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A RELIANCE ON SMART POWER—REFORMING THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BUREAUCRACY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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A RELIANCE ON SMART POWER—REFORMING THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BUREAUCRACY

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2008

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m., in room SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Akaka and Voinovich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Senator AKAKA. I call this hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia to order.

I want to welcome our guests today. Thank you so much for being here.

Public diplomacy is an essential tool, as it was in the past, in our efforts to win the Global War on Terrorism. During the Cold War, public diplomacy helped spread our values of freedom and democracy to those who were struggling behind the Iron Curtain. After the Cold War, the need for public diplomacy to some appeared less certain. Political pressure to do away with the organizations of the Cold War increased and the U.S. Information Agency, along with two other agencies, was merged in 1999 into the State Department.

The tragedies of September 11, 2001, renewed interest in public diplomacy as a means to convince foreign publics, especially those in Muslim countries, that we were friends and potential partners. An array of commissions urged improvements in our public diplomacy efforts and President Bush soon formed Policy Coordinating Committees at the National Security Council to better harmonize public diplomacy efforts. At the same time, others called for creating a new public diplomacy agency, dramatically increasing resources, encouraging more exchange programs, engaging in a war of ideas, and communicating across all types of media.

There is now a clear consensus that our public diplomacy is a vital tool in America's diplomatic arsenal and our use of it must be improved. A recognition of America's need for more public diplomacy extends beyond its borders. In a recently published report by the Asia Foundation, both Asian and American leaders recommend

a new program of cultural, artistic, and intellectual interaction between the civil societies of both the U.S. and Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian representatives called for in particular the creation of new American centers to promote a better understanding of the United States. It is important that it is foreigners who are demanding to better understand the United States.

In today's hearing, I want to examine more closely the following issues. Is our existing public diplomacy strategy accomplishing its objectives? How well are agencies coordinating? What improvements need to be made to the public diplomacy structure in Washington and in the field? What role should the private sector play? And what are the State Department's human capital and program gaps in public diplomacy?

I also want to stress my belief that all of our diplomats, especially those who project our image to another Nation's public, need to continue to develop a deeper appreciation and understanding of the culture within which they will work.

The United States is a country that values democracy and freedom. For the United States to continue to recover its international reputation, it not only needs to live up to its values, but also share them in an effective manner with the rest of the world.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and I want to welcome you at this time. We have Christopher Midura, Acting Director, Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Department of State. We have Ambassador Scott Delisi, Director, Career Development and Assignments, Bureau of Human Resources, Department of State; Rick A. Ruth, Director, Office of Policy and Evaluation, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State; and Peter Kovach, Director, Global Strategic Engagement Center, Department of State.

It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses, so I would ask all of you to stand and raise your right hand.

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Mr. MIDURA. I do.

Mr. DELISI. I do.

Mr. RUTH. I do.

Mr. KOVACH. I do.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Let the record note that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Before we start, I want you to know that your full statement will be made a part of the record. I would also like to remind you to keep your remarks brief, given the number of people testifying this afternoon.

Mr. Midura, will you please begin with your statement.

TESTIMONY OF CHRISTOPHER MIDURA,[1] ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND RESOURCES FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR SCOTT H. DELISI, DIRECTOR, CAREER DEVELOPMENT AND ASSIGNMENTS, BUREAU OF HUMAN RESOURCES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, RICK A. RUTH, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF POLICY AND EVALUATION, BUREAU OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND PETER KOVACH, DIRECTOR, GLOBAL STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT CENTER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. MIDURA. Mr. Chairman, I wish to express my thanks for your invitation to testify here today on smart power and reform of the public diplomacy bureaucracy. Secretary Condoleezza Rice and Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs James K. Glassman look forward to continuing our close cooperation with the Congress to strengthen public diplomacy's role as a vital national security priority.

Under the direction of Under Secretary Glassman, we are reviewing, improving, and modernizing public diplomacy structures and programs in the State Department to build upon the government-wide public diplomacy leadership role assigned to the Under Secretary by the White House. Under Secretary Glassman has emphasized in several articles and interviews, as well as in testimony before Congress, that we are engaged in a war of ideas with violent extremists who seek to attack the United States and its allies and to recruit others to do the same. Public diplomacy professionals are being called upon for a renewed commitment to ideological engagement, designing programs and spreading messages to directly confront the ideology of violent extremism as practiced by al-Qaeda, the FARC in Colombia, and other organizations.

We wish to amplify credible voices of moderation and to discourage potential recruits from joining terrorist movements. We can do this by combining our programs and technology to help build real and virtual networks among groups in affected societies who reject the terrorists' world view with a special focus on young people.

Under Secretary Glassman has sought to reorient public diplomacy toward these ends. Perhaps most visible has been his coordination of strategic communication in the interagency through his chairmanship of the Policy Coordinating Committee. The PCC comprises civilian and military communications leaders from the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury, the National Security Council, the intelligence community, and other agencies.

As a complement to the work of the PCC, another of Mr. Glassman's interagency initiatives has been the creation of the Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC), which serves as a subject matter advisory group for the Under Secretary and members of the PCC on topics relating to the war of ideas. GSEC staff are active duty military and civilians from the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency and the director is a senior Foreign Service officer.

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[1] The prepared statement of Mr. Midura appears in the Appendix on page 41.

I would like to highlight here the increasingly coordinated way that State Department employees are working with their Defense Department and military colleagues around the world. Today, the emblematic projection of the American Government abroad is the Provincial Reconstruction Team, a flexible mix of military capabilities with our civilian-directed development, public diplomacy, information, education, economic, and social tools. This week, we at the State Department co-hosted the first ever worldwide synchronization conference for combined State Department and DOD strategic communication leadership. I think that is a glimpse of the future.

One of the most prominent recommendations in the 2003 report of the Djerejian Group, of which now Under Secretary Glassman was a member, was the public diplomacy needed to establish a new culture of measurement within all public diplomacy structures. This criticism was echoed by the Government Accountability Office soon thereafter. The Department has since made major strides in establishing rigorous performance measurement and evaluation standards. The Evaluation Division of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs has been a leader in this field for several years by demonstrating the impact of exchange programs in building mutual understanding between Americans and people around the world.

In order to bring evaluation and measurement for the rest of public diplomacy up to ECA's high standard, the Under Secretary recently established an Evaluation and Measurement Unit (EMU), charged with development performance measurement instruments and executing detailed evaluations of the implementation and effectiveness of all State Department public diplomacy programs overseas. We intend to boost our investment in the work of the EMU, enabling us to better document the value of public diplomacy to the Department, the OMB, the Congress, and the American taxpayer.

Winning the war of ideas depends on getting the right information to the right people, using the right technology. Our Bureau of International Information Programs has been a leader in taking public diplomacy to the Internet through its America.gov website. This site features six language versions, including Arabic and Persian, discussion groups, video content, and special events, such as the Democracy Video Challenge, in which foreign citizens are encouraged to upload their own video creations to complete the phrase, "Democracy is." IIP's digital outreach team blogs extensively on U.S. policy and society in Arabic, Persian, and Urdu, giving us a voice in the growing realm of online conversations. The Bureau is also expanding into diverse areas such as online professional networks, social media, virtual worlds, podcasting, and mobile technologies.

While global ideological engagement has necessitated greater focus on expanding and updating our information programs, we also remain committed to maintaining the excellence of the programs managed by our Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, which have for years formed the heart and soul of public diplomacy efforts.

The Fulbright Program remains the unchallenged world leader among academic exchange programs, while the International Vis-

itor Leadership Program brings to the United States each year approximately 4,000 foreign professionals in a wide variety of fields for invaluable exposure to our culture, our society, and our policies. IVLP alumni have included 277 foreign heads of State. We will be looking to expand ECA's English teaching and youth scholarship programs in the coming months to target successor generations of youth, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds and/or countries of strategic priority for the United States.

To conclude, the modernization of public diplomacy structures and programs is a top priority of the Department Under Secretary Glassman. We are also working in ever-closer coordination with our interagency colleagues, particularly our strategic communication colleagues at the Department of Defense. With the support of Congress, we will continue to expand, carefully target, and rigorously evaluate our public diplomacy activities to meet the challenges of global ideological engagement.

Thank you for your attention, and my colleagues and I would be glad to answer your questions at this time.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Midura. Thank you for your statement. I am so glad you had included some of your programs and especially programs with youth and to look at the future. In a sense, this hearing is one that is looking at the future, too. We will have a new Administration, whoever it will be, but we wanted to take an early step to begin to work on our diplomatic efforts. I personally feel it is so important for our country to let the rest of the world know our culture and who we are as well as to know their cultures so that we can work together with the other nations.

In a sense, we use the word here and for this hearing, "smart power," reliance on smart power, and I am looking at our witnesses as those who have had the experience in this area and will be able to offer some recommendations that we may be using as we try to reform the public diplomacy bureaucracy.

Mr. Midura and Mr. Kovach, the June 2007, U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication was the first of its kind. Since the strategy was implemented, what measurable progress have you made in meeting the three public diplomacy priorities?

Mr. MIDURA. Mr. Chairman, the three priorities that we had in that document, the three strategic objectives were America as a positive vision of hope and opportunity, isolating and marginalizing violent extremists, and promoting common interests and values. These strategic objectives are truly broad goals that give direction to our programs here and overseas. I believe that public diplomacy programs are leading us toward these goals, although we may never entirely reach them.

This document has been valuable to us for a couple of reasons. Within existing resource limitations, it has given our overseas missions and our partner agencies here in Washington a common agenda and that has helped us establish a basis for better communication and cooperation through the interagency, and Mr. Kovach can talk about that in a moment. The document is simple, it is brief, it is easy to understand and use, and it even contains templates to facilitate planning in offices here and at posts overseas.

It has also given us an agenda for the priorities that we need to address. Many, in fact, have actually been implemented. Some of these include expansion of resources for exchange programs, which is extremely important to us; the modernization of communications, which has been a huge priority of our Bureau of International Information Programs; updating technology; creating regional media hubs, which is something that we are engaged in around the world for better messaging; creation of our Rapid Response Unit, which is our 24/7 office that monitors coverage of the United States in the media overseas and offers very quick guidance for responding to it.

We have also had greater program cooperation between the public and private sectors. We have expanded our Office of Private Sector Outreach to try and bring in more of these. And we have had greater coordination within the interagency, and Mr. Kovach, if you want to talk about that a little bit.

Mr. KOVACH. Yes. Thank you for having us here today. It is a great opportunity for an exchange at a very critical moment. I became the head of Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC) a month ago and I took the job—I had come back to Washington slated for another job—simply because of Mr. Glassman's incredible energy and the feeling that I could carry over an important interagency structure into whatever comes next that would hold.

I should back up 8 years because at exactly this stage of the second Clinton Administration, I was essentially doing the same thing. I was coordinating an interagency process that could break out into working groups around any crisis and to do strategic communication, and I can tell you, the culture has really evolved in these 8 years. Probably September 11, 2001, probably some credit to the Administration, people are really leaning forward.

Now, at that time, the structure I ran was all State Department officers and we would reach out into the various other bureaucracies—DOD, VBG, USAID, the intelligence community—as needed to pull around a working group on a crisis. Serbian democracy was a crisis we worked. We worked on Sierra Leone some with both European and international organization partners.

The office I run now is actually staffed by people from the intelligence community, the Defense Department, from our own Office of International Information Programs. So we both have reached out and we have reach in capabilities. My people are learning the State Department, my people from outside, and we are learning how to tap what we need in their bureaucracy. So it is a terrific model and I can only say I hope it continues.

The one thing I wanted to add to what Mr. Midura said, being a field officer, is that the emphasis on youth programs is really a very new thing. I think 28 years ago when I came into the Foreign Service, we rarely looked at anyone younger than grad students, and now we have the Yes Program from some vulnerable youth countries in the Muslim world, from some other countries. It is a real sea change in our targeting and I just wanted to recognize that. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

Mr. Midura, the 2007 PART assessment indicated that there is no strong evidence that interagency or private collaboration has led to meaningful resource allocation decisions. This surprises me,

since the U.S. Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications stated that, "all segments of the U.S. Government have a role in public diplomacy." Do you believe that the 2007 PART assessment was accurate, and if so, what has been done since to correct the situation? The Program Assessment Rating Tool, which is PART, is an evaluation tool.

Mr. MIDURA. And could you read the criticism again, Senator, what the PART said?

Senator AKAKA. Yes. Well, my question to you was do you believe that this 2007 PART assessment was accurate? If so, what has been done since then to—if needed to correct the situation? Mr. Ruth.

Mr. RUTH. Thank you, Senator. Yes. In fact, what the 2007 PART assessment said, did have a great deal of truth to it. We engaged very diligently with OMB and, of course, with the Hill and with the Government Accountability Office and others over the last several years to bring about what I consider to be some of the most significant changes in the way public diplomacy is measured, frankly, in the history of public diplomacy.

Like my colleagues, I have been in this business for quite some time, 33 years in this case, and I have seldom seen so much happen so quickly. Before Under Secretary Hughes came on board, and now under Under Secretary Glassman, there was, for example, no office dedicated to the evaluation of public diplomacy. Now, there is a full-time office, and as Mr. Midura indicated, Under Secretary Glassman has institutionalized this so that there is, in fact, an office in his own unit that is staffed by full-time and professional performance measurement experts and evaluators.

We have also instituted two very significant steps that are global to address two simple-sounding questions that were posed to us by both Under Secretaries. One is "what," and the other is "so what?" What are you doing around the world with all of that taxpayers' money in public diplomacy, and what difference has it made?

And so we have instituted, first of all, in answer to the "what" question, a new software system called the Mission Activity Tracker, which is a global system used by all posts around the world which can now record—in which they record in real time all public diplomacy activities with a great deal of specificity in terms of audience, strategic goal, venue, individuals engaged, even the gender and so forth, and this kind of data can now be analyzed back in Washington and reports produced that can tell the Under Secretary and other senior managers exactly what is being—what is happening and how the public diplomacy fund is being spent.

So, for example, we could have certainly told you several years ago that we were doing programs in certain ways of certain kinds. Now we can say, for example, that under the topic of civil society, that X-percentage of programs involve this kind of audience, journalists, or educators. We can say whether they involve women or men, whether they involve parliamentarians or not, whether they are cooperative with local institutions. We have a wealth of data that public diplomacy senior managers have never had before.

The second, in answer to the "so what" question, which is the most interesting, of course, I think for most of us and also the most difficult to get at, we developed what was called the Public Diplo-

macy Impact Project to precisely ask that question. What has been the aggregate impact of public diplomacy on the audiences we have engaged around the world? We conducted this program the first time last year and it sounds a little bit like a Supreme Court case because I refer to it as "Landmark v. Limited." It is a landmark case, landmark study because it is the first time that the State Department ever undertook to analyze in a statistical quantitative way the impact of public diplomacy.

But it is very limited because it has only been done once so far in a specific period of time with a certain sample size. We are now working on a second version, the Public Diplomacy Impact second version, so we can begin to move from a baseline and start to see if there are trends and changes in different directions.

And so from my perspective, these have put real teeth, if you will, into what Under Secretary Glassman has referred to as the culture of measurement.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for that response.

Mr. Midura, State places great emphasis on engaging and leveraging the resources of the private sector for public diplomacy. In 2005, State strongly endorsed GAO's recommendation to develop a strategy for engaging the private sector in pursuit of common public diplomacy initiatives. Has State developed this strategy?

Mr. MIDURA. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can't speak for the rest of the Department here, only for Public Diplomacy itself. We have our own Office of Private Sector Outreach and that office has been looking for ways to work with the private sector to expand our public diplomacy reach. These partnerships have occurred between us and businesses, NGOs, foundations, educational institutions, and others. We define these relationships as sort of a collaborative arrangement between the U.S. Government and our non-governmental partners in which the goals and the structure are set out beforehand.

The Under Secretary's office concentrates on building and maintaining new relationships with leaders in U.S. businesses, and an example of that that we have had recently was a U.S. marketing college that was held in conjunction with Novartis, Kraft, and eBay and was hosted at our Foreign Service Institute, and it combined strategic communicators from the interagency to listen to private sector experts on marketing and the kind of tools that the private sector uses to market products. While they realized that was an imperfect comparison in some respects with public diplomacy, it is a means of thinking outside the box and this week-long intensive course was so successful that we are going to work with the same organizations to do it again in January.

These are the kinds of things that we have been able to do. Obviously, we would like to expand in this area even more. We have had some success in the past with humanitarian relief, but we would like to be able to use, to leverage, our contacts with the private sector to expand particularly in English teaching, but also in youth exchange and other similar programs.

Senator AKAKA. Yes. This recommendation that I mentioned in 2005 by GAO was included in a report entitled, "Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy." From what you just mentioned, you have been

working on it and my question was whether you had developed a strategy for that.

Mr. MIDURA. Yes. The national strategy that we were discussing earlier was directly related to that criticism and the need for getting a document out there that would allow the different agencies and the different posts to be working from the same sheet of music. I think this document does that. Obviously, it is something that we will probably want to update again in the not-too-distant future. But as you mentioned earlier, going into the Presidential transition period right now, it is probably a good time for us to be thinking about future directions of public diplomacy but perhaps not exactly producing a new national strategy for a while yet.

Senator AKAKA. Well, let me call on my friend, Senator Voinovich, for his statement or questions that he may have for this panel.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for not being here for your testimony, but we had Secretary Paulson before our policy luncheon. I wanted to hear from him about a few things, what he thinks we ought to do right now.

As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I have had the opportunity to see firsthand the success and failure of our efforts to win the hearts and minds of world citizens and I remain concerned that our public diplomacy is arguably at its lowest point in history. I once described it as our President got elected and he thought he was talking to Texas. Then he realized he was talking to the United States, and then he realized he was talking to the world. Once that happens, when the water goes over the dam, it is hard to get it back up again.

As a Nation, we must do a better job communicating our policy objectives and actions on the international stage. The solution to this challenge does not rest solely with the State Department, however, nor does it lie in the creation of a new government entity.

Mr. Chairman, you and I have worked on some concrete tools to improve our public diplomacy, such as reform of the visa waiver program, combining security enhancements while also facilitating legitimate travel by some of our closest allies. In some of those nations over there, this is the most damaging thing that we had because they felt that they were being denied the opportunity of a visa waiver.

Now we must ensure the State Department has the leadership capacity, the resources and people necessary to do the job we have asked them to do. Our men and women in uniform can no longer be responsible for foreign assistance and messaging. Secretary Gates, in July, called for increasing our investment in the capacity and readiness of the State Department. I think it was welcome news for everybody.

Congress has had a number of thoughtful reports and recommendations to improve our global engagement, including the recent report by the Commission on Smart Power and the forthcoming report by the American Academy of Diplomacy. The Commission on Smart Power emphasized the fact that our success in public diplomacy depends in large part on building long-term peo-

ple-to-people relationships. Given the short-term duration of our hardship posts, I am concerned about the ability of our Foreign Service officers to cultivate the relationships necessary to carry our message forward.

According to the American Academy of Public Diplomacy, the number of State Department personnel responsible for public diplomacy is 24 percent less than in 1986. The Academy outlines a plan to meet this shortfall, which includes a focus on training. The Academy also recognizes the need to more effectively use the Internet to win the hearts and minds of broader audiences.

The Subcommittee's oversight work on radicalization shows that much work needs to also be done in that area.

Congress must recognize its responsibility by making careful choices among the many domestic and international funding priorities to ensure the State Department has the tools necessary to meet new realities and emerging challenges. Our budget situation demands that we allocate scarce resources to areas where the United States can achieve the greatest return on investment.

Again, I am sorry that I wasn't here for your testimony, but are you at all, any of you, familiar with the recommendations that are coming from the American Academy of Public Diplomacy or are familiar with what Joe Nye and Richard Armitage did in terms of smart power. I would be interested in what you think of those recommendations.

Mr. MIDURA. Yes, Senator, if we can talk about them separately. I think that the smart power recommendations are—public diplomacy was only a part of that and I believe that the report was pointing in the right direction. Obviously, there are resource issues. While we support the President's budget, I think I would be untruthful if I didn't say that if we had more public diplomacy resources, we could probably do more and could probably move the needle a bit farther, as you implied.

The Advisory Commission report was largely focused on personnel issues. As we have here, the Director of our Office of Career Development and Assignments in the Bureau of Human Resources, I think it might be good for Ambassador Delisi to address that one.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. We have heard from the folks that have been—a lot of those folks, Tom Pickering and others, have had some good experience, but you are the ones that are on the firing line and I would really like to know just how you feel about it, and if we had the capacity to do it, do you think what they are recommending in the area of human resources is adequate to get the job done.

Mr. DELISI. I will try to answer some of that, Senator. Thank you for the question and thank you for the chance to be here.

I have spent most of my career in the field, and I came back about a year ago and became the Director for Career Development and Assignments. This is my first time dealing with some of the resource implications of our business, and it is frightening when we look at it. Right now, when we look at our Service as a whole, we are probably short at least 1,000 officers just to fill the jobs that we have. But even then, when we are filling these jobs, we aren't giving them the training that they need. We wouldn't have enough

bodies to do the training, give them the linguistic skills, and address all of the other challenges they are going to face out there.

So to give them that training, it means that some of these jobs are going to go unfilled even if we had that extra 1,000 bodies. Now, this is in the Foreign Service broadly. I will talk about public diplomacy, as well.

But when we look at it, we also recognize that in the past few years, increasingly, we don't need to just fill those 1,000 jobs that we are short. We need to fill more. We need to be creating additional positions. We need to be doing more in China, in India, in the Middle East, in parts of Africa, and in Indonesia. The demand to get our people out there is greater and greater, there are greater challenges, and we just don't have the resources.

On the public diplomacy side of the house right now, I think it is even—there is some positive news, but it is a grim picture overall. When I look at the mid-level up, from our Foreign Service 02 ranks and above, we face deficits in every single one of those grades, including in our senior grades, most heavily at the 02 and 01 level. A lot of that is because right before the merger, USIA's hiring, as I understand it, had really dropped off. USIA's hiring was low.

Since then, we had a surge, as you know. We had the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative and we brought in a number of folks, and that has helped. At the lower grades, we have a group of new young public diplomacy officers who are coming along and that is good. And when we looked at DRI, we brought in a greater proportion of public diplomacy officers than officers in some of our other skill codes. So that is helpful.

But in the past 4 years, we basically have been hiring again at attrition. So we aren't able to really get ahead of this curve, and even as it is, if we bring these folks up—right now, on the public diplomacy side of the house, we probably, in raw numbers, we have a 64-officer surplus. That is our latest figure. But again, they are at the wrong grades, and while you have 64 extra officers—by the time we put them into training slots, give them the linguistic training, 2 years in Arabic, 2 years in Chinese, what have you—we are still considerably short to fill the jobs we have, and we want to be filling even more.

So we have a real challenge on our hands. For this coming year, we are able to hire 186 more officers—186 above attrition. We will bring in a greater percentage of public diplomacy officers within that group of 186 than in our other cones—than in political, management, economic, etc. But still, we have to bring in officers in all of our cones. So we have a considerable way to go.

The good news is that while we have these gaps in the senior ranks among the public diplomacy officers, in a service that is made up of generalists, right now, for example, we have 136 Foreign Service officers who are not public diplomacy officers but who are filling public diplomacy jobs. The bulk of them are political officers, many economic officers and also consular and management. We are seeing that they get the training and, let us say, in today's world, all of us have to be public diplomacy officers. I mean, I am a political officer. That is what I grew up as in the Foreign Service. But you learn very quickly. We all have to have these skills.

And I think there is a much greater emphasis these days on ensuring that our officers get these types of training, even if they aren't PD officers, that they at least get fundamentals of public diplomacy training early in their career, and if we are going to put them into public diplomacy, we really make every effort to ensure that they get the training. And the biggest constraint on that is just sometimes it is a function of timing. Again, given the lack of resources, sometimes we have to choose between filling the positions and giving them the full range of training, and it is a balancing act and we usually consult closely with the geographic bureau and the embassy and public diplomacy colleagues and say, what is the trade-off here? Where are we going to get the best value?

Senator VOINOVICH. Are you familiar with the recommendations from the Academy of Public Diplomacy?

Mr. DELISI. I am not, sir.

Senator VOINOVICH. I would like you to become familiar with them because we are going to be dealing with this next year and I would like to have their recommendations verified from those of you that are on the firing line and get your best opinion on it.

Mr. DELISI. Their recommendation—was this in terms of additional numbers——

Senator VOINOVICH. It was human capital. They are talking about the core diplomacy. They are talking about public diplomacy. They are talking about economic assistance. They are talking about restructuring, of helping governments to restructure. You also have the initiative that we have back from Secretary Condoleezza Rice where she is talking about adding more people, I think, what, 500 in the State Department and 500 throughout other Federal agencies and then another volunteer corps that would be available to deal with—we have a lot of problems that deal with our public diplomacy. So I am anxious to get your best thoughts on those recommendations.

I think the last thing I would like to mention is the issue of the change of the guard over there. You had Charlotte Beers, then you had Margaret Tutwiler, and then you had Karen Hughes, and now James Glassman. Does anybody want to comment on how that doesn't work, impedes your ability to get things done?

Mr. MIDURA. I think it is fairly obvious that quick turnover at the Under Secretary level is not particularly helpful in terms of developing a coherent long-term strategy and progression for public diplomacy. I think that there are certain commonalities to all of them. I believe that every Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy favors increasing exchanges and working with the Congress on exchange programs.

Under Secretary Glassman's particular focus, as we were mentioning earlier, is on the war of ideas. That is, if not unique to him, at least a focus that he has chosen to make during the short time that he has remaining in his tenure. It is an item that was part of the National Strategy. It was the second of the three. But he is a strong believer that this is an area in which public diplomacy can make a very great impact, and so that is how he has chosen to focus most of his attention during the remaining time here. That doesn't mean we aren't still working for improved mutual under-

standing or working with our partners on exchanges, but it does mean that we are investing more of our resources right now in programs that are information-based and that are intended to establish a hostile climate for violent extremists.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I was just mentioning to Senator Akaka, how would you like to get together and draft a resume of the next person? Would that be inconsistent with your job?

Mr. MIDURA. Senator, yes, I think you could say that. [Laughter.]

Yes, it would probably be inconsistent.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I am serious. I think that one of the problems that we have is that we don't pay enough attention to the people that we hire for these jobs, and I think that the better we have—I am on the Foreign Relations Committee. The more information we have about what it is, the kind of characteristics that we are looking for, the better off we are going to be. And instead of waiting for them to send somebody up, to send something over there and say, this is a very important post. Our public diplomacy is at the lowest it has ever been probably in this Nation's history. This is a very important job and here is the kind of individual that we think you are going to need in that job if we are going to turn this thing around, including the next President and how he handles, or she handles their job.

Mr. MIDURA. Yes, I appreciate that, Senator. Obviously, our focus is going to be primarily on the structure of the public diplomacy cone itself and whether we are doing the right things in terms of the structure of our overseas posts, whether we are doing the right things in terms of strategic planning, and what we could do better in the future, and then discussing this with the transition team. I will leave the selection of the next Under Secretary to the next Administration and to you.

Senator VOINOVICH. If you would do me a favor, with or without attribution, to define what you think we should be looking for in that position. With or without attribution. Mr. Kovach.

Mr. KOVACH. If I could speak to that, I have worked with all four Under Secretaries that you mentioned and I have to say the turnover has not been ideal, but all four of them, I think, brought an important component to the job.

Charlotte Beers, coming from Madison Avenue, was frankly appalled at how anecdotal, impressionistic our baselines were. When we looked at PD communication problem, we saw a foreign audience that we were trying to move more toward our position or to support of our position or at least to dissonance so they wouldn't support, let us say, violent extremism, and she really brought a strong sense of that culture of measurement, and I think some of our initial attempts to define measurement that I took part in happened on her watch. I think that is a very important set of skills in a leader.

Margaret Tutwiler, who was our spokesperson, understood public affairs and understood the domestic political arena, went over and was our very successful ambassador in Morocco and she came back and she has kind of got street smarts. Most of my career has been in the Arab world. She understood that some of the people we most had to address were not only the youth, not only elite youth, middle-class youth, but we had to go—for any of you who have ever

been to Rabat, Morocco, across the river there, there is a huge, what they call in French, a Bidonville, that we would call a slum, and that was really the recruiting ground for potential jihadists in Morocco. And she came up with this great idea of access English programs, where if we could give them 2 hours of English after school on the high school level with some kind of follow-up that the best students would be tracked into other scholarship opportunities, we would have a very successful program, and that program has flourished throughout the Muslim world since. A huge contribution, in my view.

Karen Hughes—I was in Pakistan as the PAO, the public affairs officer, the year of the earthquake and the private sector partnership she and four other CEOs cobbled led to, I think close to $150 million of private American corporate aid going to Pakistan, well publicized by my team. And what was really touching, I think what some editorialists picked up on, was that some of that aid was not from the companies, it was from the employees of the companies who contributed. That was a huge—I mean, you talk about private sector participation in public diplomacy. She brought that, and then she brought us a much greater awareness of how effective exchanges are and how that needs more support.

Mr. Glassman is terrific. Under Secretary Glassman, he has such vision. He is such an experienced communicator, connections in the world of publishing and the world of ideas. All four of them bring great resumes, and I could say any combination of those skill sets as you look to confirm the next Under Secretary would be great. I just wish that we had a longer time with each of them.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Senator Voinovich.

On paper, the public diplomacy area officers report to regional assistant secretaries and through them to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. But I understand that these officers actually take policy guidance and get resources from the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Does this arrangement happen with only the public diplomacy function, and if so, why is that?

Mr. MIDURA. Senator, I don't know if it is entirely unique. It is a little different in the case of public diplomacy because the public diplomacy offices located in each of the regional bureaus, depending on the needs of that particular bureau and the arrangements that have been reached and the staffing, are all a little different in terms of their relationship with the regional bureaus. But as you said, they do report to their Assistant Secretary. They are considered to be part of those bureaus and the relationship with the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy is a policy-related one, not a direct line of authority.

That said, we do have the resources at our disposal that are used for public diplomacy programs. My office transfers these resources both in terms of dealing with base budgets at the beginning of the year, but also to answer specific program requests during the year. So we have an extremely close relationship with these offices. The Under Secretary meets on a weekly basis with the Public Diplomacy Deputy Assistant Secretaries from each of the regional bureaus and we in our office also meet with the public diplomacy of-

fice directors once a week. So we know what their resource concerns are. We know what their policy concerns are.

And although the relationship is not absolutely direct in terms of lines of authority, it works for the context of the Department, and in a manner of speaking, it is also the same relationship that, say, a political officer working in the European area would have with the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Although that line of authority may be a little bit more direct than with public diplomacy, they still report to the Assistant Secretary and that is still the head of the office that they work for. So it may not be entirely unique.

Mr. DELISI. In my current position, we don't really get into this. Speaking as someone who has been out in the field dealing with this, for us, what we have found is that the Under Secretary's office had the money. They had the resources. They had the programs. And they provided us with kind of the big picture and the global vision and here are the broad themes that we want to sound and we are going to make these programs available to you to advance this goal.

We still, though, would engage with our assistant secretary and our public diplomacy office in the Africa Bureau, in the South Asia Bureau, because each of these programs, while the vision remains the same, depending on where you are and how you implement that vision, the context of the program is going to be a little bit different and it has got to reflect the policy considerations for Eritrea or whatever country you are in.

And so we found it worked reasonably well. I mean, I never had real problems in balancing our engagement with the Under Secretary's folks and getting their idea of the broad directions we wanted to go in and balancing and making that reflective of the specific policies unique to the countries we were serving in. It worked pretty well.

Senator AKAKA. I also understand that the Public Diplomacy Area Office Directors, the directors attend meetings with regional assistant secretaries and deputy assistant secretaries. I just wonder about whether the attendance at these meetings translated into policy outcomes. Mr. Kovach.

Mr. KOVACH. I was the Director of the East Asia Office for 2½ years and I can tell you that they did. I had a respected voice. We were dealing—this is 2003 to 2005. We dealt a lot with how to, I think, put certain security programs in Southeast Asia to Muslim majority countries or to Muslim media directed at Muslims. We instituted public diplomacy in the Pacific Islands, an area where the Chinese were exerting more and more soft power, and we came up with a formula to do that. We talked to the Chinese about reaching out to their Muslims to give them more of a sense of global connection, supplied speakers at, I believe, the 600th anniversary of Islam in China, which a group of Chinese Muslim intellectuals were celebrating with seminars and historical reflections.

So yes, there was a lot of that. Then day-to-day issues would come up, Burma and how pronounced we should be about our feelings about the regime there, publicly versus through private diplomacy in APAC and the Southeast Asia Organization.

So yes. I mean, public diplomacy and reorganization started with a proposition that we would have a seat at the policy table and I think that has been gained by having those offices in the regional bureaus that spearhead our main product, which is bilateral diplomacy. And I think that at the same time, even then in probably a less perfect iteration of structure, I regularly saw the people from the Under Secretary's office and we regularly had a dialogue on resources. I got a line budget, but I also was able to compete for discretionary money against the originality and relevance, policy relevance, of projects I would put forward. So I thought it was a great perch.

Senator AKAKA. Yes. Well, can you give me an example, and my question is whether any of these policy profiles were used, such as what impacts have public diplomacy offices had on issues like NATO enlargement, national missile defense, and Georgia?

Mr. KOVACH. Well, those were not issues in the East Asia Bureau, but I truly believe that the way we put our policies forward, especially—I mean, look at the main issue of this decade, has been counterterrorism and the global war. Some of the ways we—some of the agreements we crafted with countries in that region might get the backs of moderate Muslims up, and I think that we were at the table not only in figuring out how to structure those agreements, but how to publicize them, what should be in the public domain and what should remain in the domain of diplomatic discourse. I think we had a very important seat at the table in determining that and those in some ways were our major diplomatic products of that mid-decade period.

Senator AKAKA. Yes. Well, Mr. Midura and Mr. Ruth, the public diplomacy area offices are apparently designed to be the field's window on Washington and Washington's window on the field. In this age of instantaneous e-mail communications, I am concerned that this arrangement may not add value. For example, if an officer at the post has a problem relating to the Fulbright program, why isn't it more efficient for that officer simply to reach out directly to the appropriate office in the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs?

Mr. MIDURA. Mr. Chairman, they do routinely. In fact, I can vouch for that one personally because as the Cultural Attache in Prague, I had a substantial Fulbright program, a substantial number of International Visitors, U.S. Speakers and others, and we coordinated routinely with ECA and IIP on these programs. We obviously let our desk officer know what was going on with these, as well. But the desk officers had a lot of responsibilities and particularly within the PD area. Many of these desk officers are responsible for more than one country. So as long as the concern was with an individual program, it was much more likely that I was going to get a problem resolved by going directly to the bureau that ran that program.

We worked with the desk officers primarily on resource issues, on policy issues that needed the support of the bureau, and ad hoc things that came around where we did not necessarily know where to go in the Department and were enlisting the support of the desk officer to find the right person. But when it came to programs from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs or IIP, we had contact people within those bureaus and we went to them directly.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Kovach.

Mr. KOVACH. If I could give you an example, my last overseas tour was in Pakistan and during my time, we negotiated the largest student Fulbright Program in history, and this was not an easy negotiation because there were three funding groups, including the Government of Pakistan using, I believe, World Bank money, and USAID and the State Department. If my regional public diplomacy office hadn't had good contacts with the branch of ECA, the Academic Programs Branch, because the politics were very tricky, and it is not only the Academic Programs Branch, but it is the Board of Foreign Scholars and what their attitudes are because this was a program that had some interesting features to it, let us just say.

Without those cues from that desk, I don't think I ever could have pulled this off with the State Department, with my own agency, believe it or not. It was vital to have them there as intermediaries. It would not have happened.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Would you agree that our public diplomacy is at a low point?

Mr. MIDURA. I don't really know how to answer that, Senator. I mean, my experience goes back for 20 years, and from the perspective of the individual officer, I think people are pretty much doing the same things they have always been doing. Now, whether the resources have kept up with the needs or not is another question.

Senator VOINOVICH [presiding]. I think we know that they haven't.

Mr. MIDURA. We try and work with what we have got. I mean, that is really the—the posts know they have a certain amount of money each year. They know that, we in the Under Secretary's office, have a certain amount that we are going to try and get them as much as we can. In the case of countries where there are immediate crisis needs, we work with our Congressional partners for supplementals. It would be nice if we had more in the way of resources, but at the same time, I am not certain that we would be able to handle a huge influx of new resources right now without also reviewing our staffing patterns and other things. I think all of these things are of a piece and we probably have to look at the whole picture for the next Administration and we know how that is going to go.

I mean, speaking as an individual PD officer, I don't feel any lower or higher than I did 10 years ago. I think we go out there and we try and do the best we can with what we have.

Senator VOINOVICH. Did anybody sit down and say, like Karen Hughes or Jim Glassman come in and say, hey, I think we have a problem. Let us get all you folks together and let us develop a strategic plan on how we can do better. Is there such a plan at all in existence?

Mr. MIDURA. Well, I mentioned earlier that with the transition coming up, we are certainly going to have to look at revising the strategic plan that we have got right now. It is the sort of thing that we would definitely want to look to do in the future, to see whether the one we have from 2007 is appropriate to the coming Administration and the needs of PD in the future. We will update that document. It is just a question of when.

Senator VOINOVICH. One of the things that we have tried to do is we have a high-risk list that the GAO puts together, and Senator Akaka and I have tried to work on getting OMB and GAO to sit down and develop a strategic plan on how we are going to get them off the high-risk list and develop metrics in determining whether or not progress is being made. It would seem to me that with a new Administration coming in, that would be really good for the State Department to look at that area and look at the human resources that you need, but also here is where we are and here is where we want to be, here are the problems, and try and develop a real plan on how to do better than what you have been able to do.

Mr. MIDURA. I absolutely agree. As far as the evaluation piece is concerned, that is something that I think we are going to make good progress on fairly quickly. Mr. Ruth mentioned PD impact earlier and how we are attempting to aggregate data and look at the impact of public diplomacy programs worldwide. We have had a good start on that, but due to resource constraints, we were only able to do a limited number of sample posts at the beginning. While OMB was very pleased with the measures that we used and the indicators, the response that we got was, OK, this is good, but we need a lot more. We need a much larger sample.

And, in fact, we have invested a substantial amount of this year's resources in expanding that sample. We have the contract for that coming up soon and we will expand that to other posts so that we can get a better baseline view of exactly how effective these programs are. I think that will help a lot.

We have already discussed the human resource issues. That is something we are definitely going to have to look at. It is being reviewed. And we do have the good news that people are moving up in the ranks and we are going to have a lot more 02 public diplomacy officers in the not-too-distant future than we do right now. So the huge deficits that we have been facing will disappear. So there are optimistic elements to this.

Senator VOINOVICH. If we provide the money.

Mr. MIDURA. Well, some of them are there already. I mean, a lot of these people right now are at the junior officer level, or entry-level officer. They are doing consular tours in many cases and they will move into public diplomacy when they have completed those tours. So we should have more of these people for the future.

Senator VOINOVICH. Are there any benchmark programs out there? I mean, is there a consensus of what country is doing the best job in the area of public diplomacy right now?

Mr. MIDURA. I don't know if we have that done by country. We tend to do evaluation more by program. Mr. Ruth, if you want to address that.

Mr. RUTH. Thank you, Senator. No, there is no ranking country by country of who is considered to be doing the best job. There are now, as I mentioned, that we have the information and the Mission Activity Tracker, it is possible for the Under Secretary, and, in fact, any State Department manager or policy maker, to look and see exactly what each country, in fact, is doing, which audiences they are engaging on which topics and in what format, and that gives us a large leg up in terms of transparency and accountability and the ability to make decisions about resource allocations in the future.

The kinds of formal evaluations that we undertake are generally program by program and not country by country.

Senator VOINOVICH. I have no other questions. I don't know if Senator Akaka wants to ask any more questions.

Senator AKAKA [presiding]. Yes. Well, thank you very much, my friend, Senator Voinovich.

I want to thank this panel very much for your experience, I think even wisdom on how we can work on our diplomatic areas in the future of our country. I would tell you that I am very interested in my friend's suggestion about resumes—— [Laughter.]

As something that can really help determine the type of person we need in the office. And so that is something that we need to work on.

I want to thank this panel very much for your responses and your testimony here and ask you to continue to be close to us as we continue in this effort and look forward to working with you in the new year.

Again, I want to say thank you very much for your statements and your responses.

Mr. MIDURA. On behalf of my colleagues and myself, thanks to both of you and thank you for your support of public diplomacy. We really appreciate it.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

Now, I would like to welcome the second panel of witnesses, the Hon. Douglas K. Bereuter, President and CEO of the Asia Foundation, and a former U.S. Congressman; Ambassador Elizabeth Bagley, Vice Chairman, U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Washington, DC; Stephen Chaplin, Senior Advisor, the American Academy of Diplomacy, Washington, DC; the Hon. Ronna Freiberg, Former Director of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, U.S. Information Agency; and the Hon. Jill A. Schuker, Fellow, University of Southern California, Center for Public Diplomacy.

As you know, it is a custom of this Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses, so I ask all of you to please stand and raise your right hand.

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Mr. BEREUTER. I do.

Ms. BAGLEY. I do.

Mr. CHAPLIN. I do.

Ms. FREIBERG. I do.

Ms. SCHUKER. I do.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Let the record note that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Before I start, I want you to know that your full written statements will be part of the record. I would also like to remind you to keep your remarks brief, given the number of people testifying this afternoon.

It is great to see a friend, my former colleague in the House, Mr. Bereuter, and it is good to have you here. May I ask you to begin and proceed with your statement.

TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS K. BEREUTER,[1] PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE ASIA FOUNDATION

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich. It is nice to be here today. And thank you for the opportunity to testify. As I understand the focus of the Subcommittee's inquiry, it builds upon the widespread recognition that America needs to increase its public diplomacy efforts and especially to make its public diplomacy far more effective than it is today.

I will not neglect your invitation to give you my thoughts on the subject of desirable administrative and structural reforms. The views I offer today are not the position of the Asia Foundation, but strictly my own. I wrote my own testimony based upon 26 years of serving in the House and 20 years of that on the Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 years on Intelligence, now the last 4 years chairing the Asia Foundation, which is, I think, the premier development organization working in Asia.

I feel it is my duty to tell you today as a citizen with that experience base that although administrative and structural changes in the bureaucracies of our important departments and agencies surely could bring positive changes in the effectiveness of America's public diplomacy, a more fundamental reorientation of our public diplomacy effort and emphasis is far more important.

I think it is a common mistake or misunderstanding repeated over and over again when our government or advisory groups seek to improve the American public diplomacy structure. It is a failure to recognize that while bureaucratic reorganization and better management practices can bring improvements, the most important American public diplomacy assets are, (a) the American people, and relatedly, (b) the opportunities for foreigners to see demonstrated or otherwise experience those characteristics of our country and our people which the world traditionally has most admired.

The world has admired American openness, its system of justice, popular culture—generally, and unmatched environment of opportunity. They admire, above all, the practices, principles, and values undergirding America's tradition of democracy, pluralism, rule of law, and tolerance, which Americans embrace as universally applicable. It is only when we seem to have strayed from those principles, practices, and values that we disappoint the world and we are seen as hypocritical.

Today, while there is still some confusion and uncertainty, a misplaced sense of priorities and ineffective practices in the public diplomacy of the country, it is fortunately recognized increasingly and accepted that public diplomacy cannot just be regarded as a job of the Nation's diplomats, high-level State Department spokesmen, or other governmental officials. A major impediment to improving America's public diplomacy, in my judgment, has been the prevalence of the view that improving our Nation's image and influence abroad is primarily a direct governmental function. One might say to emphatically make a point that the implementation of effective public policy and public diplomacy specifically is too important to be solely or primarily the responsibility of government officials.

[1] The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter appears in the Appendix on page 46.

I looked at the recommendations of eight high-level task forces, commissions, committees convened in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. I found a very strong consensus that it is in our national interest to not only emphasize public diplomacy, especially in the Islamic world, but also that such an effort should be implemented with a very major role for non-governmental organizations, credible high-profile individual Americans, and the private sector in general.

Ambassador Edward Djerejian had something to say about that and he certainly endorses that kind of view. He said the United States should recognize that the best way to get our message across is directly to the people rather than through formal diplomatic channels, and I have a cautionary note on page three of my prepared statement about the use of American business expertise in public diplomacy. I am not going to go into that in detail because of the shortness of time.

I also suggest on the bottom of that page and on page four, as well, that some of the views of one of the country's noted scholars and programmatic and practical advisors on the subject, Dr. Nancy Snow of the Newhouse School of Public Communications at Syracuse University has a lot to say that is very valuable. I take four of her 10 points there and I specifically call them to your staff's attention and to you.

So there is nothing really new about the U.S. Government conducting some of its public diplomacy programs through non-governmental organizations. We, at the Asia Foundation, do a lot of that. We have a whole range of things that I mentioned on the bottom of page four that, in fact, are public diplomacy, and we use USAID funds, we use from private donors, we use from other governments who also are trying to encourage democracy, pluralism, tolerance, citizen participation, and they help reinforce the principles and values which Americans embrace, as I said, universally.

I call to your attention, as Senator Voinovich has mentioned, the CSIS Commission on Smart Power. I was there when they released its report. Two of your Senate colleagues served on the body, two from the House, former Senator Nancy Kassebaum, and that report emphasizes that the American public, drawn from every corner of the world, constitutes the U.S.'s greatest public diplomacy asset, especially those citizens who beneficially volunteer, study, work, and travel abroad, if their conduct reflects those things which foreigners have long admired about America and our country.

As I said, in my judgment, the American people and the positive features of our whole American experience, observed abroad and here at home by example or direct contact, are our two greatest assets. They make our case better than any government agency ever can. Our public diplomacy officers abroad should not have the view that they directly deliver public diplomacy. They should employ Americans and the experience in America, even if that experience is demonstrated in Asia or Africa or elsewhere in the world. That is their duty, to use those resources not directly, but to use the best resources of the American people.

So I looked at about 10 specific categories of proposals that various organizations and people have made. I am going to make very candid comments about them, I think things that are realistic from

a Congressional point of view as to what can be accomplished. You can take items from No. 2 and No. 6 and No. 9 and No. 10 that make sense in my judgment.

But I would like to conclude, Chairman Akaka, Senator Voinovich, and Members of the Subcommittee, by saying that the primary message I give to you today is to emphasize that for a truly effective public diplomacy effort, America must return to—and I say return to, and then reinforce and remind people throughout the world by example what they have especially admired about our country and our people. That won't be accomplished by an improved governmental relations campaign, by governmental reorganization, or only by adding more State Department public diplomacy officers in our embassies or consulates or Washington, DC. However, greater good will, respect, credibility, and support for our country can be regained. Changes in policies and emphases, a smarter variety of public diplomacy, and perhaps some governmental reorganization are only part of the answer.

The primary orientation of your effort must be to remind people abroad and reinforce by example and our direct experience what they and their leaders traditionally have liked and admired about America and our country. We have done it well in the past. We can and we must do it again.

Thank you very much for this opportunity.

Senator VOINOVICH [presiding]. Thanks very much. Ms. Bagley.

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR ELIZABETH F. BAGLEY,[1] VICE CHAIRMAN, U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Ms. BAGLEY. Thank you, Senator Voinovich. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you at this hearing on reforming the public diplomacy bureaucracy. I am honored to represent the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy this afternoon and to brief the Subcommittee on our 2008 report entitled, "Getting the People Part Right: A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of U.S. Public Diplomacy."

At the outset, Commission Chairman William Hybl and I would like to ask the Chairman's permission to enter the entirety of our report in the record.[2]

Senator VOINOVICH. Without objection.

Ms. BAGLEY. Thank you. Just over a year ago, the Commission reviewed the extensive recent literature on U.S. public diplomacy and determined that few, if any, observers had ever sought to look under the hood and study the impact of internal human resource practices and structures on our Nation's efforts to communicate with foreign publics. We decided to explore this basket of issues because, in the final analysis, as Congressman Bereuter just said, people are the key to success of our Nation's public diplomacy.

Over a one-year period, the Commission met with scores of State Department officials and outside experts on Public Diplomacy (PD) human resources issues, and we learned a great deal in the process. Our 2008 report contains our findings and recommendations.

[1] The prepared statement of Ms. Bagley appears in the Appendix on page 55.
[2] The report submitted by Ms. Bagley referred to above appears in the Appendix on page 149.

In this short statement, I would like to highlight our key conclusions. Later, I will be happy to elaborate, if necessary, and answer any questions the Members of the Subcommittee might have.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we found that the State Department recruits smart people, but not necessarily the right people for the PD career track; tests candidates on the wrong knowledge sets; trains its officers in the wrong skills; and evaluates those officers mostly on the wrong tasks.

In terms of personnel structures, State has a PD bureaucracy in Washington that hasn't been critically examined since the 1999 merger and that may or may not be functioning optimally. Its overseas public affairs officers are spending the majority of their time administering rather than communicating with foreign publics. And meaningful integration of public diplomacy into State Department decision making and staffing remains elusive. In short, Mr. Chairman, we are not getting the people part right. Let me now take up each of these points in a little more detail.

On recruitment, very simply, the Department of State makes no special effort to recruit individuals into the public diplomacy, or PD, career track who would bring experience or skills specifically relevant to the work of communicating with and influencing foreign publics. No serious Presidential or Congressional campaign or private sector company would hire communications personnel who have no background in communications, but to a large degree, that is exactly what the U.S. Government is doing and we need to change that.

Turning to the Foreign Service examination process, we found that the Foreign Service Officer Test and Oral Assessment do not specifically test for public diplomacy instincts and communications skills. Since we neither recruit for nor test for these skills, it is thus possible for candidates to enter the PD career track, and for that matter the other four Foreign Service career tracks, without having any documented proficiency in core PD-related skills. This is problematic. The Commission believes we need to modify the exam, particularly the Oral Assessment, to include more substantive PD content.

In terms of public diplomacy training, though there have already clearly been some improvements in recent years, a number of conspicuous and serious blind spots persist. For one, we make virtually no effort to train our PD officers in either the science of persuasive communication or the nuts and bolts of how to craft and run sophisticated message campaigns. The Commission believes we need to rectify this. We would like to see more substantive PD offerings at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, including a rigorous 9-month course analogous to the highly regarded one currently offered to economic officers.

With respect to the State Department's Employee Evaluation Report (EER) form, the essential problem is that it lacks a section specifically devoted to PD outreach and thus contains no inherent requirement that State Department employees actually engage in such outreach. Until it does, PD officers overseas will continue to spend the overwhelming majority of their time behind their desks administering rather than out actually directly engaging with foreign publics. The Commission wants to see outreach built into the

EER form, and we also want to see at least one substantive PD communication task built into the work requirements of every PD offices in the field. A one-line change in the EER form of the type we have proposed could result in thousands more outreach events per year than we are seeing now. Now is the time to put direct outreach at the center of American public diplomacy, right where the current and previous Secretaries of State have said they believe it should be.

Let me now turn to the public diplomacy area offices. At present, the mechanism by which public diplomacy considerations are ostensibly brought into State Department policymaking is the PD area office, about which you already talked with the previous panel. This is a self-standing office within the six regional bureaus. The Commission looked at this structure and concluded that though PD now has a higher profile within the State Department than it did some years ago, the jury is still out as to whether that higher profile has been translated into appreciable services and policy outcomes. The current bureaucratic arrangement is anomalous in two ways. First, Washington-based PD officials take policy direction, as we talked about before, not from the official to whom they nominally report, and that is the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, but rather from an official to whom they do not formally report, namely the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Second, PD is the only substantive function not permanently represented on the county affairs desk, the focus of Department policymaking. We think it is time to revisit the current arrangement to see if it is working as it should.

With regard to the role of public affairs officers (PAOs), at post, particularly at large posts, the Commission was surprised to find that notwithstanding the job title, most PAO responsibilities were inwardly, not outwardly, oriented. In short, our PAOs are essentially administrators, not communicators. The Commission recognizes that program administration is an important component of public diplomacy that will always be a part of the job. Nonetheless, we would like to see the Department take a critical look at the PAO position, particularly at large posts, to see if these senior officers are playing the role they ought to be playing and if this expensive managerial layer is cost effective and adding value.

Finally, a few words about the integration of public diplomacy officers into State Department staffing. The stated goal of the 1999 merger of the USIA into the State Department was to integrate PD considerations and PD personnel more fully into the mainstream of State Department planning and policy making. The Commission has found that this integration remains largely elusive, and concomitantly that PD officers continue to be significantly underrepresented in the ranks of the Department's senior management. As we put in the report, "the PD career track is no longer 'separate,' but it certainly is not yet 'equal.'" If the Department is to attract and retain first-rate PD officers, then it needs to demonstrate that these officers will be regarded as capable of holding senior Department positions.

Let me conclude. Getting the people part right can go a long way toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of America's outreach to the world. As our report suggests, there is much work to be done.

That said, most of the needed fixes are feasible. With some political and bureaucratic, and perhaps some Congressional attention—they can be made. We certainly hope they will be.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much again for this opportunity. I look forward to responding to any questions you may have.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Ms. Bagley. Mr. Chaplin.

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN M. CHAPLIN,[1] SENIOR ADVISOR, THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF DIPLOMACY

Mr. CHAPLIN. Senator Voinovich, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to testify on what can be done to improve public diplomacy's performance in achieving foreign policy objectives. I spent a 32-year career with USIA, was a member of the Senior Foreign Service, and acted as a member of the steering committee at USIA on the consolidation of the Department of State.

Today, I represent the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center, which together have produced a new report entitled, "The Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness." I served on both the advisory group and the working group that prepared the report, which will be issued next month.[2]

I think the best description of why this report is necessary are some words in the foreword from Ambassadors Ron Neumann, Thomas Pickering, Thomas Boyat of the Academy, and Ellen Laipson, President of Stimson, "The study is intended to provide solutions for and stimulate a needed conversation about the urgent needs to provide the necessary funding for our Nation's foreign policies. We need more diplomats, foreign assistance professionals, and public diplomacy experts to achieve our national objectives and fulfill our international obligations. This study offers a path forward, identifying responsible and achievable ways to meet the Nation's needs. It is our hope that the Congress and the next Administration will use this study to build the right foreign affairs budget for the future."

Now, many fine studies have been published in recent years that have recommended institutional reorganization of foreign affairs agencies, offered guidance on how U.S. foreign policy should be conducted. This report is different. Its purpose is straightforward: Determine what the Secretary of State requires in terms of personnel and program funding to successfully achieve American foreign policy objectives. Based on informed budgetary and manpower analyses, the Academy and Stimson report provide specific staffing and cost recommendations.

My colleague, Stanley Silverman, a longtime USIA Controller, and I focused on public diplomacy. This is what we found. Despite recent increases, public diplomacy in the State Department is understaffed and underfunded. The fiscal year 2008 PD budget is $859 million. The PD's current staff of 1,331 Americans is 24 percent less than a comparable figure of 1,742 in 1986. According to State data, public diplomacy in early fiscal year 2008 had a 13 per-

[1] The prepared statement of Mr. Chaplin appears in the Appendix on page 59.
[2] The report submitted by Mr. Chaplin appears in the Appendix on page 190.

cent Foreign Service vacancy rate. That is equivalent to 90 man years.

To have a reasonable chance to accomplish its objectives, PD needs to cover an employment shortfall, establish additional positions, obtain greater program funding, and significantly expand training. We believe that our recommendations for the 2010–2014 time frame will significantly improve PD's capability.

We are all familiar with international public opinion surveys showing extensive dissatisfaction with many U.S. global policies and the disagreement of U.S. allies with certain U.S. decisions. However, these survey results don't fully convey foreign attitudes toward the United States. More than any Nation, the United States is looked to for ideas, innovation, and opportunity. In much of the world, the United States is viewed as a society that recognizes individual initiative and rewards talent. Given these factors, public diplomacy, properly funded and staffed, can make a difference.

Before I mention our specific recommendations, I want to stress that PD field officers still successfully deal in traditional programs such as exchanges, lectures, media placement, and cultural events. However, in 2008 and beyond, they and the Washington support units must reach out to broader audiences to what I would call the Internet generation of 20- to 40-year-olds with credible information, and in many instances, entertaining Internet media, which are essential to reach these audiences.

Whether it is traditional programming or Internet-based programming, public diplomacy's success results from a long-term commitment of staff effort and funding. Our report recommendations cover exchanges, advocacy of U.S. foreign policies and informational and cultural programs about American society, institutions, and values.

Briefly, they include: Increase permanent American staff by 487 and locally-employed staff by 369; increase academic exchanges over this 5-year period by 100 percent, international visitor grants for rising foreign leaders by 50 percent, and youth exchanges by 25 percent; expand the capacity of PD English and foreign language advocacy websites aimed at experts, young professionals, and students, and hire additional specialists in website design and program content; establish 40 American cultural centers to broaden the daily U.S. worldwide cultural presence where security conditions permit; reengage the U.S. Binational Center network in Latin America of over 100 centers and 100,000 members who desire closer ties with the United States; expand other programs, particularly overseas staff and operations, to increase PD effectiveness.

In total, from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2014, the staff increases we recommend will cost $155.2 million and program activities $455.2 million. Overall funding increases will total $610.4 million in 2014.

Finally, while training recommendations are located in another section of the report, they call for substantially increased training opportunities for PD personnel. PD Foreign Service officers, in particular, need more extensive training in foreign languages and area studies, technology applications, public speaking, and resources management.

I will be very happy to respond to your questions. Thank you.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chaplin. Ms. Freiberg.

TESTIMONY OF RONNA A. FREIBERG,[1] FORMER DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

Ms. FREIBERG. Thank you, Senator Voinovich. As a veteran of USIA, I have a continuing interest in the effectiveness of the Nation's public diplomacy and our ability to adapt it to the demands of the 21st Century. My remarks today reflect my own views and not those of any organization.

It is no secret that our public diplomacy apparatus needs reform. Creating a consistent and coherent outreach to foreign publics must be a high priority for the next Administration. In the past few years, as others in this room have said, we have been flooded with reports from numerous high-level task forces studying what should be done and to reinvigorate and to strengthen public diplomacy. The report that Mr. Chaplin just described is the newest addition and it contains some valuable information as well as valuable recommendations.

Some of the reports have also suggested creation of an independent or quasi-governmental organization to perform all or part of this function. Although the ideas have merit, it is still unclear to me how a new entity would interface with the State Department and how it would operate in the field. For this reason, I have focused my testimony on improving State Department's current public diplomacy organization and operations.

In his book on soft power, Joe Nye described public diplomacy as not only conveying information and selling a positive image, but also building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies. The consolidation of USIA into the State Department in 1999 has not made it any easier, I think, to sell a positive image or to build long-term relationships. The merger, in my view, has been less than successful for public diplomacy, which continues to be plagued with underfunding, lack of interagency coordination, a culture that still undervalues and marginalizes it, and the encumbrances of a large bureaucracy.

