AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

S. HRG. 110–764

# DEFINING THE MILITARY'S ROLE TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY

## HEARING

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 31, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

48–042 PDF WASHINGTON : 2009

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, *Chairman*

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL NELSON, Florida
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania
JIM WEBB, Virginia

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BOB CORKER, Tennessee
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
JIM DEMINT, South Carolina
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, *Staff Director*
KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., *Republican Staff Director*

# CONTENTS


| | Page |
|---|---|
| Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement | 1 |
| Brigety, Dr. Reuben E., II, director of the Sustainable Security Program, Center for American Progress, Washington, DC | 38 |
| Prepared statement | 40 |
| Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania, statement | 33 |
| Edelman, Hon. Eric S., Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC | 11 |
| Prepared statement | 16 |
| Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, statement | 35 |
| Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, statement | 22 |
| Locke, Mary, former senior professional staff, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC | 47 |
| Prepared statement | 49 |
| Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement | 3 |
| Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, statement | 26 |
| Negroponte, Hon. John D., Deputy Secretary, Department of State, Washington, DC | 5 |
| Prepared statement | 7 |
| Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. | 69 |
| Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Richard G. Lugar | 78 |
| Perito, Robert M., senior program officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC | 57 |
| Prepared statement | 59 |
| Rupp, Dr. George, CEO and president, International Rescue Committee, New York, NY | 51 |
| Prepared statement | 54 |

# DEFINING THE MILITARY'S ROLE TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY

**THURSDAY, JULY 31, 2008**

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:22 p.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Menendez, Casey, Lugar, and Barrasso.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S., SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say to my colleagues, I apologize. I got the time wrong, plus got tied up over in the Capitol, and I'm sincerely sorry, particularly to our witnesses, who are extremely busy.

We're here today to discuss an important trend affecting this country and that is, in my view at least, the expanding role of the military in U.S. foreign policy. The events of September 11 made it clear that our Armed Forces could not focus solely on traditional challenges, threats from traditional states with traditional military capabilities. This new world that we found ourselves in has compelled us to think in a very different way.

In response to this, we've given our military much greater flexibility in funding and more resources. The administration is trying a new model for an integrated combat command in Africa. The military is much more deeply engaged in stabilization activities, humanitarian assistance, and foreign aid programs. In fact, there's been a migration of functions and authority from the U.S. civilian agencies to the Department of Defense.

Between the years 2002 and 2005, the share of the U.S. official development assistance channeled through the Pentagon budget has surged from 5.6 percent in 2002 to 21.7 percent in 2005, rising to $5.5 billion. Much of this increase has gone toward activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it still points to an expanding military role in what have traditionally been civilian programs.

I share the concern raised by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently when he raised the concern by saying, "The military has become more involved in a range of activities that in the past were perceived to be the exclusive province of civilian agencies and organizations. This has led to concern about what's seen as creeping militarization of American foreign policy. This is not an entirely unreasonable statement."

This is, I think, problematic for a couple reasons. First, the increasing dominance of the military in our foreign policy may inadvertently limit our options. When the military is the most readily available option, it is the most likely to be used, whether or not it's the best choice.

Second, we have to balance economic and military aid to a country, and doing so in an attempt to influence their perceptions about U.S. priorities and how we choose to project our power. A foreign policy that overemphasizes the military runs the risk of displacing or overshadowing broader policy and development objectives.

Third, focusing on the immediate military dimensions of combating extremism instead of pursuing longer term strategies in vulnerable countries could have the unintended consequence of purchasing short-term gains at the expense of long-term stability and sustained development.

Finally, militaries are very good at winning war and training armies, but we don't want soldiers training lawyers or setting up court systems—the question is, Do we? I think not—or instructing health care workers on HIV and AIDS prevention, or running microfinance programs. Of necessity, our men and women in uniform have gotten very good at all of these things, but it's not their primary mission, which is war-fighting.

The question before us today is quite simple in my view: In expanding the role of our Armed Forces, have we diminished our diplomatic and development assistance institutions, and have we done so in a way that undermines our national security?

I called this hearing so we can get a better understanding of the policy choices that we have made and continue to make to reshape our civilian agencies and the military. In this hearing I hope to focus on the following issues.

First, why is the expansion of the military happening? Secretary Gates provides one answer. He argues that our civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for much too long. They cannot fulfill these responsibilities and challenges to our national interests around the world absent a change.

If that is true, then from the military's perspective what reforms and changes do we need so civilians can once again be effective counterparts? From the civilian side, what is required so that they can support our national security priorities? And what is preventing these reforms from taking place?

Next, is the military the appropriate institution for implementing foreign aid programs? What are the foreign policy implications of DOD expanding its foreign aid role? Does the military even want this responsibility?

Third, many claim that the real crux of the issue lies in the field with embassies and regional Combatant Commands. Combatant Commands, led by AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM, are assuming new roles and responsibilities that are not well understood, but have broad foreign policy implications. This includes everything from strategic planning to undertaking foreign assistance programs. With funding and manpower that far exceed civilian resources, are military commands becoming the central organizing point of U.S. foreign policy in these regions?

Finally, interagency coordination. By law the State Department plays a primary role in overseeing foreign assistance activities. In practice, the Department of Defense is taking on more and more responsibility for traditional foreign assistance programs. How can we be sure that State plays its proper and necessary role?

Our first panel today brings years of experience and perspective to these issues. I'd like to welcome Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte and Under Secretary for Policy in the Department of Defense, Eric Edelman. I look forward to hearing their testimony.

Before I turn to the witnesses, I would turn to my colleague, Senator Lugar, for an opening statement.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Deputy Secretary John Negroponte and Under Secretary Eric Edelman to our committee again.

During the last 5 years the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has focused much attention on how we can improve our diplomatic and foreign assistance capabilities and integrate them more effectively with the military component of national power. Since 2003 we have been advocating through hearings and legislation the establishment of a civilian counterpart to the military in post-conflict situations. We have argued for a rapidly deployable civilian corps that is trained to work with the military on stabilization and reconstruction missions in hostile environments. This is the intent of the Lugar-Biden-Hagel legislation that passed the Senate in 2006 and passed this committee again this year. Increasing the capacity of the civilian agencies and integrating them with our military is essential if we are to be ready for the next post-conflict mission.

The Pentagon's role in foreign assistance also has been of longstanding interest to the committee. In 2006 I directed the Republican staff of the committee to investigate the expanding role of the United States military in areas that traditionally have been in the portfolio of the State Department. The resulting report, entitled "Embassies as Command Posts in the Campaign Against Terror," was led by former Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member Mary Locke, who will be testifying on the second panel today.

The report documented the rise and development of humanitarian assistance that is being funded and managed by the Pentagon. The report recommended that all security assistance, including section 1206, be included under the Secretary of State's authority in a coordination process for rationalizing and prioritizing foreign assistance.

The role of the Defense Department in stabilization and reconstruction, foreign assistance and public information programs has grown in the post-September 11 environment. This new role includes increased funding, new authorities, and new platforms, such as AFRICOM. It has also produced new models for interagency coordination, as reflected in SOUTHCOM and the approval process for section 1206 projects.

It is clear that our military and civilian capabilities are severely out of balance. In 2001 defense spending comprised just 5.2 percent

of total U.S. official development assistance. According to preliminary figures, this has increased to 15 percent in 2007. While Congress maintains generous levels of funding to our military, funding for our diplomacy and foreign assistance persistently falls short.

Defense Secretary Gates points out that the total foreign affairs budget request for fiscal year 2009 is roughly equivalent to what the Pentagon spends on health care alone. The 1-year increase in personnel planned by the Army is about the same size as the entire Foreign Service.

Secretary Gates has been vocal in supporting a reinvigoration of civilian agency capabilities. Until that happens, he has also made clear that the military must continue to take on noncombat activities such as reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure, promoting good governance. This position reflects new thinking within the Defense Department and in the U.S. military on preventative, deterrent, and preemptive activities, as reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Many experts consider the military ill-suited to run foreign assistance and public information programs. These functions properly belong with civilian foreign policy agencies. Nevertheless, Congress has granted new authorities to the Department of Defense to fill the gaps in civilian capacity. These grants of authority have been given on a temporary basis and Congress has resisted making them permanent or expanding their reach. However, the Pentagon has continued to request that these authorities be made permanent and be expanded in both size and scope.

As this debate continues, we must address several fundamental questions: In the long term, should DOD be involved in global programs of a purely civilian nature? What are the consequences of U.S. engagement being fronted by a military uniform? In regions of the world with an uneven history of civilian control of the military, do we risk professionalizing foreign militaries to the extent that they overshadow the capacities of civilian governments? If current State Department programs providing military assistance are cumbersome and slow, should we first address those problems rather than create competing programs in other agencies?

Answers to such questions are essential to ensure that we are not engaging in mission creep that has not been well thought out by all the relevant policy actors. The best approach would be to develop a truly integrated national security strategy that assigns roles and resources according to the strengths of each foreign policy agency. Although developing such a comprehensive approach is beyond our scope today, I'm hopeful that Congress, the State Department, the Defense Department will give greater attention to constructing a system of roles and authorities that maximize the prospects for success of United States national security policy.

I thank the chairman for calling the hearing and we look forward to the insights of our witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Negroponte, the floor is yours. Again, I apologize for keeping you waiting.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC**

Secretary NEGROPONTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to provide the Department of State's views of the roles of civil and military agencies in foreign assistance.

Before I turn to the topic at hand, I wanted to take the opportunity to thank you all for support for the legislation that just passed the Senate, to help facilitate a comprehensive claims settlement agreement with Libya. This initiative provides the best opportunity for American claimants to receive fair compensation in an expedited manner and would help turn the page on the last vestige of our contentious past with Libya so that we can focus on the future of our relationship.

Now, turning to the question of foreign assistance, we have this discussion today against the backdrop of record levels of foreign assistance provided by the United States. This administration is, I believe, justifiably proud of overseeing a dramatic increase in assistance levels since 2001, of course with the support of the Congress.

Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, also Senator Kerry, you were present yesterday at the White House when the President signed into law a bill reauthorizing a second 5-year program for PEPFAR, and that initiative showcases the focus on results that we have brought to programs that are transforming lives and helping to make our world more secure.

It's a pleasure to appear today alongside my Foreign Service colleague Under Secretary of Defense Edelman. Our two Departments agree that diplomacy and development, as well as defense, are essential to overcoming the threats facing the United States in the 21st century: Combatting terrorism, global pandemics, trafficking in narcotics and persons, and other transnational threats depend as much on strengthening states and societies as they do on destroying enemies. The State Department is a national security agency and our administration is engaged in a long-term effort to ensure that our Department and other civilian agencies have the resources and capabilities to fulfill their responsibilities for securing our Nation.

With Congress's support, we've made good progress. Increases to our foreign assistance budgets, new authorities, and new interagency coordination mechanisms have enhanced the Department's ability to advance U.S. foreign policy and national security priorities.

At the same time, as Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates have both publicly urged, much remains to be done to give civilian agencies resources commensurate with their responsibilities. It is in the national interest to have strong and capable civilian partners to our military. To support nations struggling to improve governance, fight disease, strengthen law and order, and expand opportunity, the administration has increased foreign assistance across the board, and in particular we have more than doubled official development assistance since 2001.

Wherever conditions allow, civilian agencies such as State and USAID lead our assistance efforts. Only where necessary, as in

Iraq and Afghanistan, does DOD play that role on the ground, as it has done in past conflicts. In Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD's role in administering development assistance is strong, beneficial, and appropriate. But even there, it is specific to limited situations. The goal there, of course, is for civilian assistance to take an ever-increasing role and for the military role in providing assistance to diminish as security conditions permit.

Set aside funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, the official development assistance provided through the DOD budget drops down to something like 2.2 percent in 2005, which is consistent with historic levels.

The close State-DOD partnership is a key component of the seamless governmentwide approach to the national security that we need today. We both need and welcome greater civilian-military cooperation and coordination in Washington and in the field. For instance, civilian officials are assuming senior leadership positions in AFRICOM to ensure that it supports and complements civilian-led initiatives.

We also see the success of this partnership in the sections 1206 and 1207 authorities, which have given us the capability to respond to emergencies and opportunities related to counterterrorism and stabilization and reconstruction. Ultimately, these authorities have brought more resources to the table for vital priorities without compromising the Secretary of State's prerogatives.

We hope the House will accept the Senate's position on these authorities, which would expand them and make them more useful to our commanders and diplomats in the field.

As part of her mandate to lead our Nation's conduct of foreign affairs, Secretary Rice exercises continuous supervision of all such programs to ensure that they are well integrated and serve U.S. foreign policy. Chief of Mission authority—and I want to stress this point. Chief of Mission authority remains an essential organizing principle for U.S. engagement overseas. As a five-time ambassador, I am a strong proponent of that authority and I am confident that it is adequate to ensuring that the State Department retains lead responsibility for our foreign affairs and its execution in the field.

But while our authority is adequate, our resources at present are not. We continue to work with the Congress to build civilian capacity to respond to and prevent threats to our security. The Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy has recommended doubling the size of the Foreign Service and USAID. To approach that target, the President's fiscal year 2009 budget request seeks an additional 1,100 new State Department Foreign Service Officer positions and 300 officer positions for USAID, as well as additional foreign assistance resources.

Given the serious threats arising from weak and failed states, the administration is especially focused on creating a strong civilian capacity for stabilization and reconstruction missions. For too long, insufficient numbers of trained, prepared, and supported civilians have obliged us to resort to the military for such missions more than might otherwise have been necessary. The Civilian Stabilization Initiative is the centerpiece of our efforts to correct this problem by enabling the State Department to assume a greater

operational role in reconstruction efforts, a goal DOD and State and this committee all share.

The Civilian Stabilization Initiative will create a civilian rapid response capability that could be deployed on its own or with international partners or alongside our military, even amidst ongoing violence, as in Iraq and Afghanistan. The President's fiscal year 2009 budget request includes $248.6 million to support this capability. We hope Congress will enact the additional authorization strengthening this initiative and fully fund the President's request.

State, DOD, and all of our national security agencies will continue looking for ways to build on this administration's groundbreaking work in making our government better able to meet the challenges of the post-cold-war, post-9/11 world. We appreciate your leadership in this important area and we will continue working closely with this committee to refine our operations and to develop better tools and mechanisms to meet the requirements of our national security.

Thank you again for holding this hearing today, Mr. Chairman, and I'd be happy in due course to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Negroponte follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me today to provide the Department of State's views of the roles of civil and military agencies in foreign assistance. I am pleased to appear alongside Under Secretary of Defense Edelman.

Since 2001, our two Departments have been adapting and improving how we cooperate to meet the challenges facing our country in the 21st century. We now confront threats from international terrorism, trafficking in narcotics and persons, and global pandemics that thrive on the inability of failed and failing states to perform even basic sovereign responsibilities. This administration has recognized that defeating those threats depends as much on strengthening states and societies as on destroying enemies. Accordingly, President Bush has designated the State Department as a national security agency and made diplomacy and development, as well as defense, pillars of our national security strategy.

This administration has begun the long-term effort to equip the State Department and other civilian agencies with the resources and capabilities to fulfill their responsibilities for our national security. With Congress's support, we have made good progress. Increases to our foreign assistance budgets, new authorities, and new interagency coordination mechanisms have enhanced the State Department's ability to advance U.S. foreign policy and national security priorities. At the same time, as Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates have both publicly argued, much remains to be done to give civilian agencies additional capabilities to meet their responsibilities. It is in the national interest that our military have strong and capable civilian partners, and that is why the administration has requested additional funds for critical programs in the 2009 President's budget to continue this positive trend, which I will discuss below.

To meet the global challenges that our country faces, this administration has sought significant innovations and increases in funding for foreign assistance. Over the past 7 years, we have more than doubled Official Development Assistance to support nations struggling to improve governance, expand opportunity, and fight disease. We are on track to double our annual assistance to sub-Saharan Africa to $8.7 billion in disbursements by 2010, in accordance with our commitment at the Group of Eight's 2005 summit in Gleneagles. The State/USAID FY 2009 Foreign Assistance Request of $22.7 billion, a 10-percent increase from the FY 2008 request, will continue this effort, enabling our Government to continue advancing important and interconnected priorities, including promoting long-term economic growth and development; reducing poverty; fighting disease; providing military assistance and training; promoting post-conflict reconstruction and recovery; delivering humanitarian response; and improving governance, transparency, and accountability.

More specifically, our core assistance programs aim to expand the community of well-governed states by helping recipient countries address short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs. To meet these challenges, our FY 2009 request for core assistance accounts is over $12 billion, a 9-percent increase from the FY 2008 request. That request supports critical investments in areas such as health, basic education, agriculture, environment, democratic governance, economic growth, microenterprise, and water resource management. Indeed, as Congress appropriates funds from the recently passed 5-year, $48 billion reauthorization of the PEPFAR—the largest campaign ever against a single disease—our assistance levels will rise even higher. In addition to our core assistance, in FY 2009 we also requested $2.2 billion for the poverty reduction efforts of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, an innovative organization this administration has created to empower local partners and emphasize principles of good governance, economic freedom, and investments in health and education.

Military and security assistance, requested at $7.3 billion in FY 2009 (14-percent increase from the FY 2008 request), advances U.S. interests by equipping and training coalition partners and allies for common security goals. These programs advance international support for voluntary, multinational stabilization efforts, including support for non-U.N. missions and for U.S. conflict-resolution programs; and support bilateral and global programs to combat transnational crime, illicit narcotics threats, and terrorist networks.

The United States also remains committed to providing humanitarian relief, food aid, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in countries affected by natural and man-made disasters. We continue to provide resettlement opportunities for refugees and conflict victims around the globe as well as contributing to key humanitarian international and nongovernmental organizations. The FY 2009 request includes $2.4 billion for these needs.

While expanding all of these programs, this administration has worked to keep our overall foreign assistance programming coherent and closely tied to our foreign policy objectives. Secretary Rice established the "dual hatted" position of Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator of USAID to coordinate all U.S. foreign assistance and ensure that it meets long-term development needs. So even as we spend more, we get more for every dollar.

Unfortunately, our support for struggling societies will not always take place in stable and peaceful conditions. Where the situation allows, civilian agencies will take the lead in assistance. Where conditions require, DOD will support civilian agencies or, under certain circumstances—such as in combat situations—may have the lead in administering assistance. Our efforts to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq and Afghanistan show the spectrum of situations in which we must operate, and the ways we must respond. In these hard circumstances, the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have benefited greatly from the Defense Department's cooperation and resources—as they have, I should add, historically. In the post-World-War-II era, in the Vietnam era, indeed in any conflict or post-conflict time, our civilian and military agencies have worked together to address unique needs and circumstances. DOD's role in administering official development assistance (ODA) in Iraq and Afghanistan reflects exactly this pattern.

Our civilian-military partnership is strong, beneficial, and appropriate. It is also specific to limited situations. If one sets aside funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, ODA provided through the DOD budget drops to 2.2 percent in 2005, which is below 1998 levels. It is also worth noting as Ambassador to Iraq, I oversaw the deployment of reconstruction funds for Iraq, as have my successors—even though these funds have come from a DOD appropriation.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, our Armed Forces, State, and USAID collaborate closely on assistance and more. That partnership is repeated at all levels of our Government, beginning with the close working relationship between Secretaries Rice and Gates. Deputy Secretary of Defense England and I meet on a biweekly basis to review the many issues our Departments jointly manage. In the field, the daily cooperation between our ambassadors and military commanders is exemplified by the excellent partnership of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker in Iraq. That collaboration carries through at the working level to our country teams, including the leadership of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Defense Department is well-represented in our embassies through the attaché program. We have made them a valuable participant in our strategic planning process. Conversely, over the last several years, DOD has similarly opened its processes to State and USAID to an unprecedented degree. State now participates in many of DOD's most important defense policy and strategy initiatives, including the Quadrennial Defense Review and the development of AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM Theater Campaign Plans. At DOD's request, we have expanded our Political

Advisors (POLAD) program from 15 to 31 personnel to make more State Department POLADs available to provide foreign policy expertise to military commanders in the field, and USAID is placing Senior Development Advisors in each of the combatant commands.

Closer State-DOD cooperation is serving not only our missions in Iraq and Afghanistan but also our broader efforts to address post-9/11 challenges. This administration and Congress have recognized that we must direct resources to build partners' military capacity. We also recognized the need for increased civilian participation in its growing involvement in stabilization operations, and sought authority to fund "Section 1207." We are grateful that Congress supported the administration's efforts to redress those shortfalls through the new authorities enacted in sections 1206 and 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

Sections 1206 and 1207 are valuable tools that allow the administration to fund military capacity-building and civilian reconstruction and stabilization assistance, respectively. Section 1206 authority has enabled us rapidly to develop partnership capacity to address emerging and urgent threats and opportunities in places as far flung as the Caribbean Basin, Lebanon, Yemen, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The flexibility and quick-reaction capability provided by section 1206 authority is a useful complement to our FMF and IMET programs, which are focused on longer term support.

Section 1207 authority also complements our traditional foreign assistance tools by enabling us to provide targeted reconstruction and stabilization assistance to bolster stability in weak states, failing states, and states facing unanticipated crises. In many cases, 1207 funds allow the State Department to respond to needs until more formal programs can be planned. Ultimately, these authorities have brought more resources to the table for State and USAID-led projects that have a specific stabilization focus. Section 1207 authority has already provided program funding for interagency programs developed under the leadership of the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and its continued use for future programs is completely supportive of the Secretary's goals for the newly launched Civilian Stabilization Initiative.

In FY 2006 and FY 2007, we programmed $109.7 million in 1207 funds to 8 projects covering 14 countries, including projects to: Remove unexploded ordnance in Lebanon and train elements of the Lebanese police; remove violent gangs from a Haitian slum; and help the Colombian Government extend government services to communities newly liberated from the FARC. For FY 2008, joint State, DOD, and USAID committees have identified nine priority projects to receive a total of $100M in 1207 funds. I am pleased to note that both the Senate and House versions of the FY 2009 NDAA extend this authority, as well as section 1206.

These authorities have also created opportunities for whole-of-government approaches to national security. Such "dual key" mechanisms, requiring approval from both the State and Defense Departments, ensure coordination among chiefs of mission and Combatant Commanders, policy officers abroad and here in Washington, and DOD officials. In both cases, Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates ultimately hold "dual key" authority, ensuring all efforts undertaken meet the Defense Department's needs and accord with our foreign policy objectives, ensuring the Secretary of State's primacy in foreign policy. The experience our Departments gain through these mechanisms helps build and reinforce a broader culture of cooperation between our Agencies.

In Africa, where the State Department and USAID are deeply involved in administering a range of major foreign assistance programs, the Defense Department is working to ensure that its new regional command, AFRICOM, supports and complements our civilian-led initiatives. We are pleased that DOD is giving senior leadership positions within AFRICOM to State Department officials, positioning them well to advise the command on appropriate courses of action. AFRICOM is already working with State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to coordinate counternarcotics strategies. We look forward to expanding State-DOD cooperation in this theater.

In the area of humanitarian assistance resulting from natural disasters, the State Department—specifically, the USAID Administrator in her capacity as Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance—has responsibility for coordinating all of our government's efforts. This is the case even when the military has the unique capability to respond. For example, in the aftermath of Pakistan's 2005 earthquake, U.S. military aircraft transported blankets, tents, and other emergency relief supplies to Pakistan, where military helicopters then distributed the relief to remote areas. State Department and USAID experts helped plan this operation to ensure that short-term assistance did not inadvertently undermine local capacities; did not duplicate other donors' efforts; did not risk causing conflict; supported long-term de-

velopment work; and suited the cultural context. Such collaboration enables us to integrate short-term assistance into larger, long-term programming.

While coordinated interagency efforts—both those State leads and those DOD leads—are vital, the State Department also appreciates the importance of each government agency's contributing to our overall foreign policy goals in a manner consistent with its mandate and expertise. As you know, the Secretary of State is vested with responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, including the continuous supervision and direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs. This authority enables the Secretary of State to ensure that such programs are well-integrated and serve U.S. foreign policy. The State Department's leadership, including Secretary Rice, myself, the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, and our ambassadors in the field take this mandate very seriously. Chief of Mission authority remains the central organizing principle for U.S. engagement overseas, across all regional combatant commands. As a five-time ambassador, I am a strong proponent of this authority and believe it is adequate to ensuring that the State Department retains lead responsibility for our foreign policy. We believe that "dual key" authorities maintain and enhance the Secretary of State's prerogatives by ensuring that she has ultimate direction of foreign assistance moneys, regardless of their source.

The State Department continues to work with Congress to build its own capacity to respond to and prevent threats to our security. Together, we have made good progress over the past 7 years. The State Operations and Foreign Assistance budgets have increased by 73 percent and 72 percent, respectively, from FY 2001 levels, and we have added 4,272 personnel to the Department, a 27.7-percent increase over FY 2001. This positive trend must continue. The Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy has recommended that "ultimately doubling the workforces of the Department and USAID would better position both organizations to meet future challenges." Additional personnel will allow State and USAID to increase our foreign language, diplomatic, and border security capabilities; augment our public diplomacy, cultural affairs capacity, and POLAD program; increase USAID's presence overseas and development contributions; and implement the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, including the Civilian Response Corps, to provide additional civilian expertise for rapid crisis response.

The President's FY 2009 budget request seeks an additional 1,100 new State Department Foreign Service officers and 300 USAID officers. It also seeks $7.3 billion for military and security assistance, a 16-percent increase over FY 2008 enacted levels (excluding emergency designated funds). This assistance is critical to achieving our peace and security objectives around the world and to creating secure environments in which our diplomatic and development work can succeed. Equally critical is our request for a 60-percent increase from the FY 2008 request in Development Assistance aimed at reducing poverty, promoting economic growth, and strengthening our commitments to Latin America and Africa. We know Congress recognizes the importance of these resources to our work, and we look forward to working together with you to strengthen these programs in the years ahead.

The mission to stabilize and reconstruct a nation is one that civilians must lead. But for too long, we have not had sufficient numbers of trained, prepared, and supported civilians who could provide that leadership. As a result, over the past 20 years, over the course of 17 significant stabilization and reconstruction missions in which the United States has been involved, too much of the effort has been borne by our men and women in uniform. The Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) is the centerpiece of our effort to build civilian capacity for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions. It will create a rapid civilian response capability that could be deployed alongside our military, with international partners, or on its own. Experience has shown that stabilization and reconstruction missions occur in a range of circumstances—sometimes in hostile security environments, sometimes in permissive ones, and sometimes in environments somewhere in between. Our goal is to enable civilians with stabilization and reconstruction expertise to work side by side with the military even amidst ongoing violence, as in Iraq and Afghanistan.

