AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–144]

THE CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. GROUND FORCES

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD
APRIL 9, 2008

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
44-098 WASHINGTON : 2009

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, *Chairman*

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MARK UDALL, Colorado
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
KATHY CASTOR, Florida

DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
HOWARD P. "BUCK" McKEON, California
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JEFF MILLER, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
TOM COLE, Oklahoma
ROB BISHOP, Utah
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia

ERIN C. CONATON, *Staff Director*
MICHAEL CASEY, *Professional Staff Member*
STEPHANIE SANOK, *Professional Staff Member*
CATERINA DUTTO, *Staff Assistant*

CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2008

	Page
HEARING:	
Wednesday, April 9, 2008, The Current Status of U.S. Ground Forces	1
APPENDIX:	
Wednesday, April 9, 2008	51

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2008

THE CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. GROUND FORCES

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services	2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services	1

WITNESSES

Cody, Gen. Richard A., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army	4
Magnus, Gen. Robert, USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps	6

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:	
Cody, Gen. Richard A.	55
Magnus, Gen. Robert	66
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:	
[There were no Documents submitted.]	
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:	
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]	
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:	
Mr. Sestak	109
Ms. Tsongas	110

THE CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. GROUND FORCES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 9, 2008.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:25 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, as I announced at the earlier hearing today, for this hearing we will depart from our usual order of questioning to ensure that everyone has the opportunity to participate. And we will start by questioning with members who were here for this morning's hearing, but did not get to ask a question, that were present at the gavel for this hearing. We will then proceed in the usual order. If you have any questions, please address them to the staff.

House Armed Services Committee will now meet in open session to discuss the state of ground forces' readiness.

We are honored to have with us today two exceptional military leaders: General Richard Cody, Vice Chief of Staff for the United States Army, and General Robert Magnus, Assistant Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.

And, gentlemen, we welcome you and thank you for your service.

We convene this hearing shortly after an important hearing this morning with General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. And from my perspective we cannot consider the way ahead in Iraq without careful examination of the state of readiness of our military and its ability to deter or fight an unexpected conflict.

We have had 12 military contingencies in the last 31 years, some of them major, most of them unexpected. We must have a trained and properly equipped force ready to handle whatever comes, but my strong concern is that our readiness shortfalls and the limitations on our ability to deploy trained and ready ground forces have reached a point where these services would have a very steep uphill climb with increased casualties to respond effectively to an emergency contingency.

And I have to agree with you, General Cody, in what you said in testimony last week. I have never seen our lack of strategic depth be where it is today, and this should concern all Americans.

We have the finest military in the world, no doubt about it, and they have become masters in the counterinsurgency fight. But it

takes time to retrain our forces so they can deal with our types of conflict, and our forces just don't have the time.

I understand the Army intends to reduce deployments from 15 to 12 months. This is an improvement, and, of course, I applaud it, but it only resets us to where we were last winter. At this pace, we will still wear out our troops, and it does not leave enough time for the training needed to ensure they can respond to any conflict we might face.

I might, at this point, say I am very sensitive about this because I had a roommate in law school who was caught in the Pusan Perimeter in 1950, and hearing him tell about that, we do not want to be in that state of readiness as we were, sadly, at that moment.

The Army and Marine Corps have been forced to move equipment from nondeployed units and preposition stocks to support combat requirements. Our equipment is focused on the units next to deploy to Iraq and the ones in theater, leaving gaps for training and for those who should be our strategic reserve.

This also extends to the National Guard, which has an average of 61 percent of the equipment needed to be ready for disasters or attacks on the homeland.

General Magnus, your testimony says that the net effect of these trends is that our ability is very limited to rapidly provide ready forces to conduct other small- or large-scale operations.

And despite all that this Congress and the services have done to provide funding to reset our force, our readiness, as General Cody aptly put it, it is being consumed as fast as we can build it.

So where do we go from here?

Gentlemen, there is no ulterior motive here. We need to hear where things stand with our ground forces and what must be done to reduce the strategic risk that we are facing. This committee is committed to doing all we can to help you restore the readiness of our ground forces. We owe it to all those serving with incredible distinction, as well as to their families and to the American people, whom they defend. We look forward, gentlemen, to your testimony.

My friend, my Ranking Member Mr. Hunter.

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for holding this hearing. I think very timely hearing.

And, gentlemen—General Magnus, General Cody—thanks for being with us today and for your great service.

And, General Cody, I understand this may be one of the last hearings you are going to be attending, since your retirement is imminent. And let me just say that I think you have performed a great service for this country. We have crossed swords a lot over the last several years and had a lot of common ground together, but I think that anybody who evaluates your great military career has got to come to the conclusion that you put a tremendous intellect and a great heart into everything that you do.

And, personally, I think it is a mistake for us not to get a few more miles out of you before we take the saddle off. You are a great asset to this country, and, very personally, I would like to see you

continue to perform in a leadership role for this country. It takes a lot of time to develop that corporate insight and capability and experience that is important in times of war. This is a time of war. So my opinion is that we need to ride you for a couple more miles here, General. Thanks for your great service to this country.

Our committee members—and especially those of the Readiness Subcommittee—are actively engaged in the issues that impact the readiness of our forces in light of the operations right now in Iraq and Afghanistan. So we face this big challenge to rebuild and reset and modernize and to transform and at the same time make our forces bigger all the time we are engaged in the war.

So we started this endeavor with about a $56 billion shortfall in equipment, and, in addition, the Army's transformation initiative—the necessary transition from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve—and the Army and Marine Corps grow-the-force efforts have all increased a lot of the requirements.

In effect, these changes have shifted the readiness goalpost further down the field. And let me go over a few of those.

In 2001 we had a requirement for 4,722 medium tactical vehicles, and we only had 290 of them on hand. Today that requirement has grown to 22,000, and we have got over 9,200 fielded to our Army Guard units. In other words, we have gone from 290 to more than 10 times that much.

In 2001 they had a requirement for 69,000 tactical radios, and we had 60 percent of that requirement on hand. Today we have got over 82,300. That means we have got about 40,000 more than we had before, and yet the readiness sheets show that we now have increased the requirement to 81,000. So we are right at what we have to produce to have the right number, but we are substantially over what we had in the past.

In 2001 they had a requirement for over 200,000 night-vision goggles, and we had 53,000. So we had about 25 percent of the requirement. Today we have got over twice the number produced—that is, we have 112,000 night-vision goggles—but we moved the requirement up, and we now have filled 77 percent of the requirement.

So I think it is important to be clear that a lot of this progress is a result of years of supplemental funding that is in part due to the fact that the base budget was not increased to fill in these shortages. And folks at home need to know that. They need to know that what we refer to as the "global war on terror supplemental" is providing funding for things like trucks, radios, body armor and night-vision goggles that we did not have but that we had a requirement for prior to September 11, 2001. And I think it is important for folks to understand, in many areas of equipment, we have vastly more equipment today than we had in 2001, even though our papers and our documents still show a shortage.

The readiness of our forces is critical, and there is certainly a lot of work to be done. However, I believe we are remiss in talking about military readiness without addressing the role that we—the Congress—have in assuring the money is provided to achieve that readiness.

In January 2007 the Administration submitted the 2008 global war on terror (GWOT) supplemental request alongside the fiscal

year 2008 base budget. I would like to read you a brief statement from that request: "The cumulative effect of 5 years of operations is creating strain on both personnel and equipment. This request provides funding for special pays and benefits for personnel to sustain the all-volunteer force, and it provides funding to maintain, repair or replace equipment lost, worn out or stressed by use."

During his testimony before this committee on February 6, Secretary of Defense Gates stressed that funding in the 2008 supplemental request was directly related to the readiness of the force. He stated: We have about $46 billion in the 2008 supplemental for reconstituting the force. We received about $13 billion-plus of that in the bridge. So that will help us replace equipment and repair equipment that is associated here.

Secretary Gates continued: So I think there are a number of things that are in the budget that put us on the path to improve readiness, but it is clear that our readiness is focused—at least in the Army—on fighting the wars that we are in in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The forces that are being sent there are fully trained and are ready when they go.

That said, I would like to ask all of my colleagues concerned with military readiness a very simple question: Why is the fiscal year 2008 supplemental request still sitting on the shelves collecting dust when it can be used to improve the readiness of our troops?

Over the last two days, I have watched my colleagues across the aisle chastise the government of Iraq for not passing critical legislation when we can't even pass a supplemental spending bill during a time of war. We have readiness issues, and we are all concerned about the impact on readiness on our national security.

However, our readiness issues are not to be blamed solely on the war in Iraq. It is time we take responsibility for our readiness shortfalls and fund the requirements rather than use readiness problems that existed well before we set foot in Iraq as a reason to justify abandoning that mission.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing today, and I look forward to the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

General Cody.

STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD A. CODY, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General CODY. Good afternoon, Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter, distinguished members of the committee.

I am honored to represent the——

The CHAIRMAN. Would you get a little closer to the microphone, please.

General CODY. Roger.

I am honored to represent 1.1 million soldiers, nearly 600,000 of whom are serving on active duty today and over 250,000 of whom are deployed worldwide, 176,000 of those in the combat zone, as I testify on issues that are critical to the readiness of the United States Army.

I have submitted a detailed written statement for the record, but I would like to briefly emphasize a few points here today.

One of the qualities that we cherish as a values-based and capabilities-based Army is the ability to engage in frank, candid and professional assessments of our abilities and our levels of preparedness. With this quality comes the duty to provide not only an honest assessment of our strengths and weaknesses but also recommendations to remedy those areas that we believe need improvement. We must be self-critical if we are to ensure that our soldiers are always more than ready to meet the challenges of an adaptive, patient, prolific and very dangerous enemy.

It has been almost nine years since I sat before this committee as the returning deputy commanding general Task Force Hawk to testify on the state of Army readiness. At that time, I told the committee that we were starting to feel the results of declining resources and that, while the armed forces budgets and authorizations continued to shrink, our mission set in the Army has steadily expanded. When asked directly, I stated that I believed we were a 10-division Army attempting to execute a 14-division mission. I stand by that statement.

Just two years later, 9/11 would bring terrorism to our shores, and our necessary military response would accelerate us down a path toward decreased strategic readiness that we now see today.

We can no longer allow hope to trump what history and experience have taught us. When we size and resource our force for the stable world we all hope for and not for the full-spectrum dangers before us, it is the American soldier who ultimately pays the price.

History has once again given us an opportunity to get this right. If we take the long-term view, if we fully appreciate and act on the reality that our investments in the Army of tomorrow and the readiness of our current force are dependent upon each other and are inextricably linked, then we can change the course.

I believe that the Army leadership with the help of the President, the Department of Defense and Congress has taken the long-term view and maximized the momentum of a force in motion that is at war to transform this Army. We have taken this window of opportunity, the increased resources and national attention to invest in our soldiers and their families, to grow the Army, reset and modernize our equipment, rebalance and modulize our formations, change our doctrine and improve our care of the force across the total force.

Because of this, we are faced with a dichotomy of readiness. We are the most battle-hardened, best-equipped, best-led, and best-trained force for the counterinsurgency fight that we now face. But we are also unprepared for the full-spectrum fight and lack the strategic depth that has been our traditional fallback for the uncertainties of this world. We are a stress force but not a hollow force. We are a better force, but our focus has been narrowed.

Overall, I believe that the strength of our soldiers and their families are truly what allow me to say unequivocally this Army is not broken. We have asked our soldiers to sprint, and they did. We have asked them to run a marathon, and they have. That marathon has become an enduring relay, and our soldiers continue to run and at the double time.

Does this exhaust the body and mind of those in the race and those who are ever present on the sidelines cheering them on? Yes.

Has it broken the will of the soldier? No. Our soldiers do not quit. They stand on a tradition of victory for this country and don't just want to run the race. They want to win it.

We cannot take their resiliency for granted. It will require more than the courage and valor of our soldiers to ensure our Army can continue to fight and win the Nation's war in an era of persistent conflict. We must invest in the future to ensure our soldiers always have technical and tactical overmatch against any enemy. We need an open and honest discussion on the size of our force versus the demands of a contemporary operating environment that we now face.

We must continue the transformation of the Reserve component to an operational force, and, above all, we must retain the quality all-volunteer Army that we now have. For in the end, the recruitment and retention of a highly motivated and capable all-volunteer force is the center of gravity for this Nation and all that we stand for.

To do this, we need full and timely funding that takes the long-term view of readiness. We must place a higher value in this country on what it means to serve and have a greater appreciation for those who have heard that call to duty and, knowing the dangers, are brave enough to answer it. And we will need the continued support of the American people, whose safety and security are preserved by those courageous few.

The Congress has provided tremendous support to our Army these past six years, and we are grateful for it. With the continued support from the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress, the Army will restore itself to balance and build the readiness necessary in an era of persistent conflict and continue to remain the strength of this Nation.

I thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Cody can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you.

General Magnus.

STATEMENT OF GEN. ROBERT MAGNUS, USMC, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General MAGNUS. Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter, distinguished members of the committee.

Thank you for this opportunity to report to you today on the readiness of your Marine Corps. On behalf of our over 189,000 active component and nearly 40,000 members of the selected Marine Corps Reserve, our sailors and their families, I would like to extend my appreciation for the sustained support that the Congress provides your Marine Corps.

Your Marines are fully engaged in long war today, with over 37,000 Marines deployed from Iraq to Afghanistan, the Horn to West Africa, from Korea to the Philippines and here in our homeland hemisphere. Your Marines and sailors are performing magnificently under challenging and often dangerous conditions. I want to assure you that our warriors in combat are our number-one priority. They are well trained, well led and equipped for their assigned missions.

Although we are currently meeting our operational requirements with ready mission-effective forces, the net effects of sustained combat and a high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) are taking a toll on our Marines, their families, our equipment and full-spectrum training readiness.

Contributing to the stress on our force is the short dwell time between deployments and our intense focus on counterinsurgency operations. The short dwell time at home does not allow our units the time to train to the full spectrum of missions needed to be ready for other contingencies. This most directly affects your Marines' proficiency and core competencies, such as, combined arms and amphibious operations.

To ensure our forward-deployed forces maintain high readiness, we have been required to source personnel and equipment from nondeployed units and prepositioning programs. This cross-leveling of personnel and equipment has reduced nondeployed units' ability to train for other contingency operations.

Additionally, we are taking actions to correct the effects of stress on the force.

First, to sustain the demands of the long war, the Marine Corps is growing its active component and strength to 202,000 Marines. This increase will provide the combatant commanders with ready Marines for the current counterinsurgency mission.

It will also improve our active component deployment-to-dwell ratio to one-to-two, reducing stress on Marines and their families and ensuring that Marines have the necessary time for full-spectrum training. The increased active in-strength will create three balanced Marine expeditionary forces and reduce the need to mobilize our Reserve forces, improving their dwell ratio to one-to-five.

Second, we are resetting our forces to ensure our equipment remains ready for tomorrow's missions. For over five years, intense combat operations have resulted in the heavy use and loss of our ground and aviation equipment. Operational demands have also increased our equipment maintenance and replacement costs far beyond what was planned in our baseline budgets.

With the Congress's help over the past three years, we have begun to make progress in meeting reset requirements. To date the Congress has provided $10.9 billion in supplemental funding toward our estimated total reset requirement of $15.6 billion. We look forward to continuing to reset our forces with the remaining fiscal year 2008 GWOT request.

Third, to ensure that your Marine Corps will remain ready for future challenges, we will continue to modernize our warfighting equipment, including new ships and aircraft, and our infrastructure.

I am proud to report that your support has helped ensure the continuing success of Marines and sailors. The morale and resiliency of your Marines has never been higher. They volunteered to serve their Nation at war, have been sent to do that mission and know that they are succeeding despite very demanding conditions and a ruthless enemy.

We will continue to keep our primary focus on supporting Marines and sailors in combat and taking care of their families at home. We will continue to reset and to modernize your Marine

Corps, ensuring that it remains ready today, ready tomorrow and ready for the uncertain challenges of the future.

Congress's support has enabled us to succeed. That continuing support will ensure that we will always, as Congress has directed, be the most ready when the Nation is least ready.

I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Magnus can be found in the Appendix on page 66.]

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much.

We will begin where we left off, and I have on the list now Mr. Cooper, Mr. Miller, Mr. Marshall, Mr. Kline—in that order—to begin on the five-minute rule.

Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Generals, our Nation is thankful for your service.

First question, since the ground forces have borne the largest share of the fight, do you think they should get a larger share of the base budget of the Pentagon than the Navy or the Air Force? That share, as you know, has held constant now for some 30 or 40 years.

General CODY. I think, Congressman, having been in the building now for six years—I think we ought to throw out the pie charts or percentages for services. This Nation deserves the best Air Force, the best Navy, the best Marines, the best Army and the best Coast Guards we can have. This is not about percentages of what service gets what share. It is about the wants and needs of this country to be defended by our services.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, General, but the Army has gotten 28 percent plus or minus 2 percent over 40 years, even though you have borne—what?—90-plus percent of the casualties. It is an amazing thing to me that we don't adjust these budgets to meet the needs of our troops.

General CODY. I have testified before that this is not about, again, taking money from our other teammates because we will always go to war as a joint force. The fact that our soldiers have not been strafed by enemy aircraft for over 50 years is because we have the best Air Force. The fact that we are able to unload our equipment in ports safely is because we have the best Navy. And the Marines and Army fight as a joint force.

The real issue is what percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) is the Department of Defense (DOD) going to get for a top line? If you take a look at the amounts of dollars it has taken us to put in supplementals—as Congressman Hunter so stated—to put in supplementals to buy back—what the former Chief of Staff of the Army Pete Schumacher so well said—"holes in the yard" for the contemporary operating environment we are in, it is about increasing the top line for DOD so we can do all these things.

We can't look at the current fight and modernization of all the other services and play them off each other. We have to take a holistic view of the defense of this Nation.

Mr. COOPER. Let me try again.

After the Pentagon completes its roles and missions review, do you think that the Army and the Marines will or should look any different than they do today?

General CODY. As you know, we came out of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2005 and we started seeing a top-line increase for the Army. We will have another QDR in fiscal year 2010. And, again, it gets back to we need to fund what the Nation needs and wants, and the wants and needs need to be equal.

Mr. COOPER. If you look at our troops today in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have performed brilliantly, but many of these troops were not really trained for the job they are executing on the ground. We have Navy and Air Force personnel on the ground doing what would normally be expected to be Army-Marine work. We have other anomalies: artillerymen training folks who will never see any artillery.

Would our troops be under less stress if they had been better trained for the mission against the insurgents or special groups—whatever we are calling them today?

General CODY. First off, let me make sure that I am clear on this.

We had to in 2004 and 2005 retrain artillery battalions to conduct security convoy operations. We had to take them out of their traditional roles as artillerymen. We have had to do that with other parts of our forces because we entered this war with an Army that was end strength of 482,000 on the active side, 350,000 on the National Guard and about 198,000 in the United States Army Reserve (USAR). That was a result of 10 years of downsizing after the wall came down in 1989 and after the Gulf War.

And so we did not have enough depth across the Army—total Army—to meet the demands of a 360-degree battle fight that we were in. But we did not send those artillerymen in untrained. We retrained them for that mission.

Mr. COOPER. But we have had four or five years now to train folks properly for the task at hand, and we are still using Air Force and Navy personnel on the ground.

General CODY. We are. Those are for the military-training teams, as well as for other security force. Again, it is because of the stress that we have had on the total force.

But I want to make sure I am clear. We don't send anybody down range unless we train them for that mission. It may not be the mission of the unit they came from.

But to your point, that is what we mean by when we say we are out of balance. We should have artillerymen today preparing for a different fight, in many cases, than doing convoy security. And that is one of the reasons why growing the Army and the active force by 65,000 and in the National Guard Reserve by 9,500, we believe by 2011 we will have the right mix of capabilities across combat, combat support and combat service support so that we don't have to send artillerymen in to do an infantry mission.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, General.

My time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General, before I call Mr. Miller, were you around when General Meyer was the Army chief of staff?

General CODY. Yes, sir, I was.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall he made the comment to us in this Congress, in this room, about the United States Army being a hollow Army?

General CODY. Yes, sir, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. My recollection is that was 1983. Would you compare today's Army to the hollow Army of 1983, General?

General CODY. No, sir, I wouldn't. Chairman, I will——

The CHAIRMAN. Do your best to, please, compare them.

General CODY. Compare them. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General CODY. I was in that Army. I was a company commander in the 24th Infantry Division. What made that Army hollow then was the fact that we didn't have the right training base. We were about 10 years into the all-volunteer force. Our soldiers were coming out of the training base 65 percent trained on their skills.

At the same time that was happening, we did not have any investments, as you know, coming after Desert One, the investments in some of what we now call the "big five." So we had older tanks, older Cobra gunships, older UH–1 helicopters, and we did not have the OPTEMPO dollars to train the total force for the mission set at hand. At the same time that was going on, I believe that we were completely out of balance in terms of the types of forces we had. But I have talked to General Meyer, the former chief of staff, and I remember quite vividly when he made that statement, and I think he was right.

What is different today is we have made some very tough decisions when we got into this fight. We made decisions like we are going to fully train our troops in basic and increase the training based upon the mission sets we see. So we changed the way we trained.

We made the tough decision to—unlike Vietnam—keep the commanders with the troops the entire deployment cycle. So a commander coming in taking over a unit at Fort Bragg, trains them up as a unit, builds trust soldier to soldier, leader to led, and then deploys, and he doesn't come out of command during that deployment. He stays with them and brings them home. And I think, even though the personnel accounts—that caused all kinds of problems because we had commanders with 36 months or 40 months of command time when usually it was only 24 months—we believe that kept this Army together in terms of the investment in leadership.

The other reason why I say that we are not hollow at this time is because we have moved to the modular force design, and as Congressman Hunter talked about, that increased the numbers of equipment that we had and the density of those levels so that we didn't have a platoon, like Jessica Lynch's platoon, that only had 1 radio in that 10-vehicle convoy and 1 crew-served weapon.

And so with the help of Congress, we have been able to keep this Army not being hollow, but we have got to continue to invest in it and continue to grow it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to both Generals and to the men and women that you represent.

General Cody, if I can, in following up on some of the training issues, involuntary call-ups of individual ready reservists. Many of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers really haven't conducted real Army training for many, many years. And I have got a case—it may be a simple one at that—where there has been an army captain that was recalled right before Christmas, he hadn't fired a weapon in five years. After a few months of training here in the States, he was placed on a military-training team, sent to Afghanistan to lead combat patrols with the Afghan army.

My concern is are we giving the Individual Ready Reserves ample training before they are sent to the field, or is this an isolated case?

General CODY. Well, thanks for that question, Congressman, because it allows me to answer it in a little bit different way.

When people talk about stress of the Army and people start talking about numbers, everybody is looking at brigade combat teams. Brigade combat teams is just one part of the story. We have well over 4,000 soldiers involved in military-training teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. We have 86 security company missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. So it is not just brigade combat teams when you start looking at rotations and stress on the force.

On the Individual Reserve soldiers that we call back to active duty, one, we try to call back those who have been off active duty for a short period of time. But we bring them all—in the case of the military-training teams, we bring them all to Fort Riley, Kansas. We have a very robust training environment there to train them as a team and make sure that they are certified for the rigors of the mission they are going to.

Mr. MILLER. Some are saying that our Army is broken due to the high OPTEMPO and the deployments to Iraq. However, the reenlistments are currently at high levels, especially those that are taking place within the combat zone.

Would you give us some feedback, sir, on what you are hearing from your soldiers on the ground in Iraq as to the reasons that they are reenlisting in such high numbers?

General CODY. One of the things, Congressman, that has made me most proud of this generation is the fact that they have great resiliency. But we should not take it for granted.

I just came back from Iraq and Afghanistan. I reenlisted in 1 formation over 240 soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division, Rock of the Marne. They still had time left in country. They don't start coming home until June.

I talked to many of those soldiers and asked them why they reenlist, and I will paraphrase by saying they know they are making a difference, they don't want to leave their buddies, they are committed to the Army and they enjoy what they are doing.

At the same time, we are in uncharted waters. This is the first time we have taken this all-volunteer force to war this long. But, more importantly, this surge is not just about five brigade combat teams. When we surged, we also added three months more of combat time to every brigade and unit down range. And when we did that, we also surged every training base.

And so we are in uncharted waters here in terms of what the reenlistment rates are going to look like in the next two years. But we all should be grateful that these young men and women, after seeing what it is like to be in combat, in combat raise their right hand and say, "America, I will stay with this. I will defend you."

Mr. MILLER. General, one more question. It is regarding the 40 percent shortfall in information operation soldiers. It does concern me—and this committee, I am sure—that it is so crucial to winning the hearts and minds, encountering the propaganda that is being conducted by al Qaeda now. Can you talk a little bit about the shortfall in the short term, and what are we doing for the long term?

General CODY. In this setting, what I can tell you, Congressman, is this: We have talked to the National Security Agency (NSA) director, we have talked to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), as well as our own intelligence community. We are on a path with this 65K growth in the active force to grow more information operation soldiers and officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, both, for your service, and especially thank all of those that you represent here today.

