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A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 13, 2007

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A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, December 13, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, the hearing will come to order. Members will come in shortly. After the vote yesterday, I am sure that they would think that a hearing today is—well, it is great to have our panel here.

December 13, 1775, anniversary today, the Continental Congress authorized the first 13 frigates. And Duncan Hunter says we have to build them soon. This is the 100th anniversary of the Great White Fleet. "a good Navy is not a provocation to war, it is the surest guarantee of peace," President Theodore Roosevelt, December 2, 1902, in his second annual message to Congress. And we congratulate the Navy on its celebration of the Great White Fleet. And as I have told my Navy friends many times, my father served on the USS *Missouri,* which was part of that Great White Fleet. He served on it in 1918, and it was decommissioned the following year. That was when my father said that that is when they made men of steel and ships of wood. But I am sure there was a little facetiousness there.

Well, thank you for being with us. It is a special treat. Actually, we are making history today. Appearing before us, Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations; General James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps; Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. This is historic because this is the first time the holders of these three respective positions have ever testified together. And we are thrilled that you are here to discuss this.

We are fortunate to count Elijah Cummings, a member of this committee, who chairs the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Transportation Committee, which has oversight of the Coast Guard. And hopefully, Admiral Allen, you will feel as comfortable here as you do before that subcommittee.

We are here today actually at the request of the service chiefs. You have asked for the opportunity to present to Congress a published doctrine entitled "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century

Seapower," and it should be in front of you in booklet form. And we welcome this opportunity to discuss strategic concepts. I think that strategic thought gets lost in the minutiae of building systems, trying to keep families and personnel at their highest level of capability. But it is important that we have a strategic thinking for our country, particularly in seapower. The seas don't get any smaller. Our Navy, sadly, gets smaller. And that, of course, is one of the challenges before us.

I will ask that my statement, so artfully drafted by an excellent member of the staff—who as of 15 minutes ago is a new grandfather, Will Ebbs, who sits next to me, and if he flees the room it is understandable. Congratulations to you.

So with that, and without delving further into the need for strategic thinking or the military education that goes into it, and hopefully we will be able to touch on that. It was an area that I was blessed to study as a panel chair of this committee a good number of years ago. So we may touch on that as well. Duncan Hunter.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for calling this hearing. And gentlemen, good morning. And especially I would like to join in Ike's welcome to Admiral Allen, and also give a special welcome to Admiral Roughead, who appears before this committee for the first time as Chief of Naval Operations. Congratulations, Admiral, and best wishes to you in this assignment.

I understand that the strategy was developed in a nonresource-constrained environment. And it is not intended to replace the Navy's 30-year-old shipbuilding plan, or 30-year shipbuilding plan or budget planning documents, and for that I applaud you.

For some time I have been concerned that the strategy of the Department of Defense is driven by the Office of Management and Budget. As you have heard me say in the past, I believe the greatest failing of the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review was the artificial constraint placed upon it by budget caps. I understand that the availability of resources must shape our programs, but in order to make educated decisions we have to start with a baseline understanding of the global security environment and what capabilities we need to protect the national security interests of the United States, with minimal risk. Only after determining requirements can we begin to make trade-offs based upon resource constraints in such a way that we understand where we are accepting risk.

And that is why this committee initiated the Armed Services Committee Defense Review in parallel with the QDR, to establish a framework for the members to consider the recommendations of the QDR. The irony is that with all the personnel available to the Department of Defense, the work that this committee did by taking a different, nonresource-constrained approach, turns out to have been more representative of what the services now say that they need.

And incidentally, I would turn your attention to the personnel end-strength recommendations that came out of the Committee Defense Review as compared with the old QDR.

So I look forward to hearing more from you today about how you intend to translate this strategy into service-specific requirements which will form the basis of your request for resources.

However, with that said, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard don't have a good track record with regard to managing the resources that you have been provided. You are not alone, but that does not excuse the situation we find ourselves in. On one hand, we have a critical need for modernization, and DOD's planned investment in new systems that has doubled in the last 6 years from around 750 billion to nearly 1.5 trillion. On the other hand, there has been cost escalation on nearly everything, from aircraft to ground vehicles to submarines and shipbuilding.

The GAO has found many times over that acquisition programs are too often started with immature technologies, and without stable designs. Every time one of these programs experiences a Nunn-McCurdy breach, the cost of a ship more than doubles, the support for additional resources and modernization wanes.

Now Admiral Roughead, when you and I had an opportunity to meet the other day we discussed this. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was supposed to be a small, fast craft that we could build in large numbers to operate in the littorals. Instead, they are over 400 feet, the size of World War II-era destroyers, operate at 45 knots, and cost nearly half a billion dollars apiece. Today we have only been able to partially build two. And I fear that the Navy's talk of transformation is nothing more than a speech senior leaders give at the Rotary Club.

And after coming off that podium and talking about having a Navy that is going to have fast ships with a low manning level, multi-mission capability and all the other things, we tend to stride off that podium and the reporter says, "Well, what are you building this year?" and you tell them, "We got a carrier going, and a couple of submarines, and maybe an LCS."

But the talk about transformation has essentially been that. It has been talk. You have had the opportunity to embrace transformation and you have chosen not to. And I want to point to the *Sea Fighter,* the X-Craft that was built up in Mr. Larsen's district. Here was a ship built by the United States Navy, by the Office of Naval Research, which is the fastest ship in the history of the world, goes 60 miles an hour, does it with a crew of 26, can handle and does handle in fact a UAV, helicopter capability, special operations capability, and has the ability, if you a use those modules in the right configuration, you can put over 500 medium-range cruise missiles on that ship. That gives you multiples in terms of capital investment versus firepower, manning versus cost, operations and maintenance versus cost, huge multiples over the current state of affairs with America's warfighting ships. And yet the Navy has spent more time trying to kill the Sea Fighter than, in my estimation, do anything else with respect to platforms.

So gentlemen, with all due respect, I am pleased that you have cooperated to develop the strategy that you are going to talk to us about today. I am supportive of its tenets.

But you are not going to be able to deliver if you can't afford the force that will make the strategy a reality. What are you planning to do to get control on requirements and to enable the acquisition community to more effectively manage their programs?

Last, I look forward to hearing more about a few specific elements in the strategy. First, the strategy states, today the United States and its partners find themselves competing for global influence in an era where they are unlikely to be fully at war or fully at peace.

General Conway, I am surprised that the Marine Corps would agree with such a characterization. Isn't the Marine Corps now fully at war? Are we being naive to think that we are in an era without the possibility of full war? And if so, how does this affect your need for resources in terms of end strength and weapons systems?

Second, the strategy advocates a concentration of forward-deployed forces in the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean. At what expense? Where will we take risk if we pursue such a strategy? Also, is this consistent with the recommendation contained in the strategy to establish a persistent global presence of U.S. forces? How will you accomplish both?

And finally, I would be interested in learning how the growing influence of China, with the expanding Chinese shipbuilding capacity and the increasing capability and numbers of Chinese submarines and air power, shape the new maritime strategy. How is this strategy different as a result of these factors?

And gentlemen, let me just tell you one thing that I am very concerned about is that China has an increasing domestic shipbuilding capability, commercial shipbuilding capability. If that shipbuilding capability, which is presently focused on commercial construction, is translated or turned into warship construction, the Chinese Government has the ability to quickly outstrip the construction of American ships and the fielding of a large Navy. So I would like you to talk about that a little bit, whether or not you are looking at America's shipbuilding plan against the backdrop of a China which is quickly stepping into the superpower shoes that have been left by the Soviet Union, and which understands that the naval dimension of that new superpower status is extremely important to their economic well-being and also their ability to enforce their foreign policy, which at times may be contrary to America's foreign policy. So if you could address that, that is a very important point I think for us to look at as we come together on this policy.

With that, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. Very important hearing. Gentlemen, thank you for being with us today.

The CHAIRMAN. Before I ask our distinguished witnesses for their testimony, let me take this opportunity to again thank the members of this fantastic committee for the work that you all have done for the bill that passed yesterday overwhelmingly. And we, of course, all know that we could not have done it but for such an outstanding staff that we have to work with. And I just want to add my personal gratitude to every member and every staff member, because it was yeoman's work. We finally got there. Now it is in the bosom of the Senate. And we hope they will pass it momen-

tarily, and, among other things, pay raises can go to the sailors and the troops.

Mr. Hunter, thank you very much. We will testify in this order: Admiral Roughead, General Conway, and Admiral Allen. So without further ado, I thank you very much for this. This is an all-important hearing to think strategically regarding our seapower. Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM. GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you very much, Chairman Skelton, Mr. Hunter, distinguished members of the committee. On behalf of our 600,0000 sailors, Navy civilians and families, I am pleased to be here with General Conway and Admiral Allen to present the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. That all three maritime service chiefs are here together and are signatories to the strategy is a testament of our Nation's maritime forces to an integrated approach in protecting our Nation's vital interests.

We are a maritime Nation. Our founders recognized it, our history has Shown it, and this committee, with its leadership and interest, continues to reinforce it. Our last maritime strategy, albeit a Navy-only strategy, was issued in the early 1980's. It contributed to the end of the Cold War. And because it was a Cold War strategy, its efficacy ended there.

We have been too long without strategic guidance for our maritime forces. I am pleased to have been part of this maritime strategy development. It is a strategy that charts the right course for our maritime services at this point in time.

I am of the fleet. My experiences of the past 5 years as Commander of U.S. Second Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic, as a Maritime Homeland Defense Commander supporting U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), as Commander of Joint Task Force 519 in the Pacific, as the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, and as the Commander of United States Fleet Forces Command, these experiences have given me a perspective of our worldwide operations that convinces me of the relevance of this maritime strategy.

As recently as the year that preceded its release, I led robust operations in the Western Pacific, ranging in the full spectrum of seapower from multi-carrier operations in the Western Pacific to proactive humanitarian assistance operations with our hospital ships *Mercy, Comfort,* and *Pelileu.* While at opposite ends of the operational spectrum, these uses of U.S. seapower demonstrated the need to codify our strategy and build for a new future.

At the same time, my experiences working with our partners and allies around the world made it clear to me that international partnerships and cooperation will underpin global and, therefore, American prosperity.

Watching the successful Malaysian and Singapore and Indonesian operation, enhanced maritime security and maritime domain awareness in a vital strategic strait was incredibly important. And also seeing our activities under the Proliferation Security Initiative to dissuade the transfer of weapons of mass destruction shows that these cooperative opportunities and similar activities will be important to our future.

But my experiences and those of my colleagues were only part of what informed our new strategy. Through our conversations with the country, I heard firsthand the demand of the American people to remain strong and to also cooperate internationally to secure our national interests. This solidified my conviction that the Navy needed a new strategy that would address the changing and increasingly integrated global environment while securing our prosperity through the seas and protecting our homeland.

At the International Seapower Symposium in Newport, Rhode Island, the three of us unveiled this maritime strategy that uniquely met those demands. Before record attendance of 98 nations, 67 Chiefs of Navy, and 27 Chiefs of Coast Guard, the symposium was the ideal venue to communicate our new vision and demonstrate our commitment to international cooperation. It was extremely well received. And while the maritime strategy reaffirms our unbending commitment to forward presence, to deterrence, to sea control and power projection, it is unique for three reasons:

First, all three maritime services participated in the development and are signatories.

Second, we take the bold step of committing to a higher level of cooperation with maritime forces around the world, a commitment that we as seagoing forces are uniquely able to meet.

And third, while we remain the preeminent warfighting force this maritime Nation expects, we also intend to pursue proactive humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and maritime security operations.

My guidance to the fleet is to execute our strategy. And my priorities—to build our future Navy, to maintain our current readiness, and support our people—reflect what is needed to do so.

The imperative and challenge for the Navy is to remain a balanced Navy, with the force structure and capability and capacity that can apply the enduring principles of seapower in a manner that protects our vital national interests, while promoting greater collective security, stability, trust, and prosperity.

I look forward to working with you to ensure that our maritime services remain preeminent. And on behalf of our sailors and Navy civilians, I thank you for your continued support and your commitment to our Navy. And I would like to submit a copy of my written statement and a copy of the maritime strategy for the record. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, they will be received.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

The Chairman. General Conway.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General CONWAY. Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter, distinguished members of the committee. I have pledged to always provide you with forthright and honest assessments, and I bear that in mind as I report to you today on the future of the Marine Corps. Your Marine Corps is fully engaged in what we believe is a generational struggle against fanatical extremists. This long war is multifaceted, and will not be won in one battle in one coun-

try or by one method. Your Marines are a tough breed, and will do what it takes to win, not only in these opening battles of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in subsequent conflicts which we endeavor to prepare for today.

Congressionally mandated to be the most ready when the Nation is least ready, your multicapable Corps is committed to fulfilling this responsibility.

Some say that today the Marine Corps is closer to the Army than it has been since World War One. Our new maritime strategy reaffirms our Naval character, and reemphasizes enduring relationships with the Navy, and now the Coast Guard.

Current operations limit our ability to aggressively commit forces to strategy implementation at this time. However, as we increase our end strength to 202,000 Marines, and as security conditions continue to improve in Iraq, the Marine Corps will transition our forces to other battles in the long war. Ultimately, we will realize a new era of expeditionary operations called for by this strategy.

The most complex mission in the maritime strategy is the congressionally mandated mission of amphibious forcible entry. Such an operation requires a high level of proficiency, and long-term resourcing, and is not a capability that we can create on short notice. The sea-basing concept allows us to maximize forward presence and engagement, while stepping lightly on host nation responsibilities. In that matter, we avoid disruptions that can result from a larger U.S. presence ashore.

A classic example was our recent operation, alongside our brothers in the Navy, in Bangladesh. Importantly, sea-basing is not exclusive to the Navy and the Marine Corps. It will be a national, joint capability. Combat tested in the Middle East, with historical roots in the Pacific, the Marine Corps seeks to further enhance its operational capabilities in the Pacific theater.

That said, some areas like Africa offer unique opportunities for the operational flexibility afforded by sea-basing and the extended reach of aircraft like the MV–22 and the KC–130J. The future bodes well for dispersed units of Marines with their interagency partners to enhance our relationships on that very large continent.

As America's Naval forces implement this new maritime strategy, several factors warrant consideration:

First, based on defense reviews over the last several years, we have already accepted risk in our Nation's forcible entry capacity. We have reduced amphibious lift from three to two brigade-sized assault echelons. On the low end of the spectrum, Marines embarked aboard amphibious ships must also meet Phase 0 demands. The ability to transition between those two strategic goalposts, and to respond to every mission in between, will rely on a strong Navy and Marine Corps team and the amphibious ships that cement our bond. The Navy and Marine Corps have worked together to determine the minimum number of amphibs necessary to satisfy the Nation's needs, and further look forward to working with this committee to support the chief of naval operation's (CNO's) shipbuilding plans.

Second, key to our ability to implement this new strategy is the flexibility and combat power of Marine aviation. Our priority has been to replace legacy aircraft, some of which have been flying

since Vietnam. Today and tomorrow, vastly more capable aircraft, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, will ensure that the Corps maintains its warfighting advantage for our Nation in the years to come.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, everything we read about the future indicates that well-trained, well-led human beings with the capacity to absorb information and rapidly react to their environment have a tremendous asymmetric advantage over an adversary. Ladies and gentlemen, that advantage goes to us. Our young Marines are courageous, willing to make sacrifices, and, as evidenced by our progress in al-Anbar, capable of operating in complex environments. Quiet in their duty, yet determined in their approach, they are telling us loud and clear that wherever there is a job to be done they will shoulder that mission with enthusiasm. Your continued support remains a vital and appreciated foundation to their service.

Thank you for your magnificent support thus far, and thank you for the opportunity to report to you today on behalf of your Marines. I look forward to answering the committee's questions, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Conway can be found in the Appendix on page 58.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Allen, please.

STATEMENT OF ADM. THAD W. ALLEN, USCG, COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD, U.S. COAST GUARD

Admiral ALLEN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hunter, distinguished members of the committee. I am very pleased to be here today with my fellow sea service chiefs to discuss the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.

I would like to begin by recognizing the leadership of Admiral Roughead and General Conway in spearheading an integrated strategy for our Nation's sea services. This approach reflects maritime challenges faced by our Nation and offers a consensus on the way forward. While the strategy is new, it takes on greater meaning, having been jointly developed by all three sea services for the first time in history. It continues to reflect enduring relationships built on more than two centuries of working together.

The cooperative strategy reflects our times. It is a convergence of leadership, ideas, and capabilities. It is also a platform we can use to talk about how to best move this Nation forward with confidence into a very uncertain future in an era of persistent and often irregular conflict, where the next challenge may be wholly new and unanticipated. It is a global strategy that reflects the absolute necessity to integrate, synchronize and act with coalition and international partners, not only to win wars, but as Admiral Roughead has said, to prevent them.

Your Coast Guard is not a large organization, but we are broad in reach. As we meet here this morning, we have Coast Guard patrol boats working with our Navy, Marine, and coalition partners in the northern Arabian Gulf, maintaining the security of the Iraqi oil platforms, sharing best practices with emerging regional navies and coast guards, as we have done in Yemen.

We are also working in the eastern Pacific and Caribbean, with aerial surveillance and surface patrols, extending our reach in removing drugs from the transit zone before reaching shore. I am proud to say we reached a milestone in Coast Guard history this past year, having removed more cocaine at sea than any year in our history. That is maritime strategy in action.

Closer to home, we are saving lives of mariners in distress, securing critical infrastructure, inspecting commercial ships, and protecting the environment. We are at all times maritime, military, and a multi-mission service. With our partners, we bring critical capabilities to bear on this strategy and its future.

The Coast Guard is a unique instrument of national security. Unlike the other services and other Federal agencies, we are simultaneously an armed force of the United States and a Federal law enforcement agency. This dual character allows us to operate in many venues, domestically and abroad. In international engagement, we necessarily move beyond traditional relationships with maritime-related ministries and military relationships with defense ministries. Over two centuries we have become agile in building multiple relationships with our foreign partners.

The Coast Guard's role is also unique because of the capabilities and the history we have of operating in the world's polar regions. The Cutter *HEALY,* one of the Coast Guard's three icebreakers, returned this fall from a science mission off the North Slope of Alaska to determine the extent of the United States Continental Shelf, an appropriately timed deployment given the changing Arctic environment and associated challenges. The Coast Guard is the Nation's most visible presence in isolated waters, and we must continue to be able to extend our reach, our competencies, our capabilities and our capacities in high-latitude regions.

Equally important to the execution of the strategy is our expeditionary force capability that can quickly build and deploy force packages for environmental protection, disaster relief, security cooperation and other missions. We are prepared to tailor and deploy operational teams immediately for full spectrum operations. We are integrated with our sea service partners. And given the composition of our fleet, are able to work very closely with emerging, less developed nations and coalition partners.

Mr. Chairman, my promise to the committee today, my promise to Admiral Roughead and General Conway, is that we will work tirelessly in implementation and execution of this strategy, not only because it is the best thing for the Coast Guard, or the best thing for our sea service—which it is—but because it is the best thing for maritime security of the United States, as well as peace and stability around the world.

I thank you. I would be glad to take your questions and submit a full statement for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Allen can be found in the Appendix on page 68.]

The CHAIRMAN. Again it is a pleasure to have all three of you before us today. In listening to you and your strategic outline, I have had the privilege of serving here in the House for a good number of years, and it just seems like yesterday when President Ronald

Reagan was urging a 600-ship Navy. And if we count every one today, it is a 280-ship Navy. And I think you will find this committee understands the challenges.

It also understands that there is a quality with quantity as well. And we, of course, want your best advice regarding that.

I have one quick question before I ask Mr. Hunter to lead off with a question. You are talking about strategy, which is strategic thought. Strategic thought is taught and discussed at our war colleges. And I remember back in 1988, when it was only a secondary thought in some services to receive an intermediate and senior-level War College degree. Since that time, much has changed. The Naval War College at that time was the best, but you didn't have to go there. It was good if it fit into the career.

The Marine Corps, thanks to General Al Gray, did a complete 180-degree turnaround, which today makes us very, very proud of the Marine Corps, not just in its graduate staff level, but now with its War College. I don't know how many Coast Guardsmen go to either intermediate- or senior-level schools, but I think it behooves that to take place.

So let me ask one question, and I will just do it of you, Admiral Roughead, if I may. Are you getting the strategic thinkers, uniformed strategic thinkers from the various War Colleges, whether they are other service schools, your service school, or the national Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) or the Joint Forces Staff Colleges? Are you getting those strategic thinkers that you need today?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. We are, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to say that our Naval War College was instrumental in the development of this strategy. And as you know, it is not the brick and mortar that contributes, it is the intellectual effort of the young men and women who are at the college, who have gone through the college, who populate our strategic planning staffs. So we are getting the numbers that we need.