CSI will marshal hundreds of civilian experts from across our Federal Government, and thousands of private citizens—doctors and lawyers, engineers and agricultural experts, police officers and public administrators—to ease the burden of post-conflict reconstruction borne by our fighting men and women, and ensure that civilians with the right skills, training, and equipment can deploy quickly to strengthen weak states and prevent their collapse. The President's FY 2009 budget request includes $248.6 million to support this capability. The support of Congress, and this committee in particular, have been critical to our success thus far in launching CSI. We hope Congress will enact the additional authorizations strengthening this initiative and fully fund the President's request for this initiative. CSI

will enable the State Department to assume a greater operational role in reconstruction efforts—a goal that DOD, State, and this committee all share.

State, DOD, and all agencies of the national security complex will continue to examine how we must improve individually and collectively to meet the challenges of the post-cold-war, post-9/11 world. The innovations I have reviewed today represent a positive trend in interagency cooperation. As we work to increase civilian capacity to perform the diplomatic and development missions demanded by our national security strategy, we are grateful and better off for the Defense Department's contribution of expertise, personnel, and resources in support of our work. Our Nation is safer and stronger when our lead national security agencies are united in purpose. DOD's contribution is not only meeting military requirements, but directly advancing the goal of our diplomacy: A world of democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people and act responsibly in the international system.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, this administration has done groundbreaking work to make the State Department and USAID better partners to the brave men and women in our Armed Forces. But, of course, this effort is the work of a generation, and much remains to be done. We appreciate your leadership in this important area, especially your support for the President's Civilian Stabilization Initiative and your interest in ensuring the proper balance among our Nation's diplomatic, development, and defense capabilities. In close consultation with this committee, we will continue to refine our operations and to develop better tools and mechanisms to meet the requirements of our national security. I want to thank the committee for the opportunity to share with you the ways in which the Departments of State and Defense are working together to secure our Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We confirmed you five times as Ambassador?

Secretary NEGROPONTE. Yes; and another four times for other positions.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that. God, and you still come back. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. You're a wonderful guy.

Secretary NEGROPONTE. No more.

The CHAIRMAN. No more, huh? [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. All right, they call that fatigue.

Mr. Secretary, please. Welcome.

## STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC S. EDELMAN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador EDELMAN. Chairman Biden, thank you. Senator Lugar, members of the committee, I'm pleased to be here today to talk to this very important topic with you. I'd request that the text of the full statement that we submitted to the committee be entered for the record.

I'm also pleased to be here with my long-time and very distinguished Foreign Service colleague, John Negroponte. I'm also very relieved that he was pleased to be here with me. The fact that DOD and State are here jointly is a testament, I think, to the success we're enjoying in integrating and institutionalizing State and DOD cooperation in a variety of areas.

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, in particular for holding this hearing because, even though I've spent the last 3 years as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as a career and actually still serving member of the Foreign Service I've long been concerned about the funding for State Department programs. I've seen firsthand the shortfalls both in funding and manning as an ambassador and in a number of other embassy posts.

I'm in the fortunate position today of working for Bob Gates, who has been at the forefront of calls to increase State and USAID

funding. I think the fact that a Secretary of Defense who manages the tools of hard power is a leading voice for soft power speaks volumes. He has not made this call just once, but has made it repeatedly, in both speeches and testimony before the Congress.

I'm here to reprise many of his themes and perhaps to dispel a few myths. Let me begin on this last score by making it clear that we all agree that a militarized foreign policy is not in our interests. As the Secretary said recently before the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, "It is a reasonable concern," and one that both Senator Biden and Senator Lugar I think alluded to. From our point of view, such an agenda would be counterproductive, wasteful, and dysfunctional. It would send exactly the wrong message to those nations who are striving to build democracies with civilian oversight and to be able to partner with us.

I think the media coverage of Secretary Gates's speeches suggested that he was warning of a potential creeping militarization in U.S. foreign policy. But I think we should be clear today about what the nature of his concern is. He believes, as I do, that the risk comes not from DOD doing too much, but from our civilian agencies being undermanned and underresourced. In many ways, DOD has had to act by default because of the lack of civilian partners and the significant risks that presented to our troops on the ground and to the civilian populations that we found to be in need of basic services.

We all agree that there's a need to increase civilian capacities to more effectively execute these critical missions. Yet other DOD activities, in particular training, equipping, organizing, and advising other militaries, represent military requirements for DOD to fulfill its core responsibility to provide for the Nation's security. These are activities that DOD must institutionalize for our future defense. This is a lesson I think we and the American people should take from today's hearing.

It's important for us to focus on the challenges that we face and the ways that State and Defense are working together to confront those challenges. We've made some significant strides. We've improved coordination and alignment of humanitarian assistance. We've created a dual-key process for programs like 1206 and 1207 and we've facilitated interagency input into departmental plans and strategies as never before.

Those are all important developments, but they are all only a first step. Far too often, we find our military assuming missions for which it's not best placed and, while we've filled these gaps admirably, I believe, there's no substitute for civilian expertise and experience, whether it's building schools, advising city councils, or engaging in other activities in complex operational environments.

Let me address one argument that has already been advanced in this discussion and been mentioned by both the chairman and Senator Lugar. The DOD share of official development assistance rose from 5 percent in 1998 to 21.7 percent in 2005. I think it's important to remember that this metric must take into account the fact that we are engaged in two active theaters of war. So I think it comes as no surprise that the DOD percentage would rise in that circumstance. If you take out the ongoing missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD's portion remains quite modest, between 2 and

3 percent, which I think has been the historical, roughly the historical average.

Another important area of discussion is the establishment of AFRICOM. The intent behind AFRICOM was never to militarize foreign policy or diminish humanitarian or other development space. The goal from the inception has been to create something other than a traditional warfighting command, but one with sufficient civilian expertise to focus on preventing problems before they become crises. The intent is to improve DOD's ability to provide support for our civilian counterparts operating on the continent under Chief of Mission authority, and, as a former Chief of Mission as well, I'm very attentive to the importance of that.

I understand that some see this as DOD seeking to lead in areas where it lacks mandate or expertise, but I can assure you that that's not the case. One thing we understand well in the Department of Defense is supporting and supported relationships. We have those relationships between commanders in the field, and here we understand that we are a supporting element, with State very clearly the supported, lead element.

As Dr. Gates said earlier this year, it's unclear that DOD will ever be able to avoid reconstruction and stabilization missions entirely. Throughout our history, major military deployments have required some ongoing presence to maintain stability. On that score, he's made some points I'd like to highlight.

First, when we're engaged in such conflicts the success is going to take years. It's the patient accumulation of quiet successes, as he said, and it will extend beyond any one agency.

Second, success will require more than rebuilding the structures of the past. So even as DOD has supported an increase in State's resources, it has through necessity expanded its core activities from the direct application of military force to a more politically tenable collaboration with our civilian partners to better stabilize theaters of operation involving key U.S. national security interests. These indirect approaches are central to the Department's plans to achieve its missions and responsibilities, and I think Senator Lugar made mention of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the discussion we have in there of enhancing partner capacity. The United States cannot do all this on its own.

As Secretary Gates has remarked, "arguably the most important military component in the war on terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police, once the province of special forces, is now a key mission for the military as a whole."

Despite this central military requirement, the U.S. lacked the flexibility required, operating with 2- and 4-year budget cycles and processes that encourage monopolies of control rather than combined efforts. Our problem, though, is not only one of flexibility. We have faced a fundamental mismatch of authorities, resources, and capabilities. DOD has the military requirement, the historical knowledge, and core competency for training as well as equipping partners in the profession of arms. But we lack the foreign policy expertise that must accompany such decisions.

To meet that need, with Congress's support, we were able to enact section 1206 to provide a means to fill U.S.-identified capability gaps to build and sustain capable partner-nation military forces to conduct counterterrorist operations or operate with our forces in stability operations. This program focuses where we are not at war, but where there are emerging threats or opportunities, and aims to reduce the likelihood of U.S. troops deploying in the future. Our combatant commanders see it as a vital tool in the war on terror beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, and many Chiefs of Mission have come to me to tell me how valuable a tool they find it to be. It's dual-key approach is in my view a model of State-DOD cooperation both in the field and in Washington.

Some have asked why the requirement isn't being funded by State, but I think Secretary Gates has explained the rationale well. "Building partner capacity," he said, "is a vital and enduring military requirement irrespective of the capacity of other Departments, and its authorities and funding mechanism should reflect that reality."

The Department of Defense would no more outsource this substantial and costly security requirement to a civilian agency than it would any other key military mission. On the other hand, it must be implemented in close coordination and partnership with the Department of State.

While activities like 1206 reflect core missions, others are not, but DOD supports them because civilian capacity is absent or still being created. In this latter category is the section 1207 authority, which allows the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $100 million to State for civilian stabilization and reconstruction assistance. ADM Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has famously said he'd give a portion of his budget, if used effectively, to State, and 1207 has been created precisely in that spirit.

We've recently agreed to seek a 5-year extension and an increase to 1207, but over time our hope would be that State would be given adequate funds in its own budget to meet those requirements.

I think both 1206 and 1207—and it's important to stress this—are achieving tangible results. Lebanon, I think, is a case study on the critical role that these two tools can play. Following decades of Syrian occupation, Lebanon stands on shaky ground as it struggles to build the foundations of democracy. We recently witnessed the brave battle which the Lebanese Army took on last fall against the al-Qaeda-affiliated Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp.

The Lebanese Army, like the country, has had a long road to transition from fragility to stability. Rebuilding its military capability is a tremendous challenge, especially given the strong support that Iran is providing to Hezbollah. Since fiscal year 2006, 1206 has allowed us to meet this challenge with speed, providing the Lebanese Armed Forces about $40 million in trucks, spare parts, small arms, ammunition, and night vision goggles. The programs were designed to help the LAF and the special forces defend against, disrupt, and attack terrorist organizations and improve border security. The mobility we provided the Lebanese Army through 1206 allowed it to maintain the offensive at the Nahr al-Barid camp and ultimately stabilize the area.

Section 1207 also played an important role in fostering nonmilitary stability in Lebanon. As a result of impending civil disorder at the end of 2006, the Lebanese police requested civil disorder management equipment as well as assistance with unexploded ordnance; 1207 funding helped the Embassy recruit and train mine action teams, ultimately clearing 2,170,915 square meters of mines, removing 11,642 pieces of unexploded ordnance. Nearly 450,000 Lebanese residents now live free from land mines as a result.

There are other examples. We've seen a great return on our investments in Pakistan, where night flight training provided through 1206 has helped with rapid planning and execution of Pakistani counterterrorist special operations raids in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. For example, helicopter pilots from the 21st Quick Reaction Squadron were recently involved in a FATA combat mission when hit mid-flight by a rocket-propelled grenade. Using training and aviation combat tactics they received under 1206, they not only finished the mission, but were able to safely land the helicopter. They then provided first aid, also trained by 1206, to the wounded.

Pakistan's 21st Quick Reaction Squadron has also begun using its training to conduct emergency medical evacuation missions for stranded troops. Using night vision goggles and training received by 1206, U.S.-trained pilots can enter combat areas after dark and remove wounded personnel, which they were unable to do before 1206.

These examples demonstrate what can happen when the U.S. strategically applies resources to build partner capacity based on U.S.-identified needs. These are not programs traditionally conducted by the State Department. We've never conducted programs like this. In some ways, these programs are among our only needs-based tools. In programs like Foreign Military Financing, the allocation of resources is impacted by host-nation preferences, which is a legitimate and even critical role for these instruments, but it's not the same as a direct strategic application of resources to meet U.S.-identified threats.

Building professional, interoperable, and reliably capable partners can have immediate and important impacts, but the long-term benefits will accrue to future Secretaries of State and Defense. Over time, as partners take on more burdens or deploy effectively beside U.S. troops, we will reduce stress on our military. Even with the added end strength of the Army and the Marine Corps, U.S. forces will always be finite. We need global partners standing along with us, alongside us. Building their capacity to handle their own security early will reduce the aggregate risk of the need for future U.S. military interventions as well. These savings accrue in servicemember lives saved, missions avoided, and ultimately reduced burdens on the Treasury and the taxpayer, and they'll be crucial to our long-term security.

As everyone is aware, this administration ends in 6 months. These tools may be important now, but I believe they'll be crucial in the next administration, whoever wins the election. It's critical that the next President have these tools in place rather than hav-

ing to create them anew. Providing them for the incoming team should be a bipartisan priority.

The discussion we'll have today is understandable. I believe it's very healthy. It's a healthy one for our country. We're all better off because we live in a country where military involvement in any area is thoughtfully considered and taken with utmost care. So without such discussions, both DOD and our Armed Forces would not be able to perform their national security mission with the trust and support of the Congress and of the American public.

Thank you again for holding this important hearing, Mr. Chairman, and I would be happy to join my colleague in answering whatever questions you or your colleagues might have.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Edelman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC S. EDELMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

Good afternoon, Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, members of the committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the role of civilian and military agencies in foreign assistance. I am also pleased to be here alongside my friend and Foreign Service colleague, John Negroponte. The fact that DOD and State are here to testify jointly is itself a testament to the more collective, integrated process we have been institutionalizing in our two Departments.

Let me begin by offering my thanks for your decision to hold this hearing. Even though I have spent the last several years as an Under Secretary of Defense, as a career (and still serving) member of the Foreign Service, I have long been concerned about funding for State Department programs, having worked firsthand with our Nation's "soft power" tools in my stints as an ambassador and in other embassy posts. In testifying before this committee today, I am lucky to have what we in the bureaucracy call "top cover," in that my current boss, Secretary Gates, has been at the forefront of calls to increase funding for the State Department and USAID—what he calls a "man bites dog" story.

The fact that a Secretary of Defense, who manages the tools of "hard power," is a leading voice for increasing our soft power funding speaks volumes about where we have come as a country. And he has not made this call just once: Secretary Gates' appeal for increased State Department funding has become a refrain, delivered in such fora as the "Landon Lecture" at Kansas State University, the first-ever joint Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State testimony on this topic before the House Armed Services Committee, a breakfast meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and speeches at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Brookings Institution, Business Executives for National Security, and, just two weeks ago, the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign.

I am here to reprise many of his same themes, and perhaps dispel a few myths. Let me begin on this last score right away—and it is important that you hear this not just from State, but from Defense—by setting the record straight: We all agree that it is not in our national interest to have a "militarized" foreign policy. As the Secretary said before the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, this is a reasonable concern. Such an agenda would be counterproductive, wasteful, and dysfunctional. It would send exactly the wrong message to states and societies who strive to build effective democracies that emphasize civilian oversight, and who seek to partner with the United States as responsible international players.

Some media coverage of Secretary Gates' speech earlier this month suggested that he had "warned" of a potential "creeping militarization" in U.S. foreign policy. His concern is legitimate, even if his remarks were quoted out of context. His concern should be our focus today, and, in my view, we should consider the origins of this potential problem: From where does the danger of militarization arise? Secretary Gates—and I very much agree with him on this—believes this risk comes not from DOD activities, as some would have you believe. Rather, it stems from a need to invest in civilian agencies to increase their capability.

His attempt at a balanced speech designed to shift the status quo is being used—perversely—to bolster the status quo. So let me be clear. DOD has acted in some cases not because it wanted to, but because at that point in time it was best positioned to, and in so doing avoided increased risk to the life and limb of U.S. forces and civilian populations. The nation would have been worse off if DOD had not acted in such cases, but we do need increased civilian capacity to assume these bur-

dens, while institutionalizing the lessons of recent years so that DOD is prepared to act when others cannot.

Other DOD activities—in particular the training, equipping, organizing, and advising of other militaries—represent military requirements for DOD to fulfill its core legal responsibility to provide for the Nation's security. These are activities DOD must build and institutionalize for our future defense. This is the lesson that I believe we, and the American people, should take away from the hearing today.

Put another way, I suggest the question of differentiating the respective roles of our civilian and military agencies cannot be adequately answered until we first ask "what is the national need, and how can it be realistically met?" Taking an inherently bureaucratic rather than strategic line of inquiry leaves this first and most critical question unanswered. Therefore, I suggest that we step beyond the rhetoric of jurisdictional lines and turf debates to first focus on the challenges facing our country, and the ways that DOD and State are working together to confront these challenges.

Together, we have made significant strides. The administration has succeeded in more than doubling Official Development Assistance worldwide since 2001 and introduced innovative new approaches to foreign assistance such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation. In the FY 2009 budget the President has requested an additional 1,100 new Foreign Service officers and 300 new USAID officers. Secretary Rice undertook a Transformational Diplomacy initiative, repositioning the diplomatic corps globally to align it with today's global landscape, with stations located in more difficult operating environments. And just 2 weeks ago, Secretary Rice launched the standup of the Civilian Response Corps, with strong support from DOD. The American people owe you, and the Congress as a whole, a debt of gratitude for your role in supporting these important initiatives.

We have made improvements within DOD as well. We've worked closely with State to create Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. We have invited State in unprecedented fashion to provide inputs to the creation of DOD strategic guidance and campaign plans; State has likewise increased opportunities for DOD to participate in their effort to develop country-specific foreign assistance strategies. My office has refined its guidance for humanitarian assistance to ensure that military projects are aligned with wider U.S. foreign policy objectives and do not duplicate or replace the work of civilian organizations. And DOD and "InterAction"—the umbrella organization for many U.S.-based NGOs—have, for the first time, jointly developed rules of the road for how the military and NGOs should relate to one another in hostile environments.

These are important developments. But they are only a first step. As Secretary Gates often notes, the entire Foreign Service is still less than the number of personnel required to man one of DOD's Carrier Strike Groups. The entire State Department budget amounts to roughly what DOD spends on health care. USAID, once 15,000 strong, is now a 3,000 organization for a "Development" mission President Bush has rightly put on par with "Diplomacy" and "Defense."

All too often, our military will find itself in a position of having to assume some missions for which it is not best placed. We have seen this in Iraq and Afghanistan, and many other conflicts throughout our history. Faced with no civilian alternative, our soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen have filled the gap admirably. But in these situations, there is no substitute for civilian experience and expertise.

Let me stop here for a moment to clear up another often repeated myth. Defense Department critics often assert that DOD's share of Official Development Assistance rose from 3.5 percent in 1998 to 21.7 percent in 2005. But these numbers ignore a critical change in circumstances between 1998 and 2005. In 2005, and today, we are in the midst of two wars, wars that require DOD to play a significant role in reconstruction and stabilization in order to counter insurgencies. It is inevitable that DOD's share of Official Development Assistance (ODA) would rise under these circumstances. I asked my staff to determine DOD's share of ODA in 2005, when ODA was at its peak, excluding Afghanistan and Iraq. The result: DOD's portion is a modest 2.2 percent. That number speaks for itself. DOD's share of ODA has since remained relatively constant.

In this context, it is also worth responding to concerns that some have raised about the new Africa Command. The intent behind the creation of Africa Command was never to militarize foreign policy, or to diminish humanitarian or development space efforts in the region. The goal from the command's very inception to today has been to create rather than a traditional war fighting command, one with sufficient civilian experience and expertise to focus on preventing problems before they become crises. Once we have to deploy troops to react to a major crisis or catastrophe, it's too late: The costs—both material and human—are vastly higher at that stage of engagement. But the goal of that command structure was to provide support for

our civilian counterparts operating on the continent, acting under the authority of the ambassadors. The presence of this civilian experience and expertise, therefore, is to better help the command provide support to USAID, for example, as the lead U.S. Agency in humanitarian response, so that DOD's role is fully integrated in the larger effort when requested, so that we are able to support U.S. Government leadership outside DOD effectively. And this assistance would be in areas where DOD possesses the appropriate expertise, for example in logistics and communications. I understand that some have suggested that this command represents DOD's desire to move into areas where it lacks the appropriate authorities and expertise, but that is simply not the case.

At the same time, as Dr. Gates said earlier this year at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, it is unclear that DOD will ever be able to avoid reconstruction and stabilization missions entirely. From Winfield Scott's campaigns in Mexico in the 1840s to General Eisenhower's administration of North Africa in the 1940s, virtually every major deployment of U.S. forces has led to a military presence to maintain stability. It is for that reason that even as Secretary Gates presses for greater civilian resources and capabilities, he has made clear that the Department of Defense must seek to institutionalize hard, in some cases searing, lessons we have learned over the last several years.

As both Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice have made clear, these new requirements are not going away. We no longer face a clean division between war and peace; the future before us is one in which our national security requires capability not only on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, but also in the gray area between war and peace. Unlike earlier eras where the primary threat to peace emanated from state-on-state conflict, many of today's threats originate not from states themselves, but from ungoverned or undergoverned spaces within them. Many of these states are not our enemies, but our friends. At the same time, many of the threats we face defy solution by U.S. military force alone. Nonstate actors and organizations can exploit undergoverned spaces and establish informal networks that cannot be countered by traditional measures.

In these situations, success is less about imposing our will than shaping the environment. But for the past 15 years, we have tried to do so with processes and organizations designed in the wake of the Second World War. After nearly 7 years in Afghanistan, U.S. departments and agencies are only now beginning to develop the tools required to combat these challenges. While our adversaries rapidly deploy terror and effective information, economic and social campaigns to challenge us around the globe, we act slowly and often with limited strategic coherence. Though our national strategic guidance and our military plans proclaim as imperative integrated efforts along military and nonmilitary lines, legacy structures and processes allow anything but.

On this score, Secretary Gates has made several points that I would like to underscore. First, success in such conflicts will take years—the accumulation of patient successes—and will extend beyond any one agency. We cannot afford to make bureaucratic distinctions between war and the use of armed forces and the essential peacetime activities once the sole purview of diplomats, but must integrate our political and military tools into a cohesive national effort. And second, success in the future will require more than rebuilding the structures of the past. New approaches and new institutions are required; bureaucratic barriers that hamper effective action should be rethought and reformed. The disparate strands of our national security apparatus, civilian and military, should be prepared ahead of time to operate together. And so even as DOD has supported increasing the State Department's resources, the challenges we have confronted have forced DOD to consider the core activities and new missions required to meet its responsibilities to provide for the Nation's security, in an environment where the direct application of force may be politically untenable, requiring action by, through, and with partners.

These so-called "indirect approaches" are central to the Department's campaign plans to achieve the end-states assigned to it and missions directed to achieve them. As the Secretary remarked to the Association of the United States Army:

> [A]rguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole.

Despite this central military requirement, the United States lacked the flexible authorities and funding streams required, operating instead with 2-to-4-year budget cycles designed for long-term assistance and cooperation but ill-suited to meeting shifting challenges by networked adversaries, and competing processes and jurisdic-

tional structures that encourage monopolies of control rather than combined efforts overseas.

Our problem was not only one of flexibility. We faced a fundamental mismatch of authorities, resources, and capabilities. DOD had the military requirement, historical knowledge, and the core competency for training and equipping partners in the profession of arms, but lacked the foreign policy and human rights expertise that must accompany such decisions. We also had what wargamers call "strategic overmatch" in budgetary resources, but lacked authority to carry out these missions.

To meet this need, the administration, with the authorization and support of Congress, created the Global Train-and-Equip program—known as section 1206—to provide commanders a means to fill longstanding U.S.-identified capability gaps in an effort to help other nations build and sustain capable military forces to conduct counterterrorist operations, or to operate with our forces in stability operations. This program allows Defense and State to act in months, rather than years, to address urgent needs among partner nations. It focuses on places where we are not at war, but where there are emerging threats or opportunities, thereby decreasing the possibility that U.S. troops will be used in the future. Combatant commanders have found the Global Train-and-Equip program to be a vital tool in the war on terror beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. And it's a "dual key" approach that has become a model of interagency cooperation between State and Defense—both in the field and in Washington, DC.

Some have asked why this requirement isn't being funded and executed by the State Department. Can't we just increase State's funding to the point where it can take over this responsibility from DOD? Secretary Gates has explained the rationale behind this program well:

> [B]uilding partner capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement—irrespective of the capacity of other departments—and its authorities and funding mechanisms should reflect that reality. The Department of Defense would no more outsource this substantial and costly security requirement to a civilian agency than it would any other key military mission. On the other hand, it must be implemented in close coordination and partnership with the Department of State.

Put simply, these are military requirements and it is only proper that DOD fund them. At the same time, in designing these tools, we have ensured that the Secretary of State retains her prerogatives to ensure all activities accord with U.S. foreign policy objectives.

This point has been made before. I would like to offer another. That DOD would one day need to devote major attention to building partner capacity, rather than wage major combat, to fulfill its mission is something few envisioned. The attacks of 9/11 and the operations that followed around the globe reinforced to military planners that the security of America's partners is essential to America's own security. As borne out in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other theaters large and small, success in the war on terror will depend as much on the capacity of allies and partners in the moderate Muslim world and elsewhere as on the capabilities of our own forces. We ignored this fact for far too long. But these are core missions, not distractions. Letting DOD off the hook on this would be a shame, and far more costly in lives and treasure in the long run.

While activities like 1206 are core missions, as I mentioned earlier, others are not, but DOD is supporting them because they are necessary and the civilian capacity is absent or still being created. We need to be clear about which activities are which. In this latter category is section 1207 authority, which allows the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $100 million to the State Department to provide civilian stabilization and reconstruction assistance. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has now famously said that he'd happily give a portion of his budget, if employed correctly, to the State Department. This authority was created in that spirit. We recently agreed with State to seek a 5-year extension and an increase in the authority to $200 million. As Secretary Gates explained, "a touchstone for DOD is that 1207 should be for civilian support for the military—either by bringing civilians to serve with our military forces or in lieu of them." Over time, State should be given adequate funds within its own budget, without cuts to its other vital activities.

Besides core missions DOD must undertake and missions for which DOD has had to fill gaps there is perhaps a third category. Experience is a powerful teacher. As we learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are dangerous operating environments where DOD will be required to operate alone and, because of the security environment, perform missions that would otherwise fall to civilian agencies. Make no mistake: Whenever possible, civilian agencies should have the lead for these activities.

But even after our current conflicts subside, we should want DOD to maintain a capability to act where civilians cannot, because it will be needed in the future. As Dr. Gates has warned, it would be a mistake to allow this capability "to wither on the bureaucratic vine."

With both 1206 and 1207, we are achieving tangible results. Lebanon is a case study on the critical role these tools have played in achieving U.S. national security objectives. Following decades of Syrian occupation, Lebanon stands on shaky ground as it struggles to build the foundations of democracy. We recently witnessed the brave battle that the Lebanese Army confronted when they took on the al-Qaeda-affiliated group Fatah al-Islam, which was operating from a Palestinian refugee camp. But the Lebanese Army, as well as Lebanon the country, has a long road ahead to transition from fragility to stability. Rebuilding the Lebanese military capability represents a tremendous challenge, especially given the support Iran is providing to Hezbollah. It has not been in our strategic interest to delay in implementing near- and long-term solutions designed to bolster Lebanon's ability to exercise its sovereignty and provide security to its populace.

Since fiscal year 2006, section 1206 has allowed us to act with speed, giving us the ability to quickly provide the Lebanese Armed Forces about $40 million in trucks, spare parts, small arms, ammunition, and night vision goggles. The programs were designed to help the Lebanese Army and Special Forces defend against, disrupt, and attack terrorist organizations within their own territorial boundaries and to help improve their border security. The mobility we gave to the Lebanese Army through 1206 allowed the LAF to maintain the offensive at the Nahr al-Barid camp and ultimately stabilize the area.

