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FORTRESS AMERICA ABROAD: EFFECTIVE DIPLOMACY AND THE FUTURE OF U.S. EMBASSIES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

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CONTENTS

	Page
Hearing held on January 23, 2008	1
Statement of:	
Grossman, Ambassador Marc, vice chairman of the Cohen Group; Dr. Jane Loeffler, visiting associate professor at the University of Maryland; John Naland, president of the American Foreign Service Association; and Ambassador Thomas Pickering, vice chairman of Hills and Co.	12
Grossman, Ambassador Marc	12
Loeffler, Dr. Jane	20
Naland, John	34
Pickering, Ambassador Thomas	40
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:	
Grossman, Ambassador Marc, vice chairman of the Cohen Group, prepared statement of	15
Loeffler, Dr. Jane, visiting associate professor at the University of Maryland, prepared statement of	23
Naland, John, president of the American Foreign Service Association, prepared statement of	36
Pickering, Ambassador Thomas, vice chairman of Hills and Co., prepared statement of	43
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of	8
Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State of Massachusetts:	
Letter dated January 22, 2008	71
Prepared statement of	4

FORTRESS AMERICA ABROAD: EFFECTIVE DIPLOMACY AND THE FUTURE OF U.S. EMBASSIES

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room 2157, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Maloney, Lynch, Higgins, Welch, Shays, Burton, Platts, and Foxx.

Staff present: Dave Turk, staff director; Davis Hake, clerk; Andy Wright and Janice Spector, professional staff members; Dan Hamilton, fellow; A. Brooke Bennett, minority counsel; Todd Greenwood, minority legislative assistant; Nick Palarino, minority senior investigator and policy advisor; and Benjamin Chance, minority clerk.

Mr. TIERNEY. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs hearing entitled, "Fortress America Abroad: Effective Diplomacy and the Future of U.S. Embassies," will come to order.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements. Without objection.

I ask consent that the hearing record be kept open for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without objection, so allowed.

On behalf of the members of the subcommittee, I want to welcome our panel of highly distinguished witnesses who are with us today. We are going to discuss challenges—as well as the opportunities—for the future of U.S. Embassies and diplomacy with four uniquely qualified experts.

We will examine not only the ramifications of the new type of Embassies that U.S. taxpayers are currently funding around the world—some call them "fortress" Embassies on the outskirts of towns—we will also evaluate the broader purposes of our diplomatic presence abroad. We will discuss how we can best maintain and improve our relations with foreign governments and the people those governments represent.

Our diplomats put themselves in harm's way for all of us day and night. They live in every part of the globe, often in remote and

austere places that are afflicted by poverty and violence. And they suffer casualties, like Tom Stefani of the Foreign Agricultural Service, who was killed by a bomb in Afghanistan last October, or John Granville, a USAID officer killed along with his driver earlier this month in Sudan.

We all recognize the need for robust and effective security. Our people deserve it and our missions cannot be effective without it. At the same time, we have to recognize that the very effectiveness we seek to maintain with that security is threatened if the security measures are not carefully managed.

Take the symbolism of the American Embassy itself. For generations, the sight of the American flag flying openly in the heart of foreign capitals and oppressive regimes gave hope to dissidents, relief to Americans abroad, and pause to many dictators.

Stories are legendary of young people learning in American Embassy libraries and cultural centers who would later become leaders of their nations, with affection for the United States that they would never forget. Yet, our concerns with security have now led us to build new Embassy compounds of cookie-cutter boxes surrounded by walls located on the outskirts of towns.

One magazine called our new Embassy in Iraq, for example, the "Mega-Bunker of Baghdad." One of our witnesses today has referred to this phenomenon as "Fortress America."

But $700 million Embassy Baghdad is not the only example. There are a number of others that we are showing slides of them up on the board right now.

More and more, the American flag flies on the outskirts of foreign capitals, remote from daily life, from inside the fortified perimeter of a massive bunker. In the words of one commentator, "These Embassies are the artifacts of fear."

My concern is that our diplomats are at risk of alienation, of becoming unable to communicate face-to-face with the very people they must try to understand and to influence. They are at risk of irrelevance.

I don't think that anybody on this panel here today claims to have the answers for the very difficult questions that confront us: questions of safety, of costs, and of the best way to conduct diplomacy in this post-9/11 world.

That is why we have assembled such an extremely great group of experts here for us to ask these tough questions and to learn from the collective years of experience, and personal and professional study that these witnesses have given.

For example, if diplomats can't meet with their counterparts, travel the country and get to know people, what purpose do they serve? What is the symbolism of Embassies and what messages do they send to the host country and its people? What positive symbols should our Embassies be sending? Is the symbolism important? If so, how should this fact be reconciled with other considerations such as security and fiscal discipline?

What are the best ways to protect those serving in our Embassies abroad? Do we need to focus not on risk avoidance, but on risk management? And how do we do that? How much does heavy security screening reduce casual traffic into American libraries or cul-

tural centers on Embassy compounds? How significant is this and what creative options are there for acceptable substitutes?

How can we best utilize and leverage advanced communications technology in pursuit of diplomacy, especially diplomacy focused directly on the people of a host nation?

How is the U.S. Ambassador supposed to control and coordinate the activities of an ever-increasing patchwork of government agencies, especially the large increases of military personnel who do not report to the Ambassador, but to a distant theater combatant command?

Should so-called "American Presence Posts"—that is, small expeditionary-type offices with a single diplomat in remote, but significant, foreign cities—be a part of the diplomatic puzzle? If so, how can we best provide safety and the necessary manpower?

If we do not have adequate numbers of language-trained and otherwise adequately prepared personnel to send on these and other missions—which the Government Accountability Office, among others, has documented—how do we get them?

In sum, how best should the United States pursue diplomacy in the 21st century? And how can we ensure that we have this discussion before we spend more and more millions of taxpayer dollars on fortress-like Embassies or other activities that don't best serve our core and long-term national security needs?

Defense Secretary Gates recently stressed, "What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development. . . . We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military."

This sentiment about the dangerousness of our lack of investment in diplomatic resources and funding is gaining ground across party lines and ideologies. But how do we best set a goal to get from point A to point B, and just what should point B look like in operational form?

In the end, I am confident that we can do the right thing and get the right balance of security and openness, of trained personnel and resources necessary to carry out the vital task of American diplomacy in the 21st century. But we first need a robust and open dialog among policymakers, experts, and the men and women who represent us abroad in the face of great personal sacrifice.

I want to again thank our outstanding witnesses for being with us today. I look forward to learning from your expertise and your experience.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

Opening Statement of Chairman John F. Tierney at the Oversight Hearing entitled, "Fortress America Abroad: Effective Diplomacy and the Future of U.S. Embassies."

January 23, 2008

On behalf of the Members of this Subcommittee, I welcome our panel of highly distinguished witnesses. Today, we will discuss the challenges – as well as the opportunities – for the future of U.S. embassies and diplomacy with four uniquely qualified experts.

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My fear is that our diplomats are at risk of alienation, of becoming unable to communicate face-to-face with the very people they must try to understand and to influence; that they are at risk of irrelevance.

I don't claim to have the answers for the very difficult questions facing us today – questions of safety, of costs and of the best way to conduct diplomacy in this post-9/11 world.

That's why we've assembled such an esteemed group of experts; for us to ask these tough questions of you, and to learn from your collective years of personal experience and professional study.

• For example, if diplomats can't meet with their counterparts, travel the country and get to know the people, what purpose do they serve?

• What is the symbolism of embassies and what messages do they send to the host country and its people? What positive symbols should our embassies be sending? Is this symbolism important? If so, how should this factor be reconciled with other considerations such as security and fiscal discipline?

• What are the best ways to protect those serving in our embassies abroad? Do we need to focus not on risk avoidance but on risk management? How do we do that?

• How much does heavy security screening reduce casual traffic into American libraries or cultural centers on embassy compounds? How significant is this, and what creative options are there for acceptable substitutes?

• How can we best utilize and leverage advanced communications technology in pursuit of diplomacy, especially diplomacy focused directly on the people of a host nation?

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And this sentiment about the dangerousness of our lack of investment in diplomatic resources and funding is gaining ground across party lines and ideologies. But how do we best get from point A to point B, and just what should point B look like in operational form?

In the end, I am confident that we can find the right balance of security and openness, of trained personnel and resources necessary to carry out the vital task of American diplomacy in the 21st century.

But we first need a robust and open dialogue among policymakers, experts, and the men and women who represent us abroad in the face of great personal sacrifice.

I thank our outstanding witnesses for being with us today, and I look forward to learning from your experience and expertise.

Mr. TIERNEY. At this point, I would like to ask Mr. Shays for his opening statement.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and welcome to our very distinguished witnesses.

A determinant of U.S. success will be the size, scope, and skill of the U.S. diplomatic presence abroad. International economic, political, military, and cultural alignments are changing rapidly. Our diplomatic and interagency staff must be nimble to adapt to these realignments. Adaptability includes having the correct number of people and skill sets in our Embassies, and the ability to react to changes within a country.

Members and staff of this subcommittee have had face-to-face discussions with the men and women stationed in our Embassies. We hear reports of Ambassadors having little more than titular authority to manage non-State Department personnel. We have continued security concerns, which, in many instances, have led to limited mobility outside of the walls of the Embassy compounds. And, of course, we hear reports of Embassies in need of additional security upgrades both in terms of increased security for Embassy personnel and security of physical structures. Congress must address these concerns through continued oversight and potentially with new legislation.

In 2002, the subcommittee began investigating the Department of State's right-sizing efforts. We wanted to make sure the United States was putting the right people in the right places and in the correct numbers necessary to meet our foreign policy goals. Our subcommittee held three hearings on this topic, including one in April 2003. The April hearing focused on the GAO's review of U.S. diplomatic presence to ensure the appropriate number and types of personnel were being assigned to U.S. Embassies and consulates.

GAO found staffing projections for new Embassy compounds were being developed without a consistent systematic approach or comprehensive right-sizing analysis. GAO recommended the Department of State develop a standard format for projecting staffing requirements and ensure that staffing projects are validated within the Department.

In June 2006, GAO reported State had either implemented GAO's recommendations or was taking steps to implement their recommendations. However, despite State's best efforts thus far, more work needs to be done and GAO's reports are useful in helping the State Department understand where they can improve their efforts. Further oversight by this subcommittee will be helpful, and I look forward to working with my colleagues on this subcommittee to achieve the necessary reforms.

Mr. Chairman, we welcome all of our witnesses here today. We truly appreciate their time, their dedication and expertise, and I think we all look forward to their testimony. And I am going to try to stay to hear the testimony. I have a very important meeting that I have to get to, so if I leave before the conclusion, it is not that I think this isn't anything but a very important hearing. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA
CHAIRMAN

TOM DAVIS, VIRGINIA
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
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House of Representatives
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Opening Statement
Ranking Member Christopher Shays
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
"Fortress America Abroad: Effective Diplomacy and the Future of US Embassies"
Wednesday, January 23, 2008

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this important hearing about the future of our Embassies.

A determinant of US success will be the size, scope and skill of the US diplomatic presence abroad. International economic, political, military and cultural alignments are changing rapidly. Our diplomatic and interagency staff must be nimble to adapt to these realignments.

Adaptability includes having the correct number of people and skill sets in our embassies and the ability to react to changes within a country.

Members and Staff of this Subcommittee have had face-to-face discussions with the men and women stationed in our embassies. We hear reports of Ambassadors having little more than titular authority to manage non-State Department personnel. We hear of continued security concerns, which, in many instances, have led to limited mobility outside of the walls of the Embassy compounds.

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Mr. Chairman, we welcome all of our witnesses here today. We truly appreciate their time, their dedication and their expertise, and we look forward to their testimony.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Shays.

Mr. Lynch, you want to make brief remarks, I understand?

Mr. LYNCH. Just brief remarks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the ranking member. As well, I thank our esteemed panelists for coming before the committee to help us with our work.

I am one who, over the last few years, has come to spend a lot of time in our foreign Embassies. I deeply appreciate the work being done by our State Department, Treasury, Defense Department, and I believe that it is really an investment in personnel that will cause the greatest improvement in our foreign policy. But there is definitely a need to provide a secure environment for our folks who work in our Embassies, one that provides security, but also allows diplomacy to occur and to get out into the communities in the cities and countries in which we are located. I will rely heavily upon you to tell us how to accomplish both of those goals and, I appreciate all the experience that is on this panel before us this morning. I am very interested in hearing your remarks. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Lynch.

Mr. Burton, would you care to make opening remarks?

Mr. BURTON. No, I don't have any remarks, Mr. Chairman.

I thought, Ambassador Pickering, weren't you in the private sector last time I saw you?

Ambassador PICKERING. I am still.

Mr. BURTON. You are. I mean, I thought you were out there making a lot of money, and I didn't know why you were back. I am just teasing. I thought you were out there having a good time, instead of working——

Ambassador PICKERING. [Remarks off microphone.]

Mr. BURTON. Oh, OK. Well, it is nice seeing you, Ambassador.

I don't have any comments.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. We will bring you up to date on what the Ambassador is doing in one moment, as we introduce people here.

We are now going to receive the testimony from the witnesses before us, and I would like to begin by introducing them with a little background on each one.

Ambassador Marc A. Grossman has served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 2001 to 2005—and I guess if we add that with Ambassador Pickering, we really get from 1997 all the way to 2005 in that position of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs—as the Department's third-ranking official and its senior career diplomat. Mr. Grossman has also served as the Director General of the Foreign Service and as Ambassador to Turkey. He is currently the vice chairman of the Cohen Group and was co-chair of the Embassy of the Future Commission for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which released its final report last year and which we will be discussing at length this morning.

Dr. Jane C. Loeffler is an associate professor at the University of Maryland College Park and is the author of The Architecture of American Diplomacy and Fortress America. She is widely recognized as an expert on the history and cultural impact of U.S. Embassy design and construction. Dr. Loeffler holds a graduate degree in city planning from Harvard University and a doctorate in American civilization from George Washington University. She has also

written and commented widely on the New Embassy Compound program and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

Mr. John K. Naland. Mr. Naland is currently president of the American Foreign Service Association, the professional association and union representing 28,000 serving and retired Foreign Service personnel. He is a career Foreign Service officer, commissioned in 1986, and has written and commented on diplomatic strategy on television and in the printed press. Mr. Naland is a former Army cavalry officer and has served widely in Latin America, State Department headquarters, and the White House.

And, Mr. Burton, Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering has served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1997 to 2001. He has also served as U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Israel, India, Jordan, El Salvador, Nigeria, and the United Nations.

Mr. BURTON. Is that all?

Mr. TIERNEY. About 5 minutes in each place.

Ambassador Pickering is a former senior vice president for international affairs at Boeing and is currently vice chairman of Hills and Co. He is also affiliated with many non-governmental organizations, including the International Crisis Group, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Welcome to all of you.

Ambassador Pickering, you served a considerable amount of time in some of those locations as well. Was it 4 years in Jordan, 3 years in Israel?

I want to thank all of you for your expertise and for your service, for those that have been in the Foreign Service.

It is the policy of this subcommittee to swear you before you testify, so I ask you to please stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. The record will please record that the witnesses all answered in the affirmative.