I believe the unveiling of the strategy in Newport that drew 98 countries to that institution, of which the Navy is extraordinarily proud, is indicative of the stature of our War College and the emphasis that we are putting on it. I see the young men and women out and about in the fleet adding thought, adding their ideas. And I am satisfied with the product that we are getting out of there.

The CHAIRMAN. I could ask the same question of the other two gentlemen, but in the spirit of moving along, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, gentlemen, thanks for being with us.

Admiral Roughead, in putting together this plan, did you folks look at where you think China will be with respect to maritime power, where it is today, and where you think it will be in 10 years?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Mr. Hunter, we looked at changes in navies around the world and what the maritime forces around the world—how they were evolving, the technologies that were coming into play, their growth.

Mr. HUNTER. Specifically did you look at China? Probably the Bangladesh Navy may not be of too much importance from our perspective.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. We looked at China, yes, sir.

Mr. HUNTER. Have you made any changes that you think are substantive changes as a result of looking at China's emerging maritime capability?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I believe a point that you highlighted in your opening statement was the concentration and focus of our Navy and our strategy in the Western Pacific and in the Indian Ocean region. And that concentration that we have called out for is a function of the growth in navies in those parts of the world, China in particular.

Mr. HUNTER. That is an operational change, but have you done anything with respect to the construct or the makeup of the U.S. Navy, which as the Chairman has mentioned, is at an all time low in terms of numbers and the ability to cover important areas? But have you looked in your shipbuilding program for the near future and for the long run? Have you made any analysis with respect to whether we are going to need more submarines, more missile platforms, the makeup of the U.S. Navy? Have you looked at that?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Mr. Chairman, we are always looking at what the appropriate force mix and balance should be based on evolving Naval trends around the world.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Here is my question then. You said that you have looked at the evolving trends of China and you have looked at the emergence of China with its new maritime power. Is that accurate?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Have you made any changes in the long-range plans for construction of American vessels, whether undersurface or surface vessels, as a result of looking at China's evolution of their own maritime capability? Is there any manifestation of changes that we made as a result of looking at that?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, I believe if you look at the capabilities that we are putting in.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Hunter, could we get the Admiral to pull the microphone a little bit? He is speaking off to one side.

Mr. HUNTER. Yeah, get that mike a little bit closer.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. All right, sir. We look at the capabilities that navies have that are evolving, and China being one of them. And that has driven our advancements in certain capabilities, whether it be in antisubmarine warfare, ballistic missile defense, the command-and-control capabilities that we need on our ships as we operate globally as a global Navy, the strategy outlines, the overarching principles that we see. And then——

Mr. HUNTER. But in terms, Admiral—I don't want to cut you off, but those are all aspects of Naval warfare—in terms of increasing or changing the mix in the construction programs that will produce the Navy of the future, have you made any changes there in terms of do we need more submarines? Do we need more missile platforms? Do we need more aerial platforms? Have you made any changes there as a result of the evolution of Chinese maritime strength?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. Our force structure is examined. And as we build our budgets we look at what the current situations are around the world and we make adjustments to that. For exam-

ple, the *Littoral Combat Ship* was—even though it has tremendous application in littorals, it is also capable of running and providing enhanced anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability to our more traditional battle formations, our expeditionary strike groups and carrier strike groups. So LCS is a function of the need that we see for anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, and anti-surface warfare capability in areas where we see the threat evolving.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So you are saying that the LCS to some degree has been derived from an analysis of where we think China is going?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. We have derived LCS capabilities and numbers from what we see with naval developments around the world, to include China, to include the evolution of systems that are proliferating around the world and can be used by others. So that is what drives our calculus for our force structure.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Snyder, please.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being here.

I wanted to ask a question that may seem unrelated to the topic of ships and how many and platforms and all. I know this is the summary document; we have got the full document, but this is more colorful, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," and you have the three of your logos on it. But your document is very clear that it is cooperation you are asking for not just within the three of your organizations, but beyond.

And the question I wanted to ask you is this. Secretary Gates a couple of weeks ago gave his speech on soft power that I am sure you have read some of the press reports about. He gave it at Kansas State, and I quoted from it here a couple days ago when he testified, in which he called for—you know, here is the Secretary of Defense calling for dramatic increases in funding for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department and the kinds of functions that they have. And I thought we had a pretty good discussion that day. And he did a very good job in discussing that.

Ironically, or perhaps coincidentally, as we are coming here today to do your hearing in which you talk about a cooperative strategy, you talk about the importance of training your junior people on cultural sensitivity and language skills, and that you are not just a bunch of boats floating in the water off the shore, that you have interaction with all the places in the maritime community that you go to, and it is the relationships that you build that allow for your effectiveness in humanitarian relief and the kinds of things that can flare up.

But what I want to ask you about, as you put on your broad hat and looking at the full nature of our national security, today's paper, in striking contrast with what Secretary Gates was talking about three weeks ago, has a Karen DeYoung story in The *Washington Post:* Diplomatic posts at the State Department and U.S. Embassies worldwide will be cut by 10 percent next year because of heavy staffing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan, Director General Harry Thomas informed the Foreign Service yesterday.

Now, if I stopped there, we could blame the State Department; but we can't blame the State Department, we need to blame ourselves, the Congress for this.

Reading on: The decision to eliminate the positions reflects the reality that State does not have enough people to fill them. Nearly one-quarter of all diplomatic posts are vacant after hundreds of Foreign Service officers were sent to embassies in Baghdad and Kabul, and Congress has not provided funding for new hires. Many of the unfilled jobs will no longer be listed as vacancies.

And that is just part of that story. I would like the three of you to comment, as you put on your broad strategic hat, how shortsighted are we as a Congress being if we are going to allow this kind of cutback to occur in what many of us think is an already understaffed, underfunded Diplomatic Corps and State Department?

Start with you, General Conway. I would just like to hear the three of you comment on that.

General CONWAY. Yes, sir. Sir, I wouldn't blame the Congress as much as I would simply agree with what Secretary Gates has said. My observations on the ground in Iraq and in visiting Afghanistan is that the interagency is powerful. It has got to be a partner in Phase 0, Phase 1 operations, and then in Phase 4 and Phase 5. And it has simply not been resourced or manned over time in order to allow it to do that.

So I don't know that the blame goes to any one place. I think there needs to be a better case made in some instances that there is an expeditionary culture or an ability to put people forward where they are needed that I think you would resource if convinced. But there is no question in my mind about the absolute need now and in this long war.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. If I could just add on to that, there is no question that when we come together with our partners in State Department, and some of the missions that I talked about, humanitarian assistance—for example, we are operating one of our amphibious ships off the west coast of Africa—that when we work together we can achieve some significant results, bring increased cooperation into our operations. And it is a very powerful force.

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, the Coast Guard lives in both of these worlds, and so does our Department of Homeland Security. I would say the challenge goes beyond State Department, and it has to do with deployable capabilities that can construct civil societies and do the things that are not kinetic related to the mission that you are trying to accomplish. The problem is these departments and agencies don't have people in garrison on a deployment cycle ready to deploy. And that capacity and capability is just not presently there, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. I think that was one of the concerns that Secretary Gates has. I talked to Mr. Armitage about it, and he thinks that the Congress, we need to build in a 10 percent—throw out a number—redundancy in the State Department, because when we pull people from places like Afghanistan and Iraq, then when you all want to go off the coast of West Africa, the people aren't there because they have been pulled—the State Department people and the

other civilian agencies aren't there because they have been pulled to do other jobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Gingrey, please.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, Doctor, just one moment. I just learned we not only have one vote, but we have, it appears, four votes. And I will apologize to our distinguished witnesses, but we will do our best to make your short recess as short as possible. But it is necessary for us to make the votes. But we shall return, and we beg your indulgence, and we hope we have you for a great part of the day.

Doctor.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

General Conway, Chief, Admiral Roughead, Admiral Allen, we thank all three of you for being here and for your service. I am going to address my question to our new CNO, Admiral Roughead. In regard to of course pursuing this national military strategy and the national strategy for maritime security, the joint pamphlet between the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, a large focus, and I think rightly so, is on securing the United States from direct attack.

And here is the question. What are the major seaborne threats and what ability do the terrorists have to attack us from the ocean? And I will address it first to Admiral Roughead.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Sir, the major seaborne threats, as I see them, would be brought in largely through commercial activities, because we do have the buffers of the oceans, a great benefit that we enjoy. But it is also possible that as we look to the future, and the strategy tries to take us out decades, and we have seen proliferation of advanced weapons systems around the world, whether they are submarines or missiles, that in time one could see those types of threats evolving. But in the near term, it really does deal with that which can be brought in through normal means. And that is why maritime security, maritime awareness, and our partnership with the Coast Guard on being able to be aware of that which is moving on and near our coastlines, that which is coming from across the ocean, and then to be able to work in this cooperative way with the Coast Guard is key to our homeland security and homeland defense.

Dr. GINGREY. Well—and Admiral Allen may want to touch on this as well, because I think, obviously, back on the attack on the USS *Cole,* and the fact that so much of our equipment, our maritime equipment and, of course, our great seamen and Marines on that equipment are pulled into these ports all around the world in some really tough neighborhoods. And it worries me.

So Admiral Allen, if you will comment on that as well, I would appreciate it.

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir, I think our goal should be to create transparency on what is arguably the last global common. And we have made great strides since the attacks of 9/11 to do that; first of all, for mandatory carriage requirements for transponders for all vessels greater than 300 gross tons that we negotiated at the International Maritime Organization. And we will be transitioning to long-range tracking. And that will give us a view of what is legiti-

mately operating out there. And while it won't tell you who has got the machine turned off, you can then sort and understand who is legitimate and who may not be.

Beyond that, I think the next challenge we have to deal with is vessels less than 300 gross tons that are not regulated internationally. And these would be vessels capable of carrying a weapon of mass destruction or an improvised explosive device (IED). I am talking about down in the range of commercial fishing vessels, recreational boats and work boats. And that is a challenge that we are taking on in the Coast Guard, sir.

Dr. GINGREY. One other question before my time expires, and our Chairman addressed this, Admiral Roughead, at the outset, his first question with regard to are we strategically getting the manpower, the brainpower that we need from the Naval War College. And then I was sitting here thinking, now, do our Marines, General Conway, do they go to the Naval War College or do they primarily attend the Marine War College? I am not even sure where that is located, if it is located, so you can educate me on that? My point is is there some jointness in regard to cross-training with our members of the Coast Guard, the Navy and the Marines in regard to that educational experience?

General CONWAY. The answer is absolutely, sir. All of our War Colleges, both at the senior level and at the intermediate level are purposefully joint because there is some real learning that takes place in the seminars that you cannot have in the larger classrooms. I would offer to you, sir, that I think it is critically important that there be a good balance there, though, with our young officers. They need to have the operational experiences, they need to understand other cultures, they need to have seen the world a little bit before they move to the academic aspect of things, and then continue to increase their knowledge base. Simply to be an analyst without benefit of portfolio I think is not the person we are looking for.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. My time has expired, and I will yield back, and I think we will probably be going to vote soon.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me add this, Doctor. Let me tell you why I am so proud of the Marine Corps. Back in 1988, when we did our investigation of all the War Colleges, the command level staff college of the Marine Corps did not get a good grade. That was turned around 180 degrees. In addition thereto, they established their very own senior War College, not a large one, but a quality one. And I am just so proud of the fact that they took professional military education so seriously. And as a result, we have class—you know, you pick the service, class intermediate and senior War Colleges today. But the Marine Corps came a long way. And I really have to give credit to General Al Gray for initiating that.

We do have these votes. We apologize. We will be back as quickly as possible. Thank you.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. Our hearing will come back to order. Members will be returning from the vote, but we should proceed.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just jump in quickly.

Thank you all for coming today and for helping us understand the cooperative strategy for 21st century seapower.

The question is really focused right now for Admiral Allen. If you can talk a little bit about some of the issues that are a little closer to home for me, but as they relate to the strategy.

The first thing I want to ask is with regard to the Arctic, how this particular cooperative strategy aligns with the needed polar policy end capabilities. If you could speak to that generally; then I want to get into specifics after that.

Admiral ALLEN. I would be happy to.

This year, we had the largest amount of receding ice in the Arctic history, and the implications for traffic over the top of Russia or potentially through the Northwest Passage raise the spectrum of the need to have presence up there for any range of missions that any of our services may have to accomplish.

For that reason, we have initiated a requirements development process to take a look at how we would execute our missions that support the strategy, including search and rescue operations, environmental response, critical infrastructure protection and so forth. But I think we really need a reasoned discussion on the requirements and what it means to operate at high latitudes.

There is a work group that was established under the National Security Council to look at the current Arctic policy that was issued under a Presidential directive in 1994. All of this is converging.

In the meantime, our commander up there is looking at proofs of concept for both aviation and surface operations, navigation issues, communications issues and so forth.

Mr. LARSEN. Could you then talk a little bit about your Deepwater acquisition program specifically? I am on the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. We have had a lot of discussions about it on that committee.

Can you talk about how the Deepwater acquisition assets would fit into the cooperative strategy, as it relates to the Arctic? Could you talk specifically about any specific assets that would be supportive of the strategy?

Admiral ALLEN. I would be happy to do that, particularly as to the capabilities of the National Security Cutter.

We just finished machinery trials last week. We are very pleased with the progress there. With that contract, all current issues have been resolved. We are commencing construction on number three. We think this thing is being stabilized in the way that the committee was looking for.

Coast Guard cutters, by their nature, have to be interoperable with the Navy because, under statute, we can be transferred to the Navy in times of war, but we also do a lot of law enforcement work. We do a lot of work with Coalition international partners on search and rescue and oil spill response. Because of that, we are kind of a linking pin. We can go down to low-tech and no-tech partners.

As far as executing the strategy of deploying a Coast Guard cutter in concert with Navy assets out there in global fleet station con-

cepts, we have become a force multiplier at the lower end in dealing with Coalition partners, and it makes a perfect match.

Mr. LARSEN. Can you talk a little bit about the Coast Guard's polar icebreaking fleet and if it is meeting its current mission performance requirements? If not, what will it take to meet its performance requirements?

Admiral ALLEN. We currently have three icebreakers in the U.S. inventory: the *Polar Sea,* the *Polar Star,* which are heavy-duty icebreakers, and the *Heely,* which is an icebreaking research vessel.

As it stands right now, we need to make some decisions on the long-term future of the *Polar Sea* and the *Polar Star* because they are approaching the end of their service life. That needs to follow a very deliberate requirements development process, which I addressed earlier.

But, quite frankly, those ships are going to have to be addressed in the next 5 to 10 years. One is laid up in commission special status. One is operating right now, but it certainly is something we are going to have to get our arms around in the future.

Mr. LARSEN. We will need to further explore that.

For the three of you, is there a test case country where you all—the Coast Guard, Marine Corps and the Navy—are working together with that country, where we can sort of put our minds around these cooperative strategies, or a country right now where the three of you are cooperating and are trying to develop an integrated approach with that particular country? Can you help us understand?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I think not so much a particular country, Mr. Larsen, but, rather, the regions where we operate. For example, we have the USS *Fort McHenry,* one of our amphibious ships, that is operating off of the West Coast of Africa, and it is a cooperative effort with us, with the Coast Guard, with the other armed services, and with the host nations themselves.

It is this ability to come into an area, do training, work on maritime security, schemes and thinking with those countries. So it is more of a regional approach, and we get a lot of benefit from that.

Admiral ALLEN. Yes. We have law enforcement attachments and trainers that are deployed out of Fort McHenry. We just finished a deployment with the Navy in the Caribbean with *Comfort,* a hospital ship that deployed down there. There were Coast Guard hospital corpsmen on board, as well.

Mr. LARSEN. General Conway.

General CONWAY. I can only think of one instance, and it is probably off the Philippines, working with the Philippines Special Operations Forces, where we embarked aboard Navy ships and were putting forces ashore on an infrequent basis.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Okay. Thank you.

Maybe I will follow up later, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. LoBiondo.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I thank our panel for being here today and for the fine work they do.

Admiral Allen, we have been hearing some rumors that there might be a proposal to transfer the Coast Guard's safety authori-

ties and capabilities to some new entity or to a different Federal agency.

Have you given any thought or can you comment on how you think that would impact your ability to execute the cooperative strategy?

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. There has been some discussion about whether or not the Marine's safety mission might be located someplace else. It is our position that it belongs inside the Coast Guard and that safety and security are intimately intertwined.

A good example of the most robust international engagement that the Coast Guard can do on behalf of the strategy is our engagement with the International Maritime Organization, which is the international maritime safety regulatory body.

In fact, two weeks ago, I led the U.S. mission to the 25th Assembly there. This is where we negotiated the agreements on long-range tracking and things that give better transparency to the global commons. In my view, it is impossible to separate safety and security within the Coast Guard's mission section, and it should be retained there.

Mr. LOBIONDO. So that would, in your view, definitely impact your ability in the cooperative strategy?

Admiral ALLEN. It would, sir. Yes, sir.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Also, Admiral Allen, how do the Coast Guard's specific capabilities complement the cooperative strategy? It is a broad term, and it is big concept, but I am trying to connect the dots on some basics, on some specifics.

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. I noted in my opening statement that, when we go into a country on a visit, we deal with a lot of ministries other than the Ministry of Defense by virtue of the portfolio of the missions that we have. It could be the interior ministry, public safety or, in the case of China, the communications ministry. This allows us a broader reach in doing shaping and international engagement that could preclude conflicts in the future.

Right now, we have three advisors deployed to South Korea to assist in oil spill response, and that would be a good example.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of you for being here. Thank you so much for your service.

I was going to follow up, actually, General Conway, with the Chairman's question, because I wanted to have you have a chance to express your concern also about the educational opportunities that our mid-level servicemembers are having.

As one thing just to throw out there, and perhaps you can follow up, I am just wondering to what extent we are really tracking to see whether we have an increasing number of servicemembers taking advantage of classes, whether they are getting the time, on ship or dwell time, to enable them to take advantage of those classes.

Is there any way of really seeing whether there has been a drop, when there is an increase, how we determine that, and how we are able to effect that into making sure that our young people are real-

ly getting the kind of educational opportunities that they need, especially when they are serving on ship or in country?

General CONWAY. Ma'am, I would talk, first of all, to the professional education aspect of this and say that, although with our operating tempo (OPTEMPO) there have been pressures to offset the requirement for promotion and selection to command and those types of things, we have not done so. We have tried to make it easier for our Marines, both officers and enlisted, with online courses and seminar courses and that manner of thing. But before every promotion board, every selection board, there is the requirement that that Marine be, quote, "professional military education (PME) complete" before he or she receives serious consideration.

So we consider it the strategic thinking that we are going to have to have, the strong operational thinking we are going to have to have on down range. And it is just not one of those standards that we are willing to forego in spite of, again, the very significant tempo that we are experiencing right now.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. If I could add to that, ma'am, our process is very similar. The path to promotion is through professional education, professional military education. We have, in our major fleet concentration, areas and opportunities for our officers to take advantage of that.

Although, I would say that, while that is very important and it allows us to increase the numbers that are in that program, there is much to be said for going to the institution itself, to the war college. Because it is when you immerse in that environment and when you are there and in seminars and your total focus is on joint military education and on professional military education and you do not have the daily churn and demands of your job, it is a much richer experience. You get better cross-pollenization. Therefore, we cannot take our eye off of that either.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I agree. I think it is critically important. And my concern would be whether or not we are seeing some diminution of that, partly because we have so many people who are deployed for longer periods of time. And I would just hope that we would be watching that and seeing whether there is a point at which we need to be concerned about it.

The other issue, and I think it has been mentioned, is in terms of language and to be able to track and to see, you know, again, the extent to which regional expertise and language expertise is being developed and people are taking advantage of that.

We should be, really, having a surge of that kind of interest, I think, and applicability. And I would think, during this time, perhaps that is not the case.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, our policy, particularly for our officer accession programs, is that they must take some regional courses or language courses. That has been worked into our institutions.

For our enlisted force, we, as our groups deploy, provide regional expertise information to them. In the last few years, the step up in our attention on that has been significant.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If I could turn for a moment just to the humanitarian assistance, because that has obviously been a very important part of the work that you all do and over which you have, I think, a great deal to offer.

Are we ensuring that we have the right mix of personnel to conduct these operations in the future while supporting our other core capabilities? How are we doing that in terms of our health-care needs and whether or not, in fact, we are training the physicians who are going to be available for those kinds of missions in the future? Is that a concern?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The way that we have done the humanitarian missions—and my experience has been that I was intimately involved in the tsunami relief and in the deployment of our hospital ships in the proactive way that our strategy calls for.

We go through a vetting process as we put the teams together. One, what are the types of skills that we think we will need in that particular area? Then we go through a very formal vetting to make sure that we are not depleting those skills in our medical treatment facilities that are important to our sailors and to our families.

Then, of course, we reach out to other services, to the host nation and to nongovernmental organizations, which minimizes the demand that is placed on us.