Section 1207 played an equally important role in fostering nonmilitary stability in Lebanon. As a result of impending civil disorder at the end of 2006, the Lebanese police requested an immediate delivery of civil disorder management equipment from the U.S. Embassy, as well as funding for the removal of unexploded ordnance. 1207 funding helped the Embassy recruit Mine Action Teams and train them, ultimately clearing 2,170,915 $m^2$ of mines and removing 11,642 pieces of unexploded ordnance. Nearly 450,000 residents now live free from landmines as a result of this funding.

And there are many other examples. We have seen a great return on our investments in Pakistan, where limited visibility training provided through 1206 has helped with the rapid planning and execution of Pakistani counterterrorist special operations raids in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and border region to fight terrorists and anticoalition militants. For example, Pakistani helicopter pilots from the 21st Quick Reaction Squadron were recently involved in a FATA combat mission when they were hit mid-flight by a rocket propelled grenade, severing a hydraulic fluid cable and spraying hot fluid on the copilot and SSG unit seated in the rear. Using limited visibility training received under 1206, they not only finished the mission but were able to safely land the helicopter.

In the Pacific, 1206 projects for Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and the Philippines have been a model for 1206 design and execution. Embassies and the Pacific Command have worked hand in hand in identifying threats and opportunities. In Sri Lanka, 1206 was used to install a maritime and coastal radar system, which only months after it was brought online was used by the Sri Lankan Navy to engage Tamil Tigers as they exploited ungoverned waters to smuggle weapons. And in the Strait of Malacca, where 1206 has provided radars, command and control centers, and surveillance systems, attacks in the first half of this year have dropped 80 percent from 2003 levels. As Vice Admiral Doug Crowder, Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, recently told USA Today, "If it wasn't safe to bring cargo through the Strait of Malacca, the U.S. Navy would go there and make it safe"—a mission now rendered unnecessary for U.S. forces, in part because of 1206.

These examples demonstrate what can happen when the United States strategically applies resources to build partner capacity based on U.S.-identified needs. These are not "programs traditionally conducted by the State Department," as my hearing invitation suggests. We have never conducted programs like this before. In some ways, these programs are among our only "needs based" tools in our arsenal. In programs like FMF, the allocation of resources is impacted by host-nation preferences and political engagement. There is a legitimate—even critical—role for such tools in the Secretary of State's foreign policy toolkit, which can help build relationships, access and influence, and incentivize behavior in the U.S. interests.

But it is not the same as the direct, strategic application of resources to meet U.S.-identified threats. When sheltered from political ups and downs and applied strictly to military capability gaps, the capacity we build can have a profound effect. The examples of 1206 I presented earlier gave us only a taste of what is possible; for proof of concept, look no further than Colombia, where three American contrac-

tors are now free of FARC control and back on U.S. soil as a result of a robust U.S. capacity-building effort, kept above the political fray and backed by bipartisan congressional support. This is one of what Secretary Gates likes to call "quiet successes" required for long-term victory.

Moreover, the world is not standing still. We must build the capacity of our partners, because others are involved in the same activities, sometimes contrary to U.S. interests. In the 1980s, Iran started building up Hezbollah in Lebanon. Look at the damage to Lebanon that Hezbollah has done, the toll it has taken against Americans in the past, and the war they started against Israel in 2006. And while more recent reporting has suggested a drop in activity, unclassified reporting last year suggested Iran was spending about $3 million per month to train Shia militia members for activities in Iraq. China's full court press to establish influence and connections in Africa and Latin America may be seismic in its future implications for the U.S. Unlike some competitors, we will only do so with legitimate partners, and in accordance with all human rights requirements.

Instead of standing on the sidelines, we can instead be building reliable, professional, interoperable, and reliably capable partners. As my examples earlier show, capacity-building can have immediate impact. But the long-term benefits will accrue to the Secretaries of State and Defense of future administrations. Over time, as partners take on more of their own security burdens, or deploy effectively alongside U.S. forces, we will reduce stress on our own military. Even with the added end-strength of the Army and Marine Corps, U.S. forces are and will always be finite. We will need global partners standing alongside us, and by building their capacity to handle their own security early, we reduce the aggregate risk of the need for future U.S. military interventions as well. These savings accrue in U.S. servicemember lives saved, ultimately reducing burdens on the treasury and the taxpayer—and will be crucial to our long-term security. My colleague Lieutenant General Sattler, who recently retired as the J–5 from a long and distinguished career in the United States Marines, may have put it best when he said that how much you back these efforts is tantamount to "how many O's you want in your Long War."

As Secretary Gates has made clear, fundamentally new approaches are required to achieve security in today's environment. These are the types of integrated, "dual key" approaches we have forged through difficult experience, and will need in the future. As Dr. Rice said in her April testimony with Dr. Gates before the House Armed Services Committee:

> We have created many of these tools as tools that came out of necessity. But let me just say that I'm a firm believer that it is often out of exigent circumstances, out of efforts to respond to new contingencies, out of efforts of this kind that we build our best capacity and that we build our best institutions.

As everyone here is well aware, this administration ends in only 6 months. These tools may be important now, but they will be crucial in the next administration. It is critical that the next President have these tools in place rather than having to create them anew. Providing them for the incoming team should be a bipartisan priority. Just as President Truman and the Congress created the tools that would serve every President until the Berlin Wall came down, we must set in place the right set of tools to set the country on the right long-term footing, so that it can never be said that a U.S. citizen or servicemember suffered harm because we did not build partner capacity.

In closing, the discussion we will have today is understandable, even healthy, for our country. We are all better off because we live in a country where military involvement in any area is thoughtfully considered and taken with the utmost care. Without such discussions, DOD and our Armed Forces will not be able to perform our national security mission if we do not have the trust and support of the American people. Thank you for holding this important hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Let me yield to begin, because they have important committee meetings and I got them started late, to either Senator Kerry, if he would like to go first—I invite you—and then on the Democratic side after Senator Lugar I'll go to Senator Menendez since he was here as well, and then I'll go. And Senator Casey, since you came in after me, you get to go last.

So, please.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS**

Senator KERRY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that courtesy. I appreciate it, though I plan to be here.

The questions raised here are obviously important in a lot of different respects, not the least of which is to how you fight what has been called the global war on terror, which I think is probably misnamed. It is really a global counterinsurgency. I believe that Secretary Gates has been terrific, frankly, in the comments he has made. He recently said flatly, "We cannot capture and kill our way to victory."

General Petraeus has made it clear, in one of the current counterinsurgency doctrines written by him, that the more force you use the less effective it is. Obviously, our most important weapons, frankly, are nonmilitary here. We're engaged in an information battle and the people we need to be concerned about, frankly, is the whole Muslim world and the conditions on the ground in many of the countries that are ripe for the pickings for recruits.

With that in mind, we need bigger thinking out of the box. Are we constraining ourselves, talking about this issue in the context of 1206 permissions and additional permissions that the Pentagon is seeking? I think DOD is seeking now additional authority, which many of us would argue is probably unnecessary given the authority within the Foreign Assistance Act, which is where this is appropriately managed.

So my question to you is—and we have seen, many of us, in our visits on the ground to these places, we've seen some extraordinary young men and women in the military who are doing a remarkable job of improvising. They're acting as mayors, as diplomats, as psychologists, as historians, as cultural experts, as well as having to perform their military functions.

Do we need to think, so that we don't operate under the banner of defense and our military—and obviously the State Department doesn't have people who are necessarily equipped to perform this new function. Do we need to think in terms of a kind of civilian reconstruction corps, a differently trained entity that is separate from the Pentagon, but has the skills to defend itself and to operate as many of our contractors do in foreign countries, but also carry with them this broader set of skills with special training to perform these functions of information struggle?

Ambassador Edelman, do you want to begin with that?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Well, Senator Kerry, I agree with almost everything you've said in your comments. This is largely an information struggle. We don't believe that we ought to be the lead for that in the Department of Defense. As part of the national strategy for combating terrorism, the lead for combating ideological support to terror, which is the information function, resides with State. We see ourselves as supporting that activity.

We have created a Deputy Assistant Secretary position in the Department of Defense to—with the title of support to public diplomacy. It is clearly just an effort to work together with now John Glassman at Department of State—or Jim Glassman, rather—to help him in his function.

I'd have to think a little bit about—we support the idea of a civilian response corps. I'd have to think about whether something similar on the information side might make sense. My boss, Secretary Gates, has talked about the need to have an institution that plays the role that USIA played during the cold war. USIA as a separate institution no longer exists and I think there's a lot of work that needs to be done on——

Senator KERRY. But we're talking about something much more than just the flow of information here. This morning I had the opportunity to give a speech over at the Center for American Progress and I talked about how you might implement this different global counterinsurgency. Saudi Arabia isn't often used as an example for things, but they have implemented a rather interesting counter-indoctrination program—very labor intensive. I'm told that they don't torture. They're trying to get people out of prison. They involve the families, they involve the imams. They bring it down to a real grassroots level, where they also provide jobs and even a dowry, in an effort to transform people and really deprogram people who are part of a cult.

So far they've taken a country that was on the brink of this abyss 4 years ago, with gunfire in the streets, banks being bombed, the American consulate in Jeddah overrun, to a place where there is now a relative level of stability and al-Qaeda has been put on the defensive and indeed the regime's restored some credibility.

Now, that's a very different model from what we've been engaged in at Guantanamo and in other ways. My question to you therefore is, does it take a different kind of entity in coordination in order to make this happen more effectively, and is there an inherent prejudice against the Defense Department, not because it's not competent or can't do it, but because it's what it is, America's military arm, and you may need something else in order to be more effective in this effort?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Well, I'm actually aware of the Saudi program. I was briefed on it when I was in Saudi Arabia a couple of times. And I agree with you it's a very impressive program. I think it would be difficult for the United States Government to replicate that, no matter what——

Senator KERRY. Sure, I agree——

Ambassador EDELMAN. It's family-focused and oriented.

Senator KERRY. But the bottom line is—I'm sorry to interrupt you; it's an important point to make in this context—it shows how the local custom, local culture, local entities has to be part of that solution and response. It seems like the military is not necessarily the best entity to coordinate that.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I don't disagree with that. I think it depends on what activity you're talking about. We agree that, particularly if you're thinking in terms of things like global counterinsurgency, counterinsurgencies are ultimately won by indigenous forces. That's why we have another authority, 1208, that allows us to work with indigenous forces. But across the spectrum of different activities that would be required to do this, and the other lines of operation, like information or economics, it ought to be other people in the lead. I agree with that.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Secretary, my time is up. Do you want to comment with respect to this?

Secretary NEGROPONTE. Just that I think you touch on a very important issue, Senator, and I do believe that, however one deals with this issue of the global war on terror, it's got to be multifaceted and it absolutely has got to involve trying to strengthen the capabilities of the host countries where these activities are occurring to deal with these situations, whether it is in the improvement of their security forces or helping them deal with their economic challenges and the other root causes of these problems.

So it is multifaceted and, frankly, I think we've learned quite a bit in recent years about how to deal with these situations. I wouldn't overexaggerate the role of the DOD in this entire effort because I really do believe that they are more concentrated in a few specific countries and areas, whereas our Department, for example, conducts economic and development assistance programs in more than 100 countries.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll come back later.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just wanted to thank you again, Secretary Negroponte, for your leadership with the Libyan legislation. You have contacted many of us and we are grateful that our colleagues responded rapidly to attempts to bring about justice to American citizens who were harmed by raids conducted by Libya, and then to set the basis for a new relationship.

I interject this internal business by asking that the Department send up a nominee for Ambassador to Libya at the earliest, so that during the few days that we may have in September that confirmation could occur and thus the relationship might be founded once again on regular diplomacy.

Secretary NEGROPONTE. Thank you. That individual, of course, has been, as you may already know, Senator, been identified, and we look forward to pursuing that issue with you in September.

Senator LUGAR. Excellent.

Let me just pursue the issue today in this way. You mentioned that eventually a successful counterinsurgency depends upon indigenous forces. Now, others who have either supported the initiation of our conflict in Iraq from the beginning or who had qualms about it have come to at least the conclusion that sending large numbers of troops to fight al-Qaeda cells, if the war on terrorism means essentially rooting out al-Qaeda as a group of people that are prepared to make sacrifices, namely themselves frequently, quite apart from their friends and neighbors and what have you, that that may require, as our counterinsurgency doctrine seems now to portend, a few very talented individuals who in fact have counterinsurgency abilities and who, as you suggest, are able to train others who are indigenous to do this.

The value of not having a huge number of our troops identified as Americans is that there are fewer resentments in the countries that we are trying to aid, quite apart from fewer targets of the insurgency or of the indigenous population. Iraq is one situation and that will have to be resolved. Afghanistan may be another. But there are at least some foreign policy experts who come to us and

say Pakistan may be, in fact, the most dangerous area because it is there, in the tribal areas, that perhaps Osama bin Laden still lives, plus a large number of the al-Qaeda forces. At least that's the point from which they might radiate.

So we start anew with Pakistan. Now, one way in which we've attempted to do it in this committee is to suggest that that ought to be perceived by us and the Pakistanis as a long-term relationship. We've talked about 5 years of very considerable comprehensive expenditures which get into a background of education, health, and agriculture, and all of the elements that might enhance democracy in Pakistan with a fragile democratic state, while at the same time having good cooperation between a relatively small number of U.S. military people who deal in counterinsurgency and deal with Pakistani military, who are there but may need to be reoriented, retrained, or even restrained in some cases by the government.

That would be a new way of looking at a very large country and a very large problem, even though it's a very pointed way of looking at al-Qaeda in my judgment and the remnants of that situation.

Now, under those circumstances some of the problems we're talking about today don't get cured necessarily, but obviously if we're in a 5-year program of huge changes in the social fabric of Pakistan, supported, applauded, by the Pakistani people as well as their government, we're going to have a lot of civilian personnel involved in that process, notwithstanding the military people who are there, working through the tribal areas or with whoever else they might.

I suggest this as a potential new model for how we might look at something, as opposed to a very broad-scale idea of war on terror and the thought that we can go in country by country and that the military force of conquer, victory, and so forth as a doctrine, this might be a new way of looking at it.

Do you have any reaction to at least what the committee is doing or maybe what you might be doing along these lines?

Secretary NEGROPONTE. Well, first of all, I think it's an excellent way of looking at it. I think you're right to suggest that—and we have also suggested—that one has to look at the relationship with Pakistan as a longer term proposition and try to avoid some of the ups and downs in the relationship that we've had in the past. They do have an issue about militancy, militant extremism, and infiltration across the border into Afghanistan from their tribal areas. Many people have advised us that it would be both imprudent and probably counterproductive for us to think that we could take that matter into our own hands with our own forces, and that we're much better off working collaboratively with the Government of Pakistan and trying to help empower them, both through economic assistance to the FATA area and training of their forces to help them deal with that situation.

But I very much agree with the thrust of your proposal.

Senator LUGAR. Well, it begins to balance up the budget problem we are talking about. As you say, perhaps the reason why so much of the money is spent in the Department of Defense was that we start the situation with Iraq, with 150,000 troops, with all the apparatus and so forth. If we were to not start, but at least con-

tinue in Pakistan, on a very different course, this might change the budget picture.

It also might change the liabilities of our overall balance sheet as a country. In addition to fighting terrorism, we are going to have to fight some budgetary wars, simply because we are a competitive nation in a competitive world, and with deficits that the next President is going to face of $480 billion, as is predicted, and some continuation of that, this is a real strain on our country, on the build-up of our military or a changing of whatever we are going to be doing.

This is too much maybe for this hearing, but I throw out these ideas because I know we will have more conversation, and we appreciate your presence today really to initiate this.

Secretary NEGROPONTE. If I could just add, I think that of course we already do give substantial aid, economic assistance, to Pakistan and we're looking for ways to be more helpful to them because of the economic pinch they're feeling right now because of food and energy prices. But I believe it is also important to work with them and, together with our partners in the Department of Defense, to improve their counterinsurgency capabilities. That's, I think, going to be an important focus of our efforts going forward.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, sir.

Ambassador EDELMAN. If I just might add, Senator Lugar. I agree, of course, with what Ambassador Negroponte just said. I would add one thing, which is that Congress did give us a stand-alone authority to train and equip the Pakistani Frontier Corps, which is, in fact, the indigenous force in the FATA that will have the best ability to deal with this kind of counterinsurgency effort, but needs both training and equipment.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Menendez.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY**

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for your testimony. Secretary Edelman, I heard—listened intently to your testimony—and I appreciate what you said. But I have an overarching concern here. I do believe that, for example, the choice to train and equip foreign militaries is a major foreign policy decision. I do believe that when we choose to make those investments in some degree it's looked at as a U.S. endorsement of those militaries, and sometimes by how we decide to do that we can change the balance of power in a country or in a region.

Therefore, I view those as major foreign policy concerns and decisions. And I heard what you said, but I look at the fiscal year 2009 budget request by the Department that takes the 2005 section 1206, which is the broadest, farthest reaching military aid authority that has been given to the Department of Defense to date, and where you have requested under new initiatives $800 million under the heading "Building Global Partnership." Of that, $500 million is for the global training and equipment, and I see an expansion in that respect.

Then I see what SOUTHCOM put out in its document entitled "Command Strategy 2016," where it says, among other things, that it views itself as going from conducting military operations and promoting security operations, cooperation to achieve U.S. strategic objectives, into a joint interagency security command in support of security, stability, and prosperity in the Americas.

Considering the scope of what it views as its own mission and some of the commander's—SOUTHCOM commander's—description of his vision, where he said, "It's not because we're trying to take over at SOUTHCOM; it's because we want to be like a big Velcro cube that these other agencies can hook onto so we can collectively do what needs to be done in the region." But the question is who's driving it.

I have concern that when I see this expansion in terms of dollar requests, when I see SOUTHCOM's language, particularly in a hemisphere which is very sensitive toward the questions of military engagement and the history of the military in these countries. You know, if it's SOUTHCOM's intention to be the central actor in the coordination and execution of United States foreign policy in Latin America, I have a real problem with that. So I want to hear from you what you understand SOUTHCOM's view is.

Finally, I am concerned—I would pose to both of you. I think you've addressed this to some extent, but I'm still concerned. You know, there's a difference between assistance that is given by a civilian entity in the world and how that is viewed in the world by those people—it's viewed that we are in common cause with what we're trying to do for them and viewed as America's willingness to help others—versus when maybe that same type of help is given by the military, which may be seen more as, OK, they have an interest here and they're trying to pursue their interests.

So could you first give me a response to the whole SOUTHCOM thing and then comment about this fundamental difference. I'd ask you both to talk about this fundamental difference on how such aid is perceived depending upon who's delivering it.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Well, Senator Menendez, I think, first of all, with regard to both SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, I think our intent is the same. I know Admiral Stavridis's intent is the same, which is not to militarize our assistance effort, overall effort in the hemisphere. It is, rather, to make sure that we can effectively coordinate with our interagency partners to make sure that those security cooperation activities that we do have ongoing are supporting.

It very much speaks to the supporting—supported relationship that I mentioned.

Senator MENENDEZ. But who's driving that bus?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Well, the overall policy is driven by our colleagues in the Department of State and we work very closely with them, and I think Admiral Stavridis and SOUTHCOM work very closely with Assistant Secretary of State Tom Shannon and with the Deputy Secretary. I know Jim was just by briefing Deputy Secretary Negroponte on the reorganization that has gone on at SOUTHCOM.

I don't think we are—we don't aspire to drive the policy. We aspire to better serve it and better support it. That's both I think

in SOUTHCOM and in AFRICOM. It's not an attempt to take over. It's an attempt to support and to put an emphasis on those things where we can help by providing a platform or by providing MEDCAPs, medical activity, humanitarian assistance, the visits of ships like USNS *Mercy* and USNS *Comfort*. Those are just assets the Department of Defense has. We try to put them at the disposal of our colleagues in the Department of State.

There was, for instance, I think at one point an initiative that then-Under Secretary Hughes had for sending one of the hospital ships throughout Latin America. We were happy to be in support. That's the proper role for us to play.

On your overall concern, Senator Menendez, I agree with you that the decision about choosing which militaries to assist is fundamentally a political and a policy decision, and that's why this authority was devised in a way that provided for both input from embassies and Combatant Commands. It comes together to the two Departments. We work hand in glove with our colleagues in the Department of State and nothing goes forward in the end of the day that both secretaries don't sign off on. They both have to sign off on any 1206 project to make sure that we're not something that's out of kilter with U.S. policy.

The other thing which I think is maybe not completely understood about 1206 is that it also falls under all the other normal restrictions of the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act, the various prohibitions and caveats that we have there. So it's very much, I think, in tune with the overall policy direction.

I think these are things that we have never—that State has never done. For instance, the Georgia train-and-equip program which we put together in 2003—2003 through 2004—was something that had not really ever been done by State or anybody else before. Because we lacked authorities, it took about I think 9 or 10 different authorities we had to cobble together to put that together.

Georgia now is per capita the largest coalition contributor in Iraq. None of that would have happened had we not done that. 1206 is meant to draw on those kinds of lessons to provide us with a particular capability. It's not really foreign assistance in that sense.

Senator MENENDEZ. If I may, one more moment, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Negroponte, you know, some people suggest State has just rolled over here as it relates. And I'm not trying to be antagonistic in that. That is the view of some, that you have just basically as a Department rolled over here in the context of being the driving entity on our foreign assistance program and, as I said, even who we judge in making investments on military assistance is a major foreign policy consideration.

I for one see what I see as erosion, particularly of entities like USAID, where we are losing institutional capacity to do the type of civilian development work that is critically important in showing our face to the world in a nonmilitary way.

Can you just briefly speak to that?

Secretary NEGROPONTE. I will, and if I could I'd like to just, back to your question to Secretary Edelman as well. First of all, for context, not a day goes by that Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates are not in communication of some kind, either meeting personally or

through their daily morning phone calls and so forth. Ditto at my level with my Deputy Secretary counterpart. Then that process of coordination replicates itself throughout the various layers.

You raise the question about choosing which militaries to assist. The DOD is not going to go off and train a military where we have some kind of foreign policy objection or some kind of issue that we think should prevent that. Those are types of discussions that we have on a constant basis. I can think of countries where we debate. For example, we have a very specific issue with respect to Indonesia and with respect to Senator Leahy and his concern about the human rights record of some of the units in the Indonesian Army and whether or not we could train them.

These are subjects that we consult with each other about and we don't move forward unless we're comfortable that we have some kind of a consensus.

SOUTHCOM. I just spoke before coming to this hearing, just to do a little reality check of my own, with our Ambassador to Colombia, William Brownfield. I said, how do you feel about the State-Defense relationship down there in this most critical post, with the most critical security situation? He said it's just never been a problem or an issue, and that 90, 95 percent of the assistance is delivered through civilian programs, there are modest Defense Department programs, and he's never felt that his Chief of Mission authority, even in this conflict situation, has come under some kind of a threat.

So I would not agree with the proposition that we've rolled over.

Two other points. The overall foreign assistance budget of the Department of State is, after all—I'm talking about the fiscal year 2008 budget—$27.3 billion if you add it all up. So when we talk about—we obviously, we don't sneeze at the assistance that is provided through the sections 1206 and 1207. We welcome those funds and we implement them in full coordination with the Department of Defense. But they are not the sum and substance of our assistance relationship and they are relatively speaking modest amounts compared to the overall foreign assistance budget.

Last, institutional capacity. I couldn't agree with you more that USAID's institutional capacity needs to be increased, and we have some proposals before the Congress to increase their manning and their budget, and we think that those capacities should be increased in future years, because USAID is a shadow of its former self in terms of its own in-house capabilities and it needs to be dramatically increased in my opinion.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

State's budget is $27 billion, right, roughly?

Secretary NEGROPONTE. The overall foreign assistance budget. Our total international affairs budget is $39.5 billion, counting the operating budget.

The CHAIRMAN. DOD's is $600 billion.

Secretary NEGROPONTE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I just thought I'd put that in. You made $27 billion sound like a lot. And comparatively speaking——

Secretary NEGROPONTE. Well, compared to 1206 money.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Biden, that's why when my State Chief of Mission colleagues approach me and lobby me to fund a 1206 project and I tell them we have limited funds, they think I'm playing the world's smallest violin.

The CHAIRMAN. That's true. But it's kind of interesting they come to lobby you for those funds, to use those funds. Look. Secretary Edelman, why do you think Admiral Mullen said he'd be happy to give State more authority and the money if, in fact, they can handle it, in effect? I forget the exact quote, but that was basically it. What do you think he meant by that?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think what he was talking about was there are a lot of activities that need to be done in what we would call in the Department of Defense phase zero, which is before conflict, the shaping phase, where you actually hope that your activities will prevent conflict from taking place at all, and phase four, the stabilization and reconstruction area.

In the course of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq we have discovered that there has been a lack of capacity to carry out those kinds of functions that are not inherently military functions, but have an important impact on the conditions either on the battlefield or conditions that might lead to conflict. I think that's what he was talking about.

The CHAIRMAN. Doesn't that go to Senator Menendez's point, not about rolling over or not, but about, look, one of the reasons why even guys like me come back and argue for more CERP funds, for example, is that the only guys primarily—let me not exaggerate it. The primary agent that can in fact accomplish many of these civilian roles has been the military. Part of it has been by default. I have not—I don't initially remember the military asking for this authority.

So I guess the threshold point I'd like to establish—and if you disagree, either one of you, then please let me know—is that no matter how you cut it, no matter what way you slice it, there are insufficient number of civilian personnel available throughout the world to deal with some of the very problems we're talking about, even if the military did not want 1206 and did not want 1207; that there are just not a sufficient number of civilian resources.

For example, if you look at both SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, both of those envision positioning a number of very senior civilians under their hierarchy, and in the case of AFRICOM they were talking about 52 civilians they needed in order to, for lack of the proper phrase, but the public will understand this, accomplish the mission, overall mission of AFRICOM.

And they end up in a circumstance where currently it's targeting only 13 positions. Now, this is not about whether or not the military is seeking to grab power or anything like that. The military says in AFRICOM 52-plus. The military is now saying: We're targeting 13.

Now, there's either one of three things have happened. One, the military's changed their mind; they only want 13, not 52-plus. Two, they want 52, State doesn't want to give them up; they have them, they don't want to give them up. Or three, State and USAID don't have them. What is it, or is it a fourth thing I'm missing?

Ambassador EDELMAN. With regard to the specific numbers on AFRICOM, Senator Biden, I would say that the command, first of all, is going through the growing pains of setting up an entirely new organization. What the right number is I can't tell you.

Your larger point and the point that Senator Menendez made and which I think Secretary Negroponte agreed, which is that, for instance, USAID needs more capacity, I think Secretary Gates and I completely agree with. At the height of the war in Vietnam, where USAID was very deeply involved in the rural development program, I believe they had something like 17,000 direct hire employees. I think the number now is something like less than 3,000. At that time they had agronomists and veterinarians and rural development experts and rural agricultural economists on staff who could be deployed. Now it has to go through a contracting function.

