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ARMY STRATEGIC INITIATIVES

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ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

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ARMY STRATEGIC INITIATIVES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 26, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:45 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, we will come to order.

We are pleased to have the Secretary of the Army with us today and the Army Chief of Staff. We will officially welcome them in just a moment. Two matters before we begin.

I notice there is a soldier in full body uniform. And I hope your sergeants will not ask you to keep that on the entire time. So feel free, after you have been properly introduced a few moments from now, to remove that, because it gets hot in here, even with a suit coat on, so feel free to remove that.

Also we meet today on our chief of staff Erin Conaton's birthday, so I want to say happy birthday to Erin Conaton.

Secretary of the Army, Honorable Pete Geren, Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey, we welcome you as our special guests.

We know General Casey to be an outstanding leader, dedicated soldier, and the Army is very much in capable hands. We hold this hearing today at General Casey's request. He has asked for this opportunity to present to the Congress his assessment of the current state of the Army, providing his insight into what the future holds for it, and then describe for us the set of priorities as he guides the Army forward.

I want to stress how this is an example of the sort of partnership that should and does exist between the Department of Defense and our committee. Of course this committee is charged with oversight of the Department of Defense, and sometimes we have to be directive in our dealings. But we are certainly happy to provide a forum to discuss important aspects of our national security as well.

And, General Casey, we appreciate your request.

I might say that the Secretary and the General had a time limit on their testimony. They were kind enough, in mind of our vote, to extend it to 6:15. And we will do our best to have all the members ask questions by then.

General Casey, the Army has a good story to tell. It is stressed today, and I expect we will hear exactly how stressed it is in a moment. I am certainly going to say a few words about that. But at

the bottom of it, it is still a good-news story. Even in the face of all the stress, your soldiers, your civilians, your Army families continue to meet the challenges before them, as they have done for 232 years.

But the Army stands on the edge of a cliff. Six years of war in both Afghanistan and Iraq threatens to push it over. The Army's people are exhausted by repeated combat rotations, and your equipment is worn. This is first and foremost a question of strategic risk.

Gentlemen, during the 30 years I have had the honor to serve in Congress, this country has used military force on 12 separate occasions. In most cases, the United States was forced to act, with little warning. It will happen again, later, we hope, and undoubtedly sooner than we would like.

That lesson drives my present concern about the readiness of U.S. forces, particularly the Army and their ability to deter, deploy, and defeat potential adversaries of the United States.

Congress is charged with providing our military with what they require to safeguard our national security. The most critical task we face, therefore, is to attend to the readiness of those forces. Readiness is about having the right people in the right numbers and providing them with the best leadership and educational opportunities available. It is about forces that are properly equipped and thoroughly trained for any contingency. It is also about ensuring that those trained and ready forces are aligned with the proper set of roles and missions. In short, it is about reducing strategic risk.

In 1921, Major General Leonard Wood published a book entitled, *America's Duty*. In it, he wrote that, "Americans are cheerfully confident that an untrained American is as effective in war as a highly trained and equally well-educated foreigner of equal physical strength and intelligence. There is a lack of appreciation of the fact that willingness does not mean fitness or ability." Those words of General Leonard Wood remain true today.

General Wood wrote those words almost 30 years before Task Force Smith was sent to repel North Korea's invasion of South Korea in the summer of 1950. In the intervening years, we did not take his warning seriously. Undermanned, underequipped, undertrained, the soldiers of Task Force Smith were unprepared for the attack that came their way in the result of a humiliating retreat to the Pusan Perimeter. Those soldiers in our Nation learned the hard way that sending unready forces to war can have disastrous consequences. Today we would do well to keep General Wood's words and Task Force Smith's fate in mind when we consider the state of our military.

The Army has degraded to an intolerable point. We broke it so badly in the years following Vietnam that, in 1979, Army Chief of Staff General Shy Meyer warned Congress of a "hollow" Army. We skip forward to January of this year when your predecessor, General Peter Schoomaker, appeared before this committee, and I asked him if he were comfortable with the readiness of his force. He replied, "I do have continued concerns about the strategic depth of our Army and its readiness."

The parallels are alarming. We cannot risk breaking the Army again. This is not a comment on your willingness, but recognition,

as General Wood recognized, that will alone is insufficient. We must set about the task of rebuilding the Army. But rebuilding it in a way that it was before the wars will not be enough. As we reset it, it must evolve so that it develops the resonant capabilities required to conduct the full range of missions that it will face in the coming years: high-intensity combat, to be sure, but also counter-insurgency missions like those that have bedeviled us in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I look forward to your thoughts on how we move forward together to make sure our soldiers have what they need to meet the demands of the future, not just the equipment, but the training and the installations they need as well.

The modern equipment, challenging training ranges, and robust installations are worthless without the right sort of people in the ranks. The Army has some of the finest people in the world, but I am worried about them, and I am worried about your ability to retain them after so many rotations to combat that their heads must be spinning, particularly the mid-career sergeants and the lieutenants and captains, upon whom the future of this force depends.

I am worried about our ability to recruit them in the numbers we need, even as we grow the Army, without relying on measures that threaten the quality of our force. And I am worried about your ability to care for them, should they become sick or wounded.

The common thread running through all of those challenges involving your soldiers is that they have families they care about and who care about them. Parents have to know that, when they send their sons and daughters to you, they are going to get the best of everything: the best leadership, the best training, the best opportunities, and the best care. Married soldiers have to know that, when they are deployed, their families are going to be taken care of. And Army families have to know that they are going to have a chance to be a family again, to live a relatively stable life together for a reasonable period when their soldier returns.

The Army's recent decision to increase funding for family support programs is a good step. But the question is, how long will the support continue?

I look forward to hearing about all of this, and, again, General, thank you for suggesting this hearing.

And we would like to hear from our ranking member, our friend from California, Duncan Hunter.

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for holding this hearing.

And it is great to welcome Secretary Geren back to this committee, as a guy who sat on the committee for a number of years and impressed us all with his leadership, with his intelligence, and with his eloquence. And, you know, Pete Geren was the epitome of the tradition of this committee, which is bipartisanship.

And I remember, when this Administration first started, Mr. Secretary, you had a number of members of this committee, equally

split between Democrats and Republicans, who wrote the Administration and said that you were one invaluable public servant who should be in the Department of Defense, helping to shape policies. It is really great to see you. And thanks for your great tradition of bipartisanship, because that is what we need in large supply right now.

And to the Chief of Staff, General Casey, I would like to welcome you back. You have been before the committee as a former Vice Chief of Staff. A lot of us have seen you in Iraq as a former commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq. Today you sit before us as the 36th Chief of Staff of the Army. So a special thanks to you, as well. And you have gone through the hoops and lots of bumps and tough challenges in those last several years and, I think, always given us a good, straightforward presentation and good, straightforward leadership. And we appreciate your appearance before us.

You know, we are fortunate to have each of you serving us.

And as I have already said, the Army asked to have this hearing so that the Secretary and the Chief of Staff could present the committee with a set of strategic initiatives that they have developed to set the Army on a strong course for the future.

So, General Casey, it is my understanding that, based on current demands, you believe the Army is out of balance, and that these strategic initiatives that you are here today to discuss are intended to restore this balance and to prepare our Army for a period of persistent conflict.

The war we are fighting today is, without a doubt, wearing on our force. However, I would ask both of you, are we supposed to only fight the wars that improve military readiness? No one will argue that the readiness of our military is absolutely crucial to the national security strategy. However, should declining readiness trends spur us to throw up our hands and give up, or should these trends be a warning to all of us and compel us to identify, fund, and fix the shortfalls that put our Nation at risk?

The holes in the yard, which General Schoomaker talked about at great length, which are the shortfalls in equipment that existed when the war started, the sustained combat operations in extremely harsh conditions, and the simultaneous effort to transform the Army while we are having a warfight in two theaters, all stress the force.

So, gentlemen, thanks for being with us today to talk about your strategic initiatives. We have, at times in our history, been caught off-guard and forced into a reactionary mode. That is never good. It is a reflection on your leadership and character that you are here today not at our request but at yours, to alert us of your concerns, your needs, and your strategic vision for the Army.

I am glad to hear that one of the areas you intend to concentrate on is support for our soldiers and their families. And I absolutely believe that taking care of soldiers and their families, no matter where they are, is our top priority.

I would also like to point out that when it comes to taking care of soldiers and their families, this committee has a reputation for stepping up to the plate. For many years, the committee has raised the issue of increasing end-strength. In fact, the Committee De-

fense Review, last year, recommended just that to the Administration. And many members on this committee, individually, have worked on that issue for a number of years. And, as a matter of fact, we have increased, to some degree, the end-strength of the United States Army, as well as the Marine Corps. But I think we all welcome the increases that are recommended in this year's budget.

I am also reminded that when you ask us for money for reset, this committee authorized every penny that you asked for. And I think that is a reflection on the credibility that you bring to the committee when you make requests that go straight to the heart of readiness and force effectiveness.

So let me just make it clear that there should be no doubt that the committee will again take the lead to ensure that the Army gets the necessary funding that it needs to take care of soldiers and their families for both the current and the future force. In order to do so, we must know what is required. And my challenge to both of you is for you to control the bureaucracy; don't let the bureaucracy control you. If our Army needs something, tell us.

And our record, again, gentlemen, has been that this committee responds very quickly and very effectively to straight talk, to candid requests. And I think we stand ready to do that right now.

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.

And, again, to Pete Geren, thanks for coming home. And it has always been great to work with you. And you are the epitome of bipartisanship, in the tradition of this great committee.

And, General Casey, thank you for being with us. I look forward to your testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.

Before I introduce Secretary Geren, I might comment, I bet we look a little bit different from that side of the table than when you were sitting here looking toward the table. We appreciate your service very much, and we will ask you to testify for us now, and then followed by General Casey.

Secretary Geren.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETE GEREN, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Secretary GEREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for hosting this hearing.

And, Congressman Hunter, thank you, as well.

And thank this committee for the extraordinary support of the United States Army day-in, day-out, year after year.

Mr. Chairman, the view is a little different from this side of the table. I think the air conditioner doesn't work quite as well on this side of the table either.

A little different setting from this perspective, but it is truly an honor to be here. This committee and this Congress always has made soldiers a top priority, always made the United States Army a top priority. And I speak for a million men and women in uniform and a couple hundred thousand civilians when I say "thank you" to every one of you for standing with the Army during all the time, but certainly during these most challenging six years that we have been through during this first six years of this century.

I also want to thank so many of you for going to theater. It means a lot to soldiers to know that their elected officials see them where they are doing their work, where they are doing the hard work of freedom. And they appreciate it very much. It means a great deal to them. It is a great boost for their morale. And I know how hard it is to leave the District, I know how hard it is to leave here. You are awfully busy. And that so many of you have gone over there, time after time, means a great deal to the soldiers. And thank you for doing that.

We have 150,000 soldiers today in harm's way. We have those who have just gotten back, and we have those who are preparing to go. The 150,000 soldiers we have in harm's way today are the best-led, best-equipped, and best-trained soldiers we have ever put in the field. And today the Chief and I are here to discuss with you what your Army leadership plans to do to ensure that, 5 years from now, 10 years from now, 20 years from now, we can still say the same thing, that our soldiers will remain the best-led, best-trained, and best-equipped.

The Chief is going to talk about four imperatives: to sustain, to prepare, reset, and transform our force. I would like to focus on three subsets of those imperatives, three fundamental building blocks to ensure that we are prepared for the threats of the future and the threats of the present, what we need to do right now to make sure we meet the needs of soldiers and what we need to do in order to make sure we remain ready over the coming years.

I am going to talk about the all-volunteer force and the role of the Army family in the health of the all-volunteer force, talk about health care and what we owe to our soldiers.

Mr. Chairman, you said that moms and dads who send their kids into the Army, they expect the best, and we expect that we are going to give them the best. I can assure you that that is our commitment.

And, third, an issue that has come on the screen lately, a very important issue for the long-term health of this Army, and that is acquisition, contracting, logistical support to soldiers. Wherever in the world we send them, we have to make sure we are going to be able to get them what they need and when they need them.

I am going to talk about these three issues today.

We believe we are in an era of persistent conflict. Where we are today is the new normal. September 10, 2001, is a distant memory. We are never going to return to that era of organizing our Army, equipping our Army, training our Army. The new normal is the era we are in now. And, as we look into the future, we believe it is going to be an era of persistent conflict, and we have to organize training our Army accordingly.

The all-volunteer force is a national treasure, and it is not very old. The all-volunteer force is only 34 years old, really a blink of an eye when you consider the history of armed forces of the world and certainly even the armed forces of the United States.

And the all-volunteer force is not just the soldier; the all-volunteer force is a soldier plus the family. The soldier volunteers; the family volunteers to stand with him or stand with her. And if you are going to have a strong all-volunteer force, you have to have a strong soldier but you also have to have a strong family.

And when October 7th rolls around next month, we will be moving into the seventh year of combat operations in Afghanistan. This is the third-longest conflict in the Nation's history. It is the second-longest conflict we have ever been through since the Revolutionary War with an all-volunteer force. Since the Revolutionary War, we have never asked an all-volunteer force to shoulder this kind of a burden for our Nation for this length of time.

And the demographics of this Army are different than the demographics of any Army we have fielded before. We have a million soldiers, but half a million of those soldiers are married—more than half a million. And more than half of those spouses are employed and work outside of the home. There are 700,000 children in the families of the United States Army family. When a soldier deploys, a married soldier, he or she leaves a single parent behind and all the challenges associated with that family dynamic. When a single parent deploys, that single parent leaves a child in the care of others. Twelve months was asking a lot of those families, and 15 months is asking more. And we, as an Army, are stepping up and doing what needs to be done now and planning for the future to meet the needs of those soldiers and those families.

In the 1970's and 1980's, the issue for the future of the all-volunteer force was pay, and there was a crisis in pay. And the Congress and the Administration, in the early 1980's, stepped up and met that crisis and adjusted the pay accordingly and have continued. This Congress has led the way since then to make sure that our soldiers had the compensation that they needed.

In the 1990's, also led by Congress, we saw a housing initiative that was pushed by the Congress that has done more than any other single factor to improve the day-to-day quality of life for our soldiers: the Residential Communities Initiative, which, led by Congress, we have since, as an Army, invested \$1 billion; the private sector has invested over \$10 billion. And we have built wonderful homes in neighborhoods for families all across our force.

And for those of you who have seen it, I know you know what I am talking about. We have built great neighborhoods, and the soldiers appreciate it a great deal. For the members who have not had an opportunity to see the product of the Residential Communities Initiative, I urge you to do so. I think you will be impressed and proud of what you have done for soldiers.

Now the focus is on the family in an era of persistent conflict: the family after six years of war; the family anticipating that this war is going to go on; and what do we need to do to support that family.

In recent years, the Army has increased by 40 the number of child-development centers, and we have in our budget plans for 22 more. We built more fitness center, more chapels, more youth centers. And last summer, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we moved \$100 million out of existing programs into family programs to dramatically increase funding to higher family readiness support assistance. We have doubled the funding for child care. We have provided additional respite care. And we have expanded youth programming across the Army.

Soon, in the next couple of weeks, we are going to announce and launch an Army Family Action Plan. We are going to add addi-

tional resources to family programs working to improve education, health care, employment opportunities, improved housing, and providing additional funding to existing programs.

The Army Family Action Plan will be an important step forward, but we have to always remind ourselves that support for the family is going to be a dynamic effort. The needs of the family are going to change; the demands on the soldiers are going to change. And we look forward to working with the Congress to continue to meet the needs of families.

Health care: What happened at Walter Reed was a tragedy for soldiers, and it was a tragedy for the United States Army, but it was a wake-up call to the United States Army. And I am proud to see the way that soldiers stepped up and worked to change that system, stepped up to make that system work better for soldiers.

And, Mr. Chairman, I think this poster we have in the corner captures a spirit of what we have done at Walter Reed and all across our system to do a better job of meeting the needs of wounded warriors. The soldier in the picture is Sergeant Major Brent Jurgensen. He was twice badly wounded in combat in Iraq, and he is now the Sergeant Major for our Wounded Warrior Program. He is a great leader, and he is leading us and making sure that we do what we need to do, what our soldiers deserve in supporting them.

We have made tremendous changes since the revelations at Walter Reed. I think the mission statement also captures the spirit of the change out there. The mission statement now of our soldiers who are wounded, who are under care throughout our system, "I am a warrior in transition. My job is to heal, as I transition back to duty or continue serving the Nation as a veteran in my community. This is not a status but a mission. I will succeed in this mission because I am a warrior and I am Army-strong." That is the spirit that we are taking to serving the soldiers who are wounded. And across our entire system we are building these warrior transition units. We have made great steps forward in meeting the needs of those soldiers.

I would like to switch now to an issue—and, Mr. Chairman, I have spoken with you about this one—one that has come up recently on our screen but one that poses great challenges for our Army. We have had contractors in the field since George Washington led our Army. But with the drawdown that we experienced in the 1990's, we have come to rely more heavily on contractors in the field. Right now, our force in Iraq is about 55 percent soldiers and about 45 percent contractors, with contractors doing many of the jobs soldiers did in the past.

And as we look to the future, an era of persistent conflict and our need to be able to deploy anywhere in the world whenever the Nation calls, we have to make sure that our contracting system is able to support soldiers, provide them the base support they need, transportation support they need, and any other services that we cannot provide organically through our Army.

But we have lately discovered that we have some flaws in that system, and we have an aggressive criminal investigation effort to rout out those flaws. We, in the Army, are working to address the

cultural failings that allow Army soldiers to make the decisions that they have made and violate their trust.

But we also are looking to the future. And this conflict, six years of war, and anticipating this era of persistent conflict, has caused us to focus on our soldier support system. We have appointed a commission, under Dr. Jacques Gansler, to look at the future needs of our soldiers in combat anywhere in the world. And we will be coming back to you over the coming weeks with our plan, and look forward to working with you to make sure that we are properly organized, trained, and equipped to meet the soldiers' needs.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today and, again, thank you for your support of soldiers. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Geren can be found in the Appendix on page 53.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Secretary Geren.

General Casey, this is your first appearance before us as Army Chief of Staff. We welcome you before us today, and we thank you for your service. You are recognized, General Casey, please.

STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. And while I am more than willing to share credit for whose idea this hearing was, I do welcome the opportunity to come before you today and talk to you about what I have seen in my first almost six months on the job and the direction that the Secretary and I think we need to move the Army, with your help, over the next three or four years.

As the Chairman said, our Nation has been at war for over six years. Our Army has been a leader on the front lines of this war and back here at home. And, over time, these operations have expanded in scope and duration, and, as a result, our all-volunteer force has been stretched and stressed. Over these last six years, Congress has responded to the Army's request for resources. And that kind of commitment to the Army, our soldiers, and their families is both necessary and deeply appreciated.

We live in a world where global terrorism and extremist ideologies are real threats. And, as we look to the future, I believe that the next decades will be ones of what I call persistent conflict. And what I mean by that is a period of protracted confrontation among states, nonstates, and individual actors that are increasingly using and willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.

And there are several emerging global trends that are likely to exacerbate this period of protracted confrontation.

Just a few: globalization—now, clearly, globalization has positive impacts around the world but can also create have and have-not situations that can be exploited by extremist groups to undermine government in societies. Population growth and the youth bulge that accompanies that can increase opportunities for instability, radicalism, and extremism. Demand for energy, water, and food for growing populations will increase competition and possibly conflict. Climate change and natural disasters, as we have already seen,

can cause humanitarian crises, population migrations and epidemic disease.

And the two that worry me the most: The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has the potential for catastrophic attacks that will be globally destabilizing and detrimental to global economic development. And, finally, failed or failing states that are unable or unwilling to maintain control over their territory; these can provide safe havens for terrorist organizations to export terror regionally or around the world.

So, while analysts generally agree on those trends, they also agree that we will be unlikely to predict the time, location, or scope of coming conflicts. We do know, however, that the Army will remain central to our Nation's security and that we need agile forces that can rapidly adapt to unexpected circumstances.

The Army has a vision to build those forces, and we are already executing it. We intend to transform the current force into a campaign-quality expeditionary force that is capable of supporting combatant commanders across the spectrum of conflict, from peacetime engagement to conventional war, in the 21st century. That is what we are about.

So, Mr. Chairman, as we look to that future, we do so with an Army that is already stretched by the impacts of six years of war. And while we remain a resilient, committed, professional force, today's Army, as Congressman Hunter said, is out of balance. The current demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply.

We are consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight, and unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other contingencies. Our reserve components are performing an operational role for which they were neither originally designed nor resourced. Our current operational requirements for forces and the limited periods at home between the deployments necessitate a focus on counterinsurgency training at the expense of training for the full spectrum of operations.

Soldiers, family, support systems, and equipment, as the Chairman said, are stretched by the demands of these repeated deployments. Overall, we are consuming our readiness as fast as we can build it. But, with your help, we can act quickly to restore the balance and preserve the all-volunteer force, restore the necessary depth and breadth of Army capabilities, and build capacity for the future.