Your written statements are going to be put in their entirety in the record and, Mr. Grossman, the report from your organization will also be placed in the record. Without objection, so ordered. We do have a 5-minute time limitation, as you will see on the lights there. We try to be a little generous with that because what you have to say is important and we want to hear as much as we can. Without trying to be rude, if we think you're going extremely over the 5-minutes, we may just interrupt and ask you to wind it up at that point in time.

Ambassador Grossman, we would really like to hear your remarks at this time, please.

STATEMENTS OF AMBASSADOR MARC GROSSMAN, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE COHEN GROUP; DR. JANE LOEFFLER, VISITING ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND; JOHN NALAND, PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION; AND AMBASSADOR THOMAS PICKERING, VICE CHAIRMAN OF HILLS AND CO.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR MARC GROSSMAN

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Shays and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to testify here today concerning, as you said, Mr. Chairman, the recent Commission on the Embassy of the Future, which was sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

And may I just stop for a moment and thank everyone here for your interest in this subject. And I also heard in the opening statements also a very important point, which is the travel that you are doing, and the fact that members of this subcommittee get out and are at Embassies abroad and see people who are serving abroad. I know that the folks abroad appreciate that and I certainly do as well.

If I could just talk a little bit about how this Embassy of the Future Commission came to be, I think it would provide, I hope, some context for our recommendations.

The Embassy of the Future Commission started actually with the idea of the State Department, and I had the good fortune to be one of the co-chairs of the Commission, along with Ambassador George Argyros, who was Ambassador to Spain, and Ambassador Felix Rohatyn, who was the Ambassador to France. And because neither of my other co-chairs live in Washington, DC, I will do the best I can to represent them today.

It is also worthwhile, I think, and you can see from the report, we had a very distinguished Commission. Ambassador Pickering was one of our commissioners, and I thank them for their effort. And I would also say that we had the good fortune to consult with Dr. Loeffler and a very lot of good cooperation from AFSA as well. So we thank everybody here and the organizations that we represent.

Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate the fact that you would put my written statement and the Commission's report in the record. I appreciate that.

As I say, the study was conceived at the request of the State Department. The then Under Secretary for Management, Henrietta Fore was in touch with CSIS and she asked that organization if it might be possible for them to survey the State Department's program to modernize its Embassies and to make recommendations about how to improve the functions of the Embassies.

I also want to say that the Commission study was funded by the Una Chapman Cox Foundation, which is a private foundation whose commitment is to better the life of people in the Foreign Service.

And as the chairman said, we reported our findings to the State Department at the end of last year, including a briefing to Secretary Rice, and we made our findings public in October of last year.

Mr. Chairman, I would tell you and members of the committee, that when CSIS first conceived of this report, they were focused on the buildings, and they envisioned it as a study that would examine the structures of the Embassy, because, as, Mr. Chairman, you said, there is a debate inside, outside the State Department about what these structures are all about. Do we have the right ones? Are they in the right place? How are they affecting the work of our diplomats.

But as you said in your opening statement with all of those questions, our commissioners, once we got started, recognized that this agenda was much too narrow and that the issue was really how do you get the most effective foreign policy and diplomacy for the United States in the 21st century; and this came to us as an issue that was more fundamental, bigger, if you will, than the buildings themselves. And I am not saying the buildings are not important—and I look forward to the discussion today—but the issue for the Commission was how do you get diplomats ready to do the 21st century job. So that was the focus of our work. And if you would allow me, I will tell you a little bit about it and our recommendations.

First of all, it is really important to recognize, as you did, Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Shays did and Mr. Lynch did, that the job that diplomats are doing today is changing. It isn't the same job that John Naland and Ambassador Pickering and I had when we joined the Foreign Service. It is now a job that has to do with activity. It is not just about reporting and sending back information for others to make decisions; it is about all the active things that our people are required to do, to get out to speak to individuals, to get out into societies.

That is a different kind of job. It is a 21st century job. Sure, there are, as we said in the Commission, the traditional things will continue to be done. You have to go and visit the foreign ministry; you have to go visit the government. But if you are not out now with individuals and political parties and students, and in the culture of these societies, we believed, as a Commission, that we were missing a very big set of opportunities for the United States of America.

So the first fundamental thing that the Commission dealt with was that the job of diplomats is changing. And we also recognized that the State Department, over the past few years, has started to make some changes. You see what Secretary Albright, Secretary Powell, Secretary Rice have done, but we concluded that much, much more needed to be done. And I would say, sir, that one of the things that we hoped to have in our report was the kind of report where people could open it up over at the State Department, start reading and say, yes, we could do these things. It isn't huge philosophy and a Ph.D. thesis on this, that, or the other thing; these are recommendations, 20 or 25 recommendations, that people could do if they had the will, and we hope that they will.

These recommendations go like this. First, people. As Mr. Lynch said in his opening comments, we concluded that without the right number of people, everything else isn't going to work, and the Commission recommends the hiring, over the next 3 years, of 1,079 new Foreign Service people; and the reason for that is that we believe

the Department ought to have enough people to train people and to have people moving without having to have losses at the various Embassies. And as I say, without this, we believed, nothing else matters. So this number is a number that we believed in. We believe it is a good number and a number we could justify, but it is something we hope the State Department will move on, and I hope also with the support of the Congress.

Our logic then went like this: if it was right, sir, that we needed more people, you can't just have more people; they have to do this new job. And to do this new job, they need two things. First, they need better training. So they need training in better security practices; they need training in the cultural affairs; they need more language training; they need a way to learn how to interact with these societies; and, second, that they need new technology. And the technologies that are out there in order to enhance the job of this new diplomacy are legion, whether it is BlackBerries or video conferencing or the Internet. These are ways that the State Department could communicate better with itself and also with other government agencies, but also, very importantly, out to societies.

We said, if that is right, more training, more technology, then you get to the question of platforms, and we concluded that the State Department's building program is something that ought to continue; that people have a right to a safe, secure place to work where they are working; that the job is now to get them out of this Embassies and do the job outside of the walls. So, as you said, sir, American Presence Posts, American Corners Virtual presence posts. All these things are really important.

If the platforms are more dispersed, what do you know? As the committee said, you need more authority, as Mr. Shays said, for Ambassadors, if people are spread out, the Ambassador needs the authority to run her or his country team.

And a final point that I would make is the question of risk management. We concluded, as a Commission, that it is important, obviously, that people be protected. But you need to shift from a culture of risk avoidance to risk management. And as people are out farther into these communities, as they are in APPs, as they are in Virtual Presence Posts, what is going to happen? Well, you increase their risk. But they ought to have better training and better protection. But we are, as a society, going to have to deal with the question of pushing our people out into these societies and running the risk that more people will go into harm's way even further than they are today.

Mr. Chairman, I see that my time is up, but we thought that, collectively, this issue of the right number of people, technology, training, platforms dispersed and distributed, more Ambassadorial authority, and a shift from risk avoidance to risk management would allow us to really say that diplomacy already is a vital tool of national security for the United States, but we hoped, as a Commission, to be able to enhance that thought and open it up for the opportunities that are so evidently available for the United States and the world.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for the opportunity to testify this morning.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Grossman follows:]

Testimony of the Honorable Marc Grossman

Before the

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

United States House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.

January 23, 2008

The Embassy of the Future

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to testify before you today concerning a recent commission report focused on the Embassy of the Future. Thank you for your interest in this important subject.

The Embassy of the Future Commission was organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies here in Washington, D.C. I was privileged to be one of the co-chairs of the Commission. The other co-chairs were Ambassador George Argyros and Ambassador Felix Rohatyn. Because the other co-chairs do not live in the Washington area, I will do my best to represent them today. I also wish to recognize and thank again all of those who served as Commissioners.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask that you include the report of the Commission in the official transcript of this hearing.

Let me briefly explain the origins of the study in order to put in context the findings of our report. The study was conceived at the request of the State Department. Then Under Secretary for Management Henrietta Fore contacted CSIS to ask if CSIS would survey the State Department's program to modernize its embassy platforms, and make recommendations to improve the functioning of the embassies. The project was funded by the Una Chapman Cox Foundation, a private foundation dedicated to improving conditions for the Foreign Service and to make American diplomacy more effective. We reported the results of our study to the Department last fall in briefings to senior management, to include the Secretary of State, and released the report to the public in October, 2007.

Mr. Chairman, in the early stages of the planning for this commission, CSIS staff had envisioned it as a study that would examine the building program for new embassies. There has been debate, inside and outside the State Department, about the kind of facilities being built and where they are located in foreign capitals.

Our commissioners felt that agenda was too narrow. There is a much larger question to be asked: What must America do to have the most effective 21st century diplomacy? This is a question that is larger and more

fundamental than buildings and it was this issue that became the focus of our work.

As the report says, what we think of as traditional diplomacy – where government and social elites interact in highly formal channels – is being transformed. Today's diplomats will continue to conduct traditional business, and it is important, but they must also adapt their skills to nontraditional settings.

America's diplomats are already doing business in new ways. They work to bring development to mountain villages in Nepal and Peru, travel to remote jungles to support drug eradication missions in Colombia, and deliver food and water in the wake of catastrophes such as the tsunami. They deploy with US military forces in provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan and Iraq and operate from one-officer posts to promote American business in commercial centers in France.

In our interviews with serving diplomats around the world, we heard that they are struggling to break free from the bureaucratic practices that keep them inside US embassy buildings and that emphasize the processing of information over the personal, active, direct engagement that wins friends and supporters for America – the kind of diplomacy that inspired them to serve their country in the first place.

Today's diplomatic challenges – such as highlighting and demonstrating American values; strengthening the growth of civil institutions and the rule of law; promoting democracy; serving and protecting the millions of American citizens who live and travel abroad; promoting trade and investment; fighting drug trafficking; stopping the trafficking in persons; supporting sustainable development to combat poverty; preventing genocide; strengthening foreign cooperation and capacity to address global security challenges such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, international crime, disease and humanitarian disasters – cannot be accomplished from Washington. These objectives require frontline activity by skilled diplomatic professionals operating in – and increasingly out of – embassies of the future; dynamic and effective platforms for American power and influence around the world.

The State Department has taken initiatives to change the way American diplomacy is done. Secretary Albright began the effort to revamp the Department's personnel system. Secretary Powell made significant contributions, the most important of which was the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, the program that hired just over 1,100 Foreign Service officers in three years. Secretary Rice has emphasized "transformational diplomacy" and acted to redistribute positions to new priorities.

Mr. Chairman, the Commission devoted a good deal of time to thinking about the requirements for effective diplomats and effective diplomacy in the future. Let me summarize the highlights of this report, and then I would look forward to answering any questions you have.

First, the Commission concluded that we need to resource the State Department properly. The Commission concluded that we need to increase the number of Foreign Service Officers to correct long-standing shortfalls in personnel. Our report calls for the budget to increase so that 1,015 are hired as soon as possible. I can't overstate the importance of this. The price for fixing this shortfall in staffing of the State Department would cost less than just one C-17 transport aircraft. I think we need to buy transport aircraft. But I use this example to show that the price of correcting this shortfall is easily within our reach as a nation. We must act on this or the rest of our proposals will have little real effect.

Second, the State Department must exploit new technologies for a new diplomacy. With advances in technology such as Blackberries, videoconferencing and online networking, diplomats can extend their reach and widen their networks. State also needs to use technology to make it easier for our diplomats to report from the field, and to share knowledge with colleagues in the embassy and the State Department, and with other agencies.

Third, diplomacy in the future will be most successful if it is practiced from dispersed, distributed platforms, away from main embassy compounds, operating closer to target audiences. We must have diplomats with stronger language and other skills, with more flexible technology and trained for a broader range of activities. The American embassy in a foreign country is one of the platforms for the operations of American representatives. But it is

also a physical representation of America. We should be showing a confident and proud face to the world, not a worried and frightened image.

Fourth, we need to strengthen the role of the Ambassadors to enable them to forge the country team into one unit, insuring that all the agencies represented are working coherently. As our platforms become more diverse and technology allows people to be out more on their own, the Ambassador's integrating function becomes more important, not less.

Fifth, we need to think about how we manage risk. We must protect the women and men who work in the mission. But there needs to be an effective balance between accomplishing the mission and protecting the people. This doesn't mean less security. It means smarter security. We need to give our security experts and our Ambassadors better tools, and State Department employees better training, so that they can reach a reasoned plan for security and mission effectiveness.

As the Commission concluded, supporting diplomacy of the future will require changes in how Americans perceive diplomacy. Some Americans mistake diplomacy as a tool for the weak, always about making concessions or appeasing our foes. Diplomacy is a vital tool of national security. The men and women who pursue America's diplomatic objectives abroad are as honorable and dedicated in their promotion of defense of America's interests as are our men and women in uniform.

The United States faces unprecedented opportunities and challenges around the world. We will not meet these challenges, or grasp the opportunities available to us, without a successful American diplomacy.

Thank you. I am delighted to answer any questions you might have for me concerning the Commission report.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you very much.

Dr. Loeffler.

STATEMENT OF DR. JANE LOEFFLER

Ms. LOEFFLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Shays, for holding this hearing and inviting me to participate. The remarks I am making now are a summary of those that I have submitted for the record.

I am not an architect nor a diplomat. I am a historian who studies architecture and public policy. My observations are based on 25 years of research into America's Embassy program and its impact on the international landscape. And there are pictures that go with this talk, if you want to be distracted a little. They will help.

People ask if architecture really matters when security is such a huge concern. There is no better illustration that it does matter than Congress's instinctively correct decision after 9/11 to maintain the Capitol as its place of business. You might have relocated to a lower profile, less accessible setting, or retreated to home districts and chosen to communicate via teleconference, but you did not. You decided to conduct business here, adding as much security as possible without impeding the business of government or public access to government.

During the Civil War, when he might well have stopped construction of the great Capitol dome, President Lincoln did not. "When the people see the dome rising, he declared, it will be a sign that we intend the Union to go on." Lincoln recognized the power of architecture. Congress has recognized it. When it comes to America's presence abroad, we must recognize it too.

Good design conveys good intentions. Well-designed buildings represent the best of modern technology, show our respect for countries that host us around the world, and proclaim our confidence in the future. Sadly, OBO's program, with its cookie-cutter approach to production—which you have mentioned, Mr. Chairman, conveys neither good will nor strength.

To the contrary, it is dotting the global landscape with Embassies that resemble big box stores, only they are bigger, more isolated, and far more forbidding than any store designed to attract business or sell a product. And an SED does not belong everywhere any more than a Wal-Mart belongs in Georgetown.

With globalization, when we face the world, we face ourselves, and what we see matters. The standard Embassy design, the SED, is an expedient solution that ignores the message it sends. More than that, it utilizes a design/build process that gives direct control to individual contractors, weakens the government's negotiating role, and minimizes the contribution of architects and other design professionals whose skills are needed now more than ever.

For these reasons and more, experts warn that soaring maintenance costs will plague our new Embassies. Poor oversight and cut corners are bad news for those who have to live and work in such facilities, and for those who maintain them. It might be OK if these buildings were going to be replaced in 10 or 20 years, like shopping malls here at home, but they are not.

No one would argue that security should be compromised for aesthetic purposes, but as GSA has shown here at home, security is

bettered by design excellence. A good overseas example is the new British Embassy in Yemen, which not only meets security requirements, but is also a model of sustainability in a desert climate. We can point to nothing comparable. Anyone who has seen the American flag flying atop U.S. Embassies in Prague or London knows what Lincoln meant when he compared the Capitol to a symbol of strength and a beacon of freedom. And that little arrow in the slide points to the American flag that flew over Prague all through the cold war and was considered a symbol of strength in that city and a beacon of freedom. It is in the picture, but it is hard to see.