General CONWAY. Ma'am, I do have a mild concern, and that is just with the number of Marine expeditionary units, or now the expeditionary support groups, that we are able to put out at any one time. We have what we call a "1–0 presence." there is one at all times in the Central Command region, but we are not covering Europe like we used to. We are not covering the Pacific completely.

We have had some very good fortune with ships and with people being in the right place with some of the catastrophes that we have had, but we can only hope that we continue to be lucky, because we are not covering the planet like we used to.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Admiral Roughead, at a Seapower Subcommittee hearing in October, our subcommittee raised several questions relative to the adequacy of the 60 Sierra to perform adequately a number of missions. I would like, with your permission, sir, to submit some questions for the record relative to these helicopters and to your future planning.

In your maritime strategy, you mentioned climate change as a factor in changing the global security environment. There is another factor which, if the environmental changes loom large, these changes will be huge, and that is changes that will occur because of an increasing scarcity of the amount of oil that the world would like to use.

We have had four Government studies—two of them in 2005, two of them just this year—that were paid for by your Government, that were ignored by your Government, that were all saying essentially the same thing, that the peaking of oil—that is, the world's ability to produce oil—is maxing out. The peaking of oil is either present or imminent, with potentially devastating consequences.

There are two major entities which track oil around the world and which do prognostications. I would pay little attention to their prognostications, but they do a very good job of documenting what

has happened. This is the International Energy Administration and the Energy Information Agency in our country. Both of them have been tracking the production of crude oil around the world. If you look at their graphs, both of them show that the world has reached a maximum and is down a bit from that maximum that it reached in the production of crude oil. This reality, of course, is reflected in the fact that crude oil is now more than $90 a barrel.

China, as you know, is going around the world, buying up all of the oil it can at the same time that it is aggressively building a blue-water navy. With 1.3 billion people, the time may come when China will not be able to share the oil which it owns with the rest of the world. That will produce some enormous challenges and dislocations in the world, and I wonder why this very real potential for future challenge was not included in your maritime strategy.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, I would say, Mr. Bartlett, that the strategy calls out for where we must be and the types of capabilities that we must have. As we translate those requirements into what we buy, I believe that is where we look at what is the proper source of propulsion, the proper source of power generation.

And it is in that process that we then take a look at, given the future that we see, what are the decisions that we must make to have the robust, capable fleet and fleet in numbers for the future.

Mr. BARTLETT. Of all of the institutions in our country, our military is more effectively addressing the energy challenge than any other. I appreciate that.

As a whole, of course, our country is doing a tiny fraction of what it needs to be doing in this area, but you mentioned climate change, you know, the melting of the polar ice so that we now have access to resources there and maybe sea routes through there and the flooding of low-lying areas, which require the need for more humanitarian aid. So you are looking to the future and in how you would structure our maritime forces to meet these challenges.

Don't you think that the increasing scarcity of crude oil in the world will potentially create even bigger challenges and a bigger need to look at our strategy for the future than global warming? Global warming is probably not going to produce any big effects for maybe a half a century.

I will tell you, sir, I do not think we will make it through a decade without some major international dislocations as a result of competition for energy. I am not sure how this would impact what your planning for the future is, but I think, certainly, it needs to be a factor in that planning.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. And I believe that, in our strategy, we clearly call out for the effects of the competition for resources. And that played no small part in where we have focused our attention and have called for a focus of attention, which is in the Arabian Gulf, in the Indian Ocean region and in the Western Pacific, where energy will become a driver of what takes place.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor, please.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank our very, very distinguished guests for being with us and for serving the Nation.

Commandant Allen, I am going to start with you. I want to first thank you for letting me visit the Baltimore shipyard last weekend. It gave me a much better appreciation for the challenges of the 110's, 123s. It also, quite frankly, left me more angry than I went there, knowing that eight very capable vessels were turned over to the yard that built them in order to modify them. That yard was given a performance spec. And I am told by the very capable Coast Guard captain who walked us through the yard that, almost immediately after those boats were delivered, even before they saw any sort of a sea state, that the engines started being out of alignment because the hulls started deflecting almost as soon as they engaged the clutches on the engines.

I would remind the commandant that other Government agencies—and, as you know, we have been through Hurricane Katrina—starting with the Corps of Engineers, have the right to tell contractors who are not living up to their expectations on one contract that we are not even going to consider you for the next until you fix the first one. And the Corps, I know, did that with a number of debris haulers. I would like to know if you have the legal authority to do that under present law.

I would also like to put you and the contractor in question on notice that, on the next Coast Guard authorization bill, if this is not resolved to your satisfaction and to the taxpayers' satisfaction above all, it is my intention to have those eight vessels heretofore known as the "Bollinger class." I think our contractors deserve a big pat on the back when they give us a good vessel, but when they design something and they build it and they modify it and they screw it up and they do not assume responsibility for that, then, again, we are going to help them assume responsibility for that. So I hope this message is delivered to your contracting folks.

I am curious. On the contracting, do you have the authority right now to say, "Look, until you straighten this out, you are never getting another contract"?

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. Under our current contract award procedures, we are able to include past performance, and we do. And that does bear in the decision-making process, moving forward. We appreciate your continued support, and this is a difficult situation.

Just to advise you on where we are, we have revoked the acceptance of those boats. We have made that notification to the contractor. They have provided us information back in rebuttal. We are getting very close to what we would call a contracting officer's determination on our final position on it. Then that will take us to our next step, whether it is in the courts or whatever.

We will keep you advised, sir. We thank you for your interest.

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, these are assets of the people of the United States of America. And if someone—again, if he built it, if he modified it, if there were a performance spec and if it did not work, as far as I am concerned, Bollinger Shipyard is responsible, and they need to fix it. Either that or give their money back to the Nation.

Admiral Roughead, I hope you are aware that this year's Defense Authorization Bill calls for the next generation of nuclear cruiser. The next generation of cruiser is to be nuclear-powered.

You were kind enough to give me a book on Admiral Nimitz and how his efforts in Hawaii led to a series of events leading to other

books about the war in the Pacific, the most recent about Howse's typhoon.

Do you know what initiated the series of events that caused Admiral Howse's fleet to sail into that typhoon, the series of historical events that led to the sinking of the three destroyers and of also the 900 sailors?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. It dealt with the need to fuel those ships——

Mr. TAYLOR. That is correct.

Admiral ROUGHEAD [continuing]. And the decisions that were made to ballast or not ballast. I believe that is what you are getting at, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. That is exactly what I am getting at, Admiral.

Again, you know, for all of the reasons we outlined earlier in the year, as far as I am concerned, that was the icing on the cake. Any potential peer or foe is going to recognize our Nation's, as the great Congressman from Maryland pointed out, vulnerability when our fuel supply is cut off.

For that reason—and remember, they had to get far enough away from the Philippines where they could not be attacked by land-based aircraft while they were refueling. If another scenario like that in the Pacific were to take place, I know that you do not want to see our carriers vulnerable while the ships that are protecting the carriers are refueling.

So I would encourage you—the Senate has passed this, and the House has passed this. I fully anticipate the President will sign it. We have got about seven years to put the plans together for these vessels.

Quite frankly, it is going to be the one part of the ship where we have a pretty good idea of how much it is going to cost. Everything else is up in the air. So let's go ahead and let's get this going and let's get those ships in the fleet.

General Conway, again, thank you for working with us on the expeditionary fighting vehicle. I do appreciate the Marine Corps's willingness to look at options to make the vehicle more mine-resistant. I think it is fair to say that the ranking member and I are not yet sold on your solution, but we do want to continue to work with you, and we do appreciate your looking at other options to make it more mine-resistant.

We appreciate all three of you in your service to our Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor triggered my thought, Admiral Roughead, of which I will subject you to again, that we in Congress do our homework. Sometimes we are able to look at the problems you have that extend beyond today or tomorrow vis-a-vis the work that we did over four years, which, as you full well know, we call Goldwater-Nichols.

When Mr. Taylor makes reference to fuel problems, to oil refueling problems, we take this very seriously. And it is our baby, because we are the ones who are constitutionally charged with raising and maintaining the military. And we intend to work with you.

Then we hope that you will understand the depth with which we pass the measure regarding our future cruisers. I know I speak for Mr. Taylor and for Mr. Bartlett. Their subcommittee will work very, very closely with you on this.

I use as an example Goldwater-Nichols, which is now part of your culture, which, as I told you recently, every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was adamant against, but at the end of the day, to you all's credit, you made it work. And it has done a good thing for our Nation and for, hopefully, the other work that we do, including, the issue of which Mr. Taylor spoke would befall that category.

Do you have a comment on that, sir?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I do, Mr. Chairman. I am a great proponent of the work that you did and how it has transformed our military. We talk about things that are transformational—it is not always equipment—and I think that that is a case in point.

I have spoken with Mr. Taylor about this, and we know that, as we go through our analysis on our designs and force structure, that the cost of building a nuclear cruiser is going to be significantly higher than it would not be, as far as acquisition cost.

The concern I have is how will we then resource the rest of the shipbuilding program that we need when we have a significant cost up front, perhaps to be regained as we go through the life cycle of the ship. But I am concerned about what the initial ship costs will be and what that will do to fleet size because of the rate of procurement that we can have.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you are looking at the people who are going to solve that for you.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. All right, sir. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Jones, please.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

General Conway, this is a personal issue, that I want to publicly thank you,on behalf of Congressman Gene Taylor and myself, for what you did to help the Jerome Lee family in Mississippi. I think that the services of the Marine Corps, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the Army and of the Air Force are special, and too many times we forget that our fighting men and women have a big heart. So I just want to say thank you, sir.

General, I do have a question regarding the 33 amphibious ships of which you have been ordered to satisfy the issue addressed in the maritime strategic document. I ask this question because we have you and General Roughead here. How is this program going? Is it working together well to fulfill these requirements of these 33 amphibious ships?

General CONWAY. Sir, I will take the first part of it and say that I am very comfortable that the Navy and the Marine Corps have worked together closely to identify what the requirement is to put two brigades in assault across another enemy shore, the forceable entry capability that we must have as a Nation.

We have gone to Quantico. We have worked together on a computer load-out, which is what we would use to put those two brigades aboard ship. The number, actually, comes to 34 ships in the total requirement, 17 ships for each brigade. But in deference to the CNO shipbuilding plan, my predecessor said we can live with 30. We can do some things on black bottoms that will augment.

So I have maintained that line of reasoning and have said, if the requirement is 30 ships, if you apply 85 percent of availability

against that, then we need probably 33 ships in order to have that capacity ready on short notice.

I have had those conversations with the previous CNO. Admiral Roughead and I have had those conversations, and I think we are in general agreement on the requirement. At this point, I think the determination is, do we extend old ships for a longer life cycle or do we build new ships to get to that number? But we are confident that the CNO understands and the Navy understand the requirement.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. If I could, Mr. Jones, the way that I look at things—and I do not believe that there is a lot of daylight between General Conway and myself—is that there are requirements and then there is what we can afford. While I agree on the requirement, I also have the obligation to you to be able to produce a shipbuilding plan that is fiscally possible.

So, as we go through our process in the coming years, the requirement is there, and we will work very closely together to realize the capability for our country and for our Navy and Marine Corps that gives us the capability that is important and that is called out in the maritime strategy.

Mr. JONES. Admiral, I appreciate that. And that is why I am pleased that the Chairman is Gene Taylor and that the ranking member is Roscoe Bartlett, because I know that these two men will do what is necessary to make sure that our Marine Corps and our Navy have exactly what they need to defend this country and the interests of this country.

I have one last question. I think I have a little bit of time.

General Conway, considering the Marine Corps's end-strength will increase by 9,000, what is the state of the Marine Corps?

You might have had this question earlier. I was at Walter Reed, visiting the troops, and I missed votes, and I missed being here. If you had that question, I apologize. But if you did not, Camp Lejeune is in my district, and it is a growing base, and we are happy about that, but can you speak to the question I asked?

General CONWAY. First of all, sir, I would say we are going to go by a total of 27,000 over the next 5 years. And if you look at those metrics that help our leadership to define the health of the Corps, they are all pretty good. I mean, we are working hard, and the first tempo for operational forces is seven months deployed and seven months home. We consider our families to be the most brutal part of that whole equation because Marines are essentially doing what Marines joined our Corps to do.

Re-enlistment rates are increasing, really, every year compared to what they were the year before. We recruited not 5,000 in this first year, which was our goal, but actually 7,000 young Americans to be Marines, without reducing our standards in the slightest.

Our equipment is getting worn-out, admittedly, but that said, this committee and others have helped us with reset costs, and we have the expectation that that will continue to be the case as we posture for the long war and for whatever might follow in years to come.

So, all in all, I feel pretty good about where we are right now, sir, to be honest with you.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, General.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the panel for being with us here today.

Admiral Roughead, I want to just follow up on your comments about the fiscal challenge that you face. In looking at your testimony, it states that the 313-ship force represents the maximum acceptable risk in meeting the security demands of the 21st century.

Given the fact that today we are at 280, it sort of begs the question about whether or not we are at a point of unacceptable risk. And I just wonder if you could maybe fill in that blank.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I would not call it unacceptable risk, but I do believe that we have moderate risk in our ability to conduct the range of missions that we have around the world and, as I found out firsthand when I was in the Pacific, that I could have used more ships of differing types to be able to conduct operations that span the spectrum that our Navy is expected to perform.

Getting to 313 ships is a priority. I believe that is what we need as a Navy, as a minimum. In my four years that I have ahead of me, I am going to be working to achieve that objective.

Mr. COURTNEY. Again, you have a lot of friends in this room, but having just sort of gone through this process as a new Member just this year—and again, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Skelton and Mr. Hunter obviously moved heaven and earth to try and get both the defense bill out of this committee and the budget bill to a higher level—it seems to me that, as to what is projected in terms of the $14 billion a year over the next few years, it almost has to work perfectly to get to that number, because there just cannot be any cost overruns, given the strains that that is under.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, I believe there are many things that have to come into play: making sure that, particularly in my area of responsibility, we accurately define the requirements; that those requirements are what we need, not just want; that we then have in place some accurate costing processes to determine what the cost is; that we then have the oversight on the programs, as we build those programs, to ensure that we are staying within those cost controls; and also, that we have an ongoing process to ensure that, as classes are being built, that we do not see what I call a requirements creep, which is often the case.

I have seen it time and time again, and we have to have the discipline to say, no, we are not going there because it will cost us out of business.

Mr. COURTNEY. Okay. Again, it just seems that the trajectory of what you have to reach or of what you are shooting to reach and what the budget is that is being projected is a pretty big challenge for you. Hopefully, as you go through that, that is something that you will be—I do not mean this in a negative way. I mean, hopefully, we are going to get a straight picture, you know, from the Pentagon about whether these pieces are really falling into place with the numbers that are being projected.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. You will from me, sir.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak, please.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you for your time.

Admiral, I guess Mr. Hunter had asked the question—I have come and gone, and I may have missed it—on the LCS. You just mentioned you were out on the Pacific.

If you had to say what the major areas are of focus that you might do regarding China—and I do not mean that as an adversary, but Taiwan is like a dog with two tails, us and China. If Taiwan shakes, we just have an honest broker's role to play.

What are your number-one and number-two areas of concern regarding the maritime capability we want to bring forward? Not concern—that would probably be your priority out there.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I would say that, for me—and I lump it into the context of what will it take to keep the sea lanes open. I have for a long time been someone who has focused on antisubmarine warfare because of the ability of just one submarine to cause enough uncertainty and confusion that it could shut down the flow of commerce, which would be absolutely critical, or the flow of our supplies should we be in conflict. So antisubmarine warfare is a very high priority for me.

Mr. SESTAK. I am sorry; I did not mean to interrupt. Was there one more? That is your number one?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. That is where my number-one focus has been.

Mr. SESTAK. Before you go on to your next, your answer to Mr. Hunter mentioned the capabilities of ASW for the LCS and for the anti-surface warfare (ASUW). But this year, the Navy cancelled the Advanced Deployable System (ADS), the major ASW capability that we are supposed to have on the LCS. The modeling that has been attendant to how good the LCS would be in ASW in a scenario in the Western Pacific has relied almost exclusively, not totally—it has the Romeo, but the Romeo has to stay close on an ADS. So did we make the right decision to cancel ADS if that is your number-one priority out there?

And, number two, is LCS to be a player in that scenario in ASW?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I——

Mr. SESTAK. Okay. I will follow up—I am sorry—at this time. I apologize. Go ahead.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. No. I would say that, as I come into my job and as we look to the 2009 budget and 2010 budget, clearly, looking at our capabilities across a broad spectrum—ASW for one, air defense for another, ballistic missile defense—we really have to get away from looking at just the platforms and look at the systems that give us the capability.

Mr. SESTAK. That is not a platform. ADS was meant to be off-ship——

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Right.

Mr. SESTAK [continuing]. Which seems to me where the Navy was headed for a while. It is not platform on platform. If the Chinese have more submarines than we do today, we just cannot build enough submarines to go one on one. So the concept, to my understanding, was to get these with off-board ASW capability, throw them out there, and they will kind of track them.

So why did we cancel ADS if LCS is the priority?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, as you know, as we go through our budget process, there are priorities that drive cancellations or additions or sustainment. And my view is that, as we go into our Palm 10 process, we have to look at what capabilities we are going to buy. And I fully recognize that it is not a platform, but what we have to do is look at it holistically and see where we get the most bang for the buck. ASW is an area that I am going to be paying particular attention to.

Mr. SESTAK. Admiral and General, in your testimony, you have mentioned seabasing, but I didn't notice seabasing in yours, sir, or even in this. Has the Navy walked away from the concept of joint seabasing? I may have missed it, but that seemed to be, for a number of years, where the naval service was going, conceptually.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I have not walked away from seabasing. In fact, the discussions that we have discuss that.

Mr. SESTAK. Should it have been in here if it is still a part of the ethos of the Navy?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. What we did is, as we were developing that strategy, we talked more about the capabilities that we wanted and that we believe are relevant to the future. Then as we go into our operating concepts and then into our strategic plan, that is where I believe we put the fine definition on the "seabase" and the types of things that we have to acquire to be part of that seabasing.

Mr. SESTAK. I am out of time. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Before I recognize Mr. Cummings, let me interject.

There was a certain class of Coast Guard cutters—I think they were called the 110's—that you tried to extend by 13 feet, and it didn't work; am I correct?

Admiral ALLEN. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think the Navy has ever had similar problems. From this country boy, whose only experience with a body of water is called the Missouri River, I am having a little difficult time as to why we didn't have the expertise to say, "Hey, these things are going to buckle; something bad is going to happen," but no one did, which raises the thought with this Missouri River-bound country boy as to why we don't have, in some instances, common hulls with the United States Navy.

Is there some problem with it? Do you all speak about these things and say, "Hey, let us try this together"?

Do you ever do that, Admiral?

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. In fact, those conversations got started a year and a half ago when I became the commandant within the CNO.

Admiral Mullen—in fact, Admiral Roughead and I are scheduled to meet after the first of the year in these ongoing series of warfighter talks. And the topic for that meeting is the side-by-side comparison of LCS and the National Security Cutter (NSC), not just hull forms but systems and subsystems—the deck gun, the radar and so forth.

As I had told Admiral Mullen before I became the Chairman, I think you are going to see us up here more often together, answer-

ing these types of questions, because they are the right questions to be asked, sir.

I will tell you this just in general, and then I will throw it to Admiral Roughead. The employment and the concept of operations for the LCS and for the NSC are different, and that does drive some of the hull considerations. LCS is looking for speed. They operate with oilers. We look for high endurance, for the ability to loiter.

We operate independently, and that does take you different places on the hull design, but it is a perfectly legitimate question to ask. We need to be talking about it. We need to provide you answers based on our conversation, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It sounds like a major step in the right direction.

Admiral.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Clearly, in the environment we are in, the need to be more cooperative and collaborative on systems and even on ship types is something that we have to continue to assess. That is the path that we are on. But as Admiral Allen pointed out, sometimes our mission requirements are different, and then that, in turn, drives the ship design. Wherever we can reach commonality, that is where we are going to go.

The CHAIRMAN. That is great. I know you will keep the Subcommittee on Seapower fully advised on that——

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. At the beginning of the year.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to also thank you, Mr. Chairman, for raising the issue that you just raised. As Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Coast Guard under the Transportation Committee, I can tell you that Congressman Taylor also sits on that subcommittee, and we have urged the commandant of the Coast Guard to work closely with the Navy. We just think that it is a good combination and that it makes a lot of sense, as the Chairman was just saying.

Let me just address a few questions to you, Admiral Allen. Does the Coast Guard's involvement in this strategy mean that any of the Coast Guard's missions will change in any significant way? Will your relationship with the Navy change? Or is the strategy more an articulation of the kinds of relationships and joint activities you already undertake with the Navy?