Four imperatives will frame what I think we need to do here in the coming years, but implementing these imperatives will require several years, considerable resources, and sustained commitment by Congress and the American people.

First imperative: We need to improve the manner in which we sustain the Army, soldiers, families, and civilians. The Secretary already talked a lot about what we think we need to do for families, and the importance of families in the readiness of the forces. But recruiting, training, and retaining our soldiers, the centerpiece of this force, can only be done for transforming our quality recruits into soldiers who are physically tough, mentally adaptive, and that live the warrior ethos. These warriors are our ultimate asymmetric advantage, the one thing that no enemy can duplicate now or in the future, and we need to keep them with us.

I mentioned that we recognize a strain on families, and we also recognize that they play an increasing role in the readiness of this all-volunteer force. So we will ensure that their quality of life is commensurate with the quality of service that they provide.

We will also ensure that our wounded warriors are cared for and reintegrated into the Army and society. And we will never forget our moral obligation to the spouses and children and families who have lost soldiers since September 11th.

So, first, sustain; second, prepare. We need to continue to prepare our forces for success in the current conflict.

With your help, we have made great strides in equipping our soldiers, and we are continually adapting our training and equipment to keep pace with an evolving enemy. We remain committed to providing our deploying soldiers with the best available equipment to ensure that they maintain a technological advantage over an enemy that they face. And I will show you some of that here in a few minutes.

We also will continue to provide tough, demanding training at home stations and in our combat training centers to give our soldiers and leaders the confidence that they need to succeed in these complex environments. Military success in this war is tied to the capabilities of our leaders and soldiers, and we will not fail to prepare them for success.

Third, the Chairman mentioned reset, that we must continue to reset our units and to rebuild the readiness consumed in operations to prepare them for future deployment and future contingencies.

And the notion that the Chairman mentioned about resetting for the future rather than resetting for the past is exactly the track that we are on. Since 2003, equipment has been used at a rate of over five times that program in harsh, demanding desert conditions.

In addition to fixing, replacing, and upgrading our equipment and retraining for future missions, we also have to revitalize our soldiers and families by providing them the time and the opportunity to recover from the cumulative effects of sustained operations.

Resetting our force is critical to restoring the readiness that you spoke about, Mr. Chairman. And reset must continue as long as we have forces deployed and for several years thereafter. The commitment to providing resources to reset our forces is what is essential to restoring the strategic depth and flexibility to the country.

Last, transform: We must transform our Army to meet the demands of the 21st century. Transformation for us is a holistic effort to adapt how we fight, train, modernize, develop leaders, base our forces and support our soldiers' families and civilians. It is a journey for us, not a destination.

Let me just say a few words about one element of our transformation, and that is modernization. We believe we must continually modernize our forces to put our Cold War formations and systems behind us and to provide our soldiers with a decisive advantage over any enemy that they face.

With your help, we will continue to rapidly field the best, new equipment to our fighting forces, to upgrade and modernize existing combat and support systems, to incorporate new technologies

spun out of Future Combat Systems research and development, and, finally, to begin to field the Future Combat Systems brigade combat teams themselves.

We are ultimately working toward an agile, globally responsive Army that is enhanced by modern networks, surveillance sensors, precision weapons, and platforms that are lighter, less logistics-dependent, and less manpower-intensive. It is a truly 21st-century force.

So four imperatives, Mr. Chairman: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform.

Each of these imperatives requires resources. And at the start of fiscal year 2007, Congress, as Congressman Hunter mentioned, provided the Army with sufficient base and supplemental funding to support the war, fund reset, and to maintain and train the force. With the start of fiscal year 2008 fast approaching, it is imperative that we work together to ensure that funding is once again available at the start of the year. This is essential to maintain the momentum to put us back in balance. Since it looks like we will start fiscal year 2008 under a continuing resolution, I ask, Mr. Chairman, that Congress provide the necessary resources and authorities to maintain this momentum.

In closing, your Army is the best in the world at what it does. We are that way because of our values, because of our ethos, because of our people and because of your support. We have magnificent soldiers, leaders, and civilians. They are ordinary people who are doing extraordinary things for our country. They have made hard sacrifices, and they will make more. We have lost over 2,400 soldiers and had over 20,000 wounded, a quarter of those from reserve components. We have also awarded a Medal of Honor, six Distinguished Service Cross medals, over 260 Silver Stars and 6,700 other awards for valor.

But it will require more than the courage and valor of our soldiers to ensure that our Army can continue to fight and win the Nation's wars in an era of persistent conflict. It will require clear recognition by national leaders like yourselves of the threats and challenges that America faces in the years ahead and of the need to ensure that our armed forces are prepared to meet them. I am optimistic that we can meet these challenges together.

Thank you for your attention, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

If you would give me five minutes, I would just like to give you a quick show-and-tell here on some of the equipment that, one, has come out of the Future Combat Systems research and development effort and that is in Iraq now, and to show you how we continue, again, with your support, to improve what we are doing for our soldiers.

And on Tuesday, we issued the one-millionth set of equipment to soldiers. When we started out in 2002, there were 15 items, and today there are 84 items. And I will show you those. But, first, let me just show you a couple—

The CHAIRMAN. General, let me say thank you for limiting it to five minutes. We know that you must leave here, at the very latest, at 6:15. And we appreciate you extending your leave time.

And I would like to announce we will have a five-minute break, no longer than that, at 5 o'clock.

General, you are recognized.

General CASEY. Okay. If you just look over here to the right, I would like to just point out three systems that are in Iraq now that came out of Future Combat Systems research and development.

The first one is the Micro Air Vehicle, we call it. It is also called the "beer keg unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)" or the "scrubbing bubble." But this is a squad- and platoon-level unmanned vehicle that you can run down an alley, look around the corner, look up on a roof and see what is up there. I think you can see the great potential that has for our soldiers. There are 50 of them in Iraq right now with the 25th Infantry.

Second, I will point out the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle. This is a robot that has already been used about 30,000 times, and it gets credit for diffusing 11,000 improvised explosive devices (IEDs). There are 5,000 of these in-theater. And you can also see that sending a robot up to diffuse an IED is much safer than having a soldier do it.

Hold up one of those unattended ground sensors, if you would.

These are critical for us. A soldier can take this and put it in a building or along a road and watch it back in his base, so we don't have to leave soldiers out inside buildings because they can watch them through these different cameras, and that is a great capability.

Again, those first three came out of Future Combat Systems research and development, so we are reaping the benefits of that now.

Point to the JTRS, Joint Tactical Radio System.

Now, while this is not fielded, this is the system on which we will provide voice, data, and video to individual vehicles and individual soldiers. So if you think about that Verizon commercial where he has the army behind him, this is the system that is going to bring that level of knowledge down to the individual soldier.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 75.]

General CASEY. And last, Sergeant Cantrell, will you stand up, please?

This is Sergeant Joshua Cantrell. He has been sitting here patiently and ready to go take his stuff off. But this is the Rapid Field Initiative equipment that we have been issuing to our soldiers and improving over time.

I am going to ask Frances Aden here, from our project manager soldier, to talk a little bit about where we are with this.

Mr. ADEN. Sir, we have made this system a lot lighter than the current body armor that we have right now. We added an extremely important feature to it where it will allow a soldier to quickly toss the system in case of emergency, vehicle fire, rollover. We have added an emergency quick-release to the system that the soldier is going to demonstrate right now, only to be used in the case of emergency: vehicle rollover, a fire or a drowning.

Go ahead and execute.

And the system just falls apart, and the soldier is able to get out of the vehicle in case of emergency.

General CASEY. This system is now the second generation of individual body armor that we fielded. And so we are continuing to improve what we are giving to the soldiers over time.

So that is probably less than five minutes. I yield the balance of my time back to the Chair here.

[The prepared statement of General Casey can be found in the Appendix on page 64.]

The CHAIRMAN. General, we thank you, sir, and we thank your soldiers so much for being with us.

I just have one question, General. I asked a question of your predecessor back in January, and I will ask you, General Casey, today. Are you comfortable with the Army's readiness for an unexpected serious military challenge?

General CASEY. As I mentioned in my opening statement, Mr. Chairman, I am not comfortable that we could respond as rapidly as we would like to. It would take us time to reverse directions, especially for a conventional threat, to train up to that level.

But I will tell you that this is a combat-seasoned force that should not be taken lightly in its ability to adapt quickly. But it would still take longer than I am comfortable with.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, again, gentlemen, thanks for appearing before us today.

You know, last year, on the reset piece, you folks told us back in June that you were going to have problems with funding for reset. And so we called you in, we had hearings, some classified, some open, and you laid out the exact dollar amount. And I can't remember the exact dollar amount, but it was—I thought it was \$18 billion. Is that right?

Secretary GEREN. \$17.1 billion.

Mr. HUNTER. And we had a subsequent hearing, because I believe in November we looked at the amount that had actually been executed at that point and it was something like \$3 billion. It was a fairly small amount of that money. And so the question became—because we had checked, the committee had sent out teams to the depots to ensure that we had capacity when we marked up the \$18 billion-plus to make sure we had capacity in the depots to, in fact, do the work that you needed the money for. And there was a pretty good degree of head room there, quite a bit of head room, and apparent capacity.

You had a few—we had some problems, I know, with getting the so-called carcasses of vehicles back in, the ones that were being reset, that were being worked on, flowing them back in the country to make sure that they could be refurbished.

How is that piece of reset going? Have we accelerated that process, and is that smoother now? Or is it still going at a fairly slow rate? What is your take on that?

Secretary GEREN. We are operating the depots right now not at max capacity, but we are operating them at optimal capacity considering the load that we have to flow through them. Because of the surge, we don't have as much in the queue, in reset, as we would have expected, had it not been for the surge. Next year, a lot of that equipment will be coming home.

But we have committed 98 percent, I believe is what I was recently briefed, of all those funds. We have reset 25 brigades through the depots over the last year. The program is running well. We have good accountability for the system. And we believe that we are operating at the optimal level, not maximum capacity level. Next year, the system will have a greater demand on it based on what comes back from theater.

General CASEY. If I can just add, the reason that we were able to do that is because of what I said in my opening testimony. We had the resources from Congress at the beginning of the year, and we had resources for operations and maintenance and procurement.

The other thing I would add, Congressman, is not only are the depots operating at increased capacity, they are operating more and more efficiently. And they are being recognized nationally for their efficiency efforts. There is an award called the Shingo award. It is a public-sector award for lean manufacturing. In 2005, none of our depots won one of those awards. This year, 12 did. And so, we are operating with the money that you are giving us more efficiently here.

So the reset process is going well. If we continue to get the resources in a timely fashion, we will maintain the momentum.

Secretary GEREN. Let me mention one other thing quickly on this point. Not only resources are important, but authorities are important. You all will likely be funding us with a continuing resolution (CR). And not only do we need the money, but we also need the procurement authority in order to procure long-lead items.

One of the reasons it worked so well last year: We had the money and authorities ahead of time; you could purchase the long-lead items that take months, in some cases, to get the depots. If you do a CR, we ask that you give special consideration to that need, not only the money but the authorities to procure the long-lead items.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, gentlemen. I think it is smart of you to let us know early we need to keep it flowing, and keep it flowing with the authorities.

And, Mr. Chairman, I think it is wise to have this hearing at this time, and I think it is incumbent upon us to try to make these bulky packages that are tough to pull through the political wickets, get them through the wickets, get the money going and to keep the authority going and to keep the reset going.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman from California.

Mr. Spratt from South Carolina.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you both for your testimony.

Mr. Secretary, can I get it clear, again, what the reset costs are likely to be on an annual basis, as the war goes on? And then afterwards, after the war has faded down, what is the likely cost going to be over a five-year period of time?

Secretary GEREN. I don't have the five-year number. For next year, we have budgeted \$13.5 billion. And I will have to get you the outyears. I will provide that to you for the record. But \$13 billion for 2008.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 81.]

Mr. SPRATT. General Casey, you refer repeatedly in your testimony to stress and strain on the standing Army. Would you tell us how exactly how, in your perception, this stress and strain is manifested? Family problems, lack of military proficiency?

General CASEY. It is certainly not lack of military proficiency.

What we are seeing is, one, the families are the most brittle element of the force. There is no question about it. My wife and I traveled around and talked to Army families all over the world in the first four months, and it was clear to us that the families are affected.

And it is a cumulative effect. One spouse stood up at Fort Bragg and said, "You know, General, it is not the same, running a family readiness group, for the second deployment as it was for the first, and for the third deployment as it was for the second." And people are getting stretched. That is probably the most significant stressor that we see.

The other stressor, as I mentioned in my opening statement, the fact that we are only home for 12 months. And so, we can only focus on the counterinsurgency aspects of the coming mission, and I don't have the time to train for full-spectrum operation. So those skills will atrophy over time. We are not in a bad point right now, as I said, because of the combat experience of our force, but that will atrophy over time.

Mr. SPRATT. I had a visit from some spouses recently, wives, who felt that the family wasn't adequately involved, particularly with patients who have symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). That it was a family problem as they came home, and the identification of these problems and making the children included to understand what was going on was critically important. They simply didn't feel that they were getting that from the active forces or from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).

General CASEY. We recognize that, as well. And about probably six weeks ago, we started a chain teaching program on PTSD and mild traumatic brain injury. And there was a family version, and there was a soldier version. And the intent was to have each member of the chain of command teach this to his subordinates so that we, one, increased awareness and, two, started working on eliminating the stigma that is attached to seeking mental health care. So that is working its way to them.

Now, we are also challenged by the lack of availability of mental health specialists, both inside the Army—I think we are under 80 percent—and in the civil sector supporting our bases. And we are taking measures to increase the number of mental health specialists that are available to soldiers and families.

Mr. SPRATT. One last question, a slightly different topic: the mine resistant ambush protected vehicle (MRAP). The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has just approved a substantial increase in the requirement for the MRAP. I believe the additional costs could be as much as \$16 billion. How do you assess the MRAP? Given the threat we have gotten, is it the answer to the problem with IEDs?

General CASEY. There is no panacea for IEDs, Congressman. The MRAP will provide our soldiers increased protection against particularly deeply buried IEDs. And so, there will be an enhanced

level of protection with the MRAP vehicle, but it is not a panacea. And I think you have been told before that you must attack the whole IED system and defeat the system, not just protect yourself against the blast. But it will be an enhancement.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow up on what I thought was an excellent opening statement that you gave here a few minutes ago.

Let me just begin by saying I came across a report from The Heritage Foundation here recently, entitled, "Four Percent for Freedom: The Need to Invest More in Defense." And if I may quote from this, "The United States military has reached a crossroads. In many respects, American armed forces are better off than ever before. The all-volunteer force is a proven, mature, and successful model. America is protected by the finest service men and women in history, who employ the most advanced arsenal on the planet. Yet the number, size, and duration of military deployments have increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War, while defense spending has remained at a historically low level.

It is clear if a clearly delineated policy is not established now to ensure stable funding, the military risks becoming a hollow force. A hollow force rings loud and clear in many of our ears. Historically, we have had a pretty good record on defense spending. During World War II, we spent just under 35 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). During Korea, we spent just under 12 percent of GDP. During Vietnam, it was just under 9 percent. And of course, during the 1970's, we developed what is known today as the hollow force. We built back up to six percent during the Reagan buildup. In 1991, during the first Gulf war, we were 4.6 percent. And today, according to this Heritage Foundation report, we are at 3.8 percent.

They suggest that robust and consistent funding of the military is fully within America's capability. Currently, the U.S. spends only 3.8 percent of GDP on the core defense budget. That is far lower than during the Cold War and almost a full percentage point lower than the hollow-force era after Vietnam.

I guess my question is this. They go on to suggest here that we ought to have a stable funding level of 4 percent of GDP. If we were to boost defense funding along the lines as suggested here or along some other line that provided for a significant \$25 billion to \$35 billion on an annual basis, my question is, Mr. Secretary and General, where would be the prime areas for the Army to invest their share of that increase?

Secretary GEREN. Each year, at the request of the committee, we provide a list of unfunded initiatives for the Army, and that would be a place to start.

I think one of the most important things for the Army is predictable funding. An organization of this size has a very difficult time managing rapid radical changes in either the timing or the level of funding. And if I look to the future, consistent funding and predictable funding would be one of the most important things that we could ask for. It would allow the Army to plan, allow the Army to look down the road.

And it is not to say that we can predict what is going to happen three years from now, five years from now; and we are always having to tweak budgets on the margins. But in the time that I have been involved with the Army, the predictability of funding and the lack of predictability, frankly, has posed some of our greatest challenges in managing our resources.

But as far as additional resources, I think we would probably do the same things sooner, rather than do many additional things.

Chief.

General CASEY. I don't really have much to add to that. Equipment is probably the area that would benefit the most from additional resources right now. And, as the Secretary said, it would allow us to do things that we know we need to do sooner.

Mr. SAXTON. Like the Chairman, I am very concerned about readiness. This report also points out some patterns in defense spending that this committee and others in the Government are responsible for. The first example it gives is the Pentagon purchased, on an average, 78 scout and attack helicopters each year from 1975 to 1990, but only seven each year from 1991 to 2000. Second, an average of 238 Air Force fighters and five tanker aircraft were purchased between 1995 and 1990, compared to only 37 from 1991 to 2000. And the third example they give is the average age of the Air Force in 1993 was just nine years. The average aircraft age today in the Air Force is 24 years.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I am concerned, like you. I think we have some challenges ahead of us, particularly given the persistent conflict that looms in our future.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to welcome our witnesses today. It is good to see my good friend who was a very valuable member of the Texas delegation, congressional delegation, for many years and now to see him as Secretary of the Army.

And, General Casey, Chief, good to see you. And we thank you for your service, for the good work.

One of the things that worries me is the prepositioning stocks. Over the past several years, the Army has drawn much of the equipment that was in the prepositioning stocks. This equipment has gone to support ongoing combat operations and also to fill our shortages in units preparing for deployment.

The Army has indicated it will be soon sometime before the stocks are restored. This is concerning, because the combatant commander expects to use this equipment to respond to emerging contingencies in the area of operations.

What actions has the Army taken to mitigate the strategic risk of having withdrawn equipment from the stocks? And when will the preposition stock be fully restored?

I know that a few moments ago you said that we might be able to respond slowly. But what about the equipment when we have to respond? And this really worries me, because this is part of my Subcommittee on Readiness. When we look at the resetting and when we look at the lack of equipment that we have, this really

worries our Subcommittee on Readiness and, overall, this committee.

So how do we respond to that? And maybe both of you can help me.

General CASEY. At this level of classification, Congressman, I think it is fair to say that we have consumed a good portion of our preposition stocks, and we recognize, as do you, that they need to be replenished.

A lot of that equipment has been sent in with the surge forces, and the expectation is that it will come out with the surge forces, need to be reset and then reconstituted. And I think there is a supplemental addendum coming up here, and a portion of the money in that is to begin the replenishment of our Army prepositioned stocks (APS).

I share your concern, but, again, all the preposition stocks are not consumed. We still have some flexibility. But as you said, we need to replace that to give back our strategic flexibility, which is exactly what I talked about in my opening statement.

Mr. Secretary.

Secretary GEREN. I don't have anything to add.

Mr. ORTIZ. I know that there has been talk about, both from the Administration and from Members of Congress, about redeploying and withdrawing.

We want to be sure that if we were to do that, that we can do it in a way that it would protect our soldiers as we either do one or the other. And, of course, I hope that we can win this war. I know that we cannot predict any future conflict, but we must be ready just in case.

And I just wanted to see, Mr. Chairman, if later on we can have—because there are a lot of things that worry me. The things with Blackwater. I know that between the State Department and Army, we are paying about \$1 billion in contracting out. We were just wondering the other day, I wonder how much \$1 billion will buy as far as soldiers that we can put in? I know that we might have to visit end strength, and I don't know if we are ready to revisit that or not. But sometimes I hear different testimony about the need for more soldiers, and I just hope that one of these days we can have a hearing so that we can all be singing from the same page so that we can work toward having a victory in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from New York, Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, Chief, welcome. As I have stated in other forums and I will repeat here today: As a Nation, and certainly as a committee, we are so fortunate to have great leaders like you in such challenging times, and I compliment you for stepping forward and actually asking for a hearing. I am not sure what that says about your sanity, but it says a great deal about your bravery and about your concern about the men and women.

General CASEY. As I said, I am willing to share credit for that.

Mr. MCHUGH. Fair enough, Chief.

I will tell you, like my friend from Texas who just spoke, the gentleman from New Jersey who spoke just before him, and of course

the Chairman of the full committee, I too am concerned about readiness. I know you both are as well. I would tell you, Chief, in reading your written testimony, your comment that, quote, "The current demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply. We are consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and are unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other potential contingencies" is just downright frightening.

As I said to General Petraeus when I had a chance to visit him over the August recess in Baghdad, it is awfully disconcerting to know that as we find ourselves in such a conflict in Iraq, that one of the key inputs of our strategy has to be the sustainability and the size of the force.

