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HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

HEARING HELD
MARCH 5, 2008

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FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 5, 2008.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, this is a very important meeting of the House Armed Services Committee to take testimony on the posture of our two most important combat commands, the Central Command and the Special Operations Command.

But first a couple of administrative items.

This hearing will stop promptly at one o'clock because our witnesses have other commitments, and we will do our best to stay within the five-minute rule, and that way we want to get as many, if not all, of the members the opportunity to ask questions within the five minutes. And you have been very, very good in the past on that, and I would hope that would continue.

I gave notice at the last hearing, but again let me say that the hearing on March 12 with the Pacific Command (PACOM), we will begin the questioning on the bomb rule by reverse seniority based upon, of course, who is here at the falling of the gavel.

And with those two, we should proceed and welcome Admiral William Fallon, commander of Central Command (CENTCOM); Admiral Eric Olson, command of Special Operations Command (SOCOM), to be with us today.

And welcome, both of you, and thank you for the excellent work that you do, and thank you for the men and women that you lead. Those who serve with you are truly in the lead of America's efforts, both militarily and as we face the Nation in critical parts of the world. We couldn't be more proud of you or the people you have in your commands.

Admiral Keating, the combatant commander for the Pacific Command, was recently quoted as saying, "The readiness of our forces is affected by combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq." Admiral Keating added that "We are a higher-risk state," and I suspect he was engaging an understatement when he said that PACOM—his command—had only to adjust his strategic plans a little bit since

30,000 of the troops assigned to him are deployed in the Central Command.

This is just the latest signal that we are facing increased strategic risk. Admiral Mullen sat at the same table you are, gentlemen, not all that long ago and called the level of risk significant. Anyone who has been paying attention knows that aren't many, if any, units at home in the United States that are ready to conduct full-spectrum combat operations. And it is interesting to note General Casey's answer to a question regarding readiness and the timeliness within which it would take to respond to call for the unexpected.

And the only reason we can't refer to the Army as stressed and not broken, in my opinion, is because of the commitment and sense of duty demonstrated by our troops, as well as their families, and, of course, this concerns me. And I don't need to list all the potential flash points in the world we could be called on to deal with. But as you know from recent news accounts, the brewing crisis in the Andean region—Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador—provides a rather clear example. Because of our involvement in Iraq, we are accepting more risk than we should then we won't be able to do those risks.

And I am afraid we are also shortchanging our commitment in Afghanistan, which is a primary front against those who attacked us, as we all know, on September 11.

Admiral Fallon, I understand you are conducting a review of military operations in Afghanistan and hope that, based on that review, you can reassure us. And I am being pessimistic when I say that we face potential failure in Afghanistan if we cannot reallocate some resources to that front—to that war.

We should also expect our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to step up and do more. That is a disappointment. But we should also take the lead in demonstrating an additional commitment.

These are serious issues facing our country, and it will make the decisions made about Iraq during the spring and the summer particularly important, and we cannot address our level of risk or rebuild our Army to reinforce our effort in Afghanistan if we keep 15 brigades in Iraq. Iraq must be viewed in this context and not taken in isolation.

And, Admiral Fallon, I saw in your written statement the recommendation to the President regarding the pace and scope of redeployments from Iraq would include the recommendations from you and others in the chain of command. I hope these inputs will include the context of strategic risk and the strain on the Army and our needs in that other country of Afghanistan.

Now, Admiral Olson, let me say a word about Special Operations, if I may.

The demand for Special Operation Forces will continue to be high, even after we are able to redeploy many combat forces from Iraq. And I hope you will share with our committee your plans and challenges for keeping a highly trained, culturally attuned force over the long term.

I look forward to hearing your thoughts on how we measure success in the overall campaign plan for the war on terror and how

we track our progress over time in shaping the environment so that the number of terrorists who must be taken off the battlefield decreases over time and what lessons should we and others learn from your work with other partners in the interagency efforts, which all of us on this committee have a great deal of concern about.

And a special thanks to each one of you for your commitment, your expertise, your hard work, your wisdom and your judgment. We are blessed in this country to have people like you in such responsible positions, and we thank you for being with us and sharing your thoughts and recommendations with us.

So with that, Admiral Fallon.

Oh, excuse me. Duncan Hunter, then Admiral Fallon.

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks for holding this hearing. What a critical hearing for us to hold today, and I really appreciate you teeing this one up for us here.

And, Admiral Fallon, Admiral Olson, thank you for your service.

And let me go over just a couple of things that I think are important for us to know and to work on.

First, in the Iraqi theater, we are seeing lots of successes. The last figures I saw were 131 Iraqi battalions trained and equipped and, obviously, operating with varying levels of effectiveness.

But my question was this: We had great success in rotating in—and I think we all agree that the key to a successful transition or handoff of the security burden in Iraq is going to be a function of one thing: reliable Iraqi military. That is, an Iraqi military that can move in, fill in, take the handoff from us and hold. Show up when they are supposed to, be effective in what they do and be able to provide the security shield for that country as the political process matures.

So question here: We had a rotational policy here in Baghdad. We were rotating in Iraqi brigades. They were taking place—they were moving out, others were coming in. I thought that that gave us—in the Baghdad area—I thought that that had a salutary effect on the Iraqi forces overall because it made them play what you would call "away games." That is, a brigade that would have to stand up, saddle up, move out from their home area, where they may have had a certain comfort level and they may or may not have been involved in substantial fighting, move into another area, move into a battle zone, deploy and operate and then rotate back. And I thought that a professional army should manifest that ability, the ability to saddle up, move out, undertake a mission, complete the mission, and then rotate out of the area of operation (AO).

I understand they are not doing that anymore, that we are going to have a permanent force there in Baghdad.

But my question to you and one thing I would like you to comment you on, as we go down the line here, Admiral Fallon, is whether we have in place—or working with the Iraqi armed forces—a plan that will allow all of their battalions to get into the

fight. That is, even the battalions that are in benign areas of Iraq, where you don't have any activity taking place. The one way to make sure that those battalions are reliable and will fight when called on is to operate them, is to give them missions, move them out, have them undertake those missions, be able to examine them, rate them, figure out what their deficiencies are with respect to personnel and equipment, fix them, and then you know you have got somebody who will come when called.

And so my question—I would like you to comment at some point on whether we have a plan to rotate all the Iraqi armed forces into at least enough operations that they will be able to figure out whether they in fact are going to be reliable when the U.S. leaves.

Another important issue, I think, for this committee and for the defense structure in general is this: As you talk to the Guard guys especially—but a lot of our active-duty leaders too—we move units over to the theater, they often taken on new equipment in theater, sometimes they come with new equipment—especially the Guard guys—and they unhorse that equipment before they leave, a lot of it stays behind.

We have also had evolutions of certain equipment, like the up-armored vehicles, where we had at one time, for example, we had basically nonprotected vehicles going in with slight protection, and we put on thicker armor on the Humvees, and we came with Marine Armor Kits (MAK) for the Marines, for example, and then we went to up-armored Humvees, and, finally, we are going now to more Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs) and more use of heavy vehicles, like armored trucks because they have got a much more protective capability with our troops.

But the question is, with all the equipment that we have purchased, especially in these supplementals, going into the war-fighting theater, what I am worried about in the back of my mind is that we have got like places at al Taqqadum, where we discovered 1,800 MAK-kitted Humvees parked, that we have got a lot of equipment the U.S. taxpayers paid for, which could be used now at least to full up the Guard units that are back here that came back bare. And in the back of your mind, you are always worried that at some point we are going to be selling those off in a foreign military sales to somebody for 10 cents on the dollar. We are keeping big traunches of stuff behind that we actually could bring back and full up some of the units that are here in Kona.

So whether or not we have got a good inventory on what we have, do we know what we have got, I think, is an important issue for the active and Reserve and Guard forces.

With respect to Afghanistan, you know, we just gave this massive contract on the new tanker for the aircraft—a $35 billion-plus contract to a European firm—which will do, at least according to their own statistics, more than half the work—more than half the jobs—looks like 100,000 jobs going over to Europe—and yet we are sending 3,200 Marines into Iraq, partly to prepare for what we think may be a spring offensive in that southern area. And we couldn't extract an average of 100 soldiers apiece—maybe a few more than that—maybe 115 soldiers apiece—out of the 26 allies. And so, as a result, we are going to send in and are deploying 3,200 Marines to undertake that mission.

Now, I think we have got an interest in training our European allies to fight and to be able to operate and, Admiral Olson, especially to be to operate with effective Special Forces.

And so I think, Admiral, it would be good if you could explain—Admiral Fallon, if you could talk to us today a little bit about how we are going to ensure in the long term that we have a coherent leadership structure in Iraq—understanding this division between Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF)—that we have a coherent leadership structure in Afghanistan.

But beyond that, that we employ and motivate the European allies who are involved in that theater to take on the fight. And how we get some, like the Germans, who, I understand, will not leave garrison, to get into the fight, and that we don't end up with what, I think, Secretary Gates described as a situation in which some folks go on the battlefield and some folks don't—an unhealthy relationship to have with our European allies, who at some point might have to fight in a big war alongside of the United States.

So just a couple of questions.

Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to put my written statement into the record, if I could.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.

And thank you very much for being with us, gentlemen.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your statement is put in the record.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

The CHAIRMAN. And now, Admiral Fallon, we will ask for your testimony, to be followed by Admiral Olson.

Thank you.

Thank you, both, again.

STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

Admiral FALLON. Thanks.

Chairman, Mr. Hunter, distinguished members of the panel, it is a great pleasure and honor to be back with you again this morning and to be sitting alongside my colleague, Admiral Olson. The Navy has kind of taken over Tampa temporarily, but there is a lot of water down there so we feel right at home, and we have been warmly welcomed in the neighborhood.

I would like to submit my written testimony for the record, if you would be so kind.

And without wasting a lot of your time, because I know you want to ask questions, I will tell you that we have many challenges, certainly in the Central Command region. As I look through the 29 countries there, there isn't a day that goes by that there aren't several issues, frictions, conflicts or instabilities that are in front of my and my staff's attention. We are working all of these to the best of our ability.

I can tell you that the number-one issue is still Iraq. We are making substantial progress, certainly in security. Be happy to

field your questions in that regard, but without a doubt, the performance of our men and women out there has been just spectacular.

Speaking of people, I would like to highlight for you—and I know this committee certainly knows better than about anyone else in this city or the country—how well served we are by our men and women in uniform. They are doing just a fantastic job. If you think of the amount of time, we are six years now working in Iraq. Many of these people have been back several times. The good news is they are really, really good. They know the territory. It is astounding how readily they fit back in and adapt and can give us really good advice in dealing with people.

The other side of the coin, of course, is that these repeated deployments are certainly a strain on them and their families. But they are performing just in a spectacular manner, whether it is Iraq, Afghanistan or the many other places in the theater, and I know you join me in appreciation for their good work.

If I could move to Afghanistan, we are making progress. I don't think there is going to be a spring offensive by the Taliban. The spring offensive is going to be by our security people as they move out and take advantage of the situation that they helped to create through their good works here in the fall of last year.

There has been a heavy winter in Afghanistan, a lot of snow in some areas. That has caused some personal problems for many people. A lot of—not a lot—but several hundred people, we understand, were lost, particularly in the west, but it has also served to keep activity levels down. The snow is starting to melt now, and as our Marine infusion begins to arrive in the country, it puts us in a position in the south to give General McNeil, the maneuver unit that he has been asking for. And I couldn't imagine one that is better equipped with all the enablers to give him the shot in the arm that he needs to really go after the security, particularly in the south, which is where he intends to begin employing those forces.

The other piece of this is just as important, if not more so, in my mind; that is, a battalion of Marines dedicated to training. To bring in the Afghan army, which is really coming along in a manner that would please you, those of you who have seen them. And those who have not, I would encourage you to go take a look at them. I am sure you will be as impressed as I am with their leadership and the capabilities and, particularly, their willingness and strong desire to get out there and take care of business on their own, and that is going to be where we want them to go. So the Marines ought to be very helpful in working with the Afghan security forces this spring.

In Pakistan, across the border, it has been a troubled country with a series of stability issues for the duration of its existence. There is a political process that is in progress now, as you know, and that is good, and it has been generally a lot more peaceful than some might have thought. We are anxiously watching to see how they deal with this situation because we cannot, from my view, separate activities in Afghanistan from Pakistan. The reality of life is that the Pashtun tribal overlay covers both countries and we just have to deal with the whole picture. We have been getting a lot of

help in Pakistan. I would be happy to field your questions in that regard.

There are some other signs of goodness in the region.

The recent peace agreement in Kenya that was brokered by Kofi Annan is a really good sign, and we are grateful for his intervention and for the leadership—their decision to actually try to fix things in another troubled area.

Regional stability is the last point I would make. It is a priority with me. It is not just these individual countries, but trying to create the conditions throughout the Gulf area, the Horn of Africa, Central Asia so that people will work together. We are there encouraging them, trying by the example of our people to show them how things could be and should be better and to help them in every way we can.

With that, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I will look forward to receiving your questions after Admiral Olson.

Thanks very much, Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Fallon can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Fallon, thank you very much.

Admiral Olson.

STATEMENT OF ADM. ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Admiral OLSON. Morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hunter, distinguished members, and I, too, thank you for the opportunity to be here with you this morning to report on the Special Operations Command and the Special Operations Forces.

I am honored to represent the 54,000 active and Reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, civilians who are assigned to Special Operations Forces, and I am pleased to be here this morning with my friend and colleague, Admiral Fallon, with whom our Special Operations Forces are now so heavily engaged.

And with your permission, sir, I will submit my written statement for the record and limit my opening remarks.

The strong and steady interest of the Congress, and particularly this committee, has helped Special Operations Forces achieve a global capability and a global effectiveness since we were created by legislation, now, almost 21 years ago. We have proven ourselves in many well-known and lesser-known operations around the world throughout that time, and we have been a strong and steady presence with friends and allies. The command's strength is clearly in its people, enabled by unique authorities and a dedicated budget.

As you well know, we are charged by legislation to perform many specific activities, including counterterrorism; counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; direct action; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense, which is training our friends and allies; a special reconnaissance; psychological operations; information operations. And I am tasked, as well, by the President to serve as the lead combatant commander for synchronizing Department of Defense planning in the global campaign against terrorism.

In aggregate, these doctrinal terms define a complex set of tasks that are best accomplished by specially selected, trained, and

equipped force with special skills, discipline, courage and wisdom. It is a force that must operate with equal confidence and equal capability across a spectrum of conflict, from precrisis activities through intense combat into stabilization and reconstruction activities, and such a force must be carefully managed in order to optimize its readiness.

When deployed outside the United States, Special Operations Forces are almost always in support of geographic combatant commanders. They are present in 58 countries today. About 80 percent of our force deployed outside the United States today, though, is under Admiral Fallon's combatant command deployed in the Central Command area of responsibility focused on a balance of direct and indirect actions, working to kill and capture terrorists and those who wish to do us harm as they contribute to local stability.

Operational commanders have learned over the last several years that no other force can accomplish such a broad scope of missions in such diverse operational environments as the Special Operations Forces. And so global demand for such a force does exceed supply, and I anticipate no decrease in demand, even as other forces do begin to draw down, especially from Iraq.

In fact, I expect an increasing demand for Special Operations Forces as the local environments transition from environments of large force occupation and combat to smaller footprints of train-and-assist activities, which are a specialization of Special Operations Forces. And this is especially considering the continuing deficit of Special Operations Forces in the regions of the other geographic combatant commanders of the world.

To answer this is a result of program decisions made in the last few years, we are expanding as fast as we can reasonably absorb the growth. In fact, the Program Objective Memorandum 2008 (POM–08) cycle has programmed for us an increase of about 13,000 forces that we are continuing to work into our force now and in the next few years.

In the long term, I estimate that a three to five percent growth rate in military manpower across Special Operations Forces is about right. And if we need to expand our organic enablers, like cordon-and-search forces and their field control and quick-reaction forces and interrogators and linguists, aviation capability and the like, then we will need to expand it at a greater rate.

Most of the mobility platforms and much of the equipment used by Special Operations are initially procured by the services and then modified for their Special Operations peculiar missions by the budget provided to me, and, therefore, most of U.S. Special Operations Command's acquisition programs are dependent upon service budgets and decisions.

Recapitalizing our fixed-wing transport fleet and acquiring additional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, not just platforms, are our most critical needs. And for these and other items that deliver Special Operations peculiar capabilities, speed of process is essential, and I am committed this year to exploring my authorities for making our acquisition systems more responsive.

In any case, I am convinced that U.S. SOCOM will be required to at least sustain—and likely grow—its levels of both operational effort and funding for the foreseeable future.

I remain humbled to command such a capable and versatile force at this most important time, and I remain in awe of the dedication and courage demonstrated by our great men and women every day.

I thank this committee for its continued support of Special Operations, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in the Appendix on page 89.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you.

Without objection, each of the statements of the witnesses will be placed into the record.

Admiral Fallon, please define for us what victory means in the war in Iraq? In that war, we can't measure progress by territory, as we were able to do in the Second World War by islands taken in the Southwest Pacific or territory taken in France and Germany and Europe.

So how do we measure—and it is not just security either. So what is our goal? How do we measure, A, progress, and how do we measure victory that America—people at home ask about?

Admiral.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, Chairman.

No easy answer. It is certainly not as simple—if that is the right word—as watching the front move on a map as it covers geography. I can tell you what I look at and how I measure success, and it is much more than just the security area.

Of course, I look at the level of violence, the level of activity day to day in the country, and I am really happy to tell you that those indices are all continuing to move in a very, very positive direction.

When I was here before you last year, the number of violent incidents a day in the country of Iraq was averaging over 150. I can tell you that today those numbers are down in the low 30's a day. There are places in the country, such as Anbar, which was exceedingly violent last year, in which there are many days in the past couple of months where there have been no reported incidents of violence.

That is a good indicator for me to start, and then beyond that, I look at other things: how the country is coming, how it is developing, how fast we can turn over security to the Iraqi army and the other Iraqi security forces. I watch with interest the south, where most of those provinces have been—the vernacular is PIC'd or under provincial Iraqi control, where the Iraqis themselves are responsible for security and watching with interest how they do that.

An interesting measure for me was just these past couple weeks with the annual Arbaeen pilgrimage, in which the estimate was about 8,000 pilgrims were on the roads moving to the shrine cities in the south. The Iraqis drew up the plan, moved units around. To get to Chairman Hunter's—one of his questions—they did move people from other areas to take care of security affairs. They executed the plan. We watched, provided very, very little in the way of support and they pulled it off with the smallest number of casualties. Regrettably, there were some. Twenty-some people were killed in a bombing attack. But compared to prior years, a remarkable difference.

I look at economic activity. Things are beginning to change in a dramatic way. Just a couple of months ago, back in December, the first private investment in the country—about $3 billion—took over three of the old state-run industries, a mix of Iraqi and outside folks, to get those things up and running.

So to sum up, I don't have any simple answers. What I am looking for is not just the level of violence going down, which is pretty easy for us to tell; not just the level of casualties on our side, which are continuing to fall, thank God; but to see the amount of activity on the Iraqi side; to see their governance taking over and making this place a country that is viable.

I would be happy, if you wanted to for the record, come back and give you a number of things that I look at every day to try to give me a sense of where we are.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be very helpful to us if you would do that, Admiral.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Olson, in the same vein, how would you define victory on the war against al Qaeda, and how do you measure progress that we have been killing them for some seven years and the war doesn't end and people seem to still support them in some areas? How do we measure progress? What is our goal? When do we say—when do we run up the victory flag?

Admiral OLSON. Mr. Chairman, I am not convinced there is ever going to be a day when we run up the victory flag. This is a different kind of an adversary, much more elusive, living and fighting among the people, and I don't anticipate that it will lead to the signing of a document aboard the USS *Missouri*.

Our success against al Qaeda is manifested mostly in the growth of Iraqi and Afghan security forces, trained and equipped to be responsive to local and regional needs within those nations. It is a decrease in violent acts, which is a manifestation of a decrease in those who are planning every day to conduct those violent acts against us. It is a dismantling of the infrastructure, of the funding lines and the training facilities that contribute to that and interruption of the flow of weapons and materials that enable them to conduct those acts against us.

As does Admiral Fallon, we have a series of metrics that we track. I am happy to provide those separately to you for the record. But I agree with Admiral Fallon completely that——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Yes, if you would do that.

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to is classified.]

Admiral OLSON. I agree with Admiral Fallon completely that, ultimately, the measure of success is a secure and sovereign nation in a stable region with self-determination and a functioning government enabled by a growing economy. And when we reach that point, then it will lead, certainly, to a withdrawal of our forces there. But, again, I will be surprised if it does lead to the raising of a victory flag. I think that we will creep into success.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, first, Admiral Olson, I just wanted to take a chance to publicly thank Special Operations, because I had never had a chance to do it, for what you folks did a couple of years ago. We had a congressional delegation in Fallujah during the time when Fallujah was pretty hot, and we asked General Mattis what he needed for his Marine command there, and he said he needed Advanced Combat Optical Gunsights (ACOGs), that great, very effective riflescope that they are using on the M4s. He said he had Marines actually coming out of Fallujah, putting on their new ACOGs, going back into the fight and being very effective, but he needed them.

Well, when we got back with that congressional delegation, we called up—I forget who I talked to in your command, but we gave you guys a phone call on the way back, and the next morning—it was 7:30 in the morning—we had one of your fellows come in with a poncho, and he unwrapped it in the office, and he had a ton of ACOGs and other stuff, and he said, "We will give you whatever we got." And you guys pulled, I think, several hundred of them off your shelves because you had some extras, and you got them over to the Marines.

That prompted an outcry of protest from the acquisition bureaucracy that claimed that those were your ACOGs, by God, and that they should be back on the shelf someplace in Florida. But I wanted to thank you for, what I saw, was the fastest interservice equipment transfer I have ever seen. And I know they were effectively used.

So one great aspect of your service is you guys move quick, you have got lots of flexibility, and it looks to me like you support the other services very effectively.

Admiral Fallon, let me go back to this flipped jurisdiction of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) forces in Afghanistan and kind of try to get it right.

I know we have got a total of about 54,000 total forces, U.S. and allied, in country in Afghanistan. Roughly half of those are American. Is that right?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HUNTER. About half of them are American, and about how many of them are attached to the ISAF mission?

Admiral FALLON. About half of those.

Mr. HUNTER. And about half to the OEF mission of our people? It is about 50–50?

Admiral FALLON. It is close.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. I thought it was a little bit more for ISAF, but, anyway, pretty close to a split.

When you are putting together your military missions for ISAF, you are constructing the missions, who constructs the missions?

Admiral FALLON. If they are ISAF missions, General McNeil has got the responsibility for them. But the reality is that this is not an issue, in my mind. When I got in this job last year, there was a lot of hubbub about this, and a couple of steps that I took.

One was to go back and look at the authorities that had been issued from CENTCOM relating to all of the command's subordinate commands. We wrote those, streamlined them, cleaned them up and reissued that operational guidance. I then went to NATO

to ask the Secretary General and the chairman of the military committee what their beef was, and most of it was historical. Since then—since last fall—we haven't had an issue.

The reality is that, when missions are planned, they have to be coordinated pretty very well between these forces. There are some U.S.-only forces that operate in close conjunction with the ISAF forces. And the key thing is the training and equipping of the Afghan security forces that are a part of these combined forces that are used pretty much all over the country. We are in charge of that. We help them set them up and work closely with ISAF. So it is very well coordinated.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Well, okay. Well, I am just trying to understand the chain of command, if you will, and the division responsibilities. In Iraq, for example, you have got General Petraeus commands all coalition forces; General Odierno, the U.S. forces. Is General O'Neil—he commands the OEF forces in Iraq?

Admiral FALLON. General McNeil has the NATO forces. He is the ISAF commander.

Mr. HUNTER. But does he also have any command of the OEF forces?

Admiral FALLON. No, sir.

Mr. HUNTER. Who is the OEF commander in——

Admiral FALLON. I have that command. I have that responsibility.

The confusion may be that there are U.S. forces—General Rodriguez, who is the commander of the 82nd in his U.S. hat, is also the NATO commander of Regional Command East (RC East). He works for General McNeil in the tactical execution—operational execution of his duties. He also works for me in the responsibility that I have for the care and well being of all U.S. men and women in uniform in that region.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So if you are putting together a mission, you have got the various—in the ISAF mission you have got the various European participants all with their separate varying policies. For example, I understand it—and tell me if I am wrong—that the Germans do not involve themselves in what you would call "kinetic missions." They stay in garrison, they do some nation-building jobs, but they don't involve themselves in the military operation.

So if General O'Neil is putting together a military operation, how does he build that operation? He brings in the various countries and asks them what they would like to do or what they are able to do as a result of their national policy?

Admiral FALLON. No, sir. First, to the key point, it is General McNeil, and he——

Mr. HUNTER. I am sorry. McNeil.

Admiral FALLON [continuing]. He is the guy that has to deal with this, not me. He has got responsibility for all the NATO forces. The way he has the country organized in regions, and, frankly, most of the kinetic activity is going on in the east, where it is all U.S. forces so far with a few exceptions. We have got some Polish units out there for us. In the south, where it is some U.S. but mostly European NATO.