Admiral ALLEN. Sir, you have summarized that absolutely correctly. What we are actually doing is institutionalizing and codifying relationships that have been built over 2 centuries. Quite frankly, even though we are building new classes of ships, the old ships are still operating and deploying. For instance, we had a medium-endurance cutter deployed to the Gulf of Guinea this last year.

We are actually bringing this into our governance in an integrated synchronization structure that will actually allow us to be more effective with the resources we have, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. As you know, of course, the Subcommittee on the Coast Guard is very concerned about the need to ensure that the Coast Guard adequately balances its traditional missions, particularly Marine safety, with its significant new homeland security missions and with the missions it is undertaking in support of the

Navy and of our U.S. operations around the world. While that will be required to implement the full range of missions and vision in the new cooperative agreement, the Coast Guard has to also work to fine-tune this balance.

How will the services' participation in this new strategy affect the services' ability to carry out their traditional missions, such as ensuring the effective regulation of the commercial maritime industry?

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. It is a great question. In fact, it allows us an opportunity to integrate at a higher level, both at safety and security, in furthering the needs of that other nation and our services.

Specifically, I think the greatest synergy that we bring to this strategy is our involvement with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is the international safety regulatory body. The fact that the Coast Guard leads the mission to the General Assembly is a way that we can deal with it.

And I will give you a good example. We dealt with both a Marine safety and a security issue with the last General Assembly. One was a resolution on how to move forward with coastal states that are involved with piracy issues, mainly Somalia. The other issue we dealt with was ballast water management and the issue of invasive species.

I don't think you are going to find an ability to bring those types of things together in an international forum to promote the aims of the strategy, which is to shape and to make sure that we can avert wars in the future by working internationally, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. One of the things I failed to say, Mr. Chairman, also, is that one of the proudest moments for the Coast Guard was during Hurricane Katrina, when they saved over 30,000 people, 20,000 of whom would have perished if it were not for the Coast Guard. And I think that so often goes unnoted.

Going back to the strategy document, it says, quote, "To successfully implement this strategy, the sea services must collectively expand core capabilities of U.S. seapower to achieve a blend of peacetime engagement and major combat operational capabilities."

We have core capabilities specifically and, within the Coast Guard, the need to be expanded as part of the effort to ensure the effective implementation of the maritime strategy, particularly given that the Coast Guard has significant responsibilities for ensuring the maritime security of the United States, but it is obviously much, much smaller than any DOD services.

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. We are required by title 14, chapter 2, to be interoperable with the Navy should the President elect to transfer us to the Navy in times of major war. The last time that occurred was in World War II, when that indeed did happen.

That drives the need for all of our core capabilities at some level to be interoperable with the Navy, should that happen. That also drives the discussion we just had earlier about would you look at the NSC and the LCS. Even if the hull forms are different, they have to be interoperable. We train at the same standards. We go through the same shake-down and refresher training that the Navy does, and that is how we accomplish the ability to integrate.

So, as we grow core capabilities, there is no distinction or conflict between our core mission set and what we need to do to operate with the Navy, because it is legally mandated anyway, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you.

With that, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Duncan Hunter has questions again.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Roughead, as the Chief of Naval Operations, I am sure that you know some of these facts. In terms of commercial shipbuilding, China is turning out 5,000 commercial ships a year versus 300 by the United States. They are turning out three submarines a year versus one by the United States. And undergirding that production is a production of 480 million tons of steel versus 99 million tons for the United States, a five-to-one advantage.

All of that is giving them the industrial base that could allow the Chinese naval capability to outstrip the United States if they turn that commercial shipbuilding capability into a warship-building capability.

Now, I have looked at your plan for construction, and I see no adjustments in the American plan for construction that reflects this change and this emergence of Communist China's naval power as a major security concern for the U.S.

In my estimation, there is something else you should be doing. We are sending China $200 billion a year more than they are sending us. They are utilizing American trade dollars to arm, clearly, and they are complementing the homemade or country-made naval construction with acquisition from places like Russia, where they are purchasing the sovereign mini-class missile destroyers. You are aware of that.

I think you should be weighing in with the Administration with respect to their trade policy, because that high cash flow that is going to China from American consumers each year pursuant to these unfair trade policies is being translated into military power.

So my first question is, have you engaged with the Administration on the need to adjust our maritime construction strategy?

And second, have you engaged with the Administration on the need to stop China's cheating on trade and this massive trade imbalance, which is being translated into security problems for your sailors and Marines?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, Mr. Hunter, as you know, our engagement on our shipbuilding policy is through the Administration and the programs that we put forth. But I have not engaged on trade policy with the Administration.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, that is a very small answer to a much bigger question. With respect to the increased production, in terms of them outstripping us by three to one on submarine production, and your own figures show that they are going to eclipse us in submarine numbers in 2011—maybe a little earlier, maybe a little later, depending which analysis you go with—clearly that should be a concern to you.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, it is.

Mr. HUNTER. Clearly, this massive commercial shipbuilding capability should be a concern to you.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I have had the opportunity to visit their yards that have built commercial and military ships, and they are state-of-the-art. They are very competitive on the world market. And there is no question that their shipbuilding capability is increasing rapidly, and I believe that not in the distant future it will likely surpass Korea as the prominent shipbuilder in the world today.

Mr. HUNTER. Does that give you any concern?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. As someone who is involved in the maritime interests of this country, the fact that our shipbuilding capacity and industry is not as competitive as other builders around the world is cause for concern.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Roughead, did we ever receive any official explanation from China, to your knowledge, as to why they refused the harboring of the *Kitty Hawk* and the two minesweepers, the two minesweepers that I understand were in weather distress? Did we ever receive any official explanation for that?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. With respect to the information that I have received, it is categorized as a misunderstanding. And then we have moved forward and have moved beyond that and are continuing to work with the Chinese Government to continue the program of ship visitations that we have had.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. That was a great surprise to me because of the cordiality and openness that our delegation received in China in just this last August. I was very surprised.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The interest that I have in the military-to-military relationship is to get to the heart of exactly what you are talking about, Mr. Chairman, to be able to better understand their process, their decisionmaking process, to better gauge the intent and where they plan on going with their navy and how they intend to employ that navy. And I believe that, through the military-to-military interaction that we have, we can gain insight into the intent of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The CHAIRMAN. You may recall—Admiral Ferguson is with us—you may recall that we had an excellent briefing from their navy, as well as a visit aboard one of their ships. And I thought they were very, very open to our delegation at the time.

Mr. Taylor has additional questions.

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, again, I wanted each of you to know how much I respect you, how grateful I am for your service to our Nation. And I am grateful that you are here today.

It is a nice, pretty slick brochure, but at the end of the day it really didn't do very much for our country.

A couple things I wish I had heard in this brochure—and it starts first with the Navy and the Marine Corps. In my time in Congress, I have seen a tendency by the Navy to give second-class treatment to Marine Corps requests. And that starts with the big-deck amphibs. It is like, "Well, the Marines will get that on their own. We won't make it a priority in our requests."

And, Admiral, I know you are new on the job. I know the Commandant is new on the job. I know this Commandant is fairly new on the job. I would hope, in addition to slick brochures, that in the future we see the Navy giving a higher preference to amphibs. I was deeply disappointed to see the second amphib that this committee put into the bill, that the House appropriators funded, did not get similar treatment from the Senate. And I think, quite frankly, if the Navy had weighed in and said, yeah, we need it, the fleet is at an all-time low post-World War I, and it is in the budget, doggone it, we hope you guys will keep it in there.

Second thing that I would ask of you—and, again, both of you are fairly new in this job, but I would hope that, between the Commandant of the Coast Guard and the CNO, that you will set the standard for, in the future, greater use of common hulls. Each of you come to me individually and say we are not buying enough to get any sort of economy of scale. That is why they are so darn expensive; that is why we need so much money. But I have never, in 18 years, seen the Coast Guard and the Navy really sit down and say, what hulls can we use?

Historically, the Coast Guard has used a heck of a lot of Navy surplus hulls. They worked very well. The ship that saved the air crew in the movie "The Perfect Storm," which was a true story, was a Navy hull that had been given to the Coast Guard that the Coast Guard used for a good 40 years after World War II, did a great job.

So it can be done. And I would hope that you two set the precedent for, in the future, greater use of common hulls so that we can get some economies of scale in our purchases.

And the third thing—again, Commandant Allen, I do appreciate the visit to the Baltimore yard last week. And I was very impressed with the captain who walked us around. I was very impressed with the gentleman, I guess from either Pakistan or India originally, who is your expertise on the civilian side.

But I remember asking them, why wasn't a hogging and sagging calculation run on this boat? And they said, in effect, "Well, we were counting on Bollinger to do it, and Bollinger screwed up." I said, "Well, who is your equivalent of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)"—Navy Shipbuilding Command. And they said, "We are." Two guys.

And so, I am not going to blame two guys for this fiasco. Bollinger should have done it right the first time. But what does trouble me, having been lucky enough to visit the David Taylor Research Center, having been lucky enough to get to work extensively with NAVSEA over the years is, why wasn't there a greater use of that resource?

Okay. And that is water under the bridge. But what kind of guarantees are we going to get in the future that there will be greater cooperation? Because, quite frankly, I understand that a major acquisition of Coast Guard large hulls is a generational thing. But the Navy is doing it every year. There is absolutely no reason for the Coast Guard, every generation, to recreate a shipbuying apparatus when the Navy has got one. And the vast majority of what you all do is common. I realize there are some things that are unique to the Coast Guard, some things unique to the Navy.

And that really is going to start with you two gentlemen, that this is a cultural thing, that we have to get better as a Nation. Because we have seen the LCS mistakes, we have seen the 110 mistakes. And, quite frankly, we can't afford as a Nation to keep repeating these mistakes.

So what, if anything, is going to happen toward any of those requests?

Admiral ALLEN. Well, first of all, we are already moving on several of those fronts, sir. And, again, I thank you for your interest.

First of all, the solicitation for the new patrol boat that will succeed the 110-foot fleet is going to be American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) class. We have Naval Sea Systems Command involved whenever they are needed.

The current project office down in Pascagoula for the National Security Cutter is jointly staffed with both Supervisor of Shipbuildings (SUPSHIP) for Navy personnel and Coast Guard personnel. And the acceptance trials for the National Security Cutter will be done by a U.S. Navy Inspection and Survey (INSURV) board for the first time in the history of the service, sir.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. And, Mr. Taylor, if I could just add on to the approach that we are taking, Admiral Allen referred to our warfighter talks. I think that the fact that our two services have joined over the past year to look at the future and see what capabilities we believe we, as a maritime nation, can have or need to have, and doing it jointly, leads us into the room to have the types of discussions and make the decisions that get exactly to your point.

So even though the strategy may be an overarching document, I believe it has set in motion a level of cooperation and sharing of information systems and commonalities that are going to be very important to us and, at the end of the day, also be very economical for both of our services.

Mr. TAYLOR. How about our request that the Navy give a greater degree of importance to the need to replenish the Marine Corps's amphibious fleet?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. And as General Conway has mentioned, we have already met, in the brief time that I have been the CNO, to talk about and work through our future amphibious lift requirement, acknowledging the requirement that has been generated by the Marine Corps, and moving forward to create the type of capability that we need to have a viable, modern amphibious force to support the Marine Corps.

So we are already going down that path, as well.

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, I thank you for your service to the Nation.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you for being here.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bartlett has a question.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

I would like to return for just a moment to Mr. Hunter's line of questioning. A bit less than a year ago now, Mr. Larsen and I and seven other Members of Congress spent several days in China. We spent New Year's Eve in Shanghai. And we went there principally to talk about energy. The Chinese began their discussion of energy by talking about post-oil. We have trouble in our country thinking

beyond the next quarterly report and beyond the next election. They seem to be able to think in terms of generations and centuries. And there will, of course, be a post-oil world.

They have a five-point plan, which everybody in their Government seemed to know. The first point of that five-point plan is conservation. They understood that there is now no surplus oil. To invest in the development of alternative energy sources, we need to buy some time and free up some oil with an aggressive conservation program.

Second and third points were get energy from other sources, and as much of that as you can from your own country.

And the fourth one may surprise you: Be kind to the environment. They have 1.3 billion people, 900 million of which are in rural areas, clamoring for the benefits of an industrialized society. And I think they see the potential of their empire unraveling, like the Yugoslav and Soviet empires unraveled, if they can't meet these demands.

As Mr. Hunter noted, this year they will turn out, I think, six times as many engineers as we. They will graduate more English-speaking engineers than we graduate. And half of our English-speaking engineers are Chinese students. They have an enormous potential. They now are buying up oil all over the world and building a blue-water navy.

I am really quite surprised that in your document looking forward that you didn't mention energy. I think it is going to be the overarching issue, not just for our country but for the world, in the next decade. And I think that many of the challenges that you face in the future are going to be a result of the competition for decreasing amounts of fossil fuels.

Our obsession with corn ethanol has driven up the price of grain, so that there are children now hungry in India because we are making corn ethanol for our cars. And one of the people from The World said that this was a—what was the term he used?—a crime against humanity.

If we use all of our corn for corn ethanol—these are numbers from the National Academy of Sciences—if we use all of our corn for corn ethanol, every bit of it, all 70 million acres, and discounted it for fossil fuel input, we would displace 2.4 percent of our gasoline. That is absolutely trifling.

And by the way, they said also that all of our soybeans converted into diesel would displace 2.9 percent of our diesel.

Don't you think, gentlemen, that our maritime posture for the future needs to consider energy in a very large way? And I am really quite surprised that it wasn't even mentioned. You mentioned a competition for resources, energy which would be one of those. But you really don't mention energy as a challenge for our planning for the future. Shouldn't you have?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, Mr. Bartlett, by addressing the competition for resources, we are addressing the challenges, the potential strife and even conflict that can come from that competition for resources. That is the intent of addressing it in the strategy, because we believe it will drive where we will have to operate, the types of operations that we will be involved in, and ultimately will

drive the type of fleet that we must have to operate, live and shape that future world.

So the strategy does address competition for resources. But it is as we go forward in our operating concepts and in where we are going to be accepting risk and then building our programs from that, that is where that will play out in the future years.

Mr. BARTLETT. But you did single out global warming. That is a challenge. I think it is a fairly trifling one for the next couple of decades compared to our competition for energy.

Why do you think the Chinese are so aggressively pursuing a blue-water navy? They don't need one for Taiwan, do they? Won't a brown-water navy do just fine there?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I believe that what the Chinese Navy, the PLA Navy is doing is developing a blue-water navy that allows them to influence and control events in the Western Pacific, around some of the critical straits and into the Indian Ocean. That is the navy they are building. They are very unabashed about the fact they are building a blue-water navy that will operate out to the first island chain, as they refer.

And as we have seen throughout history, and as we have seen in own country over the course of our Nation's history, that we are a maritime nation and our Navy and Marine Corps and Coast Guard are the maritime forces that can influence events in that maritime domain. They also see, as do other countries, the importance of navies to assure their security and their prosperity. And that is what is going on.

And we, as a Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, must also value our navy and what it takes to be a global navy, to be able to influence events in ways that are advantageous to our country.

Mr. BARTLETT. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We know the Marines are an expeditionary force. And I wonder if you could speak to the issue of whether, or to what extent, we have had to sacrifice some of that role.

In your maritime strategic concept, you say, "Permanent or prolonged basing of our military forces overseas often has unintended economic, social or political repercussions."

Could you speak to some of those? What is that? How far down that road, I guess, do you think that some of that role has been sacrificed?

General CONWAY. Some of it, ma'am, but I think knowingly. The Nation is engaged in two major fights. And as long as that is the case, the Marine Corps has to live up to its claim of being adaptable and flexible to the Nation's needs. And we consider that we have done that.

When the time comes to disengage from that kind of activity—and, really, our role in Iraq, in particular, has been that of a second land Army. When it comes time to be able to disengage from that service to the Nation and retain our original expeditionary flavor and our naval roots, I think we need to be looking at doing that. And that is what the strategy now seems to me to offer. And it is, I think, a blueprint for us to be able to do that in a little bit of a new and different fashion.

The things, the mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAP) comes immediately to mind, those things that would make us heavier, that would make us not nearly so expeditionary, the fact that our battalion tables of equipment are vastly different today from what they were in 2003—we have people working on all those things. And so we want to be able to do both, provide a service to the Nation that it desperately needs to help the Army with the commitments, but at the same time, when the time is right, to retain our expeditionary flavor and be lighter and harder-hitting and more agile.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is there a part of that, though, that worries you the most?

General CONWAY. Probably the human dimension. Because, again, we now have a generation of young Marines who think that being expeditionary is three squares a day at the forward-operating base and a bed at night. And we need to get away from that some and have the Navy deliver us to a moonscape somewhere where we have to start fending for ourselves and making something out of nothing. That is expeditionary.

So I think as long as we have great young leaders who can manage that mindset, we will be okay. But we need to, again, remember what it was like before 2004, when we probably first started experiencing those things.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. If I could just add on that, acknowledging what General Conway has just talked about, my Third Fleet commander and his general out in California have, given those circumstances, have come into agreement on being able to do more with what we currently have available and what the Marines can afford to contribute, so that we keep that tie that is traditional and that really gives the Navy and Marine Corps its power.

The systems are important, the ships are important, but it is when our sailors and our Marines come together, that is the power of the Navy-Marine Corps team.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And I think we would certainly all agree that they have performed magnificently. I think the concern is, you know, what are the problems that you see down the line with that, if any?

And I know, General, you mentioned also the fact that our families are brittle. That element is an important one to keep focus on, and I appreciate the fact that you are dedicating your resources to that.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady from California.

As I understand, we are going to have three votes momentarily. Mr. Larsen and then Mr. Sestak, as I understand, have additional questions.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, we are going to play a lightning fill-in-the-blank here, given the shortness of time.

Perhaps for Admiral Roughead and maybe for Commandant Allen: Does the Law of the Sea Treaty, does approval and ratification of that help, hurt, is it neutral on what you want to accom-

plish with the cooperative strategy, especially as it relates to other nations?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I believe especially the Law of the Sea Treaty is a very positive thing for our Navy and for our country.

What I saw in the Pacific was that the fact that we had not acceded to the treaty kept countries from doing things with us that would have enhanced the maritime security and the interoperability that are so important across a range of operations.

Admiral ALLEN. I couldn't agree more. In fact, sometimes I think we are inhibited because, two things: Number one, we are dealing with countries that understand we haven't acceded to the treaty; and number two, we are not in a position to rebuke claims that are not consistent with the Law of the Sea Treaty because we have not ratified it.

I will tell you, just in relation to Arctic issues, moving north, issues relating to the continental shelf, the potential for 25 percent of the world's oil and gas resources may be unexploited in that part of the world, not having a seat at the table when the claims are made on the continental shelf by Russia I think robs us of a chance to act where we need to under the strategy and also is going to inhibit our ability to make claims on our own continental shelf.

Mr. LARSEN. It is ironic that lack of ratification may be impacting our ability to exercise our sovereignty.

Second, Admiral Roughead, in your testimony, you talked about vessel tracking system. Perhaps for, again, both Admiral Roughead and Commandant Allen, can you talk about sort of a Navy role and Coast Guard role and where that line is in the vessel tracking service (VTS)? Is there a line, or how does it overlap?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. My view is that we no longer live in a world of lines.

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. And the ability to be able to merge the information we have with the information the Coast Guard has with information other agencies have and other countries may have, that is where we have to go.

Admiral ALLEN. Yeah. Maritime domain awareness has two major components. One is what we will call global maritime situational awareness, be able to sense and understand what is going on there. And then the information associated with it, which we would call global maritime intelligence integration.

Both of those functions have a place. Global maritime intelligence integration is part of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) organizational structure. And that community of interest is currently being headed by a Coast Guard flag officer. Global maritime situational awareness is a program office at Coast Guard headquarters within Department of Homeland Security (DHS), but is headed by a Navy admiral. There are no lines.

Mr. LARSEN. So, as that applies back home in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the Strait of Georgia, and between Washington State and British Columbia, with the vehicle tracking system, there is really no—not only are your systems interoperable, but your people are interoperable.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Exactly.

Do you want to add to that?

Admiral ALLEN. That is correct. In fact, we just opened a Joint Harbor Operations Center in Seattle on Pier 36 that has representation from the Navy and our force protection role related to the movement of their vessels in and out of Puget Sound.

And I might add we have international cooperation with the Canadian Vessel Traffic Services in Tofino that actually exchange information with our Vessel Traffic Services in Puget Sound.

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah.

Back to China, if I could just weigh in a little bit on that, Admiral Roughead, you discussed a little bit in response to some questions. I was going to ask, you know, what is your judgment of the Chinese military modernization? Do you have a judgment that is good, bad, indifferent, or how do you——

Admiral ROUGHEAD. My judgment is that it is a navy that is modernizing at a rate that is exceeding what our expectations have been. There are resources that are flowing into it. It is a navy that is becoming more capable, more modern, has legs that can get it into the blue water.