Are isolated Embassy enclaves really "platforms for diplomacy," as some maintain, or just platforms for maintaining an overseas presence? Do such facilities support or undermine the expansion of public diplomacy, a key weapon in the war of ideas? Is a design formulated for Kampala really right for The Hague? These questions call for answers, and in seeking answers we would do well to be guided by the same thinking as those who strive to maintain the openness of the Capitol.

Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer recently spoke out on this subject because of his concern that we are allowing security experts to make too many of our decisions about public buildings. "We'll end up with buildings that look like our Embassy in Chile," he said, deploring it as a "fortress." It is not just about money, he said, it is about finding people who will listen, who understand that Embassies make "a statement that the United States is a democracy and not walling itself off from the world."

Former Ambassador to India, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, addressed these issues in 1999. Senator Moynihan saw architecture as a national policy issue and called for an ongoing conversation on how to balance security and openness at home and abroad. That conversation has not yet occurred, but with your help it can begin now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If, with your permission, I can have a few more comments that I would like to add to this statement.

Mr. TIERNEY. Go ahead.

Ms. LOEFFLER. One, on minimizing the role of—six comments. On minimizing the role of architects in the Embassy production process, it should be noted that OBO no longer even hires architects for individual projects. The exception are only the high-profile projects such as Berlin and Beijing. And they also abandoned the highly respected peer review panel that served the State Department so well between 1954 and 2004, in its 50th anniversary year, and, instead, created a panel of industry representatives who vied for OBO contracts and simply rubber-stamped the director's policies.

Two, architectural sophistication and cultural expectation are serious factors to reckon with. Both of these matter in places like Oslo or The Hague, both of which are slated to receive SEDs in the near future. These are not Third World countries with undeveloped infrastructure; they are places where historic preservation and urban design are taken seriously. We would not want to return to the architectural ego trips of the 1950's, but we must ask if a big box prototype will further our interest in Norway or The Netherlands.

Three, design excellence can contain costs and enhance security, while standardization can lead to the opposite. One example, OBO buys all its windows from one vendor. They all meet the same specifications. That single window is engineered to withstand blasts at 30 meters, the minimum setback for all Embassy perimeter walls, but it is being used everywhere, even at distances far exceeding 30 meters. Large Embassy compounds have many buildings, some situated far from perimeter walls. This means that a costly fixture is being installed many places, where a less costly one would meet all requirements.

Four, the future of Embassies, the right priorities are offensive, not defensive. It is far easier to spend money on security improvements to protect buildings than it is to devise and implement programs, such as those that Ambassador Grossman has cited, that might diminish the threat of attack and boost respect for America and what it stands for. After all, that should be our first priority. Unfortunately, it is easier to install more ballards of blast protection than it is to devise ways to make such barriers unnecessary.

Five, programs designed to decentralize services and reach more people, such as those outlined in the CSIS report, will pose logistical challenges unmet by conventional solutions. It is worth asking whether the isolated fortress-like Embassy even provides the security it advertises if many diplomats must travel outside its confines to do their work and many employees live beyond its walls.

And, six, Congress is the one that determines our face abroad. The only reason the building program expanded so dramatically in the 1950's was because it was funded through flows in counterpart funds, not new tax dollars. The only reason it expanded so dramatically in the last decade was to avoid a repeat of the tragic bombings of our Embassies in East Africa. That is reason enough to build better buildings, of course, but a country like ours can do better at what we are doing.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Loeffler follows:]

House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

January 23, 2008

"Fortress America Abroad: Effective Diplomacy and the Future of U.S. Embassies."

Testimony by Jane C. Loeffler, Ph.D.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Shays, for holding this hearing and inviting me to participate. I am not an architect, nor a diplomat; I am an historian who studies architecture and public policy. My observations are based on 25 years of research into America's embassy program and its impact on the international landscape.

I want to discuss three items here today and to raise questions for you to consider as we ponder the future of U.S. embassies. First, I want to underscore the importance of architecture as a political and cultural export. Second, I want to call attention to serious problems with our current embassy building program. Finally, I want to point to suggest that we find a better fit between inflexible infrastructure and the diverse and rapidly changing diplomatic challenges that we face.

People ask if architecture really matters when security is such a huge concern. There is no better illustration that it does matter than Congress's instinctively correct decision after 9/11 to maintain the Capitol as its place of business. You might have relocated to a lower profile, less accessible setting or retreated to home districts and chosen to communicate via teleconference, but you did not. You decided to conduct business here adding as much security as possible without impeding the business of government or public access to government.

During the Civil War, when he might well have stopped construction of the great Capitol dome, President Lincoln did not. "When the people see the dome rising," he declared, "it will be a sign that we intend the union to go on." Lincoln recognized the power of architecture. Congress has recognized it. When it comes to America's presence abroad, we must recognize it, too.

With globalization, when we face the world, we face ourselves. What we see matters.

Good design conveys good intentions. Well-designed buildings represent the best of modern technology, show our respect for countries that host us around the world, and proclaim our confidence in the future. Sadly, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) program, with its cookie-cutter approach to production, conveys neither goodwill nor strength.[1]

To the contrary, it is dotting the global landscape with embassies that resemble big box stores, only they are bigger, more isolated, and far more forbidding than any store designed to attract business or sell a product.

Pushed by Congress, OBO has transformed its building program in recent years producing dozens of new embassies and consulates that provide U.S. diplomats with sorely needed safe and functional workplaces. In so doing, however, it has adopted a "standard embassy design" (SED), an expedient solution that ignores the message it sends. More than that, as it is being implemented, the SED program puts short-term considerations far ahead of those that may affect a project over the term of its useful life. It also utilizes a design/build process that gives direct control to individual contractors, weakens the government's negotiating role, and minimizes the contribution of architects and other design professionals whose skills are needed now more than ever. Most of the time, OBO no longer even hires architects for individual projects—the exceptions are high profile projects such as Berlin and Beijing—and it abandoned its highly respected peer review panel in its 50th year (2004) eliminating the outside experts who reviewed plans and designs and provided up-to-date assessments of design and engineering options. Instead it created a panel of industry representatives who vied for OBO contracts and rubber-stamped the director's policies.

For these reasons and more, experts warn that soaring maintenance costs will plague our new embassies. Poor oversight, shoddy construction, and cut corners are bad news for those who have to live and work in such

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[1] For illustrations of new embassies, recently constructed and under construction, see www.state.gov/obo/projects/

facilities and for those who maintain them. It might be okay if the buildings were to be replaced in ten or twenty years, like shopping malls here at home, but they are not.

Architectural sophistication and cultural expectation are also factors to be reckoned with in places such as Oslo or The Hague, both of which are slated to receive SEDs in the near future. I am not arguing for retention of existing embassy buildings in either capital. Both were designed by distinguished architects but neither meets even minimal security setback requirements. They need to be replaced. But these are not third world countries with undeveloped infrastructure, they are places where historic preservation and urban design are taken seriously and where an architectural message really matters.

We would not want a return to the architectural ego-trips of the 1950s, but we must ask if a big-box prototype will further our interests in Norway or The Netherlands? History has shown that misguided embassy plans have unfortunate political and diplomatic ramifications. An SED does not belong everywhere any more than a Wal-Mart belongs in Georgetown.

No one would argue that security should be compromised for aesthetic purposes, but as GSA has demonstrated, security can be bettered by design excellence, which can also help to contain costs. A standardized approach can actually accomplish the opposite. For example, OBO buys all its windows from one vendor and they all meet the same specifications. That single window is engineered to withstand blast at 30 meters, the minimum setback requirement from all embassy perimeter walls, but it is being used everywhere—even at distances that far exceed 30 meters. Large embassy compounds regularly have many buildings, some situated far from perimeter walls. This means that a costly fixture is being installed where a less costly one would meet all necessary requirements. In addition, the windows are designed for use at sea level so when they are installed at high altitudes, there is no assurance that they will perform well. Failed windows would not only add further to costs, but would compromise security. My point is that standardization is not necessarily what it is advertised to be. It is inflexible, by

definition; it tends to repeat its mistakes and cannot rapidly integrate technological innovation.

In dramatic contrast, the British are still designing new British embassies and high commission buildings as individual projects. In Yemen, Sri Lanka, Algeria, and Zimbabwe, British architects are participating in a building program that, as a matter of policy, aims to demonstrate "the best of British architecture." In Yemen, for example, where the old British embassy was bombed in 2000, the new British embassy meets all security requirements using a cleverly massed structure, set back, and sophisticated landscaping. It is also a model of sustainability in a desert climate.

A recent article quotes Mike Gifford, the British ambassador in Yemen, who says: "One of the most pleasing aspects of the new embassy is the way it combines a modern architectural style - which sends a message that the UK is home to some excellent design talent - with references to Yemen's rich architectural heritage; it's not simply about providing secure boxes."[2]

We can point to nothing comparable.

The recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) commission report argues that buildings themselves will play less of a role in furthering America's diplomatic goals in the future while outreach and access will grow increasingly important. If that is true, it calls for a serious re-thinking of how and what we build. More than that, it means that State needs a lot more money for programs (and people) to match or exceed expenditures for infrastructure. It is far easier to spend money on security improvements to protect buildings than it is to devise and implement programs that might diminish the threat of attack and boost respect for America and what it stands for. After all, that should be our first priority. Unfortunately, it is easier to install more bollards or blast protection than it is to devise ways to make such barriers unnecessary.

Programs designed to decentralize services and reach more people, such as those outlined in the CSIS report, will pose logistical challenges

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[2] Dominic Bradbury, "With these embassies, you spoil us!" telegraph.co.uk/

unmet by conventional solutions. And it is worth asking whether the isolated fortress-like embassy prototype provides the security it is designed to provide if many diplomats must travel outside its confines to do their work and many embassy employees live beyond its walls.

The history of the embassy program is written the transcripts of House and Senate hearings. Directly or indirectly, Congress determines our face abroad. The only reason that the building program expanded so dramatically in the 1950s was because it was funded through "frozen" counterpart funds, not new tax dollars. The only reason that it expanded so dramatically in the last decade was to avoid a repeat of the tragic bombings of our embassies in East Africa. That is reason enough to build better buildings, of course, but a country like ours can do better at what we are doing.

Anyone who has seen the American flag flying atop U.S. embassies in Prague or London knows what Lincoln meant when he compared the Capitol to a symbol of strength and a beacon of freedom.

Are isolated embassy enclaves really "platforms for diplomacy," as some maintain, or just a platforms for maintaining an overseas presence? Do such facilities support or undermine the expansion of public diplomacy — a key weapon in the war of ideas? Is a design formulated for Kampala really right for The Hague? These questions call for answers, and in seeking answers, we would do well to be guided by the same thinking as those who strive to maintain the openness of the Capitol-- a policy of risk avoidance, not one of risk elimination.

Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer recently spoke out on this subject because of his concern that we are allowing security experts to make too many of our decisions about public buildings. "We'll end up with buildings that look like our embassy in Chile," he said, deploring it as a "fortress." It's not just about money, he said, it's about finding people who'll listen, who understand that embassies make "a statement that the United States is a democracy and is not walling itself off from the world." [3]

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[3] Jane Loeffler, "The Importance of Openness in an Era of Security: A Conversation with Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer," *Architectural Record*, Jan. 2006.

Former U.S. Ambassador to India, Daniel Patrick Moynihan addressed these issues in 1999. Senator Moynihan saw architecture as a national policy issue and called for an ongoing "conversation" on how to balance security and openness at home and abroad. That conversation has not yet occurred, but with your help it could begin now.

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"Fortress America Abroad: Effective Diplomacy and the Future of U.S. Embassies"

House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

Testimony by
Jane C. Loeffler, Ph.D.

January 23, 2008

The U.S. Capitol: architecture matters



A positive statement of political and cultural identity

Finnish Embassy
"Embassy Row"
Washington, D.C.

Heikkenen & Komonen, 1994





Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (**OBO**)
"Standardized Embassy Design" (**SED**)
U.S. Embassy, Bamako, Mali



"...it combines a modern architectural style - which sends a message that the UK is home to some excellent design talent - with references to Yemen's rich architectural heritage," says Mike Gifford, the British ambassador in Yemen. "It's not simply about providing secure boxes."

telegraph.co.uk

Design Engine Architects

Security and sustainability via quality design:
British Embassy, Sana'a, Yemen



Embassy purchased 1924

...and in Grosvenor Square, London

Eero Saarinen, Architect, 1959

U.S. Embassy, Santiago, Chile (1994)



Leonard Parker & Associates, Architects

Design meets "**Inman standards**" adopted after 1983 bombings in Beirut

U.S. Embassy, New Delhi, India (1959)



Edward Durell Stone, Architect

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Doctor. You found a unique way to get around the 5-minute rule, and I commend you for it.

Ms. LOEFFLER. I am sorry. I was put up to it by——

Mr. TIERNEY. We are really appreciative of it; we wanted to hear what you had to say. But whenever I see colored paper hidden underneath the white statement, I am going to know what is coming from now on.

Mr. Naland, please, your remarks will be welcome.

STATEMENT OF JOHN NALAND

Mr. NALAND. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, subcommittee members, the American Foreign Service Association welcomes this opportunity to discuss the future of U.S. Embassies. We are grateful to you for convening this hearing. In fact, we are grateful for any interest given to diplomacy and development assistance.

Our Embassies are bricks-and-mortar platforms for projecting U.S. influence in foreign lands. As such, their design, location, and accessibility certainly matter. But as the CSIS Embassy of the Future report stresses, diplomacy is foremost about people: our diplomats and their capacity to carry out their missions. Thus, I will focus on the human element of the Embassy of the future.

The Foreign Service is a worldwide available corps of professionals with abilities essential to foreign policy development and implementation. Foreign Service members need to possess a range of abilities, including foreign language fluency, area knowledge, management skills, public diplomacy skills, and job-specific functional expertise.

Unfortunately, due to chronic understaffing and chronic under-investment in training, the Foreign Service at State and USAID has long been shortchanged on many of the prerequisites for its own effectiveness.

For example, recent data show that the Foreign Service is below 85 percent staffing, short 1,015 positions for overseas and domestic assignments, and short 1,079 positions for training, transit, and temporary needs. A 2005 GAO report found that 29 percent of language-designated positions were not filled with language proficient staff.

As a result of understaffing and under-investment in training, today's Foreign Service does not have to a sufficient degree the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for diplomacy and foreign assistance. Future U.S. diplomacy will suffer unless the White House and Congress views staffing our Embassies as being no less vital than staffing our military units. Future diplomacy will suffer unless professional development of our diplomats is seen as being no less vital than the professional development of our military.

If calling for more resources seems self-serving coming from the president of AFSA, please let me quote also recent remarks of the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates: "The Department of Defense has taken on many burdens that might have been assumed by civilian agencies in the past. The Military has done an admiral job, but it is no replacement for the real thing—civilian involvement and expertise. What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security."

Secretary Gates clearly recognizes the value of a well-staffed and well-trained diplomatic corps. Thus, as we think about the Embassy of the future, we must not lose sight of the human dimension. Future U.S. diplomacy will suffer unless human capital deficits are addressed.