General Cody, you talked in your written statement about the complex 21st century security environments that we are going to be facing in this era of persistent conflict. And I have talked an awful lot with noncoms and officers about this issue that they are quite concerned about. I know you are as well.

Whether it is counterinsurgencies or nation building or building partner capacity or any number of the other kinds of challenges that we are going to ask our soldiers to meet and our Marines to meet, the quality of the individual soldier noncom officer is terribly important to success, and yet at this point, at least as far as Army recruiting is concerned, the summary given to us by staff is that we are bringing in a larger number of recruits without high school diplomas, higher percentages from some of the lower mental categories, a lot of medical waivers, conduct waivers, and we are having a real problem with young noncommissioned officers (NCO)—mid-level NCO and officer retention.

And those I speak with about this issue—they bring it up with me—they are concerned that one of the long-term effects that this will have on the Army, on the Marine Corps is a force that is not as well prepared as it might have been to address these complex 21st century security environments.

And I wish you both would comment a little about that. I know you are concerned about it. There have been a number of different proposals for how to address it. When I talk to college kids, I often say, "This is the greatest thing you could be doing for your country, for your own selves as individuals, by getting involved in this. We need our best and brightest stepping up right now, and you won't do anything in your life that is as exceptional as this opportunity for you offers."

And if you could talk about that, I don't know whether it is money or it is—how do we address this problem, assuming that it is a problem?

General CODY. Thank you, Congressman, for that statement, and I agree with you wholeheartedly. And that is why I put it in my statement that we have to have a national conversation about what it means to serve.

On the quality issue, we established those quality marks—Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and all the services—back when the all-volunteer force started. I talked about 1983—I am going to give you a quick vignette, and I will go quickly so my sidekick here can answer.

Nineteen hundred eighty-three was a year where we had 60 percent or so high school grads that year that we recruited in the Army—about 84,000 that year—on an Army that was about 780,000. We had a high percentage of cap force, but, totally, if you looked at those marks and superimposed them on the quality marks of the citizen—now, this is not the soldier quality marks, this is when they come to us as citizens—and you superimpose it on the quality marks we have today, it is a little bit worse than 1983.

About 7 months ago I talked to our Command Sergeant Majors Academy—260 E–9s that are getting ready to take positions as command sergeant majors in our formation—and I said, "How many of you came in the Army in 1983–84?" Almost all their hands went up. I said, "Good. Now, how many of you were cat 3 Bravos and cat 4? Keep your hands up." A third of them.

And I told them then, I said, "When we talk about the quality of the force, let us not get hung up on the initial marks because my question to you one third that just raised your hand is when did you become category 1? When you graduated from the basic course? When you graduated from advanced individual training (AIT)? When you graduated from your first sergeants NCO academy?"

We take what America gives us and invest in them. Does that mean we are having to train harder? Yes. Does that mean we are taking 28-year-old soldiers who raise their right hand and say, "I have watched this war on TV, and I want to be a part of it"—oh, by the way, he owns up to the fact he has a felony conviction when he was 16 years old, and we will have a colonel look at it.

The one mark that we haven't talked about is courage and selfless service. And the fact that we had 80,000 in the active and 175,000 total last year join the United States Army, that right now is what I look at. This country has in the 17- to 24-year-olds—the population that General Magnus, myself and the rest of our recruiters go after—in that population today, 35 percent meet the minimum requirements by those standards mentally and physically to be in the military.

And so when people tell me you have a quality problem, I say, "America, we have got a problem with our youth, and we are going to have to deal with it."

General MAGNUS. Thank you, General Cody, for the remarks.

If I could please respond to the question for the Marine Corps, and I agree with General Cody's entire set of remarks prior to this.

Today we have 189,400 active component Marines. Only a year ago we had estimated, as we grew the force, that we would have 3,000 fewer Marines. In other words, we have estimated 186,500. America's young men and women are answering the call to the colors. The Marine Corps has not diminished its quality standards, and yet even with those high-quality standards, we have over 95 percent of our enlisted accessions are high school graduates, and we have exceeded our target by 3,000 enlisted Marines.

That is not only accession, but we are also turning the corner in improving our first and subsequent tour reenlistment rates to keep those experienced warriors who volunteered to serve and have served on for subsequent tours during a long war.

Additionally, we have 300 more officers than we projected a year ago. So not only are America's young men and women answering the call, they are answering the call to stay and serve longer.

Some of this is due to improved training. We have historically low attrition in our recruit training. We also have low losses during the first tour due to improved and focus on mental and physical health and in taking care of our Marines.

Today's Marine Corps is a far different Marine Corps than when General Cody and I were company-grade officers or, for that matter, is a far different Marine Corps than it was before 9/11. Your Marines are versatile, agile, and they have got the experience of combat to prove that they have expeditionary combined-arms capabilities appropriate to the missions they have today.

From Iraq to Afghanistan and back to Iraq and back to Afghanistan, your battalions and squadrons have shown they are combat effective. This is not just the units. This is the Marines and sailors that make the combat effectiveness that is the units.

This is not just the active component. This is the Reserve. Our Reserve—all nine Reserve infantry battalions have been to war, and they are going back to war again, and they want to answer the call when the Nation needs them to go to arms.

Their performance is magnificent, and as General Cody has said previously, their resiliency, to me—after over 38 years wearing the uniform of the cloth of the Nation—brings tears to our eyes. They and their families are performing well, and I believe that they are already showing us that they will have the capability for the 21st century. They are showing it now.

As we build the Army and the Marine Corps to the right number of soldiers and Marines, the right number of brigades and battalions and squadrons, we will have the depth to be able to return to a deployment-to-dwell ratio that will allow us to give them the training that they would need should there be other contingency operations than we face today.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your testimony.

I want to be so bold as to say that, with the two of you here, I feel a little bit like I am with family, and I am very proud to be part of that family. General Magnus and I started serving together probably for the first time 25 years ago—a quarter century ago—when we were squadron commanders together.

And, General Cody, it is a great pleasure and honor for me to know that my son is serving with your son in the 101st in Afghanistan, repeat overseas tours for both of them.

And so it is a great family, and I will be so bold as to include myself in that family for just a minute.

Earlier today we heard testimony from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, and Ambassador Crocker at one point, in talking about the Iraqi government's inability to get things done sometimes, he said that their parliament was engaged in "lengthy and contentious debate."

We know in this Congress a great deal about lengthy and contentious debate and sometimes not getting things done or not getting them done in a timely manner. Last year we had some lengthy and contentious debate over the supplemental, and that time period dragged on, and I know that the members of the Army and the Marine Corps and all the services started to feel the pain.

We are getting ready to start debate again on another supplemental—I understand in the next week or so—and so my question to both of you is—and I hope you will both take a moment to try to answer it—should we be engaged again in lengthy and contentious debate and we don't get the supplemental approved in April or perhaps in May or perhaps in June or perhaps in July, I would just like to get a sense from you on what the impact of that would be on our ground forces should that debate extend on and on? Surely, you have taken some look at that. I would like to hear from both of you, please.

General CODY. Thank you, Congressman. And your son is doing well over there. I talked to him the other day. I am sure he is surprised to hear from the vice chief directly.

Mr. KLINE. Shocked, I think, would be the word.

General CODY. In 2007 this Congress passed the supplemental very quickly, and if you remember, we got the $17.1 billion upfront, and we got it by the end of October. We were able to take that $17.1 billion and energize our depots. But, more importantly, we were able to replace our pre-position stocks in Kuwait, the heavy-brigade combat team, the light-brigade combat team and an infantry battalion for Afghanistan.

When the surge came, because of that timely investment by this Congress to the United States Army, of which we obligated by January 2008, we were able to do the surge, and the surge units fell in on that equipment.

This year we didn't get all the money for reset, there is still $7.6 billion for the Army sitting out there, and time is not on our side. We now have the most brigades deployed that we have ever had consuming our equipment, our depots are running at 26 million direct-labor hours, and we need that $7.6 billion like in October of last year to start buying long-lead items because we have got the workforce energized and then, as these 5 brigades come out, be able to rapidly reset so we can start getting in to the time factor of building a strategic reserve. And so when I talk about timely and fully funding, that is critical to get back to strategic readiness.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you.

General Magnus, if this drags out on into the summer or later, what would happen?

General MAGNUS. Thank you, sir.

I would address it in two parts. First, clearly the fiscal year 2008 GWOT that is remaining on the Hill will have impacts to us by the end of the summer, certainly before the end of the fiscal year. We are concerned about the funds that are required for us to continue to grow this force to get Marines and their units ready for the long war and for combat. So there is hundreds of millions of dollars in basic pay and special pays that are required to be able to sustain this force through the fiscal year.

In terms of procurement, we have hundreds of millions of dollars of logistic armored vehicles, up-armored Humvees, explosive ordinance disposal systems. That, in addition to the Navy has got nearly $2 billion of funding to buy replacement and new aircraft for sustained operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But that is the dollars and cents of the impact, and I am confident that the Congress will support our needs, hopefully, before the end of April or at latest May.

The second part of it, though, sir, is that these tough, bright, well-educated warriors—and most of them are young warriors—they are listening and watching. They have put everything on the line. Many of our Marines, who would have normally gone back to their communities to go to college and raise families and go to the farm, they have extended to go for that next deployment. They have decided to reenlist for two to four years. They have put family and education on hold to go fight this ruthless enemy, to go bring this war to a closure, to find, to fix and to finish this enemy that brought the fight to Americans here at home or wherever we are. They are looking for that sustained support so that their will, their courage, their professionalism will be backed up by the will of the American people.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Before I call on Mrs. Boyda, let me ask one quick question of each of you. You can answer it with one word.

General Cody, are you personally comfortable with the state of readiness of the United States Army to respond to any emerging contingency?

General CODY. No, Mr. Chairman, I am not.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Magnus, are you personally comfortable with the state of readiness of the United States Marines to respond to any emerging contingency?

General MAGNUS. Mr. Chairman, in short, no. Of course, we are sustaining significant risk for other unplanned contingencies at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mrs. Boyda.

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, both, for your service and all of the men and women who serve so proudly and honorably under you. Thank you so much.

I just wanted to ask a quick question for the record about Stop Losses. Could I just have some information on what the total Stop

Losses are in the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we can do that later. If you want to make a brief statement, but I don't want to take my time on that, if I can.

General CODY. I will give you the exact numbers for the record, ma'am.

Mrs. BOYDA. All right. Thank you so much.

General MAGNUS. I can give you the exact numbers for the Marine Corps: zero.

Mrs. BOYDA. Zero? Thank you.

When we talk about readiness—and, General Cody, you had spoken about pre-position stocks. Can you just give me some information on when you see those pre-position stocks being at a point when they are ready—if you can share in an open forum or wherever—when they are going to be ready to respond to another threat that may in fact happen?

General CODY. Congresswoman, if we get the 2008 supplemental, we get the full 2009 supplemental and the full base budget, we will start building back the four Army pre-position stocks that are empty today, and we should have them built back up by 2013. We will build up the ones in Kuwait first so we have some depth there and then fill up the float and everything else. Now, that is based upon the level of commitment of not having another five-brigade surge.

Mrs. BOYDA. I understand.

General CODY. Again, it is a time factor.

Mrs. BOYDA. I would also like to just ask a question on—the week before last on the Sunday talk shows, Mike Hayden, our director of our Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), said basically we can expect to have another 9/11-type event happen and it will probably come from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border there.

If something were to happen—and I assume from everything that I have been told in these numerous hearings that we are prepared as a country to have overwhelming force with our Navy, with our Air Force, Army and Marines, as well, that we can go in and respond in some overwhelming way. It is the sustaining of some response that begs the question of what would we do.

And I would just like if you could comment on what do you think the options are? What would we be doing if we had to respond to another 9/11-type event? What would we do? What are our options? Are we ever going to consider a draft? Would you ever consider stopping the rotations and leaving people in place? What are the options that you see as available to make sure that we can not only have that overwhelming force, but we can sustain our effort?

General CODY. Not knowing the true nature of the scenario——

Mrs. BOYDA. Let us assume that it is, again, a 9/11. And, again, I know the theoretical, and you tend not to answer theoreticals.

General CODY. The issue would be, if something happened, we would have to take those next-to-deploy forces, cobble equipment sets together because they are not fully equipped back home. They are equipped enough to train for the counterinsurgency mission in Iraq and Afghanistan, and then, when they get there, they get the full-up set. So we would have to take those forces. The other forces probably would have to stay where they are or, depending upon the situation, be redirected by the combatant commander.

Mrs. BOYDA. And I understand, too, if we had another 9/11 situation, I think the fact of troops of maybe being asked to stay would be—in another 9/11 situation, my guess is that many of them would be very understanding of that being a necessity with our country under attack in that regard.

Any comments on a draft?

General CODY. Ma'am, I was in a draft Army. I am now in an Army that is an all-volunteer force, General Magnus the same. We do not need to go back to a draft.

In my statement I mentioned we need to get on with transforming the National Guard and Reserve to an operational force and fill those holes in the yard. Most of the holes in the yard that Congressman Hunter talked about were in the National Guard.

Mrs. BOYDA. I just have a few minutes. Could you comment, then, on the cost of the draft Army versus the cost of an all-volunteer Army? What it means if you are going to invest in incentives or—what are we saying?—the reenlistment incentives versus a draft?

General CODY. It is harder to train, and you don't keep them long enough for the investment you make.

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you.

I yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Generals, thank you so much for being here today and for your service. We have had a long day of hearings and, of course, as you know, earlier hearing from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, and the Senate, of course, heard testimony from them all day yesterday—the two committees on that side.

And a lot of members, both in the Senate and the House, have asked a similar question in regard to readiness. Our distinguished chairman just a few minutes ago asked both of you the question about if another contingency occurred, Mrs. Boyda referenced a 9/11-type attack would we be ready, and I think your response was no. Maybe, General Magnus, yours was no with some reservations.

And I realize that that is a concern. And what my colleagues—some of my colleagues—mostly on the majority side of the aisle—are talking about we have got a thinly stretched force—ground forces—Army and Marines mostly. They are tired, and their equipment is wearing out. We have spent too much money. Some people say it is $12 billion a month—although I think it is closer to $10—and it is time to come home. No matter what the situation is on the ground from the security perspective or from the political perspective, it is time to bring those troops home, give them some rest, reequip them, reset them and prepare them for the next contingency.

If we do that—and this is my question to both of you. If we do that and disregard the fact that the surge has worked—is working—by any metric one wants to measure—and we have had those statistics—and these troopers, as General Petraeus referred to them, come home having seen 4,000 of their comrades—men and women—killed in action and 20,000 or so severely wounded, no matter how well rested and reequipped and reset they are, what

will that do to their morale in regard to going into that next contingency, and what adverse effect, if any, will that have on our retention and recruitment?

General CODY. Thank you, Congressman.

First off, I support the surge, and I support everything that General Petraeus and General Austin and Ambassador Crocker and our forces in Afghanistan are doing. I believe this is critical to the security of this Nation.

How we fight it and how we sustain it are two different things. The fighting piece, clearly, the generals on the ground and the officers on the ground are getting it right. The real issue that is facing the Nation is how quickly can we build back up our strategic reserve while still being able to have a victory in Iraq, have a victory in Afghanistan, take the options away from al Qaeda, take the options away from a meddlesome Iran and provide security in that region while still having capacity to look at places that also have trouble in the world that right now we don't have the capacity for.

And so I do not advocate the discussions of coming down so quickly until the job is done because we have invested blood, sweat and tears of our soldiers and their families. When I presented a flag to one of our fallen family members, I will never forget the steely-eyed, stern look the father gave me. He said, "General Cody, make sure that we continue this fight and my son did not die in vain."

And so I don't know what impact it would have on morale, but I will tell that, for the security of this Nation, we have got to continue this fight. The issue is how quickly can we build back up our strategic reserve.

Dr. GINGREY. General, thank you.

If there is some time, Mr. Chairman, if General Magnus could respond to that just briefly, I would appreciate it.

General MAGNUS. Thank you, sir. I would be happy to do that.

I agree completely with my fellow warrior, General Cody. I support—and the Marine Corps supports—the plus-up that was needed and is needed to continue this spring and summer as the situation in Iraq improves.

The Marine Corps also supports the additional forces that we are sending this very day. Second Battalion 7th Marines is flowing into Afghanistan as we are holding this hearing right now, 3,400 additional Marines that were not planned to go at the end of last year.

We are growing the force of Marines and soldiers, as well as Special Operations Command, to build the capacity that is necessary to fight, not just these two campaigns but this long war against a ruthless enemy.

The risks will be in the mistake of not fighting this enemy now where the enemy is and waiting for the enemy to come back and get us where we live. That is how this started on the 9/11 that was mentioned by the good congresswoman. We have learned that lesson. We need to build the Army, the Marine Corps and the Special Operations forces, the Air Force and the fleet that will support them so that we will find this enemy where he lives, fix this enemy where he lives, and with the help of our Afghan and Iraqi security forces, crush this enemy before they come back and get us again.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much.

Mr. Johnson from Georgia.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And please accept my humble thanks for the great job that our servicemen and women do to protect our Nation, and you go to the battlefield without regard to the political implications of it or whether or not it is popular or not, you just go and do your job. And as far as the war in Iraq is concerned, 4,017 men and women—our troops—have paid the ultimate price, and 29,676 have been wounded in combat. And to them, as well as their families, and to all of the servicemen and women, we owe a debt of gratitude for what you have done and what you will do.

Now, having said that, I would say that one of the things that differentiates this country from many others is that we live in a democracy. We live in a country where the civilian control over the military is a hallmark of what we do. And it is our civilians that send the military into these roles that they have to respond to. And this war in Iraq is a war that once enjoyed the support of the American people, but now 66 percent of the people want us to bring our troops home.

And this Congress—this civilian Congress—is not immune to the desires of the people who elect us to represent them. Eighty-eight percent of the current and former military officers who have stated that they believe that this war in Iraq has stretched the U.S. military dangerously thin—88 percent, according to the Foreign Policy Center for New American Security, a study that was published on February 19 of this year.

And this is a war that we were placed in by civilian authority on the concept that there were weapons of mass destruction—that was the reason given—and then later the reason given nuclear materials being sought, and then, last but not least, there was a link between Iraq authorities and the 9/11 attack on our country. And all of those reasons for going to war have been debunked. And now we find ourselves in a war that we can never get a good answer as to what victory is, when would that victory be achieved and how will we bring our troops home thereafter?

And so the American public is not in favor of the Congress continuing to write a blank check. Notwithstanding the fact that we know that this war has strapped our military to the point where we are not as ready as we would want to be to respond to any other difficulties that may and probably will arise.

In reference to both the Army and the Marine Corps, how are extensive deployments of key leaders affecting those services' ability to recruit and train new personnel as they attempt to grow the force?

General CODY. Thank you, Congressman.

When the surge went in, it wasn't just the five brigades that went in. We had combat support, combat service support troopers that also went with them. But at the same time, we had to provide the commander on the ground with 20 brigade combat teams—regimental combat teams from the Marines.

In order to do that, we had to extend all of the other brigades that were there to 15-month deployments. What that meant was, in the training and doctrine command of the Army, where our

training base is, it meant that they had to go short drill sergeants and captains and others to train the next force.

So currently the surge effect on our ability to train new recruits, train brand new lieutenants, the leader-to-led ratio or the trainer-to-led ratio is not where we want it to be, and until we come off the 15-month deployment so we can start recycling, if you were in a unit that was at 15 months, we need to get you back. When you get back, we would like to put you in charge of training a unit. Right now we don't have that capability.

And so when I say that the surge affected the whole Army, in particular, it affects our combat troops for sure, but it has put a premium on our ability to get combat veterans back into our training base to train the next-up guys and gals.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, General.

General MAGNUS. Sir, thank you for the question. Let me respond, and I agree, again, with General Cody.

We are adding new battalions and squadrons to get the force so that we have adequate capacity in the force and time for those at home to get properly rested, reset and trained for their future missions.

As we grow the force with the new brigades, the new battalions—we are actually growing the second of three infantry battalions as we speak right now—2nd Battalion 9th Marines—we need the leaders for those units, as well as to supervise the training. That means more drill instructors at the recruit depots, it means more instructors in the schools, as well as more leadership in the battalions and the squadrons.

We are also, just like the Army, meeting the demands for transition-team advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan, both from the Iraqi and Afghan tactical level, right on up through the government. This is the war that we have today, and we will meet those needs. And as we have said before, this, of course, does give us stress on that force.

Our Marines are responding admirably. They are volunteering to extend to go out with their units or to go on independent deployment as advisor. They are reenlisting so that we retain the leadership, particularly in those mid-grades in the enlisted and officer ranks.

We will grow the Marine Corps to have the right number of Marine enlisted and Marine officers in the active component well before 2011. We are well ahead of our goals, and our Marines that are volunteering to stay, as well as the young Americans that are volunteering for their initial accessions, we believe they full-well understand the importance and the urgency of the mission that the Nation has sent them to do.

Mr. JOHNSON. And I definitely support them 100 percent, and they are brave men and women who are doing the work. And thank you very much for your service.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Generals, thank you very much for coming today.

Earlier today one of my colleagues mentioned that General Fallon came here early March and requested 2,000 troops for, I

guess, Afghanistan or something and was told didn't have them. I don't know if that statement is accurate or not—I don't want to address that. But in a setting like this that you can talk about, are there requests for troops and capacities that are going unmet right now throughout anywhere in the world at this stage?

General CODY. I know, Congressman, that General McNeill, as well as General Cone, who is over there running the training of the Afghan army, has asked for a brigade's worth of trainers that we have not been able to give them.

Mr. CONAWAY. General Magnus.

General MAGNUS. Thank you, Congressman.

We are sending 3,400 Marines, most of whom are on the ground right now going into combat operations, in addition to a third Marines Special Operations company that is also on the ground. If we are asked to go, Marines are ready to go to war.

Mr. CONAWAY. But in terms of requests that have been made of you, you have been able to fulfill all your requests so far for troops?

General MAGNUS. We have fulfilled the requests that have been made of us for Iraq and Afghanistan. Of course, that has caused other unmet demands elsewhere. The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which is on the ground now in Afghanistan at full strength, was originally intended to go afloat with the Navy in an expeditionary strike group to provide the combatant commanders a sea-based theater-reserve force.

As a result of that, we have had to extend one Marine expeditionary unit that was at sea and accelerate the deployment of another Marine expeditionary unit. So we are stretching. We are under stress. We are meeting the demand for combat forces first.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. So thank you. What I am hearing you say is you are coping with whatever it is that is going on.

The chairman earlier in his comments talked about how critical it is that we reset and refit and fix everything that is going on. Has there ever been a country that has been able to withdraw from a fight that they were currently in in order to be able to do that? Is there a model out there for us to look at?

I mean, the one we have got right now is we have got a fight in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have got all this stuff that we need to be doing, and we really can't call a timeout anywhere that I am aware of that would make that process easier. Has there ever been a historical precedent where a country has been able to quit or stop a fight someplace in order to refit its Army or Marine Corps?

General CODY. Congressman, I don't know of any model, and, again, I don't advocate leaving that dangerous part of the world.

General MAGNUS. Nor do I.

General CODY. Iraq and Afghanistan are what they are, but that whole region is vitally important to our interests, and we need to be moving forward.

The whole purpose, I believe—the reason why the chairman asked for this hearing—is to talk about strategic depth and readiness for other things. You asked me a direct question about do you have requests for forces that you can't meet? I told you of one. But we have other combatant commanders that aren't requesting forces because we can't give them to them.

And so we have got other work that should be done by the Marines and by the Army, by our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, our special operating forces that should be doing theater security operations in other areas of responsibility (AORs), building partners, training other militaries, providing medical support and other things that we have done in the past. But because of the demand on the size of the force for Afghanistan and Iraq, we are not meeting the other things we know we need to be doing in what we call Phase Zero operations.

Mr. CONAWAY. General Magnus walked down a path. I don't question anybody's love of this country or patriotism, and we all get an opinion as to whether or not we ought to be in this fight in Iraq, and I think we should be there and as hard as it is, we have got to maintain the resolution that is necessary.

But as we have these conversations, I believe it has an impact on morale. I believe it has an impact on moms and dads deciding to promote military service. I believe it has an impact on community leaders and others who help young men and women decide to, as you call, answer the call to this country.

And as folks make these critical comments, which they are perfectly right to do, we all ought to understand that they have a consequence. And to, out of one side of your mouth, praise what we are doing there or praise the people that are doing it and then be so harshly critical of what we are trying to get done there, to me, is difficult to absorb and not as heartfelt as it might have been.

General, do we track stress things—like suicide rates, divorce rates and other home-front stresses—that help us understand the depth of the problems here?