And the most significant change that I have seen in my observation of it over the last 13 years is in the human dimension. We can all watch the systems they are buying, capabilities they are buying——

Mr. LARSEN. Right.

Admiral ROUGHEAD [continuing]. But what I have seen is the nature of the leadership. These are now officers in their navy who have grown up in their areas of specialty, whether it is submarining or a surface ship or an aviator, and bring that perspective and that ambition to their leadership positions. And I think that is one of the major drivers in shaping their navy of the future.

Mr. LARSEN. Does that relate—are you saying that, although they are all PLA, they are becoming more professionalized as a military, as opposed to strictly an arm of the party?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Or those who had risen out of the Army, and they are now—these are now very professional naval officers. Their desire to constitute a noncommissioned officer corps is also indicative of the value that they place on the human resource.

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. I will just make one final note. And not to differ too much with my friend and colleague from San Diego, California, who is not here now, but I would prefer if the Navy stuck to the Navy and let the U.S. Trade Representative's Office stick to trade issues.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, sir.

I just had two questions. They both have to do with some questions asked by the Congressman in the back row on cost and numbers of platforms.

I mean, you have all had your challenges from Deepwater to LCS to EFE. I was struck that joint strike fighter (JSF), however, seemed to consciously go out at the beginning of it, get about eight nations to be in on the development of it, and therefore more people are buying, nations are buying this platform, so the cost goes

down. Why haven't we done the same thing with particularly the LCS?

For the first time, the U.S. Navy is going after a small ship, which seems so apropos for some other countries. The CNO of Israel was up to Wisconsin just the other day, I understand, to look at it, but can't get in on the development of it. And it is kind of a hull that you just got to change out capability to some degree with modular.

If we are concerned about costs, shouldn't we make this the JSF of the Navy?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Mr. Sestak, I am aware of countries that have shown an interest in LCS, but if I had to characterize most of them, they are watching us to see will it take flight or not.

Mr. SESTAK. All right. I had dinner with the Ambassador, and the CNO also stopped by. He said he is ready to sign the line—I understand it is probably different—sign the line if he could just be asked to do so. I pass it on. It just sounds like a great concept. And he seemed, the CNO, yesterday or the other day, to be very, very interested and said I would sign. But cost is something.

Could I follow up—and the last question is, again, I think Mr. Hunter, besides the trade issue, where else he was trying to go, and that is the number of platforms. I asked that earlier question on the LCS. And, you know, the concept had been that it would take this advanced deployable system. And I was struck by what you said, Admiral, it is just not platforms; it is systems. And we are supposed to take this underwater listening system, place it there, and move away, and then submarines from China might go over it, and you know where they are because it has a little antenna that sends the signal.

But, as you said in your response, well, you know, you kind of have some—you have to review things, and some things—you didn't say these exact words, but some things just don't make it, you know, because you only have so much resources.

I guess my overarching question would be, do we have the wrong metric of greatness in our Navy, really in our Army, in our Marines, Coast Guard or whatever, when we say we have the—that in this new transformational era that greatness is measured by the number, 313. Time and again, you hear about capabilities-based units.

And so my question really comes that, as we have gone from a Navy of 600 ships 20 to 25 years ago down to 300 or 280 today, no admiral would change today's Navy for one of 25 years ago, even though it had twice the number of platforms.

Is what is happening with our phobic—and I mean that in a positive way—on number, that what really gets pushed off in the resource fight is the capability like ADS? I mean, now we have an LCS platform that will go out there with no ASW capability, or very minimal. So we have another platform, just can't do the mission.

So do we have the wrong metric if we are still sticking with number as the sign of our greatness?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I would say that we cannot totally discount numbers, because, as you know, numbers have value, just in the variety of places around the globe where we can be doing things.

But I would say that our approach and how we assess our capabilities, that there is a bias that pulls us to platform. And we have to get away from that. We have to look at what it is that we are trying to do, what is the effect that we are trying to generate, and then what comes together in totality to be able to deliver that effect.

But we do tend to pull toward platforms, and we have to stop.

Mr. SESTAK. I say that only—I mean, with great respect. We have gone from Desert Storm, where lots of our Naval aircraft couldn't even—they just dropped gravity bombs, to today everyone has a precision-guided munition, to where everybody shares the common operating picture.

So it just seems as though sometimes, because of understandable interest everywhere, that—are we building the right capability for the future if we focus almost exclusively on numbers?

I am out of time. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You will note the votes have come, and we will close our hearing.

I want to express my gratitude to each of you this morning for your testimony and for your outstanding service and what you have and what you are devoting to the Nation.

I will have to tell you sailors that, as being one interested in history, I am so pleased to see you celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Great White Fleet. We can all learn so much from history. And that was a milestone for you, the Navy; it was a milestone for our country.

And with this strategy that you have testified about today and the fact that you are together today, the Marines and the Coast Guard, and the fact that you are helping implement this strategy could very well be an historic moment in our country, not just for you but for our country. And, of course, we in Congress hope and expect to play an important constitutional part in that.

So we thank you for your excellent testimony, your advice, and especially for your service. And, with that, we will thank you and see you again soon. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

December 13, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

DECEMBER 13, 2007

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT BY

ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

THE COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER

13 DECEMBER 2007

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Admiral Gary Roughead

Adm. Roughead is a 1973 graduate of the United States Naval Academy.

Among his six operational commands, Adm. Roughead was the first officer to command both classes of Aegis ships, having commanded USS *Barry* and USS *Port Royal*.

As a Flag Officer, Adm. Roughead commanded Cruiser Destroyer Group 2, the *George Washington* Battle Group; and U.S. Second Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic and Naval Forces North Fleet East.

Ashore, he served as Commandant, United States Naval Academy, the Department of the Navy's Chief of Legislative Affairs, and as Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.

Adm. Roughead is one of only two officers to have commanded the Fleets in the Pacific and Atlantic, commanding the U.S. Pacific Fleet and Joint Task Force 519, as well as Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces, where he was responsible for ensuring Navy forces were trained, ready, equipped and prepared to operate around the world, where and when needed.

Adm. Roughead's awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Navy Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, and various unit and service awards.

Adm. Roughead became the 29th Chief of Naval Operations on 29 September 2007.

STATEMENT BY
ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter, and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you today representing the dedicated men and women, Sailors and civilians, of the United States Navy. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss *The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,* our nation's new maritime strategy.

The United States is and has been from its founding, a maritime nation. Preserving the security of our homeland and people, ensuring the free flow of commerce, and sustaining partnerships with other nations are enduring American interests enabled by the ability of our maritime forces – our Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard – to operate over, on, and under the seas. Our citizens rely upon American seapower to protect our way of life – our prosperity and security.

Our connection with the maritime domain is shared globally: nearly three-quarters of the world is water; 80 percent of the world's population lives on or near the coastline; and 90 percent of the world's trade, including two-thirds of the world's petroleum, moves on the oceans to market. Yet, today, the nations are competing for global influence in an era in which there is unlikely to be total war or total peace. The challenge for our maritime Services is to remain a balanced maritime force, and apply seapower in a manner that protects our vital national interests while promoting greater collective security, stability, and trust. Without question, defending our homeland and defeating adversaries in war remain the indisputable ends of seapower; however, we must apply seapower more broadly to secure our national interests.

The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower articulates an approach that integrates seapower with other elements of national power in cooperation with our friends and allies. Our desire is to move beyond episodic involvement and execute a strategy that ensures security and prosperity. We want to foster an environment where the United States enables friends and Allies to fulfill their own security requirements. To achieve this end and encourage a peaceful global system, our maritime Service must integrate our capabilities across the full spectrum of military operations.

Recognizing the need for a more global and integrated approach, our strategy addresses changes to the global system that have taken place since the Navy published its last maritime strategy during the Cold War. Our new strategy places renewed emphasis upon the importance of forward presence, expeditionary warfare, peacetime operations, and crisis response missions highlighted in the Navy strategic whitepapers "...From the Sea" (1992) and "Forward...From the Sea" (1994).

Our new strategy represents unprecedented collaboration between our Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, both in the formulation of the strategy and in its implementation. That all three maritime Service chiefs have signed this strategy and appear before the Committee today is a testament to our commitment to integrating our efforts in protecting our nation's vital interests.

The collaboration to produce this strategy also includes the input of the American public. Through a series of "Conversations with the Country" over the past year, maritime Services leaders spoke with business leaders, the academic community, and the general public who shared what they expect from their maritime Services. These insightful discussions revealed that the American people want their maritime Services to remain strong, to defend the homeland, and to protect American citizens. The conversations indicated that the American people understand that our security and prosperity are linked to the security and prosperity of the world, and that preventing wars is just as important as winning wars. Public input helped frame our thinking as we vetted the drafts of our strategy through modeling and simulation at the Naval War College to evaluate the feasibility and practicality of our strategy under current and potential security scenarios.

Today, the United States is the world's preeminent maritime power. While we often call attention to the brave actions and audacious victories of our Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen at sea and on land, we often overlook the daily and steadfast contribution of our maritime Services to our nation's security and prosperity. Indeed, it is the Navy's constant presence, the Marine Corps quick response to crises, and the Coast Guard's watchful patrols that preserve our security and prosperity and enable our way of life in both peace and war.

The maritime strategy recognizes the unique contributions of the maritime Services in each of the six capabilities it describes. The capabilities are:

1. Forward Presence

Maritime forces will be forward deployed, especially in an era of diverse threats to the homeland. Operating forward enables familiarity with the environment, as well as the personalities and behavior patterns of regional actors. Mindful of the sovereignty of other nations, this influence and understanding contributes to effective responses in the event of crisis. Should peacetime operations transition to war, maritime forces will have already developed the environmental and operational understanding and experience to quickly engage in combat operations. Forward presence also allows us to combat terrorism as far from our shores as possible. Where and when applicable, forward deployed maritime forces will isolate, capture, or destroy terrorists, their infrastructure, resources and sanctuaries, preferably in conjunction with coalition partners.

2. Deterrence

Preventing war is preferable to fighting wars. Deterring aggression must be viewed in global, regional, and transnational terms via conventional, unconventional, and nuclear means. Effective Theater Security Cooperation activities are a form of extended deterrence, creating security and removing conditions for conflict. Maritime ballistic missile defense will enhance deterrence by providing an umbrella of protection to forward-deployed forces and friends and allies, while contributing to the larger architecture planned for defense of the United States. Our advantage in space—upon which much of our ability to operate in a networked, dispersed fashion depends—must be protected and extended. We will use forward based and forward deployed forces, space-

based assets, sea-based strategic deterrence and other initiatives to deter those who wish us harm.

3. Sea Control

The ability to operate freely at sea is one of the most important enablers of joint, combined, and interagency operations, and sea control requires capabilities in all aspects of the maritime domain, including space and cyberspace. There are many challenges to our ability to exercise sea control, perhaps none as significant as the growing number of nations operating submarines, both advanced diesel-electric and nuclear propelled. We will continue to hone the tactics, training and technologies needed to neutralize this threat. We will not permit conditions under which our maritime forces would be impeded from freedom of maneuver and freedom of access, nor will we permit an adversary to disrupt the global supply chain by attempting to block vital sea-lines of communication and commerce. We will be able to impose local sea control wherever necessary, ideally in concert with friends and allies, but by ourselves if we must.

4. Power Projection

Our ability to overcome challenges to access and to project and sustain power ashore is the basis of our combat credibility. Amphibious operations, strike warfare, information operations, and naval special warfare deliver flexible, scalable, and sustainable offensive capabilities at a time and place of our choosing. Our advantages will be sustained through properly sized forces, innovative technologies, understanding of adversary capabilities, adaptive joint planning processes and the proficiency and ingenuity of our Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen. We will maintain a robust strategic sealift capability to rapidly concentrate and sustain forces, and to enable joint and/or combined campaigns. This capability relies on the maintenance of a strong U.S. commercial maritime transportation industry and its critical intermodal assets. Power Projection will continue to be a critical and unique maritime Service contribution to our national security.

5. Maritime Security

The creation and maintenance of security at sea is essential to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities. Countering these irregular and transnational threats protects our homeland, enhances global stability, and secures freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations. Key to maritime security is the awareness of everything moving above, on, and under the ocean, or maritime domain awareness. Our maritime forces enforce domestic and international law at sea through established protocols such as the *Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan* (MOTR). We also join navies and coast guards around the world to police the global commons and suppress common threats.

Maritime security is demonstrated in varying forms. Recently the USS JAMES E. WILLIAMS interceded during an act of piracy against a North Korean merchant near Somalia. We participated in Malabar 2007, a Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) engagement where our maritime Services engaged India and other nations through training exercises focused on promoting security. We continue to collaborate with

Canadian authorities using the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) that enables an accurate account of shipping transiting in and around the Strait of Juan de Fuca between Washington state and British Columbia.

6. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HA/DR)

Building on relationships forged in times of calm. These relationships establish cooperation, common operating procedures, and trust. While we have consistently proven that we can surge materiel and people anywhere in the world in times of crisis, the one thing we cannot surge is trust. We will continue to mitigate human suffering as the vanguard of interagency and multinational efforts, both in a deliberate, proactive fashion and in response to crises. Human suffering moves us to act, and the expeditionary character of maritime forces uniquely positions them to provide assistance. Our ability to conduct rapid and sustained non-combatant evacuation operations is critical to relieving the plight of our citizens and others when their safety is in jeopardy.

Our response to the devastation of the Southeast Asia tsunami in December 2004, Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, and the cyclone in Bangladesh just last month have allowed our nation to provide desperately needed relief in a time of need. We do this, because it is the right thing to do. Our actions send a message to the world that United States seapower promotes security and stability in cooperative ways that do not necessarily resemble conventional applications of seapower. In addition to direct support and compassion for our friends and allies around the world, there is a by-product that engenders trust and invites further cooperation in addressing our collective security interests.

Resourcing and sustaining a powerful fleet of ships, submarines, and aircraft as well as the people and infrastructure that operate and support them are critical to our ability to implement our new strategy. Implementing the strategy will be my focus over the next four years as CNO.

Implementing the Strategy

Implementing the maritime strategy poses unique challenges to each maritime Service. The Marine Corps is actively involved in sustained operations ashore, yet it faces increasing pressure to develop its force for the future. The Coast Guard is the first to board ships while overseas, yet they patrol our coastlines daily, saving lives and preventing harm to the homeland and our precious environment. I applaud my counterparts for their vision and determination to make this strategy work.

For the Navy, the new strategy is the capstone document within a family of strategic guidance. It provides the basis for the Naval Operations Concept (NOC) and the Navy Strategic Plan (NSP). The NOC describes how, when and where the Navy-Marine Corps team will fight and operate to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. The NSP translates strategy into guidance for the development of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The NSP guides the application of resources in order to optimize the current and future force while addressing the

very real constraints of people, time, and money that we face now and in the years to come. The NSP for POM-10 will align the FY2010 budget submission to our new strategy.

VISION

My vision for the Navy is as follows:

"The United States Navy will remain the preeminent maritime power, providing our country a global naval expeditionary force committed to global security and prosperity. We will defend our homeland and our Nation's vital interests around the world. We will prevent war, dominate any threat, and decisively defeat any adversary. The Navy will remain a powerful component of Joint warfare by exploiting cutting edge technology and cooperating closely with the other Services, the interagency community, allies, and international partners. We will remain a superbly trained and led team of diverse Sailors and civilians, who are grounded in our warrior ethos, core values, and commitment to mission readiness and accomplishment."

My vision aligns with our new strategy in that it recognizes the need to remain a credible combat force while providing the forward presence, maritime security, and crisis response capabilities that contribute to global security and prosperity. My vision also recognizes the importance of our Sailors and Navy civilians, the Joint force, and technology, which underpin our success.

FOCUS AREAS

To achieve my vision and implement our new strategy, I will balance the Navy's efforts among the three focus areas that I identified at my confirmation hearing: to build the future force; to maintain warfighting readiness; and to develop and support our Sailors and Navy civilians.

A resource constrained environment complicates that balance. While the FY2009 budget will reflect the commitment to my focus areas, we are already analyzing the required force structure and budgetary changes that will be necessary in the FY2010 budget to optimize our force. Your assistance will be critical as we move forward with integrating the core capabilities identified in our new strategy with our existing budget to improve the capability and capacity of our own military forces, as well as that of our partners.

Future Force

The 30 year ship building plan was designed to field the force structure to meet the requirements of the national security strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review meeting the FY2020 threat. The 313 ship force represents the maximum acceptable risk in meeting the security demands of the 21st century. That is why in the context of our new strategy, I view 313 ships and the commensurate people, aircraft and infrastructure as a floor. Based on our new strategy, we will reexamine our previous force structure analysis to validate the minimum force

structure and determine the optimum force size and mix across the capability areas. This opportunity will allow us to align our ship and aircraft requirements with the new strategy, and produce a program that provides maximum stability for the industrial base.

In developing our optimum force size and mix, we must consider the quantity and balance of ships and aircraft required to fulfill the strategy. It is no longer feasible or affordable to purchase the most capable, multi-mission platform to predominantly execute tailored missions. The challenge for the Navy is to remain preeminent in traditional core naval capabilities while simultaneously enhancing our capability to conduct expanded core capabilities to ensure that naval power and influence can be applied on and from the sea, across the littorals, and ashore. Our new strategy addresses all required capabilities equally, but some capabilities require immediate attention, in particular our littoral capabilities.

My recent experiences as a Fleet Commander and the nature of operations in the foreseeable future place a greater emphasis on the littorals. Our ability to address the littoral threat is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The mission modules provide the LCS with the ability to conduct anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine warfare (MIW), and anti-surface warfare (SUW). LCS provides the flexibility that is required to meet the demand by providing forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and HA/DR. We have learned several lessons from LCS and will apply these lessons in future ship development.

Cutting edge technology is part of the Navy's culture and identity, yet the technology environment has challenged our edge. The technology gap is closing; however, the costs associated are increasing. I intend to wisely invest in our research and development in order to maximize the return on investment. Unmanned systems, cyberwarfare, ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare and decision superiority are specific areas that could provide significant advances in the future.

Warfighting Readiness

The Fleet Response Plan (FRP) has enabled the Navy to increase operational availability and generate more forward presence on short notice than was possible in the past. It allows the Navy to respond to global events more robustly with a disciplined, deliberate process to ensure continuous availability of trained, ready Navy forces. The FRP allows the Navy to identify clearly the surge forces ready to conduct the previously mentioned six capabilities.

The FRP has and will continue to allow us to operate and protect our vital national interests in the Western Pacific, the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. It allows us to broaden our engagement in South America and Africa and to deploy in new and creative ways to promote good will and trust. This allows us to conduct the full range of capabilities outlined in our new strategy.

Our readiness to win our nation's wars whenever and wherever they occur will remain the standard for preparedness. American and global stability and prosperity also requires readiness across the entire spectrum of military operations. The ability to rapidly transition from

one mission to another, such as the non-combatant evacuation of Lebanon, can not be taken for granted.

The capabilities of our new strategy highlight that we will continue to be the dominant and most influential maritime force, globally and across all maritime mission areas. Our forces are forward deployed, maintaining sea control, deterring our enemies, and projecting power ashore. We continue to train in our traditional warfare areas; and, we will expand and refine our training to include additional skills while honing our ability to command operational level campaigns.

This summer's humanitarian assistance deployment of the USS PELILEU was an excellent example of how the FRP has allowed us to implement expanded capabilities under our new strategy, deploying outside its normal expeditionary strike group rotation. Previous readiness standards would have precluded this mission, but the FRP enabled PELILEU to provide unique regional capabilities beyond the traditional application of seapower. Its humanitarian assistance mission, along with the magnificent efforts of the hospital ships MERCY and COMFORT have demonstrated our commitment to support and compassion. Collectively they have a positive impact on the image of the United States and help build trust and confidence around the globe.

Another example of our expanded capabilities is the Global Fleet Station (GFS). GFS provides a visible, reassuring, and persistent sea base from which to interact with global maritime communities, thus supporting the regional engagement objectives of combatant commanders. The High Speed Vessel SWIFT recently completed the first GFS pilot in the Caribbean and South America with outstanding results. The USS FORT MCHENRY is conducting a follow on GFS deployment in West Africa in the Gulf of Guinea region. These missions included joint, interagency, allied, and NGO personnel. Their contributions highlight the ability to unite to provide training and assistance to increase regional capabilities and capacities.

The wide range of operations at sea requires that we maximize every opportunity to gain and maintain proficiency at the ship/unit level, and integrate units in complex scenarios. Within our modern and sophisticated training ranges off the coasts of the continental United States and Hawaii, we conduct numerous U.S. exercises and training events with our friends and Allies, focusing on skills such as ASW, coordinated operations, and air operations. Through these exercises our Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups deploy ready and certified in all warfare areas. Recent public and legal debate have questioned our operations in many of these ranges and facilities citing environmental concerns. Our policies and procedures establish a needed level of safety, while allowing realistic training. We are committed to remaining good stewards of the environment; maintaining an open dialogue, and continuing to advance our scientific understanding of the impacts of our operations on the environment.