So the larger point that we lack civilian capacity across the board is absolutely right. For instance, in some of our PRTs we've had to bring in certain National Guard units that have agricultural capability because we just lack the people who can be deployed from the Federal Government who could perform those functions.

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize for repeating this, but again I am not a—I have become a huge fan of the U.S. military. I mean, I have become a gigantic fan in my now, counting the Balkans, in my 25, 30 trips into the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the region. They absolutely, as the kids would say, my grandkids, they blow me away in their capability.

I apologize for referencing this again because my colleague from Indiana has heard it 50 times. A couple trips ago, I think my sixth or seventh trip into Iraq, I was speaking with a very tough commanding general, former commander of the First Cavalry Division, was then I think No. 2 when I went in command in Iraq, not with First Cavalry. And we were talking about the growth of militias and he said: Senator, he said, you want me to stop the growth of militias. He said, give me some guys from the Department of Agriculture and the State Department.

He said: Let me give you an example. And he says: Look, the date palm is the national tree here. It's a symbol of this country. Whatever the equivalent of the boll weevil is to cotton, there's something to the date palm. He said, whatever that varmint is. And he said, these date palms have to be sprayed every 5 years.

He said: So I went to State and said: You've got to spray them; you've got to get folks from the Department of Agriculture. And they said: That's a problem for the Department of Agriculture here in Iraq; let them do it. He said: They don't have the capacity.

I said: What did you do? He said: Same thing Saddam did. He said: I used military helicopters and I sprayed them. And then he said: And then I came back and told—had our guys go and tell them what they had to do in the future.

So I want to make it clear that I don't think the military's out there saying, give me more power. But I think the effect is that. I think the success in Afghanistan and Iraq as it relates to the military multitasking here at zero—there's four stages, you know better, much better than I do, zero through four. The whole purpose of a State Department is zero. That's the whole, sole purpose

of a State Department at the front end. It never was envisioned to be any part of the military.

You guys are handling phase zero now, and I think it's mission creep here, not by intention, but all of a sudden, out of necessity in Iran and Iraq—I mean, Iraq and Afghanistan. Now we've got CENTCOM and AFRICOM being organized in a way that no one ever thought of it. Prior to Iraq, no one would have contemplated AFRICOM in the configuration it is now being contemplated.

So I want to make it clear, this is not—this is not about the military wanting to gobble up State. I think they'd like to regurgitate a whole bunch of it back to State. I really mean that. I'm not being critical.

So our problem here as we go through this—and I'm going to not ask any questions in terms of my time, but I will at the very end—is that our dilemma is how do we prevent the Afghan-Iraq model from becoming the 21st century model of the conduct of American aid and assistance programs overseas, which would not have been created this way but for, in my humble opinion, Iraq and Afghanistan?

I'll come back—yes, you want to comment on that?

Secretary NEGROPONTE. Well, I do because I think, Mr. Chairman, I think part of the answer is there are situations—and I'm not familiar with the zero to four nomenclature. But there are situations where it's only the military who are going to be able to do this at the front end, at the pointed end of the spear, or whatever you want to say, when one goes in and there's a conflict situation.

The CHAIRMAN. That's true.

Secretary NEGROPONTE. And we have those capabilities and, just like you, I'm an enormous fan of the military, and I've worked with them for more than four decades and I think they've got a lot of fabulous capabilities, especially with the reservists and the National Guardsmen whose talents they bring to bear on these situations.

I think what we've tried to do with the Civilian Stabilization Initiative is to try to hasten the day when you can make some kind of a meaningful transition from this purely conflict situation to one where the civilian governmental representatives can begin to step up to their responsibilities. I think we all agree that we need more capabilities to be able to do that and we need to support mechanisms that enable us to make that transition even faster.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this civilian response notion initiated by Senator Lugar and enthusiastically embraced and supported by me, and we added onto it, and fortunately and thankfully embraced by State, is not quite what we're talking about here. It's part of what we're talking about here. What we're talking about here is not all of Africa is in conflict, for example. Yet the whole model is being conducted as if the total continent was in conflict. The same way with SOUTHCOM.

But I'll get back to that, because I'm keeping the Senator from my hometown waiting and our colleague from Wisconsin as well. But I'll come back to that.

Senator, the floor is yours.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA**

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate you calling this hearing. This is important for us to consider and to deliberate about.

Like all of us on this committee, we have the good fortune to travel a little bit, depending upon our schedules. One of the great opportunities I had last summer, in August 2007, was to go to—very briefly—to Kuwait, and to spend a couple of days in Iraq and Jordan. One of the briefings we had in Iraq, in addition to visiting the troops and getting a sense of what was happening on the ground literally, was to spend some time with the people who briefed us on the Provisional Reconstruction Teams, known by the acronym "PRTs."

We know that they're there to promote stability and security and they do tremendous work. I guess I wanted to focus my questions kind of on that model and what that means to the discussion we're having today. I'm told that in Afghanistan the United States runs 12 of the 26 PRTs and of the 12 United States PRTs 11 are military-led. Then in Iraq, the United States runs 11 of the 14 PRTs that operate autonomously and approximately 13 PRTs that are embedded in military units.

I guess, in light of your testimony and our discussion, I guess I wanted to ask questions about that. In particular, what steps are being taken to ensure that civilian agencies who know reconstruction and development best have adequate input and authority within those PRTs? Either of you or both of you, if you'd provide an answer.

Secretary NEGROPONTE. Well, subject to what Secretary Edelman might wish to add, on Iraq I think you're right. I think there's a higher proportion of civilian staffing than there is and Afghanistan, where there's a predominantly military effort. I believe that's because most of these PRTs are embedded with military units.

But in the case of Iraq there are about 800 personnel in PRTs at present, and the State Department provides about 465 of those individuals. So I think we make a pretty substantial contribution and we have a major personnel effort within our Department to be able to properly staff the PRTs.

In Afghanistan, we have a total of 24 State Department officers and 32 USAID officers working at PRTs and at regional military commands. So that's what I would have to say to that. But I think we're probably farther along in Iraq than we are in Afghanistan in terms of getting adequate civilian staffing, and I think that may be a reflection of the security situation.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I agree. I would say in Afghanistan when the PRTs were initially set up it was set up as a military operation, but it was clearly always intended that we would have State and USAID personnel. I think we now have about four. It's usually about 100 people in each of the 12 PRTs in Afghanistan, with about 4 civilian State and USAID personnel. We'd welcome more.

I think the problem here again is, the point the chairman made, is the default to providing services. It was an adaptation, if you will, on the battlefield to provide the services. I think there's actually quite a history to this. I happened to be reading not long ago

a book about the campaign in Italy, about the Anzio invasion. I noticed when Mark Clark got to Naples the garbage services in World War II were stopped in Italy. So the next thing you know, the U.S. troops, with Mark Clark in the lead, were organizing the garbage removal in Naples. Given what's happened in Naples, there might be some people who'd like to have General Clark back. But the point is——

The CHAIRMAN. Chiarelli did the same thing in downtown Baghdad.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Right. I wanted to come back to your point on that later, Chairman Biden.

So it was an adaptation. It was something that clearly needs greater civilian capacity, and in particular in areas, as the chairman was saying, like agriculture and others where we lack sufficient capacity I think now in USAID, for the reasons that Secretary Negroponte and I mentioned earlier.

Senator CASEY. In the instances where you have soldiers within the PRTs doing development activity or doing development work that civilian experts could be doing, is this a problem of—in other words, is there a process in place to get that balance right or is it just because of the nature of combat and war and exigent circumstances that you can't get the balance right? Is it one of timing, that it's working itself out, or is it that there's not a mechanism in place to get that balance right?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think the answer in Iraq is that it's working itself out. I mean, we've made a major effort to staff the PRTs and we have State Department lead most of the PRT operations there. We recruit very senior and experienced officers. We've even got some of our retired ambassadors, for example, who have gone back to run them. One of them happens to be an old colleague of mine who is running the PRTs.

So we are seeking to do our best to respond to that situation. I believe, although I don't know for sure, I believe in Afghanistan it's more a question of security than anything else. And of course, also it's more of an international effort. We do not have responsibility for as many of the PRTs as we do in Iraq.

[Additional written information supplied by the State Department providing a full explanation of the relationship of the civilian and military leadership at PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq follows:]

All 27 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq are led by State representatives. Similarly, the Defense Department personnel assigned to Iraq PRTs attend the Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Team Training Course held at the Foreign Service Institute.

One Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan is led by a State representative (the remainder are Defense-led). For the Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Training Program, State, USAID, and USDA representatives join their counterpart military Provincial Reconstruction Team Commander for a 3-week orientation course at Fort Bragg before deploying. The course teaches them how to be an integrated command team and reinforces the joint nature of their work.

While the team leader in any Provincial Reconstruction Team, regardless of leading agency, retains final authority over the team, an integrated command element of the senior State, USAID, USDA and military representatives guides Provincial Reconstruction Team planning and operations. This how some of the most effective Provincial Reconstruction Teams have operated over the last 2 years. Tighter integration among agencies represented within the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (as well as between State-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams and colocated military units in Iraq) has brought about truly joint, interagency planning efforts, more effi-

cient and coordinated use of various funding streams, and reduced duplication of efforts in reconstruction, development, and capacity-building work. It is important to also note that Provincial Reconstruction Teams are only one avenue for extending State, USAID, and USDA interests and efforts into the provinces.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Casey.

Senator Feingold

**STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN**

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Lugar, for holding this hearing, and thank you to our distinguished witnesses for joining us here today.

While Congress has discussed the role of the military in foreign policy with respect to AFRICOM and the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, to give two examples, today's hearing is a chance to address the broader issue. The Defense Department plays a tremendous role in helping State achieve its foreign policy objectives, but I am concerned that since 9/11 our approach to foreign policy has become somewhat unbalanced. I strongly support efforts to combat al-Qaeda—that must be our top national security priority. But in our efforts to make America safer and more secure, we have significantly increased military assistance to foreign regimes without a concomitant increase in nonmilitary ways of countering the threat posed by al-Qaeda. Moreover, we continue to arm and train certain foreign militaries that contribute to politically repressive environments. Now, while this may help to improve security in the short term, in the long run it is likely to undermine stability, contribute to anti-Americanism and radicalism, and potentially undermine our own national security. Finally, it seems clear we've become overly reliant on the Department of Defense to do work that was previously undertaken by the State Department and USAID. The security of the United States is paramount, but achieving this goal should not be assigned solely—or even predominantly—to the military. But unfortunately, that is precisely what we're seeing. The Secretary of Defense has recognized the problem of "creeping militarization" and noted that civilian agencies must take a greater lead in foreign affairs. I could not agree more and, despite some recent and welcome efforts to bulk up the State Department, the wheels still seem to be moving in the wrong direction.

It is our job here in Congress to invest adequately in State and USAID so they have the tools they need and do not need to rely on the Defense Department to do their job overseas. Instead of providing increased resources to the Defense Department for civilian initiatives, what if we funded these programs and projects through State and USAID? And what about requiring more effective interagency planning and coordination between these agencies to ensure that our government as a whole is developing long-term comprehensive strategies? By taking this approach, we can hopefully develop a foreign policy agenda that properly incorporates all the tools we have available to ensure our national security.

Secretary Negroponte, Section 502[b] of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits the provision of security assistance to governments that engage, "in a consistent pattern of gross violations of inter-

nationally recognized human rights." In 2006 the State Department spent hundreds of thousands and in some cases millions of dollars of foreign military assistance on three African nations—Chad, Djibouti, and Ethiopia—which according to State Department reports had "poor" human rights records due to their engagement in such activities as extrajudicial killing and arbitrary detention.

Can you explain how this is consistent with the Foreign Assistance Act?

Secretary NEGROPONTE. I probably have to elaborate on this reply with a written response for the record, Senator. But what I would say certainly with respect to a country like Chad is that they are in a critical location, neighboring on the Sudan, and Libya as well. So I think that they're in a rather strategic position in that part of Africa.

Ethiopia, of course, is a country with which we do have good diplomatic relations, and of course they have also played a role, and we think a somewhat helpful role, in helping stabilize the situation in Somalia. So I can think of reasons where we have an interest to be of assistance to these two countries.

But I'd have to amplify that response with a written—in writing.

[The submitted written response from the State Department follows:]

The United States Government fully respects the provisions of section 502b of the Foreign Assistance Act which prohibits the provision of security assistance to countries that engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. We share your concerns regarding the human rights conditions in Chad, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. There is not, however a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights in these countries, although the security forces of these countries are reported to have committed abuses and there are credible reports of specific occurrences.

Security assistance training in Chad exposes military personnel to democratic values through classroom training and the incorporation of human rights sensitization into field exercises. Efforts to strengthen and professionalize the Chadian military are key to Chad's stability, particularly given the military's historical role in unconstitutional regime change. Our decisions to engage the security sector are evaluated on a case-by-case basis to ensure our engagement supports our human rights agenda in the country and promotes our initiatives to broker increased domestic and regional stability.

Security assistance programs in Djibouti also contribute to the professionalization of the Djiboutian military and emphasize the protection of human rights. They help to build on recent improvements in human rights conditions in the country. These programs further ingrain democratic values and the primacy of civilian leadership in a country where the State Department has repeatedly found that the civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces. Djibouti is host to the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa and a stalwart ally in a very volatile region. Over the last few months, Djibouti has played an important role in facilitating the peace process in Somalia and has served as an important counterweight to Eritrean support to extremist elements in that country.

In Ethiopia, contributing to the transformation of the military into an apolitical, professional defense force capable of protecting Ethiopia's borders and contributing actively to international peacekeeping operations is a key foreign policy goal of the United States. Our military assistance to Ethiopia is forcused on areas that bolster its capacity in counterterrorism and peacekeeping, as well as professional military education of senior officers. Ethiopia is currently the second largest contributor in Africa of troops to international peacekeeping operations, with troops in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and 1,500 troops preparing to deploy to Darfur. In response to an urgent plea from the U.N., Ethiopia will provide five attack helicopters to the Darfur peacekeepers.

In light of human rights concerns, we make special efforts to ensure that all bilateral military-to-military training includes specific components on human rights and civil-military relations modeled on U.S. professional military education standards.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance are currently limited to leadership, logistics and organizational capacity training, as well as equipment and parts to maintain Ethiopia's airlift capacity to facilitate deployment to peacekeeping operations.

Senator FEINGOLD. I would appreciate that, and I thank you for that.

Secretary Edelman, I understand that, as a matter of policy, the Defense Department applies many of the human rights restrictions contained in the Foreign Assistance Act to its foreign security assistance programs. Is the Department legally bound to abide by the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act when it disburses funds pursuant to section 1206 of the 2006 defense authorization, and what about section 1208 of the 2005 defense authorization?

Ambassador EDELMAN. On 1206—I believe all of this is pursuant to the limitations of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act. All the authorities that we have for these programs, 1206, 1208, I believe are—I think actually the law—I have to check on that, but I'm sure that we're governed by that on both sides, sir.

Senator FEINGOLD. Secretary Edelman, the Defense Department provided $6 million in 1206 funding to Chad in 2007, notwithstanding the State Department's report the year before that the security forces in that country were engaging in extrajudicial killing, arbitrary detention, and torture. How do you reconcile this with the statement the Department abides by—that it abides by the restrictions of the Foreign Assistance Act when disbursing 1206 funds?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Well, all the programs, as I testified earlier today, are done in concert with the Department of State and we're both governed by the same provisions. I'd have to get back to you with specifics on Chad, sir.

Senator FEINGOLD. But isn't this sort of a plain contradiction with the law?

Ambassador EDELMAN. You're dealing with—you're dealing with countries that are in the midst of enormous civil conflict. I know that we as a matter of law are barred from providing assistance to units that we know are involved in any human rights violations and we certainly abide by that.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I look forward to both of your responses and I do want to follow up on this with both of you. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Gentlemen, I've kept you too long and the panel behind us. With your permission, I'm going to submit several questions in writing. I will not burden you too much.

I'd like to say one thing, though, Secretary Edelman, before you leave, about Lebanon. I'm not sure I'd describe your case study on the critical role the tools have played in achieving national security objectives. I'm not so sure it's so clear-cut. I think that—anyway, I'd like to get a chance to talk with you about it. I may pick up the phone and talk to you. It's not critical—I mean, it's not—it doesn't fundamentally impact on the discussion we're having here, but it does go to kind of what we define as success, and I'm not so sure I'd share that view.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I'd be happy to have that conversation with you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Great. I appreciate it very much.

Thank you, gentlemen, very, very much.

Our second panel is Dr. Reuben—is it "BRIGG-ittee"? "BRIGG-ittee." I want to make sure I pronounce it correctly. If I mispronounce it, you can call me "BIDD-in." Ms. Mary Locke, who is a former senior professional staff here on the committee. I looked down, saw her sitting in the front row, and I thought: Isn't she sitting in the wrong place? Shouldn't she be back here? And third, Dr. George Rupp, who is CEO and president of the International Rescue Committee. And last but not least, Robert M. Perito, senior program officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace.

As I understand it, at least one of our—I understand that Mr. Brigety, because of the hour, may have a flight problem. I consider it a problem even when you're 2 hours ahead of time. So Mr. Brigety, that's why I ask you to go first, Doctor. And in the event you cannot stay after your testimony, we fully understand. If you would be prepared to answer some questions we may have in writing if you're unable to stay; is that OK?

Dr. BRIGETY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The floor is yours, Dr. Brigety.

**STATEMENT OF DR. REUBEN E. BRIGETY II, DIRECTOR OF THE SUSTAINABLE SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC**

Dr. BRIGETY. Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to speak about the growing role of the American military in development assistance activities. My testimony today is drawn in part from a recent Center for American Progress report I have written titled "Humanity as a Weapon of War," which I have submitted for the record.

It is further informed by a year I spent as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow and Special Assistant at the U.S. Agency for International Development from January 2007 to January 2008. During my stint at USAID, I traveled to the headquarters of four U.S. military regional Combatant Commands and spent nearly a month in the field observing civil military projects in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

I believe that there is an important role for our military to play as a provider of development assistance that is closely linked to clear and specific national security objectives. This can and should be done in a way that acknowledges humanitarian space, supports U.S. foreign policy objectives, and, most importantly, improves the lives of beneficiaries.

Broadly speaking, there are two types of development assistance, fundamental and instrumental. Fundamental assistance aims to improve the lives of beneficiaries as an end in itself. Instrumental assistance seeks to improve the lives of beneficiaries as a means to an end, where the ultimate goal is the achievement of a security or foreign policy objective.

In recent years the U.S. military has made important changes to its doctrine, organization, operations, and funding to perform instrumental development activities around the world. In the interest of time, I would refer you to my report for a more complete discussion of this.

The United States has an interest in the successful conduct of both fundamental and instrumental assistance. There are three important questions to consider about instrumental assistance, where I believe the current controversy lies. First, how do you measure the success of instrumental projects conducted by the military? Second, how does such activity relate to other U.S. overseas development activities? And third, how do you accommodate military instrumental assistance with the legitimate concerns of the NGO community? I will briefly address each of these and offer policy recommendations for consideration.

Regarding measurements of success, there is no publicly available evidence that the U.S. military can demonstrate that its development projects, such as vaccinating cattle or constructing schools, directly contribute to U.S. security objectives. Adopting a rigorous assessment methodology is vital both to determine which projects the military should undertake and to provide accountability for them to the American taxpayer.

It is difficult to evaluate the relationship of military development projects to other development activities undertaken by the U.S. Government because the U.S. does not have a global development strategy. Though the White House periodically promulgates a national security strategy from which the national military strategy is derived, there is no document applicable to all relevant U.S. Government agencies to prioritize development objectives in support of foreign policy and in particular to adjudicate the inevitable tensions between fundamental and instrumental development activities.

Finally, we do not have common rules of the road to determine the appropriate relationship between military units and civilian agencies that are both conducting development projects in the field. The guidelines jointly published by Interaction and the Department of Defense in 2005 are of limited utility in regulating civil military activities in permissive environments.

To address these concerns, I propose three specific sets of actions be taken: First, the U.S. military must develop a robust methodology to link the conduct of its development projects to clear and discrete security objectives, especially in permissive environments. Second, the U.S. Government should promulgate a national development strategy and dramatically expand the ranks of development experts to implement it. This should include the assignment of development officers to every deployable Army combat brigade and Marine Corps combat battalion. Strengthening the role of development assistance in our foreign policy would be significantly aided, I believe, by the creation of a Cabinet-level development agency.

Finally, Interaction, the Defense Department, and USAID should jointly develop guidelines for civil-military relations in permissive environments for instrumental assistance.

Gentlemen, this concludes my oral testimony. I am grateful to the committee for studying this important issue and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Brigety follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. REUBEN E. BRIGETY II, DIRECTOR OF THE SUSTAINABLE SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, it is an honor to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today to speak about the growing role of the American military in development assistance activities. In recent years, this issue has sparked considerable interest in the humanitarian, development, and defense communities in the United States, as well as among our partner nations around the world.

I believe that there is an important role for our military to play as a provider of development assistance that is closely linked to clear and specific national security objectives. This can, and should, be done in a way that acknowledges humanitarian space, supports U.S. foreign policy objectives, and most importantly, improves the lives of beneficiaries.

My testimony today is drawn, in part, from a recent Center for American Progress report I have written titled "Humanity as a Weapon of War," which I have submitted for the record. It is further informed by a year I spent as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow and Special Assistant at the U.S. Agency for International Development from January 2007 to January 2008. During my stint at USAID, I traveled to the headquarters of four U.S. military Regional Combatant Commands and spent nearly a month in the observing civil-military projects in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya performed by the U.S. Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA).

This will proceed in four parts. First, I will provide some background information on the scope and nature of the military's involvement in development assistance. Second, I will offer analysis of this activity. Third, I submit a series of policy recommendations. Finally, I will conclude with some observations regarding the importance of development assistance to U.S. national security and the need for it to be supported.

BACKGROUND

The increasing involvement of the U.S. Armed Forces in addressing the basic human needs of civilians abroad represents one of the most profound changes in U.S. strategic thought and practice in at least a generation. The Pentagon is recognizing that conventional "kinetic" military operations, which utilize armed force through direct action to kill or capture the enemy, have limited utility in countering the threats posed by militant extremism. Therefore, they are searching for—and finding—"nonkinetic" options other than the use of force to tackle the nonviolent components of pressing security problems, both in and out of warzones.

This may seem like an appropriate approach to America's new security challenges in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but it is not without controversy. The increasing involvement of the U.S. military in civilian assistance activities has launched a contentious debate about the role of the military in global development, and the relevance of global development to American national security. Nongovernmental organizations argue that the "militarization" of development assistance threatens to undermine the moral imperatives of poverty reduction, the neutral provision of emergency relief, and the security of civilian aid workers in the field. Nonmilitary government agencies, most prominently the U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development, have demonstrated a complex ambivalence about the subject. Even as their bureaucracies have changed to accommodate the military's growing role providing assistance, some rank-and-file staff at USAID have argued that the military's programs do not constitute "real development" work, while a vocal minority of Foreign Service officers in the State Department have protested their deployment to promote political reconciliation in active war zones as hazardous assignments inappropriate for professional diplomats.

Although the Pentagon is not of one mind on this issue, many Defense Department officials argue that these criticisms from NGOs and other parts of the government are overblown, and that these nonkinetic operations have the dual benefit of helping people in need while serving American interests. This is something that

both the military, other government agencies and the NGO community should welcome.

The Pentagon has called on the State Department and the USAID to undertake more activities in direct support of American national security objectives, even as these agencies counter that their ability is constrained by years of chronic underfunding.

*The Role of the U.S. Military in Development Work*

The growing debate about the role of the military in development efforts points to two central questions: Should the United States view aiding civilians abroad as a critical element of its security? If so, what is the best way for the U.S. to perform development missions in support of its national security objectives?

The physical threats to the United States in the 21st century are of such complexity that they defy solution by force of arms alone. Neither the struggle to overcome drought triggered by climate change nor the defeat of predatory ideologies can be won by waging conventional wars. Addressing the basic needs of individuals in developing countries, and helping their governments be more responsive and effective, are critical strategic capabilities necessary for the United States to protect itself and its allies around the globe.

Helping civilians abroad to improve their lives strengthens American security in three important ways. First, it supports long-term stability by improving the economic prospects of developing countries, decreasing the likelihood of violent conflict fueled by economic hardship or extremist ideologies that can spread in such an environment. Second, it strengthens America's moral leadership in the world by increasing its reputation as a benevolent power, improving our ability to persuade other nations to support our foreign policy objectives. Finally, it serves immediate security objectives by channeling assistance to groups of people abroad that may harbor threats to the United States—diversifying the approaches available to combat the enemies of the country and its interests.

Each of these assistance missions—promoting stability, serving morality, and enhancing security—is crucially important to the United States in this changing global environment. The strategic purpose of assistance is increasingly clear, yet the method of providing it matters as well.

Assistance that is offered by civilians as a means of fighting poverty is viewed differently than is aid provided by uniformed military units fighting against global terrorist networks. To those on the receiving end, traditional development assistance provided by civilian agencies is a manifestation of our collective interests, and of an American commitment to improve the lives of others. Assistance to civilians delivered by the U.S. military, however, may be seen as undertaken in pursuit of America's national interests. The civilian-led method is largely in pursuit of a development objective, while the military-led method seeks a security aim. Though both of these methods serves at least one of the three principal missions of promoting stability, serving morality, and enhancing security, the delivery of assistance must be pursued in a way that supports all three missions rather than privileging one over the other, even inadvertently.

Despite its traditional task of fighting and winning wars, the military has an important role to play as a development actor. Its focus on countering threats to the United States makes it well suited to performing development activities linked directly to security objectives, both in combat zones and in more permissive environments. Yet the security mission of development cannot be separated from efforts to fight poverty, with ancillary benefits for promoting stability and strengthening America's moral leadership in the world.

The military's involvement in activities to improve the lives of civilians around the world has grown dramatically over the last 5 years. It is attributable not to an increase in humanitarian need, substantial as it may be, but to recognition that such need poses a threat to American interests. This is true both in combat zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and in less hostile environments such as the Gulf of Guinea, where political instability threatens the free flow of oil shipments, and on Mindanao in the Philippines, where a long-active Islamic separatist movement challenged the authority of the central government and supported al-Qaeda.

ANALYSIS

For a detailed examination of the changes to military doctrine, organization, operations and funding that have resulted from this increase in development assistance, I would refer you to CAP's report "Humanity as a Weapon of War." It is sufficient here to note that the changes have been substantial and that, in many cases, they have proceeded without significant public debate and analytical rigor to assess their efficacy, evaluate their costs and understand their broader implications.

It is important to ask two critical questions regarding military humanitarian assistance. First, is the threat analysis leading to this increased involvement correct? Second, if it is correct, what should be the relative balance of the involvement between military and civilian organizations in the development sphere?

