creating a specially trained and experienced cadre to provide
training to and to share their experience with other law
enforcement officers and employees in their organizations.
Building on the BASE assessment results, which show mass
transit and passenger rail agencies conduct and participate
regularly in drills and exercises, TSA enhances the focus of
these activities on terrorism prevention and immediate response
for threats and incidents within the systems. In partnership
with agencies in the National Capital Region, TSA is developing
a multi-phased, multi-jurisdictional, and cross-functional
anti-terrorism exercise program. STSIs in the region are
directly involved in this effort. The objective is to produce a
package to facilitate planning, preparation, and execution of
terrorism prevention and immediate response exercises that can
be adapted and implemented by mass transit and passenger rail
agencies nationally. This effort will produce the national
exercise program required under the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law
110-53). Drills and exercises remain among the priorities for
funding in the TSGP.
Of note, the 2-second assessments conducted on transit agencies
ranked among the top 50 in passenger volume do reflect improvement in
performance, in one case dramatic improvement, producing risk
mitigation. We anticipate similar results as second assessments occur
later in fiscal year 2008 and throughout fiscal year 2009.
Additionally, the process of preparing for a BASE assessment mitigates
risk as the agency reviews its security plans, programs, and procedures
and initiated enhancements. The BASE results report, a copy of which
the assessed agency received, details the agency's status in each of
the Action Items, summarizing effectiveness in implementation and
noting weaknesses and needed improvements. The report, therefore,
provides the assessed agency a comprehensive guide for security
enhancement efforts and, for an eligible agency, informs the
development of project proposals under the TSGP.
Finally, TSA continuously reviews the data received through the
BASE assessments, including the analytical reports on each agency's
assessment, in a quality control process to assure completeness,
accuracy, and consistency in approach. Revisions of the BASE checklist
templates have tailored the assessments to specific types of public
transportation--long-distance and commuter rail, rail transit, and bus
transit. Future phases of BASE will adjust areas of emphasis in light
of developments in the nature of the threat and to maintain a dynamic
approach that thoroughly assesses an agency's operational and
programmatic effectiveness.
Question 10c. Public Law 110-53--the implementing 9/11
Recommendations Act--required DHS to hire an additional 50 surface
transportation security inspectors in fiscal year 2008, up from 100.
What progress has TSA made on hiring, training and deploying these
additional inspectors? What will be the primary focus for these
inspectors?
Answer. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, (Pub. L. 110-
161, December 26, 2007), funds an additional 75 Surface Transportation
Security Inspectors in an effort to offset the impact of Visible
Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR) activities on the Surface
Transportation Security Inspection Program (STSIP). The hiring process
for the additional 75 is on-going.
The 9/11 Act also contains new requirements which may impact the
surface transportation inspectors such as reviewing security plans and
reviewing training programs for transit agencies.
Question 11a. Public Law 110-53 also contains new requirements
which may impact the surface transportation inspectors such as
reviewing security plans and reviewing training programs for transit
agencies.
Does TSA believe it has the inspector workforce necessary to meet
all of the planned inspection activities for fiscal year 2008,
including the additional requirements contained in the 9/11
legislation? If not, what is your plan for prioritizing inspector
responsibilities?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Surface
Transportation Security Inspection Program (STSIP) has the inspector
workforce necessary to meet all of the planned inspection activities in
freight and passenger rail industries for fiscal year 2008. The STSIP
originally planned to conduct 1,344 freight rail toxic inhalation
hazard (TIH) Security Action Item inspections in fiscal year 2008.
Currently, we are on target to conduct 2,020 freight rail TIH
inspections in fiscal year 2008. Additionally, the STSIP planned to
conduct 50 Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE)
assessments on the Top 51-100 transit agencies in fiscal year 2008.
Forty-five transit agencies agreed to allow TSA to conduct these
voluntary BASE reviews in 2008. Regulations required by the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 are
under development. Therefore, we envision compliance inspections for
these additional security requirements to commence in fiscal year 2009.