Our Sailors and Civilians

If we are to pace the security challenges of this century and execute our strategy, our Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education Enterprise must continue to evolve. We must

recruit and retain high quality young men and women to lead the Fleet tomorrow. This will be a more specialized, technically capable, better educated, more culturally diverse, and culturally aware Navy than today.

Globalization and the information revolution have changed the way we operate. Generational shifts have altered personal and professional expectations. It is critical that we stay ahead of these changes. Old models of recruiting, assigning, and compensating Sailors and Navy civilians are no longer sufficient. Today, increased competition for talent and changing employment expectations demand our Navy be an employer of choice for our citizens.

We must establish Sailor and civilian career paths that accommodate the greater breadth of learning and the depth of experience our strategy requires. We must adjust our personnel strategies to account for the dynamic nature of the demands on our people while providing required current and future capabilities. Creating the proper life work balance for our Sailors and Navy civilians will be crucial to retaining the talent we need to operate a capable Fleet. We are exploring expanded options that include opportunities for "on ramps" and "off ramps" toward a career long continuum of naval service. Success in delivering the kind of career options necessary to attract the Sailors of tomorrow will require your help to modernize outdated compensation and force management constructs to afford leadership the flexibility needed to lead emerging requirements and competitive employment markets. Your assistance will help us create career opportunities that deliver the force necessary to effectively and efficiently implement the Maritime Strategy.

In addition to personnel management, we are implementing our strategy by instilling in our workforce a focus on mission and individual readiness that is underpinned by a warrior ethos. We recognize that Sailors or Navy civilians experiencing personal challenges or confronting problems at home can become understandably distracted from the assigned mission. This is why we place an emphasis on Sailor readiness and family preparedness, including access to quality medical and dental care; pre- and post-deployment briefs for families with deploying Sailors; and robust family support services and organizations.

Force structure and the global security environment influence our ability to balance time at sea and time at home for our Sailors. We must continue to develop our people, Sailors and Navy civilians, with the correct mix of skill sets to conduct the full spectrum of naval operations is critical to the success of our strategy. Today's environment and the cooperative strategy require people have regional understanding and cultural understanding. We are taking steps to grow our cadre of Foreign Area Officers who specialize in specific regions, but we must do more. In our global Navy, every Sailor is an ambassador. Their interactions with foreign populations will shape perceptions of our Navy and the United States. Our efforts to increase cultural awareness skills equip our Sailors with the perspective necessary to operate effectively in the diverse global environment.

Conclusion

Our Navy has and will continue to give our nation global reach and persistent presence. This strategy reaffirms the use of seapower to influence actions and activities at sea and ashore.

The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces provide the United States the advantage of scaling its military presence in areas where access might be denied. The sea is a vast maneuver space, where the presence of maritime forces can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable flexible approaches to escalation, de-escalation and deterrence of conflicts. United States seapower is a force for good, protecting our nation's vital interests even as it joins with others to promote global security and prosperity. The oceans and waterways of the world are and will increasingly become the domain for building a better tomorrow.

On behalf of all of our Sailors and civilians, I thank you for your continued support and commitment to our Navy. I look forward to working closely with you to make our maritime Services and nation more secure and prosperous.

Not public until
Released by the HASC

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL JAMES T. CONWAY
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

BEFORE

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

On

A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER

13 DECEMBER 2007

Not public until
Released by the HASC

General James T. Conway

General James T. Conway was born in Walnut Ridge, Arkansas and is a graduate of Southeast Missouri State University. He was commissioned in 1970 as an infantry officer. His company grade assignments included multiple platoon and company commander billets with both the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions; Executive Officer of the Marine Detachment aboard the USS Kitty Hawk (CVA-63); series and company commander at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in San Diego; aide to the Commanding General, and Director, Sea School.

As a field grade officer, he commanded two companies of officer students and taught tactics at The Basic School; he also served as operations officer for the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit to include contingency operations off Beirut, Lebanon; and as Senior Aide to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, he was reassigned to the 2d Marine Division as Division G-3 Operations Officer before assuming command of 3d Battalion, 2d Marines in January 1990.

He commanded Battalion Landing Team 3/2 during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Selected for colonel, he served as the Ground Colonels' Monitor, and as Commanding Officer of The Basic School. His general officer duties included Deputy Director of Operations, J-34, Combating Terrorism, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.; and President, Marine Corps University at Quantico, VA. After promotion to Major General, he assumed command of the 1st Marine Division. In November 2002, Major General Conway was promoted to Lieutenant General and assumed command of the I Marine Expeditionary Force. He commanded I Marine Expeditionary Force during two combat tours in Iraq. In 2004, he was reassigned as the Director of Operations, J-3, Joint Staff, in Washington, D.C.

General Conway graduated with honors from The Basic School, the U.S. Army Infantry Officers Advanced Course, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Air War College.

General Conway's personal decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with palm, Navy Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with two Gold Stars, Navy Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal and the Combat Action Ribbon.

Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter, and Distinguished Members of the Committee; during my confirmation and in subsequent hearings and conversations, I have pledged to provide you forthright and honest assessments of your Corps. I welcome this opportunity to report to you today on the future of the Marine Corps as a Naval service.

Your Marine Corps is fully engaged in what we believe is a generational struggle against fanatical extremists; the challenges we face are of global scale and scope. This Long War is multi-faceted and will not be won in one battle, in one country, or by one method. Your Marines are a tough breed and will do what it takes to win — not only in these opening battles of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in the inevitable conflicts that will continue to arise.

Congressionally-mandated to "*be the most ready when the Nation is least ready,*" your Corps is committed to fulfilling this responsibility across the full spectrum of conflict. As an integral component of our national security, maritime forces provide our Nation unrivaled flexibility and options for deterring war and responding to crises. The recently published *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* provides for unprecedented partnership of Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard capabilities that advance the interests of our country. As a joint document of our Naval Services, this new maritime strategy articulates the integrated application of our Nation's seapower.

This maritime strategy re-affirms the naval character of the Marine Corps, re-emphasizing our enduring relationships with the Navy and Coast Guard. Implementation of this strategy will strengthen the security of our Nation for the Long War and beyond; however, the demands of current operations limit the Marine Corps' ability to aggressively commit forces to the strategy's implementation at this time. As we reach our authorized end-strength increase and as security conditions continue to improve in Iraq, the Marine Corps will transition our forces for other battles in the Long War — ultimately realizing this new era of expeditionary operations called for by our maritime strategy.

This strategy also incorporates hard-fought lessons from our current battles in Iraq and Afghanistan. Combat casualties have in a very real sense become a center of gravity for America — no matter what the cause or conflict. Therefore, "increased risk" and "slower response times" must always be calculated in terms of their real costs — loss of life and materiel on the battlefield and then, potentially, the loss of support of the American people.

Strategic Context

The United States faces a complex mix of states who sponsor terrorism, regional and rising peer competitors, failing states that undermine regional stability, and a variety of violent non-state actors — religious extremists, insurgents, paramilitary forces, pirates, and other criminals — all serving to destabilize legitimate governments and undermine security and stability of the greater global community. We see this global security context as a persistent condition for the foreseeable future.

Our Nation and its international partners are engaged in a global struggle for influence at the same time our access to many areas is acutely challenged — diplomatically, militarily, and geographically. In the past, the United States has maintained large forces on a significant number of permanent bases beyond our shores. Today, however, we have far fewer installations overseas. When conflict is imminent or crises occur, which may require land-based forces, we must conduct extensive diplomatic negotiations to acquire basing rights. Because of local and regional political, social, or economic pressures, even countries friendly to the United States decline to host or place conditional restrictions on basing U.S. forces.

Our national interests increasingly require us to operate in remote, developing regions of the world where infrastructure is either insufficient or rendered useless by natural disasters. Our rapid response to conditions in Bangladesh reinforced the advantage of providing robust humanitarian aid without overwhelming infrastructure ashore or creating misperceptions of our intent.

The growing trend of violent, transnational extremism is especially prevalent in many of these remote areas. In addition to ethnic and religious intolerance, many developing regions are troubled with economic challenges and infectious diseases. These problems are especially severe in the densely populated urban centers common to the world's littorals, resulting in discontented populations ripe for exploitation by extremist ideologues and terrorist networks.

We estimate that by the 2030 timeframe, more than 75% of the world's population will live within just 50 miles of the ocean; alternative energy sources will not be mature, so industrial and, increasingly, developing nations will depend on the free flow of oil and natural gas. Fresh water will be as equally important as petroleum products; during the 20th century, while the global population increased 300 percent, the demand for water increased 600 percent.

Demographics and the aging of the population in industrial countries, accompanied by a youth bulge in developing countries, will literally change the face of the world as we know it. The U.S. technological advantage, economic power, and military might still exceed that of other nations, but will not be nearly as dominant.

U.S. Maritime Forces

Given these strategic conditions, the requirement for maritime forces to project U.S. power and influence has increased — and will continue to increase. With its inherent advantages as a seabased, expeditionary force, the Marine Corps can reach the key areas of the globe in spite of challenges to U.S. access. The Marine Corps and its naval partners will expand the application of seapower across an even wider range of operations to promote greater global security, stability, and trust — key objectives for winning the Long War. Our seabased posture will allow us to continue to conduct "Phase 0" operations with a variety of allies and partners around the world to ease sources of discontent and deter conflict. We must increase our capacity for these operations without forfeiting our warfighting prowess in the event of a major regional conflict. The role of maritime forces is to provide unique expeditionary capabilities with utility across a wide range of operations. These include:

- Enabling multinational partnerships to address existing regional challenges and mitigate the conditions that allow irregular threats to proliferate;
- Responding to crises, providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;
- Conducting proactive Phase 0 security cooperation activities to build partnerships, positively shape events, and contribute to winning the global struggle for influence;
- Where and when applicable, isolating, capturing, or destroying terrorists as well as their infrastructure, resources, and sanctuaries; and
- Providing the Nation's primary power projection capability, remaining capable of overcoming challenges to access, conducting forcible entry operations, and facilitating the introduction and sustainment of joint or combined forces.

The basic premise of our newly-published maritime strategy is that the United States is a force for good in the world — that while we are capable of launching a clenched fist when we must,

offering the hand of friendship is also an essential and prominent tool in our kit. That premise flows from the belief that preventing wars is as important as winning wars.

Regionally Concentrated, Credible Combat Power. The maritime strategy advocates *credible* combat power as a deterrent to future conflict. The Marine Corps supports this capability through the flexibility and combat power of the Marine Air Ground Task Force embarked on amphibious warfare ships. By far the most complex of our congressionally-mandated missions, amphibious forcible entry requires long-term resourcing and a high-level of proficiency. It is not a capability that we can create in the wake of a threat.

The characteristics of amphibious ships (their command and control suites, flight decks, well decks, air and surface connectors, medical facilities, messing and berthing capacity, and survivability) merged with the general-purpose nature of embarked Marines, make them multi-mission platforms — unbeatable in operations ranging from humanitarian assistance to amphibious assault. These forces have brought hope and assistance to peoples ravaged by tsunamis, earthquakes, and cyclones — even hurricanes in our own country. They have provided a powerful combat force from the sea as evidenced by the opening days of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM when Marines provided the first conventional forces ashore in Afghanistan. An equally powerful force assaulted from amphibious ships up the Al Faw peninsula in early weeks of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In spite of the proliferation of anti-access technologies among state and non-state actors, Navy-Marine Corps amphibious capabilities have answered our Nation's "911 call" over 85 times since the end of the Cold War. Many international navies have recognized the value of amphibious warfare ships — as evidenced by the global renaissance in amphibious ship construction.

Joint Seabasing. The maritime strategy makes the case for seapower as the United States' asymmetric advantage. For Marines, that asymmetric advantage translates into Joint Seabasing, which allows us to maximize forward presence and engagement while "stepping lightly" on local sensitivities, avoiding the unintended political, social, and economic disruptions that often result from a large American presence ashore. It allows us to conduct a broad range of operations in areas where access is challenged, without reliance on ports and airfields. Given diplomatic, geographic, and infrastructure constraints, Seabasing is absolutely critical to overcoming area

denial and anti-access weapons in uncertain or openly hostile situations. The combination of capabilities that allows us to influence events ashore from over the horizon — amphibious warfare ships, innovative Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships, Joint High Speed Vessels, surface connectors, MV-22s, and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles — play a key role in surmounting access challenges.

Seabasing is not exclusive to the Navy and Marine Corps — it will be a national capability. In fact, we view Joint Seabasing as a national strategic imperative. Just as the amphibious innovations championed by the Navy-Marine Corps team during the 1920s and 1930s were employed by all U.S. and Allied forces in every theater during World War II, we believe that the Seabasing initiatives currently underway will expand to become joint and interagency capabilities. Our control of the sea allows us to use it as a vast maneuver space — 365 days a year. Seabasing allows us to project influence and expeditionary power in the face of access challenges, a distinct asymmetric advantage. These capabilities allow maritime forces to support our partners and to deter and defeat adversaries in a complex and uncertain future. Today, another generation of Naval planners continues to envision how our amphibious capabilities can evolve into more fully sea-based operations and better meet the Combatant Commanders' varied and competing requirements.

Global Presence. The maritime strategy describes the need for a distributed and persistent global presence to conduct those Phase 0 and Phase 1 activities that will counter extremist ideology and deter conflict. The implementation of this maritime strategy necessitates an energetic discourse with our joint, interagency, and multinational partners. In recognizing the value of integration of our maritime services for deterrence and security cooperation, it advocates the full participation and integration with agencies across the U.S. government.

Recently combat-tested in the Middle East and historically engaged in the Pacific, the Marine Corps will seek to further enhance its operational capabilities in the Pacific theater. Some areas like Africa offer unique challenges and opportunities for significant U.S. engagement. The shear breadth and depth of that great continent present their own challenges, but given the operational flexibility afforded by Seabasing and the extended reach of the MV-22 and KC-130J, the future bodes well for the ability of dispersed units of Marines — with interagency partners — to extend our partnerships within the continent of Africa.

Generating the right capabilities to maintain a persistent presence and effective security cooperation requires creative task-organization of current and emerging Navy / Marine Corps / Coast Guard capabilities. This exemplifies what we mean by adaptive force packaging — where the unique capabilities of each Service are brought together to create new capabilities or increased capacity. Further examples include: maritime security and riverine operations; operations to counter terrorism, weapons proliferation, piracy, and other illicit activities at sea and in the littorals; and Marines aboard Global Fleet Stations for a variety of theater security cooperation activities. Our Marines are adaptable and possess cultural understanding and tactical skills that can be applied afloat or ashore — as part of the additive combat power of a Marine Air Ground Task Force operating as part of a joint force. Our Sailors have very sophisticated capabilities for identifying and tracking threats in the maritime domain, imposing local sea control, and delivering striking power. Our Coast Guardsmen maintain extensive inshore expertise, established legal authority, and strong international partnerships based on maritime security and safety issues of common concern. Rather than requiring one Service to bear the manpower and resource burden of recreating these capabilities for specific missions to the potential detriment of other missions, the more pragmatic course is mix and match the expertise of each Sea Service to increase our overall joint capacity.

Our Marines Give Us the Advantage. In our Nation's history, the demand for Marines, as a seabased expeditionary force in readiness, has consistently increased. With the maneuver space of the seas and the strategic context of the future, the requirement for maritime forces is inextricably linked to our Nation's future security. The growth of the United States Marine Corps to 202,000 Marines will provide rapidly deployable and multi-capable forces to address taskings that vary from partnership building to the inevitable contingencies that will arise.

Everything we read about the future indicates that well-trained, well-led human beings with a capacity to absorb information and rapidly react to their environment have a tremendous asymmetric advantage over an adversary. That advantage goes to us. Our young Marines are courageous, willing to make sacrifices, and increasingly capable of succeeding in complex environments. They are out there now, forward-deployed, ready to respond to crisis, and daily putting a human face on American naval diplomacy. I am confident our Corps, and indeed our

Nation, will be in great shape for a long time to come as these young men and women continue to grow and assume greater positions of responsibility.

Strategy Implementation

As America's Naval Services implement this new strategy, several factors bear in consideration. This strategy calls for both Phase 0 conflict prevention missions as well as regionally concentrated, credible combat power; the capacity to operate across the spectrum of Naval force missions drive our amphibious ship requirements.

Based on strategic guidance, in the last several years we have accepted risk in our Nation's forcible entry capacity and reduced amphibious lift from 3.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault echelons to 2.0 MEB assault echelons. In the budgetary arena, the value of amphibious ships is too often assessed exclusively in terms of forcible entry — discounting their demonstrated usefulness across the range of operations and the clear imperative for Marines embarked aboard amphibious ships to meet Phase 0 demands. The ability to transition between those two strategic goalposts, and to respond to every missions-tasking in between, will rely on a strong Navy-Marine Corps Team and the amphibious ships that cement our bond. The Navy and Marine Corps have worked diligently to determine the minimum number of amphibious ships necessary to satisfy the Nation's needs — and look forward to working with the Committee to support the Chief of Naval Operation's shipbuilding plans.

A key factor of the Marine Corps' ability to implement this maritime strategy is the flexibility and combat power of Marine Aviation. It enables the Marine Air Ground Task Force to fight and shape the single battle while generating greater tempo than our adversaries. Throughout history, this combined arms team has proven unequalled across the spectrum of conflict. Our priority is to replace legacy aircraft — some of which that have been flying since Vietnam. Introducing vastly more capable aircraft — such as the Joint Strike Fighter, MV-22, H-1 upgrades, and CH-53K — will ensure that the Corps maintains its warfighting advantage for our Nation in the years to come.

Conclusion

Thank you for the opportunity to report to you on behalf of your Marines. They remain committed to their mission and know that the American people and its government support them in their endeavor. Quiet in their duty and determined in their task, they are telling us loud and clear in other ways that they know that there is a job to do and they will continue to shoulder the burden. More than 332,000 Marines have either enlisted or re-enlisted since September 11, 2001, and over 184,000 have enlisted or re-enlisted since March 2003. Make no mistake, they joined or decided to re-enlist knowing they would go into harm's way, and your Marines have made a positive and selfless decision to stay resolved. They are performing magnificently.

They are equally committed to stand ready as the Nation's Force in Readiness — to serve in any clime and place. Your continued support remains a vital and appreciated foundation to this service.

U. S. Department of Homeland Security
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

U. S. COAST GUARD

STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN
COMMANDANT

ON THE

COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 13, 2007

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is my pleasure to be here today to testify on the tri-service document, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.*

Thank you for the invitation to speak to the U.S. Coast Guard's role with the U. S. Navy and U. S. Marine Corps in defending our Nation at sea and securing the marine transportation system.

I want to begin by recognizing the leadership of Admiral Roughhead and General Conway in developing an integrated strategy for our Nation's sea services. We share a vision for seapower that will strengthen our national defense and economic security. It is a common vision about how to move our Nation forward into an uncertain future; into an era of persistent conflict and of irregular conflict; into an era where the next challenge may be something disruptive and unanticipated. To succeed in such an environment we need flexibility, agility, and adaptability -- all characteristics which are embedded in this strategy. We also need a strategy that integrates the three services' unique capabilities into a single vision.

The Coast Guard is a multi-mission, military and maritime service, responsible for the safety, security and stewardship of our Nation's ports, waterways, maritime borders and international maritime interests. Its wide civil maritime authorities empower the Coast Guard with the unique competencies that it brings to its defense role, defined in statute (14 USC 1 and 2, and 10 USC 101). We traditionally provide capabilities and resources in mission areas that support naval operations, such as maritime interception operations; domestic and expeditionary port operations/security and defense; theater security cooperation; military environmental response operations; and coastal sea control operations. Increasingly, however, we contribute our law enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and civil governance competencies in defense operations. These essential military tasks may be performed by the Coast Guard as an element of joint and combined forces in peacetime, crisis and war. The Coast Guard participates with the other military services and combatant commanders in the Department of Defense's (DoD) deliberate and crisis planning processes. Coast Guard forces are apportioned to combatant commander operation plans and are regular participants in joint and combined military operations.

About two years ago, the Coast Guard testified before our authorizers in the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure regarding the newly released *National Strategy for Maritime Security*. That testimony highlighted the Coast Guard's extensive Title 14 responsibilities in securing our ports, waterways and the maritime domain. My testimony today on *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* highlights how the Coast Guard integrates its Title 10 responsibilities with the Navy and Marine Corps in a wide spectrum of military operations. For me, this "closes the circle" in describing the Coast Guard's unique contributions to the security and defense of our Nation, and highlights the value of integrated, synchronized operations among the three services.

The Coast Guard subscribes completely to *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. It reinforces the time-honored military and humanitarian missions that we have carried out for the Nation since 1790 and it reflects the global reach and influence of our maritime services. The strategy emphasizes the need to integrate, synchronize and act with our coalition and international partners not only to win wars, but as Admiral Roughead said, to prevent wars, too.