General McNeil, through his regional commanders, puts together his operations, and they are executed down at the regional-com-

mand level. He is the guy, unfortunately, from my perspective, that has to deal with all these caveats, and there are many of them, and it makes life very difficult, very challenging for him, but he does it and figures out how to do it.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Last question.

In your leadership role, is it your responsibility to talk to the military commanders of the various European components of the ISAF command to bring them into the fight, so to speak? If you have nations that you think are not participating in a robust way or in a way that really helps the operation and you would like to adjust that, do you communicate with them, or is that strictly a matter of their national policy and it flows down from their leadership and basically you and your commanders and General McNeil are left to basically accept the restrictions and the caveats as they arrive with the foreign troops?

Admiral FALLON. No, sir. I am not in the chain of command. It goes from General McNeil back through German General Ramms in Brunssum headquarters—that is the NATO operational headquarters—back to General John Craddock, U.S. four-star, who has all the NATO forces, and that is how they deal with those individual challenges. So John Craddock is the man to ask that question of.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. I guess I lied. I guess last, last question.

Do you think we should be getting more and we should be trying to get more in terms of support from the allies?

Admiral FALLON. Well, we would certainly like to have more robust support and—no secret—less restrictions, less caveats so that people can do the job that they have, by word, signed up for.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Smith from Washington.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen.

First of all, I want to thank Admiral Olson. He does a great deal of work with the subcommittee that I chair on terrorism. Both you and all of the folks at SOCOM have been just terrific to our committee. You have kept us very informed of the issues. You have been here, you have met with us. It has been a very open relationship. And with everything else you have got to do, I really appreciate that working relationship and your leadership down at SOCOM, particularly your emphasis on the counterinsurgency and indirect-action issues that you are really beefing up there, which I appreciate. I enjoy that working relationship a great deal.

Admiral Fallon, thank you very much for your service as well in a very, very difficult part of the world.

I wanted to ask some questions about Afghanistan and, specifically, sort of where we are at in the struggle. I think there is some concern from the last couple of years that we have started to lose ground in some areas, and the way I want to sort of focus that is, if the issue is hearts and minds sort of winning over territory, we seem to be losing some areas, in eastern Afghanistan and in southern. And by "losing areas," I mean the local population basically is siding more with the Taliban and the insurgents than with us. And

it is a very difficult situation. You know, we have to target the insurgents, we don't always know who they are, there is accusations of civilian casualties, even if it is not the case.

It seems to have, in certain areas, have turned the population against us, from what I can read and from the briefings I have received. I wonder if you could give me some idea where those areas are, how many there are, and what we are doing to try to reverse that as we try to balance the need to hit the insurgents as hard as possible while at the same time not alienating the local population? How do you see that struggle going at this point?

Admiral FALLON. Mr. Smith, you have highlighted the general challenge, and that is, it is complex.

First, to the business of who is in charge, there are no provinces and no districts that are "in the hands of the Taliban." We have maintained the initiative throughout the country. We, that is, U.S., ISAF, the Afghan security forces. Nonetheless, there are lots of challenges, and most of them are local issues.

This is a very checkered country with lots of tribal affinities. It is an isolated country. As you are aware, there is only one major road in the entire nation, and it is this ring road, which is not quite completely paved yet, but we are working on it. And so there is certainly a lot of tension and ebb and flow.

What we are trying to do is to work with the Afghan security forces to put in place a framework of stability so that the business of moving forward in governance and in economic development and nation building can take place. There are a lot of actors on the playing field, and that is a challenge for us to deal with, not just in a security area but in the redevelopment and assistance area.

My sense is that we are working hard and we are gaining ground. There certainly was an uptick in kinetic activity last year, as there was the previous year. The relative increase last year was not nearly as great as it was forecast, and our intention this year is to get that and to keep that from growing in any appreciable way.

We are providing time and space for the Afghan governance part of this to be effective in the country.

Mr. SMITH. And how confident are you in our counterinsurgency ability because that seems to be—this is not, you know, a big, traditional, conventional fight——

Admiral FALLON. Correct.

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. This is sort of Admiral Olson's territory, if you will, in terms of it is as important to make sure that you are working with the local population in a diplomatic way as it is to make sure that you have got the military hardware necessary to kill the bad guys. And that is a tough thing to do, particularly following up on what Mr. Hunter talked about, in terms of all the different pieces.

Do we have the people with the skill sets necessary to do that job?

Admiral FALLON. Yes. Short answer, yes. We have got a lot of experience from Iraq, and particularly from Afghanistan, and our people are doing a terrific job in that regard.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you.

I have many more questions, but my time is almost out so I will probably submit some for the record, and I appreciate both you gentlemen being here this morning.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. A quick question, Admiral Fallon, before I call on Mr. McHugh.

We all know the unfortunate experience that Great Britain had with the entire Middle East 1914, 1922. Do you think we understand the culture any better than they did at that time?

Admiral FALLON. We are learning. I am not going to sit here and tell you that we have got it all figured out. I know that our people have a much better appreciation for this than they did a few years ago. I have watched them work down at the troop level in Afghanistan. I have been amazed at how quickly our people pick it up and how good they have been at passing this down. I am not going to tell you that everybody gets it to the same extent. But I have been very impressed with the way that our people are operating.

In several of the provinces, they are not leading with their weapons, they are leading with their brains, and they are engaging with people, and those that are doing that are really having terrific success.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Olson, cultural awareness is a major part of what you do. Can I ask you the same question?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, we, too, are learning rapidly. With so much of our force now in Central Command (CENTCOM), it is a steeper learning curve for some than others. Some of our groups regionally oriented to other parts of the world are now working in Iraq and Afghanistan. We do have the advantage in force management of being able to rotate, primarily two of our Special Forces groups, in and out of Iraq and two of our Special Forces groups in and out of Afghanistan. And as they rotate in and out, we try to make sure that they go not only back to the same country but back to the same fire base so that they are working with the same people over and over and over again over time. So that knowledge and those cultural sensitivities are growing every day, but we, too, still have a long ways to go.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you, as always, for the great work that you and those terrific people you lead do on our behalf.

Admiral Fallon, you talked a bit about, perhaps not how to precisely how to define victory, but what the factors are that lead us toward a better or more successful outcome. One of those components has to be the political reconciliation in Iraq.

Recently there has been some movement made with regard to so-called benchmarks—a couple of steps forward, a step back. They had the provincial laws passed but then vetoed to have passed the de-Baathification law, so-called, that has some questionable components to it, an 2008 budget and such.

How do you assess the political reconciliation and growth of the national government? I think there is probably more success at the provincial level, but in Baghdad, how are things going there?

Admiral FALLON. They are learning, Mr. McHugh. Quite a steep learning curve, but they are picking it up.

Nine, 10 months ago, I went out and met most of the senior Iraqi leaders, and I found them to be, my opinion, uneasy in their positions, certainly without a lot of experience. They are coming from narrow political or party or some other very distinctly inwardly focused orientation. Now they have got bigger responsibilities. They are growing into it.

If I could give you one example: This recent passage of the three pieces of legislation—simultaneously the budget and the amnesty and the provincial council's business—they had struggled for a couple of months with these. Individually, just not getting there, everybody had a piece of the action, everybody wanted something, couldn't agree. And somehow the light went on, they came up with another idea: What if we bundle these things together? Maybe, collectively, there enough things that people could feel that there is enough goodness here to move it forward—it is a political process that I am sure you understand a lot better than I—and all of a sudden, in a half day's time, bingo, it is passed. Not by overwhelming numbers, but it got passed.

Now there is another part of their process that has taken place. They have this presidency council. The way the legislation works, they get to review it. These are kind of the godfathers, if you would. They take a look and see what they like, don't like, and one of them, Hashemi decided he didn't like an aspect of the bill and kicked it back, and so now it is in for reconsideration in the Council of Representatives (COR). Meanwhile, the other the other two bills are proceeding at pace. I think that is pretty indicative of a maturing political process.

So is it going to be lightning quick? You could look around here and see that some things take a while to get through your institution as well. They are making progress, and I am happy to see, not just the way they have been able to get some of these pieces across the board, but the way that they are consulting with one another, the way that they actually, behind the scenes, get down there and rub elbows and roll up their sleeves and get moving. So they are making progress.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, sir. When it comes to Congress, our message to the Iraqi parliament ought to be "Do as we say, not as we do," I suspect, but I appreciate your assessment.

Recently, Muqtada al-Sadr issued a continuation of the cease-fire. It is certainly in the early days the stand down of Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) and the decreasing violence was a critical part. Is his word going to be able to hold that cease-fire, or what do you read there?

Admiral FALLON. I don't know, to be very blunt with you, but I do know that any steps like that that generally send a message of moderation and to not answer the call to arms is helpful. It has got to be helpful. And I think we have benefited from that.

There is clearly dissention within the ranks, from our view of what is going on Jaysh al Mahdi, but the results are speaking for themselves. There are many days now in which there is little to no violence in areas that we know have a significant JAM presence, and that is really good. What we are focused on and what General

Petraeus is focused on right now is those special groups—those bad actors or criminal elements—that just continue to wreak havoc.

Mr. MCHUGH. Got a few seconds left so I will throw out an easy one.

You want to give us your opinion on the so-called potential for a summer pause in the drawdown of U.S. forces? Take all the time you need.

Admiral FALLON. Okay. Just to say that General Petraeus will come back to me within a matter of days with his recommendations on what he thinks in response to some questions I have sent him on various scenarios. We will be happy to consider that and pass it up the chain of command.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Sanchez, please.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being before our committee today.

You know, sometimes this job is a very frustrating one. I just had a colleague walk out very frustrated with some of the lack of answers that we are really getting out of this panel this morning. So I am going to try this again.

This has to do with Afghanistan because I think many of us here are very, very concerned about what is going on in Afghanistan. And the study report that General Jones and Ambassador Pickering turned into us about February 1 of this year, it said, "The year 2007 has been the deadliest for American and international troops in Afghanistan since the U.S.-led coalition forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001."

And it went on to say that the progress achieved after six years of international engagement was under serious threat and that the United States and the international community have tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few military forces and insufficient economic aid. Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that we have spent about $127 billion in Afghanistan compared to almost $500 billion for Iraq.

And when Chairman Mullen was before us on February 6, he pointed out that in Afghanistan we are seeing a growing insurgency, increasing violence, a burgeoning drug trade fueled by widespread poppy cultivation, and, in response, more U.S. forces will deploy to Afghanistan.

So my question to you is, aside from the 3,200 Marines who are destined to Afghanistan in April, what is the status of additional U.S. forces being deployed to Afghanistan?

Admiral FALLON. Those Marine forces that have been announced are the sum of the additional increase forces. There are certainly rotational forces going in, and behind the scenes, in the small print, some of these forces are actually larger this year than the forces that they are replacing.

There has been for sometime an outstanding requirement from General McNeil to the NATO hierarchy to provide two maneuver brigades for his use in ISAF. We have not seen that to be forthcoming and so have recommended that we have a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTAF) deploy, and I think that is going to be a substantial assistance to General McNeil.

We have also a standing requirement for a couple of thousand personnel to do training in the OEF area. I am pleased that we are going to have a battalion. It is about half of the number that we have asked for. I think that is going to be substantially helpful to us. But that is the sum of the U.S. forces that are going to be additionally sent to Afghanistan.

Ms. SANCHEZ. And given the small number of resources and personnel that we devoted to Afghanistan, are you surprised at the current state of insurgency, violence and drug trade that is occurring?

Admiral FALLON. That is a very complex question, and I certainly am not going to dispute the fact that there are more incidents of violence, more improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and more casualties this year. But when I go back and look at the history of the U.S. engagement alone in Afghanistan from 2001 to now, there was a big hump of activity until 2002 and then a time in which there was not as much engagement. That engagement has been substantially ramped up, and there is an awful lot of progress going on.

So there is a lot of stuff that has happened, a lot of numbers that are certainly negative rather than positive, but as I look at my responsibility for the region, the total of activity in Afghanistan compared to Iraq, for example, they are just not in the same range of metrics.

That said, we have set ourselves up for what, I think, is going to be substantial progress this year in Afghanistan, and most of that is going to be directed in the area that, I believe, is really the most appropriate way, and that is to have the Afghans picking up more and more responsibility for security and stability in that country, and that is where we are really focused.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Admiral, what would be the ideal number of U.S. troops for mission in Afghanistan, and if we weren't in Iraq, would we be devoting the right resources to Afghanistan?

Admiral FALLON. Well, the number of forces that have been requested through NATO, and two maneuver brigades, and I could put to good work another 1,500 or so trainers there. We have a lot of requirements and a lot of demands on our system. I think that we have done our best to balance those competing demands. I feel confident that, with the forces we have this year, we are going to make significant progress.

Ms. SANCHEZ. And if we were not in Iraq? You wouldn't change what we are doing in Afghanistan?

Admiral FALLON. As far as changing the way we are going about this and the way we are doing it?

Ms. SANCHEZ. Number of troops, what we deploy, what we are doing?

Admiral FALLON. The plan that we have is, I believe, the appropriate plan in Afghanistan. It would be nice to have more resources. Our commanders always want more resources. I have to deal with that, I have to do my best to adjudicate those demands, but as far as the strategy, what we are doing, how we are doing it, I think we are on the right track, and I think you are going to see some success this year.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. To clarify your answer to Ms. Sanchez, there will be 3,200 Marines going in since NATO is not coming forward with 3,500; is that correct?

Admiral FALLON. Three thousand two hundred is about the right number, and that is split between maneuver force and then the folks that are headed in specifically for training.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is my question. You said about a battalion-size Marine contingent is going to do training. Does that come out of the 3,200 hide or——

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. A sum total of 3,200.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in addition thereto?

Admiral FALLON. No, sir. That is the sum total of all the U.S. troops that are going in.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Olson, you talk in your written statement about indirect warfare, about irregular warfare, and you make the statement that in a world characterized by protracted struggles, emerging irregular warfare doctrine calls for a suite of capabilities to prevail against those who threaten us.

Just as most of us tend to think of success and warfare as that front moving across a map—like you all talked about earlier—most of us tend to think of warfare in more traditional terms: in tanks, in ships, in airplanes and so forth. And this suite of capabilities you talk about for irregular warfare is not something that most of us are used to thinking of when we think about our military.

I think it would be helpful for us if you would take just a moment—because SOCOM has done more work in this area, more thought, more experience in this area than most of us. Take just a moment and from a national perspective—not a SOCOM perspective—from a national perspective, talk about why this suite of capabilities you mention is important. And I am especially interested in what obstacles you see to this country developing that suite of capabilities for irregular warfare.

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry.

"Irregular warfare" is a term that has emerged just in the last couple of years, and it has become an umbrella term that describes a number of diverse activities of direct and indirect nature. So many irregular warfare activities are conducted by handfuls of people in remote regions in face-to-face activities, but manhunting and terrorist killing is also an irregular warfare activity. It has come to include counterinsurgency and counterterrorism and counterguerrilla warfare and train-and-assist missions, and stability and reconstruction.

Many irregular warfare activities are activities in which the Department of Defense has the lead. Many irregular warfare activities would not be termed "warfare" but are related activities in which other agencies of government have the lead and Department of Defense is in support.

It does require cultural attunement. It requires language skills. It requires sustained presence. At sort of the low-density, low-technology region, it also requires the ability to sense what is occurring

in very high-tech ways and be able to respond to that with violence when that is required.

Special Operations does many things across that suite of military activities. So do the rest of the conventional forces. There are irregular warfare centers of excellence and irregular warfare units and commands that are being developed within the services in order to answer that need.

And I think the obstacle—in specific answer to that, the obstacles are in defining roles and missions—who is going to do what, who is going to have the lead to do what—the prioritization in which these activities are going to occur and the regions in which they are going to occur—and then the access that is required to do this—access by host nations and access by our own other agencies of government in order to perform military activities in areas where we are not in conflict and may not expect to be in conflict soon, which requires policy decisions and permissions for military forces to conduct those kinds of activities.

Mr. THORNBERRY. If you had to give the Nation a grade—A through F—on where we are with irregular warfare capabilities, what would you give us today?

Admiral OLSON. We are in the B to C range, I would give us, and growing. But much of this has to do with how we are organized and whether or not we are going to be able to apply discreet units in remote places, outside the normal organizational structure of our large conventional forces. And each of the services is working to do that with varying degrees of energy and success.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I appreciate it.

Admiral Fallon, just briefly, talking about how many soldiers are in Afghanistan, do you recall how many soldiers the Soviets had when they tried to occupy Afghanistan?

Admiral FALLON. Number 100,000 comes to mind, but——

Mr. THORNBERRY. I would say it is more like 3- to 400,000 that they had trying to subdue that country unsuccessfully. It is a matter of bodies, or is it a matter of something else?

Admiral FALLON. It is not a matter of bodies. If I could go back to—Congresswoman Sanchez has left—okay.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and answer the question.

Admiral FALLON. We could use some more people. I don't believe we need large numbers. We could use some more folks to help with the training and to give General McNeil a little bit more of a boost. Last summer, last fall we chopped a battalion of U.S. troops to go in the south and help them out. They were very, very helpful to him, and he was able to do very well with them.

A couple thousand more troops, I think, would pretty much give us all the flexibility we need to wrap this thing up pretty quickly, to expand stability in a way that would really be meaningful.

But I don't think we ought to be contemplating large numbers of troops. I have seen in some places that, you know, we roll tens of thousands of troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan. I don't think it is appropriate at all. It is a very different situation. I think we have got the right idea, we have got the counterinsurgency strategy, and our emphasis is really on training the Afghans to pick this up and not in staggering the large numbers.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thanks, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. So you would boost the numbers from 3,200 roughly to 4,200?

Admiral FALLON. We could use a couple thousand more—some troops actually do work down there.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be 5,200.

Admiral FALLON. Sorry, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. That would be 5,200; is that correct? 2,000 on top of 3,200——

Admiral FALLON. If we are at about 3,200—I have lost the dot here on total numbers. We have got about 25,000 or so of our troops. A couple thousand more of anybody's that are willing to really get out there and do the things that need doing would help us immensely.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder, please.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your clarification to Ms. Sanchez' question because I thought the first go-round was not as satisfactory as we would like. You know, we are here to help you, the country wants to help you, and I think an acknowledgment that——

Admiral FALLON. There is no doubt we have given the priority to Iraq, and I think that is most appropriate given where we were, certainly from the time I have been in here. But we have not neglected Afghanistan, and we are taking a round turn on this, in Navy parlance, to get us where, I think, we need to be as quickly as we can.

Dr. SNYDER. And then the question for us is you have expressed a need for an additional 2,000 troops. Are the things that we need to be doing as a Congress reflecting the will of the American people to help you get to where you think you need to go, and that is the purpose of this hearing today.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. I wanted to ask, Admiral—and I did not have your biography in the packet we had—and I saw you sitting there, I thought, this looks like a guy who was a tough guy in his young days and is still tough today. And so I have got your biography now, and that confirms that judgment, and I appreciate your service.

I wanted to ask, kind of in following up on Mr. Thornberry's question, the issue in terms of the roles of the Special Ops Forces versus, what I call, the general-purpose forces. And in your statement you talk about the Foreign Internal Defense is something that you all participate in a lot.

Now, is it not correct that, according to joint doctrine, that that is to be a role also of the general-purpose forces? And would you give me an update on where we are at with regard to is it a numbers issue, or do we still have some flux and debate going on about exactly who is going to do what with regard to general-purpose forces and Special Ops forces?

Admiral OLSON. Mr. Snyder, we are still having the debate about who is going to do precisely what and who is going to lead what with respect to development and application of forces globally in an irregular warfare kind of environment. Foreign Internal Defense is training and assisting alongside foreign counterparts. We get train-

ing from that; they get training from that. This is not about a one-way transfer of skills. It is about relationship building and mutual benefit, that kind of interaction, best conducted by forces that can go to the same place repeatedly over the course of a career.

Dr. SNYDER. Right. So when you earlier said—I think you said—in terms of the augmentation of your force, didn't you say three to four percent per year?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. I would think that until this debate is resolved—I mean, if you and General Casey and others and the secretary and maybe this debate is going to go on to the next Administration—say, no, all this is going to go to Special Ops Command, three to four percent may be terribly inadequate. Is that a fair statement?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I actually said 3 to 5 percent, and that is on the order of—we are about a 50-, 55,000-person force depending on how we count the Reserves into it. And so 5 percent growth on that is about 2,500 people a year. That is about what we are experiencing now through the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the POM–08 process, a growth of 13,000-plus over 5 or 6 years.

Dr. SNYDER. But how does that relate—my time is going to run out. How does that relate to this debate going on? If it is resolved that the general-purpose forces have their hands full, they are not going to do any Foreign Internal Defense anymore, it is all going to be Special Ops, will that impact on the numbers that you all need to grow into?

Admiral OLSON. It would impact on the ultimate numbers that we would need to reach. It wouldn't directly impact the rate at which we can absorb the growth. We still have a limited ability to produce the quality of Special Forces soldiers, Navy SEALs, etcetera, who go out and conduct this activity. And it is something that doesn't scale up rapidly and massively very well. We have to work our way into it.

Dr. SNYDER. Now, is that—and my time is about up. Is that issue of ramping up—is that something that we ought—on this side of the table ought to be working on? Do we need additional training capacity for your command? Is that part of the issue? Recognizing that these are very sophisticated skill sets we are talking about and all kinds of factors. But is training capacity something that we should be worrying about so that you can ramp up faster——

Admiral OLSON. Sir, there is an element of training capacity in it, and that would be helpful, and we haven't worked all the numbers on that. We are working now to absorb the growth that we have been given with our current capacity. And, frankly, our capacity in Special Forces—soldiers, as an example—has grown from producing less than 300 a year a few years ago to producing more than 800 a year this year. So we have invested in that. Quality is up. Everything is up.

Dr. SNYDER. When do you anticipate this debate will come to an end, and is that going to be the result of—are we going to get some kind of formal study, or will there be an announcement in terms of the general-purpose forces versus Special Ops Forces in the Foreign Internal Defense?

Admiral OLSON. I don't think it is a formal study, but it will be a serious discussion about roles and missions, who is going to do

what and whether or not Special Operations Forces can hand off some of the tasks they are currently performing to the rising capabilities of conventional forces.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you for your service, both of you.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes.

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you for being here and to your service and what all the wonderful people under you are doing every day.

Couple of quick comments and then two questions for Admiral Olson.

Based on the publication you and I were discussing, there is no word in the Arabic language for "reconciliation." So as we look at, from our perspective, what is going on over there, we need to kind of factor that in.

The other thing is theirs is a religion that allows for government. Ours is a government that allows for religion. And therein there is some very subtle but important distinctions we need to work with as we wrap up this military victory that you and your forces have won.

Admiral Olson, with my allegiance and knowledge of Fort Bragg, I would like for you to speak about what additional authorities you need to assist you in executing the long war against terrorists.

And then the second question, with a reduction in the SOCOM budget for this year compared with previous years and the size of your unfunded requirements list, I am concerned, and I know this committee wants to do everything that it can to ensure that you have what you need in the fight. What equipment or other shortfalls are there that we can help with, and what challenges are you encountering with sustaining such a high ops tempo?

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Hayes.

First, about the authorities, I would like to thank this committee for its continuation of our 1208 and now 1202 authorities for another three years. That is an essential authority for us to fund the training and equipping of counterpart forces with which we are engaged around the world, including well away from Afghanistan and Iraq. That is a $25 million authority without an appropriation, and it works well for us. We find that, once in, we can't get out, and so this is going to have to be an ever-increasing top-line amount of that authority as we approach $25 million for the first time this year.

And I am a strong supporter of the 1206 authorities that also enable us to do important work around the authorities and the billing partner capacity act.

I am exploring seriously my authorities with respect to the readiness of my force. The language that created United States Special Operations Command gives me head of agency acquisition authorities and a dedicated budget. I find myself beholding in many ways to service processes and certifications in order to exercise my authorities. I am convinced that I am operating comfortably within the middle of my authorities, not on the edge, and so I am working to explore those aggressively.

The same thing goes with certain manpower and management authorities. My authority under the law now is to monitor the management of Special Operations Forces personnel, which gives me the opportunity to observe and report on how Special Operations Forces personnel—for whom I am accountable—are managed by the services. So I am exploring how to approach that, and, of course, much of what I seek ultimately will be within the authorities of the services and the Department to grant should they choose to, and some may drift into legislative requests.

And the second piece was——

Mr. HAYES. About the Unfunded Requirement (UFR) request.

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir.

Our budget request this year was below what it was the previous year. Fundamentally, we worked within the top-line guidance provided to us by the Office of the Secretary of Defense prior to submitting our 2009 budget. Then the things that we wanted to put within that top line we were unable to, those went to the top of our unfunded requirements list. Those are requirements by Special Operations Command submitted, approved, validated, vetted within the command but without room in our top-line budget guidance to squeeze them into the budget that we submitted to the Department.

The budget we did submit was not challenged. It was approved and moved on. But, clearly, within our UFR request are those things that didn't make the priority cut, those things for which we saw opportunity for acceleration, and those things which became submitted and validated requirements in the several months between when we submitted our budget request and when we submitted the UFR list.

