- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009

[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009

_______________________________________________________________________

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr., Alabama JACK KINGSTON, Georgia
ALLEN BOYD, Florida KAY GRANGER, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Paul Juola, Greg Lankler, Sarah Young, Paul Terry, Kris Mallard, Linda
Pagelsen, Adam Harris, Ann Reese, Tim Prince, Brooke Boyer, Matt
Washington, B G Wright, Chris White, Celes Hughes, and Adrienne Ramsay,
Staff Assistants
Sherry L. Young, Administrative Aide
________
PART 3
Page
Defense Health Program........................................... 1
National Guard and Reserve Issues................................ 83
Department of the Air Force...................................... 197
United States Central Command.................................... 243
Air Force Posture................................................ 315
________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009

_______________________________________________________________________

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.

Paul Juola, Greg Lankler, Sarah Young, Paul Terry, Kris Mallard, Linda
Pagelsen, Adam Harris, Ann Reese, Tim Prince, Brooke Boyer, Matt
Washington, B G Wright, Chris White, Celes Hughes, and Adrienne Ramsay,
Staff Assistants
Sherry L. Young, Administrative Aide
________
PART 3
Page
Defense Health Program........................................... 1
National Guard and Reserve Issues................................ 83
Department of the Air Force...................................... 197
United States Central Command.................................... 243
Air Force Posture................................................ 315
________

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
46-475 WASHINGTON : 2009

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania JERRY LEWIS, California
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia RALPH REGULA, Ohio
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York JAMES T. WALSH, New York
JOSE E. SERRANO, New York DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio
ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia JACK KINGSTON, Georgia
JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
ED PASTOR, Arizona TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina ZACH WAMP, Tennessee
CHET EDWARDS, Texas TOM LATHAM, Iowa
ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr., Alabama ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri
MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York KAY GRANGER, Texas
LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California JOHN E. PETERSON, Pennsylvania
SAM FARR, California VIRGIL H. GOODE, Jr., Virginia
JESSE L. JACKSON, Jr., Illinois RAY LaHOOD, Illinois
CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan DAVE WELDON, Florida
ALLEN BOYD, Florida MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida
MARION BERRY, Arkansas DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana
BARBARA LEE, California JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
TOM UDALL, New Mexico RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana
ADAM SCHIFF, California KEN CALVERT, California
MICHAEL HONDA, California JO BONNER, Alabama
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
TIM RYAN, Ohio
C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas

Rob Nabors, Clerk and Staff Director

(ii)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009

---------- --
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Thursday, February 28, 2008.

DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM

WITNESSES

HON. S. WARD ``TRIP'' CASSCELLS, M.D., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS
LIEUTENANT GENERAL ERIC B. SCHOOMAKER, M.D., PH.D., ARMY SURGEON
GENERAL, COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY MEDICAL COMMAND
VICE ADMIRAL ADAM M. ROBINSON, M.D., SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. NAVY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES G. ROUDEBUSH, M.D., SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. AIR
FORCE

Introduction

Mr. Murtha. I want to welcome this distinguished panel
before the Committee. This is an open hearing. And we
appreciate what you folks have done. I was just talking to some
of you privately, and Mr. Young was, too. And of course, what
we have been wrestling with is trying to figure out, is there a
better time to intervene? Can we intervene sooner?
And Admiral Mullen gave me a book, ``War and Redemption,''
which talks about the difficulties and struggles people had in
World War II and Iraq and so forth. And I have read three or
four books. John Parrish, Dr. Parrish, wrote a book about his
experience in Vietnam. And a couple other books I have read
talked about the emotional and mental problems that they have
had.
One thing I found is when I went to Fort Hood, I found a
much better clinical screening course than I saw before, a much
better counseling service. And I think, as we work our way
through this extra money we put in last year and we get case
workers out there who can follow people through the whole
system, I think we are going to be much better off. But we
welcome you. And there are a lot of different hearings going
on, and many of our members are both chairmen and ranking
members, because they are senior before they can get on this
subcommittee anyway, so we will go as quickly as we can. We
will take your testimony, if you will summarize it for us, and
we will get right to the questions.
Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, I just want to extend my welcome
also to the witnesses today. And as I have said so many times
before, you know, I do not have much of a medical background,
but I have seen what I consider to be some real miracles in our
military hospitals. And we have had some problems, but we deal
with the problems. We are just glad to have you here, and I
look forward to hearing your testimony.
Mr. Murtha. Nobody has been in the forefront more than Mr.
Young and his wife going to the hospitals, talking to people,
making sure that they had--and I have done my bit, and we want
to make sure medical services get their share of the budget.
And some of the things we have done I think have been obviously
very important to the overall ability of the medical services
to respond to the needs that are out there of the troops.
So, Dr. Casscells, we will start with you and go right
through the surgeons general. But we want to keep your opening
statements as short as you can.
Dr. Casscells. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young.
I really want to say, on behalf of the Under Secretary, Dr.
Chu, and Gordon England, and all the Pentagon leaders, and you
will hear from the services, we appreciate this chance to visit
with you. We come here, as usual, with two eyes open, two ears
open, and great appreciation for what this committee has done.
Mr. Murtha. Is his microphone turned on there?

Summary Statement of Dr. Casscells

Dr. Casscells. Sorry, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Congressman Young. I really want to say, on behalf of the Under
Secretary, Dr. Chu, and Gordon England and all the Pentagon
leaders, and you will hear from the Services, we appreciate
this opportunity to get your guidance. We have gotten a lot of
excellent guidance over the past year, in addition to some
extraordinary support. And as I mentioned to you a minute ago,
you and this Committee have been the leading advocates for the
healthcare for our members. And it is deeply, deeply
appreciated because it is an arm wrestle in the Pentagon.
Dollars do count, as well as the other guidance. So your
continued interest in this and Mr. Young's and Mrs. Young's is
deeply, deeply appreciated, sir.
So we are today, again, to get guidance and to give you a
report. The simple form of the report is, we are making pretty
good progress. The GAO report this morning in the Washington
Post on the situation at Walter Reed, for example, is
encouraging. We have got a ways to go. I actually have some
data, which I can share with you, which just came out
yesterday, from a survey that we commissioned done by an
independent pollster of 600 of our recently wounded warriors.
That, too, shows a big change compared to last year. Again,
there is some room for improvement. So we are always looking
for new ideas, and we welcome this opportunity to get some
input from you, sir. Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. Casscells follows:]

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Summary Statement of General Roudebush

General Roudebush. Chairman Murtha, Ranking Member Young,
distinguished members, it really is a pleasure to be before you
here today. You all very well understand the challenges that we
face. Our first task is to provide a healthy, fit force; fit
and able and resilient; able to go forward and do the mission
in some very challenging places. And while we are doing that,
taking care of family members as well as retirees to the full
extent that we can; you understand that this is a challenge
always in a resource-constrained environment, providing the
right resources, both manpower as well as money and facilities,
to do that. And you all have been very forthcoming in
supporting and working with us to find that right balance
within a very challenging environment to do that.
But as we work the challenges for today, I think the focus
certainly of this committee in working with us to do the
mission today is also to look forward to tomorrow, to
understand the challenges of those missions, because they may
be rather different than we face today. Certainly, in the Air
Force, as we use the Chief's priorities as our direct vector,
winning today's fight, taking care of our people, and preparing
for tomorrow's challenges, that is the task before us, while we
work to recapitalize facilities and equipment, reset equipment
to be sure that it is prepared for tomorrow. So we truly
appreciate the energy, the focus, the understanding, and
certainly the enduring support that you all bring to assist us
as we take care of our Nation's most precious treasure. For
that we thank you, and I certainly look forward to your
questions. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of General Roudebush follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Summary Statement of Admiral Robinson

Admiral Robinson. Chairman Murtha, Ranking Member Young,
distinguished members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to be
here with you again to share my vision of Navy Medicine in the
upcoming fiscal year. You have been very supportive of our
mission in the past, and I want to express my gratitude, and on
behalf of all of those who work for Navy Medicine, we certainly
appreciate everything you have done for us.
Navy Medicine is at a particularly critical time in
history, as the Military Health System has come under increased
scrutiny. Resource constraints are real, along with the
increasing pressure to operate more efficiently, while
compromising neither mission nor healthcare quality. The budget
for the Defense Health Program contains fiscal limits that
continue to be a challenge. The demands for wounded warrior
care continue to steadily increase due to military operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
At the same time, Navy Medicine must meet the requirement
to maintain a peacetime mission of family and retiree
healthcare as well as provide a new strategic, imperative
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as needed around
the globe. Our mission is force health protection, a fit and
ready force deployed with the warfighters, support the
warfighters in everything they do, and then make sure that we
care for eligible family members and those who have worn the
cloth of our Nation. That is what force health protection is,
and that is what Navy Medicine is all about.
Navy Medicine must ensure that we have the excellence in
clinical care, the excellence in graduate health education, and
the excellence in biomedical research in order to meet that
mission. And those missions--and those are the foundations and
the core of Navy Medicine. Thank you, again, sir, for your help
in the past. Thank this Committee for all of its help. And I
stand by and look forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of Admiral Robinson follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Summary Statement of General Schoomaker

General Schoomaker. Well, let me join my distinguished and
esteemed colleagues in thanking you, Chairman Murtha and
Congressman Young and other distinguished members of this
subcommittee, for providing me an opportunity to discuss Army
Medicine and the Defense Health Program. I have been in front
of a number of congressional committees in the past few weeks
and have spoken at length about the Army Medical Action Plan
and the Army's care and support of our wounded, ill, and
injured warriors. The care of these great warriors and their
families is the most important thing we do. We are committed to
getting it right and providing a level of care and support that
is equal to the quality of their service.
However, as my colleagues have each mentioned, this is not
the only thing we do in Army Medicine. In fact, the care we
provide to wounded, ill, and injured warriors is less than 10
percent of our outpatient healthcare managed by the Army. So I
appreciate the opportunity today to talk about the other 90
percent of what we do, the extremely important work that is
done by the dedicated men and women, military and civilian, of
the Army Medical Department who really, in my view, personify
the value of selfless service.
In January, I traveled to Iraq with a congressional
delegation to see firsthand the incredible performance of Army
soldiers and medics and medics within the Joint Force. In fact,
those of us on the panel here today had a kind of reunion of
sort in the Air Force Hospital at Balad because we were all
downrange seeing firsthand how our medical personnel were
performing. During that trip, and many times visiting hospitals
and seeing wounded, ill, and injured soldiers, and seeing
family members that were caring for them and retirees, I am
reminded of the parallels that exist between how the Joint
Force fights and how the Joint Medical Force protects health
and delivers healing. The joint warfighting community employs
all tools of intelligence and this fearsome array of lethal and
nonlethal weapons to deliver precise force to bear on our
enemies.
The medical force, represented by those of us at this panel
here, work in parallel but on behalf of healing and health. We
employ tools of medical information about the individual
soldier patient, his or her state of health or injury and
illness, to deliver the right care by the right medic, and by
medic, it is a capital M, all uniforms, all roles, at the right
time and the right place from the point of injury on a
battlefield through evacuation to rehab centers in the United
States.
In the Army, we promote best clinical practices by aligning
business practices with incentives for our clinicians,
administrators and commanders. We do not simply fund commanders
based upon what they got last year and add a factor for
inflation. We do not just pay for productivity, although it is
a very important element of what we do. We focus on quality and
best value for the efforts that our caregivers have. At the end
of the day, that is what our families, that is what our
patients really want and deserve. They want to remain healthy,
and they want to know that we are addressing their problems and
they are better off for their encounters with us.
We then address this through evidence-based medicine and a
focus on clinical outcomes. We have used the system of
outcomes-based incentives for now 4 years. It has been
implemented across the entire Medical Command last year after
an initial trial in the southeast for several years. I strongly
support this approach. It promotes a focus, again, on adding
value to people's lives through the efforts of health promotion
and in the healthcare delivery community. Our results have
resulted in the Army's being able to raise the measurable
health of our population and deliver more healthcare every year
since 2003.
As the Army and the Military Health System moves forward, I
have three principal areas of concern that require attention.
These concerns are our people, the care we deliver in our
distributed system of clinics and hospitals, which we call the
Direct Care System, and our aging facility infrastructure. You
know, I am really impressed with the professionalism,
commitment, and selfless service of our people in Army Medicine
and in the Joint Force. Nothing is more important to our
success than our dedicated workforce. And I have asked our
former assistant--or excuse me, Acting Surgeon General, Major
General Gale Pollock to serve as the Deputy Surgeon General for
Force Management. She is putting together a human capital
strategy for Army Medicine to make it the employer of choice
for healthcare professionals. We need your help in breaking the
notion that we are one-size-fits-all mentality. We need to have
tailored approaches, with flexibility and innovation, that
attract and retain the very best civilians and uniformed
personnel in the uniform.
Second, I would like to emphasize the importance of the
Direct Care System and our ability to maintain an all-volunteer
force in an era of persistent conflict. One of the major
lessons that has been reinforced throughout the global war on
terror, and especially this last year in caring for our
casualties, and reinforced by my colleagues here is the Direct
Care System is the foundation for caring for wounded, ill, and
injured service members. The Direct Care System, what we do in
our military hospitals every day, and clinics, is the
foundation for our caring for our wounded, ill, and injured
soldiers. All of our successes on the battlefield, through
evacuation, through our medical facilities back home, derives
from the success of our Direct Care System.
And sir, I know this is a particular interest of you,
Chairman, and you, Congressman Young. I want to tell you
publicly how much we appreciate your personal investment in our
Direct Care System and your continuing to emphasize the
importance and support that we require. It is where we educate.
It is where we train. It is where we develop critical skills
that we use then to protect the warfighter and to save lives.
It is the foundation of military medicine. And it is very
vulnerable. Congress, especially this committee, has been very
supportive of our Direct Care System. Thank you for recognizing
our importance. Last year, in addition to funding the Direct
Care System, you provided us additional supplemental funding
for operations and maintenance, procurement and research. I
want to again thank you for doing that and providing us those
additional funds. We are ensuring that that money is used for
what you intended it to be. And we appreciate that continued
support for our infrastructure and Direct Care System.
My last concern is about this aging infrastructure of our
medical facilities. If we are going to provide consistent world
class healing, we need environments that promote that. The
quality of our facilities, whether they are treatment
facilities or research and development and support, is a
tangible demonstration of our commitment to our most valuable
assets, our families and our Military Health System staff. It
is the bedrock of our generating force; it is how we continue
to support the Joint Force. And we need your help.
In closing, I want to reassure you that Army Medicine is
committed to the highest priority of caring for our wounded,
ill, and injured soldiers and their families. I am proud of the
Army Medical Department's efforts over the last 232 years, and
especially the last 12 months, in this regard. I am convinced
that with the help of the Department of Defense and with the
Veterans Affairs, we have turned the corner on some of the
problems we suffered last year.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before this
committee, and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of General Schoomaker follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

MEDICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Mr. Murtha. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Let me just say
that we have asked for a list of the infrastructure, medical
infrastructure deficiencies, and we have gotten it from the
Army. We got it from all three? Okay. Well, Mr. Young and I,
are going to present to the committee that we are going to
transfer the money to the Military Construction Committee to
take care of those deficiencies. If it does not get done in
those next 2 years, it won't get done.
In talking to Major Rozelle, I asked him how it was going
with the center that he works so effectively with, and he said
it is so much better. He believes that the troops now
understand, if something happens to them, they have some place
they can go and get rehabilitated. And I appreciate that. That
is the kind of thing that we do all the time.
I do not know about the Defense Department, because we have
some arguments with the Defense Department about their
priorities, but this committee stands ready to make sure that
the troops have what they need when they come home. And
infrastructure is such an important part of it. So we will
continue to ask you questions, and as long as you give us the
answers, we will take care of it financially in the next--I do
not know if we will get it all in 1 year, but we will get it in
the next 2 years because it is going to amount to $6 billion or
$7 billion. We will work it out. We are looking for places to
find other money. And the staff has been very good in ferreting
out some of the extra spending in some of the other agencies
that have asked us for money.
Mr. Young.

WARRIOR TRANSITION UNITS

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And I think all of you know of Chairman Murtha's
dedication, especially to the wounded troops and their
families. And I really like to visit the hospitals and visit
the wounded kids along with Mr. Murtha, because when my wife
finds out about a family that needs financial help, she makes
me empty my wallet. She also makes him empty his wallet.
Mr. Murtha. I empty my wallet before I see her.
Mr. Young. I want to ask or talk about the Army's Warrior
Transition Units. And my first question is going to be, does
the Navy and the Air Force have similar programs like the
Warrior Transition Unit?
General Roudebush. Sir, I can speak for the Air Force. Our
focus is to transition those individuals back to their unit,
preferably, or back to their home of record for recovery,
rehabilitation. We do that through a variety of activities. The
Air Force Wounded Warrior Program, formerly Palace HART, has a
family liaison officer assigned to each severely wounded
individual, who assists in not only the immediate delivery of
care, the immediate recuperation, but continues to follow
through rehabilitation back to the unit and then onto
transition to the Veterans Administration (VA) if that is
appropriate. So we track those individuals one by one with
their unit commander, their line commander, principally with
view and responsibility and accountability for those folks as
they work in close collaboration with the medics. So, for us,
it is not so much a unit activity as it is a, one by one,
returning them to their unit of record or their home of record
to assist them in their rehabilitation.
Admiral Robinson. Congressman Young, the Navy has a program
which includes a Wounded Warrior Regiment that is located in
D.C. And the commanding officer is Colonel Boyle. And then we
have Wounded Warrior Battalions at Camp Lejeune and at Camp
Pendleton. The concept is to make sure that Navy Medicine
partners with the line of both blue Navy and also the green
side, the Marine Corps, to make sure that the nonmedical and
the medical care needs of the individuals are taken into
consideration. Our goal is to decentralize the care, get it
away from the medical place of treatment as soon as that is
advisable, not a day or a second before, do the nonmedical and
the medical case management from the administrative and the
medical perspective, then if, I can use the word, repatriate
the patients back with their units and back into their home
environments or their units' environments because we think that
there is better healing and there is a better transition that
occurs. So we do in fact take care of those young men and women
that are coming through in that regard. And I will leave it at
that.
Mr. Young. I am glad you mentioned the Wounded Warrior at
Pendleton and Lejeune. Just a couple weeks ago, I had a chance
to visit with the Wounded Warrior Battalion at Camp Pendleton.
It was very impressive I have to tell you. And the reason I
asked about this, and I knew that you all had similar programs,
and when you talk about returning them to duty, what I am
concerned about is going beyond that and preparing them for a
successful life as a veteran in their community. And I just
wonder how much follow-up, and this may not be the right group
of witnesses to ask this question of. It may be better asked of
the VA, and I am doing that, too. But I want to tell you, just
give you an example of a situation that we dealt with. In fact,
it was a Marine that was from my area in Florida. I got to know
him very well and the family. His injuries were serious. And
after going through Bethesda and after going through the VA
Hospital at Haley in Tampa, the VA decided that he was never
going to get any better. He was more or less totally
incapacitated. His family would not settle for that. And they
took him to a private facility in California. And this private
facility brought this Marine back to life. He is able to walk.
He is able to talk. He had some legal matters, and he was able
to appear in court to the satisfaction of the Judge to make
decisions. Somewhere along the line, he was warehoused because
he was never going to survive. The family decided that was not
good enough. Now, did the Warrior Transition Units that have
organizations in all those services, do you follow up on those
young men and women that have gone into the VA system to a
conclusion one way or the other? Because you know, this man is
returning to a very useful life, a life that he can enjoy. And
the government had given up on him.
Admiral Robinson. I think that, from the Navy's
perspective, we have case managers that, once a wounded person
has come back, will stay with them throughout the care process.
So that means that as they transition to the Department of
Veterans Affairs and to VA Hospitals, our case managers will
still track them and keep up with them. I am not going to tell
you that at any point we are going to make sure that we take
care of everyone and have the success of this one individual.
But your example actually has been repeated more than one time
during this particular war. So it needs to be looked at. And
that is the capacity for the injuried, particularly on the
neurologic point of view, to come back even after we, from a
medical perspective, have thought that they could not. And
certainly at the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, we
have learned that repeatedly with the very traumatic and
extensive head injuries that we have received. We have seen
people, who heretofore medically it had been concluded were not
going to have a good quality of life, then come back and go to
college and become very productive.
So the answer to your question is, yes, we try to track
everyone. I am not sure that we are always successful at
providing the long-term systematic rehabilitative care that
they need. We have to depend on DVA, Department of Veterans
Affairs, to help us with it, but we still track them, even as
they go to the VA.
Mr. Young. I have talked to General Peake about this
considerably since he became Secretary of Veterans Affairs. You
will remember this case, Admiral, because he was the Marine
that was so tall you had to get a long extension to put on his
bed. And I know you remember that very well.
Admiral Robinson. Yes. I do.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir, and I would just add my
comments. We have obviously three very similar parallel systems
with case managers that are especially engaged during the acute
phase of treatment and intermediate rehabilitation. A major
provision I think of Dole-Shalala recommendations, as well as
the work of the senior oversight committee between the VA and
the Department of Defense, the committee chaired by Deputy
Secretary Mansfield from the VA and Deputy Secretary of Defense
Gordon England, is the development of these Federal care
coordinators who exist, as I describe them, as AWACs that fly
over the two environments, DOD Medicine and the VA Medicine,
and even into the network of private care and rehabilitation.
And they reduce the interagency friction that may occur. But
they are also committed to lifetime management. Because,
frankly, three decades from now, none of us sitting at this
table are going to be around for the management of that young
Marine or that young soldier or airman or sailor. What we need
is that warm hand off and continued handshake between the
agencies to make that happen. And, sir, I think we are working
very hard at exactly that. And I know Secretary Peake is
focused on it.
General Roudebush. Yes, Congressman Young, relative to the
Air Force, we follow three tracks for our severely injured and
wounded Airmen. First is obviously full recuperation or
rehabilitation, and if they desire, back to active duty, and if
that is able to be accommodated within the demands and the
construct of the active duty service requirements. If they are
not able to come back to active duty, but wish to continue to
serve in the Air Force, we facilitate and aggressively work to
place them within Department of the Air Force civilian
positions, and have done that. But for those who either transit
into civilian positions or transit to the VA, by policy, our
Air Force Wounded Warrior Program follows them for a minimum of
five years with contact, with query, with support to assure
that they are in fact continuing to do well so that each is
returned to the maximum in terms of lifestyle and capabilities.
Mr. Young. Well, thank you all very much. We owe these
heroes the very best that we can provide them and their
families. It is really important. And we appreciate all of you.
Mr. Chairman, I know I have gone over time, but thank you very
much.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Moran.

TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

Mr. Moran. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, have you asked why the Pentagon has only
obligated $53 million of the $900 million that this Committee
provided for traumatic brain injury? It might be useful to--I
do not want to take up a lot of time on that, and there is
probably a good reason, but it is a pretty small amount given
the priority that this Defense Appropriations Subcommittee gave
to traumatic brain injury. Is there a quick, concise
explanation for that?
Dr. Casscells. Mr. Moran----
Mr. Moran. Good to see you, Dr. Casscells.
Dr. Casscells. Thank you, sir.
We, as you know, feel this is job number one. And we had a
little delay in getting it out of the Pentagon to the Army as
the executive agent for this research. And what the Army has
done now, and I will brag about them because they will not brag
about themselves, is they have reached out, sir, to NIH, to top
academic centers around the country, all the hands, everybody
welcome, competitive process, and they set these requirements
for, what does it really mean? How can we have a balanced
program where we work hard to reduce the stigma and study it
and where we get the caregivers in there? And now this money is
flowing. They are obligating it. They are spending it. And more
importantly, sir, they are getting quick returns on investment,
and two types primarily. One is, General Schoomaker can talk to
this, it is about they are studying the impact on stigma,
people's reluctance to ask for help. That is one issue. Second
is the tremendous number of top notch academic proposals,
people wanting to work with us.
Mr. Moran. That is what I want to hear, Dr. Casscells. I
have got a lot of question areas. I just----
Mr. Murtha. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Moran. Sure.
Mr. Murtha. You are not telling me we are spending a lot of
money on administration and not spending money on taking care
of people?
General Schoomaker. Sir, maybe, I can intervene for just a
second to say, of the $900 million, sir, $300 million has gone
to research, as Dr. Casscells said; $600 million is going to
care. Of the $300 million, the bulk of those dollars will be
obligated in June and July. They are all programmed. There will
be 100 percent obligation by the end of the fiscal year for the
$300 million. Of the $600 million, the bulk of that came to the
Army, $262 million. All of it is programmed. Not all of it is
obligated yet, because we want to do a deliberate process of
contracting and the like. But at least for this Service, and I
think for the other Services as well, we have a very good
program. We understand your interest in ensuring that we
obligate those dollars before the end of the fiscal year. And
frankly, we have to.
Mr. Moran. That is the point of asking the question, to
emphasize the priority that this Committee has given that. And
this is one of the--the four of you, and those folks whom you
represent--is the real success story that we have the most
agreement with on this Committee. When you consider the fact
that killed-in-action rate is half what it was in World War II;
it is a third less than it was in Vietnam; the survivability
rate is 90 percent, that shows that in this particular area we
have made enormous progress. When you think that these soldiers
have such a higher chance of surviving being wounded in action,
in some cases as Mr. Young said, if it were Vietnam or World
War II, they would be goners. And they are not today because of
what you have done.

Prosthetic Improvement Program

Now I was over at DARPA recently, and they were showing us
some tremendous progress. I am going to take a little more time
since you extended a bit there, but there they showed
tremendous progress. They were showing us some monkeys that
they regularly fed them, and then the monkeys, they were not
able to reach it, and they found that there are brain waves
that can actually cause prosthetic limbs to move and get the
food and so on. And they say that they are ready now for brain
waves to really control these prosthetic devices. And they want
to introduce it at Walter Reed, but they are a little concerned
that, again, as the chairman says, the administrative process
of getting this stuff working for soldiers. And, you know,
these are just scientists, but they said, you know, it really
troubles us, we have got it working now, and it would mean so
much to us if we could see it working on soldiers at Walter
Reed, and it is not just because there is this administrative
delay. We know we can give them a prosthetic device that can be
controlled by the brain waves. Now, are we trying to facilitate
this? You know, I know you have got so much bureaucracy you
have to work with, but----
General Schoomaker. Sir, I am actually very familiar with
that program.
Mr. Moran. You are. Good.
General Schoomaker. That is the third phase of the
Prosthetic Improvement Program. We have gone through the first
phase that has been around a hundred years. We are into the
second phase in which we actually put now myoelectric
connectors to the stump. And DARPA is helping us to develop the
implanted chip in the brain that works on the brain's intent to
move the prosthesis. And so that program is actually aligned
with the Blast Injury Program that is being administered for
the Department of Defense out of the United States Army Medical
Research and Materiel Command.

Shortage of Healthcare Professionals

Mr. Moran. So we are going to implement it while they are
still in the hospital.
Third thing, I am concerned--we have been talking about
Walter Reed. And we are replacing it, and we are going to get
first class facilities, but we are not going to close down
Walter Reed until we are ready. DeWitt is one of those
replacement facilities. And it is going to be one of the finest
military medical facilities in the country. But I am told one
of their concerns is that, while they have the facility up,
they are afraid they are going to have a major shortage of
nurses, physical therapists, mental health counselors, the
Warrior Transition Teams. They do not have the personnel ready
to fill in. So they will have a big building, and they will
have lots of wounded warriors needing help, but they are not
going to have the health professionals, particularly the
healthcare professionals, that they desperately need. Are we
going to be able to fill that gap in time, Dr. Casscells?
Dr. Casscells. Congressman Moran, that is a great question,
and we are continually having to increase the special incentive
pays for caregivers, nurses in particular, and dentists are in
short supply, certain surgical specialties are in short supply.
In addition, we want to be able to take advantage of people who
are local. That is why, with your help, we met with people at
Northern Virginia College and Inova Mount Vernon. We are
looking forward to interaction there. There are a lot of
opportunities there to work with them. So, in some places, it
will be--the situations will be adapted to the local
opportunities.

MEDICARE TRUST FUND

Mr. Moran. All right. Thanks. As long as you are on top of
that. I have one other question. Mr. Horner asked, and maybe
you can answer it for the record, but I wonder, too, we just
passed this major Medicare--you know, we have this major
Medicare Part B program. If you are in a military treatment
facility that is reimbursed by Medicare, can they get
reimbursement from Medicare Part B if they are providing care
to our TRICARE For Life personnel? Are you going after that
money to reimburse the military budget?
Dr. Casscells. Yes, sir. You know, we put I think it is $15
billion into the Medicare Trust Fund every year, but in
addition, when patients are hospitalized we do bill third-party
providers. And one of the things that we have learned in the
last few years is that if all of those moneys come back to my
office, nobody bothers to collect them. Now leaving those
moneys with the commander who collects them, there is an
incentive, and they are collecting those third-party payments.
They can use them for operations, or education and research.
That is the way to go. As I said before, healthcare is local,
and the commanders learn from each other. We want to make sure
that there is plenty of decentralization in our system for that
kind of reason.
Mr. Moran. All right. Well, that is a lot of money. I am
glad you are doing that. We will ask later about the 30-minute
drive time standard that is affecting a lot of our seniors that
was just implemented.
But thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. I am encouraged to hear from the staff that you
have requested more money for--to continue the PTSD and the
brain damage money for next year. We want to make sure that
this is not just a one-time deal; this is something that is
going to take a long time. And we just obviously do not want to
appropriate money that is not needed, but I am encouraged that
you have already come to us and said, okay, this is something
we need in addition to the military medical infrastructure.
Dr. Casscells. Thank you, sir.
May I just say, the more we have gotten into this, the more
we have found what the opportunities are. Several things have
happened since we first got the--for example, the $300 million
research fund and the $600 million for operations. On the
research side, one of the exciting things is that we had the
developments in November with the Japanese and Jim Thompson
from the University of Wisconsin found that you could take your
own skin cells and reprogram them to become stem cells. This is
obviously a blockbuster breakthrough. And we think this is
going to help. We have got 150 people or so with spinal cord
trauma. We have got about the same number of bad eye injuries,
people who are really functionally blind. This is probably
their best hope, this kind of thing. Now that is on the basic
science side.
In addition, sir, we have been reminded by our patients
that there are a lot of therapies that patients are very
interested in and keen on that are what you might call soft
therapies. They might be meditation. They might be sunshine,
exercise, diet, vitamin supplements, or electromagnetic. There
are all kinds of things people are keen on, and they are doing
them anyway in an uncontrolled way. So one of the things we
would like to do with these funds, sir, is take a what I call a
hard look at soft therapies, put a scientific look on some of
these things that are--some of them are very valuable. Some of
them could be voodoo. So we want to look. We would like to
recognize that people make their own decisions in healthcare.
But we ought to factor them into what we are doing.
The third thing, sir, is that we had a report yesterday
from the Iraqi ambassador and the Iraqi surgeon general. They
estimate that 60 percent of the country has PTSD. I do not mean
PTS, I mean PTSD. And they have asked for our help in
developing culturally sensitive ways to reach out to that
country. And as we go into Africa, where there are many
traumatized people, Asia, their concept of psychology is
different than ours. And it has different cultural roots.
But I believe, sir, that the Uniformed Services University
and Armed Services, which are highly diverse, particularly in
our enlisted population, we have got 11 percent foreign born.
These are people who want to give back to the world. And mental
health is a big deal. And I will just close by saying the
number two at World Health Organization visited me this week.
He said, in two years--this is Dr. Ala Alwan--depression will
be the biggest cause of death globally. Depression. Because it
causes so much mayhem, heart attacks, and suicide and so on.
And he said this is the number one cause of death. So he said
the U.S. military sounds like it is going to become the world
leader in psychological health, and I applaud that. And to hear
that from the World Health Organization, sir, that was a new
day. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kaptur.

Remarks of Ms. Kaptur

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you.
Dr. Casscells, could you repeat the percentage of Iraqis
you stated were symptomatic with PTSD?
Dr. Casscells. The figure I got from Drs. Shakir and Samir
was about 65 percent. They feel that about two-thirds of the
people have had some kind of--have been traumatized either by
trauma to themselves, a family member, a close associate at
work, and they are struggling with that. Now, most people
recover from PTSD. Most people recover. But this is an
opportunity and an obligation. You know, of course, we saw this
in Europe after World War II. We saw it in Vietnam. And these
societies have rebounded. One of our questions is, how can we
be of help?
Ms. Kaptur. Maybe I will start my questioning here, and I
want to thank the Chairman for showing such a deep interest in
this health issue. I think every member and every soldier we
represent thanks him very, very much for that. I certainly do.
Thank you gentlemen, Doctor, Generals, Admiral. I have great
admiration for your work and for what you are trying to do. I
will begin with an analogy from a meeting the other day,
because you work for the largest bureaucracy in the world.
Maybe I should say the largest organization in the world. We
had a hearing on defensive missile systems. And I asked a
question of the Defense researchers whether they knew about the
Harpoon, which is an offensive system. It was very interesting
to me they did not. That was a shocking moment. And it just
said to me how massive the institution is that people often do
not know what one another are doing. I can't imagine in the
medical area it is much different. There may be something
happening on the Air Force side that Navy does not know or
Army. And then I wonder about Guard and Reserves, because it is
such a large organization. So I am going to ask some specific
questions, because I can only understand how effective we are
working together for our country if I follow specific cases up
the bureaucracy and figure out what happened. I am going to ask
you to report back to us, if you could, on Ohio, the State I
represent, and our efforts, our extraordinary efforts long
before the $900 million was passed in the last budget to deal
with the issues of neuropsychiatric care for our returning
vets. Because we had so many combat vets not just from--we do
not have bases like Fort Hood, but we have Guard and Reserve
units that have been in theater multiple times. And it is my
impression they are not being properly diagnosed and treated. I
have actually--I know that. That is not a hypothesis; that is a
fact. So here is what I am going to ask you kindly to report
back to us on in some way. I do not know, Dr. Casscells, if you
are in charge or if each branch is in charge. I do not know who
I am asking to report back, but I wish you would do it all
together somehow. I am interested in the following facts:
Number one, for 2009, in your proposed budget, how many more
psychiatrists will work for the Department of Defense to treat
these illnesses we are talking about in the neuropsychiatric
area, right now I am focusing on, including traumatic brain
injury, which is not a neuropsychiatric illness, but concussion
related, but head-related injuries? And how many psychiatric
nurses, how many more psychiatric nurses will be working for
the Department based on the legislation that we have passed
this coming year compared to last year and this year? Look at
this 3-year period. So we look at before we passed the
legislation, this fiscal year, which is the first year, and
then looking toward next year in your proposed budget. All I am
looking at are psychiatrists and psychiatric nurses.
Number two, I would like you to look at Ohio. Our
commanding officer for the Guard and Reserves is General Wayt,
W-A-Y-T. General Wayt is working with Case Western Reserve
University, and a preeminent neuropsychiatrist by the name of
Dr. Joseph Calabrese. And I do not think I am speaking out of
turn to say Dr. Calabrese says the worst experience of his
entire career, and he is in his mid-50s, is trying to get the
funds from the Department of Defense that we voted over
multiple years now to deal with returning vets.
My question to you is, why has it been so hard? What is
going on in there that a brilliant set of doctors who are
trying--and I do not even represent Case. All I know is it is
the best institution in my State to help to spearhead this
effort working with all of our medical facilities and with our
Guard and Reserve. What happened inside of Defense for him to
say to me, ``this is the worst experience of my professional
career, trying to work with that bureaucracy''? I am not
blaming anyone. All I want to do is take care of sick veterans
coming home, and I can't get it done. All right. So I want to
know why--I would like somebody to call Dr. Calabrese, figure
out, working with General Wayt at the State level, what is
going on inside DoD that we can't get this done? So that is the
second question.
The third question I want to know, I am going to mention
two specific veterans from my district who are wounded forever.
One is Matthew Drake, who will be probably a quadriplegic--no,
excuse me, Matthew Kyle, Matthew Kyle, quadriplegic for life.
He is down somewhere near Fort Hood right now. I would like to
know, I would like to have a profile on how he is being taken
care of; why did he end up in Texas rather than Ohio where he
is from? Why were we unable to take care of him in Ohio? Maybe
it was a family choice. And also, veteran Matthew Drake, who I
understand is in some family facility somewhere in Colorado.
These are both Army. His family is in Ohio. But they took him
out of the government medical facilities because they were
unable to care for him. I want to know why. I just do not know
why. He needs 24-hour-a-day care, but he is not near his
family. He is over in Colorado. His family is in Ohio. Matthew
Kyle, Matthew Drake. Okay.
Another question, I have an asset I want to put on the
table. Dr. Casscells, you talked about the Iraqi people. I have
wondered about PTSD and all kind of things because of the
bombing and the pressure on people for different reasons. I
represent a lot of Arab-speaking doctors. I have wondered about
backup in theater either for our own medical units or working
with hospitals or medical facilities in Iraq, if we could not
get telemedicine in there. The former head of our medical
college in Toledo, Dr. Gohara, is Arabic speaking. We have a
Marine now who is a head of our medical college back home, Dr.
Lloyd Jacobs. I am looking at this asset I have of Arabic-
speaking doctors and saying to myself, how can we use
telemedicine into several commands that are out there to treat
both our soldiers and the Iraqi people where it is possible and
develop relationships that help on the medical front? Does that
make any sense or not? Could you report back to me on that?
My time has probably expired, Mr. Chairman, but I would
finally ask to use a unit in my district as a test case of
whether what we are trying to do at this level is working at
the ground level. And that is the 983rd Engineering Battalion
Army Reserves located in Ohio, commanding officer in Chicago,
Illinois. There are men and women in that unit, largely men,
with PTSD untreated. How is that possible with all the money
that I have been voting for here in the Congress?
[The information follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Murtha. Let me just say, Mr. Young has to leave, and we
have no Republican here, so we are going to have to shorten our
questioning. So you will need to get that done here by 11
o'clock, because Mr. Young has to leave. So if you will shorten
your questions.
Ms. Kaptur. That was my last one, Mr. Chairman. A lot of it
is reporting back and asking them to comment on specifics so I
can understand why what I voted for still does not create more
help for my veterans that are coming home in our region.
Mr. Murtha. I will say we would work, this Committee is in
the forefront, we have been working hard trying to have case
workers to take them not only through the stay in the military
hospital, but in through the VA right through survival. And the
examples I used are two civilians, two reporters that were hurt
so badly and had civilian case workers help them. And Bill
Young earlier talked about how the family got involved, and now
we have case workers who are going to be following these
people, and General Schoomaker talked about this, the whole way
through. We all have the same problems and concerns. And the
thing that I worry about, though, is not--talking about it does
not solve it. We have got to make sure it happens. And I would
hope--I went to Fort Hood just recently. I saw an improvement,
substantial improvement of how it used to be. In other words,
they talked to the troops. The troops reacted. They screened
them, and then they started counseling them. I do not know when
you intervene because the book I am reading about war and
redemption that Admiral Mullen gave me said, if you intervene
too soon, they will not talk. It is the worst thing you can do.
It is the most delicate, difficult problem you can possibly
face. And all of us struggle with it. I have been reading three
or four books about it. And Vietnam, Korea. And so I think what
you brought up is the point all of us are struggling with,
trying to get to the bottom of it. But there is nobody that has
done more than we have in this subcommittee for military
medicine. So I appreciate what you have just said, and we work
at it all the time. And if you folks will answer any questions
she has for the record.
Dr. Casscells. Sir, I will take the responsibility. I think
I will have to get with your staff on some of these telephone
numbers, ma'am, to contact these people and get you your
answers. But as you can see, just a few people who are
struggling with PTSD really capture your heart, as they
captured yours. And if I could just follow up, I would say
again, this is collectively the thing we are most focused on.
[The information follows:]

My staff has attempted on numerous occasions to contact Dr.
Joseph Calabrese via email and phone and have not heard back
from him.
The Army staff has contacted your office regarding Matthew
Drake and Matthew Kyle to address the specifics of their case.

Mr. Murtha. I hate to interrupt you, Dr. Casscells, but you
are going to have somebody call and talk to her, because we
have to get to Mr. Bishop and then adjourn the committee.
Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome once again. My questions today, I want
to focus on joint military-VA medical facilities. And I would
be extremely interested in hearing the panel's views on the
effectiveness and productivity of the joint military and VA
medical facilities that we have now operating. For example, I
think, the North Central Federal Clinic in San Antonio, which
is the Air Force and the VA, as well as joint facilities in
Chicago, Biloxi, Mississippi and Alaska, how viable an option
is this moving forward, particularly as we are now going to be
investing more of taxpayers funds in construction of new
military medical facilities? And are there any obstacles,
pitfalls, or other issues in establishing more such
relationships that we should know about that would make it more
difficult? And are you open to more cooperation and more
utilization of joint facilities between the DOD and the VA?
General Roudebush. Congressman Bishop, I will take the
first turn at that one. The Air Force has four of the eight
current joint venture relationships. And we have found those to
be very, very productive. Our experience is that the most
productive relationships are established locally when you have
the local military facility commander and the local VA director
leverage each other's capability, find the gaps, find the
opportunities, and bring those together. We have had very
productive relationships. We have a hundred sharing
arrangements and agreements with the Guard, Reserve and Active
activities with our VA counterparts. They are two different
institutions with two different funding streams and rather
different foci, if you will, or focus of their activities, with
many areas of overlap. So, in short, I would say there are
wonderful opportunities. My experience is they tend to be best
leveraged locally but I think ought to be encouraged in every
regard because this is not only good medicine, but it is good
sense in getting the most out of every taxpayer dollar into the
hands of the people that can really provide the care.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir, I will just say for the Army,
we all agree I think about the value in planning and building
coordinately with the VA. The VA has a very good way of
predicting future populations for the VA. And we have done many
coordinated plans with the VA for community-based outpatient
clinics and the like. In your own district, I know that you are
distressed, as we are, about the replacement of Martin Army
Community Hospital. It is a $400 million to $450 million
hospital that, because of priorities within the Defense Health
Program, Military Construction Program, we had to split into
two pieces as a bill payer for the United States Army Institute
for Chemical Defense to replace it. So it became a bill payer
for part of the construction of Martin. We are going to do that
in two pieces. One piece of it is funded in 08-09, and then the
balance in the 8 to 13 POM. We would like to have it as a
single project. We have gone to the VA is my understanding. The
VA does not have the money to pony up for a joint VA-DOD
Hospital at Martin.
Mr. Bishop. It is my understanding that, prior to my
arrival this morning, the Chairman indicated that the
subcommittee was considering transferring a substantial sum of
money for medical facilities to the MILCON, which is slash also
Veterans Affairs Subcommittee of Appropriations. I happen to
serve on that subcommittee also. It would appear to me that
that might be some indication that VA will not have that kind
of a problem with resources if, of course----
Mr. Murtha. If the gentleman would yield, let me just say
this. We are going to fund this hospital. But you have to have
35 percent design completed. We do not want to hold this thing
up because of the VA. My experience dealing with VA, it will
take a hell of a long time before you get done what you want to
get done. And I know what Bishop has in mind. But you know, we
want to go forward with this hospital. I do not want the damn
thing slowed up because we got some bureaucratic beef. Not only
will you be gone, we will all be gone before it gets done.
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Chairman, my only concern, I just wanted to
get an understanding that if we were to pursue that, that there
would be no objection on the part of the DOD to that effect. I
certainly do not want to hold it up, I want it to go forward.
But once it goes forward, I would like very much for us to
pursue the VA end of that.
General Schoomaker. That is our oldest hospital in the
inventory. Our hospitals in the top five are over two times the
age of comparable civilian facilities. We are very much in
agreement.
Mr. Murtha. We will have the money to do it. Because of
your suggestion, request, because of your diligence, and
because of your influence with this Committee, they will have
the money to do it. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I
appreciate your coming before the Committee. And I just want to
say one thing. General Schoomaker said before--I was talking
about PTSD--he said he gets PTSD coming before the Committee. I
get PTSD from visiting these troops sometimes. So I appreciate
it very much for you coming before the Committee. Thank you
very much.
The Committee is adjourned to 1:30.
[Clerk's note.--Question submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answer therefore follow:]

Question. We understand that the Department of Veterans
Affairs will be responsible for hiring all Federal Recovery
Coordinators. Can you tell me what resources (both personnel
and funding) the Department of Defense is providing to this
program?
Answer. DoD funds and personnel were used to support the
development of the Federal Recovery Coordinators (FRC) training
curriculum and training programs. DoD also provided funding to
support development of the web-based National Resource
Directory, an integral part of the Federal Individual Recovery
Plan, that will allow wounded, ill and injured Service members,
veterans, and their families as well as the FRCs to access
nation-wide information on care and services.

[Clerk's note.--End of question submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Thursday, February 28, 2008.

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE ISSUES

PANEL I

WITNESSES FOR RESERVES

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACK STULTZ, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE
VICE ADMIRAL JOHN COTTON, CHIEF, NAVY RESERVE
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN BERGMAN, COMMANDER, MARINE FORCES RESERVE
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN BRADLEY, CHIEF, AIR FORCE RESERVE

Introduction

Mr. Murtha. We are going to welcome this distinguished
panel. And if you keep your testimony short we will keep our
questions short, because I think we have gotten pretty well to
the point where we want to be. And you have given us some good
information about what we think needs to be done. So with that,
I will ask Mr. Hobson if he has any opening remarks.
Mr. Hobson. No. I have a few questions I am going to ask,
but we will get to that.
Mr. Murtha. All right. Without objection, we will put your
full testimony in the record. And if you will each say a few
words we will get right to the questions.
General Bradley. Mr. Chairman, Committee members, thank
you, sir, for having this hearing. I think this is important.
It gives us a chance to talk about our people and advocate for
things we need so that they are better prepared to do their
jobs. I want to thank you particularly for the great help you
have given us over the last few years.
The National Guard and Reserve equipment account is our
life blood to really improve our aircraft and other equipment
so that the folks that we put over in the United States Central
Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) can help look after their
business and be safe and do good, close air support. We supply
missions for Soldiers and Marines on the ground.
So thanks for your help, and I look forward to your
questions, sir.
[The statement of General Bradley follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

General Bergman. Mr. Chairman, as always, it is a pleasure
to be here in front of you and the Committee. Thanks for your
continued support to the Marines and their families. In the
last 5 years, with over $200 million for the Marine Corps in
the degree account, you have allowed us to close out roughly 32
programs or training allowance allocations where we have been
able to get the equipment, both hard combat-deployable
equipment and training assimilation technology that has allowed
us to maintain and increase our readiness.
There are a lot of things on the table today, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The statement of General Bergman follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Admiral Cotton. Mr. Chairman, two things, and a comment.
NGREA echoes same comments.
TRICARE Reserve Select is enormous. Since October 1, 2007,
if you are a drilling selected Reservist you have access to
health care. In America this is unbelievable. We have noticed
an uptick in retention and especially in recruitment of
veterans that are going to college and need health benefits. We
have got about 7,000 Reservists on the program now. So for
about $260 for a family, $81 for a single, you now have health
care. It is enormous. It has really helped.
I have been chief for 4\1/2\ years. It is my last time
before you. I have got to say, Active-Reserve Integration, this
journey that Admiral Clark started, Admiral Mullen continued,
and now Admiral Roughead is a huge advocate. It has really
worked well for us. We are full partners in everything we do.
The Navy tells our story. We are sailors for life in a
continuum of service, and we thank you for your support.
[The statement of Admiral Cotton follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

General Stultz. Yes, sir. Just to echo my comrades in arms
here, thanks for all the support we have gotten from Congress.
We are getting support for the Reserve components at record
levels in terms of dollars being spent against our soldiers for
the benefits and incentives as well as the equipment.
At this time last year when I came before you, the Army
Reserve had an end strength of 188,500; today we have got an
end strength of 193,500--5,000 more than we had this time last
year. At a time when we are at record op tempo, we keep 25,000
to 30,000 soldiers deployed in 18 different countries in the
world right now, and they are reenlisting at record rates.
We are meeting our retention goals at record rates with our
first-term soldiers. And the reason I believe they do that is
they feel like, one, what they are doing is important and they
feel good about it; but number two, that they have got the
support of this Congress behind them.
So thanks for what you are doing. I look forward to your
questions.
[The statement of General Stultz follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

TRICARE MEDICAL

Mr. Murtha. I appreciate those summaries.
Let me just say TRICARE started in this committee before I
was Chairman, as a demonstration project. We had a lot of
problems at first, a lot of complaints and we adapted to that.
And I think when I go to the field, I always ask about how
TRICARE is going and how important is it. I get very high marks
from the troops in the field. And I am glad to hear that it is
helping with retention, because I found that if we don't take
care of the families we are sure as hell going to have a
problem retaining the people in the military, especially with
the strain that our folks are under right now with extended
deployments and with the fact they have been deployed so often.
So I am pleased to hear that that is going well. We had all
kinds of problems at first. We still have a lot of health care
problems. We had the health care folks in front of us today,
but it is getting better. We are going to adjust some of the
budget requests to take care of them.
For instance, military medical facilities we are going to
improve substantially. There has been a backlog for a long-term
with military medical facilities. We are going to do the same
thing with infrastructure for the regulars. And where the Guard
goes to train and where the Reserves go to train, we are going
to increase that money for that infrastructure. I am going to
transfer that to the Military Construction Committee so they
have an opportunity to have better facilities, the same type of
facilities the Regulars have.
So the advice we get from you folks is invaluable. And of
course, visiting the bases and having an opportunity to talk to
the troops gives us some insight. Sometimes it gets so
sanitized up here we don't get exactly what we need to hear in
order to get the budget developed the way it should be
developed.
So I appreciate your coming before the committee, and we
will ask Mr. Hobson if he has any questions.
Mr. Hobson. I most certainly do. First of all, General
Stultz, does what the Chairman just said help you fix the base
I have been complaining about and some other bases and put you
in a better line?
General Stultz. Sir, we are getting funding, and
specifically we are talking about Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, one of
our heaviest used.
Mr. Hobson. 10,000 to 12,000 people go through there a
year.
General Stultz. Go through there every year.
Mr. Hobson. It looks like it did in 1958 when I was up
there.
General Stultz. Yes, sir. I will say the good news--and I
will characterize that first--is we are getting funding for
Fort McCoy for certain projects when it comes to the training
facilities like ranges and things like that. The problem I have
got is, as you very well know, sir, we need better billeting
for the soldiers who are out there. We are still putting those
soldiers in World War II buildings. And when we go into the
construction program it seems like the facilities, places like
McCoy and some of the other places, like Shelby and others with
the Guard, are pushed back.
We have got our first ORTC, which is the Operational
Readiness Training Center, which is your brick training
facilities billets scheduled for Fort McCoy in fiscal year
2011. That is too late; we need it started now.
Mr. Murtha. We have a list from--I assume you are included
in that list--from all the services about infrastructure
deficiencies.
General Stultz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. And it amounts to $7 billion or $8 billion. We
intend over the next two supplementals to take care of that,
plus military medical facilities that are deficient. So we have
seen those facilities and we are sure as hell going to try to
take care of them.
General Stultz. We just can't afford to keep pouring money
into putting wood on World War II buildings.

UNIT DEPLOYMENT/COHESION

Mr. Hobson. One more thing in this round. General Bergman,
he knows I am not happy. We have the former chief first
sergeant of the Lima Company here with us today. Right, Auggie?
Voice. XO, sir.
Mr. Hobson. XO. He is here. He cares about these Marines.
He cares about the Marines in Lima Company. I wish the Marine
Corps, to be frank with you, cared as much about those Marines
as I do. I want to--there is a memorandum of 19 January 2007
from the Secretary of Defense: Mobilization of ground combat,
combat support and combat service support will be managed on a
unit basis. This will allow greater cohesion and predictability
in how these Reserve units train and deploy. Exceptions will
require my approval.
Did you have that approval or do you need that approval
now?
General Bergman. Sir, we need that approval when that goes
forward when there are exceptions to dwell time.
Mr. Hobson. Do you have that today?
General Bergman. The----
Mr. Hobson. I am asking you a very straightforward
question, sir.
General Bergman. The book that goes to the SECDEF for unit
activation goes at a defined time. Prior to that unit
activation, there is a timing process. So the unit that we are
talking about to activate those Marines out of Lima Company
325, that book will not go forth to the SECDEF until a time
here in the near future.
Mr. Hobson. But you have already, you have----
General Bergman. We have already identified them.
Mr. Hobson. You have already told people----
General Bergman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hobson [continuing]. Involuntarily, when you had
volunteers to go forward in that unit who had not served
overseas, you had volunteers, you said no, we don't want those
volunteers, we want sergeants and we want corporals, and we are
going to do cross-leveling. You didn't go to the IRR to get
people out of the IRR, which is what it is for. And one of the
basic tenets of the Marine Corps is to keep these units
together, and all of a sudden we are going to do this.
And then I asked somebody, I said, what about the schooling
these kids were going to go to to help their unit? Some of them
were going to go to sniper school. They were waiting 3 years to
go to sniper school, and now 9 of the 11 are involuntary. That
is a problem, sir.
Secondly, what is your recruitment compared to the National
Guard and even the Reserve? Is your recruitment up? Are you
meeting everything?
General Bergman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hobson. The same levels?
General Bergman. We are at 100 percent. We were at 100
percent for 2007. Basically 6,287.
Mr. Hobson. You are not going to be with this kind of
treatment of Marines, in my opinion. Marines are supposed to
care about their people. When I ask what schools are going to
be messed up by this, nobody knows. When I ask about certain
types about these individuals nobody knows. All they know is we
needed corporals and we needed sergeants. And I would like you
to tell me why you didn't go to the IRR.
General Bergman. Well, sir, we go to the IRR every day. We
have scrubbed the IRR. Right now we have about over 2,000 IRR
Marines on Active Duty that are in Iraq and Afghanistan and
preparing to go. The reality is in caring about those Marines,
we care deeply, just as everyone in this room does. One of the
reasons that those corporals and sergeants were chosen is
because those new first-time Marines need qualified leadership,
because it is those corporals and sergeants. And quite
honestly, sir, those are a little bit in short supply.
Mr. Hobson. But let me tell you the other side of this,
too. Lima Company may go back in 2009. Some of these kids were
wounded that are going back in Iraq, their previous year.
Sending them back. And when Lima deploys again in 2009, you are
going to have this same problem, cause you have taken people
out of Lima Company now and put them over in another company.
And probably when they get back, I am not sure they are going
to stay as Marines.
General Bergman. Sir, Lima Company will go as part of the
3rd Battalion, 25th Marines. And if we hold to the Force
generation model we will go in June of 2010. And the fact of
the matter is when we started deploying the infantry battalions
in 2003, it took one battalion to make one battalion; 100
percent unit cohesion. By 2006, because of the second
activations and because we had at that time an unwritten policy
of voluntary-involuntary activations, which through the model
that the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Reserve had set up
for a year activation, which Secretary Gates referred to in his
memo, that year made up of about not quite 4 months of
predeployment training, a 7-month deployment and then a
demobilization time, we got set back by, again, an unwritten
policy on you couldn't involuntarily call someone a second
time, because we had set our business model to utilize the 24
months under law in two 12-month periods. And all the Marines
and Marine Forces Reserve knew that at the time, that if a
young Marine joined, you could go in your first year, you would
have approximately between 4 and 5 years dwell time, and in
your sixth year you would go a second time. That setback in the
2006--2005-2006 time frame caused us to go from being able to
make one battalion in one battalion, to make one regiment to
make one battalion. So the folks in 25th Marines were just
coming out of that.
We project that when 1st Battalion, 23rd Marines goes in
December of 2010, we will be at the virtually no or minimal
just specialty MOS cross-leveling. It took us a 4\1/2\ year
cycle to get back to where we started, which is exactly what
you are talking about sir.
Unfortunately the timing of 225 gone does catch us a little
bit short of zero cross-leveling.
Mr. Hobson. I think it is poor planning. And second of all,
I think by the time this gets to the SECDEF, he doesn't even
know where it is in the book you give him and it is already
done. I mean, so what you have done, the way you are doing it
is you are taking the action before you have the approval. And
then, after the fact, is so buried that he won't even know that
you violated the policy or you are intending to violate it when
he signs off on whatever you give him. And if it is reviewed by
the same people who send me memos, you know, that say nothing
but bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo, certainly he will sign off on it.
I mean this is just, I think, poor planning, poor treatment
of people. It should have been foreseen. And you are telling me
now you don't--basically what you are telling me is--when did
anybody look at whether there were sergeants or corporals
available in the IRR? I always forget which one. The guys that
you give points to for doing nothing and standing around and
now you are calling them up.
General Bergman. That is ongoing, sir. We scrub that list
continually, because those IRR Marines--oh, by the way, what we
try to do, because most of those Marines who are in the IRR are
coming right from Active Duty and have served multiple combat
tours already. So the policy that we have tried to put together
is that when a Marine enters the IRR they will have a 4-year
time frame in the IRR. They serve 4 years on Active Duty and a
4-year commitment in the IRR.
We give that first year of Active Duty, a chance to
refresh, get themselves established in their civilian careers,
and then they are eligible during the second and third year for
recall. We don't want to wait too long because individual skill
sets combat capabilities are a perishable skill. And in that
fourth year of the IRR, they are pretty much on their way out,
and we do not touch them unless there is some type of greater
national emergency.
Sir, it is all about people, and we are short of people.
And we felt we would err on the side of openness to tell these
young Marines early, because they need to prepare for the
eventuality, so they know they can have the medical benefits
available. And if the SECDEF decides to say no, then he says
no.
Mr. Hobson. Let me ask, if you have some people who were
willing to go, young Marines who were willing to go and willing
to volunteer, and you have a period of time that you are giving
people advance notice that you are going, if people have been
in a while are you telling me none of those were promotable to
the ranks that were necessary that they could go with this
unit? I doubt that anybody looked at that. I think this was
just a numbers game and they said, hey, these are the guys, you
are done, you are going. We don't care about the three that are
going to sniper school to help their unit. They have been
waiting 3 years to do that. And you turned down the kids that
volunteered, as I understand it.
Now, maybe there is a different story to this, but I
understand kids volunteered to do this. And that whoever the
officer is that said we are not going to do that, nobody
looks--did anybody look to see if there is anybody promotable
that can go?
General Bergman. Yes, sir. If a Marine is turned down for
voluntary deployment, it is because, for whatever reason, they
don't have the skill sets or the capabilities that we need in
that particular mission.
Mr. Hobson. Do you know that happened here?
General Bergman. I will find out for you. I am willing to
bet you--here is the key. 25th Marines is a regiment, and we
seek to keep that regiment intact with its infantry battalions,
so that we have that management at the level that they can look
right down in those battalions and down into those companies to
make sure we get it. But I will double-check to make sure and
get back to you.
[The information follows:]

By choosing Company L NCOs to augment 2nd Battalion instead
of volunteers, the command is able to fully utilize their
combat-proven leadership and occupational skills to train and
lead the Marines of 2nd Battalion. This plan also allows the
junior Marines (who may have volunteered) within Company L to
progressively assume greater responsibility during peacetime
training events, and thereby be better prepared to assume NCO
billets during 3rd Battalion's next deployment. Consequently,
the current plan optimizes the quality and quantity of NCO
leadership provided to both 2nd Battalion and 3rd Battalion
during combat operations in support of the War on Terror.