National Defense Capabilities of the U.S. Coast Guard

The Coast Guard's contributions to the combatant commanders include cutters, aircraft, patrol boats, Maritime Safety and Security (MSST), Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET), Port Security Units (PSU) and other specialized capabilities. These assets deliver essential maritime surveillance, security and response capabilities, particularly where hostile intent is not immediately discernable or is intermingled with civil maritime operations.

The Coast Guard deploys assets to support DoD operations and theater security cooperation requirements. With more than 40 of the world's 70 naval forces structured and focused on performing coast guard type functions, combatant commanders continue to seek Coast Guard capabilities to support their theater security cooperation initiatives that are intended to improve the governance and security. Working with combatant commanders, the Coast Guard allocates forces to the highest priority requests.

The Coast Guard's 2007 defense activities illustrate the various contributions it makes to the six key military capabilities highlighted in the maritime strategy.

Forward Presence: Coast Guard cutters and other forces provided specialized and important theater security cooperation operations supporting national security and defense strategies. Multinational exercises included annual Coast Guard cutter deployments with the U.S. Navy to the Caribbean, South America and Central America. In 2007, a major cutter deployed for U.S. European Command to conduct security operations and combined training exercises with numerous countries in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. Also, a high endurance cutter deployed for U.S. Central Commmand to conduct maritime security operations, including piracy suppression operations off Somalia, the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden.

Deterrence: The Coast Guard's principal contributions were close to home in deterring transnational, unconventional threats -- principally drug smuggling -- that test our national sovereignty and border integrity, as well as weaken regional political stability and order at sea. Coast Guard, Navy, U.S. law enforcement and Allied military and law enforcement cooperation though Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF) South and West showcased the strength of integrated military and law enforcement operations, and were integral to enabling the Coast Guard to remove on average 319,945 lbs. of cocaine from the Transit Zone each year between 2004 and 2007. These were the four highest years for maritime cocaine removals ever, culminating with a record breaking removal of over 355,000 lbs of cocaine in 2007. Highly successful Coast Guard airborne use of force operations have also been extended from the Atlantic to Pacific Coast, where continued operation of Coast Guard crews on Navy helicopters in 2007 have brought an effective new joint-service capability to securing our borders. This ever tighter integration of our naval services in hemispheric maritime security operations creates a stronger deterrent effect against a range of unconventional, irregular threats to our Nation. The Coast Guard also supports the Navy's essential strategic deterrence capability through its Maritime Force Protection Units (MFPU), commissioned in 2007 that enforce Naval Vessel Protective Zones (NVPZ) for the Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) fleet.

Sea Control: In 2007, the Coast Guard continued to support National interests in the Arabian Gulf. Working alongside Navy and allied naval units, six patrol boats, two LEDETs and associated logistics and command and control elements supported the naval component commander's ability to prosecute the war on terrorism at sea and continued the protection of the

vital offshore Iraqi oil infrastructure. The Coast Guard also continued port security deployments to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in support of DoD operations. Detachments from PSUs were used to fulfill this commitment.

Power Projection: In support of the Global War on Terrorism, the Coast Guard protected and escorted Navy high-value units in 2007, including 75 Military Sealift Command ship arrivals and departures at 20 U.S. seaports of embarkation/debarkation, moving over 6 million square feet of military cargo. About one half of the over 800 Coast Guard men and women supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) in 2008 will be conducting domestic and expeditionary port operations/security and defense activities. The Coast Guard plays a specialized and essential role in supporting the military sealift that underpins power projection.

Maritime Security: The President's Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan provides for the coordinated U.S. Government response to threats against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain by establishing roles and responsibilities enabling rapid and decisive response. The Coast Guard, as the Nation's leading maritime law enforcement agency, fulfills DHS's role as one of the lead MOTR agencies in the maritime domain. With its experience working both law enforcement and military operations, the Coast Guard brings broad authorities as well as planning and execution skills to operations requiring interagency coordination through the MOTR process in support of both homeland defense and homeland security missions. The operations can include the deployment of integrated and adaptive capabilities (including use of force) required to locate, identify, intercept, apprehend, exploit, and, when necessary, defeat maritime threats. The Coast Guard continues to play an important supporting role to DoD within the interagency MOTR process used in countering piracy and suppression of unlawful acts at sea.

Humanitarian Assistance /Disaster Relief (HA/DR): With long-standing domestic authority and experience in organizing and responding to maritime and civil disasters, the Coast Guard brings highly-practiced skills to the expanded core naval service mission of HA/DR. This is second nature to us, as illustrated when tropical storm Noel struck the Dominican Republic last month. The Coast Guard rapidly deployed three helicopters, coordinating rescue and aid operations with U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) while using fixed wing air reconnaissance and the Coast Guard Cutter Tampa in Dominican Republic waters to serve as a command and control platform during the response. This joint forces effort saved over 50 lives, transported critical medical teams, and distributed vital food and water rations to victims in distress.

The changing nature of the threats and challenges facing the Nation and our combatant commanders has not only shaped the Coast Guard's role in traditional naval warfare mission areas but has also introduced new demands for specialized skill sets that the Coast Guard is uniquely suited to fill. New and emerging mission areas which support combatant commanders include:

Rotary Wing Air Intercept (RWAI). Responsibility for National Air Defense (AD) operations rests with U.S. Northern Commands, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Coast Guard RWAI forces seamlessly integrate into the NORAD air defense command and control structure, allowing unity of command and enhancement of the layered defense and law

enforcement response. In 2007, the Coast Guard is providing RWAI capability for several different AD missions, including:

- National Special Security Events (NSSE)
- Special Events Level 1-5
- NASA Space Shuttle Launches
- National Capital Region (NCR)

Coast Guard aircraft provided low/slow air intercept of aircraft in the National Capital Region under NORAD. In 2007, we responded to over 50 incidents in the prosecution of this mission. The Coast Guard is participating in planning and exercises with U.S. Northern Command to further hone this capability, including the development of an air-to-maritime concept.

Combatant Commanders support operations for the war on terror are conducted when regional combatant commanders request specific capabilities be added to deployed forces to expand capability. The Coast Guard provides forces with special capabilities and competencies often useful to DoD overseas, especially in Phase 0 "shaping" operations, including training host nation military and government forces to build capacity for maritime governance, security and basic civil administration. The Coast Guard provides training assistance to sixty nations with mobile training teams worldwide. For example, Coast Guard support has been instrumental in ensuring the success of the Search and Rescue Training Center (SAR-TC) in Malta. The SAR-TC graduated three classes last year which included students from Nigeria, Cape Verde, Tunisia, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia and nations of the European Community. The ability to field Coast Guard capabilities in areas where DoD forces lack civil authorities, expertise and access can give combatant commanders the benefit of relationships the Coast Guard has built with the civil ministries (e.g., Ministers of Interior) of many foreign countries.

Implementation Priorities for the U.S. Coast Guard

The maritime strategy captures the challenges facing our Nation and our sea services in a globalized maritime world. For the Coast Guard to serve its role in National defense operations, four implementation priorities bear highlighting.

Cutter and aircraft fleet recapitalization through the Deepwater acquisition program is my highest priority. Unless we are able to continue delivering the program's much-needed assets, our ability to secure the Nation's maritime borders, save lives, ensure national security and protect natural resources will be severely limited. The Deepwater acquisition program fully aligns with the National Fleet Policy, and by design implements the essential service interoperability called for in this strategy. The National Security Cutter was designed from the keel up to integrate with the Navy in C4ISR, weapons systems, and operational capability. Our new HC-144A CASA aircraft will also provide interoperability with DoD and other partners. There are huge returns from the Deepwater program to our homeland security and national defense readiness, as well as operational and economic efficiencies. For example, in March 2007, we opened our new C4ISR systems training facility at the Coast Guard Training Center in Petaluma, California. This facility is equipped with state-of-the-art simulators, and radar and electronics equipment to train Coast Guard crews assigned to new Deepwater cutters and has also been used to train U.S. Navy personnel on common C4ISR systems.

Building and sustaining a talented, adaptable workforce is essential to the Coast Guard's success in implementing this strategy. The modernization of our fleet of cutters and aircraft coupled with the progression of technology in the maritime industry are creating new training and education demands for Coast Guard men and women. It is especially important for our Coast Guard professionals to remain competent and technologically-current in their maritime safety, environment, and stewardship, maritime security and Title 10 roles. In fact, it is these civil competencies and authorities that are often the most valuable contribution a small Coast Guard presence can add to the combatant commanders' spectrum of operations.

Deployable Operations Group. The Coast Guard's response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrated its ability to respond quickly and effectively to one of the most costly and damaging natural disasters in American history. However, the Coast Guard also saw it could improve its response by building adaptive force packages to meet operational requirements and achieve greater interoperability with partner agencies and DoD. Because of this experience, the Coast Guard has consolidated and integrated its deployable forces under the Deployable Operations Group (DOG), which achieved initial operating capability (IOC) in July 2007. Deployable Specialized Forces (DSF) in the DOG force structure include Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST), the Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT), Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACLET), Port Security Units (PSU), National Strike Force (NSF) Strike Teams and the National Strike Force Coordination Center (NSFCC). An additional force in the DSF community is the Coast Guard personnel assigned to the Navy's Coastal Warfare (NCW) Squadrons. The DOG structure promises not only to greatly improve Coast Guard response to domestic disasters and incidents of national significance, but also to more tightly integrate training and doctrine with our Navy and Marine Corps partners and bring highly effective maritime service force packages to the combatant commanders.

High latitude operational capacity. The Coast Guard Cutter HEALY, one of our two operational icebreakers, returned in October 2007 from a science mission off the North Slope of Alaska, an effort to determine the extent of the United States continental shelf. This was a very topical deployment given receding ice, growing maritime activity in the Arctic and related challenges presented to the United States government. The Arctic contains 2,500 plus miles of U.S. shoreline and perhaps 25 percent of the world's energy reserves. The changing National security and sovereignty implications in the Arctic are noted in the strategy, and are emerging challenges for the Coast Guard and the Nation.

Maritime domain awareness. Three weeks ago I returned from London, where I led the U.S. delegation to the International Maritime Organization. High on our agenda were long-range tracking initiatives that complement shorter-range transponder systems, such as the safety-related Automated Identification Systems (AIS) used on commercial vessels around the world. The Coast Guard is a global leader in advancing systems that make maritime commerce safe and more transparent, allowing peaceful forces around the world to have a higher degree of certainty about legitimate shipping on known routes. With the additional information that will become available through the global Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system, we will be able to target anomalies and disrupt threats as far from our shore as possible. The Navy is an enthusiastic and close partner in building maritime domain awareness to protect our Nation and provide security on seas around the world. We have a Navy flag officer working with an integrated staff at Coast Guard Headquarters, and the Navy is a true leader in the effort to better share information among navies and the coast guards of the world, particularly in the European theater. Maritime Domain Awareness -- our ability to understand what's out there, and what a

potential threat is – requires the joint-service team effort highlighted in the strategy, and we are putting it into action.

A Cooperative Strategy for Global Maritime Engagement

Cooperative engagement of navies and coast guards throughout the world is the organizing principle of the new maritime strategy. This is a natural extension of the globalized nature of maritime activity, the common interest of peaceful nations in good order at sea, and the strategic advantage of defense in depth. I admire Admiral Roughead and General Conway, as well as Joint Service Chief Chairman Admiral Mullen, for having the strategic vision to expand our thinking about the relationships among maritime forces globally, and their common purpose to safeguard the maritime domain.

The Coast Guard has a unique role in this strategic concept because the service is both an armed force of the United States and a federal law enforcement agency. This dual character allows it to operate in many roles and venues. In dealing with coastal nations around the world, the Coast Guard necessarily moves beyond the traditional military-to-military relationships with the defense ministries. In other Nations, many coast guards work under the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) -- some under public safety and others under transport -- not under Ministries of Defense (MOD). Our ability to interact with those various ministries and departments in pursuit of shared civil maritime authorities and roles allows us to expand the concepts that are contained in the maritime strategy across broader elements of international governments.

To this end, we play an important role globally in managing seams between MODs and MOIs. Moving forward, the full range of interagency power must be brought to bear to deal with the challenges we face in today's world. The security provided by the Navy and Marine Corps is the essential foundation upon which our maritime Nation relies for its prosperity and way of life. But, to prevent wars and to ensure peace, we must also be able to help create and sustain the elements of a civil society and order around the world. That too is the vision of this strategy. What the Coast Guard "brings to the peace" is integration and synchronization capability to deal with civil departments and ministries of coastal nations around the world regarding search and rescue, oil and hazmat spill response, illegal migration, counter-drug operations, piracy and polar operations.

In closing, the Coast Guard will continue to be a strong partner to the Navy and the Marine Corps. We will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our shipmates to ensure the security and prosperity of our Nation, and our maritime interests around the world. I am committed to implementation and execution of this strategy, because it's the best thing for the Coast Guard, it's the best thing for the sea services of the United States, and it's the best thing for the security of this country and our partners around the world.

I look forward to your questions.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

DECEMBER 13, 2007

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower represents an historical first.

Never before have the maritime forces of the United States—the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—come together to create a unified maritime strategy. This strategy stresses an approach that integrates seapower with other elements of national power, as well as those of our friends and allies. It describes how seapower will be applied around the world to protect our way of life, as we join with other like-minded nations to protect and sustain the global, inter-connected system through which we prosper. Our commitment to protecting the homeland and winning our Nation's wars is matched by a corresponding commitment to preventing war.

Our citizens were involved in development of this strategy through a series of public forums known as the "Conversations with the Country." Three themes dominated these discussions: our people want us to remain strong; they want us to protect them and our homeland, and they want us to work with partners around the world to prevent war. These themes, coupled with rigorous academic research, analysis and debate, led to a comprehensive strategy designed to meet the expectations and needs of the American people.

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower binds our services more closely together than they have ever been before to advance the prosperity and security of our Nation. The demands of an uncertain world and the enduring interests of the American people require nothing less.

James T. Conway
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Gary Roughead
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations

Thad W. Allen
Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard
Commandant of the Coast Guard

Introduction

The security, prosperity, and vital interests of the United States are increasingly coupled to those of other nations. Our Nation's interests are best served by fostering a peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance.

We prosper because of this system of exchange among nations, yet recognize it is vulnerable to a range of disruptions that can produce cascading and harmful effects far from their sources. Major power war, regional conflict, terrorism, lawlessness and natural disasters—all have the potential to threaten U.S. national security and world prosperity.

The oceans connect the nations of the world, even those countries that are landlocked. Because the maritime domain—the world's oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, littorals, and the airspace above them—supports 90% of the world's trade, it carries the lifeblood of a global system that links every country on earth. Covering three-quarters of the planet, the oceans make neighbors of people around the world. They enable us to help friends in need and to confront and defeat aggression far from our shores.

Today, the United States and its partners find themselves competing for global influence in an era in which they are unlikely to be fully at war or fully at peace. Our challenge is to apply seapower in a manner that protects U.S. vital interests even as it promotes greater collective security, stability, and trust. While defending our homeland and defeating adversaries in war remain the indisputable ends of seapower, it must be applied more broadly if it is to serve the national interest.

We believe that ***preventing wars is as important as winning wars.*** There is a tension, however, between the requirements for continued peacetime engagement and maintaining proficiency in the critical skills necessary

to fighting and winning in combat. Maritime forces must contribute to winning wars decisively while enhancing our ability to prevent war, win the long struggle against terrorist networks, positively influence events, and ease the impact of disasters.

As it has always been, these critical tasks will be carried out by our people—the key to success in any military strategy. Accordingly, we will provide our people—our Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen—with the training, education and tools necessary to promote peace and prevail in conflict.

Guided by the objectives articulated in the *National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy* and the *National Strategy for Maritime Security,* the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard will act across the full range of military operations to secure the United States from direct attack; secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action; strengthen existing and emerging alliances and partnerships and establish favorable security conditions.

Because the maritime domain—the world's oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, littorals, and the airspace above them—supports 90% of the world's trade, IT CARRIES THE LIFEBLOOD OF A GLOBAL SYSTEM *that links every country on earth.*

Additionally, maritime forces will be employed to build confidence and trust among nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests in an open, multi-polar world. To do so will require an unprecedented level of integration among our maritime forces and enhanced cooperation with the other instruments of national power, as well as the capabilities of our international partners. *Seapower will be a unifying force for building a better tomorrow.*

Challenges of a New Era

The world economy is tightly interconnected. Over the past four decades, total sea borne trade has more than quadrupled: 90% of world trade and two-thirds of its petroleum are transported by sea. The sea-lanes and supporting shore infrastructure are the lifelines of the modern global economy, visible and vulnerable symbols of the modern distribution system that relies on free transit through increasingly urbanized littoral regions.

Expansion of the global system has increased the prosperity of many nations. Yet their continued growth may create increasing competition for resources and capital with other economic powers, transnational corporations and international organizations. Heightened popular expectations and increased competition for resources, coupled with scarcity, may encourage nations to exert wider claims of sovereignty over greater expanses of ocean, waterways, and natural resources—potentially resulting in conflict.

Technology is rapidly expanding marine activities such as energy development, resource extraction, and other commercial activity in and under the oceans. Climate change is gradually opening up the waters of the Arctic, not only to new resource development, but also to new shipping routes that may reshape the global transport system. While these developments offer opportunities for growth, they are potential sources of competition and conflict for access and natural resources.

Globalization is also shaping human migration patterns, health, education, culture, and the conduct of conflict. Conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, de-centralized planning and execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways. Weak or corrupt governments, growing dissatisfaction among the disenfranchised, religious extremism, ethnic nationalism, and changing demographics—often spurred on by the uneven and sometimes unwelcome advances of globalization—exacerbate tensions and are contributors to conflict.

United States seapower will be globally postured TO SECURE OUR HOMELAND AND CITIZENS FROM DIRECT ATTACK *and to advance our interests around the world.*

Concurrently, a rising number of transnational actors and rogue states, emboldened and enabled with unprecedented access to the global stage, can cause systemic disruptions in an effort to increase their power and influence. Their actions, often designed to purposely incite conflict between other parties, will complicate attempts to defuse and allay regional conflict.

Proliferation of weapons technology and information has increased the capacity of nation-states and transnational actors to challenge maritime access, evade accountability for attacks, and manipulate public perception. Asymmetric use of technology will pose a range of threats

to the United States and its partners. Even more worrisome, the appetite for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is growing among nations and non-state antagonists. At the same time, attacks on legal, financial, and cyber systems can be equally, if not more, disruptive than kinetic weapons.

The vast majority of the world's population lives within a few hundred miles of the oceans. Social instability in increasingly crowded cities, many of which exist in already unstable parts of the world, has the potential to create significant disruptions. The effects of climate change may also amplify human suffering through catastrophic storms, loss of arable lands, and coastal flooding, could lead to loss of life, involuntary migration, social instability, and regional crises.

Mass communications will highlight the drama of human suffering, and disadvantaged populations will be ever more painfully aware and less tolerant of their conditions. Extremist ideologies will become increasingly attractive to those in despair and bereft of opportunity. Criminal elements will also exploit this social instability.

These conditions combine to create an uncertain future and cause us to think anew about how we view seapower. No one nation has the resources required to provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain. Increasingly, governments, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and the private sector will form partnerships of common interest to counter these emerging threats.

Maritime Strategic Concept

This strategy reaffirms the use of seapower to influence actions and activities at sea and ashore. The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces provide the U.S. the asymmetric advantage of enlarging or contracting its military footprint in areas where access is denied or limited. Permanent or prolonged basing of our military forces overseas often has unintended economic, social or political repercussions. The sea is a vast maneuver space, where the presence of maritime forces can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable flexible approaches to escalation, de-escalation and deterrence of conflicts.

The speed, flexibility, agility and scalability of maritime forces provide joint or combined force commanders a range of options for responding to crises. Additionally, integrated maritime operations, either within formal alliance structures (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or more informal arrangements (such as the Global Maritime Partnership initiative), send powerful messages to would-be aggressors that we will act with others to ensure collective security and prosperity.

United States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world. As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance.

We will employ the global reach, persistent presence, and operational flexibility inherent in U.S. seapower to accomplish six key tasks, or *strategic imperatives*. Where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our friends and allies our commitment to security and stability, U.S. maritime forces will be characterized by regionally concentrated, forward-deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation's wars as part of a joint or combined campaign. In addition, persistent, mission-tailored maritime forces will be globally distributed in order to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of international partners, and prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises.

Regionally Concentrated, Credible Combat Power

Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors. This combat power can be selectively and rapidly repositioned to meet contingencies that may arise elsewhere. These forces will be sized and postured to fulfill the following strategic imperatives:

Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power. Today regional conflict has ramifications far beyond the area of conflict. Humanitarian crises, violence spreading across borders, pandemics, and the interruption of vital resources are all possible when regional crises erupt. While this strategy advocates a wide dispersal of networked maritime forces, we cannot be everywhere, and we cannot act to mitigate all regional conflict.