And along the way, fiscal year 2008 was a surge year for us as a result of the QDR. We had military construction (MILCON) at almost twice the rate we had ever had it, we had growth of the force at a rate that we had never had before, we had completion of many of our equipment modification actions in 2008, which is, in fact, what led to the lower top-line guidance for 2009.

Mr. HAYES. Don't be guilty of not asking for enough.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. McIntyre of North Carolina.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Admiral Fallon and Admiral Olson, for your leadership. I greatly enjoyed my recent visit just a couple weeks ago down to Tampa to U.S. Special Operations Command and also to CENTCOM.

And, Admiral Olson, thank you particularly for your hospitality. Enjoyed being with you also at Camp Lejeune for the groundbreaking of the new Marine Special Operations Command. We are quite excited about what that will mean on the other end of my district from Fort Bragg, where we have joint Special Operations Command that I share with Congressman Hayes.

I wanted to ask you to follow up on Congressman Hayes' question. If you can tell us, in particular, what the wear and tear—and the being the tip of the spear that Special Operations are—what equipment and resources are experiencing the greatest wear and

tear that you see as the greatest priority for replacement or for augmentation.

Admiral OLSON. Sir, in terms of sort of non-human platforms, our greatest wear and tear is being experienced by our aviation fleet. Our C–130's, upon which we depend for medium lift, are wearing out at an accelerated rate. We have a recapitalization program in place, and much of our budget request addresses that recapitalization. It is not coming as rapidly as I would like to see it, and we are going to see a degradation of that fleet because of center-wing box problems and other things with which this committee is familiar over the next few years.

We have had to retire our MH–53 Pave Low helicopter program. That is at the end of its service life. We had intended that the V–22 would be able to replace that almost airframe for airframe, but delayed delivery of the V–22 is an issue for us. We have included in our request—in the supplemental—an acceleration of the V–22 program.

The rest of our helicopter fleet—our Chinooks and our Black Hawks—are experiencing wear and tear at an accelerated rate, but we are pretty okay with those programs as we are currently programmed.

And our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) fleet, which goes way beyond platforms into systems and people and training opportunities and all of that, has proven insufficient for the environment in which we are operating. We are growing into the knowledge that that has become an absolutely essential extension of our force.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, sir.

Admiral Fallon, if I could ask you—switching gears—on Turkey. We know there is a recent Turkish invasion—or incursion into Iraq in pursuit of the Partiya Karker Kurdistan (Kurdistan Worker's Party) (PKK). Can you tell us whether that was done with any U.S. assistance or with any U.S. cooperation and whether or not you felt like that successfully put down the PKK?

Admiral FALLON. We provided indirect support to the Turkish military intelligence to help the incursion achieve some tactical success, it is my understanding. But I think the real key issue here is figuring out a way to have the Turks come to grips with the People's Congress of Kurdistan (KGK) and to not just try to eliminate them militarily. They certainly have instigated lots of trouble, and they have had a lot of casualties in Turkey, but the real solution here, to me, is that there is some kind of an accommodation reached with this group and with the Turks inside of Turkey to knock this off.

Any kind of instability like that—kinetic activity—up there in Kurdistan is potentially very destabilizing and harmful to our operations in Iraq. And so we have really tried to come at this in a measured way. We certainly recognize the pain the Turks have felt from this outlaw and terrorist activities of this group, but we know that the long-term solution is some kind of an accommodation to scratch some of the itches of the KGK. And so we will give them the help that we can, but we are really strongly encouraging them to figure out a political solution here.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Would it be your opinion, consistent with the other recommendations that this committee has heard from independent study group headed by General Jones and others, that we would not have a permanent American base in Northern Iraq?

Admiral FALLON. I don't believe we are interested in permanent bases anywhere. What we are trying to do in Iraq is to provide enough stability and security to allow the government to grow, to allow the Iraqi security forces to take over responsibility and for us to continue to withdraw our combat forces. We want to be engaged with Iraq for the long term but not in the business of maintaining a large force in Iraq.

Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Randy Forbes, Virginia, please.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Fallon, Admiral Olson, thank you so much for your service and for being here today, and I am going to talk quick because I have only got five minutes. I am going to ask you each just two questions.

First of all, I believe that words do matter, and when I hear suggestions of a broken Army, that our troops are demoralized, that fighting the challenges we face makes us weaker, these words take a toll. I remember in the early 1960's hiding under my desk, cowering in the hallway because we were afraid we might have a nuclear attack in the United States. And there were some who argued we ought not to be in that fight. We ought to be weaker then. I am glad those voices lost.

In the 1970's, I remember hearing how we were afraid we would have mutual annihilation because we were in an arms race with the Soviet Union. We were concerned about that and some that said we ought not to be in the fight. We ought to be weaker. I am glad those voices lost.

In the 1990's, some of our leaders forgot that giving our enemies time to rest doesn't reduce the challenges we face, but rather sometimes increases those challenges.

I also know the challenge that you have because, if you fight a challenge in one part of the world, there is always going to be voices that point to you and say why aren't you fighting a challenge in another part of the globe. Then they will spin the globe when you go there, and say why aren't you in another part of the globe. If you went to all the challenges, they would be saying you were stretched too thin and you needed to focus on one challenge, and the whole thing would start over again.

And so the two questions I have for you were these: We have had witnesses come before this committee—and they have stated this unequivocally and Secretary Garing and General Casey have confirmed it—that the force we currently have today in Iraq is the most experienced, the most adaptive, the most professional and the most capable force we have ever fielded. That means more than last year, more than the year before that, more than the year before that, and more than the year 2000 or anytime before that.

My question to each of you is do you agree that the force under your command is currently today the most experienced, adaptive, professional and capable that you have ever seen?

And, second, while it may be difficult to define victory—because that question was asked to you—my question to each of you is this:

Admiral Fallon, can you tell me what failure would look like in Iraq? If we loaded our troops on your ships tomorrow and brought them home, what would that look like?

And, Admiral Olson, if we loaded them on the Admiral's ships and brought them home tomorrow, what would that do to our fight against al Qaeda?

My two questions for both of you.

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, Admiral Fallon, for the opportunity to speak first.

Regarding the capability and the experience of the force, I will talk only about the United States Special Operations Forces, with which I interact every day, and the quality of the force is, in my view, better than it has ever been. They are harder, smarter, fitter, stronger, at least as motivated coming in as ever in history. They have the advantage of knowing what it is they are coming in for and how hard it is going to be for them, and this force is serving magnificently.

They are more experienced every year and every day than they were the day before, but they are more experienced in a narrower set of skills. The Special Forces image of a grizzled John Wayne and a small team of stubble-faced, grizzled veterans who are roaming around the world training foreign counterparts is really shifting into a much younger, much less-experienced force in terms of the ways of the world and the kind of international wisdom that it takes to operate it. And a primary reason for the growth in our force is to get us back out into the rest of the world, in which we have been underrepresented and underexperienced as a Special Operations Forces for the last few years.

Clearly, a rapid withdrawal of Special Operations Forces with respect to al Qaeda would be devastating in terms of the impact that we are having on them. There is an absolute dwindling of al Qaeda's capability in the places where we are able to work directly against them, and I think the decrease in violence in Iraq is directly attributed to that kind of activity.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, and failure would be regression of Iraq back into the kind of chaos and sectarian strife that we saw back in 2006.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, both.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR [presiding]. Chair thanks the gentleman.

Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from California Ms. Tauscher.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Admirals. It is good to have you here. Thank you for your service, and, certainly, I want to thank the men and women under your commands and thank them for their service.

I like and respect my colleague from Virginia, and I want to make it very clear that there is something about what he said that I agree with. I think we have the most professional force in the world. I think we have the best trained and, certainly, perhaps the most qualified volunteer force in the world.

But I hope he wasn't suggesting that they are not bone tired, and I hope he wasn't suggesting that they are not overdeployed. I think everybody understands that. And I think everybody understands that we went into this war in Iraq without enough ground forces, that the painful truth is that, seven years later, we now know that counterinsurgency is pretty labor intensive.

And I would hope that you both will quickly agree with me that qualifications and their strength and their training is not mutually exclusive to the fact that they have been overused, overdeployed and that we have a readiness crisis in our military. Do you agree?

Admiral OLSON. There is clear stress on the force, in my view, that has not yet manifested in the data. Our recruiting is up, our retention is up, the morale of the Special Operations Force is up as manifested in many ways. The data does not support my instincts—and clearly yours—that there is a future fragility that we have to get ahead of. We don't have good metrics in our services for being predictive and preventive. We have great programs for responding to manifested trauma, whether physical or psychological. We aren't as good at getting ahead of the problem in order to preempt it.

Ms. TAUSCHER. We do know that suicide attempts are up dramatically and suicides are up, and that says to me that there is something very wrong.

Admiral Fallon.

Admiral FALLON. Ma'am, I would not say that we are in a readiness crisis at all, but I will certainly tell you that I think that our troops are in need of a change in the deployment cycle. We have had too many, from my experience, of several of our key segments of the troop population—senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs), mid to junior officers—on multiple rotations. I look at my commanders, and some of them have logged more months in Iraq in the last decade than they have at home by a significant amount. We recognize this.

Our troops are doing a magnificent job, and they are—God bless them—they are willing to shoulder the responsibilities we ask. We know we need to change these rotation cycles. That is what is a key factor in the decision making that is going to be upcoming this year.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Can we switch gears and talk about the poppy crop cultivation in Afghanistan, which is, unfortunately, up again—a 17 percent increase over recent years. And we have a basic strategy that is not unlike what we did in Colombia—or are trying to do in Colombia—which is to create alternative livelihoods for farmers, eradicate poppy crops, create counternarcotics units.

General Fallon, are you satisfied that the Iraqi security forces, where we have areas of questions about corruption, that there is enough being done to be sure that the Iraqi security forces don't become an enabler for the kinds of poppy crop drug trafficking that we see and that we are not creating a long-term problem with the kind of corruption we see in the government of Afghanistan and in the security forces?

Admiral FALLON. Congresswoman, the data, I think, that we have available is for 2007. It remains to be seen. We are anxious to see how things really are this year because I have gotten assur-

ances from several of the governors in Afghanistan that they have put in place measures last fall during the planting season to reduce that crop. We will see how it works out, but it is a complex issue.

There is a history of cultivation here, as you know, goes back for hundreds of years, and it is going to be tough to break. We have a lot of responsibilities we have given our forces out there, and I would have to be honest in telling you that the first one is security and stability. We are certainly aware of the problem with poppies, and we are asking them to help as they can. There are some dedicated forces in the field, mostly from the Afghan government.

I will tell you one new initiative that has just been started, and that is the Afghan army has decided to dedicate a battalion—a Kandak, if you would—now to just drug eradication. They are about midway through their training now. Just talked to our commanders, we are going to ensure they have the right equipment to go out there and actually start plowing stuff under. And that is a good sign, an indication of dedication.

Now, there is corruption, there is no doubt about it. And I think one of the challenges that the Karzai government has to deal with is, frankly, balancing some of this, going after these guys that they know probably have their fingers dirty in here, at the same time trying to get stability and to get the kind of leadership that is necessary to move us forward.

So we are well aware of it, we know it is a real problem, it is a plague, we have got to stop it, we could use some more help from the international community in a concerted way to approach this.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you.

Mr. TAYLOR [presiding]. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your testimony, for your many years of service and for all of those things.

Couple of quick questions.

Admiral Olson, I am looking at this pretty nifty document here, and I noticed that, picking up on the comments earlier, that your Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC)—your Air Force component—is decreasing in personnel because, as you said, you are retiring the MH–53s. You have got the CV–22s coming online. As you know, the MV–22s are now deployed in Admiral Fallon's area in Iraq, and I trust that your folks are looking at that deployment, as we all are.

Is there anything we can do here—this committee, this Congress—to help speed up your employment, deployment, acquisition and so forth of the CV–22? Is it money, or are there other constraints that we cannot help with?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, it is in part money in terms of accelerating the delivery of the platforms. We are at seven now. We will be at eight by the end of this year. We intend to deploy our first four not later than January of 2009. We are working to accelerate that by a few weeks, if we can. And we do, by the way, have some people from AFSOC fully deployed with the Marine Corps so that we are drawing from their lessons learned from their first deployment.

Ultimately, an acceleration of the program will help us reach our initial operational capability, and that will require increased fund-

ing for an acceleration of the program. But, again, I only fund with my budget about a quarter of the cost of a V–22. The rest of it is in the Air Force budget.

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you very much.

And I think we should be looking at that in this committee. That is a shortfall in our premiere force that, it seems to me, we ought to be moving quickly to correct.

Admiral Fallon, I would like to say that I was in Afghanistan a couple weeks ago, and I just think our troops there, as everywhere, are doing absolutely magnificently. The progress that I saw in RC East—and particularly Khost province—very, very encouraging. A couple of questions did come up, though, and I would like to just sort of throw those out.

One is the issue that Mr. Hunter was addressing, the "who is in charge" question. I know there has been some discussion about dual hatting—General McNeil or his replacement—to cover both the American OEF force and the ISAF force. Is that something that you are considering that you can talk about, or is that simply off the table?

Admiral FALLON. I don't think there is an active discussion right now. When I got into this job, there was a lot of noise about this subject, dove into it, addressed a couple of issues I thought that needed attention. Since then, I have not been aware of a problem with this. I would much rather get activity in Afghanistan focused on fixing some of the things that really need correcting that are pretty obvious, like getting the right number of forces with the right equipment in the field, and so it is not anywhere near the top of my do list.

Mr. KLINE. Fair enough. I am not suggesting that there is a problem right now, but I am concerned that we have something that is set up that is largely dependent upon the personalities. I don't like the wiring diagram that I am looking at, and I hope that we continue to have the right personalities in place and it works out. But, if so, it is sort of in spite of the way that it is set up, again, following up on what Mr. Hunter said.

Admiral FALLON. Again, I don't think it is personalities. We have a chain of command, reporting responsibilities, directives in place to tell people what to do, how to do it. I think they are doing their job.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. KLINE. Good enough. Thank you, Admiral.

Now, on the issue of troop numbers, I hope that we are not going to try to get in the business here—unfortunately, I am afraid that we will—of us deciding in this committee and this Congress what the troop strength ought to be day by day in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia or anyplace else. That is something that is in your purview, and I have some confidence that you are looking at that in the way that you should be.

There is no question, though, that Secretary Gates and others have talked about the lack of the support from some of our NATO allies, and I trust that you are doing everything you can, and I know he is, and we should be pushing to get the rest of those NATO allies involved because you have got a balancing act here. How much do you want American troops versus NATO troops

versus the Afghan national army, which is the most respected institution in Afghanistan? And so it is not, I think, in my judgment, just a matter of how many more U.S. troops that we put in there.

Anyway, thank you very much for your excellent service and good work.

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mrs. Davis from California.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Admiral Fallon, Admiral Olson, good to have you with us. Thank you for your extraordinary service and, certainly, all the men and women that you command.

I wanted to follow up briefly on the question of training for the 3,200 Marines that are going into Afghanistan. And I am wondering, Admiral Fallon, are you aware of or have there been internal discussions about the extent of interagency planning and training that will go into that effort?

Admiral FALLON. Two aspects here, ma'am. First one is the maneuver unit. It is a coherent Marine air-ground task group that has actually been formed for some time. It is coming out of Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. It has been trained. They had a heads-up that they were going to be employed over there.

When they get into the country, they are going to be—their function is a maneuver unit, and General McNeil will use those folks as he sees fit. They will be, as they get into country—and they are getting this exposure to this now—there are other aspects of the mission over there that they are going to have to become familiar with.

Again, this is really General McNeil's business, but how he uses them and to what extent, they are actually engaged in the other activities that would help the nation-building and stability and economic business. I tend to think this going to be his response force for security more than the others, but he has got those pieces, and I am sure he will fit them in.

The other troops are going to be closer to the business of building institutions for the Afghan government. And this—I will be frank with you—it presents some challenges because the Marine maneuver battalion is not their first line—mission focus is not really nation-building, it is doing combat operations. The way that General Cone, who is going to employ these folks, is coming at this is to try to use them as an integrative unit, not break them up, keep them in platoon and company-size units and to use them as a good example in their mentoring for the Afghan security forces. These folks will—by the very nature of their tasks—have to use more of these interagency and international elements, and I am sure he has got that in mind.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Given that, I would certainly hope that, if there are opportunities there to bring in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or the State Department to help plan for that mission, it seems like we talk a lot about this, and it would be an opportunity, I think, to really put it into play so that people have that opportunity prior to actually even being in country to take——

Admiral FALLON. I agree. If I could, just to set the picture here. This is not a unit that is now going to take on a new responsibility in a new area. They are going to be a plug, if you would, that falls in an arrangement that is already set, including all those things that you mentioned here, and they are going to help execute it. So they will be arriving in a situation that has these pieces already on the chessboard.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Do you believe that there is any new authority from the Congress that is needed to continue to do everything possible, even at this time prior to new legislation, to give you that authority to engage these forces in that way?

Admiral FALLON. Well, since you bring it up, there is a proposal that would try to pull together to give us, in our view and Department of Defense view, more flexibility in the execution of those authorities that you have been generous enough—like 1206, 1207, things like that—the proposals, the building global partnership capacity—tongue twister—but that would give us, I think, more flexibility to blend the 1206, 1207, the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) authorities, which have been so useful to our troops on the ground to give those commanders a little more help there. We are very grateful for the individual authorities. If you consider maybe ways in which you might put this in a package that gives them the flexibility to move the resource around, that would probably be helpful.

Thanks.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentle lady.

Dr. Gingrey from Georgia, please.

Let me add that, before we go vote, I hope we can ask two other members to ask questions. We will break for the vote and return immediately and pick up the questioning, and you will be out of here by 1:00 p.m.

Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Admiral Fallon, Admiral Olson, thank you for being with us this morning. I think that, in your present command positions, these probably are two of the most important, certainly in regard to asymmetric warfare, Central Command and Special Operations Command. So we are comforted knowing that you are in that leadership position.

Two quick questions.

In regard to the planned drawdown and getting back to pre-surge levels in July of 2008 and at the same time Mahdi al-Sadr says, well, they will do a six-month additional cease-fire of his militia. It concerns me a little bit the timing that this cease-fire on his part will end about the time that we draw back down to pre-surge levels. So I am concerned about what might happen at that point if all of a sudden this restless militia decides that they are tired of sitting down and they are ready to stand up again. So I would like for both of you to discuss that a little bit, if you share my concerns.

The other thing, the recent trip by Ahmadinejad into Iraq. Of course, there was a lot of posturing over domestic cooperation and trade and that sort of thing. From that perspective, I guess, that is good. But Ahmadinejad, obviously, took the opportunity to blast

us once again and give his best Hugo Chavez-type rhetoric directed toward the United States, and I wonder what your feeling is in regard to this so-called new best friendship that we are seeing between Iraq and Iran and how that will possibly adversely affect what we are trying to do?

So either one of you can start.

Admiral FALLON. Sure. Regarding the drawdown of our forces and Muqtada, he is on his own timeline, and he will do what he does. From my view, the longer the Iraqi people get the experience of less violence and more stability in their lives, the less likely it is going to be that Muqtada is going to be able to encourage his militias, if you would, to revert to that kind of behavior.

And what we are seeing right now is that, I think, one of the major factors in the increase in stability is that people have just gotten sick of it. They got tired of it, and they recognize that this sectarian violence was just a never-ending cycle of bad news for them, and they pushed back. And so the longer this goes on, the more chance they have to enjoy a more normal life, the less chance there is.

Regarding Ahmadinejad's show, if you would, in the last couple of days, clearly posturing, maybe their new best friend in his view, I doubt that is the case in the view of most Iraqis, certainly not mine. I think people are astute enough to realize and recognize what is going on.

The Iraqis have to deal with him. He is their next-door neighbor. They have a huge border, almost 1,000 miles, that they share with this country, and, frankly, there is a lot of potential benefit to interaction, as there is right now. I was on the border a couple of weeks ago and watched a very robust level of trade coming across. There is a lot of good news there. There is also bad news. As Minister Bulani, the interior minister, said the other day, we like the tomatoes, the potatoes, and the mattresses and the other things. What we don't like are the IEDs and the guns and the money and the stuff that is going to fuel the insurgency. So enough is enough.

Our expectation was—and it will be interesting to see the cables—that the Iraqi leadership passed that message to Ahmadinejad and said we have had enough of that good stuff, you want to be our buddy, show us by your actions that this is what you mean.

Dr. GINGREY. Admiral Olson.

Admiral OLSON. I would certainly disagree with the theatrics of it, but regional stability is important. Iraq is going to have to live in that neighborhood after we leave. I support what Admiral Fallon said completely about border issues and economic issues and families that live on both sides of the border, and at some level they have got to have some kind of a state-to-state relationship.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

We will call on Mr. Larsen, and then we will break for the vote and return.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admirals, thanks for helping us out today.

First question for Admiral Fallon—give you a heads up beforehand, I am going to ask this—I am chairing electronic warfare (EW) working group project with a couple other members. We are looking at EW and looking at trying to how to institutionalize support for that. But I wanted to get your perspective on the role of electronic warfare, the use of it, and maybe some of the challenges that you face in CENTCOM using it and perhaps a direction that we can point to to help you out to fix some of those challenges.

Admiral FALLON. Probably the number-one challenge, from my view, is the complexity and the density of the electromagnetic environment, and the challenges are people have with trying to integrate the specific systems that they are using and not interfere, step on, or otherwise negate other activities. That, to me, is the biggest challenge I see day to day in the theater.

Mr. LARSEN. In terms of that, it is not just—you are saying it is not just a matter of people using different systems for these and different systems for totally different purposes as well?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, exactly.

Mr. LARSEN. Right.

Admiral FALLON. Everybody is working hard to solve tactical problems, and that is terrific. There is an avalanche of proposed solutions out there. The problem is, when they end up being dumped into the same box over there, General Petraeus and his team have a challenge to sort them all out and try to get a coherent——

Mr. LARSEN. And my understanding, as well, it goes beyond the IED issue.

Admiral FALLON. Sure. It is the whole thing. You are trying to do intelligence collection, surveillance, reconnaissance, support the tactical arena, just do regular daily comms, and it is pretty dense in there.

Mr. LARSEN. Second question has to do with this operational pause or pause or whatever it is going to be called officially. Do you have a personal view on whether or not the pause would delay the Army's ability to move to 12-month versus 15-month deployments, as General Casey has argued for?

Admiral FALLON. What I would like to do is, first, make a comment. As I have already said, General Petraeus is going to come back here in the next week or two with his recommendations, and we will see how that sorts out.

I think the term "pause" is probably misused—misunderstood. It seems to me that, with all of the activity that is about to get underway—four brigade combat teams (BCTs) coming out without replacement is the plan plus some regular rotations going in, that is an awful lot of activity. General Petraeus is going to have manage his pieces, if you could envision this, as a chessboard. He has got them all arranged in a way that has been very, very effective right now, takes a number of pieces off the table, redistributes responsibilities. All of these pieces going on at the same time, seems to me, that it would be prudent to assess kind of where we are for a bit and then decide what we do next. So that is what is going to be teed up.

Mr. LARSEN. That is happening, but with regard to the 15-month deployment to 12-month deployment?

Admiral FALLON. There is no doubt that we want to continue to draw down our forces and have the Iraqis maintain the security and stability, and we know that the faster we can do that, the quicker we are going to be able to get the Army back on the kind of rotation it wants to do. So I think General Casey is on record saying that, from his view, if we are able to execute the drawdown as currently planned, that should enable him to, later on this year, go back to 12. That sounds good to me. We would like to help him out in any way we can.

Mr. LARSEN. Finally, there is a lot of folks that believe that with over four million Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons—about half and half between refugees and internally displaced—resetting and reintegrating those folks is going to be a long-term issue. And can you discuss CENTCOM's role and what your plans are for resettlement and reintegration, what kind of role you all have and that we all have in that?

Admiral FALLON. I will tell you that I recently had a meeting with the U.N. special representatives to Iraq, His Excellence de Mistura—Staffan de Mistura—and really impressed. The guy has got it. He understands what he needs to do. They have taken that on as one of the U.N. As we look at all the things that could be done by somebody, who is going to primacy on things, and that is one of the things he has undertaken as a major focus for the U.N. So they are working that one. We will support them in any way we can.

Mr. LARSEN. Good. Do you anticipate CENTCOM providing platform assets to move people or anything like that?

Admiral FALLON. Not now. We haven't been asked for any of that stuff, and I don't believe so. I think they have plenty of assets. For example, the Iraqi government recently sent a convoy of buses to Jordan to bring back—they did it all on their own, and we found out about it after it was in execution. Sounds good to me.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

We will now recess for the three votes and return.

And, gentlemen, we will be right back.

[Recess.]

Dr. SNYDER [presiding]. Hearing will resume.

Mr. Skelton is speaking on a bill on the floor and asked that we go ahead and get back to our questions and get you all on the road. We apologize for the inconvenience.

Mr. Wilson for five minutes.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Admiral Fallon, Admiral Olson, thank you very much for your service. I have a special appreciation for the success that you have in that I have had a son serve under your command, the Navy—son serving in Iraq. And so I am just very, very grateful for the strategy you are pursuing, for the success, for the equipment, the training, the personnel.