Mr. Hobson. When you looked down, it didn't happen here,
because you didn't have it in the one unit that is going. You
had it in some people in another unit to fill it. And that is
called cross-leveling, which everybody, especially the Marine
Corps, has been totally taboo on. The Air Force doesn't do it
because they can volunteer their people.
But anyway, it is just--this is a decorated group of
people, they want to go, they are willing to go, but I don't
think this is the right way to get them to go or to treat them
to go, especially when they waited 3 years.
I know the Army has the donkey as their mascot. I don't
know what the Marine Corps' is, but it has got to be about the
same.
General Bergman. It is kind of a bulldog, a very friendly
little one, unless you piss him off.
Mr. Hobson. I have seen that one over there. But I will
tell you I am just, as you can tell, frustrated.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Dicks.

STRATEGIC TO OPERATIONAL RESERVE

Mr. Dicks. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, the
Commission on National Guard and Reserves believes that the
dramatic change from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational
Reserve without any study is a far-reaching decision and is a
mistake, because it is not clear that the public or Congress
stand behind this new concept. What do you think of this
criticism?
Admiral Cotton. I will jump in first. I will tell you, I
think the rules changed in 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down.
We all got a wakeup call in 1991 with Desert Storm, and we did
really well there. Afterwards, we all expected a peace
dividend. The work did not go away. So we flexed and some of
our Reservists started getting more operational.
I was an F/A-18 team pilot, where we practiced for world
war and we became trainers of Active component members before
they deployed. So we have been doing a lot of operational
support since 1991. The Air Force will tell you they have been
at war since 1991 providing aircraft overseas, so we have been
doing this. People have called it different things.
I think the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves
did a great job of looking for 2 years at all the things we are
going to be dealing with, both in the past and the future.
Operational support, I think, is here to stay. And the best
proof is the customer likes it, the combatant commanders and
our Sailors--I will speak for them--they love it, rather than
staying in a----
Mr. Murtha. If the gentleman will yield?
Mr. Dicks. Yes, I yield.
Mr. Murtha. I talked to the four generals before, and
admiral before, and we talked about this. It is really a matter
they just don't have enough troops. They can't deploy for any
length of time without the Reserve in the first place, without
the Guard in the second place. So we just don't have enough
forces to sustain a deployment, one deployment, for any length
of time. And that is basically the problem. That is the thing
we face.
Mr. Dicks. Well, the issue, then, is if we have done this,
if we have moved the Guard to an--I mean the Reserve to be in
an operational setting, then do we have a Strategic Reserve?
Should we be worried about that? Should Congress be worried
that everybody now is training for counterinsurgency, I guess,
in the Marine Corps and the Army? And so do we any longer have
a Strategic Reserve?
General Bradley. Yes, sir I believe we do. I don't think we
should be worried about it. We have highly trained Reservists
who are not being used every day in an operational way, but we
are available. I think this Operational Reserve is the right
way to do it. But those that are not employed every day could
still be considered a Strategic Reserve.
Mr. Dicks. Have you guys debated this within your services
to say, now what do we do; what are we going to have for our
Strategic Reserve and what are we going to have for our
Operational Reserve? Or is this one of those things that just
happened? Not really anybody making a decision, it just
happened. And now we are kind of stuck with it, because we
don't have enough--as the Chairman said, we don't have enough
forces, obviously, to do the whole operational mission with the
Active force.
General Bradley. Well, sir, I think the decision to do this
predates any of us being in our current positions. I cannot
answer the question whether it was debated in the service
before we did it, because it goes back so far before my time in
this position. But I will tell you, I think it is the right
thing to do.
I agree with Admiral Cotton. It helps our retention
dramatically. Our people like being involved in the real-world
things every day. It doesn't mean that 100 percent of our
Reservists are involved in it every day. But the Active Air
Force depends on the Air National Guard and the Air Force
Reserve to do everything they do. We are spread across every
mission area, practically every one, every mission area. Our
volunteerism rate is high.
I don't think there is enough money to put all of us on
Active Duty so that you don't need the Guard and Reserve, and
you just keep them as a Strategic Reserve. I don't think we can
afford to do that anymore. I think it is an affordability
issue. But it has paid off and is working well in my view, sir.

DWELL TIME

General Stultz. Sir, I will just tell you from the Army
Reserve's perspective, to answer your first question, I don't
think it was a deliberate decision. I think what we did is we
got into the war on terror, not really understanding that this
was going to be an extended conflict. And that has led us into
the process of saying we are going to have to depend on the
Reserve for the enduring future if we are going to be engaged
in a long war.
So based on that we better get into some kind of an
operational format because the soldiers are going to demand, to
sustain an all-volunteer Reserve component, what my soldiers
tell me is I need some predictability in my life; I have got to
be able to know when I am going to be able to have a civilian
job and a civilian life, and I have got to be able to know when
I am expected to be in the military.
So what we are doing in the Army Reserve is we are
developing a 5-year model, and we are rating our forces across
that 5 years, so that I can tell the Army and DoD each year,
here is how much I can give you in terms of engineer capability
or MP capability or transportation capability.
The good news, I will tell you, is in the current sourcing
for fiscal year 2008, 94 percent of the units I am sending into
the war are coming out of the right year group. So we are
starting to build that predictability.
The challenge we have got is to your point; one, I can tell
you how much I can give you, but the theater asks for more. So
when I can say, here is what predictably I can give you in
terms of engineer capability, but the theater comes back and
says, but I need an extra engineer group in two more
battalions, then I have got to pull somebody forward; which
gets to the point of we are kind of breaking that dwell promise
that we said we were going to give you years back.
Mr. Dicks. The 1 in 5.
General Stultz. The 1 in 5; yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Now we are about 1 in 2 and 3.
General Stultz. We are about 1 in 3 right now, because we
have got to get the capability to sustain it. The other thing
is for the strategic depth piece we have to look back and say,
okay, if I have got units that are in this 5-year model, my
Strategic Reserve is really probably in years 2 and 3 of this
model. And if I don't have the equipment to train those units--
that is, the right equipment that they need to deploy to war
with--then that degrades my ability to have that Strategic
Reserve out there. But that is what we are looking at, is the
Strategic Reserve piece.
Mr. Dicks. And are testifying you don't have the equipment
now?
General Stultz. Not all the equipment we need. No, sir. I
can tell you the units that deploy to theater are deployed with
the best equipment.
Mr. Dicks. But you don't have the stuff to train the people
that are supposed to be part of the Strategic Reserve.
General Stultz. Yes, sir, that is what I am telling you. We
don't. And a lot of times what we are using is what we call
``in lieu of'' equipment, which is equipment that we could use
back home, like an M35 deuce-and-a-half. But that is not what
you are going to operate when you get to theater. You are going
to operate a light medium tactical vehicle truck. That is what
they need to have back here to train on. If we are taking our
engineers into theater to do route clearance and we are using
the Huskies and the Buffalos and the RG-31s and the Cougars,
that is what they need back here to train on, because that is
what they are going to be expected to operate in the theater.
So right now the equipping side of the Army Reserve is my
concern for the Strategic Reserve piece of it; that I look back
into those earlier years.
Mr. Dicks. General Bergman, do you have a comment on this?
General Bergman. Sir, I would suggest to you that the
Operational Reserve has evolved as a subset of the Global War
on Terror. And we are looking now as to how do we sustain our
forward presence capability. And because the Guard and Reserve
forces have continued to step up to the plate to the tune of
millions of man days, it has been able to sustain us. So this
is a byproduct. And the future--and also meeting the future
expectations of the future Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines
and Coast Guardsmen who look to join a Service and say, how
long do I want to spend on Active Duty; how do I want to
dovetail that with my civilian career?
The continuum of service will be the next step in the
evolution of the Operational Reserve.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Well, I will tell you, it is somewhere in
between what you are saying. If we have a major confrontation,
there is no Strategic Reserve. It is just like every war that
has come about; we have to fall back, unfortunately, until we
build up to the point where--what I am trying to do, what this
subcommittee is trying to do, is look to the future, look
beyond Iraq, make sure you have the equipment, make sure you
have what you need so that somebody doesn't have a
misconception that we are not prepared. That is the thing that
worries me.
So that is why we are looking at more ships, we are looking
at more--for instance, we have a list for the subcommittee to
know of things that they are short, and it is substantial. And
we are going to try to fulfill that list with these two
supplementals that are coming up, because we know damn well you
don't have the equipment to train on, we know damn well you
don't have the equipment to deploy with if you had to deploy.
So we are going to try to come up with the money to take care
of that. Plus the infrastructure money that we have committed
to the Military Construction Subcommittee.
Mr. Young.

PERSONNEL RETENTION/EQUIPMENT NEEDS

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I just
want to say thank you for the men and women that you lead in
your Reserve units. Without them and without your organizations
we couldn't get there, where we have to be, and so we
appreciate very much that.
And Chairman Murtha just cited something that we have both
been concerned about for a long time, and that is being
prepared for any other contingency other than what we are
involved in today. And he specifically mentioned equipment,
which is, of course, important. But what about the personnel?
Are your tables of organization, are you at full strength, not
at full strength?
And, secondly, what is your recruiting situation? Are you
able to get recruits to fill in the attrition or to maintain
what your end strength needs to be?
Mr. Hobson. And retention, if I might add.
Admiral Cotton. I will jump in first. The Navy Reserve is
over strength by almost 3,000. We are in a very enviable
position right now, as we look toward the end of the fiscal
year, to pick and choose the ones we want to keep and transfer
the others to the IRR.
Recruiting has improved greatly because we have combined
recruiting. The best recruiters now are the commanding officers
on Active Duty and the senior enlisted advisors that encourage
people to serve in a continuum of service, Sailors for life. So
we are getting much more transfers from the Fleet to our
centers.
With that said, I will tell you I think all of us have a
shortage of junior- to mid-grade officers and also senior
enlisted, perhaps past the 20-year point, the experienced
people that stay. So the incentives, the bonuses, the things
that we ask for to target those kind of skill sets capabilities
that we need at those officer and enlisted year groups, that
has really been beneficial to us. So thank you.
General Stultz. From the Army Reserve's perspective, sir, I
will tell you this. Currently we are at 193,500 and we are
authorized 205K, so we are 11,000-some below end strength of
where we need to be. That is not all a bad-news story. We took
our end strength down to almost 185K in the past couple of
years because we had a lot of trash we needed to clean out of
the system. If we are going to be an operational force and if
we are going to ask soldiers to go and step forward and risk
their lives, then we have got people who aren't willing to
serve we have to get rid of. Every day, almost, I sign papers
discharging officers, lieutenants and captains who just refuse
to participate. And I have told the other officers in my corps,
you know, I owe it to them not to let those soldiers leave
without something on their record. So we are sending them home
with a less than honorable discharge. So we are cleaning up the
force.
So we went down to about 185K. Today we are 193,500. We
have come up 5,000 in the last 12 months. So we are bringing
into the force the right quality that we need. And we are
turning upward to get to the 205K by fiscal year 2010.
The other thing that is a good-news story is last year we
reenlisted 119 percent of our goal. In quantitative, we
reenlisted three times more soldiers than we did the year
before that were first-term soldiers.
In January I went to Iraq, and in the palace with General
Petraeus, we reenlisted 100 Army Reserve soldiers to celebrate
our 100th anniversary year of 2008, all in one ceremony. So the
good news is those young soldiers that we brought in after 9/11
knew what they were getting into and they are sticking with us
because they trust us that we are going to give them some
predictability, that we are going to give them the right
incentives and compensation and we are going to take care of
their family. So I see a real positive trend. But we have got
to maintain that support in terms of the incentives and the
compensation and everything that they deserve if we are going
to maintain this all-volunteer Reserve force.
General Bergman. 39,600 is the authorized end strength of
the Marine Corps Reserve. We are at about 38,300 right now, a
little bit lower than authorized end strength. That really
doesn't tell the whole story. The Marine Corps, the Active
component Marine Corps, is growing to 202,000. Some of those
prior-service Marines who would normally join the Reserves are
staying on Active Duty because it is the right thing to do and
we need them. We exist for one reason and one reason only in
the Marine Corps Reserve, and that is to augment and reinforce
the Active component. So we have a short-term challenge with
some of those young sergeants and corporals who won't be
available to us because they will still be on Active Duty.
We have always had a challenge with company-grade officers
in the Reserves, because in the Marine Corps all of us serve
our company-grade time, that lieutenant time, on Active Duty in
our initial commitment, because that leadership in the Marine
Corps Reserve has that Active component background.
We have instituted some new programs that will mitigate the
company-grade officer shortfall somewhat. We still have room to
grow there. But the young 18- to 22-year-old who is the non-
prior-service Marine, those numbers are still strong.
Challenging, you have to work to have them join, but the bottom
line is they are still coming in the door so we are in good
shape.
Mr. Hobson. What is your retention?
General Bergman. About 82 percent.
General Bradley. Mr. Young, the Air Force Reserve is doing
fairly well, I would say. I am very happy with our recruiting.
We have for the seventh year in a row recruited more than 100
percent of our goal. Not as hard to recruit for the Air Force
Reserve as it is maybe for some other Services or components.
So I am very pleased with our recruiting.
What I will tell you, though, it is a less experienced
force than we have had in the past because we have to recruit
more non-prior-service people, people who have not been in the
military, than we used to, because the Air Force is a lot
smaller and fewer people are getting out and transferring into
the Reserve or the Guard than used to because of just a smaller
force overall in the Active component. Our retention is okay,
but some people are leaving sooner than they have to, even
retiring, because they are eligible.
And the demands have been pretty tough. We have asked a lot
of people to deploy a number of times. I have many units who
have deployed four or five times in the last six years. My
deployments are not as long as the Marines or the Army, so
truth in advertising there.
But we have had a fabulous rate of volunteerism with a
predictive model the Air Force has, our Air Expeditionary
Forces. So our folks know when they are going to go, when they
are going to come back and when their next time is. And we have
had no shortage of volunteers. We would rather use volunteers
than mobilize people. We have done a fair amount of
mobilization and that has worked okay, but I would rather use
volunteers.
So our retention is okay, but there are some people in the
15-year point to 20-year point who sometimes also decide to
leave. And that is really tough because we hate to lose those
middle-manager kind of people. So retention is all right, but
not quite as good as I would like it to be.
Mr. Young. You know, in view of the many deployments and
the length of some of those deployments, this is a pretty good
news story. And I think it says something very special about
the young men and women that serve in our uniform. And that
just makes me feel really proud, even more proud than I was
when I walked in this room this afternoon.
General Bradley. Sir, if I can make another comment along
that line. I really believe it is true. I get out to my units a
lot and I talk to people at all levels. I go to the AOR. I have
been to Iraq and Afghanistan several times, and I talk to
people. And as I said in my answer to Mr. Dicks, our folks I
believe really want to be involved in our Nation's important
business. So it is more stress on the force, but they would
rather do that than just sit at home and train all the time for
it to be a Strategic Reserve. They like being operational. And
I think our retention is good.
And I will tell you, I have been in this Air Force Reserve
for 35 years and I think our morale is much better today than
it was 15, 20, 25 years ago.
Mr. Young. Well, with all the technology that we talk about
and the equipment and the things that we are going to buy for
you and replace that you have worn out, the most important part
of this whole equation are the men and women that operate them
and make them function. So that is also a sign of good
leadership at the top.
Thank you all very much for what you do and the folks that
work with you.
Mr. Dicks. Would the gentleman yield for one question? How
long are your troops sent out there for?

LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENT

General Bradley. Varied lengths, sir. I have some people
who are mobilized for a year and deployed. I have some that are
mobilized for six months and deployed. Most of our deployments
are 120 days, similar to the Air Force model for active duty
rotations. However, some key positions stay longer. But the
average Active Duty person goes for 120 days. And my people do
that as well. But we do have the capability sometimes to rotate
people at 45, 50, 60-day tours inside those 120.
So the Air Force gives us some flexibility, and that allows
more of my people to volunteer, relieving stress on the Active
force, so that they don't have to deploy too often. So it is a
good thing, because we get to deploy and do that, but it is a
shorter tour sometimes.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kaptur.

RECRUITING/RETENTION BONUSES

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral and
Generals, welcome. It is really good to have you here today.
Thank you for your service.
I just wanted to ask in terms of retention and recruitment,
are the bonuses being paid by the Reserves per individual at
the same level as in the Active Duty.
General Stultz. No ma'am. Our average--I think the average
reenlistment bonus for the Army Reserve is somewhere between--
we can pay $20,000 to $30,000, somewhere in that range. It
depends on some of the specialties. And what you will find in
the Active forces, theirs are much larger. That seems to be--
you know, it gets to the point--I keep saying I would prefer we
manage one end strength in the Army. Right now we manage three
end strengths. We manage an Active Army, an Army Reserve and an
Army Guard, and in a lot of cases we are competing with each
other.
And I will give you a good example. If you are in an Active
Army and I am Reserve, and you have 100 people and I have 100
people, if 10 of my people leave Reserve duty and go to Active
Duty the system shows 10 gains. If 10 of your people leave
Active Duty and come to the Reserve, we show 10 gains. So now
we show 20 gains in the system but we still only have 200
people. We need to get to the point of managing one end
strength so that we can flow between components freely and we
can pay bonuses and incentives equally for service, not service
on Active Duty versus service in the Reserve or service in the
Guard.
Mr. Murtha. Will the gentlewoman yield? I will tell you,
the bonuses went from $187 million to $1 billion. We talk about
how good the troops are, but these bonuses, this is real money.
My God, I mean, I hope there is some consideration for--we are
borrowing all this money from somebody in order to pay these
bonuses. Can we not do this without bonuses and reenlistment
and so forth incentive? Can we do this without it? Does the
volunteer Army have to have the bonuses?
General Stultz. Sir, I think the answer there is, from my
perspective, it is almost like a value equation; here is what
we ask and here is what you get in return. And it used to be we
asked 1 week in a month, 2 weeks in the summer, and here is
what you get. Now we are asking--every 4 or 5 years we ask you
to leave your family, your life, your job, and you risk your
life.
Now, to your point. I think in the future we need to look
at not just throwing money, we need to look at things and say
how do we sustain a person's lifestyle. Maybe health insurance
in lieu of an enlistment bonus is a good thing. Maybe prepaid
tuition for your kids instead of an enlistment bonus, so we are
taking care of your family and not just spending money,
throwing money idly out there.
Ms. Kaptur. What if we had no bonuses, what would happen?
Admiral Cotton. I want to say first of all in the Navy we
manage one end strength, and we use the bonuses to target
behavior of skill sets and capabilities we need to sustain the
force and especially deploy with in the Global War on Terror.
So you are looking at some pretty varsity skill sets--civil
affairs, provisional reconstruction teams, doctors, dentists,
nurses; you know, people who deploy and build things--to
sustain. And this behavior we have of the repeated deployments,
this is where the bonuses come in. If we had none of them you
would still have a force, but I don't think you would have the
numbers that we have now. It has grown to be an expectation.
And I will also admit that you see some behaviors of our
youngsters today that will shop their skill sets between the
Services, who will wait a certain time to be out to get back
in, because they know we all need these skill sets. But I also
look at our young Sailors, Soldiers and our Marines, too. They
all want a little time off, go into something else, come back
to us; so we see all new behavior of the people that we are all
recruiting from.
General Bradley. Ma'am, it might be that is kind of a cost,
the portion of the bonus the Chairman is talking about which
goes to Guardsmen and Reservists. It might be the cost of the
Operational Reserve versus a Strategic Reserve, which is
probably a heck of a lot cheaper than paying to have all of
that from the Active component because that is more expensive.
Ms. Kaptur. Well, in view of what you said and the Chairman
has said, what has troubled me about this war from the
beginning is that only some people fight and only some people
sacrifice, only some families sacrifice and some sacrifice a
whole lot.
And if one looks at a bonus versus a patriotic sense of
duty, I really am troubled by the apparently larger and larger
amounts we are having to extend for bonuses as a society, as
opposed to asking all families to sacrifice. I am troubled by
the trend.
But I would appreciate if you would place on the record the
comparison between your bonuses versus Active Duty and the
amounts of funds that have been expended to date, if you could,
in each of your branches, and the increasing rate that we are
paying for bonuses.
[The information follows:]

The Active Duty and Air Force Reserve provide similar bonuses to
Airmen to help meet recruiting and retention goals. Below is a breakout
of the funds spent or budgeted for the different types of bonuses.

[Dollars in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active Air Force Reserve
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bonus type FY08 FY08
FY07 FY08 FY09 YTD * FY07 FY08 FY09 YTD *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Prior Enlistment............... 5.9 13.0 13.0 1.0 12.4 14.4 15.3 6.0
Prior Enlistment................... 0 0 0 0 5.7 8.5 10.4 2.1
Reenlistment....................... 146.0 131.0 179.0 64.0 8.4 10.5 12.8 2.0
Health Specialist.................. 12.5 11.5 52.3 34.0 3.1 7.2 9.8 0.1
Affiliation........................ 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.3 0.2 0
Educational Loan Repayment......... 126.0 14.0 71.0 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.7 0.3
Foreign Language Proficiency....... 20.5 0 21.8 10.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1
Aviator Continuation Pay........... 153.1 149.7 127.3 59.7 4.6 4.4 2.9 1.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals..................... 310.9 169.5 337.1 169.7 31.6 42.8 50.7 12.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dollars may not add due to rounding.

* As of end of March 2008.

For clarification, the term ``bonuses'' will include Incentive
Pays, Special Pays and Allowances, Stipends, Enlistment/Reenlistment
Bonuses, and various other bonus-type payments.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
USN Active Duty Bonuses USN Selected Reserve Bonuses
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incentives Pay (Examples: Submarine Enlistment Bonus (New accession
Duty, Flying Duty, Parachute Jumping Training--NAT)
Duty, Incentive Bonus for Conversion, Affiliation Bonus (Prior
etc.). Service Veterans)
Special Pays (Examples: Physician Pay, Education Pays
Hardship Duty, Linguist Pay, Combat Critical Wartime Specialty Pays
Injury Pay, etc.). (Examples: Health Professional
Special Duty Assignment Pay Special Pays, Medical Stipend,
Enlistment/Reenlistment Bonuses etc.)
Education Pays Rating change to critical skill-
Loan Repayment Program set (RESCORE-R)
High Priority Unit Pay
Second BAH Allowance (without
dependents)
Income Replacement (for
extended or frequent
involuntary mobilizations)
Loan Repayment Program
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The amounts of funds that have been expended to date on bonuses and
the increasing rate that have been paid for bonuses are summarized as
follows:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increase Increase Increase
FY04 from 04- FY05 from 05- FY06 from 06- FY07 2008 (to
05 06 07 date)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active Duty..................................................... $1,392M 4.02% $1,448M 4.12% $1,508M 7.22% $1,617M $500M
Drilling Reservist.............................................. $7.7M 58.5% $12.2M 339.3% $53.7M 31.9% $70.8M $15.2M
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SMCR (Selected Marine Corps Reserves) Enlistment Bonus
--$20,000 lump sum payment for a 6X2 contract (6 years of drilling
time followed by 2 years of Inactive Ready Reserve (IRR) time)
--Only certain critical skills qualify
--USMC has issued enlistment bonus agreements totaling $4.82
million in FY08 (to be paid in full once reserve members complete all
required training)
* Active Component (AC) Enlistment Bonus
--$10,000 for a 4X4 contract (4 years of active duty followed by 4
years of IRR)
--$15,000 for a 5X3 or 6X2 contract
--Only certain critical skills qualify
--Expended to date: $27 million
SMCR Reenlistment Bonus
--$15,000 lump sum payment for a 3-year reenlistment
--Only certain critical skills qualify
--USMC has issued reenlistment bonus agreements totaling $1.6
million in FY08 (to be paid in full once reserve members complete all
required training)
* AC Selective Reenlistment Bonus
--Max $80,000; average is $30,000 for a 4-year reenlistment
--Only certain critical skills qualify
--Expended to date: $224 million
SMCR Enlisted Affiliation Bonus
--$15,000 lump sum payment for a 3-year SMCR unit affiliation
--Only certain critical skills qualify
--USMC has issued enlisted affiliation bonus agreements totaling $2
million in FY08 (to be paid in full once reserve members complete all
required training)
SMCR Officer Affiliation Bonus (Total obligated for FY08 is $320,000)
--$10,000 lump sum payment for a 3-year SMCR unit affiliation
--Offered to company grade officers and aviation majors
--USMC has issued officer affiliation bonus agreements totaling
$320,000 in FY08 (to be paid in full once reserve members complete all
required training)

------
* There is no comparable AC bonus to this bonus.

Based on available data, for the past 3 years, Active Duty,
Military Personnel Army (MPA) funds accounted for the following overall
Recruiting & Retention bonus payments: $671,478,000 (FY05);
$1,090,077,000 (FY06); $1,038,764,000 (FY07); and $1,011,962,980 (as of
March 31, 2008).
Further, Army Reserve, Reserve Personnel Army (RPA) funds accounted
for the following overall Recruiting & Retention bonus payments:
$180,979,000 (FY05); $330,711,000 (FY06); $314,742,000 (FY07); and
$271,027,532 (as of March 31, 2008).
The accompanying chart depicts fiscal year 2007 side-by-side Active
Duty and United States Army Reserve incentive comparisons.

POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER

I also wanted to make a comment. Earlier today we had an
excellent hearing on health care. And I would say in the
Reserve and Guard forces, which I tend to represent more of
than the Active Duty forces, like some of my dear colleagues--
like Sanford Bishop here--my impression is that the assistance
rendered to returning veterans, Iraqi veterans, Afghani
veterans, health care simply just isn't as good, because of the
way that the units are deployed, and also the fear of people in
the ranks that if they report a condition such as PTSD, that
they will lose their promotion. I just want to sensitize you to
that.
I asked this morning for the doctors to report back on one
Army unit in my area, the 983rd Engineering Battalion, which
has had several combat deployments. And I know there is PTSD in
the ranks. The unit is from Ohio, the members are from
everywhere, the commanding officer is over in Chicago, the Ohio
system isn't terribly organized to receive them back.
We simply have to have a more thoughtful manner in which to
take care of those who are coming back. And I would posit the
theory that in the Guard and Reserve, more will come back with
PTSD perhaps than in Active Duty ranks. And readjustment will
be more difficult because they don't come home to a base. And I
would like to use the 983rd as an example of how it is
currently working versus how it could work.
How could we make treatment available, how could we make
assessment available when they come back? That microcosm will
help me understand whether the policies we have set in place at
the national level are really working to take care of our
returning Guardsmen and Reservists who have been in combat. Are
you capable of doing that, general?
General Stultz. You are striking to the heart of one of my
concerns, and that is the overall wellness of our force in the
Army Reserve. And I have said this for some time. We have to
figure this out. We have got to figure out how to provide
continuity of health care for an operational force both on the
front end, to make sure they are healthy and ready before they
deploy--because we can't afford time at the end to try to get
their teeth ready or whatever--we have got to have some
confidence in our system to say we know our forces are ready in
terms of their health and their dental health before they are
deployed, but on the back end especially.
When I came out of Iraq after 2 years in 2004, before you
left country they give you a screening. And they say, tell us
if anything is wrong so we can keep you here. Well, you are not
going to tell them anything is wrong. Then when you get back to
the mobilization station where you left from, they tell you the
same thing: We are going to put you through a screening, but
tell us if anything is wrong so we can keep you here. You are
focused on going home. I want to get home with my family.
We need a system in place that says, listen, the primary
objective when a soldier comes out of theater is to get him
back, reintegrated with his family. Then let us start taking
care of him. Let us don't demobilize him and say, okay, now you
are on your own. We have to have a system of health care that
says, okay, when you come home, the first month you are home we
are going to do some screenings and look at your health care,
the second month we are going to start looking at your mental
situation; the third month we are going to look at your family
situation. We are going to reintegrate you over a period of 6
months and we are going to have that system in place.
That is what we have got to have, because a lot of these
symptoms, like PTSD or traumatic brain injury, do not manifest
themselves. Soldiers don't know they have a problem. And we
have got to have a way of identifying when a soldier needs
help. And we have got to take that stigma away that says if you
ask for help there is something wrong. We have got to have a
system in place that says everybody goes through this.
Ms. Kaptur. And, sir, even when they can identify, what
happens then is unfortunate oftentimes at the unit level, and
the systems do not work for them, and they are lost. It is not
like they return to Fort Hood or Fort Benning or wherever. They
are out there somewhere across Ohio or Michigan or Indiana, the
ones that are in our region of country.
I would invite you to come and visit the 983rd with me.
They are a wonderful combat engineer unit. They deserve better
health care.
I will also tell you--Mr. Chairman, I know I am over time--
I will say this morning when we had the doctors before us, I
said the DoD is so big that one smokestack doesn't know what
another smokestack is doing. And we in Ohio try to prepare
early for the return of our Guard and Reserve through General
Wayt at the State level--who is a saint--and our local units
and our doctors at Case Western Reserve University.
The docs at Case, who aren't DoD doctors, they are private
doctors, the best psychiatrists we have in the entire Midwest,
I would have to say; the worst experience they ever had in
their career was trying to work with DoD so we could be ready
early, okay? We could not connect to DoD. And I would love for
you to talk with Dr. Calabrese from Case Western Reserve
University in Cleveland and figure out why can't we get this
done. For me to go out to these units and to see these sick
people--and we tried to prevent what is happening and we were
not successful. I did everything I could in my job to provide
the money, to fight certain forces inside this place that don't
recognize this set of illnesses. And then to have these
illnesses happening right before my eyes, and I can't help
these soldiers, is a horrible thing to experience.
So I would invite you. This is a wonderful unit, and I
don't want to blame any commanding officer or anybody, but I
want to help these soldiers.
Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
I just visited Fort Hood, and I want to tell you the
Regulars have it down to where they are screening, they are
counseling. But it is a problem with the Reserve and Guard,
there is no question about it. I mean this is a real problem
for us because these folks are no longer from the same town,
they are from all over the country. And it really is a dilemma.
And I would be very interested if your folks could come
over and talk to the staff and tell them exactly what you have,
what plans you have in order to try to solve this problem.
Because I have got a young fellow that is working for us that
has taken him over a year, and he is getting counseling and
everything else, but it has still taken him a year to adjust
back to normal life. It was Reserve, 15 months in Iraq and
Kuwait. So it is a hell of a problem.
I talked to a woman just the other day. She said one of her
sons was killed in Iraq and one of her sons committed suicide
who was in the Army. And her husband is an officer in the Army.
So, you know, we face this kind of stuff. He is in the Regular
Army. But I think we still have a long ways to go, even in
Regulars, but especially Reserve and Guard.
General Stultz. Yes, sir. The policy that was put out last
January for the involuntary recall of the Reserve and Guard put
in place a policy that said when a unit returns they do not
come back together, are not required to drill or anything for
the first 90 days.
I have sent a letter to General Casey asking him to reverse
that policy. We asked for relief of that, because to that exact
point, the worst thing we can do is bring soldiers home from
war and say we don't want to see you for 90 days. We need those
soldiers back in their formations immediately so we can look at
them and take care of them.
Mr. Murtha. The gentleman from New Jersey.

PAY AND BENEFITS

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When you are at
the end of the food chain of questions, you can just do your
level best to try to ask something that has not been asked
before. But like my colleagues, I thank each of you for your
leadership and the men and women you represent.
I sort of want to get into the issue of pay and benefits.
We have sort of touched that issue and if there is, in your
view, some inequity. Obviously we are proud of everybody who
fights and who wears the uniform. And I always preface all of
my public appearances by thanking those in the Regular military
and Guard and Reserve. And I talk a lot about the
inseparability, everybody working very closely together.
But there are some pretty basic inequities. There are no
pay inequities, as I understand it, on the war front, is that
right, in terms of pay? But in terms of benefits, Guard and
Reserve are not in the same category.
And you, General Stultz, you talked about things that we
might do to enhance benefits for our citizen soldiers. Could
each of you perhaps add on to that aspect? I mean, this gets--
you know, historically there had been sort of a separation
between the Regular and the Guard and Reserve. And I would like
to believe that that inseparability has been erased. I know the
Air Force historically was ahead of the curve. But I would sort
of like to know on the benefit side what we might be doing.
General Bradley. Well, sir, I have one thought that--I do
not know how my fellow colleagues feel about it, but on which
that I am very grateful has changed. It is something our people
have been asking for quite some time relative to retirement.
As you know, Reservists and Guardsmen who serve the proper
number of years in a good status receive their retired pay at
age 60. This past year, the Congress passed legislation that
would allow some who have been mobilized or served on active
duty for long periods of time to get credit for that and get
their retirement pay earlier, based on the number of months
they were mobilized or on active duty.
And I am very grateful for that provision. It is a
wonderful change, and I think our folks are very happy about
it. However, they said the clock starts when the President
signs the National Defense Authorization Act. And so all of the
things that our folks have done for the last 6\1/2\ years in
combat, in great tragedies, that time does not count.
I wish that provision had not been written quite that way.
Now, I hate to look a gift horse in the mouth, but our
folks have worked hard. And you all have held them in high
honor, as do we; and I wish that we could count those months
and years of mobilizations, many people who have deployed--from
the Army particularly and Marines, multiple tours--and the
other Services as well, the Navy and the Air Force, that time
since September 11, 2001, does not count.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We hear about it. People, you know, suck
it up, but in reality it is one of those things that does
affect morale. And I assume, even though there are some fairly
rosy and recruitment and retention figures, these are things
that worry you as military leaders.
General Bradley. Yes, sir. I have had many, I have had
thousands in the Air Force Reserve who have been mobilized for
two years. And it is a wonderful service; they are proud of
their service, and I appreciate what they have done. I wish
they could get credit for that on their retirement.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. General Bergman or Admiral Cotton?
General Bergman. Sir, I would suggest to you that as we
design benefit packages, if we are designing again for that
young man and woman who is very early in the stages of their
career, those of us who have been around a while, we are pretty
much----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. But just for the record, many of those
who serve in the Guard and Reserve are not all spring chickens
here. I mean, they are adults. They are leaving their civilian
jobs. They are highly motivated and trained.
General Bergman. Absolutely. I guess my point was if you
design the package so that that individual, as they weigh the
value of their service and the time it is going to take away
from their civilian employment and what it means to their
family's life plan, and all of those metrics that they would
apply as individuals--if it is affordable to us as a Nation and
it is exciting to them as individuals--we will get to where we
are going.
There is probably not one size fits all. But the
expectations of some of the folks who have seen their--in their
civilian jobs, their pensions disappear, the different kinds of
things; the one thing you cannot do in life is turn the clock
back. So we have to be very proactive and visionary in how we
provide benefits packages for the not-so-spring chickens, as we
said, the youngsters who contemplate military service part-
time, full-time, and balancing that with a career.
I guess it is not a one-size-fits-all, but I think there is
an answer in the middle ground that we can afford as a Nation
and the young people and not-so-young people will take
advantage of.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We are taking advantage of a mature
population. That is what I see.
Admiral?
Admiral Cotton. The new folks that we have in the force are
incredible, these millenials. The old folks are great. They are
stepping up, doing everything. The one thing I see that is
constant amongst all of them, their pay and benefits, their
bonuses, their medical care, all the things this Committee has
helped out on is great.
Next is education. So there are, in our Services,
differences in tuition assistance for courses, online courses.
Each Service is a little bit different, and there is a
disparity between AC and RC expectation.
And probably the thing we have talked about in the last
couple of years--I have not seen action on it yet--is the
transportability of the Montgomery GI bill. So, in other words,
it is a benefit I have earned, but I am at a station in life
where I maybe do not need it, but I can't afford sending my
child: Could I not use my benefit for a family member?
I think that would be a huge retention tool, particularly
for the midgrade at the 20-year point where I can jump off and
get benefits, but if I am a reservist for another 4 or 5 years,
I can use that benefit for one of my children or multiple
children.
I think that might be something we should look at for the
future.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Excellent.
General Stultz, any additional comments? I know you
volunteered some information earlier.
General Stultz. Yes, sir.
What I propose is, we look at what corporate America does.
What corporate America and a lot of corporations offer is a
portfolio approach where you say, look at where you are in your
life and here is how much we are willing to invest. Now let's
look at how you want to spend that.
And it might be to John's point. Maybe instead of an
enlistment bonus or maybe, for staying a few more years, it's
going to pay for my children's education, so I can go home and
tell the family, I am staying in and the kids' education is
paid for.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Or the spouse.
General Stultz. Or the spouse. Or maybe it is some other
type of benefit that I need out there in terms of special
orthodontics for the kids, or eyeglasses, or whatever; but a
portfolio approach that says, hey, the service I am providing
to my country is taking care of my family or providing me a
better lifestyle, rather than just throwing money out there at
it each time.
See, I have said for some time I would look at a system
that says maybe you lower the retirement age that you can
withdraw retirement based on years you stay past 20. And for
every year you stay past 20 maybe that retirement is 6 months
earlier. And if you stay 22 years you could draw your
retirement at 59. If you stayed for 30, you could draw it at
55. Then you do not pay incentives or reenlistment bonuses or
whatever for that time. The reward comes at the other end,
staying for longer service to your country.
I think we have got to look outside the box, that we
traditionally have said, money is the answer.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The chairman has admonished, when we
talk about bonuses, you are talking about real money; and I am
not suggesting there would not be real money associated with
some of your proposals. But I know some committees are looking
at it, and I think it is sort of important to have it on the
table. I thank you for your response.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. I am interested in what you said. And we are
going to release this panel and go to the next panel in a
minute. Mr. Visclosky will be the first to question.
But you may remember a few years ago Congress changed the
pension plan for the military from 50 percent to 40 percent.
You may not be old enough to remember that. But I went out into
the field and I saw a fellow sitting here with 40 percent
pension and a 50 percent pension. And I came back and told the
Defense Department we could not live with that.
Well, John Hamre said, You know what? That would cost $15
billion. I said, It may cost 15 billion, but we have to do it.
President Clinton agreed with us. Hugh Shelton stepped up and
said, We have to change it. And we changed it.
I am gratified to hear you say, that is an important part
of retaining people because it just was not fair to have half
the people, just because they enlisted at a later period of
time, getting 40 percent pension rather than 50 percent
pension.
Now, we appreciate your testimony, we appreciate your
dedication.
Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Murtha. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but could I just ask
General Bergman one question for the record quickly?
In his testimony on page 4 he says, Marine Force Reserves
have provided civil affairs capabilities since the start of the
Operation Iraqi Freedom. My question is, of the Marine Reserve
forces inside of Iraq, what percent are being used as a strike
force and what percent are being used for some other purpose?
I do not know if you know that right now, but I would be
interested in knowing.
Mr. Murtha. If you would answer that for the record.
General Bergman. I will take that for the record.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I appreciate
it.
[The information follows:]

The figures for the latest SMCR rotation in Iraq are:

Number of ``Strike Force'' Marines............................ 2,161
Total number of SMCR:......................................... 2,910
Percentage of ``Strike Force'' Marines........................ 74%
---------- --
--------

PANEL II

WITNESSES FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD

LIEUTENANT GENERAL H. STEVEN BLUM, CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLYDE VAUGHN, DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
LIEUTENANT GENERAL CRAIG McKINLEY, DIRECTOR OF THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Introduction

Mr. Murtha. I want to welcome this distinguished panel
before this Committee. I know you have been coached and they
have been telling you to refrain from any outbursts, refrain
from any telling us anything that may go on here that is out of
the ordinary, that you have got plenty of money in your budget
and there are no problems.
I know that is what you have been urged to do. And they
probably have spies in this room----
Mr. Hobson. I am shocked, shocked.
Mr. Murtha [continuing]. As to what you might say. But it
has never inhibited you in the past, and we hope that you will
have the same kind of frankness with us that you have had in
the past, because your National Guard has been better because
of the testimony of this distinguished panel.
So, with that, I will ask Mr. Hobson if he has any opening
remarks.
Mr. Hobson. Not opening remarks, but I have some questions.
Mr. Murtha. Well, we will ask Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky has no questions. Mr. Hobson.
Wait a minute, have you got any testimony? You want to say
anything?
Mr. Dicks. You are ahead right now, guys. This is when they
are going to tell us the truth, Mr. Chairman.
General Blum. We will tell you the truth. I do not care who
is in the room; we will tell you the truth.
Mr. Murtha. We will put your comments in the record. But
give us a short summary.
General Blum. I would like to put our long comments in the
record, but this Committee is due at least a short word of
thanks for what you have done over the years to make sure that
what those magnificent citizen soldiers and airmen are doing
every day is possible.
You and I had a conversation before the hearing, but it is
worth sharing with the other members that we feel--and the
enlisted behind us, our senior enlisted advisors--feel if it
were not for the actions of the Congress and this Committee in
particular we would not have the tools, the equipment, the
training or the manning to do what our Nation needs us to do
overseas and what our governors expect us to do, with no notice
tonight. So thanks.
I think I might actually make that my opening statement,
and we will go right to questions.
[The joint statement of General Blum, General Vaughn and
General McKinley follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT

Mr. Murtha. All right. Well, let me just say to the
subcommittee that I have asked them to give us a list of
equipment which they need and may be available. We talked about
a number of things.
There are big shortages. If we want them to be operational
Reserves, we have got to give them the equipment to train on.
We have got to give them the dual equipment so they can train
not only for combat, but they can train for any emergency in
the United States. We either have that list or we will get that
list. That will help us recommend to the full committee what
needs to be done.
Mr. Hobson.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be
brief.
First of all, thank you, gentlemen, for all your help to me
personally and to the Guard, both the Army and the Air Guard.
General McKinley and General Blum have particularly been
helpful with the Springfield Air National Guard situation. And
hopefully we have got that under control.
General Vaughn, you have done just a terrific job in
recruiting. I mean, this recruiting for the Army Guard and the
Air Guard is just outstanding, but especially the Army. It is a
tough job. And as I understand it, you guys are ahead of
schedule, you are retaining people; and that speaks well for
leadership when that happens, in my opinion, sir.
But there is a problem, you have a problem with big Army.
It is always the big Army that is a problem with you guys. They
have done such a great job in recruiting that they may lose
some of their money for recruiting at the very time--and you
can't stop and start this stuff. It has to go.
I would like one of you to talk about that a little bit,
Mr. Chairman, because I do not think that came up, because we
talked mainly about equipment when I walked in the room.
The second item that is a problem--it is a problem, and I
am sorry Ms. Kaptur left--but in Ohio, and I think this may be
symptomatic across the country, we are officially required to
have about 2,000 full-time Army Guard positions, but it is only
authorized and funded for 1,200, 800 short, so we have about 60
percent that we need, and they will not give you the money.
I do not know how you can continue to do what you are doing
if there is that kind of disparity in this. And it is the big
Army I think that is holding back the money for this. And I
would like you to explain if it is a problem across the
country, a problem in the Air Guard, we do need to know that.
And we do have a great TAG in Ohio that fortunately our new
governor kept the guy on.
And the equipment, he has got a book on the equipment, the
little thing he is carrying around with him, so we know what
the equipment is. The problem with the equipment is--and I need
you to respond to this--it goes into the wrong accounts, and
you lose control and it gets siphoned away into the big Army.
And they get caught short again; they do not have the
equipment.

EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTS

First of all, am I right about it being siphoned off into
other accounts, the equipment?
General Vaughn. Sir, I am getting coached here. We do not
have visibility on it.
Mr. Hobson. General Blum can answer it. You do not have to
answer that one. I want you on the recruiting one.
General Blum. I would not use the words ``siphoned off.''
That would imply there is a deliberate scheme to rob the
National Guard, deny them.
Mr. Hobson. We would not want to say that.
Mr. Dicks. That would be wrong.
Mr. Hobson. You certainly would not want to say that. I
might want to say that, but you might not.
Mr. Murtha. That would be terrible.
General Blum. But I will tell you when we get NGREA money I
know exactly where every penny is going, what it was spent on,
when it arrived and where it went.
Mr. Murtha. We are going to make sure that happens.
General Blum. General Vaughn, do you want to talk about the
recruiting issues that the Congressman brought up?
General Vaughn. Congressman Hobson, on the recruiting
issues, we testified to this last year, that it was not in the
base, that we were dependent on the supplemental for something
that ought to be in the base program.

PERSONNEL FUNDING, RECRUITING AND RETENTION

We come over on the Hill with a very distinguished group,
and we were told that that would not happen again. It appears
it is going to happen again.
I will tell you that I think that we have got enormous
support out of the Army to make sure that gets paid, but right
now it does look like, you know, if it does not come in the
supplemental--and supposedly it was put back into the sup--we
were going to be faced with another omnibus reprogramming. So
we are dependent on that sup----
Mr. Murtha. I do not understand this. So the staff
understands what we are talking about, go over this for us.
Tell us what the situation is here.
General Blum. Let me set the stage for it, and then General
Vaughn can run the details to you.
My issue has been and continues to be that I do not believe
that the manning of the force to the end strength authorized by
Congress should be any other place but the base budget. It is
not for the Army National Guard; it is for the United States
Army to a large extent. They have some grow-the-Army in the
supplemental, but most of their manning of the force is in the
base budget.
Ours is not. We are dependent significantly upon
supplemental funds, which this body knows full well arrive at
different times for different reasons; and unless they arrive
early, they are often not effective. Right now, frankly, we
will run out of money for recruiting about April 15th of this
year.
We have assurances--commitments by senior leaders in the
Department of Defense and the Army--that we will be funded to
continue our bonus programs and our recruiting and retention
programs. However, it is now March. We do not have that money.
We will run out next month; we will not have that money. That
money is contained in a supplemental that no one in this room--
well, maybe somebody in this room can guarantee. But I can't
guarantee we will receive it in time to execute it, which will
require some extremely painful reprogramming and put other
significant readiness programs at risk to pay that bill until
that bridge happens, if the supplemental arrives.
Mr. Murtha. How much money are we talking about?
General Blum. We will give you the exact figure, sir.
General Vaughn. Chairman, it is $440 million in recruiting
and retention. It is $299 million in bonuses and incentives.
General Blum. Roughly $700 million is the number we have
been operating on.
Mr. Murtha. You are telling this committee there is $700
million, not in the base budget, supposedly in the
supplemental.
And when you say ``in the supplemental,''--we are the ones
that provide the supplemental, just like we provide the base
bill--and you are saying at this point you do not know whether
it is going to be available or not?
General Blum. Sir, I am going to be absolutely honest and
blunt with you. I have been assured by the Secretary of the
Army that they will pay the bill. I have been assured by the
Chief of Staff of the Army that they will pay the bill. But the
resources to pay that bill are contained in the supplemental.
And if the supplemental arrives, I have reasonable assurances
we will get that money.
But what I am trying to say is, I would much prefer that
that is in the base budget so that we do not have to
continually manage to grow the force and maintain the force at
a critical time when our Nation is at war and we need the
biggest Guard we have ever had.
Mr. Murtha. I hate to tell you, I do not know what the Army
is assuring you, but we do not know a thing about it. My staff
does not know a thing about it.
Mr. Hobson. And tell him the consequences if you do not get
this money.
General Blum. The consequences are that the National Guard
recruiting machine will stop, which means, frankly, the Army's
recruiting machine will stop because we are recruiting for the
United States Army today as well as the National Guard.

PERSONNEL FUNDING, RECRUITING AND RETENTION

We are so successful--General Vaughn has got a program that
is so successful that the Army has asked us to recruit for
them.
Mr. Murtha. They tell us the military personnel budget is
the most stressed budget in the military. Now, I guess what
they are telling you is, if there is a supplemental, they will
find a way to reprogram money for this program. Because we are
going to look at it now that it has been brought to our
attention.
General Blum. I am telling you, the condition that the
leadership of the Army National Guard operates under is one of
trust in the senior leadership of the Army.
Mr. Murtha. Yeah, but you have got to remember what they
told you. They told you, if a supplemental passes; when it
passes, that is when you have the money.
This supplemental, I met with leadership yesterday.
Hopefully, I thought we would be able to pass a supplemental
because we are going to be finished with this subcommittee by
the end of this month. But the other parts of it are not ready,
so it is not going to be passed until sometime after our recess
at Easter.
General Blum. In that case, sir, then the senior leadership
of the Army has got some very painful reprogramming to do to
deliver on the promise of the money that they assured us we
would get.
Mr. Murtha. This is why I say over and over again, we
should have no supplementals; put it all in the base bill so we
know what the hell we are doing. I mean, that is the problem
that we have.
Mr. Hobson.
Mr. Hobson. Well, I just wanted to raise those things.

FULL-TIME MANNING

General Blum. There is another aspect of that that gets to
your question, Congressman Hobson. The issue in Ohio is not
unique. All across the country, if you were to ask all of your
adjutants general in every State, they do not have sufficient
full-time manning to do the job that you are asking them to do.
It is not a problem in the Air National Guard. The Air
Force stepped up to the plate. When we went to the volunteer
force, they recognized that we were an operational force then.
They were visionary and knew that the United States Air Force
could not do its job, day to day, without the Guard and
Reserve, and they invested the resources, to include full-time
manning, to assure that they would be an operational part of
the Air Force when we went to the volunteer force.
The Army, frankly, the land forces we are in, I do not want
to use the word ``denial,'' but they failed to realize that
when we went to a volunteer force, we would be forced to use
the Reserve in a sustained conflict or any large conflict as an
operational force; and they did not resource the Army National
Guard or the Army Reserve to be able to accomplish that task.
We have now done this for 6\1/2\ years at an unprecedented
rate, and we are operating with an authorization for full-time
manning that is built on the Cold War, when we were going to be
a strategic reserve, going to show up at the end of World War
III, and where you find two people in an armory in Ohio to push
out 175 to go to war, to go to Afghanistan, to go to Iraq, to
go to the Horn of Africa, to defend, to keep the peace treaties
in the Sinai, to go run Guantanamo, to go keep the peacekeeping
operations in Kosovo, to send troops to the Southwest border,
to respond to the 17 natural disasters that your governors
called the Guard out on yesterday.
We are supposed to do that with two guys in the fire house,
and it isn't going to work that way.
That model allows for an authorization that is 40 percent
higher than what we are able to fill. We are only resourced to
hire the full-time guys to man the equipment, train the force,
administer to the citizen soldiers and their families, and to
reintegrate the people coming back home. To do all of this
work--administrative, logistics, operations, training and
maintenance, we are authorized to do that and fill it at 67
percent.
It is time to throw in the flag and question the model.
We need additional funds, frankly, to grow the full-time
manning force, or we cannot deliver on the promise that we made
to the President and the Secretary of Defense and the governors
to do the job the American citizens expect the Guard to do.
So what I am saying is, we are authorized one number, we
are funded at 67 percent of that number at a time when they are
using us in an unprecedented manner; at times where we are not
only doing what we are doing at home, we are providing 50
percent at times--or more, at peak times--of the ground combat
forces, Mr. Chairman, not just the combat support and the
combat service support, but at times we have actually surged
and provided over 50 percent of the brigade combat forces on
the ground, and yet we have not moved up the full-time manning
fill any higher than it was during the Cold War pre-9/11.
I think that time has come.
Mr. Hobson. And it is going to break. It is going to break.
General Blum. It is placing challenges on us heavier than
we should place on the force right now.

FULL-TIME MANNING

Mr. Hobson. Thank you, General. I think the chairman
understands the immense problem.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Hobson has done a service, because I asked
our expert on O&M, I said, Where in the hell does the
information come from? I do not know where Hobson gets his
information. He has a pipeline someplace that I do not know
about. That is really----
Mr. Hobson. I was listening.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. So you said 67 percent of full-time manning.
What would that be in people? What are the numbers?
General Blum. You want to talk about the numbers?
General Vaughn. Fifty-seven thousand. So it is roughly 15
percent of our force. I mean, you are talking about a percent
of a percent. We are supposed to have----
Mr. Dicks. That is to run everything, to make sure when
they come in that they are going to have good training and
everything.
And you really have to have those people to make the Guard
work; isn't that right?
General Blum. Yes, sir.
General Vaughn. Most people would equate readiness with the
number of active folks that you have got doing things. In other
words, if the Army says, You all can't be as ready as us, the
active Army--because they do this all the time--I constantly
tell them, if you want us to have a higher level of readiness,
you have to give us more folks that do this full-time.

EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS

Mr. Dicks. And you have got to have the equipment.
General Vaughn. And we have to have the equipment.
Mr. Dicks. What is the number now, 40 percent? Is that what
your statement said? You are about 40 percent of the equipment,
State by State, it averages out?
General Blum. There are two numbers here, sir. They are
very close, as a matter of fact; they are within 1 percent of
each other. We have 66 percent of the equipment that we are
required to have in our hands back here at home for the units
that are not deployed overseas, the units in the Army Guard.
The units that are overseas have 100 percent of what they
are supposed to have and then some, and that is fabulous; that
is the way it is supposed to be.
What we are saying is, the units that are back here at home
are underequipped. And the Army has made historic commitment to
this. And this is General Casey's letter to the Congress that
was sent to the Honorable Duncan Hunter, but is also copied to
Chairman Murtha and Chairman Young. So he is saying, for the
first time in the history of the Army National Guard and the
Army's relationship, that they now recognize that there is a
requirement for the National Guard to be able to respond here
at home, to weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism or
natural disasters; and that we have agreed, General Casey has
agreed, the Guard leadership has agreed--Jack Stultz, who was
just in here before, has agreed.
We have nicked that down to 342 pieces, items of equipment,
certain types of equipment that are absolutely necessary for
any unit to be able to do command and control, transportation,
medical assistance, communication, aviation, maintenance,
logistics, those kinds of things, if we were called upon
tonight to either do counterterrorism, respond to Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD), or go out and respond to an act of
Mother Nature or a man-made accident.
The Chief of Staff of the Army signed the letter and listed
an abbreviated list of the 342 items, but it gets to the
essence of what I am talking about. And he puts a bill on there
for $3.9 billion above what is in the budget and in the
supplemental that we expect or we hope to receive.
So even after the supplemental funds were to come in for
2009 and the budget, base budget, would come in for 2009,
General Casey, the Chief of Staff of the Army----
Mr. Dicks. You still need $3.9 billion.
General Blum. You've got it, sir. You have it.
Mr. Dicks. I was good in math.
General Blum [continuing]. But for once we are speaking
with one voice: The Chief of Staff of the Army says we need it,
and we checked his math and we agreed, we need $3.9 billion.
Mr. Dicks. Then we have got to get it in the budget
somehow. I mean you have to get the Defense Department to
request it.
General Blum. Now, the budget is quite an ample budget. The
President's budget is a much better budget for the Guard than
we have ever gotten before.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
General Blum. But General Casey is saying, if additional
money were available, this is what we would spend it on. And we
totally agree. The only thing I would prefer is, if I get to
choose the wrapping paper if the gift is coming, we would like
it wrapped in NGREA.
Mr. Murtha. But that would be an earmark.
Mr. Dicks. It is a national program, Mr. Chairman. We can
increase those.
Mr. Murtha. Oh, I am sorry.
General Blum. I will not label what it is called. I just
know we need it.
Mr. Dicks. You need it.
However you get it, you will take it, right?
General Blum. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. Also, in the Air National Guard which--you guys
are doing a fantastic job. I see that your airplanes are now
what, 27 years old?

EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS

General McKinley. Sir, that is the average age. Our tankers
are 45 years old.
Mr. Dicks. We want to do something about that.
General McKinley. Yes, sir, we do. But our aging fleet is
our problem.
We have got 36,000 full-time members of the Air National
Guard. As General Blum said, that is what keeps us whole. That
is what keeps us ready. That is what lets us deploy in 72 hours
anywhere in the world with our Air Force.
Our biggest problem, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee, is recapitalizing the fleet. And we have got to
build some new airplanes, we have got to look at how to do that
in proportion so that the active, the Guard, and the Reserve
get those airplanes.
Mr. Dicks. How many airplanes are in your budget this year?
How many do you get out of this budget?
General McKinley. Sir, it is the Air Force's budget.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
General McKinley. And we will not get any new aircraft this
year.
Mr. Dicks. So the airplanes you have will just get older,
another year older?
General McKinley. Yes. I was here a year ago, our planes
are a year older.
We do have some MQ-1 unmanned vehicles that are new. Those
went to North Dakota, Arizona, California, and they will go to
New York, but that is all our new aircraft.
Mr. Dicks. And most of the Air Force's new airplanes are
UAVs, I think.
General McKinley. Yes, sir, a high percentage is unmanned
vehicles.

YOUTH CHALLENGE

Mr. Dicks. I think you are doing a tremendous job. And
General, I was proud of you both at the Youth Challenge event
the other night. I do not mention it because of anything
specific, but I do think this program--this is a program they
have that is in 30 States now, where they take 150 students
twice a year, and these are kids that are dropouts, and they
have a phenomenal program of bringing them around--these kids,
when you hear their testimonials about what this program means,
which we fund, and I just want to encourage you to keep this
thing going because I think it is doing a lot of good for a lot
of people. And it is a real example, I think, in every State
that has it.
We are looking forward to having ours in Washington State
this next year.
General Blum. Thank you, sir. That program has saved almost
80,000 young men's and women's lives, or at least given them a
second chance in life so that they do not end up incarcerated
or in a cemetery. So we are quite proud of that. And we are
even more proud that, as busy as we have been in the last 7
years, we have still found time to expand that program. We did
not shrink it or walk away from it.

YOUTH CHALLENGE

So I am quite proud of all of the States that do that. And
I appreciate your support, and I know you are going to beat
Oregon.
Mr. Dicks. We are going to do our best.
General Vaughn. You know there is another program that we
are very proud of called the GED Plus Program that we run down
at North Little Rock at the Professional Education Center. We
take folks that have dropped out, a little older than the ones
that you saw, and help them get their GED. And we are actually
averaging about 94 to 95 percent graduation down there.
So we are after the Nation's youth, and giving them a
second chance. And if they turn out, great, you know, for the
American public, and if they happen to join us, that is fine
too.
Mr. Dicks. And our General Lowenberg is doing a great job.
He is one of the best.
General Blum. He is one of the best.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Let me get this straight now. You gave us a
list of the equipment. That does not include the people
shortage you have. In other words, you have to add another $700
million onto the equipment shortage, right?

FUNDING SHORTFALLS

General Blum. Only, sir, if that money is not provided to
us, as has been assured by the leadership of the Army--the
Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army. Not only
to us; they made those assurances to the Senate, they made
assurances to congressional hearings.
There is a no-kidding, honest commitment to provide that
money. The only thing I can't tell you is----
Mr. Murtha. I am not doubting General Casey's word. But you
know how things go: If this does not happen, that does not
happen.
What I am concerned about is, you are now the operational
reserve for this Nation, the operational reserve.
General Blum. Yes, sir, we are.
Mr. Murtha. And you are short by 33 percent of the
personnel that you need--37 or 33 percent?
General Blum. We are filled to 67 percent of the authorized
requirement on the full-time manning. So we are short roughly--
the appropriate math is probably what, 33?
Mr. Murtha. Why should we have to depend on the regular
Army to fund this? Why should not this be part of what we
appropriate directly to the National Guard? Why should we have
to depend upon General Casey sending you a letter?
General Blum. I would welcome the money no matter in what
form it came. I would prefer it would come in a form that
ensures the money was used for the exact intended purpose.
Like NGREA, last year. When you gave us the NGREA money for
the Air Guard and the Army Guard, for every dollar I can
account to the last for penny what was spent. And by the way,
it was all spent, and it was spent on exactly what you asked
for. Because your staff came back and said, ``Show me what you
spent it on''; and when they saw it, they said, ``My God, you
spent it on exactly what you said.''
Well, I thought that is what we were supposed to do. So
that is what we did.
Mr. Murtha. The gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; General Blum
and colleagues.

READINESS

General Blum, I think you know half of the New Jersey
National Guard will be deployed to Iraq starting in June--I
said this in other hearings and--literally half. That obviously
exposes New Jersey; and we are not the only State that is in
that type of predicament. And as you are aware, many of these
citizen soldiers were over there in Iraq in 2004.
I know we have talked about, you know, the force generation
model, but to some extent, to a great extent, it is a future
goal.
General Blum. It is a future goal. And the future goal is
to get it to one deployment followed by about five periods of
equal time back. If that goes to 10, we would be delighted.
But that goal is not attainable right now, and the reality
is that the average unit is turning about one in three. And
that is what is happening with New Jersey.
Sir, you are rightfully concerned about having half of the
Guard deployed.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The troops are not complaining, I must
say.
General Blum. No, the troops are not complaining, but the
governors are quite concerned; yet they do not mind shouldering
the burden. As a matter of fact, they have done a magnificent
job of providing every unit we have asked for when we needed
it.
We have had no push-back from any governor of any State or
territory in 6\1/2\ years. They understand their role as
commander in chief in providing the Guard when we need it for
overseas duty. But what we did was make a commitment to them
that we would not take more than half of their force at any
given time.
We have just gone to the high end of the promise with New
Jersey. But we will leverage what we call the Mutual Assistance
Compacts that every State has signed, including all of the
other adjutants general around New Jersey: New York,
Pennsylvania, Maryland and Delaware, and as far away as Ohio
and West Virginia. If an event would occur in New Jersey that
would require a response greater than the governor could
deliver, we would flow forces into New Jersey from all the
neighboring States to help them. And if it were a regional
effort that really would not permit that, we would flow forces
in from the disaffected or unaffected States.
And to those that say, ``does that work?'' Yes, it does.
Remember Katrina, we flowed 50,000 soldiers into Louisiana and
Mississippi in 6 days from every State and every territory of
this great Nation. Nobody said ``no.'' And that included even
the States that were right in the hurricane belt, Florida and
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and Alabama; everybody ran
to assist them. With that happening when we had 70,000 people
overseas--it was our high water mark for overseas--we still
were able to flow 50,000 into Katrina, and we still had 300,000
left in the country.
You talk about a strategic reserve, you are looking at it.
You are talking about America's force, I think you are looking
at it. I think it is exactly the way we should do business. We
should never send troops overseas without involving the
National Guard, because when you call out the Guard, you call
out America. But what we should do that we are not doing is
making sure they have the equipment they are supposed to have
to do both missions through----

READINESS

Mr. Frelinghuysen. And to which this committee has
committed help.
General Blum. Absolutely. And we need the full-time
manning. If you take away the military gobbledygook and just
talk about, every place where you live you have a fire house--
and most of you have volunteer fire departments, because it
costs a lot of money to have a full-time fire fighting force.
You still have fire engines that are modernized, because
nobody wants an old clunker coming to their house fire. And you
still have modern hoses and turnout gear and equipment. That is
what we are asking for.
We do not want to be a reenactment group; we want to be a
real capable force when you call us. And there are a couple of
full-time firemen in all those fire houses that maintain that
equipment and make sure the firemen are trained and they are
alerted, so when you call them, they show up, where they push
the gear out, and these guys call in on them.
That is what the Guard's got to be, your 21st century
Minutemen and women that respond locally in your ZIP Code,
exactly that way; and respond to go overseas--to get to the
chairman's point earlier--so that we do not have to tie them up
for 4 months, handing them a radio to teach them how to use a
radio they should have had in their possession for 2 years. And
we are experts on how to maintain it and operate it.
I am sorry for the digression.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I wanted you to digress, because I think
that is obviously essential, and you represent the critical
mass.
And I may say, in those fire departments and police forces
quite a lot of those people are wearing that National Guard
uniform. If you look across the country, it is amazing how many
have stood up to be counted.
A couple of related questions: family support, the whole
readiness issue, how you work with families to embrace those
families as their loved ones go abroad. And would you comment
on the--we have not talked about it today--the employer angle
here. At times you hear good stories, and in other cases--
because of, you know, so many deployments--there are some
pretty horrendous stories; and what we should be doing and,
perhaps, what you were doing to provide a higher level of
support to make sure that the jobs are there when these
soldiers return.

FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT

General Vaughn. Sir, as you are aware, we have a good
number of family assistance centers and family readiness
groups. We have had them for as much as 20 years. I mean, we
have been about taking care of all the service members. But for
the Army National Guard, it is a big deal because we are by far
the largest of all the community-based defense forces.
We team with the Army. The Army is going to put a lot of
money in reaching out into these communities. And they know
obviously that is where we are at. Their plan with us is to
stand up 250 permanent family readiness groups around this
Nation. And this is to help folks--you know, especially with
all the youngsters in the active force that have grandmothers
and grandfathers and moms and dad and are not necessarily
married, but how do they interact, how do we all solve the
different problems they have?
So I think over the last 3 or 4 years we have made great
strides, you know, in what we do with our families.

EMPLOYER SUPPORT

The employer piece is another problem, and we do not have
that solved. The big employers in this Nation, I think are
doing a wonderful job; but the self-employed and the small
employers, there has to be something, you know, that we make
progress on this, because if we do not, we are going to end up
seeing just people that belong to the big organizations in our
Army National Guard.

STRESS ON THE FORCE

I will tell you that there is a tremendous amount of stress
on the force right now. And I know that there have probably
been questions asked earlier maybe about the suicide thing. We
have looked at it and analyzed it every way we can. Less than
half of those soldiers involved in suicides have actually
deployed. And so, you know, why is it that our suicide rate is
creeping up? And it has to do with stress. And it really has to
do with--what our folks tell us, as much as anything, is this
relationship with employers and the lack of predictability.

EMPLOYER SUPPORT

We try to get the predictability better. This thing, on the
12-month mobilization problem, is huge, because the more we can
cut down on time away from employers the better off we are.
Our folks tell us the primary reason we are having trouble
in the families is because of the employers and the fact that
they do not have any way--when they come back, in many
instances, they are afraid of what they are faced with, you
know, with reduced amounts of income and supporting their
families.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. They are the breadwinners often; I think
there is an element of despair, and we hope it does not
translate into suicide. I am not sure what there is because
there are so many different types of employers.
But I assume you have been analyzing this--analyzing and
reanalyzing this, and hopefully there is some prescription that
you can come up with where we can be of assistance.
General Blum. The Federal Government's been a little slow
to be frank about it, in responding to exactly the issue you
are talking about. The States have been much more agile.
You will find that some States----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Some.
General Blum. Some States. That is true. Because there is
no universal statement for all 50 States. I appreciate that.
You are right.
But some States have stepped forward and made low-interest
loans to small business operators and self-employed members of
the Guard, so that they can reestablish and get back on their
feet when they come home.
If you are a small business owner, particularly a very
small business owner--in other words, two or three people--and
a significant rainmaker is mobilized for a year, year-and-a-
half, it essentially puts the business on ice. So they realize
that, and they need to kind of jump-start their organization
when it gets back.
So we have seen some help in that effort in regard to the
States. The Federal Government has not yet decided exactly how
they are going to handle large employer incentives, self-
employed incentives or small business incentives. All three
have to be dealt with somewhat differently.

EMPLOYER SUPPORT

It is quite different dealing with Home Depot as opposed to
Joe's House Painting Company, you know. It is quite a big
different level of magnitude. Home Depot is a great patriotic
employer. I think they have 1,500 people deployed right now out
of their workforce, which is a huge number, except that they
employ about 38,000 people nationally. And then they literally
have more people out sick with the flu on any given day than
they have mobilized. So they can handle and absorb that much
better than Joe's Hardware Store where the manager is deployed
or something like that.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McKinley. Mr. Chairman, could I make a quick
comment on New Jersey while we have a minute?
Thank you for your support. We have got two great fighter
units.

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. Frelinghuysen. I didn't want to turn my back on the Air
Force. I apologize. We need some new tankers, too.
General McKinley. But we want to let you know that under
General Blum's leadership the Air National Guard really has
become a Joint Force in the National Guard. So in the event of
an emergency in New Jersey, that Air National Guard force of
almost 3,000 people would be available.
I am very proud of our relationship with the Army National
Guard; it is working very well. And I did not want to leave out
a couple things, because I know General Vaughn and Chief Blum
said there are needs in the Army National Guard.
We have about a $1.5 billion need, too, which will help
baseline the Air Sovereignty Mission. That is a mission which
the Air Force has not baselined. We would like to see that
baselined so that we can encourage members to stay on more
often. We have some recruiting and retention issues also.
Sir?
Mr. Murtha. Is this in this list here?
General McKinley. It is on the budget card, yes.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. All the Air----
General McKinley. Yes, sir, it is an Air National Guard
unfunded requirement.
General Blum. Mr. Chairman, I will leave a document that
captures all of the needs in a very concise fashion with you
before I leave the hearing.
General McKinley. And that is all I had, sir. Thank you for
the time.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. I am fine, Mr. Chairman.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

Mr. Murtha. I just want to ask what DHS and NORTHCOM--do
they coordinate all this for you? They provide forces and money
for you--do they?
General Blum. No, sir. That is not well understood. They do
not actually provide any forces for the Guard. The governors
provide the forces for the Guard here in CONUS. Anything that
happens domestically.
Mr. Murtha. What do they do?
General Blum. Sir, they have a very vital role to play.
Mr. Murtha. Like what?
General Blum. For instance, I have no ships in the National
Guard, and if I needed a ship or I needed a maritime
capability, the place to go for that would be Northern Command,
and they would in fact coordinate that.
But Northern Command cannot do their job without the Army
and Air National Guard, and the Army and Air National Guard
cannot do everything that we could be asked to do without them.
So there is a very real need for the Northern Command and the
National Guard Bureau to have a very close coordinating and
collaborating effort.
Now, with the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008,
there are certain reports and requirements in there that will
force that to a much further degree than they have. The
Congress----
Mr. Murtha. How about DHS?
General Blum. Up until very recently, the Department of
Defense and the DHS were kind of two separate and totally apart
organizations. There is a recognition that the two of those
departments must work closer together, or the American people
are not going to be very well served when they need to be.
The National Guard does not control either one of those,
but we are absolutely critical to the linkage of one to the
other. So we will play in that arena with them and coordinate
and synchronize. Where it does work is at the State and local
level, where the State equivalent of DHS and the State
equivalent of DOD are merged seamlessly by the governors,
because they cannot do their operations without joining them
together. So if we take that State and local model and build on
it at the regional and national level, I think we will all be
better served.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We appreciate
it.
The Committee is now adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Hobson and the
answers thereto follow:]

Marine Corps Reserve

Question. Several Marine Reservists are being cherry picked from
Ohio's Marine Corps Reserve ``Lima Company'' and sister units in the
3rd Battalion 25th Marines in order to deploy to Iraq with another
battalion, the 2nd Battalion 25th Marines. This practice, known as
``Cross Leveling,'' steals the leadership, experience, and cohesion of
an infantry unit. It places the unit that lost Marines at a horrible
disadvantage when it has to deploy, and initiates a vicious cycle of
``robbing Peter to pay Paul.'' Why are you not filling these open spots
with Marines from the IRR (Individual Ready Reserve)? Isn't that what
the IRR is for?
Answer. The IRR is a pool of reservists who can be called to active
duty in case of crisis. In the case of OIF/OEF, the Marine Corps uses
its IRR to source individual augments to support the transition
training teams, Joint Manning Documents, and other Total Force Marine
Corps requirements. The IRR is used to source requirements when
sourcing from the active component operational forces, bases and
stations, and the Selective Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) (with units or
unit detachments) have failed to provide the solution. The IRR requires
a separate SECDEF authority and is the solution used prior to
activating retired reservists. The IRR does not exclusively support the
SMCR.
The Marine Corps invokes the least amount of mobilization authority
required to satisfy requirements. When an infantry battalion cannot be
sourced to the minimum required manning levels, the net is cast
throughout the next higher unit in its chain, i.e., the regiment. If
the regiment cannot source the requirement (by using its HQ and its
other battalions) then the net would be cast over the next higher unit
in its chain, i.e. the division (by using its other regiments), and so
forth.
The use of the IRR to attempt to round out NCO leadership of an
infantry battalion produces much more risk than our current practice of
allowing the Regiment to first source from sister battalions. IRR
Marines don't have the benefit of training with the Battalion prior to
activation. The Marines from 3/25 have already started to drill and
have had a two-week annual training package with the Marines that they
are deploying with and will be leading into combat. These cohesion
building training events will increase the combat effectiveness and
survivability of the Marines scheduled to deploy. Additionally, several
individual block training events will be completed by the time the unit
is activated. Use of IRRs to fill the NCO shortfall would require
activation followed by the need to conduct all individual pre-
deployment training while the unit is conducting unit pre-deployment
training. This would be detrimental to unit cohesion.
Question. A 19 January 2007 Memorandum from the Secretary of
Defense states ``mobilization of ground combat, combat support and
combat services support will be managed on a unit basis. This will
allow greater cohesion and predictability in how these Reserve units
train and deploy. Exceptions will require my approval.'' Do you have/
need approval of the SecDef?
Answer. A 19 Jan 07 SECDEF Memo published Departmental policy
changes resulting from an assessment on how best to support global
military operational needs. In addition to this assessment, and as
noted in this Memo, these changes were also based on recommendations
made by both the uniform and civilian leadership. The 19 Jan 07 policy
was further implemented in a 15 Mar 07 USD (P&R) Memo containing
additional guidance that is currently used by the Joint Staff, Service
Secretaries, and OSD when approving individual activation packages. As
previously addressed in our answer to question 1, this activation
process recognizes that although we try to manage mobilizations
``primarily on a unit basis,'' there is a necessity to fill unit
manning shortfalls. In this case, MARFORRES generated a sourcing
solution based on cross leveling of units organic to the 25th Marine
Regiment (2/25's parent regiment). This package was routed via the
Commandant of the Marine Corps to the SecNav for determination, in
compliance with paragraph lf of the USD (P&R)'s 15 Mar 07 implementing
guidance directing that, the Service Secretary ``determine the best
method to fill unit manning shortfalls.''
Question. I understand that junior marines, who have never
deployed, volunteered to make up the compliment. However, they were
taken off the list and replaced with Corporals and Sergeants who had
previously deployed with Lima Company in 2005. Some of these Marines
were wounded in action. How will involuntarily striping the leadership
benefit Lima Company when it deploys, possibly in late 2009?
Answer. The deployment of selected NCOs from Company L will not
adversely affect the Company when it activates in late 2009 and
subsequently deploys in 2010. The Company and Battalion will have
sufficient NCOs to provide leadership to its Marines should the Company
L NCOs selected to augment 2nd Battalion decide to not reenlist and not
deploy in 2010.
Company L currently has 55 of its 56 NCO billets filled [per the
Company's Table of Organization]. Over the intervening two-year period,
approximately 85 Company L Marines will be eligible for promotion to
NCO (given current promotion rates).
The Company L NCOs selected to augment 2nd Battalion have Mandatory
Drill Stop Dates prior to 3rd Battalion's next OIF deployment.
Therefore, their participation in the next Battalion deployment would
be strictly voluntary and is not assured. Ho ever, by deploying with
2nd Battalion, the command is able to fully utilize their combat-proven
leadership and occupational skills to train and lead the Marines of 2nd
Battalion. In addition, this plan allows junior Marines within Company
L to progressively assume greater responsibility during peacetime
training events, and thereby be better prepared to assume NCO billet
during 3rd Battalion's next deployment. Consequently, the current plan
optimizes the quality an quantity of NCO leadership provided to both
2nd Battalion and 3rd Battalion during combat operations in support of
the War on Terror.
** Note: Of the augments only [delete] was previously wounded in
action. He sustained a shrapnel wound to his right calf during
Operation MATADOR in Al Qaim. He was medically evacuated from theater
and subsequently returned to full duty.
Question. Three Lima Marines have been waiting for some time to
attend sniper training. These three Marines will now have to forgo that
training due to their involuntary activation. How will forgoing the
training of these ``would be'' Marine snipers benefit Lima Company when
it deploys, possibly in late 2009?
Answer. When Marine Forces Reserve researched this question it was
determined that the three Marines awaiting Scout Sniper training are
all members of Weapons Company, 3d Bn, 25th Marines. Further, they did
not meet all of the prerequisites. One needed to retake the ASVAB since
his GT score was not high enough and the others did not have a current
HIV on record. Those discrepancies have been rectified and all three
Marines (delete) are scheduled to attend the below Scout Sniper Course
at MCB Camp Lejeune, NC and will join 2d Bn, 25th Marines upon
graduation. They all have approved orders in the system and have been
notified by their command.

CID: M0381Z4
COURSE: SCOUT SNIPER CRS
LOCATION: CAMP LEJEUNE
CLASS#: 2008003
REPORT DATE: 20080413
GRAD DATE: 20080627

Air Force Reserve

Question. General Bradley, the recently published report from the
Commission on the National Guard and Reserves included a number of
recommendations that have budgetary impact on the Services. Are the
Reserves included in the dialogue on how to address the impact to your
budgets?
Answer. My personnel have been fully involved in developing the Air
Force position on the Commission's 95 recommendations. Initially we
were not invited as a member of the working group that will be
discussing the budgetary impact of the Commission on the National Guard
and Reserves recommendation on the Total Force. However, Major General
(Select) James Rubeor, my deputy, was added to the General Officer/
Senior Executive Service working group, but will not be a voting
member.
Question. Do you feel that the funding level for NGREA (National
Guard and Reserve Equipment Account) is sufficient for the Air Force
Reserve to allow you to modernize and remain a viable tier one ready
force?
Answer. While we are resourced through the Air Force budget
process, we have combat requirements that are not funded. The National
Guard and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) has been a lifeline to Air
Force Reserve modernization. While the NGREA funding has helped keep us
a ready and relevant combat force, it is insufficient to meet all
modernization efforts. Over the past three years NGREA funding
increases have allowed improvements in defensive systems, advanced
targeting pods, radars, multifunction displays, communications and
night vision equipment. The Air Force Reserve has over $670 million in
modernization shortfalls each year. The NGREA covers approximately 5%
of this shortfall, but partial funding of the shortfall increases the
time to field capabilities. Air Force Reserve aircraft and systems
modernization requirements are projected to increase and, while NGREA
funding has increased, it alone is not sufficient to keep Air Force
Reserve a viable tier one ready force.
Question. Are there any other budgetary areas where you feel as
though you are at risk?
Answer. The Global War on Terror (GWOT), Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) and Total Force Integration (TFI) have created
considerable pressures on the Air Force Reserve's budget. Recruiting
and retention challenges, along with the training of Air Force to
Reserve personnel due to BRAC/TFI mission changes create potential
funding shortfalls in these areas. Additionally, the Fiscal Year 2009
depot purchased equipment maintenance funding level of 79% has resulted
in the deferment of program depot maintenance on numerous aircraft,
increasing risk to our readiness. While we strive to mitigate this risk
in execution year, our ability to attain an acceptable level of risk is
becoming more difficult. The under execution of our programmed flying
hours and the increase in GWOT flying results in budget reductions to
our training hours, which may effect readiness in the future,
especially if GWOT flying decreases. Lastly, long term Military
Personnel appropriations orders by Reservists volunteering to support
GWOT results in the under execution of Reserve Personnel
appropriations, which may result in baseline cuts to this appropriation
effecting the ability for Reservists to train in the future.
Question. What impact is the Air Force Reserve's participation in
the war having on your readiness, in terms of your personnel and
operational capabilities?
Answer. Although the readiness of the Air Force Reserve training
objectives is still being met with an increase in the operations tempo
due to the war, wear of our equipment has accelerated above normal
peace time standards. Results of this acceleration increases concerns
for the need to recapitalize equipment as well as the funding needed to
ensure Reservists are able to maintain operational readiness.
Additionally, under-execution of programmed flying hours may lead to
reduced appropriations for flying hours. This could result in a
shortfall of flying hours when the Reserve returns to a peace time
operations tempo. Lastly, Air Force Reserve missions are being
accomplished primarily with volunteers on Military Personnel
appropriation orders which results in an under execution of the Reserve
Personnel appropriation account. As with flying hours, if Reserve
Personnel appropriation funding is reduced, the ability for Reservists
to train during a peace time environment could be jeopardized.
Question. How has AF Reserve recruiting and retention been affected
by the increased demands of the Global War on Terrorism?
Answer. The Air Force Reserve has met its recruiting goals for the
last seven years. While we anticipate challenges in the future due to
Base Realignment and Closure, and Total Force Integration initiatives
and a shrinking active duty force in which to recruit from, we have
seen nothing to indicate that Global War on Terrorism has affected our
recruiting efforts. As for retention, we've met or barely missed our
retention goals during the same period. We are monitoring this area
closely as there are some indications for potential concerns with first
term and career Airmen reenlistment rates. However, as with recruiting,
we cannot say with any degree of certainty that Global War on Terrorism
is adversely affecting our retention rates.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Hobson.
Questions submitted by Ms. Granger and the answers thereto
follow:]

South Texas Training Center

Question. The Texas Governor and the Texas Adjutant General have
discussed establishing at least one additional training center in the
southern portion of the state in order to provide more training space
to our Guard. What is being done to address this issue that affects the
Guard's readiness for both overseas and domestic missions?
Answer. The establishment and enhancement of National Guard
response capabilities (Civil Support Teams, Chemical Enhanced Response
Force Package, National Guard Response Force, etc.) to provide support
to civil authorities have created additional training and training
space requirements for nearly all of the states. The National Guard
Bureau continues to work on developing training capabilities and
identify facilities that would support the effective and efficient
delivery of training, exercise, and evaluation of the readiness of the
domestic response capabilities.
Question. Are other states facing the same training space dilemma?
Answer. Yes, states with Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives Enhanced Response Force Package
(CERFP) teams have a valid issue because of the specialized nature of
the venue required to train for their mission. The cost of these
training areas would be prohibitive if established at one time, but
could be feasible in phases. The National Guard Bureau has recommended
that up to six regional training centers be established and that
funding be provided to allow CERFPs to use the regional centers on a
rotational basis. This solution would provide a 1 to 3 training site to
CERFP ratio and would likely be a more cost effective solution.

Pay Issues

Question. Late last year, NBC ran a story describing multiple
instances of pay problems with members of the National Guard. The story
made reference to a GAO report that examined six National Guard Units--
94% of those Guardsmen had pay problems. What is being done to remedy
this and to ensure that our National Guardsmen are being paid correctly
and in a timely manner?
Answer. The NBC story refers to a November 2003 GAO Report entitles
``Military Pay: Army National Guard Personnel Mobilized to Active Duty
Experienced Significant Pay Problems.'' That GAO report correctly
identified several deficiencies in our pay system, mostly relating to
adjustments in pay and benefits when Army National Guard soldiers
transitioned between reserve duty and active duty assignments.
Those widespread, systematic problems have been addressed. In 2003
I began working with the Assistant Secretary of Army, Financial
Management and Comptroller, an the Director of Defense Finance &
Accounting Service (DFAS) to address these pay problems.
Among the corrective actions taken includes establishing joint
National Guard Bureau and DFAS dedicated support team to assist
mobilizing and demobilizing soldiers; enhancing demobilization
briefings and ensuring that all personnel know how to contact the
Soldier and Family Support Centers for any pay assistance or other
problems arise. Additionally, we have implemented standard operating
instructions to prevent problems from arising due to turnover of
financial personnel. Also, we have established procedures for reviewing
and monitoring the pay process by DFAS, Army, and the Army National
Guard; and improving the quality and availability of online pay and
benefit information for soldiers.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Ms. Granger.
Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto
follow:]

National Guard Role in Homeland Security

Question. Has the Guard defined its operational requirements for
its domestic mission?--what missions are expected of the Guard--and is
there a plan, and do units regularly train for this mission?
Answer. The National Guard has worked hard to define our
operational requirements for domestic missions, especially in the area
of consequence management. These efforts have resulted in the
development of specialized units and capabilities, including: Joint
Force Headquarters (JFHQ) and Joint Task Force-State (JTF-State); Joint
Incident Site Communications Capability (JISCC); Civil Support Teams
(CST); Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield
Explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) teams; National Guard
Response Forces; and Critical Infrastructure Program-Mission Assurance
Assessment teams. Additionally, the National Guard has analyzed civil
support operational requirements and has defined the service-provided
Army National Guard and Air National Guard equipment that specifically
supports civil support missions. These equipment lists have been
provided to service staffs to influence the rapid fielding of specific
sets of equipment to National Guard units to enhance the National
Guard's overall capability to respond to domestic incidents.
Although National Guard has made significant progress in defining
our homeland defense and civil support operational requirements, there
is more to be done. That is why the National Guard Bureau is also
institutionalizing a Capability Assessment and Development Process that
will use National and Defense Planning Scenarios to systematically
define future National Guard capability needs across the spectrum of
homeland defense and civil support missions.
As to what missions are expected of the Guard, it serves our nation
and communities across the full spectrum of domestic missions,
including, but not limited to: Counter Drug, protecting critical
physical and cyber infrastructure, air sovereignty, air and ballistic
missile defense, transportation, engineering, and medical. These
responses are to both natural and manmade disasters, as well as civil
disturbance.
Over 70 Domestic Operation plans involving the National Guard have
been written by United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the
National Guard Bureau and the 54 states, territories and the District
of Columbia. In addition, the National Guard Bureau, in coordination
with the 54 Joint Force Headquarters-State, has developed a Joint
Capabilities Database (JCD) that focuses on ``Essential 10''
capabilities that are needed and available for homeland defense,
homeland security, and civil support missions that are frequently
conducted by the National Guard. The JCD is designed to assess current
and future National Guard joint capabilities required by the Governors
in the event of an emergency, and to inform both Contingency and Crisis
Action Planners on the status of capabilities and where capability gaps
lie when formalizing plans.
The National Guard Bureau, in conjunction with USNORTHCOM, has
developed and implemented a Joint Interagency Training Capability
(JITC) that includes a regional exercise program, staff training for
JFHQ/JTF State staff elements, and collective chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE) training for
National Guard CERFPs and CSTs. CSTs also have rigorous internal
exercise programs and CERFPs have focused individual and collective
training events.
Additionally, the National Guard regularly participates in National
and Combatant Command homeland defense and civil support Exercises.
However, although the National Guard has made major strides in
developing effective homeland defense and civil support training, there
is much left to be done to assess the sufficiency of this training with
respect to the increasing National Guard homeland defense and civil
support responsibilities and to address continued training gaps in the
areas of port and border security, information sharing and Continuity
of Operations and Continuity of Government planning and exercises.
Question. Regardless of the source, would it be helpful if
additional funding, over and above that provided for military
readiness, were to be made available to states for domestic planning
and exercises performed by the National Guard?
Answer. Yes, additional funding for domestic planning and exercises
would significantly improve the National Guard's readiness to respond
to domestic emergencies. While the National Guard has made progress in
domestic planning and exercises, increased funding would enable us to
address gaps in training, to improve the assessment of that training,
and to fully integrate our planning efforts at the federal, state and
local levels.

National Guard and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)

Question. If there is federal military support to civil authorities
that needs to be provided for a disaster relief operation, is that the
responsibility of the Reserve Component or NORTHCOM?
Answer. Disaster relief response within the United States has
several tiers of response, with the goal of supporting the needs of the
local authorities. Local authorities, first on the scene, provide
initial assessments and response. If further assistance is required,
state assets, such as the National Guard, will be called upon. The
National Guard also can be employed in Title 32 status if federally
funded military support is required.
National Guard units are located in communities across all 50
states, three territories, and the District of Columbia. If
requirements exceed the capability of available forces, elected leaders
may execute an Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) request,
a voluntary agreement between states and territories to share National
Guard and other resources. This tool allows for a sharing of resources
and solves the problem at a state or regional level. However, EMACs are
not only for neighboring states. If a disaster is regional in nature,
states outside the affected area may choose to send assets.
Federal assistance may also be requested. These requests are
collected by the lead federal agency and then forwarded to the
appropriate federal agency. If the Department of Defense receives a
request, it would pass to USNORTHCOM for execution. At that point,
USNORTHCOM would provide the required capability. In some cases,
USNORTHCOM is the only source of capabilities. For example, states
typically do not have any maritime assets. If required, these would
come from active duty forces. In some cases this may require reserve
component elements to be called into active federal service.
Question. What are some of the challenges with the NORTHCOM
arrangement?
Answer. The National Guard can provide significant domestic
response support by rapidly deploying Soldiers and Airmen and necessary
equipment over great distances, as was done in the response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) is a fully capable Combatant Command (COCOM) that is
staffed to manage Federal Defense Support to Civil Authorities if
needed. It is critical that these separate, but complementary, missions
function together when disaster situations arise.
While the National Guard Bureau has been working with USNORTHCOM on
their domestic support plans, there have been limited opportunities for
USNORTHCOM commanders, staff and forces to assist state forces on
domestic response missions. This leaves significant room for
improvement on coordination of efforts and planning. Increased
coordination and exchange of staff for training and exercises will go a
long way towards addressing any coordination deficit between USNORTHCOM
and the National Guard.
Question. Title 32 operations have been coordinated in the past--
NOT by US Northern Command, but by the National Guard Bureau. What are
the advantages to having this consistent channel of communication
between the States and the DOD for operations that are conducted with
federal funds?--and what role, if any, does NORTHCOM play in these
missions?
Answer. The Title 10 requirement for the National Guard Bureau to
serve as the conduit of information between the individual states and
the Departments of the Army and Air Force is well established and
clearly understood by all parties. There would be many advantages to
continuing this proven process for Title 32 operations.
The communication process between the National Guard Bureau and the
individual states is well established and utilized on a daily basis.
State Joint Operations Centers have been established under the
Adjutants General and are tied into the National Guard Bureau Joint
Operations Center. The National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Center
then makes the information available to the Department of Defense and
the Department of Homeland Security.
The National Guard Bureau also manages the distribution of Title 32
funding that is allocated to the Army National Guard and Air National
Guard to train for their federal mission. The appropriate fiscal
accounting processes are already established and used on a daily basis.
Finally, maintaining a single, consistent Title 32 process that is
exercised on a daily basis means National Guard personnel are trained
and ready to react in a disaster the same way they operate day-to-day.
This ``train like you fight'' concept provides a high state of
readiness and is well understood and used throughout the Department of
Defense.
NORTHCOM, however, does not play a significant role in Title 32
operational missions. Since command and control of Title 32 operations
remain with the Governor and state Adjutants General, there is no
USNORTHCOM involvement in these operations other than maintaining
situational awareness. Also, not all states and territories reside
within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility. Alaska, Hawaii, Guam,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are assigned to either the Pacific
Command (PACOM) or the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).

National Guard Equipment Challenges

Question. LTG Blum you have previously noted the relatively rapid
National Guard response to Hurricane Katrina, but isn't it true that if
the Army National Guard had had 100 percent of all of the equipment it
is required to have, that response would have been even faster?
Answer. There is no doubt that higher levels of equipment generally
would facilitate a faster response in a catastrophe. While the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) ensures that a disaster-
affected state can bring in National Guard equipment and personnel from
other states when needed.
If the affected state has a relatively low level of equipment on
hand, this increases the demand on external sources and invariably will
take a longer time to meet all equipment requirements.
Question. If the National Guard were to receive the full amount of
the President's Budget request as well as the full amount currently
planned over the Future Year Defense Program, how much additional
funding would still be needed in order to bring the National Guard to
100 percent of the equipment it is required to have?
Answer. If the Army National Guard were to receive all of the
equipment in the President's Budget and the Future Years Defense
Program, the additional requirement of $9.9 billion to reach full
equipping levels. However, this figure would not displace all
substitute and ``in lieu of items currently in the National Guard's
inventory. Additional funding would be required to fully equip the
force with the most modern equipment available.
Question. Please describe the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact and how it allows the National Guard to mass equipment across
state lines during disasters--and would this work in a major crisis
when many Guard units are deployed?
Answer. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a
national mutual aid agreement administered by the National Emergency
Management Association (NEMA). All 50 states, as well as the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, are members. The
National Guard and other responders (police, fire, etc.) are subject to
request by the impacted state. It is up to the state receiving such a
request whether to respond as requested, respond with a proposed
substitute asset or to decline the request. As a general rule,
requested support is honored in a timely and efficient manner.
During a crisis requiring interstate mutual aid a state publishes
requests for support using the EMAC process. Using its knowledge of
National Guard asset availability, the National Guard Bureau contacts
the state owning the appropriate asset and asks that state to consider
picking up the support requirement identified by EMAC. The state
accepting the mission then advises the requesting state and NEMA of its
availability. The actual agreement between the supported and supporting
states is made between those states, using the EMAC agreement as the
basis.
The EMAC system works very well, even when National Guard units are
deployed. For example, during the Hurricane Katrina disaster the
National Guard deployed approximately 50,000 troops, with appropriate
equipment, in a timely and effective response in support of civil
authorities, and more National Guard personnel and equipment were
available if they had been needed. At the time, 13,000 National Guard
personnel and significant amounts of equipment were deployed overseas
in the Global War on Terror.
Question. How many full-time personnel is the Army National Guard
required to have? How many is it currently authorized to have and how
does this difference affect the readiness of the Army National Guard?
Answer. The Army validated requirement for Army National Guard
full-time support is 42,533 Active Guard and Reserve and 42,329
Military Technicians, for a total of 84,862 full-time support
personnel.
The Army National Guard's FY2008 authorization is 29,204 Active
Guard and Reserve and 28,102 Military Technicians, for a total of
57,306 full-time support personnel.
The current full-time support requirements are formulated from a
1999 manpower study based on the pre-9/11 mission of a strategic
reserve. The Army National Guard is now an operational force and has
inherently increased mission needs at the strategic, operational and
tactical levels. As we prepare and train our force for missions, in an
era of persistent conflict, the negative delta in full-time support
adversely affects our ability to meet the readiness levels required for
an operational force. Our full-time support personnel complete
essential day-to-day training preparation, maintenance and personnel
actions that allow our part-time soldiers to maximize training during
their limited training periods. Full-time support is a key readiness
multiplier.
Question. Generals Vaughn and McKinley, can you compare the full-
time percentages of required versus authorized personnel compare to
ANG? What is percentage of full-time to total end strength? I have
heard that ANG has it about right as far as working as a true
operational reserve?
Answer. The Army's validated fiscal year 2008 (FY08) requirement
for Army National Guard full-time support is 42,533 Active Guard and
Reserve (AGR) and 42,329 Military Technicians (MilTech), for a total of
84,862 full-time support personnel. The Army National Guard's actual
FY08 authorization is 29,204 AGR and 28,102 MilTech, for a total of
57,306 full-time support personnel. The Army National Guard's
authorized end-strength for FY08 is 351,300. This yields an authorized
level of full-time support at 16.3 percent.
The current full-time support requirements are formulated from a
1999 manpower study based on the pre-9/11 mission of a strategic
reserve. This study validated a requirement for 84,850 full-time
support positions to perform the Army National Guard mission as a
strategic reserve. The Army National Guard is now an operational force
and has inherently increased mission needs at the strategic,
operational and tactical levels.
The Air Force validated FY08 requirement and authorization for Air
National Guard full-time support is 13,936 Active Guard and Reserve
(AGR) and 22,897 Military Technicians (MilTech), for a total of 36,833
full-time support personnel. The Air National Guard authorized end-
strength for FY08 is 106,700. This yields an authorized level of full-
time support at 34.5 percent. The Air National Guard's full-time force
allows it to provide a high level of volunteerism for missions at 92
percent. This is a proven, ready, combat capability to the Air Force.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]

Wednesday, March 5, 2008.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE CONTRACT AWARD FOR TANKER REPLACEMENT

WITNESSES

HON. SUE C. PAYTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR
ACQUISITION
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN L. ``JACK'' HUDSON, COMMANDER, AERONAUTICAL
SYSTEMS CENTER
TERRY KASTEN, KC-45A PROGRAM MANAGER

Opening Remarks of Chairman Murtha

Mr. Murtha. The Committee will come to order.
I want to welcome Ms. Payton and General Hudson to the
Committee.
I do not think there is any subcommittee or any committee
that has done more to try to move this tanker program forward.
When Bill Young was Chairman, he recognized the problem. We
tried everything we could to put money in, prompted the Defense
Department to go forward. All of us realized the critical
nature and the national significance of this program. This is a
weapons system just like the F-22 or the JSF or anything else.
This is absolutely critical to our national security.
Having said that, what I worry about and the reason that I
wanted to have a hearing is this also has political
implications. Not only are the facts important, but the
political implications are just as important.
I look at the banks being bailed out by foreign countries.
I see a rising trade deficit with China, the rest of the world.
And when my staff gives me a paper that shows our Treasury
owes--and other U.S. Agencies owe China $922 billion, I think
it is imperative that the Air Force explain to this committee
its decision and how it came about to award this contract.
I do not know what the estimate of the contract is going to
be. It is going to be a big contract, probably as big as any
contract that we have had over the years. And I know it will
grow, because all of them do. Our experience is that all of
them get bigger. But we want to make sure everybody was treated
fairly.
And we want to know as many details as we can. We
understand that there are a lot of details that you cannot talk
about because you have not been briefed. But you have to
remember this: This committee funds this program. And all this
committee has to do is stop the money, and this program is not
going to go forward.
We want to make sure everybody is treated fairly. We want
to make sure you made the right decision. We want to support
the right decision in this endeavor.
So, with that, I will ask Mr. Young for his opening
statement.

Opening Remarks of Mr. Young

Mr. Young. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I
want to join you in welcoming Secretary Payton and General
Hudson to this very important hearing.
This subcommittee has recognized the need for a new fleet
of tankers for many years, actually, and we are really
disappointed that it has taken so long even to get where we are
today. The fiasco that encircled the leasing program--by the
way, even back then, we supported buying the tankers as opposed
to leasing them. But we were overruled in that matter. But the
important thing here is, when can we put new tankers into the
air to meet the requirement of the United States national
security requirements? And that is our issue today.
Secretary Payton, I read your prepared statement, but also
I read in The Washington Post yesterday the comments of Loren
B. Thompson of the Lexington Institute. Frankly--and please do
not be offended by this--but your statement does not say
anything about this contract, but Thompson has--well, I am sure
you have seen this.
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Thompson has a whole list of why this contract
was awarded. And I do not know that this subcommittee is going
to try to be in the business of determining which contractors
get the contract awards; I do not think that is our
prerogative. But if Thompson knows something about this, we
expect that you might know something about this as well. So,
although your statement was not very thorough in detail, I
think we are probably going to be asking you a lot of questions
about this.
So thank you for being here and being willing to----
Ms. Payton. Thank you.
Mr. Young [continuing]. Face what you know is going to be
an interesting session.
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. I am going to ask the two members that have the
political concerns in their own district to make a few opening
remarks. First we will hear from Mr. Dicks.

Remarks of Mr. Dicks

Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I wish I could say that I was happy with this decision,
but I certainly am not. And I have been a very strong advocate
for this tanker program. There are a number of things that I
think are basically unfair in what the Air Force did.
First was the decision not to take into account the massive
subsidy received by Airbus to build the A330 in launch aid. The
A330 and the A340 received over $5 billion in launch aid, and
yet, in evaluating these proposals, the Air Force did not take
that into account.
The most damning of all is the bait-and-switch tactics used
by the Air Force to first say that they wanted a medium-sized
tanker. They said, we do not want a great big tanker, we want a
medium-sized tanker to replace the smaller plane, the KC-135.
This was not a replacement for the KC-10. Had Boeing known--as
General Lichte kept saying more is better, more is better--if
Boeing had known that the Air Force wanted more, it would have
bid the 777. But they were never given that opportunity. They
were never suggested.
And let me just read to you what the Air Force said about
this program. ``We want to buy a tanker. We do not want to buy
a cargo plane that tanks. We also do not want to buy a
passenger airplane that tanks. We want to buy a tanker. Its
primary mission is going to be a tanker. The fact that it can
carry cargo or passengers is a benefit, but it is not the
primary reason for the procurement.''
So I think the Air Force has failed us here. I think they
went with the wrong airplane. By going with a bigger airplane
over lifetime, if you compare the two, the KC-767 and the A330,
the A330 will burn $15 billion more in fuel. It will also have
higher maintenance costs. It is a 53 percent larger airplane.
It is going to have higher maintenance costs.
Also, at the very end, after all the things that the Air
Force did to capitulate to Airbus and EADS and Northrop
Grumman, they have had one final capitulation on the integrated
mission assessment, where they changed it right at the end so
that they would be able to--instead of having to have--I mean,
this is a very major issue--a smaller plane, because we have
learned in airlift an airfield can accommodate more planes.
They can have more C-17s at a field than C-5s. The same thing
is true here. You can have more 767s at a field than you can
have the larger plane.
But the Air Force changed the criteria. They said, we can
look at the--instead of looking at the weakest strength of the
airfield, you look at the strongest strength. They changed the
distance between wings from 50 feet to 25 feet. They also
changed the ramps. Also, because of the size of this airplane,
you are going to have to have a massive military construction
program to build new hangars all over the world. And so I say
the Air Force changed the deal in midstream to accommodate
Airbus because they said they would pull out of the competition
if we did not do it.
Also, this is a crown jewel of American technology. We are
now giving away to the Europeans one of the most significant
things we, as a country, can do, and that is build these aerial
tankers.
Also, you said they have great mission capability, I mean,
that their boom and their drogue have great capability. They
have not even passed fuel yet. If they did, it has been in the
last week. And at the Paris Air Show, they had a wooden thing
that they had out there that they said was a boom, but it
wasn't. It was just a piece of wood.
They are behind in their Australian deal. Boeing has
delivered a tanker to the Japanese. Airbus is still 1 or 2
years behind. So how could you say that they have a superior
proposal, when they have not even delivered this airplane?
And then, to take away these jobs from the American
people--the Boeing Company and our State of Washington, which
has been one of the greatest supporters and suppliers to the
Air Force, taking these jobs away and giving this--and
remember, the major parts of this plane will be built in
Europe. The tail is built in Spain. Germany builds the
fuselage. Somebody builds the wings. They are going to send
that all to Alabama and assemble it. There is going to be very
little added to that in the United States. It is all going to
be done in Europe by a subsidized company.
And one other thing. They also--Boeing has to pay health-
care insurance. I do not think you took that into account, that
over in these European countries they get socialized medicine--
which is fine; I think it is a great program. But that should
be evaluated. Boeing has to pay health-care insurance.
So I just think this thing is totally unfair. I think the
Air Force has made a big mistake in shifting from the medium-
sized tanker to the large tanker. And I hope that we can
reconsider this decision and do the right thing, which is to
build this thing in the United States with an American company
with American workers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. We agreed before we started to let Mr. Tiahrt
also have an opening statement, and Mr. Cramer, and then we
will go forward with the witnesses making their statement.
Mr. Tiahrt.

Remarks of Mr. Tiahrt

Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this very important hearing.
I look forward to hearing from Secretary Payton and General
Hudson on the Air Force decision to award the KC-X tanker
contract to a foreign competitor over an American company. I
understand they want to limit their comments because the
competitors have not yet been debriefed and there is a possible
protest decision looming. However, I hope they understand the
seriousness of our concerns. The committee needs and demands
answers.
Mr. Chairman, perhaps we should have had Loren B. Thompson,
Ph.D., here, because he has been debriefed on this program, but
we cannot get debriefed on it.
Mr. Dicks. By the Air Force, in fact. He said the Air Force
officials gave him the information.
Mr. Tiahrt. Absolutely.
Unfortunately, the process of the Air Force's decision
leaves me asking a tremendous amount of questions. The American
public is rightfully outraged by this decision. I am outraged
by this decision. It is outsourcing our national security. An
American tanker should be built by an American company with
American workers. Choosing a French tanker over an American
tanker does not make sense to the American people, and it does
not make any sense to me.
But the more I investigate this decision and others like
it, the more I am beginning to see a pattern that is deeply
disturbing. We are stacking the deck against American
manufacturers at the expense of our own national and economic
security. Three of the last big defense contracts have all been
awarded to foreign companies, because the deck is stacked
against American manufacturers. We should have suspected it
when the Navy awarded the Marine One contract to a foreign
manufacturer, the replacement of the President's helicopter. We
should have known when the Army awarded the light utility
helicopter to EADS. And now, with the Air Force awarding the
KC-X to a foreign manufacturer, it is as plain as the nose on
your face.
Foreign competitors were able to compete and win against
American manufacturers because our acquisition laws favor
foreign competitors. If we were to compete Air Force One today,
it would go to a foreign manufacturer.
For instance, the Air Force did not take into account the
illegal subsidies or other nonaccounted-for costs that EADS and
Airbus receives from European nations. These subsidies make
Airbus aircraft cheaper in civilian markets, and clearly they
make the A330 cheaper in this competition.
Although these facts are well-established, I routinely
brought them up to the Air Force's attention. In the final
analysis, it seems that the Air Force did not even try to
evaluate the impact of European subsidies on a tanker
competition. And you should have known, when you have an
airplane that is 43 percent larger built in a country where the
euro is stronger than the dollar, it should send up a red flag
that there are subsidies buried in their bid. And that makes an
unlevel playing field for American manufacturers.
In addition to stacking the deck against American
manufacturers, I am concerned that the Air Force poorly judged
one of the most heavily contested competitions in history.
Although I am not blaming any one person--and this is not
personal, as I said earlier to you personally--the fact remains
that the Air Force looked at this competition, Congress was
briefed on it, that the competition that we were--but we were
not shown the same--the same thing you asked for is not the
same thing we were shown last Friday. And I think Congressman
Dicks pointed that out.
You asked--or it appears you were wanting to get a KC-135,
when you first told us, to replace the KC-135. But the airplane
you selected is a replacement for the KC-10. That is a total
switch in the requirements. And based on your selection, it
appears that the Air Force was interested in a cargo aircraft
that could tank and not a tanker with a cargo capability.
It appears that the Air Force was willing to ignore serious
risks: the Northrop Grumman-EADS proposal regarding supply
chain mitigation, construction of new facilities, training a
new workforce, let alone the fact that Northrop Grumman has
absolutely no experience in air refueling marketplace.
It appears that the Air Force was willing to ignore EADS'
past performance history when it came to the A400, which was
late in delivery; the A380, which was late in delivery; and the
A330, which was late in delivery. All had scheduled delays, and
yet that that is not appearing anywhere in the analysis that I
have seen.
It appears that the Air Force was willing to ignore the
mission capability by picking an aircraft that can operate in
fewer places rather than more. It appears that the Air Force
was willing to choose an aircraft that, because of its size,
will require significant military construction investment
during a time of a shrinking military construction budget.
Those are just a few of the discrepancies in what Congress
was originally led to believe. There are many inconsistencies
in the public statements of the Air Force, and the results of
this competition are simply astounding.
One additional point. The Air Force did not take into
consideration or account for economic security when evaluating
the KC-X proposal. I understand that economic security does not
fit into any bid criteria or your KPPs, but the need for a
domestic industrial base sure should. Congress has made clear
over the years its intent that taxpayer dollars should be spent
for American work whenever possible. During a time of economic
uncertainty, it is baffling why the Department should decide to
send, at a minimum, 19,000 jobs overseas to the nations of
France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. And they are
more likely to gain more jobs than any single State here in
America. This proposal benefits European aerospace workers at
the expense of American workers and economic security.
I have started a survey on my Web site, www.house.gov/
Tiahrt. That survey says, if allowed to stand, this contract
awarded to a foreign company will: hurt American workers by the
loss of U.S. jobs; outsource an essential military asset to
Europe; force the United States to depend on Europe for its
national defense; result in an inferior tanker for the United
States Air Force; and result in the U.S. being more vulnerable
at a time when we need to be less vulnerable.
We cannot allow this to come true. We must have an American
tanker built by an American company with American workers.
Congress must act to save the Air Force from itself, Mr.
Chairman.
I appreciate that Secretary Payton and General Hudson have
agreed to join us today, and I look forward to the informative
hearing.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Cramer.

Remarks of Mr. Cramer

Mr. Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
This is an important opportunity for us, as members of the
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, to scrutinize the Air
Force's process, this country's process, that would allow a
competition like this to occur and then an outcome like this to
occur.
If I understand what the Air Force evaluated, you had five
categories. And I would like to hear you get into those
categories: capability--we need some details about that
capability, how that stacked up proposal to proposal; then
proposal risk--what issues did you evaluate there; past
performance--a very important category, especially considering
the track records of these teams that were involved here;
price--what place did price have in this and the evaluation;
and then the Integrated Fleet Air Refueling Assessment. And if
I am wrong about those categories, I want to be corrected.
I would like to know how this process worked. It was a
competition that was started. Was it amended? Was it postponed?
What kind of reaction did you get from the teams that were
involved in this? Did they have a chance to amend? Did they
have a chance to, with the flexibility of this process, respond
to maybe changing requirements that the Air Force had? Because,
finally, we have to come out of this with some degree of
confidence that this process worked and that American workers
had an opportunity, the kind of opportunity that they should
have, to have been involved in this.
Ms. Payton, I would like for you to outline the Federal
requirements on military contracts. Give us some history to
judge this competition by, especially regarding the percentages
of American jobs or the share which is required for large-scale
procurements. Because what we have here today is an issue that
reflects on the procurement process of this country.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Payton, now we will hear your presentation.
And normally we put the whole presentation in the record, but I
think it is so important that you go through the details of
what the members suggested, so that we can all get a feel for
exactly what you have gone through.