Where conflict threatens the global system and our national interests, maritime forces will be ready to respond alongside other elements of national and multi-national power, to give political leaders a range of options for deterrence, escalation and de-escalation. Maritime forces that are persistently present and combat-ready provide the Nation's primary forcible entry option in an era of declining access, even as they provide the means for this Nation to respond quickly to other crises. Whether over the horizon or powerfully arrayed in plain sight, maritime forces can deter the ambitions of regional aggressors, assure friends and allies, gain and maintain access, and protect our citizens while working to sustain the global order.

Critical to this notion is the maintenance of a powerful fleet—ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based fleet activities—capable of selectively controlling the seas, projecting power ashore, and protecting friendly forces and civilian populations from attack.



Deter major power war. No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation's comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces.

Win our Nation's wars. In times of war, our ability to impose local sea control, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore, makes our maritime forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force. This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by a robust sealift capability that can concentrate and sustain forces, sea control and power projection enable extended campaigns ashore.

Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces

The Sea Services will establish a persistent global presence using distributed forces that are organized by mission and comprised of integrated Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard capabilities. This global distribution must extend beyond traditional deployment areas and reflect missions ranging from humanitarian operations to an increased emphasis on counter-terrorism and irregular warfare. Our maritime forces will be tailored to meet the unique and evolving requirements particular to each geographic region, often in conjunction with special operations forces and other interagency partners. In particular, this strategy recognizes the rising importance and need for increased peacetime activities in Africa and the Western Hemisphere.

Although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, TRUST AND COOPERATION CANNOT BE SURGED.

Contribute to homeland defense in depth. Maritime forces will defend the homeland by identifying and neutralizing threats as far from our shores as possible. From fostering critical relationships overseas, to screening ships bound for our ports, or rapidly responding to any threats

approaching our coastline, our homeland defense effort will integrate across the maritime services, the joint force, the interagency community, our international partners and the private sector to provide the highest level of security possible. When directed, maritime forces will promptly support civil authorities in the event of an attack or natural disaster on our shores.

Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners. Expanded cooperative relationships with other nations will contribute to the security and stability of the maritime domain for the benefit of all. Although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, *trust and cooperation cannot be surged*. They must be built over time so that the strategic interests of the participants are continuously considered while mutual understanding and respect are promoted.

A key to fostering such relationships is development of sufficient cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise among our Sailors, Marines and Coast Guardsmen to nurture effective interaction with diverse international partners. Building and reinvigorating these relationships through Theater Security Cooperation requires an increased focus on capacity-building, humanitarian assistance, regional frameworks for improving maritime governance, and cooperation in enforcing the rule of law in the maritime domain.

Additionally, the Sea Services must become adept at forging international partnerships in coordination with the other U.S. services and government departments. To this end, the Global Maritime Partnerships initiative seeks a cooperative approach to maritime security, promoting the rule of law by countering piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities.

Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system. Maritime forces will work with others to ensure an adequate level of

security and awareness in the maritime domain. In doing so, transnational threats—terrorists and extremists; proliferators of weapons of mass destruction; pirates; traffickers in persons, drugs, and conventional weapons; and other criminals—will be constrained.

By being there, forward deployed and engaged in mutually beneficial relationships with regional and global partners, maritime forces will promote frameworks that enhance security. When natural or manmade disasters strike, our maritime forces can provide humanitarian assistance and relief, joining with interagency and non-governmental partners. By participating routinely and predictably in cooperative activities, maritime forces will be postured to support other joint or combined forces to mitigate and localize disruptions.

Implementing the Strategy

To successfully implement this strategy, the Sea Services must collectively expand the core capabilities of U.S. seapower to achieve a blend of peacetime engagement and major combat operations capabilities.

Expanded Core Capabilities

Although the Sea Services conduct many missions, the following six capabilities comprise the core of U.S. maritime power and reflect an increase in emphasis on those activities that prevent war and build partnerships.

Forward Presence. Maritime forces will be forward deployed, especially in an era of diverse threats to the homeland. Operating forward enables familiarity with the environment, as well as the personalities and behavior patterns of regional actors. Mindful of the sovereignty of other nations, this influence and understanding contributes to effective responses

in the event of crisis. Should peacetime operations transition to war, maritime forces will have already developed the environmental and operational understanding and experience to quickly engage in combat operations. Forward presence also allows us to combat terrorism as far from our shores as possible. Where and when applicable, forward-deployed maritime forces will isolate, capture, or destroy terrorists, their infrastructure, resources and sanctuaries, preferably in conjunction with coalition partners.

Deterrence. Preventing war is preferable to fighting wars. Deterring aggression must be viewed in global, regional, and transnational terms via conventional, unconventional, and nuclear means. Effective Theater Security Cooperation activities are a form of extended deterrence, creating security and removing conditions for conflict. Maritime ballistic missile defense will enhance deterrence by providing an umbrella of protection to forward-deployed forces and friends and allies, while contributing to the larger architecture planned for defense of the United States. Our advantage in space—upon which much of our ability to operate in a networked, dispersed fashion depends—must be protected and extended. We will use forward based and forward deployed forces, space-based assets, sea-based strategic deterrence and other initiatives to deter those who wish us harm.

As a declaratory strategy, this document CHALLENGES THE SEA SERVICES TO EVOLVE AN EXPANDED RANGE OF INTEGRATED CAPABILITIES *to achieve enduring national strategic objectives.*

Sea Control. The ability to operate freely at sea is one of the most important enablers of joint and interagency operations, and sea control requires capabilities in all aspects of the maritime domain, including space and cyberspace. There are many challenges to our ability to exercise sea control, perhaps none as significant as the growing number of nations operating submarines, both advanced diesel-electric and nuclear propelled. We will continue to hone the tactics, training and technologies needed to neutralize this threat. We will not permit conditions under which our maritime forces would be impeded from freedom of maneuver and freedom of access, nor will we permit an adversary to disrupt the global supply chain by attempting to block vital sea-lines of communication and commerce. We will be able to impose local sea control wherever necessary, ideally in concert with friends and allies, but by ourselves if we must.

Power Projection. Our ability to overcome challenges to access and to project and sustain power ashore is the basis of our combat credibility. Our advantages will be sustained through properly sized forces, innovative technologies, understanding of adversary capabilities, adaptive joint planning processes and the proficiency and ingenuity of our Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen. We will maintain a robust strategic sealift capability to rapidly concentrate and sustain forces, and to enable joint and/or combined campaigns. This capability relies on the maintenance of a strong U.S. commercial maritime transportation industry and its critical intermodal assets.

Maritime Security. The creation and maintenance of security at sea is essential to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities. Countering these irregular and transnational threats protects our homeland, enhances global stability, and secures freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations. Our maritime forces enforce domestic and international law at sea through established protocols such as the *Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan* (MOTR). We also join navies and coast guards around the world to police the global commons and suppress common threats.

At all echelons of command, we must enhance our ability to CONDUCT INTEGRATED PLANNING, EXECUTION, *and* ASSESSMENT.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. Building on relationships forged in times of calm, we will continue to mitigate human suffering as the vanguard of interagency and multinational efforts, both in a deliberate, proactive fashion and in response to crises. Human suffering moves us to act, and the expeditionary character of maritime forces uniquely positions them to provide assistance. Our ability to conduct rapid and sustained non-combatant evacuation operations is critical to relieving the plight of our citizens and others when their safety is in jeopardy.

Implementation Priorities

Implementation of this strategy will require that the Sea Services demonstrate flexibility, adaptability and unity of effort in evolving to meet the enduring and emerging challenges and opportunities ahead. Specific initiatives in support of this strategy must be vetted and tested over

time through experimentation, wargaming, and continued operational experience, with periodic oversight and unified guidance provided by the senior leaders of the Sea Services. While many initiatives must come to fruition to enable this strategy, three areas will receive priority attention:

Improve Integration and Interoperability. The combatant commanders' increased demand for mission-tailored force packages requires a more integrated approach to how maritime forces are employed.

Marines will continue to be employed as air-ground task forces operating from amphibious ships to conduct a variety of missions, such as power projection, but they will also be employed as detachments aboard a wider variety of ships and cutters for maritime security missions. Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen, teamed in various combinations of security forces, mobile training teams, construction battalions, health services, law enforcement, and civil affairs units to conduct security cooperation and humanitarian assistance missions, illustrate adaptive force packaging.

Homeland defense is the most obvious example of the requirement for greater integration. It is not sufficient to speak of homeland defense in terms of splitting the responsibilities and authorities between the Navy and the Coast Guard along some undefined geographic boundary. Rather, the Sea Services must—and will—work as one wherever they operate in order to defend the United States. Consistent with the *National Fleet Policy,* Coast Guard forces must be able to operate as part of a joint task force thousands of miles from our shores, and naval forces must be able to respond to operational tasking close to home when necessary to secure our Nation and support civil authorities. Integration and interoperability are key to success in these activities, particularly where diverse forces of varying capability and mission must work together seamlessly in support of defense, security, and humanitarian operations.

Expanded cooperation with the maritime forces of other nations requires more interoperability with multinational partners possessing varying levels of technology. The *Global Maritime Partnership* initiative will serve as a catalyst for increased international interoperability in support of cooperative maritime security.

Achieving the requisite level of integration and interoperability will demand a high degree of coordination among service headquarters staffs to fulfill their responsibilities of providing, training, and equipping forces. Furthermore, Navy and Marine Corps component commanders and Coast Guard functional commanders will play a central role in determining how maritime forces are organized, deployed, and employed. This role involves identification of combatant commander requirements and articulation of how their respective service capabilities can be integrated in innovative ways to meet those requirements. Close coordination among, if not outright integration of, maritime components may be required to do this effectively. At all echelons of command, we must enhance our ability to conduct integrated planning, execution, and assessment.

Enhance Awareness. To be effective, there must be a significantly increased commitment to advance *maritime domain awareness* (MDA) and expand *intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance* (ISR) capability and capacity. New partnerships with the world's maritime commercial interests and the maritime forces of participating nations will reduce the dangerous anonymity of sea borne transport of people and cargoes. Great strides have already been taken in that direction, and the *National Strategy for Maritime Security* has mandated an even higher level of interagency cooperation in pursuit of effective MDA. Maritime forces will contribute to enhance information sharing, underpinning and energizing our capability to neutralize threats to our Nation as far from our shores as possible.

Critical to realizing the benefits of increased awareness is our ability to protect information from compromise through robust information

assurance measures. Such measures will increase international partner confidence that information provided will be shared only with those entities for which it is intended.

Adversaries are unlikely to attempt conventional force-on-force conflict and, to the extent that maritime forces could be openly challenged, their plans will almost certainly rely on asymmetric attack and surprise, achieved through stealth, deception, or ambiguity. Our ISR capabilities must include innovative ways to penetrate the designs of adversaries, and discern their capabilities and vulnerabilities while supporting the full range of military operations. We must remove the possibility of an adversary gaining the initiative over forward-deployed forces and ensure we provide decision makers with the information they need to deter aggression and consider escalatory measures in advance of such gambits.

Prepare Our People. Given the distributed nature of the forces executing this strategy, we must properly prepare Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen for the challenges and opportunities ahead. We are creating a dispersed force under decentralized authority in a world of rapid information exchange. Maritime forces will normally operate in a less concentrated manner than they do today, and junior leaders will be entrusted with a higher level of responsibility and authority for carrying out important aspects of strategically important missions. Junior personnel will be required to interact with a far greater variety of U.S. and multinational partners and indigenous populations than their predecessors. Professional development and unit training must be refined accordingly. Operations as an integrated team require improved mutual understanding of respective service or agency capabilities and cultures, which can be achieved through expanded interagency teaming of students and instructors throughout training, education, and staff assignments.

As it has always been, THESE CRITICAL TASKS WILL BE CARRIED OUT BY OUR PEOPLE— *the key to success in any military strategy.*

Similarly, if we are to successfully partner with the international community, we must improve regional and cultural expertise through expanded training, education, and exchange initiatives.

Significantly, this strategy requires new ways of thinking—about both empowering individual commanders and understanding the net effects of dispersed operations. Such operations require a broadly shared responsibility among: the on-scene commander responsible for ensuring

actions are in accordance with the commander's intent; the higher commander responsible for providing intent and guidance to subordinates; the parent service of dispersed forces responsible for ensuring that units are trained, equipped, and culturally prepared for the missions they will undertake; and, finally, the regional commanders responsible for determining appropriate force levels and readiness postures.

Conclusion

This strategy is derived from a thorough assessment of the Nation's security requirements. It does not presume conflict but instead acknowledges the historical fact that peace does not preserve itself. Looking across the wide maritime domain, it calls for a broad portfolio of core capabilities to support our vital interests, realized by well-trained, highly motivated and ably-led people.

The strategy focuses on *opportunities*—not threats; on *optimism*—not fear; and on *confidence*—not doubt. It recognizes the challenges imposed by the uncertain conditions in a time of rapid change and makes the case for the necessity of U.S. seapower in the 21st Century.

As a declaratory strategy, this document challenges the Sea Services to evolve an expanded range of integrated capabilities to achieve enduring national strategic objectives. Further experimentation, operational experience, and analysis are necessary, as is sea service commitment to building upon the ideas that this document puts forward. However, the Sea Services cannot do this alone. The diverse elements of the greater maritime community must be inspired and supported as they invest to secure peace and prosperity across the maritime domain.

The Sea Services commit to continuing the process of collaborative strategy implementation in the years ahead. United States seapower is a force for good, protecting this Nation's vital interests even as it joins with others to promote security and prosperity across the globe.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

DECEMBER 13, 2007

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. In what ways do you imagine NetCentric warfare playing a role both in the future of Naval warfare and also in coordinating missions and operations across the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The *Department of the Navy (DON) Information Management & Information Technology (IM/IT) Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2008-2009,* is our roadmap to achieve Net-Centric Warfare (NCW) and Joint transformation by providing robust information sharing and collaboration capabilities across the Naval/Joint force. The objective of our Net-Centric Warfare programs is to enable us to integrate sensors, command/control systems, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed, and sustainable combat force. That will provide a seamless, interoperable environment to enhance the sharing of time-critical information. Fulfilling these objectives will enable our forces; Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard to make better decisions and employ systems faster. Decision superiority is imperative to realizing the capabilities called out in our *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.*

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. FORBES. How does the threat to our ships posed by the rapidly expanding Chinese diesel submarines and new nuclear submarines affect the Maritime Strategy? It seems logical that the most direct threat to a sea-base is the threat posed by hostile submarines, what are you doing to expand anti-submarine warfare capability?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Advanced diesel submarines are proliferating globally, not only in China. Sea control and power projection are two of the six capabilities specified in our Maritime Strategy. Advanced diesel and nuclear submarines challenge those capabilities regardless of who possesses them.

China's increasingly modern submarine force is optimized for anti-surface warfare, blockade operations, mining, and reconnaissance. The Maritime Strategy addresses these challenges posed by advanced diesel-electric and nuclear submarines. To ensure the core competency of sea control, our Navy continues to develop improved platform and distributed sensor systems that provide capability against future advanced anti-access threats. Improvements in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) readiness, based on improvements in tactics, training and technologies, provide a defense in depth that mitigates the threat posed by advanced submarines.

Research & Development in distributed and networked sensors such as Reliable Acoustic Path-Vertical Line Array (RAP–VLA) and Deep Water Active Distributed System (DWADS) will improve wide area search. Developments in platform sensors such as surface ship sonar (SQQ–89A(V)15) and P–3/P–8 deployed Advanced Extended Echo Ranging improve our ability to hold threat submarines at risk and defend the sea base. Open architecture will provide improved capabilities for submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and distributed systems.

We are pursuing key technologies such as Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD) and Aircraft Carrier Periscope Detection Radar (CVN PDR) to defend our forces against increasingly capable threats.

Investment continues in the High Altitude ASW Weapon Concept (HAAWC) and improvements in heavy and lightweight torpedoes to increase weapons effectiveness.

We continue to respond responsibly to challenges which restrict our ability to train our ASW forces in a realistic manner.

Mr. FORBES. China recently denied the USS *Kitty Hawk* porting in Hong Kong over the Thanksgiving Holiday. Does that action figure into future planning as to which locations our ship captains can have confidence they will be welcomed at? What other possible locations in that area could a ship the size of an aircraft carrier dock, if not in Hong Kong?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The port visit planning process takes into consideration many factors. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) initial refusal, but subsequent granting, of permission for the *KITTY HAWK* Carrier Strike Group to enter the Port of Hong Kong will be included in that calculus. The United States Navy will con-

tinue to request Hong Kong and mainland PRC port visits in support of PACOM's Theater Security Cooperation efforts. In fact, USS *BLUE RIDGE* completed a four-day port visit in Hong Kong this month. I anticipate Hong Kong port visits will continue at the rate of approximately 35 ship visits per year, which is consistent with the number of visits over the last several years.

Locations in Southeast Asia that have hosted carrier port visits include:

- Hong Kong (anchorage only)
- Changi, Singapore (pierside berth available)
- Pattaya Beach, Thailand (anchorage only)
- Phuket, Thailand (anchorage only)
- Port Kelang, Malaysia (anchorage only)

Another candidate location is:

- Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia (anchorage only)

Mr. FORBES. Do you need top line relief for your acquisition programs? If so, how much do you need? In other words, Admiral Roughead, you've mentioned 313 as the absolute floor for the number of ships—what is a "mid-level" number of ships, and what would be the ceiling figure? How do the cost overruns of LCS create challenges to achieving the 313 ship Navy?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Navy continues to analyze operational requirements, ship designs and costs, acquisition plans and tools, and industrial base capacity to further improve our shipbuilding plans. This analysis will underpin any potential budgetary strategies. The near-term shipbuilding plans have remained relatively stable. A larger force may reduce risks inherent in the 313 ship minimum force structure outlined in *The Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009.* However, this plan represents an acceptable balance between capability, affordability, and the need to sustain the industrial base. Full funding is supported in the FY2009 President's Budget and in the Future Years Defense Plan through 2013.

Full funding and support of this plan is crucial if the Navy is to maintain the minimum essential battleforce necessary to meet the maritime needs of the nation.

The 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) remain an integral part of current planned force. The Littoral Combat Ship procurement profile was adjusted based on a program assessment following significant LCS–1 and LCS–2 cost increases. Although this assessment resulted in the removal of 13 ships from the FY 2008 President's Budget FYDP, the plan continues procurement to reach the objective of 55 ships by FY 2023. I am committed to continue working with the Congress on this important program which is needed to fill existing warfighting capability gaps.

Mr. FORBES. Will the new maritime strategy change the Navy's current requirements for 48 Fast Attack submarines? How will you fulfill submarine requirements in the years when there will be fewer than 48 ships?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The new Maritime Strategy will not change the Navy's current requirement for 48 fast attack submarines (SSNs). The Maritime Strategy emphasizes prevention of war, containment of conflict, and security of the seas, and submarines will be integral to the Navy's core capabilities of forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security.

The requirement for 48 fast attack submarines is indexed to the Department of Defense threat assessments for 2020, which include anticipated force levels of potential threats. The shipbuilding plan detailed in Navy's *Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009* is the best balance of anticipated resources to force structure requirements. The Navy is pursuing a 3-part risk mitigation strategy consisting of:

- a reduction in the construction time of *VIRGINIA*-class submarines from 72 to 60 months,
- a service life extension for 16 SSNs, ranging from 3 to 24 months in length, and
- an extension in the length of selected SSN deployments from six to seven months.

This strategy will reduce the impact of the projected dip in submarine force structure in the 2020-2033 timeframe and provide for all current and projected Combatant Commander critical forward presence requirements.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DRAKE

Mrs. DRAKE. Admiral Roughead, in January of 2006, the Navy stood up Navy Expeditionary Combat Command with the understanding that the new post-9/11 reality that faces our military necessitates a Navy that can extend its missions of force projection and maintaining the safety and security of the sea lanes beyond the littorals and into the many inland waterways that terrorists use to evade U.S. forces. Admiral, are you committed to the brown-water mission of the U.S. Navy?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes. Beginning in 2006 the Navy began to re-constitute a "brown water" capability—a capability in the Navy that had, outside the Naval Special Warfare community, been dormant since the early 1970's. Three Riverine Squadrons have been established under the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command with the responsibility to conduct and support offensive and defensive operations on inland waterways They have been organized, trained, and equipped. Two of the three Riverine Squadrons have deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); the third Squadron is scheduled to deploy in the spring of 2008. In addition to responsibilities in support of OIF, elements of each Riverine Squadron can support future Geographic Combatant Commander objectives in "brown water" environments, to include training host nations who request our assistance with inland waterway security. The reconstitution of our Riverine capability, in a short period of time, is a success.

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