No matter how well trained U.S. diplomats are, their effectiveness will be limited if they are unwilling or unable to get out beyond the Embassy walls to conduct face-to-face diplomacy. Fortunately, the Foreign Service has a proud tradition of working the alleys and offices of dangerous foreign cities to promote U.S. interests. But our diplomats face an ever-growing shadow of political violence. Just this month, USAID officer John Granville, from Mr. Higgins' district, was brutally assassinated in Sudan and a U.S. Embassy vehicle was bombed in Lebanon.

I have full confidence that my colleagues will continue to volunteer for dangerous assignments and will get out beyond the Embassy walls to interact with foreign publics. To do so, however, they need more training and full staffing. For example, a diplomat who lacks fluency in the local language may well be hesitant to make contact with a wide variety of segments of the local society. A diplomat who received a fraction of the physical security training that is routinely given to intelligence community officers may well feel ill at ease going out to meet a contact. An Ambassador with an understaffed security office may be unable to safeguard the members of his or her mission. Thus, before existing security procedures are revised in the name of risk management, these training and staffing gaps must be closed first.

Finally, I must mention an ever-growing disincentive to service abroad that threatens the long-term health of the Foreign Service and, with it, the future of U.S. diplomatic engagement. I refer to the exclusion of overseas Foreign Service members from receiving the locality pay salary adjustment given to other Federal employees. Groups such as the intelligence community officers receive the same basic pay overseas that they receive while in the United States. However, our Foreign Service currently takes a nearly 21 percent cut in base pay when they transfer abroad.

Both AFSA and the Bush administration are seeking a legislative correction. I thank Representative Van Hollen of this subcommittee for his support in trying to solve the problem. I encourage others to follow suit.

Thank you again for holding this hearing.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Naland follows:]

Testimony of John K. Naland
President, American Foreign Service Association

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
Chairman John F. Tierney
Hearing on:
"Fortress America Abroad:
Effective Diplomacy and the Future of U.S. Embassies"
January 23, 2008

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Shays, and distinguished subcommittee members, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) welcomes this opportunity to speak on the subject of effective diplomacy and the future of U.S. embassies. AFSA is the professional association and labor union representing our nation's career diplomats. We are grateful to you for convening this hearing. I will make an opening statement and then look forward to answering any questions.

American embassies and consulates are bricks-and-mortar platforms for projecting U.S. influence in foreign lands. As such, it goes without saying that their design, location, and accessibility matter. But, as the CSIS "Embassy of the Future" report stresses, diplomacy is foremost about people: our diplomats and their capacity to carry out their missions. Thus, I will focus my remarks on the human element of the embassy of the future.

Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities

The Foreign Service exists to provide the President with a worldwide available corps of professionals with unique abilities that are essential to foreign policy development and implementation. Foreign Service members need to possess a range of knowledge, skills, and abilities including: foreign language fluency, advanced area knowledge (including history, culture, politics, and economics), leadership and management skills (including project management), public diplomacy skills, and job-specific functional expertise.

Unfortunately, due to chronic understaffing and chronic underinvestment in professional development, the Foreign Service at the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development has long been shortchanged on many of prerequisites for its own effectiveness. Let me give some examples:

- September 2007 data (cited in the CSIS "Embassy of the Future" report, page 10) show the State Department Foreign Service at below 85 percent of needed staffing -- short 1,015 positions for overseas and domestic assignments and short 1,079 positions for training,

transit, and temporary needs. This lack of bench strength was the proximate cause of the initial difficulty that State had last fall in filling upcoming vacancies in Iraq with volunteers.

- An August 2006 Government Accountability Office report entitled "Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist" found that 29 percent of overseas language-designated positions were not filled with language proficient staff. The report said that this situation "can adversely impact State's ability to communicate with foreign audiences and execute critical tasks."

- Many Foreign Service members -- including Ambassadors, Deputy Chiefs of Mission, and Principal Officers -- go to their new assignments without receiving up-to-date area studies training. They, therefore, face a much more daunting "learning curve" upon arrival at post.

- Foreign Service officer have far fewer opportunities for skills-broadening interagency details, university training, and war college attendance than do military officers.

- While one might expect that every U.S. diplomat would receive training in how to negotiate, only about 15 percent of current Foreign Service officers have taken a negotiating course. Imagine if only 15 percent of Army officers had been trained to fire a rifle.

- Despite increasing need for diplomats to run programs (for example, public diplomacy, security assistance, and development assistance), few Foreign Service members receive training on program management.

As a result of understaffing and under investment in training, today's Foreign Service does not have to a sufficient degree the knowledge, skills, and abilities that are needed for 21st Century diplomacy and foreign assistance. Absent a paradigm shift in the White House and on Capitol Hill to view the staffing of our embassies as being no less vital than the staffing of our military units, future U.S. diplomacy will suffer. Absent a paradigm shift to view the professional development of our diplomats as being no less vital than the professional development of our uniformed military, future U.S. diplomacy will suffer.

If calling for more resources for diplomacy and foreign assistance seems self-serving coming from the AFSA president, consider what one knowledgeable outsider said recently. In a November 26, 2007 speech, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called for a "dramatic increase" in funding for diplomacy and foreign assistance. Secretary Gates said, in part:

> "The Department of Defense has taken on many ... burdens that might have been assumed by civilian agencies in the past... [The military has] done an admirable job...but it is no replacement for the real thing - civilian involvement and expertise... Funding for non-military foreign-affairs programs...remains disproportionately small relative to what we spend on the military... Secretary Rice has asked for a budget increase for the State Department and an expansion of the Foreign Service. The need is real... What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security - diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development... We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military... Indeed, having robust civilian capabilities

available could make it less likely that military force will have to be used in the first place, as local problems might be dealt with before they become crises." (http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199)

Those remarks clearly recognize the value of having a diplomatic corps that is sufficiently staffed and trained to enable the U.S. government to seek to achieve national goals without resorting to a military-led "kinetic" intervention. Thus, as we think about the embassy of the future, we must not lose sight of the human capital dimension. Today, our diplomats are hampered by a growing deficit between what they are being called upon to do and the resources available to carry out that mission. This under-investment in Foreign Service funding, staffing, and training is undermining U.S. diplomacy. The situation will only worsen in the coming years unless these human capital deficits are addressed.

Taking Risk for America

No matter how well trained U.S. diplomats are, their effectiveness will be limited if they are unable or unwilling to get out beyond embassy walls to conduct face-to-face diplomacy. Fortunately, the Foreign Service has a proud tradition of working the alleys and offices of sometimes-dangerous foreign cities to promote vital U.S. interests. But, one only needs to read the newspaper to see the ever growing shadow of political violence. Just this month, a USAID officer was brutally assassinated in Khartoum, Sudan and a U.S. Embassy vehicle was bombed in Beirut, Lebanon. The AFSA Memorial Plaques at Main State currently list 225 U.S. diplomats who have died in the line of duty while serving America abroad. Sadly, two additional names will be added at our annual ceremony later this spring.

That said, speaking as someone who began his diplomatic career in Bogota, Colombia, I have full confidence that my colleagues will continue to volunteer for dangerous assignments and, while there, will continue to get out beyond embassy walls to interact with foreign publics.

To help ensure that this continues to be the case, I return to my remarks on the need for more training and full staffing. A Foreign Service member who lacks fluency in the local language may well be hesitant to make contact with wide segments of the host nation's society. A Foreign Service member with minimal media relations training may well be hesitant to appear on a host nation TV or radio program to explain U.S. policy. A Foreign Service member who received a fraction of the physical security training that is given to intelligence community officers may well feel ill-at-ease going out to meet with a local contact in some situations. An ambassador with an understaffed Diplomatic Security office many not be able to adequately protect the members of his or her mission. Before existing security procedures are revised in the name of "risk management," training and staffing gaps such as these must be closed.

A Disincentive to Overseas Service

I would be remiss if I failed to mention an ever-growing financial disincentive to serve abroad that puts in jeopardy the long-term health of the Foreign Service and, with it, the future viability of U.S. diplomatic engagement. I refer to the exclusion of overseas Foreign Service members from receiving the "locality pay" salary adjustment that almost all other federal employees receive as compensation for the public-private sector pay gap. Other groups such as the uniformed military and the intelligence community receive the same base pay overseas that

they receive when stationed in the U.S. However, Foreign Service members currently take a 20.89 percent cut in base pay when they transfer abroad from Washington, D.C.

As a result, Foreign Service members take a pay cut to serve at 20 percent hardship differential posts such as Damascus, Tripoli, Sarajevo, Chisinau, Libreville, La Paz, and Ulaanbaatar. All told, Foreign Service members take a pay cut to serve at 183 of 268 overseas posts (68 percent). Within three years, another 42 posts -- those at the 25 percent hardship level without an additional danger pay supplement – likely will be passed unless this overseas pay disparity is corrected by Congress. This ever-growing financial disincentive to serve abroad is simply not sustainable. The financial "reward" for five years spent abroad is the loss of the equivalent of one year's salary. That has serious long-term impacts on such things as savings for retirement and children's college funds -- especially for the many Foreign Service families who also suffer the loss of income from a spouse who cannot find employment overseas.

What AFSA seeks, and the Bush Administration fully supports, is a legislative correction of what is now a 13-year old unintended inequity in the worldwide Foreign Service pay schedule. Ending this pay disparity would help validate the efforts and sacrifices made by the men and women of the Foreign Service and their families who serve our country abroad, instead of unintentionally penalizing them for that service by reducing their pay when they transfer abroad. If we don't act now, the pay gap will only widen.

While the foremost committee of jurisdiction on this matter is the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, an important role can be played by the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform as a result of its oversight on questions directly impacting the federal workforce. I would like to thank Rep. Chris Van Hollen of this subcommittee for his early support in trying to find a solution to this problem. I encourage others to follow suit. We are hopeful that Congress will solve this problem this year. If Congress fails to act on this significant problem, the negative morale impact on the Foreign Service will undermine the future efficiency of our embassies and missions abroad.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this timely hearing. I would be happy to answer any questions that you and your colleagues may have.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Naland. I think we have all quoted Secretary Gates a little bit here, but I think one of the more interesting comments at the end of that expression was that he thought that he would be happy to transfer some of his budget—which is almost $700 billion this year—to these other causes, and if we are starting to think about smart power and some of the other hearings that we have had in front of this panel that may be something we all should take a look at, re-allotting some of that money so that we get the best national security posture out there, using all of our resources.

Ambassador Pickering, please.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS PICKERING

Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor to be asked to speak with you today about the Embassy of the future in its broadest possible context.

I want to try to take the view from 30,000 feet, having just come from the aviation industry, and talk a little bit about the conditions which I think shape the focus that you have on the Embassy of the future, some of the steps that I think need to be taken to make our diplomacy more efficient both from Washington and the field.

Certainly, everything that I mention here as a problem facing the United States is interconnected as never before. Each of these issues is related one to the other and has an influence on the other.

I think that we have never faced more difficult problems in our history than we do now. I would note, to begin with, that globalization itself has changed the focus of diplomacy and its role. And, unfortunately, while it has benefited many, it has left many more impoverished.

We also have, obviously, a leadership role to play in the international community, given our unrivaled power as an economy and in the military area, and we are seeing today some of the influences of changes in our economic situation around the world, as well as new and old states failing. We have specific new challenges with states like China, India, and Russia, which can become partners or protagonists, depending upon how our diplomacy deals with them. Similarly, we, with the United Nations and others, have a major role to continue to prop up and help states in Africa and elsewhere which need assistance and help, states which, if we are successful, can move to managing these problems on its own.

Terror will continue to be a tactic widely used against our friends, ourselves, and our partners around the world. And we have challenges in the health field with HIV/AIDS, with TB, with malaria, with SARS. Just a few months ago we might have happily ignored some of the interconnectedness of our economies around the world. Today, as I just mentioned, the sub-prime crisis and its ramifications is not going to let us forget that. And nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction remain major problems for us, just to list a few on the row.

Our role in the world, which I mentioned a moment ago, will continue, I believe, to be foremost. We may be challenged over time by individual states or coalitions, and even while we occupy this particularly significant position, we are not omnipotent. Much of

what will have to be done in the world will be accomplished by diplomacy, working and acting with other states. Where we choose to lead, we will be very, very significant, perhaps in some ways the vital party in that effort. Where we choose not to lead, we will be a vital player in making things happen. And where we choose to oppose, we have an enormous possibility of making sure that things don't happen.

The result is that while we may have been in an unipolar moment for a fleeting time in the last decade, what is true for the future is what we will need cooperation, and leadership and diplomacy is the hallmark of that. Force is important, but it will not solve all our problems, as we have found out. And, in fact, diplomacy not backed up by the use of force is going to be increasingly ineffective. At the same time, the most important value of force is to be there, but not have to be used; and diplomacy can play a role in making that happen.

What makes for successful diplomacy for us is the careful integration of our people, of our policies, and our presence around the world, and that is what your hearing is all about. Without these factors operating smoothly and together, the ability to deliver in the field, out at the spear point, in the Embassies will be certainly less than ideal.

Our Embassies and our missions represent us with people, with organizations, with countries and nations around the world, and as Marc has pointed out, this particular, most dynamic aspect of our diplomacy has increased over the last 10 years in ways that we never foresaw back at the end of the last century.

Even more important than the posts themselves, the physical fabric of which, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, is emblematic of our country, are the people who serve us there. These two are inextricably intertwined and, indeed, I think it would be safe to conclude that good people in poor buildings are far and away much better than the opposite. Not that any of us would recommend that we not provide the kind of excellent facilities and tools to do the job that make good people even more effective in our national interests.

There are specific recommendations in many of the reports that you will see that are before you and that are very important. I would just mention, in summing up, a few.

In Washington, we need to find new ways to bring our government together. Too much stovepiping has once again resumed. The 1947 National Security Act was designed to try to find ways to prevent that. If our departments and agencies aren't working together, our diplomacy in the field can be much less effective.

The State Department itself now has an unusual opportunity to bring new and, I think, important changes to bringing our diplomacy together. We now look at diplomacy in four fields: our traditional diplomacy through Embassies, our public diplomacy, our development diplomacy through AID, and our new efforts to provide for stabilization and reconstruction. They all should go ahead in my view, under the umbrella of the Secretary's leadership.

There are many challenging and complex tasks to be performed in this area. The fact is that the most vital for you and the most vital for us in seeing how this work can be carried out by our Em-

bassies in the field is the funding issue. It has been mentioned before, and I want to reiterate to you again, that neither our Embassies nor our diplomacy at large, and all the various aspects of that, can be successful if they are not funded in ways that bring together and make more synergistic and capable those people who have to do that job overseas.

My written statement contains many recommendations; I won't repeat them here. I will just say that it is an honor and pleasure to be asked to come, and I look forward to addressing your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pickering follows:]

Testimony of Thomas R Pickering

House Sub-Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the
House Committee on Oversight

January 23, 2008

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be asked to join this distinguished panel to discuss with you the Embassy of the future and meeting the needs of modern American diplomacy against the challenges of the opening portion of the 21st Century. While it is now both a truism and somewhat trite, it is still correct that we have not faced as many different challenges today as we have at any time in the past. And the future is not going to get any simpler or more predictable.

As a basis for speaking with you about some ideas that I believe are important for us to consider and adopt, I want briefly to sketch in the outlines of some of these new and old problems with which we must contend.

To begin with, we should first note that each of the issues I will mention is in one way or another linked to the others. The world has become more complex, more interrelated and more interdependent all at the same time. This is what the French like to call a problematique – a problem of problems.