Opening Statement of Sue Payton

Ms. Payton. Thank you very much. And, Mr. Chairman and
members of this committee, I am honored to be here today. I am
very interested in answering as many questions as possible that
I can, within the law and within the phases of the procurement
as it is today.
I am really, really honored to be joined by Lieutenant
General Jack Hudson, who is our Air Force PEO, program
executive officer, for aircraft systems, and by Mr. Terry
Kasten, who is our current program manager for the KC-45A.
As you are aware, last Friday, the Air Force awarded the
KC-X contract to Northrop Grumman. And this is a team who met
and exceeded the requirements of the request for proposals and
who provided the best overall value to the warfighter and to
every American taxpayer based on the competition and the
evaluation factors.
At this time in the process and in this public forum, we
cannot disclose proprietary information or source selection-
sensitive data from either vendor. The Air Force must protect
both offerors' information unless we are given specific
permission to release it. Of course, now, they are able to
release their own data, but we cannot validate public comments
or media information without violating proprietary boundaries.
We cannot confirm or deny what is in the press.
Furthermore, after the debrief of the unsuccessful offeror,
they have the right to file a protest. And we cannot jeopardize
the Government's probability of winning a protest with any
comments that are made for the record today.
I would like to reiterate that the Air Force followed a
carefully structured source selection process, which was
designed to provide transparency, maintain integrity and ensure
a fair competition throughout the entire source selection
process. The evaluation team was comprised of experts covering
a broad spectrum of specialties, from acquisition to
operations, hand-picked from across the Air Force and other
Government agencies. We had an unprecedented amount of time
spent to gain a thorough understanding of each proposal.
Additionally, the Air Force and the offerors had hundreds
of formal exchanges regarding the proposals throughout the
evaluation process. The Air Force provided all offerors with
continuous feedback through discussions on the strengths and
weaknesses of their proposals.
Competition for major weapons systems are very complex.
This entire process was very lengthy, but there were numerous
exchanges that fostered a mutual understanding and clarity. As
a result of this fair and open competition, the Air Force will
deliver a tremendous capability to the warfighter at a great
value to the taxpayer.
We are ready now to move forward on something that is very
late to need, on a program that is smart, has steady
reinvestment to ensure future viability of something that is
extremely unique and vital to our U.S. security.
I would also like to point out that the Air Force's
acquisition strategy was approved by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and is in compliance with the Competition
in Contracting Act, the Buy America Act, and the Federal
acquisition regulations that are derived from those acts.
As part of the acquisition strategy, the contract we
awarded is the first of a three-part set of tranches to
recapitalize our entire KC-135 fleet. In a few more years, we
will take a look at the tanker requirements and evaluate
whether the KC-45 aircraft is still the best solution or
whether we need further competition.
KC-45A is our highest procurement priority. It is critical
to the entire joint coalition military team's ability to
project combat power all around the world. It gives America and
our allies unparalleled rapid response to combat and
humanitarian relief operations. KC-45A tankers will provide
increased aircraft availability, more adaptable technology,
more flexible employment operations, and a greater overall
capability than the current inventory of KC-135Es and KC-135Rs.
The KC-45A will be able to refuel receptacle and probe-
equipped aircraft on every mission and, itself, be in-flight
refuelable. Also, the KC-45A will have an additional role,
secondary, of carrying cargo, aeromedical evacuation and
passengers, and will be equipped with defensive systems to
enhance its utility to the warfighter.
As you know, the current fleet of Eisenhower-era KC-135s
averages over 47 years old. The KC-45A program is based on a
planned purchase of 179 aircraft and is the first of up to
three recapitalization programs to replace that entire fleet,
as I mentioned earlier.
The Air Force has budgeted approximately $3 billion per
year for an annual production rate of 12 to 18 aircraft. But
even with this level of investment, it will take several
decades to replace the 500-plus KC-135s. It is absolutely
critical for the Air Force to move forward now on this program.
On behalf of the entire Air Force community, I would like
to express my appreciation to both the teams for their
tremendous efforts. I thank you for the opportunity to be here
today to clarify as much as I can. And I look forward to
General Hudson, Mr. Kasten and I answering any questions that
we can within the constraints of where we are in the source
selection process.
Thank you.
[The joint statement of Secretary Payton and General Hudson
follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask you a
question, if I could. It just seems to me that they are not
going to be able to answer any of our questions that we have
presented. And I would just like to know when in the
procurement process can they address the issues that we have
raised here this morning?
Mr. Murtha. Let's see what they can answer.
This is as political as anything that we do. You say you
budgeted, but we are the ones that appropriate the money.
Ms. Payton. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Murtha. When I look at the Dubai crisis that we had--
and the public was up in arms--this committee, the full
committee, voted 60 to 2 to stop that provision. So this has to
be completely aired so that the public understands.
Were any presidential candidates briefed about this before
the information was released to the public?
Ms. Payton. Absolutely not.

Remarks of Mr. Lewis

Mr. Lewis. Mr. Chairman? I really hate to--I am going to
have to run. We have 22 hearings today. But in the meantime, if
I could just----
Mr. Murtha. Sure.
Mr. Lewis [continuing]. Make a comment?
To you, General Hudson, let me just say that this
subcommittee has lots of reasons to seriously question what we
do within the building over there relative to procurement
processes.
When I was first a brand-new Chairman of this Committee,
with both sides of the aisle present, closed the door for 2
hours and made a decision to pull procurement recommendations
regarding the F-22. You would have thought we blew the top off
the Pentagon when we did that. And we did that because we were
convinced that a lot needed to be done in terms of evaluating
the capability of that aircraft before going forward, like
software in the wings, et cetera. I think if we had not done
that, that program would have fallen off the cliff.
Now, General, I would make this point. I do not believe
that the F-22 program was ever scheduled in a fashion to have
manufacturing take place outside the United States.
Now, let me further make another comment, General and Madam
Secretary. It is very important for you to know that Northrop
Grumman has a very sizable presence in my district. But I am
not here today and I am not going to be asking questions
because of employment, period. I am looking at capability. I do
know that, about 2\1/2\ years ago, we were that close to giving
the contract to Boeing, and other things developed that caused
us to reconsider the direction that we were about.
I want to make certain that we continue with manufacturing
capability in the United States. I want to make certain that
any technical developments within this program that are vital
to the future interests of the United States are not going to
be transferred to the likes of a country that I do not have all
the confidence I would like to have in, namely France.
There are elements like that that are very important.
Short-term products that will deliver the requirements we need,
very, very critical. But there is a long-term interest of the
United States security involved here as well.
And those are the questions I want to ask you all behind
closed doors. This is not the place.
Ms. Payton. Thank you.
Mr. Lewis. But there was a need for this forum, without any
question. And so, with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Mr. Murtha. Yes, the political implications are so severe
in this case. For instance, we could not even get NATO to give
us an additional 3,000 troops in Afghanistan. In Iraq, they
have pulled back most of the forces from Europe. They had
47,000 there, at one time; now we have 10,000.
So the political implications are very severe here. So this
committee, in particular, has to take into consideration not
only the technical details, the capability, but also the
possible technical transfer of information. So we would hope,
as this hearing goes along, you will be able to answer those
questions, satisfy the committee, and this committee then will
make a decision whether we are going to go forward.
Obviously, it is going to make a difference if both
Democrat presidential candidates are saying--I think they said
they were against this proposal. This proposal is going to be
funded over a long period of time. It is going to be a lot of
money. So it is something that we have to take into
consideration, because we are going to be here and this
subcommittee is going to be here, whoever is the Chairman of
it, and we will have to consider what the White House wants to
do about it.
Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have a good attendance
today. And I am wondering if Mr. Loren Thompson is in the
audience?
Mr. Dicks. No.

PRESS REPORTS

Mr. Young. Because some of my questioning goes to the issue
of why Loren Thompson was given information that this
subcommittee is not going to receive today from the official
witnesses.
Mr. Thompson said that--this is what I mentioned earlier,
in my earlier statement--Mr. Thompson said that his information
was based on information from the Air Force and company
officials. If that is the case, if Thompson is entitled to have
information from the Air Force, certainly this subcommittee
should be entitled to have that information.
But one of the things that Thompson reports on, based on
his information from the Air Force, said that the awardee and
its subcontractors were more highly rated. And I just wonder
about that. Most of the subcontractors, I understand, are going
to be involved from our friends in Europe. I just tend to
believe that American subcontractors--actually, what I am
saying is I am a little offended by the fact that the Air Force
seems to rate subcontractors outside of the country higher than
they do contractors, subcontractors within the country.
Do you have any comment on that?
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir. And I appreciate the question.
The Air Force, to my knowledge, no one on this source
selection team provided any information to Loren Thompson. In
e-mail traffic that I have seen recently, it did say that he
did get information from Government individuals and that he got
information from both of the offerors.
I cannot comment on the facts of Loren Thompson's article.
I am more than willing to go behind closed doors and discuss
these things. But as I said earlier, I cannot disclose things
that are competition-sensitive, source selection-sensitive or
proprietary in an open forum. And I cannot discuss this until I
have debriefed both the successful offeror and the unsuccessful
offeror.
Mr. Young. Secretary Payton, I understand that, and I agree
with that. And I think we have to--it is sensitive here. We
have to be very careful that we are not trying to, as a
subcommittee, that we are not trying to affect the outcome of
any contract. That is not our role in life.
But it is important that we know that the funding that we
would appropriate is going to be handled properly.
Ms. Payton. Yes.

JOB CREATION

Mr. Young. That it was because of a decision based on
quality, on truth.
And some of my colleagues here have raised some serious
questions. And I think that, Mr. Chairman, it may be that we
would have to have a closed-door session on this subject.
Because I think my colleagues have a right to have their
questions answered, because they have very specific parochial
interests on both sides of this issue.
The issue of jobs, this is an important issue to the United
States and to Members of Congress. Can you estimate how many
jobs would be created if the contract, as recommended today,
how many jobs would be created outside of the United States for
this first 179 aircraft?
Ms. Payton. Job creation, location of assembly and
manufacturing were not part of this evaluation criteria,
according to the law. The law gives a special exemption, under
the Buy America Act, to a dozen countries, and they say that we
should treat those countries as the U.S. The Buy America Act is
very clear on that. The countries that have companies that will
be engaged in the new KC-45A are all on that exempted list. So
the laws of the Federal acquisition regulation, the provisions
of the Buy America Act are all being followed here.
Mr. Young. Okay. And I will accept that. And I understand
it is important to follow the law. But do you know the answer
to that? Do you personally know the answer to that?
Ms. Payton. You know, I do not, because it was not part of
the evaluation criteria. And as a person who has to follow the
law, I made sure, as the Air Force made sure, that we stayed
within what the request for proposal asked for, that we made
sure that all the requirements were evaluated in the way that
we had discussed with the offerors.
We had dozens of discussions with the offerors, so there is
no mystery here about--and no new information about where each
offeror stood in relation to the RFP.
Mr. Young. Okay. And I understand your position and your
responsibilities. And I am just, sort of, testing to see if we
can break through that a little bit.
Ms. Payton. Well, let me put it this way. I wish I could
award to somebody I like. I wish I could award to somebody who
offers things that I personally like. But according to the
law--and, you know, I promised the House and the Senate when I
went through confirmation that I would uphold the laws as
written of this country--those things cannot enter into the
decisions made in acquisition. And that is where I am finding
myself, sir.

KC-135 FLEET

Mr. Young. Okay. Well, I understand that. And, frankly, I
appreciate that, and I think it is important that people in
positions of responsibility like yours do follow the letter of
the law.
Okay, but let me ask you something I think you can answer.
How much time--or maybe General Hudson would have a good answer
on this--how much time is left in the KC-135 fleet?
I know there are several different blocks of aircraft. We
are very, very interested in this issue in my part of Florida
because of MacDill Air Force Base, and we have some of the
older KC-135s.
How much life is left in the KC-135s? And will the new KC-
45A program, will it intersect the line somewhere where before
the KC-135s all quit flying?
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir. I would like to have Terry Kasten
answer that question, because he is very in tune with all of
that.
I will say, first of all, that our KC-135s are very old. We
have incredible maintenance crews, who, honestly, they will
keep them flying as long as we need them, because that is how
great they are. But our warfighter deserves better.
And so I would like Terry to give more detail to exactly
what the real conundrum is that we are facing here.
Mr. Kasten. Thank you, ma'am.
Yes, sir. Our projections are at a recapitalization rate of
15 aircraft per year, which is kind of the target for the
source selection, that the 135 fleet is going to be out there
in diminishing numbers for the next 20 to 30 years, out to the
mid-2030s and mid-2040s. That would make that aircraft, as the
last one leaves the fleet, over 80 years old.
Again, that is driven by how quickly we can bring the KC-45
into the inventory. But if you are talking about replacing 400
to 500 aircraft at 15 aircraft per year with the KC-45, you can
just do the numbers.
Now, we are going to maintain the 135 and keep it viable as
best as we can, but when you get airframes operating that are
that old, you get into the realm of unknowns there. And we are
just hoping to avoid any catastrophic issues there that would
force us to ground that aircraft for long periods of time.
Mr. Young. Well, we need to get these new tankers. And it
is too bad, as I said in my opening statement, it is too bad
that we have lost so much time because of the fiasco
surrounding the proposed lease program some years ago.
Mr. Chairman, a lot of our members have a lot of
interesting questions. And I thank you for the time.

INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. Murtha. Did the Air Force consider the impact in
industrial capacity? The reason I ask that question is we
produced 86,000 airplanes in 1943. We are going to buy about
400--and a lot of those are UAVs--this year. Did you consider
industrial capacity when you make your consideration on these
contracts?
Ms. Payton. No, sir. Industrial capacity was not part of
the evaluation criteria. It is not part of the Federal
acquisition regulation. And so industrial capacity was not
considered.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Dicks.

LAUNCH AID

Mr. Dicks. Was the fact that the A330 received launch aid,
which is a violation of the WTO regulations, and that the U.S.
Trade Representative was bringing a case against Airbus and
EADS for this violation, was that taken into account?
Ms. Payton. Subsidies are not taken into account within the
evaluation criteria. However, because of the WTO environment,
each contractor offered, and they are contractually bound, that
if there are penalties assessed on them should they lose the
suit in WTO that they would not convey any of those losses onto
the Air Force.
So relative to the cost of the aircraft, depending on who
would win or lose, because there is a suit and there is a
countersuit, the Air Force will not be culpable to pay any of
those.
Mr. Dicks. Don't you think it is unfair, though? I mean,
going back to just the fairness of this. You have done your
work now, and it is the Congress's time to make a decision of
whether what you did is in the best interest of our country.
Ms. Payton. Absolutely.
Mr. Dicks. What worries me is that if we do not take
subsidy into account, then it allows the foreign competitor to
have a lower development cost or bid lower on the price because
they know they have already received a subsidy. And they also
have been bailed out repeatedly by the European countries. When
they have gotten into trouble, there have been cash infusions
into Airbus. Boeing does not get any help like that. Boeing has
to do it the old-fashioned way; it has to go to the banks. This
is, I think, a basic unfairness.
Now, is it not true that the Air Force changed the RFP at
the final release to include additional evaluation criteria for
airlift that was advantageous to Airbus?
And I have the letters, I have the deal, so I would urge
you not to say no, because you did do it. Okay?

KC-X REQUIREMENTS

Ms. Payton. Well, I would respectfully submit that the
requirements for the KC-X were approved by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, I believe in early January----
General Hudson. About right.
Ms. Payton. Not one requirement has changed since the JROC
approved them.
Mr. Dicks. I said additional evaluation criteria for
airlift.
Ms. Payton. No, sir, there has not been any additional
criteria added for airlift. As a matter of fact, we have----
Mr. Dicks. There was no real--on the airlift, there was no
real requirement in the document for airlift. Isn't that
correct? You know, they did not say, you have to have this much
airlift in order to be able to compete. Isn't that correct?
Ms. Payton. There were nine key performance parameters--go
ahead.
Mr. Dicks. Let him answer. That is a good idea.
General Hudson. Yes, sir. I will talk to the requirement
for airlift capability.
There are nine key performance parameters. These key
performance parameters are minimum attributes or
characteristics considered most essential for effective
military capability. So they are the basic nine. They are
developed by the warfighting command, in this case the Air
Mobility Command. They go up through the Air Force Requirement
Oversight Council; they go up through the Joint Requirement
Oversight Council. And, at that point, they are fully vetted.
These requirements then are part of the request for
proposal. It is called a systems requirements document. We just
take what those requirements are that are vetted by DOD, and
they become part of the RFP, and then the contractors respond.
One of the nine key performance parametersis (KPPs) is
called airlift capability. This is the ability to carry
passengers, palletized cargo, and air medical patients in the
airplane. So there is a fundamental capability in terms of this
one KPP; it is number four that was in the RFP.
The contractors responded. We evaluated the proposals from
both competitors. We fed back our evaluation to them, asked
questions along the way. In fact, we fed back the data several
times to the competitors, gave them a chance to clarify their
proposals and improve them as they saw fit. And then that was
finally evaluated for the final decision process.
So that is how that worked. Again, airlift capability was
one of the fundamental nine.

INTEGRATED FLEET AERIAL REFUELING ASSESSMENT

Mr. Dicks. Yes. But the problem I have here is that you
made some changes in this right at the end. And Boeing was told
that the reason the changes were made was because Airbus and
Northrop Grumman and EADS would pull out of the competition if
these changes were not made. This is what they were told.
Let me just talk about some of these so that you get a
flavor of what I am talking about.
``Maximum tankers at base have been calculated using
precise parking space rules multiplied by mission capability
rate. After the model was run, a 13 percent credit reduction in
the number of aircraft required was applied for receptacle-
equipped tankers.''
Then it goes into, ``The maximum takeoff weight and takeoff
fuel calculations for bases with multiple ramps was determined
in accordance with the lowest ramp strength, i.e. Pavement
classification numbers. It is now determined using the highest
ramp strength, which would obviously favor a larger airplane.''
This was done in January of this year. Parking space was
calculated based on wing-tip-to-wing-tip separation of 50 feet.
This separation is decreased to 25 feet for the two employment
scenarios. So that would favor, again, a larger airplane.
Tanker ground turnaround time was set to a fixed number
plus the time required to ground-refuel the tanker, resulting
in longer turnaround time for larger tankers.
So all of these things were done. And we all know--I have
been in this airlift thing for many, many years. We all know a
bigger plane takes up more space on the ramp. And that is why
Boeing went with the KC-767. The requirements were all met by
the KC-767. All these requirements, these five things were all
met, every single one of them.
And you then decided to go with a larger plane. And if
Boeing had known you had wanted a larger plane, they would have
bid the 777. But they were told that you wanted a medium-sized
airplane, and that was in the criteria of the RFP. So that is
why I say this is bait and switch, very unfair, and cost Boeing
the competition. If bigger was better, the Air Force should
have said that up front, and they did not. They said you have
to meet the criteria. If you meet the criteria, you have done
it. You do not get any advantage for more air cargo capability,
for more pallets, for more this, more that. And they were told
what they wanted was a tanker and it was the tanking that is
important.
And Boeing has built tankers. Airbus has never built a
tanker. And they are 2 years or 1\1/2\ years behind in their
deal with Australia. They have never had a boom that has passed
fuel. And you give them a superior rating on the boom drogue
capability. That is just impossible.
I mean, this thing is fatally flawed, in my judgment. Can
you explain all these changes at the last minute in a
competition of this magnitude?
Ms. Payton. Congressman Dicks, if I could indulge on Mr.
Terry Kasten to answer the questions relative--this is relative
to our Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment (IFARA)
rating. And I think Terry has a lot of detail on that, so if I
could do that, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Kasten. Thank you, ma'am.
Sir, we have not changed any of the requirements since the
RFP went out. The things that you talked about were pre-RFP.
The offerors had an opportunity to see that. All the potential
offerors had an opportunity to see that.
Mr. Dicks. And Boeing objected very seriously to your doing
it and were told, if they did not go along, that the Air Force
was worried that Airbus would drop out of the competition.
Mr. Kasten. Sir, I am not aware of that.
Mr. Dicks. That was what was communicated to them, and that
is what they told me.
Mr. Kasten. That was not communicated----

CHANGES IN REQUIREMENTS

Mr. Dicks. And that is why you guys said we have to make
these changes, we have to accommodate them.
I can remember way back, at the start of this whole thing,
when Ken Miller would come in and tell me, ``Hey, Norm, this is
going to be on tanking only. We don't want a great big
airplane. We want a plane that can do the tanking mission.''
And by the way, on this thing, the Boeing proposal met the
curve, the tanking curve by 20 percent exceeded the requirement
there.
But the whole idea was we want a smaller plane because you
can put it on more fields, it is more energy efficient over the
lifetime, we will save $15 billion over the lifetime, there
will be $5 billion less in repair work.
You know, smaller is better, in some cases. And, you know,
it does not take up and jam up the fields like a C-5 would
compared to a C-17.
So if you wanted a big plane, why didn't you say so right
up front? Why didn't you say so right up front, that you wanted
a larger aircraft, instead of saying you want a medium-sized
aircraft and then going to a--I call it bait and switch. The
Air Force said one thing and then did the other thing.
And General Lichte is up there praising the ``more, more,
more is better, better, better.'' I mean, somebody should have
showed him the memo from the Secretary that said we want a
tanker that does the job, we don't want a great big airplane
that is going to be expensive to operate. And the emissions are
going to violate all kinds of environmental rules, at some
point, when we have greenhouse effects and all that.
Mr. Murtha. I think the member has gotten his point across.
Mr. Dicks. I do. But I would just like one chance to
answer, and then I will shut up for a moment.
Ms. Payton. If I could respond to General Lichte's
comments, his comments were in relation to the KC-135, not in
relation to any other proposed aircraft. He was not read in to
the source selection.
Mr. Dicks. Why did you have him standing up there?
Ms. Payton. Because he is the customer for Air Mobility
Command. He is the customer that--we are meeting the
requirements of Air Mobility Command.
Mr. Dicks. Shouldn't you have gone to him first, then, and
asked him if they wanted a bigger plane? Shouldn't you have
done that first, instead of waiting till the end to decide
that?
Ms. Payton. We had representatives from Air Mobility
Command on the source selection team. We followed all of the
laws to specifics. It has been fair and open. We have
communicated constantly with both of the offerors. There have
been no change in requirements. And everything we have done is
in the effort of competition, which is what this is about. It
is about fair and open competition.
Mr. Murtha. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Murtha. Yeah.
Mr. Young. I am not sure that we are getting an answer to
what Mr. Dicks is suggesting about the changes during the
process.
Could you give us a direct answer? Were those changes
actually made, or is Mr. Dicks inaccurate? Give us a direct
answer on that.
Ms. Payton. There were no changes made to the requirements
or the evaluation criteria of this RFP after it was approved by
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. There have been no
requirements changes.
Mr. Dicks. Were the changes that I suggested made in the
document that was sent out to both the parties? I have got the
letter right here that says these changes were made. And it was
an advantage to Airbus to have them made.
Maybe they are not requirements, but they may be called
something else. You are the guy now. Were these changes made or
not? Remember now, when you are up here before Congress, even
if you are not under oath, you are expected to answer
truthfully.
Mr. Kasten. Sir, I always answer truthfully.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Kasten. As I started to say, no requirements changes
since the RFP went out, from my recollection.
Mr. Dicks. What about the changes I mentioned, the ones I
read to you? Were these things changed?
Mr. Kasten. Those were, as part of the RFP development
process. And we discussed those with the offerors and notified
the offerors of the----
Mr. Dicks. That you were going to make these changes?
Mr. Kasten. They saw these specific aspects of the draft
RFP as we sent those out.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, I have a letter for the record
that----
Mr. Murtha. Wait just a minute. Now, as I understand it,
what he is saying is changes were made in order to accommodate
Airbus after the RFP. You are saying they were not. That is
very clear to me. It was clear to me before. There have been no
changes made----
Ms. Payton. That is correct.
Mr. Murtha [continuing]. In the RFP in requirements, in any
kind of whatever you call them after the RFP. Is that accurate?
Ms. Payton. Correct.
Mr. Kasten. Not that I recall; that is correct.
Ms. Payton. On January 30th, the RFP was released. We
released various levels of draft RFP well before that to
coordinate with both offerors so that they fully understood.
Mr. Murtha. It is fully possible that, before the RFP was
finalized, that you may have made changes in order to
accommodate competition.
Ms. Payton. I would like to take the question for the
record, so that I can come back with the details of what
happened back more than a year ago.
But anything that we looked at relative to this RFP had to
do with Air Mobility Command and the customer.
Mr. Murtha. That is not what I am asking. I am asking that
any of the requirements that were changed could have been made
to accommodate Airbus, but if they were, they were made before
the RFP was finalized. Is that accurate?
Mr. Kasten. That is my recollection, ma'am.
Ms. Payton. I am not willing to say that changes were made
to accommodate Airbus. I am not willing to say that, under any
circumstances. The requirements of the RFP were what the flying
customer, Air Mobility Command, put in their capability
development document (CDD).
Mr. Murtha. Madam Secretary, there was tremendous pressure
from an individual in the Senate to get competition. We know
what happened. We know this is costing billions of dollars. We
are in a terrible position. You are putting us in a position--
when I say ``you,'' the country is in a position where, because
of the individual in the other body stopping what we--the Air
Force and this committee agreed to do, it is costing billions
of dollars. And we are at a point where we do not know how long
it is going to take to get these things out in the air.
And so, how many of these have been grounded so far? How
many are grounded right now, how many of these tankers?
Ms. Payton. I will have to take that question for the
record.
Mr. Murtha. Do you see the dilemma we have been put in?
Ms. Payton. Absolutely. This is why we have a sense of
urgency. But I will tell you----
Mr. Murtha. We have a sense of urgency. We want to make
sure the right decision is made here. That is our problem.
Ms. Payton. And I will tell you that there are three things
that I have encouraged the Air Force team to always consider:
The motive must be pure, the cause must be just, and the
process must be sound. And we must have no fear and no favor.
Mr. Murtha. No, I understand that. But you----
Ms. Payton. This is done in accordance with the law.
Mr. Murtha [continuing]. The pressure put on for
competition in this particular endeavor.
Mr. Hobson.
Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Payton, you know I have great respect for both you and
the General and your staffs. You have to operate within certain
constraints.
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir.

INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. Hobson. But I have a lot of problems with your
decision. We have another job, too, that apparently is not in
your purview, and that is the industrial base.
I have been told by the previous Secretary of Defense he
did not care about industrial base; he was going to buy what he
thought was the best thing wherever he could buy it. We have a
different duty sometimes than that, if there is an equally good
proposition.
And I would tell you that the countries that are on that
list think the same way when it comes it their country. And I
will be introducing something that was introduced in one of the
parliaments of Europe some time ago when a company in my State,
who actually wins somewhat in this deal, was trying to sell
something to a country in Europe. And one of their
parliamentarians stood up on the floor and said in their
parliament, ``I don't care if it is a better price or a better
deal; it affects our industrial base. And we are going to buy
our engines from our country, and not the engines from the
United States.'' And they did, because their country valued
their industrial base over what their military said to them--or
their Navy, in this case, I think it was.
Mr. Hobson. We have an obligation to do that. Apparently
from what you say, that is not in your purview; am I correct in
that?
Ms. Payton. Let me say a couple of things. First of all, I
view Northrop Grumman as an American company. I view General
Electric, who has jobs from this in Ohio and North Carolina, as
an American company.
Mr. Hobson. Do you view EADS as an American company?
Ms. Payton. I view the folks in Mobile, Alabama, and
Melbourne, Florida, as Americans. But that did not enter into
my decision here. What entered into my decision is that
according to the law, the House and the Senate have approved a
law called the Buy American Act that says that Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland are to be
viewed as the U.S. views our own industrial base. That is the
law of the United States of America.
I look to the legislative branch to write the laws of this
country, and I am sworn to enforce the laws. When you said we
want a fair and open competition under the laws of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation, the Buy America Act, the Trade Secrets
Act and a million other acts, I complied with those laws. And I
will tell you that we have a very, very capable new KC-45A. And
I will tell you that when Congressman Tiahrt and I go out to
the golf course to tee it up, we either bring our A game, or we
don't bring our A game. Northrop Grumman brought their A game
based on the law that I must abide by.
Mr. Hobson. Well, when they brought it, they brought an
airplane that has not flown in its capability. You have one
competitor who has flown an airplane as a tanker who has a
system that it has used to refuel. I have flown in them. They
are old, but I have flown in them. They are building a new one.
The other airplane, has it been delivered anywhere in the world
to a customer today with the capability, without delays? We
already know that this program needs to move forward. Had we
not been messed up before by some inappropriate actions, and
then had we not had inappropriate actions again, we would have
had this well on its way by now, and at much less cost than I
think we are probably going to be at today. You know that
better than I do.
Ms. Payton. There are some false assumptions. I believe
there may be some false assumptions in your statement. I look
very much forward to talking with you in a closed session.
Mr. Hobson. What I am talking about, can you tell me when
we are comparing apples to apples? In the two situations, you
have one experienced company at this, who I happen to think is
an American company, and, as far as I, am concerned, Northrop
Grumman is a front. They are a fine company, but they are a
front for the French and their other partners, and a company
that does have problems or whatever you want to call it. And we
are rewarding that by giving them this thing. This is what I am
saying. You are not saying it. What I don't understand is there
doesn't seem to be credit for the people who have delivered and
who have a proven product versus the people who are giving you
a scenario that is all in the future of what they are going to
do. You have made a judgment on that basis that such actions
don't count, I guess.
Ms. Payton. The Air Force looked at an integrated
assessment of all five of the factors that drove the decision,
and based on the source-selection-sensitive data that was
provided, the Northrop Grumman proposal offers the very best
value to the Air Force and to every American taxpayer, and I
look forward to discussing----
Mr. Hobson. You keep saying the Northrop Grumman proposal.
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hobson. Is that the title in it? I thought the title
was, when I keep reading about--it is the Northrop Grumman-EADS
proposal.
Ms. Payton. The prime contractor is Northrop Grumman. The
prime contractor is Boeing.

PROFITS

Mr. Hobson. How much of the profits from this deal resides
in this country versus these other countries? Let us assume you
can't treat them all the same. What percentage of the profit
resides in this country versus the profit that goes into the
European countries?
Ms. Payton. Sir, there were no laws. It was not part of the
evaluation criteria and----
Mr. Hobson. I didn't ask you what you the law was. I asked
you what percentage of profits. You say you didn't take that
into account?
Ms. Payton. We did not take it into account, sir.
Mr. Hobson. That is what I want to know.
So there are things in here that we may want to take into
account that you all didn't have to take into any account.
Ms. Payton. Absolutely. We could not take it into account
because it was not part of the requirements in the evaluation
criteria that each of the proposals was going to be evaluated
against, and that would have been an immediate protest for us
to throw in any additional things that were not in the
requirements as traced. I will say the DOD Inspector General
came in and made sure that we traced every single requirement
out of the JROC into the system requirements document and into
the RFP without dropping a single requirement. I have to stay
within the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
Mr. Hobson. I know after all the problems on the CSARs and
the other things, that you tried to scrub everything you could
on this one. But we still have some disagreements, and, you
know, I don't care who the contractors are in this deal,
whether it is GE--I didn't get into that. They are in
Cincinnati. I don't represent Cincinnati. I represent Wright-
Patterson.
Anyway, what I am concerned about is we get the best tanker
for the best dollar value, and it be, frankly, an American one.
Basically you say you think you have done that. I disagree, but
that is where we are.
Ms. Payton. We have to go to the law and look at the law.
Mr. Hobson. I understand that, and I have no question of
your integrity.
Ms. Payton. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it.
Mr. Hobson. You are tops. You are tops.
Mr. Murtha. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. First of all, Ms. Payton, when the Chairman last
year asked me to look into the acquisition procurement process,
which we were having a great deal of trouble with throughout
the services, I did a lot of asking around. And it might be
relevant at this point to observe the fact that you have the
very best reputation of every service acquisition officer.
Ms. Payton. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Moran. I didn't know you. I don't know that I ever met
you before. I never thought I would ever have reason to mention
that. But what I was consistently told is that you were the
one. Maybe it is kind of ironic they would mention it was a
woman who would stand up when everybody else was trying to cut
back on the acquisition staff because the authorizing committee
wanted you to cut about 50 percent. You stood your ground. You
kept them, and as a result, you kept the highest-quality
people. It didn't happen in a number of the other services. So
I appreciate your doing that.
Ms. Payton. Thank you, sir.

FOREIGN SUPPLIERS

Mr. Moran. I was also a little disturbed, frankly, at the
implication when--I don't know who this gentleman to your right
is, but when he had to be reminded to tell the truth, we
assumed that you have all told the truth, and I am trying to--
as far as I am concerned, it seems to me that we need to simply
know what the law was and the extent to which that you observed
the law. If politics is going to trump policy, then it ought to
be in such a manner to change the law so that the law is
different next time we have a contract situation like this.
Now, in the interest of full disclosure, I have all of them
based in my district in northern Virginia. Most of them are
just an office, but everybody is there. We don't make anything,
though, so it has nothing to do with jobs. Now, I have known
the Boeing people for what, at least 35 years, Mr. Dicks,
because I used to work on the appropriations staff for Senator
Magnusson, and I know they are very good people, and I like
them personally, as I happen to like Mr. Dicks. And I admire
his commitment to not only his constituents, but to America's
industrial base. But I am a little bothered by the direction in
which we are going.
The Chairman mentioned the Dubai Ports World situation. It
was a 62-2 vote. I happened to be one of those two, so my
comments have to be taken in that context. They are hardly
representative. But the other guy retired. Jim Kolbe.
I don't go down easily.
But, you know, I have also had occasion--I don't want to
get into too much of a digression--but to go with the Chairman
of Homeland Security Subcommittee. It turns out Dubai Ports
World has the very best technology, and as a result of that
politically oriented decision, we made ourselves somewhat more
vulnerable at the ports, and the Secretary of Homeland Security
will acknowledge that. It also had implications that may be
relevant here because when our financial institutions go to
people with money, mainly the Emirates right now, for a bailout
of our financial institutions, they tell them that we have to
attach as much as a 10 percent political risk premium on every
investment in the United States because of the Dubai Ports
World situation. So it is going to continue to cost us billions
of dollars. Now they invest anyways, and they have lost
billions, but they still want to invest in the United States.
So with that context, are both contracts in any way using
foreign suppliers? In other words, we know the EADS role, but
does the other contract involve any kind of foreign supplier or
manufacturing base? Do we know that? I know it wasn't your job
to find out, but I would be curious.
Ms. Payton. Sir, I would be very happy to take that for the
record. I think we owe you more detail as to if so, how much.
[The information follows:]

Foreign Suppliers

This information is source selection sensitive. During the
Government Accountability Office protest period, such
information will be provided verbally in a closed session, when
requested by the Chairman or Ranking Member of the Committee.

Mr. Moran. I am told both that contracts actually had
subcontractors who were going to make things outside the United
States.
Ms. Payton. The vendor supply chain for both aircraft does
include piece parts components from people all over the world.
Mr. Moran. From foreign manufacturers, exactly. And I am
also concerned, I doubt you are going to be able to tell us,
but the potential retaliation if we were to deny this contract,
what might happen to some of the sales overseas. You can't
answer that, but I think it is worth putting on the record,
since we are laying out the political context here, Boeing has
a great deal of foreign operation in other countries, France
included. But if we are going to get into this, we ought to
know what the long-term ramifications are going to be, because
the long-term ramifications of the Dubai Ports World situation
are lasting and very serious and expensive to the United
States.

SPLIT BUY

Now, let me ask you another question that, because I have
been sort of watching this as afar since I didn't really have a
dog in the hunt, but late in 2007, there was a split-buy
replacement strategy that was discussed so that we would
replace the refueling tanker fleet with a split-buy proposal.
The Air Force and DOD would simultaneously develop, test and
procure two tanker aircraft, and the people that wanted this
thought they would reduce costs through enhanced competition
and expand operational flexibility.
Was that considered? What was the determination to not do
that, to go with the one?
Ms. Payton. At the time that we were looking at a dual
procurement, I asked Mr. Kasten to go look at how that would
play itself out relative to having two aircraft in the mix,
having two production lines, having two supply chains, having
different configuration management. Out in the field when you
repair two different aircraft, what does that mean for
maintenance, training; what does it mean for sparing; what does
it mean for training pilots? So I want to turn this over to him
because we found that it was not affordable relative to the
level of funding that we, the Air Force, had to----
Mr. Moran. So it was primarily a cost consideration to go
on dual tracks?
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir.
Terry, is there any more?
Mr. Kasten. No. You answered it pretty well right there. It
is a cost consideration. We looked at all the plans Mrs. Payton
indicated and provided that to her prior to--we looked at all
that, provided that information to Ms. Payton prior to
finalizing the acquisition strategy and elevating that to OSD
for the final decision on what the acquisition strategy was----
Mr. Moran. I am not going to take as much time as my
colleagues largely because I don't have the political
motivation in this, but I just want to reiterate something. As
far as I can see, and I am happy to see any more information
provided, that you have obeyed the law that you were given as
well as regulation. If you didn't, and if you had made any
decision on a political subjective nature, it seems to me any
criticism would be more than warranted.
My other concern is that even though our job seems to be
politics, it is supposed to be legislation, and when we let
politics trump policy, then we get into very dangerous ground.
And lastly----
Mr. Dicks. Would the gentleman yield since he has mentioned
my name several times?
Mr. Moran. I mentioned it once, one critical and one
positive. I will yield to you in a moment, Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Moran. Again, if we don't like the way the law is
written, particularly considering all of our allies as though
that is apparently part of the expanded industrial base, then
we ought to consider changing that law, but I would hope that
we would not criticize you for carrying out the existing law.
Now, Mr. Dicks.

Remarks of Mr. Dicks

Mr. Dicks. I just would say to the gentleman who I have a
great deal of respect for----
Mr. Moran. And you know it is mutual.
Mr. Dicks [continuing]. We have worked with him many years.
I would just say to him, both Mr. Tiahrt and I have approached
this in a very substantive way. We are asking substantive
questions that we think need to be answered so that the
American people know how this position was made. I have taken a
great deal of my own time to try and study this, and I find
that are there some very serious conflicts here in what
happened and what was supposed to happen, I mean, in terms of
the way this was--we are not treating this frivolously.
Mr. Murtha. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Moran. You don't remind witnesses that they have to
tell the truth. You assume that they do unless they give reason
not to.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Tiahrt.

CHANGE IN REQUIREMENTS

Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to ask important questions.
To go back to this change in requirements, Mr. Chairman,
perhaps we should request in writing when they can provide it,
a schedule of the draft RFP and the RFP's release, and any
changes to those documents or revisions; also include the
specifications and the statement of work so that we can tell if
there are any changes during the process, just a schedule of
any changes, when it was initially released and the final
release. I think that is important.
Mr. Murtha. I think it is important to see that.
Ms. Payton. We look forward to doing that.

Remarks of Mr. Tiahrt

Mr. Tiahrt. Mr. Chairman, I want to mention one more time
that this Loren B. Thompson, the information that he was given
by the Air Force was a leak. I believe that leak was
politically motivated to sway public opinion towards a bad
decision by the Air Force. So before any of the details can get
out, here we have something that is trying to influence this
decision and how wonderful the decision was. It was a slam
dunk.
I think this was a strong political statement about this
decision, and I think we ought to have a chance to talk to Mr.
Thompson at some point in the future. This is very clear that
what Ms. Payton says is that the United States job creation or
impact was not part of the criteria. And as Mr. Moran said, if
there are problems with the criteria, maybe we ought to look at
the criteria, because I'm sure these people in good faith tried
to follow all the regulations they could have.
There is one thing I would respectfully disagree with. I
believe the Buy American Act, the law did not list these
countries that you mentioned, but the memorandum of
understanding that the Department of Defense released included
our NATO allies. So I think that is a decision by the
Department of Defense and not the Congress. But I may stand
corrected on that. I believe that is the way it came down. Now,
what this does----
Mr. Young. We would like to get an answer on that.
Ms. Payton. We would like to take that for the record if we
can so do. I appreciate that we will take it for the record.
Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you. That is a great suggestion.
[The information follows:]

Buy American Act--List of Countries

The following qualifying countries are party to existing
Memoranda of Understanding between the Secretary of Defense and
individual country representatives for increased security and
cooperation: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt,
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Israel, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

Mr. Kingston. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Chairman, we are getting so many taken questions for
the record, and you know what is going to happen is we are
going to get this information back to us in bits and pieces. We
are going to be distracted with other issues. It might be
better for us to have a follow-up hearing if it is possible,
because I just see getting things for the record is not going
to help the group come up with a decision here.
Mr. Tiahrt. Reclaiming my time to make the point that this
puts American manufacturers at a huge disadvantage. Talk to an
American manufacturer like Caterpillar. Caterpillar makes
engines for the MRAP and our heavy trucks. They make them in
South Carolina, and they make them in Belgium. It is cheaper to
make them in Belgium even though the euro is stronger than the
dollar because they have a lot of regulations waived, including
specialty metals. So there is an unfair advantage going into a
bid like this. This was stacked against an American
manufacturer from the very beginning.
I know that this was carefully structured to be an open and
fair competition, but it was not. It was an unlevel playing
field. This is just one example. And I will give you some more.
I want to say one thing. We talked about the requirements,
the initial requirement, what are you replacing? What is the
aircraft that you are trying to replace here? Is it not the KC-
135E?

TYPE OF AIRCRAFT REPLACEMENT

Ms. Payton. Yes, sir, the KC-X will replace all KC-135s,
not just the KC-135E.
Mr. Tiahrt. What you came up with, though, if you look at
the size of the airplanes, you are replacing the KC-10, which
is a larger airplane, not the KC-135, which is a smaller
airplane. So if your requirements were to replace the KC-135,
it is a little curious why you came up with a replacement for
the KC-10. Now, the evaluation criteria, as I understand it,
according to Loren B. Thompson, you looked at Northrop Grumman,
and you looked at Boeing. Did you look at EADS in the
evaluation criteria past performance and risk?
Ms. Payton. I will turn that question to Mr. Kasten, but,
yes, we did.
Mr. Kasten. Yes, we did. We looked at all the offerors
identified, the major contracts that they had, and principal
subs and then subs below that.
Mr. Tiahrt. Did you choose the programs that were using the
criteria, or did you always choose from a list that was
presented by those companies?
Mr. Kasten. No, sir, we did both.
Mr. Tiahrt. So you chose some of these as per evaluation,
and you asked for some for evaluation?
Mr. Kasten. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tiahrt. Did you look at the light utility helicopter in
its performance?
Mr. Kasten. Sir, I can't go into the details of what we
looked at.

LIGHT UTILITY HELICOPTER

Mr. Tiahrt. If you had looked at the light utility
helicopter, you would have found out that they made a proposal,
and it was accepted by the Army on a bid that was based on
American jobs, and once that contract was awarded, they pulled
those jobs back to Germany. So it had a worse impact on
American jobs for a domestic use helicopter than what we first
thought.
Now, that is how this is going to work. I believe that is
how this is going to work anyway. And if you look at the House
news service, the first five new KC-45s are going to be built
in Toulouse, France. I think what they are going to say, just
like with the light utility helicopter, you know, we already
have a manufacturing line set up. We are just going to keep
those jobs in France. Right now they are planning on having
1,800 jobs in America and the rest in France or the United
Kingdom or Italy overseas the rest of them.
So you have a criterion here that I think needs to be part
of your evaluation process. I hope it was. I hope you also
looked at the A-400, which is late in its delivery. I hope you
considered the A-380, which is late in its delivery. I hope you
considered the A-330, which was late in its delivery. All of
those increased the risk of this program. And if you want to
know further about risk, which I think you should know, if you
look at the replacement for the Presidential helicopter, they
moved the production line from Italy and England to America.
And when they did that, they couldn't find skilled workers.
They got behind schedule, and the costs now are 67 percent over
what their original bid was.
Do you have provisions in here to pay Northrop Grumman-EADS
when they go over their original contract? What happens? If
they can't meet their original contract, original obligations,
what are you going to do?
Mr. Murtha. They are going to come to Congress and ask for
more money.
Mr. Tiahrt. Exactly right.
Mr. Dicks. Like they always do.
Ms. Payton. We would like to address these questions with
you, because they are source-selection-sensitive, because there
is proprietary information in our answers. We very much would
like to discuss this with you. I would say something about the
KC-135.
Because we were not developing an aircraft from scratch,
the KC-135 became the comparative point so that we would be
able to understand the value of each offeror based on the KC-
135. Our goal was to not end up with another KC-135. It was to
end up with a better capability for aerial refueling. But the
only way we could determine, because the commercial aircraft
are out there, and they are different, was to baseline and
compare each offeror to the KC-135, and that gave us better
information.
Mr. Tiahrt. You came up with an apple-and-oranges
comparison because you have a replacement for the KC-135 with
one company and a replacement for the KC-10 with another one.
So you are saying you got the best value? And how is it that
you can get the best value when you have an airplane that is 43
percent bigger, built in a country where the euro is stronger
than the dollar, and it is still cheaper for all 179 airplanes?
How can that be?
Ms. Payton. I think you have a false assumption in that
last statement that I would like to take behind closed doors to
discuss with you.
Mr. Tiahrt. My question is what was the lowest cost for all
179 airplanes in each phase of that, because I am sure you will
release that as soon as you can because it's going to be in the
contract, correct?
Ms. Payton. We will release that as soon as we can;
however, there are certain things that we need to at this point
not discuss.

SCHEDULING ADDITIONAL HEARINGS

Mr. Murtha. Let me ask you a question. When will you brief
the contractors? When can we have a closed session where you
can talk to the Members freely?
Ms. Payton. We are currently scheduled to brief Boeing on
Friday, and we are trying to schedule the Northrop Grumman
debrief some time next week.
Mr. Murtha. So we will tell the staff when you finished
your briefings because then we will have a closed briefing for
the Members.
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, this is a timely issue because I
look at the schedule we are talking about, Congress will be in
the district work period during the time that this information
will be available to the subcommittee. And I am just wondering
if other events will take place prior to the time we have that
opportunity. Maybe we should accelerate this plan.
Mr. Murtha. We will see what you can work out. Obviously,
we won't be putting our bill together for a month or so, and
that is the decision we have to make based on what we hear from
them, so I think we will have enough time. But let us know as
quickly, as expeditiously as possible, and then we will have a
closed briefing.
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir. Will do.
Mr. Tiahrt. Mr. Chairman, may I continue?
Mr. Murtha. Let's go to some of the other Members here.
Let's go to Mr. Cramer.
Mr. Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Remarks of Mr. Cramer

As I said at the outset, this is an opportunity for us to
look at how this process worked. But I am glad the Chairman
referred to an opportunity down the line for us to have a
closed-door session because apparently a lot of the issues that
a lot of us have to be concerned about are issues that you can
only discuss after the debriefings occur, and those are
scheduled soon, but not soon enough for us to engage in that.
So I hope we can come back to this.
I, of course, have Boeing presence, Northrop Grumman
presence in my district. I don't have an iron in this very
fire. My State of Alabama certainly does. And my Governor has
weighed in on this, and Jo Bonner, our colleague in the
Congress who represents the Mobile area, they certainly have a
stake in this, too. So to some extent, I am their mouthpiece in
this as well.
But I think, as Mr. Moran said, what we want to do is
examine this process and make sure that integrity is preserved
and that fairness is preserved as well. And in the final
analysis, are we picking the best tanker for our men and women
that are out there using the tanker and that will represent
this country in that process?
So when I referred in my opening statement to the criteria
that I understand that you considered, capability, proposal
risk, past performance, price and integrated assessment, I
assume that you evaluated those criteria based on the teams
that were involved and not just the lead contractors, not just
Boeing, not just Northrop Grumman; is that correct?

FACTORS IN PROPOSAL REVIEWS

Ms. Payton. Yes, sir, that is correct. And I would like to
ask General Hudson if there is anything he would like to add to
the way that these offers were assessed relative to our five
factors.
General Hudson. Sir, if I can, I would like to talk a
little bit about the process we used in these factors that you
mentioned earlier. There were five factors that we used in the
evaluation. We developed these. We worked these with the
contractors through the draft RFP process, and then the five
factors were in the RFP. They supplied the proposals to reflect
their submittal for the five factors.
The five factors were mission capability, and there were
subfactors under that: key systems requirements, systems
integration and software product support, program management,
technology maturity and demonstration. That was the first
factor, mission capability.
The second factor was proposal risk. And we looked at risk
with four of those first--of those subfactors. Technology
maturity and demonstrations does not have a risk associated
with it.
And then factor three is past performance.
Factor four is cost price.
Factor five is the Integrated Air Refueling Assessment.
The first three factors, mission capability and proposal
risk and past performance, are all of equal importance. The
second two, cost price and Integrated Air Refueling Assessment,
are of equal importance, but each is of less importance than
the first three.
Mr. Cramer. But is there a winner and loser in each
category?
General Hudson. What we did was we gave for all those five
subcontractors, mission capability, each one of them received a
color code, and each one of those received a risk assessment
except for technology and maturity. That is a pass-fail
evaluation. And then, proposal risk, it is an overall
assessment, and it also had subfactors within it that were
assessed. Cost price, we looked at the most probable life cycle
cost; that is, everything from development through production,
through operating and sustaining the fleet of airplanes for a
25-year lifetime. And then the Integrated Air Refueling
Assessment generates a number, and we used the KC-135R model as
the baseline, so that was given a 1.0, and then each
contractor's proposal, the system was evaluated within a
complex wartime scenario involving two combat scenarios in two
major theaters, plus homeland defense, plus deployment. So a
number was generated that reflected essentially the
effectiveness of each competitor's aircraft within that complex
scenario, again with the R model had a baseline of 1.0.
So, we looked at each one of those factors in the priority
that I described and with the subfactors that were associated
with each, looked at, and each one was assessed a grade. And
then also in cost price we looked at risk associated with the
development work and the production work for the five priced
production lots that each competitor bid to us.

BRIEFING STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Mr. Cramer. At some point in this process, isn't there an
opportunity for the teams to come in and defend their strengths
and weaknesses or for you to cross examine their strengths and
weaknesses?
General Hudson. Yes, sir. Here is the way this worked. We
got the initial proposals from each competitor. We did what we
called an initial evaluation on each, and then we fed all those
results back to the contractors. They got all of the grades
that I described. So they had full and complete feedback on
everything, and we fed that back by means of a face-to-face
briefing with each competitor.
As we worked through the evaluation process, we also went
to each competitor with what we call evaluation notices, and
these were formal questions that went to each. They were able
to respond to each. So we used those responses in the
evaluation as well.

SIZE OF THE TANKER

Mr. Cramer. Because time is limited for me anyway, the
issue of the size of the tanker and whether Boeing understood
what size they were being asked to submit for, how would you
respond to the issues that have been raised about that,
especially considering the process that was involved?
General Hudson. Well, sir, each competitor had to make a
decision about what to submit in their proposal, what kind of
airplane, what were those military modifications that would be
made to the baseline commercial airplane to make it compatible
with the requirements as stated in the RFP. So what was
submitted was a business decision that each made.

ECONOMIC IMPACT

Mr. Cramer. In any of what you have described, do you
evaluate economic impact within the United States or jobs
within the United States?
General Hudson. Well, as Ms. Payton mentioned earlier, sir,
each proposal had to be compliant with the provisions in the
RFP as mandated by the Buy American Act, and both were
compliant. In terms of X number of jobs or Y number of jobs, we
did not consider that, nor did we evaluate it.
Mr. Cramer. Do you even know how many supplier companies
would be involved if a team wins?
General Hudson. Well, we knew, inside the proposal, each
competitor described their supplier chain to us.
Mr. Cramer. By name?
General Hudson. By name. Who would make the avionics or the
other unique things that would go into the airplane. So they
described, and this is called their subcontractor structure.
They described that in their proposal, so we were aware of
that.

TIME PERIOD FOR DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Cramer. And one last question. Within the categories
that you have described, where is it that--you want this tanker
produced within a certain period of time. How do you get the
response? Which of the categories causes them to respond to
that? Is that capability?
General Hudson. Sir, we do not mandate a specific time for
an initial operational capability; in other words, schedule. We
wanted to have a risk-prudent schedule from each contractor, so
we let them determine that, and then they told us that.
Mr. Cramer. And then you evaluate one against the other
based on what they----
General Hudson. Well, sir, we didn't have a specific
criteria that was attached with schedule. So neither got----
Mr. Cramer. Why not?
General Hudson. Well, because the interest was that we get
a risk-prudent schedule from each competitor. And we wanted a
plan, a program that would come in from each contractor to be
one that we would have confidence in, that we would be able to
award, and they would successfully execute to. So therefore the
evaluation did not say, for example, it had to be available by
a certain time.
Mr. Cramer. By a day and year. But then you react to what
they say they are capable of doing and what the schedule will
be that they submit to you?
General Hudson. Yes, sir. And we evaluate that. We looked
at the proposal that was submitted by both, looked at the
program plan that they gave us, and then looked at--for
example, in the case of the program management subfactor, we
looked at the program plan that each laid out, looked at its
risk, and we fed that back to both contractors. So we gave them
a chance several times to iterate that and improve it as they
saw fit.
Mr. Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. We have about 15 minutes, and then we will be
about an hour of voting, so we want to try to limit the other
folks as much as we can.
Mr. Kingston.
Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Madam Secretary, you obviously have a battery or team of
people who make these decisions. Can you describe the hierarchy
of the decisions?
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir. We have what is called a source
selection evaluation team. That is comprised of well over 100
people. And they are composed of skill sets that are very
important. So we have subject matter experts that look at the
proposals as proposed and assess whether the proposal is
substantiated, and is realistic and is reasonable.
And the source selection evaluation team does their job.
They then provide information to a source selection advisory
committee. The source selection advisory committee then
provides their outbrief to the Source Selection Authority
(SSA), and decisions are made.
And I would like Mr. Terry Kasten to even further talk
about this because he has lived a lot of it over the last year.
Mr. Kasten. That is correct. We had a team of well over 100
people from across the Air Force and around the country. Other
government agencies come in and evaluate proposals.
Periodically, throughout the summer and the fall, they
evaluated all the offers relative to the criteria and provided
a feedback to them specifically on what their scores were, what
their ratings, what their color ratings were relative to the
things that General Hudson just described.
Mr. Kingston. It is a series of microdecisions that maybe
make up the tipping point towards the ultimate decision,
correct?
Mr. Kasten. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kingston. And it is not a vote. Is there ever a vote in
the process? Is this mostly a gradual micro-decision-making
process to big decisions?
Mr. Kasten. Yes, sir. At my level that is what we do, and,
in fact, we very much tell the teams going in doing the
evaluation don't even compare the offerors here. Put the
assessments out there. At the very end of the process, just in
the last few weeks to a month or so, that information is
provided for offeror A and offeror B to a source selection
advisory council. Very senior Air Force people that review the
results do the comparison and then make a recommendation to the
source selection authority, who then ultimately makes the final
decisions.
Mr. Kingston. And I understand your issue is not jobs or
the industrial base that are some of the considerations that
Congress has. If Congress, because of these other issues,
decides to reverse this decision, what happens to this process?
What happens to the tanker program?
Mr. Kasten. That would be tough to speculate, sir.
Ms. Payton. I absolutely have to take that question for the
record, because I think that it will impact acquisition
programs in general. I am really not sure how to answer that at
this point. But we have a process that is regulated according
to the law.
[The information follows:]

Impact to Acquisition Process

Subsequent to the posing of this question, the Boeing
Company filed a protest with the Government Accountability
Office on March 11, 2008. The Air Force has suspended
performance on the contract as a result of this protest. We
look forward to working with the Congress and the Government
Accountability Office while seeking to conclude this matter as
expeditiously as possible. It is important to national security
that we commence recapitalizing our aging tanker fleet without
further delays. If we have to conduct a new competition, it
will delay the delivery of tankers to the warfighter by 18 to
24 months.

Mr. Kingston. In that process that is regulated according
to the law, was that developed or passed by a legislative act
and then fine-tuned over time?
Ms. Payton. Yes, sir. To my knowledge, that is----
Mr. Kingston. But it does not take the jobs or the
industrial base consideration in it?
Ms. Payton. No, sir, it does not.
Mr. Kingston. Is that something that we should revisit at
some point?
Ms. Payton. Well, I don't know. I am really not prepared to
answer that at this time either. I think that it is up to our
policy people and our legislators to determine policy for the
United States of America. I am in a position where I just
enforce the law relative to acquisition regulations, and I
can't speculate as to unintended consequences or the upside or
the downside of that action. Thank you for the question.

BUY AMERICA

Mr. Hobson. Chairman, Mr. Tiahrt asked you a question
about--because we don't remember all those countries being in
the Buy America thing. If you were to find out that that was a
waiver by the Defense Department, then it wouldn't necessarily
be passed by this Congress in what you filed; would that be
correct? Or do you have to take that for the record, too?
Ms. Payton. Sir, I really do have to take that for the
record because I am under the defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation. Buy America is part of that. And these exemptions,
I believe, have been in effect since 1970 or 1980. So I
appreciate being able to take that for the record.
[The information follows:]

Buy American Exemptions

The ``The Buy American Act,'' 41 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 10a-d,
enacted on March 3, 1933 during the Depression was designed to
save and create jobs for American workers. The central
consideration of the Act is the place of manufacture as opposed
to the nationality of the contractor. Congress has recognized
that application of the Buy American Act in certain instances
might unduly restrict an agency's ability to meet its needs;
however, the Buy American Act and the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, 19 U.S.C. Sec. 2501 et seq. establish a number of
exceptions to provide procuring agencies with certain
flexibilities. Additionally, the Trade Agreements Act
authorized the President to waive any otherwise applicable
``law, regulation, procedure or practice regarding government
procurement'' that would accord foreign products less favorable
treatment than that given to domestic products (19 U.S.C.
Sec. 2511(a)). That provision of the Trade Agreements Act has
been implemented by the President in Executive Order No. 12260,
46 Fed. Reg. 1653 (1981). Therefore, the Buy American Act
restrictions favoring domestic products have been superseded
for specific products from certain countries. The European
Community has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on
Government Procurement (Agreement) that provides appropriate
reciprocal competitive government procurement opportunities.
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2511-
2518) signed by President William J. Clinton, implemented the
following:
Section 1. The heads of the agencies, as of the date of
this order, shall not apply a price differential between
articles, materials, or supplies of U.S. origin and those
originating in the member states of the European Community.
Section 2. The rule of origin shall apply in determining
whether goods originate in the member states of the European
Community.
Section 3. This order shall apply only to solicitations,
issued by DoD (and other agencies) listed in 19 U.S.C.
Sec. 2511, Annex 1, Parts A and B above the threshold of
$176,000 for goods. According to existing Memoranda of
Understanding between the Secretary of Defense and individual
country representatives, the DoD has determined it is
inconsistent with the public interest to apply the Buy American
Act to the acquisition of end products from the following
qualifying countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Israel,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Based on
federal law and these memoranda, the content of these products
are counted as U.S. content. Much of the foreign content of the
KC-45 comes from Germany, Spain, and France.