However, I don't believe the way you win an unnamed war is to lose the one you know you are in. So that always brings me back to end strength. And I want to pay you all a compliment. When we had a Personnel Subcommittee hearing a few months ago, it sure did not look like you were going to be able to set your recruiting goal of 518,400 new recruits. That was your Army objective that went beyond end strength to a grow goal because we were increasing end strength. And from what I see in the most recent data, you are going to make that figure and, in fact, you are going to go a bit beyond that 519,000.

Congratulations on that. That is a real tribute to your recognition of the importance of recruiting. It certainly keeps you on schedule to the 2012 date of increasing end strength to 547,000 in the active Army.

And the question I simply have now as we go forward, how does this committee and this Congress provide you with the tools, with the resources necessary to continue that successful recruiting in what admittedly is a very difficult recruiting environment?

Secretary GEREN. It is a tough recruiting environment and we are on track. The final numbers are not in, but we are projecting that we will meet the recruiting goals. Active and Reserves, Guard will fall a tiny bit short but will still meet their end strength numbers. The Army when you consider active, Guard, and Reserve, we recruit a force the size of the Marine Corps every year, and it is a tribute to the young men and women of this country that in the middle of a war we have that many people step up, raise their right hand, and join the regular Army knowing that they are very likely to be sent to conflict.

We have a strong economy and that makes recruiting difficult. The recruiting bonuses that you all have authorized for us have helped us compete in that environment. Some of the retention bonuses—when we look to growing the Army, adding the 74,000 that we plan across the three services, the retention issue is a big part of that growth. And the different initiatives that we have to retain soldiers, these highly qualified soldiers that have many attractive offers on the outside, keep them in the service. Meet the needs of their families. So part of it is financial.

Also as a Nation, and as Members of Congress, your support for the Army, your support for our forces in harm's way sends a very important signal to moms and dads that, yeah, I am going to give you the most valuable thing in my life to my military. That kind

of statement from our leaders sets a tone that allows us to recruit in this difficult environment.

But we have to continue to fine-tune the effort, fine-tune the bonuses, fine-tune the approaches. We are working with the Guard on an active first program. As you are probably aware, the Guard has been very innovative in their recruiting. They have tried to turn every Guard a recruiter. We are going to be partnering with the Guard this coming fiscal year and give us the strength of their reach into the communities. It is a challenge but American men and women are stepping up and meeting the challenge.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me add my congratulations to you, Mr. Secretary. And also thank you and General Casey for your service.

First let me thank you for bringing in the Future Combat Systems gear here, because last year we actually had some of these items tested at Fort Bliss and the soldiers gave the ultimate endorsement, which was they wanted to take this equipment back with them when they redeployed back to Iraq. So we appreciate giving Members of Congress an opportunity to see the products of Army transformation and Future Combat Systems here. And I thank all the soldiers for being here with us as well.

I was curious, General Casey, I looked back at your remarks from your change of command ceremony earlier this year. I know that both our Chairman and Mr. Saxton were in attendance. You said at the time, "We are locked today in a war against the global extremist network that is fixed on defeating the United States and destroying our way of life. This enemy will not go away nor will it give up easily, and the next decade is likely to be one of persistent conflict," as you said here today. You finished it up by saying, "We are engaged in a long war."

I know that I speak for everyone in this room that agrees that we need to provide all our soldiers and their families with everything that they need to achieve their mission, come home safely, and have a good home to come to. As has been stated here by a number of my colleagues, it is a costly and intensive endeavor.

Perhaps my question is: Can you help us understand how the Army is balancing the present and pressing need, urgent need, to take care of those engaged in combat, and, at the same time, looking long term at preparing for and modernizing our equipment and our ability to prepare for future conflicts?

It is something that we as a committee—as I think you have heard here today and before—really wrestle with. You have heard concerns about readiness. You have heard concerns to make sure that we take care of our wounded. Also our military families. Can you give us a perspective from both you, the Secretary's viewpoint, and you, General Casey, as well?

Secretary GEREN. Striking the right balance, as you describe, is very difficult. But we feel that the budget that we have submitted to the Congress does strike the right balance between the needs of the future and the needs of the present. And it is not to say that we don't have to make changes along the way, and we do. We are constantly working within that budget to meet needs as they are identified. But our modernization program, our most significant

modernization program in 30 years, the Future Combat System over this 5 years' Defense budget will take less than 5 percent of the budget. We believe that is an affordable investment in the future. It is an investment that we need to make. It is hard to make right now.

Anytime you are engaged in a conflict, as we are, there are immediate needs, and the Congress has been very supportive in two supplementals. We have been able to meet those immediate needs. But the Future Combat System is our investment in the future. We never want to send our soldiers into a fair fight. We believe the Future Combat System is going to prepare soldiers for those conflicts in the future.

General CASEY. Congressman, as I went around before I took over this job talking to former chiefs, every one of them said, Chief, never forget you are the future's guy. Everybody will get so consumed by the current requirements that they will take their eye off the ball, and your commitment to the country is to deliver the type of Army that the Nation needs down the road so we don't run into situations like Task Force Smith, as the Chairman mentioned.

And so what I laid out today in my testimony—sustain, prepare, reset, and transform—those are the four things that we are working to balance, to bring ourselves back into balance here in the next three or four years. Thank you.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you both very much for your testimony and for your service.

Our staff always prepares for us a memorandum for these hearings. I wanted to ask you a couple of questions related to this statement that has been prepared for us. It says that the Army is reporting that training, equipping, and personnel readiness levels for nondeployed forces have fallen to unprecedented lows. Is that true?

Secretary GEREN. The readiness of the forces that we deploy to combat is at the highest levels. The soldiers—

Mr. BARTLETT. But this addresses the nondeployed forces have fallen into unprecedented lows. The tip of the spear is very sharp, that is true. I just wanted to see if you identified yourself with this statement.

Secretary GEREN. You used the term "unprecedented." I don't choose that word. But I will say for the deploys and next-to-deploys, we provide soldiers that are prepared for this conflict. For the soldiers that are not preparing to deploy, when you look at the total range of strategic needs that the Army could be asked to meet, our readiness is not at the levels that we want it to be. We need full-spectrum readiness, and the readiness figures that are referred to in that document are talking about our ability to respond to the full range of strategic challenges of our country, and we do not—at present time we could not offer the full spectrum of readiness that is our goal.

Mr. BARTLETT. I think "unprecedented" to most people would mean lowest ever. And if that is true or comes close to being true, we really need to be addressing that problem, don't we?

Secretary GEREN. Addressing the readiness challenge is a very high priority for us, Congressman. And we continue to invest to try

to achieve greater spectrum or fuller spectrum of readiness. But when you are in a fight as we are, resources are devoted to meeting the needs of that current fight. But continuing to reinvest in the future and making sure that we do have a full-spectrum trained force is a challenge. And that is an area that we need to work with the Congress and we need to continue to invest to improve in that area.

Mr. BARTLETT. This staff report goes on to talk about the operational risk associated with reduced equipment readiness for units in the strategic base. And then it makes this observation: This risk is evident in the degraded readiness posture of ground units not currently deployed in depleted prepositioned war stocks and in National Guard units who do not have all the equipment needed for training.

This fairly represents the factors that produced this state of unreadiness?

Secretary GEREN. Well, you noted in your—the parts you read about the National Guard, I want to make sure that this is properly understood. Before a National Guard soldier deploys—and the soldier will not deploy unless he is certified as ready and fully trained—they do not have all the equipment at their home station to be able to do all the training there, and as they move closer to their deployment point they are—equipment is made available to them and they are trained. And before they leave, they have the training that has prepared them to go, and they will be certified as ready.

But we do not have the Guard fully equipped. In fact over these 5 years, 2005 to 2013, we are putting nearly \$40 billion worth of investment in Guard equipment. In the next 2 years we have \$13 billion in investment in Guard equipment. We are not where we want to be with investment in Guard equipment, but we are improving and we are giving them, across the whole range of equipment, the top-of-the-line equipment, whether it is trucks, helicopters, aircraft. We are making an unprecedented investment in the Guard.

Mr. BARTLETT. I read these statements because I thought it was important for the American public to know the assessment that has been made by our professional staff who are generally right on in their assessment of these things.

And talking about end strength, it notes that in 2006 the Army failed in all three of its categories to meet the requirements. Failed particularly in Army Reserves. There are obviously three things that we could do to fix this, in addition to increased aggressiveness which we are doing in recruiting. One is that we might turn to a draft. A second is that we could reduce our use of the forces so that we wouldn't have to be recruiting more. And, third, and this is maybe the most important one, we could reconfigure our Army.

It is obvious today that our Army cannot fight without Guard and Reserve. Many of the skills for fighting are resident only in the Guard and Reserve. And I noted the most critical shortfall was in the Army Reserve. We need to address this challenge to see which of these routes that we will be able to follow in the future to fix the problem.

I thank you all.

General CASEY. Mr. Chairman, if I could make one short comment for Congressman Bartlett. When I listened to the words you read from the staff document, that to me sounded like what I was saying: We are out of balance. And that is what I described in my testimony. And that is what last year Congress began to assist us in fixing. And the \$17 billion for reset has already started to show an impact.

But the challenge you have is that it takes two years, once we get the money, to get equipment in the units. And so as these things get out of balance, we can't snap our fingers and put them back in balance. It takes time. We have identified it and we are moving out with your support.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Before I call on Dr. Snyder, who, by the way, celebrates his birthday today and we wish him happy birthday tomorrow.

Dr. SNYDER. Tomorrow. Don't rush it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to have another hearing tomorrow to officially compliment you.

Before I call on you, Dr. Snyder, let me—General, I know of your sense of military history. Reflecting on the words of Major General Leonard Wood in 1921 about the unpreparedness of our Nation.

Reflecting on what happened in 1950 in Korea and the Pusan perimeter and the Task Force Smith, reflecting on what General "Shy" Meyer, your predecessor chief of staff said in 1979 that we have a hollow Army, reflecting on your predecessor Pete Schoomaker in January of this year telling us he was uncomfortable with the readiness of our Army, how can we restore that readiness that we need to deter or to prevail should the unexpected happen?

General CASEY. Sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. And work in partnership with us to make the resources available to allow us to do that on the timelines. And I believe we can put this back in balance in three or four years, but it is going to take that long.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. You are referred to as the future's guy, General Casey, and I have several questions that I wanted to ask. I will ask them quick, if you would give me quick answers.

As you look ahead to the future and your putting together your numbers what level of forces we need, we currently probably have in the range of 30- to 40,000 contractors in Iraq or Afghanistan that are involved in security. And if they weren't there, probably we would have to have additional uniform military people.

As you are looking ahead to your numbers, do your numbers include that there will be a significant contractor security force, or are we looking to where we are not going to allow those kinds of contractors in the future? Or is that not a consideration at this time?

General CASEY. In the work that I am doing right now, I am not looking at replacing security contractors as an element that we deal with. So I am not looking to increase Army force structure to provide personal security detachments for different elements.

Dr. SNYDER. So if we were to reach a point as a Congress or military that we decided that the detriments outweighed the benefit to have a contractor force, that would put more pressure on the work that you are trying to do to get the force where it ought to be?

General CASEY. It would certainly add another element. And I would just say, if I could, I think the estimates of 30- to 40,000 is probably high. I think it is probably in the range of 7- or 8,000. But I don't think anyone really knows.

Dr. SNYDER. That is one of the issues, isn't it.

My second question, I thought you had a very good written statement about looking ahead at some of the issues and the tensions that will lead to future conflicts. But you talked about an enemy being immersed in populations. One of my concerns for some years that I don't think that we meet very well is the foreign language skills of our military people. And I have had some folks tell me that one of the reasons is that the leadership in the military, they have never been expected to have much in the way of foreign language skills. That because of that, they are not going to require that for their juniors down below to have foreign language skills. And the result of that is that every time we have a war in a new area, we are scrambling around running classified ads, trying to find interpreters and people that we cannot get security clearances on.

You are citing that that is the wars of the future. Secretary Geren is talking about we are going to be in persistent conflict. Why are we not starting foreign language skills in boot camp from day one and say, an hour of day for the rest of your military career we are going to reach this level of proficiency. Yours is Farsi, whatever the other languages are. Why aren't we doing that?

Lack of interpreters is a big problem. The lack of cultural sensitivity is a big problem. As you are looking ahead to the future, are we looking to doing more of that?

General CASEY. We are, Congressman. And I will tell you we draw our soldiers from the society. My take is our society is fairly insular anyway. And so that is where we start. But clearly we need several levels of language proficiency, one area for our foreign area officers and for our special forces that interact with other population. Then there is another level that I call operational language, where we can send folks to short-term school and give them some incentives to pick up the language for the mission that they are in.

Dr. SNYDER. Anyway I will finish with that point. But we are always running behind if we do it that way. We will always be behind. And being able to ask somebody, Which way does that road go or where is the bathroom is not the kind of foreign language proficiency that we need to avoid the problems that we have.

My third question is you and I talked about this the other night. Has there been consideration as you are looking ahead as to what the role of the Guard is versus active component? You and I have talked about we have 26-, 27,000 troops in Korea. Has there been consideration to look at some of these missions around the globe and saying, Why don't we let almost that entire South Korean mission be Reserve component? It is the kind of mission where the turnover probably does not matter that much. We could make the rotations much shorter instead of a year long.

Do you give that kind of consideration? Seems like we have done the South Korean mission about the same way for some decades now. Is that something you all are looking at?

General CASEY. Right after dinner we started looking at it.

Dr. SNYDER. That is a good enough answer.

General CASEY. As you know, we are already using the Guard in rotation for missions in Kosovo. And as part of our rotational model, we intend to have four to five Guard brigades available for deployment. So the notion of deploying them to Korea is something that is worth looking at, as I told you.

Dr. SNYDER. And just my final comment that Secretary Geren referred to the persistent conflict, and you went through an eloquent discussion of what is going to lead to the tensions and the conflicts in the future. We as a Congress have to do a better job of looking beyond the military as being the power of this country. And you mentioned epidemics and disease and food shortages, and we don't spend nearly enough time as a Congress looking at those kind of things.

Thank you for your statement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ [presiding]. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you guys coming in. The bad thing being this far down the list is many of the good questions are taken.

Pete, you mentioned earlier about us going to theater. I came back from this past weekend with two vignettes that I want to get in the record. One was from our trip to Baghdad. We flew into Ramadi Saturday afternoon and went to a place called 17th Street. There is a joint security station there. And we are standing out in the street, little kids running around between us and the Marines and doing what little boys do. And the leader said, six months ago had we stood in that spot, we would have drawn gunfire. Dramatic change there. That is a vignette that I bring back.

The other is how adaptive our team is. We were with a provincial reconstruction team in Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan on Sunday afternoon, and we were having a conversation with Colonel Pressler. And it is basically Economic Development 101. It could have been a Chamber of Commerce meeting: Where do we need roads and electricity and those kinds of things? And the morning before, he had been in a four-hour firefight with the bad guys. The next day he has to put on the ED, economic development, hat. So we have a very adaptive team and one that we are all very proud of.

The Future Combat System has no shortage of critics. We have not talked much about the risks that some of these ideas, particularly the heart of it—the radio is working but the heart of that network and the risks associated with that. How do you currently view Future Combat Systems in its current state? And folded into that there were some comments earlier on about make a deployable on a C-130. And yet the ground unit is currently too heavy for a C-130.

So please share with us about the Future Combat Systems and the current state of risk and development.

The final question, if we could ask Sergeant Cantrell how long it takes him to put that stuff back together?

Secretary GEREN. Many of these products that you see here in the room are products that have come out of the research for the Future Combat System. With the conflict we are in, we have put additional emphasis on spinning out the technologies of the Future Combat System so that they can help soldiers now. And it has been successful. Many of the requests that we get from theater for capabilities, we find that the answers to those questions come through technologies that have been developed as part of the Future Combat System.

Mr. CONAWAY. Speak to us about the heart of it, the integration of all of that into one unit. The individual pieces I agree, but what about the network itself and how well that is going?

Secretary GEREN. Well, early on, there were challenges and the program now is on track. It is on budget. The systems are coming together. And that is the secret, really, the magic of Future Combat System is how it empowers the individual soldier. The knowledge, the situational awareness which now is only known to commanders, we will be able to take it all the way down to the company and platoon and eventually all the way to the soldier level. But there has been great progress in that regard.

It is still a technological challenge. There is technological risk in this. We are doing something that has not been done before. But the progress is good. It is steady and we are confident that we are on track that the program is going to succeed. Every time we have to readjust the budget based on a decision of the Congress, it causes it to stretch out some. And when you stretch a program out it make its more expensive. But we are confident of where we are now and believe it is on track and the technology side of it is moving ahead well.

Mr. CONAWAY. And the C-130 issue?

Secretary GEREN. I can't—I know—I don't know, Chief, if you could—

General CASEY. We are continuing to work that and, frankly, we are working with the Air Force to decide whether that is something we still think ought to be a key requirement of the system.

Mr. CONAWAY. Sergeant Cantrell.

General CASEY. How long does it take to put that back together?

Sergeant CANTRELL. About two minutes, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. I yield back, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. The lady from California, Mrs. Tauscher.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Geren, General Casey, thank you both for your service and the fine men and women that you both command. General Casey, in your testimony, and also you, Secretary Geren, you both acknowledge that the Army is stretched. As you know, in August the House passed H.R. 3159, which is my bill to mandate minimum periods of rest and retraining for regular and Reserve components of the armed forces between deployments.

My bill mandates a one-to-one rest deployment ratio for active duty, and two-to-one rest and deployment ratio for the Guard and Reserve. This is far less onerous than the Pentagon's own policy, which is a two-to-one ratio for active duty and five-to-one for the Guard and Reserves. A majority of the Senate voted for the same

language twice. So we have passed it out of the House and the Senate has voted for it twice.

What is stunning to me is that while the American people and the House and the Senate seem to see the need to rest and retrain our troops, Secretary Gates has recommended a veto against this bill.

In your testimony, General Casey, you say that current operational requirements for forces and limited periods between deployments necessitate a focus on counterinsurgency to the detriment of preparedness for the full change of military missions. And we all know that we have a stretched military that is doing the best it can. Don't have a force big enough to deal with contingencies.

I want to ask you both the same question. Why is the Pentagon opposing a measure that will bring relief to our troops that is less onerous than the Pentagon's own policy? I also want to know when can we expect you to get back to an improved dwell time. If you don't agree that this policy is the right thing to do, to mandate it.

General Casey, how long in your opinion—and please be specific—do you think the Army can sustain current deployment and rest ratios, considering they are now 15 months deployed and 12 months rest period?

Secretary GEREN. Well, regarding your bill, as you and I discussed earlier, we share your goal. When we moved from 12-month deployments to 15-month deployments, that was because we needed to do that to meet the demand, to meet the combatant commanders' needs in the field. Our goal is to get to a point where a soldier is deployed for a year and home for two; in the case of the Guard, deployed for a year and home for five.

We can't do that right now with our current force and meet the demands of the commanders in the field. We have to organize, train, and equip based on what the needs of the commanders are. And—

Ms. TAUSCHER. Secretary Geren, there is a bigger issue here. If there wasn't a question—if there was no question at all that we were relatively without any other conflicts or contingencies that we had to deal with, I think that we could all deal with a short-term stretch of the military. But I don't think we live in a very safe world. I think we live in a very dangerous world. And I certainly don't think for us to say that because we are pinned down in Iraq right now, that we can sacrifice—because General Casey said he is the Chief of the future—we can sacrifice future preparedness and readiness.

I need you to tell me how long do you think you can sustain this 15-month on, 12-month off, and still maintain the readiness that we need for future contingencies? I think you are telling us in somewhat obscure language that you can't.

So I really don't think that I should sit here as a Member of Congress and say I am going to let you continue to have a policy that continues to feed soldiers into Iraq, that sacrifices our future ability to deal with the contingency that may be in five years, could be in five minutes.

Secretary GEREN. We have to manage the troops based on the needs of the commanders on the ground. Has to be driven by the needs of the commanders on the ground. And, again, we share your

goal. We would like to have the soldiers home more. We would like to have them deployed less, and would like to have them have more time with their families, and would like to have more time to train them. But their decisions have to be based on what is going on on the ground. It is not something that we can dictate from here.

Our goals are the same. But we are going to provide the fighting force that our combatant commanders need, and we would not be able to do it with those types of restrictions that were proposed in your bill.

Ms. TAUSCHER. With all due respect, our jobs are not the same. Our job here in the Congress is to not only look at what current fights are and current demands are, but also to make sure that we are living up to our constitutional responsibility and oath to protect the American people for anything that is going to happen. And without this bill, we are going to find ourselves, I am convinced, in a situation where something bad is going to happen, and, because of both of your testimonies, we are not ready.

Secretary GEREN. Well, let me say in that respect, our jobs are different. There is no doubt about that. But when it comes to our duty to protect the American people today and into the future, we have got the same job. And it is our duty—the Chief just said we are the future's guys—to look over the horizon. But we have to meet the needs of the present and we have got to look over the horizon as well. I think I would disagree with you that our jobs are different in that regard. I believe we share that same responsibility.