General CODY. Congressman, we do. We take a look at all the indicators. I can take that for the record and give them to you.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

General Magnus, I listen to your comments, and I could hear the anguish in your voice when you were talking about the troops and you said that you hoped that their will would be matched by the will—and their courage be matched by the will of the American people, and I would say to you that it has been. And I am sorry that is even a question, because all of us sitting here—and I think around the country—understand what we owe our troops and what they have gone through. And so I just wanted to make that point.

But the will of the American people has to do with making sure that we are safe around the globe. And when you were talking about having these troops in Iraq to make sure that they didn't come fight us here, I kept thinking about how there were no Iraqis on the plane that day, that they were mostly Saudis and that the attacks came—we had training camps in Afghanistan, not in Iraq.

And so my question to you is are we strategically in the right place? I think we are all concerned about the safety of this country and the safety of our troops. But it seems as if, when we are saying things like we expect that the next attack will be coming from Afghanistan and when both of you acknowledge in some form that we

are not quite able to stretch across the globe in possible other problems, why Iraq?

General MAGNUS. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think I would combine my response to your comments, along with some of the previous comments from other members.

I agree with General Cody. I can think of precedents about armies withdrawing from difficult fights that they were not doing well in, either because the armies were not capable or because the leadership changed their will. Right off the top Napoleon comes to mind. The Germans and Russia come to mind. I don't think those ended the way those nations wanted, and maybe those fights were not good fights to have started in the first place.

We are in the process now of sustaining your Nation's military that has been sent to war by this Nation against an implacable and ruthless enemy, who has the lives of 50 million Iraqis and Afghans in their grasp. Now, it is not my purpose here to question the political decision of any nation to go to war. It is our mission to be ready to properly lead, to properly train and equip your military to go to war with our coalition partners and the Afghan and Iraqi forces to help them be able to build their capacity to do internal defense of their nation against an implacable nation.

It is true that there were other nationalities that were on those aircraft in 9/11. I don't know how many Afghans were on those aircraft, but we had to go where the enemy was, and we are where the enemy is now.

If I can use a baseball analogy, ma'am, we are in the top of the seventh inning of a very long game. There is no time for a seventh-inning stretch. We are building the capacity for this Nation to fight the enemies where the enemies are, and we don't want to, like 9/11, wait for the enemies to come back and see us.

I don't question the patriotism of any of the members here. I am simply asking that, unlike previous wars—and I joined the military during Vietnam—that the Congress appropriate the funds that are necessary for your troops to carry on this fight.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you, General. Now, I would like to tell you that my husband was also in the Army during the Vietnam era, and I was a military spouse, and I think that all of us understand the sacrifice and are very grateful.

But I still have the same question. I worry very much about Afghanistan and the training camps and what we have been hearing in testimony lately makes me think that we are in the wrong place. And I agree with you that we have enemies around the world and specifically in that region, but are we doing enough in Afghanistan?

So let me rephrase the question: Are we heavily invested in the wrong tree? Given the problem that we have and the stretch of our troops and our supplies, should we be more involved in Afghanistan? Are we just in the wrong place fighting and maybe we need to change the strategy somewhat?

General MAGNUS. Thank you, Congresswoman, and to answer your question, I think we are heavily invested in the right countries, and we are increasing the number of combat troops—along with the French and British and our other allies—as the Afghans in Afghanistan build their own security forces and their professional capability as the Iraqis build theirs.

These two campaigns of the global war are the war that we have against a ruthless enemy, and we should not leave until we are assured that our host nations have the capability to manage their internal defense. We are doing this. This is a very difficult enemy, and it is a very difficult domestic situation for both of these countries. I believe we are in the right places and we are building the capacity to allow the Nation the strategic reserves of forces to cope with other possible contingencies.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Again I would state that I am concerned of our ability to respond to an emerging threat, but I thank you very much for your service and for your answer.

Thank you.

Mr. ORTIZ [presiding]. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, again, thanks for this hearing. This has been a great hearing.

General Cody, you were asked by Chairman Skelton if you were satisfied that we are ready for any military contingency, and your answer was, no, I am not satisfied.

You also have in your statement the fact that Congress has been to date about $66.5 billion short in terms of the global war on terror funding—the supplemental funding for this year. And on page nine of your statement, you have a series of problems that will occur if you don't receive funding soon.

You have the Army runs out of pay for active duty and National Guard soldiers in June, the Army runs out of operation and maintenance (O&M) for the active component in early July, for the Guard in late June, two Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) may not receive whole protection kits before they deploy, armored security vehicles could face a break in production, Army National Guard will not receive 10 CH–47 model helicopters, converting and existing BCTs will not receive the bridge to future network's communication system, and the Army will be unable to upgrade and construct facilities for returning wounded warriors at various locations throughout the country.

So you say you are not satisfied that we are ready for any contingency. Would you say that, if the Congress does not act to fund these dollars that you have identified, that we are contributing to an unreadiness to meet any military contingency?

General CODY. Congressman, I would agree with that. It is all about time now, and those things that will happen that I hope don't happen. But if we don't get the balance of the 2008 GWOT supplemental—we have been doing this now for six years, and I challenged my staff and we went right down through all of those things, and those will all be the consequences of not getting the rest of the 2008 supplemental. It will be pushed to the 2009 supplemental, and depending upon when that is passed, we lose time.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

General Magnus, I noticed you have got a smaller amount that you have identified in your statement, but you are—similarly, the Marines are awaiting funds that have not yet been approved in the GWOT supplemental; is that right?

General MAGNUS. Congressman, that is correct. Until we receive those funds, the Navy and us cannot put under contract for this Nation's industry to build the aircraft that we need, the ground

combat vehicles and equipment that we need, in addition to the personnel and operations and maintenance expenses that are needed. Our systems command are ready to contract with American industry now, and these are all lead-time away from delivering some of these systems.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So would you agree with General Cody that, if we don't pass those funds, we—Congress—are contributing to an unreadiness to meet any contingency?

General MAGNUS. Congressman, the time to build the capacity and reset the readiness of the forces is strictly dependent upon the funding available. America's families have responded and given us their finest young men and women to give us the human capital to invest.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Let me ask you a couple of questions with respect to readiness.

Do you agree, General Cody, that Army officers are being offered inflated bonuses as incentives to address personnel shortfalls?

General CODY. No, I do not agree with that, Congressman.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Let me ask you both, gentlemen, I think it is fairly clear that you think that a priority for us is to pass this global war on terror 2008 supplemental as soon as possible; is that right?

General CODY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HUNTER. What other areas do you think—if we were to try to identify actions that would go most toward increasing readiness programs, for example? I know it is tough to issue a priority right now, but is there any particular program that you think is of urgent importance, aside from this broad funding that you have got that Congress has pending but that we have failed to pass so far? Any particular message you would send to us, for both of you?

General CODY. Congressman, I think, again, we thought through and worked with OSD. General Magnus and I sat in many meetings and worked through all the budget supplemental requests for 2008 and 2009. I believe, if those come in on time, that is important.

Second, we have other programs that we have got to deal with: the Wounded Warrior Transition military construction, the base realignment and closure (BRAC) funding. Army today is executing the most comprehensive organizational and post and formation change since World War II, and it is all being linked to and synchronized with putting our forces in and out of combat and keeping them trained, manned and equipped. But any break in BRAC funding, military construction (MILCON) funding just causes us more problems as we try to execute this and puts more strain on the military families.

Mr. HUNTER. (OFF MIKE)

General CODY. I do not agree with that statement. The one thing that we knew we had to do when this war started, after we looked at it, was make sure that we met our moral obligation to the mothers and fathers and to this country to send no soldier or Marine into harm's way untrained or unresourced. And it took us a while to get the resources going, but we stuck very hard with the training.

Mr. HUNTER. (OFF MIKE)

General MAGNUS. Congressman, I agree with General Cody. Absolutely not. We will not send Marines or sailors to war unless they are trained and equipped for the mission.

What risk we are facing is the increasing time to respond to other unplanned contingencies, which would require holding certain forces in place, retraining and refitting the Marines and sailors for the new unplanned mission and considerations of additional mobilization of our Reserve component.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. "Due to equipment shortages"—I am going to read you a statement—"Army and Marine Corps units don't train as they fight, instead receiving necessary force protection and essential equipment just prior to deployment or when they arrive in theater." Do you think that is accurate?

General CODY. That is an accurate statement, Congressman, in terms of the improvised explosive device (IED) jammers and mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAP) for sure, although we are getting better on the IED jammers. I have testified before that we would fix that. We have got several hundred IED jammer emulators so that our soldiers can train on so it is not the first time they see them when they get in country.

On the MRAP, we are training leaders before they deploy on the MRAPs, but I am not happy with the situation. I believe we need to have MRAPs in the training base so that the first time the soldier starts driving is not in combat conditions. And so what we have done is place a burden on the combatant commander to bring the soldiers over to the issue point and take them to the driver's course and train them up very quickly. That is not how a great Army should be operating.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. But aren't you going to have—we just talked about this new piece of equipment that we are going to get out to the troops very quickly from a foreign military. By definition, General, we are going to have to introduce that to our people very quickly. They won't have time to work on it for years before it gets over because it is new, it is not something we have had before, but it looks like it works.

General CODY. You are right. The training will have to be done in theater, like we did with some of the other projects that you and I are very familiar with, and we have to do that in theater.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Loebsack.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And I want to thank both General Cody and General Magnus for their service and all those who are here in the room.

And I noticed Colonel Kennedy stepped out for just a minute. I have gotten to know him quite well too, and I want to thank him personally for his service. He happened to be my stepson's commanding officer in Ramadi when he was there early on in the conflict.

I do want to first thank General Cody also for sort of broadening out this discussion a little bit, at least by mentioning BRAC and MILCON, as I am sure our subcommittee chair would want to. I don't want to necessarily put words in his mouth but—because it is not just, obviously, having the right size force and the right

equipment and all the rest—a lot of other things that have to do with readiness. And I have been honored to be on the Readiness Subcommittee since I have been in Congress—I am a freshman. So I do want to thank you for mentioning those aspects as well.

But I do want to ask kind of a fundamental question here about how you sort of arrived at the size of the Army and the Marines that you believe we need to have. I voted for the increase in the size of the Army and the Marines myself. But I am just curious sort of what kinds of assumptions you make, not only about the world but also I am trying to tie together what we heard today from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker—and General Petraeus in particular.

What kind of assumption do you make, if any, as far as how many troops you believe or assume that we are going to have in Iraq over the course of the next, say, five years—or whatever number of years you use when you decide—when you did decide sort of how large the Army should be or, General Magnus, how large the Marines should be?

General CODY. Congressman, thank you. That is a very great question.

We run what we call a Total Army Analysis. We run them sometimes three or four times a year.

We are not sizing this Army based upon the ebb and flow of what is in Iraq and Afghanistan. We size it for what we call a steady-state security posture, and then we size it for a win decisive or major campaign, as well as the ability to conduct another type of campaign. And then we look across the mission sets of our combat units. We look at the active component (AC) and the Reserve component (RC) mix, and we look at all the different types of capabilities that we would need, and then we put it in motion. In other words, rotate it.

And you need to size your military for the steady-state security posture for one-year deployed, three-years back. If you size it for that and then you get into a fight like Iraq and Afghanistan, you can move to that force and surge it to a one-year in, two-years back.

Because we went into this fight with a very small military that was sized basically for a 1-and-2 steady-state security posture, 10 years of peace, no peer competitor, you are now running this Army and the Marine Corps at a 1-to-1 or less. And that is why the 65,000 in the active and the growth in the Marines is so important to both General Magnus and I so that we can get the end strength up so that, when this settles down, we can put troops in combat for 1 year and guarantee them and their families 2-years back.

Mr. LOEBSACK. If I may ask, what does that do in the meantime as far as length of deployment and dwell times?

General CODY. It would mean 1-year in, 2-years back at dwell time.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Right. Okay. And let us assume for the moment that we have on a—for a number of years—even though a number of us on this committee don't want that to be the case, including me but—that we have 120,000 to 140,000 troops in Iraq for, say, the next 4 or 5 years. Where does that get us as far as length of dwell times and length of deployments?

General CODY. If we get the Army up to 48 brigade combat teams, we will also be in constant mobilization. Every five years we will have to get some Reserve component soldiers into the fight. That is what operationalize and reserve means. If that demand is what we think it is going to be in July, we will be at a 1-and-2, which is a surge. We will not be at 1-and-3.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Okay.

And General Magnus.

General MAGNUS. Thank you, Congressman. Again, I agree with my fellow warrior, General Cody.

Our objective is, based upon on our own studies as well as continuing annual dialogue with the staff of the joint chiefs and the combatant commanders in OSD, is to look both at the current demand in this war, as well as looking long as we build the force. So it is critical that we try to understand the steady-state security posture in between crises, as well as the impact of either spikes of a short-term crisis, such as a disaster response, or a sustained crisis, as we are currently experiencing now.

We are basically looking at the same kind of one-to-one dwell challenge that the soldiers are. That is for Marines, that is for the tactical units, that is seven-months forward and seven-months back, and then you are turning around. We have some specialties that are more challenged than that.

We are building the capacity for the long term for three balanced Marine expeditionary forces. So the commanders in chief 4, 8, 12, 16 years from now will be able to have, during these kinds of sustained surges, should the Nation have them at that time in the future, that we can give our troops the 1-to-2 dwell that they will need to get reset, to get back with their families, to get the training they need to be ready for the next unplanned contingency.

Should there not be this kind of sustained high level of demand, we ideally would like to get to a 1-to-3 in between those major crises, but in this long war, I don't see that happening in the near future.

This also has effect on our Reserve component. Currently, the Reserves—and we have a Reserve battalion that is back in the fight again—the Reserves are just as eager to support the needs of the country as their active component brethren. We are building the active component force so that we can return our Reserve component to a 1-to-5 dwell.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Mr. Chair, if I might just have another 30 seconds. Is that okay? I just want to make one last statement. Is that okay?

Mr. ORTIZ. Make it quick because we have got a lot of members who are still waiting.

Mr. LOEBSACK. All right. Thank you.

Because part of this is leading up to the fact that—the statement that you made, General, that we should not take the resiliency of our troopers for granted, and I have a very, very grave concern about the mental health of soldiers and Marines and others. We have all heard about post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and I think we are just seeing the tip of the iceberg perhaps. I have talked to a lot of people at the Veterans Affairs (VA) in Iowa City and a lot of veterans coming back. And so that is part of why I

asked this question in the first place. I just wanted to make sure you knew that.

And thanks, again, for your service.

And thanks, Mr. Chair, for letting me go over. I appreciate it.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much.

General Cody, General Magnus, thanks for being with us today.

I would like to return to a subject that has been discussed on and off here today about training shortfalls and constraints due to time that restrict predeployment training, in particular.

I have the honor of representing the busiest mobilization and deployment base for Reserve component troops in the country, Fort Dix. It might surprise some of you to know that, but that is the case. We have deployed more Reserve component troops from Fort Dix than any other base in the country.

And when I leave Fort Dix or when I am at Fort Dix during a visit, I have the feeling that there is a high level of predeployment training taking place there. The commander of the First Army has built a Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Fort Dix, they have built an Iraqi village at Fort Dix, they have built a trail upon which people are trained to drive trucks over rough terrain through sandy soil where IEDs explode along the way. And that, of course, is in addition to all of the normal training that the folks had prior to predeployment training.

I have also visited Fort Bragg, and if I said to the commander of forces at Fort Bragg that there was a shortfall in training there, I always had the feeling that he would set me straight pretty quickly.

I have been down to Lejeune and Parris Island, and I don't think I would find a Marine at either base that would claim that predeployment training isn't what it should be.

Those are just the feelings from the experiences that I have had.

So I would just like to pose the question to you—some in Congress are claiming that there is a lack of training, inadequate training, time constraints on training. Would you address this problem for us, General Cody and General Magnus, as you see it?

General CODY. Thank you, Congressman. And by the way, I do know that Fort Dix deploys more, and we are very proud of the relationship.

Mr. SAXTON. I am sure you do. I didn't mean you.

General CODY. I don't have the exact number, but I do know where the monies flow from First Army.

When we talk about training, if you remember, in my statement somewhere—and I probably wasn't as clear as I should be—we are the best trained for the contingency we are fighting today, but our forces' training focus is too narrow. And so if you asked an artilleryman or you ask an armored commander or a Bradley commander, "Are you training to all your core mission essential task lists in the 12-month dwell that you have?" Because we are spinning so fast, he would say, "No." "Are you trained to the mission that you are going to get in Ramadi or Taji or Baquba?" He would say, "Yes."

General MAGNUS. Congressman, thank you. I agree, again, with General Cody.

And thank you for the comments about, not only Fort Dix—and Marine Reserves go there too—but Parris Island, where we get about half of our enlisted through recruit training.

Again, as General Cody indicated, counterinsurgency operations and transition team training are the focus of the two campaigns of this global war that we have talked about today. The Marines who are forward deployed and those who are next to deploy would tell you they are at the highest levels of readiness in terms of personnel, training of those personnel, and as they train on their equipment and fall in on the additional equipment in theaters, they are at the highest levels of readiness.

What the shortfalls are are the shortfalls in full-spectrum or multiuse training that would be for other unplanned contingencies. For the Marine Corps, this means the focus on counterinsurgency diminishes the time available for combined-arms training—artillery, firing your tank tables, working with close air support—that we did before we did Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) on the march on Baghdad.

It also means that we have a generation of company-grade officers now who studied about amphibious operations in the basics school and in some cases never set foot on a ship.

As we grow the force this year, we are putting our first basics school class back on ships. So we are getting enough capacity now to make sure that the Nation has the land forces with the full-spectrum capabilities necessary so the combatant commanders don't have to wait for us to retrain and reset the force as we build the right capacity, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

General Magnus, you said we should not leave Iraq—or we should not leave until nations can handle their internal defense. That is a very significant policy statement.

You also said we should not—we will not send troops to war unless they are trained and equipped.

Each of you, could I ask just for a one-word answer to this question:

You have a Congress that is supposed to provide by the Constitution for the common defense. Forty percent of our Army's equipment is in Iraq. For almost three years, we have trained on nothing except counterinsurgency. Twenty-eight thousand troops who wear the cloth of our Nation are in South Korea, where the timeline to defend them by the Army cannot be met, nor any timeline for any war plan.

You said there was significant risk to a second contingency. Is that based potentially on probability and yet who predicted the first Korea war or World War II or 9/11, where we then struck back? Is it a legitimate question, therefore, for Congress to ask at how long and at what cost do we pursue the strategy in Iraq as we do our duty of providing for the common defense?

That is a yes or no, please, General. Is it a legitimate question for us to ask that?

General CODY. I believe yes.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.

General.

General MAGNUS. Of course, it is a legitimate question.

Mr. SESTAK. I only brought that up because I think we absent our responsibility if we didn't. Men and women wearing the cloth of this Nation, I think, were well represented by General Pace when asked the question, are they upset by this discussion of what is right or not right about the war in Iraq, is that our troops tend to be smart today, and they understand that is a legitimate role of Congress.

And the second question has to do, General—42 percent of the recruits that are coming into the Army today are in the below-average mental category. And I very much understand that we have the best Army today. It can't do what is required, according to our war—timelines, which is, I believe, the real debate and the failure of what people call the "Petraeus report." He should have just told us what he is doing in the military—security in Iraq. This discussion of overall America's national security from defense to the economy being affected by it, et cetera, is what we really should be debating.

And I thought you said it very well, General. We can get these recruits up to snuff and we deal with it, we take what we can, we do, we must. Why not, then, do away with measuring mental categories if we are not that concerned about it? Because, when I was in the military, we were very concerned about it because that is who is going to run your Future Combat System (FCS) in 20 years from now.

General CODY. I agree with your assessment. The reason why we have them—and it has been explained to me—the high school grad is a measurement of stick-to-itiveness. The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery's (ASVAB) scores tells us how we look at each one of them in terms of trainability.

And we invested these young men and women and so—I don't know what category I was, but I waited a long time to receive my diploma at West Point.

Mr. SESTAK. I was probably 4D.

General CODY. But I will tell you, it has nothing to do with measuring their human potential. And what we are seeing is these young recruits that are coming in—4th and 5th year and 6th year into this war—we can train them——

Mr. SESTAK. Then why not do away with the measurement? If you are so comfortable, why measure it?

General CODY. I will go back and look at it. I mean——

Mr. SESTAK. I asked the Secretary of the Army the same question six months ago, but I would love an answer to that. Because I do believe in their bravery, but, boy, I will tell you, we always seem to want the best and the brightest, particularly as you head toward FCS.

If I could ask another question——

General CODY. I will tell you one thing. In combat our soldiers don't ask what category you were in. They just want to make sure you can shoot well.

Mr. SESTAK. Sir, trust me, I know from my 31 years that is the issue out there. But we also know that there were some who could maintain that equipment better than others so it did perform when we needed it. Am I wrong, General?

General CODY. No, you are right——

Mr. SESTAK. Can I ask another question, please?

Third Division—what is the rate of Stop Loss in the 3rd Division?

General CODY. I don't have that figure, but I do know that we probably Stop Lossed in the hundreds when we act—and you have got remember, now, you have got four brigades in that division so I would have to go back and take it for the record. But normally we are seeing about 200 to 300 Stop Loss per brigade as we get to deploy them.

Mr. SESTAK. Two to three?

General CODY. Two to 300 is a round number. I will take it for the record——

Mr. SESTAK. The only reason I question that ASVAB is I have talked to several—ID people, and to some degree defined—as General Petraeus talked—to find retention that we are having there some believe is an outcome also of Stop Loss. In a sense you have a choice: X amount of thousands of dollars to reenlist for several years or Stop Loss, go to Iraq without it.

And let me end my question because I am just about done.

General, I honestly do believe that we have the best today, but I honestly believe it is a very legitimate question to ask two things: Is it going to be the best military for the future and the long-term risk as we see what comes into the force? I don't question their bravery at all.

And, second, General Magnus, I honestly believe that that policy statement of yours is one that it is someone else's to weigh the risk attendant to America's overall national security of whether we stay until they can ensure or we change our strategy to do it.

Thank you.

General CODY. Mr. Chairman, if I could just comment?

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. You bet.

General CODY. Thank you.

We will retain the quality of this force if we take the long-term view. We have got to grow the force, we have got to invest in the force, and we have to have a national conversation about what it means to serve. But we will retain this quality force if we do those things.

General MAGNUS. And, Mr. Chairman, the policy of the use of the military forces of the United States are determined by the Commander in Chief and, of course, in the dialogue that is right, necessary with the people's representatives in the Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen.

The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.

And, General Cody, again, I want to thank you for your very prompt assistance to help the family of the young Guardsman who died trying to save some folks during Hurricane Katrina. I know it didn't bring him back, but it certainly made life a little bit easier for his family what you did.

I wish you would go back to the subject of the jammers and the MRAPs, because for 18-plus years I have sat in this room and listened to you and your predecessor say, "We train as we fight," but we both know in the case of MRAPs and jammers we are not.

I was curious what initiatives were underway to try to get to the point where we are training as we fight? I sure hope I don't go back to Camp Shelby anytime soon and see another box strapped onto the front of a Humvee that says "IED jammer" and the thing is empty and it is just—and what is particularly, actually, galling—I have never actually heard you say it, but I have heard some very senior people in the DOD, starting, quite possibly, with the Secretary or previous Secretary, will say, "It is just a gadget. You turn it on, and it works." Well, if that is so, then why did the Army go and get electronic warfare officers from the Navy to explain to your units how important it was to use it at the right time, how it is going to jam their radio transmissions and how the terrain around them is going to affect it. It isn't. It is more than just turning something on, and, quite frankly, if it is going to save people's lives, we needed to be training with that more extensively.

Same thing with MRAPs. I realize that there is a production challenge, but I would think trainers, such as I know the Army has at Fort Leavenworth for vehicles, could be produced on a separate line, could be made available, could actually be run 24 hours a day, you could run your folks through that.

Why isn't there a higher priority to getting those two things done?

General CODY. First off, Congressman, I agree with you on the jammers. In this setting I will say that it is not just turning it on. There is a frequency spectrum knowledge that you have to be trained to. It is an understanding of the electronic-magnetic interference of your other systems. And we are training people now and have been training them. Hopefully, you won't find that box—I hope they got rid of it. But we have bought more of the Duke systems, of the Acorns and others that we now have issued to First Army.

But we have to deal with—and I hope you can appreciate this. Because of the frequency spectrum, we have to deal with what else is around in terms of jamming other things that may be kind of critical, like air-traffic control and stuff like that.

But I believe we are getting better there, and the Navy was very helpful to us in getting their electronic warfare officers, and we now have a course, and we are starting to replace those guys. And I think that you will be pleased to see the progress we have made.

But if you remember, everything that was coming off the line back then, we were more concerned about getting it, testing it, giving the new equipment training in theater, which was not sufficient at all and not the place we wanted to be, but it was the best we could do at the time to get it off.

We find ourselves the same way in MRAP. We do have 25 vehicles from the MRAP University, and we are sending our master drivers and our master trainers to that so that when they deploy with their soldiers and go to the issue points—there is five issue points over in theater—and they take their soldiers through it and train them up, the leaders are trained ahead of time before they deploy. That is not a place we want to be either.