Question 11b. In December 2006, TSA issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that proposed giving TSA regulatory authority for conducting
security inspections of passenger rail systems, as well as additional
security requirements on passenger and freight rail operators. When
does TSA expect to issue the final rule and how closely will it align
with the proposed rule? What process was followed to incorporate
industry comments?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) final rule
on rail transportation security is undergoing review at the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). Following DHS approval, the rule will go to
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review under Executive
Order 12866. We believe the final rule will achieve the security
objectives identified in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). TSA
obtained the views of our security partners by holding a public meeting
and through the public comment process initiated by the NPRM. TSA
received over 70 public comments on the NPRM from trade associations,
affected companies, labor unions, States and localities, and private
individuals. TSA reviewed and evaluated each comment and will respond
to all the issues raised in the preamble to the final rule.
Question 11c. TSA has previously issued security directives for
passenger rail as well as a proposed regulation that would place
security requirements on passenger rail systems. However, TSA has not
issued security requirements for other mass transit systems, such as
bus systems? What are TSA's plans to do so, if any?
Answer. In the absence of a substantial security threat or incident
warranting expedited action to require specific enhancement activities,
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not anticipate
issuing new security directives in the mass transit and passenger rail
mode. Rather, TSA is working to meet the requirements of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public
Law 110-53) for promulgation of regulations concerning security plans,
assessments, and training programs for designated passenger rail and
mass transit agencies, including bus systems. TSA is doing this in
consultation with Federal security partners and the mass transit and
passenger rail community as represented by the Mass Transit Sector
Coordinating Council and the Transit Policing and Security Peer
Advisory Group. TSA anticipates the security plan regulation, when it
takes effect, will formally supersede the security directives
applicable to passenger rail carriers.
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION--PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Question 12a. What are the key performance measures TSA uses to
track performance of its surface transportation initiatives?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Surface
Transportation Security Program uses the following six performance
measures to track performance:
1. The percent reduction in risk from Toxic Inhalation Hazard bulk
cargoes in rail transportation;
2. Percent of mass transit and passenger rail agencies that are in
full compliance with industry agreed upon Security and
Emergency Management Action items to improve security;
3. Number of rail inspections conducted per 1,000 inspector hours;
4. Percentage of applicable passenger and mass transit rail systems
having undergone a Security Directive review;
5. Number of high-risk Pipeline corporate systems on which Pipeline
Corporate Security Reviews have been conducted; and
6. Percent of highway infrastructure systems that have undergone a
Corporate Security Review.
These performance measures are included in the Program Assessment
Rating Tool (PART), and results for TSA's Surface Transportation
Security Program can be found at the Office of Management and Budget's
Web site at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore.
Question 12b. What percentage of nationally critical surface
transportation assets or systems by mode have been assessed and have
mitigation strategies developed based on those assessments?
Answer. The percentage of nationally critical surface
transportation assets or systems by mode that have been assessed and
have mitigation strategies developed based on those assessments is as
follows:
Pipeline Mode.--As of May 2008, 84 percent of the high-risk
corporate pipeline systems have undergone a Corporate Security
Review.
Mass Transit Mode.--As of October 2007, 72 percent of the
applicable passenger and mass transit rail systems have
undergone a Security Directive review.
Freight Rail Mode.--The independently owned and operated
Freight Railroads have identified their critical infrastructure
and developed security plans that provide for protective
measures during heightened states of alert.
Highway Motor Carrier Mode.--As of March 2008, 80 percent of
highway infrastructure systems have undergone a Corporate
Security Review.
Question 12c. How does DHS track the surface transportation assets
or systems by mode have been assessed and have mitigation strategies
developed based on those assessments?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration uses the Office
of Management and Budget's Program Assessment Rating Tool to track the
surface transportation assets or systems that have been assessed and
then have mitigation strategies developed, based on those assessments.
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION--TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS SECTOR-SPECIFIC PLAN
(TSSP)
Question 13a. The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan
(TSSP) and its supporting modal implementation plans and appendixes
establish a strategic approach for securing surface transportation
modes based on the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and
Executive Order 13416, Strengthening Surface Transportation Security.
The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan describes the security
framework that is intended to enable sector stakeholders to make
effective and appropriate risk-based security and resource allocation
decisions.
In your opinion, do these plans include the necessary specific
actions and milestones, quantitatively define the costs and benefits of
securing the surface transportation system, and outline the specific
roles and resources each partner will contribute?
Answer. The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan (TS SSP)
includes, as appendices, plans for each of the six transportation
modes. These modal plans have varying degrees of specificity regarding
actions and milestones to secure the mode. The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) reports implementation of the TS SSP to the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security on a monthly basis. A
list of specific actions with milestones was developed using the TS SSP
as a basis. The specific roles and responsibilities for the security
partners are adequately delineated.