The threat analysis underlying increased military humanitarian assistance has great merit. One of the principal lessons from 9/11, as supported by the 2002 National Security Strategy, is that the social ills endemic to weak and fragile states can pose substantial threats to the United States. Many of these problems, from poor governance to conflict over basic resources, are not amenable to solution through the force of arms alone. Therefore, "nonkinetic" means must be used to address them, and often chief amongst these are various forms of development assistance.

The U.S. has an interest in two types of development assistance: Fundamental and instrumental. Fundamental development assistance aims to improve the lives of beneficiaries as an end in and of itself, with potentially collateral strategic benefits to the United States. Agricultural assistance, for example, to farmers in Malawi is an effort at poverty reduction to improve the livelihoods of beneficiaries. Though the U.S. has no vital national interests at stake in Malawi, effort to bolster sustainable development there has the additional benefit of promoting national and regional stability by improving economic conditions for the populace. Instrumental development assistance, on the other hand, sees aid to beneficiaries as a means to an end, where the actual goal is a security objective that is abetted through humanitarian action. Well-drilling operations by U.S. military units in northeastern Kenya may provide fresh water to remote communities, but the primary rationale for these activities is likely not the humanitarian need of the largely ethnic Somali population there. Rather, with chaos inside neighboring Somalia threatening the stability of the region and enabling the rise of extremism, using U.S. military assets to perform a humanitarian mission shows the face of American compassion to a skeptical population while also giving the military an eye on activity in the area.

The distinction between fundamental and instrumental assistance is particularly important to understand when considering the security environment in which the activities take place. Broadly speaking, we may consider two types: Permissive and nonpermissive environments. Permissive environments are those where there is not a current armed conflict and where the host government has given permission for U.S. humanitarian and development work. Nonpermissive environments are those where there is an active armed conflict and/or where the host government cannot or will not give permission U.S. humanitarian activities. Considering the relative strengths inherent in military and civilian organizations, the chart below gives a rough approximation for determining when and how they should be involved in development assistance activities.

| | Permissive environment | Nonpermissive environment |
|---|---|---|
| Fundamental Assistance | • Civilian led<br>• Military involvement by exception | • Military led.<br>• Civilian input required for project design. |
| Instrumental Assistance | • Military or civilian led<br>• Civilian input required for project design. | • Military led.<br>• Civilian input as requested by military. |

Understanding how fundamental and instrumental development approaches should be balanced with one another, and what the relative roles of the military and civilian agencies should be in achieving them, is of critical importance. It is helpful to consider four broad criteria to make this assessment: Determination of strategic objectives, comparative advantage of the provider, indicators of success and normative considerations.

*Strategic determination.* The principal difference between fundamental and instrumental assistance is the extent to which improving the lives of beneficiaries through development activity is an end itself or a means to an end. Furthermore, this distinction presumes that the ultimate objectives of instrumental assistance can be clearly defined.

Civilian development agencies, like USAID, have very different sources of strategic guidance than does the military. The National Security Strategy, as noted earlier, envisions a broad role for development assistance to strengthen failing states. Beyond that, however, there are few other documents or processes to help prioritize development objectives relative to other foreign policy priorities. The so-called "F" process was intended to do this, but falls short.

The military, however, has various levels of strategic guidance that personnel can use at headquarters and in the field to determine instrumental development objectives. The National Military Strategy, as well as Theaters Security Cooperation plans developed by each Regional Combatant Command, can be very useful in this regard.

Broadly speaking, instrumental development activities should only be undertaken if they can be linked to clear strategic objectives in support of U.S. national security interests. Otherwise, U.S. development activities should be fundamental in nature.

*Comparative Advantage.* Civilian agencies and military units have different strengths to bring to development activities. USAID and its implementing partners have substantial experience to bring to bear on development projects. They often combine this with extensive local knowledge of the area where projects are performed, which is gleans from a persistent presence in-country. In the U.S. context, USAID has substantial legal authorities to engage in a wide variety of development activities, and can do so with relatively little expense compared to comparable activities performed by military assets (such as well drilling, humanitarian logistics, etc.). Finally, civilian development officials have a "humanitarian mindset" in which the first question they ask when addressing a development problem is, "What is the humanitarian need?"

Though many observers often focus on the attributes such as logistical lift, money, personnel, organization as the most important comparative advantages held by the military, I argue that a "security mindset" is the most important unique advantage that it has. Whereas civilian development experts look at a situation and ask, "What is the need?"; military actors often ask the question, "What is the threat?" It is this perspective that makes the military a plausible, if not preferable, purveyor of instrumental humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, the military has a unique comparative advantage in providing security for itself and other U.S. agencies in hostile environments. Thus, military units may be the only actors that can provide humanitarian or development assistance in situations of armed conflict.

*Indicators of Success.* Civilian development agencies are accustomed to applying measures of effectives to their projects. Some activities, such as providing emergency shelter or fighting acute malnutrition, are amenable to quantitative measures and therefore easier to identify as successes. Others, such as promoting democracy or mainstreaming gender considerations, are harder to quantify and rely on qualitative data for assessment. In both instances, however, fundamental development programs have a first-order task with regard to the assessment of their programs, where the only important metric is whether or not the lives of the beneficiaries have improved as a result of the projects completed.

Instrumental development activities have a second-order problem. That is, it is not enough to demonstrate that an instrumental development project has improved the lives of the intended beneficiaries to show that it has been successful. In addition, it must also be clear that improving the lives of the beneficiaries has advanced the strategic objectives for which the instrumental activity was planned and performed. It is easier to demonstrate the success of instrumental development projects in nonpermissive environments than it is in permissive ones. Assuming that a main objective of development activities in nonpermissive environments is to create stability and decrease violence, like providing basic jobs for disaffected Shia youth in Baghdad's Sadr City in 2004, a key indicator of success would be the extent to which violent conflict is abated in the wake of development activities. In permissive environments where there is no armed conflict, measuring the success of instrumental activities is harder. It is hard to know, for example, if the vaccination of local livestock in Manda Bay, Kenya, by U.S. military units actually advances U.S. national interests. Without such proof, it is difficult to justify this sort of instrumental development activity, or to know which development projects should be performed to support American security objectives. This is probably the most challenging aspect of the military's involvement in instrumental development activities, and one for which Congress should demand accountability.

As of this date, there is no publicly available evidence that the military has a rigorous methodology for assessing the strategic effectiveness of their instrumental development activities. Nor is there is no clear rationale for military involvement in fundamental development activities in permissive environments. To the extent that it is engaged in instrumental activities in both permissive and nonpermissive environments, it must develop methodologies to measure their effectiveness. This ensures both accountability for taxpayer dollars and, as important, the efficacy of the activities themselves.

*Normative considerations.* Ethical considerations regarding what constitutes an appropriate development actor are not merely matters of philosophical debate. They have real consequences on the ground, ranging from which local and international

partners can be engaged in performing projects to the level of acceptance one can expect from the local community and the host nation.

Though some development and humanitarian NGOs have restrictions on the funding they will receive from national governments, civilian governmental agencies such as USAID, USDA and others are generally seen as legitimate development actors who can be cooperated with in the field. On the other hand, there is widespread concern about the military serving as a development actor in nonemergency cases, in both permissive and nonpermissive environments. As a matter of principle, many NGOs reject the instrumental considerations on which they perceive military humanitarian assistance to be based. Focused on the well-being of the beneficiaries, they argue that humanitarian assistance performed for strategic motives ceases to be humanitarian by definition. In addition to these philosophical concerns, many NGOs also fear that the military's involvement in the development sphere constricts humanitarian space and endangers civilian aid workers that may be perceived to be aiding and abetting military objectives.

Notwithstanding the significant reservations of the NGO community and other observers, I believe that the United States has an interest in the successful conduct of both fundamental and instrumental development assistance. As such, I also believe that the military can be an important development actor, particularly with regard to instrumental assistance. This requires a number of steps to ensure that such activities are successful, that they account for the concerns of implementing partners, that they are acceptable to host nations and local beneficiaries, and that they are accountable to Congress and the American people.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The U.S. Government in general, and the U.S. military in particular, have rediscovered the imperative of development assistance as a means of advancing U.S. security interests in a post-9/11 world. Yet the manner in which these initiatives have been pursued lacks the coherence necessary for them to be most effective. To execute a successful policy of sustainable security in which military humanitarian assistance plays a central role, six elements must be in place:

- A national consensus on development assistance;
- Adoption of a National Development Strategy;
- Cabinet-level development agency;
- Support for both fundamental and instrumental assistance programs;
- Dispersal of development personnel in critical positions in government and in the military; and
- Coherent and effective methodology for measuring the success of strategic humanitarian missions.

### *National Development Consensus*

To sustain support for the level of development activities essential for America's interests, there must be a broad consensus among the American people regarding the importance of international development for America's security as well as its values. Just as the vast majority of Americans broadly accepts the value of defense spending in protecting America—even though they may have differences on specific policies and programs—so must there also be a general agreement on the value of development assistance. While certain aspects of the defense and foreign policy elite accept this proposition, it is not widely shared in military or congressional circles, nor is it accepted by most Americans.

Building this consensus will require a concerted effort by a variety of advocates to educate both policymakers and the American public. Some of this is already happening. Defense Secretary Gates has made several speeches on this subject, as have other senior military leaders, among them the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ADM Michael Mullen. USAID senior leaders have given speeches on particular aspects of civil-military cooperation in the development arena, such as regarding AFRICOM.

Changing public perceptions of development's importance to our national security is a task that requires Presidential leadership. When the Commander in Chief makes an argument that helping others to be secure directly contributes to our own security, the Nation will listen. Indeed, it was precisely this argument that helped President Truman push the Marshall Plan through Congress, and President Kennedy to push the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which created USAID. Raising this issue in the next State of the Union Address or making a Presidential foreign policy speech would help introduce the concept of sustainable security to the American people and spark interest in the nonmilitary instruments we need to strengthen this approach.

Presidential leadership must be followed by assertive public engagement on the part of civilian development agencies. No one can tell the story of America's global commitment to sustainable development and its contributions to our security better than the people who do the work every day. Yet their ability to do so is restricted by section 501 of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (Smith-Mundt Act), which functionally restricts the ability of USAID to use public dollars to tell its story inside the United States. This legislation should be amended or repealed so that USAID, just like the Department of Defense, can tell the American people about the value of its work and continue to build public support for it.

*National Development Strategy*

If development assistance is to be a central component of U.S. national security policy, then it must be guided by an overarching strategy linking it to other instruments of national power, and must be applicable to all U.S. government agencies involved in development assistance, including the military. This will provide a framework for setting priorities in development assistance, delineating responsibilities among agencies, linking assistance to other instruments of statecraft, and allocating resources appropriately.

A National Development Strategy should outline how the country's assets for development assistance will support the requirements outlined in the National Security Strategy, which is periodically produced by the White House. Modeled after the National Military Strategy, which provides broad guidance for the employment of the armed forces in support of national security objectives, the NDS should include the following elements:

- Overview of the global environment in which assistance takes place;
- Explicit rationale for the role of development assistance in support of American foreign and national security policy;
- Principles for effective fundamental and instrumental development assistance;
- List of major development goals for the U.S. Government; and
- Blueprint for an optimal development assistance bureaucracy, including responsibilities of relevant government agencies.

As important as the final content of a NDS would be for U.S. foreign policy, the process of drafting it would yield useful benefits as well. The diversity of government agencies involved in delivering some aspect of development assistance means that a broad conversation including all of them would be required to draft a comprehensive strategy. Such a process would be invaluable for identifying and resolving tensions in U.S. development assistance.

The drafting of the NDS should also be led by the country's leading development agency, USAID, but ultimately issued by the White House in order to have the authority necessary to coordinate actions across government agencies.

*Cabinet-Level Development Agency*

To ensure that development assistance is appropriately accounted for in our foreign policy, the United States should create a Cabinet-level development agency. This would strengthen the likelihood that we will have a strong and consistent advocate for the resources, policies, and personnel to support development activities that are vital for our national interests. Furthermore, it would be a more rational structuring of our government relative to those of our allies. Though the United States is the largest single donor of Official Development Assistance, we have no Cabinet-level agency to disperse those funds according to a clear development strategy.

*Support for Fundamental and Instrumental Development*

If the United States hopes to promote its interests in combating extremism and promoting stability through the use of development assistance, then it must take steps to protect, promote coordinate and both the instrumental development projects which the military performs and the fundamental development programs managed by its civilian agencies.

The first step is for the government to make clear to its own agencies, to other governments, and to partner organizations that both the fundamental and instrumental assistance activities in noncombat environments are important to America's interests. In large measure, this can be accomplished through the drafting and promulgation of a National Development Strategy that explicitly embraces a role for the military and for civilian agencies in providing development assistance.

Second, the division of labor between the military and civilian organizations should not simply be based on the duration of the project, but also on the principle of exception. Unless there is an explicit and near-term security objective that is the primary focus of a development project in a noncombat environment, then such an

activity should generally be performed by civilian officials rather than military personnel. This will decrease the extent to which all U.S. development assistance—both fundamental and instrumental—could be skeptically viewed by beneficiaries and host nation governments. Furthermore, it is vital that the military's objectives in performing development projects be both explicit and transparent to all parties involved.

Finally, budgets must be protected in such a way that the fundamental development missions performed by civilian agencies are not harmed in the budget process relative to Defense Department budgeting and legal authorities for instrumental assistance. Joint Select Appropriations Committees from the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees of both Houses of Congress could have concurrent jurisdiction over development funding, to ensure that both fundamental and instrumental missions are adequately resourced and overseen.

*Dispersal of Development Expertise*

Development programs performed by U.S. civilian and military personnel must be coordinated at all levels of government—in the field, at regional headquarters and embassies, and in Washington. One of the negative consequences of decreased funding for USAID over most of the last 20 years has been the dramatic downsizing of its cadre of experienced development professionals capable of being deployed all over the world. Not only has this limited the number of people available to develop and direct purely civilian development projects. It has also constrained the availability of development experts for details to the military and to important interagency assignments like service on the National Security Council staff.

As a result, many military development activities in the field (especially those outside of PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan) have not had the benefit of direct and real-time support from civilian development experts on the ground. Further, the relative absence or underrepresentation of development experts at important policy and command centers has decreased the extent to which appropriate development concerns have been taken into account on important strategic issues.

There have been movements to rectify this. USAID is now sending Senior Development Advisors to each of the regional combatant command headquarters and more junior advisors to PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to CJTF–HOA on an ad hoc basis. Yet much more could be done. In Washington, there should be a Senior Director for Development Assistance at the National Security Council responsible for coordinating nonemergency development assistance worldwide.

In addition, USAID should send liaison officers to relevant bureaus in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. In the field, USAID development officers should be assigned on a rotating basis to every deployable combat brigade in the U.S. Army and combat battalion in the U.S. Marine Corps to accompany them to the field and to instruct and train personnel in development tasks during their routine training cycles.

*Methodology for Measuring Success*

Of all the challenges involved in military humanitarian assistance, measuring success is perhaps the most difficult as well as the most vital. Determining whether or not a given assistance activity achieved a tactical or strategic objective, rather than merely being correlated with its occurrence, can be a very tall order.

Nevertheless, it is essential to have a methodology to link conclusively development outputs with tactical or strategic outcomes. Otherwise it is not possible to determine with much analytical rigor which humanitarian activities that military forces or their civilian counterparts should undertake to support certain security objectives. Furthermore, demonstrating the utility of specific development activities for security interests may prove necessary for continued congressional funding support for those programs as they proliferate in scope and scale.

Despite its importance, there is no publicly available evidence that the Pentagon has a successful methodology for measuring the causal success of its strategic humanitarian activities. It is essential that it create one in partnership with its civilian development counterparts, and that the results be made public in the interests of transparency.

## CONCLUSION

The depravations of grinding poverty, environmental degradation, and poor governance are not entirely new dilemmas to the international community. Neither are the challenges posed by hostile nations and violent groups. Yet in an increasingly interconnected world, the depth of human suffering in far away lands can metastasize into concrete threats to the security of American citizens here at home.

This 21st century reality requires a new approach to American foreign policy, accompanied by the will to update outmoded processes and institutions to meet the challenge.

It is no longer enough for America to solely destroy its enemies to keep our country safe. We must also care for our friends, whether they be powerful states or impoverished people. This perspective, which is increasingly shared by defense and development professionals alike, is the rationale driving the military's increasing involvement in providing assistance to local populations around the world. It is not an activity that should be rejected out of hand or accepted uncritically. Rather, we must work to ensure that military humanitarian and development assistance is appropriately linked to broader U.S. foreign policy objectives, that it works in concert with other development priorities of the United States and our national partners, that it respects the concerns of the NGO community, and that it tangibly improves the lives of the beneficiaries it serves. This is a substantial challenge, but one that we must meet to serve our values, promote our interests, and support our friends around the world.

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—The report "Humanity as a Weapon of War" mentioned above was too voluminous to be reproduced in the printed hearing but will be maintained in the permanent record of the committee. It may also be accessed online at www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/06/sustainable__security2.html.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I know you have to go. I'd just ask you one question. On the Cabinet-level issue, I thought we already had a Cabinet-level person to do this, called the Secretary of State.

Dr. BRIGETY. Yes, sir. As you are well aware, particularly the military, as well as other government agencies, are pleased to talk about the 3D security paradigm—defense, diplomacy, and development. I personally believe that we are not going to be able to elevate development as a critical policy perspective unless there's a Cabinet-level department whose specific job is to advocate for development. The reason is both because it is important to have a Cabinet-level principal who can sit at the table with the Secretaries of Defense and State when these sorts of issues are being debated at the highest level of government; and also because a Cabinet-level development agency would be a much more powerful advocate to create and to send officers throughout the governmental bureaucracy both here in Washington and, most importantly, downrange in the field, where that sort of tactical expertise is most needed.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you. You're welcome to stay, but I was told you have a plane.

Dr. BRIGETY. Yes, sir. I'll be able to stay a few more minutes. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize. I forget who I recognized next. Oh, Mary. I apologize. Like I said, I'm so used to seeing you back here, even though it's been a while.

## STATEMENT OF MARY LOCKE, FORMER SENIOR PROFESSIONAL STAFF, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. SENATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. LOCKE. Well, it's very different here. I didn't realize we should be providing witnesses with sunglasses. [Laughter.]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for asking me to testify. It's a unique pleasure to appear before you and Senator Lugar today.

This committee has had a longstanding interest in the role of the military in foreign policy. Most recently, in June 2006, when Senator Lugar was Chair, the committee heard from two executive branch witnesses in classified session on the topic of the DOD

train-and-equip foreign assistance program. In unclassified answers to questions for the record, the two witnesses sought to reassure this committee. The State Department was said to be comfortable with the new provisions giving DOD train-and-equip authority and funding. The committee was also told that the Secretary of State was able to ensure that the new programs conformed to her overall priorities for U.S. foreign assistance.

To follow up and to see whether views in the field matched those at headquarters, Senator Lugar tasked a number of us on the staff to examine the relationship between State and Defense in our embassies. He asked us to give special attention to foreign assistance and the military's new 1206 funding. As you know, Mr. Chairman, 1206 refers to a section in various defense authorization bills giving DOD the authority to train and equip foreign militaries around the world directly from the DOD budget. Traditionally such programs have been funded in the foreign affairs 150 account and implemented by the Department of Defense under the authority of the Secretary of State.

Our findings included the following: First, the number of military personnel and Department of Defense activities in noncombat countries is increasing significantly. The leadership qualities of the ambassador are a determining factor in striking a prudent U.S. military posture in our embassies.

Second, as a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State's primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries.

Third, the increase in funding streams, missions, and authorities for the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders are placing new stresses on interagency coordination in the field. As the role of the military expands, particularly in the area of foreign assistance, embassy officials in some countries question whether the Department of Defense will chafe under the constraints of State Department leadership and work for still more authority and still more funding.

Four, there is evidence that some host countries are questioning the increasingly military component of America's profile overseas. Host country militaries clearly welcome increased professional contact and interaction with our military. However, some host countries have elements in both government and general society who are highly suspicious of potential American coercion. There is no sense so far that foreign hosts believe that the U.S. military is dominating U.S. policy in-country, but if such a perception were to gain hold it would give ammunition to U.S. adversaries and strengthen their propaganda and recruitment opportunities. More important, it would weaken the bilateral relationships that are necessary to win the campaign against terror.

The disparity in the ratio between our country's investments in military versus civilian approaches is a major contributor to the problem. In a related staff study, we found that during the Bush administration's tenure up until that time the Congress had denied some $7.6 billion that the President had requested in his regular

foreign aid budget. With this track record on the foreign affairs 150 Account, it should not be a shockingly unexpected development when the executive branch turns to the defense 050 Account as an alternative, a budget that is larger by a factor of at least 12.

So what can be done? One, in our staff study we found the programs undertaken under 1206 authority to be valuable, although not all uniformly targeted to urgent counterterrorism purposes. Strengthening the security sector of responsible governments, tightening border surveillance, improving intelligence, are important components of the antiterrorism campaign. The ideal would be to allow the 1206 authorities to expire in October, while continuing such programs and funding them in the right place, the foreign affairs 150 Account. If this is impossible, capping the DOD funding and targeting it uniquely to military-to-military counterterrorism support is a second best solution.

Second, it's clear that new mechanisms of cooperation between the two Departments in counterterrorism have been found. Some credit is due in large measure to congressional interest, probing, and oversight. Congress should continue to push for regional meetings of ambassadors, Assistant Secretaries of State, and senior interagency personnel, including the Combatant Commands, as regional planning and intelligence sharing are needed to address borderless terrorism.

Third, those in Congress who support the foreign affairs budget should be vigilant in protecting robust funding throughout congressional deliberations, including the budget debate and authorization and appropriation processes.

Fourth, your bill, the Lugar-Biden-Hagel reconstruction bill, should be a top priority for the Senate and should be passed before this Congress adjourns.

Fifth, it is as important to listen to our ambassadors to get a handle on the issue of the role of the military in foreign policy as to officials here in the headquarters. Studies, oversight hearings such as this, and appropriate legislative and budget decisions will go a long way toward keeping the right balance struck.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Locke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY LOCKE, SENIOR PROFESSIONAL STAFF (RETIRED), SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, U.S. SENATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for asking me to testify. It is a unique pleasure to appear before you and Senator Lugar on this most important topic.

This committee has had a longstanding interest in the role of the military in foreign policy. Most recently, in June 2006, when Senator Lugar was Chair, the committee heard from two executive branch witnesses in classified session on the topic of the DOD train-and-equip foreign assistance program. In unclassified answers to questions for the record, the two witnesses sought to reassure this committee. The State Department was said to be comfortable with the new provisions giving DOD train-and-equip authority and funding. The committee was also told that the Secretary of State was able to ensure that the new programs conformed to her overall priorities for U.S. foreign assistance.

To follow up, and to see whether views in the field matched those at headquarters, Senator Lugar tasked a number of us on the staff to travel to some 20 countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East to examine the relationship between the State Department and the Defense Department in our embassies. He asked us to focus on the agencies' cooperation on counterterrorism strategy, policies and activities, and give special attention to foreign assistance and the military's new section 1206 funding.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, "1206" refers to a section in various defense authorization bills that has given the Department of Defense the authority to train and equip foreign militaries around the world directly from the Defense Department budget. Traditionally, such programs had been funded in the foreign affairs 150 account and implemented by the Department of Defense under the authority of the Secretary of State. But, having been granted the authority and funding to train and equip militaries in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense requested the permanent extension of such authority to foreign militaries and police worldwide. Congress did not grant the full $750 million requested, capping the amount at $200 million and later raising that to $300 million. Congress also required that any programs be "formulated jointly" by both departments and did not include foreign police. Also, the authority was granted on a temporary rather than permanent basis. It will expire at the end of this fiscal year unless the decision is made to extend or make it permanent.

Senator Lugar's staff report is widely available; appears on the Government Printing Office Web site, and has been distributed to every Senator. Moreover, it was sent from the Department of State to all embassies and we are told it is being used in the FSI course for future ambassadors.

Its findings include the following:

(1) The number of military personnel and Defense Department activities in noncombat countries is increasing significantly. Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics, and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated. The leadership qualities of the ambassador are a determinative factor in striking a prudent U.S. military posture in our embassies.

(2) While finding, capturing, and eliminating individual terrorists and their support networks is an imperative in the campaign against terror, it is repairing and building alliances, pursuing resolutions to regional conflicts, fostering democracy and development, and defusing religious extremism worldwide that will overcome the terrorist threat in the long term. It has traditionally been the military's mission to take direct action against U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies' mission has been to pursue noncoercive measures through diplomacy, international information programming, and foreign and economic assistance. As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State's primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense's focus on war fighting.

(3) The increase in funding streams, missions, and authorities for the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders are placing new stresses on interagency coordination in the field. Currently, overlapping missions and interagency frictions are, for the most part, refereed by the U.S. Ambassador and other State Department leadership in the Embassy with intermittent referral to headquarters for guidance. But, as the role of the military expands, particularly in the area of foreign assistance, embassy officials in some countries question whether the Department of Defense will chafe under the constraints of State Department leadership and work for still more authority and funding.

(4) There is evidence that some host countries are questioning the increasingly military component of America's profile overseas. Some foreign officials question what appears to them as a new emphasis by the United States on military approaches to problems that are not seen as lending themselves to military solutions. Host country militaries clearly welcome increased professional contact and interaction with the U.S. military. However, some host countries have elements in both government and general society who are highly suspicious of potential American coercion. There is no sense so far that foreign hosts believe the U.S. military is dominating U.S. policy in-country, but if such a perception were to gain hold, it would give ammunition to U.S. adversaries. More importantly, it would weaken the bilateral relationships that are necessary to win the campaign against terror.

The report goes on to attribute migration of traditionally foreign policy authorities and missions to the Department of Defense both to the urgency of the campaign against terror and the disparity in the ratio between our country's investments in military versus civilian approaches. In a related staff study published last November, we found that during the Bush administration's tenure up until that time, the Congress had denied some $7.6 billion that the President requested in his regular foreign aid budget. With this track record on the foreign affairs 150 budget account, it should not be a shockingly unexpected development when the executive branch

turns to the defense 050 account as an alternative, a budget that is larger by a factor of at least twelve.

Congress has been slow in other ways to strengthen the civilian contributions to our national security effort. This committee has passed multiple times the Lugar-Biden bill authorizing new capacity at the State Department to work as a full partner with the Department of Defense on post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. The bill is supported by both the Secretaries of State and Defense. In the last Congress, the bill passed the Senate unanimously but languished in the House. It has now passed the House in this Congress but is being held up from unanimous consent consideration by an objection from one Senator.

What can be done?

(1) In our staff study, we found the programs undertaken under 1206 authority to be valuable, although not all uniformly targeted to counterterrorism. Strengthening the security sector of friendly, responsible governments, tightening border surveillance and improving intelligence gathering are important components of the antiterrorism campaign. The ideal would be to allow the 1206 authorities to expire in October while continuing such programs and funding them in the right place, the foreign affairs 150 account. If this is impossible, capping the DOD funding and targeting it uniquely to military-to-military counterterrorism support is a second-best solution. Otherwise, DOD foreign aid will balloon to less manageable and even more worrisome levels.