Chief.

General CASEY. If I could, one I laid out today here was some thoughts on how to put ourselves back in balance. And I am personally working on these rotation schemes to get us back not only to one-to-one, but beyond that. And to do that as rapidly as I can.

I can't tell you right now when I am going to be able to say we are off of 15 months. I can tell you I have every intention of doing that as soon as I can. But the worst thing I could do now is go out and say off 15 months, and then have to go back on that. So as the Secretary said, we support what you are trying to do. We believe we are very capable of doing this and with the interests of the current and the future force in mind.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jones of North Carolina.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And to the Secretary and General Casey, thank you so much for being here.

Mr. Secretary, I wanted to read some comments that were e-mailed to me today by a former Army general: The stress of third and fourth deployment on soldiers and their families is crushing. The spirit of the force is at risk. Units are filled 90 to 120 days from deployment with young soldiers, right out of basic training with inadequate and inexperienced noncommissioned officer (NCO) leadership. The foundation of NCO leadership is seriously degraded. Lieutenants are almost all right out of basic school, which is now only four months in duration. Experience is seriously lacking in a mission which depends on platoon-level competency. Battalions and brigades, weeks away from deployment to war, are struggling with nondeployable rates as high as 15 percent. Bottom

line, our Army is at a breaking point, and, without serious mobilization, cannot continue the current cycle of deployments.

Along the line of what has been said before me, does anyone at the White House understand what is happening? I just cannot—this general, like you, General Casey, you know him. I mean we are hearing this all over. That is what Mrs. Tauscher is talking about. What do we do in—you are saying that—let me see my note right quick—how do you fix the shortfalls? How do we fix the shortfalls? I think it is impossible to fix the shortfalls. If this is what is happening, it is happening in the Marine Corps, too. This just happens to be an Army general and he has been to Iraq a couple of times and he is making this evaluation from a trip he made recently. And I don't have his permission to use his name or where he was.

But I will read the last comment—this was the first comment: The Army is in decay due to the current cycle of deployments, a mission without an overreaching regional strategy, and a country not mobilized. Nothing new.

Who is speaking to the White House to make them understand what is happening? God bless these men and women in uniform. I love them and respect them, but we have a constitutional responsibility to treat them fairly, to make sure that if they are going to give their life or their limb for this country, that we are giving them everything they need from training to equipment and to compassion. I am not angry at you. I want to make that clear. I am at the White House.

Secretary GEREN. The Chief spent most of the last three years in Iraq, and I think it would be valuable for him to offer his assessment of the troops. There is no doubt our troops are under stress. But I would dispute the characterization that that general made of our Army. It is a resilient force. Our soldiers are reenlisting at rates that exceed our goals, but there is no doubt we are asking a tremendous amount of them. We are asking a tremendous amount of their families.

But you have been over there. You met with the soldiers, and you meet with them here. We have got a committed force, a resilient force, and a determined force, and we are asking a great deal of them. But they believe in what they are doing. And I think any comparison of this Army today to the Army that was called the hollow force in the seventies, I don't think that is apt at all. This force is stretched, but it remains strong.

I would like the Chief to speak. He has firsthand experience leading troops.

Mr. JONES. Real quickly, and my time is going to go and if the General could speak when the Chairman brings down the gavel, that would be fine. I don't know how you could not say—and not you personally, because you did admit that the troops are stressed—but tell me, when generals have said, including McCaffrey, other generals, that by the spring of this year, what happens when the Army breaks? Can you tell me what happens when the Army breaks?

General CASEY. Congressman, the Army is not going to break in the spring of this year. We are beginning now to work the implementation of the strategy the President announced to begin draw-

ing the force down. That will help us significantly in increasing the dwell time at home.

I talked in my whole testimony, we are out of balance. There is no question about it. Out of balance is not broken. I came into hollow. I know what hollow is, and we are not there.

Mr. JONES. I thank the Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Before I make the next call, General you talked of restoring balance to the Army. And we know some of the reason for drawing down from the 20 brigades to 15 brigades in Iraq is the sustainability of the level of forces. And even with 15 deployed brigades in Iraq, a significant percentage of our soldiers there will be under continuing strain on the force. So what will be the impact on the readiness of the Army of continuing a 15-brigade commitment in Iraq?

General CASEY. Obviously, that level of commitment, Mr. Chairman, would be harder on us than a continued decreasing commitment to both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you do a better job of describing "harder" to us, please?

General CASEY. The lower the number of brigades we have to deploy, the greater the time can be spent at home in preparation for the other units. So it is a supply and demand.

I would also remind the committee that we are continuing to increase the number of combat brigade teams in the Army. In this modularity program we are a little over halfway done, and we started off with 33 brigades about 3 years ago. We are at 38 now, with 5 more standing up. And so by the end of next year we will have 42 brigades, going to 48. So it is a combination of decreasing the demand and increasing the supply of the brigades that will also help put us back in balance.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary and Chief Casey, for being here, for your service.

I wanted to just start by acknowledging, I think, some of the passion I feel in your presentation when it relates to the military families. And I appreciate that. I think that it is important that we have that. And in many ways I think it has been missing to a certain extent. And I wanted to just ask you to try to embellish a few of comments that you made.

You said in your testimony, we will build a partnership with Army families and improve family readiness by standardizing existing family programs and services. And you put out increasing access for the quality of health care. But one of the problems that we have in that is that we have been converting, as you know—engaging in the kind of civilian conversions in Army medicine, which means for many of the families they don't have that accessibility in the way that they anticipate, the way that they expect.

Is there something then that is going to change as we try and focus more on how do we support and help our families, particularly in this area? Could you expand on your comments in that area?

Secretary GEREN. The issue of accessibility, when I travel around the country and meet with families I hear that over and over. Access to health care, the long delays that they often experience, and

the problems exacerbated by the war. Many of our uniformed soldiers are down range. They are in theater, they are supporting the fight.

I also hear from many families about the availability of TRICARE physicians, the availability of physicians in the TRICARE network. We are examining that, looking to expand the participation in the TRICARE network. We have got areas where the participation is very low and we are trying to understand why. Is it a question of the bureaucracy? Reimbursement rates? Or is it a question of not good education?

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I think, Mr. Secretary, what I am looking for, if in fact we are going to have soldiers in theater for I don't know how many years, even as many as perhaps 10, then this is not just because of the war. This is because of the problems that have been exacerbated because of the war. And what I am looking for is what is it in the way that we are working with our recruits or our academies; is there something that we are going to be doing that is really different to address these needs?

Secretary GEREN. In the health care area specifically? Well, we are putting additional resources, we have a hiring effort right now to hire 300 additional mental health professionals. We are trying to make the TRICARE network work better for soldiers, and that is the capacity in the TRICARE network we believe is not fully tapped. We need to work better in that area.

But we are hiring both civilians and into the—I mean into the Army, and we are exploring joint efforts to meet the needs, medical needs. But it is an area that we are working very hard. We recognize the challenges there.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Are we likely to curtail the conversions, the civilian conversions, or is that something that we expect is going to continue or even increase?

Secretary GEREN. Well, the issue of mil-to-civ conversions is something that we are looking at hard. The effort, lately we have slowed it down because we are not able to fill the posts with civilians. And so we are slowing that down. But we are looking at other ways to build capacity.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Well, I know certainly in the mental health area, that is an area that obviously has to grow.

I wanted to ask you some more about that because that is a real need and we are hearing about that. I know that in San Diego I think we are working hard on that issue. And particularly as people transition to the VA system. But we are not there yet, even beginning. And it needs a lot of work.

I did want to ask you, though, about the four imperatives that you identified, General Casey, is to grow the Army and provide and sustain sufficient forces. How does that factor into the approximately 7,000 of the forces that are a result of our stop-loss policies? Is that stop-loss policy likely to continue? Because I think that is an area where certainly we have a morale problem from our soldiers and one that needs to be addressed.

General CASEY. It will, Congresswoman, over time. We don't like the stop-loss policy, frankly, any better than anyone else. And we are looking that as the demand comes down and as the supply goes up as we bring in new soldiers and increase the size of the force,

that we will gradually wean ourselves off of stop loss. But I would expect it will stay on for a while longer.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. You can define "a while" for the benefit of our service members and give them a better idea?

General CASEY. No, I would be guessing, but it will be probably—gradually start weaning ourselves off after we come back to 15 brigades. So it will be before next summer before we start weaning ourselves off of that. And it will be a gradual process. For example, it is now 90 days before you go. We will probably cut that back a little bit.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. May I make reference, General, you testified a few moments ago that the Army has issued one Medal of Honor to one soldier during the present conflict. During the Vietnam conflict, my records show that there were 159 soldiers who were awarded the Medal of Honor.

Is there a different standard being applied to the awarding of the Medal of Honor in this conflict as compared to previous ones?

General CASEY. I would say not. I have not seen it, Congressman. It is a much different-level fight at the tactical level. We are not fighting battalions, brigades, and divisions. We are fighting individuals. So it is a much different level of fighting there. I have not seen a different standard applied.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wilson of South Carolina.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. Over the years I have enjoyed having breakfast with you often. Additionally, General Casey, I want to thank you as a Member of Congress but I particularly want to thank you as a parent. One of my sons served under your command for a year in Iraq. And our family is very grateful for your service and your leadership.

And I also want to give a brief update. I had the privilege of serving on the congressional delegation (CODEL) led by Congressman Abercrombie. It was hard-charging, relentless, he kept us going, and so Congressman Larsen and I were there. But it was extraordinary to go to Iraq and Afghanistan, to visit with General Fil in Baghdad. What an extraordinary leader he is. He took us to the Khark community, joint security station. We could see the joint efforts of the American and Iraqi forces and the success.

We visited with General Roberts in Ramadi. It was extraordinary to be in the capital of Anbar province and find out the day before there hadn't been a single attack. To be there as there were local officials coming to discuss not security concerns, but concerns about trash collection. So I am just very, very pleased.

Additionally, I had the opportunity to visit with General Bob Livingston, the South Carolina National Guard. I was in that unit for 28 years, the 218th brigade. They are making extraordinary progress training the Afghan police. Record reenlistment.

And, finally, we visited the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Jalalabad. Again, I had been there in June. The young service people serving there are quite an inspiration. And everywhere we went, we would have breakfast, lunch, and dinner with people from our home State, junior officers and enlisted personnel. And as a veteran, I believe that we have the most competent and capable

people serving our country, equipped. They are very positive about their mission.

As I say this, I am concerned as a former member of the National Guard with three sons currently serving in the Army National Guard. There are reports that indeed the Guard is 40 percent equipped. I was very pleased to hear your comments, both of you, as to the initiatives for \$13 billion the next 2 years, \$40 billion in the next 5 years. And I like, too, to hear that it was unprecedented in terms of the equipment that is going to be provided.

If you could maybe fill in some more of what those of us who so much appreciate the National Guard, what should we expect?

Secretary GEREN. The 39 billion is from 2005 to 2013. But 66 percent of all of our production in the medium tactical trucks will be going to the Guard. A high percentage of the new helicopters will be going to the Guard. Our goal is to equip the Guard as we equip the active duty. In the nineties, the changes that we made, we started moving in the direction of being one Army, and as you correctly note we rely heavily on the Guard. There is no way we can do what we do today without being a total force, active, Guard, and Reserve.

And one of our initiatives is focusing on what we need to do to fully operationalize the Guard component, Guard and Reserve. What changes do we need to make to transition from a strategic reserve to part of the operational force? We are going to have to train differently. We certainly are going to have to equip differently. We are going to have to have in the Guard the same quality of equipment that we have in the Guard as in the active component, and the investments that you are making now are leading us in that direction.

General CASEY. I can't add anything to that.

Mr. WILSON. Another concern I have is how quickly the MRAPs are going to be delivered to our troops. I am concerned in that I did not see them. And when I would ask persons what the status was on the MRAPs, they were looking forward to their arrival.

So what is the status of MRAPs for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Secretary GEREN. Well, the JROC has approved for the Army 10,000 MRAPs. The MRAP program is a joint program with the Marines as executive agent. It is being run out of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I happen to have the production figures for the Army in front of me now: October, 90; November, 298; December, 728; January, nearly 1,200; February, 2,000; March, 3,400; April, 4,000.

So we are ramping up very quickly. We wish it were quicker, but we are ramping up quickly and we are moving them into theater as quickly as we can. The way the MRAPs are apportioned will be decided by the central command between the Marines and between the Army. The figures that I gave you, that's the fielding schedule for the Army.

Mr. WILSON. And as I conclude, one example of success. I was shown a picture of a Humvee that had been attacked in Camp Phoenix at the entrance and the vehicle-borne IED vaporized. The only thing left was the rear axle. We had one soldier injured but all survived, thank you very much.

Secretary GEREN. Thank you.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [presiding]. Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, gentlemen, for helping us out today.

General, a few questions for you. As part of the group that went over to Iraq and Afghanistan with Mr. Abercrombie, we met with the PRT in Jalalabad, and a few questions came up as we talked to these folks maybe you can help us out with.

At one point, one of the folks said they will do whatever they need to do as an Army soldier, as a member PRT, but they would love to get back to being a soldier, get back to soldiering.

So the question I had, one question I have has to do with, I think, a verbal statement you made. I did not find it in your written testimony. Had to do with being home long enough to complete the training that you need beyond just counterinsurgency training.

And so if you can answer quickly, cause I have a second question that is related to that, what training does the average soldier not get when they are home as a result of the deployment schedules we currently have?

General CASEY. Right now, it is a question of time, and my estimation is that until we have folks home for at least 18 months, and they won't be able to do the conventional war fighting skills where they maneuver platoons and companies and battalions against a fixed enemy and integrate the different elements of artillery, direct fire, indirect fire, those types of things.

Mr. LARSEN. So if they are home for 12, they get some rest, obviously, and then they start their training up again, but it is usually now focused on counterinsurgency and it would be another 6 beyond that to really get the full complement of the training that they would need to do whatever we might ask of them.

They may not be going back to Iraq or Afghanistan, they may be going somewhere else for all we know. So it brings up the second question, because earlier this year, as well, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) put out the call for volunteers in the military to help fill billets in the PRTs, because those billets were not being filled by folks from other civilian agencies.

I talked with some of these folks who happen to be in the Air Force, a couple of young Air Force guys who were happy and willing to do it. They were a little surprised going from a 4-month deployment to what has turned out to be a 16-1/2-month deployment; but they are going to do it, they are excited and they are developing a great skill.

But I have a question for you as you are thinking about the future Army. Are you making an assumption that the future Army—since failed states are going to be an issue for us, that the future Army is going to continue to be the developing world's public works department, or that we are going to have soldiers who are actually going to get back in the business of soldiering and only be in support of postconflict reconstruction.

What is your thinking on that?

General CASEY. That is a great question. Here is my thinking after watching it for my time in Iraq:

We are the most capable organization of reconstruction in a hostile environment; there is no question about it. But my concern is that unless we have the authorities and the resources that go with

the ability to conduct that reconstruction, we are never going to get past the friction that we have now. And I think it is something that the government—we all need to think our way through. Who is going to do this? And whoever we decide has got the mission ought to get the resources and the authorities to do it.

So right now it could be something that the Army takes on, but I am reluctant to take it on unless I get the money to do it.

Mr. LARSEN. I started out thinking that it should be your job, part of what you all do. But more and more, as we move forward in Afghanistan and Iraq, I am thinking that it ought to be only part of what the Army does and in a supporting role as opposed to a leading role.

Not because you couldn't do it. To the last person, every one of these folks we talked to said, if you want us to do it, we will go do it; that is our job, we will go do it. But we would love to get back to doing what we are first and foremost trained to do and be in support of other agencies who are using their expertise, especially in this PRT setting, which is probably a model that we are going to be using in the future if, in fact, this plays out in the future; and I believe it probably will.

General CASEY. And I think it is something that the other eight agencies of the government ought to think about in terms of creating a culture that deploys people to help in these environments.

Mr. LARSEN. I absolutely agree.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [presiding]. Mr. Bishop.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, gentlemen. I, first of, all want to thank you as well for being here at this committee, and staying this late so some of us in other assignments can actually get down here. It can't be easy for you.

I also want to thank you for your service in this country and the men and women who serve underneath you.

I recognize that you have an unusual responsibility that covers a whole lot of areas. I don't want to sound parochial, but I am going to. Also, if you can probably find a question mark in anything I am going to say, you are doing better than I. But I recognize the difficulty that we are having here.

I appreciate this committee and the chairman of the subcommittees, as well as the full committee. I think this committee works in a bipartisan way to come up with good prioritization, although I think a lot of our problems could be solved if we had more money that we were putting into our authorization and which I think is woefully underfunded compared to everything else we are doing.

I also look at the money that is flowing, and I recognize a lot of the money—it appears to me, especially on our military construction (MILCON), to be going to base realignment and closure (BRAC) areas and BRAC bases or to support BRAC movements when we were supposed to have savings and that that hasn't quite materialized yet.

But here is where the parochial part comes. Tooele Army Depot in my district, for example, has spent since—from their igloos more ammunition into Iraq and Afghanistan than any other depot facility in the Nation, and yet there is nothing in the fiscal year defense

plan (FYDP) as far as MILCON projects or that installation, nor has there been anything for the past 12 years.

Once again, I don't want to compare other services, but I am. The Air Force does try and plow six percent back into their depots to remodernize, and I realize that the technology is important in those particular efforts. I also have another facility, Dugway, which is part of the biochem mission, which has increased its mission low at 800 percent since 9/11, and yet the MILCON flow has not gone there, part of which I understand was kind of an ownership effort as to which actual entity is responsible for MILCON applications to those particular areas.

What I am simply saying is that I realize, in all of this, the weighty issues that you have been hit with just in this hearing, that there are also some MILCON issues that deal with areas that may be considered second tier installations, but nonetheless have a significant role in maintaining the warrior and the supplies to the warriors going through there. And somewhere along the line we may be looking at the infrastructure needs that are essential in those particular areas.

I told you I was going to be parochial. And I really am searching right now for how to end this with a question so you can respond to it in some way other than—if you want to say something in general, you can go about that. But there is concern I have, that as you are looking at the overall planning, what may be considered second tier installations, are suffering in some way and there needs to be some kind of consideration on the MILCON going into those areas in the future.

Secretary GEREN. Let me just say, recapitalizing our assets, part of our depots and all of our infrastructure is a challenge. As much money as we have in our MILCON and our BRAC funding, it still falls short of what you would do in the private sector to recapitalize your assets.

And also the maintenance and support for these facilities, we have worked to try to put more resources into the operations and the maintenance, as well as recapitalization.

In my year as Under Secretary of the Army, I spend a great deal of the time moving resources around trying to meet the needs at various facilities; and we get to the end of the day, and we have got more needs than we have resources in those accounts.

But your point is well made, and I will certainly take a good hard look at it. But recapitalizing some of those assets is a challenge for us and something we have continued to try to improve and get the recapitalization rate into a more sustainable level.

Mr. BISHOP. I thank you, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Bishop, you have another minute if you would like to go into another area.

Mr. BISHOP. I was actually going to compliment the subcommittee under whom I serve for what they do here. I do truly enjoy the bipartisan nature and the prioritization this committee does.

However, I do understand all of our problems could be solved if we actually did put greater investment into making up some of the backlog that needs to be made up just in the military. We are not spending enough in this particular area of our budget.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am done.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You are welcome, Mr. Bishop. Thank you. And I also thank you for serving with you in other committees, where you were also prepared to tell us what we need to do in order to accomplish all we need to do.

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I am just waiting for the time when you actually follow my instructions.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, perhaps right after Ms. Shea-Porter gets finished.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. This is probably a good time for me to jump in. Thank you very much.

And I want to thank you both for appearing today. I am going to ask some questions that are tough for me to ask because my husband was an Army brat when Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) served. I was a military spouse.

I am very worried about the Army. And I don't see it the way this report showed it. And I am sorry, I am going to have to ask you a few questions about this. I am going to quote you.

You said, "With authorization to increase the Army's size by 74,000 soldiers over the next 5 years, we will achieve this as fast as possible." Now, when you wrote that, did you take into account that the President has a possible 10-year plan for Iraq? Because that is going to make it much more difficult for you to bring 74,000 more troops in.

General CASEY. We have laid out a plan to do that, Congresswoman.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General, could you just pull that mike a tad closer to you, please. Thank you.

General CASEY. We have laid out a plan to do that, Congresswoman, based on what we believe that we can recruit and retain. And we have looked at it very, very carefully. We don't think it is a kind of pie-in-the-sky number; we think it is the number that we are going to achieve this year and the number that we will continue to achieve.

Can I tell you, in the first 9 months of fiscal year 2007, the one that is going to end here in a couple of days, 250,000 men and women enlisted or reenlisted in the Army Guard or Reserve. That is a quarter of a million folks, and there are still a lot of people out there.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Let us talk about those numbers. The age for a private has now been raised to age 42; is that correct.

General CASEY. That is the maximum age that someone can come in.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Right, which has increased from when my husband served.