While TSA does not have an aggregate accounting of the costs and
benefits of securing the surface transportation system, TSA
quantitatively evaluates the economic impacts of regulatory actions,
security directives, major guidelines, and recommended security action
items to determine if the benefits are sufficient to justify the costs.
Question 13b. What has been the effect of having the TSSP and
strategy for surface transportation?
Answer. The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan (TS SSP)
provided the sector's partners with a definitive approach to evaluating
security gaps, setting security priorities, and reaching consensus on a
path forward to reduce security risks. It provided the mechanism for
improved industry and government information exchange, increased
understanding of shared responsibilities, and established enhanced
cooperation for common security objectives. Improved coordination among
the sector's partners led to greater efficiency in identifying and
implementing risk-reduction initiatives, ultimately benefiting the
transportation system users and taxpayers.
Question 13c. To what extent has the development of the
Transportation Sector Specific Plan (TSSP) and supporting modal annexes
been coordinated with or adopted by industry stakeholders?
Answer. Each mode has active Government Coordinating Councils and
Sector Coordinating Councils. While each mode is unique in the state of
engagement of its security partners, all use these mechanisms to
exchange information and to coordinate security initiatives. These
councils were used extensively during the Transportation Systems
Sector-Specific Plan (TS SSP) drafting process and signed the published
plan. They have been used increasingly for drafting the Sector Annual
Reports, and as the partnership relationships are better understood and
the member rosters stabilize, we anticipate even more effective
participation during the upcoming revision of the TS SSP. TSA
anticipates that as the sense of joint ownership of the sector plans
improves, the extent of our security partners' contributions will
improve with a corresponding increase in the use of the TS SSP as the
sector's primary planning document.
Question 13d. How does TSA assess the degree to which Federal and
industry surface transportation security efforts are achieving the
transportation security goals and objectives outlined in the
Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan (TSSP)?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assesses
the achievement of the sector's goals in the TS SSP through several
means. First, monthly reports of the accomplishment of the specific
milestones in the TS SSP implementation plan sent to the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Second, periodic metrics are
reported to DHS's Office of Infrastructure Protection through the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan Metrics Portal. Third, TSA
submits, on behalf of the Sector, an annual report to DHS that assesses
the progress made implementing the TSSP and its goals. Fourth, progress
implementing specific tasks is reported quarterly to the Office of
Management and Budget, as identified in the Performance Assessment
Rating Tool and in the Future Year Homeland Security Plan.
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION--RISK ASSESSMENTS
Question 14. TSA is responsible for coordinating and ensuring the
security of the entire surface transportation system. Other DHS
components, including the Coast Guard and the National Programs and
Protection Directorate also have responsibilities which cover surface
transportation related assets and systems. For example, bridges and
tunnels: How does TSA ensure Federal risk assessments of surface
transportation assets are coordinated and not redundant?
As required by Public Law 110-53, what is TSA progress in
fulfilling the following requirements:
Complete, within 6 months after enactment (Feb. 3, 2008), a
nationwide risk assessment of a terrorist attack on railroad
carriers;
Require each railroad carrier assigned to a high-risk tier
to conduct a vulnerability assessment and prepare, submit to
the Secretary for approval, and implement a security plan;
Assign railroad carriers to a risk-based tier and establish
standards and guidelines for developing and implementing the
vulnerability assessments and security plans for railroad
carriers assigned to high-risk tiers?
Answer. In both freight and passenger rail, Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has implemented comprehensive security assessment
programs evaluating carriers' posture in Security Action Items
developed in coordination with the respective communities. The Action
Items encompass areas foundational to effective security programs. The
results of the assessments drive risk mitigation priorities and inform
development of security enhancement programs and resources allocations,
including Federal security grants.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has already completed
much of the groundwork that will serve as a basis for the National Rail
Risk Assessment. Prior to the 9/11 Act, the TSA began a national risk
assessment of the rail network. TSA concluded that the greatest threat
to the security of the freight rail network is the transportation of
toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials. This finding led to the
development of nationwide programs to reduce the risk associated with
the rail transportation of TIH materials including the significant risk
of standing, unattended TIH railcars. The Security Action Items are a
component of this effort, enhancing freight rail security generally and
mitigating the risk of rail TIH transport in particular.