(2) It is clear that new mechanisms of cooperation between the two departments on counterterrorism aid have been found, with credit due in large measure to congressional interest, probing and oversight. Congress should continue to push for regional meetings of ambassadors, assistant secretaries of state, and senior interagency personnel, including the combatant commands, as regional planning and intelligence sharing are needed to address borderless terrorism.

(3) Those in Congress who support the foreign affairs budget should be vigilant and active in protecting robust funding levels throughout congressional deliberations, including the budget debate and authorization and appropriations processes.

(4) The Lugar-Biden reconstruction and stabilization bill should be a top priority for the Senate and should be passed before this Congress adjourns.

(5) This committee should carry out vigorous oversight on the issue of the role of the military in foreign policy. It is as important to listen to our ambassadors to get a handle on this issue as to officials in headquarters. Studies, hearings such as this, and appropriate legislative and budget decisions will go a long way toward keeping the right balance struck.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Rupp.

## STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE RUPP, CEO AND PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, NEW YORK, NY

Dr. RUPP. Thank you very much, Chairman Biden and Ranking Member Lugar. I'm delighted to be here. I'm honored to be part of this panel and I appreciate the fact that you are taking the lead in having these important issues addressed.

I'm the president of the International Rescue Committee, a board member of Interaction, the coalition of about 160 aid and development organizations, and cochair of the Interaction CEO level working group on civilian military affairs. I was also a member of the Smart Power Commission. In all of those roles, I have followed, I'd have to say with worry, increasing worry, the trend toward the militarization of foreign aid that has emerged in the arena of foreign policy and humanitarian assistance.

The International Rescue Committee operates in 42 countries around the world. Almost all of those countries are in the midst of conflict or suffering from its aftermath. They would be nonpermissive environments for the most part, to use Rubin's taxonomy. Our largest programs are in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. We also have a program in Iraq. Therefore we are accustomed to working in close proximity to military

forces and we are acutely aware of the indispensable role that assuring security plays for allowing our work.

Everyone, virtually everyone who has spoken here has praised Secretary Gates and quoted him. I will praise him. I won't requote him because he's already been invoked many times. But in keeping with the collaborative tone that Secretary Gates has consistently exemplified, I'd like to register three brief points, and I'd ask that my full testimony be entered into the record because I will truncate what I say orally.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be.

Dr. RUPP. First, the U.S. military has an entirely appropriate role in humanitarian activity. Second, in all but the most extreme settings there is a comparative advantage for civilian-led response to the challenges of relief and development assistance. Third, there is a quite drastic imbalance in the resources available to the two sectors, a point that both you, Chairman Biden, and you, Ranking Member Lugar, have made very eloquently.

My first point acknowledges the vital contribution to international disaster assistance that the U.S. military provides at crucial times of urgent need. Especially in sudden onset natural disasters, our military has very impressive capacity to deliver quality engineering and transportation capabilities, logistical personnel and materials, and emergency telecommunications quickly and with global reach.

There are many examples even in our recent history: Ethiopia and Sudan in 1984–85, Northern Iraq in 1991, Goma, Zaire, in 1994, Kosovo and Macedonia in May 1999. More recently, the United States military distinguished itself in its response to the tsunami, especially in Indonesia, and to the earthquake in South Asia and in its response in Pakistan.

But even in these dramatic examples, the U.S. military's efforts were most effective when they were coordinated with such civilian agencies on the ground as the U.S. Agency for International Development, the United Nations, and NGOs that are expert in disaster relief.

So that's my brief but heartfelt applause for the important role that the military can play in these circumstances.

My second point is that civilian humanitarian agencies are positioned more effectively than the military in situations where they are present, operational, and knowledgeable about the needs of the populations in distress. At the IRC we emphasize programs designed to involve people in the very projects from which they will benefit. We've had lots of mentions of Afghanistan and Pakistan as examples where there is not enough security and therefore the military needs to play a lead role. We have very major programs in Afghanistan. It's one of our largest programs. We have 99 percent Afghan staff; so we work very closely with local communities. We're present in over a thousand villages, most of them off-limits to the U.S. military and NATO forces, and we work there very closely with villages, building the capacity of those villages in a way that they themselves strongly affirm. I don't mean we never have security problems, but we continue to operate there.

Similarly, we've just launched a major initiative in the FATA, which is the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, with

USAID funding, in which we also are working with 100 percent Pakistani staff in order to build local capacity and livelihoods and training.

I use those examples because they underscore the fact that one of the most crucial components of NGO security for our staff in the field is the acceptance by the local community of our presence. We cultivate that acceptance by valuing cultural sensitivity, understanding local customs, demonstrating long-term commitment in the community, and employing large numbers of the community members themselves.

Military troops can compromise this security of our staff by blurring the line between military and civilian humanitarian personnel.

I was involved in a 2-year project to draft and negotiate a common set of principles for the operational conduct of field operations. The resulting guidelines for relations between the U.S. Armed Forces and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations were jointly published by Interaction and the U.S. Department of Defense. The guidelines provide practical recommendations on how NGOs and the military will conduct themselves in terms of dress and appearance, institutional visibility, protocols, transportation, field activities, communication, joint meetings, and coordination. They are needed especially in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, where the U.S. military and NGOs operate in the same space.

The guidelines include much common sense, as both the Department of Defense and NGOs have recognized, but they are not yet common knowledge.

That brings me to my third and final point: The imbalance in resources available to the military and civilian sectors. I can be brief here because this point, including the metaphor of imbalance, has been used by both of you, distinguished members and leaders of the committee. But let me remind us again of the point, Senator Biden, that you made in an aside, namely that the Department of Defense funding is $600 billion a year—that's about 22 percent of the Federal budget. The Department of State has about 1 percent, and the money that goes specifically for development aid by civilian agencies is far, far smaller than 1 percent.

The ability of the Department of State to carry out effective long-term strategies to rebuild countries that are recovering from conflict has been hampered because of resource constraints. The U.S. military has stepped in to fill the gap, as has been observed by all participants in this panel. A number of new programs that are well funded in the DOD budget involve the military in humanitarian, development, and reconstruction activities. They've been discussed. I won't go through all of them, but mention in particular the possibility that AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM are the opening wedge of making this pattern not only in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, but more broadly.

The result is that the proportion of official development assistance that Department of Defense controls has grown dramatically, a point which has been made by a number of others who have testified and I won't belabor all of the data.

What we have to do is to build the capabilities to shape the security environment in ways that obviate the need for military intervention. Poverty alleviation and state-building are keys to reducing

the threat to U.S. security. USAID and the Department of State, which are Departments of peaceful offense and benevolent power as we call them, must be given ample financial resources, staffed, with trained and experienced personnel, and supplemented with a surge capacity of civilian staff ready for deployment on short notice.

As GEN William "Kip" Ward, Commander of AFRICOM, suggested in one of our several meetings, we should each stay in our own lane and not confuse the identities of actors so that we can have maximum positive impact.

In closing, I emphasize that this recent trend of militarization of foreign assistance is not irreversible or inevitable. It can change, and it is you, the distinguished Senators who serve on this committee, who are in a position to influence and guide that change as the country prepares for a new administration. That is why this hearing today is particularly timely and why I am especially grateful to have the opportunity to appear.

Thank you very much for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Rupp follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE RUPP, PRESIDENT AND CEO, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, NEW YORK, NY

INTRODUCTION

Thank you for the invitation to address the distinguished members of this committee. I am honored to be part of this panel, and I appreciate the time and attention you are devoting to this important subject. I am the president of the International Rescue Committee, a board member of InterAction, the coalition of over 160 relief and development nongovernmental organizations, and the cochair of an InterAction CEO-level steering committee on civil-military relations. In these roles, I have followed closely the worrisome trend toward militarization of foreign aid that has emerged in the arena of foreign policy and humanitarian assistance.

As important as InterAction is for the entire NGO community, my perspective is most crucially informed by the experience of the International Rescue Committee. Our origins go back to Albert Einstein and focus on resettling refugees in the United States—in the earliest instance from Nazi-occupied Europe. We continue to do that work in collaboration with the State Department and through 24 resettlement offices across the U.S. But because there are large numbers of uprooted people who will not be resettled in America, we also operate in 42 countries around the world.

Almost all of the countries in which we operate internationally are in the midst of conflict or suffering from its aftermath. Our largest programs are in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. We also have programs in Iraq. Therefore, we are accustomed to working in close proximity to military forces, and we are acutely aware of the indispensable role that assuring security plays in allowing our work.

I was present earlier this month when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates delivered remarks in which he acknowledged "that America's civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long—relative to what we traditionally spend on the military, and more important, relative to the responsibilities and challenges our Nation has around the world."

In keeping with the collaborative tone that Secretary Gates has consistently exemplified, I would like to register three points: First, the U.S. military has an entirely appropriate role in humanitarian activity; second, in all but the most extreme settings, there is a comparative advantage for a civilian-led response to the challenges of relief and development assistance; and third, there is a quite drastic imbalance in the resources available for the two sectors.

*1. Appropriate Role of the U.S. Military in Humanitarian Activity*

As my first point, I would like to acknowledge the vital contribution to international disaster assistance that the U.S. military provides at crucial times of urgent need. Especially in sudden-onset natural disasters our military has impressive capacity to deliver quality engineering and transportation capabilities, logistical per-

sonnel and materials, and emergency telecommunications quickly and with global reach.

Examples of military involvement in humanitarian operations in exceptional circumstances include Ethiopia and Sudan in 1984–85, Northern Iraq in 1991, Goma, Zaire, in 1994, and Kosovo and Macedonia in May 1999.

More recently, the U.S. military's contributions to affected populations after the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Pakistan/South Asia Earthquake were invaluable, and their contribution helped improve public opinion toward Americans in those countries.

But even in these dramatic examples, the U.S. military's efforts were most effective when they were coordinated with such civilian agencies on the ground as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations, and NGOs that are expert in disaster relief.

*2. Comparative Advantages of Civilian Response to Crises*

My second point is that civilian humanitarian agencies are positioned to respond more effectively than the military in situations where they are present, operational, and knowledgeable about the needs of populations in distress. Many of the International Rescue Committee's relief workers have spent their entire careers cultivating a professional approach to aid delivery in which we take pride. Like other major relief and development agencies, we emphasize programs designed to involve people in the very projects from which they will benefit. We strive for empowerment of local communities, capacity-building of national institutions, gender equity, and self-reliance of individual beneficiaries.

One of the most crucial components of NGO staff security in the field is the acceptance by local communities of our presence. We cultivate this acceptance by valuing cultural sensitivity, understanding local customs, demonstrating long-term commitment in a community or refugee camp, and employing high numbers of community members.

Military troops can compromise the security of NGO staff by blurring the lines between military and civilian humanitarian personnel. If we work too close to the military, NGOs become vulnerable to accusations that we are agents of the Pentagon or spies rather than operationally independent humanitarian workers. This problem is exacerbated in those instances when the U.S. military has chosen to conduct aid projects while driving civilian vehicles and dressed as civilian aid workers while carrying concealed weapons—a dangerous practice that can put the lives of NGO workers in jeopardy. As a result, NGOs are vigilant about distinguishing ourselves from belligerent forces.

It is tempting, I am sure, for military commanders with personnel and resources to deploy them and carry out humanitarian activities as part of a "hearts and minds" campaign to win the support or acceptance of a local population. This type of activity may meet short-term goals of the military: Positive outreach to local populations, exercises in team-building, and boosting troop morale. But it is not a good use of taxpayer money and may have little lasting impact. In contrast, well-designed civilian-led efforts demonstrate a long-term commitment to help others.

The motive of soldiers who are implementing aid services is not in question, but there is good reason to doubt their effectiveness in undertaking activities for which they are not trained. Further, estimates of the cost per year to maintain a U.S. soldier in the field are as much as 10 times what it takes to deploy an American aid worker—and even a much higher multiple of the amount required to support the vast majority of our staff (over 95 percent) drawn from the local population.

I was involved in a 2-year project to draft and negotiate a common set of principles for operational conduct in field operations. The resulting "Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations" were jointly published in 2005 by InterAction and the U.S. Department of Defense. The guidelines provide practical recommendations on how NGOs and the military will conduct themselves in terms of dress and appearance, institutional visibility protocols, transportation, field activities, communication, joint meetings, and coordination. They are particularly needed in places like Afghanistan and Iraq where the U.S. military and NGOs operate in the same space.

Even though the guidelines have been approved by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Secretary of State, they need to be disseminated into the ranks of the U.S. military and to our own field staff. I appreciate that Defense Secretary Gates has acknowledged this need, which should help raise awareness about them. The guidelines include much common sense, but they are not yet common knowledge.

*3. Funding for Humanitarian Assistance: Out of Balance*

That brings me to my third point: The imbalance in resources available to the civilian and military sectors.

With over $600 billion a year in funding and over 1½ million uniformed personnel, the Pentagon and its operations account for 22 percent of the Federal budget. All spending on international affairs agencies is a little over 1 percent of the Federal budget. Relief and development aid is much less than 1 percent.

The ability of the Department of State to carry out effective, long-term strategies to rebuild countries that are recovering from conflict has been hampered because of resource constraints. The U.S. military has stepped in to fill the gap. A number of new programs that are well-funded in the DOD budget involve the military in humanitarian, development, and reconstruction activities. These include the Commanders' Emergency Response Fund Program (CERP), the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating in Afghanistan and Iraq, and some of the planned activities of the Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

The result is that the proportion of official development assistance that the Department of Defense controls has grown dramatically—surpassing 20 percent of all of the U.S.'s Official Development Assistance in 2005, a fourfold increase since 1998, when it was 3.5 percent. The percentage is slightly lower in the past fiscal year (18 percent), but is still remarkably higher than the pattern through the 1990s.

The militarization of development assistance, the growing power of combatant commands, and the projection of U.S. global power in the form of military might are undermining the authority of the Secretary of State to set the agenda for U.S. foreign policy. At the same time, USAID's lead role in poverty reduction and impartial humanitarian assistance is depleted by years of chronic underfunding and reduction in qualified staff.

The legitimacy of foreign aid depends on the extent to which our efforts are perceived as consistent with the needs of those we seek to assist. Congress should fund aid programs that have long-term impact, build trust with communities, and cultivate genuine relationships with countries receiving assistance. These programs should be funded where they belong—in the international affairs budget and not in the defense budget.

CONCLUSION

As Secretary of Defense Gates stated earlier this month, "We cannot kill or capture our way to victory." We are learning that the fight against extremism will not be won in the battlefield. The enemy is not terrorism; the enemy is ignorance and poverty. The remedy is health, education, and economic development, carried out in a cost-effective way by experts.

Importantly, we must build the capabilities to shape the security environment in ways that obviate the need for military intervention. Poverty alleviation and state-building are the keys to reducing external threats to U.S. security. USAID and the Department of State—our Departments of Peaceful Offense and Benevolent Power—must be given ample financial resources, staffed with trained and experienced personnel, and supplemented with a surge capacity of civilian staff ready for deployment on short notice to trouble spots around the world. As General "Kip" Ward, Commander of AFRICOM, suggested to me in a meeting, we should each "stay in our lanes."

In closing, I emphasize that this recent trend of militarization of foreign assistance is not irreversible or inevitable. It can change. And it is you—the distinguished Senators who serve on this committee—who are in a position to influence and guide that change as the country prepares for a new administration. That is why this hearing today is particularly timely.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, an interesting statistic, that I'm not sure what it really says, but there are substantially more people who play, who are musicians, in military bands in the United States military than there are total Foreign Service officers. I found that an interesting little statistic.

Mr. Perito, how are you? Welcome. Thank you.

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. PERITO, SENIOR PROGRAM OFFICER, CENTER FOR POST-CONFLICT PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. PERITO. As a former Foreign Service officer, I resemble that remark.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you play an instrument? That's the question.

Mr. PERITO. I used to, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you qualify.

Please.

Mr. PERITO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar. I want to express my appreciation for the invitation to appear here today and say that I'm very honored to take part in this very important discussion of the military's increasing role in implementing U.S. foreign policy. My remarks today will focus on the 1207 program, which is a case study of a congressionally mandated effort to develop integrated security assistance projects. My statement is a summary of a longer report which I prepared on this subject in response to a joint request from the Department of State and the Department of Defense. I respectfully request that my prepared statement be submitted for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be, and we are familiar with the report as well.

Mr. PERITO. Thank you.

The views that I express today are my own and not those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

As we all know, since the beginning of fiscal year 2006 section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act has provided up to $100 million a year in funds, services, and defense articles to the State Department for security, reconstruction and stabilization programs—a rather unique idea, Congress giving money to one Department to be utilized by another. Funds were authorized by the Armed Services Committee in response to a request from Secretaries Rumsfeld and Rice to help jump-start the new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the State Department and provide opportunities for the Department of State and the Department of Defense to work together to deal with contemporary challenges.

Projects focused on security, stabilization, or reconstruction by promoting regional stability or by building capacity of partner countries to address conflict, instability, and sources of terrorism. These programs were designed to address urgent or emergent threats and they were also supposed to involve "whole of government" approaches by integrating the work of various agencies across multiple sectors.

The history of the 1207 program provides a number of practical examples of the problems that arise when the Department of State is expected to exercise leadership in implementing U.S. foreign policy, but the Department of Defense is provided with the resources. It's also an example of the practical problems of interagency coordination that occur even in a situation where agencies decide that they want to work together.

I'd like to start with a history of this program. In fiscal year 2006, the first year of the 1207 program, almost nothing happened.

Confusion and bureaucratic conflicts between Departments prevented any action and there was confusion caused by different bureaucratic cultures. The Defense Department was not amused, for example, when the State Department sent over a memo asking DOD to simply send a check for $100 million. It wasn't until the end of the fiscal year that a small program—$10 million—was provided to Lebanon to provide assistance after the war between Israel and Hezbollah.

In fiscal year 2007, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization assumed leadership of the program and began working closely with DOD to cobble together an application process, which was troubled by conflicts within the State Department. USAID complained that it was excluded from the decision-making process, but was then expected to implement the projects.

By fiscal year 2008, the formal application procedures had been worked out. USAID was added as a full partner into the process. Even then, implementing 1207 has provided examples of the type of practical problems that arise when the Department of State and the Department of Defense attempt to work together.

The first problem that became apparent is that country teams in small embassies in crisis countries were really incapable of completing the very complex applications that were required to get 1207 projects. These applications were developed largely by DOD, which has large staffs of highly trained strategic planners, and was interested in creating a program that replicated the 1206 program.

Second, since only $100 million was made available, projects were reduced in size to spread the money as far as possible. The Haiti Strategic Initiative, which was supposed to involve three Haitian cities and multiple sites, was reduced to one site and one city. This year the $100 million will be spent among nine different countries, so everybody gets somewhere around $10 million.

Third, the 1207 program was only authorized; it was not appropriated and it was not earmarked. DOD did not fund proposals until the very end of the fiscal year to make sure there were not more important needs for the money.

Funding 1207 proposals was not without risk for DOD because senior Members of the House of Representatives have challenged DOD to demonstrate why giving $10 million to Nepal was more important than using that money to buy body armor and ammunition for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Even after the funds were actually allocated by DOD at the end of the fiscal year, it took so long for the money to make its way to the State Department that projects went more than a year without funding. An example of this was Somalia: A proposal was put in when the Islamic Courts movement was defeated and the transitional government retook and reoccupied Mogadishu. The money didn't actually arrive in the State Department until more than a year later. By then the circumstances on the ground had changed and the project couldn't be implemented.

Since continuation of the 1207 program is assured for at least next year and maybe longer, there are at least four actions that could be taken to make this program work better. First, since everyone has endorsed this program, including Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice, DOD could treat, as a virtual earmark, this $100

million out of the $150 billion DOD operating budget. It could make funds available as soon as projects are approved. This would speed up the process.

Second, State could provide strategic guidance and staff support to embassies to assist them to prepare project applications, to assure that the right countries were involved and assure that the right proposals were forthcoming. This might be a future job for members of the Active Response Corps, which is a component of the Civilian Reserve Corps the Department of State is beginning to recruit. This could be a place where these talented and skilled people work and gain experience. This is something that would have to be worked out with Congress and with the participating agencies, but it's a thought.

Third, State should conduct an evaluation of projects that are now under way to see how they are going and whether they're meeting their goals. A very quick look at some of these projects shows that implementation has been problematic.

Finally, Congress and State should work together to honor the original intention of the congressional creators of this program. They should find a way to provide the money for this program directly to the State Department in the 150 Account. This step would cut administrative costs, save time, and regularize this important program.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Perito follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. PERITO, SENIOR PROGRAM OFFICER, CENTER FOR POST-CONFLICT PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, I want to express my appreciation for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the military's increasing role in implementing U.S. foreign policy. My remarks will focus on the "1207 program," an example of a congressionally mandated effort to develop integrated security assistance projects. My statement is a summary of a longer report on this subject, which I prepared in response to a joint request from the Department of Defense and the Department of State. The views I express are my own and not those of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

INTRODUCTION

Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2006 and FY 2007 authorized the Defense Department (DOD) to provide up to $200 million over 2 years in funds, services, and defense articles to the State Department (DOS) for security, reconstruction, and stabilization. The State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) assumed leadership of an interagency process to develop proposals and request funding for projects that would carry out the intent of the act. Projects focused on security, stabilization, or reconstruction objectives. They advanced U.S. national security interests by promoting regional stability and/or building the governance capacity of partner countries to address conflict, instability, and sources of terrorism. Programs addressed urgent or emergent threats or opportunities and involved countries where a failure to act could lead to the deployment of U.S. military forces. Projects involved a whole of government approach by integrating initiatives across multiple sectors.

Since the inception of the program in FY06, DOD has provided funding for the following projects:

- In FY 06, DOD transferred $10 million in section 1207 assistance to the State Department for a program to support the internal security forces in Lebanon following the Israeli war.
- In FY 07, DOD transferred over $99 million in section 1207 assistance to DOS to fund projects in Haiti ($20m), Somalia ($25m), Nepal ($10m), Colombia

($4m), Trans-Sahara Africa ($15m), Yemen ($8.8m) and Southeast Asia ($16.9m).

- In FY 08, DOD will provide $100 million for nine projects.
- In FY 09, the NDAA will reauthorize the 1207 program. The House version provides $100 million annually through 2010; the Senate, $200 million through 2011.

INTENT OF CONGRESS

The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) introduced section 1207 into the FY06 NDAA in response to requests from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for help in jump-starting S/CRS by providing authorization and funding for projects that would involve interagency coordination. This action was taken in recognition of the fact that Congress was unable to pass a State Department authorization bill that would authorize S/CRS to conduct a comparable program. Congress regarded 1207 as a source of funding for short-term programs in response to emergencies and unforeseen contingencies.

Congress wanted State Department involvement to insure these security assistance projects would include more than a military perspective and would involve the use of political and economic means to resolve problems. Congress also wanted to indicate its clear support for the State Department assuming long-term responsibility for foreign security assistance programs and to urge the administration to request future funding for such projects in the State Department budget. Congress was aware that recent administrations had "pumped up" the foreign assistance component of the Defense Department budget because of the perception that it was easier to obtain congressional approval. Congress hoped that the relative difficulty for DOS of obtaining these funds via DOD would encourage the administration to request the money through the regular foreign assistance budget.

1207 FUNDS WERE "AUTHORIZED," BUT NOT ASSURED

The money authorized under 1207 was not covered by a corresponding appropriation. Funds were not "earmarked," but could be taken from the Defense Department's regular $150 billion budget for operations and management. DOD was required to decide that 1207 proposals took priority over other uses for the money, which included purchasing military equipment and ammunition. As a result, DOD held approved 1207 applications until the end of the fiscal year to insure that more urgent demands did not arise. Once DOD decided to fund the projects, money was transferred through the Office of Management and Budget to either the State Department or USAID where it was held until the implementing offices were prepared to obligate the funds.

Projects that were designed to respond to urgent threats or emergent opportunities were delayed because 1207 funding did not become available for up to a year after proposals were submitted. In Somalia, the defeat of the Islamic Courts Movement and the return of the Transitional Federal Government to Mogadishu created an opportunity for the U.S. to assist Somalia to restore stability, initiate counter terrorism efforts and alleviate human suffering. An integrated security assistance proposal was submitted in February 2007, but 1207 funds for project implementation did not reach the Africa Bureau of the State Department until February 2008, a year later. By then conditions in Somalia had changed dramatically and parts of the proposal could not be implemented because of the deteriorating security situation.

Waiting a year might seem like an exceptional delay except when compared to conventional U.S. foreign assistance programs. In the normal congressional budget cycle, the administration begins planning for the allocation of U.S. foreign and military assistance 2 years in advance of the fiscal year in which the funds will be appropriated. Congressional earmarks, report language and legal restrictions then determine how all but a tiny fraction of the money will be utilized during the fiscal year and thereafter. In the case of Foreign Military Financing (FMF), funding to deal with emergencies may not be available for up to 4 years in the future. Of the $4.6 billion FMF account only $80 million was available for discretionary use by DOD, which is less than the annual 1207 authorization.

The same is true for the State/USAID foreign assistance budget, which is all but completely controlled by earmarks and other legislative limitations. Supplemental appropriations can provide funds for emergencies, but this type of legislation is often controversial and may take up to a year from preparation to congressional approval. State and DOD officials view the fact that 1207 proposals were prepared, approved, and funded within 12–14 months as operating at "light speed" or "bureaucratic real time."

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE 1207 PROGRAM

The administration and Congress are increasingly aware that military force alone will not overcome the diverse and largely nonmilitary challenges that the U.S. faces from extremism and political instability. The 1207 program is a small, but important effort by Congress to encourage the State and Defense Departments to develop joint approaches to these emergent challenges. Despite some initial problems, it now seems likely that the program will continue. To improve the current 1207 program, it is suggested that the State and Defense Departments adopt the following recommendations:

- *Set aside DOD funds.* Since the Secretaries of State and Defense have publicly endorsed the 1207 program, DOD should set aside $100 million as a virtual contingency fund so that proposals receive funding as soon as they are approved. This will remove the current tension over whether DOD will actually make the money available and speed implementation of projects. This would help avoid the inability to implement projects because the crisis has worsened or the opportunity has disappeared.
- *Provide strategic direction.* State and DOD should provide strategic direction for 1207 projects by encouraging specific countries to submit proposals and providing the administrative support required to prepare applications. This would ensure that critical countries would not be left out or fail for lack of capacity to prepare the applications. It would also counter the practice of reducing the size of projects to spread the available funds as far as possible. The Haiti Strategic Initiative was reduced from three cities to one; the Tans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Project from five countries to three. This year $100 million was divided among nine countries.
- *Clarify the relationship between 1207 and the Civilian Response Corps (CRC).* Since S/CRS leads both of these initiatives, it should clarify the relationship between the Active Response Corps (ARC) and Standby Response Corps (SRC) components of the CRC and the 1207 program. ARC and SRC personnel that will be assigned to various agencies could be used to implement 1207 projects and 1207 could be used as a source of supplemental funding to keep CRC personnel in the field. However, this use of 1207 funds should be discussed with Congress and participating agencies and agreed in advance. Currently, S/CRS does not implement 1207 projects, a task that is delegated to USAID and other DOS bureaus.
- *Evaluate implementation of 1207 projects.* While the 1207 program is entering its third year, almost none of the 1207 projects have been evaluated to determine if they are accomplishing their objectives. S/CRS should use the money it will set aside this year for monitoring and evaluation to determine whether the eight original 1207 projects have been effectively implemented and achieved their goals.
- *Transfer funding to the State Department.* In the future, the State Department should request that Congress act on its stated intention toward the 1207 program and appropriate the funding to the State Department. DOD could still participate in deciding on project proposals, but the money would be guaranteed and could be made available more quickly. This would require coordinating the efforts of various congressional committees, but it would streamline the application process and restore the traditional role of the State Department in funding U.S. foreign assistance.