We have a requirement for 600 MRAPs for the training base and for the next-to-deploy soldiers, but we can't get to them until the end of October so that we meet the theater commander's require-

ment of what he needs for the Army, and it is saving lives over there. And so we will be at that state until October, until we can start putting some in the training base. Not the answer I want to give you, but that is where we are.

Mr. TAYLOR. You might have noticed I have signed a letter or two during this hearing. It is from the Military Retiree Organization. It starts off by saying, "Military leaders have called for a $2,000 increase in their TRICARE costs." You two guys strike me as military leaders. I was curious if either of you gentlemen thought this up, or is this something that came out of the White House?

General CODY. I haven't seen that, Congressman.

General MAGNUS. I am not aware of it, Congressman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I think you just answered the question. I think it is an initiative of the White House for the seventh straight year to increase health-care co-pays for military retirees and, hopefully, for the seventh straight year this committee will defeat that measure. But I just wanted to get on the record I don't think it came from you two gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Assume, Generals, the Iraqi war stops tomorrow, the Afghan war stops tomorrow, how would you reset the United States Army and reset the United States Marines to make you personally comfortable with the state of readiness for the Army and the Marines respectively?

General Cody.

General CODY. Well, first, under that assumption, Mr. Chairman, there would be a detailed plan of the mission set of the units in either Afghanistan and Iraq to move to operational and strategic over watch and so that the units coming out were coming out in an orderly fashion.

What we would have to do to get back to strategic readiness is to get our depots even more ramped up than they are and immediately go back to full-spectrum training—and by full-spectrum training, to include counterinsurgency training. One of the things that we did not do after Vietnam was we did not include counterinsurgency training as we built up our training base. We left that to our special forces. And so we would continue the counterinsurgency training but get back to the full maneuver training that we have at our training base.

And then what we do is probably try to accelerate the growth of the Army so that we can build the strategic depth we need and then finish converting the Reserve component to an operational force.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General MAGNUS. Mr. Chairman, would you like an answer from the Marine Corps on this?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, please. I was about to call on you. Please?

General MAGNUS. Sir, thank you.

Agree, again. As we build the capacity, another way of doing that is reducing the demand signals so should there be a significant drop in the demand for forces for Operation Iraqi Freedom and En-

during Freedom, we would also return to a multiuse or full-spectrum training to be ready for other potential contingencies.

There would be an extensive multiyear depot maintenance program for the equipment that would be flowing back from those campaigns as the unit requirements dropped and as the ships in the maritime pre-positioning squadrons came into Brown Island for their own maintenance cycle and the aircraft will return for theirs.

We would also finish growing the force, which we anticipate doing within the next three years. The 3rd Marine Regiment would go back to Hawaii, and the 4th Marine Regiment would go back to Okinawa and be able to stand or watch in the Western Pacific, and we, with our shipmates in the Navy, would return to a steady-state security posture, which includes providing forward-deployed expeditionary strike groups and Marine squadrons on the carrier strike groups to provide the theater commanders the contingency forces forward, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General Cody, in essence, you would abide by the brand-new almost-printed new manual—am I correct?—when you speak about full-spectrum preparedness?

General CODY. Yes, Chairman. A new doctrine, 3.0. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it looks like the Marines have read the same thing?

General MAGNUS. Yes, Chairman, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, General Cody and General Magnus, for being here.

General Cody, how long have you been in the Army?

General CODY. In June it will be 36 years, sir.

Mr. FORBES. General Magnus?

General MAGNUS. General Cody is a youngster, sir. It will be 39 years this summer.

Mr. FORBES. Well, for both of you, thank you for your service, and please understand, as I am asking my questions, if I put you in a position where I demand a yes or no answer, you can't explain it, forgive me. I have too much respect for you to be there. So I am not going to put you in that position.

And earlier today we talked about statistics, and we hear everybody throwing these statistics out. One of the things we sometimes forget, when we were fighting for the most important thing we had—our freedom in the Revolutionary War—if we would have had pollsters then, the pollsters would have said about 33 to 34 percent of the people then favored fighting for freedom, about 33, 34 percent were against it, and about 33 or 34 percent didn't care.

We heard about 66 percent—a figure thrown out today—wanting to bring our troops back, and yet I look and I hear all these words about how the Army is broken, the war is lost, everything has failed, everything is horrible. Somebody can come into one of these hearings with a costume with makeup on their hand and stand up, and every photographer in here is going to take a picture of them.

Behind you, you have six of the best men and women probably we have in the country today. My suspicion is that each of them

has a story of courage, commitment and sacrifice. But if you stand up, we are not going to take a picture of you, and we are not going to write a story about you, and we wonder why we get that 66 percent number.

So what I want to do is take just a moment and take a breath and look at this from a big picture. My suspicion is, in all the years that you guys have served, there has never been a Camelot period, where you looked and said you didn't need some tweaking in training, some additional equipment, something that you had that you could make better, both the services that you served in.

The other thing I would say is that we have had witness after witness after witness come before us, then, when they look at the big picture, they say, "This force we have today, despite some of the tweaking we need to do and some of the shortfalls that we have, is the most experienced, the most professional, the most adaptive, and the most capable force in the world and that we have ever fielded."

One question I have for you today is do you agree with that?

Second—and I just want to get these out in the short five minutes I have. Before we started this in 2000, we had these holes in the yard that you guys have talked about before. As I understand it, that was about $56 billion of needs we had in 2000. You guys have fought a war. Basically, you have done all the stuff you have done, and we have reduced that number from $56 billion. The last statistics I saw show that you were on track to have them down to $17 billion—huge success there.

And then you have also moved from the strategic reserve—where everybody is talking about being ready for all these contingencies—but back before you began fighting this battle, we were in a posture where we had strategic reserves, which meant you would have had to have ramped up if you had one of these contingencies, and you guys have moved to—moving to operational reserve at this particular point in time.

And the reason I throw all those things out is because it looks like to me—I don't know how we talk about all of those questions when the huge problem we have for your readiness is a supplemental that is sitting somewhere that is not getting the funds that you need to do what you really need to do.

And so, General Cody and General Magnus, my question for both of you today is, if that supplemental doesn't come forward in a timely basis, what specifically is going to be denied you, denied the Guard, that is going to hurt us and hurt their readiness because I think that is the issue we need to be addressing and getting before this committee today?

General CODY. Congressman, for the Army, we start running out of military pay for our force in June, we start running out of——

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Let me just stop you there. So that means that, despite the fact that what we are talking about pay being—we start running out of pay in June?

General CODY. That is correct. We start running out of operational dollars that we can flow to the force either down range or back home in early July for the active, by the end of July for the National Guard.

But I will tell you it is a cumulative effect. We have had late supplementals two or three times since this war has gone on, and this one here being late during a time, when we have asked our soldiers and families to surge for 15 months, we are in uncharted waters.

Mr. FORBES. So that means that, even a delay—even if the money ultimately comes—the delay means you have to start making decisions earlier rather than later that could be that you couldn't withdraw those decisions down the road; is that correct?

General CODY. We have to run contingencies. That is correct.

Mr. FORBES. General Magnus.

General MAGNUS. Sir, thank you.

If we don't get the supplemental in a timely manner, as I said before, sir, it will simply mean that we, number one, delay procurement of warfighting equipment until such time as the Congress appropriates the funds and it becomes law.

The Army and Marine Corps—literally in that order—in the fourth quarter will run out of the necessary manpower funding and the necessary operation and maintenance funding, and we will, of course, support the troops forward, but that will simply mean that we begin to ratchet down operations at home, and that includes depot maintenance.

I am confident that we will be supported in the request for these funds.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Does poor Mr. Courtney ever get to go, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Does Mr. Courtney want to go?

Dr. SNYDER. Yes. I will go last.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to do that.

Mr. COURTNEY. After the lunch break so thank you, Mr. Snyder.

I want to thank Mr. Chairman also for holding this hearing and the witnesses, both for your service but also for your frankness today and not pulling any punches in terms of the testimony that you have given.

Recently in Hartford, Connecticut, where I come from, General Eric Shinseki spoke to a large gathering veterans' ceremony, another distinguished public servant who also spoke frankly and, I think, will go down in history as a prophet, frankly, about this whole episode and time of our country's history.

And there was a large number of people in the crowd expecting him to talk about his testimony before the Congress prior to the conflict and the honest answers that he gave about what he thought the proper troop size was and the consequences that he suffered as a result of that.

But instead what he talked about when he spoke to the crowd was what he saw as the fallout and the—after Vietnam in terms of the loss to the officer corps of the military—the hollowing out that Mr. Skelton referred to earlier—and expressed grave concern about the fact that we are now entering a somewhat similar period in our history.

The *New York Times* reported that half the graduating class of West Point 2001 left military service. General Petraeus earlier today, when he was talking about the success in terms of recruit-

ment enlistment of enlisted men, did point out the fact that retaining the captains still is a challenge for our armed forces.

And I was wondering what, in the context of military readiness, it means to our country that really the best and the brightest are not staying with their original plans?

General CODY. It is a serious concern, Congressman.

By the way, five of those captains have my last name, and so I get feedback.

We have run a retention bonus on our captains. We need to retain the best and brightest. Twelve thousand of them took it. This past year we just opened it back up for the rest—for the year groups again to get another shot at it, and hopefully that will bring more of them to stay with us.

The reason why we need them to stay with us is, when we grow 6th Infantry brigade combat teams by 2011, that is 36 to 37 captain company commanders we need. It is 40 new majors we need, so many new lieutenant colonels. We have to start growing them now and retaining them now. So as we grow this Army out, on the active side in particular, with a 65K force that we are going to grow it to, we need to retain these captains because they are going to be the majors and lieutenant colonels that are going to be leaving these outfits.

So it is very important to us. We are watching it closely. I have been to most of the training bases and talked to the captains that are just coming back from the war. We have sent a brigadier general out with a team to talk to the captains of the units coming back from 15-month deployments.

At the end of the day, those who are leaving has to do with they don't—they are having a struggle between their family life and staying with an Army they love. And it has all to do with the fact they don't have enough dwell time in between deployments, and we shouldn't put them in that position. It breaks my heart when a young captain says, "I am so proud of what I have done, this is my second tour, but I have to make a choice between seeing my daughter's birthday and all the things," and he said, "I just can't put my family through it." We should not have them in that position. That is why getting this force size is so important to us.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. My time is almost up, but I have talked to families back home who have described exactly that torn feeling and the fact that it is the dwell-time issue that really seems to be the biggest factor that is driving people out of the force. And hopefully the President is going to change that proportion, as been reported in the press, in the next 48 hours, 72 hours or so because that—General Shinseki clearly conveyed that message is that, if he had to describe what he thought was the biggest future challenge to our country's military readiness, it is the damage that has been done to the middle ranks of our armed forces.

Yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Bartlett, Dr. Snyder, then Mr. Saxton in that order.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.

What do I say to those who ask me why Stop Loss isn't a backdoor draft?

General CODY. First, Congressman, thanks for the question.

It is because it is the law. It is the military service obligation. It is part of every contract.

We do not like Stop Loss. I wish we weren't in the position that we had to use it. But we are executing Stop Loss because of the short turnaround cycle of the units with 12 months dwell time back at home, we have to keep unit integrity and unit cohesion and key people, and so that is one of the reasons why we have instituted it.

We started it, as you know, early just for high-demand, low-density military occupational skills, but when the war continued second, third and fourth rotation, and access to the National Guard, after we spiked up in 2005, we have had to keep Stop Loss in.

But it is not a backdoor draft. The contracts are clear. I wish we don't use it, but——

Mr. BARTLETT. As necessary as it may be, to what extent do you think it may hurt recruitment?

General CODY. I hope it doesn't hurt recruitment. It hasn't so far. I will say that many of the young soldiers who end up being Stop Lossed turn around and reenlist in the combat zone. But we shouldn't put them in that position. We need to steady out this force so we don't put this on their backs, and that is why getting the force right and getting the dwell times back to where they need to be is so important to us.

Mr. BARTLETT. General, at a hearing here last March you testified that we have the best counterinsurgency force in the world but they are not trained for full-spectrum operations. I shouldn't conclude from that that you believe that we are adequately equipped?

General CODY. The units back home today are short equipment for not just the counterinsurgency fight but for a full spectrum. So we would have to move equipment around if we were to move to another battlefield for full-spectrum operations. But the units across the board right now have enough equipment back home to train for the mission they have in Iraq and Afghanistan but not enough time to train for full-spectrum in order to have all the equipment for it.

Mr. BARTLETT. Which of those two shortages is the more acute, people or equipment? We can fix the latter with money. The former is a little more difficult.

General CODY. Right now in the first six months, it is both. It is people and equipment. Because, as I said, the surge took all the stroke out of the shock absorber for our personnel accounts. And so in the first six months of reset, it is people and equipment. The last six months, if you are talking about full spectrum, it is time and equipment.

Mr. BARTLETT. General Magnus, let me ask you a question that may be of more concern to you.

We found that the Humvees were very susceptible to IEDs, and so we have now deployed at considerable cost a large number of MRAPs. The enemy, in response to that—and I gather that, because we now find more explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and they are clearly placed by more professional people because we cannot find anywhere near the percentage of EFPs that we do of IEDs,

that the enemy knows that they are more effective. These, of course, can bring down a tank.

At what point might our service people in the MRAP threatened by EFPs be no more safe than they were in the Humvee threatened by IEDs?

General MAGNUS. Thank you for the question, Congressman Bartlett.

We continue to evaluate, along with the Army—and, quite frankly, the Navy and the Air Force are also using increased armored protection, including the MRAPs both in Iraq, principally, and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan—we continue to evaluate the requirements.

In Al Anbar province, where the majority of Marines are in Iraq, this is more than just about the nature and the capability of a single IED or EFP, which are right now at a tiny fraction of the number of incidents—and incidents includes actual attacks, as well as those that are turned into us by the Iraqis own security forces—a tiny fraction of what it was 18 months ago.

When we initially went with the Army to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and started what was a tremendous response to the request for these MRAP vehicles back in January and February of last year, the number of incidents was at a high and immediately began a decline because of a variety of things, and it was not the least of which, of course, was the vehicles, but it was also the effectiveness of our tactics and the Iraqis.

Explosively formed penetrators are not currently a significant portion of the incidents in Al Anbar. They are much more of a concern in Baghdad and the areas to the east, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Generals, for being with us.

And, General Cody, I have sat through many a hearing with you and appreciate your service through all these years, and perhaps we will see you in this setting before you leave, but, if not, we certainly wish you well.

I also always appreciate your no-nonsense style about things. We have had several discussions back and forth today about what happens if we don't have a supplemental pass in a timely manner, and I appreciate your being very straightforward about that. And in your statement you list the things that could happen, and I think there will be bipartisan interest in seeing that this happens in a timely way.

But I also think we need to—you were also very clear in your statement—and I am just going to read from page nine, which didn't get read when the list was read—in which you state, "Congressional action on the balance of the GWOT request prior to the end of May will provide funds in time to prevent any disruption in operations or programs."

So I think in the intent of Speaker Pelosi is to have that done before we recess for Memorial Day, but I think it is helpful that you have laid out that list of the things that can happen if that is not done.

I wanted to pursue a little bit—Mr. Conaway began the discussion, but I was going to ask about it anyway, which is this issue that Admiral Fallon first brought to our attention on March 5—sitting right where you are, General Cody—about the need for 2,000 troops, primarily trainers, for Afghanistan. And I think there were a number of concerns. I know it concerns you. You have got a combatant commander saying he needs 2,000 troops for a war zone right now, today, not 6 months from now, and yet we don't seem to have the ability to meet that need.

My first question, though, was piqued by what you said about that response to Mr. Conaway, which you said—if I heard you correctly—which is you have other requests from combatant commanders that—well, I guess they are potential requests that are actually not being made because they know they can't be met.

One of the fears that some of us have had over the last six or seven years is that we would hear from the then Secretary of Defense that any need from combatant commanders is being met, but some of us have feared that word has gotten around they can't be met so the requests aren't being made.

Of those that you have in the back of your mind, when you know there are combatant commanders out there that have needs, that they would make the request if they thought they could be met, what other ones relate to the war in Iraq or Afghanistan, other than Admiral Fallon's request for the trainers for Afghanistan?

General CODY. Thank you, Congressman.

Most of them deal with theater security cooperation, whether it be in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) or U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) or U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) AOR. Many of them deal with civil affairs and psychological operations (PSYOPS) deployments, medical teams to South America—the Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs) we used to run down there—Special Operations training with other countries armies, reinforced by a company of Army troops.

Those types of operations for theater engagement are critical to us worldwide so that we can assist countries that want to partner with us and help them build and train with their military. In Europe I know of a couple exercises that we could not get the right numbers of troops there because we were so stretched other places. We had the same problem on one of the Korean exercises. And so we end up having to cobble together capabilities that weren't really what the combatant commander wanted.

Dr. SNYDER. So there are not any other specific requests as straightforward as Admiral Fallon has requested?

General CODY. That affect GWOT, no.

Dr. SNYDER. Help me understand about the 2,000. So Admiral Fallon specifically said he needs 2,000 today in addition to the Marines that are either going or about to go. When Admiral Keating and the commandant were here, the commandant said he didn't have the troops. Admiral Keating said—I asked him, "If you were required to come up with 2,000 troops from your command, could you find areas where you could do without 2,000 troops?" and he said he could. Subsequent to that, we had Admiral Mullen, who said, "Well, Admiral Mullen needs to talk with us because we can't find them."

Now, what I don't understand is why can't we find those troops? In terms of balancing of risk for a period of time, could we do with 1,000 less troops in South Korea and 500 less or 1,000 or so less in Japan? I mean, I am just—you all know your business.

But this must be incredibly frustrating for you warfighters, when you have one of your combatant commanders saying I need 2,000 more troops, we are the most powerful nation on earth, we have the most powerful military in the world, and we can't find 2,000 more troops. Now, is it just not realistic out there to find those 2,000?

General CODY. We have looked, to be sure. When the first request came in—and it wasn't 2,000 when it came in, it was for a brigade, which was about 3,200—this was to train the Afghan army and police, and we looked at it very hard. Again, I go back to my comment that the surge sucked all the stroke out of the shock absorber. We have very little flex.

Now, we are under partial mobilization. When people ask and say, "Gees, you got 1.1 million people in the Army. Can't you find that?" Not the way we are operating today. We haven't fully mobilized for this war, and I am not suggesting that we should. We have put a lot of strain and stress on the National Guard and the Reserve component forces, we have got a lot of stress and strain on the active force, and when we looked at this, we couldn't find the 2,000 that we would move over there to do it cyclically because it was going to take away from the warfight in Iraq.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me follow through on that.

The question was asked of Admiral Keating—a similar question was asked of Admiral Keating, when he was here, and my recollection is that he said he has sufficient troops to do that; am I not correct?

Dr. SNYDER. That is exactly what he said——

The CHAIRMAN. From his command. And I understand the thrust of Dr. Snyder's question and a little trouble on why you can't find the answer.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. SNYDER. May I ask in a related follow-up?

The CHAIRMAN. Please do.

Dr. SNYDER. And you have been in the building a long time now, Mr. Cody. Do you know, when did Iraq become priority number one and Afghanistan became priority number two? Because that is what your talk about here. Your priority is number one—and those 2,000 troops are somewhere. Right now they are in Iraq. When did Iraq become priority number one?

General CODY. I don't have the exact date. I believe, though, we ran an exercise with the Joint Staff—our Elaborate Crossbow series exercises—and I can't remember if it was Elaborate Crossbow 1 or 2 where we looked at all the combatant commands (COCOMs) across the board on how we were going to balance when we rotated OIF one force out in the OIF to the Iraq force in and how we were going to balance across the COCOMs, as well as the requirements for Afghanistan and Iraq. But it was somewhere probably in the 2004 timeframe, as I remember.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN. For what it is worth being a country lawyer and a reserver through the years, those in the area that might well attack us, as they have before, have a very difficult time understanding why that does not remain priority number one.

Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I just wanted to follow up on a question that the chairman asked earlier when he said, if the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were over—I don't know whether he used the word "instantly" or not—but came to an end and what we would do, and I thought, General Cody, your answer was right on. Obviously, we would have to get people out of the country in an organized, efficient manner. We would have to return to broad-spectrum training that you talked about.

Let me just ask this: Looking ahead just a little bit further—let us say 5 to 10 years—it seems to me that we are going to find ourselves going through a revolutionary development in warfare. Over the past several months, I have had the opportunity to look at some of the technology that both the Army and Marines will have access to as we go forward. Just the other day we ventured to Fort Bliss to see some components of the future combat system, which are quite impressive. And, of course, more recently—just today—the Army had an FCS and Land Warrior demonstration here in this building.

And I have got to say, Mr. Chairman, that, while it is fairly easy—comparatively easy to talk about legacy systems—where we need more, where we have weaknesses, where we need more training, where we need different kinds of training—it is a whole new world to try to figure out what the technologies that we will be adopting in the military in the next decade mean to readiness, warfighting capability.

For example, to think about tactical firepower that can be precision firepower and reach out 40 kilometers, to talk about the force multiplier effect of various types of technology and sensors that can actually relieve us of some human responsibilities, that we can have command vehicles that can handle top-secret information and be mobile, that we can have fuel-efficient vehicles that eliminates the need for long convoys of fuel trucks using electric and diesel hybrid technology.

These things are all in the design stage, and they are going to be real, and I just—and the Land Warrior system, a system that gives soldiers at the platoon leadership level the ability to see things that we can't see now. It is hard to talk about these things because we really haven't developed a language to explain them to each other very well yet.

General Cody, I would just like to ask—you have been dealing with these things on a full-time basis now for the entire period that they have been in development, whatever that has been. Tell us what you think they mean to future readiness and future force capability?

General CODY. Thank you, Congressman.

You have stated it better than I can, but the real dichotomy that we are in, that we have always been in in the past and why I think we need to reverse that trend is we have always traded off either our current or our future, and we no longer can do that.

The Future Combat System suite of equipment that you saw—the Army's experimental task force out there—some of that technology was being used right now in Iraq. With the help of this committee, we have got unmanned aerial vehicles tied to manned systems, air-ground manned and unmanned teaming seeking out and killing the IED and placers. We have got robotics that are doing great work in saving soldiers' lives.

This stuff is here today, and what we need to do is take the long-term view. We can't leave Iraq and Afghanistan—whenever that is—and turn around and say, "Well, that was fine, and we paid for it by taking money out of future." Because we are going to face another threat.

And the chairman talked about 1950 and that war. We stopped looking at the future back then, and our bullets wouldn't take care of the Chinese tanks. We didn't have the right communication gear, and Brad Smith and Task Force Smith had a heck of a fight on his hands, and the Pusan Perimeter almost collapsed because we did not have the forethought to invest in future technologies.

And so we have to balance that in a balanced way. But the Future Combat System promises to save soldiers on the battlefield, allow them to develop out of the contact the situation and bring precision munitions to the enemy and gives us great latitude, as well as reduces our logistical footprint.

We need to continue to invest in that because there are going to be fights in the next five years where that technology is going to be needed, and we can't turn around and say, "Let us trade off those monies there to fix your current problems." We have to take a balanced approach.

Mr. SAXTON. General Magnus, do you have a perspective on this?

General MAGNUS. Thank you, Congressman. Again, agree with—and no surprise the two warriors known each other so long agree.

You are right about the tremendous impact of changing in technologies, but I will tell you that the human element of warfare continues to rapidly evolve. And more than just the humans. Yes, robots. Robots help us. In the future they are going to be under sea, looking for mines, but they are on the ground right now getting an advance of our explosive ordinance disposal teams and our other ground combat Marines.

But it is also dogs. We are now learning how to use combat tracker dogs, new ways of using an old capability—the man-dog team—but also bomb dogs. They don't have to be used just in the airports. They are actually helping the Marines along with the robots.

Along with intelligence fusion, and not just soldiers and Marines but interagency fusion of our capabilities. To be able to exploit networks—the enemy is using networks to enable their command and control communications and propaganda. We can also exploit not only our own networks but exploit the capabilities of others.

We are fielding dramatically new capable weapon systems. The Marines are first deploying out a weapon system that was pio-

neered by the Army—the Army's multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). We have got the high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARs) version of that. They are firing precision rockets from Al Taqaddum in support of operations in Al Anbar.

We are fielding a new 120-millimeter mortar system and our Expeditionary Fire Support System so that, if we again have to go to someplace like Eastern Afghanistan—and it is not a question of if, it is simply a question of when and where we will go there—we will have organic, long-range precision fires to fill the gap between 81-millimeter mortars and the 155s and, on the high end, the HIMARs.

We are going to meet and beat the threat of things like IEDs and EFPs not just by armoring our vehicles. And we are armoring our vehicles. You know about the Humvees, the MRAPs and the future joint light tactical vehicles (JLTVs). But it is a combination of counter-IED electronic warfare equipment, as well as the tactics and techniques of our soldiers and Marines.