Additionally, I want you to know that, over the weekend I saw firsthand that freedom is winning and, as you said, Admiral, at the troop level. We had the opportunity to visit in Afghanistan, and I visited with the 218th Brigade of the South Carolina Army Na-

tional Guard, General Bob Livingston and the troops of that brigade that I served with for 28 years. And they are just very, very proud, as they conclude their service there, of training the Afghan police and army, and they feel like they are making a difference, and I believe they are. And I am very grateful that 3,200 Marines will be now joining that effort. That really—on what they have done—will be so helpful.

Additionally, I had the opportunity to meet with President Karzai. It was wonderful to meet again with General McNeil. He was very understanding of us coming back. What a great leader he is. And to learn from them that the number of districts that have violence out of nearly 400 in Afghanistan has been reduced to almost just 10 percent of the districts across the country. And the American people need to know that the people of Afghanistan are very supportive in the success of our troops.

Additionally, in Iraq we had the opportunity to meet with General Petraeus, to meet with Ambassador Crocker, to learn of the over 60 percent reduction in violence in the last year. We went by MV–22 to Kurdistan, met with government officials there. We visited in Fallujah and actually were able to walk the Sukh street area of Haditha, and we shook hands with citizens of Iraq, who, through interpreters, explained their appreciation for the service of the American military, the verification that al Qaeda has been removed and that they would fully resist any return of the terrorists.

And so I want you to know that, as we go to thank the young people serving our country, and the best way to protect American families is to stop terrorism there. We go to inspire them; they inspire us. And we have the new greatest generation.

Again, we were not alone—and Dr. Gingrey brought this up. Over the weekend President Ahmadinejad came, and, as I believe you correctly stated, there needs to be a good relationship between Iran and Iraq by trade. But I am concerned that the actions of President Ahmadinejad are not positive.

Can you tell us what you can about the providing of explosives or rockets to terrorists in Iraq from Iran?

Admiral FALLON. We have no doubt that Iran has provided both rockets of a certain type and these improvised explosive devices, so-called Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs), to the militias inside of Iraq. I can't tell you how much of it is still coming. I just don't have a sense of whether any of this has really slowed down. We know the level of attacks has decreased. Again, how much of that is Muqtada's freeze, how much of it is the very effective work of our own people and so forth, I just don't have a balance.

But to the bigger issue of, if he is going to be a neighbor—and a potential friendly neighbor—they need to get their act together, in my opinion, and be helpful. And I think the Iraqi people, by and large, understand that and are pretty wary of the overtures. They like the good part. They don't want any more of the kinetic stuff.

Mr. WILSON. Another crucial country, Pakistan—we have worked very closely with their military. With the elections, what do you anticipate in terms of our continued working with the military and government of Pakistan?

Admiral FALLON. We certainly intend to make ourselves available and to try in every way to help them as they—there is a polit-

ical process underway, as you know, now. We will let that sort out. We have given strong assurances to the Pakistan military (PACMIL) that we will do everything we can to assist them to make them more effective and more competent. They are helping us immensely along the border with Afghanistan, in my opinion.

That is one of the reasons that the level of attacks is way down in eastern provinces because they have put pressure on the bad actors out there, and now they have got to worry about our people in the west and the Afghans in the west, as well as the PACMIL. So I think they are squeezed, and it has been overall helpful. There is a lot more that needs to be done, though.

Dr. SNYDER [presiding]. Mr. Courtney for five minutes.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you both witnesses for their endurance and testimony today.

I just want to follow up on Mr. Wilson's inquiry regarding Iran because, in your testimony in chief, Admiral Fallon, I mean, again, you identified Iran as a source of finance, weapons and training supports to lawless militia groups in Iraq. And, to me, to characterize the Iraqi government's actions last week as just bad theatrics is far too generous to that government, as far as I am concerned, and I think a lot of people watching that are just wondering whether we have a coherent policy.

I mean, if on the one hand we have identified Iran as a source of weapons that are killing American soldiers, and on the other hand those same soldiers are propping up—or supporting—I shouldn't use propping up—but supporting a government that is treating Iran like they are literally kissing cousins—I mean, there was hugs and kisses—that is very troublesome. And I just think that—well, let me ask a specific question.

Right now we are in the middle of apparently negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the government of Iraq. I hope—and maybe you can comment on this—is that, as we enter into that agreement, that one of the conditions that is hopefully being discussed is that that government, which is asking our troops to provide security for them, are not treating Iran as just a normal neighbor, that there has got to be some expectation from them that they are not going to countenance that type of activity by the Iranian government. So maybe you could comment on the SOFA negotiations that are going on now and, again, in particular, the events of last week?

Admiral FALLON. The SOFA will be between Iraq and ourselves——

Mr. COURTNEY. That is correct.

Admiral FALLON [continuing]. And not Iran. I would certainly hope personally that they convey these exact same messages to the Iranians. I do recognize that, in addition to being their next-door neighbor, there is a lot of history here of a different type. During the Saddam era, many of the Iraqi folks and leaders, particularly from the south, took refuge in Iran, and so they are beholden to the Iranians for some support and for protection in some ways.

I believe this is a developing relationship that is in development. A year ago my view was that the Iranians were covering every bet they could inside Iraq, throwing money at every group to try to

make sure they had support and influence. I can understand that from a strategic perspective, you want to have influence on your next-door neighbors, but shipping the lethal weapons in and really going after us, using this as an opportunity to come after us, certainly not tolerated. We have sent some pretty strong messages, I think, to the Iranians on ground we are not going to put up with it, we catch you, you are—enough said on that one.

We have tried to stiffen the Iraqis on this issue too. And I think that they have figured it out. They know they have got to figure out some way to present themselves to the Iranians, but I will be anxious to hear exactly what the discussions are.

I view this last week's thing as a theater. This is acting. There could have been other ways to do it. Maybe they might have considered not extending the invitation until certain things were accomplished. Again, they are struggling to come up with their own identity. But I share your concerns that the demonstrated behavior of the president of Iran and the actions that they have taken publicly are not helping us in the region.

Mr. COURTNEY. And really I am not against negotiations with people who—I mean, your basic point is correct that, in the long term this is a region that is going to have to coexist and countries that are going to have to coexist. It just seemed for the Iraqi prime minister to be standing there mute while this guy is carrying on about how the Americans are the problem in Iraq is really—that is a bitter pill, I think, for a lot of people who have suffered loss to sit there and watch.

Admiral FALLON. I agree.

Mr. COURTNEY. So real quick, Pakistan—is there a working relationship starting to get functioning between the NATO and the Pakistan army about the border as far as having some kind of real system for tracking the bad guys?

Admiral FALLON. Afghanistan or Pakistan?

Mr. COURTNEY. I am sorry. In Afghanistan, as it relates to, you know, Taliban coming in and out of Pakistan into Afghanistan. Is there, again, systems that are being developed so that there is real tracking and pursuit?

Admiral FALLON. There is a lot of things going on. The U.S. has most of—the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is in the U.S. area of responsibility. So we are on top of this and in the middle.

There are a number of things that are in play. Probably the most productive to date is a tripartite group—ourselves, Afghan military, PACMIL—regularly get together and have come up with a series of functional guidance to the troops that actually work on the border to help them to cooperate more. There has been significant improvement.

Dr. SNYDER [presiding]. Mr. Jones for five minutes.

Admiral FALLON. So the answer is it is improving and the results are very positive.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Jones for five minutes.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And I want to say to Admiral Olson thank you very much for coming down to Camp Lejeune a week ago for the groundbreaking for Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and bringing

your lovely wife with you. Very much appreciated your comments as well.

Admiral Fallon, I appreciate everything that you have done and said, as well as Admiral Olson. You know, as I think Ranking Member Hunter brought this up a couple hours ago about NATO, and this is an issue that many people—I represent the 3rd District—Camp Lejeune, Cherry Point Marine, Seymour Johnson Air Force Base.

The issue is this: I was so—not upset because, I mean, I didn't know—but before the Personnel Subcommittee we had Secretary Chu, and I asked him a question—they are going to get me the answer—of the 3,200 Marines going into Afghanistan, what is their previous deployment history? And I didn't really expect to know Marine by Marine, but I want to get that information.

If NATO does not step it up—and I know that Secretary Gates went to Germany a couple weeks ago trying to encourage the NATO countries to, you know, give us more of your manpower, help us out. What is going to be the condition of our troops in Afghanistan, if you are sitting before—or whoever replaces you—the Congress three to four years from now, and we have got the same situation where we are having to battle the Taliban and yet we are doing it with more and more Americans?

My concern is—I mean, we have got to fight it—there is no question about it—but my concern is that the manpower—I have talked to a lot of these Marines. The commitment is still there. I mean, they will go today if you ask them to go. But there is not but so much that a person can take physically before they just wear out, and then that jeopardizes the mission there on.

So if we don't get the help from NATO, are you concerned, as a military leader of this country, that, if we have got the same situation three years from now that we have today, that this country is going to be in a situation where we really have to push to replace?

Admiral FALLON. Congressman Jones, I would hope that in three years, there are a lot of things that are different. I would certainly expect that we will have continued to build on our success in Iraq and have security and stability remain and our forces generally reduced from the levels they are now.

I would expect to continue to make progress in Afghanistan to the point that we don't need additional U.S. forces, that the Afghans are in a position to take care of security and we don't have to worry about that.

And I am acutely aware of the fact that we have in those Marine units mid-level officers and NCOs that have done repeated tours. The good news about the Marine Corps is there is, as you know, continuous turnover of the young Marines, and if history is, about 40 percent of these will be probably in their first tour. Notwithstanding that, I am very sensitive to the fact that the leaders just can't keep doing this. We are going to have to get them a break.

So we are working this one to the best of our ability. I know that by me going to the Secretary and asking for this deployment, there is no free lunch here, that there is a cost in doing this, I am aware of that. It seemed to me that part of my rationale in requesting the forces right now is that I think we are in a position to really build on the success we had in the past summer and fall in Afghanistan

and to try to move this ball far enough down the road that we really pick up momentum.

So it is best I can tell you. I recognize the pressures and hopefully—and not just hope based on the good work that is being done by our people—we are going to be in a position here a couple years down the road.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I am going to try one quick question. I know my time is about up.

Admiral, do you see Iraq becoming a nation in the next 10 to 15 years as we would describe America as a nation? And let me real quickly—and my time is going to end—and you give me a yes or no.

But I met with a captain in the Marine Corps that just got back three weeks ago from Iraq, and I asked him, I said, "Captain Lane, do you think that we will ever see Iraq as a nation?" And his honest answer was probably not. He said we are having great success as we are dealing with the tribal chiefs, we are making great success. He said, but, congressman, he said it is just like Raleigh, North Carolina, is our capital, Jacksonville is our city where Camp Lejeune is, and that, quite frankly, the mayor of Jacksonville—the way I see it in Iraq—that the mayor of Jacksonville doesn't need to deal with Raleigh, North Carolina, capital. He has got his own responsibilities, own town and city. Is that really what is going to probably end up being the success.

Admiral FALLON. It is going to be Iraq and not America, and it is going to be different for a host of reasons. I do believe they have the basics to be able to make themselves an entity that can take care of its people and function in a manner that people can accept as appropriate for their culture and the situation there in. It is not going to look like——

Mr. JONES. I understand. I understand. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Sestak, the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon. Two quick questions, and then really the ones I wanted to ask.

Just wanted the admiral to follow up on your readiness. Have we deployed at full strength in the past year or two? Have we always deployed our Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams—operation attachment ones—and our SEAL teams at full strength, respectively 12 and 16, every time? Just a yes or no.

Admiral OLSON. The answer is three years ago we were not, and now we are.

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, sir. In the last year or two, we are not now; right?

Admiral OLSON. We are now.

Mr. SESTAK. Okay. And three years ago we weren't?

Admiral OLSON. Three years ago we weren't. As I said, we grew the capacity of our school——

Mr. SESTAK. In the last year or two? In the last year have we always?

Admiral OLSON. Our ODAs have been at full strength for at least a year.

Mr. SESTAK. SEALs?

Admiral OLSON. SEALs are not at full—the platoons that we deploy are full strength——

Mr. SESTAK. But I am asking SEAL teams?

Admiral OLSON [continuing]. But we take the risk in the back of those that aren't deploying.

Mr. SESTAK. Okay. So SEAL teams aren't there yet?

Admiral OLSON. SEAL teams are not at full strength.

Mr. SESTAK. All right.

Admiral, and when you testified here about a year ago, I asked you about the readiness, as you were Pacific commander, and the fact that no Army unit at home is in a state of readiness, which hasn't changed, to deploy to Korea to back them up. And your answer was but we will rely upon the Air Force and the Navy. And, in fact, we deeper probed whether the precision guy and munitions were really there. They are not quite funded at all what they needed to be.

I bring this up because I have no doubt we have the best military today, but can we do—it is not whether the question is whether we are best, it is whether can we do what is required. Are our SEAL teams able to actually deploy at full strength? Are we able to, Admiral, meet the timelines in the Pacific and elsewhere?

I bring this up, Admiral, because ISAF has a U.S. requirement from NATO that we have not met for trainers and mentors in the Afghanistan army and police. We are 2,400 troops less. Why do we point at NATO, the other countries, when we have not met our own training requirement?

And I bring that up because I think the question about Iraq people are asking is how long do we do this without a change in strategy? When the Taliban have changed their method of operating in Afghanistan, no longer frontal assaults, yet we see the first surface-to-air missile being used recently. And they are back in the ungoverned regions, where it all began, protecting al Qaeda.

So why haven't we met our requirement for ISAF for trainers and mentors if that is where it all began?

Admiral.

Admiral FALLON. Congressman, I think what you are referring to is not really an ISAF requirement. This is the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A), the Combined Support Training activity on the U.S. side. And they have, in fact, a signal in for a couple thousand trainers. We are going to meet some of that requirement with this Marine brigade that is going in.

Mr. SESTAK. About half of it.

Admiral FALLON. But the fact is that we have provided significant amount of force to ISAF to meet the NATO requirements.

Mr. SESTAK. But we still haven't met ours. Correct?

Admiral FALLON. We have addressed ours. We have to make decisions. What is the priority of the forces——

Mr. SESTAK. Can I switch then to Iraq, because we haven't met our requirement, nor can we get our SEALs going, nor can we protect our army in Southern Korea with 5027 how it asked us to.

My next question is what is your coalition strategy in Iraq for the south? In a sense we are going to come to a pause. We have limited U.S. presence in the south of Iraq. Hakim and al-Sadr are

trying to get the power. The federalism law has been on hold for 18 months. It expires in April. All this is about power down there. The coalition is leaving the south. You are pulling our troops down, but now have you stopped it because of security concerns.

How are you going to address and what is your strategy for the south, like when that April deadline happens, that the regionalization process can now proceed, and yet we can't meet our requirements throughout the world of what we are being asked to do? I mean, you can only so long continue to say, I believe, Admiral, we are just balancing the different requirements. But sometimes it is not enough to do what is best. We have to do what is required. What is our strategy with these limited resources you have for the south?

Admiral FALLON. Specifically in the south, since these provinces have been picked and sent to Iraqi control, what has been happening here in the last five to six months is that, as challenges arise, the Iraqis have been addressing them. On a couple of occasions, we have supported the Iraqi forces with enablers and with other specific assistance—Special Forces folks have been prominent in that role—but, by and large, the Iraqis are meeting their demand signal for forces.

And they have had some challenges, and they have dealt with them. Nasiriyah, for example, there have been a couple of—and Diwaniyah—have had challenges in the past several months. I watched with interest to see if we were going to have to pull a fire brigade to help. They have been able to deal with it with a little bit of assistance, and that has been encouraging to us.

And we have watched a couple of things on the Iraqi side. They have decided to put a new division down there. They decided to create an operational command and put a good guy that actually really has his act together in charge of it, they have been responsive, and so this is the strategy for the future. And as we withdraw more and more of our troops, the fact is we are going to have to rely on them to be able to do it. I think so far it is a pretty good demonstration of their willingness and ability to pick it up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

This does remind me of the Sun Tzu advice: We should never have more than one enemy at a time.

Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

I would like to thank you both for being here. I know it has been a long time and tough questions, but you understand our responsibility.

Therefore, I would like to go back to Iraq right now and the behavior of Maliki and Ahmadinejad and our response. And I don't think our response saying that it was theater is strong enough. It is absolutely outrageous. Iraq has won our dollars—$10 to $12 billion a month—we have sent our brave men and women there, we have given their lives to Iraq, and we have borrowed ourselves into debt—the greatest deficits in history—and this is what we get? They have won our dollars, but we did not win their hearts and minds, which has been the conversation that we have been having for a long time now about winning their hearts and minds here.

So if we can't get the leader of Iraq to stand there and at least say what people would say in a bar brawl, which is, "Hey, leave my buddy alone," what are we doing there? And I have to ask you again, if we can't even get the leader, the one who picks up the checks, who understands the money that we have given and the effort and the blood and the sweat and the toil, what about the rest of them?

Admiral FALLON. I haven't seen the reporting yet from our ambassador, and really this is his lane. He deals with the political leadership in that country. But I can tell you that, if we didn't have the support of many people in Iraq, we would have not been able to make the gains on the ground that we have made this year. It just wouldn't happen. The reality is, from my perspective, in trying to help get security and stability in most of this country, the people are helping. They do get it.

And that is why I say—you know, I can't speak for all the Iraqi people. I can tell you that we would not have been successful in many of the places, including Baghdad, this past six or eight months if we didn't have support. I have been there and talked to people. I have asked them what they think. They have changed their minds in many cases. They didn't like the instability. When I was there in Baghdad, the last couple of trips, no questions about security, it was just other things—we are happy to have you here, don't leave in a hurry, help out these other things, help our government to provide those things that we need, and we will like it.

So I am not going to apologize for any of the behavior of the leaders, but I can tell you that we are getting some significant support from the people.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And I would say that all the success really is because of our terrific military's effort, and you talk about biting the hand that feeds you. If we can't have the leadership stand up and say the very simple statements in our support, it is pretty hard to go out and justify the burden that this country has carried. So I just wanted to say that.

And that leads me to Africa Command (AFRICOM), and I realize that the African nations will be switched over to AFRICOM. But I worry about how we look there as well because we have lost some standing in the world, as you know, and people are concerned about our role in the Middle East and now in Africa. And when I talked to some people, I was told that long term we probably will be helping the various African nations build up a military and perhaps supplying.

Is that what you see in the game plan? Because what I worry about is the instability in that region, where we see nation against nation, and to arm them or to help arm them in any way, when they are already at war often, it seems pretty frightening.

Admiral FALLON. My part of Africa that I have in my area of responsibility is the Horn of Africa, the northeastern—eastern part. And in that area, I have a subordinate command, Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa, that is out there every day with a staff that engages these countries directly. We are trying to build their capacity for their abilities to have stability and security in this region.

I can't address the rest of Africa. Frankly, I haven't looked at it all, but I do know that the focus of AFRICOM is not as nearly as

much in the military domain as Central Command or some of our other regional commands. This is more in the business of nation building, it is more of helping them grow their capacities to be better countries, as opposed to building militaries. Other than that, I think I will stick to my own domain.

In Horn of Africa, my intention is to work as hard as we can to transfer what we think is a really effective engagement tool for getting these countries to work with us and amongst themselves and transfer it to AFRICOM——

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, let me state that I do recognize that we have a role to play there and that soft power certainly is helpful in helping them build economic advantages, etc., is a good thing. I just am concerned that we could possibly do that through our embassies versus having a military——

Admiral FALLON. The vast majority of our activities, even in the Horn of Africa, are in those nation-building areas and helping people.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. Thank you very much.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to be able to finish on time, gentlemen. It looks like Mr. Sestak has one more question. I will then yield to Mr. Hunter, and I will have one more question, and we may go over a couple of minutes, but we are going to make it.

Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Admiral, may I ask again a readiness issue—global strategic readiness.

To your point, sir, now the Army is recruiting and making close to its goal, but 42 percent of all our recruits are in the below-mental category—first time in decades—which will feed throughout the force for years to come. You even said that we need to be more engaged around the world, like Special Forces did. It is an intangible, but it is a risk not being out there.

Admiral, then in your testimony—written statement—you said conditions on the ground will be a major determinant in Iraq. By definition, that is an open-ended commitment. How do you know when the stop is? It is condition based.

How do you then signal the Iraqis—besides jaw-boning and watching—because that is what it sounded like your strategy was now for the south is "We will watch. They call us in." But how do you motivate them to assume greater responsibility in something that you will know is a place where they are as interested in the personal fiefdoms of those 32 agencies in controlling everything to do something?

And my other part of that is, therefore, are there also nations out there that say to us, "Not only I am worried about Iran, but can't you United States engage with them also much more to bring about a peaceful resolution?"

Admiral FALLON. In Iraq we are focusing on the Iraqi army as a priority and trying to encourage this institution to be representative of the whole country, and we are seeing significant progress. There was no doubt that a year ago many of the considerations for appointment of leaders were based on identity cards and where they came from and what they believed in terms of their religion

or place in the country. Increasingly, they are making good decisions to put the best leaders in place.

The army is generally representative of the country. They are undertaking some of these—to Chairman Hunter's comment earlier. They are getting smarter about it. They are deploying these folks in different parts of the country specifically to give them the experience of operating in different areas. You have got to start somewhere, and this one institution, which we think is most important for stability and security, is making progress in the business of neutralizing these sectarian things. That is our focus.

And we are not just sitting on this. Every day our Army and Marine units in country are more and more sliding back and giving responsibility to these Iraqi units and flying close wing on them to bring them. Some are doing a lot better than others, but that process is in work all over the country, and it is not a template. You can't say, "Five of these, this division," whatever, but it is in progress.

The rest of the region, we are trying to engage everywhere, as you know, doing the best we can, and I think we are doing pretty well in a lot of countries.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you very much.

I just wanted to say at how long and at what cost to that longer-term readiness.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for presiding over this very important day here.

And, gentlemen, thank you for your endurance.

Going back to my original question at the beginning of the hearing, Admiral, it is clear that you have really got two overlapping combatant commands in Afghanistan. Makes this a somewhat unusual war-fighting theater. You have got the combatant command European Command (EUCOM) under General Craddock's command, and you have got CENTCOM under your command.

Your command, the chain of command drives down through General Rodriguez and the American forces that are under Rodriguez, which is primarily—as I understand, he is the commander of all American forces in Afghanistan, but that is primarily that southeast sector, where the Americans are more heavily present.

The ISAF command, which drives down to General McNeil from EUCOM—from General Craddock—under its chain of command drives through General McNeil and includes, for example, the place where they have had a lot of contact and a lot of—and the European countries that are engaged there, and I think the Brits and the Canadians and the Danes have taken some casualties there in that southern sector where the Marines are going. That is under EUCOM.

So this is an unusual scenario. You have got a battlefield which—and I can't think of any similar situations which really has two separate American combatant commander chains of command.

And so my question would be would it be better for a General McNeil, for example, to wear two hats? To be the commander of the ISAF forces and to also be the commander of the American forces

in the same theater, thereby, obviously, allowing for a much better, I would think, integration of the operations that emerge from those two chains of command?

Admiral FALLON. Congressman, if I could take a stab at this one more time.

The key issue here is missions. NATO has accepted responsibility for one mission, and that is counterinsurgency. There are two other missions that, as the U.S. combatant commander, I have responsibility for. One is counterterrorism, our battle against al Qaeda and their affiliated terrorist groups worldwide but specifically in Afghanistan. Second is the nation-building mission.

It seems incongruous, but these same NATO nations that have troops on the ground in most cases—and there are other countries there as well—are contributing to Afghan reconstruction and nation building, but they are doing it in a bilateral basis and not taking up this mission.

If I could clarify something, General Rodriguez, the commander of RC East, works for General McNeil in the ISAF chain of command, which goes back to not EUCOM but to the NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) headquarters in Belgium. It is strictly NATO; it is not U.S.

Mr. HUNTER. But isn't that headed at the top by General Craddock as supreme allied commander?

Admiral FALLON. In his NATO hat, not in his U.S. hat.

Mr. HUNTER. His what?

Admiral FALLON. In his NATO hat, not in his U.S. hat.

Mr. HUNTER. Right, but the same person?

Admiral FALLON. Same person, but it is a NATO responsibility, NATO rules, NATO everything.

As the U.S. person, in our system we have one person someplace in the world responsible for every soldier, sailor, airman and Marine—that is me. I deal with that for the troops that are assigned to NATO through General Rodriguez as the senior U.S. military designated officer on the ground. And if I have an issue dealing with the safety, security of our people—not the tactical employment, operational employment—I deal with him.

There are other commanders, though, who work directly for me in Afghanistan. General Cone is the commander of our combined support and assistance team, responsibility for a lot of things, most importantly the training of the Afghan security forces. Reports directly to me. He has to work and coordinate with General McNeil, Rodriguez, everybody else out there, but he works for me.

General McChrystal, who is a Special Forces commander with responsibilities worldwide, reports to me for his assignments in Afghanistan. Those things also have to be coordinated with other commanders.