In passenger rail, systems operating in the Nation's sizable
metropolitan areas are among the most thoroughly assessed of all
transportation modes. Since 9/11, they have undergone security
assessments by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the former
Office of Grants and Training at DHS (for grant funding eligibility),
the American Public Transportation Association, private sector security
consultants (often funded by DHS grants), and now under the Baseline
Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program conducted by TSA
Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs). Through the BASE
program, fully implemented as of November 2006, TSA assesses a transit
system's security posture on the 17 Security and Emergency Preparedness
Action Items. The Actions Items cover a range of areas that are
foundational to an effective security program, including security
program management and accountability, security and emergency response
training, drills and exercises, public awareness, protective measures
for Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) threat levels, physical
security, personnel security, and information sharing and security.
Particular emphasis is placed on posture in the six Transit Security
Fundamentals (protection of underground/underwater infrastructure;
protection of other high consequence systems and assets; random,
unpredictable deterrence; training; exercises; and public awareness).
Risk-based tiering of rail carriers has effectively been
implemented through these collective efforts. In freight rail, TSA's
security enhancement and assessment efforts focus on rail carriers
operating in and through designated High Threat Urban Areas. In
passenger rail, DHS has effected risk-based tiering through the Transit
Security Grant Program. Tier 1 consists of mass transit and passenger
rail agencies operating in the Nation's largest metropolitan areas--New
York, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, DC, Atlanta, Chicago, Los
Angeles, and San Francisco. Tier 2 includes numerous agencies in other
metropolitan areas, such as Buffalo, Cleveland, Dallas, Houston,
Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Denver, San Diego, and Seattle. This list is
not exhaustive. The entire list may be viewed in the fiscal year 2008
Transit Security Grant Program guidance at http://www.tsa.gov/assets/
pdf/fy_2008_tsgp.pdf (see Table 4, pages 16-17).
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION--PIPELINE
Question 15a. Has TSA completed a pipeline infrastructure study to
identify the highest risk systems of the Nation and outline the
security mitigation initiatives TSA will undertake to address these
risks?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Pipeline
Security Division has identified the pipeline systems at highest risk
in the United States. TSA is using its Corporate Security Review
program to evaluate the security planning and implementation at these
high-risk systems and to determine security deficiencies within the
mode. Through this process, TSA has identified pipeline industry
security gaps and outlined mitigation measures to implement over a 5-
year period. These measures are delineated in the Pipeline Modal Annex
of the Transportation Systems Sector Specific Plan.
Question 15b. When does TSA expect to develop a timeline and
project plan for developing a long-term risk reduction outcome measure
for the pipeline mode?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
currently developing a risk gap analysis tool that identifies threat,
vulnerability, and incident consequence to the Nation's highest risk
pipeline systems. By the end of fiscal year 2008, TSA's Pipeline
Security Division will utilize the risk gap analysis planning tool to
establish a timeline and project plan for developing a long-term risk
reduction outcome measure.
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION--COMMERCIAL VEHICLE
Question 16. The Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act mandates, among other things, that the Secretary of
Homeland Security develop a tracking program for motor carrier
shipments of hazardous materials by February 2008 and complete a
security risk assessment on the trucking industry by August 2008. What
is the status of these efforts? Has the hazardous materials tracking
program been completed? Will TSA be able to complete a risk assessment
of the trucking industry by August 2008, and if so how is the agency
planning to complete this assessment of 1.2 million trucking firms with
the resources it has?
Answer. In December 2007 the Transportation Security
Administration's Highway and Motor Carrier Office developed a high-
level plan for implementing Section 1554 of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) that sets
requirements for establishing a Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) Truck
Security program. To meet the agency mission, TSA started the HAZMAT
Truck Security Pilot project in 2005. Seven tracking vendors and twelve
HAZMAT carriers participated in the pilot project. The pilot project
has concluded and the final report will be published in June 2008. The
results of the pilot included the following:
Frequent or continuous communications.--TSA has developed a
set of tested protocols that are capable of interfacing with
existing truck tracking systems, State/local law enforcement
agencies and first responders, and with Federal intelligence
and emergency management centers.
Vehicle position location and tracking capabilities.--TSA
has implemented a tested and functioning truck tracking center
that allows TSA to monitor truck locations and track load types
in the continental United States.