I understand that you have 10 percent on moral waivers, which can mean a variety of issues, but it could be a problem for military discipline.

Is that true, that it is now 10 percent moral waivers?

General CASEY. It is. But I will tell you that 80-plus percent of those are more misdemeanors.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. I just worry about the problems for other soldiers if they have soldiers that lack discipline in there, coming in with problems.

A high school dropout rate: you have had to allow more high school dropouts.

General CASEY. Not exactly. We have taken in more soldiers who do not have a high school diploma. All of them have a high school equivalency. We don't take anybody in without a high school education or equivalency. And it is less than 10 percent more.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And \$20,000 bonuses, if they went in by the end of September, right, which would not be sustainable if you have to keep giving \$20,000 bonuses for people to come in over the long term.

And these are just my worries here. There has been talk about gang activity, some gang activity inside the Army because we brought the wrong people in. And I know that most of these troops are great men and women. I worry about them having gang activity on the outside bases. That has been an escalating problem; am I right?

General CASEY. It happens. But to say it is an escalating problem, I wouldn't necessarily agree.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. Let's keep going over the list. These are just my worries here.

My understanding is almost half of the West Pointers are not re-upping now. These are the men and women that we have trained to take leadership positions in the future. And I am looking 10 years and 20 years down, as you are, to see what the military can look like and should look like.

Are we losing West Pointers at that rate.

General CASEY. We are losing West Pointers about five to seven percent more than the historical rate at the six-year point when their term is up, so it is a slight increase.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, and then also what is the top dollar being offered for reenlistment? I heard some enormous numbers the other day for those that are really in very specialized jobs. Is it true that we are offering more than \$100,000 bonuses?

And the question I want to ask is, is Blackwater stepping in and replacing and taking some of our men and women and also taking some of the wages?

General CASEY. I couldn't tell you what the top reenlistment bonus is. I do know that a year or so ago we worked a special bonus for Special Forces that were concerned that some of the senior, most experienced Special Forces, noncommissioned officers, were in fact being hired away by Blackwater. And we instituted a further substantial bonus program and that was reversed.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. There seems something crazy about having Blackwater working alongside instead of just having our own troops, our terrific troops, who are on 24/7, who have dedicated their lives to this, and now we have this group Blackwater. And it seems as if we are sending some of our best people to them.

And then we are paying Blackwater and we are paying our people not to go to Blackwater. It doesn't sound very efficient. It sounds insane, really.

Could you just address that? I know you have about two seconds. I am sorry.

General CASEY. I kind of lost the thread on that Blackwater piece.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, I just can't understand why we are paying Blackwater more than we pay our own brave troops, and then we pay our brave troops not to go to Blackwater. It seems like we have fallen into a cycle.

Should we get rid of Blackwater? Do you need Blackwater?

General CASEY. I don't believe we have hired Blackwater for any security tasks. We have in the past, but right now we don't have any current security contracts with them. I do believe that for the foreseeable future there will be a requirement for the country to have security contractors to provide personal security for people deployed in these environments. I don't think we are going to be able to get away from that quickly.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And then we will lose some of our troops to them.

General CASEY. That is a constant tension. But as I said, the bonuses that we have offered have reversed that trend.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. And, again, thank you both for your service.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

Mr. Akin.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple quick questions.

I wanted to just ask you, the first thing off, it is my understanding that the Army has the lowest research and development (R&D) budget of the three services.

Secretary GEREN. I believe that is right.

Mr. AKIN. And then the biggest R&D item in the Army budget is Future Combat Systems; is that correct?

Secretary GEREN. Yes. It is our major modernization project. It is.

Mr. AKIN. And then this is really the only major modernization project in the Army for quite a number of years, isn't it, in terms of a major, really big one?

Secretary GEREN. Yes, it is. This is the largest modernization effort we have had in the Army in decades.

Mr. AKIN. Now, I see some of the different parts of that that are being spun out for the soldiers in the field that are up here. I assume those things have been working reasonably well, and you have confidence in the program.

Secretary GEREN. We do. Some of the technologies you see here today have already been spun out and are operational working in the field and are doing well. All of these systems are—in addition to being R&D projects, they are coordinated in heavy involvement of soldiers who have ground combat experience. So we making sure that we don't have just eggheads producing technology. We have got to make sure that they are well grounded in what the needs of soldiers are.

So as we are developing these technologies, we are making sure we have got input from the ground up so that we are keeping the technologies relevant to the immediate needs of the soldiers in the field.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Let me interject just for a moment. I want to make sure we understand the questions; and perhaps there is a misunderstanding because this committee has funded more than

\$20 billion in projects other than—in R&D other than the Future Combat System (FCS). But if I heard you correctly, you were saying that was the “only.”

Secretary GEREN. No. It is our primary modernization; it is not the only. I may have misspoken if I said that.

But it is our major modernization initiative. It is our top priority. There are other smaller initiatives. And we have got an R&D budget that funds a number of areas. But our major modernization initiative is FCS.

Mr. AKIN. And because of the fact that you have the troops, hands-on, working with the equipment, you are comfortable with the direction that that is going and feel that should be a major priority then and you still have that commitment.

Secretary GEREN. We are comfortable with the progress. We have made—in early years there were some issues. The issues have been addressed and the program is on track and on budget.

Mr. AKIN. That is good to hear.

Now, this committee I believe decided to cut the budget by 25 percent of Future Combat Systems. Would that have a pretty significant effect in terms of having to rescrumble all of the very complicated logistics of how the systems have to talk to each other and the computer discipline of making these platforms all interoperable?

Secretary GEREN. The cut that was authorized by the committee would pose a serious challenge for us in the Future Combat System. We are working with the committee trying to make sure that they understand our perspective on it, respect the committee struggling with very difficult challenges across a range of fronts.

But it would be—if the cut were to stand, it would pose significant challenges for the program. It certainly would.

Mr. AKIN. I think many of the different people who have asked you questions all have that same pressure of the budget, and how do we get the squeal out of the nickel and how do we prioritize things. And certainly that is something we all struggle with. But this was a pretty big cut, a 25 percent cut. So you are saying that would be big.

Well, I am glad to hear that it is on time, on budget and that you are pleased with what is going on. And it sounds like you wouldn't be saying that if the troops that were using the equipment didn't have a good sense of excitement about it and felt that it would really advance us in terms of our ability to protect our soldiers and to really basically produce a more effective Army.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You are welcome.

Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

General, could I ask maybe two questions of you and one of you, Mr. Secretary.

You have a readiness reporting system. And basically now your men and women are training primarily for insurgency. So people go off. That means there is no unit sitting here at home. And I saw, before the surge, the classified slide, so I am not sure his comment about “unprecedented” is wrong. It depends how far you go back.

So not one Army unit is really ready, for instance, trained to—let's just take one scenario—protect the 30,000 troops in South Korea. So when Admiral Fallon came through the House Armed Services Committee and we asked him who are those that are going to protect them, since the Army is not ready to deploy forward to protect them if there is an attack, he said, the Air Force and the Navy, and he was comfortable with that.

So my question to you is, are you comfortable with that; and if so, does that mean the war plans for 5027 for Korea, can we now assume when Iraq is over we don't need to plan any longer for three or two, or whatever Army divisions, for that contingency since we are comfortable with it now?

General CASEY. I am not sure what—

Mr. SESTAK. Admiral Fallon on his way through here, on the way to Central Command (CENTCOM).

General CASEY. First of all, there are Army units that are trained for Korea. There is an Army division and an Army brigade in Korea. And they just completed Ochi Focus, which is a major joint exercise with the Koreans, so they are training for that conflict.

Mr. SESTAK. So they are C1 or C2. Those right now are C1 or C2, the units you just mentioned?

General CASEY. I couldn't put the ratings on them. But your comment was that they are doing only counterinsurgency training. That is not true for the forces in Korea.

Mr. SESTAK. Having looked, though, are there any units here at home C1 or C2 that could deploy to Korea.

General CASEY. When you get into—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General, excuse me, before you answer. Some of this—I think we are going to wander into areas that I don't think we can talk about at this hearing.

General CASEY. That is what I was saying.

Mr. SESTAK. On the state of readiness that they could deploy, are you comfortable with their state of readiness they could deploy?

General CASEY. And as I said in answer to the chairman's question, no. And I said in my opening statement that we are in a state of—the forces who are not in Iraq, their levels of readiness do not permit them to deploy as rapidly as we would like to places like Korea.

Mr. SESTAK. Could I ask a question then?

You oversaw as J3, or participated in or as director of the Joint Staff, a series of war games on J8—marvelous work; I forget what they called it—where 101030, do you remember all that, and speed mattered, of deployment? And these, you say, aren't ready to rapidly deploy there, but speed seemed to matter in those war games. And the assessment of those games over several years was, we had the number about right of how many Army troops we needed if they could rapidly deploy there.

So my question comes: You said in your opening statement that we are building a 21st century Army that will be less manpower intensive. And yet we are getting 65,000 more troops. And I am not sure the Army has yet presented what support troops they need for those; I don't think that has been brought forward yet.

So my question is, are we buying these troops, in view of those war games and now the future, saying they are less manpower intensive because of Iraq?

General CASEY. No.

Mr. SESTAK. And then, if not, those war games had the wrong assessment?

General CASEY. I am not exactly sure how far back you are going on these war games. But when I talk about less labor intensive and a smaller footprint, that is what we are trying to get out of the Future Combat System.

Mr. SESTAK. Less manpower intensive?

General CASEY. Less manpower intensive.

So in a brigade combat team the number of mechanics between a tank brigade combat team and a Future Combat System brigade combat team is down by about 1,300. It requires less people to maintain. The FCS brigade combat team can sustain itself for 72 hours.

Mr. SESTAK. Are we going the wrong direction then building up our troop structure?

General CASEY. Two different issues. One is how we are going to design our forces for a 21st century environment. The second issue is the number of forces we need to do operations in general.

Out of the increase, the 74,000 increase that we have been directed to make, only about 40 percent of that is going into brigade combat teams; the rest are going into enabling forces that we need for full spectrum operations.

Mr. SESTAK. As we always do?

General CASEY. As we always do.

Mr. SESTAK. I have one more. Should I just wait until the next round?

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You can do that. I am the next round, so why don't you go ahead.

Mr. SESTAK. If I can come back to Representative Shea-Porter's questions, I had thought that diplomas for the military personnel who you are recruiting, that their diploma rate had gone down—actually having gotten a diploma, not a GED—a diploma went to 92 to 81 percent.

But with your GED effort that you are doing—I think it is TAR or S or something—you have got it from 75 up to that 81. But let's set that aside.

For the first time since 1990, we are recruiting in categories 3A and 4, the lower two below average mental category; 40 percent of our recruits are coming from those two categories. We haven't been that low since 1990. So even though we may be getting the bodies in, if what you said—this 21st century, less manpower intensive, but much more technological—because I do think FCS, built around the information network, bodes a lot for the future brought about right. But it is going to depend upon a soldier who is really—where you were going—is the best and the brightest.

Is that of concern to you that having watched the Army transition through all post-Vietnam years and all and gotten to getting—you know, basically you could only recruit 0.1 percent in category 4. Now you are at the max you can at four percent, so you are leaping over into category 3A.

Is that of concern to you for your future since those are the ones that are going to run this FCS system come 20 years from now?

General CASEY. It is something that bears watching for sure. And I agree with you, what you are saying about the mental capacity of these troops to operate these new 21st century systems.

Mr. SESTAK. Is there any initiative, though, to try to, I mean, attract those you used to attract in 2004? Because this has all changed since 2004.

General CASEY. Sure.

Mr. SESTAK. Not just numbers, which I know is a challenge, but the quality.

General CASEY. In fact, the Secretary and I have directed kind of a clean sheet of paper: Look at how we are recruiting. Because this is the first time that we have had to recruit an all-volunteer force in a protracted conflict since the Revolution. And so there are things we are sure we need to do differently to get the caliber of folks in that we need.

But I would say that I went out and talked to drill sergeants when I first got here; and I said, How is the quality of the troops that you have? And some of them said, I am spending too much of my time helping some of these guys.

And so I said, Okay, tell me about it. And they said, Well, look, about 20 percent of the guys and gals we are getting in are really good. I was surprised to find out that 20 percent of the West Point Corps of Cadets is prior service. Now we are taking in a pretty high-caliber folks. I met one kid that was going to London School of Economics after he graduated, who came up in the ranks.

The second part of that is—I lost my train of thought here, Mr. Secretary. Can you help me out?

Secretary GEREN. The drill sergeants.

General CASEY. The drill sergeants. Thank you.

About 60 percent are your solid middle, and then you have got 20 percent that are problems. Of those 20, they said about 10 percent are never going to make it, and they are the problems.

So I said, Wait a minute; you are telling me you are spending 90 percent of your time with 10 percent of your people? And they said, Yeah. And I said, Well, that is what I have been doing since I came in the Army 37 years ago.

Mr. SESTAK. Mr. Chairman, I beg your indulgence to just follow up with him, or I will go after you.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Let's finish up.

Mr. SESTAK. Can I ask you one final one?

Do you believe we need to go below the surge level to get to an Army that is not one where you are uncomfortable or not happy with the strategic readiness in order to confront the other challenges around this world?

General CASEY. Congressman, as I said, demand is a factor here. And the sooner we get demands down to sustainable levels, the easier it will be for us to do the things we know we need to do.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

The chairman had said that we would finish at 5:00, but I am the last one to speak. With your permission, is it all right if we just go ahead and then we can finish up?

Secretary GEREN. Certainly. What is your pleasure.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Secretary, I am delighted to be able to welcome you as a colleague and friend as Secretary. I am sure you have already been told by others on the committee how happy we are for you and how proud we are of you. And it is a particular personal pleasure for me to offer you my aloha today.

Secretary GEREN. Thank you very much.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is the good news.

Secretary GEREN. I am bracing myself.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. No, no, not at all. Because this is a hearing on strategic initiatives, I am going to let the Future Combat System discussion go to another forum, perhaps as we go to the conference. Inasmuch as my subcommittee made the initial recommendation on the reallocation of funds, I always get a little concerned when we throw words like “cut” around.

I didn’t consider it a cut; I considered it—as did the chairman and, finally, the rest of the committee—a reallocation of funds based on some of the commentary that has been utilized today of meeting readiness demands and proper allocation of funds considering where the Future Combat System is today in terms of its ability to produce. But I will say that just as an observation on the commentary of this point.

For my part, General Casey, I want to refer to your testimony, almost two years to the day ago, in your capacity as the multinational commander when you came to speak to this committee on September 29, 2005. I am going to quote a few things to you, not with the idea of saying, Aha, you know, here is what you have said, I have trapped you in some kind of previous commentary; but rather to try to establish a perspective for today on strategic initiatives.

The sum and substance of your statement had to do—and what I am going to quote to you as quickly as I can—had to do with strategic as well as the broad concepts that you had. And your testimony is based on your summary of your judgment over the past 18 months—starting in June of 2004, and you were speaking at the end of September in 2005—about the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces in terms of—qualitatively and quantitatively in terms of their increase.

And you said, “So over the past 18 months we have built sufficient capability to begin preparing for the transition of the counterinsurgency mission to capable Iraqi Security Forces.”

The reason that you stated for wanting to do that, you referred to a closed study of history that showed, without strong indigenous partners, counterinsurgency operations have not fared well.

And then you went on to say, “The longer the Coalition carried the brunt of the counterinsurgency fight, the longer they would carry the brunt of the fight itself. This gets to a dependency issue.”

Then you went on to indicate, in reducing the visibility of the Coalition forces across Iraq and, ultimately, as conditions warrant, to begin to reduce our presence in Iraq away from an element that fuels the insurgency—and I am quoting you now—“that is the perception of occupation.”

You went on to cite the number of security forces in the hundreds of thousands, et cetera.

The third point under the strategy was that the more capable security forces are, the quicker—excuse me, increased Coalition pres-

ence feeds the notion of occupation and contributes to the dependency of Iraqi Security Forces on the Coalition and extends the time it will take Iraqi Security Forces to become self-reliant and exposes more Coalition forces to attack at a time when Iraqi Security Forces are increasingly available and capable.

Finally, your fourth point, and I am quoting directly, “Reducing visibility and ultimately the presence of Coalition forces as we transition to Iraqi security self-reliance is a key element of our overall strategy.”

I cite those things because you felt in September, two years ago, after 18 months of trying to put this together along those lines—and I hope you feel that I have accurately or adequately summarized your points—we now find ourselves, 2 years later. And I would like to know what would lead me to believe, then, at this stage, after three years and eight months, that we are any further along toward meeting any of those four points. Or if we are further along, at what point are we going to be able to make the transition?

You probably also recall that in that talk that you gave then, you indicated the average counterinsurgency, from previous times presumably—I am not quite sure whether the “strong indigenous partnership” was mentioned, but you mentioned nine years as an average.

Well, here we are, three years and eight months into it. I would like to know if you felt that you were ready to make that transportation two years ago? What is your strategic assessment today, then, in terms of the capacity to fulfill any of those four or all four of those points that you made.

General CASEY. I would say, I said, “begin the transition.”

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Oh, yes. And I read that to you because I understood that you would zero in on that.

But the beginning was two years ago.

General CASEY. And we have begun the transition, and it continues in Iraq.

Now, I don’t do Iraq anymore, obviously. I have a different view that I have laid out here today. And I represent the interests of the Army as an institution.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But the difficulty, General Casey, is that absent this particular reference that I have made, one would think, and I think the country thinks now, it is almost as if we are just starting today.

If you go back to General Petraeus’ commentary, it is as almost—and this where, Mr. Secretary, I think you are going have a difficulty here—it is—almost every hearing we have, it is as if we are just beginning to make our transition.

Well, this is the 65th hearing, or the 3 years and 8 months down the line in which we have begun to make the transition; and at a certain point it almost gets to a “crying wolf” situation.

At what point do we actually make the transition? Do you have a projection? Because that fundamentally informs what we will be able to do in terms of strategy initiatives.

General CASEY. I will tell you there are 7 provinces that have already transitioned, and that was part of the strategy, 7 of 18. Now, it is clear that the sectarian violence that was spawned by the at-

tack on the mosque in Samarra in February of 2006 complicated the situation.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But that takes place, that kind of thing can take place all the time; that is what I call events getting in the saddle and riding you.

What is the projection now today in strategic initiatives? What is the projection of when we are going to make the transition? Let's assume for our conversation's sake that you are able to keep control of events.

General CASEY. Congressman, that is a question for General Petraeus. I can talk about the history, but I can't talk about the projections for today. That is his bailiwick now.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, I am disappointed in that answer, because that—it does relate, this kind of thing directly relates to, say, funding for Future Combat Systems and all the rest of it. We have got to make decisions here about what we do in terms of funding and what policies we direct.

I guess I will put it to the Secretary.

What is the projection, Mr. Secretary? How do we reconcile what this committee has to do in terms of putting a Defense budget and policies together with regard to the strategic—this commentary that I am quoting General Casey on was with regard to the strategy we are going to pursue.

Secretary GEREN. The circumstances on the ground will drive those decisions. And I can't—I don't have a crystal ball. I couldn't add anything to what General Casey told you now or General Petraeus told you earlier.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Because we don't have all the time in the world, if that is going to be the case, what you are saying is, third parties are going to determine the strategy of the United States.

It has to depend on our policies. If conditions on the ground determine everything, we are supposed to determine what we want to do about the conditions on the ground.

Secretary GEREN. And that is General Petraeus' job. And our job is to provide him properly organized, trained, and equipped resources to do it.

That tension is never going to go away: Meeting the needs of the present and also making the proper investments for the future. It is a struggling that we have today, and I am confident we will have 10 years from now, using the supplemental to fund the war effort; and I don't know how long we will continue to approach it that way, but we have got the base budget, where we try to balance the needs of the present and the future and use the supplemental to meet the immediate needs of the war effort.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But the supplemental, you are familiar with my argument that I don't like to do things that way.

You may recall, in 2006 I made a motion to try and pay for the war—I was defeated—try to pay for the war on our budget. And I was defeated because, you may recall, the then-chairman of the committee said, "We will take it up in the supplemental." And I said, you know, this is a whole brand-new way of doing things.

From a statutory point of view, I think that that puts you in a very difficult position in terms of trying to reset the Army.

Secretary GEREN. No doubt the uncertainty of the future, the uncertainty of tomorrow, makes projecting our allocation of resources difficult. We have to look at the circumstances that we have and balance those investments in the present with the needs to invest long term.

I think if you look over the history of our country, frankly, we have not done a very good job of that. We tend to underinvest in the future and find ourselves short when the future gets here. We have done it in many conflicts. We have often done it following on the heels of conflicts. We don't properly guess the future and we invest improperly.

I think back on my time on this committee and my time in the Congress, and we looked into this century. I voted with the majority and we drew down the forces from 780- to 482,000. When I look back on it, it wasn't a very good decision.