New ground combat systems, like the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, new ships, new aircraft, but also a new 21st century warrior team, which is here now and is probably evolving faster than the technologies are evolving.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Taylor has a question.

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Gentlemen, again, thank you for sticking around.

General Magnus, on the V–22—great platform, I am glad it is working. It does, however, strike me as being particularly vulnerable with its lack of self-defense. And I was curious what initiatives are taking place within the Marine Corps to weaponize the V–22. I am glad things are going well in Anbar, but there is no guarantee it stays that way.

The second thing I would hope you mention is, in your written testimony, you talked about the Marine Corps Wounded Warrior units. Every young amputee that I have encountered, first words out of their mouths are they want to stay with their unit. And I am curious to what extent both of your services are letting those young people know early on the opportunities that exist, what steps they would have to take in order to stay in? And I am very pleased that, because of the help of the Secretary of the Navy and the folks at the Merchant Marine Academy, we do have a program to try to get some of your wounded warriors over to that academy to act as coaches and tutors and instructors.

Can you walk us through some of the opportunities that you are finding for people who, because of their service to their country, find themselves in that situation?

General MAGNUS. Thank you, Congressman. So let me answer this in two parts. First on the V–22 and then, second, on what we are doing with wounded warriors, and on that one I certainly would recommend that we allow General Cody to comment on the Army's Wounded Warrior brigade and the tremendous efforts that they are doing.

V–22 self-defense, quite frankly, all of our rotary-wing aircraft, with the exception of our attack helicopters, have always been vulnerable to fires received from the forward area. The only heli-

copters that have forward-firing weapon systems are attack platforms that have been equipped with forward-firing guns or forward-firing organs like Hellfire and Tow.

Having said that, the V–22 currently deploys with a ramp-mounted gun, which is very similar to the capabilities we use for sideward-firing and rearward-firing guns, even on some of our special operations aircraft.

But, in fact, we are now working and believe that we will be successful in testing and eventually fielding a belly-mounted gun system that will be able to be deployed out of the door in the belly that is commonly called the "hell hole" that will allow a forward-firing capability for the first time from a transport helicopter. We believe we will be able to successfully test that this year. On the completion of those successful tests, we will rapidly field—and this is not a new gun system, but it is integration of the system inside the V–22 for the first time.

Our first V–22 deployment is finishing this month, and they will be replaced with another V–22 squadron. And we are glad to report that, not only are the readiness of the aircraft up and their effectiveness has been great but we have sustained no aircraft losses or casualties.

With respect to our Wounded Warrior Regiment, sir, our first mission, of course, is to get our troops recovered and rehabilitated. There will be a determination then at the right point, particularly for those who are traumatically injured, such as amputees or those that have traumatic brain injury, a point at which a decision will be made as to whether or not the medical personnel believe there is what we call an "unfitting condition"; in other words, some medical disability that may prevent them from continuing military service.

We will do everything in our power to make sure that, if it is an infantryman, that there is a possibility, if they desire to stay in military service, that they can change their occupational specialty, provided that they are still fit for some other military capability in the Marine Corps. We will put them on the temporary-limited-disability list, which will last for up to 18 months, pending reevaluation. They may, in fact, be able to go to the permanent-disability list, in which case they will no longer be responsible for things that they could have done before they were disabled but now no longer can do, provided that they are still fit to perform in some military occupational field.

Many of our wounded elect—as they would have if they weren't wounded—elect to leave military service whether they are medically retired or not. We will do everything for our wounded to make sure that, whether they stay or they elect to leave or if, in fact, they are found to be unfit to stay in military service, that we not only provide them the clinical and nonclinical care, but Marines are Marines for life. We will take care of them and help them with the Veterans Administration—which we are doing right now—to ensure that they can get the education they need to provide a useful and productive role in society whether or not they stay Marines in uniform or become civilian Marines.

General CODY. Thank you, Congressman, for that question.

Just like General Magnus said, we offer every one of our soldiers, if they want to stay on active duty and it is physically possible for them to do that, we allow them. We have got double-amputees that we have put down at our hospitals to train other amputees as a coach. We have got a double-amputee that is going to go to the War College and then be an instructor at West Point. Master Sgt. Luis Rodriguez lost his leg early in this war above the knee. We allowed him to stay on active duty.

We have got a couple of hundred—I review the list every month—of soldiers that ask to stay on active duty, and we make those accommodations, and we do it early in the process because we know it is important. Many of them want to stay and continue to stay with their buddies and contribute to this Army that they have invested in.

We have 11,000 wounded warriors today in our 35 Wounded Warrior Transition Units. Within 12 months, 70 percent of them are returned back to their units physically and mentally fit to continue on. The other 30 percent end up going through the physical evaluation board process. We stay with them the whole step of the way as we go through this.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, my question is, specifically, for both of your services, is there a timeline once that wounded warrior has regained consciousness? Is there a timeline where you try to deliver the message that you, as the United States Army—you, as the United States Marine Corps—are going to do everything humanly possible should it be that service person's decision, to help them stay?

And this goes to a very real scenario that I encountered in the past month or so, but it is about the third or fourth time that I have seen it, where—I can't imagine waking up missing an arm or a leg. I have seen other people that happened to, but I just can't imagine going through it myself. But amongst all the other uncertainty that this person is dealing with, that is one of them that I don't think anyone has clearly said to them, "Look, if you want to stay, we are going to find a way to help you make that happen. This is what we are going to expect of you. This is what we are going to do for you." When do you deliver that message?

General CODY. Usually, it is delivered—because we set up the case managers and the Warrior Transition Units. Usually, it is delivered when they get on our wards, either at Walter Reed or Bethesda or at Brooke Army Medical. They stay a very short time in Landstuhl and then get brought in. I go up there—some soldiers will stay in the intensive care unit (ICU) for sometimes 2 to 3 weeks and then move up to Ward 57 or 56.

And then they are teamed with their case manager, the nurse care manager, as well as their squad leader from the Wounded Transition Unit. And we have empowered that triad of care to let the soldier know that we are going to do everything we can for that soldier to get him totally rehabilitated and, if they want to stay in, we will assist them in doing that—or her.

I had a case—these are all anecdotes. I had a case of a young lady, a specialist, military police (MP), who lost both her legs below the knee, and she asked to stay on active duty, we gave her that option, she rehabilitated well, and then at the last minute she de-

cided, you know what, I really don't want to do that, and we honored that. So we are working with them.

There are some tragic cases, though. We should not put false hope to some of these people because they can't stay on active duty. And for those, they are taken care of in our Army Wounded Warrior Program to move them through and take care of them all the way up to the point where they have to be medically discharged and go into the VA, and then our case manager from the Wounded Warrior Program stays with them for five years—or with their family, depending upon how severe the case is—and then we renew that.

But there are cases out there, Congressman. I have seen them—and I know you have—where we will not be able to keep them in uniform, and those are the tragic ones.

General MAGNUS. If I could, I will pile on to what General Cody said, Congressman.

Early on—two things—we are going to tell them as soon as they ask, which is usually—and I have seen them undergoing multiple surgeries want immediately go back to their unit with their warrior buddies. So we are not going to give them false hope. What we will tell them and their next of kin that are with them is that we are going to focus on regaining their health, getting their medical condition right, if they need therapy—and many of the severely wounded, including the amputees we talked about—we have had single and multiple amputees that are still in military service. I know of a gunnery sergeant that has had over 30 surgeries and is still on active duty, mainly because he is still undergoing surgery and we are not trying to push him out of the door until he is ready.

The commandant of the Marine Corps two years ago told them that, if they are fit to perform any military occupational specialty and, if they want to stay in the Marine Corps, we will do our best to take care of them clinically first and then take care of their rehabilitation in terms of their ability to perform a useful function.

None of these troops want to feel like we are just keeping them to make them happy. They want to be soldiers, they want to be Marines, and we don't want to give them false hopes, but we will give them every single asset that they need, including caring, to make sure that we are going to continue to take care of them.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Special thanks and tribute to each of you for your long and dedicated service. We appreciate it more than you know.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Couple of things—one is, General Magnus, how many embassies do Marines man around the world? Quite a few, isn't it?

General MAGNUS. Yes, sir. Embassies, including consulates, well over 150. In fact, the number in the last several years since 9/11 has increased in response to security requirements from the State Department.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So over 150. What is your average Marine contingent at each one of those?

General MAGNUS. Sir, I can get you the information on the numbers. The detachments vary quite significantly. In fact, we have deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq Marine fleet antiterrorism support teams to back up the Marine security guards.

Normally, the number of Marines is in the vicinity of 8 to 15, but, again, it varies depending upon the security situation in the nation.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. I was just looking at that following on the question of my friend from Mississippi. If you have got 1,500-plus positions at embassies around the world, that would seem to me to be a good location for wounded Marines who may want to have—may be kind of nice to be able to go tell the wife we can go back and we can stay in the Corps and we can deploy to one of these locations.

General MAGNUS. If I could, Congressman, the only Marines that go to Marine security guard duty are ground combat arms. These are fully fit and male Marines for close combat that comes to your attention when you see an assault like we saw on the assault in the embassy in Belgrade. These Marines have to be capable of independent combat action. And so we would make sure that a Marine who goes into close combat arms is as fully capable as he would be if he was sent to close combat in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, don't you have some embassies that are pretty benign, the ones that the State Department guys like to go to?

General MAGNUS. Yes, sir. They are benign until they are not.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Let us explore that a little bit, though, General. I think you ought to have some—the other place we were looking—at least I thought was of interest—is the State Department, especially when I saw the reluctance of some of the State Department folks to go to the Green Zone. You have probably got some great Marines and soldiers that would like to look at that career in the State Department and go to some of those places.

But, listen, one thing that I missed, when I was talking about General Cody's—was made aware that General Cody is retiring was that you, General Magnus, are retiring on July 16; is that correct?

General MAGNUS. Seventh, sir. Please don't push it a day. [Laughter.]

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Somebody moved you up.

Well, this is kind of a—to me, this is quite a blow to the committee because you have given magnificent service to our country. And to have both of you gentlemen here, especially in the middle of this conflict, leaving the service, I think, is a real loss to our country. And I want to commend you on a magnificent career—I know the committee does—and I wish there was a way to keep both of you aboard for the service to our country, especially while we are engaged in two shooting wars.

But thank you very much for your great service to the Corps and to America.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, gentlemen, and I know everyone on this committee joins Mr. Hunter in commending you for your outstanding and fearless service.

Thank you so much.

[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

April 9, 2008

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 9, 2008

RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

GENERAL RICHARD A. CODY
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SECOND SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

ON THE READINESS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

APRIL 9, 2008

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

For over six years our Nation has been at war. Our Army—Active, Guard and Reserve—has been a leader in this war. We have been fully engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and defending the homeland. Today, I am honored to represent the Nation's nearly one million Soldiers—nearly 600,000 of whom serving on active duty and over 250,000 of whom are deployed worldwide — as I testify on issues critical to the readiness of the United States Army.

To understand the need for an Army that is fully prepared to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict, one must clearly understand that the world in which we live is exceedingly dangerous. Global terrorism and extremist ideologies threaten our safety and our free way of life.

We believe that the coming decades are likely to be ones of persistent conflict among state, non-state, and individual actors who use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. Soldiers will continue to confront highly adaptive and intelligent adversaries in complex terrain. They will exploit technology, information, and cultural differences to threaten U.S. interests. Soldiers must be ready to conduct full-spectrum operations in campaigns that include peace engagement, counterinsurgency, and major combat operations. Because these missions require us to operate among the people, Army forces will continue to have a central role conducting Joint operations to implement our national security strategy and defend our nation.

An Army Out of Balance

Today's Army is out of balance. The current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds the sustainable supply and limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies. While our Reserve Components (RC) are performing magnificently, many RC units have been assigned missions as an operational force, when they had been resourced as a strategic reserve for decades. Current operational requirements for

forces and insufficient time between deployments require a focus on counterinsurgency training and equipping to the detriment of preparedness for the full range of military missions.

Given the current theater demand for Army forces, we are unable to provide a sustainable tempo of deployments for our Soldiers and Families. Soldiers, Families, support systems, and equipment are stretched and stressed by the demands of lengthy and repeated deployments, with insufficient recovery time. Equipment used repeatedly in harsh environments is wearing out more rapidly than programmed. Army support systems, designed for the pre-9/11 peacetime Army, are straining under the accumulation of stress from six years at war. Overall, our readiness is being consumed as fast as we build it. If unaddressed, this lack of balance poses a significant risk to the All-Volunteer Force and degrades the Army's ability to make a timely response to other contingencies.

Restoring Balance

We are committed to restoring balance to preserve our All-Volunteer Force, restore necessary depth and breadth to Army capabilities, and build essential capacity for the uncertain future. Our plan will mitigate near-term risk and restore balance by 2011 through four imperatives: Sustain, Prepare, Reset and Transform.

Sustain

To sustain our Soldiers, Families, and Army Civilians in an era of persistent conflict we must maintain the quality and viability of the All-Volunteer Force and the many capabilities it provides to the Nation. By Sustaining our Soldiers and their Families we will ensure that they have the quality of life they deserve, and that we will continue to recruit and retain a high quality force. In order to *sustain* our force we must offer dynamic incentives that attract quality recruits to meet our recruiting

objectives for 2008 and beyond; provide improved quality of life and enhanced incentives to meet our retention objectives; continue to improve the quality of life for Army Families; continue to improve care for Wounded Warriors and Warriors in Transition through a patient-centered health care system, Soldier and Family Assistance Centers, and improved Warrior Transition Unit facilities; and continue to support Families of our fallen with sustained assistance that honors the service of their Soldiers.

Prepare

To prepare our Solders, units, and equipment we must maintain a high level of readiness for the current operational environments, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. To fully *prepare* our Army, we must continue to adapt and enhance the rigor and realism of institutional, individual, and operational training to enable Soldiers to succeed in complex 21st century security environments; train Soldiers and units to conduct full spectrum operations with improved training ranges to operate as part of a Joint, interagency, or multi-national force; provide Soldiers the best equipment through the Rapid Fielding Initiative, the Rapid Equipping Force, and base budget-funded modernization efforts; partner with private industry to rapidly develop and field equipment needed on today's battlefield; and continue to improve the Army Force Generation process which increases the readiness of the operating force over time by generating recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units

Reset

To reset our force we must prepare our Soldiers, units, and equipment for future deployments and other contingencies. The objective of Reset is to undo the accumulated effects of more than six years of combat operations.

There are three broad components of Reset: resetting equipment, retraining Soldiers and reconstituting units by revitalizing Soldiers and

Families. Each of these components must be sufficiently resourced to set the conditions for units to prepare for their next deployment and future contingencies.

The Army must repair, replace and recapitalize its equipment. As we reset equipment, we must not only return units to pre-deployment levels of equipment readiness, but also equip them at the standards required either as part of the modular Army or posture them to return to combat.

Retraining Soldiers is another important component of Reset. Soldiers must be retrained to accomplish the full range of missions. Units back from deployments face the challenge of retraining Soldiers for missions that may be different from those they just completed, especially in the RC. Some units face a transformation process that includes a new mission and organizational structure. These requirements are in addition to professional education requirements for Soldiers and leaders.

The Army must also revitalize Soldiers and Families. Repeated deployments of longer length combined with shorter dwell time at home have stressed Soldiers and their Families. Soldiers and their Families must be given the time and resources they need to reintegrate and reverse the effects of the sustained operational tempo. The Army is providing a number of programs and services to assist the Soldiers and Families during this time. Properly resourced, these programs will contribute to revitalizing our Soldiers and Families.

Transform

To transform our force, we must continuously improve our ability to meet the needs of the Combatant Commanders in a changing security environment. In order to *Transform* we must help balance our force and increase capacity to provide sufficient forces for the full range and duration of current operations and future contingencies by growing as quickly as possible; upgrade and modernize to remain an agile and globally

responsive force with Future Combat Systems (FCS) as the core of our modernization effort; continue organizational change through modularity and rebalancing to become more deployable, tailorable, and versatile; complete the transition of the RC to an operational reserve and change the way we train, equip, resource, and mobilize RC units; and integrate the Grow the Army initiative, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), Global Defense Posture Realignment, and the operation of installations and facilities. Achieving these goals will increase our readiness, improve our efficiency, and improve the quality of life for our Soldiers, Families, and Army Civilians.

I want to highlight three critical aspects of readiness: Modernization; Growth of the Army; and full and timely Funding.

Modernization

Future Combat Systems (FCS) are the core of our modernization effort and will provide our Soldiers an unparalleled understanding of their operational environment, increased precision and lethality, and enhanced survivability in both irregular warfare and conventional campaigns. These improved capabilities cannot be achieved by upgrading current vehicles and systems. FCS will use a combination of new manned and unmanned air and ground vehicles, connected by robust networks, to allow Soldiers to operate more effectively in the persistent and complex threat environments of the 21st century. Maintaining our technological edge over potential adversaries, providing better protection, and giving our Soldiers significantly improved capabilities to accomplish their mission are the reasons for FCS. FCS capabilities currently are being tested at Fort Bliss, Texas, and they are proving themselves valuable in the current fight and are being fielded to our Soldiers in combat operations today.

Soldiers have always had to fight for information. Since World War II, 52% of casualties resulted from "finding the enemy." In irregular warfare, when the enemy hides among the people, Soldiers need the

Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) capability to identify threats before the point man enters the building or the convoy hits an IED. Our goal is to develop the situation before making contact, so when Soldiers engage the enemy, it is from a position of advantage instead of the ambush zone. FCS provides over 830 RSTA sensors — four times the number in the old brigade design and twice the number in the modular Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Plus, every Soldier truly becomes an effective sensor when he's on the network. The FCS-equipped BCT also provides more Infantry to secure the population, build local contacts and gain more human intelligence. By combining timely and precise RSTA with the power of a robust network, Soldiers can discern insurgent threats before they emerge instead of after they act. This combination of RSTA and the network gives commanders what they need to see the environment, build shared situational awareness, act first and react swiftly to take the initiative away from the insurgent.

Given the risk to Soldiers in close combat with irregular threats, Soldiers need increased survivability in complex urban and human terrain. We are reaching the limits of what armored protection can provide in this kind of fight. FCS provides a new combination of networked and physical systems that help Soldiers avoid detection, avoid the initial hit and survive to eliminate the exposed threat.

Task Force ODIN (Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize) provides a current example in Iraq that reveals how FCS-like RSTA improves situational understanding and survivability by leveraging the power of the manned and unmanned team. Since we established Task Force ODIN to employ Unmanned Aircraft Systems, linked to commanders in the air and on the ground through the Common Ground Station, we have killed several hundred IED emplacers, attacked the IED network, and captured 141 High-Value Targets. This manned/ unmanned teaming has resulted in far more survivable manned aircraft. That's powerful. That's FCS capabilities working today – in combat.

FCS is the our highest priority program, and the Army's only major defense acquisition program on the Department of Defense's list of its 10 largest programs. Over the past three legislative cycles, funding for FCS has been cut by $790 million. These direct reductions have resulted in an indirect programmatic cost increases of $403 million, resulting in total impacts to the FCS program of over $1.2 billion. This impact has resulted in significant delays to System Development and Demonstration work, and have caused slippage in key FCS program milestones by up to eight months. We cannot sustain these continued cuts to our #1 modernization program, and we ask for full funding of this year's request in the President's Budget.

Another critical enabler for the success of our future force are the capabilities that manned and unmanned Army Aviation bring to the battlefield. Aviation forces continue to prove each day their versatility to rapidly reinforce and sustain the commander on the ground and overcome land-bound intervisibility lines and obstacles with responsiveness and unmatched timely and integrated reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. Army Aviation's vital role is enduring and therefore, the Army seeks your continued support to the efforts to modernize Army Aviation as we fight the Global War on Terror and transform, simultaneously. I ask your continued support for the production of the UH-60M, CH-47F, AH-64D, UH-72A (LUH), AH-70 (ARH) and Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA). Additionally, we seek your continued support in the development and procurement of Aviation Survivability Equipment, the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, and our Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Sky Warrior, Shadow, and Raven. Each of these systems provide required capabilities in direct support to the commander on the ground and their roles are assured for the next 20+ years.

Growth of the Force

Our Grow the Force initiative is a critical component of reducing stress on the force, improving readiness, and building strategic depth. In January 2007, the President approved a growth in Army End Strength by 74.2K (65K in the Active Component, 8.2K growth in the Army National Guard, and 1K growth in the US Army Reserve). This plan will build six additional active component BCTs, 15 Support Brigades, and associated Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. We will culminate in a total of 76 BCTs and approximately 227 Support Brigades across all three components by 2013.

Under surge conditions, the Army goal is to deploy the Active Component at a 1:2 deployed to dwell ratio and the RC at a 1:4 mobilized to demobilized ratio. At these ratios, the Army can supply 21-22 BCTs annually. Currently, meeting global demand requires dwell times well below this surge goal. Some units deploy for 15 months with only 12 months training at home station prior to their next deployment. To meet the Joint demand for Army forces, some RC units must also deploy sooner than the goal of one year mobilized and four years demobilized. Continued deployment rates below the surge goal put the All-Volunteer Force at risk in this era of persistent conflict.

The Army is executing a tightly-woven plan to support this growth, and we are executing this plan concurrently with the 2005 round of BRAC and the Global Defense Posture Realignment. This requires an investment in military construction that is unprecedented – over $66 billion from FY06-13. In order for the plan to have its intended affect on readiness, we must have full, predictable and timely funding for BRAC and military construction. An interruption of our planned sequence of basing actions, and associated construction projects, will have profound impacts on readiness, and the quality of life of Soldiers and their Families.

Full and Timely Funding

Our Soldiers need full and timely funding of the Army's FY09 request of $140.7 billion to be ready to meet the needs of the Nation. For their sake and the safety of our Nation, we must remain dedicated to put the Army back in balance. Over the last six years, the Army has received increasing proportions of its funding through supplemental and GWOT appropriations. Because of this recurring reliance on GWOT funds and a natural overlap between base and GWOT programs, the Army's base budget does not fully cover the cost of both current and future readiness requirements. Because the GWOT planning horizon is compressed and the timing and amount of funding is unpredictable, some base programs would be at risk if supplemental funding is precipitously reduced or delayed.

The Army appreciates the $70 billion "GWOT Bridge Fund" that Congress provided in December of 2007. However, $66.5 billion from the FY08 GWOT request has not yet been provided to the Army. Congressional action on the balance of the GWOT request prior to the end of May will provide funds in time to prevent any disruption in operations or programs. A delay beyond the end of May will create substantial impacts on readiness. Anticipated impacts include:

- The Army runs out of pay for Active Duty and National Guard Soldiers in June 2008;
- The Army runs out of O&M for the Active component in early July and for the Guard in late June;
- Two Stryker BCTs may not receive hull protection kits before they deploy;
- Armored Security Vehicles could face a break in production;
- Army National Guard will not receive 10 CH-47 F model helicopters;
- Converting and existing BCTs will not receive the Bridge to Future Networks communication systems; and

- The Army will be unable to upgrade and construct facilities for returning Wounded Warriors at Forts Drum, Campbell, Stewart, Carson, Hood, Riley and Polk

There are clear implications on the Army's readiness to each and every one of these projected impacts. I ask for your full and timely support of the balance of the FY08 GWOT request, and the FY09 base budget. They are absolutely vital to supporting our Soldiers, sustaining their Families, and restoring balance to our Army.

Preserving the Strength of the Nation

The nation and your Army has been at war for over six years. Our Soldiers have demonstrated valor, endured countless hardships, and made great sacrifices. Over 3,000 Soldiers have died and many more have been wounded. The awards our Soldiers have earned reflect their accomplishments and bravery on the battlefield. But their valor is not enough to restore balance and readiness to our Army. We must continue to invest in our centerpiece – Soldiers – and the Families that support them.

The Congress has provided tremendous support to our Army these past six years, and we are grateful for all you have provided. You have extended our recruiting incentives, provided for our Wounded Warriors, grown the Army, made significant improvements in the quality of life of our Soldiers and their families, and since 9/11 you have authorized and funded 94 new programs worth over $100 billion. With the continued support from the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Congress, the Army will restore balance, build the readiness necessary in an era of persistent conflict, and remain The Strength of the Nation.

Not public until
Released by the
House Armed Services Committee

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL ROBERT MAGNUS
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

9 APRIL 2008

Not public until
Released by the House Armed Services Committee

General Robert Magnus
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps

General Magnus assumed his duties as Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps on 8 September 2005.

Gen Magnus is a graduate of the University of Virginia (1969) and Strayer College (1993). His formal military education includes Naval Aviator Training, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the National War College.

Gen Magnus' operational assignments include: Intelligence Officer, HMM-264; Operations Officer, H&MS-15 SAR Detachment, Task Force Delta, Nam Phong, Thailand; Training Officer, SOES, MCAS Quantico; Aviation Safety Officer, MAG-26 and HMM-263; Weapons and Tactics Instructor, MAG-26 and HMM-261; Operations Officer, MAG-29; Commanding Officer, HMM-365; Commander, Marine Corps Air Bases Western Area; and Deputy Commander, Marine Forces Pacific.