There is no easy place to begin. Globalization has made us more integrated both economically and politically while it has unfortunately increased the differences between the impoverished and most wealthy. New states are emerging to contest America's so far unrivaled leadership in the economic and military arena. And both new and old states are failing. China, India, Russia may become partners or protagonists in large part as a result of how our policies and diplomacy manage our relations with those states. We may, with the United Nations, have to continue to play a role of propping up and assisting weak states in Africa and elsewhere or we may see success as some of these states emerge able to govern and manage their economies on their own.

Terror will continue to be a tactic widely used against us and our friends and partners around the world. While now heavily focused on us by Islamic militants and extremists, they have had no monopoly in the past, now, or in the future on the use of this tactic and we must work hard to assure as the president has said that we do not turn the conflict with terrorists in to a war on Islam.

If that were not enough, and it is just the beginning, we must be mindful of the challenges we face elsewhere. Health issues from HIV/AIDS, to TB, to Malaria, to new pandemics

such as SARS, all must be issues for our diplomacy and action. So too must growing energy and environmental needs as closely linked, significant problems for the future. A few months ago we might have happily ignored the tight interconnectedness of all of our economies around the world, something the sub-prime crisis and its ramifications will not now let us forget.

Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction continue to be a serious preoccupation. How we deal with Iran, the DPRK, and India, Pakistan and Israel in this category as well as a growing number of countries who seem bent on creating independent enrichment capacity is most important.

This list just marks the surface only of what we face down the road. Much of the list - most of the issues - have been carefully documented in a series of studies which have recently appeared or I hope will shortly appear. I have had the pleasure to work on a number of them, including the Embassy of the Future report of the CSIS which gives rise, as I understand it, to this set of hearings and on which I want to draw heavily for my suggestions to follow. The CSIS also sponsored the "Soft Power Report" which provides a powerful new way of thinking about diplomacy and the exercise of American strength across the spectrum of activities closely linked into our diplomacy and national security policy for the future. So too has been the recent report prepared by a Commission led by Mary Bush studying the future of our assistance programs.

Others in the works and which I hope will appear soon are a report to Secretary of State Rice on Transformational Diplomacy and another being prepared by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University on the challenges to be faced by the next American president and the options available to deal with those challenges.

There area a number of salient themes which run through most of these reports and which are worth recalling, even if only in summary form here.

First on our role in the world – we will remain for the foreseeable future the world's largest economy and the world's most powerful country militarily speaking. We may be challenged overtime by individual states or coalitions of them. Even while we occupy this significant position we are not in a unipolar sense omnipotent. Much of what will have to be done in the world must be accomplished by states and others acting together to make it happen. We are uniquely both equipped and endowed to be the leader of those actions and movements where we choose to be. In that sense, we are still widely accepted as the essential partner for success in most important endeavors requiring international cooperation around the world. Where we choose not to lead, but still support the endeavor, we well may become the essential party. Where we choose to oppose action we have a strong capacity to block such activity. Although to the degree we oppose a broad international consensus we will increase the opposition and the cost to ourselves of such efforts. The end result is that there may have been a fleeting unipolar moment in the history of the last decade, but I will let writers and historians argue over that. What is true now is that cooperation and leadership are required and they are both made effective through diplomacy and our activities overseas.

The second major factor is that force will not solve all problems; indeed we see that force alone solves very few problems. The paradigm is complicated even more when we note that diplomacy not backed up by the potential to use force is weak and often ineffective. At the same time it is largely true that force is most effective in supporting diplomacy when and where it does not have to be called into use.

Similarly, while force alone does not easily solve problems, we know that the results of the use of force often compel additional uses of force, and they in turn often require a significant contribution of non-forceful efforts to pick up the pieces – to stabilize and reconstruct the damaged economies and polities left in the wake of the use of force. Force in self defense and force as a last resort when all else has been tried to meet the vital national interests of our country, will always be required for our security, but if anything, recent experience compels us to do better and more effectively all those other tasks that will make the deployment of force unnecessary. Wars of choice don't work very well for us or for others. And Democracies do not and should not go to war for any but the most exigent reasons

What makes for successful diplomacy is the careful integration of our people, our policies and our presence around the world. Without these three factors operating smoothly together the ability to deliver in the field will be less than ideal. Similarly, without adequate and prescient reporting and assessments from the field our policy will be less adequate to the task. Without the right people in the right spots diplomacy cannot work effectively.

Our Embassies and other missions overseas represent the spear point of our activities with other nations, organizations and peoples all around the world. It goes almost without saying that our objective should be the broadest possible representation with the world at large. All administrations since the 1950s have followed a general practice, with rare exceptions, of being represented in most if not all foreign capitals and in many of the larger cities of the world with embassies, consulates general, consulates and other special purpose missions.

But even more important than these posts themselves, the physical fabric which is emblematic of our country, are the people who serve us there. The two are inextricably intertwined and indeed it would be safe to conclude that good people in poor buildings are far and away better than the opposite. Not that any of us would recommend that we not provide the kind of excellent facilities and tools to do their job which make good people even more effective in our national interest.

The Embassy of the Future Report emphasizes several points which bear reiteration in this hearing. First, it concludes that diplomacy is our first line of defense and it cannot work only centered in Washington,. It must be in the field. Second, non-state actors and audiences are growing in number and importance – we need to be able to engage that new audience. Third, the threats against us and our diplomats have increased significantly.

Even more importantly, the report stresses several principles which need to be operational for the success of our future diplomacy. These include: the capacity for dispersed operations – getting out of the compound; diplomats need the tools to operate more independently; new training and skills and enhanced old ones are required to make this happen - better language capabilities for one; a more distributed presence is required to support our objectives – such as one-person posts in important cities outside capitals; back office support functions should be further standardized, regionalized or relocated to the US and made more efficient; technology should be further provided and improved to enable our diplomats to function more effectively – hand-held communications tools for all our representatives for full time, real time contacts; and enhanced sharing of knowledge in the field and in and with Washington should empower our people working out there for us.

Specific recommendations in all of these reports cover a wide area of activity and will provoke lively and predictably some controversial debate. Let me however cover just a few of those that I consider most important ones so you can sense the direction and flavor of the effort which attempts to take into account the analysis and conclusions which I have just presented.

In Washington, I believe there is much that can be done to fashion a new and effective diplomacy for the future. Some of the steps which need to be taken are fundamental. New ways need to be found to integrate the efforts of our departments and agencies to address national security and foreign policy challenges. The stovepiping of these efforts all the way up to the top was something the national security structure created in the 1947 Act was designed to overcome. The strength of the president in his lead of this effort and the role and functioning of the national security advisor and the staff of the NSC together with the cooperation of the cabinet secretaries and agency heads is vital, especially in the execution of these tasks. While differing policy and implementation ideas ought to be provided to the president on critical national security issues and foreign policy problems, once the decision has been made the country expects that the departments and agencies will be seamless in their integrated efforts to make the policy work

Even more, in the State Department there is now an unusual opportunity to build on the work of the last two administrations to bring our traditional diplomacy, our public diplomacy, our development diplomacy, and our efforts at stabilization and reconstruction under the broad umbrella of the Secretary's leadership. While advice differs on whether to create a new activity under the Secretary to carry out public diplomacy, increasingly our experience shows that special skills, special training and leadership are required and that those skills and leaders should be lodged together, perhaps as an agency of the department much the way USAID has now been configured.

Once that is done, many challenging and complex central tasks for all four activities could be performed inside the organization. There is in this regard a crying need for more integrated strategic planning and budgeting. A new activity to bring together for all portions of a new State Department these tasks would go far to assuring better planning and as a result more effective funding and execution of critical tasks.

If the State Department and diplomacy are to play a lead role in the future in war avoidance, in assuring cooperative relations with states, and economy and democracy building, adequate funding must be provided. Many estimate that the personnel requirements for State alone will double over the next decade and more rapidly for USAID which has become largely, in my view, a contract management organization rather than one directly representing the US in development. The funding to empower all these activities - traditional diplomacy which is largely people and facilities and development diplomacy, public diplomacy and reconstruction and stabilization which is for people, facilities, and programs, is vital to the success of the mission. Currently, all of this accounts for about 35b or less than one percent of our national budget. The President has now decided that this funding should be part of our national security budget. I would hope that he and the Office of Management and Budget as well as the Congress would, through a clear understanding of the importance of this aspect of the budget, support it fully, I also hope that they will evolve and develop ways to effect trade-offs among the many pressing functions of our national security in both the 50 and 150 accounts.

The Department of State itself could use a dose of streamlining. Too many people report directly to the Secretary of State, including almost 50 at the assistant secretary level alone. Many in Congress for whom a particular issue within the State Department's purview has become an important issue have tried to help the Department along by creating new Assistant Secretaryships and bureaus to cover that issue. We have arguably way too many bureaus and Assistant Secretaries as a result, some of them dealing with issues which could be combined into a more robust and effective bureau. The job can be done well by fewer assistant secretaries. There is now a real opportunity, as has been done in the past, to combine many functional bureaus together dealing with analogous issues. Similarly, The State Department is too highly layered and should revert to a simpler structure with no more than three or four layers between the bottom and the top. These changes will make Assistant Secretaries of State responsible for more significant areas of activity and as a result make them more effective and influential players in the interagency arena, Congressional and international scene. The reduction in layering and the consequent move of responsibility downward will help prepare officers for more responsibility in the field and should make the department more agile and effective.

These steps too will mirror what has already been accomplished in the Embassies – the development of strong country teams bringing together under the Ambassador the work of all US Government departments and agencies in a particular country.

Let me turn now briefly to some of the key, and I believe, well inter-related recommendations of the Embassy of the Future report.

First, invest in people. This should begin with another 1000 diplomats to fill positions now empty at home and abroad and provide sufficient additional positions and people so that needed training and education take place without leaving vital jobs vacant.

Second, integrate technology and good business practices. Technology has a vital multiplier role to play and State has been slow to adopt it in part because of funding limitations. The Department needs to teach technology better. It should have its own Chief Technology officer as well as funds for technology innovation at its field posts.

Third, embrace new communications tools. Internet-based media for sharing information, video communications, richer web sites, internal blogs and assuring that every officer will have a hand-held, secure communications device in the future will go far toward improving effectiveness.

Fourth, operate beyond Embassy walls. Both security training and more effective communications devices and methods can enhance our ability to be present outside the Embassy where the contacts and action are located.

Fifth, strengthen platform and presence options. This means putting people where they can meet and work with all elements of a foreign society that are important to US interests. This needs to be tailored to local needs and should include arrangements for single-person posts in important locations outside the capitals, the use of technology to create virtual representation, circuit riders, and setting up American corners in local universities and American libraries and information centers where that works best.

Sixth, strengthen the Country Team. Clear authorities for the Ambassador should be set forth by Executive Order. Our buildings themselves should be organized to permit interaction and cooperation, and communication should be laterally as vigorous as it is to Washington for all element of the Mission.

Seventh, manage risk. Security practices should continue to transition from complete risk avoidance to risk management. All diplomats and others at our overseas missions need enhanced training in security skills based on the best practices throughout the US Government. Similarly, security professionals need more training in diplomatic practice and languages.

Eighth, promote secure borders, open doors. We need to have our consular practices reflect our traditional welcome for visitors while carefully screening those who are risks and to do so in a humane, welcoming fashion. Better facilities to welcome visa applicants and more distributed consular operations can assist this approach.

Ninth, streamline administrative functions. Standardizing process and centralizing regionally or in Washington should help improve in some areas where specific local applications are not major factors.

For all of the above adequate funding remains critical to success.

Some critical questions:

Does it make sense to construct Embassy compounds in fortress-like style

outside metropolitan areas?

Every Embassy represents an exercise in risk management. It is not easy to lose people especially if we determine they could have been saved by better physical protection measures. It is also important to understand that no facility is perfect and that physical protection needs to be supplemented by good personal security practices and good intelligence among others. This report suggests new ways of dealing with this issue constructively, from better risk management to more distributed operations obviously closely keyed to local circumstances. Where a building can be located downtown, such as in Ottawa, that should be a key part of the equation.

How can we best conduct diplomacy in this post 9/11, information-age world?

I would suggest that the best diplomacy is best conducted face-to-face wherever that is possible. Individuals still react more openly and sincerely to such encounters. Information is easier to come by as a result, and the interaction often has the capacity to produce new ideas and solutions. Effective relationships and friendships can be solidified over time through such meetings.

Is the shift from risk avoidance to risk management a wise idea?

Yes, an Embassy that cannot perform its function, but is completely walled off from its neighborhood, may be one way of assuring near perfect security. At the other end of the spectrum is a wide open situation where the neighborhood is dangerous. Neither does the complete job very well. Full risk avoidance often means that we have few or no contacts and influence. Too lax a security posture means we lose people and public property. Risk management does not mean we abandon risk avoidance, but it does mean incorporating smarter techniques and approaches to getting the job done. Intelligence is a key to much of this. We can also, under risk management, tighten or relax postures relatively in view of what our intelligence and other judgments are about the local situation at any particular time. We need to bring our public along with the central truth that there is no perfect security equation and not doing our job risks our national security.

Are Embassies useful in sending signals, are they symbols?

Like our flag, more broadly our Embassies and other overseas US Government structures do send those messages. Over time, excellence in architecture has stood for something in how foreign citizens and leaders react to our country and its position in the world. At the same time, in the trade offs that have to be made, architectural excellence also needs to be combined with good security. The task is harder now than it has ever been. The challenges to the designers and builders of our overseas buildings and the costs incurred in meeting them once again emphasize that we must be prepared to pay for the facilities necessary to do the excellent job in the right buildings in the correct location that our public expects.

Does heavy security screening block people from entering our facilities, especially our libraries and others which depend on public access? Are there other ways to engage in effective people-to-people diplomacy?

The answer to the former question is yes. Again trade offs have to be looked into. Often libraries can be located with other public facilities which reduces their potential to become targets – part of a university library. Donations of books can be made without setting up a facility. The internet is a new media form for virtual communications. Personal calls, and cultural or other events can bring people together for effective people-to-people public diplomacy. Exchange programs help in this regard and are old and tested methods of working.

Thank you for the chance to address these important issues for our country and its future. I look forward to your questions and he chance to interact with the panel you have assembled this morning.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you all very much. We are all pleased to have such great expertise and experience before us.

We are going to move on to the question period here. We are under a 5-minute rule; 5 minutes for the questions and answers. With the number of people here, I am certain that we can probably have more than one round, and hopefully get some good information on the record and for our information.

Let me, if I might, just begin by asking everyone, except Dr. Loeffler, the question of what your opinion is of the types of standard buildings that are now going up, like the one in Baghdad and others?

Ambassador Grossman, did your report make any recommendation with respect to the design and the architecture; whether those should continue as are or whether they should be done on a different basis?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for the——

Mr. TIERNEY. You will have to put your mic on, I am sorry.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Thank you for the question. First, let me say that I think, from the perspective of the Commission, we decided that Baghdad was unique, that if we spent our time figuring out whether Baghdad was right, wrong, or indifferent, that it would distort the recommendations of the Commission. So I tell you that we did not take a position on Embassy Baghdad, and I just want to be clear about that.

But, yes, sir, there was a huge conversation that went on in the Commission about the Embassies, and here is what we came to as a recommendation. First of all, we believe that the State Department building program ought to continue; that people have a right to be in a building that is safe and secure and efficient; and in countries in which the United States of America is represented, people ought to have that kind of a building. But we said that it should do so under a certain number of considerations.