We are constantly having to look over the horizon and render our best judgment knowing that we often will get it wrong. And our best insurance against getting it wrong is investment in full-spectrum readiness so that we can be as well positioned as possible for whatever happens next.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, I value this discussion because it strengthens—in me, at least; I don't know how others will conclude—that we need to set the policy and not have the policy set by actions that take place outside of the decisions made here. We need to set where we want to go and not go where we have to go, because we let events get in the saddle, as I said, and ride us.

So unless the chairman has further commentary, I want to thank you both for spending the time with us today and, more particularly, for taking up the question of a strategic initiative and how we can best address that from the point of view of the Defense bill.

And I hope to be able, at some point, Mr. Secretary, in particular—be able to extend my congratulations to you even more personally.

General Casey, thank you very much. I also appreciate your hospitality in recent days as well.

With that, unless there is anything else, Ms. Shea-Porter, I will bring the hearing to a close.

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

SEPTEMBER 26, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SEPTEMBER 26, 2007

RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

THE HONORABLE PETE GEREN
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

ON THE ARMY'S STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES

SEPTEMBER 26, 2007

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF THE ARMY PETE GEREN

Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, I thank you for holding this important hearing on the future direction of the Army. After serving as a member of this committee during my time in Congress, I am especially honored to appear before you today.

I'd like to begin by thanking all of you for your unwavering support of our Soldiers and their Families. I know they appreciate your ongoing efforts to provide them not only with the ways and means to achieve the strategic objectives that our Nation demands, but also to improve their quality of life. Indeed, later in my testimony I will discuss some of the very concrete ways we have been able to address the needs of our Soldiers and their Families because of the support and generosity of the Congress.

I have recently returned from visiting Soldiers and units in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait. As you all have seen on your own Congressional delegations, our units and their leaders, and most especially our great Soldiers, continue doing a superb job under the most challenging conditions imaginable. Their courage and heroism are truly inspiring.

On October 7th, we will enter the seventh year of major combat operations in the Global War on Terror, making this the third longest war in American history, after the Revolutionary War and Vietnam. This is also the first extended conflict since the Revolution to be fought with an All Volunteer Force.

To be sure, our Army is being stretched to meet the demands of the current conflict. The Army has approximately 150,000 Soldiers in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. Since the beginning of combat operations, over 550,000 Soldiers have served in combat zones; over 200,000 have been deployed multiple times. Our All Volunteer Force is a national treasure, but as we move into the seventh year of major combat operations we are in uncharted waters as an All Volunteer Force. We are adapting our policies, programs, and investments to reflect the realities of this era of persistent conflict.

The All Volunteer Force is 34-years-old. Some of you may recall that in its very first decade its success was threatened by a cap on military pay that led to serious retention shortfalls. President Reagan and Congress increased pay a total of 26 percent in 1981 and 1982, restoring military pay to levels “reasonably comparable” with the private sector, probably saving the All Volunteer Force in the process. Today, the strain of multiple deployments on Soldiers requires us likewise to work together to adapt in a way that ensures the health and wellbeing of the All Volunteer Force.

Despite our many challenges, our Soldiers remain the best trained, best led, and best equipped force we have ever put in the field. Today’s Army is the pre-eminent land force on the face of the earth – and we will keep it that way. And Army Families are standing with our Soldiers and shouldering the responsibility of selfless service.

Our Soldiers count on their Army leadership to provide them the training, equipment, and leadership to take the fight to the enemy. They also count on Army leadership to make sure their Families receive the support they need to stay Army strong.

On the wall in one of the Army conference rooms there is this quote by former Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams: “People are not *in* the Army, they *are* the Army.”

The people who “are” the Army extend to more than just the Soldiers. Spouses and children are as much a part of the Army as the Soldiers they love. Everyone in Army leadership recognizes the role of the family in the All Volunteer Force and is committed to improving support to our Army Families; and I am proud to partner with General Casey in working to improve the quality of life for Soldiers and their Families.

As you know, we are asking a great deal of our Soldiers and Army Families and we cannot expect that these demands will diminish in the foreseeable future. Organizational and institutional changes will continue for years and we must expect and plan for a future typified by persistent conflict and continuing deployments.

In order to sustain our All Volunteer Force, we will work to bring our Army into balance and do more to provide Soldiers and Families a quality of life equal to the quality of their service. Family support systems – health care, housing, childcare, and education – designed for the pre-9/11 peacetime Army must be adapted to sustain an Army at war.

Furthermore, the demographics of today's Army are markedly different from any Army that has fought an extended conflict in our Nation's history, posing previously unknown challenges. Over half of our Soldiers are married and a majority of Army spouses are employed. Army Families include over 700,000 children – a number greater than the entire population of the capital city where we meet today.

When a married mother or father deploys, he or she leaves behind a single parent household and all the challenges associated with that family dynamic. Soldiers who are single parents must leave their children in the care of others. With multiple deployments and dwell time filled with training for the next deployment, the stress on the Family increases. General Casey and I are committed to addressing these challenges.

Support for Soldiers and Families

The Army has recognized the strain on Soldier and Families and for several years has been taking steps to address many of these issues, often with Congress playing a leading role, and always a strong partner in the service of our Army. For example, the Army continues to improve Soldier and Family Housing, bolstered by legislation enacted by Congress in 1996 allowing the military services to leverage their government housing assets to include private sector participation in military housing. This Residential Community Initiative (RCI) has allowed the Army to construct, improve, and sustain Army family housing in the U.S. at a greatly reduced cost to the Army. As of the beginning of this month, the Army had privatized almost 79,000 homes on 36 installations. The total cost to date is estimated at \$10.4 billion of which the Army share is only \$1.3 billion. The quality of the homes and neighborhoods built under the RCI has improved

dramatically the quality of life for our Army Families. Again, the Congress can take a great deal of the credit for this achievement.

Besides the RCI, the Army is on a course to eventually eliminate inadequate family housing, first in CONUS, later OCONUS. Additionally, we have also been expanding housing for unmarried senior NCOs and officers at locations where off-post rentals are not available.

Our facility modernization efforts continue to focus on the long term effort to improve Unaccompanied Personnel Housing and we have delivered 200 new units in recent years with plans for another 1,200. In the past five fiscal years, the Army has invested about \$5.5 billion to fix, upgrade, and replace permanent party barracks for 72,400 Soldiers.

The Army is shifting additional resources into family programs for 2008 and beyond. In recent years, the Army has built 18 Child Development Centers with plans for 22 more. We also continue to build new fitness facilities, chapels, and youth centers.

Last summer, the Army transferred \$100 million into existing Family programs, which had an immediate and positive impact. These funds are being used to hire Family Readiness Support Assistants down to the battalion level, expand the availability and reduce the cost of child care, provide additional respite care for Family members with special needs, and enhance morale and recreational programs across the Army.

Additionally, after many months of work, the Army will soon launch the Army Soldier-Family Action Plan. This plan to support Families is based on the input of Families from across our Army – here and around the globe. ASFAP will address issues such as education, access and quality of health care, employment opportunities, improved housing, and the resourcing of existing Army programs. It will be an important step forward, but it is not the final answer to the needs of Army Families.

Keeping Faith with Wounded Warriors

As an Army, we pledge never to leave a fallen comrade – that means on the battlefield, in the hospital, in the outpatient clinic, or over a lifetime of dependency if that is what is required. I have witnessed the cost in human terms and to the institution of the Army when we break faith with that sacred pledge, as a handful did at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, and we have worked hard to make that right.

Indeed, the silver lining in the WRAMC breakdown is that it prompted the Army to make dramatic changes in the way we care for our wounded warriors and also led to a partnership between the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to overhaul our military disability system. The goal of this latter effort is as simple to identify as it will be difficult to implement: a seamless transition for our Soldiers from the Department of Defense disability system either back to service in the Army or a productive life as a veteran. We begin that task not by thinking in terms of how we can improve the current outmoded system, but instead thinking about what kind of system we would build if we could start from scratch. It is a process that involves close collaboration between DoD, the VA, and Congress.

But the Army also is moving out aggressively to change what we can on our own. I am pleased to report that we have made significant progress in the areas of infrastructure, leadership, and processes issues as part of our Army Medical Action Plan. A few examples:

- We've given wounded warriors a new mission that is codified in the Wounded Warrior Mission Statement: "I am a Warrior in Transition. My job is to heal as I transition back to duty or become a productive, responsible citizen in society. This is not a status but a mission. I will succeed in this mission because I am a Warrior."
- We've consolidated Medical Hold and Medical Holdover into single Warrior Transition Units (WTU), organized into military units that are under the command and control of the medical treatment facility commander. The WTU's mission is to focus solely on the care, treatment, and compassionate disposition of its Soldiers.

- We've institutionalized a Triad of Support for every wounded warrior to include a primary care manager, nurse case manager, and squad leader, and we've organized outpatients in a chain of command.
- We've established Soldier and Family Assistance Centers at medical centers across the entire Army. These are one-stop shops where Soldiers and Families can get the information they need regarding entitlements, benefits, and services.
- There is now a Wounded Soldier Family Hotline that provides Warriors in Transition and their Families 24-hour access to information and assistance.
- We've initiated a Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury chain teaching program for every Soldier in the Army, to not only educate and assist them in recognizing, preventing, and treating these conditions, but also to help remove the stigma associated with these injuries. We are on track to train the entire force, over 1 million Soldiers, by October 18. Similar training is being provided to Family members.

There is much more we have done as well, but there is still much more to do. President Lincoln pledged our Nation to care for those who shall have borne the battle, their widows, and now widowers, and orphans. That pledge must be constantly renewed, not with words, but with deeds. I believe that the Department of Defense, the Congress, and the Department of Veterans Affairs have an opportunity that does not come along often – overhaul the entire military disability system. Let us not squander the opportunity.

Force of the Future

Even without the Global War on Terror, we would be a busy Army, implementing the largest Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) in history. We are growing the total Army by 74,000 and completing the transformation of the Reserve Component from a strategic reserve to an operational force. We are half-way through the largest organizational change since World War II, converting our combat and enabling formations to modular formations. Our depots are operating at historical levels to reset and recapitalize our battle

damaged vehicles and equipment. And we are working to transform and modernize the force.

The purpose of the Army modernization effort is to maintain dominance in land operations – we never want to send our Soldiers into a fair fight. The goal of Army modernization is to know before the enemy does where our forces are and where the enemy is. Knowledge is power, and nowhere is that dictum more applicable than on the battlefield.

The Future Combat System will give our Soldiers the knowledge they need to fight and win in any battle space, day or night, whether the battle is conventional or asymmetrical. Indeed, theatre commanders are validating this effort by requesting specific operational capabilities and technologies that we are currently developing in FCS. Through spinouts, we are providing soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan FCS capabilities that are critical to their current missions and force protection.

Two good examples are the class one unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV, and the small, unmanned ground vehicle, or SUGV. The UAV weighs about 35 pounds and is controlled at the squad level by the robotics operator. It gives Soldiers a set of eyes in the sky. The SUGV is also a squad-level asset that can see over small obstacles and can go into buildings and negotiate stairwells. These types of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, along with robots and unattended ground sensors, will put machines in harm's way instead of Soldiers.

While we plan for the future, we must never forget that we have 150,000 in harm's way and it is our responsibility to meet their needs with the urgency their mission demands. I know Congress shares this commitment, which is why you have all done so much to advance the production and fielding of MRAPs. To update you, the JROC has approved the Army's request for 10,000 MRAP vehicles and production is now underway at several facilities. By the end of April 2008, we are projecting that we will field almost 4,100 MRAPs.

Along with mobile armor, we also have made great strides in body armor, recently introducing breakaway armor that in an emergency allows Soldiers to

shed their body armor with the pull of a tab. Force protection will continue to be a top priority.

Contracting Issues

Our recent focus has been on ensuring Soldiers are well trained, equipped, and prepared for rapid deployment into hostile environments; and for their sustainment in these expeditionary operations for as long as necessary. However, in order to best position the Army for future military operations, our warfighters also need an agile support system that includes the ability to procure timely contractor augmentation effectively, efficiently, and legally, and to measure the performance of the contractor support. Given the current force structure, we must recognize that our Soldiers do not operate alone.

Our current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan show that the deployed force in 21st century military operations will include large numbers of contractor personnel. In fact, approximately half of the personnel currently deployed in Iraq are contractor employees. This puts Army contracting (writing, negotiating, monitoring, and achieving accountability and enforcement of the contracts), along with modern (information-based) logistics support, squarely at the forefront of our challenges in supporting expeditionary operations.

To ensure that we learn from the experience of our current military engagements, and prepare for future conflicts, I have established a "Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations." I have tasked this Commission to provide forward-looking recommendations, within 45 days, on the Army's needs for a business structure that will best enable 21st century military operations. The senior experts on the Commission are assessing process (including internal controls), personnel, organization, training, policy, regulatory, and (if necessary) legislative solutions to assure that the Army is best equipped for future expeditionary operations.

The post-Cold War cuts in the Army's procurement budget resulted in continual cuts in the acquisition workforce, over an extended period. Today, we have an undersized acquisition workforce (military and civilian) that is resource-

challenged to accomplish its peacetime acquisition business, and stressed by ongoing wartime operations. This workforce has not been adequately expanded, trained, structured, or empowered to meet the needs of our 21st Century, deployed warfighters. We also need to do a better job in training our commanders on their responsibilities for requirements definition and contractor performance.

In working with the Commission Chairman, Dr. Jacques Gansler, it has become clear that timely and efficient contracting for services in support of expeditionary operations, and the subsequent management of the contracts, will be a key component of our achieving success in future military operations. The Commission is tasked to recommend actions that will ensure that we have a contracting, program management, and logistics workforce that is adequately staffed, trained, and prepared to deploy in support of future expeditionary operations; with full capability for procuring services, on-demand, in the field of operations; and for monitoring contractor performance thereafter.

Contracting is the nexus between our warfighters' requirements and the contractors who fulfill those requirements – whether for food service, interpreters, communications operations, or equipment repair. In support of critical military operations, contractor personnel must provide timely support to the warfighter; and Army contracting must acquire that support effectively, efficiently, and legally, while operating in a high-risk, fast-paced environment. As the Commission examines the current, in-theatre system for defining requirements, developing statements of work, awarding contracts, and managing contractor performance, they are identifying ways to ensure that the Army has the business structure, and a sufficient number of qualified and prepared people (military and civilian) that will best enable our warfighters to achieve successful 21st Century military operations.

Conclusion

The old saw, "If the Army wanted you to have a Family, it would have issued you one" is as out-dated as the smoothbore musket.

To paraphrase General Abrams, Soldiers and their Families *are* the All Volunteer Force. And we cannot have a healthy All Volunteer Force without healthy Army Families.

In today's Army, you recruit the Soldier, you retain the Family. Working with General Casey, I am confident we will do both and we will do both well. We will remain the pre-eminent land power and we will remain Army Strong!

Again, thank you for allowing me to testify. I look forward to your questions.

RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

ON THE ARMY'S STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES

SEPTEMBER 26, 2007

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STATEMENT BY
GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, on behalf of the more than one million Active, Guard, and Reserve Soldiers, their Families, and the Civilians of the United States Army, serving around the globe, the Secretary and I welcome the opportunity to discuss the direction we intend to take the Army in the next several years.

Our Nation has been at war for over six years. Our Army has been a leader on the front lines of this war and back here at home – protecting our people and securing our borders. Over time, these operations have expanded in scope and duration. As a result, they have stretched and stressed our all-volunteer force.

Over these last six years, the Congress has responded to the Army's requests for resources. In fiscal year 2007 alone, the Congress provided over \$200 billion to the Army, most at the start of the fiscal year and in time for the fully-funded Reset Program. That kind of commitment to the Army and our Soldiers is deeply appreciated.

We live in a world where global terrorism and extremist ideologies are real threats. As we look to the future, national security experts are virtually unanimous in predicting that the next several decades will be ones of persistent conflict -- protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors that use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. Adversaries will employ propaganda, threat, intimidation, and overt violence to coerce people and gain control of their land or resources. Some will avoid our proven advantages by adopting asymmetric techniques, utilizing indirect approaches, and immersing themselves in the population.

Many of these conflicts will be protracted – ebbing and flowing in intensity, challenging our Nation's will to persevere. Several emerging global trends are likely to fuel this violence and enable extremist groups to undermine governments, societies, and values. Globalization, despite its

positive effects on global prosperity, may create "have" and "have not" conditions that spawn conflict. Population growth and its "youth bulge" will increase opportunities for instability, radicalism, and extremism. Resource demand for energy, water, and food for growing populations will increase competition and conflict. Climate change and natural disasters will cause humanitarian crises, population migrations, and epidemic diseases. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will increase the potential for catastrophic attacks that will be globally destabilizing and detrimental to economic development. Finally, failed or failing states unable or unwilling to maintain control over their territory may provide safe havens for global or regional terrorist groups to prepare and export terror.

While analysts generally agree on these trends, we cannot predict the exact time, location, or scope of individual conflicts. We do know, however, that the Army will remain central to our national strategy to ensure our security in spite of these threatening trends. We need to ensure our forces are agile enough to respond rapidly to unexpected circumstances; led by versatile, culturally astute, and adaptive leaders; and supported by institutions capable of sustaining operations for as long as necessary to ensure victory. The Army has a vision to build that force, and is already executing this vision. We will continue along these lines and transform our current force into a campaign-quality expeditionary force that is capable of supporting the needs of combatant commanders operating effectively with joint, interagency, and multi-national partners across the spectrum of conflict from peacetime engagement to conventional war. Simultaneously, the Army will pursue the necessary actions to restore balance to our current forces.

While we remain a resilient and committed professional force, our Army today is out of balance for several reasons. The current demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply. We are consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and are unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other potential contingencies. Our Reserve Components are performing an operational role for which they were neither

originally designed nor resourced. Current operational requirements for forces and limited periods between deployments necessitate a focus on counterinsurgency to the detriment of preparedness for the full range of military missions. Soldiers, Families, support systems and equipment are stretched and stressed by the demands of lengthy and repeated deployments with insufficient recovery time. Equipment used repeatedly in harsh environmental conditions is wearing out at a far greater pace than expected. Army support systems including health care, education, and Family support systems that were designed for the pre-9/11 era are straining under the pressures from six years at war.

Overall, our readiness is being consumed as fast as we can build it. We will act quickly to restore balance to preserve our all-volunteer force, restore necessary depth and breadth to Army capabilities, and build essential capacity for the future. Four "imperatives" frame the work we will do. Implementing them will require several years, considerable resources, and sustained commitment from Congress and the American people.

First, we need to improve the manner in which we **sustain** the Army's Soldiers, Families, and Civilians. Recruiting, training, and retaining our Soldiers – the centerpiece of the Army – can only be done by transforming quality recruits into Soldiers who are physically tough, mentally adaptive and live the Warrior Ethos. These Warriors are our ultimate asymmetric advantage—the one thing that cannot be matched by our adversaries—now or in the future. We recognize the strain on Families, are aware that Families play an important role in maintaining the readiness of our all-volunteer force, and must therefore ensure that their quality of life is commensurate with their quality of service. For these reasons, we will build a partnership with Army Families and improve Family readiness by standardizing and funding existing Family programs and services; increasing accessibility and quality of health care; improving Soldier and Family housing; ensuring excellence in schools, youth services, and family child care; and expanding education and employment opportunities for Family members. We will also ensure that our

Wounded Warriors are cared for and reintegrated into the Army and society. We must never forget our moral obligation to the spouses, children and Families who have lost their Soldier since September 11th. And finally, we must continue to support our Army Civilians. They have a 230-year record of dedicated service and they remain an integral part of the Army. As the Army's missions evolve and become more complex, so will the roles of Army Civilians.

Second, we will continue to **prepare** forces to succeed in the current conflict. We have made great strides in equipping our Soldiers and are continually adapting our training and equipment to keep pace with an evolving enemy. We remain committed to providing all deploying Soldiers the best available equipment to ensure they maintain a technological advantage over any enemy they face. We will continue to provide tough, demanding training at home stations and in our combat training centers to give our Soldiers and their leaders the confidence they need to succeed in these complex environments. We will implement the Army Force Generation model by 2011 to manage the preparation of forces for employment and improve predictability for Soldiers and Families. Military success in this war is tied to the capabilities of our leaders and our Soldiers -- we will not fail to prepare them for success.

Third, we must continue to **reset** our units and rebuild the readiness consumed in operations to prepare them for future deployments and future contingencies. Sustained combat has taken a toll on our Soldiers, leaders, Families, and equipment. Since 2003, equipment has been used at a rate over five times that programmed -- in harsh and demanding desert and mountainous conditions. In addition to fixing, replacing, and upgrading our equipment and retraining for future missions, we must also revitalize our Soldiers and Families by providing them time an opportunity to recover in order to reverse the cumulative effects of a sustained high operational tempo. Resetting our forces is critical to restoring readiness -- this year we will reset over 130,000 pieces of equipment and almost 200,000 Soldiers.

Reset must continue as long as we have forces deployed and for several years thereafter to ensure readiness for the future. Commitment to providing the resources to reset our forces is essential to restoring balance and to providing strategic depth and flexibility for the Nation.