Since this is the situation that the next President will inherit, I don't advocate recreating the old USIA. The question is, how can we make public diplomacy better? I have seven recommendations for reform, and since some of these have been mentioned by other witnesses, I will not go into great detail in these few minutes.

First, we do need to clarify and strengthen the role of the Under Secretary. We have talked about the sort of bifurcated situation that now exists with personnel in the regional offices and in the field reporting to regional Assistant Secretaries and to the Undersecretary for Political Affairs. I believe that the regional PD offices need to be able to report directly to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy. Or, we need to create a bureau for field operations. I can go into that in the question period if you would like.

Second, we need to increase public diplomacy resources. Better minds than my own, including that of Secretary Gates and my colleagues at this table, have made the same point, that if we are se-

[1] The prepared statement of Ms. Freiberg appears in the Appendix on page 63.

rious about our commitment to public diplomacy, we must find the resources to expand it in a number of areas, some of which are detailed in my written testimony. Among those options, I would focus on expanding exchanges, augmenting the size and technology of the Bureau of International Information Programs, and restoring some of the positions and facilities in the field that were lost in the 1990s, such as American Centers.

Third, we have to, I think, restore the country plan. Prior to the consolidation, area offices developed detailed country plans which defined communication strategies and set objectives for overseas programs. The country plan would bring additional coherence to the policymaking process and encourage greater coordination between regional bureaus and PD field operations.

Fourth, develop a plan for private sector engagement. That theme has been repeated on numerous occasions recently and during the last hour-and-a-half. Several of our witnesses, I think, agree on that point. The current State Department Office of Public Diplomacy does have an Office of Private Sector Outreach. That office should produce a detailed strategy for the next Administration on how to leverage private sector and nonprofit resources and expertise in the coming years. If we opt to create an outside organization for public diplomacy, one of its central objectives should be to encourage and better utilize this private sector input.

Fifth, bring coherence to the management of interagency coordination. Too many departments and agencies, Defense and USAID, just to name two of them, engage in public diplomacy or strategic communications activities, resulting in inconsistent messages and lack of accountability. The next Administration should inventory these activities government-wide, consider consolidating some of them, and at a minimum, decide at what level and how to make them work together. That includes the possibility of elevating the NSC Policy Coordinating Committee on Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy to a body on a par with the NSC, the HSC, and the NEC at the White House.

Sixth, strike a balance between security needs and public access to programs abroad. Current security arrangements at posts, though necessary, in many cases hinder efforts by public diplomacy officers to interact and engage with both media and citizen groups at post.

And finally, this, I believe, is the most important thing we can do moving into a new Administration, and that is we must launch a major government-wide international education effort. Both our national security and our international competitiveness demand it. It will require interagency and certainly Congressional support. Such a campaign would have three elements.

First, attract and welcome more international students to this country. The university environment fosters interaction with our values, our political system, and our citizenry. Further refinements in visa policy and cooperation with institutions of higher learning are needed. Other nations have created comprehensive national strategies to attract students, and we are competing with those other nations. Our lack of such a strategy works to our detriment.

Second, find ways to make our own students more aware of the world beyond our borders by increasing the number and diversity

of students who have the opportunity as undergraduates to study abroad and the diversity of locations available to them, particularly in the developing world and emerging economies. Study abroad should not be an opportunity limilited to the wealthy.

The third element of an international educational strategy, is to expand funding for international educational exchange programs, beyond the increases of the past 5 years, which have gone largely to the Middle East. Participants and alumni of these programs are vital public diplomacy assets.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, our success in foreign policy depends on our ability to engage and influence foreign publics through the power of our values, our institutions, and our national character. It depends also on understanding our audiences and building the kinds of relationships that outlive the policies of any one Administration and sustain us during times of international crisis.

Yes, it is about message, but it is also about people-to-people programs. Yes, it is about mastering communications techniques and state-of-the-technologies. But it is also about translating our Nation's positive attributes into realities that others can experience. Too often, people associate public diplomacy with public relations. That is only a piece of the puzzle. The art of salesmanship is transient. The art of fostering understanding and good will becomes the work of many generations.

Thank you. I am happy to answer questions.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Ms. Freiberg. Ms. Schuker.

TESTIMONY OF JILL A. SCHUKER,[1] FELLOW, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, CENTER FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Ms. SCHUKER. Thank you very much. Senator Voinovich, Mr. Chairman, and the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today on the important organizational challenges facing public diplomacy in this new century.

Through your hearings on smart power, this Subcommittee has been in the forefront of forward thinking on this issue and capturing the urgency and attention it deserves. Twenty-first Century U.S. public diplomacy is at a crossroads of both challenge and opportunity and it will be a centerpiece issue for the next Administration taking office in 2009. As the Smart Power report concluded, public diplomacy is indeed a companion for effective U.S. foreign policy. It is an opportunity, if effectively shaped and executed, to create new levers of influence that will ultimately make better use of hard power when needed and provide diplomatic alternatives to mutual threats and challenges.

Simply put, public diplomacy must be intimately involved in effectively identifying and promoting our national interests and informing smart power policy. But public diplomacy problems lie in both expectations and structure.

First, the United States is expected to lead by example, as you have said, and this becomes a key measurement for effective public diplomacy abroad. Poll after poll tells us that we are at a low point in moral authority globally.

[1] The prepared statement of Ms. Schuker appears in the Appendix on page 68.

Second, 10 years ago, mistakes were made in the rush of "jerry-built" architecture for public diplomacy that, in my view, in part, threw the baby out with the bathwater, leaving gaps in our public diplomacy readiness and effectiveness. Many of these challenges have been mentioned. The multitude of serious public diplomacy reports over the last years share the same main message of change, and that change is needed both structurally as well as for the role of public diplomacy and how it plays in the policy process.

In addition to the report that was mentioned that is about to come out, a new one is about to emerge, I think on October 1, from the Brookings Institution that was funded also by Congress, which I think will have some very interesting things to say.

Others testifying here today as inside-government public diplomacy practitioners have spoken more expertly and directly about the viability of specific present office structures, personnel, and portfolios, but let me enumerate quickly my thoughts given my own expertise both inside and outside of government.

First, while U.S. public diplomacy clearly is directed to a global audience, effective public diplomacy must begin at home. This demands a more aware and better educated U.S. public, ensuring that at every level of our society and government we are structurally geared to preparing ourselves for the 21st Century challenges, such as shifting demographics.

Targeted public diplomacy and the training of our professional civil service in all departments must be given an integral place so that all sectors, be it health, housing, the arts, sciences, etc., have both accountability and an awareness and an expertise in public diplomacy. The recent *Washington Post* article highlighting a new intelligence forecast looking to 2025 reportedly being prepared for the next President predicts that our increasingly competitive flat world will enable the United States to remain preeminent, but "its dominance will be relatively diminished because of the rise of everyone else." Public diplomacy needs to prepare for and navigate this successfully.

Overall, public diplomacy needs recognition of the professionalism of the public diplomacy function, the independence of its work, the quality professional corps, and deeper resource and financial support that is needed, and the reality that effective public diplomacy means long-term planning, outreach, and engagement, which is now missing.

The dismantlement of USIA, which I am not asking to have reconstituted, but the dismantlement of USIA and its transfer into the Department of State continues to have repercussions. This transfer caused serious disruption with the departure of many professionals and the resistance by and to a new culture, whatever the good intent. Lessons should be learned from this experience about how to reinvent government more successfully. The President sets the tone and agenda, but State runs the function.

Day in and day out, it is the cadre of professionals who need and must have adequate resource support, funding, training, and respect, which is not always there. An appreciation by the Foreign Service of public diplomats' expertise is too often taken for granted by regional bureaus, and in the conflict of shifting directives from the regional bureaus, the ambassador if abroad, and the Under

Secretary. This must be better rationalized and the independent public diplomacy role respected.

It is also important to recognize that the role of the public diplomat is intrinsically, in my view, separate from that of a spokesman or press officer, and this has gotten lost in translation. Public diplomacy is definitionally a two-way street, seeking to reach out and dialogue with the street beyond traditional networks of officialdom, the basic diplomatic focus of the State Department. This is actually one of the oddities of public diplomacy being based at State.

The seige mentality that has overtaken much of our diplomatic in-country outreach since September 11, 2001, clearly also has hurt the effectiveness of public diplomacy. So many of our embassies have become armed camps, cut off from the countries in which they reside and their publics. How to find a better balance between security and contact is a major challenge that needs to be addressed, and this includes visa reform, as well, which you have also mentioned, which would enable better reverse public diplomacy in terms of students and cultural exchanges.

Public-private partnerships also are very important to optimize effective public diplomacy engagement. They need to be more aggressively and successfully pursued to embrace the reach and resources they can provide outside of government, impacting public diplomacy in ways that cannot be successfully accomplished by government alone.

Some of the dollars, which is in my testimony, that the private sector has, for example, Citigroup's budget in 2007 in 100 countries was $81.7 billion. In 180 countries, this was nine times the amount that the State Department is dealing within its entire budget.

We also need better training and mastery of the new media by our public diplomats. These provide a different way to social network and inform citizens of other countries about United States' interest and values. This ranges from the Internet to blogging to all modern public diplomacy vehicles which, in addition to traditional skills, we need to encourage new information, technology-savvy public diplomats.

Priority must also be attached to the nomination and confirmation process for the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy. The short-tenured revolving door of this particular job has swung often since the reorganization of the late 1990s and added to its woes. The reasons need to be assessed by this Subcommittee. Public diplomacy's troops have not had the full, consistent, internal integration and direction needed and required for full success.

Specific programs face problems, as well, including Alhurra and even Radio Sawa and programs being run through the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Too often, they are viewed as propagandistic rather than as hard news or providing an honest broker perspective. If we are going to put money and muscle into broadcasting, then we should look at what has worked for us—Voice of America, for example—and not diminish or undercut or dilute these structures. Does cutting out VOA to India, as has been done recently, I gather, or cutting it back in former Soviet republics really make sense for our long-term smart power interests? Are we letting specific short-term policy and low funding run public diplo-

macy before public diplomacy can do the job? This is unproductive and a challenge for Congressional consideration.

We also need to bring into government public diplomacy talent we have either been ignoring or discouraging from outside of government, including skilled immigrant Americans who have language skills and geographical and cultural knowledge. One of our country's strengths is our diversity and it is one of the most identifiable ways to demonstrate tangibly abroad what we mean when we say public diplomacy begins at home.

On funding, which has already been mentioned, funding is minuscule relative to funding for similar activities at the Defense Department, which indeed both Joe Biden recently, as the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as well as Secretary of Defense Bob Gates have mentioned, and those have been addressed already in testimony.

Two final points quickly about the structure of public diplomacy. Both our Presidential candidates have mentioned the importance of ideas such as AmeriCorps, America's Voice Initiative. I think these would be very useful.

Last, and I mention this in my testimony, I would recommend serious consideration by the next President of having a senior advisor in the White House responsible to the President with responsibility for public diplomacy, sending an immediate signal abroad. This would not be the running of day-to-day public diplomacy, but it would add a dimension that I explain in some detail in the testimony. Thank you very much.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

The American Academy of Diplomacy, Mr. Chaplin, has done, I think, a pretty good job of making some recommendations. It was interesting, I was over at John Kerry's house and there was a presentation between Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft about bipartisan foreign policy and I asked the question, what about the human resources that you are going to need to implement the policy, and not very much in the book about it?

I think one of our big problems here is that, at least on this side of the government, there is not enough appreciation about the fact that you need the people in place to get the job done. So the real challenge, I think, is if we are going to change this around and do a better job of public diplomacy, we are going to have to make the commitment in terms of the resources that are necessary, also to try and make sure that we get the right individual in, as I mentioned. Some of you were here for the previous panel, but what is the job description for the individual that ought to head up this part of the State Department?

It gets back also to the issue of even the State Department in terms of management. I think that Dick Armitage and Colin Powell did a pretty good job of stirring some esprit de corps back into the State Department. Condi had lots of things to do. In my opinion, Bob Zellick should never have gotten the job. That wasn't the job for him. So having the right people in the right places at the right times makes a big difference.

I think all of you in your respective roles should keep working on trying to get this across to whichever candidate you are supporting, or your organization can make that available to them.

The big issue, again, is the funding. Mr. Bereuter, you spent a lot of time here. Now you are with the Asia Foundation. You have also headed up the NATO Interparliamentary Group. Do you believe that the fact that we are kind of taking care of the rest of the world in terms of our military prowess, and if you look at the budgets, that of the NATO nations that they are supposed to be coming up with their 2 percent, they don't come up with that money at all. We are doing it for them. As a result of that, I think we are pouring so much more money into defense where we should be putting it more into the public diplomacy area.

I would like all of your observations. Which countries are doing a better job than we are in public diplomacy? Are there any benchmarks out there that we can look to?

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Senator Voinovich, for that question. Well, I have always thought that, unfortunately, we seem to have to do the heavy lifting, and for many parts of the world, we come across as the heavy in that respect. I have always thought it would be nice to be, for example, a Scandinavian country and focus most of your resources on soft power and present this image to the world.

But we do have some advantages yet because people around the world still admire our people, our country, our system, when we live up to the principles and values, so we have those advantages. We have shown in the past we can do it (public diplomacy) very well.

I will come back to resources, if I may, in just a second. The number of public diplomacy officers we have today is not an insignificant number. It has been increased substantially. The problem, in my judgment, is that they spend only a small amount of their time really on that role, and you heard from a very distinguished member of the Foreign Service, Ambassador Delisi, what I thought was the fundamental problem, and the fundamental problem is they are still talking about resources as if our public diplomacy officers must have this incredible variety of language training and other skills—highly desirable, no doubt about it, but it is not their responsibility, in my judgment, nor the effective way to regard themselves as responsible for the direct delivery of public diplomacy. They have to understand how to manage the resources we have in the American people and the experience that we can give the foreign public here and abroad. That magnifies our resources tremendously if they have that attitude.

But to believe that public servants, people in our government primarily are responsible for the direct delivery of public diplomacy fails to take advantage of the resources and the expertise we have. So that is my point. I guess I have made it before, but we have those advantages. We took advantage of them in the past when we had USIA, to a greater extent.

Let us take a look at public libraries today, U.S. libraries abroad. There are very few today. They are behind security. They are inaccessible, largely. Our American Corners facilities too are few and far between. We deliver in the Asia Foundation over a million books a year abroad, all donated by our American publishers, and they are located in some 43,000 locations in Asia. We get some USAID assistance to help us move them across the ocean, but we

certainly, could use more resources. This is a way of taking the American experience through books and materials to an extraordinary number of people.

Muhammad Yunus, for example, a Nobel Prize winner, said, "I first had my look at America, my experience, by looking at books that you delivered to me in Bangladesh when I was a boy." So within the problems of security we have today with our embassies, we need to look at other alternatives in that specific area, for example.

Senator VOINOVICH. Ms. Bagley, you mentioned that from your Commission's point of view, that we are recruiting the wrong kind of people. What kind of people should we be going after and where do we find them?

Ms. BAGLEY. I think, Senator, it goes back to what Mr. Bereuter was saying, and others about the kinds of people that we want to have and those are those who have communications skills. You can worry about management. You can talk about managing your programs, which is the IV Program, the Fulbright programs, all the wonderful cultural and exchange programs, which I do agree should probably be increased, but there is so much more that a PAO should be able to do overseas.

I think the kind of person you want is someone who has communications skills already, who understands how to communicate with the public, who understands how to look at polling and use that as an expression of whatever the sentiment is in that particular country. That is on the overseas part.

At the State Department level, and that goes back to the kind of holistic approach which the Commission has endorsed, and that is to start with the testing, we have two tests. The Foreign Service exam does not test to any communication skills or any kind of strength that would be natural to the PD career track.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, you could look for people that do have communications. There are great schools——

Ms. BAGLEY. I know. Exactly.

Senator VOINOVICH. My alma mater has the Scripps School and they do a bang-up job at producing people.

I think maybe the State Department would be saying there are some folks there that could be—I mean, it is amazing to me. My chief of staff, when I was governor my last 2 years, was out of communications, a great manager, but he knew how to communicate. I mean, that seems it is a no-brainer, I would say.

Ms. BAGLEY. It is not rocket science, no, and that is something they don't really do yet at this point and I think that was one of our big recommendations, was that with the Foreign Service Exam, especially the Oral Assessment, just to begin with communications. When they talk to a Foreign Service applicant, they never ask them if they have ever had communications training. They don't test them on their speech making or before a board to talk about press inquiries. There are a lot of things you could test them on that they are not tested. So we are hoping—and that was one of our recommendations—that just to begin with, the testing should require some sort of communication ability for the PD officer, in particular.

Senator VOINOVICH. We are getting those people in, but today, we have a lot of political appointees that have gone in and there is no requirement that they speak the language of the country in which they are going into. I have seen the professionals and I have seen the appointees, and some of them are really great and some of them are——

Ms. BAGLEY. Right. I know.

Senator VOINOVICH. I mean, these are the people representing the United States of America. I think more careful work should be done in deciding who we are going to send overseas to get the job done for those political appointees.

Mr. Chaplin, I haven't finished the report that the Academy has done, but I have heard, and I keep hearing, that this exchange of individuals, of sending our people overseas and bringing people here to this country has been something that has been very good for us, and we see evidence of that over and over and over again. In the report, how much emphasis was placed on that? On other words, if you have resources, you can bring people in the State Department. You have got X-number of dollars and you allocate resources. If this is something that is really good but is the kind of thing that doesn't pay dividends like that, it is one of those things that pays dividends over——

Mr. CHAPLIN. Long term——

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. Fulbrights and so forth, I can't recall, did you get into that?

Mr. CHAPLIN. Yes, sir, Senator. I think you are right. First of all, the investment in exchanges is a long-term investment, and you just have to wait and see the results. But if you choose people wisely based on their competence and the abilities you think they have, it can pay off in lots of ways.

We recommended on two major exchange programs. On the Fulbright Program and programs affiliated with Fulbright, we recommended a 100 percent increase, and that would bring several thousand people more. I think a couple of points on Fulbright—it has a proven track record, but foreign governments also contribute a part to it and that has been one of the geniuses, I think, of a program as designed by Senator Fulbright. They have a stake in this and so they want to be sure they send qualified people.

Second, the fact that you are bringing over a number of either students or scholars from other countries who have not had experience in the United States previously, and I think this opens their eyes in many ways. They learn about the values of American people as well as the fact that we are a consumer society and all the other things we can show off, and that is important because they take that back with them. And I think during times when we may have difficulties with certain countries, there is still a reservoir of good will towards the United States in these particular groups that can resurface once things improve.

So we think that well-organized and well-executed programs can pay dividends. The International Visitor Program, the other major program, and that is spotting leaders as they are rising. It was pointed out earlier today that 277 former heads of state have gone through that program, but also writers, labor leaders, economists, journalists, a lot have gone through, and this is an investment. A

committee within the embassy which selects the people they think are going to really rise and be important in that society, and that has paid off, as well. And again, you are talking about these are kind of friends for life. They may be critical of us on individual policies, but their basic feeling about the United States is a positive one.

So I think the more that we can do on that. There obviously are private sector programs which are also very effective, university-to-university programs, other student exchanges. The more of that can be done, when people see America firsthand and when they deal with Americans firsthand, those are kind of the major advertisements I think we have for our society.

Senator VOINOVICH. One of the observations is that, too, is using our private organizations in the country more fully to try to figure out how we can integrate them into this whole process, the NGOs, what you are doing, Mr. Bereuter, and your organization. There are others out there—a better coordination.

I am going to finish on this, Senator Akaka. One of the areas that I think we don't do a very good job on, and it is something that carries over from my days when I ran for president of the student body at Ohio University, and I engaged a guy named Mong Sah Min, who was from Burma, to be my campaign manager with the international students because they had a right to vote, and my observation was is that these students, and I don't know if it is the case or not, maybe from your observations getting around to universities, is they come to the universities and they all hang out together and there is no effort to try and get them out or get people at the university to spend time with them.

I got elected and Mong set it up and we had these folks going out to fraternities and sororities and to the dormitories to have dinner and to talk about their countries and answer questions and really got something going there. And I just thought, I just wonder how many universities today have the same old thing. They all get together, and how often do they intermingle with the other students there, and are the students there taking advantage of this wonderful resource to get to know somebody from another country, or do they just go on with their own sorority and fraternity or dormitory work.

Mr. CHAPLIN. In my case, just from anecdotal experience, I think you are probably right. Times have changed in that. But universities which can organize host family activities and others to try to get people engaged often do pay off, but it takes some effort by the university, I think, to organize these outings and bringing them closer with American families.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I just think that I am going to really look into it to find out what is really being done. I mean, we have in Cleveland the international organization. My folks used to bring in kids, adults from the School of Social Work at Case Western Reserve and they would stay with us for a month and they got a chance to get to know a family and we got to know them. I would think there is a tremendous opportunity here if somebody really started to pay attention to it and probably could do it without a whole lot of money.

Mr. CHAPLIN. I want to just mention one thing, sir. The proposals that we recommend that total $610 million, $410 million are devoted to exchanges. We either need the resources to bring people over to the United States or we need the public diplomacy infrastructure to support the programs abroad.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. Senator Akaka, I have taken up too much time.

Senator AKAKA [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

I want to say at the outset thank you very much, Mr. Bereuter, for this book, and to mention that on pages 52 and 53, you have a statement there pointing out the blunder of reducing USIA and the need to come back with better programs.

I just want to say that we will be facing four votes that were supposed to happen at 4:30, but it hasn't yet, and that I intend to adjourn this because it will take about one hour for us to do that.

I have questions that I am going to submit for all of you to respond to, but I have two questions, one to Mr. Bereuter, and this in particular is about the U.S. Marketing College. How do you feel about the U.S. Marketing College, the State Department's new partnership with the private sector?

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Senator Akaka. I am happy to deliver that report to you, by the way. It is interesting. As you pointed out, the views it contains come from Asians making this recommendation to us, and Senator Voinovich, I brought one for you, too.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. I don't think we have enough experience to really know, but my cautionary note on, I think it is the top of page three, about marketing, there is great expertise in marketing and public relations in our private sector, extraordinary, the best in the world. But public diplomacy is not like selling toothpaste. So we need to take that expertise, particularly the kind of surveys that they have expertise in conducting, and realize that that is an expertise that is important to public diplomacy, but it is only an element in our arsenal and you can take it too far.

I was concerned, for example, what I heard mentioned earlier about strengthening the White House's role in public diplomacy. That seems natural, yet public diplomacy is not selling the foreign policy du jour of an Administration. Administrations come and go. Presidents come and go. But what we are talking about, as you heard before, in part is long-term investment and building the relationships with the foreign publics. Sometimes that only will pay off in a generation or two.

So I think it is an interesting step. It can be a very positive step. I just give you the cautionary note that I explain more fully in my testimony here today.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

Ambassador Bagley, in your testimony, you recommended that the State Department should review its public diplomacy area office staffing structure to determine if the current arrangement is functioning optimally. In your experience, can you please explain this issue in a little more detail?

Ms. BAGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, the area offices, as the previous panel of State Department officials has already noted,

come from the 1999 merger where they basically—my view—kind of plunked the USIA structure into the State Department without, I think, a lot of thought as to whether it would really work well. So you have a PD office within, say, EAP Asia, and the PD officer reports to the DAS, the Deputy Assistant Secretary, and then to the Assistant Secretary nominally, but then really reports to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Policy. So while he or she is working within that area office, he is not really responsible to that office in itself. He or she is responsible to the Under Secretary.

So it makes for a kind of difficult arrangement because from what we have found talking to a lot of these PD officers, they don't really feel that they are part of the policy formulation. Although they report to the Deputy Assistant Secretary, they don't really feel that they are really part of the team because ultimately they are reporting to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy.

So it is an amalgam that doesn't, I don't think, seem to work, although on this particular point, I am speaking for myself. The Commission has not taken a position on it. Basically, on the Commission, we have each had differing positions and we came to the conclusion that it needed to be looked at again. It needs to be analyzed. Perhaps it is not working. Perhaps you don't even need a PD officer in the area offices. It might be better to have them in on the country desk where all the policy formulation begins.

The bottom line is if you want to integrate the PD function into the State Department, we are not doing a very good job within that context. So I think it needs to—and the Commission's recommendation is that we need to look at it. The Congress needs to look at it. The State Department needs to review it to see if this is really an effective use of the public diplomacy officer.

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you very much for that.

I wanted to follow up with anybody from the panel who wishes to comment, whether you agree with Ambassador Bagley's comment about the public diplomacy area offices. Ms. Freiberg.

Ms. FREIBERG. Yes, Senator. I do think there needs to be some clarification of what these relationships are. I would like to suggest that the PD area offices report to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and make it that simple, although I realize none of this is simple at all. I think when you are being reviewed by one set of offices and you are getting your policy direction and your resources from another office, it can make life confusing. Although there may be Foreign Service officers in this room who would disagree with me on that, it is the feed back I have received from many practitioners. As I said in my testimony we need to strengthen the role of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy.

Senator AKAKA. Any further comments on this?

[No response.]

Well, thank you very much. I just want to ask you for your top three recommendations for improving the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy. It is not that simple, is it?

Ms. BAGLEY. Could I answer?

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Bagley.

Ms. BAGLEY. I think for the Commission, our top three priorities would be, first, training at FSI. We should do a better job of train-

ing our PD officers. We are recommending that there be a substantive training course of 9 months or so at FSI, the Foreign Service Institute, that would be similar to the one that they give to the economics officers, which is very highly regarded. So that is our first point.

Second point, outreach. We need to build PD outreach into the standardized Employment Evaluation Report (EER), so that we actually know that in the work requirements, there is a requirement for communications skills. That would encourage or incentivize the public diplomacy officer to actually do more communications and develop those skills because he or she would be evaluated on that as part of their work requirement.

And finally, PD area offices. As Mr. Chairman, you already dealt with and asked the question both of the previous panel and of us, we do need to undertake an honest zero-based assessment of the PD area offices to see if they are functioning optimally, or if they are not, how they should function. We have some ideas about that, but we are not making a judgment as to whether it works. We just think it should be reevaluated.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Senator, your question took me back a little bit, but I will try to take a stab at it. I heard Secretary Glassman elsewhere today say we spend basically the same amount on the Broadcasting Board of Governors as we do on public diplomacy. Broadcasting is important, but I think more resources are needed for other forms or methods of delivering public diplomacy.

Second, I think that the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs funds should be put in the hands of your public diplomacy officers in the regions.

I believe that—third, I would say that more of the USAID programs, development programs, ought to have integrated within them the objectives of trying to bring practical experience in democracy and pluralism to the foreign publics as an integral part of those USAID programs. That might be my top three.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Ms. Schuker.

Ms. SCHUKER. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say three points, and this relates to some of the other comments already made. First, is the understanding that public diplomacy has a long-term responsibility, that it is not just a byproduct or related to specific short-term policy goals. I think this is where we have been running into a lot of trouble during certainly these last years in terms of both the perception abroad of the United States and the role of public diplomacy, and it has sort of become a handmaiden to policy, a specific policy, as opposed to informing the policy and having a longer-term profile. That gets back to values and principles.

Second, in terms of the organization of public diplomacy, I think there has got to be an understanding that there is a very unique function for public diplomacy. It is a two-way street. It is "to the street" and not directly to officials, which is the sort of meat and potatoes, so to speak, of the State Department. This is part of, I think, the confusion of the locus of public diplomacy, although I am not, as I said in my testimony, suggesting that it be totally changed

at this point, but it certainly needs to be addressed in terms of how the public diplomacy function is organized and respected.

And that gets directly to the money, the resources. It is very difficult for the State Department, I think, to run effective public diplomacy or to run public diplomacy effectively when its budget is basically a minuscule amount of what, for example, the Department of Defense has in terms of public diplomacy. If you are going to run an interagency function and are going to basically sit at the top of the food chain and be able to be effective interagency, you have to have both the imprimatur as well as the resources to put your money where your mouth is in terms of the work.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much.

May I ask that others of you please respond. We are going to send these questions to you and have you respond to this.

I want to thank all of you as witnesses today. You have proposed some exciting and new ideas to make our public diplomacy more effective. I hope the next President will give them priority. I plan to do what I can by bringing them directly to the new President's attention.

I want to thank you again. The hearing record will be open for one week for additional statements or questions other Members may have, and I have already told you I will send you my questions for your responses and look forward to your responses.

Thank you very much for being here, and this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:54 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Testimony of Christopher Midura, Acting Director, Office of Policy, Planning and Resources Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia
September 23, 2008

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Committee members, I wish to express my thanks for your invitation to testify here today on "Smart Power and Reform of the Public Diplomacy Bureaucracy." Secretary Rice and Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs James K. Glassman look forward to continuing our close cooperation with the Congress to strengthen public diplomacy's role as a vital national security priority.

The timing of this hearing investigating the relationship between "smart power" and public diplomacy is especially appropriate as we begin to make the transition between administrations. Under the direction of Under Secretary Glassman, we are reviewing, improving, and modernizing public diplomacy structures and programs in the State Department to build upon the government-wide public diplomacy leadership role assigned to the Under Secretary by the White House.

The term "smart power" implies two points of particular significance in this process. One is that the exercise of public diplomacy is indeed a show of power. It reflects the power of our culture, the power of our values, the power of our ideas. It is not merely a series of programs intended to convince foreign publics to like us, although that would certainly be optimal. Along with the "hard power" exercised by the military, the "soft power" of public diplomacy, as practiced by State, USAID, and strategic communications professionals at the Department of Defense, is an essential support in advancing U.S. interests abroad. The other implication is that, to be effective, the "soft power" of diplomacy must be carefully and intelligently applied to meet our foreign policy needs. That's the "smart" part.

Under Secretary Glassman has emphasized in several articles and interviews, as well as testimony before Congress, that we are engaged in a war of ideas with violent extremists who seek to attack the United States and its allies and to recruit others to do the same. Public diplomacy professionals are being called upon for a renewed commitment to ideological engagement, designing programs and spreading messages to directly confront the ideology of violent extremism as practiced by al Qaeda, the FARC in Colombia, and other organizations. We wish to amplify credible voices of moderation and to discourage potential recruits from joining terrorist movements. In the words of noted smart power proponent Professor Joseph Nye, "We cannot win unless the number of people the extremists are recruiting is lower than the number we are killing and deterring." We can do this by combining our programs and

technology to help build real and virtual networks among groups in affected societies who reject the terrorists' worldview, with a special focus on young people.

Under Secretary Glassman has sought to re-orient public diplomacy toward these ends. Perhaps most visible has been his coordination of strategic communication in the interagency through his chairmanship of the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC). The PCC comprises civilian and military communications leaders from the Departments of State, Defense and the Treasury, the National Security Council, the Intelligence Community, and other agencies.

As a complement to the work of the PCC that he leads, another of Mr. Glassman's interagency initiatives has been the creation of the Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC), which serves as a subject-matter advisory group for the Under Secretary and members of the PCC on topics relating to the war of ideas. The GSEC also coordinates with the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and produces a daily Counterterrorism Communications Alert. GSEC staff are active-duty military and civilians from the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director is a Senior Foreign Service Officer.

Since Under Secretary Glassman joined the State Department in June, he has convened the PCC three times, and has formally established four sub-PCCs, whose activities are coordinated by the GSEC. The four are "Harnessing and Connecting Expertise," "Research and Intelligence," "Metrics and Polling," and "Countering Violent Extremism at the Grassroots." Through the work of the PCC and its sub-PCCs, we are strengthening cooperation among government agencies to coordinate our messaging and take maximum advantage of available resources.

I would like to highlight here the increasingly sophisticated and coordinated way the State Department employees are working with their Defense Department and military colleagues around the globe. Perhaps in the distant past it was possible to separate and isolate the tasks of the military from those of the diplomat; today the emblematic projection of American government abroad is the Provincial Reconstruction Team – a flexible mix of military capabilities with our civilian-directed development, public diplomacy, information, education, economic and social tools. And if you looked in the door at the State Department earlier this week, you would have seen the first-ever worldwide synchronization conference – hosted at State and organized by the two departments – for the combined State and DOD strategic communication leadership. I think it is a glimpse of the future.

The Office of the Under Secretary has expanded two of its existing programs to increase our available public diplomacy resources and the reach of our messages. Our Office of Private Sector Outreach for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs recently conducted an innovative "U.S. Marketing College" with the participation of private-sector marketing experts from top U.S.

companies such as eBay, Novartis, and Kraft. This intensive four-day course, hosted by the Foreign Service Institute, equipped officials from across the interagency with relevant marketing strategies to employ in the war of ideas and for other public diplomacy programs. Reviews of this program were so successful, we plan to hold a second U.S. Marketing College in January 2009.

We are also creating new regional media hubs in overseas media centers. In addition to our hubs in London, Dubai and Brussels (the former two serve pan-Arab media located in those cities, the latter serves pan-European media in the EU capital), we are currently opening a smaller hub in Johannesburg and planning to open a full-scale hub in Tokyo during the next fiscal year. Others are under study. These regional hubs enable the quick dissemination of information to foreign correspondents based in international media centers and facilitate communication between U.S. officials and multiple foreign media outlets.

One of the most prominent recommendations in the 2003 report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, which was chaired by Amb. Edward P. Djerejian and of which now-Under Secretary Glassman was a member, was that public diplomacy needed to establish a "new culture of measurement ... within all public diplomacy structures." This criticism was echoed by the General Accountability Office soon thereafter. The Department has since made major strides in establishing rigorous performance measurement and evaluation standards. The Evaluation Division of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) has been a leader in this field for several years by demonstrating the impact of exchange programs in building mutual understanding between Americans and people around the world.

In order to bring evaluation and measurement for the rest of public diplomacy up to ECA's high standard, the Under Secretary recently established an Evaluation and Measurement Unit (EMU) charged with developing performance measurement instruments and executing detailed evaluations of the implementation and effectiveness of all State Department public diplomacy programs overseas. The Mission Activity Tracker, a comprehensive database employed by our overseas posts and domestic bureaus to record outputs of public diplomacy activities, enabling us to better evaluate PD programs, is already in widespread use. We intend to boost our investment in the work of the EMU, enabling us to document the value of public diplomacy programming to the Department, OMB, the Congress, and the American taxpayer.

Winning the war of ideas depends on getting the right information to the right people using the right technology. Our Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) has been a leader in taking public diplomacy to the Internet through its America.gov website. This site features six language versions (Arabic, Chinese, French, Persian, Russian and Spanish), discussion groups, video content, and special events such as the Democracy Video Challenge, in

which foreign citizens are encouraged to upload their own video creations to complete the phrase, "Democracy is...." The Digital Video Challenge is also a good example of public-private cooperation; among our partners in the venture are NBC Universal, New York University's Tisch School of the Arts, and the Motion Picture Association of America.

IIP's Digital Outreach Team blogs extensively on U.S. policy and society in Arabic, Persian and Urdu, giving us a voice in the growing realm of on-line conversations. The bureau has also revamped infocentral.gov, a "one-stop" source of information for U.S. foreign affairs and security officials working with the public. The bureau is now expanding into diverse areas such as on-line professional networks, social media, virtual worlds, podcasting, and mobile technologies.

In addition to its traditional public diplomacy role of briefing and arranging programs and media events for foreign correspondents in Washington, our Bureau of Public Affairs (PA) runs our Rapid Response Unit, a 24/7 global media monitoring office that analyzes how the U.S. is being covered in foreign media. The Rapid Response daily report highlights media trends on hot issues and provides quick messaging to officials in Washington and overseas. PA's Foreign Press Center in Washington has organized an innovative program embedding 50 prominent foreign journalists with U.S. media outlets covering the U.S. elections. The Washington and New York Press Centers have also organized reporting trips for over 1000 foreign correspondents to several major primary elections and caucuses and both political conventions. They will host journalists for the four presidential debates and visits to several election battleground states.

While global ideological engagement has necessitated greater focus on expanding and updating our information programs, we also remain committed to maintaining the excellence of the programs managed by our Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, which have for years formed the heart and soul of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. The Fulbright Program remains the unchallenged world leader among academic exchange programs, while the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) brings to the United States each year approximately 4,000 foreign professionals in a wide variety of fields for invaluable exposure to our culture, our society, and our policies. IVLP alumni have included 277 foreign heads of state. We will be looking to expand ECA's English teaching and youth scholarship programs in the coming months to target successor generations of youth, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds and/or countries of strategic priority for the United States.

As most of our resources are invested in people, the Under Secretary's office takes a direct interest in the career development of our public diplomacy personnel. In order to ensure that we are putting the right people in the right public diplomacy jobs, we have raised our profile in the Foreign Service assignments system. In cooperation with the Bureau of Human

Resources and the regional bureaus, the Under Secretary was recently given the authority to approve all public diplomacy assignments worldwide.

To be effective, our people must also receive the right training: The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) offers public diplomacy training to between 1,250 and 1,500 students a year in Washington, overseas, and on-line. These courses prepare State personnel for public diplomacy positions overseas; assist others in better understanding public diplomacy and the importance of outreach to foreign audiences; and provide training and professional development for Locally Employed Staff in our overseas missions. FSI has developed four new public diplomacy distance learning courses in FY-07 and FY-08, with five more planned for launch in FY-09.

To conclude, the modernization of public diplomacy structures and programs is a top priority of the Department and Under Secretary Glassman. We particularly look forward to welcoming our International Information Programs and Educational and Cultural Affairs bureaus to Foggy Bottom next year when they move to newly constructed space across the street from the Truman Building. We are also working in ever-closer coordination with our interagency colleagues, particularly our strategic communication colleagues at the Department of Defense. With the support of Congress, we will continue to expand, carefully target, and rigorously evaluate our public diplomacy activities to meet the challenges of global ideological engagement. Thank you for your attention, and my colleagues and I would be glad to answer your questions at this time.

Testimony of the Honorable Douglas Bereuter

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia
U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

"A Reliance on Soft Power – Reforming the Public Diplomacy Bureaucracy

September 23, 2008

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. As I understand the focus of this Subcommittee's inquiry, it builds upon the widespread recognition that America needs to increase its public diplomacy efforts, and especially to make its public diplomacy far more effective than it is today. You start, I am told, with the broadly supported premise, based upon overwhelming evidence, that a major reorientation of American public diplomacy may be needed, perhaps involving administrative and structural reforms within our government. I fully support your inquiry and applaud your energetic effort to examine and act on this very important public policy issue.

Mr. Chairman, I will not neglect your invitation to give you my thoughts on the subject of desirable administrative and structural reforms. The views I offer today are not the position of the Asia Foundation; they are my own thoughts on this subject offered to you as a former 26-year Member of Congress who served 20 years through 2004 on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 years addressing national security issues through service on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and for the last four years as President and CEO of The Asia Foundation – the premier nongovernmental development organization working in Asia. I feel it is my duty, however, to first tell you today, as a citizen with this experience base, that although administrative and structural changes in the bureaucracies of our important departments and agencies surely can bring positive changes in the effectiveness of American public diplomacy, a more fundamental reorientation of our public diplomacy effort and emphases is far more important. So the first part of my testimony today will focus on the nature and importance of that basic and crucial reorientation.

Prime Public Diplomacy Assets: The American People and the American Experience

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, there is a common mistake or misunderstanding repeated over and over again when our government or advisory groups seek to improve American public diplomacy. It is the failure to recognize that while bureaucratic reorganization and better management practices can bring improvements, the most important American public diplomacy assets are: (a) the American people, and relatedly, (b) the opportunities for foreigners to see demonstrated, or otherwise experience, those characteristics of our country and our people which the world traditionally has most admired. The world has admired American openness, system of

justice, popular culture (generally), and unmatched environment of opportunity. They admire, above all, the practices, principles, and values undergirding American traditions of democracy, pluralism, rule of law, and tolerance, which Americans embrace as universally applicable. It is only when we seem to have strayed from these principles, practices and values, that we disappoint the world and are seen as hypocritical.

It is reported that the first use of the term public diplomacy was by Edmund Gullion in 1965 in conjunction with the establishment of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. In his remarks at the time he urgently insisted that public diplomacy, defined as being aimed at influencing the public (the citizens) of other countries was "beyond traditional diplomacy" to include not just "the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries" but also "the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another.... [and] the transnational flow of information and ideas."[1]

Today, while there is still some confusion and certainly a misplaced sense of priorities and ineffective practices in public diplomacy by the U.S. Government, it fortunately is increasingly recognized and accepted that public diplomacy cannot just be regarded as the job of the nation's diplomats, high-level State Department spokesmen, or other governmental officials. A major impediment to improving America's public diplomacy has been the prevalence of the view that improving our nation's image and influence abroad is primarily a direct governmental function. One might say, to emphatically make a point, that the implementation of effective public diplomacy is too important to be solely or even primarily the responsibility of governmental officials. Instead, public diplomacy should be implemented under a coherent, coordinated strategy not only through governmental officials and direct programs but also through a broad collaborative effort involving the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other parts of the private sector, and the efforts of individual citizens.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, my detailed examination of recommendations of eight high-level task forces, commissions, and committees convened in the aftermath of 9/11 found a very strong consensus that it is in our national interest not only to emphasize public diplomacy, especially in the Islamic World, but also that such an effort should be implemented with a very major role for the nongovernmental organizations, credible high-profile individual Americans, and the private sector in general. Nearly all of these reports also strongly emphasized the importance of utilizing the soft power tools, with creativity and flexibility. They also concluded that these tools and practices are much better developed in parts of the NGO community and private enterprises. Ambassador Edward Djerejian, then Chairman of the State Department's Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, for example, urged the U.S. Government to collaborate with American businesses and non-profit organizations "that have the world's best talent and resources in communications and

[1] Charles Wolf, Jr. and Brian Rosen, "Public Diplomacy: How to Think About and Improve It," Occasional Paper (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2004) 3.

research" and that "the U.S. recognize that the best way to get our message across is directly to the people – rather than through formal diplomatic channels."[2]

I would offer one cautionary note about the use of American business expertise in public diplomacy, i.e., that sector's vaunted reputation in marketing or public relations. For the most part, this frequently cited solution to our public diplomacy problems advocated by many very respected organizations and individuals, I respectfully suggest, is not a good answer – the wrong remedy and in general a poor use of funds. In fact, employing these public relations tactics for public diplomacy often is counterproductive, for its product is perceived abroad as only simplistic propaganda. For an examination of this issue, I urge you and your staff to generally consider to excellent 2004 RAND Corporation Occasional Paper by Charles Wolf Jr. and Brian Rosen, entitled "Public Diplomacy: How to Think About and Improve It." It is a thoughtful analysis of the questionable validity of comparing or conflating private good and public (or collective) goods in implementing public diplomacy. They conclude that: "It is fanciful to believe that redeploying American 'marketing talent'... to launch a new Middle East television network, would significantly diminish the prevalence of anti-Americanism."[3]

The creation of high-level public diplomacy positions by both the Clinton and Bush administrations undoubtedly were logical steps, especially after the elimination of the U.S. Information Agency. Yet, while there have been some considerable effort and resources expended, since then notable successes are hard to find. I would suggest that advocacy of American foreign policy objectives abroad to advance an administration's foreign policy initiatives and goals du jour, even if that was the best use of public diplomacy, is not like selling toothpaste. Expertise in public relations, commercial marketing techniques, or mastery of the art of political spinning may have their place in the arenas of advocacy or politics, but the practice of effective public diplomacy is something quite different.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, in efforts to improve American public diplomacy, I believe we should consider the advice of one of our country's noted scholars and pragmatic advisors on the subject, Dr. Nancy Snow of the Newhouse School of Public Communications at Syracuse University. Among her cogent ten suggestions for revitalizing U.S. public diplomacy, you will find these very relevant comments:

(a) Public diplomacy cannot hail primarily from the U.S. government or any official source of information. The world misunderstands and increasingly resents us because it is our President and our top government officials whose images predominate in explaining U.S. public policy. It's the American people, however, who can better initiate personal contact with the foreigners whose support and understanding we need on the stage of world opinion. The American public is the best ad campaign going for America. We've got

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[2] Edward P. Djerejian, Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World (Washington: The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, 2003) 14-15.

[3] Charles Wolf, Jr. and Brian Rosen, "Public Diplomacy: How to Think About and Improve It," Occasional Paper (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2004) 5.

the greatest diversity in people and culture and it shows in our receptiveness to learning, our generosity, and our creativity.

....

(b) Political leadership in Washington keeps scratching its head wondering why the leading country in the world in advertising, public relations, and marketing cannot seem to do an effective job on itself. It is precisely because we conduct U.S. public diplomacy from an uptown, top-down, and inside-the-beltway perspective that we aren't making headway. We need to get back to basics that people hold in common – friendliness, openness, and putting people at ease. We need to listen and learn rather than dictate and declare. The U.S. holds no patent on democracy or freedom: we are part of a larger and majority neighborhood of global and civic-minded nations that cherish the democratic process and democratic ideas over tyranny and dictatorial control.

....

(c) We need to continue to tell our stories to one another and encourage people-to-people dialogue and exchange – efforts based on mutual learning and mutual understanding. What this means is a Marshall Plan for International Exchange.

....

(d) Any effective public diplomacy must establish greater outreach with NGOs. Global civic society is immersed in American-oriented values of democracy building, human rights promotion, and social, political, and economic growth and development ....[4]

Indeed, of course, there is admittedly nothing new about the U.S. Government conducting some of its public diplomacy programs through non-governmental organizations and the other parts of the private sector. We just need to recognize the value of their capabilities and emphasize and use them more.

In fact, a very significant share of the development programs of The Asia Foundation I now lead, implemented in nearly two dozen Asian countries, in part with funds from USAID, State, foundations, and other democratic countries, are also properly characterized as public diplomacy. With these funds, we implement a wide variety of educational and cultural exchanges, study tours in America and Asia; support Track II dialogues, provide library resources and educational materials, parliamentary assistance programs, intercultural and interfaith dialogues, fellowships, media exchange and training programs, American studies programs, to name only some of the more effective programs. Also, working with Muslims populations and Muslim groups for more than 35 years in several Asian countries gives us unmatched credibility. In short, we use

[4] Nancy Snow, "How to Build an Effective U.S. Public Diplomacy," ed. Jeff Chapman, 5 May 2007 <http://home.earthlink.net/~jde24/USpublicPolicy.htm>. Dr. Snow has served as a public diplomacy advisor to the U.S. advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations committee among other such roles.

American public and private donor resources to implement a whole range of governmental and NGO programs that provide the recipients with practical experience in democracy, pluralism, tolerance, citizen participation and other activities that involve or re-enforce principles and values which Americans embrace as universally applicable. In fact, for the last three years, I have directed some of our annual congressional appropriation to be set aside for high-impact demonstration programs in public diplomacy.

In November 6, 2007, the CSIS Commission on Smart Power released its report. It was chaired by Richard Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. with a distinguished panel which included two members from both the Senate and House, plus former Senator Nancy Kassebaum. Their report emphasized that the American public, drawn from every corner of the world, constitutes the United State's greatest public diplomacy asset, especially those citizens who beneficially volunteer, study, work and travel abroad – if their conduct reflects those things which foreigners have long admired about Americans and our country.[5]

Fortunately, the instincts and tradition of American volunteerism is still very much alive, and the personal and institutional philanthropy of America is unmatched. Also, unmatched are the strengths and diversity of this country's nongovernmental community and private sector; their skills are grossly under-utilized by our government, but available and better than ever. They need to be unleashed and financially supported as the public diplomacy force that is needed to regain America's friends and influence. The American people and the positive features of the whole American experience – observed abroad and here at home, by example or direct contact – are our two greatest assets; they make our case better than any governmental agency ever can. Governments' primary role should be to facilitate the use of those two matchless assets.

Various Proposed Administrative and Structural Changes for Public Diplomacy

Now, Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, I will give you my thoughts about administrative or structural reforms. In preparing the remarks, I first reviewed, again, three reports to Congress on public diplomacy from the U.S. Government Accountability Office and two issued in the last five years by the Congressional Research Service, a 2003 report by a task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and a report of the Defense Science Board.[6] The following is a summary of my reactions to the major

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[5] Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., A Smarter, More Secure America – Report of the CSIS Commission on Smart Power (Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2007).

[6] WORKS CONSULTED

Susan B. Epstein, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission Recommendations," CRS Report for Congress (Washington: The Library of Congress - Congressional Research Service, 1 May 2006).

Susan B. Epstein and Lisa Mages, "Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past Recommendations," CRS Report for Congress (Washington: The Library of Congress - Congressional Research Service, 31 October 2005). The report includes a matrix prepared after a survey of 29 articles and studies (Table 1, p. CRS-4 through 6.)

Jess T. Ford, U.S. Public Diplomacy – State Department Efforts Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges, GAO-06-707T (Washington: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 3 May 2006).

categories of recommendations contained in reviews of past recommendations by the Congressional Research Service.

1. Create a New Agency for Public Diplomacy. This is, of course, one of the bolder recommendations, and its support and repeated mention probably isn't surprising as Congress considers a full range of reforms or improvements. What makes this proposal especially controversial, no doubt, is that it actually is a rather direct repudiation of the 1999 decision to eliminate the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) as a separate agency and merge its functions into the State Department. In my judgment, that clearly was indeed a mistaken element in a compromise between the leadership at the time of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Administration leaders who wanted other elements in that agreement and an improved climate between the Clinton Administration and Congress; I said so at the time, and many others did, too.

   You will continue to hear energetic defense of that change from past and present foreign policy leaders in the Executive Branch, but that change, along with decreased attention and resources in the post-Cold War environment, dramatically downgraded the public diplomacy programs of our government. The claims of increased and closer coordination and integration of public diplomacy into the foreign policy operations of the State Department, even in their exaggerated form, simply don't compensate for the loss of USIA. Eliminating the USIA was a bad decision; probably the most basic decision of the Subcommittee is whether you want to recommend recreating it in some form or instead can find a less dramatic way to restore and employ the expertise and programs downgraded or lost with the demise of the USIA. No doubt any Secretary of State would resist quite vehemently a complete congressional reversal of the 1999 legislation. Thus the choice is probably to find an alternative way to restore and build upon what has been lost with the elimination of USIA and the downgrading of resources for other public diplomacy programs without actually reconstituting the agency as it did exist.

2. Reorganize the Public Diplomacy Effort at the State Department
   The past recommendations of the CRS (update report of October 31, 2005) and the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force contain a number of such recommendations of value which could be implemented for improved coordination and effectiveness, including:

Jess T. Ford, U.S. Public Diplomacy – Strategic Planning Efforts Have Improved, but Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges, GAO-07-795T (Washington: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 26 April 2007).

William J. Hybl et al., Getting the People Part Right – A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of U.S. Public Diplomacy (Washington: The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2008).

Peter G. Peterson et al., Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy – Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003).

U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy – Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research, GAO-07-904 (Washington: U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 2007).

(a) restoring the independent reporting and budget channels lost during the USIA merger, as suggested by the Heritage Foundation;
(b) upgrading the status and reporting lines of personnel positions related to public diplomacy
(c) overhauling the recruitment process to bring in more people with public diplomacy skills and orientation, including persons which have professional skills in specific countries or regions;
(d) recruiting NGO and other private sector experts on public diplomacy for non-career appointments abroad; and
(e) placing more responsibility and clout for public diplomacy in the Department's regional bureaus.

However, while these and other changes will bring improvements and are worth doing, they will not bring the fundamental improvement in U.S. public diplomacy which is desirable. They are largely administrative fixes that are not the necessary fundamental change in the limited capacity and misdirected public diplomacy orientation and delivery system of the State Department.

3. Greater Government-wide Coordination of American Public Diplomacy
Some of these recommendations focus on interagency coordination and the formulation of a public diplomacy strategy, and others on State Department-White House coordination and collaboration. There are, of course, advantages in the former, but the very real downside is the bureaucratic difficulty and resultant lack of timely responsiveness thereby created, and in the dilution of the State Department's primary responsibility in our government for public diplomacy. A closer working relationship of State and the White House on public diplomacy programs and policy might sound natural and attractive, but the very real downside will be an even greater direct tie of public diplomacy to the transient White House foreign policy messages of the day, with the increased perception abroad that such efforts are only politics and propaganda lacking public credibility or relevance.

4. Create a Center for Global Engagement (CGE) (A proposal of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communications.)[7]
This is an even more comprehensive proposal than the proposal for a Corporation for Public Diplomacy (CPD). It is bold and indeed staggeringly idealistic to imagine its creation. It suffers, I believe, from the same downsides as the CPD proposal and #3 above with its proposal to focus on governmental reorganization to create more government-wide coordination or on coordination and collaboration between State and the While House. However, some of the desirable responsibilities proposed for the CGE might well be created or re-enforced in the National Security Council.

5. Creation of a Not-for-Profit Corporation for Public Diplomacy (CPD)

[7] William Schneider, Jr. and Vincent Vitto, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2008).

This big, bold proposal of the day seems to be based upon the Corporation for Public Broadcasting model. It has some of the same proponents as the two foregoing categories of suggested reforms. I find it difficult to believe that the Congress and Executive Branch would support this step to move the primary leadership role for public diplomacy outside a cabinet department of the Federal Government, even if it is labeled as supplementary to, or an implementation organ for, the State Department. If it only further fragments the responsibility and resources for public diplomacy, which I fear to be likely, its creation, even if possible, would be a mistake. Having said that, nevertheless such a dramatic reform may at a minimum show marginal gains for it could serve as a credible and attractive recruiter of effective voices from the NGO community, the private corporate sector, and influential persons from the media, entertainment, and academic worlds.

6. Increased Technology Use
   Of course, this is essential in the 21st Century world, but it is not a panacea.

7. International Broadcasting
   A number of recommendations from very reputable persons and groups focus on reorganizing and upgrading American international broadcasting efforts. There are various specific recommendations for improvements which are sensible and which should be adopted by administrative action or statutory change where necessary. However, our broadcast messages now have far less utility, effective reach, and persuasive power than many long-time advocates in the field would like to admit. Broadcasting can be an adjunct of some continued significance if properly refined, but the public diplomacy message delivered by the broadcast media doesn't come close to having the favorable impact of direct contact of the foreign public with the American people and the American experience and environment.

8. Establish an Independent Public Diplomacy Training Institute
   This proposal, from a Council on Foreign Relations Task Force, shouldn't be a high priority. No doubt it could bring a positive result, but my fundamental view, of course, is that a more effective public diplomacy will come from the existing highly qualified skill base relevant to public diplomacy which is already found in the American public and in the NGO or private sector community; it is primarily a matter of the governmental sector recognizing and better utilizing these skills and experience base. My view does not preclude more training for current or new foreign service officers, but the establishment of a separate institute is a drain on resources for a low return on the investment required.

9. Increased Financial and Human Resources for Public Diplomacy in the State Department
   Of course, this may be part of the answer for improved public diplomacy, but the number of personnel designated for public diplomacy duties in the U.S.

and abroad, with recent increases, is not insubstantial – if they really can devote their full time to those duties and understand that their personal direct delivery of public diplomacy should be relatively limited. However, they do need these resources and funds in their hands and under the budgetary control of their bureaucratic component within the State Department to effectively bring Americans and America to these members of the foreign public, and to bring carefully selected persons and groups from that foreign public to our country for education, training, and the American experience.

10. Increase Exchanges and Libraries
Of course, this is a very important part of enhanced American public diplomacy. These elements of our soft power should never have been downgraded or made less accessible. More funds and more effective use of fellowships, study programs, and exchanges, along with sending American volunteers abroad (Farmer-to-Farmer, Service Corps of Retired Executives, Peace Corps, etc.) are vital ways to bring Americans and the American experience to the foreign public we wish to influence.

With respect to the too few remaining U.S. libraries, be they in embassies or American Corners, today they are usually too inaccessible or are avoided for security reasons. Instead, a lesson could be learned from the Asia Foundation's Books for Asia program which now distributes over 1,000,000 books a year which are found in more than 40,000 locations throughout the Asia region. These books are donated by American publishers, but more U.S. funds for transportation would be a very valuable way to assist.

Conclusion

In concluding my testimony today, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, my primary message is to emphasize that for a truly effective public diplomacy effort, America must return to (and I do emphasize the words "return to"), reinforce, and remind people around the world by example, what they had especially admired about our country and people. It won't be accomplished by an improved governmental public relation campaign, by governmental reorganization, or only by adding more State Department public diplomacy officers in our embassies, consulates, or Washington, D.C. However, greater good will, respect, credibility, and support for our country can be regained. Changes in policies and emphases, a smarter variety of public diplomacy, and perhaps governmental reorganization are part of the answer. Yet the primary orientation of our effort must be to remind people abroad, and re-enforce by example and their direct experience, what they and their leaders traditionally have liked and admired most about Americans and our country. We have done that well in the past; we can and must do it again.

"A Reliance on Smart Power: Reforming the Public Diplomacy Bureaucracy":

Testimony of
U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy
Vice Chairman (Ambassador) Elizabeth Bagley
before the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs' Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia
September 23, 2008, 2:30 p.m.
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Rm. 342

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Voinovich, Distinguished Members of this Subcommittee:

Thank you very much for the privilege to appear before you at this hearing on "Reforming the Public Diplomacy Bureaucracy." I am honored to represent the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy this afternoon and to brief the Subcommittee on our 2008 report, entitled, "Getting the People Part Right: A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of U.S. Public Diplomacy."

At the outset, Commission Chairman William Hybl and I would like to ask the Chairman's permission to enter the entirety of our report into the Congressional Record as the Commission's "prepared testimony." Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me now move directly into the substance of my opening statement.

Just over a year ago, the Commission reviewed the extensive recent literature on U.S. public diplomacy and determined that few if any observers had ever sought to "look under the hood" and study the impact of internal human resources practices and structures on our Nation's efforts to communicate with foreign publics. We decided to explore this basket of issues, our thinking being that, in the final analysis, people are the key to the success of our Nation's public diplomacy. Over a one-year period, the Commission met with scores of State Department officials and outside experts on PD human resources issues and we learned a great deal in the

process. Our 2008 report contains our findings and recommendations. In this short statement, I would like to highlight our key conclusions. Later, I'll be happy to elaborate as necessary and answer any questions Members of the Subcommittee might have.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we found that the State Department:

- recruits smart people, but not necessarily the *right* people, for the PD career track,
- tests candidates on the wrong knowledge sets,
- trains its officers in the wrong skills, and
- evaluates those officers mostly on the wrong tasks.

In terms of personnel structures:

- State has a PD bureaucracy in Washington that hasn't been critically examined since the 1999 merger and that may or may not be functioning optimally,
- its overseas public affairs officers are spending the majority of their time administering rather than communicating with foreign publics, and
- meaningful integration of public diplomacy into State Department decision-making and staffing remains elusive.

In short, Mr. Chairman, we're not "getting the people part right." Let me now take up each of these points in a little more detail.