First of all, that the Department has to take the approach, as Dr. Loeffler said, to combine the questions of security and design; and we felt that there were new ways to do that.

Second, we also believe that the Secretary of State should be the person who, in the end, had the capacity to decide where Embassies should be located. And there is a huge debate going on in the Department about where these things should be, and we thought the Secretary herself or himself should be able to make that decision.

Third thing we said was that as she, currently, as the Secretary of State makes that decision, that a key factor is that locations remote from urban centers ought to be avoided wherever possible. We recognize that there were sometimes when that wasn't going to be possible, but as a principle we thought that the remote locations were a disadvantage to our diplomacy.

Next, we in the Commission said that there are architectural features and new ways in thinking about architecture that ought to be included in these design features that meet, as we said in the Commission, security needs and are consistent with the American values of openness. Because, as you said, sir, one of the things that we were worried about is that we give off this sense of fear.

And I would just, as a parenthesis, if I could, recognize that it isn't just the new buildings. If you go to Embassy London, for example, today, or Embassy Paris today, those are buildings that have been there a long time, but they also now, I think, give off this sense of a closed or closing American society.

One other important point, and that is that we also highlighted—because it shows the importance of American values—that these Embassies ought to be at the leading edge of environmental standards, and that this is a LEED standard, as it turns out. There is am Embassy in Sophia now that meets these standards, but more and more ought to do that because it shows the U.S. commitment to those values as well.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ambassador.

Ambassador Pickering, you were on that group, so I assume that you either filed a dissent on this or you are in full agreement with Ambassador Grossman.

Ambassador PICKERING. I am in full agreement with what the committee reported on the Commission report, and I had two thoughts that I think ought to be considered by you all as you look at this question.

One is that it seemed to me lamentable that we didn't do two things with the standard box: that we didn't submit it to an architectural contest and we didn't provide that the standard box could have different facades in different places; that is, standard interior, standard security, but maybe a public face that was more appropriate to the location where it was being put and more appropriate to being symbolic to the United States of America.

The second issue is what I would call the hidden hand of funds. I mentioned it a moment ago. But we all know that location was not just a question of security, but how much money we had to spend. And while obviously buying a large expansive property in the center of Tokyo would be, I think, wildly expensive, beyond the range of comprehensive, I know in a couple of cases—because I worked on them when I was Under Secretary—had we been able to have more funding, we could have provided more setback closer to the center of the city. We could have been a park-like structure, but accessible to the people who needed to have access. And there I agree with Marc, we need to provide different kinds of access for different functions within the standard Embassy compound. To the extent that we can do that, I think it would go a long way.

But those are two or three personal ideas.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Naland, do you have any comments on that?

Mr. NALAND. Yes, sir. The life of the rank and file Foreign Service, I believe, is that beggars can't be choosers. After the Beirut bombings in 1983 and 1984, there was a flurry of discussion about the need for secure Embassies, but then funding never came. So after the tragedies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the Foreign Service was just ecstatic that the Congress, year after year, has appropriated funds for Embassy construction. So I think we were just so overwhelmed that the Congress was going forward with the funding that perhaps that is where people like me kind of stop thinking about the issue.

The President nominated, and the Senate confirmed, a very strong-willed person to head the overseas building office. He pushed through a lot of construction that we are very thankful for. But now that he is gone, perhaps it is a time to ask some of these questions, and the issue of funding is critical. We need a new Embassy in Mexico City, but to buy a square block in Mexico City, let alone Tokyo, would cost a lot of money.

So I totally agree that we need to look at this more. I just hope that the funding continues. And if more funding is needed to buy land in the middle of the center of a city, then we will need that funding.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Doctor, we are going to give you a chance to fit back later, but it was basically your work that we were commenting on, so I hope you don't feel left out on that.

Mr. Burton, 5 minutes.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won't take the full 5 minutes. I have been to a lot of our Embassies around the world. I have been on the Foreign Affairs Committee for about 25 years, and it seems to me that the architectural aspect is nice, but security is much more important. You know, I think about—when you mentioned Lincoln a while ago, Ms. Loeffler, you know, they used to be able to walk in the White House and wait for the President, get an appointment and go in and see him, and he used to walk down the street. Harry Truman used to walk down the street doing his exercise. You can't do that any more. So the world has changed dramatically. And it seems to me that the most important thing is to have security for our people, architecturally pleasant if possible, but it should be primarily of concern that we have security for the people.

It seems to me a more important issue, in addition to the buildings being secure so that the attacks can't be successful in killing personnel in the Embassies, is that we have more trained and better trained personnel. You said you are short over 1,000 people. It seems to me better trained personnel—and you can all comment on this—better trained personnel and more personnel who have the ability to bring leaders in these various countries into the Embassy, if it is not safe to go outside, and to discuss with them issues that are very important as far as our relations with those countries.

You mentioned going out and shopping in the areas, and those sorts of things, and that would be nice, but being realistic in this world, it is very difficult to see that accomplished. So it seems to me, of all the things you were talking about, security is No. 1; and, No. 2, making sure we have diplomats that are conversant with the culture, knowledgeable about the various dialects so they can communicate knowing about the people who are leaders in the community so they can bring them in and discuss the issues of major importance so that we have much better relations. Those are just my observations, but I would be happy to hear what you have to say about that in your comments.

Mr. TIERNEY. To whom are you directing that, Mr. Burton?

Mr. BURTON. Any of them. Ms. Loeffler, you can go back to Lincoln, if you want to.

Ms. LOEFFLER. Well, I can't go back that far. I totally agree with you that we have to be protected and that the world has changed. We are dealing with a very changed circumstance, for sure. I only want to point out that, really, architecture and security are not mutually exclusive. What I am talking about, they can support one another. And, in fact, you can take examples of even a sustainable design, for instance, such as Ambassador Grossman mentioned. If you could have an Embassy be self-sufficient, if it could have its own energy supply, if it was able to recycle and so forth, it could be a safer place; it wouldn't be dependent, it wouldn't be—if, God forbid, it were taken over, as some of them have been, people wouldn't be suffering for lack of water and so forth. That sort of thing. There are lots of advantages in trying to be self-reliant and also energy efficient.

But the main thing is that security can be augmented. And in these places, such as Ambassador Pickering mentioned, where the land is difficult to come by, it takes even more creativity to figure out how to provide security in a place which maybe doesn't have 15 acres to work with. So you really need more creative decisions and input to accomplish those security goals, which are, as you said, the most important.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Mr. Burton, thank you very much. I just wanted to agree with the points that you made. As I said in my opening presentation, our logic was that if you don't have the right number of people, all the rest of this is not as relevant. And we felt that the number 1,079 was a defensible number for precisely the numbers that you said, is that it would allow for people to have better training, not just in the languages and the culture, but also in security. And so the logic of the report is you have to deal with the people question first; training and risk management; and then the building issue is part of this 21st century diplomacy. Security is obviously crucial, but as you said and others have said before you, it is the people.

And you are not talking about that much money. We took a look at the resource implications in the report, and if you were to set out today to hire 1,079 people over 3 years, it is $198 million. I am not saying that is not a lot of money, but in the comparison of what else we do as a country, if you could solve this State Department personnel problem for $198 million over 3 years, I think it would be something well worth doing.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. NALAND. Sir, speaking as the union guy representing the Foreign Service, I just have to say that perfect security is always going to be impossible. You read a profile of someone like Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and no matter where he has been, whatever tough city it has been, he has always managed to sneak out the back door of the Embassy to go down to meet with his contact to figure out what is going on. Maybe he is not doing that today, but as a junior officer and a mid-level officer. So we need a Foreign Service that does that, that does take risks.

The absent memorial plaque has 225 names on it of people who have died in the line of duty and, unfortunately, there are going to be more as years go on. But we have to get outside the walls. Give us the securest walls you can. Give us diplomatic security

agents and obviously intelligence community colleagues to get an idea what is going on out there, but at some point there is a continuum with kind of, you know, domestic Civil Service employees on one side and maybe Navy Seals on the other end, and the Foreign Service is more in the military continuum; they are not at the Navy Seal end, but we are in harm's way and we need to be in harm's way. Reasonable risk, obviously, but speaking as the union guy, I am not going to say, you know, put us all in Wichita, KS and we will be safe. We have to be out there.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. In a conversation we had before the hearing, Mr. Burton, I think Ambassador Pickering put it right; he said the best security is to have no Embassy at all.

Mr. Lynch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Naland, it is ironic that you mentioned Ambassador Crocker. I was with him last week in Baghdad and he mentioned, as well, that he was stationed in Beirut when the Marine barracks were bombed. So while you emphasize the need for some flexibility for the Ambassador to move around, there is also some instances, glaring instances of the need for greater security. I wanted to ask you about the idea of these American Presence Posts. This is an initiative that is cited in the report The Embassy of the Future. I gather it is an initiative begun under Ambassador Felix Rohatyn, and this is what an American Presence Post is, the establishment of a small office with one diplomatic officer and a small number of locally hired staff placed in more remote areas in some of these countries.

And having just come back from Lebanon and Afghanistan and Pakistan, I am concerned that these APPs are just another word for hostages. It would be, I think, extremely, extremely risky to use something like this, given the current environment, and I just have some real misgivings about this, and hoping you can help me with this, any of you who have foreign Embassy service, especially Ambassador Pickering. You have had a fair share of it yourself. How do you think this thing would work?

Ambassador PICKERING. Mr. Lynch, I am glad you raised the question, and it is an important one. I was an early supporter of it; I worked with Marc Grossman with Ambassador Rohatyn in setting up the post in France. If you ask me should we do the same in Iraq or Afghanistan, I would say no. I would be certifiably loony to do that. But there are a number of places around the world where the threat is more moderate, where we have large cities. When I served in Nigeria, we had something like six cities over a million. No one American could name even three of them. But they were extremely important for what was going on in the country, they helped to set the political tone, they stimulated the economy. There are cities in China, many of them, like that, where we have almost no contact.

Ambassador Rohatyn proceeded with this and we, in fact, used that particular approach, which was low key; apartments in upper stories connected with a small office, basically very few office calls on the individual. The individual was out and around. But the mayor knew them, the head of the local French Department knew them, the business community knew them, the NGO community knew them, the American community knew them; and they were

extremely important. We gave them no classified work to do. If they had anything that was classified, they could take the train to Paris and spend a day at the Embassy.

I wanted to do that in a number of places in Russia where we had very low coverage. I faced the problem that, in order to do that, we had to come to the Congress to set up a consulate. That was a year and a half or 2 year proposition, and as soon as we mentioned that, I had 35 American agencies who all wanted to assign people to that one-man post.

We have gotten away from those. We would obviously watch the security very carefully. We would train the individual, as Marc's report has discussed, in the best security practices of the U.S. Government wherever they are, as John Naland said, drawing on some of our colleagues' training from the intelligence community. We would use local employees to help us understand and there would be absolutely no prohibition on the individual leaving, going to ground, or finding other premises if there were a peak-up in security problems; and that would be something we would watch very carefully with the intelligence community.

And we think that in two-thirds of the world, at least, all of those places where we are not now restricting, say, families for security reasons, these kinds of posts would do a great deal. And Ambassador Rohatyn put it very, very clearly, he said, I am willing to give you the people from my Embassy complement because I feel these are 100 percent more productive than they are working here in the Embassy compound in Paris. And, indeed, that has been the significance of this and it is the reason why we have supported it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Lynch.

Mr. Higgins, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just in reading and listening to the testimony, I am struck by the emphasis on physical plants, on infrastructure. And while there seems to be a reference to the human infrastructure that represents American diplomacy, there certainly should be, I think, much more. I think America's problem today is not necessarily Iraq, it is not Afghanistan; it is America's isolation in the world. We are in these places virtually on our own. Sure, there are other countries that are represented there, but disproportionately. America's presence is profound.

In traveling to Afghanistan and Pakistan with Mr. Lynch and Mr. Platts late last year, I was also struck by the American military and their emphasis not only on their military duties, but more on the humanitarian aspect of their job. I think that is very, very refreshing. And you weren't hearing necessarily from diplomats, but from the military personnel themselves that their mission is equal parts humanitarian and equal parts military.

And when we talk about buildings and fortresses, reference was made to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who was a great admirer of American architecture, primarily because architecture says something about a community; it says something about a nation. And I think when you look at these fortresses that represent American Embassies throughout the world, it conveys a sense of isolation. And in diplomacy, what it is you need is constructive engagement.

You know, the author Fareed Zakaria has said, in diplomacy, style is the substance.

I know that it was referenced in the chairman's opening statements, and Mr. Naland's as well, about John Michael Granville. John Michael Granville was not only a constituent, he was a kid from the neighborhood. He grew up a couple of streets away from me. And I spoke with his mom a couple of times on New Year's Day. John was murdered coming home from a New Year's Eve party at the British Embassy in Khartoum. He was shot five times. He died about 3 hours after the incident, and his driver was killed instantly.

But it was amazing, you know, his mom's admonishment to me as a representative of the U.S. Government, don't feel sorry for us that her son, who she spoke with the night before, always said that the importance of his work, the importance of his work—peace and reconciliation—in this particular case trying to reconcile the peace agreement, the 2005 peace agreement between Northern and Southern Sudan, after 21 years of bloody civil war—but the importance of his work far outweighed the danger of it. While a family was grieving, a Nation and a community was grieving, there was also this sense of purpose that John Granville's life had represented, and I think it was an extraordinary testament to the great work that diplomats are doing throughout the world.

John was with the Agency for International Development, U.S. Agency for International Development, but when you look at what is happening at places like Darfur and other places in the continent of Africa and other places in the Middle East, it is these kinds of people, that are doing the work of peace and reconciliation, who are most susceptible to violence. It is them, it is the non-governmental organizations. Because I think when they are doing important work in tough neighborhoods, they become most susceptible to violence because they are truth tellers. And when you look at what is happening in Darfur, the last thing the Sudanese government wants is westerners to tell the rest of the world what is really going on there. And journalists and humanitarian workers and diplomats are thus susceptible to extraordinary, extraordinary violence.

So your thoughts on those things. And thank you for being here.

Mr. TIERNEY. To whom are you directing your comments? Because there won't be enough time, I don't think, for anybody to respond to that.

Mr. HIGGINS. However far it gets.

Mr. TIERNEY. All right, Ambassador Grossman.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Mr. Higgins, I certainly won't be as eloquent as you in talking about these issues or about Mr. Granville, but if I could just make three points, I think.

First, like with Mr. Burton, I agree with you completely that the issue here is about the people, and Mr. Lynch said this in his opening statement. As I said in my statement, this Embassy of the Future project started with people thinking about it is going to be about the buildings. And the buildings are important, but it is not about the buildings. It is about the people. And it is about, sir, as you said, the jobs that these people do. And what we tried to convey in our report is that the job is changing, and that it isn't the

same job that I joined when I started in the Foreign Service and popped out 30 years later in retirement. But it is a different job, and a job that Mr. Granville is doing and others were doing. So it is about the people. And then it is about if you have the right number of people, you can have the right technology and the right training, and then you can have the right kind of platforms and, very importantly, about security.