I have another commander, General Mulholland, Special Forces man, who works another piece of the problem in growing Afghan security forces with his Special Forces separate from McChrystal. He reports to me as well.

So these mission commanders that report directly to me. The ISAF NATO counterinsurgency mission is all in the NATO chain of command, they all report through McNeil, General Ramms and General Craddock in his NATO hat.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So the 3,200 Marines that are coming in—the 2,000-plus that are going to move into that AO that heretofore has been occupied by the Danes, Brits, Canadians, where there is some fighting that is taken place, who will they be under?

Admiral FALLON. The answer is two different people, not the same folks. The MAGTAF, the maneuver unit, is going to work for ISAF. They will work for General McNeil. The other people—the other battalion—the trainers are going to work for General Cone back up through me.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Will the chain of command for the Marines who are maneuver battalion, meaning they are going to be in contact, they are going to be undertaking military missions, they are going to have a chain of command up to McNeil——

Admiral FALLON. In NATO.

Mr. HUNTER. In NATO? So their immediate commander could be a Brit?

Admiral FALLON. Could be a Canadian.

Mr. HUNTER. Could be a Canadian?

Admiral FALLON. There will be chopped—tactical, I understand—General McNeil's business, but I would expect he would probably chop tactical control forces to the Canadian commander if they operate in the south. Right now there is a Canadian general in charge down there.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So the Marines could be chopped to Canadian——

Admiral FALLON. Tactically, yes.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Now in your estimation, this scenario you have just explained is—you think is efficient as it could be?

Admiral FALLON. No.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. What would you do to make it more efficient?

Admiral FALLON. Is it workable? Again, priorities. This is not the top priority in Afghanistan. The top priority is coordinating those nation-building things that are, in my opinion, all over the map.

The second priority is to get the people that are on the ground in the NATO chain of command all pulling on the oars to the same extent that others are, and so removing these caveats and removing these restrictions and letting them actually be effective in the full range of their capabilities are the priorities.

We can figure out—and we have done—and I think it is reasonably, well, always open to——

Mr. HUNTER. But, now, you told me that you are not in the business of trying to remove caveats, that is General Craddock's thing.

Admiral FALLON. They are all in the NATO chain of command.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, I guess to some degree I think that defines the problem that I have just tried to outline. If that is the case and it is important to remove those caveats but you are not in a position to do it, that is—although you are running a big piece of the operation there in Afghanistan. Why is that effective? Why is that good?

Admiral FALLON. I have, I believe, been effective in getting the results from the commanders who work for me in the field. I think we are making progress in those areas. I think there has been progress made in the ISAF responsibilities, but it could be a lot

better, in my opinion, if that chain of command could get those restrictions modified so that they had the full range of their capabilities.

That doesn't impinge on me other than as a taxpayer, and as a commander looking at this, it could be done more effectively, but it has nothing to do with whether McNeil has 1 hat or 50 hats. It has everything to do with whether those nations are willing to remove those caveats and let him effectively use—he has got every authority in the world to run that battlefield, but he doesn't have the individual authorities to employ those forces as he would like to.

Mr. HUNTER. I think that is true except I think that the fact that you, for example, can't weigh in to this fight to try to get more NATO participation—I mean, my gosh, Admiral, we are talking about an average of 100 people apiece per country, if you average it out, for the 26 NATO nations. And because we couldn't extract 100 people, even though we just moved 100,000 jobs to them of American taxpayer, paid-for tanker aircraft—couldn't extract 100 people per country, we are deploying those Marines.

So in terms of leadership—if leadership is getting people to sign up and find common ground with your cause, which is what we are trying to do in this war against terror, we have been pretty poor in leadership. And the fact that they are able to deflect this question to a different chain of command because it is not your job—it is not your baby—I think, allows them to avoid these moments of truth when we might be able to get the Europeans to sign up for these things.

So I think the proof is in the pudding. And not being able to extract a few more personnel from nations that have lots of money, robust industrial base, and presumably common cause in this war against terror, I think that denotes failure in that particular area, and I think part of that is because they can deflect these requests.

It is still a little difficult for me to understand about how we put the question to them in terms of getting more people out there. But we will try to run that dog down and figure out, eventually, how that happens. But we are obviously—they have been able to sidestep the question, and I can see the day when in that southern AO, where we have got lots of contact being made, we may end up with an Arizona shift taking place, where in the end, the American Marine contingent gets followed with another contingent and our other allies extract themselves from that position and it ends up with Americans being the only guys that are in strong contact in that AO.

Admiral Olson, do you have any comments on that?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I can limit my comments to the Special Operations participation in ISAF, which is growing, and it is not a good-news story yet, but it may be on the way there.

General Craddock has taken the step of establishing a NATO Special Operations coordination center and establish that around an American commander as the framework nation. We are less than half of the headquarters, and we are less than half of the forces assigned to ISAF within Special Operations, and it is becoming a little bit of a rallying point around which some of our NATO Special Operations forces are beginning to gel.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the extended hearing. I appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. You bet.

Thank you.

Admiral Fallon, let me ask a final question, if I may.

You seem to be suggesting that training and equipping the Afghan national security force is a key to success in the country of Afghanistan. Yet there has been a chronic shortage of trainers and mentors for those Afghan forces.

Secretary Gates recently told our committee that we are short about 3,000 trainers and mentors. As a result of this shortage, the completion date for training and equipment the Afghan forces is, frankly, uncertain.

And at a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 27 the Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell testified that the Afghan forces remain hampered by insufficient training and equipment, corruption and absenteeism.

Are we doing enough to address the problems? What should we be doing?

Admiral FALLON. Chairman, there is an outstanding requirement for, I think, the number is about 2,600 trainers that has been on the books here for at least the 10 months or so I have been here. We are going to meet about half of that requirement in another couple of months with those Marines. There is substantial progress addressing each of these woes and ills that are cited in the various list of shortcomings.

I am particularly encouraged by the results and the progress that I have seen in the Afghan army, in particular. The police, we have a longer way to go, and, frankly, we are directing most of this attention to the police now. The army is coming along. They are growing. They are anxious to take over.

I could give you lots of examples of things that I have seen in the past year where they have demonstrated an ability. They are growing. They are picking it up. Each of these shortcomings has been addressed, and there is progress in virtually every area, and I think it is coming together, and I think that it is, in my opinion—ought to be a continuing area of focus because this is the number-one issue in the security that is going to make progress in Afghanistan.

Notwithstanding the bigger issue, and that is governance, and it is the ability of President Karzai now and that government to pull together and to represent the people and the country to be able to do the things to make it a nation.

But I think we are definitely making progress in the security area. Could we use a few more troops? Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral Olson, Admiral Fallon. This has been an excellent hearing. We appreciate you being with us and staying with us through the vote, and with that, you have our gratitude, and we will dismiss.

[Whereupon, at 1:16 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

March 5, 2008

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 5, 2008

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON, U.S. NAVY

COMMANDER

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

5 MAR 2008

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

I. Introduction.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee:

On behalf of the men and women of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), I thank you for this opportunity to testify about the state of the command and to provide an assessment of security and stability in my Area of Responsibility (AOR), as well as our military strategy and operational requirements.

I would begin by highlighting the selfless service and sacrifice of our Service members and their families. This dedicated work on behalf of our nation merits recognition and credit for the substantial progress that has been achieved in security and stability during these past twelve months.

The CENTCOM AOR is large and diverse. It spans 6.5 million square miles and 27 countries stretching from the Horn of Africa, through the Middle East to the Central and South Asian States. These countries possess vast human and natural resource potential, have rich histories, and sit at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe. The region is home to nearly 700 million people, who speak more than 80 languages, identify with 50 or more ethnic groups, and are adherents of more than a dozen religions. Despite differences in language, culture, and history, we share basic aspirations with the peoples of the Middle East, East Africa, and Central and South Asia. They desire security and prosperity for their families, opportunities to make choices, and governments that respect their rights and respond to their basic needs.

This is the seventh consecutive year of combat operations in the CENTCOM AOR. I am pleased to report significant progress in security in Iraq. Our forces there, in concert with coalition partners and the increasingly competent Iraqi Security Forces

(ISF), have expanded areas of stability and brought a return to more normal life for the citizens of Iraq. Likewise, in Afghanistan, large areas of the country are generally stable, millions of children are in schools and the Afghan National Army (ANA) is growing in size and demonstrated performance. But challenges remain in both these countries and in other areas of the region. Violent extremism, weak governance, political crisis and lagging economic development are key inhibitors to long-term stability. Given the complexities of the region, two certainties stand out; there are no simple answers to the challenges, and enduring solutions require predominately non-military initiatives.

To advance U.S. security interests and regional stability, CENTCOM works with interagency and international partners to promote development and cooperation among nations, responds to crises, deters and, if necessary, defeats aggression. Success will require patience, thoughtful application of resources and commitment.

The strategy in support of this mission has focused efforts in five main areas: setting conditions for stability in Iraq; expanding governance and security in Afghanistan; degrading violent extremist networks and operations; strengthening relationships and influencing states and organizations to contribute to regional stability and the free flow of commerce; and posturing forces to build and sustain joint and combined war fighting capabilities and readiness.

II. Setting Conditions for Stability in Iraq.

United States and Coalition forces have operated continuously in the region since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and will soon enter the sixth year of combat operations in Iraq. Our objective is a unified, democratic and federal Iraq that can

govern, defend and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. We are pursuing this objective along political, security, economic, and diplomatic lines of operation. I can say with confidence that we are closer to our objective today than when I last testified.

The most significant development in Iraq over the last year has been a dramatic decrease in violence. By almost every measure, the security situation has improved significantly. This turnabout is the result of many complex and interrelated factors. The application of the "surge" deployment implemented last February, which increased troop levels and shifted our strategy to the priority task of protecting the population, has enhanced local security. The proximity of our troops to the populace and their shared experience in day-to-day life throughout the country has reversed the widespread anti-coalition attitude to a general acceptance and appreciation for our presence. This situation has been facilitated by the larger and more capable Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which have expanded the scale and effectiveness of operations against al-Qaida in Iraq and criminal Shia militias. The population has welcomed the widespread deployment of the Iraqi Army and is growing more comfortable with the Iraqi Police. Both of these forces are becoming more capable and competent as they assume an increasing share of security duties and boost reconciliation.

Equally important have been the growing rejection of al-Qaida by the Iraqi people and the genesis of the "awakening" movement, which has altered the local balance of power between extremists and security forces. More than 90,000 Iraqi men have volunteered to assume grass root security functions as Concerned Local Citizens, also known now as Sons of Iraq. These men are key partners who supplement uniformed security forces in their communities and provide invaluable intelligence about the violent

extremists. Although at this point, these groups are comprised primarily of Sunni Muslims, some Shia communities have started similar initiatives as Jaysh al-Mahdi extremists wear out their welcome.

While security in Iraq has improved dramatically and sectarian violence has greatly diminished, these gains are not irreversible. Multiple strains of violent extremism remain a threat to the government and populace, and some of these groups benefit from external support. From the East, Iran pursues a destabilizing political and ideological agenda and is a key source of finance, weapons and training support to lawless militia groups. In the West, foreign fighters continue to enter Iraq from Syria.

To sustain and build on improvements in security, Multi-National Force - Iraq conducts security operations with the ISF while transitioning, where conditions allow, to Iraqi led and conducted operations. More than 530,000 Iraqi soldiers and police officers now secure their country with notable improvement in capability and battlefield performance. With the ISF proving themselves in battle, the next steps in building the ISF will focus on enhancing capabilities in command and control, logistics, combat support functions, and other operational enablers. I believe our efforts to improve Iraq's Army and Police will help set the conditions for sustained security and enable future U.S. troop redeployments.

Meanwhile, the previously announced reduction of Brigade Combat Teams from 20 to 15 is underway, along with several Marine Corps battalions and some enabling forces. General Petraeus is preparing a response to a Planning Order from me to consider scenarios for the post-July 2008 period in Iraq and to provide recommendations on the pace and scope of a further reduction of forces from Iraq. His recommendations will be

considered by the Chain of Command and our inputs, along with his, will be forwarded to the President for his consideration. Recommendations will consider the existing security situation, progress of the ISF and their readiness to assume responsibility for security. The conditions on the ground will be a major determinant of future moves.

Progress in governance lags behind security, but there are signs of improvement. To sustain the security gains, a general improvement in government effectiveness and the enactment of legislative guarantees are required. Iraqi political leaders have begun demonstrating the will and skills to move this process forward. The recent passage of the 2008 National Budget, Provincial Powers, Amnesty, and de-Ba'athification laws are significant accomplishments. The Presidency Council returned the Provincial Powers Law to the Council of Representatives but with the assurance that preparations for provincial elections this fall should continue. Meanwhile, the Government of Iraq continues to work toward other important legislation including Hydrocarbon and Election laws and the referendum on Kirkuk.

Economic development is a key component of sustained growth and reconciliation. The Government of Iraq has improved budget execution and increased allocations to provinces and ministries. Iraqi and Coalition initiatives to secure critical infrastructure and a substantial investment in repair and refurbishment have resulted in greater oil production and revenue from oil sales. The international community is playing an increasing and welcome role in Iraq. The Neighbors Conference Ministerial meetings have contributed to stabilization efforts. France is actively reaching out to Iraq while Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait are considering the re-opening of diplomatic offices in Baghdad. The UN designated a new Special Representative to

Iraq, who has demonstrated strong initiative and a keen understanding of the situation. The UN also dramatically increased its assistance mission, while the Security Council passed a new Chapter 7 mandate for the Coalition to operate in Iraq until 31 December 2008.

Looking to the future and as U.S. forces are withdrawn, we are planning to normalize long-term bilateral relations through a framework agreement that reflects our shared political, economic, cultural and security interests, as well as a Status of Forces Agreement. These agreements will establish authorities and jurisdictions for U.S. and Coalition forces operating in Iraq beyond 2008. The documents will allow us maximum flexibility to assist the Government of Iraq in the fight against al-Qaeda, develop its security forces and combat harmful influences inside Iraq while, at the same time, protecting our own forces. As Iraq increasingly asserts its sovereignty, we want to continue to assist in developing the Iraqi capacity to secure and defend their country.

III. Expand Governance and Security in Afghanistan.

U.S. and Coalition forces support international efforts to assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to provide security, improve stability, and enhance development and governance. Within Afghanistan, the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commands the security mission while CENTCOM leads the military capacity building and counter-terror efforts. These command structures require close coordination between CENTCOM and NATO.

Despite increased violence in 2007, most visibly in the form of suicide attacks, Afghan and Coalition forces have degraded the ability of the Taliban and other insurgents

to execute coordinated and effective attacks. The Coalition has maintained relentless pressure on the insurgents, and as a result, the enemy has shifted most of its effort to targeting police and civilians. The recent increase in suicide attacks is a concern and may give the perception that the insurgents have grown stronger. In reality, most of their successful attacks are confined to about 10 percent of total districts, while the vast majority of Afghans deny support to the violent extremists.

The successes in Khowst Province are one example. Long considered ungovernable and one of the most dangerous provinces in Afghanistan, Khowst has been turned around by Afghan and Coalition counterinsurgency operations. Tangible improvement in governance, reconstruction, development and security have been noted and are good examples for application elsewhere in the country.

The increase in U.S. forces planned for this spring will reinforce our momentum while enabling accelerated growth of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). CENTCOM recently concurred with an initiative to expand the authorized end strength of the ANA from 70,000 to 80,000 soldiers. The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is scheduled to complete the fielding of 80,000 ANA personnel by the end of 2010. Meanwhile a Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force will deploy this spring and bolster the ISAF maneuver forces in Regional Command–South.

The ANA has taken the lead in more than 30 significant operations to date and has demonstrated increasing competence, effectiveness and professionalism. Operation MAIWAND executed last summer in the Andar District of Ghazni Province is an example of recent progress. Planned, rehearsed, and executed under the direction of the

Afghan 203rd Corps Commander, a combined ANA and NATO ISAF task force cleared the entire district and removed a Taliban shadow governor. This well-integrated security operation was quickly exploited with the synchronized application of governance and development efforts consisting of medical treatment for 2,300 citizens, 10 new schools, the delivery of 260 tons of humanitarian aid and one million dollars committed toward additional development. This operation resulted in significant disruption to enemy forces in Ghazni Province and is a manifestation of the growth and maturation of ANSF as well as the spread of governance and development.

The Afghanistan National Police (ANP) are improving, although at a slower pace than the ANA. While police competence has progressed in many areas, corruption, poor leadership, pay issues and equipment shortfalls challenge this organization. A new initiative, led by CSTC-A, called the Focused District Development plan and implemented late last year, shows great promise. This initiative withdraws local police from selected districts, replacing them temporarily with highly trained and effective Afghan National Civil Order Police. The local police then receive two months of immersion in a concentrated program of instruction by carefully selected mentors to upgrade their professional performance, equipment and confidence. Local police units then return to their districts as much more capable forces and better able to serve their communities.

Recruiting for both the Army and Police has shown a positive trend. Despite increased targeting of ANSF personnel and high casualty rates, Afghans continue to enlist in large numbers. This demonstrates confidence in the government and their future (as well as a strong need for employment opportunities). Proper training of these

dedicated volunteers will take time, and additional U.S. personnel will be needed to fill key shortfalls in training capacity. A battalion of U.S. Marines will deploy to support and mentor the ANP this spring in an effort to boost ANP capability.

Setting the conditions necessary for economic growth is essential to long-term security and stability. Afghanistan has come a long way in seven years. Since 2001, Gross Domestic Product, per capita income and Foreign Direct Investment are all up. There has been considerable growth in Afghanistan's domestic revenues as well as international reserves, which have nearly doubled since 2004. However, Afghanistan still faces formidable economic challenge. The Afghan government remains overly dependent on foreign aid, with official revenues covering only 20% of recurrent costs. Inflation, particularly for food and fuel, is rising. Access to credit is limited, and few Afghans are able to borrow.

Four strategic economic priorities support the counterinsurgency effort. These include embracing free market economic policy, enhancing government resources, addressing inflation and implementing structural reforms. Staying the free market course means resisting costly new subsidies, which serve to reduce resources for other more constructive expenditures in areas like infrastructure, education and health care. U.S. and international community efforts are assisting the Afghan government move toward a sustainable fiscal policy to generate revenue, manage resources and operate without massive foreign financial support. The international community is also trying to boost economic growth by modernizing the infrastructure, particularly in the areas of electrical power, road construction, water management and agricultural development. Our Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are key elements in these endeavors, and

they have brought real improvement directly to the populace. Finally, trade is benefiting, albeit slowly, from growing regional integration. On March 3, Afghanistan is scheduled to join the South Asian Free Trade Area, bringing greater access to and integration with six other regional countries.

Narcotics remain a significant challenge for Afghanistan and the international community. Opium production in Afghanistan increased substantially in 2007. The narcotics trade dissuades work and investment in legitimate activities, provides the insurgents with a lucrative source of funding and contributes heavily to heroin addiction in Central Asia, Europe and increasingly in East Africa. We will continue to work with the interagency and international partners to reverse this negative trend. Of note, the ANA is standing up a new Counter-narcotics battalion for the single purpose of poppy eradication. This unit is in training and is expected to deploy this spring to destroy (by plowing under) poppy plants in fields when found.

Our commitment to the Afghan government and people seeks to shape a future of a moderate and stable Afghanistan as a key regional partner. There is a general sense of optimism and determination among the Afghan leaders and people. They regularly voice their appreciation for our assistance. Enduring success will require additional, well coordinated Coalition resources and support.

IV. Degrading Violent Extremist Networks and Operations.

Whether sponsored by Iran, enabled by Syrian acquiescence or motivated by networks such as al-Qaida and its associated movements, violent extremism is a serious danger to regional and global security. We must identify, mobilize against and confront

this menace as its anachronistic worldview and murderous tactics threaten people and stability worldwide. While our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, we will use all available methods to build regional and international momentum for moderate behavior while eroding support for violent extremist ideology.

The highest priority in our counter-terror efforts is to defeat al-Qaida. Part of this effort, but not an end to itself, is the removal of senior al-Qaida leaders. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, we and our partners have captured or killed terrorists, diminished safe havens, driven leaders underground and restricted their operating space. Despite these efforts, challenges continue as our enemies work to reconstitute their networks. Critical to countering these violent extremists is the denial of the sanctuaries, nation-state support and lines of communication that sustain them. These militant Islamist terrorists attract recruits from a large, worldwide pool of disaffected young people. Unfortunately, their tactics and radical ideology remain almost unchallenged by voices of moderation. In response, we will enhance our intelligence capabilities, develop partner nation capacities, strengthen information sharing, disrupt illicit lines of communication and work to prevent terrorist organizations from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. All of these actions will require inter-agency and international coordination and cooperation.

Equally important to defeating al-Qaida and other extremist groups is de-legitimizing the underlying social and political movements that support them. To diminish the radical social movements from which our enemies derive their strength, we must maintain operational pressure on their networks while building capacity in governance and security that help at-risk societies address problems that foster internal

and local grievances. This work requires empowering credible experts to expose the flaws and internal contradictions of the enemy's ideology; provide viable, competing alternative worldviews; and contest the intellectual "safe harbors" where extremist ideas incubate.

Defeating extremists and their ideology would be easier if they did not have state sponsors. Iran and Syria have not cooperated with efforts to combat terrorism and promote reconciliation. Their policies and actions threaten the internal security of their neighbors and the collective stability of the region. The Iranian regime provides Shia militia groups in Iraq with training, funding and weapons including lethal Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs), a particularly deadly form of Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Iran continues to employ surrogates in Lebanon and Gaza, providing money and weapons to Hezbollah and Hamas, threatening the stability of Lebanon and undercutting the future of Palestinians, as well as engaging in confrontational activity in the Gulf.

Iran's most destabilizing activity has been the pursuit of nuclear weapons technology in defiance of the international community, International Atomic Energy Agency and United Nations Security Council. A nuclear-armed Iran would further threaten regional stability, potentially trigger an arms race and increase the potential for extremists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

The Syrian government continues to meddle in Lebanon. Its support for Hezbollah is destabilizing the country, and it stonewalls the investigation into the Rafik Hariri assassination.

Over the past five years, terrorists, suicide bombers and foreign fighters have traveled through Syria to attack Iraqi and Coalition forces. The government in Damascus

has tolerated the presence and operations of Iraqi Sunni extremists who have fueled the fighting in Baghdad and elsewhere in the country.

In Lebanon, the government is confronted by opposition groups and violent protests, but the Lebanese Armed Forces are maintaining a fragile order. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese have stood up publicly against assassination and terror, and for their elected government and a peaceful, prosperous future. The international community continues to support the popularly elected government in Beirut and its legitimately constituted and disciplined security forces.

V. Strengthening Relationships and Influencing States and Organizations to Contribute to Regional Stability and the Free Flow of Commerce.

To increase prospects for long-term stability and security in the region, we are working to strengthen relationships between and among these nations and the United States. We also trying to influence states and organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council to contribute to regional stability and work to ensure the free flow of commerce and positive economic growth.

During the course of my numerous trips to the region, I have developed relationships with most of my military counterparts and many of their political leaders. The foundation of these partnership building efforts is our Theater Security Cooperation program, which helps develop the security capabilities of current and prospective coalition partners, builds and supports effective regional security arrangements and interoperability, and synchronizes efforts with other U.S. government agencies. More importantly, these programs forge personal relationships between the U.S. and partners in

the region, enhancing mutual trust and confidence and facilitating the effective operations of our commands.

The CENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation program is built on a foundation of enduring relationships. The synchronized efforts of all the elements of U.S. and international power are key to success. We are fortunate to have a number of close, reliable partner nations. Five of these countries, **Egypt**, **Jordan**, **Kuwait**, **Bahrain** and **Pakistan**, are Major non-NATO Allies, and of those, **Jordan** and **Bahrain** are Free Trade Agreement partners. Our Theater Security Cooperation Strategy enables regional stability and advances security efforts that protect vital U.S. national interests and helps partners build capacities to combat terror and become self-reliant.

Department of State programs such as Foreign Military Funding (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) are vital to build enduring security relationships. Attendance at U.S. institutions and courses of instruction by foreign military personnel offers exposure to our ideas, principles, standards and most importantly, our people. The resulting personal relationships have proven invaluable in building long-term trust and access. In my experience, withholding IMET funds inhibits the ability to influence the positive transformation of regional military forces. Additionally, authorities for building global partnership capacity proposed in Title 13 of the draft FY09 National Defense Authorization Act will give me the tools I need to support our partners in the War on Terror more effectively and efficiently than current authorities. Passage of this legislation will allow CENTCOM to use existing authorities to train and equip partner nations' non-military security services in addition to national military forces, and to engage in a wider range of combined exercises, training, and

personnel and information exchanges. It will also give more field commanders the authority to spend Commander's Emergency Response Program funds, give rewards for valuable information and integrate a wider range of Department of State capabilities with our military ones. However, it will still require advance notification to Congress, thereby maintaining appropriate levels of transparency and oversight.

In order to facilitate multi-lateral engagement between our partners, I hosted the inaugural CENTCOM Chiefs of Defense Conferences in Tampa, bringing together senior military officers from 19 of the 27 nations in our region. These conferences were very well received and bolstered the stature and acceptance of the Iraqi and Afghan Defense Chiefs. Additionally, the unprecedented engagement between participants reduced suspicion and enhanced trust while cementing personal relationships.