On **recruitment**, very simply, the Department of State makes no special effort to recruit individuals into the public diplomacy (or "PD") career track who would bring into the Foreign Service experience or skills specifically relevant to the work of communicating with and influencing foreign publics. No serious presidential or Congressional campaign, or private-sector company, would hire communications personnel who have no background in communications, but to a large degree, that is exactly what the United States Government is doing. We need to change that.

Turning to the Foreign Service **examination process**, we found that the Foreign Service Officer Test and Oral Assessment do not specifically test for public diplomacy instincts and communication skills. Since we neither recruit for, nor test for, these skills, it is thus possible for candidates to enter

the PD career track – and, for that matter, the other four Foreign Service career tracks – without having any documented proficiency in core PD-related skills. This is problematic. The Commission believes we need to modify the exam – particularly the Oral Assessment – to include more substantive PD content.

In terms of **public diplomacy training**, though there have clearly been some improvements in recent years, a number of conspicuous, and serious, blind-spots persist. For one, we make virtually no effort to train our PD officers in either the science of persuasive communication or the nuts and bolts of how to craft and run sophisticated message campaigns. The Commission believes we need to rectify this. We would like to see more substantive PD offerings at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, including a rigorous nine-month course analogous to the highly regarded one currently offered to economic officers.

With respect to the State Department's **employee evaluation report** (or "EER") form, the essential problem is that it lacks a section specifically devoted to PD outreach, and thus contains no inherent requirement that State Department employees actually engage in such outreach. Until it does, PD officers overseas will continue to spend the overwhelming majority of their time behind their desks administering, rather than out directly engaging foreign publics. The Commission wants to see outreach built into the EER form and we also want to see at least one substantive PD communication task built into the work requirements of every PD officer in the field. A one-line change in the EER form of the type we have proposed could result in thousands more outreach events per year than we are seeing at present. Now is the time to put direct outreach at the center of American public diplomacy – right where the current and previous Secretaries of State have said they believe it should be.

Let me now turn to the **public diplomacy area offices**. At present, the mechanism by which public diplomacy considerations are ostensibly brought into State Department policymaking is the PD area office – a self-standing office within the regional bureau. The Commission looked at this structure and concluded that though PD now has a higher profile within the State Department than it did some years ago, the jury is still out as to whether that higher profile has been translated into appreciable differences in policy outcomes. The current bureaucratic arrangement is anomalous in two ways: first, Washington-based PD officials take policy direction not

from the official to whom they *nominally* report – the under secretary for political affairs; but rather, from an official to whom they do *not* formally report – namely, the under secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs; second, PD is the only substantive function not permanently represented on the country affairs desk – the locus of Department policymaking. We think it is time to revisit the current arrangement to see if it is working as it should.

With regard to the role of **public affairs officers** (or "PAOs"), particularly at large posts, the Commission was surprised to find that, notwithstanding the job title, most PAO responsibilities were inwardly, not outwardly, oriented. In short, our PAOs are essentially administrators, not communicators. The Commission recognizes that program administration is an important component of public diplomacy that will always be a part of the job. Nonetheless, we would like to see the Department take a critical look at the PAO position, particularly at large posts, to see if these senior officers are playing the role they ought to be playing and if this expensive managerial layer is cost-effective and adding value.

Finally, a few words about the **integration of public diplomacy officers into State Department staffing**. The stated goal of the 1999 merger of the USIA into the State Department was to integrate PD considerations, and PD personnel, more fully into the "mainstream" of State Department planning and policymaking. The Commission has found that this integration remains largely elusive, and, concomitantly, that PD officers continue to be significantly under-represented in the ranks of the Department's senior management. As we put it in the report, "The PD career track is no longer 'separate,' but it certainly is not yet 'equal.'" If the Department is to attract and retain first-rate PD officers, then it needs to demonstrate that these officers will be regarded as capable of holding senior Department positions.

Let me conclude. Getting the people part right can go a long way toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of America's outreach to the world. As our report suggests, there is much work to be done. That said, most of the needed fixes are feasible; with some political and bureaucratic will – and perhaps some Congressional attention – they can be made. We certainly hope they will be.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much again for this opportunity. I look forward to responding to the Subcommittee's questions. Thank you.

September 23, 2008

Testimony of Stephen M. Chaplin, Retired Senior Foreign Service Officer and Senior Advisor to the Stimson Center and American Academy of Diplomacy

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United State Senate

"A Reliance on Smart Power: Reforming the Public Diplomacy Bureaucracy"

Chairman Akaka, Senator Voinovich and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to testify on what can be done to improve Public Diplomacy's performance in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives.

I am a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer who served 32 years with the United States Information Agency. My final assignment was as a member of the USIA Steering Committee that worked on the consolidation of USIA with the State Department in 1999.

Today I represent the Advisory Group and the Working Group that prepared a report commissioned by the American Academy of Diplomacy and researched and written by the Stimson Center entitled, " A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness."

In the introduction to the report, which should be issued next month, Ambassadors Ronald Neumann, Thomas Pickering and Thomas Boyatt of the American Academy of Diplomacy, describe the study in the following terms:

> **" *This study is intended to provide solutions for and stimulate a needed conversation about the urgent need to provide the necessary funding for our nation's foreign policies. We need more diplomats, foreign assistance professionals and public diplomacy experts to achieve our national objectives and fulfill our international obligations. This study offers a path forward, identifying responsible and achievable ways to meet the nation's needs. It is our hope that the U.S. Congress and the next Administration will use this study to build the right foreign affairs budget for the future."***

Many fine studies published in recent years have recommended institutional reorganization or offered guidance on how U.S. foreign policy could be better conducted. This report is different. Its purpose is straightforward: determine what the Secretary of State requires in terms of personnel and program funding to successfully achieve American foreign policy objectives. Based on informed budgetary and manpower analyses, the Academy and Stimson report provides specific staffing and cost recommendations.

The Working Group on which I served conducted interviews with active duty and retired State Department officials and others, including budget, administrative and personnel specialists. The interviewees included Civil Servants, Foreign Service Officers and political appointees. The report is the result of months of internal discussions on how best to address the critical issues of staff and funding shortfalls.

My colleague Stanley Silverman, a long-time USIA comptroller, and I focused on Public Diplomacy (PD). This is what we found: despite recent increases, Public Diplomacy in the State Department is under-staffed and under-funded. The FY-2008 Public Diplomacy budget is $ 859 million. PD's current staff of 1,332 Americans, is 24 percent less than the comparable figure of 1,742 in 1986. According to State Department data, Public Diplomacy in FY-2008 had a 13 percent Foreign Service vacancy rate.

To have a reasonable chance of achieving its goals, PD needs to cover an employment shortfall; establish additional positions; obtain greater program funding and significantly expand training. I should add that, since this study dealt only with those resources controlled by the Secretary of State, we did not examine U.S. government civilian broadcasting as conducted by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). Broadcasting remains an important element of public diplomacy and I hope that it will continue to enjoy strong congressional support

There are several interesting definitions of Public Diplomacy, but in examining the State Department's Public Diplomacy mission we prefer the following: *"To understand, inform, engage and influence global audiences, reaching beyond foreign governments to promote greater appreciation and understanding of U.S. society, culture, institutions, values and policies."*

PD practitioners in the State Department devise comprehensive strategies, develop content and select the most effective communications vehicles for reaching diverse global audiences. Here I wish to stress two points. First, there are limits to what Public Diplomacy professionals can accomplish in influencing the attitudes of foreign audiences. This is especially true during a period of lengthy, sharp policy disagreements between the U.S. and other nations. Secondly, Public Diplomacy is not like a water spigot that can be turned on or off at will to produce instantaneous results. Rather, it involves a cumulative process. The PD officer must first establish credibility over time, in many ways, on the road to trust. It involves a long-term investment of time, consistent engagement and respectful dialogue.

Two decades ago some observers believed that a strong U.S. Public Diplomacy effort was no longer needed after the fall of communism in Europe. Outside of international relations circles, insufficient credit was given at the time to the vital role played by Public Diplomacy in winning the ideological battle with the Soviet Union. By the 1990s there was a decline in budgetary and other support to USIA and in 1999 USIA was consolidated into the State Department. Today,

according to international public opinion surveys, there is extensive dissatisfaction with many U.S. global policies. Some question the U.S.'s leadership capability on major global issues and others, including many allies, simply disagree with certain U.S. decisions.

However, these negative foreign public opinion survey results don't fully convey foreign attitudes towards the United States. The fact remains that more than any other nation the U.S. is looked to for ideas, innovation and opportunity. In most of the world, the U.S. is viewed as a society that recognizes individual initiative and rewards talent. Foreign student enrollment in U.S. universities is rising and the number of foreign-born technology specialists interested in working for U.S. companies exceeds available visas. Given these factors, PD can make a difference.

In a post 9/11 world the U.S. must remain vigilant about possible international terrorist attacks, keep a watchful eye on a resurgent Russia and a China seeking to assert its influence beyond Asia. Today, unlike 20 years ago, U.S. officials and most international affairs experts concur that a robust, credible, creative and timely global Public Diplomacy capability is essential to U.S. national security.

The nature of Public Diplomacy work is such that PD personnel and the activities they design, implement and evaluate are inseparable. PD personnel stationed at embassies and consulates continue to conduct traditional, successful programs such as exchanges, cultural and informational programs and media placement explaining U.S. policies and American society. These activities put PD personnel in touch with identifiable, established or rising opinion makers, people we deem important to reach with factual information and our views.

But in 2008 and beyond PD personnel--in the field and Washington--must reach out to broader audiences, the 20,30 and 40 year olds that are part of the "Internet Generation." Information on websites originating from Washington will certainly reach individuals unknown to individual country PD staffs. But this effort to reach the "Internet Generation" is vital since many of them are likely to be important to the U.S. because of their work, the people they know and their participation in national public policy debates and elections. In addition, our embassies utilize information provided by Washington on their own websites, information that is available to in-country Embassy contacts as well as self-selected audiences.

Consistently attracting and maintaining the attention of this 20-40 year old audience requires the development of credible, informative and, in many instances, entertaining Internet media. PD's multiple advocacy websites are engaging distinctive audiences. An example is the Digital Outreach Team, which involves PD staff in the Bureau of International Information Programs. Arabic-speaking personnel, who identify themselves as U.S. Government employees, participate in chat room discussions, particularly in the Islamic world, on U.S. policies and society.

The following Academy recommendations cover the breadth of PD's operations: educational and professional exchanges; advocacy of American foreign policies; and cultural and informational program explanations about American society, culture, institutions and values. Our recommendations span five fiscal years, beginning in FY-2010 and ending in FY-2014. These recommendations, which do not constitute an all-inclusive list of worthy activities, include:

- **Increase permanent American staffing by 487 and Locally Employed staff (i.e. Foreign Service National employees) by 369.**
- **Increase current academic exchanges by 100%; International Visitor grants involving future foreign leaders by 50% and youth exchanges by 25%.**
- **Expand capacity of PD English and foreign language advocacy websites aimed at experts, young professionals and youth and hire additional specialists in website design and program content.**
- **Establish 40 American Cultural Centers (or a mixture of ACCs and smaller Information Resource Centers) in order to broaden the U.S. daily cultural presence worldwide. The centers would only be established where suitable security conditions permit and programming interest warrants.**
- **Re-engage the autonomous pro-U.S. Binational Center network (of over 100 centers) in Latin America whose membership is desirous of closer U.S. ties**
- **Expand other programs, particularly overseas staff and operations to increase the effectiveness of Public Diplomacy.**

Staffing increases will cost $ 155.2 million annually by 2014 and program activities, $ 455.2 million. Over-all funding increases will total $610.4 million in 2014.

In addition, elsewhere in the report, there is a call for substantially increased training opportunities for PD personnel. PD Foreign Service Officers need more extensive training in: foreign languages and area studies; technology applications; public speaking and management of personnel and resources.

The quality of an organization depends on the skills and preparedness of its staff. Personal contact with host country nationals remains the most effective PD tool. To accomplish Mission objectives, embassy and consulate Public Affairs Officers must have appropriate staffing support and a limited administrative burden. They must be allowed to do what they came into the Foreign Service for, namely meet, cultivate, listen and learn from host country citizens while explaining the U.S. to them. Only through this process can thoughtful dialogue result in successful communication and mutual understanding.

The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center firmly believe that approval of the report's recommendations for personnel and funding increases will be significant factors in Public Diplomacy officers' efforts to attain greater success in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Statement of Ronna A. Freiberg
Former Director of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, USIA
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
"A Reliance on Smart Power – Reforming the Public Diplomacy Bureaucracy"
September 23, 2008

Chairman Akaka, Ranking Member Voinovich, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing on public diplomacy. As a veteran of USIA, I have a continuing interest in the effectiveness of the nation's public diplomacy organizational structure and its ability to adapt to the demands of the 21st century. My remarks today are based on personal experience, observation, and regular discussions with practitioners inside and outside of government. I do not represent the views of any organization.

Our need for a robust public diplomacy strategy and support structure has been influenced by a number of developments, beginning with the end of the bipolar world of the Cold War. The subsequent rise of new technologies, the growing involvement in international affairs by NGOS, businesses and other private sector actors, the ever-present challenge of terrorism and the evidence of widespread negative attitudes toward the United States have created a "perfect storm" in international relations.

It is no secret that our public diplomacy apparatus has not responded effectively to this perfect storm. To a large degree, the current failures of public diplomacy are more attributable to resentment of our policy decisions than to flaws in message or communications. Even the most effective public diplomacy cannot compensate for policy mistakes. That aside, recent experience teaches us that designing a structure to enable creative, consistent, and coherent outreach to foreign publics must be a high priority for the next administration.

In the past few years, numerous task forces have been created, reports issued, seminars organized, and hallway conversations held to address what should be done to reinvigorate and strengthen public diplomacy. Some of these proposals focus on reforming the existing bureaucratic structure. Alternatively, a number of respected organizations have suggested creating new independent organizations outside of government. Although many of these ideas have merit, it is still unclear how a new entity would interface with State and in particular, how it would operate in the field. For that reason, I have focused my testimony on ideas for improving the State Department's current public diplomacy structure and operations.

First, a word about definitions. Public diplomacy has come to mean different things to different persons. Other witnesses may articulate their own definitions. I have adapted the definition that appears in discourse and discussion most frequently: *Public diplomacy is the effort to understand, inform, engage and influence the attitudes and behavior of*

foreign publics in ways that support U.S. national security interests. Public diplomacy's fundamental tools are the dissemination of information through a range of media, both new and old; direct interaction with individuals and organizations through public and press outreach activities; and a broad range of academic, professional and citizen exchange programs. Public diplomacy includes aspects of international relations that go beyond official interactions between national governments. Or, as Joe Nye put it in his book Soft Power, public diplomacy entails not only "conveying information and selling a positive image," but also "building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies." The short-term and long-term aspects of public diplomacy can sometimes be at odds, and this affects how we approach reforms in the system.

Much has been said and written about why the Clinton administration and Congress approved a merger of USIA into the State Department in 1998, over USIA's objections. I will not rehash those arguments. Certainly the move gave the Department access to all the "instruments" of diplomacy, which was one of its goals. And my colleagues on the State Department panel can tell us whether the expected cost savings occurred and whether duplication of services and functions was reduced. USIA had already undergone reorganization, downsizing and streamlining before the integration occurred.

The merger may have been good for State but it has been less than successful for public diplomacy. The culture of the State Department, though improving, still treats public diplomacy as a stepchild in the policymaking process. Public diplomacy initiatives are under-funded. Many programs are dispersed through numerous government agencies and still lack coordination. The State Department bureaucracy limits our ability to act creatively and nimbly in a world of peer-to-peer communication, despite the efforts of seasoned public diplomacy officers in Washington and in the field.

Still, this is the situation the next President will inherit and I do not advocate recreating the old USIA. The question is, how do we make public diplomacy better?

I have seven recommendations for reform:

1. Clarify and strengthen the role of the Undersecretary. At the time of the reorganization, there was a great deal of debate about the authority of the new Undersecretary, specifically with regard to personnel and budget. In the end, the USIA area offices and field personnel went into State's regional bureaus. As a result, individuals in the field and the regional bureaus now report to regional assistant secretaries and up to the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, while they obtain resources, and theoretically, policy direction, from the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy. It would be more efficient, and serve the unique needs of public diplomacy, to have the regional public diplomacy offices report directly to the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy. One way to accomplish this would be to create a bureau that would house public diplomacy regional offices and connect to the corresponding field staff.

2. Significantly increase public diplomacy resources. If we are serious about our commitment to public diplomacy, we must find the resources to expand exchanges, augment the size and access to technology of the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP), restore some public diplomacy positions that were lost in the 1990s, increase the public diplomacy training provided to all cones of the foreign service, expand English teaching, increase funding for public opinion research, and restore some in-country facilities such as American Centers.

Priority attention should go to funding for the IIP bureau, personnel increases across-the-board, and exchanges.

Because of its critical responsibilities for production and transmittal of large amounts of material in a range of formats, including print and digital technologies, development of more sophisticated internet capability and demands for even more new media, IIP should receive more funding for technology and new positions. The leadership of the bureau should be raised to the Assistant Secretary level.

Technology, however, is not enough. Like the CIA, State was wrong in thinking technology could replace human contact as a means of furthering its objectives. In public diplomacy, personnel, programs and activities are inseparable. The Department needs to restore some of the positions that were cut during the streamlining of the last decade.

Finally, although funding for educational and cultural exchange has doubled in the last five years, more needs to be done. Most of the growth in resources has occurred in the Middle East, in response to crises there. We clearly need more funding for regions of highest priority, especially in language competencies and scholarships, but we must strengthen our exchange capability in a broader way to foster relationships in other regions and lay the groundwork to prevent crises, rather than responding after the fact. The International Visitor Program and Fulbright are examples of effective activities that should be expanded. Participants and alumni in exchange programs have become enormous public diplomacy assets, acting as third party interpreters of our value system and our political philosophy.

3. Reinstate the use of the country plan. Prior to 1999 when USIA was absorbed by State, the public diplomacy area offices developed detailed country plans, which defined communications strategies and set objectives for the country's exchange and information programs. Currently there is only a mission performance plan, which lacks specificity about communications or public diplomacy. The country plan, with approval by the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and the regional Assistant Secretary, will bring additional coherence to the policymaking process and encourage greater coordination between regional bureaus and public diplomacy field operations.

4. Develop a plan for private sector engagement. State has established an Office of Private Sector Outreach in the Undersecretary's office. This office should produce a detailed strategy for leveraging private sector resources and expertise to the next administration. Several outside organizations have proposed alternatives to locating this

function within the State Department, preferring instead to create an independent quasi-governmental or non-profit organization which would serve as a nexus for involvement in public diplomacy by the academic, research, business and non-profit communities. To create another new entity is a serious and costly undertaking and requires thorough discussion and debate. There can be no disagreement, however, that private sector input must be better utilized to support and enhance our ability to communicate with the world. Currently there is no central entity in the State Department, or elsewhere in government, to which private sector interest can be directed.

5. Bring coherence to the management of interagency coordination. Too many departments and agencies engage in public diplomacy or strategic communications activities and programs. The Department of Defense, for example, has resources and personnel devoted to this function, with little if any coordination with State. This results in inconsistent, uncoordinated messages and lack of accountability. Conflicting jurisdictions among Congressional committees can complicate the effort to coordinate.

The next administration should inventory these public diplomacy activities government-wide and consider consolidating some of them. At a minimum we should determine at what level and how they should be coordinated. The NSC Policy Coordinating Committee on Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy, headed by the Undersecretary of State, may need elevation in the policymaking hierarchy. One proposal is to institutionalize the role of the PCC by creating another council parallel in status to the NSC, the HSC, and the NEC in the White House, reporting directly to the President, responsible for interagency coordination of international communications. A decision on this obviously rests with the next President.

6. Strike the right balance between security needs and public access to programs abroad. If the role of the public diplomacy officer on the ground, at post, is to interact with and engage both media and citizen groups in his or her community, and if we are going to evaluate officers on the number of these interactions, then certainly our security requirements, though necessary, may hinder the effort. In some locations, the loss of publicly accessible facilities has resulted in moving some programs into the embassy, which often appears fortress-like and unapproachable. We need to redouble our efforts to maintain access to embassies, and assure the security of embassy staff as they move about in the community.

7. Launch a major government-wide international education effort. Both our national security and our international competitiveness demand that we devise a strategy to raise the importance of international education. Again, this will require interagency cooperation and the support of several committees of Congress. But, in my view, nothing is more important, because the value of long-term relationship building, in all its forms, far exceeds that of short-term message creation in the panoply of public diplomacy activities.

An international education strategy should have three components:

(a) We must attract and welcome more international students. The university environment fosters interaction with America's values, its culture, its political institutions, and most importantly, its unique citizenry. To accomplish this task, further streamlining of the visa process and a greater degree of coordination between government, academic institutions and the non-profit sector may be required. Many other countries have developed comprehensive national strategies to attract students. We are competing with those countries. Our lack of a strategy works to our disadvantage.

(b) We must find ways to make our own students more aware of the world beyond our borders. We know that for individuals to participate actively in a global economy, and for the country to increase its competitiveness, Americans must acquire not only math, science and technology skills, but also international knowledge, language competency, and cross-cultural skills. We also know that the U.S. cannot conduct effective diplomacy – public or otherwise – if our citizenry does not have an understanding of the people we are trying to influence.

Many of the reports on public diplomacy have recommended an increase in the number and diversity of U.S. undergraduates studying abroad and the diversity of the locations they choose. One option under consideration by Congress is the Paul Simon Study Abroad Foundation Act. The Simon Act creates a national study abroad program to send one million American undergraduates to diverse locations over a ten-year period through direct scholarships and improvements in on-campus capability to encourage such participation.

(c) The third component of a campaign to build long-term relationships through education will require summoning up the will to find more resources for the educational and cultural exchange programs of the State Department, as discussed earlier.

Conclusion

Our success in foreign policy depends on our ability to engage and influence foreign publics through the power of our values, our institutions, and our national character. It depends also on our commitment to understanding our audiences and building the kinds of long-term relationships that outlive the policies of any one administration or political party and sustain us during times of crisis.

Yes, it's about message. But it's also about people-to-people programs. Yes, it's about mastering communications techniques, message development and state of the art technologies. But it's also about translating our nation's positive attributes into realities others can experience. Too often people associate public diplomacy with public relations, which is only a piece of the puzzle. The art of salesmanship is transient; the art of fostering understanding and goodwill becomes the work of generations.

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee On Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia Hearing on "A Reliance on Smart Power--Reforming the Public Diplomacy Bureaucracy."

September 23, 2008

Testimony by (Hon.) Jill A. Schuker, President JAS International and Former Special Assistant to the President (William Jefferson Clinton) for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Public Affairs, National Security Council

Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for this opportunity to address the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia on the important organizational challenges facing public diplomacy in this new century.

Through your hearings on Smart Power, under Chairman Daniel Akaka's leadership, this Subcommittee has been in the forefront of forward thinking on this issue, and capturing the urgency and attention it deserves.

If I may, I would like to set the stage for my recommendations and reflections.

Twenty-First Century U.S. Public diplomacy is at a cross-roads of both challenge and opportunity and it will be a centerpiece issue for the next President and his Administration taking office in January 2009.

Globalization has created a more complex atmosphere for the conduct of traditional public diplomacy, while as this Subcommittee is acutely aware, new security concerns, unforeseen in earlier times, have erected both structural and virtual impediments to effective, traditional operations.

Balancing the necessary and the possible, the likely and the unthinkable, to create a more effective "smart power" posture for the United States, requires thinking anew.

Mistakes made in the wake of hasty pronouncements by some respected but ill-considered thought-leaders that history ended with the Cold War along with political compromises, enabled a rushed, "jerry-built" architecture for public diplomacy ten years ago that "threw the baby out with the bathwater" leaving gaps in our public diplomacy readiness and effectiveness. This, accompanied by subsequent rhetorical and substantive foreign policy missteps, assured public diplomacy to fall on hard times over these last years. Instead of creating a lifeline for information and dialogue, the conduct of public diplomacy became part of the problem.

Furthermore, the rapid growth and complexity in communications avenues and outlets, widely accessed by non-state actors, and no longer "organized" in news cycles, created a "24/7" intensity that demands immediacy, often eliminating thoughtful or quiet deliberation before public comment or action is expected. This creates a new challenge for formulating and explaining the national interest to a range of audiences.

All this has led to the need for a more nimble and cutting-edge public diplomacy shaped through a more sophisticated and flexible prism. It means identifying and insuring the right human resources, structure and serious financial support, heretofore missing or needing strengthening.

As this Subcommittee is aware, one need only to look at respected, credible polling and qualitative survey research to know that the U.S. has been living through an agonizing and challenging period both to its moral authority and to its long-recognized leadership as the international superpower and touchstone for national credibility.

Neither the realities of U.S. "hard power" nor the power of our rhetoric, our history, our values and our attraction are the issue. Our "soft power" continues to bring millions to our shores seeking those governing principles we take for granted.

But, we are expected to lead by example.

We are being challenged abroad to demonstrate by word and deed that we are on the right track as we look toward the end of this first decade of the new century.

Indeed, for our nation, to which "much has been given", much is indeed expected. This becomes a measurement for effective U.S. public diplomacy. The issues we tackle and the solutions we seek must have a global dimension and redound to the benefit of the many—development, pandemics, natural disasters, climate change, proliferation and terrorism and other multilateral and multi-national challenges. These all are concerns of modern Twenty First century public diplomacy.

Indeed public diplomacy is a companion for effective U.S. foreign policy. It is an opportunity if effectively shaped and executed, to create new levers of influence that will ultimately make better use of hard power when needed, and provide diplomatic alternatives to mutual threats and challenges. Simply put, public diplomacy must be intimately involved in effectively identifying and promoting our national interests and informing policy.

This recognition of both public diplomacy's importance and its structural limitations as a tool in the diplomatic arsenal in engaging foreign publics has led to a multitude of serious reports over the last seven years researched and written by Think Tanks, policy organizations, the private sector, the Departments of State and Defense, the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy, the American Academy of Diplomacy and Capitol Hill. The main message is a fairly consistent one: (1) change is needed both financially and structurally and (2) the recognition and role of public diplomacy in the policy process is deficient.

One new and important report, funded by Congress and under the leadership of The Brookings Institution, will be birthed on October 1, prepared for the Department of State and commissioned by Congress. It focuses on concrete steps—in and out of government-- to strengthen U.S. public diplomacy interaction across the globe.

In my view, its analysis, conclusions and recommendations are thoughtful and provocative and provide essential food for consideration and action by Congress and the next Administration—as well as other public diplomacy protagonists in and outside of government.

It underscores as all these serious reports have done, that effective public diplomacy is essential to America's standing in the world and to be effective we cannot conduct a monologue if we are to have credibility and a resonant and responsive audience in "winning" the "war of ideas".

Simply put, Public Diplomacy is a matter of national interest and national priority for our next Administration.

Architecture, Organization and Coordination

There are others testifying here today as inside government practitioners who can speak more expertly and directly about the viability of specific office structures, personnel and portfolios as they operate today.

My best insights come from my own expertise inside and outside of government—at State, the NSC, US/UN, DOC, on Capitol Hill, in state government, in the private sector, and in academia as well as my participation in various public diplomacy reports and studies. .

First, while U.S. public diplomacy clearly is directed to a global audience, effective public diplomacy begins at home. It **must**.

This demands a more aware and better educated U.S. public, insuring that at every level of our society and government, we are structurally geared to preparing ourselves for the Twenty-First century challenges.

Along with the sciences, Americans need stronger history, civics, language and cultural education-- beginning with our own "story", as well as providing an understanding of the global dimension and the interdependence of our planet.

This needs to start early, it needs to be comprehensive, and it needs to reflect and be open to new realities—shifting demographics, for example. This includes targeted public diplomacy training of our professional civil service in all departments so that it has an integral place in all sectors—health, housing, the arts, sciences, as well as diplomacy.

The recent *Washington Post* article (by Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus, September 10, 2008) highlighting a new intelligence forecast reportedly being prepared for the next President predicts that our increasingly competitive world will enable the U.S. to remain "pre-eminent" but its "dominance" will be relatively diminished because of "the rise of everyone else".

This is the world we need to prepare for and navigate successfully through school curricula and training at every level, providing incentives for future teachers to have the skills needed, and preparing for a much more diverse, and as Tom Friedman has called it, "flat" world.

Further:

- The dismantlement of USIA and its transfer into the Department of State continues to have repercussions. This transfer, which caused serious disruption with the departure of many professionals, and the resistance to and by a new "culture" suggests that there are lessons to be learned from this experience about how to "reinvent" government more successfully. It may even be legitimate to question whether public diplomacy would have operated better in these last years, if the architecture and staffing had been less disrupted.

I am not suggesting a reiteration of USIA. What does need recognition, however, is the legitimacy of the function, the independence of the work , the quality professional corps that is essential, and the recognition that effective public diplomacy means long-term planning, outreach and engagement.

- The role of public diplomat is intrinsically separate from that of a spokesman or press officer and this has gotten lost in translation. Public diplomacy is definitionally a two-way street, an openness to dialogue with "the Street," reaching out beyond traditional networks of officialdom, the basic diplomatic focus of the Department of State. (This indeed is one of the oddities of public diplomacy's being based at State.)

While at one level, bringing public diplomacy more into the policy halls of the State Department was viewed as giving it an added gravitas and

engagement, it lost some of its essential ability to reach non-traditional audiences and became only an arm of policy instead of *informing* the policy.

This in my view has created some of the dissonance that has called into serious question the effective operation of public diplomacy in the last years.

- An additional concern, of course, is the "siege mentality" that has overtaken much of our diplomatic, in-country outreach since 9/11. So many of our embassies have become armed camps, cut off from the countries in which they reside and their publics.

This is, of course, understandable from many security aspects. But it also is a serious hindrance to effective public diplomacy. How to find a better balance between security and contact is a major challenge, but it suggests that we need to pay attention to the recommendations being made by new reports about how to better use not only governmental outreach tools but the private sector, civil society and citizen contact to create more and stronger networks for the important "last three feet" of communication-- as Edward R. Murrow called the key distance for the real impact that public diplomacy requires.

- This also means better training and mastery of the new media that provide a different way to "social network" and inform citizens of other countries about United States' interests and values. The internet, blogging—these are among modern public diplomacy vehicles and we need both traditional skills and new information technology-savvy public diplomats.

- The U.S. Government is and will remain the essential actor in public diplomacy. This is where the national interest "resides." This ultimate responsibility cannot be shifted elsewhere..

But this requires a priority being attached to nomination and confirmation as well as tenure. The revolving door of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy has swung often since the reorganization of the late 90s and added to its woes. The reasons need to be assessed by this Subcommittee. However professional, experienced, dedicated and talented the incumbent may be, the shifting focus, confirmation delays and short tenures of the incumbents have left public diplomacy and its troops without the full integration and direction it needs and requires.

Further, if public diplomacy (and the public diplomacy chief) is to be recognized as an "honest broker" on policy, to listen as much as to explain and influence, then it is difficult to have any architect of a particular foreign policy that is dominating the global discourse, to hold that office as credibly as possible. It sends a very mixed signal abroad as well as at home. Closeness to the President and the White House needs to enhance the public diplomacy mission, not overshadow it.

- This relates as well to the problems faced by Alhurra, and even Radio Sawa and programs being run through the Broadcasting Board of Governors. They are too often viewed as propagandistic rather than as "news" or providing an "honest broker" perspective. If we are going to put money and muscle into broadcasting then we should look at what has worked for us –Voice of America, for example—and not diminish or undercut or dilute these structures.

Also are we looking ahead to the challenges we face today—as well as tomorrow? Does cutting out VOA to India or cutting it back in former Soviet republics, for example, really make sense for our long-term smart power interests? Are we letting specific short-term policy and short-sighted funding run public diplomacy before public diplomacy can do its job and begin to inform and enable good, sound policy? This is unproductive and an issue for congressional consideration.

- What are we willing to spend and for what? Congress has the ability and responsibility to reverse unwise cuts....and to ask the right questions up front about priorities and directions. If we are really to support smart power and to provide "the powers to lead" as Harvard Professor Joseph Nye has stated, then these are legitimate and necessary points to explore.

- Public diplomacy also is more than a one person job. The President sets the tone; State runs the function. But day in and day out it IS the cadre of professionals who need and deserve resource support--funding, training, respect internally in and by the Foreign Service , and an appreciation that theirs is an expertise too often taken for granted. At one time economic officers in the Foreign Service were viewed as second class citizens to the political officers. This is a message that now must be addressed for those who practice public

diplomacy. There must be a reinvestment in public diplomacy professionals with recruitment and reward, as well as a refocus on fundamentals and a commitment to a long-term effort.

- We also need to bring into government public diplomacy, some of the talent we are ignoring or discouraging, from outside of government. One of our country's strengths is our diversity—and it is one of the most identifiable ways to demonstrate tangibly abroad what we mean when we say public diplomacy begins at home.

It means bringing into government more of our skilled immigrant Americans who have language skills and background (Arabic, Farsi or Chinese, for example), as well as useful geographical and cultural knowledge, rather than further marginalizing their talent and desire to make a substantive and serious contribution.

This should be informed by the new intelligence forecast mentioned earlier, identifying civil society and emerging global leaders we should be reaching through public diplomacy and providing the leadership to prepare for new global realties—in development, by non-state actors, energy demands, and transnational and non-state threats—and for rethinking and expanding our global opportunities, alliances and partners. We should be thinking now about how public diplomacy should impact the new realities of the global economic meltdown.

- As to funding and architecture—how can the State Department be expected to be the coordinator of our country's public diplomacy when their funding is miniscule? Relative to funding for similar activities at the Department of Defense, State public diplomacy funds barely register on the radar screen. [See Chart]

Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recently opened up a hearing stating that "there has been a migration of functions and authorities from U.S. civilian agencies to the Department of Defense." This hurts both State's effective stewardship of public diplomacy as well as how public diplomacy is interpreted abroad.

Defense Secretary Bob Gates has been eloquent in his recognition and support for public diplomacy but he too has stated that both the State

Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development have been "chronically undermanned and underfunded for too long".

There is much to be learned from the military in terms of training and outreach useful for public diplomacy, but this is NOT structurally where public diplomacy should reside, nor is it where the funding for this function should be flowing. It is neither the right messenger, nor does it have the mission. The skewed funding, however, is in danger of tilting our diplomatic arsenal in the wrong direction. This is not how to shape smart power.

Further, this impairs State's public diplomacy leadership ability to act as the interagency interlocutor and coordinator for public diplomacy, much less its legitimacy on behalf of the U.S. for global outreach. It sends the wrong signal. The President sets the tone and the agenda; but State runs the function. The underfunding of State has got to be reversed if the United States is to demonstrate that it takes public diplomacy seriously.

Three final points about the structure of U.S. public diplomacy:

1. Public-Private Partnerships are essential to optimize effective public diplomacy engagement. They need to be more aggressively and successfully pursued to embrace the reach and resources outside of government –the private sector, citizens of all ages, cultural institutions and civil society influentials —and impact public diplomacy in ways that cannot be as successfully accomplished by government alone. Business for Diplomatic Action, Americans for Informed Democracy, The Asia Society, and the U.S. Center for Citizen Diplomacy are but a few examples of important interlocutors in public diplomacy operating effective programs outside of the public sector but partnering with government and civil society.

   There is an important role for active citizen (and cultural) diplomacy <u>outside</u> of the policy dimension, including "reverse public diplomacy" bringing a range of delegations and visitors to our shores—business executives, artists/musicians, doctors, scientists, educators as well as tourists and foreign students.(Programs to send students abroad as well as to bring them to the U.S. is an essential element in the public diplomacy dialogue.) This also means revamping our visa programs in many instances so that security concerns are not unnecessarily diluting effective public diplomacy.

The dollars available in the private sector and foundations even with the serious current stresses in the economy is impressive. For example, Citigroup's budget in 2007 in over 100 countries was $81.7 billion—9 times the size of the State Department's budget that year of $9.5 billion for public diplomacy operations in nearly 180 countries.

2. Both our presidential candidates have discussed the importance of public service—nationally and internationally-- a crucial component relating to effective public diplomacy. This has ranged from the expansion of AmeriCorps to such innovative ideas as Senator Barack Obama's call for the "America's Voice Initiative" to send Americans fluent in local languages and dialects abroad to expand our public diplomacy. These programs need to be encouraged, expanded, and energized for Americans of all ages with a range of skills. This is exactly the kind of participation that will enhance our public diplomacy objectives.

3. Finally, I would recommend serious consideration by the next President, of having a Senior Advisor in the White House responsible to the President (Assistant to the President perhaps) with responsibility for public diplomacy. This would not be a position with operational responsibility for public diplomacy which would continue to reside at the Department of State. But it would send an immediate signal regarding the importance placed on credible international outreach by the new President and his administration. And it would do more than this.

   This Advisor's portfolio would provide an appropriate level of linkage between the White House and the Department of State; insure support for the work and organization of public diplomacy centered at the State Department; add the imprimatur of the White House to State's interagency coordination of the public diplomacy function; participate in highest level Principal or Deputy deliberations to insure the public diplomacy dimension is being incorporated and considered relating to our national interests; advise and keep the President informed regarding public diplomacy dimensions of foreign policy; and provide a liaison with the private sector, foundations and others as a conduit for ideas on specific public diplomacy needs, actions and reforms.

This Advisor also would serve as a coordinating point for consideration and recommendations about new architecture needed (coordination through the National Security Council, for example, rather than State), and a formal and informal point of contact for such outside advisory input.

Wayne Gretzky, the great hockey player, when asked what gave him his special edge, said that "he skates to where the puck *will* be."

This is the message for the United States as we consider how to insure effective public diplomacy and effective change going forward.

We have the raw talent and resources. We embody and embrace the principles and the values. We need to have the will, the vision, the leadership and the discipline to seize the moment.

The window is small but with these months of transition in which we find ourselves, we are at the right moment in our history and in the history of our globe to make a needed difference for our own future and for a better global future. This Subcommittee must help define this direction in concert with a new Administration.

Thank you.

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September 24, 2008

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The first number is the federal budget for 2008 – nearly $3 trillion dollars. The second number is the Defense Department budget, including the special appropriations for the war in Iraq. The third number -- $36.5 billion – is what we will spend in the current budget year on International Affairs. The fourth number, at the bottom, is what we will spend on public diplomacy.

Presentation by Dick Martin, Author, Rebuilding Brand America, The National Summit on Citizen Diplomacy, February 12, 2008, Washington DC

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Acting Director Christopher Midura by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#1)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

The 2007 strategy stated that "the Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) will meet regularly to review progress implementing this strategy."

According to Under Secretary Glassman's comments before the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in July 2008, this PCC had met only twice in the previous twelve months. You mentioned in your testimony that it had met three times since June.

How frequently will the PCC meet to regularly review progress towards this strategy's implementation?

Answer:

Under Secretary Glassman convenes the PCC on a monthly basis to review implementation of strategic efforts underway and to advance an agenda of new strategic communication initiatives.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Acting Director Christopher Midura by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#2)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

The 2007 Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) assessment indicated that "there is no strong evidence that interagency or private collaboration has led to meaningful resource allocation decisions." This surprises me since the U.S. Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication stated that "all segments of the U.S. Government have a role in public diplomacy."

Do you believe that the 2007 PART assessment was accurate, and if so, what has been done since to correct this situation?

Answer:

Both interagency and private sector collaboration have yielded meaningful resource allocation decisions. For example, a centerpiece in the War of Ideas put forward by Under Secretary Glassman is the launch of a journal/website/ conferencing project called Problems of Extremism. DOD has agreed to fund this ambitious initiative.

Two of the most promising projects for countering violent extremism at the grassroots level, a virtual game called X-life and Co.Nx, a high-tech/low-bandwidth Internet-based video conferencing system with a social networking component, have both been launched through major private-sector funding partnerships.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Acting Director Christopher Midura by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#3)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

The 2007 PART assessment also found that there is an absence of a strategy that integrates the diverse public diplomacy programs. In fact, the Office of Management and Budget cited this as a "core deficiency."

Do you agree with this assessment? Why or why not?

Answer:

The 2007 PART field work was completed before the Policy Coordinating Committee issued the "U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication" on May 31, 2007. A copy of the strategy may be found at the following Internet address:

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87427.pdf

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Acting Director Christopher Midura by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#4)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

In your testimony, you mentioned the U.S. Marketing College, which was based on collaboration with the private sector and was meant to equip officials with relevant marketing strategies. Mr. Bereuter, in his testimony warned that public relations tactics used for public diplomacy can often be counterproductive. Its product overseas can be perceived as simplistic propaganda.

a. Do you agree that this is a concern?

b. If so, what safeguards are in place to prevent public diplomacy from turning into propaganda?

Answer:

The U.S. Marketing College was a four-day course taught at the Foreign Service Institute under the auspices of an experienced marketing professional, who was acting in his private capacity. Instructors were arranged by the marketing professional and were private sector volunteers. Professionally, they worked for various private-sector companies, such as eBay, Kraft and Novartis. The attendees included strategic communications professionals from the Department of State as well as several other USG agencies.

The Marketing College was not intended as public diplomacy training per se; we sought to raise awareness of communications strategies employed by the private sector to reach targeted audiences. The course focused on the principles of how effectively to develop a strategic communications plan from a marketing perspective, rather than on implementing an advertising initiative and selling the American brand. Understanding your audience and how best to engage them is integral to both public diplomacy and marketing, therefore, classes focused on strategies and techniques in developing areas such as social networking and online communities, better to utilize the progressing methods of communication.

Our Public Diplomacy Officers overseas have an arsenal of programs and strategies to inform and persuade diverse publics. They routinely engage with different groups in the society to determine the most effective means of conveying U.S. foreign policy messages, usually in the local language. We know from experience that propagandizing foreign audiences – or employing any one-way strategy that doesn't take into account the views and societal norms of our target audiences – almost never works, so "propaganda" is rarely a major concern, except perhaps with audiences that are fundamentally opposed to the message itself and conflate the message with the methodology.

While every overseas public diplomacy post must engage in occasional activities that might be interpreted as "public relations," that is generally only a small part of what our posts do, and these activities are conducted in service of a broader public diplomacy strategy related to the Mission Strategic Plan.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Acting Director Christopher Midura by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#5)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

Are your public diplomacy programs supported by in-depth audience research that analyzes how target audience opinions are formed and the specific factors that must be addressed to shape our messages and programs accordingly? If so, please provide an illustration of such research and how it was used to develop, implement, and evaluate a public diplomacy program.

Answer:

We are at the beginning stages of this type of in-depth audience analysis. In FY 2007, the Under Secretary's Office of Policy, Planning and Resources launched a landmark study on the impact of public diplomacy programs among select foreign audiences. The Public Diplomacy Impact (PDI) project included a comparison group design, scaled measurement, demonstrated reliability of the measures, and statistical modeling that identifies possible predictor/key drivers of foreign audience opinions, based on themes of the public diplomacy outcome performance measures. As a pilot in FY 2007, PDI had a limited sample size of 1,848 foreign participants and therefore a limited global representation. PDI was primarily designed for comparison of public diplomacy program participants and non-participants overseas, but the exploratory analysis of the key drivers of foreign

audience opinions in relation to the public diplomacy performance measures has shown promise.

The Office of Policy, Planning and Resources will launch an expanded version of the PDI project this year with an increased sample size. Through the findings from this project we hope to collect trend data on the aggregate impact of the public diplomacy activities of the Department of State, and perform a more comprehensive analysis of key drivers of foreign audiences' attitudes and opinions.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Acting Director Christopher Midura by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#6)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

The Mission Activity Tracker was launched in October 2007 by the State Department to gather quantifiable data on public diplomacy activities that reach foreign audiences.

In the information your office provided to this Subcommittee, it showed that 12 percent of posts were not using this system.

What is slowing the full implementation of this tracker?

Answer:

The Mission Activity Tracker (MAT), the Department's database for public diplomacy activities, is operative in Public Affairs Sections at U.S. missions worldwide. In FY 2008, more than 20,500 public diplomacy activities were reported in MAT, including submissions from all of the Department's six regional bureaus. Information technology issues affecting some posts in Africa have prevented full implementation of MAT in that region, but the Under Secretary's Office of Policy, Planning and Resources is working closely with information technology experts in the Department to resolve these issues. We are also working on revisions to MAT that will increase its functionality and ease of use for posts.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Acting Director Christopher Midura by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#7)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

Other than the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, the Africa Bureau has the lowest number of Mission Activity Tracker entries. Given the strategic significance of Africa, why is this?

Answer:

The public diplomacy work carried out by the Bureau of African Affairs is indeed of great strategic importance to the Department and U.S. foreign policy. Public diplomacy activities in Africa bridge humanitarian, trade and foreign assistance efforts with the core values of American society. Unfortunately, many infrastructural issues impede Internet access in some regions of Africa. The limited speed of Internet connectivity and low bandwidth can make entries in the Mission Activity Tracker, a data-intensive environment, cumbersome for some posts. The Under Secretary's office is working in earnest with our information technology colleagues to develop solutions to these problems, but doing so will take time.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Acting Director Christopher Midura by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#8)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

In your testimony, you mentioned that winning the war of ideas depends on getting the right information to the right people using the right technology.

How are you gauging our progress in the war of ideas?

Answer:

We gauge our progress through standardized public diplomacy performance measures and program evaluations. The newly established Evaluation and Measurement Unit within the Under Secretary's Office of Policy, Planning and Resources is preparing to launch evaluations of war of ideas-related programs in FY 2009. These evaluations will look at foreign audiences reached by war of ideas activities and seek to determine whether participation in these programs has resulted in concrete actions to initiate positive change. Important indicators of success for these programs are behavior change and the application of knowledge gained to local communities, particularly vulnerable communities at particular risk of victimization by extremist ideology (e.g., youth, minorities, women).

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Acting Director Christopher Midura by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#9)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

What are your top three recommendations for improving the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy?

Answer:

Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs James K. Glassman has emphasized the following three priorities for improving the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy:

1. Ensuring that the human and capital resources for Public Diplomacy are adequate to meet the requirements of the war of ideas, including upgrading our strategic communications technology and addressing the rapidly rising costs of the academic and professional exchange programs that serve to increase mutual understanding between U.S. and foreign societies.

2. Focusing PD resources and institutionalizing PD structures (including the interagency Policy Coordinating Committee and Global Strategic Engagement Center in Washington, and our regional media hubs overseas) aimed at coordinating USG messaging to confront extremist ideology and marginalize violent extremists worldwide.

3. Improving the career development path of Public Diplomacy officers in the Department of State by raising the profile of the Under Secretary in the Foreign Service assignments process and promoting appropriate career planning, training and promotions for PD personnel.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Scott DeLisi by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#1)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

An ambassador depends on the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) to lead his or her public diplomacy efforts. I am concerned that these officers are functioning more as administrators than public diplomacy experts.

a. What percentage of time would you say that the average PAO spends on program administration as opposed to direct outreach to foreign publics?

b. Is this the right balance?

c. In your view, does the evaluation and promotion system reward direct outreach to foreign audiences sufficiently?

d. If not, what can the State Department do to fix this?

Answer:

The Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, in its 2008 report "Getting the People Part Right," made the claim that "Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) view themselves, and are viewed by others, more as managers and administrators than as expert communicators." We respectfully disagree with this statement.

While all public diplomacy positions overseas necessarily involve some administrative tasks, including those relating to supervision of American and local employees; execution of grants; and planning, monitoring and evaluation of

programs, these activities are necessary to ensure that appropriate messages are reaching the right audiences, using the right means, and that there is proper follow-up to ensure that taxpayer funds are being used wisely. While "outreach" is certainly a necessary part of conveying America's message overseas, it is not synonymous with "public diplomacy." Outreach can be any form of contact with local audiences; public diplomacy, however, requires considerably more strategic planning, analysis, sustained relationship-building and follow up, management of human and financial resources, and careful evaluation of lessons learned. This process, done in the field by trained officers, is essential in order positively to influence foreign publics.

Communicating to foreign publics is about more than simply having an American officer give a speech or a media interview; it is about knowing how to communicate a message using means and methods appropriate and effective in the local context. On any given issue in any given country, the best way to achieve a particular communications goal could be through a non-governmental American speaker, an exchange visitor grant to an important local figure, a grant to a local university to hold a seminar, a representational event with key influencers, an op-ed in a major newspaper, an ambassadorial speech, an old-fashioned press conference, or any combination of these and other public diplomacy tools. Our public diplomacy professionals in the field provide the indispensable tradecraft

expertise, local knowledge, and informed judgment to conceive and implement strategic communications that advance our interests. In this context, to "administer" is to "communicate."

Outreach to foreign audiences by all employees at our overseas posts is strongly encouraged where feasible and is already built into the Department of State's Foreign Service promotion precepts. This outreach helps bring about greater mutual understanding between Americans and other societies, and we intend to continue to expand such contact in the future. In addition, there is a specific rubric in the annual evaluation form for Foreign Service Officers covering communications and foreign language skills.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Scott DeLisi by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#2)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

At our embassies, Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) are in charge of both the information and cultural affairs offices and brief the ambassador and others on information and cultural affairs matters.

a. Does it make sense for the information and cultural affairs officers to brief on the activities of their own offices?

b. What is the PAO's substantive portfolio, as distinct from the work of the two sections he or she supervises?

c. And if there isn't an independent substantive portfolio, then where is the value-added?

Answer:

The structure of Public Affairs Sections (PAS) at our overseas posts varies, depending on the size and resources of the mission and the relative strategic importance of the host country, but in all cases the PAS is headed by a Public Affairs Officer (PAO). The PAO is charged with developing and implementing an overall public diplomacy strategy, and employing information programs, professional and academic exchanges, cultural programs and other program tools to reach target audiences and convey messages in support of the Mission Strategic

Plan. At embassies, the PAO serves as the Counselor for Public Affairs to the Chief of Mission.

A common structure for a Public Affairs Section is to have an Information Officer (IO) and Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO) serve under the PAO. The IO and CAO form the core of the PAO's staff and are responsible for managing their respective sections and initiating and administering programs and activities within the strategy developed by (and in coordination with) the PAO. This is parallel to the structure in other Embassy sections, such as a Political Section, where officers have individual substantive portfolios but work under the direction of a Head of Section.

IOs and CAOs routinely brief mission leaders on the activities of their own offices at most overseas posts – just as, for example, a Political-Military Unit Chief and Internal Politics Unit Chief, both members of the Political Section, might brief Mission leaders on their respective areas of responsibility. At some senior meetings, such as meetings of the Ambassador's Country Team, briefings may be conducted by the PAO as Head of Section.

At some smaller posts, the PAO may be in charge of administering either the information or cultural portfolio, with an Assistant PAO managing the other. At our smallest posts, the PAO manages all public diplomacy programs him/herself.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Scott DeLisi by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#3)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

Substantively, rather than administratively, what would be the case against dividing the cultural affairs and information operations functions, up-grading those section heads at our embassies, and having them both report to the deputy chief of mission?

Answer:

There are many commonalities and synergies derived from having cultural and information operations combined in one office under the management of a Public Affairs Officer, who can support mission goals most effectively when he or she has the full array of public diplomacy programs to deploy. Some of our most effective PD programs have both an informational as well as an educational or cultural component, and their design and execution can more readily be done by an integrated office.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Scott DeLisi by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#4)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

a. What do you think about the proposal by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy about a long-term, possibly 9-month, public diplomacy training course? Other career tracks do have long-, or at least longer-, term training.
b. Aside from a lack of resources, why doesn't public diplomacy have a long-term training opportunity for its people? Is the problem the lack of resources?

Answer:

Additional in-depth, long-term training in the theory of mass communications, marketing, and influence would be of interest to public diplomacy professionals. In fact, FSI recently hosted an R-initiated training course on integrated communications taught by marketing experts from the private sector.

Given current deficits in personnel in the PD cone, it would be very difficult to sustain a class of such long duration, at least in the near future.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Scott DeLisi by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#5)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

How does the Department plan to respond to calls for more substantive communications training?

Answer:

The critical roles of research, planning, message development, effective communication, and evaluation form the core elements of our public diplomacy training. Curricula for these subjects are drawn from U.S. civilian and military sources, the private sector and academia, and are continually evaluated and updated.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Scott DeLisi by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#6 and #7)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

Does it make sense to build into the employee evaluation report a hard requirement so that Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) do public outreach?

What are the State Department's views on mandating at least one outreach task in the work requirements statements of all public diplomacy officers?

What would it take to make these changes?

Answer:

The Department takes public diplomacy and public outreach seriously. These key principles are included in both the Core Precepts, which are the qualities and capabilities considered essential for advancement in the Foreign Service, and in the Procedural Precepts, which lay out the criteria to be used by the Selection Boards in reaching their decisions on promotion.

We have added a specific section in "Communication and Foreign Language Skills," one of the six Core Precepts used to evaluate performance, to highlight our expectations for "public outreach" skills at the entry, mid and senior levels. Moreover, when we introduced classwide promotion possibilities (vice strictly conal promotions) several years ago, we specifically instructed the Selection

Boards recommending FSOs for classwide promotion at the mid-ranks and also into the Senior Foreign Service to consider the employee's efforts to advance the Department's strategic goals, specifically citing the role of public outreach. Classwide competition requires FSOs to build skills and gain experience outside their area of expertise (i.e., their conal designation – public diplomacy, political, economic, consular, or management).

In our highly competitive service, this emphasis on public diplomacy and outreach sends a strong message to FS Generalists and motivates active participation.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Scott DeLisi by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#8)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

The Government Accountability Office and others have identified a number of human capital challenges including 1) staffing shortages, 2) field staff overburdened with administrative duties, 3) insufficient time for public diplomacy training, and 4) foreign language proficiency shortfalls.

How is the State Department addressing each of these challenges?

Answer:

A robust diplomatic service is key to the defense of our nation. Yet, because of our expanding mission, we currently have 14% more FS Generalist positions than we have officers. That percentage continues to grow. As a result, lower priority positions, while still critical, are left unfilled. Foreign language skills too frequently are deferred when they are essential. While we are making critical language skills a priority, it still takes two years to learn Chinese or Arabic and that is two years an employee is not in the field. Thus, increasing personnel is essential to addressing critical diplomatic needs as well as the issues you raise. We will be able to take an initial step using FY08 Supplemental and FY09 Bridge funding to hire 138 FSOs above attrition. We have also drawn on qualified Civil Service employees and American Family Members to help fill vacant positions around the

world. We have, for example, expanded our Professional Associates program to hire up to 105 additional American family members to fill vacant positions overseas. We have also successfully recruited and hired for much-needed critical language skills, to build as quickly as possible the numbers within our ranks with these skills. From 2004 through 2008, the Department has hired 385 officers and 32 specialists who possessed critical needs language skills.

However, interim measures cannot fully address the human capital challenges. Therefore, recent budget requests have been reflective of the necessity for additional positions to meet language and professional skills development needs. The FY2009 budget request included around 1,100 new personnel for State and 300 new personnel for USAID, which we view as a down payment. In addition to the Department's own analyses, several recent independent studies have reached similar conclusions. In its Embassy of the Future report, CSIS emphasized the need for roughly 1,000 additional positions to meet language and professional skills development needs, and another 1,000 to meet critical workload increases. The Secretary's Transformational Diplomacy Advisory Group also recommended 1,000 positions to meet language and other training requirements. A recent report by the Stimson Center, commissioned by the American Academy of Diplomacy, recommended a hiring increase of 46%, adding more than 4,700 jobs, between 2010 and 2014. The study noted that the Department would have to increase its budget by 21% to meets its global staffing responsibilities.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Scott DeLisi by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#9)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

At present, with the possible exception of officers in American Presence Posts, the State Department has no officers in the field whose primary job it is to engage directly with the host-country public. To put it differently, and to use a term coined by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, the State Department doesn't really have an "influencer career track" ("influencer cone").

Should we consider creating a category of FSO whose sole, or at least primary, job is to engage with foreign publics on topics pertaining to U.S. policy and society, including on television, radio, the Internet, in universities, and so on?

Answer:

No. We strongly disagree with this recommendation of the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. We believe we already have an "influencer cone": this is what our Public Diplomacy officers do, and we believe they do it extremely well on limited resources. Creating a new category of FSO to carry out public diplomacy duties would be duplicative, unnecessary, and confusing.

Public Diplomacy careers are all about engaging in strategic communications to influence foreign publics. Factoring in the opinion environment in setting Mission Strategic Plan goals, analyzing the key influencers around each goal, and mindfully constructing a series of program inputs to advance our ideas among those key individuals/sectors, are all key to garnering support for our policies. They collectively constitute the centerpiece of what Public Diplomacy officers are trained, and expected, to do.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Mr. Rick A. Ruth by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#1)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

Mr. Chaplin testified that the programs under the control of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs need to be greatly expanded. For instance, he advocated a 100 percent increase in academic exchange programs.

However, it is also important to understand the effectiveness of these programs before supporting such a large expansion. Based on a 2007 Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) evaluation of educational and cultural exchange assessments, you have effective programs.

In which areas do you believe that further progress needs to be made for our exchange programs?

Answer:

The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs is expanding the scope and deepening the impact of its exchanges in three critical ways:

- We are increasing our engagement with our nearly one million alumni around the world. These men and women—uniquely knowledgeable about the United States--are both national and community leaders. More than 300 have gone on to become heads of state and government.

- To reach younger and less traditional audiences in far greater numbers than direct exchanges have allowed, we have pioneered new programs and are exploring ways to magnify our message. With the English Access Microscholarship program for disadvantaged high school students overseas which we began four years ago, we have reached more than 44,000 young people who now have a better understanding of U.S. society, can utilize English materials on line and in printed media, and who are competitive for participation in USG-sponsored youth exchange and academic exchange programs. We need to sustain and build on this achievement.
- After significant focus on Near East and South Asia exchange programming over the last few years, new resources now need to be devoted in the Western Hemisphere--to the Caribbean, Central America and South America--and to sub-Saharan Africa. (The Department requested additional funding in FY09 for WHA under the PLAY initiative.) In both of these regions, demand for exchanges far outstrips our ability to provide them. In the Western Hemisphere and in Africa we must be able to reach talented but disadvantaged and middle-class participants who may have inaccurate perceptions about the U.S. In order to do this, we need to invest in newer initiatives

such as the Community College program, which directly builds the developing middle class by concentrating on exchanges that promote long-term employment skills and draws on a uniquely American educational resource, the community college system. For our Fulbright exchanges we need to increase the number of scholarships and provide the tools such as intensive English that will allow underserved participants to increase their knowledge and build lasting connections with the U.S.

- To maximize our reach and to bring the best of America to bear on today's challenges, we are actively reaching out to the private sector to create effective new partnerships and making use of new social media to engage audiences around the world.
- The FY2009 Budget requested a total of $302 million for academic exchange programs, an increase of $17 million over FY2008.

It is also critical that our public diplomacy sections in the field have sufficient staff to keep pace with our growing exchanges. The FY2009 Budget request of 2 million for additional PD LES positions will provide some needed assistance in this regard and will aid in the implementation of these programs.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Mr. Rick A. Ruth
From Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#2)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

In 2007, the number of foreigners participating in exchange programs from the Near East Asia region was less than one half of what was expected.