[Note: The statement is based upon a U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report entitled "Integrated Security Assistance: The 1207 Program," which is available on line at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr207.html.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Sir, let me start where you began and ask all three of you to respond. Your last suggestion seems to be where Ms. Locke said we should go: Either the 1206 program, as I understood you, Mary, eliminate or cap and transfer. Are you saying the same thing? Is the preferred position to be to take that $100 million, put it in the 150 account, let them make the judgments about where it goes, the portion that has to be implemented by the military in country be implemented through the embassy and through the ambassador? Is that what you're recommending basically, sir?

Mr. PERITO. Yes; that these funds be appropriated to the State Department and implemented out of the foreign assistance budget.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, how do you feel about that?

Dr. RUPP. I would agree that assistance ought to be administered through civilian agencies in every place it can be.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mary, let me ask you. In order for that to be done, don't we have to do a lot more systemically at State in order to provide the personnel and the expertise in countries, because some of the countries, as one of you pointed out, have relatively small embassies, with expertise that doesn't span the spectrum of need that the program that State here in Washington may conclude should be a recipient of whatever this particular programmatic aid is.

I don't think I'm expressing it very well, but if you transfer the $100 million—and they're asking for what, $800 million? They're asking for the program to move to what, $500 million? 1206. They have $300 million and they want to go to $750 million.

But the bottom line is the $100 million we've been referencing here, which has been what's in play so far, Defense is asking for that to be increased. Am I right about that, or are they not? My staff is even more perplexed by me than I am by me.

Ms. LOCKE. The two programs are differently funded and have different purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Ms. LOCKE. So 1206 is funded in the 050 Defense Department account.

The CHAIRMAN. Right, and how much——

Ms. LOCKE. 1207 is now in 050, but it's a direct transfer to the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Ms. LOCKE. In the case of 1206, the State Department would not have the people or programs to train and equip militaries. We have always used the Defense Department as the implementing agency under——

The CHAIRMAN. What I'm trying to get at is, it seems to me when you have the program residing in the Defense Department, notwithstanding the fact that, in effect, State has veto power over whether or not you train and equip A, B, or C paramilitary unit or military unit, army or air force of another country, that the practical effect is that authority by default, that judgment by default, falls to the Defense Department; that the State Department has a lot on their plate with limited resources.

Basically, what I'm going to ask in written questions to the first panel was, give me instances where State has actually vetoed what Defense wanted to do, where the Ambassador sits there and says, no; I don't want to do that, you can't do that. Theoretically, when Ambassador Negroponte kept talking about it's collaborative and the rest, the law says, as I read it, the State Department can say no, this is not an outfit you should be training or equipping or whatever.

Do you know of an instance where when you were here doing the study for the committee or now in your capacity where State Department has said, no, no, can't do that?

Ms. LOCKE. Yes; we did find that. In Morocco there was a program planned by the Defense Department. It went up through the two different channels. The Ambassador knew nothing about it. I don't know why. It was actually, I believe, put forward publicly and the Ambassador said no.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was stopped?

Ms. LOCKE. And it was stopped. So State does have that clout.

The CHAIRMAN. What's the practical effect on how agencies function?

Ms. LOCKE. Clout follows money.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Ms. LOCKE. It just does. We know this from the Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. Believe me, I understand.

Ms. LOCKE. And that's true in the interagency in Washington and it's true in the embassies. Now, because one ambassador was able to stop one program does not prove the reverse. I mean, it does not prove that it's not the case. We know this is the case.

If we continue along this path, while DOD says that it does not want to do all these jobs, what you find is as soon as there is the authority and a little bit of money there's more—there's more and more. The 1206 program started with 14 countries. It is now up to 42, I believe. Even the program that you mentioned, the CERP program, that started, remember, with finding funding, finding pockets of money that Saddam Hussein had found in Iraq. That is now a program that is funded in the 050 Account, authorized and appropriated.

So these programs grow.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that I'm glad you're speaking to that. That's my concern. Look, I have been surprised, unless—and I don't think these military guys on the trips that Senator Lugar and I have taken together—and we have taken several into that region where this all sort of—the rationale for this whole new approach began. But I literally hear, whether I'm out in a forward operating base with a young commander with 12 people or I am in a PRT in Afghanistan or I am sitting in Baghdad with a combatant commander, the constant refrain, and I think it is genuine—I may be kidding myself; they may be playing me; I don't think so—is that, we need more civilians here, Senator. State basically—State doesn't know what they're doing. State can't bring the people here. State does not have the capacity. State does not have the will, the will.

So I know this is tricky territory for you, but do you get the sense that the State Department is ready to sort of—has been ready to fight for its prerogatives, for lack of a better phrase here? Or is it prepared because—you know, it's that old expression that's attributed to G.K. Chesterton. He said: "It's not that Christianity has been tried and found wanting; it's that it's been found difficult and left untried."

Has this been just found too difficult for State and this left untried? They just are prepared to accede to the Defense Department? Because I don't get the sense, like I have in other areas, this is a case where the military comes in and says: Aha, this is our shot; let's go grab this big chunk of authority. It's they see a problem, the outfit's supposed to do it can't, won't, or is incapable of doing

it. They take it over and then say: Hey, it's ours now; we better do it all and now we want it and we want to keep it.

I'm being awfully simplistic, but can you respond to that?

Dr. RUPP. Well, Senator, in the earlier exchanges you noted the specific figures of the degree to which USAID's capacity, professional capacity, has been reduced over the years. That makes it very difficult for the kind of response that USAID, that had the strength it had shortly after Vietnam, for it to have a similar response now, when it has a small fraction of the professional expertise.

The numbers you quoted were 17,000 to 3,000. I think that's about right. I have it on very good authority, namely the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it's 2,000. I think it's 17 to 2. I think our witness has said 17 to 3.

Mr. PERITO. Yes; I think it's 1,200, if you're looking at the Foreign Service officers of USAID.

Dr. RUPP. That just makes it hugely challenging to be responsive, and it's one of the reasons that delivery of assistance on the civilian side has disproportionately gone to these large for-profit contractors even when their costs for delivering services are higher. But USAID does not have the professional civilian capacity to be able to deliver the goods.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to make it clear, and I'll yield to my colleague. I want to make it clear that I hold the Congress responsible here, too, because as much as Senator Lugar and I have fought for, under his leadership, significant increases in the authority, in the budgets of the State Department, the 150 function, we have had difficulty here with our colleagues in granting even what the President has asked for in the 150 budget.

So I hope—for the press that's here, this is not about a blame game. I'm not looking to say that the military or the administration—I think this ends up, almost everything is happening by default here. That's the part that worries me. That almost worries me more than if there was a conscientious plan here.

But let me yield to my colleague.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just following along that line of reasoning, because you are all veterans of the trail, I can remember back in the Clinton administration, Secretary Albright asking my assistance during November, say, before the budget is announced, to try to intercede with President Clinton to ask him and OMB to ask for more money for the State Department, which I did. And President Clinton did ask for more.

Then in that particular year, we watched on this committee as, through various slicings that occurred as the result of the hearings, the meetings of conference committees, and all the rest of it, bit by bit almost all of this was sort of sliced down to regular size. So this is not a new problem for this administration, sadly. In fact, before that both of us witnessed the whole business of USAID, its proposed reincorporation in the State Department, and many other types of reorganization. There was a feeling on my part even then that the committee sometimes came out almost as an enemy of the State Department, we were so busy controlling its activities.

But then the two of us are in a more expansive role. However, the reverse is not easy to do, given the circumstances after 9/11. As a practical matter, public opinion was galvanized, correctly, to defend our country. The President was given support. The defense budget rose in huge amounts to fight a war on terror, to go into two countries, in a war against the Government of Afghanistan, to overthrow it, and then finally the more ambitious course, to overthrow not only the Government of Iraq, but really all of its military officers, its political system, sort of root and branch.

Now, those are very ambitious goals and they require a lot of money, and the public support for all of that has continued.

But in the face of this, I remember, as I'm sure Senator Biden does, we were attempting to support Secretary Powell for a couple of years just to have the Foreign Service exam given again. There was no exam. There were no new Foreign Service officers. The attrition had come to that point. It was a day of celebration when he came to the witness table—I can remember over in Russell—and announced that, in fact, he was going to give the exam again.

So this is an ongoing struggle. However, public opinion has supported a very large budget and a very large deficit at this particular juncture, and that continues.

Now, it's under that umbrella that the administration says, if you've got to get something done that is where the money is and that is where the resources are, maybe not the right people or exactly the right territory. So common sense sort of takes over as you describe how we got to this point.

Now, suddenly Mary Locke and others go out and they begin interviewing ambassadors and they say to the ambassador: Maybe you should be in charge of everything going on in this country, or at least have some knowledge of it, even if you don't have command of it? Most of them agree that they should. And yet at the same time, moving from that point, sitting out there some distance from Washington while the conversation is going on here, it's not an easy task to include everybody. So this is why our committee helped. We sort of tried to accelerate that process.

I'm just curious, Mary, from your experience then and now, to what extent, just given the ambassadors you visited with, that you interviewed at that time, have they taken charge? Do they have more confidence? Has their ability really to manage—or even if it has, maybe you've already testified, or all three of you have, that even then they know about it, but it just doesn't necessarily mean that they have managerial control over it. And furthermore, some may still not have such inquiring minds. They may not persevere in the situation.

Ms. LOCKE. Well, I think most of our ambassadors are quite, quite good. They are now focused on 1206, part of it because the Congress is focused on 1206.

Senator LUGAR. So this is pretty universal, you think?

Ms. LOCKE. They realize this is an important function of this committee, is to raise the stakes for ambassadors if they don't know what the programs are.

But I think at one point in our history prior to 9/11 we saw some embassies as less important. I mean, I remember Foreign Service friends who were given a job in a certain embassy, given the am-

bassadorship, and somebody said: Whom did you make mad? How did you get assigned to this? There are no second class embassies any more. They are all at the front line of the campaign against terror.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that's reassuring.

Ms. LOCKE. And we cannot have second rate ambassadors. I would say over these two studies we probably were in 40 embassies and maybe 4 or 5 of those seemed to be in disarray and not up to speed.

But we can't afford that any more. Every single country in every single continent is on the front line.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that's an important factor just of our committee's responsibility, sort of oversight. Now, it may not be the responsibility of the staffs of our committee to conduct this, but if not you, who? In other words, I think that was useful, sort of elevating the whole idea that every embassy is first class, that all the ambassadors have to be knowledgeable about this.

Having gotten to that point, are all three of you testifying that even then they don't have the money, the people, the authority?

Ms. LOCKE. Yes.

Senator LUGAR. And that is the gist, it seems to me, of the collective testimony.

Go ahead.

Mr. PERITO. I'd like to come back to 1207, because 1207 is a very useful example of a small but important program which is totally civilian. The activities that are undertaken under 1207, have to do with job creation, health care, education, and police assistance. There is no reason why the funding for this program should be given to the Department of Defense.

This is a civilian program. If the Congress was able to move the funding for this program into the State Department budget, that would be an important step.

Second, these programs originate with the embassy country team and are signed off by the ambassador. That's an important authority and it's an example of the importance of the ambassador's authority to get things done. If we could just start here, this would get us on the road.

Senator LUGAR. But this is—to take that point, Mr. Perito, even if we agree that 1207 is civilian and so forth, how do you literally, in any administration, this one or the next one, get the relevant committees, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, or the relevant Cabinet people or the NSC to ask for the money in the State Department budget to begin with?

In other words, that's probably where it should end up, but the way our government works is the President asks for money, the Secretaries have defined these budgets, and for the moment there's great public support for the $600 or $700 billion in defense and sometimes it's tough to get support for what we're talking about in State.

If you were President and you saw you needed to do this, this is not the right way, you might rationalize, to do this, all things considered. But this is the way: You come to Congress. They're going to give you this money. If you go to the State Department, at least under the current circumstances, you may not get the

money, or it may be redistributed or sent to some other account as a practical matter.

I think we have sort of a fundamental question, how do we reorder the whole priorities of the country or our budget to get back to some normalcy prior to the understandable surge of money in the Defense Department that makes all these proportions so abnormal? And I'm not certain I can answer that question any more than you can, but I'm raising it because I think it's important as a practical matter as to how you get to where you want to go.

Mr. PERITO. Let me just reiterate a little history. When I started out doing the report on 1207, I assumed that this was a case where the Congress was trying to take money away from State and give it to Defense. When I talked to the staff members on the Armed Services Committees, both the House and the Senate, I was told: "No, that's not it at all; we are trying to force the State Department to exert its leadership and to take on these responsibilities. We want the State Department to ask for this money. We want the administration to ask for this money in the foreign assistance budget.

When you look at the legislative history and when you look at the hearing that occurred in the House in March, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee lectured both Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice about the fact that this program had been started in order to give them time to switch things back to the way they should be. In his words, they hadn't taken the hint.

So I think there are people on the Armed Services side who would like to put this back the way it should be. I think you would find there are allies out there.

Senator LUGAR. That sounds encouraging.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I want to follow up on that. I promise I won't trespass much longer on your time. That's what I found in the field. I mean, and I took it as being genuine. I've been hanging around for seven Presidents. I hope by now I can tell whether I'm being told something in the field by a State Department person or a USAID person or a military person, whether or not they're being sincere.

But my question still comes back, let's just stick with 1207 for a minute. Do you need more personnel to follow the $100 million? Let's assume we got the shift, Mary. Let's assume, Mr. Perito or Dr. Rupp, we got the shift of 1207 back into the State Department. What I get from State Department personnel who are in the field, who are not the ambassadors and not the Chargé, they will privately say when you're having a cup of coffee in the embassy: Look, we don't have the capacity, we don't have the personnel here. Not universally, but we don't have the personnel to handle these programs, handle this money, if we get it. We don't have the expertise, we don't have somebody who knows anything about job creation here. We don't have anybody who knows anything about whether or not we should or should not be training their police and how to train their police.

I remember the first trip—I think we were the first delegation into Iraq. We go to the police station where they're training police, and we came back. It was—God love them, as my mother would

say. They tried, but it was laughable. I mean, it was like the Katzenjammer Kids. Remember, they tried to march for us and to salute? It was like, whoa, what's going on here?

But again, again, that's unusual. That was in the immediate aftermath of a full-blown war. So I don't want to make that a model.

But Mary, does money—beyond the $100 million, do you need more people to administer, to deal with the effective use of the transfer of 1207?

Ms. LOCKE. Yes. The short answer is, "Yes." And it's not just the 1207 money. We need more people——

The CHAIRMAN. No; we do overall. I just was focusing on—because I think if we can make the case that even dealing with this one simple program out of a panoply of programs that are out there that relate to development as well as military assistance and train and equip, that it allows a bite-sized morsel for people out there who are just trying to figure out how to put food on their table and send their kids to school to understand why we need to do this.

The one thing I'm optimistic about—and maybe I'm kidding myself—but I really am: I really believe there is a generic sort of feeling among average people out there who don't know 1207 from B–69, they have no notion of it, but I do get the sense that there is a generic sense that there's an imbalance, that there's a fundamental imbalance, not that they don't like the military, but there's a fundamental imbalance between, as the military guys talk about, when things are at zero instead of at four or at three or at two, when you're trying to prevent—prevent bad things from happening. Use Friedman's phrase: If you don't want the bad neighborhood to visit you, you better visit it.

I think that sunk in. I think the next President, whomever it is, if he decides to, could effectively, if he made it a priority, come and say: I'm going to rejigger, reconfigure, at least the allocation of resources relating to personnel here.

Mr. PERITO. Could I close with one suggestion? Some of the civilian capacity is about to come on line if it's used intelligently. We're now recruiting the Civilian Response Corps, particularly those parts of it that will serve full-time in the Federal Government. These people could be the cadre that could do this work in 1207 programs, not only preparing the proposals but also implementing them.

Today the capacity doesn't exist, but this capacity could come on line. If we fund the Civilian Response Corps in its entirety and we stand it up in the next 4 years, it could do the job.

The CHAIRMAN. My concern is we better fund it much larger than the present State Department thinks it should be funded.

Mr. PERITO. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Along the lines that Senator Lugar and I have been pushing. And then again, what's going to happen is they're going to focus that Civilian Response Corps on those areas which are still going to be festering. They're not going to go to the places where there hasn't been a problem yet and figure out how to prevent a problem. That's my worry about that. But at any rate.

Dr. RUPP. Mr. Chairman, I'd in closing just say that I think the answer to your question is that we must make a change in the bal-

ance between the civilian and the military. We have a new administration coming. You two are well aware of this issue and it really is incumbent on you as chair and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to get it high on the agenda for the new administration. We will applaud and support you in every way we can as you try to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. That's totally Senator Lugar's responsibility. I just want to make that clear. [Laughter.]

Mary, do you have any closing comment?

Ms. LOCKE. There may be a——

The CHAIRMAN. And by the way, are you willing to come back? We need you, Mary.

Ms. LOCKE. Real quick—come back?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Are you crazy, Joe? [Laughter.]

Ms. LOCKE. There may be a coalition opportunity here. There are 21 members of this committee. I don't know how many members there are of Armed Services, but 28 or 30. There are more than 50 members on the two committees. A national security push to build the civilian side of the national security operation, why not? Both committees on board, voting against every offset in the budget debate that takes on the 150 account as the offset, voting against cuts, the appropriations levels, the 402[b] allocations, any opportunity you have. And then as people see that this is a tough coalition——

The CHAIRMAN. I think you're putting an awful heavy burden on your old boss's shoulders. He's got a much heavier lift than I do on that part. [Laughter.]

I thank you all very, very much. I warn you, we'll be calling on you again. This is the beginning of a long journey, I think, and hopefully we'll succeed. But thank you all very much.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:57 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

---

## ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

### RESPONSES OF DEPUTY SECRETARY JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

*Question.* A number of trends point to an increasing Department of Defense role in activities traditionally overseen by civilian agencies. DOD's share of U.S. foreign assistance has expanded from 5.6 percent to 22 percent (although much of the increase is due to programs in Iraq and Afghanistan). In recent years Congress has provided temporary authority to DOD to expand the use of its own resources to train and equip foreign security forces. Regional Combatant Commands (such as SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM) are being used as platforms for coordinating regional activities of U.S. civilian agencies as well as military.

- Are recent trends exceptional, or are they part of a long-term trend to rely on DOD to provide foreign assistance?
- Are Iraq and Afghanistan anomalies? Will DOD's role in foreign aid drop as those missions drawdown? Or do they represent a new trend in how DOD will engage with countries?

Answer. The unique challenges facing our country warrant innovations which maximize the capabilities and resources of both the Departments of Defense and State. In some cases, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has been required to assume certain missions to meet near-term exigencies where they are deployed.

Other activities—in particular training and equipping partner militaries—are a DOD need, given the current threat environment, to fulfill a military responsibility assigned to it. These are activities DOD must undertake, although only under "dual

key" approaches that ensure the Department of State retains its responsibility for directing United States foreign policy. The section 1206 program, for example, is focused primarily on quickly addressing operational requirements and military capabilities identified by U.S. military officers at Combatant Commands and country team personnel at our embassies overseas. Both Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates have made clear that the current and future security environment is one characterized by threats from within states as much as from states, and will require capacity-building to execute some military missions. Section 1206 authority allows us to meet this need, and is designed deliberately to do so using a dual-key approval mechanism that allows for explicit final approval from the Secretary of State and Chiefs of Mission in-country. We believe that this is a valuable authority which should be continued, not just to provide the necessary resources to meet these needs as identified by our Chiefs of Mission and Combatant Commanders in the field, but for the seamless coordination of efforts it has engendered both in-country and at strategic levels. Our security assistance programs focus on a much broader range of activities and are designed to address jointly identified priorities in the mid to long term. Therefore, we view 1206 and our security assistance programs to be complimentary.

Iraq and Afghanistan are countries in which we have an active military presence. DOD's increased share in Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a reflection of military activities in those countries, which suggests that DOD's role in providing such assistance will decline if we are not engaged in countries in which there are active conflicts of such magnitude. For instance, in 2000, DOD's share of ODA was 6 percent without Afghanistan and Iraq while in 2005 DOD's share of ODA went down to 2.2 percent without Afghanistan and Iraq, consistent with historical levels.

*Question.* A conference sponsored by State's Foreign Service Institute recently stated that the increased reliance on the military for foreign assistance is caused by the fact that "the current interagency process is inadequate to address modern transnational security threats that require a deft combination of hard and soft power." They concluded: "We need greater leadership [on Latin American affairs] from the civilian side of the house."

Is it accurate and fair to conclude that the trend toward militarization is due to a vacuum created on the civilian side—that the military is compensating for inadequacies on the civilian side? What do you think is driving the trend? What should be done to address the causes?

Answer. We do not believe U.S. foreign assistance has been militarized. The security challenges we face today have their root not only in military competition, but also in social, economic, and political conditions. It is not surprising, therefore, that our military recognizes that importance of the nonmilitary dimensions of security. At times the military implements assistance that is nonmilitary in nature due to diverse circumstances—including their on-the-ground presence, or to support a civilian effort. In other cases, the Defense Department funds some activities that meet a military requirement to build a partner's capacity, but only with the final approval of the Chief of Mission in-country and the Secretary of State in Washington. In all such cases, the U.S. military remains exemplary in its dedication to the principle of civilian control and the civilian direction of foreign policy.

The Secretary of State remains firmly in the lead on foreign policy and assistance, both in Washington and overseas. However, our mission and the need for our leadership abroad is growing. We look forward to working with Congress to ensure we are rising to the challenges. To do this, we urge Congress to provide State and USAID with the additional resources requested in the President's FY 2009 budget request. Within the 1,100 State Operations positions requested were 351 positions for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative to help support, train, equip and deploy an interagency Civilian Response Corps. We appreciate the advance funding on this initiative that the Congress provided in the FY 2008 supplemental and the FY 2009 bridge funding. The resources requested will help State and USAID ensure the proper balance of diplomatic, development, and defense tools in American foreign policy.

*Question.* Secretary Gates has also said that the "militarization" of foreign policy can be avoided if—"there is the right leadership, adequate funding of civilian agencies, effective coordination on the ground, and a clear understanding of the authorities, roles, and understandings of military versus civilian efforts, and how they fit, or in some cases don't fit, together."

- Why haven't civilian agencies been able to find the right leadership, funding, coordination, and understanding of roles so far?
- Do civilian institutions need to adopt wide-scale reforms that the intelligence community has taken?

- What are the implications if civilian agencies are unable to achieve this balance—can or should the military increase its policy role and dominance?

Answer. Today, as never before, we must ensure that our foreign policy and foreign assistance institutions—civilian and military—work together to achieve development, diplomacy, and defense results that promote our humanitarian and national security goals around the world. We have recently seen several significant reports on the future of U.S. foreign assistance and the ways in which the United States organizes, funds, and delivers aid programs. The consensus in these reports is encouraging; they make a bipartisan case for increasing investments and for modernizing aid structures to reflect the importance of meeting global development challenges. We have invested considerable effort to improve the coherence and effectiveness of our foreign assistance architecture.

Two years ago, Secretary Rice reviewed the challenges of effectively delivering and programming foreign assistance. She recognized that our assistance programs must become better organized and integrated to meet the national security, development, and humanitarian challenges of the 21st century. Therefore, in 2006, Secretary Rice launched an effort to improve the coherence and effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance. Secretary Rice established the position of Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance with authority over most assistance programs developed and delivered by the Department of State and USAID. The Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance is simultaneously the Administrator of USAID. This "dual-hatted" structure helps to ensure that our overall foreign assistance programming has a strong development emphasis and that it is also closely tied to our foreign policy objectives.

The Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (DFA) is working toward bringing a "whole of government" approach to our foreign assistance programming. This approach is guided by an overarching goal—a goal Secretary Rice has articulated as Transformational Diplomacy: To help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.

As an important first step to bringing about policy coherence, we have started to implement and refine the basic management tools necessary to ensure assistance programs across the U.S. Government are linked to our foreign policy goals. We are also implementing a more integrated budget process in Washington and at posts. We have brought a much stronger country focus to both budget and implementation decisions. We are 2 years into this major effort to reform foreign assistance. While we have made many important strides, we also recognize that there is much more to do. We approach the foreign assistance reform process conscientiously and constantly strive to improve our systems so that they enable us to manage aid more effectively while giving the necessary latitude to our staff in the field, who must respond to local realities in the delivery of our programs.

Staffing and funding have not grown commensurate with the tremendous growth in requirements and programs; USAID's workforce and infrastructure must keep pace. Consequently, Administrator Henrietta Fore launched a 3-year plan to significantly increase the size of our development corps. The Development Leadership Initiative (DLI) aims to strengthen and invest in USAID's critically important permanent Foreign Service Officer Corps. In addition, the President's FY 2009 budget request included $248.6M for a Civilian Stabilization Initiative to begin to build the Civilian Response Corps, which is comprised of a 250-person Active component, a 200-person Standby component, and a 2,000-person Reserve component. In addition, the FY 2009 Department's budget request includes the largest funding request in a single year to date for increased personnel resources—1,100 positions in total, including 351 for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (including the 250 for the Active component mentioned above). This increase in personnel is needed because the Department's personnel resources have not been able to keep pace with the increasing demands on the diplomatic corps around the world due to lower than requested funding and the damaging impact of exchange rate losses over the last several fiscal years.

There are numerous recent examples where the administration and the Congress have worked closely together to provide development funding commensurate with the challenges and opportunities that exist around the world. As a result, the USG has nearly tripled Official Development Assistance since 2001. We are on track to double our assistance to sub-Saharan Africa between 2004 and 2010. Perhaps the most significant example of sustained funding focus is the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief where we have already invested nearly $19 billion in programs designed to reduce the transmission and impact of HIV/AIDS, with the goal of treating 2 million people, preventing 7 million infections, and caring for 10 million people. However, we would again highlight the need for Congress to provide State and USAID with the additional resources requested in the President's FY 2009 budget

request. The resources requested will help State and USAID ensure the proper balance of diplomatic, development, and defense tools in American foreign policy.