Second, I think this issue that you raised, sir, about how the military is thinking about its job in a new way is very relevant to the point that John Naland made earlier, and my suggestion to you, or my proposition, is that 4 or 5 years from now we are going to continue to see the lines intersect between what our military forces are doing and what our diplomatic forces, if you would allow me, are doing; and that it won't, sir, be, as John said, we are not all going to become Navy Seals. But the job of representing the United States abroad is becoming a more unified operation. It is becoming, in the names of Goldwater-Nichols, more purple, and everybody is kind of working to the same task; and I think that is a really positive thing and something that we ought to do all we can to encourage.

Third point that I would just make is that I just wanted to say that the parents of your constituent, of Mr. Granville, I think hit the nail on the head. Before the hearing we were talking with the chairman. When I was the Ambassador to Turkey, 1994 to 1997, I had people who would say to me—human rights officers, and they would say, I want to get out now and go out to Diyarbakir and spend a few weeks out among the people, and I would say, too dangerous; I can't talk to your parents if you get hurt or you get killed.

But I would say, sir, that after 9/11, the level of requirement for the risk has gone up. So now, if I was the Ambassador to Turkey and I had somebody who was better trained and I had somebody who was, as Ambassador Pickering said, had someplace to fall back to, and I had some confidence that the mission, as with Mr. Granville, was of the highest priority, and then, God forbid, if somebody got hurt out there, I would be able to face their parents and say, yes, I did this. I took these precautions, but I made this decision based upon my analysis of the interest of the United States, and, yes, I took that risk and there was this challenge.

So I think you make a very important set of points, and I appreciate the chance to comment on them.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much, Ambassador.

Anybody else you want to hear from on that, Mr. Higgins? I mean, that was a pretty complete conversation. If not, we will move on to Mr. Welch.

Mr. Welch.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

I thank each of you for being here. I have done a little bit of traveling in my 1 year and I am amazed at how wonderful our Embassy personnel are, and discouraged that we don't have more of them doing the job.

Let me talk a little bit about training, because I think that obviously is extremely important.

Ambassador Grossman, you have a lot of experience in this. What is it that we need to do, very concretely and specifically, in

order to provide a level of training that will meet the current need for our diplomatic corps to be much more influential in our affairs?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Thank you, sir. The most important thing that could be done right away would be to hire the 1,079 people. And the reason I say that, Mr. Welch, is not to avoid the question of training, but to make this point. Every military unit that you can have an arrangement with has a 15 percent float-for-training-in-transit, and that means that they are not stealing from the operational requirement, the readiness of that unit to have people get the training that they need either to do their current job or to do the job that they might be going on to.

When Secretary Powell came to the State Department——

Mr. WELCH. No, I understand about the——

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Oh, I am sorry.

Mr. WELCH. I actually want to hear about—let's assume we hire those folks.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. That would be great.

Mr. WELCH. What do we need to do to train them?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I think, first of all, that would be a great assumption. Thank you very much. I think there are three very important points. First of all, language training. There needs to be a fundamental commitment on the part of the Department, and I hope supported by the Congress, on language training. Second would be the use of new technologies to increase, enhance the capacity of our ability to deal with individuals around societies, and to get out among societies. And third, sir, would be security training, so that as we ask people to take more risk, to be out in societies, that they have the capacity to understand the things that they are looking at and protect themselves.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Pickering, I have been to a couple of the big Embassies and my sense, in talking to young Embassy personnel, is that as much as the security precautions that are being taken are, maybe, necessary, they are causing them great frustration, because people—my sense—who go into the line of work that you have spent a lifetime doing really want to get out and want to interact, and to have to only go out when it is "mission critical" sort of defeats the whole process of becoming—of building trust that a successful career diplomat has to do by kind of acceptance.

And the frustration I have—and I would really be interested in your comments—is that we are kind of barricading our folks in and not letting them do their job, and it really means that foreign policy is much more politically driven by the necessities of whoever is in the White House, with diminishing significant input from folks who have devoted their careers to trying to get it right in these countries where we have interests.

Ambassador PICKERING. Mr. Welch, I agree with your conclusion and, indeed, some of the ramifications. Let me just add a few points.

We all know that there are posts where we are locked in, and those are posts where we have ongoing battle, high security threat. And, obviously, it is up to the Ambassadors and the State Department to right-size those in light of the job and to recognize we have limited capacities.

A friend of mine from the intelligence community said to me the other day that we in the intelligence community need more State Department insight, more State Department reporting, more State Department contacts. This was because, traditionally—and I think it is still true—about 80 percent of the intelligence base of the United States came from State Department reporting, open and classified.

Mr. WELCH. Right.

Ambassador PICKERING. And I think that is now missed. That is just one indicator of the value of being able to get out and understand what is going on.

Wherever I worked, I attempted to encourage my officers to understand the opposition, to be in touch with the opposition, to know what they were thinking; to understand what currents of opinion were out there, what people were thinking in various areas. And it always seemed to me as just a factor of evaluation that you got twice as much value for an hour outside the Embassy as you did inside the Embassy, and that empowering people to do that.

Russia was a huge country, 11 time zones. Travel was difficult. But we did everything we could to encourage people to travel, to know and understand what was going on across the vastness of that country as a way of understanding what kinds of things were motivating folks in the Kremlin and in the political sphere and in terms of the economy.

So I agree with you.

I think that, of course, policy is made in Washington, but the field must play what I would call nearly a determinative role in Washington's understanding of what is possible and what might be the options; and without that synergy it doesn't work. If the field is blind or half blind, the policy can turn out to be something like that and we have very significant issues.

I would just like to address one other point. Our military friends, because they have the funds and the presence, are doing jobs that are very important, but which, over time, at least in terms of the detailed training, they were not brought up to do. I think they are doing it well. And I don't want to have this as a note of criticism. But I do believe that the people who spend their lives working on these missions need, obviously, to have the resources, the presence, the capability, so that it doesn't fall back on the military to have to do these jobs; that it is the partnership that Marc described to you; that we find a way to bring that together and to integrate it.

And I would just add to Marc's comments. One of the training efforts ought to be to do integrated training, if I could put it this way, across the spectrum, so that people who need to work in the humanitarian area can be trained alongside our military colleagues who are going to have to face that question, so that through training and through doctrine they come out as a team, not basically as two separate stovepipes that only meet at the time of crisis. I think those are all important.

And thank you for the chance to make those comments.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Ambassador.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Welch and thank our witnesses on that.

You know, I think that last point—we are going to have a second round of questions, and we may not all use our 5 minutes, but we would like to ask some more questions.

I think Secretary Gates—who we keep quoting over and over again—recognizes it as much or more than anybody, that the military's job is, in fact, not to be diplomats and not to be agricultural experts and not to be commerce experts and things of that nature. But they want to compliment that to the extent necessary. It is not always our best interest to have a military uniform out there as the projection of the United States. There are times we have to have the civilian presence so that people see us differently and know that we are looking to try to help them in ways that will move their country forward. So I would think that is very important, and I would disperse our money and how we align our personnel.

What is the situation in the diplomatic corps right now with respect to diversity? Is our hiring process getting us the kind of diversity that we need? In many of these countries, even getting out and about, and trying to mingle with others would be far more complimented if we in fact had a diverse diplomatic presence.

Mr. Naland, you probably can best comment on that.

Mr. NALAND. One of the main purposes of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, the revision in 1980, was to make the Foreign Service look more like America, and a lot of provisions were put in to start to do that. And Ambassador Grossman may be able to answer this better than I can, but over the years change has been slow, but the Foreign Service, both generalists and specialists, is increasingly looking more and more like America. And if you have spoken to any of the new entry level officer classes, you can see that. We have them over to the AFSA headquarters and on the wall would be a picture of a Foreign Service class of 1934—and you can imagine what that looks like—and then you have the new officers and specialists coming in.

Now, there is a famous wealth of talent, and Hispanics, African-Americans and other are being courted—at least before the stock market crashed—being courted by Wall Street and a lot of other places, so we don't have—if you take whatever the target demographic is, the profile of U.S. college graduates, we are not on that demographic yet. But we are getting closer and closer to it.

You know, the Foreign Service, it is in for some rough times right now. Every time we in the active Foreign Service raise our voice a little, there are a lot of people out there—not Secretary Gates, but a lot of people out there who jump on it to say we are wimps or whatever, and that disturbs me a lot. There are some issues that need to be addressed. Staffing is one, this overseas pay gap is another——

Mr. TIERNEY. Would you go into that a little bit, why that gap exists and exactly what it is?

Mr. NALAND. Well, in 1990, the Congress passed locality pay legislation that came into effect in 1994, and I guess State and AFSA were asleep at the wheel, because the overseas Foreign Service was excluded. So now a Federal Government employee in Washington, DC, gets base pay plus 20.89 percent. And everywhere in the con-

tinental U.S. Federal employees get base pay plus at least 13 percent.

Mr. TIERNEY. And what does that 13 percent reflect?

Mr. NALAND. It is this convoluted idea of locality pay. It is the cost of attracting talent——

Mr. TIERNEY. To the United States?

Mr. NALAND [continuing]. To Washington, DC, or Houston or San Francisco. That is why there are different locality pay. I didn't vote on this thing, so——

Mr. TIERNEY. Everybody here will say that they probably didn't either.

Mr. NALAND. Everyone used to get base pay and that was kind of it, but then they put in locality pay. And it is not cost of living, it is some other thing.

But the Central Intelligence Agency—if I can say those words—their people, if they have any overseas, get Washington locality pay. Other folks—who I can't even mention—if they are overseas, they get Washington locality pay. But the Foreign Service doesn't. And it is now a 21 percent gap.

Now, yes, if you go to Baghdad, you are going to get a large danger pay differential, but 183 of our 286 posts you now take a pay cut to go to 183 of our posts. And if America wasn't a two-income Nation, that probably wouldn't be such a huge deal. But it is a two-income Nation. But in the Foreign Service—and the uniform military has this to some extent too—our spouses often can't get a job in Lagos, Nigeria or Tajikistan. So our family income over a 30 year career takes a major hit, and retirement savings take a major hit. So having this 21 percent pay cut when you go overseas just adds insult to injury.

Mr. TIERNEY. So is that an adverse impact on recruitment generally, as well as getting people to volunteer overseas or just on the volunteering overseas aspect?

Mr. NALAND. Sir, I don't think it has hurt recruitment yet, because, frankly, no one knows what they are getting into when they join the Foreign Service. And the State Department, certainly on their Web site, doesn't highlight this, although they do highlight the danger and other issues, which is quite extraordinary. There is a little 20 or 40 question pretest you can take to see if you are material for the Foreign Service, and I bet a lot of people take it and say, OK, something else, because there are some real challenges there.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. I would be remiss if I did not say how proud I am of our folks in the State Department and the wonderful work they are doing in some pretty dangerous places around the world. I think that they are a shining example of what is best about America, and I agree that they are underpaid for the work they are doing and that we need to figure out how best to train them and give them some more help.

I would like to ask one question about assignment, and that is how are we handling now—Mr. Naland, maybe you would have a pretty good read on this. My understanding is that there is a pretty good rotation going on now in terms of folks that might want a shot

at the Embassy in Paris instead of Baghdad. I know for a while there some folks would get reassigned to one place for multiple years, and that would sort of cause a logjam in the system, so that anyone new coming into the system had to pick, you know, Kenya or Somalia or some other place that was high risk versus having a chance at a somewhat more normal assignment maybe in a western European country. How is that being handled right now?

Mr. NALAND. Well, sir, what needs to be understood is that the normal assignment now is a hardship post. Two-thirds of the overseas Foreign Service posts are now hardship posts. Paris has been cleaned out repeatedly. James Baker cleaned it out to open up the Central Asian Embassies when the Soviet Union collapsed. Secretary Rice has cleaned it out to send people to India and other places. So the idea that Foreign Service members are all sitting around Paris and London is just absolutely no longer the case. In fact,—this is only a little facetious—to get there now, you basically have to serve in a provisional reconstruction team in Iraq and have one of your top five picks guaranteed, and that is how, after serving and surviving a year in Iraq, you can get a 3-year tour in London or Paris.

But the Foreign Service has changed a lot. It is now mostly hardship posts. When I joined, I went to Bogota, which, with Beirut, was the only unaccompanied or limited accompanied post. Now we have something like 27 unaccompanied posts or limited accompanied posts.

And then we have the staffing deficit. This whole Iraq fiasco from a couple months ago, the reason that they didn't automatically immediately have all the volunteers is just that there is a 21 percent staffing gap at the mid levels. And now Afghanistan—I don't know, this is probably not public, but there is an interest in providing more Foreign Service and other staffing for Afghanistan. But from where? From where? So we just need more people. And allegedly—or we will see with the President's budget request—apparently, the President's budget request next week will ask for a lot of those people. But my point of view is that the President's budget request a year ago asked for 254 or 256, I believe, additional Foreign Service positions that weren't funded. So, you know, please fund the additional positions to hire people to staff these places.

Mr. LYNCH. In yielding back my time, I just want to say I wasn't suggesting by any measure that folks were sitting around London or Paris. My question was more toward is the rotation system fair, so that some of our folks who are on those hardship assignments right now get a chance to rotate over time to something less perilous, I guess.

Mr. NALAND. I believe it is. The Foreign Service always takes care of people after they have done a hardship tour, in terms of their onward assignment, so I think we are still OK there. The truth is most Foreign Service members prefer the hardship tours because the morale is better there and the job is more exciting. My least favorite tour—and I don't want to hurt the feelings of the Ambassador from Costa Rica, but my least favorite tour was Costa Rica. It is a beautiful place if you have been there, but—and this was 20 years ago—it was just boring as all get out. And most For-

eign Service people want the challenge. So, yes, if I could get London for 3 years, I might do it, but then I might not, I might want a hardship tour.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. The challenge, Mr. Naland, is going to see whether the President puts in for 1,079 new positions, which I think Ambassador Grossman said would be about $200 million or less.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Over 3 years, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Over 3 years. And if he has percipacity to actually take it out of the defense budget of $700 billion, instead of just creating another $200 million somewhere. That would be a really interesting conversation for this country to have and for Congress to have. Don't hang by your thumbs waiting for it, however.

Mr. Higgins.

Mr. HIGGINS. Just on this new vision for diplomacy, you know, when you talk about the importance of language fluency, when you talk about cultural immersion, isn't that hard to achieve in the way that Foreign Service is currently structured? It seems as though people are kind of rotated on a pretty regular basis after a short period of time, and for one to become immersed in a culture, for one to develop a language fluency, I would think that reaching frequency and consistency is important.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Yes, sir, both good questions. Let me answer in this way. First, one of the recommendations of the Commission was that as we train people in language and culture immersions, we find ways to move them out of Washington and send them to the country, maybe, for some months so that they might be able to really live with a family, be at a university, learn the language, learn the culture, because we do—in my view, anyway—much too much language training now only at the Foreign Service Institute. They do a great job, but, as you say, they need to be part of these cultures. I tried really hard, when I was the Ambassador to Turkey, to get Turkish language speakers for their last few months, even, to come and live in Turkey without jobs—their job was to get their language and become immersed.

The second question is about—to go back a little bit to Mr. Lynch's question about rotation. The tension is this, is that somebody goes, let's say, to Turkey, having Turkish language training, and you leave them there 4 years or 5 years. It is human nature, after a while, Mr. Higgins, that they kind of forget who it is exactly that they are representing, and you have to break that. It is just human nature; it is not a criticism of anybody. But we are all subject to it.