Since the countries in this region are seen as important to our success in the Global War on Terror and war of ideas, why is it that they are not being fully engaged in these programs?

Answer:

In FY 2006, the actual number of participants from the NEA region was significantly higher than in previous years because ECA received special funding for one-time programs that included activities within the NEA region and a one-time transfer of $5 million for the English Access Microscholarship Program from the Middle East Partnership Initiative (Economic Support Funds). This increase in funding resulted in over 3,800 additional NEA participants that year. The FY 2007 target was based on the FY 2006 actual figure despite the fact that the extra funding was for one-year only. What appears to be a shortfall in FY 2007 is actually an error in the target projection. Since 2001, ECA has significantly increased its funding for the NEA region, and we continue to conduct innovative programs in coordination with the regional bureau to focus on engaging key individuals and audiences in this region.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Mr. Rick A. Ruth by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#3)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

It seems that much of the value of exchange programs comes from foreign participants building lasting relationships with people in the U.S. The 2007 PART assessment revealed that only 64 percent of those participating in exchanges continue to collaborate with people in the U.S. after five years, which is 17 percent fewer than in 2003.

a. Is there a reason for declining collaborations?

b. If so, what is being done to address this?

Answer:

We have not conducted a study specifically to identify the cause of the drop in collaborations, but we will continue to believe that these relationships are a valuable outcome of exchanges. Consequently, we are addressing this issue aggressively in several ways. One of the intended benefits of our emphasis on social media is to enhance the ability of individuals to collaborate in meaningful ways on-line. Our alumni outreach also fosters such collaborative activities, through our own alumni on-line community and through the development of local alumni associations that can provide individuals with encouragement and support.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Mr. Rick A. Ruth by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#4)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

Many posts in the Muslim world are considered a high or critical threat for terrorism and have limited public access to U.S. facilities, thereby reducing State's ability to conduct public diplomacy. Proposed solutions include the use of American Corners and American Presence Posts.

What efforts are underway to balance security with public outreach?

Answer:

About 70 of the State Department's 180 Information Resource Centers maintain public hours. Of the 19 IRCs in NEA, 9 offer public hours – Alexandria, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Kuwait, Casablanca, Riyadh, Damascus, Tunis and Abu Dhabi. Other IRCs open to the public in nations with significant Muslim populations include those in Dhaka, Ouagadougou, N'djamena, Asmara, Nairobi, Niamey, Bamako, and Dar es Salaam.

Finding the right balance between security and accessibility is a constantly shifting challenge best determined by embassy staff on the ground. Chiefs of Mission rely on guidance from their Regional Security Officers and Public Affairs Officers to decide the appropriate level of security and public access to embassy facilities. While American Corners

offer a means of expanding our reach to local audiences, they do not match the impact of Information Resource Centers. The security of American Corners rests with the hosting institutions.

Outreach programs conducted by IRCs, websites managed by embassies and IIP, and Virtual Presence Posts offer additional means of balancing contact and security.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Mr. Peter Kovach by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#1)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

In Mr. Midura's testimony he mentioned that the Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC) has staff from the Departments of State and Defense, as well as from the Central Intelligence Agency.

How many marketing and cultural scholars, especially from academia or with backgrounds in other cultures, has the Center hired to ensure that the war of ideas is being considered on a strategic rather than a tactical level?

Answer:

None directly in strategic communications. The GSEC has a USG interagency staff that designs, coordinates and de-conflicts USG strategic communications programs directed at foreign audiences. It operates under the authority of the Presidentially- mandated Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC). The GSEC partners in government design USG strategic communications strategies, taking into account U.S. national strategic goals and the on-the-ground expertise our embassy staffs and regional bureaus bring to the table.

That said, GSEC and other elements in R regularly reach out to cull the wisdom of the best and brightest in the private sector and academia.

Professional marketers, through the U.S. Marketing College, under the aegis of Under Secretary Glassman's PCC, have been teaching marketing skills to strategic communications planners at the Foreign Service Institute. GSEC and R have teamed up with Howcast, an online community that uses video production to counter extremist messages through sharing the experiences and voices of young Muslims. GSEC and the Bureau of International Information Programs have teamed up with SONY to launch X-Life, a virtual platform video game that imaginatively promotes identification with positive futures in the global economy. GSEC is also working with DOD to promote a promising model to amplify moderate voices in the Muslim world that was developed in part by the Rand Corporation. Academic participation and partnership will be the lynchpin of this initiative.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Mr. Peter Kovach by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#2)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

GSEC, which you lead, has been described as a standing committee on the war of ideas.

Is there a risk that our interagency effort, if focused principally on a war of ideas, may not be effective across the full range of public diplomacy challenges confronting the U.S., including the growing influence of China and Russia?

Answer:

GSEC, like other organs of the USG's strategic communications effort under the Policy Coordinating Committee, focuses on countering a wide range of ideas detrimental to U.S. interests and international peace and harmony. GSEC was active in the recent information campaign responding to the Russian invasion of Georgia. The ideologies that support virulent nationalism, for example communism or the anti-American nationalist rhetoric emanating from some groups in Latin America, are also targets in the War of Ideas. GSEC is involved in harnessing the creative energies of the interagency in these instances, too.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Mr. Peter Kovach by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#3)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

In a 2007 report, the Government Accountability Office criticized the State Department for not having the proper mechanisms in place to share polling and research data with other agencies. I am concerned that the possible classification of polling or research data may be a bureaucratic obstacle preventing other agencies that might benefit from this data from acquiring it in a timely fashion.

a. What percentage of polling or research data is maintained as classified information?

b. What mechanisms are in place to allow the timely sharing of research and polling information with all agencies involved in public diplomacy?

Answer:

a. The Department of State's Office of Research (INR/R) is committed to distributing analyses of public opinion surveys to the widest possible audience within the U.S. government. INR/R electronically disseminates all opinion analyses. This includes emailing analyses directly to clients, as well as making opinion analyses available via web platforms, such the State Department's InfoCentral portal and the Open Source Center's web

portal. Whether via email or web portals, INR/R's opinion analyses are accessible to audiences across the interagency.

In keeping with its mission to distribute opinion analyses to the widest audience possible, INR/R classifies very few of its opinion analyses. In calendar year 2007, for instance, only 15 percent of all opinion analyses were classified. Approximately 12 percent were classified Confidential; the remaining few were classified Secret. These classifications did not prevent INR/R from distributing these opinion analyses to appropriately cleared individuals at State and across the interagency. These classified opinion analyses were also posted to INR's Secret-level web site for easy access by State and interagency clients.

b. The GSEC operates a sub-PCC on Polling and Metrics whose mandate is to request and shape polling and metrics relevant to current public diplomacy campaigns. Research is called up from a number of USG interagency partners, as well as from private sector open sources. The sub-PCC sees that such information is shared widely across a broad interagency community and, on occasion, with key international allied governments.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Mr. Peter Kovach by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#4)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 23, 2008

Question:

Are your public diplomacy programs supported by in-depth audience research that analyzes how target audience opinions are formed and the specific factors that must be addressed to shape our messages and programs accordingly? If so, please provide an illustration of such research and how it was used to develop, implement, and evaluate a public diplomacy program.

Answer:

We are at the beginning stages of this type of in-depth audience analysis. In FY 2007, the Under Secretary's Office of Policy, Planning and Resources launched a landmark study on the impact of public diplomacy programs among select foreign audiences. The Public Diplomacy Impact (PDI) project included a comparison group design, scaled measurement, demonstrated reliability of the measures, and statistical modeling that identifies possible predictor/key drivers of foreign audience opinions, based on themes of the public diplomacy outcome performance measures. As a pilot in FY 2007, PDI had a limited sample size of 1,848 foreign participants and therefore a limited global representation. PDI was primarily designed for comparison of public diplomacy program participants and non-

participants overseas, but the exploratory analysis of the key drivers of foreign audience opinions in relation to the public diplomacy performance measures has shown promise.

The Office of Policy, Planning and Resources will launch an expanded version of the PDI project this year with an increased sample size. Through the findings from this project we hope to collect trend data on the aggregate impact of the public diplomacy activities of the Department of State, and perform a more comprehensive analysis of key drivers of foreign audiences' attitudes and opinions.

"A Reliance on Smart Power: Reforming the Public Diplomacy Bureaucracy": September 23, 2008

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record for Ambassador Elizabeth F. Bagley from Senator Daniel K. Akaka

Q1: In the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy's June 2008 report, it recommended that the State Department needs to improve how it recruits candidates for the public diplomacy career track, based on a candidate's skills and experiences. Could you please elaborate on how this would differ from the current practice?

A1: We start with the basic construct that undergirds the Foreign Service personnel system, and that is the "generalist" construct. The system seeks to bring in "generalists" who will, over the course of a 25- or 30-year career, be able to serve effectively in a number of geographic regions and in a number of functions. And thus, no one at State ever sits down and says, "Hey, public diplomacy is the most important thing we're doing now, so let's figure out a way to get people with that particular skill-set into our ranks"; the same is true vis-à-vis the political, economic and other career tracks. Basically, the State Department wants to bring in people who are intelligent, who know something about America and the world, who can write well, and who have good judgment and common sense. That's fine, as far at it goes, and for the most part, we are accomplishing that objective. But the problem is that the Department makes no special effort, according to recruiting officials themselves, to go out and target in its recruiting efforts people who have particularly strong backgrounds in the relevant field – in our case, public diplomacy. And so we bring in generalists, but then express surprise when those generalists do not achieve experts' results. The problem is not with the people, per se. We do, in fact, have some very bright, talented and capable people serving in the ranks of the Foreign Service, and in the PD career track – there's no question about that. The problem is with our system, which places an institutional premium on "generalism" over specialized expertise. The Commission recognizes that this problem – and, in fairness, I should add that not everyone would necessarily view it as a problem – is rooted in the entire intake system, and it affects not only PD officers, but all Foreign Service officers ("FSOs"). Philosophically, the Commission believes we need to be going after more specialized expertise, particularly in as sensitive a field as PD – an area in which most graduate students and young professionals rarely have much grounding prior to joining State. We understand, however, that this will be hard to do absent a significant reform of the current intake system. But we raised the issue because we think it is important. The State Department doesn't just need "smart people" – it needs, and our Nation needs, the *right* smart people.

Q2: If the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) is not training public diplomacy officers in what the Commission terms "the science of communication," then what, exactly, is FSI training them in?

A2: That is exactly the question the Commission asked at the outset of our exploration of this issue. As a preface, let me reiterate a point that our report made and that I made in my opening statement. The fact is, public diplomacy training is much stronger today than it was even a few years ago. There are more courses, and better courses, on the books today than was the case in the years right after the 1999 consolidation of USIA into the State Department. So, in fairness, I think FSI deserves a lot of credit – and, in particular, Secretary of State Powell deserves a lot of credit – for realizing that we needed to do a better job of training our PD officers and getting those courses on the books. Having said that, however, the fact remains, FSI PD training continues to focus almost exclusively on administration, rather than substantive communication. There are precious few courses offered at FSI on such substantive communications-related disciplines as communication science, political communication, advertising, marketing, the use of public opinion polling in the development of message campaigns, the management of message campaigns more generally, and so on. Instead, to get back to your question, we train our outgoing PD officers on such matters as how to administer programs and grants, run press conferences, or, perhaps, how to give an interview. But the bigger-picture knowledge sets are unaccounted for. The fact is, communications is a serious discipline, with an enormous literature and a host of well-understood principles and best practices. There are proven ways of communicating more effectively, just as there are proven ways of doing so less effectively. The multi-billion-dollar-a-year advertising industry – and, indeed, the political advertising industry – wouldn't exist, or be so profitable, if that weren't the case. But rather than train our people and arm them with this body of knowledge as they go out to communicate with the world on behalf of our Nation, we essentially say to them, in effect, "Just wing it!" The Commission knows we can do better than that, and we genuinely hope that the Department will act on our proposals in this area. We believe that PD, like politics and economics, is a discipline that has associated with it a significant corpus of knowledge, and we need to do a better job of instilling this knowledge in our Nation's professional communicators.

Q3: What should the Public Affairs Officer's role at embassies overseas be, if not management?

A3: The job title, "public affairs officer," would itself seem to imply that the person encumbering that position has, as a principal task, the responsibility of interacting with the public. But when we looked at PAO position descriptions and spoke with PAOs and former PAOs, we found that, in fact, PAOs spend the overwhelming majority of their time on internal tasks, such as, "supporting" or "managing" the ambassador, "running interference" vis-à-vis Washington, and so on. We were, frankly, very surprised to learn how little public engagement is built into these positions. As we noted in the report – and I made allusion to this in my opening statement, as well – there are PAOs out there whose formal job requirements are exclusively inwardly oriented. Indeed, there was no inherent

requirement for these officers even to use the foreign language facility that, in many cases, the Department had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars training them to develop. Taking a step back and looking at the bigger picture, what struck the Commission was this basic fact: with the possible exception of a small number of "American Presence Post" (APP) officers, there is virtually no one in the State Department whose primary job it is to directly engage foreign publics on matters salient to U.S. policy. And to the extent some officers do have some responsibilities in this area – for example, information officers – those officers are not the PAOs. We understand that management is important, but we see the balance between internal and external exertion as being very out-of-kilter at present. I should note that Department officials generally agree with our assessment of the issue, and rather than rebut the point, they tend to explain why this is so – with one common explanation being that the old USIA-era "executive officers" who handled a lot of the administration went the way of the dinosaur with the 1999 consolidation. But the question remains: does the Department – and does Congress – believe that, say, "managing the ambassador" is the kind of thing that highly-paid PAOs should be spending the great majority of their time doing? If so, then the system is working well. If not – and if, instead, we'd like to have these capable, and often foreign language-proficient, senior officers engaging foreign publics in support of our top foreign policy objectives – then, the system isn't working. This is the issue that we wanted to flag.

Q4: What, specifically, would the Commission suggest by way of building greater public diplomacy content into the Foreign Service exam?

A4: First of all, let me say that the Foreign Service examination process is generally well-regarded. The Commission, too, regards the examination – and, in particular, the Oral Assessment – as a "best practice," and we made that clear in our 2008 report. The problem with the examination process, from the standpoint of public diplomacy, is that there really is very little PD content in the exam, and thus, we have a situation in which 1) we recruit generalists, as we have noted; and then 2) we fail to test those generalists on the skills that, presumably, lie at the heart of effective public diplomacy. Of course, this begs the question, "Well, what skills do lie at the core of effective public diplomacy?" That's a big topic, but let me just observe that, frankly, I'm not sure the Department has thought through that question with the rigor it deserves. If one takes the Commission's basic position – that a PD officer ought to have proven aptitude in persuasive communication, a penchant for creative and effective outreach, an understanding of how message campaigns are crafted and run, and so on – then it is clear that we are not testing for these things on the exam as the exam is currently constituted. One might take issue with the premise – that PD officers ought to have these skills, though, frankly, I think it would be hard to defend that position – but if one grants that premise, then the question arises, how do we build these types of skills into the exam process? The Commission believes that it is most appropriate to build them into the Oral Assessment, and that is what we have recommended. We have a negotiating exercise in the Oral Assessment, and we have other exercises in there, but we don't, at present, have a straight PD component to the exam. Why not have the candidate deliver a speech, or respond to

tough questions from a hostile media, and so on? This is doable. The State Department could modify the exam process to bring PD into it to a much greater degree, and we think it should. Otherwise, we'll continue to have a situation in which people are able to join the PD career track, and the Foreign Service itself, without ever having had to prove that they can deliver the a policy-related message effectively. And that does not make a lot of sense to us.

Q5: What changes would the Commission want to see made to the employee evaluation report form?

A5: The Commission believes that, all things being equal, employees work to their evaluations. That is, they spend the most time and effort trying to achieve the objectives laid out, in agreement with their supervisors, in their work requirements. In fact, when you think about it, that fact is exactly what the entire performance evaluation process is predicated upon. In the Foreign Service EER, there is no section specifically devoted to public diplomacy outreach – even for PD officers. Indeed, the form itself is standardized; the same form is used for PD officers, political officers, consular officers and everyone else. Thus, at present, there is no requirement inherent to the form itself that says, "You have to reach out to foreign audiences." So the issue becomes, "What do the individual officer's work requirements say?" And what we found was that, too often, these individualized work requirements, even for PD officers, gave short shrift to public outreach and substantive communication with foreign publics. And, in terms of the rubber meeting the road, what that means is that, for the PD officers, or any officers, who genuinely want to undertake outreach, they are really swimming upstream, because they are going to be held to account for – and evaluated on the basis of – the administrative tasks they are required to complete, and in a sense, they have to "carve out" time to undertake PD outreach, if they are able to do it at all. In a sense, it is not their "real job." The result of all this is that there is an institutional, or at least corporate cultural, bias against outreach and in favor of administration. And the result of that is, predictably, we do less outreach than we otherwise might. That is what the Commission is attempting to change. We want to see the form itself require outreach of every officer; and we also want to see PD officers' work requirements statements mandating at least one ongoing outreach objective per rating period. These proposed fixes are neither complex, nor costly – in fact, they're essentially no-cost – but they would result in a dramatic increase in outreach events literally overnight. That's because officers would know they are being evaluated on their performance in this area. Right now, the most underutilized resource in our PD arsenal is the PD officer himself – our proposal would go a long way toward rectifying this and generating greater value out of our Nation's investment in cultural and language training in that officer.

Q6: Given the perennial resource constraints, what would you say are your top priorities – in other words, if the Commission could pick just two or three of its recommendations for "fast-tracking," which ones would they be?

A6: Let me begin with a general point. The Commission sees the seven issues we identified and focused on in our report as being very directly inter-related. In fact, we would argue that all seven issues need to be addressed concurrently, as part of a holistic approach to "getting the people part right." Each issue we identified has an impact on the others, often in very direct ways. For example, merely recruiting the right people, but then not testing them or training them on the right substance solves part of the problem, but obviously, not all of it. Eliminating the PD area offices, if management were to want to go that route – and, as a Commission, we are not necessarily recommending that it should – would have a major impact on the ability of PD officers to rise to the top, because there would no longer be a senior-level outlet for PD Senior Foreign Service officers as there is now; and thus, the best PD officers would be forced to compete for country desk officer director positions and other senior jobs, a point we made in our report. Revising the EER form to mandate outreach would ensure that these officers then bring an outreach mentality to the Department's senior decision-making. And so on. So, again, the Commission advocates a holistic approach to these problems. That said, let me nonetheless try to answer your question. I think the three top priorities of the Commission would be: 1) beefing up our PD training and, in particular, adding a multi-month intensive long-term training course that focuses on substantive communication strategies and skills; 2) revising the EER form and work requirement statements, as we have described, so that they are better aligned with the Secretary's vision of PD outreach, which they are not at present; and 3) taking a fresh, and intellectually honest, look at the PD area office structure to determine if real value is being added – and then going where the answers take us, rather than viewing the matter through the prism of parochial bureaucratic interests or simply continuing to do what we've been doing "because that's how we've always done it." With a few tweaks to our system, along the lines of what the Commission has recommended, we can significantly enhance the quality of our PD outreach within a relatively short period of time. In the end, that is what the Commission wants to see.

Q7: Looking ahead to the 2008-2009 period, on what issues does the Commission plan to focus?

A7: We have a very full agenda. First, we plan to work closely with the State Department on implementation of our report recommendations. We sense that senior State leaders recognize that we have raised some serious issues and they seem to be keen to do what can be done to deal with those issues – particularly those that might be characterized as the "low-hanging fruit." Second, we are working on a "Memorandum to the President-Elect," which will lay out the Commission's perspective on the key PD-related issues of the day. We also have meetings scheduled for October and November, at Yale University and the University of Texas, respectively, where we'll hear from a wide range of distinguished interlocutors on transition-related issues, as well as other topics. These meetings follow on successful meetings we have held over the last year at two of the country's top centers of academic expertise in public diplomacy, the University of Southern California and George Washington University. In terms of longer-term projects, we have three main priorities: 1) we want to play a significant role,

in collaboration with the State Department and academia, in developing the substantive PD training course that we are calling for; 2) we are developing a "Country Music Initiative" designed to leverage the power of America's most popular genre of pop music – 60 million daily listeners! – and the desire of the country music industry to get more involved in public diplomacy; and 3) we would like to host a "National Public Diplomacy Summit" in the summer of 2009 that would bring together many of the country's top minds and produce a proceedings paper that can serve as a useful reference for the new Administration. Without a doubt, this is an ambitious agenda, and we will work with Congress to try to ensure that the Commission has the resources it needs to undertake these and other projects, but for now, let me just say that the Commission is excited about the year ahead and very much looking forward to working closely with Congress to ensure that U.S. public diplomacy is as strong and effective as it can be.

Q8: What are your top three recommendations for improving the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy?

I have laid out what the Commission views as our top three priorities in the context of the human resources dimension of U.S. public diplomacy. More broadly, I think there are a number of things that can be done to enhance the overall effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy. Before I delve into those recommendations, however, let me make a basic point at the outset. I think we can and should view our Nation's public diplomacy as comprising two very distinct elements: cultural exchanges (writ-large) and policy advocacy. With respect to the exchanges part of the equation, I think our Nation is already doing a good job. We bring tens of thousands of foreign citizens to this country every year to learn about our values, culture, society and politics, and, in turn, we send thousands of Americans overseas to gain a better understanding of foreign countries. Though it is effectively impossible to measure the "bottom line" impact of these exchanges on our national interest, most of us in the public diplomacy world take as a matter of faith that exchanges further the important cause of mutual understanding and that the United States derives some unquantifiable, but real, benefit from this type of activity. This aspect of U.S. public diplomacy has very little to do, in a direct sense, with the U.S. policy initiatives of the day; for this reason, exchanges are often referred to as the "big wheels" of public diplomacy that continue to turn independently of what the United States is doing in the world, and that is as it should be. Presumably, the main way to "improve" on our work in the exchanges area would simply be to do more of it, and myriad reports on public diplomacy, including the American Academy of Diplomacy's recently-released budget study, have called for increased resources for exchanges. In fairness, and in a spirit of intellectual honesty, since we don't know for certain how these exchanges contribute to America's national interest "bottom line," it is not immediately self-evident that more is necessarily better; but that said, it probably is, albeit in some unquantifiable way.

Now, let me turn to the question of policy advocacy, which, I think, is the facet of U.S. public diplomacy at issue in your question. Here, I think there is considerable room for improvement.

First, at the most fundamental level, I think we need to do a much better job of taking public diplomacy considerations into account in our foreign policy deliberations. The American tradition of doing just that dates back literally to the Declaration of Independence itself, which articulates – in its first line – the "require[ment]" to show "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." At present, however, our basic model seems to be: "Let's craft our foreign policies on the basis of our national interests, then bring in public diplomacy after-the-fact to clean up any mess that we might have made along the way." The central premise of this approach is that global public opinion is somehow *external* to our national interest calculus, rather than an integral part of it. The Commission views that premise as fallacious. We have argued, as I have noted in my earlier comments and responses, that our bureaucratic apparatus seems, on its face, ill- (or at least, oddly) suited to ensuring the integration of PD considerations into the foreign policy-making process. In fact, though, the anomalous bureaucracy is probably just a symptom of the larger problem, which is the failure to conceive of favorable foreign public opinion toward the United States as a legitimate national interest unto itself. Somewhere in our decision-making process, the question needs to be asked: "If we pursue this policy, will the gain we realize by doing so merit the price we might pay in terms of diminished standing in the world, reduced moral credibility, etc.?" Conceptually, I believe the answer to that question can be either affirmative or negative, but my point here is that it is not clear that policy-makers are even asking the question, let alone answering it.

Second, we need to radically improve the quality of our messaging process – to the extent we can even speak of such a "process" in the first place. At present, there is a very ad hoc quality to our communications with the world. We are communicating as if there weren't a bottom line. As I noted in my testimony, the Foreign Service – unlike, say, presidential campaigns or top-flight advertising firms – does not recruit for expertise in this particular discipline, and neither do we test or train for it. On top of these obvious flaws in our system, we don't seem to have a mechanism whereby we bring public opinion polling, research and analysis into our message-crafting process in a methodical, systematic way. In fact, such data should be informing and even driving our communications efforts, just as they do in the "real worlds" of politics and business. We also continue to do a poor job of measuring the effectiveness of our efforts, and, as a direct result, the feedback and adjustment/correction part of our messaging process – an important part of any communications campaign – is virtually non-existent. As a result of these deficiencies, we generally don't know if we're succeeding or failing in our communications efforts; we're flailing. For these reasons, I believe there is a lot of room for improvement in our messaging process.

Third, I think our Nation would be well served to adopt a more modest and humble tenor in our communications with foreign publics. As we all know, and as myriad recent studies of global public opinion have clearly established, our Nation's standing in the world has declined significantly in recent years. What I think is sometimes overlooked in this discussion is that *style* has probably accounted for a significant percentage of this decline. In other words, it's not just what we do, it's how we talk about what we're

doing. Too often, we articulate and justify our policies to the world as if we were speaking to voters in Iowa. But, of course, audiences in India, Iraq and Iran hear and process information very differently than audiences in Iowa. What might sound "decisive" and "strong" to a domestic ear, can sound "stubborn" and "heavy-handed" overseas. A greater sense of humility in our diplomacy – diplomacy which will continue to be backed by our extraordinary strength and resolve, of course – can go a long way toward restoring America's standing as a nation among nations. This is something the new Administration ought to consider and explore.

" A Reliance on Smart Power: Reforming the Public Diplomacy Bureaucracy"

Responses from Stephen M. Chaplin November 14, 2008

QUESTIONS

1.) You mentioned in your testimony that the current staffing levels for public diplomacy in the State Department are 24 percent less than staffing levels in the year 1986. To increase staffing to appropriate levels by the year 2014, you recommend that the State Department hire 234 new direct-hire employees along with 200 locally employed staff.

How should the U.S. direct-hire employees be distributed to make our public diplomacy more effective?

ANSWER:
If approved, the ultimate distribution of the recommended increases will depend upon priorities and conditions at the time. However, for planning purposes, based on current information, we proposed the following distribution for the subject staff increases:

- For the African region, 26 U.S. direct hires (USDH) and 11 Locally Employed Staff (LES), primarily to address shortfalls in current staffing models and projected workload at posts associated with the proposed increases in educational; exchange programs.
- For the East Asia and Pacific region, 30 USDH and 31 LES, primarily to address shortfalls in current staffing models and projected workload at posts to support educational exchange increases.
- European and Eurasian region, 39 USDH and 41 LES, primarily to address shortfalls in current staffing models and projected workload increase especially in the Central and Eastern European country programs.
- Near East region, 33 USDH and 47 LES, to address current staffing shortfalls, projected increased workload in Iraq and increased exchange program support workload throughout the region.
- South and Central Asia region, 30 USDH and 47 LES, to address current staffing shortfalls, projected program workload in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and other countries in the region, and to support projected exchange program increases.

- Western Hemisphere region, 30 USDH and 21 LES, largely to address current staffing shortfalls and provide increased support to handle projected educational exchange program increases.
- Domestic Bureau Offices
  43 USDH to address current staffing shortfalls, primarily in the Educational and Cultural Affairs Bureau (ECA) and the International Information Programs Bureau (IIP). (Note: Staff increases related to ECA's exchange program enhancements and to website improvements in IIP are not included in this category. They are noted below.

The above information relates to the recommendation for 234 new direct-hire Americans and 200 locally employed staff dealt with needs resulting from staff shortfalls and current and projected Foreign Service workload increases. In addition, other resource proposals recommend another 253 direct-hire Americans and 169 LES to be distributed as follows by 2014:

- 145 domestic employees to implement the 100% increase in academic exchange programs, 50 % increase in international visitor programs and 25% in youth and other exchanges.
- 57 domestic employees to expand the capacity of English and foreign language advocacy websites aimed at experts, young professionals and youth abroad and to hire additional specialists in website design and program content.
- 40 U.S. direct hire and 160 LES (Locally Employed Staff) to establish 40 American Cultural Centers or Information Resource Centers in important overseas locations. Due to budget cuts in the 1990s and the post 9/11 security environment, centers, valuable venues in engaging college-age students, young professionals and other audiences about the U.S., its people, institutions and policies, were dramatically cut back. These centers would be established where threats of violence have lessened and program interest warrants.
- 6 U.S. direct-hire and 9 LES to strengthen USG advocacy capabilities with local and international media by establishing new "hub" operations in New Delhi, Tokyo and Mexico City. Current centers operate in London, Brussels and Dubai.
- 5 new domestic hires to expand the strategic speaker program (3) and provide greater support to key program partners in over 100 Binational Centers in Latin America (2).

The staff increases for public diplomacy in the American Academy of Diplomacy- Stimson Center report total 487 U.S. direct hires and 369 Locally Employed Staff.

QUESTION 2
You also mentioned in your testimony that public diplomacy officers need more training. You identified foreign languages, area studies, technology, public speaking and management among the areas where more training is needed. How do your views on training held at the Foreign Service Institute correspond to those of Ambassador Bagley?

ANSWER

I found the comments of Ambassador Bagley and those in the report issued by the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy to be quite useful. I thought that their conclusions about the need to recruit individuals with linguistic and communication skills and area knowledge, should be studied further.

In my 32 year career I had training at FSI in two languages (Spanish and Romanian) and I took training in Portuguese at a private language academy since my assignment was off cycle with the FSI Portuguese course. I found the instructors and their supervisors competent and devoted to assisting Foreign Service Officers in maximizing their language skills. Area Studies training at the time was spotty--usually one speaker a week covering the Western Hemisphere (Spanish) and I don't recall any meaningful Eastern European Area Studies program in the mid-1970s. I also took one or two brief tradecraft courses (Public Diplomacy) which I thought were valuable.

The FSI of today still offers excellent language courses and, in general, more refined and comprehensive area studies training. The quality and variety of Public Diplomacy tradecraft courses today dwarfs what was offered two decades ago. Technology and its applications for PD work is one basic factor in the change. In addition, the incorporation of USIA into the State Department in late 1999 no doubt also influenced the number of courses and the frequency with which they are offered. My impression is that FSI in a relatively short time has developed some solid courses which are beneficial particularly to entry-level and mid-level PD officers

and also to a relatively significant number of non-PD cone officers assigned to PD positions abroad.

That being said, I believe that much more needs to be done not only in exposing more officers to more courses early in their careers, but also to reviewing the standards that officers should be required to meet, particularly in language skills, area study knowledge and public speaking. There should be greater required opportunities for PD officers to increase their knowledge of the application of new technologies to PD work and to management training.

Language Training

The FSI scale for language competency runs from zero (no ability to converse intelligently) to 5 (native speaker equivalency). On the FSI scale for acceptable competency in a Romance language (e.g. Spanish, French, Italian, Romanian) after a 24 week course students are expected to reach a level of 3 in speaking and 3 in reading.

From personal experience I understand the stress involved in spending eight to ten hours in class time and homework daily, all week in studying a language for six months. Upon entering the State Department one of the new officer's main tasks is to get off of "language probation" in order to qualify for tenure, promotion and future assignments. In the case of the Romance languages the student must attain a 3-3 (Speaking & Reading) level to be considered qualified. That is a reasonable standard for someone just beginning their career.

As the individual moves up the ranks to positions of greater responsibility, complexity and dealing with higher level host nation officials and professionals, the 3-3 level is simply not adequate. One must possess greater substantive knowledge of grammar and vocabulary (including, if possible, learning local slang expressions) and the self-confidence that comes with this knowledge. Some mid-level and all senior-level FSOs must be qualified to negotiate (formally or informally) with the host government; give a substantive press interview or make a speech in the local language to an important organization.

It is not clear to me whether the Department is rigorously insisting that officers with Romance language competence achieve a higher level to

function professionally, i.e. a 4-4 (speaking and reading) by offering sufficient incentives, arranging increased training if required or following through on language exams after the officer departs post. Naturally there are many variants in language learning requirements between world or regional languages and hard languages (e.g. Japanese, Chinese, Arabic) and one-country languages (e.g. Finnish, Greek, Hungarian, Thai)

Therefore, I am only addressing Romance language training as an example of what should be required of officers if they are to be truly effective in representing the United States abroad. I urge that a similar look be taken at other languages to determine what sort of additional training might realistically be required of officers serving more than one tour in a country or region. Mastery of very difficult languages requires more than just the introductory course in say, Chinese or Japanese. What would the Department require in terms of budgetary and staffing increases to provide this additional training?

There are many considerations which make implementation of expanded language training difficult, ranging from inadequate resources, the current insufficient size of the Department FSO corps, limited facilities and other factors.

However, I think if FSI was provided with more funding, teachers and space they could probably meet this mission. It might be more cost effective in the short term, on a case by case basis, to seek training, either at a private academy in Washington or perhaps abroad in a country where the language is spoken. In the past there were such opportunities, especially where two years' of language study was considered essential for basic instruction.

Area Studies

As to the other training, except in rare instances, all FSOs should attend area studies training prior to an assignment to a new region. While I personally know of the Western Hemisphere area studies offerings since I direct the weekly Mexican Advanced Area Studies training, my impression is that FSI is doing a generally effective job with the students who are enrolled. There may be some instances--assuming adequate resources were provided-- where it would serve the Department to assign FSOs to year-long university

training, where they could combine some language training with courses on history, economics, culture and literature of a specific country or region. This valuable, but costly investment, should be reserved for individuals who'll devote several tours in a particular region, e.g. Asia, the Middle East or Eastern Europe, or a particular country, e.g. China, Japan or India.

Technology, Public Speaking and Management

As regards increased training opportunities in mastering applied technology, public speaking and more training in management, I believe that if sufficient funding is provided, PD leadership in the Department of State and FSI leadership should discuss the desired outcomes and whether FSI has the capability of providing the required courses. It may be necessary for elements of this training to be done with private organizations, for example in the technology instruction and public speaking areas. All PD officers would benefit from management training. focusing on management of personnel and programs and budget planning.

The major point is to establish an awareness at the highest levels of the Department of State of the importance of additional training in these critical areas, among others, to enable PD officers abroad to perform at the level required to produce the results the nation needs from its Public Diplomacy component.

QUESTION 3
Should our educational exchange programs put a greater emphasis on students who are attending community colleges and technical schools, instead of just on those who are attending graduate schools and universities?

ANSWER

The American Academy of Diplomacy and Stimson Center report entitled "A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future", focused exclusively on resources controlled by the Secretary of State. Therefore we analyzed, for instance, current academic and professional exchange programs. We reached the conclusion that the Fulbright student and professor exchanges, youth exchanges and the International Visitor program involving rising leaders from around the world selected by U.S. Embassy staff have demonstrated over decades their value and cost effectiveness. It was our determination

that large funding increases for these programs coupled with sufficient administrative staffing support increases in Washington and abroad would enable the Department to dramatically enhance the impact of these programs by involving significantly more qualified participants.

Our conclusion is the same as that reached over the years by U.S. and foreign university educators, the thousands of alumni spread across the world and Department personnel involved in the implementation process in Washington and abroad. I believe that every report issued by public policy organizations in the past decade which examined the role of Public Diplomacy has come to the same conclusion.

Furthermore, recent U.S. presidents and the Congress have often increased funding and the scope of existing programs while proposing new programs involving high school and college youth in, for instance, the Middle East and new nations in Eastern Europe. They've undertaken these initiatives because of a belief that exchanges are a key to mutual understanding and enhance U.S. national security and our global strategic political, military and economic interests.

Aside from USG-sponsored exchange programs there are a number of worthy exchange and scholarship programs that support study abroad by U.S. university students that are important complements to the programs examined in our report, but they lie beyond the scope of our recommendations because they are outside of the Secretary of State's direct authority.

The Department of Education and the National Science Foundation, for example, host significant exchange programs as elements of the U.S. higher education budget and a number of government-funded foundations host university scholarship programs. The Academy of American Diplomacy sees such programs--and others proposed, such as the Paul Simon Study Abroad Foundation-- as needed parts of a broader public diplomacy framework and as consistent with our report's recommendations in this area.

Personally, I think that any well designed, well funded, and well administered program that introduces American youth--including students from community colleges and technical schools, among other educational institutions-- to foreign languages and cultures is an important, healthy step

in creating a more aware and prepared American citizenry. The selection process of the students is of course key. The in-country design of the program, candid student reactions and the organizers' evaluations are also significant elements in improving any U.S. exchange activity.

In sum, we view such programs as vital complements to the programs administered by the Public Diplomacy specialists in the Department of State and the private organizations with which they work. In order to achieve our national purposes, I strongly recommend that any new public funding for these other initiatives should be in addition to--not instead of-- the program and staffing increases we have carefully identified and recommended in the American Academy-of Diplomacy and Stimson Center report.

QUESTION 4
In your testimony, you mentioned an interdependence of public diplomacy and activities. Can you please elaborate on this?

ANSWER

The basic content of Public Diplomacy work, in my view, involves two distinctive but related elements. The first part is what we call "personal contact." Basically this means that the PD officer abroad is using his/her skills and knowledge of the language, history and culture of the nation to which she/he is assigned to establish a solid, trusting direct relationship with host country citizens.

In these relationships, the PD officer is attempting to influence host country nationals' understanding of the U.S. in general and USG policies with the ultimate goal of producing supporters of both. This personal contact could be a business conversation over a meal in a restaurant or in the officer's home or in the PD officer's office. This is a one-on-one contact that involves an exchange of information and opinions. The Public Diplomacy officer might be sizing up the contact to determine if he or she would be a good candidate for an exchanges program or to be added to the embassy guest list for lectures, cultural or social events. In the case of host country nationals already known to be friendly and supportive of the U.S., a newly arrived PD officer might engage in similar contact as a means of reinforcing the embassy relationship with this person.

The second essential element for the conduct of public diplomacy concerns programs and activities. These can range from hosting a concert to organizing a lecture; distributing press releases to local media; managing the embassy website, hosting a reception; attempting to place a video product on local television or assisting the visit of a local tv crew to the U.S. to cover a particular story; managing a local Fulbright Commission program which selects host country students and professors for U.S. study; and sending a rising labor leader, journalist or politician to the U.S. under the International Visitors program to learn more about his/her professional field and the U.S. in general.

Many activities allow PD officers to establish or enhance communication with multiple individuals at one event. Placement of a print story or video in the media reach, ideally, an even broader audience--most of whom the PD officer doesn't know and may never know. But the decision is made that the vehicle for publishing or airing that information reaches an audience we deem important.

In recent years as the Internet has spread globally, more time and resources are devoted to attempting to reach youth, young professionals and experts. Here the PD officer has an embassy website utilizing information usually provided by Washington. Examples are speech texts, official declarations, or stories on major issues involving the host nation, the region or the world.

This presents a major challenge to the PD officer since he or she may never know who decides to view the website. They only know how many "hits" the website generates. I would characterize the decision to invest in Internet programming as one which involves the opportunity to provide information to thousands of people at a time. The bet is that individuals interested in domestic politics and international issues, including the host country-U.S. relationship, will want to visit the site. That's a positive, even though PD officers are used to dealing with identifiable people in most other activities identifiable rather than a self-selecting, unidentifiable audience.

Thus to do his/her job effectively, the PD officer must have a broad array of program tools available to complement his/her individual knowledge, skills and personality. It is the variety of program activities that distinguishes PD operations from other embassy sections. With a reasonably sized staff and greater financial resources, PD can expand activities and, in theory, increase

impact. The obverse is also generally true--fewer resources managed by a small staff generally result in reduced opportunities for contact and less impact on host citizens.

For these reasons I believe that the people (PD FSOs and their GS or FSN colleagues), funds (controlled at post and in Washington designed to assist the post) and the breadth of activities in which they engage are inseparable. With a qualified staff (local national employees as well as American officers), adequate funding to conduct a broad range of creative programming and an evaluation capability, a PD section can fulfill its objectives, especially in a societies with a democratic regimes. Accomplishments are of course possible--and essential--in non-democratic states as well, but the horizon for success in those situations is more limited where autocratic governments actively seek to hinder USG contact with their citizens.

QUESTION 5

In your testimony, you mentioned that the State Department's public diplomacy efforts should be reflected in comprehensive program and activity evaluations. However, you recommend that this will not require additional staff and can be fulfilled by a contractual obligation. How did you come to this conclusion?

ANSWER

The evaluation studies that we recommend concern evaluating some of PD's major activities. Evaluation studies on two such activities have been undertaken on one occasion. What is needed now are larger samples in order to reasonably determine the projects' strengths and any weaknesses. I refer to the Mission Activity Tracker (MAT) and the Performance Management Data Collection Project (PMDCP). We also urge that a major evaluation be done on a major International Information Program (IIP), initially either IIP's advocacy websites or their Strategic Speakers Series. The speakers' program involves recruiting first-rate speakers to address important foreign audiences on critical bilateral, regional or global issues in countries where understanding of USG positions on specific issues is especially important.

The first two programs (MAT and PMDCP) have already had initial

evaluation studies. In the case of MAT, the study was conducted by a private sector research company at several different sites around the globe. The thrust of the study was comparing attitudes toward the U.S. and knowledge of the U.S. between two cohort groups--one with sustained interest over time in the U.S. and another with little contact with the U.S.

In the case of the PMDCP, this project attempts to measure through a variety of factors, whether PD activities are effectively reaching the target audiences and the degree to which these activities measure up to State Department and embassy-established objectives. An initial study has been done but much deeper analysis is required to determine if the existing program is providing the data needed by senior officials in the office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of International Information Programs.

In addition, PD leadership requires up to date evaluations for their approaches to OMB for continued adequate funding for the implementation of these projects.

It is my impression that the Undersecretary's office, ECA and IIP have sufficient staff to conduct certain types of in-house evaluation studies on programs, products and activities. However the projects mentioned above require trained professional evaluators with the capacity to conduct research in several locales simultaneously around the world.

This is simply beyond the scope of PD offices--they lack the expertise and organizational capability to conduct these studies. The funds requested-- $ 1 million each for the MAT and PMDCP studies--are reasonable figures for international studies of this magnitude and scope. An additional factor is that by having a respected, qualified private sector firm conduct this research, the final product should be credible when the results are analyzed and discussed within State, at the OMB and elsewhere in the executive branch if necessary.

In the case of the proposed IIP evaluation study of either the websites or the Strategic Speakers Series, to my knowledge no major evaluation has been done of either program. In the case of the websites, a major IIP activity, many are new and evolving. In the case of the Speakers program, this too

affects all PD operations abroad. In the "A Foreign Affairs Budget for The Future" report, we determined that IIP leadership should decide which study to do first, but with the intention of conducting the second study as soon after 2010 as possible.

The reasoning for studies of the advocacy websites and the Speakers' program is that these are two of PD's most important undertakings which have the potential to grow and create greater impact. The recommendation that a private sector firm be hired to conduct the study is the same as for the two previous projects: lack of expertise in PD to effectively handle this huge undertaking and the credibility that will result from an impartial study's findings. We think the study results will be important for PD leadership as they make their case for funding these activities initially before Department budget preparers for the FY-2010 or FY-2011 budget. If their funding requests are approved internally, PD leadership will be able to provide OMB examiners with a study which is comprehensive, timely and credible.

QUESTION 6

What are your top three recommendations for improving the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy.

My top three are:

- Increasing the number of PD officer and local employee support staff positions in the field and the volume and quality of field programs they administer.
- Following Washington training assign PD officers immediately to field PD positions.
- The President should appoint to the positions of Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs; Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs and Assistant Secretary of State for International Information Programs, respected experts in international affairs, international communication, international cultural and educational exchange programs with demonstrated records of knowledge of foreign cultures and the ability to communicate American society and values to all levels of foreign audiences.

1.) Increasing the number of PD officer and local employee support staff positions in the field and the volume and quality of field programs they administer.

My response to question one provides specific recommended Public Diplomacy staff increase levels in the FY 2010-2014 timeframe. A great deal needs to be done to help restore the U.S. image throughout the world. The development of more thoughtful and realistic USG policy initiatives is the first major ingredient in any effort to convince foreign audiences that the U.S. seriously wishes to work together for mutual benefit. Public Diplomacy's role is to explain why these policies were selected and discuss their meaning for US relations in bilateral, regional and global contexts.

PD operations in our embassies and consulates abroad must be beefed up and provided with adequate program funding in order to improve and expand contact with a variety of local audiences. A larger, trained staff can engage in greater substantive personal contact with more people. Increased educational and cultural exchange budgets will permit the inclusion of more qualified professionals and students in educational and cultural exchange programs designed to further the participants' direct exposure to the United States. The establishment of a new wave of American Cultural Centers, especially in those countries with limited contact with the United States, means that youth and young professionals can through books, Internet access, lectures and cultural programs expand their knowledge of the U.S., its diversity and open nature.

In sum, a greater presence of PD staffers with first-rate outreach cultural/educational facilities and increased program funding will result in greater understanding of the U.S. and its objectives among a broader audience base.

2.) Following Washington training, PD officers should immediately be assigned to PD positions in American embassies and consulates.

PD officers, like those in other State Department specialties (or cones) enter the Department eager to begin their careers abroad working in assignments for which their skills and experience best qualify them. Unfortunately PD officers, and those in other cones other than Consular,

are required to begin their overseas careers doing consular work. While first-hand knowledge of consular functions is important to all Foreign Service Officers, this experience could be acquired in a brief one or two month rotation rather than in an obligatory 2-4 year assignment.

This policy, based on the comments of many junior PD specialists, serves to erode new officers' enthusiasm and denies them the opportunity to both learn their craft from more senior PD colleagues at post and the possibility of demonstrating their skills in writing, supervision, time management and use of the foreign language with PD contacts. One would be hard pressed to think of a commercial enterprise that would treat its best new hires in similar fashion--assigning them day to day job responsibilities for two to four years which have no direct bearing on their field of specialization.

To make matters worse, in some cases, after two tours abroad, FSOs are brought back to Washington for a domestic assignment. Therefore it's possible that a Public Diplomacy cone officer could spend four years abroad and two to four years in Washington without having participated in Public Diplomacy work. Or if the officer's Washington assignment does involve PD work, he or she has no practical PD field experience to utilize in understanding how the Washington position can best relate to field requirements.

A Department decision to have PD officers assigned to PD positions for their initial overseas tour would have significant manpower implications for the Department's Human Resources bureau and so this change should be made in an orderly fashion. But the change needs to be made in the interest of the PD specialists and the Department's own self interest in utilizing its officer corps skills to the maximum starting at the beginning of their careers.

3.) The President should appoint to the positions of Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs; the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and the Assistant Secretary of State for International Information Programs (IIP), respected experts with backgrounds in international affairs, international communication or international cultural and educational exchange programs. The nominees should have demonstrable records of knowledge of foreign cultures and

the ability to communicate information and opinions on American society and values to all levels of foreign audiences.

This might be the most important bureaucratic step required to improve the effectiveness of U.S. Public Diplomacy. It is also the only one of these three recommendations which is beyond the direct control of the Department of State since, in our political system, it is the President who nominates candidates for these political positions who then must be approved by the Senate. These positions are important in determining the quality, size and direction of Public Diplomacy in the State Department because they are largely in charge of PD (or in the Department's nomenclature, R) human and financial resources.

Rank and reputation count for a great deal within the State Department. That's why it is important that the head of R is one of the handful of Under Secretaries in the Department. The establishment in late 2008 of an Assistant Secretary position to head International Information Programs is a long overdue move, and it means that now both IIP and ECA are led by Assistant Secretaries. This helps move R up to a bureaucratic level where its' leadership might be able to better deal with other Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries in internal Department decisions on resource allocation and policy issues.

But a major step in improving PD's effectiveness will rest in the quality of the appointments to these three positions. For dealing internally in the foreign affairs community and with the American public, it is important to select internationally-respected experts who have devoted some or all of their professional careers to international affairs, including communications or exchange activities and who possess knowledge of foreign cultures and the ability to effectively communicate to U.S. and foreign audiences.

Ideally these three individuals will have developed over a life's work contact with foreign intellectuals, academics, literary figures and journalists among others and will have published widely in professional or academic journals, mainstream newspapers or magazines. The PD leaders should have prior experience in dealing with the U.S. Congress on substantive programs and in seeking program funding. They must be equally at home in the world of ideas and values, as in the Main Streets

of U.S. communities. They must understand that above and beyond the formal task of representing a particular Administration, they and their staffs have the larger responsibility of explaining American society, our history, institutions and values to foreigners, topics which transcend the here and now of specific bilateral, regional or global U.S. policies.

These leaders should willingly devote time to seeking the active involvement of the American private sector in complementing the Department's PD work. That support might come by way of obtaining appropriate U.S. business corporate funding support for sending artistic groups on foreign tours or linking NGOs up with foreign counterparts or taking advantage of American experts' private visits abroad to meet with interested local groups. Enlightened PD leadership can provide opportunities for interested private sector Americans to complement State efforts in having meaningful dialogue with foreign audiences of varying backgrounds and socio-economic levels.

Finally, the President or the Secretary of State should make clear to candidates for the Under Secretary and two Assistant Secretary positions, that while they serve at the will of the President, they will be expected to remain in their positions for at least one presidential term. It will probably take close to a year for them to become adequately knowledgeable about the PD field and Washington operations and to understand how best to maneuver within the State Department. A second year would be required to put their stamp on program design and to determine how best to utilize scarce resources. Which leaves the occupants probably 18 months or less to implement their priorities, evaluate them, and redesign where necessary.

R in the Department since late 1999 has suffered from rapid turnover of Under Secretaries and lengthy time gaps before replacements were on board. Continuity is vitally important in leadership of the Department PD effort and those interested in the highest leadership positions should do their part by committing to serve for one full presidential term.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to The Honorable Jill A. Schuker
From Senator Daniel K. Akaka

"A Reliance on Smart Power – Reforming the Public Diplomacy Bureaucracy"
September 23, 2008

1. Do you believe that the June 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication has been an effective guide for our public diplomacy efforts?

In response to your question, I am struck by the fact that in all the testimony presented, including opening statements by the Subcommittee members, this Report was not specifically mentioned. Perhaps this demonstrates that the Report is not seen as "an effective guide" for the future but perhaps one that has a policy agenda.

In reviewing the National Security Strategy as produced by the Administration a year and a half ago, including its reference to shaping public diplomacy strategies and responses to the "*war* on terror", it is closely tied to policy position rhetoric at the time which is not especially productive going forward. Also missing in the mission statement is any reference to global concerns about pandemics, climate change, environmental, food and population challenges, or multi-lateral responses, nor is there any mention of reaching out to those who may *not* share our "ideals", a crucial function of effective public diplomacy.

Therefore, my view is that this 2007 Public Diplomacy Strategy document needs both reworking and updating in light of new thinking and new realities, and a more informed view of the role and possibilities of public diplomacy as part of its mission, priorities and strategic objectives, which are overly narrow.

2. If you could design a national public diplomacy strategy, what would be the essential public diplomacy priorities?

The first ingredient for any effective national public diplomacy strategy must be a common operational understanding of what we mean by public diplomacy and not confusing it or diluting its importance by treating it as a handmaiden to specific policies or to other functions which are independent of the PD function. Public diplomacy is not a press or spokesperson function. It requires a professional corps which is trained to practice and execute public diplomacy.

Second, there needs to be the administration-wide and public message from The White House that public diplomacy is a meaningful and essential tool in our diplomatic arsenal

and must be part of the integrated thinking about policy and its public "face". It must inform policy, be part of testing the bona fides of policy, and by keeping lines of communication and dialogue open, not fall victim to the failures of any one policy.

Third, public diplomacy must be effectively structured, at home and abroad, within government and with the creation of linkages to actors outside of government who are essential to its effectiveness. There have been a number of reports that have discussed the architecture of public diplomacy and the need for change. It is my view that the present structure is not operating effectively, certainly not optimally. It is marginalized in its present environment, without the resources or the professional staffing to enable respect, gravitas, and a "place at the table," much less lead a fully effective interagency function.

Fourth, public diplomacy should be anticipatory not solely reactive. While the lack of resources in general for public diplomacy at the State Department created major challenges even before the current financial squeeze, the disparity between the funding for the Department of Defense and the Department of State for this function, will never fully allow State to be in the driver's seat. In addition, the ability to prioritize public diplomacy initiatives, should be based on targets of opportunity as well as challenge. We should be looking ahead to future, not just immediate, gaps in our overseas relationships. (China or Latin America or Eastern and Central Europe and North Africa , rather than solely the Islamic world, crucial although that is as a priority).

Fifth, if we hope to reverse even some of the damage to America's image over these last years, we must enable public diplomats to be absolutely credible and empowered, well versed in communications skills, professional and conversant in language and culture. This means Public Diplomacy being led by someone of gravitas with strong communications skills, who believes in the mission and isn't personally identified or tied into a specific substantive foreign policy initiative as an architect. Public diplomacy, if it is to stay at the State Department must reassert itself into the fabric of the Department effectively, as a respected component of the Foreign Service and as a route to advancement.

Sixth, the priorities for public diplomacy must be understood by the American public as essential ingredients in effective U.S. interaction abroad, global security, and a tool of first resort in effective U.S. moral leadership. Also, citizens—business executives, young people, students, older Americans, tourist, artists and educators—all need to envision themselves as part of the unofficial but vital fabric of U.S. public diplomacy and its national values and priorities. Public diplomacy begins at home with language and cultural training and a better understanding of history, changing demographics and global development needs. Enhancing national service and setting goals for increased engagement, exchanges and service will provide a new, different and enhanced foundation for effective public diplomacy.

Seventh, and most important in terms of U.S. security at home and abroad, there needs to be a broad, deep and sober "micro" look at what public diplomacy programs have worked and which do not, why, and what corrections are needed—be it broadcasting, exchanges,

interagency initiatives, libraries, functioning at Embassies, cultural outreach as well as national service and development initiatives.

3. Mr. Bereuter offered a cautionary note about working too closely with the private sector in the formulation of our public diplomacy outreach. Such efforts could be perceived as propaganda by the general public in another country, undermining U.S. credibility.

   What limits should the U.S. government observe as it works with private sector partners on improving its public diplomacy?

The national interest is served by public diplomacy operating effectively as a tool in our diplomatic arsenal as carried out by the United States Government. Only the USG has the constitutional responsibility for the "general welfare" and security of the American public and for operating with the public interest uppermost in mind.

I do not believe that the private sector should or can have the **leading** role in public diplomacy. By definition and practice, the private sector has a responsibility to its shareholders and to its "bottom line", not necessarily in conflict with the public interest but motivated differently. The private sector also may employ tactics and actions that are not or would not be consonant with the appropriate definition of public diplomacy in reaching out to the global "street."

The private sector, however, has an integral and useful role to play in effective public diplomacy. It is a vital and often underused actor and its energies should be harnessed on behalf of public diplomacy's national interest goals. The private sector is also an important conveyer belt for information and action, as business often operates even in arenas where the USG for policy reasons may not have full representation.

Public diplomacy can learn from those in the private sector in influence and outreach, but public diplomacy, in my view, must not be morphed into public relations or gimmickry or the "selling" of America. This perception, which is often equated in the public mind with the private sector and product promotion—a "Madison Avenue" attitude and behavior- would undermine the credibility of US public diplomacy. To the extent that the US government is perceived through these lenses, it is indicative of the failure of our public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy must be construed as a serious exercise in communication, learning and dialogue. It has both short and long term importance to US national interests. We must look for ways of demonstrating the essential ingredients that constitute American life and values. Our recent election for example—the process itself—is perhaps one of our best indicators of effective public diplomacy. Diversity, peaceful resolution of issues, acceptance of differences and results, are all elements in explaining America to others

and dialoguing about why common values, commitments and beliefs allow such a process to work.

The USG needs to maximize the opportunities offered by the private sector as a conduit for assistance, ideas and opportunities for public diplomacy—exchanges, certain funding, scholarship support, gatherings of specialists, production of certain materials for distribution to Americans traveling abroad, patterns of behavior, and the appropriate sharing and teaching of American know-how. Effective liaison needs to be established between the public and private sectors to make this work effectively . There are some very interesting and serious public diplomacy reports that have been birthed discussing the role of the private sector in public diplomacy (including the new Brookings Institution Report) and these should be closely considered by the Subcommittee for viability and opportunity.

4. In Ambassador Bagley's testimony, she mentioned the presence of a "glass ceiling." It appears that fewer public diplomacy officers rise to senior positions in the State Department as officers in other career tracks.

   Do you believe that this is an organizational culture issue at the Department? How can this best be corrected?

I agree with Ambassador Bagley's testimony in this regard and her outline of the situation based on the 2008 United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy Report "Getting the People Part Right: A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of U.S. Public Diplomacy" which she cites.

The "culture" issue at the Department of State in regard to the treatment of certain officers (such as those engaged in public diplomacy) is not a new one, nor one that has not been discussed in previous reports. As Ambassador Bagley cites, there also has been some improvement—although "equality" has not been achieved. The Report, as cited in the Ambassador's testimony, suggests certain recommendations to rectify this situation with which I agree.

However, it will require an attitude change as well, underscored from the "top"—the Secretary of State as well as The White House – in terms of the centrality of public diplomacy, the professionalism with which it is regarded, and the importance of its portfolio and practice to the national interest. That possibility exists as we begin a new Administration.

It also requires funding and recognition by Congress that will identify public diplomacy as a highly regarded function being carried out and coordinated by State and one that is being paid more particular attention with benchmarks for change and progress. This also must be the message within the Foreign Service itself from recruiting to attitude to promotions.

5. In your testimony, you stated that the merger of the United States Information Agency into the Department of State caused a serious disruption of our public diplomacy efforts. However, you did not recommend bringing back an independent public diplomacy agency.

   Can you explain how you came to this conclusion?

Part of this explanation is found in my responses to previous questions:

- If the attitude were different at State especially, the role of public diplomacy and the treatment of the cadre of professionals would be perceived and handled and executed differently in terms of respect and integration.
- If funding was commensurate with the mission and the need, the value of public diplomacy would be definitionally more highly regarded.
- If training for Ambassadors and Foreign Service Officers raised the level of importance and centrality for the public diplomacy mission at DOS headquarters and abroad, the architecture and attitude of State and other departments would be better suited to enhancing the public diplomacy mission.

In addition: I am trying to be reality-based in terms of what is possible in the shorter-term. I think the possibility of creating a new agency at this point—given the resource constrictions, the state of the economy, the intensity of disagreement over the dissolution of USIA and how to carry out this mission effectively—all do not dictate a short-term, new agency solution. In the many reports in which I have participated or have read, this is not the universally preferred alternative. The alternatives that have been suggested to State, indeed, have been varied over these last ten years right up to the present.

I believe it is worthwhile to consider a different architecture from the present one, and have said so in my testimony—including the possibility of involvement by The White House and the National Security Council (where I have served). However, if there is going to be a change it must be a well-thought out change and not a political compromise which throws the baby out with the bathwater. The new President and his administration and Congress should *consider* an independent agency in the longer term, but perhaps one that has a larger function or a different emphasis in function for public diplomacy, and that is updated and responsive to the realities of a Twenty-First Century world. The White Oak Conference in January for example, will be looking at this very issue.