*Question.* Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been vocal in calling for more civilian resources and capacity: "It has become clear that America's civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long—relative to what we spend on the military, and more important, relative to the responsibilities and challenges our Nation has around the world."

- What will it take to bring civilian institutions up to the task? What reforms, investments and changes need to occur so civilians can be effective counterparts to the military? What is preventing these reforms from taking place currently?
- If the leaders of the State and Defense Departments are in such close agreement about the need for more resources for civilian national security agencies, do you see any possibility of reducing DOD's share of the budget to make resources available? Or do we need to simply accept that America's national security requires much larger State Department and USAID budgets, along with large military budgets?

Answer. There is no question that reform and institutional change take time. Our foreign assistance reform effort, while still in the formative days, has made significant progress in bringing U.S. foreign policy objectives into closer alignment with resource allocations and in creating coherency across country programs. We have taken the first steps to reinvigorate USAID's development corps. However, we still have progress to make. We need more flexibility in funding streams. We need programs that are demand-driven, not ones that are dictated by the type of funding available. We need to recruit and retain a robust workforce, with strong operational and technical skills. We need to further streamline our planning and allocation processes. We need to fully implement a whole of government approach that achieves better coordination of USG foreign assistance programs. These steps are essential to develop, implement, and sustain a coherent USG foreign assistance program that can more effectively link with the efforts of many countries and organizations to successfully impact the lives of millions of people around the world. And to be successful, we need the active engagement of Congress, public and private partners, and the international community.

In recognition of the need for significant funding commensurate with the challenges and opportunities around the world, we have nearly tripled Official Development Assistance since 2001. We are on track to double our assistance to sub-Saharan Africa between 2004 and 2010. Perhaps the most significant example of sustained funding focus is the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief where we have already invested nearly $19 billion in programs designed to reduce the transmission and impact of HIV/AIDS, with the goal of treating 2 million people, preventing 7 million infections, and caring for 10 million people. The FY 2009 request continues this upward trend with a 10-percent increase from the FY 2008 request and a 2.7-percent increase from the FY 2008 enacted. While we appreciate your support for the International Affairs 150 Account, we are disappointed that both the House and Senate FY 2009 marks are lower than the requested level. We continue to urge for full funding of the FY 2009 request; it is necessary and urgent.

*Question.* Is DOD the appropriate institution in which to implement foreign aid activities? What are the practical effects of providing the Department of Defense new authority for foreign assistance? Does the administration have any measure of the relative effectiveness of foreign assistance when carried out by DOD compared to similar programs carried out by the State Department or USAID?

Answer. The United States faces unprecedented challenges that, more than ever, require the close partnership of civilian and military resources. These challenges warrant enhancing our ability to call upon the capabilities and resources of both the Departments of Defense and State in a manner designed to achieve seamless and rapid cooperation and coordination of efforts. The inclusion of select new authorities in Defense legislation is designed to facilitate cooperation and complement existing comprehensive foreign assistance authorities of the State Department. Together these authorities will enable the United States effectively to work internationally to further our foreign policy goals and in doing so respond to threats against our national security.

The Secretary of State remains firmly in the lead on foreign assistance issues. DOD recognizes it does not have a civilian mission; nor does it desire one. DOD personnel—at all levels—have been ardent advocates for increased civilian capabilities, including through the creation of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. State and USAID are deeply engaged in working to ensure that DOD's programs do not con-

flict with long-term development goals. DOD's growing inclusion of State and USAID in its planning processes is aiding coordination.

Section 1206 and 1207 authorities are extremely valuable tools, and we support their extension and expansion. Section 1206 allows us to respond to emergent threats and opportunities by helping partner nations build capability to conduct counterterrorism operations or to participate in stability operations where U.S. forces are present. Section 1207 makes funds available to the State Department to conduct stability and reconstruction programs.

These authorities preserve the Secretary of State's statutory role with respect to foreign assistance by providing, for example in 1206, for the explicit concurrence of the Secretary of State on all activities; and in 1207, for the transfer of resources to State at the Secretary of State's request. Moreover, Embassies and Country Teams increasingly develop proposals jointly for use of these funds, based on identified capability gaps. In all cases, these activities must have the formal approval of the Chief of Mission in-country before they are transmitted for Secretary of State approval, ensuring the Department of State's continued leadership in the field as well as in Washington, DC.

In terms of the implementation of this assistance, programs funded by section 1207 are implemented by State and USAID, and section 1206 programs are implemented by State and DOD. Both 1206 and 1207 funds are subject not only to the same authorities and limitations (including Leahy human rights restrictions) as funds appropriated to carry out foreign assistance under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act but also the same best practices and performance measures. State and DOD have also taken additional measures to assess these programs; for example, a joint assessment by the State and Defense Department inspector generals of section 1206 activity is ongoing. We look forward to the results of that report.

*Question.* Does DOD view its expanding role in foreign aid as increasingly interconnected with its core mandate? Does this new role reflect the increasing importance of "Phase Zero" activities or "shaping operations," which propose that DOD must become involved in places very far from the traditional battlefield?

Answer. As this question pertains to Department of Defense views, we will ask the Department of Defense to respond.

TRANSFORMATION OF COMBATANT COMMANDS

*Questions.*

Responsibility for U.S. military missions abroad rests with the combatant commands, which plan missions—from disaster response, to humanitarian assistance, to war—and deploy forces to carry them out. Many argue that Combatant Commands are expanding their mandates and taking over the traditional strategic planning and assistance programs done by civilian entities.

a. What is the appropriate role for Combatant Commands? How should this be balanced with civilians' traditional lead in this area? How are traditionally civilian missions going to be weighted as the military revises the Unified Command Plan? (The President approves the Unified Command Plan, which governs the operation of Combatant Commands.)

SOUTHCOM Commander Admiral James Stavridis has described his vision for his combatant command: "It's not because we're trying to take over at SOUTHCOM—It's because we want to be like a big Velcro cube that these other agencies can hook to so we can collectively do what needs to be done in this region." Along those lines, many are concerned that the military will be the central organizing point for U.S. foreign policy.

b. Is this an appropriate role for the military and combatant commands to play? What are the implications if foreign governments view U.S. policy as emanating from a military source?

c. Does having SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM do more basic assistance missions lead to a new "military" footprint in sensitive areas? What are the implications from a civilian perspective?

There is a growing perception in Latin America and other regions that DOD and SOUTHCOM have vastly more resources than do their civilian counterparts. In societies with a history of militaries taking over governments or not being accountable, this sends a very real message that contradicts our spoken messages about the primacy of civilian rule.

d. How do you see this resource imbalance being perceived overseas? Should we be concerned? What message do you think these practices give our friends and allies?

e. Why was the rollout of AFRICOM so flawed and what does this reveal about the process? Why has AFRICOM had such a difficult time integrating civilians? Why is there such broad concern regarding its mission/mandate?

f. What concerns do African countries raise regarding the enlarged military footprint that AFRICOM would bring?

Answer a. Unified Commands, also referred to as Combatant Commands, plan and carry out missions under Title 10 of the United States Code. In today's complex security environment it is increasingly important that traditional defense missions be closely coordinated with foreign assistance activities under the direction of the Secretary of State, who, under Title 22, has responsibility under the President for the conduct of United States foreign policy. The State Department has actively participated in the development of the Department of Defense strategic planning documents and the Theater Campaign Plans of the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). We expect to build on these precedents with the Department of Defense.

Answer b. The U.S. Southern Command is appropriately using its resources to facilitate greater coordination and cooperation among itself and other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government in furtherance of its national defense responsibilities. USSOUTHCOM is accomplishing this goal without any actual or implied expansion of its Title 10 mandate. Balance of the roles of civilian and military organizations must be achieved in accordance with legal authorities. It would be unfortunate and damaging to U.S. interests in promoting democratic governance and civilian control of armed forces if foreign governments were to view U.S. policy as emanating from a military source. The Departments of State and Defense are working together on effective strategic communications to ensure that such misperception does not occur.

Answer c. Combatant Commands have effectively carried out assistance missions throughout the world consistent with U.S. policy and in close coordination with the interagency and U.S. Chiefs of Mission. Those diplomatic representatives, under the direction of the Secretary of State, are well positioned in the countries to which they are assigned to determine how traditional military, or assistance activities involving the military, can best be integrated into overall U.S. efforts by taking into account the sensitivities and perceptions of the local governments and populations. The usefulness of any assistance mission and how it is perceived are factors that are carefully and continuously assessed by the Department of State in coordination with the Department of Defense.

Answer d. The overwhelming preponderance of U.S. assistance remains under the purview of the Secretary of State—and we believe it is perceived as such. In addition to military training missions, the resources of DOD and USSOUTHCOM have been especially useful in disaster relief and in humanitarian assistance initiatives such as the USS *Comfort*'s use as a floating platform by NGOs and non-DOD personnel as well as DOD civilian and military personnel. We believe the message of such deployments is positive, but fully recognize the importance that it is understood in foreign countries that such military missions occur under civilian control of the military. Military assistance in general is consistent with the foreign policy determined by the President and the Secretary of State, and under the supervisory authority of the Chiefs of Mission.

Answer e. Although the rollout of USAFRICOM was planned collaboratively and in detail through an interagency process led by State and DOD, an after-action review revealed that broader consultations involving more African affairs experts would have benefited the process. In addition, USAFRICOM was initially announced before the interagency had fully defined the Command's mission.

Establishing and setting up USAFRICOM is occurring during a time of personnel shortages at the Department of State. Despite these shortages, we are working with DOD to achieve USAFRICOM's objectives, as outlined by the interagency process.

USAFRICOM is a transformational command and early public commentary questioned its role in foreign policy and development. USAFRICOM's current mission and mandate appropriately mention its supportive role regarding both of these functions

Answer f. Some African countries initially expressed concerns that large numbers of American soldiers would translate to an increase in military activity on the continent. We also heard concerns from some Africans that an enlarged U.S. military footprint indicated a militarization of our foreign policy toward that continent. U.S.

Government public diplomacy efforts have sought to allay those concerns by effectively communicating that no significant enlargement of the U.S.'s military presence on the continent is planned. Moreover, our foreign policy objectives toward the continent have not changed.

*Questions.*

The administration requested new DOD authorities—such as section 1206, to train and equip foreign militaries directly from DOD funds, rather than using the traditional Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs overseen by the State Department, and section 1207, which allows DOD to transfer up to $100 million a year to the State Department for reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance, and the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund, which gives commanders their own training program outside of IMET—on the grounds that the strategic environment requires more flexible foreign military assistance options than those currently provided. Congress provided these authorities on a temporary basis, but the administration has sought to make these authorities permanent.

a. What are the differences between how the new DOD train-and-equip program works and the more traditional State Department-funded programs?

b. Are there particular gaps or problems that the new DOD train-and-equip program has highlighted in how the traditional programs for military assistance, like the Foreign Military Financing program, work? What is the administration proposing we do to fix those problems? In other words, if you need a new system because the old one is not working the way it should be, what do you recommend we do to fix the old system, other than to just create a new system?

c. Does the DOD program have to adhere to the same foreign policy and human rights protections that the traditional State Department programs do?

d. Does Congress have sufficient opportunities to review and oversee specific proposals for the newer DOD train-and-equip programs?

Answer a and b. The State Department's support for section 1206 authority was never based on a perceived lack of flexibility or other problems with State authorities like FMF. Since its inception, we have viewed section 1206 as a complement to FMF for building partner capacity in today's security environment. Although FMF authorities are flexible, FMF has been used generally for longer term support for developing a wide range of partner country capabilities (not limited to counterterrorism or stability operations) as well as building and maintaining our bilateral security relationships. Therefore, FMF is requested for individual countries through the normal foreign operations budget process. On the other hand, 1206 funds are provided as an unallocated sum, which makes it much easier to use the funds for new opportunities or unforeseen challenges that arise during the fiscal year in which they are appropriated. Given 1206 authority's complementary nature to programs such as FMF, State continues to request that 1206 be reauthorized beyond FY 2008.

Answer c. All 1206 programs must adhere to the same foreign policy and human rights protections that govern programs such as FMF and IMET. If a country is restricted from receiving FMF or IMET, those same restrictions would apply to 1206 as well.

Answer d. Prior to obligating funds for 1206 projects approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense, we are required to provide the Congress with a 15-day notification. To date, each 1206 congressional notification has been followed by detailed briefings to ensure that Congress is fully aware of each proposed program.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

*Questions.*

By law the State Department plays the primary role in overseeing foreign assistance activities, but many argue that DOD dominates decisionmaking because of its size, planning resources, and regional organization. In particular, many note a gap in State's ability to supervise and review DOD regional projects. SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM both envision the posting of a number of very senior civilians in their hierarchy to help deconflict activities and gain their home agencies' support for them.

a. What steps can State take to better oversee and review DOD activities?

b. Is State really prepared to put a significant number of Senior Foreign Service and Senior Executive Service officers in the Combatant Commands? Should it place even higher officials—say, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State—in each Command?

c. Is State prepared to let them represent the Department's interests in a broad array of policy and operational decisionmaking? How would that affect other interagency mechanisms for which State is responsible in the Washington context?

DOD and State Department officials assert that the two departments work together to develop a consensus on all DOD projects and programs.

e. Has the Secretary of State ever vetoed a DOD program?

f. How often does the State Department, at some level, object to a DOD proposal?

g. Has a program ever been withheld because of State Department concerns?

h. Are ambassadors fully equipped and prepared to coordinate military priorities with political and economic objectives?

i. Do all ambassadors have a full understanding of the military's role and process?

j. Does the State Department believe it efficient and effective to have an ambassador's approval/veto decision on a proposed plan substitute for a Washington-based interagency consultation with a State Department signoff?

k. Please identify, in your view, the three most successful section 1206 projects, or series of projects; the reasons such projects were uniquely successful; and the lessons from such projects that might be applied to improving similar programs funded through the Department of State.

l. Please describe in detail any differences between the development and execution, following the apportionment of appropriated funds, of a Foreign Military Sales case funded by Foreign Military Financing funds and the development and execution of a project funded by section 1206 funds. Which of those differences, in your view, make it necessary that such projects be funded by the Department of Defense, instead of the Department of State?

Answer a. Active State Department oversight of DOD assistance activities is essential for the effective conduct of U.S. foreign policy. In addition to formal approval mechanisms for section 1206 (and other) programs, State Department participation in the development of DOD strategic planning guidance and involvement in the development of the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Theater Campaign Plans are important steps toward more effective coordination in this regard. The State Department also includes the broader interagency, including DOD, in our own planning processes and strategies, including the pilot Country Assistance Strategies (CAS), which helps ensure that DOD and the interagency understand and are aware of the foreign policy and foreign assistance priorities. The assignment of State Department officers to USAFRICOM as Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities and Director of Outreach provides embedded State Department expertise for the planning and conduct of civil-military activities, and could be a template for USSOUTHCOM and other Commands that may transition to more interagency-focused structures. The longstanding practice of having Foreign Policy Advisers at regional Commands, including USAFRICOM, provides Department of State insight to the commander and facilitates Department of State involvement in Command activities.

Answer b. Due to personnel constraints, the State Department is unlikely at this time able to detail as many senior or other active service personnel as SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have requested. "Deputy Assistant Secretary" is a position title which is filled by officers within a range of ranks that could be detailed to the Combatant Commands.

Answer c. The Department of State is working with the Department of Defense and other agencies to improve coordination at all levels so that USG assistance, messages, and interactions abroad are consistent with U.S. policy, well-integrated across all agencies, and make the best possible use of scarce resources. State personnel serving in a Combatant Command or with another interagency partner may exercise the authority and responsibilities of their host organizations, but are not empowered to exercise the authorities and responsibilities of the Department of State.

Answer e. The Secretary of State has never vetoed a 1206 program. The Department of State works closely with DOD throughout the proposal review process to ensure that only proposals in line with U.S. foreign policy goals are funded. In addition, U.S. embassies and ambassadors are heavily involved in the nomination process. Together, these actions have thus far obviated the need for a Secretary of State veto.

Answer f and g. It is difficult to quantify the amount or extent to which State and DOD have disagreements about 1206 projects. It is a continually collaborative

effort, with regular meetings and phone calls at the action officer and DAS levels to resolve disagreements. This collegial back-and-forth discussion between the various bureaus with equities both at State and at DOD has served to strengthen this interagency coordination and collaboration. Programs that do not have the concurrence of both State and DOD do not go forward.

Answer h, i, and j. All 1206 projects must be approved by the ambassador or country team of the proposed recipient country. As the President's senior representative in country, the ambassador has the authority to terminate ongoing programs. Should the ambassador have concerns over the merits or timing of an assistance program which the combatant commander feels is urgent, the ambassador's views would prevail. 1206 facilitates USG strategic coherence by requiring the field and Washington to continuously coordinate from proposal initiation through execution. Combatant Commanders and Chiefs of Mission jointly define what assistance they think countries need to meet emerging threats and opportunities, while in Washington there is unparalleled State-DOD integration. Proposals can only proceed with concurrence from both Secretaries, and we provide clear and transparent information to Congress early and often throughout the process.

Answer k. In a short span of time, section 1206 authority has enabled the United States to develop its partner's military capabilities to address emerging and urgent counterterrorism threats and opportunities in places as far ranging as Lebanon, Sao Tome and Principe, and Yemen. Lebanon's 1206 program, which began in FY 2006, provides mobility support to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as it undertakes its counterterrorism mission. In FY 2007, Lebanon received small arms ammunition, weapons, night vision devices, and body armor. Perhaps the most visible impact of the 1206 program in Lebanon was the transport of 200 EDA 2.5-ton trucks from Germany to Beirut in 2007. The trucks were more modern versions of the 2.5-ton trucks in the LAF inventory. 1206 funding was used to rapidly pack and transport the EDA vehicles, which were immediately put into service deploying, repositioning, and providing logistics support and supplies to units around the country.

The 1206 projects for Sao Tome and Principe (STP) support the development of a regional maritime awareness capability (RMAC). Specifically, 1206 funded radars, a long-range surveillance camera, Automated Information System receivers and towers, computers, and communications equipment to enable the STP Coast Guard to begin to monitor illicit traffic in the country's territorial waters and the economic exclusion zone. Until the arrival of RMAC in February 2007, the STP Coast Guard was unaware of the type and quantity of illicit activities occurring in STP waters, or arriving/departing from its coasts.

In Yemen, 1206 projects have focused on enhancing the capabilities and capacity of the Yemeni Armed Forces to prevent cross-border arms trafficking and to suppress terrorist activity. The primary recipients of 1206 support have been the Yemeni Army 11th Brigade and the Yemeni Ministry of Defense's primary logistics support command, known as the Central Repair Base. The Yemeni Special Operations Forces have begun to take on an expanded counterterrorism role. Specifically, they have begun to back up the newly formed Yemeni Counter Terrorism Unit in operations where additional capabilities and capacity are needed.

Answer l. Questions regarding the differences between FMS cases funded by FMF versus 1206, would be best directed to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), our implementing partner for all FMS sales, regardless of the funding source.

*Question.* For fiscal years 2007 and 2008, please summarize, by number and by funding total, the section 1206 projects formally proposed, and the number and funding total of such projects ultimately notified to Congress. Of those, how many proposals, totaling to what amount, were originated by State Department officials, instead of the Combatant Commands?

Answer. In FY 2007, we received 75 proposals totaling over $775 million. Approximately $280 million of the available $300 million authority was used for 33 programs for 43 countries. The $20 million not executed was not due to a lack of demand but because of congressional concerns about three of the projects submitted at the end of the fiscal year. In FY 2008, we received 138 proposals totaling over $1.2 billion for the $300 million available. To date, 33 projects totaling approximately $288 million have been approved by both Secretaries. While in the initial year of section 1206 projects were markedly separated between those proposed by the Combatant Commands and those by State entities, projects are now formulated jointly by the State and DOD members of the country teams.

*Question.* The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364) required the concurrence of the Secretary of State section 1206 projects.

a. Please summarize, by number and by funding total, the projects in which the Secretary of State has not concurred.

b. Please identify and explain any differences between the length of time it has taken equipment and training to be provided in Lebanon using section 1206 funds, and the length of time it has taken equipment and training provided using the $220 million provided in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110–28), as well as an update on the status of the latter.

Answer a. The Secretary of State has concurred with all implemented section 1206 projects. Any projects on which State and DOD do not concur are eliminated during the vetting process and, therefore, never reach the level of the Secretary for consideration.

Answer b. Questions regarding the difference in execution time between FMS cases for Lebanon funded by FMF versus 1206 would be best directed to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), our implementing partner for all Foreign Military Sales, regardless of their funding source.

*Question.* A number of countries face destabilizing internal and external forces, but only a few get section 1206 and section 1207 assistance. What are the criteria used to determine this selection? Is a country such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, which confronts internal negative forces that influence regional security challenges as well, a good candidate for assistance under these programs?

Are there still countries in the world that could become "failed states" without that being a threat to U.S. security?

Answer. In exercising 1206 authority, a joint State/DOD team assesses all of the proposals individually to ensure the criteria for section 1206—to enhance the foreign military's ability to conduct counterterrorism operations or to participate in or support stability operations in which U.S. forces are present—are met. The proposals are then prioritized based on foreign policy goals and the ability to obligate funds in a timely manner. A legal review of the proposals is conducted to identify possible restrictions and legislative affairs reviews to identify any significant congressional opposition to these proposals. A country is not eliminated as a possible recipient of 1206 unless there are legal or policy restrictions against the receipt of similar funds.

There is a clear linkage between the economic, political, and social development of foreign countries and our own national security because poorly developed and failed states can serve as a harbor for terrorists, as we saw in Afghanistan. We must use all foreign assistance, from developmental to security, to strengthen our national security. In particular, we must use our foreign assistance wisely to effectively prosecute the war on terror.

---

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY SECRETARY JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

*Question.* Many observers have warned that DOD, with large budgets but little development expertise, is unraveling any attempts at achieving integrated and comprehensive development country strategies. For example, DOD is quite capable and willing to build schools, but this may occur in areas that do not have sufficient teachers or books.

Conversely, the State Department and USAID have the expertise but lack the resources, making them unable to keep pace with DOD activities. For example, DOD can strengthen and professionalize foreign militaries, while the State Department and USAID are unable to put enough resources into strengthening democracy and governance. The result has implications for civilian control of militaries especially in countries with a spotty history in civilian-military relations.

This issue goes beyond whether individual 1206 projects are jointly approved by State and DOD, but rather, speaks to our ability to design country strategies that make sense for both the host country and takes advantage of a U.S. whole of government approach.

Would you please comment?

Answer. U.S. Government (USG) foreign assistance programs are implemented by a wide range of departments and agencies with differing resource levels and areas of expertise. For these programs to be most effective and to take full advantage of synergies in our assistance, agencies must work together in a coordinated fashion.

Through the Development Policy Coordination Committee, an interagency group that meets monthly under the chairmanship of Henrietta Fore, the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator, the administration is working to coordinate "whole of government" foreign assistance efforts. Specifically, we are piloting a strategic planning process whereby stakeholders from across the USG—not just State and USAID—are working collaboratively in Washington and in the field to develop country-specific foreign assistance strategies. This interagency-approved Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) process is being tested in 10 countries around the world.

A CAS will articulate the USG's top four or five foreign assistance priorities in a given country within a 5-year period. The CAS process provides a forum for USG departments and agencies to discuss their current and planned programs in a given country so that each agency's programs can be fully leveraged and maximized and brought into closer alignment with the host country's conditions and its own definition of development needs and priorities. The CAS will be a public document to communicate the top USG foreign assistance priorities to our host country government partners, other donors, key stakeholders in civil society, including the private sector, and others. As the pilot phase of the CAS wraps up this fall, we will be working with our interagency colleagues to refine the concept.

*Question.* With the addition of section 1206 authority to train and equip foreign militaries, DOD has another tool in addition to the State Department's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. It has been argued that 1206 authority was needed because the State Department lacked the flexibility and speed necessary in some foreign environments.

Please describe the fundamental differences between the FMF and 1206 programs, in terms of both objectives and implementation mechanics. If there are problems in the management of the FMF program, are we taking steps to fix them?

Answer. The State Department's support for section 1206 authority was never based on a perceived lack of flexibility with State authorities like FMF. Since its inception, we have viewed section 1206 as a complement to FMF for building partner capacity in today's security environment. Although FMF authorities are flexible, FMF has historically been used generally for longer term support for developing a wide range of partner country capabilities (not limited to counterterrorism or stability operations) as well as for building and maintaining our bilateral security relationships and it is normally in support of country-specific programs. FMF clearly remains an authority of the Secretary of State. The State Department considers input from the Defense Department when formulating FMF requests, while relying on the Defense Department for actual execution of FMF programs.

On the other hand, 1206 funds are appropriated by Congress to the Department of Defense to address emergent or unforeseen counterterrorism opportunities and challenges that present themselves, or for use in building the capacity of partner nations currently operating alongside U.S. forces in stability operations. As such, these funds are not specifically allocated to countries upon appropriation, but are available as needs arise during the year. Proposals are generated by both departments and are vetted through an interdepartmental process that ultimately requires the approval/concurrence of both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. Inherent in the proposal process is the requirement to identify the linkage, if any, to FMF in subsequent years.

Given 1206 authority's complementary nature to programs such as FMF, State continues to request that 1206 be reauthorized beyond FY 2008.

*Question.* Several recent studies have recommended that ambassadors be given more authority, or that existing authorities be clarified, to improve their ability to manage interagency coordination in the field. Do you believe this is necessary? If so, how would it be achieved?

Answer. The existing Chief of Mission authorities are robust. Under section 207(a) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927) the Chief of Mission to a foreign country has full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and employees under the command of a United States area military commander).

Nonetheless, the global war on terror brings into focus circumstances warranting seamless coordination among all USG actors overseas. I agree that it is always useful to reaffirm the need for the concurrence of the Secretary of State or the Chief of Mission when carrying out activities overseas. For example, authorities for reconstruction and stabilization assistance and the Active and Standby Response Corps

reaffirm and elaborate on the Secretary of State's primary responsibilities and authorities.

*Question.* The Commanders Emergency Response Program has been valuable to our commanders in the field. Please describe the prospects or value of an enhanced Ambassadors Fund to take advantage of opportunities to strengthen U.S. engagement?

Answer. One of the primary goals of the Secretary's reform efforts is to bring U.S. foreign policy objectives into closer alignment with resource allocations and to maintain coherency across country programs. We have introduced a much stronger country focus to both budget and implementation decisions so as to more effectively link with the efforts of many countries and organizations to successfully impact the lives of millions of people around the world.

Ambassador's Funds can be useful tools in certain situations, and the Department has utilized such funds to a limited extent. We note, however, that certain aspects of small funds such as an Ambassadors' Funds can actually be problematic. Each grant, contract, and cooperative agreement that is entered into (no matter how small) must be reviewed for legal and other issues; the disbursement of funds must be tracked as well as the reporting of results. The amount of management and staff time that is required for numerous small grants must be a consideration in deciding whether to establish an Ambassador's Fund.

○