Military exercises enable our troops to operate with partner forces and improve interoperability as well as demonstrate capabilities. Our forces have participated in 49 combined exercises throughout the AOR, including multi-lateral exercises in **Qatar**, the **United Arab Emirates (UAE)**, **Egypt** and **Kazakhstan**. Qatar hosted an exercise focused on air defense and consequence management called EAGLE RESOLVE for the third consecutive year. This event has strengthened defense cooperation among many of our regional partners. The UAE hosted three air exercises, two of them at the Gulf Air Warfare Center, which focused on multi-lateral cooperation and interoperability among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. Egypt hosted CENTCOM's longest standing cooperative exercise, BRIGHT STAR, for 13 partner nations. After 25 years, this exercise continues to be relevant and has grown to emphasize strategic level engagement. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan hosted exercise REGIONAL COOPERATION, which

enhanced interoperability and integration between the various disaster preparedness and consequence management ministries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. By bringing together units from various nations to cooperate in response to realistic and challenging scenarios, these exercises hone the skills of US and partner military forces while enhancing regional stability and security.

Following are highlights of the development of key relationships in the region:

Egypt is a key ally, strongly supporting the Middle East Peace Process and U.S. regional initiatives. Our close relations greatly aid our efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on Terror by providing expedited Suez Canal transits for U.S. warships, over flights and access to basing. Egypt has maintained a Field Hospital and medical staff in Afghanistan since 2003 that continues to provide medical care and training. Egypt has signaled its intent to help combat smuggling into the Gaza strip through the purchase of technical equipment that could assist Egyptian security forces detect and exploit tunnels, a requirement that has assumed even greater importance in light of recent events. Egypt is one of the largest contributors to the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur with some 1,200 Egyptian soldiers and police officers. FMF significantly contributes to the modernization and interoperability of the Egyptian Armed Forces, which helps provide stability in the Suez Canal area and the Levant.

The prospects for positive change in Egyptian governance are enhanced by our close interaction on regional security matters. These relations also ensure continued Egyptian support for our regional presence and operations and demonstrate that when we make a commitment, we keep it. For these reasons, I urge Congress to continue its support for Egyptian FMF levels.

Horn of Africa and Yemen. The nations in the Horn of Africa (**Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea** and the **Seychelles**) face border and ethnic tensions, insurgencies, corruption, terrorist infiltrations and poverty. CENTCOM's Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF- HOA) conducts operations, training, and humanitarian missions in the Horn of Africa and Yemen to build partner nation military capability, improve quality of life, expand governance, strengthen bilateral relationships and build partner nations' military capability. Cooperation of these nations with us contributes to building their own capacity to combat terrorism and prepare for other challenges, including natural disasters. CENTCOM is working closely with U.S. Africa Command to ensure our relations continue to strengthen as the new geographic command prepares to assume its responsibilities.

Ethiopia is a key regional strategic ally and close partner in the war on terror. This strong bilateral relationship was readily evident in the wake of Ethiopia's initial military operations in Somalia to support the Transitional Federal Government against radical insurgents. Ethiopia has also demonstrated strategic importance by its considerable contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions, such as the UN Mission in Liberia and its pledge of 5,000 peacekeepers for the UN African Union Mission in Darfur. Our support for the efforts of the Ethiopian military to modernize and professionalize will be critical to the government's ability to address security threats effectively and in conformity with international norms.

Ethiopia has, however, refused to evacuate disputed territory on its border with **Eritrea**, despite the fact the United Nations Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission made its final ruling in favor of Eritrea's claim. Eritrea has denied supplies to the United

Nations mission there in order to force it to depart. President Isaias Afwerki's government also sponsors violent extremists in Somalia, and there is evidence it does the same in Ethiopia. Eritrea's treatment of its own people is no better, as Isaias has jailed all political opponents and devastated what had been a relatively healthy economy. As long as Eritrea is aggressive toward its neighbors and repressive against its own people, the amount of assistance CENTCOM can provide will be severely limited.

Kenya. The just signed power-sharing agreement between President Kibaki and Orange Democratic Movement leader Raila Odinga is encouraging. While we should remain vigilant for signs of a return to political crisis and ethnic violence, I believe Kenya's strong institutional foundations can be a basis for long-term stability. Kenya provides a traditional locale for the U.S. and the international community to conduct relief and rescue operations in regional trouble spots and is a key contributor to regional conflict resolution and counter-terrorism efforts. Historically, Kenya has been one of our closest and staunchest partners against terrorism. America's interests are to assist Kenya in countering the terrorist threat, support the processes of political and economic reform, help raise the standard of living, combat health crises and protect Kenya's resource base.

Djibouti. This small, peaceful and tolerant Muslim country is an island of stability in a region characterized by tension and violence. Djibouti is a key security partner as it hosts CJTF-HOA and provides refueling facilities for Coalition Naval vessels. Djibouti is also the warehouse location for pre-positioned emergency food relief used by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in times of crisis. As this country undergoes potentially rapid change while developing a new port complex, the continued support for CJTF-HOA in cooperation with other elements of the interagency will be

critical to ensure the benefits of growth are distributed in a way that promotes stability and democratic development.

Sudan. In 2007, tension between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the southern Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) increased due to the slow implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). These tensions culminated in the SPLM temporarily withdrawing from the Government of National Unity in Khartoum. We anticipate additional tension in 2008 due to expected delays in the CPA-mandated national census. In Darfur, the deployment of the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur will remain behind schedule due to NCP obstructionism. Multiple attempts to unite the Darfur rebels failed to bring about a cohesive group prior to renewed peace talks, exacerbating insecurity and the humanitarian crisis.

Somalia. Military, humanitarian and political conditions deteriorated significantly in Somalia during 2007 and could further deteriorate in 2008. Initially fractured in early 2007, the al-Qaida associated Somali resistance, supported politically by Eritrea, have regained control of much of southern and central Somalia. We will work closely with our regional partners to prevent harm to our broader interests, mitigate the humanitarian challenges and support efforts to achieve a political settlement.

Seychelles. Our relationship with the stable, democratic government of Seychelles focuses on countering coastal security threats and improving disaster preparedness. Through joint exercises with the Seychelles Coast Guard we are working to build their capacity to plan and conduct operations to counter transnational threats.

Lebanon. Since November 2007, Lebanon's already tenuous political situation has worsened. The government and opposition see the stalled Presidential election

process and the subsequent cabinet formation as crucial to their interests. The country remains politically stymied as the Hezbollah-led opposition, with its Syrian and Iranian allies, attempt to use the vacuum in the presidency as leverage to control future decision-making in the country. Syria will continue to pressure its allies to refuse any compromise knowing that the election of a Western leaning government will likely lead to the rapid implementation of the Special Tribunal to charge the assassins of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Damascus fears this will implicate high-ranking Syrian officials and their Lebanese allies. These political battles have grown violent as evidenced by assassinations of political and security leaders. In addition, bombs have targeted high-ranking members of the security establishment as well as US Embassy employees.

A well-armed and well-trained Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is a potential unifying force. The multi-confessional LAF, with its members drawn from all of the country's communities, enjoys broad support from the Lebanese people. The LAF demonstrated resolve and courage during its 102 day fight in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp last year – a victory that would have been far more costly were it not for the support of the United States and key allies like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. CENTCOM special operations forces enhanced LAF effectiveness by providing training during the months preceding operations at Nahr al-Barid. While addressing the short-term needs of the LAF, we are focusing on its long-term development. The $220 million FMF supplemental approved by Congress in 2007 is contributing significantly to this effort, but we must continue the process and strengthen our bilateral military relationship to resist efforts by Syria, Iran and their Hezbollah surrogates to undermine the sovereignty of Lebanon.

Jordan is a regional leader in security and counter-terror training and one of our strongest partners. In 2007, Jordan hosted a large multi-national Special Operations exercise as well as six other military exercises. It also hosts the Peace Operations Training Center, the International Police Training Center, the Cooperative Management Center and the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center. Additionally, Jordanian doctors and nurses operate and provide training in much needed hospitals in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Consistently supportive of our role and presence in the region, Jordan has played a major role in promoting stability and reconciliation in Western Iraq, supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces and training Palestinian Authority Security Forces. Currently, more than 1,000 Palestinian authority security personnel are receiving essential police training in Jordan.

Although it placed enormous stress on public services, Jordanian leaders opened their country to hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fleeing the violence in their own country. Jordanian efforts to improve border security are exemplary and set the standard for the region. U.S. military and economic assistance to Jordan are wise investments for a peaceful, secure and prosperous region.

Arabian Gulf States. We have improved participation and cooperation with the GCC states of **Kuwait**, **Bahrain**, **Qatar**, the **UAE**, **Oman** and **Saudi Arabia**. Of note, **Iraq** has participated in GCC multi-lateral discussions and as an observer during exercises. Developing these relationships will eventually lead to greater security and economic opportunity for the entire region. Each of these nations has been a valuable

contributor to our mutual security efforts providing essential base and port access, overflight rights and additional force protection for U.S. units in the region.

Our strong partnership with **Kuwait** is vital to the CENTCOM mission. Kuwait hosts the Combined Forces Land Component Command and provides a staging area for Coalition forces entering and departing Iraq. Military operations in Iraq would not be possible without critical support provided by Kuwait in the form of fuel, electricity, water, meals, waived customs fees and many other allowances totaling about a billion dollars per year. The military-to military relationship with Kuwait grows stronger through a robust military sales program and an extensive program of combined exercises.

The **Kingdom of Saudi Arabia** has achieved significant success with an initiative to cut off funding to terrorists and restrain violence. Saudi leaders have enacted tough anti-terrorism laws, established a Financial Intelligence Unit to combat illegal "charities" that ultimately fund al-Qaeda and have built indigenous special operations and counter-terror forces capacity. They have also made efforts to reform their educational system and have promoted the ideals of tolerance and moderation in their leading mosques and promote rehabilitation programs for security prisoners. Saudi Arabia has been helpful in our efforts to support the stability and independence of the legitimate government of Lebanon. Our military relationship is based on extensive interaction between armed forces and a robust military sales program that we expect to grow in coming years. It is enhanced by a U.S. advisory presence in the Kingdom and by our training of Saudi military personnel.

Bahrain and the U.S. have enjoyed a close military relationship for more than a half a century. Today, Manama hosts U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. In addition,

a Bahraini officer currently commands Coalition Task Force 152 with responsibility for Maritime Security in the Arabian Gulf. Bahrain hosted an Iraq Coalition conference this past October and is a strong supporter in the struggle against terror. In the past year, I attended the Manama Dialogue in Bahrain, and the Forum on U.S.-Islamic Relations in Qatar. These two widely respected fora are strongly supported by the host nations and allow leaders the opportunity to benefit from extensive engagement on substantive regional issues.

We are grateful to **Qatar** for hosting the CENTCOM forward headquarters at Camp As Saliyah and our Combined Air Operations Center at al-Udeid Air Base. The excellent military-to-military relationship with the Qatar Armed Forces is robust and mutually beneficial. Access to the airbase at al-Udeid facilitates air operations in the AOR. Doha also provides substantial in-kind support to U.S. forces, significantly offsetting the cost of our operations from there. Additionally, they have participated in the Gulf Security Dialogue meetings with the Departments of State and Defense in order to build infrastructure and systems necessary to improve deterrence.

The **UAE** has emerged as a staunch coalition partner, contributing to the continued security and stability of the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. In addition to access for air assets at the Al Dhafra Airbase, the Emirates provide nearly continuous access for Navy ships in the port of Jebel Ali. It is a leading partner in the campaign against terror, providing assistance in military, diplomatic and financial areas. Our military-to-military relationship ties are a key element of our excellent bi-lateral relations. We expect these relations to strengthen as the UAE serves as a regional example of the benefits of private sector growth and broadened opportunity for individual choice. The

Emiratis are leading the Shared Early Warning initiative in the Gulf and have a robust Foreign Military Sales Missile Defense request pending.

Oman is a stable, secure and cooperative partner. The Sultanate allows the storage of important war reserve material, and its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz is a uniquely vital strategic position. We have had an enduring relationship with Oman since the early part of the 19th Century, and they have provided strong support for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Our cooperation with Oman in areas such as education and economic development support Oman's own measured path to economic growth and more participatory governance.

Pakistan. The recent election in Pakistan was encouraging and offers the potential for a peaceful return to democracy and much needed stabilization for this populous country. It is important to note that the Pakistani Armed Forces did not arbitrate these elections, but they did provide the essential security that enabled a generally peaceful process. Senior Pakistani leaders understand the threat of violent extremism to their country and are taking steps to transform their security institutions to be more effective in combating these challenges. The military aid we have provided in all forms has been critical in the fight against extremists inside Pakistan, particularly along the western frontier adjacent to Afghanistan. Pakistan has successfully deployed more than 100,000 troops to the western frontier, directly engaged al-Qaida, the Taliban and foreign fighters.

Pakistani security forces have captured and killed significant numbers of violent extremists, to include high-ranking leaders of al-Qaida and the Taliban. They have also suffered extensive casualties. Our long-term partnership with Pakistan is central to

defeating extremist groups in the region, and it is difficult to imagine success in that struggle without its support and cooperation. We are working together to reduce the tensions stemming from the radical and violent extremist presence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Ongoing initiatives include regular meetings with Pakistan's military leaders, enhanced liaison and communications among our units operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and a Security Development Plan, which includes initiatives to establish a Frontier Corps Training Center, assist the Frontier Corps (FC) in establishing new Wings (battalion equivalent) and improve indigenous intelligence operation capabilities. Advisors will share lessons learned in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency mission sets, and FC personnel will be provided with modern equipment. Also, Sector Headquarters and Border Coordination Centers will be established to improve shared situational awareness and de-conflict border operations with coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Pakistan remains a strong partner of the United States, and our support for its counter-terror efforts will continue with a variety of focused programs. Our security cooperation funding and bilateral exercise programs help the Pakistani government conduct counter-terror operations, develop its counterinsurgency capacity and enhance its internal stability. In this critical time of democratic change it is vital that Pakistan view the U.S. as a long term trusted partner, particularly in our efforts to defeat common enemies.

Middle East Peace Process. Any discussion of security and stability in the region must include the Middle East Peace Process. Recent efforts to revive this effort

are positive. A peaceful two-state solution that offers justice and security to Palestinians and Israel would negate the widespread perception of inequity in the Arab world.

Central Asian States. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and **Uzbekistan.** These five nations in Central Asia, are strategically important to the U.S., welcome greater interaction with us and play an increasing role in the global energy market. They reject violent extremists and all, save Uzbekistan with whom we have just reestablished a military dialogue, cooperate with the U.S. in a variety of security initiatives.

Kazakhstan is a valued partner in Iraq and offers the potential to serve as a regional leader for economic growth and prosperity. Kazakhstan is a key player in east-west trade and the potential northern nexus of a trade route that could stretch south to Pakistan, linking the less developed nations in the region with access to international markets in the Middle East, Europe and Asia. With regard to its security needs, we have been assisting Kazakhstan in refining its defense strategy, modernizing its armed forces and development of its peacekeeping forces.

Kyrgyzstan is rebuilding political stability after the turmoil of the past few years and hosts a U.S. presence at Manas Air Base, a key logistics node that facilitates operations in Afghanistan. We are seeking new and innovative ways to help develop the capabilities and capacity of Kyrgyz security forces to meet internal requirements and to contribute to regional stability.

Economic woes, an energy deficit and narcotics trafficking challenge **Tajikistan,** one of the poorest nations in the region. Tajikistan has made progress in building national unity, but much work remains. I am encouraged by Tajikistan's willingness to

participate in international peacekeeping efforts, and our security cooperation programs are focused on helping Dushanbe build its capacity and secure it borders.

Turkmenistan is slowly but steadily emerging from the self-isolation of former President Niyazov. President Berdimuhamedov has loosened up internal controls, reached out to neighbors in need and demonstrated a stiff spine by halting gas exports to Iran for non-payment of agreed fees. Turkmenistan has expanded cooperation with us on a range of military-to-military activities and recently approved funding for a UN Drug Control program office in Turkmenistan. They have actively assisted our efforts in support Afghanistan operations.

We have reinstituted a security relationship with **Uzbekistan** after a hiatus of about three years following the expulsion of our forces from Karshi-Khanabad airbase, in the wake of the Uzbek government's response to an attempted extremist takeover of the town of Andijan in 2005. I met with President Karimov in January, and we welcome the opportunity to reverse the deterioration in relations between the U.S. and Uzbekistan, encourage better regional cooperation and reopen a dialogue to address issues of reform and human rights.

Throughout Central Asia, there is an opportunity to positively influence the future development of these countries. We are encouraging greater economic, political and security cooperation among these five states. Greater sustained diplomatic engagement, military aid and economic assistance would further mutual interests.

VI. Posturing the Force to Build and Sustain Joint and Combined Warfighting Capabilities and Readiness

Joint and Coalition Operations. Joint and combined war fighting capability and readiness are fundamental to our ability to prosecute ongoing military operations, maintain a credible presence to deter aggression and respond effectively to contingencies. Because we execute nearly all of our activities jointly and in concert with allies, we must cultivate effective inter-service and multi-national ways of doing business. Existing examples of such integration include the Multi-National Headquarters in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa. Because our region is filled with uncertainty, we must maintain a full spectrum of responsive capabilities through an effective forward deployed force structure, thorough planning and realistic combined training exercises. Other critical capabilities include the following:

A Strong Coalition. Currently there are 41 partner nations with troops in Afghanistan and 31 with personnel in Iraq. They bring important mission capabilities but also significant integration challenges. Blending capabilities of these countries into effective action requires, among other factors, a command and control infrastructure that accounts for remote locations, multiple languages, cultural differences and challenging force protection issues. Our Coalition must share classified and sensitive information when appropriate and have the networks and infrastructure to facilitate such exchanges.

Interagency Coordination. Establishment of security and stability in our region requires the application of all elements of national power: military, diplomatic, economic and information. The military instruments can set conditions for security but other agencies foster lasting change.

We are fortunate to have several U.S. Government entities engaged in the Central Command AOR. The Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security, as well as subordinate agencies including the U.S. Agency for International Development, Diplomatic Security Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Coast Guard, are actively engaged in our theater. Their efforts are helping to protect critical infrastructure, prevent terrorist attacks on our homeland, train fledgling law enforcement organizations and rebuild damaged or aging infrastructure. There is clearly a need for better integration and more comprehensive application of all the elements of national power.

Flexible Logistics. Strategic airlift, rapid sealift, pre-positioned inventories and access to bases with critical infrastructure are the key logistics components which support operational flexibility. Our primary focus in this area remains the timely deployment, equipping, and sustainment of units engaged in combat operations. As an example, the rapid fielding of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles to our troops would not have been possible without the highly flexible contingency air and sealift capabilities. We will leverage commercial air and surface distribution across the theater and pursue initiatives to improve theater-wide logistics cost savings and work force reductions. We will continue working with the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State and partner nations to ensure access to the infrastructure we need to support ongoing and future operations.

Adaptable Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Capabilities. Interoperable, high-volume communications systems are essential to conducting operations across a dispersed

command space. Our systems operate near full capacity daily with little surge capability. Because many of our needs must be satisfied by commercial providers, access to them is critical. The largest challenge we face is integration of disparate systems into interoperable and reliable networks. We must embrace policies that enable successful integration and technologies that result in effective interoperability and efficient information-sharing.

Ultimately, our ability to target violent extremists depends on precise and actionable intelligence. We continue to evolve our techniques and procedures to optimize efforts to "find, fix, finish and exploit" targets. Our adversaries have been agile in adapting to our operations. We continue to improve battle space awareness, seeking greater specificity, detail and timeliness of intelligence whenever possible. We are aggressively seeking ways to manage shortfalls or capability gaps in imagery intelligence, wide area coverage, sensor integration, signals intelligence, moving target indicators, layered Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) architecture, biometrics, counterintelligence and human collectors. Your support of our intelligence needs is much appreciated, and I solicit your continued funding of these critical items.

Responsive Counter Improvised Explosive Device Program. Insurgents' weapon of choice will likely continue to be the IED, or road-side bomb. They are cheap, effective, and anonymous and have been adapted to include toxic industrial chemicals such as chlorine. While some are crude, our adversaries increasingly use sophisticated technology, including EFPs from Iran. These weapons have killed or wounded thousands of military and civilian personnel in Iraq, and IEDs are becoming increasingly prevalent in Afghanistan.

To counter this threat, and working with the interagency and our Coalition partners, we are fielding jammers, specialized route clearance vehicles and equipment and improved vehicle and personnel protective armor. The most effective counter to the IED is targeting the human networks which supply, train and employ the devices. We have pressed this approach through a comprehensive application of ISR. These initiatives have reduced IED effectiveness. We must continue to develop new technologies, tactics, techniques and procedures. Of particular importance to CENTCOM is continued fielding of MRAP vehicles, and further research and development to improve the detection of mines, IEDs and unexploded ordnance.

Personnel. Sustained operations in the CENTCOM AOR depend on personnel who have foreign language proficiency and cultural awareness competency in addition to military skills. Retention is a critical issue, and we depend heavily on quality of life enhancements such as Combat Zone Tax Relief, Imminent Danger Pay and Special Leave Accrual. The Rest and Recuperation program continues to be a success, serving more than 590,000 troops to date. Over the past year, we have conducted a comprehensive review of the manning of our headquarters, which, after six years of war, is still highly reliant on temporary individual augmentation personnel. My subordinate war fighting headquarters are also heavily manned with individual augmentees. I am committed to working with the Services and the Joint Staff to properly size and resource all of these headquarters.

CENTCOM is also working to address requirements for low density skills. Our present inventory of language and intelligence specialists (especially human intelligence) and counterintelligence agents does not support current requirements. Language

expertise is crucial in counterinsurgency, counterterrorist and counterintelligence operations and will continue to be in high demand. Contracting language expertise provides interim capability, but in the long run, we need service members and career civilians with the requisite language and cultural skills.

We recognize the importance of co-locating our Service members with their families whenever prudent. We further recognize the value is compounded when done so overseas as our families interact with the host nation and strengthen the ties between our peoples. We have initiated the process to authorize our military families to return to areas as reduced threats permit. Before such actions, we will take every precaution to ensure protection and security measures are in place to safeguard our personnel and their families.

VI. Conclusion.

During this past year the men and women assigned to CENTCOM have fought valiantly in Iraq and Afghanistan, provided humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and engaged with partners and allies in deterring aggression. They have worked tirelessly on behalf of the American people to provide essential security and stability for millions of others. They have trained and exercised alongside men and women from many other nations, providing experience, advice, mentoring and example in an effort to increase the capabilities of others to defend and secure their people. The engagement of our service personnel with foreign counterparts is key to gaining the trust of these people and facilitating our ability to influence outcomes in support of U.S. policy objectives.

We stand ready to assist those who would work with us to bring lasting peace to this troubled region of the world.

The American people and the Congress have provided staunch and steady support for our efforts, and we greatly appreciate your advocacy and assistance. I am proud and honored to represent the men, women and supporting families of CENTCOM. On their behalf, thank you for your support and for this opportunity to testify before you.

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STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL ERIC T. OLSON, U.S. NAVY

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON THE

POSTURE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

MARCH 5, 2008

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ADMIRAL ERIC T. OLSON

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor to report on the state of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

USSOCOM's mission is to provide fully capable Special Operations Forces (SOF) to defend the United States and its interests; and to plan and synchronize Department of Defense (DoD) operations against terrorist networks.

America's Special Operations Forces (SOF) are organized, equipped and trained, and then deployed by USSOCOM to meet the high demands of Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) around the world. The range of special operations is wide, the geographic dispersion is great, the quality is exceptional and the results are impressive.

Although most special operation forces deployed from the United States since the attacks of 9/11 have served in and around Iraq and Afghanistan, we clearly understand the enduring value of a global presence. We are proud to be serving in about 60 countries today.

The core capabilities of SOF are in the people who choose to do, qualify for and remain committed to this type of work. Finding, training and sustaining them requires steady focus. Ensuring they have the equipment, sensors, weapons, and mobility platforms of the kind and quality demanded by their peculiar missions requires willingness to invest in the rapid fielding of both

existing solutions and cutting edge technologies even when the relatively small purchase quantities do not optimize production costs.

SOF must be manned, trained and equipped to operate globally with unmatched speed, precision and discipline within a culture that promotes innovation, initiative and tactical level diplomacy. While this Nation appreciates the tremendous impact of SOF's day-to-day engagement with global friends, allies and partners, and the powerful impact of SOF on the battlefield is legend, America also expects SOF to be able to appear in places they are not expected to be, with capabilities they are not expected to have.

To accomplish our missions, we are focused on three priorities, each containing nested objectives.

First, we must deter, disrupt and defeat terrorist threats to our Nation. We do this by planning and conducting special operations, emphasizing culturally-attuned international engagement and fostering interagency cooperation. The Command's synchronization of the plans and planning to deter, disrupt, and defeat our enemies has great influence on allocation of the Department's resources.

Second, we must develop and support our people and their families. Our great people are the foundation of mission success, and they are national assets. We must maintain our quality, train and educate our force as joint warrior-diplomats, and always care for them and their families.