6. You and Mr. Bereuter appear to take different positions about whether or not a close tie between the White House and the State Department for public diplomacy would be a good idea.

   Can you please clarify your position on this issue?

If effectively crafted and empowered by The White House and the President, I believe that a special or senior advisor to the President makes sense. It gives public diplomacy the direct imprimatur of the President in terms of underscoring the importance and linkage of reaching the global public on common concerns, as I described in my testimony. It is not an operational function; it is a liaison function. It is not a policy function or a specific one-way communications function, but as I described in the previous answer, it underscores its importance to the United States as a primary diplomatic tool to and for the global public. This person would serve as a coordinating point to think about new architecture, new ideas and public-private sector action in heightening the visibility of this important dialogue function in the public interest. Like anything else, it needs to be handled with wisdom and sensitivity, used not abused in terms of role and meaning.

7. What are your top three recommendations for improving the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy?

A. Recognition by those in the official power structure, up and down the food chain, in the administration and in congress, of the importance of public diplomacy with an agreed upon understanding of what it is and what it is not.

B. Adequate funding—at a minimum-- that enables public diplomacy to function effectively, based on a thorough vetting and understanding of its mission and programs, and assures a primacy and a voice.

C. A de-linkage between tying public diplomacy to specific pet policy initiatives instead of U.S. values—including listening/dialoguing. There has been instead a "presentation of self-interest" , which has created a cynicism about public diplomacy—and the United States-- turning our listeners into skeptics and public diplomacy into perceived propaganda or spin as opposed to credible dialogue.

GETTING THE PEOPLE PART RIGHT

A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of U.S. Public Diplomacy

2005

The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy

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United States
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

2008

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June 25, 2008

To the President, Congress, Secretary of State and the American People:

The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, authorized pursuant to Public Law 110-113, hereby submits its report on U.S. government public diplomacy programs and activities.

The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy is a bipartisan panel created by Congress in 1948 to formulate and recommend policies and programs to carry out the public diplomacy functions vested in U.S. government (USG) entities, and to appraise the effectiveness of USG public diplomacy activities.

Our 2008 report takes up the important and relatively under-explored topic of the human resources dimension of U.S. public diplomacy. Specifically, this report examines how we recruit, test, train and evaluate our PD professionals; and whether the State Department's current bureaucratic structure, both in Washington and overseas, is conducive to the integration of public diplomacy considerations into State Department policy-making. We believe that getting the human resources dimension of public diplomacy right can go a long way toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of our nation's outreach to the world. We hope that this report, in casting a spotlight on this important basket of issues and offering some concrete recommendations for improvement, contributes to that process.

The Commission salutes the talented and dedicated practitioners of U.S. public diplomacy in Washington, D.C. and U.S. missions worldwide. Their job has never been more important to the security of our nation than it is today, or more demanding. We thank these men and women for their service and wish them the best in all their efforts.

Respectfully Submitted,

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GETTING THE PEOPLE PART RIGHT

A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of U.S. Public Diplomacy

The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy

2000

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction: Public diplomacy—the effort to understand, inform and influence foreign publics in support of foreign policy objectives—has never been more important to the security of our nation than it is today. The challenges confronting U.S. public diplomacy (PD) are varied and there is no single easy fix for them. Getting the human resources dimension of public diplomacy right, however, can go a long way toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of our nation's outreach to the world. This report casts a spotlight on this important basket of issues and offers some concrete recommendations for improvement.

Section I: The Department of State makes no special effort to recruit individuals into the PD career track who would bring into the Foreign Service experience or skills specifically relevant to the work of communicating with and influencing foreign publics. The Commission recommends that the Department make a more concerted effort to recruit candidates for the PD career track who have experience and skills that are more directly relevant to the conduct of public diplomacy.

Section II: The Foreign Service Officer Test and Oral Assessment do not specifically test for public diplomacy instincts and communication skills. The Commission recommends that the Department modify its examination process, particularly the Oral Assessment, to include questions and tasks directly germane to the conduct of public diplomacy.

Section III: Public diplomacy training has never been stronger; nevertheless, it is not yet strong enough, and a number of conspicuous, and serious, blind-spots in the Department's public diplomacy training persist. The Commission recommends that the Department's Foreign Service Institute develop courses, comparable in quality to graduate-level university courses, in the area of communication theory, with special emphasis on political communication/rhetoric, advertising/marketing theory, and public opinion analysis; and that the Department establish a nine-month in-depth public diplomacy course for mid- to senior-level PD officers modeled on that currently offered to rising economic officers.

Section IV: The Department of State's employee evaluation report (EER) form lacks a section specifically devoted to public diplomacy outreach; it thus contains no inherent requirement that State employees actually engage in such outreach. Public diplomacy officers are being asked to spend the overwhelming majority of their time on administration and management, not outreach. The Commission recommends that the

Department build a specific PD requirement into the EER form itself, whereby Foreign Service officers (FSOs) are required to undertake a certain number of outreach events per rating period in order to be eligible for promotion that cycle; and that the Department require that all PD officers include in their work requirement objectives one or more specific tasks of directly engaging and influencing foreign publics on matters salient to current U.S. foreign policy or American society.

Section V: Though public diplomacy is now clearly built into the State Department structure in a way that it was not prior to the 1999 consolidation, it is more difficult to judge whether Department officials are taking public diplomacy into consideration in actual foreign policy decision-making to a greater degree, or with greater evident effect, than was the case prior to consolidation. The current bureaucratic arrangement via which PD is integrated into the Department's geographic bureaus, while generally deemed satisfactory by the current cohort of directors of these offices, is somewhat anomalous. The Commission recommends that the Department undertake a zero-based review of the PD area office staffing structure to determine if the current arrangement is functioning optimally.

Section VI: In the nearly nine years since the consolidation of the USIA into the State Department in 1999, the overseas public diplomacy staffing structure has remained essentially unchanged. Public affairs officers (PAOs) view themselves, and are viewed by others, more as managers and administrators than as expert communicators. The Commission recommends that the Department undertake a zero-based review of the overseas PD staffing model to determine if the current staffing structure, particularly at large posts, continues to make sense in the post-USIA era, in which public diplomacy is no longer the endeavor of an independent USG agency; and that the Department require that all PAOs, including those at large posts, have at least one work requirement entailing substantive engagement with the host-country public.

Section VII: The integration that the 1999 consolidation was supposed to bring about remains elusive; PD officers continue to be significantly under-represented in the senior-most ranks of Department management. Persistent under-representation is not just a matter of equity and morale; it is also emblematic of a lack of progress on the overarching issue of the integration of PD into the core work of the Department. The Commission recommends that the Department appoint suitably qualified PD officers to senior positions within the State Department with approximately the same frequency that it appoints other career Foreign Service officers to such positions, thus eliminating the "glass ceiling" that continues to prevent PD officers from rising to the same levels as other Foreign Service officers.

2008 INTRODUCTION

Public diplomacy—the effort to understand, inform and influence foreign publics in support of foreign policy objectives—has never been more important to the security of our nation than it is today. In recent years and months, a large number of organizations and groups—governmental, quasi-governmental, and academic/private—have published reports about the U.S. government's conduct of public diplomacy. Many of these groups have come to similar conclusions about both the overall effectiveness of USG public diplomacy efforts and the need for improvement in a number of areas. For example, nearly all have called for substantially increased resources for public diplomacy, especially for exchanges; greater leveraging of private sector expertise and resources ("public-private partnership"); and enhanced bureaucratic coordination both within the State Department, the USG's lead public diplomacy agency, and the USG more broadly. Some have called for improvements in the USG "messaging process," specifically, increased and more rigorous integration of meaningful research into the development of USG message campaigns, more serious efforts to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of such efforts, and so on. Relatively few of these reports, however, have addressed what might be termed the "human resources dimension" of public diplomacy. This report will address that aspect of USG public diplomacy operations.

For purposes of this report, the human resources dimension of public diplomacy embraces the following broad topics, with the principal focus on the U.S. Department of State:

- The manner in which we recruit public diplomacy officers;
- The degree to which the Foreign Service examination process tests for public diplomacy-related instincts, knowledge and skills;
- The way we train public diplomacy officers;
- The degree to which the employee evaluation report (EER) incentivizes the performance of public diplomacy outreach;
- The function, in the post-USIA era, of the public diplomacy area offices housed within the Department's regional bureaus;
- The role, in the post-USIA era, of public affairs officers (PAOs) at large posts; and
- The degree to which the 1999 merger of the USIA into the State Department has resulted in better integration of the public diplomacy function into the work of the State Department—in particular, as measured by the presence of PD officers in the Department's decision-making ranks.

A review of the dozens of reports that have come out in recent years establishes that several of these questions—specifically, those relating to recruitment, the examination process, the EER/promotion process, the function of the PD area offices, and the role of the PAO—have rarely if ever been posed.[1] A good number of reports have taken up the issue of training, but though these reports have emphasized the need for enhanced language and area studies training (with a heavy accent on the Middle East region), very few, if any, have called for enhanced training in the fields of communication and persuasion—skills that are at the very heart of effective public diplomacy. And while some reports have called for a new, more PD-friendly, "corporate culture" at State, few have explored the question of whether, nearly nine years after the 1999 consolidation, public diplomacy is fully integrated into the mainstream of State Department work; and concomitantly, whether PD officers are fully integrated into the senior ranks of the Department's staffing structure. These are important questions that go directly to some of the systemic challenges facing our nation's public diplomacy apparatus.

The Commission recognizes that the challenges confronting U.S. public diplomacy are varied and that there is no single easy fix for them. We also recognize that U.S. foreign policy is probably the most significant proximate determinant of how foreign publics view the United States as a player in international relations (if not necessarily as a polity, society or culture). Still, **we believe that getting the human resources dimension of public diplomacy right can go a long way toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of our nation's outreach to the world.** We hope that this report, in casting a spotlight on this important basket of issues and offering some concrete recommendations for improvement, contributes to that process.

1 See, for example, the CRS Report for Congress entitled, "Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past Recommendations," last updated October 31, 2005 (http://www.opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33062/).

Background

It is axiomatic that success in public diplomacy, as in any endeavor, begins with recruiting the right people for the job. Indeed, several recent secretaries of state, including the incumbent, have made the point that people are the State Department's most valuable resource. Given that, does the Department make any special effort to recruit into its ranks individuals with backgrounds in public diplomacy-related disciplines? According to officials responsible for the Department's recruiting efforts, the answer is, "no."

Addressing the Commission in 2007, an official with the Foreign Service Board of Examiners explained that the Department of State "does not specifically recruit for public diplomacy jobs." More generally, he said, the Department does not recruit people with particular, specialized skill-sets, but rather, seeks to hire generalists, including for the public diplomacy career track. The only specific goal in the Department's current recruiting efforts, he added, is diversity (e.g., racial, ethnic, socioeconomic). Beyond that, the official said, Foreign Service recruitees largely "self-select," namely, by checking the appropriate box on the Foreign Service exam registration form; in this way, the officer effectively self-assigns a career track, and while this self-assignation no doubt reflects the applicant's interests, it is less self-evident that it reflects his or her actual skills.

The Foreign Service employs approximately 6,500 generalists, including about 1,070 public diplomacy officers, and 4,500 specialists. According to 2007 data provided by the Department to the Commission, public diplomacy is the second smallest of the five State Department career tracks. Only the management career track has fewer members (about 1,040); conversely, the political and economic career tracks are roughly 70% and 30% larger (at about 1,750 and 1,370 members, respectively), and the consular career track is roughly 5% larger (at about 1,150 members).

The Department of State employs ten full-time recruiters. These recruiters travel across the country to universities, youth organizations and high schools to build awareness about and drum up interest in Foreign Service careers. The recruiting staff is augmented by ten "Diplomats-in-Residence," Senior Foreign Service officers who are detailed to major universities across the United States. The Diplomats-in-Residence endeavor to ensure some geographic diversity in Department recruiting. The Department's recruiting budget has increased "dramatically" since the beginning of Secretary Colin Powell's tenure at State, from about $75,000 some years ago to several million dollars today.[2] Notwithstanding this recent, and welcome, increase in resources devoted to recruiting, however, the Department still lacks the means to dispatch recruiters specifically

2 Our interlocutors were unable to provide a precise budget figure because, they said, a number of different offices have a piece of the overall recruiting effort and the associated monies.

to institutions where PD expertise is especially concentrated, such as schools of communication and international NGOs. Nor is the Department specifically recruiting for other PD-salient skills and competencies, such as foreign language fluency (and, relatedly, "cultural fluency"), marketing, coalition-building, and the like.

In a 2007 open meeting, the Commission asked Department officials if the recruiting process takes into account the current needs/deficits of the Department, e.g., through the following type of syllogism: "What is the Department trying to accomplish? What skills do we need to achieve these objectives? And how can we get those particular skills?" In response, Department officials stated that, though State conducts a periodic job analysis survey that seeks to gauge what Foreign Service officers actually do on a day-to-day basis, the nexus between this data and Department recruiting efforts is unclear. In other words, there is no evident connection between current Department recruiting activities and current or future Department policy or programmatic priorities.

Findings and Analysis

The Department of State makes no special effort to recruit individuals into the PD career track who would bring into the Foreign Service experience or skills specifically relevant to the work of communicating with and influencing foreign publics. Rather, the Department relies essentially on self-selection to get the PD professionals it needs; that is, the only certain connection to the public diplomacy field State's incoming officers have is having checked the PD box while registering to take the Foreign Service Written Examination. Thus, whether the Department is able to bring in individuals with the skills necessary to conduct effective public diplomacy is essentially a "hit-or-miss" proposition.

This problem, which is systemic and rooted in the "generalist" construct that undergirds the entire Foreign Service intake system (to be discussed in more detail in the next section), is particularly acute for the public diplomacy career track. That is because, unlike the other career tracks (or, at least, to a greater degree than them), public diplomacy requires skills—and, perhaps more to the point, instincts—that are somewhat more specialized and less readily acquired than those associated with the other career tracks. For example, in the case of the political and economic career tracks, candidates for the Foreign Service, having typically excelled in college and post-graduate programs (often, in these very fields), generally bring to the Department the kind of research, writing and analytical skills that are required for success in these career tracks. In the case of consular and management work, the relevant skills are usually acquired only after entry into the government, as the particular skills involved (e.g., adjudicating visas, providing American citizen services, requisitioning materiel, etc.) are associated with either work over which the government has a monopoly (consular) or special processes specific to the government (management). In the case of

public diplomacy, however, the core skill at issue is the ability to persuade across cultural and linguistic boundaries—a somewhat more complex type of skill, in our view, and one that the average Foreign Service applicant may not have and, moreover, that is less readily transmitted through short-term training (also to be discussed below). To put it another way, public diplomacy is, in our judgment, the least "generalist" of the five career tracks, and thus, the need to recruit candidates who bring with them PD expertise right from the outset is most pronounced vis-à-vis this career track.

The State Department should make a more concerted effort to recruit specialists in areas that are directly related to effective public diplomacy, such as communications sciences/rhetoric, media relations, public opinion research, marketing, and area and culture studies, among others. We believe **the Department needs public diplomacy officers who possess, from day one, the ability to articulate, usually in a foreign language and always with the requisite level of cultural awareness and sensitivity, contentious policies in compelling and effective ways.** We can train an officer to administer an exchange program, manage a grant, or organize a press conference, but developing the instincts and characteristics associated with effective public diplomacy is virtually impossible. For the most part, either candidates bring them into the Foreign Service, or they do not. That is why the State Department needs to do a better job of identifying and recruiting people with such instincts and characteristics right from the start.

Recommendations

- That the Department link its recruiting efforts more directly to its skill-set needs and programmatic priorities.
- That the Department make a more concerted effort to recruit candidates for the PD career track who have experience and skills that are more directly relevant to the conduct of public diplomacy.

Background

The most common method of entry into the Foreign Service is via the Foreign Service Written Examination (FSWE), the first of a series of exams and checks designed to identify and screen for the most qualified Foreign Service officers. Historically, the exam has been designed to test candidates for generalist-level knowledge of a wide array of subjects relevant to Foreign Service work. It also included career track-specific questions designed to test the candidate's aptitude in the five career tracks (i.e., with questions on public diplomacy, politics, economics, and so on); candidates who fared particularly well on the public diplomacy-related questions, for example, were steered into the public diplomacy cone.

Last year, the Department revamped this exam significantly, inaugurating in the fall of 2007 a "total candidate" approach that takes into account, in a way that was largely impossible prior to this time, the Foreign Service-relevant work history, education and capabilities of the candidate. This revamped exam is now called the "Foreign Service Officer Test" (FSOT).[3]

In 2007, Department officials briefed the Commission about the new exam. They stated that the FSOT greatly reduces the wait between the initial recruiting approach and the candidate's taking of the exam, and places a greater (and earlier) premium on demonstrated language proficiency. Citing data for a recent exam cycle, the officials noted that approximately: 32,000 individuals expressed interest in taking the written exam; 17,000 actually took the exam; 3,400 were invited by the Department to take the oral examination, of whom 3,300 actually sat for the exam; 320 passed the oral exam; and of these, roughly 65 became PD officers. They added that the PD career track has been the second most popular career track for the past several years, behind only the political career track, the perennial top choice. Candidates for PD positions, like those for political positions, tend to score above average on the assessment—about 5.5 to 5.6 on a 1 to 7 scale; the average score, across all cones, is 5.25.

Findings and Analysis

The Foreign Service Officer Test, like the Foreign Service Written Examination before it, does not specifically test for public diplomacy instincts and communication skills. To the limited extent that it addresses public diplomacy-related material, it disproportionately tests knowledge of the public diplomacy field, per se (e.g., "Who coined the term 'public diplomacy'?" "Who was the first director of the United States Information Agency?"), not the

3 The Oral Assessment remained unchanged.

instincts and skills vital to the actual performance of complex public diplomacy tasks. Nor does the Oral Assessment test these skills sufficiently, in our view. Though the Oral Assessment has rightfully earned high marks (including from the international consulting firm McKinsey & Company) for its overall quality and rigor, it lacks a public diplomacy element designed to ascertain whether the candidates have a penchant for cross-cultural persuasion. Because of this, officers may enter the PD career track (as well as the four other career tracks) without ever having had to demonstrate aptitude in core PD skills. And as noted in the previous section, it is not evident that the Department is getting this kind of expertise via recruitment, which, as Department officials have repeatedly stressed, is one-dimensionally focused on diversity objectives.

Because the FSWE, to date, has been entirely standardized, there has been little room in the exam to test for skills specifically relevant to the public diplomacy cone. Though the Oral Assessment features a considerable amount of oral communication, it lacks a component specifically designed to test public diplomacy expertise and talent. The recently revised Foreign Service Officer Test (FSOT) now allows for a greater degree of consideration of specific qualifications than the former system allowed—a reform that the Commission lauds and that may, in fact, increase the likelihood that the Department gets the kind of talent that it is ostensibly seeking – but we nevertheless believe the PD component remains under-emphasized on the examination.

In a day and age in which the secretary of state expects all Foreign Service employees to engage in public diplomacy outreach—and, indeed, at an exceptionally trying time for the cause of U.S. public diplomacy **—the Foreign Service should ensure that incoming employees have been tested on their cross-cultural communication skills, their media savvy, and their outreach and persuasive abilities, regardless of their preferred career track.** These areas of performance need to be emphasized to a greater degree in the Foreign Service examination process.

Recommendation

- That the Department modify its examination process, particularly the Oral Assessment, to include questions and tasks directly germane to the conduct of public diplomacy.

III. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TRAINING

Background

As established above, the Department of State neither recruits specifically for public diplomacy expertise, nor rigorously tests for such expertise in the course of its intensive examination process. The question then becomes: How does the Department go about training the generalists it brings on board in the craft of public diplomacy, and is this training adequate?

Without a doubt, the Department has expanded its public diplomacy training (and training in general) over the last several years. At the time that the United States Information Agency (USIA) was merged into the State Department, on October 1, 1999, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) offered a paucity of public diplomacy training courses. The USIA, while it was a separate, independent agency, provided most of its public diplomacy training in-house, largely through its orientation course for incoming FSOs and through details of varying lengths in USIA (and, overseas, USIS) offices. With the 1999 consolidation, however, the PD training function migrated to FSI. Under Secretary of State Colin Powell's leadership, the quantity and quality of public diplomacy courses increased significantly.

In the fall of 2007, the officials in charge of the Department of State's public diplomacy training briefed the Commission on the Department's efforts in this area. They noted that they received very strong support, including in the development of new courses, from Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes. The Department, they said, now attaches much greater importance to PD training than was the case years ago, and the budget reflects that heightened priority; the training budget increased from about $1,000,000 just two years ago to about $1.4 million today. According to these officials, that is because Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Under Secretary Hughes have both stressed that "public diplomacy is everyone's job."

FSI's public diplomacy training regimen focuses on preparing PD (and, increasingly, non-PD) officers for interacting with the media, giving effective presentations, and absorbing policy guidance on breaking issues in short order. It aims to provide cultural affairs officers (CAOs) with the knowledge and skills they need to manage exchange programs, recruit participants, administer budgets, deal with human resources issues, and so on. PD training also serves officers who, while not PD officers, nonetheless have significant PD components to their jobs, e.g., ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission (DCMs) and entry-level employees going into first and second tours of duty.

A high-level representative of the Association of Diplomatic Training and Studies (ADST), speaking before the Commission at the same meeting, said that the question at the core of PD training is how to take the

U.S. message and package it in a way that resonates with foreign audiences. At issue, he said, is "persuasive communication." The ADST representative singled out the 1993 raport of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (on "Public Diplomacy in the Information Age") as especially compelling. In his view, its last finding was the most important, namely, that in the end, what matters most in public diplomacy is the person-to-person connection, what former USIA Director Edward R. Murrow called "the last three feet." PD training, he said, should focus above all on the question of how to make our communications with foreign publics more effective. The official noted that outside models, such as PD-related courses taught at Georgetown University and George Washington University (among others), might be instructive for FSI.

The relatively spare public diplomacy training budget, while considerably larger than that of recent years, is a significant constraint. FSI has sought to leverage the budget to the maximum degree possible through the use of regionally-based training[4] and distance courses, three of which are being rolled out in 2008. The training officials stated that with more resources, FSI would try to bring more training out to officers in the field, as many officers have difficulty getting back to the United States for two weeks of training, owing to the press of business at post; this would likely result in an increase in the number of people taking the courses. FSI would also do more in the area of training in foreign languages, e.g., mock TV appearances using Arabic, Chinese, Spanish, and so on; at present, officers use English in most of these exercises.

In a departure from past practice, two to three hours of PD training is now mandatory for outgoing ambassadors; this supports the exhortations on the part of the Department's leadership for all ambassadors (and FS personnel more generally) to "get out" into the foreign media much more often than was typically the case in years past. Officials acknowledged, however, that there have been complaints about the scheduling of PD training at the very end of the one-week ambassadorial training seminar; by the end of the week, some ambassadors have to cut short their training owing to the press of business, and thus, may not get the benefit of this training. FSI is exploring the feasibility of moving the training to a better slot in the schedule, and in fact, has already started doing this in the ambassador and DCM courses, according to the officials. Recently, former Department spokesman Ambassador Richard Boucher led the PD session for the ambassador course, a sign, the officials said, of the importance attached to this component of the training.

The training officials explained that PD training has changed a great deal over the past decade. Indeed, the PD discipline itself has changed to a much greater degree than other areas of Department work, such as the management function. That is why current PD training boasts new concepts, courses, and resources, relative to ten years ago. For example, FSI is now looking at text messaging as a means of getting a PD message out to target audiences, something that was not conceived of even a few years ago. FSI also brings critics of U.S. policy into class in order to train the participants in how to respond effectively to such criticism.

4 For example, one PD training program designed to develop Spanish-language media presentation skills brings PD officers from Latin America to Mexico City rather than all the way back to the United States.

Findings and Analysis

Clearly, in recent years, the Department of State has made significant strides in the area of public diplomacy training. The Commission lauds these strides. Indeed, we believe that with more courses and a greater budget than ever before, **public diplomacy training has probably never been stronger. Nevertheless, it is not yet strong enough, and a number of conspicuous, and serious, blind-spots in the Department's public diplomacy training persist.**

A review of the titles of public diplomacy training courses recently offered at FSI is instructive in this regard:

- Advanced Administration of Public Diplomacy Operations Overseas
- Advocacy Through the Media
- Essentials of Public Diplomacy for FSNs
- Ethics in the Grants Environment
- Foreign Service National Current Issues Program
- Foreign Service National Educational and Cultural Programs
- Foundations in Public Diplomacy
- FSN Information Resource Centers Programs
- FSN Information/Media Programs
- Introduction to Grants and Cooperative Agreements
- Introduction to Public Diplomacy
- Monitoring Grants and Cooperative Agreements
- New Trends in Public Diplomacy
- Outreach Diplomacy: America's Story
- PD Engaging Foreign Audiences
- PD Tradecraft for Exchanges and Educational and Cultural Programs
- PD Tradecraft for Information and Media Affairs
- Policy Goes Primetime: Advanced Broadcast Media
- Strategic Communications: Regional Training for PD FSNs

Of these nineteen courses, offered in mid-2007, seven are for Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), not American PD officers; and seven others are entirely administrative in nature (e.g., grants management). Just five of these courses, totaling perhaps three or four weeks of training in all, deal at all with what might be termed the substance of the communication field (i.e., communications as an intellectual discipline), and even these courses are mostly focused on tradecraft rather than hard communication theory—and in one or two cases, the courses are designed not for State PD officers but as general familiarization courses for non-PD USG personnel who work with our overseas missions. **The overall message seems to be: PD officers are administrators and managers, not communicators or "influencers."**

To be sure, these are all necessary and useful courses. But the absence of even a single course on such vital topics as communication theory/rhetoric, political communication, mass communication, the psychology of communication/persuasion, public opinion, advertising/marketing, and coalition-building is striking and, indeed, troubling.[5] **In the nation that practically invented the study of persuasive communication, in a training program designed specifically for those tasked with communicating purposefully and effectively with key foreign audiences on behalf of our nation, not a single course on the science of communication is offered.** This apparent deficit of high-level communication/persuasion theory is cast into further relief by the fact that, as noted above, the Department currently relies exclusively on training, as opposed to recruitment, to produce the PD expertise nominally required by the Department. Thus, the State Department deliberately recruits generalists, does not rigorously test these officers for PD expertise or skills in the examination process, and then largely fails to train them in such basics as how to influence, persuade and counter misinformation overseas. The Commission believes that this state of affairs must be rectified.

The Commission notes that FSI has an intensive, and very well regarded, nine-month course of study for rising economic officers. This course, entry into which is highly competitive, trains dozens of mid- to senior-level economic officers in economic and trade theory and the key issues on the U.S. economic and trade agenda. According to officers who have taken the course, it provides a rigorous, master's-level experience in the discipline of economics. Smaller numbers of officers can get similar experiences (and, in some cases, master's degrees) in the fields of international politics and diplomacy through nine-month programs at the National Defense University, Princeton University, and other institutions of higher learning. Similarly, all consular officers receive several months of intensive training in their field, mostly at FSI.[6]

5 The Commission notes that American Foreign Service Association President John Naland made the same point in 2007 before a Senate committee and in a media interview.

6 They undergo a very thorough consular training program colloquially referred to as "ConGen Rosslyn," *i.e.*, "Consulate General Rosslyn, VA."

In light of the above, the absence of an intensive, months-long training program for PD officers seems very conspicuous. The Commission believes that public diplomacy, like economics, politics and other disciplines, has associated with it a substantial corpus of knowledge that practitioners ought to master as they move into the more senior ranks. At present, however, there is no training program to deliver this corpus of knowledge to PD officers in a systematic and concentrated way.

Finally, when the Commission asked FSI for its PD bibliography—its list of key books, reports and articles with which PD officers ought to be familiar—we were told that no such list currently exists. We believe such a reading list would be of great value to the State Department's PD practitioners.

Recommendations

- That the Department's Foreign Service Institute develop courses, comparable in quality to graduate-level university courses, in the area of communication theory, with special emphasis on political communication/rhetoric, advertising/marketing theory, and public opinion analysis.
- That the Department establish a nine-month in-depth public diplomacy course for mid- to senior-level PD officers modeled on that currently offered to rising economic officers.

Background

Once PD officers have been recruited, tested and trained, there is the matter of how they are evaluated. Does the current evaluation structure place sufficient emphasis on the actual performance of public diplomacy outreach? At a 2007 Commission open meeting, senior Department managers briefed the Commission on the employee evaluation report (EER) and its impact on the conduct of public diplomacy.

State Department officials informed the Commission that the critical question in the EER system is, "Has this officer demonstrated the potential to serve at the next higher level of the Foreign Service?" The officer is evaluated against a set of "precepts" that articulate the particular skill-sets necessary for advancement. About three years ago, in an effort to enhance the profile of public diplomacy in the EER process, the Department added, for the first time, a "public outreach" component to the precepts (at the entry-, mid-, and senior-levels). These outreach precepts, which continue to be in force for the current (2007–2008) promotion cycle, read as follows:

Entry-Level: Develops public speaking and writing skills by seeking appropriate opportunities to present U.S. views and perspectives.

Mid-Level: Seizes and creates opportunities to advocate U.S. perspective to a variety of audiences. Actively develops the skills of subordinates.

Senior-Level: Deals comfortably with the media; is active and effective in public diplomacy, both in the U.S. and overseas. Contributes to and implements strategies to encourage a fair hearing for U.S. views and perspectives.

Unlike the individualized work requirement statements (WRSes), the precepts themselves do not appear anywhere on the EER form itself; in theory, the promotion panels take the level-appropriate precepts into account when evaluating the performance of Foreign Service officers.

The evaluation forms used for officers at the FS-01 (colonel) level and above are different from those used to evaluate FSOs at the FS-02 (lieutenant colonel) level and below.[7] The number of promotions each year depends on the number of "vacancies" at the next level of the Foreign Service; it also takes into account the need for a training float, and the fact that a good number of FSOs will perform details in other executive branch agencies, multilateral organizations, Congress, and the private sector.

7 The Commission notes, however, that in 2008, the Department will apply the FS-01 form to FS-02 officers on a pilot basis.

According to officials, for public diplomacy officers, the promotion panels look to see if the individual has undertaken all aspects of PD work; officers who have focused exclusively on one or the other aspect of PD work (e.g., cultural, as opposed to information) often do not fare as well in the process as those who have accumulated successful experiences in both areas. Breadth of experience is increasingly important, particularly at the higher levels.

In response to an inquiry from the Commission as to how a public diplomacy element might be built into the EER to a greater degree, Department officials said that first and foremost, the work requirements statement (effectively, job description) should make clear what is expected of the employee. The form itself does not include a section specifically devoted to PD, they confirmed. Though the form does ask supervisors to address communication and foreign language skills, there is no requirement, inherent to the form itself, that mandates that these skills be applied in the context of public diplomacy. Indeed, there is evidence that even for PD officers, these skills are not necessarily being brought to bear in the service of outreach objectives.[8] That said, a Department deputy assistant secretary (DAS) responsible for human resources policy told the Commission that "PD is a part of the job" [for all Foreign Service officers], and that "everyone is expected to do some outreach as part of his or her job."[9]

A member of the 2007 class-wide promotion boards (FS-03 to FS-02), in a 2007 Commission open meeting, expanded on the question of how public diplomacy accomplishments are presented on the EER form. He told the Commissioners that, initially, he thought PD officers would fare well in the process in relative terms, because they tended to display the kinds of experience required for advancement, e.g., managing resources and staffs, working with interagency interlocutors, engaging in public outreach, and so on. As it turned out, however, PD officers, at least in this random batch of files, were promoted at the lowest rate of any career track.

A key problem, this official said, was that "raters" (those writing the EERs) tended to do a poor job of describing the PD officer's accomplishments in terms that were meaningful to an outside observer. More "striking," this problem was particularly pronounced in the case of PD officers rating PD officers. Non-PD raters generally did a better job in describing the nature of the public outreach and explaining its importance: the purpose of the outreach, the quality of the outreach, the effect of the outreach, and the "so what?" impact. PD raters, counter-intuitively, did a poorer job of this, according to this interlocutor (himself, an FS-01 PD officer and a former chief of a major overseas public affairs office). The problem seems to lie in both the WRSes (e.g., to the degree they do not articulate "promote-able" work assignments) and in the ability of supervisors to translate, in the context of the EER, an officer's achievements into a narrative that impresses promotion panels. The official opined that part of the problem is that PD officers, at least as evidenced in this

8 See below for a detailed discussion.
9 Director General of the Foreign Service George Staples, writing in State Magazine in July/August 2007, went even further, stating that outreach was the central element of Secretary Rice's "transformational diplomacy"; he wrote: "The essence of Transformational Diplomacy will have to be enhanced outreach to foreign audiences for them to gain broader understanding not only of our policies, but also, of who we are as a people....[E]veryone at post will have to work harder and smarter in support of this effort."

batch of evaluations, are being "underutilized" for substantive communication purposes; to put it another way, they are evidently spending a disproportionate amount of time on relatively mundane administrative tasks.

Notably, Under Secretary Hughes herself came to a very similar conclusion about the matter earlier in 2007. In an unclassified personal message cabled to chiefs of mission, deputy chiefs of mission and public affairs officers, Under Secretary Hughes observed, "PD officers, and their raters, are getting better at documenting the contributions PD officers make. But there is still room for improvement. Senior officers must spell out more clearly how PD fits into the big picture of U.S. foreign policy objectives. And while our officers are competitive class-wide[,] it is clear that PD officers still need to make a compelling case that their work is advancing policy goals and objectives. ...You should be communicating your accomplishments to your supervisors in terms that emphasize their contributions to the Mission and to overall U.S. policy goals."

Moving to the topic of interpersonal skills (as evaluated in the EER), the official observed that, to his great surprise, there was often "little mention of the PD officers' contact with the outside [host-country] community." Indeed, in some cases, there was no reference to the specific country in which the officer was serving—that is, on occasion, it was difficult or even impossible for the panel to ascertain from the substantive content of the EER what country the officer was working in. Too often, he said, the officer's accomplishments were linked to too great a degree to the internal (administrative) workings of the office, not public outreach, per se. Overall, the official said, he and several other panelists came to the conclusion that PD officers were simply not engaging with foreign publics. Distilled down to the essence of the matter, the question for PD officers in the EER context is, "Did this officer have an impact on how the United States, or U.S. policy, is viewed in this foreign country?" According to a number of Department officials familiar with the situation, in too many cases, the answer was, "no."[10]

Addressing the Commission in 2007, a senior representative of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), the Foreign Service's union and professional association, elaborated on this point. For Foreign Service officers to get into the host-country community and have a real impact, he said, they need to have the support of their supervisors. Often, however, they do not have this support. In some cases, for example, ambassadors prefer that their staff not give speeches on sensitive U.S. policy matters.

While the Commission recognizes that each ambassador has the prerogative to manage staff in consideration of specific in-country circumstances, it is apparent that there remain some very real cultural barriers to rank-and-file officers becoming as fully engaged in outreach as Department leadership seems to expect them to be. As noted above, the Department's leadership has issued a clarion call to all FSOs to engage in public diplomacy outreach, but this call will only generate tangible results to the extent that line supervisors empower and encourage their subordinates to get out into the local community. Absent that empowerment

10 This may explain why at least as recently as 2005, according to official Department analysis, PD promotion opportunities actually went unused "due to lack of qualified candidates." See the Department (HR/RMA) study, "Public Diplomacy Workforce Analysis" (released on May 11, 2007).

and encouragement, the evident disconnect between the exhortations of the Department's leaders and the day-to-day activities of PD field officers will likely persist.

Findings and Analysis

The Department of State's EER form lacks a section specifically devoted to public diplomacy outreach; it thus contains no inherent requirement that State employees actually engage in such outreach. Inasmuch as State employees, like employees of most organizations, tend to work to their EER, then the question becomes, "To what degree is PD outreach being built into the employees' individualized work requirements statements?"

The Commission requested and received a number of WRSes for PD officers of various levels, responsibilities and geographic postings.[11] A careful analysis of these statements suggests that the problem identified above by the member of the 2007 promotion panels is real: public diplomacy officers are being asked to spend the overwhelming majority of their time on administration and management, not outreach. In other words, the officers that senior Department leaders often refer to as the Department's vanguard in the cause of communicating with foreign publics are not, in fact, spending much time communicating with their host-country interlocutors, at least if the WRSes that we have reviewed are an indicator.

In the case of a senior-level public diplomacy officer at a mid-sized African post, for example, the employee's eleven work requirements began as follows (in this order):

- "Plan, develop and implement programs..."
- "Administer..."
- "Supervise, counsel and support staff members..."
- "Oversee the operations..."
- "Utilize opportunities to explain U.S. foreign and domestic policies..."
- "Safeguard classified information..."
- "Serve as acting PAO in the PAO's absence..."
- "Further efforts to re-establish relationships [between alumni and the Mission]..."
- "Continue to promote and enhance [the viability of American Corners, etc.]..."
- "Lead and coordinate a program of outreach..."
- "Work with the Educational Advisor to implement..."

Of these eleven work requirements, nine, or possibly ten, were administrative in nature, while only one ("Utilize opportunities to explain polices...") represented what might be called a substantive communication

11 The Department removed the names and other identifying information prior to making these WRSes available to the Commission, out of consideration for the privacy of the officers.

objective.[12] Moreover, there is nothing in this list that even hints at what may be the most important PD function of all, that of correcting and countering inaccurate information and perceptions of U.S. policy.

Other WRSes read very similarly:

- "Identify and implement..."
- "Assess..."
- "Serve as liaison to..."
- "Plan and manage conferences..."
- "Coordinate programs..."
- "Encourage greater participation..."
- "Improve the effectiveness..."
- "Design and oversee..."

In short, by our rough count, based on data the Department provided us, at least 90 percent of the tasks assigned to public diplomacy officers stationed overseas—those presumably in the business of communicating purposefully with foreign publics—were essentially administrative in nature. This was true for officers at all levels and of all positions, from first-tour junior officer assistant cultural affairs officers (ACAOs) and assistant information officers (AIOs), to senior-level PAOs at major posts. In other words, our independent review of the data available to us strongly affirms the concern expressed by a number of our interlocutors that **public diplomacy officers are simply not being utilized in direct pursuit of key USG communication objectives. And if they aren't, then who is?**

Conspicuously, and indeed virtually wholly, absent from the WRSes we reviewed—WRSes for PD officers, it should be kept in mind—were directives such as:

- "Influence public discourse..."
- "Shape the terms of the debate..."
- "Persuade key interlocutors..."
- "Correct inaccuracies and misrepresentations appearing in the local media..."
- "Appear on talk shows on television and radio..."
- "Publish articles in newspapers and magazines..."
- "Publish a book..."
- "Teach a university course..."
- "Lecture at major venues..."
- "Launch an American-style debate program at a university or high school..."

12 In the requirement that begins, "Lead and coordinate...," it is unclear whether the officer was expected to take part in the outreach to universities, or merely coordinate/facilitate the participation of others.

- "Inaugurate elective student government..."
- "Perform in a mock presidential debate..."
- "Participate in regular webchats..."
- "Start a blog..."

It seems to us that tasks such as these ought to constitute a substantial element of every PD officer's job. We should expect our nation's public diplomacy officers to be influencers, not merely administrators; and in this career track, one should have to communicate, not administer, one's way to the top. **A PD officer should not be able to fulfill his or her job requirements—let alone be promoted—without having engaged in substantive, persuasive interaction with host-country interlocutors.** While we certainly recognize that PD officers cannot do it all on their own, and that administering and coordinating is part of the job in a large organization, there seems to be a major imbalance, at present, in favor of administration at the expense of outreach. We believe there should be an increased emphasis on the conduct of effective communication itself.

We commend Secretary Rice's vision of "transformational" public diplomacy outreach, but note that there remains a substantial divide between this vision and the way the Department actually evaluates its personnel. The Commission is persuaded by the argument that building PD into the EER form is a highly cost-efficient and effective way of incentivizing the performance of public diplomacy outreach. As one observer put it, "If it's in the form, people will do it; if it's not, they won't." A small change—of perhaps fewer than twenty words—on the EER form could result in an increase of literally tens of thousands of public diplomacy outreach events within the span of months.[13] A revision of the EER form itself is the surest way to bring about a fundamental change in the prevailing, and still relatively conservative, State Department corporate culture.

Recommendations

- That the Department build a specific PD requirement into the EER form itself, whereby FSOs are required to undertake a certain number of outreach events per rating period in order to be eligible for promotion that cycle.
- That the Department require that all PD officers include in their work requirement objectives one or more specific tasks of directly engaging and influencing foreign publics on matters salient to current U.S. foreign policy or American society.

13 One possible formulation might be: "I, the rating officer, hereby certify that the rated officer has undertaken ten public outreach events this rating period."

Background

In 1999, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was folded into the State Department, thus bringing the public diplomacy function wholly into the State Department for the first time since 1953. At the time of the consolidation, the central question, from the USIA standpoint, was essentially, "How do we preserve a robust public diplomacy function that can stand on its own two feet while ensuring that public diplomacy is fully integrated into the work of the Department of State?"

Aside from some obvious cosmetic changes, the 1999 "cross-walk" into the State Department had relatively little direct impact on most of the Washington-based USIA staff and similarly negligible impact on the day-to-day activities of PD generalist officers overseas. In Washington, for example, most, though not all, of the USIA employees remained housed at "the old USIA building," now called State Annex 44 (SA-44). Overseas, the staffing structure that had been in place for decades remained essentially unchanged: assistant cultural affairs officers (ACAOs) and assistant information officers (AIOs) (and increasingly, information resources officers, or IROs) reported to cultural affairs officers (CAOs) and information officers (IOs), who, in turn reported to deputy public affairs officers (DPAOs) and PAOs. The PAO, as had always been the case, reported to the deputy chief of mission (DCM) and the ambassador. For the most part, the merger did not fundamentally alter the staffing structure overseas, nor did it do so for most Washington-based personnel.

The one major exception was the old USIA "area office." The area offices—so named because there was one for each of the six geographic areas into which the U.S. foreign affairs community divides the world—felt the impact of consolidation more acutely than most other offices. The area offices were essentially the posts' support network in Washington; when a PD officer in the field had a question about a policy or program, he or she could query the area office; in turn, the area office, in the person of the country affairs coordinator for the country or region in question, would go to the relevant functional office within the USIA (or, occasionally, elsewhere in the USG) to get the answer for the post. The area office directors or deputy directors also attended regular meetings at the State Department.[14]

With the merger, the USIA area offices were transferred en masse, and basically intact, into the State Department's regional bureaus, the analogous (though much larger) entities in the State Department bureaucracy, where they mostly became offices of "public diplomacy and public affairs" or "press and public diplomacy." The rationale for moving these offices into the State Department's regional bureaus was to enhance coordination between the underlying U.S. policy and the public diplomacy efforts designed to

14 Indeed, these officers typically held State Department ID badges, which very few other USIA personnel did.

support that policy. Whereas the cultural and information bureaus of the old USIA, upon entry into the State Department, essentially retained their original structures and ways of doing things—basically, just putting a new shingle on the outside of the building[15]—the area offices were necessarily the crucibles for whatever integration was actually achieved in this process.

There are six PD area offices and each office is home to some seven or eight Foreign Service generalists (mostly PD officers) and two or three support personnel, as well as one or two auxiliary personnel (e.g., Presidential Management Fellows, interns, and so on). In all, approximately sixty-five or seventy Foreign Service employees, including both generalists and specialists, work in the State Department PD area offices.

In a 2007 Commission open meeting, the six PD area directors and the director of the under secretary's Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs ("R/PPR," in State jargon) briefed the Commission on the role of their offices in the State Department bureaucracy nearly nine years after consolidation.

These senior PD officials stated that public diplomacy has never been more integral to the work of the State Department than it is at present. The presence of the PD area offices in the heart of the State bureaucracy—the regional bureaus—ensures that PD considerations are taken into much fuller account than was the case prior to 1999, or even a few years ago, the officials held; it also engenders greater "cross-pollenization."

The officials acknowledged, however, that though the system functions adequately, there are some quirks and seeming inefficiencies. For one, the PD area offices, which nominally report through the regional assistant secretaries to the under secretary of state for political affairs ("P," in State parlance), actually take policy direction and get resources from the under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs ("R"), an official to whom they do not report on paper. One area director conceded that this bureaucratic arrangement is "a bit anomalous." It also necessitates "more meetings," several of the officials agreed.[16]

Findings and Analysis

Public diplomacy appears to be better integrated into the State Department bureaucracy than was the case some years ago. The presence of public diplomacy offices in the geographic bureaus, for example, has raised the profile of public diplomacy work within the bureaus charged with managing the United States' bilateral relationships. Moreover, the very term "public diplomacy" is now a part of the State Department working vocabulary to a greater degree than ever before, with the secretary and other senior Department leaders frequently invoking the term and characterizing public diplomacy as a key Department priority.

15 The Commission is certainly aware of the major structural/operational changes that have been implemented in the Bureau of International Information Program (IIP) in recent years, but notes that these changes were not a part of the consolidation/"cross-walk" process, per se.

16 R meets weekly with the PD area office directors to help ensure the uniformity of message across geographic bureaus. R also meets regularly with the regional bureau deputy assistant secretaries (DASes) responsible for public diplomacy. And the PD area office directors (PDODs) themselves meet once a week, as well.

The Commission commends Under Secretary Hughes, in particular, for the efforts she led in recent years to bring public diplomacy considerations into the State Department's decision-making processes.

The jury is still out, however, as to whether PD's higher profile has led to appreciable differences in policy outcomes. Admittedly, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the impact of one factor or another on a process as inherently amorphous as policy-making. Still, the Commission cannot point to any specific recent policy outcome that was different for public diplomacy having been "at the table." Thus, though public diplomacy is now clearly built into the State Department structure in a way that it was not prior to the 1999 consolidation, it is more difficult to judge whether Department officials are taking public diplomacy concerns into consideration in actual foreign policy decision-making to a greater degree, or with greater evident effect, than was the case prior to consolidation.[17]

The Commission believes that at least part of the problem is structural. The current bureaucratic arrangement under which PD is integrated into the geographic bureaus, while generally deemed satisfactory by the current cohort of directors of these offices, is somewhat anomalous. As noted above, these offices nominally report through the geographic assistant secretaries to the undersecretary of state for political affairs; but de facto, they actually report to the undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs—the Department official from whom they receive funding and take guidance.[18] Though "matrix management" [19] arrangements such as this can and often do function effectively, in this particular instance, it appears to reflect a continuing ambiguity about where, and how, PD fits into the overall Department structure.

The current structure would seem to suggest that PD is a class of activity that somehow exists and operates independently of bilateral relationships, rather than an activity that is organic, or at least closely tied, to the management of those relationships. For example, the political, economic and consular functions are all lodged squarely within the country desk, the locus of action in all U.S. bilateral relationships (e.g., the Indonesia desk manages the overall U.S.-Indonesia relationship, and so on).[20] Why isn't the public diplomacy

17 Some Commissioners acknowledge that effective public diplomacy may well impact the development and implementation of our foreign policy in ways that are not visible, let alone measurable. At the very least, our policies may be better understood and appreciated by foreign publics due to the recent increased emphasis on public diplomacy in the State Department and in other areas of our government.

18 The Commission recognizes that the under secretary for public diplomacy plays an invaluable role in developing broad strategic and tactical policies related to the effective communication to foreign publics of U.S. policy. Moreover, the under secretary provides essential budgetary support for the PD function within the Department. We do not mean to suggest in any way that this essential relationship be modified. Having said that, there remains a need to develop a way to better integrate PD officers into the regional bureau policy-making process.

19 Matrix management is a type of organizational management in which employees are grouped both functionally (e.g., by skill-set) and on a project basis (e.g., by mission); in a matrix management arrangement, employees effectively have "two bosses."

20 *See bottom of page 27.*

function? What is the rationale for having, for example, the Indonesia PD desk officer work in an office with other PD officers, rather than with his or her other Indonesia affairs colleagues on the Indonesia desk?[21] The answer to this question, as best the Commission can discern it, is that the PD area offices came over from USIA to State intact and they remain intact largely because of simple bureaucratic inertia, not necessarily because this is the arrangement that optimizes PD integration into State Department policy-making—the stated goal of the integration in the first place. Simply put, form seems to be driving function rather than the reverse.

Then there is the question of what these offices, as currently configured, actually do on a day-to-day basis. According to the PD office directors, the primary function of these offices is to serve as a "window on Washington" for posts, and concomitantly, a "window on the (PD) field" for the Washington bureaucracy. Thus, their principal role is as a conduit for communications—in effect, a "middle man." One class of task that is emblematic of this role is that of arranging appointments and briefings at Main State for visiting participants in U.S. exchanges, such as International Visitors, Fulbright Scholars, and so on. For instance, the International Visitor office might call over to the Mexico PD desk officer and say, "We've got two Mexican IVs coming through town. Could you set up briefings with the Mexico desk and the folks at Main State who handle U.S.-Mexico environmental cooperation?" The Mexico PD desk officer will then make these arrangements, escort the visitors to the meetings, and, effectively, serve as "control officer" for this mini-visit. This type of administrative/liaison task can constitute a fair percentage of the PD desk officer's day.[22]

20 Though country desk officers do routinely perform tasks generated by other bureaus, e.g., the Bureaus of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs (EEB) or Consular Affairs (CA), these officers nonetheless regard their regional assistant secretary and the undersecretary of state for political affairs to be their "bosses." In contrast, according to interlocutors who addressed the Commission in 2007, the PD officers in the regional bureaus do not regard the undersecretary of state for political affairs ("P") as their "boss" in a day-to-day sense, and indeed, their work has virtually no bearing on the day-to-day work of P; rather, they view the undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs ("R") as their boss, and to a large degree, R sees these officers—and indeed, PD officers overseas—as "its own." Note, for example, the phrasing in Under Secretary Hughes' 2007 telegram to ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission and public affairs officers, cited earlier in this report: "...[W]hile *our* officers are competitive class-wide[,] it is clear that PD officers still need to make a compelling case that their work is advancing policy goals and objectives" (emphasis added). In this respect, PD officers do not seem to be as well integrated into the mainstream of P work as officers of the other four career tracks. In matrix management terms, there seems to be an imbalance in favor of function at the expense of (integrated) mission.

21 The Indonesia desk is part of the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs' Office of Maritime Southeast Asia Affairs. The Commission understands that, at present, PD desk officers often have responsibility for more than one country, e.g., in this example, not just Indonesia, but also Malaysia, the Philippines, and others. But the question remains: in principle, what is the value of having PD officers working with other PD officers, as opposed to their country affairs colleagues?

22 On the contrary, the PD area offices are not tasked with preparing the daily "press guidance," country- and issue-specific material used by the Department spokesman in the daily noon briefing; rather, political and economic officers routinely prepare this material. The Commission finds it odd that the regional bureaus are not relying on officers who generally have served as embassy spokespersons to prepare press talking points.

We do not see the value-added in this layer of communication.[23] [24]

Some observers make the case for the reprogramming of these PD positions overseas, where USG communications needs are most acute[25]; others call for the increased integration of PD officers into the country desks (e.g., the PD officer for Indonesia moving onto the Indonesia desk)—and indeed, a number of area offices have already begun doing this on a trial basis.[26] Presumably, a collateral benefit of the former scenario would be an increased pressure for mid-level and senior PD officers to bid on country desk jobs, including at the level of deputy director and director. **True integration of public diplomacy considerations into the policy process will be achieved only when PD officers are in the policy-makers' seats;** as long as there is a separate PD office in the bureaucracy, the incidence of PD officers rising into such positions will likely remain, as it is at present, fairly low.[27]

At a minimum, the Department ought to perform a zero-based review of the current arrangement to determine if the system, with its informal and somewhat unclear lines of authority, is functioning at peak capacity and maximizing the integration of PD considerations into the Department's policymaking process. To our knowledge, no such review has ever been conducted.[28]

Recommendation

- That the Department undertake a zero-based review of the PD area office staffing structure to determine if the current arrangement is functioning optimally.

23 In this example, for instance, we do not see why the ECA or IIP action offices could not reach out to the desk directly, thus obviating a communication layer that seems to be largely extraneous.

24 In a candid, internal 2006 e-mail message, one PD area office officer, arguing for the continued intermediary role of the PD area offices in making IV appointments, wrote, "I would strongly object to having the IV program officers take over any responsibilities for making the DOS appointments. Often, setting up these appointments and escorting the visitors around is our best opportunity for contact with other offices…, and even more importantly, our own front office. I usually only see [our own DASes] thru IV appointments. [Cutting the PD area office out of the appointment process] would also confuse even more the issue of why there is a separate PD office within the regional bureau" (names of DASes and other identifying information redacted from the original). This message, part of a longer multi-party e-mail discussion on this topic and the broader issue of the relevance of the PD area offices, suggests, at least anecdotally, that even the officers who work in these offices find it difficult to define their niche within the regional bureaus. The comment that escorting IVs represents "the best opportunity for contact… with our own front office" is particularly revealing.

25 The State Department already faces a major and chronic shortage of FSOs for field positions; indeed, the Director General of the Foreign Service recently felt compelled to direct overseas posts to identify 10% of their bid-able positions for non-filling. With respect to PD positions specifically, according to official Department analysis, the shortage is particularly acute at the mid-levels, and the vacancy rate has increased in recent years. In other words, there are not enough PD officers, particularly at the mid-levels, to fill the existing job slots; in mid-2007, for example, the mid-level deficit was 253. For more details, see "Public Diplomacy Workforce Analysis."

26 For example, the China and Russia PD officers are "embedded" on the China and Russia desks, respectively.

27 See the last section of this report for a more detailed discussion of this point.

28 In our 2002 report, the Commission called upon the secretary of state, in concert with the Commission, to conduct "a review of all consolidation initiatives and make any necessary recommendations in such areas as training and the location and reporting structure of public diplomacy units." Our current recommendation, above, is narrower in scope than the 2002 recommendation.

VI. THE ROLE OF PAOS AT LARGE POSTS

Background

The senior-most public diplomacy official at overseas U.S. missions is the country public affairs officer (PAO). A member of the "country team," the PAO is the overall manager of the public diplomacy operation at post and principal advisor to the ambassador for public affairs-related matters. On the organizational chart, the PAO sits atop two very distinct embassy functions that, jointly, constitute the public diplomacy function: cultural affairs and information (press) affairs. At large posts (which are the focus of this discussion), there has often been a deputy public affairs officer (DPAO), who effectively serves as the PAO's "alter-ego" and, in the absence of the PAO, serves in that capacity on an acting basis; the number of DPAO slots has decreased significantly in recent years, however. As a general rule, neither the PAO nor the DPAO has a substantive portfolio that is distinct from the cultural and information functions; their role is essentially managerial.[29]

With the 1999 consolidation, the PAO went from being the head of an independent USG agency overseas (e.g., akin to the head of the U.S. Agency for International Development or the Foreign Commercial Service), to being a senior-level State Department official; in other words, the PAO went from "head of agency" to "head of section." When USIA (or overseas, USIS) was a distinct bureaucratic entity, the PAO, while clearly subordinate to the ambassador, had considerable management autonomy over such issues as public diplomacy budgets, administrative matters (e.g., pertaining to office space, vehicles and the like), and so on. Though the 1999 consolidation had little substantive impact on the PAO's basic role at post, it did strip away some of the purely managerial/administrative responsibilities associated with service as a PAO, with the direct impact greatest on the old USIS executive officers, who managed most of the PD-related administrative support functions on a day-to-day basis.

At a 2007 Commission open meeting, senior PD officials at the Department of State, most of whom had previously served as PAOs, stated that the PAO remains a key member of the country team. Some acknowledged, however, that "personalities" at post can have a significant impact on the degree to which the PAO is integrated into mission decision-making. Most of the officials who addressed the Commission on this issue agreed that the PAO's role is primarily managerial, not representational; that is, the PAO spends the great majority of his or her time managing, rather than directly engaging foreign counterparts. As one put it, "The PAO is not necessarily the outreach person." Another senior PD official elaborated by noting that there is now an expectation on the part of senior Department leadership that "everyone does PD,"

29 See below for a more detailed discussion of this point, including specific references to PAO work requirements statements.

or more precisely, "outreach." That notwithstanding, the official added, there is still a need for PD officers—trained practitioners of public diplomacy who are capable of conceptualizing, managing, implementing, and measuring the effectiveness of public diplomacy and PD programming. This skill- and knowledge-set is distinct from those associated with outreach. As one senior PD official colorfully observed, "This ain't rocket science, but it is science"; and thus, we need seasoned officers managing our PD efforts in the field. Most of those who have spoken to the Commission on this matter have stated that if they were building an overseas PD operation from scratch, they would, in fact, have a PAO, as well as officers responsible for the cultural and information affairs functions; some officers, however, have disagreed, arguing that the PAO function is largely superfluous in the post-USIA era. There was general unanimity, though, about the fact that consolidation had not fundamentally altered the way business was being done overseas.

Findings and Analysis

In the nearly nine years since the consolidation of the USIA into the State Department in 1999, the overseas public diplomacy staffing structure has remained essentially unchanged. Prior to consolidation, the PAO headed the overseas office of an independent U.S. agency, with all the attendant managerial responsibilities and issues associated with such a role (e.g., budget, personnel, etc.). **Nearly nine years after the consolidation, the Department has yet to re-examine the utility of this old USIA-era staffing pattern.** While many FSOs advocate the current arrangement, some believe that large posts are excessively management heavy and that large-post PAOs and DPAOs can constitute an extraneous layer of senior-level management between the CAOs and IOs, on the one hand, and DCMs, on the other. In large missions, for example, the presence of a PAO, and possibly DPAO, creates up to two layers between the embassy spokesman and the embassy front office—a situation that is all the more difficult to fathom considering that IOs (and also CAOs) at large posts are often, at least in theory, members of the Senior Foreign Service; in individual sections, there shouldn't be even one layer, let alone two, between fellow members of the Senior Foreign Service. Such a structure is needlessly top-heavy.

The Commission is also concerned that in many cases, our most experienced and able PD officers overseas evidently are "not necessarily the outreach person." To the extent this is so, it begs the question: then just who is "the outreach person" if not the PAO? While the Commission certainly lauds the idea that PD outreach is now everyone's job, we are troubled that PAOs are not, in fact, leading the charge in this outreach effort, especially in light of U/S Hughes' assertion, articulated in her 2007 message to ambassadors, DCMs and PAOs, that "we all need to remain fully engaged in making sure that we are effectively reaching foreign audiences." **Why aren't PAOs tasked with "reaching foreign audiences?"**

In reviewing PAO WRSes, which the Department provided to the Commission at our request, we found that, unfortunately, there seems to be some validity to the assertion that PAOs view themselves, and are viewed by others, more as managers and administrators than as expert communicators. Here are the first words of each of the responsibilities assigned to one major-post PAO:

- "Oversee the implementation of..."
- "Supervise, manage, and evaluate [staff]..."
- "Manage the [PD] allotment..."
- "Upgrade technologies..."
- "Manage classified material..."
- "Organize..."
- "Revitalize [organizations]..."
- "Oversee..."
- "Undertake special assignments..."
- "Oversee professional development..."