Mr. Murtha. Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Remarks of Mr. Rothman

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that there are two tasks for
the Congress, and in particular this committee. The first one
is to evaluate how this decision was made and whether, given
the law that was guiding the decisionmakers, the decisionmakers
made the right judgment under the law. And apparently we are
unable to get all the answers that we have sought, and we are
waiting. We will wait for answers to be forthcoming at either
another hearing or in written form. And I look forward to
receiving those answers so we can do our job and evaluate
whether the decisionmakers made the right decision under the
law that they were given.
But, Mr. Chairman, I believe that there is another
obligation of the Congress, which is to decide, perhaps in
hindsight, but to decide whether--let's assume for argument's
sake that the decisionmakers here made the judgment that they
made according to the law that they had instructing them, but
that we, today, as representatives of the American people,
understand that what was guiding them in the law led them to
the wrong answer, bad policy, a bad judgment. Then I believe it
is the requirement of this Congress and this committee to
overturn that decision and to embrace the right decision.
Now, it may require for future projects that we amend the
law so that our decisionmakers can be guided the first time
with a comprehensive list of criteria, including perhaps,
perhaps not, this is subject for debate in the future, job
creation, location of manufacturing, industrial base, whether
the competitors are receiving subsidies from their governments
or not, the location of where the profits reside and other
elements. But that doesn't mean that we have to accept--if, in
fact, the law was guiding these decisionmakers in the wrong
direction, it doesn't mean we're handcuffed to the wrong
decision that will be against the interests of the United
States and the American taxpayers.
Mr. Murtha. You got that right.
Mr. Rothman. So I would suggest that our work is not done,
Mr. Chairman, and that the work of the decisionmakers here may
have been done in an exemplary manner with the highest of
professionalism and integrity, but because perhaps they were
given the wrong list of criteria or an incomplete list, they
were bound to come up with the wrong answer.
We will find out when we get the responses to our
questions, but in the end, Mr. Chairman, I do believe it is up
to the representatives of the people, the taxpayers, to
ultimately make the right decision whether or not every--the
directions were followed under a bad set of directions and the
wrong outcome came to be.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Bishop.

Remarks of Mr. Bishop

Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank the panel for the information that has been
brought to us this morning. Seems to me that, as I understand
it, the tanker procurement program is the Air Force's number
one priority because of the aging of the 135 fleet. However, we
are now tied in knots, if you will, because based on the policy
decisions that have been made, the Air Force is going forth in
a way that seems to be very disturbing to a number of the
members of this Committee and, of course, to some of our
colleagues outside the committee. And it is disturbing to me
that we are now placed in a position where we can't provide for
the needs of our servicemen and women and the needs of our
national defense in providing this particular equipment because
of the lack of clear guidelines and policy set by our
policymakers in the procurement process.
I don't know how we resolve this other than to have us take
another look. I think that the suggestion that we have a
follow-up hearing might be appropriate when we can get answers
to some of the questions that have been raised.
I certainly am sympathetic to the awardee of the contract.
I happen to be a native of Mobile, Alabama, and, of course,
Alabama named me, but Georgia has now claimed me. I still feel
compelled to try to look at this situation in an objective
fashion, and I would hope that that is what our committee and I
am sure the Chairman will lead us in that direction.

Remarks of Mr. Murtha

Mr. Murtha. I want to say this: None of us dispute the
integrity of this panel. We understand you follow the law.
There may have been some insinuations and so forth; we have no
question you did the best you could do. But we are going to do
the best we can do also in evaluating this thing politically.
When I say ``politically,'' I am talking about industrial base
which with the Navy we consider very carefully. As you well
know, they put the ships, they announce where the ships are
going. So this is part of it. So we have that responsibility
under the Constitution.
So we will have another briefing with you as soon as we
can. As Mr. Young said and Mr. Kingston suggested, we will have
a private briefing so we can get some of the answers.
I think you had pointed out you followed the law to the
best of your ability, and we all appreciate that, even though
some Members may disagree with the outcome.
Mr. Dicks has a clarification.

INTEGRATED FLEET AERIAL REFUELING ASSESSMENT

Mr. Dicks. I wanted to clarify that when I spoke earlier,
the changes were in the Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling
Assessment. That was made in February, I believe, of 2007. That
was different.
The other change, Mr. Chairman, if you just give me a
little time here, this is Reuters, weeks before a final
decision, the U.S. Air Force changed criteria used to assess
rival bids from Boeing Company and Northrop Grumman for new
refueling tankers. Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute
said the last-minute change in the evaluation criteria could be
significant since both proposals met nine key requirements for
the new tanker, including aerorefueling, capability range, and
ability to carry cargo and passengers.
So, again, I want to ask you, was there a change made? I
asked this question, and I was told repeatedly there wasn't.
But here it is right in the Loren Thompson, who is the Air
Force's Bible.
Ms. Payton. Yes. I believe you might be referring to
something that had to do with the model, and this would have
been February 2008.
Mr. Dicks. Yes.
Ms. Payton. Not 2007.
Mr. Dicks. No, this was 2008.
The other one I talked about was changes in airlift
evaluation. That was the runways and the distance between the
wings.
Ms. Payton. And we have taken action to bring you back the
timeline on any changes.
But I would like General Hudson to address the model, the
IFARA, and what that involved.
Mr. Dicks. So we have two changes, one in seven and one in
eight.
Ms. Payton. No. I am not saying we had two changes. We did
not have any changes in requirements, but I would like to
clarify what went on with the model in 2008.
General Hudson. Sir, I will talk about the IFARA model and
the process we used. The IFARA model has been in existence
since the 1980s. It is an air mobility command model, and it is
used for looking at fleet effectiveness given a fleet of
airplanes, in this case of the competitors' proposals.
What we did is we provided both offerors all the
information on the model so they could use this themselves and
then generate their own numbers for IFARA and then submit that
to us. And then we took their information and evaluated it, had
the same kind of feedback process back and forth with them.
Last fall, we were in the process of evaluating the model,
looking at what we call receptacle credit, and that is the
ability.
Mr. Murtha. This is factor five, isn't it?
General Hudson. Yes, it is factor five of----
Mr. Murtha. I think you explained that very well.
Mr. Tiahrt, you had something else?

Remarks of Mr. Tiahrt

Mr. Tiahrt. Yes. First of all, I hope we can make this
transcript available to the public as soon as possible, because
I believe the Air Force has made a big mistake here. They just
don't realize how big a mistake it is yet.
One thing I want to point out in addition is under proposal
risk, according to Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D., who was debriefed
on this program even though we can't be, he said the proposal
risk, the competitors matched in this area, but only after
Boeing agreed to lengthen its development schedule. The
rescheduling added cost to the Boeing proposal.
Now, in another point in this proposal, I understand that
the Air Force believed that they would have more aircraft on
the tarmac by a certain point in time from EADS than they would
from Boeing. So in other words, they think it is okay for EADS
to have an aggressive schedule, but if Boeing has an aggressive
schedule, then we are going to penalize them with a higher
cost. These kind of details need to be brought out.
Ms. Payton. This is very important for a closed hearing,
because there may be some false assumptions.

Concluding Remarks of Mr. Murtha

Mr. Murtha. We are going to have a closed briefing, but we
appreciate the panel, and it has been very helpful, I think, to
the committee to make a final judgment. So I appreciate very
much the time that you have come up here.
Ms. Payton. Thank you all for what you do for our Air
Force. We appreciate it.
Wednesday, March 6, 2008.

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

WITNESS

ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

Introduction

Mr. Murtha. The Committee will come to order. I want to
welcome Admiral Fallon, one of the premiere commanders in the
field, one of the really--people who turned things around, an
individual that has had a phenomenal influence on what is going
on overseas. And we appreciate it. A lot of confidence in
yourself. And I see you have a very light staff. Most of these
guys come in, they got it filled up in the back room and right
behind them. You have got yourself and a couple other people.
We like to see that. We like to see somebody that--are your
people outside or where are they?
Admiral Fallon. No, sir, this is it. We are traveling
light.
Mr. Murtha. Where is the spy from the Defense Department?
Admiral Fallon. We are trying to slash staff.
Mr. Murtha. Where is the spy from the Defense Department?
Who is representing them? Because they always send a spy over.
No spy?
Admiral Fallon. Spy, please stand up and identify yourself.
Mr. Murtha. No spy. All right. Well, we welcome you and we
look forward to your statement. And Mr. Young.

Remarks of Mr. Young

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the
hearing today which involve classified material be held in
executive session because of the classification of the material
to be discussed.
Mr. Murtha. Without objection. You have an opening
statement?
Mr. Young. No, just welcome Admiral Fallon here. I have had
a chance to visit with him the weekend before last and went by
his headquarters, and I picked out a spot for a new building
that he really needs.
Mr. Murtha. Is there anything that you don't have down
there that Bill has not put in there already?
Mr. Young. There is not much room left, I tell you that.
Admiral Fallon. We are anxious to get the rest of that
headquarters.
Mr. Murtha. We welcome your statement, Admiral.
Admiral Fallon. Thanks very much. I have submitted a
written statement.
Mr. Murtha. Without objection it will be part of the
record.

Summary Statement of Admiral Fallon

Admiral Fallon. Thanks. And just a couple words. Chairman
Murtha, Congressman Young, distinguished members of the
Committee, it is a pleasure to be back here with you. And I am
honored to have the opportunity to spend a little bit of time
with you. I would like to, first of all, give credit where it
is really due, and that is to our people, men and women in
uniform who continue to astound me with their good works every
day in Iraq and Afghanistan and throughout the theater, whether
it is the Horn of Africa. As I see the young people and the
responsibility that they are very willing to accept, the way
they discharge their duties, most impressive to me are those
small units, individuals, most of them pretty low ranking that
are out there using their heads. They have got the picture on
where we are trying to go, and they just figure out how to do
it, the smart way and the effective way. We are really honored
to have them working for us.

CENTRAL COMMAND ISSUES

There are lots of challenges and issues in the Central
Command region. I think you know that as well as I do. I look
at the countries here, and every day I say let's see, let me
find a glowing spot of goodness here. And I think I came
closest to that in Oman the other day, where they actually have
a ruler that is progressive and wants good things for his
people, and the country is stable and secure, and they get
along with their neighbors, and they maintain their own
internal security. Of course, it is still a one-man rule. He is
trying to loosen that up. But the other places all have some
degree of instability, insecurity or challenge. And it is just
the facts of life. We have to deal with them, which we will.

IRAQ

I will tell you that I am very encouraged with Iraq since I
was last here about 10 months ago. Real progress, and it has
been enabled by a lot of things. Great work by our people using
their heads, refocusing on what they are doing, doing it much
smarter. And they are getting a lot of help from many things.
And we can talk about all that. I will save that until your
questions.

AFGHANISTAN

There is real progress in Afghanistan. I know there is a
lot of chatter in the air these days about how this is going
bad and that is going bad and bombings are up and things. The
facts are the facts. I look at this from my perspective in a
couple ways. One is when I look at the number of events in
Afghanistan and I compare them to what has been going on in
Iraq, there is absolutely no comparison. The scales just are
not even appropriate to look at. That said, there are some
challenges.
In Afghanistan, the leader, President Karzai, actually
enjoys support from the majority of his people. And that is a
really good start. Governance is a major issue. They do it
their way. It is very different than ours. And it is a
struggle, frankly, to import our kind of democracy into their
way of thinking. I do not think we are going to change this any
time soon, nor probably should we. But for the most part they
not only enjoy the support of the people, they are actively
working to try to give people something that they can be happy
with.
Again, it is a huge difference from Iraq. In this country
70 percent of the people are illiterate. Most of them live in
remote places, inaccessible, very few roads. They have lived
that way for centuries. It is just a different problem set than
in Iraq. There are other things that I would like to highlight
in a positive way. The Afghan Army is coming along very well.
They are making progress. They are small, but they are well
led. The leaders all have experience fighting the Soviets.
Could be good, could be bad. I view it as good because they
understand how armies are supposed to work.
They understand the primacy and importance of leadership.
And they realize that unless they figure out the enablers all
the way down to the bottom they can't get a job done. And they
are actually working on these things. The people that make up
the Army are ethnically mixed. I do not have the problems that
we had faced certainly a year ago in Iraq, where if you were
not a Shi'a, you were going to have a tough time getting into
the security services.
In this Army, they really do get along whether they are
Tajiks or Pashtuns or whatever persuasion they are. We have
some additional American forces that are coming into
Afghanistan in the next couple of months. One is a Marine
maneuver unit that I think will be very helpful in the south,
that will help us to leverage where we left off in the fall.
The other unit is just as important, maybe more important to
me, and that is a Marine battalion that is going to be mentored
to help in the training piece. Because that is the real future
is to get the Afghan security people ready to take over
security for their people. And we will be able to hand it over
to them and significantly reduce our footprint. Just across the
border in Pakistan, in my mind, cannot separate Afghanistan
from Pakistan. There may be a border out there, but the reality
is that the people that make up a large part of Afghanistan and
a significant part of Pakistan are Pashtun tribesmen.
The border is insignificant to them. and we have to deal
with the reality that they are on both sides, and it really
complicates business, particularly in Pakistan. There are, as
you know, elections were just held. They are in the process of
trying to form a new government. I am anxiously watching to see
how this is going to work out. The good news is it is a
democratic process. People were elected to form a government.
The challenge is just the traditional insecurity and
uncertainty within that country and how this is going to work
out. So we are certainly following that closely.
There is some good news, though. Kenya, which as you know,
was just torn by ethnic fighting amongst the people there, Kofi
Annan went down there and brokered a peace deal finally between
Kibaki and Odinga, and fingers crossed that they will follow
through not only with what they say and what they agreed to,
but that they actually put in place things that are going to
give confidence to people to get back together again.
I will spare you the rest of the litany of the 27 other
countries, except to say that we spend a lot of time working on
trying to build capacity within these countries to provide for
their own security so they can do it rather than us. But we
recognize how essential it is for American leadership and
presence in this region to try to get people to work together.
They do not come naturally to it. It is just a fact. Most of
them are very willing to work with us. They do not like to work
with each other. And that goes for most of the Arab countries
as well as the others, but I think it is in our best interests
to keep pushing it, so we do that. I think I will end it here.
Thanks for the opportunity to be here. And why don't I turn it
back over to the Chairman and let you all see where you would
like to go. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Admiral Fallon follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

FINANCIAL CONTROLS

Mr. Murtha. A couple things that I just want to point out.
One, I worry we have so much problem in Iraq with the
acquisition program, where cash was just such a temptation. I
worry about the program that the troops are actually running,
because these people, may of them were uniform people that were
involved in this acquisition program. You keep asking--when I
say you, most of the commanders keep asking for more money, and
I realize the value of it. But we got to be very, very
cautious. And they have got to be told, you know, when that
cash is floating around, they have got to be responsible for
it. And at the early stages of the war there was all kinds of
access to that money, and it was not necessarily the military,
but certainly lately it has been, and I am hoping that your
commanders understand they have got to be very responsible for
that money and to be very careful in the way they hand it out.
Admiral Fallon. Sir.

PRISON SYSTEM

Mr. Murtha. The prison system, talk about the prison
system. When I was over there at Thanksgiving I visited the one
prison. I was so impressed by what General Stone was doing. And
I think that was a big part of the change, because I saw--staff
told me 6 months or so before that it was ready to explode.
Stone came in and did a job. here is it now?
Admiral Fallon. Chairman, I concur with your assessment.
When I first went over there last year and took my first look
at Buca the smoke was still rising from the latest riot. They
burned down their hooches in these. And I took one look at it
and said oh, big trouble. Big strides. In the probably two
significant areas of approach here, first the physical
dimension of moving away from those cages and putting people
into much smaller confinement areas, hardening some. And most
importantly is what is going on with the individual people. As
you know, the approach here has been to not treat them all like
they are all arch criminals, but to actually spend some time
sifting through each of the cases trying to sort out the bad
from the real bad from those that may have gotten--they may not
be purely innocent, but we can figure out a way to work with
them. My sense is that we have to figure this out and to try
our best to return to society as many of these folks as we can.
Otherwise I suspect that the day we finally leave they are just
going to get turned over and they will all run.
General Stone has done remarkable work in first thinking
through this problem, recognizing that everybody is not the
same. And we have to figure out a way to try and rehabilitate
those that can be done, and not let them get tied up with the
zealots, of which there are certainly some in there. And so he
has worked hard at separating them. This is a tough sell, I
will be honest with you. Our troops were gagging at the idea
that we were going to turn these guys loose. They said we
captured the, we found them out in the field trying to kill us
and do other things, and they just did not like it at all.
There is a process now for reviewing each case.
They bring the field commander's representatives in to let
them sit in, watch and see so they can have a vote in it. But
the deal is that the numbers are going up that are being turned
back into society. And they are not just being turned over.
They are being trained, educated. And the guys are taking to
it. Most of these people do not have a high school education.
And part of the deal is to offer them a chance to learn
something. And we actually had a case some months ago where
there were a bunch of youngsters, there were teenagers, I think
about a hundred and some, or I think there was like 700 total
that were under 21. They were in an education program. And a
large number of them said we do not want to be released yet. We
want to finish the schooling, because it is our only
opportunity.
I think that is success in my book. So it is coming along.
I have got to tell you we have got to do the same thing in
Afghanistan. Numbers are dramatically smaller, less than a
thousand detainees, facilities unsat. Have not been coming at
it the same way. Asked General Stone to go down and take a look
at this. He spent a week out there, came back, kind of verified
my first impression, and is helping us to craft a program and
do the same thing in Afghanistan.
Mr. Murtha. You mentioned the possibility that you needed
money for a prison.
Admiral Fallon. Need to rebuild that facility.
Mr. Murtha. Have we gotten that request?
Admiral Fallon. You have not. It is in work back in the
building. We will figure it out.

PISTOLS

Mr. Murtha. One other thing I wanted to mention is when I
was over there the trainers themselves said the pistols did not
work, that they had problems with it the safeties were
defective. I talked to a lot of trainers, and they all agreed.
Now, your staff came back and said there is no problem with
these pistols. I wish you would have them relook at that
because I am talking to people who are actually training
people, looking at it, and they are telling me personally that
these things do not work.
I do not know how far your staff looked into it, but
somebody sitting at your headquarters may not know as much as
they know. So I would appreciate it. There is 37,000 of them.
They are Smith & Wesson pistols. And every trainer I have
talked to felt they were defective. So I would appreciate it if
you would look into that yourself.
Admiral Fallon. Will do, sir.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Young.

EUROPEAN SUPPORT IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Admiral,
welcome. Always glad to have you here. We appreciate your
responsibility and the really good way that you carry it out.
Chairman Murtha this morning at a hearing relative to the Air
Force's decision on awarding the contract for the new tankers
made a point that I have been thinking about all day. And I
thought it was a pretty good point. And that is in this
contract, many of our European friends are going to have strong
economic effect, positive economic effect, but they are the
very ones who are refusing to help in Afghanistan to meet what
really is their part of the share--that share of the burden as
part of NATO. Is there a good reason why these other countries
do not want to join up in Afghanistan as we face an aggressive
Taliban?
Admiral Fallon. In my mind, no, sir. I think it is a lack
of will, a lack of leadership, lack of willingness to accept
some casualties. It is, frankly, just not wanting to get hands
dirty doing the tough jobs. The lists of qualifiers, of caveats
as they call them that General McNeil has to put up with from
the majority of our allies is pretty sad. He is a better man
than I am. I probably would have lost patience with this
sometime ago. They just do not seem to have the stomach for it.
Happy to talk about it, but walking the talk is a different
matter. I think that is just what it comes down to.

REGIONAL THREATS

Mr. Young. I know that you are in contact with the leaders
of at least most of these nations, especially the ones in your
AOR. Do they understand what the long term threat from the
Taliban might be or al Qaeda if they are not held in check?
Admiral Fallon. I think they do. Different degrees of that.
And perceptions are all over the place. Certainly in
Afghanistan, Karzai and his leadership recognize the challenge
these folks present to them. In Pakistan, the leadership
understands it. There is a significant part of the population
that is very sympathetic to these folks, though. In the rest of
the region it depends on who you are and where you are as to
who you see as threat. Most of the other countries feel Iran is
the long term concern because of doubts about where the
Iranians' intentions really lie. Most of them, if you get them
off line, will tell you that they think they want to create
another Persian empire, and they are going to try to do
whatever they can to be in that position. So they recognize
these things.
One of the challenges we deal with, frankly, and in some
places, Pakistan is a good example, is that they see us do
things that they like, but then they doubt how much or to what
extent we are willing to stick by them for the long term. They
recognize that a lot of these problems are not going to be
solved overnight, and they look at things like actions that we
take that they feel are not in their best interests. We had
about a 12-some-year hiatus when the General ran them and other
things, and I understand why these things get ginned up, but at
the end of the day, we have now lost 12 years' worth of time
with the leadership in the military, for example, who during
that period when we had no engagement are tending to be
distrustful of us.
And you know, okay, you guys talk, but are you going to be
here if we really need you? So that presents some challenges.
There is also the reality that these folks, for a host of
reasons, do not really cooperate too well with one another.
They will go, they will smile, they will drink tea, they will
all attend various summits, but when it comes to real
cooperation, well, let's band together and do this, we will
work with you. Let's leave these guys out of it for now. So
that is reality. We deal with it as best we can. I think most
of them recognize the threats. They see Iran, Iranian behavior,
do not like it. They see the nuclear program that has a big
question mark over it. And then they look at what the Taliban
have done, they look at the methods of al Qaeda, kill people to
make their point, torture people, and I think these things
register with most of them.

PAKISTANI ARMY

Mr. Young. One of the important players, maybe I should not
say players, but one of the important individuals in this area
is the general who is the new commander of the Pakistani Army.
Is he somebody that we can depend on or----
Admiral Fallon. I think so. I have met General Kiyani
several times. I was just telling Chairman Murtha that I spoke
with Admiral Mullen early this mo ning. He had just flown back
from Pakistan. Had another meeting with him. We both feel the
same way, that even though he has only been on the job a few
months, he seems to understand the strategic priorities. He has
taken pains to try to pull the Army away from politics. They
had gotten pretty enmeshed in it as Musharraf was both chief of
the Army and the President, the lines got blurred. He has
directed Army guys to start backing away, including retired
people, to get out of a lot of these civilian institutions that
are part of the government.
------

So these things tell me that he gets it. And we will try
and help him in any way we can.
Mr. Young. Does he have control of Pakistan's nuclear
weapons?
Admiral Fallon. ------.
Mr. Young, Well, you have a real heavy responsibility. And
I appreciate the way that you have taken over and charge in
running your responsibilities so well. So thank you very much
for that, and thank you for being here today.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TRAINING TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Murtha. One of the things I did not mention is these
training teams you have in Afghanistan, my understanding are
the most part of our deployment, because they react with the
people, they train the Afghans. That is really what it is all
about. And it is supposed to be a State Department training
team. Of course, not all of your people. But your protege
there, young woman you introduced me to is going to AFRICOM,
tells me they are loading it up with the Commerce and so forth,
which I am glad to hear, because that is really what we need to
be involved in with these other agencies. I know the shortages
that I heard about were agriculture, commerce, and things like
that. So the State Department, this committee has offered over
and over again to give them money if they would provide the
leadership of those teams, but they just can't do it.
Admiral Fallon. This is a case of, first of all, the Armed
Forces are expeditionary by designed and by nature, and so the
idea that we have an emergency, we pack up and go is part of
the business. Our other institutions except the Department of
State generally are domestically focused, always have been. And
so to change the culture to one that is expeditionary I think
is a real challenge. And the numbers are really thin.
So we are doing what we can. We are blessed with folks in
uniform, a lot of the Reserves and Guardsmen that have other
jobs that are in these areas. So we are trying to leverage
those for the time being. And actually, what is really
interesting, some of these PRTs, these Provincial
Reconstruction Teams that are being led by uniform people,
completely new, different than what they ad done, I went to one
place, and I kid you not, the commander and two of his
subordinates were submarine officers, nuclear engineers that
are out running these things.
And by all accounts, the guys were ding pretty darn good at
it, pretty darn well at it. An F-18 pilot, Navy guy, and again
these are just Navy examples because they highlight them to me,
they think I am still in the Navy every day, but there are
folks from every walk of life that are stepping up and doing
these things.

EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION

Mr. Murtha. One of the things Mr. Young mentioned that I
talked about this morning, the last time we were over there we
were waiting on the Europeans to put mere troops into NATO. And
this was one of the things finally we had to send the Marines
in. But the frustrating thing is they tell me the British lose
more people from drug abuse than they do in Afghanistan. And
the poppy growing has increased so significantly, it all goes
to Europe, and they still can't understand the importance of
this effort, or at least they do not seem to participate. They
just let us do it. But we appreciate your difficulty in dealing
with them. And Mr. Cramer?
Mr. Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Fallon,
welcome back. I want to stick on this Afghan issue. You sounded
fairly optimistic about Afghanistan, yet everything I hear and
read would indicate there is not much reason to be optimistic
about what is going on there.

SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Admiral Fallon. I guess my sense is you got to keep putting
it in context. I have to do that myself. Even within the
Interagency, I have to tell you it is actually a great novel
idea, and one that I much appreciate, is some of our
intelligence agencies are now actually sending me their draft
reports for comment. And the last one that I saw I actually
said, interesting. I understand what you are trying to say
here, but I choose to disagree with this conclusion and this
conclusion, and here is why.
Part of it is data. Afghanistan is a challenge because it
is so rugged geographically and so chopped up by tribes and
district and so forth. We have a significant presence in a
relatively small percentage of that country. There is a lot of
data extrapolation in my opinion that takes a point here and a
point here, and next thing we have--the data that I have seen
indicates that somewhere in the 70 to 80 percent of all the
kinetic activity takes place in about 10 percent of the
districts in the country. And so the converse of that is that
there are large tracks of this country where it is pretty
benign.
I try, every visit to that country, to go to a different
place so I can have my own assessment of what it is really
like. And I have been to some places that are very benign. I
take my wife to Afghanistan almost every trip. And I am tied up
in meetings a good chunk of the time, but she is not, and she
gets a chance to go meet real people in real places. And is it
great? Is it totally secure? Are people not nervous? No. There
are definitely problems. But my sense is it is not as bad as
some might have yo., believe.

NATO CONTRIBUTION

Mr. Cramer. The NATO presence there is uneven. I mean with
the caveats and the division of the PRTs and their ability to
engage in direct combat, and some countries are, some countries
are not. By the way, which ones are?
Admiral Fallon. To be quite frank, our best partners to
date by demonstrated performance are the Canadians. And after
that it is starting to get pretty spotty.

POPPY PRODUCTION

Mr. Cramer. Even the Brits, and I think their PRT is the
biggest poppy-producing region, or one of the bigger.
Admiral Fallon. Well, but that is kind of by circumstance.
Helmand Province is the number one poppy-producing area in
Afghanistan. A lot of that, to be fair, is geography. It
happens to sit right athwart probably the biggest river valley,
which means the most irrigation, which means the most fertile
land, and it is a huge province. And it has traditionally been
a poppy growing area. That said, and I keep my observations to
the security side rather than the PRTs and others. But each of
them have restrictions, stated or otherwise. And when General
McNeil, our commander, has to--wants them to do something, in
many cases they tell him to hold the line for a bit, and they
will go back and even go all the way back to their capitals to
ask a specific permission to do a single operational thing. And
that is certainly not the way to do it.
Mr. Cramer. Are the Italians making any progress? Aren't
they charged with trying to create or help create a judiciary
there?
Admiral Fallon. I can talk more of the security. They just
had the west until recently. And I did not see much action at
all. They have got people on the ground, but not doing the
things that----

U.S. MARINES IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Cramer. Our 2,200 Marines that are employed there, will
that be for a seven-month deployment?
Admiral Fallon. There are actually two different groups of
Marines.
Mr. Cramer. One for training and one for----
Admiral Fallon. Total of about 3,200. The one of 2,200 size
is going to be a maneuver unit. It is going to go and work for
the NATO command for General McNeil. And he has told me he
expects to use them in the south, where he thinks he has got
his biggest problem. They will be there until next fall. And I
specifically asked for a unit for that period of time, because
that is when I think they are going to be useful. In the
winter, things really tend to die down because the weather just
is too difficult to operate. So given the demands on our forces
right now, it seemed to me this was a prudent use of them and
will not tie them up excessively after that.
So I think they can get a lot done, because this is going
to be the--in Afghan tradition, we do not like the choice of
words, but they call the spring, summer and fall the fighting
season. And then they go back and try to stay out of the
weather during the winter. So they are there for that purpose.
The battalion that is going to do the training, working
directly for me in the OEF hat, to do that, they will also be
there for about that period of time. Because of the demands on
the system, I do not want to--I would like to be able to come
up with replacements for them later in the year.
We will have to jump that fence when we get there. But they
are going to be there just for a limited period of time. But I
think in the case of the maneuver unit, it is exactly the right
period of time and should----

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

Mr. Cramer. I want to ask you a question about MRAPs in
Iraq. When MRAPs were first deployed to Iraq we were using
contractors to train Marines to use the new vehicles. Are we
still doing that?
Admiral Fallon. I couldn't tell you the answer to that one
directly. I can tell you that the MRAPs are now in widespread
use throughout the country. In fact, I rode in one the other
night when the weather, sandstorm shut us down and couldn't fly
to get back to Baghdad. They are very, very helpful. They have
saved a lot of lives. In fact, to the best of my knowledge we
have had two people killed in these things, one when the thing
blew up and actually rolled over and the gunner unfortunately
was crushed but the people inside survived. And another one
when some terrorist actually managed to shoot an RPG into the
turret of the gunner.
But the things have been remarkable in keeping our people
from being seriously hurt. And they are there in significant
numbers. In fact, I just saw an e-mail this morning from
TRANSCOM that they have hundreds queued up now ready to go, and
they have made a big difference. The training, I think--
whatever the training, is, they appear to be doing fine,
whoever is doing it. And I will get back to you.
[The information follows:]

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle training is the
responsibility of the Joint Program Office, Program Manager, MRAP (JPO
PM MRAP). The training team is comprised of a consortium of contracted
instructors from the respective MRAP Original Engineer Manufacturers
(OEMs).
MRAP New Equipment Training (NET) is a 32 hour block of instruction
conducted over a four day period. Pre-requisite for the course is
assignment or anticipated assignment to a unit operating MRAP vehicles.
NET consists of Vehicle Characteristics, Preventive Maintenance Checks,
Emergency Egress/Roll-Over, Vehicle Driving Operations Phase I and II
(Day/Night), Operating Under Unusual Conditions, Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) Training, Vehicle Self Recovery/Auxiliary Equipment/
Flat Tow and Operator Level Vehicle Troubleshooting and Maintenance.
NET concludes with a Final Exam an End of Course Critique.

LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENTS

Mr. Cramer. We have an opportunity to go to Iraq from time
to time And one of the biggest issues that I hear from my
constituent troops there is about the length of deployment
there. This time last year, the Secretary announced that tours
would be increased from 1 year to 15 months. How is that
having--what morale effect is that having?
Admiral Fallon. Clearly, 15 months is a long time. I have
been around this institution for 40-some years. I have made a
couple of 10-month deployments at sea, and they get pretty old
after a while. 15 months in a combat zone is a long time. We
know it. The expectation is that as the drawdown accelerates
here later this year, General Casey has indicated he thinks he
can go back to 12-month deployments with 12 months off.
We all know that is not good enough either. We want to get
much more time. We would like to go to twice as much time at
home before you go out, Marines on a little different cycle,
but the stress is about there. It has an effect no doubt on it.
It has a big effect on families. And my assessment is that you
can only keep this up for so long. And we have got to bring it
down. And we are going to work to that end. But when they are
out there despite the amount of time, the troops are performing
terrifically. With very, very few exceptions they are just
getting the job done, and they are sucking it up, and we ought
to be really grateful for what they do. But we know we have to
change this. And we are going to do it.
Mr. Cramer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. The gentleman from Georgia.

CONGRESSIONAL SPOUSE TRAVEL TO AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, I want to
ask you a question. First of all, in terms of when we go to
Afghanistan, we are not allowed to take our spouses. When will
that be allowed on a CODEL?
Admiral Fallon. I don't know. And that is a loaded
question. If I could come back at you.
[The information follows:]

The Department of Defense limits combat zone visitations to mission
essential personnel only. Members of Congress qualify as mission
essential due to their oversight capacity. However, current United
States Central Command policy denies spouses and children accompaniment
on Congressional Delegations for security reasons.
United States Central Command cannot provide a specific timeline
when the benefits and symbolism of spouses attending Congressional
Delegations to a combat zone will offset the security concerns. Admiral
Fallon concurred that spouses and family members provide significant
partnership benefits with host nations. He endorsed the return of
dependents to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, in part because
of the contribution their return would make in our relations. As the
security situation improves in Afghanistan, prohibition of spouse
accompaniment into a combat zone may change as appropriate for the
conditions
United States Central Command, the Chief of Mission to Afghanistan,
and Combined Joint Task Force-101 continually assess security concerns
in Afghanistan. Should the situation warrant a change in Office of
Secretary of Defense policy, United States Central Command will conduct
proper coordination.

Mr. Kingston. It would have a lot of not just symbolism,
but substance if we could do that.
Admiral Fallon. I will be frank with you. I actually had
planned to take my wife to Iraq last month. And at the last
minute a decision was made to not let that happen. It really
irritated her. And we had a whole program set up. But I think
that is part of the problem, that Iraq's a little bit less
stable than Afghanistan. And my sense is that right now we are
probably about where we ought to be. Let's get this thing moved
down. My wife can go--or I want her because she is actually
engaging with Karzai's wife, for example. They have become more
than just passing acquaintances. And it is interesting how
effective sometimes that those messages that we are trying to
send can be. So I understand what you want to do. I think we
probably ought to wait a little bit longer.

AMERICA'S IMAGE

Mr. Kingston. Thank you. Another question, we often hear in
popular discussions that America's image overseas has fallen
and so forth. And so often I always think, well, that is just
because France is mad at us, and usually it is the Europeans
who are constantly very unhappy. Do you find that to be true in
your 27 countries? Would you say our stock is about where it
has been or is it down or up?
Admiral Fallon. It all depends on where you are. I think
that we are seen in a better light now just because our folks
have been successful in Iraq, for one thing. There is a
continuing criticism, frustration with the situation in the
Levant with Israel and the Palestinians. And this is constantly
being spread out. And we are blamed because we have been
historically very supportive of Israel. Of course we are
supportive of the peace process, and trying to get everybody a
fair shake here.
And I heard something I actually thought remarkable. I was
sharing a dais and a forum in Doha a few weeks ago, and a
gentleman who had been the chief negotiator for the
Palestinians for about a decade was speaking. And he actually
said, and I almost fell out of my chair, he said, you know, we,
and he pointed to himself, he said we have to take
responsibility for a solution here. Not the Americans, not
others, we have to do it. We have to figure out how we are
going to deal with Hamas and get this job done. And I thought
wow, that is terrific. Record that. But then he regressed into
some other stuff about the U.S. should do this, and this and
this. But this is a job. The Palestinian issue in the Arab
world is a continuing thorn in our side in terms of thrown in
front of our faces constantly.

ISRAEL

Mr. Kingston. And as long as we have our relationship with
Israel, then that is going to continue to be a problem.
Admiral Fallon. Well, I have another view of this thing. It
is also a handy whipping boy, in my opinion, for lack of people
getting along to knuckle down and get stuff done. One of the
other challenges in the Arab world, frankly, is they just will
not cooperate well enough in my opinion with each other. And so
it is easy to have somebody else be the bogeyman for this
stuff. I got to tell you something else. On the flip side of
this, the engagement and the good will that our people
generate, our individual soldiers and sailors and civilian
employees of the Department and of the other agencies that
actually get out and do real work in these countries, that is
appreciated--recognized, appreciated, and that is its own
little enclave of goodness. And you know, word gets around.
So it seems to me that the right approach here is to
continue to work these seemingly intransigent issues which
sooner or later they are only going to get solved by people
that are willing to take leadership positions and force the
solutions and to keep our people working at the grass roots
level.

TRADE AGREEMENTS

Mr. Kingston. The only country we have a trade agreement
with I think is Jordan, relatively new, '05 I think, and then
Bahrain.
Admiral Fallon. Bahrain, too.
Mr. Kingston. That is not on line yet, is it? Or is it just
getting on?
Admiral Fallon. I think Jordan and Bahrain are both----
Mr. Kingston. Jordan was '05 I think. I am not sure, but I
know our trade with them has gone up 90 percent since the
implementation of that agreement. Is that something we need to
start really running out and doing a lot of these trade
agreements like that?
Admiral Fallon [continuing]. A little bit out of my lane,
but it seems to me it is the economy, and this where you can
really make some hay. And so without being the expert by a long
shot here, it seems to me that these are good areas to move
down.

SOMALIA

Mr. Kingston. And I have one more question, Mr. Chairman.
Where are we on Somalia these days? You only had a paragraph in
your statement on it.
Admiral Fallon. Somalia is one of the few countries that I
have not put my feet on the ground. It is very unstable. It has
had a succession of challenges. As you know, it is very tribal.
The idea of a central government is kind of wishful thinking it
seems to me. It got pretty bad last year, so the Ethiopians
decided to go fix it. It got too bad for them. And they have
another problem because they have a region of Ethiopia in the
east called the Ogaden which has been traditionally a very
distressed and fractious area. The instability in Somalia was
spilling over, and they finally had enough and went in to try
to fix it. As they discovered, along with some of us, it is a
lot easier to get in sometimes than get out, and so now getting
out without leaving total instability has been a problem. They
are working on it. They are trying to train security forces and
so forth.
Somalia is still pretty dicey. It is a very tough, tough
area. And as you probably saw, we actually did a
------

So Somalia is very tough. It is certainly not a place that
I think is going to get much better any time soon.
Mr. Kingston. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Fallon, great
pleasure to have you back.
Admiral Fallon. Thanks.
Mr. Rothman. How many carriers do we have in the Persian
Gulf now, sir?
Admiral Fallon. One.
Mr. Rothman. One. And I read we were about to have three
warships off the Lebanese coast. Or are they there yet?
Admiral Fallon. One for sure. And actually Lebanon is my
responsibility, but the waters to the west of there are
NAVEUR's. I think the plan was to have three out there for some
period of time.
Mr. Rothman. Is there one there now?
Admiral Fallon. There was a destroyer out there this
weekend.
Mr. Rothman. There is a lot of speculation as to why we
would have that show of force there. Thee are lots of reasons.
My question is--well, first of all, what is the reason?
Admiral Fallon. The idea is to demonstrate that we care a
lot about this country called Lebanon, that we are aware that
among others, Syria is influencing it negatively. And it is a
show of interest rather than a show of force. It is a show of
caring. And it is one of these balancing acts. You do not want
to be obvious----
Mr. Rothman. Right.
Admiral Fallon [continuing]. In terms of being seen or
threatening, but you want to show that you are interested.
Mr. Rothman. There is a belief that if Israel has to go
into Gaza to try to stop Hamas from sending these rockets and
killing the civilians that this warship the several warships
off the Lebanese coast will have a chastening effect or
chilling effect hopefully on Hezbollah. Is that related at all?
And if Israel did enter--or rather if Hezbollah attacked Israel
from the north, would those warships be involved in any
military operations?
Admiral Fallon. No. Not unless some discussion and
agreement were made. They are not connected at all.
Mr. Rothman. Okay.
Admiral Fallon. But Israel has gone into Gaza, though. In
fact, they just pulled back yesterday after an incursion to go
after the rocket men.

TROOP STRENGTH IN IRAQ

Mr. Rothman. Right. And without much effect on the numbers
of rockets sent into Ashkelon. With regard to Iraq, it was
reported that you had said that there should be a pause in the
troop reductions in Iraq.
Admiral Fallon. I did not use the term--I think we probably
ought to stop using that term pause because it is not really
appropriate. What I think, and I am waiting for General
Petraeus coming back to me with his proposals, the way this
works, I had sent him what we call a planning order a couple
months ago and said as we look ahead, and I did the same thing
back last summer as we try to figure out, so I said after July
what do you think we ought to do? And to help you, I want to
frame some scenarios for you.
Conditions continue to improve, conditions are staying
about the same, or conditions deteriorate. Give me your
proposed ways you are going to come to grips with this. And so
he is going to get that back to me here. We will consider it at
our headquarters, and we are going to talk to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs. Now, here is what I think is going on in the
background.
Mr. Rothman. So those report were inaccurate, sir?
Admiral Fallon. Well, they are inaccurately stated. But if
I could----
Mr. Rothman. Please.
Admiral Fallon [continuing]. Explain why I think it is
appropriate to have some assessment. What I think--General
Petraeus, I am ahead of him, because he is the guy on the
ground, he has got to deal with this, he is going to come to
me. But what I expect him to tell me is that what is going on
between now and July is that we are going to pull back four
brigade combat teams very quickly. We are also in the process
of changing out two other brigade combat teams, whose
replacements will continue to maintain our force level at 15 in
the country. That is a lot of moving parts in a short period of
time.
The reality, if you could picture Iraq, God's eye view
looking down on it as a big chess board, and the operational
commanders have divided responsibility for various pieces of
the turf to different commanders, as we cull these commands and
all their troops out of there, those areas of responsibility
are going to have to expand. And so the new commanders on the
ground are going to take responsibility for areas they did not
have before. There are a lot of places that this is going to be
pretty interesting, because we have had difficulties, as you
know, in the past in Baghdad and Diyala and certain other
places.
And so as these things change around, I think it is
probably pretty smart to take a little 1ook at this and see
what it is. How long? Do not know. We are all of the same mind
here. We want to bring our forces down, and we would like to do
it as quickly as makes sense. We do not want to throw away the
blood, sweat and tears that have just been poured into this
thing in the last year. And the solution here is Iraqi Army
stepping up to take over responsibility.
At the same time we are moving all of our forces, they are
going to be moving forces as well to take over chunks of this
turf. So all these things going on, I think it is probably
going to be prudent, I will be surprised if General Petraeus
doesn't come back to me and say let's take a look at this for a
little bit.

IRAN AND SYRIA

Mr. Rothman. If I may follow up, in analyzing how fast to
draw down, lots of people talk about concerns regarding Iran
and Syria. Can you talk to us about what is the level of
Syrian--or rather Iranian involvement in Iraq good and bad, and
Syrian involvement good and bad? It is reported that 90 percent
of the foreign fighters are coming in through Syria. Have they
done anything positive to help us or is it just one good effort
and then one bad effort equals nothing?
And if I may, since I know we have to vote, I will just
throw this question out, if it is not too flippant, but I am
concerned, if you get a chance to read other than the
extraordinary materials that you do, what fiction book are you
reading?
Admiral Fallon. It is not a fiction book, and I will
confess Chairman Murtha might get a kick out of this. I had a
special treat last week in that I discovered down in Tampa that
one of my childhood idols, a baseball player by the name of
Robin Roberts, who used to pitch for the Philadelphia Phillies
had actually retired to Tampa. So I immediately got ahold of
him and asked him to come in and maybe honor me by coming to
lunch one day. So he did. And on Monday he showed up, and I was
just thrilled. And he is a great gentleman, mind sharp as a
tack, and remembers those games almost a lot better than I did.
And when he left he was kind enough to leave me with a
couple books that he had written. And one of them is the 1950
Whiz Kids and their story. So that is what I am actually
reading in my spare time. I have got about 20 pages done.
Syria.
------

Iran has got to play a better role.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you.

EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION

Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, it is good to
see you again. I want to go to Afghanistan. And Mr. Murtha may
have talked about some of this, but I want to go over a little
bit of it. Mr. Murtha and myself went to Afghanistan, and we
found out some disturbing things there. We found a situation I
think could be winnable. I think Mr. Murtha agrees. But we
don't see the Europeans doing their part. I think we have been
awfully nice about this with the Europeans. They are in right
now stealing jobs from this country on an airplane at the same
time--that is not your problem--but at the same time they are
lot living up to the responsibilities that they voted to do.
For example, the number two guy in Afghanistan told us that
if they had about, maximum, maybe 3,500 more troops they could
pretty well contain--over what we are already putting in they
could pretty well get around this thing, but the Europeans
won't do it, and I guess the Germans don't go out at night and
lots of caveats and things. And it still continues, I
understand, and there has been no change in that?
Admiral Fallon. The bottom line there is they have more
reasons than you can count for not doing the job. It is more
than troops. The numbers of troops are interesting, but my
opinion is if all the folks who were on the ground already were
doing what they should be doing we would be in tall cotton
right now.

AGRICULTURAL TRAINING TEAMS

Mr. Hobson. One of the things he told us they needed to
win, and I am going to meet this afternoon with my Department
of Agriculture of Ohio State, is these teams to go out and help
the Afghans get some infrastructure. And let me give you an
example, just see if you agree with this because I am going to
be talking about this, I think Mr. Murtha is probably talking
about this to others. Pomegranates, they have the ability to
grow lots of fruits, vegetables, and one example they gave to
us was they grow these and there is no way to process them. So
they send them to Pakistan where they pay somebody an extra fee
to do, and then they send them out through their port. They
apparently used to have this, but the Russians or somebody blew
up all this infrastructure and even the irrigation stuff.
Is there a program that you all are sponsoring that maybe
the Europeans could get into that they might be more willing to
do something like that to put these teams out there under some
protection from our troops and their troops to get this going
in a meaningful way?
Admiral Fallon. If I could give you an opinion, first of
all, that in Afghanistan the priorities, the needs are
electricity, roads, agricultural development and water
management far exceed all the other things in the country.
Mr. Hobson. Aren't there some movement on the electricity?
Admiral Fallon. Yeah, but it is not the kind of movement
that is really going to get the results. There is, each is, and
that is the problem. I have seen people coming to me with a
half dozen proposals on agriculture, specifically grow this,
and pomegranates are one of them. Any one of these things would
be helpful. The challenge is getting the right people with the
right skill sets to get engaged and actually do it. And it is
certainly something the Europeans could do. If they would be
willing to undertake in a coordinated manner these other
things, they would be very, very helpful to us.
What I see is there are lots of folk who will volunteer to
come help, most of them working in small groups individually,
and it needs to be a much more comprehensive approach to this
that would be helpful. So we have asked from the U.S. side our
AID folks in the embassy to take a turn on this. I have hired--
not hired but I have talked to one of our senior AID personnel
to come and work with my staff to help, to add her insight. She
has been in the field about 35 years. She knows how to do this
stuff, and we will try to get it done.

ELECTRICITY IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Hobson. What about the electric? What would you do--if
you could play king for a day or Karzai for a day or yourself,
how would you fix the electric problem?
Admiral Fallon. First thing I would do is to get the
leaders of Afghanistan and other neighboring countries to,
------

But they have phenomenal potential in water reserves. They
have some huge piles of snow up there all the time in the
winter. They have some dams they are building. They could be a
good source of power. There needs to be a comprehensive
approach. There was a meeting in November----
Mr. Murtha. What was the question, Mr. Hobson?

WATER PROBLEMS

Mr. Hobson. Remember, they told us about the water problem.
I said how would you fix the water problem; if you could play
king for a day, what would yo do to fix the water?
Admiral Fallon. You need a comprehensive approach. Here is
what I see: I go over there and the same complaint everywhere.
There are provinces over there that have zero electrical power
except for generators. Everybody wants it. And what is
happening is we have been trying to solve it at the local
level, solve it at the provincial level. It is not going to
work. You need a national, and really an international
solution, in my opinion, because each of those countries have
similar challenges, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan. If they can figure out a way to cooperatively say
we are going to build a dam here and a dam here and a dam here,
run the lines, we would be in tall cotton. But it needs a big
picture, coordinated approach. Okay, we will hope for that and
try to move it along.
Meanwhile back at the ranch in Afghanistan today there is a
dam at a place called Kajaki in the south. Unfortunately, it
sits in a hotbed of insurgent activity. But the dam is up and
there is a power plant next to it. It happens to have one
operable turbine in it today. It is designed for three. I have
been trying since I got in this job to get three turbines in
the plant installed and operating. It took me several months to
get the rest of the story. It turns out you can't just put the
turbines in. That is a chore in itself. With one turbine
operating at max capacity, it turns out that the power lines
are maxed out. So they need to put new power lines up. Of
course power lines mean new towers. That means you have to have
some security. Frankly, I couldn't get the Brits to do anything
last year. Wouldn't even talk to me. Wouldn't even fly my team
up there to look at this. They are not in charge anymore. And
we are going to figure this out. And clever man that he is, old
General McNeill and General Cohen, they have taken a look. It
just so happens that the turf where Marines are going to be
operating may just include the turf that we need. So we are
going to get it done one way or the other.
But if we can get that power plant functioning and it is
going to take a year probably, maybe more than that to get it
up, we will provide power for large areas of those provinces
that are most problematic. And I think this is what people
need.

POWER LINES

Mr. Hobson. Can I make one suggestion to you? I have two
quick things I want to add to that. On the power lines, 3M
Company makes a product that will boost those power lines
dramatically and DOE didn't want to look at it. I got an
earmark, and now DOE loves it. They think it is the greatest
thing since sliced bread on power lines. You might have
somebody look at that.
Admiral Fallon. Name, address and phone number? I'm all
ears.

PISTOLS

Mr. Hobson. We will help you. One other thing, and I will
yield back. I have a lot of stuff, but the one thing I want to
talk about that really is distressing when we go some place and
talk to somebody and we are out there talking about a neat
program, I think, because one of the problems is in the police
departments in how they handle the cops and the training. So we
go and we are visiting this thing and they are showing them off
to us and I know you don't have the paper on this but I am
going to hit you with it anyway. You can find out because it is
really frustrating to me and I think to the chairman, all of
us, when we do this. So we are touring this place and they are
showing us how they got these guys and they got them doing this
stuff and they are clicking the guns and the pistols and
everything. So we start talking to the guys that are doing the
training. And the guy--I said, how is everything going? And the
guy says everything is fine, sir, it is a good program. We
think we are going to get good results from this, but these
damn pistols aren't worth a god damn. And then I get a report
back.
Admiral Fallon. These were the police trainers, right?
Mr. Hobson. Yes. One guy is from Pennsylvania. I don't want
to get him in trouble.
Mr. Murtha. State policeman?
Mr. Hobson. State policeman. He didn't just make this up,
sir, but when I get the stuff back that I got here, it is from
DoD. It is like you guys don't know what you are talking about.
Nobody ever told you this, I mean, summary of report of
province, no manufacturing defects have been reported. Well, I
just reported one. Stovepiping. I mean.
Admiral Fallon. Tell me the place you were. Where were you?
Kabul?
Mr. Hobson. Kabul, in that little place where they are
training the police. Who is the contractor? These guys were
DynCorps. These guys were trying hard, doing well. But I don't
understand it. How many times do we go through this situation
where, you know, it is like we didn't hear it. It is like who
are you guys? Well.
Admiral Fallon. Don't worry. I get that same effect.
Mr. Murtha. Power line problem in Iraq, we had the same
problem he is talking about in Afghanistan. Haditha.
Mr. Hobson. We went to Haditha Dam to visit Marines there.
Admiral Fallon. By the way that refinery they tell me is
going to be operating up there in about 2\1/2\ months. Told me
it couldn't be done a year and a half ago.

HYDROELECTRIC POWER

Mr. Hobson. We went to Haditha. I said why didn't you get a
Corps of Engineers guy up here? And it took how long to get a
Corps of Engineers guy up there and look at the dam and tell
them what to do with the dam. The general there couldn't get
anybody up there to look at the dam to make it work better. You
got to be--if it frustrates us, it has to drive you crazy.
Admiral Fallon. Invite NATO to come in with all the caveats
and then see.
Mr. Hobson. We got into the Dutch guy over there atNATO.
But it is McNeill, let me tell you, McNeill is a straight commander, I
think, and he came in and did a lot of good stuff. But I think he is
very frustrated as he goes out the door. But I think he is a good
warfighter from what I can see. I think he thinks it is winnable if he
could get the right stuff done. But anyway, I don't mean to beat you up
about this.
[The information follows:]

I have confirmed with the Combined Security Transition Command in
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) that they are confident the 9mm Smith & Wesson
Sigma Series pistols provided to the Afghan Army and police do not have
manufacturing defects. That said, the S&W Sigma, though a modern and
effective handgun, is considered by some observers to be a somewhat
lesser-quality pistol compared to more expensive handguns such as the
U.S.-issue M9 Beretta, the Glocks or Sig Sauers. Additionally, some
individuals do not like certain features of the Sigma's design such as
certain disassembly procedures and the lack of a positive thumb safety
feature that some other models offer. While the S&W Sigma 9mm meets all
requirements, it has been decided future pistol procurements will
specify features comparable to the M-9 Beretta that is issued to U.S.
forces.

Admiral Fallon. I will be looking for pistols, 9mm.
Mr. Hobson. They are the stupid 9mm, which don't kill a
lot.
Mr. Murtha. Gentleman from Georgia
Admiral Fallon. It was a congressional decision, I think,
wasn't it, to replace all those guns?
Mr. Hobson. But I wasn't here at the time and I have been
fighting it ever since.
Admiral Fallon. What happened to the old 45s?
Mr. Murtha. General Moseley said to us he wants 45s for the
Air Force. So we put money in to experiment with the 45s. I
said what do you carry? He said a 38.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Gentleman from Georgia.

AFRICAN COMMAND

Mr. Bishop. Thank you. Admiral, I have a couple questions.
The first has to do with the stand-up of the African Command.
Of course General Ward got a star and then of course he was
designated to head up the new African Command, and that means
that the Horn of Africa region will transfer from your
responsibility to CENTCOM to AFRICOM, and reportedly it is
supposed to happen by October.
Do you know whether or not a decision has been made on the
home for AFRICOM? Do they have a home?
Admiral Fallon. They have not found a home other than
Germany, and this young lady behind me is going to be their
chief of requirements and resources. So I think they will
probably give her one of those jobs to try and find a place.
Right?
No, they are still working on it. There is a problem, of
course, real anxiety in Africa about where this place goes.
Mr. Bishop. Because Nigeria said absolutely not. And next
place I understand is Liberia, and I don't know what the status
of that is. Do you have any idea?
Admiral Fallon. No.

PIRACY

Mr. Bishop. What is the status of the efforts to transition
the command, and the piracy, as I understand, off the coast of
Africa has been increasing. Do you have enough international
effort for that, a long-term solution to that? You have to take
control of that and be responsible for policing those waters.
Admiral Fallon. Our idea here is to take the Horn of Africa
Command, Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, which now reports to
me, and to chop that over to General Ward with the idea that it
stays intact, and it really crosses the boundary between
AFRICOM and CENTCOM. I would like to stay very well connected
to this entity because frankly AFRICOM is not going to have the
resources, knowledge, or experienced people to do the things we
have going on for quite some time.
Mr. Bishop. Will that be left up to you or be left up to
the----
Admiral Fallon. The way this whole thing will really work
is they will ultimately report to General Ward. If I see
something that I think needs doing, I can through the staff
call up and say here is what we recommend. And we have had this
discussion already. I think that is the way it is going to
work. Most of the reason is that they don't have assets. We
still have them and so piracy, we will be working that one
pretty much from NAVCENT.

ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA BORDER DISPUTE

Mr. Bishop. What is the current status of the situation
with Ethiopia and Eritrea, the border dispute and the U.N.
mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia?
Admiral Fallon. Tensions are rising. Background here is
that two leaders, Isaias and Meles use to be good buddies. In
fact now they are--not only buddies, they are cousins of some
pedigree. They really don't like each other now, and the
personalities drive this agenda, friction between the two. The
problem in the last few weeks is that the Eritreans have been
starving the U.N. contingent in there of all supplies and
basically forcing them to leave the country as unsustainable,
and as they withdraw it is going to leave no buffer between the
two.
My assessment of the situation, and I will admit I haven't
been to see Isaias yet, hasn't been very welcoming. I have
talked to Meles about it. Neither one probably wants a war.
They might be able to stumble into it if they are not careful,
so it is something that needs attention. I know the U.N. is
focused on it. We don't really have the ability to go help
negotiate much at this point from what I can see, so we have to
be careful.