A feature that allows a driver of such vehicles to broadcast
an emergency distress signal.--TSA has developed and tested a
concept that is being vetted by government and industry
volunteers. This facilitates effective responses to drivers'
emergency distress signals.
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION--HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE
Question 17a. Why do the National Programs and Protection
Directorate and the Federal Highway Administration have a greater
presence with the highway infrastructure stakeholders than TSA, the
lead Federal agency for transportation? What are the consequences?
Answer. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is the highway
infrastructure stakeholder community's primary Federal provider of
funds, safety regulations, engineering expertise, and cooperative
activity. FHWA has been in existence since 1938 and currently has a
stronger presence in the highway environment than the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA). TSA relies on the FHWA for engineering
and safety subject matter expertise in highway infrastructure matters.
Question 17b. What benefits exist for establishing an annex to the
existing MOU with DOT to address any underlying jurisdictional
ambiguity and delineate respective roles and responsibilities, as it
concerns securing highway infrastructure?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) have not experienced significant
jurisdictional disputes in this community. As TSA matures and assumes
regulatory and compliance roles in the highway infrastructure element,
an annex with FHWA can help to avoid overlap and conflict by clarifying
the roles and responsibilities of each agency during this transition.
Question 17c. Has TSA completed a highway infrastructure study to
identify the highest risk systems of the Nation and outline the
security mitigation initiatives TSA will undertake to address these
risks?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not,
to date, completed such a study for highway infrastructure, nor is
there yet a formally approved National Bridge/Tunnel Security Strategy.
However, comprehensive risk studies are currently underway (trucks,
motor-coaches, school buses). Infrastructure will be the subject of a
comprehensive study when these other reports (some mandated by the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11
Act)) are completed. The lack of a single comprehensive report,
however, should not suggest that TSA has not engaged in comparative
risk analysis for infrastructure assets. Using accepted threat,
vulnerability, and consequence tools, TSA has identified critical
infrastructure and has encouraged our security partners to take
appropriate mitigation steps.
One aspect of this activity is our work within the Homeland
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis (HITRAC) program run by the
Department of Homeland Security Office of Infrastructure Protection.
This is a data call made to all States through the regional Protective
Security Advisors to nominate highway infrastructure for the Tier 1/
Tier 2 critical infrastructure lists. Additionally, TSA has shared with
its highway infrastructure security partners our report on results from
infrastructure Corporate Security Reviews, which highlights the most
common findings and recommends actions based on the best practices
found in the field. TSA is in the process of reviewing the critical
transportation infrastructure within certain major cities. This effort
will be available to Federal Security Directors to ensure their
awareness of critical infrastructure within their areas of
responsibility. Finally, TSA is leading the creation of a multi-
disciplinary National Highway Bridge Security Working Group to address
highway bridge security through the following goals:
Identify, assess, and prioritize risk to critical bridges
from terrorist or criminal acts;
Provide to bridge owners and operators standard means of
risk assessment and risk mitigation based on threats,
vulnerabilities, and consequences;
Establish a means to prioritize available Federal security
funding to address security gaps at the Nation's most critical
bridge infrastructure;
Establish priorities for research and development and
security enhancement projects over the long-term; and
Encourage and guide the incorporation of risk-reducing
technologies and construction practices in improvements to
existing bridges and future highway bridge design.
Question 17d. When does TSA expect to develop a timeline and
project plan for developing a long-term risk reduction outcome measure
for the highway infrastructure mode?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
anticipates initial outcome measures for long-term risk reduction to be
developed in fiscal year 2008. TSA is currently completing initial
baseline corporate security reviews of all State Departments of
Transportation and will finish the initial assessments in fiscal year
2010. In addition, TSA has started revisiting sites that have had an
initial baseline review. Comparing the results of the second review
with the initial review will allow us to measure the impact of
additional security measures as they are implemented by highway
infrastructure owners and operators.
Question 17e. What does it cost to conduct a Corporate Security
Review (CSR?)
Answer. The cost of conducting a Corporate Security Review, on
average, is approximately $1,900.00 (considering 1 subject matter
expert for 1 night and 1 day). On average about $1,400 for travel and
$500 for salaries.
Question 17f. What are the challenges related to implementing a
risk management framework for highway infrastructure?