Fourth, we must continue to **transform** our Army to meet the demands of the 21st Century. Transformation is a holistic effort to adapt how we fight, train, modernize, develop leaders, station, and support our Soldiers, Families and Civilians. Transformation is a journey -- not a destination. Transformation is also a multi-faceted process.

We must **grow** the Army to provide and sustain sufficient forces for the full range and duration of current operations and future contingencies. This growth will allow us to revitalize and balance our force, reduce deployment periods, increase dwell time, increase capability and capacity, and strengthen the systems that support our forces. We have authorization to increase the Army's size by 74,000 Soldiers over the next five years. We will achieve this as fast as possible.

We must continuously **modernize** our forces to put our Cold War formations and systems behind us and to provide our Soldiers a decisive advantage over our enemies. We will continue to rapidly field the best new equipment to our fighting forces, upgrade and modernize existing systems, incorporate new technologies derived from the Future Combat Systems research and development, and soon begin to field the Future Combat Systems themselves. We are ultimately working toward an agile, globally responsive Army that is enhanced by modern networks, surveillance sensors, precision weapons, and platforms that are lighter, less logistics-dependant, and less manpower-intensive.

We are over half-way through the largest **organizational change** since WWII. We must continue to convert our combat and enabling formations to modular units that are more deployable, tailorable, and versatile, and have demonstrated their effectiveness in Iraq and Afghanistan. We must also continue to rebalance our capabilities by converting less

necessary skills to those in high demand, and by shifting much-needed reserve forces into the active component.

We must continue **institutional change** in processes, policies, and procedures to support an expeditionary Army during a time of war. Most of our systems were designed to support the pre-9/11 Army. Our transformation cannot be cemented until the institutional systems -- personnel, education, training, healthcare, procurement, and support among them -- are adapted to meet the realities of our current and future environments. Continued support is needed to execute Army Business Transformation through management reform; acquisition reform; consolidation of administrative and compensation processes; comprehensive redesign of organizations and business processes that generate, deploy, and reset forces; consolidation of bases and activities; military to civilian conversion processes; and performance measurement enhancements. While this is largely an internal process, it may well be the most difficult aspect of transformation -- and the one that is most essential to giving us the Army we will need for the rest of this century.

We must continue to **adapt our Reserve Components** from a paradigm of a strategic reserve only mobilized in National emergencies, to an operational reserve, employed on a cyclical basis to add depth to the active force. This has been happening for the last six years and will be required in a future of persistent conflict. Operationalizing the Reserve Components requires National and State consensus and support as well as continued commitment from Reserve Component employers, Soldiers and Families. It necessitates changes in the way we train, equip, resource, and mobilize the Reserve Components.

We must continue to **develop agile and adaptive leaders**. Leaders in the 21st Century must be competent in their core proficiencies; broad enough to operate across the spectrum of conflict -- from humanitarian and peacekeeping operations through counterinsurgency to major conventional operations; able to operate in joint, interagency, and combined environments

and leverage political and diplomatic efforts in achieving their objectives; at home in other cultures, able to use this awareness and understanding to support operations in innovative ways; and courageous enough to see and exploit opportunities in the challenges and complexities of our future operating environments.

Each of these imperatives requires resources – on time and in the amounts needed to meet the mission. At the start of fiscal year 2007, Congress provided the Army with sufficient base and GWOT supplemental funding to support the war, fully fund reset, and to maintain and train the force. With the start of fiscal year 2008 fast approaching, it is imperative that the Army and the Congress work in partnership to ensure that funding is once again available to the Army at the start of the fiscal year. This is essential in order for us to support the war, support our Soldiers and their Families, and reset the force. If it is necessary for us to start fiscal year 2008 under a continuing resolution, I ask Congress to provide the necessary resources to ensure we maintain continuity of funding in order to support an Army at War. Our continued and close partnership with Congress will be essential as we restore the Army's balance over the next several years.

The Army has long been the Strength of this Nation. We were in 1775, and we are today. For 232 years, the Army has symbolized, in the truest sense, American resolve and commitment to defend its interests. We protect the homeland and lead the Nation's efforts against the scourge of global terror, and we will do so in a future of persistent conflict. Our Soldiers, their Families, and our Army Civilians epitomize what is best about America: they work hard, selflessly carry heavy burdens, and are willing to face a hard road ahead.

Today, we are locked in a war against a global extremist threat that is fixed on defeating the United States and destroying our way of life. This foe will not go away nor will it give up easily. At stake is the power of our values and our civilization -- exemplified by the promise of America -- to confront and defeat the menace of extremist terrorists. At stake is whether the

authority of those who treasure the rights of free individuals will stand firm against the ruthless and pitiless men who wantonly slay the defenseless. At stake is whether the future will be framed by the individual freedoms we hold so dear or be dominated by demented forms of extremism. At stake is whether we will continue to expand freedom, opportunity, and decency for those who thirst for it, or let fall the darkness of extremism and terror.

Faced with such a long and difficult struggle, we must remind ourselves that this Army exists to field forces for victory. We are at war, fighting for our freedom, our security, and our future as a Nation. We have made hard sacrifices, and there will be more. We have lost over 2,400 Soldiers and had almost 20,000 wounded -- over a quarter from the Reserve Components. We have also awarded a Medal of Honor, six Distinguished Service Cross Medals, 269 Silver Stars, and over 6,700 other awards for Valor.

Our Soldiers, Families, and Civilians are the strength of our Army and they make the Army the Strength of the Nation. Their sacrifices are what builds a better future for others, and preserves our way of life. They will lead our Nation to victory over our enemies. They will preserve the peace for us and for our allies. Our combat veterans know well the meaning of Army Strong. Baptized in fire and blood, they have come out steel. That steel endures. Our Warrior Ethos has it right -- I will always place the mission first, I will never quit, I will never accept defeat, and I will never leave a fallen comrade.

The Secretary and I are greatly encouraged by the recent actions of the Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Defense which reflect clear recognition of our challenges following six years of war. We look forward to working with you to maintain our Army -- still the best in the world at what we do.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD



SEPTEMBER 26, 2007



Micro Air Vehicle (MAV) CL I Surrogate Unmanned Air Vehicle

Mission: Provides Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting and Acquiring (RSTA) platoon level capability. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) / Situational Awareness / day-night /semi-autonomous

Sensors: Electro Optical, Un-Cooled Infrared



The MAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) (Class I surrogate) provides the dismounted soldier with Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA). Estimated to weigh less than 20 pounds, the air vehicle operates in complex urban and wooded terrains with a vertical take-off and landing capability. It is interoperable with selected ground and air platforms and controlled by dismounted soldiers.

The MAV uses autonomous flight and navigation, but it will interact with the network and Soldier to dynamically update routes and target information. It provides dedicated reconnaissance support and early warning to the lowest echelons of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in environments not suited to larger assets.

The system (which includes two air vehicles, a control device, and ground support equipment) is back-packable.

*Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Case: OCVF XX-0000, XXXXX 2007.


PROGRAM MANAGER
ECS Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV)
 BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

Mission: Provides extended reconnaissance of MOUT and subterranean battlespace / network node

Armament: Non-Lethal specific to MOUT

Gross Weight: 30 lbs

Sensors: Color/Monochrome EO, Un-cooled IR, Acoustic, Target designation, NBC



The Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) is a small, lightweight, manportable UGV capable of conducting military operations in urban terrain, tunnels, sewers and caves.

The SUGV is an aid for enabling the performance of manpower intensive or high-risk functions (i.e. urban Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions, Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TIC)/Toxic Industrial Materials (TIM) reconnaissance, etc.) without exposing Soldiers directly to the hazard.

The SUGV modular design allows multiple payloads to be integrated in a plug-and-play fashion. Weighing less than 30 pounds, it is capable of carrying up to six pounds of payload weight.

PROGRAM MANAGER
FCS
 BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
 FOR THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION

Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS)

Mission:	Provides modular and modifiable groups of sensors utilizing multiple ground sensing technologies / network node	
Gross Weight:	No more than 25 lbs (fits in MOLLE carrier)	
Endurance:	Tactical UGS – 7 days Urban UGS – 2 days (48 hours)	
Deployment:	Hand, Robotic, Vehicle	
Sensors:	Monochrome EO, Un-Cooled IR, IR Trip Wire, Acoustic, Seismic	


The FCS (BCT) Unattended Ground program is divided into two major subgroups of sensing systems:

Tactical-UGS (T-UGS), which includes Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)-UGS and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)- UGS

Urban-UGS (U-UGS), also known as Urban Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Advanced Sensor System (UMASS)

An Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) field will include multimode sensors for target detection, location and classification; and an imaging capability for target identification. A sensor field will also include a gateway node to provide sensor fusion and a long-haul interoperable communications capability for transmitting target or SA information to a remote operator, or the common operating picture through the FCS (BCT) JTRS Network.

The UGS can be used to perform mission tasks such as perimeter defense, surveillance, target acquisition and situational awareness (SA), including Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield Explosive (CBRN) early warning.



JTRS is central to the military's plan for Network Centric operations using seamless real-time communications—both with and across the U.S. military services, and with coalition forces and allies. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) will provide the Warfighter with a software programmable and hardware configurable digital radio networking system to increase interoperability, flexibility and adaptability in support of varied mission requirements. JTRS is a component of the FCS network with two variants:

The Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radios (JTRS GMR) is a vehicle mounted family of radios supporting multiple software programmable. This family of radios is capable of handling voice, video, and data. JTRS GMR is the first of a family of high-capacity tactical radios to provide both line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight C4ISR capabilities. The GMR radio will be delivered to the warfighters for test starting in FY 2008.

The Joint Tactical Radio System Handheld, Manpack & Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS) family of radios with several variants of Small Form Fit radios to include handheld and manpack units and forms suitable for dismounts & unmanned devices. The JTRS HMS SFF (Embedded Radios) will be delivered to the warfighters for test starting in FY 2008.

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

SEPTEMBER 26, 2007

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SPRATT

Secretary GEREN. Reset funding is not programmed across the Future Years Defense Plan. Reset requirements depend on forces deployed and deploying in support of current operations; the amount of equipment returning from the area of operations; wear on that equipment; battle losses; lessons learned; capability gaps; continued use of theater provided equipment; and restoring Army pre-positioned stocks. Future Reset requirements are estimated at \$13–14 billion a year. This funding is necessary for 2–3 years beyond the cessation of the current conflict. [See page 15.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

SEPTEMBER 26, 2007

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ

Mr. ORTIZ. Secretary Geren, General Casey stated that the Army is “consuming readiness as fast as we can build it,” yet you stated that the Army’s depots are not operating at maximum capacity. At the same time, when asked what you would do with more money, you said you would put it in equipment. Please explain the disconnect between these statements. If the Army needs more equipment, why aren’t its depots operating at maximum capacity to return equipment obviously needed for operations and training?

Secretary GEREN. The depots return the Army’s current equipment up to the readiness standard but they do not fill Army equipment shortages (the holes in the yard). Only new procurement can do that. The depots are operating at the capacity level required to expeditiously repair the equipment as it comes out of theater. Unit rotation schedules drive the rate of return of equipment from theater. Depot production schedules are based on the return of equipment and Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) requirements. Operational decisions made by these commanders continue to drive our depots’ operating capacity. For example the decision to leave the 4th Infantry Division combat systems in theater to be used by the 1st Cavalry Division affected the amount and timing of work required in the depots. The requirement for us to surge five additional brigade combat teams this year and the decision to extend unit deployments from 12 to 15 months reduced, in the near term, the amount of equipment returning from theater. As we redeploy the surge brigade combat teams and return to shorter deployment times, the amount of equipment returning from theater will increase which will drive the need for higher resources and capacity at our depots.

Currently all depots are working multiple shifts to meet the ARFORGEN requirements. The depots are finalizing production schedules for this fiscal year, and they continue to order necessary parts with varying lead times to ensure our depots can operate at the appropriate level to reset the force. It is imperative that we receive sufficient supplemental funding early in the fiscal year. If received on time, the U.S. Army Materiel Command does not anticipate the need for additional funding to increase production capacities in fiscal year 2008.

Although the depots have the capability to substantially increase their production in most areas, such an increase would have to be undertaken over time, and in response to clear requirements. For example, the repair parts needed for Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems can take up to 18 months to procure; parts for the M1 can take up to a year. Without adequate parts, depots cannot repair weapon systems. Some shops at the depots, such as the painting, sandblasting, metal work, and other process shops are currently working 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. To prevent these from becoming bottlenecks that impede increased production, we continue to use Lean/Six Sigma to reconfigure, and expand our core depot operations. Specific details on the current depot work schedules follow:

- Anniston Army Depot is accomplishing 74% of its production on 1st shift (working 11 hours per day, 6 days per week), and 26% of its production on 2nd shift (also working 11 hours per day, 6 days per week plus 25%). Painting, sandblasting and chemical treatment operations are conducted on Sundays. This leaves only 2 hours per day plus 1 day per week (Sundays) for maintenance and upkeep of the maintenance facilities.
- Red River Army Depot is accomplishing 82% of its production on 1st shift (working mostly 10 hrs per day 4 days per week, plus 24% overtime), 16% of its production on 2nd shift (also working 10/4 plus overtime), and 2% of its production on a 3rd shift in the rubber products division (which works 3 8-hour shifts per day seven days per week).
- Corpus Christi Army Depot is accomplishing 78% of its production on 1st shift (standard 8 hrs, 5 days per week with 21% overtime), 16% on second shift (also 8 hours, 5 days per week with overtime), and 6% of its production on third shift (same as the other shifts).

- Letterkenny Army Depot is accomplishing 85% of its production on 1st shift (8 hours, 5 days per week plus 10% overtime), 13% on second shift (same), and 2% on third shift (same).

Tobyhanna Army Depot is accomplishing 86% of its production on 1st shift (8 hours per day, 5 days per week plus 17% overtime) 4% on second shift (same), and 10% on third shift (same).

Mr. ORTIZ. General Casey, what is your estimate of the “considerable resources” that will be required to implement your four imperatives and over what time frame?

General CASEY. The Army greatly appreciates increased support in both base and supplemental appropriations. We rely heavily on supplemental funding to ensure readiness in deploying forces, to achieve readiness in our next-to-deploy units, and to build strategic depth.

We face significant challenges as we balance the current needs with future demands. With the continued support of Congress and OSD, we are developing a comprehensive resource strategy to *sustain* our Soldiers, Families, and Civilians; *prepare* Soldiers for success in current operations; *reset* to restore readiness and depth for future operations; and *transform* to meet the demands of the 21st century.

Our goal is to match the base budget to assigned missions, which includes transitioning appropriate supplemental funding to the base.

Mr. ORTIZ. General Casey, what specific training and leadership programs are planned to ensure future Army leaders are “culturally astute”?

General CASEY. The Army has incorporated culture awareness into training and leadership programs at all levels. Our intent is to develop cultural understanding over the course of our Soldiers’ entire careers, not just develop it when their units are preparing for deployment. The Army’s goal is to develop the right set of competencies to operate across the full spectrum of operations in coordination with other Services and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners and allies.

The Army will train leaders to master a portfolio of professional competencies for operations around the world, which can profoundly influence the outcomes of U.S., allied, and coalition operations at any time. The integration of cross-cultural competence and regional expertise is essential to the planning and execution of all operations. We are training Soldiers and leaders to understand the key factors that define cultures and the peculiarities particular countries or regions, e.g. identity groups, values, beliefs, and relevant economical, historical, and political processes. Ultimately, Soldiers and leaders will understand how people from other cultures and regions perceive themselves, their neighbors, and the United States.

We have incorporated culture training for enlisted leaders starting in the Warrior Leader Course (supported by the Sergeants Major Academy) and for officers in the Basic Officer Leader Course (supported by Army War College). At the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College, we conduct regional studies electives and symposiums to better educate and train our mid-grade and senior leaders. We have also begun to develop cultural understanding in pre-commissioning programs, Reserve Officer Training Corps and the U.S. Military Academy.

The Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center (TCC), at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, integrates the cultural component of initial military training for Soldiers. The TCC also deploys mobile training teams to operational units and distributes its educational products across the Army to enhance the cultural capabilities of our Soldiers. We also employ civilian and military role players at mobilization sites and training centers to reinforce our Soldiers’ training.

The Army is building learning into all Soldiers’ career paths to develop, sustain, and balance the right combination of language and cultural proficiency with their traditional warfighting skills. Education and training will begin early and be sustained throughout the career life cycle. The Department of the Army believes that improving the ability of our Soldiers and units to work with people from other cultures is important for effective operations today and in the future.

Mr. ORTIZ. General Casey, given that you stated you would not be comfortable with the Army’s response to a conflict in which conventional warfare skills were required because limited dwell time is constraining full-spectrum training, how will the Army ensure its Soldiers are fully trained in traditional warfighting skills in addition to providing counterinsurgency training?

General CASEY. With limited time to reset and train in between deployments, Army units are challenged to find enough time to train for their core, full-spectrum mission while also ensuring they are prepared to assume their next assigned mission. As we grow the Army and increase the dwell time between deployments, we will be better able to train our units for full-spectrum operations.

With enough time in between deployments, our units will first focus their training on their more general “as-designed” or core mission. Their core mission is designed to address fundamental capabilities required to execute full spectrum operations (offense, defense, and stability operations) in the contemporary operational environment. Our units do this by employing various operational themes (limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major conflict) throughout various types of conflict (unstable peace, insurgency, and general war). For Brigade-level units and above, the Army plans to publish a list of essential tasks for each unit’s core mission, or Core Mission Essential Task List. This will provide a standardized focus for training and readiness reporting. Units not assigned a specific mission will ensure proficiency in their core mission.

Mr. ORTIZ. General Casey, with a 5 million acre maneuver deficit for CONUS units, how will the Army ensure its Soldiers are provided the training needed to “succeed in the current conflict” and “keep pace with an evolving enemy”?

General CASEY. Answer. In 2003, the Army G-3 approved the Range and Training Land Strategy (RTLS). The purpose of the RTLS is to address the increasing land deficit facing the Army. The RTLS serves as the mechanism to prioritize Army training land investment, and helps to optimize the use of all Army range and training land assets. The RTLS provides a long-range plan for the Army to provide the best range infrastructure and training land to units. The RTLS is updated periodically to address the Army Campaign Plan.

The Army Sustainable Range Program (SRP) continually takes steps to maximize the capability, availability, and accessibility of all Army training lands. The SRP actively identifies and changes internal Army and governmental processes and practices in order to maximize use of current Army lands.

The Army examines the land status of other Federal entities to mitigate land deficits at Army installations. Land that borders Army installations, held by the other services, the Bureau of Land Management, or U.S. Forest Service, has the potential to transfer or to be leased to the Army after a comprehensive approval process that includes the National Environmental Protection Agency and other public reviews.

Army Compatible Use Buffers (ACUBs) allow the Army to preserve or enhance an installation’s current training land capabilities by influencing land uses outside the installation. By forming partnerships, the Army can deter encroachment by securing off-installation land-use agreements that are compatible with Army training. ACUBs serve to insulate Army training from encroachment and to reduce environmental restrictions to training. Land buffers are very effective and generally popular among local communities. ACUBs do not provide additional training land.

The Army will pursue land acquisition where feasible and doctrinally sound. The Army will not be able to address its training land shortfall by land acquisition alone. The Army will pursue land acquisition at locations with the capability, accessibility, and availability for land acquisition.

Mr. ORTIZ. General Casey, in light of the fact that units deploying to theatre now may have to conduct their mission rehearsal exercises at home station, how will you ensure that Army forces train at the combat training centers?

General CASEY. The Army’s primary choice to prepare deploying units is through a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) conducted at one of our Combat Training Centers. The decision to conduct the training at home station instead of executing a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation is made by the Army senior leadership on a case-by-case basis.

Units that conduct Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRE) at home station, instead of at a CTC, do not experience significant differences in training readiness. The tasks trained during a home station MRE are the same tasks that are trained during a CTC MRE, with the exception of reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) tasks. There are some differences in the type and amount of maneuver area between these venues. However, we mitigate potential risks by ensuring the fidelity of the Contemporary Operating Environment and instrumentation, the participation of joint enablers, the appropriate level of live-fire exercises, and the export of critical resources from CTCs. This enables our home station training locations to fully prepare our units for the combat mission they have been assigned.

Over the past four years, operational requirements have necessitated that we train five BCTs through home station MREs to preserve time. Let me assure you, conducting an MRE at home station is the exception and not the rule, and CTCs remain the primary venue for unit MRE training prior to deployment.

Mr. ORTIZ. General Casey, what is the Army’s plan to speed up implementation of Army Force Generation by two years, from 2013 to 2011? How will this acceleration be implemented?

General CASEY. The Army has mature strategies for manning, equipping, training, sustaining, modernizing, funding, reporting readiness, mobilizing, deploying

and educating the force to conduct continuous full-spectrum operations. Currently the demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply and readiness is being consumed as fast as the Army can build it.

We are acting quickly to restore necessary depth and breadth to Army capabilities and build essential capacity for the future in order to restore balance and to preserve the All Volunteer force.