SURGE UNIT EQUIPMENT

Mr. Bishop. I am going to have to run and vote. But I did
want to switch gears on the surge equipment. I hear about what
happens with equipment that has been used by the surge units
when they depart. Are they taking them with them? They normally
would be--equipment would stay to be used by replacement
follow-on units. But some of the equipment will be sent back
for reset. Will it be reconditioned for theater?
Admiral Fallon. Most of it is coming out. We are bringing
it out, yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. Well, Admiral, we appreciate your coming before
the Committee. We appreciate your dedicated work and we hope
your protege is going to do as well in Africa. We hope she
straightens it out in Africa. Thank you very much. The
Committee is adjourned until 10:00 o'clock Tuesday.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow:]

Extended Deployments

Question. Admiral Fallon, when you last appeared before this
Committee, Secretary Gates had just announced that all active-duty
soldiers currently deployed or going to Iraq and Afghanistan would see
their one-year tours extended to 15 months. In his statement, the
Secretary said that the extended tours were necessary to support the
surge in Iraq and to allow for 12 months at home between tours for rest
and reset.
Admiral, the drawdown in the number of soldiers, marines an
supporting forces involved in the surge has begun, but so has talk of a
pause in the drawdown. What are the metrics that are in use to help
inform decisions about the continuation of the surge, or a pause in the
drawdown?
Answer. ------.
Question. What are the resource implications of a pause in the
drawdown? Will additional funding be needed?
Answer. Resource implications depend on the length of the pause.
United States Central Command does not see an immediate need for
additional funding to support operations due to a pause in the
drawdown. However, we would likely require additional funding
commensurate with the force levels retained, if the pause continues
into the second or third quarter of Fiscal Year 2009. We are
coordinating with the Services to identify specific funding
requirements necessary to support a prolonged pause in the drawdown.
Question. Admiral do you endorse a drawdown in troop strength to
pre-surge levels, or can we drawdown to significantly lower levels?
Answer. As you know, we are currently reducing forces to pre-surge
levels as directed by the President. Planning efforts are underway to
determine the appropriate longer-term troop strength for Iraq. It would
be premature to comment on the results of those efforts, but any
determination will be based on the conditions on the ground, and the
judgment of commanders in the field.

Iraqi Security Forces

Question. Part of the new strategy in Iraq is to use larger numbers
of trained Iraqi security forces, accompanied by U.S. forces to ``clear
and hold'' sectors of Baghdad and other places in Iraq.
What can you tell us about the numbers of Iraqi Army units that are
accompanied by U.S. forces, their manning strengths, their capabilities
and desire to engage in the fight, and most importantly, their ability
to assume the lead in counterinsurgency operations?
Answer. ------.
Question. Reports from Iraq generally conclude that the Iraqi
military forces are improving steadily. However, the Iraqi police have
so far been less capable, and mere prone to corruption. What is your
assessment of the Iraqi police forces?
Answer. ------.
Question. Some U.S. military personnel are living with their Iraqi
counterpars in the neighborhoods they are securing in Iraq. Can you
inform the Committee process is progressing?
Answer. ------.
Question. How many U.S. personnel are involved in operations
teaming with the Iraqis? Is this number increasing or decreasing as the
surge draws down?
Answer. It is impossible to provide a specific number of U.S.
personnel who are involved in operations teaming with the Iraqis. Many
U.S. personnel are members of transition and training teams, who work
directly with Iraqi units every day. Even those not on transition and
training teams are still involved in operations, as members of units
partnered with Iraqi counterpart units. In this role, U.S. personnel
work with their Iraqi partner unit to conduct training and work
together in combined operations. This is true for personnel in combat,
combat support and combat service support positions, since nearly all
of these types of units have counterparts in the Iraqi Security Forces.
The number of U.S. forces involved in operations with the Iraqis will
decrease as overall force levels decrease, but the proportion will
remain about the same--however, over time the nature of the
relationship will change as Iraqis increasingly take the lead in
security operations.
Question. How many U.S. soldiers are in the typical small unit, or
team, that is embedded with the Iraqis?
Answer. ------.
Question. What are the experience and training levels of the
officers and NCOs that are provided as members of embedded training
teams?
Answer. ------.

Progress by the Government of Iraq

Question. In mid-February, Iraq's parliament passed three key
pieces of legislation that (1) set a date for provincial elections, (2)
approved $48 billion for 2008 spending, and (3) provided for limited
amnesty for detainees in Iraqi custody.
How specifically do these legislative actions influence security
and stability in Iraq?
Answer. Setting a date for provincial elections are a key to
rebalancing of Iraqis and empowers decentralized governments in the
provinces. An approved budget brings along money for reconstruction and
government services that employ and better the conditions of Iraqi
citizens. The Iraqi motivation for the passage of a general amnesty law
was to further reconciliation efforts by pardoning certain offenses and
allowing those individuals a second chance to become productive members
of the new Iraq. The passage of the law is a significant reconciliation
step, given its clear benefit to the Sunni community that constitutes
an estimated 85% of the detention population.
Question. Highlight some of the important aspects of the fiscal
year 2008 Government of Iraq budget?
Answer. On February 13, 2008, Iraq's Council of Representatives
(CoR) passed a $49.9 billion budget for FY 2008--21% rise in
expenditures over last year's budget. Based on increased crude oil
exports and persistently high oil prices, Iraq is well positioned to
afford an expanded budget in 2008. Oil revenues are expected to grow
from $31.0 billion in 2007 to $35.5 billion this year, an increase of
15%. Other revenues are expected to grow from $2.4 billion to $6.9
billion.
Total 2008 budgetary expenditures will increase to $49.9 billion,
including $37 billion for operating expenditures, a 19% increase over
last year. Security expenditures will increase by 23%--from $7.3
billion to $9.0 billion--with $5.1 billion earmarked for Ministry of
Defense and $3.9 billion earmarked for Ministry of Interior.
2008 Budget allots $13.2 billion for investment spending, an
increase of 32% over last year's $10.0 billion. Capital funds allocated
to the 15 provinces will increase over 50%, from $2.1 billion to $3.3
billion, reflecting the improved budget execution performance by the
provinces in 2007. Total capital allocations for the Kurdistan Regional
Government will grow from $1.6 billion to $2.7 billion, keeping them at
17% of GoI revenues after deduction of ``Sovereign Expenses.'' Ministry
of Oil's investment allocation will be cut back from $2.4 billion to
$2.0 billion, based on this Ministry's persistent under-spending, while
Ministry of Electricity will be budgeted a flat $1.3 billion. Iraq's
2008 budget contains funding for key investment programs necessary to
promote economic development and support security gains, including: $70
million for a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
program, $417 million for public works programs, $250 million for
housing and construction programs, and $62 million for agricultural
programs.
Question. Can you describe for us some of the improvements in Iraqi
Provincial and local governance?
Answer. Iraqi provincial and local governance continue to improve
and build upon the progress seen during last quarter. The provinces
made some real progress in the past year, particularly when many of the
provinces executed only a very small portion of their budgets in 2006.
They spent most of their $2.0 billion allocation for 2006 in 2007.
Mentoring by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) has resulted in
17 out of 18 Provincial Councils submitting their Provincial
Development Strategies (PDS) to the Ministry of Planning on a timely
basis. The PDS serves as the framework document for building provincial
budgets and links the provinces to supporting ministries throughout the
Government of Iraq. According to preliminary Iraqi budget execution
data, most provinces are making significant progress in capital
projects as well. These improvements are due in part to capacity-
building efforts, including Procurement Assistance Centers, training
activities and capacity development programs in the ministries and in
the provinces.
In addition, the PRTs are helping to successfully nurture this
process. At present, there are 11 PRTs working at the provincial level,
13 PRTs embedded with Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and seven Provincial
Support Teams operating from established bases at the local level. They
draw on U.S. interagency and Coalition expertise to assist local,
municipal and provincial governments to strengthen the Government of
Iraq's capacity to deliver basic services to its citizens, facilitate
economic development, foster reconciliation and encourage application
of the rule of law. PRTs are working to facilitate this transition by
assisting provincial and local governments in meeting basic needs
related to schools, roads, sewage, an water services.
Question. Can you also discuss the impact of the Concerned Local
Citizens groups, which I understand are now called Sons of Iraq? Are
the members of these groups all Sunni?
Answer. The Sons of Iraq (formerly known as Concerned Local
Citizens) are an indigenous ally fighting a common adversary in Iraq,
Al Qaeda. Their activities range from conducting joint Coalition Forces
and Iraqi Army patrols and manning check points providing actionable
intelligence on weapons caches, terrorists and criminal elements in
their areas. Their effort constitutes a new, armed ally for the
Coalition, while simultaneously drawing from the Al Qaeda recruiting
pool. These groups are force multipliers that have played an integral
part in reducing Coalition casualties, equipment losses, and the
overall violence in Iraq. The overwhelming majority of the Sons of Iraq
are Sunni.
Question. How much U.S. funding goes to support the Concerned Local
Citizens groups?
Answer. From 1 Jul 07 to 31 Jan 08, $148M has been expended on CLC
programs. As the program grows, more funding will be expended. However,
this summer the program will start transferring to the government of
Iraq.

Jordanian International Police Training Center

Question. The Jordanian International Police Training Center was
created to train Iraqi police cadets. The cost to construct the
facility was over $140 million.
What is the current usage of the facility?
Answer. Training at JIPTC has lately been dedicated to developing
security forces of the Palestinian Authority (PA). 418 PA Presidential
Guard personnel graduated a 2-month program at JIPTC on 13 Apr 2008. A
battalion (approx. 600 soldiers) of PA National Security Force
graduated a 4-month course on 28 May 2008.
Question. What are the future plans for the facility?
Answer. Palestinian Authority security force training at JIPTC has
been very successful this spring. Negotiations for follow-on training
are ongoing. While the current round of U.S.-funded training has
concluded, Jordan has agreed in principle to work with us in the future
to provide mutually beneficial internal security force training for any
number of friendly nations.
Question. Does the facility continue to receive U.S. funding?
Answer. The Jordanian International Police Training Center (JIPTC)
is not receiving funding from the Department of Defense. Department of
State is currently paying the Jordanian government to train Palestinian
forces at the JIPTC.
Question. In addition to the Jordanian International Police
Training Center, are there plans underway to complete construction of
the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center. How are these
training facilities not duplicative of each other?
Answer. The Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) was
originally used to train Iraqi police, but now has moved on to train
international police officers, most recently for the Palestinian
Authority. This center focuses on interaction with civilians, rule of
law and basic police tactics. The facilities are largely oriented
toward this law enforcement role and consist largely of classrooms,
basic small arms training ranges, and a driving course.
In contrast, the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center's
(KASOTC) primary mission is training U.S. and international special
operations forces in counter terrorism operations. This facility has
military-oriented capabilities including a sniper/rappelling tower,
aircraft breeching facility, 360 degree live-fire shoot houses, as well
as classroom facilities and dorms.

Troop Strength in Afghanistan

Question. We have heard a lot about an anticipated spring offensive
in Afghanistan by the Taliban. The United States is sending a force of
approximately 2,200 Marines to bolster combat power to counter the
Taliban Spring offensive, and another 1,000 to train and otherwise work
with and strengthen the Afghan military.
Where in Afghanistan will the Marines conduct combat operations?
Answer. For the past several years we have observed a natural
pattern in the resumption of Taliban activity in the spring months
building up to a summer peak and tapering off as the harsh Afghan
winter sets in. To characterize this activity as a ``Spring Offensive''
is to give inordinate credit to an enemy incapable of making a
coordinated effort. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
forces have been very effective in preventing the Taliban from
coordinating their efforts and in 2007 had significant successes
against Taliban core leadership.
This year, we committed additional forces to give ISAF an
additional combat punch to continue pressure on the Taliban and to
bolster security for the Afghan people in the southern region. General
McNeill, followed by General McKiernan, will position these forces as
they see fit, but the 2,200 Marines are currently forecast to conduct
combat operations in Regional Command (RC) South.
Question. After their seven month tour is up, will they be replaced
with another Marine unit?
Answer. Currently, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit and the 2D
Battalion, 7th Marines is a one time U.S. deployment to Afghanistan.
Any replacement units will be a Secretary of Defense decision.
Question. As U.S. brigades are withdrawn from Iraq, will you
request additional brigades for combat operations in Afghanistan?
Answer. There is no relationship to the drawdown of forces in Iraq
and the buildup of combat power in Afghanistan. All sourcing options
are considered when trying to fill U.S. force requirements and
shortfalls in any region; however, withdrawals of U.S. brigades from
Iraq do not necessarily trigger additional requests for U.S. brigades
for Afghanistan.
Question. Assuming that the additional U.S. trainers are mid-grade
NCOs and officers, how will this surge in trainers impact dwell time
for those soldiers that comprise a part of the force that is already
difficult to retain?
Answer. The additional U.S. trainers are a Marine Air-Ground Task
Force containing a mix of all grades, not a concentration of mid-grade
NCOs and officers. As for the impact of dwell time for these Marines,
this question is best answered by Headquarters Marine Corps. USCENTCOM
does not have visibility on Marine Corps retention and/or dwell time
statistics.
Question. What is your overall impression of the situation in
Afghanistan, the capability of the Taliban, and the preparedness of the
Afghan security forces to fight and defeat them?
Answer. The insurgency in Afghanistan's predominantly Pashtun south
and east will not directly threaten central institutions or prevent
progress in the north and west. However, Afghanistan's challenging
situation is likely to become more difficult over the next year despite
planned improvements to governance, development, and security.
Afghan Security Forces continue to mature and develop, especially
the Afghan National Army (ANA). The ANA took several steps forward over
the past six months. In December 2007, the ANA played a prominent role
in retaking Musa Qaleh in Northern Helmand Province. In March 2008, the
first ANA Battalion was certified as fully capable of conducting
independent combat operations. The Afghan National Police (ANP) has not
yet progressed as well as the Army, but significant effort is being put
into the ANP to improve their performance.
Question. What is your assessment of the capabilities and abilities
of the various NATO member contingents and their ability to engage in
combat operation against the Taliban?
Answer. We appreciate the troop contributions the many NATO nations
and other partner states continue to make to International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF). These forces are engaging the Taliban
effectively. Last year's predicted Spring Offensive did not materialize
largely due to ISAF troop effectiveness. Earlier this year, ISAF forces
in conjunction with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) re-took
the vital Musa Qala area from Taliban control. While there are
shortages in resources, the NATO and ANSF forces on the ground are
taking the fight to the Taliban and effectively delivering improved
security and stability throughout Afghanistan.
Question. Which NATO countries provide forces to engage in direct
combat, and in what numbers?
Answer. NATO contributes approximately 26 thousand of the 45
thousand ISAF forces with Great Britain, Germany, Canada, and Italy
making the largest contributions. NATO is committed to the mission in
Afghanistan and understands that it is a long-term commitment in which
all NATO nations share the borders. Nations participate in the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) according to their
individual national interests and capabilities.

Violence in Afghanistan

Question. While violence seems to have decreased in Iraq, violent
acts in Afghanistan appear to have increased including the use of
Improvised Explosive Devices, and suicide bombers. There are those who
are concerned about the situation in Afghanistan, highlighting levels
of violence and suicide bombings. Others point to progress made in
curbing violence, improving governance, and expansion of the Afghan
Security Forces.
Is timely and accurate intelligence available on the Taliban?
Answer. Our intelligence on the Taliban and other insurgent groups
is timely and accurate, but is now and will always be incomplete based
on the nature of the enemy and this war. We continue to use all our
capabilities to collect the most accurate information possible, and
send the analysis of that information to the units and decision makers
who most need it. Increasing the number of ISAF personnel on the ground
in Afghanistan in 2008 will further enhance our understanding of the
enemy in Afghanistan and the tribal support network they rely on so
heavily for sustainment and to conduct operations.
Question. Please describe the contributions of the various NATO
member countries to combat operations and support operations in
Afghanistan.
Answer. There are currently 26 NATO member countries and 13 partner
nations providing significant combat and support operations in
Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). These NATO member
countries are providing a full range of operations from war fighting to
civil reconstruction operations to include: Command and control, combat
maneuver units, special operations, psychological operations (PSYOPs),
regional signal intelligence/electron warfare/human intelligence teams
and enhanced medical treatment facilities capable of delivering primary
surgical treatment. In addition, instrumental contributions are made by
NATO provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) which provide critical
support to the Government, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan local
representatives for civil/admin law and order, justice, and public
services.
Question. Is the NATO experiment working?
Answer. The NATO ``experiment'' in Afghanistan is working. NATO
member nations are supporting the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) mission with national treasure and blood. International
cooperation towards the noble goals set forth by the Afghans and the
International Community to rebuild and develop Afghanistan is
unprecedented. ISAF forces in Afghanistan are making a difference.
Security, despite reports to the contrary, is improving in Afghanistan.
Question. Are you adequately resourced for the mission in
Afghanistan?
Answer. No. For U.S. forces in Afghanistan, the Commander, Combined
Joint Task Force-82 and the Commander, Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), submit their requests for forces to U.S.
Central Command for consolidation and prioritization. The outstanding
priorities for U.S. force fills in Afghanistan are embedded training
team personnel to mentor and train Afghanistan National Army and Police
forces; and additional intelligence, medical, criminal investigation,
and other support personnel needed for combat support requirements.
The Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
identifies combat force requirements via the Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). The
CJSOR is sourced through for ISAF via NATO channels. The outstanding
priorities in Afghanistan include requirements for rotary wing
aircraft, maneuver forces, operational mentor liaison teams, and
medical support.
Question. Are coalition forces adequately resourced?
Answer. Yes, coalition forces have the resources and equipment
required to defeat the insurgency and assist in rebuilding of
Afghanistan. NATO mandates that countries are responsible for their own
national training, equipping and human resources. Partnering NATO
countries have many avenues to acquire the best personal military
equipment for their fighting forces; however, there continues to be a
need for high demand items which are fielded as soon as they are
produced.
Several of our coalition partners have training facilities, and
trainers that rival those found in the United States. These countries
offer a variety of training opportunities for partnering countries who
feel they can benefit from training and developing relationships with
other countries.
Adequate manpower is always a challenge, but our partnering NATO
countries are constantly evaluating how they can contribute more. We
are seeing our coalition partners contribute in a variety of ways
including military forces, civilian expertise, in country and out of
country training, equipment and weapons donations, and funding support.

Iran

Question. Admiral, it seems that Iran is pursuing a multi-track
policy in Iraq, consisting of overtly supporting the information of a
stable, Shia Islamist-led central government while covertly working to
diminish popular and military support for U.S. and Coalition operations
there.
What actions does CENTCOM have underway in the region to prevent or
curtail Iran's destabilizing activities that contribute to internal
Iraqi or Afghan frictions, and that threaten regional stabilities?
Answer. In Iraq, Multi National Forces--Iraq (MNF-I) is using
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to monitor
border activities for lethal aid flow. Special Operations forces, along
with Iraqi Special Operations Forces, are targeting Iranian surrogates
and Qods Force operatives in Iraq. Coalition Forces are assisting the
Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement by training, and reinforcing
ethical border enforcement technique at border crossings in Maysan and
Basrah Provinces. MNF-I leadership continues to encourage GoI to
diplomatically engage Tehran to stop the flow of lethal aid into Iraq.
As Coalition Forces unearth caches with Iranian munitions, information
is cataloged and presented to the GoI as further proof of Tehran's
meddling to destabilize security in Iraq.
Regionally, CENTCOM is partnering with Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) members to deter Iran's maligning influence in the region.
Through theater security cooperation and multi- and bi-lateral
exercises with our GCC partners, we convey to Iran our strong resolve
for regional stability. Our operations in and around the Arabian Gulf
prevent Iranian Qods Forces from further maligning influence and from
pursuing greater control of international commerce flowing through the
Gulf. Our presence in the Gulf also curtails piracy from Iranian
surrogates and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy--Qods Force
(IRGCN-QF).
Question. What is the status of your contingency plans for
potential operations in this theater and what shortfalls or concerns
have you been able to identify?
Answer. CENTCOM is always looking at ways to ensure we are prepared
for a range of contingencies in this very dynamic theater of
operations. As you know, there are many threats we face on a day to day
basis that require a critical eye and focus. Iran's maligned influence
throughout the region, most notably in Iraq, their defiance of the
international community with respect to its nuclear program and recent
reckless behavior at sea demonstrated by their Revolutionary Guard
Corps Naval Forces against a U.S. Naval Vessel are all troubling signs
that require our attention and concern. CENTCOM will be prepared to
support any military option should it be necessary to confront Iranian
aggression, but I'm optimistic that the current U.S. Government and
international community efforts to work towards a diplomatic solution
in dealing with Iran's destabilizing policies in the region will be
successful.
Question. Considering the recent Strait of Hormuz encounter between
the U.S. Navy and Iranian speed boats, do you believe Iran has become
more aggressive against U.S. and Coalition Forces?
Answer. ------.
Question. How would you characterize Iran's influence and
objectives Iraq?
Answer. Iran's objectives include an Iraq that is militarily weak
and able to maintain its own security, free from Coalition or U.S.
military presence, receptive to Iranian influence, and led by a Shia
Islamist government. Iran works to build long-term influence among
Iraqis by pursuing humanitarian, reconstruction, and economic projects
and by providing Shia militia the means to achieve their goals,
including weapons, training, and funding. These efforts are almost
entirely led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps--Qods Force
(IRGC-QF). Iran, through the IRGC-QF, pursues its short-term objective
of a painful Coalition military withdrawal by encouraging Shia
militants under varying degrees of influence to attack Coalition
targets. Iran pursues its long-term goal of an Iraq free from U.S.
military presence through attempts to influence Iraqi Shia, Sunni and
Kurdish politicians.
Question. In probable reaction to Iran's nuclear program, Egypt and
many Gulf Cooperation Council countries expressed an interest in
developing a peaceful nuclear program, individually and collectively.
What is your assessment of the underlying rationale for peaceful
nuclear programs when most of these countries possess abundant oil and
natural gas reserves?
Answer. Many Arab countries have a long-standing interest in
nuclear technologies. Arab governments have closely monitored the
Iranian nuclear negotiations, and are aware of the prestige and
bargaining power Iran derives from its nuclear program. Rapidly
expanding populations and the expectation of an improved standard of
living in Arab nations is creating chronic energy deficiencies
throughout the region. Greater quantities of fossil fuels will be
required to meet the growing demand for electricity thus limiting
potential export profits. While the region is rich in fossil fuels,
natural gas (the preferred fuel for electrical power generation) is
unevenly distributed, and transporting industrial quantities of natural
gas requires a highly specialized infrastructure. The additional
revenue available from the record price of petroleum products
encourages maximum export vice internal consumption and further
encourages alternative methods of power generation.
Question. As a follow-up question, how concerned are you that these
nuclear programs could rapidly transform from a peaceful power-
generation program into a nuclear weapons program?
Answer. While the proliferation of nuclear knowledge and materials
are worrisome, Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula countries that are
interested in nuclear power have pledged to develop transparent
programs in compliance with International Atomic Energy Administration
guidelines. These nations have traditionally respected their
international obligations and have lived peacefully in the region.
There is no reason to believe that these nations would be anything
other than responsible in their peaceful development of nuclear
programs.

Pakistan

Question. The U.S. and Pakistan are fighting a common enemy in the
Taliban. The U.S. provides material assistance and training to Pakistan
which is intended to support a common strategic effort to counter
extremism and militancy.
Are you comfortable with your ability to measure accountability and
effectiveness of funding and resources provided to Pakistan?
Answer. The U.S. provides significant support to Pakistan,
commensurate with its importance to U.S. national security interests.
It is difficult to make a direct correlation between the dollars we
provide and Pakistan's actions, but Pakistan has been and continues to
be an essential ally in the war on terror. Our engagement and security
assistance programs are effective in building trust and confidence
within the Pakistani Army; however, it will take time to overcome
imbedded perceptions that have resulted from years of sanctions.
We have a comprehensive process to reimburse Pakistan for the
additional costs it incurs as a result of operations conducted in
support of the war on terrorism. This process has served us well in
allocating an appropriate level of assistance and supports our other
security assistance programs (Foreign Military Finance, International
Military Education and Training). It is important to ensure that our
various assistance programs are focused on not only reimbursement, but
also with the aim to solidify a strategically focused, long-term
balanced bilateral relationship. This requires that we constantly
assess whether the tools we are using lead to this end.
In the case of Coalition Support Funds, we have asked for and are
now receiving additional accountability detail to justify these claims.
We continue to closely scrutinize Pakistani claims and are working with
the Pakistanis to clarify what is and is not reimbursable. With regard
to Foreign Military Financing (FMF), we have begun moving towards
funding efforts that more closely support the war on terrorism and will
work with the Pakistanis on FMF for 2010 and beyond. Congressional
funding of the Security Development Plan will directly target
improvements to Frontier Corps capabilities that support our regional
efforts. Equipment that we provide to Pakistan is typically procured
through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, regardless of funding
source and so includes the End Use Monitoring provisions that are part
of that system.
Question. Given ongoing media scrutiny over Pakistan's ability to
safeguard its nuclear weapons during periods of instability, are you
convinced the Government of Pakistan has taken adequate measures to
ensure their nuclear weapons remain secure?
Answer. We are confident Pakistan's military maintains firm control
of its nuclear weapons and will continue to do so throughout periods of
political uncertainty. The exponential growth of Pakistan's nuclear
program coupled with the A.Q. Khan scandal (late 2003) posed inherent
security concerns and revealed program vulnerabilities. Since then,
Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, charged with oversight of its
nuclear program and headed by now retired Lieutenant General, has
implemented a variety of physical and personnel security measures
designed to eliminate threats to its nuclear program. They have
expanded outer perimeters of nuclear facilities to counter suicide
attacks, enhanced nuclear accounting and control procedures and
implemented a more robust personnel reliability program.
Question. How will recent elections in Pakistan affect our
relations with the Pakistan military?
Answer. I expect positive military-to-military relations will
continue, barring any major changes to Pakistan's willingness or
commitment to reject extremism in favor of ideologies that are
responsible and enduring. Pakistan and the United States share a common
goal to dissuade extremism and defeat the terrorism which threatens
world security--and we are both strongly committed to this end. This
mutual goal eclipses all political dynamics and serves to foster an
already productive and strong military-to-military relationship between
our two countries. The recent election and its developing outcomes do
highlight changing political dynamics in Pakistan, which will require
acknowledgment and some adjustment on our part, although I foresee no
major changes in our strategic relationship. The changing political
dynamics as a result of the recent elections will affect the position
of Pakistan's military in society and government. Prime Minister
Gillani's stated desire to put a Pakistani face on the war on terrorism
domestically may result in Pakistani efforts to downplay the U.S.
military role in Pakistan.
It is vital that we maintain continuous military relations with the
Pakistan military while their civilian political process unfolds. This
election gives the U.S. the opportunity to further relationships with
institutions and individuals other than Pres. Musharraf as well as
provide support to Pakistan for countering extremists' activities.
Outside of Admiral Mullen's two meetings with Pres. Musharraf, the
engagement of U.S. senior military leaders has been almost exclusively
with their Pakistan military counterparts since Pakistan's
parliamentary elections. During these meetings, Admiral Mullen has
stressed the importance of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship to both
countries and his commitment to strengthening that relationship.
Although Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Kayani, and the Pakistani Army would
prefer Musharraf remained president, even out of uniform, Musharraf
would serve as a known quantity that will protect the interests of the
army. However, the army will not likely choose to support Musharraf
over its own corporate interests or in the event of untenable levels of
civil unrest. Generally there is agreement amongst the politicians and
the media that the extremist activity emanating from the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is an issue that needs to be addressed
at the national level. In fact, several politicians have emphasized the
need for a ``two-pronged'' approach where political development and
security initiatives in the Northwestern Frontier Province (NWFP) and
the FATA complemented one another. Further, administrative isolation of
the FATA was a colonial policy that made no sense for a modern Pakistan
and needed to be redressed through a series of steps beginning with
extension of the Political Parties Act to the FATA and reform of the
Frontier Crimes Regulation. These attitudes and approaches bode well
for continued military-to-military relations between our two nations.
Question. What is your assessment of the cooperation and assistance
the coalition is receiving from Pakistan?
Answer. Pakistan has been, and will remain, a key ally in the War
on Terror; however, the type and scope of their support is heavily
impacted by Pakistan's regional security concerns and domestic
politics. Statements by recently elected Pakistani officials indicate
that Pakistan will remain an ally in the War on Terror; however, they
may review the nature and level of that support. Since 2001, Pakistan's
support has been a key enabler of coalition operations in Afghanistan.
Without their contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),
crucial air and ground links which provide a lifeline of support and
operational flexibility to coalition forces would not be possible.
Moreover, despite growing public resentment, the government has
maintained approximately 100,000 security forces throughout Baluchistan
and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
Question. Please describe the anti-Taliban operations underway in
Pakistan and how have these operations evolved over time?
Answer. Pakistan launched counter-terrorism operations in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in December of 2001 in
support of our operations in Afghanistan. The historic animosity
between the tribes and the Army, combined with a well equipped and
aggressive foreign fighter element, challenged Pakistani security
forces. In July 2006, the government entered into a peace accord with
the tribes and militant leaders in order to regain stability and
relieve pressure on the Army.
Violence increased significantly in July 2007 following the
government's raid on the Red Mosque in Islamabad, because it fueled
extremist animosity toward the government. Pakistani security forces
continued counter-militancy efforts in the FATA and surrounding regions
through late 2007; however, the Army shifted to a less aggressive
posture to allow the elections to proceed in early 2008. As of early
April 2008 the ceasefires between the government and tribes are
holding; however, there are indications the situation is eroding.
Pakistan's priorities in the border region are domestic politics
and Pakistan's regional security concerns. As a result, their military
posture, strategy and operations are focused on countering the domestic
militant threat emanating from this region. Improving Pakistan's
ability to address U.S. concerns in this region will require more than
diplomatic pressure, funding and training; it will also require a
change in the current domestic and regional environment that creates
conditions that allow Pakistan to take steps to address U.S. concerns.
Question. How are these operations likely to change in the short-
and long-term, particularly in light of increasing cross-border
incursions by the Taliban into Afghanistan?
Answer. First, available data does not indicate ``increasing''
cross-border incursions, but rather a predictable return to heightened
militant operations that occurs each year in the spring as weather
improves. Pakistan's current political situation and statements by
military and civilian leaders indicate we are unlikely to see a renewal
of large-scale military operations in the tribal areas in the near-
term. The long-term plan for the FATA focuses on development and
improved governance, supported by a strong yet constrained military
presence. Pakistan's long-term plan for improved border security
includes developing Frontier Corps capacity to better interdict cross-
border activity.
Question. Do you believe you have all the assets important to your
mission requirements in Pakistan?
Answer. The U.S.-Pakistan military-to-military security
relationship is strong and improving. We must continue to support
Pakistan in its efforts to combat terrorism on its own territory, while
respecting Pakistani sovereignty. Legislatively, supporting Pakistan's
legitimate defense and counter-terrorism needs will improve both its
capability and our relationship. The war on terror is as much a
challenge for Pakistan as it is for the U.S. The Government of Pakistan
(GoP) is empowering the Frontier Corps, a largely indigenous force that
has traditionally operated in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. We support this effort through
the U.S. Security Development Plan and are working with Pakistan to
make the Frontier Corps into an effective security force through a
long-term plan to address shortfalls in equipment, training and
intelligence capability, in concert with Embassy and GoP efforts. Line
item funding of this program for 2009 and beyond would help ensure that
we are able to focus our efforts on these most critical forces. Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) for Pakistan currently runs through 2009.
Continuing FMF funding at current levels in the out years would
simultaneously provide tangible evidence of U.S. commitment to Pakistan
and help fund programs that support both Pakistani and U.S. efforts in
the war on terror.

Military-to-Military Relationships

Question. Admiral, please describe for the Committee some of the
key military-to-military relationships within your area of
responsibility and why these relationships are important to you as a
combatant commander.
What can Congress do to support these relationships?
Answer. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is absolutely vital to
ensuring we succeed in the war against terrorism. Pakistan is a major
contributor to our operations, having killed or captured more
terrorists than almost any other partner. Pakistan has suffered as
consequence as well, losing more than 1000 military personnel as part
of operations conducted in support of the U.S. since 9/11. The bulk of
our ground and aerial resupply for Afghanistan operations flows through
Pakistan. More importantly, Pakistani support for the war against
terror is essential due to its geographic location and relationship
with Afghanistan. In addition, as the sole Islamic nuclear power,
security and stability in Pakistan is of the utmost importance to U.S.
national security interests. Congress can support this vital
relationship by continuing to fund critical programs in Pakistan,
including the Security Development Program and by continuing to support
Pakistani efforts to meet legitimate defense needs, such as with the F-
16 sale. Through these efforts the U.S. will signal that it is
committed to a long-term bilateral relationship and continues to build
essential trust and confidence within the Pakistani military.
Jordan is an ally on the War on Terror, a steadfast regional
partner, and at peace with its neighbors. The ties between our
militaries are deep and longstanding, with an extremely robust
bilateral exercise schedule and frequent, fruitful exchanges between
officers at all levels of command. However, Jordan has made this
commitment to our mutual success at a higher percentage of their gross
national product than is sustainable. Congress can help by funding
Jordan's Foreign Military Financing allocation at the requested multi-
year level of approximately $345 million, as well as continuing to
support programs which contribute to Jordan's ability to defend
themselves and secure their borders.
Egypt is another of our key partners and serves as an anchor state
towards achieving CENTCOM's Theater Strategic Objectives in the region.
The Egyptian military is a coalition partner with us in Afghanistan,
provides expedited canal transits, grants nearly unlimited overflights
for our aircraft, and serves as a moderating voice of support for our
efforts in the region. The cornerstone of our partnership with Egypt is
commonly recognized as the $1.3 billion annual Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) allocation that was established in 1979 following the
historic Camp David Accords. Over the last three years, that FMF has
been the target of proposed reductions and conditioning by members of
Congress. Those attempts to reduce FMF have led many of our Egyptian
friends to question the U.S. commitment to the partnership and threaten
to undermine the relationship that has been built over the past twenty-
nine years. I encourage Congress to preserve current FMF funding levels
for Egypt and protect its FMF from conditionality or reduction.
The UAE is another key partner within our area of responsibility.
Our relationship with this progressive and forward thinking military
friend and ally is very strong. Its importance not only lies on its
strategic location but more so in its commitment to regional security
and its efforts in the war on terrorism. Its Armed Forces have been
working hand in hand with us toward peace and stability in the Middle
East. Congress can best sustain our excellent relations by ensuring
quick action on notifications of defense related hardware of mutual
interest and by considering the UAE's requests for defense systems on
their merits, not linked to other countries' requests. Additionally, at
every opportunity, we can thank the UAE for their steadfast support of
Coalition and U.S. Forces in the region and for leading and
participating in several multilateral, as well as bilateral, military
exercises and symposiums.
Congress helped greatly by approving JDAM and LANTIRN sales to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Both of these programs increase our military
interoperability and modernize the weapons of a key partner. Congress
can further help by approving the AIM-9X missile program. The AIM-9X
will be a key component in Saudi Arabia's ability to counter regional
threats. Additionally, the U.S. is working with the Kingdom to enhance
its navy and secure critical infrastructure. Both of these are key
areas of interest for regional stability and continued economic access.
As requests in these areas come before Congress, CENTCOM looks forward
to working with members to facilitate approval and show our key partner
that the U.S. takes Saudi security seriously.
Question. Please describe the influences of China and India in the
geopolitics of the area and what you are doing to counter these
influences.
Answer. China's influence in the CENTCOM AOR is growing in
proportion to China's investment in the energy sectors of various
countries in the region and China's expanding markets for its
commercial products. China remains an alternative market for arms
purchases and a limited amount of military assistance for many of the
region's nations, but has its strongest role in this regard with
Pakistan. China is seeking to ensure access to energy resources to meet
its growing energy demand, especially via overland routes. In terms of
energy, China is significantly invested in Sudan, Qatar, Iran,
Kazakhstan, and recently signed a $30 billion pipeline deal with
Turkmenistan that has yet to be constructed. China's most significant
investments are in Pakistan where it provided funding for the
construction of Gwadar Port and other infrastructure projects--
investments which augment the robust security partnership the two
countries have shared.
India's influence in our AOR is not as significant as China's, but
is also growing, especially in regard to expanding energy relationships
with Iran. India has continually sought to remain engaged in
Afghanistan's reconstruction, primarily to demonstrate its role as a
regional power but also to frustrate Pakistani interests in denying
India access to Afghanistan. The most significant influence India has
in the AOR is the potential for conflict with Pakistan and the tensions
arising from Kashmir and water management issues. India's increasing
economic strength and diplomatic status have consequently led to
India's expanding contacts in the AOR, especially in Central Asia and
Iran.
Neither China nor India actively seek to counter U.S. interests in
the region, per se, but more accurately, they are pursuing their own
economic interests and desire to achieve access and diplomatic
relationships to support their commercial and energy requirements. They
are not deterred by any potential conflicts of interest with the U.S.
or Europe as they pursue their own national interests. China and India
would prefer to see less U.S. military presence in the region, but they
generally support U.S. security interests in defeating violent
extremist organizations; both China and India support the role of the
international community in stabilizing Afghanistan.
CENTCOM does not specifically focus any of its activities in
countering Chinese and Indian influence in the region. CENTCOM programs
and operations support U.S. national security interests in the region;
at present, neither China nor India are officially viewed as strategic
threats to be actively countered. In most cases, regional militaries
require more assistance than is currently allocated by the U.S. and
Europe, which leaves room for China, Russia, and to a lesser extent
India, to contribute as well. The lack of U.S. economic and military
engagement with Iran and Syria, naturally forces those countries to
look elsewhere.
Question. Are military to military programs adequately resourced?
Answer. Military to military programs are generally adequately
resourced. As our security cooperation relationships in the region
expand, however, the need for additional resources will also increase.
Currently funding for Central and South Asia has been adequate,
however, each source of funding has its own restrictions on how monies
can be spent, creating a challenge to support all military contact
events. Additionally, a number of Central and South Asian uniformed
services do not align perfectly with Department of Defense (DoD)
military branches, yet the need for military contact events with these
foreign uniformed services are necessary to build stronger security
cooperation relationships. For example, the Border Guards of some
Central Asian countries do not fall under the Ministry of Defense and
therefore are not eligible for DoD funded military contact events.
However, the Border Guards play a significant role in counter-
narcotics, counter-terrorism and regional stability and so CENTCOM
explores other ways to fund this sort of engagement. Funding for
Pakistan's Security Development plan, while adequately met in FY08
through supplemental and other funding sources, will require additional
resources in the out years, ideally as a line item in the DoD budget.
In short, we are adequately resourced, but we must remain flexible in
order to maximize our security cooperation potential.

Cooperation With Central Asian Countries

Question. The U.S. has expanded its security cooperation with the
Central Asian regimes since 2001, to include varying levels of military
basing and access.
What is your assessment of the current U.S. military relationship
with its Central Asian counterparts?
Answer. The military relationship with most of our Central Asian
counterparts is good and improving. Soon after the September 11th
attacks, Uzbekistan stepped forward and offered basing access and
overflight rights to the U.S. for operations in Afghanistan. While this
relationship soured late in 2005 after the Andijon events and
termination of the access agreement, recently there have been modest
signs of improvement in the relationship. Since the U.S. left Kharshi-
Khanabad Airbase in Uzbekistan, Manas Airbase in Kyrgyzstan has become
more important as the only remaining northern Central Asia base. The
Kyrgyz have been willing to expand and solidify that relationship and
improvements to the infrastructure and capabilities of Manas airbase
continue. Kazakhstan has aggressively pursued strengthening of the
bilateral relationship with the U.S. The Kazakhstanis recently signed a
five-year-plan of military cooperation with the U.S., which is further
proof of our strengthening cooperation. Although Turkmenistan's
approach to the bilateral relationship has been quite circumspect since
2001 it has improved and shows real promise since the death of
President Niyazov last year. Turkmenistan's new President
Berdimukhammedov continues to allow U.S. humanitarian overflight and
gas and go operations within Turkmenistan. Recent gestures toward
improving the international investment climate as well as breaking down
Niyazov's cult of personality suggest a much brighter future for the
bilateral military relationship with Turkmenistan.
Question. Does CENTCOM have an interest in long term military
basing and access in support of operations in Afghanistan?
Answer. Yes. In our annual Master Plan submission we stated that we
desire long term access to two locations in Afghanistan. One location
is Bagram Air Base which will serve as the long term operational hub
for CENTCOM military operations in Central and south Asia. The other
location is Kandahar which provides critical support for U.S.
operations in Afghanistan and would provide surge capability for U.S.
military activities in this region in the future. This basing and
access is assessed each year and provided to SECDEF for approval and
submitted to Congress in our annual Master Plan submission.

Recent Report Findings Concerning the Security Situation in Iraq

Question. In general, incidents of violence are down significantly.
However, these are many, intertwined reasons for this including: the
surge, changes in the tactics employed by U.S. and coalition forces,
cooperation between tribal leaders (the ``tribal awakening''), ethnic
cleansing of formerly mixed localities, and the continued cease-fire on
the part of Sadrist militias.
Admiral, do you believe that Iraqi security forces are capable of
operating independently soon?
Answer. ------.
Question. Recent reporting available to the Congress suggests that
Iraqi forces have not reached a point of being able to operate
independently. Would you comment?
Answer. ------.

The Iraq Weekly Security Incidents Report

Question. The Iraq Weekly Security Incidents, 15-21 February 2008
reports incidents of violence in total and stratifies incidents based
on an assessment of the intended targets. The reported period is March
2005 through the present and shows a decline in weekly incidents of
violence from a high of nearly 1,600 incidents per week in early June
2007 down to about 450 incidents for the most recent reporting period,
a level roughly comparable to the level reported in March 2005.
Admiral, do you believe that we should be encouraged that the level
of violence since the surge is roughly comparable to the level in March
2005?
Answer. The reduced level of violence in Iraq is encouraging and it
allows the Government of Iraq to work on creating a functioning state
that is not totally focused on security issues. That said, the nature
of violence has changed and it continues to have the potential to
spike. Sectarian violence is the primary area where attacks have been
reduced in the past year. The U.S. ``surge'' set conditions that
allowed tribal efforts (Sons of Iraq) to blossom, creating jobs for
many disaffected Sunni Arabs. This enabled Sunnis to reduce support for
and to combat al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Additionally, Sadr's call for a
Jash al Mahdi (JAM) ceasefire further reduced sectarian violence.
Finally, coalition pressure on AQI reduced AQI's ability to sustain
attacks.

The 9010 Report

Question. What is your assessment?
Answer. I've got to tell you that, after going to Iraq, I am very
encouraged. The situation has improved substantially in the security
arena, and I believe that there are many other aspects of the situation
that are coming together that have contributed to this improvement, and
I see this on an upward vector. General Petraeus has the major task of
resetting the battlefield there. He has to focus on keeping this
momentum moving towards increased stability and security. It is truly
remarkable today to look at the statistical evidence and--as many of
you know because you were there to see it, to actually see the
difference on the ground.
Further progress will depend on the continued ability of Iraqi
leaders to capitalize on the hard-fought gains achieved by the
Coalition and Iraqi forces and gradually assume responsibility for
security in their country. However, I remain concerned that real,
sustained progress in Iraq over the long term will depend on their
ability to address a complex set of issues associated with key
political and economic objectives.
On the political front, I am concerned that the Iraqi political
leadership continues to squander the opportunity our troops and
taxpayers gave them. Much in Iraq will depend on the continued
legislative progress, improvements in the Iraqi ministries and their
will to turn nascent political accommodation at the local and national
levels into lasting national reconciliation. I am troubled by the fact
that our soldiers continue to risk their lives while Iraqi politicians
continue to refuse to take political risks.
On the economic front, any enduring improvements for Iraq will be
dependent on the government of Iraq's still-tenuous ability to provide
essential services and improve the oil, electricity and water
infrastructures. Advances in these areas will be critical to keeping
Iraq on the path to sustainable economic development. As the economic
activity levels increase in Iraq, this is really the longer-term
solution. We've got to have help from the development agencies and from
others. I'm encouraged by the beginnings of investment from outside
private money into Iraq in the future of this country, and that's the
real answer, giving them alternatives.
Question. The Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq (the 9010
Report), December 2007 makes several references to ``bottom-up''
reconciliation which is reconciliation among Sunni and Shi'a tribal
leaders who are increasingly working with the Government of Iraq and
Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
Please explain the ``bottom-up'' reconciliation.
Answer. Bottom-up reconciliation efforts represent one way we have
been able to work towards national reconciliation within Iraq. Because
national-level progress continues to be hindered by competing political
interests, we initiated some local-level, bottom-up level security
improvements in Anbar province that has led to favorable conditions at
the local level for positive movement in the areas of reconciliation,
political accommodation, economic development and the provision of
basic public services. Once it took hold in Anbar, we expanded it to
other areas--and we were able to incorporate growing numbers of Sunni
and Shi'a tribal leaders into working with the Government of Iraq and
the Coalition to improve security and economic conditions at the local
level.
While the record on ``top-down'' reconciliation remains mixed, the
Awakening movement among the tribes of western, central and northern
Iraq continues to grow. Sunni Arab and a growing number of Shi'a
sheikhs are now working with the Coalition. Their tribal members and
other local citizens are fighting AQI through participation in the Sons
of Iraq groups. Nationwide, some 91,000 members continue to reject
extremism and are joining the political process by working through
established governing institutions. The Sons of Iraq groups complement
Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police and Coalition forces and have begun to
integrate its members into the Iraqi forces. Some senior Iraqi
politicians who formerly opposed Sons of Iraq members have begun to
recognize the value of these groups in stabilizing Iraq. These
politicians are making public statements about the significance of this
``bottom-up'' initiative and supporting the program.
Question. Admiral, would you comment on the progress on key
legislation, as well as political reform and reconciliation?
Answer. The Government of Iraq passed a number of key pieces of
legislation this past reporting period. In early February, the Iraqi
Government passed the Accountability and Justice Law, reforming the
draconian de-Baathification measures that were in place. This was a
controversial bill on all sides, and was never going to please all
former Baathists and all victims of the Hussein regime. But it was also
a compromise in which all sides took some risk. We are watching closely
now to see that it is implemented in a spirit of reconciliation. Even
more impressively, on February 13, the Council of Representatives (CoR)
passed three laws; the 2008 Budget, the Amnesty Law and the Provincial
Powers Law. This was an unprecedented legislative grand bargain that
included major compromises across political alliances and ethno-
sectarian lines. On February 26, 2008, the Presidency Council endorsed
the Budget and Amnesty Laws, but Vice President Mehdi returned the
Provincial Powers Law for amendment on constitutional grounds. On 19
Mar, VP Mehdi waived his objection, provided the CoR consider
amendments in the future. The passing of the Provincial Powers Law, in
concert with the Provincial Elections Law now in the works, puts into
motion the possibility that provincial elections will be held before
the end of 2008. And ultimately these elections are the means by which
the provinces of Iraq will realize their individual importance within a
functioning federal system. This will be an eye-opener for all Iraq
leaders; reforming the political landscape at the local, provincial and
federal levels and above all localizing politics and the means of
providing for the population. These types of legislative successes
represent a significant step toward broader political reconciliation
within Iraq.
The passing of the 2008 Budget was a significant event. There were
numerous contested issues with regard to the budget, but none more so
than the overall percentage of the budget provided to the Kurdistan
region in the North (17%). This was the major sticking point in the
budget's passage, but this was overcome by a CoR that recognized the
importance of their offices and their duties and responsibilities to
the Iraq citizenry.
The Amnesty Law passage was a major accomplishment toward
reconciliation and reform. It greatly reduced an obstacle to the return
of key Sunni parties to the political process by releasing significant
numbers of detainees from Iraqi custody if they have not been charged
or convicted of serious crimes.
Several key laws remain to be tackled in the weeks and months to
come; the Provincial Elections Law just mentioned, and the package of
Hydrocarbon laws being the most prominent. But the actions of the CoR
this past February indicate that dialogue can occur, compromise can
happen, and Iraq's future looks brighter today than in recent past.
As I mentioned earlier, reconciliation in Iraq is taking on a
``bottom up'' flavor. The tribal sheiks and provincial leaders are
searching for avenues for reconciliation. This momentum will be
fostered (I believe) by the Provincial elections that are now on the
calendar. They will further power an Iraq reconciliation that will
recognize the right to religious differences and yet instill a sense of
nationalism amongst its people. I would like to point out that the
Government of Iraq also passed a highly symbolic flag law, eliminating
the Saddam Hussein-era flag. Today, the new Iraqi flag flies over all
parts of Iraq, including Iraqi Kurdistan.
It's been encouraging to watch the development of the Iraqi
leadership, from Prime Minister al-Maliki on down, to see them take
responsibility. It's not a straight line, and I don't think it's going
to be. And there are things that are frustrating. This is a different
culture from ours, and, frankly, it's a different political process and
philosophy in this country, but its coming along. So I think we have to
continue to engage them, continue to point out to them the cost of this
in terms of blood, sweat and tears on the part of our people, which is,
as you know, very substantial--the resources that we've devoted to this
country. They're working on it. They're taking responsibility, in my
view. Whether it's in the political process or in recognition, it seems
to me they are more aggressive now in going out and addressing issues
away from the capital, and this is essential to me. If they can't
figure out how to get people in the provinces, the basics that they
need, we're not going to be successful nor are they. But increasingly I
see them paying attention to it.
Question. With regard to the officer and NCO shortfall, the report
finds that it will be years before Iraq can round out its leadership
requirements because of constrained training facilities which are
presently operating continuously at or near capacity.
Admiral, would you say that Iraqi forces are dependent upon
Coalition enablers?
Answer. ------.
Question. Please describe these ``enablers'' and those that are
most critical to the effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces.
Answer. ------.
Question. Admiral, according to Measuring Security and Stability in
Iraq (the 9010 Report), dated December 2007 ``Syria is estimated to be
the entry point for 90% of all foreign terrorists known in Iraq''.
Would you comment?
Answer. ------.
Question. Would you comment on the continuing activities of the
Kurdistan Peoples Congress (KGK) such as its cross-border raids into
Turkey? How do you believe the current situation can be resolved?
Answer. ------.

The Jones Commission Report

Question. Address the training, equipping, command, control and
intelligence, and logistics capabilities capacity of the ISF, and
Assess the likelihood that the continued support of U.S. troops will
contribute to the readiness of the ISF to fulfill its missions.
Admiral, the Jones Commission found that ``. . . the Iraqi Security
Forces will not be able to secure Iraqi borders against conventional
military threats in the near term.'' Would you comment?
Answer. ------.
Question. The Jones Commission reports signs of improvement
including evidence that baseline infrastructure is forming to lead to
successful national defense capabilities but the ISF will be ``unable
to fulfill their essential security responsibilities independently over
the next 12-18 months''.
What is your assessment?
Answer. ------.
Question. The Commission report states: ``The Iraqi Police Service
is fragile . . . the force is underequipped and compromised by militias
and insurgent infiltration. In general, the Iraqi Police Service is
incapable today of providing security at a level sufficient to protect
Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence''. Admiral,
how is this being addressed?
Answer. ------.
Question. The Commission found specific weaknesses due to a lack of
key support functions such as aviation support, intelligence and
communications and found that the Iraqi Defense Forces lack required
combat support services such as adequate indigenous training,
logistics, supply chain management and equipment maintenance
capabilities. The Commission concludes: ``Logistics remains the
Achilles's heel of Iraqi ground forces''.
Do you agree with the commission's assessment that, `` . . .
achieving an adequate force-wide logistics capability is as least 24
months away''?
Answer. ------.
Question. Are the Iraqis making progress on improving their
logistics capability?
Answer. Iraqi Army logistics have improved significantly since June
2007 and continue to move forward. All logistics disciplines exist in
various stages of independence. Leveraging existing Iraqi processes,
overarching policies and procedures are still in early stages of
development across the logistics spectrum. Life Support Self Reliance
(LSSR) is the process furthest along and independence increases
monthly. Ministry of Defense (MOD) is becoming less reliant on
coalition fuel support.
While the Iraq Air Force development began in earnest just one year
ago, the Air Force logistics concept is similar to the Army system with
the maintenance system having four levels or lines of maintenance,
currently using a mix of Iraqi Air Force technicians (under advisement
of Coalition military and contractor personnel) and contractors at
regional maintenance facilities.
The Iraqi Navy, meanwhile, utilizes organic sustainment capability
which currently completes mainly first and second line repairs on their
vessels and vehicles. Third and fourth line repairs will likely be
conducted by contractors which is consistent with the Gulf Naval
forces.
Question. How can U.S. Forces assist the Iraqi armed forces to
improved their logistics capability?
Answer. Partnership and over watch are linchpins to successful
transition to Iraqi logistics self sufficiency and is a joint Iraqi
Ministry of Defense (MOD)--Coalition imperative. Both Multi-National
Corps--Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command--Iraq have
coordinated to accelerate the development of logistics capabilities and
capacities in partnership with Iraqi leadership. Coalition over watch
along side Iraqi counterparts enables the identification of logistics
priorities through joint assessment and engagements, facilitating Iraqi
solutions and priorities to Iraqi challenges.
Question. Do the Iraqis lack logistics ``know how'', or do they
lack the actual supplies and delivery capability?
Answer. It would be incorrect to state the Iraqis lack the know how
or the delivery capability, but rather state there are limitations in
both areas. While there are current Iraqi processes in place,
additional overarching procedures continue to be developed. In
addition, while there are certain categories of logistics that are
farther along than others, the development of additional trained
personnel and facilities for the storage, repair and distribution of
supplies and equipment continues. While the system is not sufficiently
developed to support and sustain itself, the process is on-going to
improve both the ``know how'' (the training of personnel and the
policies and procedures) and the delivery and maintenance capabilities.
Question. The Commission report states that: ``The Ministry of the
Interior is a ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as being
dysfunctional and sectarian, and suffers from ineffective leadership.
Such fundamental flaws present a serious obstacle to achieving the
levels of readiness, capability, and effectiveness in police and border
security forces that are essential for internal security and
stability''.
How long do you expect this will be corrected?
Answer. ------.
Question. How long do you expect that it will take?
Answer. ------.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Tuesday, March 11, 2008.

FISCAL YEAR 2009 AIR FORCE POSTURE

WITNESSES

HON. MICHAEL W. WYNNE, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
GENERAL T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Introduction

Mr. Rothman [presiding]. Good morning. This hearing of the
House Appropriations Committee on Defense will now convene.
This morning the Committee will hold an open hearing concerning
the Air Force fiscal year 2009 budget request.
We are pleased to welcome two distinguished witnesses, Mr.
Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force, and General T.
Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. They are very
well qualified to discuss these areas and to answer the
questions of the committee.
Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, thank you for being here
this morning. The Committee is very interested in hearing what
you have to say about the Air Force's fiscal year 2009 budget.
We look forward to your testimony and to a spirited and
informative question-and-answer session. Now, before we hear
your testimony and opening statements, I would like to call on
Mr. Tiahrt for his opening remarks.

Opening Statement of Mr. Tiahrt

Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for being here for this hearing. I also want to thank Chairman
Murtha for holding the hearing. I am looking forward to the
testimony of Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. And although
this is an annual Air Force posturing, hearing, I hope the
witnesses will be willing to comment on the recent KC-X tanker
contract. This controversial decision to award a $35 billion
contract to a foreign supplier has rightfully outraged the
American public around the country. The losing bidder has
announced they intend to protest this decision, and rightfully
so, but I still believe that both of you need to answer some
questions on this vitally important issue and also the
methodology used by the Pentagon on any decision for a
contract.
The more I learned about this decision, the more I realized
that this competition will need to be redone. It will save the
Air Force time and money to immediately revise the RFP with
your apparent goal of replacing the KC-10.
Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, one of the most difficult
things from this whole experience is that I believe I was
misled by the United States Air Force. Since 2001, the Air
Force has said that it must replace the KC-135, our medium-
sized tanker. For 7 years and countless hearings, the Air Force
has said the same thing: We need to replace the medium-sized
tanker.
And now the Air Force buys an airplane bigger than the KC-
10, not as efficient as the KC-10, but bigger. What has changed
and why was not Congress informed that the Air Force actually
wanted to replace the KC-10 and not the KC-135? Why did the RFP
baseline reflect a KC-10 instead of the KC-135?
It is hard for me to understand how something as integral
as the size of the aircraft was misconstrued in the award
decision. This is just one of the many reasons why you will
save time and money by deciding to recompete this with your
real goals and intent.
However, in the meantime, I believe Congress has an
important role of understanding how the acquisition system
failed the American people. It is becoming clear to me that the
government has a stacked deck in favor of European
manufacturers. As I mentioned last week, three of the last big
defense contracts have been awarded to foreign companies. The
Navy awarded the Marine One contract to a foreign manufacturer.
We should have suspected something was going on. Then the Army
awarded the light utility helicopter to a foreign manufacturer.
We should have known something was going on. And now with the
Air Force awarding the KC-X to a foreign manufacturer, it is as
plain as the nose on our face. Foreign competitors are able to
compete and win against American manufacturers because our
acquisition laws actually favor foreign competitors. The deck
is stacked for foreign competitors.
For instance, the Air Force did not account for the costly
regulations that our domestic manufacturers have to comply
with. And you simply waive it for our European allies, with an
internal procedure inside the Pentagon. This includes cost
accounting standards, specialty metals laws, the Berry
amendment, Buy American provisions, Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act and ITAR compliance. These are the ones I know of. There
are probably others.
The Air Force did not account for the $5 billion illegal
subsidy that European governments provided to Airbus for the
development of the A330. One part of our government is suing
them for this illegal subsidy, and then another part awards
them a contract that has it embedded in the price. You simply
ignore the subsidies, and yet the cost accounting standards
would require an American manufacturer to amortize such costs.
Foreign manufacturers gain a huge cost advantage which is
unacceptable in the final contract award.
The Air Force did not account for the billions of legal
subsidies, such as socialized health care and workmen's
compensation that the American manufacturer, because of cost
accounting standards in the Federal Acquisition Regulations,
have to include in their costs. This provides a French company
with a competitive advantage over an American company.
The Air Force did not account for the loss of tax revenue
with fewer American jobs. Under the Airbus tanker, America will
see a minimum--just taking a minimum of 19,000 jobs, if you
just take the proposals at their face value. I think it is
actually going to be greater based upon past performance of
EADS in other contracts. These are good, high-paying jobs. We
should expect that these workers would pay a minimum of $10,000
a year in Federal taxes. If you factor that throughout the life
of this program, that means lost revenue to the Federal
Government of $3.8 billion.
So what does this $35 billion contract cost the American
people? It costs them 35 billion for the initial contract and
then an additional 3.8 billion in lost revenue. So it is 38.8
billion, not 35.0 billion. What should our system do to account
for these type of lost costs? The Air Force did not account for
the industrial base concerns. The Navy does when making
acquisitions for submarines and all ships. They take into
consideration the industrial base. But the Air Force did not
even ask that question. Maybe they were not interested in the
answer.
The Air Force did not account for the national security
concerns. As you know, tankers are a single point of failure.
Our national defense and United States military does not
project power without tankers. But no consideration was given
to our national industrial base.
Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, you may argue that you
did not have legal responsibilities or requirements to address
these issues, but didn't you have a professional obligation to
at least address them? You had two competitors, but they were
not on equal footing. It was not a fair competition. The deck
was stacked against the American supplier and against the
American workers.
I hope that we can take these things into consideration and
learn lessons from our experience. But it would save the
government money if we would just go ahead and put in the RFP
your apparent intent of buying a replacement for the KC-10 and
save us all a lot of money. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Tiahrt.
Mr. Rothman. I know that Mr. Dicks has an opening statement
as well.