Numerous other PAO WRSes were virtually identical; and indeed, one senior PD official told the Commission that PAO (and, more generally, PD) WRSes are largely "generic," a characterization that the Commission found to be accurate.

A close look at the verbs above makes it clear that, indeed, PAOs are essentially high-level managers without their own substantive (e.g., communications) portfolios, just as a number of interlocutors, including the PD official who sat on the 2007 promotion boards, asserted to the Commission. In the above case, the words "oversee," "supervise," and "manage" appear six times out of ten requirements in all. And to reiterate a point made in the EER section of this report, above, words and phrases that pointedly do not appear in the above PAO WRS include, for example: "Influence...," "Shape public discourse...," "Speak to foreign audiences on...," "Persuade influential journalists...," and so on. In fact, in the example cited above, not a single one of the ten work requirements mandates communication with the host-country public or requires the use of foreign language skills. We find this astonishing. Moreover, this state of affairs seems to be squarely at odds with the expectation set forth in the senior-level promotion precept mentioned in section four of this report.[30] If PAOs are not required to engage foreign publics, then why is the Department spending millions to train them in foreign languages? And more fundamentally, is the value added by the PAO's management worth the considerable expense to the USG associated with maintaining these high-salary positions? In summary, we believe that a zero-based review of the basic overseas staffing model—something that has not occurred since the 1999 consolidation—is long overdue.

30 Again, the senior-level precept is: "Deals comfortably with the media; is active and effective in public diplomacy, both in the U.S. and overseas. Contributes to and implements strategies to encourage a fair hearing for U.S. views and perspectives."

Recommendation

- That the Department undertake a zero-based review of the overseas PD staffing model to determine if the current staffing structure, particularly at large posts, continues to make sense in the post-USIA era, in which public diplomacy is no longer the endeavor of an independent USG agency.
- That the Department require that all PAOs, including those at large posts, have at least one work requirement entailing substantive engagement with the host-country public.

VII. THE INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY INTO STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS AND STAFFING

Background

An enduring question in the wake of the 1999 consolidation is the degree to which public diplomacy has been integrated into the State Department policy-making process; and one important proxy for this is whether PD officers are serving at the senior-most levels of the State bureaucracy—in particular, the PD bureaucracy—in greater numbers than was the case before October 1, 1999.

The input the Commission received from the many interlocutors we heard from on this topic in 2007 Commission open meetings was mixed. A number of senior PD officials told the Commission that, in a dramatic change from the past, PD officers are now well-represented in the senior-most ranks of Department management. One senior PD official claimed that the PD community has become "a victim of its own success" in the sense that such a large number of PD officers are now in senior management jobs that there is a relative dearth of PD officers available to take senior-level PD assignments (such as PAO positions, for example).

Other officials, from both the PD and other career tracks, were considerably less sanguine about the degree to which PD officers have attained senior positions in the Department. These officials argued that the old bias against PD that has always existed in the Foreign Service endures on, albeit not as dramatically or obviously as before. Given the conflicting perspectives on this important issue, the Commission requested that the Department provide definitive human resources data to document PD officers' career paths in the nearly nine years since October 1, 1999.

Findings and Analysis

Authoritative human resources data provided to the Commission by the Department establish that PD officers continue to be significantly under-represented in the senior-most ranks of Department management. The data suggest that the integration that the 1999 consolidation was supposed to bring about remains elusive.

The following two graphs, generated from the data the Department provided the Commission, illustrate the problem:

GRAPH 1

	PD Offs as % of Generalists	PD Offs as % of Sr. Managers
1999	13	2
2000	12	3
2001	13	5
2002	14	6
2003	15	6
2004	15	8
2005	16	9
2006	16	8
2007	17	7

GRAPH 2

	% of FS Generalist Population ('07)	% of Senior Mgmt. Positions ('07)
Management	16	8
Consular	18	10
Economic	21	16
Political	28	29
Public Diplomacy	17	7[31]

Though the percentage of PD officers serving in senior-level positions[32] has, in fact, increased somewhat (Graph 1); statistically, **PD nevertheless remains the most under-represented of the five career tracks, in both absolute and relative terms** (Graph 2). Indeed, since 2005, there has been an evident downward trend in the percentage of PD officers serving in senior-level positions, from 9% to 8% to 7% in 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively (Graph 1). Moreover, the problem is most pronounced at the assistant secretary and ambassadorial levels. In 1999, the PD career track produced no assistant secretaries and just 1% of all U.S. ambassadors; in 2007, the PD career track produced just one

31 In Graph 2, the percentages of senior management positions by cone add up to 70, not 100; political appointees encumber the remaining 30 percent of these slots.

32 The Department defines "senior-level positions" as assistant secretary, deputy assistant secretary, chief of mission, deputy chief of mission, and principal officer (e.g., consul general).

assistant secretary-level official and 3% of ambassadors (specifically, an increase from two ambassadors to four). Indeed, no career track has yielded fewer ambassadors than PD in any year from 1999 (the year consolidation occurred) to 2007 (the last year for which the Department has complete data), except for the consular career track in 2004. And similarly, no PD officer has ever risen to the Foreign Service personal rank of "career ambassador," the Service's top rung, in the decades the rank has existed. Thus, nearly nine years into consolidation, **the PD career track is no longer "separate," but it is certainly not yet "equal."**

We recognize that many PD officers now at or coming into the prime of their careers, and who therefore would be candidates for senior positions at State, spent their formative years working in what was then a separate government agency—the United States Information Agency. That being the case, it is understandable that these experienced PD officers may well not be effectively integrated into State, or may lack the mentorship and broader support within the Department hierarchy that is necessary for advancement into the higher-level positions. Having said that, **we are nonetheless troubled that, nearly nine years after consolidation, PD officers have not attained senior management positions in the Department of State in considerably greater numbers,** let alone, in rough proportion to their representation in the Foreign Service as a whole. While important in itself as a matter of equity and morale, the more fundamental point is that the relative lack of success on this front suggests a lack of progress on the overarching issue of the integration of PD into the core work of the Department.

The Commission believes that if we are to attract and retain first-rate PD officers, then the Department of State needs to demonstrate over time that these officers will be regarded as generally capable of holding the Department's senior-most positions—particularly, those responsible for the conduct of public diplomacy. Looking ahead toward the second decade after consolidation, the Commission hopes and expects to see increased representation, more commensurate with PD's representation in the Foreign Service itself, of PD officers in the ranks of the Department's leadership. We will revisit this issue periodically to monitor progress. Unless and until PD officers can rise to the senior-most ranks of the Department leadership, the cause of weaving PD considerations into the Department's policy process will not meet with the success originally hoped for in 1999.

Recommendation

- That the Department appoint suitably qualified PD officers to senior positions within the State Department with approximately the same frequency that it appoints other career Foreign Service officers to such positions, thus eliminating the "glass ceiling" that continues to prevent PD officers from rising to the same levels as other FSOs.

2009 CONCLUSION

The human resources dimension of U.S. public diplomacy is by no means the "silver bullet" to the nation's current public diplomacy challenges, but it is an important, and generally under-emphasized, part of the puzzle. The Commission believes that we can significantly enhance the quality and effectiveness of our nation's outreach to foreign publics by: recruiting for the public diplomacy career track in a more focused way; testing our recruitees more thoroughly and methodically for their PD instincts, knowledge and skills; training them more intensively in the core PD skill-set of persuasive communication; and evaluating them more on communication and less on administration. The Commission also believes that now is the time, nearly a decade after the 1999 consolidation of USIA into the State Department, to assess the utility of two key PD-related bureaucratic constructs: the PD area office and the PAO at large posts. Finally, the Commission hopes and expects to see progress, over the coming months and years, in the integration of PD officers in the Department's leadership ranks, including those of the PD bureaus themselves. The enduring under-representation of PD officers, vis-à-vis officers of other career tracks, in the Department's top ranks is important both as a matter of equity and morale, and also, because it suggests that there is much more work to do in the larger cause of integrating PD considerations into State Department policy-making.

The Commission and the State Department share a very important goal: to make U.S. public diplomacy as effective as it can possibly be. We submit this report in that spirit and look forward to working closely with the State Department and other USG agencies in continuing to enhance the quality and impact of America's communication with the world.

COMMISSIONER AND STAFF BIOGRAPHIES

Mr. William J. Hybl is Chairman of the Commission. From 1990–1997, he served on the Commission, including as Vice Chairman, under Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Hybl is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of El Pomar Foundation, a general-purpose foundation and a national leader in innovative grantmaking recognized by the Association of Fundraising Professionals in 1998 as National Foundation of the Year. He is also President Emeritus of the United States Olympic Committee. He twice served as President, leading the U.S. Olympic delegations at the 1992 Winter Games in Albertville, France and 1992 Summer Games in Barcelona, Spain; and doing so again for the 1998 Winter Games in Nagano, Japan and the 2000 Summer Games in Sydney, Australia. Hybl also serves as Chairman of the U.S. Olympic Foundation and is a member of the Colorado Sports Hall of Fame. An attorney, former member of the Colorado legislature and former special counsel to President Ronald Reagan, Hybl also serves as Chairman of the Board of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), as Commissioner on the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, and as Civilian Aide Emeritus to the Secretary of the Army. In 2001, President George W. Bush appointed Hybl as U.S. representative to the 56th General Assembly of the United Nations. Hybl currently serves as Vice Chairman of the Board of the BROADMOOR Hotel, Inc., and is President of the Air Force Academy Foundation and The Hundred Club of Colorado Springs. Hybl also serves on numerous corporate boards. He was named 2003 Citizen of the West and, in 2005, was elected to The Colorado College Board of Trustees. Hybl holds a bachelor's degree from The Colorado College and a law degree from the University of Colorado.

Ambassador Elizabeth Frawley Bagley is Vice Chair of the Commission. She serves as "of counsel" to Manatt, Phelps & Phillips Law Firm and senior advisor to Manatt Jones Global Services. From 1997 to 2001, Bagley served as Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State; she also served as Senate liaison for NATO enlargement. From 1994 to 1997, Bagley served as U.S. Ambassador to Portugal. From 1977 to 1981, she held several positions in the U.S. Department of State, including, Congressional Liaison Officer for the Panama Canal Treaties (1977–1979); Special Assistant to Ambassador Sol Linowitz for the Camp David Accords (1979–1980); and Congressional Liaison to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1980–1981). Ambassador Bagley is a Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and serves on several international boards, including the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Vital Voices International, and the American Ireland Fund. An attorney specializing in trade and international law, Bagley was an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University in Washington until January 1993. She is a member in

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Dr. Maria Sophia Aguirre is an associate professor of economics at The Catholic University of America. Aguirre has also held appointments at the University of Chicago and Northwestern University's Economics Department. Aguirre's specialization is in international finance and economic development. She has researched and published in the areas of exchange rates and economic integration, as well as on theories of population, resources, and family as it relates to economic development. Her work has been widely published in numerous academic journals, including, among others, *International Advances in Economic Research, Journal of Economic Studies, International Review of Economics and Finance,* and the *Journal of Economics and Finance;* it has also been featured in major international media, such as the *Washington Post,* the *Wall Street Journal,* PBS and BBC. Aguirre has served as an advisor to several governments on women's education, family policies and health, and several U.N. representatives; she has also testified before numerous federal legislatures on her areas of expertise. She serves as an officer in different capacities on several organizations' boards, including the Commission on the Status of Women in the Professions, a working group of the American Economic Association. Aguirre has received numerous honors for her work, including a Citation for Excellence (1998), the Magister en Gestión Educative by the Consejo Iberoamericano (2004), and inclusion *Who's Who Among America's Teachers* (1996 and 2006).

Mr. John E. Osborn is currently a visiting research fellow at the University of Oxford's Centre for Socio-Legal Studies and a senior member of Wadham College Oxford. For more than ten years, he held various senior executive positions with Cephalon, Inc., a leading biopharmaceutical company, where he was responsible for managing all legal, intellectual property, quality assurance, government and public affairs matters at the company. Prior to joining Cephalon, Osborn held various positions with The DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Company. He served in the U.S. Department of State as special assistant to the legal adviser, practiced corporate law in Boston with the firm of Hale and Dorr, clerked for Judge Albert V. Bryan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and worked on Capitol Hill in the offices of former U.S. Representative Jim Leach of Iowa and the late U.S. Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania. Mr. Osborn also has held a visiting research appointment in politics at Princeton University, has lectured at the Universities of Pennsylvania and Michigan, and was an Eisenhower Fellow to Northern Ireland, a visiting scholar in East European Studies at

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Mr. Harold C. Pachios is a former chairman of the Commission and is serving his fourth term as a Commissioner; he is the longest serving Commissioner in the 60-year history of Commission. Pachios is managing partner in the law firm of Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau, Pachios & Haley, based in Portland, Maine. In his prior government and political career, he served as associate White House press secretary under President Lyndon B. Johnson and on the Peace Corps staff under President John F. Kennedy. He has also served as chairman of the Maine Democratic Party. Pachios is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a director of the Salzburg Seminar in Salzburg, Austria, and a member of the National Governing Board of Common Cause. He is also Chairman of the Board of the University of Maine School of Law, and a former Northeast Regional Vice Chair of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.

Ambassador Penne Korth Peacock has served on the Commission since 1997. President George H. W. Bush chose her to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Mauritius (1989–1992) and as his first female appointee to serve as co-chair of the American Bicentennial Presidential Inaugural. She currently serves on the boards of directors of Chevy Chase Bank, the Council of American Ambassadors, the Hillwood Museum (Emeritus), and the U.S.-Mauritius Business Council; as well as on the Advisory Boards of the America Australia Association and the Washington Ballet. While living in Washington, Peacock previously served as a member of the boards of the White House Preservation Fund, the Washington Round Table of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, the Meridian International Center, and the National Symphony Orchestra at the Kennedy Center. In Sydney, Australia, Peacock served as Chairman of Republicans Abroad in 2004, and is currently a member of the Sydney Cancer Center Advisory Committee and an International Representative of Sotheby's. In Austin, Texas, she is a member of the Advisory Board of The Harry Ransom Center at the University of Texas. Peacock attended the University of Texas from 1960 to 1964.

Mr. Jay T. Snyder was sworn in as a Commissioner by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell on May 8, 2003 and reappointed to the Commission in 2005. He is a principal of HBJ Investments, LLC, specializing in private equity investments. His prior government service includes serving as a U.S. Representative to the 55th United Nations General Assembly. As a public delegate appointed by President Clinton, Snyder was actively involved in a variety of issues, particularly those related to the international HIV/AIDS pandemic, sustainable development,

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Mr. Carl K. Chan is the executive director of the Commission. Born and raised in Hong Kong, Mr. Chan is a former Senior Foreign Service officer. His foreign postings included Israel, where he was press attaché and embassy spokesman; Pakistan, where he was cultural attaché; and China, where he reestablished the United States Information Service (USIS) operations in the city of Guangzhou after a 33-year hiatus. He also did press and cultural work in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. In domestic assignments, he worked on international trade and security issues and served as a member of the Foreign Service Board of Examiners, which administers the Oral Examination to Foreign Service officer candidates. Before entering the Foreign Service, Chan was a radio and television writer and producer. He has a bachelor's degree from the University of South Dakota and a master's degree from Northwestern University, both in mass communications.

Mr. David J. Firestein is the senior advisor to the Commission and the project director and principal drafter of this report. A Foreign Service officer since 1992, Firestein has served at the U.S. embassies in Beijing, China (five years) and Moscow, Russia (four years) and in domestic positions in the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He is the recipient of numerous Department of State honors, including the Secretary's Award for Public Outreach and the Linguist of the Year Award. He is fluent in Chinese and Russian. A prolific author, Firestein has published three books and some 130 articles in major international periodicals; in 1995, he became the first foreign citizen to have a newspaper column in the People's Republic of China. Firestein is an adjunct member of the public diplomacy faculty at the Foreign Service Institute, where he teaches "Best Practices in Public Diplomacy"; and the graduate faculty of the

University of Texas (Austin), where he has taught U.S.-Russia relations and U.S.-China relations. In 2001, he was an adjunct professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Russia's premier university and diplomatic training ground, where he taught two courses on "Political Consulting and the American Political Campaign"; he was the first U.S. diplomat ever to teach at MGIMO. Firestein is a recognized expert on the political communication effect of contemporary country music and is the author of the seminal 2005 study, "The Honky Tonk Gap: Country Music, Red State Identity, and the Election of 2004." He is an elected member of the Board of Governors of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA). A native of Austin, Texas, Firestein is a graduate of Georgetown University (B.S.F.S., 1990) and the University of Texas (M.P.Aff. / M.A., 1992).

Mrs. Jamice Clayton is the administrative officer of the Commission. Her 30-year career with the federal government has included service with the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Selective Service System, and the Department of Health and Human Services.

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Designed by: Caesar Jackson

A Foreign Affairs Budget *for the* Future

Facing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness

October 2008

Resources for US Global Engagement

Full report

The Stimson Center's Office of Strategic Initiatives

STIMSON

Dear Colleague,

The new Administration will face multiple, critical foreign policy challenges with inadequate diplomatic personnel and resources to carry out policy effectively. To lead the way in presenting detailed recommendations tied to specific analysis, we are very pleased to present *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future*. This study examines key elements of the resource crisis in America's ability to conduct its international programs and policies. Our study considers the 21st century challenges for American diplomacy, and proposes a budget that would provide the financial and human capacity to address those fundamental tasks that make such a vital contribution to international peace, development and security and to the promotion of US interests globally.

The American Academy of Diplomacy, with vital support from the Una Chapman Cox Foundation, launched this project in 2007 and named Ambassador Thomas Boyatt as Project Chairman. The Academy turned to the Stimson Center to conduct research and draft the report. To guide key directions of the research, the Academy organized, under the leadership of former Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, an Advisory Group and a Red Team, comprised of distinguished members of the Academy and senior former policy makers from outside its ranks. Their participation in a series of meetings and feedback was critical in establishing the key assumptions for the study. The Stimson team was led by former USAID Budget Director Richard Nygard. Former OMB official Gordon Adams, now a Distinguished Fellow at Stimson, was a key advisor to the project. The full list of American Academy and Stimson contributors can be found inside.

This study is intended to provide solutions for and stimulate a needed conversation about the urgent need to provide the necessary funding for our nation's foreign policies. We need more diplomats, foreign assistance professionals and public diplomacy experts to achieve our national objectives and fulfill our international obligations. This study offers a path forward, identifying responsible and achievable ways to meet the nation's needs. It is our hope that the US Congress and the Obama Administration will use this study to build the right foreign affairs budget for the future.

Sincerely,

Ambassador Ronald Neumann
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The American Academy of Diplomacy

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Advisory Group Chairman

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Specific report findings and recommendations do not necessarily reflect the views of or endorsements by all members of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Advisory Group, Red Team, Una Chapman Cox Foundation, or Stimson Center.

Note: The Ambassadors listed above are not currently serving in ambassadorial positions.

Summary of Recommendations

This study reviews four major categories of foreign affairs activity – 1) core diplomacy, 2) public diplomacy, 3) economic assistance, and 4) reconstruction/stabilization – and finds critical gaps in each of them.[1] In addition to staffing shortfalls, there are "authority shortfalls" relating to certain economic and security assistance programs that should be in the Secretary's civilian toolkit but that are currently being exercised by the Secretary of Defense. We also conclude that increased staffing capacity alone will be insufficient to meet U.S. Public Diplomacy goals; in addition, a number of international exchange and other programs should be expanded to help meet the country's foreign relations goals and objectives.

As a result of our analysis, we recommend the following:

- The State Department should hire 1,099 additional staff members by FY 2014 for its core diplomatic functions. This increase will require an additional $510.5 million in FY 2014 above the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline. In addition, the Academy recommends funding to permit ambassadors to respond effectively to humanitarian and political emergencies be increased by $125 million in FY 2010 and $75 million annually thereafter. Finally, we recommend shifting 493 Consular positions from fee to appropriated funded status, at a cost over baseline of $160.6 million.

- Permanent American staffing at the State Department should be further increased by 1,287 by FY 2014 primarily to support institutionalized workforce re-training and professional development, with the goal to continuously update the specialized competencies of State to meet new policy demands. This staffing increase will cost $309.8 million annually by FY 2014.

- To fill current shortfalls and enhance the public diplomacy efforts of the State Department, there should be an increase in U.S. direct-hire staff by 487 and an increase of 369 locally employed staff (LES) for Public Diplomacy by FY 2014. This increase will cost $155.2 million in FY 2014 above the CBO baseline. Certain existing programs in the area of public diplomacy should also be expanded to give the Secretary of State more tools at his or her disposal to conduct public diplomacy around the world. The total cost for these additional programs in FY 2014 is estimated at $455.2 million. Increases for Public Diplomacy total $610.4 million.

- For USAID, staffing should be increased by 1,050 Foreign Service Officers and 200 civil servants for a total U.S. direct-hire staffing increase of 1,250 by 2014. USAID should also reduce its reliance on Personal Service Contractors (PSC) and Foreign Service Limited appointments (FSL) because many of these workers perform functions that should be done by permanent direct-hire staff; accordingly, we recommend that the number of PSC and FSL staff be cut by 700 (these savings would be in USAID's program accounts and would not reduce operating expenses). The USAID staffing increases would cost an additional $521.1 million in USAID's operating expenses account over the CBO baseline in FY 2014.

[1] This study's scope does not explicitly comprise Department of State assistance, administrative, and diplomatic security activities, although some of these, such as overseas Counter-narcotics and refugee work, should in the Academy's view be considered basic elements of U.S. diplomacy.

- In the area of reconstruction and stabilization, staffing should be increased by 562 U.S. direct-hire staff by 2014. This increase would cost an additional $286 million in FY 2014, including equipment, deployment and training costs.

- Authority over selected Security Assistance programs should be moved in stages from the Department of Defense to the Department of State (DOS), with implementation largely remaining at Defense. In addition, 50 new staff would be required to manage the increased workload necessitated by the transfer of authorities and increased appropriations. These transfers of authority and appropriations could increase the international affairs budget by $785 million by 2014.

In total, the Academy recommends that U.S. direct-hire staffing be increased by 4,735 during the 2010-2014 time period, a growth of 46% above current levels in the four categories listed above. This increase should be accompanied by significant increases in training opportunities and in the number of locally employed staff retained overseas. The cost of these additional staff and related expenses will rise to $2 billion annually by 2014. In addition, program increases in Core Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy and Security Assistance will cost $1.3 billion annually by FY 2014.

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Introduction and Overview

> "Our diplomatic leaders – be they in ambassadors' suites or on the State Department's seventh floor – must have the resources and political support needed to fully exercise their statutory responsibilities in leading American foreign policy."
>
> *-Defense Secretary Robert Gates, July 2008*

The situation that Secretary Gates calls for does not exist today. Currently, the United States faces a wide range of problems ranging from Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations to the challenges of globalization, HIV/AIDS and other pandemics, environmental degradation, proliferation and failed states. Opportunities also abound in relation to rising powers, strengthening of international trade and financial systems, development and improvements in governance and the quality of life in developing and transitioning societies. These dynamic challenges and opportunities can only be met proactively and effectively through a significantly more robust foreign affairs capacity that features skilled diplomats and foreign assistance professionals.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the diplomatic capacity of the United States has been hollowed out. The chart below illustrates the decline in foreign affairs staffing that has contributed to the diminished diplomatic capacity of the United States.



A combination of reduced personnel, program cuts, and sharply increased responsibilities has put maximum pressure on the capacity of those US agencies that are responsible for the missions of core diplomacy, public diplomacy, foreign assistance, and reconstruction and stabilization under the 150 Account. These missions are defined as follows:

- **Core diplomacy** consists of political, economic and certain consular functions, as well as emerging priorities such as expanded science and technology and multilateral diplomacy;
- **Public Diplomacy** includes exchanges and overseas public diplomacy and cultural affairs work;
- **Foreign Assistance** covers the work of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the management and oversight of security assistance programs; and,
- **Reconstruction and Stabilization** refers to an expanding area that provides for a civilian "surge" capacity that can respond quickly to pre- and post-crisis situations.

During the 1990s, overseas staffing for these functions was significantly reduced in the context of the roughly 30% real dollar reduction in U.S. international affairs spending as the "peace dividend" was cashed. In addition, the implosions of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia resulted in the need to staff some 20 new embassies in the new countries created as a result, and to expand staff based in other Eastern European nations. By September 11, 2001, the overseas staffing shortfall in the State Department had approached 20%, with a larger gap within USAID.

Secretary of State Powell's Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) created more than 1,000 new State Department diplomatic positions during 2001 to 2004, bolstering core diplomatic staffing to above that of post-Cold War levels. These increases, however, were quickly absorbed by the diplomatic surges in Iraq, Afghanistan and neighboring countries.

Since the DRI ended in 2004, staffing increases at State have been concentrated in consular affairs and diplomatic security. Core diplomatic staffing deficits have, in effect, returned to 2000 levels. The current realities are as follows:

- As of 2008, State faces a personnel shortfall of more than 2,000 staff-years relating solely to enduring core diplomatic work, emerging policy challenges, and critical training needs. Persistent staffing gaps at hardship posts continue to impede important policy pursuits. Staffing demands related to Iraq and Afghanistan translates not only into needs for resident personnel, but for significant ongoing waves of short-term staff who are diverted temporarily from other jobs to the detriment of other work.

- Training lags because of personnel shortages. A well-trained workforce is extremely difficult to achieve when every training assignment leaves a position unfilled. A 2006 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that 29% of language-designated positions at embassies and consulates were not filled with language-proficient staff.[2] Functional training lags as well.

- USAID currently has 2,200 direct-hire personnel who administer more than $8 billion annually in development and other assistance (excluding cash grants), following cumulative staff reductions of nearly 40% during the past two decades. In 1990, USAID had nearly 3,500 personnel assigned to the task of administering a total of approximately $5 billion annually.

- In public diplomacy, reduced budgets and staff devoted to explaining America abroad after the end of the Cold War contributed to a reduced understanding of and respect

[2] General Accounting Office, *Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gap* Washington, D.C.: GAO, Report 06-894, p 25.

for the United States in many parts of the world. Increased resources, including larger numbers of skilled personnel, are required in this area.

- There will be an increasing need for pre- and post-conflict stabilization efforts in many parts of the world, which should be managed by civilian leadership. While a Presidential directive (NSPD-44) directs the State Department to coordinate government-wide stabilization and reconstruction operations and that Department is doing so, the Department of Defense (DOD) has assumed responsibility for implementing the largest of these programs, those in Iraq and Afghanistan. There needs to be a permanent core of civilian experts who are ready to "surge" when required in non-combat zones; these experts should, in turn, be supported by others in government and in other sectors that can provide additional or related support.

- The "militarization of diplomacy" is noticeably expanding as DOD personnel assume public diplomacy and assistance responsibilities that the civilian agencies do not have the trained staff to execute. In addition, in the area of security assistance - traditionally under the authority of the Secretary of State but implemented largely by the Defense Department - a number of new DOD authorities have been created, further reducing the role of the Secretary of State in this vital area of U.S. foreign policy.

The administration has proposed significant staffing increases for the State Department and USAID for FY 2009 (1,152 new positions). These proposals are consistent with the direction in which we believe the government should move and have, in some cases, provided a partial basis on which our forward projections have been built. The staffing models used by USAID and in part by State for both overseas and headquarters contain the critical policy and workforce factors needed to project staffing needs and we have utilized them in our analysis. We have, however, revised or added to the input data applied to these models. Given the likelihood that the Administration's proposed increases will not be enacted and that the government will spend much of FY 2009 under a series of Continuing Resolutions that extend FY 2008 funding levels, we have used the FY 2008 enacted levels as the base for our projections. We have built in some increases for FY 2009, based on supplemental appropriations enacted late in FY 2008, but have assumed that significant growth in staffing and funding will not occur until a new administration presents its budget for FY 2010. Funding increases described in each of the sections represent increments above the current services baseline used by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which projects programs at current levels in real terms, assuming modest levels of inflation.

Our review has led to the following conclusions:

1. Existing staffing levels are inadequate to meet ongoing requirements as demonstrated by significant vacancy rates and insufficient personnel flexibility to permit needed training and transfers;
2. New programmatic and substantive requirements in each of the areas will require additional staff with new and updated skills if they are to be addressed successfully;
3. In order to manage the foreign policy portfolio, certain authorities and programs in the area of security assistance now exercised in the Department of Defense should be under the authority of the Department of State; and,
4. Enhanced training, through the Foreign Service Institute and elsewhere, will be an essential complement to the recruitment of new staff.

Effective implementation of U.S. foreign policy will require an increase of 4,735 Direct-hire Foreign Service and civil service American staff by 2014, plus 2,350 Foreign Service Nationals (FSN) or Locally Engaged Staff (LES). This staffing increase will require increased funding for Function 150 totaling $2 billion above FY 2014 CBO Current Services estimates. New program funding, primarily in the areas of public diplomacy and security assistance, will add another $1.3 billion to Function 150.

Staffing Level Summary[3]									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Delta	% Increase
Core	6,407	6,480	6,740	7,034	7,312	7,506	7,506	1,099	
Training	306	351	891	1,325	1,593	1,593	1,593	1,287	
PD	1,332	1,352	1,558	1,670	1,727	1,784	1,819	487	
USAID	2,020	2,150	2,500	2,850	3,100	3,270	3,270	1,250	
Stabilization	19	69	331	406	481	531	581	562	
Sec. Asst.	38	38	41	56	76	88	88	50	
Total	**10,122**	**10,440**	**12,061**	**13,341**	**14,289**	**14,772**	**14,857**	**4,735**	**46%**

Staffing Increases - New Hires Per Year							
	2008/9	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
Core	73	260	294	278	194	-	**1,099**
Training	45	540	434	268	-	-	**1,287**
PD	20	206	112	57	57	35	**487**
USAID	130	350	350	250	170		**1,250**
Stabilization	50	262	75	75	50	50	**562**
Sec. Asst.	-	3	15	20	12	-	**50**
Total	**318**	**1621**	**1280**	**948**	**483**	**85**	**4,735**

Cost Increase over CBO Baseline Selected Functions ($ in millions)								
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	% Increase
Baseline	$14,114	$14,382	$14,655	$14,963	$15,292	$15,629	$15,973	
Core Diplomacy								
Staff	-	$15.4	$88.6	$183.8	$323.9	$447.9	$510.5	
Consular Staff			$21.1	$65.5	$112	$147.7	$160.6	
Program	-	-	$125	$75	$75	$75	$75	
Training								
Staff	-	$4.7	$68.5	$170.3	$258	$299.3	$309.8	
Public Diplomacy								
Staff	-	$3.1	$34.9	$82.5	$112.6	$136	$155.2	
Program	-	-	$101.7	$192	$274.8	$362.5	$455.2	
USAID								
Staff	-	$38.2	$112.3	$245.1	$370.6	$479.8	$521.1	
Stabilization								
Staff	-	$38.2	$190.1	$210.5	$237.2	$261.7	$286	
Sec. Asst.								
Staff	-	-	$.6	$5.2	$14	$21.3	$24.2	
Program	-	-	$35	$135	$385	$535	$785	
Increases	-	***$100***	***$778***	***$1,361***	***$2,151***	***$2,746***	***$3,283***	
Total	$14,114	$14,482	$15,437	$16,358	$17,476	$18,418	$19,256	**21%**

[3] Staffing figures throughout this study are considered U.S. Direct-Hire (USDH), unless otherwise specified, and represent people on board at the end of the year.

STAFFING AND RESOURCES REQUIRED

STAFFING FOR CORE DIPLOMACY

Summary

Significant recent work has gone far in defining the prospective global policy environment. Credible commissions, advisory groups and task forces have delineated likely over-the-horizon policy scenarios, and have set out a range of diplomatic activities required to rise to expected challenges and opportunities.[4] On the basis of available information, a number of analyses have suggested critical gaps between needed and existing diplomatic capacity. This section attempts to quantify those gaps in terms of specific activities and associated financial costs and to set out a budgetary framework for their public presentation and execution.

For Core Diplomacy, the Academy recommends staffing increases totaling 1,099, and total underlying budget growth of $510.5 million by FY 2014, as follows:

Core Diplomacy – Staffing and Cost Increases, 2010-2014 ($ in millions)							
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total Staff Increase
New Hires in Year (USDH)	73	260	294	278	194	-	1,099
Cost Increase Over Base							
Staff	$15.4	$88.6	$183.8	$323.9	$447.9	$510.5	
Consular Staff		$21.1	$65.5	$112	$147.7	$160.6	
Program	-	$125	$75	$75	$75	$75	
Total Cost	**$15.4**	**$234.7**	**$324.3**	**$510.9**	**$670.6**	**$746.1**	

For the purpose of our analysis, core diplomacy includes the following activities:[5]

- ***Conduct of Diplomatic Relations:***
  - Government-to-government diplomacy, implementing policy, representing U.S. interests and advocating U.S. policy positions abroad, negotiation;
  - Intelligence, in terms of overt collection, analysis and reporting of information from foreign sources;
  - Transnational issue diplomacy, executing specialized U.S. policy pursuits, in areas ranging from law enforcement to energy.

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[4] e.g., Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, *Final Report of the State Department in 2025 Working Group*, U.S. Department of State, Washington DC, 2008, and prior analyses cited in its bibliography.

[5] Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2009. Excluded from "Core Diplomacy" for analytical purposes are the budget activity sets corresponding to "Diplomatic Security," as well as those corresponding to indirect management/administrative support. However, core diplomatic costs include full per capita shares of full funding for needed overseas administrative support services, without which none of the policy demands identified can be met.*

- **Conduct of Consular Relations:**
  - Adjudication of non immigrant and immigrant visa requests;
  - Routine and emergency assistance to American citizens in distress;
  - Public information activities for the benefit of American travelers and the U.S. travel industry; and,
  - Adjudication of passport applications, and passport issuance or denial for U.S. citizens.
- ***Policy Formulation***: Development of substantive policy positions and strategies for their pursuit.
- ***Multilateral Diplomacy***: Conduct of relations at multilateral organizations.

In addition, State will also need to increase core diplomatic staffing and expertise to manage the following new emerging foreign policy imperatives:[6]

- ***Proactive and Preventive Shaping Capabilities***: To create conditions favorable to U.S. interests on an anticipatory (vice reactive) and results-oriented basis, specifically consisting of proactive multilateral leadership, pre-crisis conflict mediation and resolution, the ability to activate and influence emerging areas of international law, development of joint-planning and joint-response strategies with both state and non-state actors.
- ***Engagement of Non-Traditional Actors***: A strengthened institutional means to understand, engage and partner creatively with private sector and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) actors.
- ***Capacity to Integrate U.S. Government Global Affairs Activities***: Coordinating the periodic development of a Global Affairs Strategic Plan and presenting a related and integrated annual Global Affairs Budget; and, leading development of government-wide regional strategic plans and expanding its senior-level diplomatic visibility.

Background

Against a backdrop of overall post-Cold War fiscal constraint during the 1990s, aggregate funding for U.S. international affairs fell in both nominal and real terms until the end of the decade. As a subset of this, State Department staffing for so-called "core" diplomatic and policy activities remained static at a time when workload demands were growing significantly. During this timeframe, the Department absorbed most of the staffing needs associated with the opening of 20 new embassies, principally in the states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and primarily by staffing down (and even closing some) Western European posts.[7] The following chart illustrates these trends:

[6] Based on recommendations 1-3, Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, *op. cit.*
[7] Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justifications*, Washington DC, 1992-95.



At the same time, shifts in U.S. political thinking to a Cold War-victory mindset served to reinforce the downward drift in funding for international affairs generally and for diplomatic engagement specifically. Congressional debates of the early 1990s manifested a bipartisan drive for disengagement abroad and a fundamental questioning of the purpose of diplomatic missions. Such missions were defended, however, by a minority that warned against a predilection to "want to get off the world" and spoke of an environment "ever more complex, not simple, [to which] closing our eyes will not make the complexity go away."[8] Contemporary academic work also underscored the need for ongoing engagement, while calling for a now-familiar broadening of diplomacy "...to augment state-to-state relations with other avenues of U.S. influence overseas, such as the business community, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and charitable institutions."[9]

The staffing constraints of the 1990s, in turn, limited the Department's ability to expand and diversify the staff skills needed not only for a broadened mission but for conduct of government-to-government diplomacy in new countries and management of newly-emergent priority transnational issues. This in turn fed into perceptions of the Department's marginal relevance to work that was high on the 1990s policy agenda, such as democracy promotion and global environmental cooperation, further eroding political support for needed budget and staffing growth at State.

These cross-currents also reflected a continuation of debates regarding the extent to which technology and corporate business models could serve to centralize diplomatic activity and reduce overseas staffing accordingly. As early as the 1970s, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote about U.S. needs for "a foreign-relations machinery that exploits the latest communications techniques ...," and of a "business community [with] extensive experience in foreign operations ... accurate reporting, foreign representation and central control -- without relying on enormous staffs and redundant operations."[10]

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[8] *Congressional Record*, Rep. Dante B. Fascell, July 30, 1992, pp. H7034-7; Sen. Joseph Biden, March 28, 1996, pp. S3144.

[9] Project on the Advocacy of U.S. Interests Abroad, *"Equipped for the Future; Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century,"* John Schall, Executive Director, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington DC, October 1998, p. 7.

[10] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages, Viking Press, 1970, pp. 291-3.

The downward trend in diplomatic staffing partially reversed itself beginning in 1997, with a return to immediate post-Cold War "core" levels by 2001. That was followed by increases of approximately three percent annually over four years. The first year of this growth, however, did little more than offset the impact of post openings that had occurred during the previous decade, and subsequent years were significantly consumed by staffing demands related to Iraq, Afghanistan, and their neighboring countries.

Simultaneous to these events, staffing and funding for security, management, information technology, and administrative activities within the Department rose at higher overall rates than did core funding and staffing. In part, this reflected the need to play catch up after years of infrastructure neglect. A number of these activities - for example new Embassy construction - came to be budgeted for and managed as operating or capital programs in and of themselves, with funding and staffing levels determined according to long-term operational or service quality goals, rather than direct reference to the core activities supported. Consular and security resources also expanded sharply to cope with the new, radically different post-9/11 environment.

Overseas Staffing

Since 2005, the Rice-era State Department has become explicit in emphasizing a more "field-first" staffing orientation that merits support. As this proceeds, the following principles should be seen as central to future overseas staffing:

1. *Universality*: The U.S. will have a resident presence in every country with which it maintains national government-to-government relations, and at every multilateral organization of which it is a member.
2. *Expanded engagement:* The Department will need to significantly expand interaction with non-national-government actors, requiring concomitant staffing increases.
3. *Location/configuration*: To this end, the Department will need to extend the U.S. presence "in capitals and outside them," as manifested by the establishment of branch offices, American Presence Posts, American Centers, and use of traveling circuit riders.[11]
4. *Security*: "To support a diplomatic presence that is distributed, the Department's security culture and practices must continue to transition from risk avoidance to risk management." It can be anticipated that physical threats to U.S. government personnel abroad will continue, will likely grow with dispersal, and may grow in any event.[12]

With rare exceptions, contemporary staffing needs related to mainstream diplomacy have been gauged on a static basis, that is, in terms of building and maintaining a workforce to meet existing demands only. The most significant, forward-looking foreign affairs staffing initiatives since the 1950's have concerned agencies other than State. Prior to the 2008 budget cycle, such contemporary, State-centric staffing initiatives as were undertaken aimed to close existing gaps and meet established goals in the context of existing conditions. State's two recent "Diplomatic Readiness Initiatives" (of the Christopher and Powell eras, respectively) were constructed largely along these lines. Periodic attempts at "forecasting and matching future (policy) requirements with staff skills" have achieved only limited traction.[13]

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[11] Center for Strategic and International Studies, *"The Embassy of the Future,"* Washington DC, 2007, p. 30.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 50.
[13] Barry Rubin, Secrets of State, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 107. This point remains accurate today.

Consistent with this approach, the Department has, since at least the mid-1990s, gauged staffing demands on the basis of separate Overseas and Domestic Staffing Models. The current Overseas Staffing Model (OSM) sets out a framework of five program activity sets for purposes of core diplomatic workload measurement: Executive, Political, Economic, Labor and Science. Staffing requirements for each are then calculated on a post-by-post basis by assigning each post to one of five categories, according to a matrix of: 1) the magnitude of U.S. interests locally at stake, juxtaposed against; 2) the importance of post roles in pursuit of U.S. policy goals as set out in the Department's strategic plan.

For purposes of job categorization, the Department defines corresponding work content overseas according to the following 16 skill codes set out in regulation:[14]

State Skill Codes	
Executive (Chief of Mission, DCM)	Economic Affairs
Political Affairs	Finance & Economic Development
Political-Military Affairs	International Transportation/ Communications
Labor Affairs	Trade
Narcotics Control	Economic Resources & Commodities
Refugee Affairs	Environment, Science, Technology
Legal Affairs	Multifunctional
Intelligence Research	International Relations

As of 2008, overseas staffing gaps related to core diplomacy totaled 234, calculated according to the Department's OSM criteria. In addition, State has identified staffing growth demands of 320 needed to support new initiatives directly, including Transformational Diplomacy (100), opening of new American Presence Posts (75), and Iraq (45). These are being budgeted in annual increments consistent with recruitment and training capacity. Among these requirements, 73 were funded in FY 2008. Although some of these needs were met through the Department's Global Repositioning exercise, none were put in the 2009 budget, leaving a shortfall of 481. All of these components of new initiatives appear to have been developed on the basis of policy drivers, for example, of standard models for staffing needs related to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq, or target sites for American Presence Posts.[15]

Although State models its overseas staffing configuration on the basis of policy conditions and working environments rather than quantifiable workload, the staffing gap identified appears to correspond to 5% or less of the total overseas workforce for core diplomatic work. There is no basis for believing that legitimate alternative modeling techniques would produce dramatically different results in a range this small.[16] The application of alternative, more robust staffing models to micro-scale new initiatives would likely be similarly unproductive. The one-person American Presence Post concept, for example, has already been field-tested and validated at multiple locations in different environments.

In addition, State will need to increase staffing and expertise by 545 staff-years to assure effective management of new foreign policy imperatives.[17] Current baseline analyses and workload assessments for these activities are difficult to construct because State does not

[14] 3 FAH-1, Exhibit H-2323.3
[15] *Transformational Diplomacy*, speech, Georgetown University, January 18, 2006.
[16] A 2006 GAO analysis identified shortfalls totaling 154 staff-years. GAO Report 06-894, p. 14.
[17] Based on recommendations 1-3, Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, *op. cit.*

act in some of these areas and does not frame its activities in this way even where it acts in others. The following staffing guidelines, derived from the emerging activities outlined previously, could be indicative, however:

1. **Multilateral Diplomacy**, meaning development and execution of longer-term more proactive strategies for influencing the agendas of multilateral institutions, and strengthened presence in such institutions to these ends. For the latest year in which records are available (2005), a total of 28 State employees were detailed or seconded to multilateral organizations other than NATO. Assuming two additional State employees assigned to each of a menu of key regional multilateral organizations, specialized U.N. agencies and development banks, 10 additional mainstream U.N. assignments, and another 30 staff added to the static 300 employees working in multilateral diplomacy for the Department directly, a total of 100 additional staff would be needed.[18]

2. **International Law**, in terms of monitoring/driving the development of international law and practice – particularly in new domains, such as climate, genetics, and nanotechnology. The staffing increment associated with this workload would be significant in the context of the existing base, which is likely zero. The Office of State's Legal Advisor has long been assessed as seriously understaffed, and has no overseas assets. Establishment of a minimal staff of attorneys and legal assistants assigned to 5-8 regional hubs abroad would account for 20 total additional staff.

3. **Economics, Science and Technology**, specifically increased focus on economic diplomacy and on coordination of global economic policy execution, as well as expanded engagement in science, engineering, and technology. These functions are understaffed for existing overseas work, according to OSM outputs. Overseas positions allocated to State's economics portfolio, for example, total 519, approximately 8 percent of State's core diplomatic workforce, and this following growth by just under 100 staff-years in the past decade. The Academy specifically recommends a further near-doubling of this growth during the next five years, corresponding to 80 additional staff, to be deployed at posts abroad, detailed to multilateral development banks, and to the offices of U.S. Executive Directors of such institutions.[18]

   The Academy has previously recommended that State "have a formal mandate to manage international science negotiations and ... make an aggressive effort to recruit officers with the ability to understand sophisticated scientific issues and methodology."[19] The Department currently has ESTH (Engineering, Science, Technology & Health) staff at 35 locations abroad, including 12 sub-regional hubs. We believe that on the basis of current staff distribution, an increase of 70 overseas staff – 21 at existing ESTH locations and 49 at other posts – is warranted. An illustrative list of possible additional ESTH staff deployments is attached as Appendix A.

4. **Public-Private Partnerships**, meaning strategic engagement of non-state actors to influence the emerging patterns of activity through which they operate, and leverage the growing resources and capabilities at their disposal. It can and should be assumed that some work in this territory is already going on as part of core diplomacy, and that it will be expanded further using the projected one-time staff increases identified earlier for second-tranche APPs and Transformational Diplomacy, and identified separately for Public Diplomacy and Assistance Diplomacy. However, a reasonable out-year expansion (100 staff-years) of this activity in the form of regional hubs and roving staff should be anticipated.

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[18] Examples of specialized U.N. agencies and development banks include: ASEAN, AU, SADC, OAS, EBRD, ADB, AsDB, IADB, UNDP, UNHCR, PAHO, UNICEF, ILO, WIPO, WTO, EU, CARICOM, and ECOWAS.
[19] American Academy of Diplomacy, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

5. **Interagency Coordination,** in terms of policy planning, development and execution. Both outside groups and the Department's FY 2009 Budget argue for staffing increases in this area. Both recommend an increase in interagency details, for which State proposes 125 additional positions for FY 2009. Other proposals circulating in the Department are more radical, specifically one calling for establishment of regional planning hubs abroad, a concept which merits endorsement, and, we believe, can be accommodated through a staffing increment of 50, in combination with a reasonable reallocation of Washington-based positions; for a total increase of 175 staff.

The first and third of these prescriptions are obviously not new. A 2004 AAD Task Force report and the 2006 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication included similar findings and recommendations.[20] However, even as early as the 1960s, FSOs were targets of Kennedy-Administration-era exhortations to "involve yourselves in every element of foreign life – labor, the class struggle, cultural affairs – attempting to predict in what direction the forces will move ..."[21] echoed again a decade later by Brzezinski, "Our diplomatic machinery is still ...predominantly geared to government-to-government relations, often neglecting the currently far more important role of social developments."[22]

To play its critical role in managing some of the highest-priority, over-the-horizon US Government (USG) global policy imperatives, State will need to staff up over the medium term - in numbers and expertise - to meet these new work demands. To the extent that State is not staffed accordingly, it is probable that other USG agencies will step into pieces of this territory, and that other critical work will go undone, to obvious public detriment.

Consular Affairs

For much of U.S. history, Consular representation actually outpaced diplomatic representation abroad. The following table illustrates historical trends:[23]

Year	Diplomatic Posts	Consular Posts
1781	4	3
1800	6	52
1820	7	83
1840	20	152
1860	33	282
1880	35	303
1900	41	318
1920	45	368
1940	58	264
1950	74	179
1960	99	166
1970	117	122
1980	133	100
1990	145	97
2008	179	81

[20] AAD Task Force report, *American Diplomacy for a Changing World,* November 2004, p. 5.
[21] *Foreign Service Journal,* July 1962, p. 28, cited by Rubin, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
[22] Brzezinski, *op cit.*, p. 292.
[23] Source: Department of State, Office of the Historian, and *Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2009.*

The U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Services, originally separate, were merged only in 1924. Transitions from consular to diplomatic representation obviously reflect post-1960s realities of decolonization. However, consulate closings were also an end-result of budget constraints, of security concerns, and of views that U.S. interests could be pursued more cost-effectively in growing numbers of locations by remote control, given post-World War II improvements in communication and transportation. In any event, Consular officers both acted and were perceived as sole U.S. government-to-government representatives vis-à-vis local authorities across most of the world well into the 1960s.

State's budget sub-category "Conduct of Consular Relations" comprises the following border security and citizen services activities:[24]

- Adjudication of non-immigrant visa requests from foreign tourists, students, business people, investors, and government officials. In FY 2007, State processed 8.56 million non-immigrant visa applications. The Department expects that demand for non-immigrant visa services will grow to 9.64 million applications in FY 2008 and 10.1 million applications in FY 2009.
- Adjudication of immigrant visa applications. In FY 2007, the Department processed a total of 680,000 immigrant visa applications. This workload is expected to remain at the same level in FY 2008 and FY 2009.
- Routine and emergency assistance to American citizens in distress. In FY 2008 and FY 2009, the Department projects that it will respond to 2 million citizen services requests worldwide each year.
- Public information activities for the benefit of American travelers and the U.S. travel industry, regarding dangerous situations abroad, carried out by means of Consular Information Sheets, Travel Warnings, and the Department's Consular Affairs web site.
- Adjudication of passport applications, and passport issuance or denial for U.S. citizens wanting to travel abroad. In FY 2007, the Department processed 18.4 million passport applications. Workload is expected to grow to 29 million applications in FY 2008 and between 30 and 36 million in FY 2009.

Current State Department U.S. Direct-hire (USDH) Consular staffing abroad totals 1,435 representing just over a doubling since 1995. Virtually all such staffing is funded by fee collections. As of the end of FY 2007, only 161 overseas USDH consular positions were supported with appropriated funds, down from 712 in 1995, coinciding with a decline in total appropriated funding budgeted for the conduct of consular relations from $241.3 million to just under $60 million. These trends were predominantly induced by 1990s budgetary rules of the road; as increases in appropriated funding became harder to come by, fee increases became an interagency norm.[25]

Taken at face value, this shift also appears to reflect an excessive reshaping of the Department's view of consular work; though significantly a function of general government, consular activities are now treated, from a budgetary point of view, as specialized services to a specific subset of users. From an administrative point of view, this has seemed a risk-free option during good economic times; but now, with fee revenues projected to decline, consular funding has become uncertain. The Academy notes the inconsistency of this shift with originally-stated legislative intent:

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[24] Extracted from: Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2009*, p. 34.
[25] *Ibid.*, FYs 1997-2009.

> *The committee of conference emphasizes that the purpose of this fee retention authority is to provide enhanced consular services and equipment upgrades above and beyond current base consular services and modernization programs. This new authority is not intended to permit any of the current consular base funding to be transferred to any other purpose.*[26]

Looking ahead to the kinds of broader people-to-people diplomatic engagement foreseen by the Academy, Consular Officers should be expected to again play key roles. A logical budgetary reflection of this would be reversion of overseas Consular Officers to appropriated-fund status.

As a first step in this direction, the Academy recommends such a change affecting all overseas mid and senior level consular personnel, presently totaling 493 over the five-year period under examination. This would require a shift of funding of $160.6 million by FY 2014.

Domestic Staffing

The most recent application of the Department's Domestic Staffing Model (DSM) indicated a 4.1% shortfall (498 FTE) in full-time permanent hiring authority as of the beginning of FY 2006 for work carried out during FY 2005. The DSM estimates regional bureau domestic staffing needs by ratios of domestic staff to the magnitude and complexity of overseas missions backstopped by each bureau, modified according to the relative difficulty of differing overseas operating environments. Other current domestic staffing requirements are calculated according to a matrix of more than 800 workload factors.

Projecting forward to 2009, the model identifies a basis for prospective increases in full-time permanent domestic hiring authority totaling more than 1,500. Significant shares of this are attributable to domestic passport and Diplomatic Security workload (discussed later), as distinct from core diplomatic activities.[27] The remaining DSM projection is qualified as assuming no workload restructuring resulting in efficiency or productivity gains, specifically citing the need "to set priorities on missions, seek operational efficiencies, and outsource functions to non-FTP categories, all of which would affect future staffing requirements ..."[28] Outside groups have made similar recommendations, for example, calling on the Department to "rationalize [its] organizational structure by reducing to three or four decision layers and consolidating bureaus and offices to reduce the number of officials reporting directly to the Secretary."[29]

These recommendations are not new, but recur at this time against a backdrop of continuing domestic staffing growth at State, as illustrated in the following chart:

[26] House of Representatives, Conference Report 103-482, p. 167.
[27] Department of State, *Domestic Staffing Model, Phase 3 Report*, March 2007, p. 7-3.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. xi.
[29] Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, *op. cit.*, p. ii.



Reflecting this trend and anticipated economies, the Department has not proposed any significant net domestic staffing increases for core mission or administrative support for the last three budget years and none have been funded. Mid-senior-level officials have, in multiple separate discussions, explicitly confirmed this as representative of a deliberate effort to close domestic staffing gaps by "aggressively reforming existing structures, procedures, and systems – reducing organizational layers, expanding shared services, promoting strategic procurement, and eliminating or competitively sourcing lower priority, non-core functions."[30]

Previous external reviews have endorsed efforts to consolidate administrative services as a component of this approach.[31] This is seen, in part, as an acknowledgement of the success of the Powell-era acceleration in infrastructure spending (referred to earlier), as is the resulting ability to capitalize on this success to achieve efficiencies and economies of scale. Accordingly, the State Department should increase ongoing efforts to streamline the Department's domestic establishment, particularly looking ahead to the upcoming transition in administration in 2009, when such changes are optimally achievable.

Physical Security Context

Key issues include:

- The extent to which U.S. government mission effectiveness can be impeded by general application of current physical security standards to overseas staffing configurations.
- The extent to which employees and policy-makers are prepared to assume any increased risks associated with alternative configurations.
- The extent to which cost-effective variations – as reflected in the recommendations of the Accountability Review Boards convened after the 1998 terrorist attacks on U.S.

[30] Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2009*, p. 4.
[31] Center for Strategic and International Studies, *op. cit., p. 58.*

Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam – of the current New Embassy Compound model have been adequately considered in overseas staffing configurations.

The 1979 seizures of U.S. Embassies in Tehran and Islamabad, and the 1983-84 bombings of U.S. Embassy facilities in Beirut, characterized two decades of escalating violence directed at U.S. diplomatic and consular facilities. The outlines of the Department's current security posture grew out of these events, and in part from the so-called "Inman Panel" recommendations which followed.[32] They were reinforced as an immediate reaction to the 1998 terrorist truck bombings of U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Pursuant to the recommendations of the two Accountability Review Boards convened following these attacks and chaired by Admiral William J. Crowe, the "Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999" authorized needed appropriations for capital construction for the 2000-2004 timeframe.[33] This provided a renewed basis for long-overdue replacement of multiple USG facilities abroad, a number of which were substandard in both operational and security terms.

However, the 1999 Act further encoded into law the following two stipulations:

1. In selecting a site for any new United States diplomatic facility abroad, the Secretary shall ensure that all United States Government personnel at the post (except those under the command of an area military commander) will be located on the site; and,
2. Each newly acquired United States diplomatic facility shall be sited not less than 100 feet from the perimeter of the property on which the facility is to be situated.

An effect of this was to put physical security on at least an equal footing with the worldwide diplomatic agenda. In practice, this has meant that from 2001 onwards, new overseas construction projects have been required to conform to worldwide statutory specifications producing centralization of U.S. government personnel into sometimes-distant suburban facilities.

There is little evidence to suggest that the Crowe Boards seriously evaluated the potentially detrimental effects to U.S. policy pursuit that might derive from such configurations, simply because it was not within the scope of either of their mandates to do so. Secretary Albright specifically recognized this on receipt of the Crowe report:[34]

> Admiral Crowe's mandate was to investigate the embassy bombings and to recommend ways to improve security. As Secretary of State, I have a broader mandate to ensure the effective promotion of U.S. interests and values around the world ... We will continually have to make difficult and inherently subjective decisions about how best to use the resources we have and about how to reconcile security imperatives with our need to do business overseas.

Expanding on this, Secretary Rice more recently (January, 2006) affirmed a view that "transformational diplomacy requires us to move our diplomatic presence out of foreign capitals and to spread it more widely across countries [to] work on the front lines of domestic reform as well as in the back rooms of foreign ministries..."[35]

The Academy endorses both the Department's ongoing efforts to replace substandard facilities and the (previously-referenced) "transition from risk avoidance to risk

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[32] Department of State, *Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security*, June 1985.
[33] Enacted by reference as §1000(a) (7) of P.L.106–113, Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2000.
[34] U.S. Department of State, "Remarks on Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam," January 8, 1999.
[35] Condoleezza Rice, "Transformational Diplomacy," January 18, 2006, Georgetown University.

management," enabling greater decentralization of the USG presence abroad. A summary of Diplomatic Security activities and staffing/funding trends is attached as Appendix B.

Contingency Funding

A number of standing authorities provide the Department of State, and/or Chiefs of Mission abroad, significant latitude to meet fast-emerging policy contingencies. In practice, however, use of these authorities has been highly constrained by regulation, precedent, and funding limitations. The Academy recommends relaxation of some of these constraints and appropriation of additional in two specific areas.

Diplomatic Contingencies

Specific permanent statutes provide the Department with broad latitude to meet unforeseen contingencies, specifically to:[36]

> ...make expenditures, from such amounts as may be specifically appropriated therefore, for unforeseen emergencies arising in the diplomatic and consular service...only for such activities as—
>
> (A) Serve to further the realization of foreign policy objectives [and];
>
> (B) Are a matter of urgency to implement...

And to:

> ...provide for participation by the United States in international activities which arise from time to time in the conduct of foreign affairs for which provision has not been made by the terms of any treaty, convention, or special Act of Congress...

Historically, the Department has been comfortable with only very limited use of these authorities and has requested funding accordingly. The following table sets out a history of recent appropriations specifically for these purposes:[37]

Contingency Fund Use ($ in millions)																	
1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
$10.3	$24.4	$12.5	$13.6	$13.8	$13	$9	$13	$18	$17	$5	$46	$7	$43	$35	$4	$44	$5

The Department currently labels activities conducted pursuant to these authorities "Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service (EDCS)," specifically:[38]

- ***Evacuations***: Urgent medical and travel expenses related to natural disasters or terrorist incidents; emergency evacuations of U.S. government personnel and their families overseas, and, in certain cases, private U.S. citizens and third country nationals.
- ***Activities Relating to the Conduct of Foreign Affairs***: Representational activities, generally in connection with the U.S. hosting of conferences, such as the U.N. General Assembly, visits by foreign dignitaries, and official overseas travel by high-level members of the U.S. government, including Members of Congress.

[36] State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (P.L. 84-885), as amended, §4-5.
[37] Data Source: OMB Public database.
[38] Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2009*, Washington, D.C., p. 581-2.