Gen Magnus' staff assignments include: Aviation Assault Medium Lift Requirements Officer; Chief, Logistics Readiness Center, Joint Staff; Executive Assistant to the Director of the Joint Staff; Head, Aviation Plans and Programs Branch; Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation; Assistant Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations; and Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources.

Gen Magnus is married to his wife Rose, they have two children, Elizabeth and David.

I. Introduction

Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter, and distinguished Members of the Committee; on behalf of your Marine Corps, I would like to thank you for your generous and sustained support and look forward to this opportunity to discuss the readiness of your Marine Corps. Your Marines know that the people of the United States and their Government are behind them, and your support has been exceptional.

America's Marine Corps is fully engaged in the Long War. Around the globe, they are performing magnificently under challenging and dangerous conditions, and despite a high operational tempo, the morale and resiliency of your Marines have never been higher. They believe in what they are doing, and know that their sacrifices are making a positive difference everyday. We are currently meeting all operational requirements with ready, mission-capable forces, but sustained combat operations and our high operational tempo are taking a toll on our warriors, equipment, and full spectrum training readiness, as well as their families. To address these challenges we need your continued support to maintain current capabilities, reset the force, and modernize to prepare for future national security challenges. With your continuing support, we will remain the Nations' premiere expeditionary force in readiness—most ready when the Nation is least ready.

II. Stress on the Force—USMC Commitments in the Long War

Our operational tempo and the global demand for Marine forces in support of the Long War remain high. Today, nearly 32,000 Marines are deployed worldwide. Over 25,000 Marines continue to support operations in Iraq, where we are having extraordinary success in transitioning responsibility to Iraqi Security Forces and disrupting insurgent activities—resulting in dramatically improved security throughout Al Anbar province.

Elements of Marine Corps Forces Special Operation Command continue to serve afloat with our Marine Expeditionary Units, and provide foreign military training teams to partner-nation special operations forces—most recently in Mauritania. Also serving ashore, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command continues to conduct combat operations with Afghan, US, and allied Special Forces units in Afghanistan. Additionally, this month the Marine Corps will deploy approximately 3,400 additional Marines to Afghanistan to conduct combat

operations against resurgent Taliban forces, and to help build capacity within the Afghan National Security Forces.

This past year, Marine forces participated in over sixty Theater Security Cooperation events, ranging from small Mobile Training Teams in Central America to Marine Expeditionary Unit exercises in Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific. Additionally, the Marine Corps conducted civil-military and humanitarian assistance operations including New Horizons events in Nicaragua, land mine removal training in Azerbaijan, fire fighting support in Southern California, and cyclone disaster relief in Bangladesh.

Across the globe, Marine Security Guard forces provide crucial support at US embassies from Amman to Zagreb. They perform their duties superbly, as demonstrated in Belgrade. Our Fleet Anti-terrorism Security Teams (FAST) provide a forward deployed expeditionary capability in support of the Combatant Commanders and their Naval Component Commanders by protecting our personnel and key infrastructure. They recently provided a quick reaction force in support of President Bush's trip to Africa.

Due to the continued high demand for Marine forces, our non-deployed units are consistently stressed by the requirement to send their leadership personnel as individual augmentees for transition teams, joint headquarters, and other requirements in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF). While these Marine leaders are enhancing the capabilities of Iraqi and Afghan security forces, and performing needed functions with our deployed joint headquarters, their extended absence from our non-deployed forces leave their units short of the key personnel needed to effectively train, develop unit cohesion, and lead.

Contributing to the stress on our force is the short dwell time between deployments and a necessarily intense focus on counter-insurgency operations. Deploying units conduct a rigorous pre-deployment training program focused heavily on the Iraq and Afghanistan counterinsurgency missions. The short dwell time available at home does not allow our units the time to train to the full spectrum of missions needed to be expeditiously responsive for other contingencies. This short dwell time and heavy training focus on counterinsurgency limit the ability to develop and maintain proficiency in core competencies such as combined arms and amphibious operations. Additionally, the need for units such as artillery, mechanized maneuver and air defense units to train and conduct "in lieu of missions" (such as security, military policing, and civil affairs)

degrades the readiness of those units to conduct their regular primary mission. While the result is a Marine Corps well trained for ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is significant risk in our degraded ability to support other operations, including major combat operations where those primary mission, full spectrum capabilities would be required.

The sustained, high operational tempo of the past several years continues to take its toll on our equipment readiness. In order to ensure that our forward deployed forces are sufficiently equipped, we have cross-leveled equipment from our non-deployed units, strategic programs, and in-stores assets. This cross leveling has degraded our non-deployed units' ability to train for and conduct additional contingency operations.

The net effect of focusing our equipment and personnel priorities on forward deployed units, coupled with a heavy training focus on counterinsurgency operations, is that our ability is very limited to rapidly provide ready forces to conduct other small or large scale operations as well as Theater Engagement, Theater Security Cooperation, and Humanitarian Assistance, missions. Currently, units require additional time to form, train, and equip their forces before deploying in support of contingency operations. Such delay limits effective early options for the Commander in Chief and increases the likelihood of US casualties.

As we continue the Long War, we must maintain current capabilities while we simultaneously prepare for the challenges of the future. The Marine Corps will do this by: right-sizing the force; resetting the force; taking care of our warriors and their families; and modernizing the Marine Corps for the future.

III. Right-sizing the Marine Corps

Today, your active component Marine Corps end strength is approximately 188,000 Marines. As the first step towards minimizing stress on our force and meeting the demands of the Long War, the Marine Corps will grow its active component personnel end strength to 202,000 Marines by 2011. This increase in structure will provide the capabilities for three balanced Marine Expeditionary Forces—each possessing significant ground, aviation, combat logistics, and command and control capability—capable of executing full spectrum operations anywhere in the world. Our end-strength growth is designed to move the unit deployment-to-dwell time ratio, currently near 1:1 for most units, to a more acceptable ratio of 1:2. This

increased dwell time will provide units with additional time to conduct full spectrum training, and significantly reduce the strain on Marines and their families. Our increase in training capacity will be gradual, as we stand up new units, add end strength, and grow our mid-grade enlisted and officer leadership. These are all vital parts of our growth that cannot be developed overnight.

Although growing our force structure presents challenges, we are progressing well. Last year we stood up two infantry battalions and added capacity to our combat engineer battalions and air naval gunfire liaison companies. This year we will add a third infantry battalion, and increase capacity in much needed skill sets including intelligence, communication, civil affairs, military police, unmanned aerial vehicle, helicopter, air command and control, combat service support, and explosive ordnance disposal. Additionally, our growth in Fiscal Year 2008 will add 200 Marines to the Marine Corps Recruiting Command, and nearly 500 to our Training and Education Command.

a. Growing the Force: 202K Marines

The Marine Corps surpassed its Fiscal Year 2007 authorized end strength goal of 184,000, and is well on track to meet both the Fiscal Year 2008 goal of 189,000 Marines and our targeted end strength of 202,000 Marines by Fiscal Year 2011.

Recruiting. A vital factor in sustaining our force and meeting end strength goals is the recruitment of qualified young men and women with the right character, commitment, and drive to become Marines. With over 70% of our end strength increase comprised of Marines on their first enlistment, our recruiting efforts are a critical part of our overall growth. We continue to recruit the best of America's young men and women into our ranks. In Fiscal Year 2007, the Marine Corps added 5000 Marines to our total authorized end-strength, and achieved over 100% of the Active Component accession goal necessary to grow the force. We also met 100% of our reserve recruiting goals. We met these goals while maintaining the high quality standards the American people expect of their Marines. Over 95% of our accessions were high school graduates (DoD standard is 90%), and over 66% were in the upper mental group testing categories (DoD standard is 60%). In fact, we believe these high standards make the Marine Corps more attractive to those considering service in the armed forces in a time of war.

Furthermore, there is a direct correlation between the quality of youth today and the long term effects it has on reducing attrition at the recruit depots, increasing retention, and improving readiness in the operating forces.

We know that active and reserve recruiting will remain challenging particularly given the increased accession requirements needed to meet our end strength growth. To succeed, we need the continuing support of Congress to sustain our existing programs and the incentives essential to achieving our recruiting mission.

Retention. Retention is the other important part of building and sustaining the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps achieved unprecedented numbers of reenlistments in both the first term and career force in Fiscal Year 2007; a strong indicator of our force's high morale. The expanded reenlistment goals, in which we sought to reenlist over 3,700 additional Marines, resulted in the reenlistment of 31% of our eligible first term force and 70% of our eligible career force. This achievement enabled us to reach the first end strength increase milestone of 184,000 while maintaining our high quality standards. In fact, a recent Center for Naval Analysis study showed that the quality of our first term force has improved steadily since Fiscal Year 2000. The percentage of Marines that were high school graduates, scored in the top 50th percentile of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), and achieved a first class physical fitness test score, increased from 40% in Fiscal Year 2000 to 51% in Fiscal Year 2007.

For Fiscal Year 2008, our retention goals are even more aggressive—17,631 compared to 16,098 in Fiscal Year 2007—but we fully expect to meet them. Our continuing success will be attributable to two important enduring themes. First, Marines are motivated to "stay Marine" because they are doing what they signed up to do—fighting for and protecting our Nation... and they know they are winning. Second, they understand our culture is one that rewards proven performance—our Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB) are designed to retain top quality Marines that possess the most relevant skill sets.

Our Marines' leadership and technical skills make them extraordinarily marketable to lucrative civilian employment opportunities. To retain our outstanding Marines, we need Congress' support for SRB funding. In Fiscal Year 2007, the Marine Corps spent approximately $460M in SRB and Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) to help reach our end strength goal. With a reenlistment requirement of 17,631 in Fiscal Year 2008, the Marine Corps expects to spend

$536M in reenlistment incentives. This aggressive SRB plan will allow us to retain the right grade and skill sets for our growing force, particularly among key military occupational specialties.

Reserve Component End Strength. Our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are a Total Force effort, which includes the superb performance by Marine Reserve forces. The Marine Corps goal is to obtain a 1:5 deployment-to-dwell ratio within our Reserve Component. As our active force increases in size, the current, necessary reliance on our Reserve forces will decrease—helping us achieve the desired deployment-to-dwell ratio within our current authorized end strength of 39,600 Selected Marine Corps Reserves. As with every organization within the Marine Corps, we consistently review the make-up and structure of our Reserve component to ensure the right capabilities reside within the Marine Forces Reserve units and the Individual Mobilization Augmentee program.

Military-to-Civilian Conversions. Military-to-civilian conversions replace Marines in non-military-specific billets with qualified civilians, enabling the Corps to return those Marines to the operating forces. Since 2004, the Marine Corps returned 3,096 Marines to the operating force through military-to-civilian conversions. We have only 27 new conversions scheduled for Fiscal Year 2008, but plans are underway to convert approximately 900 military police billets to civilian security personnel over the next four years. We will continue to pursue sensible conversions that will help improve unit personnel readiness and aid in our deployment-to-dwell ratio goals for the force.

b. Growing the Force: Warfighting Investment

Close cooperation between the Marine Corps and our industry partners enabled an accurate assessment of the materiel requirements to grow our force. This cooperation was fundamental to providing the units created in Fiscal Year 2007 with the equipment they needed to enter their pre-deployment training cycle and to be prepared to deploy in this fiscal year. Prioritization of equipment levels and the redistribution of our strategic stocks also played a large role in the preparation of these units. With the Congress' continued support, the numerous equipment contracts required to support our growth to 202,000 Marines were met during Fiscal Year 2007 and will be met through Fiscal Year 2008 and beyond.

The Commandant recently directed a comprehensive Marine Corps-wide Tables of Equipment (T/E) review. The changing security environment and lessons learned by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it clear that many of our units T/E do not necessarily reflect the way we fight today, or will fight in the future. It will take three to four years to work through these equipping challenges and return our total force equipment readiness to the levels which preceded OIF/OEF, but it is a necessary step. The new T/E will support enhanced mobility, lethality, and command and control across a dispersed battlefield for the entire operating force—active and reserve components—and will ensure that our Marines remain capable of meeting both the traditional and irregular warfighting requirements of future conflicts.

c. Growing the Force: Infrastructure Investment

Military construction is an essential component supporting the Marine Corps growth to 202,000 Marines by FY 2011. Because our end strength will increase before final construction is complete, we are providing interim support facilities that will include lease, rental, and purchase of temporary facilities. Our plan will ensure adequate facilities are available to support the phase-in and final operating capability of a 202,000 Marine Corps, while meeting our environmental stewardship responsibilities.

Military Construction – Bachelor Enlisted Quarters Initiative. For single Marines, housing is our top military construction focus. Barracks are a significant quality of life element for our single Marines, but funding shortages and competing priorities over the past several decades forestalled new construction projects. We are now committed to providing adequate billeting for all of our unmarried, junior enlisted and non-commissioned officers by 2012—and for our increased end strength by 2014. To do that, we doubled our bachelor housing funding request from Fiscal Year 2007 to 2008; with more than triple the 2008 amount in Fiscal Year 2009. We are also committed to funding the replacement of barracks furnishings on a seven-year cycle and prioritizing barracks repair projects to preempt repair backlogs.

Public Private Venture (PPV) Housing. For married Marines, the housing privatization authorities are integral to our efforts to accommodate both current housing requirements and those resulting from our planned force structure increases. Thanks to Congressional support, the Marine Corps had business agreements in place at the end of Fiscal Year 2007 to eliminate all of

our inadequate family housing. However, we intend to continue our PPV efforts to address current inventory deficiencies in adequate housing units, as well as the housing deficit being created by the increase in end strength to 202,000. Presently, 99.2% of our US inventory is privatized and we will have 99.7% of the inventory privatized by the end of Fiscal Year 2013. 96% of our worldwide inventory is privatized and we will have privatized 97% of this inventory by this time next year. We don't expect to privatize more than 97% of the worldwide inventory.

Training Capacity. As part of our holistic growth plan, we are increasing training capacity and reinvigorating our pre-deployment training program to provide support to all elements of the MAGTF across the full spectrum of potential missions. In order to accomplish this we are conducting planning studies into an expansion of our range complex at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California in order to support large-scale MAGTF live fire and maneuver training. Additionally, in accordance with the Secretary of Defense's Security Cooperation guidance, we are developing training and education programs to build the capacity of allied and partner nations. We are also developing the capability to conduct large-scale MAGTF exercises within a joint, coalition, and interagency context to maintain proficiency in core warfighting functions such as combined arms maneuver, amphibious operations, and maritime prepositioning operations. Finally, our budget request supports our training and education programs and training ranges to accommodate the 27,000 Marine Corps end strength increase.

Infrastructure Energy Considerations. While we continue to concentrate on the many aforementioned programs, we have not lost our focus on efforts to reduce energy consumption at our installations. We have embraced recent legislative and Presidential mandates to reduce energy consumption and set into place several programs to meet the new energy reduction requirements. Since the new baseline year of 2003, the Marine Corps has reduced its annual energy consumption rate from an overall level of 98.7 Million British Thermal Units (MBTUs) per Thousand Square Feet (KSF) to a present level of 93.22 MBTU per KSF, equating to an estimated utilities cost avoidance of $10.7 million in Fiscal Year 2007. For energy projects awarded since 2003, the average project payback period is 9.9 years.

We are focusing on our mandate to reduce consumption by a minimum of 3% per year through 2015. To achieve this, $4 million in Fiscal Year 2008 and $29 million in Fiscal Year

2009 are programmed to support energy projects that have payback periods of less than 15 years (such as solar roofs, replacement of older heating and air conditioning units with higher efficiency models, and hiring supplemental energy contractor staff whose employment is dependant on lowering installation energy consumption and costs). We also continue to focus on contractor financed energy programs that have been made available through the renewed Energy Savings Performance Contract legislation. Any additional Congressional funding support for the DoD MILCON Energy Conservation Improvement Program (ECIP) would also directly add to our energy reduction efforts. Noteworthy projects which the Marine Corps recently completed or awarded are: the installation of one of DoD's largest solar array field (1 megawatt, payback of 9.9 years with an annual cost avoidance of $392,518) at MCAGCC Twenty Nine Palms; contract award of a 1.25 megawatt wind turbine (payback of approximately 11 years and an annual cost avoidance of $493,727) at MCLB Barstow; and lighting and air conditioning upgrades at MCB Hawaii (payback of 11.8 years with an annual cost avoidance of $1,089,600).

IV. Resetting the Force

For over five years now, the Marine Corps has been involved in intense combat operations resulting in the heavy use and the loss of our combat equipment. The demands of the conflict in Iraq and the greater Global War on Terror increased our equipment maintenance and replacement costs far beyond what was made available in our baseline budget. We are very thankful that Congress has been extremely supportive in providing required GWOT funding to continue our reset efforts.

a. Reset Funding

Reset funds replenish the equipment needed to keep the Marine Corps responsive to today's threats. Costs categorized as "reset" meet one of the following criteria: maintenance and supply activities to restore and enhance combat capability to unit and pre-positioned equipment; replace or repair equipment destroyed, damaged, stressed, or worn out beyond economic repair; and enhance capabilities with the most up-to-date technology. With Congress' help over the last three years, we have begun to make significant progress in drawing down our reset requirements. To date, Congress provided $10.9 billion in supplemental funding towards our

estimated current total reset the force requirement of $15.6 billion. The timely appropriation of procurement funds in the Title IX funds in Fiscal Year 2007 allowed us an early start on this year's procurement actions that will ultimately provide new and improved equipment to our Marines. We also look forward to receiving the $1.3 billion reset funding remaining in the Fiscal Year 2008 GWOT. This funding is critical to our continued progress with resetting the force. As the Long War evolves, we will continue to refine and assess our reset costs.

b. Ground Equipment Readiness

Due to Congress' continuing support our deployed forces have the equipment they need and deserve. Our deployed warfighters are our number one priority and receive our highest equipping priority. Deployed units are reporting the highest readiness levels of equipment supply and condition. Sustaining high deployed equipment readiness has been a total force effort and is not without long term ramifications and consequences. Approximately 26% of all Marine Corps ground equipment and nearly 25% of our active duty aviation ground equipment are engaged overseas. Most of this equipment is not rotating out of theater at the conclusion of each force rotation; it remains in combat, often used on a near-continuous basis, at a pace that far exceeds normal peacetime usage. While the vast majority of our equipment passed the test of sustained combat operations, it is being subjected to more than a lifetime's worth of wear and tear stemming from increased vehicle mileage, operating hours, and exposure to harsh environmental conditions—accelerating both equipment age and maintenance requirements.

For example, in OIF, crews are driving Light Armored Vehicles in excess of 8,700 miles per year—3.5 times more than the programmed annual usage rates of 2,480 miles per year. Our tactical vehicle fleet is experiencing some of the most dramatic effects of excessive wear, operating at five to six times the programmed rates. Additionally, the IED threat forced us to modify vehicles with heavy armor plating, which further accelerated the wear and tear on these assets. These factors, coupled with the operational requirement to keep equipment in theater without major depot repair, significantly decreased the projected lifespan of this equipment. As a result, we can expect higher than anticipated reset costs due to the need to replace assets that are not economically repairable. Depot level maintenance requirements for the repairable equipment will continue beyond the conclusion of hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Equipment aging adds to the readiness challenge as well. As equipment ages, more time, dollars, and effort are expended repairing legacy equipment. Maintaining optimal readiness, while continuing to support OIF, OEF, and other contingencies, will require additional resources for maintenance as well as for the replacement of equipment.

To support deployed Marines, we drew additional equipment from our Maritime Prepositioning Ships, prepositioned stores in Norway, and also retained equipment in theater from units that rotate back to the United States. The operational materiel impacts of these efforts have been outstanding. The average mission capable rates of our deployed forces' ground equipment remain above 90% — but achieving this operational availability was not without cost.

The cost has been a decrease in non-deployed unit readiness. Because of funding lags and long lead times for production, the fielding of new equipment for the operating forces has lagged needs. As a result, equipment across the Marine Corps is continuously cross-leveled to ensure units preparing to deploy have sufficient equipment to conduct our rigorous pre-deployment training programs. This focus on "next-to-deploy" units for the distribution of equipment has left many non-deployed units with insufficient equipment to effectively train for the full breadth of possible contingencies. The timely delivery of replacement equipment is crucial to sustaining the high readiness rates for the Marines in theater and improving readiness of the forces here at home. While the Congress provided the funding requested to maintain our equipment readiness and grow the force, much of this equipment is still many months away from delivery.

c. Aviation Equipment Readiness

Similar to our ground equipment, the operational demands and harsh environments of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa taxed our aging fleet of aircraft. Our aircraft are flying at two to three times their designed utilization rates (Figure 1) to support our Marines, sister Services, and coalition partners.



Figure 1

Despite this unprecedented use, our maintenance and support personnel sustained a 79% aviation mission-capable rate for deployed Marine aircraft over the past twelve months.

Maintaining the readiness of these aviation assets, while preparing aircrews for their next deployment, is and will continue to be an enormous effort and constant challenge for our Marines. To maintain sufficient numbers of aircraft in deployed squadrons, our home squadrons took significant cuts in aircraft and spare parts—resulting in a 30% decrease in the number of non-deployed units that are deployment capable over the last five years. Reset programs have helped us mitigate degradation of our aircraft materiel readiness through aircraft modifications, proactive inspections, and additional maintenance actions. These efforts successfully bolstered aircraft reliability, sustainability, and survivability. Again, similar to our ground equipment, additional requirements for depot level maintenance for airframes, engines, weapons, and support equipment will continue well beyond the conclusion of hostilities. Because we are simply running short of aircraft on our flight lines due to age, peacetime attrition, and wartime losses, continued funding support for our essential programs to modernize our aircraft fleet is critically needed.

d. Pre-positioning Equipment and Stores

Comprised of three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons and other strategic equipment stocks in Norway, the Marine Corps prepositioning programs are a critical part of our ability to respond to contingency operations and mitigate risk for the Nation. Targeted withdrawal of

equipment from our strategic stocks, along with cross-leveling of equipment in non-deployed units, has been a key element in supporting combat operations. Prepositioned equipment withdrawals have provided the necessary equipment in the near term, while we follow with the contracting and acquisition of new equipment. The Congress has generously supported our need to reset shortfalls within our strategic programs.

Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF). We used our MPF assets heavily in support of GWOT requirements. Eleven vessels supported the initial introduction of forces in Iraq in 2003. In February 2004, MPSRON-2 supported the reintroduction of Marine Forces into Iraq. The bulk of that equipment remains in Iraq supporting your Marines. Equipment was removed from MPSRON-1 in Fiscal Year 2007 to support the end strength growth of the Marine Corps to 202K Marines. This decision reduced readiness of the MPF, but it was the best solution to meet our demand in advance of new equipment deliveries from industry. MPSRON-1 will deploy with 80% of its prepositioned equipment and 100% of its stocks in June 2008, and will begin full reconstitution in June 2010 during its next scheduled maintenance cycle. MPSRON-2 was reconstituted to the greatest extent possible and returned to service with roughly 50% of its prepositioned equipment set. Equipment is being staged at Blount Island Command to support the reconstitution of MPSRON-2 during maintenance cycle 9 (occurring May 08 through June 09). While industry is responding to our funded demand for equipment, the window of opportunity when we can influence a ship's load during maintenance cycles is very short. Of course, we continue to balance the demands to reconstitute our MPF with the requirements to equip our growing force and deploying Marines.

Prepositioning readiness was impacted by changing the equipment needed to react to an adaptive enemy. To better protect our forward deployed Marines and Sailors, we are integrating protected vehicles into our prepositioning programs. The integrated armor on our trucks and engineer equipment is impacting the amount of equipment our ships can carry, due to their increased size and weight. To offset the loss in equipment stowage, we are working with the Navy to incorporate newer, more flexible ship platforms from the existing Military Sealift Command fleet to replace aging legacy Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS).

We seek to incorporate three of the Military Sealift Command's nineteen, large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSR) as replacements for five of our older leased platforms. The

LMSRs are U.S. owned and significantly expand MPF flexibility. These vessels provide a stability that new leasing laws preclude, while allowing the Marine Corps to reconstitute and optimize MPF to meet combatant commander requirements.

Marine Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway (MCPP-N). In addition to our afloat prepositioning program, equipment from Marine Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway (MCPP-N) is used in support of Long War operations. Attainment for major end items within MCPP-N is 46 %, an increase from 38% in our last report. The Marine Corps will reset MCPP-N in concert with our other operational priorities.

e. Depot Maintenance

Depot maintenance is key to sustaining equipment readiness. The Marine Corps aggressively works to improve equipment readiness and availability by managing the conditions that affect our depot maintenance rework plans. These conditions include: the uncertainty of the timing of reset, asset availability, timing of funding, equipment condition, and evolving skill requirements. The in-theater identification of equipment and scope of work to be performed enables better planning for parts, manpower resources, funding requirements, and depot capacity. Triage assessments made in theater and relayed back to the sources of repair help to reduce the repair cycle time, return mission capable equipment to the warfighter quicker, and improve materiel readiness.