Third, we must sustain and modernize the force by equipping the operator, upgrading our mobility platforms and further developing persistent intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors and systems.

These priorities support USSOCOM's ongoing efforts to ensure SOF are highly trained, properly equipped and deployed to the right places at the right times for the right missions. Our personnel must be capable of planning and leading a wide range of lethal and non-lethal special operations missions in complex, ambiguous environments. This specific requirement underpins expectations that SOF will continue a military culture of initiative and innovation at every level. USSOCOM will continue to work closely with the services to ensure that the conventional force enablers upon which we depend remain a part of our future operations.

DETER, DISRUPT, AND DEFEAT TERRORIST THREATS

The enemy threat is complex and patient. USSOCOM anticipates no relief from our deployed commitments even when U.S. force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan are reduced. SOF's ability to grow relationships and build partner nation capacity is a fundamental part of the Department's campaign plan against terrorist threats.

We pursue two essential, mutually supporting and often intertwined approaches – direct and indirect. These two approaches integrate the requirement to immediately disrupt violent extremist organizations while positively impacting the environment in which they operate.

The direct approach addresses the immediate requirement to pursue terrorists, their infrastructure and their resources. Despite the positive trends in Iraq, operations to capture or kill terrorists and disrupt their networks remain both urgent and necessary. In the dynamic and ambiguous environments that constitute today's battlefields, the ability to rapidly analyze and exploit information is key to fast sequential targeting. This requires unique skills, specialized technologies and flexible mobility. We understand the necessity of prosecuting targets with speed, precision and discipline.

The indirect approach addresses the underlying causes of terrorism and the environments in which terrorism activities occur. The indirect approach requires more time than the direct approach to achieve effects, but ultimately will be the decisive effort.

In a world characterized by protracted struggles, emerging Irregular Warfare (IW) doctrine calls for a suite of capabilities to prevail against those who threaten us. IW is a logical, long-term framework that assists in both analyzing and applying many elements of national and international power to achieve mutual security objectives.

IW often employs indirect operations to gain asymmetric advantage over adversaries. IW is not a new mission area for SOF. Unconventional warfare, counter-terrorism (CT), counter-insurgency (COIN), civil-military operations (CMO), Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) are all traditional IW activities and core tasks for SOF. With IW's emergence as a focus area for broader participation across the Department, it

increasingly describes activities that both SOF and general purpose forces will employ in their operational approaches.

Theater SOF Efforts – By, With and Through

Deployed SOF are normally under the command of Theater Special Operations Commanders (TSOC) who work directly for the Geographic Combatant Commanders. The Theater SOCs have the regional focus that contributes to a good understanding of the people, the cultures and the issues of their areas of interest.

It is under the Theater Special Operations Commands that permanently deployed and rotational SOF work in other countries to enhance combat skills; establish relationships with counterparts; advise, assist or manage a variety of civil and military projects; contribute to the achievement of U.S. Ambassadors' objectives; or gain the experience that will contribute to future successes.

For example, at the direction of Special Operations Command – Pacific, SOF assist Philippine forces' efforts to identify and defeat indigenous and transnational terrorist organizations in the southern islands. Building on the model that was effective on Basilan Island in 2002, a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force works closely with Philippine Army, Marine and Navy units and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide both humanitarian assistance and military training. SOF also manage information and public affairs plans in coordination with the U.S. country team. The combined effect of these efforts has made central and southern Mindanao

and the Sulu Archipelago a much more challenging environment for terrorist activity.

Under Special Operations Command – Europe, Army Special Forces conducted an exercise during the summer of 2007 involving several Trans-Saharan (Pan-Sahel) nations and our European partners. SOF provided training in regional synchronization, intelligence sharing, planning and coordination for CT related operations. Last year, SOF also participated in Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises in this region. These exchanges enhance SOF skills while building person-to-person and unit-to-unit relationships.

Under Special Operations Command – Central Command, SOF have continued programs that are building competent and capable Iraqi and Afghan security forces . Iraqi Special Operations Forces are generally touted as some of the most effective military units in the region.

Under Special Operations Command – South, SOF personnel train, advise, and assist in Colombia's campaign against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) narco-terrorists.

Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

SOF employs its unique abilities to assess, train, advise and assist host nation militaries to build military capability. In so doing we improve our partner nations' confidence and abilities to detect and defeat violent extremist organizations. In 2007, SOF conducted hundreds of FID missions around the world.

Civil Affairs (CA)

Civil affairs projects deter support for violent extremist organizations by legitimizing existing governments and fostering a more favorable opinion of U.S. efforts. Simultaneously, programs that address government corruption, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and basic human needs build confidence in fledgling governments. While CA units are key to success in Afghanistan and Iraq, they remain equally vital to the conduct of myriad other SOF operations throughout the world.

Working closely with Colombian government and military officials, SOF CA personnel carried out more than two dozen medical humanitarian civic action events. These events treated thousands of Columbian patients in remote areas of the country and solidified that government's legitimacy in undergoverned spaces.

The Civil Military Engagement Program employs Civil Military Support Elements which are scalable, modular SOF teams that plan, coordinate, facilitate, manage and lead programs and projects that support U.S. and host nation objectives. Combatant Commanders are increasingly requesting this CA augmentation to enhance their indirect operations.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

One of the most important components in defeating terrorism includes countering violent extremist propaganda. These efforts are global in scale and are locally implemented by the geographic Combatant Commands. PSYOP

forces disseminate truthful information to shape behavior and erode the attraction of extremist ideologies among foreign audiences.

USSOCOM's Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC) includes functional, cultural and geographic experts who bring a combined approach to tackling what has become a tough, entrenched war of ideas. JMISC currently orchestrates a 24/7 multi-media campaign formatted to the cultures and languages of relevant audiences. This provides a factual message as an alternative to the extremist ideology for global audiences.

A most important tool in our ability to build the capacity of partner nations to conduct counterterrorism or stability operations is our continued authority to train and equip foreign military forces under language included in the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. Sections 1202 (previously known as 1208) and 1206, which expires this year, are authorities that have made a big difference in developing carefully selected counterpart forces. As an authority specific to Special Operations, Section 1202 is especially germane.

Synchronization and Planning

In 2005, USSOCOM was directed by the Unified Command Plan to plan, synchronize and, as directed, conduct global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other combatant commanders. While this was widely perceived as granting USSOCOM the authority to direct a wide range of operational activities in areas already assigned to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, we have realized in execution that our greatest value is in synchronizing GWOT campaign plans and planning. The operations themselves

are in almost every case conducted by the Geographic Combatant Commander responsible for that region, with USSOCOM in support. Every day at Headquarters USSOCOM, and at numerous outstations and agencies around the world, USSOCOM personnel are collaborating, coordinating and planning with other agencies to achieve desired global effects.

The most comprehensive element of USSOCOM's synchronization effort is the global collaborative planning process. This effort draws on other Combatant Command capabilities and expertise to develop DoD's GWOT campaign plan. This plan, coupled with the Geographic Combatant Commands' regional war on terror campaign plans that support it, are dynamic and under continuous review. USSOCOM and the DoD Global Synchronization Community have developed structured processes to evaluate and prioritize the many capabilities, operations, activities, resources and forces required for DoD's efforts to deter, disrupt and defeat terrorism. USSOCOM provides real and virtual venues for regular meetings, briefings, and conferences with each of the Geographic Combatant Commanders, interagency partners, and friendly and allied nations. The primary forum is the semi-annual Global Synchronization Conference. Because collaboration with our partner nations is so important, several other programs such as the foreign attaché-based SOVEREIGN CHALLENGE and our upcoming International Special Operations Forces Week improve global cooperation.

USSOCOM's Interagency Task Force (IATF) is a catalyst to rapidly facilitate CT collaboration within the U.S. government against trans-regional, functional and strategic level problem sets and opportunities.

USSOCOM's International Engagement Program (IEP) identifies requirements and helps coordinate actions within selected foreign countries to assist, resolve and enhance their CT capabilities and increase overall information sharing.

Future Concepts

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified several initiatives to give the Department greater capability and agility in dealing with the most common and enduring threats of the 21st Century. The development of Irregular Warfare capabilities was prominent. USSOCOM plays a lead role in developing IW doctrine.

The IW Joint Operating Concept (JOC), developed by USSOCOM in partnership the Marine Corps, was approved and signed by the Secretary of Defense in September 2007. It is the first step in the promulgation of IW doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel and facilities.

In order to maintain the momentum in IW planning and policy, USSOCOM established an IW Directorate (J10) in 2007. The J10 provides continuous focus on IW related issues that cut across operational and programmatic lines.

DEVELOP AND SUPPORT OUR PEOPLE AND THEIR FAMILIES

The Commander of USSOCOM is responsible for ensuring the combat readiness of assigned forces. With this requirement comes the need for better defined personnel management authorities and readiness reporting frameworks.

Recruiting and Retention

The ability to identify and recruit the best SOF candidates is a challenge requiring innovation and commitment of resources. Diversity across the force is an operational necessity posing additional challenges to recruiting. Attributes sought by the SOF community include culturally-attuned individuals proficient in foreign languages who physically blend into the operational environment.

Ongoing personnel sustainment and programmed growth efforts directed by the QDR require intense cooperation and support between USSOCOM, the Services and DoD. This concentrated effort has paid dividends--89 percent of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 QDR growth was achieved. With support from the Services, the SOF community leveraged a combination of innovative accession programs, revamped training programs and implemented retention incentives.

SOF personnel have deployed often and suffered many casualties. USSOCOM puts great emphasis on sustainment programs that assist families as well as the uniformed member. The SOF Care Coalition project, implemented by my predecessor, has been extremely successful through patient and family advocacy that extends beyond recovery, rehabilitation and any subsequent transition to civilian life. No issue is too large or too small. Care Coalition successes range from minimizing medical and physical evaluation board

bureaucracy, ensuring Traumatic Serviceman Group Life Insurance compensation is appropriate, coordinating home repairs for a family whose father was deployed, making certain a SOF warrior's young daughter received the best TRICARE could provide, and providing personalized support for all families caring for their hospitalized wounded warrior.

Although USSOCOM is specifically responsible for the special operations force defined by Major Force Program (MFP) 11 authorizations, one of the greatest emergent challenges is the health of our service-provided SOF enablers.

Training and Education

The Component assessment and selection programs identify candidates with the potential for entry into the SOF community. The initial SOF qualification training that follows assessment and selection takes up to two years to complete, but skills training is continuous thoughout one's career in SOF.

Professional military education remains an essential element to the development, sustainment, and advancement of SOF. One initiative scheduled to begin in 2008 will expand the SOF Interagency Fellow's program to provide post-graduate courses, full degree programs, and independent research opportunities for SOF strategists and long-range planners.

Language and Culture

Language skills and cultural knowledge continue to be key to establishing effective relations with the foreign forces, organizations, and individuals with which SOF will interact. The 1st Special Forces Group (SFG) language training

program was recognized by the Army and DoD as the best of its kind in 2007 but, although we have enhanced all of our language training programs in recent years, we remain underqualified in many key languages and dialects. We will continue to expand our programs in 2008, stressing the need for a few individuals to be thoroughly steeped in select languages and cultures. Our initiatives will include exploration of innovative options to permit such specialization without sacrificing promotion opportunity.

Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) is responding to the increased need for strategic and operational level education for our SOF personnel, enablers, and international partners. JSOU will continue to offer a range of academic options that address strategic and operational subject areas. Programs will include traditional courses and seminars; tailored academic electives at the Service professional military education institutions; joint mobile education teams; symposia and academic workshops; individual performance support; and similar activities aimed at the needs of our student base.

SUSTAIN AND MODERNIZE THE FORCE

Budget

The budget and acquisition authorities provided in the original language that created USSOCOM have proven invaluable in enabling SOF to be properly trained and equipped.

The FY 2009 President's Budget request of $5.727 billion for Major Force Program 11 will permit continued development of capabilities peculiar to special operations. This request will continue our investment in capabilities to improve SOF warrior systems, promote specialized and institutional training, explore and exploit new technologies and refine force structure. Over half of the budget request--$3.7 billion--is for Operations and Maintenance to sustain SOF operational readiness, to maintain equipment, and to provide for fuel, consumable supplies, civilian salaries, spare parts and repair of weapons and equipment.

Of the remainder, $1.5 billion is for Procurement, and will be used to fund vital SOF-unique modernization and recapitalization efforts in force protection, mobility, weapons, munitions, communications and intelligence equipment. An additional $361 million is requested for RDT&E to develop SOF-peculiar equipment, to provide technological advances, and to modernize SOF weapons. Finally, $255 million is requested for Military Construction to fund 13 projects in seven states and one project at an overseas location.

We expect our optempo will remain high even when conventional forces downsize in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, the funding we have received in supplementals will still be required to support our efforts. In order to sustain our operations long term, we are working with DoD to pursue a shift of essential supplemental funding to the base budget.

Force Structure

Last year, SOF added 6,443 military and civilian positions. These positions provided needed enhancements to both headquarters and operational force structure.

In FY 2009, USSOCOM will add another 1,536 military and civilian billets across the component commands in order to improve readiness and add capacity and capabilities. We will grow to 55,890 civilian and military personnel by the conclusion of FY 2009, of which 43,745 will be active duty military members, 6,870 will be in reserve components (4,310 Guard and 2,560 Reserve) and 5,275 will be government civilians.

Acquisition Efforts

USSOCOM's acquisition organization is a very important factor in resourcing SOF-peculiar requirements. While Federal Acquisition Regulations uniformly apply to the Department, we strive to take advantage of flexibilities that are inherent in these guidelines to quickly provide materiel solutions for the SOF operator. Because our budget authority is limited to SOF-peculiar equipment and modifications, USSOCOM must work closely with the three military departments (MILDEPs), because the MILDEPs fund, develop, acquire and provide the basic Service-common vehicles, aircraft, boats, weapons, ammunition and other equipment to USSOCOM, which we then modify to SOF-specific platforms, systems and/or equipment.

When a SOF requirement cannot be met using a Service-common solution, USSOCOM uses its authority to develop and acquire SOF-peculiar equipment or

modify the Service-common equipment to meet SOF needs. USSOCOM's acquisition culture stresses assertive risk management, and process efficiencies to steward a system that is often more tailorable, responsive, and agile than elsewhere in DoD.

USSOCOM's Urgent Deployment Acquisition (UDA) process continues to provide a rapid acquisition and logistics response to combat mission needs statements (CMNS) submitted by deployed SOF. Most capabilities developed under this program are delivered to the forces within six months to a year after the requirement is validated.

Our total requirements, funding and acquisition sub-processes are still slower and more restrictive than we believe is optimal for this specialized force. During the coming year we intend to explore whether we are using the full extent of our legislated authorities as the Congress and President intended when USSOCOM was established.

Science and Technology

USSOCOM's Science and Technology (S&T) strategy is to selectively invest and leverage available resources with the MILDEPs and other agency laboratories, academia, and industry for the purpose of maximizing SOF capabilities. S&T programs identify and assess emerging technologies for potential insertion into current and future SOF concepts, requirements, and acquisition programs of record. As the strategic, tactical, and geopolitical environments in which SOF operates evolve, so too does the S&T investment focus and support.

The USSOCOM Special Operations Technology Development (SOTD), Special Operations Advanced Technology Development (SOST) and Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programs work together to synergistically develop, evaluate and eventually transition key technologies. The USSOCOM Locating, Tagging and Tracking efforts are being staffed through the SOTD and SOST programs in collaboration with our program executive officers, the Defense Research and Engineering Directorate, the MILDEPs and interagency partners. Our involvement in several Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations and Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations allows USSOCOM to leverage the resources of other organizations to create robust opportunities for evaluating and transforming mature technologies in a way that USSOCOM could not otherwise afford on our limited S&T budget.

Equipping the SOF Warrior

The new combat assault rifles, the MK16 and MK17 and their associated enhanced grenade launcher module, completed development and began limited fielding in 2007. We expect these weapons to be fully deployed by the end of 2009. USSOCOM will continue the development of next-generation ammunitions as well as fused-image-capable, clip-on optics for our weapons.

In 2007, USSOCOM fielded more than 11,000 supplemental body armor kits, saving lives and reducing injuries by increasing the area of ballistic protection beyond that of previously issued SOF body armor. More than 4,500 sets of the new protective combat uniform were fielded to provide extreme cold weather protection for SOF operators. The Command implemented a product

improvement effort to reduce the weight and/or increase the ballistic performance of the modular integrated communications helmet.

The worldwide proliferation of night vision devices has somewhat diminished the technological advantage that the U.S. military possessed during the conduct of night operations. Although the technology gap has narrowed, USSOCOM continues to identify, test and field many new night vision and visual augmentation systems. In 2007, USSOCOM continued to field advancements in thermal imaging and camera technology by putting into service visual augmentation systems that were smaller and lighter with increased capabilities.

SOF Munitions

Special purpose munitions, such as demolition, breaching, diversionary, and shoulder-fired munitions, are required to accomplish SOF missions. Future developments will upgrade the SOF shoulder-fired systems with the capability to fire within and from enclosed spaces for use in urban environments. We will continue to procure foreign weapons and ammunition to train SOF operators so they will be better prepared to train the forces of our partner nations.

Once munitions are developed and fielded, our logistics personnel assume responsibility for procurement of replenishment munitions to sustain the force. All SOF munitions are intensively managed in order to minimize stock levels while simultaneously providing time-sensitive capabilities required by the Theater Special Operations Commands.

SOF Communications

USSOCOM continues to transform its respective capabilities in the areas of communications, information technology, automation of intelligence data and collaboration tools into a single, integrated SOF information environment. Such an information environment enhances operations by permitting robust command and control capabilities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and by extending information services to the individual SOF warrior.

As a result, available satellite communications bandwidth is at a premium.

SOF Mobility

USSOCOM continues to sustain and modernize the venerable SOF C-130 fleet. We have engaged with the Department of the Air Force to develop strategies for replacing and modernizing the aging MC-130E Combat Talon I and MC-130P Combat Shadow fleets. As an interim solution, four of twelve planned MC-130W air refueling tankers were delivered to date, with four more scheduled for delivery in 2008. The 8 aircraft will help to partially offset those MC-130Es & MC-130Ps. Four CV-22 trainer aircraft and the first three operational CV-22 Ospreys were delivered in 2006 and 2007. Three additional aircraft will to be delivered in 2008, with Initial Operational Capability projected for February 2009.

USSOCOM rotary wing programs, in partnership with the U.S. Army, are providing the latest technologies and sustainability upgrades to the current SOF rotary wing fleet. Taken together, these programs for the MH-47s, MH-60s, and the MH-6Ms will improve current capabilities and prepare for future

modernization while consolidating the fleet into three common standardized airframes. The MH-47G variant has been deployed since February 2007. The MH-60M program was accelerated and will begin deliveries in 2008. The MH-6M Little Bird is nearing completion of its first block modification upgrade. Meanwhile, the MH-53M fleet is being drawn down for total retirement later this year.

The fielding and deployment of the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) in June 2007 moved USSOCOM Undersea Mobility capabilities significantly forward. ASDS #1 is now available for deployment as a reliable combat capability based on successful testing, exercises and improvements in reliability. This vehicle enables Special Operations Forces to perform myriad missions in water space that was previously unreachable. Our other Undersea Mobility efforts such as the wet submersible Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV) and Dry Deck Shelter (DDS) will continue to provide capabilities that enable SOF to perform a wide range of specialized tasks. There are on going studies to better define future undersea mobility joint efforts in this area.

USSOCOM recently enhanced its surface maritime mobility systems by fielding the advanced forward looking infrared systems for installation throughout its combatant craft fleet. As a result of combat lessons learned, USSOCOM has also fielded other improvements on the special operations craft-riverine. As the current models of rigid-hull inflatable boats and the SEAL Delivery Vehicles age, USSOCOM will begin developing the next generation of these surface and undersea maritime platforms.

This year, two new classes of vehicles were introduced for SOF ground mobility: the RG-31 medium mine protected vehicle and the RG-33 mine resistant ambush protected vehicle. These vehicles enable SOF to deploy forces across the theater of operations with a level of protection previously unavailable. In 2008, USSOCOM will begin fielding a suspension upgrade for our primary ground mobility vehicle (HMMWV variants) in order to return payload and mobility to the platform that was lost with the addition of heavy armor packages. Additionally, the light mobility vehicle, delivering in 2008, will carry 3-5 personnel over all types of terrain and is deployable from multiple aircraft platforms, including the CV-22.

SOF Sensor Systems

Sensor systems that provide persistent ISR are essential elements of USSOCOM's operations and force protection. USSOCOM has been swiftly fielding persistent ISR capabilities within budgetary constraints and respective Service training program limitations. We have modified existing SOF equipment where available, procured additional manned and unmanned ISR platforms, and partnered with the MILDEPs, Defense Research and Engineering Directorate and the Joint IED Defeat Organization to cooperatively field additional sensors.

SOF Locating, Tagging and Tracking capabilities are currently providing valuable information regarding hostile force location, movement, and intent while minimizing risk to US personnel. USSOCOM, in conjunction with other government partners, will continue to invest in leading-edge technologies for sensors and data infiltration and exfiltration.

Improved laser range finders and designators, hand-held thermal imagers, infrared pointers and marking and illuminating devices are a few of the capabilities delivered over the past year. Eye-safe laser range finders and binoculars provided a marked improvement in the determination of enemy target locations. Improved target geo-location accuracy was demonstrated in 2007, providing USSOCOM with the world's most accurate self-contained laser targeting geo-locater.

Additionally, USSOCOM acquired and utilizes a combination of several manned and unmanned airborne ISR assets to provide the necessary flexibility for supporting the dynamic SOF mission set. Unmanned aerial systems continue to be powerful force multipliers for SOF activities and a key component of almost every operation. The micro unmanned aerial systems, the long-endurance Predator class systems, and the potential ultra-long-endurance unmanned aerial systems, such as the Global Observer JCTD, are platforms that provide force protection to small SOF units and aid in the identification and tracking of individual targets and items of interest. USSOCOM also continues to grow our manned airborne ISR capability to complement the unmanned ISR systems. In FY 2007, additional airborne ISR aircraft were procured with supplemental funds, and SOCOM partnered with the National Guard Bureau to rapidly modify and employ Air National Guard aircraft and air crews to augment USSOCOM's organic ISR capability.

CONCLUSION

We continue to improve our capability and capacity to conduct all of our assigned missions, carefully balancing the demands of both preceding and responding to the sound of guns. Over the course of USSOCOM's twenty-one year history, Congress has consistently demonstrated strong interest in the command and its people. The joint Special Operations Force you see around the globe today is a direct product of your vision, your trust and your commitment to build the world's premier Special Operations capability. We will prevail against those who threaten us and assist those who don't. The men and women of the Special Operations Force will meet your highest expectations. Thank you for your continued support.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 5, 2008

United States Special Operations Command

FY 2009 Budget Highlights

United States Special Operations Command

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Questions concerning the source and interpretation of the information contained in this booklet should be directed to:

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

History

Resulting from legislation passed in October 1986, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was established on April 16, 1987. Congress mandated the creation of USSOCOM to address unconventional threats. Because of new responsibilities brought on by the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), USSOCOM's mission statement is:

Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to defend the United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize operations against terrorist networks.

In March 2005, President George W. Bush signed the Unified Command Plan that codified the command's new authorities for the GWOT. The President designated USSOCOM as the lead for planning, synchronizing, and, as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks. USSOCOM's strategic approach is keyed by positioning the limited numbers of high demand Special Operations Forces (SOF) who are highly trained, properly equipped, and deployed to the right places, at the right time, facing the right missions.

USSOCOM is comprised of four service Component Commands: the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC); the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC); the Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM); and Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC). Each component ensures that its SOF are highly trained, equipped, and rapidly deployable to support our goals around the world. USSOCOM also has one sub-unified command, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

From its earliest days, USSOCOM has responded to our nation's call and has conducted special operations along the entire continuum of operations, in support of conventional forces and as independent missions in support of national security objectives. USSOCOM and SOF have played significant roles in major operations dating back to Operation EARNEST WILL (1987-89) through to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF-Afghanistan, OEF-Philippines, and OEF-Trans Sahara) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) (2001-Present).

One key means of SOF engagement is through foreign internal defense (FID), which enables SOF to assess, train, advise and assist the military of other nations around the world. Conducting military operations by, with, and through host nation forces, as well as indigenous and surrogate forces, is a crucial capability in accomplishing the United States' national interests, especially in the GWOT.

To meet these challenges, USSOCOM continues to adapt, establishing command and control infrastructures and investing in programs and systems to improve SOF's operational capacities and capabilities. The results of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) have begun to significantly increase SOF capacities and capabilities.

America's Special Operators are the most capable in the world, and we need to maintain this edge. The United States faces more unconventional challenges, and SOF have the skills and leadership, to meet the irregular warfare challenges in complex, ambiguous environments. USSOCOM is and will continue to be engaged in the fight against terrorism around the world.

Mission

"Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to defend the United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize operations against terrorist networks."

Command Vision

Special Operations Forces must be highly trained, properly equipped and deployed to the right place at the right time for the right missions.