The most critical and initial step is that we must grow the Army faster. We have a plan in place to achieve the Active Component end strength of 547,000 by FY10; and the Army National Guard is on a ramp to achieve 358,200 even sooner. This growth will enable us to revitalize and balance the force, reduce deployment periods, increase dwell time, increase capability and capacity, and strengthen the systems that support our forces. This accelerated growth will not immediately restore readiness, but is a step in the right direction.

Second, we are implementing a reset model to both sustain and prepare forces for future deployments. This model includes actions and necessary improvements to Title 10 processes required to rebuild readiness consumed in operations. Most important, reset encompasses those tasks required to reintegrate and care for Soldiers and Families, then organize, man, equip, and train, a unit. Reset is organized around the premise that we must enable Soldiers and Families the opportunity to recover in order to reverse the cumulative effects of sustained operational tempo. The first six months after return from deployment—referred to as “Reconstitution”—is structured to maximize Soldier and Family reintegration. The 15-month model will set the conditions to move the Army to Objective ARFORGEN by FY11.

Mr. ORTIZ. General Casey, what is the Army’s timeline for reconstituting its prepositioned stocks and thus eliminating strategic risk, or in your words, “providing strategic depth”?

General CASEY. The answer to your question is classified; therefore, I have provided a separate response.

Mr. ORTIZ. General Casey, how will the Army’s military construction program support accelerating Grow the Force?

General CASEY. The Army’s military construction program is synchronized to complete construction of primary and supporting facilities for five additional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in a sequence which supports their stationing requirements. Specifically, the facilities for the five BCTs will be programmed in the Army’s upcoming Future Years Defense Program. Quality of Life projects which will support the BCTs are programmed a year later than the primary mission facilities to meet the accelerated standup of the Grow the Force units.

Mr. ORTIZ. General Casey, the delay of certain quality-of-life construction projects at 2005 BRAC gaining installations would not appear to support efforts to “build a partnership with Army Families and improve Family readiness”? How will you overcome these budgetary constraints and reduce the strain on families?

General CASEY. The Army is committed to making quality of life (QOL) improvements by ensuring that required facilities are in place prior to re-stationing. The Army has identified requirements for 104 QOL facilities—37 Child Development Centers, 8 Youth Centers, 21 Fitness Centers, 25 Chapels, and 13 Fire Stations. The Army will continue programming additional construction improvements of QOL facilities to reduce the strain on Families. Additionally, we are in the final stages of approving an Army Family Covenant which will represent a \$1.4 billion investment in fiscal year 2008 to improve our Families’ quality of life. We are committed to providing similar levels over the next several years, and we will need your continued partnership.

Mr. ORTIZ. General Casey, what efforts are being taken to identify and analyze “less necessary skills”? If much-needed reserve forces are shifted into the active component, how will you backfill the strategic reserve?

General CASEY. Since 2003, the Army has continued to identify and analyze the force to meet the major warfighting requirements, operational demands and Homeland Defense missions related to the persistent conflicts in our National Military Strategy. Our focus is to mitigate capability shortfalls by increasing high demand skills and reducing “less necessary skills” across all three components while maintaining balanced force capabilities, transitioning the Reserve Component to an operational force, and ensuring strategic depth across all three components. In maintaining the balance of capabilities across all three components, we avoid the risk of creating a requirement to “backfill” skills in any one component. Instead, by conducting continuous, holistic reviews of the force requirements needed to ensure strategic depth across the Army, we shift capabilities within and across the components to meet most effectively our current and future Global Force Demands.

Mr. ORTIZ. General Casey, how will the Army prioritize and fund the elements identified under Army Business Transformation, i.e., management reform; acquisi-

tion reform; consolidation of administrative and compensation processes comprehensive redesign of organizations and business processes that generate, deploy and reset forces; consolidation of bases and activities; military to civilian conversion processes; and performance measurement enhancements. What is the funding plan for these activities?

General CASEY. Army Business Transformation is an enabler that exists across the Army and within its organizations, systems, and processes. The Army is prioritizing its Business Transformation efforts by focusing on the four Army imperatives: Sustain, Prepare, Reset, and Transform—and has internal resource review processes that bring competing needs together for review and funding. A separate process exists for the operational needs of the Soldiers and units both in theater and heading to theater. The Army is also using business best practices such as Lean Six Sigma to help prioritize our efforts.

Funding for Business Transformation efforts comes from a variety of sources: explicit line items within the budget (e.g., BRAC); implicitly within other line items; process reengineering and organizational realignment that increases efficiencies, and rebalances and reprioritizes workload, for example the HMMWV reset line at Red River Army Depot was reengineered to increase production from 0.5 per week to 125 without any increase in cost; and reprioritizing funding within reprogramming thresholds to provide modest central funding for the Army's Business Transformation office and Lean Six Sigma training.

Mr. ORTIZ. General Casey, what statutory changes are needed to adapt the reserve component to an operational reserve? What consultations are being held with the state governors to ensure their access to National Guard forces in times of emergency if reserve forces are operationalized?

General CASEY. The Army is examining the role of the Reserve Components (RC) within this era of persistent conflict. The Army leadership decided to expand the operational role of the RC to assist the total Army employed on a cyclical basis to add depth to the active force. It is currently premature to identify statutory changes which might be required to enhance the accessibility of this force. Once the requirements for the operational force are identified, if necessary, the Army will begin the legislative process to Congress for consideration at the earliest opportunity.

The Nation's governors have unimpeded access to their National Guard forces in accordance with provisions of state law provided they are not mobilized for federal missions. The National Guard Bureau is their formal channel of communications with the States on all matters pertaining to the National Guard and the NGB staff is in regular and ongoing communication and consultation with state leaders.

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau has communicated to the States the goal to manage National Guard mobilizations in ways which leave States with at least 50% of their National Guard forces in the state and available to the Governor at any particular time. Throughout this persistent conflict the National Guard Bureau was successful in this goal.

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact provided depleted states (over half of their forces mobilized due to military necessity the access to adequate National Guard forces from other states should a disaster or other domestic emergency arise. This mechanism of sharing National Guard forces across state lines to aid an affected state in times of even catastrophic emergency was proven effective in the response to Hurricane Katrina.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General Casey, the FCS program has numerous technical, software, and integration challenges to overcome, meaning it is not a sure thing to succeed. Does the Army have a viable alternative it can fall back on in the event that FCS cannot deliver the needed capability for the agreed-on cost?

General CASEY. Future Combat Systems (FCS) is ground-breaking development of a System of Systems for which there is no alternative. The FCS program is not a traditional one system program. FCS is the Army's first full-spectrum modernization in nearly 40 years. The FCS (Brigade Combat Team (BCT)) is the material solution for the future force and is the Army's principal modernization strategy that is the embodiment of the modular force, a modular system designed for "full-spectrum" operations. It will network existing systems, systems already under development, and systems to be developed to meet the requirements of the Army's Future Force. It is adaptable to traditional warfare as well as complex, irregular warfare in urban terrains, mixed terrains such as deserts and plains, and restrictive terrains such as mountains and jungles. It is also adaptable to civil support, such as disaster relief. It is a joint networked (connected via advanced communications) system of systems.

When fully operational, FCS will provide the Army and the joint force with unprecedented capability to see the enemy, engage him on our terms, and defeat him on the 21st century battlefield.

As with all major weapons system development programs, the FCS program also faces technical, software, and integration challenges; however, these challenges are not insurmountable. The issues are successfully being addressed and resolved within the Army's cost and schedule parameters. To overcome these challenges, the FCS program has implemented risk mitigation plans to reduce the impact of the technical, software, and integration challenges. "Currently, the FCS program is on cost and on schedule and is poised to provide mature FCS technology to the Current Force as soon as FY10 with spin out technologies." The early fielding and spin outs not only provide proof of FCS capabilities, but also serve as risk mitigation strategy to correct any development or integration issues before the FCS core Milestone C decision.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General Casey, does the Army have firm, quantifiable criteria that it can use to determine whether FCS is demonstrating needed technical and cost performance before a commitment to production is made? In your mind, what would constitute the thresholds that FCS must meet to stay viable?

General CASEY. The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) determines the FCS program's approval for the production and deployment phase (Milestone C). Milestone C approval is based on whether the FCS program successfully meets or exceeds the SDD exit criteria and Milestone C entrance requirements. Further, the FCS program's cost and performance criterion are firmly embedded in the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB). The APB includes objective and threshold values for: RDT&E, procurement, average unit procurement cost, and program acquisition unit cost. The status of these cost metrics are reported to the Congress on an annual basis in the Selected Acquisition Report. In June 2006, the Office of the Secretary of Defense submitted the FCS Independent Cost Estimate. This report identified risk areas that could lead to potential cost growth and schedule delays in the FCS development. The Army will re-assess and adjust, to align with the Department of Defense acquisition priorities and affordability constraints, if the risks identified in this report materialize.

The Army has established a review process to ensure that the program continues to meet its cost and schedule goals. Annual reviews with Army and OSD leadership discuss current program status against set criteria, such as technical maturity and affordability. The Army evaluates the progress toward production readiness of the LSI by levels of engineering maturity. The Army will verify the engineering maturity criteria set forth in the contract at each milestones (preliminary design review, critical design review) leading up to Milestone C, where the engineering maturity level will be verified for readiness for entrance into low-rate initial production.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General Casey, independent estimates of FCS cost are some 30% higher than the Army's estimate, which forms the basis of budget estimates. Why does the Army believe its estimate to be more realistic, and what is the contingency plan in the event that the Army's estimate proves optimistic?

General CASEY. Much of the difference between the Army's estimate and the independent estimates is driven by potential risks that, to-date, have not manifested themselves in negative cost performance. The Army acknowledges these risks and, has established program metrics and risk mitigation strategies to minimize the likelihood of the risks that lead to cost growth. At this point, it would not be prudent to plan and budget the program to a set of potential risks. Higher independent cost estimates are generally driven by potential program schedule delays that are assumed to be the primary impact of the identified risks. This means that in the event that some of the risks do come to pass, the program would face a total RDT&E cost issue, not a funding/affordability issue. In other words, any extension of the RDT&E schedule would free up near-term planned procurement expenditures, thereby allowing the program to move forward without the need for additional resources. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army intend to re-evaluate the FCS program if the program faces significant cost growth.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General Casey, recently, the Army announced its intention to award initial production of the core FCS systems to the Lead System Integrator. This decision seems to go against the Army's stated philosophy of keeping the LSI focused on development and avoiding organizational conflicts of interest by not giving the LSI a stake in production. Why the reversal in position? Why was it necessary to make a sole source announcement in 2007 when initial FCS production does not start until 2013—6 years away?

General CASEY. The Army is not reversing its philosophy of keeping the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) focused on development. The 2007 sole source announcement provides mature FCS technology to the Current Force in three separate spin out in-

crements before the FCS core production decision scheduled in FY13. Additionally, the NLOS-C production effort is to meet the Congressionally mandated fielding date of FY 2010. The Army intends to conduct separate Milestone C decisions for each of the efforts described in the spin outs and NLOS-C efforts.

The Army initially determined that implementation of a LSI was the best program management approach for developing and managing the complexities of the Concept and Technology Development and SDD phases of the FCS program. The Army has further determined that the use of an LSI remains the most viable approach for the Spin Outs and the initial NLOS-C efforts. Additionally, the employment of the LSI concept has been approved for the FCS core program LRIP phase by the Milestone Decision Authority. It is critical to continue the employment of the LSI concept through the LRIP phase to hold the LSI accountable for the success of the SDD effort. During the LRIP phase, the FCS program will conduct the required test and evaluation of the FCS System of Systems to gain approval of the full rate production. As such, Boeing is the only contractor capable of fulfilling the LSI role for the subject major contractual efforts without seriously impacting performance, cost, and schedule.

The first two initial production efforts, NLOS-C and Spin-Out 1 (SO1), will be performed concurrently with the FCS core SDD effort, so it is essential that the same contractor be accountable for integrating, managing risk, budgeting, and scheduling between the efforts. While delivering the overall LRIP schedule is extremely challenging, the inclusion of synchronized Spin Out technology development timelines with a Congressionally mandated NLOS-C fielding add significant complexity to the schedule. Therefore, the acquisition strategy and long-term arrangements must be established well in advance of actual production start to allow the precision planning and coordination essential to the execution of the multiple layers of the FCS LRIP efforts in parallel with on-going development. The timing of the NLOS-C effort (long lead, facilities, tooling, during 1st quarter, FY08) and SO1 (long lead, facilities, tooling, during 2nd quarter, FY08) dictated that key decisions be made during FY2007 to determine the acquisition strategy for the LRIP effort.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General Casey, by the time of the 2013 initial production decision, the Army will have requested nearly \$20 billion in production money for FCS. With development money, the total investment in FCS at that point will be around \$40 billion. Is it conceivable that the Army could change its mind about FCS after that much investment? Is the production decision in 2013 in essence a foregone conclusion?

General CASEY. FCS embodies the key requirements we have identified to improve the current force and make an effective future force, and that has been reinforced by what we have learned from current operations. No production decision, though, is a foregone conclusion. Some of those requirements may be modified based on further lessons learned and the results of testing and the systems delivered may be modified. The Army will not buy equipment for its Soldiers that do not work. It also needs to be said that it is not really conceivable that the future Army will be able to maintain its dominant edge without networked systems providing extensive sensors coupled with unmanned systems in concert with robotic improvements and tactical dominance enabled by the Manned Ground Vehicles the FCS program is developing. The research and testing this program has paid for is necessary to develop those capabilities and will also enable greater developments in the future.

The most recent budget justification material provided to Congress shows planned RDT&E budget requests of about \$27.5 billion and planned production budget requests of about \$9 billion (both figures are through FY13 for the core FCS program). Since the bulk of the planned production budget request in FY13 would not be spent until after a positive Milestone C decision, the total investment in FCS up to Milestone C is, in reality, about \$30 billion. While this is still a significant figure, it represents less than 20% of the total planned acquisition investment (and the production investment is only about 2.5% of the total planned production program). It should also be noted that there will be other program decision points prior to the Milestone C. A Defense Acquisition Board decision is planned for early 2009, after the program preliminary design review. The program will only reach the Milestone C decision after the Army has ensured its modernization priorities and FCS are properly aligned.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General Casey, during the hearing, both witnesses referred to the Small UAV, Small UGV, and T-UGS, U-UGS as "programs developed within FCS research". However, all three of those programs were originally developed outside the FCS program and subsequently moved inside FCS. For example, it is my understanding that development of the SUAV began within DARPA, the SUGV was originally developed as the "Pakbot" program, and the T-UGS/U-UGS were developed in part under the REMBASS program. In order to clarify this issue, please pro-

vide the following information for each of the three programs, as well as FCS Class IV UAV: Funding history, to include: project name(s), budget line(s), PE(s), and funding amount(s) for each budget year during U.S. government-funded development prior to incorporation into the FCS program; the number of systems currently deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan; and the capabilities, in comparison to threshold requirements, of any prototype systems currently deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan.

General CASEY. The U.S. Army attempted to retrieve the requested funding information from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, but did not receive a response in time for this Question for Record response submittal. Even if the data was available, it is unlikely to provide a satisfactory answer to the question as asked. Here is the reason why: Generally, all major development programs incorporate (and mature) selected technologies and capabilities that are derived from basic and fundamental research efforts. The primary aim of basic research is a fuller knowledge or understanding of the subject under study, rather than any practical application. It is the first stage of the Research and Development process. The program elements funded under this basic research involve pre-Milestone A efforts. In fact, that is the reason for the existence of basic research and technology base efforts. The predecessor programs you mention are just a few examples of technology base efforts that have transitioned into Future Combat Systems (FCS). They tend to be the most visible because they resemble individual FCS "platforms." However, it must be noted that there are significant differences between these predecessor systems and the threshold FCS platforms. Because of this, the funding history being requested may yield misleading results. In particular, not all of the development dollars related to the above predecessor programs are relevant from a FCS perspective, nor are the FCS dollars being spent on the corresponding threshold FCS platforms necessarily based on the prior work (i.e., besides maturation activities, there are significant unique development efforts). Beyond the fact that the requested cost data would likely be misleading, it is also difficult to know where to draw the line in terms of what constitutes a prior government-funded development effort for predecessor platforms and/or technologies.

According to the Army G-8, there are currently 416 PACBOT variants in theater. These are comprised of several variants, each with a specialty. There are 14 Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAVs) in theater, which are a variant of the Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (SUAV) you referenced. There are no fielded Unmanned Ground Sensors (UGS) or Class IV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). There are significant improvements in the Class I UAV that will greatly increase its capabilities over the MAV currently deployed. One of these improvements is that the Class I UAV has a more capable camera, and features a laser designator and laser range finder. The Class I UAV also has a quieter and more fuel efficient engine. Most importantly of all, the currently deployed UAVs do not have the FCS battle command capabilities of the Class I UAV that will greatly increase the Soldier's situational awareness. In regards to the SUGV, the improvements over what is currently in theater are also significant, including the addition of FCS battle command capabilities. The FCS Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) is lighter in weight than its predecessors, easier for Soldiers to carry and the controller is smaller and easier to use. The SUGV can also laser designate targets, has an improved capability to maneuver on slopes and operate in an increased range of climates, and has a Global Positioning System enabling Soldiers to pinpoint its location. These improved capabilities for the Class I UAV and SUGV will greatly enhance their military utility for Soldiers across the full spectrum of combat.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK

Mr. LOEBSACK. Secretary Geren and General Casey, I have three primary Army National Guard battalions in my District. The 224th Engineer Battalion was deployed for OIF from October 2004–December 2005. When the 224th deployed to Iraq, it was at 100% equipment readiness. When it redeployed, it was forced to leave most of its equipment in theater, leaving it with 30% of its required equipment, most of which was borrowed from other units. Secretary Geren and General Casey, when the 833rd Engineer Company was recalled to OIF after only 14 MONTHS of dwell time, they had no equipment on which to train. The Iowa National Guard was forced to borrow equipment from other states. If it were not for the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the Iowa National Guard, the unit would not have been able to properly train before their redeployment. Since the 883rd's redeployment, the 224th Battalion's retention rate—which had previously maintained 98% personnel strength—has struggled to meet Iowa's retention rate of 85%. To say that this training, equipment, and readiness situation is alarming is a gross understatement. Iowa

leans heavily on its National Guard for emergency response. Guard units operating with 30% of their equipment and with only 14 months of dwell time are simply not in a position to respond to an emergency at home. How do you intend to reset our National Guard's equipment? How long do you believe it will take to fully reset the National Guard's equipment?

General CASEY. The Army is committed to ensuring units deployed and units stationed at home have the necessary equipment to train and respond to future contingencies. We have established a plan to resource 342 dual use items to ensure state units can respond to local and Title 32 emergencies. The Army will provide approximately \$26 billion through fiscal year 2013 (FY13) to fill Army National Guard (ARNG) requirements which include the 224th Engineer Battalion. The fill of equipment will take some time, but by FY15 we estimate that average fill of ARNG units will be 77 percent, and we are committed to achieving 100 percent. Until that time, we will work to mitigate current shortfalls of equipment by transferring equipment to units preparing for deployment or responding to contingencies. For ARNG equipment left in theater, the Army captures the requirement and restores that equipment to the ARNG. The FY07 Supplemental specifically provided \$1.8 billion to replace a portion of the ARNG equipment left in theater. The National Guard Bureau submitted the 224th Engineer Battalion's 1225.6 payback requests for 507 items with a total value of \$20.3 million. These items include M113 tracked personnel carriers, tractor trucks, and dump trucks. All the 224th's items were validated and are scheduled for payback to ARNG by the end of FY09.

In regards to dwell time, the Army is pursuing three initiatives: Grow the Army, balancing the force, and implementing Army Force Generation, or ARFORGEN. The goal is to achieve a 3:1 dwell to deployment ratio for the active component and 5:1 ratio for the reserve component. The combined effect of these efforts will be greater capability for our Army's strategic depth, 100 percent equipment fill, and longer dwell between rotations.

Mr. LOEBACK. The 833rd's quick redeployment has not only affected its readiness, it has devastated its morale and has had a significant emotional impact on the Soldiers and their families. An Army study found that consistency and predictability are vital to military families. Do you intend to continue to deploy Guard units with short dwell time? What effort is the Army taking to provide greater consistency and predictability in deployment?

General CASEY. The planning objective for mobilization of National Guard and Army Reserve units is one year mobilized to five years at home. However, today's global demands will require a number of selected Guard/Reserve units to be mobilized sooner than this standard. We intend that such exceptions be temporary and move to the broad application of the 1:5 goal as soon as possible. In order to provide Soldiers and their Families more immediate predictability, we are working hard to alert Guard and Reserve units at least 12 months before mobilizations and limit their mobilizations to 12 months. This will enable Soldiers, their Families and employers more reliability in their planning for mobilizations. Our policy is that every Guard and Reserve Soldier receives at least 12 months of demobilized time prior to being mobilized again, even if the Soldier volunteers. We are working hard to restore balance to the Army over the next several years, and we will move as quickly as possible to provide our Reserve Component Soldiers, Families and employers with five years in between mobilizations.