The only factor limiting our two depots is asset (carcass) availability, not funding or their workload capacity. When required, we can increase capacity to support surge requirements through: overtime, additional shifts, and additional personnel. Our depot workforce has multiple trade skills ranging from laborers to engineers, enabling work to be performed on over 260 product lines. However, much of the equipment in theater includes items not previously repaired by any depot facility, and as a result, the existing work force may require additional training. Ultimately, new personnel, as well as continued augmentation through contractor support, may be required. We are leveraging state and local institutions, such as technical colleges and universities, to provide valuable assistance in training our workforce in skills such as welding, environmental science, and engineering.

The Marine Corps Maintenance Centers have implemented Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) methodologies through the use of modernized business practices to enhance depot operations. Those tools include Manufacturing Resource Planning II (MRP II), Lean Six Sigma, Theory of Constraints, and International Standard Office (ISO) certified quality systems. This CPI approach, coupled with key engineering projects, significantly enhances depot maintenance processes and operations.

Additionally, Maintenance Centers collaborate with private industry and other Services to identify process improvements designed to enhance materiel readiness. We also coordinate with the other Services to reduce redundancy in our efforts. Examples of the excellent coordination between the Marine Corps and other Services include: the repair of Marine Corps M1A1 tanks at the Anniston Army Depot; the repair of various Marine Corps electronic equipment at Tobyhanna Army Depot; and Marine Corps maintenance on Navy/Coast Guard Paxman engines. The Marine Corps also contracts or out sources work which allows us to purchase repairs through: a Depot Maintenance Interservice Agreement with another service, a contract with a private vendor, or a Public/Private Partnership. In all cases, the repair source is evaluated for the best return on the investment for the Marine Corps.

f. Equipment Retrograde Operations from CENTCOM AOR

Marine Corps Logistics Command took the lead as the Service Executive Agent for the retrograde of equipment in the CENTCOM theater in 2006. In addition to receiving, preparing, and shipping equipment no longer required within theater, Marine Corps Logistics Command (Forward) coordinates strategic lift requirements and manages the redistribution of principle end items. Since June 2006, over 15,731 principle end items were processed at the retrograde lot in Al Taqaddum, Iraq, and approximately 11,799 items were shipped back to Blount Island Command for disposition. Once disposition is received, assets are sent to Marine Corps Logistics Command to be repaired, stored, or used to fill requisitions. If deemed uneconomical to repair, assets are sent to the Defense Reutilization Marketing Office. These actions will enable us to better manage the demand for equipment and to influence readiness rates across the enterprise.

In order to enhance our preparedness to retrograde a greater volume of equipment from the CENTCOM AOR, we are seeking facilities project improvements that will increase throughput operations at Blount Island Command. Naval Facilities Engineering Command is prepared to support us in this endeavor.

V. Taking Care of Warriors and Families

Taking care of our Marines, Sailors and their family members is a fundamental commitment and critical to our current and long-term readiness. Throughout our proud history, our successes have been through the cumulative efforts and sacrifices of individual Marines and Sailors. We have a moral obligation to ensure their well being during their time in the Marine Corps and their transition back to civilian life. When Marines are wounded, ill or injured, we will take care of them – they are Marines for life. When Marines die, we will honor our fallen angels, and assist their families. This enduring obligation also includes the well being of their families—who are essential to the resilience and effectiveness of our Marines and Sailors who serve alongside them. Because of the demands of the Long War and the need to improve support and services for our warriors and families, we are putting our family readiness programs on a wartime footing.

a. Casualty Assistance

Marines selflessly serve, assuming the often dangerous work of defending our Nation. Whenever Marines pay the ultimate price, we will continue to honor them as selfless patriots who gave their last full measure of devotion to the Nation. Our casualty assistance program will ensure the families of our fallen Marines are always treated with compassion, dignity, and honor.

Trained Casualty Assistance Calls Officers provide the families of fallen Marines assistance with their transition through the stages of grief. Last year during Congressional hearings and inquiries into casualty next of kin notification processes, we testified about deficiencies that we discovered in three key and interrelated casualty processes: command casualty reporting, command casualty inquiry and investigation, and next of kin notification. Reacting quickly to understand and fix these deficiencies, we ordered an investigation by the Inspector General of the Marine Corps. Without waiting for a final investigative report, the

Commandant of the Marine Corps directed actions, which included issuing new guidance to commanders — reemphasizing investigation and reporting requirements, and the importance of tight links between these two systems, and with next of kin notification. We will continue to monitor our processes to ensure families receive timely and accurate information relating to their Marine's death or injury.

b. Putting Family Readiness on a Wartime Footing

Last year, we conducted self-imposed, rigorous assessments of our family support programs. We gained reliable data to build upon our strengths and to execute needed improvements. Actions are underway to refresh, enhance, or improve: our family readiness programs at the unit and installation levels, including our Exceptional Family Member Program and the School Liaison Officer Program.

Through our assessments, we determined that major enhancements are needed to the Marine Corps Family Team Building Program and Unit Family Readiness Program. These programs form the centerpiece of our family support and are based on a peacetime model with an 18-month deployment cycle. They are also largely supported on the backs of our dedicated volunteers. While our volunteers are performing magnificently, they need substantial increases in program support. Reacting quickly to the assessments, the Commandant directed a sustained funding increase for Marine Corps family readiness program reforms in Fiscal Year 2008 which include:

- Formalizing the role and relationship of process owners to ensure accountability;
- Expanding programs to support the extended family of a Marine (spouse, child, and parents);
- Establishing primary duty billets for Family Readiness Officers at regiment, group, battalion, and squadron levels;
- Improving the quality of life at remote and isolated installations;
- Increasing Marine Corps Family Team Building installation personnel;
- Refocusing and applying technological improvements to our communication network between commanders and families;
- Dedicating appropriate baseline funding to command level Family Readiness Programs; and
- Developing a standardized, high-quality volunteer management and recognition program.

We request Congress' continued support so we may continue to advance these reforms and address the evolving requirements of our warfighters and their families.

c. Wounded Warrior Regiment

In April 2007, the Wounded Warrior Regiment was activated to develop a comprehensive, integrated approach to Wounded Warrior care and to continue to ensure that "Marines take care of their own." The Regiment reflects our deep commitment to the welfare of our Marines, Sailors, and families throughout all phases of recovery. The Regiment provides non-medical case management, benefit information and assistance, and transition support. We use "a single process" that supports active duty, reserve, and separated personnel, and is all inclusive for resources, referrals, and information.

There are two Wounded Warrior Battalions, headquartered at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and Camp Pendleton, California. The Battalions have liaison teams at major military medical treatment facilities, Department of Veteran's Affairs Poly-trauma Centers (VAPTC), and Naval Hospitals. Additionally, the Battalions provide local support in regions without military treatment facilities or VAPTCs through Marine For Life Home Town Links (M4L HTL), or Wounded Warrior Regiment District Injury Support Cells.

The Regiment constantly assesses how to improve the services it provides. One of the major initiatives is a Job Transition Cell manned by Marines and representatives of the Departments of Labor and Veteran Affairs. The Regiment also established a Wounded Warrior Call Center for 24 hour a day/7 days a week support. The Call Center receives incoming calls from Marines and family members with questions, and makes outreach calls to the almost 9,000 wounded Marines who left active service. A Charitable Organization Cell was created to facilitate linking wounded warrior needs with charitable organizations that can provide the needed support. Additionally, the Regiment maintains a liaison presence at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Headquarters, and liaisons from the VA and the Department of Labor are located within our Wounded Warrior Regiment headquarters at Marine Corps Base, Quantico.

I deeply thank you for your support on behalf of our wounded warriors and their families. The numerous visits from members of Congress and their own families, are deeply appreciated by them and their families. Your new Wounded Warrior Hiring Initiative to employ our injured

in the House and Senate demonstrates your commitment and support to their future well-being. We are grateful to Congress for the support for wounded warriors in the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. This landmark legislation will significantly improve the quality of their lives and demonstrates the Nation's enduring gratitude for their selfless sacrifices.

d. Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBI)

The improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by our enemies cause blast and penetrating traumatic brain injuries. TBI awareness and education is part of our pre-deployment, routine, and post-deployment training. All Marines are being screened for TBI exposure during the post-deployment phase and those identified with it receive comprehensive evaluation and treatment.

Concussive blast injuries to the brain are currently classified as mild, moderate, or severe traumatic brain injuries. Physical examinations performed by medical personnel, aided by screening tools such as the Military Acute Concussion Evaluation (MACE) and the Glascow Coma Scale (GCS), assist in the diagnosis and categorization of TBI. Despite this, Mild TBI (mTBI) can be difficult to detect with the current screening techniques available in the theater of operations. The Marine Corps is seeking a means to use the Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics (ANAM), developed by the Army, to evaluate an individual's neuro-cognitive functioning (i.e. brain operations that are responsible for all aspects of perceiving, thinking, and remembering) following exposure to concussive blast. To be maximally effective, pre-exposure testing with the ANAM is required to establish the baseline functioning of each Marine and Sailor prior to deployment. The Marine Corps is working closely with the Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury to advance our understanding of TBI and improve the care of all Marines.

e. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

The Marine Corps has partnered with Veterans Affairs and its National Center for PTSD (NCPTSD) to improve the psychological health of our Marines, Sailors, and families through research and effective new training and early intervention programs. Our premiere PTSD research project is the "Marine Resilience Study," a collaboration with the VA at San Diego and

Boston, as well as the Naval Health Research Center, to prospectively study the biological, psychological, and social factors that predict resilience in two battalions of ground combat Marines bound for Iraq or Afghanistan. Initial phases of this ground-breaking study are under way at MCAGCC 29 Palms. Through collaborations with the NCPTSD and both Navy Medicine and the Navy Chaplaincy, we have also developed new Combat and Operational Stress First Aid tools for early intervention for acute traumatic stress and loss in operational environments. We have also partnered with UCLA and the National Child Traumatic Stress Network to establish over the next six months a family resilience training program known as FOCUS (Families Overcoming Under Stress) at our four largest mobilization and demobilization sites. We are determined to reduce the frequency and severity of PTSD in our Marines, Sailors, and family members through effective, evidence-based primary and secondary prevention programs.

The Marine Corps is thankful to Congress for their leadership and support of research as well as treatment for TBI, PTSD, and other combat-related mental disorders. We will continue to place a high priority on improving our knowledge and treatment of these disorders and providing non-clinical assistance to Marines and their families.

f. Combat and Operational Stress Control (COSC)

Marine Corps commanders are fully engaged in promoting psychological health among our Marines, Sailors, and their family members. Small unit leaders have the greatest potential for detecting stress occurrences and assessing their impacts on warfighters and family members. Marine leadership fosters an environment at all levels where our warriors learn it is proper to ask for help, because taking care of Marines and ensuring their readiness means caring for physical and psychological health. We stress this to Marines repeatedly during pre-deployment training, deployment, and post-deployment periods, as well as through the training continuum. The Navy is supporting expansion of embedding Navy mental health professionals in operational units—the Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) program. The goal by Fiscal Year 2010 is for 161 Navy Personnel (62 Medical Officers, 16 Chaplains, and 83 Sailors) embedded at all levels of the MEF. We are also collaborating with the other Services, the Department of

Veterans Affairs' National Center for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, and external agencies to determine best practices for Marines and their families.

g. Exceptional Family Member Program (Respite Care)

Parental stress can be heightened for families who are not only impacted by operational tempo, but have the challenges of children with special needs. To focus on this issue, we offer active duty families enrolled in the Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) up to 40 hours of free respite care per month for each exceptional family member. Many of our families rely on TRICARE's Enhanced Care Health Option (ECHO) program which offers limited respite care, but provides other important benefits such as medical equipment, mental behavior therapy, rehabilitation, special education, and transportation. Unfortunately, in many cases, the monthly ECHO cap of $2500 does not enable families to cover all of these services, forcing them to choose between respite care and other benefits. The Marine Corps EFMP now underwrites the respite care, enabling families to apply ECHO resources to these other treatment services. We also seek to provide a "continuum of care" for our exceptional family members through: our assignment process; working with TRICARE and the Department of the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery to expand access and availability to care; and providing family support programs to ease relocations and ensure quality care transitions.

h. Family Member Pervasive Developmental Disorders

The sustained readiness and effectiveness of Marines and Sailors during deployment requires that they know family members are supported at home. Currently, the TRICARE ECHO program is not able to provide sufficient support to children of Service members with special needs, to include Pervasive Developmental Disorders such as: Autistic Spectrum Disorder, Asperger's Disorder, Rett's Disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (NOS). The Marine Corps is working closely with the Department of Defense Office of Family Policy Work Group on examining options to expand its Educational & Developmental Intervention Services (EDIS). EDIS is the DoD response to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), a federal mandate that provides Developmental Services for children 0 to 3 years old, and Special

Education Services for children 3 to 21. EDIS delivers early intervention services to eligible infants and toddlers in domestic and overseas areas, and medically related service programs for school age children in Department of Defense schools overseas.

i. Water Contamination at Camp Lejeune

Past water contamination at Camp Lejeune continues to be a very important issue for the Marine Corps. Our goal is to use good science to determine whether exposure to the contaminated water at Camp Lejeune resulted in any adverse health effects for our Marines, their families, and our civilian workers. The Marine Corps supports the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) in their health study, which is planned to be completed in March 2009. With the help of Congress, the National Academy of Sciences is also helping us by studying this difficult issue. Their study is expected to be completed in the fall of 2008. The Marine Corps is making progress notifying former residents and workers of this issue and we established a call center and notification registry, where the public can provide contact information, so we can keep them apprised of the completion of these health studies. Additionally, 50,000 letters will be mailed by 31 March 2008 to individuals who were identified in a Department of Defense personnel database that were former residents and/or workers at Camp Lejeune.

VI. Preparing Marines for Current Operations

The Training and Education Continuum for deploying Marines begins with entry level training, ascends through formal schools, home station training, Professional Military Education, and culminates with a final unit Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP) assessment. This ascending-levels-of-competency approach allows Marines of all ranks to be trained at the right level, at the right time, and the right place. Mojave Viper (MV), Desert Talon (DT), and Mountain Warrior (MW) are established as the primary OIF/OEF Pre-Deployment Training Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRX). The Marine Corps PTP is both realistic and adaptive. Utilizing role players and live fires, PTP prepares Marines mentally, physically, and culturally as to what they can expect in the combat environment. Training is constantly updated based on lessons learned. PTP is conducted in five nested blocks in ascending levels of competency and

culminates in a full-scale, intelligence-driven, controlled, and evaluated exercise conducted at Twentynine Palms, Bridgeport, Yuma, or an approved alternate venue. During Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007, the PTP resulted in over 42,000 Marines receiving combined arms and urban operations training at MV in Twentynine Palms, California; over 2,800 Marines receiving mountain operations training at the Mountain Warfare Training Center in Bridgeport, California; and over 12,000 Marines participating in aviation-focused DT exercises in Yuma, Arizona.

Core Values and Ethics Training. As part of our ethos, we continually seek ways to improve ethical decision-making at all levels. In 2007, we implemented the following initiatives to strengthen our Core Values training and prepare Marines for the mental rigors and challenges of Combat:

- Tripled the amount of time Drill Instructor and recruits conduct "foot locker talks" on values (increasing instruction time from 14 to 41.5 hours);
- Institutionalizing habits of thought for all Marines operating in counterinsurgencies, the message of the importance of ethical conduct in battle, and how to be an ethical warrior in all operating environments and locations;
- Re-emphasized the Values component of our Marine Corps Martial Arts Program, which teaches Core Values and presents ethical scenarios pertaining to restraint and proper escalation of force as the foundation of its curriculum;
- Educated junior Marines on the "strategic corporal" and the positive or negative influence they can have;
- Published pocket-sized *Law of War, Rules of Engagement, and Escalation of Force* guides;
- Increased instruction at our Commander's Course on command climate and the commander's role in cultivating battlefield ethics, accountability, and responsibility.

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. Our Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned applies lessons from operational experiences as well as those of the Joint Staff, other Services, and Joint Forces Command to guide efforts for "fine tuning" and transforming our force. This rapid, continuous process ensures the latest enemy and friendly tactics, techniques, and procedures are incorporated in our training programs. In 2007, as result of these lessons learned, the Marine Corps implemented changes in pre-deployment training in such areas as detention operations; transition teams; interagency coordination of stability, support, transition,

and reconstruction operations; irregular warfare; and the role of forensics in counterinsurgency operations.

Experimentation. Research, development, and experimentation are key factors to adapting our force, enhancing training, and providing the foundation for our own future warfighting capabilities. We continuously work with the Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and other Services Science and Technology (S&T) and Research and Development (R&D) activities, leveraging their special, significant efforts. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory conducts experiments to support operating force requirements and combat development with improved capabilities. Some examples of current projects include:

- "Combat Hunter," a project aimed at enhancing observation and hunting skills of individual Marines operating in a combat environment;
- Company Level Intelligence Cell experiment, designed to provide us with a "best practices" model and to standardize infantry battalion intelligence processes;
- Squad Fires experiment, enhancing close air support to squad-level units;
- Combat Conditioning project, examining advances in physical fitness training to best prepare Marines for the demands of combat; and
- Lighten the Load initiative, an effort to decrease the amount of weight carried by Marines in the field.

VII. Modernizing the Marine Corps

In addition to recruiting and retaining high quality Marines and ensuring their individual readiness, we are also committed to providing our warriors with the very best warfighting equipment and capabilities. Our equipment modernization has high priority, so that we can ensure ready, relevant and capable Marine Air Ground Task Forces now and in the future. As careful stewards of our Nation's resources, we must decide the most effective ways to modernize our Total Force. With this in mind, we continue to sustain the readiness of our aging legacy equipment by resetting it and also fielding next generation capabilities. Because we are at war, we must do both, modernizing on the march. Thankfully, Congress has consistently supported

our efforts to achieve long-term modernization, while maintaining our current readiness to prosecute the Long War.

a. Urgent Warfighting Requirements.

Designed to procure equipment for commanders more expediently than if submitted through the traditional acquisition process, our Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS) process uses a secure, web-based system that provides full stakeholder visibility from submission through resolution. We have studied and continue to review our overall capabilities based Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) requirements generation process, including the wartime UUNS process, to ensure we meet valid warfighter needs for timely effective and efficient material solutions. One example of our efforts to provide timely responses is that, through continuous process improvement, and a Lean Six Sigma review, we have reduced average UUNS processing time from 142 to 83.2 days and transitioned over fifty emerging capabilities into programs of record. Typically, UUNS are either funded by reprogramming funds from approved programs or through Congressional supplemental funding until we can transition them through the next budgeting cycle. We are committed to rapidly and properly equipping our warriors, continuously reviewing our system for opportunities to increase efficiency and responsiveness in order to provide Marines the best combat equipment and protection as swiftly as we can identify and test material solutions and field them.

b. Enhancing Individual Force Protection and Survivability

The Marine Corps is pursuing technological advancements in personal protective equipment because Marines in combat deserve the best gear for their mission. Fully recognizing the factors associated with weight, fatigue, and movement restriction, we are committed to provide our Marines with the latest in personal protective equipment—such as the Modular Tactical Vest, QuadGard, Lightweight Helmet, and Flame Resistant Organizational Gear.

Body Armor. Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the need to evolve our personal protective vest system. In February 2007, we began transitioning to a newly-designed Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) which integrates more easily with our other personal protection systems and provides greater comfort by incorporating state-of-the-art load carriage

techniques. The MTV also incorporates our combat-proven Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (E-SAPI) and Side SAPI plates. These plates are provided to every Marine in the Central Command theater of operations to render the best protection available against a wide variety of small arms threats. The initial acquisition objective for the MTV was 60,000 vests in response to a Universal Urgent Needs Statement (UUNS), with deliveries completed in October 2007. The Marine Corps placed a final order for 24,000 additional MTVs and deliveries began in Nov 07 with approximately 17,000 vests received to date. With this initial capability fielded to all deployed forces we are now using feedback from our Marines and Sailors to refine the vest into a system that can further enhance the performance and safety of the warfighter.

QuadGard. The QuadGard system provides ballistic protection for a Marine's arms and legs when they are serving as a turret gunner on convoy duty. This system, which integrates with other personal ballistic protection equipment, provides additional protection against ballistic threats—particularly improvised explosive device fragmentation.

Lightweight Helmet. Similar to body armor, we continue to rapidly evolve the best head protection. The Lightweight Helmet (LWH) weighs less than its predecessor and provides a high level of protection against fragmentation threats and 9mm bullets. Because of tests, including studies by the University of Virginia on the effects of ballistics and blunt impacts, we now have replaced the sling suspension with a superior protection pad system inside the helmet. We are retrofitting more than 150,000 helmets with the pad system and have already fielded enough helmet pads for every deployed Marine. Since January 2007, all LWHs produced by the manufacturer were delivered with the approved pad system installed. In October 2007, we began fielding an initial buy of 69,300 of the Nape Protection Pad (NAPP), which provides additional ballistic protection to the occipital region of the head (where critical nervous system components are located), with final deliveries scheduled for April 2008. The NAPP is attached to the back of the LWH or the Modular Integrated Communications Helmet (MICH), which is worn by our reconnaissance Marines, to include MARSOC personnel. The Marine Corps currently has 1,800 MICHs in its inventory. We continue to work with the US Army and to challenge industry to build a lightweight helmet that provides greater ballistic protection by defeating the 7.62 mm round fired from widely used AK-47s.

Flame Resistant Organizational Gear (FROG). In February 2007, we began fielding FROG to all deployed and deploying Marines. This lifesaving ensemble of flame resistant clothing items—gloves, balaclava, long-sleeved under shirt, combat shirt, and combat trouser—will reduce exposure to flame injuries. We also began providing flame resistant fleece pullovers to Marines for use in cooler conditions, and are developing flame resistant varieties of cool/cold weather outer garments with planned fielding in late FY 2008. With the mix of body armor, undergarments, and outerwear, operational commanders can determine what equipment their Marines will employ based on mission requirements and environmental conditions. As with individual and unit equipment, we continue ongoing development and partnerships with other Services, seeking the best available flame resistant protection for our Marines.

Counter Improvised Explosive Devices. The incorporation of lessons learned is integral to the Marine Corps CIED effort. We are mindful that our enemies are constantly evolving to offset our military capabilities and technology superiority; therefore, our ability to support the warfighter and maintain optimum readiness levels is accomplished through multiple complementary efforts within the Marine Corps and the larger Joint and Interagency CIED communities of interest. The following is a sampling of some of these efforts:

- Upgrading our Counter Radio-controlled IED Electronic Warfare systems to meet rapidly evolving threats, while remaining engaged with the Navy's Joint Program Office to develop a joint solution.
- Modernizing our Family of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Equipment through enhancement of technician tool kits and greater robotics capabilities.
- Evaluation of new technologies to enhance our Family of Imaging Systems portfolio and protect against both vehicle and personnel-borne IEDs.
- Continuing to field our point, route and area Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities -- Ground Based Operational Surveillance System, Unmanned Aerial Systems, and Angel Fire.
- Explosives odor detection, infantry-based, off-leash IED Detector Dogs have proven very effective in their first deployment and the Marine Requirements Oversight Counsel has approved an effort to eventually provide dogs to every deployed maneuver battalion.

- Specific to CIED, Training and Education Command's Marine Corps Engineer School has created Master Lesson Files, established Mobile Training Teams in support of home station training, incorporated CIED education into existing institutional and virtual training platforms, and is coordinating CIED upgrades to our training facilities.
- Lastly, we continue to develop CIED and counter insurgency capabilities normally associated with law enforcement through the fielding of Biometrics tool kits and embedded law enforcement officers.

c. Marine Aviation

Just like our ground combat and support elements, Marine Aviation must sustain current operations, reset the force and modernize. Execution of any one of these is a formidable challenge. Today, Marine Aviation is executing all three concurrently in order to win today's battles, while preserving our warfighting capabilities to be ready to respond to other contingencies. Your Marines rely on aging aircraft to execute a wide array of missions including casualty evacuation for our wounded and timely close air support for troops in contact with the enemy. Legacy aircraft production lines are no longer active—exacerbating the impact of combat losses and increasing the urgency for the Marine Aviation Plan (AvPlan) to remain fully funded and on schedule. The AvPlan incorporates individual program changes, synchronizes support of our end strength growth to 202,000 Marines, and provides the way ahead for Marine Aviation as it transitions 39 of 71 squadrons. By 2017, Marine Aviation will transition from 13 legacy aircraft to 7 new aircraft.

F-35B: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The Marine Corps has not received a new tactical aircraft in a decade, with our last delivery an F/A-18D in 1998. In FY09 we plan to procure the first of 420 F-35B aircraft, with IOC beginning in Fiscal Year 2012. We will complete the transition from the F/A-18 and AV-8B by Fiscal Year 2024. The Marine Corps literally skipped a generation of strike fighters in order to field an all Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) fifth generation aircraft force. The F-35B STOVL will provide a quantum leap in capability, basing flexibility, and mission execution across the full spectrum of warfare. The JSF will act as a networked, integrated combat system in support of ground forces and will be the centerpiece of Marine Aviation. F-35B Lightning II development is on track with the first flight of the BF-1

STOVL variant scheduled for spring 2008. The Fiscal Year 2009 budget requests eight aircraft for delivery in Fiscal Year 2010. These aircraft will support pilot transition training and are essential to the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of Fiscal Year 2012. The manufacture of the first 19 test aircraft is on schedule and underway.