- ***Terrorism, Narcotics, and War Crimes Rewards*:** Rewards supporting Department of Justice publicity campaigns have focused on High-Value Targets in Iraq and elsewhere, as well as prominent Al-Qaeda terrorists. The recent success of these media campaigns has led to reward programs covering narcotics-related matters and war criminals in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

With an eye toward emerging foreign policy challenges, the Academy recommends the expansion of these activities to include more "in advance" policy pursuits, geared more toward development of anticipatory local partnerships and oriented more to crisis prevention, rather than crisis response. For example:

- Organization and conduct of pre-conflict reconciliation conferences in specific situations, or what could be called a localized "Dayton-in-advance" approach;

- Embassy-managed execution of small (maximum $100,000) NGO grants for civil-society and/or micro-development purposes. (The operational success of the Department's limited experience with its Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation is instructive here);

- Support for multilateral or bilateral deployment of rapid-deployment mediation rapid response teams into pre-crisis situations; and, [39]

- Deployment of civilian police advising teams into localized environments of developing, over-the-horizon civil or ethnic strife.

For this field-oriented expansion, we recommend a $25 million increase in funds appropriated to the Department's EDCS account annually for the next five years, with not more than $5 million to be available for representational purposes. We also recommend that the name of the account be changed to the "Emergencies and Contingencies in Diplomatic and Consular Service."

Humanitarian Response

USAID's Disaster Assistance work has been widely praised in recent years. However, the International Disaster Assistance account is underfunded for the often-overlapping purposes of immediate crisis response and sustained relief operations. The Academy recommends partial separation of funding for these two kinds of activities and the establishment of a new USAID Emergency Humanitarian Crisis Response account (to mirror the Emergency Refugee and Migration Account in structure and operational mechanics), with an initial capitalization of $100 million, and $50 million annual replenishment thereafter.

Further, the Academy notes that the immediate effect of ambassadorial authority to declare humanitarian disasters has remained limited by directive/regulation to $25,000 for so long as to have rendered such authority meaningless.[40] The Academy recommends an amendment of this limitation to lift this cap to $250,000.

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[39] The United Nations announced establishment of a mechanism for such deployments on March 5, 2008, ref.: *http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/pa1.doc.htm.*

[40] U.S. Agency for International Development, ADS E251.5.3

Recommendation

For Core Diplomacy, the Academy recommends staffing increases totaling 1,099 and corresponding budget growth of $510.5 million by FY 2014. In addition to provide an adequate contingency fund the Academy recommends appropriating $125 million in FY 2010 ($25 million in EDCS; $100 million in Emergency Crisis Response funding), and annual appropriations of $75 million ($25 million in EDCS; $50 million in ECR funding) thereafter.

TRAINING

Summary

Increase permanent American staffing by 1,287 by 2014 to support institutionalized workforce training and professional development. The goal is to continuously update the specialized competencies, including Public Diplomacy, of State to meet new policy demands. This staffing increase will cost $309.8 million annually by 2014.

Training – Staffing and Cost Increases, 2010-2014 ($ in millions)							
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Staff Increases
New Hires in Year (USDH)	45	540	434	268	-	-	1,287
Cost Increase Over Base							
Staff Costs	$4.7	$68.5	$170.3	$258	$299.3	$309.8	

Foreign Service Training

In terms of strategic personnel management, the Department has, since the post-World War II period, faced two related fundamental issues: Whether and to what degree to reinforce specialized diplomatic competencies, and what role(s) various agencies should play in USG activities abroad. On the one hand, the performance of specialized responsibilities by agencies other than State has produced an accelerating fragmentation of the federal foreign affairs community, complicating coordination. On the other hand, as indicated previously, it is clear that staffing constraints – in terms of both numbers and skills – have prevented the State Department from effectively managing new-generation policy issues. In any event, prior to World War II, the number of non-State, USG employees involved in international affairs work was marginal. By 1975, non-State staffing abroad had grown to nearly 3,500, or almost one-half of the US government total.[41] Today, the corresponding figure is approaching 10,000 - approximately two-thirds of total federal U.S. direct-hire staffing at diplomatic and consular posts.[42]

It can be counter-argued that some of these developments have been self-generated at State. For example, as far back as the late 1940s, the Department was (in the words of one of its sympathetic biographers) resistant to integration of foreign assistance into U.S. foreign policy pursuits.[43] Yet, post-war reconstruction and stabilization in Western Europe were Truman Administration priorities. The result was establishment of a succession of separate "temporary" assistance agencies.[44] From this perspective, contemporary post-conflict Reconstruction and Stabilization activities can be seen as requiring not just staffing and money, but also a sustained institutional commitment.

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[41] James W. Clark, "Foreign Affairs Personnel Management," Appendix P to the *Report of the Commission for the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy* (Murphy Commission), Washington DC, GPO, 1976, p. 222, cited by William I. Bacchus, Staffing for Foreign Affairs, Princeton University Press, 1983, pp. 78-79.

[42] Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2009, Analytical Perspectives*, p. 364.

[43] Andrew L. Steigman, The Foreign Service of the United States: First Line of Defense, Westview Press, 1985, p. 24.

[44] Economic Cooperation Administration (1947), Foreign Operations Administration (1955), USAID (1961).

However, even assuming such commitment, the Department appears to lack the specialized expertise needed to fully execute the Forward Engagement responsibilities outlined previously, as well as sufficient numbers of on-board staff needed to retrain its existing workforce to take on new tasks while sustaining core diplomatic work. These constraints are systemic, as documented by repeated analyses. As early as two decades ago, a GAO report found training shortfalls attributable to "logistical, fiscal, and other concerns."[45] In 2006, GAO found staffing gaps closing, with "targets for hiring, filling vacancies overseas being met," but gaps still remaining in critical language competency, with 27% of State's 3,267 overseas language-designated jobs encumbered by language-deficient staff, and shortfalls exceeding 50% in some critical Arabic-speaking countries.[46]

State's FY 2009 budget request sets out requirements for: (1) 300 additional staff-years for purposes of training in "critical needs languages such as Arabic, Chinese, Hindi, and Urdu," competition for which, in the context of U.S. supply/demand dynamics, makes recruitment of mid-level specialists difficult, and (2) 75 additional staff years for increased "professional development opportunities with DOD." The Department has modeled requirements for a further 34 Foreign Service language training staff-years (for a total deficit of 334), as well as an additional 290 F.S. staff-years for professional and functional training requirements (130 for professional education, with a total deficit in this category of 205, including the 75 requested for FY 2009, and 160 for other functional training), as summarized in the following table:[47]

State Foreign Service Training Requirements*			
	Required	Actual	Deficit
Language training	527	193	334
Professional education	279	74	205
Other training	199	39	160
Total	**1005**	**306**	**699**

* Totals in Staff-Years

These identified requirements need to be placed in a broader context. Many observers find that today's Foreign Service does not have to a sufficient degree the knowledge, skills, abilities, and outlooks needed to equip career diplomats to conduct 21st century diplomacy. Those skills include: foreign language fluency, advanced area knowledge, leadership and management ability, negotiating and pre-crisis conflict mediation/resolution skills, public diplomacy, foreign assistance, post-conflict/stabilization, job specific functional expertise, strategic planning, program development, implementation and evaluation, and budgeting. These shortfalls are largely a result of inadequate past opportunities for training, especially career-long professional education. But they also reflect the tendency of some officers to undervalue and thus avoid training.

State's Foreign Service Institute (FSI) has performed well in the past and has responded recently to emerging needs by developing and implementing new curricula in a number of areas of tradecraft and skills training, particularly management, budgeting and leadership courses. But FSI/s staffing and budget must be substantially increased to meet the needs this report identifies.

To accomplish this needed upgrading requires considerable development work. One possibility would be to charge FSI and the Department with designing necessary

[45] General Accounting Office, *Professional Development of Foreign Service Employees*, NSIAD-89-149, p. 3.
[46] GAO, *op. cit.*
[47] CSIS, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

coursework in each of the chosen topics, and then to make the determination about how they should be assembled into workable packages that serve both broad system needs as well as specific needs of members of the service. Developmental detail assignments and retraining to update existing skills to meet new policy demands must also be included. But however it is done the Academy recommends an additional year of formal training for each FSO between the time of tenuring and entry into the Senior Foreign Service. All of these elements need to be incorporated into a comprehensive career development program for each officer.

Other Training, Transit and Temporary Staffing Needs

Beyond this, the Department has modeled "typical" requirements for 254 Civil Service staff-years solely for training related to "Mission-Critical and High-Yield Occupations," for which its pending budget does not specifically make a request.[48] These include:

- Security Administration: GS-0080
- Foreign Affairs: GS-0130
- Human Resources Management: GS-0201
- Management and Program Analyst: GS-0343
- Accounting: GS-0510
- Passport & Visa Examination: GS-0967
- Public Affairs: GS-1035
- IT Management: GS-2210

The modeling underlying identified Civil Service training requirements can be summarized as follows:[49]

State Civil Service Training Gap – Mission-Critical and High-Yield Occupations

Occupational Series	Total FTP Workforce	Actual Training Hours	Required Training Hours	Training Gap Hours	Training Gap
Mission-Critical Occupations	3,405	145,210	539,543	394,333	212
High-Yield Occupations	1,172	35,414	114,491	79,076	42
Total	**4,577**	**180,625**	**654,034**	**473,409**	**254**

The methodology underpinning calculation of the Civil Service requirements identified above appears to be sound.

The Department has further set out requisites of 199 Foreign Service staff-years for transit between assignments and 135 staff-years for temporary needs. The principle underlying the second of these requirements is clear: to offset the effects of near-constant total numbers of personnel on rotating temporary assignment to crisis hot spots since the mid-1990s; in other words, to provide sufficient personnel to deliberately and temporarily overstaff particular organizations to cover the gaps left by people being sent on lengthy temporary duty in hot spots. The principle behind the first requirement is equally clear: to provide sufficient staffing to double-encumber overseas positions in order to reduce staffing gaps between departing and arriving personnel.

[48] For these purposes, the Department defines "typical" training as that related to normal career progression.
[49] Department of State, *Domestic Staffing Model, Training Study, Phase Three.* Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Human Resources, 2006.

Recommendation

Additional staff-years for training, transit and temporary needs totaling 1,287, budgeted by fiscal year as follows:

Training, Transit, Temporary Needs – Staffing and Cost Increases, 2010-2014 ($ in millions)							
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
Language Training	20	280	34	-	-	-	334
Professional Education	10	65	75	55	-	-	205
Other Training	-	10	100	50	-	-	160
Civil Service Training	10	65	100	79	-	-	254
In transit	5	70	75	49	-	-	199
Temporary needs	-	50	50	35	-	-	135
Total	45	540	434	268	-	-	**1,287**
Cost	**$4.7**	**$68.5**	**$170.3**	**$258**	**$299.3**	**$309.8**	

The above confirms and costs out conclusions on this subject of the CSIS *Embassy of the Future* report, which based its analysis on much of the same source data, but: 1) did not include a Civil Service training requirement; and, 2) identified interagency details in a training context, rather than as a mainstream element of core diplomacy as discussed previously. [50] The upshot of both sets of recommendations would result in comparable Foreign Service staffing corresponding to 15% of the total State Foreign Service workforce.

[50] CSIS, *op. cit., p. 10.*

STAFFING FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Summary

The Academy recommends the following staffing and program funding increases for Public Diplomacy in the State Department: Increase permanent American staffing by 487 and Locally Employed Staff (LES) by 369 between 2010 and 2014. Increase current academic exchanges by 100%, International Visitor grants by 50% and youth exchanges by 25% in this timeframe. Expand capacity of PD English and foreign language advocacy websites aimed at experts, young professionals and youth and hire 57 additional specialists in website design, program content and technical operations. Establish 40 American Cultural Centers (or a mixture of ACCs and smaller Information Resource Centers) in order to broaden U.S. daily cultural presence worldwide. Re-engage the Binational Center (BNC) network in Latin America whose membership is desirous of closer cultural and political ties with the U.S. Expand other programs and activities, particularly overseas staff and operations, to increase the effectiveness of Public Diplomacy as described below. These staff increases will cost $155.2 million annually by 2014 and the program activities, $455.2 million. Increases for Public Diplomacy total $610.4 million.

Public Diplomacy – Staffing and Cost Increases, 2010-2014 ($ in millions)							
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total Staff Increase
New Hires in Year (USDH)	20	206	112	57	57	35	487
Cost Increase Over Base							
Staff Costs	$3.1	$34.9	$82.5	$112.6	$136	$155.2	
Program Costs	-	$101.7	$192	$274.8	$362.5	$455.2	
Total Cost	$3.1	$136.6	$274.5	$387.4	$498.5	$610.4	

Background

Almost two decades ago some observers believed that a strong public diplomacy effort was no longer needed after the fall of Communism in Europe. But in recent years, foreign public opinion has expressed extensive dissatisfaction with many U.S. global policies. At the same time, the Public Diplomacy (PD) function in the Department of State is understaffed and under-funded in comparison with historic levels. PD's FY 2008 budget is $859 million. Today's staff of 1,332 Americans is 24% less than the comparable 1986 level of 1,742. To have a reasonable chance of accomplishing its goals, PD needs to fill shortfalls, add positions, obtain greater funding and significantly expand training as described on page 16 ("Training - The Department of State"). Despite negative attitudes about U.S. policy in recent years, the fact remains that more than any other nation, the U.S. is looked to for ideas, innovation and opportunity. In most of the world, the U.S. is viewed as a society that recognizes individual initiative and rewards talent. Foreign student enrollment in U.S. universities is rising and the number of foreign-born technology specialists interested in working for U.S. companies far exceeds available visas.

While there are many useful definitions of public diplomacy, we prefer the following definition of the State Department's Public Diplomacy's mission: " To understand, inform, engage and influence global audiences, reaching beyond foreign governments to promote

greater appreciation and understanding of U.S. society, culture, institutions, values and policies." The responsibility of PD practitioners in the Department of State is to devise comprehensive strategies, develop content and select the best communication vehicles for reaching diverse world audiences (See Appendix C for detail on Public Diplomacy activities at the Defense Department).

The typical workday, by definition, for PD officers abroad involves direct communications and interaction with host country citizens through personal contact and/or professional or academic exchanges or indirect communication through media placement and cultural and informational programming.

Today, Public Diplomacy personnel face a major challenge in attempting to engage foreign audiences on discussions about U.S.-host country relations and U.S. policies in general. PD officers continue to use traditional program tools such as media placement, professional and academic exchanges and cultural programming with readily identifiable individuals. But to succeed in 2008 and beyond, PD personnel must find ways to reach out to broader audiences now including the "Internet Generation." These 20, 30 and 40 year-olds, through their workplaces, their personal connections and their votes, are playing an increasingly influential role in the policy debates in their nations. To attract and hold this group's attention will require credible, informative and, in many instances, entertaining Internet media.

The three major components of Public Diplomacy within the Department are: field operations supervised by their regional bureaus; the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) that prepares products, programs and services for the field; and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) that organizes professional and academic exchanges and cultural programs.

ECA is the only PD component to have received notable funding increases since the consolidation of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) with the Department of State in 1999. A combination of executive branch initiatives and bipartisan congressional support has resulted in steadily rising budget levels. In fact, for FY 2008, Congress approved funding that exceeded the President's request.

Field operations - the heart of Public Diplomacy programming - have suffered in recent years from staff shortages and inadequate funding. The Bureau of International Information Programs responds to post requests for products and services and provides the field with PD policy guidance and other program assistance. Increasingly, it has broken new ground in developing Internet programming related to major policy objectives.

Snapshot of PD Resources ($ in millions)

	1990	1994	1998	2000	2002	2004	2008
Staff (USDH and LES)*	4,108	3,933	2,900	2,843	2,930	3,002	3,034
Main Accounts							
PD Ops	$216	$244	$224	$234	$280	$300	$358
Education Exchange	$154	$367	$198	$204	$247	$317	$501
Total	**$370**	**$611**	**$422**	**$438**	**$527**	**$617**	**$859**

* Pre-2000 data adjusted for comparability with data after the State-USIA merger.

PD's peak year in the 1990s was 1994 – when the major accounts of USIA (with the exception of Broadcasting which received $605 million) had a total budget of $611 million (See Appendix D for more on Broadcasting). While the State Department has obtained annual budget increases for PD since the USIA-State consolidation in 1999, the fact remains that PD, like Core Diplomacy, has insufficient staffing and program funding to accomplish its mission.

In FY 2008, PD's overall workforce totals 3,034 full-time positions and includes 1,332 U.S. direct-hires and 1,702 Locally Employed Staff (LES). Of this total, 2,360 are assigned to the regional bureaus, 96% of whom serve abroad. IIP supports overseas operations with 263 staff and the ECA has a staff of 362. An additional 49 PD personnel are in the offices of the Under Secretary for PD and in functional bureaus throughout the State Department.

To enable PD to achieve its worldwide objectives the Academy proposes several specific, high priority funding and staffing increases. Other enhancements may also be in order. The Academy recommends:

1. Meeting Employment Shortfalls and Workload Increases

a. *Current Staff Shortfalls:* According to an analysis by the Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, in early 2008 the difference between PD Foreign Service requirements worldwide and available staff personnel was 13% or 90 staff years. That shortfall should be met. In addition, program changes in 2007 and 2008 primarily financed by the 2007-2008 supplement appropriation have increased the workload for ECA (12 domestic and 3 overseas positions) and the field, (14 FS and 56 LES positions). The staff will be added as follows: Africa 4 USDH; East Asia, 5 USDH and 9 LES; Near East 21 LES; South and Central Asia, 4 USDH and 19 LES; Europe, 1 USDH and 7 LES. (Funding by 2014: $41.5 million. Staff: 119 USDH and 56 LES.)

b. *Projected Workload Requirements:* The major increase proposed below in educational programs will impose a significant workload on PD staffers abroad. The work includes: assisting Fulbright commissions and for other academic, International Visitors, youth and other exchanges programs; screening, selecting and processing applicants. The workload varies from post to post and will be determined by the final distribution of exchange program activities. In addition, staffing in a number of important countries (e.g. Iraq; Afghanistan; Pakistan; China; Sudan; South Africa and Nigeria among others) needs to be augmented to address important audiences and issues in these times of expanding communication opportunities and adversarial activities. (Funding: $58.7 million; Staff: 115 USDH and 144 LES.)

c. *Program Funding Increases to Support FS Workload Requirements*: The significant increase in educational exchanges requires program funding increases for posts abroad as well as enhancements to staff. Many of the 189 Public Affairs Section (PAS) offices will require funds for travel, printing and other expenses of $10,000 to $20,000 each on an annual basis beginning in 2010. This annual requirement, beginning at $2.7 million in FY 2010 and adjusted for annual increases and inflation, will increase to $15 million in 2014. In addition, requests for added programming funds, totaling $6.9 million, to meet existing requirements at many posts, especially the posts receiving staff increases as noted above, should be funded. The Academy recommends an increase of $5 million in 2010 to begin to

meet these requirements. Adjustments for inflation are also included. (Funding by 2014: $20.6 million; no additional staff are required above those identified above).

Meeting Current Shortfalls and Workload Increases ($ in thousands)						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Direct Hire						
U.S.	14	123	190	212	234	234
LES	-	122	148	174	200	200
Total Staff	14	245	338	386	434	434
Costs						
U.S.	$2,741	$23,571	$53,811	$71,783	$84,108	$91,796
LES	-	$2,196	$4,995	$6,279	$7,480	$8,400
Staff Cost	$2,741	$25,707	$58,806	$78,062	$91,588	$100,196
Program Cost	-	$7,665	$10,640	$13,786	$17,111	$20,623
Total Cost	**$2,741**	**$33,372**	**$69,446**	**$91,848**	**$108,699**	**$120,819**

2. Expanding Academic and Professional Exchanges

Academic Programs

Academic exchanges involving Americans and foreigners over the past six decades have been a major element in creating greater mutual understanding and respect among the participants and the people they met. In monetary terms, U.S. governmental and private sector-financed exchanges have been an enormous bargain when one considers the positive results in terms of good will, cooperation and, in some instances, institutional ties that have developed. The Fulbright program in its 60-year history has become the world's most renowned and successful international exchange program. The concept of having participating nations contribute toward the program costs allows the foreign partners to view themselves as stakeholders with a vested interest in the program's success.

In 2007 there were nearly 7,000 participants in programs under the Fulbright umbrella, ranging from short-term summer participants to students and professors whose scholarships or fellowships lasted a year or longer. The Hubert Humphrey Fellowships, English Language programs and Advising Student Services are also included in this category. The Academy recommends a 100% increase (twenty percent per year for five years) in these programs and to a number of similar excellent private sector institutional exchanges that are funded with private or other government funds. In addition, given the increasingly important and complex engagement of the U.S. with China and India, we endorse a proposal previously made in the CSIS "Smart Power" report for a multi-year initiative aimed at developing a new generation of American academic experts on China and India and Chinese and Indian academic experts on the United States.[51]

The dollar increase level has been determined by increasing the FY 2008 Academic Exchange Program base of $280 million by 20% per year (plus inflation) over the five-

[51] CSIS Commission on Smart Power, *A Smarter, More Secure America*. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, November 2007.

year period beginning 2010. ECA requires a staff increase of 23 USDH per year or a total of 115 domestic USDH by 2014. The 2014 additional personnel cost will be $15.68 million. By 2014, the grant program total increase would be $315.14 million. Total staff and personnel costs will total $330.82 million in 2014. We expect the current pattern of foreign contributions to the Fulbright program to continue and offset about 10% of the U.S. government's grant program cost.

A number of other worthy exchange and scholarship programs that support study abroad by U.S. university students are important complements to those examined in this study, but some lie beyond the scope of our recommendations because they are outside the Secretary of State's direct authority. Both the Department of Education and the National Science Foundation, for example, host significant exchange programs as elements of the U.S. higher education budget and a number of government-funded foundations host university scholarship programs.[52] The Academy sees such programs - and others proposed, such as the Paul Simon Study Abroad Foundation - as needed parts of a broader public diplomacy framework and as consistent with its previous recommendations on this subject.[53] The Paul Simon Study Abroad Foundation is likely to be funded substantially within the 150 account and be substantially controlled by the Secretary of State, and as such the funding for the program would logically come within the 100% increase recommended here.

Academic Programs ($ in thousands)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Direct Hire					
U.S.	23	46	69	92	115
Costs					
Staff Costs	$1,530	$4,732	$8,225	$ 11,829	$15,680
Program Costs	$56,000	$115,360	$178,230	$244,768	$315,140
Total Cost	**$57,530**	**$120,092**	**$186,455**	**$256,597**	**$330,820**

International Visitor (IV) and Other Exchange Programs

The International Visitor Program has proven to be the most successful U.S. government initiative in bringing future government and private sector leaders to the United States. Typical International Visitor Grantees usually are in their 30s or 40s, have not studied or worked in the United States and are widely recognized as individuals who will make an important contribution to their societies. The program has been widely praised by our embassies, Congress and the thousands of American volunteers from cities large and small who have proudly welcomed foreign visitors to their communities and homes. In FY 2008 the International Visitor office projected 4,365 IV participants. The program has the capacity to increase its volume with only small foreign and domestic staff increases.

The Academy recommends an IV program increase totaling 50%, or ten percent per year (plus inflation) for five years. At the current rate of $22,000 per grantee in FY 2010 the program increase for 436 grants in FY 2010 will be $9.6 million rising to $54 million by 2014. The Academy also recommends a 25% increase in youth and other exchanges with program costs reaching $20.5 million by 2014. A total of 30 new positions will be added

[52] e.g., the Barry Goldwater, Harry Truman and Morris K. Udall scholarship programs.
[53] AAD, *American Diplomacy for a Changing World*, November 2004.

for all of these programs at a cost of $4.2 million in 2014. The total staff and program costs in 2014 will be $78.8 million.

International Visitor and Other Exchange Programs ($ in thousands)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Direct Hire					
U.S.	8	18	22	26	30
Costs					
Staff Costs	$532	$1,783	$2,840	$3,526	$4,243
IVP Costs	$9,592	$19,760	$30,528	$41,924	$53,980
Other Exch. Costs	$7,300	$18,798	$19,362	$19,943	$20,541
Total Cost	**$17,424**	**$ 40,341**	**$52,730**	**$65,393**	**$78,764**

3. Incorporating Internet and Other Modern Technology in PD Program Output

a. *Staff Increases to Make Technological Changes Permanent*: The technological changes described below were initiated in 2007 and 2008 using funds from a supplemental appropriation. Ten contractors were hired to get these important changes underway. Now, staff should be added to make these operations permanent. In addition, many of the technical functions in the Office of International Information Programs (IIP) are performed by contractors, including the initiation of the America.gov website and other new web-based programs. In order to regularize these programs some 47 contractor slots (out of a total of 123) should be converted to domestic USDH status. (Funding: $8.6 million by 2014; Staff: 57 Domestic USDH.)

Staff Increases for Bureau of International Information Programs ($ in thousands)						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Direct Hire						
U.S.	6	57	57	57	57	57
Staff Costs						
10 USDH (New)	$386	$1,064	$1,370	$1,420	$1,470	$1,515
47 USDH (Contract Converts)	-	$3,125	$6,439	$6,674	$6,909	$7,120
Total	**$386**	**$4,189**	**$7,809**	**$8,094**	**$8,379**	**$8,635**
Contractor Savings	-	($3,642)	($7,567)	($7,802)	($8,084)	($8,460)
Net Cost	$386	$547	$242	$292	$295	$175

The costs above represent the salary, benefits and related support costs of the increased Domestic USDH staff of 57. By 2014, the salary account would be increased by $8.64 million. That amount could be offset by savings of $ 8.46 million from the reduction of 47 of 123 contractors charged to IIP's program account. It is likely however that the savings would be reallocated to additional technological changes rather than cut.

b. *Expand America.gov Foreign Language Programming:* As part of an evolutionary process in providing information about the United States that began with the Wireless File, the Bureau of International Information Programs (IPP) launched a new website named America.gov in 2008. The website is produced in six languages besides English: Arabic, Chinese, French, Persian, Russian and Spanish. The website has sought to develop the design and interactive features that will attract younger, Web-savvy users, as well as cover substantive topics that interest traditional opinion

leaders. These topics include foreign policy, the U.S. economy, American life, democracy, science and health among others.

The Academy recommendations come in two parts. The first deals with existing services. Three major language services - Arabic, Chinese and Persian - have operated under funds first appropriated in an emergency FY 2007-2008 supplemental appropriation. Additional funds have been sought for FY 2009, but these services can only become fully established and achieve maximum impact if they receive base level funding in FY 2010 and beyond. The requests are as follows:

Arabic Service:
The Department seeks to provide Arabic speakers with the policy documents necessary to understand U.S. government positions. The material is offered on web sites, listservs, webcasting and text messaging. An expanded Arabic communication capability will enable the Department to increase targeted support to Embassy Baghdad and to reach an expanding youth audience. (Funding: $571 thousand in FY 2014; Staff: See point a. above).

Chinese Service:
The proposed expansion would enable this critical service to offer a greater array of policy statements, speech texts, transcripts and other materials in formats that Chinese audiences are most comfortable with, e.g. websites, listservs, webcasting and text messaging. (Funding: $746 thousand in FY 2014; Staff: See point a. above).

Persian Service:
Without a permanent physical U.S. government presence in Iran, this website serves as a virtual U.S. presence in providing information on U.S. policy and American society to the Iranian people. Much of this funding goes to establishing an adequate contractual staff component. (Funding: $1.1 million in FY 2014; Staff: See point a. above).

The six current America.gov foreign language websites represent an auspicious beginning in reaching important foreign audiences--especially students and young professionals in their languages. We believe the time is right to expand the America.gov foreign language effort to two additional languages: Portuguese and Bahasa Indonesian. A Portuguese capability would be valuable in reaching millions of Portuguese speakers on three continents in Brazil, Portugal and Lusofone Africa. Similarly a Bahasa Indonesian service would be an asset in reaching the world's fourth most populous nation, a country with the world's largest Muslim population and a nation that is strategically important to U.S. interests in Asia. The start-up costs for each service are estimated at $650,000 for contractors and other operational costs. (Funding for two additional websites: $1.5 million in 2014; Funding for Current and Projected language services: $3.9 million in 2014; Staff: See point a. above).

America.gov Current and Projected Language Services ($ in thousands)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Cost	$3,450	$3,571	$3,696	$3,825	$3,959

c. *Enhancing the Capacity of the Digital Outreach Team:* The Digital Outreach Team (DOT) was established in 2006 in recognition of the need to provide Arabic speakers the opportunity to look at reasoned U.S. policy positions. The DOT seeks to engage

interlocutors in a more informal manner than is normally associated with the U.S. government. The team, themselves Arabic speakers, identify themselves as U.S. government employees. The DOT mission is to explain U.S. foreign policies, including the role of society and institutions in forming these policies and to counter false information about the U.S. (Funding: $688,000 in FY 2014; Staff: see point a. above concerning staff changes.)

Digital Outreach Team ($ in thousands)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Cost	$600	$621	$643	$665	$688

d. *Further Development of IIP's High-Tech Hub:* In order to keep pace with a rapidly changing global communication environment, the Department uses mass media technologies that most appeal to the individuals that the Department and U.S. missions most need to reach. To meet the audience's increased expectations a greater investment is necessary in multimedia packages of content that combine video, audio and other graphic materials. It is essential to identify and test the viability of emerging technologies and prototypes and introduce viable new products. (Funding: $2.2 million in FY 2014. Staff: See point a. above).

High Tech Hub ($ in thousands)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Cost	$1,900	$1,962	$2,026	$2,091	$2,159

e. *Global Strategic Engagement Center:* The Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC) replaces the Counter-Terrorism Communication Center (CTCC) which was created in 2007 at the direction of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and the National Security Council. The mission and staffing level remain the same. The GSEC serves as a rapid response unit to deliver effective messages that undermine ideological support for terror and to counter terrorist propaganda. The GSEC provides a quick, reliable service to Missions worldwide, but especially to the Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is currently funded from the FY 2007-2008 emergency supplemental and is included in the Department's FY 2009 funding request. (Funding: $573,000 in 2014; Staff: See point a. above).

Global Strategic Engagement Center ($ in thousands)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Cost	$500	$518	$536	$554	$573

f. *Promoting PD Websites*: The Department's websites compete with international websites for the viewer's attention. Because the Internet is increasingly becoming the place to promote products and services, PD is studying proposals for the purchase of Internet advertising on major search engines such as Google or Yahoo which reach millions of people world-wide daily. While the exact cost needs to be determined we recommend that $1 million be provided for an annual promotion budget. (Funding: $1.12 million in 2014; Positions: This activity involves a contractual arrangement and there is no additional staffing requirement).

Promoting PD Websites ($ in thousands)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Cost	$1,000	$1,030	$1,060	$1,090	$1,125

4. Increasing Strategic Speakers Series

For more than five decades the U.S. government has sent expert speakers abroad to share their knowledge with foreign audiences on topics of mutual interest such as American politics, culture and history. The guest speakers often provide mission officers with access to new audiences or opportunities to renew ties with long-time contacts. Based on an increased volume of field requests on high priority topics, we propose an increase of 100 speakers annually to address topics such as terrorism; the rule of law; environmental protection and energy alternatives among others. Each program cost averages about $10,000 (apart from staff costs). Three new domestic positions will be required to handle the additional speakers. (Funding: $1.58 million in FY 2014; Staff: 3 Domestic USDH).

Strategic Speaker Series ($ in thousands)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Direct-Hire					
U.S.	3	3	3	3	3
Cost	$1,200	$1,441	$1,487	$1,534	$1,581

5. Enhance Program and Activity Evaluations

In a period of fierce competition for limited U.S. government resources, it is imperative for the Department to provide to OMB and Congress timely, accurate and comprehensive PD program and activity evaluations. These evaluations help justify both current and future funding requests. We recommend that three major studies be scheduled annually during the 2010-14 timeframe. The first studies to be undertaken by independent contractors should be expanded follow-up studies of the Mission Activity Tracker and the Performance Management Data Collection Project, and a study of a major PD activity such as the speakers program or Internet foreign language advocacy programming.

The Mission Activity Tracker (MAT) and the Performance Management Data Collection Project (PMDCP) were successfully launched and earned high marks from OMB. The MAT system provides timely data on Mission public diplomacy activities. PD officers at each Mission prepare it with input from other sections. MAT reporting analyzes the number of activities conducted at the Mission by category (e.g. media placement; representational activity; educational programming) and provides a breakdown of the audiences that attended. It tracks how well each activity matches major embassy objectives and PD themes and explores the tone of media coverage among other objective measures.

The Performance Management Data Collection Project (PMDCP) is a landmark study on the effectiveness of PD programs. The research contractor selected two cohort groups in seven locations throughout the world. One group included individuals who had studied in the United States, participated in Public Diplomacy programs and received PD information products. The other group had not studied in the U.S. and was not on the embassy's contact list. It was demonstrated that the former group thought more favorably about the

United States, had a better understanding of American society and values and were more open to sources of information about the U.S. The study while promising needs to be expanded to include a larger sample. Multi-country research is expensive, but remains the most reliable way to determine international public opinion.
There have been no recent major evaluation reports on significant programs such as the Speakers series or the panoply of IIP foreign language Internet websites. One of these programs should be evaluated in 2010 and the other in FY 2011.

The Academy recommends that $3 million plus inflation be provided annually for a minimum of three PD-related research studies between 2010 and 2014. (Funding: $3.37 million in 2014; Staff: Because these evaluations are done under a contractual arrangement there is no staffing requirement).

Program and Activity Evaluations ($ in thousands)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Cost	$3,000	$3,090	$3,182	$3,278	$3,376

6. Establishment of American Cultural Centers or Information Resource Centers

The combination of spiraling budget reductions of the 1990s and the stepped-up security precautions in a post 9/11 environment served to eliminate or significantly reduce the operation of American Centers. These centers - along with smaller-scaled Information Resource Centers (IRCs) and the Binational Center network (BNCs) in Latin America (together with the American Corners program) - represent the major American cultural presence in many countries. The consequence has been lost opportunities in engaging host-nation audiences--particularly college-age students and young professionals--in discussions about the United States, its people, institutions and government policies.

Today the choice between operational preference and adequate personal security protection for American officials, Locally Employed Staff and local visitors is not an easy one and circumstances vary from country to country.

The Academy believes the time might be right to revive the American Center concept in those countries where the threat of violence has sufficiently diminished and the program environment warrants. To better describe the breadth of the centers' activities we propose that these new multi-service centers be called American Cultural Centers (ACC). The ACCs would offer a traditional library reading room containing open stack book and magazine collections, computer access, English language instruction, student counseling and multi-use space for lectures, performances and exhibits.

The smaller Information Resource Centers (IRC) approach generally consists of a reading room with computer access and librarian assistance on reference matters. The ACC operation provides more services and is therefore more expensive and involves more professional LES staff support. Depending on local circumstances, interested Missions might opt for either the ACC or IRC model.

We recommend that 40 American Cultural Centers (or a mixture of ACCs and IRCs totaling 40) be established or re-established between 2010 and 2014. Staffing would include an American director (preferably an FSO or a qualified local hire American) and four LES. A security guard contract will be required (we estimate the cost in the range of $100,000 annually), and custodial help arranged. Initial annual program funding of $150,000 per

year would be provided between 2010 and 2014. Students would pay for English language instruction and student counseling. Our embassies should consider seeking appropriate financial support from the host country private sector and resident U.S. companies. (Funding: $47.17 million by 2014 for staff and program costs; Staff: 40 USDH and 160 LES).

Establishment of American Cultural Centers ($ in thousands)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Centers	8	16	24	32	40
Direct Hire					
U.S.	8	16	24	32	40
LES	32	64	96	128	160
Staff Cost	$2,196	$6,774	$11,722	$16,912	$22,533
Program & Admin Costs	$4,208	$8,888	$13,840	$19,096	$24,640
Total Costs	**$6,404**	**$ 15,662**	**$25,562**	**$36,008**	**$47,173**

7. New Cooperation with the Binational Centers in Latin America

For over five decades Binational Centers (BNCs) were key program partners for U.S. Embassy Public Affairs Sections throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. BNCs are private, non-profit, autonomous organizations usually governed by a board consisting of host country citizens and resident private sector Americans. Most who attend BNC language classes and programs are interested in learning English because it opens up employment opportunities. Historically BNC students and alumni have held favorable views of American society and culture. Due to major budgetary reductions in the 1990s, USIA withdrew personnel and funding support to most BNCs and since that time sporadic attention has been paid to deepening the relationship.

Today there are over 100 BNCs of varying quality. Today over 100,000 students - mostly high school students to middle-age adults - annually take English language lessons. Many seek educational counseling on study opportunities in the United States. BNCs offer great opportunities for embassy programming targeting student and professional audiences. In some instances a BNC serves as a U.S. mission surrogate in cities where the embassy has no physical presence. We propose the establishment of a new position of BNC Coordinator in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) to direct Department relations with the BNCs. The coordinator would be expected to establish program standards, determine which BNCs merit Department financial and program support. An administrative support position should also be created.

During the first year the Coordinator would determine those viable BNCs which merit Department consideration for immediate-to-long-term support. In addition, we recommend that $5 million be provided annually to the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs for grants to promising BNCs for the following: English teaching materials; computers; books; magazines; CDs; DVDs; lectures, cultural programs and other activities. In certain instances, limited funding to renovate BNC workspace could be considered. Where feasible, we recommend that a qualified resident American be appointed as BNC director. The possibility of a Department grant should be used to leverage host country private sector financial support. (Funding: $5.9 million for staff and program support in 2014; Staff: 2 Domestic USDH).

Binational Center Support ($ in thousands)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Direct Hire					
U.S.	2	2	2	2	2
Staff Cost	$133	$274	$284	$294	$303
Program Cost	$5,000	$ 5,150	$ 5,304	$ 5,463	$5,627
Total Costs	**$5,133**	**$5,424**	**$5,588**	**$5,757**	**$5,930**

8. Expand Media Hubs to Mexico City, New Delhi and Tokyo

The State Department's Regional Media Hub Initiative was launched in September, 2006. The current Hubs - in Brussels, Dubai and London - engage with Middle East and European media to strengthen the U.S. Government's presence and advocacy capabilities in those key regions.

The objective of the Regional Media Hubs is to increase U.S. government voices and faces on foreign television, radio and in other media. The Hubs complement work performed by U.S. embassy and consulate Public Affairs Sections. The goal is for foreign audiences to hear the U.S. Government's message every day, directly from American officials. The Dubai Media Hub primarily utilizes fluent Arabic-speaking U.S. government officials on Arabic television and radio programs. The London Media Hub engages directly with the influential pan-Arab media based in London, while also bringing USG officials to the broad array of international media working in that city. The Brussels Media Hub, using its' own new television and radio studios, amplifies U.S. policy messages by bringing together American officials with European audiences across the region.

The Media Hub staffing model consists of one to two American officers and three experienced Locally Employed Staff. We see potential benefits from extending the Hub concept to other regions. The Academy recommends new Media Hub operations in three of the world's most important countries, each of which is a regional leader and a key nation for U.S. regional and global interests: India, Mexico and Japan. There is a strong international media presence in New Delhi, Mexico City and Tokyo, and each city often plays host to important regional or international conferences on topics important to the United States. We recommend that two officers be assigned to each Hub, a senior FSO specialist in the region and a mid-grade FSO deputy also with regional experience.

Both officers would be expected to do electronic and print interviews in addition to organizing them for senior USG officials. Therefore these FSOs must be qualified at the professional business level in speaking and reading (a rating of 4-4 in reading and speaking on the Foreign Service Institute evaluation scale) in one or more of the region's languages. The FSN staff should include a senior media specialist; an administrative support specialist and, if a broadcast studio is involved, a studio broadcast technician.

We propose that the first new Hubs become operational in 2010 and the other two in 2011. (Funding: Estimated salary and operational costs will be $ 4.8 million in 2014; Staff: 6 USDH and 9 LES).

Expanding Media Hub Operations ($ in thousands)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Direct Hire					
U.S.	2	6	6	6	6
LES	3	9	9	9	9
Staff Costs					
U.S.	$405	$1,666	$2,581	$2,664	$2,747
LES	$54	$222	$351	$ 360	$378
Program Costs	$500	$1,545	$1,590	$1,638	$1,689
Total Costs	**$959**	**$3,433**	**$4,522**	**$4,662**	**$4,814**

Recommendation

The Academy recommends the staff and program increases detailed above, which total 487 U.S. Direct Hire, 369 Locally Employed Staff, $155.2 million for staff costs, and $455.2 million for program costs. Total costs $610.4 million.

Total PD Staffing, 2008-2014								
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Increase
Direct Hire								
U.S.	1,332	1,352	1,558	1,670	1,727	1,784	1,819	487
LES	1,702	1,702	1,859	1,923	1,981	2,039	2,071	369
Total	**3,034**	**3,054**	**3,417**	**3,593**	**3,708**	**3,823**	**3,890**	**856**

Staff and Program Funding Increases ($ in millions)						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Staff Costs						
U.S.	$3.1	$32.1	$75.5	$102.8	$123.7	$140.4
LES	-	$2.8	$7.0	$9.8	$12.3	$14.8
Subtotal	**$3.1**	**$34.9**	**$82.5**	**$112.6**	**$136**	**$155.2**
Program Costs						
Requiring Staff	-	$97.2	$187.4	$270	$357.6	$450.1
Not Requiring Staff	-	$4.5	$4.6	$4.8	$4.9	$5.1
Subtotal	-	$101.7	$192	$274.8	$362.5	$455.2
Total Cost	**$3.1**	**$136.6**	**$274.5**	**$387.4**	**$498.5**	**$610.4**

STAFFING FOR USAID

Summary

We propose that USAID staffing be increased by 1,050 Foreign Service Officers and 200 civil servants between the present and 2014, as shown in the following table, as well as an increase in the number of Locally Employed Staff (LES). These staffing additions would require annual increases in the USAID Operating Expenses budget that results in a budget $521 million above the current services baseline by FY 2014.

USAID — Staffing and Cost Increases, 2008-2014 ($ in millions)								
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Start Understaff
New Hires in Year (USDH)	60	70	350	350	250	170	-	1250
Cost Increase Over Base								
Staff Costs	-	$38.19	$112.28	$245.11	$378.62	$479.81	$521.11	

Those increases would be partially offset by eliminating 700 temporary and non-direct hire U.S. staff over the same period.

Background

During the past 30 years, USAID has lost much of the capacity that made it an effective force of U.S. foreign and development policy from the 1950s through the 1970s. The size of USAID missions overseas has gradually shrunk to the point where many believe that insufficient management oversight exists over many field activities. Implementation of programs has shifted from Agency employees to contractors and grantees and USAID lacks the technical management capacity to provide effective oversight and management. At present, USAID employs only five engineers worldwide, despite a growing number of activities in that sector, and employs only 29 education officers to oversee current education programs in 84 countries. Between 1995 and 2007 alone, USAID's permanent FSO corps, excluding the Inspector General's office, fell from 1,337 to 1,019, a reduction of almost 24% while, at the same time, the total level of economic assistance programs for which USAID is responsible (excluding cash grants), rose from $4.7 billion to $11.6 billion.

The environment in which USAID operates has changed in a number of ways:

- The flows of assistance and other funds fostering economic growth to developing and transitional countries from U.S. non-governmental organizations (foundations, universities, firms) have increased significantly, giving USAID opportunities to leverage some of those flows to promote U.S. assistance goals, a role the Agency has played somewhat over time, but whose potential has grown. Expanding the capability of USAID field missions to work with the U.S. non-governmental sector can be an important part of an expanded emphasis on economic diplomacy.

- Development assistance now comprises less than half of USAID's program portfolio and management of other kinds of assistance (such as the Economic Support Fund,

Assistance to Eastern Europe and the Baltic nations, The Freedom Support Act, International Disaster Assistance and Transition Assistance) constitutes much of the agency's workload, as does coordination and preparatory work for programs of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).[54]

- In addition, economic assistance has become closely intertwined with other elements of U.S. foreign policy in the age of natural and global health, economic and environmental challenges, governance, regional conflicts and terrorist attacks. USAID needs knowledgeable staff to work closely with the Departments of State and Defense in carrying out U.S. international assistance programs in a collaborative fashion in pursuit of common national security and foreign policy goals.

We propose to provide USAID with the staffing that will permit the principal U.S. agency for managing foreign economic assistance to provide effective support to the Secretary of State in achieving U.S. foreign policy goals. Specifically, we propose to increase USAID's Foreign Service Officer corps from an estimated 1,080 in 2008 to 2,070 by FY 2014 (partially offset by reductions in non-direct hire US staff), and to increase its Civil Service staff from 1,000 to 1,200 over the same period of time.

Assumptions

We assume for the purpose of analysis that the size and composition of USAID-administered programs (including ESF, assistance to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and food aid, in addition to development assistance) will remain as they are currently (FY 2008) in real terms, using the Congressional Budget Office's current services inflation estimates for the out-years. Increases in some programs will be offset by decreases elsewhere.

Recent studies, as well as the statements of at least one of the presidential candidates, have called for major increases in bilateral economic assistance, which we interpret as development/child survival/health programs. We estimate that an increase of 50% above current levels over five years for these programs would require an additional staff increase of about 10%, or 200 FSOs, while a doubling of USAID programs would require an increase of about 20%, or 400 FSOs. We have not made precise estimates of such increases nor have we priced them.

Approach

The tools required to permit USAID to enhance the effectiveness of program oversight in the field, to facilitate the flows of private resources and to assure effective coordination with other U.S. agencies include:

- More and different staff in USAID missions overseas, with the highest priority accorded to technical managers in fields such as agriculture and other areas of economic growth, health, education, engineering, democracy and humanitarian assistance who can manage the implementation of the Agency's varied programs;

- Smaller increases at headquarters to support the larger field missions;

[54] See Appendices F and G for MCC and PEPFAR detail.

- Expanded training to assure that staff have the skills to take on the challenges facing the agency (including expanded language training, updating of technical and professional skills and training in new areas such as the building of partnerships and working with private sector organizations); and,

- A shift from temporary to permanent employees in those skill areas that will be needed over the long term, while maintaining sufficient temporary staff (personal services contractors, detailees from domestic agencies and universities) to provide critical specialized skills.

USAID senior management, with the strong support of the Department of State, believes that a more robust presence is needed to design, manage and oversee field programs if the Agency is to perform effectively in the future. Internal studies by the Agency have shown that projects and programs which receive constant and detailed oversight generally produce better results than those where oversight is less frequent and exercised from afar. To that end, the Agency has undertaken what it calls the "Development Leadership Initiative" or DLI. This initiative, the first stage of which is proposed in the Administration's 2009 budget request, would double the size of USAID's FSO corps by FY 2013 and increase the civil service and FSN cadres, while reducing significantly the number of non-direct hire U.S. employees (personal services contractors and others).

The initiative is supported by an illustrative staffing model that shows how the increased staff would be deployed, based on program size and content, strategic or humanitarian importance of recipient countries and several other variables. The model provides a useful starting point for our analysis; we have added to and modified some of the assumptions, but find that the overall direction of the initiative is consistent with our approach. Our projections show somewhat smaller annual increases over a longer timeframe, but the basic outcome is similar – a greater field presence for USAID, supported by an effective headquarters staff, that will permit the Agency to contribute more effectively to achieving the goals of economic assistance diplomacy through better management of assistance programs and expanded interactions with other key actors like local groups, U.S. NGOs and businesses and other donors.

In addition to staff, greater emphasis is needed in assuring that both new and current employees have the skills needed to take on current and future challenges. For 2009, the Administration requested $5 million for USAID's central training budget, less than 1% of the Operating Expenses account. Given that recent USAID annual training budgets have ranged from $10 million to $15 million, we conclude that this amount is insufficient to pay for even a basic amount of language and professional training. Given the very tight staffing, however, it is unlikely that many more people could be freed up to undertake additional training under current circumstances. Three things are needed in this area and are provided for in our approach:

- A set complement of 15% for the Foreign Service and 2% for civil servants, over and above operational positions in Washington and overseas, that will cover training, details to other agencies or outside the government (another form of training, which should be increased), post-to-post transfers and medical leave;

- The establishment of training positions for junior officers in the overseas missions and in Washington so that they can acquire experience while working with more experienced officers; and,

- Quadrupling of the training budget to a minimum of $20 million per year to cover both long-term training and a number of shorter courses.

In addition, USAID needs to expand the use of formal classroom training. The Agency has experimented with combinations of distance learning and classroom work to lower the cost and increase the number of employees to whom training is offered. This has been successful, especially with FSN employees. However, it is important that distance learning not be the only source of training for FSNs or the primary source for US employees. Classroom work provides opportunities for useful exchanges with both instructors and other colleagues that are not available in on-line courses. This is particularly important as USAID moves more into coordinating the efforts of U.S. non-governmental organizations and into working with State and DOD counterparts.

Efforts should be made to assure that USAID can and does take maximum advantage of the capabilities of the Foreign Service Institute in developing and providing professional training courses. This training should be balanced with a limited number of courses at the War Colleges and Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), as well as opportunities for university training. Training courses need to be developed that will impart competencies in working with businesses and NGO organizations in development partnerships and provide updated skills in other business, financial and sectoral areas relevant to USAID's development and other economic assistance programs.

Application of the adjusted staffing model criteria (described in Appendix E) to USAID's current program operations yields a requirement for a total of 2,070 Foreign Service Officers and 1,200 civil servants. Staff assigned to the field would almost double, from about 750 to 1,450, and headquarters staff would rise by about one-third (including the larger training/transit complement). We propose that these numbers be achieved by gradual increases between 2010 and 2014. The tables below show the proposed increases by employment category and the offsetting decreases in non-direct hire and Foreign Service Limited (FSL) staff, as well as the funding implications of the staff increases.

One of USAID's goals is a shift to a greater proportion of permanent U.S. direct-hire employees. USAID requested and received a five-year authority to provide FS Limited appointments, financed from program accounts rather than the operating expenses account, to a number of Personal Services Contractors (PSCs) already employed by the Agency. USAID currently employs about 200 such FSLs under this authority but the authority expires in 2009. While individuals in this category do not automatically qualify for conversion to career appointments, the authority reflects a recognition that many PSCs carry out long-term, career-type work for USAID. With recent conversions to FSL status under this authority, USAID continues to employ about 900 PSCs. The Agency has concluded, after reviewing the work performed by PSCs, that more than half of them perform functions that should be viewed as permanent or long term. Under USAID's plan for the next five years, which we endorse, the FSL authority will expire and 500 of the 900 PSC positions will be eliminated. These functions are to be taken over by the expanded Foreign Service staff to be hired by the Agency. The result is that, while permanent FSO employment under our projections will increase by 1,050 officers, the net total U.S. staff will increase by only about 540. The FSL staff and most of the PSCs have been paid from USAID's program accounts, while permanent, direct-hire staff must be paid from the Operating Expenses (salaries and expenses) account. It has been difficult in the past to obtain significant increases in the latter account. It will be necessary, therefore, either to make a compelling case for such increases or to seek legislative changes that would make it possible to pay some USAID direct-hire staff from the program accounts.

USAID programs are implemented primarily by institutional contractors and private sector grantees (NGOs and universities). We have not reviewed the number of such implementation personnel, nor do we propose a basic change to the current mode of operations. The new USAID direct-hire staff would provide more effective program management and oversight and permit the building of partnerships in developing countries.

Recommendation

Increase U.S. direct-hire staffing in USAID by 1,250 by 2014, to be offset in part by reductions of 700 in temporary and non-direct hire staff. Increase USAID FSN staffing by 2,150 by 2014.

USAID Staffing Projections, 2007-2014								
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
U.S.								
Foreign Service	1,020	1,080	1,150	1,450	1,750	1,950	2,070	2,070
Civil Service	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,050	1,100	1,150	1,200	1,200
LES	4,730	4,780	4,880	5,280	5,680	6,080	6,480	6,880
Subtotal	**6,750**	**6,860**	**7,030**	**7,780**	**8,530**	**9,180**	**9,750**	**10,150**
FSL	211	200	150	-	-	-	-	-
PSC and Other	900	850	800	700	600	500	400	400
Total	**7,861**	**7,910**	**7,980**	**8,480**	**9,130**	**9,680**	**9,850**	**10,550**

The cost of the staff increases would be borne by the USAID Operating Expenses account; offsetting reductions could come from various program accounts where the number of PSCs would be reduced and FSL positions would be eliminated.

Funding Levels for USAID Staffing Changes, 2009-2014 Changes from CBO Baseline ($ in millions)						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Increases						
FSO	$25.8	$71.3	$171	$260.4	$319.4	$352.5
LES	$12.4	$38.2	$65.6	$95.5	$139.1	$143.3
Civil Service		$2.8	$8.5	$14.7	$21.3	$25.3
Total	**$38.19**	**$112.28**	**$245.11**	**$370.62**	**$479.81**	**$521.11**
Decreases						
FSL	($10.9)	($39.3)	($40.5)	($41.8)	($42.6)	($43.9)
PSC and Other	($15.5)	($31.8)	($54.6)	($78.8)	($104.3)	($119)
Subtotal	($26.4)	($71.1)	($95.1)	($120.6)	($146.9)	($162.9)
Net Cost	$11.8	$41.2	$150	$250	$332.9	$358.2

The costs above represent the total increases related to the increased staff, both US and foreign national, including recruitment, assignment, management support and training. The Operating Expenses account would rise by $521 million; that could be offset by savings of $163 million in the program accounts; it is likely, however, that the savings in the program accounts would be reallocated to programs rather than cut.

USAID — Staffing Increases, 2008-2014								
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
U.S. Direct Hire								
Foreign Service	60	70	300	300	200	120	-	1050
Civil Service			50	50	50	50	-	200
Subtotal	60	70	350	350	250	170	-	1250
LES	50	100	400	400	400	400	400	2150
Total	**110**	**170**	**750**	**770**	**650**	**570**	**400**	**3400**

STAFFING FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

Summary

To provide a substantial surge capacity for reconstruction and stabilization efforts under the authority of the Secretary of State, we propose an increase in direct-hire American staffing of 562 by 2014. This would include: (1) 500 employees to serve as an active response corps in crisis situations; (2) 37 to staff an expanded Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; and, (3) 25 to backstop the new Standby Response Corps of federal employees and a Civilian Reserve Corps. These increases and related program costs would require an annual funding increase of $286 million by FY 2014 and, to be effective, will entail further clarification of the roles and missions to be undertaken by surge teams in failed and failing states.

Reconstruction and Stabilization - Staffing and Cost Increases, 2009-2014 ($ in millions)							
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Increase
New Hires in Year (USDH)	50	262	75	75	50	50	562
Cost Increase Over Base							
Staff Costs	$38.2	$190.1	$210.5	$237.2	$261.7	$286	

Background

Although the task of post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan has fallen largely to the military as those two countries remain combat zones, there is a broadly recognized need for a civilian surge capacity to intervene prior to conflicts and to assist with stabilization and reconstruction after conflicts abate. Such capacity should be an integral part of the civilian toolkit available to the Secretary of State to deal with contingencies that may arise in the coming years. To address these priorities, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created in the Department of State in 2004 for the purpose of identifying, integrating and utilizing relevant skills and personnel from across the U.S. government and from the private sector. In National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 of December 7, 2005, the President directed that the State Department be the lead agency in R&S and required State to coordinate all governmental activities in this area.

S/CRS has utilized Department of State employees and retirees for small-scale (usually one or two persons), conflict-related deployments over the past few years in countries such as Sudan, Haiti, Chad and Liberia, as well to provide support for embassy and military teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. The experience gained from these deployments has indicated the need for a larger, more established and better trained surge capacity to address pre- and post-conflict situations around the world, as well as the need for improved coordination among U.S. government agencies in planning and responding to conflict-related emergencies. To that end, an interagency management system has been established under the leadership of S/CRS. The system includes some fifteen federal agencies and a process in which country-specific working groups would be established for each crisis situation; it would be co-chaired by the S/CRS Coordinator, the appropriate regional Assistant Secretary of State and a director from the National Security Council staff.

For 2009, the Administration proposed a Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) and requested $248.6 million to finance the first year of the initiative. In addition to strengthening the Coordinator's office and the interagency management process, the initiative would establish:

- An active response corps of 250 people (hired by State but detailed in part to other agencies, including USAID and the Department of Justice) who would be available for immediate deployment when a pre- or post-conflict situation arises;
- A standby response corps of up to 2,000 people, working in full-time jobs in federal agencies, but trained and available to participate in surge activities on relatively short notice; and,
- A civilian reserve of up to 2,000 people who hold permanent jobs outside the federal government, to be trained and available to participate in surge activities.

The types of professions to be included in each of the three corps would include engineers, police officers, judges, lawyers, corrections officials, rule of law experts, economists, public administrators, public health experts, agronomists and city planners, among others.

S/CRS assumes that about 80% of the active response team would be deployed at most times and that approximately 10% of each of the other teams would be deployed. The numbers of people included in the request are intended to permit the United States to participate in several small post-conflict operations and one or two medium- or large-sized operations in a given year.

The FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act incorporated legislation that would specifically authorize the programs in the Administration's CSI.[55] However, given the likelihood that a series of Continuing Resolutions will be in effect for most of FY 2009, significant implementation of the new surge capacity is not expected to begin until FY 2010.

Some initial build-up of staff and training capacity, as well as continued small-scale deployments to crisis situations, can take place in 2009 using up to $50 million from expected supplemental funds and up to $100 million in transfer authority from the Department of Defense under Section 1207. This funding is sufficient to recruit staff for an active response team of about 50 persons and to begin recruitment, training and deployment of up to 100 members of the standby corps of federal employees.

At present, issues remain regarding how U.S. civilian reconstruction and stabilization teams can be most effective in different types of pre- and post-conflict in failed states, whether working alone or under multinational mandates. These issues include further defining the precise gaps between conflict and development that the teams will fill as well as assuring that institutional arrangements among State, the Executive Office of the President and other involved agencies are optimal. They should be resolved before a major expansion of capacity is undertaken. The modest growth in capacity expected in 2009 will permit S/CRS programs to continue while establishing a firmer basis for a robust FY 2010 request. Positive resolution of these issues and a review of 2008 and 2009 performance can form a basis for justifying a larger program in FY 2010 as shown in the table above, including the interagency management system and the three response components.

[55] The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act was incorporated into the FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act.

The magnitude of growth beyond FY 2010 will depend largely on the experience gained based on deployments in that year. For purposes of projection, we propose that the active response team would grow to 500 by FY 2014, the standby response corps would remain at 2,000 and the civilian reserve would grow to 4,000. The responders and reservists will need to be supplemented by contractors with specialized skills, to be called in as needs dictate. The surge budget would need to contain program funds for this purpose.