So my preference would be, as the Foreign Service does now, if you teach somebody Turkish or Chinese or Arabic, then you would like them to serve in a country where you can use that language maybe three or four times over their career. Maybe not sequentially, but over time. So we had a number of people in Turkey who were back for their third tour, for example, but it was broken up with a tour in Bogota or a tour in Prague. And I think that is healthy for human beings, is my observation, having been in the Foreign Service 30 years.

Ambassador PICKERING. Could I add a point there too, Mr. Higgins? Because I agree with what Marc has said and I think the

State Department is attempting to do that, and that is shorter, but more frequent, tours in area of language specialization. But often those people come back to the United States and they serve in the bureaus of the State Department and they bring back that kind of knowledge, that ability in linguistics, and that informs the policy-making process in a way that I think is very important. And I think that it is rotation of Foreign Service officers that continues to enrich the State Department's ability to have a good perspective on and, indeed, a real feeling for what is the situation in that country and how and in what way policies can best be shaped to deal with it, as well as dealing with visitors from that country, foreign diplomats, foreign ministers coming here, who in fact expect to see that when they come.

So I think it is a pretty good system, and it balances off this problem of local-itis, which Marc described. It balances off the problem of how do you make the best use of that individual.

There are other things that have to happen, too. Too much focus, too much narrowness, even with rotational assignments, I think tends to produce people who have come up against a glass ceiling, and I think it is also valuable to give specialists in Turkey a little bit of a look at some other place, where different ideas, different approaches, different innovative ways of thinking about things could help them when they go back to Turkey. So I think all of those kind of rotational things are important.

Admittedly, you have somebody in a place for 25 years—and some foreign services have done so—you may have the world's best expert on a very narrow feature of the landscape. But you may not make the best possible use of that individual and, psychologically, very few individuals are attuned, I think, to spending their lives in a 25 year assignment to wherever it might be. It is a little bit of the devil's island problem.

Mr. NALAND. Could I just briefly mention? This is in the CSIS report. We do have Foreign Service members who are posted in a country for 30 or 40 years. They are the Foreign Service nationals. And one of the many bad things that happened after 9/11 was that some of the trust was taken back from Foreign Service nationals, where only cleared Americans now can do a lot of this stuff in the consulate. I am sure some of that is appropriate, but, moving forward, if we could give back some more authority to the trusted 30 year Foreign Service nationals who are cleared also, at least to the secret degree, I think that is something we ought to really work at, try to figure out how to do.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is an excellent point and dovetails on what we were all talking about earlier, about the APPs. If you are going to have those, you are going to need foreign nationals to sort of buttress the individuals that you put in those facilities and help you with the intelligence and getting along with the culture. So we do have to move on that.

Dr. Loeffler.

Ms. LOEFFLER. Just one point picking up on the reference to the APP. If what the CSIS report says is true, and there will be a de-emphasis on the Embassy itself, or new ways of doing diplomacy, then that argues for rethinking the infrastructure, this really big permanent, very, very expensive infrastructure—the worst example

being Baghdad, but similar and lesser examples—that we are doing around the world.

Mr. TIERNEY. Absolutely.

Ms. LOEFFLER. The Commission report says we should maintain the building program, but we don't know what that shape of that program should be.

Mr. TIERNEY. They don't really mean that.

Ambassador Grossman, would I be wrong to characterize the report that you think you ought to maintain the building program, but you are also amenable to some of the changes Dr. Loeffler and others have talked about in terms of size, in terms of materials, in terms of goal, placement, and all that?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Absolutely right. The report says to maintain the building program, because that is a very important thing.

Mr. TIERNEY. Keep building, just do it better.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Yeah, with these considerations about openness and the environment and where they should be placed, and who decides.

Mr. TIERNEY. Right.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. And very importantly, as well, as the report says, maintain those buildings.

Mr. TIERNEY. I got the feeling that the Commission had actually read Dr. Loeffler's book.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Well, as I said in my opening statement, we had the good fortune to consult with Dr. Loeffler.

Ms. LOEFFLER. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Welch, do you have any questions?

Mr. WELCH. Yes.

There has been an emerging almost consensus that there has to be a merger between the military activity and the diplomatic activity, and they have to work hand in glove. Obviously, there has to be a fair amount of cooperation, but I would like to challenge that. You know, Iraq and Afghanistan are two special situations, but, by and large, the work around the world of trying to provide humanitarian assistance—and to the extent that the Embassies play a role in that and coordinate USAID activities—is, by definition, civilian, not military; and having people show up in work clothes, as opposed to a Humvee or an MWRAP, to a very rural village sends a totally different message.

And what I am starting to hear is that with this turmoil in our country about how best to address Iraq, there is a mission creep that is being imposed on the military so that, in addition to them providing fighting terrorists and al Qaeda and insurgents, they are being asked, as we saw, to set up and run prisons, to set up and establish a judicial system. I met a 55 year old career prosecutor from my hometown who is out there trying to set up a judicial system. We have captains in Ramadi who are trying to figure out how to get the trash collected out there. And that is the kind of mission creep that it is hard for me to see how that would be sustained the moment, when and if it ever comes, that we come home.

But my question is whether it is really sensible to be acting as though your efforts—and I will ask you, Ambassador Pickering, because you probably have the most experience—should be seen in

that way, as essentially of an extension of a military policy—I will use Iraq as an example—of trying to win hearts and minds, where the State Department folks are an extension of that. That, in my view, has a significant negative impact in the long haul about what is the real work that folks like you do.

Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you, Mr. Welch, for raising that question, because I can see how an earlier comment I made might have been taken as a generic prescription for all foreign policy, as opposed to what it was supposed to be, which was a specific prescription in the areas where, for one reason or another, military and civilians have to interrelate; and I would say those are in a couple of cases. They are in the case of active war-fighting—Iraq and Afghanistan—which are at one edge, if you like, of the continuum.

A little closer in is peacekeeping, the kinds of things that we have done in Bosnia and Kosovo, that we and other people are engaged in in many places in Africa—Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and earlier in places like Liberia and Sierra Leone. And, to me, the point there is that you do need to have this interrelationship. You need to have the mutual support and you need to have the mutual understanding of how that works.

More broadly, the interrelationship is what I would call less salient and less pointed in other places. Sure, our military are present in many Embassies and they relate to foreign military, and they do everything from training cooperation, to joint exercises, to mutual support in the intelligence area, to many other kinds of things. And here there is a different kind of need for civilian understanding and a different set of relationships, and that is more easily come by; it is more standard in our diplomatic practice, and I think in many ways less overwhelming in the sense that the military in the Embassies is sized to meet the mission. The mission isn't that they would run the foreign policy of the country at all.

There are other kinds of areas in the campaign against the use of terror against us where obviously there needs to be more common understanding of what is happening, how it works and where it is going.

So I can see several different cases that have to become part of the curriculum, rather than the standard, basically all-out major military effort that we are seeing in Iraq, and what I think has been the difficulty of the civilian side to support that: to mobilize; to find the right people; to train them; to have, in fact, military understand how and in what ways those two can go together; and how, in fact, a synergy coming out of that process can work.

I would far rather have in as many places as possible the United States represented by a civilian mufti dressed individual, wherever that can be done, and I think it meets much more the concerns that we have of the growing antagonism toward the United States around the world, which I think is still borne out in the polling data, particularly in the Islamic world, that we need to find important ways to overcome, and one of those I think is not to make the military the spearhead.

Now, I am a little concerned by the creation of AFRICOM and how——

Mr. WELCH. What?

Ambassador PICKERING. AFRICOM, which is a new military organization for Africa, and how it will fit, because it is an apparent possibility that they will see their role as basically—if I could put it this way—militarizing African policy. And I think we need to be aware of the fact that they can provide enormous support and terrific help, but the policy toward Africa needs to be civilianized and it needs to be broadly represented by a civilian.

Not that the military does not have a portion of that, or a serious part to play in making that happen, often in helping with training, in preparing African units for peacekeeping responsibilities—and Africans have tried hard to step up to those in places like Darfur and elsewhere, but they have shortfalls—but there are vast parts of our policy in Africa that are not militarized, don't need to be militarized, and, in fact, we would carry a burden in Africa if we thought to convey the view that they are and will become militarized through AFRICOM.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Welch.

Thank you, Ambassador. You hit on a note—I was just showing the staff here that I had written that down myself. We are contemplating having a hearing, in fact, on the AFRICOM mission because we have our own concerns as a committee that it has gone from being focused in one direction and maybe sliding over to the other, I think at great risk to us.

Mr. Lynch and Mr. Welch, do you have any further questions?

Mr. WELCH. No, thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. LYNCH. No. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Let me simply just ask two last questions on that. One is, for the Ambassadors, with the growing variety of individuals that now find themselves located in our various Embassies, and particularly the large increase in military personnel there who answer probably to another commander other than the Ambassador, how are we going to get that so that the Ambassador has the right amount of authority to make the Embassy and all of the outreach from the Embassy really work effectively? Ambassador Pickering?

Ambassador PICKERING. I would say that we have, over the years, had the President designate for each Ambassador—sometimes in a generic way; through a letter—what that Ambassador's authorities are. Some of these have morphed over a period of years, but, generally speaking, the situation is that unless combat operations are being undertaken by a combatant commander, the person who used to be called the unified commander or the commander in chief, one of the five major U.S. overseas responsible commanders, that the Ambassador had full authority. And I think that needs to be maintained.

I think in your report, but certainly in other reports, Marc, it has been suggested that particular document be perfected and then incorporated at least in an Executive order, so it has the potential to continue from one President to another. This has been seen as a Presidential prerogative, an individual prerogative and has to be negotiated. Often, it takes 2 or 3 years and some Presidents, even in a 4-year term, haven't produced this magic letter.

Mr. TIERNEY. Who are they negotiating with?

Ambassador PICKERING. It is usually negotiated with the White House by the State Department.

Mr. TIERNEY. And it takes 4 years to get it done?

Ambassador PICKERING. But other agencies get engaged in it. But the effort is, obviously, since it has to be signed by the President and the State Department often proposes it, that is the negotiating channel for it. But it seems to me we are now ready for a standard document; that it ought to become part of the continuing aspect of U.S. regulatory law, if not basically congressionally enacted. But that is another step. But my recommendation would be that this document be perfected and be signed very early as an Executive order and be inherited from one administration to the next unless there are extremely valid reasons to change it. Now, that provides the legal basis.

Then I think the second question is choosing Ambassadors. Now, I have served a number of times as Ambassador. My own feeling is that to exclude all political appointees is a serious mistake. But I do think that we have too many appointees—and I am not concerned at all about saying this—who haven't measured up to the job, who have other training background and experience. And I am fond of saying that, obviously, we all know that the first job that was truly professionalized was brain surgery.

So our Army folks did away with this after the Spanish-American and Civil War. It is time, in my view, to take a look at a smaller percentage. And indeed, a serious candidate for the President of this country, when he was here in the Senate, suggested 10 percent was the right figure, not the current 33 percent. My view is that makes a lot of sense, that allows a president to bring people of ability from outside the Foreign Service.

We also, I think, need to be cautious and careful about the Foreign Service officers we choose. We haven't always had 100 percent success rate, but I think the success rate is higher. I think more training for Ambassadors is well recommended, particularly those who come in from the outside. A 2-week training course is not sufficient to be able to do that. And I think all of those would be helpful in making the point that in most places around the world we have civilian activities.

I would finally say that if we are successful in this in every place around the world, we will not have to use combatant commanders to carry out our national security and foreign policy, because diplomacy can provide that first line—if I can call it—of action. I don't like to say defense because diplomacy is offensive as well. The first line of action has to be diplomacy. And I think with successful diplomacy we have, in the past, avoided conflicts.

I would finally say—and I say in my report to you—that it needs to be backed up by the best military in the world. So I don't think that in any way we are going to try to reconfigure the balance; we just hopefully can use the diplomacy more effectively and the Embassies more effectively to carry that out.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

You have something to add to all that? Go ahead.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Yes. I was going to add one sentence. Just to prove the fact that we were trying to find out the

practicalities of the Embassy feature, one of the things that was very important that we recommended was to put the Ambassador in the chain of performance evaluation for all of the people who are represented at the Embassy.

Mr. TIERNEY. That would make sense. Thank you.

Dr. Loeffler, let's have you have the last word, since we started off talking about buildings on that. We have created some new courthouses around this country, Federal courthouses that are both, I think, unique in their architecture, but somehow always manage to take care of security issues. Your last comments on how we can do that, how the two are not necessarily at odds with each other, that we can have security and we can have architecture that works?

Ms. LOEFFLER. Well, the GSA program has shown that, that it is possible, and we hope that the State Department can learn from GSA. GSA still has a panel of advisors, architectural advisors. They hire individual architects for individual projects; let them bring their creativity and know-how and engineering and design skills to the projects; and we have wonderful solutions, such as the courthouse in Boston or the courthouse in Phoenix or the courthouse in San Francisco.

So I hope that we can take some tips from the GSA program and see if we could apply some of that know-how to the building program. This is a time of opportunity for that building program with a no director at the present and a new one to be obviously appointed, so new direction is on the horizon.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. And I note that on January 22, 2008 there was a letter from the executive vice president and the chief executive officer of the American Institute of Architects to Secretary Condoleezza Rice making those recommendations exactly on that, and I would ask that be entered on the record. Without objection, it is.

[The information referred to follows:]

THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS

January 22, 2008

The Honorable Condoleezza Rice
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20210

Dear Secretary Rice:

Since 1857, the AIA has represented the professional interests of America's architects. As AIA members, over 82,000 licensed architects, emerging professionals, and allied partners express their commitment to excellence in design and livability in our nation's buildings and communities.

On behalf of our members and allied professionals, I would like to express our appreciation for your immediate attention to the State Department's Office of Overseas Building Operations (OBO). The AIA looks forward to working with you and Interim Director Shinnick throughout the remainder of your term.

As you know, over the last few years the "Standard Embassy Design (SED)" template, adopted under the previous leadership of the OBO for use in all new U.S. embassy construction, has been criticized by many for not being an innovative and welcoming representation of the United States in our diplomatic missions. While understanding the need to build embassies efficiently and securely, the design community has expressed concern over the lack of innovation in the SED template and how that reflects upon the United States in our overseas outreach. Building security and good design need not be mutually exclusive. The AIA urges the State Department to explore how it can best meet the security needs of modern diplomacy while constructing embassies that showcase the best of American design and ideals.

In seeking to improve embassy design, the AIA hopes that the Department will continue meeting with and seeking regular input from the design and engineering community by re-instating the Architectural Review Board that was in place for several decades prior to former this decade. For nearly fifty years, the Architectural Review Board served as a highly respected and successful peer review panel of outside experts who reviewed embassy designs and plans and gave contemporary evaluations of design and engineering options, resulting in a catalog of American embassies whose designs are respected and admired world-wide.

We look forward to continuing to work with you and your staff to seek the best in U.S. embassy security and design.

Sincerely,

Christine W McEntee

Christine McEntee
Executive Vice President/Chief Executive Officer

1735 New York Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20006-5292
Information Central 800-242-3837

Mr. TIERNEY. I want to thank all of our expert witnesses here today. Your experience has been invaluable to us. Your comments were deep and insightful, and we hope that we are going to continue on. We will get a debriefing later on from what legislation might be necessary. I suspect there may not be a lot of legislation, but more appropriation, as well as just a way to help the administration work its way through some of these broad details on that.

Thank you all very, very much for your time and for your knowledge.

[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]