Our commanders and staffs must capably plan and lead the full range of lethal and non-lethal special operations missions in complex, ambiguous environments.

Our people will be professional, diplomatically and culturally astute, responsive and innovative.

As key members of Joint, Interagency, and International teams, SOF will employ all assigned authorities and apply all available elements of power to accomplish assigned missions.

FY 2007-FY 2009 Total Obligation Authority



FY 2008 appropriated does not include GWOT
Numbers may not add due to rounding

FY 2009 Budget Highlights

Budget Overview

USSOCOM's mission is to provide fully capable SOF to defend the United States and its interests, and to plan and synchronize operations against terrorist networks. Significant resources are required to accomplish these missions and ensure that SOF are highly trained, properly equipped, and deployed to the right places, at the right time, for the right missions. USSOCOM is investing in capabilities to improve systems, enhance specialized and institutional training, improve organizational structure, foster leap ahead technologies, and grow force structure and manpower.

The USSOCOM FY 2009 Budget Request includes the resources necessary to continue providing full spectrum, multi-mission global SOF that will provide our nation with a comprehensive set of unique capabilities. It provides the foundation needed to support additional growth across all four components—Army Special Forces, Navy Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) teams, and Air Force and Marine Special Operations Units—to ensure the United States can apply specially skilled forces whenever and wherever they are needed. As a result, the FY 2009 Budget Request continues to increase funding for Operations and Maintenance (O&M), which is utilized by the command to grow additional SOF, expand unit and schoolhouse training, and provide additional soldier protection systems such as body armor, protective clothing, and survival equipment.

The FY 2009 request also includes funding for the costs of establishing and sustaining a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) for the new US Africa Command (AFRICOM). This funding will cover the broad range of requirements for standing up a new TSOC, including civilian pay, day to day operational support, travel, and the acquisition of equipment required to support Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA) achieving full operational capability in March, 2009.

Overall, USSOCOM's FY 2009 request decreases by nearly $300 million from FY 2008, in large part due to the change in funding for Military Construction (MILCON). This year's request also marks a change in the way the Command's investment accounts are explained and displayed. In FY 2009, USSOCOM restructured the Procurement and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) budget line items to comply with Department of Defense (DoD) policy to standardize financial information, to improve visibility of USSOCOM capabilities, and to improve financial analysis. The restructure resulted in many non-programmatic changes to USSOCOM's program of record; however, none of these changes impacted scope or level of funding.

People

People are the foundation of USSOCOM's success in meeting the daunting challenges of a very dangerous and ambiguous world. Overall in FY 2009, USSOCOM will grow by 1,536 military and civilian authorizations, which will add the following capabilities and capacities:

USASOC:
Special Forces (SF) Groups: Adds 444 authorizations to provide one SF Battalion, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capability, and increase the number of maintenance, logistic and operational planners within each Special Forces Group. The increased force structure bolsters the command's ability to deploy SF globally for long term operations.

Civil Affairs (CA): Gains an additional 133 authorizations to support the growth from one active CA Battalion to one active CA Brigade comprised of four regionally aligned Battalions. The increased authorizations provide additional capacity for coordination with civil, military, and humanitarian components within critical regions. Forces will work to bolster the legitimacy of friendly governments who can then deny safe haven to terrorist networks.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP): Increases by 151 authorizations in order to build organizations that are critical in shaping current and future security environments. The environments include dangerous anti-US and anti-western terrorist groups seeking new ways to target the US and Allied interest worldwide. PSYOP organizations will focus on the human and informational dimensions to shape the security environments.

Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR): Adds 168 authorizations to support SOF mobility operations worldwide. As a result of this critical increase, the ability of each of the combatant commanders to facilitate ground operations within their area of responsibility will be greatly enhanced, and will facilitate their ability to prosecute the GWOT.

NAVSPECWARCOM:
Naval Special Warfare Groups (NSWG): Grows by 189 authorizations, which adds gunners to man weapons stations, expands maintenance personnel, increases diver support for undersea mobility platforms, and provides Naval Special Warfare units with new billets for Intelligence and Information Operations (IO) to support and augment the "find" and "fix" capabilities within these units.

MARSOC:
This component grows by 418 authorizations, which will enable the component to continue/accelerate the establishment of the MARSOC Headquarters and the Marine Special Operations School. The growth also will add two Marine Special Operations Battalions, Foreign Military Training Units, and a Support Group with the capability to provide logistics, intelligence and communications needed to sustain global MARSOC operations.

AFSOC:
In FY 2009, there will be a decrease in personnel assigned to AFSOC, due to the retirement of the MH-53. Those billets will be returned to the command in future years as new platforms, including the CV-22, come on line.

Headquarters, USSOCOM:
Center for Special Operations (CSO): Grows by 112 authorizations which increases Joint Intelligence analysts, liaisons with other government agencies, and operations and logistic planners.





	MILITARY	CIVILIANS
ARMY FY 2008	25,933	2,038
ARMY FY 2009	27,115	2,127
AIR FORCE FY 2008	12,856	2,037
AIR FORCE FY 2009	12,373	2,149
MARINE CORPS FY 2008	1,966	33
MARINE CORPS FY 2009	2,393	33
NAVY FY 2008	8,547	944
NAVY FY 2009	8,734	966
USSOCOM FY 2008	49,302	5,052
USSOCOM FY 2009	50,615	5,275

United States Special Operations Command

Operations & Maintenance

The FY 2009 O&M Budget Estimate includes growth required to support additional Army SF, Navy SEALs, Air Force Special Operations, CA, and PSYOP personnel to ensure the United States has uniquely skilled forces prepared for global deployment. USSOCOM's O&M budget estimate increases $442.2 million in FY 2009; of which $70.8 million is price growth and $371.4 million is program growth.



	*FY 2007 Actual	*FY 2008 Appropriated	*FY 2009 Request
OPERATIONAL FORCES			
FLIGHT OPERATIONS	898.8	804.8	977.0
SHIP/BOAT OPERATIONS	75.5	91.6	106.2
COMBAT DEV ACTIVITIES	1,119.1	652.4	668.2
OTHER OPERATIONS	799.9	473.6	519.1
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT			
FORCE RELATED TRAINING	57.9	48.1	49.8
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT	77.7	36.1	38.4
INTELLIGENCE	200.5	270.4	323.8
COMMUNICATION	211.7	200.3	226.5
MGT/OPERATIONAL HQTRS	202.4	139.7	180.4
MAINTENANCE	376.0	225.2	272.5
BASE SUPPORT	45.1	21.9	25.1
SKILL AND ADVANCED TRAINING			
SPECIALIZED SKILL TRAINING	148.5	119.1	144.4
PROF DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION	10.4	6.9	9.0
LOGISTICS OPERATIONS			
ACQ/PROGRAM MGT	176.0	119.8	111.8
TOTAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND	**4,399.5**	**3,209.9**	**3,652.2**

*Numbers may not add due to rounding

A substantial portion of USSOCOM's programmatic growth in FY 2009 is linked to the 2006 QDR initiatives designed to significantly increase USSOCOM's personnel and force structure. These initiatives support the emphasis on USSOCOM's role in leading, planning, and coordinating global operations against terrorist networks. The FY 2009 Budget Estimate provides additional assets required to strengthen core capabilities and build a potent force to fight global terrorism. These O&M increases support the planned expansion of SOF capabilities and personnel for the following initiatives: adding one battalion to each Army Special Operations Group; sustaining one additional company to each of the three active Ranger battalions; providing additional SEALs and support personnel at NAVSPECWARCOM; creating a larger active duty CA Brigade; forming an Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) squadron; adding airtime, equipment, and personnel required to distribute and utilize Predator data feeds (Distributed Common Ground/Surface Systems (DCGS)); enhancing classified force structure and military intelligence; and increasing assets and personnel for USSOCOM's Center for Special Operations.

Other significant increases in FY 2009 were provided to maintain a growing inventory of soldier protection systems such as body armor, protective clothing, weapons, and survival equipment.

In addition, funding was also provided to support the growing demand for specialized SOF training in order to keep pace with the overall growth in SOF personnel. These increases emphasize language skills, advanced skills, and special tactics. The increases targeted to training also include course material, SOF unique supplies and equipment, alternative training delivery methods, and civilian pay to increase the number of instructors.

FY 2009 also includes funding for O&M collateral equipment associated with MILCON projects required to accommodate the growth of SOF, as well as O&M fact of life increases necessary to fund civilian pay and rising sustainment costs for SOF warrior systems critical to the protection, mobility, and lethality of SOF operators.

Flight Operations: O&M Program growth in FY 2009 is associated with new aircraft, increased flying hours supporting formal aircrew and operational unit training, and higher fuel costs. These costs include a shift in the CV-22 program from Interim Contractor Support (ICS) to O&M funded Contractor Logistics Support (CLS), Non-standard Aviation for mobility requirements of the TSOCs, and support for operations conducted with UAS.

Other Operational Capabilities: Program growth will support the establishment and sustainment of SOCAFRICA, the addition of one SF battalion to the 3rd Special Forces Group, increased operational support for maritime special operations craft, and additional logistics support for special operations unique equipment. Additionally, one-time funding is provided in FY 2009 for O&M collateral equipment requirements associated with MILCON projects at Camp Lejeune, NC; Camp Pendleton, CA; MacDill AFB, FL; Coronado, CA; Ft Campbell, KY; Ft Bragg, NC; Little Creek, VA; and Qatar.

Maintenance: Increased O&M funding is required to maintain USSOCOM's inventory of small and medium Unmanned Systems, individual body armor, protective clothing, survival equipment, load bearing equipment, weapons, night vision, and optical devices. The increase to USSOCOM's Maintenance funding also includes sustainment for the Directional Infrared Countermeasures System on AC-130 and MC-130 aircraft.

Communications and Intelligence: O&M growth also supports USSOCOM's Communication and Military Intelligence requirements necessary to keep pace with the growth in personnel and the demands associated with operations against terrorist networks. Programmatic increases include contract maintenance and logistics support for U-28 aircraft. Additional growth is required for maintenance, parts, supplies, and other related day-to-day costs required to sustain MQ-1/9 Predator operations, classified intelligence capabilities, and additional airtime, equipment, and personnel required to distribute and utilize Predator data feeds to DCGS.

Additional communications growth supports programs that provide primary command and control services, equipment, and IT applications for processing, protecting, and disseminating all information within USSOCOM. Program growth is required to maintain system security, secure terminal equipment, technology refreshment, software licenses, hardware maintenance, wireless communications airtime, and intrusion detection capabilities over an increasingly large and complex communication and information network. FY 2009 O&M also provides additional support for tactical and deployed communication capabilities associated with SOF Tactical Local Area Networks (TACLAN) and tactical communication devices used to conduct air, ground, and maritime missions.

Management and Operational Headquarters: An important initiative contained in USSOCOM's FY 2009 budget request is the SOF Care Coalition Recovery Program, which provides casualty mentors to each wounded SOF warrior. This effort combines all stages of recovery to include activities designed to improve confidence, motivation, and self esteem. It also provides important personal assistance with civilian transition and employment opportunities.

Additional funding was provided to support USSOCOM's Title 10 functions in the following areas: develop strategy, doctrine, and tactics; educate and train; maintain and assess lessons learned; conduct exercises; assess future SOF capabilities in concept development and experimentation; and develop SOF's strategic vision.

Specialized Skill Training: Additional O&M funding ensures SOF training facilities at the Naval Special Warfare and SEAL Center and US Army John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School will keep pace with the overall growth in SF personnel. The increase is primarily attributable to the emphasis on advanced and specialized SOF training such as special tactics, language, and cultural skills. Funding will also provide for course material, course development, alternative delivery methods, and civilian pay for additional instructors.

United States Special Operations Command



Procurement

The FY 2009 Procurement budget decreases to $1,459 million from the $1,769 million FY 2008 appropriated funding level. FY 2008 included resources in the areas of SOF Warrior, SOF Communications, and C-130 Modification programs. These added resources allowed for increased SOF capability to conduct operations against any emerging or asymmetric threat in forward areas of the world.

As part of the FY 2009 Budget Restructure, the following P-1 Line Items were created:

- SOF Automation Systems
- SOF Tactical Radio Systems
- SOF U-28
- SOF Soldier Protection and Survival Systems (operator)
- SOF Visual Augmentation, Lasers and Sensor Systems
- SOF Global Video Surveillance Activities
- SOF Operational Enhancements Intelligence

New Starts/Terminations: In FY 2009, there are no program terminations and six new starts. Procurement new starts include the following modifications: A/MH-6 Lightweight Hellfire Launcher; AC-130 Weapon System Trainer Electronic Warfare Officer Station; Rotary Wing Aircraft Reduced Optical Signature Emissions; MC-130P Dual Rails; and U-28 Block 20 Retrofit.

Combat Mission Needs Statement (C-MNS): The C-MNS process was developed to address critical materiel needs for new or existing systems or items that require fast track development, acquisition, and fielding to support SF in the field. The C-MNS process is not a means to circumvent traditional acquisition processes, but it does provide an avenue to expedite validation, funding and fielding of those items needed urgently in combat. The Command provides a quarterly report to Congress of approved C-MNS projects. Validation and approval of a C-MNS requires expeditious, but thorough analysis, documentation, and staffing as it generates a "must pay" bill. The process begins when a SOF unit, either deployed in the field or during pre-deployment training, identifies an urgent and compelling capability gap derived from a combat survivability deficiency or potential mission failure. After a need is identified, the unit or their TSOC forwards an analysis of the need to the responsible Global Combatant Commander (GCC).



Item	FY 2007 Actual	FY 2008 Appropriated	FY 2009 Request
AVIATION:			
ROTARY WING UPGRADES AND SUSTAINMENT	103.552	72.996	51.950
MC-130H AIR REFUELING SYSTEM	1.516		
MH-47 SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM	100.272	60.840	63.667
MH-60 SOF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM	91.533	76.238	98.163
NON-STANDARD AVIATION		22.361	39.172
SOF TANKER RECAPITALIZATION		18.439	36.286
SOF U-28			7.659
MC-130H, COMBAT TALON II	107.687	38.043	
CV-22 SOF MOD	195.151	213.759	162.971
AC-130U GUNSHIP ACQUISITION	0.902		
C-130 MODIFICATIONS	101.268	107.744	47.018
AIRCRAFT SUPPORT	0.911	1.313	1.347
SHIPBUILDING:			
ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM (ASDS)	12.578	10.549	5.760
MK8 MOD1 SEAL DELIVERY VEHICLE	2.463	8.692	7.061
AMMUNITION:			
SOF ORDNANCE REPLENISHMENT	96.586	51.487	67.083
SOF ORDNANCE ACQUISITION	80.694	26.329	5.540
OTHER PROCUREMENT:			
OTHER PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS	1,731.891	1,059.916	865.066
TOTAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND	**2,627.004**	**1,768.706**	**1,458.743**

If the GCC approves the requirement, the C-MNS is forwarded to USSOCOM Headquarters and the appropriate Component Commander for analysis, documentation and potential approval. If the Deputy Commander approves the C-MNS, the requirement is funded and equipment is procured.

In FY 2006 and FY 2007, Congress provided funding for the C-MNS program. USSOCOM included this program in their baseline beginning in FY 2008. In FY 2009, the Command is requesting $21.6 million to address the emergent needs that arise in the field and are validated through this process.

Rotary Wing Programs

- Rotary Wing Upgrades and Sustainment: The MH-47, MH-60 and A/MH-6 platforms provide organic aviation support for worldwide contingency operations and low-intensity conflicts. The specialized aircraft for these missions must be capable of operating at extended ranges under adverse weather conditions to infiltrate, provide logistics for, reinforce and extract SOF. Major modifications requested in FY 2009 are the Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures (SIRFC) and the A/MH-6 Lightweight Hellfire Launcher.
- MH-47 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP): The MH-47 is the SOF platform of choice in executing the GWOT. The MH-47 airframe has been in service since the 1960's and the SLEP is designed to extend the average life of the aircraft. FY 2009 requests funds to convert six MH-47E platforms to MH-47G platforms.
- MH-60 Modernization Program: MH-60 aircraft are capable of worldwide rapid deployment operations and penetration of hostile areas for these missions. FY 2009 requests funds to convert eight U.S. Army common UH-60M aircraft into the SOF-configured MH-60M.

CV-22 SOF Modifications: The CV-22 will transform the Command's ability to project SOF capabilities worldwide. The CV-22 provides leap-ahead capability in speed and range, allowing long-range vertical lift missions to be performed in a single period of darkness. In FY 2009, USSOCOM requests funds to modify six CV-22s with SOF-peculiar equipment.

SOF Communications Programs: SOF Communications consist of the Communications Equipment and Electronics P-1; SOF Tactical Radio Systems P-1; and SOF Automation Systems P-1 line items.

- The Communications Equipment and Electronics line item provides for communication systems to meet emergent requirements to support SOF. USSOCOM's mission mandates that SOF systems remain technologically superior to any threat to provide a maximum degree of survivability, and units require communications equipment that improves their warfighting capability without degrading their mobility. (Note: Starting in FY 2009, all funding requested for radios was moved under the SOF Tactical Radio Systems P-1 line item).
- The SOF Tactical Radio Systems P-1 line and the SOF Automation Systems P-1 line were created in order to budget for and manage SOF radios and automation systems as separate commodity areas.

SOF Ordnance Replenishment: The Ordnance Replenishment line item requests funds to procure munitions required for annual training, combat missions, and war reserve stocks.

SOF Warrior Programs: The SOF Warrior Programs consist of: the Small Arms and Weapons P-1; the SOF Visual Augmentation, Lasers and Sensor Systems P-1; the Tactical Vehicles P-1; and the SOF Soldier Protection and Survival Systems P-1 line items.

- The Small Arms and Weapons line procures a variety of weapons and equipment for SOF warfighters.
- The SOF Visual Augmentation, Lasers and Sensor Systems line (a new P-1 line) provides day and night visual augmentation systems, laser range finders, pointers, illuminators, and designators for SOF troops. This line was created in order to budget for and manage these types of systems under one commodity area.
- SOF Tactical Vehicles are used for Counter-Proliferation, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, and Unconventional Warfare missions, and serve as a weapons platform throughout all areas of the battlefield and/or mission area.
- The SOF Soldier Protection and Survival Systems line (a new P-1 line item) provides specialized equipment to improve survivability and mobility of SOF while conducting missions in harsh environments, for unspecified periods of time, and in locations requiring small unit autonomy.

SOF Intelligence Systems: The SOF Intelligence Systems line item includes equipment required to provide timely intelligence to deployed forces, including intelligence dissemination, sensor systems, integrated threat warning to SOF mission platforms, and tactical exploitation of national system capabilities.

C-130 Modifications: The C-130 Modifications line item addresses modifications required to correct mission performance deficiencies, as well as logistics problems and changes in the missions of the C-130 aircraft.



United States Special Operations Command

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

The USSOCOM RDT&E budget continues to develop capabilities to remain technologically superior in the age of asymmetric warfare of SOF while meeting its missions in the GWOT. The FY 2009 budget request is $361 million, a decrease of $89 million from FY 2008 appropriated funding levels. The only new start in FY 2009 for RDT&E is the development of the DCGS.

The following Program Elements (PEs) were created in FY 2009 as part of the USSOCOM Budget Restructure:

- PE 1160472BB SOF Information and Broadcast Systems Advanced Technology
- PE 1160474BB SOF Communications Equipment and Electronics Systems
- PE 1160476BB SOF Tactical Radio Systems
- PE 1160477BB SOF Weapons Systems
- PE 1160478BB SOF Soldier Protection and Survival Systems
- PE 1160479BB SOF Visual Augmentation, Lasers and Sensor Systems
- PE 1160480BB SOF Tactical Vehicles
- PE 1160482BB SOF Rotary Wing Aviation
- PE 1160483BB SOF Underwater Systems
- PE 1160484BB SOF Surface Craft
- PE 1160488BB SOF PSYOPS
- PE 1160489BB SOF Global Video Surveillance Activities
- PE 1160490BB SOF Operation Enhancements Intelligence





	FY 2007 Actual	FY 2008 Appropriated	FY 2009 Request
Special Operations Technology Development	17.729	32.040	23.104
SOF Medical Technology Development	2.234	2.327	2.459
Special Operations Advanced Technology Development	145.245	41.251	28.930
SOF Information and Broadcast Systems Advanced Technology			10.990
Classified Programs*	2.383	2.866	1.668
Special Applications for Contingencies	20.075	16.844	16.225
Distributed Common Ground/Surface Systems (MIP)			3.165
MQ-1 Predator A UAV (MIP)		12.765	13.679
STORM (MIP)		26.413	
Small Business Innovative Research	12.213	7.883	
Special Operations Aviation Systems Advanced Development	67.695	55.451	43.977
Special Operations Tactical Systems Development	85.058	58.816	13.263
Special Operations Intelligence Systems Development (MIP)	58.562	62.417	39.125
SOF Operational Enhancements	103.431	57.877	48.137
Special Operations CV-22 Development		22.872	38.229
Special Operations Aircraft Defensive Systems	3.760	5.062	
Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) Development	31.616	19.772	7.090
Mission Training and Preparation Systems	4.084	6.241	4.052
Unmanned Vehicles	10.040	6.334	1.527
MC-130J SOF Tanker Recapitalization		12.375	4.659
SOF Weapons Systems			2.759
SOF Soldier Protection and Survival Systems			3.190
SOF Visual Augmentation, Lasers and Sensor Systems			3.495
SOF Rotary Wing Aviation			3.822
SOF Underwater Systems			3.142
SOF Surface Craft			5.206
SOF PSYOPS			15.554
SOF Global Video Surveillance Activities			14.686
SOF Operational Enhancements Intelligence			8.729
Total Special Operations Command:	**564.125**	**449.606**	**360.862**

*Details are classified

Science and Technology: Science and Technology consists of four PEs: Special Operations Advanced Technology Development; Special Operations Special Technology; SOF Medical Technology Development; and SOF Information and Broadcast Systems Technology Development.

- Special Operations Advanced Technology Development PE conducts studies and develops laboratory prototypes for applied research and advanced technology development, as well as leverages other organizations' technology projects.
- Special Operations Special Technology PE conducts rapid prototyping, Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs).
- SOF Medical Technology Development PE provides studies, non-system exploratory advanced technology development, and evaluations focused on medical technologies, centering on physiological, psychological, and ergonomic factors affecting the ability of SOF to perform their missions.
- SOF Information and Broadcast Systems Technology Development PE (a new PE for FY 2009) was created to capture rapid prototyping efforts, ATDs, and ACTDs of information and broadcast systems in one capability area.

SO Aviation Systems Advanced Development: This PE provides for the investigation, evaluation, demonstration and integration of current and maturing technologies for SOF-unique aviation requirements, to include a rapid response capability to support SOF fixed wing aircraft and unmanned aircraft systems.

Special Operations Intelligence: This PE provides for the identification, development, and testing of SOF intelligence equipment to identify and eliminate deficiencies in providing timely intelligence to deployed forces.

CV-22: This PE develops improved CV-22 capabilities in block increments, supported with rapid prototyping. FY 2009 funding continues design and development of Block 20.

Predator Medium Altitude Long Endurance Tactical (MALET): This PE identifies, develops, and tests SOF organic MALET UAS platforms, intelligence payloads, and control systems. As the supported combatant command in the GWOT, USSOCOM requires the capability to find, fix, and finish time-sensitive high-value targets. FY 2009 continues development of payload and ground control station improvements.





United States Special Operations Command



Military Construction

USSOCOM's MILCON funding request for FY 2009 is $255 million, a reduction of $339 million from the FY 2008 appropriated funding level. Construction projects support forces growth related to the QDR and readiness enhancing training facilities. The FY 2009 list includes one project in California, three in Florida, one in Kentucky, one in New Mexico, four in North Carolina, two in Virginia, one in Washington, and one overseas project. These projects provide some infrastructure needed by the command to grow the size of SOF by 13,119 personnel.

Additionally, the FY 2009 request includes $17 million for planning and design, along with $8 million for minor construction.



PROJECT	AMOUNT	LOCATION	STATE
SOF Combat Crew Training Facility	9.80	Naval Base Coronado	California
SOF Battalion Ops Complex	40.00	Eglin AFB	Florida
SOF Special Tactics Group Facility	8.90	Eglin AFB	Florida
SOF Add/Alter 501B	10.50	MacDill AFB	Florida
SOF Tactical Equipment Shop	15.00	Ft Campbell	Kentucky
SOF Maintenance Hangar	18.10	Cannon AFB	New Mexico
SOF Expand Training Compound	14.20	Ft Bragg	North Carolina
SOF Headquarters Facility	14.60	Ft Bragg	North Carolina
SOF Training Facility	5.30	Ft Bragg	North Carolina
SOF Security/Force Protection	4.15	Ft Bragg	North Carolina
SOF Small Arms Range	11.60	Ft Story	Virginia
SOF Operations Facility, Increment 2	31.00	Dam Neck	Virginia
SOF Ranger Battalion Complex	38.00	Ft Lewis	Washington
SOF Training Range	9.20	Al Udeid	Qatar
TOTAL	**230.35**		

SOF Truths
Humans are more Important than hardware
Quality is better than quantity
Special Forces cannot be mass produced
Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur

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