MV-22 Osprey. The 360 MV-22 aircraft planned for procurement by the Marine Corps are already bringing revolutionary assault support capability to our forces in harm's way. The MV-22 has begun to replace the CH-46E aircraft which are over forty years old, and which have very limited performance to support the MAGTF. In September 2005, the V-22 Defense Acquisition Board approved full rate production. MV-22 IOC was declared on 1 June 2007. The current inventory of 57 operational MV-22 aircraft that have been delivered are based at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina; NAS Patuxent River, Maryland; and Al Asad Air Base, Iraq. Even though we are at war, modernization on the march means we must transition two squadrons per year, with 30 aircraft per year requested in the budget. With current rate of production, the transition will be complete (FOC) in 2018.

VMM-263 is presently deployed to Al Asad Air Base in Iraq, and has already proven the significant capabilities of the Osprey in combat. The rapidly evolving use of MV-22s in Iraq tells a compelling story: on a daily basis MV-22s carry twice the load, twice as far, at twice the speed. The aircraft's operational reach rapidly ranges the entire area of operations at altitudes above the reach of our enemy's weapons. Congress answered our request for an aircraft that could carry more, fly farther, faster, and safer.

KC-130J. KC-130J Hercules aircraft are continuously deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom providing multi-mission, tactical aerial refueling, and fixed-wing assault support. Its theater logistical support reduces the requirement for resupply via ground, limiting the exposure of our convoys to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and other surface-borne attacks. The recent introduction of the aerial refuelable MV-22, combined with the retirement of the legacy KC-130F/R aircraft due to fatigue life and parts obsolescence, requires an accelerated procurement of the KC-130J.

The Marine Corps is programmed to procure a total of 46 aircraft by the end of Fiscal Year 2013. To date, 29 new aircraft have been delivered, 7 more are on contract and 2 aircraft are requested in the FY 2009 budget for a total of 38. This is still 13 aircraft short of our

inventory objective of 51 KC-130J's for the Active Force. Ultimately, the Marine Corps will also seek to replace our 28 reserve component KC-130T aircraft with KC-130Js, thus necking down our aerial refueling force to a single T/M/S.

UH-1 / AH-1. The H-1 Upgrades Program will replace AH-1W and UH-1N helicopters with state-of-the-art AH-1Z and UH-1Y models. The H-1 Upgrades Program, through a combination of remanufacture and new procurement, modernize our fleet to 100 UH-1Ys and 180 AH-1Zs. With approval to increase the size of the Marine Corps active component to 202,000, procurement must increase to 123 UH-1Ys and 227 AH-1Zs. To date, seven UH-1Y and four AH-1Z have been delivered. The first UH-1Y scheduled deployment is on track for the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2009. To support this effort and continue H-1 modernization, the Fiscal Year 2009 budget requests $496.9 million for aircraft procurement and spares with $3.9 million for continued R&D.

CH-53K. In operation since 1981, the CH-53E is becoming increasingly expensive to operate and faces reliability issues. Its replacement, the CH-53K, will be capable of externally transporting 27,000 lbs to a range of 110 nautical miles, more than doubling the current CH-53E lift capability. Maintainability and reliability enhancements of the CH-53K will significantly decrease recurring operating costs and will radically improve aircraft efficiency and operational effectiveness over the current CH-53E. The program passed Milestone B in December 2005 with a subsequent contract awarded to Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation in April 2006. IOC is scheduled for Fiscal Year 2015. The program is proceeding through its developmental stages and will begin to procure airframes in the Fiscal Year 2013 budget request. The transition to the CH-53K will culminate in Fiscal Year 2021, with a total procurement of 156 aircraft for our seven active and one reserve squadrons.

d. Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Protection (Armoring)

Our vehicle armoring efforts are absolutely critical to protecting our Marines against IEDs and other weapons. Our goal is to provide the best level of available protection to 100% of in-theater vehicles that go "outside the wire." Our tactical wheeled vehicle strategy pursues this goal through the coordination of product improvement, technology insertion, and new procurement in partnership with industry. The Marine Corps, working with the Army and other

Services, is fielding armored vehicles such as: the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP), the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement Armor System, the Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) Marine Armor Kit, and the Up-armored High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV).

Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) Armor System (MAS). The MAS provides an integrated, armor enclosed, climate-controlled cab compartment and an armored troop carrier for our MTVR variants. These vehicles are also being upgraded with an improved blast protection package consisting of fuel tank fire protection kits, blast attenuating seats, five-point restraint harnesses, improved belly and fender-well blast deflectors, and 300 AMP alternators. Basic MAS was installed in all of the Marine Corps MTVRs in the Central Command's theater of operation. The target for completing installation of MAS blast protection retrofits on in-theater vehicles is Fourth Quarter Fiscal Year 2008.

Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) Marine Armor Kit (MAK) II. The LVS MAK II provides improved blast, improvised explosive device, and small arms protection over the current LVS MAK. It has a completely redesigned cab assembly that consists of a new frame with armor attachment points and integrated 360-degree protection and an integrated air conditioning system. Additional protection provided by the LVS MAK II includes overhead and underbody armor using high, hard steel, rolled homogenous armor, and 2.75" ballistic windows. The suspension system will also be upgraded to accommodate the extra weight of the cab armor. We estimate the LVS MAK II armoring effort will complete fielding by February 2009.

Up Armored High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Upgrade- Fragmentation Kit 2 and Kit 5. "Fragmentation Kit 2," enhances ballistic protection in the front driver and assistant driver wheel-well of HMMWVs, and "Fragmentation Kit 5," reduces injuries from improvised explosive devices, as well as armor debris and fragmentation. Installation of both fragmentation kits was completed in Fiscal Year 2007. In addition, new Up-Armored Expanded Capacity Vehicle (ECV) HMMWVs were fielded to theater in FY07 to support the "surge." The Marine Corps has adopted a strategy of armoring 60% of the current 25,385 HMMWV Authorized Acquisition Objective (15,231 vehicles). All newly acquired Expanded Capacity Vehicle (ECV) HMMWVs will have an Integrated Armor Package. Of those, 60% will be fully up-armored during production to include the appropriate "B" kit and fragmentation kits. The

Marine Corps will continue to work with the Army to pursue the development of true bolt-on/bolt-off "B" kits and fragmentation kits to apply in a retrofit approach (as needed) to vehicles delivered with Integrated Armor Package only. We are also evaluating the Army's objective kit development and collaborating with the Army and Office of Naval Research to assess new protection-level capabilities.

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles. Over the past two years industry has designed MRAP vehicles with a V-shaped armored hull and protect against the three primary kill mechanisms of mines and improvised explosive devices (IED): fragmentation, blast overpressure, and acceleration. While designs are improving, these vehicles provide the best available protection against IEDs, just as the enemy is trying to improve these crude but potentially lethal weapons. Experience in theater shows that a Marine is four to five times less likely to be killed or injured in a MRAP vehicle than in an up-armored HMMWV. To date, no Marines have been killed or seriously injured from IED attacks while traveling in the MRAP vehicles.

The total Department of Defense requirement for MRAP vehicles is 15,374—of which 3,700 were originally allocated for the Marine Corps. However, the JROC recently approved the Marine Corps refined requirement for 2,225 MRAP vehicles (the JROC Memorandum is pending final signature this month). This decision supports the Marine Corps operational assessment of the vehicles, which reviewed changes in mission tasking and existing Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.

As another example of our adaptation to evolving threats, the Joint MRAP Vehicle Program Office has recently selected qualified producers of a new MRAP II vehicle for the Marine Corps and other forces. Vehicles procured through this second solicitation will meet enhanced survivability and performance capability required by field commanders. The Marine Corps is very pleased and thankful for the overwhelming support of Congress on the MRAP program. We request Congress' continued support for these life-saving vehicles as we transition to the sustainment of these vehicles into Fiscal Year 2009.

e. Ground Mobility

The Army and Marine Corps are leading the Services in developing tactical wheeled vehicle requirements for the joint force to provide an appropriate balance of survivability, mobility, payload, networking, transportability, and sustainability. The Army/Marine Corps Board is a proven valuable forum for; the coordination of development and fielding strategies; production of armoring kits and up-armored HMMWVs; and responding to requests for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. The Ground Mobility Suite includes the following systems:

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV). The EFV represents the heavy weight capability in our Ground Combat Tactical Mobility portfolio. The EFV is designed for maneuver operations conducted from the sea and sustained operations in the world's littoral regions, but its inherent capabilities provide utility across the spectrum of conflict. As the Corps largest ground combat system acquisition program, the EFV is the Nation's only sea-based, surface-oriented vehicle that projects combat power from a seabase to an objective. A fighting vehicle designed to strike fast and deep, it will replace the aging Assault Amphibious Vehicle—in service since 1972. The EFV's amphibious mobility, speed of maneuver, day and night lethality, enhanced force protection capabilities, and robust communications will substantially improve joint force capabilities. Its over-the-horizon capability will enable amphibious ships to increase their standoff distance from the shore—protecting them from enemy anti-access weapons. An EFV mine protection feasibility study was completed last October, which assessed external V-Hull, internal V-Hull, and appliqué configurations for survivability and performance impacts. The study concluded that the appliqué configuration provides increased mine blast protection with minimum performance impacts. A final EFV feasibility report from The Center for Naval Analyses concerning this enhanced armor configuration is pending. System development and demonstration has been extended to allow design for reliability through 2008, and fabrication and test of seven new EFV prototypes, with Milestone C in 2011. Delivery of 573 vehicles will begin in 2013, with the program scheduled to achieve IOC in 2015 and FOC in 2025.

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The JLTV represents the light weight capability in our Ground Combat Tactical Mobility portfolio and will be the centerpiece of our Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Fleet. This fleet will also include the HMMWV Expanded Capacity Vehicle

series, the MRAP Vehicle, and the Internally Transported Vehicle (ITV). The Army/Marine Corps Board has been the starting point for vetting of joint requirements for JLTV—which will provide protected, sustained, networked, and expeditionary mobility in the light tactical vehicle weight class. Throughout 2007, Army and Marine Corps combat and materiel developers coordinated with the Joint Staff, defining requirements and acquisition planning for the replacement for the HMMWV. In December. JLTV was approved for entry into the acquisition process at Milestone A with the Army as the lead Service. A Request for Proposal was released this month, initiating competitive prototyping for the fabrication of a family of vehicles and companion trailers. After prototype evaluation, we expect at least three competitors to be selected for the technology development phase. We must continue to sustain HMMWVs in our forces until their replacement with JLTVs. We are committed to full funding of 5,500 JLTVs in Increment one. IOC is scheduled for 2012.

Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC). The MPC represents the medium weight capability in the Ground Combat Tactical Mobility portfolio. It is not a replacement vehicle, but will complement the capabilities offered by the EFV and the JLTV across the range of military operations. Increasing armor-protected mobility for infantry battalion task forces, the MPC program balances vehicle performance, protection and payload attributes. Joint staffing of an Initial Capabilities Document and a draft concept of employment were completed in 2007. The MPC program is currently preparing for a Milestone A decision in the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2008 and is on track for a Milestone B decision in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2010. The MPC requirement is for 558 vehicles, with an IOC date in the 2015 timeframe.

Internally Transported Vehicle (ITV). The ITV is a family of vehicles that will provide deployed MAGTFs with MV-22/CH-53 internally and externally-transportable ground vehicles. The ITV program will field an expeditionary vehicle that provides units equal to or greater mobility than the maneuver elements they support. The ITV includes powered prime movers and towed trailers which will provide deep maneuver and rough terrain mobility for the Expeditionary Fire Support System (120 mm mortar) and other payloads. The Fiscal Year 2009 budget contains $8 million for 44 ITVs. ITV recently successfully completed a Government Accounting Office audit and is currently undergoing a DoD Inspector General audit. IOC is planned during Fiscal Year 2008 and FOC is planned for Fiscal Year 2011.

f. MAGTF Fires

Our Triad of Ground Indirect Fires provides organic complementary, precision fire capabilities that facilitate maneuver during combat operations. The Triad requires a medium-caliber cannon artillery capability; an extended range, ground-based rocket capability; and a mortar capability with greater lethality and greater tactical mobility than current artillery systems. The concept validates the capabilities provided by the M777 lightweight 155mm towed howitzer, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and the Expeditionary Fire Support System.

M777A2 Lightweight Howitzer. The Lightweight 155 (M777A2) is a Joint USMC/Army program in Full Rate Production which replaces all legacy, aging heavier weight M198 howitzers. It can be lifted by the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53E helicopter and is paired with the MTVR for improved cross-country mobility. Through design innovation, navigation, positioning aides, and digital fire control, the M777A2 offers significant improvements in lethality (with the Excalibur precision munition capability), survivability, and mobility. We began fielding the first new howitzers to the operating forces in April 2005 and expect to complete fielding 511 howitzers in Fiscal Year 2011. The M777A2 was first used in OIF in October 2007.

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). HIMARS fills a critical range and volume gap in Marine Corps fire support assets by providing twenty-four hour, all weather, ground-based, indirect precision and volume fires throughout all phases of combat operations ashore. When paired with Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets, HIMARS will provide a highly responsive, precision fire capability to our forces. There is $109 million budgeted in Fiscal Year 2009 to procure USMC HIMARS tactical and training rockets. To date, we have fielded and trained one reserve Battery and two active duty Batteries. Battery F, 2/14 completed the first operational deployment of a Marine Corps HIMARS unit, firing twenty-four tactical rockets in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The requirement for HIMARS is 46 and we expect to achieve FOC by Fiscal Year 2010.

Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS). The EFSS will be the principal indirect fire support system for the vertical assault element of the Ship-to-Objective Maneuver as part of a

Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) assault element. EFSS consists of two ITV prime movers, a 120mm rifled towed mortar, an ammunition trailer, and ammunition. In conjunction with the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53 helicopter, EFSS provides a 110 nautical mile radius, internal lift capability. Supported units will have immediately responsive, organic indirect fires at ranges and lethality well beyond their current battalion mortars. Fiscal Year 2009 provides $22.1 million for accelerated procurement of 41 EFSS systems. The requirement for EFSS is 66 systems and will be manned and supported by artillery regiments. EFSS recently completed successful operational testing. IOC is planned for Fiscal Year 2008, and FOC is planned for Fiscal Year 2010.

g. Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)

The Marine Corps is taking aggressive action to modernize and improve organic UAS capabilities. The Marine Corps UAS are organized into three tiers, tailored to the mission and requirements of the supported command. Tier III UAS serve at the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level. Tier II UAS support Regimental Combat Team and Marine Expeditionary Unit operations, and Tier I UAS support battalion and below operations. At the Tier III level, we have transitioned Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadrons (VMU) from our legacy Pioneers to the Army developed RQ-7B Shadow. We are also initiating a reorganization of the squadrons' force structure to better task-organize for mission requirements and began the stand up of a third active component VMU squadron. The addition of a third VMU squadron is critical to sustaining current operations and will help in decreasing the operational tempo from our current deployment-to-dwell ratio of less than 1:1—to a more sustainable 1:2 ratio. This rapid transition and reorganization, initiated in January 2007, will be complete by the fourth quarter Fiscal Year 2009, significantly improves organic Marine Corps UAS capability while increasing joint interoperability and commonality.

For our Tier II needs, using supplemental appropriations provided by Congress, the Marine Corps is using an ISR services contract to provide Scan Eagle systems to Multi-National Forces-West, Iraq. Contracted Scan Eagles are expected to fill the Tier II void until future fielding of the Tier II/Small Tactical UAS (STUAS), a combined Marine Corps and Navy program which began in Fiscal Year 2008 and is planned for fielding in 2011.

At the Tier I level, the Marine Corps is transitioning from the Dragon Eye to the Joint Raven-B program, used by the US Army. When fully fielded, the Marine Corps UAS family of systems will be networked through a robust and interoperable command and control system that will provide commanders an enhanced capability to use across the spectrum of military operations.

h. Logistics Modernization

Logistics challenges during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and subsequent operations accelerated the requirement to modernize Marine Corps logistics. The Marine Corps Logistics Modernization (LogMod) program is a three-pronged, enterprise-wide, logistics improvement and integration effort designed to increase the operational reach and lethality of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). LogMod is focused on enhancing the readiness of deployed forces, increasing the operational availability of equipment, and decreasing the logistics burden of Marine units. It constitutes the most comprehensive, end to end approach ever taken to improve MAGTF logistics. Once fully implemented, the LogMod program and its initiatives will drive improvements in technologies, processes, and people through modernization of doctrine, training, and organizations. As a roadmap for more effective expeditionary logistics, logistics modernization will greatly enhance our ability to operate in all environments and in all theaters. A key initiative was the implementation of the Marine Logistics Group reorganization.

The 2006-2007 reorganization of the garrison-focused Force Service Support Groups (FSSGs) into expeditionary Marine Logistics Groups (MLGs) created a more adaptable, capable, and rapidly deployable logistics organization. The MLG allows for the rapid formation of deployable, task-organized logistics forces, providing experienced logistics Command and Control for planning and operations while fostering strong habitual working relationships between supported and supporting units. Significant process change and adoption of new technologies will increase the effectiveness of logistics on the battlefield. By decreasing process steps and levels, supply and maintenance chains are being streamlined to increase velocity of support and services. Visibility of assets and requests for support, enhanced by new IT enablers and technologies such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), will allow deployed forces to decrease their support footprint on the battlefield, trading inventory volume for accurate and

timely information. Enhanced transportation and distribution processes and organizations provide dedicated assets to prioritize cargo, optimize routing, and reduce uncertainty. Deployed forces are using recently-developed technologies such as the Battlefield Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3) and Warehouse-to-Warfighter (W2) to gain visibility of assets as they move across the "last tactical mile" from sustainment areas to combat forces. In total, Marine Corps Logistics Modernization will ensure the readiness and sustainment of combat forces in any operational environment. Of critical importance is the development and fielding of the Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC).

Global Combat Support System—Marine Corps (GCSS-MC). GCSS-MC will deliver a modernized information technology system that will enhance logistics support to the warfighter. As the primary information technology enabler for the Marine Corps Logistics Modernization efforts, the system's primary design focus is to enable the warfighter to operate while deployed and provide reach back capability from the battlefield. GCSS-MC is designed with modern, commercial-off-the-shelf enterprise resource planning software that will replace our aging legacy systems. The Global Combat Support System – Marine Corps Block 1 focuses on providing the operating forces with an integrated supply/maintenance capability and enhanced logistics-chain-management planning tools. Field user evaluations and initial operational test and evaluations are scheduled for 2nd Quarter Fiscal Year 2009, followed by fielding of the system and Initial Operating Capability during Fiscal Year 2009. Future blocks will focus on enhancing capabilities in the areas of warehousing, distribution, logistics planning, decision support, depot maintenance, and integration with emerging technologies to improve asset visibility.

VIII. Conclusion

Since 2001, the austere expeditionary environment, high operational tempo, and effects of combat have tested the flexibility and exceptional abilities of your Marines. They have repeatedly succeeded. This sustained effort has come at substantial cost in terms of personal sacrifice on the part of individual Marines and their families, as well as the cumulative wear and tear on our equipment. Your Marine's remarkable resilience and professionalism vindicates the Nation's trust and confidence in them. In this Long War, it is imperative that we keep primary focus on support for our Marines in combat, while resetting and modernizing a multi-capable

force ready for our nation's future challenges. The Congress' continued and consistent support has enabled us to prevail in today's battles and will ensure that we always remain the Nation's premier expeditionary force in readiness!

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

April 9, 2008

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SESTAK

Mr. SESTAK. What is the stop-loss number for the 3rd Infantry Division over the past year, per brigade, and per division as a whole? In addition, how are they broken down, per specialty? Lastly, how many of those who might have faced stop-loss as their unit prepared for deployment, reenlisted vice-face stop-loss?

General CODY. The Army is committed to reducing and eventually eliminating the use of "Stop Loss." We are currently working with the Secretary of Defense to develop policies that will allow us to reduce our reliance on "Stop Loss" as a force management tool. The data that you requested related to "Stop Loss" in the 3rd Infantry Division is below.

We have a moral obligation to provide combatant commanders with cohesive Army units that are fully manned, trained, and equipped for the missions they will undertake in theater. Personnel losses caused by separations and retirements have a significant adverse impact on units deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in terms of cohesion, training, and stability. In order to minimize these detrimental effects, we use "Stop Loss" sparingly and for limited periods of time. "Stop Loss" affects only about one percent of the total force.

"STOP LOSS" Data on the 3rd Infantry Division

Stop-loss numbers for the 3rd Infantry Division over the past year, per brigade, and per division as a whole:

3ID Subordinate Units	# Soldiers "Stop Lossed" March 07 – March 08	# of Soldiers Assigned*
1st Brigade Combat Team	270	4,195
2nd Brigade Combat Team	251	3,946
3rd Brigade Combat Team	178	4,046
4th Brigade Combat Team	119	3,991
Aviation Brigade	120	2,675
Division HQ	48	1,079
Sustainment Brigade	63	540
3rd Infantry Division Total	1,049	20,472

*as of 25 April 2008

(table continues on next page)

(table continued from previous page)

Broken down per specialty:

MOS	# SL Mar 07 - Mar 08	MOS	# SL Mar 07 - Mar 08	MOS	# SL Mar 07 - Mar 08	MOS	# SL Mar 07 - Mar 08
11B	163	94R	9	15B	4	46Q	2
68W	81	31B	8	35P	3	92L	2
19K	70	15G	8	25B	3	15U	2
63B	47	44B	8	21U	3	63X	2
19D	42	35K	7	35H	3	15H	2
13B	39	63D	7	68J	3	21M	2
25U	37	89B	7	27D	3	68G	2
13F	37	25S	7	45B	3	92M	1
21B	34	94F	7	35N	3	15N	1
92A	32	74D	7	45K	3	13P	1
92F	32	15Q	6	35T	3	56M	1
35F	22	94A	6	94M	3	15K	1
88M	22	94E	6	13R	2	13W	1
63M	20	44C	5	25N	2	13S	1
92G	19	63J	5	13M	2	94W	1
92Y	19	15P	5	94D	2	11Z	1
11C	18	25F	5	14J	2	52X	1
52D	15	15Y	5	62B	2	92S	1
15T	15	15R	5	21J	2	25C	1
25Q	13	15F	5	42R	2	68D	1
63H	10	35M	4	63Z	2	15S	1
63A	10	14R	4	88N	2	68S	1
42A	9	92W	4	52C	2		
13D	9	45G	4	15D	2		

Of those who might have faced stop-loss as their unit prepared for deployment, reenlisted vice face stop-loss in the 3rd Infantry in the past 12 months, 255 subsequently reenlisted and 11 more transitioned to serve in the Reserve Component.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS

Ms. TSONGAS. While patrolling crowded and noisy urban settings in Iraq, U.S. troops have a difficult time identifying where enemy fire is coming from. Hostile fire has claimed the lives of more than 1,200 American soldiers in Iraq since combat began there in March of 2003. Indeed, it is my understanding hostile fire has become the second leading cause of American fatalities after IEDs. General Cody, almost six weeks ago I asked General Casey about the status of releasing appropriated Supplemental funds for various shooter and sniper detection systems. To the best of my knowledge, additional systems have not yet been procured using Supplemental funding. Can you please update the committee on the Army's counter-sniper initiatives both in terms of last year's $1.2 billion Supplemental as well as any additional plans moving forward?

General CODY. The Army received $400 million in other procurement, Army funding for Rapid Equipping Soldier support systems in the FY08 bridge supplemental. The funds were allocated to procuring counter sniper items. The funding is less than the total FY08 counter sniper requirement of $451 million, which is a reduction from the original request of $1.2 billion and was based on a continuing refinement of the counter sniper requirements by the Army staff. Counter sniper systems being procured with current funding include:

- Boomerang gunshot detection system
- DoubleShot shot detection system
- Vanguard (which integrates a remote weapons station with Boomerang and DoubleShot for vehicle based Counter Sniper capability)
- handheld thermals, stabilized and ruggedized binoculars, security veils and vehicle nets, magnifiers and mannequins.

The remaining portion of the FY08 supplemental request includes the requirement for counter sniper procurement. The Army approved the transition of two sniper defeat capabilities into acquisition programs: vehicle/fixed site-based gunshot detection and Soldier-based gunshot detection. The third capability, a remote weapons station with a vehicle based gunshot detection system (similar to Vanguard) has been assessed to support an acquisition program decision. Funding requests have been incorporated into the Army's FY10–15 Program Objective Memorandum submission. If approved, a requirement for the Vanguard-like system would be submitted and expected to be a program of record in FY12.

○