Opening Statement of Mr. Dicks

Mr. Dicks. Well, I want to welcome our witnesses, and I too
must say this is one of the most regrettable days I have had
since I have been in the United States Congress. And I say that
because I, too, feel that I was personally misled. I think the
Congress was misled, this committee was misled, the Boeing
Company was misled.
And, you know, we start with what the Air Force was saying
in 2002. The KC-330's increase in size does not bring with it
commensurate increase in available air refueling offload. The
Air Force went on to say that the EADS aircraft would demand a
greater infrastructure investment and dramatically limit the
aircraft's ability to operate effectively in worldwide
deployment.
And if we could put my chart up here, in a hearing in 2006
before this Committee, Secretary Wynne, I asked--we were
talking about this, and Secretary Wynne said, So as we look at
this, we would tell you that the first--our highest motivation
is actually medium-sized tankers. Then our highest motivation
is mixed fleet. Our last thing we want to do is have a whole
fleet of large airplanes.
I also feel that a memorandum that Ken Miller provided to
me, if we can put that up now, really lays this thing out in a
way that--and this was given to me in December of 2007. And it
shows tanker road map, KC-135R, which is a medium-sized tanker
equivalency. And it shows the first tranche of airplanes is
going to be the KC-X, 15 years, a medium. Then the KC-Y, 15
years, a medium. And the KC-Z, 9 years, large. And at the
bottom we have the KC-10. And it is there all the way through
this.
And, General Moseley, I asked the question, How many of
these do we have? We have 59 of these airplanes. They are the
newest airplanes. They would be the last that you would replace
first. In fact, that was testified to in several cases. So I
feel that I was misled in this. Boeing was misled. They wrote a
letter to the Air Force after--there were some changes in a
model that was owned and operated by Northrop-Grumman. Were you
aware that this CMARPS model, Mr. Secretary, was under the
control of the Northrop Company, was owned and operated by
them? And I hope there was a firewall between that model,
because a number of changes were made to it right up to the
time of the decision, which made it more--made it possible for
the bigger plane to be competitive.
In fact, Northrop-Grumman wrote a letter to the Air Force,
which I do not think our committee has yet received, which we
would like to have, that basically said if you do not change
the criteria then we are going to pull out of the competition.
So what did the Air Force do? It changed the criteria. Ken
Miller came to my office and said, We cannot do anything. They
will drop out. We have to do this.
And in fact, the Air Force didn't tell anybody until Boeing
wrote a letter to the Air Force, saying you made these changes,
and we think it indicates that you favor a large airplane. And
then they wrote a letter to the Air Force saying, if you want a
large airplane we will compete the 777. And they were
discouraged from doing this by the Air Force.
So I feel that we were misled. And I am with Mr. Tiahrt, I
think there is only one way to fix this. And that is to go back
and compete the two planes. And if the Air Force wanted a large
plane, they should have said it. And they did not say it. You
said it repeatedly, over and over again. In fact, here is what
Secretary Wynne said in January of 2007. And I bring this up
because in the paper there has been all this credit given for a
larger--for cargo space and passenger space. But those were not
in the requirements. They were secondary issues. There was no
requirement for a certain amount of pallets or a certain amount
of passengers. It was a secondary issue.
Quoting Secretary Wynne--this is in the ``Inside the Air
Force.'' We want to buy a tanker. We do not want to buy a cargo
airplane that tanks. We also do not want to buy a passenger
airplane that tanks. We want to buy a tanker. Its primary
mission is going to be a tanker. The fact that it can carry
cargo or passengers is a benefit, but it is not the primary
reason for the procurement.
And General, I got to tell you General Lichte did not put a
lot of honor on his stars the other day when he said what we
want is more, more, more. That was not part of the RFP. He was
wrong to say it. And you cannot take this pig and put a flag on
it and say it is an American airplane. It is not an American
airplane. It is built, the wings, the fuselage, the tail, all
these things are built in Europe. They are going to be brought
to Mobile, Alabama.
And we have tried to build some of these projects, the A-6
rewinging. I think we tried, Northrop-Grumman tried to do their
Joint Stars program down there in Southern States, and they had
a hard time getting this thing done. Yet Boeing, who has got a
plant, who has built this plane, was written down and added
risk to their proposal for doing an in-line approach to this
thing, while the other people who have to bring all these parts
from Europe and bring them to Mobile, assemble them in a plant
that does not exist, with people that do not exist. The risk is
clearly on that side of the equation.
So I urge you to go back and start over. This is a sad day
because, after all the work and effort--and the necessity for
these tankers is without question. But you made a big mistake.
You did not do this right. You were not honest with the
Congress, myself, or the American people or Boeing, and you got
to go back and start over.
[Clerk's note.--The testimony and chart referred to by Mr.
Dicks follow.]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Opening Statement of Mr. Rothman

Mr. Rothman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Secretary, General, now I would welcome your opening
remarks, understanding that your full statements will be
admitted for the record.
I did want to acknowledge that the issue that Mr. Tiahrt
and Mr. Dicks--is of great importance to this Committee. But we
have already had one hearing on it, and I know that we will
have another one. We may well have several more. And we are all
very interested in that subject.
The subject matter for today's hearing is the Air Force's
Annual Posture Statement articulating the major element
requirements for the Air Force to fulfill its entire mission
and its priorities over the course of the next year and into
the future, and in particular explaining why the fiscal year
2009 budget request looks the way it does and why it should be
changed or should not be changed.
So Mr. Secretary, if you would begin.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rothman. Yes.
Mr. Moran. If, as apparently has happened, two of our
colleagues have addressed another issue in opening remarks, I
would like about 30 seconds to reflect another point of view
from this subcommittee.
Mr. Rothman. Certainly. If the Secretary and the General,
if you will just allow me, I will recognize Mr. Moran for 60
seconds.

Opening Statement of Mr. Moran

Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, there are some on this subcommittee who
believe that the professionals responsible for this procurement
acted in a professional manner. And in fact Ms. Payton, from
everything I can understand, is perhaps the best procurement
acquisition officer we have in the services, and that she
followed the law. And that some of us believe that it is the
Congress' responsibility, if they do not like the law, to
change the law. But unless there is something that can be shown
to us where the Air Force did not follow the law that it was
required to implement, then the disappointment in the results
may be only that. And you should know that there is a
difference of opinion with regard to that acquisition. Although
there may be shared disappointment that the contract is not
going to be carried out by American firms in all respects,
there is less disappointment in the way in which the Air Force
personnel conducted themselves. I think they conducted
themselves professionally. And I thank you for having
professional personnel working for you and working for us.
Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Moran.
Mr. Lewis, would you like to make opening remarks?
Mr. Lewis. No opening remarks. I am just anxious to attend
the tanker hearing this afternoon. The posture hearing is this
morning, I believe.
Mr. Dicks. The briefing is this afternoon.
Mr. Rothman. Very well. Mr. Secretary, if you would proceed
with your opening remarks.

Opening Statement of Secretary Wynne

Mr. Wynne. Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of America's Air
Force. Thank you as well for your support to our improved
readiness via retirement and recapitalization, as we are
working hard to see it through.
Today we also urge you to pass the pending supplemental, as
it will help. Across the Total Force of Active, Guard, Reserve,
and Civilian, we are America's strategic shield in air and in
space and in cyberspace. We are contributing to today's fight
with increasing ordnance drops, and we stand watch at the
missile fields, and we stand ready in the nuclear field, and we
are an effective air superiority and strike force to both deter
and dissuade any opponent who may consider our forces to be
stretched in the Global War on Terror.
We are gratified to hear that role reaffirmed by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the deliberate message to those
who might seek to dissuade or deter us from our own options in
the future. This is why we seek to move forward and not
backward into fifth-generation fighters, into new expeditionary
tankers, and into long-range strike assets.
We recently awarded the new KC-45A air refueling tanker. We
believe we accurately followed the laws and arrived at a
decision, selecting the better of two very qualified
competitors to some published criterion, a major step in the
Air Force critical recapitalization and modernization effort.
It is why we seek to modernize space assets as the Executive
Agent for Space and not see further fragmentation of the
management of this now vulnerable area. It is why we have
established the provisional Air Force Cyber Command, and see
this as a warfighting domain in which we need to dominate to
remain a netcentric force for the future.
Clearly, beyond the Global War on Terror, we must not lose
America's asymmetric advantage in strategic forces. Your Air
Force has been in the fight for 17 years, and yet has over the
same 17 years seen underfunded modernization. We thank you for
initiatives to restore fleet management to the United States
Air Force, a responsibility we do not take lightly.
When General Moseley and I came to our posts, we set about
a strategy to restructure our Air Force, to develop a lean and
efficient Air Force in order to husband the resources for
investment. We worried about the industrial base and the need
to look after the open lines. I am pleased to report to you
that the Department and the Air Force have indicated a desire
to not close the F-22 line and to develop the long-range strike
asset. It is to these we would like to apply the saved
resources over the near term, while the F-35 proves itself
through rigorous tests and is effectively capped on production.
We ask that you agree with an approach for the F-22
aircraft while we work to restore readiness with younger
aircraft. The F-35 and the F-22 are complementary. The F-22 is
bigger, is faster, and is planned to fly higher and can carry
more air-to-air weapons internally. Also, with less than 20
penetrating bombers in our current fleet, it is time to develop
an alternative t as well.
We have talked about being underfunded, but we here have
worked to offer a balanced budget prioritized to best defend
America, and we will continue to do that over the fiscal year
defense plan.
The Air Force Research Laboratory is well-engaged in
technology development, expanding the opportunity for energy
alternatives, while reducing our demand in our fleet and at our
bases and also expanding in unmanned flight, in propulsion, in
material science, as well as in human effectiveness.
With regard to space, at Kirtland Air Force Base, a branch
of the Air Force Research Laboratory is creating inherently
defensive space assets. In cyberspace, career development,
including the Air Force Institute of Technology and also
warfighting schools, are keys. Combatant commanders and
agencies partner with us in this increasingly contested domain.
I have worked in space for almost two decades, and have
worked in commercial and classified space as a supplier and a
customer. We need consolidated leadership to maintain our
current strategic advantage. Congress asked for a relook at
responses to the Space Commission, and we should really
consider what is in the report. The Air Force is undergoing a
``back to basics'' as well as a ``back to blue,'' complementary
efforts to restore a steady demand and knowledge base. I
recommend we keep the executive agency where it is. I have
engaged Airmen in both theaters of operation, and they have
asked about the continuation of our presence and the
continuation of the ground force tasking referred to as ``in
lieu of tasking.'' My answer is they perform so well that our
Army colleagues do not want to give them up. And they do
perform well, many winning Bronze and Silver Stars.
Your Air Force is currently protecting the air sovereignty
of these fledgling nations, and until their Air Forces can do
that, I would not be surprised to see our Air Forces remain. As
a result, we are reconsidering force cuts, although we are
currently continuing to give top priority in our budget to
recapitalization.
I again thank you for the privilege of leading the best Air
Force in the world. Every day our Airmen earn the respect of
our friends as well as our enemies. We worry for their quality
of life as we seek efficiencies and as we implement joint
basing, but we never worry about their sense of mission that
they bring to the task.
I will not have the privilege to represent them in this
setting for the force posture again, and I hope I have
reflected their pride in service, as I have felt myself. I am
ready to answer your questions.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[The joint statement of Secretary Wynne and General Moseley
follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Rothman. General Moseley.

Opening Statement of General Moseley

General Moseley. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity for Secretary Wynne
and I to talk about the posture of the United States Air Force,
our vision for the future, and the strategy to achieve it.
If you allow me to take my time, I would like to introduce
six distinguished Airmen that we brought with us today to put a
face to the committee on this great Air Force. And I would like
to, if you allow me to, take my time for a brief introduction
of each.
First, Lieutenant Colonel Brian Turner, University of
Virginia graduate, is a Virginia Air National Guardsman who
flies F-22As at Langley Air Force Base as part of the First
Raptor Classic Association between Air National Guard and
Active units. He is the assistant operations officer of the
149th Fighter Squadron. He is a symbol of the Air Force's
ironclad commitment to Total Force Integration and to
maximizing the strengths of the Air National Guard, Reserve,
and Active components. He has logged over 3,600 flying hours in
the F-16A, B, C and D and F-22A. He has got over 300 combat
hours.
Mr. Rothman. Excuse me, General, forgive me. We want to
make sure we get to all the questions, and I am honored to meet
all the people that you would like to introduce. If we do not
have to hear every part of their biography, I am sure they are
all distinguished, but a briefer synopsis of each's
contribution.
General Moseley. Yes, sir. And I will stay inside my five
minutes.
Mr. Rothman. I am willing to give you leeway, but much more
than that I think would impinge on the rights of the members to
ask all the questions they have. But I am anxious to hear your
presentation, sir.

SIX AMERICAN AIRMEN

General Moseley. All right, sir. One of his roles at
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia was flying in operation Noble
Eagle, with sorties over Washington, DC, New York, and the East
Coast.
Next is Captain Kari Fleming, a C-17 pilot from Charleston
Air Force Base, South Carolina. She is a 2003 graduate of the
United States Air Force Academy. Charleston Air Force Base is
her first assignment. She has amassed over 1,200 hours, total
flying hours, including 900 hours in the C-17. She has flown
124 combat missions, 278 combat hours since 2005 for Operation
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, where she has
flown missions that include direct supply, aeromedical
evacuation, and operational air drops, and she has just
returned from a deployment in the U.S. Central Command Area of
Responsibility (AOR). She is pretty proud to say she has landed
that big airplane in the dirt six times. Who would have thought
not long ago we would be landing a strategic airlifter on dirt
strips, or dirt roads? That is a face on the strategic airlift
of our country.
Next is Captain Scott Nichols of the 55th Rescue Squadron.
He is an HH-60G combat search-and-rescue pilot from Davis-
Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona where he is a flight commander.
Like Kari, he is a United States Air Force Academy graduate,
and he is also a distinguished graduate of the Air Force
Weapons School. Since May 2002, he has been deployed five
times: three times to Kandahar, Afghanistan, for Operation
Enduring Freedom; and two times to Balad Air Base in Iraq for
Operation Iraqi Freedom. He has logged over 2,000 total flying
hours, including 158 combat hours and 53 combat support hours.
Next is Technical Sergeant Jim Jochum. He is an aerial
gunner on a Special Operations AC-130 gunship out of Hurlburt
Field in Florida. He joined the Air Force in August 1989, and
spent five years as an aircraft maintainer before he joined Air
Force Special Operations. Since November 1995, he has logged
over 4,300 flying hours, 2,500 combat hours on 367 combat
sorties, in the AC-130, more than anyone else in Air Force
Special Operations Command. Since October 2001, he has accrued
892 days deployed, over three years. He wears an Air Medal and
16 oak leaf clusters.
Next is Technical Sergeant Michelle Rochelle. She is one of
the lead operators on the joint team of cyber operations under
the tactical control of U.S. Strategic Command's Joint
Functional Component Command for Network Warfare. There she
executes computer network attack missions and National Security
Agency task computer network exploitation missions. She is in
direct involvement with the Global War on Terror and supplying
strategic intelligence to America's political and military
leaders. Mr. Chairman, she represents the vanguard of the
forces we are organizing, training and equipping to operate in
cyberspace, and she is a reminder that we believe the cyber
domain is critical, the nexus of all warfighting domains.
Last we have Technical Sergeant Michael Shropshire,
currently the acting operations superintendent for the 12th
Combat Training Squadron at Fort Irwin, California. The
National Training Center is our interface between the Air
Warfare Center at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada and the United
States Army. He enlisted in July 1992. He is a battlefield
Airman who has spent his entire career associated with the
United States Army. Multiple deployments, from operation Joint
Endeavor in Bosnia to Operation Iraqi Freedom, he wears a
Silver Star and a Bronze Star. The Silver Star was awarded for
heroic actions while surrounded, cut off, under hail of enemy
gunfire in the largest sandstorm in four decades. He quickly
coordinated close air support, delivered 12 Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (JDAMs) on 10 Iraqi T-72 tanks, while constantly
switching from his radio headset to his rifle, personally
engaging and killing three hostiles at close range. He wears a
Bronze Star for exceptional performance as a tactical air
control party member during the Third Infantry Division's push
on Baghdad in 2003.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to take my
time for oral statements to introduce six great Americans that
wear Air Force blue. Secretary Wynne and I are proud to
introduce these to the committee today, and I am particularly
proud to wear the same uniform as the Chief of Staff of this
great Air Force, serving alongside these men and women that
represent a variety of functions inside your Air Force.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Rothman. General, thank you so much for introducing us
to these outstanding Americans. If I may ask the committee for
a round of applause to acknowledge in the briefest way their
service.
[Applause.]

ORGANIZING, TRAINING AND EQUIPPING

Mr. Rothman. Let me say a brief round of applause certainly
is not enough to honor and address what you do, but that is
what we are here today to accomplish: to provide a budget for
the Air Force for fiscal year 2009, which will allow you brave
men and women, and your leaders, to accomplish the critical and
noble mission that you have accepted on behalf of your country.
Let me begin by asking some general questions, an overview
for the General and the Secretary. How is the Air Force today
organizing, training, and equipping itself to deal with the
threats that face our Nation today and the threats that you can
foresee in the future? And how are these efforts reflected in
the 2009 budget?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, we believe that we are presently stretched,
but we are accomplishing the missions that have been assigned.
We demonstrate that we are being a little bit stressed in a
couple of ways. One is we took a real position to reduce our
Air Force from November of 2005 to now by about 10 percent. Our
Airmen are struggling with that reduction because we have seen
a growth in the ground forces, and we are responding to that.
We are stretched in the sense that we have airplanes that
are 20 years old on average in our fighter world, and 44 years
old on average in our tanker world, but yet our maintainers are
doing a crack job. Their best effort is to make sure that those
airplanes are satisfactory to the mission. So I would tell you
that we are stressed, but we are proud of the Airmen that are
keeping us aloft.

REDUCTION IN FORCE

Mr. Rothman. Mr. Secretary, before I get to the General,
you indicated a reduction in forces. The budget request is for
a 9 percent increase in Air Force budget over last year. You
indicated a reduction in forces, but at the same time there is
an increase in forces, in personnel. My understanding was that
the reduction in forces was to, for lack of a better term,
address an oversupply of middle management in the Air Force;
and the increase in personnel, which would exceed the decrease,
addresses the need for other types of personnel in the Air
Force. Is that correct, sir?
Mr. Wynne. Mr. Chairman, every person in our Air Force,
whether Active, Reserve, Guard or Civilian is a volunteer. We
value what they bring to our Air Force. We regretted any
reduction in force that we were required to do, but the
affordability is an issue. And affordability is how we are
responding. We are trying to prioritize what percent of the
American Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has allowed us to in fact
protect America. We prioritize this in such a way that right
now, with the age of our fleet, we need recapitalization. And
we need the investment. So we decided to prioritize the kind of
people we had as a reduction.
Now, I will tell you this is delicately balanced, because
if you lay off the maintenance people and they can not maintain
the airplanes, the airplanes will fall out of the sky. So we
have got to balance the recapitalization along the way with
this. When the Army and Marines have elected to increase their
force structure, which they have, we have got to relook at what
the impact is on our Air Force, because we directly support
them with our ground units, with our Joint Tactical Air
Controllers (JTACs), and with our airborne units. And so we
need to be very careful about making sure that we are not out
of balance and not out of synchrony with our ground force
components.
Mr. Rothman. General, did you want to address this? And by
the way, we are talking about--by the way, I am sure the
committee members know, but perhaps not the whole audience, you
are explaining the President's request.
Mr. Wynne. Right.
Mr. Rothman. This is the President's request for the Air
Force.
Mr. Wynne. Right.
Mr. Rothman. A 9 percent increase with these reductions in
one segment of the force, and increases in another segment. So
what you are presenting to us is what the President would like
us to accept. Okay. So you are fitting within a 9 percent
increase that he has imposed on you as his limit, and the
priorities you can accomplish for the Air Force within his
priority dollar figure; is that correct, sir?
Mr. Wynne. That is correct. We support the President's
Budget request. We believe we prioritized it within that.
Mr. Rothman. General.
General Moseley. Mr. Chairman, as we look at 17 years of
continued deployed combat in the Middle East, to include
Bosnia, Kosovo, Mogadishu, Somalia, along with the 12 years of
no-fly zones, some of the lessons learned from that length of
deployment in combat operations are we can continue to evolve
the Air Force. As the Air Force organizes, trains and equips,
we look at units, look at mission types, look at equipment, and
determine how to train these great Airmen to conduct tasks.
So as we look at the growth of unmanned vehicles with
multiple wings and the growth of combat search and rescue, we
hope to recapitalize with newer equipment. Now what does that
mean for our logistics support? For instance, we believe with
the Joint Strike Fighter, we can reduce the number of Air Force
specialty codes from 18 to eight relative to those squadrons.
So we think there are some inherent savings relative to these
new weapon systems.
But Mr. Chairman, I will also tell you as our comrades in
the Army grow, the Air Force interface in Air Force units that
directly support the Army also grows. For every one of the
brigade combat teams that the Army grows, we have embedded
Airmen--we have one Airman sitting behind me here--that
performs combat communications, combat weather, terminal air
control parties--all embedded. So for the Army growth that is
programmed, we grow about a thousand or so Airmen that reside
inside the Army.
Mr. Rothman. Gentlemen, if I may, and I am just going to
ask this question briefly, it is a large question, and then I
want to recognize Mr. Lewis----
Mr. Lewis. Go on to Norman.

UNFUNDED REQUIREMENT LIST

Mr. Rothman. Then I will go the other way around then. In
your opinion, Mr. Secretary, General, you have requested--the
President's request is a 9 percent increase over last year,
from 108 to roughly 117.9 billion; but you are looking for an
additional, or have mentioned that there is an additional wish
list, so to speak, or rather a list of unfunded mandates as it
has been called, of an additional 17.9 billion on top of the 9
percent increase that you would like to have funded.
In your opinion, is there any part of the President's Air
Force budget that can be used to address any portion of the
17.9 billion unfunded mandate list or that should be
substituted for what is in the President's 9 percent increase?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, we were pleased to get a nine percent
increase, as you mentioned. We were pleased that the President
saw that we needed an allocation of that magnitude. The
Congress asks us each year to come to them with what is the
requirement to meet the National Security Strategy, how would
you spend the next dollar? We felt like the appropriate thing
to do was stipulate a required force, to come off of that
required force in a very balanced way, and to defend the
President's Budget request as an acceptance of risk below that.
We think, as well, that you deserve to know where we would
spend the next dollar. And we have established a baseline for
the required force that we think is necessary. And I encourage
the members of this committee to become familiar with that, so
that you understand the baseline with which the Air Force is
operating. Chief?
General Moseley. Mr. Chairman, we take the National
Military Strategy, we dialogue with the combatant commanders,
we take their demand signals and their requirements, and we
build a required force that is parallel to those requirements.
The required force is the amount of funding that we have inside
the President's Budget request. The delta is a reflection of
the congressional requested unfunded requirements list.
Sir, I would take a bit of issue with calling it a wish
list because it deals with our people, it deals with combat
capabilities, and it deals with an Air Force that is at war. So
we provide that to the Congress. And that is a very open
process that we say, given one more dollar, this is where we
would spend it.
Mr. Rothman. So if we wanted to give you more money you
would not spend it on these things, General?
General Moseley. Sir, that is where the funding would go,
because that is what you asked us to provide.
Mr. Rothman. And let me correct myself. It is not an
unfunded mandate, these are unfunded requirements. And we are
grateful that you have thought through and laid out for the
Congress these additional items.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, would you just yield on this point
just a second to clarify?
Mr. Rothman. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. Congress, by statute I think, has required the
Air Force to do this.
Mr. Rothman. Yeah. I am not being critical of that.
Mr. Dicks. I think this is a good thing so that we know
what we could do at the margins if we had a little extra money.
Mr. Rothman. And frankly, I think it is our responsibility
to analyze the President's Budget and analyze the list of
unfunded requirements that the Air Force has presided. We may
have a difference of opinion with the administration, as have
prior committees with prior Presidents in prior fiscal year
budgets. But I would like now to--so I do not take all the
time--to acknowledge and recognize Mr. Tiahrt.

FOREIGN MANUFACTURING

Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to thank you for introducing the
troops. Only 1 percent of our population wears the uniform. And
I believe they are elite. And you just explained why when you
introduced those six individuals. So thank you for serving. I
appreciate it very much. And I also appreciate what Mr. Moran
said about having a professional workforce.
And Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, Assistant Secretary
Payton, Special Assistant Ken Miller, you have all done a very
professional job. And this is not about you individuals, this
is about the system that I believe is weighted heavily in favor
of foreign manufacturers. And some of it has come around
because of a memorandum of understanding within the Pentagon,
and it has created an unlevel playing field. And that is why a
lot more contracts today are going to foreign manufacturers
than ever have before in the history of this country.
The DFARS 225.872-1, General, is a memorandum of
understanding. It says as a result of memorandum of
understanding and other international agreements, DOD has
determined it is inconsistent with public interest to apply
restrictions of the Buy America Act or Balance of Payments
Program to the acquisition of qualifying country end products
from the following qualifying countries. And you list 18
countries, which include our NATO allies, basically. And then
there is another section which adds another three: Austria,
Finland, and Sweden.
And yet the requirements that you waive for these countries
are firmly held for American manufacturers, Specialty Metals
Act, cost accounting standards, the things I listed in my
opening statement, ITAR. All these things are paperwork that
require people and money and time to be invested in our
products.
In the future--and you know, we are focusing on the tanker
today, but this is something that is important to the whole
procurement system within the Pentagon because it was the Navy
that bought Marine One from a foreign manufacturer, it was the
Army that bought the light utility helicopter from a foreign
manufacturer, and it is the Air Force that made this decision.
All three of those were impacted by agreements of the
Department of Defense, internal memorandums and understandings
that you have in the Department of Defense that have created an
unlevel playing field for American manufacturers. And we have
to straighten this out if we ever hope to maintain a defense
industrial base.
In addition to the unlevel playing field and regulations,
where are we going to account for the difference in lost
revenue? I mean right now it is clear that when you lose over
10 percent of the cost of this contract--in addition to the
cost of this contract in lost revenue, what is the true cost of
a product? What is the true cost of replacing the 179 tankers?
And how did you take that into consideration? I mean there was
zero recognition given to it. And you say, Well, we do not have
a legal obligation to. We should, because it is a net loss for
the American taxpayer.
So I think when we point these things out to you, I would
like you to comment on what we can do to make it a level
playing field for American manufacturers. How can we address
the memorandum of understanding that excludes our European
allies from regulatory--gives them regulatory relief and
excludes American manufacturers from regulatory relief? How can
we take into consideration the subsidies, whether legal or
illegal? And how can we make sure that we take into
consideration the defense industrial base, as the Navy does
when they buy ships? Would you care to comment?
Mr. Wynne. Well, one thing I would tell you, sir, is the
acquisition system is increasingly complex. And it has been
layered, as you have seen, by laws and then regulations and
memorandums. It is a burden.
I would encourage the Congress to take a good hard look at
the total system, and especially if the Congress is unhappy
with the outcome, because for us we are constrained to be
obedient to the laws, the regulations, and the memoranda, and
we believe we have fairly applied them.
If I could take just a second on this Integrated Fleet
Aerial Refueling Assessment (IFARA) model, we exposed the
firewall to both Boeing and to Northrop-Grumman. We recognized
that the Air Force actually owns, operates and changes the
software, but we gave each of those contractors the model, and
we allowed them to run their own software. And so they could
develop their own inferences as to how their product was
performing. We think we have conducted this hearing now, sir,
in as open and transparent a manner, but constrained by, as you
say, a very complex set of rules and regulations.

KC-X REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL

Mr. Tiahrt. In this modeling, the RFP was released January
of last year, the end of January, I think it was the 30th or
31st. A week later a change to the modeling comes to both
contractors. After analyzing, which takes some period of time,
how did you expect any company to respond in the short amount
of time you gave them to analyze and produce a proposal? I mean
they have 90 days to produce a proposal. You took 120 days to
evaluate it. They get this change to their modeling a week
after the RFP comes out within that 90 days. And what the
modeling appears to say is that we are not buying a KC-135, we
are buying a KC-10.
And so it really did not give a fair opportunity by your
own rules--a fair opportunity for the American manufacturer. I
mean the baseline of the RFP is a KC-135E. Is that not true?
The baseline RFP.
Mr. Wynne. The baseline Request for Proposal (RFP) is to a
set of requirements that were vetted by the Joint Requirements
Operations Council. It does not favor one or the other. It
simply states refueling is primary and----
Mr. Tiahrt. But the baseline RFP is a KC-135E.
Mr. Wynne. It is a replacement program for the KC-135. It
does not baseline the KC-135.
Mr. Tiahrt. Okay. That is what everybody gets on January
31st. And that is what everything was indicated for the last 7
years, including the RFI, comes up to this point. And then the
modeling comes out a week later that says, you know, this
really is not a KC-135 replacement, this is a KC-10 replacement
because we are going to put these new scenarios in that include
longer range. And so after 7 years you expect a company to give
a complete proposal and address all the things that you have to
address, it is just unfair.
Mr. Wynne. Sir, while the contract is under protest I
really cannot go into the details, but I think you will find it
was done in a fair and legal manner.
Mr. Rothman. I thank the gentleman. I am exceeding the 5
minutes per member and am prepared to do more on the next
round. Just so we can make sure that we until then have an
opportunity for everyone to ask their questions. Mr. Dicks.

AIR FORCE MEDIUM TANKER

Mr. Dicks. Mr. Secretary, how can you explain the
difference from your testimony and what happened here? I mean
your testimony basically said we are looking for a medium
tanker. I will read it to you one more time.
Mr. Wynne. So as we look at this, we would tell you that
the first, our highest motivation is actually medium-sized
tankers. Then our highest motivation is mixed fleet. Our last
thing we want to do is have a whole fleet of large airplanes.
And I said, Mr. Dicks, and that is because you need a
number, not just size.
And Wynne says quantity has a quality all of its own.
Mr. Dicks. So we were all--Mr. Secretary, I think you are a
decent person. Everything I have ever dealt with you on has
been straightforward. You have always tried to help on things.
This is not personal. And if I said anything that sounded that
way, I am not saying we were intentionally misled, I am just
saying we were misled, that we thought you wanted a medium-
sized tanker. And this committee, that you testified in front
of, how can you explain the difference in what happened? We
went and did what you said we would never do, and that is buy
big tankers, because we still have the KC-10. How can you
explain that?
Mr. Wynne. The replacement program was for the KC-135. The
RAND analysis of alternatives ranked various airplanes, from
the 737 to the 777, the Airbus 330, the Airbus 340 as
candidates for this. Every competitor understood the offerings
pretty much of what the other people had.
Mr. Dicks. But there are just two competitors, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Wynne. And therefore, I think it was a fair and open
competition, very transparent, a lot of feedback to the
offerors of record, done in a very legal way.
Mr. Dicks. But Mr. Secretary, just to take the opposite, if
it was transparent and if it was open and honest and wonderful,
you would have said we want a large tanker. We want a big
tanker. This is what General Lichte kept talking about at this
press conference. And Sue Payton says he was not part of the
selection thing. Because more wasn't part of the selection.
Cargo--there was no number of pallets, no number of passengers.
None of that. It was all secondary. You said it over and over
again: We want a tanker, not a cargo plane.
Mr. Wynne. I can only tell you----
Mr. Dicks. So all I am saying to you, Mr. Secretary, can
you understand why we feel we were misled?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I can fully understand.
Mr. Dicks. Explain your testimony. I am talking about your
testimony and what had been said over and over again.
Mr. Wynne. No, sir, there was no size in any of the
Requests for Proposal. These are very competent suppliers. They
can read the request for proposal.

CMARPS MODEL

Mr. Dicks. Boeing said it wrote a letter to the Air Force
after these changes in the CMARP were made to advantage Airbus
so that they could compete. They could not even have competed,
had those changes not been made in the criteria. Once they were
made and acknowledged, the changes were made, Boeing wrote a
letter to the Air Force saying, If you want a big tanker, we
will--let us bring in the 777. They were discouraged from doing
that by the Air Force.
Mr. Wynne. Boeing had every right----
Mr. Dicks. And that is why we feel so mistreated in this
deal. And that is why we are so angry about it, because we do
not think this was fair, open, and transparent. You keep saying
those words, but the words do not mean anything if the
actions--look at the actions. And the actions were not fair,
open, and transparent.
Mr. Rothman. Mr. Dicks, this will not come from your time.
Mr. Secretary, did you want to respond? Did you want to
respond?
Mr. Wynne. Only to say that we can empathize, but we have
to comply with the laws and regulations. Both of these
competitors brought qualified products. One was judged to be
better. And you are going to find out about that this
afternoon.
Mr. Rothman. Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. Now, one thing I keep hearing from the spin
masters--and Mr. Miller, by the way, is very good at spin. He
and Lauren Thompson are about the two best in this town, I
think. But one of the things they keep saying about this--and
this has been said all over the Hill, and I have people who
called me and told me about it--is that the Air Force is saying
that somehow Boeing was discourteous or was arrogant.
Do you have any indication of any--have you heard this?
That during this competition Boeing's people who worked on this
were arrogant or worked not in a professional way? I have not
ever heard of that ever from the Boeing Company.
Mr. Wynne. Sir, all my dealings with Boeing were on a
completely professional and objective manner, even to the point
of getting notified about the protest.
Mr. Dicks. And one other thing. You know, the day after the
decision is made, Lauren Thompson has all of this information.
And he says to the press he got it from the Air Force. Now,
that was not right. They should not have leaked this
information out there, because the other competitor in this who
did not win had not even been debriefed.
I mean why would the Air Force do that? Why would the Air
Force give Lauren Thompson, who gets a huge fee from Northrop-
Grumman to operate his Lexington Institute, why would they give
him all this inside information? And he says in the paper that
it was given to him by Air Force officers and Northrop-Grumman.
How can you explain that?
Mr. Wynne. We have no way of explaining. We have asked who
was it----
Mr. Dicks. Can you check into that for us?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir, I would be happy to. That was a
violation.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Moseley. Mr. Chairman, can I offer one follow-up?
Congressman Dicks, I will defend General Lichte for a minute.
It is my understanding when he said more, he was talking
relative to the KC-135, not relative to the two offerings. When
he was talking----
Mr. Dicks. But more was not part of the competition. And if
he does not know what he is doing, you should not have him
standing up there, because he was in contradiction of the
entire RFP. The RFP was to get a tanker. And the Secretary said
this publicly many times. It was to get a tanker. And cargo--as
I said, there was no requirement in the--let me finish this.
Mr. Rothman. Sure.
Mr. Dicks. There was no requirement in the bid for a
certain number of pallets or a certain number of passengers.
There was some requirement on aeromedical and on fuel offload.
Boeing met those. Boeing met all the requirements that were
there in this competition.
And this general gets up there and says more, more, more,
and all these things that were not part of the requirement.
That is, again, trying to spin the obvious change in direction
that the Air Force went, in picking this large plane over the
medium-sized plane that they testified here that that is what
they wanted.
Mr. Rothman. Thank the gentleman. General, did you have
another response?
General Moseley. No, sir. I was just going to say,
Congressman Dicks, his comments were relative to the advantage
over the 135, not the two offerings.
Mr. Rothman. Mr. Lewis, please.

AIR FORCE ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN

Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, welcome to the committee
on the posture of the Air Force. As you can sense in this
environment, it is going to be very difficult to have members
who are very concerned about their constituencies and
implications of the process that is before us to spend a lot of
time on posture. But one area where you could help me and maybe
the committee would be to spend just a few moments, Secretary
Wynne, and certainly General Moseley if you like, on the
funding that you will be delivering for advertising purposes
relative to the, above all, public understanding of the Air
Force's role.
Will you spend a little time doing that for the committee?
And maybe we will go back to the tanker after a while.
Mr. Wynne. Sir, the intent of it was to reach the
influencers. What we find is you have to reach people who are
inclined to support defense. And what we will tell you is that
the way we are going about this is to really create an image in
the press, in the thing that allows coaches, allows people to
essentially influence these smart kids, that we are going to
require to keep our high-technology Air Force, to come see us
and sign up. It is actually far less than our sister Services
are presently spending. But we asked if they could at least
make sure that the influencers would take a peek, take it home
with them and understand that their Air Force is an important
element in the defense of the country. Chief?
Mr. Lewis. General Moseley.
General Moseley. Sir, thank you for the question. We have
had a couple of questions from the staff that would reference
that we are attempting to lobby the Congress. And sir, that is
not the case. We would not do that because it is not right. It
is also in violation of policies. So that would never happen.
But I would like to be on the record as saying we have the
lowest number of recruiters per recruited member. We have a
fraction of the recruiting budget or the outreach budget of any
of the Services. We recruit the same numbers of people that the
United States Marine Corps does. The recruiting population out
there is getting smaller and smaller. The understanding, as
Congressman Tiahrt mentioned, the understanding of the American
military, whether it is Soldiers, Sailors, Coast Guard, Marines
or Airmen is less and less. This campaign that we started is
not just in newspapers, it is in magazines, it is in video, it
is on TV.
Mr. Lewis. Right.
General Moseley. And it also establishes directly into an
Air Force dot.com Web site that goes immediately to enlisted
opportunities and officer opportunities, and a variety of other
Web sites, to bring people who are influencers or interested
parties to understand more about their Air Force as we look at
air, space and cyberspace.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Moseley. And, sir, if you need, for the record, we
can get you the numbers and the comparisons with our other
brothers on recruiting and on outreach and the numbers of
recruiters.
Mr. Lewis. It would be appropriate to provide that
material. Thank you.
[The information follows:]

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY07 Air Force Army Marine Corps Navy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# of Recruiters..................... 1,312 6,439 2,783 3,501
Advertising Budget.................. $63.1 $308.7 $167.9 $146.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marine Corps
Air Force Reserve Army Reserve Reserve Navy Reserve
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# of Recruiters..................... 175 1,800 N/A 700
Advertising Budget.................. $12.2 `$54.5 Included in Included in
active duty active duty
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Guard Army Guard
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# of Recruiters..................... 408 5,100
Advertising Budget.................. $10.7 $85.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All active duty data and all recruiter numbers received from OSD P&R, all other data received from the
respective Service components. Dollars are reflected in millions.

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Moran.

MASSIVE ORDNANCE PENETRATOR

Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What? Did you draw the
short straw in this hearing here?
Mr. Rothman. I am proud to be here and in this Chair.
Mr. Moran. I know you are. Nice job, Steve. Good to have
you chairing it.
Would it be okay if I switched the subject for just a
moment? Would you mind that, Mr. Secretary?
Last year, in the President's supplemental request, the Air
Force asked for $88 million to retrofit B-2 stealth bombers.
That would have enabled the B-2 to carry a 30,000-pound bunker
buster. You will refer to it as a massive ordnance penetrator.
At that time, there was speculation that this funding might be
a signal regarding the Administration's efforts to attack
Iran's subterranean nuclear enrichment program, either Natanz
or any other facility. The bunker buster could be used in
Afghanistan, but really there isn't any need to retrofit a B-2
stealth bomber since there is less need for stealth
capabilities in the Afghan skies.
So some of us in the Congress were concerned about that
request, since the only justification that we ever received is
that the funding was necessary in response to, and I quote, an
urgent operational need from theater commanders. Can you assure
the subcommittee today that the retrofitting for B-2 will not
be used for a preemptive strike on Iran? Because that was the
speculation, as you know.
Either one of you can answer that, General or Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Wynne. Sir, all I can say is we are subject to the
guidance of the National Command Authorities, and I know of no
direct instructions to us to complete that such that it could
be a preemptive strike. But I will tell you, as a matter of
policy for the United States, that option is always on the
table.

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

Mr. Moran. Well, that certainly is the same script we have
been hearing from.
The second-highest priority behind the tanker replacement
program is the combat search and rescue helicopter replacement
program. We have had contractual problems dating back to 2007.
The GAO upheld a protest over the contractual award to the
company that was initially given it. Just last month, the DOD
Inspector General said that it will begin an audit of the
latest competition to determine if the Air Force followed the
rules regarding the requirements for this aircraft. What effect
will that delay caused by the big protest have on the program
schedule and do you still anticipate awarding that contract in
the next few months, General Moseley.
General Moseley. Sir, I will defer the contract award
questions to my boss, but I will tell you the operational
impact.
Just like this captain sitting behind me, we are flying HH-
60 aircraft that are limited in range and payload and
capability in some pretty severe places in combat today. The
desire is to give our combat search and rescue team the best
possible flying machine with the best possible capability.
Because we do combat search and rescue for the entire joint
team, not just for the Air Force, but for Marines, Navy, Army,
special operations and for our Coalition partners.
So, Congressman Moran, that is a great question. And the
further it slips the more risk we take in theater combat
operations and the more risk these crews, like this captain
sitting behind me, take with an aircraft that is underpowered,
has not much range, and has not much capability.
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I will tell you that August or September is
our target. Yes, sir. And, hopefully, everything is saucered
upright.

RELIGION AT THE AIR FORCE ACADEMY

Mr. Moran. That is good. I am glad to hear that.
I have one further question. Last night, I saw a movie
about a subject that I have only heard about, but it was very
disturbing. It was about the Air Force Academy, and it detailed
incidences of real anti-Semitism, that religious evangelicals
have had an undue influence on that university. We heard a
great deal from the chaplain who was very much troubled by it
but who had been threatened as a result, and a gentleman who
sued the Air Force Academy. He had three sons going there. And
you probably--Mikey Weinstein, I think was his name. He had
sued, and he has gotten death threats as a result, and it
detailed what his sons had gone through.
I have a constituent who is a Dallas State delegate who
also attended the Air Force Academy who also happens to be
Jewish.
This stuff is real, and I want to know that it has now been
put an end to. There is no more of that kind of real
discrimination and almost persecution of people who are not
Christian at that university. Can you assure us of that?
General Moseley. Sir, let me take that, as the Air Force
Chief of Staff. It is outrageous that someone would attempt to
do that to people in an institution, whether it is a public or
private institution but for sure in the United States military.
Mr. Moran. But it did happen? You acknowledge it was
happening?
General Moseley. We have had issues. So has everyone else.
And we have taken it on. And it is outrageous that sort of
thing occurs to people, citizens. We watch this as far as all
faiths. We hold very dear the notions of dignity and respect
for all people that go through the United States Air Force
Academy, as well as basic military training and any place where
they serve while on Active Duty, in the Guard or the Reserve or
anywhere in the United States Air Force.
Mr. Moran. You are telling me what we want to hear,
General. The problem is that the people who were involved have
been rewarded by promotions, and I would hope that you are
looking into that situation with some real depth and not just
the kind of superficial response that is normally given.
It didn't happen at the other academies in the way it
happened at the Air Force Academy. It should not have happened;
and I would hope that measures have been put in place to ensure
that the Academy is open for everyone and that everyone's
participation is desired and that that is not considered to be
any kind of semi-religious institution, i.e., some kind of
Christian academy, as some preachers would have wanted it to
be, such as Ted Haggard.
I won't go into it in any greater length, but I want you to
know that there are some people in this subcommittee and I know
in the Congress who are adamant that that kind of stuff has got
to stop. It is far beneath the dignity of our service
academies.
General Moseley. Sir, as the Air Force Chief of Staff, I
agree 100 percent with that.
Mr. Rothman. General, I am just going to exercise the
privilege of the Chair to ask for further clarification. Is it
your testimony or your statement to this committee that the Air
Force is now taking all the necessary steps to make certain
that this kind of religious discrimination that Mr. Moran
described will not happen again?
General Moseley. Absolutely, sir; and we can provide for
the record all of the studies and the work that we have done
since those episodes, if you would like that. We had a
commission run by our Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel and
rounded up several outside experts to be able to go look at
that; and Mr. Chairman, Congressman Moran, we would be happy to
provide that and answer any other questions. Because it is
outrageous, and it is unsat, and we don't buy it.
Mr. Rothman. And, General, you are satisfied that you are
taking and have taken all the steps necessary to assure that
this won't happen again?
General Moseley. Sir, you are never satisfied as a
Commander or as a Chief of Staff, because you don't know what
you don't know until it happens. But I am satisfied we have
made the case that this is unacceptable behavior. We welcome
all faiths and all disciplines, and that is the way it should
be.
Mr. Rothman. This is your watch, General, right?
General Moseley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rothman. Mr. Hobson.

MOBILITY AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT

Mr. Hobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, nice to see you today. I know it is not an easy
day.
I want to thank you both for the foreign military training
mission at the Springfield National Guard base and your
continued help in making that successful, as you have been very
helpful in that and continue to be.
I would like to talk about the C-5s and the C-17s, if we
could, because we have some of the C-5s. Can you give us your
perspective on what we are going to do to C-5s and what we are
going to do with--are we going to buy any more C-17s?
I think Ms. Granger left. There are a lot of people
interested in C-17s and C-5s, and you have had some discussions
on that.
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I can give you a quick snapshot and then I
will segue into affordability. There was a recent acquisition
decision following a Nunn-McCurdy breach. The Nunn-McCurdy
breach was as a result of the program exceeding its cost budget
by more than 50 percent of its original baseline and 25 percent
of its current baseline. The acquisition decision memorandum
came down from the OSD AT&L that certified the program for 52
RERP'd, if you will, C-5s; and I believe they are going to be
called C-5Ms at the time.
This leaves approximately 59 or so C-5As which we intend to
Avionics Modernization Program (AMP). You have to AMP them to
meet the international standards for position and navigation.
So, right now, it is the policy of the Air Force to follow that
acquisition model and to re-engine approximately to the total
of 52 what will be called C-5Ms.
As to what happens beyond for the C-5 fleet, we are going
to follow the law. The law currently prohibits retiring of the
C-5s. We have put forward, I think, an argument for the fact
that C-17s are being used to a tremendous extent. I would say
sometimes we use the phrase ``flying the wings off'', but they
are the workhorse of this engagement, and we believe that the
models that are used do not accommodate the moving goalpost
that the mobility capability study did, and we can see a case
for additional airplanes.
General Moseley. Congressman, the President's Budget
request has no C-17s in there. We support that. We have
discussed this. We don't have an updated mobility capability
study. There will be one. We are working hard with the Joint
Staff and USTRANSCOM that hopefully in the early 2009 time
frame will deploy.
Mr. Hobson. Will the line be shut down by then, General,
the C-17 line?
General Moseley. There were 10 airplanes in last year's
supplemental. That takes us to 190. There were 14 aircraft in
the foreign military sale. So that 24 airplanes will go to some
length to maintain the line.
Sir, I don't know the answer to that. I will have to take
that for the record.
[The information follows:]

With no additional Air Force procurement above 190
aircraft, the Boeing C-17 production line may begin to shut
down in 2008. The last contracted foreign customer deliveries
are to the United Kingdom--six in June 2008 and the final
production line C-17 deliveries to the U.S. Air Force--190 in
August 2009. There are no other orders for C-17s; however, the
United Kingdom, NATO Strategic Airlift Capability, and Qatar
(two aircraft each) are potential remaining foreign customers.
Boeing is currently at risk protecting long lead items for 10
aircraft. C-17s have a 34 month build time. Without commitment
for more procurement, Boeing may halt production on protected
aircraft.

General Moseley. But, Congressman, the challenge we have in
attempting to define this requirement has been the goalpost
being moved. We have an Army and Marine Corps that has grown
close to 100,000. Most MRAPs are incapable of being transported
on C-130s. Only the MRAP version RG31, category 1 can be
transported in a C-130. This MRAP version is used by special
forces and is currently being procured by the U.S. Army and
U.S. Marine Corps.
Mr. Hobson. That you are renting? You rented former Russian
aircraft?
General Moseley. Air transport of MRAP vehicles are being
done with the Russian-made Antonov AN-124. Sir, our C-5
inventory, the C-5As are less reliable; and that gets to the
Secretary's point about the Avionics Modernization Program to
actually be able to fly them in the international environment.
And then our C-17s and C-130s we are burning up with high
utilization rates, and this young captain sitting behind me is
a good example of that. Every month we take somewhere around
3,500 convoys off the road and close to 9,000 people off the
road inside C-17s and our C-130s to avoid Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs), to avoid insurgents.
And so, sir, as you look at all of those, the goalposts do
continue to move on us a bit when you look at strategic
airlift. And so the mix of C-17 and modified, reliable C-5s
takes us to the place where in the unfunded requirements list
we put additional C-17s. Because, if we had extra dollars, that
is where we would spend it to be able to maintain this very,
very critical piece of the joint fight.
Mr. Wynne. I endorse what the Chairman said. I am very
pleased with the nine percent improvement that the President
has offered us, and we have tried to prioritize it within that.
As the Chief said, though, the goalposts keep moving. We have
to adhere to that goal.
Mr. Hobson. But we need your advice. And if Mr. Murtha was
here, I think he would--I can't speak for him, but I think he
would say, as I have heard him speak before, if these goalposts
are moving, you need to help us keep you in the game by telling
us what you need to stay in the game.
And, for example, I have a parochial interest in the C-5s
that are at Wright-Patterson; and I would hope that someday
those would be C-17s as we move forward and the goalposts--that
was even before the goalposts changed, so I am not going to
beat you up about that, but I would like to see that happen.

JSF ALTERNATE ENGINE

I would like to ask your personal feelings about one other
thing. The President's budget, again, does not contain an
alternate engine on the joint strike fighter. And you have both
had experience with the wars of single engines in the past. Can
you give us your personal opinion--because I wouldn't have
asked you this, but I think you have been asked this before.
Will you tell us your personal opinion about the alternate
engine?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, the first thing we have to say is that we
support where the President's Budget request came in. We
recognize that it was a business case. We recognize that that
business case tried to postulate where it is.
Now, having given all that, it is my personal opinion that
we have many nations participating with us. There is even a
tendency to go with a single-engine fighter for all the
American forces; and if it is going to be all of the free Air
Forces are going to fly the same airplane, I think then you
have to reach beyond a simple business case into a reliability
case.
And if you reach into that reliability case, I can't tell
you how happy I was when we stood down the F-15 fleet that I
happened to have a second airplane, namely the F-16s to
backfill. If I am not going to have any other airplanes to
backfill, then I ought to have an extra engine to backfill. And
that is where it makes the case I think for excessive
reliability, but I think that is what we owe our partner
nations.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Hobson.
General, did you want to address that?
General Moseley. Yes, please, sir.
Sir, this, like the C-17 issue, is truly an affordability
issue. When we say we support the President's Budget request,
we have been in hard work for over a year to balance our
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and to be able to submit an
Air Force budget. So we support that.
These issues that we are talking about are absolutely
linked to affordability; and the $2 billion that it would take
to field the second engine, my fear is I don't know where the
$2 billion comes from. And the desire to hold the IOC, the
initial operational capability, of the airplane constant, I
don't know where the funding comes from; and I don't know how
that is squared inside that program. But, sir, if you are
asking my personal opinion of should there be a second engine,
I believe there should be.
Mr. Rothman. Mr. Hobson, did you want to make a brief
comment?
General Moseley. I just don't know where the funding comes
from, sir.
Mr. Hobson. I understand. We will take care of that. That
is our job.
The other thing I wanted to say for the record before I
leave relates to something we haven't talked about today, but
it is very important I think to the future of the Air Force and
the military in general. That is synthetic fuel. I am not going
to ask you to comment, because I have to leave, and there are
other members who want to talk. I hope before you leave you all
will talk about synthetic fuels for our aircraft and where we
are going with other types of vehicles on that.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your diligence.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Hobson.
Mr. Cramer.

BRAC 2005

Mr. Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and welcome, both of
you, to the subcommittee.
General Moseley, I want to ask you a question about BRAC,
BRAC 2005; and the Alabama delegation has been trying to
understand where the Air Force is coming from. This is about
rotary wing activities. In the BRAC 2005 recommendation, there
was a consolidation of the rotary wing activities into Redstone
Arsenal, my base there in North Alabama; and we still haven't
gotten an answer.
I think the Air Force has been trying to evaluate whether
the jobs were related to development or acquisition; and that
is what the BRAC order more or less said, that these jobs will
be moved there. And, at first, there were 120 jobs; and then
the Joint Cross Service Group cost of base realignment
assessment reduced that number to 50. But we still seem to be
at a disagreement over whether those 50 will be moved there or
not; and our offices, Senator Sessions and I, were trying to
present this issue to your folks early in February. Do you have
a position on that?
General Moseley. Sir, if you will allow me to take for the
record the detailed calendar of what happened, who did what, we
will get that to you.
But, sir, you know we will 100 percent comply with BRAC,
because that is the law of the land, and we will do that.
Mr. Wynne. I will also add to that, sir, that when we
completed the BRAC analysis we then turned into trying to make
sure that they had the right business case and that they were
accurate when they came up with the information; and I think
there is some discrepancy in there. I think the Chief is right.
We should take this for the record, go back and make sure that
you have a correct assessment of what it is.
Mr. Cramer. Well, you need to do that.
[The information follows:]

BRAC recommendation number 189 consolidates Army and Air
Force rotary wing (RW) DAT&E from Ft. Rucker, AL, Robins AFB,
GA, and 50 manpower billets, to the Technical Test Center at
Redstone Arsenal, AL. This recommendation was the product of a
Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) recommendation.
In March 2004, Air Force Material Command (AFMC) responded
to a TJCSG data call, certifying that Robins AFB, GA performed
RW DAT&E with approximately 10 civilian full time employees as
of September 30, 2003 (the snapshot-in-time date for all BRAC
recommendations).
In May 2005, the Department of Defense BRAC recommendations
were forwarded to the Commission, and made public. In the
summer of 2005, the BRAC Commissioners and staff visited all
locations nominated for BRAC action. In July 2005 through April
2006, AFMC conducted site surveys at Robins AFB, GA and found
significant differences in reported data and actual RW DAT&E
work at Robins. (incidental to other activities then, now
discontinued).
In October 2007 AFMC certfied, in a letter to the Air Force
BRAC Program Management Office that they incorrectly responded
to the BRAC 2005 data call and that RW DAT&E is no longer
accomplished at Robins AFB, GA.
AFMC's re-certification superseded the BRAC requirement to
relocate the mission and 50 civilian billets, since those
billets were no longer utilized by RW DAT&E. In short, the Air
Force cannot move what no longer exists.

Mr. Cramer. And, of course, we all have to respect the BRAC
process, and we are bound by law to do that. But if there is a
disagreement there I would like for you to point that, if you
think a mistake was made, how that mistake was made. There is
construction money at stake here, too, so we have got an
unjoined path of construction of needing to go forward, yet we
are not clear about where this is going.
General Moseley. And, Congressman, there is another part of
that, which is where is the work actually done? Where is rotary
wing development acquisition test logistics actually done? So
that will be part of the reply that we put for the record to
show you where we did that at the time of BRAC and where that
work is done now because I depend on the United States Army to
do most of that for us.