We do not project continued growth in the standby corps because we are concerned that this will be the most difficult of the three components to staff adequately, given the likely reluctance of domestic agencies to free up large numbers of highly qualified staff for deployment to post-crisis countries. Even though those deployed will be paid by the Department of State while on duty, the agencies from which they are deployed are to be reimbursed for only a portion (currently estimated at 25%) of the funds needed to fill in behind them.

Training will be required for each of the teams of responders. Prior to each deployment, area training will be provided relevant to the specific country where the team will be active. In addition, the standby and civilian components will require initial orientations regarding stabilization operations and support, as well as annual training to assure that technical skills are appropriate for deployment and to provide updates on the details of deployment operations. Funding is included in each year to provide continuing training for the standby and civilian components; those in the active response corps will also receive training between deployments. If and when the total response cadre grows, it may be necessary to develop new training capacities and obtain separate facilities.

The Administration's proposal includes annual training for all members of the standby and civilian reserve teams, even though the expectation is that no more than 10% of those teams will be deployed at any time. The Administration proposal of $248.6 million included $49.5 million for training and related costs during the first year, which includes the establishment of new training programs as well as salaries and maintenance for the standby and civilian staff undergoing training. As indicated above, it will be necessary to determine after the first few years of CSI operation the extent to which the standby corps – who have other full-time jobs – can actually be drawn upon for deployment on relatively short notice and to adjust training and other cost estimates based on these determinations.

Major costs related to deployment include equipment and security, the actual cost of which will depend greatly on the type of situations to which CRS responds. Costs for vehicles and either military or civilian security support may vary greatly. For the purposes of this paper, we have used the State Department projections for these categories of expenses.

The staffing and funding levels shown on the attached table reflect the supplemental funding that will be available in 2009 to permit the development of new training programs and the start of additional recruitment for the active and standby corps; we assume, however, that recruitment of the civilian corps and costs associated with that corps will not be undertaken until FY 2010. Out year costs assume a steady level of deployments, a figure that is likely to change but which cannot be predicted. S/CRS has estimated that maintaining the program, exclusive of deployments, would cost about $130 million a year for salaries, training, equipment replacement and other costs. We have reduced the staff

for S/CRS by 20 from the level requested by the Administration because we conclude that a number of the Active Response Corps will be available to help staff the office.

It should be noted that USAID has a similar program carried out by its Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), whose annual budget is around $40 million. The USAID office currently cannot undertake police and law enforcement activities, which might be a key part of the CSI, but can and does provide other interventions in post-conflict situations similar to those envisioned in the CSI. USAID's offices of International Disaster Assistance, Military Affairs and Crisis Management may have related roles to play in dealing with fragile states. The relative roles of S/CRS and the USAID offices need to be resolved within State because there appears to be some potential overlap.

Recommendation

Increase total U.S. Direct-Hire (USDH) staffing for reconstruction and stabilization efforts carried out under the authority of S/CRS by 562 from current levels by FY 2014, consisting of 500 for the Active Response corps, 25 for a home office for the Civilian Reserve Corps and 37 for the S/CRS staff. The recommended increases would cost $286 million above the CBO baseline by 2014.

Total Reconstruction and Stabilization Staffing, 2008-2014							
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Direct Hire							
S/CRS	19	19	56	56	56	56	56
ARC		50	250	325	400	450	500
CRC Office			25	25	25	25	25
Total	**19**	**69**	**331**	**406**	**481**	**531**	**581**

Funding Levels, 2009-2014 Changes from CBO Baseline ($ in millions)						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Salaries	$2.7	$19.2	$55.6	$66.7	$76.8	$86
Training	$11	$56.6	$69	$82	$93.8	$106.1
CRC Recruit, etc.	-	$17.7	$4.7	$4.8	$5	$5.2
Deployment	$16.5	$80.4	$64.5	$66.5	$68.4	$70.5
S/CRS non-salary	$8	$16.2	$16.7	$17.2	$17.7	$18.2
Total	**$38.2**	**$190.1**	**$210.5**	**$237.2**	**$261.7**	**$286**

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Summary

One critical function of the Secretary of State is to budget, plan and oversee security assistance programs worldwide. These programs, managed in the bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) at the State Department, provide equipment, training, infrastructure, and even budgetary support to help U.S. allies combat terrorism and maintain global security. The State Department authority has ensured that these programs conform to overall U.S. foreign policy goals, while the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) at the Defense Department, together with the military services, implements much of the program.

In recent years, a new parallel architecture of economic and security assistance programs has emerged at DOD that is planned, budgeted, managed, and implemented under Defense Department authorities. These have been created because of uncertainties about the flexibility and agility of existing security assistance programs and because it proved easier, in conditions of crisis, to raise funds through the defense budget. This trend, if continued and put in permanent law however, will have significant implications for the capacity of the State Department to direct overall U.S. foreign policy. This section chronicles this trend and highlights the major DOD security assistance programs. It recommends the gradual transfer of authority over some of these programs to the Department of State, integrating them with existing State Department authorities and capabilities (which should be reformed), and proposes the necessary funding and staffing for State to plan, budget, and oversee these programs at State, while their execution remains largely the responsibility of the Defense Department and the military. The eventual proposed transfers could total $785 million annually in budget authority, requiring fifty additional staff at State to manage these programs.

Because security assistance continues to be an area of close State-Defense cooperation, the proposed adjustments in the security assistance portfolio are recommended in the framework of the following principles:

- The Secretary of State has and should have responsibility for assuring that all security assistance is carried out in accord with U.S. foreign policy. That includes setting the overall policy, approving the countries which receive assistance and the budget numbers in the requests for such assistance. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have important roles in making recommendations to the Secretary of State on these issues. The Defense Department also has the principal responsibility of implementing these programs.

- In areas where U.S. military forces are engaged in on-going, significant levels of combat operations the Secretary of Defense should, for the duration of the period of combat, have the authority to use DOD funds to provide clearly-defined emergency humanitarian, stabilization and reconstruction assistance, in consultation with the appropriate Ambassador and the Secretary of State.

- Where policy and funding authorities should, over time, be shifted to State, the current execution of these programs should continue to be carried out by the Department of Defense, under existing temporary authorities. The capacity of State to oversee, set policy, and budget for these programs should be enhanced, with the support of the Congress.

Security Assistance – Staffing and Cost Increases FY10-FY14 ($ in millions)						
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
New Hires in Year (USDH)	3	15	20	12	-	50
Cost Increase Over Base						
Staff Costs	$.6	$5.2	$14	$21.3	$24.2	
Program Costs	$35	$135	$285	$535	$785	
Total Cost	**$35.6**	**$140.2**	**$299**	**$556.3**	**$809.2**	

Background

The Department of Defense and the military have consistently supported U.S. national security objectives through use of military force and also as the implementer (through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency) of a number of security assistance programs that DOD and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) jointly plan with the Department of State. The policies, budgets and recipients of such programs – notably Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, Peacekeeping Operations - are determined under the authorities of the Secretary of State and funding for them is provided through the State Department budget.

While the Pentagon began to create its own security assistance programs, beginning in the 1970s, the role of DOD and the military in security and foreign assistance changed significantly with the attacks of 9/11 and the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. A new security assistance portfolio emerged, based on DOD's own statutory authorities and funded either through additional defense appropriations or as a draw on funding in DOD's Operations and Maintenance accounts. Although the concurrence of the Secretary of State is needed to execute some these new authorities, the content of these programs is developed in DOD. Studies by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and non-profit research organizations suggest that the required coordination between the State Department and the Defense Department is loosely structured.[56]

The chart below lays out nine authorities and activities in DOD (all except CCIF and OHDACA were created after 9/11) that could be described as "foreign" or "security assistance." From FY 2001 to FY 2008, Congress authorized or appropriated nearly $45 billion to support these DOD security assistance programs - with another $3.2 billion already appropriated in the FY09 Bridge Fund.[57]

[56] See, Government Accountability Office, *Section 1206 Security Assistance Program*, GAO-07-416R, 28 February 2007; Government Accountability Office, *Military Operations*, GAO-08-736R, 23 June 2008; Government Accountability Office, *Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed Over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds*, GAO-08-806, June 2008; Government Accountability Office, *Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership*, GAO-08-860, July 2008; Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance: Final Report of the Task Force on Non-Traditional Security Assistance," December 2007.

[57] These figures include funds from the second FY08 supplemental and the FY09 Bridge Fund as part of P.L. 110-252, signed June 30, 2008.

DOD International Assistance Programs ($ in millions)		
DOD Assistance Program	FY 08 Funding	Similar Program[58]
Global Train and Equip (Sec. 1206)	$300	FMF, PKO
Coalition Support Funds	$300	ESF
Security and Stabilization Assistance (Sec. 1207)	$100	N/A
Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program	$25	IMET
Commander's Emergency Response Program	$1,727	OTI, DA, ESF
Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund (CCIF)	$25	FMF
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDACA)	$103	FMF, INCLE
Iraq Security Forces Fund	$3,000	FMF, PKO
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund	$2,750	FMF, PKO

In addition to the new programs, DOD has expanded some of its existing security assistance authorities to include activities that have been historically carried out by the civilian foreign policy agencies. These expanded authorities include changes to the Combatant Commanders' Initiative Fund, and DOD's humanitarian assistance program, OHDACA.

The range of these new and expanded programs is broad, including humanitarian relief, stabilization assistance, reconstruction and development support, training for security forces in other countries, and budget reimbursement for support other countries provide to the U.S. military for the counter-terrorism operations. From 2001 to 2005, U.S. official development assistance rose from $9.7 billion to $27.6 billion, with much of this growth attributed to new DOD activities in security assistance and reconstruction (but not including DOD train and equip programs).[59]

These new programs emerged in DOD under the pressures of combat and post-combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and broader military operations to confront terrorist organizations. Tasked to reconstruct and stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan and pursue terrorists globally, the DOD and the military services realized that there was a deficit in State/USAID capabilities (personnel, readiness, flexibility, agility and funding) to shape and support these programs. DOD had the resources and personnel to plan and execute these programs, but not the statutory authority in law, while the State Department and USAID had the authority, but lacked the capability. While DOD leaders have given strong support to strengthening the capacity of State/USAID for such activities, DOD is, at the same time, seeking to expand the funding for its own programs, extend their coverage to the global level, and embed some of them in permanent statute (Title 10).

While DOD and the military services have an important role in addressing the challenges of instability and chaos in post-conflict situations, it is our view that authority, policy responsibility and budgeting for security and assistance programs should lie with the Secretary of State, who has responsibility for the overall direction of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. relationships with governments in the recipient countries. Several of the new assistance programs that the DOD has developed are integrally connected to U.S. foreign policy and need the long-term, sustainable commitment and overall policy direction for

[58] FMF: Foreign Military Financing; PKO: Peace Keeping Operations; ESF: Economic Support Fund; OTI: Office of Transition Initiatives; IMET: International Military Education and Training; DA: Development Assistance; INCLE: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement.

[59] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *DAC Peer Review: United States* 1999, 2006. The bulk of official development assistance growth during this time period is attributable to Iraq Reconstruction Aid, provided by the DOD through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF).

which the civilian agencies are responsible. Furthermore, many of the new DOD assistance programs parallel existing State/USAID authorities and programs.

Any transfer of authorities to State and USAID should be done gradually, as conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan improve and as the State/USAID capacity for overseeing these programs is enhanced. We recognize that the State Department and USAID's personnel and funding in this area are not as extensive as those of DOD. Specific to State, specialized Foreign Service Political-Military staffing has declined during the past decade from 63 to 19, in spite of assumption by State of additional GWOT-related responsibilities, integration of ACDA functions, and an overall increase in Function 150 military assistance during this period of 54% (from $3.67 billion to $5.65 billion).[60] There is anecdotal evidence of a significant increase in DOD details of uniformed military personnel to fill some of the gaps thus created during the first half of the period under examination (1998-2008). In the meantime, the Academy notes that core staffing at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency increased from 15 to 109 during the same time period.[61] The Academy recommends that the FS staffing decreases in question be reversed, and that additional staff be hired for new responsibilities.

Moreover, the authorities governing many of the existing State/USAID programs are dated and inadequately flexible, and the Department faces a constant challenge raising funds in its budget for such programs. The current mechanisms are antiquated and slow to respond to changing security threats. However, if State/USAID authorities and programs need to be reformed to acquire the funding, flexibility and agility needed to deal with current security challenges, then such reforms need to be defined and proposed to the Congress. Details of such reforms are outside the scope of this study.

The military can bring skill and expertise to the implementation of these programs but they are not core to the military mission. DOD's expanded policy responsibility for security assistance programs risks leading to the additional atrophy of the civilian agencies' ability to plan and conduct foreign policy and foreign assistance and raises serious concerns that such programs could conflict with broader U.S. strategic and foreign policy interests. Finally, it is important for the U.S. to ensure that its non-military international presence and engagement be carried out primarily by civilians, not by the military.

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[60] Data Source: OMB Public Budget Database

[61] Department of Defense, Budget Justifications, Defense-Wide Operations & Maintenance, DSCA Budget Estimates, FYs 2000-2009.

The following discussion summarizes many of the new DOD authorities and programs that have implications on U.S. foreign policy. This section also describes the parallel State/USAID capability and provides a specific recommendation for change, where we think it appropriate.

A. Transfers to State with Immediate Budget Implications

DOD Authorities to be Transferred to State ($ in millions)		
Program	FY09 Defense Authorization	Recommended 150 Funding by FY 2014
Global Train and Equip (Sec. 1206)	$350	$300
Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)	$35	$35
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)*	$1,500	$450
Total	**$1,885**	**$785**

* The Academy recommends non-combat CERP be transferred to State and USAID. DOD should retain CERP in its current form for combat purposes.

Global Train and Equip (Sec. 1206)

Context

Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to conduct or support programs globally that build the capacity of a foreign country's military forces. In 2007, Congress increased the funding authority for Section 1206 programs from $200 to $300 million and permitted the Secretary of Defense to draw funds from DOD's Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts to pay for these programs. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) implements 1206 projects using similar procedures as the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program.[62]

The Pentagon continues to seek permanent, broader authority, for the Section 1206 program, to build the capacity of foreign military and security forces. In 2007, DOD submitted the *Building Global Partnership Act* (BGP) to Congress, which would authorize up to $750 million for 1206 programs, make the authority a permanent part of Title 10 of the US code, and authorize the DOD to support non-military forces (police, border patrol guards, and other internal security forces). BGP was not enacted in 2007 but it was re-submitted as proposed legislation for FY 2009.[63] The FY 2009 Defense Authorization bill increased funding authority or Section 1206 to $350 million and extends the program to FY 2011. It has not been enacted into permanent law.

Parallel Authority

Section 1206 parallels the existing Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) program that is planned and budgeted under State Department authorities. PKO funds, which are subject to the restrictions of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), "furnish assistance for friendly countries...for peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in furtherance of the national security interests of the United States."[64] While planning and budgeting are

[62] Government Accountability Office, *Section 1206 Security Assistance Program*, GAO-07-416R, 28 February 2007.
[63] Defense Department, FY 2007 NDAA Legislative Proposals, "Building Global Partnerships Act," Office of Legislative Counsel, accessed on 5/16/08 at: http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/third_package13April2006.pdf
[64] Part II, Chapter 6, Section 551, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

primarily the responsibility of State (in collaboration with DOD and the regional commanders), PKO programs are largely implemented by DOD, using the processes and capabilities of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).

Budget History

Global Train and Equip (Section 1206)* ($ in millions)					
	2006	2007	2008†	2009	Total
Authorized	$200	$300	-	$350	$850

*Section 1206 is an authorized drawdown on appropriated Defense-Wide Operations and Maintenance funds.
†FY 2007 authorization for Section 1206 was a two-year authorization, thus there was no reauthorization in FY 2008.

Recommendations
We recommend that the authority over 1206 train and equip programs be transferred to the Secretary of State, along with an appropriation of $300 million to the PKO account for this purpose. This appropriation would double the current PKO account. Management of the planning and budgeting process should be the task of the Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis (PM/PPA) in the bureau of Political Military Affairs (PM).

In the future, to better align these programs with the long-term foreign policy objectives of the United States, the State Department should consider three options: 1) Propose a broader, more flexible and agile training program for foreign militaries and security forces that reforms the current Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and PKO architecture; or, 2) Expand the PKO account, which provides greater flexibility to train and equip foreign security forces. Any new security assistance training program should be planned and budgeted under the foreign policy authority of the Secretary of State. For PKO to implement some of the same functions as 1206, Section 660 of the FAA – which restricts the training of police or internal security forces of a foreign country – may need to be amended, or the new program provided with "notwithstanding" authority. 3) Rewrite Section 1206 as an additional "drawdown," authority under section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), through which the President, on the advice of the Secretary of State, could use DOD resources and capabilities to execute train and equip programs.[65] DOD and the Combatant Commanders would continue to play an important role in shaping programs and projects, and be the primary implementing agency, with State Department guidance.

Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)

Context
The Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) was established by Congress in early 2002. The program began as an academic training tool to share counterterrorism tactics with partner nations. The initial appropriation stipulated that the funds may be used by the Secretary of Defense to, "fund foreign military officers to attend U.S. military educational institutions and selected regional centers for non-lethal training."[66] In the subsequent congressional decision to establish CTFP in permanent law in the FY 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, the program was no longer limited to non-lethal training (10 USC 2249c).

[65] Section 506(a) authorized the President to "direct...the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training, of an aggregate value of not to exceed $100,000,000 in any fiscal year."
[66] P.L. 107-117 §8125, "Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the U.S. Act, 2002," January 2002.

The statute authorizing the fellowship program allows the Secretary of Defense to spend up to $35 million annually, drawn from funds appropriated in the O&M, Defense-Wide account for such education.[67]

Parallel Authority
CTFP closely parallels the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which is authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act and planned and budgeted by the State Department. Chapter 5, Section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act authorizes the President to provide, "military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries."[68] IMET supports students from friendly allied nations in receiving training and education on U.S. military practices and standards. IMET programs are implemented by the DOD.

Budget History

Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program ($ in millions)								
	2002	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Authorized	$17.9	$20	$20	$20	$25	$25	$35	$163

Recommendations
CTFP authority under 10 USC 2249c should be repealed and the program should be included in an expanded IMET program that covers counter-terror training and education. The State Department's IMET budget should be increased by the $35 million proposed budget for the CT-IMET program.

IMET has previously been expanded (E-IMET) to provide education in defense management, civil-military relations, law enforcement cooperation, and military justice. Congress should mandate a CT-IMET that precludes lethal training but focuses specifically on counterterrorism training.

Section 544 of the Foreign Assistance Act (1961) should be amended to include subsection (d): "The President may provide for the attendance of foreign military and civilian defense personnel at counterterrorism training schools and programs in the United States and at U.S. military bases around the world without charge, and without charge, funds available to carry out this chapter, notwithstanding section 652(d) of this act."

Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)

Context
The Commander's Emergency Response Program was initially created by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad to "enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility, by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people and support the reconstruction of Iraq."[69] Fragmentary Order 89 of the Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force 7 formalized CERP in Iraq on June 19, 2003 and provided guidance on

[67] 10 USC 2249c., See also, FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act.
[68] Foreign Assistance Act (1961) as amended, Part I, Chapter 5, Section 541.
[69] Martins, Mark S., "The Commander's Emergency Response Program," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 37, 2005, accessed on 2/22/08 at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0937.pdf

permissible uses of CERP funds. FRAG 89 directed that CERP funds be used for improvements and reconstruction for:

> ...water and sanitation infrastructure, food production and distribution, healthcare, education, telecommunications, projects in furtherance of economic, financial, management improvements, transportation, and initiatives which further restore the rule of law and effective governance, irrigation systems installation or restoration, day laborers to perform civic cleaning, purchase or repair of civic support vehicles, and repairs to civic or cultural facilities.[70]

CERP was formally established in the FY 2005 Defense Authorization Act, which also authorized the creation of a CERP program for Afghanistan.[71]

In the *Building Global Partnerships Act* (BGP), DOD requested that CERP authorities become permanent law, with global application.[72] The proposed legislation would require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to, "jointly develop procedures" to execute any CERP project, but does not provide for State Department concurrence in CERP planning or budgeting.[73] CERP was expanded to include the Philippines in the FY 2008 Supplemental appropriation.[74]

Parallel Authority
A large proportion of CERP programs, projects, and activities are parallel to those supported by State Department ESF and USAID Development Assistance (development assistance) and USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) funds.

Budget History

Commander's Emergency Response Program ($ in millions)							
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009*	Total
Appropriated	$480	$854	$923	$956	$1,700	$1,500	$6,413

*This figure represents the FY 2009 authorization for CERP. See FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act.

We recommend that the DOD retain the CERP authority in Iraq and Afghanistan and in other areas which now or in the future are areas of combat activity under a US Combatant Commander to carry out those stabilization and assistance activities that are consistent with and supportive of combat missions, or to execute broader tasks on a temporary basis in areas where security conditions will not permit civilian deployment. CERP could be funded at a level sufficient to ensure that CERP projects focus on immediate needs in direct support of combat operations.

A parallel authority should be created or current State/USAID capabilities be enhanced to permit State/USAID to carry out projects and programs that focus on sustainable civilian reconstruction and agriculture, economic, financial and management improvements, food production, education, health care, irrigation, water and sanitation and other humanitarian assistance functions in post-conflict zones. This capability should be provided either through the proposed Civilian Stabilization Initiative (see section on Reconstruction and

[70] Ibid, p. 47. See also FRAGO 89 of June 19, 2003.
[71] P.L. 108-375 §1201, "National Defense Authorization Act, 2005."
[72] Defense Department, "Building Global Partnerships Act," Office of Legislative Counsel, accessed on 2/21/08 at: http://www.DOD.mil/DODgc/olc/docs/BGPA.pdf
[73] Ibid. The House National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009 would extend CERP authority to the end of FY10 and the Senate National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009 would extend CERP to the end of FY11.
[74] P.L. 110-252, "Defense Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008," June 30, 2008.

Stabilization) or through the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), or both. State/USAID should also work to resolve this duplication of capabilities. The authority should be provided with $450 million in contingency appropriations for these programs.[75]

Reversing the Section 1207 authority (see below), the Secretary of State should also be given the authority to transfer up to $200 million in funds to DOD from its own CERP-like program for short-term reconstruction and stabilization activities in environments that are insecure for civilian operations, but might include support for short-term electricity, telecommunications, law and governance activities.

B. Transfers to State without Immediate Budget Implications

- Coalition Support Funds
- Security and Stabilization Assistance (Sec. 1207)

Coalition Support Funds (CSF)

Context
Coalition Support Funds reimburse the recipient countries for logistical, military and other expenses incurred while supporting U.S. military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the global operations against terrorist organizations.[76] This program was developed as part of U.S. operations in Afghanistan and against Al-Qaeda in 2001-2002. Pakistan is largest recipient of CSF (81% of the total through FY 2008) for the assistance it provides to U.S. counter-terror operations.[77] CSF funds have also been used to reimburse other coalition partners, including Poland, Slovakia, Georgia, and Lithuania, for support and operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere against terrorist targets.[78]

Parallel Authority
Coalition Support Funds are similar to the State Department's Economic Support Funds (ESF) account, which is planned and budgeted at State in cooperation with USAID, which implements much of the ESF program. Like FMF, ESF funds are subject to the provisions of the FAA and AECA.

Budget History

Coalition Support Funds ($ in millions)									
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Appropriated	$490	$1,400	$1,150	$1,220	$935	$1,100	$1,100	200*	$7,595

* Funding for FY 2009 funding is appropriated in the June 30, 2008 supplemental, FY 09 Bridge Fund (P.L. 110-252).

Recommendations
Authority over CSF should be transferred to State and funding should be budgeted annually as new requirements emerge. These funds should be treated as an ESF program

[75] This figure is based on the FY 08 percentage of combat-related activities of CERP projects in Iraq multiplied by one-half of the FY 2008 CERP appropriation for Iraq (totaling approximately $200 million). In addition, the full FY08 CERP appropriation for Afghanistan was multiplied by the FY08 percentage of combat-related activities as reported by SIGIR (totaling approximately $250 million). All Data reported by SIGIR, Quarterly Reports, July 2008, from FY04 through March 31, 2008.
[76] Department of Defense, FY08 Budget Request, Operations and Maintenance, Defense-Wide.
[77] Government Accountability Office, "Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed Over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds," GAO-08-806, June 2008.
[78] FOIA, The Center for Public Integrity, Department of Defense, "Coalition Support Funds," 2 August 2006.

under the authority of the Secretary of State. Providing a budget subsidy to foreign governments is characteristic of some existing and past ESF programs. Decisions to agree to such reimbursements should be consistent with overall U.S. foreign policy objectives. The annual appropriation request should be prepared by State's foreign assistance budget office, with input from PM/PPA and the DOD. Funding levels will vary from year to year. State and the ESF budget process are sufficiently agile to administer this program, as opposed to DOD reimbursements that take an average of eight months to be processed.[79]

Security and Stabilization Assistance (Sec. 1207)

Context
Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $100 million in defense articles and funds to the Secretary of State for the purposes of providing reconstruction, security or stabilization assistance to a foreign country.[80]

The Congress viewed this authority as temporary until the new State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization could be "fully stood up and adequately resourced."[81] Congress commended the interagency collaboration between DOD and State, but was uncomfortable funding State Department activities through the Department of Defense budget. Nonetheless, Section 1207 was reauthorized in 2008 and extended to the end of FY 2009.[82]

Parallel Authority
The State Department has not had a parallel authority like Section 1207.

Budget History

Security and Stabilization Assistance (Section 1207)* ($ in millions)					
	2006	2007	2008†	2009‡	Total
Authorized	$100	$100	-	$150	$300

*Section 1207 is an authorized drawdown on appropriated Defense-Wide Operations and Maintenance funds.
† In 2007, Section 1207 was extended through FY 2008 and therefore not reauthorized in 2008.
‡ The FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act included an additional $50 million in authorized funding under the Section 1207 program for assistance to the Republic of Georgia. This $50 million does not count against the $100 million authorized for the overall Section 1207 program.

Recommendations
We recommend that authorization for Security and Stabilization Assistance (now Section 1210) be repealed. If additional funds are needed for security and stabilization assistance, then they should be funded through the International Affairs (150) account directly as part of the larger effort to establish a civilian capability for reconstruction activities.

C. AUTHORITIES TO REMAIN AT DEFENSE

- Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF)
- Overseas, Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDACA)
- Iraq and Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

[79] Department of Defense, "Coalition Support Funds," 2 August 2006, as released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from The Center for Public Integrity.
[80] P.L. 109-163 §1207, "National Defense Authorization Act of 2006."
[81] "National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, Conference Report" H.R. 1815, p. 802.
[82] National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009

Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF)

Context
The Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund, established in 1991, is a $25 million-per-year program that enables Combatant Commanders to fund short-term, low-cost projects that meet the requirements of unforeseen situations.[83] In recent years, CCIF has received supplemental appropriations of an additional $25 million, bringing total CCIF appropriations to $50 million. As originally established in Title 10, Section 166a, the CCIF provided Combatant Commanders with funds for the following activities:

1) Force Training
2) Contingencies
3) Selected Operations
4) Command and Control
5) Joint Exercises (including activities of participating foreign countries)
6) Military Education and Training
7) Personnel Expenses of Defense Personnel for Bilateral or Regional Cooperation Program[84]

In 2007, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act, 2007 authorized CCIF to support programs that provided, "humanitarian and civic assistance to include urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance." It also stated that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should give priority consideration for CCIF funds to, "be used for urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance, particularly in a foreign country where the armed forces are engaged in a contingency operation."[85] The accompanying conference report urged the Department of Defense, "to request sufficient funds for this purpose in future years budget requests."[86] In FY09, the DOD requested $100 million in CCIF as part of its *Building Global Partnerships* proposal.

Parallel Authority
The purposes added to the CCIF statute parallel the CERP program at DOD, the existing DOD authority to provide humanitarian and civic assistance (OHDACA) under 10 USC 401, and ESF, DA, OTI, and the proposed S/CRS initiative at State/USAID.

Budget History

Combatant Commander Initiative Fund ($ in millions)									
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009*	Total
Appropriated	$25	$25	$45	$50	$50	$50	$50	-	$175

* CCIF funding for FY 2009 has not yet been appropriated.

Recommendations
The CCIF was not intended, nor should it be used, to support humanitarian and civic assistance and reconstruction assistance, which is the domain of the civilian foreign policy agencies. We recommend striking sub-section (b)(6) - "humanitarian and civic assistance

[83] CJCSI 7401.02D, "Combatant Commander Command and Control Initiatives Program," *Defense Technical Information Center*, 31 October 2007. Accessed on 3/17/08 at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/7401_02.pdf
[84] DOD Directive 7280.4, "Commander in Chiefs (CINC's) Initiative Fund," 26 October1993. Accessed on 3/17/08 at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/corres/pdf/d72804_102693/d72804p.pdf
[85] P.L. 109-364 §902, "John Warner National Defense Authorization Act, 2007."
[86] Conference Report 109-702.

to include urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance" - from 10 USC 166a. In addition, we recommend striking sub-section (c) (3) of 10 USC 166a: "the provision of funds to be used for urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance particularly in a foreign country where the armed forces are engaged in a contingency operation." This will remove the duplicative funding and authorities and maintain CCIF as a tool for the Combatant Commands to fulfill the functions described in the initial authorization and guidance.

Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDACA)

Context
The relatively small OHDACA account at DOD was authorized in 1987 and is dedicated to providing humanitarian and civic assistance to foreign countries through three programs: the Humanitarian Assistance (HA) program, the Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Program and the Foreign Disaster Relief and Emergency Response (FDR/ER).[87] OHDACA funds are two-year appropriations that provide the DOD flexibility to respond to unforeseen disasters. Funding for OHDACA has historically been in the $50-60 million range, with supplemental appropriations passed to fund emergency operations needed to cope with natural disasters. Currently, DOD is seeking to amend the OHDACA humanitarian assistance authorization (10 USC 2561) to expand DOD's authority to provide relief for stabilization purposes worldwide.[88]

Parallel Authority
The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in USAID provides parallel assistance responding to international disasters through the International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA) account. In FY 2006, OFDA responded to 76 disasters in 55 countries. Such disasters included droughts, floods, earthquakes, and health emergencies.[89] OFDA coordinates closely with DOD in executing this program.

Budget History

Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDACA) ($ in millions)									
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009*	Total
Appropriated	49.4	94.5	94.2	175.8	60.8	63.2	103	-	640.9

* OHDACA funding for FY 2009 has not yet been appropriated.

Recommendations
OHDACA has been an invaluable tool in supporting global relief efforts. The U.S. Pacific Command's response to the massive Indian Ocean Tsunami on December 26, 2004, used OHDACA funds to quickly provide supplies and relief to the affected areas. However, OHDACA's authority and funding should not be expanded to cover stabilization and reconstruction operations. No additional authority is needed at State/USAID to cover these needs, beyond the previous proposals and supplemental funding needed to cope with unforeseen disasters.

[87] Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) Appropriation," *DSCA*, Accessed on 3/19/08 at: http://www.dsca.mil/programs/HA/OVERSEAS%20HUMANITARIAN%20DISASTER%20AND%20CIVIC%20AID.pdf
[88] Department of Defense, "FY 2009 Proposed Legislation," 7 February 2008, p. 109-110. Accessed on 5/16/08 at: http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/FY2009_NDAA_BillText.pdf
[89] USAID, OFDA FY 2006 Annual Report

Train and Equip (Iraq Security Force and Afghan Security Force)

Context
The lawlessness and instability following the missions of Iraq and Afghanistan led the U.S. military to develop programs to rebuild the Iraq and Afghan security forces. Officials hoped to transition security responsibilities from the U.S. military to indigenous military forces. Therefore, in November 2003, Congress appropriated $150 million to "provide assistance only to the New Iraqi Army and the Afghan National Army..."[90] As the security situation in Iraq and Afghanistan deteriorated, funding increased dramatically peaking at nearly $13 billion in 2007. Authorization was formalized in 2005 as "Iraq Security Forces Fund" and "Afghanistan Security Forces Fund" respectively.

Authority for these funds comes from Section 1209 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, and Section 1202 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act, 2007.

Parallel Authority
The Iraq and Afghanistan Security Forces Fund parallels the existing State Department Foreign Military Financing program. Annual appropriations for Foreign Military Financing range from $4-5 billion.

Budget History

Iraq and Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ($ in millions)							
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009*	Total
Appropriated	150	7,485	5,415	12,900	5,750	3,000	$34,700

*Initial funding for FY 2009 is appropriated through the June 30, 2008 supplemental FY 09 Bridge Fund (P.L. 110-252).

Recommendation
Spending for the Iraq and Afghanistan Security Forces funds are large and have been criticized for inadequate oversight and poor accounting. A recent GAO report found that the DOD could not account for at least 190,000 weapons.[91] As activities in these two countries evolve, we recommend that these two programs remain at DOD. As funding declines and the security forces of these two countries acquire the capacity to provide adequate security, Congress will want to consider folding a residual program into a reformed FMF program under State Department authorities and guidance.

[90] P.L. 108-106 §1107, "Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004", November 2003.

[91] Government Accountability Office, *Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces*, GAO-07-711, July 2007.

Other Considerations

Human Resources Management

Resources – human and financial - are not by themselves enough. State's personnel management practices must reflect the expanded responsibilities and a global operating environment that itself has changed fundamentally from the Cold War period on which State's operating models are still based. Among the four categories considered in this paper, core diplomacy has been considered the most central function of the Department and even that area has changed in important ways, driven by the rise of such areas as multilateral and global issues. The mechanics of the personnel system must provide individuals with the skills and incentives to carry out the expanded functions and purposes of all of the categories examined, and the culture of the Department of State must accept those new or expanded functions as legitimate and important.

The Kennedy administration (and every President since) has given every Ambassador a letter confirming the Ambassador's authority to direct all elements of the U.S. government in the Ambassador's country of assignment. While divisions remain in Washington, for over 40 years the best Ambassadors and Deputy Chiefs of Mission have understood the important roles State, AID, USIA and other federal agencies play at post and have worked to ensure that they operated collaboratively under the Ambassador's authority. Despite the reality that significant progress has been made in this area, widespread perceptions remain that the Department has generally declined to acknowledge the importance of foreign assistance and public diplomacy as integral parts of the U.S. foreign policy mission. Many Foreign Service Officers, especially those who have served in Iraq, Afghanistan, on PRT's, in anti-narcotics programs and in other difficult assignments involving non-traditional functions, would consider that perception dated. All of this being said, more needs to be done.

Other nontraditional policy areas are an increasingly central part of U.S. global engagement. It is critically important that State emphasize efforts to recruit, train, and provide relevant career experiences and incentives for talented individuals who can assume these responsibilities as part of their diplomatic careers.[92] The possible steps to accomplish this include:

- Recruitment practices attuned to emerging needs, including the use of specialist, mid-career appointments, waivers for the Foreign Service's strict time in class and "up or out" promotion system, and limited appointments as necessary;
- Expanded training, often mandatory, including current management and leadership training at each level as well as training in strategic planning and program development, implementation and evaluation;
- More effective coordination of the assignment process to ensure that individual preferences are balanced with overall systemic needs and best use is made of available human resources;
- Strong emphasis on assignments out of cone and details outside the Department of State, for example to USAID, DOD and Treasury, as well as working in multifunctional units or directly in development or Public Diplomacy. Such tours should be mandatory requirements in the Department's Career Development Program and in promotion precepts to cross the senior threshold;

[92] For a similar argument, in more detail, see p. 35-36 of *State 2025*.

- Refined performance measurements and accountability, based on specific skills, goals and objectives, are developed for each employee;
- A promotion system that provides a proportionate opportunity for advancement for those individuals carrying out these broader responsibilities; and,
- Real opportunities for advancement to senior ranks for the full range of State personnel.

In sum, the mechanics of personnel operations must serve overall system needs. The culture of the State Department and Foreign Service must also continue to evolve to reflect new realities. For success to occur, underpinning all these efforts must be a strong and sustained emphasis on their importance by State's senior leadership.

USAID has also seen its mission change significantly, as described in the section of the paper devoted to that agency. Its culture and operations, and the human resources function that supports them, must be realigned to reflect its role as a fully integrated element of a broadened and more coherent national foreign policy.

Interagency Coordination

The expanding international role of other federal agencies in recent years has meant that the Department of State is also facing a coordination challenge. The Department should be working more closely in this area with the NSC and OMB to ensure effective coordination of U.S. foreign and national security policy. Enhanced coordination is necessary for success in at least two of this report's focus areas:

- Foreign economic assistance programs are carried out by more than 20 federal agencies, fewer than half of which lie under the authority of the Secretary of State and the Director of Foreign Assistance. These include programs planned and implemented by Health & Human Services, Treasury and others, as well as security assistance programs under the direction of DOD. While coordination and communication regarding such programs does occur between State and other agencies, it is often imperfect and is mostly *ad hoc*.

- The new civilian surge capacity for reconstruction and stabilization will draw on expertise located in a number of domestic agencies (Agriculture, Justice, etc.) for its Standby Response Corps. State has established an interagency management system to provide coordination and has set up a process by which country-specific operations will be overseen by interagency groups jointly chaired by the State regional assistant secretary, a director from the NSC and the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. As this process is used, it will need to be reviewed to determine whether it provides the types and numbers of people needed to make the surge capacity successful and whether coordination is being done at the right level.

Organization

Significant agency organizational issues were outside the scope of this study and thus were not reviewed for the purposes of this paper. We note the existence of credible work already done, and more underway, in recommending or examining a number of options for reorganizing the U.S. government foreign affairs apparatus, particularly in terms of Public Diplomacy and Foreign Assistance.[93] Our purpose has been to determine staffing

[93] See, e.g.: AAD Task Force report, *American Diplomacy for a Changing World,* November 2004; *Changing Minds, Winning Peace.* Washington D.C.: Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy, 2003; *Final Report*

and underlying financial needs related to specific diplomatic functions. None of the most likely organizational alternatives to the present configuration could be expected to reduce staffing requirements below the target levels we have identified. Without additional staffing – in terms of both numbers and competencies – the more effective conduct of diplomatic activities that is our goal and purports to be that of every serious reorganization concept now being considered, will not be achieved.

Overseas Administrative Staffing

Quality administrative support is clearly critical to successful conduct of diplomatic work abroad. The Department provides such support to most USG agencies within the statutory[94] framework of the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) mechanism, which "gives posts the authority to determine how services are delivered, at what cost ... by whom ... and incorporates a full-cost recovery system ..." The Academy assumes that there will be a need for additional administrative support services and/or staff abroad commensurate with its recommended increases in core, public, assistance and post-conflict diplomacy, but believes that ICASS has become effective during its decade-plus evolution, and accordingly finds it inappropriate to attempt to prescribe any specific service configuration. Accordingly, the Academy has built full ICASS funding into its recommendations, expects that any added administrative support personnel overseas will be funded through ICASS cost-recovery, and proposes that specific administrative support staffing and service modalities be decided on the "locally-empowered" basis referred to in applicable regulation.[95]

Fiscal Environment

Projected federal deficits suggest that the fiscal environment will be constrained for several years. Some will suggest that the budget increases we propose are not possible, or need to be offset by other spending cuts, either in Function 150 or elsewhere in discretionary spending. We would argue that our proposed increases would have a minimal impact on the overall federal deficit. As Secretary of Defense Robert M Gates said in a speech on July 15, 2008:

> It has become clear that America's civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long – relative to what we traditionally spend on the military, and more importantly, relative to the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world...Because the numbers we are talking about are relatively small compared to the rest of government, a steep increase in these capabilities is well within reach – as long as there is the political will and wisdom to do it.

Even increases double what we propose would have a minimal impact, while not providing these funds would make only a minimal contribution to deficit reduction. It is our view that not providing these additional resources will ultimately lead to crisis spending, downstream, that will surpass the increments we are proposing. Therefore, we urge that these increases be provided without offsets. No current budget rules prevent such

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of the State Department in 2025 Working Group, Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, U.S. Department of State, 2008, *The HELP Commission Report: Beyond Assistance,* Washington D.C.: December 2007.

[94] P.L. 104-208.
[95] 6 FAM 911.4

funding from being provided. If offsets are deemed necessary, we would urge that they not be provided from other reductions in International Affairs budgets.

Appendix

A. Science and Technology Staff Deployments

Possible Additional S&T Staff Deployments
(Existing locations in **bold** | *Hub location)

Africa		+USDH
Ethiopia*	**Addis Ababa**	**1**
Rwanda	Kigali	1
Kenya	Nairobi	1
Botswana*	**Gaborone**	
South Africa	**Pretoria**	
South Africa	Cape Town	1
Congo	Kinshasa	1
Ghana*	**Accra**	
Nigeria	**Abuja**	

East Asia/Pacific		+USDH
Australia	**Canberra**	
Burma	Rangoon	1
Cambodia	Phnom Penh	1
China	**Beijing**	**2**
China	Chengdu	1
China	Hong Kong	1
China	Shanghai	1
Fiji*	**Suva**	
Indonesia	**Jakarta**	**2**
Japan	**Tokyo**	**1**
Korea	**Seoul**	**1**
Laos	Vientiane	1
Malaysia	Kuala Lampur	1
Mongolia	Ulaanbaatar	1
New Zealand	Auckland	1
Papa New Guinea	Port Moresby	1
Philippines	Manila	1
Singapore	Singapore	1
Taiwan	**Taipei**	
Thailand*	**Bangkok**	1
Vietnam	**Hanoi**	
Vietnam	Ho Chi Minh City	1

Western Hemisphere		+USDH
Argentina	**Buenos Aires**	
Barbados	Bridgetown	1
Brazil*	**Brasilia**	
Brazil	Sao Paulo	1
Canada	**Ottawa**	**1**
Canada	Vancouver	1
Chile	**Santiago**	
Colombia	Bogotá	1
Costa Rica*	**San Jose**	1
Ecuador	Quito	1
El Salvador	San Salvador	1
Guatemala	Guatemala City	1
Haiti/DR	Santo Domingo	1
Mexico	**Mexico City**	1
Peru	Lima	1

Western Hemisphere (cont.)		+USDH
Trinidad and Tobago	Port of Spain	1
Uruguay	Montevideo	1

Europe		+USDH
Austria	**Vienna/UNVIE**	**2**
Belgium	**USEU**	2
Belgium	USNATO	1
Denmark*	**Copenhagen**	
France	**Paris**	**1**
France	IEA	1
France	**OECD**	
Hungary*	**Budapest**	
Iceland	Reykjavik	1
Italy	**Rome**	**1**
Russia	**Moscow**	**1**
Spain	**Madrid**	
Switzerland	**Geneva**	**1**
Turkey	Istanbul	1
Ukraine	Kiev	1
United Kingdom	**London**	**1**

Middle East/North Africa		+USDH
Algeria	Algiers	1
Egypt	Cairo	1
Iraq	**Baghdad**	
Israel	**Tel Aviv**	
Jordan*	**Amman**	**1**
Kuwait	Kuwait City	1
Morocco	Rabat	1
Oman	Muscat	1
Qatar	Doha	1
Saudi Arabia	Riyadh	1
Tunisia	Tunis	1

South/Central Asia		+USDH
India	Mumbai	1
India	Hyderabad	1
India	**New Delhi**	**1**
India	Chennai	1
Kazakhstan*	**Astana**	
Nepal*	**Kathmandu**	
Pakistan	Islamabad	1
Uzbekistan	Tashkent	1

B. Diplomatic Security

State's current Diplomatic Security staffing posture has evolved since 1986, beginning with enactment of the Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of that year (P.L. 99-399). Prior to this, funding for Diplomatic Security (DS) totaled just over $200 million, and staffing just over 1,000. For FY 2007, Diplomatic Security appropriated funding totaled $1.055 billion, and U.S. Direct-Hire staff totaled 2,388, of which 1,462 were based in the U.S. and 926 overseas, in 25 U.S. cities and 159 locations abroad, respectively.[96] All DS Agents are members of the Foreign Service, regardless of duty station, all have domestic arrest authority, and all benefit from Law Enforcement Availability Pay (LEAP).

The following chart illustrates DS funding and staffing trends over the last two decades. The indicated funding levels are separate and distinct from amounts provided for capital costs related to construction of new secure embassies and consulates. They are also separate from State Department Core Diplomacy funding and staffing figures elsewhere in this paper:



In addition to the above, 401 foreign national direct-hire positions were attributed by State to appropriated-fund Diplomatic Security work in FY 2007. An additional 148 USDH Diplomatic Security positions were funded by means of $38.3 million in Border Security fees collected by the Department in 2007, using authorities effectively unavailable to the Department prior to the mid-1990s. For 2009, State has proposed increasing this to 370 positions, at a cost of $79.8 million.

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[96] U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, 2009*, and www.diplomaticsecurity.gov (Bureau of Diplomatic Security home page).

For budget purposes, State's Diplomatic Security activities can be grouped into three subsets, as follows:[97]

- **Protection of U.S. Government personnel and facilities**
  - Development and implementation of programs that shield U.S. missions and residencies overseas and more than 100 domestic State Department facilities, from physical and technical attack.
  - Formulation and execution of plans to deal with emergency contingencies, ranging from hostage situations to evacuations.
  - Monitoring and analysis of intelligence on terrorist activities and threats directed against the Secretary of State, senior U.S. officials, visiting foreign dignitaries, resident foreign diplomats, and foreign missions in the United States.

- **Counter-terrorism and law enforcement**
  - Liaison with foreign police and security services overseas in support of U.S. law enforcement initiatives and investigations, significantly on behalf of other U.S. federal, state, and local agencies, aimed at locating and apprehending fugitives who have fled the United States.
  - Real-time assessment and longer term evaluation of threats to U.S. interests from terrorism, political violence, and crime.
  - Domestic investigation of passport and visa fraud violations.

- **Information Security**
  - Monitoring, prevention and negation of electronic threats directed toward embassies, information systems security, education of employees on counterintelligence and possible vulnerabilities that might be exploited by foreign intelligence agencies, and investigation of alleged espionage incidents ad damage assessments of confirmed acts of espionage.
  - Secure movement of classified U.S. government material, equipment and construction materials bound for sensitive posts.
  - Background investigations on job applications, employees and contractors, in support of determination of suitability for employment, as well as levels of access to classified information.

The Department's most recent internal analysis of domestic staffing requirements projects Diplomatic Security workload growth ranging from 18 to 27% during the triennium through 2009, absent any workload restructuring resulting in efficiency or productivity gains.[98]

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[97] Extracted from: *Diplomatic Security: 2007 Year in Review,* Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, April 2008, and *www.diplomaticsecurity.state.gov*.

[98] Department of State, Bureau of Human Resources, *Domestic Staffing Model, Phase 3 Report*, March 2007, Table 6-2.

C. Public Diplomacy at DOD

Following the recommendation of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, a Strategic Communication Integration Group (SCIG) was formed within the Department of Defense and a strategic communications road map was produced. In April, 2007 Dr. Michael Doran was named as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Support for Public Diplomacy in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy).

In a speech early in 2008 Dr. Doran said:

> The office that I head was established over a year ago. ... It represents a growing awareness in the Department of Defense that we have a public diplomacy role to play; it represents an awareness that you can't conceive of military operations in isolation from other forms of national power....that you have to take into consideration the public diplomacy of any operation at the takeoff, from the beginning.

DOD bases its authorities for conducting public information on Title 10 of the U.S. Code. These authorities cover the following information operations: Public Affairs; Visual Information; Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Information Operations, including Psychological Operations. In terms of determining how far down the chain of command a particular congressional authority is delegated, in practice it has been the commander has the final say.

DOD's decision to develop its own public diplomacy effort may originate, at least in part, from disappointment with the State Department's perceived inability to obtain foreign public opinion approval for U.S. responses to terrorist actions and threats and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD has long been concerned with the number of State Department clearances required before a proposed action is approved or disapproved. For instance when a combatant commander proposes an initiative in his region, he may have to seek concurrence from several U.S. ambassadors in the region rather than being able to speak to one regionally based authority or a single Washington official. From the DOD perspective this arrangement inhibits timely decisions and stymies implementation.

What has DOD actually accomplished in its PD efforts? It's hard to tell. Interviews with active duty and retired military personnel and State officials and additional research failed to reveal facts on how much funding and personnel DOD devotes to Public Diplomacy. The interviewees made clear that throughout DOD there remains uncertainty concerning a clear definition of "public diplomacy". This suggests that at this point there may have been more discussion on the terminology rather than action.

For instance DOD officials' congressional testimony has focused on what PD practitioners might call public affairs activities on humanitarian operations, e.g. Pakistan earthquake relief and aiding the departure of American citizens from Lebanon during 2006 hostilities.

DOD has not fully explained publicly its early 2008 dissolution of the Strategic Communications Integration Group (SCIG). This decision reportedly has upset members of the House Armed Services committee who are strong supporters of DOD strategic communications. The dissolution was viewed as a major setback to coordination of "Strategic Communication/PD" efforts.

In May, 2008 the House of Representatives passed their version of the FY-2009 National Defense Authorization Act (HR 5658). The bill would establish a Strategic Management

Communications Board--an advisory board appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Board would consist of representatives from throughout the government including State, USAID and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). The companion Senate bill does not have similar language. If the Senate Armed Services Committee adopts similar language and the measure passes both chambers this could further complicate the DOD-State relationship as to leadership in international PD efforts.

Conclusion

The lack of precise public information about DOD's PD activities, budget and personnel levels makes it virtually impossible to determine whether DOD PD programming is encroaching on State's authority.

Recommendation

When new State and DOD leadership are in place after the next Administration takes office in January, 2009, an inter-agency meeting should be convened by State at the Deputy Secretary level to prepare an inventory of USG international public diplomacy assets and activities. If DOD is conducting PD activities outside of combat zones, the authority to conduct these activities should be returned to the State Department.

At the same time, there should be State/DOD discussions on tangible ways of increasing mutual effectiveness through closer coordination, increased cross training and assignment opportunities and cost-sharing arrangements.

D. BROADCASTING (BBG)

Under the supervision of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB) provides administrative and engineering support for U.S. government-funded non-military international broadcasting services. IBB and BBG were established as independent federal government entities in 1999. The Secretary of State is an ex-officio BBG member but has no direct authority over BBG's budget or operations.

The BBG and IBB oversee: Voice of America; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; the Office of Cuba Broadcasting; Radio Free Asia and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (*Alhurra, Radio Sawa and Radio Farda*). The Administration's FY-2009 request for the BBG is $ 699.5 million, a 2.6% increase above the FY-2008 budget.

The IBB uses radio, television and Internet programming, essential USG public diplomacy tools, to inform global audiences of the day's regional and international news; U.S. government policies and developments in American society. During the Cold War, broadcasting services, especially VOA and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, played a prominent role in keeping the peoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe fully informed about developments in their own countries and the world and communism's failures. Today's critical stories, be they repression in Darfur, Zimbabwe, Tibet or Georgia, terrorist acts or natural disasters with political overtones such as occurred in Burma and China, need to be reported accurately, in depth and in timely fashion to the citizens of those countries and the world.

The combination of inadequate funding over several years to cover rising operational expenses (especially in television); the dollar's weakness, and the Congressionally-mandated establishment of new broadcast services in recent years have compelled the BBG to eliminate or scale back several language services. The BBG through annual reviews has identified those areas where it urgently needs funding and staffing increases if it is to maintain its place among the top rank of international government-sponsored broadcasters.

Recommendation

Given the valuable role USG broadcasting plays in many public diplomacy efforts, it seems likely that on certain occasions the BBG might request active State Department support for a funding request or programming initiative. If the Department determines that the specific request will help further U.S. foreign policy objectives, it may wish to weigh in with public support to the OMB and/or Congress.

At the same time the Department should be pro-active in seeking opportunities to do interviews on the stations operated by the BBG and should consider regularly briefing reporters from VOA, RFE/RL and the other USG-funded stations on U.S. policies as they relate to current international developments.

E. USAID Staffing Methodology

1. Overseas Staffing is Based on:

- Three sizes of mission, based on program size:
  - Large, where program exceeds $30m per year;
  - Medium, where program is between $10m and $30m per year;
  - Small, where program is between $3m and $10m per year; and,
  - Posts with programs below $3m per year are non-presence.
- There are also provisions for regional hubs and regional satellites:
  - Hubs are centers that provide program and administrative support to country missions and may also manage regional programs. USAID currently has hubs in each region where it operates; and,
  - Satellites are mini-missions for small programs, usually consisting of only one U.S. Direct-Hire.
- Staff increases are provided for special case countries:
  - Countries in crisis (humanitarian or other); and,
  - Regional linchpins (countries of strategic importance).
- Operations requirements (senior management, program direction, legal, finance, contracts, administration) are standardized according to program size (see mission sizes above) and adjusted for special case situations, such as countries in crisis or strategic importance of country. U.S. operations staff ranges from 2-3 in small missions to 16-20 in the largest missions.

- Requirements for technical officers (managers and technical experts) are based on program size by type of program, and are again adjusted for special case countries. The program rations are the same for similar technical programs regardless of whether financed from development accounts, ESF or other program accounts. If programs become extremely large (as in the case of some PEPFAR activities), the proportions are changed to assume staff will oversee larger amounts of money per capita. Relation of staff to program size assumes that some technical personnel will not manage programs, but will facilitate development activities funded in whole or in part with non-USAID resources.
  - For health programs, one "employee" would be provided for each $1.5 million in program size. The "employee" consists of 25% FSO, 66% FSN and 9% short-term non-DH, such as a PSC. Thus, a $15 million health program would require a total of 10 employees, approximately 3 FSOs, 6 FSNs and 1 PSC.
  - For economic growth programs, one "employee", defined the same way, would be provided for each $1.3 million in program size. Thus, a $13 million economic growth program would require a total of 10 employees, divided as in the previous case; and
  - USAID's third major program area incorporates democracy and humanitarian assistance. The same ratios are used in this category as for economic growth.

- Adding together the operations and technical management staffs, large missions would have between 20 and 30 USDH, medium missions 10 to 20 USDH, and smaller posts only 5 to 10 USDH. A few larger missions would be staffed at higher levels because of extraordinary requirements (e.g., Iraq, Sudan) and regional support centers (providing technical, administrative and legal services to smaller

posts) would also be staffed at levels of 25-30 FSOs. Large missions would contain some junior posts in both operations and technical areas to serve as training positions.

- Foreign Service National (FSN) employees, almost all of whom are PSCs, are not factored into the staffing levels for the purpose of this exercise but their costs are included. USAID expects that, given a doubling of FSOs at field posts, the number of FSNs would increase by about 30%.

2. Headquarters Staffing

- USAID headquarters consists of the Office of the Administrator, regional bureaus, pillar (or technical) bureaus, a management bureau, a bureau for legislative and public affairs, a legal office and an office of the Inspector General, plus several specialized staffs. The USAID policy bureau was largely moved to the State F area. All other existing bureaus remain.

- Headquarters staffing is a combination of FSOs, civil service and non-direct hire (PSCs and other). Proportion varies by type of bureau.

- **Regional bureaus** consist largely of geographic offices with desks for each recipient country of group of countries. They also include small technical liaison and administrative management staffs. The size of each bureau is based on the number of programs and the type/complexity of country programs (one desk officer per country, more if mission is a regional hub or linchpin). Senior management is 50% FSO, 50% GS; other categories of staff are primarily GS.

- **Pillar bureaus** (one each for Economic Growth, Health and Democracy/Humanitarian Assistance) manage headquarters programs and provide technical support and backstopping to all field missions. The size of each is a function of overall program size. Staff of these bureaus is carried out with the following proportions: FSOs, 11%; civil service, 34% and temporary staff (PSCs and other) 55%.

- **The Management Bureau** and other headquarters bureaus and offices base staffing levels on appropriate metrics (staff served for HR; financial transactions for Finance, contract/grant volume for the Procurement Office), and comparisons are done with other federal agencies to assure that levels are in line. Most of the staffing in these bureaus and offices is civil service, but rotational assignments for FSOs are maintained in each professional area relevant to the Foreign Service.

- **Complements** are maintained for the FSO (15%) and civil service (2%) to cover longer term training, rotations, details to other agencies, health problems and other situations.

F. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was established in January, 2004 as a new U.S. government bilateral economic assistance agency. It is a government corporation run by a Board of Directors of which the Secretary of State is the chair.

The Corporation is based on the principle that assistance will be most effective when it reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in people. To qualify for funding from the MCC, provided as a result of a bilateral agreement known as a "compact," countries must satisfy a number of criteria based on indicators of progress relating to governance, economic policies and social sector performance. Countries that have made progress but do not yet meet the criteria are eligible for "threshold" programs, funded by the MCC but administered by USAID. These programs are intended to help the countries become eligible for full "compact" status. Once a country reaches that status, the programs are largely run by the country itself with oversight by the MCC.

Currently, the MCC has active compacts with 16 countries and expects to complete two more before the end of FY 2008. Each compact is planned to run for five years. The average size of compacts approved over the past two years is about $490 million. Programs undertaken under the compacts include economic growth activities, such as agricultural development and road construction, and social sector programs in the fields of education and health. The total budget for the MCC was $1.8 billion in 2007, is $1.5 billion in 2008 and $2.2 billion has been requested for 2009. For the past few years, Congress has reduced the MCC's request because of slower than planned growth in the program.

The MCC staff is headquartered in Washington; domestic staff, which currently totals 276 and is limited to 300 by Executive Branch agreement, is civil service except for senior executives who are non-career. Overseas presence consists of two MCC U.S. direct-hire staff in each compact country, employed under Schedule A of the federal personnel regulations (non-career civil service) for the five-year duration of the compact with the country within which they serve.

G. THE PRESIDENT'S EMERGENCY PROGRAM FOR AIDS RELIEF (PEPFAR)

The PEPFAR program, an initiative of the current administration, was authorized in PL 108-25, signed into law on May 27, 2003. It provided a five year authorization for the new program. Through 2007, a total of $12.2 billion was obligated and the PEPFAR operational plan for 2008 calls for the commitment of an additional $6 billion. A similar amount was requested for FY 2009. The program has been reauthorized by a bill signed into law on July 30, 2008 which provides authority for up to an additional $39 billion for HIV/AIDS programs over the next five years.

The program is overseen by the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (S/GAC) , located in the Department of State but with reporting responsibilities to both the President and the Secretary. The Office has a staff of 28 and administrative costs for the Office are estimated at $12.9 million in 2008.

The program includes both bilateral programs and contributions to multilateral funds. Bilateral programs are managed primarily by USAID and by the HHS Centers for Disease Control, though other field programs are overseen by the Departments of State, Defense, Labor and Commerce and by the Peace Corps. The staff who manage the programs are employed by their own agencies and are therefore not "PEPFAR" employees. USAID currently has bilateral AIDS programs in 50 countries, and has established seven regional centers which oversee programs in an additional 50 countries. HHS/CDC maintains presence in 29 countries as part of PEPFAR teams.

The PEPFAR staffing implications for Function 150 agencies (State, USAID) have been built into prior and current year estimates and requests. Significant increases in funding levels for HIV/AIDS activities for which these agencies are responsible could require additional staffing.

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