Answer. The challenges to implementing a risk management framework
for highway infrastructure lie in determining the traditional elements
of risk (threat, vulnerability, and consequence) and the development
and implementation of subsequent countermeasures to address the risk.
Although there has been a continuous stream of information
concerning threats against the Nation's infrastructure, there
have not been credible threats identified against the Nation's
highway infrastructure.
The type of infrastructure, as well as its geographic
location, affects highway infrastructure risk. Additionally,
the sheer size and diversity of the highway community magnifies
the total vulnerability. ``Highway infrastructure'' encompasses
more than 580,000 steel and concrete structures--bridges and
tunnels of widely varied construction and durability--and more
than 4 million miles of highway. It also includes traffic
management centers and commercial vehicle terminals. Its owners
are broadly distributed and represent a challenge in aligning
their efforts to enhance security.
Question 18. Please describe the milestones for implementing the
following highway risk mitigation priorities identified in the
Transportation Sector-Specific Plan Annex D:
Highway and Motor Carrier Modal Implementation Plan;
Standardized risk assessment and risk mitigation approaches;
Establish measurable security action items;
Integrate security measures into the design on the Nation's
transportation network;
Explore the use of existing grant programs to support
critical highway infrastructure security improvements.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
developed standardized risk assessment procedures and currently uses
them when conducting corporate security reviews of highway
infrastructure systems through State Departments of Transportation and
private operators, trucking operators, school bus districts and
operators, and motor coach operators. TSA has developed standardized
risk mitigation approaches in the Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Motor
Carrier industry through the Security Action Items that have been
developed and are in the TSA publication process. Additional
standardized risk mitigation methods and approaches for the school bus
transportation and the motor coach industries are in development.
TSA has developed standardized risk mitigation approaches in the
HAZMAT Motor Carrier industry through draft Security Action Items that
we expect to issue within the next few months. These have been
developed in close collaboration with industry security partners.
Additional standardized risk mitigation methods and approaches for the
school bus transportation and the motor coach industries are also being
prepared for publication.
TSA is working closely with the Federal Highway Administration,
other government agencies and industry to develop a National Strategy
for Bridge and Tunnel Security that includes specific security measures
for the highway transportation network. This strategy document is
currently in the review process within TSA and the Department of
Homeland Security.
Currently, there are two security grants programs that pertain to
the highway transportation mode: (1) the over-the-road bus security
grants program; and, (2) the trucking security grants program. The
over-the-road bus security grants program is designed to enable
intercity bus operators to enhance security. The trucking security
grants program helps to train commercial drivers to identify and report
suspicious events. It also funds information sharing between the
industry and the government.
TSA is exploring ways of developing a security grants program to
help highway infrastructure owners and operators to enhance security.
TSA has approved grant funding for projects involving security
enhancements to bridges and other dual use infrastructure.
Questions From Hon. Mike Rogers for Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary,
Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. What does the Department spend to acquire and maintain
X-ray cargo scanning machinery? What is the range of prices for these
machines?
Answer. With respect to the air cargo environment, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not acquire and
maintain X-ray screening equipment. However, TSA has piloted Explosives
Detection System screening technologies, in an ongoing effort, at
several airports in air carrier facilities, to assess performance to
screen cargo.
X-ray machines vary in price from $60K to $3.3 million per machine.
Question 2. Do you expect that with the increased use of explosives
detection dogs for screening, you will have a decreased need for X-ray
technology? Or do you view these two systems as entirely complementary?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) views the
use of screening technology and canines as complementary methods of
screening cargo. TSA canines will primarily be used on-airport to
complement screening performed by the airlines. The need still exists
for X-ray, as well as other TSA-approved technologies, to enable
industry to screen cargo further up the supply chain prior to its
arrival at the airport and to ensure commerce is not impeded.
Question 3. Can you tell us how the President's fiscal year 2009
budget request for cargo screening breaks down for the canine program?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2009 budget request includes a
total of $37.7 million for canine cargo screening that is split among
two PPAs. The $86.3 million Air Cargo PPA request includes $19.9
million to support half of the 170 air cargo canine teams (85 teams)
included in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental Appropriation. These 85
teams are led by Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs). Another
$17.8 million is contained within the proposed Law Enforcement PPA to
fund non-Federal teams, including $10.8 million to fund the remaining
85 teams included in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental Appropriation
and $7 million to fund legacy non-Federal teams that are partially
dedicated to cargo screening.