TSAT

Mr. Cramer. And then we need the opportunity to hear where
you are coming from so that we can respond to that with
honoring the process, too.
Secretary Wynne, I would like to ask you a question about
TSAT. TSAT has been the keystone system in DOD's communication
and architecture, yet you pulled $4 billion out of the TSAT
program, which seemed to me further delaying the system's
protected communication capabilities and communication on the
move which are critical components in the future combat systems
as well. Can you respond to that?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I can tell you that we were directed to buy
another AEHF satellite, the fourth one. We saw this as a direct
influence into where the Congress at the time felt like the
TSAT program was going. We attempted to be very, very clear
about the fact that we thought the tactical readiness level of
the TSAT was higher than the Congress had assessed, but we
recognized the risk. And I think overall, as we went down the
road of constructing the budget that we have today, AEHF four
took a prime position and essentially slid the TSAT; and the
response was, from inside of the building, that this would give
us a further opportunity to mature the technologies. From an
Air Force perspective, we thought they had been matured, but,
frankly, we went along.
Mr. Cramer. So this is a slide rather than a
reconsideration of how TSAT fits in?
Mr. Wynne. We see that TSAT is a requirement of
communications-on-the-move. We think that if we are going to be
overburdened we see it as essentially saving what we forecast
as a saturation of bandwidth downstream.
Mr. Cramer. Do you know the time frames for when that next
AEHF satellite will be available?
Mr. Wynne. I believe, sir, that they--I don't. I will have
to take that for the record, just to make sure I don't
misspeak.
Mr. Cramer. All right. Thank you.
[The information follows:]

The Fiscal Year 2009 President's Budget submission plans
for the launch of AEHF Satellite Vehicle 4 (AEHF 4) in Fiscal
Year 2014. Because the production of AEHF 4 follows a four year
production break, the Air Force is currently conducting a study
to assess the impacts of diminishing manufacturing sources,
long lead parts, the production break, and other potential
vendor issues. Following the completion of this study in April
2008, any potential updates would be reflected in the Fiscal
Year 2010 President's Budget submission.

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Cramer.
Mr. Boyd.

ABOVE ALL ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN

Mr. Boyd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, first of all, let me
commend both of you for your very distinguished careers serving
our country. I have had the opportunity to work with your
offices over the years; and particularly I know, Secretary
Wynne, you spent most of your career there in research and
development. And I have my interest in the research labs at
Tyndall Air Force Base that worked with your office, General
Moseley, often. I commend you for your service and the way you
conduct yourselves.
I want to revert back to a question that Jerry Lewis from
California asked earlier, and this will be very brief. But it
is the Above All advertising campaign. Maybe, Secretary Wynne,
it will be more appropriate for you. In the information I have
it is about an $81 million cost. Can you tell me, was this ad
campaign developed completely in-house or was it done outside
by contractors?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I believe it was done outside by
contractors.
Mr. Boyd. Can you briefly tell the committee why the Air
Force felt compelled to run these ads, which to some appear to
be the kinds of ads that an advocacy group would run, when, in
fact, it is specifically prohibited in law?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, we have no intention of lobbying Congress.
In fact, the survey that was conducted said that we need to get
noticed by the influencers, the coaches, the counselors, the
parents of people; and we need to push for the Air Force's
highest quality individual we can get.
We recognize that there is only about two or three percent
of the American population that we essentially compete with. We
do this with a relatively meager budget. I would tell you it is
probably one-third of anybody else's. We have one-third the
recruiters per recruit out there.
So the fact is, and I will say that the papers that we put
it in, the New York Times, the Washington Post, go to all the
school libraries. So it seemed to me to be a very effective way
of contacting the influencers.
There was no intent to lobby, advocate, except to make sure
that the influencers understood that there is an opportunity
here for their kids to come join the Air Force and defend
America.
Mr. Boyd. So your position is it is used as a recruiting
tool only?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir. It directs those kids to Web sites for
placement within the enlisted or officer corps.
Mr. Boyd. Thank you. I have no more questions.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Boyd.
Mr. Bishop.

F-22 PROCUREMENT

Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much.
I would like to ask you about the F-22A procurement
program. The Office of the Secretary stated that 183 F-22As are
affordable and sufficient to meet the projected threats. But
the Air Force continues to state the need to procure a minimum
of 381 F-22As to meet the national strategic needs. Are there
plans to procure additional F-22As beyond the 183 aircraft buy?
Do the problems with the F-15s support the acquisition of more
F-22As? And does a multi-year current procurement contract
provide for variation and quantity? If you decide to procure
more aircraft, can they be added to the multi-year contract and
purchased at the same reduced price? If procurement is complete
at 183, when will the F-22A production lines start to shut
down?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, the first thing I need to say is that we
support the President's Budget request, which currently has an
agreement to not shut the F-22 line down but to allow the next
Administration to do it. So the budget has essentially removed
all of the close-down funds, which would probably have to be
reentered, because I think about $40 million is required by
about November of this year.
But, nevertheless, as we present ourselves, we have to say
that it was a huge argument about affordability, with the
Office of Secretary of Defense determining that the Air Force
could not afford to have the F-22 program going forward while
the F-35 became developed.
That raging argument, sir, a decision has been rendered,
although the Deputy Secretary said he would put four more
airplanes into the supplemental request that is coming out
later. Now, those four airplanes will be an attempt to add to
the multi-year. And it is an agreement that has to be made, but
there is no variation in quantity, to your point. We don't
think it is sufficient to get it to the other side. But I would
say that that is up to the contractor of record.
Mr. Bishop. General Moseley.
General Moseley. Congressman, I will echo Secretary Wynne.
This is fundamentally an affordability issue, and we support
the President's Budget request in trying to square all of the
requirements we have with the budget authority that we receive.
The 183 airplanes, plus the perhaps four more, will get us to a
place that offers us some opportunities to be able to employ
the airplane.
There have been discussions about requirements higher than
that. There have been discussions about the studies that take
you to those higher numbers. But the affordability question
that we face now takes us to those smaller numbers.
Mr. Bishop. So are you saying that you need the 381, but
you just can't afford it right now? Is that what you are
saying?
General Moseley. Sir, my personal opinion as the Chief of
Staff is that the larger numbers provide much more capacity and
much more depth than they cover the things like the unforeseen
grounding of the F-15s and in the numbers of squadrons that we
need to be able to deploy relative to the national military
strategy. Except, sir, this is fundamentally an affordability
issue.
Mr. Bishop. So that is your personal opinion, not the
official?
General Moseley. My personal opinion is more airplanes are
better.
Mr. Bishop. And so that would strengthen strategic
capabilities?
General Moseley. Sir, it would allow us to retire the
fourth-generation airplanes that we are having some challenges
with maintaining. The modification lines that we have,
particularly for the F-15, I asked General Corley at Air Combat
Command a week or so ago, of every dollar spent on
modifications, how much goes to true combat capability? Eighty-
six percent goes to safety and sustainment issues on those
older airplanes.
And, sir, we have made this case in supporting the
President's Budget request and attempting to balance our budget
authority. This is about funding, and this is about what we can
afford.
Mr. Bishop. So every dollar you put in there is like
throwing good money after bad to work on that maintenance and
that safety of the old aircraft, as opposed to going on and
investing in the new?
General Moseley. Sir, I would say all funding is good, but
the return on that dollar spent is not necessarily pure combat
capability because of the age of the system.
Mr. Bishop. Do you agree with that, Secretary Wynne?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir. In those figures, only 14 percent goes
to enhanced combat capability; 86 percent goes to essentially
sustain the system. You cannot at the end of the day survive
like that as a nation.
Mr. Bishop. So you have a personal opinion about more
aircraft being better?
Mr. Wynne. My personal opinion actually stems from a study
that was done by an outside contractor. Because I don't have
the warfighting background that the Chief of Staff has. But
Whitney, Bradley and Brown, Incorporated (WBB) did a study that
basically said that the Nation would be in a medium-risk
category, not in a low-risk category, with a quantity
approaching 280 ships--280 aircraft, excuse me.
Mr. Bishop. Because we are talking about 183 versus 381?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir. The WBB study actually took a middle
position and ended up with about 277 to 280 units.
Mr. Bishop. So that would be my middle?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rothman. Do you have anything more?
Mr. Bishop. No.

UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS LIST

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Secretary, General, I have a few questions; and then we
will start the second round. But, for the record, understand
that we as a committee and as Americans are in awe of the
capability and the dedication of your service people under your
command. We know that you are the difference between, you and
the other services, between the security of our country and the
insecurity or lack of security. We are extraordinarily grateful
for what you do, and we are mindful that it is only a handful
of you with this extraordinary ability and talent and
professionalism that make our Air Force the best on the planet
earth.
It is the responsibility of this Congress, however, and
this committee to receive the President's budget for the Air
Force and examine it thoroughly to make sure that our shared
commitment to our national security is achieved--is maximized
by the President's allocation of dollars and that we spend the
taxpayer dollars as wisely as possible. And there may be a
disagreement about what system, what plane, what ordinance that
we would include if the President hasn't, et cetera, et cetera.
But we are sharing the same goal. We are simply doing our job
to make sure that we examine these numbers ourselves as a check
and balance and to fulfill our constitutional responsibilities.
Along those lines, I have been told that in previous years
the unfunded requirements list was called an unfunded
priorities list and that not only did the name change this year
but that the unfunded requirements list this year is not in
priority order. If that is an accurate statement, I would ask
for the record for the unfunded requirements list to be
provided to us in priority order. Do either of you gentlemen
have a problem with that?
Mr. Wynne. No, sir.
General Moseley. No, sir.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you. Obviously, as soon as we can get
that, it would be much appreciated and allow us to do our work
even more effectively.
[The information follows:]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY09 Amount
Priority Requirement ($ M) Item description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1............... B-52 NDAA 183.1 FY08 Authorization Act
Compliance (76 directed 76 TAI/44
aircraft). Combat Coded (CC)
fleet with common
configuration.
Currently funded at
56 TIA/32 CC. Funds
four additional
aircraft Programmed
Depot Maintenance
inductions, increased
MILPERS/flying hours,
and modifications for
additional aircraft.
Maintains viability
and execution of B-52
CONECT program.
Selective
Availability Anti-
Spoofing Module
(SASSM) GPS receiver
upgrade is required
to address capability
deficiencies,
maintain combat
capability and
ability to deliver
all modern weapons.
Supports Required
Force.
2............... Blue Ribbon 99.5 Funds the following
Review. items in accordance
with the Blue Ribbon
Review: Remote Visual
Assessment (RVA)
$0.3M; ICBM Payload
Transporter (PT) High
Security Locks $4.2M;
Common Vertical Lift
Support Platform
(CVLSP) $4.5M;
Radiation Sensors
$5.8M; ICBM
Cryptography Upgrade,
Increment II $7.5M;
Nuclear Storage
Structures/Areas
Upgrades $15.4M; New
ICBM Payload
Transporter (PT)
$20.0M; Nuclear
Surety, SDT $6.0M;
Nuclear Surety, Test
Equipment $9.0M;
Nuclear Surety,
Procure non-powered
munitions trailer
$22.8M; Nuclear
Surety, Powered
Munitions Trailer
$4.0M.
3............... Total Force End 385.0 The FY08 Defense
Strength for Appropriations Act
Required Force. tasked the AF to
report on end
strength
requirements. This
requirement requests
funding to increase
Active end strength
by 13,554, civilian
by 1,830, and reserve
by 3,400 in FY 09 in
support of the Air
Force's 86 Combat
Wings (Required
Force). Also includes
McConnell AF
Reserves.
4............... C-130J (+8 576.0 C-130J procurement
aircraft). ensures
recapitalization of
the aging C-130E
fleet, in accordance
with Fleet Viability
Board recommendation.
Continued C-130J
procurement allows
the Air Force to
continue meeting the
Intra-theater Airlift
requirements for the
Combatant Commanders.
Part of Required
Force.
5............... C-17 (+15 3,900.0 Procures 15 C-17s,
aircraft). keeping only active
strategic airlift
production line open.
Part of Required
Force.
6............... Special Ops 156.8 C-27B for SOF $74.8M--
Aircraft (+2 C- Funds two C-27B
27Bs, +1 CV-22). aircraft, initial
spares, and ground
support equipment for
delivery to AFSOC.
Accelerates delivery
of C-27B aircraft to
AFSOC by two years,
meeting Commander's
needs for precision
attack and
specialized airlift.
Part of Required
Force. CV-22 Aircraft
$82M--Buys one
additional CV-22 in
FY09 to accelerate
fielding of SOF
aircraft as directed
by QDR. Part of
Required Force.
7............... F-35 (+5 aircraft 828.0 5 additional aircraft
in FY09 & in FY09 $761M--
Advance Procures 5 additional
Procurement for F-35s (including long
FY10). lead) to meet
Required Force
procurement profile.
Advance Procurement
for six additional
aircraft $67M--Funds
advanced procurement
items for 6
additional aircraft
to be programmed in
the FY10 budget to
meet Required Force.
Without procuring
additional aircraft
to meet Required
Force, the Air Force
is unable to
sufficiently
recapitalize its
aging aircraft.
8............... Vanishing Vendor 48.4 ICBM Solid Rocket
Base. Motor Life Extension
$31.0M--Following
completion of
Minuteman III
Propulsion
Replacement Program
this initiative would
fund a low-rate ICBM
Solid Rocket Motor
sustainment
production line
producing 6 booster
sets per year to
maintain critical
industrial skills,
certifications, and
supplier base.
Mitigates impact of
loss of critical
propulsion skills/
industrial base until
a follow-on booster
program is approved;
U-2 Vanishing Vendor
Mitigation $17.4M--
Funds for Vanishing
Vendor Mitigation of
ASARS On Board
Processor (OBP).
Funding will purchase
two OBPs.
Additionally,
diminishing
manufacturing
suppliers and
increased GWOT
operations tempo is
accelerating
depletion of Remote
Airborne Sensor
(SIGINT sensor--RAS-
1R) spares, support
equipment, Senior
Year Electro-optical
Reconnaissance Sensor
(SYERS) visible and
IR focal planes and
circuit card
assemblies.
Insufficient spares
inventory to sustain
operations results in
the inability to meet
COCOM intelligence
collection
requirements.
9............... Quality of Life 166.0 Funds MILCON
MILCON Projects. requirements for
construction,
improvement,
planning, and design
of facilities to
improve quality of
life of Air Force
personnel. Projects
include libraries,
youth centers,
fitness centers,
child development
centers and workplace
improvements.
10.............. Critical Base 276.9 Provides critical
Services. funds to base
services that impact
the quality of life
for all Airmen.
Adjustment will bring
non-pay programs to
85% of the total
requirement,
consistent with
historical execution
rates. FY09 baseline
funding is at 63% and
barely covers the
average execution for
contracts, and does
not adequately fund
services such as base
shuttle service,
dining hall service
hours, fitness/
recreation programs,
etc. Lack of funding
impacts the entire
base community and,
specifically, junior
Airmen. Support
Required Force.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

AGING AIRCRAFT

Mr. Rothman. In November of '07, the F-15 broke apart. My
understanding is, as was appropriate, the entire inventory of
F-15s was then examined with a fine-tooth comb and several of
the aircraft were deemed to be in danger of falling apart
because of a crack or other defects. And I am assuming it, but
I would like you to confirm, that you feel confident now that
you have identified the problems or problem with the F-15.
Can you tell me, have you gone through the KC-135s with the
same fine-tooth comb, given their age, to assure us and the
American people that we have--we are paying as close attention
as possible to a potential problem with these KC-135s?
Mr. Wynne. I can tell you, sir, that there are no
engineering models that go this long. There are no engineering
models that have these kind of hours in them. So every day is a
brand new discovery. Our maintenance people are doing miracle
work. We do, however, do teardowns; and we look very hard at
the KC-135s that are going to be flying we think for another 35
to 40 years, at least the last one.
We also will tell you that on the F-15s there is the third
factor of stressing. You know, stresses have to go somewhere on
an airplane. When you pull an airplane at nine Gs, they have to
go somewhere. We have chased them down into the region we think
is the problem, and we are repairing that. We believe that we
have gotten it down to the point where we can tell our pilots
that this is a safe and effective fleet.
But I can tell you, sir, that as time goes on you can't
patch your way into a combat force. You are going to experience
what I call geriatric aging, that we all hate to admit among
ourselves. But it does occur in metal fatigue. It does occur in
systems.
Chief.
General Moseley. Mr. Chairman, thanks for that question.
We have a fleet viability board that looks at major weapon
systems. We have looked at the KC-135. We have looked at the C-
5, the C-130, the A-10. Now we are asking the system to look at
the F-15 to give us some idea about long-term sustainability.
But the Secretary is exactly right. On the KC-135, we are
beyond any engineering fail rate data from the company that
built the airplane. And they build good airplanes. And to go to
them and ask them what is going to break on this airplane, it
is tough to know.
So as the question about dignity and the United States Air
Force Academy, as the Service Chief of Staff I am never
satisfied that I know everything about the aircraft as they age
and that I understand everything that is going to break next,
because I don't.
On the F-15s, it was a major wake-up when we had a longeron
break and have an airplane break apart in flight. We got our
Missouri Guardsman back. He has had some surgery, and we will
get him back in shape. But, sir, you are never satisfied that
you know everything about that.
Mr. Rothman. As long as you make--I understand what your
testimony is, that you are making the effort to do as much as
you can to discover problems in these other aircraft.
General Moseley. Yes, sir. And on the F-15 side we are
about to embark on another set of evaluations where we go
through another set of fatigue tests on an airplane off the
line as well as a teardown test and let the company partner
with us on finding out what is any more predictive data that is
knowable on how to maintain the aircraft that are now 30 years
old.

COUNTERSPACE PROGRAMS

Mr. Rothman. I have one more question. Then I am going to
go to Mr. Tiahrt. And this is a general broad-picture question
about changes that the Air Force has made to the counterspace
systems programs, if any, in response to the recent Chinese
anti-satellite test.
This is an open hearing. I am certain that there are plenty
of things that are being done that you can't talk about in an
open hearing. But to address that potential threat, the present
threat of anti-satellite weapons or the future threat of anti-
satellite weapons.
Mr. Wynne. I can tell you, sir, this goes to the Executive
Agent for Space. The Executive Agent for Space, which is
myself, does not have the authority that he could have. We have
demanded, for example, that any future space thing come with a
defensive suite, which can be argued as to whether it has merit
or not. But I find myself engrossed in a coalition of the
willing. In other words, I don't have the authority to direct
it. I have to encourage and essentially take the moral high
ground that America's space needs defense.

EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR SPACE

Mr. Rothman. Excuse me, Secretary, I am not sure I follow.
Who do you have to encourage and is this a lack of
congressional authority or some other authority?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, there are more people managing space than
there are suppliers to space in our government; and this is a
question of who is in charge of space within the national
security regime.
Mr. Rothman. Are you requesting that the Congress delineate
or designate your office, and you in particular, to head this
effort and that all efforts be unified under your command?
Mr. Wynne. The Congress actually created a panel to examine
the implementation of the Space Commission that was chartered
and chaired by, I think at the time, Secretary Rumsfeld before
he became Defense Secretary. They have a report coming to
Congress. I think I would encourage the Congress to review that
and take them up on their offer that some of the implementation
is a little bit flawed, and I think they would seek to restore
the Executive Agent for Space to make sure there is one.
Mr. Rothman. Do you know when we can expect that report,
sir?
Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir. I believe they are making it available
this spring.
Mr. Rothman. This spring. Thank you.

ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS

General, did you want to comment on that, on the anti-
satellite weapons program?
General Moseley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. Because that
also gets at the heart of maintaining space and assured access
to space for this country, not only military but for commercial
use. The United States Air Force takes this role very seriously
as far as space situation awareness and beginning to look at
ways to maintain security of systems, not just the satellite
itself but the link in the ground station, because that is the
synergy of all of that.
We have Air Force Space Command that spends 24 hours a day,
seven days a week worrying about this problem; and we have a
new commander of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
that happens to have been the Commander of Air Force Space
Command. So I will tell you that we worry about this quite a
bit, and we understand very well what the threats to those
systems are and what options we have as we evolve into newer
systems, fielding newer systems that are much more survival and
much more capable, that they should fit inside that concern.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, General.
Mr. Tiahrt.

KC-X PROGRAM

Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you said that you believe you accurately
followed the law in the procurement of the replacement for the
KC-135E. And I do believe that within the Federal acquisition
regulations there is a requirement for the Air Force to provide
a fair and open competition when they do in fact have a
competition versus a sole source contract, but I believe it is
very clear now that this was not a fair competition.
I think you would agree that it is not a fair competition
when you demand a set of regulations be followed by one
manufacturer and you waive those regulations for another
manufacturer, because that does change the cost scheme. I think
you would agree that subsidies, whether legal or illegal, do
change the cost of these products, depending on where they are
made; and by ignoring the subsidies and not accounting for it
this is not a fair competition.
And it is very clear you had no consideration given to lost
revenue or the revenue that would have been gained, in other
words, by having an American manufacturer versus a foreign
manufacturer.
But there are also areas where it was not a fair
competition in the way you evaluated risk.
The Air Force tried to start a program depot maintenance
facility in Lake Charles, Louisiana. That facility was unable
to get FAA approval or get qualified aerospace workers.
The Navy tried to start up a facility in Greenville,
Mississippi, to do the A-6 replacement wing. That facility was
unable to get FAA approval or find qualified aerospace workers.
But yet you completely accepted the risk of a foreign
manufacturer when they said they were going to--so they
promised to move and set up I believe two--maybe as many as
four--production lines in America in a place where they have
never had FAA certification or they have qualified aerospace
workers. That is a huge risk.
And if you look at VH-71, the cost overruns by setting up
an American manufacturing facility and transferring work from--
a portion of the work from Europe to America, they have overrun
their cost by 67 percent, a huge risk; and yet none of that was
taken into consideration by the Air Force and created an unfair
level of competition. This I think is a bad decision, and it
was tried to be sold as a good decision. And the way it was
done is the Air Force, not releasing data, leaked this to a guy
named Loren B. Thompson, PhD, a guy with a great deal of
authority; and he is in a think tank, and everybody gives it a
lot of credibility.
It was leaked by the Air Force to say that this bad
decision was a slam dunk for Airbus. And the truth is it was a
very close competition. In spite of all these inequalities, in
spite of all these things that pushed this to a foreign
manufacturer, it was still very, very close.
And I want to go back to this modeling. Because the RFP
baseline to KC-135 released on January 31st. I said a week
later that you had a change to the modeling on February 6th,
and I was accurate when I said that. What I failed to mention
is that on February 20th, another 2 weeks later, you came out
with a third modeling--second-change, third-modeling scenario.
Now, the first one was clearly--the first that was released
in October of '06 was clearly a modeling that looked at a KC-
135 replacement. Then on February 6th, after the RFP was
released, the second modeling started to look like you were
looking at a bigger tanker. And the third modeling was clearly
pushing this to a bigger airplane, clearly pushing this to a
bigger airplane. If you look at the change in scenarios and
putting greater emphasis, this was pushed by the Air Force to a
bigger airplane. It wasn't a fair and even competition. So I
don't see any way that you can claim that it is fair with all
these inequities, all of these inequities.
And then there was given extra credit--even though the RFP
doesn't demand extra credit, it was given extra credit for
passengers and for fuel capability--or, excuse me, passengers
and cargo.
Now, right now, tankers haul about 1 percent of the cargo;
and when you put cargo in them it really defeats the purpose of
the tanker portion. I mean, what you want is a tanker up there
flying around ready to refuel airplanes. If they are carrying
cargo, they have less capability. And what percentage of the
time do they even carry cargo? It is such a small percentage of
the time.
This is a refueling aircraft, and yet this unfair
competition was pushed towards a bigger aircraft because it
exceeds cargo, which wasn't in the RFP. Meeting the criteria
was what was. It exceeds passenger carriers, which wasn't in
the RFP. Just meeting the standard was in the RFP.
So this has clearly been pushed to a bigger airplane and a
foreign manufacturer. There is just no avoiding that data. It
is not a fair competition. How can you accept this as a fair
competition when you know this data exists and you know, in
fact, that you have waived regulations; you know you didn't
consider for subsidies; you know that you didn't consider lost
revenue; you didn't even consider for the lost hangars and the
reinforced ramps and the extended runways?
Where is the cost for these items in this solution? It
isn't. You may have considered it in your scenarios, but the
cost is not in there. So how can you tell me that this is a
fair competition knowing that all these inequities exist and
they are violating the intent of the FAR to provide a fair and
level competition?
Mr. Wynne. I would like really to leave the policy
discussion. I think some of those questions ought to be
directed to the General Accounting Office to see whether or not
the policy implications ought to be considered as you have
indicated in a competition. We currently are not, if you will,
authorized to examine that under the laws of the United States.
I would also say that since this isn't--I would love to be
loquacious about it, but since it is under a protest and you
are going to get I think a good inside look, I would ask that
you might reserve an open mind and take a briefing later.
Mr. Rothman. General, did you have a comment?
General Moseley. No.
Mr. Tiahrt. In conclusion, it is an unfair competition. It
is outrageous that we would do something like this, because the
FAR demands a fair competition.
Thank you.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Tiahrt.
Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. Just to follow up on a few of these issues, and
I am doing this because this is like a historical record, just
like we found Secretary Wynne's comments 2 years ago, which led
us to believe that we were going to buy a medium-sized tanker.
And let me just go into a couple other things that I think the
Air Force needs to think about.
In 2006, the Air Force commissioned a RAND study looking at
issues associated with the modernization of the aging KC-135
fleet. It concluded that an inline production approach for a
new tanker would eliminate risk and reduce cost.
Boeing proposed an inline approach to the KC-767 tanker
production.
Northrop Grumman's approach to production certainly does
not appear to be inline and, in fact, appears to be
characterized by significant uncertainty and risk, involving
manufacturing and modifications in multiple countries, the need
to build new facilities, hire and train a new work force,
certify new processes and even to produce an operational boom
for the first time.
In light of RAND's conclusions, Boeing was marked down in
this competition for proposing the inline thing that RAND said
it should do. They are doing the same thing right now on the P-
3 replacement at the Renton plant in Renton. And everyone says
after a few initial hiccups--and they have learned a lot from
that--of doing this is the right way to do it. So this is
another issue that I think was unfairly discriminated against
Boeing.
Also, on this whole--Mr. Tiahrt brought up the area of
refueling issue and air cargo and passengers. It is normally,
looking at Air Force records in terms of cargo, only 1 percent
of cargo that is carried in tankers. It is not a big deal. And
in most operations of tankers they come back with 70,000 or
better pounds of fuel when they come back. They don't use up
all the fuel. So having massive amounts of fuel capacity--in
fact, I think this plane met the requirement for fuel offload,
went over by 20 percent, the KC-767.
So, again, big is not better. Secretary, you said it over
and over and over again, Ken Miller told me over and over
again, that the medium-sized plane is better because it costs
less. You don't burn up as much fuel. Over 25 years, the
difference in fuel consumption is $15 billion.
The difference in maintenance--and this plane is 53 percent
larger than the 767--is $5 billion to $6 billion. So there is
$20 billion.
No one has ever talked to Congress about hangars. We are
going to have to have hangars, new ramps. And the National
Guard is coming in with a letter saying, wait a minute, we
haven't got any hangars this large.
Now, you took most of the tankers away from the National
Guard. They are still smarting over that. But for the people
who still have a chance to do it, they don't have any hangars
this size. That is going to cost billions of dollars.
And, again, I go back to this scenario. I mean, these
people over in France having to bring in Germans because the
manuals on the A-380 were done in German. I mean, you know we
are going to build the tail, the fuselage, the wings in Europe,
bring it to the United States and then build it in a plant that
doesn't exist with a workforce workers that doesn't exist.
Todd has detailed you all the times we have tried to do
this before, and it just doesn't work. And this is going to be
a catastrophic fiasco that is going to hurt the reputation of
the United States Air Force. You two are the leaders of the
United States Air Force.
I implore you to go back and take another look at this and
do what we have suggested. Redo this competition. Send out the
RFP.
And I think big is wrong. I still think that the medium
size--that Secretary Wynne was right when he said we want a
medium-sized tanker. Because it is more flexible. It can go to
more air fields. It is more adaptable. And the bigger the
tanker is--the more runways are going to have to be
strengthened for these tankers. They have got to have hangars.
Big is just not the answer. A medium-sized tanker to
replace the KC-135R is the answer.
And we have had a competition. I mean, to me, this isn't
even a close call; and the idea that it was some kind of a slam
dunk is just totally ridiculous.
And again, going back to the spinmeisters over there in the
corner, you know, you can't spin something that is this
flagrantly wrong. And so--if you want to comment, fine. I know
you are going to say we have to defer to the protest and all
this.
And, by the way, one other thing. The GAO said they looked
at this thing on cargo and on passengers, and they said the Air
Force did not follow its requirements. They did not look at
whether this was needed. And their conclusion was the Air Force
could spend billions of extra dollars getting excess cargo and
passenger capability that is not needed, and they didn't do the
studies to justify that.
So the GAO I hope will take a look at this when they
evaluate this.
I just want you to know I have been here for 40 years, and
this is the worst decision I have ever seen. There is no
justification that I have heard yet for what happened,
switching this thing in the middle, going away from the midsize
tanker to a great big tanker that is going to be more
expensive. And the risk of building this thing is huge, huge.
And I just hope--I just hope you guys will go back and say we
have got to do the right thing. We should reconsider this. This
is obviously a mistake.
Thank you.
Mr. Rothman. Do either of you gentlemen wish to respond
again?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I think we took that all on board.
Mr. Rothman. Mr. Bishop.

C-130J PROGRAM

Mr. Bishop. Sir, I want to ask you about the Air Force's
supplemental request that included funding for an additional 15
C-130Js and 2 MC-130Js in the aircraft '08 supplemental
request. Given the utilization rates of the C-130 and the Air
Force's request for additional aircraft in '08 and '09, does
the subcommittee need to consider authorizing a follow-on
multi-year procurement of additional J models after the current
multi-year expires in '08?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I would say this, that we are very pleased
that the Department sought to expand the fleet of C-130Js.
Frankly, we didn't talk about the C-130Es that are out there,
but many of them have flown the wings off them. They have
cracked bulkheads. We have a real dilemma on our hands.
The Air Force Special Operations Command and the Marine
Corps all want C-130Js. And I will tell you one of the laments
that people have that I think is so real is when you get
material assets delivered to you in a supplemental you cannot
push them into a proper acquisition model.
So I would encourage this committee to tell the Air Force
to package up the C-130J program and get a follow-on multi-
year. I think having them delivered, whether they are from the
regular appropriations or from the supplemental or as it goes,
we should have the ability--I think somebody mentioned a
variation in quantity. I think you did, sir. And I think we
need to be encouraged to get a contract that allows for a
little bit of growth or a little bit of shrinkage as time goes
on and do it on a multi-year basis.
Mr. Bishop. How much are we paying for the supplemental
aircraft in comparison to the multi-year aircraft?
Mr. Wynne. Sir, I would have to get that for the record,
because the supplemental aircraft is an estimate and a multi-
year is an actual contract.
[The information follows:]

The cost of the Fiscal Year 2008 supplemental aircraft is
dependent upon the number of aircraft approved. If 17 U.S. Air
Force and 7 U.S. Marine Corps aircraft requested were to be
approved, we are estimating a contract price of $61 million for
a C-130J, $62.5 million for a KC-130J and $77 million for the
MC-130J.
In Fiscal Year 2008 the price under the Multi-Year
Procurement contract was $59.8 million for a C-130J and $59.7
million for a KC-130J.

Mr. Bishop. When will they be delivered?
Mr. Wynne. The multi-year delivers--sir, I would have to
take that on for the record.
[The information follows:]

The Fiscal Year 2008 GWOT supplemental aircraft delivery
dates depend upon when the Fiscal Year 2008 GWOT supplemental
request is approved. Whether the aircraft are procured under a
multiyear procurement contract or an annual procurement
contract the projected aircraft delivery dates are the same at
31 months from Congressional approval to the first C-130J
delivery.

Mr. Wynne. But I will only tell you this. The multi-year
prices lower than if we have to buy the original aircraft on an
individual basis, and I think the multi-year runs out either
this year, in calendar year 2008, or in calendar year 2009.
Mr. Bishop. How many J models have been deployed to the
AOR?
General Moseley. Sir, every one we have has been deployed.
Mr. Bishop. What was the initial estimate of the annual
flying hours for a C-130J and what have the average actual
annual flying hours been?
General Moseley. Sir, let us take that for the record and
get you the numbers.
[The information follows:]

The C-130J continues to perform admirably in the Global War
on Terrorism and is the intra-theater aircraft of choice for
the joint force. Since 2000, the C-130J has flown an average of
over 8,500 hours versus over 8,200 programmed hours programmed
for an over-fly percentage of 4%.

Mr. Bishop. Would you say the actual flying numbers have
exceeded what you had originally estimated?
General Moseley. I bet that is what we will see.
Mr. Bishop. You don't have an indication of that?
General Moseley. I will have to get you those numbers, sir.
Mr. Bishop. I understand you would have to get the exact
numbers. You would have to do some calculations. But do you
have a sense of whether or not you have overutilized what the
estimates were?
General Moseley. Yes.
Mr. Bishop. What is that sense?
General Moseley. Over the programmed estimate I think we
are overflying the airplanes. And, sir, if you let me contact
the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve Command and
Air Mobility Command, I will provide you those actual numbers.
Mr. Bishop. How many C-130 aircraft that are deployed in
the AOR have infrared countermeasurement protection?
General Moseley. Sir, I am thinking all of the new ones,
the C-130Hs and the C-130Js, but let me provide those numbers
to you, also.
[The information follows:]

All of the C-130's currently deployed in the U.S. Central
Command Area of Responsibility are equipped with infrared
countermeasures. This includes 36 Air Mobility Command, 11 Air
Force Special Operations Command and six Air Combat Command
aircraft for a total of 53 aircraft.

Mr. Bishop. You have some old ones there that don't have
it?
General Moseley. We have different ways to do that, but
they don't have the new systems. That is correct. Those are the
ones we are looking to retire, the C-130Es.
Mr. Bishop. How many of the C-130s are grounded or flight
restricted?
General Moseley. Almost all of the 119 C-130Es. But those
are the ones we are looking to retire. Some of the C-130Hs are
also operating under those restrictions.
Mr. Bishop. My next question is going to be how many of the
grounded aircraft have been returned to flight?
General Moseley. Sir, a lot of the aircraft are flying
under restrictions; and some of the airplanes are so restricted
that we can only fly the crews. So we have some grounded. We
have some severely restricted. And those are the older versions
of the C-130, which is why the C-130J is so important to us,
sir.
Sir, if I could follow up, it is also not just for the
cargo carrier C-130s, but it is for the special operations
aircraft, also. Those are the ones that are probably more
critical to replace in the supplemental because of combat
losses.
Mr. Wynne. And they are flying more?
General Moseley. Correct.

Closing Remarks of Mr. Rothman

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Secretary, General, thank you so much for testifying
and coming before our committee. We look forward to receiving
the items that you indicated you would be providing the
committee for the record and, again, receiving them as soon as
possible.
Please convey to the men and women under your command our
deep gratitude, respect, affection and support for their
professionalism and effectiveness in defending our country and
doing what they do better than any other air force, again, on
the planet Earth.
We know that you gentlemen, as their leaders, have an
awesome responsibility to coordinate all of these efforts and
to do so within the budget provided to you by the President and
by the Congress; and we are grateful for your many, many years
of outstanding service.
You are in our prayers, but we do expect from all of the
people who work in government, ourselves and you as well, the
highest degree of excellence, effectiveness and
professionalism. So Godspeed to you both and to the men and
women who serve with you.
This subcommittee stands adjourned and will reconvene at
1:30 p.m. For another hearing.
Mr. Wynne. We thank you for your time and attention, Mr.
Chairman.
General Moseley. Mr. Chairman, thanks also for watching
over not just Airmen, but Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, Coast-
Guardsmen, all of the young military members that we have
defending this Nation. Thanks to this committee for watching
over them.
Mr. Rothman. That is our honor and our privilege.
General Moseley. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Tiahrt and the
answers thereto follow:]

B-52 Core Component Jammer

Question. General Moseley, we understand the Air Force and
OSD have endorsed the requirement for a stand-off jamming
capability that supports Air Force and joint operations. With
the pending retirement of the EA-6B which has been providing
jamming support to the Air Force, this makes great sense to me.
However, I am concerned about how tight the Air Force budget
is, and there does not appear to be sufficient funding for the
Air Force to seriously begin developing the technology and
entering into a program of record. Would you please tell the
committee the Air Force plans for establishing an acquisition
program that will lead to a fielded stand-off jamming
capability by the fiscal year 2015 time-frame?
Answer. To date, we have no plans for establishing an
acquisition program for a stand-off jamming capability. The
proposed Core Component Jammer program is not funded. However,
the Air Force is pursuing technical maturation efforts for a
possible stand-off jamming solution. In this effort, the
Service has increased technical materials funding in the
President's Budget request for Fiscal Year 2008 by $20.5
million and in the President's Budget request for Fiscal Year
2009 by $52 million. We have also applied the $4 million
Congressional added to the President's Budget request for
Fiscal Year 2008 to risk reduction efforts in pod development
and design. We are investigating phased array weight and power
requirements; systems architecture refinement; and development
of low/mid band phased array suppliers in order to increase
technical readiness levels and position the service for a
possible program start of an affordable stand-off capability in
the near future.

Re-Engine of the B-52

Question: General Moseley, with the current national focus
on energy dependence on foreign sources for oil, and
recognizing that the Air Force is the largest consumer of fuel
in the Defense Department, would you please discuss what the
Air Force is doing to address recent study recommendations for
large aircraft fuel efficiency?
Answer. The Air Force has implemented an energy strategy
that consists of reducing our overall demand for energy,
increasing the supply of secure energy, and changing the Air
Force culture to make energy a consideration in everything we
do. Through our Air Force Smart Operations (AFSO) 21 efforts,
the Air Force is reducing fuel demand by purchasing fuel-
efficient equipment whenever possible and flying more
efficiently. We are implementing cost efficiencies, such as
reducing the weight of our aircraft and optimizing the routes
we fly, where mission appropriate. Our goal is to achieve an
overarching cultural change down to the aircraft commander and
crew chief level to conserve fuel while maintaining a level of
accountability.
In 2007, the National Research Council released a report
entitled ``Improving the Efficiency of Engines for Large Non-
fighter Aircraft'' that assessed possible technical options,
including some for the B-52. The Air Force is currently
examining the report and identifying ways to move forward. We
are also continuing to pursue new aviation technologies to
increase the efficiency of jet engines and airframes. Next
generation aircraft systems will save energy through more
efficient engine technology. Programs such as Adaptive
Versatile Engine Technology and Highly Efficient Embedded
Turbine Engine are expected to produce greater gains in
performance, while resulting in substantially increased range,
persistence and speed for both subsonic and supersonic missions
while significantly decreasing fuel usage.

Investing in Air Force Bombers

Question. General Moseley, concerning our three bomber
fleets, the B-52, B-1 and B-2, and given each bomber has a
number of decades of life remaining in the aircraft structure,
the amount of funding dedicated year over to year toward taking
advantage of new capabilities that are available such as radar
upgrades, tactical data links, and getting more smart weapons
in the weapons bays, has been pretty slim. I recognize the Air
Force has a very tight budget right now, but, it also makes
sense that we take advantage of the nation's investment in
these bombers through a program that provides enhancements that
keeps them flying safely and allows them to better support
military operations. Would you please comment on the Air Force
plans with regard to ensuring the nation has a viable bomber
fleet for this decade and next through investing in our current
bombers to sustain and enhance their capabilities, as well as
though investing in a future bomber?
Answer. The Air Force is moving forward to enhance its Long
Range Strike (LRS) capability by implementing a comprehensive
three-phased LRS strategy which addresses near-term issues
while also preparing for future operational needs. The strategy
and upgrades are detailed in the Air Force Long Range Strike
2007 White Paper, which includes the below highlights:
Phase I (already underway) of this strategy is to modernize
the present bomber force and reduce risk. The B-1, B-2 and B-52
are undergoing upgrades focused on sustainability, lethality,
responsiveness and survivability that enhance their combat
capabilities for the combatant commander. Primary among these
are the following bomber upgrades: B-1--Fully Integrated Data
Link and Advanced Targeting Pod integration, B-2--Radar
Modernization Program and Advanced Extremely High Frequency
integration (with primary flight computer upgrades), B-52
Combat Network Communications Technology.
The second phase requires a highly survivable, penetrating,
persistent LRS capability in the anti-access environment
expected to exist after 2015. The Air Force has completed an
analysis of alternatives validating these requirements and
identified the most promising platform concepts. Phase II, the
Next Generation bomber program, will leverage existing and
near-term technologies to meet these requirements by 2018.
For the longer term, Phase III of the air Force's LRS
strategy will employ advanced technologies to provide the
speed, range, accuracy, connectivity and survivability required
in the 2035 timeframe.

Mixed Fleet

Question. The 2005 Mobility Capability Study stated that
the United States Air Force should continue to have a mixed
fleet of tanker aircraft--medium and large. The Air Force chose
the KC-30 as a replacement for the medium-sized tanker.
However, the KC-30 is 27% larger than our largest tanker, the
KC-10.
Does the United States Air Force still believe we need a
mixed fleet of medium and large tankers? do you consider the
KC-30, although it is bigger than our ``large'' tanker, to be a
medium-sized tanker?
Answer. The Air Force benefits from the operational
flexibility provided by a mixed fleet of tankers. We are taking
a three-phased approach--KC-X, KC-Y, and KC-Z--over the next
several decades to replace the KC-135s and eventually the KC-
10s. It is envisioned that each phase will be a next
competition based on warfighter requirements at the start of
each phase (i.e., for KC-Y and KC-Z), we anticipate repeating
the requirements and acquisition processes we went through for
KC-X. at the recapitalization, we still plan to have a mixed
fleet for the operational flexibility we need.
The KC-X solicitation was silent as to the size of the
aircraft in order to give the offerors maximum flexibility in
crafting their proposed solutions. According to the RAND
Analysis of Alternatives for KC-135 recapitalization, medium
sized tankers are those with a maximum takeoff gross weight
(MTOGW) of 300,000 to 550,000 lbs. Using this Analysis of
Alternatives, the KC-135, KC-45 (previously referred to as KC-
30 by Northrop Grumman), and KC-767 are all in the medium size
class. The KC-10 MTOGW is nearly 600,000 lbs., putting it in
the large size class.

Subsidies

Question. It is clear that Airbus received Subsidies and
launch aid from European governments for the A-330 and other
aircraft. Airbus was given $5 billion in subsidies to develop
the A-330/A-340 aircraft. This launch aid and subsidies allows
airbus to undercut Boeing's bid the commercial market, and the
same thing happened in the KC-X competition.
Given the subsidies and other non-accounted for costs, do
you believe there is level-playing field for American and
foreign competitors in Department of Defense competitions?
Answer. The Air Force worked diligently to conduct a fair
and transparent competition. This was done throughout by strict
adherence to the laws and regulations that govern this process.
Prior to the start of the competition, the Air Force addressed
the World Trade Organization dispute (both claims and
counterclaims) with the offerors and Members of Congress. Since
the dispute had not been resolved, the Air Force sought to
protect the government and taxpayers by preventing any costs
imposed by the outcome of this letigation from being passed on
to the KC-45 contract. Both offerors agreed to this condition
as evidenced by the contract clauses they submitted in their
final proposals.

Changes to RFP

Question. It is clear that the Air Force made changes to
the draft RFP that allowed a large tanker, such as the KC-30,
to compete in a competition for a medium-sized tanker
replacement.
Why did the Air Force change the RFP at final release to
include additional evaluation criteria for airlift? Were these
changes directly the result of Northrop Grumman's threat to
withdraw from the competition unless greater value was placed
on airlift?
Answer. There were two draft Requests for Proposals (RFPs)
prior to the final RFP. The purpose of the draft RFPs was to
facilitate discussions with potential offerors and government
agencies to ensure the government clearly stated its
requirements and evaluation methods and set the groundwork for
a fair and open competition. Both offerors provided verbal and
written comments prior to the final RFP. None of the changes
were made to favor one offeror over another.
Five amendments were accomplished on the final RFP.
Amendments one through three were accomplished prior to
proposal receipt; amendments four and five were done after
proposal receipt. Amendment one included clarifications of the
RFP. Amendment two included minor mandatory updates including
required chemical, biological, and environmental information
and administrative changes to the Systems Requirements Document
(SRD). Amendment three clarified the Combined Mating and
Ranging Planning System (CMARPS) model along with numerous
administrative changes. CMARPS is a modeling and simulation
tool used in the evaluation of the Integrated Fleet Aerial
Refueling Assessment (IFARA). This amendment contained
clarifications to the SRD. Amendments four and five were
strictly administrative.
On February 23, 2007, amendment one of the RFP included
clarifications of the RFP. On February 28, 2007, amendment two
of the RFP included minor mandatory updates including required
chemical, biological, and environmental information and
administrative changes to the Systems Requirements Document
(SRD). On March 21, 2007, amendment three of the RFP was issued
extending the proposal date to April 12, 2007 and included
administrative changes to clauses, data requirements, and
Section L. Also included was an SRD update, clarifications to
the O&S form and CMARPS model clarifications to attachments
seventeen and eighteen. Two corrections requested drag index
values and expanded aircraft performance array. All amendments
occurred prior to the Air Force knowing what aircraft Boeing
and Northrop were going to bid. Both offerors could have
offered multiple aircraft types. Both offerors could have
exploited provisions in the law if they felt any of the RFP
amendments were unfair.

Boeing's Past Experience With New Construction

Question. Gentlemen, Boeing once tried to build facilities
in Greensville, Mississippi and Lake Charles, Louisiana. Those
facilities failed due to the difficulty in getting FAA
certification and difficulty in hiring qualified aerospace
workers. However, the Airbus proposal apparently contains plans
for construction of two new manufacturing plants, the training
of a new workforce, and a shift of the supply chain from Europe
to the United States.
During the KC-X competition, did you examine the failed
experiments at Greensville and Lake Charles to understand the
risk of starting a new aerospace facility in this region of the
country?
Answer. The government carefully examined production
strategies of both offerors. The assessment of these strategies
is source selection sensitive. During the Government
Accountability Office protest period, such information will be
provided orally in a closed session, when requested by the
Chairman or Ranking Member of the Committee. We are ready to
provide such a briefing at your convenience.

NG-EADS Risk

Question. In the KC-X competition, we have two clear
competitors: Boeing has a flying tanker that is FAA certified
and delivered to the Japanese Air Force. Airbus has not yet
produced a tanker and is already falling behind schedule in the
Australian tanker.
How did the Air Force evaluate risk given that Boeing has
delivered a tanker and EADS has not? did the Air Force evaluate
the failures in the EADS Australian tanker? Why didn't the AF
deem the NG-EADS proposal more risky given that they have not
produced a tanker?
Answer. The risk assessments of each proposal are source
selection sensitive. During the Government Accountability
Office protect period, such information will be provided orally
in a closed session, when requested by the Chairman or Ranking
Member of the Committee. We are ready to provide such a
briefing at your convenience.

VH-71 model

Question. The Presidential Helicopter, VH-71, has risen 67%
since the contract was awarded in 2005. Although the VH-71 is
being built by Agusta/Westland and Lockheed-Martin, Northrop
Grumman-EADS used a similar model of migrating minimal supply
chains from Europe to the United States.
Did the Air Force examine the VH-71 contract in determining
contract risk of the Northrop Grumman-EADS proposal?
Answer. Transition of production facilities from Europe to
the United States was thoroughly scrutinized during the source
selection. The details of this evaluation are source selection
sensitive. During the Government Accountability Office protest
period, such information will be provided orally in a closed
session, when requested by the Chairman or Ranking Member of
the Committee. We are ready to provide such a briefing at your
convenience.

Multiple Production Locations Risk

Question. The Airbus KC-X proposal apparently involves
building the first 7 aircraft using multiple production models
and 5 different production locations spanning two continents.
Given the complexity and the fact this is all new
territory, how can the Air Force accurately assess Northrop-
Grumman's tanker manufacturing risk?
Answer. The Government carefully examined productions
strategies of both offerors. The assessment of these strategies
is source selection sensitive. During the Government
Accountability Office protest period, such information will be
provided orally in a closed session, when requested by the
Chairman or Ranking Member of the Committee. We are ready to
provide such a briefing at your convenience.

Past Performance of EADS and NG

Question. In the KC-X competition, what was the past
performance criteria used for EADS? Please provide all
documentation to the Committee.
Was the Army's experience with the Light Utility Helicopter
considered in EADS' past performance? Was Northrop-Grumman's
past performance with Deepwater considered? The A400M is a year
behind schedule and $2 billion over cost. Was EADS' experience
with the A400M considered? The A380 is 2 years behind schedule
and around $7 billion over cost. Was Airbus' experience with
the A380 considered in past performance in the KC-X
Competition?
EADS has demonstrated very poor A400M and A380 performance
for their own design and build process. How can they be
entrusted to build a U.S. tanker?
Answer. As stated in the Request for Proposal (RFP), past
performance on contracts was evaluated if it was both recent
and relevant to the mission capability evaluation factors and
cost/price. The specific contracts considered, and the results
of the past performance evaluations, are source selection
sensitive. During the Government Accountability Office protest
period, such information will be provided orally in a closed
session, when requested by the Chairman or Ranking Member of
the Committee. We are ready to provide such a briefing at your
convenience.

Life-Cycle Costs

Question. In the KC-X competition, how did the AF evaluate
out-year costs for life-cycle costs? Did the AF take into
consideration the likely increase in the price of fuel?
Answer. Life cycle costs include development, production,
operation, personnel, and sustainment costs. Fuel costs are one
component of operation costs. For the evaluation, the Air Force
used the Department of Defense published fuel prices and fuel
inflation indices that were available at the Request for
Proposal release.

Military Construction Costs

Question. The KC-30 won't fit in our hangers, it is too
heavy for our runways, and it needs longer runways than we have
at many air bases.
Were the costs of military construction investments, new
hangers, runways, tools, additional training, etc., considered
as part of the competition? Were the Military Construction
costs for any Air National Guard bases considered?
Answer. One of the five source selection evaluation factors
was Most Probable Life Cycle Cost (MPLCC). Military
construction is one component of the MPLCC and includes new
buildings, modifications to existing buildings, new hangars,
ramp expansions, and relocation of fuel hydrants. Since basing
decisions have not been finalized yet, Air Mobility Command
conducted site surveys at representative bases to support an
estimate of total military construction costs.

Tanker Decision in 2001

Question. In March 2001, after examining offerings from
both Boeing and Airbus, the Air Force decided that the Boeing
KC-767 Tanker was the right choice for KC-X, the Next-
Generation Air-Refueling Tanker.
At that time, the USAF gave four main reasons for this
selection of the KC-767 over Airbus's KC-330:
(1) ``The KC-330 increase in size does not bring with it a
commensurate increase in available air refueling offload.''
(2) The KC-330 ``. . . presents a higher-risk technical
approach and a less preferred financial arrangement.''
(3) ``The size difference of the EADS-proposed KC-330
results in an 81 percent larger ground footprint compared to
the KC-135E it would replace, whereas the Boeing 767 is only 29
percent larger.''
(4) The KC-330 requires ``. . . greater infrastructure
investment and dramatically limits the aircraft's ability to
operate effectively in worldwide deployment.''
What has changed from the analysis in 2001 to the analysis
today?
Answer. There have been several significant changes since
then. The Request for Information evaluation in 2001 was
conducted prior to RAND's Analysis of Alternatives for KC-135
Recapitalization, which was developed from 2004 to 2006. This
comprehensive analysis informed both the defining of
requirements and the drafting of the acquisition strategy. The
requirements were written by the Air Force and validated by the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in November 2006.
The acquisition strategy was approved by the Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in January
2007 which then led to the release of the final RFP later that
month. The source selection decision was based on an integrated
assessment of the five evaluation criteria described in the
RFP. This assessment considered capabilities (for example,
aerial refueling and airlift efficiencies) relative to the
requirements validated by the JROC and in light of costs,
risks, and past performance. All the issues enumerated above
were accounted for in the assessment.
Since 2001, both offerors have leveraged development
efforts for international customers, allowing them to propose
more capable and technologically mature aircraft. For example,
the A330-based tanker was a paper design in 2001, but prior to
the conclusion of the source selection, the aircraft had
entered flight testing.
Additionally, conducting a competition changes the equation
because of the motivation to maximize capability relative to
the taxpayers' investment. As a result, the Air Force concluded
the Northrop Grumman KC-45 proposal provided the best value
approach to begin the replacement of our KC-135s.

Waivers

Question. The Department of Defense waives at least 5
costly regulations for our allies with which our domestic
manufacturers have to comply. These include ``Cost Accounting
Standards,'' the Specialty Metal laws, Buy America provisions,
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and ITAR Compliance.
What is the complete list of regulations in the FAR that
are waived for foreign manufacturers with which domestic
manufacturers must comply?
Answer. Waivers of the FARs are considered on a case by
case basis and are rigorously reviewed by Air Force contracting
and legal professionals prior to acceptance using long accepted
practices and legal precedent. This particular question
requires some diligent research and cannot be answered
effectively without completion of such research. A
clarification must also be made regarding those elements of
U.S. law that are legally ``waived'' by treaty and therefore
set forth in the FAR (as supplemented), and those ``waivers''
of FAR requirements granted by the Department on a case by case
basis.
It is readily acknowledged that the FAR, as supplemented,
is a complex set of regulations implementing both law and
exemptions from law derived from lawful negotiated treaty
agreements. Accordingly, some amount of time will be required
to fully research which FAR requirements actually incorporate
treaty agreements that appear to ``waive'' laws that are
otherwise applicable to domestic entities thereby exempting
foreign manufacturers that partner with us. The Department of
Defense does have a few specific waivers in place (including
some of those things listed in the Congressman's question), but
it is quite possible that many other waivers are in place and
appropriately incorporated in the FAR which affect labor,
environmental, tax, small business, subcontracting, and many
other laws, any of which could in effect exempt entities
manufacturing outside the U.S. from U.S. law, and for good
reason. Furthermore, U.S. law is not generally applicable
outside the U.S. for entities that are manufacturing outside
the U.S. Notwithstanding, those same entities would need to
comply with those laws when their point of manufacture is
inside the U.S.
Accordingly, a complete assessment of the issue raised by
the Congressman will require a team of international lawyers
and will require an exhaustive sifting of the FAR as
supplemented in order to determine what is, what is not, what
cannot be, and what should not be enforced on foreign entities.

National Security Considerations

Question. Did the Air Force evaluate national security
implications of having a tanker so dependent on a foreign
company? When you announced buying a French tanker for KC-X,
you said that U.S. jobs didn't impact the decision. Are you
implying that we would have no problem buying Russian bombers
and Korean ships for our military if we thought they were a
good deal?
Answer. The Department of Defense believes the
participation of allied countries in the procurement of weapon
systems can improve our national security. A Department of
Defense Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) lists countries whose
companies are exempt from restrictions in the Buy American Act;
lifting such restrictions promotes security cooperation.
Northrop Grumman's major subcontractors outside the United
States are located in Spain, Germany, and France--all three are
listed in the MOU.
Furthermore, these three countries are NATO allies. The
experiences we have had with our NATO allies on other programs
have not negatively impacted our national security. As an
example, the engines that power our KC-135R tankers are
manufactured by CFM International, a joint venture between
General Electric and the French company Snecma. Despite past
disagreements between the United States and France over foreign
policy, we have not experienced problems in maintaining these
engines. We have no reason to anticipate negative impacts to
our national security due to Northrop Grumman's production and
sustainment of KC-45 tankers.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Tiahrt.]

W I T N E S S E S

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Page
Bergman, Lieutenant General John................................. 83
Blum, Lieutenant General H.S..................................... 164
Bradley, Lieutenant General John................................. 83
Casscells, S.W. ``Trip''......................................... 1
Cotton, Vice Admiral John........................................ 83
Fallon, Admiral W.J.............................................. 243
Hudson, Lieutenant General J.L................................... 197
Kasten, Terry.................................................... 197
McKinley, Lieutenant General Craig............................... 164
Moseley, General T.M............................................. 315
Payton, S.C...................................................... 197
Robinson, Vice Admiral A.M....................................... 1
Roudebush, Lieutenant General J.G................................ 1
Schoomaker, Lieutenant General E.B............................... 1
Stultz, Lieutenant General Jack.................................. 83
Vaughn, Lieutenant General Clyde................................. 164
Wynne, M.W....................................................... 315